Introduction

China's emergence as an economic super power has had a significant impact on China's pursuance of an active and aggressive global strategy and its military modernisation programme. The clichés like ‘China Dream’ and revival of ancient trade through ‘Belt and Road Initiatives’ along with ‘Maritime Silk Route’ are initiatives to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. In this scheme of things, China’s armed forces constitute a major factor, which protect the Chinese core and mercantile interests. China’s 2015 defense white paper, China’s Military Strategy, hinted at this change when it described “the goal of CPC is to build a strong military where China’s armed forces will unwaveringly adhere to the principle of the CPC’s absolute leadership, uphold combat effectiveness, follow the CPC’s commands, and can fight and win wars”. Building a strong national defense and powerful armed forces through China’s modernization initiative is a strategic task and a major impetus is being provided to this task under President Xi Jinping. The central military commission issued the “Guidelines on Deepening National Defence and Military Reforms” on 01 Jan 2016, which emphasised the political nature of the PLA and its subordinate relationship to the Chinese Communist Party and that all the reforms initiated would be achieved by 2020.

Structure of China’s Military Reforms

President Xi Jinping on 26 November 2015 announced a comprehensive long-term reform plan for the People’s Liberation Army. Since he is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, these reforms are not only for PLA but also for People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF), China’s militia and reserve forces. In addition to reforming the armed forces, these changes will probably make President Xi Jinping further consolidate his hold on all state organs. The various reforms are as follows:-

Reorganise the ‘Military Regions’

The seven military regions in Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Lanzhou have been reorganised to five namely Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and the Central Commands/Zones. The continued principle of the newly implemented structure is that the CMC takes charge of the overall military administration, theatre commands / zones focus on combat, and the different military services pursue their own development. This transformation
is supposedly aimed to have a greater cohesiveness in joint operations. The main objective of these theatre commands/zones as enunciated by the President is for the development of a war winning strategy and also enhanced training for joint operations. The military reform is aimed at establishing a three-tier command system “the CMC – Theatre commands – troops/units” and an administration system that goes from the CMC through various services to the troops/units. Most of the commanders of the new theatre commands/zones are the previous commanders of one of the seven military regions. However, many were relocated far from their original base of power, ensuring that no commander can maintain a network of personal loyalty that supersedes Party authority. For example the former commander of the Lanzhou Military Region (MR) Liu Yuejun, is now the commander of the Eastern Zone, similarly in the other reshuffles, Wang Jiaocheng, the former commander of the Northern Shenyang MR becomes the commander of Southern Zone, Zhao Zongqi of the Eastern Jinan MR takes over the Western Zone and Commander Song Puxuan, former Beijing MR, will head up the Northern Zone. It is interesting to note that his deputy commander, Han Weiguo, has been promoted as the commander of the Central Zone. Thus with this, the President has ensured that his loyalists are promoted to power circles, so that the reforms are executed unhindered.

The Creation of Two New Forces Namely the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force-

China’s Second Artillery Force has been replaced by PLA Rocket Force. While this new entity retains its old characteristics, the significant part is that now the ‘PLA Rocket Force’ is considered the fourth service in China’s armed forces, on an equal footing with the PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force and not just an extension of the army looking after the land missile forces. Secondly the conventional missiles will also be under the Rocket Force which confirms China’s continuation of its strategy of “Dual Deterrence” where China has tried to enmesh its conventional missile force to its strategic forces, thus strengthening the strategy of “Active Defense”. This “Active Defense” is an important indicator of China’s military thinking where the stated Chinese defensive posture (of attacking the adversary only when struck by it first) actually camouflages an offensive operational strategic posture. A large number of conventional tactical and cruise missiles would be integrated in this force. In this sense the new Rocket Force will continue to enhance China’s nuclear deterrence and counter-strike capabilities. In the long run, improvement of capability to carry out medium and long range precision strikes will enable China to emerge as a major power. Similarly the PLA Strategic Support Force will form the fifth leg of the armed forces. This is a new structure that has been created and will act as a force multiplier for the other four services. It will provide appropriate cyber and intelligence support during war as also facilitate space operations, Electronic Warfare etc. Thus a lot of thought process seems to have gone in these transformations.

