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EDITORIAL

There are bench marks in every nation's history. These are the times when a nation changes course. Such a moment came when India carried out five nuclear tests during May 1998. The blasts sent shock waves across the world. In contrast, within the country, public opinion is firmly behind the government's decision not only to test but also to weaponise our nuclear capability. Factors that contributed to domestic consensus on the nuclear issue are - a deterioration in the national security environment over a period of time due to growing regional threats and fundamental changes in the global power equation.

The lead article in this issue has been excerpted from a talk delivered at the USI on 6 March 1998 by Shri Jaswant Singh, to the Joint USI-Oxford Research Group for international consultations on 'Abolition of Nuclear Weapons : Removing the Obstacles'. The talk was prior to the Indian nuclear tests. It highlights the fact that India has moved from a purely moralistic to a more realistic stance with regard to nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons has a deterrent value. If the possession of nuclear weapons by the 'Permanent Five' (P5) is good for their national security, it should also be good for our national security if India possesses nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding this, India continues to remain the strongest proponent of complete nuclear disarmament provided all nuclear powers agree to a time frame for destruction of their nuclear arsenals.

On 06 April 1998, Pakistan test-fired its first intermediate range missile *Ghauri*. Shri B Raman, in his article on "Pakistan's Quest for Ballistic Missiles : Ghauri and After", has traced developments in the Pakistani missile programme since 1980. Assistance from China in the form of transfer of technology has been a major contributory factor.

Professor Matin Zuberi in his article on "India's Nuclear Leap Forward" has brought out that five nuclear tests in quick succession by India have posed a formidable challenge to the global nuclear order. The tests involved a fission device, a low-yield fission

device, a thermonuclear device and two sub-kiloton tests. India has succeeded in achieving a substantial degree of technological self-reliance in the nuclear and missile fields. There is a need to accelerate the *Agni* missile programme to develop a missile-borne nuclear deterrent.

A major impediment to India's development - particularly in the field of national security - has been the lack of strategic thinking. We tend to react to situations and events rather than shaping them. On the other hand, most of the advanced nations attempt to ensure that the best brains are devoted to strategic planning in the interest of national security. Lt Gen CK Kapur, in his article on "National Security Council for India - A Proposal", has brought out the inescapable necessity for such a Council. As and when it is functional, it is bound to be of help in strategic planning and decision making.

Obstacles In the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

JASWANT SINGH

Introduction

This is indeed a very distinguished gathering, and I am disappointed that though I had been asked to attend the entire Neemrana dialogue, on account of other preoccupations, I was kept away for that portion of the discussions. However, this date had been set far in advance, and I did not want to miss the opportunity. I cannot attempt to be informing you of that, which you do not already know. My hesitation is also on account of the realisation that you have been talking about the subject for about one week now and, therefore, at the end of that week, for someone like me, a student of current affairs, to be able to say something novel and different, is extremely difficult. I will, however, endeavour and attempt to put across the viewpoint of a man who has been engaged in public affairs in India for over thirty years. Naturally, I shall be addressing the challenging task of sharing with you my views about removing the obstacles in the abolition of nuclear weapons, from India's viewpoint.

India's Strategic Culture

As one of the participants in this exciting Indian endeavour at participatory democracy, I ought to briefly, but pointedly, share with you what I think are some of the outstanding characteristics of India's strategic culture. The first thing that strikes me is India's concept of nationhood being more civilisational in history, and also in practice; it not being territory-bound. If you examine the

Excerpted from the talk delivered at the USI on 06 March 1998 by Shri Jaswant Singh, to the joint USI-Oxford Research Group for international consultations on 'Abolition of Nuclear Weapons : Removing the Obstacles'.

Shri Jaswant Singh in the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission of India.

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history of this great civilization this over-riding aspect stands out, from the earliest of invasions in the Third Century BC, till the withdrawal of the British from the Sub-Continent and the attempt to structure a viable and developing nation-state in 1947. Because the sense of nationhood was non-territorial, the concept of defence of territory was always very localised. Consequently, the concept of offensive action or attack from India, has actually never existed. India as a nation, as a state, as a culture, or civilisation, has not been a conquering or an aggressive nation, or a state that reaches out from its territorial boundaries to capture, subjugate or even dominate. There is a third characteristic which we must bear in mind. The industrial revolution having bypassed India, the evolution of the current military science and thinking was also almost totally missed by India. Therefore, when we examine or attempt to evaluate India's military science and India's military thinking, we find that there is a break, which ended roughly, with the end of the Sikh Empire of Ranjit Singh; thereafter, most of the military science and military thinking in India has really been adopted from outside. It is adapted thinking, and I find it necessary to very briefly share this background and the historical perspective with you, because otherwise we will really not understand the difficulties that others have in evaluating India's position on nuclear weapons.

Intellectual Capacity and Leadership

There is another great ability that India has combined with the mismatch that is almost entirely Indian. In intellectual capacity, India is unmatched. To be able to productionise that intellectual capacity, India, perhaps, does not demonstrate the required leadership. This challenge, to productionise the great intellect of India, has a direct bearing on the evolution of the nuclear policy of this country. There has thus been, to restate briefly, India's evolution as a state; from a non-territorial, to a territorial state. Therefore, as a nation, its leadership has become conscious of the extent of that State power, and its limitations, and has really begun to sense it only now.

Employment of the Armed Forces

There is another aspect that is worthy of reflection. The preoccupation of the Indian State, even in the military sense, has been with maintaining internal order. In the last fifty years, India had to face as many as thirty seven conflicts, which include trans-border conflicts, UN Peacekeeping missions and major insurgencies within the country. Once you tabulate all this, you are startled by the fact that within fifty years, India has confronted thirty seven conflicts. This has resulted in a preoccupation with internal security, combined with an absence of a military surplus, combined thereafter, with the civilisational trait of not wanting to go beyond the amorphous dimensions of this civilisation: whether to conquer or to dominate or to occupy.

