

# U.S.I. JOURNAL

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Big Business Versus The Army — The Myth and the Reality — *Lt Col Brajendra Singh*

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APRIL - JUNE 1983

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## Matching Programs and Strategies to the Threat\*

Dov S. ZAKHEIM\*\*

IT is a distinct pleasure for me to be with you this after-noon. Although I have done considerable research into issues affecting this critical part the of world, it is the first time that I have visited the sub-continent. My stay here is a short one—only three days—but it is the start of what I hope will be many future encounters.

The United Service Institution has a long and distinguished history, and I very much appreciate the opportunity to lay before you the conceptual underpianings of our strategy, policy and programs.

Two years ago, American voters elected Ronald Reagan as their President in part because of his strong Commitment to revitalizing our national defense. Since November 1980, however, economic and political pressures have put the Administration to the test of demonstrating the sincerity of that commitment. I believe that we have done so, because the underlying reasons for that commitment—the ominous trends pointing to a disparity in militray power between the Soviet Union and the United States--have certainly not disappeared. Indeed, if anything, events worldwide demonstrate that no contingency, however small, can be totally dismissed outright, and that readiness and strength are a prerequisite to the successful protection of our own interests worldwide.

I should like, therefore, to outline for you our assessment of the nature of Soviet military developments, our formulation of a strategy to cope with those developments, and the programs that we have supported in order to realize the strategy we pursue.

This Administration perceives that there has been a significant shift in the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union since the beginning of the 1970s. I can best portray for you the nature of that shift if I can first take you back, for a moment,

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\*Remarks to the United Services Institution of India, November 25, 1982.

\*\*Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).

to the period prior to the Vietnam War. At the time the United States enjoyed a considerable advantage in strategic nuclear forces. In the early 1960s, for example, we developed and deployed a force of strategic ballistic missile submarines, all of them nuclear powered and, therefore, able to operate under the sea and in a manner invisible to the Soviets. Our bomber force was relatively modern, while our land-based missile force was considerably superior in accuracy to that of the Soviets.

Our conventional forces, though outnumbered in certain areas, particularly with respect to land forces in Europe and elsewhere, were nevertheless acknowledged to be superior because of the considerable progress that we and our allies had achieved in applying technology to military weapons systems. Our Navy was superior to that of any other, while that of the Soviets was primarily a coastal force, geared to the defense of the Soviet homeland against a so-called imperialist amphibious attack that, of course, never materialized.

The times have certainly changed, perhaps most markedly with respect to the realm of strategic nuclear forces. We can no longer even seek, much less achieve, strategic superiority. Instead, we are trying to maintain parity with the Soviets' awesome strategic might. Why this change, and how did it take place? The answer is that while we chose to maintain our strategic offensive forces at roughly the level they had reached by the end of the 1960s, the Soviets continued to build and develop the capabilities of their forces and we simply did not keep pace with them. While we refrained from building highly accurate, large throw-weight, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Soviets have increased the accuracy of their much larger missiles. Although we were the first to develop multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—MIRVs—they developed their own technology far earlier than we had anticipated. Although we were the first to deploy ballistic missile submarines, they quickly followed suit. They have modernized their missile force, their bomber Force, their submarine Force.

They have improved upon what has for some time been the largest, most complex, air defense system in the world, while ours was permitted to decline. They are continuing to improve their anti-submarine warfare capabilities. So we now find that they have the potential to destroy much of our land-based missile force in one premeditated attack; that they can seriously weaken the effect of any bomber attack on their homeland; that we must improve our ability to defend our airspace, and to ensure the timely and sustained operation of our command and control system, if we are to be in a

position to retaliate effectively against what the Soviets might hope would be a strike to end a war in a flash—and in their favour.

It is these concerns that have prompted the President's strategic forces program. Without the MX missile, our ability to counterpunch the Soviets from land-based missile sites is highly questionable. Without an improved B-1 bomber we would be left with an aging B-52 force whose ability to penetrate Soviet airspace, and, therefore, whose credibility as a deterrent, would be highly dubious. Without a revitalized air defense program we would be creating incentives for the Soviets to lay greater stress on the modernization of their bomber force, which in any event is progressing apace. Without improvements in command and control, we could be at a severe loss to identify and respond effectively to an initial attack and to continue to function coherently in its aftermath.

Needless to say, the concerns to which these programs respond render irrelevant an approach, however well-meaning it might be, that emphasizes the freezing of nuclear weapons. For a freeze would stabilize for all time the strategic imbalance that now exists. More damaging still, it would enable the Soviets to pursue conventional defenses against our systems—such as air defense and anti-submarine warfare (and it is our ballistic missile submarines that are least vulnerable to Soviet destruction)—while we could not develop the offensive systems required to offset or obviate those defenses.

We do have an arms control policy, however, and it complements our strategic forces program. Our approach to arms control is that we seek to achieve agreements that diminish the risks of war and help to reduce the threat to our security and the security of our allies. Cosmetic agreements—those that merely legitimate a further build-up of Soviet military power—are not in our national interest. In sharp contrast, an agreement that reduces substantially the weapons on both sides—particularly the most threatening and destabilizing ones—in an equitable and verifiable manner would constitute a major step down the long road to diminishing the likelihood of conflict at all levels of violence. That we remain unalterably committed to this was confirmed by the President's announcement of our far-reaching "START" initiative, and of the subsequent negotiations that we have undertaken with the Soviet Union.

It is unrealistic to believe, however, that the Soviet Union will ever agree to equal limits at lower levels unless its leaders are first persuaded that the United States is otherwise determined to maintain

equality at higher levels. Only when they are convinced beyond doubt that we are truly committed to rebuilding our strength in this vital area will they have any incentive to negotiate seriously on strategic arms reductions. We believe that our strategic modernization program will provide the Soviets strong incentives to make impending discussions meaningful. But, if we terminate our efforts unilaterally, we will never get the Soviets to engage in real arms reductions. Thus our strategic program not only bolsters our ability to deter war, it also enhances our ability to negotiate agreements that will diminish the threat to our security.

The situation is no less pressing, and the dangers of policy error no less rife, with respect to that other realm of nuclear weaponry, intermediate nuclear forces. Here, too, we find that Soviet developments have placed Europe in a particularly vulnerable position via-a-vis Soviet missiles, especially the SS-20, a mobile missile with three warheads and with the range to hit every Western European capital quite accurately even when fired from behind the Ural Mountains. We currently have no equivalent whatsoever to the more than 300 SS-20 missiles that the Soviets have already deployed. We are developing cruise missiles and the Pershing II ballistic missiles. When deployed in Europe, these missiles threaten the Soviet Union's homeland from European territory, thereby correcting the imbalance that now effects our European allies, and, by a not very long extension, ourselves.

We recognize that it would be in the best interest of all if we did not have to deploy our new systems to Europe. The President has therefore offered not to deploy them, if the Soviets dismantle the Missiles that are the primary cause for the current imbalance. No number is better than zero where the control of arms is concerned. If the Soviets are as serious about controlling arms as they keep telling us they are, they will agree that eliminating the missiles that threaten Europe, as well as those which they feel will threaten them, is the only way to go.

I have been quite grim about the current state of nuclear balance, and have pointed to the urgent need for implementing our strategic program in particular. The problems are no less awesome, and the need to implement our solutions no less urgent, in the conventional sphere.

Let me turn first to the nature of our problem, and then describe the strategy and programs that we hope will go a long way to solving it.

We no longer have the luxury we once did of assuming that we could defeat an adversary anywhere we might have to take him on. Perhaps in the past we didn't have that luxury either. But now we know we do not have it. We confront a Soviet Union that has not sacrificed its superiority in manpower and in quantities of equipment while, at the same time, it has significantly improved upon the effectiveness of that equipment. Whether one discusses tanks such as the T-72 and T-80, (whose armor and firepower at a minimum matches those of Western tanks) personnel carriers such as the BMD (which is air transportable, carries anti-tank missiles, a gun and a small complement of troops), the BRDM, which is like the BMD but can be *dropped* from the air, anti-air guns such as the ZSU-23, a host of air defense missiles, or more mundane items like engineering equipment, one is stunned by the tremendous advances in quality that the Soviets have realized. With it all, the Soviets maintain their quantitative advantage—for example, the Warsaw Pact has a 3 to 1 advantage it takes over NATO.

These qualitative advances have perhaps been most significant in the spheres of maritime forces and tactical aviation, for they have permitted the Soviets to assume new military missions that previously were beyond their capability. Soviet development of swing-wing bombers such as the MIG-27 and SU 24 with larger payloads, and longer combat radii, enables them to focus not merely on air defense in Europe, but on the sorts of interdiction missions that Western air forces previously had reserved for themselves. Soviet development of missile armed helicopters such as the MI-24 has allowed them to perfect their own tactics for air mobility in a field that, again, had once been the sole province of the West. Soviet warships such as the nuclear powered Kirov—the world's largest and most powerful battlecruiser, and the Kiev class carriers, which deploy fixed wing aircraft that take-off vertically—now provide the USSR with far more than a defensive posture against American aircraft carriers, or with a token presence in far off seas. To be sure, the threat to our carriers has grown as well, given continued Soviet development both of capable cruise missile submarines such as the Charlie class variant and now the Oscar, and of attack boats—also nuclear powered—such as the Victor. The blue water fleet that the Soviets have developed means that they can—and have—used their Navy to support adventures by their surrogates in areas such as Africa, raising the stakes for the U.S. if it hoped to intervene. Finally, the Soviets have developed the large and capable air transport fleet that was so prominent in the

attack upon Afghanistan and the lift of supplies to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa War of 1977-78.

As a result of these developments, and of clever Soviet use of Cuban and East German surrogates, not to mention the invasion of Afghanistan and the massing of about 25 divisions along the borders of Soviet Central Asia, we have been forced to reevaluate both our strategy and our programs in order to respond to the demands that the protection of our Allies, interests and citizens abroad place upon us.

As many of you may know, for many years we have pursued a strategy that assumed that we could compartmentalize the conflicts we might become involved in. We called it a one-and-one-half war strategy. Of course, one cannot fight a half war. What was really meant was that we would have the capability to fight in a less demanding conflict somewhere outside of Europe and not necessarily involving the Soviets, as well as a worldwide conflict against the Warsaw Pact with Central Europe as the primary, but not only, battle theater. Growing Soviet capability worldwide, and the requirement that we protect our interests in the Persian Gulf, a region that is roughly half-way around the world from us, has forced us to reevaluate that strategy. We have reached a number of conclusions:

—First, and most obviously, whatever our strategy we must build up our forces in both quality and quantity beyond their current levels.

Second, we can no longer be rooted in a fixed, easily predictable strategy that on a grand scale virtually telegraphs to Soviet planners what our every move might be.

—Third, we cannot permit the defensive posture from which we operate in peacetime to color our wartime operations. We will never start a war. But if the Soviets do want to start one, they cannot expect us to remain on the defensive throughout the campaign. We certainly will do everything we can to stop their initial thrusts, but we reserve the right to counterpunch, when and where it might be to our advantage.

—Fourth, and following upon the preceding points, we must be more flexible in our ability to cope with threats worldwide. The Persian Gulf region is NATO's soft underbelly. We must defend it if we are to ensure Europe's economic viability and political cohesion. But we cannot isolate the Persian Gulf as some sort of half war. A conflict there could spread to Europe. On the other hand, such a local conflict could by itself be a

very demanding contingency, given the massive Soviet deployments along the borders of Iran and Turkey, as well as in Afghanistan. Moreover, there is no guarantee that were we required to commit forces in the Persian Gulf, other potential adversaries would sit by and await its outcome before they acted against our interests elsewhere. It is not at all obvious that North Korea, or Cuba, or other unfriendly states plan their strategies on the basis of what might or might not happen in the Gulf—indeed, they might be encouraged to act at a time when they perceived us to be preoccupied by another contingency. Only a more flexible strategy can enable us to maintain a deterrent that is credible in all regions to which we might have to commit forces.

—Fifth, Europe must remain the centerpiece of our strategy. It is a common misperception that for some reason we are downgrading our commitment to defend Europe. This motion is patently absurd. Why should we be so concerned about the Persian Gulf, whose petroleum is far more vital to Europe's economies than to ours, if Europe has become less important to us? In fact, flexibility, solidly grounded in our current commitments—notably that which calls for our reinforcement of Europe so as to achieve a total of ten divisions and sixty squadrons within ten days of mobilization—would only enhance those commitments.

—Sixth, we cannot tolerate the erosion of our maritime strength. For years what we termed our margin of superiority, measured not on a simplistic ship by ship basis—because we never outnumbered the soviet fleet—but on an aggregate qualitative basis, became slimmer and slimmer. There is no margin now. What we must have is the ability to dominate those waters—and not every ocean or sea—that are of vital importance to us. I should add that I mean not merely warships, but the sealift that many of those warships would be expected to protect.

What has recently taken place in the South Atlantic reinforces many of the principles of our strategy that I have just outlined. The requirements placed upon the British—in addition to all the other commitments they had—clearly demonstrated the futility of positing a strategy on the basis of a neat compartmentalization of conflicts more appropriate to the musings of an analyst than to the real world in which we live. Flexibility is the only means by which we can respond to the demands of the moment without vitiating our ability to cope with longer term concerns elsewhere in the world that could at any time erupt into other, simultaneous contingencies.

The South Atlantic crisis has also vindicated our approach to sea power. Many pundits have overly focused on the loss of surface

ships to cruise missiles. Such losses are to be expected in combat. The central question is whether the probability of those losses is magnified because surface ships have to operate without the benefit of adequate early warning, or minimized through a combination of size and defense in depth. Our concept of naval warfare stresses the latter concerns, precisely because we have been aware for years of the potency of the cruise missile and of the need to defeat it through both active and passive defenses. While the pundits ponder the implications of the Sheffield, serious naval observers already drew those implications and acted upon them nearly 15 years ago, when a Soviet Styx missile sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat. A number of small countries, Israel included, responded to that event by building small, short range torpedo boats. The United States, with greater resources, far-flung commitments, and the ability to provide air cover for its surface forces, responded in its turn by refining its concepts of defense in depth and enhancing its naval electronic countermeasures capabilities. Our current program furthers our efforts of the past decade.

How are we realizing our strategy? We are fielding new land systems—the M-1 tank, the M-2 Abrams and M-3 Bradley armored fighting vehicle systems. The Patriot air defense missile, the Apache attack helicopter—to name just a few. These systems, coupled with the improvements that we anticipate in the forces of our Allies and friends, will enable us to offset the quantitative advantage that the Soviets have in land forces systems, and to cut into the ratio of production in areas such as the fielding of new tanks, which currently favors the Soviets by about 2.5 to one.

We are planning to build two additional aircraft carriers, and to reintroduce four battleships to the fleet. By the way, the battleships are not ancient at all, as some claim, they all have about 12 or fewer years of service life. They will have 32 Tomahawks—they may ultimately get V/STOL. We will then be able to bring to bear significant sea based firepower against onshore targets in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same time, we will be able to maintain important deployments without subjecting our crews, and the systems they man, to impossible strains that arise from overworking in stressful environments far from home.

We are continuing the modernization of our tactical air forces, and seeking economies in the process of doing so. Again our goal is to cut into Soviet production advantages that, with respect to what we call "Tac Air", currently are as great as 2.3 to 1 in the fighter production category.

Finally, and critically important to a strategy that emphasizes flexibility, we are enhancing our ability to lift forces to remote areas both by land and sea as quickly as possible. Lift is the key to the effectiveness of our Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. We have recognized that we need considerable lift sooner, rather than later, if we are to mount a credible deterrent both to the Soviets and to others who might threaten our interests and those of our allies in the region we term southwest Asia.

Our answer to the demand for lift to ensure the timely arrival of the RDJTF in the Gulf region has been a manifold one. First, we have cancelled the CX—which was meant to increase our airlift capacity, but was only going to become available in 1987. Instead, we are asking for additional procurement of the world's largest airlifter—the C-5—whose capability was most demonstrably underlined during the airlift to Israel in 1973. By producing the C-5, we not only acquire a giant airlifter whose problems have all been worked out over the years, we also get 17 more of them by 1988 than we would have had if the CX were procured. At 100 plus tons capacity per plane, 17 aircraft is a lot of lift. In addition, we are also planning to acquire over 40 KC-10 tanker planes. These aircraft are military versions of the DC-10, and they can carry a considerable amount of fuel. Because larger airlifters can be refueled in the air, the acquisition of the KC-10s means that C-5s and the somewhat smaller C-141s needn't land on their way to the Middle East. Landing is time consuming, and can often result in unexpected breakdowns. On the other hand, if aerial refueling is possible, airlifters can load up with more cargo, relying on refueling rather than on the capacity of their own tanks. The net result of all this is more airlift and faster airlift—available to the United States sooner for the support of its interests and those of its friends and allies in Southwest Asia.

But I am not finished yet. We are also proceeding apace with improving our ability to reinforce by sea. The problem with sealift is that while ships can carry more, they move more slowly. We cannot create ships that fly. But we are buying—at bargain prices—eight ships that can move at 33 knots—some 40 land miles an hour. These ships could carry equipment for an entire U.S. mechanized division to the Persian Gulf in about two weeks. In addition, we are increasing the number of ships in our Ready Reserve Fleet from 27 to 40. These slower moving ships would be ready for deployment 5 to 10 days after an order to deploy, and would provide our forces with timely support and reinforcement.

We are also continuing our efforts to secure better enroute access to the Gulf region. We have asked our European allies for their support, and are actively examining ways to improve facilities between the continental United States and the Middle East. We hope that our arrangements with our NATO allies, particularly those along the Mediterranean, will further enhance our rapid deployment capability to southwest Asia.

I have spoken at some length, and in some detail, about our program and why we have framed it the way we have.

There are of course, many more aspects that I would be pleased to touch on during the discussion period. Let me conclude by saying that we certainly recognize the magnitude of the expenditures that the strategy I have described to you implies. We have scrutinized each and every program, and made difficult decisions. The Soviets do not have the dilemma we face; totalitarian societies do not worry about the domestic welfare of their citizens, nor do they view defense as insurance for the protection of that welfare. We do, and it is for that reason that we have attempted to put a halt to the relative decline in our defense capability. For it is nothing other than the security and welfare of our citizens—which is the prime concern of our democratic system—as it is of yours and of all democracies—that ultimately is at stake.

# Concept and Environment of National Security

MAJOR GENERAL MN RAWAT

"When war comes it dominates our lives...It challenges virtually every institution of society-the justice and equity of its economy, the adequacy of its political systems, the energy of its productive plants and wisdom and purposes of its foreign policy."

—Walter Millis

## INTRODUCTION

WE as a Nation have seldom paid serious attention to the subject of National Security in our country. The result has been that from the times of Alexander's invasion the indigenous powers have been found to be unprepared against foreign armies. The invading hordes of Kushan, Scythians, Huns, Muslim rulers of petty states and small European powers who had utilised their economic surpluses to buttress their political ambitions with modern and strong armed forces for those times have succeeded in their designs with a regular monotony. Local population has never seriously opposed an invading army throughout our recorded history. Even since independence, "India has been forced to use its armed forces on five occasions against external powers and for preservation of our internal security in Nagaland, Telengana, Naxalbari, Mizoram and on numerous occasions in aid to civil power. If we wish to learn from history, and do not wish it to be repeated with such regular frequency, we will have to pay a lot more attention to national security. No nation has been able to achieve development without ensuring secure environments against stresses and strains posed by the international power system. While we have achieved a viable and vibrant political set up by means of adult franchise, federal constitution and social control of economy, we have not been able to do the same in the sphere of national security.

## CONCEPT ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Walter Lipmann has defined security in the following terms and I quote 'A nation has security, when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to

maintain them by war." National security has to be the concern of every citizen who values the sovereignty of his country. It over-rides all other considerations, for without secure environs, an individual or society cannot live and develop in lawful freedom. The technological revolution of the current century coupled with far-reaching political, sociological and economic changes that have swept the world has made the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threats a very complex problem. Henry Kissinger has stated that "National Security Policy...In its widest sense, comprises every action by which a society seeks to assure its survival or to realise its aspirations internationally." The basic factors that govern national security are political, technological, economic, psychological and social, we will discuss these separately.

#### POLITICAL

The important aspects of political factor that affect national security are:-

(a) *Dynamic International Relations.* The problem of security is inextricably linked with the development of nation-states. Nation states like England, France, Germany, Russia, Japan and United States during their development came in conflict with the existing environment and had to earn their eventual place in the hierarchy of nation-states after a series of wars. As a developing nation possessing the second largest population, the third largest technical manpower and being capable of changing the existing hierarchy of the Nation-States, India is bound to come into conflict with International environment. Conflict with superpowers which desire status quo and with those powers who may have to go down to ladder is, therefore, inevitable unless we reconcile to retain subordinate status in international environment at the cost of our national interests.

(b) *Superpower Interests.* The superpowers have kept the international political environment in a state of flux as they move from the era of confrontation and containment towards detente and strategic arms limitation and again to gaining spheres of influence and proxy wars. Most of the recorded 150 conflicts since 1945 whether national or international have been as a direct result of interaction between superpowers. It should be quite evident that Cuba could not have posed threats to countries in Africa without active support it received from a superpower nor could Pakistan become a threat to India without active support it received earlier from USA and lately from USA and China. China's efforts to achieve a major power status and parallism that USA sees in her gaining a sphere of influence in SE and South Asia similar to one that USSR achieved by Brezhnev Doctrine after Helsinki accords of Nov

1975, will influence the security environments for India for a long time to come.

(c) *Internal Events of Neighbours.* Pushing of millions of East Bengali refugees into India in 1971 which threatened communal harmony of our country was a subtle threat to our internal values and thus to our security. Similarly, our successful elections and formation of linguistic states which contributed to our national stability gave rise to similar demands leading to the first ever election in Pakistan in December 1970 and its eventual bifurcation. Honest elections conducted by India in March 1977 again led to considerable disturbances and to the present military rule there. Similarly, Chinese model is considered a threat by some nation states who have certain contradictions in society and consequent vulnerabilities. President Nasser's coming to power in Egypt had important repercussions in other neighbouring states.

(d) *Diplomatic Pressures.* Countries which are prone to subversion may face threats to their security from within aided or abetted by external encouragement or material aid. The coups engendered in Iran, Gautemaland Chile in 1950's by the Central Intelligence Agency of USA are common knowledge. So is the training and material aid given to Naga and Mizo hostiles by China and Pakistan. Similarly, pressure was applied to India to arrive at a settlement with Pakistan on Kashmir when we were looking for arms aid from the Western powers in 1962. Numerous examples of such political pressures directly or indirectly applied are available in the history of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia.

