U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS
(Established 1870)

PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

JULY - SEPTEMBER 1979

The

Journal

of the

United Service Institution

of

India

Published by Authority of the Council

ESTABLISHED : 1870

Postal Address :
'KASHMIR HOUSE', RAJAJI MARG, NEW DELHI-110011
Telephone No. : 375828

Vol. CIX JULY-SEPTEMBER 1979 No. 457

USI Journal is published quarterly in April, July, October and January. **Subscription :** Rs. 40 per annum. **Single Copy :** Rs. 10. Foreign (Sea Mail) $ 4.00 or £ 1.25. Subscription should be sent to the Secretary. It is **supplied free to members of the Institution. Articles, Correspondence and Books for Review** should be sent to the Editor. **Advertisement** enquiries concerning space should be sent to the Secretary.

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Moral Issues Facing Serving Men

An adaress to the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi on April 9th, 1979

GROUP CAPTAIN LEONARD CHESHIRE, VC, DSO, DFC, RAF (RTD)

INTRODUCTION

LADIES and gentlemen. I would like to say first of all what a very great privilege I count it to have been invited to address such a distinguished audience here in New Delhi. To you, Sir, General Menezes, I would like to say a special thank you for your extremely warm introduction, and to add that I only wish I had the clear memory far factual detail, as you have just now so ably demonstrated.

I think we are all aware that the subject I have been asked to talk about is a very profound one, one which affects the whole human family and to which we all need to address our minds seriously and objectively. Because of its complexity and the many difficulties that it presents, particularly in the contemporary scene, it is a subject about which we cannot afford to be too dogmatic and in which there must be room for different opinions. Nevertheless, I think that despite its complexity there are points of reference that we can establish, and also certain general principles that we can lay down to guide us. To this end I would like as best I can to try and approach the subject in a systematic way.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

My terms of reference are 'moral issues facing serving men' which perhaps might be more precisely defined as : 'The Morality of Force'. By force we mean force used by, or on behalf of, a legitimate government and of a severity sufficient to cause considerable loss of life and damage to property. We are not talking about the force involved in arresting a gangster or terrorist or some incident of that kind.

In talking about it I want to look at it from the point of view not only of the use of force, but of our duty as military men to defend our belief by reasoned argument when we meet somebody who holds that force is not permissible. I have listened to many arguments between military men and pacifists, and I have found that usually the

pacifist will win the argument in the eyes of a third party listening because he appears to stand for peace and the military man appears to stand for war. It is very necessary in my opinion firstly that we recognise the sincerity of the other person's point of view : secondly that we acknowledge the dilemma that we both face, because there is a dilemma when you come to use major force; thirdly that we have thought the matter through sufficiently to be able to meet the pacifist's arguments with clear and objective answers.

MORALITY

As a preface to what I have to say, we have to consider what we mean by morality, taking into account the fact that there are so many different countries, cultures, philosophies and religions in the world which differ and have differed from each other down the ages.

Morality is a general term for the good, which derives from the Latin world *mores*, meaning customs. All societies and groups from the beginning of history have evolved customs which they consider binding upon their members and for the good of the society, and as civilization has developed these have been supplanted by codified systems of law. But morality only comes fully into play when there is a claim on the person, on me in my inmost being, of what ought to be, of what I know I ought to do even though it may be contrary to prevailing custom around me. So immediately we find two distinct aspects of morality, the external law, or custom, and the internal conscience. I would like to touch briefly on both of these.

LAW

Law may be defined as an ordinance of reason, made for the common good, and promulgated by the person or persons in authority over the particular society. For example, the police, the army, the nation will each have its own laws, and we know perfectly well, particularly as military men, the consequences of breaking the law. Every time the law is broken disorder to a greater or lesser degree ensues, and a habitual law-breaker becomes a disrupter of society. Moreover, we also know that the more disciplined a group can become, the more able it is to achieve its particular end. Law should exist not only to maintain order, but also to help the society in question to achieve its ends. I say this in order to establish the necessity of abiding by the law and therefore the importance of knowing exactly what it says. Law itself may be divided into three categories : the positive law, the natural law, and the eternal, or divine, law.

The positive law is the man-made law which all societies from the nation downwards—and in more recent times International Society itself—have made for the welfare and proper ordering of their particular community. This, the man-made law, is particularly relevant to our present discussion when we come to consider what International Law has to say about war.

The natural law is the law that the majority of men consider to be the way that we should behave as human beings, or as defined by some, 'rules of right conduct considered by the majority of mankind to be binding upon all men in their relations with each other and with society as a whole'. It is a law that derives not from any man-made system, as is the case with the positive law, but from the nature of man himself. The ancient Greeks were the first who began working out the concept of natural law in an attempt to give it concrete expression, and though many have taken a contrary view, neverthless the appeal has lingered down through the ages and still claims men's attention. The very fact that so much emphasis is laid upon human rights today testifies to this fact. At all events the purpose of its study is unambiguous enough-to describe the dignity of the person and the rights of men, and to give them validity in social life. Most of us would probably agree, despite the wide variety of views and moral standards throughout the world community, there is in fact such a thing as natural justice, which we feel should be reflected in the man-made laws that govern our lives as citizens of a nation. If one were to ask what is the lowest common denominator of the natural law, I think we could say, despite our differences, that the natural law is there to uphold the dignity of the human being, that we should never do anything that degrades another person's human dignity and in a positive sense should work to build up his dignity. Alternatively we could invoke the Golden Rule, 'Do unto others as you would they should do to you'.

The eternal law of course presupposes the existence of a Creator, and clearly those who do not acknowledge, or have not as yet felt they can acknowledge, the existence of a Creator will not accept the eternal law, but this is not crucial to our purposes today. Although it is common to differentiate the eternal law from the natural law, in fact the two should more properly be seen as one and the same, the eternal law giving to the natural law a new dimension. Having regard to the definition of law as being 'made for the common good and promulgated by the person or persons in authority', then, granted the existence of a Creator, it is entirely reasonable that He should have laid down laws regulating man's rights and obligations, in much the

same way as the physical laws hold nature together as an integrated entity. Thus the divine or eternal law is the order of things prescribed by the Creator for the development of man's faculties, and for the attainment of his eternal goal, the natural law being that part of it which man is able to attain by the light of reason. It is, of course, not a set of laws arbitrarily imposed by God, but laws which arise out of the nature of man and society, and their ultimate destiny and goal. I think that, despite man's differing backgrounds and religious outlooks, we would all agree that our goal is the triumph of good over evil and the ultimate unity of the entire human family, a unity that enables us all to live in peace, in justice and in freedom, and in a world where poverty and deprivation such as we see today is eliminated.

Conscience

Conscience is the ability we have to judge the ethical status of our actions. It presupposes a law written on the heart, on each of our hearts, as distinct from the external laws. To the religious man it is God speaking to us in the inmost core of our being, God who is showing us what 'ought to be done' and warning us of the consequences of doing the opposite. It is not a separate faculty, like the faculty of memory, but is an ability that we possess which comes into operation when we are faced with a concrete situation requiring a moral decision. One could compare it to some extent with the ability to do mathematical sums, though clearly this latter is solely an ability of the intellect, not one that involves the whole person. Consciences then, is not a store of moral knowledge from which we can extract the answer we want as if by turning to a reference book, but rather a personal, reasoned response to a concrete situation of the moral order, based upon a knowledge of the attendant circumstances and upon a personal evaluation of the moral principles involved. Conscience is universally held to be inviolate, so that if a man truly believes in conscience that he must act in a particular way, society does not have the right to force him. Conscience, however, is not the final arbiter of what is truly right. We have a duty to inform our conscience, just as if we want to become a mathematician we would have a duty to study and practice mathematics.

Summing up, therefore, we may say that where there is an honest and upright search for the truth, where there is a genuine attempt to live by the dictates of our conscience, and where we accept a share of responsibility for the well-being of our neighbours, *there* is morality. So now, having completed that brief introduction, we now have to confront the concept of morality with the war convention.

THE WAR CONVENTION

By the war convention I mean those rights and obligations that have been specified in certain treaties and conventions, such as the Geneva Convention, The Hague Convention and various Resolutions of the United Nations, which have been written into International Law, and which broadly speaking are accepted by the majority of men. As its starting point, the war convention sees International Society as consisting of a series of Sovereign States, each of which has certain inalienable rights. The principal of these are territorial integrity and political sovereignty which correspond to the right of the individual to be secure in his own house and free to decide his way of life within it. When we make such a comparison we invoke what is termed the 'domestic analogy', indicating the similarity between International and National law.

The war convention upholds the inviolability of these two basic rights and states that the one crime against International Society is aggression, granting to the State that is being overrun the right to defend itself, and permitting other States to come to his aid. The difficulty, however, is that in the war convention there is a great poverty of terminology. In the domestic scene we have armed break-in, robbery with violence, murder, theft and all sorts of different terms which enable us to put the particular crime in its right place; but in International Law there is just one word, aggression, and even that has not yet been defined by the United Nations. This poverty of terminology is an undoubted complicating factor, compounded by the manipulation of words which is becoming such a feature of the international political scene. Every aggressor is always a 'peace maker' who desires nothing more than that he be allowed to occupy the other nation's territory without a struggle and in the guise of a liberator.

APPEASEMENT

I think that before we consider the right of the State to defend itself, we ought to look at the objections that some members of Society raise against the right of self-defence. One of these is the view that the best way of dealing with a criminal aggressor is by appeasement, and of course, the most notorious example of this, unfortunately, is the action of my own country, together with France, in the face of Hitler's ever-increasing demands in the late 1930s. I cannot go into historical details, but I do assert that in 1938, when Hitler wanted to march into Czechoslovakia, all the military cards were in fact stacked on the Allied side. Hitler had 37 divisions, Czechoslovakia a roughly

equal number and into the bargain was determined to fight to the last man; France had 87 divisions and Britain six. Hitler's generals told him that what he was proposing was militarily impossible, but he answered: 'Never mind, they won't fight'. What governed that fateful decision, and served only to reverse dramatically the military balance, was not a sense of justice but a fear of war. An excessive fear of war, or an excessive desire for peace, can very often bring war closer instead of driving it further way.

By contrast to the policy of appeasement favoured by Britain and France there is the example of Finland which, when threatened by Russia in 1939, decided to take up arms in self-defence rather than concede to the demand Russia was making. Though many have questioned her wisdom in doing this, the decision was applauded throughout the world as a vindication of the sovereign rights which form the base of International Society. This fact raises a very fundamental point: that the right to defend yourself against an aggressor has a moral value of itself. The common values of International Society are strengthened when aggression is resisted, and diminished when, whether through appeasement or capitulation, it is allowed to triumph. Aggression in the international field is inherently much more dangerous than is domestic violence, because on the international scene there are no policemen; it is the victim and his allies, if he has any, who alone can act the policeman's role. For this reason the war convention confers the right not only to resist the aggressor, but once he is defeated to punish him in order to deter potential aggressors in the future. On the domestic scene we instinctively know that the demands of hijackers or kidnappers have to be resisted to the best of our ability if the floodgates are not to open.

Pacifism

The other contrary argument which we do have to take seriously is pacifism. I am not, of course, aware of the degree of pacifism which may exist in India, and pacifism is such a general term that we have to be sure before we talk of it that we know what kind of pacifism we are discussing. For the purposes of this paper I am only concerned with what I call absolute pacifism: that is to say the belief that under no circumstances whatsoever may you meet force by force, or even take a human life no matter what is at stake. Now I stress again that when you meet such a person you must respect his view: he holds it because he feels that the people of this world have been fighting each other for seven thousand years without making peace any more of a reality, and that therefore we should look for an alternative

method. With this basic premise we can do nothing but agree. We should make it clear that, though military men ourselves, we too are at heart men of peace. But there are a number of weaknesses in the pacifist's argument with which we need to be familiar. Firstly, pacifism remains only a theory : it has never seriously been put into practice, and moreover it remains a minority view. Secondly, and more importantly, the pacifist is virtually obliged to argue his case in the abstract, not in the light of an actual, historical situation, and this makes it very difficult, if not quite impossible, to weigh up the relative consequences of resisting or not resisting armed assault. Thirdly, in the many discussions I myself have had with pacifists, I have never yet received an unequivocal answer to the question : 'If a man enters this room with a sub-machine gun and opens fire on the occupants, do we have the right to shoot him, assuming that to be the only way of stopping him ?' The pacifist's dilemma is that if he says No he loses credibility, whereas if he says Yes he has given away the foundation of his case, and so I find he almost invariably equivocates.

There is, however, a new form of pacifism, an extension of the doctrine of non-violent resistance, which is attracting a measure of support, and which we need to be able to counter with rational arguments. This is the argument that if a country is invaded, even by a criminal aggressor such as Hitler, we should not offer armed resistance nor attempt to stop the invader, but let him overrun us and then resist him passively. We withdraw all our labour, refuse to co-operate in any form whatsoever, to the extent of not manning the telephone exchange, not operating the bus service, or the trains, not even producing food except secretly and for our personal use. In short we make ourselves ungovernable. The incoming soldiers, it is argued, will be so demoralised by having to attack men who never shoot back, that ultimately they will give up. The invader will not possibly be able to import sufficient manpower to operate the essential services, and therefore ultimately he will have to withdraw. This argument is presented by a number of intellectuals and churchmen and sounds, at first sight, rather appealing, but to me it is unrealistic and dangerous, for two main reasons. It the aggressor were a man, or rather a nation, who lived by the normal rules of society, there might be some force in it. But a criminal aggressor does not live by those rules, and history shows us just what happens to the victim. Refusal to fight back, far from being respected, is looked upon as a sign of weakness, and serves only to feed the aggressor's brutality, who would have no compunction in shooting down unarmed men if they happened to be in the way. The proponents of this non-violent resistance policy agree that its success presupposes a high degree of organisation on a

national level, and that intensive peacetime training comparable with that of the professional soldier would be required. He also concedes that non-violent resistance would require competent and inspired leadership, total commitment by the greater part of the nation, and military type communication and co-ordination. But the victim nation would very soon be deprived of all communication media : leaders, potential trouble makers, indeed almost anyone at the aggressor's whim, would disappear in the middle of the night, never to be seen again. Physical intimidation would be applied to some sections of the community and to others enticement to collaborate, and history so amply testifies how readily under such circumstances collaborators are forthcoming. It is inconceivable that more than a small, dedicated minority would still be holding out by the time the full extent of the aggressor's ruthlessness and power had become apparent.

But over and above all this, acceptance of the policy by the nation would necessitate a public declaration of intention followed by the disbanding of the Armed Forces, for otherwise the country would place itself in the hypocritical situation of maintaining a military potential that was never to be used. On the domestic scene this would be the equivalent of doing away with the Police Force. The military should know that this is a view held in great sincerity by a number of people, and should be equipped to meet it with reasoned argument, acknowledging that both sides are equally concerned to discover how to meet the demands of morality in a situation of violence and armed confrontation.

The Christian Command to Love

Finally I think that, as a Christian, I have to ask the question, 'Can we reconcile all-out war with the Christian belief in a God of love who calls all of us to love our fellow men and, by loving them, to love God ?' I can only, in the time at my disposal, answer that the call to love is to love all men. If therefore, we are faced with a situation in which there are two groups of people whose lives are at risk—on the one hand your own countrymen who are about to be invaded, and on the other the aggressor who is engaged in a criminal activity—we have to decide to whom we owe a primary duty. Whichever, our decision, lives are going to be lost, and since we are personally involved there is no way in which we can opt out. Once the aggressor opens fire, there will be blood on our hands, either by default if we refuse to try and stop him, or by positive action if we take up arms against him. In life, given the world we live in, we cannot always choose a course of action which in itself is absolutely good. All too often we have to choose

between the better of two alternative courses, neither of them as we would wish, and at times the rights and wrongs of the choice that faces us is difficult in the extreme to assess. What is certain is that the Christian Church does not forbid us going to war, if it is a matter of defence against an aggressor and if all efforts at a peaceful solution have previously failed. Yet it is equally true that the problem of killing, particularly in the context of modern weapons, continues to exercise the Christian mind and conscience. We are on ground where all men of goodwill, of whatever belief or political persuasion, need to come together to work out the moral issues and their practical application.

AGGRESSION

Now let us consider the matter of aggression itself. Aggression is difficult to define, has not yet been properly defined by the United Nations Organization, and it will fall upon the leaders of the nation that is being threatened to decide whether or not an aggressor is about to march Clearly it is encumbent upon us all to work to the absolute limit to solve the particular problem by peaceful means if at all possible, but it needs no stressing that if we wait too long the situation may well be lost. On the other hand, if we act too soon we may provoke a war which could otherwise have been stopped, and will thus cast ourselves as the aggressors not the victims. The potential aggressor will do everything in his power to make us fall into this trap if he possibly can. All aggressors want nothing more than that their victim should be judged the one who is at fault, and he a welcome liberator. No one would deny that it is a very difficult question to answer, if not impossible in the abstract, but there is one situation in which we can definitely say that the right to do so exists. There is where the following three conditions apply :

Firstly, that there is a manifest intent on the aggressor's part to invade and occupy. Secondly, sufficient degree of preparation to make that intent a positive danger, and thirdly a general situation in which not resisting is going to place you in ever increasing danger.

Despite the United Nations ruling against intervention under any circumstances, there have in fact been situations under which one State has become involved in another's armed conflict with the general approval of other States, either in the form of intervention or counter-intervention. However, this is a difficult and complicated subject, and I would prefer to leave it until question time but to talk very briefly on humanitarian intervention. History in fact offers no clear-cut example of pure humanitarian intervention, and the closest that one can find

is the Indian intervention in Bangladesh. Now when we come to make a historical judgement obviously people will differ in their interpretation, and I am taking the interpretation to which probably a majority of people would subscribe but in the realisation that some will disagree. In this instance I think it is fair to say that there were other political motives involved beyond purely relieving the oppressed members of East Pakistan, as it then was. Neverthless the aims of India turned out to be totally indentified with the aims and wishes of the oppressed people of Bangladesh that it enabled India to make a very quick and successful attack, and similarly quick withdrawl, and then to show great humanity to the defeated army. I think that that is an example in history that will go down as the closest that there has yet been of one State coming to the help of a severely oppressed people.***

THE MANNER OF WAGING WAR

Having determined under what circumstances a nation may go to war, we finally have to look at the manner in which war may be waged, in particular the rights and obligations imposed by the war convention. The general principle is simple and clear enough, that we should not use any means that are excessive to our objective ; that everything we do should be related to winning ; that nothing be done wantonly or anythiag destroyed purely for the sake of destroying. But of course it is absolutely essential from the beginning that we know exactly what our aims are, since these in themselves decide the nature of the war that is being fought. Ridding the world of Hitler was a very different proposition from, say, combating the rival extremists in the Northern Ireland conflict or fighting the Civil War in Nigeria. In the case of World War II the allied aim could be nothing less than unconditional surrender, for the reason that the Nazi system was so vicious that there had to be a political reconstruction of the country. In Korea the objective was limited to reaching and securing the 49th Parallel, though in point of fact that objective was later changed. The war aims should not only be clearly determined and stated, but known by all operational commanders in the field.

*** Since this talk was delivered we have had the example of Tanzania intervening military in Uganda under broadly similar circumstances, but whether this action constitutes purely humanitarian intervention will depend upon the future actions of Tanzanian Forces in Uganda. It is the author's belief, however, that the United Nations ruling about intervention should be modified.

Having briefly outlined the general principle relating to the manner of waging war, I would now like to consider four specific and difficult issues.

Individual Conscience

The first is individual conscience. To what extent does an individual soldier have the right to refuse to obey an order? I stated that conscience is inviolate, and that if a man really believes in conscience that he must not do something we have to respect it. But to make a moral jndgement you have to have full knowledge of all the facts relating to that situation and if it were a campaign or major action no individual soldier or member of the Armed Forces would be likely to have sufficient information to make such a judgement. The very fact that he joined the Armed Forces means that basically he has confidence in his Government. Secondly, if what he is going to do by withdrawing from the action were to jeopardise seriously the lives of his comrades, I think he would have to consider very deeply before he decided to opt out. But if he was asked to do something which is clearly unjust or immoral, like shooting a prisoner of war who is out of action and therefore no longer a threat, he has not just the right but an absolute duty to refuse Although I do not know the full facts, Mai Lay is an example of this very issue becoming the object of a military enquiry and provoking strong public feelings.

Interrogation : The use of torture as a means of interrogation

Again we are faced with this poverty of language in the war convention, as torture is in effect the one word we have for the use of physical means to extract information, and not unnaturally creates an immediate sense of revulsion. My personal view is that, whilst it would be unrealistic to deny an interrogator the right to use some degree of physical and psychological pressure where a matter of substantial importance is at stake, torture in the full sense of the term cannot be admissible as a general rule or practice. This I say for the following principal reasons. Firstly, it must be held to be contrary to the natural law. Secondly, it degrades the person who practices it. Thirdly, it escalates the level of violence and hatred.

However, we have to consider - and I have been trying to grapple with this problem—a situation where *you*, shall we say, have *me* in your power and I have information which is of such crucial importance that unless you can get it from me you may lose a major battle. Even if it is not the loss of an entire battle, let us assume that the lives of a considerable number of men are at stake. In such an event one

has to face up to the issue realistically and ask what are our respective rights and duties. Being mortally wounded in battle can be every bit as painful as many forms of torture, and here we have an instance where I, as a single individual, am held in the balance against either a manor military reverse or the lives of a 1,000 or more men. If such were the situation, and trying as best I can to put myself in the shoes of the man who has been captured and who holds the all-important information, I think that I would have to concede the right to do almost anything you wanted with me in order to extract the information. Were I a neutral third party I would feel bound to insist that in applying whatever pressure you felt you had to, you ensured that my dignity as a human being was not degraded. Whether these two conclusions are mutually contradictory I do not know : I just have the feeling that the man who does his best to live up to accepted moral standards would treat me harshly, yes, but in a different way from the SS and Gestapo interrogators of World War II.

It brings me to a conclusion which I think must be admissible in other moral dilemmas too, relating to war, namely that in a situation which can be honestly and objectively termed extreme emergency, that is to say where the existence of the State or a major military undertaking is in serious jeopardy, almost any rule of war may have to be thrown overboard. The man who takes the decision to do this must know that he will have to answer for what he has done and show that the harm he was forced to do was necessitated by the threat of a much greater harm still had he not done it.

