Abstract
Beijing views the United Nations (UN) as a tool to achieve its ‘Middle Kingdom’ Dream and reshape global governance. Despite being a late entrant, China has skilfully infiltrated key UN departments, aligning norms with its long-term strategy. This influence signifies a shift in global governance with implications for a rules-based order. Beijing has advanced its agenda by placing nationals/proxies in key positions, providing funding, and initiating aligned programs, which has allowed it to shape agendas and build coalitions against Western dominance. China’s presence has reshaped UN cultures, diluting human rights norms and raising transparency issues. As China’s role expands its impact on global decision-making will likely increase and challenge the traditional rules-based order.
Introduction
Post-World War II, numerous international organisations have emerged to oversee global affairs. Improved means of communication and transportation have heightened interdependence among countries, making international organisations indispensable for navigating global affairs. The United Nations (UN) has emerged as a powerful entity, with many nations believing it can establish a new world order.
China has been diligently working to establish a new international order that addresses its historical sense of mianzi (loss) from past humiliations and asserts its global prominence. This effort involves subtly influencing global dynamics without antagonising the international community. Having satisfied lower-level need of basic and psychological needs of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, China is now pursuing a higher-level need of self-esteem and self-actualisation for rejuvenating its global image and reclaiming its historical status. As the United States (US), a declining power, reevaluates its role, China, a rising power with substantial resources, is seizing every possible opportunity to shape an alternative global environment where it is seen as a friendly, peaceful, and dependable partner.
Since the early 21st Century, China has emerged as a formidable economic and military power. With the second-largest economy and military, China aims to enhance its global standing and reclaim a pivotal role in global governance through international organisations. After joining the UN in 1971, China has skilfully leveraged international organisations to shape norms, standards, and practices that support its long-term strategy to bolster its global image. On 10 Apr 2024, Victims of Communism’s President Emeritus, Ambassador Andrew Bremberg, testified before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on global health, global human rights, and international organisation that “Over the last decade, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has grown increasingly assertive in its engagements at the UN. What was once described as a defensive ‘Snapping Turtle’ approach has been replaced with Xi Jinping’s; ‘Wolf Warrior’ foreign policy’.1 To amplify its preferred narratives and suppress dissenting views, China has been meticulously working to exploit multilateralism in global governance by transforming existing international organisation into ‘China Fit Organisation’. A former UN employee and British citizen, Emma Reilly, has provided evidence of China reshaping the international order through the UN by silencing discussions on sensitive topics, manipulating reports to align with its priorities, and downplaying human rights and democracy issues.2 China is increasingly playing an active role in international organisations, signalling its potential to lead and challenge existing institutions and norms. In October 2021, to mark the 50th anniversary of China assuming a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), UN Secretary-General António Guterres delivered a speech lauding China as “An increasingly important contributor to the work of the organisation and a major pillar of international cooperation”.3
The CCP promotes the view that China is ‘A builder of world peace, contributor to global development, defender of the international order, and provider of public goods’. To that end, China positions itself as a crucial ‘Promoter’ and ‘Constructor’ of international organisations, with the ambition of making China’s viewpoints part of a ‘Global Consensus’. China also pushes to insert its own global governance rhetoric of a ‘Shared Future’ into UN documentation. In doing so, China counters the traditional UN focus on development, human rights, peace and security as the means to promote just and stable societies, with its own state-centric approach that dismisses universal values and instead champions each state as unique.4 The United Kingdom’s Parliament is currently investigating China’s instrumentalisation of the UN and how China is attempting to bribe and influence the UN system to gain favours from the multilateral system.5 In recent past, China has phenomenally boosted her power by taking a bigger role in international institutions, advertising its increasing influence, creating pro-Chinese international organisations, and subverting global governance rules.6 This article examines China’s strategic penetration of the UN to promote its global governance vision of a shared future and counter traditional UN priorities. It explores how China achieves this by positioning its citizens and proxies, providing funds, implementing developmental programs and initiatives, manipulating voting, and creating organisations aligned with Chinese interests, and various alternative strategies to undermine global governance regulations.
