Abstract
All nations strive to achieve self-sufficiency in the development and production of military hardware to attain strategic independence and enhance their standing within the community of nations. While India is experiencing economic growth and exercising considerable diplomatic influence, it remains the third-largest importer of military equipment, a factor that could hinder its aspirations to become a major global power. Despite numerous initiatives such as ‘Make in India’, self-reliance in defence production remains an elusive goal. This study examines the shortcomings in India’s defence production and proposes a roadmap to achieve self-reliance in defence manufacturing by adopting industry best practices aligned with strategic concerns and desired defence policies. The article offers recommendations to assist developing countries, including India, in accelerating their efforts to achieve genuine self-sufficiency in defence production.
Introduction
The state is responsible for maintaining national security, and to achieve that, it needs a strong military, which can only be sustained if the state develops and manufactures the weapons and equipment it needs.1 In addition to the security concerns, developing nations’ pursuits for self-reliance are also motivated by power, wealth and prestige.2 Power to exert control over other countries, wealth resulting from exports, helping technology spread to other industries, and prestige due to a confluence of circumstances, namely improving diplomatic and economic connections and technical advancements. A nation cannot be heavily reliant on foreign armament supplies if it hopes to be regarded as one of the great nations, as this not only reduces its military vulnerabilities also undermines its national power by curtailing its freedom of action.3
However, for the developing countries, the defence industry presents a formidable challenge; it requires higher than average technological competence and a steep learning curve,4 which often acts as a significant barrier to entry.5 Defence products are complex systems unlike mass-produced goods, requiring mastery of production capabilities, system design, project management, system engineering and integration.6 Regardless of the challenges faced, developing countries continue their efforts and build capabilities with support of foreign partners and indigenous breakthroughs.7
India’s pursuit of achieving self-reliance in arms development and production has been a long-cherished dream since its independence. It invested heavily in the creation of a Defence Industrial Base (DIB) comprising a mix of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs), Ordnance Factories and the Defence Research and Development Organisation.8 India continues to focus on developing its DIB by supporting a number of long-term weapons development programs9, irrespective of the fact that many such earlier attempts lacked the quality when compared to similar products available in international markets.10 To further self-reliance agenda, a slew of measures has been taken by the government, which include amongst many, increased participation of the Indian private sector, small and medium enterprises, and including tapping into the start-up ecosystem.
Even after continued focus, support and investment, the DPSUs and the private companies have not been able to successfully provide the arms needed by the Indian defence forces, severely impacting the self-reliance goals of the government.11 Faced with this reality, India has been forced to follow a middle path by continuing direct imports of high-technology advanced weapons with simultaneous sourcing of low-technology and mass-produced products via domestic production, supplemented by licensed production. The indigenous component is primarily focussed on the production of spares, upgrades and life extensions, while direct imports of main equipment and associated technologies are used to fill critical gaps, along with projects wherein indigenous programs have failed.12 India remains the largest importer of major arms between 2018 and 2022, accounting for 11.0 per cent of the global market (Figure 1) with its arms exports share being less than 1.0 per cent (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Market share in the import of major arms
between 2018 and 2022
Source: Statista, 2023
Indian Policy Domain
The official policy domain on the subject in India is strewn with committee papers, directives, annual reports, and answers to parliamentary questions. The degree of information contained in each varies depending on the context, reference and relevance. The Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP)/Defence Acquisition Procedures (DAP) lay out the guidelines for capital acquisitions for the armed forces. Figure 3 provides and overview of the major reports and policy documents along with the key recommendations from 1991 to 2023, which have influenced shaping of the Indian DIB.
