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


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
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Afghanistan—An Appraisal

FANGA LA

SOVIET foreign policy, like most things in life, can be viewed from two angles. Some look upon every Russian strategic action as an aggressive policy; others view the same moves as defensive ones. It all seems to depend on which end of the telescope has been placed to the eye. But is a balanced appraisal possible? Is the Soviet action in Afghanistan an invasion and a threat to the Western world or a defensive strategy?


SOVIET STRATEGY

Soviet foreign policy suffered a set back during the Cuban crisis because it lacked the backing of a strong naval presence. Since then, the Soviet Navy has been given steady official support. Consequently, over the past two decades, it has emerged as one of the most modern and the second largest navy in the world. The acquisition of Aden as a base in South Yemen enables the Kremlin to exercise its influence in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. At the same time, the main thrust of Soviet aggressive policy has been switched from South America to Africa. But the results have been a mixture of success and failure. In Angola they enjoyed well-publicised success. In Nigeria and Egypt they have been forced to leave.

South-East Asia has been another area of vigorous Soviet policy. The Russians have supported Vietnam and Kampuchea against China, partly in an attempt to encircle China and partly to draw pressure off the Sino-Soviet border.

Soviet policy in West Asia reached its peak some years ago when the Russians seemed to be the main defenders of the Arab states against the belligerent and victorious Israelis. But President Sadat's peace initiatives and an aggressive Islamic revivalism, have weakened Soviet influence. Today, despite the overthrow of the Shah and the temporary set-back suffered by the USA with the hostage issue, the Americans are totally involved in the area and are in a position to emerge in a favourable light because of Soviet action in Afghanistan. It is, there-

fore, important for us to understand the factors which compelled the USSR to act as they did in Afghanistan.



AFGHANISTAN

TOPOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY

Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least developed regions of the world. The people are tribal in their social organisation, Islamic to their roots and medieval in their attitudes. In the South is a vast desert that crosses the border and extends across Baluchistan to the sea. In the South-West is located the Shahr-i-Zabul, a great inland swamp that also overlaps into Iran. The centre of the country is a vast barren

mountain tangle; desert in summer and snow-bound in winter. Large rivers rise in the massif and flow south through the desert to end uselessly in the swamps of Shahr-i-Zabul. To the North is the plain of the historic Oxus river, now the Amur Darya, which forms the border with the Soviet Union.

Three cities of importance are located at various points on the massif. In the west is Herat, close to the borders of Russia and Iran. In the South-East, controlling the Bolan Pass and in a fertile valley, is Kandahar : the second city of Afghanistan. The capital and major city is Kabul, located in a broad valley controlling the main passes across the Hindu Kush towards the Soviet Union in the north, and also the Khyber Pass leading to Pakistan to the east. A town of growing importance is Masar-i-Sharif, located in the Oxus Valley. These four together with several other minor towns are joined by a motor road. There is very little else : no railways and minimal light industry and mining. The whole country is agriculturally poor.

Afghanistan is a paradise for guerillas. An occupying power can only sit in the cities, towns or villages. There are few fertile areas from which they can exclude the guerillas who will starve if they remain in large groups and who, therefore, perforce have to operate in small bands. Although the society is tribal and socially disunited, the key to the unity of the people in the past has been their love for personal freedom and Islam. There are two other social factors that merit attention. The first is melmastia (hospitality). Even an enemy is given protection in one's home provided he touches the doorway and demands sanctuary. The second is badla (revenge). A family must kill a member of the family of a man who killed one of their relatives. This in turn, also demands badla from the other family, and so a murderous family feud must ensue until most of the men of one or the other side are decimated and their women and children sue for peace, or a family withdraws from the feud and remains dishonoured for ever.

BACKGROUND HISTORY

Afghanistan has always been the north-western gateway to the plains of India. When the Imperial Russians in the 19th Century, advanced into Central Asia and absorbed the old cities of Bokhara, Samarkhand and Kiev, the British reacted forcibly and twice tried to occupy Afghanistan to forestall further Russian advances. Both the wars, in 1838 and 1878, were disastrous and the British Indian authorities had to withdraw each time. Foreign invaders found Afghanistan very inhospitable. The tribes are protected by their desert hills and are wild natural guerillas.

After 1880, the Russians consolidated themselves on the Oxus but were in no position to invade Afghanistan or India. Russia remained on the defensive till some years after her Revolution and World War I. After Cuba, as has already been mentioned, it is only at sea and in Africa that the Soviet Union is being expansionist and aggressive. Following the withdrawal of Britain from India, the USA and USSR both made a bid for the favour of the King of Kabul. But caught between the pincers of a rearming NATO and faced with rebelling East European states and a pro-Western China, the Kremlin had to be on the defensive in Asia. Moreover, the expenses involved in facing upto NATO in the West and China in the East, in paying for their adventures in Africa, aiding Vietnam and raising new fleets were proving very costly.

Perhaps some Russians still have an expansionist urge to bypass Iran and drive Southwards to the Indian Ocean. But they lack the forces to invade Pakistan. For once an invader is through the Khyber and Bolan Passes, there are no natural barriers until one reaches the sea and thus one must ensure that all South Asia is under control; they must plan to conquer all or forget their dream and remain within Afghanistan. In fact, because of these economic and strategic restraints, the Kremlin could not afford to even occupy Afghanistan. They realised that Iran would be hostile irrespective of whether it was under a Shah or Ayatullah; the USSR were unhappy to have Iran's US-trained forces or resurgent Islam on their southern flank. They, therefore, were determined to establish a Marxist puppet state in Afghanistan; they planned to rule the country by proxy.

Two decades of steady diplomatic effort brought success to the Soviet Union and saw the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. By 1978, they were controlling Kabul from Moscow. The Soviet Union's plans seemed to be a brilliant success. They were ruling the country by proxy and all was well. Then their plan began to fall apart. In April 1978, a coalition of the two rival factions of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) overthrew the Daoud regime in a military coup. Both factions, Parcham (Flag) headed by Babrak Karmal, and Khalq (Peoples) headed by Nur Mohammed Taraki, were Marxist-Leninist and sympathetic to the Soviet Union. But on other matters they had major conflicts. The Khalq is largely dominated by persons of Pashtun background whereas Parcham has a greater Tajik representation. The Khalqs constituted two-thirds of the PDP and four-fifths of the military, and have always regarded the Parchamis as usurpers and unqualified to rule. So the new regime faced internal problems from its very inception.

Under Taraki, the PDP embarked on radical internal reforms in such sensitive matters as marriage and the status of women. These reforms were badly planned and opposition turned into a major anti-regime insurgency. Added to this was instability caused by in-house fighting between the rival factions. Some Parcham leaders were jailed; others, including Karmal, formed a rival group in exile in Eastern Europe. When Islamic fundamentalists took over increasing power in Iran, the Soviet Union grew alarmed and started to look for a way to stabilise the Afghan situation. But Taraki could not control the warring factions, so a reshuffle of leadership was ordered. Mohammed Amin, who was the strongman of the Khalq group, was then functioning as Taraki's deputy; he was considered unreliable. It was believed that he was "systematically eliminating some of Moscow's favourite Afghan Communists and maintaining secret contacts with Islamic militants in Iran US diplomats acknowledge that.....Mr Amin had sent signals of his desire to improve relations with the United States and to distance himself slightly from the Soviet Union."¹

The initial USSR plan was to eliminate Amin, blame the excesses on him, abandon some unpopular socio-economic measures and establish a broad-based PDP-led government under Taraki to include Parchamis. The plan miscarried and in September 1979 Taraki was eliminated instead. Things continued to deteriorate. At that time, some 50 Soviet advisers and a few of their families were rounded up and massacred by mobs. Some of the victims were senior generals who had been sent in September to advise Amin on how to reverse the deteriorating situation. Some claim that it is this event that triggered the eventual Soviet intervention which, however, did not reflect "an emotional reaction but the imperial logic of control and retribution, piously disguised as peace-making."²

Another reason which may have influenced the Soviet Union's decision to intervene arose from the plight of US hostages in Teheran. "The Russians could never rid themselves of the fear that US attempts to free the hostages disguised a strategic plan to reverse the loss of Iran and conceivably to turn Afghanistan back from its progress as a Soviet client." The Kremlin cold-bloodedly argued that "American intervention in Iran would provide the perfect cover for Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, because international reactions would be directed against the Americans as much as the Russians."³ Soviet America-watchers

1. A Washington Post article entitled "Soviet misunderstanding on Afghanistan" as reprinted in the Indian Express (New Delhi) 19 April, 1981.

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

apparently came to the conclusion that President Carter was about to launch a US-sponsored military coup in Teheran.

Whether cold-blooded or erroneous, the "decision to invade was a defensive one taken in what had become accepted in practice as the Soviet sphere of influence. It was as logical as the move into Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). It is not a new, aggressive Soviet policy.... Needless to say, the rest of the world has not seen it in this light. Equally, the Kremlin was obviously unaware of the effects of their involvement in Angola and the Horn of Africa on Anglo-American public opinion."⁴ The Kremlin did not seem to realise that world opinion no longer accepted that Cuba's proximity to the USA gave the latter the right to walk into that country, anymore than the USSR could treat Yugoslavia (or Afghanistan) as its sphere of influence to do with it as they pleased because of geographical contiguity.

Whatever be the factors that influenced their decision, when the Soviets moved into Afghanistan on 27 December 1979, it was on the pretext of an invitation from a regime that had allegedly overthrown Amin; a regime whose leader, Babrak Karmal, was not even present in Afghanistan.

THE MILITARY FRONT

By mid-1980, the Soviets had deployed over 85,000 soldiers in Afghanistan. To begin with, it seemed that they had learnt almost nothing from the American experience in Vietnam, and that they were condemned to repeating the same mistakes as the USA. Their army was also largely a conscript one but with some significant differences. The Soviet soldier is badly educated, poorly paid and is without the "backing" of the powerful media and elected Congressmen to emphasise his reluctance to serve in a wild, brutal and inhospitable land.

85,000 soldiers are not enough to win the war in Afghanistan. Large numbers of men are required to fulfil the routine jobs of feeding and maintaining an army, guarding barracks, protecting convoys and patrolling roads, villages and towns, keeping a watch on the Afghan ground forces and essential services—and all this must be done all the time, before others can be spared to perform their real task of cordon-ing, searching for and destroying the enemy. Moreover, the few that were left over for the real tasks were not trained for a counter-insurgency war which is a difficult war to fight.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet Army took quick control of the major cities, military installations and essential services, and still retain their

4. "Afghanistan—A Dissenting Appraisal", by Geoffrey Warhurst. RUSI—volume 125, Issue No. 3, September 1980.

control over these. But their domination over the long road communications is less certain. Their convoys continue to be ambushed from time to time. The Soviets are trying to improve and widen the roads from their border into Afghanistan. A petrol pipeline is being installed along this road. They are also lengthening the airfield runways at Kabul and Jalalabad. There are some who believe that the reason the Soviets have not brought in more men is that they do not have the infrastructure to support them; the improvement of communications augurs an increase of the Soviet presence in the coming year. There are others who argue that the USSR may not have more troops readily available. Though they have a four-million-man army, their commitments for internal security in Eastern Europe and as anti-NATO and anti-Chinese forces are heavy.

Whatever that be, the Soviets did well with their limited forces. Initially, they hoped to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. But they were unable to "sell" the Babrak Karmal regime to the people. Indeed, they were not even able to unite the Parcham and Khalq groups. When the "Soft" approach failed, the Soviets increased their use of force. They began employing high-technology-low-manpower tactics. They moved about 350 combat aircraft into Afghanistan, including 150 helicopters. Of these, there are said to be MI-24 gunships organised into six squadrons (some 75 helicopters). Helicopter gunships and MIG-21 jets are used to attack hostile villages.

During the last quarter of 1980, the Soviets withdrew some 5000 soldiers; these were from units such as air defence and heavy transport echelons which were ineffective in anti-insurgency operations. The Afghan Army which was 100,000 strong before these troubles commenced, has been reduced to 30,000. By early 1981, the Soviets had accepted the unsuitability of their tactics and weapons. Specialists in anti-insurgency were brought in and formation commanders were allowed greater freedom of action. There is evidence that in some areas they are destroying crops, food stores and animals, thus denying supplies to the Mujahideen. But in the meantime their casualties mount. A nurse at Kabul hospital is quoted as saying that 25 to 50 Soviet soldiers die at that hospital alone every week.⁵

Undoubtedly, Soviet casualties would have been high to begin with. Some experts have put these as 15,000 by September 1980.⁶ Afghan casualties would have been even greater. But once the Soviet Army got into its stride the casualties will have been reduced. Perhaps a more accurate current estimate would be about two killed and six

5. Report on Afghanistan, by Kuldip Nayar, Allied Publishers.

6. ABC Evening News, 18 September 1980.

wounded every day : a total of about 3000 killed and wounded every year. This is by no means large enough to hurt the Soviet Army or deflect them from their objectives.⁷ Meanwhile, in April, 1981, all the major news media in India and abroad reported the induction of about 22,000 fresh Soviet troops into Afghanistan raising the force level there to about 100,000. These reports were denied by Moscow. But whatever that be, experts are of the opinion that the Soviet Union would require something like 250,000 loyal troops to subdue Afghanistan militarily.

THE NON-MILITARY FRONTS

On 27 December, 1979, when the USSR moved into Afghanistan in force, they toppled Amin who was killed in the confusion. Babrak Karmal was installed into power. Soviet forces moved speedily to seize military bases. Apart from these military actions and from trying to solve the country's economic problems which have contributed to the regime's continued unpopularity, the Soviet Union's multi-pronged strategy on the non-military fronts laid emphasis on Islam, attempted to keep the rival Communist factions together and to build a loyal Afghan armed force.

One of the ways that the British in India kept the frontier from erupting was by ensuring that no local trouble was allowed to become into a general Islamic issue or a jihad. The Soviet Union also recognises the political power of Islam revivalism and is trying to prevent it from taking an anti-Soviet character. The Khalq's all-red flag has been changed to one featuring an Islamic green. Religious leaders who had been jailed under Amin were released. The government has established an office of Islamic teaching under Karmal's direction; a series of meetings with local religious leaders from various parts of the country have been organised to persuade them that "respect for the sacred religion of Islam is part of the Government's programme."⁸ Karmal has argued that true Islam exists in Soviet Central Asia. Delegations of Afghan religious leaders are being sent to the Soviet Union to visit various mosques and hold meetings with Muslims of the USSR so that they can see things for themselves. Karmal has said that the "date of December 27 represents the intervention of God Almighty" and has

7. According to the New York Times, 9 October 1980: Afghanistan has been divided into seven Soviet military regions—Konduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kabul, Herat, Shindand and Kandahar with one or two Divisions allotted to each region. According to the Daily Telegraph (London) 3 September, 1980, although each of these regions have a local PDP leader, they are in fact governed by Soviet generals.

8. Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 8 February, 1980.

called the Soviet help for the Afghans "an act of God".⁹ Each of Karmal's speech begins with a reference to Allah and is interspersed with quotations from the Koran, chants of "Alahu Akbar" and references to Afghanistan's Islamic traditions.

The second major soviet aim has been to patch up relations between the rival Communist factions, the Khalq and Parcham, and to broaden the base of support of the party by bringing in non-party members and winning over the youth. There are various roots of the traditional rivalry between the Khalq and Parcham, some of which have already been discussed. Karmal, on being installed as President, claimed the leadership of a united party. But there are many indications that the two groups are far from integrated. Many Parchamis who suffered under Khalq rule seems bent on taking their revenge on those who had supported Amin or even Taraki. Internal conflict has demoralized the party and further complicated the crisis of legitimacy and security of the Karmal regime.

If the Soviets identify themselves too closely with the Parchamis, they could antagonise the Khalqs and thus incite them into opposing the Soviet presence in the country. If the Russians lean too much towards the Khalq group, the Parchamis might look on this as an attempt to cultivate the Khalqs as a reserve, should Karmal fail to cope with the situation. Either way, the Soviet position is unenviable. Meanwhile they are trying to encourage Karmal to broad-base the government without much success. Karmal's efforts to win popular support have apparently failed because a large majority of the population remains opposed to the Soviet presence, though with varying degrees of activism.

In the period between the April 1978 coup and the Soviet Army's entry into Afghanistan, the Afghan Army has experienced numerous purges of its officers and a consequent decline in morale accompanied by defections. Effective Afghan military strength fell to less than 30,000 by September, 1980. The third major element of Soviet policy has, therefore, been to reorganise and expand the Afghan armed forces to its pre-1978 level of 100,000 men. The legal draft age has been reduced from 22 to 20. Forced recruitment, however, presents the Government with the dilemma that an unwilling recruit is a potential insurgent. The Karmal regime has also been trying to organise a party-controlled militia consisting of young recruits.

9. Karmal's speech to Afghan elders, broadcast on Radio Kabul in Dari on 18 June, 1980 and as reported in an article entitled "Soviet—occupied Afghanistan", by Zalmay Khalilzad, published in the Magazine "Problems of Communism" Nov-Dec 1980, Vol XXIX.

AFGHAN RESISTANCE

The groups leading the insurgency today are basically the same ones that attacked the Khalqi regimes of Taraki and Amin because they "lacked an Islamic foundation". In leadership, organisation and co-ordination, the Afghan movement is one of the weakest liberation struggles in the world. There are more than half a dozen different factions with no general strategy save following traditional ties of tribe and family. The resistance has no vision of the future. However, Soviet intervention has lent them greater legitimacy by giving them the role of fighters for Islam and the liberation of their homeland from foreign occupation. Their struggle is no longer an internal conflict, but a war for freedom and independence.

Resistance is split geographically into two parts: guerillas who operate from the jumbled hills in the centre of the country and those operating from across the border. Resistance within Afghanistan to Soviet intervention and the Karmal regime takes many forms: strike by shopkeepers, demonstrations by students, and the distribution of "shabnama" (literally, night letters; mimeographed or handwritten critical statements which are distributed secretly under cover of darkness). There has also been open violence ranging from killings of solitary Soviet soldiers, and government officials in towns, to attacks against convoys and the sabotage of vital installations.

Guerillas who operate from across the border are located in areas of Pakistan and Iran, close to the Afghan border. Whereas the Iran bases appear to be small and hampered by the conditions prevailing in Tehran, the Pakistani border is active. The main Islamic groups operating from number six.¹⁰ There are also several secular groups. Despite their Pakistan common antipathy towards the Soviet Union and sympathy for Islam, the major Islamic groups have failed to form a stable front. Under pressure from the Islamic world, the six Pakistani-based groups have formed an Islamic Rescue Front. But major disagreements persist. Besides personality conflicts, there are disagreements over leadership, the future shape of Afghanistan, the role of the former King and relations with other political groups and countries.

Meanwhile, there have been loud complaints that "70 per cent of the military and financial aid (meant for the Mujahedin) is directed to the Pakistani Army, the black-market and the pockets of various individuals. The present system suits the Pakistan Administration. Apart

10. The Chief Islamic groups operating from Pakistan are the National Liberation Front, the National Front for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan, two factions of the Islamic Party, the Islamic Association and the Islamic Revolutionary Movement. The key group in Iran is the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan. — Ibid.

from providing rich pickings for corrupt officials, it enables General Zia to gain popularity through being seen to control a popular Islamic cause. He can use the jihad to divert attention from his own internal difficulties. There are two possible solutions—to persuade Pakistan to make more effective use of these resources, by distributing them to the men who are actually prepared to use them, or to begin supplying the arms and finance to the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan directly.¹¹

Although the Pakistani based groups receive wide publicity in the international press, experienced observers are of the opinion "that President Zia, and indeed any likely successor in Pakistan, will exhaust all available tactics of evasion before he even considers opening the way to a charge, which could be sustained, that his country is ready to offer military hope to the Afghan Mujahidin."¹² So, unless Pakistan is prepared to allow the resistance groups to receive military aid, the fighting in Afghanistan will continue to be conducted by localized ethnic, tribal and sectarian groups, poorly armed and with tenuous links with the groups in Pakistan and Iran.

Whilst this lack of unity has undoubtedly hampered the coordination of military effort among the various groups, it has also decentralised the partisan groups and their sporadic guerilla actions have made them less vulnerable to large-scale counter-insurgency operations by the Soviets. Militarily, the resistance is growing in effectiveness. There are several indicators of this. The opposition moved from the hills in the countryside to occasionally challenge Soviet control of Jalalabad and Herat in August and September 1980. The partisans now have a few anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons acquired either from defecting Afghan units or purchased in the international arms' black-market. There have been reports of increased Soviet losses. For example, in fighting for Panjsher Valley (a mere 80 Kms north of Kabul), Soviet forces reportedly lost several aircraft and tanks without gaining real control of the area.¹³

SCENARIO FOR THE FUTURE

Several factors will play an important part in determining whether the Soviet Union succeeds in neutralizing the Afghan partisans. The most crucial will be policies adopted by Pakistan towards the insurgents.