(e) *National Aspirations.* In addition, national aspirations may change with changes in external or internal environment and these will also help to shape the evolution of a national security policy. We cannot today depend on aid from the United States like we got in 1962. Article IX of the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty can also be nullified by the Chinese acceptance of "No War Pact" offered by USSR on numerous occasions. We have, therefore, to depend on self reliance. The simplistic faith of our elites that we will be rescued whenever hard pressed by one or the other superpower must now be changed to a more concrete foundation. Similarly, we will have to evolve a satisfactory solution to reconcile the aspirations of minorities, linguistic and tribal groups and regional centrifugal tendencies.

#### TECHNOLOGICAL

Advanced nations today safeguard their technological secrets more intensely than their military secrets. Transfer of technology is used today to gain influence over the receiver-country's policies, to make for scale of economies in the donor-country or to increase their

own employment. The more advanced a technology is, the more difficult it is to get on commercial terms. The acquisition of less sophisticated technology, however, poses a problem of fast obsolescence. Nuclear as well as sophisticated conventional weapons can be produced by only a few industrialised nations. The twin pillars of military power in this country are mass production and large scale research. Until World War II the former was all important but increasingly military power today flows from organised research, science-based industries, highly skilled workers and the brain power of scientists, engineers and managers. While escalating cost of arms race is a significant factor in the US-Soviet detente and Strategic Arms Limitation or Reduction Talks, there has been a brisk international traffic in weapons. Nations, therefore, do not appear to have abjured the use of force to settle their international problems.

While we got full-scale plants for manufacturing products, we have not acquired the associated design technologies to be able to go forward from these, especially in the desired fields. Our economic and scientific plans were not matched earlier and even now have not been made by an integrated planning forum. Both economic and science and technology plans had been conceived and executed without regard to their implications on National Security. Defence has not only been considered separate from development, but our intellectual elite have been fed on the impression that they are mutually exclusive and even contradictory. While we have concentrated on import substitution, we have not given attention to give direction to original research and development. We can acquire self-sufficiency in technology soon, provided we import the best design technology in the desired fields and develop these further by earmarking our best scientific talent and enough economic resources to retain the state of art. We should not then have to take recourse to future imports of technology or finished products in vital sectors of our economy and for national security needs like we had been forced to import various generations of aircrafts, tanks, steel mills and electronic components. Technological independence alone can avoid diplomatic pressure from industrialised countries.

Technology has also increased man's ability to feed himself and create a better life for his family and society. It has helped to spread the word of these advances further and faster than ever before. It has, therefore, created a revolution of rising expectations. If one political system will not satisfy these aspirations then another will and if it is not readily available by peaceful means then violence will

appear to be justified to younger generations. Technology has, by increasing cost, speed and frequency of change, has reduced the value of custom, tradition and precedent as standards of international behaviour, lessened the predictability of actions and thus helped to make international balance and stability far more fragile.

#### ECONOMIC

Foreign aid and investments have been used as a potent instrument for exercising political influence on developing nations. Foreign aid, like in our case of PL-480 aid, had increased dependence on the donor country. The green revolution only started after PL-480 shipments of grain had been cut off. Dangers from foreign investments as exemplified by ITT, an American firm in Chile and Union Miniere in Congo are too well-known to need an explanation. Restrictive trade practices also come in the way of development of third world countries and all the efforts of UNCTAD have come to little avail to-date.

Even though economic potential and finance is the vital nerve of war, in the age of sharp, short conflicts, it is clear that industrial potential has lost a great deal of its significance. After the outbreak of a short conflict the side whose forces in being, are superior will gain a decisive advantage. The age which permitted mobilisation of potential resources like in World War II is gone for ever. Even in the World War II economic might of the allies was of no avail till 1943. Economic might of France and USA did not win them victory in the jungles of Vietnam.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL

The desire for security is motivated by fear. The fear of a threat, generates the desire to have power. We should be able to realistically assess potential long and short term threats to our security, so that we could develop a balance of power against them as also to make intervention by their more powerful allies too costly to be acceptable to their people. The nature of such power in our case need not have offensive capability as we have no desire to covet others territory or the necessity to impose our will on others. We will, however, need to develop 'defensive' as well as 'deterrent' power, the former being "the ability of a state to avoid coercion by another" and the second meaning "the ability to present certain threats or actions from being carried out by posing an equivalent or greater threat". Precautionary defensive policy and deterrence would, therefore, mean the capability to take preventive action to curb an aggression. We need not and should not adopt a purely defensive policy

like waiting for an enemy to come upto 'Panipat' before taking action. Precautionary defensive policy which Britain followed, to ensure that Antwerp or Tibet were not occupied by a potentially hostile power, should be adopted, as by the time the opponents' intention becomes clear, it may be too late to affect them.

Similarly, deterrence depends upon aggressor's assessment of risks and operates not on credibility but uncertainty. If aggressor has even a reasonable doubt that the defender will retaliate, he is unlikely to launch his aggressive design. If deterrence is successful, aggression does not take place. An effective deterrent strategy thus has an inbuilt pressures to strengthen the arguments of those who argue that a defence effort is unnecessary. We often hear the later argument in our press and inspired comments by our so called experts. We should, however, remember President Kennedy's words "Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year spent on weapons.....is essential to keep the peace."

#### SOCIAL

Social stresses and strains impinge on the quality and solidarity of human resources and the competence and character of the leadership it throws up. Elites under Chiang-Ki-Shek and Tsars ignored the interest of the nation and satisfaction of their sectoral interests alone led to revolutions. Even in the past indigenous empires and kingdoms have over run by invading hordes due to passiveness of our common people. The area South of R Kaveri where people opposed the invading hordes of Samudra Gupta, Malik Kaphur, Allaudin Khilji and Aurangzeb could maintain its independence till British were able to sow dissensions. We have in the past been treating the interests of our power elites as synonymous with those of our nation. Thirtytwo years of planning has shown that the income disparities have grown and so has the unemployment. We have to develop a commonality of interests between the elites and the masses so that we develop a society which is viable, has united and dedicated human resources and which throws up competent leaders with strength of character to evolve a credible and self-reliant policy for development and National Security.

#### THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL POWER

It is frequently assumed that a nation's power is simply the sum of its tangible and intangible resources. This definition, however, fails to do justice to the concept of power. When two nations have equal capabilities to wipe each other from the face of earth, their

power vis-a-vis each other would be nil. That happened in the bipolar world of 1950s and 60s and this allowed comparative freedom of action to smaller states. The relational and psychological aspect of power is crucial. Real power of a nation depends on what other nations perceive it to be. Some time a leading nation might by doubly careful not to provoke an irresponsible leader of some smaller state like Idi Amin of Uganda or wait deliberately for the right time to exploit favourable environmental conditions. However, in an emergency or in anticipation of conflict, it is the capabilities that count. The physical capabilities of a nation depend upon tangible factors like geography, natural resources, size, population, economy, technological advancement, social and political stability and institutional framework of Government. None of these, however, are decisive by themselves. Russia whose vast size and climate defeated Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon and Hitler, was in 1904 brought low in a naval battle by tiny Japan. Similarly, mere possession of natural resources is, by no means, decisive, for example, Brazil. Afghanistan and Congo are not global powers inspite of having rich natural resources. It is the use that a nation is able to make of these natural resources, which makes it powerful. The latter depends on the country's economic and industrial development and its command of an advanced technological base. England, Germany, Japan prior to World War I and Soviet Russia and United States since assumed great power status based on their strong industrial economies. Similarly, population can become the basis of national power provided it is used profitably in the development of modern industrial base which, in turn, makes possible a first-rate military establishment.

The psychological aspect of the power chiefly concerns intangible factors like national character, morale, ideology and national leadership. National character is highly elusive, and contrary to common belief, is constantly changing. The roots of national character and morale as source of power are probably to be found in the culture, historical experience and social structure of nations. The sudden collapse of Germany in 1918 can be contrasted to its fanatical fight to the last in 1945. Similar is the change in the tremendous staying power of the Red Army in World War II to that of Russian Army in 1918, or that of the Peoples Liberation Army as opposed to the Chinese Army under Chiang-Kai-Shek. It would, therefore, be seen that national character and morale provide tremendous reservoirs of power but are variable commodities and can be cultivated if desired, as had been done in the case of North Vietnam lately. These can be reinforced by ideologies like Napoleon's vision of "Equality, Liberty

and Fraternity". Hitler's idea of "Superiority of the Aryan Race" and the faith in the "Ultimate triumph of communism", held by the Soviet Union and the Chinese leadership. Finally, the quality of the nations' leadership and the image it projects upon the world are important sources of power. If the leadership is defective, all other resources may be of no avail as the use of all the tangible and intangible resources of power is decided by the leadership of the nation through proper governmental organisations. The early triumphs of Nazi Germany were the product of Hitler's mind but so was the final act of its national suicide. India under Nehru in 1950s wielded much greater power than physical attributes would justify. These yielded certain valuable results, both in anti-colonial struggles all over the world and in cold war issues. However, when the same was tried in an environment of emergency in 1962 the importance of capabilities revealed itself in its stark reality. This brings us to the question of understanding the internal and external environment that conditions the problems of National Security.

#### ENVIRONMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

National Security of a country depends in a large measure upon the dynamic and ever changing international environment, the hostility or friendship of which is rarely certain and never absolute. Every nation attempts to enhance its power and influence; to promote well being and progress of its friends; to create beneficial, political, economic, cultural and military links and to deny resources and support to its adversaries, potential or presumed. A desire for equality, dignity and individual rights has given rise to nationalism in all the 157 states who speak with equal voice in the United Nations irrespective of their power. Their conflicting interests, ideologies, world-wide and regional rivalries have led to disruptive tendencies for world stability.

The vast destructive power of modern weapons, revolutionary changes in the field of transportation, communications, command and control systems brought about by technology have led to new and far reaching developments in strategic doctrines, tactics and organisation. Man may not yet be able to improve much upon what Alexander did to Tyre or Rome to Carthage, but the ability to do it within minutes, from thousands to miles away has revolutionised the concept of war and peace. 170 urban centres in USA containing 75 percent of manufacturing industry, 55 per cent of population and 80 per cent of managerial talent can be destroyed in the first one hour of general war reducing superpower into a third rate one. There is, therefore, a strong

urge among the superpowers to avoid all situations leading to war among industrialised powers or violate their vital national interests. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was significant not only for bringing the two superpowers to the brink of war, but also for the alacrity with which one of them backed off. This had led to a strategy of deterrence and a high state of preparedness.

Since 1945 the superpowers, despite occasional confrontations have pursued their rival interests by classic devices of arming proxies, fomenting revolts and winning loyalties of client states. The past decades have seen an alarming rise in frequency and intensity of inter-states, anti-colonial and insurrectionary wars. All these had, however, been limited in aim, scope and use of weapons for superpower's dread of escalation to nuclear wars. They have been able to control these due to dependence of developing states, used as proxies, for the supply of their armaments on industrial powers, large cost of maintaining weapons inventories which get obsolescent very fast and the conflicting interests of superpowers which put a restraint on the quantity and quality of armaments that either camp makes available to the area of conflict.

The quality of national security policy and its decisions depend on soundness of our assessment of short terms threats and trends in the international strategic environment which would affect our security perspective over the long term. The character of war, the tensions between the wars and a long lead time required for preparation of weapon systems specially those of the Navy and Air Force coupled with rapid obsolescence due to technological innovations calls for assessment of military capabilities of all our potential adversaries not in isolation, but in conjunction with their economic strength, scientific achievements, political intentions and psychological and social vulnerabilities. We will also have to assess their ability to acquire these capabilities from superpowers and other regional powers. This assessment has to be a continuous process and should be done separately to meet current preparedness and future orientation of research and development.

The following factors of international environment which have implications on National Security have to be considered in our context:-

- (a) Though the danger of nuclear war between the two superpowers has receded on the continent of Europe after Helsinki accords of November 1975 which gave a similar advantage to USSR to that enjoyed by USA in the Western Hemisphere since 1823 by Monroe Doctrine, the competition for spheres of

influence in the continents of Africa and Asia has, however, not only continued but intensified. Similarly, the Sino-Soviet rift in the context of which, in Chinese perceptions India figures as leaning towards the Soviet Union, will continue to pose problems for our security. Superpowers will also not like India to upset status quo of the hierarchy of nations by developing an independent power centre. Similarly, the strife in the international environment will continue to pose problems to our national security till we reach our destined place in the hierarchy of nation states.

(b) Pakistan and China are likely to continue to have an adversary relationship with this country for some time to come. Short-term improvement of relations with Pakistan due to its own internal problems and indications from China to reduce tensions due to their pre-occupation with their northern borders should be treated as bonus. Pakistan has considerably enhanced its military capabilities since the 1971 War and has been spending around 9-10 per cent of its GNP or 45 per cent of its budget on defence. It is also determined to develop a nuclear weapons status and assume the lead of Islamic states to achieve a major regional power status and military parity with India inspite of strains created for its economy. China has indicated its stake in the sub-continent by her military aid and championship of Pakistan, their support to anti-Indian stance of Bangladesh and Nepal, their arms aid and training to Naga and Mizo hostiles and their moral support to the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist). China sees itself as a natural leader of the Third World and wishes to ensure that India remains totally independent of Soviet influence. It is the capabilities of potential adversaries that have to be taken into consideration while preparing for national security and not their immediate intentions as intensions in a dynamic international environment are never static. Fate of our security will be decided much before either of these countries reach 'Panipat' in future.

(c) The USA has not fulfilled its treaty obligation to defend South Vietnam and has not been firm in its commitments to Japan and Taiwan in its eagerness to reach a detente with China. Lack of its credibility in Europe led De Gaulle to develop its own independent nuclear deterrent. It sees parallelism of interests with Communist China in its confrontation with USSR. In fact, according to some reports, American policy makers feel that China must be allowed its own sphere of influence in South East and South Asia. Similarly, USSR has no intention to go to war with China, has offered a 'no war pact' to China over the border issue, which could be made operative at short notice like its predecessor the 'Non-Aggression Pact' with Hitler in August 1939. India must, therefore, develop its own self reliant defensive and deterrent power.

(d) Increased energy requirements of the Western industrialised nations and Japan and increased flow of sophisticated

armaments to West Asia have security implications to India by transfer of arms and surplus petrodollars to Pakistan. Its assumption of leadership of Islamic states in the context of upheavals in Afghanistan are clear indication of such polarisation. Even conflict of countries like Iraq and Iran with imported weapons poses threat to our security due to our dependence on Middle East Oil. There is also an increased tendency to exploit religion on the part of Pakistan's present leadership. We have also to contend with the vital interest of the United States of America in Gulf area. The location of Pakistan on the mouth of Persian Gulf and its proximity to USSR, makes it indispensable to the United States. USA had released weapons to Pakistan in 1973 long after it had made USA to shift its base from Peshawar and was no longer counted to contain communism in Afghanistan. The same interest has forced USA to cultivate Pakistan now.

(e) Increasing unemployment, widening income disparities, large scale spread of poverty with social contradictions, like problems of language, minorities and tribal populations, call for a faster rate of industrialisation, modernisation, national integration and equitable distribution of incomes. The two tasks of industrialisation and building of military power had been achieved simultaneously by England, France, Germany, Japan and Soviet Russia. China is trying to achieve the same these days. It is, therefore, vital for us to undertake these two vital tasks simultaneously. It is only then we will be able to contain the fissiparous tendencies apparent in our border states in the North East, Jammu and Kashmir, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

India may be advised, in the circumstances, to keep out of all these troubles and concentrate on its development. We have seen that inspite of India's effort in the fifties to stay non-aligned but by remaining militarily weak, USA armed Pakistan and China decided to humiliate India on the border question. What would, however, be apparent from the above is that international relations and security threats are dependent upon each other and this conforms to the famous saying of Clausewitz that "War is a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means."

### CONCLUSION

Given the conditions where defence policies, strategic principles and military weapons are changing fast, the governmental organisations for the higher direction of war cannot afford to remain static. Though relieved by occasional talks on detente, Strategic Arms Limitation and Cooperation and Security, the world environment today continues to remain as predicted by

he great historian and philosopher, Arnold J Toynbee, "We must expect in the round world of today to be under seige for as long as we can see ahead". The weapons of mass destruction have both increased and dramatised the stakes. In the state of armed preparedness where satellites of superpowers scrutinise every military movement and are able to disseminate that information over world-wide fast communications, where "Salus populi suprema lex" . . . "The safety of the People" is the Supreme Law, mere partial response to a bold challenge—reaction instead of initiative, vacillation as compared to an affirmative policy-making—may well decide our future in the hierarchy of Independent Nation States for a long time to come. It is time we decided for an independent course to earn overdue place in the Hierarchy of Nation-States irrespective of the cost involved.

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## Indo-Soviet Trade Military Dimensions

MAHARAJ K. CHOPRA

**T**HREE have recently been considerable discussions about the trade between India and the Soviet Union. These have been mostly related to the items which enter into trade, trade balance which has of late grown heavily in favour of India and requires reduction, and, especially, the rupee-ruble system of barter without involving any other foreign exchange. There has been practically no mention of the military aspect of the trade relations. And yet this aspect is of considerable significance.

### THE PERSPECTIVE

An attempt to examine Indo-Soviet trade in a military perspective would look rather cosmetic at first sight. One main reason is of course that the relevant statistics are not issued—and perhaps should not be issued being of a sensitive nature. However, the task could not be described simply as barking up the wrong tree.

One can burrow back into the Indo-Soviet relations in the post-war period and collect authentic pointers from historical facts which bear upon the current situations. One could wade through Defence Ministry reports and defence budgets for material. The three wars India has fought have opened chinks into the military and also inspired a number of generals and defence officials to bring out first-hand reports. Some official policies cannot but reflect what is happening, for instance to the sources of arms supplies or build-up of forces or financial implications. More recently, there has been wide-ranging dialogue on Indo-Soviet trade links, which is informative.

All these supply the imperatives of arms transactions which are just as important as sheer figures in the balance-sheet.

### USSR REPLACES THE WEST

Trade follows contacts. How come that it was the Soviet Union which came to occupy a pre-eminent place in India's political, economic and military life? That place should have rightfully belonged to the British, or perhaps the Americans. After all the

British had withdrawn with amity, even grace, leaving behind a legacy of arms, equipment, organisation and techniques of the forces with which India was familiar. Americans had supported India's struggle for independence and even had a finger in India's military-industrial complex—the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. But both these nations were ousted by the Russians who, like the proverbial camel, inched into India's tent, and have stayed.

There are at least two reasons for this changing of the boats, militarily speaking. One, the alliance strategy of the United States: the day it signed the SEATO Pact with Pakistan it was alienated from India, and the alienation has persisted. And two, neither Britain nor any other state of Europe was prepared to supply arms to India on equitable terms; some, indeed, were in no position to supply either, owing to post-war difficulties.

As for the Soviet Union, India was not exactly a Stalin's cup of tea, but by the time the Soviet dictator died in 1953, Russia had veered round the view that it could do business even with a bourgeois society. The first major approach was economic, in 1955, with a few transport planes and helicopters thrown in. But in 1962 there came the watershed. In its war with India, China found a pro-Indian Soviet tilt. As the rift widened, India and Russia came closer. Our wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971 had Soviet support, which included supply of arms, some flown from the Soviet stocks in Egypt. This military support came in the trail of political and economic assistance. All these have not abated; on the other hand they have ripened into cooperation, collaboration, friendship, and, as some say, even alliance.

Weak, developing, suffering from the shocks of partition, India was no doubt greatly in need of link with the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union too needed a friend, and, in terms of realpolitik among other political and economic considerations, India was an asset. The erstwhile allies of World War II having split, Russia rolled on to a course irreversibly divergent from that of the United States.

With Mao Tse-tung refusing to toe the Soviet line, China broke off and the two Communist giants have been in confrontation ever since. Among over a dozen neighbours in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, India was and has remained the only one which has friendly ties with Russia, providing a valuable security buffer on its southern flank. Lying astride the Middle East, India has had the potential to bolster Soviet strategy in that region. Its crucial crossroad location in the Indian Ocean has provided Moscow a valuable vantage in the context of a possible showdown with the United States. Indo-Soviet relations have indeed been very much a two-way traffic.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 forms the apex of these relations. It contains everything that a super power can provide for the strengthening of a developing power, politically, economically and militarily. In its twelve clauses, three bear directly on security. The merit of these clauses is that they contemplate collaboration at the military level without institutionalising this collaboration: thus India has been assured of military support without military alliance—and its non-aligned character. And another merit is that a great arms-producing country becomes involved in the bolstering of India's military clout with assured supply of defence hardware.

Apart from the unhelpful attitude of the West in respect of arms supply, India suffered from another handicap—paucity of foreign exchange. It was only after a quarter of a century from independence that our foreign exchange position rose to the top. India was certainly in no condition to defray the heavy expenditure on weapons, after its war with China and growing threat from Pakistan. Thus, military, political and economic considerations all conspired to the acceptance of the system of barter trade involving only the rupee and rouble. The Soviet terms are also favourable—a mere 2½% interest on credits repayable in 12 years.

For some twenty years now this system has continued. As far as I am aware, nobody in the official circles is plumbing for an alternative system of international foreign exchange. But even if there are people who would like to have otherwise, it appears impossible to do anything about it at this juncture, so deep are the roots of the rupee trade. Should anything be done under these circumstances and if so what?

#### THE SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES

I am concerned with the military aspect. Let us see how the services figure in regard to the major weapons acquired from the Soviet Union. The approximate picture, according to *The Military Balance* 1982-83 of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London is something like this:

Army	Tanks T-54/55	950
	Tanks T-72	170 (on order 600)
	Anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4	
Air Force	Mig-21	300
	Mig-25	16
	AN-32	16
	AN-12	30
	TU-124	16
	Mi-4, Mi-8 helicopters	112
	Sam-2/3	120
	On order 60-Mig-23, 8 Mig-25, 40 AN-32	

Navy	Submarines	8
	Destroyers	2
	Frigates	12
	Corvettes	3
	Fast Attack Craft	16
	Coastal Boats	6
	On order two destroyers, two frigates, 3 IL-38 helicopters	

While scanning this picture, two facts must be borne in mind. First, the Soviet Union has not been the exclusive supplier of India, for arms and equipment have also been coming from Britain or France and the United States. Weapons from Britain or made with British collaboration include an aircraft carrier, Sea Hawk maritime planes, Sea King helicopters, Canberra bombers, Hunter ground attack fighter/bombers, HS 748 transport planes, Leander class frigates, and artillery pieces such as the 25 pounders. From France have come Alize planes, Alouette helicopters and SS-11 missiles. American contributions include Dakotas, super-constellations and C-119 transport planes. These have played prominent part in India's wars.

