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Sea Power-Key To Deterrence and Development

Vice Admiral M. K. Roy, M.A., AVSM

"In a modernising society deterrence encourages security and security means development. Security, however, is not military hardware—though it may include it. Security is not just military force—though it may involve it. Security is not merely traditional military activity—though it may encompass it."

THIS planet paradoxically called 'Earth' is in reality a 'water' planet, as the 3 oceans cover almost 71% of its area. It is, therefore, interesting to observe that water was the prime ingredient for the birth of civilisations. The first civilisations, therefore, can be said to be those that were located on the banks of rivers such as the Tigris and Euphrates, Yangtze and Hwang Ho, Indus, Nile and the Ganges. The advantages of such a location were that the river became the medium for movement which led to the exchange of goods, ideas and skills. This human urge for mobility also resulted in various types of propulsion being innovated such as the oared craft, sail, steam, diesel, gas and lastly nuclear propulsion.

Hence, river civilisations enjoyed an outlet to the open seas which the coastal states exploited by persuading their Governments to use the oceans for commerce and colonisation which subsequently led to the founding of empires in the 18th century by maritime powers such as Portugal, Holland, France and Britain. The seas thus became the primary arteries for ensuring the steady supply of raw materials and finished products from and to the colonies. It was, hence, not surprising that India was considered to be the brightest jewel in the British Crown.

Further, the socio-economic and political developments in these states were partly due to the influence of seafarers who were now keen to decide their own way of life in an otherwise largely feudal society. This, in turn, resulted in some of them leaving their country to settle down in other continents where they could be founding fathers of new nations. Thus, the seas, by

outflanking mountains and deserts, afforded a better escape route, as it were, for the hopes and aspirations of a substantial segment of mankind. Hence, the ship, in retrospect, played a more discernible role in 'opening up the world' than either the horse or the camel.

It is, therefore, of interest to compare the ancient Laws of the Seas with the emerging concepts, as Law inevitably develops according to the needs of the society. It will be observed that the earlier Laws of the Seas were structured around the notion of the freedom of the seas. This principle was based on two assumptions. Firstly, resources of the oceans were regarded as essentially 'inexhaustible' and secondly, resources were treated as 'res communis' which means 'belonging to all'. In view of these assumptions, the seas tended to attract attention only during political and maritime tensions but were otherwise not subjected to everyday economic or technical pressures.

But with the liberation of over 44 maritime States after World War II together with the increasing cost-effectiveness of utilising advanced technology to harvest both living and non-living resources of the seas such as fish, off-shore oil and seabed minerals, these developing maritime states challenged the old concept of the laissez faire of the oceans because of their anxiety to meet the growing needs of their people by exploiting the seas around them. This resulted in the convening of the Third United Nations Conference on the Laws of the Seas in December 1973. The 9th Session on 29th August 1980 was almost in complete agreement with widely supported proposals which are likely to be formalised in the near future.

The most significant changes proposed in the new Laws of the Seas are the extension of the Territorial waters to 12 miles, the Contiguous Zone for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations to 24 miles and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to 200 miles for the harvesting of living and non-living resources with new regimes of archipelagic waters, international straits, marine pollution and international seabed forming separate conventions.

This is particularly significant to the Indian Ocean, on which 3 continents abut, covering an area of 28 million sq miles and encompassing one fifth of the world's sea area. But nonetheless, one quarter of the earth's population live in this region operating at different levels of political consciousness ranging from military dictatorship and despotic monarchies to communism, tribalism, Islamic fundamentalism as also the largest practising democracy in the world.

India now has the 12th largest EEZ because of the Andamans and Nicobars and Lakshdweep Islands which have brought an additional area of roughly 2.8 million sq miles under New Delhi's jurisdiction and regulatory control. The Navy, therefore, has to provide a 'constable on the beat' in this EEZ to counter poachers or smugglers as also making its presence felt in the seas around us. The cost effectiveness of utilising naval power is difficult to

be matched by any other means. Further in the exploitation of the seabed and the development of underwater and off-shore technology, the Navy by virtue of her structure, professionalism and understanding of the seas will continue to be a credible instrument for implementing national policy. Again in calamities such as collision, fire or accident, the Navy provides the fastest responses. The management of the oceans has, therefore, ushered in fresh rules for managing the seas and seabed as also additional areas for both conflict or more interdependence based on a country's perceived interests as well as its long range objectives.

We must, therefore, realise the enormity of these twin challenges of development and conflict that have enlarged the role of the Navy. In addition, maritime history must recognise, however haltingly, that the emerging relations of the seas to the State and the effects of the growing technological developments will inevitably bring in social changes based on the increasing aspirations of the people which in course of time may well transform the present heterogeneous society into a more homogeneous world community. The key to success for such a multi-disciplinary approach will be our ability to manage our ocean interests in an organised and integrated manner, by exploiting our geo-economic advantage of sitting atop the warm, rich and strategic ocean named after this sub-continent.

The initial impact of this evolutionary cycle will probably be the induction of high technology which may well change the life styles of the people. Hence, while new disciplines such as off-shore structures, energy, instrumentation and pollution are becoming part of the expanding syllabi in the universities and technical institutions, there will, nevertheless, be a requirement for the introduction of more ocean-based studies as has been done in space, electronics and atomic energy. In addition to Mechanical, Electrical, Civil and Chemical Engineering, one must also introduce Ocean and Nuclear Engineering, with an added emphasis on the trichotomy of materials, energy and environment.

The increasing cost-effectiveness in investing in the seas in the coming decades could well herald a technological revolution in the next century which may dwarf the accomplishments or otherwise of the industrial and agrarian revolutions of the previous century. Again, such a juxtaposition of resources between land and the seas will have far reaching effects on our economy as already evident to some extent in Bombay where the recovery of off-shore oil and gas has partly transformed the coastal belts of these maritime states. The oceans are indeed the last frontier of mankind.

It will, therefore, not be too heretical to prophesy that in the next century there will possibly be a metamorphosis of the continental homo sapiens presently ensconced in the plains of India into a sea-mammal whose habitat will be more and more the warm, rich, salt waters of the Indian Ocean. This will, in turn, create reverberations not only on the mosaic of our traditional employment vistas but also on our economic growth and our inherent social restraints.

All these interaction have, however, economic, political and security spin-offs. The Lok Sabha has recently passed a bill for the creation of an 'Ocean Commission' and has also structured a Department for Ocean Development. So the seas, in their changing relations to the State, are not merely the instruments for commerce and colonisation, but have also become the most important medium for utilising the oceans as a fish-pond, resource mine, rubbish tip, international highway and, indeed, the entire spectrum of mining and extraction as on terra firma.

Again, in the arena of conflict, the seas are unique as they join all parts of this planet, and hence, can be utilised as much or as little as required without inviting a 'shooting war'. A similar policy of 'riskiness' on land will possibly result in national frontiers being violated and the ensuing chorus in the media and parliament to throw the offending party out by force which was the main reason for the 300 conflicts taking place in this century. It is interesting to note that while from 1915 to 1945 there have been 1.5 conflicts every year, it has increased to 2 conflicts per year from 1945 to 1975.

Further, in the Management of Conflict, 'maritime strategy' has much wider ramifications than 'continental strategy' as the oceans have far reaching international repercussions-both political and economic-in view of the indivisibility of the seas. It is in this context that sea power is said to denote the capacity or ability of nations to exploit not only their geographical environment but also the character of their people and the comprehension of their Governments.

And in this broader concept, the ice-free Indian Ocean, which is a link between Europe and the East as also between North and South, has discernibly become an 'object' rather than a 'subject' with peninsular India dominating this region with her 6000 Kms of coastline jutting out into this Ocean and encompassing 10 major, 20 intermediate and 300 minor ports. In addition, the off-shore islands of Andamans and Nicobars and Lakshdweep are strategically located astride the busiest focal points in the world, the Malacca straits and the Ten Degree channel, and hence can be exploited to choke the 'choke points' most cost-effectively and with minimum effort.

This interconnection of the world's sea area has also enabled external maritime powers to base their warships in this region to influence and pressurise the littoral states which amounts to 'gunboat diplomacy' which may be definitive, purposeful or expressive depending on the issues at stake. Therefore, the Navy is only a tool of a country's overall policy, in the same way as a hammer is a tool to the carpenter.

Hence, India must maintain a maritime presence in this Ocean named after her which can be physically seen, as this is not only the most cost-effective but perhaps the quickest means for projecting a country's credibility in the inter-

national arena. It is obvious that India is too big a country to be ignored but at the same time is not strong enough to be entirely effective. Hence, an investment in maritime hardware will make it possible to provide a maritime constable at short notice at any of the hot spots in this Ocean area such as Hormuz, Gulf of Aden, straits of Babel Mandeb and Malacca. And such a presence will not only have a salutary effect in lowering the threshold of the cold war but will also create a greater consciousness for India's efforts to offset the balance of power compulsions being propagated by outside powers. It is, indeed, cheaper to be strong as vascillation invariably attracts adventurism as seen in previous conflicts when we were attacked by smaller countries. Furthr, one cannot always keep on adding up the 'pros' or 'cons' of Defence spending and then balancing them to see which weighs heavier. It has also been clearly brought out after our independence that without national security, there cannot be national development. Hence, investment in our security, is an investment in the country's progress and stability.

In addition, our Defence industry employs nearly 2 million workers in more than 50 factories whose turnover is nearly 2000 crores and this productivity flows into the economy of the country and adds to the overall GNP. Therefore, unlike a country's foreign policy which is based more on our 'hopes and aspirations', Defence plans are instead structured to existing geo-political and geo-strategic factors on a realistic short or long term basis as there are no runners-up in war. Hence the old cliche "If you desire peace, prepare for War".

In this scenario missile firing platforms and aircraft carriers are particularly cost-effective which marks them ideal instruments of deterrence which perhaps more than any other factor has prevented conflict in other oceans. It is, therefore, not surprising that the quest for submarines and sea control ships by almost all modern maritime powers has resulted in spectacular developments in design, propulsion, sensors and weapon systems. If we fail to take advantage of this technological progress, India may have to pay a high price for not achieving self sufficiency and thereby continue to spend large sums of foreign exchange for importing maritime hardware.

A 60—crore gas turbine missile frigate or, for example, a 100—crore sophisticated submarine, has a life span of 30 years. This factor needs to be balanced against 1 modern aircraft costing 20 to 25 crores or 1 tank costing 2 crores. Ships and submarines in view of their inbuilt staying power can however be positioned at focal points well out to sea for early warning and for constricting the movements of other forces by their presence which in turn will provide credibility and decisiveness for making our intentions clear to our perceived adversaries. In war, the control of the seas or the denial of the seas to the enemy continues to be the main spring of naval activity. The structure of sea power must therefore contain the broad spectrum of

pragmatism and purpose, efficiency and effectiveness, education and technology encompassing the emerging spectrum of relations between the seas and the state.

Hence, 'Sea power' by its flexibility, mobility and everyday readiness underpins both deterrence and dependability to safeguard our maritime interests as also to provide the 'advanced tripwire' for national security. Further maritime power will progressively dominate our Defence strategy as the Indian Ocean is fast becoming an arena of tension due to the increasing presence of pacific and Atlantic powers who are exploiting the vast sea areas of this water planet for making their presence felt globally.

Thus, the skilful management of our total resources must take into account forces and factors that will help or hinder our developmental plans by creating expanded parameters for both security and development in a 3-dimensional envelope.

Therefore, it is becoming increasingly clear that investment in maritime hardware for exploiting our waters for development and seabed mining as also for the effective management of our ocean for trade and commerce and the understanding of the 'Seas around us' in their new relationship to the state will have a meaningful impact not only on our national economy but also on national security as Sea Power is the key to both deterrence and development.

The challenge and dynamism therefore of the oceans in this decade of the Seas may not be the single most important facet in the remaining years of this century—but, then, it may ! So, to conclude, in verse :

'As each beholds in cloud and fire
The shape that answers his own desire
So thou in the seas shall find
The figures and features of your mind'.

Trends and the Prospects of U.S. - China Relations*

Parris H. Chang **

A DECADE OF DETENTE

EXACTLY ten years have elapsed since President Richard Nixon's highly dramatic trip to China in February 1972. This historic visit removed virtually overnight U.S.-China military confrontation after two decades of unremitting mutual hostility, and set in motion a process toward diplomatic normalization and future cooperation between the two former adversaries.

Indeed, in less than a decade, enormous changes and improvements as well, have taken place in the U.S.-Sino relations. Among the more notable developments are :

—Completion of diplomatic normalization in 1979, in which the U.S. recognized the government in Peking as China's sole legal government, and severed all official relations with the government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, and terminated the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty.

—Emergence of a U.S.-Sino entente. Vice President Mondale, in a speech in Peking in August 1979, pledged that the U.S. would join with China "to advance our many parallel and bilateral interest" and warned that "any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate China in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interest." A few months later, the U.S. granted the most-favoured nation status to China but not to the USSR, signalling the Carter administration's open tilt toward Peking.

—A new dimension, namely the security cooperation, was added into the U.S.-China relations in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 and of Defense Secretary Harold Brown's visit to China in early 1980

*Lecture Delivered under the auspices of the USI on Thursday 5 Aug. '82

**Professor of Political Science, Chairman of East Asian Studies The Pennsylvania State University

(the first by an American defense secretary). Both sides sought to concert their parallel responses to the Soviet and coordinate their aid to Pakistan and Thailand, and the Carter Administration announced a new policy to permit sale of dual-use technology and nonlethal military equipment to China.

—The strategic relationship between Washington and Peking was reaffirmed by President Reagan soon after he came into office in January 1981, candidate Reagan's campaign rhetoric to restore official relations with ROC notwithstanding. In June Secretary of State, Al Haig, visited Peking to reaffirm the U.S.-Sino strategic partnership and made public a new policy under the Reagan administration to further security ties with Peking by permitting transfer of American weapons to China. Inspired press leaks during Haig's visit disclosed that the U.S. with China's consent, had set up monitoring stations in north-western China since 1980, and that the two nations were jointly monitoring Soviet missile tests.

—Over 7,000 students/researchers from China are currently in American universities and research institutions for advanced study in the fields of science, technology and engineering, in contrast with several hundreds of American faculty members and students who are studying primarily language, humanities and social science subjects in China. In 1981, the U.S. approved more than 1,000 applications for licenses to export high technology to China (most of them denied to the USSR), as the Reagan administration further relaxed curbs on high-technology exports to China.

—Moreover, such bilateral bodies as the U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee have been set up to enhance mutual cooperation and deal with matters of common concern, and senior American and Chinese officials now hold meetings regularly to consult on a wide range of global issues. In a brief decade the U.S. and China have forged impressive ties.

What's for Peking ?

The reconciliation of the PRC and the U.S. has been extremely beneficial to both parties, perhaps even more so to the PRC. For Mao and other Chinese leaders, the opening to the U.S. in the early 1970's was a strategic maneuver to enhance China's security. Instead of confronting both superpowers simultaneously, which had resulted in dispersal of China's strength, the Chinese leadership saw the necessity and the virtue of distinguishing between China's principal enemy and secondary enemy, and aligning with the latter to oppose the former. In a strategy to play the "American card," Peking intends to use the U.S. as a strategic counterweight to the USSR.

Thus for China has benefited enormously from her American "connection" from 1972 onward. Reconciliation with Washington, for example, pre-

luded a collusion of the two superpowers against China; it effectively removed the U.S. military threat from the Taiwan Strait and the Pacific, and thus enabled Peking to reallocate its military and economic resources and to concentrate them on the USSR and, after 1978, Vietnam. Without normalization of relations, Peking might not feel confident enough to launch the punitive war against Vietnam in February 1979. Inasmuch as the Chinese action was taken a few weeks after Deng Xiaoping's tour of the U.S., where he openly spoke of teaching Vietnam "a lesson," and conveyed a strong impression that the U.S. was behind China, the USSR which is an ally of Vietnam may have been deterred and was quite restrained in its response to China's attack of Vietnam.

The opening of relations between Washington and Peking also greatly raised Peking's international status and strengthened its diplomacy in Asia. During 1972-75, Peking capitalized on its new ties with the U.S. and induced Japan and several other Asian/Pacific nations to switch diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking. The improvement of Sino-U.S. relations also made it possible for the PRC to develop and expand impressive ties with Japan in the past decade. If the U.S. had objected, development of such close and extensive Sino-Japanese relations would seem unlikely.

Peking's Unfulfilled Expectations

One very important objective that the PRC leadership has sought to accomplish is to reduce American support for the Nationalist government on Taiwan and to facilitate Taiwan's return to China. Thus Peking's diplomatic maneuvers, starting with Nixon's visit in 1972, have been designed to create conditions conducive to Taiwan's reunification with the PRC. The normalization of U.S.-China relations at the end of 1978, mainly according to terms insisted on by Peking, succeeded in weakening ties between the U.S. and Taiwan and isolating the ROC diplomatically.

Some in Peking may have thought in 1978 that, with the U.S. severing official ties and terminating the U.S.-ROC defense treaty, the Nationalist authorities would probably have collapsed in a fairly brief span of time and readily accepted Peking's offer of unification. This has not happened so far and there is no sign it will in the near future, perhaps much to their astonishment and chagrin. Apparently the Chinese leaders have blamed Washington at least partly for Taiwan's political resilience and refusal to enter negotiation with the PRC, and have in the past year applied intense pressure on the Reagan administration to end arms sales to Taiwan, thereby hoping to demoralize Taiwan and force it to accept Peking's peace terms.

Indeed, there is a danger that Peking and Washington could trip over Taiwan and retrogress into confrontation. Taiwan is without question a very important yet highly emotional issue for various parties concerned and does

not admit to easy and neat solution. As is well known, despite President Nixon's diplomatic breakthrough in 1972, Sino-U.S. normalization of realtions had been stalled prior to 1979, primarily because on the one hand, Peking insisted on China's sovereignty over Taiwan, and on the other hand, the U.S. was unable or unwilling to disengage from its diplomatic and security ties with Taiwan. U.S.-China normalization was consummated in the end of 1978, only after the Carter administration accepted Peking's terms on Taiwan and both sides agreed to disagree on such important issues of contention as China's use of force against Taiwan and the sales of American arms to Taiwan.

However, these issues just do not go away. In April 1979 the U.S. Congress enacted, over the objection of the Carter administration and amidst the protest of the PRC government, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which contained provisions committing the U.S. to Taiwan's security and restoring a semblance of sovereignty to Taiwan's status. More specifically, the TRA defines the future U.S. commitments to Taiwan's defense, by writing into American law the U.S. obligation to provide Taiwan with "such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary" for Taiwan's defense, by openly declaring an intention to "resist any resort of force" against the people of Taiwan, and by putting Peking on notice that any such use of coercion to achieve reunification would be a matter "of grave concern to the United States."

To some analysts the TRA has become very much a 'functional substitute' for the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (which was terminated one year after U.S.-China normalization) and incorporated in substance the same protective relationship the U.S. had maintained with Taiwan. Not surprisingly Peking has attacked the TRA as interference in China's domestic affairs and a violation of the normalization agreement between the U.S. and China.

The issues of U.S.-ROC relationship were once again in public limelight in the summer af 1980 as candidate Ronald Reagan attacked President Carter's handling of the normalization and offered, if elected, to establish some form of official relations with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Peking's response was swift and strident; a People's Daily commentary called his support for official relations with Taiwan and continuing friendly relations with China 'sheer deception' and accused Reagan of resuscitating the plot to create "two Chinas." Although Reagan dispatched his running mate George Bush to Peking to assure the Chinese that no fundamental change in relations with the ROC was planned under the Republican administration, Mr. Bush was given a rude reception.

In spite of his campaign rhetoric, President Reagan apparently decided soon after his inauguration to abandon the idea of elevating relations with Taiwan. Instead, he stressed, his desire to develop friendly relations with

the PRC and, in June 1981, dispatched Secretary of State Haig to China strategic cooperation. Yet the leaders in Peking have continued to be apprehensive about Reagan's Taiwan policy. While the PRC government chose not to make a serious issue of its opposition to continuing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan throughout the Carter administration, it has toughened its line and expressed strong objection even to an innocuous spare-parts sale to Taiwan in April 1982 by the Reagan administration. In fact, Peking has been pressing Washington hard to set a timetable to end all military sales to Taiwan. Below is a brief analysis of three issues which have strained U.S.-China ties.

Arms Sale

China's demand for a timetable to end U.S. military sales to Taiwan was first aired when Premier Ziyang met with President Reagan last October at the North-South Conference in Cancun, Mexico. It was brought up again in November by Foreign Minister Huang Hua during a heated White House meeting, in which the Chinese threatened to downgrade diplomatic ties with the U.S.

In recognition of Peking's concerns, President Reagan decided early this year not to sell advanced aircraft such as the FX requested by the Nationalist government on Taiwan, but to allow continued co-production of F-5E fighters. Despite Mr. Reagan's concessions (which have not been popular with his conservative supporters in the U.S.), the Chinese leaders have not been placated. Peking has since pushed the U.S. relentlessly to set a cutoff date to phase out American arms sale to Taiwan.

To head off an impending U.S.-China diplomatic crisis, the Reagan administration bent backward to be conciliatory and sent Vice-President George Bush to China in May upon the completion of his 5-Nation Asian-Pacific tour, to reassure Peking on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Whereas the Bush mission did not solve the fundamental dispute between Peking and Washington over American arms sales to Taiwan, it apparently succeeded in defusing the crisis for the time being as the Reagan administration has made a number of key concessions.

For example, in the three letters written to top Chinese leaders, which were made public by U.S. officials at the end of Mr. Bush's visit, President Reagan proposed to reduce U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as China makes progress toward a peaceful unification. Although Reagan's offer falls short of Peking's demand on setting a timetable to terminate all U.S. military supplies, it softens considerably a firm U.S. commitment to provide Taiwan defensive arms as mandated by the TRA. This seems evident from Reagan's letter to Premier Zhao in which the U.S. President said that he welcomed and supported "any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question" and that "in the context of progress toward a peaceful solution, there would naturally be a decrease in the need for arms by Taiwan."

To dispell the apprehension that his administration might reverse normalization and pursue a two-China policy (impressions conveyed by candidate Reagan's statements), the President explicity states in a separate letter to Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping that "There is only one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American People and people of Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle." Moreover, Reagan said he recognizes the "significance" of Peking's 1981 nine-point reunification proposal and policy of peaceful unification since 1979, adding that his veto of the FX sale to Taiwan in January reflects "our appreciation of the new situation created by these developments." Reportedly, Peking had wanted the U.S. government to publicly endorse its peace overtures toward Taiwan, and Secretary of State Haig had also urged Mr. Reagan to make such a gesture, but to no avail until now.