Figure 2: Market share of the leading exporters of major weapons between 2018 and 2022
Source: Statista 2023
Industrial Policy 1991‘ n Self-reliance goal
n Investment I R&D
n Licence for defence industries
n FDI allowed
n Technology and foreign consultant allowed
n Made a mention of private sector in defence sector for better competition, but preserve the sector for DPSUs
Group of Ministers n Defence management needs to be
Report 2000/01 efficient, resilient and responsive
n Dysfunction amongst DPSU, DRDO and users
n No synergy between academic research and government
n Government policy making happens in vacuum
n Recommended-level playing field to private sector, push for defence exports and technology assessments within the country
Kargil Committee n Encourage private sector in defence manufacturing
Report 2005 n Use defence offsets to get technology and investment in
the sector
n Synergy between DRDO, DPSUs and OFB for hi-tech capability
n Armed forces to form a 15-year acquisition plan to be shared with industry
n Private sector to be treated at par with DPSUs
n Participation of SMEs in defence manufacturing to be increased
n Defence R&D to be done by both DRDO and private industry
n Defence offsets to be utilised
Sisodia Committee n Domestic defence industry should be involved from the
Report 2007 beginning to be able to map what capability industry has and what needs to Jbe acquired from abroad
n Cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken for all indigenous development projects
n Industry should be involved in Requirement-Formulation
n Department of Defence production to also look after private defence companies in addition to DPSUs
n Defence industrialisation Policy to be formulated
n Strategy for defence exports
Defence Procurement DPP 2002
Procedures DPP 2005
DPP 2006
DPP 2008
DPP 2011
DPP 2013
DPP 2016
DAP 2020
DAP 2020 (Update 2021, 2023, 2024)
Miscellaneous Policies FDI limit 74 per cent under automatic route and 100 per cent with government approval
Security Instruction for Licenced Defence Companies
Defence Export promotion Policy – Munition list and dual use products
Use of government test facilities by private defence companies allowed Innovation for defence excellence. Start-up challenge
Policy for Indigenisation and Spares and Components used in defence platforms
Positive lists for indigenisation
Figure 3
Innovation Ecosystem
For a better knowledge of any country’s innovation processes and invention ecosystem, patent analysis has been widely employed.13 Data from patents shows funding for research and development and, most crucially, forecasts future technological advancement.14 In order to achieve this, the study looked at two patent databases: The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The former has been used to examine the patents filed in technology domain. To better visualise the statistics and compare India’s situation with established and emerging nations, China and US’s data have been presented alongside those of India (Figure 4a). India has the lowest number of patent files overall (Figure 4a) and in emerging technologies (Figure 4c), from 2000 to 2021.
Figure 4a: Total Number of Patents Filed by India, China and US
Figure 4b: Total Number of Patents Filed by China in Emerging Technologies from Year 2000 to 2019
Figure 4c: Total Number of Patents Filed by India in Emerging Technologies from 2000 to 2019
Source15
In the military domain, referring to the International Patent Classification, section F: Classifications F41 A to J and F42 B to D are for military products. The OECD database from 1999 to 2017 (Figure 5), shows total number of patents filed by India. The data is indicates that the total number of patents filed by Indians in military field remained quite low from 1999 to 2017.
Reference Date Priority Date
Patents office & Patents Families Patent Application Filed under PCT
Reference Country Inventor (s)’s country (ies) of residence
Country India
Unit Number, 2017
41a FUNCTIONAL FEATURES OR DETAILS COMMON TO BOTH SMALL ARMS AND ORDNANCE eg CANNONS: MOUNTINGS FOR SMALL ARMS OR ORDNANCE [5]
41b WEAPON FOR PROJECTING MISSILES WITHOUT USE OF EXPLOSIVE OR COMBUSTIBLE PROPELLANT CHARGE: WEAPONS NOT OTHERWISE PROVODED FOR
41c SMALL ARMS eg PISTOLS OR RIFLES
41f APPARATUS FOR LAUNCHING PROJECTILES OR MISSILES FROM BARRELS eg CANNONS (SMALL ARMS F41C0; LAUNCERS FOR ROCKETS OR TORPEDOES; HARPOON GUNS
41g WEAPON SIGHTS; AIMING
41h ARMOUR; ARMOUR TURRETS; ARMORED OR ARMED VEHICLES; MEANS OF ATTACK OR DEFENCE eg CAMOFLAUGE IN GENERAL
41j TARGETS; TARGET RANGES; BULET CATCHERS
42b EXPLOSIVE CHARGES eg FOR BLASTING; FIREWORKS; AMMUNITION
42c AMMUNITION FUZES
42d BLASTING
Offsets
Offsets are a term used by the military to describe a kind of countertrade that involves commercial technological partnerships, involving licensed manufacture, knowledge transfer, skill development, training, and other forms of industry involvement, subcontracts, etc., that are connected to the procurement of a specific weapon.16 In India, direct offsets were first introduced as a policy in the DPP 2005 and were meant to act as a catalyst for India’s attempt towards self-reliance in defence production. The policy compelled foreign arms manufacturers to source or invest 30.0 per cent of the value of purchased goods (in ‘Buy’ and ‘Buy and Make’ categorisations, where value of purchase exceeded INR 300 Cr, which was subsequently increased to INR 2,000 Cr) from Indian industries.