China has Reshuffled The Central Military Commission-

The previous four military departments – General Staff Department, General political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department – have been dismantled and their functions and duties are now shared by 15 new agencies under the Central Military Commission. The new offices include the General Staff Department
while creating six new departments-Joint Staff, Political Works, Logistical Support, Equipment Development, Training and National Defence mobilization. It has three commissions ie Discipline Inspection, Politics & Law, and Science and Technology. Also five more divisions namely, administration, auditing, international cooperation, organisational structure and strategic planning have been formed. The CMC has essentially been given extended staff support. Many analysts have tried to bring out that this has been done with a bid to improve political control by President Xi Jinping. This may only be partially true and it seems that the new structure of the CMC is with a view to have better functionality. The Chinese armed forces are formidable in size as also capabilities. The old structures may well have become too unwieldy for day to day efficiency as also for exercising operational control during wars. One has to only compare the number of departments which exist within Indian Armed Forces HQ to understand this. In any case the political control of the party over CMC has always been absolute and there did not appear any need to reinforce it further.

The reform also include cutting troops from 2.3 million to 2 million, phasing out outdated armaments, developing new weapons systems and reducing the size of the militia. As the Chinese armed forces became progressively hi-tech, they have simultaneously been carrying out troop reduction. The proposed cut of 300,000 troops may be viewed in this context.

Time will show the effectiveness of these reforms, because the opposition to these reforms has been intense, which has emerged from within the armed forces. “If [reform] is not done properly,” wrote Sun Kejia and Han Xiao of the PLA National Defence University last month, “it could affect the stability of the armed forces or even all of society.” However in the current situation President Xi has emerged as the most powerful leader since Mao and Deng, and it seems that he has been successful in creating a centralised system where the authority of the Party remains unchallenged.

**China’s Military Reforms - An Analysis**

**Doctrinal Reforms in PLA—‘An Ongoing Process since 1949’** China was deeply influenced by the century of humiliation and has always sought to enhance its military capabilities ever since. The period of civil war post the termination of the Qing dynasty as also the Japanese occupation resulted in a society which valued a strong military. Mao was never averse to using this military power as evidenced by Chinese participation in the Korean War, military annexation of Tibet and also 1962 Sino-Indian war. In the beginning, Chinese military strategy relied on sheer numerical superiority, due to a lack of technology – hence developed the concept of “People’s War”. Over a period of time due to better military technology, settlement of border disputes and overall enhanced capacity, it was perceived that wars may be localised to a particular region or to a border with a specific nation. This was the case both during the 1979 Vietnam War as also during 1962 Indo-China War. Accordingly, the military strategy evolved to local/limited wars. ‘People’s war under modern conditions’ and ‘local/limited war under modern conditions’ were subsets of this strategy. These were later transformed to the ‘local war under hi-tech conditions and under conditions of informationisation’. The aspect of informatisation only got added after witnessing the net-centric nature of warfare, as displayed by the Western nations.
during the Gulf Wars. Another aspect worth mentioning is that at all times China continued to profess a defensive mind-set even as it became increasingly belligerent. “Active Defence”, as explained earlier, was actually an offensive thought even while stating the opposite. The current strategy is of course global force projection, in keeping with the revised global standing of the nation.

**Reason for the Current Change in Doctrine** – China believes that profound changes are taking place in the international situation, as manifested in the historic changes in the balance of power, global governance structure, Asia-Pacific geostrategic landscape, and international competition in the economic, scientific and technological, and military fields. New threats in the form of hegemonies, power politics, neo-interventionism, and international competition for the redistribution of power, rights and interests are also intensifying. There has been a revolution in military affairs and the major powers are adjusting their national security strategies and defence policies, and speeding up their military transformation and force restructuring, which is posing new and severe challenges to China’s military security. Also the national security issues facing China are now much more diverse and complex and hence a holistic view of the national security system needs to be visualised through balanced internal and external security systems and assessment of traditional and non-traditional threats. These new requirements have forced China to innovate its military strategy and develop armed forces which constantly revolutionize its strategic leadership and operational beliefs so as to accomplish military missions of fighting and winning wars. Also due to the country’s growing strategic interests the armed forces will require in future to dynamically join, both regional and international security cooperation. The military reforms in the 1949-80s periods were primarily for countering a foreign invasion. The present day reforms apart from protecting China’s core interest are being tailored to project China as a major global power. During Deng Xiaoping’s tenure it was debated that the probability of a major conventional or nuclear war had become remote. Hence the requirement for the military was to develop the capabilities of waging ‘local wars under hi-tech conditions’. This lead to reduction in the number of MRs from 11 to 7, and in the number of the then existing field armies from 37 to 24, along with their conversion as corps level organizations called Group Army. Similarly reduction in troops has also been going on periodically and PLA from having troop strength of 3.23 million in the past has now been reduced to 2.3 million only. The new reforms thus are a conglomeration of old and new initiatives which are skillfully legislated under the present leadership.