Nuclear Debate in India

I find that the earliest of Indian articulations on the question of nuclear disarmament were more moralistic than realistic. The current disharmony, therefore, between India's position and the position that the rest of the globe has seemingly adopted, is that whereas India has moved from the totally moralistic to a little more realistic, the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear conclusions entirely realistically. They now have a surplus of nuclear weapons and are beginning to move towards the moralistic stance. The rest of the world thus finds that when India added the evolution of its Statehood with the duties of a public man in that State, and moved from the moralistic to a more realistic stance, there came into existence an inevitable disharmony and a lack of understanding. That is the first, and to my mind, the principal obstacle in understanding India's position.

The second, and this is a problem faced by public men in India, is how to reconcile the over-riding national security concerns with valid and just international concerns about weapons of mass destruction. This disharmony and a disjunction between global thought and the movement of India's thought is, unfortunately, the objective reality of the world and a public man has to cope with the world as it is. In the totality of state power, nuclear

weapons as currency of it is still operational. Since this currency is operational in large parts of the globe; Indian public men have difficulty in isolating India because there is only one criteria that applies, and that is power.

Whatever one's individual views about the defence of the country, the possession of nuclear weapons has a deterrent value. You can debate this point but you cannot avoid the conclusion that the possession of nuclear weapons provides a nation with additional deterrent power. If you examine the history of the past fifty years, after Indian independence, our moralistic nuclear policy and restraint has really paid no measurable dividends. Consequently, there is resentment within the country. There is a feeling that India is being discriminated against. I am not judging as to whether in actuality and objectively India is discriminated or not discriminated against, because politicians have to deal with the political marketplace. If in that political market place, the people of a land begin to see that a particular policy has not yielded any dividends for national good, an opinion gets formed. And that, too, is a difficulty that India faces.

National Security Challenges

We need, therefore, to address ourselves to specific Indian security issues. National security is a holistic concern which covers almost all areas of national endeavour. India has had to cope with thirty seven conflicts in fifty years, and despite that, the security challenges that India continues to face are amongst the most complex in the world. They do not fit a pattern, and are entirely Indian. These are not any country-specific; instead, they are a web of complexity born of the many security challenges to India. This is as challenging as is the very act of governing this great land. I am informed that if India's map were transposed on to the European Union's map, it would stretch from Scandinavia to Iberia, and you could have that horizontal stretch covering British Isles to almost Istanbul. If that is the kind of stretch that India has; the challenges of security of this land are enormously complex. Fifty years after independence we have, other than perhaps the People's Republic of China, more unsettled land

frontiers than any other country. India has endeavoured, to have good relations with all, but we also recognise that good relations have to be based on good fences. They have also to be based on social, economic and lasting political equations for harmony. If these are absent, then the security challenges to India are indeed real.

Nuclear Weapons as Currency of Power

If the Permanent Five's (P5) possession of nuclear weapons is good, is equal to security, then how is the possession of nuclear weapons by India not good and the equation reversible; and yet we are informed that it is not in the interest of world peace and our stance has become a subject of debate. Such an approach is yet to convince the Indian leadership. India's approach to security is not any one country-centric. Others might have and will indeed, formulate policies which would be in their national interests, based on their respective strategic evaluations. That is where we come to another dilemma and an obstacle; of the currency of power; which, if the P5 continue to employ in the form of nuclear weapons, as the international currency of power, then how is India, voluntarily expected to devalue its own currency of State power, which it has to, after all, employ for its own security? That is the evolution of our thought in the past fifty years and also the learning experience from the West on the question of nuclear weapon's disarmament. And if deterrence works elsewhere as it appears to, otherwise why should those nations continue to possess these weapons, then by what argument am I to convince the political market place of India, that what works elsewhere will not work or cannot work in India? We have some difficulty when, periodically, we are informed that we have to fall in line because there is now a new international agenda of disarmament, pursued more by the political market place of that country and extension of their internal agenda or political debate. If, therefore, a great power moves A, B or C steps towards global disarmament and chooses to adopt, in pursuit of its own internal agenda, an aggressive stance that leaves India unconvinced. We cannot accept this because we have difficulty in explaining this to the political market place of India. The

rationale behind the nuclear powers in continuing to have, and reaching out to those that do not have, to have even less, leaves India in a dilemma. To a public man, it is then a challenge of reconciling the dilemma of public responsibility, international concerns and individual sensibility.

Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction

All weapons of mass destruction must be eliminated. But how can some continue to have them as weapons, or as currency of power, and India is informed that you alone cannot have them. The rationale for this is very difficult to accept. Individual sensibility will persuade any sane person to totally abolish all weapons of mass destruction. How are only some then to adopt and voluntarily forego what is an aspect of public responsibility of a public man. That responsibility which arises from a discharge of function for public good. What is the way out? I come from Rajasthan. We have a saying in Rajasthan that if you don't wish to go to a village do not ask the way to it. If we wish to go in the direction of the abolition of weapons of mass destruction and universal nuclear disarmament, that is the first decision that we have to take. If the answer is yes, then how are we to go to that village? We can only ask the 'elders' who alone are in possession of these weapons of mass destruction. The Permanent Five must, therefore, first set an example. Then I have no doubt in my mind that the rest of the world will agree to follow suit.


Nuclear Energy

I want to share just one or two additional thoughts with you. Simply because we adopt a certain position globally regarding nuclear weapons, that science will come to a standstill, does not convince me. Improvements will continue to take place. Test Ban Treaty or no Test Ban Treaty, Science will continue to move. This is an aspect of India's total nuclear endeavour that, perhaps, you would have addressed at Neemrana. We in India can certainly not forego the aspect of nuclear power as an energy source. One of the great wrongs that has been done is the mishandling of the entire challenge of nuclear power generation. In the past twenty

years or so, governments, despite repeated pleadings by the Department of Atomic Energy, have abandoned the very modest target of 10,000 MWs of power generation by the year 2000 AD. For India this is important.