The Atom Bomb

In World War II this was a question that involved me personally, because I was overhead at Nagasaki when the second bomb was dropped. I feel bound to answer that in the particular circumstances of the time, dropping the atom bomb was the lesser of two evils. I cannot see how the Allied leaders could reasonably have done anything but decide to drop it, subject to just one qualification to which I will refer later. My reason for this answer is that the alternative to dropping the bomb—that is to say the only known and foreseeable alternative—was a full scale invasion of the mainland of Japan. The Japanese Military High Command was totally committed to fighting to the last man. To them surrender was the ultimate disgrace for which only suicide on a mass scale could atone. Some historians, and others, have claimed that Japan at the time was suing for peace, but the truth is that merely private approaches were being unofficially made to see what sort of terms the Allies might offer. These did not

represent Japanese military thinking, did not have the authority of the Cabinet, and carried insufficient political support for the Allies to take them seriously.

The Americans were assembling an invasion force of five million men, the first wave of which was to land on the southern island of Japan in November 1945, and the second on the main island in March 1946. A further year's fighting was envisaged, and General McArthur's esstimate of the probable casualties were three million lives—two million Japanese and one million American and Allied. Added to that every Allied POW's life was doomed, for the Japanese had already issued written orders to the effect that the moment the first Allied soldier set foot on the Japanese mainland all POWs were to be executed. The two atom bombs which were dropped took in all 200,000 lives. If therefore one sets 200,000 against three million, it is very difficult in my opinion to see on what grounds it would have been morally preferable to let the conventional war continue. I find it a somewhat dishonest argument when someone says, as a number do: 'The atom bomb is wrong and should not have been dropped The war could have been won by conventional means alone', when they know what the latter course of action would have involved.

The one qualification I have is about the choice of a city as the target for the first bomb, Had that first been dropped in open country as a warning, it is almost certain that it would not have made any difference to the subsequent Japanese conduct of the war. They had in fact already been warned by Truman, but took no notice. Neither after Hiroshima did they even let their own people know that an atom bomb had been dropped. But the Allies would at least have done their best to avoid the civilian and military casualties, and from that point on the Japanese could have been held at least partly responsible for the continuing of the war and the inevitable second bomb. Although I do not underestimate the difficulties of the Allied High Command in this situation, particularly with only two bombs immediately available I think this latter course would have been morally preferable, and the verdict of history kinder.

Whether there could ever be a situation again in which the use of nuclear weapons could be morally justified is of course another matter, which can only be properly decided in the light of the historical circumstances obtaining at the time. If I were pressed to state my own personal opinion, I think I would have to answer that one cannot rule out altogether the possibility. If an aggressor should march again, as Hitler did forty year ago, with the clear intention of using all-out

nuclear war himself, I connot really see that there would be any reasonable alternative but to meet him weapon for weapon. The issue at stake would not be that of retaliation or reprisal but sheer national survival. The option would still lie open, depending upon the circumstances, to direct one's nuclear weapons at the enemies' missile sites. or at any rate to the minimise to the utmost their use against cities.

COMBATANTS AND NON-COMBATANTS

This thorny and difficult question raises an issue of fundamental importance in view of the nature of contemporary society and the changing face of war. The war convention itself, when applied to the rights of military men in waging war, is based upon a total distinction between civilians and soldiers, that is to say non-combatants and combatants. The argument is that a soldier by becoming a soldier forfeited his right to live, whether he enlists voluntarily or is conscripted. As a soldier he is fair game to be shot, but the civilian may never be shot. To kill a civilian according to the war convention is murder. Now this originated from the days when wars were fought between professional armies, for a long time mostly mercenaries, who made up their rules between themselves. However, with the turn of the present century and the advent of total war involving, at least in World War II. the organised co-operation of the major part of the nation, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant has become blurred. Indeed the war convention has already begun to recognise this by conceding, for instance, that a munitions worker may under some circumstances become a legitimate target for enemy attack. Others not directly involved in immediate support to the Armed Forces retain their immunity from attack, though exactly where the distinguishing line has to be drawn is not entirely clear.

For my part I find it increasingly difficult to see on what grounds this fundamental concept of distinguishing the one from the other can really be upheld under all possible situations. It goes without saying that everything possible should be done to protect the genuine non-combatant from attack. I think that all military men of goodwill would agree to this, and indeed make it a point of honour to implement it even if at times to their own detriment. But the situation that I want to consider is that of a criminal aggressor, such for instance as Hitler, having the clear and positive backing of the great majority of the nation—as Hitler undoubtedly did—launching an all-out offensive against another State with the manifest intention of establishing a tyrannical and brutal rule over them. My reasons for questioning whether the war convention as it stands today can really be morally justified in such a situation are as follows :

In the first place we are increasingly becoming an integreated society. When the nation fights, it is not just the Armed Forces but the entire nation. Moreover, the vital components of the nation's military as well as economic and industrial capability are for the most part situated in populated cities. So interwoven with the day to day lives of the city are these component elements and so dependent are they for their successful operation upon all the working population—even the baker or the woman who cleans the factory or communications centre floor—that I do not see how one can really make a total distinction. Some kind of distinction there certainly is, but not a total and absolute one.

Secondly, if the victim nation is to abide by the rule, he forfeits the right to bomb the aggressor's cities, except possibly by high precision bombing with small sized bombs against selected targets. As a result the enemy will be given safe areas in which he can carry on his war production undisturbed, regroup his Armed Forces and even install missile sites if he so wishes, knowing that he will be effectively immune from attack. The advantage he would gain would be so overwhelming as probably to change the course of the war. It would be similar to an army of former days commandeering a mass of its civilians, making them march in front of the troops and daring the otherwise to break the war convention by opening fire.

Thirdly, it will be argued that although a large proportion of the cities' population is in fact totally aommitted to the war effort, even if not actively participating, there remain little children who cannot possibly be said to fall into this category. If the war lasts long enough they will become so committed, but for the time being it must be conceded that they are not. Against this argument I would answer that an aggressor nation going to war against a victim which has the capability of bombing, has every opportunity of evacuating its children and old people into safe country areas. We in Britain anticipated from the moment war was declared in September 1939 that we would be bombed, and almost the first thing to happen was the large scale evacuation of children from likely target cities. What is more we considered that it was fair game to be bombed, in other words that bombing was just part of war in the twentieth century and I am not consciously aware of any feeling that the enemy was using an unfair tactic.

In the light of the arguments I have adduced, I feel strongly that this question of distinction between civilians and soldiers, and the right to bomb the aggressor's cities, where there is clear and urgent military grounds for doing so, should be thought through more deeply and a

clause added to cover the situation where an aggressor launches what we have come to know as total war.

CONCLUSION

Returning to my original thesis, I wish to suggest that, with the possible exception of humanitarian intervention, or military intervention at the request of United Nations or of a legitimate government, our right to go to war is limited to defend against an aggressor. The methods which we will be entitled to use depend upon the nature of the aggression and the clear determination of our war aims. To defend oneself against such aggression, or to go to a victim's help, has a moral value in itself and serves to strengthen international society, whereas not to resist and to allow a criminal aggressor full rein, weakens it and diminishes our common values. At the same time it is clear that when we fight we have to fight with honour. We have to fight in such a way that a settlement is ultimately possible, and that a better and more secure peace ensues. This means among other things that if a situation arises where for humanitarian reasons we can hold our fire, we should do so even if it involves accepting casualties on our own side provided that our doing so will not jeopardise the final outcome of the battle. When we go to war—and I am taking it for granted that we do so only because everything else has failed and because our cause is genuinely and unmistakenly just—we have to win. We have to acquire the military skills, the national determination and the sense of pride in our unit to make certain that, no matter how heavy the odds against us, we halt and defeat the aggressor; but we have to do this, insofar as we possibly can, with humanity and honour.

We have to remember that our ultimate goal is the triumph of good over evil, that the final destiny we should be seeking to achieve is the complete unity of our human family. If war should come, which God forbid, we should do all that lies within our power to fight in such a way that we will earn the respect of all honest thinking people the world over. In peace time we need to show that, though military men ourselves, at heart we too are men of peace, and that we too want a solution to international problems by peaceful means, not by war. I acquiring skills and the discipline that we will need to win the war, should it come, we should declare by our actions that it is the good of all human beings that we have at heart, not just our narrow national interests.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for having listened to me.

The Emergence Of The Indian Coast Guard

VICE ADMIRAL VA KAMATH, PVSM

ON 19 Aug 78, at a short and simple ceremony in the Naval Dockyard at Bombay, the Prime Minister Shri Morarji Desai formally inaugurated the Indian Coast Guard. Only the previous evening the President had given his assent to the Coast Guard Bill which had been passed by both the Houses of Parliament. India thus joined the ranks of handful of countries which have established such an organisation to undertake some of the many responsibilities that devolve on a coastal State in the waters under its jurisdiction.

When mention is made of a Coast Guard, people are instinctively reminded of the US Coast Guard—a Service with a long history going back to even before the United States had a fighting Navy. Today the US Coast Guard concerns itself with practically every aspect of the maritime environment of that country from Drug Control to Pleasure Boats and from Light Houses to Port Security. On the other hand the Canadian Coast Guard concerns itself mainly with keeping their navigable channels free from ice in the winter; in undertaking control of marine traffic and in pollution control work. There are in fact no set list of duties which are common to all Coast Guards. Each country must necessarily tailor the role of its Coast Guard to suit its own circumstances and priorities.

THE BACKGROUND

The emergence of the Coast Guard in India as a new Service is the end result of an awareness that had been growing for some time in Governmental and Naval circles that the development of an organisation to ensure the safety of life and property at sea and for enforcement of national laws in the waters under our jurisdiction, had not kept pace with the substantial increase in the maritime activity taking place in our surrounding waters. It would be perhaps true to say that this has been a global problem of the seventies and for

this reason this decade has rightly been referred to as the "Decade of the Seas".

The need for stepping up vigilance along our coastal areas had been a long felt need particularly in times of national emergency. But two live problems facing the country in the early 70's helped to highlight the importance of undertaking maritime policing in a co-ordinated and meanigful manner. First was the large-scale sea-borne smuggling that was taking place in the early 70's. Needless to say, smuggling had been going on for years, but it had reached rather alarming proportions by 1974, at a time when the country was facing serious economic difficulties. The Government therefore established a Marine Wing in the Customs Organisation in 1974 with a fleet of fast intercepter craft acquired from Norway, and at the same time approved the setting-up of the necessary shore facilities along the West Coast to sustain and maintain this fleet. The second problem was posed by the discovery of oil and natural gas in the Bombay High area with prospects of finding more such fields elsewhere along the continental shelf. Vast sums of money were to be invested in these fields and the question arose as to who was going to be responsible for their protection.

In 1974, the Government had set-up an Inter-Ministerial Committee known as the Rustomji Committee and on which the writer happened to be the Naval Member, to go into the question of adequacy of the ex sting anti-smuggling measures and how these could be strengthened. Faced as it was with the imminent introduction of the Maritime Zones Act and the problem of providing protection to the offshore oil installations, the Government subsequently directed the same Committee "to take an overall view of the type of organisation that was needed to enforce the laws in the waters under our jurisdiction and to ensure safety of life and property at sea, in the light of the substantial increase in maritime activity in our surrounding waters."

In that portion of its report submitted in 1 75, concerning the Coast Guard type of organisation, the Rustomji Committee concluded that there was, in fact, a need for an organisation which will take stock and charge, of the various problems connected with the 6830 Kms of coastline, particularly, in the light of the recent developments in oil exploration within the continental shelf. It recommended that a Coast Guard type organisation should be established to assume Central Government responsibility at sea in the maritime sphere, responsibility which embraces safety of navigation in our waters

search and rescue, salvage, fishery protection, anti-smuggling, prevention of poaching and infiltration and the control of pollution among others. The Committee further recommended that the Coast Guard should function as a separate entity in peace time, but should, in an emergency be placed under the operational control of the Navy to supplement the Naval Fleet.

THE MARITIME ZONES ACT 1976

Mention has already been made of the Maritime Zones Act. Known in full as the "Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act 1976" it delineated these various maritime zones. Briefly we have first the Territorial Waters which extends upto 12 miles from the Coast where we claim full sovereignty. Then comes the Contiguous Zones which extends



another 12 miles from the limit of the Territorial waters wherein we have jurisdiction in matters relating to Customs, Sanitation, Immigration and Security. The third is the Exclusive Economic Zone which generally extends up to 200 nautical miles from the appropriate coastal baseline. In the last named zone we have sovereign rights for exploration, exploitation, management and conservation of all natural resources and powers to regulate and control marine pollution. The fourth and last element in the maritime zones is the Continental Shelf which is an extension of the land mass to a depth of 200 meters. The sea bed and the sub-soil of the submarine area in this belt, even if it extends beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone, is what is termed as the Continental Shelf, wherein we have full and exclusive sovereign rights over the sea bed and the sub-soil for purposes of exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of all resources.

A look at the map will indicate the extent of our Exclusive Economic Zone, which as stated earlier extends generally to 200 nautical miles. It will be appreciated why in some areas it cannot extend to this distance. It is because our neighbours also have their claims on the waters adjoining their coast and we have to arrive at a mutually agreed maritime border, based on accepted international norms. Maritime borders have been demarcated accordingly between India, Shri Lanka Maldives and Indonesia while negotiations are in progress with some of the other neighbouring countries in this regard.

THE COAST GUARD CELL

With the passage of the Maritime Zones Act 1976 the country overnight assumed varying types of jurisdiction over an area which extends to nearly 20,00,000 Sq Kms; an area over half the land area of the country. The need for a Coast Guard type organisation to enforce applicable jurisdiction over this vast area therefore became pressing. In Jan 77 therefore the Government approved a Ministry of Defence proposal to create an Interim Coast Guard Organisation under Naval Headquarters, pending the approval of a plan for an independent Indian Coast Guard, and simultaneously the appointment of a Vice Admiral as an Officer on Special Duty in the Ministry of Defence with appropriate nucleus staff to prepare a detailed plan for a permanent organisation Two small Frigates from the Naval Fleet, (Kuthar & Kirpan) and five Patrol Boats (Pamban, Puri, Pulicat, Panvel and Panaji) which the Navy was operating on behalf of the Home Ministry were constituted as the Interim Coast Guard Force by the then Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral J. Cursetji, on 1 Feb 77 at a ceremony in Bombay.

This writer who was appointed as the OSD with the task of preparing the blueprint for the permanent Coast Guard Service could take up his new assignment on a full time basis only on 1 Apr 79 after his retirement from the Navy Meanwhile the staff approved for him consisting of 1 Commodore and 2 other Naval Officers as well as one civilian Gazetted Officer w re able to organise the supporting clerical staff and the office accommodation, arrange for furniture, telephones and the other paraphernalia necessary for supporting an office that was to be termed the "Coast Guard Cell" located in the Ministry of Defence.

The 16 months or so that it took from the time the OSD joined, to the commissioning of the new Service in Aug 78, may on the face appear a long period But the nature of the work involved was such and the number of Ministries of the Govt. of India who were concerned, were so many, that it was in fact a miracle that they were able to complete the job in this time. The first requirement was to lay down in detail the duties and responsibilities of the Coast Guard; an exercise which involved many discussions with the Ministries concerned i.e. Defence, Home, Shipping & Transport, Finance, Science & Technology, Petroleum & Chemicals, Agriculture & Irrigation and last but not least Naval Headquarters. It may be mentioned at this stage that a high level Coast Guard Advisory Board was set up under the Defence Secretary with the CNS and Secretaries of the Ministries mentioned earlier as members, to give policy guidelines to the OSD. After agreements were reached at the working levels on the various policy matters, these were finally put up to the Advisory Board where they were further discussed and either approved or modifications suggested The Advisory Board met on five different occasions between May 77 and Feb 78 to consider the various proposals put up by the OSD.

An issue which took some time to resolve concerned the role of the Coast Guard in anti-smuggling operations The Customs anti-smuggling fleet though then small was planned for a sizeable increase in the years to come. With the Coast Guard coming into being, there was a need to take an overall view so as to avoid any duplication of effort and overlapping of responsibilities. Both the organisations were to operate in the same waters possibly with similar types of craft, and with a common requirement for a shore communication, maintenance and supply organisations. The manpower for the existing Customs fleet was being met by ad hoc local recruitment of personnel some with a naval background and others with none. It was the view of the Coast Guard Cell that there would be considerable advantage in merging the Customs Marine Organisation with the

Coast Guard so as to avoid the need for maintaining two sea-going organisations operating side by side. This view finally prevailed with the Advisory Board with two conditions The first was that the Customs would retain responsibility for anti-smuggling: this being a specialised task for which that Department had built up considerable expertise. This meant that the fleet of Customs craft acquired by that Department for anti-smuggling purposes would continue to operate under the orders of the local Customs Collectors to meet the specific task of anti-smuggling although they may be manned by the Coast Guard and sail under Coast Guard colours. The second concerned the fleet of unsophisticated craft captured from smugglers which the Customs Department have been using in the anti-smuggling role on the principle of setting a thief to catch a thief. These it was decided, would continue to be operated by the Customs Department with repair support provided to them by the Coast Guard.

Another complicated issue related to the terms and conditions of the Coast Guard Service and its rank structure. While it was agreed that the new Service would generally be equated with the BSF, it was realised that the terms and conditions would necessarily have to be modified to suit the maritime nature of the Coast Guard Service. In order to examine these issues in detail, the Advisory Board appointed an inter-Ministerial Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of the Additional Defence Secretary to make recommendations. The Sub-Committee held 10 meetings spread over 3 months to resolve the many complicated issues involved before the final recommendations could emerge.

In Feb 78 all that was now left to do was the preparation of the Bill to be placed before Parliament. Work on this was therefore started in earnest and it appeared that it might be possible to bring up the Bill before Parliament during its Budget Session. Much to the disappointment of the Coast Guard Cell, it was found that with its already heavy list of business Parliament could only take up the Coast Guard Bill at its next i.e. the Monsoon Session starting mid Jul 78. The work of drafting the Coast Guard Bill involved an indepth study of both the Navy Act and the BSF Act. The various draft sections prepared by the Coast Guard Cell had then to be discussed in detail with both the Navy (Judge Advocate General) and the Ministry of Law.

The proposed organisation of the Coast Guard envisages the Headquarters being located in Delhi controlling a three-regional organisation under Regional Headquarters in Bombay for the Western Region, at Madras for the Eastern Region and at Port Blair for the

Andaman & Nicobar Region. Coast Guard stations which are expected to be set up around the coast in keeping with the build up of force levels, and the requirement at sea in the adjoining Exclusive Economic Zone, will be grouped under Coast Guard Districts which will be established one for each maritime State (2 in the Andaman & Nicobar) The Stations will report to the District Headquarters and the Districts will be under the control of the Coast Guard Regional Commander. The only exception envisaged is in respect of common facilities that may be set-up and these would include Coast Guard Air Stations, Training Establishments and Supply Depots which would operate directly under the respective Regional Commanders.

Considerable thought had also to be devoted to arrive at the type of vessels and aircraft that would be required to perform the Coast Guard functions and laying down their broad specifications. Another task was to decide on the pattern of new uniforms to be adopted for the Coast Guard, and having done so, to arrange for its manufacture and distribution in time for the inauguration day.

THE COAST GUARD ACT 1978

Section 14 of the Coast Guard Act 1978 defines the duties and functions of the Indian Coast Guard as under :—

(1) It shall be the duty of the Coast Guard to protect by such measures, as it thinks fit, the maritime and other national interests of India in the maritime zones of India.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the measures referred to therein may provide for :—

(a) ensuring the safety and protection of artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations and other structures and devices in any maritime zone,

(b) providing protection to fishermen including assistance to them at sea while in distress;

(c) taking such measures as are necessary to preserve and protect the maritime environment and to prevent and control marine pollutions;

(d) assisting the Customs and other authorities in anti-smuggling operations;

(e) enforcing the provisions of such enactments as are for the time being in force in the maritime zones: and

(f) such other matters, including measures for the safety of life and property at sea and collection of scientific data, as may be prescribed.

(3) The Coast Guard shall perform its functions under this section in accordance with, and subject to such rules as may be prescribed and such rules may, in particular, make provisions for ensuring that the Coast Guard functions in close liaison with Union agencies, institutions and authorities so as to avoid duplication of effort.

THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN

One has necessarily to see the tasks laid down in the Coast Guard Act in relation to the size of the problem A coastline of over 6,000 Kms and an area of sea of approx. 20,00,000 Sq. Kms calls for a sizeable force level with the appropriate shore infra-structure. The force level available to the Coast Guard to carry out this enormous task is currently still what was made available to the Interim Coast Guard when it was commissioned on 1 Feb 77. It will be agreed that such a force level consisting as it does of vessels long past their prime, cannot make an impact on the situation. Taking into account the likely availability of financial resources and trained manpower, it is aimed to build up the Coast Guard by the turn of the century to a level which would enable it to carry out its multifarious tasks with a certain measure of confidence and effectiveness.

Surface patrolling is planned to be met by a three-tier force level consisting of Inshore Patrol Vessels to cover an area up to about 50 miles from the coast; Offshore Patrol Vessels to cover the area between 50 and 100 miles and lastly by Deep Sea Patrol Vessels which would be responsible for operations in the outer limits of the Economic Zone and beyond, if required.

In the case of aerial surveillance a two-tier force level consisting of Coastal Surveillance Aircraft which would cover the offshore areas to a depth of approx. 75 miles and Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft for surveillance beyond this distance is planned; surveillance aircraft and surface patrols acting as one integrated system.