All things considered, these concession are highly significant, especially in light of the fact that they reverse or contradict virtually each and every campaign promise Reagan made on Taiwan and just about nullifies his celebrated five-point policy toward Asia, proclaimed on August 25, 1980. No wonder many people in Taiwan are alarmed by what they detect as the progressive weakening American commitment to stand by Taiwan and feel an acute sense of crisis.²

2. Few Economic Benefits

Aside from the Taiwan issue, the PRC leadership has also been discontentsed with the Sino-U.S. economic ties. As Deng Xiaoping made it quite clear in a speech in January 1980, modernization of China's economy would be the topmost leadership priority for the 1980's. Deng and his associates clearly realize that China's stability and their leadership legitimacy rest on the growth of Chinese economy and improvement of people's livelihood. Hence the Chinese government has sought to forge better economic ties with the U.S., Japan and West Europe, hoping to use Western capital, technology, expertise and market to aid China's program of "four modernizations." Ever since the normalization, not a few Chinese officials have cherished inflated and highly unrealistic expectations of what the U.S. can and will do for China's modernization, but have been sourly disappointed as the U.S. has thus far proved of limited help. In addition, bureaucratic

****In September 1981. Peking publicized a peace proposal which included an offer to let Taiwan keep its armed forces, autonomy, socio-economic system and foreign ties, and an invitation to the Nationalists for joint leadership in running China.*

obstruction or delays in processing exports of high technology to China may have reinforced the impression that the U.S. seems indifferent or unwilling to help.

As Secretary Haig pointed out in his memo to President Reagan last November, there was "disillusionment in Peking at the lack of tangible benefits to China in the technology transfer and economic modernization areas since normalization, and a perception that this administration, like the last, says it wants to further the process but in practice still treats China as an enemy."⁸ To overcome the resistance of the entrenched bureaucrats, Haig urged the President to reaffirm his determination to treat China as a friendly nation. "To build a long-term strategic relationship with China and to enhance its value as a counter-weight." Haig argued in his memo, "we must make available the technology Peking needs for energy development and industrial growth."

On the other hand, the Chinese themselves are at least partly to blame. In fact, continuing signs of leadership struggle in China, the policy shift and ongoing debate on China's economic priorities tend to discourage potential American investors. Meanwhile, not a few American businessmen have also been alienated by the long delays in decision-making and the thick Chinese bureaucratic red tape. Consequently, American investment has lagged behind Japan and some West European states.

Mr. Deng and other Chinese leaders may miscalculate grossly if they believe that Peking can downgrade U.S.-China diplomatic ties but at the same time maintain or even expand economic relations. In the absence of stable political relations between the two nations, which inevitably entails greater political risks, few American businessmen are likely to feel secure enough to start new investments in China, no matter how reassuring China's leadership tries to be.

3. Troubled Strategic Relationship

As Peking sees it, Moscow has been pursuing a global offensive strategy for world domination, and such a strategy inevitably disrupts international peace, threatens China's national security, and impels China to allocate scarce resources for military purposes—all of these harmful to China's economic tasks. Peking has called for a broad international united front to combat Soviet hegemonism, for Soviet expansion as manifested in its beefed up Pacific fleet, increased naval movements through the Sea of Japan southward and in the Indian Ocean, and occupation of Afghanistan, threatens not only China, but also Japan, the U.S., the ASEAN countries, and West Europe.

Specifically, Peking has urged the U.S. to be the leader and the "standard bearer" of such an anti-Soviet united front, and assume more definite responsibilities in regional defense. In East Asia and the Pacific, Peking has admoni-

shed the U.S. and Japan to strengthen their military alliance, lobbied with Japanese government political parties and groups to increase military spending and improve defense capabilities.

However, Chinese leaders seem unhappy with what they see as the absence of a coherent American global strategy and Asian policy. They complain that they do not have confidence as to what the U.S. can or will do for China in case of a serious Sino-Soviet conflict.

It is also not difficult to understand why Peking's response to Secretary Haig's offer in June 1981 to sell arms to China has been less avid and eager than some officials in the State Department and Pentagon would like. First of all, Peking is short on foreign exchange and does not wish to spend its scarce hard currency to buy weapons abroad. Perhaps even more important, some Chinese officials expect, rightly or wrongly, the U.S. to provide such weapons free, as a token of friendship and U.S.-China strategic partnership. To their disappointment and resentment, Washington has shown no signs of largesse.

On the other hand, Peking's failure to display solidarity with the U.S. during the Polish Crisis (despite Washington's urging) and its stress on the Taiwan issue over global cooperation may have hurt Peking's own credibility. Many American analysts inside and outside the government have felt compelled to reexamine more critically various assumptions on U.S.-China security cooperation, and the value of China as a partner against the USSR. They are taking a hard look at what the "China card" is really worth.

Already some China experts who used to work in the National Security Council under Drs. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski have concluded that the "China factor" in U.S. policy is "smaller than life."⁵ Their conclusion is based partly on an assessment that China's relatively backward economic development inhibits its ability to build a modern and effective military establishment, and thus limits China's capabilities and international outreach and lessens its value as a counterweight to the Soviets. Others have cautioned against too close a military alignment with China, lest such cooperation risks provoking extreme Soviet countermoves (e.g., instigation of North Korea's military adventure), or alienates other nations in Asia (apparently some ASEAN states and India, not to mention Taiwan, have been highly critical of the U.S. decision to sell arms to China).

None of the above suggests that there will be no security links between the U.S. and China. Quite the contrary. As a matter of fact, steps of security cooperation which have existed now (e.g., exchange of military attaches, visit of defence ministers, intelligence sharing about the USSR and Vietnam, and sales of dual-use technology and military equipment) will continue as both sides consider these links useful in practical terms and symbolically important.

However, due to reasons given above, they are not prepared in the foreseeable future to raise the levels of cooperation to joint military planning, joint exercise, let alone formation of a military alliance.

Limited Sino-Soviet Rapprochement

Of late Moscow has made overtures to Peking, hoping to induce China to "normalize" relations with the USSR at a time when the U.S. *China relations are in trouble.⁶ There are signs, including the dispatch of a Chinese trade delegation to Moscow in the last part of May 1982, that Chinese leadership is carefully feeling Moscow's "pulse" to assess the Soviet intentions. Given the pragmatic qualities of present Chinese leadership, a limited reconciliation between the two Communist rivals is not impossible, especially if Moscow is more flexible in its approach toward China and willing to compromise on some such Chinese demands as withdrawals of Soviet troops from the Sino-Soviet border, Outer Mongolia and Afghanistan (and this is a big "if"). If such a reconciliation were to take place, both Washington and Tokyo need not feel alarmed, for a thaw in the Sino-Soviet relations would be in everybody's interest as it would help stabilize Asia's international relations.

One hastens to add that the detente that could develop between Peking and Moscow would fall short of a sweeping rapprochement. This is because while both sides want to reduce tensions and enhance cooperation, they have too many things in conflict which seem insurmountable. We can also predict with reasonable certainty that there will be no return to the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950's, inasmuch as the previous U.S.-China hostility and aura of military confrontation are things of the past, hence Peking needs nor it will seek an alliance with the Soviets for protection.

As Peking desires a peaceful international environment and stable Sino-Soviet relations, naturally it sees a virtue of holding periodic meetings with Moscow to negotiate trade, navigation, border problems, and other issues of mutual concern. If the past talks and Moscow's responses to China's demands are any guide, then the obstacles for both sides to conclude far-reaching agreements would seem enormous.

Nor it is very plausible for Peking to attempt an even-handed approach and to adopt an equidistant posture between Washington and Moscow. In spite of their differences over Taiwan, the U.S. does not threaten China's national security. Furthermore, China is embarking on an economic modernization drive and needs substantial assistance from the U.S., Japan and West Europe —assistance which Moscow simply cannot match even if it wants to. So, if Peking becomes too cocky, such assistance from the West could be jeopardized.

China's "Larger Interests"

Whether Peking's leadership will stay pacified as a result of the Bush mission and the concessions rendered by the Reagan administration, or will it choose to challenge Washington over its future arms supplies to Taiwan (a decision on co-production of more F-5Es is expected shortly) remains unclear. Peking has already won significant points from Washington on the Taiwan issue. To push the Reagan Administration farther and harder could become counter-productive. No U.S. President can submit to pressure, totally ignore the Taiwan Relations Act which is an American law, and agree to a cutoff date for arms sales to Taiwan.

As Peking knows quite well, the U.S. has no intention of creating "two Chinas" or interfering with peaceful unification between Taiwan and the mainland. Nor are the U.S. arms sales the cause of Taiwan's estrangement from China. Rather, Peking's unification drive has failed to make desired headway because few people in Taiwan wish to live under Communist rule, and the conditions for Taiwan to be peacefully reunified with the mainland simply do not exist now. It will take hard work, time and patience to cultivate these conditions. Hence, pressing the U.S. to end arms sales to Taiwan is beside the point and will not help reunification.

Instead of concentrating on the Taiwan issue and risking diplomatic confrontation, then Chinese leadership can still choose the path of friendship with the U.S. In short, Peking and Washington should put aside their differences over Taiwan and seek to focus on their larger interests—greater cooperation to enhance China's economic development and to contain Soviet expansion.

Footnotes

1. *Tad Szulc, "The Reagan Administration's Push Toward China Came from Warsaw,"* The Los Angeles Times, Jan. 17, 1982.
2. *This is evident from Taipei's media reports in the wake of Vice-President Bush's China trip, and from President Chiang Ching-kuo's statement on May 15.*
3. *Tad Szulc, loc. cit.*
4. *Beijing Review, no. 8, Feb. 15, 1980, pp. 8-9, and People's Daily, March 27, 1980.*
5. *See, for examples, articles by Richard Solomon and Michel Oksenberg in Richard Solomon (ed.), The China Factor (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981).*
6. *These include a speech by President Leonid Brezhnev on March 24, 1982 at Tashkent and several follow-up articles in Pravda (a recent one was on May 20) urging normalization of ties.*

Falkland War—A Macro View

Brigadier Virinder Oberoy

INTRODUCTION

THE recently fought war between British and Argentina over Falkland Islands has clearly gone in favour of the former. As a result of that armed conflict, the Islands are back under the firm control of the British Government. That war attracted worldwide interest while it lasted. Inevitably, that interest vanished soon after the war was over. However, this war, like all wars, would continue to be of deep interest to the soldiers and students of military science.

In many ways, the British—Argentinas conflict was unique, bearing many contrasting features. It was a short war lasting 10 weeks ; and yet a long war starting from 1833 when Great Britain captured the Islands back from Argentina. The issue was never resolved since that time and has been simmering with varying degree of intensity. It was a small scale war involving not more than a total of 20,000 personnel of both sides, taken together. At the same time, it was a large scale conflict where both countries brought to bear their maximum possible strength and resources of the three services against each other. It was a war fought with sophisticated armament, high technology weapons systems and at the same time, the battle was ultimately fought on the Islands and brought to an end by the foot soldier with his basic infantry weapons. It was a war of slow momentum and yet intense actions took place at sea, in the air and on land. Apart from these contrasts, this war also carried some distinct features of interest. It encompassed substantial manoeuvres in international relations, political pressures and economic warfare. The theatre of war saw integrated, strategic and tactical operations by the three services on both sides. In short, this conflict presents a rare model which provides us with numerous aspects for study of modern warfare. It would therefore be very fruitful to study this war in depth from various angles and draw relevant conclusions.

We are presently too close to the event for a meaningful in-depth study and consequent drawing up of valid conclusions. To that extent, a study for the present is feasible only as an over-view or at macro level and certain

deductions in broad terms. Its study, even at macro level, should be worthwhile, if for nothing else, at least to draw our attention to specific areas which may then be taken for detailed study in time to come.

THE OVER-VIEW

The 'over-view' of the Falkland war, as a model, can be taken suitably under the following heads :-

- (a) International relations.
- (b) Political and military aims.
- (c) Strategic moves.
- (d) Tactical development of war.
- (e) Armament.
- (f) Logistics.
- (g) Inter-service cooperation.
- (h) Man and the weapon.

International Relations

This war highlights the influence of international relations over an armed conflict very vividly. Both parties tried to gain active as well as passive support from different quarters of the world community. International inter-action was also applied to gain material help to improve their respective political and military stance. Argentina, apart from banking on the support of all members of the organisation of American countries (including USA), also tried to get moral and material support of the Western Bloc and, possibly USSR. There is no doubt that she succeeded in getting moral support from a number of countries. Yet she failed in getting the desired influence over the issue. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that her wrong assessment of international attitude towards the conflict, specially that of the USA and EEC, contributed substantially for her ultimate failure. Britain, on the other hand, was successful in her efforts for gaining the right type of international support. She succeeded in obtaining economic sanctions and moral support against Argentina by EEC and some other Western Countries. The master stroke in this sphere, however, was her ability to convert the American support from that of neutrality to active support in terms of material and certain other important facilities for conduct of war. Consequently, she succeeded where Argentina failed.

In modern wars, international relations, especially the attitude of super powers, will continue to play an increasingly important role. It would be seen that moral support from those countries, howsoever numerous, which cannot influence the course of war, is of little help. On the other hand, countries which may be comparatively few in numbers but are in a position to influence the war, would play a crucial role in helping the side which wins them over.

This aspect necessitates taking a long term perspective of a country's security needs and cultivation of international relations accordingly.

National Aims and Policies

Both countries had well defined national aims. The Argentinian's option of military action to achieve her national aim subsequently proved to be untenable and failed. From early stages itself, by her military action and rigid stand thereafter on political solution of the issue, she lost the flexibility of options for achieving her national goal. The British, on the other hand, took a flexible line to attain their national aim in which military action was one of the options available. In the final outcome, the Argentinian national aim could not be attained by the option exercised by her. Perhaps, she went wrong by her failure to separate the 'political' from the 'military' while formulating national policies. As a result, a sound political situation and consequent advantageous diplomatic opportunities were lost by choosing course of war. Their military stance for solution of the problem was a gamble at the national level, which failed. It highlights the importance of separating the political authority from the military while laying down political policies and the ultimate adoption of a course of action at the national level. The military, of course, has to provide necessary input for formulation of national policies.

In the case of Britain, the national policies were far sighted and had built-in flexibility in which military action was only one of the options. These options were kept open till quite late stage in the diplomatic efforts to find a solution and need not have been exercised had the developments favoured any other course of action. The British approach highlights the requirement of keeping various available options open till as late a stage as possible of the dispute of such a magnitude. This however, should not mean that preparations to use any one of the options are also delayed.

Strategic Moves

Military action by Britain consisted of distinct successive strategic moves by which her forces were progressively built up in the theatre of potential conflict. The initial strategic move of nuclear powered submarine into the area alongwith Special Boat Section detachments ; followed by the naval task force, a brigade worth of Royal Marines and necessary air complement ; and subsequent build-up of land, naval and air forces were part of her strategic moves by which she waged war by graduated escalation. These stages can be clearly discerned as relating to surveillance and gathering of intelligence ; naval and air blockade of the Islands, while concentration of the force and logistics build-up was under way ; enlargement of the battle zone and ultimate

landing of troops in a beachhead and capture of the Capital, Port Stanley. It is pertinent to note that although there was considerable time lag between the British decision to the use of force and actual military operations, the strategic moves were efficiently executed and enabled Britain to retain initiative at the theatre level throughout the war.

The ultimate test of strategic moves lies in its meeting the requirement as dictated by the pattern of ensuing battle. British strategic moves, in spite of the inevitable slow build-up met this requirement. The moves were carried out by balanced groups of various elements of the three services in each stage.

The time lag between decision of the British Government to be prepared to fight if necessary and concentration of adequate force needs further examination. It is quite clear that the British armed forces were not prepared for this contingency. However, what is not known is whether the government took into account the time necessary to concentrate the required force in the battle zone and issued warning orders to the Chief of Defence Staff accordingly or was there avoidable time lag ?

Tactical Development of War

Tactics deal with actual movement of forces and fighting in the battle zone. So far, not much of information regarding this aspect is available from either side. It can however, be made out that there was no discernible difference in the basic battle tactics on the sea, land and in the air. Apparently, high technology and sophisticated armaments warranted no basic changes. The operations were commenced by the British with the logical initial step of achieving superiority at sea and isolation of the objective i.e. the Islands ; build up of the necessary forces ; attempts to gain favourable air situation by both sides ; establishment of a Beachhead by the British and its prevention by Argentinian ; and finally the conventional land approach by infantry to the tactically important areas. This final stage fought at close quarters ultimately brought the war to an end.

The available information regarding details of various battles fought by the three services of both sides is scant and does not throw much light on the subject for our purpose. All the same, it is obvious that the basic battlefield tactics and the interse equation on the battlefield between the three services remains unchanged. The conventional roles of the three services continue to be operative as in the past.

Armament

A salient feature of this war was use of high technology weapon systems and other sophisticated war equipment. Sea Harrier 'jump jets', Exocet

Missiles, electronic equipment and various other weapon systems of the latest generation were used by both sides. In quality, Britain, as well as Argentina appeared to be more or less evenly matched in their weaponry. It is in the quantity that Argentina suffered the disadvantage. Her frantic search for missiles and aircraft in the world market during peak of the battle shows the degree of attrition and limited stock that she had at the start of war.

The war highlighted the importance of modern weapons and equipment in the ultimate outcome of war. More than anything else, the lesson emerges clearly that a country's armed forces must be equipped with modern arms, latest equipment and remain in pace with rest of the world, particularly with its potential adversaries. Such modernisation can be ignored only at the unacceptable cost of future military defeat and nation's integrity itself.

This war also highlights the serious drawback in having very limited stocks of armament and ammunition for war, specially in the case of developing countries. Self reliance, adequate stocking and reliable source of supply should be the watchword while selecting armament and equipment for the Army.

A word of caution is necessary here. It will be wrong to come to any hasty conclusion regarding suitability or otherwise of any particular weapon system or equipment used in this war before an in-depth study of the events and their environments has been carried out. To take an example, Exocet Missiles caught world-wide attention when HMS Sheffield was sunk. There were instant comments about the desirability of this system as the latest against naval ships. It is interesting to note (from the published reports so far) that out of the two Exocet Missiles fired at HMS Sheffield one failed to find its mark and the second failed to explode after hitting the target. According to press reports, the actual sinking was brought about by explosion of the fuel tank, indirectly caused by the unexploded missile. In any case, 50 per cent hit probability and failure of a missile warhead to explode altogether is hardly creditable to a missile system. Also, to evaluate a missile system or for that matter, any other equipment, the battle field environments in which these were fired, have to be critically examined.

Logistics

The location of war zone presented peculiar logistics problems. For both sides, the base for mounting operations and provision of subsequent logistics cover lay across the sea. In terms of distance it was 580 Kms from the main land Argentina and 7500 Kms from England. It was definitely much more difficult for the latter to concentrate and maintain her forces so far away from home across the seas. There is perhaps no example in the modern warfare where a country had to fight a major war with no base or foothold on the area contiguous to the objective or in its proximity. To over-

come the problem of long haulage, Britain had to establish an intermediate base at Intercession Islands for staging and other administrative facilities for men and material. Their logistics organisation over-came these problems and successfully provided administrative cover all the three services in the theatre.

Assembling of a mixed force of Army, Navy and Air Force nearly 8000 Kms away from home across the seas and its subsequent maintenance, speaks high of the excellent logistics organisation that would have been established for the purpose. It would be no exaggeration to say that, but for an efficient administrative cover, the Falkland would never have been recaptured by Britain. The details of this logistics support would provide interesting and useful material whenever it is made available.

Inter Service Cooperation

The British side provides a good example of conduct of joint operations under one commander at the theatre level. Not to speak of the successful outcome, even the survival of the British task force would have been in jeopardy had the three services not functioned in such cohesion. Apart from intimate cooperation, the integrated command also enabled the three services to play their respective roles to their optimum efficiency in varying importance at different stages of the war.

In any future conflict, it is difficult to visualise the desired level of inter service cooperation without an integrated unified command. Any lesser command set-up would, at best, be a loose affair. Its critical importance in the modern warfare dictates that integrated command should be considered as one of the principles of war. Any lesser arrangements among the three services would fail to provide the intimate cooperation necessary for winning a modern war.

Man and the Weapon

This war, as a high technology conflict, has already been brought out. It is interesting to note that in spite of sophistication of armament and systems in the three services, the man has again emerged as the battle winning factor. Although this fact has stood the test of all wars fought so far, there is yet a tendency to forget this aspect in the environments of modern warfare. The pilots flying the Argentinian aircrafts in the battle won wide admiration for their skill and courage. On the other side, the battle had ultimately to be taken by the British and Gorkha foot soldier to the place where it is ultimately decided—close quarters with the enemy. It was for this purpose that the war could be fully escalated by the British only when the infantry elements had been inducted into the theatre. It is also significant to note that the British force had substantial strength of Gorkhas in its infantry element. It

is difficult to say with any certainty as to the reason for which Gorkhas formed this force in that strength—brought in from a longer distance than the British available at home. Was it because of the 'man' factor?

CONCLUSION

Various aspects of British—Argentinian war over Falklands would continue to be of immense interest to soldiers and statesmen for a long time to come. Its conduct indeed offers a wide scope for fruitful study in the field of military science. An attempt has been made in this Paper to highlight certain features of this war which are vast subjects by themselves and would need extensive study and deep research. Study of a war and consequent lessons drawn have to be carried out in context of the environments in which it was fought. However, it should be remembered that the application of such lessons needs to be considered in the environments in which the next war would be fought. To apply conclusions drawn from one war to another, fought after a period in different environments, may prove to be of little use. At times, these may be disastrous.

The Professional Manager Syndrome

Profession and Management

Brigadier NB Grant (Retd)

THE noun 'Profession' has been described in the Webster's dictionary as "a calling requiring specialised knowledge and often long and intensive academic preparation". The corresponding adjective 'Professional' has been described as "engaged in one of the learned professions, characterised by or confirming to the technical or ethical standards of a profession". The same dictionary describes the word 'Manager' as "one who conducts any business or household affairs with economy and care". Thus whatever business it may be, whether it be in the field of commerce, industry, engineering, R&D, university, medicine or even racing, entertainment and running a dancing casino, the respective professional in them is the economist, the engineer, the professor, the doctor, the actor, the jockey and the dancer, but not the management boss entrusted to see that these disciplines are managed 'with economy and care'. The confusion regarding the term 'professional manager', has arisen due to the fact that, with the advent of the Public Limited Companies, in our enthusiasm to differentiate between the owner of a business and the man entrusted by the former for running it 'with economy and care', for want of a better word, the latter was designated as a 'professional manager', irrespective of the fact whether he was professing to any particular specialised discipline or not.