Chinese Role in International Institution
Before joining the UN in 1971, China was diplomatically isolated and faced limited international recognition. China struggled with legitimacy issues as the Republic of China (Taiwan) held China’s UN seat until that time. Internationally, China’s influence and engagement were restricted, severely impacting its ability to participate fully in global affairs and decision-making processes. Since becoming a UN member, China has transformed into a prominent global player. As the world’s second-largest economy and a permanent member of the UNSC, China wields considerable influence and strategically shapes UN policies, norms, and operations to align with its national interests.
China, initially, was sceptical of the UN Peace Keeping Force (UNPKF), but subsequently began to engage cautiously and now has evolved into a major player in terms of manpower and funding. China is the second highest contributor to the UNPKF budget, donating approximately 15.0 per cent of the total budget after US (28.0 per cent) Unlike other permanent members of the UNSC, China is amongst the top 10 suppliers of uniformed UNPKF personnel (2,227) as of Feb 2023. Since 2018, China has maintained a 8,000-person standby force to carry out peacekeeping missions for the UN. In addition, Ambassador Huang Xia, was the first Chinese national to be appointed to a senior post of UN Peace Keeping Operations, as special envoy for hotspot regions in the African Great Lakes Region.7 The strength of the Chinese contingent is more than the combined forces of the other permanent members. Most of these Chinese soldiers serve in Africa, which facilitate China in aligning with her Africa strategy to bolster influence and foster a favourable perception.8
Leadership and Staffing
China has expanded its influence in international organisations through positioning Chinese citizens in governing positions or placing its proxies. It leverages these roles to advocate for resolutions and norms, aligning with its worldview, including non-interference in internal affairs, cyber sovereignty, and revised human rights definitions. UN agencies under Chinese leadership often promote domestic initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Make in China 2025, and the global rise of Chinese companies.9 China also strategically places its nationals, including career professionals and diplomats, in lower positions within multilateral bodies. This ‘A Team’ approach selects highly capable, articulate individuals, often western-educated, to effectively advance China’s interests in international institutions.10
China’s membership in multilateral organisations of the UN has increased from 12.0 per cent in 1989 to 20.0 per cent by 1997. Over the last two decades, ever since it entered the World Trade Organisation in 2001, China has set out to influence the global multilateral system. In 2020, China was the only state to lead four of the fifteen UN specialised agencies. The Chinese presence as a leader in these organisations ensures that national champions like Huawei and its standards become embedded and implemented by UN agencies, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This includes endorsements of the BRI through the UN Industrial Development Organisation and the exclusion of Taiwan from all discussions on air navigation and safety standards during the pandemic, as seen in the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). During the same period, the Chinese deputies were present in nine agencies.11 Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) is the UN’s think tank and conference coordinator which now reinforces China’s leadership in global development and its grasp on economic, environmental, and social issues.12 Since 2007, Chinese career diplomats have permanently held the position of Under-Secretary-General of the UN DESA, allowing China to influence and reshape the UN’s development programs to align with its interests.13
China has extensively used its economic clout to place its representative in steering committees of international bodies. In Jun 2019, for instance, Mr Qu Dongyu easily defeated the US-backed candidate to become the Director General (DG) of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).14 Under the Chinese financial/trade threat, Cameroon withdrew its candidate in 202015, while Uganda16, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay supported the Chinese candidate.17 German broadcasters also reveal Qu Dongyu has been tailoring the FAO to Chinese interests as its head.18 In Aug 2020, the Chinese candidate was selected with an astounding number of votes in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, for adjudicating disputes related to the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite South China Sea maritime dispute.19 The CCP demands that Chinese nationals in UN leadership roles prioritise party interests over UN obligations. Wu Hongbo, former head of DESA, admitted to favouring China.20 During Zhao Houlin’s tenure as ITU Secretary-General (2015 to 2022), Beijing reduced Taiwan’s international presence, changing references to ‘Taiwan, China’. In 2021, China attempted to revise the UN Code for Transport Locations to undermine Taiwan’s role in global supply chains. In 2020, ICAO, under Chinese leadership, blocked social media users inquiring about Taiwan’s exclusion.21 Chinese Interpol Director, Meng Hongwei, was actively involved in Operation Foxhunt and managing Chinese operations before his arrest as Interpol Chief in China due to differences with President Xi.22 China has also used the Interpol ‘Red Notice’ system to force the return of fugitives from the US.23 The Chinese diplomats were also accused of fishing for names of individuals who sought accreditation from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to speak against China’s human rights abuses.24