11. Lord Bethell, MEP for London North-West (Conservative), writing in the Times (London) 24 November 1980.

12. Sir Olaf Caroe, the last substantive Governor of the North-West Frontier Province under the Raj, writing in the Times (London) December 1980.

13. Daily Telegraph (London), 5 September 1980.

Other factors will include the success or failure of Soviet attempts to establish a stable government in Kabul, reorganize the Afghan armed forces and their attempts to convert divisions among the opposition groups into open conflict.

The Russians should not find it difficult to control the Iranian border, though that military task will tie down a great many men. The Pakistan border is another matter. It has never been administered either by the Afghans, the British or the Pakistanis in the past. The Pathan has always ignored the dots and dashes drawn on a map. History records that no invader can win in Afghanistan. The first provinces to revolt have been the Afghans—be it against Timurlane, Nadir Shah, the Moghuls or the British. The Russians face the same dilemma that they posed Napoleon whose experience, also, was only in civilised states. He captured the capital and dictated terms from there. But he failed. One cannot help asking: will the Russians fail in Kabul?

A great power cannot allow a handful of tribesmen to defy them and to hold them to ransom. The coming months may see a fresh Soviet offensive. The towns will be held easily, but constant small-scale defeats on convoy and isolated patrols may provoke the Soviet High Command into punitive expeditions and the destruction of villages. Afghan casualties will be heavy but they will fight back from the hills.

If no partisan leader, capable of controlling all the factions, emerges, then the fight will continue to be disorganised spontaneous uncoordinated actions. The Kremlin may then find it possible to negotiate with the more war-weary Afghan leaders. If a dynamic partisan leader emerges, then the fighting will be intense both inside Afghanistan and on the border. This may take another two years to happen, but it will then find the Soviets in serious difficulties. Undoubtedly, Afghan villages will be blown up—either by guerrillas or by Russian reprisals. The Soviets will win battles but slowly lose the war. Afghanistan cannot be militarily subdued with 100,000 troops; it requires at least 250,000 soldiers.

THE FACTOR OF PAKISTAN

We have seen that the policies adopted by Pakistan towards the insurgents will be a crucial factor in determining whether the Soviet Union succeeds in neutralizing the Afghan partisans. Pakistan will probably allow Afghan refugees to enter but is likely to limit the amount of military aid going across the border. But even by continuing to provide sanctuary and limited support for the partisans fighting in Afghanistan Pakistan can be an obstacle to the Soviet pacification strategy. Recognising this, the USSR has exerted both implicit and explicit

pressure on Pakistan; Soviet aircraft have frequently violated Pakistan's airspace,¹⁴ and Moscow has threatened to support political groups inside Pakistan opposed to the Government of President Zia-ul-Haq, with an eye towards installing a government that would be hostile towards the Afghan partisans. Iran, too, is unlikely to be willing at this time in her historical evolution, to incur Soviet displeasure regarding the Afghan situation.

Nevertheless, should it become clear to the Soviets that while they control the Afghan state machinery, roads and towns, but it is their opponents who control much of Afghan society, then this may act as a spur and tempt the hawks in the Politburo into further adventurism. As one observer has stated, "I think it is likely that Moscow's next move will be directed to the sub-continent rather than to the Persian Gulf. For advantage taken of the great rift between India and Pakistan is less certain to provoke resistance to the Soviets from the great oil consumers dependent on Gulf oil. . . Pakistan in Asia in this century may then be forced into the role sustained by Poland in Europe earlier. Moreover, such a move ably coordinated by Russia, could be expected to resolve the great problem of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan of whom there are now more than a million. An assured stance in the sub-continent might even offer Moscow a blank position as against China."¹⁵

But many disagree with this assessment. As has already been pointed out, even though some Soviet hawks may dream of by-passing Iran and reaching the Indian Ocean via Pakistan, and the West might have nightmares about Russian warm-water ports, it would be fallacious to believe that their move into Afghanistan was a first step towards establishing a base from which to conquer Pakistan and India. They could not do this in the 19th Century and cannot do it now. A more feasible Soviet aim would surely be to encourage the downfall of President Zia in the hope that his replacement would accept the Karmal regime in Afghanistan and be hostile towards the Afghan partisans. Significantly, Mr Murtaza Bhutto, 26-year-old son of Pakistan's former Prime Minister, has been building his People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Kabul since 1979. From there he is plotting the downfall of the man who executed his father—President Zia-ul-Haq.

On the face of it, the PLA is not much of an army, yet "On December 12, 1979, a Pakistani army unit was ambushed at Nowshera

14. According to President Zia-ul-Haq, there have been 200 violations of Pakistan's airspace by Soviet and Afghan aircraft: *The New York Times*, 27 September 1980.

15. Sir Olaf Caroe, writing in the *Times* (London), December 1980.

midway between Rawalpindi and Peshawar. Twelve soldiers died. Their four attackers fled towards the Afghan border. Two weeks later at Jamrud (Sic), a Pakistani Army officer was assassinated. A month after that, a goods train was derailed at Multan. And so, at regular intervals, the attacks continued. It was Mr Murtaza himself who revealed that these were the work of the PLA in Kabul.¹⁶ The PLA is modelled on the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Like the PLO it is divided into two main independent wings, political and military. Appointed head of the former is 33-year-old Raja Anwar, a political activist who was adviser to late Mr Bhutto on students' affairs. The military section has been given to a 26-year-old exiled student from Peshwar named Sohaib Sehti. He has codenamed himself "The Wolf" and has called his outfit Al-Zulfikar, which means the Sword.

In September 1980, Mr Murtaza Bhutto issued a manifesto in Kabul. This was a mixture of claims, threats and warnings, but significantly there was also an appeal to "our fellow countrymen not to travel by PIA." There is no doubt that the PLA takes the business of terrorism very seriously. Recruits are subjected to long and careful indoctrination and are trained rigorously by defecting officers from the Pakistan regular army. Just as alarming from President Zia's point of view was the clear evidence that this was happening with the support of the Afghan Government.

So it was not surprising that in early March, Flight 326 when just 25 minutes away from its destination at Peshawar, was hijacked to Kabul. "All the evidence suggests that the Afghan authorities were expecting Flight 326. The Mig fighters at Kabul airport, usually so sensitive about incursion into the Afghan airspace, did not bother to scramble. And when the plane made a bumpy landing at Kabul, Mr Murtaza was, apparently, one of those awaiting on the tarmac."¹⁷ That the PLA were eventually able to force President Zia to release some 50 political prisoners in exchange for the hostages has provoked a crisis in Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps some Russians still have an expansionist dream to by-pass Iran and drive through Afghanistan and Baluchistan to the Indian Ocean. But they lack the forces to do this. The Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was a defensive one. The Kremlin did not seem to realise that world opinion would not accept their arguments of geographical contiguity

16. The Times of India (New Delhi), 18 March 1981 in an article entitled "Avenging Bhutto's Execution" by Insight.

17. Ibid.

and spheres of influence. Undoubtedly the Soviet Army took quick control of the major cities, military installations and essential services but they have realized that they face a difficult war in a wild, brutal and inhospitable land. Afghanistan is a paradise for guerillas. The Soviet Union has deployed about 100,000 soldiers in Afghanistan; this is not enough. They will require something like 250,000 loyal troops to subdue Afghanistan militarily. In leadership, organisation and coordination, the Afghan resistance movement is one of the weakest liberation struggles in the world. The Soviet Union is a great power and cannot allow a handful of tribesmen to defy them or hold them to ransom. But in an insurgency environment, the Soviets may win battles but slowly lose the war. The key to the future in this region may well lie with Pakistan.

Although the Pakistani-based resistance groups receive wide publicity in the international press, it is evident that President Zia whilst taking full advantage of the situation, is also taking care to ensure that no charge can be levied against the government for providing military aid to guerillas. But Pakistan can be an obstacle to the Soviet pacification strategy. Nevertheless, the USSR will not be provoked into attacking Pakistan. They could not do this in the 19th Century and cannot do it now. A more feasible Soviet aim would be to encourage the downfall of President Zia in the hope that his replacement would accept the Karmal regime in Afghanistan and be hostile towards the Afghan partisans. The presence of Mr Murtaza Bhutto, in Kabul and the activities of his PLA assume significance in that context.

It is correct for India to be alarmed at USA's proposal to deliver sophisticated arms to Pakistan. There are some who believe that India is over-reacting because she is obsessed by undue fears of Pakistan attacking her. Such critics seem to overlook the historical facts of the past 30 years. Moreover, even if one were to assume that Pakistan has no immediate intentions of attacking India (and it is clear that she will be in no position to do so at least for the next two years), it should be self-evident that any increase in Pakistan's military capability would compel India to carry out a matching increase as a prudent insurance against the future in the long term. Thus, the USA would be fostering an arms race between India and Pakistan at a time when neither can afford it. Admittedly, every country has the right and duty to improve its defences against clearly perceived threats. But one might well ask whether sophisticated US weapons can protect President Zia's regime against the real threat which is not a Soviet drive into Pakistan but is political and insurgent in nature. Thus, from that point of view, the arming of Pakistan with sophisticated modern weapons at this stage in her evolution makes no military or political sense.

Nevertheless, there are many who argue that it would be unwise to overrule the threat of a major or a limited Soviet drive into Pakistan. Assuming that this be so, surely it would be expecting too much to believe that a re-armed Pakistan can stop such a determined move by a super power. Thus, even by this threat assessment, the rearming of Pakistan makes no political or military sense, unless the aim is to prepare Pakistan as a base from where the USA can intervene in the event of a confrontation with the Soviets. This scenario makes South Asia a battle-field for a future confrontation between the super-powers or their proxies. A scenario that should be condemned by all the nations of South Asia, though it might suit the national interests of outside great-powers. But it is only representative governments that can safeguard national interests. However, the question of the evolution of a representative government in Pakistan, which would be the best insurance against an erosion of Pakistan's national interests is not being discussed in this paper.

It is correct for the West and the non-aligned powers to be disturbed over Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but not for the reasons usually expressed. We should be alarmed because it could prove to be a major cause of the Third World War.

Pakistan's India Policy after the Simla Agreement

DR. M.S. DAHIYA*

THERE is a wrong impression in certain political and academic circles in India that Pakistan's foreign policy begins and ends on the Kashmir borders.¹ But the weight of evidences suggests that after the Simla Agreement both late Z.A. Bhutto and President Zia-ul-Haq did try to the best of their ability to relegate the Kashmir problem to the sidelines, though they did not pursue this sort of course openly, owing to the fact that the armed forces of both Pakistan and India went into action over the Kashmir issue twice, in 1947-48 and the Rann of Kutch in 1965. Indeed, whatever the rulers of Pakistan say publicity—particularly in Pakistan—about the right of national self-determination for the Kashmiri people is nothing but a tactic to overcome domestic problems.

The memories of the partition plan, mutual distrust, theocratic nature of the Pakistan State, communal disturbances were and there in India, utterly irresponsible utterances of certain Congress leaders² and the

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1. The utterances of Zia-ul-Haq, the President of Pakistan, just after he staged a coup on July 5, 1977, lent credence to such sweeping observations. See Inder Malhotra, "Gen. Zia and Kashmir Issue—Highly Negative Stance", *The Times of India*, May 29, 1980.

2. The late Ayub Khan noted with regret and dismay the speech of the Congress President, N. Sanjiva Reddy, under Nehru (now President of the Indian Republic) wherein he publicly stated that the Government of India would pursue the Kashmir problem to its advantage after the solution of certain domestic issues. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters—A Political Autobiography*, Oxford, 1967, p. 205. Besides, Nehru viewed Ayub with contempt, Tarq Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's power*, London, 1970, pp. 113-14.

attitude of bigoted and obscurantist forces³ of Pakistan towards "Hindu India" plagued the atmosphere and contaminated the climate of normalization between the two countries. The cumulative reflection of these factors left indelibly bad impact on the political environment in Pakistan, thereby further widening the gulf.⁴ Therefore we will have to study the Indo-Pak relations against this background.

General Zia who arrived in Beijing on May 2, 1980 on a week's visit, said the only "issue" between India and Pakistan not implemented yet was the one "relating to Jammu and Kashmir" and added that "it shall be our unremitting endeavour to seek a just settlement of this outstanding issue in the spirit of the Simla Agreement and in accordance with the United Nations".⁵ Here it is important to note that when he made this statement, his domestic problems were assuming astronomical proportions in the sense that even the banned political parties such as Tehriki-Istiqlal and the PPP had come in the open to challenge the legitimacy of the military regime. Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto have virtually joined hands to overthrow the regime, the other parties playing the subsidiary role. As a matter of fact, the Air Marshal has been fanning the flames of agitation and barnstorming from Khyber to Karachi to demolish the credibility of Zia-ul-Haq. The former President of the Azad Kashmir, Qayyum Khan, has also come out openly against the dictatorial regime. The leaders of the four defunct political parties met on May 1, 1980 in Karachi presumably to evolve a common strategy to launch a mass movement against the ruling military regime. Those who participated in the meeting included Air Marshal Asghar Khan, Mir Ghous Baksh Bezenjo of the Pakistan National Party, Miraj Mohammed Khan of the National Liberation Front and Shah Faridul Haq of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan. The meeting which took place at the home of Ahmed Mian Soomaro a Tehriki-Istiqlal leader, was the first of

3. While at Simla, the late Z.A. Bhutto himself characterised certain religious organizations such as Jamaat as Pakistan's Jana Sanghites. See M.S. Dahiya, "Solution of the Kashmir Problem" *Democratic World*, New Delhi, June 6, 1976, p. 4.

4. In view of his anti-India stance, particularly for domestic consumption, the Indian leaders were not prepared to accept Bhutto's bonafides. Besides, it was widely reported in certain circles in Pakistan just before the Simla Conference of 1972 that the Rightists, notably the Jana Sanghites "were preparing a 'Satyagrah' peaceful demonstration at Simla to pressurise Indira Gandhi. There were right wingers like Bansi Lal, the Chief Minister of Haryana and later to be totally disgraced after Indira Gandhi's fall, who would extract the last ounce of flesh from a defeated Pakistan" Salmaan Taseer, *Bhutto—A Political Biography*, Delhi, 1980, pp. 136-38.

5. *National Herald*, New Delhi, May 3, 1980.

its kind since the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan⁶. Even the Pakistan National Alliance, which became a willing cog in the wheels of Zia-ul-Haq, when Bhutto was executed, is itching for an opportunity to dislodge the General from power. Hence, it was natural on the part of President Zia to raise the Kashmir issue to hoodwink the people. The aborted coup d'état is also rankling in the mind of the general.

In so far as his reference to the Simla Agreement is concerned, it is clear even to the utterly unimaginative individual and the meanest intelligence that a harmonious interpretation of the agreement suggests that both India and Pakistan have freezed the Kashmir issue. More importantly, President Zia-ul-Haq has described the Simla Agreement as "a kind of non-aggression pact" between India and Pakistan⁷. Though in Pakistan non-aggression pact means a sell-out, yet the general further stated, "If both sides mean it seriously and continue the further normalization of Indo-Pak relations in the spirits of the Simla accord, we do not need a separate non-aggression treaty.".....Referring to bilateral relations, General Zia commented in an interview published by the West German news magazine "Der Spiegel", "I wish that they (relations) improve. The basis of Simla agreement—in whose negotiations Mrs. Gandhi chiefly participated—the normalization of relations is continuing." In accordance with its provisions, "both countries agreed to solve their bilateral problems without using the armed force". He considered "this to be a very good matter and had personally great hopes that the relations (with India)" improved.⁸ Besides, the old ceasefire line has been replaced by the new line of control as a result of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan⁸, thus completely obliterating the United Nations from the arena.

When General Zia captured power in July 1977, he went on record to publicly declare that the fate of Kashmir should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The context in which he made his statement is more important than anything else. The rejection of his plan of forming a "national government" by almost all major political parties prompted him to say something for domestic

6. *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, May 2, 1980.

7. *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, March, 13, 1980; see also *The Times of India*, New Delhi, March 13, 1980.

8. The late Z. A. Bhutto, who was one of the architects of the Simla Agreement did not differentiate between the "cease fire line" and the old "line of control". He considered them as one and the same thing, though there is a lot of difference between the two terms. For details, see Z. A. Bhutto, "If I am Assassinated...", New Delhi, 1979, p. 131.

consumption, for the very purpose of arresting the deteriorating situation (both political and economic) in Pakistan. From the standpoint of Pakistan rulers the "elite image" and "political environment" must converge at any rate. They think it essential to contain any sort of protest movement.

President Zia had to adopt such postures, when even light weights demanded "powerful and purposeful" share in the national government without having realised that this was not possible on the part of a military government to concede. For this purpose he sounded the hard core of Bhutto's enemies to form a government under his own umbrella, simply to transfer responsibility to a civilian government and not substantial powers. But this move met with mixed reaction.

The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was inclined to join the government but on its own terms, and to secure the desired end, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Prof. Gafoor Ahmed sent a letter to President Zia after the Central Council's session in Lahore in the fall of May 1978. Though the contents were kept secret, Prof. Gafoor Ahmed emphatically stated that the PNA could join only with substantial powers in the hands of civilians. If certain clandestine sources are believed, the pre-conditions stated in the letter were reported to be too harsh and hard for joining such a government for the President to accept. A number of publications believed to be close to the PNA disclosed that "the alliance wants to eat the cake and have it too". More than this, the PNA did not like to pocket "second fiddle" to the military establishment, believing that this state of affairs would damage their image beyond calculations.

As for Air Marshal Asghar Khan's Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, just after the PNA meeting took place the former Air Chief decided to sever his connections with the alliance, saying that its utility was no longer needed after the removal of Bhutto. He started operating independently in the hope of capturing power on his own if the fair and free elections were to take place. As a matter of fact, he was understood to have left the PNA to placate and humour Bhutto and his PPP. Since he is a man of sterling integrity and towering personality and since he had established a considerable following in the Punjab, he thought he could enhance his own interests by the secret understanding with Bhutto's PPP. But the postponement of elections and the Lahore High Court judgement against Bhutto demolished all that he purported. When the PNA joined hands with President Zia, he decided to stay away from any civilian government controlled by the military complex, saying that he could better serve the country from outside.

Wali Khan also did not support the formation of a civilian government with crippled wings, though he welcomed the imposition of Martial Law. He expressed the desire that the elections should be held immediately but he took the postponement quite lightly. At the same time his former associate who joined the PNA, JUP's Chief Shah Ahmed Noorani had impressed upon the Chief Martial Law Administrator the desirability of announcing elections schedule and to accelerate the process "in such a way as would facilitate the holding of general elections within this year (1978)". Unlike Wali Khan, he took a hard line to achieve the desired end. Though JUP was one of the partners in the PNA, its President did bypass the PNA Chief Mufti Mahmood, and other important leaders in a number of ways. As such, the politicians like "wobbly customers" could not direct the course adopted by the Martial Law "stockists of power". It appeared, as a Pakistani observer stated, General Zia-ul-Haq "has functioned as a crossword compiler and the politicians have been cast in the role of competitors". The withdrawal by the JUP from the PNA and the joining of government by the Muslim League lent credence to it. The eagerness with which Sardar Qayyum Khan, Bhutto's Minister for Interior, now a member of the Pakistan Muslim League, and Kausar Niazi of the parallel PPP lent their support to the Chief Martial Law Administrator did not spring any surprise, in view of the fact that they became a willing cog in the wheels of military complex long back. Niazi wanted to settle scores with Bhutto and Qayyum's strategy was directed against Wali Khan, his rival in the North West Frontier Province. He went so far as to state that "he will not sit with those who opposed the creation of Pakistan", obviously referring to Wali Khan's father. But none of them did find a berth in the new arrangement.

A close analysis of General Zia's strategies suggested that he is and was least interested in the restoration of democratic climate and constitutional niceties. For this purpose, the containment of explosive situation in Baluchistan and NWFP, the division in the ranks of the political parties and their total subordination to the military regime and complete obliteration of "Bhuttoism" were and are considered to be essential. The upheavals in Afghanistan and its impact on the leftist elements in Pakistan and, particularly on youths in Baluchistan and NWFP, coupled with the changing stance of Akbar Bugti (former Governor of Baluchistan) and Sardar Attulla Mengal (former Chief Minister) were seen to have changed the political spectrum to the CMLA's disadvantage. Besides, the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front seemed determined to get the military cantonments dismantled in the province at the earliest. According to its mouth organ, Jabal, even the "amnesty declaration is nothing more than a tactical weapon which the successive regimes ...

have been using against the Baluch". Owing to this state of affairs, Ajmal Khattak, former Secretary General of the banned NAP, and engaged in directing the Revolutionary Democratic Front from Kabul had declined to return. More importantly, though in the NWFP Abdul Qayyum Khan has and had made some compensation for the military regime by openly extending his support, it is significant to note that Sardar Qayyum, the former President of the 'Azad Kashmir' and Chief of the Muslim Conference in the province, has been hanging fire for the military regime. He has neutralised Abdul Qayyum Khan's support to the regime by demanding the dismissal of "illegal and immoral" administration in Kashmir headed by the "Chief executive" Brigadier Hayat Khan.