An Anglo-American Connotation

The notion of using the word 'management' in business, as something distinct from management in other fields, such as government offices, educational institutions, and other 'non-business' like institutions, is typically English or perhaps the Anglo-American style of 'professionalism', and does not exist in the same way either in continental Europe or even in Japan. Being an English language concept, the Americans borrowed it and tried to make a profession out of it. It must be realised that, the British professional managers were, by and large, an invention of the middle and late Victorian period, created essentially for social reasons. The new urban middle trading classes, increasingly powerful in an expanding and ever more complex

economy, built up yet another new occupational group, for the sake of its marketability and its claim to status.

In contrast, other highly developed and productive nations, like Germany, France, and Japan do not worry much about the concept of 'management' in business, and have still done extremely well without it. This is not just a specious linguistic argument; the differences have profound effects on thinking, on jobs, on status, and performance. In Germany, for instance, the man recruited to the normal executive job in manufacturing is thought of as a specialist, and his career also tends to plan a specialist path. Those who harbour hopes of getting to the top are virtually all professionals like engineers, lawyers and accountants. Of course, top men are also expected to have exceptional personal qualities, but these are regarded as qualities of leadership, rather than as skills of management.

On the other hand, it is still the typically British, and unfortunately even our own Indian approach, to reserve top jobs for the 'generalist', in the shape of the gentlemanly amateur, the product of a prestigious, non-relevant and not especially rigorous academic training. The IAS executive in the public sector is a typical example of this culture, who survives, only because he is serviced by technical, financial and other specialists. The over-riding aim is to give a cloak of respectability to the whole discrete area of business management, so that it can be known as a profession. It appears that, for Manchester and Harward, or even for Ahmedabad and Calcutta, the notion of professionalism has attractions both conservative (suggesting the gentlemanly) and radical (rational, liberal, dynamic). It pays in such a culture, for professionals to be both self-interested and socially responsible at the same time; after all, it is only the top professionals who are allowed the luxuries of moral self-doubt, genteel eccentricity, and the right to play golf at work.

Professional Norms and Management

However, even in England and the USA, the notion that business executives adhere to a set of professional norms, is more at variance with reality than the idea that their jobs draw upon a uniform body of knowledge. Executives may, indeed, be more accountable to their executive superiors, and not to their professional peers. The nature of their work is such, that 'moral' professional codes could not readily be applied even if executives were all organised in some central association. Above all, the facts of industrial organisation ensure that, executives put individual and commercial goals before the public interest, and preclude the open exchange of 'technical' information, which only professionals can do.

Again, even in America, several notable commentators have observed that top executives find no particular need for 'management, or its techniques and mysteries. Alistair Mint, in a paper which questions the accountability

of the established professionalism, expresses a suspicion that scientific techniques may even hamper executives' work by confusing their thinking. Let us face it that, management science and the 'management movement' were put together defensively, for reasons of a status in the professional setting; they were not developed for reasons of utility to work. Strange as it may seem, the techniques of management science as we know it in this country, have not still been widely adopted even in highly developed and productive nations like Germany and Japan. Few people in these countries are impressed by the management idea, designed to support a special occupational professional group. There nobody much imagines that the management science has to be invented to give a professional status to the executive work.

Management Concept in the Military

To take an example from the army, the office of the Adjutant General or the Quarter Master General connotes the departments responsible for the army's personal and material functions respectively. However, none of the officers in those departments are styled as Personnel Managers or Material Control Managers; such departments are manned by officers from various specialists disciplines like Engineering, Artillery, Infantry etc. In other words, an army officer has to be a professional first, like an engineer, a gunner, or an infantry man, but who later on in his career is called upon from time to time to do non-professional managerial duties like personnel, Materials and Logistics etc. In fact even industries are now veering round to the idea, that functions like marketing, finance, personnel and material can be done better by professionals on whom the industry is based. For example, in BHEL, the trend today is for the entire Personnel, Planning and Materials departments, and 50 % of the Finance department, to be manned by professional engineers. The concept being that, whereas the truly professional can always become a manager, the latter cannot become a professional, unless he has the requisite specialist knowledge.

The Fad of the Professional Manager

Lately, there has been a sudden craze in the country for everyone to be termed a professional manager. In this, the bureaucracy and the military are no exceptions. In the bureaucratic discotheque, management is the "in" thing—the psychedelic that has banished everything connected with the old worldly "administration". The administrators therefore now try to dance to the tune of the new rhythm, ie management, and wish to be called top managers, middle managers and junior managers in lieu of secretaries, joint secretaries and deputy secretaries to the government.

The Army has also been bitten by the management bug. It has established its own special institutes like the IDM, where the modern management deities reside, to recoup the soldier's lost faith in his own inherent managerial ability, and to perhaps get some high and mighty favours in the form of acquiring some predominantly jargon-oriented terms representing technical skill. The irony of it however, is, that whereas the military were the pioneers of the very management techniques now being taught in business schools and since adopted in commercial firms, the Service officer is now forced to introduce this in his own institutions and relearn his own inherent trade of management. To make it worse, instead of so arranging that these management techniques are automatically injected in our normal military training programmes as they once were, we have now made a fetish of these techniques, and run special courses or hold seminars on them, as is the fashion today in the business world.

To take one example of the above, let us analyse the so called latest technique of 'Management by Objectives' (MBO). Papers have been written, seminars held, talks arranged and conferences convened on this particular aspect of management. It has been made to believe, that this is the real key to managerial success, and that one of the reasons for the low profitability in many companies, is due to the lack of this single technique of management. As everyone knows, the objective of an enterprise should meet two basic requirements. It must specify a target to be achieved quantitatively or qualitatively, or both, and should define a date by which the target must be achieved. An enterprise can have any number of objectives; however, it is prudent for management to concentrate on the few goals that are expected to produce significant results. Now although the industrial description given above may sound new, the methodology of management by objectives is as old as the hills, and has been in vogue in the army from time immemorial.

To take an example from real life, the overall objective for the invasion of Europe during World War II was laid down by the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower. Based on this overall objective, the countries in Europe which had to be invaded were then given out as the objectives of each Army Group Commander. The Army Group Commanders in their turn gave to their Corps Commanders the particular beaches for landing as their objectives, and this process continued till the lowest fighting unit, the battalions, were given specific pin-point targets as their particular objectives. Each objective was then reviewed and modified to fit in with the particular formation, depending on its training, availability of fire power and other resources. A coordinated and unified plan of objectives was then issued to each unit for implementation. The result is now history. The crux of the matter however is, that whereas the planning process for 'Over-Lord' was made exactly as laid down in any modern text book on MBO, the fact, however, remains that, neither Gen Eisenhower nor his officers, ever did any special course on MBO at some IDM, the concept came naturally to them.

SUMMING UP

The new professional management jargon has now reached such idiocies, that even the house garden is termed a 'personalised recreational eco-unit' and the common spade as a 'manually operated recreational eco-unit maintenance tool'. The object appears to be, to always sound professional. In these days if you use plain English, people will merely regard you as one of them. However, if you make everything seem terribly complicated and 'professional', you will be admired and respected as an expert. Even politicians have not escaped this 'professional' management infection, and talk in such terms as 'lower socio-economic strata', "special drawing rights" and "infra-structure facilities". I am all for this 'professional' management game, but I would like to go on calling, a garden a garden, and a spade a spade, even if while doing so I may sound a simple un-professional soldier.

Man Management: The Present Environ

Captain Rajiv Kumar.

INTRODUCTION

INDIAN Society has been in a constant state of transition since the turn of the century. Not only have the very concepts of our social structure undergone a change, but the Economic, Political and Religious upheavals of the century have brought about a major change in the traditional viewing of the leaders by the led.

Bound as the Indian Soldier is to the intense social fabric of his community it is obvious that he has not been left untouched by these influences. With the ever increasing awareness in the country and the political under-toning of almost all aspects of public life a definite awareness has shown itself in the personnel of armed forces.

Our social structure today is in a process of transience from a feudal to a democratic society. The administrative structure of the country is a curious mix of the Western Colonial and native systems. Similarly the attitudes within the administration towards the administered are curious blend of a colonial, democratic and feudal mentality. The Army as a limb of State is by far the most evident symbol as it touches by virtue of its composition the man in the field—the factory worker, the peasant, the student etc. It is this segment which is perhaps in the greatest turmoil today. There are evidently two classes in the Army, namely the leaders i.e. the officers and the led i.e. the rank and file. The transient state of attitudes in Society has by and large manifested itself in the attitudes of both these classes. If the fabric of the Army has to be maintained it is but essential that these attitudes and the relationship of both these classes be maintained cordially and with mutual comradie. The British in the armed forces and the police have left behind a structure essentially colonial, and feudal in character. That the structure if not elasticised and modified properly will break down can be seen from the recent upheavals in the police forces.

It is thus necessary to evaluate the influences which work on the ordinary soldier and officer, the effect on their personalities and group relationship and the measures required for developing and sustaining a healthy officer-man relationship. This paper studies the course and development of this relationship under the following heads :—

- (a) Influences
- (b) The Structure of Relationship
- (c) The Development and Sustenance

INFLUENCES

It is necessary to evaluate the various influences which act upon the soldier and the officer. Any relationship has to take into account the attitudes derived and developed as a result of these influences. Broadly these influences can be categorised as :—

- (a) Political Influences
- (b) Educational Influences
- (c) Social, Class, and Religious Influences
- (d) Economic Influences

Political Influences

The freedom struggle and the mobilisation of the masses by the political parties brought a brand of 'agitational pacifist' politics to our grass-roots level. That the forces were not untouched by this is evident from the various involvements of soldiers in these political movements, to quote a few instances, the Garhwal Rifles Mutiny at Peshawar, the Sikh soldier involvement in the Ghadar Movement 1919, the formation of the INA and the RIN Revolt of 1946.

In the post Independence period the political climate of the country has continued to be charged. The agitational policies adopted during the freedom struggle have now been manifested in the negative aspect creating a continued agitational atmosphere especially amongst the student and worker classes. The average soldier and officers are drawn from these classes. It is obvious that the average man is not left untouched by these movements which extend to the grassroots i.e. by the intense political activity of the 'Gram Panchayats' and the 'Caste Politics and struggles of village life. An average soldier it can be safely assumed absorbs enough of these influences to be politically alive and alert if not matured.

The negative quality of these political influences is to an extent off set in the soldier by their :—

- (a) Intensely local character and their lack of visibility in his immediate surroundings within the Army. The absence of these issues tones down this ferment. There is still little realisation of large scale political issues.
- (b) The corrupt standards of Indian public and political life leave a distaste in the worker and farmers classes. This attitude manifests itself in the average soldier as well.
- (c) The a-political atmosphere of the Army and the removal of the soldier from the immediate surroundings of such turmoil prevent his immediate involvement and understanding of political issues. In addition the protected atmosphere of the Army further desensitizes him from high level politics.

It can therefore be argued that the Indian soldier though alert to politics is not yet fully mature politically. However, it has to be accepted that the political dilution of the army is inevitable over the next three decades. The police has already formed unions. It is facile to assume that the average soldier has not noticed this. It might be noticed that armies all over the world are affected by politics e. g. the French Army is intensely political and even allows the formation of unions, 'Writing to the Congressman' is a common practice in the US Army. Even in our country Jai Prakash Narain during his hectic anti Government agitation gave a call to the Army to revolt and stated that he had been contacted by Armymen with grievances against the officer class.

The present picture therefore is thus of a soldier class fully alert but disinterested in national issues. As our society is in a state of transience what further turn this takes needs to be carefully watched and analysed.

Educational Influences

The increasing demands for improved educational standards for enrolment in the Army due to the introduction of technical equipment and mass educated unemployment in the country have brought quite a few educated personnel to the Army. Such a situation did not prevail during the British regime when the accent lay on keeping the technical arms in British hands and recruiting largely uneducated Indians to Non technical arms only.

In addition to the educated recruitment, in technical arms like the Corps of Signals etc, the average technician might well be much more than merely efficient in his own trade and might well initially be able to overawe the young officer entrant. A class of technically proficient soldiers has thus emerged which requires supervision by technically competent officers.

The spread of education has therefore resulted in:-

- (a) The emergence of a class of soldiers which is more sensitive to its working conditions and may well be legalistic and conscious of its rights.
- (b) The emergence of a class of soldiers equally educated, at times even better educated, than its officers. The class is in ample possession of officer like qualities and might feel itself suitable for induction into the officer cadre.
- (c) A class much more inclined to question or 'investigate' the relevance of an order.

Overall it can be said that a class of soldiers much more alert and sensitive has emerged. The 'educational gap' between the educated officer and illiterate but 'native intelligence' possessing soldier has ceased to exist.

Social, Class and Religious Influences

The three influences perhaps need not have been listed separately. However in our context our social fabric has been deeply influenced by the latter two factors. The Indian Army as constructed by the British chose to exploit the Indian social structure influenced by the Indian class and religious leanings to military advantage. There is no denying the fact that the system worked admirably. However, nearly three decades after independence a stage has arisen in which the very construction and influence of these factors is being questioned in the country. Indirectly, it may be argued that the very structure of the Indian Army as affected by the Changes in the norms of Indian Society is in a stage of transience. This needs a deeper study.

Social Influences

The British Indian Army was recruited from a society of Indians essentially bound to their traditions and family ties. The spread of education, the upheaval of the partition, the change in the economic structure have brought up a generation of man seeking to break these ties. The migration from the villages to the cities, the spread of industry and the moves of population have led to the formation of a generation which is much more individualistic and prone to break away from social dogmas. The armed forces have also found a change in their recruiting base from entirely rural to partially urban. The change has also been forced by necessity. Some of the major social changes which have changed the quality of the soldier entrant now are:-

The Break up of the Joint Family

Indian society was traditionally based on a joint family system which though providing security, sanctity of family life, economic stability also tended to stifle initiative and imbued the individual with a sense of submission to his family and crystallising his life towards his family at his costs. The system has not stood the pressures of modern life and is in the process of breaking up. A class which is much more individualistic, rebellious and impatient of elderly advice and less prone to giving respect by virtue of mere tradition is thus emerging. Insecurity of mind due to the transition from its structure however continues to effect this class. In the forces, this class of soldiers is less prone to accepting traditional orders as a matter of course, less prone to accepting duties as obligatory, and deeply individualistic. It would be wrong to view this class as confined to men alone. In fact, both officers and men are emerging from this class. This sheer individualism is the very antithesis of the Army's group method of working.

Urban Social Influences

The spread of the recruitment base and the migration from villages to the cities has brought a class of soldiers who have been influenced by

the urban mode of living. The spread of industrialisation, the shifting of population, unionism, break up of traditional society is bringing individuals who are unaffected by tradition of their families and basically rootless to the services. The rootless personalities are much more capable of looking after themselves; independent tempered and suspicious. As a consequence the class is prone to chafe at the army's method of governing its life style, stipulating all aspects of life and dress, restrictions, or even adapting to group atmosphere and responding to traditional means of motivation. Such personnel may not at present be evident in the fighting units recruited from traditional classes but are much more evident in the technical services and arms recruiting from the urban base.

Social and Class Values

Social and class values have undergone a major change. The Harijan unrest, the Dalit Panther movement, the various youth movements and the cosmopolitan spread has encouraged influences and upset the old traditional village, class and society mores. Old professions of various classes have been given up by communities. In general the class structure though weakened has not fully broken up yet. In the Army these influences have manifested themselves in :-

Officer Class

(a) The British wary of political possibilities chose to recruit Indian officers only from politically loyal and feudal communities. However the demands of World War II and the pressures of man power brought in officers from non-traditional backgrounds. In the aftermath of Independence the shortage and general policies brought in officers from the working class totally different from the feudal structure. The changes wrought in the Indian Social structure also brought into the officer cadre men from the erstwhile deprived classes. In general the tenor of the officer class has fallen from upper class to middle salaried class. A recent study revealed that a majority of officers joining the Army now hail from families of Ex OR or JCOs. This has narrowed the gap between the soldier and the officer. In cases they might even have similar life styles and subject to similar pressures. This inturn has reduced the 'awe' in which the erstwhile officer was held by his subordinates. It has by all accounts represented a class break up. However, the difference in the life style of the officer class still continues to be viewed as Westernised by the average soldiery, the difference in privilege, though mostly imagined, is keenly felt.

The men

(b) Till World War II recruitment even to the ranks of the Army was

confined to a few 'martial races'. The 'Punjification' of the Army and the Kitchener Reforms are too well known to be discussed in this paper. However, World War II brought the recruitment of many new and earlier non-traditional classes to the Army. After Independence the Army has shifted to a policy of classless recruitment. This coupled with the influences as analysed above has led to the break up in the 'class system' and traditional influence in the Army. These are discussed as:-

Limiting of Enforcement Agencies and Traditional Deterrents

- (i) In the class system entire Regiments were recruited from the same areas. In most cases complete Squadrons or Companies hailed from the same areas at times even from the same villages. The traditional obedience to the elder as present in the Indian family and village social fabric acted as a strong deterrent to crime, disobedience and strengthened the hands of the enforcement agencies i. e. the JCOs and NCOs. It was also easy to forecast the influence of orders on a group and whip up enthusiasm or place deterrents. Much lesser management therefore fell to the lot of officers. However, the weakening of the social order and the emergence of classless units has led to:-
 - (aa) The lessening of the JCO and NCOs influence. The JCO who in turn manifested himself as the 'community elder' and acted as the elder social extension in the Army is fast disappearing. With this the officer today is much more occupied than before. This is true of even class units.
 - (ab) The benefit of deterrence from disobedience or crime has been reduced. It was a deterrent for a soldier to know that any misdemeanour on his part would rapidly reach his family or community. With increasing individualism this is slowly losing its value. In class less units with a wide recruitment base the average individual has no such fears.

In the military system of class the JCO rank though beneficial has to an extent lost some of its influence. This is especially so in non-traditional and ungrouped services. The recent cadre review, though beneficial has brought an unprecedented increase in their numbers with personnel far below the experience level required having attained the rank. This is not to criticise the rank but to realise the fact that to a large extent this intermediary class has become less useful and that its influence has been reduced. In a way this has resulted in an increase in the necessity of officers contact with the men and the shouldering of increased responsibility.

Religious Influences

Modern pressures and accents on life have seen a gradual shift towards materialism. The identification of religion in the services lies with the class. The gradual shift from class and tradition base has to an extent weakened the base. The present day soldier is less likely to be influenced by religious zeal than his predecessor. In a group atmosphere and in communities identified with a religion viz a Sikh or Muslim Coy is more likely to be influenced by an appeal to religion than a mixed Squadron or company. However religion does hold a sway although its blatant use is not likely to sway a soldier, in fact it is more likely to be distrusted. Even in these traditional communities the fervour of religious trappings is dying out. This is evident from the accent of trimming beards or hair cuts in Sikh personnel. In the officer class religion does not hold much sway.

The numerous religious reformation movements in the country, the contacts bred by the Army with other communities and religions, the growth of materialism and urbanisation may well be the reason behind the weakening. This might be contested, but the fact stays that more often than not Mandir or Gurudwara parades have to be enforced. Religion does have a hold but its influence has been considerably reduced.

Economic Influences

The traditional soldier and officer class who came to the armed forces as a matter of course and retired to the life of soldier and gentleman farmer and landowners with a military heritage have virtually disappeared. In our context today the average officer and soldier join more out of economic necessity. The attitude of intense motivation and adventurism in the service has been reduced to one of caution. This has an indirect bearing on the influence wielded by the officers on the men as the reduction in the motivation of troops necessitates a greater display of leadership and more exposition to danger.

Economic Disparity

There is very little difference in the pay scales of officers and men; when the standards expected of an officer are taken into view. This is probably correct when the necessity of avoiding feudal distinctions in the Army of a democratic country is considered. However, with the visible trappings of the officers Mess and ostentatious functions the average soldier often develops a false feeling of social and economic disparity.

In view of these influences and their far reaching effects it is necessary to examine the basis of our officer man relationship. It is essential to keep pace with change and ensure that the relationship is fostered carefully on functional principles, that behaviour and attitudes changed wherever necessary.

The Structure of Relationship

Before defining the ingredients and means of an officer man relationship structure it might be of interest to examine the structure of such relationships in the armies of advanced societies like the US and UK and a developing society like Bangla Desh.

US Army

In the US Army relationships appear to be based more on a parade hour obedience and easy going officer man relationship. The accent throughout appears to be on casual even irreverent and anti establishment attitudes. The Sad Sack and General caricatures are only too evident of this trend. Officers and NCOs are even trained at various academies for group management. Yet despite all this the flow of invective and cartoon caricatures in the various books and the American Press, Cinema against the officer class does not seem to have lessened. To add the practise of 'fagging' officers was common in Vietnam. The very casualness perhaps is the undoing of the relationship. It might be of some interest to note that in similar conditions during the Korean war Gen Mac Arthur thought it fit to restore parade ground discipline as a means of making his command battleworthy. A system of relationship which failed in an advanced society like the USA is not likely to succeed in a transient society like ours. However the lack of emphasis on social segregation needs to be taken note of.

British Army

The British Army base is structured on the principle of privilege of rank, professionalism and comradiere. The officer class is based in behaviour on a code of fair play and public school ethics. However, the concept of 'gentlemen officers' has been somewhat reduced after the twilight of the British Empire. Cartoons and caricatures of Colonel Blimp however do emphasize the rigidity of the British system. The stance of the Army is highly apolitical.

Bangla Desh Army

We might view the plight of an army like that of Bangladesh. With the emergence of a class of highly politicalised officers and NCOs, the Army has faced two major mutinies since its inception. Officer and men relationship appears to be so poor that the Bengal Lancers during a mutiny in Dacca shot not only officers but their wives as well. Work is done on a request basis. The extent of the delicate officer man relationship can be analysed from the fact that during the recent Chittagong troubles Gen Ershad found it necessary to go to almost every garrison in the country to seek cooperation-clearly indicative of the delicate situation between officers and men. This is perhaps the evidence of an improper officer man relationship in a highly politicalised army in a transient society. Mutual respect and

trust appears to have been lost as a result of politicalisation.