**PLA Senior Officers Were Possibly Seen as supporting particular Factions in the Party.** “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun” and “The Party must control the gun” have defined the party-PLA relations in China. The Red Army or PLA was responsible for the defeat of Kuomintang and the establishment of the Communist Party rule in China. Since then, PLA has played a pivotal role in nation building as also ensuring internal cohesion. This however, also meant politicisation of the rank and file, for them to continue supporting the single party rule in China. In the past, PLA not only warded off external threat but was also a party instrument for internal controls. Almost all PLA officers were party members and the political commissars were, and still are, integral components of
all PLA units wielding a parallel authority. Many senior ranking PLA officers were members of the party central committee or even the politburo standing committee. The reorganisation possibly seeks to take away the senior officers of PLA from being part of various political coteries and hence the reshuffle in appointments.

**It's All About Modernisation.** There has been a lot of debate about the reasons for the current PLA reorganisation and downsizing. The predominant view is that this is with an aim to increase the party’s hold on PLA. Probably there is a need to view it differently. The Communist Party and the President of China already have a very tight grip over PLA and it had not been diluted anytime earlier. Thus there was no real need to strengthen their grip over PLA further. In all probability the objectives would have been two fold. Firstly to reduce the levels of corruption and nepotism within PLA and secondly to make PLA a better fighting force, in keeping with evolving national objectives and regional and global standing of PRC. Of course, in the process, the President has been able to position his loyalists in key appointments and strengthen his personal control.

**Expeditionary Role-The Key Doctrinal Thought Now.** Some inkling of this modernisation can be obtained from the Defence White Paper of 2015 wherein an increasingly expeditionary role is envisaged for the PLA. This has also been due to elimination of any real threats from the immediate borders of China. China today has settled borders with most nations and has no reasons to believe an attack will take place on its territories. Even with adversaries like USA a military conflict remains a remote possibility. The major threat to China is thus likely to emanate from the Eastern Seaboard only.

**Emphasis on PLAN, PLAAF** An expeditionary capability requires a better force projection capability, jointness in command and control as also better technology for intelligence and surveillance all of which are being attempted in current reorganisation. China is moving from a doctrine of employing mass to a doctrine of harnessing technology. The bid to downsize HQ, have independent brigades in place of divisions, theatre commands / zones, more emphasis on PLAN, PLAAF and the Rocket Force are all pointers in above mentioned direction. The prima donna status of PLA army was already over and gets cemented further with PLAAF and PLAN becoming independent services.

**Release of Additional Funds for Asymmetric Capabilities** China has also focussed on asymmetric warfare such as cyber warfare, militarisation of its space capabilities- these were intended to give its forces a force multiplication effect as also develop capabilities to defeat the enemy without fighting. The downsizing in part is meant to release funds for enhancing capabilities in these fields.

**PLA Autonomy.** The PLA had been seeking autonomy from the party in professional aspects for a long time. Maybe this modernisation signals the possibility, for the PLA to practice autonomy in aspects such as force structuring, war fighting concepts etc.

**The Contradiction** How does this modernisation drive change the relationship between the party and the PLA? A truly professional force with global reach cannot at
the same time remain a political instrument controlled by political commissars in day to day functioning. Therein, lays the contradiction. The requirement for PLA to modernise and become a truly world class fighting force is now almost irreversible as China seeks a global power status. However, it will also invariably lead to a more autonomous military thinking. The change will thus have to be managed by the political hierarchy. This contradiction may not yet be apparent to them but sooner or later the political leadership will have to contend with it.