Subject to availability of resources the plans cater for build up of a force level to that indicated below by the turn of the century :—

		Nos
(i)	Coastal Surveillance Aircraft	— 36
(ii)	Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft	— 9

(iii)	Inshore Patrol Vessels	— 36
(iv)	Offshore Patrol Vessels	— 24
(v)	Deep Sea Patrol Vessels	— 6
(vi)	Multi-purpose Rescue-cum-Pollution Control Vessels	— 6
(vii)	Rescue Helicopters	— 6

The immediate plan of the Coast Guard covering the next 5 years will necessarily have to be a modest one, due to limitations of money and trained sea-going manpower. Orders for 3 Inshore and 3 Offshore Patrol Vessels are being placed on the two Defence Shipyards in Calcutta and Bombay for deliveries commencing in 1981. It is expected that orders for some Coastal Surveillance aircraft would also be placed during the current financial year, for delivery in 1980. These and other orders to be placed in subsequent years, will as they start materialising enable the new Service to play an increasingly effective role in tackling the many security problems in the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Administrative and Legal Framework

The passing of the Coast Guard Act by Parliament in Aug 78 gave the Government statutory authority to raise this new Service, but a large number of rules and regulations have to be framed and notified for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. These include rules pertaining to the constitution, governance, command, discipline, enrolment, recruitment, removal, retirement, release or discharge from service of persons in the Coast Guard, conditions of service, procedure to be followed for disciplinary courts, etc. etc. This is a monumental task for the present tiny Headquarters Organisation of the Coast Guard to undertake but it is nevertheless being tackled vigorously. Much of this work has been completed, whilst considerable progress has been achieved in the rest.

There is also the requirement for issue of Gazette Notifications empowering members of the Coast Guard to exercise powers in discharge of their duties under the various sections of existing Acts e.g. under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act 1973, for arrest without warrant, search, powers to seize offensive weapons, arrest to prevent commissioning of cognizable offences and prevention of injury to public property, etc. Coast Guard personnel have also to be invested with enforcement jurisdiction under various sections of the Merchant Shipping Act 1978 and the Customs Act 1962.

Action in regard to these and also to amend the Emigration Act 1922 to empower the Coast Guard to play its part in prevention of illegal Immigration and emigration are well in hand. Other matters being progressed include issue of Gazette Notification for exemption of Coast Guard Vessels and aircraft from the applicability of the Merchant Shipping Act 1958 and the Aircraft Act 1934 respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

There is no doubt that in deciding to set-up a Coast Guard the Government of India took a step of considerable significance in the maritime development of the country. It is a clear manifestation, if such was necessary, of the nation's realisation of the great import that the waters spanning our coast have for the well-being and the economic progress of the country. It is now for those who are associated with the building up this Service to ensure that it grows on sound lines and establishes a culture of its own and one that will enable it to grow into an effective and dedicated arm of the Central Government. The Coast Guard has been fortunate in being nursed by the Navy during its birth pangs and one can think of no better source from which it could imbibe the basic traditions on which to build its future.

Reacting To China's Military Modernisation

RAVI RIKHYE

THE recent Sino-Vietnam War has shown that China is quite prepared to use its armed forces to further national objectives. China deployed forces larger than any country has since the Korean War. Elements of at least 21 Chinese divisions were used inside Vietnam or to support the invading troops and, by their own account, the Chinese lost 20,000 men dead. If all this effort was intended just to "teach Hanoi a lesson", then presumably the Chinese would be willing to use even more troops and suffer even greater losses if there existed a substantial objective.

The years following the Sino-Indian War of 1962 were paranoia-filled for India. A fresh war was thought quite possible. But by 1972 Indian Military opinion swung to the other extreme, and war was thought so unlikely that the China-front forces were reduced. Before the 1971 War forward-deployment in Himachal had been reduced from three battalions to one; later, an entire mountain division was pulled out of Utter Pradesh and its place taken by an independent brigade; still later a reserve mountain division in Eastern Command was assigned to the plains. Some military writers even advocated deactivating three mountain divisions. Of course, to give the Army its credit, well before the Sino-Vietnam War it realised there was no call for reducing the mountain defences and a new raising replaced the reduction in Eastern Command. Nonetheless, the number of persons taking a China war as a serious possibility was becoming less and less.

Suddenly, all that seems to have changed. The Sino-US normalisation has made Taiwan a non-issue in military terms and some 30 divisions are now free for redeployment. Reports as early as January, 1979, suggested such a redeployment was taking place. The Chinese Military Regions are under reorganisation, with three instead of two for the southeastern flank (Burma/Indochina) and with Sinkiang being split into two. The author cannot as yet determine how these changes will affect command and control on the Indian

frontiers, but clearly C and C will be improved because Sinkiang and Chengtu, the two regions previously on our borders, will have much shorter sectors to cover. Next, the Chinese rail and oil-line to Lhasa is now virtually complete, greatly simplifying the Chinese logistics posture in Tibet. There are rumours of petrochemical complexes and ordnance factories planned for northern Tibet, and any day work may start with an east-west rail-line between Lhasa and the Chengtu-Kunming network. Other lines are planned for Sinkiang, so that whereas now the rail-line ends at Urmichi, it will in coming years extend to at least Kashagar.

More important than all these, China has embarked on a military modernisation to upgrade its armed forces. The dimensions and thrust of this modernisation are unclear. On the one hand, plans are proceeding apace to build new fighters and to provide quick fixes for the lack of anti-tank and SAM assets, by importing these from France. Also, the war with Vietnam will have provided a powerful handle to the modernisers. On the other hand, China's resources for any modernisation are limited and priority must be given to the economic sector.

Where does this all leave India? The first thing to do is *not* to jump to hasty conclusions and embark on another massive buildup as we did in 1963—68. Even in those years Pakistan refused to believe our buildup was directed solely against China. The 1965 War was probably a directed consequence of our buildup, with Pakistan deciding it had better make one last try before India became too strong. Pakistan's fears about possible use of our China-front forces against Pakistan were amply justified in 1971; all except one division and one brigade used in the Bangladesh operations were mountain formations. After 1971, several mountain brigades have been earmarked to reinforce the western sector. So if we now start blindly raising more divisions for China, we run the risk that Pakistan will merely start raising more troops on its side, at which point we have to start worrying about what happens in a two front war, and then we raise more divisions for the west and the vicious circle continues. Pakistan, it may be noted, has had little trouble matching our every raising since 1971 and there is no evidence that it has reached its limit as far as new divisions are concerned.

The first thing to do is to understand China's present military limits vis-a-vis India, especially as these limits have been magnified by the Sino-Vietnam War. Next, it should be analysed how soon these limits are likely to be rectified. Last, our own responses can be discussed.

In the recent Indochina fighting, China showed that it could support the equivalent (in western terms) of two armies on one front; none seriously doubts that given more time China could have deployed 36-divisions, or four armies, against Vietnam. China fought well, was prepared to suffer losses, and appeared to be able to adequately support its troops in the war zone.

So much for the plus points. On the negative side, China proved to have limited mobility and firepower, elements which are essential in modern warfare. Their air force was hardly used, and if they were worrying about a few score MiG-21s and an antiquated air defence network on the Vietnamese side, then their air force must be in quite bad shape.

Compared to the Chinese Army and Air Force, India is in excellent condition. Our divisons are much bigger and are much more mobile with much more firepower. Our mountain division probably has as much artillery as is given to a Chinese corps. We have, compared to China, an abundance of helicopters and trucks, and absolutely no meaningful shortages of equipment or supplies. Our Air Force is large and modern. After all, the IAF already fields 14 MiG-27 squadrons with more on the way, and at least 6 Jaguar squadrons are coming. There are at least 40 batteries of mobile SAMs either in service or in the process of introduction plus a very modern Air Defence Ground Environment.

Our defences against China are based on a three-axis attack, plus enough troops left over to take pieces of their territory, so that we have some good cards at bargaining time. There should be no doubt that our divisions are fully capable of meeting the Chinese threat as it exists today; in fact, it is possible to argue we are over insured.

China can, of course, even today reinforce its divisions in Tibet and sustain them in prolonged combat. They have adequate logistics to support, say, 18-divisions indefinitely against India. Without getting enmeshed in technicalities like the number of available divisions, it should be possible to agree that an army geared to deploy well over 100 divisions against the Soviets, on a frontier thousands of miles long, is not going to have much problem throwing 18-divisions against India. No one is suggesting it can do this overnight: the buildup against Vietnam took several months and the road/rail networks in South China are considerably better than those on our borders. Still, where there is a will there is a way. Few would have thought in March 1971 that the Indian Army would, within six-months deploy upwards of 150,000 men in an area where virtually no infrastructure was available.

Counting the forces in Ladakh as mountain units, India deploys at least 10 2/3rd divisions against China; knowing the way in which the term "division" has been stretched in Kashmir, it should not surprise the layman to find that some divisions, particulary those in Arunachal, are quite a bit bigger than the standard division. We may not be too far wrong in suggesting the effective strength we have is around 12 standard divisions, so that with a little shuttling around in emergency, we could provide two-division-equivalents for each of six axes. So there is no particular reason to worry about China for the next few years, even with the improved Chinese logistics in Tibet.

Peking's first priority will be to modernise the armour strike forces againt the Soviet Union, to increase artillery firepower, to provide greater infantry mechanisation, and to improve logistics/ signals/engineering capability. Very little, if anything, will be left over for the Chinese mountain forces.

Two points now need answers. What do we do after, say, 1985, when persumably resources could be available to modernise sectors other than the Soviet fronts. And do we neccessarily want to have a purely defensive capability against China ?

The answer to the first point is that we probably will need more divisions after 1985, and the only question is how best to provide these, keeping in mind budgetary limits and arms-control considerations.

The answer to the second should be that a true offensive capability against China is also needed. Deterrence is not enough. This is an accepted canon in the doctrine dealing with Pakistan, why should it not also be adopted against China ?

It is clear that despite US efforts to build China's image, China is no superpower. We are more advanced in military technology and have better troops. China is superior only in the potential number of divisions it can depoly in Tibet, but even after 1985 such a deployment cannot be rapid or easy. For far too long we have been in awe of China. There is no need to. Because China has other problems, India can easily match China in the mountains, and contrary to popular belief, we are certainly not short of resources to match China.

Let us do a few sums. This is always risky because military sums tend to be quite complex, and much subjective judgement and experience has to be employed in the place of simple data. Nonetheless, some generalisations are possible.

Four Indian brigades fighting defensively, with helicopter and air support, should be quite capable of stopping three Chinese divisions. No doubt some quick manoeuvering will be required, and quick manoeuvre is something our linear-warfare-trained commanders simply hate, but we really do have the assets for shifting troops around as needed. In the mountains, terrain knowledge is all-important, and we have all the cards here.

Let us postulate that by 1985 China can easily sustain 18 divisions against us, twice the current force. By 1990 let us postulate that 36 divisions, reasonably well equipped, could be maintained against us. So by 1985 we are talking about a 6 axis attack, by 1990 about a 12 axis attack.

Taking 1985 first, 24 brigades will be needed to defend, leaving 12 brigades for offensive operations. Naturally, it is being assumed here that our improvements in firepower and mobility continue. Our 1985 division is assumed to be a good bit more powerful than it is today, without any new programs. Still, the offensive margin seems a bit thin, and it really would make the field commanders happy if they had a few more brigades in reserve for the defence.

The additional troops can be quite easily found. One of the simplest ways is a three-step procedure :

1. Form anti-tank helicopter regiments to take the place of armoured brigades now in corps reserves;

2. Take the independent armoured brigades and team them each up with the division headquarters of an infantry division and one of its infantry brigades;

3. Assign the resulting 10 spare infantry brigades to the mountain divisions.

That gives us about 5 mountain brigades or so, the equivalent of 15 standard divisions. In turn that could mean :

1. 24 brigades against six Chinese axes, each of 3 divisions;

2. 6 brigades in reserve for the defence;

3. 15 brigades for the pure offence against China.

That looks a good deal more like the margins we need than is the case today. And the plains capability will actually be increased at a relatively small cost An anti-tank helicopter regiment is far more useful for corps anti-tank defence than an armoured brigade; and now there will be 7 armoured divisions instead of two at the cost of some unmechanised infantry. The number of divisions for the

west remains the same, except that one-third are armoured instead of one-tenth.

After 1985 there will be no alternative to converting the para-military troops into regulars, under a Directorate of Border Troops. These men will hold the first-line even after war starts. They will be heavily supported by armoured personnel carriers/missiles in the plains and helicopters in the mountains. In a forthcoming paper the author has discussed the mechanics of such a conversion, and suggested that small reductions in the regular army plus small increases in the defence budget are adequate to provide some 18 first-class border divisions for the west and north, still leaving us with some 30 regular divisions which will all go into a strike force. Of the border divisions, 6 will relieve regular army divisions on the line in the north, so that instead of the total 45 mountain brigades envisaged for 1985, some 63 mountain brigade equivalents will be available.

Of the plains troops (12 border divisions with 20 regular divisions) ten of the regular divisions will be dual-capable, which is to say, within 90-days be capable of fighting in the mountains. Similarly, 5 of the mountain divisions will also be dual-capable, able to move into the plains within 10-days, but that does not concern us here. In this manner, another 30 brigades could be added to the mountain forces within 90-days, making 93 brigades available there. That could give :

1. 48 brigades protecting 12 axes against 36 Chinese divisions;
2. 12 brigades as reserves;
3. 33 brigades for the pure offence

Obviously the whole matter is a good bit more complex than has been suggested here. The idea was not to provide definite answers; that is impossible in a short space. The idea was to show that largely within existing manpower ceilings and with marginal increases in the defence budget, our China front forces can be dramatically increased, giving us an adequate deterrent. In the first case 15 brigades are available for the attack after providing a secure defence; in the second case 33 brigades are available for the attack. That should certainly suffice in the event China one day decides that India should be taught a second lesson.

Use of Tank and Anti-Tank Weapons In the Arab-Israeli War of 1973

DR. S.S. SRIVASTAVA

INTRODUCTION

Quantitative analysis of the use of tanks and anti-tank weapon systems used during the Arab-Israeli War has been made. The war lasted from 6th to 22nd October, 1973 and was fought intensely on two fronts—Sinai and Syria. The armour battles fought were more intense than those reported in the Second World War and thereafter in all other wars till 1973. One important feature was the use of anti-tank weapons on a very large scale, along with armour. The losses in tanks in 18 days of war have been staggering and reveal the fury of tank battles.

SCENARIOS OF THE BATTLE

Sinai : The entire Sinai Peninsula is a desert. The water fronts are reported to be sandy planes. Beyond a certain depth the terrain is mountainous. It appears that in the East along the Canal front a portion of land—15 to 10 Km in depth has rolling sand. It is definitely tank negotiable. Towards the North along the Canal marshy plains come up where it should be difficult to move heavy vehicles.

There are three main roads leading to the heart of the desert from the water front. The Northernmost is from El Qantara to El Arish. In the middle is the Ismailia-Bir Gifgafa Road, where mountains start after 15 Kms. South of these are two steep mountains passes of 'Giddi' and 'Mitla'. Mit a pass leads down West to the city of Suez and Giddi to great Bitter Lake. The terrain is average height beyond Mitla and Giddi passes is around 900 to 1000 metres.

Most of the tank battles were contained in this 15 Kms. region East of the Canal. Israeli had a good hold on the mountain passes to repulse all Egyptian attempts to break through. The total frontage here was of the order 85—90 Kms.

Golan Heights : The Western side of the ceasefire line in Golan Heights is uneven mountainous terrain with a number of plateaux.

Although the ground is not suitable for Armour, a large number of tanks were used by both sides Israeli tactics were to conceal their weapons on the heights and lure the Syrian armour to attack in between the Valleys. Once they were fairly close to the mountains intensive attack with ATGMs and A/TK guns was launched.

From El Quneitra to Damascus is a road between the mountains. The fighting had been contained in the initial phases between Quneitra and Massada. Later the grim battle was fought for the control of the Road to Damascus before Iraq and Jordan opened new fronts towards South-East side around Boutmia and Khisfine. The high mountain is a noted feature of the whole terrain, yet there have been positions where tanks bypassed the roads. The visibility in the area is on an average 3 Kms.

BALANCE OF POWER

The strength of Syrian and Egyptian Forces deployed on the first day of the battle were as under :—

Syria : attacked the Golan Heights with 3 Inf. Divs. totalling about 20,000 men plus 2 Armoured Divs. equipped with 800—1000 tanks. They were supported by 600 units of Field Artillery.

Egyptian : managed to throw 11 bridges across the Suez Canal to strike the Israeli Bar-Lev Line fortifications pushing across about 30,000 troops and 400 tanks during the first 24 hours.

The strength of Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Army after attrition stood at—2nd Army : 25,000 troops and 200 tanks, deployed between El Qantara and North of Great Bitter Lake extending to a frontage of about 35—40 Kms. 3rd Army : 20,000 troops and 200 tanks deployed between East Bank opposite to Suez Town to South end of Great Bitter Lake, extending to a frontage of about 20/25 Kms.

TACTICS USED

Egyptian : In the ground war the Egyptians used what Israelis called 'Phalangial Tactics'. The tactics permitted large masses to move small distances but at the sacrifice of both speed and flexibility. Initial Arab attacks on Israel defence position in Sinai were made by Infantry Armed with 'masses' of Sagger wire-guided ATGM. These were followed by armoured columns which attacked and bypassed Israeli Defence Line. Infantry also penetrated rapidly to set up ambushes with ATGMs to hit at Israeli armour that was counter-attacking.

Syrian : The only differences noted in the attacks in Sinai and Golan Heights areas were those imposed by terrain. In Golan Heights Syrian Infantry made use of the stone fences which divided the farm fields in the area to set up anti.tank missile positions. An armoured attack along the entire front was used to locate weak points in the Israeli Defence Line and Syrian armoured reserves were committed in strength in order to push through the two weak points which were located and Israeli Armour was hit by ATGMs when it counter-attacked.

Israeli Tactics : Israel's instant decision to concentrate on the Syrian front while engaging in a holding operation in the Canal was dictated by three main factors :—

—The Syrian front was close to Israel's populated area.

—Egyptian SAM system could not be quickly knocked out.

—The Syrian Forces were smaller in number and less equipped than the Egyptian forces.

Israel had planned their Sinai strategy along three lines :—

—A system of defences in depth beyond the Mitla and Giddi Passes.

—Lightly held defence positions behind the Bar-Lev Line.

—The stretegy based on the policy of middle defence, which was to lure the Egyptians towards their (Israeli) strongly held defence positions around Mital and Giddi Passes and out of range of the SAMs and then to attack them from air and from flank.

Bar-Lev Line was reported to have 100 fortified complexes along the Eastern shore of Suez Canal, was kept lightly manned and structured to provide the Air Force with 8 min alert warning to destroy any breach-heads before they could be consolidated.

Israeli Line of Defence built on Golan Heights was provided with anti-tank ditches. In order to breach this, only infantry assault was possible.

ARMOURED BATTLES

Forces : The combined Arab Forces had a superiority in number of tanks of the order almost 2 : 1 which could be still increased. None of the involved countries were tank manufacturing countries and as such the replenishments had to be brought from outside.

Type of Tanks : As regards types of tanks—the Arab Armies were holding mostly Russian Tanks—T-54/55 (mounting 100 mm

gun) and latest T-62 (with 115 mm smooth bore gun) all in less than 40-Ton class. As against this the Israelis had a mixed fleet with some of them being Second World War Vintage tanks. The fleet included Shermans, Centurions, Pattons and some M-60 American tanks besides some captured Russian Tanks. The Israelis in order to give a new punch to their old tanks had carried out major improvements on them. The older tanks had been upgunned and a 105 mm gun was mounted on all of them. Further, in order to mount this gun in some cases the turret had also been suitably modified. In case of Sherman and Centurion tanks higher rating engines and improved suspension as well as transmission had also been put. With these modifications the older tanks had been improved in respect of firepower and mobility to some extent.

Tank Battles at Sinai Front in first two weeks : There were 3 big tank battles in the first week between the Egyptian and Israeli Forces. In the initial phase Egyptian tanks followed by infantry drove the Israeli Forces into retreat across the Canal front after beating off the air attacks. This followed heavy fighting at several points in Sinai with Egyptians trying to pour men and material onto the Eastern Bank. Within 3 days the Egyptian troops slashed forward along the entire front in Sinai and established positions as far as 14 Kms east of the Canal.

After initial withdrawal the Israeli Forces launched an Armour battle around mid-week to dislodge the Egyptian stronghold on the East-bank. The Israeli side suffered heavy casualties and failed in the mission. Russian ATGW Sagger were used by the Egyptian in large numbers which took a very heavy toll of tanks in the battle in the first two weeks.

By the week-end, encouraged by the success, the Egyptian Forces launched a massive tank attack to achieve a major breakthrough in the Sinai front apparently to gain control over the mountain passes. This attack was not successful.

In the Second Week : Egyptian side massed huge assault with clear objective of controlling the access to the mountainous passes. They were stationed some 14 Kms East of the Canal whereas the passes were located some 32 Kms from the Canal front. Attempts were made to send commandos behind the enemy line with not much success. However, Israelis made a successful Canal crossing with tanks and wedged a way on the Western Bank.

The battle was fought on both sides of the Canal in the Second week. Mid-week saw furiest tank battle ever fought. This was

supported with infantry and warplanes of both sides gave necessary air cover. However, the Central Sinai turned into an inferno, no side could gain significantly over the other.

Israeli Task Force : crossed successfully the Canal across Deversoir on 16-10-1973. They did knock off SAM batteries and other communication systems. They then succeeded in getting adequate aircover for their assault. The bridge-head was maintained and widened and more men and tanks joined the battle. By weekend they had established themselves firmly and advanced in two pronged attack in the Egyptian territory. There were12,000 men and 300 tanks across the canal as Israelis claimed that it was a frontline armour battle in Egyptian territory.

TANK BATTLES IN GOLAN HEIGHTS AREA IN THE FIRST TWO WEEKS

In the first week in Golan Heights battle opened with heavy artillery shelling on Israeli position and Syrian armour rumbled over the 1967 ceasefire line after infantry attacks had punched dents in the anti-tank ditches built by Israelis. Initially the Syrian side advanced with their tank column overriding the Israeli posts towards West. Israeli deployment of artillery, tanks and airforce to check the advance seemed to have worked well. Israeli estimates said that Syrians had massed over 1000 tanks. The total frontage in this mountainous terrain was only 100 Kms and it was not tankable throughout. Syria also used Frog-7 missiles as a long range artillery weapon (70 Km range, warhead 1100 Ibs.). However, the Israeli Armour repulsed the attack and advanced along the road to Damascus.

By the weekend it was apparent that Israel wanted to run over Damascus in a blitzkrieg fashion. Heavy armour was deployed supported by Air Force and fierce tank battles followed. By weekend they were 30 Kms from Damascus. Israel had committed most of the infantry in AFVs.