The restriction of Taiwan’s participation in the UN, the threat to bar non-governmental organisations in the UN that do not label Taiwan as a province of China, the blocking of Taiwanese passport holders from entering UN headquarters25, the shelving of recommendations to investigate a cyber security hack in Nov 2016 by a Chinese government-linked group26, the temporary removal of critical submissions from Hong Kong, Tibetan, and Uyghur groups compiled by the UN in 2018, and the continued usage of ‘Xizang’ to systematically remove Tibet’s name from the UN system are some of the major instances highlighting Chinese tampering with the UN system, either through leadership or other positions. China uses Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisations (GONGOs) in Geneva to influence its human rights reviews by filling meeting halls with officials or sympathisers to suppress criticism. Out of 47 Chinese NGOs authorised for UN Human Rights Council participation (UNHRC), at least 34 are GONGOs connected to CCP bodies.27
Suspension of ‘Ease of Doing Business’ Rating by the World Bank28 and the role of the current DG of the World Health Oragnisation, Tedros A, during the COVID-19 pandemic prominently displayed China’s growing influence through proxies holding leadership positions in the UN.29 China also employs strategies to flood UNHRC proceedings with favourable comments, aiming to dilute meaningful recommendations. Since the UNHRC’s inception in 2006, China has used tactics to gather supportive remarks by pressuring nations to speak favourably during the Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR).30 The UPR was designed to ensure all nations face regular human rights scrutiny before the international community. Despite its goal of rigorous scrutiny, China has attempted to undermine the UPR’s effectiveness by actively working to whitewash its human rights violations. Human Rights Watch reports that Beijing leverages its influence within the UN to obstruct human rights NGOs, reduce human rights positions, and use DESA’s office to eject or bar experts who are critical of China from UN premises.31
Funding
China has increased its influence in international bodies through strategic funding, especially where direct penetration is challenging. The UN’s growing dependence on China’s contributions has elevated China’s position within the system. By funding key projects, China advances its domestic agendas. High-profile voluntary funding, which offers more influence than assessed contributions, includes China’s sole funding of the UN Global Geospatial Knowledge and Innovation Centre and President Xi’s USD 1.0 bn pledge to establish the UN Peace and Development Trust Fund.32 In the early 2000s, China’s share of the UN regular budget was around 2.0 per cent. Subsequently, the share surged to 15.25 per cent in 2022 and continues to rise.33 Since 2019, China has been the UN’s second-largest funder. From 2010 to 2019, China’s mandatory and voluntary donations to the UN rose by 1096.0 per cent and 346.0 per cent, respectively. China exploits the UN’s poor funding disclosure, which omits conditions attached to donations. Reilly’s evidence suggests that China secretly requires funds not to be spent in states with ties to Taiwan, and that Chinese representatives in the UN allegedly promote BRI projects.34 In May 2017, ICAO DG Fang Liu signed a USD 4.0 million agreement with China to boost aviation safety and sustainability, aligning with China’s BRI goals of enhancing interconnectivity and infrastructure.35 Under the UN promotion, China has also signed a memorandum of understanding with International Labour Organisation, Universal Postal Union, United Nations Development Programme, and UN-Habitat to endorse her foreign policy objectives through voluntary funding.36
Programs and Initiatives
Beijing is creating China-centred institutions to shape the global narrative. Since launching the BRI in 2013, China has used multilateral forums to promote it and align it with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Chinese-led UN DESA has endorsed BRI through studies and high-profile events, and framed the Global Development Initiative’s Group of Friends as a platform for discussing SDG implementation.37 At least 35 of the 47 UNHRC member states are part of the BRI, with many supporting China or abstaining from anti-China forums. In 2020, DESA head Liu Zhenmin endorsed the BRI’s alignment with SDGs. DESA also supported the China-funded program ‘Jointly Building BRI towards SDGs’, and the UN Secretary-General affirmed the UN’s readiness to collaborate with Beijing on SDGs at the 2017 Belt and Road Forum.38 To gain prominence and lead, China has initiated and co-produced initiatives with emerging markets like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and established China-led forums like Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Beyond these institutions, Beijing fosters informal networks through ‘Circle of Friends’, party-to-party relations, and negative messaging about the West. This strategy positions China as a peace broker and a future development model for the Global South.39 In the 2010s, the SCO became a platform for China to challenge existing global norms, advocating for closed, government-controlled internets instead of a unified, open global internet.40