Conclusion

We recognise that the nature of conflict or war is so radically altering that the option for a country to go and occupy another country or to subjugate it or to invade it or to raze it to the ground, is an option that is no longer available. Therefore, if we follow the same logic, weapons of mass destruction are not really useable. But if they are not useable weapons the dilemma and paradox lies in their deterrent value. This paradox further deepens the concerns of public men having the responsibility of governance; having to continue to use all that is in their power to discharge a primary responsibility to their country. And that responsibility involves ensuring a peaceful order and a peaceful future. How to reconcile with this reality the fact that these weapons do have a deterrent value, and yet the World must be free of them, is the principal obstacle so far as India is concerned.



Pakistan's Quest for Ballistic Missiles : Ghauri and After

B RAMAN

Introduction

Pakistan's missile quest began in the 1980s. Its decision to go for missiles was influenced, in the short term, by the need for a deterrent against the *Scud* missiles supplied by the erstwhile USSR to the late President Najibullah's army in Afghanistan and, in the long term, by its perception of a threat from India's likely missile capability.

The plans drawn up under the late General Zia-ul-Haq had provided for setting up an indigenous production capability and for the acquisition of a certain number of missiles from abroad which could strengthen its security till its own indigenous production capability came into being.

There were four possible foreign inputs into the materialisation of its programme :

- (a) From China. This is confirmed, but there is still an element of uncertainty about the nature and extent of the Chinese involvement.
- (b) Through clandestine procurement from Western countries similar to the one which facilitated its acquisition of military nuclear capability : This is also confirmed, but the nature and extent are undetermined.
- (c) Through reverse-engineering of the *Scud* missiles seized from Najibullah's army after the Afghan Mujahideen captured Kabul in April 1992.
- (d) From North Korea. This is still a matter of speculation.

The flow of inputs from China followed an inexplicable order. First came a consignment of mobile launchers in 1991 which

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triggered off a temporary ban by the Bush Administration on US companies selling to China parts for a domestic communication satellite. Then came some guidance units meant for M-11 missiles, also in 1991, which led to the limited sanctions imposed by the Clinton Administration on August 25, 1993, against both China and Pakistan. These sanctions were subsequently lifted.

There has been an on-going controversy between officials of the US intelligence community and of the State Department as to whether, in addition to the mobile launchers and guidance units, China had also supplied to Pakistan entire M-11 missiles (the quantity mentioned is 36) and production facilities for them, including the training of Pakistani experts in production and testing. Intelligence officials assert that this was so, but State Department analysts feel that the evidence on this score is not conclusive.

There has been a certain consistency in the repeated refutation by Pakistan and China of US reports on this subject. They indirectly admit a missile transaction, but without identifying the missile which was supplied. At the same time, they contend that the missile supplied did not violate the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) – that is, it had a range of less than 300 kms and a payload of less than 500 kgs.

The original programme drawn up under Zia had provided for the production, with Chinese assistance, of a series of three surface-to-surface missiles *Hatf-I* (range 77 kms and payload 500 kgs), *Hatf-II* (range 290 kms and payload 500 kgs) and *Hatf-III* (range 650 kms and payload 1,000 kgs). *Hatf-I* was successfully flight-tested in 1988 and made operational thereafter. *Hatf-II* was also successfully flight tested, but there were unexplained problems in making it operational. *Hatf-III* could not be successfully flight-tested till July 1997.

A careful reading of the published literature on Pakistan's missile programme emanating from the West as well as Pakistan indicate that while Pakistan had been able to develop and test rocket engines capable of propelling a missile over various ranges, it was facing difficulties in translating this capability into an ability to have a payload reach a pre-determined target on a set trajectory due to inadequacies in guidance, re-entry and on-board computer technologies.

Since June 1997, there were indications in the statements originating from Pakistan that it had successfully overcome these problems. The Counter-Proliferation Centre of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had reportedly alerted American authorities in November 1997, that Pakistan was planning to flight-test a missile to be named *Ghauri* with a potential range of 1,500 kms and a payload of about 700 kgs. Since then, the media in the West as well as in Pakistan had been speculating on the imminence of this test.

Thus, the successful test of *Ghauri* on April 6 cannot be described as a surprise. However, what was possibly a surprise was its firing from Malut, near Jhelum, in Punjab and directing it over land to a spot near Quetta in Baluchistan. Earlier reports from the US and other Western countries had been saying that it was likely to be fired from the Baluchistan coast on an over-sea trajectory. This indicates two things. First, foreign intelligence agencies had possibly failed to notice the preparations in Punjab for the test. Second, Pakistan's apparent confidence that the test would be successful and would not endanger the population in the areas under the missile's trajectory gives cause for a strong suspicion that this was, most probably, not the first flight-test of this missile. It might have been earlier tested elsewhere – in China or North Korea.

Pakistan's acquisition of the enhanced missile capability makes our national security management more complex and, hence, more difficult. Our ability to counter this threat in the unlikely event of a future war with Pakistan would depend, first, on the ability of our intelligence agencies to give timely warnings of the missiles being prepared for firing and their location and, second, on the ability of our armed forces to pre-empt the firing by conventional or non-conventional means such as disrupting the guidance systems and on-board computers through information warfare techniques and, if they fail, by destroying them in mid-flight before they reach the re-entry phase. These aspects would need attention.

Writings in the Pakistani media indicate that their experts have been talking in terms of relying more on mobile than fixed launchers to avoid pre-emption by India. Possible counter-measures in this regard would also need to be studied.

India's Nuclear Leap Forward

MATIN ZUBERI

With five nuclear tests in quick succession, India has posed a formidable challenge to the global nuclear order. The simultaneous testing of a fission device, a low-yield fission device, and a thermonuclear device is an unprecedented event in nuclear history. The two subsequent sub-kiloton tests have yielded additional data for simulation purposes. Our scientists and engineers have now demonstrated their competence to fabricate warheads with different configurations and purposes. The government has also approved acceleration of the *Agni* programme in order to develop our missile-borne nuclear deterrent. Indigenous efforts for achieving technological self-reliance begun in the early years of our independence are now bearing fruit.

