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

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NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

LT GEN AM VOHRA PVSM (Retd)

SINCE the assessment of the military threat published in the Jan-Mar 1981 issue of this Journal, the spill over effect of super power rivalry in West Asia and South East Asia has highlighted the influence that the interests of Super Powers have on our relations with our neighbours and consequently on our national security.

The eighties have had an ominous start. The precarious balance in the Gulf region, has been upset by the overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the move in of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The super power confrontation has become accentuated and our region has become the major conflict centre. The competitive build up in the Indian Ocean has further increased. The littoral powers are under pressure to provide bases or facilities for replenishment, rest and recreation. They are likely to get involved in the manoeuvres of super powers to contain each other and gain a position of geopolitical advantage.

In 1980-1981 there has been a lot of activity towards normalisation of Indo-Pak and Sino-Indian relations albeit of preliminary or investigative nature. It is important to analyse the national security perspective in light of these and the general regional environment as well as super power interests.

SUPER POWER INTERESTS

The USA is very sensitive to the possibility of interruption of the flow of oil from the Gulf. The West as well as Japan are also dependent on this oil. In 1978, 40% of the world production of oil was from the Gulf states. The 8 littoral states around the Gulf hold over 60% of the known oil reserves of the world. Since after World War II, the United States have endeavoured to be the dominant power in the Gulf and have tried to contain USSR along its southern boundary with Iran and Afghanistan. The removal of the Shah from Iran and the move of Soviet divisions into Afghanistan have upset this precept. In fact since the late fifties Soviet influence was preponderant in Iraq and Syria and is so now in South Yemen. This contest for influence in this region is at its climax presently. To ensure capability of effective military presence in the Gulf, the USA is trying to establish a 'strategic consensus' from Egypt to Pakistan. The USSR is wooing Iraq and will ensure a satellite government in Afghanistan. The future of Iran is as uncertain as the fate of the present government in Teheran.

In the past, the Western alliance based its strategy in the Gulf on the 'twin pillars' of Saudi Arabia and Iran. With the revolution in Iran one of the pillars has collapsed. The USA would like Pakistan to take its place. Pakistan's port of Gwadar at the entrance to the Gulf of Oman would give the USA a base in the region. Equally, Pakistani military presence is likely to be acceptable to Saudi Arabia and other littoral sheikhdoms. Negotiations are believed to have taken place for the stationing of 2 or 3 Pakistani divisions in Saudi Arabia as a part of its National Guards.

The arming of Pakistan by the USA is a show of force; a signal to the USSR. So are the other measures such as the build up of the US naval strength, the development of Diego Gracia base and the creation of the RDF (Rapid Deployment Force). Although Pakistan is not in position to contest any southward move should the Soviets plans visualise such a move, it is a key element of Washington's strategy in the Gulf. Similarly the RDF is not so much to take on the Russians but rather to establish the US presence in the littoral states should local developments make this necessary.

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

Pakistan has its own reasons for accepting aid from the USA. It bolsters an unpopular regime and it gives its military rulers an opportunity to build a 'position of strength'. Should the role in Saudi Arabia materialise, it will give Pakistan a look into the petro-dollar resources of the region to obtain arms 'off the shelf' before US aid materialises in Oct 1982. Pakistan has denied that it has agreed to provide any bases or facilities to the USA and has stated that it would like to retain its non-aligned status. It has also stated that it won't act as a conduit for arms to Afghan 'rebels'. However, there has to be some *quid pro quo* for the expected pumping in of US arms, acknowledged or a secret understanding between the countries concerned.

Indian Foreign Minister, Mr Narasimha Rao's Jun visit to Pakistan was hailed as constructive as it was hoped that it would lead to confidence building measures. In the light of Gen Zia-ul-Haq's admission to Indian correspondents on 9 Jun 1981 that there was a strong feeling in Pakistan that India was not reconciled to its creation, Mr Rao's categorical assurance of India's commitment to Pakistan's integrity and sovereignty should be reassuring. However, hot on the heels of India's Foreign Minister came Mr James T Buckley, US Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance to negotiate arms aid. After this visit, it transpired that the aid would materialise shortly and is of the order so as to give 'Pakistan a qualitative and quantitative superiority on our Western front. This will necessitate matching measures by India and an arms race will be the outcome. An arms race is hardly conducive to confidence building measures. The process of normalisation is therefore a non-starter.

India has more than one border to look after. On the Western front we have never had more than parity. 'The Military Balance 1980-1981' shows both India and Pakistan with an order of battle of two armoured and sixteen infantry divisions. However, it is believed that Pakistan has increased the strength of its army from six to eight corps with twenty-four divisions of which only four are earmarked for the Afghanistan border.

Pakistan is reported to be shopping for 500 to 1000 M 60 tanks and a similar number of M 113 Infantry combat vehicles, a large number of TOW anti tank and Hawk SAM missiles, 50 to 100 armed helicopters 500 to 1000 pieces of medium guns and 300 anti aircraft guns. For its airforce it has bid for 100 to 200 F 16 fighter bombers and 4 submarines as well as 12 missile boats for its navy and some other naval warships. We have to carefully look out for what arms and equipment is actually supplied, what is its effect on the total strength of Pakistan's armed forces and in what time frame. The numbers quoted above are not for replacement or modernisations. Equally, Pakistan has recently refurbished its M 47/48 tanks and its APC/ICV presently also is M 113. So, on all counts its objective is to build up new formations as it did in the 1950s during the Eisenhower era when USA equipped five divisions of Pakistan Army. It is likely that the increase of six divisions from eighteen to twenty four mentioned earlier will absorb bulk of this equipment which will also add to its field branch and antiaircraft artillery as well as other support elements like the Army Air Corps with additional armed helicopters. The airforce and naval strength will also be considerably increased. It is the comprehensive look at the arms build up of the three services and the time frame in which it will become effective that concerns us and not only the induction of F 16 fighter bombers that is being played up by some lay commentators.

Pakistan's nuclear programme also supports the position of strength scenario. Denials by President Zia-ul-Haq or his Foreign Minister fail to carry conviction against the mass of evidence to the contrary. Commenting on Senate Democratic Whip, Mr Alan Cranston's statement that Pakistan will be able to make nuclear weapons by the end of 1982, a Regan Administration spokesman observed that a nuclear explosion is not imminent but that Pakistan would be in a position to explode a nuclear device in two or three years time depending on several factors. In its Annual Report for 1980, the London based International Institute of Strategic Studies has observed that with large scale financial backing for the nuclear project from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is pressing ahead with its nuclear programme for the production of enriched uranium and plutonium. The preparation of a desert site in Baluchistan has revived anxiety over the possibility of an Islamic bomb in Pakistan's hand before long.

Although the USA is building up Pakistan's military potential to contain the USSR as a part of its 'strategic consensus' and for Pakistan to act as the policeman in the Gulf, Gen Alexander Haig, the US

Secretary of State has recently acknowledged that Pakistan requires an arms build up to achieve position of strength against India. When questioned about the threat to Pakistan, he mentioned India is a country that Pakistan is threatened by. Left to ourselves, India and Pakistan may see the wisdom of good neighbourly relations and the need to cut down defence expenditure to boost development. However, the influence of global designs of the Super Powers has added to our mutual suspicion. An arms race appears inevitable and will certainly run into 1985, the year the US military aid is programmed upto. Production of atomic weapons by Pakistan will extend this race to the nuclear field also. In these circumstances of arms build up, any, differences that develop are unlikely to be solved by negotiations. There is therefore an increased potential for hostilities.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Relations with China have been somewhat relaxed for over a year now. In a number of interviews given to Indian journalists, Chinese leaders have talked about the desirability of improving relations with India. Mr Huang Hua met Mrs Gandhi at Salisbury in Apr 1980 and she had a meeting with Mr Hua Guofeng at Belgrade in May when he was still the Prime Minister. In the Apr 1981 meeting with Dr Subramaniam Swamy, MP. Mr Deng Xiaoping said that we have had 2,000 years of good relationship and we should have more friendship and co-operation.

The Chinese position on the border dispute has so far remained unchanged. Mr Wang Bin Nan, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee stated in an interview with the Editor of *Vikrant* in July 1980 in Beijing that according to the so-called McMahon Line, the Indian Government claims 90,000 sq kms of Chinese territory. Apart from this 40,000 sq kms of territory in Western Sector, which was under our control, is also claimed (Aksai Chin). If the Indian Government insists on both their claim in the Eastern and the Western Sectors, the question cannot be solved." Mr Deng Xiaoping also referred to the package deal in his interview with Dr Swamy but added that until that can be settled, let us develop contacts in other fields.

China has strong ties with Pakistan and has rendered extensive military aid to that country. For example, in 1977 of the total strength 30 armoured regiments in the Pakistan Army, 19 were equipped with T 59 tanks from China. On the 'Kashmir issue' China has always supported Pakistan. Insurgency in Nagaland and Mizoram has been actively supported and the Chinese established training camps for the rebels in Yunnan where they were trained and provided with Chinese arms and ammunition. The movement of gangs continued certainly until 1978. Lately the Chinese are reported to have informed India that aid to the rebels in Nagaland and Mizoram is a thing of the past.

Inspite of the relaxation in bilateral issues, views on points of difference continue to be fairly rigid. There is, in addition, the question of third country relations; the Kampuchean issue and more so our relation with Russia. The recognition of the Heng Samrin regime was commented upon in the *People Daily*, Beijing, as a stupid decision that drags Indian government's international prestige in the dust. Our Soviet connection is also highly irksome.

Strains of the traditional Chinese posture of consciousness of the mantle leadership are discernable even in the record of Deng-Swamy interview on issues such as Sikkim, improving relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal ("We have contact with them and we hear their views about you and their relations with you") and India being influenced by third countries. This attitude makes the path of normalisation somewhat harder.

Development in Tibet have considerably increased the Chinese military potential in that region. The pipeline to the mainland is operative and the railway line is nearing completion. These and the development of new airfields and roads give China the capacity to sustain operations on the Indo-Tibet border by 21 divisions for 70 days. All the same, the probability of a large scale attack across the Himalayas is militarily unlikely. Even if relations deteriorate over the border dispute or over third country issues, China is likely to resort to subversive activity and any overt military action would be restricted to a peripheral hostilities *a la* 1962.

China is preoccupied with its internal political and economic problems. The power struggle continues, the aftermath of the trial of the gang of four, the tension between the Party and the PLA over de-Maoisation and economic problems which have led to modernisation plans, make the period ahead a difficult one requiring the total attention of the Chinese leadership.

In the field of external affairs also there are issues which have brought about a modicum of fluidity in the Sino-Soviet-US relationship. Shared hostility *vis a vis* Russia is the binding force bringing the USA and China together. However, the thorny Taiwan issue cannot be left in the background and may even make China play the Russian card. Similarly, certain compulsion may make Pakistan mend their fences with Russia. In view of these options, the Chinese appreciate the value of stability in Sino-Indian relations.

The Delhi-visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Mr Huang Hua from 26-29 Jun has helped in further relaxing the relationship. It has also emphasised that the discussion of the border dispute is an essential aspect of the process of normalisation. It has been agreed to hold talks to resolve the border issue and at the same time take measures to improve general relations. It is hoped that greater cultural, scientific, technical and economic exchanges will improve the atmosphere for border discussion.

The border issue is a complex matter not capable of any easy solution but in the bilateral environment likely to prevail in the foreseeable future, belligerency in Sino-Indian relationship is unlikely.

BANGLADESH

The armed forces of Bangladesh are in a formative stage and it would be consolidating its Army's strength at five divisions in the foreseeable future. The present strength of the air force is only 27 aircrafts and that of the navy 4 frigates, 4 patrol crafts and 4 patrol boats. Bangladesh is therefore not much of a military power and does not pose any threat to our national security by itself.

Differences over the pressing question of sharing the Ganges water, the land and maritime boundary and sovereignty of the New Moore Island, in the estuary of the border river Haribanga appear to defy a solution. The last issue has been in the news lately as gunboats and patrol craft of Bangladesh and India were turned out.

The lack of any special relationship between India and Bangladesh so soon after the establishment of this country with India's help is a reflection of third country influence on bilateral relations as also on the suspicion and subjective considerations of points of difference. As a result Bangladesh is turning to China. China opposed the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. However, in 1978 it gave a credit of Rs. 9 million and offered a long term credit of Rs. 4.40 million during the late President Zia-ul-Rahman, second visit in Jul 1980. It is the Chinese connection that would necessitate our taking defensive measures on the Bangladesh border in case of hostilities with China. With prospects of non-belligerency with China, our border with Bangladesh should remain quiescent.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

The deteriorating relations among the super powers have led to tension in our region and has significantly influenced our national security issues. Whether the 'strategic consensus' that Gen Haig has in mind comes into being wholly or partially, the developments in the Gulf region are likely to lead to Pakistan building itself militarily as it did in the fifties in the Eisenhower era. If this happens, an arms race on the sub-continent is inevitable. Logically our joint objective should be to defuse problems on the diplomatic plane and create an atmosphere for mutual balanced reduction of forces. The opposite is however, likely to happen in view of the build up in Pakistan.

Fortunately there appears to be some scope for building on the relaxed atmosphere in our relations with China. Chinese attitude on the border dispute seems to be rigid. They are however fully involved in their internal problems. Having got the use of the road to Sinkiang, they have no pressing need or urgency to settle the border dispute. At the same

time there appears to be an appreciation of the advisability of establishing stability in Sino-Indian relations. To the extent the present relaxed atmosphere is maintained or improved upon, the threat to national security from China will diminish. In such circumstances, the question of any threat from Bangladesh will not arise.

Super power relations are in a flux. The confrontation in the Gulf has added to the instability of the region. European members of the Western alliance would like negotiations on arms control to be resumed and not shut the doors on detente. Summit talks may take place within a year or so but on present indications, attitudes are not likely to soften. Consequently, tension with Pakistan is likely to increase and that country constitutes the major threat to our national security once it builds up its strength with American arms.

MARITIME STRATEGY

VICE ADMIRAL RL TAHILIANI, AVSM

INTRODUCTION

Maritime strategy is the total response of a nation to the oceans around it. Sea power is that part of the Maritime Strategy with which a nation attempts to achieve predetermined economic and political goals. Sea power has both physical and psychological elements. Among the physical elements are included the geographic position and the size of a nation, the size of its merchant marine, its fighting navy, its ships building potential, etc. Among the psychological factors are included things like the character of the people and the Government and their attitude towards the oceans.

From a beginning when man explored the oceans out of a spirit of adventure, to the time when he used the seas for trade and commerce and later to carry troops to distant lands for political ends of conquering those nations, a great deal has happened to colour the concept of maritime strategy. In addition to the conventional uses of the seas, today, more than ever before, men and nations have come to realise their vital stakes in the oceans. This is because of the immense mineral wealth in the sea beds, in addition to oil and fish, which the resource hungry world badly needs.

This article discusses the changing significance of elements of sea power and suggest a maritime strategy for India.

Elements of Sea Power and Their Changing Significance

THE first and foremost element of sea power is the size and geographic location of a nation. History bears ample testimony to the fact that only those nations which have been surrounded by water and have had to use the seas for their survival and prosperity have been able to create the other required elements of sea power. However much a nation may so desire, it is clearly impossible for land-locked countries, like Switzerland or Nepal, to ever aspire to create elements of sea power. Whether this sea power is as relevant today for the prosperity of a nation is another matter, but the fact remains that only countries with coast lines and oceans around them can aspire to create elements of sea power. Needless to say, its significance is as important today as it has ever been before.

The next element in the creation of the sea power is harbours, ports and bases. Here again, it is obvious that having a coast line washed by the oceans is meaningless unless it is dotted with ports and harbours which give a nation the ability to transfer efficiently and in a short time goods and men from land transportation systems to sea transport and *vice versa*. Having bases in territories other than one's own, is only relevant if one wishes to exercise naval power in distant areas. Bases abroad are no longer necessary for preferential commerce as was the case a couple of hundred years ago.

The introduction of giant transport planes in the 40s and 50s made some people think that ports and harbours would not be as critical to a nation's trade as they had been up to that time. Nothing of sort has happened. The amount of merchant shipping necessary for transporting goods across the oceans has continued to grow. The scope and size of modern economies makes it inescapable that the merchant marines continue to expand and with that the requirements of ports and harbours. The levels of sophistication in handling cargo from a small gunny bag being carried by a coolie to giant containers being off-loaded by cranes continues to grow but the importance of ports and harbours has not diminished one bit, nor is this likely to happen.

In order not to handicap unduly, the economies of the land-locked nations, international and bilateral agreements provide these land-locked nations, harbour and port facilities in their neighbouring countries. This has significance for their economic growth but can obviously not contribute to the creation of sea power.

The size of the merchant marine is an important factor in sea power. The ability of a nation to use the seas for its own purpose is directly related to the size of its merchant fleet. However, in a multi-polar world today, the size of the merchant marine does not have the same significance as an element of sea power as it did hitherto. A country like United States with its size and resources has a very modest merchant fleet compared to a smaller country like Japan or perhaps even a tiny country like Norway. The growth of flags of convenience has undermined the image creating potential of national merchant marine.

THE FIGHTING NAVY

The most important element of sea power is the fighting Navy. Perhaps no other single factor contributes as much to the totality of a nation's sea power as its navy does. In a world which has changed markedly after the Second World War, it is only proper that strategists in every country keep asking the question: Why do we need a Navy? The reason for this is that people seem to think that since political occupation from sea as happened in the eighteenth century is no longer possible, one could dispense with the navies and have only coast guards. It is not

generally appreciated that in the modern world, naval strategy is as concerned with furthering national interests short of war as its historic function of contributing to victory in war.

In these changed circumstances, it is surprising that the old problem of how much to spend on naval forces has become more frustrating. This is partly the result of the fact that the old yardstick, the test of major war is increasingly perceived to be a distant possibility (though all admit that it is a possibility). The requirements of major war still provide some yardstick, because of the need to deter that very eventuality. However, in a deterrent situation where war is indivisible, it is obviously much more difficult to answer the question, 'how much is enough?' These problems are intensified because of the soaring costs of ships and aircraft and because all these are seen to be in competition with other developmental and welfare programmes. How much to spend on guns and how much on butter has always been a difficult question; it becomes more difficult each day and this trend must inevitably continue. This places increased responsibilities on the white uniformed individuals and makes our task none too easy.

In those who are charged with the responsibility of balancing the nation's budget, and who see the war as an increasingly remote risk, the desire for high insurance slackens. When considering the insurance quality of a fighting navy, it is always important to remember that the appropriate analogy is not with life insurance in which an individual's family receives benefits after his death, or fire insurance in which a family or business receives some recompence after a calamity; instead the valid analogy is with the kind of insurance provided by locks on houses and police forces against criminals. In such cases, unlike life insurance, there is some relationship between the amount spent (assuming it is spent on good equipment which is properly used) and the likelihood of the threat materialising and the degree of calamity experienced.

The utility of navies naturally varies from state to state. Only a few have the resources to use their navies in support of their foreign policy in distant seas; the majority are interested in exercising their naval power only within their own coastal waters. However, as more and more states become conscious of the wealth in the "common heritage of mankind", interest in the use of the seas grows. From an era where most nations were inward looking, we are fast arriving at the era when lots of nations are looking out at the seas. This explains why the more numerous and underdeveloped countries with no worthwhile fighting potential at sea have stood together and made common cause at the Laws of the Seas Conference.

Traditionally the great naval powers have been the 'producers' of international order at sea. While many states may seem to be interested in an active sense, only in what happens immediately off their shores, many more are interested at least in a passive sense to what happens up to

200 n.m. in their exclusive economic zone and beyond. Whatever a particular state's attitude to the on-going order at sea—whether it wants to challenge it, suffer it, defer to it or enjoy it—its ability to employ the use of force at sea will have some bearing on the success or not of its diplomacy in specific instances. If states make no effort in the naval field, they must be willing to face the possibility that important sea areas may be dominated by adversaries or potential adversaries. If one is interested in order at sea of one's own liking, one has to be prepared to pay for it. The relationship of "no police man, no law" is as valid today as has ever been and is unlikely to change unless the world becomes Gandhian and there is not the remotest possibility of this happening in the foreseeable future.

The contrast between the different perceptions of the historic maritime powers and some smaller powers has an important implication. There has been a natural tendency, when armed forces failed to achieve a particular objective, for critics to argue that the utility of the instrument is declining. Such an argument was heard, for example, following the demonstration of force by US Warships after the seizure of Pueblo. However, one must never automatically equate failure with disutility without first asking; were the tactics right? Were there enough (or too many) warships present? Were warships the most useful response? Even if one still decides that one's warships are or were irrelevant for a certain policy objective, one nevertheless has to recognise that one of the reasons for this may have been related to the increasing usefulness of the adversary's warships. One of the reasons for the declining utility of intervention by great powers is directly related to the increasing utility of the defensive military power of smaller countries.

The "wide common" as Mahan called the sea was, during the many decades of *pax Britannica* and *pax Americana*, relatively amply, reasonably stable, little used, unpolluted and economically marginal two-thirds of the earth's surface. For a mixture of military, economic, technological and political reasons, the wide common is now much troubled. The perceptions about declining resources on land have increased the significance of resources at sea. This has accelerated technological development and made the exploitation of the sea easier. The whole issue has been galvanised by the powerful nationalism of the developing countries. This has increased the temptation of those that are technologically capable to grab what they can, and to exploit it before conditions change.

Potential Source of Conflict at Sea

The potential source of conflict are many and are by now familiar. Some of these are :

- (i) Problems resulting from the depletion of non-renewable resources on land, especially oil. It is hardly surprising that the oil problem has caused disputes about jurisdiction over the

continental shelf between, amongst others, Greece and Turkey, Indonesia and Vietnam, Japan and Taiwan.