Voting and Manipulation
The voting trend in the UN on sensitive Chinese issues validates growing Chinese influence in international bodies including the UN. In Oct 2019, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo has warned that the CCP participates in international organisations to validate its authoritarian system and spread its reach. The growing pro-China views on various UN platforms regarding sensitive Chinese issues are a testament to the increasing influence of China in the world. In Jul 2020, China’s restriction of political freedoms in Hong Kong led to two opposing UNHRC declarations: one praising Beijing, supported by 53 nations, and another expressing concern, backed by only 27 countries.41 On 10 Oct 2023, China was elected as a member of UNHRC for the sixth term since 2006, making it one of the most frequently elected members, despite its poor human rights record and allegations of monitoring dissidents.42 In 2022, China sought to prohibit the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights from releasing a report in Aug 2022 documenting its abuses in Xinjiang.43 Despite extensive evidence of atrocities against millions of Uighurs in Xinjiang camps, many countries, including all Islamic nations, have yielded to Chinese pressure.44 Interestingly, Islamic nations support for China extends beyond just commending China’s human rights record and obstructing resolutions critical of China; it also involves apprehending and repatriating Uighur refugees back to China. There are even reports of the presence of secret Chinese jails in Dubai to arrest and deport Uighurs.45
Miscellaneous
Christopher Krebs, former United States Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, while comparing Chinese and Russian digital threat said “When we think about Russia, they’re trying to disrupt the system, and China is trying to manipulate the system”.46 Beijing reportedly spends billions annually to shape global opinion through media manipulation. China co-opts influential individuals with financial incentives and positions while repressing negative reporting through legal threats, visa denials, and other measures. In democratic countries, China files defamation suits, threatens legal action, and uses international institutions to label critics as ‘Economic Fugitives’ for repatriation.47
The integration of the Digital Silk Road and Space Information Corridor with the BRI allows China to leverage big data and advanced artificial intelligence technologies for global communication monitoring and manipulation. Xi proposed the concept of wÎngluò xìnxî xìtÒng (internet information system) as vital for modern battles. Chinese state media highlights the Information Support Force, a successor to the Strategic Support Force, as a key component of China’s modern military.48 China employs propaganda, misinformation, censorship, digital authoritarianism, and manipulation of international organisations to advance pro-China narratives and suppress criticism.49 China engages in overt or covert digital data collection and management, shaping data processing and generating new narratives. With vast databases and digitalisation tools, China not only manipulates historical records, but also directs global audiences towards its curated data.50 China has extensively employed popular social media platforms for global dissemination and manipulative tactics like bots and trolls to amplify pro-Chinese content and suppress anti-Chinese voices. China has also complicated online navigation by flooding search engine results and hashtag searches.51 In 2019, ICAO head Fang Liu has even obstructed investigations into the 2016 Chinese cyber-attack to cover up the incident.52
China employs cartographic manipulation through its ‘Three Warfare Strategy’ to increase influence in international forums, using psychological tactics, media influence, and legal justifications to assert their territorial ambitions.53 China has also coerced Multinational Corporations to align with its geopolitical goals of depicting disputed areas as part of China and have made specimens of companies not aligning with their preferred narratives.54 With the largest market, China’s influence extends to sports55 and Hollywood56, where stakeholders conform to unwritten Chinese dictates and avoid actions that may upset China. China has enacted numerous laws and regulations to bolster the legal framework for information campaigns and media strategies both domestically and internationally. Recent laws include the Data Security Law (2021), Personal Information Protection Law (2021), and Cyber Security Law (2017). China’s new laws extend extraterritorial reach and pose distinct hurdles to freedom of expression globally.