Shortly after China's first nuclear test, Homi Bhabha had assured the Indian public that our scientists could explode an atomic device within eighteen months after a decision was taken. This confident assertion was based upon a series of earlier decisions taken during the Nehru era. These included the commissioning of a reprocessing plant at a time when only the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France had such technological capability. It was this decision, coupled with insistence on autonomous development of nuclear installations insulated from external intrusions, that ultimately opened the nuclear weapons option. The unique feature of this option is that it has emerged from the expansion of our civilian nuclear enterprise. In contrast, the first five nuclear weapon powers initially produced fissile material from installations dedicated to military pursuits; their nuclear power stations came later.

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Indian nuclear policy and disarmament diplomacy worked in tandem from the early days. Jawaharlal Nehru's appeal for a nuclear test moratorium in 1954 was designed as a disarmament measure. There were only three nuclear weapons powers at that time, and the two superpowers had just conducted their first thermonuclear tests. If his appeal had been heeded, most of the subsequent nuclear follies like the triad, MIRV and Star Wars and so on would have been avoided. The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988 proposed a workable framework for global nuclear disarmament. Our active involvement over the years in disarmament conferences was based on the belief in a nuclear-weapon-free world, while the nuclear weapons powers were convinced that these weapons provided stability and made conventional wars redundant. Hence, they discarded nuclear disarmament and replaced it with the edifice of arms control whose main objective was to make the world safe for nuclear deterrence. The NPT became the crown jewel of arms control by limiting the possession of nuclear weapons to a handful of countries.

India's refusal to join the NPT arose from our consistent stand on international safeguards (controls) to be imposed on nuclear facilities, first articulated by Bhabha at the 1957 Conference on the Statute of the IAEA. We accepted safeguards on the Tarapur and Rajasthan nuclear power stations imported from the United States and Canada, respectively, but insisted on not subjecting our indigenously produced nuclear installations to international controls. This provided room for autonomous development of our nuclear option in a world where a handful of countries were determined to perpetuate their nuclear monopoly.

With the emergence of China as a recognised nuclear weapon power, India found herself in a nuclear neighbourhood. Lal Bahadur Shastri, therefore, authorised a project on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE). The United States and the Soviet Union then had ambitious projects for using such explosions for releasing oil and gas and for changing the course of rivers. The sudden deaths in quick succession of Shastri and Bhabha, and Vikram Sarabhai's opposition to nuclear explosions of any kind, brought the PNE project to a halt. Only after Sarabhai's death in January

1971 was the project taken up again. It was our nuclear autonomy which enabled Indira Gandhi to give the green signal for Pokhran-I. Our scientists and engineers demonstrated their technical competence by mastering the implosion technique. India is the only country whose first nuclear explosion was not an atmospheric but an underground test. The United States conducted its first underground nuclear test code-named Rainer in 1957, twelve years after the 'Trinity' test of July 1945.

The international reactions to Pokhran-I were diverse. While the Soviet reporting was bland and factual, the Chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission actually sent a congratulatory telegram. China's response was muted and reflected ties with Pakistan. The Beijing Review of 30 May 1974 quoted Z.A. Bhutto's statement that Pakistan would never surrender its right or claims because of India's nuclear status. It was added that "the Chinese Government and people firmly support Pakistan and other countries in their just struggle to safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and oppose aggression and intervention from outside, including nuclear blackmail and threat".

The United States, as the conductor of the global nuclear nonproliferation orchestra, took Pokhran-I as a challenge to the established nuclear order and began concerted efforts to reshape the nonproliferation regime and to tighten technology controls. The NPT acknowledged only the distinction between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon countries. And the objective of safeguards was to detect diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military purposes. A new cabal of nuclear supplier countries was assembled in order to stem the flow of nuclear technology to developing countries. The United States, architect of the non-proliferation regime, unilaterally changed the definition of proliferation and consequently the objectives of safeguards. Not only nuclear weapons but even enrichment and reprocessing capabilities (not prohibited by the NPT) became a forbidden fruit. And the objective of safeguards was no longer detection of diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to military pursuits, but prevention of 'nuclear explosive capability'. The industrialised countries were, however, allowed to develop enrichment and

reprocessing plants on which they had already spent billions of dollars; but the developing countries could not have these facilities even under IAEA safeguards. A new layer of discrimination was thus added into the non-proliferation regime – nuclear fuel cycle states and countries with only fragmented fuel cycle capabilities. Had India been a party to the NPT, these substantial alterations in its provisions would have closed our nuclear option for ever.

At the bilateral level, some members of the U.S. Congress were eager to 'spank' India for its temerity in exploding a nuclear device. Using pending applications for the shipment of enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur station, they tried to discipline India. The State Department and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were embroiled in a bitter controversy with Congress regarding the appropriate strategy to coerce India. The U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 was specifically drafted to close any loopholes left in the NPT regime. There was, however, a remarkable consistency in the Indian response to American pressures. Successive Indian governments showed their determination not to accept full-scope safeguards. We endured a quarter century of technology embargoes but succeeded in preserving our nuclear autonomy. This was possible because of a remarkable consensus across the entire political spectrum in favour of keeping the option open. Moreover, the technology embargoes were taken as a challenge by our scientists and engineers to demonstrate our technological competence.

The option necessitated development of indigenous missile capability. Indira Gandhi took the first step by instituting the Integrated Guided Missiles Development Programme in 1983. This was accelerated during the Rajiv Gandhi administration. At the same time, successive governments have periodically considered exercising the nuclear option. Prime Minister Vajpayee has rightly observed that all heads of government since Jawaharlal Nehru have supported indigenous research and development in the nuclear field. While one of the extraordinary features of the nuclear age was the protracted public debate in India on the nuclear option, the technocratic momentum was all the time pro-

elling the country towards Pokhran-II. This is somewhat similar to the French nuclear decision-making process -- the atomic establishment had done everything preparatory for a French test and was only waiting for a political decision to fix the date for it.

Emboldened by the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, the nuclear monopolists resorted to the tactics of devising a comprehensive test ban that would foreclose the nuclear option for other aspirants. Our decision to exercise the double veto on CTBT was taken in this context. The CTBT entry-into-force conference of 1999 and the NPT review conference to be held in the year 2000 would have resulted in tremendous pressure on India to close its nuclear option. A Fissile Material Cutoff was also being mooted. The international arms control agenda thus forced the Vajpayee government to take the necessary steps to safeguard our national security.