Even though they are a politically sensible strategy, offsets fall short of expectations. Data and economic theory both contradict the idea that offset agreements boost the economies of the importing nations.17 The benefits of offsets as a component of a developing country’s acquisition and industrial policy have also been analysed by many researchers, wherein, more or less it has been generally concluded that, while raising the price of purchase, offsets have not been shown to be advantageous.18 The expense of the defence equipment supplier meeting its offset commitments will be passed on to the customer in the form of increased costs. On the other hand, the military industries of buying nations will become offset reliant and, if the contract expires, find themselves unable to handle new prospects and a competitive market.19 Due to the fact that offsets cannot, on their own, overcome structural shortcomings and human resource limitations of the receiving nation, they have failed producers in their attempts to rise to the level of system-wide self-sufficiency and have failed to build a single global military firm.20
Defence offset experience in India has not been positive. The Standing Committee on Defence of Parliament noted that, after reviewing offsets since 2005, 56 offset contracts totalling around USD 13.03 bn were signed between 2008 and 2027. However, only USD 88 mn of these had been authenticated as of 2017, but by 2021, that number had risen to USD 1,928 mn. Only USD 1,928 mn of the entire USD 3,569 mn in offsets that overseas suppliers claimed to have discharged have been approved by the audit. The early findings of the Controller and Auditors General of India’s study on the ‘Management of Defence Offsets’ point to a terrible state of affairs in terms of offset conceptualisation and execution. It emphasises the policy’s incapacity to obtain cutting-edge military technology or, at the very least, production capabilities. The research highlights the Ministry of Defence’s inefficiencies, excessive red tape, and lack of qualified employees, while highlighting the fact that, there has been no technology transfer or investment in Research and Development (R&D).21
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
The term FDI refers to cross-border investments where a resident of one nation buys stock in a firm that is situated in a different country.22 In addition to supplying desperately needed finance, FDI also permits the transfer of beneficial technology and know-how, which boosts the local economy.23 FDI was not authorised in the defence industry until 2001, after which 26.0 per cent of it was granted via an automatic process.24 The primary motivation for allowing FDI in the defence industry was that it would entice international suppliers to import technologies, enhancing domestic defence production.25 The FDI ceiling has continuously increased since 2001 and is now 74.0 per cent via the automatic method and 100.0 per cent with government permission.26
Increase of the FDI limit by India has not had the desired effect, as its inflow in defence sector remains almost negligible when compared to other sectors. Figure 6 provides the cumulative and year-wise FDI in the defence sector from year 2005 to 2020. Even after raising the cap to 74.0 per cent, the abysmally low FDI has contradicted the reasons offered by the Kelkar committee and even industry organisations, who anticipated fast improvement.27
Figure 6: FDI inflow Defence Sector
Source28
Defence Industrial Policy
India does not have a Defence Industrial Policy (DIP), and the policy guidelines are interwoven in the defence acquisition procedures. Even after repeated recommendations by various committees including the Sisodia Committee29, Government of India has not promulgated a separate DIP. While India strives to have a credible DIB, it must be built around a policy which considers a wide range of factors, including size, ownership, structure, and most significantly, a R&D foundation. Any defence industrial policy must be guided by industrial base capabilities, military requirements, and best value for taxpayers. The goal is to create a sustainable environment that consistently meets stated security objectives.30 The defence industrial policy has to formulated in the context of strengthening military capabilities versus supporting international competitiveness in the face of liberalising markets.31
Figure 7a and 7b demonstrate how different DPPs have affected India’s export and import of weapons as well as the overall number of military licences given to Indian firms. The analysis indicates that there has not been much of an impact on the ground from frequent modifications to the DPP and its related industrial policies. The defence exports have remained very low, defence imports have remained very high and the number of defence industrial licenses issued have not shown any significant increase. Furthermore, only 30.0 per cent of companies which have received license have commenced production. Also, measuring impact in terms of offsets, of the total of USD 13.03 bn offsets signed since 2008 onwards, only 14.7 per cent (USD 1.928 bn) have been verified.