The battle of Golan Heights in the second week was confined to the control of the roads to Damascus. Jordanian Forces came under Syrian Command to fight against Israeli advance. The tank battle in this area developed into a sort of war of attrition.

TANK TO TANK

The comparative characteristics of the tanks of the two Armies are given in Table Nos. 1 and 2.

Table 1 : Showing the year of introduction of the tanks in service on Israeli side

Tank	Sherman	Centurion	M-48 Patton	M-60	Captured	
					T-54/55	T-62
Year of Introduction	1944	1948	1954	1060	1953	1963
Nos. held	200	850	400	150	100	3*

Israeli tank force composition predominates in the Sherman and Centurions and a reference to Table 1 above will indicate that these are the tanks which were put into service in pre-1950 period. They could be classed as Second World War vintage tanks. On the other hand the Soviet designed T-54/55 and T-62 tanks with the Arab Armies were post-World War II development and were considered to be better designed.

Referring to the physical dimensions of the tanks the important comparisons have been tabulated below :

Table 2 : Showing the physical characteristics of the Tanks

Characteristics	Sherman	Centurion	M-48 Patton	M-60	T-54/55	T-62
Combat Wt. (tons)	34.8	51.8	47.2	48.1	36.0	38.0
Height (m)	2.83	2.96	3.09	3 76	2.40	2.28
Ground Pressure (psi)	13.1	13.4	11.8	11.2	11.8	10.8
Width of track (m)	0.42	0.61	0.71	0.71	0.56	0.58
Steerability ratio (L/C)	1.85	1.7	1.36	1.45	1.45	1.45

SURVIVAL PROBABILITY

It will be observed from the above comparison that the tanks with Arabian side had smaller combat weight as well as lower height above the ground. Lower height results in smaller silhouette of the

*Captured during the Oct-73 War.

tank in the battlefield. T-62 tanks are said to have smallest silhouette of any turreted tank in current service. In order to compare the advantage of the low silhouette chance of survival of two tank targets i.e. T-62 and Centurion have been worked out against a 105 mm tank gun attack. This is shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3 : Showing the chance of survival of target presented by T-62 and Centurion Tanks (broad side on) to an attack of 105 mm tank gun

Tanks / Ranges (in yds)	1400	1600	1800	2000
T-62	0.26	0.36	0.43	0.50
Centurion	0.15	0.23	0.31	0.38

The comparison has clearly brought out the greater chance of survival of T-62 tank target at different ranges. Most of the current Soviet designs of tanks have an impressive low silhouette, as such, they are at an advantage in this respect when compared with larger silhouettes of Centurion and Sherman and to some extent M-48 Pattons.

PROTECTION

In the Table 4 below a comparison of the Armour distributon of tanks is indicated.

Table 4 : Showing the Armour Distribution (Thickness of Armour in mm)

Centurion Mk 1		M-48 Patton		T-54/55	
Turret	Hull	Turret	Hull	Turret	Hull
F=152	F=76	F=110	F=100	F=280	F=100
S= 89	S=76	S = 64	S= 76	S=110	S= 60
R= 89	R=51	R= 64	R= 75	R=115	R= 45
T= 29	T=32	T= 25	T= 50	T= 30	T= 25
	N=28		N=100		N=100
	F=17		F= 25		F= 25

F=Front R=Rear N=Nose
S=Side T=Top F=Floor

(The armour distribution of M-60 and T-62 being later developments could be assumed to be improvements on M-48 and T-54/55 series).

Perusal of the table will show that Russian built tanks have a better armour distribution thus providing increased protection. Steerability Ratios for the tanks has also been worked out in table 2 above. Practical values of steerability ratios range from 1.1 to 1.9. Beyond these values on either side, tanks are either unstable or unsteerable.

Tank designers observe that steerability ratio exceeding 1.65 results in loss of agility. Older tanks with Israelis are definitely at a disadvantage in this respect.

The shape of the Turret is an important consideration in the matter of survival of any battle tank. The oval shaped turret of Russian designed tanks gives better ballistic performance compared to Centurions, Shermans and to some extent M-48 Pattons.

Mobility : The mobility of a battle tank is primarily a function of its engine power. Evaluation of mobility has to be based on two criteria—operational mobility and tactical mobility.

The operational mobility of the tanks is effected by the time necessary for its movements from rear areas upto the combat zone for deployment. The cruising speed and range of action are main parameters involved in it. As for the tactical mobility it is understood to mean, that the battle tank has the ability to advance in the battlefield and over obstacles in all weather, terrain and light conditions. The parameters involved are speed, manoeuvrability, cross-country performance and operatability.

It was known that Israelis had renovated the Centurion tanks by replacing the British Meter petrol engines with American Continental air-cooled diesel engines and installing Allson G automatic transmission making driving much easier. This change had certainly given the old tanks a new life but still the excessive weight and the limited fuel capacity had some disadvantages.

The engines on the Russian tanks were of higher rating and provided greater power to the tanks thus giving them higher cruising speed and range of action. The only drawback with the Russian engines reported from earlier Sinai campaign had been the cylinder block. This being of a light magnesium alloy and could be a source of fire if the tank is hit.

Firepower : In the field of firepower it was a match between British/French 105 mm gun on Israeli tanks and 100 mm or 115 mm (smooth bore) on the Arab tanks. The important performance characteristics of the guns are tabulated below.

Table 5 : Comparing the Tank Gun Characteristics

	M-60	M-48	Centurion Mk. 3	French	T-54/55	T-62
Gun Calibre (mm)	105	90	105	105	100	115
Length of tube (calibre)	51	48	51	56	56	—
Gun Designate	L7A1 (M68)	M41	L7A1	Mod F1	D10T/ D10T23	—
Type of Amm and HV (m/sc)	APDS/ 1470 HEAT 1170 HEP/790	HVAP-PS/ 1250 HEAT/580 HEP HE/ 730	APDS/ 1470 HESH/ 730	HEAT/ 1000 HE/700	APHE/ 918 HVAP HE	HVAPDS 1600 HEAT HV
Wt. of Projectile (kg)	5.9APDS 9.5HEAT 109HEP	—	11·3 —	10·95 HEAT 12·1HE	16 AVHE 10 HVAP 16HE	12APDS 13 HEAT
Practical rate of fire rpm	9	8·9	9·10	8	7-8	8

Israelis have most of their battle tanks mounted with 105 mm gun. This gun fires on APDS round with a m.v. of the order 1470 m/s. The accuracy of the gun is also of a very high order. As against this, the T-54/55 tanks of Arab Armies mount a 100 mm gun and fire APHE round with a m.v. of 918 m/s. The round being heavier, the rate of fire per mt. is lower compared to 105 mm gun. The hit probability of the 105 mm is higher compared to 100 mm thus Israeli tanks had greater advantages in engaging T-54/55 tanks.

The 115 mm smooth bore gun on T-62 is an altogether a new generation of tank guns. The gun is reported to be firing fin-Stabilised APDS round as well as full calibre round with a m.v. of 1600 m/s. This higher m.v. gives the round a greater K.E. which is of great

advantage. However, it has also been reported that the fin-stabilization of the round results in greater dispersion. For the 115 mm gun, its dispersion though not very high, is, however, greater than that of the APDS round of the British 105 mm gun.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS

The most remarkable feature of this war has been deployment of armour by either side alongwith anti-tank weapons surpassing all previous records. The number of casualties suffered by tanks has also been large highlighting the intensity of the battle in 18 days war.

Losses : An estimate of tank losses (based on US. Def Dep) are given in the Table below. The total Israeli loss has been shown separately for the two sectors for comparison.

Table 6 : Showing Tank losses of Egypt, Syria and Israel

Egypt	*Syria*	*Total*
895	880	1775
Israel Losses		
600 (approx)	250 (approx)	850

A perusal of the Table shows that for each tank lost by Israel, 2 tanks have been lost by Egypt and Syria combined. Further in the Sectorwise comparison the Syrian losses have been in the ratio 3 : 1.

Types of ATGWs : Besides the tank guns discussed earlier, Soviet-built (first generation wire-guided) ATGWs, SAGGER, SNAPPER and SWATTER have come into prominence. The Israelis are known to possess French made SS11B1, SS12 and German designed COBRA missiles. TOW missiles were also used by Israel to some extent.

Features of Battle : The noted feature of this war has been :

(i) presence of tanks in very large densities;

(ii) clear visibility in the range of 3-5 Kms; and

(iii) the ground with no natural cover.

For these reasons the avilability of the tank targets has been very high.

Added to this has been a very liberal issue of ATGWs to Arab Armies. An observation by an Israeli captured tank commander are very pertinent. He observed the slaughter of his tanks by the Egyptian Inf weapons. "He believed that one out of the three infantry

soldiers was issued with this weapon." As to the effectiveness of the ATGWs an independent analysis (Av Week & Sp Tech Oct 15, 1973) attributed the majority of 550 Israeli tank losses in the first week to Soviet-built ATGWs.

Looking at the Israeli performance, although not much has been reported on the effectiveness of their own ATGWs, but still the tank losses suffered by Arab armies has been double of the Israelis (Ref Table 6). Some of the casualties have been due to air action also. There is every reason to believe that Israeli tank manoeuvres have been bold and remarkable.

Use of ATGWS in Sinai : All the ATMs are the wire-guided systems of the first generation, the hit probabilities of these vary between 0·4 to 0·5 and the reliability of the system is around 66%. The latter is corroborated by the use of Entac Missile of the Indian Army in the last Indo-Pak War. Assuming that the hit probabilities of the Russian ATGMs were in the region mentioned above, the likely number of missiles which could have been used by the Egptian Second Army in the Sinai warfare has been calculated and are stated in Table below.

Table 7 : Showing expected number of ATGWs required to kill 200 tank with 1 generation missiles (hit prob. 0 4|0.5 and reliability 66%)

SSKP of the ATGW first generation ATGW	No. of missiles to be fired to achieve a kill with 90% confidence	Aveg. No. of missiles needed to be fired to kill 200 tanks	Total No. of missiles needed to cater for 66% reliability
0·4	Four to Five missiles	nx200=900 (av)	1200
0·5	3 missiles	nx200=600	800

This has been calculated on the basis that approximately 1/3 of Israeli tanks force has been destroyed by the anti-tank missiles. However, the inf also used RPG-7 rocket-fired anti-tank grenades, which casualties from this are also included in this estimate.

The number of missiles is estimated to vary between 800 to 1200. Most of these have been used in the infantry role. As Sagger anti-tank missile is the lighter (total wt=10·5 kg.) and a warhead

weighing 2.4 Kg missile it is most suitable for infantry role. The Snapper and Swatter are much heavier missiles weighing 22·25 Kg and 20 Kg respectively. They are vehicle mounted, each vehicle carrying 3/4 missiles. The missiles are mounted on Soviet-built Reconnaissance Vehicles (BRDM-7). From the reports it is clear that Snapper has been used widely and that missile carrying vehicles have been deployed alongwith the tanks, in the defensive|offensive role. As the missiles have a maximum range of 3 Kms and the visibility in Sinai terrain for tank targets is greater than 3 Kms, it can be presumed that ATGWs have been used in hitting Israeli tanks as they started their counter-offensive. Thus, Egyptians have used anti-tank missiles both in the infantry role and on soft vehicles and have succeeded in holding the superior Israeli Armour counter-thrust. The large scale use of anti-tank weapons along with the tanks shows Russian tactics have been injected in the Egyptian training.

It will be correct to presume that Egyptian Second Army had 800 to 1200 ATM operators (one for each missile Launcher including reserves). If one assumes that for every ATM operator, there were two rejects after training, a lot of effort has been put in by Egyptians Army to train men in use of anti-tank missiles.

The use of ATMs of the first generation on such a large scale is unique, in spite of the known limitations of this type of missiles. Perhaps mix of these weapons (infantry role, combined with ARVs (armoured reconnaissance vehicles) and tanks has been successful in holding the Israeli Counter Offensive which had higher fire power in 105 mm gun. The number of T-62 tanks was limited but its performance has been reported to be very satisfactory.

CONCLUSIONS

(a) Tanks and anti-tank weapons have been used on a very large scale in the Arab-Israeli War of 18 days causing very heavy losses of armour on both the sides.

(b) The visibility range in the battlefields has been more than 3 Kms and tank battles have been reported at all distance in this range. The availability of targets in the battle area has been high although the terrain on the Syrian front has not been very favourable for large scale deployment of armour.

(c) The Russian tanks are lighter in weight, more mobile and better designed for Armour protection. Because of low silhouette their survival probability is found to be higher than those of Israeli tanks in the battlefield.

(d) Most of the Israeli tanks were of World War II vintage in respect of their body but had been upgunned for greater fire power.

(e) Because of better fire power and bold tactics, for each tank lost Israelis have been able to kill two tanks of the enemy.

(f) One-third of the Israeli losses of tanks have been attributed to a large scale use of several types of Russian anti-tank missiles used by the Egyptians.

(g) It is estimated that 800 to 1200 anti-tank missiles have been used by Egyptians in this war and they should have had over 4000 missiles in their inventory.

(h) Arabs have put in a lot of effort in training the ATM missile operators and in building the reserve of manpower for this purpose.

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Leadership—Development Of Battle Dynamism

MAJ GEN KS BAJWA

THE military command system, and exercise of leadership, is structured to meet the vital requirements of economy and concentration of force. There is a well defined executive leader a t each and every level of the organisational pyramid. The sphere of command of each of these leaders and the scope for exercise of their authority, is fairly well delineated. Although, similar executive structu res exist practically in all spheres of organised activity outside the armed forces, in one very important iespect the military system is different from all of them. In the military system, the authority of the executive leader on the organisational levels below him is practically absolute. Moreover, authority and responsibility are not always coterminous. While, authority is nearly always delegated, the primary onus of responsibility rests at the level of the eventual decision making. This creates a very special environment for exercise of executive leadership. While the system is tailored to meet the particular command needs of battle, it has inherent to it, considerable potential for "noise" inhibition and frustration It is necessary to study the system in depth so that its functioning can be properly regulated and a smooth flow of battle leadership ensured.

Economy and concentration of force are complementry. In a war situation, armed forces can never hope to have a surfeit of resources. Adequate resources have, therefore, to be concentrated at the critical points of decision, by thinning out elsewhere consistent with security and where necessary, even by accepting calculated risks. Desired concentrations are easier to achieve in the opening round by the side, which has the initiative to start hostilities. To a considerable extent, this advantage continues to be operative with initiative even during the course of battle. The side which lacks initiative at the outset or has lost the initiative in the course of a battle or is confronted with fresh or somewhat different situations in battle, faces many problems in exploiting its resources to maximum advantage. Time to react to the opponents initiative ; to assess the

situation ; to reach the level, which can command the resources needed ; to plan and take decisions ; to marshall the resources allotted and to plan and act, is invariably limited. Time, space, resources and decision making become critical. Consequently there is need for rapid centralisation of decision making in an ascending order till a level of resources and command capability of a matching response to the situation being faced is reached. In order that required effort is made available and applied in a manner to produce the desired result and that there is no dissipation or divergence effort, the leaders authority over all levels subordinate to him, has to be practically absolute. This is well recognised and exercise of such dominant authority is backed by a legal code.

The system must, therefore, permit flexibility in command which would enable timely employment of resources available at each level or a concentration of larger resources consistent with the requirement. The rapidly changing situations must be met with a mounting intensity of response till a status of matching effectiveness is reached or the situation contained without being allowed to escalate. In the event the situation is contained or could be foreseen at the outset, superior resources can be concentrated in time relevant to the situation. It is evident that military commanders must act on their own with the resources at their command as well as be prepared to subordinate themselves to superior levels of command when the situation so demands. Under these requirements and parameters, institutional delineation of where one responsibility ends and the other starts is neither feasible nor practicable.

In the trade and industry, authority and responsibility go hand in hand. The fall out of success or failure emanating from decision making is correlated. This is not so in the military system. Since the final decision making vests at the level of the desired or the matching response and all activity has to be closely directed towards the unitary objectives, authority and responsibility tend to be centralised at a fairly high level. However, execution of plans and coping with changing situations is feasible only if the bulk of the authority is decentralised. However, consequences of a major failure in battle are generally irreversible and the cost very high. The final authority and the matching responsibility for success or failure must stay at the top. This creates its own special burdens, pressures and a syndrome of concern. Far too often, this leads to over centralisation and exercise of excessive authoritarianism. This inhibits initiative, deprives the command system of its flexibility and makes the organisation less productive. It may be argued that considerable

decentralisation of authority is built in the system. Admittedly this is so in the matters of peace time administration and similar logistic command functions. However, in the vital sphere of situational responses in battles, adequate rules and regulations can neither be framed nor are desirable. Doctrines and concepts only exist to produce a community of thought and approach. In practice, the dominant position of the leader at each level of command provides to him not only an opportunity for intervention when needed, which is essential, but also power of interference and veto which is repugnant. To a large measure the authority of subordinate commanders becomes a form of perpetual delegation, which renders the command system unstable.

In essence, the military command system is highly personality intensive. While personal equations are important in all walks of life, these are much more so between commanders in the armed forces. A leader has a dominant impact on the organisation and personnel subordinate to him. In turn he is subject to a similar domination by the leader above him. In the absence of institutional regulation of inter-leader relationship lack of adequate qualification of performance and the disproportionate value acquired by confidential reports, which are largely an opinion, there is a potential and a demonstrated tendency to form master- slave relationships.

Whereas no institutional barriers can be accepted in the way of timely intervention and concerted collective action, checks and balances can be based on understanding self-restraint, tradition and usage. A clear concept of delegation which plays an important role in the military command system becomes essential.

We have seen that practically on all important issues, exercise of authority at any level becomes a delegation from above. This is a very important reality in the fabric of the military command. There could hardly be any doubt about the literal fact of delegation, but what it truly implies is generally hazy. Foremost is self-confidence, clarity of thought and decisiveness of the leader from whom the delegation will flow. He must know what he wants to achieve and how his organisation will set about it. He must have a conceptual grasp of how his theme will develop, and how it must cope with the influence of troublesome variables, that are invariably encountered in battle. And above all he must have faith in his subordinate commanders, a sound estimate of the capacity of their respective commands and an understanding of their strengths and weaknesses. A genuine deep seated faith of the leader in his own capacity and a mutually shared trust with those below him becomes vital.

In order that the assignment of tasks to subordinate commanders is sound and the delegation realistic, the executive leader must consider capitulaties and break down of the task two levels below him. Since the eventual responsibility for achievement of the task rests with him, he must approve the plans at the level just below him. Thinking any further down the chain or approving plans of levels lower than the one below him, results in interference and can only paralyse the organisation.

What of the concern which an executive leader may feel with regard to the outcome of task delegation ? This is a genuine human reaction and obtains in almost all cases in varying degrees. Good feedback and an effective monitoring system, provide options of timely intervention and keep the anxiety level within tolerable limits. The content of information and the level it relates to is important. If it delves too far down, a potential for interference is built up and the initiative of the subordinate leaders may well be curbed. Here too, thinking two down and approving one below provides a suitable regulatory principle. It is important that a leader be forearmed with adequate information but should intervene only when necessary for achievement of the task objectives. He must under no circumstances interfere, which results when he injects himself into a situation, well within the competence of his subordinates or use the powers of veto, which he can abrogate to himself. Cultivation of patience and self-restraint and the development of self-confidence and conceptual reach are absolutely vital in higher commanders.

Closely allied to delegation is the exercise of initiative by subordinate commanders Elbow room, freedom of action within a given organisational design and a positive orientation to application of planned, and what is more important, spontaneous effort towards a common objective, are essential for organisational achievement as well as leadership development. A thorough understanding of the ultimate organisational aim ; a detailed articulation of the current task and its total implications ; an intimate insight into the conceptual projections and design of the overall commander ; a clear appreciation of the situational constraints and a smooth flow of intercommander interaction, create the climate and environment for battle dynamism, the ultimate goal of initiative. Generally the factors and conditions that promote sound delegation, generate the action ethos. Mutual trust and confidence are essential. A downward thrust of loyalty is absolutely vital. The belief of a subordinate that his superior will stand by him and will watch his interests, even at the cost of his own, creates a solid motivation for aggressive,

self-generated and sustained effort. Alas this is too often forgotten, especially during peace time. In the interest of narrow and short term organisational progress, which is invariably attuned to selfish motives of making a mark, subordinate leadership development and long time health of the organisation is so often sacrificed.

Excessive dominance and authoritarianism are the largest enemies of desirable leadership equations. Every effort must be made to curb authoritarian tendencies and reduce institutional dominance to the level healthy for organisational needs. For instance, where is the justification of Command and Army Headquarters to directly and indirectly controlling the movement and deployment of sub-units and even units. This is clearly in violation of principle "think two down and approve one under". Even delving too far down for information, is an indirect interference and builds up a potential of a even more undesirable direct interference or at the best a premature intervention. The other facets of insatiable information seeking, which encourage military sneaking, gossip and rumour mongering are even more reprehensible. Information to the level relevant, that is two levels below generally, must be sought and obtained legitimately. Sometimes turning a Nelsons eye to what is not relevant to the level of command or the direct concern of subordinates well placed to handle it, is highly beneficial.

Another major aspect that promotes unwarranted dominance is the present system of rendering of confidential reports. In the absence of a dependable system of quantification of performance and with the current format and content, the confidential report is largely a personal opinion. Total objectivity, at the best, can be only a pious hope. Moreover, there is excessive concentration of assessment power at the ascending levels of command. It is pertinent to consider that at the higher echelons, commanders do not have adequate opportunity to form objective assessments. For instance, an army commander can get to know a very small number of officers of the level of major and below well enough to arrive at a sound evaluation of their performance. It is just as doubtful whether they can get to know majority of the Lieutenant Colonels adequately for the purpose of reporting, unless they visited their units fairly frequently. This may itself be counter-productive. Equally the heads of arms and services at the Army Headquarters lack opportunities to assess fairly the performance of officers on whom they are currently reporting It is felt that it would be fair system, if reporting including that by the heads of arms and services is generally confined to two levels below. However, the option to comment on officers employed lower down

may be retained in selected cases, but the reporting officer must indicate in reasonable detail his opportunity and basis of assessment. Even then all reports must be carefully reviewed at the Military Secretary's Branch and all cases of inconsistency/incongruity resolved. To quote an example, it was found during a selection board for promotion from Lieutenant Colonel to Colonel/Brigadier that the head of a particular arm had not recommended a large number of officers, even though all these officers had been graded above average by commanders in the direct chain of command. The remarks of the head of the arm, even though totally incongruous had not been challenged and it was left to the individual members of the board to draw their own conclusions. It is fairly evident that the whole system of reporting needs a critical review.