Now that we have crossed the nuclear Rubicon, we must resolutely complete the process begun in 1974. Those protesting against our tests are themselves beneficiaries of nuclear peace. Their urgent pleas to adhere to 'nonproliferation norms' are designed to deny the status India deserves as happened after Pokhran-I. Our nuclear competence was not acknowledged because of American opposition; the main obstacle to acquiring nuclear weapons capability is not the NPT but the United States. Our nuclear policy and diplomacy should now be designed to ensure that Pokhran-II leads to India's recognition as an acknowledged sixth nuclear weapon state. The data generated by the tests should be used for developing a modest missile-borne nuclear deterrent capability. We should not repeat the nuclear follies of others by stockpiling redundant nuclear weapons.

The global nuclear order recognises only five nuclear weapons powers -- countries that exploded nuclear devices before 1 January 1967. But there is nothing sacrosanct about that arbitrary date. India, Israel, and Pakistan have so far been recognised as 'threshold' countries. All other countries party to the NPT have renounced the right to produce nuclear weapons. India is no longer a 'threshold' country. Neither is Pakistan. Israel is gener-

ally credited to have a sophisticated arsenal of 100 to 200 nuclear weapons. How long can the international community maintain the fiction of 'threshold' states? That which is opposed before it happens is something which it is wise to accept when it becomes real. As the so-called father of the H-bomb Edward Teller recently said, "the governments that are responsible for roughly half the population of the world already have nuclear explosives..... We should start thinking not in terms of what we wish, but in terms of what is reality".

The international repercussions of this formidable challenge to the discriminatory nuclear order are reportedly being discussed by an ad hoc group of ministers headed by the Prime Minister. There are urgent matters relating to the development of a modest nuclear deterrent, including the minimum numbers of nuclear warheads needed, the command and control systems to be put in place and the framing of a nuclear doctrine which need to be deliberated and decided upon. An institutional structure needs to be quickly set up to discuss these issues along with other strategic and economic matters impinging on national security. A task force headed by Mr. K.C. Pant is already preparing a framework for the proposed National Security Council. It may be of interest to look back on historical predecessors of institutions dedicated to long-term strategic planning. The American National Security Council has been frequently cited as a model; but what is not generally known is that it was in a parliamentary system that the first such experiment originated.

Ninety-five years ago, British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour established the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), which later was to serve as a prototype for the National Security Council of the United States. It has been rightly described as 'history's most successful experiment, under democratic auspices, in harnessing land, sea and air power to the political objectives of strategic planning, preparedness, policy formulation, and war-making'. The CID was in many respects a typically British institution: its appearance with very sketchy terms of reference and gradual evolution in response to pressing needs, careful avoidance of publicity; use of a small and rather informal staff in preference to elaborate

machinery; and strict adherence to the traditional principle of civil control over the military. Keenly interested in its work and determined to ensure its role in imperial defence, Balfour presided over every one of its sixty meetings held during his tenure in office.

Although the Prime Minister could choose the members of the CID, and retire them at will, it became the custom to retain certain cabinet ministers and professional officers on it. Along with the Prime Minister, the core membership consisted of the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War and their key advisers -- Chief of the General Staff, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of Military Intelligence, and Inspector-General of the Forces. Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, India and the Colonies, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were slightly less regular members. Experts were also invited; for instance, whenever the question of the defence of the British Indian Empire was discussed the advice of Lord Roberts of Kandahar was solicited.

The presence of serving military officers and ministers on a basis of theoretical equality was a drastic innovation. But because of their very position, experts could not be the equals of ministers. The Committee was actually a forum in which specialised knowledge of many aspects of defence problems was brought to bear, the alternatives sifted, and the decision then made and passed up to the Cabinet as recommendation. The very fact that its advice to the Cabinet bore the approval of important ministers, especially that of the Prime Minister, meant that in practice there was little likelihood the CID's suggestions being rejected.

The Committee was assisted by a small secretariat to which was passed the duty, not of strategic planning, but of assuring, as agent of the Prime Minister, that the civil and military machinery for planning was properly coordinated and functioning successfully. Much of the secretariat's activity in performing these functions was quite informal -- discussions with officers and civil servants on a working level, sounding out of opinion on specific measures, and coordinating among various ministries and organisations to implement Cabinet decisions.

A key figure in the structure was Secretary to the Committee. He had to be an individual of initiative and yet, if continuity were to be preserved, must be adaptable to the personality and methods of his chiefs, who might change frequently and vary greatly in temperament. A civil servant or serving officer chosen by the Prime Minister, he could be removed at any time. He had to perform the role of 'remembrancer' to the Prime Minister on matters pertaining to defence. This role became well established right in the early days of the Committee when Sir George Clarke (later Lord Sydenham) was appointed Secretary. He says in his memoirs that he was permitted 'to raise any questions which seemed to be of Imperial importance, present or future, and to act as remembrancer in Naval, Military and cognate matters to the Head of the Government'. But Clarke interpreted his responsibility too widely; he was removed from the secretaryship when he was accused of exceeding his brief by advising the Prime Minister to oppose Admiral Fisher's proposal for the construction of Dreadnoughts. This served as a warning that 'the tail must not try to wag the dog'.

Lt Col Maurice (later Lord) Hankey, having served as Assistant Secretary of the Committee since 1908, became its Secretary in 1912 and continued in this post until 1938. He took great care to ensure accuracy and secrecy of the records. Having an unquenchable zest for power behind the scenes and a matchless tact, he was able to be at once unobtrusive and formidable. He had to remain non-partisan, inasmuch as one of the secretariat's *raison d'être* was to supply the continuity of defence policy despite changing administrations. During his long tenure, he carried on his job without jurisdictional disputes and intensive jealousies which would have destroyed the effectiveness of the Committee. His tact, discretion and integrity inspired universal respect. His formidable reputation for honesty, loyalty, discretion and objectivity made him almost automatically *persona grata* with as many as seven successive Prime Ministers representing the entire spectrum of British politics.