Xi Jinping has called for more shared control of global governance. He has declared that China needs to ‘Lead the reform of the global governance system with the concepts of fairness and justice’ for a multipolar world. China’s multi-pronged strategy to align with global governance rules ranges from supporting international institutions that align with its goals and norms (such as the World Bank and the Paris Agreement on climate change) to countering those organisations that undermine its values by reorganising existing ones or creating alternatives (such as human rights). In areas where norms and institutions are still being established (such as internet governance), China works with other powers such as Russia to create international standards that reflect their interests. China employs both offensive and defensive measures to counter organisations that undermine its values. China’s evolving global governance strategy is most apparent in four major issues: global health, internet governance, climate change, and development finance.57
China is shifting health governance in a revisionist direction, potentially undermining global public health cooperation. Unlike traditional donors, Beijing acts unilaterally and opaquely, expecting recipients to seek support without formal proposals. Its aid focuses on infrastructure like hospitals, but lacks transparency efforts in recipient countries.58 China aims to lead global internet governance, promoting ‘Cyber Sovereignty’ for state-controlled internets. With the world’s largest internet user base, Chinese companies excel in 5G patents and standards.59 Beijing leverages its UN influence and other forums to advocate closed internet policies. China is active in organisations setting procedures and standards for new technologies, such as International Organisation for Standardisation, International Electrotechnical Commission, ITU, and 3rd Generation Partnership Project, using its scientific and technical potential to influence international rule-making.60 Chinese representatives in agencies like ITU have ensured that Chinese companies like Huawei embed their standards globally, exemplified by the acceptance of blockchain standards for finance proposed by Chinese institutions.61 In the past decade, China has shifted to supporting international climate change efforts, reduced fossil fuel use, and become the largest investor in renewable energy. It leads globally by collaborating with international institutions.62 China employs unilateral and multilateral strategies in development finance, establishing two institutions: the BRI, operating under its own standards, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, adhering to international aid standards.63
Conclusion
Beijing now sees the UN as a strategic tool for reshaping global governance. China’s increasing influence in the UN, represents a significant shift in global governance and has substantial implications for the adherence to a rules-based order. With increased involvement in administrative and procedural matters within the UN, China has emerged as a highly effective player wherein it has successfully advanced its agenda and deflected objectionable proposals from others. Chinese effectiveness and assertiveness in UN forums can be observed in its ability to shape policies, utilise organisations to project power, and promote its national interests. Tangibly, China has exploited the UN structure for elevating its status by strategically placing its nationals/proxies in key UN positions, providing substantial funding, initiating developmental programs/initiatives, and transforming organisations aligned with its interests. These efforts have allowed China to shape agendas, advocate for policies in its favour, and build a coalition of supportive nations to enhance its decision-making influence and position it as a counterbalance to Western dominance. Intangibly, China’s presence in the UN agencies invariably has reshaped institutional cultures to project Chinese power and promote its national interests. This growing Chinese influence in the UN/international bodies has diluted norms on human rights and individual freedom, fight against global pandemic and various other issues for protecting Chinese interests. Transparency and accountability are other issues that have also emerged in Chinese-funded UN projects and BRI.