Secondly, India has some three dozen ordnance factories and a dozen defence undertakings. These have made the country well-nigh, though not absolutely, self-sufficient in small arms. Some 1,000 Vijayanta tanks have been made in Indian factories, with British collaboration. The latest model aircraft Ajeet (from the British Gnat) has been produced by our Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. A vast array of items roll out of weapon-producing centres spread all over the country.

#### THE COST AND THE VALUE

What is the cost of the Soviet-supplied weapons and what proportion does it bear to the total imports from Russia are secrets closely guarded by both New Delhi and Moscow. However, the absence of precise information on these points does not vitiate our assessment of this category of arms in the context of rupee-rouble trade. The timing as well as the quality of the material at the specific crucial junctures of our history are important considerations. The hardware came to us when we were militarily weak and we needed them badly. At the periods they arrived, they were regarded as arms of the second generation, which was good. The Migs, submarines, tanks etc. were "modern" stuff during 1960s.

And one more fact. Russian help was also pumped into our industry, and we owe the Soviet Union a good deal for our steel, electric power, oil and fertilizers. These and others are some of the cornerstones of military power, and should not be ignored in assessing the Soviet contribution.

Now we come to the cost factor, a difficult proposition, for we are not vouchsafed with figures. But let us make a guess, however hazardous. During the decade 1971-81, India imported, according to published figures, Rs 79,000 million worth of stuff from Eastern Europe and Rs 55,000 million worth of stuff from the Soviet Union. Assuming that some one-tenth of imports from Eastern Europe and some one-fifth of imports from the Soviet Union comprised weaponry, the arms and equipment that flowed in the rupee trade area of East Bloc could be worth Rs 20,000 million.

This is a hefty sum indeed, with marked incidence upon rupee-ruble trade. However, its value transcends cost, and the investment was worth our while.

#### THE OTHER FACET

The above discussion represents one facet of Indo-Soviet arms trade. There is another facet also, and to that we must now revert.

What influence has this trade exercised upon India? That arms trade has a conspicuous impact upon international relations goes without saying. But it has political and military dimensions also, and sometimes these supercede the purely commercial gains. Big powers in particular use this to win friends, gain presence, and exercise influence. Comparatively, the recipients are in a humbler position, and may have to toe the line of the Big Brother. Between the Soviet Union and India, the former is a super power, and it would be correct to say that it has an upper hand in terms of power status as well as the supplying agent.

Within a broad consensus, as implied in the Indo-Soviet Treaty, it would be a fine point of diplomacy to discern when Moscow has used the "whip". But let us have a cursory probe into India's attitude towards some of the world's latest politico-strategic issues.

So far as the issues of a general nature are concerned—disarmament, arms reduction, strategic arms limitations, missile deployment in Europe—India has gone absolutely in its own way, with stress on moderation, lessening of tension, and peace. When its own security is at stake, it has built or acquired whatever arms it needs irrespective of what this or that super power says. Our nuclear explosion of 1974 may have annoyed half the world, but we considered it to our advantage.

Switching to specific politico-strategic situations, the Middle East would suggest itself first. This region provides a striking example of India's useful foreign policy orientations. As it is, this most explosive region is now sharply divided into states which are inclined towards or are allied with one super power or the other. But India has maintained the best of relations with all the states, except Israel, whether these are "moderates" or "radical"; and, indeed, it redounds to its credit that both the belligerents at the Gulf, Iran and Iraq, agreed on New Delhi as the venue of the non-aligned summit, after Iran rejected Baghdad.

Things, however, are debatable when we look at two other sensitive areas, Indo-China and Afghanistan.

India is the only major country outside the East Bloc that has recognised Kampuchea and kept friendly relations with Vietnam marked by economic aid. Since Moscow has a good foothold here, it has been said New Delhi's policy has succumbed to Moscow's pressure. But then, we should not forget that India was once chairman of the three International Commissions on Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and possesses expertise about this region more than most outsiders. Besides, and, perhaps as a matter of personal opinion, in terms of *realpolitik*, India's presence of howsoever low a profile in an important sector of China's southern flank is quite in its strategic interests. If China feels India's presence is a pinprick in its side, then it should look into its own almost massive intrusion and collusion in occupied Kashmir, of which the building of the Karakoram Road is a conspicuous example.

It may be mentioned that even among the Asean Nations—Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines—who are otherwise opposed to the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea—there is a body of opinion which considers that a strong Vietnam would be highly useful as a buffer to Chinese power. And, in reversal to earlier policy, the newly established government of Australia under Prime Minister Bob Hawke is extending economic aid to Vietnam.

With Afghanistan however the matter is different. There are people in this country, and many among the non-aligned states not to say nations of the West, who hold the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as violation of international law, a continuation of Czarist imperialism which one had thought had ended with the annexation of Central Asia, and a danger to the security of the neighbouring states, especially India because with the Afghan Wakhan panhandle in

Russian occupation, a super power comes right at this country's doorstep. The Soviet case has been that Afghanistan being on its border is important for its security and that a Sino-Pak-US collusion to take advantage of the turmoil in Afghanistan was in the offing. In general, the Soviet apologia has not been convincing, for after all no country has the right to occupy another country because its own security is at stake. And one might say that in this case New Delhi's low profile of reaction is in deference to Soviet wishes.

May be this is one of the more unpleasant diplomatic games a country has to play in order not to jeopardise larger interests. But there is no doubt that in consequence of Soviet intervention, India's security dimensions have been widened and, with the US military aid to Pakistan on a massive scale on the pretext of Soviet threat, an arms race in the subcontinent is inevitable.

#### TECHNOLOGICAL-MILITARY ASPECT

There is always some speculative element in the assessment of politico-strategic influence that accompanies arms deals. But there can be a more definitive appraisal of military-technological aspects. There will be many questions : how far has the Indo-Soviet link resulted in indigenous self-sufficiency in arms manufacture ? Are the Soviet supplied-weapons related to strategic environment? What about widening our sources of arms supply ?

In respect of self-sufficiency, in several major weapons of the Army, Navy and Air Forces it simply does not exist. To supplement earlier purchases, we continue to buy destroyers and frigates and corvettes from Russia. Nothing like an indigenous submarine is in sight. After T-54/55 tanks we are now seeking the Soviet T-72 tank. It has been stated that India is near indigenisation of Mig-21. If this is the old model in the series, by the time we can produce it indigenously, it may be due to be phased out. The SAM/3-4 continues to be an exclusive Soviet supply, and its local manufacture has not even been contemplated.

When the Soviet weapons began to arrive in the 1960s, they were relatively modern. Then, as now, our two hostile neighbours were Pakistan and China. Pakistani arms in the wars of 1965 and 1961 were antiquated, and were no match for India's new acquisitions. This, coupled with the overwhelming superiority that India commanded, loaded the dice heavily in our favour. China too at that time juggled with outdated weapons. Thus, India could very well do with the Soviet-supplied hardware.

But now that is no longer the position. China has put its defence modernisation programme as a matter of top priority after industry, agriculture and science. Submarines are being fitted with missiles, aircraft factories have been activated, Chinese experts are in Europe and the United States hounding for computers, electronics, and special metals. The People's Liberation army is being turned from a largely guerrilla force to a force fit for both nuclear and positional warfare. India must reckon with contingencies on the northern border decidedly more serious than of 1960s.

This is all the more so in respect of India's north-western frontier. General Zia ul-Haq is said by the media to be very warm-hearted man, but he knows his onions.

In the \$3-2 billion package for military and economic assistance, F-16s have figured prominently. For one thing they have been discussed *ad nauseum*. Some have even argued that 40 F-16s that Pakistan will have by 1985 do not make much of a force—knowing though that with re-fuelling they could attack targets well beyond India's central regions and some would be quite capable of penetrating our radar and missile screens no matter how powerful is our Air Defence Ground Environment System. But more serious is the fact that noises about F-16s have drowned the other hardware Pakistan is getting from the United States. Here is a list, for record :

Armoured Personnel Carriers	30
TOW anti-tank missiles	1200
TOW launchers	60
Artillery rounds 105mm calibre	25000
Units of radio communication	200
Gunship helicopters	10
Howitzers 155mm	75
Towed guns 155mm	64
Self-propelled howitzers	40
M-48 tanks	100

Apart from the massive deal, a most important point from our angle is that this is US-made equipment. Now, time and again it has been proved that technologically American arms surpass Soviet arms. One need not go back to the Arab-Israeli wars in which the Soviet supplied arms were decisively blunted by American weapons, used no doubt with Israel's superior combat capability. But I give the latest instance from Lebanon.

Basically, Israel struck into Lebanon in June 1982 in order to destroy the PLO's military fangs developed dragon-like in the country during the twelve years or so after its expulsion from Jordan. But

Syria was there too, with over 30,000 troops under the guise of "Arab deterrent force", sharing the occupation of Lebanon with the PLO. The ground segment of this force kept a low profile but the air segment stirred ominously. This comprised some 80 Soviet-built Migs of the more modern variety including Mig-23s and 19 SAM-6 missile launchers. Within almost twenty four hours these were destroyed by US-built weapons, a fact as spectacular as the destruction of the Egyptian air fleet in the 1967 war 15 years ago to the day.

The decimation of the Migs did not involve any extraordinary tactics. But taking on the Sam sites was yet another instance of Israel's miraculous prowess. According to eye-witnesses, Israelis sent pilotless drones which, before being shot down by missiles, relayed back to a ground station the frequency used by the homing devices on the missiles.

Apart from the drones, the Israelis used at least one of the four Boeing 707s as ECM platform over the Sams, jamming radar and communications. They also used the Wild Weasel, an electronic system fitted to the Phantoms that not only can deceive Sams but actually home in on the radar and the radio missiles on a beam right upto them.

The aircraft, drones, Boeing, Wild Weasel, complex ground stations were all American built. The Soviets laid the blame for the ineffectiveness of their weapons on the Syrians for their inability to handle missiles, but this would be taken with a pinch of salt. The latest on this is that quite a few Soviet troops have arrived in Syria with a new air defence system, the Sam-5, but how it works remains to be seen.

The evidence is unmistakable that in the event of another war with the neighbouring state, India will be up against arms much more sophisticated than those of the 1960s and early 1970s. The Soviet supplies executed so far will not do.

#### DIVERSIFICATION

The diversification of the sources of supply undertaken recently would show that steps have been taken to meet the new challenge. Mirage-2000s are coming from France, Jaguars and Sea Harriers from Britain, and SSK-1500 submarines from West Germany—all top producers of the newest weapons. India is also understood to have opted for Exocet anti-ship missiles from France in replacement of the outdated SS-N-2 Styx missiles of Soviet manufacture. Further, a deal may be struck with the Aerospatiale of France and Westland of Britain for anti-submarine helicopters.

However, there has been some shift in this policy, or so it seems. In respect of the Jaguar deal, after obtaining a number of planes in finished state as well as in kits to be assembled in the country, there was an option of indigenous manufacture of some 60 Jaguars. Now this last option has been abandoned. A similar action is understood to have been taken in respect of Mirage-2000s. In effect, this means that while India will have some more sophisticated aircraft from the West, it will not have the manufacturing technology.

Instead, India has opted, according to reports, for the latest Mig-27. The upshot is that India has gone in for Soviet technology for its air fleet, in the hope, apparently, that this would give a good mix of the Western-made and Soviet-made aircraft that could take care of the main threat that comes from Pakistan's F-16s.

That being so, and collaboration with the Soviet Union in respect of arms supply having been reinforced, two good lessons emerge. First, steps should be taken to indigenise manufactures as fast as possible; and secondly, to learn from the Soviet technology with a view to self-sufficiency in the near future. The example of China in this connection is pertinent. During the last three years China has sold weapons to the Middle East in a big way—worth, according to one report, about \$ 5 billion. But the technological gain has been more impressive and of greater consequence. China is understood to have received from Egypt as well as Iraq (both of whom have large quantities of Soviet-made weapons) samples of the more modern Soviet equipment than the 1950s technology. Items obtained in this way include Sukhoi SU-20 fighter bombers, export versions of Mig-23s, T-62 tanks, and Sam-3 and Sam-6 anti-aircraft missiles. The updated technology has been incorporated in China's own manufactures based upon the earlier Soviet supplies—with excellent results; its latest F-6s, F-7s and F-8s are a big improvement on the original Soviet designs. China has so far shunned any large-scale buying of arms from the West.

## Use of Air Power in Counter Insurgency Operations

Wg Cdr V K SETHI

"By gaining the people,  
the kingdom is gained,  
by losing the people,  
the kingdom is lost."

—CONFUCIOUS

"A guerrilla war differs from traditional military operations because its key prize is not control of territory, but control of the population. This depends in part on psychological criteria, especially a sense of security. No positive program of counter insurgency can succeed unless the population feels safe from terror or reprisal. Guerrillas rarely seek to hold real estate."

—HENRY KISSINGER

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Kissinger made this statement after the war in Vietnam was almost lost. The importance of winning the people cannot be more emphasised in counter insurgency (COIN) operations.

The post World War II period brought out two distinct patterns of warfare. The sharp, short and limited wars, like the Arab-Israeli wars and the long, protracted, limited insurgencies as in Indo China, Malaya, Algeria and the Philippines. The efficacy and credibility of both have been amply proved by their aims and achievements.

During this century, insurgency has assumed a great deal of importance, and has gripped the attention of all military thinkers in the world. Insurgency is an inexpensive method of waging an indirect war without active involvement. It can also be waged by a small group of people to try and topple legal government.

Insurgency and guerrilla warfare go hand in hand. The insurgents always use guerrilla tactics, and the objectives of insurgency and guerrilla warfare can be any of the following :—

- (a) To defend the country, as a last resort against an enemy or to assist the regular forces.

(b) To instigate the masses to action so as to over throw the enemy or existing government.

Insurgencies can either be urban or rural. In India we have examples of both, Naxalite urban insurgency and the rural insurgency of the Nagas and Mizos. Both must be countered differently to succeed. This paper deals with rural counter insurgency. The aim of this paper is to study the "Use of Air Power in Counter Insurgency Operations".

#### INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY

"Given an established base or sanctuary from which to work, the first aim of any insurgency movement must be to gain momentum by capturing more weapons, ammunition and explosives. Attacks will therefore, be made on isolated police posts and stations, and even on military installations where security is lax. At the same time, these and other attacks, particularly on communications, will be designed to throw the government off balance, to cause panic in the population and dislocate the economy. If these attacks in turn entice the government forces to go blundering around the country side, so much the better".

—ROBERT THOMPSON

*Aim of An Insurgency.* The strategic aims of the insurgents must be clearly understood by those who wish to counter it. The use of force by itself has not won any COIN operations. As Henry Kissinger once said, "The war in Vietnam was won militarily but lost politically". The political aim of the insurgents is to gain control over the population by starting in the rural areas and destroying the governments prestige and authority. The military aim is to neutralize the armed forces, rendering them powerless to save the country.

COIN operations must, therefore, ensure that the villages are made secure. The people must be won over to support the government forces. Without the people the war would be lost in any case. It is the masses, who in the long run decide the outcome of COIN operations. This fact must be borne in mind, particularly so when air power is used in COIN operations.

#### BRIEF HISTORY OF AIR POWER IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Air power has been used in COIN operations in Malaya, the Philippines, Algeria and Vietnam. Though the circumstances of the insurgencies differ in each country, nevertheless, there are a few valuable lessons to be learnt.

**MALAYAN INSURGENCY**

In 1948 an emergency was declared in Malaya when the insurgents launched a wave of murders against rubber planters. In 1951 the insurgency reached its peak and did not die off until the end of the decade. It was in 1951 that serious countermeasures were undertaken by the British. The COIN operations were directed by the civilians and the military campaign was subordinated to the political objectives. This was done to primarily gain or regain the confidence of the people. Throughout the operations, no independent role was assigned to the air force, and it was almost always used in close coordination with the ground forces in the following roles :—

- (a) Offensive Air Support.
- (b) Transport Air Support.
- (c) Helicopter Operations.
- (d) Reconnaissance.
- (e) Psychological Warfare Operations.

During offensive air strikes special care was taken to avoid destruction of private property. The rules were so strict that often a raid was aborted if a house lay in the target area. Also all strike operations were cleared by the local police, in order to keep civilian casualties to an absolute minimum.

In the thick jungles offensive air strikes were largely ineffective due to these restrictions. In isolated pockets the insurgents were, however, harrassed, and kept on the move, thus lowering their morale.

The air force concentrated mainly on aerial reconnaissance (recce), transport support and psychological warfare operations. In these roles air power was found to be valuable and even indispensable.

The situation in Malaya was, however, different from that in Vietnam. No bordering country supported the insurgents. As the insurgents were mainly of Chinese origin, they could not blend with the local population, to escape the government forces.

**ALGERIAN INSURGENCY**

With a flat terrain without foliage air power was more extensively used in Algeria than in Malaya.

The French Air Force used a total of 1,000 aircraft including helicopters to support the ground forces from the very start, flying almost 1,000 sorties a month. Air power was used in offensive strikes, recce, in transport support, liaison and casualty evacuation operations.

Air power combined with the ground troops reduced the ranks of the insurgents, and gave the government forces decided advantage. However, this military victory was never translated into a political one. Indiscriminate and rampant bombing of suspected guerrilla strongholds and villages led to a large number of women and children being killed. This left a scar on the people, information thus dried up, as the people sympathised with the insurgents.

#### AIR WAR IN VIETNAM

"We fought a military war, our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition, our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrillas war, the guerrilla wins if he does not lose, the conventional army loses if it does not win."

—HENRY KISSINGER

The conflict in Vietnam started as a small scale guerrilla war and gradually escalated to a point where the guerrillas operated in strength leading to a limited conventional war. The air war in Vietnam was one sided as there were severe political constraints on the use of air power. Almost 4,000 to 5,000 aircraft were employed in COIN operations during the peak years by the United States and its Allies. Air power was used in the following roles :—

- (a) Offensive Strike Operations.
- (b) Interdiction.
- (c) Air Transport Operations.
- (d) Reconnaissance.
- (e) Helicopter Operations.
- (f) Psychological Warfare.
- (g) Miscellaneous operations including flare dropping, defoliation and crop destruction.

The air war lasted almost a decade and saw a wide variety of aircraft and munitions being used. In 1968-1969 the average daily sorties flown by fighter bombers and helicopters in South Vietnam was approximately 700 and 2,800 respectively, and the monthly average by the B-52 bombers were 310 sorties. The total weight of bombs dropped on South Vietnam by the middle of 1971 was 3.9 million tons and the US aircraft losses till then were 429 fixed wing aircraft and 1876 helicopters.

The civilian casualties caused till Apr 71 were almost 1,050,000 which included 3,25,000 deaths. A total of 6,000,000 South Vietnamese became refugees, which is one third the total population.

During World War II and the Korean War the total tonnage of bombs dropped was 2,000,000 and 1,000,000 tons respectively. In Vietnam a country the size of Britain 6,300,000 tons of bombs were dropped till 1971 and by the end of 1972 the bombs were still falling on Indo China at the rate of 55,000 tons per month.

Though air power was dominant during the Vietnam war, it could not win the war, but it prevented it from being lost. The large number of civilians killed by bombing, eventually led to the defeat of the government forces. The military victory could not be translated into a political one.

#### USE OF AIR POWER IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

In the initial stages the insurgents rely on hit and run tactics, operating from well protected bases in jungles, mountains and swamps. The insurgents are not well defined as such not vulnerable to air attacks. Therefore, the use of air power is limited during this stage. Once the insurgents have consolidated their ranks and offer battle to the government forces, air power plays a dominant role in COIN operations. Without air power COIN operations may prove unsuccessful. However, indiscriminate and ruthless use of air power does more harm than good.

#### ROLE OF AIR POWER

The role of air power will be discussed under the following :-

- (a) Air Transport Operations.
- (b) Reconnaissance.
- (c) Offensive Air Strike (Fixed Wing).
- (d) Helicopter Operations.
- (e) Defoliation and Crop destruction.
- (f) Psychological Warfare.

#### AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS

The lack of suitable surface communications in under developed areas causes a lot of difficulties and delays for the ground forces to reinforce a threatened area. To keep the existing lines of communications open, a large force is tied down.

The insurgents rely mainly on surprise for success. They can select targets at random, attack and withdraw before the opposite side can react. Air Transport provides mobility and flexibility for the ground forces. It is thus possible to deploy troops rapidly in the threatened areas and achieve surprise.

Air transport operations can be carried out by para dropping or landing troops and material, using VTOL/STOL aircraft, and to maintain contact with isolated parts. Quick evacuation of sick and wounded government forces, civilians and insurgents could be carried out. Thus raising the morale of own troops and winning the support of the masses and insurgents.

*Paradropping.* These operations will largely depend on the terrain and area in which they are carried out.

When a guerrilla camp has been located or an outpost attacked, the para force, which is on alert, gets airborne immediately. The DZ selection, so as to give the insurgents minimum warning. A second para unit is dropped along the likely retreat route, as soon as possible.

High winds would cause casualties and dispersion of the force, delaying regrouping. Use of flares, flags, whistles and smoke candles would help in quick regrouping. Today special parachutes permit drops from low altitudes, however, in case of main chute failure, casualties would be higher, as there is no time to operate the auxiliary chute. The aircraft in this case is exposed to ground fire, however, the paratrooper is exposed to ground fire for a shorter duration and dispersion is reduced.

The para force should remain in the area till the guerrillas have been annihilated or have escaped. Therefore, arrangements for resupplies should be made in advance. The force should as far as possible be retrieved by air using helicopters or VTOL/STOL aircraft. Return by surface communications over long distances would reduce the force's effectiveness and employability. Ambush enroute would also cause heavy casualties.

*Terrain.* Paradrops in paddy fields and generally flat ground is easy, while drops in jungles can be hazardous. At times paradropping may be the only way to reach a guerrilla camp and maintaining surprise. For drops in thick jungles, the paratrooper is equipped with a special shock absorbing bag which is positioned under the feet as soon as the chute opens. The initial impact is taken by the bag. As soon as the chute is firmly hung in the trees, the bag is lowered to the ground. A canvas strap, which is firmly attached to the paratrooper is passed through the chute harness. When the chute is released the paratrooper slowly descends to the ground.

*Air Landing of Troops and Material.* Para operations may not always be feasible. In which case it would be essential to land troops

and material close to the threatened area of hideout. Preparing landing strips over soft ground and jungles is extremely difficult. In jungles, however, strips could be prepared by the use of explosives or cutting down the trees. The use of VTOL/STOL aircraft could reduce the length required. Landing strips could be prepared in advance if possible depending on the area of operations. On receiving information about the guerrillas, the troops could be air lifted to the nearest landing ground.