In contrast, the American National Security Council, established in 1947, has an elaborate structure necessitating several

changes to suit the temperament and working styles of each of the 10 successive Presidents. All of them have relied on trusted friends and informal groups for advice and used the Council as an instrument to establish their control over competing departments. Truman neglected it for the first three years and it was only with the onset of the Korean War that his interest in the Council was aroused. The Eisenhower presidency was the golden period of the Council. He chaired 329 of its 366 meetings. Kennedy appointed McGeorge Bundy as his National Security Adviser. This was an innovation as the Council since its inception had its own Executive Secretary. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy relied on a small group of advisers, the 'Ex-Com' of the Council, which deliberated for six days in total secrecy the options available to Kennedy.

Johnson trusted his National Security Adviser Walt Rostow and relied on the 'Tuesday Lunch Group' to direct the Vietnam War. The latent tension between the Council and the State Department since 1947 became acute during the Nixon and Ford administrations. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger has narrated with great glee in his memoirs his systematic efforts to circumvent Secretary of State Rogers. For a short period Kissinger succeeded in becoming Secretary of State as well as National Security Adviser. Carter convened only 100 meetings of the Council and his National Security Adviser Brzezinski clashed with Secretary of State Vance. Carter had his own intimate group of advisers meeting at breakfast on Fridays. Reagan downgraded the role of National Security Adviser and depended on his old cronies for advice. Some changes were again made during the Bush and Clinton administrations in the composition and role of the Council. Bureaucratic struggles and personality clashes have thus been a prominent feature of the Council during the last 50 years.

Given these precedents, it would be advisable for India to start on a modest scale with suitable changes to existing arrangements like the Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs. Learning from the American experience, efforts should be made to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic friction. A secretariat exclusively devoted to matters pertaining to national security could provide the

necessary logistical support to the decision-making process. The Secretary as 'remembrancer' to the Prime Minister would not only ensure continuity to the deliberations but also institutional memory sadly lacking in our present system. Much would, therefore, depend on the personality of the individual so selected. He should have some of the qualities which Hankey displayed so successfully, especially tact, discretion and impartiality to inspire confidence across the political divide. Moreover, he should have a tenure that would enable him to provide stability to the planning and decision-making process. It may, however, be added that even the most streamlined organisational chart does not automatically guarantee success, while men of goodwill can accomplish miracles with the most archaic institutional structures.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles on National Security issues for publication in the USI Journal, may be sent to the Editor in duplicate, typed in double spacing. Subjects should be covered in depth with adequate research and reference made to sources from where information has been obtained. The length of articles should be between 3,000 to 4,000 words.

Articles may not be returned unless accompanied by self-addressed and stamped envelope.

National Security Council For India - A Proposal

LT GEN C K KAPUR, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Historical Background

After having been ruled for long by alien conquerors, India shook the world by attaining freedom through non-violence and emerged as the largest democracy in the world. During fifty years of Independence, it has fought four wars and has the fourth largest armed forces in the world. It has demonstrated its technological competence by the recent series of nuclear explosions. India's strategic location, size, population and democratic institutions have contributed towards its pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region and its global importance.

Psychologically, India has always regarded its massive mountains in the North and the seas in the South as protective barriers against external interference. Largely because of its geography and culture, India has a long history of non-aggression and non-expansion outside the sub-continent. Due to its relative wealth, fertile soil and rich heritage, India has lacked the incentive to expand. Further, India has lacked political unity throughout most of its history. Thus, not much importance was ever given to the strategic defence of India. As a cumulative result of various factors, we developed an inward looking attitude and defensive psyche. The British generated strategic options for the defence of India but mostly kept Indians out of the strategic decision making process. Besides, British strategic planning was based on its global and maritime considerations of which India was just one part.


The non-violence through which India attained Independence and the non-involvement of its armed forces in its struggle for freedom further inhibited the growth of strategic planning mechanism. In sum, post-independence India thus inherited the cumulative effect of all factors that worked against the concept of

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institutionalised strategic thinking and planning. Besides fighting four wars, our armed forces have taken part in a large number of UN peace-keeping and strategic power projection missions. The strategic thought which has developed in the last few years is largely a result of our reactive and crisis management compulsions which is unlikely to serve India's long term vital interests in its march towards the Twenty First Century. Notwithstanding its legitimate claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council, it has failed to articulate a coherent national security policy.

National Security

In our planning process, even in knowledgeable circles, the ramifications of national defence and national security have remained blurred if not totally confused. National security strategy is a part and parcel of our overall national strategy. The concept of national security implies the preservation of core values crucial to the nation-state from external and internal threats, challenges, risks and vulnerabilities. Core values that are enshrined in our Constitution represent the basic ethos and beliefs of the Nation, i.e., Democracy, Justice, Freedom and Fraternity in a secular society. From the core values follow national interests which have to be protected and enhanced to ensure national security as follows:



India's vital interests encompass the welfare of the people, territorial integrity, political sovereignty and economic prosperity. It

also envisages the country attaining the rightful and honoured place in the world and contribute its mite towards international peace and security.

National security is thus not merely the defence of the country against foreign aggression and internal threats but a lot more. Ensuring national security transcends management of military factors, even though the military will continue to remain its important ingredient. Another equally important key factor is national economy. The increasing role that economic and commercial policies play in the security and stability of a nation can well be appreciated from the recent economic crisis in some of the South East Asian countries, particularly Indonesia. The canvas of national security is vast and varied. Its effective policy formulation involves defence, internal security, external affairs, economic, commercial, financial and technological missions, and scientific, social, political and environmental factors related to the growth and well being of our people and India's place of pride amongst the comity of nations. The national fabric is thus woven together based on vision, national strategy and objectives, and national security strategy and policy formulation. This is a complex process that needs an institutionalised mechanism to operate efficiently and effectively.

National Security Council (NSC) — Experiments in its Formulation

In the last decade or so, four Prime Ministers have felt the need for a NSC. In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi first experimented with a variant of NSC by instituting a "Policy Planning Committee on National Security". In 1990, the VP Singh Government set up a multi-tier NSC. In fact, it was the first time that a NSC was formally launched. Both the organisations however did not take off. Another version of NSC was set up by the Narasimha Rao Government in the form of the "Security Strategy Group". Inder Kumar Gujral agreed with the necessity for a NSC as was evident from the election manifesto of the United Front, but his government was too short-lived to launch its own model of NSC. Interestingly, all these bodies soon became defunct without yielding any fruitful results. India's search for an institutionalised mechanism in the form of a viable and dynamic NSC for long term strategic planning continues.

