

# U.S.I. JOURNAL

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Wellingtons Battles in India — *Maj Gen RM Rau, AVSM (Retd)*

OCT-DEC 1982

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## **The Persian Gulf and India's Security**

Lt Gen A M Vohra PVSM (Retd)

### **RESERVOIR OF OIL**

THE eight littoral States around the Gulf hold over 60% of the world's known oil reserves. In 1978, these States accounted for 40% of the world production of oil. The industrialised countries of Western Europe, the USA and Japan are heavily dependent on this oil. Their figures of import of oil from the Gulf for 1979 are 63%, 31% and 73% respectively. The countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) possess only 10% of the known reserves of oil, of which Japan has none, Europe has 2% and the rest is concentrated in the USA and Canada. As Dr. Kissinger put it, a complete stoppage of the Gulf oil could lead to industrial paralysis and economic strangulation of these countries. Since the oil embargo of 1973, the fear of interruption of oil supply from the Gulf has caused considerable concern. The energy demand of OECD is likely to go up further to 27 million barrels per day by 1985. Of this they would be dependent on the Gulf for 56%.

At present the Soviet block is self-sufficient in oil and in fact exports about a million barrels a day. In the seventies it was anxious to purchase readily available cheap oil and gas from the Gulf region. By the end of 1970, the pipeline from South-Western Iran was supplying 600 million cubic feet of gas per day to the Soviet Union. In April 1972, Iraq began to supply oil to Russia from the North Rumailia oil field. It has also been suggested that the general phenomenon of shrinking oil supply in relation to demand may effect the USSR by as early as 1985, when the Soviet block is expected to become a net importer of oil. However, there is the contrary view that even if the Soviet oil production has peaked, it seems to have the potential for developing substantial oil reserves. It is also increasing its coal production, thermal power and nuclear energy. Nuclear power has already gone up from 4,000 to 12,000 MW between 1975 to 1980. It is certain that it will

make further efforts to develop oil and gas resources. It has made proposals to double the supply of natural gas to certain West European countries in return for investments in the Siberian project. An agreement with West Germany has been reported. (The USSR already supplies gas to Austria, Italy, West Germany and France to the extent of 100%, 28%, 17% and 9.5% of their requirement).

As against the total oil requirement of 25 million tons in 1979, India's production was 12 million tons. Although indigenous production has now increased to about 16 million tons, at present we still have to import about 16 million tons, about 50% of which comes from the Gulf. Our imports have been diversified and we get a fair amount from Bulgaria and Mexico. Our requirement by 1984-85 is expected to go up to 43 million tons when our production is expected to be 30 million tons. Forecasts indicate that by the end of this decade there are prospects of India becoming self-sufficient in oil.

#### STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE GULF REGION AND ITS CONTROL

The outer Gulf, the Gulf of Oman dominates the sea routes from Europe to the Far East and from Asia to Africa. The British secured the Gulf to ensure free passage to India. The rapid development of oil resources since World War II has added to the strategic importance of the region. (Iraq and Iran were producing oil from the beginning of the century but the rest of the Gulf countries commenced commercial production only after the World War. In 1939, Middle-East oil accounted for only 6% of the World production as against the present figure of 40%). In view of the vital interest of the Western powers, it is recorded in the Truman diaries that the United States resorted to a nuclear threat to ensure Soviet withdrawal from Iran in 1946. Western powers are known to have contingency plans for the seizure of oil fields to ensure continuity of oil supply.

After the withdrawal of the British in the late sixties and early seventies, the Shah assumed the mantle of the policeman of the Gulf. The Nixon doctrine of self help depended in this region on the twin pillars of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran was the strongest local power. It accepted American arms aid in 1948 and joined Baghdad Pact in 1955 (later CENTO after the overthrow of monarchy in Iraq in 1958). However, early in the sixties, Iranian disillusionment with the USA on issues of financial aid and ready recognition of the republican regime in the Yemen led to a detente with Russia, resulting in the Shah's visit to

to Soviet Union in 1965 and some commercial agreements in 1966 as well as some arms supply 1967. In subsequent years, Iran maintained a policy of good neighbour relations with Moscow while strengthening her armed forces with Western arms in preparation of its perceived role after the withdrawal of the British. Since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran is in turmoil and not in a position to play any stabilising role in the foreseeable future.

Fully cognisant of the strategic importance of the Gulf, the US objective has been to contain the USSR along its Southern boundary. The Soviets could not be expected to accept this attempt to include the entire Gulf region as a sphere of American influence; a region which is close to the USSR and in which the USA had formed blocs, sent arms and military missions and has been endeavouring to set up bases. On their part, the Russians gained influence in Iraq on the overthrow of monarchy in 1958 as also in Syria and later in South Yemen, just as the Americans established their influence in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, UAE and earlier in Iran. The US and the USSR have, therefore been arbitrating powers, the former through its allies in Riyadh and Muscat and the latter through its proxies in South Yemen and to a lesser extent in Iraq and Syria.

Apart from the Russian presence in Afghanistan, 30 divisions are reported to be deployed on the Soviet border with Iran. The USA or the Western alliance have no military presence in the Gulf States or closeby except for personnel for assistance programmes or training missions. (The US is constructing bases for the Saudi Army and is also developing air bases at Taif and Khamis Mushayt). The super powers have to act through the local states. Considerations of national security, economic interest and to some extent ideology determine whether an outside power secures bases or an alliance. The fact that the economies of the oil producing countries of the Gulf and the industrial Western States are complementary, gives the Western alliance an advantage.

Some American commentators point out that the Soviet military power poses a serious threat to the Eurasian periphery of the Soviet Union, particularly to the Middle-Eastern portions extending from Turkey to Pakistan, including the Arab Peninsula. The USA feels that in view of the vital interests of the West in the Gulf region, there is potential for direct clash necessitating an appropriate military deterrent to be arranged in cohesion with the Middle Eastern countries. Given the geopolitical significance of the Gulf region ; its importance to the West for energy supplies, the potential for conflict is indeed serious.

**ARMS BUILD UP**

During the October 1973 Arab-Israel War, the oil producing Arab states asserted oil power by restricting production and export of oil to countries aiding Israel. Aware of this new power, the Gulf States are anxious to exercise their independence as opposed to acting as clients of either of the Super powers. Military presence of the USSR or the Western alliance would not, therefore, be acceptable to any of them. They have indulged in large scale import of arms. Saudi Arabia's defence expenditure shot up from \$ 1415 mn during period 1968-72 to \$ 5319 mn during period 1973-77. During the same period, Iran increased its expenditure from \$ 2015 mn to \$ 6718 mn, Iraq from \$ 766 mn to \$ 1634 mn. Bahrain from \$ 10 mn to \$ 42 mn, Qatar from \$ 80 mn to \$ 853 mn and Oman from \$ 84 to \$ 553 mn. However, these states are far from stable and are subject to internal upheavals. Saudi Arabia faces socio-economic pressures from within. Traditional leaders in Oman, Kuwait or UAE could face domestic opposition also. Unrest and rebellion can take the form of uprising by the Kurds in Iraq or Iran and guerilla warfare in the Dhofan Province of Oman. In addition, there are historical bilateral disputes between Iran and Iraq who are presently in a state of war, between Iraq and Kuwait and between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Such differences make a regional alliance difficult and invite super power interference.

The Carter Administration discussed a new national military strategy in Sep 1977 and spelt out the necessity of forces required beyond those earmarked for NATO. This was the beginning of the concept of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). In May 1979, the US Administration proposed to create a force of 100,000 and to raise the 5th Fleet to look after US interests in the Gulf region. With the revolution in Iran, the Western alliance lost a pillar of its strategic structure. Russian presence in Afghanistan accentuated the threat from the US point of view. This led to the Headquarters of the RDF being activated on 1 Mar 1980 at MacDill Air Force Base under the "Readiness Command". The force includes airborne, air assault and amphibious elements, the latter being 50,000 strong from the Marine Corps. The Air Force will provide fighter and reconnaissance aircraft as well as the airlift. The Navy will provide carrier battle groups. It is planned to pre-position ships with equipment and 30 days supplies for the three marine brigades (one by 1983, second by 1985 and the third by 1987). The RDF will draw its field force from existing force structures. A capability to deploy a force of 300,000 in 30 days is to be built up.

A serious repercussion of the Afghanistan crises has been tension in West and South Asia. On the Indian sub-continent the build up of Pakistan's armed forces has led to an arms race. It has been reported that as against the strength of six corps of two armoured and sixteen infantry divisions shown in "The Military Balance 1980-81" Pakistan Army is now to have eight corps of two armoured and twenty two infantry divisions. It has been assessed that by 1984-85, the US aid would have been assimilated and all the new formations will be in a state of operational readiness. Apart from 40 F-16 fighter bombers, Pakistan is likely to receive upto 4 submarines and some other ships for the Navy and a sizeable amount of equipment for the Army including M-60 tanks, M-113 infantry combat vehicles, Hawk and TOW missiles, armed helicopters and medium as well as air defence artillery. This qualitative and quantitative boost to Pakistan's military strength will inevitably be matched by India.

#### SUPER POWER CONFLICT AN ITS SPILLOVER EFFECT

President Carter's state of the union message on 23 Jan 80 after the move in of Russian troops into Afghanistan in the last week of Dec 79, warned the USSR that any move to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be repelled by all means including military. The USA announced its intention to form a strategic concensus from Egypt to Pakistan. Its new arms policy has resulted in pumping in of arms to Egypt, Saudi Arabia as well as other Gulf States and Pakistan. The USA was anxious that Pakistan should assume the role of the policeman of the Gulf. From the American point of view Pakistan can play a key role by providing base facilities at Gwador, by acting as conduit for arms aid to the Afghan insurgents and by stationing troops in Saudi Arabia. Pakistan has denied acceptance of the first two roles and it appears that the third will not be acceptable to Saudi Arabia although it was earlier reported that negotiations for stationing three Pak divisions in that country were near finalisation.

Pakistan has stated that it intends to retain its non-aligned status. Over the period of 3 years since the onset of the Afghanistan crises, there have been developments that indicate that it would like to keep both the assistance to the insurgents and its relations with the USA within the limit of Soviet tolerance. An alliance or provision of bases would therefore appear to be out. Realpolitik also dictates that Pakistan should keep the Russian card up its sleeve.

Super power confrontation over the influence of the Gulf region in an atmosphere of local instability of the Sheikhdoms as well as in Iran

will continue. The issues that have a bearing on the conflict include some that are a carry-over of the historic strategic policy of the British which, among other measures, was to ensure that Palestine should remain within their sphere of influence. The second major issue is the recent manifestation of another historic aim; Russia's anxiety to protect its Southern under-belly. The move of Russian troops into Afghanistan has, however, given rise to an apprehension of expansionist motives. The third major issue affecting the Persian Gulf is the internal situation in the Gulf states and inter state relations.

#### ARAB ISRAEL CONFLICT

To achieve the aim of ensuring their influence over Palestine, the British settled Jewish immigrants for 30 years from 1917 to 1947. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917 promised the establishment of a 'Jewish Home'. The British role in helping Jewish colonisation of Palestine and creating a Jewish state is historically well established as also their motive to have effective influence in an area which lies at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and dominates one bank of the Suez Canal. After the withdrawal of the British from Palestine, the USA took over the responsibility of looking after the interests of the Western alliance in this region; the process having started after the Second World War. The Zionist movement predictably shifted towards the United States for support of a Zionist State. To safeguard its strategic interest, the USA has always been firmly committed to the security of Israel. It now considers Israel its most reliable ally. As a signatory to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 14 May 1948 the USA accepted the right of the Palestinians to an independent state but its mediation in the Arab-Israel conflict has been partisan both because of internal pressures and its anxiety to retain and strengthen its only strategic asset in the region. Assured of US support, Israel has been going slow on the Palestinian issue. Camp David accord divided the Arabs which suits Israel. However, until Israel withdraws fully from the territory occupied in 1967 and is willing to solve the problem of Palestinian homeland, tension in the region will persist.

#### AFGHANISTAN

This is another trouble spot in West Asia that affects the stability of our sub-continent especially if Pakistan were to get involved in the US global strategy. Any dilution of the integrity of Pakistan would pose problems to the security of the sub-continent as a whole. A regional approach would have contributed to stability on the sub-continent.

However, the crises of confidence between India and Pakistan prevailed and the situation, in fact, worsened. Apropos the Gulf, the Soviet presence is viewed as a threat to American interests. The USA has been supplying arms, equipment and funds to the insurgent groups based near Peshawar. Pakistan has been facilitating Sino-US-Saudi-Egyptian aid to the resistance groups. The Russians are committed to the viability of the Babrak Karmal regime. Although there is lack of cohesion among the insurgents and they are clearly incapable of forcing the Russians out, their activity is preventing the stabilisation of the Soviet-backed Government. It would appear that the Russians are reconciled to a low key operation in order not to further aggravate local hostility. The Karmal Government has been unable to meet the problems of insurgency and tribal feuds. It controls only the towns. The countryside including the trunk roads is in the hands of insurgents. The government is trying to raise an army of 80,000 or more to establish central control but this will be a long drawn out process and there is no possibility of the Soviet troops pulling out until this happens.

#### THE GULF STATES

The internal instability of the Gulf states and inter-state disputes have been referred to earlier. Most of these States are subject to internal pressures which are likely to grow with development and exposure to outside influences. The wide gap in incomes and the standard of living between the few at the top and the masses could become a cause of increasing frustration and dissatisfaction with awareness. This indeed was one of the factors that led to the revolution in Iran. Insurgency, movements for a better economic deal and democratic rights or for religious revival could be expected in most of these states. Furthermore, there are regional conflicts which might make some of them look outwards for support and thus invite foreign interference. Although the Gulf states are of the view that the security of the Gulf region is their concern and are anxious to prevent it becoming a theatre of war, their bilateral conflicts, coupled with super power competition, make a regional approach a Utopian dream. In fact, the Carter doctrine of January 1980 is indicative of a pre-emptive super power approach. This of earlier evidence of the likelihood of super power interference has not prompted any regional cooperation. The failure of the Muscat Conference on Gulf Security in 1976 and the rejection of the Iraqi proposals of 8 Feb 1980, which included measures like non-grant of bases to any foreign power, are two examples. The Iran-Iraq war which has been going on for over 2 years (Iraq abrogated the 1975 Agreement on 17 Sep 1980 and

attacked Iran on 20 Sep) has further aggravated Arab—Iranian animosity. In this environment, the emergence of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) of the remaining six states (all Arab—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar) is a healthy development. The GCC was formally created after the Summit Conference of the six states held at Abu Dhabi in May 1980. It opposes military pacts and bases as well as any foreign presence. However, it is primarily not a military alliance. In addition, the fact that Iraq and Iran are not members, detracts from its strength and its ability to keep foreign powers out. The turmoil in Iran and the Iran-Iraq War are issues which are a major hinderence in the way of regional stability.

#### CHANGING CONCEPTS

Like some other regions in the Third World, the Persian Gulf area gives scope for super power interference by its inability to establish co-operation and regional cohesion. However, the American concept of strategic consensus is not working out. Secondly, the USA does not consider the Afghan situation critical any longer. The Soviet 'rush to the Gulf' concept no longer seems valid. Furthermore, the Russians have got bogged down militarily with the persisting insurgency. This preoccupation suits the USA. Supply of arms to and support of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, UAE and South Yemen will continue. The USA is still committed to strengthen and support Pakistan both to prevent a feeling of isolation and to restrict the development of relations with the USSR. These measures and the formation of the new Central Command for the deployment and control of the RDF are part of the US policy to protect its oil, trade and strategic interests. But the American strategy has undergone a change in so far as forming alliances and looking for surrogates to play the role of the policeman in the Gulf goes, in view of the changed attitudes of the countries of the region.

#### INDIAN SECURITY

National Security is dependent on many factors; preparedness to meet the military threat being one of these. In the context of the factor of the military threat, the situation in West Asia led to a deterioration in Indo-Pak relations in the wake of the arms build up in Pakistan. It seems now that the exposure to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan has brought home certain lessons. Firstly, it is clear to Pakistan that it is in her interest not to move completely over to the American camp; it must co-exist with the USSR—its neighbour in the North West. Secondly,

the stability and strength of the countries of South Asia is in their joint interest. Thirdly, the realisation that the provision of bases or joining alliances would not only be upsetting for the region but it also renders the countries concerned more vulnerable. The depth of the impact of these lessons is not certain, but it is becoming abundantly clear that regional stability is an essential requirement of national security. The effects of super power rivalry are also clear. Nothing can, however, be achieved by blaming them. Results can only be achieved through constructive steps by ourselves—the countries of South Asia. It is therefore essential that the dialogue between India and Pakistan on non-aggression pact/treaty of peace and friendship is given a sense of purpose.

## Turkey and NATO

H. E. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR MR. ALI HIKMET ALP

THE subject-matter of my talk is "Turkey and NATO". I propose to review it first through historical developments which led Turkey to apply for membership, and then to examine to what extent NATO is relevant for the security of Turkey and what role and importance Turkey has in the Organisation from military and strategic points.

Republic of Turkey can be considered in many ways as the successor to the Ottoman Empire. Despite radical differences between the Imperial and Republican periods, this legacy is still valid at least in two respects : First : whether she likes it or not, Turkey cannot dissociate herself from European politics. Secondly : Anatolia, or the Turkish mainland, has such a unique geographical, and therefore strategic position that a decrease in size and the transformation from an Empire to a national state have not brought any great difference in strategic terms.

In the past, this strategic situation had given the Ottomans an advantage for military intervention on three continents. Then, particularly during the period of decline, Turkey was involved in power politics between the British Empire, France, Russia and later Germany and Austria. Thus, quantitative and qualitative changes in the actors have occurred but the basic mechanism remains.

The "Sublime Port", in the late 18th and 19th centuries relied for survival on rivalries between major powers (in particular on Great Britain which, till the First World War had seen the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as part of its strategy to protect its interests from Eastern Mediterranean to India). Expansionism of the Tzarist Russia had always been a constant element. In the Republican period, despite important qualitative changes, the Soviet Union has taken its place as a factor which Turkish foreign policy is obliged to take into account in one way or in another.

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\*A talk given to the Indian Diplomats Association.

Instead of relying on the uncertain outcome of foreign power rivalries, the young Turkish Republic adopted a policy of neutrality, but with a tilt towards the Soviet Union. She also tried, in the early 30's with considerable success, to rally neighbouring countries around some form of regional cooperation, in political, economic and even military fields in order to contain the influences of the major powers. On the European front, the Soviet Union after the October Revolution was on the defensive, and a neutral and friendly Turkey was helpful to ensure the security of its southern borders. The Soviets had supported the Turkish liberation movement—not altogether with unselfish motives—and the *Treaty of Friendship signed in 1925 between the two countries* had brought stability and development of political and economic relations. Turkey and the Soviet Union were friends to the extent of being considered as allies. In the mid-1930's important developments occurred in Europe. First, Hitler came to power, and soon emerged as an adversary of the Soviets. Italy's colonialistic adventurism created fears and tensions in Europe and the Mediterranean. Mussolini openly singled out the Eastern Mediterranean as Italy's natural zone of expansion. But the Soviets, in 1934 and 1935 did not respond to a Turkish proposal of military pact which would guarantee the Straits and the Eastern Mediterranean against aggression. Turkey was also anxious to remove the restrictions imposed on the status of the Straits by the Lausanne Treaty, since they rendered Turkey—and the Soviets—vulnerable in a most sensitive area. All major powers traditionally wanted complete freedom of movement for their own war ships at all times, while riparian powers asked for maximum restrictions on all other ships, and Russia traditionally asked at least for a joint control and defence of the Straits.

Consultations with major powers in 1935 for the Montreux convention on the regime of the Turkish Straits (Dardanelles and Bosphorus) showed that there was no substantial change in these attitudes; and the adoption by the Soviets of positions similar to those of Tzarits Russia aroused traditional suspicions.

Turkey was ready to recognise security concerns of the Soviet Union but could not go so far as to share her sovereign rights, nor could she give up the idea of multilateral guarantees, in exchange for a risky bilateral arrangement with Russia alone. The Montreux convention, concluded in 1936, was a compromise between these conflicting interests. But the Soviet and Turkish Delegations had to defend contradictory positions on important points. This development

has somehow cooled the so far close Turkish-Soviet relations and led to a rapprochement with the Western powers,

1936-38, are years of increased tension and confusion in Europe. The growing threat from the Axis powers, facilitated a Soviet-French rapprochement. The Soviets have strongly favoured closer relations between Turkey, France and Great Britain, which led to the signing of a Treaty of Alliance in 1938. This Treaty practically ended the neutrality which Turkey had preserved since 1923. A treaty of friendship had already been signed between France and the Soviet Union. Soon, however, a dramatic change occurred : the Soviet Union signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany, reversing all previous allegiances. The Inonu Government, worried by this Russo-German rapprochement which would expose Turkey to the Axis powers, sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Saracoglu to Moscow, with instructions to try to ensure the support or at least a clarification of the position of the S.U. towards Turkey. He was authorised to propose a *mutual defence treaty*, with some military clauses, virtually accepting the common defence of the Straits. The Soviet response was cool. Saracoglu had not been received for about a week by any official and the Soviet-German pact was actually signed while he was in Moscow.