(ii) Problems arising as an result of the increasing importance of the sea as a source of foodstocks, as world population increases. Intensified exploitation threatens both traditional patterns of fishing and present catches. This in turn stimulates efforts to protect stocks and livelihood; such a situation almost inevitably results in disputes, such as the 'cold wars' between Britain and Iceland. Disputes about fishing rights have been a regular feature of maritime affairs in many parts of the world, and there is reason to suppose that they will increase rather than decrease.

(iii) Problems resulting from the new technologies. These are making new exploitation possible and old tasks easier. New fixed systems are frequently a cause and a result of this exploitation. In turn, oil and gas rigs, pipelines and cables can cause legal and military problems.

(iv) Problems resulting from the military uses of the seas, including the use of fixed systems for submarine surveillance, the tensions associated with the cat-and-mouse activity of anti-submarine warfare, and the dangers involved in the operation of fleets in close proximity.

(v) Problems arising from the claims which have been growing about the territorial sea and exclusive economic zones; these affect the rights of ships, especially warships, passing through a number of major shipping straits. Troubles may arise if coastal states extend their powers of regulation, and especially if they close off important areas of what was hitherto regarded as high sea. A principal example in this respect is the Indonesian archipelagic concept of internal waters. States making such claims will obviously improve their bargaining strength if they can support their legal claims with naval power, be it only a minimal force such as Iceland's gunboats.

(vi) Problems arising from challenges to the existing character of international law, and from the problems which may result from differing interpretations, ambiguities and claims concerning whatever agreements materialise.

(vii) In addition to these newer problems, there are also many of the traditional ones, such as the need to protect neutrality in crises and war. In recent times these problems have been witnessed as a result of the US action during the Cuban missile crises, and US mining of North Vietnam.

(viii) Finally, it is not only the 'common' that is troubled, but also the lands around it. The propensity for disorder in the years ahead is very high, because of economic, political, social and military strains in many parts of the world. Some of the conflicts which result can be expected to spill over on to the sea.

SHIP BUILDING INDUSTRY

Although a nation may not have a very large merchant marine, it must have the ability to build, maintain, and modernise its war ships. It would

be inconceivable to think of a nation which could not build its own war ships as having the ability to boast about sea power. Hence, while economic and other factors may necessitate a nation having to build and operate a comparatively modest size of a merchant marine, however, its ability to build war ships has to be commensurate with its needs and goals for sea power.

Psychological Factors

The attitude and approach of the people and the Government to the seas has an important bearing on sea power. In the days of sail, it was obviously important that the people be, what came to be called, sea faring people. The elements of nature, like wind and tide, required this special attribute amongst the people in order to be able to feel at ease at sea. Modern day ships and navigational methods do not make it so imperative that this psychological factor be positive.

More than the individual's sea faring quality, what is required now is the psychological approach of Government to matters relating to the seas. Nations which are slow to grasp the significance and the potential for both conflict and wealth in the oceans in the decades ahead, would be psychologically unprepared for the kind of future shock that lies in store for them. Taken in their totality, therefore, the elements of sea power have not changed. What has changed, however, is the relative importance of each.

Changes Since Mahan

No discussion on maritime strategy can be complete without mention of Mahan. In the foregoing discussion, the changes in the significance of elements of sea power that have come about in the last few decades were spelt out. A few other factors which are different from the way Mahan figured them are : One.—Free use of the seas for commerce and transits in peace time (except in unusual cases) a matter of convention and usage and not national power or naval power. Two, World politics are fundamentally different in today's post-colonial and indeed anti-colonial era. In Mahan's days, Cuba could not have existed as it does today. Concept of power in the world is changing in nature, depending more on economics and resources than on the familiar military and territorial elements. Three. Small powers can impose high costs in conflict with much larger states. A good example of this is Vietnam. The three factors combined make it obvious that there is much less relative advantage today in being a great power. This factor is of great relevance to nations like India trying to chart out their own maritime strategy.

The Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy

Naval diplomacy is carried out by means of five basic tactics. The first two tactics, standing demonstration of naval power and specific

operational deployments represent what can be termed as naval power politics ; the rest, naval aid, operational visits and goodwill visits are naval influence politics. There is a considerable degree of inter-relationship between these two types of tactics and the dividing line between naval power politics and naval influence politics is not easily drawn.

All naval deployments for diplomacy do not necessarily achieve the object that is set out for them. A policy of bluff can have unfortunate results if the test of performance cannot be avoided. The reverberations for Britain's political standing in Asia of the sinking of the 'Prince of Wales' and the 'Repulse' in 1941 far exceeded the intrinsic loss of these warships. Likewise the US Seventh Fleet's foray into the Bay of Bengal in 1971 proved to be counter-productive and created for the US a great deal of ill-will in India and elsewhere.

In naval diplomacy, prestige, credibility and deterrence are closely inter-related. Port visits as a tactic in enhancement of naval prestige are a more complex activity than formerly. They require handling with greater discrimination because of the great political changes which have taken place in the last twenty years. One man's goodwill visit may well be another man's gunboat diplomacy. And gunboat diplomacy is definitely counter-productive in today's anti-colonial era where all nations are highly nationalistic in outlook.

Today, with the relative decline in the significance of naval power, with the end of overt imperialism and with the declining utility of force for territorial conquest in many situations, it is sometimes believed that the naval factor is not as significant as formerly when defining the threat for most countries. Most third world countries, for example, probably fear the alleged neo-colonialism of the multi-national company, rather more than they fear punishment from the sea in the form of bombardment etc. Base facilities and oil are the two most obvious factors causing the militarily strong to be dependent to some extent on the militarily weak. Valuable possessions transform the militarily weak into potential military targets. Hence the relative importance of the naval factor in the overall assessment of threat is a function of the countries foreign policy and maritime interests.

The arrival of warships dramatises a country's foreign policy. However, by providing such power in evidence, warships can exacerbate relations, even with countries with whom the possibility of hostilities seems remote. Naval Diplomacy today is a far more difficult task and has to be performed with discrimination and tact.

Importance of the Indian Ocean

Historically, the Indian Ocean has been comparatively free from conflict. However, the happenings in the last couple of years have made

it a centre of super power rivalry. As a result of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the areas of influence between the Super Powers in Europe are clearly delineated. This is a stabilising factor. The Atlantic and the Pacific and to some extent the Mediterranean where the super power rivalry was intense are no longer the hot spots of world tension. Today because of the happenings in Iran and later in Afghanistan, super power rivalry in this part of the world has become intense. The other factors which contribute to the potential for conflict are :

- (a) By and large the littoral states surrounding the Indian Ocean belong to the third World non-aligned group, and
- (b) The political regimes in some of these are either monarchist or dictatorial and inclined to be unstable. This lends an edge to the Super Power competition for influence in these areas.

The economic factors which lend importance to the Indian Ocean are mainly centered around the sea routes which pass through it and particularly the oil traffic from West Asia to Japan in the east and to Europe in the West. Many of the industrialised countries in the world, with the possible exception of the United States, and the USSR, (and more recently the UK and the Norway who have tapped off-shore oil) would have their economies paralysed if this oil jugular vein was to be cut off. The United States and its allies fear that the Russian bear which is sitting to the north of this ocean would attempt to cut off this oil jugular vein. Hence they try and justify the creation of the rapid deployment force. Whether the R.D.F. is a response to the Russian presence in Afghanistan or an instrument to seize gulf oil fields should need arise is a debatable point. The importance of the Indian Ocean to India economically needs no elaboration. As our economic infrastructure grows, our dependence on imports and our need for exports to pay for them must inevitably grow. Our island territories, our off-shore assets, to say nothing to the fish and mineral wealth in the ocean makes it necessary that we, as a nation, turn towards the Indian Ocean and direct our energies in such a manner that our economic progress continues unhampered.

Our Maritime Strategy

Since maritime strategy is the total response of the nation to the oceans around it, what should be this total response of India in this field ? At the policy making level, we must create a co-ordinating body at the highest level of the country which will take a total view of our maritime strategy. This body, let us call it a Maritime Management Board, would have representatives on it of different disciplines, from science and technology, shipping, commerce and industry and the fighting navy. This policy making body will decide how and in what time frame we should attempt to harness and conserve our sea resources and how to protect them, till they have been exploited. As a natural corollary, the development of fisheries, shipping, ports, off-shore drilling for oil and gas and the host of other subjects

and their relative priorities would be decided by this Board. The Board would also lay down policy guidelines for the total requirements of the protective apparatus of these resources.

One of the more important factors in this total response to the oceans would be the creation of an efficient fighting navy of adequate size to safeguard our maritime interests. Of the four broad categories of navy—the Global Navy, the Ocean going Navy, the Contiguous Navy and the Coastal Navy—the Global Navy is only for powers who have interests outside their own country and the waters surrounding them; hence, we have no requirement for a Global Navy. The Coastal Navy for a large country like India, with its big coast-line and many island territories, would be prohibitively expensive to build and operate, so the Coastal Navy we also cannot afford. Our approach has to be somewhere between a Contiguous Navy and an Ocean-going Navy.

Even amongst Ocean going Navies, traditional naval thinking demands that you have forces created and allocated for inshore operations, separate for coastal defence, and then of course, the fighting fleet for the deep blue yonder. Our resources will not permit us this kind of a balanced Navy growth, with adequate number of forces for the three tiered force levels. As a nation, we have to take risks. We have to have poverty near the coast-line and punch at sea. Hence, to sum up in two words, what our naval strategy should be, it would be "the poverty and the punch."

It would, of course, be foolish to suggest that we totally neglect LND forces. Harbours like Bombay have to have LND forces to keep them open. But it would be equally foolish if we were to attempt to create LND forces for all the major ports that we have in India. Far better to invest our modest resources in creating a punch which will deter potential adversaries from attempting to interfere with our shipping or attempting to close our ports. The flexibility which a naval task force or a fleet with integral tactical air enjoys at sea is unparalleled in the other two services. We must make maximum use of this flexibility to deter attacks rather than create large defences along the coast as a deterrence.

How then do we persuade our neighbours to believe that the punch is never going to be directed at them? This is where our diplomacy comes in. Through centuries of history and civilisation, the Indian people have never had a record of attempting to dominate smaller neighbours. It would be a measure of the success or failure of our foreign policy if we were able to put across or fail in putting across this point of view.

Every nation, however, small has its own feeling of pride and independence. This is perfectly justified and the larger nations like India must respect this and encourage this. We must also go out of our way to provide a helping hand to the smaller littoral states. The smaller states would like to create adequate military forces be they Army, Navy or Airforce, to be able to safeguard their own interests. A country with a comparatively small coast would find that a defensive strategy at sea by having a coastal

navy would probably achieve the aims of defence better than attempting to invest in a powerful fleet. Whatever be the perception of individual neighbours and littoral states in the Indian Ocean, we must respect and help and create a feeling of mutual trust. On the naval side, port visits, assistance in training and in maintaining ships etc., would no doubt, forge the links between littoral states and hopefully persuade the Super Powers to quit the region one day.

CONCLUSION

Concepts of maritime strategy have been progressively modified over the centuries to fulfil felt needs of different nations. In the years ahead, the increasing economic significance of the oceans must inevitably persuade nations to focus attention on the oceans. The world instead of being ideologically divided as East West, may be more economically divided as North South. If the nations of the South are to solve their many economic and social problems, then an identity of interests in the oceans and cooperative endeavours rather than competitive ones are more likely to produce the right answers. Viewed from any angle, we have no alternative but to adopt a progressive, outward looking and forward thinking maritime strategy with all its ingredients.

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY

V.K. ANAND*

INTRODUCTION

DURING the long years of evolution, while the insurgent has developed a business-like schedule, the counter-insurgent has been often found bewildered, for unlike the conventional warfare, counter-insurgency is not standardised and against the over hundred insurrections which erupted after the Second World War, the very few counter-insurgents who found salvation had to practically charter their own courses. This has relevance only to free societies where democratic norms have to be advocated and followed against the insurgent who, ironically, is the most regimented.

With the foundations of counter-insurgency also resting on the starting points of insurgency, it is in them alone that a basis for combating insurgency can be found. Killing some insurgents and silencing the masses only provides a superficial, fragile and, often, misleading mask of success with little relevance to the realities of the situation.

The contest between the insurgent and the authorities that be is benign neither to the security forces, nor the masses. Being an all pervading struggle, it leads to a peculiar contest in which no house, man, woman or child can remain unaffected. Though every aspect of life gets shattered, all fields of human endeavour turn chaotic and the very future of the country tends to become uncertain, yet the masses cannot be treated as hostile, the insurgent enemy, and the contest war.

So much is the suffering, anarchy and confusion that it often becomes difficult for the ordinary citizen to discern as to who is fighting for his conscience, where lies the real authority and whom to support. What helps the masses to decide is the inertia of the winning side. But how can a government succeed in preventing, checking or reversing the tide of insurgency without first knowing what it is up against?

The counter-insurgent can win provided he pursues certain governing principles which on translation into objective responses can nullify the very foundations of insurgency, *i.e.*, its pre-requisites, catalysts and elements.

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Notwithstanding the general principles of war that are of universal significance, the conventional wisdom emerging out of the inter-action that took place between the contestants in Algeria, Bangladesh, China, Cyprus, Cuba, Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines and other areas during and after the Second World War helps to arrive at the following governing principles of counter-insurgency :

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

1. **Unretraceable Incumbency.** The potential insurgent, having no legal mandate but self-imposed responsibility, may not commence insurgency at all and even when he does, he is at liberty to retrace his steps on avowedly strategic or tactical considerations without much loss of face, feeling of guilt or compunction. He can also wait to select his place, time, model of insurgency and modules of attitudinal and physical matrices.

Incompatible socio-economic environments though directly responsible, may fail to generate insurgencies for indefinite periods. No major mass based flare-ups have erupted in Egypt, Nepal and many other areas where conditions have not been any better than in many countries engulfed by insurgencies. While in 1965, the broad based discontent against the Indonesian authorities turned into an insurrection-cum-coup, oddly enough inspired by President Sukarno himself, in Iran, the abdication by the Shah was caused by a revolution-cum-coup led by the religious fundamentalist Khomeini long in exile. Thus, no inter-action can be predetermined between unpalatable conditions and the nature of popular expression. Nor can the inevitability of relationship between the cause and insurgency be established. In spite of the worst conditions existing in certain areas, even a ripple of insurgency may not appear for years.

But, there is some incumbency about the counter-insurgent's moral, legal and timely obligations which can neither be postponed nor neglected. Most of the responses initiated by him, once insurgency erupts, are irreversible until he succeeds or reaches a viable settlement with the insurgent, or is defeated finally after a stalemate.

The British in Malaya won clearly. In north-eastern India, the authorities agreed to carve out a separate administrative territory of the Naga Hills District and the Tuensang Division and later raise it to the status of a full fledged state to satisfy the aspirations of an overwhelming majority.

No gainsaying that wherever insurgency erupts, the authorities respond by inducting the security forces which continue to operate until the contest reaches a conclusive end. But most of the authorities jumped into the well of counter-insurgency without realising its darkness and depth, and time and effort required to emerge out of it. That there is an inevitable and unretraceable inter-action between insurgency and counter-insurgency must be appreciated well in advance,

2. Opportune Reaction. The insurgent's ability to surprise the authorities or prolong their reaction time is indicative only of the counter-insurgent's ineptitude and inadequate preparation. To check the demands on his resources from multiplying and becoming interminable, the counter-insurgent should be able to react meaningfully at the earliest by exploiting all the options, opportunities and resource that inhibit progression of insurgency and help in the restoration of normalcy. After a decade's experience in Nagaland, a quicker and more comprehensive response in Mizoram helped to check the spread of the Mizo insurgency with lesser effort, fewer mistakes and greater confidence. But it is ideal to respond before and not after the insurgency has commenced. Though for timely action credit may never be available to the government, for how can any authority claim or justify, in a democracy, that an insurgency was imminent. For the responses to be opportune, they must not only be suitable and effective but immediate as well.

3. Localisation of Issues. The insurgent's endeavour to expand the conflict by drawing in others both in space and time has to be frustrated by denying internal and external sympathy, traffic and support by means ranging from diplomatic to military. Localisation of the issues greatly reduces the government's burden while escalation increases it. Because the insurgent's reliance on outside help would appear less susceptible to criticism than the counter-insurgent's on account of the natural sympathy flow for the apparently aggrieved, the government should itself seek only optimum foreign aid and that too as last resort.

One reason why the Naxalites in India have not been able to make any significant headway can be found in the government's ability to fragmentise the movement internally and deny outside help effectively. The 1962 Chinese attack on India accelerated the splitting up of the leftist movement and eroding the appeal of communism in the country. Had the Chinese 'volunteers' not moved into Korea and the Russia backed Cuban combatants failed to appear in Angola, the outcome of the conflict there could have been quite different.

In Malaya, where the insurgents lost decisively, no significant foreign aid could arrive for them, whereas in China and Vietnam, where the authorities were ultimately defeated, help from outside continued to flow unabated. In addition to the large quantities of arms and ammunition captured by the Chinese communists from the KMT and the Japanese, about 100,000 small arms, 1,000 aircrafts and 700 armoured vehicles were supplied by the Russians as well. The various forms of Chinese aid to Vietnam, besides the massive Russian equipment that poured in later, is alone believed to be of the order of \$20 billion.

Had Pakistan not commenced war against India in December, 1971, compelling her forces to spearhead into the then East Pakistan in the aid of the insurgents, Bangladesh might never have emerged the way it did,

4. Complex Resources. Not being an undisciplined conflict but a multifaceted and controlled revolution, insurgency can be prevented or responded to successfully only by the simultaneous prosecution of numerous integrated inputs.

If the counter-insurgent responses are measured in certain units, the percentage of military contribution would be small compared to the major input required in the cultural, social, political, economic, psychological and a variety of other fields.

The result of the 1971 crisis in the then East Pakistan where reliance was placed entirely on a spasmodic military response, could have been quite different had the economic, political and constitutional options not been inexplicably left unexploited altogether. Though caused primarily by prolonged maladministration, the recent deft handling by the officials and ingenuity of the government's flexible response leading to attrition of the agitators has, for the time being, checked the movement against 'foreigners' in Assam from spreading beyond the stage of isolated acts of sabotage.

5. Immense Inputs. The source of insurgency being lodged in the hearts and minds of the people makes it impossible for the counter-insurgent either to quantify its exact potential, extent and intensity or crush it with precisely predetermined quantums of effort. The slow, secretive and the assiduous nature of the struggle compels the counter-insurgent to deploy vast human, material and financial resources over wide areas and for periods seemingly indefinite.

The insurgency continued for 31 years in Vietnam, 22 in China, 12 in Malaya, 8 each in Algeria and Kenya, 6 in Cuba, 5 each in Greece, Cyprus and Yemen, 4 in Morocco and so on. In Nagaland and Mizoram, the security forces continue to be stationed even after 25 and 15 years of counter-insurgency operations respectively, though at a considerably reduced level.

In the Philippines, the 2.5 to 1 initial ratio, less than the conventional 3 to 1 was of little avail when even the French 10 to 1 superiority in Indo-China flopped. The British employed 40,000 soldiers against Cypriot insurgents having less than 1,000 weapons. In Algeria, 500,000 French troops were held at bay by a comparatively small insurgent force of 30,000. Almost the entire Portuguese army of 170,000 failed to subdue the insurgents in Angola, Mozambique and Genea Bissau. It was the 25 to 1 ratio that brought success for the British in Malaya where the peak figure of insurgents rose to about 9,000.

At a rate of \$2 million a day, the French in Algeria spent 25 times more than the FLN. While in Kenya the liquidation of each Mau Mau cost the British 10,000 pounds, in Malaya it cost \$200,000 per insurgent. While in the early period of involvement, about half a million dollars were being doled out annually on the 10,000 Americans stationed in South Vietnam, the price per Vietcong head rose to \$400,000. And by the time

the richest and the strongest country of all times felt compelled to leave Vietnam, the Americans had, of their own reckoning, spent \$150 billion.

While the government of Cyprus was nearly reduced to bankruptcy, almost the entire military expenditure of the Portuguese was being incurred to suppress insurgency in the colonies. The mere cost of replacing losses by air in the eastern wing started pinching Pakistan when towards the end of 1971 the figure of government casualties rose to about 40 a day.

After over two decades of counter-insurgency operations in Nagaland the breakdown of the financial outlay for the fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-79) of Rs. 834 million, nearly 28 times more than the 1956-71 Plan, comes to about Rs. 50,000 per sq.km. or Rs. 1,200 per head, one of the highest in India. The net outflow of money from London to the strife torn Northern Ireland, where about 12,000 troops are deployed, is expected to exceed \$2 billion a year.

6. Minimum Violence. To get over his general ignorance and unpreparedness and compensate for the insurgent's popularity, support and self-reliance, the counter-insurgent cannot exploit his resources and ability to unleash unlimited terror, death and destruction. Since, for success, the people have to be ultimately won back and the damage made good by the government alone, only minimum of organised violence for minimum area should be allowed to the insurgent and the counter-insurgent's own executive agencies as well.

Extortion, blackmail, falsehood and rampant corruption and maladministration as perpetrated by the KMT cannot become the instruments of a democratic system. Rape, loot, torture and killing only strengthen the peoples' resolve against the authorities and the insurgent's appeal and support.

In a short period of a few years, the Batista regime killed 11,000 Cubans with complete disdain for life. The French are suspected to have massacred 30,002 in Madagascar and 20,000 in the Algerian town of Setif, sparing only 14,000. The Portuguese proved equally trigger happy in their colonies. It was the genocide of about three million people, as alleged by Mujib, in the then East Pakistan that cast the die for the emergence of Bangladesh.

But in Malaya, not more than 1,000 casualties per year were inflicted during the peak period of operations.

The fact that in Nagaland and Mizoram months roll by without the security forces firing a single shot has considerably helped to belie the insurgent's propaganda and this super human restraint has saved many tribesmen from drifting into their lap.