The impact of China’s growing influence on the global polity is profound. By advancing its own agenda while deflecting objectionable proposals from others, China is redefining the dynamics of global governance. This paradigm shift challenges the traditional rules-based order that has been predominantly shaped by the Western powers. As China continues to expand its role in international bodies, its impact on global decision-making processes is likely to increase, further reinforcing its position in global governance. The future of China’s influence in these international bodies will depend on the broader geopolitical landscape, responses from other major powers, and the evolving priorities of the UN and other organisations. Constructive dialogue and collaboration will be crucial to ensure these bodies remain platforms for addressing global challenges inclusively and equitably. China’s growing role reflects its broader ambitions, necessitating careful management to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of international institutions and maintain a balanced and fair global polity.
Endnotes
* Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is a psychological theory that organises human needs into five levels: physiological (basic survival needs like food and water), safety (security and stability), love/belonging (relationships and social connections), esteem (self-respect and recognition), and self-actualization (achieving personal potential). The theory suggests that lower-level needs must be met before higher-level needs can be addressed.
1 “VOC Testifies on the Hill”, Victims of Communism, last modified 11 Apr 2024. https://victimsofcommunism.org/voc-testifies-on-the-hill/
2 “China Accused of Influencing Votes at UN to Serve Its Interests, Whistleblower Claims,” The Economic Times, last modified 17 Apr 2024.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-accused-of-influencing-votes-at-un-to-serve-its-interests-whistleblower-claims/articleshow/109361897.cms?from=mdr
3 Courtney J. Fung,, Shing-hon Lam J. Fung, and Shing H. Lam, “Mixed Report Card: China’s Influence at the United Nations”, Lowy Institute, last modified 18 Dec 2022. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/ publications/mixed-report-card-china-s-influence-united-nations.
* Shared Future Xi Jinping’s “Shared Future” concept envisions a global community where countries work together towards common goals, mutual benefits, and sustainable development. It emphasises cooperation, inclusiveness, and interconnectedness, promoting peace, prosperity, and stability worldwide. This vision advocates for dialogue and partnership over confrontation, aiming to build a world that is open, innovative, and environmentally friendly, aligning with China’s broader strategy of enhancing its influence and fostering global harmony.
4 Fung, and Lam, “Mixed Report Card: China”.
5 Angad S. Brar, “China and the UN: Investigating Multilateral Bureaucracy”, ORF, last modified 04 May 2024.
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/china-and-the-un-investigating-multilateral-bureaucracy
6 “China’s Approach to Global Governance”, Council on Foreign Relations, accessed on 05 Jun 2024.
https://www.cfr.org/china-global-governance/.
7 Jagannath Panda, “China’s Push for Normative Change in UN Peacekeeping”, Institute for Security and Development Policy, last modified 29 May 2023.
https://www.isdp.eu/un-peacekeeping-china-pushing-for-normative-changes/.
8 Paszak Pawal, “China’s Growing Influence in International Organizations”, 14 Oct 2020.
https://warsawinstitute.org/chinas-growing-influence-international-organizations/
9 Kartik Ashta et al., “China’s Expanding Influence in the UN System”, Gateway House, last modified 27 May 2021, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/chinas-expanding-influence-un-system/.
10 Stephen Olson and Clyde V. Prestowitz, “The Evolving Role of China in International Institutions”, The Economic Strategy Institute, 2011.
https://www.uscc.gov/research/evolving-role-china-international-institutions
11 Ashta, “China’s Expanding Influence UN System”.
12 Fung, and Lam, “Mixed Report Card: China’s at United Nations”.
13 Tung Cheng-Chia and Alan H. Yang, “How China Is Remaking the UN In Its Own Image”, The Diplomat, 09 Apr 2020.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/how-china-is-remaking-the-un-in-its-own-image/
14 “China’s Approach to Global Governance”.