The early collapse of France in war virtually completed the isolation of Turkey. It was feared that Germany and the Soviet Union had divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence and that Turkey had been left to the Soviet sphere of influence. (Documents published after the war have shown that Molotov in fact had made such proposals to Von Ribbentrop but Germans were non-committal.) Some authors consider that these proposals and unilateral Soviet actions in Eastern Europe actually accelerated Soviet-German drift. The German attack on the Soviet Union, while it alleviated immediate Turkish apprehensions, increased the German threat. Turkey opted for *strict neutrality* and this was accepted and praised by all the belligerents, including the Soviet Union. However, in 1941-42, the Allies, anxious to use all available means against Germany, put pressure on Turkey to go to war on their side. In 1943, following the German defeat in Stalingrad, however, the Soviets suddenly gave up their insistence and adopted a very cool attitude towards Turkey. Churchill in fact had in mind the opening of a Balkan front (despite Soviet objections). Balkans and Greece, as well as the Italian islands in the Aegean being under German occupation and the Allies not having the means for sustained military operations, Turkey refused to take part in such a

suicidal military adventure at least without adequate preparation and the long-promised assistance from her Allies. Instead she signed a pact of *non-aggression with Germany*, to the great disappointment of the Russians.

Thus, Turkey succeeded in staying out of the war, avoided to be a "liberated country" but in the process caused Soviet dissatisfaction. She had not been able to follow meandering Soviet policies, nor to satisfy the Allies by her refusal to enter into the War under adverse conditions. Her prestige with the Allies at the end of the war was low and she was virtually isolated. Another important development was that the Soviet Union notified that she would not renew the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of friendship of 1925.

The most crucial year for Turkish foreign relations is undoubtedly 1946. In April of that year the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, on instructions from Ankara, had approached Molotov to discuss the ways of improving relations between the two countries. The Soviet Foreign Minister had forwarded some "suggestions" which would lead to better relations. These included;

- transfer of some territory in Eastern Anatolia to "small Caucasian Republics" ;
- joint control, and defence of the Straits ;
- creation between Turkey and Russia the kind of relationship similar to the one established between Poland and the Soviet Union after the War (Both "historical adversaries" of Russia, as Molotov put it).

These "suggestions" were totally rejected, although the Government was willing to satisfy Soviet concerns regarding the Straits of the Black Sea. Without any doubt, the Soviet demands, though not totally unexpected, caused a definite change of direction in Turkish foreign policy.

Apart from the deterioration of Turkish-Soviet relations and tension in Europe, the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey was also in confusion. The Soviets tried to keep their forces in Iran ; an internal war with outside support had erupted in Greece ; Balkans were occupied by Soviet armies and Communist regimes installed. Turkey had to cope with the exodus of approximately 600,000 refugees of Turkish origin from Balkan countries. On internal front things were not better.

Thanks mainly to the wise and able President of the Republic, M. Ismet Inonu, Turkey had managed to stay out of war, but military preparedness and large troop mobilisations had a devastating effect on the economy. More than one million young people from all classes were under arms. The productive capacity of the nation was curtailed, her resources diverted. Although Turkish agricultural and mining products fetched good prices abroad during the war, Turkey had to buy industrial goods at equally high cost. Thus, at the end of the war, Turkey economically was almost exhausted but still maintained a large army, felt isolated in the face of a Soviet threat.

When the Truman Doctrine and Marshal Plan had been announced, Turkey did not hesitate to apply for help to end her isolation and to redress her economy. This opened a new phase in relations with the West.

However, in 1951, when Turkey formally applied for NATO membership, Inonu, well-known for his calculating and cautious policies, was not in power. He had initiated the multi-party political system in 1946 and his People's Republican Party had lost the 1950 elections. The Democratic Party, usually considered as representing the new bourgeoisie, landowners and economic liberals scored an unexpected victory in the elections and won with an overwhelming majority. The new Government formed by Adnan Menderes applied for NATO membership. They were helped by the anti-Communist feeling sweeping the Country, a feeling which was evidenced by the participation of a Turkish expeditionary force of 5,000 men in the Korean war.

The Turkish leaders genuinely believed that if the post-war Soviet and Communist expansionism were not contained, Turkey would be the new victim. It was hoped that, even if the security guarantees by European powers would not be very reliable, an alliance could at least help Turkey to develop *her own defence forces*. Adhesion to NATO also suited the Government which came to power with promises of economic development and prosperity. Thus, besides the shield of security expected from NATO membership, expectations of external economic and military assistance played an important role in that crucial decision.

As I have tried to show, the Turkish membership in NATO has not come as a decision based on theoretical analysis or preferences; but on hard facts and at a particular stage of the European history. In

other words, it is a matter of national interest as perceived in the post-World War II period and a very important element of Turkey's links with Europe, links which are imposed by geo-strategic realities. Later developments in the East-West relations created a much more suitable atmosphere for accommodation of better relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries. I should add that, the repudiation of Stalinist policies in the Krushchev and post-Krushchev area and acceptance by the Soviets Turkey's membership in NATO as a fact which would not prevent the development of bilateral relations helped a lot. Several visits at the highest level have been exchanged between the two countries and a document on the principles governing relations between the two Countries has been signed in 1969.

#### SOME OBSERVATIONS ON NATO

NATO is a forum for cooperation, consultation, harmonisation and planning in common "defence matters" in the larger sense of the term. Thus it presupposes a reasonable degree of identity or at least, compatibility in national interests, besides a common threat perception. Unanimity for formal decisions is always required and consequently a continuous process of discussion and consultation for compromises acceptable for all is the normal procedure. All military planning and activities are under the control of the supreme political body, the NATO Council (or the Military Planning Committee, which means the "council less France" dealing only with questions of military organisation).

Since early 1960's, the main pillars of the basic policies of NATO are "defence and detente". In other words, the Organisation operates as a multi-national body for strengthening common defence through military preparedness, but at the same time serves as a forum for the coordination of the policies of detente and arms control. The increasing role of NATO as a forum of discussion and coordination for matters relating to detente and the East-West relations is particularly suited to Turkey which has traditionally maintained a high level of defence strength and adopted policy of non-provocation as pillars of her national security. In fact, in the detente era a great expansion of Turco-Soviet relations has been witnessed. This is particularly evident in economic and cultural areas. The same is true for relations with other socialist countries, among which Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have always prominently figured in Turkey's political and economic outlook.

There is no doubt that NATO has played a vital role in amalgamating national military efforts for the defence of Europe through an international system and in keeping an overall balance of forces with the socialist block. The distribution of defence responsibilities and areas within coordinated plans not only increased operational efficiency, but also the cost-effectiveness of military expenditures. NATO has been a major factor in preserving peace in Europe and an indispensable element of European stability in the post-war period, militarily and politically.

NATO's area responsibility in Europe covers only national territories in Northern Hemisphere and excludes overseas territories or dominions. Although the most important member of the Alliance is not a European power, NATO is considered to a great extent the defence wing of the European economic and political integration. It introduces controls and checks on the deployment and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and on their proliferation in Europe, for those members which take part in the integrated military organisation.

There are important elements in the Treaty which were most relevant in the immediate post-war period, but not fully operative today. One is the clause regarding the coordination of economic policies. Following the establishment of the OECD and the EEC, economic matters are practically taken out of NATO. However, in view of the close relationship between defence and economy, Turkey has successfully invoked this Article as a basis for economic assistance. Another clause which is loosely implemented in practice is the one on political consultations. Originally, political consultations were envisaged with a view to achieve some kind of concensus and coordination on the main international issues. However, it has soon been remarked that an elaborate political consultation process was not feasible as almost all countries desired to reserve their freedom of movement in political field. Today, the idea of political consultation as originally conceived is implemented on a West European scale by a political consultation mechanism within the EEC and to which Turkey is not a member. However, there is a permanent information process practically on all matters in NATO. This usually leads to the preparation of a concensus on major questions relating to East-West relations. Preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is a typical example. The ministerial level meetings also give an opportunity for open discussion on political issues without aiming at a concensus. This flexible arrangement is in tune with present world realities and moreover suits Turkey's position. Because, due to our

geographic location and different areas of interest, we have on many international and regional questions opinions different from almost all other members. To seek a consensus would not only be impracticable, but also dilute specific positions. Thus, for example, our well-known policies and positions on West Asian questions are reserved.

In the military field, *due to the geography and size*, the Turkish armed forces have *an autonomous position* within the common defence planning; all Turkish forces are under the command responsibility of the Turkish commanders. There are no foreign troops stationed in Turkey and all military installations are under the control of Turkish base commanders.

Turkey has also bilateral military arrangements with the United States (not bases in the proper sense of the word which involves the stationing of combat troops). By an agreement concluded in 1981, some of these installations have been transferred to Turkish Armed Forces and the use of the rest made conditional to the concept of "NATO mission."

The benefits of NATO membership to Turkey can be summarized as follows :

- Turkey benefits from deterrence value of the Alliance against aggression.
- Military readiness, access to military know-how and technology, force standards, training, infrastructure, communications are developed or obtained at a lesser cost.
- Military assistance to Turkey from bilateral or multilateral sources is facilitated, allowing thus, larger resource allocation for economic development. An additional benefit is the economic value of some military installations, with both civilian and military use such as the airfields, pipelines, communications installations etc.
- It provides a forum in easing tensions in Turkish-Greek relations.
- It provides a shield of security against regional conflicts.
- It helps the development of relations with individual Western countries and European organisations (political and economic).
- It restrains eventual external political and military pressures.

## TURKEY'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

- By its geographic position, Turkey checks and controls Warsaw Pact's military presence in the Mediterranean and West Asia.
- Turkey has the third largest armed forces in NATO, and her land forces in particular are a valuable asset for the Alliance.
- In wartime, Turkish air bases can provide forward operational facilities for allied air forces to interdict access to the Eastern Mediterranean and West Asia in general.

*To what Extent NATO Membership entails the Risk of Involvement in Armed Conflicts for Turkey*

As I have earlier said, NATO is based on a common threat perception by all its members. If a member country has a different threat perception there is no benefit to gain from membership. Secondly, any alliance worthy of the name, is based on the expectation that uniting forces will increase deterrence against aggression and provide protection for member countries which cannot cope individually with the threat. In case of an East-West conflict, a member can be involved in a war by merely belonging to an adverse military grouping. However in the case of Turkey, an additional factor is the security shield provided by the Alliance *also against local or regional conflicts*. No country can perpetrate an aggression against Turkey without taking account of a response from the Alliance. On the other hand, logic requires that Turkey is also committed to take part in the defence of any other member country, even if she herself is not attacked. As I have already said, if a common threat perception exists, mutual defence commitment is a logical consequence. In NATO these risks are minimized by defensive and democratic character of the Organisation. This subject, closely linked with the deterrent value of NATO, can be discussed from different angles and premises in the case of Turkey.

In recent years a subject debated was to what extent Turkey may get involved in a war because of a conflict in Central Europe. At least theoretically, such a risk cannot be ruled out. However, the probability of Turkish involvement cannot be viewed in isolation from a general confrontation in Europe and the role of NATO is important exactly in this interdependence which diminishes the risk of a conflict. Besides, the risk of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, into which Turkey could be drawn, is not less. A corollary of the same question is the following: in the case of a major conflagra-

tion in Central Europe is it militarily and strategically possible for Turkey to stay out? The military history provides ample evidence in that respect and contemporary conditions are not basically different from conditions which have prevailed in the past. There is no guarantee that Turkey can effectively preserve her neutrality by staying out of NATO, because this view is based on the very dubious assumption that the belligerents would not resort to offensive operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Even if war is limited to Central Europe, there is no guarantee that a neutral Turkey's territorial integrity and independence would be respected, at any stage of hostilities or at the end. My conclusion is that strengthening of NATO as a defence organisation which can take initiatives on matters of disarmament and peace suits best to common interest. One has to operate on the basis of existing realities, by trying to reduce the risks of confrontation, by solving political disputes, preserving the balance of forces with a view to their reduction at lowest levels and thus minimizing the risk of war. So far, despite past crises, NATO and the Warsaw pacts have managed to maintain peace and avoid the use of force. Politically, the situation in Central Europe is essentially stabilized and the two Alliances representing two different ideologies are factors of this stability.

To what extent Turkey's withdrawal from NATO is a probability and what form this withdrawal can take?

Turkey's membership in NATO is based, besides some constant factors like the geographical location and historical background, on rather complex political, military, economic and to some extent, ideological considerations. However, at least theoretically, probability of withdrawal cannot be discounted since, after all, conditions, threat perceptions and national interests are not immutable. In general terms, a withdrawal can be provoked only if NATO loses its relevance for the defence of Turkey. Under present conditions and may be for the foreseeable future this looks as improbable, so long as an international collective security system which would make the military pacts irrelevant is established or a new threat, not covered by NATO, has developed.

However, both elements are matters of perception by Governments in power (with usual reservations regarding the complexity of decision-making process in a democratic society). In summary, a change in

threat perception may happen as the result of a gradual process, of a new but critical development (such as a major dispute or conflict) or, of the change of Government by subversion. However, world political—military situation does not develop in that direction. The occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets and conflicts in West Asia are clear indications in that respect.

In the past, two members of NATO have withdrawn only from the military organisation of NATO; France and Greece. French withdrawal, rooted in the traditional French perceptions of status in Europe, is a particular case. The withdrawal of Greece has never been materialised fully, since Greece asked for a conditional withdrawal and has posed the problem as a "re-arrangement of her military ties with NATO, in accordance with her national defence policy." The basic concept of this policy (the concept of "the threat coming from within the Alliance, e.g. Turkey) having been found unacceptable by both Turkey and the Alliance, and the withdrawal aimed at political leverage, modalities had never been seriously negotiated. Turkey has clearly stated that such a "defence concept", contradictory to the spirit and the letter of the Treaty, nor negotiations based on that are acceptable. In view of the Turkish objection a Greek withdrawal from the military organisation could only be a full withdrawal or a partial withdrawal of acceptable parameters for Turkey. Neither from a legalistic point of view this concept is defendable since the main point of contention, Cyprus is not Greek territory, nor a territory covered by NATO Treaty. Its acceptance would have amounted to a repudiation of Cyprus Guarantee Agreements, to which also Greece is a signatory. Despite the rather tough statements, the new Greek Government has not pursued the matter further and prefers to keep the issue alive for internal political purposes and to get concessions from the USA for bilateral base negotiations and for increased assistance.

Another much discussed question is, to what extent the Turco-Greek dispute is harmful to NATO and for the defence of these Countries.

The question being closely related with the Turkish Greek disputes, it is necessary to look briefly into that matter.

#### TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS AND NATO

Two main questions between Turkey and Greece, namely, the Cyprus issue and the Greek claims of exclusive control over the Aegean

Sea are the main causes of the present uneasy relations between the two countries. It is interesting to note that both of these disputes arise from the tentatives of upsetting the balance established in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. There are also constant irritants such as the militarisation by Greece of some islands which should stay demilitarised in accordance with the international agreements, the anomaly of 10 miles of national airspace and six miles of territorial water limits, unilaterally declared by Greece, and the threat of increasing the territorial limits in complete disregard of the special character of the Aegean (in such a case, sea communications between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean would be at the mercy of Greek will). Greece asserts that the present state of relations cannot permit a defence cooperation between the two countries and the Papandreu Government has repudiated the provisional arrangements accepted by the previous Government on command responsibilities in the Aegean area. This position, which is not of critical importance in peacetime (question of command responsibilities in that area had never been settled) might be of serious consequences for both of them, especially when only one of them is involved in an armed conflict.

However, my personal opinion is that in practical terms, as long as Greece does not let her territory be used for aggressive operations against Turkey (in other terms, as long as she is in the Western camp) the Greek non-cooperation is not vitally harmful to the defence of Turkey. The reason simply is that, both Turkish and Greek armed forces are, according to NATO planning, assigned to defend their national territories (a situation different from Central Europe where the French US and UK forces are stationed), and the Turkish territory in Anatolia has enough depth for the reception of external reinforcements in an armed conflict. On the other hand, it is obvious that unless the Straits and the Turkish Thrace are well defended Greek territory will be exposed and vulnerable. During the Second World War, even a neutral Turkey was of great importance for military and civilian support to Greece. Consequently, non-cooperation with Turkey in matters of defence will create more problems for Greece than for Turkey, and hostile Greek attitude can cause a multitude of reactions. Membership in NATO is part of a more complex relationship and the indications are that Greece is not ready to risk this relationship as a matter of national interest.

## **Foreign Interference in Indian Ocean 1971 Repeat Performance—A Research**

**CAPTAIN RANJIT RAI IN**

THE recent announcement of USA having set up a massive rapid deployment force of the three Services with a view to deploy at short notice in the middle East, in the wake of the Iran-Iraq conflict smacks of what USA tried and failed to achieve in 1971. It is unfortunate that USA has not learnt its lesson from the 1971 experience and repeats its performance by super charging the Indian ocean with fleets abegging further escalation of super power rivalry and bunkmanship of war.

A fair amount has been written by politicians about the activities of the two super powers USA and USSR during the 1971 Indo-Pak war; a war which was fought for the liberation of Bangla Desh. It is a well publicised fact that both super powers rapidly deployed naval forces in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal.<sup>2</sup> This they did at the very time the Indian Navy was seriously engaged in blockades and naval actions of a magnitude not seen since World War II. A total of over 50 warships and Squadrons of aircraft were deployed by India and Pakistan. A truly Indian version of how the naval actions of the super powers were viewed is unlikely to be made public because of the nation's reticence to talk about defence matters, and more because of lack of public concern about the Navy. However, much light and candid revelations have been made by the publication of Kissinger's book-The White House years and Admiral Zumwalt's outspoken biography and reminiscences—"On Watch". Whilst the former book has been serialized in excerpts and conclusions questioned by political pundits, the later which is a superb exposé on happenings at about the sametime in Washington has been written with no holds barred. 'On Watch' has not been widely read except in naval circles. This article therefore attempts to present the facts as they have been reported and draws inferences with specific reference to the Enterprise incident—an incident which like the USS 'Pueblo' (captured by North Koreans) poses lessons to naval strategists and tacticians, and all professional politico-military men. The incident

may even be a harbinger of many such to come as it has ramifications in more than mere naval decisions.

The Enterprise incident also exploded in America in 1974 what came to be known as the 'Admirals spy ring'<sup>3</sup> in which, a lowly naval rating Yeoman Charles Ratford continuously leaked secret National Security Council papers on India from 19 Dec 71 to the Washington Post columnist Jack Anderson. Later Anderson was to win the Pulitzer Prize for this scoop. Ratford did this because of a friendship he had struck up with Anderson during the Journalist's earlier visit to India. Yeoman Ratford was then in the US Embassy in Delhi and had become fond of India and Indians. Having access to National Security Council papers in 1971 this lowly official was upset at Nixon's tilt towards Pakistan-hence his heart felt desire to vent and expose the high decisions of USA to the press, with a fervent hope that the American people would see the light and what came to be known as the American Tilt towards Pakistan. He also leaked the movements of USS Enterprise and task force 74 on 13 Dec 71, with a hope to warn India, which leak caught him out. Yeoman Ratford was found out, transferred in Jan 72 and Admiral Zumwalt's plea<sup>4</sup> to courtmartial the sailor was countermanded by President Nixon himself because he already had enough political problems, on his plate. All these events, and the fact that India as a nation acclaimed its own Navy having come of age in 1971 needs some putting of pen to paper on the events and actions of that war—it suffices in this article to discuss super power actions and the Enterprise incident and pose a few questions, to naval planners and foreign policy makers. Have we reduced the accent on our naval programmes ?

As early as November 1970, the youngish forty-nine year old Chief of Naval Operations of USA, Admiral Zumwalt and Mr. Henry Kissinger had made an assessment of possible Soviet naval threats to US Interests in the Indian Ocean<sup>5</sup> area and chalked out the deployment and development of friendly naval forces. The conclusions were the same as US sees them today in trouble riddled Iraq, Iran and Soviet controlled Afghanistan vis-a-vis the Indian Ocean, an area of 28 million square miles. It has been proved that 24 out of 48 raw materials of strategic importance to the West originate from countries bordering Indian Ocean. These include oil, copper, manganese, cotton, jute, sugar and rubber—the most important being oil. The Western world and its ally Japan, are dependent on the Gulf area for its oil and it is obvious that any nation with the power to interfere with commercial shipping in the Indian Ocean will be in a position to seriously disrupt the economies of a great many nations, big and small. The seizure, closure or denial of

maritime access points in this area, would drastically effect trading pattern. Today one wonders if Russia is attempting to gain the shores and USA offering graduated responses at sea.

In 1971, though the Indo-Pak war was fought predominantly on land, the Naval actions can be briefly summed up by recollecting that the Western Fleet of the IN consisting of the cruiser Mysore, a handful of frigates and the missile boats went in for daring attacks off Karachi, sank two warships, damaged others and successfully blockaded West Pakistan. A few IN submarines operated in the Arabian Sea, but under strict recognition responsibilities which made it impossible to seek spoils. In the east, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, a handful of frigates and submarines successfully patrolled the Bay of Bengal, attacked ports, sank PNS Ghazi and helped rout the Pak army with a final surrender. As Indian Express put it on 12 Dec<sup>6</sup>—"The Indian Navy holds sway over the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Pakistan has confirmed that it is the Indian Navy which rules the waves off its coast. In its merchant broadcast, it has warned all merchant shipping that they would approach Karachi at their own risk".

The unaggressive and unlucky Pakistan Navy on its part kept inshore, was surprised by daring Indian attacks off Karachi, and their submarine Ghazi fell victim early. However, a submarine sank INS Khukri<sup>6</sup> killing 18 officers and 176 sailors off Diu and an Alize aircraft went down, in the Arabian Sea<sup>7</sup>. In such a ship charged area, it is interesting to see how super powers poured in their fleets and finally restrained themselves under advice of their professional naval leaders, because an Indian Fleet in being with teeth bared was in its finest hours.