7. Reconstruction and Development. As even limited insurgency creates serious problems in unlimited fields, the counter-insurgent is compelled to devise, initiate and vigorously pursue not only social reforms, rehabilitation programmes, and reconstruction schemes but also initiate nation building activities for national growth and development besides waging complex military operations.

With a mere 95,000 French and 56,000 American losses, the number of the Indo-Chinese deaths during 1945-75 is considered higher than that recorded in all the theatres of the Second World War. In Vietnam alone, the war injured or disabled one million children, orphaned 800,000 and compelled a half million women to turn prostitutes. In addition to other warlike activities, an aggregate of 7.6 million tons of bombs lobbed at Indo-China, *i.e.*, 350 per cent more than the entire Allied bombing conducted during the Second World War, shattered the rice bowl of the South-East Asia. The resultant human, social and economic problems and the intense hostility generated by the depleting goods and services, increasing scarcities, shortages and erosion of national assets—natural or man made—could snowball to such dimensions as to make any authority unsustainable.

8. **Establishment of Credibility.** To make up for the inability to effectively exploit mass involvement, psychological tools, and terroristic techniques which work better for the insurgent alone, the counter-insurgent should utilise every available moment, man, material and machine to successfully translate the national consensus into popular policies, plans and programmes on the ground. Only faith, confidence and hope generated in the masses can help the counter-insurgent's own agencies to establish rapport and credibility so essential for success. The projection of morbid scenes of Vietnam fighting on domestic viewers by the unfettered and discordant mass media played no small a role in crystallising American public opinion against their participation in the far off land and depriving the GI of a counter-cause and a will to fight.

It will be futile to motivate a starving peasant for supporting a particular society and authority under whose very system he is being already oppressed by the landlord, squeezed by the functionaries, ignored by the bureaucracy, tortured by the police and denied justice at the doors of judiciary. The American supported authorities in South Vietnam could do little to match the redistribution of land and reduction of rents in the areas held by the communists. It is not, therefore, odd that insurrections have been generally inspired by communism and never for the democracies which have tended to degenerate sooner or later in the Third World.

9. **Introspective Realism.** The counter-insurgent's mental apathy to accept the insurgent's popularity and power often generates an atmosphere of hypocrisy, sycophancy and make-believe. Misconceptions, wishful thinking and self-deception, as in the case of the French in Indo-China, could greatly contribute to the counter-insurgent's self-destruction. Introspective realism is the keyword to objective responses.

The Nazis could not realistically estimate the will and ability of the indigenous populations of the occupied territories to sabotage the German war effort. Nor could the Pakistanis visualise the extent and depth of hostility which their ruthlessness could provoke in the then East Pakistan.

10. **Gratuitous Benevolence.** Ruthless suppression, vindictiveness or indifference brightens the insurgent's image and extends his life in the long run. The counter-insurgent should show restraint and adopt gratuitous benevolence as the main plank of responses towards the masses and insurgents rather than ridiculing the innocent at the pillory or appeasing the guilty. Whether it is against a peon or a prince, law must be enforced uniformly, fairly and expeditiously without any let or other considerations.

The various tribal insurgencies continue unabated in Burma because the authorities have been able to neither crush the upstarts nor protect the innocent from the insurgent's wrath. Same has been the story of the Kurds spread over certain parts of Iran and Iraq.

Appeasing those who have criminally violated law only emboldens others to take up the gun. Alternating punishment with pampering or *vice-versa* though indicative of flexibility, does not project an image of continuity, consistency and fair play. Though without any lessening of the tensions, the clear, firm and unprovocative British attitude towards the the insurgents in Northern Ireland has been greatly responsible for not allowing the struggle to advance beyond the stage of terrorism.

11. **Conditional Loyalty.** Masses may support both the sides simultaneously, but what the counter-insurgent needs least to make any headway is the appeal of a broad based counter-cause and the undivided loyalty of a strong minority and which does not come until the appeal of an ideology based national perspective is amply supported by intentions, resources and performance for heralding visible peace, progress and prosperity.

The counter-insurgent's ability to protect the villages, hunt the insurgents and launch welfare projects depends on the peoples' support, but the masses will not participate in the governmental programmes until they feel safe and secure. Here lies the greatest paradox for the authorities to face. Thus during the course of insurgency, efficient management that brings succour and hope to the people itself becomes the dominant cause and the masses tend to support the side which starts overwhelming the other.

The Sri Lanka communist insurgency of early 1971 was crushed perhaps in the shortest period known, because almost the entire leadership and cadres were either liquidated or apprehended in just about ten days leaving the masses unaffected. The Chinese, even after over 20 years, have not been able to completely silence the insurgency in Tibet by integrating the majority of Khampas within the mainstream of national life and adopting such means as cannot be prescribed by any democratic authority.

12. **Indigenisation of Manpower.** Complete indigenisation being one major reason for the insurgent's superiority, an alien counter-insurgent suffers from inherent handicaps. The indigenisation of the

counter-insurgent, particularly the manpower, grants him, at least 'congenital equality.' In the Philippines, the entire counter-insurgent force was of indigenous origin. The Americans in Vietnam were not only aliens but belonged to an altogether different race, colour, religion, culture and linguistic area. Almost the entire Pakistani forces that faced the liberation movement in Bangladesh belonged to an altogether different racial and cultural stock though professing the same religion.

The Vietnamese soldiers found themselves too small for the parachutes meant for the western soldier and thus presented themselves targets far too long besides getting drifted. The Indian jawans were perplexed when on being rushed to Nagaland they discovered that about 15 tribal dialects, each different from the other, and their own numerous languages were being spoken there.

13. **Human Superiority.** The counter-insurgent can successfully exploit his unlimited freedom of action, military strength, vast resources and the inertia of incumbent authority against the insurgent only when his material supremacy is matched by human superiority in all walks of life. There is an irony of the counter-insurgent's physical assets, for besides appearing unmistakable symbols of the government, they provide easy targets for the insurgent. Somehow, the artillery, tank, rocket and aircraft have been of little avail against the insurgent whose material poverty only simplifies matters for him. In Cuba, the very sight of a B-26 bomber only intensified the anti-American feelings.

The historic contrast in Vietnam only highlights the comparative human inferiority of the counter-insurgent. In Malaya, where the counter-insurgent utilised limited material assets, it was the integrated administration, clear cut policies and above all talents and skills of the junior level leadership that won the contest for the government.

14. **Innovative Techniques.** To meet the insurgent's multi-faceted challenge, particularly in the field of warfare, the counter-insurgent can neither rely entirely on conventional doctrines nor adopt all the insurgent's ways. He should display original ideas, technological superiority and innovative techniques that are relevant to the local conditions. Concepts, successfully tried elsewhere need critical appraisal before transplantation.

Whereas, the regrouping of population successfully evolved in Malaya could not be effectively carried out in Nagaland and Mizoram for various reasons, the small foot patrols proved as rewarding as in Malaya. For success, it is essential that the counter-insurgent creates conditions under which instead of being hunted, he starts hunting. The laudable, but risky, precaution of not firing unless fired upon, though difficult to follow, has won many hearts for the Indian security forces deployed in the country's eastern region.

15. **Permanent Recovery.** The manifestation of insurgency being only a syndrome, superficially diminishing, denying or hiding the symptoms conveys neither success over nor end of insurgency. Only the negation

of pre-requisites for and denial of the constituents of insurgency can restore permanent peace and deny opportunities for the relapse of conditions leading to insurgency.

The insurgent's tangible assets are the leadership, masses, resources, violence, organisation and patronage. Even when once denied or destroyed, they can appear again unless the very intangible elements, *i.e.*, the cause, goals, ideology and aim are incapacitated or politically and psychologically reconciled within the framework of national perspective.

The environmental improvements which greatly influence the attitudes of the people, take long to emerge and favourably condition their mental articulation. The 1948 communist insurgency of Telengana, having remained in suspended animation for about 20 years, erupted with a crescendo at Naxalbari and spread to other states in various forms of Maoist type of terrorism because after Independence the socio-economic landscape, by and large, continued to remain unchanged. While the terrorists of Malaya are again making news in the region adjoining Thai border, in certain areas of the Philippines insurgency, though with a religious fervour, has also reappeared with renewed vigour.

CONCLUSION

An understanding and adoption of the above principles is expected to benefit the students of political science and military studies and, above all, the leaders at various echelons of different disciplines deeply concerned with insurgency or similar regional, sectional, communal and caste conflicts that may be apparently dormant, spectacularly militant or hopelessly malignant.

A CLOSE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT FOR THE INDIAN AIR FORCE

ASHOK LAW

INDIA, being such a large country, has a very varied geography, and this is a factor which strategists have to pay a lot of attention to while planning for defence equipment for the country.

Potential battle-fields for India stretch from the arid wastes of the Thar Desert, through the plains of Punjab and then up to the cold and mountainous regions in the Himalayas. In the East the Himalayas taper down to thick, jungle, covered low hills with paddy cultivated plains below them.

Such a varied climatic and topographical situation poses a major problem to those acquiring defence equipment for India. For even though one always strives today to get the most role-oriented equipment it is still advisable to try and get equipment that would work almost as well under the various conditions prevailing in all possible theatres of war. This is to maintain a sense of uniformity in the Armed Forces which will ease problems of personnel training, spare parts etc.

Thus when considering any piece of equipment for the use of India's Armed Forces geographical compatibility is one of the first things to be studied.

It has been conclusively proved over two wars in India, and two in Middle East, that the most efficient land weapon system for vast plains and deserts, is the Armoured Fighting Vehicle. But for certain reasons the tank alone is not adequate. These reasons can be generalized under the following :

(a) For the large border, which India has suitable for armoured warfare, it is drastically short of tanks. Thus the policy so far has been to deploy armour only in pockets, and here too only in strengths of about a regiment or two at a time. But it should be noticed that in all such areas significant victories have been attained.

(b) However, armour is not suitable for the interception of enemy ground troop concentrations in depth, as it may involve fighting en-route or finding gaps in enemy defences. Fighting en-route may often require the launch of either a major ground offensive along with series of air attacks by conventional strike aircraft. Such a ground offensive is a lengthy, time consuming and expensive procedure often ending in a pitched battle and locating gaps can be an equally lengthy procedure. There are also logistic problems of no

small magnitude. More often than not, before the intercepting ground forces reach the area the enemy concentration would not be there. An alternative is the third dimension.

At the first signs of an air attack these concentrations would again break-up and the aircraft India has today are not particularly effective against isolated ground targets. Also combat time over target area for these aircraft is fairly short allowing only limited offensive action.

(c) Because of sparsely spread out own armour it would often be difficult to concentrate adequate armoured strength to counter enemy thrusts. The most effective weapon system, in use in India today, against the tank is the tank. But if out numbered by enemy armour, even if locally, there is no method available to even out these odds apart from rushing more armour to the threatened sector. This is not always feasible at a critical time for reasons of non-availability or time and space constraints.

(d) In case of a swift pursuit of a retreating force an armoured column can often leave its supply system behind, coming upon enemy resistance when it is low on supplies. The enemy of course has its own supply lines intact and intact shorter.

All these factors necessitate the use of a weapon which is mobile, which packs considerable fire-power, can be operated from central bases so that there are no pockets of concentration or depletion in defensive strength and one which is not effected by supply lines to the front.

It should at the same time be able to reach its target fast, with minimal chances of detection, and be in a position to remain over the target area for a sufficient period of time while remaining in touch with ground and air forces at all times.

From these considerations there are two weapons that suggest themselves :

- (a) A helicopter of the advanced attack type.
- (b) A fixed wing aircraft capable of carrying heavy loads at low altitudes and high subsonic speeds, yet retaining a certain amount of manoeuvrability, still not being much bigger than the average combat aircraft (Super-sonic or trans-sonic strike aircraft like the Su-7, Jaguar and HF-24 are ruled out because of their high speeds and so low time over target areas, poor low level performance, relatively, low fire-power etc. For examples the Su-7 has a combat time of about 45 minutes, can carry a maximum combat load of 2,000 kgs. and has 2 cannons with 70 rounds each. The poor performance of such aircraft, as compared to a close support aircraft will become clear later.)

A comparison of the two types, which is very interesting, will be made later.

It is also worthwhile to note that such a weapon system would have very interesting uses in mountainous country. Used as both a defensive and an offensive weapon such an aircraft ought to be very effective in such circumstances as exist in mountain warfare. Let us consider that such an aircraft was available at the time of the famous operation at Zojila Pass when Stuarts were transported up to the pass in two stages, first intact and

then their turrets were dismantled and reassembled on reaching the operational area. These tanks were then used successfully against enemy troops. The availability of a close support aircraft would solve transportation problems, be faster and equally effective. Being a low speed manoeuvrable aircraft it could be used with comfort in the confines of a pass. Moreover it could pack more fire-power than the light Stuarts or even main battle tanks.

Such an aircraft can also be used in offensives where the mountainous terrain makes the deployment of tanks a problem and the enemy's commanding defensive positions make a ground attack expensive. Rather like the use of Typhoons by the RAF during the Pyrennes offensive in Europe. Pill box, sand-bagged and dug in enemy positions, normally immune to the attacks of fast aircraft carrying light armament or a few bombs, would be highly vulnerable to the continuous harrying attack of such aircraft. Once such positions have been broken up it is much easier for ground troops to work their way through. Ground troops of course are necessary because at some stage it is necessary to physically over run and occupy enemy positions, in order to dislodge him from advantageous ground. Here a close support aircraft is particularly helpful as it can be used to soften up enemy points of resistance just 50 m from the forward line of own Troops. This is where their low speeds and good target acquisition abilities come into use. Being comparatively slow and low-flying such aircraft can also be used for counter-insurgency operations.

Having seen that close support aircraft would be a welcome addition to India's arsenal let us compare the two types mentioned earlier namely the attack helicopter and the fixed wing close air support aircraft.

There are in the world today, two major tactical multi-role helicopters. One is the Russian Mil Mi-24 (HIND) and the other is the American Hughes AH-64. (There are of course a large number of helicopters like the German MBB BO-105 (PAH-1), the American Bell Huey Cobra and the British Westland Lynx, which are armed, but these are all light anti-tank helicopters or small gunships, neither suitable for India's needs.)

The MI-24 has a maximum speed of about 170 mph (275 kph) with a range of about 300 miles. The usual armament carried by the MI-24 consists of one 12.7 mm gun mounted forward and it has eight wing hard points. Four of these hard-points normally carry Swatter wire guided anti-tank missiles and the other four are used for various purposes. The usual being bombs, rocket pods, air-to-ground missiles etc. The MI-24 is rated to carry about 8,000 lbs of slung load and has a crew of three. Even though it has a fairly powerful engine the MI-24's statistics do not appear to be very impressive. Two reasons can account for this. It must be remembered that the MI-24 is a development of the MI-8, a transport helicopter and not an original attack design. This accounts for the MI-24's peculiar troop carrying capacity. (The MI-24 can carry upto 12 fully

armed troops.) This also accounts for its low speed. Also structural weights of the MI-24 are high, mainly due to its large size and also due to the absence of light high-strength alloys and composite materials in its construction. Another factor is that the MI-24, for all its worth, is under-gunned. The 12.7 mm gun is rather punitive compared to the 20 or 30 mm canons mounted on normal aircraft today and does not have the same devastating power as these canons.

Even though slow the MI-24 is a formidable weapon platform carrying all four kinds of conventional air to ground weapons ; bomb, rocket, gun and missile. If it were to be ungunned it would become a weapon not to be easily reckoned with. The Russians have now fitted a new four barrel rotary gun on the HIND-D version of the MI-24. This large calibre (14.5 or 23 mm) Gatling type machine gun is a definite improvement on the 12.7 mm gun of the HIND-A.

The Hughes AH-64, which was chosen a short-time back from two competitors for the US AAH (Advanced Attack Helicopter) specifications, is a more modern and role oriented design than the MI-24. One reason of course is that it has been designed from scratch as an attack helicopter and so has a marked advantage over the MI-24. It is smaller and lighter than the MI-24 with a slightly more powerful engine. The speed of operation of the AH-64 is 191 mph (307 kph) and it carries a crew of two in a tandem configuration.

The armament of the AH-64 consists of a 30 mm gun slung under the forward fuselage. It also carries eight TOW anti-tank missiles and can carry about, 8,000 lbs of payload on hard-points under its fuselage and wings. As an alternative to the TOW missiles it can also carry 16 Hellfire laser-seeking missiles. Target acquisition and designation and a pilot's night vision systems are also mounted.

It may be seen that the AH-64 is faster than the MI-24 has a longer range and packs more fire-power. The bolt and chain driven 30 mm gun is more efficient than the Russian 12.7 mm gun and packs a greater punch. At 30 mm the shell has high explosive, incendiary as well as armour piercing capabilities. The fact that the AH-64 is lighter and faster offers it greater manoeuvrability. Not having to carry troops allow it a greater power to weight ratio than the MI-24. A higher power to weight ratio give it better climb rates, faster acceleration and the ability to take-off and land at higher altitudes.

The obvious merits of the helicopter are that it can operate from very close to the front lines, without the preparation of airstrips and other ground-control facilities. It has hover capabilities so giving a stable missile or gun platform, especially for TOW and other guided missiles. But these merits are vastly overshadowed by those of a fixed wing aircraft.

The concept of a fixed wing close air support aircraft is almost as old as aerial warfare itself. A close air support aircraft is defined as one that

that can carry out air attacks against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

In World War I large numbers of aircraft were used for ground support. During World War II typhoons and tank-busting Hurricanes of the RAF were used very successfully in close support roles. The Hurricanes mounted 40 mm guns and were used in anti-tank roles in Burma and Africa. The Typhoon, which played a major part in the war on the Continent, had four 20 mm Hispano canons and also carried rockets and bombs. The Germans used a JU 87 mounting to 37 mm canons and carrying a wide assortment of bombs. They called it the 'Panzerschachter' or tank destroyer.

In post-war years the concept of the close support aircraft died out and none were designed till very recently. More effort instead was made to let combat aircraft fly higher and faster. It was only in the later part of the last decade, that the importance of a close support aircraft was realised. Credit for this can go to the USAF. They realised the inadequacies of armed helicopters and faster strike aircraft during their time in South East Asia. The only close support aircraft available to them were the antiquated Douglas Skyraiders, which were to have been scrapped after the Korean War, but the USAF continued to use them as nothing better was available.

This led to the USAF specification for a close support aircraft in the late 60's. There were two designs proposed. One by Northrop ; the YA-9, and the second by Fairchild ; the YA-10. The YA-10 was finally chosen as the USAF's close support fighter and now as A-10 equips 20 squadrons of the USAF's 354th Fighter wing.

With a wing span of 56 ft. 6 in., the Fairchild A-10, Thunderbolt II is comparable in size to the AH-64 and MI-24, which both have rotor diameters of about 55 ft. The A-10 is powered by two, 9,065 lb thrust General Electric turbosfans. It has a maximum speed of 424 mph (682 pkh) and can operate at altitudes comparable to those of helicopters, *i.e.*, in the vicinity of 50-100 ft. above ground level. The A-10 has a range of 3,015 miles (with ferrying) and at a radius of 288 miles has a loiter endurance of 1'93 hours at 329 mph. This, while carrying eighteen 500 lb Mk. 82 bombs and 750 rounds of canon ammunition, is formidable.

In terms of fire-power the A-10 is far superior to its rotor powered counterparts. It mounts a 30 mm GE, GAU-8/A AVENGER seven barrel rotary canon with a rate of fire of 2,100-4,200 rounds per minute. This gun is the most powerful to have ever been mounted on an aircraft. It has a muzzle velocity of 1,050 m/s and a muzzle power 20 times that of the M-4 75 mm gun mounted on the Sherman. Besides the canon which has an ammunition drum capacity of 1,350 rounds the A-10 can accommodate a wide assortment of weaponry ; bombs, rocket pods and TV-guided

Maverick anti-tank missiles. These are carried on eight under-wing and three under-fuselage hard-points.

The A-10 can be operated from 'C' class forward airstrips and has a take-off run of between 1,500 and 3000, ft., depending on loading and wind conditions. USAF tests have proven it extremely efficient for a wide range of operating temperature. It has been tested successfully under simulated battle conditions during the Joint Attack Weapons System (JAWS) exercises in conditions varying from arctic to desert warfare. It was tried out against armoured vehicles, transport vehicles, troops and ground installations. To test the versatility of the aircraft the tests were carried out from a dried lake bed in the desert around Fort Hunter in California.

In all these tests the A-10 has proved an extremely stable weapon platform not affected by the firing of its massive rotary canon and the vibration generated therein. It has been found most menacing when used in pairs, each aircraft attacking the target alternatively, as the other aircraft circles back to approach the target again in shallow dive. The GAU-8/A is effective against armour from a range of 1,220 m. The fact that such an attack can last for over an hour make it a most devastating weapon. The A-10 has also been deployed during JAWS immediately after an artillery barrage with a primary aim of destroying air defence radars and other installations and causing armoured vehicles to close down thus reducing their visibility and mobility, the next wave destroying these closed down vehicles. Once the ground offensive is launched the A-10's are controlled by a forward air controller at brigade or regimental levels depending on the size of the operation.

The A-10 uses depleted uranium armour piercing ammunition and fragmenting high explosives against tanks, lighter vehicles and troops. This choice of ammunition make it as dangerous to ground troops as it is to tanks.

The A-10, has only been cited as an example of the fixed wing close air support aircraft concept. It is infact today, the world's most modern close support aircraft and its success should pave the way for others, for an aircraft of the same type as the A-10 enjoys a certain distinct advantage over the combat helicopter.