The inbuilt capability for absolute dominance and the character of perpetual delegation that authority at any level acquires, robs the military command system of a sense of institutional stability and permanence While there should be no barriers to the rapid centralisation of a command response to match the situational needs, delegation of authority must be genuine and battle dynamism by commanders at all levels assidously cultivated. By selection of higher commanders of the right temperament and ability; by training and education and by well calculated regulatory patterns and usage, we must reduce excessive authoritarianism of the military system. The principle of "think two below and approve one under" could be profitably applied to information gathering, participation in operational designs, intervention and even leadership assessment. Emphasis should be on gearing up an unobtrusive monitoring system and a timely intervention as against interference or even a premature intervention. Cultivation of sound and dependable human equations, regulated by self-restraint and mutual confidence will go a long way to ensure smooth flow of leadership throughout the military organisations.

Stress and Strain of Services and Suggested Preventive Measures

LIEUT COLONEL B RAHA

INTRODUCTION

It is common knowledge that bottled up anger or frustration can crack the bottle, that prolonged stress and strain can make people sick. This folk-lore now has considerable scientific support. That every day tension may cause more disabling disorders, including coronary heart disease, than all the traditional culprits combined is an accepted scientific fact now. As the various diseases connected with emotional factors usually hit the males hard in middle age, the role/effects of stress and strain acquire a special significance in the Armed Forces, because a large percentage of service population comprises middle aged males only. Hence the importance of a discussion on the subject cannot be overemphasised.

DEFINITION

THE word stress is borrowed from physics and engineering where it has a very precise meaning : a force of sufficient magnitude able to distort or deform when applied to a system. The term strain, as per Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary, is synonym for stress. By common usage, stress is usually related to the various "Physical" forces acting on our systems in our day to day existence, in contrast to strain which is related to the "Mental" forces acting on the same systems. However the terms are broadly interchangable.

FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR STRESSFUL/ STRENUOUS SITUATION

A. APPLICABLE TO ALL

(i) Loss of loved ones or of a job

(ii) Loss of self-esteem when a person's level of aspiration is impossibly high.

Classified Specialist (Medicine), 167 MH C/O 56 APO.

(iii) Threat to individual's status, goals, health and security.

(iv) Occupational stress like a difficult boss or a subordinate; overload of work either more work than one could possibly finish during an ordinary working day or more that one could do well enough to preserve one's self-esteem.

B. PECULIAR TO SERVICE PERSONNEL

(a) Too frequent transfers resulting in :—

(i) Living, with one's own household 'in boxes' throughout the life.

(ii) Becoming unfamiliar with and unknown to one's own place/people and becoming unacceptable at times.

(iii) Creation of problems about children's education.

(iv) Separation from the family while posted in forward areas.

(b) Threat to security :—

(i) War and enemy action.

(ii) Non-availability of proper separated family accommodation.

(c) Isolation and loneliness

(d) Exposure to extremes of nature varying from deserts of Rajasthan to snow covered peaks af Himalayas, etc.

(e) Lack of job satisfaction.

(f) Retirement at a rather young age, in an able bodied state, with very little chances of re-employment.

DEFENCE MECHANISM AGAINST STRESS

Whatever may be the cause of stress or strain, human reaction remains the same. Following every stress and strain, there is an attempt by our body to adapt. In this adaptation mechanism the endocrine system (glands secreting hormones) plays an essential part. The adaptation evolves in three stages :—

(i) Alarm reaction or "Call of arms". Efforts made through different organs for the purpose of provision of more energy readily.

(ii) Stage of resistance i.e. ability to resist the stress following summoning up of resources for energy.

(iii) Stage of exhaustion in which the general adaptation fails following prolonged stressful stimuli.

Example of three stages of alarm, resistance and exhaustion is that of the wounded soldier who fights on, seems to do well for a while and then succumbs to secondary shock.

STRESS AHD DISEASES

"Stress", Dr. Hedge said "could convert itself into distress and lead a man to the disease". He quoted the instances of Gen De Gaulle and Sir Winston Churchill as those who lived hectically as long as people accepted them. Once rejected, they died within months of their rejection by the people, because of the stress and frustration that followed their downfall

Thus, following derailment of defence mechanism, one may develop various diseases beginning from mild transient headache to a serious malady like myocardial infarction ? The list of diseases connected with stress is a long one. Important ones are listed below :—

(i) Coronary Heart Disease
(ii) Hypertension
(iii) Peptic Ulcer
(iv) Bronchial Asthma
(v) Migraine
(vi) Ulcerative Colitis
(vii) Psychoneurotic disorders
(viii) Accident proneness.

PREVENTION

It is probably impossible to list out the preventive measures which would ensure "Stress free" Life. But by adopting the following measures it may be possible to reduce the degree of stress to a considerable extent.

GENERAL MEASURES

(i) *Correct Motivation*—Correct motivation can be achieved through good training. To an untrained and ill-motivated individual everything is stress (i.e. whichever does not suit to his taste). One must appreciate that achievement in a soldier's life cannot be without hazards. After all, we are not a fair-weather army. Elaborate training organisations in services aim at training us for this "achievement/motivation".

It should be kept in mind that a soldier is something more than an individual with certain qualities. He is also an individual with distinctive moral qualities. Our training tries to impart some of the qualities like self-sacrifice, loyalty, obedience, discipline, courage, fortitude, comradeship and cheerfulness.

Hence importance of a good imaginative training can hardly be over stressed.

(ii) *Psychotherapy*—The contributions of Psychologists and 'behavioral scientist' in alleviating stressful situations are well known. Problems in cases of stress is that the individual loses objectivity. At times trouble comes from the notion that self worth depends on how much one achieves in rank or otherwise. Often, just talking to a Psychatrist or Counsellor makes such a person look at this from a correct angle and develop coping mechanisms.

Such counselling can probably be given a start in our set up through various medical officers and even trained paramedical personnel by means of demonstrations and group discussions.

SPECIFIC MEASURES

(i) More imaginative and planned postings as far as practicable e.g. to minimise problems of children's education, transfer orders may be issued keeping an eye on academic sessions.

(ii) Provisions of 100% family accommodation for all ranks serving in both peace and field areas.

(iii) Children's education needs to be streamlined further with establishment of more institutes like 'Kendriya Vidyalays'.

(iv) While in service, the service personnel should be trained sufficiently to 'fit well' either in jobs or small business (Individual or Cooperative) in their post retirement days.

(v) Careers of service personnel should be planned further from the very beginning depending upon the ability, motivation and basic soldierly qualities, so that lack of job satisfaction can be removed.

CONCLUSION

Although inordinate stress and strain have been identified as quite a killer, yet one should remember that stress or strain is not necessarily harmful always. Without stress, as Arnold points out animals, men and even civilisations tend to degenerate and wither away. It is told that a climate with marked variation in temperature is likely to produce people physically and intellectually superior. This is the result of environmental stress. To quote Herodotus, "soft countries invariably breed soft men".

Hence the importance of certain amount of stress in our daily existence can hardly be overemphasised. At the same time too much can be perilious to mankind.

The Problem of fixing criteria for SSB Selection

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THE basic concern of the Selection Agencies is to make sure that the Selected Candidates possess the qualities, which the tests certify them to possess. For this purpose the determination of the validity of the tests and validity of prediction becomes of paramount interest. Unless the validity of prediction is known, the Selection Agencies are not in a position to know whether the selection is being done on right lines and in what direction, if any, is there need for improvement. As the Selection bodies are engaged in predicting the possibility of performance in a job with regard to different candidates, their main concern is to know the predictive validity of the tests rather than face validity, content validity or construct validity. The predictive validity indicates the value of the tests for correct judgment and prediction.

The Services Selection Boards (SSB's) are engaged in selecting officers for the Armed Forces. The ability and performance of these officers is of utmost importance not only to the Services Headquaters but to the nation as a whole. The validity of the SSB Selection must, therefore, be quite high, so that trust-worthiness of selection procedure is established beyond doubt. For this purpose we have to establish a criterion or some criteria, against which the prediction is validated. The best criterion is the job itself for which the selection is made. In selecting criterion for validity of the SSB assessment, therefore, we must first determine the job or jobs of the service officers.

A service officer in his career of 25 years has to perform many types of jobs in different theatres, from active field to uneventful peace areas, from actual command to staff duties, from establishing peace in the riot torn areas to creating chaos in the enemy camp, from purposeful killing to saving life. There are various reports also

available for each job, sometimes uniform and at times contradictory. This poses a problem as to which job or which report should be taken as criterion ?

ULTIMATE CRITERION

The ultimate criterion for our selection procedure will in the final analysis, depend upon our aims and objectives of building up Armed Forces. The concept of waging a war and grabbing the territories, as the objective for Armed Forces has become obsolete and outdated. Now the more acceptable concept is to prevent war and defend our territory from the invaders. That is why we have Defence Forces or Security Forces rather than invading Armies now-a-days. Thus the main job of the Armed Forces is to :—

(a) Fight back the invaders.

(b) Prevent a war as far as possible.

(c) Guard the boundary lines from the point of view of the security.

(d) Fight the Armed rebels to save the territorial integrity.

Apart from this Armed Forces are also deployed for various operations during peace time when the civil administration finds it difficult to deal with the situation. Such operations may be varied and heterogeneous in nature such as :

(a) Rescue operation during floods/draughts.

(b) Establishment of peace and order during violent riots.

(c) Rehabilitation of the affected people due to natural calamity like cyclone or volcanic erruption etc.

(d) Taking over administration during extreme emergency.

Thus the jobs of war and peace both are challenging and quite capable of testing the ability of the officers to perform the job. Therefore, the ultimate criteria for the assessment of the officers and the validity of selection should not only be 'War' but also 'Peace'. In fact performance in war and peace can work as 'Co-criteria' in the ultimate analysis.

DEPENDABILITY OF CRITERION

A criterion to be dependable should be :

(a) Valid or relevant to the ultimate goal of testing.

(b) Practicable or availability of data for comparison.

(c) Objective or free from bias in its assessment.

(d) Reliable or stable and consistent in the standard of performance.

Do our co-criteria of 'War' and 'Peace' conform to these standards of a good criterion ? As seen earlier the criteria of 'War' and 'Peace' if well delineated and defined can serve as valid criteria, because the functions are quite relevant to the job. However, we have to see whether it is really practicable to employ these criteria to evaluate the performance of all service officers ? Firstly, the war may not come even once in the life time of an officer. Similarly the exigency of deploying the Army for peace operation may or may not come during one's service period. Secondly even when such an opportunity arises, only a limited number may get deployed in the actual theatre. Thirdly, there may be practical difficulties of actual delimitation, definition and isolating the operational field and officers deployed in the actual war operation. For example :

(a) The term 'War field' unless precisely defined may connote differently to different persons. Should only those who have taken part in the 'actual war operation' in the front, be taken to have participated in the war or all those who were associated in one way or the other, should also be taken to have participated in war ? Whether the actual war field should be taken as the 'operational theatre' of the war or all persons, in the 'danger zone' or even behind the line should be included in the operational area ? In the modern times of scientific development, can any particular area be called an operational zone or the whole country becomes the operational area ? Unless these posers are precisely answered it would be difficult to pin-point the particular performance which can be taken to be the criterion.

(b) There are many factors in a war which are equally important in determining the performance of a soldier eg men, arms and ammunition, logistics, communication, mobility. climate, weather and morale etc. For a scientific study of the performance of one factor i.e. officers, we should be able to control the other factors and eliminate their effect, so that we can exclusively judge the performance of one factor only. The method of 'parallel groups' requires us to equalise the two armies in respect of all other factors except 'men' and then see the performance of men to men. Is it practicable to do so ? If not, are we justified in passing a verdict on the performance of the officers who are acting in so different conditions, with one and the same criterion ?

(c) Are the reports of the performance in the war always authentic and objective ? Is there any method to verify the facts or can there be any confirmation in the subsequent performance ? Does the heat and stress of war permit any such cool, and

deliberate assessment ? The consideration of 'Morale boosting' also does not warrant cold and factual reporting. The method of 'passing on the baby' to others may also confuse the actual fixing of responsibility and the reports may, thus be vitiated.

(d) The 'Chance' factor during war time also plays an important part which may decide the performance of an officer. History bares out the fact that many battles were won and lost and several awards earned because of the chance factor. Many generals have parmanent place in the history because 'chance' or 'Luck' was constantly in their favour. Unless this factor can be equalised for all, which is impossible; are we justified in correlating the selection assessment with the performence where the powerful extraneous factor has tilted the balance in favour or against a particular officer. It is clear from the above discussion that the criterion of performance in war, apparently so charming has many pitfalls and unless the problems posed above are clearly examined and the loopholes removed, it would not be safe to rely on this criterion.

The criterion of peace may, objectively speaking, provide a better alternative as the problem of delimiting the area, difference in the various factors relating to performance and heat and stress of war are not present during peace operations. However, the chances of such operations are far and few in between and the number of persons deployed is very limited.

The criterion of war can serve useful purpose if the difficulties and loopholes are plugged in the following manner :—

(a) Operational area, relevant duties for war operation and criteria for performance are precisely defined.

(b) A team of scientists may be especially trained for the job and the schedules and proformas kept ready for objective assessment and reporting during the actual war operation, on the lines of war correspondents and news reporters in the actual war theatre. The number should be sufficient to cover each sector separately.

(c) The factors of arms and ammunition, logistics, climatic conditions, terrain and the training condition of men and their morale should be given different weightage and the performance of officers be evaluated in relation of these factors.

The chance factors and the emotional tinge in the reporting cannot be eliminated altogether but the scientists may be warned to remain as objective as possible with regard to these factors. These measures will go a long way to make the criterion of 'war' objective and reliable within reasonable limits.

INTERMEDIATE CRITERION

If the ultimate criterion is difficult to get, we have to adopt some intermediate criterion against which the selection assessment may be validated. The intermediate criterion can be the performance at the Unit level after getting the Commission. An officer, soon after coming from the training Academy is posted to various units as a junior officer, commanding a platoon, leading a patrol and performing other duties. During this period he gets reports from different officers year after year. He also begins to attend certain courses and pass some examinations and gets grading in them. Now the question arises as to which report or grading should be taken as the criterion; should one report after a certain period of 'Settling down' and 'improvement' be taken as the criterion or all the reports during this period put together should be considered desirable to compare the selection assessment? Are the reports during this period objective and free from personal biases ? Do they cover all the qualities which the SSBs made assessment of, so as to make them directly comparable ? Is the meaning and connotation of the words and phrases used by the SSBs and the assessing officers at the unit level the same, so that there is no confusion and ambiguity left at the time of comparison ?

Notwithstanding above mentioned difficulties, performance at the unit can make a good intermediate criterion because here an officer gets opportunity to handle various types of jobs and undergoes stresses and strains which an officer is likely to face in times of war and peace. This is the first opportunity for him to see the real conditions of 'Work' and 'living' for the major period of his career. In the units there is contact with the men for the first time and the qualities of leadership emerge clearly. However, to make the performance at the unit level a reliable criterion, the performance over a period of time, say five years in its totality, should be taken as one unit. This can nullify the effect of prejudice in reporting, if any, and may give the trend of progress to make a final opinion on the achievements of the officer.

To make the criterion further reliable, there has to be a standard proforma for reporting, containing all the qualities originally assessed at the selection board with detailed instructions for rating and marking alongwith the appendix giving the precise meaning of the words and phrases to be used in report writing. It would be desirable if a certain period is devoted for instruction on report writing and assessment to the senior officers, alongwith the senior officers or any other

such course. This criterion apart from being valid and practicable will become objective and reliable to a great extent with these measures.

IMMEDIATE CRITERION

To get the intermediate criterion, one has to wait for a pretty long time, generally seven to eight years after the selection of an officer. Therefore, it is desirable to have some immediate criterion against which the selection assessment can be validated and in the light of validation, necesssary amendment may be made in the battery of tests or selection procedure if the original assessment does not correlate satisfactorily with the criterion.

For this pupose, performance at the Training Academies is the best available data against which our selection assessment can be validated. All the candidates selected by the Boards, except a few entries, are sent to the Training Academies and detailed report of each term and a final report on 'passing out' is prepared for each candidate. This report can and generally does, serve as the immediate criterion, which is valid as well as practicable.

Now the question is, whether this criterion is objective and reliable ? This implies whether methods and outcome of the training are satisfactory and the reporting on the cadets objective and scientific ? Do they cover all the qualities which are assessed at the SSB's ? Do the Academies fulfil the expectation of the SSBs who allow a certain margin for training ? Unless these questions are satisfactorily answered, we cannot be sure about the reliability of the criterion.

There is Directorate of Psychological Research to probe into the methods and the outcome of the selection to advise and help the Director of Recruiting. It would be ideal if a scientific body is also there, to advise and assist the Director of Military Training to evaluate and do research in the methods of training and assessment of the trainers. In the absence of such a body the standard of criterion is neglected while the selectors have to adjust their technique according to the criterion. The research body for training will not only help to maintain the standard of training uniform but will also be useful in introducing standardised form of marking and grading the trainees.

Choice of academy grading as a criterion is based upon the assumption that the best cadet in the Academy would also be the best officer in the Army. If we look at the past history of the successful generals, does it hold good ? The answer is 'not always'. The famous

generals of World War II were perhaps not always the top best cadet of the Academy. The Academy grading may perhaps be better correlated with Intelligence grading than OLQ rating. That may be one of the reasons why the top best candidate of the Selection Board is not always the 'Sword of Honour' Cadet of the Academy. Now if this presumption is questionable, are we justified in taking the Academy grading as the immediate criterion ?

As discussed above, one of the important qualities of a criterion is 'practicability' and 'availability'. From this point of view, Academy grading is probably the best criterion as the data is systematic and easily available for all the cadets. With slight modification in the method of grading, it can make a still better criterion. One of the modifications may be that Academies are asked to grade the cadets with regard to the future potential as an officer and not merely on the basis of the performance in the Academy. If this future prediction is also included the Academy grading it would be better comparable with the Selection Board assessment.

If the grading for each and every cadet is regarded as cumbersome producer, 'Nomination Technique' may be applied. According to this technique, 10% best cadets and 10% cadets at the bottom may be marked and the rest may be left ungraded to be in the average or low average category. This may provide more objective and less cumbersome procedure and hence more reliable criterion.

CONCLUSIONS

The above analysis indicates the difficulties in fixing a criterion for validating the selection assessment. The ultimate criterion is rarely, if ever, available for use and both the intermediate criteria remain only partly meaningful since, at best, they only give indications or approximation to the ultimate goal towards which selection or training is directed. Therefore, all the three types of criteria are to be kept in view and the selection procedure validated against whatever data is available.

A great problem in this search is to get the objective and reliable reports of the performance in criterion situations. It is difficult to guarantee that the ratings obtained from the different raters are really independent and objective. The sources of unrealiability in the rating of behaviour during the performance of a specific task are three fold :—

(a) Subjectivity of observation.

(b) Difficulty of setting a standard task to be observed and rated.

(c) Inconsistency of behaviour.

The above two sources of error can be reduced with uniform training and standard of rating to be specified. The standard tasks may also be defined. However, the third factor can hardly be controlled and this general source of unrealiability has to be put up with.

With these precautions in mind and with the modifications suggested, the three criteria can serve the purpose of validating the selection technique used in the SSB's with better results.

Ghori. After fortifying Hansi, Thomas came to be known as the Emperor of Haryana. For some time his luck was in the ascendancy.

Begam Samru, and her French lover and husband were embroiled in a rebellion and the Frenchman committed suicide. Begam Samru sought the help of her jilted lover George Thomas who hurried to Sardhana from Hansi and restored order for Begam Samru. But it appears he did not renew his love overtures but promised to give his loyal services whenever she needed. Begam Samru also had cooled off towards George Thomas as he would not become a Roman Catholic. By this time Begam Samru's Churches at Sardhana had their own Bishop and the Church of Saint Mary at Sardhana had become a Cathedral.

George Thomas wrote off Begam Samru as he had enough troubles in his own hands. He had located his civil and military courts at Hansi and had defied his previous overlord Sindhia. Sindhia came down on him and ordered General M. Perron, Governor of the Ganga Doab to attack George Thomas in 1801. With the Maratha operations against him several Sikh, Jat and Rajput chieftains who had been put down by George Thomas broke out against him.

In the several military operations Georgegarh fell and Thomas retreated to Hansi. But some of his own chief officers betrayed and Thomas could not retain Hansi. He left Hansi and was on his way to Calcutta abandoning his "empire". He fell ill at Burhanpur where he died. He was buried at Burhanpur and the chequered career of a military adventurer came to an end.

The Georgegarh or Jahazgarh fort is in ruins and its *burji* (tower) still exists. The fort came later into the possession of the Nawab of Jhajjar and he named it Hussaingunj In his short rule George Thomas was able to organise the revenue system to some extent though he himself took a good share for his personal use. He was rather hard on his officers and did not allow them to fleece the peasants and that is why his officers rose against him at the first opportunity. His was an instance when a military adventurer, absolutely a stranger, could carve out a kingdom exploiting the circumstances.