Corruption – The Ongoing Theme
Xi Jinping has also cracked down on the prevalent corruption in the PLA. The reorganisation therefore gives him an opportunity to weed out established norms, influences and structures which permitted this corruption to flourish. It establishes a new order which can start afresh without corruption.

Nonetheless, the initiative by Xi Jinping is more about efficiency and modernisation than being about control. It also reflects the changing perception about the type of conflicts the PLA is likely to participate in the future.

Reorganisation of Military Regions
* The numbers of military regions in China have been undergoing a change in the past also. There used to be 13 military regions at a point in time till they were brought down to 11, then seven and now five. This has been an outcome of changing threat perceptions and reducing force levels. If the maps published by Economist (see map below) are correct then the three coastal military regions remain largely intact even as Chengdu and Beijing military regions are merged in other regions. The exact boundaries are not yet certain. The boundaries depicted below are yet indicative.

* The concentration of group armies are therefore likely to be more in the three coastal military commands/ zones, with them probably also commanding the three fleets.
It will be interesting to study the structures of newly evolved military commands / zones. For instance will they control the PAPF (Peoples Armed Police Force) and the militia units or if their control will be with a separate chain. Should the latter happen, then that would signal the Party's intention to control internal situation through PAPF leaving the PLA to concentrate on external threats (akin to the Indian Model). If it happens it will be a major shift and will significantly reduce PLAs importance in maintaining the party regime. This aspect is not fully clear and needs to be watched further.

Possibly the PAPF, likely renamed as National Guard, will assume a greater role. This may mean expansion of the PAPF role to shoulder all internal security responsibilities. It may be due to the perception in the CPC, that with increasing prosperity, a Tiananmen Square type of incident is less probable. However, this line of argument may be flawed as regime change remains an existential worry for CPC, in spite of the fact that President Xi Jinping enjoys almost total power over all organs of the state.

Another major area will be to study the new chain of command for the PLAN and the PLAAF. The PLAAF/ PLAN regional HQ were so far coterminous with respective Military Regions. Will the new military commands/zones continue to have joint structures like earlier, wherein, the controls of all services are vested in a single commander or with the nomination of PLAAF and PLAN as independent services, the service HQ will have a greater operational say-specially in case of PLAN. In all likelihood the three PLAN fleets are likely to remain under the three coastal military commands / zones. This aspect is not very clear yet. But the reorganisation is not about making the military commands / zones more 'joint' as even earlier military regions were controlling elements of all the services located within their jurisdictions.

Similarly even though expeditionary capability has been desired in the latest military paper, the re-organisation of military regions does not give a clear indication as to if a specific military command/zone is to be tasked with this responsibility or all military commands/ zones will now earmark a force component for expeditionary tasks.

The reallocation of group armies will be of particular interest to India as that is likely to dictate the quantum of reserves available to the military region opposite us. Moreover the attempted reduction of 300000 troops may entail some downsizing of fighting units. Mere reduction in HQ may not result in such massive reduction. These details are yet to emerge.

Primarily there are three land borders of military significance – i.e. With India, Russia and Vietnam. All three are grouped with different military zones.

The Western Zone which merged the erstwhile Lanzhou and Chengdu MRs will have large swathe of territory, as also the responsibilities for the longest land borders. They may also have the trouble prone regions of Xinxiang and Tibet under them. The Western Zone with more than one third of China's land based military, represents a strengthened military formation. Gen Zhao Zongqui, the new Commander of the Western zone is an old Tibet hand, having served in Tibet as Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff during the period 1984-2004. His stance on Tibet is unlikely to be soft.
* Indian land borders are now only with Western military zone. This will be probably more efficient from a Chinese perspective as they can have better synergy and orchestrate interplay between application of forces on our Western and Eastern sectors. This particularly is of relevance as the Chinese are strategically on interior lines. India on the other hand, has limited strategic synergy between its Western and Eastern Sectors, being on exterior lines.