Because of its larger fuel carrying capacity it has a greater range and longer loiter time over target than the helicopters. It is faster and at the same time comparable in manoeuvrability. Even though it is lacking in hover capabilities it makes a stable weapons platform because of its immense aerodynamic stability, the result of broad, high-lift, low vortex-forming wings and high rated turbofans. Greater manoeuvrability is maintained by a comparative low loading of wings, about 400 kg/sq.m. This allows effective manoeuvring in the rolling direction, which assists in evasive jinking manoeuvres and good turning at low levels for weapon aiming. The control surfaces of such aircraft are, for obvious reasons

very large and efficient. It is less susceptible to ground fire because of the higher speeds maintained than helicopters which are highly vulnerable to ground fire. The fact that it can be operated from hastily prepared air-strips and has a longer range make it superior to the helicopter in terms of availability in times of need. With its speed and hedge hopping flight capabilities it can penetrate deep into enemy territory, radar protection being offered by ground clutter. Its loiter abilities let it fight alongside armour with, at times, greater efficiency than the tanks themselves. Low flying capability, large power and immense manoeuvrability make it suitable for the mountains.

The greatest advantage these aircraft have over their rotor powered contemporaries is in terms of fire-power. The A-10 has been tested against T-54, T-55, M-47, and M-48 hulls. Kills have been as close as 100% in almost all cases and with the help of their elevated positions, modern aiming systems, a target moving at a speed negligible to theirs, and their ability to approach their targets in a shallow dive, first burst hits are almost 100%, and a burst from the GAU/8 is not something to be taken lightly. From all practical aspects a close support aircraft seems to be superior to an attack helicopter for India's requirements.

It may also be seen that such an aircraft would help overcome many of the problems faced by India in terms of armoured warfare. The reasons mentioned in the opening of this article should be considered once again, now keeping in mind the abilities of a close support aircraft similar to the A-10.

The fact that such an aircraft can operate effectively over a wide range of climatic and physical conditions would lend an air of uniformity to the tactical fighter wing of any air force, and especially the Indian Force because of the varied nature of India's borders. They can be operated from central bases and so cover the entire border, with turnover times between missions being extremely short. Unlike ground forces they need not be fully committed to one mission, but can be used again in a battlefield hundreds of miles away almost immediately. Low flying allows deep penetration and an attack by such aircraft would be more effective than one by conventional strike aircraft as they are more effective against isolated targets. (A note made by the US Defence Secretary last year has shown the A-10 as having the kill potential of 7 armoured vehicle per sortie. Other comparative figures that have come from the same study are : A-7, F-4 and F-16 ; 2.4 vehicles per sortie, Jaguar (attack version) 0.8, Mirage F-1 an optimistic 0.6). They are also in a position to spend more time over target area, at the same time leaving fighters the sole job of maintaining superiority in the air, without having to pick out pockets of ground resistance, as these would be dealt with by the ground troops and support aircraft.

The greatest advantage of course is that they can be almost anywhere and everywhere over the battle area with the advantage of greater mobility

than ground forces yet not been too far removed from the battle-field like the conventional fighter and strike aircraft of today.

It is evident that the close ground-support aircraft would be a great boon to the Indian Air Force for the many reasons discussed so far. But the question that arises is whether India is in a position to acquire or build such an aircraft. A conscientious team of workers should have no great problem in designing such an aircraft, as no great marvels of technology are required. Besides this within a few years a number of such aircraft should be available on the world market. The Swedes are also working on a similar aircraft designated the B3LA, the Americans already have the A-10, the Northrop YA-9 (which is almost as good) and it is certain that the Russians must be having something up their sleeves as well.

In the meantime, one solution that seems obvious is the retrofitting of Hawker Hunters with a more powerful engine, preferably a turbofan (because of lower IR generation), broader wings generating more lift at low speeds and more efficient control surfaces. The 4.30 mm canon pack mounted under the nose of the Hunter is a killer with 150 rounds per gun. The Hunter can also carry 2,000 lbs. of bombs and two dozen 3in. rockets, with a more powerful engine the armament carried out could probably be uprated with upto 200-250 rounds per gun a greater bomb load or preferable more rockets and some provisions for air to ground missiles. It would of course be an aircraft very different to that built for the British Defence Ministry's specification F.3/48 back in 1951 but still a very impressive and effective close support aircraft. In fact such a retrofitted Hunter could also be used by the Navy as a ground attack fighter, similar to the old GA11 Hunter variant.

But whatever course is chosen it is interesting to note that here we finally have an aircraft that can do the job, sometimes even better than the old iron sides themselves. It is also rather amazing how this one weapon system would help iron out the kinks in India's combat forces by being able to tackle so many problems at the same time with greater efficiency than existing weapon systems.

TOWARDS THE ALL TANK ARMY CONCEPT IN ISRAEL

MAJ VK NAIR

"Armour is an offensive force which solves all its tactical problems by attacking".

INTRODUCTION

There are numerous factors that go towards evolving the tactical concepts that a nation should adopt so as to ensure optimum efficiency from its war machine which would, of course, enhance national security. Some of these factors are, the nation's capability to generate resources ; terrain on which security operations are visualised ; enemy tactics, quality of manpower and equipment ; internal political climate ; and of course, the ability of the military leadership to correctly visualise the shape of future conflict and consequently be able to reconcile the mind to new and hitherto untried and unconventional concepts.

The Israeli Defence Force (Zahal) has been under a continuous metamorphosis, within these parameters, from the day it was formed until it was launched for the fourth time against the Arabs, in 1973, as an "All Tank Army". The results were spectacular not only in victory but also in defeat. History has indisputably brought out the advantages of this system but has also proved that there are many lacunae. The aim of this article is not to justify or refute the efficacy of the concept, but to trace events with reasons for the evolution of the Zahal's ground forces into an all tank army.

BACKGROUND

It was not until two months after its legal establishment in 1948, and a good eight months of bloody war, that the Zahal did acquire its first tank unit. These were initially taken to reluctantly and were accepted only as an expedient of necessity. This tank battalion was raised in July, 1948, when the dregs of war surpluses were released due to the expiry of the British mandate. Israel inherited or smuggled in ten French Hotchkiss light tanks and a solitary Sherman MK IV, the latter being the only modern tank of the lot.

This force was organised as a battalion, but obviously could not comprise of the usual three squadrons with ten to fifteen tanks each. This then was the core around which the Israel armoured corps was formed. Its growth had a lot to do with the future trends and the shaping of tactical concepts of the early fifties,

Teething Troubles

The numerous problems faced by this unit are listed below :

- (a) There were no Israeli trained crews. Therefore this unit comprised of English, French, Polish and Russian speaking immigrants who had served in the Second World War. This resulted in a serious communication gap because of the language barrier.
- (b) These immigrants had been trained by different armies and consequently followed differing operating procedures and drills.
- (c) A shortage of manpower caused constraints on selectivity of personnel to types of equipment.
- (d) Shortage of time forced the Israelis to launch this unit into action within a week of receiving the equipment, with minimal training and no backup infra-structure.
- (e) Lack of technical know-how coupled with chronic breakdowns made it an extremely unreliable force. As such commanders had to plan their actions with the inclusion of armour as an unpredictable bonus.
- (f) The immigrants had recently fought within the frame work of armies with tried out organisations and doctrines. On the other hand, the officer cadre of the Zahal had cut their fighting teeth under severe pressure where the only solution was, more often than not, to apply brazenly unsound military practices to achieve any degree of success. The two made a poor mix which adversely affected the tactical handling of tanks as also their initial and future employment in the Zahal.

The outcome was that these tanks performed particularly badly which left an indelible impression on the minds of those who were later responsible to decide the future role of the corps within the concepts for battle of the Zahal.

1949 TO 1956

The men of the infant Zahal had fought through the War of Independence with zeal, vigour and initiative. They were not the legacy of an established colonial army, but amateurs with no sound military background emanating from a formal military education. The lack of military tradition allowed for a wide range of original thought. It was in this atmosphere that the post war period was given over to the development of tactical doctrine and organisation of units.

In 1949 the Israelis managed to buy their first battalion worth of tanks. They imported fifty-four Sherman MK IVs. The Army now had tanks but no crews or instructors. Even the General Staff had no idea as to how this force could best be employed. The Zahal was devoid of a cadre of tank officers ; had no experience on organising tank warfare and no established operational doctrine for the employment of tanks in the socio-economic, political and terrain conditions then prevailing in the Middle East. The first step was to rationalise the Armoured Corps and induce Israeli blood into it.

Not in a position to benefit from accumulated experience of the Allies and Axis powers, the first generation of tank men learned by trial and error coupled with endless debate. They got to understand the equipment by using it under all prevailing terrain conditions and applied the little practical knowledge gained to their limited stock of tank tactics. These tactics were then tried out, discussed, modified and tried out again till a satisfactory new method was added to the doctrine. Actually this was, then a very wasteful procedure, forced on them due to numerous constraints. It soon became the primary means of evolving doctrine and was to have long term effects. Consequently all tank tactics employed were intrinsically woven into the local environment. This process continues to date where the Zahal can boast of having one of the most effective tank forces.

Theories Advocated By The Laskov Group

Laskov, a tank enthusiast was the head of the Training branch from 1949 to 1951. This branch was responsible for the construction of doctrine and organisation for the Army.

This group immediately hit upon the essence of the armoured corps and despite the lack of resources, advocated a major role for tanks in any future conflict. They recommended that armoured combat teams should slice through the enemy flanks deep to his rear without expending energies to guard flanks, supply lines or hold ground. There to attack the enemy rear and flanks in conjunction with the ground forces. They should scrupulously avoid being embroiled in built up areas or fortified positions. They laid down the basic considerations for armour employment in the priority given below :

- (a) Speed.
- (b) Surprise.
- (c) Manoeuvrability.
- (d) Concentration.
- (e) Shock Effect.

Broadly, this group favoured the "indirect approach" and recommended that tank to tank battles must be avoided as enemy armour concentrations were better neutralised by a screen of anti-tank guns appropriately deployed. Though this reasoning smacks of the readings of Liddell Hart and Guderian, the true cause was :

- (a) Equipment shortages.
- (b) Poor showing of tanks in 1948.
- (c) Shortages in trained manpower.
- (d) Lack of resources.
- (e) The presence of numerically superior hostile forces.
- (f) The need to draw the land battle away from the proximity of the country.

Theories Advocated By the Mobile Infantry School

General Dayan and most of his General Staff had been through a traumatic experience with tanks in 1948. This had caused a definite bias towards a dependence on mechanised infantry. As the armoured corps was responsible to provision, maintain and man the APC fleet, the general staff gave more attention to that aspect of the corps.

They could not reconcile themselves to arguments that the slow moving and heavily armoured battle tank had a greater battle-field mobility than the faster moving APCs. Their experience of tanks overlooked the fact that the 1948 tank battalion had been far too small to generate the "mailed fist" effect which we know is the single crucial factor of modern tank warfare. Added to this was the chronic unreliability of tanks.

They advocated that tanks were primarily a support weapon for the infantry. They should, therefore, be grouped in sub units of squadron size and either be allotted to infantry units/formations before battle or on an as required basis during battle.

The Third School of Thought Prevailing

This was found amongst those tank men who could not reconcile themselves to the reality of equipment shortages and allied problems then prevailing. They suggested the spear head role for the armoured corps. Armoured brigades, spearheaded by their tank units were to fight in self sufficient combat teams of tanks, mechanised infantry and supporting artillery. They visualised tank forces breaking through frontal defences, penetrating in deep narrow thrusts to break up the positional cohesion of the enemy and isolating him in weak groups. The normal infantry supported by towed artillery would then overwhelm these isolated pockets piecemeal. They conceded the need to avoid large scale tank to tank battles, but not at the cost of reduction in the momentum of the armoured spearhead.

Policy Adopted

Dayan would not even consider the third school of thought. He opted instead, for a compromise of mobile infantry supported by tanks to effect a break-in. Thereafter to regroup armour into tank battalions to break out for limited exploitation. As a result, the Zahal had the misfortune of a badly dissipated tank force during the 1956 Sinai Campaign. Except for Ben Uri's 7 Armoured Brigade—which, inspite of its strike potential, was allotted a supporting role in the GHQ plans ; all remaining armour was allotted to the classical support role.

As for the organisation, Dayan did not favour massing of tanks in battalion size units. He preferred to have them readily available in a reserve pool of squadron size units to be allotted in support of infantry. As a result, the majority of the armour was not organised to fight as an organic combat unit, but was a supporting-cum-administrative sub unit devoid of organic combat support.

1956—SINAI CAMPAIGN

What did finally transpire during this campaign had spectacular results which subsequently gave more enlightenment to all concerned and the evolution of future concepts for the employment of armour got more direction.

In contravention to the GHQ plan, the GOC Southern Command released Uri Ben Ari's 7 Armoured Brigade 24 hours before schedule. While the infantry had not got to grips with enemy fortifications of Umm Katef, the tank units managed to infiltrate to the rear of these positions and after some hard fighting, overcome them. Thereafter, without waiting to regroup, the brigade moved West in combat teams and took control of most of Central Sinai in a single day. This unforeseen success was the direct result of a classic armoured attack—in direct contravention to all orders and plans. The Zahal had truly discovered the 'tank' at last.

1956 TO 1967

Despite the phenomenal victory, army leadership was aware of the tactical errors and organisational shortcomings highlighted by this campaign. Post-mortem debates led to critiques of doctrines which ended in radical changes in the overall concept for future warfare in the Sinai. There are many reasons for such radical about faces in the then accepted doctrine. Besides the unexpected success of armour there were other reasons for this metamorphosis ; these are outlined below :

(a) **The Short War Assumption.** A need was felt for an offensive orientation in stance, to enable Israel to strike the first blow so that the enemy could not recover before the super powers had forced a ceasefire. This necessitated the structure of Zahal being reshaped around fast moving armoured forces.

(b) **Lack of Depth.** Israel is a narrow linear country sandwiched between four hostile Arab States which were equipped with armour capable of overrunning the country in a short period. There was no depth to trade space for time. It, therefore, became imperative to fight outwards. This entailed organising armour as the decisive land force with a capacity to strike fast, hard and deep across the borders to draw the Arab armies away from the homeland.

(c) **Manpower Shortages.** A very fundamental problem to contend with the small population. To have a dynamic economy, manpower could not be spared for a large standing army. Casualties were then, as even now, unacceptable. The ratio of casualties sustained as also kill capability of tanks to infantry turned the balance in favour of an armour predominant army.

(d) **The Collapse Theory.** Though not fully justified, the immediate effect of Uri Ben Ari's actions in the central Sinai gave the higher command conviction in this theory. It was felt that once substantially sized armoured units could break through to the rear of Arab

fortifications the defences would collapse and provide no resistance to weaker assaulting infantry. This reduction of pockets was considered a secondary task and as such a greater weightage was given to the tank force.

(e) **A Short Warning Environment.** The Arabs had all got large standing armies equipped with the latest mechanised equipment available in the market. These armies were posted close to Israel's borders and had the capability to launch quick strikes. Israel on the other hand had to depend chiefly on calling up reserves. The warning period available had been drastically reduced to about 24 to 48 hours. For the Zahal to be able to mobilise with speed and move straight into battle meant that they were constrained to fall back on superior armoured forces.

With this, the General Staff recognised the tank to be the key weapon of the ground forces. The immediate effects were :

- (a) Transfer of high grade officers from the infantry to the armoured corps.
- (b) Rapid expansion of existing tank forces.
- (c) Purchase of modern battle tanks.
- (d) The relegation of infantry to a supporting arm and reduction of funds allocated to mechanised infantry.
- (e) A radical change in doctrine so far not ascribed to by any other army. This is analysed in subsequent Paragraphs.

Tal Doctrine For the Sixties

The man behind this new doctrine was Maj Gen Israel Tal. This doctrine was in direct opposition to those evolved by modern tank armies. The world consensus was for close cooperation between tank, infantry and artillery, each being reciprocal to the other. This theory is based on the need for mutual protection from automatic fire and short range tank killing weapons. The Second World War had quite adequately demonstrated the efficacy of such a system.

Gen Tal studied the issue in context to the Israeli conditions and came to the conclusion that this theory was not applicable to Israel for the following reasons :

- (a) The prevailing APCs in service were old and incapable of keeping abreast with tanks. Any new purchases would eat into the funds allotted for purchase of tanks. However ; tanks were on priority one.
- (b) Irrespective of the type of APCs employed, it would cause prohibitive casualties if mechanised infantry had to fight in close conjunction with tanks in terrain obtained in the Sinai.
- (c) Massed tanks moving across the wide open spaces of the Sinai could not be attacked by short range Anti Tank weapons which ruled out the need for close infantry protection.

- (d) Lack of natural cover coupled with flat open spaces made long range anti tank weapons vulnerable to the tank gun.
- (e) Massed long range Anti tank weapons employed by the Arabs, he felt, could easily be neutralised by superior tank gunnery which would force these weapons to fire at extreme ranges to give themselves away.
- (f) He emphasised that fire power coupled with mobility were the prime factors for armour success. As such minefields became greater deterrents and the infantry could not really assist.
- (g) The prime objective of armour was enemy tanks which, he felt, were best destroyed by tanks. To this effect he was hot on fast and accurate gunnery.
- (h) The terrain—"An excellent arena which provides opportunities for deploying great masses of armour, that is why Zahal maintains a large armoured corps."

The tank was originally developed during the First World War to support infantry. In the Second World War it won recognition as an arm within itself, to be employed in conjunction with infantry which was actually subordinated to tank forces. The advance of a force would now be limited to tank mobility, and not infantry speeds, in the face of hostile fires.

Basic Considerations. In the light of these developments Laskov's priorities for the basic considerations were reshuffled as under :

- (a) Shock action.
- (b) Fire power.
- (c) Mobility.
- (d) Surprise.
- (e) Concentration.
- (f) Speed.

This was an obvious reversal of priorities. The indirect approach as preached by Laskov was also dropped. The new concept for tank warfare was :

- (a) Our flank and hit in the rear where possible.
- (b) Spear head the frontal assault.
- (c) Reduce the cohesion of the objective for follow up infantry to mop up.
- (d) Force the issue with anti tank guns at extreme ranges and destroy them before they are effective.
- (e) Operate on a narrow front with massed tanks without infantry.
- (f) Continue the action into the night.
- (g) Self propelled artillery must move in close support of tanks.
- (h) Maintenance and replenishment was to be brought forward to the tanks which were not to wait for it, or go back to it. The maintenance of momentum would be achieved by the "conveyor belt" replenishment system.

(j) Tanks having breached the defences were not to wait for mechanised infantry, but push on irrespective. The breach was to be widened as soon as the infantry fetched up.

In point form, these were the ingredients of Israeli tank tactics as practiced for and employed during the Six Day War. Without recounting the events of this war, suffice it to say that these methods were extremely successful, if not totally conclusive. The ball had been set rolling towards the most radical change—the ALL TANK doctrine as advocated by Tal.

POST 1967 ERA

The Israelis themselves were quite overawed by their complete victory during the six days of June 1967. They concluded that, whether the need was to reduce defended fortifications, fight up mountains, sweep the desert of all enemy or capture towns, the armoured corps was capable of spearheading, breaching and wrapping up the works.


The ALL TANK doctrine, formulated by Gen Tal, snowballed into a major overhaul of the Zahal. It stressed the independent and self sufficient role of tank forces depending chiefly on their accuracy, firepower, speedy build up, and concentration; resulting in perpetual forward motion. These tank units and formations were the cutting edge of the ground forces. All other arms and services were subordinated to the supporting role.


This thought process was undeniably responsible for some of the far reaching tactical victories of the Yom Kippur War. However, there is no gainsaying the fact that there were acute shortcomings felt in the battle field. These, were primarily due to an over reaction by the General Staff in assessing the output of the Six Day War.

The Role of the Infantry

The infantry, till then 'Queen of the Battle', had shared honours with the tanks as she still does in all other armies. The Israelis went a step further and dethroned the Queen. The infantry, in this doctrine, was accredited with a supporting role. This was actually reversing the place of both arms as of 1956. The Israeli general staff were obsessed with the need to maintain a forward motion with all available armour. To this effect they gave up the "push system" of maintenance of forces in preference to the "pull system." This resulted in combat support being provided by a conveyor belt. It was to this role that the infantry was now relegated. To understand this, it would be appropriate here to broadly explain this system.

Combat Support by Conveyor Belt. To avoid a break in the momentum of the tank forces, a linear integration of all arms and services was done. See Appendices P and PI for diagrammatic explanation of movement of these administrative echelons in the initial and final stages of the attack, respectively). The administrative base is divided into two. The





'first echelon' and the 'Second echelon'. The mechanised infantry follows in the immediate wake of the forward tank teams. Their role is to retain ground captured, hold the shoulders of the break in point, allow the 'first echelon' through as also to provide them with immediate close protection from counter attacking forces. This lot is followed by the motorised infantry. Their role is to provide protection to the 'second echelon' which is moving to replenish the depleted 'first echelon'; consolidate gains made by tanks and mechanised infantry; and to keep the axis open. Therefore, the major role visualised for the infantry, was the operation of the conveyor belt.

Other Roles. Besides this, the infantry was allotted to armoured formations to assist them in their task. All roles so far known were incorporated. However, the emphasis had now shifted to the use of paratroopers and mechanised infantry in support of tanks.

Change in Doctrine

In the post 1967 rethink, tactics did not really undergo any major evolution. The major changes were structural. The Ugdah system was abandoned. These had been headquarters capable of controlling units and formations on a task oriented basis. The Zahal now went in for armoured divisions comprising of two tank brigades and a mechanised brigade alongwith integral artillery. Though additional para and mechanised infantry could be allotted, the two tank regiments per brigade were the main combat force. The tank units were further streamlined by stripping them of their organic mechanised infantry and mortars. Therefore, in essence, the whole works depended on the tank units with mechanised infantry following up in their wake to mop up.

The argument used for the neutralisation of known Arab anti tank system of guns and missiles was, to advance rapidly in a solid tank wedge to minimise the surface exposed to fire and to utilise own armament either on the move or at the short halt. It was expected that the tanks would still penetrate these anti tank screens and break up the enemy's cohesion at short ranges.