Now that all major political parties, particularly former Air Chief Asghar Khan's Tehrik-i-Istiqal and the PPP, are determined to oppose the perpetuation of the military regime and that the political developments are assuming astronomical proportions in view of Zia's ambitions and his anti-deluvium and effete actions, the country is likely to be plunged into chaos and disorder. Therefore, the military regime raises the Kashmir issue to divert the attention of the people.

There are other indications that Pakistan is likely to come round to the view that the 30-year old problem should no more be allowed to impede normalization of relations between the two countries. This view has been expressed at least twice in the recent past by the government owned "Pakistan Times". The latest is an article by M.B. Naqvi. He noted with concern that Kashmir defied solution for thirty years despite UN efforts and two wars. The Simla Pact derecognised the 1949 ceasefire line and made the United Nations defunct in so far as the state was concerned. He further said that "the solution of Kashmir problem now can only be predicted on peaceful means.... War for the purpose is no longer a peaceful option and that quite apart from having subscribed to the Tashkent Declaration and Simla accord which bind the two parties to seek Kashmir's solution through peaceful means." Also, "for solving the Kashmir issue we have to reorient our thinking and search for some new element or factor that has hitherto eluded us..... It is the Kashmiri people themselves..... It is time we did some closer thinking on its implications and concomitants. At all events, if reunification is a long term goal to be struggled for by the Kashmiris (in which Pakistanis have morally and politically committed themselves to helping them to the best of their ability) Pakistan need not continue to suffer from the same early cold war mentality which forbids detente, with the adversary. In another 14-page article published in the Karachi Weekly "Pakistan Economist" in May 1980, M.B. Naqvi has advocated somewhat similar steps. In

certain respects he has gone beyond this. On Kashmir, Mr. Naqvi, a senior Pakistani journalist, says :

Since a resort to arms over Kashmir is not on the cards and is not a desirable course on any count, one may as well acknowledge that the larger historical forces are stronger than a given government's policy. That may be hamstrung by an unfavourable, international situation. Once such an avowal, not necessarily explicit, is forthcoming, all roadblocks in the way of a closer Indo-Pakistan friendly cooperation get removed. This would be the single most hopeful factor for Pakistan today—firstly, by securing our eastern flank and, secondly, by brightening up the prospects of a regional initiative for solving the crisis triggered off by the Afghanistan events. The chances of success for a solution within a regional framework would improve further if the US were to fall in line, which it may⁹.

Under Bhutto also, Kashmir seemed to be slipping down, due to the compulsions of domestic and regional politics. Speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on Kashmir in August 1972, Bhutto said that there was only one method of liberating Kashmir from "the Indian yoke", that is, Kashmiris should start the "struggle for freedom". He hastened to add that "as soon as the people of Kashmir launched their freedom struggle", Pakistan would jump into the arena to proceed "all out in support and assistance" to their cause. By concluding the Simla Agreement, as it stands at present, Bhutto agreed to tolerate the *status quo* in Kashmir, notwithstanding his utterances to the contrary afterwards. With his rather vulnerable position on the home front, he could not be expected to openly accept the position on the ground. Had he talked of any sort of compromise on the Kashmir issue, bigoted religious organizations, such as Jamaat, would have launched a vilification campaign against Bhutto, capitalizing on the deteriorating situation in a demoralized and truncated Pakistan. While at Simla, Bhutto had himself defined their role by describing them as Pakistan's "Jan Sanghaites". In the face of this state of affairs, and probably to strengthen Bhutto's hands to withstand the mounting pressure from all quarters, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi purposely declared that if Islamabad did not withdraw the Kashmir question from the United Nations it would still not affect India's bilateral approach to Indo-Pak affairs.

It is significant to note that even before the Simla Agreement, Bhutto had in March 1972 told an Indian journalist that Pakistan could not be an active party to getting the Kashmiris the right of national self-determination. He categorically stated that "self-determination cannot be inspired from outside. Like revolution it cannot

9. Cited in *The Times of India*, New Delhi, May 13, 1980; see also *The Tribune*, Chandigarh, May 17, 1980.

be exported. It has to be an indigenous struggle..... Their struggle will be basically theirs... I am not making it my dominant theme." He repeated his stand in somewhat similar fashion on later occasions.

But while speaking to the military personnel in Gilgit in May 1976, he said that he entered into agreements with India following the advice of certain friends but that did not mean that Pakistan compromised its stand on Kashmir issue. Undoubtedly what Bhutto said contradicted his previous stand. But he had his own unique style of diplomacy, of moving interminably forward and backward. For Bhutto torrents of concocted oratory for domestic consumption were as useful as normalization of relations with neighbours and, in turn, maintenance of Pakistan's prestige abroad.

Viewed against this backdrop, the deteriorating political situation in Pakistan, in the face of a united opposition and rapidly changing atmosphere in the international arena, explain what he said. To achieve the supposedly desired ends, he had directed his guns against his adversaries. The well-organised National Awami Party had been banned and its leaders had been put on trial. Judges from outside had been drafted into service in Hyderabad (Sind) by putting the constitution through amendments of far-reaching consequences. The uncovering of the opposition's "London Plan", and the recovery of arms from the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad, provided Bhutto with a fine excuse for bolstering up the waning fortunes of his faction-ridden Pakistan People's Party. Believing that Bhutto had scant regard for constitutional norms, democratic niceties or parliamentary proprieties, Wali Khan himself wrote to the Supreme Court in a "bold indictment" that "The executive powers have passed into the hands of a single individual and the legislature has been corrupted and totally neutralised and made subservient to the whim and caprices of one man."

As for the other opponents of Bhutto's "vice-regal" style, former lieutenants Mustafa Khan and Hanif Ramay discovered their true plight on being thrown into jail on whimsical charges, thus making the political arena immune from the hostile elements in the Punjab—Bhutto's base of support both in political and military affairs. The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal chief Asghar Khan, a man known for his integrity with a considerable influence in the armed forces, had been made to understand that Bhutto's men had the capacity to outmanoeuvre, outnumber, outbrave and probably outgun him even in Lahore, where the Air Marshal is said to have a substantial following among the masses.

The conservative press also came under severe attack on the Kashmir issue. When Nawa-e-Waqt of Lahore raised the Kashmir

issue in its editorial on 23 April 1976, and criticised the process of normalisation at the cost of "principle", the Bhutto Government instructed all public sector organizations to stop advertisements to this paper, thus breaking its back, financially.

All this was a part of Bhutto's strategy to draw out and decimate the opposition to the normalization process initiated at Simla, thereby paying the way for accepting the new situation in the Kashmir Valley. His move to integrate Pakistan-occupied Kashmir may be cited as a case in point. With its former President Qayyum Khan out of power, the formation of the Kashmir Council consisting of 14 members (5 nominees of the Prime Minister from the National Assembly or the Central Government) headed by the Prime Minister and armed with far-reaching powers hastened the elimination of local obscurantists and stabilised the situation on the Pakistani side of the border.

Bhutto's talk about creating the best fighting force in Asia and purchasing war material from varied sources was meant for domestic consumption. A strident West Asian presence for Pakistan may not be possible in the near future in view of Iran's exorbitantly increasing military power. But it is a fact that the geopolitical factors in the subcontinent are a stumbling block in the way of Pakistan's long range strategy to dominate the region. In 1976, Bhutto himself declared at Quetta's military Staff College that Pakistan could ignore anything but geographical constraints. Viewed against this background, it may safely be said that in Bhutto's priorities Kashmir had been relegated to background.

Now that all pending issues between India and Pakistan, except Kashmir, have been sorted out without external interference, the developments of viable working relations depends upon how the new leadership in Pakistan views Indian intentions. Since India has time and again declared publicly that the maintenance of Pakistan's territorial integrity is in India's national interest, and also conveyed this view to Islamabad, one may look forward to a period of unprecedented normalcy on the Kashmir issue, barring unlikely surprises.

As a matter of fact the Simla Agreement may be said to be a watershed in the history of Indo-Pak relations, though both the countries are inclined to interpret its provisions in their own ways and to their own advantages. There is no doubt that even after Pakistan was humbled by India in 1971 and that the allies of Pakistan could not put an effective halt to the process of her dismemberment and that a sense of revenge could be easily smelt even from a distance, if one goes by the utterances of Bhutto just after he took over as President of Pakistan in 1971, his contribution towards normalization of relations between the

two countries cannot be minimised, despite the fact that even then he was interested in involving super powers in the affairs of the subcontinent.¹⁰ But when he met Mrs. Gandhi at Simla in June 1972, he was all for a settlement but not a sell-out, because the acceptance of the Indian conditions on the part of Pakistan even as a defeated country would have disastrous consequences for Bhutto on the home front, in view of his vulnerable position. Here it is quite interesting to note that there was a substantial reversal in the Indian and Pakistani priorities as compared to their earlier negotiating postures, particularly those immediately following the conflict of 1965. Then, Bhutto as Foreign Minister had insisted on an immediate solution of the Kashmir problem to the exclusion of all other issues, though President Ayub Khan was prepared to relent to some extent. Pakistan had argued that unless and until the basic problem was solved, it was futile to attempt to solve peripheral issues since such piecemeal settlement would not contribute to creating a climate of peace in the subcontinent. But at Simla, the emphasis of both India and Pakistan reversed completely. New Delhi tried to the best of its ability for an all-encompassing settlement which would once for all lay at rest the ghost of Kashmir.¹¹ In view of this position, there occurred a deadlock and there seemed no possibility of a breakthrough, but since Bhutto had been schooled in the statecraft, he left an indelibly good impression by his undoubted genius upon Mrs. Gandhi. He made her realize that the history¹² would not forget and forgive

10. When Nixon visited China from February 21, 1972 to February 28, Bhutto declared that the Indo-Pak summit "is linked with what is taking place in Peking and I won't make any reply until Nixon leaves the shores of China." But the Shanghai communique issued on February 28, 1972 at the end of Nixon's China visit could not change the situation to the advantage of Pakistan, excepting for the fact that China did openly support Pakistan on every issue as it was usual on her part in the past one decade. In so far as the US stand was concerned, it was of no avail to Pakistan. Bhutto waited for all this even after the first official initiative for the opening of a dialogue between India and Pakistan was volunteered by New Delhi on February 14, 1972, in a letter addressed to the UN Secretary-General. India did offer direct talks with Islamabad "at any time, at any level and without any precondition to ensure lasting peace". *Hindustan Standard*, Calcutta, February 20, 1972, cited in Mohammed Ayooob, *India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—Search for New Relationship*, pp. 74-75.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87; see also n. 4, p. 142.

12. "Bhutto paid a visit on the evening of 2nd July to Indira Gandhi's residence 'the retreat'. The two dispensed with all aides and closeted themselves alone. In the informal atmosphere, Bhutto wound their mutual problems into the indissoluble chains of history. He spoke to her of their great cultural heritage; Mughal heroes and emperors like Aurangzeb and Ashoka and the judgement of generations to come if they failed at Simla. He outlined to her the sort of Agreement which would be acceptable, reiterating the historical significance of their tryst. 'I found myself talking in the perspective of history', he mused to journalist Noti Ram in November 1976. 'I remember asking her what the world would say if we failed.....consider our claims to bring continuations of great civilizations..... let us start by agreeing we are in disagreement'.....After he finished, Indira Gandhi smiled and suggested they resume the conversation after dinner'. After twenty minutes, Bhutto emerged triumphant" and as such a cordial atmosphere was created to formalise the agreement. For details, see n. 4, p. 138.

them if they did not arrive at any settlement to the satisfaction of both India and Pakistan. He impressed upon the desirability of demonstrating statesmanship and told Mrs. Gandhi that if they failed in resolving the outstanding issues and that if he was pressured to accept the Indian conditions, the military would take over the reins of Pakistan and as such it would be very difficult on the part of India to deal with the dreaded dictatorship of military. At the same time he also gave the assurance that he would recognise Bangladesh in the near future if he went back to Pakistan honourably. Believing that Bhutto would be somewhat more pliable and tractable as compared to a dictator, Mrs. Gandhi pressed her aides into services to prepare the draft of a settlement which came to be known as the Simla Agreement.

There is no doubt that the provisions of Simla Agreement, as they stand in the present shape, were contrary to what the successive rulers of Pakistan desired from time to time since the time Pakistan came into existence, Bhutto did hoodwink the people upon his arrival in Pakistan by stating that he did not succumb to the pressure of India and that he had got the Pakistani territory back occupied by the Indian forces in the Western sector. He also assured the people that the prisoners of war numbering to 93,000 in the Indian custody would be released without any string.

Upon hearing all this from their leader, the Pakistani people comforted themselves by the Simla Agreement, despite the fact that the UN enforced ceasefire line in Kashmir was derecognized. Besides, the much detested idea of a "no-war pact" was introduced through the backdoor. Trained in the art of practical political prostitution, Bhutto did manage the approval of the people and almost all the political parties, except for some religious organizations. But he had to face rough weather in connection with the recognition of Bangladesh from every nook and cranny of the country. People were not prepared to reconcile to the reality of Bangladesh, though Bhutto did try his level best to make them understand the gains emanating from the recognition but all in vain. As the release of the prisoners of war was linked with the recognition of Bangladesh, in view of the fact that the Pakistani forces had surrendered to the joint command of India and Bangladesh, and as India had declared that she could not take any decision on this issue without the concurrence of Bangladesh, though for all practical purposes it was nothing more than a "legal fiction" Bhutto was in search of some suitable opportunity, and that was provided by the Islamic Summit Conference in 1974. After having been recognised by Pakistan, Mujibur Rehman dashed to Islamabad. As a matter of fact Bhutto gave the impression that he did recognise Bangladesh following the suggestions

of some Muslim countries and not under the cocktail of "Indian blackmail".

But the process of normalization was still in progress, he visited Peking¹³ (now Beijing) to import external involvement in the affairs of the subcontinent to the exclusion of bilateralism as initiated at Simla. But just after his arrival in Pakistan, the Indian nuclear explosion frustrated the strategies of Bhutto "embroidered" in China and "intellectualised" by Aziz Ahmed in Pakistan. Bhutto went on record to publicly and bitterly criticise the Indian moves and halted the process of normalisation, of relations. Mrs. Gandhi did try to assure him, saying that the Indian nuclear explosion was meant for exclusively peaceful purposes and differentiated between a "nuclear power" and "nuclear weapons power".¹⁴ Not convinced, Bhutto wrote to Mrs. Gandhi and questioned the Indian intentions. However, after a few days the dialogue between the two countries was resumed to the satisfaction of Bhutto.¹⁵ So far so good.

But Bhutto continued to raise the Kashmir issue with almost clocklike regularity, despite the fact that by the end of 1974 he had consolidated his position in Pakistan. His PPP controlled every province, though in Baluchistan and NWFP extraconstitutional and unconstitutional means were employed to grab power. Even the "Azad Kashmir" was not free from the operation of his nimble fingers.¹⁶ Under these circumstances Kashmir was the only issue to claim the people's attention.

By the time the emergency was imposed in India in June 1975, Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi¹⁷ had reached a clear understanding, in so far

13. Bhutto visited China in May 1974 in an effort to involve the Chinese in the affairs of the subcontinent as a tactical measure. Even before he came to Simla in June 1972, he had paid a visit to Peking from January 31, 1972 to February 2, 1972.

14. See *The Times of India*, New Delhi, May 20, 1974. Mrs. Gandhi wrote to Bhutto on May 22, 1974 to assure the Pakistani leader that India remained committed to only peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that there were no political or foreign policy implications of the test. n. 10, p. 135.

15. After having made mountain of the moult hill, Bhutto resumed negotiations with India and declared that he had secured guarantees against the Indian nuclear blackmail. As a matter of fact, he wanted to suspend the process till he visited Bangladesh in June 1974. The visit, however proved a total failure.

16. n. 16, p. 138.

17. Bhutto conveyed to Mrs. Gandhi through journalist Miss Falaci that whatever he said in connection with Pakistan's relations with India was meant for domestic consumption and hence it should be taken to mean simply a political gimmick. *India Today*, New Delhi, July 1-15, 1979, p. 11.

as the Indo-Pak relations were concerned. As a matter of fact, both the leaders concentrated on domestic politics, that is, containment of their opponents within and outside their own political parties.¹⁸ Therefore foreign relations receded to background in their priorities.

The year 1977 marked a turning point in the history of Indo-Pak relations. Mrs. Gandhi crashed to defeat in the 1977 parliamentary elections followed by a military take-over in Pakistan on July 5, 1977. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Minister for External Affairs, in the Janata Government visited Pakistan and assured the new military regime headed by General Zia that India was full-bloodedly committed to the cause of peaceful atmosphere in the subcontinent, and the General was so impressed after meeting him that he went on record to register his "personal regard"¹⁹ for the Indian leader, though previously Vajpayee was a suspect in the eyes of Pakistani leaders, in view of his anti-Pakistan stance. The visit was followed by a number of other steps such as a "soft border" between the two countries and Salal Dam Agreement in 1978, trade missions, transit negotiations and cultural and sports missions.

The Afghan crisis has further drawn the two countries closer to each other, notwithstanding the pronouncements of General Zia in regard to Kashmir. In January 1980, he "went so far as to bracket the problem of Jammu and Kashmir with that of Palestine". He went to the extent of stating that the people of both regions were "groaning for the right of self-determination". When he spoke in a somewhat similar fashion on May 24, 1980, the Indian Ambassador stayed away from the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference held in Pakistan.²⁰ But even then the progress made by the two countries to normalise relations was not obscured, as the geo-political compulsions on both sides have assumed new proportions. There is no doubt that India²¹ has not protested as violently as Pakistan but the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, has time and again declared that New Delhi has "always disapproved of foreign interference in any country. Therefore, we do not approve of

18. For details, see P.N. Lekhi, *Witness for Prosecution: Sedition Unmasked*, New Delhi, First published 1979, p. 69.

19. n. 8, p. 132.

20. *The Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, May 25, 1980.

21. In their conversations with Mr. Swaran Singh, Mrs. Gandhi's emissary, the Pakistani leaders made the point that "Indian criticism of the Soviet military action in Afghanistan was not strong enough. To this his answer was that hard words never broke any bones". Inder Malhotra, "Dialogue With Pakistan—A Bright Patch", *The Times of India*, New Delhi, April 17, 1980.

the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan". The Afghan issue, she added, "had to be seen in historical perspective". Also, "we find there are double standards in the world. Those who are attacking the Soviet Union today did not say a word when China attacked Vietnam or a similar situation developed elsewhere."²²

Another redeeming feature is that a fairly large section of the Pakistani people does not see any advantage in the policy of confrontation with India. Indeed some have gone to the extent of pleading a policy of co-operation with New Delhi. Even the Kashmir issue, "near and dear" to their heart, is not considered any sort of hurdle.²³ English language daily Dawn of Karachi has also pleaded that India and Pakistan—faced with the situation created by the developments in Afghanistan—should promote the process of normalisation and explore areas of mutual understanding. Commenting on Mr. Swaran Singh's visit to Pakistan in April 1980, the paper said that "although an overall settlement between India and Pakistan might not be possible at this stage, given the nature and depth of their disagreements, it is to be hoped that they will continue to identify the issues of common interest to them and explore the areas where an agreement is possible". The paper added, "The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan has changed the strategic balance and diplomatic environment in South-West Asia to the detriment of both India and Pakistan". Also, "The security problems which have been created have given rise to new compulsions for both countries to seek greater understanding with each other".²⁴ Closely following, the leading Pakistani journalist, M.B. Naqvi, observes that Pakistan's national interest lies in forging close political and economic relations with New Delhi, "a notable economic power of Asia". He suggests that Pakistan should give priority to relations with New Delhi over those with the United States, China and even the Muslim world. The USA is always motivated by her own national interests. In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the American offer of support was "precisely zero" and she only wanted Pakistan to line against the Soviet Union. About China, he says that Pakistan's relations with her alarms the Soviet Union and "not many Islamic countries are likely to welcome a closer cooperation with China when chips are down. Also, China itself is bending over backwards to seek to befriend India". He further says: "It is time we reconsidered our basic approach, its underlying assumptions and motivations. Dignified unconcern towards India, pretending we are not a part of the Indian subcontinent and are instead a West Asian power will not do. It is merely a posture fed by nothing more

22. *The Times of India*, New Delhi, April 18, 1980.