Air transportation of troops and material provides mobility, flexibility and surprise, which is so essential in COIN operations.

*Air Cushion Landing System.* One of the major problems in operating transport aircraft, is the preparation of landing strips. This problem can be overcome by using Air Cushion Landing System (ACLS). The ACLS works on the same principle as the Air Cushioned Vehicles (ACVs). The aircraft fitted with ACLS would be able to operate over water, land, marshy areas, swamps, ice, snow and over undulating terrain. This means that the preparation of the landing strip becomes easy. This system can be used on any type of aircraft including helicopters. The aircraft would thus be able to operate over a wider variety of terrain without the requirement of firm ground.

#### AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

Intelligence in COIN operations is obtained by observing the movements of guerrilla bands, interrogation of prisoners, captured documents and informants. Some of this information is outdated and unreliable.

Aerial recce is today one of the most important methods of gathering intelligence. The aircraft can traverse a large area in a short time, thus providing valuable information regarding enemy movements and hide-outs. Aerial recce keeps the guerrilla on the move, thus reducing his effectiveness and morale.

Aerial recce can be carried out visually or by photo, radar, infra red and low light television (LLTV).

*Visual Recce.* Using fixed wing slow speed aircraft and helicopters provides upto date accurate information and permits the ground forces/strike aircraft to react fast. Night vision equipment enables visual recce to be carried out by night effectively. Visual recce should be carried out by pilots allotted more or less permanent areas of operation. Thus any departure from the ordinary would be easily noticed.

*Aerial Photography.* Similarly, aerial photography can be extremely useful in providing upto date information of suspected areas. New tracks and clearings in jungles would be easily noticeable in aerial photos.

Visual and photo recce would also be essential in pre-strike and post strike intelligence.

Though the type of target may be known by radar and infra red recce, it is difficult to identify as friendly or hostile. Such recce would have to be linked with other sources of intelligence.

Low Light Television (LLTV) uses sensitive TV cameras to view the ground in fading light. The ground image is projected on the screen for the pilot to examine, thus providing an accurate picture of the ground. This, however, is not possible on dark nights or when visibility is reduced due to low clouds.

*Armed Recce.* In COIN operations armed recce, in which a target is located and attacked, has more disadvantages than advantages. The pilot spotting movement of supplies and men has no way of confirming if they are insurgents. This can lead to attacks on innocent civilians and cause harm to the COIN operations. This form of recce so effective in conventional wars with a well defined frontline is useless in COIN operations.

#### OFFENSIVE AIR STRIKES

In COIN operations, there are a number of restrictions on offensive strike sorties. The fact that the guerrillas operate in and close to the local population, with no well defined front lines, imposes a moral and political restraint on these operations. One fact must be borne in mind that these strikes are carried out on own territory and indiscriminate or ruthless use of air power, could cause damage and high casualties amongst the civilian population, thus tilting the scale in favour of the guerrillas.

"If you kill a few civilians from the villages or the aborigine tribes, particularly if they are children, you do more harm than all the good you may do by killing a few insurgents. You have made those people, villagers and tribes, enemies for good. Quick air strikes, also indiscriminate bombing becomes very unpopular towards the end"

#### —THE AIR WAR IN INDO CHINA

In COIN operations, the insurgents is an elusive target. He operates in small bands and is difficult to identify. The terrain makes location and identification of targets difficult. Therefore, offensive

strikes must be well planned based on accurate intelligence, to avoid casualties to civilians.

Offensive strikes could be preplanned or immediate. Both, if used discriminately backed by accurate intelligence, can be efficacious. Strike aircraft were used in Algeria and to a greater extent in Vietnam. However, the damage caused to the guerrillas was insufficient to make them surrender. Lack of intelligence caused more damage to innocent bystanders.

Lets examine a typical case in Algeria and Vietnam of a village known to harbour guerrillas and sympathisers. Leaflets were dropped or 'voice' aircraft used, ordering the villagers to evacuate the village by a prescribed time, after which it will be bombed. Perhaps only a few can leave the village for fear of the guerrillas reprisals. The bombing commences at the prescribed time and the village is razed to the ground. The result—two guerrillas killed for the loss of 50 villagers including women and children. These strikes were routine. General Johnson US Army Chief of Staff in 1969 summed this up when he said, "We have not enough information, we act with ruthlessness, like a steamroller, bombing extensive areas and not selected targets based on detailed intelligence."

On the other hand when close air support was used in Malaya, it was based on accurate and upto date intelligence.

*Method.* When a guerrilla camp or hideout has been located, the area must be fixed accurately by the ground forces. Thereafter, attacks could be carried out in one pass so as to give no warning to the insurgents. Similarly, an electronic homing device could be planted as close to the camps as possible, an aerial fix taken and then attacked. The guerrillas are thus caught unawares and have little chance to escape. The ground forces must move in only after the attacks are on the way so as to give no warning to the insurgents.

Also, during encounters with insurgents, close air support could be carried out, under the control of the airborne FAC, to ensure the safety of own troops and civilians. At times the ground forces may have surrounded the insurgents, but are unable to close in due to the terrain, offensive strikes would be extremely effective in killing the guerrillas or forcing them out into the waiting troops.

#### HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

The versatility of the helicopter renders it extremely efficacious in COIN operations, in terrains, which does not favour elaborate road communications or landing strips for fixed wing aircraft. They can

operate in hilly terrains or jungles so long as a small clearing is available.

During the Vietnam war no other aircraft has been as exploited as the helicopter. It has, similarly been used in Algeria and Malaya. In Vietnam, however, the helicopter operated with total air superiority. The achievements quoted by the US army have been exaggerated quite a bit. A study by an impartial study group has this to say :—

“By the end of 1971 the total US aircraft losses were 429 fixed wing aircraft and 1876 helicopters.”

= The Air War in Indo China

The details of aircraft losses is attached as Appendix A.

The helicopter still plays an important role in COIN operations, the use, however, would depend on the resources of the country. Helicopters can be used for various roles in COIN operations.

*Mobility.* The troops carrying helicopter provides mobility and flexibility to the ground forces in underdeveloped areas. The troops can be kept in readiness, with helicopters standing by. Whenever, the insurgents have been spotted or an outpost attacked, this force could be quickly deployed to encircle the insurgents and cut off their retreat. Once surrounded, the ground forces could carry out mopping up operations. The helicopter can operate from unprepared clearings and is more advantageous than the STOL aircraft, though the flying time is more. The combination of VTOL aircraft and helicopters is ideal.

*Reconnaissance.* The slow speed and hovering capability of the helicopter make it an ideal platform for recce. Visual recce can be best done in helicopters. The pilots operating in specified areas could spot any changes easily. Similarly, photo recce and electronic recce can be carried out—similar to fixed wing aircraft. Use of LLTV and night vision equipment would make it effective during the night also.

*Casualty Evacuation.* The helicopters ability to evacuate own casualties from inaccessible areas gives a tremendous boost to the morale of every soldier on patrol. This ensures quick medical treatment of the sick and wounded. Similarly, when civilians are evacuated from far flung areas, they regain confidence in the government. Leaflets with the following would help to win the borderline insurgent : “Leave the sick and wounded behind, we guarantee their safety and medical treatment.” This would have a devastating effect on the insurgents and would go a long way in winning the war politically.

Similarly, search and rescue of downed pilots would save valuable pilots and uninjured pilots would be available for flying immediately.

*Airborne FAC.* The helicopter could be most effectively used for the airborne FAC to direct the firepower of strike aircraft. Slow speed fixed wing aircraft could also be used. The FAC could also act as a command post and airborne relay station, to augment the communications during major operations. Target marking rockets and coloured smoke could be used to mark the target and indicate position of own troops.

*Armed Helicopter.* The utility of the armed helicopter in COIN operations is undisputed. However, it was various limitations like the fixed wing strike aircraft. Operations in an hostile environment would cause a high rate of attrition. The US army in its eagerness to retain control of the helicopters have given exaggerated achievements, while playing low on the losses. The attrition rates in Vietnam are given as Appendix A.

It can be argued that the helicopter flew a larger number of sorties. This is not entirely true. Only a part of the total sorties were utilised in the strike role, the rest being used for recce, communications, casualty evacuation etc.

At no stage is it implied that the helicopter is useless, far from it. However, it does not replace the fighter ground attack aircraft, but is complementary to it. The helicopter, if used haphazardly, the losses in pilots and aircraft would be prohibitive. Besides, it would jeopardize the government cause, if used ruthlessly, similar, to the fixed wing aircraft.

*Helicopter Gunships.* The armed helicopter could be used in the defensive and offensive role. Aircraft mounted with sideways and or forward firing guns are referred to as gun ships. The 7.62 mm miniguns and the 2 75 inch rockets have proved to be very effective due to the accuracy of the weapons. The fragmentation warhead and the Flechette round, which is a finned metal dart, designed to air burst provides very good penetration in thick jungles.

The gunships can be used independently or in conjunction with other ground/air operations. Once a hideout has been located and identified, they could be used to attack and or hold the insurgents till the ground forces surround the hideouts. Road convoys and troop movements could be provided cover from ambushes. The gunships can also provide suppressing fire power during para operations, casualty evacuation, rescue operations and when troops and supplies are landed in guerrilla infested areas.

Due to high explosives and large dispersion of the weapons, use of gunships in close proximity of own forces or civilians would be restricted. Fire control by FAC would, therefore, be essential.

*Gunships and Hovercrafts.* The hovercraft (ACV) has proved to be very effective, capable of operating over swamps, marsh, tall elephant grass and uneven ground. Due to the operations just above the ground the visibility is restricted. The helicopter and the ACV used as a hunter killer group would be very effective against insurgents. The ACV is a noisy vehicle and its approach can be heard by the insurgents. The helicopter, after detecting the insurgents can hover out of small arm range. Its noise would then drown the ACV approach which is being guided by the helicopter, thus taking the insurgents by surprise. Similarly, troops can be retrieved without the insurgents knowing. Due to no contact with the grounds, no vibrations are caused by the ACV.

#### DEFOLIATION AND CROP DESTRUCTION

In COIN operations aircraft can be used for defoliation and crop destruction. This would deny the insurgent the cover provided by the thick jungle foliage and food. Aerial spraying could be done over a large area. These operations, however, are not recommended as the destruction caused to forest and crop is more or less permanent causing extensive damage to valuable forest, animals and crop, as seen after the Vietnam war. Instead of winning the support of the people, such destruction is more likely to turn them against the government.

The damage caused in Vietnam was about 35 percent of the hard wood forest was destroyed and one half of the mangrove forests in the Delta region. The total crop destroyed was enough to feed 600,000 people for one year.

#### PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Aerial psychological warfare, in COIN operations is as important as the operations mentioned earlier. It is essential that the people be explained the reasons of the war against the insurgents.

The use of aircraft with loud speakers for propaganda and counter-propaganda could be carried out very effectively. Aircraft can cover large areas and be used in remote places, including guerrilla strongholds. This would lower the morale of the insurgents and also assure the people that the government has not deserted them. Similarly, leaflets, special ration cards, surrender passes, could be dropped in large numbers over a wide area to induce the insurgents to defect and sally with the government forces.

Leaflets announcing rewards for information regarding the insurgents, or the rehabilitation of surrendered insurgents could be dropped in suspected and known insurgent camps. This should have a devastating effect in the ranks of the insurgents.

*Propaganda* by captured/surrendered insurgents, especially well known ones, announcing the good treatment given by the government, could be done by using taped voice or dropping leaflets with the signatures. This would have a profound effect on the morale of the insurgents and would cause mistrust in their ranks.

#### CONCLUSION

Counter insurgency operations are primarily conducted by the government forces and ground forces and air power used to support these forces. Since 1950, air power has demonstrated the important contribution it makes in COIN operations, especially in jungle, hilly, marshy and swampy terrain. The intelligent use of air power has resulted in a more economical campaign and considerably reduces the manpower which would be much more and way out of proportion to the insurgents.

Air power would provide the government forces with a higher degree of initiative and surprise which otherwise is denied to them. The correct use of air power provides the commander an opportunity to meet the insurgents at times and places least suitable to the insurgents.

Air power can be utilised for air transport support, offensive strikes, recce, strikes by helicopter gunships, airborne FAC, search and rescue. It can be used in the hunter killer role in conjunction with ACVs and for psychological warfare operations. However, air power must function in support of the ground forces. The clearance of offensive strikes must be by the government forces to keep the civilian casualties to the minimum.

The indiscriminate and ruthless use of air power, especially in the offensive strike role would cause damage to civilian property and life. The killing of women and children would do more harm than good to the government forces.

Air power is a dominant factor in COIN operations. It provides the commander rapid mobility, quick deployment of forces and gives a hard punch to the insurgents, if used carefully. No ground commander can hope to succeed in counter-insurgency operations without the support of air power.

Appendix 'A'  
(Refers to para 54 and 61.)

US AIRCRAFT LOSSES—SOUTH VIETNAM

Type of Aircraft	1961-1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Feb 1971	Total
Fixed Wing	81	69	73	107	68	29	2	429
Helicopters	106	123	260	495	452	393	42	1878

Note : Losses due to hostile action.

US AIRCRAFT LOSSES—INDOCHINA ALL CAUSES

Type of Aircraft	1961-1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Feb 1971	Total
Fixed Wing	462	634	728	657	466	256	45	3248
Helicopters	275	321	664	1008	1048	832	104	4252

US DEATHS DUE TO AIRCRAFT LOSSES—HOSTILE ACTION

Type of Aircraft	1961-1967	1968	1969	1970	Total
Fixed Wing	538	250	165	87	1040
Helicopters	640	631	638	610	2519

—“The Air Power in Indo China”

## Big Business Versus The Army— The Myth and The Reality

L T COL BRAJENDRA SINGH

THE human mind is a peculiar thing. Even when it knows better, it persists in deluding itself. Who does not dream of becoming a hero, a filmstar, a millionaire, a sports champion or suchlike. We homo sapiens specialise in day dreams of grandeur, in far-out beliefs and in perpetuation of legends. These dreams and beliefs are extended by our social groups to create myths and folklore. This done mainly to give grandiose versions of ordinary incidents or to glorify and cover up defeats and humiliations, so that coming generations would be suitably impressed with our wonderful deeds and, as a result thereof, continue the tradition of ancestor-worship. I will illustrate what I mean by a few randomly chosen examples.

Let us start with the Trojan War. This war was fought between the Greeks and the Trojans and a detailed account of it has come down to us through the Greek poet, Homer. The tale is indeed a wonderful one, full of valorous deeds, glorious fights, interference by the Gods and Goddesses and so on, something like our own epic, the Mahabharata. The Greeks eventually won the war through trickery and sacked and burned Troy. The War was ostensibly started when a Trojan prince persuaded the Greek queen Helen, to run away with him. Since she was the most beautiful woman on Earth, her husband and his fellow kings declared war on Troy, in an effort to get her back. Much as I hate to disappoint the fans of Helen—she of the face that launched a thousand ships—I still have to say, that the truth about the start of the war is much more mundane and much less romantic. The facts are as follows.

The Trojans, whose capital Troy lay on the Western portion of the Turkish peninsula, controlled the entry into the Black Sea. The Greeks, who have been traders for centuries, used to trade extensively with areas along the Turkish and Black Sea coasts. The Trojans, having the opportunity, started taxing and harrassing the Greek trading ships. At first the Greeks accepted this minor irritant and paid the Trojans, to let them trade peacefully. But the Trojans grew greedy and increased their taxes exorbitantly. When the Greeks

refused to pay, the Trojans raided their ships and sank some of them. The Greeks were thus just itching for a fight and were looking round for an excuse to start one. That excuse was provided by Helen, and the war started.

Next we come to another myth—the Origins of the First World War. This was supposed to have been started because a Serbian student assassinated the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and because Serbia refused to atone for the crime. The facts tell a different story. The Archduke Ferdinand had married a commoner and had almost been dis-inherited. Serbia had accepted most of the Austrian conditions and was willing to make amends. But unfortunately none of these things really mattered. The fact was that Germany, under the Kaiser, had built up a mighty Army and a tremendous Navy. The Germans were most anxious to try out their Army against the Russians and the French, whom they considered to be pushovers, and their Navy against the British, who they thought had ruled the waves for too long. On the other side, the French were still smarting from their defeat by the Germans in 1870 and were just dying to take revenge. The Germans prodded the Austrians, the French egged on the Serbians and the war started.

Coming nearer home for my third and final example, let us examine the myth of Parsuram. As per the story that is current, Parsuram's father accused his wife of infidelity and asked his sons to cut off her i.e. their mother's head. All refused, except Persuram, who carried out his father's wishes and chopped off his mother's head. He then asked his father what reward (vardan) he could ask for, for carrying out his father's orders. His father replied that he could ask for anything; where upon Parsuram asked for his mother, alive and well. So the father was forced to bring his wife back to life, through supernatural means. The truth however is slightly different, as pointed out by K.M. Munshi. Parsuram's father did ask his sons to kill their mother, and all did refuse, except Parsuram. But before he took any action he asked his father what reward he would get for carrying out the latter's orders. His father replied "You can ask for anything you wish". Parsuram then retorted "Father, at the moment you are angry. Suppose I do what you ask and cut off my mother's head, and then ask for her life back—can you grant me my wish?" This calmed the old man down and all ended happily.

Thus it can be seen that myths, though generally based on real-life incidents, must be examined closely, in order that the truth may be

ascertained, which truth may be quite different to the substance of the myth.

The above examples will, I think, amply prove my contention. We now come to the myth that is the reason detre for this article. This is the myth that Big Business is far more efficient, well-run and better managed than the Army. Unfortunately this myth has gained wide currency and even we Army officers, who should know better, believe in it. We have a tendency to denigrate our management techniques and praise those of business houses. We somehow feel our methods are old and out-dated and that modernisation has passed us by, thus making us constantly strive to catch up. Is this the truth? Let us examine the facts.

In the following paragraphs I will restrict myself to the officer level, though what I State, is applicable almost as fully to the rank and file.

We start by examining the procedure for selection. The procedure in the Army is a tough and long drawn-out one. First of all we have a written test, consisting of many papers, on various subjects, over a period of several days. Those who manage to cross the first hurdle, are then faced with a tougher one—the Services Selection Board. They are tested again over a period of several days, and every facet of their personality is literally put under a microscope. They undergo test after test, mental, physical and psychological. They then face an interview board, which grills them thoroughly once more. And finally, if they succeed in getting through that, they face a medical board which examines every inch and every organ of their bodies. Even now, those who make the grade, are not assured of getting in. Instead, the successful few are put in a merit list, and only the tap required few, are taken. I think it can be agreed that the above method, which passes candidates through screen after screen, each one finer than the last, is certainly an excellent one, and assures that only the best and purest emerge at the other end—the very cream of the crop.

Now let us see the selection procedure in vogue with the Business Houses. They put in an advertisement in the papers, calling for bio-data or mark sheets in case they want trainees. Candidates with suitable credentials (writing of which is an art) are then called for an interview, which may last an hour, at the outside. And that is all.

Granted that Business Houses cannot afford to maintain selection centres like the Army does; but at least they can test would be entrants more thoroughly. They can have aptitude tests, group discussions

and so on, apart from the interview. It is further granted that businessmen need not be as fit as Army officers, but all the same, I am sure no Business House wants to take on someone who is diabetic, has high blood pressure or heart trouble. Yet almost no Business House carried out a medical check up of its potential employees.

Thus it is amply clear that, in selection procedures, the Army has far superior methods and thus most likely gets far better candidates, on an average, than Big Business does. That the latter can throw out a man in less time than his selection book, is accepted. But frequent changes of staff is not conducive to efficiency, and we all know of lemons who not only manage to show a surface glitter (which only deep probing can penetrate) but also manage to hide their defects till they have inflicted considerable damage on the organisation of which they are a part.

Next let us come to training. To start with, the Army trains its future officers for periods ranging from six months to four years, depending on the mode of entry and the type of commission desired. During this period, the candidates are put through a rigorous schedule and are taught a wide variety of subjects with emphasis on practical training. These include academic subjects like maths, science, literature, geography and so on. Then there are military subjects ranging from principles of war to study of campaigns, including man management, human psychology and law. The practical side includes the complete gamut of military training—drill, weapon training, field craft, physical training and games. To round it all off, trainees are encouraged to learn a foreign language, take part in debates and take up hobbies; the latter ranging from aeromodelling and amateur dramatics to wireless telegraphy.

I know that there are many who say that the above extensive basic training is essential because the Army recruits its personnel at a rather young age and who have somewhat lower educational qualifications. Granted that this is correct, but now the Army is putting much more emphasis on "graduate entry", and I do not think that there has been any reduction proposed or carried out in the standard of basic training.

The fact is that the Army insists on having officers with well-rounded personalities, who not only know their job, but will make good and useful members of society and, in addition, be capable of taking on almost any general task or cope with any emergency that may arise. I do not think that anyone can say that the above are not good goals to aim for. But can any business house confidently state that it trains its officers to even remotely approach the above goals?

Let us continue on the subject of training. After the officers get their commissions, the Army does not stop their training. In fact training continues throughout their careers. First come the young officers courses ranging from four to six months, in which the general training of the academies is supplemented by specialist training for the arm or service the officer has joined. After that officers have a choice of scores of courses so that their knowledge and training constantly improve. Most officers do from six to ten or more courses on a wide variety of subjects. The courses are spread out throughout their life, all the way to the National Defence College, where they go after more than a quarter of a century of commissioned service.

Apart from the military courses, officers of the technical arms and services are also encouraged to do post-graduate studies in civil universities and a number of them avail this opportunity. In this context, it is pertinent to point out that Army officers who do post-graduation, generally stand at the head of their classes, a telling commentary on the background training that they have received in the Army.

In addition to all the above, officers can take study leave for doing courses, to improve their professional knowledge. During this period, as during this post-graduate studies, the Army keeps on paying the officers their emoluments, freeing them from any financial worries.

Thus it can be clearly seen that the Army provides professional training which is constantly updated and refreshed. This continuous training is a part of life in the Army. Officers are therefore not placed in managerial positions of responsibility without being trained for the job. Thus their chances of carrying out the tasks assigned to them professionally and competently, are high.