Figure 7a: Defence Exports and Imports (in $ millions)
issued from 2001 to 2018.
Figure 7b: Total defence Industrial licenses
Source – GoI DPIIT website32;
Total licenses issued till 2021 are 539 to 333 companies
(Source - Rajya Sabha un-starred question no. 669 answered
on 26 Jul 2021)
Analysis
It is amply clear that India’s quest to create a credible DIB by India has not had the desired result. The majority of India’s efforts at indigenisation are driven by foreign acquisition. Additionally, a severely distorted, uneven playground has been created as a result of the acquisition policy’s recurrent revisions (once every two years), which were implemented with practically no impact assessment studies. Considering procurement timelines of at least five years for any major procurement, this translates to a minimum of two DPPs per acquisition. Maintaining continuity of policy between inception to acquisition is important as it displays coherence of purpose, process and method33, thereby, reducing uncertainty, costs and risks for both foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and local industry.
Additionally, large high-ticket purchases are being made through Inter-Government Agreements, which bypasses the strict requirements of local involvement and indigenisation content in the DAP that any Indian business or its foreign partner must follow. The fact that most of these purchases, involving Government-to-Government contracts, are allocated to the DPSUs, further demoralises local businesses, like the recently concluded contract for local production of AK-203 rifles from Russia, being manufactured via the Ordnance Factory. As a result, the DPSUs continue to dominate the Indian defence manufacturing sector, making it difficult for any indigenous companies to compete. A healthy, impartial defence manufacturing ecosystem is a crucial part of the nation’s DIB, ‘For’ the state and not ‘Of’ the state.34
The acquisition policy outlines the steps for what to purchase, how to acquire it, and whom to buy it from, but it completely ignores the cost-benefit analysis of such choices. It is difficult to establish defence industrial autarky, especially when considering the financial burden it places on the country. An investment in defence results in a reduction of funds available for welfare, health, and education, each of which directly impacts voting behaviour, particularly within a democratic system. India’s aspiration for defence manufacturing self-sufficiency is unique, as it disregards economic factors. The procurement categorisation decisions (Buy, Buy and Make or Make) are based on indigenous capability development rather than financial logic (short and long term). It is necessary to re-evaluate the defence industrialisation process with a more pragmatic and selective approach. All defence-related choices should be managed effectively, with a cost-benefit analysis taking into account both the short- and long-term effects, and through the lens of affordability.35
Although FDI is a crucial instrument for integrating the economies of different countries, it is driven by the need for profits for the investment company. Any company engaging in FDI would be in competition with local companies; thus, unless the investing company is given an edge over local competitors, it will not participate. Furthermore, in India’s FDI policy, there is a difference in objectives between the government and foreign manufacturers regarding technology transfer and support for local industry. While technology acquisition is one of the key goals of India’s FDI strategy, OEMs wish to preserve this area, as the result of costly R&D, technology grants the OEM exclusivity and control, which are lost, if it is sold or parted with.36 Further, the ‘Make in India’ strategy and the new Defence Acquisition Procedures (DAP)37 give priority to local acquisition. This further, discourages international OEMs from investing in India as a result of this excessively proclaimed favouritism towards local industry, which raises the risks associated with their investment.
