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Be extremely subtle even to the point of formlessness

- Sun Tzu

Abstract

This article delves into the complexities of China’s strategic culture and military stratagem, exploring their implications for India and the broader Indo-Pacific region. Through a nuanced analysis of China’s historical and cultural roots, the article examines the country’s approach to warfare, diplomacy, and economic development. It highlights the importance of understanding China’s strategic culture, which is shaped by its ancient philosophical traditions, including Sun Tzu’s Art of War. It also explores the implications of China’s rise for India, including the need for India to develop a more assertive and pragmatic approach to dealing with China. It concludes by outlining key elements of India’s China policy, including the need for patience, strategic communication, and economic growth.

Introduction

Having seen the historical developments in Part-I of this article, this part focusses on the present-day China and its future trajectory. The re-organisation of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the various arms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and formation of the PLA Strategic Support Force have significant implications for its neighbours. It is instructive to note that most major powers have devoted study centres and think tanks solely for the study of China. It may be critical to assess and dissect the Chinese military leadership’s psychological and cultural thought process, evolving from their historical stratagem. Response to any provocation or dialogues needs to be well tailored, keeping in mind the age-old Chinese techniques of manipulation and deft diplomacy couched in subterfuge.

Modern Threads

Adaptability and Flexibility: Cornerstones of Chinese Military Stratagem.

• The weft and warp of Chinese military stratagem are woven with threads of adaptability and flexibility. This is evident in the PLA’s doctrine of ‘Active Defence’, which emphasises a proactive and adaptive posture. Unlike the traditional western concept of defence, the Chinese approach involves seizing the initiative and adapting to evolving circumstances.
• The concept of ‘Shashoujian’1  or the ‘Assassin’s Mace’, has been adopted to represent a strategic innovation that incorporates asymmetrical warfare and technological surprise. This embodies the notion of using unexpected and unconventional means to achieve military objectives, showcasing the PLA’s commitment to strategic creativity.

Military Culture.

• The PLA has undergone significant modernisation in recent decades. For the CMC, Operation Desert Storm with its Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the effective air campaign that made land operations a minor operation, was the epitome of warfare. The CMC put into motion various processes to unravel the RMA within its own ranks and move towards ‘Informatised Warfare’. The evolution of its military culture reflects China’s ambitions on the global stage. Xi Jinping’s vision of a ‘World-class’ military by 2049, the centenary of the People’s Republic of China, underscores the nation’s commitment to enhancing its military capabilities.
• The PLA’s military culture emphasises the ‘Three Warfares strategy: psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare’. These tactics are an official political/information non-kinetic warfare strategy of the PLA, revised in the ‘Political Work Guidelines of the PLA’ in 20032, employed not only in times of conflict but also during peacetime to shape perceptions and gain strategic advantages. China’s military doctrines, such as ‘Integrated Joint Operations’ and active defence, underline the stress on modern warfare, incorporating cyber capabilities, space assets, and advanced technology.
• The Himalayan region serves as a strategic theatre for both China and India. The Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan Valley clash in 2020 highlighted the potential for military escalation in the disputed border areas.
• In the 21st Century, China seems to show an aversion to taking risks, especially in terms of fatalities during conflicts and were supposedly averse to body bags, it is believed. But this may be just a ruse, since Chinese people have been known to be able to take pain and suffering in their stride like the sufferings during the Great Leap Forward. The race to stay ahead in 4G, information, and cyber warfare is an attempt to achieve supremacy and fight a war without physical conflict, in line with Sun Tzu’s strategy, but when push comes to shove, the Chinese are likely to exert their will; even at the cost of fatalities.
• The Chinese short term is about 10 to 20 years, while in the medium term, they look at 20 to 50 years and in the long term, beyond 50 years. They do not feel time pressures and practice infinite patience. Mao famously quoted Sun Tzu, “Do not take matters on this world so rapidly. Why is there need to be in such great haste”.3

Information Warfare and Psychological Operations: Modern Weaving on Ancient Fabric.

• In the contemporary landscape, the PLA’s emphasis on information warfare and psychological operations represents a modern thread in the ancient fabric of Chinese military stratagem. The concept of the ‘Three Warfares’—psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare—exemplifies the integration of ancient principles with modern technologies.
• The use of disinformation, strategic narratives, and cyber capabilities reflects China’s understanding of the significance of shaping perceptions in the information age. This sophisticated approach to non-kinetic warfare aligns with Sun Tzu’s emphasis on subduing the enemy without direct confrontation.