The theory expressed was that armoured forces must fight on the move from the line of march and concentrate on a weak point indicated by local penetration which is not ascertainable in advance. "In the manner of water descending down a slope which flows into the faster rivulets, tank forces on the move find their own direction in the course of the battle itself, breaking through the line and out to the rear in a manner that cannot be planned in advance." (Tal)

CONCLUSION

This then was the scenario of the Zahal at the out break of the Yom Kippur War. The IDF had evolved from a mere guerilla force to a modern infantry army in 1956. From there it gave a

priority to the tank forces which spearheaded the attacks of the Six Day War. The exuberance of success with tanks led to an "all tank army" which was fielded against the Arab onslaught of 1973. In doing so, they had forsaken their "guaranteed air superiority" to field the infantry at optimum efficiency and their advantage of night fighting was relegated to the back ground. Though the Yom Kippur War could possibly be slated as an Israeli victory, it was too short a period to realise the true efficacy of this new system. Considering that the Israelis are not likely to have a war of a long duration, they would have to re-evaluate the rationale that brought them to the all tank concept. Some of the possible changes would be apparent to the military thinker, but it won't be till the next war that the world at large would know the finer ingredients of the latest evolution. What one can say is that the tank has shown that it is still a necessary weapon system for a ground force. The question that does arise is its *inter se* relationship with the infantry? This, however, would need to be analysed elsewhere. I would conclude, that the Israelis came upon the "all tank army" concept by process of an over reaction. In any future re-organisation the general staff will have to guard against this and suitably employ infantry in consonance with tanks so that the setbacks experienced in the Yom Kippur War are eradicated.

ARE WE FORGETTING OLD VALUES ?

BRIG SCN JATAR

INTRODUCTION

The changing values of the modern world and the sweeping changes that have occurred in our society in the past decade give rise to uncertainty in the minds of service officers as regards their own standards of values. Should we adhere to old norms which have stood the test of battle ? Or be carried away with the tide ? Here are some thoughts for the young officers.

A GENERATION GAP IN RESOLVING PROBLEMS

A young officer perhaps thinks that the problems he is facing are more varied and complex than a generation before. The problems are probably the same ; what has changed is our response to these problems. What was acceptable a few years ago (say, standards of signal communications or of living conditions) is not acceptable now. Hence the need to be more exacting and alert. The same problem gets magnified because the standards have become more rigid. A feeling of helplessness creeps in when the resources at hand cannot meet the situation. This manifests itself in making us resentful towards the establishment. And the symbol of the establishment is our superior. We attribute all ills to the conduct of our superiors. Little do we realise that this manifestation makes itself evident down the line. Our subordinates have the same realisation. So why not put things right first within our own spheres of influence and command ? Let us then commence with ourselves and analyse how our character should be moulded.

CUSTOMS OF THE SOCIETY. ARMY LIFE AND OUR VALUES

Army life is a reflection of the habits and customs of the society as a whole. We have, no doubt, to move with the society. We should not, however, let the standards of integrity and loyalty fall. We must maintain the traditions of uprightness. The society must look up to us to bind the nation together. There is no compromising, therefore, on certain values that an officer must cherish.

TRUTHFULNESS

Firstly, truthfulness. It is not enough to be truthful oneself. One must not accept lies or bluffs from others either false or phony reporting must be ruthlessly curbed. This assumes more importance because most of the time we are fighting battles on the black boards or the sand models. The credibility gap between what we profess and what we actually achieve

MORAL INTEGRITY

Next, integrity. There is moral integrity and professional integrity. Moral integrity embraces discipline, pride and honesty. Discipline is not obedience only. It also means respect and regard for others and implies not doing something when not being watched what you will not do when being watched. After all no one will watch you in battle except your men. One must have pride in oneself, in one's team, sub-unit, unit and formation. A person who has pride in himself will never give an occasion to be told twice about the same thing. Honesty implies not taking what does not belong to you or what it is privilege to use. Honesty of purpose is very important in all your dealings as an officer. Do not grudge others the privileges that go with the rank.

PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY

One lacks professional integrity if one does not know one's men. A close working relationship between the officers and men is a must. An officer's rapport with the men gets displayed in the way they salute him.

The temptation to 'fudge' training records must be curbed. Even a small 'adjustment' in the records develops into a second nature for fudging all other records. You cannot obviously win a war by showing your training records to the enemy.

There should be no exaggeration or playing down when your professional opinions are sought. Your professional views are not negotiable.

Last but not the least, is the looking after of your men as part of professional integrity. Do not 'wet-nurse' or 'spoon-feed' your men. If you treat them as children, they will behave as children. Look after both their material and psychological needs.

PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS OF MEN

We make a much ado about the men's material requirements such as food, clothing, shelter, water, electricity, their children's education and so on. Their psychological needs are more difficult to satisfy. This applies equally to young officers. The psychological aspects are :

- (a) Making the man feel that he is an important and indispensable part of the whole, that is the section, platoon, company and the battalion.
- (b) Giving responsibility commensurate with service, rank and capability. Not hurting his ego by lowering his self-respect or his pretence of it. Collective punishments do just that. So avoid them.
- (c) There is an inborn quality of aggression in each human being. Channelise it in constructive activities. Rather than employing manpower and that too on holidays in cleaning ('*saf-safai*'), it is better to draw up a plan for beautifying or improving company lines over a period. A person is happy when he is growing. Happiness is growth.
- (d) Learn to 'talk' to your men so that they give vent to their feelings of aggression. Sainik Sammelans or arzi reports must be judi-

ciously used for this purpose. Then men will not complain anonymously.

(e) Do not let a feeling of helplessness set in ("Why take up a case, *Kuch hogta to nahi*"). This leads to withdrawal phenomena ; pent up feelings erupting in some form of 'violence' : accidents, petty disobedience, bad turnout, poor saluting, indifference to seniors. It is time then for leaders to sit up and take stock. No amount of orders will rectify the situation. 'Carrot-and-stick' approach will not do.

LOYALTY

Next we shall consider loyalty. Criticising your unit personnel outside, 'discussing' orders of your superiors and so on is disloyalty. This does not mean that you ignore offences committed by your unit personnel. That again is being disloyal to your unit because this will set in a rot in your unit. Orders are explicit about dealing with offenders ; be they your superiors, colleagues or subordinates. Blaming your subordinates to your superiors, *vice-versa* is the worst form of disloyalty. One must have a positive attitude. Never say 'NO' when the answer is 'YES' or 'I HAVE NOT TRIED IT'. Never say 'YES' when the answer is 'NO' or 'I DON'T KNOW'. In either case, you will be a let-down to your unit, to your subordinates and to your superiors.

ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY Vs. ABSOLUTE LOYALTY

The conflict between absolute integrity and absolute loyalty has to be resolved. What do you do if your commanding officer (who is the arbiter of your destiny) asks you to judge the training records of your company ! Is integrity the over-riding factor or loyalty ? More likely integrity because by sacrificing integrity, loyalty to your subordinates is getting eroded. By sacrificing loyalty, integrity remains untouched. Better to lose only one, not both.

DILIGENCE IN PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES

There is a growing tendency to 'broad brush' all duties. In duty officers' reports, one sees nothing but 'OK' from here to eternity. The same goes for audit boards. This results in small mistakes getting magnified and in suspicion of fraud. Then it is difficult to put them right without high level courts of inquiry.

OBEDIENCE OF ORDERS

We now come to obedience of orders. There is a feeling that our duty ends once orders are issued. No, not till you check that your orders are being implemented. MacArthur refused to ban fraternisation of GIs with the Japanese women because he knew that the order was not practicable. Better to give less order but ensure implicit obedience. Always check, re-check and cross-check that your orders are being implemented. Flexibility in interpretation is only at higher commander's level,

IMPORTANCE OF STUDYING MILITARY HISTORY

As BH Liddle Hart has said, a 'regular' soldier cannot regularly practice soldiering unlike other professions. We are on 'casual employment'—once for a few days in a few years—for example in 1965 and 1971. There are two forms of practical experience—direct and indirect. Even if you have been through battle earlier, it is in a lower rank. In battle, it is not the same being a company commander, battalion commander, brigade commander and so on. The scope for direct experience is extremely limited. Hence, military history assumes importance. The value of studying military history is in its greater variety and extent; the experiences of many others under manifold conditions. Officers must develop the reading habit and be encouraged to speak out in discussions. They must be given free time in the afternoons of Wednesdays and Saturdays and on holidays so that they can read, develop hobbies and play games of their own choice.

BASIC TENETS OF AN OFFICER'S CONDUCT

While on the topic of officers training, it may be worth-while recounting some of the basic tenets of an officer's conduct:

- (a) **Punctuality.** The secret of success is to be five minutes before everyone else.
- (b) **Attendance on First Parades.** Always be with your men first parade be it P T drill or any other task.
- (c) **Follow the Command.** Be present wherever your men are working.
- (d) **Saluting.** The first impression. Easy to correct it yourself if you wish to.
- (e) **Bearing**
 - (i) Stand erect with weight equally balanced on both legs, not with shoulders drooping, hands folded or legs crossed.
 - (ii) Do not put hands in your pockets.
 - (iii) Do not smoke while outside or on the move.
- (f) **Dress and Turnout**
 - (i) Wear head gear correctly and at all times except when under cover.
 - (ii) Do not wear unauthorized pattern of uniform. Do not dye your cotton uniform. Choose a good tailor. It will be more economical ultimately.
 - (iii) Always possess three pairs of each item of your uniform so that you are never found wanting in any of these.
 - (iv) Do not allow your batman to polish/clean your foot-wear when you are wearing it. Do it yourself.
- (g) **Officer's Mess**
 - (i) Follow the mess customs and etiquettes as laid down.
 - (ii) Do not force drinks on others.
 - (iii) Do not offer drinks to or accept them from mess members.

- (iv) Do not allow serving of large pegs.
- (v) Do not allow mixing of drinks.
- (vi) When junior celebrates a happy occasion, do not overstay his hospitality by having more than two or three drinks on him.
- (vii) First clear your mess bills and in time. Then raise queries.
- (viii) Always sign for your drinks either the same day or the next morning. Or else do not question the wine *abdar*.
- (ix) Do not exceed the wine quota.
- (x) Do not get indebted to anyone. The only credit an officer avails of is in his Officers' Mess and that too for a month only.
- (h) Do not proceed on leave till you have completed the tasks in hand, properly briefed your successor and handed over the charge to him. Also clear all your dues including Mess bill before proceeding on long absence.
- (i) Do not be servile. Do not 'Sir' unnecessarily and often. Do not cramp your initiative and freedoms of thought and actions by rank consciousness. Express your views clearly, fearlessly and emphatically.
- (j) Learn your Regimental history backwards. Know the Regimental language.
- (k) Insist on high quality of work. The men will produce the standard that you accept.
- (l) Guide your subordinates. Do not interfere. Guidance is before the work commences. Interference is when the work has commenced.
- (m) Be sympathetic and just but strict with your subordinates. Do not bully, shout or use abusive language. Undergo the same hardships as your men.

OUR ATTITUDES TOWARDS SPORTS

With the increase in the tempo of competitive sports and the questionable means being used in the civil to win a game, Army sports are getting vitiated. The aim of games and sports in the Army is to develop certain martial qualities in peace time. We have no time for sports in war. The qualities that sports develop are courage, comradeship, loyalty, discipline, endurance and alertness. Hence, sub-unit competitions and regular participation of officers with their men at games are most important. It is not the winning or losing that matters. It is how we play the game. Remember the following :

- (a) Do not question a referee's decision either verbally or by your actions.
- (b) Do not let victory or defeat bother you. Win as if you were used to it, lose as if you were prepared for it.
- (c) Do not play rough.
- (d) Do not pre-empt or prompt the referee by raising your hand when a foul is committed,

- (e) Do not protest either before, during or after a game. You cannot do so in war.
- (f) Do not allow "organised barracking" or "steady clapping" by unit spectators.
- (g) Remember that the better side always wins.

ANONYMOUS LETTERS AND STATUTORY COMPLAINTS

Both anonymous and statutory complaints are on the increase. The reasons are :

- (a) Not being just and fair in your dealings.
- (b) Not giving their due materially and psychologically to the subordinates.
- (c) Not giving opportunities to subordinates to give vent to their 'cribs'.
- (d) Not making earnest efforts to solve the problems put across.

Ninety-nine per cent of the anonymous complaints are frivolous. These take the form of channels of ventilating grievances by disgruntled personnel. More often than not, this comes from superseded individuals who have not been told why they have been superseded and what their weaknesses are. Statutory complaints are also an indication that all has not been just and fair. Quite often the statutory complaint refers to the weaknesses of seniors and colleagues while the cause for initiation has been supersession or an indifferent ACR.

We should realise that answering or investigating statutory or anonymous complaints take up a lot of our time and effort. It is indicative of bad management. It does not speak well of the personnel initiating such complaints either. There is certainly a wide scope for us to rectify the situation.

CONCLUSION

While it is necessary to move with the times, one must not forget certain basic values in our behaviour. We have to set the pace in the country. Unless we cherish old values and build them up assiduously, we will not be able to lead our men successfully in battle.

GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP

PART 1—FROM BUSH TO STRATEGIC SOPHISTICATION

Lt Col CHANDRA B KHANDURI 1GR

VERY few individuals in modern times have influenced the course of history in East Asia as has Gen Nguyen Giap. For, not only he is one of the main architects of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam but its unifier and saviour. It is also said that he is the perpetrator of the present day Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea.

Known to some as the legendary "Lord of the Battlefield" and to the others as the "Snow Covered Volcano", he rose to the zenith of the strategic sophistication and tactical brilliance after his victory at Dien Bien Phu (DBP) in 1954. During the so called Second Vietnamese War of Independence, the main question which the American South Vietnamese (of President Nguyen Van Thieu's Govt.) asked was : "What is Giap upto"? The same question was asked during the Chinese offensive into Vietnam in February-March 1979.

Early Life

Born on 1 September 1909 in An-Xa, a small village in the Quang Tri Province, Giap saw his early years in a poor but literary family of freedom fighters. The patriotic fervor became the creed of young Giap at school and later, in the University. During the period 1928-31, he was imprisoned for his political activities. Although political activism was in no way dampened in this young communist, after this brief confinement, he turned more to the academics rather than politics. Marital opportunism was to be exploited by him when, bereft of any funds, he decided to study history, economics and politics and stay in his future father-in-law's house. Having completed his studies, he taught for the next 7-8 years. He married his first wife Mai in 1938. The combination of his theoretical brilliance with his keen sense of opportunism saw in him a flame of an irreversible ambition, a thirst for fame. During this period we see him not only teach but join the Indo-Chinese Communist Party (ICP) where he met an enigmatic character, Pham Van Dong, who was to be the first Prime Minister of the Republic in 1965. (The ICP had proclaimed in 1941 to liberate Vietnam).

Predictably, the communists—their sympathisers and relations included—were rounded up in 1939 which, curiously telescoped with the German invasion of Poland. While he escaped to China, his wife Mai was rounded up. She died (or was killed) in a French prison uncen-

monially after four years.

In the East, China has provided a training ground for the revolutionaries at least, from only early 1940s. Giap not only served his apprenticeship with Mao's guerillas but he was to meet his master and mentor - Ho Chi Minh here. Thereafter the two were to act together combining their brains and the brawn for the ultimate mission of their lives: the liberation of Vietnam.

New Responsibility

So innovative and flamboyant was Giap that Ho Chi Minh entrusted him with the task of organising a communist military force inside Vietnam. What, one might ask, were the credentials of Giap as a military leader then? He had just done a short course in guerilla warfare with Mao-Tse-Tung's guerillas. But leadership—as often the case with any embryonic organisation—was at stake with the North Vietnamese. Giap filled the line quickly with a promise. Fortunately for him, his promise to Ho was substantiated by performance results. His politics—military training helped him create a nebulous yet powerful faction of the Highland tribes produced what he called as the 'Armed Propaganda Brigade'. He had been cautious but deliberate in tasking them for their missions, a trait which he was to exhibit in all his military actions—from the liquidation of Border outposts of Phy Khat and Na Nagen (22 Nov 44) to Dien Bien Phu (DBP) and even in recent events.

The Japanese occupation of Vietnam—albeit brief—helped Giap and Ho to establish their influence in the countryside. For Giap and Ho, the French enemy had been substituted by the Japanese. Their targets, therefore, were the Japanese for that period. The saying then went: "The Japs control the strategic areas of towns and cities but Giap controls still important areas—the countryside." On the capitulation of Japan, the great hope of the independence of Vietnam was crushed as the French Masters were back, with the changed policy of not accepting the free state of Vietnamese Democratic Republic. This was not acceptable to Ho Chi Minh and he insisted upon total freedom which, predictably drew 'red herrings' from the French. In Dec 46, he, therefore, announced an all out fight against the French. Giap's force then totalled some 100,000 guerillas in North Vietnam.

A Shaky Start

It turned out to be a war of independence where the ill-trained but well-motivated Vietnamese guerillas and growing number of the regulars engaged themselves against the French parachutists—their Corps de elite and the French Foreign Legionnaires, a no less contender for this title. It also turned out to be a war of frustrations and often defeat and despondency. But the mission justified all that. It is owing to the mounting casualties, frustrating results of engagements and the criticism of his conduct campaign that Giap said "every minute hundreds of thousands of people die all over the world... The life or death of a hundred, a thousand

or tens of thousands of our compatriots represent really very little." Was it a megalomania in Giap or a homicidal madman who had spoken thus? He was bitterly criticised. Some still attack him. But war of independence called for great sacrifices. The statement should perhaps be seen in that light.

The Mao Government's debt to Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam must be great. (Future developments following the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea have drawn a large penumbra on this debt!). In 1950 while the Chinese were entering the Korean Campaign with nearly 450,000 men, they still supported the Vietnamese guerillas by training and arming them. The Russians, too placed at Giap's disposal a large quantity of arms and ammunition, guns and vehicles. The world's attention was then naturally focussed on the Korean War (1950-44) more than French Indo-China. It was, in any case, considered as a large scale insurgency, well within the capability of the French. Giap was quick to exploit this strategic advantage to organise his regulars.

Learning Through Blunders


Giap was to make grievous errors of judgement when he believed in his capability to beat the French in regular warfare in the Red River Delta against Marshal Jean Lattre de Tassigny's¹ par: troops and his overseas legionnaires in 1950-51. He got defeated but this was followed by a period of heart searching, introspection, reflections and correcting mistakes. The legend goes that he took to reading Napoleon so as to understand the basic tactics and strategy. The French had to be beaten in the French way!

The French too failed to understand the essentials of the guerilla warfare in that fighting the guerillas was not an act of isolation. The guerillas were an integrated force and had to be fought as such. The result of their misconception led them to defeat in detail at Cao Bing Ridge.

However, he was beaten again in the battle of Hoa-Binh. The French were led with great elan and their troops proved excellent in set piece battles. Giap's command suffered thousands of casualties but the survivors learned their lessons. With Ho Chi Minh as his saviour, Giap got away with prodigious blunders. In the strategic field, his reputation sank to that of a "school teacher-tactician." But after the "Op Lorraine" (1952-53), Giap managed to achieve a strategic deployment which threatened the French both in Laos and Vietnam. According to Robert J. O'Neill² by 1953 Giap's strategy had reached a degree of sophistication and elegance which was remarkable by his 1951 standards."

¹ The French commanders who came on the scene were : de Tassigny ; Raoul Salan, and Henri E. Navarre.

² "General Giap" by the same author.



THE DIEN BIEN PHU

THE DIEN BIEN PHU

It is difficult to visualise Giap in his correct perspective unless we dwell at some length on DBP—its genesis, development of plans and its execution. For, it was to be his Cannae and Austerlitz.

DBP—The Vital Ground. Why was DBP considered important by both the French and the Vietnamese? The mixed bag of results of the Red River and Mekong Operations of 1951-53 had forced a large number of Vietnamese guerrillas and regulars into Laos where, they combined with Pathet Lao guerrillas to open a new front from the West against the French. The French had undertaken upon themselves the responsibility of the defence of Laos by signing on 22 October 53, the Matignon Agreement.³

The strategic aim of the French was to establish an impregnable fortress⁴ of defence at DBP as a strategic objective with the hope of attracting substantial part of Giap's army and destroying it in a set piece battle. It was thus a strategic extravaganza—the creation of a fortress from the air⁵, some 350 kms deep inside the hostile line from Hanoi.

DBP, it might be recalled, had been lost by the French to Vietnamese in 1952 and it, therefore, had to be recaptured. The capture and seizure of DBP involved the establishing of an air head with airborne troops. On 15 Nov 53—immediately after the rains, some 1500 paratroops were dropped on DBP, which cleared the area around it. The Vietnamese defenders fell back to the heights. In another week the strength of the garrison increased to 2,200 and by the end of the month it was 4,500 with Col De Castries as commander of the garrison. The defences were soon prepared with several strong points, some of which were protecting the airstrip, others denying the road axes and yet others occupying some dominating features—called Hills. The strong points were code-named as Beatrice, Gabreille, Anne

³ The Valley of DBP and its dominating high grounds controlled move from Laos into Vietnam. Geographically it is a large plain about 10 kms by 8 kms. The valley is surrounded by densely wooded hills and has very heavy summer rains during May/October. It is a communication centre with roads to Lai Chau, Son La, Na San, Luang Prabhang (Laos).

⁴ Of fortresses or fixed defences, Napoleon had said, "Fortresses are useful in offensive and defensive war. Undoubtedly, they cannot themselves arrest the progress of an army but they are excellent means of delaying, impeding, enfeebling and annoying a victorious enemy".

⁵ History is replete with examples wherein the air maintained garrisons and outposts have fallen to determined enemy attacks. A strategic example is the inability of the German High Command to maintain the Afrika Corps of Rommel. Most of the analysts are convinced that accepted the level of generalship between Montgomery and Rommel, it was the ability of the Allies, to sustain and improve vastly the fighting potential of the British 8 Army vis-a-vis the German-Italian Afrika Corps, which tilted the balance of combat in their favour. Still fresh with these lessons of World War II, the French high command in Indo-China, made strategic blunder in displacing its battle front to a geo-politically disadvantageous terrain.