* USA has strategic commands with the entire globe divided under their jurisdiction. However, even with an expeditionary thought, China has limited the geographical boundaries of the newly created theatre commands/zones “Within China”, even when it is clear that the Central, Eastern and Southern Theatre Commands/Zones are likely tasked for contingencies “Outside China”. Most likely that the Southern Theatre Command/ Zone is likely to be tasked for the IOR, even as the Central and Eastern Theatre Commands/Zones are likely to look at Pacific Ocean. The specific jurisdictions need to be ascertained further.

**PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force**

As brought out above there is considerable emphasis on development of asymmetrical capabilities such as space, missile capabilities, nuclear deterrence, cyber warfare etc. The creation of the PLA Rocket Force gives further fillip to this effort and ensures synergy of resources. China has already tested capabilities such as anti-satellite weapons. The status of a service also gives the rocket force more autonomy to develop concepts and doctrines. It also signals China’s reliance on this service as a battle winning factor. While remaining a part of PLA ( ie Army ), or any other service, there may have been a conflict of interests wherein, the senior officers of that service may have tried to retain their relevance, at times at the cost of development of the missile and nuclear deterrence. The conventional missile deterrence will also become more effective as warheads can be interchanged as per requirement. Thus, the delivery means become common under a single agency.

Similarly the PLA strategic support force also brings under a unified command structure, diverse elements such as cyber warfare capability as also intelligence gathering. This again will help in better development of force structures, doctrinal concepts as also certain independent funding and autonomy. This will also be of help to bolster their expeditionary capabilities. While these may appear insignificant spin offs, in effect they will make a considerable difference.

The moot point of course still remains to discern their likely distribution or deployment as also operational command parameters which at the moment are unclear.

**Miscellaneous Restructuring**

There were also unconfirmed reports about other restructurings such as doing away with the divisional HQ and having only brigades under the group armies. It is unclear whether this has been implemented or is being contemplated as phase 2 of the restructuring. However, all armies have grappled with this thought at some time or the other as certain distinct advantages and disadvantages accrue. The advantages can range from faster decision making, better management of reserves, flatter and leaner organisation etc. On the other hand the group army HQ will
have to be enhanced and becomes unwieldy. The decision making also becomes that much centralised with no buffer in case of a wrong decision.

The restructuring is likely to continue alongside modernisation as has been repeatedly emphasized by Xi Jinping. Recently China had also announced a National Security Commission to combat Terrorism, extremism and separatism. This did not get much attention as this was overshadowed by the declarations on military restructuring. The PAPAF / National Guard are also likely to work under a new set of laws even permitting their overseas deployment. Again this has not got much media coverage but has wide ranging implications for the internal security dynamics as also likely deployment of Chinese paramilitary as well as their regular troops to protect Chinese interests abroad.

**Modernisation Trends**

In the implementation of the military strategic guideline in the new situation, China’s armed forces must closely centre around the CPC’s goal of building a strong military, respond to the state’s core security needs, aim at building an informationized military and winning informationized wars, deepen the reform of national defence and the armed forces in an all-round way, build a modern system of military forces with Chinese characteristics, and constantly enhance their capabilities for addressing various security threats and accomplishing diversified military tasks.

1) **Nuclear Weapons**– The doctrine of NFU has been further nuanced by China but in real terms there has been no major change. The nuclear forces have been further networked with respect to their command, control and communications enabling a better and faster mobilisation and deployment. As far as the Land-Based Platforms are concerned, there has been a growing number of DF-21 D with a range of 1500 Kms. These can be used for both conventional and nuclear warheads. Additional DF 31s with 11200 Km range are also likely to be inducted. DF 41 with MIRV capabilities are also being developed, as also new generation mobile missiles. Since China’s nuclear force is for second strike and conventional missiles for offensive first strike, hence now its conventional missiles make up the bulk of China’s ballistic missile, and their growth has been much faster than the nuclear forces. They are also emulating the Americans and developing the ‘Global Strike Precession’ missiles.

As far as the development of the triad is concerned they have tried to develop their sea based platforms for power projections. This has been the area of maximum development. The Jin Class SSBN Type 094-3+5 have been fitted with JL2 SLBM (7,400 km) improving Chinese triad capability as also enhancing the capability to target any part of American mainland. China in the next decade is likely to develop SSBN (Type 096)/ Type 095 (SSGN)-as also Guided Missile Attack Submarine Land Attack Capability (ASCM-ASCM/LACMs).