Admiral Zumwalt and Mr. Kissinger have both revealed that the Washington Special action group (WSAG) met on 17 Aug, 8 Sep, 7 Oct, 22 and 2 Nov and 2, 4, 6 and 8 Dec<sup>2</sup>—a schedule that reflects the Administration's concern. Unfortunately the July visit to China by Kissinger arranged by Yahya Khan made Nixon tilt to Pakistan and all his professional advisers were helpless—hence the naval actions in the Indian Ocean as indeed other actions were taken at the highest level in USA without recourse to consultation by naval leaderships.<sup>2&8</sup> This complicated the naval situation in the Indian Ocean.

A large British Navy task group including two carriers were on their way home in Dec 71—the last of the British permanent Fleet in the East. Being present, their planes began to fly sorties in an attempt to

discreetly monitor what was going on, and it is lucky they kept away from the fray. Two Russian destroyers, a submarine and a minesweeper entered the Malacca Straits as relief for Russian ships on station in the Indian Ocean.<sup>2</sup> The force was later used to augment minesweeping operation in Bangla Desh<sup>5</sup>. On about 7 Dec Japan reported a Russian missile equipped cruiser and escorts heading for the Singapore straits. The Americans were non-plussed at what to do—a situation which after Vietnam and now after Afghanistan, has risen more than once. The National Security Council without recourse to the CNO, decided that the 7th Fleet should detach by Presidential order Task Group 74 for the Indian Scene. This group comprising of USS Enterprise, a carrier with 100 aircraft, destroyers Parsons and Decatur—both fitted with Tarter surface to Air missiles (SAM) and USS Tripoli—a landing ship with marines embarked, was ordered to proceed off Singapore on 10 Dec. Surprisingly Admiral Zumwalt who was junior in Command and Control to the Joint Chief of Staff then Admiral Tom Moorer, was unaware of this movement. On learning about it, he questioned the mission as he did not wish to send them, 'in harm's way, a term the US Navy learnt after Pearl Harbour. It is interesting for naval observers to note the ships were off Singapore for 2 days till 12 Dec and only then ordered into the Indian Ocean. This order was rescinded in an hour and the group re-ordered to traverse the straits by daylight so that world could see and report the act publicly.

Thus by 14 Dec, the Americans in TG 74 a sizeable naval force were headed for the East Bengal coast; the Russian ships were off Ceylon and the British transiting the Indian Ocean. Some 15 foreign men of war including two submarines were milling around in an area where the IN was engaged in battle. One shudders to think of a night confrontation between IN submarines and warships and these foreign men of war because in a war situation of fog with blockade orders, all is possible. Unconfirmed reports indicate foreign nuclear submarines were around, but that secretive type of ship could well be there and added to the confusion. Luckily for all, Mrs. Gandhi declared a ceasefire on 16 Dec 71 and no IN/foreign skirmish took place, except a few neutral merchant ships suffered damage in Pakistan ports.

Mr. Kissinger in his book takes credit for the ceasefire by saying that at 3 AM on 14 Dec, Mr. Vorostonov, the USSR Ambassador in Washington, handed Gen Al Haig a nine page hand-written memo indicating Indian Leadership's firm assurance that India had no plans for seizing West Pakistan territory.<sup>9</sup> Again as Kissinger puts it the ceasefire was a reluctant decision by India resulting from Soviet pres-

sure, which in turn, grew out of American insistence, including the Fleet movement and the willingness to risk the summit. One wonders whether it was true, or was it an independent decision by India after liberating East Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that after the ceasefire, the US and Russian ships turned South to Ceylon and shadowed each other for days in a similar manner established in the Mediterranean, and now off the straits of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq war.

The story then is as these foreign writers have revealed, and the naval gestures by super powers may have been contributory to the end of the war. Yet till the Lady Mrs. Gandhi's private papers are made public, no one will know for sure. Now that she is back in power and 10 years have elapsed, some pen to papers may find answers to many questions the world still seeks an answer for, about 1971 as we enter another similar situation this time caused by the Iranian and Afghanistan happenings and the Iran-Iraq war.

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# **The Future of Urban Insurgency and Terrorism**

**MAJ S K MAHAJAN**

## **INTRODUCTION**

A tank is always a tank but guerilla wars differ greatly from one another. Throughout history unconventional warfare has been affected far more by indigenous political, social, cultural and economic factors and of course by geography than conventional warfare.

The term "guerilla" was originally used to describe military operations carried out by irregulars against the rear of an enemy army or by local inhabitants against an occupying force. More recently it has been applied to all kinds of revolutionary wars and wars of national liberation, insurrections, peasant wars and terrorist acts such as hijacking airplanes or kidnappings.

## **HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

**I**N the late 1960s rural guerillaism gave way to Urban terrorism in many parts of the world. Major exceptions were Vietnam (where the war had, however, proceeded far beyond the guerilla stage), the Portuguese colonies and some minor theatres of war such as Burma, Thailand, the Philippines and Eritrea. Elsewhere the hijacking of airplanes, bank-raids and the kidnapping of diplomats and other public figures rather than the ambush in some remote jungle village became the symbol of armed struggle. Skyjacking had taken place since the early 1930s with an average of about 2-3 cases annually, most of them not even political in character.

There was a wave of kidnappings and political assassinations in Guatemala, Brazil, Turkey, Sudan and after 1972 in Argentina. Hijacking and kidnapping were also the favourite ploys of the Palestinian organisations and of some of the European terrorist groups.

To launch a rural guerilla war at least a small group of people were needed whereas any single madman or criminal could put a time bomb on a plane or at a vulnerable point or place in a city.

### URBAN TERRORISM

The shift from rural guerilla warfare to operations in the cities was by no means limited to Latin America. It occurred in Palestine during the last years of the British Mandate. It also took place in Cyprus, Aden and Ireland.

In some instances only sporadic actions by very small groups were involved; elsewhere the struggle lasted for years and was well organized. "Urban guerilla" factions were plagued by internal division not less than their precursors in the countryside. Ulster and Spain provided typical examples where the IRA split into two factions and the Basque nationalist movement split into the ETA VI and ETA V.

### THE URBAN GUERRILLA

The term "Urban guerilla" poses something of a problem for the student of guerilla warfare. It is a misnomer and its widespread use is to be regretted. Insurrections and revolts have occurred in towns and so of course have acts of terror but urban guerilla warfare only on the rarest of occasions. The essence of guerilla warfare lies in the fact that the guerilla can hide in the countryside and this, quite self evidently is impossible to do in a city. The distinction is of more than economic importance. There have been guerrilla units of ten thousand men and women but an urban terrorist unit seldom if ever, comprises more than a few people and urban terrorist "movement" rarely consist of more than a few hundred members.

What is now commonly called "urban guerilla" warfare is of course, terrorism in a new garb. It is advocated and practised as an alternative to or in conjunction with guerilla warfare. The political importance of urban terror has frequently been overrated, perhaps in view of its highly melodramatic character and the fact that unlike guerilla operations urban terror usually has many spectators. The attitude of the media towards the "urban guerilla" reminds one of TE Lawrence's description of his Arab levies, "they thought weapons destructive in proportion to their noise."

### THE PROBLEM OF STREET FIGHTING

The lessons of the Russian revolution of 1905 showed that Moscow had proved that a well defended line of houses was a position of strength. This had some important implications in relation to the Irish struggle. Ireland was no ideal guerilla country in the traditional sense; it had no mountain passes or glens. But a city is a huge mass of glens formed by streets and lanes. Every difficulty that exists for the operations of regular troops in mountains is multiplied a hundred fold in a city. Moreover the administrative difficulties which are likely to be insuperable to an irregular or popular force taking to the mountains is solved for them by the sympathisers of the populace when they take to the streets. These observations are based in fact on the old fallacies of 19th century barricade fighting. Street fighting was admittedly difficult for regular troops especially if they are untrained for this purpose and if the population was hostile. But a frontal collision constituted the very antithesis of guerilla warfare. An insurgency such as this would either lead within a few hours victory or more likely to defeat as it did in Dublin in 1916. A later generation of Irish insurgents, having digested the lesson did not opt for street fighting.

### PLANNING OF TERRORISM

Planning of terrorism resembles the working of a multi-national corporation. An operation would be planned in West Germany by Palestine Arabs, executed in Israel by terrorists recruited in Japan with weapons acquired in Italy but manufactured in Russia, supplied by an Algerian diplomat and financed with Libyan money. With the improvement and greater accessibility of modern technology the potential for destruction for small groups of people becomes much larger. As technical progress continues societies become more vulnerable to destruction. A single individual can spread alarm and confusion even by means of a single telephone call about a bomb that has been allegedly placed in some vital place. This new power acquired by a few has, however, its limits, it can paralyse the state apparatus but it cannot take cover.

### CONDITIONS SUITABLE FOR URBAN TERRORISM

Urban terrorism is most effective where terrorists operate as the military wing of a political movement rather than on their own initiative. But in this case there are always the seeds of conflict between the military and the political leadership of the movement.

In Urban terrorism it is action that counts not consistent strategy or a clear political aim. It is a Herculean task to disengage its rational and irrational components.

For any Urban insurgency to succeed the basic requirement is popular support of the population amounting to almost eighty percent. If this condition prevails then Urban guerillas will succeed even if the security forces have an overall superiority of 1000 to one. Of great importance is the support of the clergy with regard to communication with the masses.

#### TRAINING

The Urban guerilla has to have the following four qualities if he is to be potent :—

- (a) Highly skilled in marksmanship.
- (b) Possess high degree of initiative.
- (c) Have unlimited patience.
- (d) Fortitude in adversity.
- (e) Knowledge of sabotage.
- (f) Familiar with alleys, cellars, sewers and utility tunnels of his town.
- (g) Use of small arms and close quarter battle techniques.

*Basic Unit.* The basic unit is the firing group comprising 4-5 individuals. Two firing groups comprise the firing team.

*Mechanization.* Mechanization plays a vital role in the logistic set up of the Urban terrorists.

*Basic Tactics.* Basic tactics are hit and run and attack from all directions in an endless series of unforeseeable operations. In this manner they prevent the security forces from concentrating their forces. The inherent advantages the Urban terrorists have is surprise in attack, better knowledge of terrain, greater mobility and speed and a better information network. They further avoid combat and decisive battle. Bank raids are the most popular form of action, ambushes, occupation of schools, factories and radio stations, defending popular demonstrations, liberate prisoners, seize weapons from army barracks, execution of agents of the government, kidnapping policemen, sabotage of transport, cutting of oil pipelines, depletion of fuel stocks and spreading baseless rumours is part of their psychological warfare.

*Aim.* The aim of the Urban terrorists is to create chaos and confusion thereby making elections appear as a mere farce and to thoroughly discredit the ruling political parties. Urban terrorists also visualise that the future society should be built not by longwinded speakers and signatones of resolutions but by those steeled in the struggle of an armed alliance of workers, peasants and students.

#### STAGE OF URBAN TERRORISM

Urban terrorism can generally be divided into three phases.

##### PHASE 1.

- (a) Dissemination of an idea of an armed struggle.
- (b) Collection of arms and ammunition,
- (c) Organisation of small units comprising 3 or 5 to 10 members.

##### PHASE 2.

- (a) Actions of a minority to turn into a mass struggle.
- (b) Formation of militia cells with the help of the masses especially in areas where the security force are weak or no longer able to concentrate their forces.

PHASE 3. Mass action in the form of street demonstrations strikes and barricades to support the terror of the guerilla units.

#### ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF URBAN TERRORISM OVER CONVENTIONAL RURAL GUERILLAISM

There are some striking advantages Urban terrorism has over rural guerillaism. These are discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

##### ADVANTAGES

*Propaganda.* As the level of education is much more than in rural areas there is greater opportunity to carry on their propaganda and recruiting. Propaganda can be carried out by scrawling of anti-military slogans on walls. Distribution of pamphlets and posters and holding of secret meetings.

*Intelligence Collection.* More intelligence can be gathered as they are in the heart of a communication centre which ordinarily houses the headquarters of large government forces.

*Sabotage.* Communication centres are more vulnerable to damage. Sabotage of a marshalling yard has more long term effects than the blowing up of a culvert or a single line in a rural area.

*Assassinations.* Liquidation of key government agents is easier.

*Publicity.* Publicity is the vital weapon and what counts beyond all else in the final analysis is to keep the issue alive. Any outrage committed in an Urban area immediately makes headlines. The media makes a hue and cry about it. Such outrages such as the killing of members of the Israeli Olympic team in Munich in 1972, the hijacking of airplanes, kidnappings, despatch of letter bombs and other gambits such as attacks on foreign ambassadors in Khartoum were far better means than the traditional ones of guerilla warfare for furthering the cause.

*Modern Weaponry.* The development of modern weapons favour the guerilla more than those operating against them. These weapons can be readily concealed and lend themselves to the first principles of guerilla warfare-rapid concentration and equally rapid dispersion.

*Quick Getaway.* Mao Tse-Tung once said that a guerilla is like fish in water. Water is the populace. In Urban areas populace is in abundance. Hence the Urban guerilla is in his element amongst the masses wherein he can make a quick elusive getaway and disappear.

*Access to Supplies.* Easy access to arms, ammunition, food and rations, pharmacies with medicines and workshops for repairs and manufacture of bombs etc.

*Cover.* Slums of big cities and upper class residential areas provide better cover for operations than the jungles and mountain.

There is more publicity in one day than rural ones in an entire year—as far as the media is concerned their exploits are far more newsworthy.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- (a) To reduce risk of discovery they have to operate in small groups.

- (b) The political impact of a small anonymous group is quite insignificant.
- (c) Urban terrorists are not serious contenders for power.
- (d) Once the foreign power has withdrawn they generally drop out of the picture since they are so few in number and lack political organisation or cohesion.
- (e) Assembly of a large body of men and their re-disposal after a strike in force is well nigh impossible under the eyes of a vigilant police force.
- (f) Risk of recognition even in a crowd by informers requires a much more sophisticated security system than in the case of rural guerillas.
- (g) Operations have to be restricted to small numbers.
- (h) Risk of open street fights has to be avoided at all costs.
- (j) Repetition of the same form of terrorist activity will diminish the interest of the media and such acts will no longer command headlines.
- (k) The terrorists have to think of new, sensational and even more bizarre exploits.
- (l) After a tip off, escape is more difficult than in rugged terrain.
- (m) A single informer could lead to the whole group, to its arsenal and eventually to its headquarters.

#### INSIGHTS OF SOME URBAN INSURGENCIES THE WORLD OVER

##### POLAND

It was proved by the Police Home army that a great city can provide hidden paths through alleys and cellars, attics and roof tops, just as inaccessible to strangers as a hidden jungle trail. The labyrinthine sewer system of Warsaw provided a highly effective system of communications.

The ruins of bombed houses provide innumerable half buried cellars to serve as refuges and bases. Such a city was inaccessible to tanks and provided ideal hideout for guerillas armed with snipers' guns and grenades.

**LATIN AMERICA**

In early 1960s guerilla operations mainly concentrated in the countryside but with the failure to establish secure rural bases (Argentina and Brazil in 1964, Peru and Venezuela in 1965, Bolivia in 1967) Urban terrorism became the fashion, principally in Uruguay.

**IRELAND**

The IRA had international connections. Money was given by well wishers in USA. Money and arms were supplied by Libya's Colonel Gaddafi, a protector of terrorists from Northern Ireland, to the Philippines and from Eastern Europe. The IRA was more successful than other Urban terrorist groups because it had a fringe, albeit small, of supporters, it was not accidental that this base was sectarian—religious rather than "revolutionary" in make up.

**QUEBEC**

The FLQ lacked a sanctuary and a clear programme. The Canadian political culture was considerably less murderous than in Ireland. Therefore its movement was much more shortlived.

**USA AND WEST GERMANY**

The Urban insurrections there have had no major political impact even though they greatly preoccupied journalists, psychologists, lawyers, judges and law enforcement officers.

**IRAN**

The Iranian Urban guerillas have been financed for years by Iraq.

**CUBA**

Cuba Urban terrorists have contributed to various Latin American terrorists groups even though in principle it favoured rural guerillaism.

**SOVIET RUSSIA**

The attitude of Soviet Russia have been one of ambivalence-on the one hand they would welcome and support movements likely to cause disruption in the West, on the other they could not fail to realise that small ineffectual factions such as Beadu-Meinhof would bring a political

backlash that would be directed not only against members of that specific group but against communists in general.

#### PALESTINE

The Palestine PFLP is engaged in combined operations with the Japanese URA against Israel.

#### BASQUE ETA

With its Bank robberies, holdups, bombings and kidnappings it was a little more effective because like the IRA and unlike the Latin American terrorists it had its base in a national minority.

#### THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE URBAN GUERILLAS

The starting point for an "Urban guerilla" doctrine was the undisputed fact that the rural guerilla movements had been unsuccessful on the whole. They pointed to basic social and demographic facts which their predecessors ignored to their detriment. The idea of the countryside "encircling" the cities seemed out dated, due to constant inflow of poor, unskilled jobless people to the towns. "Urban guerilla" strategy is based on the recognition of the fact that the political, military and economic centre of power lies in the cities and should be attacked there and not from the periphery.

In highly urbanized countries revolutionary battles are to be waged in the Urban areas for the revolutionary potential is where the population is".

The clandestine nature of Urban terrorist operations make it difficult to establish how many members the terrorist group numbered, in whose name they were operating or speaking, whether their motive was politically motivated or whether the love of excitement of money was the driving force and to what extent the whole phenomenon belonged to the realm of psychodrama rather than politics.

#### FUTURE OF URBAN TERRORISM—AN ASSESSMENT

One of the traditional weaknesses of rural guerilla warfare is that peasants cannot easily be turned into professional revolutionaries willing to give up their ties and roots-

Although guerilla ideologists have claimed since time immemorial that rugged forest country is the most favourable for guerillas but if the

country is too rugged or the jungle too thick the guerillas would be hard put to it to procure supplies. If they retreated into remote unpopulated areas they were not easily accessible, they would be secure but ineffectual as Guevara had noted. If they opposed elections (as in Venezuela) they would damage their image as staunch fighters for democracy. If, on the contrary they contested elections they would be defeated as in Uruguay. If they waged guerilla warfare in small elitist conspiratorial groups consisting primarily of students (or recent graduates) they would be reasonably safe from detection, but the moment they tried to broaden their urban base and mobilize the masses they would expose themselves to infiltration by enemy agents.

It is the Urban slum dwellers and landless peasants which form the revolutionary reservoir for Urban guerillaism. In India slum dwellers seem to be ever on the increase in the major towns and cities. Landless peasants are perpetually migrating to towns. The government should take steps to remedy the situation before it becomes a problem of huge proportions. The Naxalite movement is still fresh in our memory.

A look at the strengths of the terrorist groups all over the world indicates that terrorist groups have had meagre numbers. Despite this, the media has always referred to such groups as an Army. It is interesting to note the strengths of these groups given below.

(a) Latin American Terrorists	— few dozens.
(b) Japanese URA	— max 300.
(c) FLO	— 150
(d) TPLA	— less than 100
(e) British "Angry Brigade"	— 8.
(f) Symbionese Liberation Army	— 10.
(g) Provisional IRA	— 500-600.
(h) Official IRA	— 400.

It goes without saying that an Urban uprising that does not enjoy outside support will fail against determined opposition. But this does not preclude the possibility of successful guerilla operations of other kinds in built up areas.

Perhaps one reason for dismissing the possibility of Urban guerilla operations is that the very word "guerilla" is generally associated with the wilderness, the mountains of Northern Spain, the jungles of South

East Asia, the Plains of China or the deserts of Arabia where bands can hide in caves, dense forests or simply in the vast desert spaces.

To ignore the possibility of future guerilla operations in thickly populated areas and to fail to provide adequate training and preparation to counteract it would seem to be almost as short sighted as Hitler's dismissal of the guerilla problem in Russia with the order to liquidate them ruthlessly in combat or while trying to escape".

As far as the possibility of Urban terrorism is concerned in our country there is every chance of terrorist groups committing outrages in our large Urban towns. These groups are likely to be the educated unemployed frustrated youth of our country once they get disillusioned with our politicians and state of affairs. As far as insurgencies in the North Eastern regions of our country are concerned terrorism will be resorted to in the capital cities but may not achieve political aims because the Urban towns in that region are yet underdeveloped and their population is thin. Nevertheless it will be foolhardy on the part of the government to disregard the spectre of future Urban terrorist movements in India.

## Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and Its International Repurcussions

CAPTAIN R D SINGH, 4 HORSE

"Martyrdom is the key"

—Arafat

"The PLO will not stay"

—Begin

### BACKGROUND

ISRAEL came into being as a follow up of the Balfour Declaration on 14 May 1948 in the midst of Arab hatred. Ever since its inception, it has been in a state of war. Israelis fought with Egypt on Suez in 1956—



occupied Sinai and West Bank in the Six Day War of 1967—was again at war with Egypt and Jordan in 1973-entered Southern Lebanon in

1978—annexed the Golan Heights in 1981 and the same year bombarded the Iraqi Thermal Reactor. Earlier in 1978, it thought of making peace and signed a peace treaty with Egypt known as Camp David Agreement. The main features of this treaty were :—

- (a) Israel to withdraw from Sinai.
- (b) A self-governing authority to be elected by the inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza for an interim period of 5 years for the resolution of Palestinian problem.
- (c) After the establishment of self governing authority, negotiations to be conducted to decide the final status of West Bank and Gaza. Also, a peace treaty to be concluded between Israel and Jordan.

The final withdrawal of Israelis from Sinai was completed on 25 Jun. There has been no progress on the other points because of changing political situation in the Middle East and the unfortunate death of Anwar Sadat.