The Dragon’s Reach: Geostrategic Implications.

• As the dragon awakens, the geopolitical implications of Chinese strategic culture and military stratagem extend beyond its borders. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), often dubbed as China’s ‘Silk Road’, showcases a grand strategic vision rooted in ancient concepts of connectivity and economic influence. China’s colossal infrastructure investments, amounting to a total of USD 67.8 bn in 2022, are likely to touch USD 1.0 tn shortly.4 This is envisioned to usher in a new era of trade and growth for economies in Asia and beyond. But skeptics worry that China is laying a debt trap for borrowing governments.5
• China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS), where it has constructed artificial islands and strengthened its military presence, echoes historical notions of controlling key points for strategic advantage. China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty over the sea and the sea’s estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cu ft of natural gas; have antagonised competing claimants: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.6 The geopolitical chessboard reflects China’s aspiration to secure its maritime routes and establish itself as a dominant regional power. It also reinforces the concept of wei qi (encirclement).
• The future of each of our nations—and indeed the world—depends on a free and open Indo-Pacific enduring and flourishing in the decades ahead. Like Japan, we believe that a successful Indo-Pacific vision must advance freedom and openness while offering autonomy and options. We support a strong India as a partner in this positive regional vision.7 The US wants India to play an active role in the SCS, given its proximity to the area as well as the historic animosity with the dragon. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) is an attempt to play wei qi with the Chinese, by encircling them from south west, east and north east. China’s west as of now is secure with the Central Asian Republics playing the Chinese flute and the Russians in the Chinese Hebao (protective umbrella).
• The Chinese Police Stations in various countries across the world, including the American and European continents, under the garb of ‘Overseas Service Stations’ are raising concerns about extra-legal offices being tools of hard power and coercion for the empire. These unofficial Police Stations or Public Security Bureaus are used to spread Chinese philosophy, intimidate dissidents and pressure them to return to China.  In the African continent, China has active military presence through alliances and Military Assistance Programs in many countries. Some estimates predict the number of Chinese nationals in the continent to be close to one million (including nearly 10,000-12,000 military personnel).

Diplomacy and the Silk Road: Soft Power Unfurled.

• The Chinese emphasis on soft power, intricately woven into the Silk Road of ancient times, has reemerged as a prominent feature of its contemporary diplomatic efforts. The Confucius Institutes, serving as cultural ambassadors, project China’s soft power globally, fostering an environment conducive to its strategic objectives.
• The use of economic tools as diplomatic leverage, typified by concerns over debt-trap diplomacy related to the BRI, illustrates the strategic interplay between ancient cultural values and modern geopolitical manoeuvres. The Silk Road, once a conduit for goods and ideas, has been transformed into a symbol of China’s diplomatic outreach and economic prowess. It has also enmeshed the economies of its participants with the Chinese economy, with the concomitant pitfalls.

The Dragon and the Elephant: Sino-Indian Relations.

• In the complex montage of international relations, the interaction between the Dragon and the Elephant (China and India) is a critical component that could unravel into a mess, if the associations are delinked. China’s strategic historical thought process and military culture exert a profound impact on its relations with India. China has an interminable and steadfast patient approach to what they perceive as recalcitrant neighbours, especially ones which could be their nemesis, if they are dealt with haste.
• China’s strategic culture plays a pivotal role in shaping its approach to Sino-Indian relations. The ancient precepts of strategic culture intertwine with contemporary geopolitics, creating a dynamic that oscillates between collaboration and contention.
• The enhancement of border infrastructure, military modernisation, and efforts to strengthen coalitions and friendships in the Indo-Pacific region reflect India’s evolving strategy. India’s response involves a combination of military preparedness, diplomatic manoeuvring and regional partnerships. As China expands its influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, India has sought to diversify its partnerships. Engaging with like-minded countries under frameworks like the QUAD, has become a vital element of India’s strategy. This collaborative approach is aimed at balancing China’s growing influence and fostering a rules-based international order. However, these same actions have intensified the rivalry between the two giants.
• “For the foreseeable future, Beijing desires to keep New Delhi contained in a geostrategic South Asian box with the lid on tight, while China conducts business-as-usual diplomacy and commerce with India. Chinese leaders perceive India as an oversized middle power with great power pretentions. While neither side wants escalation, their actions risk exacerbating a classic security dilemma, leading to costly, high-stakes competition”.8
• India on the other hand is a peace-loving country which does not desire confrontation with China. As both nations strive for regional influence and global standing, understanding the interplay of China’s strategic weave becomes imperative for India to navigate the complex patterns of Sino-Indian relations. A more assertive India, resultant of its growing economic footprint and global standing, tempered with cautious and pragmatic interaction with the Chinese, is the need of the hour.