The BJP Government, based on its election manifesto and the National Agenda for Governance, has set up a three-member task force to make recommendations on the formulation of a NSC for "constantly analysing the security, political, economic threats and technological requirements and to render continuous advice to the Government in terms of reviewing policies and suggesting options in a co-ordinated and integrated manner." While a strong national consensus exists for the establishment of a NSC, its composition, role and staffing need to be thoroughly examined.

National Security Apparatus in the USA and the UK

Most of the advanced countries have institutionalised mechanism, based on their requirements and genius, for dealing with National Security. In the USA, with a Presidential form of Government, the President is the supreme commander. Besides the normal chain of command from the President through the Secretary of Defence (equivalent to our Defence Minister) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to field commands, there is also a NSC to act as the "highest coordinating and advisory body in the US National Security Apparatus." The NSC is headed by the President, with the Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defence as Permanent Members, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and Director, CIA, as Permanent Advisors. In the conduct of the affairs of the NSC, the President is assisted by the National Security Advisor. The President can nominate any other member on as required basis. The NSC is an advisory body to the President and is not controlled by the Congress. It is a multi-tiered body with its own dedicated staff, assisted by a National Security Advisory Group and a number of functional groups and committees and task forces formed to meet its specific requirements. The NSC is designed to integrate domestic, foreign and defence policies and to ensure proper co-operation between the military services and other departments and agencies of the government in the matters relating to national security.

In the United Kingdom, the supreme responsibility for national security rests with the Cabinet who are collectively responsible to the Parliament. The Ministry of Defence under the Secretary of State for Defence is responsible for defence policy formulation and implementation. They have a Chief of Defence Staff

system (CDS), where the CDS is the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Ministry of Defence, the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Aviation Supply are all merged together. The two Committees of the Cabinet, i.e., the Overseas and Defence Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee, normally perform the functions that the US NSC carries out.

The aforesaid systems in the USA and the UK are based on certain considerations that do not exist in India. An anomalous situation exists in India in the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff and combined command system, the lack of integration between the Service Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence, and the non-existence of a single centralised National Intelligence Agency. These lacunae need to be addressed without any further delay. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, we should evolve our own model of NSC based on our political system, strategic requirements and working ethos.

Structuring Parameters

India has been searching for a viable National Security apparatus since long. In 1962, a National Defence Council was set up under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The most recent attempt was in August 1990 when a four-tiered structure was set up with a NSC at its apex, the PM as Chairman and certain cabinet ministers as its members. While a NSC exists only on paper, there is no formal functional structure; this has forced the Government to reconsider the issue.

Some of the requisites of the NSC for ensuring effective national security are as follows:

- (a) The NSC and its associated structures should be set up by an Act of Parliament to ensure continuity and accountability. All its previous incarnations were created by executive orders and died premature deaths. The NSC is a fundamental instrument of state whose status should be like that of the Election Commission.
- (b) We are a parliamentary democracy with the collective

responsibility of the Cabinet. The NSC should be headed by the PM with some of his Cabinet colleagues as members.

(c) Continuity and commitment needs to be ensured through the creation of a permanent secretariat, with dedicated staff.

(d) As highly sensitive matters will be discussed, the NSC should be compact to be able to maintain secrecy.

(e) Great care needs to be exercised in working out its charter, structure and composition. It should be manned by highly competent experts from different disciplines. Its multi-disciplinary staff should be mean and lean.

(f) Its working mechanism should be so orchestrated that it does not come in conflict with the existing centres of power and decision making within the Government. The Cabinet Secretary and Line ministries will continue to play a key role in normal implementation of Government policies. To that extent the role of the NSC should be advisory only.

Proposed Composition

The NSC will be the highest authority to consider all aspects of national security in a co-ordinated and comprehensive manner. It will take a holistic view of all national security issues in the light of external, socio-political, economic, commercial and military developments and their linkages with our national objectives and vital interests.

Organisationally, a two-tier structure is proposed as below:

(a) At the apex should be the Cabinet Committee on National Security headed by the PM and a set of permanent advisors.

(b) The second tier should be the Permanent Secretariat which would advise the NSC with respect to issues and areas of current and potential threats to national security and indicate viable options for response along with their implications.

National Security Council - Composition.

- (a) Cabinet Committee on National Security.
 - (i) Chairman - Prime Minister.
 - (ii) Members - Ministers of
 - Home
 - Defence
 - External Affairs
 - Finance
 - Commerce.
 - (iii) Any other Minister or Chief Minister of the concerned state should be co-opted on as required basis.
- (b) Permanent Advisors.
 - (i) National Security Advisor (NSA).
 - (ii) Chief of Army, Navy and Air Force or CDS when created.
 - (iii) Cabinet Secretary.
 - (iv) Secretaries - PMO, Defence, Home, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Commerce.
 - (v) Directors, IB and R and AW.
 - (vi) Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee.
 - (vii) Scientific Advisor to the PM.

The NSA should preferably be a highly qualified and experienced retired civil or defence services officer with the status of a Minister of Cabinet rank. He should be given a fixed non-renewable tenure of five years. This will elevate his status and help him in efficient conduct of the affairs of the NSC. An officer of the rank of a Secretary to the Government of India should head the Permanent Secretariat.

Permanent Secretariat (PS)

- (a) The PS would be the nerve centre of the NSC. It should comprise of 30 to 40 defence officers, diplomats, technocrats, area analysts and other specialists from different walks of life. It should be a mix of serving and retired officers who

would bring to bear their unbiased expertise on issues of national importance. With the broadening of the concept of national security, a large range of issues will fall within the ambit of PS.

(b) Proposed outline Organisation is given in the Appendix.