Saudi Arabia came out with their own 8 Point Peace Plan when the Camp David Agreement was meeting with a dead end. The Saudi's Eight points were :—

- (a) Commitment to the establishment of an Independent Palestinian State.
- (b) Withdrawal by Israel to the pre June 1967 borders.
- (c) Recognition of the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes.
- (d) Removal of Jewish settlements in post 67 occupied areas.
- (e) Restoration of the original status of Jerusalem.
- (f) Return of Golan heights to Syria.
- (g) Renunciation of force to solve territorial disputes.
- (h) Recognition of the right of all states of the region to live in peace.

The above peace plan was also rejected by Israel.

#### PLO

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was formed in 1964 during the first Arab Summit Meeting. So far it has been recognised by 117 countries as a representative of Palestinian people. It has

got its offices in 90 countries and the UN has accorded it the status of an Observer.

The PLOs, numbering approximately 13000, had a state within a state in Jordan till 1970. They were thrown out of that country after 'Black September' and the PLO guerrillas came to Lebanon and had a state within a state there till recently when they were evacuated to various countries after the Israeli seizure of West Beirut.

The Palestinians—the people who were displaced from Palestine when Israel was created—numbering about 7 millions are scattered all over the Arab world as under :—

<i>Country</i>	<i>Population of Palestinian</i>
(a) Lebanon	—3,47,100
(b) Israel	—6,53,000
(c) West Bank	—7,25,000
(d) Gaza Strip	—4,50,000
(e) Egypt	— 48,500
(f) Syria	—2,15,500
(g) Jordan	—11,60,800
(h) Iraq	— 20,000
(i) Qatar	— 22,500
(j) UAE	— 34,700
(k) Kuwait	—2,78,000
(l) Saudi Arabia	—1,27,000
(m) Oman	— 48,200

Yasser Arafat, born in 1929 in Jerusalem, an engineer by profession, is the forceful Chairman of PLO since 1968. He is committed to his homeless people and dedicated to the cause of his Organisation. Regarding the aims and aspirations of PLOs, Arafat says "Nobody can destroy the Peoples' National Movement after a struggle that has gone on for 18 years. We have been fighting for the right to live, for self determination, for a future for our children".

The PLO guerrillas through their terrorist activities, have been a thorn for the Israelis. Between the two, there have been actions and opposite reactions—though not equal. Israel considers PLO a threat to its security. This fact is important while analysing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

### THE INVASION

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was, for the first time a proper invasion and not a police type action as it has indulged into earlier. The following could be the reasons for the invasion :—

- (a) The presence of PLOs in Southern Lebanon became a major worry to Israel because of their raids and firing of long range weapons into North Israel.
- (b) The UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) and Haddad's land ceased to prevent PLO terrorist activities into Israel.
- (c) Israel wanted to create a buffer of about 25 to 40 kms in Southern Lebanon to secure its Northern borders.
- (d) It wanted to eliminate the PLO bases in Lebanon.
- (e) Effect Syrians out of Lebanon and uproot the SAM missiles from the Bekaa valley.
- (f) Have government of its own choice in Lebanon.
- (g) The shooting of Israeli Ambassador to England, Mr Argov could have added fuel into fire.

*Force Level* Israel's formidable fighting force consisted of the following :—

- (a) ARMY
  - (i) Tanks —3500 (M-48, M-60)
  - (ii) APCs —4000 (M-113)
  - (iii) Arty Guns —1200 (175 mm Sp guns and 175 mm & 203 mm Sp How)
- (b) AIR FORCE
  - (i) Combat Aircrafts —605 (F-15, F-16, F-4E & A-4 Sky Hawks)
  - (ii) Anti Aircraft Missiles —Exact figures not known.

85% of the above equipment comes from United States. Israel gets a military aid from United States alone to the tune of \$ 1.5 billion a year which is more than one fourth of our complete Defence Budget.

On the other side, there were 30,000 Syrians, known as Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) who had come to Lebanon in 1976 during the civil war to restore peace. And there were about 11,000 PLO guerrillas. The weapons used by them were mostly hand carried along with few artillery pieces.



**“OP PEACE IN GALILEE”**

On 06 Jun, Israel with 2000 tanks and Armd cars, behind a screen of bombing jets and shooting gunboats, launched a three pronged massive attack on Southern Lebanon under the code name “OP Peace in Galilee”. The invasion was on a frontage of 53 kms from port city Tyre to Mt Herman. There was hardly any resistance and within 48 h Israeli troops were through 40 kms of Southern Lebanon. By 09 Jun Israelis

and Syrians were racing for the Demascus-Beirut Highway which had a strategic importance as far as Beirut was concerned. The Israeli strategy appeared to be a pincer movement—one thrust from South to North and another from East to West. There was heavy fighting between the two sides in the *Bekaa* valley. Very soon, the Israeli troops had cut off the Highway and Arafat along with his 7000 guerillas and 500,000 civilian population was trapped in West Beirut. They first entered the Christian dominated East Beirut from where they reconnoitred the West Beirut—the muslim populated area.

#### SEIZURE OF WEST BEIRUT

The Israelis captured the Beirut International Air Port and closed all the entry/exit routes to West Beirut. By 21 July, the electricity was cut, water and food supply stopped, and the Israelis imposed a 'Famine Blockade' on West Beirut with a view to :—

- (a) Pressurise the PLOs into surrender.
- (b) Cause tension among civilian population so that they are antagonised against the PLOs.

Initially, the Israeli targets in the city were PLO strong holds and Arafat's HQ at Fakhni but later the Israeli bombardment was all over the place. The houses were destroyed and even hospitals were not spared. Hundred of civilians were killed and people were burnt by the cluster bombs (made of phosphorous) which Israel used against Geneva Convention. A Time correspondent wrote of what he saw in West Beirut—"The faces were white, the voices were hushed. You could smell the fear, the sweat, the corodite". A Lebanese woman whose house was shattered, husband killed, children burnt, spoke out in agony :—

"My daughter, my husband blown up, dead. Thirty years of work wiped out. But God help me. They will pay for it. They took Palestine and now they have taken Lebanon. Where is there any justice ?"

At the end of 70 days seizure of West Beirut, the following casualties were reported :

(a) Killed	— 17,000
(b) Wounded	— 30,000
(c) Made homeless	— 3,00,000

**EVALUATION OF PLO**

While the West Beirut was being massacred, Philip Habib, the US Special Envoy, was trying to negotiate between Arafat and Begin to finalise the PLOs evacuation plan. The Israeli demands were :—

- (a) Their captured pilot should be returned.
- (b) Bodies of 9 Israelis killed to be returned by the PLO.
- (c) A list of all PLO guerrillas in Lebanon be given.

The demands were not acceptable to Arafat and his own demand was that he should be permitted to leave behind his 1000 guerrillas along with his office.

Philip Habib carried on with his negotiations while the cease fires were being made and broken off and on. The diplomacy ultimately won and PLOs evacuation plan was finalised. Before the PLOs were evacuated, the following international force arrived in West Beirut to ensure smooth evacuation :—

(a) French	— 850 tps.
(b) Italian	— 530 tps.
(c) US Marines	— 800 tps.

The PLOs were evacuated by land and sea to various countries as under :—

- (a) 2,900 PLO guerrillas to Syria.
- (b) 320 to Jordan.
- (c) 300 to Sudan.
- (d) 1000 to Tunisia.
- (e) 1000 to North Yemen.
- (f) 1000 to South Yemen.
- (g) 300 to Algeria.
- (h) 80 to Iraq.
- (i) 3500 Palestinians under Syrian command to Syria.
- (j) 1500 Syrians to the Bekaa valley.
- (k) 150 to Cyprus.

The parting of the PLOs was very touching. Hundreds of guerrillas left behind their families for destinations unknown. However

they maintained a sense of an honourable retreat and left in the midst of flags flying and cannons firing. When a batch of evacuated PLOs reached Syrian Port City, they were welcomed by the cries of "Palestine"—"Victory". A PLO child asked his father—"Why is every body shouting?" The father said that they are celebrating the PLO victory. "If they are celebrating the victory, why is every body going away?" To this there was no answer. And there would be no answer till the PLOs find a home.

#### INTERNATIONAL REPURCUSSIONS

The following could be the international repurcuussions of the Israeli invasion :

- (a) The cause of the PLOs has won a world wide recognition.
- (b) The PLOs have got sympathy from all over the world.
- (c) Egypt was the only Arab country which had its Ambassador in Israel and now it has withdrawn him. It is a major development.

The Israeli gains in this Invasion have been :

- (a) Their security has been strengthened to some extent.
- (b) They have dispersed the PLOs and hence disorganised them.
- (c) Syrians will be made to leave Lebanon and Russian 5 AM missiles will be removed from Bekaa valley.

However, though Israel has won a military victory, it has suffered economically and got a set-back in its credibility not only in Arab countries, USSR and India but also among its own people. When Israel invaded Lebanon people thought that "in the name of peace it has waged a war, in the name of trust it has played a deception upon its friends, in the name of religion it has sought territorial gains". It will be interesting to know the results of an Opinion Poll carried out by News Week after the Israeli invasion :—

#### NEWS WEEK OPINION POLL

- (a) Compared to a year ago, would you say you are more sympathetic or less sympathetic to the Israeli position ?

	Aug 82	Jul 81	Feb 78
More	32%	29%	27%
Less	41%	37%	34%
Same	15%	18%	19%
Don't know	12%	10%	20%

(b) Compared to a year ago, would you say you are more sympathetic or less sympathetic to the palestinian position

	Aug 82	Jul 82
More	28%	22%
Less	40%	36%
Same	18%	21%
Don't know	14%	21%

(c) The Israelis sent their military forces into Lebanon. Do you approve or disapprove of this action ?

Approve	30%
Disapprove	60%
Don't know	10%

(d) The Israelis have given the following reasons for sending troops into Lebanon :—

- To stop the rocket attacks on Israeli settlements.
- To remove 'PLO' military forces from Lebanon.

Do you think the Israelis were justified in sending troops into Lebanon for these reasons or not ?

Justified	41%
Not justified	47%
Don't know	12%

The PLOs gain has been the world sympathy and their loss is their backbone broken.

#### LESSONS OF LEBANON

Though it is too early to draw lessons from Israeli invasion of Lebanon yet the following could be noted :—

- (a) During this invasion, Syrians have been humbled, PLOs dispersed, Lebanon discredited.
- (b) The fallacy of Arab radicalism has been exposed. When PLOs were in dire need of help, not a single Arab country came to their rescue physically. On the day of Id, Arafat told the Arab nations—" I don't want your prayers. I want your swords. Not a single sword came forward".
- (c) Arab nations lack unity and do not want to face Israel or the US physically on the ground.

(d) *Might is right.* The invasion has demonstrated that if you have super power by your side, you can get away with anything. Hence, Israeli's audacity unlimited.

#### US LATEST PEACE PLAN FOR MIDDLE EAST

No area in the World is more torn by strife, more poisoned with age old hatred, more strewn with the seeds of super-power rivalry than the Middle East. Hence, it is the ripe ground for diplomacy. USA has got a critical role to play in the Middle-East. On the one hand it is committed to the support of Israel's security and on the other hand it has to develop its relations with the moderate Arab countries to keep away the Soviet influence. Reasons for its support to Israel are :—

- (a) A very strong Jewish lobby of 6.1 million people (Israeli population is only 4.3 million) in USA who not only have economic hold in the country but also count for votes. Hence no US President can afford to ignore them.
- (b) The strategic importance of Israel in the Middle East for USA as it offers her a military base.
- (c) Israel can protect oil interests of USA in the Middle East.

After the PLOs were evacuated the United States, turned an advocate from a mediator and came out with their latest Peace Plan for the Middle East. The main features of the Peace Plan are :

- (a) Palestinian 'Self Government' in association with Jordan in West Bank and Gaza Strip.
- (b) Israel to hold further Jewish settlements in the occupied areas.
- (c) Arab states to recognize Israel's explicit right to exist.

*Reaction to US Peace Plan.* Israel denounced the Plan outright and PM Begin wrote to Ronald Reagan—"It was the saddest day in my life that you had to come out with such a peace plan". Thumping the table, he spoke to US President on telephone "Mr President, for you it is a political matter, for us it is a matter of our life. Judia and Sammaria have been the land of Jews for generations upon generations and will continue to be so".

The reasons why Israel would never accept an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank are as under :—

- (a) Israel thinks that such a state will be under the Soviet influence which it considers a threat to its security.
- (b) If the West Bank is given to the PLOs, the neck of Israel north of Tel Aviv will be reduced to only 9 Kms and hence its defence will be difficult. The PLOs sitting on the West Bank can fire upto this shore and on Tel Aviv with the long range weapons.

#### THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON

After the PLO's evacuation was completed during the 1st week of Sep, the following further developments have taken place in Lebanon. :-

- (a) Bashir Jamael, the President elected from the Phalangist Party, was killed in a bomb blast a week before he was to take over on 23 Sep. The Israelis reacted to it by re-entering West Beirut. Now his elder brother, Amin Jamael, has been elected President of Lebanon.
- (b) On 18 Sep, 15000 PLO guerrillas were slaughtered in the PLO refugee camps of Sabro and Shatila. It was the job of Christian militias may be with or without the connivance of Israel. There was uproar all around and Begin was asked to resign by a section of Israeli people. Begin has denied any Israeli hand in the PLOs massacre and has ordered a judicial inquiry to appease his people.
- (c) The international peace keeping force which had left Beirut has again been recalled to restore peace in Lebanon.
- (d) Philip Habib has again set on his round of negotiation with the Arab countries to find ways to withdraw the Israeli and Syrian troops from Lebanon.

#### CONCLUSION

Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a turning point in the history of PLOs. West Beirut was seized, houses destroyed, civilians killed, and the PLOs dispersed. But the problem has not been solved.

The time has come when, as Reagan says "World can no longer accept a situation of constantly escalating violence". Israel and PLO must revise their approach and be more accommodating to other. PLO should accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and give up the Palestinian Charter Calling for Israeli's destruction. Israel in turn, must end its policy based on the mystique of Zionism and acknowledge the legitimacy of Palestinians national aspirations. Let us hope that peace returns in the Middle East.

## Passing It On

BRIGADIER SC SARDESHPANDE

### CREDENTIALS

I was dead keen on becoming a lieutenant colonel and battalion commander. I worked with uncorrupted zeal and virgin enthusiasm, enjoying my service, my associations with the unit and its officers and men, and my soldiering all along. My family had never strayed within even stone-throwing distance of the profession of arms. I therefore discovered half of north India after becoming an officer. I made friends not only with my colleagues but also with many JCOs, NCOs and men, who seemed to take a certain interest in me and treated me as one of them, which is far more satisfying. Some of my colleagues and superiors (one or two steps higher, but never higher than that) also stopped on their way to look at me for a while before marching off again. Most of them passed by. The few who stopped seemed to find something in me, may be my rural simplicity, ignorant uprightness or unconcealed happiness with my job and myself. Most of such benign benefactors were later superceded as majors, half colonels and brigadiers. If I had missed becoming a half colonel my first generation professional heart would have broken, but not destroyed, for, believe me, I seemed to have unknowingly prepared myself for such an eventuality, a state helped by the long string of superceded superiors of mine who had stopped by me and beamed an encouraging smile. Some of these superiors told me later that I came within an area of muffing up my promotion. Had I been found wanting ? Had I angered somebody ? Had I failed to get into currency in quarters that matter ? Had I remained unknown to those who looked at me through my dosiers and were struggling to assess my fitness for promotion ? I could not figure out. I have not looked back either.

Today I am a brigadier, a mixture of a bit of the bygone and a lot of the present. God was kind in making me a half colonel commanding my unit in war. My ambition fulfilled, I have been granted the bonus of the next rank. Whether I get additional bonuses or not will

depend on what my subordinates and men think of me and what my superceded superiors wished for me. Times have changed. So have mental stances. Many of my colleagues and contemporaries, have changed. They display less of their erstwhile gay and carefree attitude, direct dedication and genuine involvement ; and more of their concern for self-promotion, salesmanship.

Today, they say, our officers are extremely busy, and have so many commitments that they find it difficult to attend to their primary concern—the men and the professional studies. COs seem thoroughly harrassed, interfered with, and to be on edge as everyone up the hierarchy hastens to hold them responsible for everything in their units. Everyone upto half-colonel is in precipitate haste, either to finish his regimental tenure or earn his requisite command reports, or do a staff/instructional tenure, and generally attend to his career prospects. One wonders what they enjoy and what they contribute to the men, the unit, the institution. True, the profession has become more complex, diverse and demanding with the passage of time and various other very obvious developments. We have to catch up and keep abreast. The ever-present need to excel often promotes and succours rat-race. Despite my self-imposed demeanour to desist from entering into this fascinating race I have often been forced to admire those who sail through this race with such prescience, diligence, ruthlessness and finesse. Not everyone is gifted with these virtues. And such unfortunate ones have to go through the rough and tumble, paying a price to go according to the rules of the game. For some opportunities to excel, to attract, to establish, to gather experience and to go places fall in their lap. Some are born barren and have to struggle to gain wider horizon, wider experience, greater job satisfaction and greater service pleasure. It is for such friends that my passing on is intended.

#### THE YOUNGSTER

The first 5-6 years of service of a young officer are preparatory. He has to gobble everything that comes his way. Do as many courses as possible, muck around with men, know them and keep himself at their disposal for their scrutiny, read widely, throw in his lot with the men and the unit. This is the only time you can afford to make genuine mistakes, not hereafter. This is also the time to evolve your own discipline by way of setting a routine that will shape your life and attitude as you grow in service. Simple habits like making it a point to spend about 15 minutes reading daily newspapers, reading a book

for an hour, spending a few minutes in reflecting over the day's happenings in your life and chalking out what you want to do the next day, spending some time in thinking about a professional, human or any other worthwhile problem, and so on, help immensely. That will instil in you the habit of planning your time, actions and efforts. These small habits are irksome and boring initially. One must bear with it. Once you have inculcated them you will enjoy it, and be steps ahead of events.

At about this time the youngster comes up against the first major decision in his service. There are two types of officers in the army, a good officer and a successful officer. A good officer is competent, steady, loves his men, merges his identity with his unit, and is a source of strength to his subordinates, colleagues and superiors. He desists from rat race, showmanship. He enjoys his service and contributes to the aggregate personality of his group, command and institution. He is always striving towards self-improvement and towards improving his own command in professional knowledge and competence. He freely gives to his command what he has learnt and accumulated. He seldom overbothers about his superiors. A great soul, stout at heart, broad on the shoulders, he is prone to under-assessment and supercession, because his worth can be found out only by deliberate efforts. But he couldn't be bothered about his under-assessment too, because he genuinely loves his men and profession and enjoys devoting himself to both. On the other end of the scale is the successful officer. He is intelligent, keen, industrious, ambitious, competent, but self-centred, and a self-promotee. To him his men and unit are tools for his professional progress. If in the bargain his men and unit benefit it is incidental. He is a showman, opportunist, likes to be at the right time and place, can manipulate things uniquely and keeps his nose clean. Does well on courses, catches the eyes of those who matter and is always appreciated by his superiors. He keeps himself in active circulation, does not bother much for his men and unit. But his competence and knowledge are substantial. He is more likely to go places, never mind what his men think of him or what his contribution to his men and unit is. He is a chap who fulfills most of the QRs in our army for various assignments. He has better employability. Now the young officer has to choose what type he wants to become—a good officer or a successful officer.

Within the service brackets of 8-10 years an officer learns enough of regimental soldiering. Thereafter there is not much basic learning

left. The young officer should do his staff or instructional or ERE tenure and more important courses like JC and PSC at this time and return to unit to plough back his advanced knowledge and widened experience. There probably is no greater satisfaction and pleasure to a psc company commander than to command his coy as a psc major. No company or battalion can have better benefit from such a circumstance. Such an officer will not only enrich the knowledge and experience of his command but also be able to learn more himself about the nuances of command and the profession. It is indeed a pity that most of our pscs, BMs, DQs and G2s shun this deeper sense of involvement and plough-back. Their knowledge and experience of staff job and higher courses satiate the QR thirst of the hierarchy but seldom benefits the men and units. A successful officer will manage to become CO's handrail by drafting papers and replies or migrate to Brigade HQ as officiating BM or DQ.

#### ADOLESCENCE

And now, with about 10-12 years service the time has come for the officer to evolve his own philosophy of service and his own life in service. His ideas of devotion, sacrifice, identity, professional education, loyalty and probity have to crystallise. His attitudes to his superiors, colleagues and subordinates have to mature. Is he going to be a Yes-man, or stand by his convictions ? What are his convictions and what elements has he based them on ? What are his values and priorities and why ? What is his guiding star if he suffers set-backs in the profession ? What role is his wife going to play in his professional life ? What is his attitude to his family life vis-a-vis his professional demands ? What is his vision of the army, the profession and the soldier, and their interaction with the nation's institutional fabric ? He should now outgrow his professional instruction and enter the realm of professional education. And he has to educate himself. It is here that his earlier habits of private study, reflection, thinking and planning time, action and efforts come in handy. In this stage of professional adolescence he must develop his opinions and definite views on various subjects and problems. They must be based on wide experience, deep study and mature thought. Individual experience and personalised thought give rise to subjectivity in views and opinions. Hence the need to guard against it by increased sharing of experience of others, deeper cogitation and testing one's opinion and views on the anvils of different audience. Another convenient way to clarify and test one's ideas and opinions is to pen them down and if lucky get them published in professional journals, or discuss them among friends. Officers training schedule in

units is a good forum. All this he can do if he divests from the command-report fever. All this is required if he is to evolve his service philosophy and make a clear choice between good and successful officer.