Now let us see what business organisations do in the way of training. Several organisations do take on graduates as trainee officers and keep them on probation for a year or so. And after that? To examine the record I have taken figures from six companies/ organisations chosen entirely at random, from the big business houses of India. The figures I have taken are for 1979-80 and 1980-81, since the figures for 1981-82 were not available, but they are representative all right. These figures have been taken from the reports to the share holders and hence can be considered fairly authentic. They are tabulated below. All figures are in crores of rupees :

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Company/ Organization</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Sales/ Turnover</i>	<i>Profits Before Tax</i>	<i>Amount Spent/ set aside for training</i>
1.	I.T.C.	1970-80	455.65	13.61	0.18
		1980-81	429.78	13.75	0.22
2.	The Gramophone Co of India	1979-80	12.87	1.45	—
		1980-81	19.65	1.93	—
3.	G.E.C.	1979-80	43.56	3.66	—
		1980-81	53.64	4.95	—
4.	Tata Chemicals	1979-80	55.75	9.26	—
		1980-81	74.49	12.29	—
5.	B.E.S.T.	1979-80	66.05	6.59	—
		1980-81	75.06	5.26	—
6.	Indian Hotels Co Ltd.	1979-80	26.49	3.26	—
		1980-81	31.54	4.00	—

A glance at the above figures shows that, except one company, which spent approximately one and a half percent of its profits on training, no other company has shown any money at all being expended on training. It may be argued that one does not need training to sell records or cigarettes, but surely training, refresher or otherwise, is needed in the hotel business, electrical industry and chemical production. In fact production and sales techniques are being revolutionised throughout the World and there is almost no business, be it in a manufacturing or in a service line, which will not profit from imparting updated training to its personnel. The sad fact is that, out of the six organisations whose figures have been given, two are headed by as shrewd and progressive a personality as J R D Tata. And yet, both these have shown no expenditure on training whatsoever.

This makes it clear that big business can certainly learn a lot from the Army in yet another field i.e. training. In order that they stay abreast of the latest developments, stay internationally competitive-which they will have to eventually do, if we are to survive without foreign aid-and keep their heads above water in a buyers market (towards which our economy is hopefully inching), they will have to train their officers, their supervisory staff, their labour force and even their sales agents. This is an absolute sine qua non as far as business houses go, and all such organisations in the OECD and other progressive countries ensure that they are never left behind in this respect.

We now come to the third aspect in which business can learn a trick or two from the Army. This is in the matter of personnel policy for promotions and placements.

The promotion system in the Army is based on an objective review of the performance and potential of an individual. Placement is also based on the performance and potential of individuals tempered by organisational and personal requirements. Whatever people may say about the confidential report system, it is the one that is universally followed—in the Army, the civil government and in most big businesses. The current computerised system in the Army has been made almost as fool proof as possible and, if a few boot-lickers do get through, we can point to a similar cases in business where, the man who does shopping for the boss' wife, get accelerated promotion.

In the Army, every officer gets a confidential report once a year—oftener if his boss changes. In addition, he is evaluated on every course he does. He is graded on various essential qualities and his potential is constantly evaluated. Based on these evaluations and reports, his placement in various jobs is done. When his turn for promotion comes, a board of senior officers, who do not know who they are assessing, evaluate his performance and recommend whether he is to be promoted or not.

In business, confidential reports are given, as in the Army, though they might not be as detailed in their scope. But, as far as placement goes, this depends mainly on vacancies rather than on suitability. The Army believes in rotating people every few years, to give them a wide variety of experience. This means that if a job suitable to the genius of a particular officer is not available today, it is likely to be available tomorrow.

On the other hand, businessmen stay in the same post year after year and thus placement of a suitable man in a suitable post is more difficult. Not that the Army does not have square pegs in round holes but, since it emphasises career planning, job rotation and experience of both command and staff, its placement opportunities are definitely superior.

With regard to promotion, since business promotions are done with definite people in mind, they are bound to be less objective than those done via the impersonal Army system. In the Army, there is strong competition for promotion, the heirachial pyramid is narrow

and so, generally, only the best squeeze through. In business, promotion is easier, the pyramid flatter and the criteria less rigidly applied.

We thus come to the end of my article, and I do hope that by now I have convinced my readers that it really is a myth that big business is more efficient, well-run or better managed than the Army. To conclude or sum up, the Army believes in recruiting the best people, spending a lot of care and money in developing their talent and matching abilities to job requirements. It believes in progressive and formal training designed to supply a steady stream of professionally competent officers, who think clearly and logically. In other words the Army has a total commitment to management development and this is where big business can learn a lot from us.

## General K S Thimayya A Profile in Courage

COL CHANDRA B KHANDURI I GR

GEN K S Thimayya, a towering man of Bismarckian stature was a commander of professional intellectualism. A man of immense personal charm, he respected human values and rationality. He commanded, and even now after two decades of his death, continues to command the allegiance of people by his inspired qualities as man and leader. In his personality, it is often said, he combined oriental wisdom and Western flexibility. Endowed with talent, clarity of mind he was tough and flamboyant. Every job offered him a challenge to excel; to rise to the occasion.

Simple and modest, Timmy, as his friends and admirers called him, had developed remarkable traits of leadership and higher command. He was perhaps lucky too, to have been on the scene when 'time and space' factors suited his genius. The point in history that Timmy occupied (1906-65) would be recorded as one of strategic consequence to India. This period encompassed the final stages of our revolution for self-rule and the evolution of democracy. The Army leadership was assertive and influencing—not in politics but assisting the new nation militarily to survive and improve its image as a neutral peace-loving nation.

Fleeting as opportunities are, he picked on them to his use. And, by the time he moved out of stage, his was an image of a leader who could well have turned to be the envy of a Patton or a Mac Arthur—given, indeed suitable opportunities of command.

Timmy, like most renowned leaders of genius, was not an easy subordinate. His demand that he be treated as an officer with dignity, stemmed as much from his environmental growth as, to a small extent, from the prejudices of the white man; and later the compatibility gap between him and his political bosses. This basic issue of Timmy's life must be understood to perceive his repeated tenders of resignations from a subaltern to an Army Chief. To safeguard his rights as an officer, he was blunt and uncompromising.

## BORN IN A REVOLUTIONARY ENVIRONMENT

Born on 31 March 1906 in a rich Coorgie family, Timmy was educated in the best English schools available in the South before his entry into RIMC-preparatory joining the prestigious Sandhurst. He observed prejudices of the English against the Indians. In him these prejudices generated competitiveness to beat the British equals convincingly. "He saw" as his chief biographer Humphrey Evans said: "the British as they were and not superman". Timmy had seen them as lovers of democracy and to the Indians they should change. A sensitive nature, was nonetheless, a byproduct of this association.

By the time he earned his commission in 1926, he was a youth of grace and charm. Ingratiating, he was known to be cordial and friendly. During his one year attachment with 2 Highland Infantry a Scottish Unit—he observed it something like a club; untrained and unemployed. It also made him aware of the average ability of colonial officers, their moral degradation and the fundamental influence of the commanding officer. He did learn an important lesson : to be a good officer whom he led was less important than how he led.

Upon completing his attachment he joined 4/19 Hyderabad (later 4 Kumaon) at Baghdad. It is here that his regimental life began in earnestness understanding men and his profession.

By 1926, the national struggle for Swaraj—total independence had taken shape. Bhagat Singh had become a martyr; Gandhiji's cult of non-violence was posing mortal threat to the colonialists. Timmy and other young officers did not remain uninfluenced by this inevitable resurgence. During his tenure at Allahabad, which had become the hub of all national activities, he got acquainted to eminent Congress leaders—Motilal, Padmaja Naidu, to mention a few. It is here that he realised and acknowledged the personal magnetism of Gandhiji. It is also here that his company was called out for internal security duties. Even as a junior officer, he was of firm conviction that troops should not be called for such 'unsoldierly' duties. He said : "If army is used to suppress minor civil disturbances, the general situation would not improve but people would hate army as well as the police. No soldier could be expected to fight well against his enemies if his own people hated him." The lessons of history are fresh to vindicate this observation : the conduct of Pakistani Army in the erstwhile East Pakistan; Shah of Iran's Army repression in and around Tehran in late 70s; and now in Afghanistan.

At Fort Sandeman and Quetta he became and remained the alter ego of his commanding officers. The service in NWFP then regarded

the training ground of the colonial army—gave him faith in his ability to outdo the better of the best officers in tactical handling of the troops. At Quetta, then married to Nina, they did great humanitarian service during the 1935 earthquake.

A brief ERE tenure at Madras made him see Britishers in their disgusting colonial shapes. They should be treated as equal if not inferior, he thought.

While the German Blitzkrieg was in progress in Europe and the British in India and elsewhere were at their nadir, Timmy's Battalion arrived in Malaya to be part of Gen. Perceval's garrison, which was without adequate defences or design to protect the peninsula.<sup>1</sup> His contribution as a junior officer then were: largely two: training his company in jungle warfare and; helping settle a mutinous<sup>2</sup> situation. As he left the Battalion they suffered the first outcome of their lack of preparation: capitulation before fighting broke out.

#### TACTICAL BRILLIANCE—ALL THE WAY FROM MAUNGAW TO ZOJILA

When he was given the command of his Battalion (4 Kumaon reraised) in Burma the Japanese superman bogey still haunted the British. Timmy was one of those few who paved the way—in a small yet distinct way—for success by launching, what may be called a 'private attack'. And this he did to retrieve his 'irrevocably damaged position' after a British battalion's failure to capture the objective. He employed novel tactics—in selection of approach, timing and technique. Then followed 'Poland'—a nicknamed Japanese position. The earlier success had given him faith in his unconventionality and a soldier's faith in his luck—which he regarded as single most important quality a soldier could have.

At Poland, his unconventionality was at the executional level. While two companies of his battalion infiltrated for attack, one resisted reinforcement and the fourth demonstrated a feint.

Of tactical innovativeness he would often agree with Picasso that 'every act of creation was first of all an act of destruction'. He was applying an artist's perception of the destruction—creation phenomenon to a destruction destruction-environment. This is where his greatness lay.

#### TACTICAL ELEGANCE ENHANCED

Timmy's employment of his Sridiv during the 1948 Summer Offensive speaks volume for his brilliance at both tactical and strategic levels. Faced with gnawing paucity of troops he decided

on a deception to lead the enemy believe that the main offensive against Dommel-Muzaffarabad was from the North. To achieve this Harbaksh's 163 Inf Bde captured the Tithwal Pass before LP Sen's 161 Inf Bde commenced its advance astride the Road axis. Although the desired results of drawing the enemy reserves were achieved, but the advantages were partly negated by slow advance of Sen's Bde. Timmy's victorious will was not to be balked. He asked Sen to threaten enemy garrison at Chakothi from the Pandu axis. The weather and logistics difficulties forced an abandonment of further<sup>3</sup> offensive towards Muzaffarabad. Nonetheless, a Southernly advance resulted in the capture of vital grounds of Pirkanth and Leddigali.

The threat to Leh had developed simultaneously with other sectors. The force level, logistics problems suggested to Timmy a strategy of containment in Leh till decisive results had been achieved in other sectors. Capture of Leh was only possible if the formidable Zojila was captured. An earlier attempt to capture this 10,000 feet pass in Sept 48 had failed. Timmy realised that unless surprise was sprung on the enemy, the outcome of any attack on Zojila would remain uncertain. The force de frappe so to say-became his squadron of Stuart tanks ferried across a 450 Kms distance most secretly. And then having forged the decisive weapon, it became a matter of time to Attal's 77 Para Bde (Chindits) to reduce the enemy defences at the pass and maintain the momentum of a relentless pursuit all the way to Leh. It gave us one of the history's firsts : the successful<sup>3A</sup> employment of tanks at high altitude.

The 1948 Operations added to the stature of Timmy. He proved to be a bold field commander—innovative, calculative, who could outwit his enemy and who was expected to have liberated the entire Kashmir if an ill timed cease-fire had not been agreed. He emerged as the finest tactician and strategist among his contemporaries. His personal bravery became legendary when he flew in Air Cder Mehar Singh's transporter to Leh on 24 May. Nothing he thought, should be spared to make an operation easy for a subordinate; but once an operation had been launched he demanded resolute execution.

#### A SOLDIER ENVOY—KOREA AND CYPRUS

A unique honour was given to Timmy when he was selected to be the Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea in May 1953. The task, by no mean easy, involved the repatriation of some 121,000 Chinese—North Korean and 359 UN POWs, 41,000 of whom were unwilling to be repatriated to their own countries. Under him came Gen Thorat's Custodian Force; Sweden,

Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India became the members. To assist him were Haksar, Chakrabarty, Rao and U Bahadursingh.

"My job" Timmy said "became an attempt to reconcile two irreconcitable view points." The irreconciable, in his views were, due primarily to the incongruity of ideological conflicts; mutual hatred, cynicism, misunderstanding, shrewdness and high idealism. The bedlam that followed the transfer ceremony of POWs on 10 Sep 53 brought him under sharp criticism. But by the time the repatriation was completed, it had added a glorious feather to Timmy's cap. Admiration of 'one of the most difficult and delicate jobs well done' came from Gen Eisenhower, the US President and the others.

His own conclusion of his unique mission was penetrative and futuristic. He opined that 'in any future war POWs should not be allowed to choose repatriation but the Geneva Convention should enlarge its functions to look after it'. "The success of my mission" He said "will be remembered as the first step towards a possible victory of mens' reason and courage over his emotions and fears", And he came back with firm convictions that the value of India's neutrality<sup>4</sup> as a constructive force in a world divided by ideological wars was considerably reduced.

He was an ardent believer in peace. "I am a soldier." He said "I believe that the functions I perform are necessary and honourable. But senseless and pointless fighting, to me, is a revolting spectacle".

Timmy's fame as an adroit international negotiator in Korea had already brought him in the world focus. Now in retirement, when in Jul 64 the UN Secretary General asked him to head the UN forces in Cyprus, he agreed.

Cyprus had been torn by deep schism of faith, mutual distrust and ideological differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. It was feared that if the situation was not handled firmly it could lead to another Crusade. Timmy employed with effect the 6000 multi-national UN force till his death, on 18 Dec 65.

#### A SMALL ECLIPSE??

At 51 he was Chief of the Army Staff. His appointment, naturally was considered as a great occasion. He had an image of a splendid military leader, on whose loyalty and professionalism, to quote Lord Mountbatten, Mr Nehru could count. He had a mature soldier's views on politics. "My experience has taught me that the country's

armed services should be an instrument, but never an arbiter of national policy" He had said.

Strange as the world is, his image as a shrewd experienced Chief, unfortunately became a cause of suspicion of his political seniors. His Napoleonic faith in his luck appeared to be eclipsing. The rise to the power in Pakistan of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and fall of some political heads elsewhere, created imaginary albeit deep apprehension among some. Politics crept into the Army. Not only strategic planning suffered at the highest level but also lack of rapport became overtly visible. The Chinese threat became menacingly large. Later he said : "We could never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security." (It was to be a strategic volta face in 1962!) This became a period of unhappiness and anxiety for him. His anxieties and crises of conscience arose due to Mr Krishna Menon's<sup>5</sup> callous disregard to defence and procedural matters. He offered to resign but on persuasion, withdrew it. The whole thing became a cause celebre for politicians. While in office he kept pointing to the Govt, the frightful imbalance that existed between political theorising and power equation. The Govt failure to respond to his strategic assessments eventually brought devastating humiliation to us a few years thence in 1962.

#### MORE VIGNETTES OF QUALITIES OF THE GREAT MAN

##### COURAGE WAS HIS HALLMARK

Timmy was a varitable monument of courage. From this quality originated his creativity, unconventionality, competence, tactical innovativeness and strategic vision as well as his mastery of command. It gave him, in life and his command, his convictions and principles. He became a symbol of victorious will. He regarded physical courage as a necessary adjunct to maintaining virtue. Moral courage was however, a more noted and welcome characteristic of his personality. He feared no man when he saw, what he believed to be honourable or true, at stake. If he even compromised on this score it was due to his soldierly allegiance and devotion to duty as evidenced in his last act as Chief. Despite deep crises of conscience his staying in office was nothing but a fulfilment of a sworn in duty.

His unconventionality and risk taking calculus were indications of his courage in his earlier part of life.

### MORAL VS MATERIAL

He valued both the material and moral aspects of war. He admired as decisive the human factors in war—the man behind the weapon and the man scrambling up a slope to dislodge the enemy. But he regarded the material, and with it, the technological developments equally important. After the Zojila battle he was heard saying : materially the offensive was not practicable. Morally I was certain."

### MAGNANIMITY

Magnanimity was yet another character quality of Gen Thimayya. He regarded it an essential quality for higher command. To quote an example. In Jul 48 a company of a battalion had abandoned its position under pressure in the Tithwal Sector. The battalion came under clouds. Timmy in his magnanimity told its brigade commander : "I consider that the troops fought well under the circumstances and had been overwhelmed. These things do happen in war." He understood the fallibility of man. He would often quote Dr Johnsons 'a fallible being will fail somewhere' and forgive people.

He knew that despite the best of intentions things could go wrong and usually do. Those responsible for conduct of war, he had said later, must understand actualities of war and the responsibilities that go with command. "They must therefore have adequate courage to accept the errors of their good meaning subordinates". He had said.

### A MAN OF INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

The assignment with the NNRC gave Timmy broad spectrum of international relationship. He learned that all wars have been and would continue to be ideological which usually was a mask for some pragmatic objectives and were intended primarily to increase nations fighting spirit. The result of such wars developed 'schisms' and often a revitalisation of culture among the vanquished. The results of Crusade, the repression of Hindus by Muslims or the intransigence of Israel in West Asia today all vindicate his conclusions. And in his book 'Experiments in Neutrality' posthumously published he leaves a serious thought to ponder : Would future Generals need to be expert in dialectics as well as tactics? Plausibly yes.

We are assured that not only was Timmy's contribution to the world peace substantial but far reaching in its future applicability.

## CONCLUSION

When I wrote to Mrs Nina Thimayya for information on the General she, in her cautious sagacity noted that I had undertaken a difficult job. As I finish this analysis I agree with her. For, Gen Thimayya was a great man. And greatness is not an easy thing to define. Beside being a great commander, he had been, what may euphemistically be called, 'on the side of life'-loving it, meeting it gallantly, with a relish and with phenomenal creative courage. He, like other great commanders had the quality of mind and spirit which helped him perform his duties, as God gave him light to do.

"This is not to say, my life has been more difficult than of any other soldier". He said with humility "On the contrary I have been more fortunate than the most and the rewards and satisfaction have been great". Indeed, he had been lucky but it had been more the triumph of his indomitable will, a creative courage and pre-eminent ability over the palmists' belief in deep burrows in his palm.

Of all the eulogies for him I consider Gen Bhagat's the best : "A Gen Thimayya is not born in every generation. The like of him there will seldom be—a soldier, a general a man's man; the Army, his soul, his soul, the Army."

What struck me equally great about Gen Thimayya is his views on generalship, which he once wrote to a friend" : Generalship is an intelligent and creative activity. Human inversion has no place in it". Great many lives like ours, I feel, would be influenced by this message of his life long wisdom.

## FOOTNOTES

1. The Garrison commander, it is often alleged did not prepare defences as it would have led to panic among the civil population.
2. In later years, his experience helped him defuse a mutiny by a battalion in Japan.
3. Owing to lack of desired superiority of force the offensive, to quote Gen Sen; 'remained on offensive without teeth'.
4. A shift in our policy of strict neutrality to positive neutrality came about after 1962.
5. Of Krishna Menon, Brig Dalvi said that he had sapped the morale of the higher echelon of the Armed Forces by his arrogance and near contempt of senior officers.
- 5A. This part of Kashmir has once again become important. The Karakoram Highway a Class 60 all weather road linking Sinkiang with Pakistan through the occupied Kashmir adds new strategic dimensions to this region.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND BIBLIOGRAPHY**

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16. Gratitude to Lt Gen M.L. Tuli—Commandant, The College of Combat, for inspiration and guidance.

# “Towards A Better Resettled Life”

CAPT S S DASAKA

## SYNOPSIS

**T**HREE has been a greater thinking on the resettlement of ex-service officers. This continues to attract the attention of all the right-minded people as the gap between the requirements and achievements in the resettlement of officers has been widening at a very alarming rate. This Himalayan problem requires Herculean efforts to be encountered with so to achieve atleast a satisfactory solution.

The existing differences in the resettlement opportunities available to the officers of the various arms/services by virtue of their service background keep one section of them at an edge over the others. A considerable percentage of ex-service officers are not happy with what the Army has provided them for better and faster resettlement. Most of them retire at the age of 50 years a time when the family burdens may be the maximum requiring early attention which is earlier than that of their counterparts in the civil life. Many remain unemployed or under-employed after they retire. Their life in civvies has been a “Not-so-happy” one compared to that in uniform. A drastic difference does exist; the life in uniform taking an edge over the other. A great deal has to be done to reduce the suffering of these noble figures who gave all theirs for their home, land and are not able to get in turn atleast a fraction of their requirements. If the situation is allowed to continue for long, it is bound to have unwanted effects on the morale of service officers. The prestige of the Army profession in the eyes of the nation may also reduce to a very low limit which in turn will further adversely influence the entry of already-reluctant youth into the Army as officer trainees.

This paper makes an attempt to suggest various measures for initiation of plans aimed for better resettlement. While so doing, this mainly speaks for those retiring earlier. For obvious reasons, the AMC, ADC and the SSRC officers are kept out of the purview of this paper.

## TWO SIDED PROBLEM

This problem of the resettlement of ex-service officers can better be studied once the officer cadre is broadly divided into two

categories, firstly those from the non-technical arms who mostly do not possess a technical qualification/experience and secondly those from the technical arms (like Engineer, EME, Signals) who are either technically qualified at the time of entry (technical graduates) or become so during their service. The problems, its severity and possible solutions differ widely in respect of these two groups. Therefore, a separate but simultaneous dealing is necessary in the analysis of the problem. Most of the civilian employees retire between 55-60 years against the majority in the Army who retire at 50. Thus the Army officer's service tenure is reduced by 5-10 years compared to a civilian employee. This period normally is most taxing on the Army officer since his responsibilities will be at their peak. The ex-service officer should atleast be able to earn as much, if not more as his Army pay, during 5-10 years after retirement.

#### WORLD OF SPECIALIZATION

Today we live in a world of specialization. Rare fields of learning of yesteryear have bifurcated themselves into various specialized disciplines today. The world needs a specialist and not a generalist. We all do specialize in our own arm/service but this may not be of much significance to the civil organisations where the specialist qualifications expected of us are most of the times entirely different than what majority of us acquire during our service in the Army. We should therefore specialize to be absorbed in civil organisations at a later date. This specialization is in the form of education/work experience.