23. For details, see Kuldip Nayar, "Kashmir Main Hitch in Ties", says Zia, *The Indian Express*, March 22, 1979.

24. Cited in *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, April 28, 1980.

than frustration that is basically escapist. India is a reality and has constantly to be dealt with The security and political angles make it crucially important that we keep our eastern flanks peaceful, secure and, if possible, friendly"²⁵.

Undoubtedly there exists a hard-core lobby of India-haters though they are in microscopic minority at present. But being entrenched in the levers of powers, this lobby possesses the capacity to shape things as it likes. The increasingly bellicose attitude of this section can be best explained by what happened when, alarmed by the steadily declining productivity in agriculture, the military regime of Pakistan invited Dr. Norman Borleng, the father of green revolution, for advice. He suggested that Pakistan should look across the border to seek Indian assistance and guidance to set things right. To this came the reply of the Pakistani official presiding over the meeting: "Over my dead body"²⁶. But in view of the gravity of the Afghan issue, such voices and noises are heard only in wilderness.

25. *The Pakistan Economist*, May 3, 1980. The 5000-word report in the Weekly has been highlighted by almost all the national dailies of India.

26. For details, see n. 21.

Management of the Oceans in the Eighties

VICE ADMIRAL M.K. ROY, M.A., AVEM

THE Earth is paradoxically not a land but a water planet for the oceans cover 71% of its area. Therefore, it is a myth to state that land unites and the sea divides for if one looks back at the history of the Indian Sub-continent, it will be observed that the seas have invariably out-flanked the land barriers of both the mountain and desert with ships playing a more credible role in the conquest and continuity of empires than either the horse or camel.

It is, therefore, perhaps appropriate to pause and share some of my thoughts with you with regard to the Management of the Oceans in the eighties which I will attempt to paraphrase in 3 parts :—

- (a) Firstly, the effect of the enlarging regime of the oceans on the relations between the seas and the State with particular reference to peninsular India.
- (b) Secondly, the impact of Science, Technology and Engineering on the exploration and exploitation of the seas and sea-bed and the resultant repercussions on our economy and society both qualitatively and quantitatively.
- (c) And lastly, the institutional arrangements required to implement our maritime policy for the management of our ocean economy.

The term 'ocean space' is used to indicate the surface of the seas, water column, sea-bed and its sub-soil. This ocean space contains more than 95% of the world's water with probably more living and mineral resources than are found on land. The ocean space also provides suitable niches for a great diversity of living things, both plant and animal, large and small, sessile and mobile.

In the context of this expanding regime of the oceans in its relation to the State, it will be observed that in the colonial era the oceans were mainly utilised as an international waterway for colonisation, commerce and conversion. But with the liberation of over 44 maritime nations together with the increasing cost-effectiveness in harvesting the resources

of the seas, there has been a discerning change in the relationship of the seas to the State in the context of the uses that has been made of it.

Physically, the Indian Ocean on which 3 continents abut has an area of 28 million sq miles. It is the smallest of all the 3 oceans encompassing one-fifth of the world's sea area. But nonetheless one quarter of the earth's population live in this region, operating at different levels of political consciousness ranging from military dictatorships and despotic monarchies to communism, tribalism, Islamic fundamentalism as also the largest practising democracy in the world. This ocean is also significantly named after India, which straddles this region, as it were, with her 6000 Kms of coastline jutting out into the sea and encompassing 10 major, 20 intermediate and 300 minor ports as also containing large off-shore islands such as Andamans and Nicobars, Lakshdweep, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Socotra, Diego Garcia etc.

Geographically, the Indian Ocean provides a linkage both between Europe and the East as well as North to South with well defined entry and exit choke points which attract external powers in view of their balance of power compulsions which in turn adds new dimensions to the geo-political relations between the seas and the littoral States as seen from the injection of nearly 10 billion dollars of arms into this region partly due to the necessity of recycling petro dollars and partly due to the requirement of ensuring the economic growth of nations with high labour costs.

Again oceans are continuously used in an ever-increasing number of ways. They serve as a separator or buffer between nations. They also act as a great heat reservoir levelling the temperature extremes that would have otherwise expanded the deserts. The margins of the sea are also one of the major sites for recreation.

In addition, the oceans provide the least expensive form of transportation. More than 25,000 large and 50,000 small merchant ships continuously ply over the seas. Cargo from major Indian ports has steadily increased from 20 to 60 million tons. The seas also supply the States with almost 17% of their protein requirements. For example, the fishing catch in the Pacific and Atlantic are 27 and 20 million tons respectively. In India, there is an estimate of 15 million tons of fish within 30 miles of the coast but only 2.5 million tons are harvested annually with India's share being only 1.5 million tons. Even so, it gives employment to 22,000 non-mechanised craft, 13,000 small mechanised craft and in due course to 350 deep sea trawlers.

The seas are already a major source of minerals and power. The important ocean extractives include 30% of world production of Sodium chloride, 70% Bromium, 60% of Magnesium, 30% of Thorium and large quantities of Platinum, Sulphur, Tin, Aluminium, Nickel, Copper and Cobalt. Further, 18% of the world's production of oil is from the seas. And this proportion is dramatically rising and may reach 50% by the next decade. The protection of off-shore installations such as Bombay High which is nearly 120 Kms from the mainland and the associated surveillance of the sea-bed are all additional requirements which have made deep inroads into the erstwhile military and economic relations between the seas and the State.

The shortage of fresh water is gradually becoming a pressing problem and therefore tapping the oceans is now cost-effective in many areas. For example, an average iceberg represents 250 million cubic metres and could be towed in 300 days from the Antarctica to near the Atacama desert in Chile during which time it would lose 80% of its water mass but still retain 35 million cubic metres of fresh water which will be worth 27 million dollars with the cost of towing being about 13 million dollars provided the remnant iceberg does not crack into pieces due to thermal stresses. The list of potential and unconventional energy sources is also long and impressive. When calculated in watts, this planet receives 10^{16} watts of energy followed by wind, ocean currents, tides and geo-thermal energy.

The ocean, however, sadly continues to be abused despite its importance to human welfare. It has become a dustbin and cesspit for most human refuse such as sewage, industrial and agricultural wastes. And because the flora and fauna of the oceans are dependent on complex food chains which in the ultimate analysis are based on the penetration of solar energy, any reduction in the depth of penetration and hence of energy input due to surface oil films of varying degrees of opacity, will jeopardise the survival of many of the species in the oceans. Hence measures to prevent oil spillage and pollution have repercussions on the relations between States because of the connecting seas which merit a fresh look. The seas are hence no longer just international highways but have now become a fish pond, a resource mine, a rubbish tip, an underwater habitat and a self-effacing battlefield.

Secondly, with regard to the impact of science, technology and engineering on the exploration and exploitation of the seas, it is of interest to analyse the precise definitions and interdependence of these 3 widely used words. Science is an English word derived from the Latin

root 'Scaire' which is simply 'knowledge.' Technology is derived from the Greek root 'Techne' meaning 'art' and is translated as 'Science of the industrial arts'. Engineering has its origin also in the Latin root 'Ingenium' meaning 'cleverness' which is reflected in the 'design and construction of work'. On the basis of the aforesaid definitions, it will be observed that while science is concerned with the fundamental knowledge of the world and its environment, technology deals with the ways and means of pressing science into human service. Therefore, while science connotes power, it is technology and engineering that confers a direction to this power which in turn deeply influences both the economy and the texture of our society.

Again ocean techniques are generally highly sophisticated and hence more dependent on the advancement in the fields of hard science which must be introduced in our schools and colleges preferably located in the vicinity of commercial ports and naval bases so that maximum use can be made of the expensive defence and commercial equipment in the country such as diving tenders, submarine rescue vessels, underwater TV, submersible bathyscopes, sub-surface electronics etc. This in turn will encourage a balanced and all-round development of all the associated maritime skills and ocean disciplines. A scenario of having to carry nuclear bombs in bullock carts in view of the lopsided growth of our scientific and industrial base is not one of mere cynicism.

Hence while new disciplines such as off-shore structures, energy, instrumentation and pollution are becoming part of the expanding syllabi in universities and technical institutions, there is nevertheless a requirement for the introduction of more ocean based studies such has been done in space, electronics and atomic energy. For example, underwater medicine and physiology will require to be more widely practised in order to further extend the limits of human tolerance. Again, in addition to the mechanical, electrical, civil, chemical and materials engineering, one must also introduce Ocean and Nuclear Engineering in more technical institutions with an added emphasis on the trichotomy of materials, energy and environment. As often criticised, the import of overseas technology has been at times indiscriminate and repetitive. Hence efforts must be channelled to build up broader bases in the country to absorb new scientific disciplines as also to create a climate for adaptive technology so as to diminish our continuing dependence on the developed powers for information collection, data interpretation and ocean exploitation.

Further, as our demand increases for resources from the seas, both living and non-living, it will become imperative to harvest the wealth of

the oceans without creating any serious perturbations in the environment which might lead to irreversible ecological changes.

The growth of modern science in the last 3 decades could perhaps be measured from the fact that while in 1950 there were 750 modern Scientists from 48 countries, in 1975 the numbers grew to over 22,000 Scientists from 130 countries. Above all, there will be additional employment generated over the next 2 or 3 decades by scientists and engineers opening up new frontiers at sea, which is already becoming visible over the horizon due to the wide ranging spectrum of ocean management which includes not only ships and off-shore activities but also the development of ports, harbours, communications, warehouses and ancillary industries. The increasing cost-effectiveness in investing in the seas in the coming decades could well herald a technological revolution in the next century which may dwarf the accomplishments or otherwise of the industrial and agrarian revolutions of the previous century. Again such a juxtaposition of resources between land and the seas will have far reaching effects on our economy as already evident in Scotland and to some extent in Bombay where the recovery of off-shore oil and gas has transformed the coastal belts of these maritime states, as also strengthened the currencies of these countries.

Further, such 'work changes' in closed compartments in the seas or on the sea-bed or perched up on isolated off-shore platforms which are in turn dependent on the umbilical cords connecting them to their shore logistic points and production centres will, in course of time, have an impact on the psychology and sociocultural life style of these workers who may develop into a new breed of frontiersmen with little or no allegiance to hereditary caste or out-moded obligations to an orthodox society as seen in communities in the desolate regions of the Arctic and desert areas.

It will, therefore, not be too heretical to prophecy that in the next century, there will possibly be a metamorphosis of the continental homosapien presently ensconced in the Indo-Gangetic plains of North India into a sea mammal whose habitat will be more and more the warm rich salt waters of Southern India due to the widening implications of Ocean Management in the eighties which will perhaps create reverberations on the mosaic of our traditional employment vistas, economic growth and social restraints.

And finally, it is necessary to examine the new laws of the sea and the institutional arrangements necessary to implement them. The laws

of the seas have developed over the centuries around the notion of freedom of seas. This principle was based on two assumptions; firstly the resources of the oceans were regarded as essentially inexhaustible and secondly, the resources were treated as 'res-communis' which means belonging to all. In view of these assumptions, the oceans were the cynosure of only political and maritime rivalry and not subjected to economic or technical pulls as these were not quite understood. But from 1960, the situation quickly changed. The trend of appropriating large areas of the oceans by developed nations who could utilise their advanced technology to exploit the seas and sea-bed was challenged by other less developed maritime states which finally resulted in the convening of the Third United Nations Conference on the Laws of the Seas commencing December 1973. In the ninth session on 29th August 1980, there was almost complete agreement on widely supported proposals and these are likely to be formalised by September 1981.

The most significant changes proposed in the new 'Laws of the Seas' were the concepts of the extension of the 'Territorial Waters' to 12 miles, the 'Contiguous Zone' for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations to 24 miles and the 'Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)' to 200 miles with new regimes of archipelagic waters, international straits, marine pollution and scientific research and international sea-bed area.

India has the 12th largest Exclusive Economic Zone because of the Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshdweep islands which have brought an area of roughly 2.2 million sq miles under New Delhi's regulatory jurisdiction and control. But for each of these functional zones, a complex mechanism will need to be devised and implemented if we are to protect our national interests. Another area of intensive work relates to India's participation in sea-bed mining which involves multi-national consortium activities.

We, therefore, must realise the enormity of the challenges that lie ahead in view of the new uses of the seas and it is for us to exercise some degree of leadership with respect to the development of a coordinated and consistent ocean policy. The key to success for such an integrated approach will be our ability to manage our ocean interests in an organised manner, channelling it as far as practicable, to benefit the weaker sections of our society. There will be therefore, a requirement for the integration of all the complex ocean issues which are now being controlled by various Ministries such as Transport, Agriculture, Mines, Defence, Finance, Science and Technology, Oil & Natural Gas, Revenue etc., in order to avoid deficiencies on the one hand and duplication on the other,

Further the inherent weakness in the country to implement plans and programmes has been further aggravated by outmoded bureaucratic and financial procedures which have successfully resisted reform both from within and without which in turn merits crisis management if India is to benefit from her geo-economic advantage of sitting atop the warm, rich and strategic ocean named after this Sub-continent.

All these interactions have economic, political and security spinoffs and hence even if there is a comprehensive law of the seas, there will also be continuous challenges facing our national planners with respect to the ocean space. Whether we have an inter-ministerial committee or a central coordinating department or a full-fledged Ministry for Ocean Management and Maritime Policy is a matter for the Government to decide. For example, the Soviets have a highly orchestrated and coordinated mechanism for all maritime activities. The United States has recently centralised the administration of ocean affairs in a single agency. Japan and other countries have in turn evolved substantial working relationship between industry and the Government in planning and developing their maritime interests. Bangladesh has established a cell on maritime affairs to coordinate policies of ocean management. Sri Lanka is structuring a separate department for marine affairs concentrating on the Laws of the Seas.

Hence the establishment of such institutional structures can no longer be delayed if India is to have a cohesive and coherent maritime policy. But regrettably, there is a great deal of misunderstanding as to the 'realm of the possible' for resource exploitation and other uses of ocean space. The effects of non-planning at this stage could only put us at a great disadvantage in competing for the use of ocean space. It must be realised that failures in national ocean activities tend not to be instant or seemingly catastrophic. They are gradual and often subtle. Posterity must not look askance at us for not having taken bold initiatives or done innovative planning in the dynamic environment of the oceans. Timely and zealous implementation will be the key notes for successfully exploiting the seas for the management of our oceans for the benefit of our kinsmen. The need to understand the seas around us in their new relationships to the State as also the repercussions of ocean sciences on technology, economy and the aspirations of the people as also on the fabric of Indian society cannot be over-emphasised nor over-repeated for such an understanding is essential for utilising the oceans for safeguarding and promoting both our national security and national development.

Jai Indian Ocean,

Hovercraft for the Indian Navy

COMMANDER J.S. BRAR, NM

INTRODUCTION

Hovercraft is a craft which "hovers" or rides on a low pressure cushion of air produced and maintained by its own machinery. The cushion of air raises the body of the craft above the surface over which it travels, thus reducing resistance and enabling the craft to travel at very high speeds without requiring any substantial increase in the overall power of the craft. These crafts are also known by different names like ACVs (Air Cushion Vehicles), GEMs (Ground Effect Machines), SESs (Surface Effect Ships).

These crafts combine many of the capabilities of wheeled vehicles, ships and aircrafts. Hovercraft can at very high speeds carry heavy loads and operate over sea, marshy lands, desert, snow, rough terrain etc. Hovercraft's value lies in its ability to operate successfully in places where none of the other vehicles or crafts individually can. Figure-1 shows the comparison between different types of crafts in their operation over different types of surfaces.

BRIEF HISTORY & DEVELOPMENT

THE inventor of the present day hovercraft is considered to be Sir Christopher S. Cockerell (a British Engineer) who conceived the idea in 1954. The first flight by the hovercraft was made by the British 4½ ton Saunders Roe SRN-1 model on 30 May '59 with a 1500 Lbs thrust viper turbojet engines. The first built SRN-1 had a hover height of only 9 inches. This imposed a severe restriction on its freedom of movement, because although it could leave the road and set off across trackless wastes, it could be brought to a sudden halt by a 10 inch high obstruction on land or a high seawave. This led to the development of 'flexible skirt' which when fitted to a SRN-1, the hovercraft could ride over solid obstacles 3 feet 6 inches high and run smoothly across 4 feet high sea waves. Modern hovercraft can operate satisfactorily in seas with wave heights more than 2.5 meters.

Some of the leading manufacturers of hovercraft in the World are British Hovercraft Corporation, Hovermarine Transport Ltd, U.K., Vosper Thornycroft, U.K., Bell Aerosystems (USA), Ship-builders

dubigeon Normandie France. Hovercrafts are also being manufactured in Soviet Union, Japan and some other countries.

DESIGN FEATURES

GENERAL CONSTRUCTION

Figure-2 shows the detailed construction of SRN-4 model hovercraft. To ensure maximum possible strength with the least weight, aircraft techniques of construction are used in the building of Hovercrafts. The general construction of a hovercraft varies according to its type, size and whether it is to be used for civil or military purposes. The basic structure of a hovercraft is a flat-topped plenum chamber of oval or rectangular shape under the belly of craft meant to contain air cushion; the cabin, engine control gear and plenum chamber air intakes are all fitted above the floor formed by the top of the plenum chamber. With single engine hovercraft, the air intake and the engine are at the rear and the passenger and the freight compartments are located forward.

The buoyancy tank meant to provide the hovercraft a large reserves buoyancy is fitted within the plenum chamber. A system of control rudders and tail planes is mounted at the extreme rear of the hovercraft. The main propulsion machinery is either gas turbines or high speed diesel engines.

Flexible skirts are fitted around the hull below the plenum chamber to contain the air cushion. The control cabin is located at the forward end on top, to provide the operating crew with the all round visibility. The access to the main compartment of the hovercraft is both at the forward end and at the rear. The access doors fold forward and down to provide ramps for easy loading of stores and movement of personnel.




Fig. 1. Comparison Between Different Types of Crafts.




Fig. 2. Cut-Away Diagram of an Amphibious Hovercraft

A small anchoring equipment is fitted on the foxle. Necessary firefighting and life saving equipment are provided in and around the main compartment of the hovercraft. In the hovercrafts used for military purposes, the compartments are designed to accommodate the weapon equipment.

SKIRT

It is perhaps the most important part of the hovercraft. Its main purpose is to retain the air cushion in any condition but it creates drag and absorbs lift power. As the craft lifts, the skirt extends below it to retain much deeper cushion of air thus enabling the craft to maintain greater hoverheight and pass over obstacles. The skirt has to be flexible, offer least drag and at the same time be strong enough to withstand the hammering of sea waves and have a long life.

Different types of air cushion arrangements have been designed and are in use in different types of hovercrafts in various countries, the two most common are shown in Fig-3.




Fig. 3. Common Air Cushion Arrangements

All skirts are made basically from the woven cloth sandwiched between either natural rubber or neoprene. Also nylon woven materials with rubber coating and specialised Rubber Fabric Combinations have been developed for manufacture of skirts of the hovercraft for better performance and long life.

PROPULSION AND LIFT SYSTEMS

Normally there is a separate engine to provide power to each propeller and lift fan unit through a common gear wheel drive from the main engine. Such a unit of machinery is called the "integrated lift and propulsion unit". While in a small hovercraft there may be only one gas turbine-propeller lift fan unit, in a large hovercraft, there may be two or four of each of these and they are all symmetrically placed, though they are coupled together to enable all units to continue to run even if one engine should fail for any reason. The propellers used to drive the amphibious hovercraft are of the aircraft type with variable pitch blades,

This also meets the requirement of constant speed for the lift fan and main engine. The non-amphibious hovercrafts generally have variable pitch marine screws.

For high speed hovercrafts gas turbines are used. However, in the side wall type hovercraft, which is being commonly used in the navies of different countries high speed diesel engines are also fitted.

The cushion of air is built up and maintained by a number of symmetrically placed big lift fans. To obtain acceptable performance over rough sea, the maximum wave height must be carefully related to its wave length and then to the height of air cushion.

CONTROLS

As a hovercraft has no physical contact with the surface over which it is travelling, its controls are aerodynamic like the aircraft controls. But as it can easily lose its balance or be moved off its course by wind or waves, the controlling system must be accurate to provide a safe passage. It has stabilising fins, rudders and tailplanes similar to the conventional aircrafts.

Hovercraft requires lift, propulsion and directional control. Lift is controlled by varying the fan speed which in turn is obtained by varying the engine speed. Directional control is obtained by the rudders or having swivelling type propeller pylons. Also small plenum chamber bleed jets may be used at the corners of the hovercraft to assist steering. Speed is controlled by varying the propeller pitch. In an emergency hovercraft can be stopped amazingly quickly: merely shutting down the lift power causes it to settle down and slow to a halt in two or three craft lengths but this is seldom done as it may damage the skirt if done over land. In the hovercraft designed purely for marine purposes, controls similar to these in small vessels are fitted.