#### COMMANDING OFFICER

As a CO one has so much to do and so little time. The handicap is greater if you happen to change units and regiments. No other command appointment brings the commander in such direct and close association with the men, their lives and their families. At the executive level no other appointment yields such direct influence as the CO's. His obligations to the men and his moral responsibilities are greatest. The first essential is to discern the strength and weakness of the unit you have taken over within the first few weeks. Then assisted by your own service philosophy and professional views evolved in you earlier as a major you should be able to decide what you want to achieve during your command tenure, what aspects you want to concentrate on. Some clever or naive COs decide on things like dance bands, parties, red carpets, gladiators, AXIs, family welfare centre produce, national sportsmen, and certain very sophisticated "looking after" drills. These can be very impressive. Some drab but serious minded COs decide on such difficult targets like improving the standards of junior leaders, building up unit motivation under tough conditions, cultivating and nursing unit's pride and dignity by shielding it from the mindless depredations of the superiors and their staff who tend to treat units as pooled labour force, and so on. These are theoretically laudable goals, but practically unimpressive and very often embarrassing if not harmful to the CO's career prospects. But decide your goals and priorities you must. In this you will be helped by all your previous professional preparation and upbringing.

There is too much work for the CO these days; yes. But why not delegate responsibility, explain aim, allot resources and supervise timely? Any CO wanting to do everything himself is unfit and dangerous. He cannot do everything. He must delegate, guide and supervise. He need not know every detail, but must know where to find them, when necessary. He need not be everywhere, but must develop the sense of being at the required place and time. He must organise his time and actions. Everything requires time and there is time for everything. For this he has to look a few months ahead, anticipate interruptions (thanks to Bde and Div HQ) and plan not only time and events, but also responsibilities and its delegation. As a battalion commander I endeavoured to be steps ahead of my Bde/Div HQ

so far as my unit's readiness was concerned. As a Bde Cdr nothing gave me greater pleasure than seeing my bn cdrs well in lead over me.

Human problems are more complex. A more frequent dialogue, greater efforts to take subordinates and men into confidence, easier access to the men, less rigid stance on issues, a large heart to openly acknowledge mistake when necessary, and friendly but firm attitude help a good deal. Periodical counselling of officers, Jcos and even senior Ncos by the CO in an informal atmosphere, where the subject has an opportunity to air his views and feelings and to know what the CO thinks of him considerably ease human and assessment problems. Use of privileges is another bug. Everybody knows about the idea of some privileges accompanying the rising ranks. The trouble arises only when they are misused or overused.

**FAMILIES :** Officers' wives have a big role to play, led by the CO's wife. Most wives don't fully realise it. Some consider themselves to be telephone extensions of their husbands' rank and appointment and start throwing their weight about. Some bright careers have been ruined and many units have suffered. Some wives treat their husband's career as something alien and untouchable and don't even show their face when family welfare centres operate. But such ladies get very upset if their husbands don't get the services of their batmen ! Both the extremes are deleterious. The third one is to treat the unit family welfare centre as a lesser incarnation of Govt handicraft emporium. Unit family welfare centre and family meetings are designed to create a sense of belonging in the families towards their husbands' unit ; to generate in the families confidence in the unit, the army and the system, and a feeling of assurance and contentment that will put not only them at ease but also their husbands; to provide medical facilities; to promote a better sense of sanitation, hygiene, child care and house-keeping; and to provide other facilities to the families to learn such jobs as tailoring, knitting, reading and writing and any other vocation that will help them become self-sufficient, self-reliant, self employing.

Training of subordinates and the unit is a tremendous job satisfaction. In the army our thinking, planning and appreciating have taken strong strides. But I am not so sure of similar strength in the field of execution. All plans, bold and ingenious, can bear fruit when the men and junior leaders execute them boldly and ingeniously, and have inbuilt initiative in their professional training. This aspect, to my mind, is not yet fully developed. Today we have a very large number of Ncos and Jcos in units, but the Officer deficiency continues.

Moreover the sub-unit commanders will comprise of larger number of superceded officers. I must venture to opine that in our wars the backbone of units will be the average Ncos, Jcos and superceded officers. Most of the AXs and gladiators will not be available. It is perhaps better to have a larger sprinkling of average (CZ) Havs and Nks than a few junior Nks with AXs. It is this average commodity which will be available for training their commands and lead them in battle, and which therefore, needs far greater attention by the COs. As to the superceded officers, I somehow, against normal logic, feel that generally they will not be found wanting when it comes to war. Most of them have been through two wars, and have imbibed a certain influential measure of professional ethic. It is this residual ethic that will drive them to rise to the occasion. They may not exactly display amenability during peace to the routine professional pull and push. But we have to bank on them considerably, because they will have experience and residual ethic. COs have to handle them carefully, nurse them, enable them to draw job-satisfaction and bring the best out of them.

#### STAFF OFFICERS

The normal tendency is to enjoy the chair, push files, busy in drafting letters and keep their staff procedures afloat. Very few staff officers visit units and troops. Their main responsibility of acting as catalysts between commanders and their subordinates and troops is often relegated. Normally there is considerable reserve and tension between superior and subordinate commanders. Attitudes of units and superior HQ towards each other have elements of prejudice, bias and even certain animus. In this sphere human factors are perhaps at their worst. Now all of this falls within the purview of the staff officers. They can smoothen relations, calm nerves, develop mutual trust and help build a happy, confident, cohesive team and a well oiled machine; but only if they get off their chairs and offices and visit units, project their commander' expectations, solve units problems and apprise their commanders objectively, fearlessly. Some staff officers struggle to make their commanders eat off their palm, strictly controlling the subordinates' access to the boss and pouring sweet music into his ears. There cannot be a bigger disservice. I saw two rare specimens who could warm up the heart of the erstwhile German General Staff. One was a BM in the last war; once at a critical juncture he ran to my Bn HQ, spent a whole night with me smoothening my nerves and getting what the Bde Cdr wanted done. Another was an HQ who most

of the time beat my Bde HQ with answers to our likely problems even before we could project them. His patience, forethought and close identity with troops were exemplary. I must also mention my own earlier Bde staff, who took the bit and ran some very fine shuttles between me and my units. But these are exceptions. I feel the staff officers' ethic is not fully emphasized in the training institutions.

#### CONCLUSION

For the majority of us service ethic is a formidable thing to confirm to in the present environment. Service pleasure and job satisfaction don't fall in our lap. We have to seek them and enjoy them. Both the good and the successful officers do the same, but the methods and the ethos differ. The good officer contributes, but pays a price. The successful officer extracts and manipulates the price. The former is closer to the professional ethic and finds joy in doing his bit irrespective of upset or success. The latter derives joy mainly in success, but incidentally adds to professional competence of the army as a whole.

My passing on mainly relates to the former type. He has to gear himself up for the straight perpendicular Naga climb in a methodical, wholesome manner, huffing and sweating, but enjoying every bit of it and contributing to the overall happiness and competence of the army. He has to pay a price, but what a tremendous satisfaction it is when one is ultimately superceded, to remember all the warmth the subordinates and the men and the profession showered on you !

# Traditions and Customs in the Indian Army

MAJOR AMARJIT RANDWAL, JAK RIF

“We and our children must build on our own heritage.  
If we borrow on others, we impoverish our own.”

—Mahatma Gandhi

## INTRODUCTION

**T**RADITIONS means something that is handed down, accepted, cared for and passed on. It consists of all customs and ideas handed down from generation to generations. It is reincarnation of some of the past into that of today. By traditions, our kingship is established with our worthy forebears and we claim their glorious achievements as our own; we also accept the responsibility for passing on these not only untarnished but also more glorious than before. Military traditions play an important role in building and maintaining of the fighting spirit of an army. They inspire soldier to feats of valour and instil in him a sense of justifiable pride and self confidence. They encourage him to emulate the great deeds of his ancestors and live upto his proud heritage.

The observance of customs in the Army, whether it be a bugle call or the wearing of a piece of coloured cloth behind a badge in an integral part of military life. These customs have originated from military experience through the ages and play an important part in fostering esprit-de-Corps. As Indian Army is modelled on the British, it cherish some of the traditions adopted long ago. Some of these are outdated and done away with. However, many of these are still important to the man in uniform, therefore it is essential to know the significance of these, weather it be saluting or trooping of colours.

## SALUTING

The act of saluting denotes an exchange of courtesy, either between officers or an officer and a soldier. The origin of this custom can be traced to ancient times when the man who saluted has to put

up his open hand to show that he has no hidden weapon. In the feudal ages knights at arms, while passing each other saluted by lifting the visors of their helmets to show their friendliness. There are many variation in saluting. Troops marching in a body salute by turning their heads and looking in the face of officer whom they salute. This custom is reminiscent of ancient times when captives and slaves, who were forced to march in procession or walk in the streets to commemorate the victory of the captors, had to keep their eyes down. It was the proud privilege of the soldiers of the winning side to look his commander in the face.

A soldier salutes with the rifle by bringing it to rest in a position where it cannot be used. Tanks and armoured cars dip their guns groundward to assure the person to whom greeting is addressed that the gun is not trained on him. Aircraft fly past the saluting base dive towards the earth and come within the range of ground defences as an assurance against a hostile act. Thus all the different forms of saluting symbolise friendliness.

#### UNIFORMS

The way in which a soldier is dressed is determined by the interaction of four factors—economy, impressiveness, recognizability and utility. These four factors strike constantly for supremacy. Active service tends to simplify uniforms, while a prolonged peace makes for elaborate changes in weapon system and tactics also influence the kind of uniform that is desirable. To quote Michal Glover 'Fashion in uniform do not change with the rapidity of those in women's clothes but fashion is still an influence'—uniforms must be attractive, as no soldier will fight the better for feeling that he looks old fashioned. Forthcoming change to combat dress is in conformity with above factors.

It will be interesting to trace the origin of 'Sam Browne Belt' which is part of all our ceremonial dresses. In 1849, Lt Browne was a young officer of 2nd Regiment of the Punjab Cavalry. Nine years later he lost his left arm in battle but won Victoria Cross. Despite his disability, he continued in the Army until he became General in 1888. In order to secure his pistol for safety reasons, he designed a leather belt with shoulder brace for easy handling with right arm only. The Sam Browne Belt is still in vogue not only with Indian Army but also in British and most of the Commonwealth countries.

### THE QUARTER GUARD

The origin of the quarter guard can be traced to medieval times when these used to be a guard at the castle gates who always turned out on the approach of a stranger to ensure that he was a friend before permitting him to enter. This was a necessary precaution lest the castle be attacked by surprise.

### REGIMENTAL SONGS AND MUSIC

Music has long been cementing force in the Army and it is a bond of friendship and association among various units. Regimental songs stir soldiers to the very depth of his soul and no soldier can resist the appeal of a rousing march. Most of the Regimental songs were of English origin and tune, but since independence a number of these songs has been composed and successfully introduced in Indian tunes. Famous Indian tunes such as '*Joshila Kadam*' and '*Deshon Ka Sartaj Bharat*' is pride of Indian Military music.

### REGIMENTAL COLOURS

Though Colours have not been carried in action since 26 Jun 1881, when a British Infantry Battalion carried them during the Boar War in South Africa. During the British period, the kings colours used to be bestowed in recognition of group heroism and bravery. After India became independent, it was inevitable that the symbolism of the old regime should give place to the new. Consequently in November 1950, the 35 kings colours were laid up at the National Defence Academy at a solemn and dignified ceremony. Since then the President of India has presented colours and battle honours to a number of regiments in recognition for their outstanding contribution in various battles. Regimental Colours play an important role in fostering esprit de Corps and moral, for they symbolise the spirit of the Regiment. The past glory of the regiment is reflected in the battle honours, which vividly bring back to mind the deeds of valour performed by the men and officers of the regiment. No wonder they are held in high esteem and are venerated for they are an epitome of the history of the regiment.

### REGIMENTAL CENTENARIES AND RAISING DAY

Centenaries of battalions and regiments recall most striking achievements of a regiment and each soldier of the regiment associates himself with these achievements. In the words of RTJ Hills "Everyday, almost in some barracks or camp, some

little known battle is being celebrated, some honour, faded almost to invisibility save in a regiments living soul, is being refurbished, that the Army may remember and march on". January 15 is celebrated as Army Day every year, on that in day 1949, General KM Cariappa became Commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, the first to occupy the post.

#### GALLANTRY AWARDS

Gallantry awards play very important role in strengthening the regimental traditions. In the Indian Army the Indian Order of Merit was the highest honour a soldier could earn until the Victoria Cross was opened to him in 1911. After independence number of gallantry awards were instituted. Lance Naik Karam Singh was first to get Param Vir Chakra, the highest award for gallantry in Independent India. First recipient of Maha Vir Chakra was Brigadier Rajender Singh of J & K State Forces, who was bestowed this honour posthumously for his high degree of leadership, courage, devotion to duty and gallantry ; there after, many a heroic deed has been performed in order to earn the coveted honours.

#### WAR MEMORIALS

War memorials are important as much as they keep alive the spirit of heroism displayed by the men and officers of the Army. Most of the regiments and some battalions have built war memorial to honour the officers and men of the regiment who laid down their life in the service of the nation. One of such memorial is at Walong in Arunachal Pradesh, just few kilometers from Tibet Border. This is in honour of soldiers who laid down their lives in the battle of Walong in Oct 1962. Any soldier who happen to read the words inscribed will never abandon this position.

#### ANALYSIS

Customs and Traditions of the Indian Army were not built up only during the British regime but also in the course of centuries of warfare which preceded it. During the ancient and medevial periods, Indian rulers trained and fashioned their soldiers, led armies in battles, erected fortification and practised the art of warfare. Weapons as good as those produced in other countries were manufactured. During British period the indigenous traditions and customs suited to the conditions of service in the colonial Army were retained, but they were influenced and over shadowed by European rulers. As the time went on, new traditions and customs were added to suit the alien

Masters. The main emphasis was on Officer-men relationship as the bulk of the officers were British and so foreign to Indian soldiers. Customs and traditions during the period were oriented to ensure loyalty to the British officers and main criteria being the pride and glory of the battalion, the regiment, and the army. During this period old Indian traditions were forgotten and British writers only highlighted the period of their rule.

Europe has been the centre of military power over past two or more centuries and its influence has spread over the world. To discard this influence altogether is equivalent to discarding modern technology from the life of the nation; same applies to certain customs and traditions like saluting, gallantry awards, war memorials and regimental ceremonies. However, their relevance should be examined in present day context and modified to suit present day environment. Customs should be a means to function efficiently and to develop the mental, moral and spiritual outlook of a man so that he can contribute to the strengthening of the organisation. Some of the suggested modifications are as follows :-

- (a) Adopt regimental songs and march past in Indian tunes and music which are understood by all.
- (b) Have only those battle honours which justify our pride and honour as Indian nation.
- (c) Officers messes which symbolises to the officers home in the Army should represent an institution where officers can eat and relax. Mess functions must be simple yet dignified so that officers have pride in them as professional homes.
- (d) Martial race theory is not valid any more but emphasis should be given to 'secular theory of martial races' which was succinctly summarized by ex defence minister YB Chavan, "we are all Kshatriya now and when it comes to the defence of Indian Nation, all are equally martial, what caste or class level they wear"
- (e) Names of older infantry regiments based on caste and region should be retained as they have over riding advantage of command and control, moral, esprit de corps and simplification of logistical aspects as regard food habits. However, further recruitment to these regiments may be made broad based.
- (f) Indian Army follows the British tradition of separate sphere of military and civilian activity, and that the military is and should always be outside politics. This is welcome both for Army as well as politicians, but India's strategic environment and sensitive borders, make it impossible for military to avoid political questions in the time of peace let alone during war. Therefore it is necessary

that Army officers should be educated to understand politics to enable them to effectively explain 'the cause of war' to motivate the men in particular and answer the public in general.

#### CONCLUSION

Traditions and customs are soul of the Army. Organisation, discipline and training lend strength and cohesion but they do not touch the heart of an Army; that only traditions, the moral force, can do. Moral factors are important in war, which is essentially an affair of soul, the predominant partner in business being mind or spirit. There is no doubt that traditions go a long way in conditioning a man for battle and greatly contribute to his reflex actions in the face of danger. Indian Army has rich heritage of the high traditions of gallantry, leadership, discipline and esprit de corps. These traditions and customs should be made more glorious and completely compatible with our national pride as they are golden links in a glorious chain of history, the strong cement of army life.

## Wellington's Battles in India

MAJ GEN RM RAU, AVSM (Retd)

THE military exploits of Britain's greatest soldier, the Duke of Wellington (the other claimant to this title being the Duke of Marlborough) in India are relatively unknown. This is all the more surprising since he stayed for eight and a half years in this country from February 1797 to September 1805, at a time when the East India Company had given up all pretence of being a purely trading company, and was pursuing a policy of expansion. The Duke, during this period, took part in no less than four major battles and a host of minor actions. Most of them have been forgotten, except by serious students of military history and some such as "Assaye" are still among the most treasured battle honours of the present day Indian Army regiments. I wonder if any other army in the world retains amongst its honours, battles in which their own countrymen have been defeated by a foreign power, of course, aided and abetted by another section of their countrymen.

Arthur Wesley (later changed to Wellesley in 1798) landed at Calcutta in February 1797 as the Colonel of His Majesty's 33 Regiment of Foot. He was only twenty seven, but there were even younger Colonels in the British Army at that time, when commissions and appointments could be purchased except in the artillery and engineers. The establishment was well entrenched in Britain, and if you were born in a good family with money, you started off life with a great advantage. It must be said in fairness that Arthur Wesley was not particularly well off financially, and his family were Anglo-Irish aristocracy, always considered a little second rate, with estates in the present Irish Republic. It may be pointed out here that through eight centuries of murderous history, the 'Irish Question' has bedevilled Britain, and the latest chapters are still unfolding with the inevitability of Greek tragedy in Ulster.

It is worth considering at this stage the set-up of the army during Wellington's stay in India. The bulk of the army consisted of the East India Company's (EIC) regiments of Cavalry and infantry and units of artillery and engineers, later termed the Sappers and Miners. EIC artillery in the upper grades is officers, NCOs and gunners were almost all

European. Gun lascars were, of course, Indians, but normally they only handled the drag lines and performed minor functions during firing.

The three presidencies viz Bengal, Madras and Bombay had separate armies under their own Commanders-in-Chief. The C-In-C of the Bengal Army had precedence over the others but frequently, the other two chose to ignore him when it suited them. Apart from the EIC units, there were some king's regiments of Cavalry and infantry. There was always a certain amount of friction between the officers with a Royal commission and the EIC officers. The King's officers considered themselves superior to the EIC officers, whereas, in actual fact, some of the latter were as good as, if not superior, to the King's officers by virtue of their experience and knowledge of India.

The crown had a Military Academy at Woolwich for officers of the engineers and artillery since 1741, but the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst for the training of Cavalry and infantry officers was only established in 1802. Even so, up to the time of Waterloo (1815), only one newly commissioned officer in twenty-five for the royal army had passed through this academy. The Company were more thorough. Almost all their potential officers were expected to pass their College at Addiscombe established in 1810. Those who passed the course at the top of the list were commissioned into the engineers, the next batch went to the artillery and the remainder to the infantry. Commissions to the Cavalry regiments were in the gift of the directors of the Company, no training being considered necessary !

In August 1797, Colonel Wesley and the King's 33rd Foot sailed for Manila in the Philippines, as part of a British expeditionary force to capture that city from the Spanish who had become allies of the French, the traditional enemies of the British. The French, with their revolutionary fervour, and with leaders like Napolean had become the strongest military power on the Continent. However, the expedition was called off and returned from Penang in November 1797. The main reason for the recall from the British point of view was that Tipu Sultan, after his defeat by Cornwallis in 1790 and 1792, became a yet more determined enemy and was trying to form an alliance with the French, who were becoming stronger day by day on the Continent, with their amazing victories under some of the finest generals the world had yet seen. It is difficult to see, however, how the French could have sent a substantial expeditionary force thousands of miles to help Tipu Sultan beat the British, as the French were fully committed with their problems and the Royal Navy had control of the seas. One

cannot help feeling that the French bogey was raised as a pretext to knock out Tipu Sultan once and for all, and to acquire additional territory.

It is worth reproducing in full a letter addressed to Tipu Sultan by Napoleen Bonaparte in February 1798, from Cairo, which was his Headquarters during his Egyptian adventure. This letter has never been quoted in any book by an English author for obvious reasons. Its text was :

## FRENCH REPUBLIC

7th year of the Republic, one and indivisible. Bonaparte, Member of the National Convention, General in Chief, to the most magnificent Sultan, our greatest friend Tippoo Saib.

You have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea, with an innumerable and invincible Army, full of the desire of delivering you from the iron yoke of England.

I eagerly embrace this opportunity of testifying to you the desire I have of being informed by you, by the way of Muscat and Mocha, as to your political situation.

I would further wish you could send some intelligent person to Suez or Cairo, possessing your confidence, with whom I may confer.

May the Almighty increase your power and destroy your enemies.

### Napoleon Bonaparte.

Napolean's letter has survived the ravages of time and has been handed down to history, but it never reached Tipu Sultan. It was to be forwarded by the Sheriff of Mecca, and was intercepted at Jeddah. Significantly, it makes no mention of any overtures on the part of Tipu Sultan, much less of any alliance between the French and Tipu Sultan.

Much is talked about by British authors about the help Tipu Sultan may have received from Maritius, then ruled by the French. They had a miserable garrison of 600 men who were less than adequate for the defence of the Island itself. There is even mention

of the French Governor of the Island, General Malartic, being got at by the British to issue a proclamation that 'two ambassadors had come from Mysore to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with the French and to secure military assistance for expelling the British from India. Tipu Sultan would maintain the French troops as long as the war lasted and furnish them with everything except wine'. The fact that the French governor of Maritius may have been rewarded handsomely by the British for making this proclamation cannot be discounted. It would not be in keeping with the British character and tradition to attack without an excuse.