#### EDUCATION

Ex-service officers face the problem of securing a job due to the absence or inadequacy of qualification and work experience required by the civilian agencies.

(a) Compared to those from the technical Arms, the officers from the non-technical Arms are the worse victims of this problem. Officers from the non-technical Arms should be given an opportunity to prosecute higher studies in civil institutions, in areas of their choice for a period of 3-4 years during their service. This may further their chances for better resettlement. It may generally be ensured that the course, the officer is allowed to do, must be of some direct use to the Army to the extent possible. However many areas exist, the specialization of which may not be of any direct use to the Army and so this aspect need not be emphasised at all.

Is there a true justification in allowing these officers to spend 3-4 years of their service on higher studies and thus depriving the

Army of their service for that duration? This may be the general doubt of the policy makers. The justification does exist. The technically unqualified officers (not to confuse with those from the non-technical arms) joining Technical arms spend, at present, 3 years in the various Army training institutions, for their engineering degree studies. Moreover some of these officers and some of the technical graduates also spend 2 years for post-graduation in engineering/Management. Thus a technically unqualified regular officer (from the technical arms) spends out of his service a minimum of three years for graduation to a maximum of five years for graduation and post-graduation. In the case of technical graduates, the minimum being nothing for those not selected for post-graduation, the maximum will be two years. But the officers from non-technical arms, at present, do not spend anytime out of their services for similar courses. Will it not, therefore, be proper for the government, in view of the above justification, to also allow those from the non-technical arms for higher studies for 3-4 years on par with the other group? The cost-benefit ratio, in so doing, should not be considered at all since the facility, if extended, will have a salutary effect on the officers morale. Will the government say that this inherent disadvantage of the non-technical officers is already being compensated for by their faster promotions compared to technical Arms officers? These promotions are only after the rank of Major and since the fate of those who retire at 50 years (of whom we are concerned) does not change by virtue of this promotions the government may not be very correct in saying what is stated above.

(b) The percentage of officers selected for post-graduation is always microscopic. All the officers should be allowed to continue post-graduate studies for 2-3 years, at a time suitable to the officers. By so doing, a technical graduate officer would spend 2-3 years out of the service for studies and in the case of a regular officer this totals to 5-6 years including the time spent while in the service for the engineering degree. Irrespective of these figures, all the officers should be allowed to do post graduate studies.

The technical graduate is available for service as a qualified engineer right from the day of entry into the Army, while a regular officer attains that status only after a period of 6-8 years of commissioned service (A regular officer normally attends the engineering degree after three years of service and a SSRC officer attends it almost one year after being granted PRC).

The ante-date that is granted to the technical graduates is to cater, probably, for the extra time spent by them (5 years) for an engineering degree compared to the time spent by a regular officer (3 years) before joining the Army for a non-engineering degree.

On an analogy with that of regular officers government will be justified to allow all technical graduates for post-graduate

studies. However, notwithstanding the above, the regular officer also should be allowed to continue post-graduation since the cost benefit ratio in the case of all officers in doing post-graduation will be beneficial to the state.

There are two options open to the government. On one hand the continuance of the policy of not allowing the non-technical arms officers to continue higher studies (as it exists now) and on the other allowing all the types of officers to do so as proposed. The effects of the former are quite well known to all of us: the ex-service officers' plight for a new living. The latter, if allowed, will raise the morale of the officers' cadre but also will help the Army to get a reputation for itself as being able to provide enough civil educational opportunities to its officers, so that these are welcomed into the fold of the civil employment agencies very willingly once they retire. Isn't it a point to ponder about? Every right-minded person will vote for the latter keeping the broader interests of the Army in particular and the nation in general.

#### SCHOLARSHIPS

Allowing so many officers of the Army for higher studies, may be a great burden on the Army. Is there a way out? Yes. It seems so. Government of India, various other governments, scientific and public institutions offer every year tens of hundreds of scholarships for higher studies at home and abroad. At present, no provision exists to allow the Army officers to compete for these scholarships. The Govt should permit all Army officers to compete in the open for these scholarships. In case where the scholarship amount exceeds or at least equals that of the pay of the officers, the officers should be asked to opt for these scholarships. In case where the scholarship amount is less than the salary of the officer, he should be allowed to draw the scholarship and a part of the salary so that these two totalled together equal the normal monthly salary of the officer. In case of the non-existence of such a provision as of now, necessary steps may be taken to allow the officers to do so.

#### COURSES

Lot of efforts are being made to get some of the courses of the Army recognised as equivalent to the civil courses to facilitate resettlement. The results are not very promising indeed. It will be better trying to solve the problem from the other end. The Government should identify some civilian courses, which if attended by the Army officers, will acquaint them with the subject matter of the courses to the same extent as will be done by a similar course offered, by the Army. Thus, those courses, where the objective of the civil courses coincides more or less with that of the Army courses, should be listed. The Army Officers should be sent to these civil courses so

that the problem of getting recognition for the Army course will minimise. If there be any difference in the objective of the civil and the Army courses, the civil course may be suitably modified to cater for the additional needs of the Army officers. In cases where specific military knowledge is to be imparted to the Army officers in addition to the civil course contents, the same may be imparted exclusively for the Army officers in the Army training establishments. This proposal, if accepted, will reduce the efforts to get recognition for the Army courses from civil institutions. Common areas where civil and military course interests coincide are Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning, post-graduate engineering diplomas, petroleum, tele-communication, Supply and transport, various disciplines of management, educational sciences and all the degree engineering courses. The proposal may have a welcome relief on the Army Budget since it enables reduction of staff and connected costs in the Army Training establishments. Moreover, any officer who attends any of these courses walks out confidently with a civil qualification in hand. Coupled with the above is the proposal to encourage Army officers to do civil courses, which may benefit them in their Army career. This will have the dual advantage.

#### EMPLOYMENT

Lack of work experience in a related field stands in the way of an ex-service officer finding a suitable job in the civil agencies. This problem can be overcome if every service officer is allowed to serve in any government/reputed private agency for a period of 2-3 years. At present, Army officers are sent on deputation only to those agencies which request for the Army officers. There may be many agencies, which may not be specifically requesting for the Army officers on their staff but will not be very reluctant to have them, if approached. In most Government organisations, every employee is allowed to apply for deputation thrice a year. Similar facility should be extended to the Army officers so that they are allowed to apply through normal channels for deputation, in direct response to advertisements appearing in the press. True, all of us are aware that the Army will not be able to provide suitable working experience required for civil jobs to all its officers but if the Army can let them have it outside, isn't worth? In some cases, the experience thus gained by an officer while on deputation may help him in the Army career to some extent. This will also help him in earlier resettlement. If a service officer can prove his mettle and get selected for a civil job, the government must only be too willing to spare him accordingly for his own benefit and thus vote for a reduction of burden on it for his

resettlement. This may specially help the officers from non-technical arms to a great extent.

Be there a difficulty in extending this facility to all the officers, who should get priority? The officers who retire at the earliest age, obviously, should be preferred to others. Those who go up the ladder retire at the later age than these officers. Resettlement for the later is more important than for the former. Let us not doubt the capabilities of the early-retiring officers and thus prove to disqualify them for priority in employment. These officers could not go beyond a particular rank since they were relatively low in the merit. Should the percentage of promotions increase, some of them would definitely jump into the next rank, thus justifying their capabilities.

#### FINANCES

All of us are not very adequately paid to be able to save enough for the rainy day. It is a known fact that a suitable job abroad will enable everyone to overcome this problem. All the service officers should therefore be permitted to serve abroad with any Indian agency for a period of 2-3 years to better their finances, a rare possibility in the Army. In this context, the reported decision of Sri Lanka Government in accepting a committee recommendation that servicemen should be allowed to seek short term overseas employment which would benefit the services may be thoroughly analysed (as reported in the New Delhi Edition of the Times of India dated 31 Jul 81). This, if found suitable in helping the officers to improve their finance, may also be extended to our officers.

#### INCENTIVES

Suitable monetary incentives may be given to service officers acquiring civil qualifications, which the Government feels, will benefit the officers in faster resettlement, though these may not be of significance to the military career.

#### FUTURE PROSPECTS

One may visualize the future when there may be a requirement of peace-keeping forces: Sanitary Forces to ensure sanitation, Pollution prevention forces, forces for mass education drive, afforestation forces etc. The ex-service officer with their disciplined behaviour will suit any of these forces in an appropriate capacity.

### UNEXPLORED FIELDS

Teaching remains to be one of the fields where very few ex-service officers settle in. The Government may consider the proposal of introducing "Defence Studies" as one of the subject at the graduate level and laying the qualification for the combined Defence Services examination as graduation with "Defence Studies" as one of the subjects. This will absorb a considerable percentage of the ex-service officers in the teaching profession and also bring in officers into the Army with better awareness of the defence matters.

### RESERVATIONS

At present, certain percentage of vacancies of various grades are reserved in the Government agencies for ex-service officers. The percentage may be increased and more important will be the creation of a machinery, if not already existing, to enforce strict implementation of the reservation policies.

### CREATION OF AN ENVIRONMENT

It is very unfortunate that most of the civilians consider the officers with service background joining the civil organisations as unwanted. Unless this attitude of the civilians is changed, it may prove to be very detrimental to the Army officers. It is therefore necessary to create an environment wherein the civilians regard the service officers as an asset to their organisation and thus be happy to receive them with open hands into their fold. For this, the ultimate and the penultimate levels in certain identified public sector organisations must be filled by the service officers so that they, by virtue of motivation rather than by compulsion, create an environment where the civil folk of these organisations readily respond positively to the process of recruitment of ex-service officers (There are at present 17 officers with defence service background manning various public sector undertakings so says a report. But, shouldn't this figure be increased?

Will it be out of place to mention that the service officers by virtue of their sense of discipline and dedication to the duty continue to occupy positions of eminence in various countries. Should we lag behind? No, not at all.

### RAISING OF AGE LIMIT

All the above proposals, if implemented, may not fit into the service span of an officer. In view of the rise in the average span of

life due to rapid advancements in science and technology, would it not be proper to consider an increase in the retirement age of the officers?

### CONCLUSION

The recommendations made so far aim at reducing the intensity of the problem of resettlement of the ex-service officers. To cater for the strength of officers being allowed to proceed for higher studies/deputation/overseas jobs, the government may have to go in for a certain percentage of officers as floating strength over the normal requirements. All these recommendations, warrant a thorough and rational analysis viewed against a background of growing dissatisfaction among the retiring/retired service officers on one hand and the rapid downfall of the Army profession in the eyes of the nation at large on the other. The problem of finances that might arise to implement these, can definitely be sacrificed for the sake of the welfare of ex-service officers, the motivation of the youth and the social status of the Army profession. Needless to say that a career in the Army, at onetime among the first few preferences of a youth has of late, been climbing down the ladder. It is therefore the duty of every right-minded person to help motivate the youth prefer a career in the services and thus be able to bring the Army back to its glory. Let our Great Army get a name for looking after its officers equally well whether they are in or out of the uniform.

It is time for us to think, act and faster. Let's do so and not be wanting any more.

## British Neglect of Artillery in Indian Campaigns

Professor D.D. KHANNA, ndc and R.K. TANDON

THE following extracts are from the manuscript diary\* of a young British Artillery officer who came to India in 1801 in the service of East India Company and later accompanied the Grand Army under Lord Lake to chase the Maratha Army of Jaswant Rao Holkar. The manuscript is retained in the British Museum, London. The complete diary, for the period 24th August, 1804 and 23rd August, 1805, is written in a loose sloping hand on 290 fulscale sheets and at various places takes enormous time to decipher. The diary contains several drawings both Architectual and Military and makes a useful addition not only on the pattern of warfare in India during the period but also on European approach to Indian Architecture.

The author preferred to remain anonymous and concluded his diary with these words "I have erased a few Names and Particular works, which might in these days of Intercepted Correspondence, create me not a little trouble—As it is, I cannot hope to escape appearing in Print if my Journal is taken but I have concealed by Name, and such points as might more easily show who was the Author—" Repeated readings of the diary and interpreting events with contemporary records and personalities, has made it possible to locate the Officer as one Lt. James Young who later became a leading personality in India.

James Young was born in Glasgow on 2nd October, 1782 and matriculated from Glasgow University where his father John Young was a Professor of Greek for nearly half a century. James married Jane Frances, daughter of Richard Hamfray in India in 1807. He resigned from the service of East India Company in 1818 and became a Director in the firm of Alexander & Co., Bankers & Agents in Calcutta. He had the distinction of being Sheriff of Calcutta twice, once in 1838 and again in 1839.

The diary of James Young is a valuable Historical document record of the unusual freedom with which Young puts down his

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\*The diary is being edited by Professor D. D. Khanna, Head, Department of Defence Studies, University of Allahabad, and will be published by East-West Publications Fonds B.V., London.

comments on his superiors both Military and Civil. James is highly critical of the discriminatory treatment given to Artillery by the British in their Indian Campaigns in early 19th Century. He has highlighted not only the poor quality and out dated arms and equipments used by the British in India but also the miserable conditions of the Artillery officers especially in the service of East India Company. He is also very critical of the British Policy in India and also of the performances of some very senior British Officers including Wellesley and Lord Lake. For both Military and Political Historians the diary puts the period in a rather different complexions.

The extracts from the diary as printed here have not been changed at any point so as to retain its originality even of the abbreviation, punctuations, spellings etc.

A brief background of the Anglo-Maratha relations and operations in the following paragraphs will prepare the background of the diary.

The Treaty of Bassein signed on 31st October 1802 between Baji Rao Peshwa and the British sealed the fate of the Maratha Independence. Immediately after this Treaty the other Maratha Chiefs decided to meet this challenge if necessary by force. The combined forces of Daulat Rao Sindhia and Bhonsla decided to operate in Deccan (South India) while Jaswant Rao Holkar operated in Hindustan (North India). The Maratha forces both in Deccan and Hindustan were defeated in no time and in the Deccan Bhonsla and Sindhia signed a Treaty with the British.

Jaswant Rao Holkar, however, refused to accept the British terms for Treaty and decided to continue his harassing tactics against the British forces in North India. Lord Lake, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in North India was ordered to recommence hostilities against Holkar and chase his army towards destruction. Holkar, however, at places succeeded in surrounding and humiliating the British Forces leading to the disastrous retreat of a British detachment under Col. Monson. This led to the formation of a Grand Army under Lord Lake to chase and destroy the forces of Jaswant Rao Holkar in North India. The Grand Army under Lord Lake marched from Cawnpoor on the 3rd of September 1804. The Diary deals at length the various aspects and events during the march.

#### EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY

SEPTEMBER 9, 1804

The Artillery lost 28 Europeans with Monson's Party—& are really quite dwindling away—to a mere Nominal Corps from the *Fatal*

and *Stup'd* Parsimony of a Blind Govt—in a Department the most essential to their Existence as a State—It is in the Art of Artillery & Engineering alone—that the Country Powers have never *yet* been able to Rival us—tho' of late years they have been making rapid strides towards it—& notwithstanding this—& the positive Necessity which Commonsense might be supposed to dictate—of keeping this branch of the Art of War—in a state of perfect & Constant Effectiveness—the very opposite Line of Conduct is pursued—& the Regt—of Artillery *alone* in their Service—is about 2/5—of its Nominal strength—in Men—& nearly 1/2 deficient in Commissioned Officers—were I to add to this wretched Account—*The Pitiful & Parsimonious* Mode in which The *Commissariate & Bullock* Departments—are Conducted without *Men—Cattle—Carriages*—even *Guns entertained*—or *ready for service*—until the Moment when they are actually wanted & it is too late to have them—disciplined—or fit for use—I shd fill up a Volume instead of a Page.....As to the Inefficiency of the Sepoy Establishments—It cannot be better exemplified—than by taking a look at the State of Defence in which we were compelled to leave our own Provinces—all last Campaign—& the present one—when if an Enemy had got into the Dooab or got into it now—he might traverse it at leisure from one End to the other—without scarce meeting with even the shew of opposition—I hope in a few years, to see on the Bengal Establishment—60,000 Regular Infantry—& 3000 Effective Artillery at least—But the *Policy or Economy*—of opening their Purse—Strings—will not, I dare say appear to the Govt—until some severe lesson be taught them—God grant it may not be *More* than a *Mere* Lesson :

SEPTEMBER 13, 1804

We have plenty of Horses—but no Riders—our Little Troop at it's full complement—is only calculated to Men—2 Guns—2 Howitzers—25 Tumbrils—of our whole number—at this Moment—by Death & Sickness 20 or there abouts are “*hors de Combat*”—& yet we have A Gun & a Tumbril, more than our Establishment which require 12 Draught Horses—& 9 Drivers—The Consequence of this *Augmentation by Inversion*—is real diminution of our strength—Instead of 6 Horses per Carriage, we are compelled to have only 4—as we have no Men to drive more—These 4, having, in addition to The burden of a Dragoon horse *on their Backs* to draw between them a 6 pr 5½ Howzr or Tumbril, are quite unable to do the work, & die—Yet with certain wise heads—it is considered as “Augmenting our Horse Artillery”—to add Guns & Horses—without giving Men to work them—so that like the Man who starves in the Midst of plenty—we have the

Reputation of Great strength, while the real fact is, that at present every Gun & every Horse we received adds to our weakness—what Capt. B. thinks on this subject I know not—but I think even the profit which he, & he *alone*—makes by these added Guns & Horses—would not tempt him to receive *one* of them, without a Proportion of Men and Lascars to work them—If he knew what high Ideas are entertained of us & the use we shall be of—by everyone in the Army—All which, will I know be cruelly disappointed—& our shame which ought to fall on the heads of our Superiors—be redoubted—or tripled—In proportion to the exaggerated Ideas now entertained of us—In action—4 Men even, an altogether too few for the Management of a Gun—including the Casualties incident to all Troops—& especially to us—in the Mad and absurd—tho' bold—mode, in which our (erased) means to act with us—Running up in the Face of an Enemy—Unprotected—Unannoying—until he has got so near—that the Enemy could kill us with their very Pistols or Charge us—long before we could commence our first Round—what have we to do with all this *Changing* etc etc—If we go within 300 Yards—at nearest—we expose ourselves to Musquet Shot—& Is not this throwing away the Principal—the Grand Advantage of the Artillery “He being able to annoy Infy or Cavy at a distance, when their Musquets—or Carbines can not come near you?”—It is—I affirm— & unless it is to be supposed that the Enemy are to be Panic—Struck & never dream of resistance, when they see the Redoubtable Horse Artillery, come Galloping down on them—I do not see how they *possibly could fail* to kill every Men or Horse of us, 'en we could open on them—whatever the Mahrattas may do—I would only ask if any one thinks the French Regt in their place wd suffer a Man of us to return alive to tell the tale? or if one of our own Sepoy Corps—wd not, by a Single well directed Volley, Levelled at the Horses Breasts—put the whole of us “*Hors de Combat*”—? For, be it recollect—as an Argument, stronger than any other purpose, against our approaching too near—That if a Single Horse is killed—in the Harness—(& who can well miss such a train)—The Gun is rendered altogether useless until that Horse is replaced no Relief may be near—& if there is—The Men must dismount—& the Dead or Wounded Horse with difficulty be disengaged from the Harness—This is no work of a moment & while we are about it—must the Enemy—within so short a distance—we supposed to have to *gone to sleep*?—The more I think of this Subject—the more it vexes me—the more I could say on it—if, (erased) does act as he says he will, in this manner—he will perhaps be able to kill numbers of the Enemy, before they run in on his Guns—or have shot *all* his Men and Horses—but he will most undoubtedly—lose *all* his Officers—& *all* his *brave Men*—& leave *his Guns with the Enemy*—In

my opinion—(Altho' the *most obvious reasons*—prevent *my* opening my Lips to him on the subject till called on) It is no longer a cold question of *Profit and loss*—to be calculated by ordinary Rules of Dr. & contra Credr.—which is of most advantage to his Employers & the service—The Killing numbers of the Enemy & losing his Men, Horses, & Guns—or, killing perhaps *fewer* of the Enemy, yet preserving his Corps from Annihilation—Altho' this, sets the question in as *striking* a point of view as any mode of putting it can do—yet there is a sentiment superior to that, which ought to govern the heart of every Brave Man, entrusted with the lives of his Fellow Subjects—Such a Man altho' he is never to think of Danger, where his services are likely to produce Victory—Honor—or even advantage to his Country—Yet, he is to be, specially when, as in the present Case, Success is *at best problematical*—careful of the Lives of his Men not being Wanlonly & uselessly Sacrificed”—Yet is our Commander (erased) brave even to daring—but his prejudices are Strong—& having imbibed a false & dazzling Ideas of the superiority of *Horse Artillery* over every other Species of Force—Guns—Cavalry, or Infantry—he will not give up the *Dear Decoits*—It is but justice to him, however, to Say, that I do not believe he even heard or read any Arguments on the opposite Side of the question—to make him inclined to think non-seriously about it—once only, did he speak of it to me a year ago—when I merely Combated it slightly upon such Grounds as my Reason told me, made against it—but since then—I have though much—& read more one on the subject—through the advice & assistance of my most highly esteemed friend Colonel Horsford—whose opinion—at any time *Gospel* on professional, or literary subjects with me—I am happy to Say, in the present Instance entirely Conclide, with my own—From the various Authors chiefly French—which he has lent me—I can see that in their opinion—& in particular in the formal opinion of the Committee of Marshals & Generals of French Artillery—assembled by the late Louis XVI—to try & decide, on the Uses—Merits & Discipline of Horse Artillery—“Horse, a Flying Artillery—was to differ from all other Field Artillery, only in as much as that having More Horses to a Price—& the Gunners being Mounted—It could with the Celerity of Cavalry move from point to point during action as required—But that in every other *Respect whatever* The Rules for Disciplining the men—& Horses—& using the Gun were to be precisely the same as those for ordinary Field Artillery—which in fact they became—The moment the Gun was unlimbered—& the Men dismounted to Commence firing”—Is this not *Simple—Rational—& Intelligible*? Oh! that I could get (erased) to think it so;

SEPTEMBER 19, 1804

At Calcutta—a shabby Company of Golundauze or Native Artillery Men—is ordered to be raised for the defence of Prince of Wales Island—for the safety of which Govt—seem at last to be anxious—after having left it nearly defenceless, since the French War broke out—To this Company of Artillery, not a single Officer is given yet Regiment or Regiments of Native Infantry are raised, & with them, always the due proportion of Officers, yet the poor neglected Artillery Officers are never to receive benefit by any augmentation : : This is *Justice* :