In the Indian Army we have to establish principles suitable to our conditions. The Indian system is still a blend of the British and our own still developing democratic set up. In our system the relationship has to be based on a system which institutionalises rank and insulates the Army from political activities. Similarly a high standard of mutual trust has to be achieved without any compromise of discipline and professionalism. If the police revolt is any indication the basic disaffection lay in:-

- (a) Politicalisation
- (b) Mutual distrust between officers and men. Equalisation of opportunity and promotion to the officer cadre only through ranks was a major demand of the CRPF.
- (c) In-efficiency and weakening of professionalism.
- (d) Indiscipline.

Relationships in our Army must therefore take these facts into account and be based on :-

Privilege and Respect of Rank

- (a) It is essential for rank to be respected and obeyed. No compromise can be effected on this score; because in the basis of rank lies the institution of discipline. As regards privilege it should not be misconstrued with exploitation. A certain deference is necessary to set an officer apart and ensure obedience to him. Even the Soviet Army found it necessary to reintroduce the privilege of rank. Those who criticise privilege had best realise that privileges are rarely if ever respected or given by troops if undeserved. Privileges should not however, lead to exploitation or interfere with the welfare of troops.

Comradeship

- (b) The mutual sharing of joys and sorrows in the course of the demands of the profession, an open understanding between officers and men based on a degree of frank exposition between them eliminates misconceptions and misunderstanding.

Professionalism

- (c) Professionalism forms the bone work of the forces. The requirement is to professionalise both officers and men. All traces of rank must disappear when the profession so demands. The average soldier is shrewed and quick to locate chinks in the professional armour. There can be no hiding from the men one commands. The tendency to 'muck in' should be encouraged. There can be no white collar workers in the Army.

Discipline

(d) The need for maintenance of discipline at all costs cannot be over-emphasised. However, the tenor of discipline enforcement should be frank and fair. Certain notions held at present about discipline should be relocked into. Punishment should be a last resort, but when rendered should be exemplary and salutary.

Mutual Trust and Respect

(e) There is a necessity to understand the social background of the soldier and develop respect for his feelings and views. It is not possible to coerce the soldier into the thought process of his officer, but a good workable relationship based on mutual respect can often be developed with the most recalitant soldier. Trust is slow to develop especially in the modern context. However if a genuine effort is made to solve his grievances, and the bonafides of a genuine, concerned and caring officer established, trust is obtained and kept in the most trying circumstances.

THE DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTENANCE OF RELATIONSHIP

After identifying the ingredients on which the officer man relationship is to be based it is necessary to examine the methods required for its development and sustenance. It is also necessary to identify the various irritants to the officer man relationship and the means of their removal.

Development

Training the average officer is mostly in his early twenties when commissioned. He is barely out of college or the Academy after his early training at the NDA. In most cases he has had an insulated life and is in his first profession. He is still to face the travails of life. He has had training towards his profession but only has certain conceptions often romantic about the life he is about to lead. If not from a village background or posted to a class unit from a different part of the country than his, he might well find himself in the midst of troops totally strange in behaviour, speech, customs and habits.

The troops in general, are a hard bitten, shrewed, worldly wise, soldiers of long service, earthy, quick to evaluate the officer and a tough lot. The development of a relationship in such circumstances is not an easy task.

It is a pity that no training barring a few lectures on leadership in which the cadet rattles the principles after a bored Directing Staff is given to the young officer at the NDA, IMA or OTS. Nor is the young officer fully mature to guide or command the men he is now beset with. There is virtually no instruction in group psychology, personnel management, behaviour pattern or evaluation given to the young officer. He has no idea

about the class behaviour of the men he has to command. Compare this with a young MBA inducted into a factory. He is not only trained and a master of these arts but has also done extensive on the job training before graduating. There is a necessity of imparting instruction to the officer class in these subjects. It might be added that this is only a necessity in the present context when a general awakening and far reaching socio-economic changes are sweeping the country.

For the development of a good strong relationship it is necessary to ensure:-

Long Term Relationship

(a) The Indian soldier is phlegmatic and a long serving soldier. He does not readily adapt to strangers or give his trust and confidence. Officers should not generally be posted from one unit to another or even from one sub unit to another.

Participation

(b) It is necessary to participate in activities with troops. While parade ground activities are generally rigid, informed participation in activities like religious festivals, games, social functions attains an informality allowing proper development of relationship.

Identification

(c) It is necessary to be identified with the troops and their feelings. The spirit of oneness must be developed. The act of sharing common joys and sorrows, suffering and sharing the travails of soldiering together brings one closer to troops. The British went to the extent of visiting soldiers on leave in order to develop an idea about their background and identify with them.

Social Consciousness Respect

(d) It is essential to give due respect to the social consciousness of the soldier and respect his feelings. A soldier met out of uniform must be properly and courteously treated. The social inhibitions of a man must be respected. It is also proper to avoid impinging upon a mans privacy in the present environ. Forcing of personality is never acceptable to the Indian soldier, impressions have to be subtle, mature and made with forethought.

Awareness of Management by Men

(e) There is a certain amount of management of the officer also done by troops. It is also necessary to be alive to such manipulations and reduce them to humour whenever possible. The point of who is the boss should be established as quickly as possible.

(f) Professionalism

It is necessary for professional competence to be developed to a high degree. The average soldier is quick to gauge incompetence and see through an officer.

(g) Impartiality and Sincerity

An impartial and fair attitude is necessary. Even a slight or imagined partiality or favouritism easily wrecks an officer's credibility. Similarly men must be given hearing of their problems. A committal must be genuine. Men are quick to gauge insincerity. Any effort to assist them must be genuine.

The sustenance of the officer-man relationship requires a continued sustenance of goodwill through the most trying conditions. It is essential to remove irritants to the relationship before they manifest themselves. In the present context the irritants would be :

a) A Feeling of Intense Social Disparity and Exploitation

Even a few gestures in our present Social environment can give rise to accusations of Social Disparity and Social exploitation by the officer class. It has to be realised that the atmosphere is sensitive. The most obvious would be :-

Ostentations Functions in the Officers Messes Clubs

Any display of ostentation in the Messes and Clubs is capable of making itself glaring to sensitive eyes. Use of troops on these occasions also tends to make them feel and evaluate the officers' privileges in comparison to them. It should therefore be ensured :-

- aa) Troop participation in preparations, lighting etc should be minimal. Troops should not be used as waiters etc.
- (ab) Ostentation should be avoided.
- (ac) Suitable outings in amenity transport for picnics, pilgrimages should be organised for troops and their families.
- (ad) Drivers etc coming with staff cars etc should be suitably fed and provided with rest rooms etc during the functions.

The Batman Issue

- (a) It is undeniable that the issue does exist. With the increasing social awareness it is likely to become even more intense. The issue is likely to become more open in due course. It should be noted that the issue was a major grievance in the police services. The batman by all accounts is an inescapable part of an officer's life. Laying down of scales has little or no relevance. What needs to be emphasised is that the relationship between an officer and batman is not

the relationship between a domestic servant and master. It is essentially a mode between comrades. However, unwilling personnel should not be detailed as batman, nor should personnel be used as domestic servants. In case the issue reaches higher proportions, the privilege should be given up. In any case it is even now certainly voluntary. Incidents of personnel refusing to be batmen are not uncommon. The feeling of personnel should be respected.

The Feeling of Professional Superiority

(c) There are undeniably a number of men in the ranks today who are equally well educated and possess officer like qualities. The gap has considerably narrowed. In certain technical services personnel are supremely efficient in their own trades. This at times gives rise to the feeling in troops that they are much more competent than their officers. This needs to be negated carefully. There is no reason for officers to be technically in-competent. Should an officer lack aptitude for technical subjects he should be posted to a non technical arm. However, professionalism should not be slackened. At the same time avenues should be opened for professionally competent JCOs/OR to join the officer cadre. The Principle of equalisation of opportunity should be followed. The ACC entrance for OR and the recent increase in the SL Cadre intake does in fact mollify these conditions.


Informal Assesment

These are some of the issues attracting attention at the moment. As our pace of transformation increases other issues are bound to crop-up. What is necessary is that a continuous watch be kept on these issues and a speedy redressal be given in all cases. The extent to which all issues are made into class issues between officers and men and the intense concern of the Press and public in all issues is much in evidence. Countering and assesment of all such feelings need should be done informally. Informal explainations by officers who are in close touch with the men are very effective. Official pamphlets and statements are never fully trusted by any class. Similarly an informal watch should be kept and the implications of all issues affecting the relationship speedily analysed and attended to.

CONCLUSION

That our country and society are in a transition necessitates that we not only ensure that the transition affecting us in the armed forces is positive and development oriented. We are fortunate in having a fine and well established relationship between our officers and men—a relationship which has stood the test of war and travail. Intense interaction and trust between Officers and men has been a tradition of the Indian Army. It is essential that this spirit is maintained. The increased interest and scrutiny of all things by the public and press only necessitates even greater emphasis on this score. What is even more important is the ensuring that ideas and attitudes do not remain fixed and change with time and social necessity.

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Infantry Organisation of the Nineties and Beyond

Colonel Jaspal Singh

INTRODUCTION

Victory is still measured by the foot—Queen of the battlefield has retained its status and survived many challenges. It is however hesitant to shed its fat ! Thus aptly, is described the infantry's resistance to change and evolve an organisation which can sustain it over a protracted future- Ever since 1962, we have alternated between standardising in the mountains and plains, reacting to the shifts in the threat environments in the region. What is needed is, an in-depth threat perception of the ensuing two decades and on the basis of same, evolvement of an organisation which would enable an effective fulfilment of assigned role by the infantry arm in a future war !


Toward this end, I have endeavoured to propound a concept which could be a guide for evolving an organisation of Infantry in the backdrop of security environments during the period 1991-2010.

Threat Perception and the Organisational Deficiency

STATEGISTS presently involved in assessing the national security environments in the coming decades will agree that normalisation of relations with China and Pakistan are at best a temporary phase. In international relationships, there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies ! Geo-political environments in Asia will always place India in a state, in which a military conflict with China or Pakistan will remain a probability.

China and India are the two major powers in Asia and their conflict of interests can never be eliminated. In relation to China, India will have to maintain a degree of military preparedness which not only requires an adequate level of military forces but a credible offensive capability which should enable wresting of initiative in the initial stages of hostilities. We have learnt a bitter lesson in 1962 when in an effort to stop enemy

OUTLINE ORGANISATION—INFANTRY REGIMENT



advance, we were unable to launch an offensive even on a limited scale so as to unbalance the enemy. At each stage efforts were made to dig-in for a prolonged defence and in consequence, positions were outflanked and instead our own forces were unbalanced ! A glaring deficiency in the organisation of our fighting formations was evident from the fact that we were unable to undertake an offensive at any stage of that war.

As for Pakistan, a military conflict could ensue in the event of a political instability in that country or in the event of its acquiring a nuclear capability of magnitude that poses a definite threat to India. Cuban missile crisis in which President John F. Kennedy prepared United States for a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union is a lesson from recent history.

In the backdrop of international environments as prevalent and likely to emerge in the foreseeable future, a military conflict with China or Pakistan will be of limited duration. It will be the endeavour to gain a position of tactical and strategical advantage through an early offensive action. A basic tactical requirement is thus identified and suggests that the organisation of our fighting formations is to be tailored so as to *meet the requirements of offensive action in the initial stages of hostilities only and at a very short notice*. Wars in this sub continent, though of short duration, will be fought under a shadow of probability of a nuclear attack.

Suggested Organisation

I would recommend evolving a cohesive organisation of the size of a brigade replacing the existing system in which a cohesiveness is retained upto a battalion only. The underlying concept of proposed organisation is as follows :—

- (a) Streamline the organisation in such a manner that its offensive capability is enhanced.
- (b) Reduce administrative commitments for the battalion commander so that he is able to concentrate his time and energy towards training his command for combat.
- (c) Ensure optimum utilisation of fire support and anti-tank protection.
- (d) Adaptable to tactical troop lifting by helicopters.
- (e) Adaptable to tactical requirements on a nuclear battlefield.

Proposed organisation is explained with the help of a chart (opposite page) Infantry Regiment is to be an equivalent of an Infantry Brigade in the existing organisation. Based on the concepts propounded above, basic requirements are to have three rifle battalions and an headquarter battalion.

Requirement of an Headquarter Battalion. The headquarter battalion will be required to conduct general administration, organise logistics in war,

and enhance and coordinate fire support and anti-tank protection. Appropriately, it is recommended to be commanded by the Deputy Regimental Commander. Salient features of its organisation are :--

- (a) *Managing Headquarters.* The RHQ platoon which is part of the RHQ company, will include the establishment of the brigade headquarters camp as organised at present. It will also include personnel on the establishment of battalion headquarters of headquarter battalion.
- (b) *QM Establishments.* The Regimental Quartermaster Platoon will hold the three months maintenance stock of clothing and general stores for the entire regiment, as also, items of ASC supply. Responsibility of the QM Section at battalion level is restricted to control and distribution of ordnance stores and items of ASC supply.
- (c) *MT and EME Cover.* MT Platoon in the RHQ company of headquarter battalion will manage all the vehicles authorised for the regimental headquarters, signal company, mortar and ATGM platoons. Infantry battalions will retain their MT in the present form. All UROs are recommended to be pooled to form an LRW and give a more specialised EME cover.
- (d) *Medical.* Expertise in this field is to be improved to the extent that requirement of treating casualties caused by the nuclear explosion is adequately met. Medical establishment at the regimental level will need to be developed on scale of an ADS as authorised at present. A decontamination section may be required in each company so as to ensure prompt action in a company locality affected by a nuclear explosion.

Signal Communications. Existing signal companies staffed by the Corps of Signal personnel are recommended to be absorbed into the regiment and staffed by infantry personnel. As for holding of signal equipment in the rifle battalions, it should be in-built in authorisation of equipment to a rifle company. Repair and maintenance cover for the entire signal equipment held in the battalion will be given by the signal company.

Fire Support. In the coming decades, concept of fire support will undergo a radical change, emphasis will be more on destruction than neutralisation. Continued retention of 81 mm Mortars will not serve much purpose. Infantry should therefore be equipped with 120 mm Mortars. Considering the range of this weapon, 6 x 120 mm Mortars should be adequate to cover the entire regimental frontage with minor re-deployment in some situations.

Anti-Tank Protection. At the regimental level, an ATGM platoon consisting of four detachments (one launcher per detachment) is recommended. Re-adjustment of one or two out of four launchers will enable the platoon to cover all feasible approaches across the regimental front. At company level, close protection is best ensured by the rocket launcher presently authorised and indications are that it will be in service during the nineties. As for the anti-

tank platoon at battalion level, our immediate answer is the 106 mm RCL gun till such time we can find a missile which can be effective within the range of 500 m — 1300 m, the dead space left after deploying the rocket launchers and the ATGMs presently in service with us.

Main Fighting Element. The main fighting element consists of nine rifle companies grouped into three rifle battalions (three companies per battalion). Tactical loads of a company should be such that it can be lifted in three helicopters of the MI-8 type or similar vehicle of the future.

Equipment Policy for the Main Fighting Element. In order to release maximum manpower for offensive action, quantum of troops required to hold an assigned piece of ground will have to be considerably reduced. This will only be possible if a phenomenal increase in the fire power of rifle company is achieved. We need to develop a general purpose machine gun which can be used in an LMG role by mounting on a bipod and in an MMG role by mounting the same on a tripod. Such a weapon should have the rate of fire similar to our Mag-58 presently in service but lighter in weight. Holding formations may be authorised two such weapons per rifle section and those in an offensive role need have only one. Increase in the fire power to such magnitude will considerably reduce the requirement of troops for holding ground and it may become possible to lift troops from a locality without prejudice to its security as those remaining will have a good measure of fire power.

Battlefield Environments (1991-2010) and its Influence on Infantry Organisation

Visualing the possible pattern in which military operations against Pakistan are likely to develop, the basic foot infantry can be assigned any of the three roles :—

- (a) Holding ground.
- (b) Break-in into the defences based on elaborate obstacle system.
- (c) Consequent to a breakout, opening the axis of maintenance on which the strong centres of resistance are still prevalent because the mechanised forces would have by-passed the same.

As for the role assigned in which holding of ground is involved, it is to be appreciated that the lowest level at which the supporting arms can be integrated into a tactical plan is that of a brigade. Cohesiveness at this level assumes further importance when we examine situations in which counter-attacks are undertaken. At battalion level, it will be difficult to lift troops for counter-attacks and hence the reserve for such tasks will have to be constituted by lifting troops from some other part of the brigade defended sector. A situation will thus arise in which a company from a particular battalion is operating in the defended area of another battalion. Imagine this eventuality

in our present environments where two battalions have probably been together in the same brigade for not more than a year ! Cohesiveness within a brigade in the conduct of defensive operations is therefore an essential requirement.

The other two roles which may be assigned to foot infantry can appropriately, bracketed as part of offensive operations. It is now an established fact that in the conduct of offensive actions at the level of a brigade, what is really involved is drills and not so much tactics. All the more reason, cohesiveness of organisation at brigade level assumes greater importance in offensive operations.

Analysing the tactical situations in a war with China, our posture and subsequent conduct of military operations in an overall perspective will be defensive. In the conduct of a defensive war, offensive actions at brigade and divisional level will be essential. In the mountain regions whether fighting Pakistan or China, tactical mobility through helicopters will be essential in order to ensure a meaningful conduct of offensive and defensive manoeuvres.

Reasons in favour of cohesiveness of the proposed organisation find further support when viewed in the backdrop of a probability or actual use of tactical nuclear weapons. Tactical requirements in such a situation will enjoin upon a field formation the necessity of rapid dispersion and concentration, and succession of command at number of appointments in consequence of heavy casualties. A cohesive organisation at brigade level would serve the purpose better than the continued retention of our present arrangements.

CONCLUSION

Entire emphasis in the coming decades will be offensive action at short notice and this requires tactical mobility of a high order. Essential requirements to achieve the same are—

- (a) Main fighting element should be kept light and administrative responsibilities of company and battalion commander should be reduced.
- (b) Quantum of troops required for holding ground should be kept minimum.
- (c) Organisation of a tactical outfit should be cohesive and homogenous.

In the proposed organisation, above requirements are met by the authorisation of a headquarter battalion, equipment policy for the main fighting element and recommending a cohesive and homogenous infantry regiment to replace our existing infantry brigades.

Our Parachute Regiments are an ideal base to commence this experiment. It should be possible to group three to five regiments under a divisional headquarters without any major increase in the overheads.

The Future of the Tank

Lieut Colonel Lalit Roy

The tank has undergone a number of changes since it was first used in the trench warfare in World War I. From time to time, coupled with the experience gained, the tank has increased its mobility, fire power and even armour protection due to advances in metallurgy. Though in World War II, anti tank weapons based on the hollow charge principle were discovered as having tremendous armour piercing capabilities against any known tank, the success of armour in battle is well known. Now a days with the advent of the missile it is often said that, due to the high kill probability of the weapon and the cost of production of an Armoured Fighting Vehicle, the tank has met its natural death. This erroneous conclusion was based on the fact that any known armour can be pierced by the missile. However, when the limitations of the anti tank missile were recognised the initial enthusiasm for these gave way to less sweeping claims.

The main advantage enjoyed by a tank is that it has an enormous array of direct firing accurate weapons which, due to their mobility, still can tilt the balance of battle in one direction. Armour protection has become only secondary to mobility and this accounts for the continued survival of the tank though it can still be pierced by a number of weapons.

There are a number of conflicting requirements between armament and weight but these have been partly resolved by the use of specialised armour vehicles like the Recce and the Main Battle Tanks. A wide range of these have been produced since World war II which suggest that this conflict between weight and armament has not yet been resolved.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the main characteristics of a tank and see what future it has in the context of the advent of modern weapons.

Characteristics of the Tank

WITH the modern trends in warfare and the wider ranging scientific developments there is cause for some rethinking on the role and characteristics of the tank. In the past, characteristics of the tanks have been :—

- (a) Fire power
- (b) Mobility
- (c) Protection.

Various nations have assigned different priorities to the above and depending on the type of tank required, it is necessary to trade off one against the other in design. There are a various number of alternative methods of achieving these main characteristics, which bear consideration.

Fire power

The value of direct fire and hard hitting main armament is evident. The fire power of tanks has been used in support of predominantly infantry operations in Vietnam where many thought it would prove useless. The main gun of the tank can deal with enemy bunkers and neutralise any pin point target the commander can observe. The main gun of the tank has quicker effective reaction than any anti tank weapon produced so far and can fire very accurately. While in Vietnam, the tank was useful, it also illustrated the effectiveness of the other forms of direct fire power. The enemy there has shown how effectively various rockets and recoilless rifles can be used both in the direct and indirect roles. Most of these weapons were man carried and proved very accurate against vehicles, personnel carriers, strong points and tanks. They, seem to offer the same advantages of the main tank gun, less its mobility. Of late a lot of work has gone into the development of anti tank missiles, both man portable and mounted on various types of vehicles. Though these missiles have not as yet measured upto the hopes held out for them, the latest generation of missiles offer attractions which challenge the conventional tank gun for cost and efficiency. The first two generations of anti tank guided missiles were based on wire and infrared guidance which did not suit all conditions of terrain and climate. The third generation based on a laser beam has proved to be very effective, though with certain limitations. MILAN, developed by the French and Germans is a man portable, semi automatic missile with a range of 2000 meters and is primarily an infantry weapon. DRAGON, a surface attack guided missile being developed by the USA is an anti tank weapon light enough to be carried and deployed by one man, yet potent enough to destroy armoured vehicles and battle field

fortifications. The American TOW the German/French HOT, as well as the British SWING FIRE, offer ranges which are effective and greater than most main armaments and are capable of penetrating all known tanks at above 3000 meters range. A new generation (the fourth) of missiles, at present prohibitively expensive, will offer "fire and forget" fully automatic capability. Developments such as these are rapidly leading to the time when accurate, reliable and quickly deployed weapon systems will be carried and operated on smaller and faster vehicles than tanks, as is to-day.