Richard Wellesley, second Earl of Morington, the new Governor-General of India arrived at Calcutta in May 1798 after stopping en route at Madras, alongwith his younger brother Henry, who was thirteen years younger than Richard and four years younger than Arthur. Henry became the Governor General's private secretary.

The arrival of his elder brother as the Governor General certainly did not hinder Arthur's career, although it did create a certain amount of jealousy in some quarters. The fact is that Arthur was capable enough to get on without his brother's helping hand, but his way was made smoother as the Governor General had great respect for Arthur's military capabilities and judgement and consulted him frequently. Friction did develop between the two brothers, but only towards the end of Arthur's stay in India, which he left in March 1805.

The Madras Army which would form the bulk of the force attacking Tipu Sultan was concentrating at Arani, Arcot, and Vellore under Colonel Ashton. This officer was a King's officer in command of 12th Foot and was socially popular and good at his profession. However, he died of a wound sustained in a duel with Major Allen, another officer in his own battalion. Although he was not the most senior, Arthur Wellesley was given his first extensive military command. He arrived on 18 December 1798 and immediately got to work completing the work which had already been put in hand for getting the force ready to take the field. Arthur Wellesley found the Supply and Transport the weakest link in the organisation. There was no proper commissariat in the British Army during any part of the eighteenth century. He had to depend on the age old custom of establishing bazaars and laid down the following rules. "First, there will be present one grand bazar, which will be placed in rear of headquarters; secondly, one regimental bazar to each Corps of European and Native

Cavalry, and each Corps of Native Infantry. Those Corps of European artillery and infantry which bring bazars with them to camp will send their dealers to the Grand bazar, taking care to take a list of their names and trades, of which they will give a copy to Quarter-master of Brigade Kelly". This system of merchandising was more efficient than it seems to us. A bazar contained merchants who could supply rice, other grains and almost anything else. There were of course shortages of commodities like rice, and Wellesley went to great lengths to procure rice and other items to stock up his bazars.

Wellesley also started training his command vigorously for the coming battles. Hardly any battalion had drilled with other similar units. He insisted on daily battalion drill and also assembled brigades which operated together. He again introduced live fire target practice, something unheard of before him.

General George Harris, the Commander-in-Chief Madras Army, arrived from Madras and took over command from Wellesley on 29 January 1799. He brought four other general officers and Wellesley dropped from No 1 to No 7, and was not even placed in command of a brigade. But Harris was extremely pleased with Wellesley's achievement in six and a half months of command, and he earmarked him for independent command when the occasion arose.

The Governor General Richard Wellesley, Earl of Morington (later Marques Wellesley) had in the meanwhile arrived at Madras. He wanted to join the field army, but Arthur advised him strongly against it as it would restrict the authority of General Harris.

Harris's main army (from Madras Presidency) consisted of more than 20,000 fighting men including 4300 European Soldiers. Of the other co-operating British forces under Harris, the army from Bombay Presidency under Lieutenant General James Stuart had a total strength of 1600 European and 4800 Indian fighting men, alongwith some pioneers and gun lascars and attached irregulars. Lieutenant Colonel Read and Brown had forces with fighting strengths of about 2000 and 2500 respectively; they were to protect British territory, gather supplies and join the main forces later. Harris moved from Vellore on 11 February 1799 and reached Ambur on 18th. Here, the Nizam's army joined them.

The entire Hyderabad army was commanded by Mir Alam and consisted of six battalions of infantry commanded by English officers, about 10,000 cavalry and some artillery. It appears to have been as

large in numbers as Harris's own but it needed two things : a European unit of infantry to stiffen it and a British officer able to exercise control. The officer who took this job would have both to be respectable and tactful. There was only one answer, and that was Arthur Wellesley.

On 9 March, the entire force camped near the village of Kalamangalam about 15 miles from the border of Tipu's territory. Soon after dawn on 10th, the great conglomeration began to move out. Arthur Wellesley and Mir Alam were on the right while Harris's own army was on the left with the baggage train in between. The country was ideal for harrassing movements by Tipu's cavalry, which was trying to break through to the Central baggage. A column of Tipu's horsemen, 2000 in number, had used a covered approach route and charged one section of Wellesley's rearguard. He quickly took counter-action. The two 6-pounders went into action alongwith the infantry. Grape from the cannon and regular volleys from about 500 of Colonel Wellesley's Indian units emptied saddles and killed horses. Wellesley personally led the rear-guard cavalry in a bloody counter-attack which inflicted a costly defeat on the enemy.

Tipu had realised that the only way he could survive was to prevent the junction of Harris's Madras Army from the east and Stuart's Bombay Army from the west. He resorted to the wise and age old tactic of taking on his enemy one at a time before they could unite. He would also be operating on 'interior lines' ! He first attacked Stuart's army at Sadaseer on 6 March, but after a hard battle, withdrew leaving 2000 men dead on the battlefield.

The battle Tipu fought against Harris's army at Malavalli on 27 March was a more serious affair. Here too, Tipu suffered a serious defeat inspite of the heroism shown by his troops. Wellesley played a prominent part in this battle, personally commanding his 33rd Foot and giving the order to fire when Tipu's advancing infantry was barely sixty yards away. Tipu's casualties were all the more heavy as they were advancing in column in the French style. This was Wellesley's first major action, although Malavalli was not large as battle go. He had come out of it with flying colours, and had shown remarkable coolness in holding his fire till the enemy was sixty yards away. On the other hand, Tipu was thoroughly disheartened after his defeats at Sadaseer and Malavalli and he lost confidence in himself, his forces and his military ability. His only hope now was to hold out behind the strong defences of his capital Seringapatam till the monsoon broke and made the Kaveri unfordable. He knew that

the British could not indulge in a long siege, as they had not built up a large enough stock of supplies and forage.

#### CAPTURE OF SERINGAPATAM

When Harris advanced from Malavalli to Seringapatam on 28 March, he found his line of march stripped bare of forage. Harris had no intention, however, of making a predictable advance on Seringapatam. He shifted his direction more than ninety degrees twice-south to the village of Sirsoli and again west towards Seringapatnam (See Map). He completely surprised Tipu by this ruse and obtained forage and some other supplies as well.

The Kaveri splits into two branches around Seringapatam Island. Tipu hoped to keep out Harris's force till the coming of the monsoon made both the rivers unfordable. If he could hold out till about 20 May, Harris would have to retreat, since even boats could not be used, as the current would be too fast.

Harris's combined armies moved past Tipu's southern flank and camped south-west of Seringapatam, on 5 April 1799. The C-in-C placed the Nizam's army now completely controlled by Colonel Wellesley to the South. Harris's plan was to deliver an assault across the South Kaveri against the city itself which occupied the western tip of the island. This would have the advantage that a single attack could be immediately decisive. If an assault was to be made on the South or East, the British armies would first have to gain a foothold on the island, when Tipu had established a fortified camp. (See Map).

Early in the afternoon of the 5th, Harris ordered Wellesley to deliver a sunset and night attack to clear the village of Sultanpeta, the aqueduct and 'Sultanpeta Tope'. Colonel Wellesley was to use his King's 33rd supported by two of his EIC battalions, apparently 1/11 and 2/11 Madras Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Colonel Shawe with the King's 12th supported by the 1/1 and the 2/3 Madras Native Infantry was to advance on a similar direction towards the aqueduct but from Harris's camp. The main aim of these diversionary attacks was to clear numerous enemy outposts between the allied camp and the city, so that siege-works could safely begin.

The ground inside this tope was scoured with irrigation ditches from four to six feet deep. It was pitch dark and Wellesley and


his men floundered about quite lost, as they had no guides, and had no idea of what their area looked like in daylight, as no reconnaissance had been carried out. As soon as the enemy realized that Wellesely's attack was in progress, they punished his staggering, groping men with a hot fire of musketry and rockets. It was impossible for Wellesley to locate the quarter from which the counter-attack was coming or to rally his troops for a disciplined withdrawal. Lost and separated from his men and dismally aware that he had failed, he stumbled into headquarters at midnight to make his report to General Harris, who recorded that 'the young Colonel came to my tent in a good deal of agitation to say that he had not carried the tope'. Twelve soldiers who had been taken prisoner in the tope, were taken into Seringapatam and killed. Lieutenant Fitzgerald of the 33rd, although mortally wounded, was carried back to the British lines.

The whole episode of the tope and the killings made an indelible impression on Wellesely. He wrote : 'I have come to a determination; when in my power, never to suffer an attack to be made at night upon an enemy who is.....strongly posted, and whose posts have not been reconnoitered by daylight' an opinion which is applicable to this day.

The entire Sultanpeta Tope affair has been magnified out of all proportion, because it was the only action in which the Duke of Wellington ever suffered a military reverse. Wellesley had not yet arisen above professional jealousy and some said that but for his relationship to the Governor General 'he never would have had a chance of getting over this affair.' But the fact is that the whole thing was a relatively small affair, which did not affect later operations for the capture of Seringapatam. Wellesley, in fact, took the entire aqueduct and the Sultanpeta Tope area in a daylight attack on 6 April without the loss of a man.


Stuart and his Bombay army arrived to the west of Seringapatam on 14 April. After a day of rest, they were ordered to the north side of the Kaveri. On the 16th their camp was established to the west of Serigapatam island and Harris now controlled both banks of the river west of Seringapatam. Batteries could be mounted south of the Kaveri without fear of enfilade fire from the north side.

At sunset on the 17th Major Macdonald led the 2/12 Madras Native Infantry and carried the north-south stretch of the Little Kaveri. It became known as Macdonald's Post and was situated only 1000 yards from the main defences of Seringapatam.



### THE ADVANCE ON SERINGAPATAM

- - - Stuart's route  
 - - - Harry's route  
 0 20 40 60 80 100 miles  
 0 40 80 120 160 Kilometres



The seige operations were being carried out by EIC Colonel William Gent and his engineers, ably and unselfishly supported by General Harris. The engineers were professionals with many years' experience in India. There was an ample siege train, a great number of Indian pioneers organised into four units, some European pioneers and working parties from infantry units. The seige was carried forward on scientific principles according to the hallowed ritual of the master, Vauban, Marshal of France (1633-1707), the most celebrated of all military engineers. The progress from step to step was based on efficiency and security. Work now progressed steadily and securely on both sides of the Kaveri. During the night of 25th, a four-gun battery was constructed at the southern end of the diagonal trench extending from the rear of the powder mill battery towards the little Kaveri. The battery of 18-pounders opened fire on the morning of 26th at a range of 900 yards and was astonishingly effective. Tipu's cannon in that sector were silenced and Stuart's batteries north of the river were also very effective. By noon of the 26th, all the guns on the walls of Seringapatam that could fire effectively at the British batteries north and south of the river had been silenced.

However, in the vital section south-west of the south Kaveri, there remained a line of entrenchments which had to be cleared. Wellington who became brigade commander of the day at noon on 26th, received orders to capture these entrenchments. This was not to be another Sultanpeta Tope. Wellington knew exactly what the position of the enemy was and how it was defended. The attack was mounted in a systematic manner, and inspite of stiff enemy resistance, the entrenchments were carried by 10.00 a.m. on 27th.

Harris now had all the territory he could use for his future operations on his side of the river. Breaching batteries were constructed at a distance of less than 400 yards from the main ramparts of Seringapatam, but this was done carefully and in a manner that did not divulge to Tipu the actual point of attack. After divisionary fire for three days, on the morning of 2 May 1799, the batteries suddenly concentrated all their fire on the walls where the actual breach was to be made. The point chosen was in the west wall just south of the already destroyed north-west bastions. The breach was tentatively pronounced practical on the evening of the 3rd; this meant that the troops encumbered only by a musket, bayonet and cartridge box would be able to climb it.

On the morning of the 4th, the troops destined for the attack were placed in the trenches before daylight, so that the enemy might not

observe any particular movement. The attack was to be launched during the hottest part of the day, when it would be expected that Tipu's soldiers would not be so vigilant.

Two regiments and ten flank companies of Europeans, three Corps of grenadier sepoys, and 200 of the Nizam's troops formed the storming party consisting of 2500 Europeans and 1,900 Indians. Major-General Baird who was in command, divided this force into two separate columns, which, on mounting the breach, were to move to the right and left. Colonel Sherbrooke commanded the right column, destined for the attack of the southern rampart and Lieutenant Colonel Dunlop commanded the left, to clear the northern rampart. Wellesley remained in the advanced trenches in command of the reserve, to support the troops in the assault, in case it should be necessary.

At 1.00 p.m. the troops began to move from the trenches. The troops descended into the bed of the river, and advanced, regardless of a tremendous fire, towards the opposite bank. Tipu's men fought bravely, but soon the British colours were planted on the summit of the breach. The assaulting parties under Baird, Sherbrooke and Dunlop who was wounded, taking the direction ordered, soon cleared the ramparts. Fierce fighting went on for some more time before all resistance ceased, but there was no sign of Tipu at the palace or elsewhere.

At dusk Baird, accompanied by Wellesley who had earlier joined the troops inside, tracked him down. In the torchlight, his body was discovered by an amulet on his right arm and dragged out of a huge pile of corpses near the water gate. Tipu had fallen in the fighting thereafter taking a personal part in the defence of the northern wall. He had died a hero's death fighting to the last.

Tipu is, in many respects, a remarkable personality in Indian history. A man of sound moral character, free from the prevailing vices of his class, he had an immense faith in God. He was fairly well educated, could speak fluently in Persian, Kanarese and Urdu and had a valuable library unlike many of his Indian contemporaries. Tipu was an able and industrious ruler. Some of his English contemporaries like Edward Moore and Major Diron were favourably impressed with his administration. Even Sir John Shere observes that "the peasantry of his dominions are protected and their labours encouraged and rewarded". But the bulk of English historians, old as well as modern, have wrongly described Tipu as a cruel and sanguinary

tyrant, an oppressive despot, and a furious fanatic. He was no doubt cruel like most Indian rulers of his day, but "his cruelties were in general inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies". He also did not attempt any wholesale conversion of his Hindu subjects, but forced it only on those on whose allegiance he could not rely. On the other hand, he was no paragon of all virtues as some Indian authors have painted him out to be, and he certainly did not have any conception of Indian nationalism as attributed by these authors. No Indian of that period could visualise India as one nation, but Tipu at least recognised the threat posed by the British more than some other rulers.

#### ASSAYE

After the defeat of Tipu, Richard Wellesley, the Governor General turned his attention to the Maratha Confederacy, which though in considerable disarray, was still a power to be reckoned with. Although the Peshwa at Poona was a nominal head, Holkar of Indore and Scindia of Gwalior were the strongest rulers in the Confederacy. Both Jaswant Rao Holkar and Daulat Rao Scindia entered upon a fierce struggle with each other for supremacy at Poona and the weak minded Peshwa made matters worse by incessant intrigues. The Peshwa murdered Vithuji Holkar, brother of Jaswant Rao Holkar. This highly incensed the latter, whose power and position had recently improved and on 23 October 1802 he defeated the combined armies of Scindia and the Peshwa at Poona. After running from place to place, the Peshwa took refuge at Bassein. Here, he signed with the British the Treaty of Bassein on 31 December 1802, and consented to accept the subsidiary alliance. Under the treaty, a subsidiary force of not less than 6000 British/Indian regular infantry with artillery was to be stationed, within the Peshwa's territory in perpetuity. A British force under Arthur Wellesley conducted the Peshwa to his capital and restored him to his formal position on 13 May 1803.

War was not long in coming. The Treaty of Bassein was, as Arthur Wellesley aptly remarked "a treaty with a cipher (the Peshwa)". It wounded the feelings of the other Maratha leaders, who saw in it an absolute surrender of Maratha independence and by sinking their mutual jealousies for the time being, tried to present a united front to the British. The Peshwa, now repentant of his action, sent them secret messages of encouragement. Even so, Jaswant Rao Holkar remained aloof and retired to Malwa to sit on the fence and watch events. The Gaekwar remained neutral. This left Daulat Rao Scindia and Raghujji Bhosle II of Berar who combined to form a formidable force, Scindia's contingent being by far the larger.

Arthur Wellesley captured Scindia's Fort at Ahmednagar on 12 August 1903 after an audacious assault. This fort would serve as an excellent base for future operations. One of the Maratha Chieftains, the younger Gokhale, who actually joined Wellesley with his troops and remained with him throughout the war, wrote to a friend 'These English are a strange people, and their General a wonderful man. They came here in the morning, looked at the petah wall, walked over it, killed all the garrison, and returned to breakfast. What can withstand them?' In this remark, we see the result of Wellesley's careful thought and planning. He was using audacity to build a legend of invincibility.

The battle of Assaye (situated about forty-five miles north-east of Aurangabad), one of the most crucial in British Indian History, was fought on 23 September 1803. The regular force of the Maratha Army numbered about 15000 disciplined soldiers under European officers. They had some eighty artillery field pieces plus a few battering guns. The biggest component of this force, numbering about 7500, was under Pohlmann, a mercenary serving under Scindia. Pohlmann was a capable soldier with a penchant for pomp and show. The number of Maratha cavalry is difficult to determine but appears to have been between 30,000 and 60,000 armed horsemen.

Wellington employed about 6000 troops at Assaye. The cavalry were H.M. 19th light Dragoons, and the 4th, 5th and 7th Madras Native Cavalry. The infantry were H.M. 74th and 78th and 1st/2nd, 1st/8th, 1st/10th and 2nd/12th of the Madras Native Infantry. He had only twenty-two artillery pieces to the Maratha's hundred and more. He had a force of pioneers but the Marathas had them too, especially in Pohlmann's force. The odds in numbers against Wellington in all arms were tremendous.

Stevenson, with a force similar to Wellesley's was advancing on parallel lines somewhat further west about fourteen miles away. Wellesley planned to join forces again at a village twelve miles away, when he would bring the enemy to battle on 24 September.

But on the 23rd, with Stevenson unaccountably not yet emerging from the hills, Wellesley received intelligence that Scindia's cavalry had already escaped him, though there was still time to catch his infantry in the camp, which was only six miles away. Wellesley at once made a swift reconnaissance on a good horse, entailing a circuit of four miles. He was astonished at what he saw. Instead of infantry alone opposing him, Scindia's whole army was still there spread over seven miles of shimmering plain.

Wellesley realised that he had caught the enemy in camp. If he attacked immediately, Scindia and Berar could not get away, except by sacrificing guns and baggage. The chance to defeat the enemy depended, however, on striking within the next three hours, it would have been useful to have Stevenson's army close at hand; but was it absolutely necessary?

Wellesley saw that numerical odds meant nothing. Maratha cavalry was so disorganised that one had to only to contend with the men in the front of their formations; the rest could not influence the battle one way or the other. But the regular battalions would be another matter. Their composition and strength were similar to Wellesley's fine EIC battalions, they were as strong in men and stronger in artillery.

Wellesley considered the alternatives for no more than a couple of minutes. The opportunity was too good to be missed. He would attack. One cannot help wondering that the British had built up a tremendous superiority complex in view of the victories they had already achieved against tremendous odds. They knew that the Indian soldier fought with great courage, but had been repeatedly let down by his leaders. Leadership, that most important factor in a battle was lacking.

The enemy was drawn up on the far bank of the Kaitna (*See Map Sketch 'A'*) a river with steep and rocky banks which for most of its course presented an obstacle to troops.

A frontal assault of the enemy was impossible and the only alternative was to cross the river and attack one of his flanks. The guides had informed Wellesley that there was no ford across the Kaitna in that area, but Wellesley had noticed two villages opposite each other, and felt that there must be a ford across the river at that point. A tributary stream, the Juah, joined the main stream about a mile below the ford.


Wellesley was the first man into the river; the water was less than three feet deep. As more Indian and British troops approached the ford, they began to receive fire from the heavy Maratha artillery pieces from the direction of Assaye. An 18 pound solid shot took off the head of Wellesley's orderly dragoon. Both armies were now on the tongue of land between the Kaitna and Juah, which a mile above the ford narrowed to a width of a mile. It was here, at the narrowest point, that Wellesley formed his line of battle. Meanwhile the enemy,

though they had been slow to react to Wellesley's move, had by now realised that they were about to be attacked from the flank and had re-formed to face him. It was a difficult manoeuvre to change front in the crowded place and only well-trained troops could have performed it. Their line along the Kaitna had been abandoned and the infantry with guns interspersed now faced Wellesley's across the narrowest part of the tongue between the streams (See Map Sketch 'B'). On the enemy's left, and held by them, was the village of Assaye, packed with guns and infantry, well covered behind strong mud walls. This was impregnable by direct assault without artillery preparation by such a small force as Wellesley's. Further, a fierce enfilading fire could develop from Assaye. Wellesley's therefore determined to deliver his main attack on the enemy's right and leave Assaye well to his own right.

Wellesley's infantry were in two lines. His first line of infantry from south to north on the far left were H M 78th Highlanders, 1/10 Madras and the line continued to the right in much less strength as a series of pickets consisting of 1/8 Madras and detachments of 1/2 Madras, the rest of whom were guarding the camp. The second line of infantry from south to north were 1/4 Madras, 2/12 Madras and H M 74th Highlanders. (See Map Sketch 'C'). Wellesley's plan was that 78th Highlanders and 1/10 Madras were to pivot in a wheeling movement, driving the enemy, who were crowded into a narrow space, back upon the Juah river. Since Assaye village was so strongly held, it could be dealt with during the main advance and the right hand troops were instructed to keep well away from the village. The infantry attack by H M 78th, 1/10 Madras, 1/8, 1/4 and 2/12 went in well, and about 900 yards of the southern portion of Pohlmann's line was shattered and about forty pieces of field artillery taken.