Marie, Dominique, Huguette, Francoise, Elaine, Claudine, Isabelle—(perhaps all comparing with Maginot or a Bar Lev Line—both in sophistication and also, in concept and strength). However, an attacker can always find weaknesses in a defensive system and reduce it. Giap accepted this challenge and decided to exploit this God sent opportunity. His aim was to isolate this garrison and destroy it piece-meal.

The Genesis of Thought Process

Giap's strategic considerations stemmed from assessment of the French strength and weakness as also appraisal of his own limitations and capability. He saw that the French were developing strong defences, they had capability of strong counter-attacks, their air force was a boon so long the weather remained favourable but it became wholly ineffective in bad weather and against effective air defence. His own force was scattered and had to be concentrated and nothing substantial except tactical preparation could be done for months together. His logistic system which was based on a meagre vehicular transport and was mostly cycle and mampack based, would need several months to build up stocks of ammunition and rations. Surprise had to be the keyword. How was this surprise to be achieved?

He thought of an age old strategem—to do the unexpected and do it at a time when it suited him. Innovative as he was, he employed two of his strategems : achieve an overwhelming superiority in strength and fire power; and, strike at the beginning of the summer rains. He had to concentrate nearly four divisions on the firm base that he had around DBP. In the absence of his integral air power, he needed a preponderance of artillery. The Chinese helped him with 75 mm and 105 mm field guns and howitzers, as also the air defence guns. The guns had to be hauled up the slopes of the mountains where they were burrowed deeply into the tunnels and emplacements made on the reverse slopes. The air defence artillery too had to be deployed to neutralise the French aerial superiority. The ammunition expenditure had to be carried for about two months of intense rate of fighting. Giap had worked out details systematically and had his logistic-back-up tied up to the threadbare.

Giap may not have gone to any academy except the Chinese-Vietnamese bushes, but experience had taught him valuable staff duties for this battle which he meant to make into a decisive one. His assets, as always, were motivated soldiers and a huge strength of them. We shall see later what has made them into a sturdy soldier of a great fighting machine—the Vietnamese Army. Numbers alone did not confer so much advantage as the discipline and indoctrination. Every weakness of the French had to be exploited—their vulnerable logistic and reinforcement system, their tenacity had to be broken through relentless operations. He proved to be a great thinker, planner and a great strategist.

Gen Navarre—the Commander of the French Indo-Chinese Forces also helped achieve his aim in several ways. His overall defences were based on a forward posture and there were gaps even in the DBP defences

where mutual support lacked between the strong points. The ten battalions with a squadron of tanks and artillery had, no doubt, more than 16,000 troops but the battle of DBP as and when it started had no complementary or support operations which could divide Giap's effort. There was an operation planned for Lai Chau but it was too distant to influence the DBP battle. Reinforcements were planned both by air and surface routes but both appeared inoperative, as they proved later.

The Battle

Preparations having been made surreptitiously, Giap began his operation very systematically. His assault developed on 13 Mar 54 with a two pronged divisional size attack—one prong aimed at the Northern Sector and the other isolating the strong point of Isabelle. An intense five days of fighting secured for him the objective. His own casualties were unproportionately high and a pause was required as also a great length of the communication trenches had to be dug to close in with the French and neutralise the effect of their superior fire power from ground and neutralise the effect of their superior fire power from ground and the air. It was a trying time for his leadership, as the commanders of the troops preferred to go in for direct assault rather than waste time and effort in such guerrilla tactics. He took over the command when things appeared shaky. The second phase commenced from 30 March. It was a grand attack by infiltration which cut off the French Central Sector and the battle for the 'Hills' dominating the airstrip began. His infantry attacks—some of them sage in heroism followed his oft said principle: "heroism is the best answer to the superior fire power". The French launched a determined counter-attack and recaptured some of the lost areas. The dog fight continued till 15 April when the vital airstrip was captured by Giap. This drove a wedge in the French defences. The French threw in every bit of their forces and managed to recapture part of the airstrip. The loss of the airfield was irreparable to the French. To sustain the defenders, they resorted to air supply, losing a large percentage of it to the Vietnamese (some 100 aircrafts). Inspite of desperate and brave stands of the French parachutists and some of the Foreign Legionnaires, the third phase of battle i.e., the annihilation phase, was begun on 1 May, and, by 16 May last light, the inevitable capitulation came.

In this epic battle, Giap had deployed well over 70,000 troops of which some 25,000 became casualties. The casualties mounted naturally as it was one great saga in the Vietnamese liberation. Thousands fell fighting and thousands "provided stepping stones on which the other following could clamber over the wire entanglement". The French lost about 5,000 dead, 10,000 wounded and only 73 managed to escape.

At tactical level it was a battle fought with brilliance. The plan, albeit not very bold, involved capture of the strong points (the redoubts) of Gabreille, and Beatrice and then capture the airfield and the command post—the nerve centre of the DBP. While unsuccessful counter-attacks

came on the captured objectives, attacks developed along other axes to divert and weaken these counter-attacks. As Isabelle fell in the last but one phase, it became a matter of time.

Ho Chi Minh later gave it a political colouration and ideological twist to the outcome of the DBP. He said : "DBP was not a victory—not only our people, but also for all weak peoples who are struggling to throw off the yoke of colonialists and imperialists. History will record it as one of the crucial events in the great movement of (the) Asians, African and Latin American people who are rising up to liberate themselves and to be masters of their own destiny".

PART 2—THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE

THE VIETNAMESE SECOND WAR

Overview

As North Vietnam was liberated, Ho and Giap turned to the problem of the unification of the South. Vietcong activities continued. In 1958, the South Vietnamese Govt asked the US to support it. This began an era of the US-South Vietnamese involvement which saw the landing of the US military personnel in 1965 and its Air Force bombing North Vietnamese targets in the North of the 17th Parallel. By 1968 the US had more than half combat troops in South Vietnam and it was losing some 800-900 men every week as war casualties ; its cost of the war was approximately 3 billion dollars annually and the USAF was, mercifully dropping three million tons of TNT every year on the jungles of South Vietnam and Strategic "targets" in the North. The U.S. was beginning to have a second thought on the wisdom of their involvement in a useless and costly war in a remote part of the world, when the 'Tet Offensive' came which, although a military failure, shook them. Following the Tet, and in order to trade time for better preparations, the North Vietnamese agreed to attend the Paris Peace Talks in May 68. As an overture of peace, President Johnson ordered the cessation of bombing—in the North. Simultaneously with it, the US Govt. planned on a three phase Vietnamisation : raising one million strong South Vietnamese Armed Forces and switch over operational responsibility to them in a phased manner ; modernising its Air Force, Army and Navy ; and withdraw all US combat personnel by beginning of 1969, Mr Nixon, the new President of USA, promised to execute it with speed.

The whole plan was upset by a North Vietnamese offensive into Cambodia with ostensible object of securing sanctuaries there. The US was back to the fighting and it started bombing the Vietnamese concentrations in Cambodia as in the North. An abortive offensive was launched by the North Vietnamese in 1972. As a sequel to this the cease—fire was signed on 27 Feb 73 and the US forces were out of Vietnam by end of March 1973—honourably, one should say.

While the South Vietnamese grew in strength and took over their

responsibilities they lacked combat leadership and had learned to believe in the US tactics of super-abundance of fire power rather than tactical mobility and manoeuvre. It was a question of time, when the North Vietnamese would inflict the coup de' grace which came in the beginning 1975 and by 30 April, there was no more of the US backed South Vietnam.

A brief look at the force level of the opposing forces : South Vietnam had 13 infantry divisions, one airborne division, 15 Ranger Groups deployed in its three military regions ; whereas the North Vietnamese having moved and concentrated nearly 14 infantry divisions with an equal number or more of Vietcongs on three axes of attack.

Throughout the South Vietnamese operations, Gen Dung was the Army Commander responsible for the offensive for the liberation and achieving the "Mandate of Heaven."


We were to see Giap's brilliance again in South Vietnam though, perhaps not of the same dimension as at DBP. Despite the North Vietnamese aided Vietcong operations, it was a case of changed circumstances. It was not a direct involvement of generalship so to say but an indirect stewardship against the South Vietnamese-US troops. At tactical level, Gen Dung, his Army Commander was attacking Khe-Sanh, Qang Tri, Danang, Dak To, which had a marked degree of resemblance with DBP. To offset the US advantage of air power, they dug close to their defences and then attacked and overwhelmed them or just melted away.

At the beginning of the Second Vietnamese War, Giap had said : "South Vietnam is the model for the national liberation of our time. If it succeeds in defeating the special war being tested by the American imperialists in South Vietnam, this kind of war can be defeated throughout the world". And he made it a mission of his life to defeat the Americans and throw them into the South-China Sea where, as he said, they belonged. Ironically, it was to be the South Vietnamese elites who had to face in May, 1975.

Having created his "Legion of Porters", Giap was to employ them again and again against the US massive bombings, which exceeded several times the Allied bombing of Germany. "There were no roads or bridges left intact in North Vietnam" said David Schoenburn. "The Legion of Porters was a brilliant logistical creation of Giap. The back of the coolies became the backbone of the Vietnamese operations".

It was part of the North Vietnamese strategy to frustrate the American aerial supremacy and in the end, he succeeded in defeating the primary strategic objective of the US bombing as it failed to break the North Vietnamese back--nor was it in any case, able to support the South Vietnamese back.

South Vietnam was often a deeply frustrating affair for Giap and also for Ho Chi Minh, particularly, after the failure of the Tet Offensive in 1968. However, in the overall perspective, the outcome of Tet was to set a pace for the final capitulation of the American backed South Vietnamese regime.



The Final Offensive

What Was the Strategy of Gen Giap During the Tet Offensive (29-31 Jan 68)

Thus the strategic aim of the operation was to be political as well as military.⁶ The strategic aim of the Tet Offensive were to destroy the maximum capability of the Americans and the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, deployed in the South ; to establish a political systems in the South favourable to North by seizing political headquarters down to the District level and finally to unify Vietnam. The basic military objectives of Tet offensive were Hue and Saigon. Giap was assessed to have committed nearly eight divisions of the North Vietnamese regulars in addition to an equal number of Viet Minh guerillas. The offensive petered out like Giap's offensive against the French on the Mekong Red River Delta of 1951-33. The possible reasons for that was the wrong assessment of the factors—the weather, the tremendous air power that the Americans were able to bring against his forces and the tenacity of his troops to remain in contact with the US-Vietnamese forces for longer duration. Three eighth of his regulars were reported to have been killed in the offensive (he lost some 60,000 regulars and the Vietcongs, but despite these staggering casualties, Giap caused tremors both in high places in Saigon and Washington that Tet was there and there could be yet another Tet. By Western standards the casualties suffered by Giap's force were disproportionate to the doubtful military gains during the Tet but it set a pace for the eventual capitulation of South Vietnam. It was, what Bernard Brodie (writing in the Decisive Battles of 20th Century) called "A shock to start an avalanche of sorts". It set an American withdrawal in motion. He himself learned his lesson that the North needed more cohesion, a better strategy, a broad based logistic support to fight and win a war against a US backed South. The North Vietnamese also had to reflect on their grand strategy of politically and militarily separating the US and the South Vietnamese in a future conflict. One possible strategy in sight was to show keenness for a political settlement of the South Vietnam issue, makes the American believe that the overt threat of the North Vietnamese aggressions against the South was over and in the absence of the US-as and when the Americans withdrew the South Vietnamese could manage their own security. Ho and Giap, undoubtedly share the credit for this grand strategy. Whether it would show results, they were not sure then but they decided to give it a trial after 1968-69. And all these required time.

The Final Offensive

The strategy of the final offensive for liberation of South took into account the two courses open to the North Vietnamese ; develop attack along the North-South Axis i.e., from the DMZ to Saigon ; or, strike from the West i.e., Cambodia with holding attacks from the North

⁶ This was a very sound base. The US learned—at considerable loss of prestige and influence one of their important lessons of the Vietnamese War—"military action without supporting political consensus and policy is bound to lose",

and South West. The first course, although safe, had its problem of getting into a hard slogging match. The second, bold and risky, had the great prospect of driving a deep wedge between the Northern and Southern military regions, and thus defeating the South Vietnamese in detail. The latter course¹ was adopted by Giap and Dung. Then through several deception measures they were able to spring surprise in every sector. The South Vietnamese corps commanders² also were deceived as to the likely point of attack. For example, in the central or military region II—where the main thrust of the operation was developed—it was appreciated that the vital grounds of Kontum or Pleiku being priority objectives would be attacked first, but the actual attack came on Ban Me Thout. By its capture, the South Vietnamese lines of communications were cut off to such an extent that the whole corps was ordered to be withdrawn and in so doing, destroyed piece meal.

Thus in inception, the plan for the final offensive was bold and emphasises the strategic brilliance of Gen Giap. It is equally educative to know that Gen Giap's timing of the operation was governed by his astute analyses of the political situations in USA and elsewhere. For, in the fall of 1974, the US was gripped by the Watergate affair, its economy—as indeed the world economy—had been rudely shaken by the price hikes in petrol following the Yom Kippur War. There was therefore, no or little chance of the US support or intervention. In any case to test US reactions, he had launched a preliminary offensive in the Phoue Long. There being no reaction, the offensive went on as per schedule.

It may not be out of place to mention here that under Giap a tremendous command organisation was formed which controlled the operation in three divergent axes each some 300 kms apart. It speaks of Giap, the Defence Minister who controlled the operations so dexterously—both military and political.

THE 17 DAY SINO-VIETNAMESE WAR (17 FEB-5 MAR 79)

Earlier, I referred to the Vietnamese indebtedness to China. The self-interests of China and Vietnam vis-a-vis their relations with the USSR created tension between them. This led to an exodus of the ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and Kampuchea. By 1978 war between them appeared likely, if not inevitable. During this period, Giap, as Defence Minister of Vietnam never failed to refer to their struggle of 1000 years

¹ The plan was : To attack Ban Me Thout in Phase 1 alongwith launching holding attacks in the North (Quang Tri, Da Nang and Quang Ngai) and in the South West (Tay Ninh and An Loc). In Phase 2, the towns of Pleiku and Kontum were to be captured and Route 19 was to be cleared upto Phu Cat in the North and Qui Nhon in the South. In Phase 3 to capture Saigon and the mopping up was to be done.

² The Period of 1973-74 was used for improving the Ho Chi Minh Trail to take vehicular traffic, construction of roads in the Vietcong—North Vietnamese controlled areas. Before the offensive it was said that several thousand vehicles and some 1,200 tanks and APCs were moved alongwith this trail for the offensive in the Central and Southern sectors.

and their having intermittently lost independence to the Chinese from A.D. 938.

Eventually, the big brother invaded Vietnam in February, 1978. The PLA crossed into North Vietnam on three broad axes with about six divisions. Unfortunately, the development of the operations from both sides continue to remain shrouded in mystery and the lessons of operations which have been drawn by the analysts are conjectural than based on the historical truth. However, it is the strategic deployment of force by Giap which proved decisive. He is reported to have held back his regular formations for a strategic counter-offensive ; while the Chinese invaders were kept in check initially by the militia.

The evacuation of Long Son by Giap was considered a great strategic manoeuvre of fighting a mobile defence. For, having evacuated the town and made the Chinese secure it, the Vietnamese launched a furious counter-attack, caused such a great degree of attrition on them that they were forced to withdraw from Long Son. Notwithstanding the other strategic constraints of the Chinese, *i.e.*, the fear of the Soviet intervention, the isolation in the third world, their withdrawal from North Vietnam in less than three weeks, appeared to have been forced by the punishment that the PLA had received at the hands of the Vietnamese forces. (Both sides had not employed their air force in the War, like the Sino-Indian war of 1962).

GIAP—AN EVALUATION

Giap's thinking at the initial glance appears to be a synthesis of Lenin and Mao with his drawing inspirations from great masters like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz and Napoleon. Guerilla warfare was considered by Ho and Giap, as essential to fight a superior enemy and establish equilibrium. But to achieve complete destruction of the enemy, there was no substitute to regular warfare.

The Western analysts have often demonstrated skepticism about his military genius. Said Steward Manual "Giap, despite emotional eulogies within and spoken about him, was not a military genius. He was uninformed about the principle of warfare and inexperienced in any kind of combat". Undoubtedly, by Western standards Giap had no formal military education nor perhaps did he show those great flashes of strategic brilliance comparable with Napoleon or even Mao from the beginning. However, with the passage of time, he moved from one stage of tactical perfection to another when eventually DBP came. And then, for a while, he got into this brand of 'shadowy' with less demonstrative appearance of his tactics or strategy. It is natural that writers like John Keegan and Andrew Wheeler call him a 'shadowy' figure. Their evaluation of him : "Clearly a General of the first class, he remains, nonetheless a shadowy

^{7a} It is normal in a communist society, every figure becomes shadowy—even great figures like Marshal Zhukov became one.

figure whose philosophy of war in so far, as it differs from Mao must be guessed from what he has done than anything he uttered on the subject which is very little'. This, agreeably is a 'jaundiced' evaluation. A brief analysis of his principles and thoughts should help us see him in correct perspective.

Strategy

The three principles expounded by him are :

- An internal war is a long term proposition, in which innumerable military victories against a numerically superior enemy are necessary to reduce the initial power balance working against our side.
- The stages of internal war begin with a communist 'defensive' campaign followed by achievement of 'equilibrium' with the Govt. forces and these are capped by a 'counter-offensive'.
- As the power balance shifts in favour of the communists, guerilla warfare gives way to a war of mobility, using regular forces but without fixed battle lines. In the final stage it is combined with some positional warfare.

For the liberation of South Vietnam, his strategy, basically, remained on similar lines—the resistance stage by widespread guerilla warfare in the South, obtaining an equilibrium and then the Tet Offensive in the 1968 marked the first stage of the counter-offensive. The strategy catered for flexibility in a protracted conflict. The military operations were followed by vigorous political psychological activities. Winning of war at the military bases of Danang, Saigon was not good enough, an internal political resistance had to be built up in the US public to discard and condemn the policies of the US Administration in supporting a corrupt and illegitimate Government at Saigon. This was remarkably achieved,⁸ as in USA thousands evaded the conscription and hundred-thousands wanted their sons to be brought back home from the 'My Lais', while the soldiers in the battle field dragged their feet, and hoped that long range artillery and their B-52s would win the war for them. All this was the master strategy of Giap—the man who, as the Time Magazine once said "What is Giap Thinking" And "would the US Vietnam Command react with advantage".

Role of Militia. Speaking of them he said "Militia will always be a strategic force". Their role was visualised as : "replenishing the regular army : to maintain security, and protect production ; to serve the front line, and carry out guerilla warfare activities in war time". The Vietnamese Militia's role in the Sino-Vietnamese war of 1979 was unparalleled. While the regular army was being geared up, the Militia fought and contained the Chinese advance. The result was so unexpectedly unfavourable to the invaders that after a so called 'punitive action' of three weeks, having suffered large casualties at the hand of the Militia, they unilaterally pulled back.

⁸ As this psychological appeal showed results, said Giap : "We are grateful to US peace demonstrators".

Surprise. The size of units, degree of concentrations and element of surprise play critical role. He saw surprise not only in concealed movement, deployment or selection of an axis of attack but also in the employment of a decisive weapon system. In Dien Bien Phu it was artillery.⁹ In the liberation of South Vietnam, it was logistics and troops through the Ho-Chi Minh Trail, the divergence of axes of attack and their great tenacity to pull through the operations. Besides it was also Giap's choice of objective—*i.e.*, Ban Me Thout, in the Central region whereas the South Vietnamese appreciation was that the main point of attack may be Danang. Surprise was also achieved by him in launching the offensive in 1975 while the earliest the Southerners expected them to strike was sometimes in 1976.

Motivation. What is it that he did to produce the Vietnamese soldiers? Even today experts feel that they are the best in the world and it would take decades to break the Vietnamese fighting spirit even by the best weapons of a modern army. It was proved in the US Vietnamese Operations, as also it was more than amply exhibited by the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. [However, the question remains if in a protracted Sino-Vietnamese conflicts, will the Vietnamese spirits dominate till the end.]

Giap and his lieutenants produced by the end of the Dien Bien Phu a set of "motivated, indoctrinated soldiers who believed in what they were fighting for, who were not afraid to die, or who have had certainty of ultimate victory and who, far from being robots, driven forward by fanatical officers, appear to have a good deal more to say about their units operations".¹⁰

On the operational side, they stood head above shoulders with their adversaries in Vietnam. Said Col. Herbert of US Army "I never saw an NVA soldier who I wouldn't have been proud to have in my unit... Their discipline, fire control, spirit, all were superb...there was an invincibility about them".

How did Giap foster this discipline in his units? The 'Six Forbiddances' and 'Six permissibles' gave them the rudiments. Speaking of 'discipline', Giap had said, "The fighter must unquestionably carry out the orders of his superiors..." and, "a centralised leadership and unified

⁹ It has always been battle winning factor, the employment of artillery by Babar at Panipat (1526), tanks at Cambrai, the pre-emptive Israeli air strike in the 6 days war, the SAM Umbrella in the Yom Kippur War and indeed, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan in August 1945. The new weapon system will continue to be decisive in all warfare—be it conventional or nuclear,

¹⁰ Rand Corporation's Report,

command at a given degree always proved to be necessary. He who speaks of Army speaks of discipline".¹¹

Tactics. He analysed the so called impregnability of the Dien Bien Phu the strong point with 17 battalions and three artillery battalions. It had 49 strong points all organised into fortified resistance centres with mutual support; and, it had its own air field. The French thought it would never be attacked, least, captured. But said Giap "We overcame this difficulty by applying the tactics of progressive attack by regrouping and achieving local superiority at one point of attack". He saw the vulnerability of this fixed system of defences. (This had been proved time and again but every time the defenders have made this mistake. The mobile, more flexible always wins against a static defender). Offensive and mobile action have, therefore, been the key to his offensive. He opined, "the US troop tactics—the excessive mobility and fire power of the 'liberation' troops made the US marines, air cavalry division all proved 'inefficient' and the fault lies in the US erroneous thinking". And according to him, this made the US operation ineffective in Vietnam. He re-emphasised what great masters have said : "The fighting spirits and good fighting techniques ensure success".