A further development in the evolution of fire power is the employment of a low pressure main gun, the SWEDISH IKV 'S' tank (15 tons) carries the 90mm Bofors low pressure gun. Its design minimizes the need for a large vehicle and there is less visual weapon signature because the flash and obturation are reduced. This weapon may offer a satisfactory compromise between the needs of the light weight vehicle and for an effective alternative, particularly if used in conjunction with missiles. The SHERIDAN main Gun/Launcher concept has not yet won wide spread popularity with other countries, though the French have produced a 142 mm Gun/Launcher for the ACRA missile; later generations of this type of a weapon may be ideal for a light weight platform. The fixed gun concept with the SWEDISH 'S' Tank incorporates which can be traversed or elevated by hydraulic platforms in the tank has given the following advantages :-

- (a) It is easier to command.
- (b) Fire positions can be occupied easier.
- (c) It reduces crew.
- (d) Automatic loading is made possible.
- (e) It is 25 per cent lighter and cheaper.
- (g) It makes the use of sloped armour possible.

Mobility

Tanks can achieve mobility by any of the following means :—

- (a) Low ground pressure (weight/pressure)
- (b) Power reversing of tracks for quick turning.
- (c) Increased Horse Power.
- (d) Suitable suspension (Width/length ratio).

Mobility is hampered by wet and marshy ground, mechanical failure, terrain, such as ravines, steep gradients and rocky terrain, densely vegetated areas and man made obstacles.

Although the ground pressures are kept as low as possible in most tanks, we find that most Main Battle Tanks have a bridge classification far higher than other Military Vehicles and this more often than not, restricts move of these

vehicles on high ways. Even the railways in some countries cannot accept the weight and dimensions of these tanks. Recent developments with wheeled vehicles have demonstrated that a far greater mobility can be achieved than was possible a few years ago. The 'GOER' served in Vietnam in various cargo carrying configurations and its performance compared very favourably with the M-113 personnel carrier in swamp going. The Vehicle has an articulated body with wagon, steering and four large low pressure tyres. It has no suspension system but it can achieve 30 mph with a 8 ton load. In the foreseeable future, this vehicle could conceivably be fitted with a heavy machine gun, rockets or missile launchers or even a gun to give it fire as effective as armament on Main Battle Tanks.

Protection

The advances in modern anti tank weapons have almost rendered any tank vulnerable to them. This concept of protection should always be considered with mobility. Operations in Vietnam have shown that without even the presence of enemy tanks and aircraft, own tanks can be destroyed or disabled. A tank is as good as destroyed if it is immobilised. On modern tanks the areas which are most vulnerable are the running gear, the main armament and the Commander himself. If the Commander is forced to fight closed down, the tank loses most of its effectiveness and becomes even more vulnerable to short range anti tank weapons, due to lack of observation. The optical system used by the Commander of the tank is another chink in the armour of the tank. If on the other hand the armour protection of a tank is increased to such an extent that it provides total safety to the crew, its mobility gets totally hampered and the tank becomes extremely vulnerable. Protection can be achieved by evasive action, by agility and by concealment or deception. With the intensive research which the countries of the World are doing on surveillance devices, the tank becomes more and more difficult to conceal or disguise. Deception is awkward and expensive with large machines and dummy tanks. These considerations have led to a tank of light weight with high speed manoeuvrability where physical shielding has been sacrificed to a certain extent for increased evasive capability. Another recent concept is sloped armour protection which makes a kinetic projectile ricochet off the armour due to the angle of impact being acute. The British have of late introduced CHOBAM armour which consists of ceramic plats sandwiched in between armour plating in their CHEIFIAN Tanks. It is claimed that this would defeat all high explosive anti tank and even high explosive squash head projectiles.

Helicopter

The helicopter has intruded into consideration of all three of the main characteristics of the tank. While it is unlikely to replace the tank, it does possess capabilities which would appear to make the tank less indispensable. At the moment it can only be regarded as being a valuable complementary weapon to the tank and is well described as an advanced air fire support system.

Future

The Combat vehicle of the future is likely to take advantage of all the major characteristics of the tank. It will probably be an articulated vehicle with multiple driving wheels fitted with cellular on solid tyres, capable of high speed performance in most types of terrain. It would probably have a multi fuel engine with a high operation range of 500 KM or so. This vehicle will have a very low profile and will be adaptable for use as a troop carrier; recce vehicle, field gun platform and a direct fire weapon carrier. In this latter role the vehicle may be fitted with rockets, guided missiles and a low pressure conventional gun. Combat vehicles will be armed with plating to protect it against conventional small arms fire and sharpnel, probably using a light weight alloy, plastic or ceramic plates or even flexible sheets. Some tanks may be equipped with electronic remote explosive initiators which will destroy enemy mines, missiles or rockets at safe distances. The tank of to-day is as anachronistic as medieval body armour. Though it has many advantages, it has evolved to the stage of imminent-extinction because it has become increasingly inefficient in an age which demands more of machines than ever before. The USA Army has of late gone in for proto type production of the XM-1 tanks that are currently being developed by the Chrysler Corporation. This tank is to have a turbine driven diesel engine developing 1500 horse power and can easily attain the top speed of 45 MPH with increased acceleration. The main armament is likely to be the 105 mm M-65 Gun capable of firing all types of ammunition or a rifled 120 mm gun. When introduced into service this vehicle will be most effective and deadliest land combat vehicle in current use. The vehicle encompasses improved ballistic protection, a reduced silhouette, dramatically increased mobility, revolutionary suspension and a precision fire control system.

A view of the future of the tank

Is the tank alive? The tank will remain to be alive until its combination of characteristics are reproduced by some cheaper weapon. Well protected battle tanks can survive mines, shell splinters and a wide range of pro-

jectiles. *Formations of heavy weight* Main Battle Tanks will be able to advance even in the presence of all these threats.

Battle Field Mobility. It stems from entirely two different sources :—

- (a) The ability of the tank as a tracked automotive vehicle to move over various types of terrain and obstacles.
- (b) Armour protection which enables the tank to ignore the threat of fire from a significant number of weapons. In consequence tanks can move on the battle field more freely than any other unprotected or only lightly armoured weapon systems.

The ground pressure and the steerability ratio of any tank limits its weight to about 45 tons. Within this weight a tank can be made immune to only certain types of weapons like small arms fire.

Helicopter as an Alternative. As a mobile weapon platform the tank is likely to be needed as long as ground forces require mobile and accurate firing heavy weapons. Thus the only thing that could eliminate the need for the tank is the development of a superior weapon platform. A helicopter is undoubtedly superior to the tank as far as mobility is concerned, but it remains vulnerable to a number of weapons. Helicopters carrying missiles have proved to be a very effective weapon system and have achieved a large number of tank kills versus helicopter kills ; but it must be remembered that the cost of a sophisticated helicopter is more than the cost of a tank and that the exchange ratio needs to be high if the employment of attack helicopters is to be cost effective against tanks. The helicopter is also less versatile than the tank as a weapon platform. It cannot carry high velocity guns which are indispensable in killing tanks. At best, therefore, a helicopter can only be a supplement to the tank and not a substitute.

The choice between a gun or a missile. Tank Guns are capable of killing all enemy tanks within most probable ranges of engagement. However, their kill probability leaves much to be desired at long ranges. A high degree of accuracy does not result. Missiles as an alternative have been developed for the tank. This led to the development of SHILLEIAGH Guided Missile System. The principal attraction of a guided missile as a battle tank armament has been that the hit probability is higher than that of guns at longer ranges. Development of advanced tank fire control systems based on laser range finders have significantly increased the range at which the relative effectiveness of the two weapon systems change. In consequence, missiles are likely to be superior to guns, less frequently than guns to the missiles. Moreover, missiles are much more expensive than guns. The guns also offer the advantages of being able to fire high velocity armour piercing shot, as well as projectiles with shaped charge warheads. They thus force the enemy to protect his tanks against two different threats.

The enemy need not do this against missiles as they have low velocity chemical energy warheads.

Recces tank. According to some tank tacticians the requirement of a light tank merely for recces reconnaissance seems unnecessary. They suggest that recces can be done by suitable armoured cars or suitably modified infantry combat vehicles. Where information has to be fought for, a heavy tank can do the needful. With the improvement of anti tank weapons, particularly aircel rockets, the high cost of heavy armour is a distinct disadvantage. The emphasis, therefore, comes back to mobility. Therefore, instead of having a variety of tanks, a tank which is highly mobile and mounts a powerful gun seems to be the answer. Having only one type of a tank would considerably simplify production and maintain economy.

There appears to be a necessity of a separate type of a tank for the reconnaissance role. This tank should have mobility, long radius of action, long range signal communications as opposed to protection and armament, the main features of the battle tank. At present there is no uniform design of recces tanks. The designs reflect the differences in tactical concepts. The future trends likely to be incorporated in the reconnaissance tank are :-

- (a) More powerful armament, primarily guided missiles.
- (b) Greater mobility by better engine, performance and amphibious capability.
- (c) Reduced weight through the use of light, alloys for armour protection.

The tank of tomorrow's Battle Field

On tomorrow's battle field we can certainly anticipate the expanded use of air mobile forces for lightening quick responses to changing situations. The rapid mobility of these air mobile forces, however, is of doubtful value unless they can be supported and reinforced by highly mobile, all weather ground forces. Our tank must, therefore, possess on and off the road mobility that will permit it to rapidly spearhead link up forces in conjunction with other combat forces. It must be able to move cross country in the face of hostile fire and therefore be capable of manoeuvring with speed, agility and acceleration while possessing the capacity to rapidly cross obstacles. The survivability of the tank cannot be measured by the sheer thickness of armour. The main determining factors of tank survivability are mobility, vehicle size, fire power, missile counter measures and design details which limit damage.

CONCLUSION

During World War I when the tank replaced the Horse Cavalry the latter went into extinction. As an axiom, therefore, with the advent of armed helicopters and anti-tank missiles, it is wrongly thought by many tacticians that the days of the tank are over. It is true that with the development of modern weapon systems, there is an urgent need to change the employment of tanks with some modifications to its design also ; but to suggest that these modern weapon systems would eventually replace the tank would seem a total fallacy. At best these systems could be used as an useful adjunct to the use of armour which still continues and it likely to in the foreseeable future, to play a vital role on the battlefield of tomorrow.

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FOR VALOUR

Wg. Cdr. S. Sankara Narayanan

THE most exclusive of all the orders of bravery is the bronze Victoria Cross, inscribed with the simple words, "For Valour." It has been awarded as a decoration nearly 1400 times to a small and select band of warriors as the foremost heroes of the battle-field. The Victoria Cross was instituted on 29th January 1856 by Queen Victoria, but was made retrospectively applicable to the autumn of 1854, to cover the period of the Crimean War. The Cross was to be awarded for outstanding deeds of gallantry in the face of the enemy. It was to consist of a Maltese Cross of bronze with the Royal Crest in the centre, and a scroll underneath, bearing the words, "For Valour." On the reverse side of the Cross is the date of the act of bravery, while the name of the recipient is engraved at the back of the clasp. The medal is made from the cascable of two pieces of Russian cannon captured at Sebastopol during the closing stages of the Crimean War. Hencock and Co. of London have been making the medal since its inception. The Russian guns are on display at the Rotunda, Woolwich.

INDIAN SHARE OF V.C.'S

With the independence of India, since 1947, the decoration is no longer awardable. However, a total number of 39 in undivided India received the award, dating from the first World War. The names of the recipients are shown with the ranks held at the time of the act, and the year in which it was won.

Sep.	Khudadad Khan	1914
Nk.	D.S. Negi	1914
Jem.	Mir Dast	1915
Rfm.	Kulbir Thapa	1915
Sep.	Chatta Singh	1916
L.Nk.	Lala	1916
Nk.	Shan Ahmad Khan	1916
L. Dfdr.	Gobind Singh	1917
Rfm.	Karam Bahadur Rana	1918
Ris.	Badlu Singh	1918
Sep.	Ishar Singh	1921

Lt.	P.S. Bhagat	1941
Sub.	Richhpal Ram	1941
Hav.	Parkash Singh	1943
Sub.	Lalbahadur Thapa	1943
Coy. Hav. Maj.	Chhelu Ram	1943
Hav.	Gaje Ghale	1943
Nk.	Nand Singh	1944
Jem.	Abdul Hafiz	1944
Sep.	Kamal Ram	1944
Rfm.	Gangu Lama	1944
Rfm.	Tulbahadur Pun	1944
Sub.	Netra Bahadur Thapa	1944
Rfm.	Agan Singh Rai	1944
L. Nk.	Y. Ghadge	1944
Rfm.	Sherbahadur Thapa	1944
Sub.	Ramsarup Singh	1944
Rfm.	Thaman Gurung	1944
Sep.	Bhandari Ram	1944
Hav.	Umrao Singh	1944
L.Nk.	Sher Shah	1945
Jem.	Parkash Singh	1945
A.Nk.	Fazal Din	1945
Nk.	Gian Singh	1945
Rfm.	Bhanbhagta Gurung	1945
Lt-	K.S. Judge	1945
Sep.	Ali Haidar	1945
Sep.	Namdeo Jadhav	1945
Rfm.	Lacchiman Gurung	1945

However, during the past century and more in which the award has held the pride of place, there have been certain uncommon and remarkable features worthy of notice.

Civilian Winners of the Victoria cross

Four civilians have been decorated with the Victoria Cross. Of them, three were magistrates of the Bengal Civil Service during the Indian Mutiny of 1857 ; and the fourth was a Bengal clergyman, who won it during the Afghan War. Civilians are eligible for the award, provided they are serving with one of the Armed Forces.

Although the Victoria Cross (as opposed to the George Cross) is essentially awarded for bravery in the face of the enemy, it has been awarded for

bravery, *not* in the face of the enemy on six occasions—to one for suppressing a fire in a carriage containing live ammunition, and to five for saving the lives of companions in a storm at sea.

No Woman Recipient Yet

Members of the Women's Services are eligible but up to date no woman has won this highly coveted honour.

Forfeiture of the Award

To preserve the sanctity of the distinction, convictions for treason, cowardice, felony or any other infamous conduct, entailed forfeiture of the award. Forfeitures, however, were discontinued in practice since 1920. A total of eight forfeitures is on record, the last one under Royal Warrant was in 1908.

Twice-Decorated V.C.'s

Only three soldiers have won a bar to the Victoria Cross, i.e. won the award twice. They are :

Lt. (Later Lt. Col) Arthur Martin Leake, V.C., V.D., R.A.M.C., (1874—1953), V.C. in 1902 and Bar in 1915.

Captain Noel Godfrey Chavasse, V.C., M.C., R.A.M.C., (1884—1917), V.C. in 1916 and Bar posthumously on 14 Sep. 1917.

Captain Charles Hazlett Upham, V.C., N.Z.M.F. (Born 1911), V.C. in 1941 and Bar in 1942.

Such distinction has not come the way of the men of the other Armed Forces. And these three soldiers, therefore, belong to a select band.

Six V.C.'s Before Breakfast

The largest number of Victoria Crosses awarded to one regiment in one action is 7. In the Gallipoli landings in 1915, the Lancashire Fusiliers won "six V.C.'s before breakfast."

The Youngest V.C. Holder

The lowest established age for a V.C. holder is 15 years and 100 days for Hospital Apprentice Arthur Fitzgibbon, (born at Pithorgarh Northern India), of the Indian Medical Service for bravery at the Taku Forts in Northern China on 21 Aug. 1860. The youngest living V.C. holder is Lance Corporal Rambahadur Limbu (born in Nepal 1939), of the 10th Princess Mary's Own Gurkha Rifles. The award was made for his courage while fighting in the Bau District of Sarawak, East Malaysia, on 21 Nov. 1965. Because of

the fact that youth is the age for 'derring—do' and great physical endeavour, the greatest number of Victoria Cross winners is to be found in the age group of early or middle twenties. But the older are not to be denied. The oldest was believed to have been sixty nine years of age.

The Longest Lived V.C.

The longest lived of all the winners of the Victoria Cross was Captain (later General) (Sir) Lewis Startford Tallemache Halliday, V.C., K.C.B., of the Royal Marine Light Infantry. He was born on 14 May 1870, Won his V.C. in China in 1900, and died on 9th March 1966, aged 95 years and 299 days.

The V.C. Strain Ran in the Family

There are three instances where father and son have been decorated with this supreme distinction. They are :

Lt. F.S. Roberts (1858) and Lt. the Hon'ble F.H.S. Roberts (1899)
 Capt. W.N. Congreve (1899) and Brevet Major W.La T. Congreve,
 D.S.O., M.C. (1916).

Major C.J.S. Gough (1857-1858) and Capt. J.E. Gough (1903)

And there are four known instances of brothers winning the coveted honour.

Maj. C.J.S. Gough (1857-1858) and Lt. H.H. Gough (1857-1858)
 Maj. R.W. Sartorius (1874) and Capt. E.H. Sartorius (1879)
 Lt. A.B. Turner (1915) and Lt. Col. V.B. Turner (1942)
 Lt. Col. R.B. Bradford, M.C., 1916) and Lt. Col. Bradford (1918).

It is noteworthy that the unique Gough family have three V.C.'s to their lasting credit.

While the British Unknown Warrior of the 1914, 1918 war was not awarded the V.C., the American Unknown Soldier was awarded the V.C.

The number of V.C. awards for Acts of bravery during the Indian Mutiny was exactly the same as that of World War II—182 each. The reason for the apparent imbalance in awards is not far to seek. The V.C. and the Distinguished Conduct Medal were virtually the only decorations for gallantry in those distant days. Later on, there were other decorations like the M.C., D.S.O., M.M., D.S.M., I.D.S.M. etc., Had these decorations existed at the time of the Indian Mutiny, they would undoubtedly have been awarded in many of the cases, instead of the V.C.

In the case of conspicuous bravery on the part of a body of soldiers, sailors or airmen, the elective principle decided the award. The question of

a posthumous V.C. is not easy to decide. All factors considered, it must be the case of a valiant person who dies as the direct result of his action, either immediately or in subsequent days.

The Mettle of which the V.C. is Made

What sort of men won the V.C.? It is a difficult question to answer. Courage is a queer quality that defies analysis. Men react to different stresses and different conditions in a myriad ways, in accordance with their individual characteristics. To very few is it given to be without fear. Most men are afraid of something, most of us of many things. But, if there is any single denominator, it is a degree of persistence and obstinacy—a refusal to be beaten. Of such sterner stuff was the gallant band of men, who won this distinguished award for valour.

USI National Security Papers

**LEADERSHIP IN THE INDIAN ARMY
DURING EIGHTIES AND NINETIES**

By

Lieut General M.L. CHIBBER, PVSM, AVSM

Ask Your Copy From :—

Secretary

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA
RAJAJI MARG
NEW DELHI

Real Facts About Punch Garrison

Brigadier N. S. Rawat (Retd.)

THE Sainik Samachar has begun 1982 really well, i.e. with the Army Number, the supplement of RIMC Diamond Jubilee and now the IAF Golden Jubilee. There is no doubt that the I.A.F. has most certainly created history full of many glorious moments and spectacular achievements since inception. And it was very rightly summed up by our Rashtrapati Dr. Radhakrishnan when he declared at Srinagar Air Strip. "If we are here today, it is only because of our Air Force".

Air Marshal Chaturvedi has very rightly emphasised that events should be judged in the right context and appropriate perspective. So indeed these should be in fairness and equity even while belittling the momentous role played by erstwhile J & K State Forces in the defence of not only Punch, but the entire J & K territory.

It is not fully appreciated that the long border between India and the newly created Pakistan (West) was guarded valiantly by the J & K S.F. hardly ten thousand in all, with no supporting arms, artillery, armour or even supply system. To perform the same role Indian Army later employed ten times that number with all the nations' resources at its back and call.

That the J & K S.F. were wholly dependant for all their military supplies on the Indian arsenal of Rawalpindi which on partition went to Pakistan. One of the screws applied by Pakistan was to stop all supplies. A most serious handicap.

Some forty percent of the forces consisted of Muslims from Mirpur and Punch side, all state subjects. This lot was so greatly contaminated by communal virus that it entirely forgot the sacred oath over Quran of loyalty and allegiance. They walked lock, stock and barrel to join the enemy, the raiders, to indulge in loot, forcible conversion, arson and even machine gunning their erstwhile comrades in their sleep. History has not many examples of such dastardly acts of treachery.

The J.K. S.F. were inevitably strung out in penny packets all along the long border, but they hung out to their posts despite all from Skardu, Madhopur, Suchetgarh, Mirpur, Kotli and Punch. They were fighting a desparate battle for own hearths and homes. They had inherited the unexcelled patriotism and loyalty of Zorawar and his valiant successors. For them it

just could not be a case of *could-not-care-less* as was subsequently seen in the unfortunate surrender of Muzzafarbad and Kotli.

That the J & K Forces suffered a very heavy casualty of over 10% of their strength is a proof of their grim determination and supreme sacrifices. Despite this such colossal handicaps one could mention the undernoted superb performances by the JK Forces :-

- (a) *Brigadier Rajindra Singh's epic rear Guard action.* He, a recently promoted Chief of the Staff, personally jumped into the fray on Oct 22nd with hardly a strength of some 150 students from different units attending summer courses in the Valley. He secured three most valuable days to enable the Indian Army to land in Badgaon air strip, equally heroically defended by Major Som Nath Sharma of the Kumaonis. Somnath was most deservedly awarded the highest award of bravery-PVC (Posthumous) Perhaps Rajindra Singh deserved similar recognition for his no less valour, leadership and dedication extending to over hundred hours and sacrificing his very life. He delayed the mad onrush of fanatic hordes of over five thousand tribal raiders in MT armed, trained and equipped by Pakistanies and officered by them and even by Brig. Tariq, a Yankee adventurer.
- (b) *Brigadier (then Lt. Col.) Sherjang Thapa*:-He was then commanding 6 JK Inf., mixed composition half muslims. Sherjang got besieged inside Skardu Fort with less one Coy including 1/3 muslims and over one thousand refugees. He inspired his troops with supreme dedication and unfailing vigilance, and repulsed several attempts of the attackers four or five times far stronger. Sherjang, controlled the distribution of his scanty rations and even water which had to be brought in from outside, amazingly well including his sharing these with the refugees. He refused offers of surrender, even when a Commander of Gen. Thimayya's status, then GOC-in-C Western Command, expressed deep regrets at inability to send relief or help. Ultimately when the raiders brought in Mountain Guns to support their pressing attacks, the gallant band had no recourse other than to surrender to escape annihilation.
- (c) *Defence of Punch*:-Punch was surrounded from all sides by Pakistan raiders cum Punchees Muslims in mass. Even though the J&K Bde under Brig. Krishna Singh was holding on the situation was critical. It is said the AHQ (India) suggested that it was not possible to rescue it, but that Pt. Nehru the then P.M. was violently against surrendering it on a plate as it were. The J&K Bde, there consisted of four very seasoned, extremely well trained units 1st J&K, 8th J&K and 9th J&K and Coys of 4th and 7th Inf under able commanders like Lt. Col. Hira Nand Vrc, Malook Singh, Khajoor Singh. Their

glorious performances would have been borne out even by Brig. Pritam Singh MC the gallant Commander himself had he been alive or even by records in the AHQ archives. Maj. Genl. D.K. Palit Vrc. in his unbiased 'J&K Arms' writes :—

"The garrison of Punch consisted of predominantly J&K SF (about four Battalions) and it fought valiantly for sixteen months. The SF and the inhabitants fought a desperate struggle against a strong and well armed enemy, repulsing numerous raids and even organised attacks. They were forced to subsist on starvation scale of rations—a few ounces of gruel or chappati per day, occasionally forced to eat horse meat for sustenance. But the indomitable courage of the officers and men of the SF's, who never ceased fighting for their beloved hills kept the enemy at bay." So to brand them as "untrained" is most undeserved and unkindly cut by any reckoning. It could be said that the then prevailing catastrophic situation was an occasion for J&K SF to exhibit their unbeaten patriotism, unquestioned loyalty and bravery of a very high order.