15 Robert Jack, “China Manipulates International Organizations in Its Effort to Control the World”, Nspirement, 19 Dec 2020.
https://www.nspirement.com/2020/12/19/china-manipulates-international-organisations-to-control-the-world.html
16 “China’s manipulation of international organizations”, U.S. Embassy in Georgia, last modified 30 Nov 2020.
https://ge.usembassy.gov/chinas-manipulation-of-international-organizations/
17 Courtney J. Fung and Shing-Hon Lam, “China already leads 4 of the 15 U.N. specialized agencies — and is aiming for a 5th”, 03 Mar 2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/03/china-already-leads-4-15-un-specialized-agencies-is-aiming-5th/
18 Arne Meyer-Fünffinger et al., “Exerting Influence: How China Is Instrumentalizing the FAO”, Tagesschau, last modified 30 Jun 2023.
https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/china-un-fao-100.html
19 “China wins seat at international tribunal on Law of the Sea”, 28 Aug 2020.
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/08/china-wins-seat-at-international-tribunal-on-law-of-the-sea/.
20 Christopher H. Smith, “The Chinese Communist Party’s malign influence at the United Nations—it’s getting worse”, 2024.
https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2024-04-10_ccp_malign_ influence_ at_un_opening _remarks_formatted.pdf
21 Global Engagement Center, “HOW THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SEEKS TO RESHAPE THE GLOBAL INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT”, 2023.
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/HOW-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-SEEKS-TO-RESHAPE-THE-GLOBAL-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT_Final.pdf
22 “China Detains President Of Interpol, Raises Questions About China’s International Diplomacy”, 26 Oct 2018.
https://theowp.org/china-detains-president-of-interpol-raises-questions-about-chinas-international-diplomacy/
23 “Lawyers say China using Interpol to seek dissident’s return”, Deccan Herald, 30 Jul 2021.
https://www.deccanherald.com/international/lawyers-say-china-using-interpol-to-seek-dissidents-return-1014547.html
24 Brar, “China UN: Investigating Multilateral Bureaucracy”.
25 Yu J.Chen, “Rule by Law: China’s Increasingly Global Legal Reach”, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2023.
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2023-11/Chapter_2_Section_1—Chinas_Increasingly_Global_Legal_Reach.pdf
26
27 See Human Rights Watch, “The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference with United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms”, Human Rights Watch, 2017, 18-20.
28 “World Bank Suspends Ease of Doing Business Report Amid Concerns of Data Manipulation”, News 18, 28 Aug 2020.
https://www.news18.com/news/business/world-bank-suspends-ease-of-doing-business-report-amid-concerns-of-data-manipulation-2826893.html.
29 “China’s manipulation of international organizations”.
* Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR): The UPR was designed to ensure all nations face regular human rights scrutiny before the international community. It includes a three-and-a-half-hour session where representatives of the reviewed country participate in a dialogue with a government presentation and questions/recommendations from other nations.
30 Rana S. Inboden, “Hearing on The PRC’s Universal Periodic Review and the Real State of Human Rights in China”, CECC, 2024.
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/Hearing Rana SiuInboden February 1 2024CE
31 “The Costs of International Advocacy”, 2.
32 Fung, and Lam, “Mixed Report Card: China’s at United Nations”.
33 Andrew Hyde, “China’s Emerging Financial Influence at the UN Poses a Challenge to the U.S.”, Stimson Center, last modified 04 Apr 2022.
https://www.stimson.org/2022/chinas-emerging-financial-influence-at-the-un/
34 Brar, “China UN: Investigating Multilateral Bureaucracy”.
35 Ashta, “China’s Expanding Influence UN System”.
36 Ashta, “China’s Expanding Influence UN System”.
37 Global Engagement Center, “How China Reshape Global Information Environment”, 19.
38 Chia and Yang, “China Remaking the UN”.
39 "Gaining influence in the United Nations and China’s Global Aspirations”, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, last modified 18 May 2023.
https://pulaski.pl/pulaski-policy-paper-gaining-influence-in-the-united-nations-and-chinas-global-aspirations/.
40 “China’s Approach to Global Governance”.