OCTOBER 25, 1804

Lt. Col. Burn is besides to reduce some Towns & Forts in his way—for which purpose he has taken, besides his Field Pieces—2 or 3—18 Pounders—Judge, all the who by *reading* or *Experience*—know how the Ordnance Department are conducted in France—In *England*—in *Europe*—how they are carried on here, & what a Corps of Artillery we have in Bengal—when I tell you—That with this Train—there is not a single Artillery or Engineer Officer—The 5 or 6 with the “grand army of India”—being already *too* few—to spare even one—but what is even worse—These 18 Pounders—have no ammunition—no shot I mean—& are to depend, for a supply of that *rather necessary article* for a siege—or what they, or the Resident at Delhi—*can procure*—“*Cudite Tencri*”

OCTOBER 26, 1804

— to do the whole of the Garrison & Field Artillery duties—all of all which army & of 5 or 6 Forts & Garrisons—There are *nominally* 2,100 European Artillery—*Really*—(for they have never yet been *nearly complete*)—about 6 or 700 Europeans & about 2 or 300 Golundauze, (or Native) Artillery Men—no state in the Civilized World has nearly so small a proportion—France & the great Continental European states, are out of the question—England during the last peace—had 8 Battns—of 1000 or 1200 Each—& 7 Troops of Horse Artillery—Their Majesties even of Portugal—Naples, or Ci = devant Sardinia—had far more :—with regards to, to *cherishing*—& *fostering*, what is, or ought to be a *Scientific* Line of service, as it is one, acknowledged, in the Ignorance of European Ideas, to be of the greatest *Use* of any, in the act of War—the French—Austrians—Prussians—the English even—are weak enough, to encourage this Corps, (the Artillery), by giving him Every advantage, in point of *Rank & honours*—over the other *Lines of service*—where Talents are not expected—& scarcely necessary—according, however, to our more

Enlarged Indian Ideas, on these Matters—*Rank—Enrollement & Command*—go in the *Inverse Ratio* of utility to the state—Thus, whereas in England the Artillery Batt have a Ed Offr (A Colonel in Second) *more* in proportion than the Infantry—so in India—The Arty have 2 in proportion, fewer than the Infy—& 3 fewer than the Cavalry —, But the Depression under which *our* service lies in this country, from this, & a 100 other similar cause, is too serious a subject for joking—In February 1802 an addition of 6 Companies of Arty was made to our Regt—but *not a single Fd Officer* was added with them—*If* we & the officers of the Infy or Cavy were on a footing *formerly*—(when the army in 1798 was re-organised)—& *if* It was intended that we shd-not in future be *deprived* of our *Equality* in this Grand Respect of promotion—both which points were contained in the spirit of the orders of—98—& were, besides, at the Instance of the Artillery Representatives in 94-5-& 6—stipulated for—& agreed to by our Masters of Leaden-hall street & His Majesty's Ministers—why, on augmentation of the Interior Ranks, was not an equal & fair proportion of the Higher, or the Fd—officers, also given to us?—What political or Military sin has our Unfortunate Corps singly committed, to the singly excluded from the benefit—of our Equel Chance of attaining a Fd officers Rank & *Consequent Pension*?—that object, of all others the first in the Prospects of an Indian officer—& on account of which alone—the Equality of Chance to promotion to the higher Rank was bestowed on all branches of the army alike—our Unfortunate Captain, stand at the head of the List of Capts in the army—while Captains 2 & 3 years their Juniors—have become *Lt Cols* of Infy or Cavalry—for when these Corps have been increased—they have always had the proportion of Field Officers added also—as Colonen Greane, the Commandant of Artillery, at the Presidency is a, selfish, man-devoted to himself alone—& totally devoid of *Espirt de Corps*—or the most remote Ideas of Public spirit—we have never been able to Interest him in our Cause—but our present Comg Officer in this Army Lt. Col Horsferd An Officer of the highest professional ability—as well as the most general knowledge & Literature—whom it were injurious to name in the same page with the former Man—sensible of the Cruel Injustice under which the Corps laboured—both from immediate supercession & ultimate retardation of promotion—presented in Octr 1803, to H.E. the Comr in Ch—them before Agra—a Memorial—stating our wrongs & begging Redress from Govt thro' His Excy' Mediation—The Genl professed himself sensible of our wrongs—& declared he wd forward the Memorial to Govt—a year has since Elapsed—no notice has been taken of us or our Petition—yet daily additions are made to the Infy to the Cavalry—& every such

increase, but adds to the Injuries we have sustained:—Capt Harewick of the Artillery—The senior Captain of the Regt & the principal sufferer—on going home in 1802—was furnished by Col. Horsford with a similar Memorial, to be presented to the Court of Directors—He printed it—signed it in behalf of himself & his Brother Officer in Bengal—The Court were graciously pleased to declare themselves penetrated by our Hardships & sensible of our Wrongs—They then—consigned it to—*oblivion*—we now, as the last resource—have some thoughts of asking our Col—(Horsford) to press His Ex. the Comr in Ch—for at least the Honor of an answer from Govt atleast a *Yes*: or *No* :—A favor we have not, in 12 Months been able to obtain—

OCTOBER 27, 1804

This day Lt M W Brown, Qn Mr of the Arty in Camp—and I, met at his Tent, to frame a letter to Lt. Col. *Horsford*—to be signed by the Arty Officers in Camp—requesting him to obtain—if possible from the Comr in Chief—some answer relative to the Artillery Petition of the last year—on the subject of Field Officer—This letter was meant to submit to the Arty Officers, now in the Army—for approvation & signature—God Grant that it may succeed:—“Q.F., F.Q.S.”—

OCTOBER 29, 1804

Yesterday Capt Nelly, the Senr Arty Officer in Camp Delivered to Col Horsford—a Letter—signed by all of us except one—Who, altho' no doubt he will rejoice to *benefit* by *our* exertions—does not chuse to take upon himself, even the *small share* of Responsibility, that wd attach to *his share* of the address—were it either criminal or unjustifiable—whereas it is the humblest, of humble Petitions merely requesting the Comg. Offr—to put His Excy the Cr in Chief in mind of a Petition forwarded by him, in our behalf to Govt a whole year ago—& to which even a *Yes* or *No* has not been deigned—The Officer to whom I have alluded, knows well enough that the Request will not be the less or more Granted or Denied for want of the signature of so Insignificant an Individual as he, *for more reasons than one*, is—& shd it be granted—he will without danger of trouble, be one of the first to be *bit* by it—shd it be refused—he will no doubt rique himself Vastly on his *Penetration*—in seeing the *Folly* or *Impropriety*—of subjects, using their *Undoubted Rights* to *humbly* Petition their Governor of *Re'ress*—another reason for this *Generous & Public Spirited* Conduct, in the Person alluded to—I have heard alleged viz that he had not *Common Sense* enough to discriminate between *modest request*, & *mutinous remonstrance*—but had declared—“that he wd never put *his*

*hand to any thing*"—is A *Second Deniel*" : "a very Solemon this : 's—with regard to these Different opinions, as Sir Roger De Coverby say—"much may be said on both sides"—Be this as it may—Col H—in his observations on the subject to the Officers—had handed him down to recorded & deserved Contempt—I blush to add, that the Officer I allude to, is a *particular* Brother Officer of mine—in the Troop of Horse Artillery—*His Name* ;—sicken with Envy : *hide your Diminished Heads—the object Time servers* : the *Sycophants & Courtiers* : is in mercy I erase his name—The Col Forwarded his Officers request to Head Qurs in a most nervous & maly Letter in his very best style—particularly dwelling on the aggravation to our Distresses & Supercessions, occasioned by the total refusal of even a *simple answer*— & the serious loss of a whole year, to the Artillery—during which time, their Petition wd have been sent to, & answered by the Court of Directors— & the numerous supercessions we suffer, by the additions to the Infy & Cavalry—either not have existed, or have been patiently born, as irremediable :—

# JOSEPH FRANCOIS DUPLEIX

1697-1763

LIEUT-GENERAL S.L. MENEZES

DUPLEIX, the Governor to be of French India, was born in 1697 into a wealthy, provincial bourgeois family, though not of the nobility. After his successful siege of the English at Madras in 1746, he was ennobled and awarded the cross of Saint Michael. (Nearly two centuries later, the English named a New Delhi road and lane after him, as a tribute to his prowess.) His father's family came from near Poitiers, where for some generations they had been trades people. Dupleix's father, however, entered into tax-collecting and his work took him to Landrecies, where he became the Controller General of the lands of Hainault. In 1695 he married Anne Louise de Massac, the daughter of a royal official.

The father moved soon after to Brittany, becoming a Royal Councillor and Receiver General of the King's farms by 1700. Together with the scions of the Breton aristocracy the young Joseph was educated by the Jesuits at Quimper. Later he was to champion the cause of the Jesuits at Chandernagore against the prejudices of the French Superior Council at Pondicherry. One might also explain Dupleix's later aristocratic pretensions, in terms of his adolescent association with the Breton nobility, less class-ridden than the other French provincial nobility.

Francois Dupleix, the father, eventually moved to Paris. By 1721 he had prospered sufficiently to become one of the Farmers of Tobacco, a lucrative government office which brought him into close contact with the Directors and Syndics of the French East India Company. (The sale of tobacco, a French government monopoly, provided part of the capital necessary for the various French trading companies which rose and fell in rapid succession between 1717 and 1722.) It seems probable, that the elder Dupleix used his influence with the Directors to get his son appointed First Councillor and Commissary General of troops at Pondicherry in June 1721.

Although Joseph Dupleix was only twenty-four years old when this appointment was made, he was not entirely without experience. During the previous five years he had travelled extensively in France, and had sailed to India on at least one occasion and to America on another. He remained on intimate terms with his elder brother, Charles Claude Ange, who became in time another highly successful financier and took the title of 'Bacquencourt et de Mercin'. In 1730 Bacquencourt bought his way into the company of the Farmers General and his financial acumen—along with a fashionable second marriage to the daughter of the Chamberlain of the Duc de Lorraine, the father-in-law of Louis XV—gained him an entree into court circles. He remained Dupleix's most powerful ally and spokesman in France.

Arriving at Pondicherry in August 1722, Dupleix encountered an unfavourable reception from his future colleagues on the Superior Council, which comprised the Governor and five other members. At last he was accepted, but only as Fourth Councillor—a clear illustration of the way in which the local power in India would disregard instructions from the metropolis.

Until his appointment as 'directeur' of the French establishments in Bengal in 1731, Dupleix led the fairly humdrum life of a Company servant. He extended his knowledge of South India by visits, and in 1724 sailed to Canton as supercargo. Meanwhile relations between Governor Lenoir and this young man in a hurry deteriorated.

Dupleix used the influence of his brother, now a Farmer General at Paris, to gain the chief post in Bengal. As he frankly acknowledged to his brother in a letter written after his new appointment: I have always been of the opinion that without you I would have had nothing from the Company'.

He proceeded to Chandernagore with great hopes, for as early as 1727 he had recognised the potential which Bengal could offer as a centre of the 'country' trades, as distinct from 'foreign' trade. As with many other younger sons in the eighteenth century, his original intention in going to the East was almost certainly to amass a private fortune. He was now in a favourable position to achieve this goal and during the next ten years he was the chief inspiration behind French efforts to establish and sustain an extensive trade with the ports of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Maldives, Malacca and Manilla. Dupleix was nothing if not enterprising. Interested in opening up trade with Assam and Nepal, he even suggested to the Ministry at Versailles that an expedition be organised to search for

'des terres australes'. But owing to a number of shipping losses in the late 1730s he was not satisfied with his efforts to acquire a personal fortune. Martineau estimated his then assets at 555,000 livres.

In 1773 he was joined at Chandernagore by his personal friends, the Vincens family, whom he had first met at Pondicherry. Jacques Vincens was a Pondicherry Councillor who in 1719 married Jeanne Albert, later to become famous as Johanna Begum, the Marquise Dupleix. She was the daughter of a French Company surgeon, Jacques Theodore Albert, and her longlived mother was Elizabeth Rose de Castro, born at Madras in 1684 and herself the daughter of a Portuguese and an Indian woman. Certainly Madame Vincens spoke Tamil, English and French fluently (though she preferred to speak Portuguese), and she was conversant with Indian customs and politics. Dupleix was free to marry her after the death of Jacques Vincens in 1739, and they were wed at Chandernagore on 17 April 1741.

In 1735 Benoit Dumas and Mahe de La Bourdonnais, both of whom enjoyed the favour of Orry, the Controller General, and brother Fulvy, Commissary of the Company, were appointed as the Governors of Pondicherry and the French Islands in the Ocean. (Mauritius, etc.) respectively. Naturally this news was not welcomed by Dupleix who was even less pleased when titles of nobility and other distinctions were conferred on these two officials without similar recognition for his own services. It was at this time, too, that a French surgeon, Volton, at the Mughal court in Delhi, expecting the overthrow of Muhammad Shah by Nadir Shah, proposed to Dupleix that the Governors at Chandernagore and Pondicherry apply to become mansabdars of the Mughal empire. During the eighteenth century each mansabdar was graded in the imperial service according to his personal rank and the number of men in his service, there being mansabs of ten to ten thousand troops. A mansabdar was paid either directly from the imperial treasury or indirectly through the revenues of certain territories—these were the famous jagirs. By Dupleix's time, however, the office had lost much of its original importance as Mughal officials broke away from the empire and intermingled with the regional aristocracy, in this way acquiring for themselves strong local bases of power. Moreover, the system also suffered from a steady inflation of honours and offices in the eighteenth century.

Despite all this Dupleix was evidently impressed with the scheme. In a letter to Dumas dated 10 January 1740 he wrote that the mansabdar title 'would avoid for us a great many insults, especially

in Bengal; it is the highest mark of distinction and protection that one may obtain from the Mughal (Emperor) and on many occasions it would curb the avidity of the wretched (local) government with which we have to deal.....‘The Company and the nation would be far more respected than they are in these districts and other nations would not delay to spend immense sums to be on the same footing’. Was personal glory his motive or did he acquire the title for the Company to enhance its opportunities for trade and profit? Had Dupleix become the first of the European ‘nawabs’?

His remarks to Dumas suggest that he made an appraisal of the political and commercial advantages which would probably accrue to the French from their new status within the empire. Martineau believed that Dupleix was concerned with the honorific value of the title and not with the privileges and emoluments of office: Jouveau-Dubreuil argues that Dupleix saw in it a weapon of conquest. Dumas in Pondicherry warmly endorsed the idea and it was by all accounts the latter’s initiative in providing refuge for the relatives of the slain Nawab of the Carnatic, Dost Ali Khan, in May 1740 that induced Muhammad Shah to accede to Volton’s request. The French thus began to intervene in the politics of South India some years before the ‘nawabised’ Dupleix arrived at Pondicherry as Governor. Nor should we forget the general decline of the Mughal empire, revealed in 1739 by Nadir Shah’s sack of Delhi.

Dupleix was one of the first outsiders to perceive the opportunities provided by the Mughal empire’s disintegration; and certainly the French were the first Europeans to exploit such opportunities on a large scale. From his vantage-point in Bengal Dupleix was a great deal closer to the core of the Mughal state than were his countrymen in the South. He only felt the distant repercussions of Maratha turbulence. He saw in Bengal at first hand the growth to power of the Nawab-Nazims, largely independent of outside control. And when at last he received the title towards the end of 1741, he was quick to proclaim its merits: ‘this title brings honour to the nation, and it can only result in good on this coast. The Faujdar of Hugli deferred to it by refusing to accept the salaam or gift that M. Dupleix presented to him when he took his leave of him: by such an action he acknowledged the superiority of his (Dupleix’s) title over his own’.

On 30 December 1739 Dupleix was nominated Governor of Pondicherry by the Company, this decision being ratified by the King on 1 January 1740. Owing to the inevitable lag in communications the order was not executed until the summer of 1741, when Dumas

returned to France. Dupleix was now officially recognised as Commander of the French forts and establishments in India and President of the Superior and Provincial Councils.

Less than two years before, the Maratha cavalry had invaded the Carnatic to collect 'chauth' and rescue the Hindu ruler of Tanjore from hostile attack. Following the defeat of Dost Ali Khan's forces near Arcot in May 1740, there had been a general retreat to Pondicherry, where with great pomp and ceremony Dumas had received the immediate relatives of the slain Nawab. By this action the French were confirmed in their dual role as allies and guardians of the Navait (or Nait) community.

Ever since Aurangzeb's campaigns in the South, which partially extended Muslim rule there, the Nazims of the Carnatic had been men of the Navait community. The Navaits had originally settled in the costal region of Konkan, claiming to have come from Arabia in the eight century. At least the militant Tahir clan, if not all the Navaits were Shia Muslims. Sa'adatullah Khan, Aurangzeb's general and the first Navait Nazim Nawab of Arcot, invited his relatives and family from Konkan to the Carnatic and bestowed on them many jagirs and forts. By 1737 the relatives of Nawab Dost Ali Khan were firmly established as governor throughout the province and one of the most enterprising of them, Husayn Dost Khan (later to become famous as Chanda Sahib and a son-in-law of the Nawab), acquired the then Trichinopoly from its Hindu ruler.

In collaboration with the forces of the Nawab's son, Safdar Ali, Chanda Sahib next attacked Tanjore, now a Maratha state. Even at this early stage the French enjoyed close relations with Chanda Sahib and the Navait clan, often receiving delegations and loans from them at Pondicherry. Not surprisingly, the French hoped to profit from the war against Tanjore since they were themselves attempting to gain Karikal and its surrounding villages as a trading base. But the aggression against Tanjore drew on their heads the Maratha eruption of 1740-41. Chanda Sahib was captured in April 1741 and taken to Satara as a prisoner; his wife and family were to remain at Pondicherry for the next eight years.

The disorder which followed in the wake of Nawab Safdar Ali's murder in October 1742, provided the pretext for Nizam-ul-mulk's intervention in the affairs of the Carnatic early in the next year. As Wazir of the Deccan and 'saviour' of the empire, Asaf Jah was an impressive though ageing personage. In many ways he resembled Aurangzeb, whom he had served with great distinction, and

he was ever careful to secure the interests of the Turani faction and foster Sunni orthodoxy. Inevitably, therefore, he alienated the Navait leaders, one Muslim historian reporting that Asaf Jah 'imprisoned all the people of the Nait community who were the source of mischief, trouble, enmity and intrigue, and took them along with his army'. Before returning to the Deccan he installed one of his veteran warriors, Anwar-ud-din, as Nawab of Arcot.

By the time Dupleix arrived at Pondicherry the Maratha armies had withdrawn from the area. Instead, the French cautiously eyed Fort St. George, the chief settlement of their English rivals on the Coromandel. When England declared war against Spain in 1739 and when in 1740 the War of the Austrian Succession broke out on the continent, it was clear to all that France would not long remain indifferent. In fact, French forces allied with Prussia intervened in Germany against Maria Theresa in 1741, although Fleury's policies averted a collision with England until 1744. In India, where news of the war reached Madras in September 1744, Dupleix optimistically believed that he could negotiate truce with English which would outlaw the extension of European hostilities to the East.

The English Council at Fort St. George was polite but evasive. A small squadron despatched from England soon after the declaration of the war conducted a campaign against the French merchant ships in the Malacca and Banca Straits area late in 1744. Dupleix, some of whose own ships had been captured, was outraged and his hostility towards the English probably dates from this period. As the War of the Austrian Succession continued, in September 1746 a French force succeeded in capturing Madras, a spectacular blow to English trade and prestige in South India. Pondicherry was thereafter invested by the British under Admiral Boscawen, with a fleet of 30 sail and a land force of 6000, on 30 August, 1748, and was defended by Dupleix. In October Boscawen was forced to withdraw having lost by sickness or in action nearly a third of his land force. The French lost only 250 during their whole seige of Pondicherry. In 1748 Madras was returned to Britain against Dupleix advice in exchange for Louisburg in Nova Scotia.

Much about the attitudes and behaviour of Dupleix at this time can be gathered from the profuse jottings of the Tamil diarist Ananda Ranga Pillai-Dupleix's chief 'dubash'. Ananda Ranga Pillai wrote, 'A hundred French soldiers are a match for 1,000 men of this part of the world'. Dupleix emerges as a more energetic and capable administrator than Dumas, with whom he is often compared. In

the style of the Regency grand seigneur or an eastern potentate, he loved display.

Since Dupleix found himself engaged increasingly in the affairs of the Company and the country powers—receiving embassies from the Nawab, the Nizam and their relatives, and conferring on them nazarana or gifts—he delegated much of the authority in matters affecting the 'ville noire' or the Indian population of Pondicherry to his wife. During the months in 1748 when Pondicherry was besieged by the reinforced English army and blockaded by Boscawen's fleet, Dupleix relied on his wife to organise a network of espionage and intrigue amongst the local community.

In the recorded interviews between Ananda Ranga Pillai and his master, who was eulogised in his writings as the 'Maharaja Raja Sri His Excellency Nawab Monsieur Chevalier Dupleix Bahadur Mazaffar Jang', we encounter a man as described by Brian Kennedy "who prides himself on his brilliance, his diplomatic finesse, and his sense of occasion. With subordinates he sometimes displays a suspicious and impatient nature, qualities which are to become aggravated during the siege of Pondicherry. But in sentiment and attitude he remains a Frenchman, a servant of the King desirous to win honour and glory for himself, his family and his country. Significantly, when the dubash seeks to influence his master it is through an appeal to such personal and patriotic ambitions."

His dramatic penetration of the politics of South India came after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. This involvement was a response to altered circumstances. While Dupleix attempted to keep in touch with Chanda Sahib during his exile at Satara, 'negotiating with the Marathas to pay his ransom and caring for his family at Pondicherry, this was no more than an intelligent gamble at the time.' There is no evidence concerning the success of the negotiations : whether the French actually paid the ransom, or if they did, whether this payment resulted in the release of Chanda Sahib early in 1748 ? That Dupleix saw the obvious—the imminent deaths of the aged and debilitated rulers of the Carnatic and Deccan, and following these the likely succession disputes between the Navaits and the ruling dynasty—is sufficient to account for his interest in the fortunes of Chanda Sahib and his relatives. In this way he was continuing the policies of Dumas.

With the death of Nizam-ul-mulk in June 1748 and the siege of Pondicherry by the English, however, Dupleix interest in the movements of Chanda Sahib ceased to be of merely academic concern.

Actual negotiation between Chanda Sahib's embassy and Dupleix appear to have been established in February 1749, arms and men being promised well before the battle of Ambur. As Chanda Sahib later confided to Dupleix: 'you were pleased to send my son Raza Sahib with soldiers, sepoys, guns, mortars, shot, powder, shell and other munitions against Arcot'.