It is conceded that there were SFs & SFs. Some of these were guarding the harems as in Rampur or the kennels as in Junagarh. Some excelled in fine table manners and others in sheer bravados at drink bars. But for solid soldiering few equalled, much less excelled, the J&K SF from Zorawar days in 1840, during the two World Wars and partition days. One could safely brand them as 'ill equipped and ill supplied' but certainly not 'untrained' by any stretch of imagination. Let us be fair and honest, let us give due credit, no more but no less either.

Russian Annexation of Turkestan

Major Ravinderpal Singh

INTRODUCTION

Russian advance to the frontiers of Sinkiang in the South East, and of Persia and Afghanistan in the South was undertaken in two stages separated by more than a hundred years. The first advance covered most of what is now Kazakhstan, and the second stage of advance moved over Turkestan which covers the territories of the four Southern republics of Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, Tajikstan and Turkmenistan. The Russian conquest of Turkestan was conceived and achieved in much lesser space of time than that of the Kazakh region lying to the north of it. The three Khanates of Khokand, Bukhara and Khiva which were virtually untouched by the Russian influence till the middle of the 19th Century, were annexed within a space of 25 years or so. By the end of the 19th Century, Russian control had spread over the entire region and she had now become the paramount power in the region. During the century and half which ended with the annexation of Merv, Russia had acquired territory larger than Indian sub continent but with much lesser population.

Russia's push towards Turkestan did not require new decisions but was a product of previous policy. The cause of this aggressive movement could be explained as an irrepressible urge to expand. The need to counter the British influence was probably not as strong as the need for mercantile advantages. And for that peace and order had to be ensured, which could only be achieved by the force of Russian arms. Possibly reasons were simpler. Russia had grown strong compared to her Central Asian neighbours. Exploiting this situation, the Russians were sucked into the power vaccum, where justification for expansion was provided by either alleged provocations by the Central Asians or the need to introduce the supposedly superior Western or Russian civilisation.

This paper attempts to identify the Russian motivations, policy and methods adopted for the conquest of Turkestan. It traces the growth

of the Russian control in Central Asia and its influence on the Anglo-Russian relations in the second half of the 19th Century.

CENTRAL ASIAN COMMUNITIES


FROM the ancient times many different races of people have passed over Central Asia. The first people known to have existed in the region were Scythians, after whom came the Persians. Tajiks who are the descendants of the Persians are considered to be the original inhabitants of the land. The Greeks under Alexander had controlled this area for a short while. Central Asia has also seen Chinese supremacy thrice, but on each occasion for a short time only. With the advent of Islam came hordes of Arabs, who brought with them the arts of reading, writing, sciences and skills of raising large buildings. After the Arabs, the Uzbeks made themselves masters of Central Asia and split into various tribes. To this period history belong the renowned and powerful rulers, Chengiz Khan and Taimur.

The ethnographic distribution of the population falls into two divisions; the Turki extraction and the Iranian group. Amongst those of the Turki descent the Uzbeks are the most prominent, constituting not only the racial preponderance but the ruling power of the erstwhile Khanates. The remaining constituents of the Turki divisions are the Kirghiz, who represent a major portion of the population along the Chinese Turkistan, and the Turkomans. Long before the Christian era, the Turkoman branch inhabited the Altai mountains in the North but the pressure of population led their hordes to spread over the great steppes between the Hindu kush and the Caspian. Turkomans are divided into tribes like Yomuds, Salors and Tekkes etc.

To the Iranian category belong the Tajiks, the original inhabitants of the country and even now constituting the principal section of the population; the Sarts, a conglomeration of Turki and Iranian nationalities comprise a considerable proportion of the urban and the rural population. The entire population of the region is Islamic and can be distributed into sedentary, semi-nomadic and nomadic classes. The first constituting about 65 percent of the population is distributed in the plains, a considerable proportion comprising Tajiks and Sarts. The semi-nomadic population form about 15 percent consisting partly of Uzbeks, Turkomans and Tajiks dwelling in the hills. The nomads, who make up 20 percent of the population live in the steppes and comprise mainly the Turkoman, the Uzbeks and the Kirghiz.

EARLIER RUSSIAN ANNEXATIONS

Although contacts between Russia and Central Asia were in existence before the 18th century, but it was Peter the Great who first pursued an active policy of opening up Central Asia. Czar Peter on advice of the Turko-



man trader Khwaja Nefes established contacts with the Khan of Khiva. Peter was motivated by the stories of the gold deposits in the territories of Khiva and Bokhara, besides, the need to divert River Oxus into its original course of flow into Caspian was important as it would enable Russians to reach Khivan territory directly from Astrakhan.^{3,7} To achieve his object, Peter dispatched an expedition in 1717 under a Circassian Chieftain Dawlat Giray, who on baptism had changed his name to Bekovitch Cherkaski. The Khan of Khiva lulled Bekovitch into sense of security and persuaded him to divide his forces into smaller detachments. The Khivans then fell upon the isolated Russian detachments and defeated them in detail^{8,7}.

The next step in Russian advance was necessitated by the raiding propensities of the Kirghiz nomads who used to make incursions over the Orenburg border. A policy of establishment of control was adopted which required raising of forts and posts. This line of control consisted of Cossack settlements or advance posts, frequently strengthened by mud walls, or wooden stockades. There were 15 to 20 men on each post and the garrisons contained as many as 150 men depending upon its importance.¹¹ The Cossacks were the most reliable guardians of the Russian soil and their numbers were increased to control the Kazakhs of the steppe. But when predatory activities of the Kazakhs were not found receding, the Russian government decided to strengthen its positions further to the south on the Syr Daria.

In 1839 an expedition from Orenburg was despatched against Khiva under General Perovski, but he failed due to severe weather conditions. Men were not inured to hardships and one third of the force perished.⁹ The Russians in the decade of 1840's consolidated the Syr Daria line by a gradual establishment of fortresses, and garrisons, and thus tightening their grip in the region. In this process, the Russians came into contact with new enemies in the shape of Khokandis, who began to interfere with colonisation of Syr Daria by the Cossacks. The Khokandis could penetrate through the 500 miles of open steppe between the Orenburg fortress and the Siberian detachments to carry out their raids. This compelled a two pronged Russian advance in 1854. One under Cherniaev to capture Aulia-ata and the other under Verevkin to capture Turkestan. Later the fortress of Chimikend fell to the two columns combined. Cherniaev then decided to push on ahead with the hope of capturing Tashkent. But the Russians were repulsed with a considerable loss due to the strong defence put up by the city. In this manner the line of control on the Syr Daria was united with that of Siberia.

The military governorship of newly conquered Turkestan province was created under Cherniaev, who was promoted to the rank of a general, and was invested with special powers because of the areas remoteness.¹⁴

CONQUEST OF TURKESTAN


In 1865 Cherniaev raised the issue for the capture of Tashkent on the grounds that Turkestan had no natural frontiers, and if it had to be domina-

ted, then this domination had to begin in Tashkent whose possession was essential for Russia. To justify the new expedition, he argued, that the city was coveted by the Emir of Bukhara who would capitalise on its dangerously unstable situation. The population was divided between the pressures of muslim clergy who were demanding the Bukharan protection, and the commercial middle class which was hoping for its contacts to develop with Russia resulting in more favourable consequences. Whereas, the government was in favour of keeping Tashkent out of the orbit of the Russian conquest. The Foreign Affairs Department was demanding a cessation of military operations in order to consolidate the Russian control on the conquered territories. But events favoured Cherniaev. While the Russian government was debating its intentions, the Emir of Bukhara marched into Ferghana which was a province of Khokand Khanate. Taking advantage of this conflict between Khokandi forces and Bukhara, Cherniaev advanced to Tashkent in May 1865, cut off its water supply and the city surrendered to his attack launched a month later. Cherniaev was later recalled by the Emperor for transgressing his instructions.

In June 1867, Turkestan province was detached from the Orenburg Military command and formed into Turkestan military district under General Von Kaufman.^{7,14} Tashkents fall had united the Khokandis and the Bukharan Emir. The Russian force of 3600 supported by 20 guns and rocket apparatus routed 5000 well armed Bukharan regulars and 35000 horsemen at Irjai in May 1866.⁷ The Russians profiting from the victory chose to drive a wedge between the Bukharan and Khokand territories by capturing Khojend a fortnight later. The Emir was then presented with conditions which were unacceptable, particularly the payment of large tribute within ten days. This condition was to serve as an excuse for launching a fresh attack on Bukhara, while at the same time shifting the responsibility for the action on the Emir.

Bukhara

The Russian relations with Bukhara at this juncture had various considerations. Firstly, not only the Bukharan strength but the religious and political standing of the Emir was overestimated. Secondly, the Bukharan frontiers were bordering Afghanistan which was under the British sphere of influence. Any expedition in this direction would naturally cause problems with the British. But the overriding consideration was that Bukhara was regarded as a principal trading centre in Central Asia, and since economic exploitation was one of the main objectives, Russians were anxious to establish order and control quickly. The Russians commercial middle class had evinced a great interest in the Central Asian problems and was pressurising the Government into pursuing with the conquests.¹⁻⁴ Thus Kaufman, on assumption of governorship signed a commercial accord with Khokand before grappling with the Bukharan



problem. The Emir's position was unstable with clergy reproaching his dilatory policy. He had to proclaim Jihad or Holy war against the Russians. Kaufman chose to march against Samarkand and captured it in May 1868. The ensuing treaty while handing over the Zerafshan province to the Russians, allowed Bukhara to continue as an independent Emirate.⁴ A rebellion broke out against the Emir which was squashed with the help of Russian troops. The Emir had now reconciled, that with Samarkand and Zerafshan in Russian hands, he was dependent upon them and the Emirate was reduced to a vassal state.

Khiva

After the subjugation of Khokand and Bokhara, the Russian government could not allow the last of the Central Asian Khanates, Khiva to survive independently. Especially with its khan lending support to the Kazakh uprisings in the 1870's.¹ A Russian expedition despatched from Kransnovodsk was repulsed by the Khivans in Oct 1872.² On hearing of this failure, General Kaufman decided to prepare such force which would end the Khivan problem once for all. Russians by this time, had amassed a great experience in overcoming the physical difficulties to be encountered and had profited by the lessons learnt from the previous failures. Three columns moved against Khiva in March 1873; from the Caspian, Orenburg and Tashkent in March 1873. Russian military staff had worked out the minutest details so carefully, that the columns after marching 900 miles through waterless deserts, reached Khiva almost simultaneously.² The Khan could not withstand against a combined force of 13000 supported by 50 guns. With his capital thrown into confusion by a coup attempted a few days earlier; the Khan signed the treaty without arguing the conditions imposed by Kaufman who then entered the city on 10 June 1873.^{3,8}

The fall of Khiva had been mainly brought about by the Orenburg column under Verevkin. All that was left for the main column from Tashkent under Kaufman was to enter the city. The circumstances greatly incensed the officers who had hoped of gaining distinction and promotion. Kaufman had demanded an indemnity of 2.2 million roubles from the Khan of Khiva.³ The Khan in trying to avoid making such large payments blamed the Yomud Turkomans for not paying their taxes.⁸ Russians as it is wanted the Turkomans to feel the Russian power. In face of these considerations, Kaufman perpetrated one of biggest crimes committed in the modern history. He demanded a payment of 3,00 000 roubles from the Yomud Turkomans on 17 July 1873; knowing fully well that being a nomadic tribe they would not possess that much money.³ One third of this payment was to be made in ten days, i.e. 27th July, and the balance within five days. On the following day he gave a written order to General Golovatchiev to destroy the tribe in

case they do not appear to be collecting the money. Golovatchiev, although disinclined to execute this order, marched out on the 19th July, and Kaufmans order for final extermination of the tribe was carried out with thoroughness. For five days, the Yomud men, women and children were pursued, shot and sabred by the Cossack squadrons. The burning of the Yomuds settlements, their flight and massacre has been vividly described by Macgahan, the New York Herald correspondant, who had accompanied Golovatchiev's column.⁸ The number of victims in this massacre will never be known; but the power of Yomuds, the biggest and the most powerful of the Turkoman tribes was completely broken. On 31st July the Yomuds, greatly disheartened and ruined, sued for peace. They were ordered to pay 310000 roubles in twelve days time. The Yomud women stripped themselves of the ornaments and sold to the Russians for what they chose to give.⁸⁸ Regarding the question of the authenticity of orders for extirpation of the tribe, Alexi Krausse writes, Golot-achiev had addressed his staff that the orders had been received from Kauf- man, that "expedition will not spare either sex or age. Kill all of them". These orders were heard and noted by more than one reliable witness, and their authenticity is beyond question.⁸ Whereas. Macgahan who witnessed the massacre, writes that, "several Russian officers told me that Kaufman gave orders to spare neither women nor children, but that officers and soldiers alike were too humane to obey. As I did not see nor hear this order, I would fain believe Kaufman had been calumniated".

Khokand

Although humbled by the fall of Tashkent in 1968, the Khanate of Kho-kand continued to survive. Its unstable existence nonetheless, provided Russia with the needed pretext for subjugating the Khanate once for all. During 1873-74, increased taxation and cruel oppression by the Khan led to a rebellion in 1875. The forces sent by the Khan to crush the rebels went over to them. His authority disintegrated when his own son threw in his lot with the rebels. This changed the character of the rebellion from a movement against the oppressive ruler to a resistance against the Russians. A number of revolts and counter revolts led to confusion in the Khanate. The Russian force sent against Khokand routed the Khokandi army and the Khanate was finally annexed to the Russian Empire as the province of Ferghana. General Skobo-leff who had subjugated the Khanate, was made its military governer in February 1876 .

Turkomania

With the fall of Khiva in 1873 and annexation of Khokand three years later, the Russian hold on the Khanates was strengthened. Kaufman then decided to turn his attention to further extensions in Central Asia. General Lomakin who was appointed the Governor General of the newly formed

military district of Transcaspia, found frequent interruptions by the incursions of the Akhal Tekke Turkomans. Lomakin sent out an expedition in 1877 upto Khoja Kala, where it was besieged by a large number of Turkomans and had to beat a retreat pursued by their enemy. Lomakin was superseded by General Lazareff who in early 1879 mobilised the largest expeditionary force Central Asia had ever seen. A force of 18000 men of whom 3000 were cavalry and 36 guns marched against the Akhal Takke Turkomans.⁷ During the advance General Lazareff had died and Lomakin once again resumed command.

The bulk of the Tekke fighting men had gathered in the district of Geok Tepe. They had entrenched themselves in the stronghold of Dengil Tepe which contained 15000 men equipped with mainly sabres and some firearms. In addition, there were at least 5000 women and children inside the fortress. Whereas Lomakin's infantry was equipped with breech loading rifles and their attack was supported by rocket tubes and 12 guns⁶. Lomakin launched the attack without any parley preceding the action. No demand was made for the surrender of Dengil Tepe, and neither had the Tekke been offered any terms.⁷ After the bombardment had commenced the Tekke Sardar asked for a cessation in shelling so that he could induce the Tekkes to lay down their arms, but the request was not entertained.⁶⁻⁷ Artillery fire inflicted heavy casualties within the stronghold. Twice the Tekke women and children tried to get out of the stronghold in the hope of escaping the inferno, but the Russian cavalry drove them back into the crowded encampment within the ramparts. The devastation was awful. The rockets and shells tore their way through crowded tents, killing and maiming in hundreds. Those who were panic stricken attempted to escape but were shot down by the Russian soldiers blocking the escape routes.⁶⁻⁷

It is a maxim in Central Asian warfare, when assaulting a fortified stronghold, one side is left open for escape of the defenders if they wish to do during the combat. Once out of the fortress, it is not difficult for the Cavalry to pursue and capture the fugitives. Thus bloodshed is reduced to the minimum. Maddened by their losses and inspired by their women, the Tekke fought like demons. The Russian assault was beaten and chased all the way back to their gun positions. Exhausted and with about 450 killed and wounded, the Russians withdrew from Dengil Tepe. Lomakin, by penning women and children and subjecting them to a slaughter by artillery, had failed to make the Turkomans surrender. It is quite likely that he deliberately inflicted high casualties. Firstly, to assuage his desire to revenge the earlier reverses which he had received at the hands of Tekkes ; the other reason was that bigger the fight, the bigger would be the reward from the Emperor. Surprisingly, although a number of correspondants of Moscow and St Petersburgh Journals had accompanied the column, but none of them

expressed indignation at the bombardment of women and children. The Tekke were believed to have suffered a loss of four thousand, half of whom were women and children⁵. The massacre was taken as a matter of course, a mere incident in the operations of war. Lomakin was relieved as the Russian military prestige suffered a shock. The Tekkes emboldened by the Russian reverse carried on with greater activity of raid and plunder.

The Tsar in his perplexity turned to an illustrious soldier, General Skoboleff to regain the Russian prestige. The reasons of failure of the previous campaign were carefully analysed. It was found that camels on which the transportation was relied upon had perished by the thousands in the desert, and at the critical moment, there were not enough means to continue the siege.⁷ Skoboleff's brilliance invoked the aid of railway. He saw beyond the need of the moment to the strategic advantages which would flow from the railway connecting the Caspian and Amu Darya. He realised the effect that artillery had played on the Tekke encampments, and asked for 100 guns with large supply of shells charged with petroleum.⁷ This perhaps was the earliest use of an incendiary shells against an ill-armed Asian tribe. After six months of preparations, a force of 12000 laid siege to Dengil Tepe in January 1881. There were 30000 Tekkes massed within the rude entrenchments.⁸⁻⁷ The Russian superiority of weapons and organisation took three weeks to break down the resistance, during which they fired heavy concentrations of petroleum shells into the densely packed encampment.

Kurapatkine, who was Skoboleff's chief of staff estimated that the Tekkes lost about 9000 lives. He strenuously denies the allegation that Tekke women and children were intentionally slaughtered. The Russians, he states, did not wilfully kill a single non-combatant, though of course, many must have perished from the hail of petroleum shells which were poured into the doomed enclosure for three weeks.¹⁻⁷ General Skoboleff's report on the assault on Dengil Tepe states that "the pursuit of the flying enemy was carried out by the cavalry for 16 versts (approximately 11 miles). Only complete darkness and complete dispersion of the enemy caused it to be abandoned. In this pursuit by the dragoons, supported by Cossacks and a battery of horse artillery, 8000 person of both sexes were killed.⁸⁻¹² The total number of Tekkes slain during the siege were reported as 20,000.⁸

Merv

Geok Tepe was the last stronghold of Central Asian independence, and its capture should rank among the decisive battles of the World. While imperialistic civilisation gained by the victory, a national entity disappeared for ever. After the victory the troops were allowed to loot for four days and it is estimated that a booty of more than half a million sterling was found.⁸ A column was pushed out for capture of Askabad from where it

was planned to capture Merv. For three years, Russian expansionist movements were in check. But in the mean time her plans to annex Merv continued unabated. In 1882 Lieutenant Alikhanov was sent to Merv on a secret mission. Disguised as a Russian trader, he not only made accurate estimates of the defensive strength of the Merv fort, but also contrived to convince the leading citizens of Merv, to submit to the Russian control. His efforts bore fruit when Merv was occupied by the Russians in a swift advance in February 1884.³

Meanwhile, Sarakhs was occupied. It was on the Junction of roads to Herat and Meshed, and therefore, had an important strategic location. Encouraged by this easy occupation, General Kamar-off who had been appointed the Governor General of Transcaspia in 1883, decided to occupy Penjdeh. This brought the Russians in direct confrontation with the Afghans who claimed Penjdeh. As a result of a major clash in March 1885, which the Russians accused the Afghans for provoking, the Afghans were worsted, and Penjdeh was handed over to the Russians by the Anglo-Russian joint Commission.⁴ The delimitation of the Pamir frontier in 1895 gave Russia the areas of Roshan, Shignan and Wakhan. The work of the Anglo-Russian boundary commission was typical of the attitude of the imperial powers who paid none or inadequate attention to the habitation pattern or to the actual location of the areas when demarcating the frontiers. The whole episode was best described by Lord Salisbury "Drawing lines upon maps where no human foot has ever trod. . . giving away mountains, rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by a small impediment that we never knew exactly where those mountains, rivers and lakes were".⁵ Perhaps Lord Salisbury overlooked the fact that although no European feet had tread in those parts, but there were communities living there for centuries, who were now separated from each other because of cartographic indifference in London or St Petersburgh. Thus Russia reached the end of her acquisitions in Central Asia which marked the acquisition of a vast new empire.

Historical Significance of Russian Conquest

The Russian invasion of Turkestan began when the ruling dynasties of the Khanates had been in power for little more than fifty years. In addition to their domestic weakness and instability, they were all at war with each other, and therefore, were in no position to face their common enemy. The Russian contention, that the relative ease of their advance and absence of any united resistance was due to the fact that the people welcomed them as saviours, is not borne by any historical evidence. Perhaps, a more objective assessment of the historical significance of the Russians conquest would be, that once Russia had established herself in the vast territories upto the Pacific, her energies were then diverted towards expansion southwards upto the frontiers of properly constituted states. At that point in time, the Central

Asians were weakened by dissensions and internicine feuds. Russia was the only power on the Asiatic mainland with necessary military strength, social organisation, economic urge and technological superiority, that could take over the Central Asian region. And by doing so, she undoubtedly improved her strategic and economic position.