A nation’s pursuit of achieving self-sufficiency in the defence manufacturing industry must be supported by a well-defined DIP. When examined in isolation, procurement decisions may seem advantageous for a specific acquisition; however, only when they are considered within the context of a larger DIP framework, can their implications and chances of success for the nation’s goal of achieving autarky be evaluated, along with any justifications for deviating from the best course, if applicable.38
India’s attempt to employ offsets has failed; yet, they have continued to rule India’s acquisition landscape since 2005. The refusal to recognise the issue and conduct an effect study of the policy has further denied users of an evidence-based solution that might have modified the policy in accordance with the changing dynamics and demands of the nation.39 India’s aspirations to become self-sufficient are being hampered by the MoD’s unwillingness to conduct an offset audit and its continued practise of restricting data access to academics. India’s offset policy undoubtedly requires reform, but without comprehensive data and rigorous analysis, achieving this will be challenging.
Conclusion
Developing nations aspiring to establish a reliable DIB must carefully balance their immediate demands with current industrial capabilities, future needs, and available funding, considering all these factors over the long term. Short-term, poorly conceived actions and policies, implemented without qualitative data and analysis, will not only result in financial losses but also extend the timeline for achieving genuine self-sufficiency in the defence manufacturing industry. It is essential for developing nations to formulate a coordinated strategy that integrates cross-domain capabilities with policy continuity. Achieving self-reliance in defence manufacturing carries an economic cost, making affordability and the efficient management of available resources critical. Any national strategy aimed at promoting defence indigenisation must be rooted in a robust policy framework that fosters close collaboration with the private sector to build an ecosystem of innovation and sustainability.
Endnotes
1 Richard A Bitzinger, “New Ways of Thinking about the Global Arms Industry: Dealing with ‘Limited Autarky’”, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2015), no. 3 (2015): 210.
2 Hüseyin Baðcý and Çaðlar Kurç, “Turkey’s Strategic Choice: Buy or Make Weapons?”, Defence Studies 17, no. 1 (2017): 38–62,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2016.1262742
3 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India”, Asian Politics and Policy 7, no. 4 (2015): 531–53.
https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12221.
4 Joosung J. Lee and Hyungseok Yoon, “A Comparative Study of Technological Learning and Organizational Capability Development in Complex Products Systems: Distinctive Paths of Three Latecomers in Military Aircraft Industry”, Research Policy 44, no. 7 (2015): 1296–1313.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.03.007.
5 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Revisiting Armaments Production in Southeast Asia: New Dreams, Same Challenges”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 3 (2013): 369–94.
https://doi.org/10.1355/cs35-3c.
6 Mike Hobday, “Innovation in Complex Products and System”, Elsevier, 2000, 793–804.
7 Lee and Yoon, “A Comparative Study of Technological Learning and Organizational Capability Development in Complex Products Systems: Distinctive Paths of Three Latecomers in Military Aircraft Industry”
8 Laxman Kumar Behera, “Indian Defence Industry: An Agenda for Making in India”, IDSA, vol. 53, 2016.
9 Tai Ming Cheung, “Commentary on Asian Arms Industries and Impact on Military Capabilities”, Defence Studies 2436, no. Jul (Jul 3, 2017): 1–5.
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10 Bitzinger, “Comparing Defense Industry Reforms in China and India”.
11 Laxman Kumar Behera, “Perspectives Focus India’s Defence Public Sector Undertakings/ : A Performance Analysis”, Journal of Defence Studies 3, no. 4 (2009): 118–30.
12 Manjeet S. Pardesi and Ron Matthews, “India’s Tortuous Road to Defence- Industrial Self-Reliance”, Defense and Security Analysis 23, no. 4 (2007): 419–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751790701752451.