Training. Speaking of training he said in 1965, "Our army is still young with limited fighting experience. It must endeavour to learn expertise of the advanced armies, of brother countries—first of all, the Soviet Union and China. To meet the requirements of modern war, the army must be trained to master modern techniques, tactical use of arms, coordinated tactics and modern military science". And for that he advocates "an admixture of their own experiences with modern methods and techniques".

Of officers' training he admitted "Our officers are weak in modern tactics, we must advance their cultural level and level of military technical science to become good military cadres of the party". And he thought four rudimentary aspects were necessary : "high degree of centralisation, unification of organisational spirits, disciplinary spirits, spirit of planning and accuracy". No doubt, there is, the known combination in military doctrines of scientific socialism and political culture. But his teachings on military matters are practical and operationally oriented.

THE SUMMING UP

Analyses of Giap's concept of strategies, his performance in both the Vietnamese wars do not show him as a 'General ordinaire' as contended by some analysts. He has been influenced, no doubt, by Mao Tse Tung's theory of guerrilla warfare. That perhaps was unavoidable, as all those

¹¹ From the Vietnamese Soldier's Code of Conduct.

^{11a} Also See Chanakya's View on Discipline in "Chanakya—A Prodigy", by the author,

who came in Mao's contact felt his charisma. A General should, however, be evaluated by his performance. The decisive battle at DBP was an example of brilliant inception of a plan and its execution, the success of a brilliant commander that Giap has been. The conduct of has second offensive in South Vietnam resulting in the eviction of a powerful US and final capitulation has no parallel in the living memory of modern history of warfare. It was all the success of a strategist in Giap.

The assessment of Giap's character and capability by Generals Abrams and Westmoreland, has been coloured a lot by Giap's apparent military failure in the Tet offensive. They claim that he had made strategic errors during the South Vietnamese operations 1966-72. Events in Vietnam were to prove their conclusion wrong. It was, as one can say, in retrospect that the North Vietnamese man behind the gun proved superior to those fighting him from South ; as also the brain behind the offensive for the "Mandate of the Heaven".

The Western analysts, unfortunately are used to seeing a Patton, Rommel, MacArthur or a Guderian conduct conventional warfare and emerge as hero of the war. That comparison is unfair to Giap, as after DBP, he had to conduct operations in a different environment. He had to fight and defeat a tremendous enemy—the US, its tremendous mobility and fire power. The essence of his strategy was to exploit the enemy's weaknesses, its successs lay in not only exploiting the US weakness but employing his North Vietnamese regulars decisively. That is where his genius is exhibited and that is where it lies.

We cannot study an engine till it stops, is a universal truth. Appropriately, therefore, while Vietnam is passing through the ebbs and flows of a turmoil of East Asia (with Kampuchean issue), Gen Giap who is still the Defence Minister of Vietnam, is a running machine. My analysis of his character, therefore, is sectionalised. While it dispassionately analyses his successes and failings, it does not claim to be complete. More analysis of personality of Giap which is obviously an inter-action of his character and genius –will be necessary as and if the mighty machine, God forbid, ceases.

For, his deeds are not only the military successes but combining the military results with political successes. It is this rare combination of the military and the politics that makes him and the history of his life supreme. If we were to go by the explanation of a genius by Emil Ludwig—"it is the political genius which makes a military commander supreme", we find Gen Giap meeting that requirement qualitatively.

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BOOK REVIEWS

NUCLEAR MYTHS AND REALITIES

Edited by K Subrahmanyam

(Published by ABC Publishing House, New Delhi, 1981, pp. 290
Price \$ 15 00)

THE nuclear weapons debate in the country has so far been superficial. In the West it has been biased concerned primarily with preventing horizontal proliferation while vertical proliferation goes on unabated. As TT Poulose puts it in the second of the nine essays published in the form of the book of above title, "All the nuclear powers are free to proliferate their nuclear weapons capabilities under the NPT and the shackles are meant only for the non-nuclear weapon states". Editor K Subrahmanyam, who has contributed two essays to this volume and the introduction entitled 'India's Dilemma', points out that it is a myth to believe that "nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of nuclear weapon powers, their allies and clients but not in the hands of others." This has led to safeguards which M Zuberi brings out in his, the first essay, restrict developing countries even the development nuclear energy. "Energy independence, decoupling of civilian and military nuclear programmes, and general and technological self-sufficiency become illegitimate aspirations concealing military ambitions. These countries should not have a complete nuclear fuel cycle." "Until 1975 nuclear proliferation was supposed to signify the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries. This is no longer a definition acceptable to the supplier states. Not only nuclear weapons but also enrichment and reprocessing capabilities have become forbidden fruit, which cannot be legitimized even by acceptance of international controls."

Soon after the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was presented in August 1968 by its co-sponsors, the USA, the USSR the Great Britain, a conference of Non-Nuclear Weapons States was held in August-September 1968 which called for a halt to development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as well as steps to reduce and subsequently eliminate nuclear weapons stockpiles. Pursuing this line of thought, Poulose feels that while advocating a stop to horizontal proliferation, nuclear weapon powers should have been agreeable to accept "restraint on the nuclear arms race and simultaneously reduce their weapon systems."

In his essay 'Implications of Nuclear Asymmetry', Subrahmanyam asserts that the arsenals of nuclear weapon powers have grown so much

that the certainty of mutual destruction has established the age of deterrence. He also draws attention to the doctrine of proportionate deterrence based on the concept of certainty of destruction likely to be wrought on two adversaries. The destruction inflicted by the lesser power would be sufficient to make the losses unacceptable. The factor of asymmetric possession of a small nuclear arsenal with an aggressor would deter a non-nuclear weapon state. He is of the view that "the only feasible scenario of the use and threat of nuclear weapons is either a situation of asymmetry where only one side has the weapon or where two adversaries have very small nuclear arsenals only aircraft delivery systems." Nuclear weapons can be deterred only by nuclear weapons. In light of this, nuclear China and a likely nuclear Pakistan, the specific situation of India is analysed and the military as well as political disabilities and handicaps of nuclear asymmetry are outlined. A case is made for India to be "strong and yet gentle and generous and not weak and consequently insecure and petty fogging."

The remaining essays analyse China's attitude on nuclear proliferation, the concept nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), the clandestine or undeclared nuclear weapon states of Israel and South Africa and Pakistan's Nuclear Posture.

The book is a serious study of nuclear weapons issues and a valuable contribution on the subject which should be read by our policy makers and their advisors; politicians, bureaucrats and soldiers.

AMV

DYNAMIC THINKING FOR EFFECTIVE MILITARY COMMAND

by Brig J. Nazareth (*Retd*)

(Published by Tata McGraw Hill Publishing Co., Ltd.,
New Delhi 110002, pp 240, Price Rs 57'00)

THIS book has a neat appearance and its content is very informative and highly educative. The work, as the author explains in his preliminary note, is a systematic compilation from his experiences, study of military history and biographies of various military commanders down the ages. The scope of the book is indicated well in the title and the book is certainly one which is different from the ordinary run. It is a book of knowledge and directions to young military aspirants. With this end in view, it mobilizes all the relevant materials from the World's military heritage, the study of basic elements of logic and modern thoughts, building the structure of dynamic thinking in both its sweep and practical details. The author has an inquisitive mind and wide reading evolved over many years, his writing is lucid and expressive with the requisite thoroughness.

The author has marshalled the enormous and priceless bequest at his disposal into several chapters in the book. The first few chapters set

forth the art of study and knowledge of human mind, how ideas are formed, the nature of thinking, the types of experience, battle drills and procedure, and dependence on one's forethought. In other words it affirms the supremacy of mind. It is imperative, that, ideas must be available when they are needed and to realise this, he advocates the importance of keeping a note-book and generates the concept that one can not be a good leader unless one develops one's imaginative faculty. (Chaps. 1-4).

In the next chapter 'the Study of Military History's' he elaborately maps out the pathway to the realisation of military knowledge and experience. He indicates the practical approach to the study of Military History and campaigns. Thus the salient features of various battles/campaigns fought by major commanders of the past have been brought out in their essentials to form an objective lesson to reward the earnest aspirants for higher commands. Quoting Bismarck, who says, "Fools say they learn from experience, I have always tried to get my experience at the expense of others." (Chap. 5).

In later chapters, he outlines what is meant by a problem, its identification and methods of solving it; largely depending on the mental make up of the thinker. There are three ways of tackling a problem, that is, by trial and error, by insight and by gradual analysis. Of these the gradual analysis i.e., conscious logical reasoning is the most usual method by which problems are resolved. When a commander deals with military problems there is an element of probability hence his appreciation depends on his judgement only, which he can develop by the study of military history. This is the sanest and profoundest guidance. (Chaps. 6-9).

Again there are instances of solutions to the problem by one's creative thinking. An interesting example of this, was how Lord Mountbatten developed PLUTO (Pipe line under the Ocean) to supply oil for Operation Overlord, during invasion of Normandy in World War II. (Chap. 10).

In the chapter heading 'Strategical Thinking', the author reiterates that military problems do not exist in fixed setting and hence standard military appreciation is not adequate to deal with dynamic situation. Human mind is constantly searching for rules and therefore the 'Principle of War' comes into play. Thus the strategic thinking is derived by firstly, by the logical principles of examining the nature of military operations and secondly, by empirical principles (from experience) or from the study of military history which provides a vital source. He goes on to add, that all the great wars have taught concerning the way to success, is by incorporating not mechanically but organically the following of the 'Principles of War'. (Chaps. 11-12).

Further, in the age of advancing technology, it is difficult to choose a correct strategy with adequate weapon system. Here experience does not

help. What with exorbitant cost, weapon system is a heavy economic burden for any country. Thus a scientific evaluation known as System Analysis is evolved, which is a gradual analysis method for resolving a problem. (Chap. 13).

Regarding problem solving at Headquarters (Chap. 14) is an interesting part of the book. In particular how institutions develop their own personality. In this, the personality of the commander is key to any endeavour which lays the foundation for effective harmony and functioning of the Staff. The author's observation on the use, misuse and abuse of those who can think and not always being 'Yes man' is specially relevant.

Then there is the moral of the use of 'language'. One should write as clearly as possible. The author in his note (page viii) states that when the deficiencies of thinking exists in a commander they are manifested in a system, known as 'flap' thereby the commander communicates his uncertainty and loss of grip of the situation by hasty, conflicting and meaningless orders. (Chap. 15). Here, as a reviewer, it will not be out of place to mention, that, after our attaining Independence, many of our Officers with only limited years of service—some only in peace stations—got rapid promotions (leap frogging in ranks by 2 to 3 stages) and this was well evident during the sad 1962 debacle.

Finally, in the last chapter, Brig Nazareth deals with problems of thinking in a realistic setting in a Junior Commander's level and crystallises one's ideas on the theme of the book.

To sum up, about the book :

- (a) the get-up and printing as a whole reveal the fine taste of the author and the publishers. Maps, sketches and line diagrams are very illustrative,
- (b) although an improvement and additions upon any such work is always possible by the author or someone else, the effort by itself remains a formidable achievement, and
- (c) the author has highlighted the importance of analytical thinking in decision making and that in itself is of considerable value in promoting leadership qualities.

MMM

THE CARLOS COMPLEX : A STUDY IN TERROR

by Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne

(Published by Hodder and Stoughton, Great Britain, 1977, pp 304
Price 95 p in Great Britain)

THE year 1981 began with the unfolding of one of the longest dramas in international terrorism, when 52 members of US diplomatic staff in Tehran were released after 444 days custody for a ransom of 8 billion US Dollars. Close at its heel followed the other events : the detention of a PIA Boeing for 14 days and the hijacking of an Indonesia Garud Airways Boeing to Bangkok. By March 30, the US President Mr. Ronald

Reagan, was in hospital with an assassin's bullet in his left lung. Terrorism agalore !

Terrorism had become an international phenomenon from the beginning of 20th Century A.D. Gavrilo Princip started the Great War in 1914 by assassinating Archduke Ferdinand. Today the knowledgeable people even fear that a Third World War might be started by yet another terrorist. The Gulf War, at least, in part was started by an accentuated problem of terrorism.

The correspondent researchers Dobson and Payne examine in great depth the genesis of the international cobweb of the terrorists led by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez Carlos (what they euphemistically call the Carlos complex) and their masterpiece acts of terrorism—the Munich massacre, the Lodd Killing, the Entebbe and Mogadishu acts of terrorism. View the array of the terrorists organisations : Al Fatah, Black September, Red Army Faction, Japanese Red Army, The Italian Red Brigade, Provisional IRA, The Basque, MNLF of The Philippines, not mentioning the mafias and the religious groups. Their victims include, Jews, political leaders, prosecutors, policemen. Their object of killings is often ransom, political bargaining and killing for killing sake (as at Lodd). For years, after the incident, they would go into hiding. Oldo Moro's Killers, for instance, have been unearthed on 5 Apr 81 after a sustained search of 3 years.

Some indulgence with Carlos. Carlos, a Venezuelan multi-millionaire's son, has been a 'fascinating study in paradoxes'—affluence, high life, affable to those who do not know what violence he conceals under the facade of his soft exterior. Violence is his creed. "We are working for a revolution all over the world" he says. His area of operations are really world-wide though he concentrates primarily on the Middle East—against the Zionist. He has qualified—in the literal sense of the word—for the leadership of the international terrorism. He provides the technical know-how to almost all European and the Arab terrorist gangs and holds a sway over the Japanese Red Guard and the Italian Red Brigade. He is perhaps available to the Provisional IRA as a technical consultant !

The Carlos Complex is a conglomeration of men and women who fit rather loosely into George Jacques Danton's 'Observation : "the supreme power rests with the most abandoned"'. Carlos too was a 'semi-abandoned'. Although his father gave him plenty of money but he could never influence his character and capability. The result was a perverted violent man. His mates—both males and females came from middle income group families ; most of them school drop-outs and with firm anti-social convictions who thought every man in uniform a 'schwein' (Swine). The women belonged to a different strata of social life and mental capabilities. Some grew as perverts, others disillusioned with the society. But both men and women shared common views on violence. The women made as perfect 'revolutionary brides' and men perhaps the 'revolutionary bridegroom's. There have been high contents of women in the Carlos organisations,

according to Dr Stumper (an eminent psychiatrist) they tend to ginger up the men and push (them) on greater deeds of violence! Their leading women have been : Leila Khaled, Gabiele, Ulrike, Gudrun (the Carlos group), Fusako Shigenobu (The Japanese Red Army), Maria Coyle (the Provisional IRA). In India, perhaps Phoolan Devi may one day compete for this roll of honour !

What of their modus operandi ? The Jews are the primary targets of the 'Carlos Complex'. While their tactical targets are decided at lower level, the strategic targets are often given by the pay masters. The researchers believe that Col Gadaffi,—the Servant and the Saviour of Islam'—(as he calls himself) is their chief financier. This, in fact, is the most interesting aspect as it peeps deep into Col Gadaffi's character and convictions as the Chairman of Revolutionary Committee. It is revealing that among Gadaffi, Carlos and Dada Amin (His excellency Al Haji Dr Dada Amin, Life Member President of Uganda !) they produced the plan and perfected the staff duties of the Entebbe Terror.

Torture is the forte of the terrorists. However, none can compare favourably with the brutalities of the Japanese Red Army, not even Capt Mahmud, the terrorist leader aboard Lufthansa (who shot its captain after a mock trial). The Japanese Red Army perhaps retains that great tradition of 'Kamikaze', epitomizing the spirit of self sacrifice and its inflicting the sufferings and death on its victims by most terrible known methods. One wonders why the Japanese have joined the Arabs in terrorising the Jews ! Understandably, the German terrorists (as the book also suggests) still have a bit of 'residual Nazi hatred' for the Jewish people.

The authors raise two pertinent points. One, that 'the freedom of press is essential to the success of terrorism', and, two, that 'security against terrorism is a joint responsibility of the Governments and individuals'. The freedom of the press, it is true, often does more harm to the cause of preventing terrorism by giving it undue publicity rather than vehemently criticising it. TVs and films have no lesser contribution to it. Terrorism must be vehemently condemned with all the power at the command of the powerful 'fourth estate'. Next, how to combat terrorism ? No doubt, it has to be combated with determination and speed as the intra-Governmental level. The Israelis, for instance, adopt the most stringent checks of their air traffic after the Lodd Killing. Their 007 Commando units are in a high state of combat readiness. They proved it at the Entebbe Raid. The others who have enviable records are the British Special Air Service Unit, the German GSC-9 and the Indonesian Commandoes.

The attitude of the other Govts to the terrorism is yet another issue. Some world leaders like President Sadat would want to deal with the terrorists with speed and violence, while leaders like President of Austria have shown lukewarm attitude to them. Col Gadaffi, of course, supports their cause wholehog. President Sadat's stand on dealing with the Iranian

terrorists in the final stages of the release of US hostages was also brave. He said that every year USA lost, some 55,000 people on road accidents and if the honour of the states was at stake, they should consider 52 hostages as having been lost. He was reminding the US not to succumb to the terrorists' demands.

The international terrorism of the Carlos Complex manifests itself in many new forms. The element of surprise remains with the terrorists. They can strike where they want. The world, therefore, must continue to remain vigilant to the terrorism. We, in India too have our dissenters both in the East and West who might decide to adopt terrorism as their instruments in not-too-distant in future. In fact, they are already active in the Eastern States. We need to appreciate the problem and resolve to meet it with determination and speed.

Similarly, concerted effort is required to fight the international terrorism on a War footing. To conclude with Rudyard Kipling's quotation "if blood is the price of admiralty, Lord God we ha' paid in full!" Eternal vigilance, afterall, is the price of liberty.

CBK

MIZORAM : THE DAGGER BRIGADE

by Nirmal Nibedon

(Published by Lancers Publications, New Delhi, 1980, pp 269,

Price Rs 95'00)

THE author, with a keen eye for detail, has more than succeeded in sensationaly presenting interesting information, hitherto little known, on the sordid drama that has needlessly gone on for 15 long years in the haunting jungles of Mizoram and along some of the trails leading to the sanctuaries in Burma, China and the erstwhile East Pakistan.

Nibedon discusses the skirmishes between the Mizo insurgents and the security forces with boldness and imagination rarely available. His description and narration are so vivid and graphic that it takes the reader right into the deep interior of Mizoram with darkness, uncertainty and fear overwhelming even the stronger points of anyone.

It is quite possible, as the author implies, that had little more care been taken of the famine conditions caused by the flowering of the widely growing bamboo clumps which blossomed towards the late 'fifties, the Mizo National Famine Front might have remained unable to attract the Mizos into the folds of its successor organisation—the Mizo National Front.

Also it is difficult to reject that a community more tolerant and passive than the Mizos might have accepted the famine as a visitation of the gods and reacted less violently. Nevertheless having gone through the full cycle of insurgency, the majority of the Mizos have realised that if not

the cause at least the means are absurd, and that peaceful interlocution is a better means of inter-action than the hot war which hurts only the Mizos most.

The book written in a highly dramatic style, surcharged with suspense and daring is a commendable effort portraying not only the guts, courage and devotion of both the insurgents and the security forces but also the internal suspicions, conflicts and feuds that afflict the Mizo insurgents.

However one wishes that the author with such a broad based, long and intimate exposure to the violent conflicts of north-eastern India could have suggested a few guidelines for the authorities at various levels. One misses any mention of doctrines for the benefit of the higher military command. Recommendations on some of the tactical problems faced by the platoon commander 24 hours a day could have been helpful. But, perhaps that was not the aim of the book !

VKA

NAGALAND : THE NIGHT OF THE GUERRILLAS

by Nirmal Nivedon

(Published by Lancers Publishers, New Delhi, 1978, pp 404, Price Rs. 95'00)

NIRMAL Nivedon, having spent considerable time in Nagaland with accessibility to numerous overground and underground operators, is a knowledgeable person and with rare insight into the goings on in the area has garned an exciting account of the happenings that dreadfully continue to overwhelm the Naga horizon.

The author's style is quite original—investigative, descriptive and above all highly dramatic—but some how the unending repetition of almost similar episodes sometimes produces the feeling of viewing a movie in which the camera focuses on the same spot of the canvas again and again.

While the varying ideological postures adopted by the Naga insurgents during their long struggle exhibit their half-baked understanding of modern thoughts, the logic behind the various geo-political twists given periodically in no way enhances the standing of the underground "intellectuals". No doubt, the insurgents as depicted are a fine breed, but at the same time it must be accepted that the military adventurism of the small group of tribesmen could have been checked in a much shorter time by a less humane authority. And this aspect needs to be elaborated upon.

If the insurgents, reasoning that Nagaland is "not" a part of India because it was never occupied by them is accepted, then the country will have to be split into hundreds, or perhaps thousands of independent states. After what Gandhi, Nehru and Patel did to galvanise the Sub-continent into one nation, no Indian authority could have ever had the mandate of

breaking it up. At such a historic juncture, when the need for national unity was greatest, the Nagas got misled and for coming back to the rails not only they but the entire nation paid a heavy price. And Nibodon has done a remarkable job in projecting it so candidly.

While laying considerable stress on the squad level operations of the last 25 years, the book is almost silent on the educational, developmental and other aspects of the nation building activities which are rapidly changing the socio-economic landscape of the age old Naga areas and generating side effects some of which are not entirely helpful to the restoration and maintenance of peace. After all the Nagas are an ebullient people and unemployment of the educated, increasing economic disparities and delayed redressal of grievances will only enhance their restlessness.