Strategical Significance of Russian Conquest

The conquest of Central Asia by Russia began only after the conclusion of the Crimean War, when the Russian armed strength became available for the expeditions. Besides, the failure in Crimea diverted the Russian disappointments to find relief in Central Asia. Russia was able to gain a tremendous strategical advantage by its annexation of Central Asia, which is of relevance even today. The British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder had propounded the Heartland theory in 1919, that :—

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland,
Who rules Heartland commands the World Island,
Who rules the World Island Commands the World.

The Central Asia constitutes a large portion of heartland. The World Island being the Eurasian land mass. The heartland's defensive strength lies in its inaccessibility to an oceanic invader and its large depth. Its offensive power lies in the fact that it can exert an influence anywhere in Europe and Asia. It was because of this advantage, that Russia was able to retain initiative in the Anglo-Russian confrontation throughout the 19th Century.

The consolidation of Russian conquests necessitated railways construction. Railways were required to maintain large Russian forces operating against Central Asian adversaries, besides, it assisted in the colonization process. The strategic Trans-Caspian railway from Kransnovdsk to Merv and Samarkand was completed in 1888. The Branch line from Merv to Kushka on Afghan border was completed in 1898. The Central Orenburg-Tashkent line, which also had economic value was completed in 1906. The effect of these conquests and railways was that Russia was united with Central Asia and new frontiers were established, fraught with international interests with Persia, Afghanistan, China and India.

RUSSIAN MOTIVATION

A question that often crops up is what motivated the Russians to annex the Central Asian region ? Was it a strategic necessity, or simply a desire of territorial aggrandisement ? Just because there were no territories to conquer in the West so the alternative was the East. And since Russian energies channelised by the Stragonov family had already reaped the economic benefits of annexing Siberia, the only fresh pastures which were available were in Central Asia. Attractions of mineral wealth and trade benefits were

an important factor. Besides, the Russian racial and religious superiority was outraged when it became known that ethnic Russians were being sold as slaves in the Central Asian Khanates of Khiva and Bukhara.³ This indignation had nothing to do with the fact that the Russian princes of Kiev had regarded traffic in human beings as one of the prime sources of wealth. 'The slave trade in the 16th Century Russia had been made a state industry, next in importance to the monopoly over export of silver and gold.¹ One explicit limitation was that ethnic Russians were not to be sold in foreign slavery and foreign Christians not to be bought. Ironically, it were Kazakh or Bukharan slave traders who brought Kalmyks and Siberian tribesmen for sale in the Russian markets. And just as the Central Asian Sunnites were willing to trade Persian Muslim slaves, the Russian Orthodox found it possible to sell Christians of other sects to muslim infidels.¹ Regardless of the real motives on the subject of slave trade, which was first treated as an economic question and later moved into the realm of religious significance. The very idea of Russian slaves in Central Asian Khanates, who were considered backward and inferior, hurt the Russian vanity and damaged their esteem in the European community. More than a humanitarian concern, it was an affront to the Russian ruler that his subjects were in bondage, which provoked a demand for punishing the Central Asians and the consequent conquest.

This sense of racial and religious superiority is in evidence when Colonel Veniukoff justifies in "Sbornik Gosndarstvennikh Znanyi, 1877". "The gradual movement of Russia in Central Asia may be called the re-establishment of the sway of the Aryan race over countries which for long period were subject to the peoples of Turk and Mongol extraction. In economic sense, it marks successive introduction of the requirements of life in countries, where thousand of years have rolled by, without alteration in thoroughly Asiatic mode of life of the people, in their tastes, or in their industrial progress. In its relation to morality, law giving and religion, it is a fresh step towards extending the domains of Christianity, towards replacing the elements of Mohamedan fanaticism by humanising elements and freeing the man from "narrow bondage" of Islam. For science and culture, the Russian movement has not only opened a fresh, unexplored field, but laid a solid foundation for the propagation of enlightened ideas among peoples, who upto that time, were steeped in the greatest ignorance."¹⁶

Attractions of trade has been considered as the most influential single factor in an colonial enterprise. It was inevitable, that merchants and trade exerted a great influence upon relations between Central Asia and Russia. The economic ties between the two regions were so persistent that, the pattern of trade, means of transportation, trading centres and the type of goods were essentially the same in the 19th Century as they had been, since the 10th Century. One of the matters of major concern was the domination of this

trade by the Central Asians. Even the Russian goods passed into the Steppe region through the medium of the Central Asian merchants, who thus were the monopolists in market, instead of the Russian traders. It was only with establishment of Russian settlements and forts in the Steppe district, that their traders could directly influence the trade. Colonel Venuikoff expressed the Russian feelings when he wrote, "the development of Central Asian trade must be considered as one of the best conductors of Russian influence and Russian civilisation in Turan."¹⁶ It was with a view to improving unsatisfactory state of commerce, i.e., to establish with certainty for Russian trade its paramount importance in Central Asia, that commercial treaties were concluded with Kashgar 1872, Bokhara 1868 and 1873 and Khiva 1873, by which Russian merchants in these Khanates received equal rights with the natives.¹⁶ It goes without saying that these treaties had to be preceded by a force of arms, and it is needless to add that the same desire to enlarge the Russian market in Central Asia was the motive for forbidding the import of English goods into Russian Turkestan via India.

In 1860-62 the interest in Central Asia increased as a result of American Civil War which was depriving Europe of cotton. In 1865, raw cotton constituted 74 per-cent of exports from Central Asia to Russia¹. Besides the Turkoman desert was regarded as a potential breeding-ground for cattle, which would supply the home market with hides.⁷ The Russians coveted the un-tapped mineral wealth of not only the Khanates but also of Pamir region. A monograph compiled by Ostroumoff mentions of considerable petroleum springs in the vicinity of Chikhilshar, and of sulphur, saltpetre, iron and copper vitriol found in the Turkoman country.¹⁴

The initial Russian invasion of Central Asia was not brought about by any political design, but by the necessity of controlling the Kirghiz bands who had made the frontiers of Orenburg Steppe unsafe by their marauding activities. The political fabric of Central Asia was woven into a complex web of inter-dependencies ; at the hub were the three Khanates of Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva ; whereas the outer shell was inhabited by the nomadic Kirghiz in the North and the Turkomans in the south. If territorial acquisitions were made on the periphery for protection against the nomadic tribes, then the core had also to be occupied for consolidation of territories annexed. Prince Gortchakoff, the Russian Chancellor of the period explained the policy of expansion as being carried out on the score of dire necessity. He pointed out in a circular that Russia had found herself in contact with a number of semi-civilised tribes, who proved a constant menace to the security and well being of the empire, under these circumstances the only possible means of obtaining order was to bring these turbulent tribes under Russian subjection, but as soon as that was accomplished, it was found that these new subjects were in turn exposed to attacks by the more distant tribes. And so it became

necessary to bring the outlying tribes into submission till the borders of civilised states are met. The chancellor pointed out that the Russian position in Central Asia was in no way different from that of the United States of America, or the French in Algeria and the British in India. The circular led to grave suspicion on the Russian policy. Whether it is going to pursue systematic conquests of tribes, or stabilization and reinforcement of territories acquired ? Upto what geographical limit and upto what political strength would Russian presence be based ? The answers to these questions were framed more by the force of events, rather than by a defined political objectives. Throughout the period of expansion it was uncertain whether a particular conquest came about through opportunistic seizure of available territory or a long traditional policy of aggression. The results however, were the same.

COLONISATION : POLICY AND METHODS

The policy and methods adopted by the Russians for the colonisation of Central Asia, were in no way different from the methods adopted by other 19th Century imperialistic powers. Due to the geographical proximity, the historical associations and the economic similarities of the peasant class in Russia and in Central Asia, the Russian colonialisation process was slightly different than the other forms of imperial colonisations. During his temporary service or in permanent settling of the Central Asian muslim lands, the Russian soldier did not have the same feeling of leaving his homeland, as other colonialists had ; for example as the English felt when serving or settling in India. The standard of living of a Russian peasant not being very different from that of his Central Asian counterpart, the Russian solidiery, who mainly came from the peasant stock, did not have that typically imperious attitude. Nonetheless, the Central Asians were treated with disdain and antipathy.

The agricultural colonisation of Central Asia took two forms, Firstly, the Cossack and other Russian settlements, and the other was, in the shape of free agricultural enterprises. The Cossack colonies had military agricultural complexion and were advantageous from the point of view of consolidation of power. But due to the large amount of territory which was conquered in a short space of time, the utility of the earlier settlements diminished. In addition, these settlements deprived the nomadic population from its traditional grazing grounds which naturally caused alienation. The free agricultural colonisation, i.e. by the peasantry, did not make much progress inspite of these enterprises being exempted from taxes and the state subsidy it received. This was mainly due to the insecurity generated by hostile native population.

If the policy was to achieve race domination, then it did not meet with much success either, as indicated by Veniukoff's writings on the subject ;

"glancing briefly at the Russian settlements in Central Asia, 'we see that their number is limited, and that, in consequence we are still far from exercising a race-domination over the natives. This influence may be gained by the some other means, namely, peaceful replacement of a part of native population by a mixed Russian one, which as we remarked, might be accomplished by the settlement of young men who once attracted to Central Asia by service, might wish, to marry Mohammaden women, and make the country their permanent home'"¹⁶. It was felt that the Russian strength would enhance with assimilation of subject races and thus by degrees, the new race will be the sole guarantee of the stability of the Russian position in Turkestan.

The Russian attitude towards Islam varied with the fortunes of their Empire. Earlier in the 17th and the 18th centuries, the policy was to discourage communication between the Muslims, both within the Empire, and also between the Central Asian Khanates and other muslim territories to the South. As the Shiite Persian hostility against the Central Asian Sunnis had blocked the direct route to Mecca, the Russians were reluctant to permit passage across their territory for the Central Asian pilgrims. The Russian conquests were heralded by the zeal of the Russian orthodox church. When the Russian troops stormed muslim Tashkent, the chaplin of one of the leading battalions headed the assault, holding his ecclesiastical cross high before him, urging on the attack in the name of Christianity!.

The policy of Tsarist regime towards Islam was inconsistent and confused. During the early stages of Russian advance into the steppe Region, Islam was regarded as stabilizing and pacifying influence. The Russians even constructed mosques for the Kazakhs, but later, they realised that 140 years of sovereignty over the Kirghiz has not only failed to obliterate the difference in religion, but on the contrary strengthened that difference.¹⁶ This was inspite of the fact that nomadic Kirghiz were not fervent adherents of Islam. Mohammadenism came to be considered unfavourable to the Russian position, as it was felt to have contributed, not only to racial and political differences, but also resisted the introduction of the European ideas. When the authorities realised to what extent commerce and agrarian system was tied up with Islamic law, the Kazis began to be considered with disfavour. The influence of Islamic clergy was mainly undermined through the favours given to the merchant middle class. The status and commercial influence of Tashkent was built up in order to counter balance the religious prestige of Bukhara.

Kaufman felt that the dangerous influence of Islam could best be countered by a policy of indifference. Although he did not interfere with religious observance, but he did all that he could to minimise the influence of Islam, as he caused to abolish the office of Kazi Kalan, the supreme judge. His other method to undermine the influence of Muslim education was to

create Russian schools to which Central Asian children would be admitted. This had the double advantage of drawing Muslim children away from the muslim schools and of bringing Muslim and Russian children together.

On the other hand, it must be mentioned that, the Russian conquests and her policies in Central Asia had replaced the barbaric system of government. The principle of security of life and property was introduced in the regions where it was previously unknown. As regards the severity of the massacres, the Russian military tried to justify it on the grounds the Central Asians being ferocious by temperament, had to be crushed completely, so that they realise the futility of further resistance.

THE ANGLO RUSSIAN RELATIONS

The complications, the fears and the reactions in the Anglo Russian relations in Central Asia, have to be understood from the perspective of their relations in Europe. After the downfall of Napoleonic France, Russia took an eminent position in Europe. The fears generated by such position led to apprehensive reactions to every extension of Russian power. The advance of Russia in Central Asia, excited misgivings, particularly in Britain, who feared her predominant position in Asia would be destroyed, if Russian frontiers approached those of India. Britain had spent great efforts in order to destroy Napoleon's power, which began to threaten, even her Indian Empire. And now, there was this new danger, in the form of continuing Russian advance in Central Asia.

The British fears were also founded on the reports of Russian plans for the invasion of India, which had been projected from time to time. As reported in a French pamphlet on the subject, one of the earliest schemes for the Russian invasion of India, was presented by a Frenchman, M de Saint Genie to Empress Catherine. It suggested an advance from Orenburg to Bokhara and from there to Kabul. At that point in time, it was impossible for an army to have crossed the Steppes of Kizil Kum. Later in 1800, Tsar Paul I and Napoleon conceived a more practical plan of combined Russian and French force to cross the Black sea and the Caspian sea. And from there to advance to Herat and Kandhar. The plan could not be pursued due to the change in Russian policy as the result of Csar Paul's death and Napoleon's defeat in Europe. A similar scheme was mooted by General Khronreff at the time of Crimean war. After the Treaty of San Stefano 1878, when war was imminent between Russia and England, plans were afoot for Kaufman to cross River Oxus, the Hindu Kush and reach Indus. The Russian advance envisaged a move in three coloumns. One from Oxus against Herat, another against Kabul over the Hindu Kush and the third over the Pamirs against Kashmir.¹³

On the other hand, the Russians were equally fearful of the growing British influence in the Central Asia. Although the Russian policy was expansionist, but not beyond the frontiers of what the foreign minister's circular described as "properly organised states", and that too, only as far as the risk of war with the major European power England, could be avoided. Russia had to therefore lay a careful screen to cover up its conquests, and play down English fears. Perovski's unsuccessful expedition 1839 towards Khiva had created concern in England. When, Czar Nicholas visited England in 1844, he agreed to "leave the Khanates of Central Asia to serve as a neutral zone between Russia and India, so as to preserve them from dangerous contact".³ The modus operandi of Russian diplomacy is in evidence when in Jan 1873 Count Schuvaloff was sent by the Tzar Alexander II to assuage the British fears on the Russian expedition to Khiva. The Count categorically stated, that, "their intention was to punish the Khivans for brigandage and to recover to Russian prisoners. The Emperor had not only no intention of annexing Khiva, but has given specific instructions to prevent it, and directions have been given, that conditions imposed should be such, as would not in any way lead to prolonged occupation of Khiva".²⁻³ Whereas, the justification for occupation of Khiva is given that the Khan of Khiva feared the resentment of the Turkomans who had been severely treated by the Russians. Therefore he requested for retention of a part of Russian army in Khiva. A force therefore had to be posted on the Amu Darya.⁵ The questions that have been left unanswered were, why in the first place such harsh indemnity was imposed on Turkomans, when there were specific Czarist instructions against it ? And secondly, was the location of force in keeping with fears expressed by the Khan, or for occupation of the territory conceded by the Khivan treaty ?

The British and the Russian Empires were closest together in this region than anywhere else in the world. As the gap closed, so increasingly on each side, suspicion begat suspicion and activity begat counter activity, in a vicious chain reaction. The motivating force was in-bred mutual suspicion of Britons and Russians, which was aggravated by the fact that the leading participants of this "Great Game" were soldiers. As Salisbury pithily warned Lytton : "you listen too much to the soldiers.... You should never trust experts. If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome. If you believe theologians, nothing is innocent. If you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe."²

If it is believed that every step taken by a hostile power to consolidate on the frontier, must be answered by own step forward, than the mathematical cause-affect-cause sequence, leading to a conflict, is not difficult to explain.

CONCLUSION

During the century and a half, which ended with annexation of Merv in 1882, Russia had acquired a larger territory than the Indian

sub-continent. In the Steppe Region, the advance was slow and cautious, besides the Russian control was not fully established till the core of Central Asia,—Tashkent had fallen. The final control of the Central Asian Khanates thereafter, became easier and rapid. The actual military operations were not of any particular significance, and do not reflect any credit to the Russians. Although on occasions, Central Asians were able to concentrate superior numbers against the Russians, but they had no experience of modern warfare and were armed with primitive weapons. Their assets were courage, religious zeal and their ability to endure hardships. Russians on the other hand, not only had superior arms, particularly artillery, but also benefitted from modern technology (wireless and railway), and their organisation was backed up by their experience of fighting in Europe and Caucasus. In set piece encounters, whenever the Central Asians stood against the concentrated fire power of the Russian units, they suffered heavy casualties. Had the Central Asians kept the encounters within the element in which they were superior, the Russian offensive columns, perhaps, would not have been able to endure the attrition and hardships of the campaigns. The Turkomans mounted on the superior horses were more mobile than the Russian cavalry, therefore had they kept the mobility in battle, instead of confining themselves into mud walled fortresses, they would have underscored the superiority of the Russian artillery.

The relative size of population was another factor to Russia's advantage. Her population in the 19th century was estimated to be 60 million as opposed to 5 to 6 million people in Central Asia¹. Moreover, the Central Asian resistance was sporadic and uncoordinated, they were unable to forget their internecine feuds and unite against the common enemy. Russian diplomacy ensured that the Khanates do not arrive at a mutual assistance pact. The conquest of Central Asia had been, in the final analysis, rapid and relatively easy. Russians in most cases had easily put her adversaries to flight. In all operations in Central Asia from 1847 to 1873, Russian casualties amounted to only 400 killed and about 1600 wounded.⁴ Their main problem was that of supply, and this became progressively easier, as Russians laid the railway, and established bases and settlements. The casualties suffered by the Central Asians on the other hand ran into tens of thousands, though no precise figures are available. The Khanates having sapped their strength by domestic struggles and handicapped by a backward economy, were rather lame adversaries for their conquerors.

Russia's advance in Central Asia naturally caused alarm in the states bordering the region, and particularly the British in India. Of

the other states, Persia and Afghanistan were not displeased at the appearance of a rival to the British power; whereas, not much account was taken of the Chinese power. Russians on their part were not apprehensive of any interference from Afghanistan, inspite of her foreign policy being under the British influence. As regards Persia, she was able to derive advantage by obtaining supplies from the northern province of Khorasan during the operations against the Teke Turkomans.

Russian relations with the British had two contradictions. On one hand she did not want to antagonize Britain for the fear of prejudicing her position in Europe. Yet at the same time she was aware of the British sensitivities in India, and felt that it was here, that she would be able to gain an upper hand. The Russian military attache in London was writing in 1858. "In the case of conflict with England, it is only in Asia that we shall be able to struggle with her with any chance of success, and to weaken her."¹ The British expression of alarm culminated with delimitation of Afghan frontier in 1895. After that the British apprehensions to some extent died down, but the Russian threat to India continued.

The great divide between the Indus system flowing into the Indian Ocean, and the Oxus flowing into the Aral Sea is the Hindu Kush. The natural boundaries of the Indian Subcontinent in the north is formed by the convergency of the great mountain ranges of Himalayas and of the Hindu Kush. As long the mountain ranges and their passes were under the control of semi-independent tribal chiefs, the threat to the Indian sub-continent was of minor nature. When a strong, independent and hostile power came to be established north of these mountain ranges, then the security of the sub-continent was threatened. But if such power, establishes itself south of the mountain ranges, then the security of the South Asian region becomes vulnerable.

As far as the British were concerned, the Hindu Kush divided the region into two zones. North of the mountains were India's "nervous tissues"—those lands which were of political and strategic interest, but which were deemed to be beyond effective military operation or occupation. South of the mountains were the areas, which had to be controlled or defended, in order to prohibit any foreign interference within the Indus drainage system. This natural frontier which was distinct, had to be respected. On the other hand, the senior Russian soldiers at that time were strongly opposed to any boundary being laid down which would prevent them from carrying out their ambitious designs of adding more territory to the Russian

Empire. The need to absorb northern Afghanistan upto the Hindu Kush, was a constant theme in the Russian press and the invariable topic of conversation amongst the officers in Turkestan garrisons.² The development of railway system in Turkestan was contributed by such aspirations. The distance from the Russian railway terminus at Kushka to Herat is about 80 miles. This consideration should be viewed with the fact, that the possibility of laying a railway line from Herat to Kandhar and New Chaman on Pakistan frontier, does not offer many engineering difficulties. This ability has to be taken note of with concern, especially with Russian presence in Afghanistan having materialised.

Postscript

A report appeared in Times of India on 24th March 1983 on the Soviet plans for rail link with Kabul.

"According to a UPI report from London, the Soviet Union is planning to build the first rail road in Afghanistan and link it with the Soviet-rail net-work to overcome problems in keeping the country under military control. The Soviet Union plans to link up Kabul with 1520 or 60.8 inch guage railway."

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Correspondence

Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

To
The Editor
'USI' JOURNAL

FUTURE SERVICE OFFICERS

NAPOLEON when asked how he became a great general said "Read and re-read the campaigns of great generals". Through the ages great captains of war have left lasting impressions on the Sands of Time. The Romans built roads all over Europe which last even to this day, and at that time led to the expression "All roads lead to Rome". The Napoleonic Code is still followed in countries like Italy and traditionally a Frenchman headed the department of Egyptology in Egypt and French is still spoken by its elite.

Even in the recent past we have the Marshall Plan which was conceived and put into operation by a soldier helping Europe and even vanquished Germany to resurgence from the ashes of war. Or again the Japanese owe part of their industrial and economic miracle to the reforms and guide lines laid down by Gen MacArthur. We thus see that an outstanding soldier has been a man of many parts not just a professionally sound. Taking a lesson from history we see that the future service officer should be a man of many parts not just a professional soldier.

In this age of technology the future service officer specially those who reach the higher echelons have to have adequate knowledge of technology, social, industrial, and geopolitical awareness for the defence strategy will be based on them.

Now a days high performance aircraft, ships and tanks are in daily use, missiles is a major weapon system in all the three services. Electronics assist the eyes and ears of the services. Laser ranging is in use and computers are used in Avionics, war games or even the prosaic stocking of stores. The recent Falklands dispute emphasised the role of missiles in warfare. Even in our context of defence of our frontiers, we have to perforse match the technology of our likely enemies and gear up accordingly.