It is essential that hovercraft is balanced in static as well as dynamic condition.

Static balance of the hovercraft can be obtained by transfer of fuel or water ballast. While the hovercraft is moving, its balance or trim can be controlled by using all-moving tail planes or lifting of the skirt at the appropriate point by the movement of the joy stick by the Commander of the Hovercraft.

PERFORMANCE

The performance of the hovercraft is normally indicated by a detailed list which includes operating weight or carrying capacity, speed, maximum hovering height/obstacle clearance/height of sea waves it can

cross, maximum gradient it can climb, maximum operating range, type of weapons fitted etc.

TYPES OF HOVERCRAFTS

There are two types of hovercrafts, the Amphibious type and the Non-amphibious type.

AMPHIBIOUS HOVERCRAFTS

Such a craft has a flexible skirt all round and is propelled either by large slow speed air propellers mounted on pylons and symmetrically distributed on the upper deck or by air jets. The drive to the propellers is provided by the gas turbines; part of the engine power is absorbed in running the big fans which provide the large volume of low pressure air to maintain the cushion pressure and compensate for the continuous air leak which takes place almost all along the periphery below the skirt while the hovercraft is crossing uneven ground or waves when the skirt cannot touch the surfaces below everywhere. Such crafts are costlier and noisier (air borne noise only) in operations as compared to the non-amphibious ones which employ generally marine screws driven by diesel engines. But these crafts are high speed and can go over virtually any type of surface (over water, swamp, desert, snow etc.).

SRN-4: It is a 194 ton 130 feet long passenger/cargo transport hovercraft of the Amphibious type. It has been operating very successfully for years in British waters. Its radar and navigation system enables her to run safely at night, in fog, bad weather and the 7 feet skirt depth allows speeds in excess of 60 miles per hour over almost all open sea conditions except those associated with exceptional storms. Speeds higher than 81 mph have been held over calm water, total stopping distance from 55 mph is less than 700 yards and range with full payload is about 200 nautical miles but this can be increased if required by fitting additional fuel tanks. The craft is controlled by swivelling the four pylon mounted propellers either in unison or in opposition, changing or reversing propeller pitch or altering cushion pressure by varying power turbine speed. SRN 4 has proved basically reliable and capable of high utilisation and this is improving with experience. It has propellers specially designed for hovercraft use, being large, slow and consequently very quiet in operation. The cargo carrying space is specially strengthened for carrying very heavy loads.

NON-AMPHIBIOUS HOVERCRAFTS

Although most of the hovercrafts in the world are amphibious but very few are actually used over land. Realising this, some manufacturers have come to the conclusion that the amphibious capability of large hovercrafts is obtained only at excessive cost and they have instead designed purely marine crafts. The non-amphibious hovercraft are of the following two types.

FULLY SKIRTED

This type of hovercraft submerges practically nothing in water and thus has much less drag. The peripheral-jet, fully skirted hovercraft has many advantages over the non-amphibious sidewall type and by installing powerful engines it gives the hovercraft the capability of good gradient climbing, manoeuvring and acceleration. Big hovercrafts of this type run up on to a sloping slipway to allow passengers, cars freight etc., to be loaded and unloaded in a simple way over the bows, the craft beached head-on, the lift system is switched off and the loading/unloading goes on.

VT-1 and VT-2 : These are important non-amphibious hovercraft designs. They are manufactured by the firm Vosper Thornycroft of Portsmouth, England. VT-1 of this type is a 86 ton 96 feet long marine ferry which can carry upto 322 passengers. It has 4 lift fans, two on either side and is propelled by two variable pitch marine propellers getting their drive from two 2000 HP gas turbine. It can go right up on to a sloping concrete slip-way to allow passengers and cargo to be loaded and unloaded over the bows.

VT 2 is the latest design manufactured by the firm Vosper Thornycroft, U.K. The Royal Navy has shown great interest in procuring this craft. The Navy had chartered the VT 2 for a couple of months two years back to take part in the amphibious landing exercises and logistics experiment.

SIDEWALL

A compromise between the properties of a fully amphibious hovercraft and a conventional hull borne vessel is offered by the sidewall hovercraft in which a low-pressure cushion contained by rigid sidewalls and by flexible skirts at the bows and stern is used to raise the main hull out of water. The total installed power needed for such a craft is as little as half that required by an equivalent high speed displacement vessel with only 20-30 per cent of the power being devoted to providing the cushion.

The side-wall hovercraft is though not fully amphibious but because of its shallow draught it can nose up to gently sloping beaches. It is less weight sensitive than amphibious crafts, is well suited to diesel propulsion and can accommodate efficient water screws on the side walls. This craft demonstrates the lowest fuel and power consumption of all types of crafts in the 30 to 50 knot speed range for the same work capacity of tactical capability. However at higher speeds the drag caused by the submerged sidewalls becomes too great and the amphibious type hovercraft is then more efficient and faster for a given power. Such crafts can be easily integrated with existing fleets of displacement crafts. Because of water propulsion the craft is quiet and can be operated in the confines of harbour and built up areas.

Sidewall Hovermarine 533 MA : The Hovermarine 533 MA Fast Attach Boat (Fig-4) is one of the most cost effective of her type yet




Fig. 4 Sidewall Hovermarine 533 MA

designed, with a 40 knots top speed, good sea keeping capabilities, excellent handling characteristics and a shallow draught. A crew of 12 mans this effective, stabilised platform which can be fitted with a variety of communications, electronic and weapons systems. For example, 4 ottomat missiles and a twin Oerlikon 35 mm gun gives a tactical capability out of all proportion to the size of the craft. The 533 utilises well proven marine systems and diesel engine drive which, together with GRP construction gives reliability, ease of maintenance and problem free integration with existing fleets and facilities.

<i>Principal Particulars</i>		<i>Armament</i>
Length	32.20 m	
Beam	10.20 m	4 ottomat SSM
Draught		{ Twin Oerlikon 35 mm naval gun with Marconi saphire fire control system
(a) Off Cushion	2.55 m	
(b) On cushion	1.40 m	
Max gross weight	110,000 kg	Small arms
<i>Machinery and Performance</i>		<i>Crew and Accommodaiton</i>
Propulsion engine	{ MTU 12V331 1200 HP	2 officers 4 Senior Ratings
Lift engine	{ MTU 12V331 1200 HP	6 Junior Ratings
Auxiliary power		BOATS
Units	Perkins 6.354 m	High speed inflatable dinghy.
Maximum speed	40 knots	
Range	{ 2700 nm at 12 knots 1350 nm at 36 knots	Life Rafts

NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

Radar Gyrocompass Log

Echo Sounder HF VHF UHF

MF/DF Decca Navigator or Loran C

SURVEILLANCE RADAR Marconi S 810

Electronic Warfare :—

Decca RDL—IBC/SC/7C

IFF and Chaff Launchers

For navies with a need to defend archipelagos, inshore installations or to control narrow passages through straits where long range is not a requirement, the combined high speed, fire power and manoeuvrability gives this type craft the ability to extend its sphere of influence out of proportion to its size and cost. This concept exploits fully the ability to operate from a small unsophisticated port or anchorage.

APPLICATIONS

NAVAL APPLICATIONS

Hovercraft's high speed, ability to operate over virtually all types of surfaces, its small size, special construction (of Aluminium or Glass Reinforced Plastics have low magnetic signature) combine to give it advantage over conventional crafts in a number of naval roles as given below :

- (1) It is an ideal vehicle to chase military landing parties, smuggling and illegal immigrants over reefs and shallow waters on to dry land. Hovercrafts can leave the confines of harbours quickly and be on task at a short notice.
- (2) It is not affected by mines.....on/underground or under water. It is uniquely suited for clearing of mines from heavily used supply channels. In the Second World War more shipping was sunk by mines than U-Boats and the technology has since advanced to tax mine-sweeping forces even further. Trials with British Hovercraft Corporations, Model SRN-3 have shown that hovercraft can survive mine explosion which would sink an equivalent hull borne vessel. The air cushion attenuates the 3000-4000 Lbs per square inch underwater pressure pulse to only 1.4 to 2.0 lbs per square inch on the vehicles. BHC Models BH-7, SRN-4 together with Vosper's VT-2 are undergoing minesweeping trials in England and the Royal Navy is expected to place production orders soon.
- (3) It can use any stretch of beach to refuel, take or give supplies or sit out bad weather far from the port. US Navy already has plans to have a 3000 ton 80 knot Hovercraft Frigate (Sidewall Surface Effect Ship) in the near future for this type of role.
- (4) Hovercrafts can serve our interests better than other boats and crafts in our Island Establishments like those in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Laccadives etc.
- (5) A fully amphibious hovercraft has better sea keeping properties than a fast patrol boat of the same size and can travel at speeds upto 90 knots where as an equivalent hull borne craft is limited to about 40 knots and the hydrofoil crafts suffer from disadvantages such as risk of crippling collisions with a log or obstruction.
- (6) US Navy is developing hovercrafts to replace the conventional landing crafts over ranges of about 40 miles or so with the advantages that men and vehicles can be off loaded from a ship out of range of shore based defences, transported to a beach rapidly and then skimmed over mine fields.
- (7) Can be used successfully for anti-submarine warfare operations. An amphibious hovercraft gives a reduced underwater noise since above water propellers are used.

(8) The plenum space allows for the carriage and retrieval of objects in the belly of the craft. Miniature sub-marines, extra fuel pads, retrieval nets etc. could be carried in this space without effecting the hydrodynamics of the craft in its high speed role.

(9) Hovercrafts are being used for hydrographic survey also.

(10) It can be very effectively used by the Navy as well as Coast Guard for operations along the coast line for surveillance and defence of the off-shore installations.

(11) The wide beam of the hovercraft enables the quick and safe carriage of equipment for combating fires and other emergencies on oil rigs etc. A large free deck area can be used for helicopter landings/take off.

OTHER APPLICATIONS :

(1) It is very useful for flood rescue operations, needed in some of the states in India which experience floods almost every year. This craft will be much more useful and be more effective than ordinary boats or helicopters or aircrafts in rendering quick and substantial aid to the people in the flood affected areas. Hence Navy by acquiring hovercrafts can in time of such national calamities give aid to civil power and render good national service.

(2) It is ideal for carrying loads over soft snow (can be used in Kashmir) soft terrain and marshy land unable to support ordinary truck wheel loadings.

(3) It has the advantage of not requiring any special terminal facilities. It can sit happily on any reasonable surface. However, for travel through forests, hover lanes are necessary.

(4) It provides a fast, comfortable and economical ferry service.

(5) Hovercraft principle is already being applied in increasing the speed of trains. The speedy hovertrains (with a speed of over 450 km per hour) are expected to be in service in Japan, West Germany, France in a few years.

(6) Air cushion assisted transporters are specifically designed for carrying very heavy loads over roads and bridges that would otherwise need expensive strengthening. Use of air cushion reduces the effective load coming on the roads/bridges.

(7) A new ice breaking technique has been developed by Canadian Coast Guard Engineers from an accidental discovery that hovercraft easily shatters thick lake and river ice. The result is substantial savings in time and cost of the annual Canadian ice breaking programme.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With the initiation of 200 mile Economic Zone Limit and the growing need for protection of oil rigs and other major marine capital investments, a combined surveillance, defensive and emergency force of swift deployment and being able to chase, identify and apprehend insurgent vessels is of prime importance to national security and major commercial interests. Until the last decade or so, relatively small crafts capable of operating safely in the open sea with atleast a reasonable degree of comfort when combined with high performance and cost effectiveness were impossible to conceive. Minimally frigate size vessels with a maximum speed of 25 to 40 knots were the only answer and any extra speed beyond this still appears to be prohibitive costly barrier for such a craft.

However over the last decade high performance marine craft designers have applied their growing technology to this particular problem and to find a solution which would allow multicraft fleets for blanket deployment and a cost effective approach per unit. Hovercraft is a good solution to this problem. Such crafts can be readily integrated with existing fleets of displacement ships and crafts. The patrol and attack versions of hovercrafts can form the basis of powerful small craft fleets for surveillance and defensive purposes. The development of hovercraft would soon extend to larger crafts that would fulfil open sea requirements. These crafts will be of a size that can effectively protect off-shore installations and territorial limits combining high speeds, long range and cost effective construction. Hovercrafts can be built and fitted with the weapon system, propulsive machinery and other equipment as desired and considered suitable.

It may be seen from above and from the wide applications of the hovercraft both for Naval and other purposes that this type of craft has come to stay in the world. With our fast developing Navy and her increasing responsibilities in the ever changing geo-political situation in the areas around our coast line, Andaman and Nicobar Islands and in the Indian Ocean it is but necessary that our Naval Research and development keeps growing. He should endeavour to remain abreast of the developments taking place in Advanced countries and keep up the process of modernisation of the Indian Navy.

In such a case as given above, it should be the Navy which should take the lead and initiative instead of letting it be taken by other branches of the armed forces or Coast Guard etc.

It is, therefore, recommended that Indian Navy should send for a period of about 6 weeks a team consisting of two experienced officers, a marine engineer and an aviator to visit the hovercraft manufacturing firms in England, France and the United States of

America for the purpose of carrying out a detailed study of the various types of hovercrafts. The scope of the study should include

- (1) Suitability of hovercrafts for our Navy and their operations/maintenance problems.
- (2) Feasibility of their manufacture in India.
- (3) Purchase of two squadrons of 4 hovercrafts each, one of Amphibious type and one of non-amphibious type hovercrafts. For this purpose, sidewall hovercrafts manufactured by Hovermarine Transport Ltd. (as non-amphibious type) and SRN 4 type hovercrafts manufactured by the British Hovercraft Corporation (as amphibious type) be seriously considered.

The Womens' Army

INDIRA AWASTY

ANY subject connected with the Defence Forces in India is shrouded in secrecy, complains Inder Malhotra. This has its advantages in keeping technological and tactical military developments a secret, atleast from our own people. It has its disadvantages in allowing unquestioning perpetuation of outmoded and antiquated systems, because there is no exposure to the outside world. Conversely, the Army itself lives in an inured cocoon and is hardly aware of what is going on in the world, which is a large place, or even in our own country. The subject merits atleast a thesis.

Surfice it to say that from a superficial point of view, for an average Army family, the following things matter, in order of precedence—own promotion and posting, other people's promotion chances and posting endeavours, economics (present living standards and savings and investments), education and settling of children, grumbling about anything, and worry about the future. All this is a joint family effort. To achieve the aim of becoming a General, of any or some sort, the co-operate family—wife, children, related others and including the officer himself—pitch in and strive hard.

As a background, let it be stated as a primary premise, that some military sociologists have initiated some feeble attempts at recognising the sea change that has taken place in the last 33 years in the socio-economic class content and attitudinal expectations of the officer cadre and the Jawans of the Indian Army. Some intervention has been made to defuse the frustration felt by Army personnel about job prospects and economic stringency. However, while every thing else has changed from the times of the British—namely total democratisation of all ranks in terms of social class and regional composition, some sophistication of equipment and training, the control over the purely military aspects of planning etc. The "form" and concepts of dealing with this new material have remained the same. I will quote another statistics which are an incisive comment, and, self explanatory, about what is happening to us. In 1974-75, "At the NDA 30% of the intake was sons of J.COs,

and N.C.Os, 20% were the sons of civilians who had sent their sons to Sainik Schools; 40% were those who did not make the grade for Universities. "A bare 10% were the sons of service officers of which 9% fell in the category of these who could not make the University grade." "At the IMA as far as the quality of the intake was concerned, 88% of the candidates were in the lowest acceptable grade."—Taken from a paper presented at a USI Seminar on Recruitment to the officer Corps.....in 1977, by Maj Gen Som Dutt (Retd).

One may wonder what this diversion has to do with the women folk in the Army. Everything. If the Army personnel need to be managed anew, so do women folk deserve a new look. The M.C.Ps in the Army may want to wish away the frivolous females, but that would be un-realistic. If there are a million men under arms, there are an equal number of armed wives (that ought to strike terror deep in the throat of the enemy, here ;")

I will don my historical wig again to explain the dichotomy which exists at more than one level. Philip Mason sketches the profile of the 'Brindian' officers who came out of Sandhurst after 1923 and from the IMA after 1932. They imitated British speech, attitudes, manners, customs and dress even more zealously than the British themselves. Officer like qualities demanded that he must neither be a bounder nor a mug. A mug was an abstentious type who was a teetotlar, did not play games and was studious. (The change to day is due to increased professionalisation requirements). However, if my colonial memory serves me right, a spirit of comradeship did not grow up among the Indian Officers themselves. The competition to win the approval of British officers was pathetically intense, leading to burning jealousies, rivalries and back biting etc.

"Plain Tales from the Raj" and other memoirs delineate the life style of the British lady in India. But not much has been said about the Indian counterpart of the services wife. The British officers wives appear to be superior lot of pale, white, ruffled ladies, with little intelligence, very sharp and punctilious on Victorian details of manners, etiquette, dress and protocol. They were forever herding up to or down from the hills. In fact Cantonment life was said to revolve around paying court to these sporty creature, for the British sublaterns (The Brindians were busy scheming) In the beginning, the Indian officers did not bring out their women because of the obvious cultural chasm. But very soon the Brindian wives closed in on the scene. They did not wholly change their attire but in every other aspect they absorbed the British Indian culture,

language and ethos. Women wore the correct texture and shade of dress to watch the occasion and climate, chatted endlessly about the weather and other small talk subjects, danced to the appropriate tune etc. In short they sat languishing lady like on pedestals as mute as statues. The Indian wives, for the most part, ignored each other, but concentrated on vying for the favour of white women whose superiority was axiomatic with the colour of their pigmentation.

Since Independence, the situation has altered dramatically. Moreover, the setting in which women were placed in British days, has remained. This is the anomalous position. Today's Army wife is a full blooded Indian woman who carries the cultural and spiritual verve and energy of our country in her veins. She is human and pulsating and not a creature to be pulled like a puppet. The male chauvinists among us feel terribly embarrassed at this new phenomena. But the thing to do is to take the bull by the horns, understand and deal with the growth before it distorts and strains the proportions.

The wife in the circumstances in which the present day Army Officer finds himself, has an exceptional role to play in the context of his own nuclear family. It must be clearly understood that a soldier takes to arms as a mean of earning a livelihood. His military service is a career to earn money for the fulfilment of the needs of his family and thus himself, Period. A man's wife and children should, it follows, be a major component of his life and must bear great influence on him, his behaviour and actions.

An officer spends 50% and upwards of his service in non-family stations. During these long periods of enforced separation, it falls to the lot of the wife to live alone to bring up and educate the children single handed, to care for the health of the family, to manage the finances in a tightly restricted budget, to buy from an elephant to pin, to load and move waggons, and to take over houses etc. Emotional trauma and nervous tension is heightened. Very frequent transfers add to the unsettled life and frustrations about non-availability of accommodation and children's schooling etc. Thus an Army wife and family have to contend with a multitude of problems unlike their civilian counterparts who live in a far more secure world. All these experiences mould the army wife into a different person-harder, self reliant and independent.

Now to draw a profile of Army wives at different stages of their career and to try to understand the missing substance in their lives. It must be stated at the outset that a clear division has emerged between

"junior" and "Senior" ladies. Not to recognize this is to be the proverbial ostrich. When in family stations, the discipline, privileges of rank and authoritarianism rub off on the wives as well.

The social group of the young wife must necessarily change along with that of her husband, but with a difference. Usually, nearly every girl will be a graduate, if not more highly qualified. In the words of a bachelor Colonel "these girls are very quick to bob or let down their hair and wear scarlet lipstick. Within a year they are trapezing on the dance floor, but certain finer mannerism are missing forever". Very soon these hesitant girls become independent, smart, bossy and ambitious women. Anxiety about augmenting the single fixed income becomes an obsession. But jobs in small, peripheral or even big towns are not easy to come by. Transfers are another deterrent factor. Peace stations are God forsaken places with no job opportunities and no domestic help either. However, my guess is that given an option 80% or more of the younger wife would like to work remuneratively. Yet less than 1% find themselves employed.

There is little to do at peace time army station. A lot of card playing and mahajonging goes on. This is more prevalent in the higher ranks—those whose children are on the way to being settled and those who have a private servant or a cook borrowed from the mess. The younger wives, because of paucity of servants and their inability to pay high wages, are usually tied to chores like cooking and child care. However, this group too has a lot spare time spent leaning over the gate and gossiping with the neighbour.