Indian Reaction To British Policies*

(A Review Article)

PRAMOD KUMAR MISHRA

THE British came to India for the purpose of trade, but taking advantage of the internal rift among the ruling princes. decided to capture political power. Beginning from the battle of Plassey in 1757 until the sepoy mutiny of 1857, their major purpose was to put a strong foundation of the British Empire. The mutiny which was the first major challenge by the natives on the paramountcy of the British Empire. radically changed their outlook towards the problems facing the people of India. They realized in their heart of hearts that they could not possibly continue to rule and drain the wealth of India without making some concessions to the people. Hence the Viceroys who came in the later half of the 19th century and early decades of the present century, had to introduce certain reforms in the social, economic and political life of India. These measures were inevitable for the consolidation of the empire. However, they never desisted taking recourse to certain repressive measures, whenever they apprehanded any danger to the continuance of their rule in India. One of the most powerful and dynamic Viceroy in British India was Lord Curzon. During his short tenure from December 1898 to August 1905, he took certain drastic steps affecting the life of millions of Indians. One can delineate his policy on land revenue, educational policy, repressive policy towards the press, tackling of the outbreak of plague and finally the most important being the partition of Bengal. The disastrous consequences of his repressive measures for the consolidation of the British Empire was faced by his successor, Lord Minto who ruled India between 1905 to 1910

However short the tenure of these two Viceroys may be, nobody can deny the truth that it provided a significant landmark in the history of British Empire. It had also far-reaching repercussion on the freedom struggle of India and the future geopolitical map of the

* Indian Reaction to British Policies by V.K. Saxena and Published by Sundeep Prakashan, Delhi, 1978. PP 202, Price Rs. 50/-.

subcontinent. It is also a pointer to the future governments particularly in their attitude towards the press, education, emancipation of women and the burning issue of land reforms. It is in this context that the present study by Dr. Vinod Kumar Saxena has its relevance for the present generation of students, teachers and the decision-makers.

Focussing on the major land marks of Lord Curzon's reign in India and its aftermath, the author begins with the land revenue policy and in separate chapters highlights on the public reaction in India to such a policy. Before pinpointing on Curzon's role, he presents a broad scenario of the British land revenue policy since their advent in India. According to him there were mainly three land systems that were prevalent at that time. They were the Zamindari System, the Mahalwari system and the Raiyatwari system (p. 5). He explains each one of these systems and points out their application to different parts of India. The general conclusion drawn by him from these systems was that the Indian peasantry was leading an utterly miserable life and was below subsistence level. Such a state of affairs was noted by Curzon on his arrival in India. The Government of India passed a land resolution in 1902 at his initiative, but the major problems facing the peasants were overlooked. No doubt it provided for "greater elasticity in the revenue collection, facilitating its adjustment to the variations of the seasons, and the circumstances of the people (p. 11). To protect the poor peasant from the atrocities of the money-lender he took certain positive steps like the passage of Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900 AD) and creation of Agricultural Banks (1901 AD).

But in spite of the sentiments expressed by Curzon for the welfare of Indian peasantry, the lot of the tillers of the soil as the author rightly feels, was very miserable (p. 40). He substantiates his remarks from the extracts of the contemporary newspapers like 'Anis-i-Hind' of Meerut, the 'Prayag Samachar', 'Hindi Pradip' of Allahabad etc. Even he cites the remarks of Indian National Congress in its Calcutta session of 1901 to highlight the plight of millions of peasantry on the verge of starvation. Through the nationalist press, public forums and writings by prominent Indians, the basic demands of the people were brought to the notice of the British masters. The basic demands, as highlighted by the author, were (1) reduction of land tax (2) ban on Export of Foodgrain, particularly curb on the activities of European companies like the Ralli brothers. (3) permanent settlement of land tenure.

Obviously the British Government was not prepared to meet all these demands. A few remedial measures like the Punjab Land

Alienation Act, the Bundelkhand Land Alienation Act, the establishment of Cooperative Credit Societies had a mixed reaction in the minds of the people. The author very objectively comments that the real reason for the British Government's refusal to accept a permanent settlement was that it wanted to increase land revenue from time to time and that it did not want to forego its right to do the same by establishing permanent settlement in the country (p. 51).

About the 'Educational Policy' of the British in general and of Lord Curzon in particular, the author first highlights on the dialogue between the divergent schools i.e. the "Orientalists" and the 'Anglicists'. The intention of the British was very clear in Macaulay's own words : "We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpretors between us and the millions whom we govern—a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in words and in talent." (Cited by the author in p. 15). During Lord Curzon's reign a University Commission was appointed to enquire into the conditions and prospects of the Indian Universities and promote the advancement of learning (p. 18). He also got the Universities Act passed in 1904 Its major purpose was to enhance the scope of activities of the Universities and treat them as real centres of learning. He also championed the cause of female education.

The author highlights on the defects in the educational set up introduced by the British. These were (1) Cramming and Neglect of vernaculars, (2) Lack of technical education and, (3) Costly education. As he very rightly points out, the system was defective, profitless, devoid of practical utility and qualified students only for clerical jobs (p. 65). The major reforms as suggested by the intelligentsia of that time were emphasis on (1) Technical Education, (2) Free and compulsory Primary Education, (3) Female Education. Indians were highly critical of non-representation of a single Indian in the Universities Commission. According to the author leaders like Mrs. Annie Besant and Lala Lajpat Rai, advocated the spread of National Education catering to the needs and aspirations of Indians. He also emphasises on the growing alienation of the educated Indian from the existing educational system.

About the role of press in British India the author throws light on the monopoly of the Britishers in its early stage and the sudden rise in the number of Indian managed newspapers and periodicals after 1857. The Vernacular Press Act passed in 1878 alienated the the natives to a great extent. In 1908 the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act was passed. It was followed by the Press Act of 1910.

All these were motivated to harass the Indian controlled press, which was sympathetic to the nationalist struggle. The Press Act of 1908 was opposed by some newspapers on the ground that they took away the freedom of the press However, a few newspapers like 'Aligant Institute Gazette, found nothing objectionable there. The Indian National Congress, according to the author, opposed it outrightly (p. 90). The Vernacular Press was also highly critical of the Press Act 1910 and the policy of Press Prosecutions which followed after that. The author takes pain to cite the facts and figures of the number of newspapers being punished and their securities forfeited. Expressing a note of optimism he writes. "The Indian Press did not care much for prosecutions and punishments. They bore the brunt of the Government's attack with great courage" (p. 95). According to him they played "no mean part in arousing national conciousness in the country and in focussing the attention of the people over the political and economic grievances and the doings of the alien government which were injurious to the interests of the country.

About the reaction of Indians towards government's attempts to combat Plague, the author cites from documentary evidence that the severity of Plague regulations resulted in serious riots in different parts of India. However according to him the government alone, was not to be blamed. The poverty and conservatism of the people was a major contributing factor for its failure, although the government did not really spend a sizable fund on this operation.

Lord Curzon is pointed as the main villain behind the partition of Bengal. However according to the author the spade work was already done earlier by Sir Strafford Northcofe's Minute (1868). According to him the rationale behind the partition of Bengal was threefold i e. firstly it wanted to relieve the Government of Bengal of a part of the burden imposed upon it and at the same time, it wanted to make provision for more efficient administration of the outlying districts of the province ; secondly, the government wanted to promote the development of Assam by enlarging its jurisdiction so as to give it an outlet to the sea ; and thirdly, the government wanted to unite under a single administration the scattered section of the Oriya speaking population (p. 112).

However, there was a furore all over the country on the issue of the partition. The people, particularly the Bengalees felt that it was a deliberate attempt on the part of the British Government to drive a wedge at the growing solidarity of the Bengalee-speaking people and to create a difference between the Hindus and the Muslims (p. 114).

Many nationalist songs like Vande Mataram were sung in mammoth public gatherings to protest against the partition. The author comes out with this conclusion that the Boycott and Swadeshi movements were an off-shoot of the partition of Bengal. Again according to him although the Muslims were not for partition in the beginning, when partition was annuled in 1911 they were unhappy about it. Throwing a pointer to the birth of Muslim separatism and the future partition of the country the author holds the view that the majority of the politically conscious Muslims felt that the Congress had supported a Hindu agitation against the creation of a Muslim majority province. It reinforced the Muslims belief that their interests were not safe in the hands of the Congress. Thus they rushed more towards the Muslim League to safeguard their interests (p. 34). Such a sweeping conclusion about the Muslim attitude needs to be examined in greater depth.

Undoubtedly the author is at his best in the chapter on "Seperate Electorate". Pointing out the divergence in the attitudes of the Muslims and the Hindus, he writes, "Muslims regarded the British as their bitterest foes who had usurped the political authority and the attendent privileges which they had so long enjoyed". On the other hand the Hindus welcomed the English rule and "even regarded it as a deliverance from the tyrannies and miseries of the Muslim rule" (p. 142-3). Again according to the author the Wahabi movement was anti-British and anti-Hindu. About the role of Sir Syed Ahmed, the author emphatically points out that he was mainly responsible for the change of Muslim attitude towards the British. According to him some writers point Sir Syed as a separatist or a communalist. Others treat him to be a nationalist and a patriot. The author, rightly perhaps, is more inclined to accept the first view.

About the genesis of Hindu-Muslim differences, the author discards the existing view that the British alone were responsible for creating it and engineering the Simla deputation of the Muslims to demand separate electorate. Rather he rightly feels that the differences between the two communities had existed in the past, the British government accentuated them and profited by such differences (p. 160). He raises another controversy before the historians when he writes, "The separate electorates were not gifted to the Muslims by the British Government. The Muslims had demanded and worked hard for separate electorates both in India and in England." (p. 162). Thus according to him the Muslim leaders in order to safeguard the minority interests played the role of the villain of peace. The British as an Imperial Power only took advantage of it.

The author makes another sweeping observation in his concluding chapter in the following words, "It is mainly because of Congress's support to anti-partition agitation that the Muslims formed a political party of their own on 30th December 1906 in Dacca, known as the Indian Muslim League" (p. 180) But this matter must be investigated with more documents to substantiate such a viewpoint. Certain other aspects of the genesis of Muslim League like the role of personalities, social, economic and psychological problems facing the Muslim community should also be looked into.

However, from all accounts Dr. Saxena's treatise is commendable for its intellectual depth and historical insight It is expected that in future he should bring out a second volume relating to the later part of British policies and Indian reaction to it.

China Policy : Old Problems And New Challenges*

(A Review Article)

PRAMOD KUMAR MISHRA

SINCE the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a new nation, United States has followed a traditional policy of hostility towards the new regime. As a champion of the so called liberal democratic movement, Americans have naturally opposed the spread of the communist movement spearheaded by both the Soviet Union and China. But with Richard Nixon as U.S. President, there was a significant departure in United States' China Policy. Henry Kessinger, his dynamic Secretary of State was mainly responsible to bring about the basic reorientation in U.S. and China relations. His secret trip to Peking through Islamabad in 1971, prepared the necessary spade work for Nixon's historic visit to the mainland of China.

A brief survey of the various issues involved in United States' China Policy in the light of changing political climate at the global level, has been attempted by a close observer of China's political scene for more than two decades He has written either independently or in collaboration sixteen books beginning from the emergence of the communist regime till date. His fields of enquiry cover a wide range of subjects like the Chinese economy, Social structure, Political setup and its International behaviour. Being born in Sanghai and having studied for the past thirty years Doak Barnett, as written in the foreword of his book "has had broad experience in government, journalism, and academic affairs" (p. ix—x).

In this short treatise for which financial support was extended by the Rockfeller foundation and the Office of External Research of the U.S. Department of State, he starts his introductory chapter

* China Policy : Old Problems and New Challenges by A. Doak Barnett and Published by Brooking Institution, Washington, D.C., 1977. PP 131, Price not given.

with a brief survey of U.S.-China relations with a special emphasis on the new avenues thrown in the seventies. Looking at the background of U.S.-China relations, the author very correctly observes : "The deep antagonism between Washington and Peking that began in the fifties had been intensified by a series of military and political conflicts and crises on China's periphery. The resulting mutual hostility seemed likely to last indefinitely. Not only were the two countries divided by a enormous ideological, political, economic and cultural chasm ; the bitterness resulting from Korean war seemed to ensure continuing conflicts of American and Chinese interests wherever these came in contact in East Asia, from Korea to Taiwan to South-East Asia (p. 2). It is very clear from his observation that the Korean war hardened the attitude of both China and U.S. towards each other. Hereafter, in his observation "Washington pursued a policy designed to contain, isolate and exert pressure on China to try to weaken it, while Peking relentlessly attacked and attempted to undermine the U.S. position throughout East Asia". However the author does not give adequate emphasis on the ideological over-tones of China's countering the influence of U S. imperialism.

The special relationship between Communist China and Soviet Union, in the fifties gradually gave way to mutual distrust and competition for their own sphere of influence in the Third World. This obviously resulted in some rethinking on the part of the Chinese leadership to refashion their policy options for Washington. In terms of security threat for China, Soviet Union, not United States was rated as the "principal enemy". This was duly reciprocated by the other side and Nixon's visit followed thereafter. With the signing of Sanghai Communique during his visit, both Washington and Peking departed from their traditional policy of hostility. Hereafter unwillingly U.S. conceded the permanent seat of the Security Council to Red China, even if it was not prepared to abandon its two-China policies. Taiwan continued to remain a trusted ally.

The humiliation suffered by United States in the Indo-China war with the victory of the North Vietnamese, the Chinese leaders again raised apprehensions about the capacity of the Americans to check any Soviet threat in the region. Therefore the beginning of detente made in the early seventies could not attain maturity.

With the departure of Chau-En-lai and Mao-Tse-Tung from China's political scene, as the author rightly thinks, there was certain amount of uncertainties in both the domestic and external

policies of China. Hua-Kuo-Feng, the new party Chairman who was initially accepted as a compromise candidate, was later on more aligned to the "Civilian and military pragmatists" (p. 10). There is an increasing feeling in the late seventies not only among the radicals (who have always advocated hardline policies both towards Washington and Moscow) but by others. They believe according to the author that "Peking has given too much and gotten too little in regard to the Taiwan issue." (p. 11). Certain pragmatic leaders in China, also rightly feel that "a more flexible policy to protect China's security might be better than maintaining a totally hostile posture towards Moscow hoping that Washington can keep it in check".

The author also rightly predicts that with the lessening of tension between Moscow and Peking, Washington's equation with Peking might change. According to him, "Washington would probably lose some of the leverage it now enjoys in dealing with both the Chinese and the Russians, and Moscow might believe it had a somewhat freer hand than at present in dealing with the West in Europe." (p. 13).

Citing the evidence from the public opinion polls the author predicts that increasing number of Americans would not like to sacrifice Taiwan (Nationalist China) for sake of cultivating Communist China. This naturally puts the U.S. government in a dilemma. The author seems to suggest a via media when he writes, "While it cannot and should not abandon Taiwan, it cannot continue to deal with Taiwan on the same basis as in the past if full normalization of relations with Peking is to be achieved. And if full normalization is not achieved, Peking could not well reassess its policies and move in new directions in its policy towards either Washington or Moscow or both, with consequences that could damage U.S. interests." (p. 16).

After a brief survey of U.S.-China relations in the seventies, Barnett formulates two future premises of United States policy towards China. First, it is "necessary, desirable and feasible to expand and improve U.S.-China relations". This, as he rightly feels would be a pragmatic approach to check any further deterioration with possible dangers to U.S. interests. A second premise, according to him "must be that further improvement of Sino-American relations will not be easy. The process will, at best, be gradual and the obstacles formidable. Further strengthening of ties is by no means certain ; it will depend on the priority both Washington and Peking give to the necessity for compromise and mutual accommodation". (p. 18). Accepting the reality that both U.S. and China will continue

to be adversaries in certain sphere, the author rightly asserts that the American aim should be "to reduce step by step, the areas of tension and conflict, and to gradually broaden the areas of mutual accommodation, recognising that there is no formula for rapidly resolving all differences or radically transforming Sino-American relations". (p. 21) The minimum immediate aim of U.S. policy towards China, according to him, must be "to consolidate present relationship, institutionalize them, and reduce the risk that a reversal of Chinese policy might occur, leading to a deterioration of relations once again". Its longterm aim, as explained by him must be "to develop gradually a variety of interlocking interests that will create a more solid basis than exists at present for a stable, long-lasting relationship". (p.21). While highlighting the differing policies of both China and United States on broad international issues and on problem areas in South and Southeast Asia, as admitted by both sides in the Sanghai Communique, the author is full of admiration for the sentiments expressed by both parties for "the progress towards normalization of relations" and "to reduce the danger of international military conflict". (p. 22).

In the next chapter the author delineates the major areas of future cooperation between the two countries. He particularly emphasizes on the economic and cultural areas and the military-security relations. He also focuses the attention of readers on the controversial issue of arms control. According to him the process of interaction in all these areas "is certain to be difficult and at times frustrating" (p. 35), but there should be attempts by both sides to minimize their differences in any of the problem areas. He cites interesting statistics of a sudden rise in U.S -China trade from $ 5 million in 1971 to $ 934 million in 1974. Because of the ideological differences, he clearly admits the limited areas of interaction in the field of education, art and culture. About military-security relations, he also rightly points out that even if "both United States and China have taken steps to minimize the dangers of military conflict, the two countries are obviously not allies, and neither is likely to view the relationship in traditional alliance terms in the foreseeable future." (p. 51). He also foresees certain difficulties in persuading China in controlling its arms, both conventional and nuclear.

While United States cultivates its relationship with China, it must not lose sight of its global perspectives. While defining American objectives in regard to broad global problems, the author points out that the policy makers in United States must take into consideration the attitude and perceptions of Soviet Union and Japan

alongwith China on any of the problem areas of the world. Even according to him, the overall American interests in Southeast and East Asia cannot be lost sight of, while framing its policy towards China.

The author would similarly emphasize the need to reorient U.S. policy in positive terms i.e. to bring about "normal, peaceful, political, economic and other relationship with and among all countries in the region, encouraging greater regional and subregional cooperation supporting developmental programmes that emphasize equity within and among East Asian nations, and devising cooperative approaches to the problems created by growing economic interdependance". (p. 82). In their approaches to global economic problems, U.S. and China, as the author clearly admits, "have frequently worked at cross purposes". (p. 117). The Chinese along with the leaders of other Third World countries have been much critical of the "neocolonialist policies of plunder and control" by the two super powers. Realizing the need for a restructuring of the international economic order he would suggest that United States should see to it that Third World participation in international economic policy making must become an accepted principle. He would also expect Peking leaders to be more deeply involved in the international economic intercourse.

In his concluding chapter, the author while looks at the past and present state of relationship between United States and China, imagines an ideal scenario for the further improvement of their relations. He strongly advocates the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Peking at the Ambassadorial level. After that all other problem areas between the two countries and in the periphery of China can be sorted out for a viable solution. While admitting that Chinese are basically influenced by their past history, he equally supports the view that there should be positive responses from their side for an overall improvement in Sino-American relations. He would also expect the Chinese leaders to reorient their Maoist outlook in bringing about a better world order. Thus United States must encourage, if it can, a greater international involvement of Peking leaders. Any bilateral relation being essentially a two-way traffic, the bright prospects of Sino-American relations much depends on the attitudes and perceptions of the new leadership in Peking.

Looking at the wider perspectives of Sino-American relations, Barnett's book has not only opened up new horizons, but also provided enough problem areas to be investigated by serious students on international affairs. However in certain respects, while examining the policy options for the U.S. government, he seems to bypass objectivity.

BOOK REVIEWS

CHURCHILL AND THE ADMIRALS

by STEPHEN ROSKILL

(Published by Collins, London, 1977) pp 351. Price £8·50

CAPTAIN Stephen Roskill, RN (Retd) is a distinguished naval officer who is considered to be one of the foremost naval historians of today.

Thus his writings tend to be both historical as well as autobiographical as he was on active service during the last World War and hence at the receiving end of some of Churchill's erratic interventions in the conduct of naval operations at sea.

Churchill's underestimation of Hitler's submarine threat and his decision to divert aircraft from the Battle of the Atlantic which had near disastrous results, his inability to comprehend Japan's naval potential resulting in the sinking of the battleships *Repules* and *Prince of Wales* in 1941, the decision to disperse a convoy to Russia which practically ended in its decimation, his failure to push for the reopening of the Scheldt in 1944 were some of the instances highlighted by Roskill to demonstrate the heavy price paid by Britain for Churchill's interference in the conduct of war at sea.

Roskill draws attention to Churchill's predilection for 'offensive actions' which he states were often sideshows, futile if not dangerous, for the British to undertake. He, therefore, agrees with the United States strategy to press on for the defeat of Japan in the Pacific without diverting forces to implement some of Churchill's projects for recovering British imperial outposts in South East Asia.

That Churchill was allowed to carry through such decisions was partly due to his choice of a comparatively weak and tired but infinitely patient First Sea Lord in the person of Admiral Sir Dudley Pound who tended to act more as the Prime Minister's mouthpiece than as the professional head of the Royal Navy. His successor, Admiral AB Cunningham with his reputation as the brilliant Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, did not, however,

come under the Churchillian spell and was able to block 'the Former Naval Persons' attempts to interfere in naval operations

From such examples Roskill concludes that Churchill was a poor judge of Admirals. He reinforces his analysis by referring to Winston's low opinion of Jellicoe and his disastrous quarrel with 'Jackie' Fisher in 1915 as well as his dislike of the equally competent British naval commanders of World War II, *viz.* Tovey, Forbes, Harwood and Little. Churchill's preference for Admirals David Beatty, Roger Keyes and Louis Mountbatten was perhaps more due to his enthusiasm for 'offensive war' and his penchant for 'gallant types' rather than based on their comparative service records or competency in operation.

It is therefore, pertinent to draw attention to Roskill's continuing debate with Professor Arthur Marder whose book 'From the Dardnelles to Oran' highlighted the need to look beyond Churchill's foibles to be able to appreciate the strong political leadership that he gave to the Royal Navy which the eminent civilian Professor infers was the essential prerequisite for the success of British seapower. Professor Marder adds that British Admirals tended to make a mess of things when left to their own devices :

Hence it is interesting to compare the analysis of Professor Marder with that of Captain Roskill with the former eulogising Churchill's role in the overall achievements of the Royal Navy, while the latter questions the efficacy of civilian intrusion into the professional conduct of naval operations

Such lively debates will necessarily continue among contemporary students of military history particularly in a democracy, which, in turn makes this lucid study by Captain Roskill on 'Churchill's and the Admirals' a fascinating addition to the enlarging spectrum of books on maritime history.