While highlighting the courage, tenacity and fanaticism of the insurgents and the consequent death, destruction and misery brought upon the Naga settlements, the author takes no sides. He steers himself clear, content with narrating incidents and developments as they appeared to him, without advising either the insurgents or the authorities and with no message for the poor Naga masses crushed between the jaws of the two contestants.

VKA

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[1]

MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND THE ARMED FORCES

Sir,

REFERENCE is made to the article 'Management Training and the Armed Forces' by Sqn Ldr AN Verma in USI Journal Apr/Jun 80.

2. The author has made some very pertinent observations on the Management Training needs of our Armed Forces. It is all very well to say that new techniques in decision analysis and management are necessary for our services to successfully function in today's rapidly changing world. But all this takes time because in the final analysis it is the individuals who have to actually use these techniques. This takes a lot of convincing, not only to these individuals, but also to the organisations who employ them. It would be disappointing to see the enthusiasm of starry eyed enlightened juniors snuffed out by an organisation 'deaf' and 'blind' to their attempts to practice techniques radical to its ways of thinking or established practices.

3. There is also a dichotomy as far as the services are concerned i.e., the need for free lateral thinking at the top and strict obedience to orders and instructions below. Modern warfare calls for lowering of various decision levels but escalating costs of weapon systems and accountabilities for failure tend to push them up. The generation gap, both literal and figurative, keeps top management further and further away from the levels of operating units. The mushrooming 'staff' departments filter information as it travels upwards and in doing so, many a times, distort it. Much needs to be said about the manpower joining the services today. This includes the officer cadre. Various studies in this field have conclusively shown that the cream of the nation is no more attracted towards a career in the Armed Forces. While doctors and other craftsmen can migrate to greener pastures in foreign countries, soldiers cannot. Further, sound military leadership cannot bloom in isolation. It has to be part and parcel of the national system or environment. After all, not unlike the governments, a country can only get the generals it deserves,

4. As far as material management in the Services is concerned, I wish to say that the author has neglected to point the actual environment. Modern warfare, especially of the short duration kind, we are likely to experience in the future, requires the maintenance of large forces in being. There would not only be little time available to augment the forces defending threatened points but no time available to gear up industry to meet wartime needs. Hence, the requirement to stockpile needed stores and munitions close to the anticipated areas of hostility.

5. The Armed Forces plan their 'force mix' on the basis of threat appreciations. Who is going to be our enemy 20 years from today? It takes about that long a time to build up the necessary infrastructure to meet the threat. What kind of force is the enemy likely to deploy against us then? This would govern the quantum of defence effort required. Such questions and their like are very difficult to answer and no government can satisfactorily answer them today. Nevertheless the services have to plan on some assumptions. Such are the problems of finding solutions in areas of uncertainty. What weapon systems should we make and what should we buy? Which is more cost-effective? And don't forget time—it would be calamitous to have our 'cost effective' weapon system under development when the national security threat actually rears its head! So, 'to make' or 'to buy' is a very big question requiring an answer not from Service HQs alone but jointly, by numerous agencies. Even, when a decision to make is made, a large portion of sophisticated equipment (hardware and software) and special raw materials still have to be imported. The 'buy' decision is followed by other questions. 'From Whom?' 'How Much?' and 'In What time frame?'. Modern equipment, in no time tends to become obsolete. Simultaneously the gestation periods of weapon systems is increasing. Not only is our Jaguar project a case in point, the same is true of European efforts to introduce a standardised infantry weapon into NATO forces for use in the eighties. Meanwhile, cost escalate exponentially? Not many countries are likely to part with know-how about weapon systems that are still on the drawing board, though this is becoming increasingly popular on a selective basis and that too to meet the national interests of contracting parties. Further, only a few of the weapon systems under development actually enter service. So even here, the risk element is present. Therefore, who wants to be saddled by a weapon system, however new, when it is rejected by the country of its origin?

6. Lastly I wish to say, that management is not an exact science. No theories or concepts can by themselves, satisfactorily explain the behaviour of man as a part of organisation. Nevertheless, it is heartening to know that some very promising work is being done at the Institute of Defence Management, Secunderabad, in enlightening officers in middle and top management levels of the three services on the techniques mentioned by the author. And even then, a lot more needs to be done for the hurdles

are many. Those who lead and manage are invariably wary of anything new and the theocrats.

Commanding Officer Wing Com CN BAL
No. 16 Squadron Air Force
C/o 56 APO

[II]

LET US REORGANISE OUR LOGISTIC SERVICES

Sir,

I read with interest the above article by Col Gurdial Singh in the Jan-Mar 81 issue of USI Journal.

2. It is well accepted that a Division is the lowest self contained fighting organisation. A figure of 18% is not at all high for the representation of logistic personnel in a Division. In view of the fact that the equipment is getting sophisticated, one may need logistic support at any time. If we are going by numbers alone, then why raise a hue and cry that our neighbours have many more divisions on our borders : well knowing that their divisions have lesser strength than ours.

3. The author has suggested changes in the present logistic organisations as a Field Army. The changes are warranted but we cannot lose sight of certain aspects as discussed below :

Supply and Transport

4. The idea of using the Supply Company for its actual task during peace may be workable but the net work of Supply Depots is meant to meet the needs of scattered units. In field areas the Supply Companies are performing these tasks already.

Medical Service

5. The idea of using VTOL and STOL aircraft for casualty evacuation is welcome but do we have enough transport aircraft or afford them in that quantity after meeting other needs ? The civil hospitals will and do take the extra load on field/military hospitals but it is a known fact that emergency treatment in a military hospital is still the best and the fastest. About the medical officer on staff. Does he need professional training ? Or is he senior enough for others to draw on and gain from his experience ? If the 'A' Branch takes on the tasks of medical officers on staff, will it not expand as is the tendency ? Then why not have an ADMS at a Divisional HQ alongwith his staff ?

Provisioning and Repairs

6. There is no doubt that an organisation like Bharat Electronics or Heavy Vehicles Factory can replace the Base Workshops and discharge

the same duty better. There was a move some time back to decombatise the Base Workshops. Why was the idea dropped? Mainly because of the fact that though primarily manned by civilians the Base Workshops still deliver goods in a reasonable time. They are comparatively immune from labour and discipline problems and strikes. Also the equipment which is obsolete and not manufactured by the civil industry is still in service and needs attention performe. M/s Mahindra and Mahindra can overhaul engines better and at a lesser cost than the Base Workshops but where is the adequate pool of engines? We should permit the field Workshops to carry out repairs of the higher echelons to keep the fleet going and serviceable. Facilities in local market can be utilised for the same. Station Workshops invariably have a variety of load like NCC units. TA units (Rly), Recruiting Organisation etc. Often they have two or more detachments located away from them. Command and control of these personnel located with the detachments is difficult. Effort involved in maintaining these detachments is quite a bit. Smaller units of NCC etc. can be given enhanced financial powers or grants to obtain the repair cover from the local market. Thus at least certain Station Workshops (having only one officer) will be wound-up, thus causing a reduction in the investment and man power.

7. Provisioning is a continuous process and not as technical as the author considers it to be. Head of every Service is directly accountable to the Formation Commander. But how many Formation Commanders insist that AOC does the entire provisioning. The spares for Guns, Radio sets and Instruments reach a Workshop in time because they are not available in local market. But the spares for vehicles, the expendable stores, the items like Socks, Jerseys and Vests remain NA for long. If AOC cannot do bulk provisioning and use their financial powers fully and freely how can the users rely on ULPO alone after going through the long procedures of obtaining NA certificates? However, it would be worthwhile to have an EME Officer to look after the Ord section of a Workshop. The logistic services are over burdened before the operations and immediately afterwards. The days of over hauling equipment about 2000 miles in the rear and using again are gone for the good.

Different Terrain on the Borders

8. On the Western Front the units whose duties are similar to certain civilian professions can be kept in skeleton form. But we need the present organisations in mountainous sectors where a single road is the life line of the Formation and all activity like stocking of supplies and ammunition, evacuation of casualties, repair and recovery are closely linked with it.

Cost Effectiveness

9. If cost effectiveness is the only measure of efficiency, the Army may cease to exist. Public Sector Organisations including Army

Installation cannot be as cost effective as their counter-parts, in the Private Sector, for obvious reasons. It is like paying an Insurance Premium at the National level. When an AD Regt goes for practice firing it appears to fire off rounds worth thousands of rupees, but when it knocks out a Star Fighter during war it damages an aircraft worth lakhs of rupees and also saves an installation like a Refinery or a VA like an Armour Concentration. In a number of places the costly equipment like Guns, Radars and Vehicles are without garages or shades. They are open to the vagaries of nature. Is this cost effectiveness? Or are we catching the economy at the wrong end?

10. If the cost of training has to be reduced one can do so at the Recruiting Stage. We should enroll in EME, Sigs & Engrs candidates with ITI certificate or those having equivalent qualifications. Thus the training at the Centres can be reduced to only military training. Similarly those having Diplomas in Engineering fields can be directly recruited in the JCO rank. This will provide younger JCOs at no cost. In order to provide incentive we may reserve about 20% vacancies for them in the Officer rank. This may reduce the common crib that an NCO starts losing interest in service after becoming a JCO.

11. If the Private Sector is asked to produce war-like equipment they will do so at a lesser cost in lesser time. Presently the equipment becomes out-dated before it is fully operational and available for all units. Examples may be quoted of 106 mm IFG, Radio Sets C-42, HM-30 etc. The Private Sector will do a faster job than the Ordnance Factories, R&D and the GS together.

12. It is felt that the changes suggested must be tried in various Sectors and Formations over a period of at least two years. A frank opinion of their usefulness should be obtained from Officers of different service groups before the implementation.

Maj SG GOGATE

[III]

Sir,

COL Gurdial Singh in his article 'Let Us Reorganise Our Logistic Services' published in the Jan-Mar 81 issue of the Journal, has merely restated the age old concept of handing over to existing civil organisations the bulk of our logistics cover in peace, and also some of it in war. He has not however, gone into the details of how this can be actually achieved on the ground, without sacrificing military control and its connected loss of efficiency.

2. In fact if Col Gurdial Singh's ideas were to be followed to their logical conclusions, then there would be no need for the Air Force to possess transport aircraft, and the entire MES and Border Roads Organisations could be wound up and handed over to the Central and State PWDs. Col Gurdial Singh bases his theory on the one single assumption that,

future wars will be short lasting for a few days. I feel that, if any thing, it is this very condition, that dictates the army to have a captive logistics service, which can be made operational at a moment's notice, and hence it has got to be under its direct control.

3. However, I wish to take this opportunity of touching upon yet another aspect of logistics which is peculiar to the Indian army, and which no other army has to contend with. There is a common belief that, due to his high standard of living, the logistics problem of the American Soldier is far greater than that of his Indian counterpart. The fact however is that, due to the class composition and the traditional die-hard habits of the jawan, his personal logistics outweighs any saving of his so-called simple living.

4. To begin with, inspite of government policy of having a one class army, except for the services and some arms like the Signals, all the fighting arms are still based on class regiments, with the obvious logistics problems that go with it. The fact that even in mixed class regiments, the North Indian wants his wheat against the South Indian requiring his rice, is in itself a major logistics handicap. Secondly, the insistance of the jawan wanting a hot meal every time even at the highest of pickets, is one problem the US GI does not have to worry about as he can easily get along for days on end on the World War II k type dry rations. No amount of money and effort spent in trying to ease the logistics problem by the introduction of compressed food like Cheese and Sakkarpura, has made the slightest difference to the jawan's eating habits. Even in sub-zero temperatures, the introduction of the chemical toilet was rejected—the jawan must have his lotta and defrozen water for his ablution.

5. The jawan may be living like a hermit in his village, but by God, he creates more logistics problems on the battle-field, than the comfort loving American soldier.

Brig NB GRANT

RANGPO
SIKKIM
22 Jul 81

[IV]

"WAR IS AN AFFAIR OF STATE"

PERMIT me to comment on Dr. H.K. Srivastava's learned treatise on "Future Service Officers." I do so, because the N.D.A. Syllabus was originally designed after much careful thought ; by first asking ourselves, what sort of person do we want to produce ? The Professor has, instead started by accepting the FOUR (shall we call them) pillars of wisdom, postulated by the American Quincy Wright. These are : (1) The technological, (2) The legal, (3) The Socio-political and (4) The Biological-physiological-cultural, which he says are the basis of wars. Therefore we presume he wants to train leaders for a Quincy War.

We are not given the benefits of Quincy Wright's arguments; but we must assert that War and Peace do not depend on such ephemeral or such super sophisticated mentally gymnastic factors. We do not even know of Quincy Wright's claim to creditiblity; particularly as he comes from a land which has known or seen little of war. Moreover, in spite of it, being the most industrially powerful country in the world; the U.S.A. has proved itself constantly to be a military MORON. The U.S.A. was not involved in the early years of World War I or II. One push at Sousse by Von Arnim of Germany in 1942, sent them scrambling in North Africa. They managed to land in Normandy through sheer weight of material; but waht became of an advance which they should rapidly have made to and across the Rhine with a friendly French people itching to help them along? Thereafter, against Japan, Korea and Vietnam, the American Forces could scarcely have put up a worse performance. Their Military philosophy is already non-existent. So they rely on weapons of mass extermination as a threat.

When men like Quincy Wright express themselves, it should be taken as intellectual jugglery and not as a serious proposition on matters of war and peace. However, that the N.D.A. Principal (The Controller of Studies) should take these theories as a premise, is a warning for us. Therefore, the logic of what he has written must be given due attention and analysis the most serious thought. He has quite rightly said that "attitudes (of people) are primarily given form by education—Educational procedures address themselves to individuals and seek to influence private attitudes, thus building individual personality." This is true; but if we are to apply this to the American Armed Forces of the 20th century, we must admit that the end product of West Point and Annapolis has been notable by its inability to provide the attitudes and personalities necessary. Past and present experience already show this. For, above the power of the Dollar and the gigantic production capacity behind him, the American Soldier is not fit for a rating in the same class as the Hottentot or a Sumatran Aboriginal. MacArthur, D Eisenhower or Bradley only earned fame through the forces they had—Not all that big.

But Dr Srivastava has reeled off a list of the most sophisticated weapons and the Chemical, physical, electronic, mechanical and intricate wonders of so-called war. But as General Petain is said to have told a British General, "*C'est magnifique mais ce n'est pas la Guerre*"—It is magnificent but it is not war—The professor has no where given us an indication of what sort of a person is to be produced as an officer and leader of people. We certainly do not want an officer fully ready to man a Trident Nuclear Submarine. India has no need of such weapons any way. This is the land of Gandhi in so far it has no aggressive aims what-so-ever. This land is rising out of "the myre of despand." This land was, without its people's opinion, divided into two; so that its

agriculture was separated from the nascent industrial base. This automatically cut our growing economic base asunder. That in turn led to our present legacy of confrontation across our frontiers (now one frontier). The unfortunate developments with China have added to our difficulties. This is the milieu in which we exist. It has many future possibilities, both hopeful and dreadful which are not discussable here : but the one thing that stands out is that India, and with it, our Armed Forces of today and of tomorrow will have to be led by men of considerable integrity and ability ; Men of culture, vision, broad grasp and character of steel. Above all they will have to be men on whose shoulders the robes of responsibility rest easily like a perfectly fitting gown. Whether such men are masters of the M.I.R.V. or understand the details of laser rays or not, they will have to know what is needed, why, where and what for. Therefore they will be men looking for the challenge, rising above small and personal considerations and taking charge in whatever sphere the call may come to them.

Such a man is of quite a different make and shape, to the cartoon of a uniformed professor that Dr Srivastava has painted for us. In fact his (The Doctor's) figure is that of a person shaped by the machines around him rather than one who discusses what he wants and uses the tools and technology of the day to serve the ends of his purpose. The professor on a visit to the Cadets cabins will see there Rudyard Kipling's immortal poem "IF" which concludes "then you are a man my son." Surely the aim of the academy must be to produce a complete man ; steadfast, cool and resolute in battle and compassionate, honest socially and mentally clear in peace.

It was with such a man in view that the curtain rose on the Khadakvasla project. The notable feature of this was the habit of hard work. We can safely say that the cadet then did with ease almost twice what his successor of today does. Studies were, of course, the first and major function, with Science, Mathematics and English being the most essential and basic among subjects, for obvious reasons. But they played hard and worked hard. They turned their hand to everything and anything with only one proviso ; that what they did must be qualitatively good. The second rate was simply not acceptable.

If the "Proof of the pudding is in the eating" let us take a look : Cadet Salari, who was not so good at studies died with a P.V.C. in far off Africa. Madan who, some teachers thought, was not military material, won a very good M.V.C. and is going great guns today. Jogi Palta who was a great young artist rushed a Chinese road block and was cut to pieces by automatic fire : but the block was removed. These are a few of many great acts of heroism and leadership by boys who today would not have a chance, probably, to pass out.

In the field of scholarship, I can quote also, that all except for one cadet dropped for not making it in studies at the N.D.A. and who went

on to university, passed in the first division with ease. Some later appeared for I.A.S. and other examinations, and fared likewise. But have we forgotten that today's BA and B Sc are of the Lord Macaulay pattern with very little content? There is neither breadth nor depth therein. On the other hand the N.D.A. syllabus was framed with both and was thus not only far superior, but it also was better taught than the teaching of any university in India. One good example of the resultant produce is that an American news reporter, is said to have found the Commanding Officer of a Battalion sitting calmly under a tree and reading Shelly soon after the Unit had consolidated a position.

Another example is of a Colonel Gupta who, as a captain much later, was sent to attend a degree course in Engineering at Kirkee. He topped the list and took the Gold Medal of the course against all recent graduates. In fact a gap began to show between N.D.A. and outside cadets at the I.M.A.. Thereafter it was a tragedy when the BA/BSc was brought into the N.D.A., and made an excuse for cutting down a full syllabus putting back the clock and tending to soften and make idle by habit the average N.D.A. Cadet.

Nor can we agree with Dr. Srivastava that, "Defence is an accomplishment of territory to an aggressor, establishment of immunity to an alien political philosophy and a barrier to a migrating alien population". This is indeed a novel and far removed definition of defence. It is as an in-opposite as is the Doctor's quotation of Ruskin that "War is a necessary evil". It was so in Ruskin's days perhaps: but what is there to fight about today, that cannot be solved, shared or bought, when the rulers of the modern age are supposed to be of the people, and appointed by the people for the duration of the people's pleasure?

Even were war inevitable no education of worth can be war-weapons oriented. All education has to be an impact on the growth and prosperity or progress of the present social order with a view to the future. An educated mind is not necessarily a highly technical mind by any standard of necessity.

Thus we must stoutly deny that the education of a service officer has to be "entirely different from that normally imparted to his fellow country-men." Yes, in India, because of our out-dated Macaulian pattern, the whole shape of Education in India is almost at a level of uselessness. It signifies a rubber stamp to qualify for a job. The deliberately different shape given to the N.D.A. courses shou'd never have been cut back to a shape that is recessive; but it should have been further moulded and given even more advanced definition.

That "Machiavelli expounded the art of using superior preparedness, a reputation for ruthless and a threat of war for further victory" was all right in Machiavelli's day; but what happened when his political descendant Mussolini tried it?

The fact of the matter is that the Doctor himself has a vague idea of what defence is ; so also, seem to be, those whom he so authoritatively quotes. The final straw is where he quotes J.R. Schlesinger (Then Secretary of Defence of the U.S.A.). Thereby he makes it impossible for himself to come to a correct conclusion : because "Counter-force" programming is for a specific strategy still to be proved, which has more money than good sense behind it and is for global operations. It can be as related to us as a tigress is to a Persian cat.

The proper definition of defensive scope for India is the protection of our frontiers from outside aggression together with adequate ability to destroy any aggressor and to deter any thought of aggression. While we should also do all we can, to be on the best of relations with our neighbours, we should be able to discourage any thought of their being able to get away with creating or executing hostilities. In fact we should through all means educate them to see the advantages of friendship, material production and trade.

While defence policy should be clear and made clear, soldier, sailor, tinker and tailor, should get their heads down to enhancing and shaping, to the maximum, the economic development of India ; so that in the last analysis, it is not the number of heads that abound in India, but the mass of those peacefully living people that can change, if need be, to turn their hand successfully to fighting and destroying an aggressor at any cost. That will be the victorious factor in those hands that shape the economic advance of India.

I was myself educated in a public school and at Sandhurst. So it was a great discovery to find that the young Indian has a more fertile, more receptive and a far more eager mind than did my English Friends. "There is an end which shapes our destinies" Towards that end and keeping that end clearly in view, must the N.D.A. adjust and re-adjust. Professors in uniform are not what we need in great numbers ; but men who can take hard decisions and offer qualitative and honest advice. Let the U.S.A. or Europe go its own way. Let us turn our attention to our home. A good officer today must have a good knowledge of history to be able to judge the correct approach to our neighbours. He must be objective, broad and deep in his vision to see that our foreign policies do not fail us. He must be as fit as a fiddle and hard as a nail : so that he can face all hardships. He must know his own people and have a taste for culture and appreciation of his heritage. These will produce a character as clear as a crystal and as flexible and un-breakable as steel. We have too a far greater and prouder heritage to live upto than any Atlanticist.

As India looks out into "the encircling gloom" it has to rely on itself and its own people. We are rising out of the darkest age of our history ; we need the time, there is not a moment to waste and above all we need the *men* in the fullest sense. The N.D.A. is the one area where that torch must shine brightest so that it is *second* nature,

"To put the cause above renown,
To play the game beyond prize....." and
To hold the life if battle good
And dear the land that gave you birth..."
This is what those officers must be conditioned to face upto which
inspired direction at an early enough age.

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