The senior ladies are a breed by themselves. The atmosphere in a station is determined entirely by the sociability and personality of the senior officers and more so, their wives. Like there are varying "command styles," there are different personality expositions by senior ladies. It is my guess that a majority of senior ladies are highly egoistic and authoritative, beating their husbands at the game. I have no doubt that this statement will raise many eyebrows in disapproval. The reason for this "Commanding Syndrome" is easy to understand. For nearly two decades we bow and scrape, stand in the background like stage scenery, strain every nerve to be noticed by the powers in being and keep repeating like robots "Yes Sir, Yes Sir, those bags full Sir. "Then the mother-in-law type of psychosis sets in. The minute an ounce of power comes into our hand, we want to manipulate the levers for the sheer love of it. All the drive is diverted towards sanctimonious management of others. In the case of Army wives there is no lawful area laid down for

the operation and exercise of this release of zest and enthusiasm. Hence it has no choice but to overflow into what might be deemed as 'interference' by certain quarters into sacrosanct male spheres. The only legitimate spheres of activity for women, and as it turns out the senior ladies only is The Ladies Club and the Welfare Centres.

The minority of senior ladies who are mild and unpre-possessing are so due to their own retiring personality or involvement with own children or some serious professional or career or other amusing interest of their own. This is the ineffective segment.

It must not be assumed that the active interest of senior ladies is undesirable, in fact the results that they achieve are usually very laudable. The problem is that the males consider these subjects over which the wives snatch a role, as very marginal to their main jobs and hence resent the time spent on doing the biddings of these ladies. Why not give over these areas exclusively to the women to run? Why NOT?

The crux of the situation has two dimensions. There is no employability for women of any age or rank. Secondly there exists a communication gap between the older and younger wives, as also officers, I expect. The senior ladies are too preoccupied in the interplay of their own career puzzles to spare a moment for the young ones. The 'Junior' girls do not readily accept the inherent superiority of rank and are cynical about the sincerity of the upper echelons.

Mention must be made of Welfare Centres and Ladies Clubs. There usually is a Welfare Centre in every unit. Depending on the energy and ingenuity of the Commanding Officers' lady, the Centre is run imaginatively or is there just in name, run by the battalions JCOs. Hence again, the Centre becomes a show piece and eye wash to be shown to visiting VIPs. The other regimental wives do not normally come willingly to the Welfare Centre. Plenty of excuses are trotted out—small children and no servants, expecting a baby and not keeping good health etc. The urgency of the need for the ORs' wife to be helped has also declined. The ORs are very well off now and their families are well aware of nearly everything that we know about. The patronizing attitude will not do with them any more. They too consider the Welfare Centre a waste of time. What they are interested in is accommodation with amenities like fan etc, putting children to Central Schools, to be treated in Military Hospitals and to see free movies. All this is automatically provided for by the authorities. If the Welfare Centres are to have any credibility they must become employment oriented training and economically productive enterprises.

The Ladies Club is an institution which can be used most effectively, and productively. However, more often than not, it serves more as a channel for the glorification of the senior lady's prestige and command. Nearly all the Ladies Clubs that I know of concern themselves primarily with the entertainment of their membership. The most popular activity is cooking demonstrations.

The reason d'être for forming Ladies Club is very valid. The women must have a forum wherein they all meet together as women. However, even if the ranks cannot be divested, the occasion should be used for feeling the pulse of the younger girls. The mingling could be more egalitarian and procedures much more democratic. Here is an invaluable and unofficial conduit to bridge the growing gap between the rank structures. It is here that intelligence about the frustrations and problems and aspirations of the younger couples can be gauged, without fear of reprisals. The best way to get closer to each other is to work together on a common constructive enterprise. However, attendance at Ladies Club is either enforces or thin.

It is a crying pity that the talents of Army women are not put to more constructive use. One could easily visualize a greater role for them in community, not necessarily, military, affairs. In the far flung areas army wives could have a great impact in organising education, health and social services and economic projects and other rural uplift programmes. Monetary remuneration should be an essential feature of this scheme.

Such developmental programmes could be worked out between the local organisation of Army wives and the district or State authorities or even the Union Government. This is only one avenue. There must be many others.

Any Army wife is not entirely a non-person. And why should she be? I think that any study on Army Officers is sadly incomplete without giving due consideration to the potentialities of their spouses. And no attention what-so-ever has been paid to this aspect.

The Eleventh Commandment— Thou Shalt not Disclose

BRIG N B GRANT (RETD.)

TOP SECRET—Enclosed please find a cash receipt for your signature and return please. This is for income tax purposes." Thus read a message from Army HQ. The enclosed receipt was for the fee given to me for being an examiner for one of the army examinations. All correspondence in connection with this examination being classified as "Top Secret", the authorities thought it proper, that even the cash receipt for the purpose of income tax should be classified as such.

If Moses gave the world the ten commandments to guide us in our day to day life, the military intelligence in our country has added yet an eleventh one enjoining us what not do disclose. Possibly ours must be the only country in the democratic world, where-in notices can be seen forbidding the taking of photographs on aerodromes, at dam sites, near bridges, and in the vicinity of all such structures. The theory behind this appears to be, that if such photographs were to fall in enemy hands, the letter would be in a position to sabotage or bomb these localities. If one totals up such areas, we will come to the conclusion that, there is hardly any structure, or for that matter any place, left in the country which remains unclassified.

It is common knowledge, that once any paper is given a security classification, it has to go through a number of processes before it can be disposed off. Any large circulation of such paper entails additional clerical work on the part of large number of officers, as clerks are forbidden to deal with it. Besides, any loss of such papers entails a lot of time spent on courts of inquiry, not to mention the disciplinary action which invariably follows, not so much because security is jeopardised, but simply because a paper which has been classified is lost. Apart from involving a lot of clerical work, classified papers and localities cause a lot of delays and inconvenience in general. A stage is very fast approaching, when there will be more things in the country which are classified than unclassified.

AIM

The aim of this paper is to bring home the absurdity of some of our thinking on security classification. It is intended to do this, by giving illustrations from personal experiences of the various facets of security.

SECURITY OF INFORMATION

During the J&K operations of 1965, the GI and I were accompanying the GOC of a particular Division in the middle of the night, trying to find out the location of a Para Brigade which was on exercise. The security during that period was very tight. We lost our way and the General Officer was getting quite upset. We stopped near a Gorkha sentry, and the General asked me to go and find out from the sentry where this particular brigade was exercising. When I posed my query to the sentry, his reply was "*Sahib afsos hai, magar mei nahi bata sakta hoon.*" The General then asked his GI to do the needful. The GI after having tried for five minutes, got exactly the same reply from the sentry, viz "*Sahib afsos hai, magar mei nahi bata sakta hoon.*" When he could not contain himself any longer, the General himself went to the sentry, patted him on his back, asked his name and put him completely at ease. Then he asked him whether he knew who he was, to which the sentry recognised him and said "*Ha Sahib, aap Div Comdr sahib ho.*" The General looked at us in disdain, as if to say, that where we had failed, he was successful. Then he told the sentry as to how pleased he was with his bearing and turn out, and asked him whether he would now tell him where the Para Brigade was located. The sentry promptly saluted and said—"*Sahib afsos hai, magar mei nahi bata sakta hoon.*" This is a typical case where it was drummed into the Gorkha sentry, that no matter who asks for the location of units, it will not be given. A case of security of information carried out to its absurd limit.

SECURITY OF INSTALLATION

Until recently, IAC aircraft flying over certain military cantonments like Poona and Ambala, were subject to a peculiar type of security measure. As soon as the aircraft came over these stations, the hostess would automatically close all the window curtains. When asked as to why she was doing so, her standard answer would be 'Sir, I am sorry but this has got to be done on security grounds, due to military installations below.' Thus even an innocent traveller who had no knowledge that there were some defence installations in such stations, now

necessarily became curious, and tried to peep between the curtains to find out what exactly was down below. This is a case where by introducing security we made people more inquisitive.

SECURITY OF LOCATION

During the last war, and in some cases even during the recent J&K operations, the sign boards showing names of railway stations were removed on grounds of security. I remember travelling in the Punjab on one such occasion and the train stopped at Ambala. There was of course no name board on the station, however one had only to go a few yards away outside the station, and one came across big sign boards saying "Ambala Hair Cutting Saloon", "Ambala Hotel", "Ambala Restaurant" etc. This is a case where this type of security did not serve any purpose, but on the other hand it confused and baffled the travelling public for no purpose.

SECURITY OF FORMATIONS

I have attended several inter-formation sports matches. The score board has printed on it titles like 'A' Team, 'B' Team, 'C' Team etc, representing the particular participating divisions and other formations. On security grounds, the number of the divisions are not given, and they are substituted by letters such as 'A', 'B', 'C', etc. Unless one is conversant with the colour of a particular formation, one does not really know which team is playing, and has to wait to read the next day's local paper, which gives you the complete information with the correct Division number.

Another similiar case is the liberal use of APO addresses for our formations. I remember commanding a formation in J&K (I dare not here mention its name due to security reasons !) the official address of this formation was 56 APO, and which was to be used in all official correspondence. However all mail from local civilians invariably come to the following address--

"Commander
.....Formation
The Bund
SRINAGAR".

The above are two typical cases where this type of security had misfired, and if anything, compromised the real security.

SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT

When serving with the R&D Organisation, I remember an instance, when certain foreign dignitaries wanted to visit some of our develop-

ment establishments. When I requested the Minisery for permission for these VIPs to visit my particular establishment, I was asked to give a list of projects which can be shown to them. My reply to the Ministry was, "that at the present juncture of our development, we should be more concerned with what foreigners do not see rather than what they do see." In other words, they should not find out what we have not got; however it does not matter one bit if they know what we have. In fact the latter would act as a good deterrent. The advice for once was accepted, and the visitors were allowed to see whatever they wanted, and I think in the bargain they went away more impressed than they would have been if restriction was imposed on them.

SECURITY OF WORKS

Again when commanding a formation in J & K, I asked permission from Army HQ for re-producing on the formation New Year card, photograph of a part of the road which was under construction somewhere in the Himalays. Permission to do so was refused on security grounds, and I was told, that under on circumstances will any part of the road be photographed and reproduced either on greeting cards or in any Service journals. Like a good soldier I obeyed, however I was horrified when a month later while reading through the American "LIFE" magazine and the book on the 1962 Chinese invasion by Mankekar, complete photographs of the very portion of the road which was not allowed to be reproduced on the greeting card, was published for the whole world to see. This is another case where security measures were imposed only for military personnel, but the public at large had complete access to them. What an absurd situation !

SECURITY OF PAPERS

Having just returned from an operational area in J & K my unit was in the process of settling down somewhere in a peace area. We had hardly been there for three days, when a young havaldar from the Intelligence Corps came over to see me in my office. I told him to sit down and went over to my adjutant's cabin for some papers. When I returned, the havaldar gleefully held up my office rubber stamp in his hand, and said that leaving it unattended for even three minutes amounted to a breach of security, as such he will have to report this. Knowing what is to come, the next day I went to see the GSO 1 of the Area, and while he was called in by his GOC, I took a top secret file lying on his table and put it in my briefcase. When the GSO 1 returned, after exchanging the usual pleasantries, I left.

True to form, a week later at the monthly OC unit's conference, the Area Commander gave a long lecture on the poor state of security

in the station, and gave the taking away of the rubber stamp incident in my office as an example. When asked to explain I told the GOC that this was a stupid (that's exactly the word used) method of judging the standard of security of a unit. I further told him that, if I desired, I could walk into his own office and take away even a top secret file with the greatest of ease. I thereupon pulled out the missing file from my briefcase, and asked him to verify whether it belonged to him. Of course the next day I was marched in for a proper dressing down. In my explanation for this conduct, I told the 'old man' that, there was no other method of proving to him the absurdity of the Intelligence havaldar's action, than to enact the same scene in his own office. Fortunately, he accepted my defence. The fact that, the GSO 1 and I were not on talking terms for a long time, is a different matter.

SECURITY OF DOCTRINE

I can go on giving a number of instances of the above nature ; however it will suffice if I say, that the greatest toll, that our present system of being over security minded takes, is in respect of one Service journals. The articles produced in our Service journals are so heavily censored, that some of the best papers never find their way in these journals. In this respect we also seem to take shelter under the guise of security, for not allowing papers to be published which goes contrary to the current doctrine.

A glance at some of the foreign journals, which we are still fortunate to receive will show, that if anything they encourage officers to write boldly and give out their views even on policy matters no matter how controversial they are. What is even more surprising is, that in these journals no attempt is made either to conceal their organisations or even their orbit. In this connection, I was surprised to read the other day an article appearing in the American Military Review, wherein not only the exact location of their missile sites were given, but even the type of equipment which they contained. Such information would not only be sacrilege for our journals, but the officer author would be in danger of being court martialled,

I wish to take this opportunity of emphasising, that an open society like ours, grows or withers according to the power of its ideas and the vitality of its interior dialogue. If ever our military journals should reach a point where the clash of ideas come to an end, where debate disappears, where everybody agrees with everybody else on everything, then we are finished as a thinking society. The intense interest which has recently been shown both by military and civilian

officers in Service journals, and seminars on military subjects, is a striking evidence of a hunger for ideas, for knowledge, and for insight into Defence matters.

I believe, that if our Service journals are to achieve their stated objectives viz “furtherance of interest and knowledge in the art, science and organisation of the Defence Service”, then, we should encourage our officers to dare to read, think, speak and write in these journals. In this respect I give below an extract of an editorial note of one of the Royal Engineer Journals, which speaks for itself—

“In all military thought and endeavour—and the science of military engineering is no exception—there is always more than one point of view. We should like to know the other. However controversial it may be, these options give rise to discussion, healthy argument and invariably lead to a superior organisation, a more up-to-date doctrine and a better understanding in the use of equipment. We would exhort our readers to express their beliefs and convictions without reserve, and without fear.”

CONCLUSION

It has been my experience, and even the short military history of our own country since Independence shows that, whenever security has been seriously compromised, it has always been done so deliberately, and very seldom as a result of an off chance slip up.

By over classifying and placing wrong emphasis on security, we always seem to be giving away more than what we seem to conceal. After all, what are we afraid of—the enemy or ourselves? It is a well known axiom, that the weaker and less prepared a nation, the more emphasis it lays on false security. The more powerful the nation, the less it tries to conceal its military hardware. The idea being to instill fear in the enemy, rather than being afraid of its own people. We today have got the third largest, and certainly the biggest volunteer army in the world. Our approach to security should reflect our strength and confidence, and not our weakness and insecurity.

NOTE : It is hoped, that there will be no ban for publication of this article on “Security Grounds” !

Maharaja Ranjit Singh and the Principles of War

LT. COL. GULCHARAN SINGH, (RETD.)

MAHARAJA Ranjit Singh though he may not have listed the principles of war as we know of them today, but in the conduct of his campaigns and fighting his battles, he had certainly put most of the principles into practice at one time or the other. Let us examine his campaigns and battles from this point of view. We shall first take the master principle of the *Selection and maintenance of aim*.

From the very start, Ranjit Singh's aim was very clear to him : the creation of a kingdom. And to achieve this ultimate aim he had before him certain subsidiary ones too ; one of these subsidiary aims was to create a strong fighting force, and, towards this end he worked relentlessly. The central aim of his policy was the progressive consolidation of his forces. He was keen to maintain a well-disciplined, well-equipped and an efficiently trained composit, balanced army of infantry, cavalry and artillery. It is said that in 1805, he visited Lord Lake's camp in disguise to observe himself the drill of the Company's troops, whom he respected for their discipline, equipment and training. In 1807, he was further impressed with the Comapnny's troops when they, under Lord Lake, had routed Holkar's hundred thousands soldiers. Once so convinced, the Maharaja wasted no time in adopting the Bast India Company's methods of training the troops.

The Maharaja took keen interest in the training of his troops in that he would personally attend their parades, examine equipment of his army and spend nearly half of the day daily in seeing reviews. He would spend considerable time in studying the working and efficiency of each branch of his army. (!) In the formation of his military force, writes Princep, the Maharaja "evinced the same enquiring activity, the same attention to minutiae, and perseverance in watching the execution of his

1. "He himself, being passionately fond of the military profession, has chiefly devoted his attention to the organisation of his army." (The Sikhs and Afghans, Shahamat Ali, p. 23.)

plans, which characterised the first Peter of Russia ; and, compared with all that we see and hear of other chiefs who have raised themselves to high dominion, he ranks amongst those, whose means have been the least exceptional..." (2) This extraordinary man, a military genius, radically changed the brave Sikhs with little knowledge of the art of war into an efficient and disciplined army, which for "steadiness and religious fervour has had no parallel..." He proved that a Sikh was a disciplined soldier, and thus dispelled the myth that the Sikh was incapable of being disciplined.

For this purpose, he did not hesitate to employ even foreigners, especially the European officers. With their assistance and with his own efforts and the personal interest that he took, he was able to create out of the turbulent Khalsa a formidable army, well-disciplined and excellently trained. He produced a military machine composed of Sikhs, Muslims, Hindus, who had only the interests of the Panjab to look to ; a force in no way inferior to any foreign army of the time. During the Ropar meeting between the Panjab Monarch and the British Governor-General, army displays and manoeuvres were also arranged by both the sides, "and at the termination of the field-day there seemed to be but one opinion regarding their efficiency. Many indeed (and some of them high judges) believe that they surpass the Company's army ; but, be this as it may, their state reflects great credit on the Maharaja..." (3) Later, in 1838, on the conclusion of the Ferozepore meeting between the Maharaja and Lord Auckland, the British Governor-General, the latter crossed over the Satluj for a visit to the Panjab. In a secret letter to Sir J. Hobhouse, Lord Auckland, giving an account of his visit, praised the Maharaja's army in these words : "On Wednesday morning was a review of his (Ranjit Singh's) troops, about eight or nine thousand in number ; and I must say that in equipment, in steadiness, and in precision of manoeuvres, they seemed to be in no respect inferior to our own army." (4) From Amritsar, where he reached on 12th December 1838, the Governor General again wrote : "He (the Maharaja) has here irregular horsemen innumerable, with their metal caps, heron-like plumes and silk dresses, the most picturesque troops in the world, and he has 150 pieces of cannon and about 25,000 regular infantry. They formed up on the plains about four miles and a half in length and the sight was altogether very beautiful." (4)

2. Ranjit Singh, Princep, p. 148, (Reprint 1970) "Only he that does great things with small means has made a successful hit." (On War, Clausewitz, Vol. iii, p. 75.)

3. Travels into Bukhara, Burnes, i, 174.

4. Quoted by G.L. Chopra in *The Panjab as a Sovereign State*, p. 74.

Once, after having reviewed his troops for a foreign traveller, the Maharaja put him the question : "You have now seen divisions of all my troops ; tell me what you think of them ?" The traveller's reply was : "The world knows what these troops have done under you. The answer to your question has been given by your cannon from Ladakh to Multan, from the Setlej to the heart of Afghanistan." (5)

Ranjit Singh was a great strategist ; he planned and executed his plans in relation to his strength and the resources available to him. He always avoided to fight on more than one front at a time even if he, as he did, had to give in the east to the British. At this time, there were three powers—British, Sikhs and the Marathas—involved in the contest for the mastery of northern India. The Sikhs and the British signed the Treaty of Amritsar in 1809 and decided upon their respective spheres of influence and ousted the Marathas from the struggle. Now, both the British and the Maharaja busied themselves in consolidating their respective positions on either side of the Satluj. The Treaty, where it secured the Maharaja's eastern frontier at the Satluj and gave him free hand in the areas west of the river where he was able to conquer Multan, Kashmir and Peshawar ; on the other hand, it gave the British time to consolidate their power in India and establish themselves in the northwest including Delhi and the Cis—Satluj area of the Panjab (the Malwa), and thus "formed an impenetrable barrier against his further advance southwards." (6)

The territorial expansion of the Maharaja can be divided into three parts, in each of which he was assisted by a capable general. During the first phase, we may call it the phase of consolidation, he annexed the adjoining territories, subdued the chiefs and the nawabs of such places as Lahore, Amritsar, Kangra, Gujrat, Kasur and thus became master of the Central Panjab. In this process, Ranjit Singh was assisted by General Diwan Mohkan Chand and the Maharaja's talented mother-in-law Sardarni Sada Kaur. The second phase that followed was the conquest of the two famous provinces of Multan in the south and of Kashmir in the north, where the man in actual command of the operations was General Misr Diwan Chand. And in the third phase he devoted his attention towards the area of the Indus, that is the Peshawar Valley, and the Derajat. Here the most celebrated General Hari Singh Nalwa (7) made his name.

5. Travels, Hugel, p. 332.

6. Rulers of India, G.D.Oswil, Vol. iv, p. 202.

7. For the life sketch of the General, see Infantry Journal, October 1971 and April 1972 issues.

Now we shall take particular campaigns and battles fought during the Maharaja's period.