Balancing Act: Navigating the Future.

• As China strides confidently into the 21st Century, the deep shades of its strategic culture and bold colours of its military stratagem continue to shape its trajectory. The balancing act between tradition and modernity, flexibility and assertiveness, defines China’s approach to global affairs.
• Understanding the depth of Chinese strategic culture is not a mere intellectual exercise but a prerequisite for navigating the complexities of a world where the dragon’s influence is expanding every passing year. As the geopolitical imperatives influence the future, the nuances of Chinese strategy, rooted in millennia of wisdom, will undoubtedly continue to shape the course of international relations. The world watches as the dragon flaps its wings and the jifu (dragon’s robe) unfolds, revealing the heat of the fire in the dragon’s belly, the depth of China’s strategic culture and the cold conduct of the military stratagem on the global stage.

Key Elements of India’s China Policy

Having fathomed the depths of the Chinese strategic ethos and developed a historical long-term perspective of the Sino-Indian dynamics, it is imperative that the geopolitical waltz of Indian policies towards China is orchestrated, keeping in mind the Chinese strategic culture to bring about a possible rapprochement and thaw in relations by resolving outstanding issues; if not, then try and contain the Chinese, through deft manipulation and statecraft using age-old strategic tools. The CCP is manifested with a different sense of morality, something that is not aligned to the generic world.

        Some of the facets of Indian strategy that may have a significant import for safeguarding own sensitivities and contain the dragon are listed below:

• Avoid riling the dragon on issues of minor consequences; it is better to lose small battles and save energies for the bigger ones. Keep negotiating calmly, adopt a modus vivendi to avoid confrontation and escalation which could be deleterious in the long run.
• Continue the dialogue process, even in the face of provocations and conflicts. ‘Be like the duck, calm on the surface while paddling furiously underneath the surface’.
• Not playing to the media generated hysteria and reacting to minor incidents would require imperturbable minds, through steady and consistent cultivation at the highest levels of decision making.
• Utilise all instruments to absorb and adopt the Chinese way of dealing and dialogue process to beat them at their own game. In the case of the Chinese, remember ‘Facts and Truth do not always go together’. The Chinese negotiators set and prosecute the agenda by discursive dialogues to lead the opponents astray.
• Subtle and covert actions are the key to success while direct confrontation is fraught with risks of conflict. Undermining the CCP by a discrete Information Warfare (IW) campaign showcasing the failure of the communist ideology; in fact, the Chinese society has the greatest wealth disparities and is a capitalistic model in the garb of communism. 
• The Chinese think in terms of decades and centuries, while the Indian mind is thirsty for quick satiation. During a meeting with Kissinger in 1971, Mao had said that “Beijing would not foreclose options over Taiwan and indeed expected to have to use force someday, but second, for the time being at least, Mao was putting off this day. Indeed, he spoke of being willing to wait for 100 years”.9 When dealing with the Chinese, the greatest virtue is that of patience.
• India needs to use the world to posit and reinforce its own claims. There is a need to orchestrate and precipitate the abandonment of the Chinese claim on Arunachal Pradesh in concert with other world powers. The sliver of opportunity is likely to remain only in the coming decade. Create world class infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh and make it a tourist haven. It is important to develop the state into a modern state, subsidise travel and suffuse it with social media propaganda to show that it is an integral part of India. When foreign travellers/tourists visit the state, share photos on their social media handles, it will reinforce the concept that it is an integral part of India. Enhanced settlement of Indians from other regions, would add to the sense of integration.
• Economic growth is the single most important driver for geopolitical clout and military capabilities. India must avoid conflict as far as possible to focus on economic activities and maintain a high growth trajectory. This trajectory needs to be enhanced to an even higher one to catch up with Chinese levels.
• To deter conflict, alliances with nations which share common interests such as, US, Australia and China’s neighbours need to be strengthened to ensure a unified deterrence. Alliances are complex associations, framed to suit overt and covert purposes as also to deter perfidious mutual enemies; hence these need to be dealt with caution and a lot of contemplation. Alliances which do not have security guarantees, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, only resort to agglutination as a deterrence.
• The Chinese population have the ability to overcome depredations inconceivable anywhere else in the world, which shows the tenacity of their culture and the cohesiveness of their relationships, which is an Indian weakness.  Indian polity needs to build up this tenacity and cohesiveness amongst the populace through media, education and a wholesome Information Campaign.
• It is important to strengthen the five fingers to make a fearful fist. The five fingers comprise of information warfare, diplomatic deftness, military ascendency, mature and assertive leadership and economic eminence.
• Narratives are critical to convey success of any event, the Indian Katha (story) has to cater for the three levels viz. Domestic, Adversary and International. A robust national IW setup for unleashing the Katha needs to be setup in the country.
• The dragon may remain on leash till the US remains superior to China in economic and military terms. Once China advances past US, it will most likely start imposing its notion of celestial supremacy by asserting through force. India needs to be prepared for that event, both in terms of economic and military heft and insulation with a robust comprehensive national power. The national policy on grey zone warfare including non-kinetic warfare/non-contact warfare is still inchoate, there exists a large chasm, which needs to be bridged. 