41 Yaroslav Trofimov, Drew Hinshaw and Kate O’Keeffe, “How China Is Taking Over International Organizations, One Vote at a Time”, 29 Sep 2020.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-china-is-taking-over-international-organizations-one-vote-at-a-time-11601397208?mod=hp_lead_pos10
42 Xinhua, “China Secures 6th Term As Member of UN Human Rights Council”, The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, last modified 12 Oct 2023.
https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202310/12/WS6527d348a310906 82a5e8338.html
43 Emma Farge, “China seeks to stop UN rights chief from releasing Xinjiang report - document”, Reuters, last modified 20 Jul 2022.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-china-seeks-stop-un-rights-chief-releasing-xinjiang-report-document-2022-07-19/.
44 Jessy Raggie, “Muslims urged to boycott Chinese products to protest Uighur treatment”, 21 Dec 2019.
https://www.thethirdforce.net/muslims-urged-to-boycott-chinese-products-to-protest-uighur-treatment/.
45 “Detainee says China has secret jail in Dubai, holds Uighurs”, 17 Aug 2021.
https://apnews.com/article/china-dubai-uyghurs-60d049c387b99 b1238ebd5f1d3bb3330.
46 IPD Forum bureau, “China May Be Biggest Hacking, Social Media Threat to U.S”, Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, last modified 29 Mar 2019.
https://ipdefenseforum.com/2019/03/china-may-be-biggest-hacking-social-media-threat-to-u-s/
47 Global Engagement Center, “How China Reshape Global Information Environment”, 23.
48 Kalpit A. Mankikar and Satyam Singh, “Tracking China’s Moves on Information Warfare”, ORF, last modified 22 May 2024.
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/tracking-china-s-moves-on-information-warfare.
49 “How China reshape global information”, 31.
50 CECC Bureau, ”The Long Arm of China: Exporting Authoritarianism with Chinese Characteristics”, U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2017.
https://www.congress.gov/115/chrg/CHRG-115hhrg28385/CHRG-115hhrg28385.pdf.
51 DCS Mayal, “China’s Shaping of Global Information Environment and Winning Without Fighting”, Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Jan-Mar 2024 154, no. 635 (Mar 2024): 63.
52 Christopher H. Smith, “The Chinese Communist Party’s malign influence at the United Nations—it’s getting worse”, 2024.
https://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2024-04-10_ccp_malign_ influence_at_un_opening_remarks_formatted.pdf.
53 Sai P. Banoth, “Chinese Cartographic Aggression Against India”, Centre For Joint Warfare Studies, last modified 19 Aug 2023,
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54 Kerstin L. Friedrich, “China Public Diplomacy- International companies face increasing reputational risks,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, Apr 2019.
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55 CECC, “Long Arm of China”.
56 Benjamin Lee, “China continues to exert damaging influence on Hollywood, report finds”, The Guardian, 05 Aug 2020.
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58 “China’s Approach to Global Governance”.
59 “China’s Approach to Global Governance”.
60 Pawal, “China’s Growing Influence International Organizations”.
61 Ashta, “China’s Expanding Influence UN System”.
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63 “China’s Approach to Global Governance”.
@Colonel (Dr) DCS Mayal (Retd) was commissioned into 3 MAHAR in 1991 and transferred to the Intelligence Corps in 1997. During his military career (1991-2024) of more than 32 years, he tenanted various field and staff appointments in Indian Army and Indian Navy. He is a graduate of the Defence Services Staff College and commanded an Intelligence unit in High Altitude Areas. He has done his MPhil and PhD from Panjab University. Post retirement, the officer is as Senior fellow with the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. Additionally, he holds a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Resource Management, Industrial Relations, Personnel Management, and Public Relations.
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol. CLIV, No. 637, July-September 2024.
Author : Colonel (Dr) DCS Mayal (Retd),
Category : Journal
Pages : 468 | Price : ₹CLIV/637 | Year of Publication : July 2024-September 2024