MKR

PORTRAIT OF A POLITICAL MURDER

by H S. BHATIA

(Published by Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, 1979) pp 176. Price Rs 35

HS BHATIA'S book 'Portrait of a Political Murder' is yet another instance of furious burst of scribbling by journalists and authors, caused by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's death on the gallows on 4th April 1979. The book is divided into 14 Chapters

which do not form a coherent whole. In the first three Chapters, Mr Bhatia describes Mr Bhutto's early education, his career, his rise in Pakistan's politics and his achievements in public life. These chapters are full of extracts from Piloo Modi's "Zulfi-My Friend" and other editorials that had appeared in Newspapers soon after the conviction and sentence of Mr Bhutto. Chapter 4 with a provocative heading "Did C.I.A. Topple Bhutto" is a reproduction of an interview with Mr M. J. Akbar. The only highlight of the Chapter is the comments on the Chief Justice of Lahore High Court and his bias towards Mr Bhutto. Chapters 5 and 6, titled "White Paper on Bhutto" and "Abduction and Torture" narrate instances to show how Mr Bhutto used his authority and position to silence and suppress his opponents or to achieve other political purposes. These two Chapters bring out the extent of rot that had been set in the Pakistan body politic.

Chapter 7 "Bhutto's Appeal" comes before the Chapter which discusses the Lahore High Court judgment in the murder trial of Bhutto. These Chapters are merely quotative and do not help the reader in understanding the legal arguments or pinpoint the legal loopholes. The text of the judgement does not make it explicit whether Bhutto personally gave orders for the elimination of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, although in the prevailing atmosphere in Pakistan such desire/direction could have been easily implied.

Chapter 9 contains extracts from the judgment of Lahore High Court (State Vs Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and others). This Chapter gives sufficient details to allow the reader to understand the facts bearing on the whole case, the evidence of important witnesses and the details of the actual incident. The verdict of the Pakistan Supreme Court has similarly been exhaustively narrated in Chapter 10 but there is a serious shortcoming. Whilst the arguments of judges who voted for the verdict and the sentence of Lahore High Court have been dealt with in detail, the arguments of the dissenting judges and the independent judgment of Mr Justice Dorab Patel have merely been alluded to without any elaboration of their reasoning against the verdict. In fact, the reasoning of these minority judges would have thrown light on the much debated question whether Bhutto did have a fair trial and how far his guilt was legally sustainable. A reading of Chapters 7 to 12 does indicate that there was evidence on the basis of which the legal guilt of Mr Bhutto could be established. At the same time, the judgment does contain references to irrelevent and unnecessary matters such as Bhutto's faith in Islam etc. which leave in the reader a distinct impression that personal bias on the part of

some of the judges of both the Lahore High Court and the Supreme Court, could have denied Mr Bhutto justice according to law.

On the whole, Shri Bhatia's book contains adequate narrative details of the case most of which had also been reported in the newspapers except for the extracts from the Lahore High Court Judgment. Shri Bhatia does not, however, carry out any in-depth analysis of the events or gives his own comments on the happenings. This seriously detracts from the value of the book or the standing of Shri Bhatia as an author.

OPS

MOST SECRET WAR: BRITISH SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE 1939-1945

by R.V. JONES

(Published by Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978) pp 556. Price £7.95

SCIENTIFIC Intelligence as an important weapon of war is an accepted fact in modern defence planning. But this was not so in the late thirties and early forties in Great Britain. It took a lot of effort on the part of scientists like RV Jones to convince British politicians and military leaders on the utility and efficacy of scientific intelligence in modern wars.

Dr RV Jones, the author of the book "Most Secret War" was a senior scientist at the Air Ministry in London during the World War II. In the book, he describes his contribution to the British War effort in the field of Scientific Intelligence. Most of the achievements described in the book will no doubt appear very elementary to the present day reader. However, they assume significance when viewed against the background of the poor state of technological developments existing four decades ago.

By avoiding the use of highly technical language in describing the 'Intelligence' systems that he had developed, the author has made it possible for all types of readers to understand, appreciate and enjoy reading the book. The numerous anecdotes given in the book make interesting reading Once when they located a tiny wooden box containing an induction coil, some wires and crocodile clips in the house, an electrical engineer who was a former 'Blackshirt' and who when confronted denied having ever seen this gadget, they thought that their search for a clandestine jamming apparatus which was

jamming a nearby radar, was over. But imagine their disappointment and embarassment when they realised that the gadget was a harmless hair remover which the engineer's wife had bought for her personal use and had been practising a mild deception on her husband.

A good book for relaxed light reading over the weekend.

CVP

ACES & AERIAL VICTORIES

BY THE US AIR FORCE IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1965—73

(Published by U.S. Government Printing Office) pp 188. Price $ 5.25

THE Book is an Official Publication of the Government of United States of America,—the contributions are from a half dozen writers, and these are edited by a group headed by Walter Hanak under the guidance of an Advisory Committee.

In Air Force parlance all over the world, an Aircrew credited with positively destroying at least five enemy aircraft is an "Ace". (One may be an Ace Pilot or even an Ace Air Gunner.)

In the event of conflicts spanning years (rather than Months/ Days), aircrews do have the opportunity of "Kills" many more than five.

The present book is a candid and careful collection of "first-hand accounts" by U.S. Air Force fighter crews who flew combat missions over North Vietnam between 1965 and 1973

The background situation has been well explained with special reference to the "Restrictions" imposed on the American aircrews, and the support and facilities provided to them.

The narratives are taken directly from the "aircrew after-action reports" (de-briefing reports) and thus retain the freshness of the situation. The reader is never far away from "the sound of guns and the smell of powder".

The conduct of the war in Vietnam had undergone many changes as brought about by America's national policy as well as the international political situation. The military support obtained by North Vietnam varied from time to time, and so did their strategic moves and the tactics they adopted.

The reader is led through the panorama of the changing situation and given a clear view of the manner in which the American Air Commanders conducted the air battles and the US Aircrews fought in the air,—sometimes against very stiff opposition. Their victories were no mean achievements.

In the characteristic American Way, the book is profusely illustrated with maps and photographs. The aircraft they flew, the arms and ammunition they employed, the twists and turns of their evasive manoeuvres—all these are made evident to the reader.

The publication is meant primarily for the air-commanders, air-tacticians and air-crews. There is also much of interest to readers of military history.

This is an admirably good Document, and is supplemented by Tables, Sketches, glossary and Index. Good reading for any military man.

SDS

CAMERA AT WAR : THE NORMANDY CAMPAIGN

BY ROBERT HUNT AND DAVID MASON

(Published by Leo Cooper, London, 1976) pp. Price £ 6.25

ALTHOUGH 35 years have elapsed since the Operation Overlord was launched on 6 June 1944, human interest in that great human drama is still strong No other campaign of the Second World War has caught so much of our imagination, and its grand scale, risk and difficulties were indeed unique. Pitted against the 3,000-mile long defensive Atlantic wall, built up by the Germans to defend their conquests against any possible Anglo-U.S. invasion from the West and guarded by redoubtable German generals—Rundstedt and Rommel, the Allies threw into the Campaign great military leaders like General Eisenhower, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, General Montgomery, Admiral Ramsay, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, Lt.-Gen. Omar Bradley, and General Patton, along with 4126 landing craft, 1213 warships, 1600 other vessels, and thousands of aircraft and tanks.

To give an example of the intensity of the fight, on 25th July, 1944, 2500 bombers of the Allies dropped more than 4,000 tons of high explosive and napalm in an area of 6 sq. miles, south of Caen.

This is essentially a pictorial book with, of course, a brief account of the Normandy Campaign. The wartime photographs have been selected by the well-known picture editor, Robert Hunt, and the text has been written by David Mason, the author of "The Raid On St. Nazaire" and "Breakout From Normandy". Between them they have produced an interesting account of an unforgettable military operation, which will be read with interest by all. Besides a large number of pictures, the book contains some useful maps which help one to understand the developments in the campaign.

BCC

THE APPEAL THAT WAS NAVER MADE ; THE ALLIES, SCANDINAVIA AND THE FINNISH WINTER WAR 1939-1940

BY JUKKA NEVAKIVI

(Published by C. Hurst & Co., London, 1976)

pp 225. Price £ 7.00 in U K. only.

THIS is a well-researched account of the role of the Allies and the Scandinavian countries in the Russian invasion of Finland during 1939-1940. The purpose of the study 'is to deal not so much with Allied relations with Finland during the Winter War as with Allied attitudes towards the conflict itself.....in other words, with an early stage in the Anglo-French "grand strategy" during the Second World War', as explained by the author. The book is based on the author's Finnish work—*Apu jota ei pyydetty*.—first published in Helsinki in 1972 but extensively revised in the light of fresh information culled from the Archives of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the French Army Historical Section in Vincennes, the Public Record Office, London, the Sikorsky Institute, London, the Norwegian and Swedish diplomatic archives and those of the Finnish foreign and defence ministries, besides interviews with some important contemporary witnesses like G.A. Gripenberg.

his is the story of a small power which fell victim to the strategic and security interests of a big power, while other big powers played their own game of power politics to serve their national interests and hardly did much to help the victim, beyond extending lip service. Harri Holma, the Finnish Minister, wrote : "The French and British Governments are eagerly looking for the opportunity to resume negotiations in Moscow, that is why war has not been declared

against Russia and that is why France and Britain are doing nothing to help the Baltic countries."

The heroic resistance of the weak Finns against the mighty Russians for over four months drew sympathy for the victim from every quarter, and the Anglo French Allies made a number of military plans and even raised forces to help Finland, but by March 1940 Finland was defeated and forced to accede to Russian territorial demands, and the Western efforts proved abortive.

This is an excellent case-study of big-power diplomacy in respect of a small power, bullied by another big power, which will interest scholars, soldiers and diplomats alike.

An exhaustive bibliography adds to the value of the book.

B.C.

ABOVE THE BATTLE—WAR-MAKING IN AMERICA FROM APPOMATTOX TO VERSAILLES

BY THOMAS C. LEONARD

(Published by Oxford University Press, New York, 1978)

pp 260. Price $ 12.95

THIS book gives us a new dimension of wars the Americans fought between 1861 and 1918. It deals with issues above the common place strategy and tactics of war—how the warriors saw themselves and their enemy, their perception of the bright and dark sides of the power of weapons, how soldiers understood and remembered the violence and ordeals of the battlefield, and how politicians, who had sent them to the war front, the inventors and manufacturers of arsenals, and the thinking and articulate Americans "who argued about what war meant" preceived those wars and violence. The author has tapped diverse sources—civilians and soldiers, battle veterans and students of war—for collecting his evidence. Indeed, he has quoted from so wide a literature that his book may appear to be a literary criticism of American wars during that period of 57 years. Things such as the testimony from soldiers like Harry Crosby, Hemingway, Dos Passos and Faulkner, the memoirs of generals and political leaders like Gen. Grant, Lt. Gen. Richard Taylpo, Gen. Pershing and Theodore Roosevelt, and writings of men like Henry Fleming, John De Forest, Joseph Kirkland, A. Bierce, Tourgee, and Walt Whitman throw much light on how those people looked at the wars.

Generally, the veterans spoke about the bright side of the war, and scarcely related the tales of blood, mud, and suffering. They "remembered what they needed to fit into the society that welcomed them home." Mathew Brady's realistic photographs of the campaigns in the 19th century were forgotten in a Washington Studio. Wars were depicted as noble and character-building, and the new weapons as less blood shedding. American Unionist soldiers even looked upon the Confederate soldier, the Red Indian enemy, the Cuban rebel, the Filippino native and even the German adversary as friendly foes. On 4th July 1898, the day after the battle of Santiago, the Americans on the Iowa toned down their celebration so as not to offend the sensibilities of their prisoners. But there was another side of picture also, which was ignored or conveniently fogotten "The blood and confusion stirred men to duty and desertion; Saintliness and debauchery; cynicism and idealism." During the Civil War half-a-million men had deserted, and one soldier had died for every six slaves freed. But soldiers became reticent after returning from the front. The inhuman atrocities on the Indians were hardly mentioned. Gen. Sheridan referred to the appalling reports like the following that came to him weekly : "Since 1862, at least 800 men, women, and children have been murdered within the limits of my present command, in the most fiendish manner; the men usually scalped and mutilated, their (he omits the word) cut off and placed in their mouth; women ravished sometimes fifty and sixty times in succession, then killed and scalped, sticks stuck in their persons, before and after death."

About the attitude to new weapons, it has been said that the U.S. armed forces nourished a prejudice against new machines as they prepared to fight. The author has also given us a glimpse of the aimlessness and disinterested involvement of the US volunteers in the Great War. One volunteer said "I don't believe we care very much if France is torn to bits." Sometimes, the soldier after fighting a different culture becomes an enemy of the culture of his own country.

But for too many quotations, this is an interesting book, opening up various human issues of war. It will be more interesting and instructive if the author could prepare a second volume covering the post-1918 period in which he will be able to collect plenty of material from the Second World War, Korean War and Vietnam War for a similar but a more contemporary study.

The book contains some fine illustrations, but an unstreamlined bibliography of sources.

B.C.

SERVICE ETIQUETTE

BY ORETHA D. SWARTZ

(Published by Annapolis Naval Institute Press, 1977)

pp 582. Price not given

THE Service Etiquette by Mrs Oretha D. Swartz is a very comprehensive guide to the Military and Social customs in the American Armed Forces It covers almost every situation of Services etiquette in daily life and for special functions and important events. It also gives a picture of social life in the U.S.A. It is a useful book for those who want to study and learn about the social and service etiquette in the U.S. Army and it will be of great help to the officers visiting that country either on duty or courses of Instructions

No doubt there is a similarity in the military customs in the U.S. Army and the Indian Army as the origin of most of military customs and courtesies is the same though the social customs are somewhat different.

Mrs Swartz has covered all the service etiquette in detail. The dress regulations for service personnel and manners for various military and social occasions are very well covered. It gives useful hints on introductions, official and personal calls, social life in a military station and on the art of conversation and speaking before an audience. It also shows how to address general correspondence, invitations and replies.

It covers service abbreviations, how to address service personnel and civilians—from cadets and midshipman to the President of the United States—and embassay officials as well as business correspondence.

Information on modern entertaining is included covering buffet suppers at home, formal dances, coffee parties, seating plans and precedence, order of ranks and the duties of the host and hostess. The section on "how to eat" includes points on eating different type of food and carving poultry and other meat. Unexpected situations at dinners also covered including excellent instructions on the life saving methods for aiding those who choke on food.

Information for the military family is included with tips on family security, wills and simple hints to wives for protection from assaults.

Traditional etiquette since its origin in 1100 AD to present day military and social customs are interesting and the traditional military ceremonies and courtesies—saluting, whom to salute and when not to salute—from dining in, ship launching to the most elaborate military functions and weddings are well covered. It also include procedure and courtesies at military funerals.

Mrs Swartz has combined hard to find, authoritative information with interesting and historical anecdotes in an up-to-date military life. It is a most comprehensive guide to military social customs and courtesies written in a easy style and fascinating to read.

CND

ANNAPURNA SOUTH FACE

by CHRIS BONINGTON

(Published by Cassel and Co Ltd., London (C) Mount Everest Foundation 1971, pp 335, Price £ 3 25.

ELEVEN men under the leadership of Chris Bonington arrived at Base Camps in the Annapurna Basin at the end of March 1970 and on 27 May 1970, two members of the expedition reached the summit of Annapurna, thus conquering the "seemingly impregnable" South Face. There were also the supporting members, viz. porters, auxiliaries, signallers, kitchen staff and others without whom the climbers would not have succeeded.

Chris Bonington, the leader, had abandoned his army career partly through discontent and partly to be able to do some climbing. That he made a successful leader and considerate manager is well brought out in this book.

Then there was Nick Estcourt, not a natural climber, but powerfully built, highly strung, very competitive and who had attained a high standard of climbing. He was sufficiently devoted to this sport to abandon engineering, in which he had a degree, and to switch over to computers, with a firm based on Manchester, so that he could be relatively near mountains to do some climbing.

Martin Boysen, the third man, on the other hand was remarkably uncompetitive, secure perhaps in his own natural ability and too lazy

to enter into the rat-race that dominates some aspects of British climbing. He had taken up teaching and was happy to remain an amateur indulging in climbing during the long holidays that all teachers enjoy.

Dougal Haston, the fourth member, was one of Britain's most outstanding climbers Introspective and deeply reserved, yet a very easy companion. He had a climbing school in the Highlands. He instructed at his school throughout the summer but kept himself free to join expeditions and climb as he chose in his off-seasons.

Ian Clough, a very kind unselfish person, was the next member. He had made climbing his career and ran a small climbing school in Glen Coe. He was "the perfect expedition man". Incidentally, the book is dedicated to him. He lost his life during the course of the climb.

Mick Burke, the sixth man, had a working-class background. He took up climbing at the age of fifteen to get away from home at week-ends. He was not a brilliant climber, but by "sheer perseverance" had become "extremely competent". He died in the 1975 Everest British Expedition

The seventh was Don Whillans, a very fine all round mountaineer. But he had let himself go and was not in very good physical condition. He was also not a very lucky climber and very different from the leader. He was shrewed and cautious, rarely swayed by emotion, whereas Chris was "enthusiastic and fairly emotional and impulsive" changing his "mind very easily and constantly cooking up new schemes". He could not have been more dissimilar to Chris; but each complemented the other's weak points and got on well while on the mountains. He was the Deputy Leader.

All the ones mentioned so far were those who had climbed together at some time or another. They got on well with each other and compatability is essential for success in any mountaineering expedition.

The eighth member's selection was influenced by finance. He was an American, who had done some climbing in Alaska and in the Himalayas. Tom Frost was a Mormon, eschewing strong drink, gambling, smoking, bad language, tea and coffee ; but he was very tolerant and so made a very good member of the team.

The Doctor of the expedition, David Lambert, "bouncy, talkative yet full of enthusiasm", was the ninth member. He had done some

climbing in the Alps and was prepared to pay his way to go on this expedition.

For managing the Base Camp and making administrative arrangements, there was Captain Kelvin Kent, who proved invaluable.

The last of the elevan was Mike Thompson, one time in the regular army with Bonington, he found soldiering too limiting and so became a civilian. He was not a particularly high standard climber, but he had an easy equable temperament and proved very useful as a food organiser at the Base Camp.

The amount of time and preparation required are well brought out in the book. The idea to attempt this mountain was born in 1968 and the successful attempt was made in 1970. Running an assault on a Himalayan Peak is very similar to fighting a war—logistics and planning are the key to success.

On the approach march the expedition met the Japanese women's expedition to Annapurna III and were impressed by the Japanese keep fit routine of early morning P.T. and long runs.

Chris's team on the other hand were not averse to lazing around and hard drinking, specialty at Base Camp. It certainly did not seem to do them any harm. They had plenty of whisky—over four hundred miniatures and seventy-two full bottles ! Most of the team also smoked and this did produce some friction between Tom, the Mormon, and his partner As a compromise his partner was always careful to smoke by the entrance of the tent to avoid a smog inside. There were also serious arguments between various members of the team, but they ended up in all of them becoming closer friends than before.

The Sherpas were treated kindly. No members allowed a Sherpa-Sahib relationship to creep in. They were never asked to wait on the white members of the expedition. The Sherpas, however, did this of their own accord, which the leader of the expedition certainly liked !

There are plenty of useful hints both regarding administration and the technique of climbing for those taking part in mountaineering expeditions. It is also essential to have a pastime when there is nothing to do. Tom's favourite pastime was, while paying out the rope to the leading climber, to sit on a small ledge and admire the beauty below.

While smoking and drinking did have an adverse effect on the performance of most members, Don Whillans, who smoked for, at

least twenty years and drank on an average three pints a night", seemed to have a tremendous amount of stamina. He was one of the successful summiters.

The radio was in regular use and some conversations have been reproduced from tape recordings showing what a vital role the radio played.

Chris Bonington has brought out the feelings of individuals well by including quotations, even whole chapters by the individuals themselves The chapter entitled "The Final Push" by Dougal Hoston is enthralling.

That some members believed in and had seen a 'Yeti' is mentioned in one of the early chapters.

It is not understandable why the expedition surveyor having computed a trigonometrical height checked its accuracy by an altimeter. An altimeter gives at best an approximate height correct to within 20 to 30 metres and so is really no check on trigonometrical work, unless the latter has not been carefully done. Actually altimeter heights should be checked against heights derived after triangulation i. e. trigonometrical heights, and not the other way around.

No members suffered from frost bite or severe exposure. This was because the leader had arranged for a wide choice of gear to enable individuals to select what they wanted. This worked.

There are useful appendices and a glossary at the end. What, for example, is a 'dead man' ? Not a man who is dead, but a snow anchor. However, there are some incorrect transliterations in the Appendix on "The People of Nepal."

Apart from the tragedy, the book ends on a hopeful note. Those who helped to climb and those who climbed will find new challenges. The author for example, says "my life will be constant search for Annapurnas and, having found one, I shall feel forced to seek the next".

The illustrations are clear and well produced.

On the whole an excellent book and would serve as a work of reference for those planning ascents on any high Himalayan peaks.

J.A.F.D.

CORRESPONDENCE

Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

To
The Editor
'USI' JOURNAL
Kashmir House
Rajaji Marg
NEW DELHI-110011.

Sir,

IT is with interest that one reads Maj Gen KS Bajwa's article on "Military Leadership And the Changing Social Ethos" in your Sep 78 issue.

To-day's officer cadre, coming as it does from mainly the middle, and even lower middle class, and self-centred that it is because of the changing socio-economic melieu, as rightly diagnosed by the author, is increasingly careerist in outlook and action. It wants to do well, rise higher, earn more pay as well as better recognition. It can be brazenly ambitious. There is tremendous competition, throat-cutting and one-upmanship, with means that tend to become ruthless and even foul, transgressing decorum and sense of self respect. Concern for getting what is thought to be its right often drowns the lean straw of its obligation to the profession and even to the comrades. Although the picture may not be so bleak as yet as the above suggests, yet one cannot help witnessing the oncoming shadows cast by such an ethos gripping the officer cadre. Such a viciously competitive environment throws up some salient features which are discussed in succeeding paras.

The Atmosphere. The competitive atmosphere, high ambition and urge to do better, if harnessed properly, have a high potential for improving the professional standards of the officer cadre. Increased and increasing tension are the ambience of the day, of our socio-economic and political life. But it is also equally true that

it is tension which drives mankind to adjust, to improve, to struggle, to find answers and to strike balance with the environment.