It was the exigencies of a European global war which had provided Dupleix with a large number of French troops, there being nearly two thousand French troops at Pondicherry in 1748. Until their repatriation they could be farmed out to native rulers in return for territorial revenues and commercial concessions. For years Dupleix had been embarrassed in his trading activities by the delay or insufficiency of funds from home, but now disputed successions in the Carnatic and the Deccan provided him with a splendid opportunity to acquire for the French the jagirs of Villiyallur (or Villenour) and Bahour with their eighty-one villages around Pondicherry.

When the English intervened as the champions of Muhammed Ali, who had taken refuge in Trichinopoly after the battle of Ambur, Dupleix was forced to see the local conflict as an extension of European rivalries. The power of the English and their proteges, Muhammed Ali and Nasir Jang, must be checked and destroyed, while that of France and her allies, Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang, must be consolidated and expanded. Ananda Ranga Pillai describes the great pleasure which Dupleix derived from his elevation to the exclusive military order of Saint Louis in 1750, his exploits in India earning him a marquisate in 1752. Of greater political and material value, however, was his appointment as Muzaffar Jang's nominal deputy to govern the lands south of the Krishna—a status that included 'the jagir of Chenji (Gingee), Tiruvati and other places', expected to produce a revenue of 350, 000 rupees.

By this time, Dupleix had become the patriarch of a large clan. Many of his commanders in the field and his colleagues on the Superior Council at Pondicherry were bound to him by personal as well as by official ties. Saint-Paul, admitted to the Council in 1749 as second-in-command, had married a sister of Madame Dupleix: the Irish baron, Jacques O' Friel (or Friel), formerly manager of a factory at Canton who had had dealings with the then French Cochin China, was married to a niece of Madame Dupleix and became a Pondicherry Councillor in 1748; while Choisy, the husband of Dupleix's own niece, also entered the Council in 1745. Furthermore, Dupleix

commander in the Carnatic, Combault d' Auteuil, was married to a sister of Madame Dupleix; Duval d'Espremenil, who was in command of Madras during the French occupation, married a daughter of Madame Dupleix in 1743; and the Marquis de Bussy, the most distinguished of the French officers and a close friend of Dupleix, was for a time betrothed to one of Madame Dupleix's daughters. There can be no doubt that Dupleix valued these bonds of kinship.

At first Dupleix met with considerable success in his diplomatic and military endeavours. The jagirs ceded by Chanda Sahib in 1749, together with the later revenue grants made by the ruler of Tanjore and the Subahdar of the Deccan, contributed substantially to the payment of the wars—at least for the initial phase.

From the time of Aurangzeb's death ambitious officials and local rulers had eagerly exploited opportunities at the periphery of the diminishing Mughal empire, and according to Brian Kennedy, Dupleix followed in their steps on behalf of France. There was little difference in method that separated this Frenchman from his Indian counterparts : both aimed to build up local power bases independent of the central government.

The conflicts between the French and British in India continued till 1754, when the French government anxious for peace in Europe and as the British viewed Dupleix's activities with growing suspicion and alarm sent to India a special commissioner with orders to supersede Dupleix and, if necessary, to arrest him. These orders were carried out with needless harshness. Dupleix's work in India was ruined at one blow, and he himself was compelled to embark for France on 12 October 1754. He had spent his entire private fortune in the prosecution of French public policy in South India, estimated by Martineau at 7 million livres. The French government refused to acknowledge the obligation, and would do nothing for the greatest of French colonial governors, who died in France in obscurity and want on 10 November 1763. His wife's demise in 1756 had preceded his and he had remarried two years later. In a memoir in 1727, quoted by Martineau, he had written, "what joy it would be, if, after serving well and with careful management having accumulated something, one were to increase it considerably on returning to France, and by this means finish one's days in peace in the bosom of one's country." Alas, on his return in 1754, his country did not take this great administrator to its bosom.

## CORRESPONDENCE

*Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.*

The Editor,  
U.S.I. Journal.

Dear Sir,

### RE-ORGANISATION OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES/AUTHORITY

#### I

WE cannot but congratulate Rear Admiral Venkateswaran and Wing Commander Gopalaswami, for tearing wide open in detail, the total contradiction, repetition and mill-stone that is today India's Defence Ministry. Beside the fact that it, in consultation with other ministries, was the cause of our debacle against China, when there was no need to have gone into confrontation with the country at all, General Kaul and Thapar were advising against the operation till the last moment, but the Ministry of Defence went ahead with ordering it, against Army advice.

This misadventure should have been a glaring and major mistake which should have been analysed, traced to source and its causes explained. But by hiding everything under the caption 'security' much has been swept under the carpet including the Henderson Brooks report. There is no field in which mankind has learnt more by failure than matters pertaining to war.

One thing has been clear about all the battles that India has fought; that is the ponderous machinery that brings troops to battle, leaving almost nothing to manoeuvre, flexibility, mobility or decisive action. Indeed, doing the unexpected is almost an unknown feat by our armed forces. All this stems from the 'Whitehall system' of handling files; duplication, moving files up and down and sideways, and query after query before anything at all is allowed to happen. After this Babble of opinions the decision is either too late or wrong. The

dead weight on top is daily becoming more oppressive destroying that jeweled virtue of a soldier "INITIATIVE".

However, the Admiral and the Wing Commander have in their essay bogged their minds down with irrelevant history which has no useful purpose to serve for a readiness for operations of the forces of India of today. It would have been enough for them to go back to World War II in which the use of Army, Navy and Air Forces, for the first in history, were used on a really major scale, truly combined in effort on a world wide and theater level.

We can still remember that it took Britain a long time to deploy its efforts, and America, while starting out in 1942 with broad, wide ranging operations, also became more and more tied down and even exhausted as the fires of war consumed her effort. It was fortunate for America that her productive capacity was left unhampered by Hitler. This cannot happen again, if America should be unlucky enough to go to war. But England had to switch much of its production effort to India and the dominions to cope at all with the Axis. Even then the strain left England impoverished at the end of the war. Are these the patterns to emulate?

What is surprising is that the Sailor and the Airman did not while writing their critique of our Defence Ministry look for a solution that could lead to real efficiency and self reliance by studying the only really successful methods of waging of war that threw back and destroyed Hitler's Hordes. That happened in the U.S.S.R. A most clear and well written book is the "Soviet General Staff at War" 1941-45 by General of the Army S.M. Shtemenko.

In the first chapter he criticize the critics who say that the U.S.S.R. was caught totally offguard. He says, "Did our country have the potential to fight a powerful enemy?" (That was at the start of the war). He replies "Yes it did. The U.S.S.R. had developed from a State of Backwardness into a genuinely powerful socialist country". That means an advanced country is better prepared for war then a backward one.

"Thanks to 5 year plans we had all the material and technical pre-requisites for defeating the enemy", and justifying his statement, he points out that in 1940 the U.S.S.R. produced 18 million tons of steel as compared to Germany's 19 million tons. The U.S.S.R. made 15 million tons of pig iron compared to Germany's 14 million. The Germans 68 million kwh of electricity was compared to the Soviet's 48 million kwh. U.S.S.R. had set up its own "oil extracting industry, machinery, aircraft, tractor and instrument making industries—Farming

was undergoing fundamental re-organization—and the Soviet system had extensive cultural achievements".

All this must sound peculiar to the ears of our military "experts"; but that was the foundation of Soviet ability to wage war. He goes on and states what was being done to train "a regular army of many million strong". In 1983 the U.S.S.R. produced 5,469 aircraft, in 1940, 10,826. While confessing that a number of mistakes were also made he says "These mistakes undoubtedly made our position difficult when we entered into war against Germany which had all the economic resources of most of Europe to draw on. Nevertheless Nazis immediately began to incur heavy losses and within six months—suffered crushing defeat at Moscow".

We should ask ourselves what was the enabling organizational machinery which made this possible. They set up a general H.Q. of the High Command of the Armed Forces. With it was set up a board of permanent advisers to G.H.Q. Most of these had direct links with other national activities which were essential to support the war effort.

The way of command is also of interest. The book abounds with passages like this. "The General Staff ideas on the subject were sent to the Front's military council as a tentative attempt to find the best solution". When the Front sent its counter proposals he says that "it tended to dissipate the efforts of the troops particularly the cavalry corps and the tanks and involved a far too complicated manoeuvre". So the General Staff reviewed the plans and again sent them to the Front with a general directive of their intentions. It may be noted that "Stalin always preferred reports from the actual scene of events". Further "Army problems under consideration at G.H.Q. were discussed in a calm business like atmosphere. Everyone could state his opinion—For him (Stalin) there was only one form of address "Comrade Stalin".

A study of the book shows the absolute integration of the Defence organization with all the supply, social, cultural, technical production and learning activities of the entire country. Such a thing is not possible without a proper services edifice integrated into a national whole. But as Sun Tzur said 2500 years ago "war is an affair of state,—a matter of life and death". Can we today play with it, can we have organizations based on traditions, on feelings for historical considerations that no longer exist? Of course, every one will say, no; but on what is the shape of India's Ministry of defence based? Where is the close knit and direct relationship between the top and the bottom, the rear and the front? Must we go on depending on outside

Atlantic countries for organizational patterns and for know how ? Must our concept not be based on our own needs, on our peoples capabilities and on the situations we are likely to face ? While at one end we insist that we must (for missstated reasons) have the best of arms, on the other we control and direct them through the most archaic and suicidal organizations.

I notice the Admiral and the Airman have not faced the even more important error that we did make by abandoning a G.H.Q. and then going on to a triservice (totally out-moded) organization. The principal of Unity of command has always existed, from before Alexander to Stalin. Even though the U.S.S.R. changed its social order it organized its armed forces on this principle. To ensure proper work it went so far as to have Tank Armies, Artillery Armies, and Air Armies. They all have their Commanders-in-Chief; but the guiding controlling H.Q. is the Defence H.Q. manned by service men and commanded by one of them.

E. Habibullah  
Maj. Gen. (Retd.)

11, Mahatma Gandhi Marg,  
Hazratganj,  
Lucknow.  
21.3.83

## II

Dear Sir,

THE authors in their effort to eliminate the dual control to which the service headquarters are subjected today, have given little importance to the fact that their suggestion leads to further degradation in the status of the services chiefs.

Let us pay more attention to the fact that it is the armed forces which have been entrusted with the responsibility of defending the frontiers of the country and thus :—

(a) Sufficient authority must be vested in the services chiefs or the chief of defence staff as suggested by the authors as would enable them to carry out their responsibility. This should include financial powers as well.

(b) The infrastructure such as defence research, Admin, supply etc. built to assist and indeginise the forces must remain subordinate to the defence headquarters simply because this infrastructure has been created for the defence forces and not vice versa.

There is no necessity to have an equivalent civ org/appt for every

Mil Org/Appt in the Min. of Def. I suggest the Def. Commission be the highest org to have civ reps. This commission should have the heads of various agencies as reps, a Mil offr of the rank of Lt Gen as a rep member of the joint chief of staff and the Def Minister as the chairman. The article has also raised two major issues as under which call for views of experts :—

- (a) The principle of political control over the armed forces has to be abided by in our country. But does this mean that the def org be subjected to civil bureaucracy at a time when all over there is a cry from technocrats and educationists to act as direct advisors to the respective Ministry rather than be advisors to the civil bureaucracy.
- (b) There is a need to upgrade the status and powers of the services chiefs keeping in view the status granted to them at the time of independence and that too much of power is currently concentrated with civil bureaucracy (IAS) and needs to be decentralised.

1 Wireless Experimental Centre  
Delhi Cantt-10  
January 1983

Mukesh Kumar Gupta  
Captain

## BOOK REVIEWS

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY : A STUDY OF MODERN GUERILLA WARFARE

by LT. COL. V. K. ANAND,

Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi-27, 1981 ; pp. 263 ; price : Rs. 90/-

THIS book under review has been chapterised under (1) Distinctive Features of Insurgency, (2) pre-requisites, (3) Elements of Insurgency, (4) Progression of Insurgency, (5) Basis for approach to counter-Insurgency, (6) Foundationary Measures, (7) Restoratory Operations and (8) Conceptual Features. Besides, it contains four tables : (I) Operational Level of Pre-requisites in South Africa, (II) Empirical Requirement of Manpower, (III) Functional Requirement of Forces, and (IV) Overall Requirement of Manpower, and also 14 Charts outlining (1) Areas with Potential for Insurgency, (2) Pre-requisites and elements—Figurative Representation, (3) Geographical attributes, (4) Multiple goals of Insurgency, (5) Variegated struggle—Inputs and outputs, (6) Insurgent Organisation, (7) Fixed Model—Periods phases and stages, (8) Insurgency cycle, (9) Flexible Model—Modular patterns, (10) Insurgent's Refractoryness, (11) Character of Naga Insurgency, (12) Objective Responses to Attitudinal and Physical Matrices of Insurgency, (13) Progression Vs. Resources, and (14) Security Forces-Organisation.

Insurgency is as old as the State and in the past also counter-insurgency measures used to be taken, but the difference with the modern insurgencies are that the latter are more affected by socio-political ideological orientation. The present-day world is faced with two kinds of insurgency—rural and urban, and until social and economic disparities and discriminations are eradicated from different States the incidence of insurgency will remain. In modern insurgencies, which have grown very complex, not only political ideologies play an important role, but foreign powers, foreign agents and foreign money also exert a great influence. Besides, if the insurgency area becomes geographically contiguous to a big power, which is hostile to

the ruling regime against which the insurgents fight, the chance of success of the insurgents becomes more likely.

Dr. Anand has written a very useful book, analysing certain case studies and drawing his conclusions. The book contains a bibliography (some of the entries do not, however, show the date and place of publication). It deserves welcome from all those who are interested in this important subject.

B.C.

**CHINA, IRAN, AND THE PERSIAN GULF**

by A.H.H. ABIDI,

RADIANT Publishers, E-155 Kalkaji, New Delhi-19 ; p.p. : 352 ; price : Rs. 150-

**I**N this book under review, Prof. Abidi has tried to make a full-length study of the dynamics of the relations between China and the Gulf States, including Iran. "China's advance in the Gulf is a fascinating subject of study in international relations.",—he says. The author has given a historical overview first and then discussed China's growing relationship with the Gulf States during the Mao and post-Mao periods, covering political, economic and cultural fields.

International relations are conducted by sovereign states on the basis of their respective national interests, which can cause a cleavage between ideologically related states having disparate and incompatible social or political systems. According to the author, China and the Gulf States turned to each other "on account of changes in the international situation and partly because of their own respective national interests", In ideological terms. China applied the "from above" variant of Lenin's "united front" policy to make a common cause with the ruling groups of different persuasions against the "main enemy". While China had condemned Iran for its subservience to USA during the 1950s and 1960s, in the 1970 she unflinchingly backed the Shah of Iran in his armament drive and his position on the Gulf. The author has concluded that the rationale beneath the Sino-Gulf understanding was essentially political and the economic and cultural interactions were peripheral and restricted.

The book contains a map, a good bibliography and also an Index. It is an interesting study which should be read by all interested in this subject.

B.C.

**ON TO BERLIN : BATTLES OF AN AIRBORNE COMMANDER  
1943-1946**

by JAMES M. GAVIN

(The Viking Press, New York, 1978 ; pp. 336, price : not mentioned.)

**G**EN. James M. Gavin is as well-known an author on Military subjects, as he became famous as the commander of the reputed 22nd Airborne Division which parachuted to fight in various theatres of World War II. His is the story of the odyssey, beginning in Casablanca, then passing through Tunisia, Sicily, mainland Italy, Normandy, Holland, the Ardennes, and finally to the heart of Berlin. Although the concept of airborne warfare was entirely neglected in the U.S. until World War II, and while in contrast the Russians staged a number of massive drops between the two World Wars and the Germans had organised the first airborne combat division in the world, nonetheless the Americans surpassed the Germans in the tactics, equipment, organisation and training for the airborne battles within three years from 1940 to 1942. And in this the author played a leading role, and his story is full-blooded and first-hand, unlike the scholarly military histories based on archival records. What is more, this story forms a very important part of the saga of the European theatre in the Second World War, told with a great style and panache. The author, in his last chapter entitled "Berlin in Retrospect", has expressed his view in affirmative on the controversial question whether his troops should have gone for capturing Berlin or not.

This excellent book containing 33 sketch-maps and quite a number of photographs of personalities and actions, and an Index, is a must for all interested in the American airborne operations in Europe during the Second World War.

B.C.

**INDIAN ARMY POST OFFICES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR**  
by BRIG. D.S. VIRK

Published by The Army Postal Service Association, pp 362, Rs. 125/-

**O**F the various factors that effect the morale of the troops in an operational areas, mail is one of the most important. Commanders and staff are therefore always anxious that arrangements are made for the regular delivery of mail.

The Indian Post and Telegraph Department provided special post offices for field service (FPOs—Field Post Offices and BPOs—Base Post Offices) for more than 100 years before the Second World War. After World War I, it was decided that the FPO organisation

would be militarised and, during World War II, the Army Postal Service was gradually evolved. Brig. D.S. Virk, who is a retired director of the Indian Army Postal Service, has written a scholarly regimental history covering the period of this war and a couple of years after the war.

The account of the 1937 mobilisation scheme given as a part of background information of the years between the two world wars has an interesting similarity to the situation in West Asia in the early 1980s. The 1937 mobilisation scheme visualised BPOs at Peshawar and Quetta with a Base Postal Depot at Lahore; operational plans in the 1930s catered for a Russian invasion through Afghanistan. What transpired however, was the despatch of FPOs to Egypt in 1939 and by the end of 1941, postal units were deployed in the Sudan, Iraq, and Persia in the West and Malaya and Burma in the east.

The functioning of the postal units has been narrated campaign-wise with a descriptive backdrop of the operational situation to which the experiences of the personnel of the IAPS add a personal touch. For instance, Havildar B.A. Sonawane of FPO 13, writes how Warrant Officer N.B. Kelkar, the postmaster with a brigade made "a lone dash of 300 miles to Post Sudan in the FPO truck to trace and fetch the outstanding mail". On his return "he was solemnly admonished for making an unauthorised journey but the whole Brigade were rather proud of the dash and determination of their little postmaster, who was, affectionately known to all ranks as Ali Baba".

An extract from the diary of Warrant Officer Brahma Sarup Saxena of the APS is another example of fascinating quotations which make this regimental history unique. When the Allied Forces laid down their arms in Malaya on 15 Feb. 1942, Saxena made a successful bid of escape. He made his way to the Naval harbour in Singapore, swam to a boat, rowed to a small island and joined some Australian and British personnel on a steam boat which made Sumatra in 6 days and ultimately returned to India via Ceylon. There are similar interesting extracts from the Burma campaign: and retreat and the reconquest.

Technical details like mail arrangements, censorship, sorting, redirection, postal services (letters, telegrams, parcels), postal rates, concessions and postal accounts in respect of the Middle East Force, the Persia and Iraq Force and India command as well as services rendered by the APS in Italy, Greece, Malaya, Burma and with the occupation forces in Japan and SE Asia are narrated in detail.

A comprehensive and well written with very useful maps.

A.M. V

**THE PROVINCE OF AGRA**by **DHARMA BHANU SRIVASTAVA**

(Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi : Rs. 90/-)

**T**HE Province of Agra, which today virtually constitutes the whole of Uttar Pradesh minus the Awadh region in the eastern part, has always had an identity which distinguished it from the rest of the State. The two are distinct cultural units which differ from each other not only in language and literature, but also in the social, cultural and economic life of the people inhabiting the respective geographical areas.

Agra City had been the capital of the Mughal Emperors, while the Agra Province had for sometime the status of a Presidency under the British—on the pattern of the Presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras. Whereas there are a number of scholarly works on the history and administration of the Presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, no serious attempt had been made at writing a scientific account of the history and administration of the Presidency of Agra, which within three years of its birth, was given the name of the North-Western Provinces. To the Agra Province was united in 1877 the principality of Awadh which had been annexed by Lord Dalhousie, and the entire area was renamed the United Provinces of Agra and Awadh by Lord Curzon in 1901. After independence, the United Provinces became Uttar Pradesh.

For the first time in 1957 an attempt was made to collate the history and describe the administration of this province from the earliest times. The original title was 'History and Administration of the North-Western Provinces'. A well-documented study, the book has been revised and brought up to date by the author in this edition, in the light of further research.

In this comprehensive work Dr. Dharma Bhanu has delved deeply into records both published and unpublished available in the country, so as to make publication as authoritative and broad-based as possible.

A publication which should serve as a permanent book of reference for the researcher interested in this particular area of the state of Uttar Pradesh. Very readable, the book contains many passages which enliven it. As the late Sir Jadunath Sarkar aptly puts in his preface to the 1957 edition, "a manual of abiding instruction to students of administration as a vital branch of political science".

## Secretary's Notes

### ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

I would like to thank all those members who paid their subscription so promptly at the beginning of the year. To those of you who have not yet paid may I remind you that your subscription was due on the 1st January. Would you please, therefore, put a cheque in the post to me today. There are some members who have also to pay their subscription for 1981 and 1982. They are requested to make the payment for these years to avoid unnecessary reminders. Effective from 1 Jan 1971, the annual subscription has been raised from Rs 15 to Rs 20.

### NON RECEIPT OF JOURNAL

It has been reported by many of our members that though annual subscription for membership of the Institution is being debited to their account regularly by their Bankers, they are not receiving the USI Journal for quite sometime. The non-receipt of the Journal is because either the members have failed to notify change of address, or their Bankers have not duly sent the credit to the Institution or while sending the credit they have not given full and correct particulars of the member making it difficult to identify him in the ledger account. All these factors create accounting problems and result in names of members getting dropped from the mailing list.

It is requested that all members who have continued to send upto date subscription through their Bankers and are not receiving the USI Journal may kindly intimate to me direct their latest address and membership number so that the USI Journal could be sent to them immediately. They are also requested to write to their Bankers that while sending annual subscription to Institution, their membership number, correct name with units and latest address is invariably given.

### INSTITUTIONS BANKERS

Grindlays Bank, Parliament Street, New Delhi, ceased to be our bankers for all purposes. Kindly note that Our bankers are Syndicate Bank, Extension Counter, South Block, New Delhi-11 (A/c No.513477), All the members may kindly note the change.

In case any of the members have issued standing instructions to their bankers for the payment of Subscription fee to this Institution, we shall request them to issue revised instructions to their bankers under intimation to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India.

### SUGGESTIONS FOR THE JOURNAL


The USI Journal is in its 113th year of publication. As you will, no doubt appreciate, the Institution spends a great deal of its funds on producing this publication. We would like to have your comments, criticism and suggestions so that we may improve this publication to meet your requirement.

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


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