To the north of 2/12, things did not go exactly as planned. Lt Col Orrock, the Commander of the pickets, made one of those tragic and inexplicable battlefield mistakes that occur all too frequently in military history. He had been told by Wellesley to incline to his right far enough to allow space for 1/4 and 2/12 Madras and then to straighten up and attack on the flank of 2/12. The King's 74th would then come forward on his right to complete the British line, all out of effective artillery range of the fortified village of Assaye.

Orrock misunderstood his orders, or missed his way, or both. He went straight ahead towards Assaye with three and a half companies against forty guns and 10,000 matchlocks. The 74th followed him and also a part of 2/12. The pickets were practically annihilated.



Of the fifty men from one picket of 1/2 Madras (later 1st Punjabis) 21 were killed and 24 wounded. 2/12 Madras lost 228 but they continued to move as a compact body. The 74th was reduced from a battalion to little more than a company, losing 17 officers and 400 men. At this critical juncture, the Marathas loosed a charge of cavalry at the already decimated infantry in front of Assaye village. There is some controversy about the counter-charge by the British-Indian cavalry. Some accounts have it that Wellesley himself ordered the counter-charge, whereas the credit in some other accounts is given to Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell of 19th Dragoons, appointed the overall cavalry commander, who alongwith the 4th Madras Cavalry charged straight at the on coming Maratha Horse. In the frightful shock that followed, discipline told against the immense superiority of numbers crowded in too narrow a space. Now the infantry could advance again; a second cavalry charge by the 19th Dragoons, 4 th 5th, and 7th Madras cavalry was put in and the whole Maratha line was driven back on the Juah.

Matters did not end there. Another attack had to be put in on Pohlmann's third position along the Juah. Wellesley's horse Diomed was piked and he was almost certainly fighting with his own sabre at least for a short time. Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, the Cavalry commander, was killed in this attack. The action was finally decided by a bayonet charge by the 78th against which Pohlmann's soldiers broke and fled across the Juah.

It was an astonishing victory. Wellesley had 22 cannon all of small calibre to more than a hundred, of which 98 were captured. His infantry was outnumbered by atleast three to one, counting on the enemy side only trained troops with French officers. His men had marched 24 miles before the battle began. His cavalry was outnumbered by more than ten to one.

Wellesley was not a man to use superlatives lightly, but he used them often of Assaye. He wrote : 'I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops; they advanced (in the best order and the greatest steadiness under a most destructive fire .....All agree that the battle was the fiercest that has been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably; the sepoys astonished me. Years later, after his peninsular wars and Waterloo, when his battles were distant memories, his friend, Mr Chad of the diplomatic Service asked him what was 'the best thing' he ever did in the way of fighting. 'Assaye' replied the Duke of Wellington somberly. He did not add a word.

Assaye was a General's battle, as Wellesley kept strict personal control from the start to the finish. When things went wrong as at Orrock's attack on Assaye, contrary to his orders, he quickly reiterated the situation which could have ended in defeat. By careful training, he welded the Madrasis and the British regiments into one instrument; neither could claim a preponderance in valour.

One cannot help wondering at the great risk he took in placing his troops on a narrow strip of land between two rivers with no room for manoeuvre. He certainly could not have done so, if the enemy was lead by a reasonably capable commander not to speak one of the calibre of Napoleon. As it was, both Scindia and Berar departed from the field of battle as soon as the fighting started.

#### ARGAON

Argaon (situated about a hundred miles to the north east of Assaye) was a small battle compared to Assaye both in terms of political implications and the fierceness of actual battle. Assaye was, at one time a matter of 'touch and go', as Waterloo was to be much later. As a matter of fact, after Assaye, Wellesley's next objective was Gawilghar, the principal enemy fortress in the hills which separated Berar's country from Hyderabad. However, he once again found, much to his surprise, the Marathas drawn up for battle south of the village Argaon. And Wellesley was never a Commander to refuse battle, especially if it helped to drive in another nail in the coffin of the Maratha Confederacy, which was already in the process of disintegration.

The Marathas never stood a chance at Argaon as Wellesley's army had joined up with that of Stevenson. Further, Scindia had sued for an armistice after Assaye, which Wellesley saw no harm in granting, if he could separate him from Berar. The infantry and artillery of Scindia had been practically wiped out at Assaye, and at Argaon, the bulk of the Maratha force consisted of Berar's army with some of Scindia's cavalry. Why then did the Marathas stand and fight at Argaon? One explanation given by some writers is that Berar's brother Manu Bapu, a brave and capable soldier, wanted to redeem the honour which he felt he had lost at Assaye. This explanation seems to be over-romantic and far-fetched, but the truth may lie somewhere between the desire of the Marathas to redeem themselves after their defeat at Assaye and also fight a battle on ground of their own choice. They also felt that they had learnt some bitter lessons at


Assaye, which they could put to good use in tackling the British at Argaon.

Wellesley met Stevenson on the morning of 29 November 1603 at Patterly as previously arranged. Both the commanders climbed a tower, which allowed an all-round view from the top. The Marathas were in plain sight to the north and lined up for battle. The only problem was one of fatigue: Wellesley's army had marched eighteen miles since dawn; Stevenson's had covered a similar distance. Wellesley was once more faced with the choice of attacking with an exhausted army (as at Assaye) but he decided to attack and orders to that effect were given quickly.

The British armies advanced north from Patterly in four columns. Wellesley's cavalry was on the extreme right; his infantry came next. Stevenson's cavalry including the so called Moguls, a cavalry part of the Nizam's forces, was to the extreme left with his infantry adjacent to Wellesley's (See Map for detailed dispositions). The four British columns approached the village of Sirsoli and the plain of Argaon from the south. At that time, it was covered with millet, the individual stalks of which were seven to nine feet high. A man on foot could neither see nor be seen. The plain was flat, but was cut by deep narrow ditches. The Marathas had taken up position behind the ditches which would act as an obstacle to British cavalry and even infantry would have to slow down. A nullah ran generally north from south of Sirsoli to Argaon.

Wellesley made a quick personal reconnaissance. The narrow ditches caused him considerable anxiety, but he had no option to a head-on attack, as there were only about three and a half hours of daylight left, and there was no time for manoeuvre. Arthur Wellesley met Colonel Stevenson near Sirsoli and quickly explained his battle plan. The nullah would be the boundary between their forces; Stevenson's force would be to the west of the nullah and his own to the east with their cavalry on either flank.

As the British vanguard entered the plain, they came clearly into the view of the Maratha gunners, who opened fire with their 18-pounders at the considerable range of 3000 yards. As often happened in these days, the first round were more accurate than those which followed. The air overhead was filled with the awe inspiring sound of the passage of large shot discharged by fifty Maratha guns. One of the balls struck a bullock-drawn British 6-pounder and the bullocks bolted in fright through the ranks of the British advance-guard.



Another gun team did likewise and soon the advance-guard of about six companies of sepoys was in full flight, although the same units had fought valiantly at Assaye. Luckily, Wellesley himself was within 150 yards of the spot and endeavoured to stop their flight. When he did not succeed, he quickly ordered their officers to lead the men back under cover of the village, and rally them. By 4.30 p.m. all his troops were in line and he ordered Stevenson and his own force to advance cautiously. Wellesley did not want to repeat the mistake committed by the British at Assaye, of blundering headlong on to the Maratha artillery, which had already given notice of its strength.

The British-Indian infantry had advanced for about 2000 yards under desultory Maratha fire but suffered only a few casualties because the enemy gunners were initially at almost maximum range. Later on, they were tired and their pieces overheated. Wellesley allowed his infantry to continue its slow advance until it was within 600 yards of the enemy. Then he gave a pre-arranged signal on which the artillery bullocks wheeled and brought their gun muzzles to bear on the enemy. The artillery fire, at the rate of about three rounds per minute, was very effective and grape tore into the Maratha infantry and artillery.

In the meanwhile, Wellesley's cavalry and attached artillery attacked Berar's cavalry and after a stiff fight, put them to flight. Field guns were important in cavalry actions in India; one shot often caused several casualties and had a tremendous effect on morale. This is where the British scored; they had light horse-drawn artillery with their cavalry whereas the Indian artillery was cumbersome and heavy.

In the centre where Wellesley was personally in command, the British did not find things so easy. Manu Bapu, the Maratha Commander, kept his disciplined infantry steady and sent forward a unit of 1000 to 1500 Arabs, the best professional soldiers in India. One might think it odd that Arabs were fighting in Berar's army, but by this time, the Maratha army was made up of men of different religions and races. The Arabs fought valiantly and fell almost to a man.

After the elimination of the Arabs, Wellesley sent the entire infantry-artillery line forward; the units moved individually and carefully and not in a line as at Assaye. Both infantry and artillery had to cross ditches in order to get at the enemy. One battalion after another would cross a ditch, form on the other side and continue the attack. The battle in the centre was decided in these isolated infantry

duels. In every case, the King's and EIC units defeated the enemy. Manu Bapu's men withdrew to the rear in panic. Stevenson's force on the left won after an even less arduous fight. The British and EIC cavalry units pursued the unfortunate Maratha infantry for two days, during which thousands of Marathas were killed. At Assaye, the British had sustained too many casualties and were too tired to pursue the enemy, but at Argaon, they were relatively fresh.


The casualties suffered by the combined armies of Wellesley and Stevenson during the battle of Argaon were: Indians 31 killed, 148 wounded and 5 missing; British 15 killed and 145 wounded. As against this, the Marathas suffered greatly.

In his usual style, Wellesley kept a tight control of the battle. He personally carried out reconnaissances from the tower at Parterly and on the ground just before the battle. Very few Commanders gave so much importance to personal reconnaissance as Wellesley did. He never forgot the lesson of Sultanpetta Tope, where he was completely lost during the night during the seige of Seringapatam. He was at hand to rally the two battalions who had fled back in disorder when they came under heavy artillery fire. He overcame the problem of the ditches by ensuring that units reformed after crossing them. Argaon once again proved the meticulous detail which Wellesley went into, his ideas of precise movement and efficient staff work.

#### GAWILGHAR

The next objective after the battle of Argaon was the Fort of GAWILGHAR, where the remnants of Bhonsle's army, including Manu Bapu had taken refuge, and reinforced the original considerable garrison under Beni Singh, the killadar. Gawilghar lies about fifty miles north-east of Argaon. In other words, Assaye, Argaon and Gawilghar lie north-east of Aurangabad almost in a straight line at distances of fifty, one hundred and fifty and two hundred miles respectively.

The Gawilghar fort was all but impregnable except from the north. The approaches from the south consisted of two 'tracks' leading to the fortress from the valley below, on which no attacking force of any size could advance. The easterly approach was so difficult that it would not even take bullock carts. The westerly track was narrow and steep and was not suitable for deployment of an artillery force.



The only possible approach was from the north. The two rocky hills on which the fortress had been built were connected on the north by a narrow strip of land to a range of hills about 3600 feet high, stretching many miles in an east-west direction (See Map).

Wellesley began his operations by sending 1/2 Madras to occupy Deogaon on 6 December 1803. He also sent 1/6 Madras and two companies of 94th to seize the fortified village of Damergaon.

The two British armies moved out of Ellichpoor on 7 Dec. 1803. Wellesley advanced to Deogaon which would act as his base for the operation. Stevenson's army, temporarily reinforced by two of Wellesley's 12-pounders, and artillery and engineer personnel, had a much more difficult assignment. The Madras Pioneers constructed a track to Lobada, by cutting trees and negotiating difficult, hilly country. After four days of exhausting work, Stevenson's army complete with its battering artillery and ammunition concentrated at Lobada. This army was to carry out the main assault from the north.

Wellesley was at Lobada on the evening of 10 December because Stevenson was ill and had been so since Argaon. For the next five days he shuttled between the two armies.

During the night of 11th, a breaching battery was begun on the crest of a small rise overlooking the north tank only 250 yards from the northern wall of the outer fort. On the morning of 12th, fire was opened from two 18-pounders and three 12-pounders. There was an enfilading battery set further back and to the east to keep the enemy from repairing the walls.

The 18-pounder and 12-pounder shot travelling at more than 1,200 feet per second caused extensive damage after a few hours bombardment. Almost every round brought down chunks of masonry. There were to be three breaches in all, a wide one in the lower wall and two to the upper structure. By the morning of the 14th the breaches were thought practical. Wellesley had a close look with a telescope and decided on an assault the next day. Stevenson was still not well and Wellesley continued to direct both armies, giving verbal orders and discussing all pertinent details with Stevenson's Corps Commanders. He confirmed his orders in writing later that day from his camp at Deogaon.

These orders are in the Supplementary despatches Volume IV and are an example of precision and clarity. They are short and to the

point, and yet included details such as what tools the pioneers with the assaulting detachment would carry and the measures to be taken to stop the troops from plundering.

Wellesley's attack from the south had no hope of taking the place, but two diversionary assaults were to be made under Colonels Wallace and Chalmers. The aim of these divisionary assaults was to draw the attention of the Marathas to the southern approaches, whereas the main assault would come in from the north.

The assault party was led by Lieutenant Colonel Kenny of 1/11 Madras, with the Grenadier company and two battalion companies of the King's 94th and the three flank companies of the 1/11, the 2/11 and 2/7 Madras. They were also small units of pioneers and artillery, making a total of about 1000 men in all.

Kenny's party entered the outer fort without much difficulty but the stronger inner fort proved a more difficult problem as there was a ravine between the two forts, and there were a number of gates to overcome. Kenny fell mortally wounded while advancing through the inner fort but the action which probably ensured the quick capture of the inner fort was a daring ascent by Captain Campbell and eighty men of the King's 94th up the steep face of the cliff to the north-west of the inner fort, and climbing the wall by a ladder. These men admitted the rest of the British force into the inner fort. All organised resistance soon collapsed thereafter.

British/Indian casualties were light, a total of only 126, but the Marathas suffered terribly. There was practically no way out for them and quarter was not normally given when fortresses were stormed in those days. It is assumed that about half the total garrison of 8000 were killed; the rest managed to escape somehow by jumping steep cliffs and by using their turbans to lower themselves. Manu Bapu was killed sword in hand and so was the killadar.

Wellesley's own contribution to the victory was as much physical as mental. He directed both armies and rode an average of forty five miles per day during the siege and assault. The victory depended also on the professional skill of his armies, especially the engineers and artillery men and on the dominance of the British/Indian infantry. Wellesley was able to retain the initiative and keep pressure on the enemy. He won with a combination of military expertise, fighting efficiency and audacity.

## ARTHUR WELLESLEY AS A SOLDIER IN INDIA

'I understood as much of military matters when I came back from India as I have ever done since' the Duke said long after Waterloo. This statement had to be taken with a pinch of salt, since no man with a mind as analytical as Arthur Wellesley, could fail to learn a lot more during his wars against French forces in the Spanish Peninsula. However, his professional military skills were developed to a maximum while he was in India, where his young mind was receptive to new ideas.

What were the greatest characteristics of Arthur Wellesley as a soldier during his stay in India ?

Probably the most important was his physical fitness and stamina, at a time when most British Commanders were unfit through over-indulgence. Wellesley rode forty-five miles a day during the siege of Gawilghar, and felt no worse for it. Time and again he was to prove that he was supremely fit in a land, where every European in those days, fell prey to some malady or the other.

The second was his eye for detail. He would go into the minutest problems such as the best feed for the bullocks and the transportation of pontoons overland, and seemed to have a finger in every pie as far as administration and logistics were concerned. He was well ahead of his time in these two important aspects of warfare and may even be considered superior in this respect to Napoleen, one of the all time great Captains of war, with whom he finally clashed at Waterloo.

Wellesley's intelligence in India was first rate for those days. He used hirkaras, the long established spies and scouts of India, who for centuries had sold more or less correct military information to both sides, but Wellesley managed to gain more from the facts he received. He was exceptionally good for his time at delegating work and responsibility, but he never delegated the collection and interpretation of information.

Wellesley's tactical acumen was sound and he kept a tight grip on his battles especially when things went wrong as at Assaye. But one wonders if he could have taken the risks that he did in India against troops led by good commanders in Europe.

He fought both Assaye and Argaon in the afternoon after his troops had marched nearly twenty miles; and although fit, were tired. At Assaye, he positioned his troops in a narrow neck of land hardly

a mile wide between two rivers, to take the enemy on the flank, but thereby limiting his own capability to manoeuvre. Orrock's charge at the Maratha artillery, which inflicted the maximum casualties on the British-Indian force, may partly have been due to lack of space.

Wellesley placed great reliance on personal reconnaissance, even at some risk to himself. The lesson he learnt at Sultanpeta Tope in front of Seringapatam, where he had to flounder about lost at night, left a lasting impression on his mind and he never attacked a position later, unless he had carried out a reconnaissance by day.

Few Englishmen have ever been able to get on as well with Indians as Wellesley. He just treated them as if their skins were white. He spoke the vernacular of his day and knew how to appeal to Indian soldiers. At times, he vented his wrath on Indians saying 'The natives are the most mischievous, deceitful race of people I have seen or read of', a statement which is not dissimilar to the one he made after the battle of Vittoria about British soldiers being 'the scum of the earth'. Both statements appear to have been made in the heat of the moment.

Some over-enthusiastic admirers of Wellesley put him on par or even superior to Napoleen in overall military ability saying "One of Wellesley's advantages over Bonaparte was his ability to personally command forces of any size and composition quickly, flawlessly and with complete confidence. He went to special trouble to see that every unit he had, could drill and manoeuvre impeccably. The French emperor could not drill even a battalion; his artillery background and his phenomenally rapid rise up the military ladder prevented him from developing this skill." It is quite evident that these people are biased in favour of Wellington; Napoleen was a military genius and figures in practically every list of great Captains of War in the company of such Commanders as Hannibal, Ceaser and Alexander whereas Wellington's name seldom figures in these lists. Napoleon's battles were fought on a much vaster scale than those of Wellington and his opponents were generally of a higher calibre than those who opposed Wellington. However, in certain fields such as logistics and administration, Wellington had the edge over Nopolean, who seldom bothered about these things. Wellington cannot match the sheer brilliance with which Napoleon, conducted his battles, but he was an outstanding Commander in the true British mould, solid and steady in adversity, with the right amount of dash when required in attack.

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## Letters to the Editor

**The Editor**  
**USI Journal**

### LET US REORGANISE OUR LOGISTIC SERVICES

**C**OLONEL Gurdial Singh's article "Let us Reorganise Our Logistic Services" is indeed a very good and timely article. It is time we took stock of the existing situation and organise ourselves accordingly. The resistance to change and to orthodox thinking has to be overcome in the national interest.

However there are one or two points at which one would differ with the Colonel. For instance, though we can and should reduce the "divisional slice" however we cannot reduce it to the level of Pakistan because of the differences in the type of government in the two countries. While Pakistan being a police state and under martial law can plan to muster all the resources in a very short period of time, being a democracy it would be very difficult for us to do the same. Till such time as the war actually breaks out and DIR are pressed into service, and even then only when patriotic fervour grips our countrymen can the Armed Forces expect some help and cooperation from our civilian brethren and by then it may be a trifle too late or in any case we start the War with a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis our adversary. Thus we have to accept and have a larger element of logistic services. It is uneconomical but that is part of the price we have to pay for being a democratic country.

Another point which most of us generally forget is that the next war as and when it comes would be quite different from the last one. To begin with we would not get the long notice/warning we got in 1971. In 1971 events indicated that a war was likely several months before it actually broke out. It would be naive to expect the same type of notice/warning yet I have heard so often people quoting that as in 1971 all will work out well. Following the successful 1967 Israeli pre-emptive air raid the Pakistanis attempted a similar type of pre-emptive air strike on 3rd December 1971. That they did not achieve any measure of success, particularly since we were prepared for it is besides the point. The success achieved by the Egyptians in October 1973 may tempt our adversary to try a similar type of feat and we have to be prepared to meet such a situation. The Israelis were able to

recover because of their excellent national mobilisation scheme. Can our country mobilise in the same manner? In this scenario when a sudden two week war is forced on to us one wonders whether our fighting formations located in the South would even be able to reach the front before the war is almost if not entirely over. Thus not only must we expect a short sharp and intense war but we must be prepared to face a surprise or sudden attack.

As far as Colonel Gurdial's suggestion about reducing the MT companies of ASC Battalions it should be obvious that we cannot accept any large scale reduction in the MT companies. It would be preferable to permit army vehicles to carry civil supplies rather than permit any reduction in their numbers. Besides we cannot risk depending on civil infrastructure. The civil infrastructure should be used to supplement but not replace our existing MT.

It is indeed true and unfortunate that most of the doctors in field formations both in unit and in the staff are under employed while the doctors in the hospitals remain very busy. These doctors could and should do duties in the military hospitals which would help them also as they will remain in touch with their profession. With the new medical organisation in the divisions the administrative elements within the medical organisation have doubled in that both Field Ambulances now run separate offices, canteens etc leading to duplication. It would therefore be desirable to have a single medical unit in the division which would have the same medical resources as at present but would reduce the overheads.

Colonel Gurdial's views on provisioning, issue and repair of stores and equipment would appear to be very radical but they are very relevant. His suggestions are very pragmatic and must be implemented. Narrow loyalties and empire building tendencies must be overcome in the larger interest of the service and the nation. Let us hope the higher authorities are able to overcome the resistance to change. We should not wait for a war to learn lessons from. Let us prepare for the next and not the last War.

10 Jan 1982

57 Mtn Div Sig Regt C/o 99 APO

Maj R K Kukreja

## THE MARTIAL RACES OF INDIA

THE review by BMB of Lt General Sir George MacMunn's book, "The Martial Races of India", in the USI journal would make potential readers feel that it is not worth reading. The review offers the Reviewers political opinions, formed long after the events have taken place and he finally dismisses the General as a 'military historian whose writings should be taken with a pinch of salt! He thus consigns the book to the rubbish heap, implicitly including with it the millions of soldiers who fought the wars of India, just because they belonged to a class who took to the profession of Arms, overlooking that the same classes are still fighting the wars of India.