13 Sadao Nagaoka, Kazuyuki Motohashi, and Akira Goto, “Patent Statistics as an Innovation Indicator”, Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, 1st ed., vol. 2 (Elsevier B.V., 2010).
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14 Sungchul Choi et al., “SAO Network Analysis of Patents for Technology Trends Identification: A Case Study of Polymer Electrolyte Membrane Technology in Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cells”, Scientometrics 88, no. 3 (2011): 863–883.
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16 Bitzinger, “Revisiting Armaments Production in Southeast Asia: New Dreams, Same Challenges”.
17 Jurgen Brauer and J. Paul Dunne, “Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets, Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy, and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets”, 2011.
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18 Jurgen Brauer and JP Dunne, “Arms Trade Offsets and Development”, International Conference on Economics and Security 35, no. 1 (2005): 14–24.
19 Arne Martin Fevolden and Kari Tvetbråten, “Defence Industrial Policy – a Sound Security Strategy or an Economic Fallacy?”, Defence Studies 16, no. 2 (2016): 176–92.
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20 Stephen Martin, “The Economics of Offsets”, 1996.
21 India CAG, “CAG Report 20 of 2019 on Management of Defence Offset”, 2020.
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22 Investopedia, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Definition”, n.d.
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23 Laura Alfaro, “Foreign Direct Investment and Growth - Does Sector Matter”, Harvard Business School 53, no. 1 (2003): 1689–99.
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24 Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (Government of India), “Press Note 4 (2001 Series) Revision of Existing Sectoral Guidelines and Equity Cap on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Including Investment by Non Resident Indians (NRIs) and Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCBs)”, no. 4 (2001): 2.
25 India Ministry of Defence, “Stranding Committee of Defence - Lokh Sabha 2020/21- Procurement Policy Znd Defence Planning”, Parliament Report 1, no. 1 (2021): 1–64.
http://www.nutricion.org/publicaciones/pdf/prejuicios_y_verdades_ sobre_ grasas.pdf%0Ahttps://www.colesterolfamiliar.org/formacion/guia.pdf%0A
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27 India Ministry of Defence, “Standing Committee on Defence Report - Indiginisation of Defence Production”, Parliament Report 1930, no. Nov 2006 (2008): 0–32.
28 https://dpiit.gov.in/publications/fdi-statistics
29 Laxman Kumar Behera, “INDIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE - IDSA Monograph Series, 2013.
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31 Martin Blom, Fulvio Castellacci, and Arne Martin, “Technological Forecasting & Social Change The Trade-off between Innovation and Defense Industrial Policy/ : A Simulation Model Analysis of the Norwegian Defense Industry”, Technological Forecasting & Social Change 80, no. 8 (2013): 1579–92.
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32 https://dpiit.gov.in/sites/default/files/dil_13July2018.pdf
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34 Marc R. Devore, “Arms Production in the Global Village: Options for Adapting to Defense-Industrial Globalization”, Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 532–72.
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35 Ron Mathews, The Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53, 2019.
36 Imad A Moosa, “FDI - Theory, Evidence and Practice”, 2002.
37 Ministry of Defence, “Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020”.
38 Keith Hartley, “Chapter 16 Industrial Policies in the Defense Sector”, Handbook of Defense Economics 1 (1995): 459–89.
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39 India Ministry of Defence, “Stranding Committee of Defence - Lokh Sabha 2018/19”, Parliament Report 1940, no. 21 (2019).
@Cdr Raghvendra Chaturvedi (Retd) is an ex naval officer, commissioned in 1991. He is an alumnus of Naval Academy and Defence Service Staff College.
#Dr M Venkatesan is a Professor in Organisational Behaviour/Human Resource Management and Strategy at Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Delhi.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIV, No. 637, July-September 2024.
Author : Commander Raghavendra Chaturvedi (Retd),Dr M Venkatesan,
Category : Journal
Pages : 409 | Price : ₹CLIV/637 | Year of Publication : July 2024-September 2024