Thus the future service officer should have a wide horizon and knowledge. This cannot be acquired overnight but by a gradual process starting from the service academies. As officer goes up in rank and specially when he is serving at a service headquarters he has to deal with counterparts in the government and for this an indepth knowledge of the subject, industrial

capability of the country, the social and economic aspects and the geopolitical aspect have to be considered and discussed.

Taking an example from the present day, the modern day Superman, the Astronaut, is mostly a serviceman who is physically fit and mentally alert. Though a high performance aircraft pilot with combat missions behind him he is normally a doctorate in some physical science like engineering, Physics or Geology.

So we see that the Services are capable of producing a multifacet man, only the exposure and relevant training is required. It will not be cost effective or necessary to train all the officers to that high pitch but selected officers could undergo training so that by the time they reach the top he is a complete man, a professional soldier whose knowledge is not merely confined to military matters, a person who can put his point across and talk one to one with his counterpart in the government or any other walk of life.

But above all like in industry one cannot have a high quality product like a Rolls Royce rolling out at one end with second rate input despite the strict process and quality control, in the context of the services good officer material, good training and selection. The services no longer attract the best like it used to nor are many officers children following the footsteps of their fathers as was the tradition. The best are going into industry and business which offers jobs with better pay, easier life and better prospects. So before we start on what a future serviceman should know let us ensure that the Services continue to attract the cream of the country's youth by offering better pay, perks like free housing, free rations etc. History of warfare has proved that it is the Man behind the weapon that counts and that in war there is only the victor and the vanquished, no second best.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE REAL WAR

By **Richard Nixon**

(Published by Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1980) Pp. 366 Price £ 1.75.

THIS is an American best seller, written by the ex-U.S. President, Richard M. Nixon. The author, a highly active and informed man, has already published several books, e.g. "Six Crises," "R.N. : The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, vols. I and II", etc. to fill his idle hours after fading out of politics as a result of the Watergate Scandal. A very widely-travelled person with enormous political and administrative experience, covering a third of this century, Nixon has more than adequate credentials for writing this book. But what is the result ? The book is nothing but an anti-Soviet diatribe—the Soviets are warmongers, always preparing to defeat and swallow the West, and the Americans are complacent and unprepared to face the Soviet challenge, so on and so forth. Hence, Nixon has taken up the siren to warn his compatriots, so that Russia cannot make one up. Nixon is known to be shrewd and clever, but that alone does not help either a nation or the whole world which seems like sitting on the summit of eruptive volcano, made of thermo-nuclear explosives. Would a continuous arms race between the two super powers bring the world nearer to peace ? The Soviet Union has always shown its eagerness to hold arms limitation talks and gradually reduce the quantity of the weapons of mass destruction, held by the two super powers. She has also expressed her desire to limit the military presence in the Indian Ocean. But the U.S. response has been inadequate. The Soviet action in Afghanistan, USSR's neighbour, has been condemned by Nixon like many others. But would Nixon ignore the establishment of a Communist regime in U.S.A.'s neighbourhood, say in Mexico ? What is the need for U.S. military presence (especially military bases) in the Gulf region or in the Indian Ocean ? If the Soviet Union has helped in the liberation of Angola and Mozambique from the clutches of colonial regimes, she should be thanked. Why have not the Western democracies liquidated colonial rule in those states themselves and set up the so-called 'democratic' system ? Time does not stand still, nor political and social justice wait for long.

Nixon says : "During all of my presidency we were engaged in a 'war' with the Soviet Union. That struggle with the Soviets will continue to dominate world events for the rest of this century...The next two decades

represent a time of maximum crisis for America and for the West, during which the fate of the world for generations to come may well be determined. (Pp. 2-3)...America no longer has the luxury of considering any place on earth too remote to affect its own security". (P. 12) Is this not some 'Kind of war psychosis ? Nixon, and like him, many American conservatives assume self-appointed role of the world policeman to oversee whether in any part of the globe any nation opts for socialism/communism, which, in their thinking, will be a great set-back to the U.S. and the so-called "free world". Again, according to their logic, because the U.S. and the West as well as Japan are dependent on the Persian Gulf countries for oil, and on Zaire for Cobalt, which is essential to jet aviation, on southern Africa for chrome which is needed for the manufacture of jet aircraft, stainless steel, missiles and various precision instruments, the countries which produce these strategic materials are considered to be the targets of U.S. national interests, so much so that these countries should not be allowed to change their political or social system. This is nothing but super power hegemonism which aims at reducing these areas producing vital resources into hostages of big powers.

Nixon has stated chivalrously that "with the worldwide retreat from empire by Britain and France and the other European powers, we picked up many of their former obligations in the Middle East, in South and South-east Asia, in Africa, and in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, we continued to play our traditional protective role in Latin America. We had become the world's gyroscope, single-handedly maintaining the balance of power all across the globe, taking over the responsibilities that five great empires had previously borne both in containing Russia and maintaining world order." (p. 73) Like the well-known 'White man's burden' of yesteryears, Nixon wants to carry a sort of super power's burden all over the world. Indeed, Nixon's words appear to be unadulterated "imperialism". About the global, stabilizing role of U.S.A., mention has been made by the author of the C.I.A.'s convert help to Gen. F. Zahedi in his successful effort to put down Mossadegh (p. 83), without thinking for the moment that this was also a kind of intervention in a third country.

The US foreign policy, as Nixon sees it, is primarily aimed at the containment of international communism. To that end the author thinks that the key to Israel's survival "is our determination to hold the ring against the Soviets." (p. 101) If the West's vital interests in the Middle East are challenged, Nixon has "no choice but to do what is necessary to prevent our oil lifeline from being severed." (p. 204) The Nixon Doctrine provided for the US arms supply "to nations threatened by aggression, if they were willing to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower necessary for their defence", and Nixon says that "there is almost no case

on record since World War II in which arms provided by the United States have been used by the country receiving them for purposes of aggression." (p. 214). But unfortunately Nixon has forgotten that US arms were used by Pakistan during its conflict with India in September 1965.

To restore the balance of power with the Soviet Union Nixon prescribes an increase in the US defence budget of at least \$30 billion—in 1980 dollars—annually for five years which means a real increase of more than 20% over present levels. But will this not lead to an arms race between the two super powers ? Nixon says : "perhaps a nation that equates celebrity with wisdom, that looks to rock stars and movie actresses as its oracles, deserve to lose ; and yet there is more to America than that... If the American people do wake up one day to find themselves confronted with the stark choice between war and slavery, they are going to fight. They are going to fight with missiles, with airplanes, with ships, with tanks ; they are going to fight, if need be, with sticks and stones and with their bare fingernails." (p. 268) Churchillian style of oratory indeed ! The author further says that the U.S. President alone bears the specific responsibility "for ensuring the nation's survival and the free world's future." (p. 270), and he has also prescribed 'Do's and Don'ts' for the U.S. President. Towards the end of this book, Nixon tried to be prophetic saying : To the extent that the United States prevails, the world will be safe for free nations. To the extent that the Soviet Union prevails, the world will be unsafe for free nations.' But this looks like block-busting.

The world will be safe if the big powers stay away from their policy of intervening in every part of the globe and their vicious arms race and arms sales in the developing countries. There is no need of big power military bases far away from their shores. Let nuclear weapons be out-lawed and buried under the ground, and let the warmongers shut up their mouths, and peace will prevail. In his speech to the 37th session of the UN General Assembly, on 4th October, 1982, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, said that the rivalry between the two super powers rocked the world. He also charged the British with bullying the weak in the Falklands War. He said :—'The quest for hegemony by the super powers and the resultant global rivalry between them are the main source of the unrest and turmoil in the world. They have openly or covertly subjected other countries to their aggression, intervention or control by direct or indirect use or threat of force". He further said that while the focus of the US-Soviet conflict remained in Europe, the main sphere was in the third world. "This fierce rivalry has constantly rocked the world and increased the danger of a world war,' he remarked.

However, the book under review is full of interesting information on various countries, on a galaxy of world leaders, on history, economy and foreign policy of some major states of the World. And everything has been said in the Book in a racy style and masterly language. The book contains selected Source Notes and also an Index. Although readers may differ with the author on many points, they will definitely find the book informative and absorbing.

—B.C.

THE DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE : THE KISSINGER ERA

by Coral Bell

(Published by Martin Robertson, London, 1977), pp. 278 price £ 8.95.

CORAL Bell, the author of "Negotiation from Strength : A Study in the Politics of Power", "The Debatable Alliance", and "The Conventions of Crisis", has based the book under review on source material studied in London, Washington and Canberra and her extensive interviews taken in the U.K. and U.S.A. This book has been described by the author as "a first tentative effort to put together an account of detente as an American foreign policy concept deployed in relationship with both China and the Soviet Union: that is, to see detente as a diplomatic strategy for a triangular power balance", developed by Dr. Kissinger from 1969 to 1977.

The book has been divided into the following 82 chapters : The Nature and provenance of Detente ; Kissinger : The Policy-Maker as Theorist ; Kissinger : The Theorist as Policy-Maker ; Strategic Doctrine and Arms Control : The Nature of Stability ; The Middle East War : Some Rather Loud Signalling ; Europe : Security and Identity ; South East Asia : A Means of Disengagement ; Cyprus : The Scope for Local Intransigence ; Portugal and Southern Africa : Setback and Rebound : Australia : The Range of Middle-Power Manoeuvre ; The Enemies and Sceptics of Detente ; and A Balance of Ambivalences. While the New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, College Edition, has given the meaning of "detente" as "a thaw in tension, as between two countries ; a lessening of hostility", to the policy-makers in different countries the word does not mean the same thing or denote the same functions. However, Coral Bell has thought it appropriate to start with the American definition of the concept implying "a mode of management of adversary power", adapted from a statement of Dr. Henry Kissinger's. She says : Ideology determines objectives, calculation determines strategies. But moral judgements.....are applicable to both." No doubt, detente does not replace the national ideological interests of the Big Powers, as Brezhnev's Report to the Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union in February 1976 says : "Detente does not in the slightest abolish nor can it alter, the laws of the

class struggle. We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as the way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and Communist construction....As for the ultra leftist assertions that peaceful co-existence is freezing the socio-political status quo, our answer is this : every revolution is above all a natural result of the given society's internal development." According to Bell, in the triangular diplomacy of detente amongst the U.S., the Soviet Union and China, the former being more pragmatic and ideologically flexible than the other two gave the United States capacity for diplomatic manoeuvre superior to either China's or the Soviet Union's, thus making it possible for a U.S. detente with both adversaries at the same time. Peace is an objective, while detente is a diplomatic strategy by which that objective is sought, but it should not be mistaken for appeasement.

The author has discussed the origin of detente during the 1940s, long before the Kissinger era, and even the Russian attitude of detente in the 1920s, but she has not mentioned the effect of the Non-aligned movement on international detente, which is undoubtedly important. Nor she has told us much about the benefits and failures of detente, case by case, throughout the world.

However, this publication is a useful study of an important international political behaviour which acts as a shield between peace and war. It contains a brief bibliography and an Index. Political Scientists, practitioners of diplomacy and statecraft, and students of International Relations will find this book interesting and educative.

—B.C.

GREAT POWER INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by Milton Leitenberg and Gabriel Sheffer

(Published by Pergamon Press, New York, 1979), pp. 352 price \$ 28.00

THIS book under review is the 27th Volume of the Pergamon Policy Studies series on International Politics. It contains an "Introduction" by the Editors, and 16 Chapters divided into 4 parts.

Part I : *Strategic Concerns* has three chapters :

- (a) Great Powers' Military Intervention in the Middle East,—
by Y. Evron
- (b) The Great Powers' Nonproliferation Policies toward the Third World with particular Reference to the Middle East and Persian Gulf
by S. J. Baker
- (c) A Nuclear Middle East : Infrastructure, Likely Military Postures.
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Part II : *Aspects of Arms Transfer* has seven chapters :

- (a) United States Arms to the Middle East 1967-76: A Critical Examination by Anne Hessing Cahn
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- (e) Economic Aspects of Arms Supply Policies to the Middle East by Mary Kaldor
- (f) The Vulnerable Condition of Middle East Economics by Fred Gottheil
- (g) Arms Transfer, Great power Intervention and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict by A. S. Becker

Part III : *Prospects for Political Resolution* has five chapters :

- (a) The Middle East: Imposed Solutions or Imposed Problems ? by G. H. Quester
- (b) Critique of "The Middle East: Imposed Solutions or Imposed Problems ?" by Walid Khalidi
- (c) Critique of "The Middle East: Imposed solutions or Imposed problems ?" by Don Peretz
- (d) The Year of Sadat's Initiative by Mattityahu Peled
- (e) Great power Intervention in the Middle East: 1977-78 by David Pollock.

Part IV : Epilogue, written by the Editors themselves.

The above-mentioned chapters have grown out of research papers presented at a conference held in April 1977 by the Cornell University Peace Studies Programme, which is committed to research and teaching on the moderation or prevention of War.

The roots of the Arab-Israeli Conflict have been traced to the Arab and Jewish national movements against Turkey at the turn of the last century, which the British occupation of Palestine and the 1917 British recognition of the right of the Jews to a national homeland there institutionalized as an enduring conflict. Since 1967, this conflict has proceeded on two interconnected levels: Palestinian Arabs versus Israelis, and Israel versus the Arab States. But in course of time the conflict has developed a multidimensionality of issues comprising not only territory, but also water resources, borders,

land and sea passages, markets, competing labour forces, cultural and emotional aspects. The book has restricted itself to aspects of direct and indirect military intervention by Great Powers, especially the Super Powers.

While in the 1950s, the West organised a defence organization of the northern tier of the Middle East, the Soviet Union made friendship with the UAR and thus got a foothold in the heart of the region. Consequently, the West tried to build its position in the outer ring of the region. Twenty years afterwards, the heart of the Middle East moved back in the direction of the West, while the USSR built close relationship with Syria and started relying more on the outer fringe of the Middle East : South Yemen, the horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Libya, Ethiopia, and PLO. Even after the signing of the Camp David Agreements by Carter, Sadat and Begin in 1978, the concerned parties are still faced with the problems of the West Bank, the ultimate boundaries of Israel, the fate of Jerusalem, the security arrangements for Israel, and a home for the Palestinians. Although the first of the two Camp David agreements regarding the withdrawal of the Israelis from the Sinai is undergoing the process of implementation, the other agreement providing for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours and for "the resolution of the palestinian problem in all its aspects" will require prolonged negotiations, before implementation. However, the dependence of both Egypt and Israel on American military aid has lessened the likelihood of another Arab-Israeli War in the near future. The Arab inaction during the recent Israeli military action in Lebanon shows that the Arab countries are still to be united in a Joint military action against Israel, as in 1967 or 1973. There is no doubt that USA will exert a great influence on Egypt and Israel, and even on Saudi Arabian and Jordan through her military aid, to cooperate more and more for an eventual Arab-Israeli peace. The book, however, concludes with the remark. "until there is peace, further American and Soviet intervention in the area is to be expected, and it may continue even if peace does come."

No doubt, this is a well researched book, complete with charts and statistical tables and an exhaustive Index, which will be read by concerned persons with avid interest.

—B.C.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SHAH

by Amin Saikal

(Published by Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1980) Pp. 279, price \$ 15.50.

THIS book is the result of Dr. Saikal's 5-year study of the Shah of Iran's rule from 1953 to 1979, in the context of his dependence on the United States in the 1950s for its survival and his attempts in the 1970s to transform Iran into a major pro-Western regional power with aspirations to eventual world-power status. The author, a political scientist of Afghan origin, has

politically reviewed domestic and foreign policies and behaviour of the Shah. For the sake of his study, Dr. Saikal visited Iran, Britain, U.S.A. and Australia.

The book has been divided into two parts. Part I has been devoted to the period from early 19th century when Iran was a centre of big power rivalry to 1975 when she emerged as an important oil power. In Part II of the book, the author has dealt with Iran's emergence as a regional power and the Shah's policies leading to his final over-throw.

It is a strange coincidence that the rise and fall of the Shah of Iran was marked by bloodshed, discontent and the belief that Mohd. Reza Shah Pahlavi was an American puppet. The essential aim of the Shah was to centralise power in his own hands and simultaneously modernise and develop Iran into a rich, welfare state, militarily powerful and economically viable, with the help of the United States' technology, military equipment, and personnel. But unfortunately, his policies were beset with basic contradictions. While his welfare programme and policy of modernisation opened the country to modern ideas of the West, the same also encouraged the elite and the middle classes to aspire for a share in the political power of the country and to oppose the Shah's autocracy and over luxurious life-style.

Despite his efforts, the Shah never succeeded in establishing a process of balanced political and socio-economic development, nor did he ever manage to overcome the indignity of his initial reliance on the CIA for wresting power from Mossadeq. His dual objective to strengthen the monarchy and to transform Iran into a modern pro-Western state were constantly in conflict with each other ; so were the policies that he adopted in realising these objectives. By 1977, he governed his country largely with the help of his secret police, SAVAK. In the 1970s, U.S.A. played a determining role in strengthening the Shah's dependence on U.S.A. within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine which was applied to Iran within a "Twin-Pillar" policy framework, referring to American support for Iran and Saudi Arabia as twin powers on either side of the Persian Gulf. The Shah committed the greatest of his blunders when he brought 37,000 American civilian and military personnel for working in different fields of activity in Iran with a view to modernising and militarising the country at a rapid pace. As a result of this, the Iranians felt that their cultural identity, traditional beliefs, values, and the aspirations for freedom and justice were being seriously threatened ; their natural resources were being exploited to benefit foreigners ; and qualified Iranians were facing unemployment due to the induction of Americans in various jobs. It is a pity that the Shah could not understand that his own behaviour and policies were contradictory in themselves and incompatible with the

needs of the Iranian society and that the degree of support that he received from U.S.A. was in the long run counterproductive.

This is an excellent book which has competently analysed the causes of the rise and fall of the Shah of Iran, comparable to any Greek tragedy—a very interesting and important political episode of the present century. The book contains a good Bibliography, and Index and some illustrations. It is expected to be read with great interest by political scientists, diplomats, statesmen and students of International Relations.

—B.C.

GUNS, MORTARS & ROCKETS

by J.W. Ryan

(Published by Brassey, Oxford, 1982) pp. 226 price £ 13-00.

AMMUNITION (INCLUDING GRENADES & MINES)

by K.J.W. Goad and D.H.J. Halsey

(Published by Brassey, Oxford, 1982) pp. 289 price £ 17-50.

SMALL ARMS & CANNONS

by C.J. Merchant Smith and P.R. Haslam

(Published by Brassey, Oxford, 1982) pp. 201 price £ 13-00.

BRASSEY'S who are among the oldest names in Defence publishing, where hitherto most note worthy for their annual Defence Year Book, which was always an authoritative and up-to-date volume including articles on the most topical of current defence subjects. More recently Brasseys have joined other well known publishers like Janes in adopting a catalogue type of format with different volumes restricted to a single nature or type of defence equipment such as Infantry weapons, Artillery, Defence Communications and so on. Best known of course of these catalogues are those of Janes whose referred series are invariably on the shelves of any staff officer dealing with weapons and equipment.

However, Brasseys have now come up with a series of volumes with a difference. They neither portray specific weapons systems nor tend to highlight the performance of one or the other. Instead the current series of books under review have been written for those who wish to improve their fundamental knowledge and therefore, are equally relevant to professional defence personnel as those involved in R & D or production of defence equipments or indeed any one interested in modern warfare.

The texts of the volumes under review are written in an empirical manner which needs little mathematical knowledge or technical depth other than the basic sciences of high schools. Therefore, these volumes are of particular interest for those who are studying for professional service examinations or

who are employed as staff officers in weapons and equipment directorates. The authors of these books are all members of the Faculty of the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham, UK. They are not only leaders in the technology of their subjects but are acutely aware of what the military practitioner requires.

Volume II on **Guns Mortars & Rockets** is written for those seeking to improve their knowledge of these weapons systems. Amongst the more attractive features of the volume is the historical background to the development of artillery including such little known but delectable facts that British Troops came under rocket fire from Indian rockets systems at SERINGPATNAM in 1799. This volume goes on to deal with all basic requirements of artillery systems, delivery systems, Ordnance, carriages and mounts, mortars and free flight rockets. It concludes with a chapter on future trends which is of particular interest in pointing the direction in which artillery and rocket systems are likely to take as a result of the latest technology, the development of automatic data processing and the needs of survival in the modern battle field.

Volume III on **Ammunition (including Grenades & Mines)**, concentrates on the requirements, the methods of Operation and Design Principles of the entire range of different mines and ammunition. It, therefore, widens substantially the knowledge of the young and middle piece officer in the vital and fundamental commodity of his military life. The entire gamut of technologies which contributes to the effectiveness of ammunition is discussed, of particular interest being the chapter on war heads, the nature of which are changing so rapidly, what with top attack ammunition, terminally guided ammunition and cluster ammunition all part of future trends. The attack of armour has been explained very comprehensively and gives one a better understanding of why, no matter how advanced the armour carried by a modern battle tank, there will always be some kind of ammunition developed which will form an effective counter to it.

Volume V deals with **Small Arms & Cannons**. Apart from giving the professional soldier an understanding of his personal weapon it is also useful for others who wish to enquire rather more into the design philosophy of small arms and cannons.

An interesting and valuable feature, common to all these volumes is the series of self test questions at the end of the chapter, which provides useful exercises either for those who want to confirm the progress of their own knowledge or those preparing to take examinations on the Subject at different levels.

-G.M.S.

MILITARY DICTIONARY AND ENCYCLOPEDIA 2ND EDITION
by H.S. Bhatia Eds.

*(Published by Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 110027) pp. 326 price
Rs 110/-*

THIS book contains various things—glossary of abbreviations, a calendar of World Armament and Disarmament (1981), military terms arranged alphabetically from A to Z, chronology of world military events from the ancient times to 1980, an essay on Nuclear weapons, including India's nuclear power, India's Military Organization and Weapons throughout history, India's Defence Budgets, 1980-81 and 1981-82, Armed strength of the Super Powers, and the comparative strength of the NATO, Warsaw Pact and Chinese Theatre Nuclear Forces, 1980 and 1985. The book has been enriched with illustrations, at some places, of weapons, and charts and tables. Besides, it has a useful bibliography. The editor has compiled a lot of information on military matters in this short volume, and as a military dictionary-cum-encyclopedia, it will surely prove to be useful to soldiers and students of military history and military science. However, its high price may not attract too many individual buyers.

—B.C.

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