It is a fact that all India's armies, whether Rajput, Mahratta, Tamil, Moghul, British or Ancient were recruited from classes which took to the profession, as one of honour. The wars of the Mahabharata and Ramayana were fought by the Kshatriyas and other such tribes, the second Commander-in-Chief of the Kauravas being a brahmin, Dronacharya—another martial class of MacMunn's books. Our present day committed historians may want to rewrite these two epics. The Moghuls fought their wars with Muslim, Rajput and other Hindu troops, Akbar's best General being a Rajput. The Mahratta confederacy had a strong contingent of Arabs and Afghans. Ranjit Singh's army consisted of Punjabi Mussalmans (mostly of Rajput extraction), Dogras and Afghans. If today, for political reasons, the word 'martial' is anathema, the realities are different. We can't blame Gen MacMunn for a concept which is not British, but entirely Indian. Till independence, Indians of all shades of thought never adverted that all Indians could make good soldiers. The Indian members of the prewar Federal Public Service Commission who interviewed candidates for the Indian Military Academy were strong believers of the martial concept.

Lt General Sir George MacMunn wrote his first book, "The Armies of India" in 1911 as an Artillery Major. This was long before the Simon Commission and before the Garhwals refused to fire on the Pathans of the NWFP. Incidentally, the same Pathans raided Jammu & Kashmir in 1947 and took away hundreds of women, looting and killing. The second book of MacMunn has followed on the same lines and to accuse him of writing to strengthen the Simon report does not carry much credence. The best accounts of India, its religions, its populace, its tribes, the Gazetteers, were all written by the British and other Europeans and still form the best and truest

record of the country. Implication of motives is not the best way of improving on the records.

Both of Lt General MacMunn's books make excellent reading because :—

- (a) It was written by one who appears to have a good background knowledge of ancient and later day Indian History;
- (b) He has great sympathy and understanding of the classes recruited then, many of whom are still recruited;
- (c) He has enumerated all the classes; of the North (the Turks, Afghans, Rajputs, Jats, Gurkhas, Brahmins) and the South (Mahrattas, Tamils, Telugus, Deccani Mahammadens);
- (d) He has written of them with admiration, his profoundest being for the Rajputs—and who does not admire the Rajputs and their history ?
- (e) His knowledge of India is extensive and more than what many Indians can boast of.

Gen MacMunn has brought in Mahatma Gandhi's name in just a couple of lines— “.....the gentle yet merciless race of hereditary money lenders from which Lala Gandhi springs”. Have we got to be so sensitive ? He has generally approved of the Simon report. He, however, strongly supports the Indianisation scheme and saw a good future for the Indian Officers. A few opinions here and there which run counter to ones own prejudices should not lead to an outright condemnation of a useful book.

If you wish to learn of the old Indian army from pre-Alexandrian days to this day, the two excellent books of Lt General Sir George MacMunn are worth reading and including in ones own library.

20 Feb 1982  
Pushpanjali  
Marcara (Coorg)

C. M. Belliappa  
Colonel

## BOOK REVIEWS

AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR : THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1950-1975  
by GEORGE C. HERRING

(Published by John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1979) pp. 298 price not given.

THE publication under review has been brought out as a volume of the "America in Crisis" series of books on American Diplomatic History under the editorship of Robert A. Divine who has written the Foreword to this book. The thirty-year Vietnam war, 1945-75, reminds us of the devastating Thirty Year's War of Europe, 1618-1648. This book, however, confines its scope to American involvement in the Vietnam War during 1950-75 at first to uphold French control and then to build and maintain South Vietnamese independence, in which five U. S. Presidents had to lick their wounds of failure, more than \$ 150 billions went down the Vietnamese drain and about 50,000 American combatants lost their lives. In his book "The Real War", R. Nixon has tried to justify his Vietnam policy of Vietnamisation of the conflict, with continued US support to Saigon with arms and equipment, but the 'Watergate' eroded his power and legitimacy, leading to the cut-back of U. S. arms aid by the U. S. Congress and the eventual collapse of South Vietnam.

The author has made a perceptive analysis of the causes of the American defeat and the South Vietnamese collapse. The economic crisis of 1974 compounded President Thieu's political woes, the Buddhists agitated for peace and reconciliation with the Communists, and the Catholics, the most important base of support for the Government, organized an anti-corruption campaign against Thieu. At home, in USA, the people became sick of the prolonged war and Senator E. Kennedy gave vent to the public sentiments against America's "endless support for an endless War". Nixon's ill-advised promises tempted Thieu to reject the path of negotiations and to launch a war he could not win. When the Americans decided to withdraw from Vietnam, their departure was in chaotic and hostile atmosphere. "The spectacle of U. S. Marines using rifle butts to keep desperate Vietnamese from blocking escape routes and of angry ARVN soldiers firing on the

departing Americans provided a tragic epitaph for twenty five years of American involvement in Vietnam".

"The most significant, most enduring and still least predictable effects of the war are the changes it worked on the attitudes of the American people towards themselves and their place in the world". A whopping 72 per cent of Americans concluded at the end of 1978 that the Vietnam war "more than a mistake, it was fundamentally wrong and immoral". Again, some military analysts have, without selfexculpation, opined that since the Americans would not like to be involved any more in long drawn-out, costly wars, USA in any future conflict must employ its military power overwhelmingly. In conclusion, the author has observed : "Vietnam made clear the inherent unworkability of a policy of global containment. In the 1940s the world seemed dangerous but manageable. The United States enjoyed a position of unprecedented power and influence, and achieved some notable early successes in Europe. Much of America's power derived from the weakness of other nations rather than from its own intrinsic strength, however, and Vietnam demonstrated conclusively that its power, however great, had limits. The development of significant military capabilities by the Soviet Union and China made it too risky for the United State to use its military power in Vietnam on a scale necessary to achieve the desired results. He further said "To adapt to the new era, the United States must recognize its vulnerability, accept the limits to its power and accommodate itself to many situations it does not like. Americans must understand that they will not be able to dictate solutions to world problems or to achieve all of their goals. Like it or not, Vietnam marked the end of an era in world history and of American foreign policy, an era marked by constructive achievements but blemished by ultimate, although not irreparable, failure."

This is an excellent book, complete with maps, suggestions for additional reading and an Index, which will be welcome by one and all, interested in the Vietnam episode.

B. C.

HOW IT WAS : THE WAR AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN THE  
SOVIET UNION  
by L. I. BREZHNEV

(Published by Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1979) pp. 111 price not given.

THIS is part of L. Brezhnev's memoirs originally written in Russian, but subsequently translated into English. A unique personality of

Communist Russia, Brezhnev, who is now both President of the USSR and Secretary-General of the Central Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has a chequered career and enviable record on both fronts of War and Peace. A metallurgist, he had gone up the entire ladder from stoker to engineer-before devoting himself to Party work. In this book he has described his involvement as a political commissar during the Second World War on the southern front of the Soviet Union, and also the part played by him in the post-war reconstruction in Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk regions, where he was sent by the Central Committee of the Communist Party as the First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Party.

During the war of attrition with Germans, in April 1943, he was posted with the famous 18th Army on Malaya Zemlya beachhead, in the suburbs of Novorossiisk, which jutted like a cape into Tsemesskaya Bay of the Black Sea, and witnessed some of the bloodiest actions of the entire war. He fought in the Caucasus, in the fields of Ukraine, crossed the Carpathian ridges and took part in the liberation of Poland Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The landing on Malaya Zemlya in the teeth of fierce German opposition was possible due to special training courses which prepared the Russian troops in handling weapons blind-folded, leaping into the sea with machine guns, climbing cliffs and throwing grenades from awkward positions. It is to be remembered that 3 million Russian Communists fell valiantly at the fronts of World War II and 5 million patriots joined the Party during the War years. Brezhnev says : "History has many examples of individual heroism but only in our great country, only under the leadership of our great Party did the Soviet people show that they were capable of mass heroism." This was possible due to the motivation and political work carried out by the Party among the Soviet troops. For instance, the troops on Malaya Zemlya pricked their fingers to draw out blood with which they signed an oath to defend their beachhead against the Nazis. The political workers inspired the troops on the battlefield by their personal example of courage and self-sacrifice, and hence they "were the heart and soul of the armed forces."

The Novorossiisk landing operation, in which even torpedoes were used for a strike against the shore, "was one of the biggest and most outstanding of the war." Brezhnev has drawn this important conclusion from this war that "There must never again be another war."

In the second part of the book-The Reconstruction-the author has given an interesting account of his post-War reconstruction work first in Zaporozhye and then in Dnepropetrovsk. Within a year the famous Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Station was rehabilitated and electricity was produced again early in the spring of 1947. This was followed by the rebirth of the Ordzonikidze Iron and steel works in Zaporozhye. Later, Dnepropetrovsk was rebuilt, the mines in Krivoi Rog and Nikopol were reopened and the rebirth phase of the national economy was completed by 1950.

This publication shows how Brezhnev helped the country during war and peace with tact and courage, with great managerial competence and uncommon insight into the nation's destiny. It should be read by all who want to know about the great dedication of the Russian Party and patriots to the building up of what USSR is to-day.

VIRGIN LANDS : TWO YEARS IN KAZAKHSTAN, 1954-55

by L. I BREZHNEV

(Published by Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1979) pp. 100, price not given.

LEONID Brezhnev, whose father was a worker and grandfather a peasant, himself had a go at both factory and farm work. Although he began his working life as a factory worker, in the years of economic disruption, during long stoppages at the factory, he learnt to plough, sow and reap. Later he worked as a land-use surveyor in the Kursk Region of Byelorussia and in the Urals, but although subsequently, he went back to metallurgy interest in agriculture never flagged.

At the end of January 1954, P. K. Ponomarenko and L. Brezhnev were assigned the task of opening up the virgin lands in Kazakhstan by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. They were elected First Secretary and Second Secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party respectively, but two years later Brezhnev became the First Secretary. This book is an account of what Brezhnev and his comrades did to bring 27 million hectares of Steppe land under cultivation in only two years. The virgin land project in Kazakhstan was taken up as a national project, to be completed on war footing, and for this thousands of volunteer workers, scientists, technicians, etc. came from all over USSR to implement the task. In 1954 alone, over 22,000 new tractors and 1,000 new combines were brought

to the virgin land (Tselina). Many came to work, but settled here. One Ivan Ivanovich, hailing from Leningrad, who had lost both of his legs in defending his native city during the Second World War, came to Kazakhstan and stayed on as a fine machine operator, adding two Orders of Lenin and a Hero's Gold Star—awards for labour—to his war medals. "Everything that the Party did in the virgin lands was an epic of innovation, and an extremely successful one", says the author. Although, initially many doubted the result of this stupendous work undertaken by the virgin landers in the face of destructive droughts that visited the land once in ten years (Even Khrushchev cut Brezhnev short sharply saying : "We can't make pies out of your promises"). Ultimately the project was a great success, pouring about 16 million tons of Kazakhstan grain on average per year into the national granary of USSR. Way back in 1955, private sector vegetable growing was resorted to on a broad scale by giving everyone, who wanted, a plot of land. The same policy was adopted for poultry and the sale of animals for personal use.

As a result of unusually hard work, the author suffered a heart attack, but he was truly happy when in 1954 Kazakhstan was awarded its first Order of Lenin for the 16 million tons of virgin land grain. During 1954-1977, total expenditure on the Kazakhstan Republic's agriculture amounted to 21.1 billion rubles, and the turnover from the sale of grain in these years yielded 27.2 billion rubles—thus leaving a clear profit of 6.1 billion rubles, leaving aside the value of the fixed and working assets of the Kazakh collective and state farms amounting to 15 billion roubles. The development of virgin lands led to its all-round development industrially and culturally. Ninety new cities have come up here and the republic now produces coal, oil, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, mineral fertilizers, modern machine tools, machines, and tractors, and it has even a fast-breeder reactor. "It has become a symbol of selfless service to the homeland, a great achievement of the socialist era", the author concludes.

The book, containing some illustrations and a map of the area, will be found very interesting and educative by every reader.

B. C.

HISTORY OF THE CORPS OF ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERS,  
1943-1972

by COL SUSHIL JAGOTA, VSM

(Published by Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment, New Delhi. 1981) pp. 444, price not given

ALTHOUGH in 1977, an introductory volume on the IEME was published under the title, "Their Formative Years", the book under review is, in fact, the comprehensive story of the IEME. This book has been divided into four parts. Part I deals with the formative years, starting from the days of the East India Company, when between 1824 and 1843, Sappers and Miners were raised as three self-administered Corps under the command of Engineer officers, right up to the Second World War. During 1823-1850, an ordnance Department was also organised. The Supply and Transport Corps had for long been responsible for the maintenance and repair of all animal transport carts and general service wagons in the Army, and hence, later, its duties were extended to all kinds of mechanical transport when the same was introduced in the service. Thus M. T. was added to S. T. as a prelude to the formation of the Corps of EME later.

With the unification of the three Presidency Armies, three Presidency Ordnance Departments were amalgamated in April 1884 to form the Indian Army Ordnance Corps (IAOC). On 17 April 1923, the ST Corps was renamed as Indian Army Service Corps (IASC), and on 3 June 1935, "Royal" was added to it to make it RIASC.

Following the formation of REME in Britain on 10 October 1942, IEME was formed in India on 2 March, 1943.

Part II of the book dwells upon IEME's activities through the Second World War till 1947, while Part III describes its role in the post-Independence Operations in India and abroad, its Training Institutions and personnel, and Part IV gives a glimpse of its sports, honours and awards, etc.

It is interesting to note that one of the officers of this Corps, Maj. Gen. S. P. Vohra, was awarded PVSM in 1968, two ORs got Kirti Chakra; Naib Subedar Milkha Singh and Major HPS Ahluwalia were awarded Padma Shri for excellence in athletics and mountaineering respectively, and Jam. Jit Singh was awarded Vir Chakra for gallantry in the face of the enemy.

The book has 38 illustrations, 19 Maps and 4 charts, besides 3 Appendices, Select Bibliography and an Index. Soldiers and students

of military history who want to know about this important service of the Army-the EME-will certainly find this publication informative and satisfying.

IN FATHER'S FOOTSTEPS : A POLICEMAN'S ODYSSEY

by M. K. SINHA, IP (RETD)

(Published by Vanity Books, New Delhi, 1981) pp. 204, price Rs 60/-

IN Father Footsteps" is a sequel to "32 years in Police and After" the biography of Sri D. K. Sinha the first Indian IG of Police during the British Raj. Originally intended as the second part of his biography, it has developed into a fullfledged autobiography of his son Sri M. K. Sinha who himself rose in his father's footsteps to occupy the cove-table post of IG police of Bihar State.

As mentioned by Sri L P Singh, the Governor of Assam, in his foreword, the book presents evocative glimpses of the administrative history, leading personalities and social life of Bihar during a very eventful phase of history marking the transition from the British Raj to the sovereign democratic republic of India. The Police had always been known as the instrument of repression which the British rulers employed with impunity to crush peoples ambitions of attaining even a semblance of self respect. The transformation of such a police force into an essential and respectable organ of a democratic republic needed the infusion of an entirely new concept of its *raison-de-etre*, an absolutely different self image and ideals and a totally different approach to the society whom it was now required to serve as guide and friend. This naturally required leadership of a very high calibre. At a time when disclosures of the Bhagalpur blindings, police rebellions in various states, charges of fake encounters and brutal suppression of journalists and intellegentsia—not sparing even eminent jurists like Mr. Tarkunde, are so fresh in memory and when the image of the police—especially of Bihar Police, is at its lowest ebb, one may not be very much impressed by the author's suggestion that the challenging task of transition was successfully carried out by the top brass of the police. However this autobiography at least gives a fair idea of the stupendity of the task.

It goes to the authors credit that the book does not get laden with excessive philosophizing and sermonising as it could easily have become. Mr. Sinha has made it a simple tale weaving into its pattern numerous personal details and myriad images of his day to day experiences in such

a manner that the book makes a very interesting reading. In this process, however, occasionally the author gets drifted into mundane trivialities and too many personal details of his family life. The preface itself reads like a who's who of the Sinha family tree wherein all members of the clan appear to have the Mydas touch as far as class I services go. The author's references to the charisma of saints and rishis with extra-sensory perceptions and superhuman powers make a rather incongruous reading in a seasoned police officer's autobiography. Inspite of these weaknesses one cannot fail to notice the sincerity and humility of the man who made it to the top of the tree yet remains very modest in the description of his personal achievements.

For the serious reader, however, the Appendices serve a very useful purpose. In the five appendices Mr Sinha has presented very thought provoking papers on the Philosophy of Policing, The Art of Administration, Investigation and Trial of Criminal Cases, Communal Disharmony and the Concept of Police Sabhas. The concept of Police Sabhas has been inspired by the durbars or welfare meetings of the Armed Forces and the author lays considerable stress on the usefulness of these meetings where in grievances of a general nature are ventilated in a disciplined manner. In fact, as the autobiography reveals, the author has displayed the same concern, for the genuine grievances of his subordinates throughout his career and it won him the loyalty of his complete force at every stage in his life as a Police officer. This particular appendix and the author's total philosophy of leadership could be an eye opener for the police officials of various states where the menacing ramblings of police revolt have been heard so loudly in the recent past. Even in the three services, attainment of closer and healthier contacts between officers and men is the crying need of the day due to the higher educational achievements and the consequent boost to the ambitions at all levels. The concept may be old but needs much greater emphasis today. Similarly the author's advice to the young police officers to be absolutely above reproach to command the respect and loyalty of their men is relevant in any walk of life where leadership counts. Against the grim background of today's socio-political realities autobiographies like this could be of great use in enlarging the horizons of young service officers.

Mr. Sinha's book is a straight forward account of a sincere and unpretentious man who has a story to tell. It cannot be considered a literary achievement, it could even do with better proofreading, but it

is interesting and often inspiring. What bigger achievement could there be for an author who lays no claim to literary genius, yet can keep the reader bound to his book.

A. N. V.

DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND NAVAL QUOTATIONS

by COLONEL ROBERT DEBS HEINL, JR

(Published by UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND, 1966) pp. 367, price not given.

ALTHOUGH the title of the book is self-explanatory, nonetheless, it contains quotation on aircraft, airforce, air power, and airborne operations also. According to the author "Quotations in this Dictionary are intended to comprehend the whole art of war-its incidents, its personalities, its participants, their weapons and equipment, their traditions and customs, the warlike virtues and failings and the ways, techniques and modes of war.....in the air, on land, and sea." Because of the universality of war, this Dictionary sometimes transcends its exact bounds of the profession of arms and extends to such exotics as diplomacy, woman and comptrollership, thus extending the uses of this book to cover various types of persons, historians, military instructors, military students, information officers, speech-writers, ghost-writers, editors, librarians, briefers and other reference specialists. The author says, "The Dictionary cannot be considered as standard equipment for foxhole, sea bag or cockpit, yet hopefully, it will furnish perspective and inspiration—items never found in the allowance lists—for those who inhabit such places."

The book contains a "Table of Rubrics" at the outset, under which all subjects of quotation have been listed alphabetically. Next to this, there is an Index of Sources, i. e., the authors of the quotations, again arranged alphabetically. The book is quite comprehensive, covering quotations from the age of Old Testament to that of the Vietnam War. Persons as well as events and theories, popular ballads and even slogans have been referred to and although the anthology is basically American, it includes non-American sources from other countries also such as Sun Tzu and Xenophon, Clausewitz and Jomini, Rommel and Liddell Hart.

Incidentally, this book reveals that Napoleon Bonaparte, Sir Winston Churchill, Clausewitz, Frederick the Great, Francis Grose, General Sir I. S. M. Hamilton, Lt. Gen. T. J. Jackson, A. H. Jomini, Rudyard Kipling, T.E. Lawrence, Gen. R. E. Lee, Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart, A.T. Mahan, Mao Tse-Tung, Admiral Lord Nelson, Lt. Gen. G. S. Patton, Admiral J. J. St. Vincent, Marshal M. Comte de Saxe, William Shakespeare, Gen. W. T. Sherman, Sun Tzu, Gen. George Washington, Field Marshal Wavell and Field Marshal, Duke of Wellington as some of the most prolific quotation breeders.

Some of the interesting quotations are reproduced below :

“There is nothing certain about war except that one side won’t win.”  
—Sir Ian Hamilton.

“All a soldier needs to know is how to shoot and salute.”

—John J. Pershing

“Domestic Police canonly defeat us : foreign policy can kill us.”

—John F. Kennedy.

“In war, truth is the first casualty.”

—Aeschylus.

“Revolution is the locomotive of history”

—Karl Marx.

“Learn to obey before you command.”

—Solon of Athens.

Often the test of courage is not to die but to live.”

—Vittorio Alfieri

“Nothing so comforts the military mind as the maxim of a great but dead general.”  
—B. W. Tuchman

“War is hell.”

—William T. Sherman

“War is a wasteful, boring and muddled affair.”  
—A. P. Wavell

“The art of war in its highest point of view is policy.”

—Karl Von Clausewitz.

“In war the morale is to the material as three to one.”

—Napoleon I.

"Aerial warfare will be the most important element in future wars."

—Giulio Douhet.

"When princes think more of luxury than of arms, they lose their state." —Niccolo Machiavelli

"War forms part of the order of things instituted by God."

—Helmuth Von Moltke.

"The best form of 'warfare' for the troops is firstclass training."

—Erwin Rommel.

"Insurrection is an art as much as war."

—V. I. Lenin.

It will be seen from the above that all military men have not eulogised war. The book contains photographs of some important personalities whose quotations have adorned this book, which will certainly be found interesting and useful by all types of readers.

B. C.

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