        History has proven time and again that the primary guarantor of a nation’s sovereignty is its military power. Investment in developing a future ready and strong military may not appear to pay dividends in the short term but adds immense value to the country’s progress by ensuring its growth and survival. The gestation period of developing any military capability is nearly a decade and half.

        The dragon is likely to start flapping its wings in the later part of this decade as it starts matching US capability for capability, then would start growling to dictate terms by early next decade, roar to threaten enemies by the end of the next decade and finally breathe fire to destroy its enemies in the decade starting 2040 to realise the master’s dream of 2049. Therefore, if India is to be prepared for the Dragon’s roar which may come close to the end of next decade and avoid its breath of fire, we need to put in motion processes to step up our military capabilities in this decade itself.

Conclusion

The understanding of China’s strategic culture and military stratagem is crucial for India to navigate the complex dynamics of Sino-Indian relations. The dragon’s awakening has significant geopolitical implications, and India must develop a nuanced approach to engage with China, leveraging its own strengths and weaknesses. By adopting a patient and pragmatic strategy, India can mitigate the risks of conflict and promote a rules-based international order. The key elements of India’s China policy, including avoiding provocations, continuing dialogue, and utilising all instruments of national power, will be critical in shaping the future of Sino-Indian relations. As the dragon continues to assert its influence globally, India must prioritise economic growth, military modernisation, and strategic partnerships to ensure its sovereignty and security. The time to act is now, for the dragon’s roar is approaching, and India must be prepared to face the challenges of the future.

Endnotes

1 Bruzdzinski, Jason E. “DEMYSTIFYING SHASHOUJIAN: CHINA’S ‘ASSASSIN’S MACE’ CONCEPT”, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004, Accessed on 16 Nov 23.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11969.13.  

2 Peter Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective”, War on the Rocks, 30 Jan 2018, accessed on 16 Nov 23.

https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/

3 Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”, published by Penguin Classics, ISBN 0141395842.

4 “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade investment and finance landscape”, Accessed on 26 Nov 23.

https://www.oecd.org/finance/Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-in-the-global-trade-investment-and-finance-landscape.pdf 

5 James McBride, Noah Berman, and Andrew Chatzky, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 Feb 2023, accessed on 16 Nov 23.

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative   

6 “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea”, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on 16 Nov 23.

https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea

7 “US President Joe Biden at the Quad Leader’s Summit”, 24 Sep 2021.

8 Daniel Markey, Andrew Scobell, “Three Things to Know About China-India Tensions”, The United States Institute of Peace, 19 Oct 2023, accessed on 16 Nov 23.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/three-things-know-about-china-india-tensions

9 Kissinger Henry, “On China”, published by Penguin Books Ltd, ISBN 9780141049427.

 

@Air Commodore Shirish Dhakate was commissioned into the fighter stream in 1993 and is presently posted at Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) as the Head of Training Team (Air). He is a graduate of National Defence Academy, Post Graduate from DSSC and MPhil from Army War College. He has been editor of two journals and a publication in the past. He is an avid researcher and writer on myriad topics of strategic interests and has been an active contributor to various journals.  

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIV, No. 637, July-September 2024.

Author : Air Commodore Shirish Dhakate ,
Category : Journal
Pages : 457     |     Price : ₹CLIV/637     |     Year of Publication : July 2024-September 2024