The application of the principle of *security* which he practised so astutely, both strategically and tactically, saved him from being surprised by his enemies. On the other hand it afforded him chances to bounce upon his enemies without warning and enable him to take them by surprise. For example, take the capture of Lahore. He was at Ramnagar on the eastern bank of the Chenab river, when Ranjit Singh decided to seize it. From there, instead of advancing direct to Lahore, the Maharaja marched towards Batala (Gurdaspur district) and thence to Amritsar. However, the news broadcast was that the Maharaja was on his usual pilgrimage to Amritsar to take a dip in the holy *sarovar*. From Amritsar, Ranjit Singh carried out a forced march, reached Lahore and took by surprise the Bhangi Sardars who were not given any chance to prepare defences. Then take the battle of Nowshera (8), one of the decisive battles of northern India that took place in 1823 between the Afghans and the Sikhs. Here the enemy force lay in two parts each on either side of the Landai (Kabul) river. The force under Sammad Khan was on the left bank of the river, and that portion under Azim Khan, who had advanced from Peshawar, was on the southern bank of the river. Ranjit Singh had left a small body of infantry and two batteries of artillery on the southern bank of the Landai river which successfully contained the large force under Azim Khan and prevented it from participating in the main battle that went on the northern bank. Besides, Ranjit Singh had secured the left flank of the battle and thus prevented it from being engaged this direction.

Take, again, the Treaty of Amritsar (1809) which offered Ranjit Singh many more advantages. The treaty saved him the number of troops he would have had otherwise to deploy in order to secure his eastern border. This also permitted him to *concentrate* that much additional force to carry out the conquest of such important places as Multan, Kashmir and Peshawar. Since Ranjit Singh, as already stated above, had always avoided fighting against more than one enemy at a time, it had afforded him to concentrate his forces at the decisive place, at the right time, and without having to look back over his shoulder. In the tactical field, when during the third Kashmir campaign (1814) he, may be as is said it was done on the advice of the Chief of Rajouri but

8. For details of this and the other battles mentioned in this article see the author's *Ranjit Singh and His Generals*.

the responsibility lay with Ranjit Singh, divided his force at Rajouri whence the columns advanced along two different routes. Due to the lack of efficient communications (the present day means of communication being not available those days), the activities of the two columns so widely separated by mountainous terrain could not be co-ordinated. Napoleon's following maxim holds good here :

"It is contrary to true discipline to require forces which have no communications with each other to act separately against a central force whose communications are good." (9)

He had further said that "An army must have but one line of operations. This must be maintained with care and abandoned only for major reasons." Then Ranjit Singh had weakened the column under his personal command, by detaching a 5,000 strong contingent to help Diwan Ram Dayal operating on the other axis. This contingent, because of its commander's timidity, did not reach the Diwan, and thus could not be employed on either axes. This much effort was wasted. This, combined with the lack of supplies, resulted into the failure of the campaign. However, concentration of the force was achieved during the final campaign for Kashmir (1819) when the Valley was conquered.

Another example of the application of this principle is when the capture of Mankera was undertaken. The Maharaja, after the Dussehra of 1821, marched from Amritsar towards the Indus. He crossed the Jehlam river near Khushab where he was joined by Misr Diwan Chand. Thence the combined force marched towards Mitha Tiwana where it was joined by Hari Singh Nalwa who had been called from Kashmir. On the force's arrival at Bhakkar, it was divided into three parts each column advancing by a different route facilitating quick movement of the columns and enhancing *mobility* of the whole force. All the three columns converged on to Mankera and put in a concentrated attack and captured the town,

ADMINISTRATION

Administration is an important aspect of military operations, and has been so since the advent of warfare, although it has been included in the list of the Principles of War only during the World War II (1939-45). The success of any operation depends upon efficient administration without which many an operation have been doomed to failure.

Ranjit Singh did not overlook this important factor. He paid particular attention towards the administration of the campaigns led by him

9. Napoleon and Modern War, Col. Lanza, p. 34,

or conducted under his direction. The two striking examples of this are the campaigns launched for the conquest of Multan and of Kashmir. The final invasion of Multan was launched in early 1818. To make it a success the latter part of 1817 was devoted to the various administrative arrangements required for the offensive. As was the custom, local officers along the route from Lahore to Multan were directed to arrange for food supplies; at Kot Komalia, half-way between Lahore and Multan, a big base was established under the charge of one of the queens; all the available boats on the Ravi and Chenab rivers were commandeered to facilitate move of the troops and stores required for the invasion; all the ferries over these rivers were guarded; in order to facilitate the passage of orders, news and so on, special postal arrangements were made, in that postal *chaukis* were established at a distance of every three miles all along the route; and a large number of bullocks were arranged for dragging the guns.

Rations and ammunition were dispatched by the Ravi river and the route was divided into seven stages. A boat's hire charges for each stage being twenty rupees made the hire charges for one boat-load from Lahore to Multan to Rs 140.00. A boat could take a load of 150 to 300 maunds. (10) Thus, one can imagine the cost of moving a force by river those days.

Next take the final campaign for the conquest of the Kashmir Valley launched in 1819. Here, again, the Maharaja took particular care so that he did not suffer from the lack of administrative support. He established depots full of provisions further up the line of advance, thus cutting short the supply route. The expeditionary force was divided into three parts, and the Maharaja himself stayed with the third column at Wazirabad which formed reserves for the offensive. He ensured prompt despatch of stores, ammunition and reinforcements. As the first two columns advanced, Ranjit Singh also stepped forward and looked after the administration of the campaign. This way, he completely freed the force commander from the administrative liabilities so that the latter could fully devote himself to the operational tasks.

The problem of water during the invasion of Mankera, an area deficient in this commodity, was solved in an ingenious manner. To begin with, water for the invading force was brought from Manjgarh on the backs of camels, horses, bullocks and ponies. In the meanwhile,

10. Maharaja Ranjit Singh, S-R. Kohli pp. 240-241.

under the personal supervision of the indefatigable Ranjit Singh, the following had dug twenty wells in the area of the Sikh camp, which considerably facilitated the supply of water.

The principle of administration does not remain limited only to the provision of stores and equipment to own forces, but it involves also denial of administrative support to the enemy's forces. For example, during the sieges of the forts of Multan, Kasur etc, all communications of the besieged with the outside world were cut off, with the result that no provisions, no reinforcements could go into the forts. The cutting-off of the only water supply (from the Indus) of the Afghans during the battle for Attock (1813) and the siege of Mankera are other examples of the denial of administrative support to the enemy.

MORALE

High morale is based on a number of factors, such as good leadership, high standard of training and man-management, discipline, esprit de corps. Such factors as religion, civil administration looking after the interests of the soldiers also play an important part in creating and maintaining high morale. Capable leadership and efficient training create confidence in the soldier, whereas man-management provides his all possible human needs; religious faith "gives men something which they think is sublime to fight for." as some fight for God, some for a cause, some for the country, region, class, tribe, religion.

As for Ranjit Singh's army, it was highly trained and was well equipped¹¹, as already mentioned above. He had provided capable leadership, and had also created leaders who could instil confidence in their troops. Then the army was fighting for a cause, for their country. Religion also played an important part; the religious toleration practised by him was in itself a great morale booster as his troops belonged to different religious denominations. Acts of valour performed by his troops were recognised and decorations bestowed on the deserving individuals. For this purpose he had created various decorations; besides, jagirs and khillats were also awarded. These awards were bestowed without any consideration of religion, class or region.

Since no desertions or mutiny have been reported to have taken place in the Maharaja's army, goes to prove that his army's morale was

11. "Morale depends ultimately on confidence, and even the finest troops will lose confidence in their innate superiority over their enemies unless they know they are equipped with most effective weapons." (Thoughts on War, Liddel Hart, p. 80)

high. Once referring to the mutiny at Barrackpore, of 47th Regiment Native Infantry, he questioned M'Gregor as to "How did it happen with troops receiving regular pay and pensions, and commanded by British Officers; while an occurrence of the kind never takes place in my army, the soldiers of which are often six months in arrears, and receive no pensions?" The questioned had no answer.¹²

It would not be inappropriate to narrate here a sole-stirring incident that took place during the final battle for the capture of Multan (1813), recorded by Ghulam Jilani in his *Jang-i-Multan*, and who was spying in the Sikh camp. "While the bombardment," writes Ghulam Jilani, "of the fort-wall was going on, one of the Sikh guns lost one of its wheels. The Sardar in charge of the gun was of the opinion that if he could fire a few more shots, he would succeed in causing a breach in the wall. There was no time for repairs, and the delay was very dangerous. He, therefore, proposed to his gunners that they should all be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the honour for the Khalsa by laying their shoulders one by one under the axle on the broken side. Their lives would be lost, no doubt, but it would be a worthy contribution towards the victory of the Panth. They all jumped at the idea and there was a wrangling amongst them for priority. But they were soon silenced by the Sardar, who ordered that they should come in only in the order of their ranks, the senior (meaning himself) going in first. One by one the brave gunners went forward to lay down their lives, and it was after the tenth or the eleventh shot, when as many of them had been sacrificed under the pressure of the gun, that a breach was seen in the wall, and Akali Sadhu Singh rushed to the spot with sword in hand, shouting *Sat-Sri-Akal-Akal* to proclaim 'Victory to the arms of the Guru.'" Ghulam Jilani, who was moving about in disguise, tells that more than once even he felt inspired and moved by this spirit of self-sacrifice to follow them under the axle. But if there was anything that kept him back, it was nothing but the desire in his mind to narrate to the world the story of this unique spirit of self-sacrifice of these Sikhs in the cause of their nation.¹³

The principle of *co-operation* was fully exploited during the various battles and campaigns. There was co-operation among the three arms: infantry, cavalry and artillery.

As for the principle of *offensive action*, there is no doubt at all of its application. No successes can be achieved without it, and the

12. History of the Sikhs, M'Gregor, i, 272.

13. Maharaja Ranjit Singh, First Death Centenary Memorial, 1970 ed.; 33-34.

Maharaja had been most of the times successful in capturing places and strongholds. The dash of the dare devil *Akalis* during the capture of Multan (1813) and during the battle of Nowshera (1823) are the two out of the many instances of such actions.

The result of the proper applications of the principles of war by the Maharaja has been that he was most of the time successful, and that he was able to create a large and strong kingdom, extending from Multan to Kashmir, and from the Satluj to Jamrod. Thus he erected a strong barrier between Hindustan and Afghanistan; cut off communications between India and the rest of the Muslim world, stopped reinforcements of fresh blood in from Centre Asia. He allowed no penetration into the Panjab from the northwest.

To round off, Maharaja Ranjit Singh has to his credit the following two achievements. Firstly, his greatest achievement, or shall we say his greatest contribution to the cause of India, was wresting of the Panjab and the adjoining land upto the frontier from the clutches of the Afghans and consolidating these into one compact unit. Had he failed to do so, it is probable that "some of these tracts might have been lost, even geographically, to India, as some other tracts had been in the past. The Guru's followers kept the frontier intact and no service could have been greater."¹⁴

Secondly, in the words of Olaf Caroe, the "Tibesmen who boasted they had never within memory yielded more than a nominal and temporary submission even to Mughal or Durrani had actually suffered in open battle at the hands of unbelievers."¹⁵

14. Evolution of the Khalsa, Indubhusan Banerjee, vol. ii, p. 161.

15. The Pathans, Olaf Caroe, p. 302.

BOOK REVIEWS

WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT

SIPRI YEAR BOOK 1980

(Published by Taylor and Francis, London, 1980, pp. 514 Price £ 19.00).

READERS of SIPRI Year Books are familiar with their style and format. The 1980 Year Book retains all the usual features and as in Year Books for earlier years provides factual data pertaining to military spending by different nations and military blocs, production of arms, conventional and nuclear, and arms sales and other forms of arms transfer from one country to another. This is valuable and constitutes indispensable reference material for students of international affairs as well as for planners and defence personnel generally.

Even more useful in the 1980 edition of the Year Book is the exhaustive analysis of SALT II Treaty including texts of the various clauses of the Treaty. Protocols, Memoranda of Understanding and Statements of the two Signatory Powers pertaining to or clarifying certain provisions of the Treaty.

So are the Chapters on Eurostrategic weapons, and role of satellites in verification of arms control agreements. Verification of the Salt II Treaty is dealt with separately. Together with the Chapter on Salt II Treaty these concern the Super Power strategic balance and inferentially on what is generally referred to as vertical proliferation of nuclear arms.

From the point of view of nuclear weapon powers and industrial nations, a subject of equal concern is the possibility of the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons or the emergence of more countries as nuclear weapon powers. Non nuclear weapon states are equally concerned with this aspect of the problem but from their point of view, occupying a position of weakness vis-a-vis nuclear weapon states, the incentive for the development of nuclear weapons by states not now in possession of such weapons would disappear only when nuclear weapon Powers take positive steps to reduce their arsenals as a preliminary to complete nuclear disarmament in accordance with an agreed and time bound programme and adequate verification and enforceable safeguards. From both these perspectives the chapters on the Non Proliferation Treaty and "Negative Security Assurances" are valuable. Likewise, "Chemical Disarmament", 'Prohibition of radiological warfare' and 'Prohibition of

'Prohibition of inhumane and indiscriminate weapons' for each of which a separate chapter supported by documents has been devoted, are matters of public concern throughout the world.

Other interesting and useful features of the 1980 Year Book are discussions, again in separate chapters, on "A Comprehensive programme of disarmament", "Confidence Building Measures in Europe", "Disarmament at the 1979 UN General Assembly Session", "Implementation of multilateral arms control agreements" and "Bilateral US-Soviet arms control agreements."

A chapter on "United Nations peace-keeping operations in the 1970s", summarising UN's endeavours in preserving peace has been included, as also, appropriately, chronology of major events concerning disarmament issues.

This bare recounting of the subjects covered by the Year Book is indicative of the vastness of the area surveyed. The documents and statistical tables provide the frame work for the analysis of the many important issues pertaining to armaments and disarmament, conventional as well as nuclear, and other forms of mass destruction.

Each topic dealt with in the Year Book would merit, in its own right, detailed discussion and analysis from our perspectives, which would clearly be outside the scope of this short review.

A few points however, would deserve mention considering their topicality and their possible impact on and relevance to global or regional security.

First, the phenomenon of steadily increasing expenditure on arms build up, the pace for which is set by USA. USA's defence expenditure for Fiscal Year (FY) 1978/79 was estimated at \$ 110 Bn. Expenditure on defence however, has risen sharply since then and will rise even fast for assest of the decade as announced by President Carter last year. The 1980 figure is \$ 152 Bn and the projected figures for the five year period FY 1982—FY 1986 are as under :—

(FY 1981	\$ 173.9 Bn)	(roughly an annual
1982	\$ 200.3 „	rise of 14%)
1983	\$ 228.6 „	

1984	\$ 258.0 „
1985	\$ 289.7 „
1986	\$ 324.1 „

Among the major programmes to be covered during the next five years are :—

- (i) Raising and Positioning Rapid Deployment forces for action in the Gulf Area and other areas of the Third World ;
- (ii) Modernising US strategic weapons ;
- (iii) Development and procurement of new strategic weapon systems; and possibly ;
- (iv) Development of systems and techniques for dealing with space vehicles and for space borne systems for dealing with hostile nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union's military expenditure for 1979 is estimated by SIPRI analysts at \$ 105 Bn (against USA's \$ 110 Bn) with the observation that this is a "compromise figure" which corresponds neither with Soviet official figures nor with CIA's figures (the latter's figures, as is generally agreed, considerably exaggerate Soviet outlay on defence while understating those of some other countries, notably China and Pakistan). However, even SIPRI estimates tend to show Soviet defence spending as being far more than it may in fact be.

China's defence outlay has steadily risen from \$ 12.9 Bn in 1950 to \$ 44.2 Bn in 1979. A good part of these outlays by USA and other Great Powers would go for weapon manufacture—conventional as well as nuclear and other. As far as convention arms are concerned, arms sales and gifts are important levers in the hands of Great Powers for maintaining regional tensions, triggering wars between developing countries and 'tilting' in favour of one or other developing country.

Second, nuclear policy ; while this Book was under print or subsequent to its issue, President Carter had promulgated a Presidential Directive (PD 59) which substantially changes earlier US nuclear doctrine. The doctrine notwithstanding the 'forward' deployment of tactical or battle-field nuclear weapons, was based on the recognition that the role of nuclear weapons is to deter an adversary from launching an attack. The revised doctrine, it would appear, makes the use of tactical nuclear weapons 'thinkable' and is based on the premise that a nuclear exchange

between the Super Powers can be limited to the tactical level ie use of limited yield limited range nuclear weapons so that the vital areas of the two principal contenders are not threatened. The proposed induction of the neutron bomb by USA into West Europe, would support this theory.

USA's West European allies---especially West Germany---are understandably alarmed since they rightly recognise that a nuclear war once triggered cannot but rapidly escalate to all out nuclear war and hence talk of tactical nuclear war or of the use of ERW* is utterly irresponsible. Even if a tactical nuclear war stays at the tactical level, it is hardly any consolation to West Germany (and front line states of the Warsaw Pact) since their country would be devastated anyway---whether the tactical weapons are ERW or are fitted with earlier makes of uranium/plutonium warheads.

Third, SALT II Treaty : SALT II was concluded by the two Super Powers on the basis of maintaining "essential equivalence" of strategic weapon inventories of the two Super Powers. The proposed development of a number of new strategic weapon systems and the deployment of ERWS is hardly in accordance with the spirit of SALT II and of NPT.

Fourth, NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) ;

This, as is familiar to observers from the Third World, is entirely one sided and imposes obligations on non nuclear weapon states without reciprocal obligations on the part of five states who had developed nuclear weapons before 1967.

This as well as the documents in the chapters on Chemical Disarmament and Radiological Warfare constitute useful reference material.

A point of interest (not to say concern for us) regarding chemical weapons is that General Rogers, Chairman Chiefs of Staff, USA has recently noted in an official US document that Pakistan and Vietnam have chemical warfare capabilities. In the case of Vietnam, possibly chemical weapons are those left behind by departing US forces, form their inventory. In the case of Pakistan, they may well have developed a chemical arsenal to supplement their nuclear arsenal under manufacture. Alternatively, US and Chinese sources might have transferred selected types of chemical weapons for issue to irregular and other forces which are equip-

*Enhanced radiation weapons.

ped through Pakistan for activities in Afghanistan ; and Pakistan might have retained the bulk of these supplies. Either way it would add another dimension to the threat that this country faces, and to the unwelcome possibilities of heightening tensions on the Afghanistan border.

R.R.R.

"DETENTE AND DEFENSE---A READER"

Edited by ROBERT J PRANGER

(Published by American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC pp. 445, Price \$ 4.50)

THIS is a collection of a neatly presented view from Washington on the central problems of future US foreign policy, the rationale of detente and the requirements of US defence strategy. A wide range of American thinking, both Hawks and Doves, Democrats and Republicans, provide an interesting discussion on detente and, some documents and official statements give background material to it, as well as, to defense issues. Many well known names, ranging from Nixon, Kissinger, Fulbright, Melvin Laird to Brzezinski, George Kennan and even Alexander Solzhenitsyn are on the list of contributors.

While discussing the problems of future American foreign policy, be it Nixon, Laird or Brzezinski, all advocated, a dominant US role in terms of military and non-military power. The former President Nixon puts it delicately : "Peace needed America's strength."

Official statements on the basic agreements on detente entered into by the US between 1972 and 1974 with USSR and China are available in the book. A group of eleven authors in a joint article contend that detente does not benefit the US because under its guise, USSR is getting militarily stronger. Some others like Kissinger and George Kennan conclude that detente is worth saving because ever new and awesome terror of the nuclear weapons make it imperative for the US and USSR to expand their cooperation with each other.

In regard to defence, their being no difference of opinion about what counted was military power, the question, therefore, was American Forces really inferior to USSR in some key areas as claimed by the US Congressional Research Service (Jan 1976) ? Representative Les Aspin

(Democrat) concludes that American defense capabilities are sufficient in areas that are often criticized as inadequate. In one of the articles Kissinger felt that in Angola, the United States should have checked the Soviet military intervention, but failed to do so. Then, there are other well known contributors who throw interesting light to the controversy and its obvious implications on future SALT agreements.

This is a useful book in understanding the diplomatic and defense objectives of USA in its relation with both USSR and China as well as, to assess to what extent the happenings elsewhere may count. It is clear from various articles in the book that the global perspective is dominated by geopolitical consideration, superceding ideological positions and that there was continuous rivalry between US and USSR, inspite of the detente. Also, reaction to developments elsewhere is likely to be largely determined not on individual merit but by how Moscow and Washington (and to a lesser extent Peking), perceive their relationship with each other.

B.M.B.

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-39

Edited by W. N. MEDLICOTT, AND M. E. LAMBERT SECOND SERIES
VOLUME XXI, THE RHINE LAND CRISIS AND THE ENDING OF SANCTIONS,
MARCH-JULY 1936

(Published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, OXFORD, 1977 pp 811,
Price £ 22).