The Liaoning aircraft carrier has been shifted to Yuchi Naval base in Northern Sea Fleet. It will have an operational air wing soon. China is planning additional aircraft carriers for power projection, patrolling of SLOCs and high profile naval diplomacy. This is in keeping with the Chinese expeditionary mind-set. The PLAN (Air Wing) is further improving its offshore strike capability with a view to prevent the American aircraft carriers from closing in. In addition a number of new destroyers and frigates are also being
developed with enhanced capabilities. The HOUBEL Class ASCM has been fitted with wave piercing missile boats.

2) Air & Air Defence. These are the elite services/arms getting enhanced focus for modernisation. The modernisation process includes procuring SU 35 Flanker ac from Russia, producing fifth generation fighters (J20 and J31 like US F-35 by 2018. The Developed H6-K are being developed with the capability to carry LACMs. The testing of Y 20 large transport aircraft is also being carried out. Induction of UAVS to undertake long range Recce & strike operations has taken place. Acquisition of SA-X-21b (S-400) SAM System (400 km) and extend range of domestic CSA-9 8AM beyond 200 Km are some other developments. Building informationised military for credible A2AD capability is the next step. This will include capability to defend own information system & disrupt that of enemy. Development of further Electronic Counter Measures and radars will permit simultaneous operations on land, air, water, under water, cyber space, information domain, counter space and kinetic operations, under realistic battlefield conditions.

3) Space Capabilities. The developments here include counter communication, intelligence recce & EW Satellites. Examples of this being launch of Kuaizhou (Quick Vessel) - for launch of small satellites in low earth orbit and the Space Launch Vehicle (Long March 11) for speedy entry into space. China is also likely to resume launching of Beidou NAVSAT with a global constellation capability by 2020. The focus remains on space launch vehicles and manned space programme.

4) Building Defence Industry. This sees further cooperation between state enterprises (Shipbuilding Corporation & Industry Corporation). The aircraft carrier programme is also a part of this. The aim is to make the ground weapons of world standard and improve upon the turbo engine technology. To improve otherwise limited infrastructure and experience for the production of large body commercial and military aircraft. Concurrently foreign technology acquisition is also being carried out. The focus is on engines, solid state electronics and processors, guidance & control systems, precision machine tools, advanced diagnostic & forensic equipment, computer assisted design, manufacturing & engineering. Priorities include three-dimensional maritime environmental monitoring technologies, for fast, multi-parameter ocean floor survey technologies, and deep-sea operations technologies; also development of chemical and solid laser state technologies to field a weapon-grade system ultimately from ground-based and airborne platforms.

Conclusion

In summation, the recently published defence white paper gave an indication of the likely direction of reorganisation and reforms in PLA. China now perceives itself to be a strategic ‘Equal’ of the United States. Thus it seeks for itself not only a much larger economic global footprint but also a global military presence akin to USA. This entails a greater force projection capability, an expeditionary strategy as also modernisation of its forces. China today perceives much lesser threats from its land frontiers. The only country capable of a credible land based threat is Russia with which its relations are improving. On the other hand sea borne threat, unresolved issue of Taiwan as also
disputes in East and South China Sea make it look seawards. An enhanced global stature also makes it incumbent to lay greater emphasis on services like PLAN which provide expeditionary capabilities. The Chinese adventurism into the South China Sea, building of the artificial islands and claiming them as their sovereign territory, announcing of A2AD measures etc is likely to grow in the foreseeable future. It is in keeping with China’s ambition of being able to increase its area of influence up to the second island chain and beyond. China’s area of interest already includes the entire globe.

As far as India is concerned by bringing the Qinghai region in the Western zone, PLA has facilitated the rapid induction and deployment of high altitude acclimatised and trained troops not only into Tibet but possibly into Ladakh for any contingencies. We need to factor this aspect also into our mobilisation / operational plans. Should the Western Zone get involved in protecting the Chinese assets in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, then its troops will be ranged across us on our Western, Northern and Eastern Commands. Thus this needs further study.

End Notes


2. ibid