Changed Concepts. The concepts of integrity, loyalty, camaraderie etc have to be founded on more pragmatic grounds. For instance, take loyalty. Loyalty to whom ? To the individual, to the superior, to the cause, to the prefession or to everything ? The generally understood concept of loyalty is that one should be loyal to the superior. The superior officer tells you so. But isn't it a restricted view ? Shouldn't one be loyal to the institution. profession, or to that "Something" which is above the individual, above the superior ? Isn't it time we gave our loyalty to that something higher? But then, in so doing what if you annoy the individual, the superior ? Does the superior, who assesses you, who virtually controls your destiny through his reports. identity himself and merge with that "something higher"? Does he convince you of his identification and merger with it ? Unless the superior who controls your destiny through ACRs changes his concepts of integrity, loyalty etc and does so convincingly the rat-race of his underlings will continue unabated.

Inadequate Assessment. There apparently are some serious inadequacies in ou mode of assessment. Boldness, knowledge, integrity, loyalty, initiative, calmness and so on have to be assessed not merely under peace time conditions, but far more so under conditions of stress, strain, uncertainty, fatigue and discomfort. It is because of this inadequacy that a large number of officers, who work only when they know that it matters or when they can catch the eyes of the superiors who matter, get away with their dangerous kinks and go places in the professional heirarchy. Such instances proliferate in our present competitive environment, and whip up even those who are less inclined to follow suit.

Reappraisal of Reporting. There ought to be a reappraisal of our ethos of reporting on the subordinates and units. Are our peace time norms and guidelines, of which there is a plethora in the form of instructions and pamphlets, adequate to realistically assess individuals and units for their fitness professionally and for war ? In spirit perhaps yes, but in practice not quite so. As it is, it is pretty difficult to create war-time conditions to carry out such assessment. This is further compounded by a sense of being farther away from the probabilities of war during one's tenure of command, whereby considerations other than hard requirements of war start becoming arbiters of competence. Bullshit proliferates. "Looking after superiors" predominates. Yesmanship becomes expedient. Social pandering becomes compelling. Golf and bridge help catch the eyes

of those who matter. Showmanship is literally let loose at the cost of the unit or formation HQ. Under this floodlight of hypocrisy, bullshit and pandering the professional incompetence is carefully and effectively hidden and the gates to professional advancement tapped. Units and formations tend to be judged more by the relations between their commanders and superiors than by their inherent professional efficiency.

Interpretation of Restrictions. Notwithstanding the commendable record of maintaining itself and the army apolitical since Independence, the officer cadre of today is becoming increasingly subject to the pulls, pressures, compulsions and vicissitudes of political, economic and social trends. There are increasing number of complaints of one kind or another. There have been disturbing incidents of espionage There have been letters written by servicemen and exservicemen to the press. The behaviour of politicians, industrialists, workers, policemen, bureaucrats, technocrats, students, religionists, private profiteers and other national fibres is there for everybody to see. In this environment how long and how effectively will the officer cadre yet keep aloof and be controlled by the strictures of security and shackles of the curtailment of certain liberties provided in the constitution ? Shouldn't the spirit of security and curtailment of liberties be realistically interpreted to suit the changed times ?

Social Standing. There is the delicate question of balancing not merely the mundane emoluments aspect but also the somehow inescapable oriental criterion of "prestige" in highlighting the rung of the officer cadre in our societel ladder. This is further complicated by the interaction of such realities as our being a developing nation, over populated, with gigantic under-employment problems and the rehabilitation of officers after being eased out or super-annuated. If professional competence is to be one of the pillars of the ethos of the officer cadre, as it indeed should be, then the superceded officers have to be given a fair chance at appropriate stage in their career to opt out of service and seek resettlement elsewhere more profitably. For this his resale value, and hence prestige, have to be adequately built up and projected. For instance, why should it not be a regular feature to send certain officers, on deputation to say civil administration jobs in the bordering districts, public undertakings, educational institutions (on lecturing/teaching/research assignments), anthropological/geological surveys and so on ? Such deputations as appear to exist today are exceptional, a trickle, which do not go far in contributing to the ethos of the officer cadre.

Army Officer's Wife. Today's army officer's wife has become as much a competitive creature as the husband. She too wants her husband to do well; she too wants to enjoy the aura of prestige; she want's to make the best of the limited opportunities she gets to stay with her husband between his commutation to and from field areas. She is increasingly the driving force behind her husband. She too earns and serves; and has a lot to contribute to the welfare of the serviceman and his family in general and to her husband's mental, moral and psychological well-being in particular. Unseen and unheard she weilds considerable influence on the tension-maturity, grace-efficiency, ambition-devotion, throat-cutting sacrifice balance scales. Her increased independent demeanour and resentment of the inevitable seepage of her husband's senior junior relationship into her feminine company of other-officer's wives do affect the tone of the officer, particularly the senior, whose wife can be as authoritarian as her irascible husband and who can put pressing demands on the junior officer's wife. These are equally the causes of friction in the army officer's club life, his so called social life. Better understanding between officers, better social graces, better education in self-restraint, increased maturity and greater sense of friendship and camaraderie can be built by that inescapable human need called socialising, only if tensions are absent or considerably eased and humanism predominates in such intercourse. This kind of atmosphere is precisely what is lacking in our social functions; and which is far more acute than the mere outward pinch of a few rupees extra going down the drain of pomp, show, bombast and general futility. The senior officer and his wife have to set the tone in this sphere, in spite of that noble belief that like charity all good examples must start at home.

SC Sardeshpande Lt Ceonll

HQ 29 Inf Bde
C/o 56 APO
22 Jun 79

Secretary's Notes

ENROLMENT OF UNITS/FORMATIONS AS SUBSCRIBERS TO THE USI JOURNAL

The Council of the Institution had approved wef 1 January 1978 the enrolment of Units/Formations as subscribers to the Journal on long terms basis on concessional rates as follows :

For 2 years	...	Rs 75/-
For 3 years	...	,, 110/-
For 4 years	...	,, 140/-
For 5 years	...	,, 170/-

Although the number of subscribers to the Journal almost doubled itself from 27 to 486 in 1978, this is far below the target of 1000 subscribers which we had expected because of the concession given above. I would request all Units/Formations who subscribe to the Journal to popularise the concessional scheme thereby helping the officers to acquire the habit of reading and improve upon their professional knowledge. This not only helps the Institution financially but also makes this more than 100 years old Journal on Defence affairs a forum where Service officers can project their thinking freely and frankly on professional matters of their choice.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE JOURNAL

I continue to urge through these notes that officers must write articles for the USI Journal but the response has been very poor, which makes my task difficult Once again I would request members and other officers to write for the Journal putting forth new ideas on vast field of professional subjects. I assure them that I will do my best to publish these articles where new worthwhile ideas have been expressed. I would also welcome letters critically examining the various articles which appear in the Journal, so that all points of views get known, which is the only way in which we can get full grasp of the expanding knowledge of defence and security.

RENEWAL OF SUBSCRIPTIONS

Lastly, I request members not to forget to renew their membership and promptly send their annual subscription. Better still if they convert their Ordinary Membership into Life Membership by paying only Rs. 250/- once in life time and not be bothered to send subscription year after year The Life subscription has been increasing due to rise in the case of postage, paper and printing and it would be to the benefit of officers to become Life members *now* and not regret later if the subscription takes an upward turn

NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution :—

AHUJA, Captain H.S.
AJMER SINGH, Captain
APTE, Major ANIL
AUJLA, Captain M.S.
AUL, Captain A.N.
BAGCHI, Sqn Ldr K.B.
BAJAJ, Captain M.L.
BAKSHI, Major A.K.
BAKSHI, Captain P R.
BAL, Captain K.S.
BAL, Major S.S.
BALVINDER SINGH, Captain (Life)
BAMBBAH, Captain C.J.S.
BARUA, Lieut Col S.P.
BAUNTHIYAL, Captain G.K.
BHAGWAN SINGH, Major
BHAJEKAR, Major C.G.C.
BHARAT PARKASH, Captain
BHASIN, Flt Lt A.
BHATTACHARYA, Captaiu N.K.
BIKRAM SINGH, Captain
BI HT, Captain R.R.S
CHAHL, Captain D.S.
CHAHAL, Captain J.S.
CHAKRABARTY, Captain B.
CHANDEL, Captain S.K.S.
CHATHLI, Major B.K.
CHATTERJEE, Major A.
CHATTERJEE, Captain T.
CHATURVEDI, Captain P.K.
CHAUHAN, Major K.K.
CHAUHAN, Major K.S.
CHHABRA, Captain V.K.
CIHIKORA, Captain A.S.
CHOPRA, Captain V.
DANIELS, Captain N M.
DARSHAN SINGH, Captain
DAS, Captain S.K.
DATAR, Captain A.G.
DATTA, Captain A.K.
DATTA, Captain V.
DATTA, Major V.K.
DAWAR, Captain G.
DHANARAJ, Captain S. (Life)
DHEENDSA, Captain R S.
DHILLON, Lieut A.S.
DHILLON, Major S S.
DOGRA, Captain M S.
ETTIAH, Captain M.K.
FRANCIS, Captain M.A.
GADEOCK, Captain N.K.
GAUR, Captain P.D.
GHOSH Major A.K.
GHOSH, Captain S.
GHOSHAL, Captain D.J.
GHUMMAN, Captain S.J.S.
GILL, Captain B.S.
GILL, Captain H.S.
GOPAL, Captain R.P.
GOPINATHAN, Captain K.

GOSWAMI, Flt Lt B.C.
GREWAL, Captain G.S.
GREWAL, Captain J.S
GROVER, Captain G.K.
GUPTA, Lieut G.L.
GUPTA, Captain R.K.
GUPTA, Major S.
GUPTA, Captain S.D.
GUPTA, Captain S K.
GUPTA, Captain V.K.
GURDEV SINGH, Captain
GURUNG, Captain P.B.
HARCHARAN SINGH, Captain
HARDESH KUMAR, Captain
HARJIT SINGH, Major
HOONJAN, Captain D.S.
HUBLE, Captain N.
INDRAJ SINGH, Captain
JACOB, Captain R.
JAGGIA, Captain P.K
JAIN, Flt Lt B.K.
JAIN, Captain Y K.
JASBIR SINGH, Captain
JAUHARI, Prof R.C.
JASWANT SINGH, Captain
JETLEY, Captain R.B.
JOGENDER SINGH, Captain
JOSHI, Captain P.
KAKATI, 2/Lieut D.C.
KALRA, Captain M.L.
KALRA, Captain N.
KALSY, Captain J S.
KANAL, Captain R.H.
KAPUR, Captain B.B
KAR, Captain N.R.
KARAI, Captain D.P.
KAUSHIK, Major J.R.
KAUSHIK, Captain R.P.
KHANNA, Lieut R.
KHURANA, Captain D.
KOCHAR, Captain M.S.
KOHLI, Captain J.S.
KOHLI, Captain K.K.
KRISHAN CHAND, Captain
KULDIP RAI, Captain
KULDIP SINGH, Captain
KUMAR, Captain N K.
KURUP, Captain S.K.
LAKHANPAL, Captain A.K.
LAKHMIR SINGH, Captain
LAKHWINDER SINGH, Major
MAC, Captain A.S.
MADAN, Captain V.
MAGO, Captain A K
MAHAJAN, Captain H.H.
MAKHNOTRA, Major H.K.
MALHI, Captain S.P.S
MALHOTRA, Major H S.
MALHOTRA, Captain P.K.
MALIK, Captain M.S.
MALIK, Captain S J.
MANDANNA, Captain M.K.
MANMEET SINGH, Lieut
MANN, Major A.S.
MATHAI, Lieut F.
MATHEWS, Captain K M.
MATHEWS, Captain K.P.
MEHROTRA, Captain R.
MEHTA, Major N.R.
MENON, Captain P.V.V.
MINHAS, Major K Y.S.
MISHRA, Captain J K.
MISHRA, Captain R S.
MISRA, Captain A.K.
MISRA, Major P.
MITTAL, Fg Offr A.K.
MOHANDAS, Flt Lt L.Y.
MOHINDER KUMAR, Captain
MOOKERJEE, Plt Offr S.
MOOKERJEE, Captain S.K.
MOORTHY, Captain R.S.
MUKERJEE, Captain N.S.
MURTHY, Captain K.S.N.
NAFDE, Plt Offr P.D. (Life)
NAIR, Captain M.V.P.
NARAYAN SINGH, Lieut

least twenty years and drank on an average three pints a night", seemed to have a tremendous amount of stamina. He was one of the successful summiters.

The radio was in regular use and some conversations have been reproduced from tape recordings showing what a vital role the radio played.

Chris Bonington has brought out the feelings of individuals well by including quotations, even whole chapters by the individuals themselves The chapter entitled "The Final Push" by Dougal Hoston is enthralling.

That some members believed in and had seen a 'Yeti' is mentioned in one of the early chapters.

It is not understandable why the expedition surveyor having computed a trigonometrical height checked its accuracy by an altimeter. An altimeter gives at best an approximate height correct to within 20 to 30 metres and so is really no check on trigonometrical work, unless the latter has not been carefully done. Actually altimeter heights should be checked against heights derived after triangulation i. e. trigonometrical heights, and not the other way around.

No members suffered from frost bite or severe exposure. This was because the leader had arranged for a wide choice of gear to enable individuals to select what they wanted. This worked.

There are useful appendices and a glossary at the end. What, for example, is a 'dead man' ? Not a man who is dead, but a snow anchor. However there are some incorrect transliterations in the Appendix on "The People of Nepal."

Apart from the tragedy, the book ends on a hopeful note. Those who helped to climb and those who climbed will find new challenges. The author for example, says "my life will be constant search for Annapurnas and, having found one, I shall feel forced to seek the next".

The illustrations are clear and well produced.

On the whole an excellent book and would serve as a work of reference for those planning ascents on any high Himalayan peaks.

J.A.F.D.

CORRESPONDENCE

Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

To
The Editor
'USI' JOURNAL
Kashmir House
Rajaji Marg
NEW DELHI-110011.

Sir,

IT is with interest that one reads Maj Gen KS Bajwa's article on "Military Leadership And the Changing Social Ethos" in your Sep 78 issue.

To-day's officer cadre, coming as it does from mainly the middle, and even lower middle class, and self-centred that it is because of the changing socio-economic melieu, as rightly diagnosed by the author, is increasingly careerist in outlook and action. It wants to do well, rise higher, earn more pay as well as better recognition. It can be brazenly ambitious. There is tremendous competition, throat-cutting and one-upmanship, with means that tend to become ruthless and even foul, transgressing decorum and sense of self respect. Concern for getting what is thought to be its right often drowns the lean straw of its obligation to the profession and even to the comrades. Although the picture may not be so bleak as yet as the above suggests, yet one cannot help witnessing the oncoming shadows cast by such an ethos gripping the officer cadre. Such a viciously competitive environment throws up some salient features which are discussed in succeeding paras.

The Atmosphere. The competitive atmosphere, high ambition and urge to do better, if harnessed properly, have a high potential for improving the professional standards of the officer cadre. Increased and increasing tension are the ambience of the day, of our socio-economic and political life. But it is also equally true that

it is tension which drives mankind to adjust, to improve, to struggle, to find answers and to strike balance with the environment.

Changed Concepts. The concepts of integrity, loyalty, camaraderie etc have to be founded on more pragmatic grounds. For instance, take loyalty. Loyalty to whom ? To the individual, to the superior, to the cause, to the prefession or to everything ? The generally understood concept of loyalty is that one should be loyal to the superior. The superior officer tells you so. But isn't it a restricted view ? Shouldn't one be loyal to the institution. profession, or to that "Something" which is above the individual, above the superior ? Isn't it time we gave our loyalty to that something higher? But then, in so doing what if you annoy the individual, the superior ? Does the superior, who assesses you, who virtually controls your destiny through his reports, identity himself and merge with that "something higher"? Does he convince you of his identification and merger with it ? Unless the superior who controls your destiny through ACRs changes his concepts of integrity, loyalty etc and does so convincingly the rat-race of his underlings will continue unabated.

Inadequate Assessment. There apparently are some serious inadequacies in ou mode of assessment. Boldness, knowledge, integrity, loyalty, initiative, calmness and so on have to be assessed not merely under peace time conditions, but far more so under conditions of stress, strain, uncertainty, fatigue and discomfort. It is because of this inadequacy that a large number of officers, who work only when they know that it matters or when they can catch the eyes of the superiors who matter, get away with their dangerous kinks and go places in the professional heirarchy. Such instances proliferate in our present competitive environment, and whip up even those who are less inclined to follow suit.

Reappraisal of Reporting. There ought to be a reappraisal of our ethos of reporting on the subordinates and units. Are our peace time norms and guidelines, of which there is a plethora in the form of instructions and pamphlets, adequate to realistically assess individuals and units for their fitness professionally and for war ? In spirit perhaps yes, but in practice not quite so. As it is, it is pretty difficult to create war-time conditions to carry out such assessment. This is further compounded by a sense of being farther away from the probabilities of war during one's tenure of command, whereby considerations other than hard requirements of war start becoming arbiters of competence. Bullshit proliferates. "Looking after superiors" predominates. Yesmanship becomes expedient. Social pandering becomes compelling. Golf and bridge help catch the eyes

of those who matter. Showmanship is literally let loose at the cost of the unit or formation HQ. Under this floodlight of hypocrisy, bullshit and pandering the professional incompetence is carefully and effectively hidden and the gates to professional advancement tapped. Units and formations tend to be judged more by the relations between their commanders and superiors than by their inherent professional efficiency.

Interpretation of Restrictions Notwithstanding the commendable record of maintaining itself and the army apolitical since Independence, the officer cadre of today is becoming increasingly subject to the pulls, pressures, compulsions and vicissitudes of political, economic and social trends There are increasing number of complaints of one kind or another. There have been disturbing incidents of espionage There have been letters written by servicemen and exservicemen to the press. The behaviour of politicians, industrialists, workers, policemen, bureaucrats, technocrats, students, religionists, private profiteers and other national fibres is there for everybody to see. In this environment how long and how effectively will the officer cadre yet keep aloof and be controlled by the strictures of security and shackles of the curtailment of certain liberties provided in the constitution? Shouldn't the spirit of security and curtailment of liberties be realistically interpreted to suit the changed times?

Social Standing. There is the delicate question of balancing not merely the mundane emoluments aspect but also the somehow inescapable oriental criterion of "prestige" in highlighting the rung of the officer cadre in our societel ladder. This is further complicated by the interaction of such realities as our being a developing nation, over populated, with gigantic under-employment problems and the rehabilitation of officers after being eased out or super-annuated. If professional competence is to be one of the pillars of the ethos of the officer cadre, as it indeed should be, then the superceded officers have to be given a fair chance at appropriate stage in their career to opt out of service and seek resettlement elsewhere more profitably. For this his resale value, and hence prestige, have to be adequately built up and projected. For instance, why should it not be a regular feature to send certain officers, on deputation to say civil administration jobs in the bordering districts, public undertakings, educational institutions (on lecturing/teaching/research assignments), anthropological/geological surveys and so on? Such deputations as appear to exist today are exceptional, a trickle, which do not go far in contributing to the ethos of the officer cadre.

Army Officer's Wife. Today's army officer's wife has become as much a competitive creature as the husband. She too wants her husband to do well; she too wants to enjoy the aura of prestige; she want's to make the best of the limited opportunities she gets to stay with her husband between his commutation to and from field areas. She is increasingly the driving force behind her husband. She too earns and serves; and has a lot to contribute to the welfare of the serviceman and his family in general and to her husband's mental, moral and psychological well-being in particular. Unseen and unheard she weilds considerable influence on the tension-maturity, grace-efficiency, ambition-devotion, throat-cutting sacrifice balance scales. Her increased independent demeanour and resentment of the inevitable seepage of her husband's senior junior relationship into her feminine company of other-officer's wives do affect the tone of the officer, particularly the senior, whose wife can be as authoritarian as her irascible husband and who can put pressing demands on the junior officer's wife. These are equally the causes of friction in the army officer's club life, his so called social life. Better understanding between officers, better social graces, better education in self-restraint, increased maturity and greater sense of friendship and camaraderie can be built by that inescapable human need called socialising, only if tensions are absent or considerably eased and humanism predominates in such intercourse. This kind of atmosphere is precisely what is lacking in our social functions; and which is far more acute than the mere outward pinch of a few rupees extra going down the drain of pomp, show, bombast and general futility. The senior officer and his wife have to set the tone in this sphere, in spite of that noble belief that like charity all good examples must start at home.

SC Sardeshpande Lt Ceonll

HQ 29 Inf Bde
C/o 56 APO
22 Jun 79

Secretary's Notes

ENROLMENT OF UNITS/FORMATIONS AS SUBSCRIBERS TO THE USI JOURNAL

The Council of the Institution had approved wef 1 January 1978 the enrolment of Units/Formations as subscribers to the Journal on long terms basis on concessional rates as follows :

For 2 years	...	Rs 75/-
For 3 years	...	,, 110/-
For 4 years	...	,, 140/-
For 5 years	...	,, 170/-

Although the number of subscribers to the Journal almost doubled itself from 27 to 486 in 1978, this is far below the target of 1000 subscribers which we had expected because of the concession given above. I would request all Units/Formations who subscribe to the Journal to popularise the concessional scheme thereby helping the officers to acquire the habit of reading and improve upon their professional knowledge. This not only helps the Institution financially but also makes this more than 100 years old Journal on Defence affairs a forum where Service officers can project their thinking freely and frankly on professional matters of their choice.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE JOURNAL

I continue to urge through these notes that officers must write articles for the USI Journal but the response has been very poor, which makes my task difficult Once again I would request members and other officers to write for the Journal putting forth new ideas on vast field of professional subjects. I assure them that I will do my best to publish these articles where new worthwhile ideas have been expressed. I would also welcome letters critically examining the various articles which appear in the Journal, so that all points of views get known, which is the only way in which we can get full grasp of the expanding knowledge of defence and security.

RENEWAL OF SUBSCRIPTIONS

Lastly, I request members not to forget to renew their membership and promptly send their annual subscription. Better still if they convert their Ordinary Membership into Life Membership by paying only Rs. 250/- once in life time and not be bothered to send subscription year after year The Life subscription has been increasing due to rise in the case of postage, paper and printing and it would be to the benefit of officers to become Life members *now* and not regret later if the subscription takes an upward turn

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BAKSHI, Major A.K.
BAKSHI, Captain P R.
BAL, Captain K S.
BAL, Major S.S.
BALVINDER SINGH, Captain (Life)
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Printed at Kapur Printing Press, 64, Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi-110020.