THIS is one of the volumes of the British Government's serial publication of useful documents, collected from the archives of the British Foreign Office, covering the 20-year period between the two World Wars. There are fifty-two volumes in all, spread over four series--First series (1919-1925), Series 1A (1925-1930) Second Series (1929-1938), and Third Series (1938-1939).

As the title indicates, this volume under review has covered the period March 2--July 30, 1936, with as many as 540 documents, besides 5 Appendixes, totalling 811 pages.

Chapters I to V of the book contain documents relating to the last phase of the Ethiopian War from March to July 1936 and the European crisis following the German decision to re-militarize the Rhineland. The last chapter (VI) of the book deals with the Turkish

move to revise the Straits convention of 1923 leading to the Montreux Conference in July 1936, and the negotiations for the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, which was signed later on August 26. The five appendices are on (i) Minutes of the British Cabinet discussion on the British questionnaire to Hitler, April 29-30, 1936; (ii) Minutes of the British Cabinet discussion on plans for an Agreement with Germany, July 6, 1936; (iii) Report of the Plymouth Committee on the transfer of a Colonial Mandate or Mandates to Germany, 9 June, 1936; (iv) Sir W. Selby's views on the Austro-German Agreement of 11 July, 1936; and (v) Mr. Somers-Cocks' Memorandum on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 26 August 1936.

The British Foreign Office documents reproduced in this volume naturally show the thinking and action of the British Government of those days in the context of the German move for the re-militarization of the Rhineland and the concomitant French reaction to it and the imposition of 'sanction' against Italy for the latter's aggression on Abyssinia. The French Government of the day had its own perception, based on its own self-interest, of those problems, and similarly both Germany and Italy had also their respective view-points. But in formulating its foreign policy, each of these countries was obviously influenced by the public opinion in that particular country as well as the attitudes and interests of other major powers.

In order to make an objective study of the contemporary international relations, it would be ideal to study the foreign office archives of all the concerned countries. This exhaustive serialisation of British foreign office documents will be very useful in relating the British side of the story.

The German decision to re-militarize the Rhineland did not perturb the British and the French equally. Chamberlain's policy towards Germany, which came to be branded later as a policy of appeasement, was not personally his, but the Cabinet's, and there was a strong public opinion in Great Britain at that time favouring that Germany was right in doing what it liked in its own backyard. This moderate policy was born not out of fear, but out of a strategy. The British Government wanted to follow a delaying policy of negotiation with Germany to gain time for British rearmament. Their "principal aim.....at the present time was to play for time and for peace.....". The state of public opinion was such that the country would not be

willing to honour any commitments unless these were vital to our security, which meant those of the Locarno type.....Did it matter if the French said they could not rely on us ?" (P. 746).

No doubt, the present volume under review will be welcomed by all those interested in International Relations, History, Political Science, Diplomacy, and International Law. It will serve as a very important source material for research on European crisis in the latter part of the 1930s.

B.C.

MILITARY YEAR BOOK 1978-79

Edited by S.P. BARANWAL

(Published by Guide Publications, pp 240, Price Rs. 65/-).

THERE is need for Military Year Books to help bridge the traditional communication gap between the Defence Services and the rest. In its thirteenth year of issue, the important new additions for 1978/79 are 'Glossary of Military Terms', and 'Nuclear Strategy of China and Pakistan'. The Glossary one is grossly overdone covering 53 pages. The Nuclear Strategy part is a mere eyewash. 'Analysis of Military balance of China and Pakistan'---a straight reproduction from a well-known foreign publication on the subject is useful. The Editor might have as well allowed what the same publication had to say on India for ease of comparative study.

The improvement over the years has generally remained confined to the frills part of it, such as last year's chapter on 'Life In The Armed Forces' is this year's 'Career In The Armed Forces'. The scope for doing much better is limited when for the bulk of its contents, it does not venture beyond reprinting extracts from the Ministry of Defence publications, particularly, the Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence under different names. The conclusion is on expected lines ; 'Threat to the security of the Country are given full weight and appreciation'. Naturally, the Government should be happy about it but whether the situation is really as reassuring as that is of course, a different matter. The Year Book contains no other views.

The utility of the Year Book would have been greatly enhanced, had an index been available and also, if reference was made to the source material used. There is a useful bit about 'Naval Custom'. A separate

chapter on Custom of the Services, about which so much importance is given by the serviceman, will help.

The price is same as last year, but about 150 pages of reading material less and presumably, it will sell no less than last year. No competitor is in sight yet.

B.M.B.

CONFLICT IN NAGALAND . A Study of Insurgency and Counter-insurgency
By LT. COL V.K. ANAND (Retd)
(Published by Chanakya Publications, Delhi 1980 pp 268, price Rs. 70/-)

INSURGENCY is defined as a condition of revolt against an authority or government that is less than an organised revolution and is not recognised as belligerency. As the author points out in the first chapter, "insurgency is not a sudden and short lived outburst but a slow, planned and dynamic process both historically and operationally." And yet it has a certain similarity with revolution as well as with war. This lies in the objective which in all the three cases insurgency, revolution and war—is to bring about a downfall of the existing authority. The use of violence is also common to all three (though in exceptional cases a revolution may be bloodless as the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688). The difference lies in the nature of operations and the methods employed before the culmination of the struggle in success or failure.

Whereas war is a state of usually open and declared armed conflict between states or nations and a revolution is a sudden upsurge of the people resulting in a fundamental change in political organisation such as the overthrow of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed, insurgency is a slow and progressive process of violence or series of acts of violence, harassment, sabotage etc. Since an insurgent has very little or no chance in open revolt against the well-organised police and military machine of the established authority, he has perforce to adopt guerilla tactics, at least in the beginning. And since tanks, guns and jets are useless against him, the authority has also to adopt special methods to deal with him. Many governments, especially in the Third World, where insurgencies are common have, therefore, specially trained counter-insurgency troops and paramilitary organisations.

The author, Col Anand, has made an exhaustive study of insurgency and counter-insurgency of modern age and particularly in Nagaland where he was on active service before retirement and wrote a book on *Nagaland in Transition* considered a "remarkable achievement" by the great authority on aboriginal tribes of India like the famous Dr. Verrier Elwin.

In the present book under review, the author has dealt with the definition and nature of insurgency in general, its causes and methods etc, in the first chapter. The chapters that follow deal specifically with Nagaland, the genesis of psychological conflict (pre-1946); development of political aspirations (1946-53); the movement for independence and acquiring of military clout by the underground Nagas (1953-56) and the govt. of India's military response to the great flare-up of 1956 in which almost the entire Naga community was involved; the success of Indian Security Forces against the Naga Federal Army and the collapse of the latter.

Chapter 6, the longest in the book, describes in great detail, the events and developments from 1957 to 1980 and the efforts of the Government to find and evolve a political solution of the problem with the help and cooperation of moderate peace-loving Nagas who realised that the grant of autonomy within the frame-work of the Indian Union would meet their aspirations. Just as the struggle for independence had united the various Naga tribes, their humiliating reverses and the suffering caused to the common man by the violent movement and its suppression soon divided them. The Nagas peace committees and the peoples conventions made an appeal to the militant and hostile Nagas to give up violence, but to no avail. Mr Phizo, president of the Naga National Council, however, fled the country and settled in England. This broke the back of the hostile movement and though sporadic incidents continued to occur, the desire for peace was so strong that the moderates, who now formed about 75% of the population, started peace parleys with the Government.

The Government accepted the proposal of the Naga Peoples' Convention for the formation of a separate state of Nagaland.

The story of suspension of operations, the flight of Phizo to London from where he continued to issue inflammatory statements to his followers, peace efforts by the Naga Baptist Church Council and the peace mission

appointed by the Government of India (which incidentally included Jaya Prakash Narayan), peace parleys with Naga Federal Government, the Shillong Accord and the gradual emergence of a political solution are given with a fascinating wealth of detail.

Chapter 7, dealing with the evolution of tactical concepts of both the Naga rebels and the security forces focuses on a topic so rarely discussed and should be of considerable value to the defence and para-military personnel.

In the last chapter, the author evaluates the whole problem and gives refreshing and useful views on the military, political and administrative lessons of the conflict in Nagaland. The well conceived observations having a wider application could be thought provoking for political leadership and military command at various levels.

The entire narrative is well documented and is the result of considerable patient research and reading as is evident from the large number of references to each chapter given at the end. The story of interesting and exciting events is told in a readable style. The book is not only a stimulating piece of military history but also a mine of information about the social and cultural life of the Nagas. A glossary of words used in north-eastern region of India, four small sketch maps showing strategic location of Nagaland, its population, railways etc., and an index add to the value of the book.

No one interested in insurgency and counter-insurgency in general and Nagaland and other parts of North-east India in particular can afford to miss it.

P.N.K.

THE OFFICER'S HANDBOOK

Edited by GENERAL MAJOR S.N. KOZLOV, MOSCOW

(Published under the auspices of the United States Air Force and for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Govt. Printing Office, Washington DC 20402 1971, pp 358, price \$ 4.00).

Total of 17 books were published by the Soviet Ministry of Defence from 1965 to 1973 as "Officer's Library" series. The Officer's Handbook is the fifteenth one and came out in 1971. Its contributors include some wellknown Soviet Military writers. The Handbook, as stated in the Foreword--"will prove of real assistance to military

cadres in broadening their outlook on military theory and solving problems related to the training and education of their subordinates”.

The first four chapters are devoted to military-theoretical problems. These deal with subjects as leadership of Armed Forces by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, including, the concept of the Unity of Command and the Party Organisation in military units ; Marxist-Leninist Military Theory, containing, explanations of key terms (to give one example ; Military doctrine means the Military Policy of the Communist Party and has thus, some legal force behind it, whereas, Strategy is one of the component parts of military art) ; and, Military Psychology and the Science of Teaching. What is interesting to note in the Chapter on Science of Teaching is the added emphasis on “persuasion” as the chief method of educating the Soviet Servicemen. The subsequent chapters deal with Soviet Armed Forces and their officer corps and will be useful to readers who are not familiar how its organisation differs from tri-service concept. There are also, chapters on the Armed Forces of the other Warsaw Pact. The Chapter on “The Armed Forces of the Imperialist States” is obviously, in continuation of study about the opposite side, in the same way, the present English translation of this Soviet Officer's Handbook is intended to serve. The next three chapters, Science and Military Affairs, Weapons and Military Technology and Essentials of Sanitation and Hygiene are of interest in describing Soviet views and the method of their presentation. The final chapter is on General Reference Data.

What is noteworthy about the book is the recognition of the fact that “The officer of today has to be conversant with such mass of information, facts or figures, that it would be very difficult to him to retain in his memory”. Hence, the need for this and other sixteen books of the Soviet Officer's Library ; a readily available reference literature published by the Government.

20 Jun 80

BMB

ORGANISATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE INDIAN ARMY

By BRIG RAJENDRA SING (RETD).

(Published by Army Educational Stores, New Delhi 1980). pp. 426, price Rs. 65/-

IN a country like ours, in which public interest in armed forces abysmally low, a book of the type written by Brig Rajendra Singh is

almost a necessity. For the serviceman too, it provides a wealth of knowledge on almost all aspects of administration and logistics, covering organisations, command and control aspects, services, two arms (Engineers and Signals) maintenance, movement, procedures, management, staff duties and legal aspects.

Therefore great---very great indeed is the pity that the book is so full of practically every conceivable error and inaccuracy, ranging from out of date organisations to bad grammar to any number of printers' devils and archaic staff duties.

This book was first published in 1952. In the latest reprint of the book (1980) which is under review no serious effort has been made to update the material. It is a reprint almost in the literal sense of the word.

Only some of the more interesting mistakes are being highlighted.

The book talks of retention and Part 'A' Promotion Examinations. Both these examinations were abolished many years ago.

At many places full stops have been put in the abbreviated appointment such as "D.M.I" and "M.G.O". As far as use of abbreviations is concerned a strange admixture has been followed, for example on Page 66 in the same sentence the words headquarters and 'HQ' appear.

The major flaw is in the organisations. Almost without exception these are out of date. Salient parts are discussed subsequently.

The author talks of anti tank and heavy machine gun units (Page 66). We have neither of these in our Army.

In the book, heavy stress has been laid on animal transport. This is a cause for worry for it could lead the world at large to believe that, this is the main mode of transportation in our Army.

The organisation of a divisional headquarters is out of date. The intelligence and Field Security Section is no longer authorised. The much vaunted cadre review has been taken no notice of.

The organisation of the armoured division is also wrong. Interestingly the author talks of an airborne division, of which we have none.

Like all other organisations, the engineer organisation is out of date. The engineer regiment is no longer authorised a headquarter company. The field park company has been incorrectly called the ordnance park company. It should be noted that in infantry and mountain divisions bridging equipment is no longer held by this company. On page 85, it is incorrectly stated that the field company is authorised only one field platoon.

The biggest disservice of all has been the Author's coverage of Army Ordnance Corps. Salvage units are extant as also are the Mobile Heavy Laundry Companies. This Company functioned during World War II, when the war was being fought in many theatres. Each theatre had these company's which laundered specialist clothing (like high altitude clothing). Presently this work is done locally by units. Ordnance Officers Shop is no longer in existence and nor is the Mobile Industrial Gas Platoon. The divisional ordnance organisation has undergone a complete change. This major change does not seem to have been noticed by the Author.

On Page 154 it is stated that fired bullets, empty cartridge cases and misfires should be destroyed by the units. If this were done the auditors would throw fifty fits and the units would be in serious trouble. Each piece of each one of these items has to be scrupulously accounted for.

Like everything else the organisation of EME is also out of date. The light aid detachments which the author talks about have since long been replaced by light repair workshops

Often petty and irrelevant details have been included (probably because they happen to have been included in the previous editions). For example in the organisation of EME details of what each section at Army Headquarters is and what it does have been included. No reader is interested in such details. And on one hand while these minute details have been included, several major aspects have been left out. For example, in the Corps of EME there is a Commander technical group of the rank of a major general. He controls all technicals activity of the Corps, like issue of Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Regulations (EMERs) to the entire Army. No mention has been made of this at all.

Medical organisations at places are out of date. Some of the organisations like light field ambulance are dead and have been buried for long. The Regimental Aid Post does not carry out blood transfusion and has not been designed to do so.

On Page 331 the Author talks of a manuscript report (ACR). The present generation of officers have not even heard of it. Yet it has been included in the latest edition.

The most interesting of all errors occurs on page 376 wherein it is mentioned that on retirement the maximum gratuity admissible to an officer is Rs. 3000/-. This error is unlikely to bolster the horribly waning popularity of the Army.

Efforts have also been made to teach the reader staff duties. Unfortunately the format followed belongs to a bygone era.

And so one could go on recounting the errors in this book--- for their number is legion. But the point has been clearly made.

In artillery there is an adage that once an air defence gun is deployed it is as much a danger to own aircraft as it is to enemy aircraft and therefore it can do as much harm as it can do good. Exactly the same can be said of this book.

The Author is advised to contact the co-ordinating sections of the corps concerned to get latest trends and organisations. If great pains are taken and the book updated for information, it can be one of immense value to the public and young officers alike.

M.S.C.

THE ANATOMY OF THE ISRAELI ARMY

By GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG

(Published by BT Batsford Ltd., London 1979 pp 256 Price £ 6.95).

The central theme of this book is the evolution of the Israeli Army as it stands today as a modern army, its organisation, doctrines and special characteristics. The author has done a remarkable job to critically analyse the development of Israel Defence Forces since its foundation through various wars and conflicts and recent commando type raids. The author has provided to the reader an excellent backdrop of the IDF from the days of gureilla gangs to a well knit and one of the most efficient military machines evolved during the last three decades.

The book is excellently produced and supported with photographs of various times and actions and sketches. He has also described some of the important operations and divided the study in chronological phases of the development of IDF into various chapters, each one having an appropriate title quotation from the Bible.

The history of Israel nation since its inception in 1948 has been full of strife and exemplary display of will of the Jews to carve out for themselves a secure state. Initially the British tried to put down Jew rebellion whereby such divergent groups like Haganah, Palmach, Etzel and Lehi co-operated and the foundations of an integrated force were laid. There is, however, a tendency of all Western writers to underplay the strength of the Arabs and magnify their weaknesses (Page 52).

The mobilised strength in March 48 is said to have comprised well over 10% of the population, is the highest mobilisation ratio in recent times (Page 57). The author has given a near authentic Haganah—IDF estimate in 1947-48 in a tabulated form at page 58, bringing out various types of weapons, tanks, planes and warships and various assortments, which must have been a logistician's nightmare on the battle field. The author brings out the problems of communication between immigrant Jews from abroad because of language barrier. He quotes an example of a major, Commander of Israel's first tank battalion, who had served in the Polish division in the Soviet Army to come back to be in the ranks of IDF having trouble in communicating with his men (page 65). He talks of artillery support and it being given relative unimportance due to air superiority; which paid them hands down in the 1967 war and cost them more than a dime in October 1973 War (page 65). Israel evolved tactics, of bold employment of armour under air cover without much reliance on self-propelled artillery support. The Navy continued to be a step child of the army; a common phenomenon in most non maritime developing nations except perhaps Royal Navy of UK (Page 65). In Israel national policy making, civil and military relations, the civil authority ranges supreme (page 74).

All senior officers had to be Para Troopers including Chief Chaplain of the Army and Dayan took the course as chief of the IDF in 1954 (page 89 and 93). In the Sinai Campaign of 1967 the informal discipline and the insistence on the primacy of combat had paid off. This is in contradiction with thinking of most soldiers in most armies that first class discipline on battle field depends on good discipline in barracks. Israel's Army seems to refute this lesson (page 109-110).

The women soldiers in the IDF have had a significant role to play (page 177).

The officer-men relations and quality of officer leadership is amply described at pages 117-120. The salient point being that there is no direct entry to officer rank. Everyone has come through from the ranks, 'follow me' style of leadership, heavy dose of punishment for covering up mis-appropriation, the senior officer can retire early with concept of second career to follow and professional competence have been the hall mark for further advancement with higher ranks bringing no extra perks.

The author brings out the qualitative changes in equipment that took place between the wars of 1967 and 1973 delivered by the Soviet Union to the Arab confrontation states like Egypt and Syria. The IDF also tried to keep up a balance of power by up dating their equipment from US arsenals even though the American policy was dominated by pro-Arabists and oil lobby. The narration of 1967 and Yom Kippur war is well covered and is in consonance with most of the material published on these two wars by the other authors and it certainly repays study. It makes an interesting reading, particularly in terms of interplay of the super powers and the regional interests of the Jewish and the Arab states.

The author has carried out a very intensive study and quoted extensively from various books and catalogued foot-notes serially numbered as also has given the bibliography of selected books in English to those who wish to carry out a study in depth through these books. He has also indexed the major events and conflicts in alphabetic order.

The author has talked about the Military potential of Israel in conventional terms but has not touched upon the nuclear capability of Israel, even though subsequently he has mentioned that Moshe Dayan went to the extent of advising the Cabinet during Oct 73 War to use the nuclear option. He has covered the causes of failure of the Israeli intelligence during Oct 1973 War and has quoted intensively from the Agranat Enquiry Commission Report.

The author seems to belittle the role of Moshe Dayan as the Defence Minister by suggesting at page 179 ie his only major contribution to the Oct 73 War was the fateful decision of sending 7 Armoured Brigade to the Syrian Front. He has described at page 185 and gone on to say

"On balance, if the soldiers were guilty of neglect, so were the ministers, especially Dayan" which seems a bit harsh. He has also mentioned at page 189 that Dayan is reported to have advised the Prime Minister that Israel might have to activate its last resort nuclear option. He however, clarifies to say that on this point the evidence is not entirely clear.

Towards the end of the book the writer touches upon US-Israel relations and criticises the US policy by calling it a 'carrot and stick' approach at page 205. The various changes in the command and force structure in the post-Oct 73 War period have been lucidly covered. About preparedness of IDF before Oct 73 War, he mentions that visiting Israel in the 1960s, Liddle Hart expressed concern that the IDF, like all victorious armies, might develop a complacent attitude—a prophecy which willy nilly came true during the interim period between 1967 and 1973 wars (Page 157). The anti-terrorist activity of the IDF have been commendably brought out and he has had a look into the Israel's strategic situation into the 1980s. He concludes to say that if for the first time in three decades there is talk and hope of peace, it may well have come about because the Arab leaders have recognised that they cannot destroy the state by military means. And this may well be proudest achievement of the Israeli Army.

The two events which have occurred after the publication of the book, that is, the Israeli raid on Entebbe air port and the air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, have only enhanced the image of the Israeli Army as a military machine.

Overall an excellent book recommended for reading by most thinker soldiers.

The author has lived up to his credentials as a scholar on military affairs.

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