Role and Functions

The NSC will evolve an integrated approach to policy formulation on issues concerning national security, taking into account the linkages between the evolving external situation in political, military and economic fields and our internal socio-economic dynamics. This should lead to identification of strategies which optimise our effort in defence, internal security and foreign affairs. These strategies will form the basis of the policies to be followed by concerned departments and ministries. Some of the functions are as follows:-

- (a) To consider long term integrated policies to cover the entire spectrum of mechanisms required to safeguard the nation's vital interests and security objectives.
- (b) To formulate politico-military and geopolitical strategies which would support our independent role in the emerging polycentric world order.
- (c) To collate, sift, analyse, synthesise and evaluate options for national leadership and formulate national security strategy.
- (d) To evolve long term basic policy formulation on key issues impinging on national security including defence against internal threats and external aggression, low intensity conflict, coping with threats of coercive diplomacy, terrorism, subversion and insurgency, NBC policy, space exploration and such other important geopolitical issues. This would include strategic war-gaming, contingency planning and crisis management.
- (e) To critically examine external economic threats in vital areas such as energy, food, trade and commerce and to study the security implications of emerging trends in the world economy on India's economic and foreign policies.

(f) To carry out a comprehensive strategic defence review and to issue a White Paper on important contemporary matters like India's nuclear policy.

(g) To increase public awareness on vital national security problems and thus evolve a national consensus on strategic security issues.

(h) To coordinate decision making on security policies and issues.


(j) To monitor the implementation of approved policy and to suggest any mid-course modifications considered necessary.

Functional Aspect

To be fully effective, the NSC would need numerous inputs, which it will not be able to generate on its own. It should, therefore, have access to sensitive information that is available with various departments and ministries. It should be empowered to task various intelligence agencies to collect such information which it essentially requires for the formulation of its strategies. It would seek help from non-governmental research agencies, think tanks, Universities and other prestigious national institutions like the NDC, the IDSA and the USI to obtain well-debated and refined inputs which will enable it to evolve viable options for balanced decision making.

Conclusion

The need to have a NSC for India stands well-established. Despite numerous attempts in the past, we have not been able to formalise a viable organisation to meet our national aspirations. India's track record of creating and maintaining security organisations, be it civil or military, has been rather dismal. The standard of an organisation largely depends on the quality of people who man it and the correct type of political support. Further, to break the jinx, we would need a strong national will at the highest level, if a fully functional NSC is to see the light of the day. Otherwise it would just be another nail in the coffin of our out-dated security structure. A viable national security management apparatus should be considered as a national asset, and must surpass all narrow considerations.



India's China Policy In Perspective 2020

MAJOR MANVENDRA SINGH

Introduction

To predict the Chinese foreign policy and thereby India's policy towards China in the year 2020 AD, it is essential to understand the various components of their foreign policy, the pressures or limitations these two countries are faced with today, and what would be the outcome of these over a period of two decades or so.

Ever since 1962, China has occupied an important place in the mind of India's military planners. The unresolved border dispute between the two countries, the military modernisation programme of China, coupled with the build up of her navy, with an aim to gain access to the Indian Ocean, and a rapid growth in her relations with Pakistan have all added to India's apprehensions of the once experienced unpredictability of Chinese behaviour, notwithstanding a marked improvement in our relations with China in recent times. India will undoubtedly be always perceived by China as one of her main adversaries in the ideological realm. But would that factor be sufficient for China to resort to military adventurism in her prevailing domestic scenario?

The real cause of the Sino-Indian hostilities was not the border. It was the fact that the two are, were, and will continue to remain economic rivals, vying for the markets of South-East, South and West Asia. The Chinese were quick to realise this and they moved to trump the nascent Indian economic effort. China used the un-demarcated borders in Ladakh and North-East India for laying claims on Indian territory, forced a clash in 1962, gave the Indians

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a drubbing and thereafter forced India to go in for large scale military expansion. This put the Indian economy under very heavy pressure and delayed any incipient economic threat that India could have mounted. China still considers India as a threat to her commercial interests. China will continue to do her best to ensure that India never develops economic and commercial capability to threaten her economic interests. She has, in recent decades, resorted to a more subtle approach. Instead of a military confrontation with India, she has found in Pakistan a convenient proxy to mount a threat to India's political and regional stability.

COMPONENTS OF CHINESE EXTERNAL POLICIES

Historical Perspective

China and India can claim to be the most ancient and sophisticated Asian civilisations of the world. For thousands of years they had comprehensive economic systems, governmental set-up and administrative patterns. They made a number of technological inventions and played a predominant role in international trade. However, they also witnessed frequent wars, famines, destruction, inept kingdoms, and corrupt bureaucracies. But the point to be borne in mind, as pointed out by Gilbert Etienne, is that the concept of under-development, as applied to such countries, is of recent origin.

It is also generally agreed that both China and India were more or less at the same level of development in the late 1940s. Per capita income, life expectancy, poverty, mortality rates and industrial development showed roughly similar levels. They had a slow growth-rate of population and slow or no growth in per capita income. Both these countries were capital-poor, technologically primitive and did not have any capital goods industries.

China and India were not only at a similar stage of development in the early 1950s but also adopted somewhat similar development strategies. Since the leaders who initially assumed power in both countries were highly impressed by the success of the former Soviet Union, they articulated a development strategy that had, in the early years, a considerable degree of Soviet

influence. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders were far less exposed to the outside world than their Indian counterparts and had no experience of economic planning when they started the development process. In addition to instituting the Soviet style inward-oriented government planning, both the countries pursued self-reliance, import substitution and industrialisation by relying on strong controls on investment through licensing, and foreign trade through import quotas.

Though China and India had similar problems and adopted a common development strategy, both had altogether different historical, social, economic, and political characteristics. China is said to have begun its existence on the banks of the Yellow River around 221 BC, whereas India is said to have been unified initially in the Third Century BC by the Mauryas. Since 1949, China has had a communist dictatorship and a command economy while India had representative democracy with market-oriented mixed economy since 1947. China had to be nearly entirely rebuilt in 1949 because of a long history of foreign interferences, civil wars, and devastating famines unlike India, where partition pains were really serious but not greatly prolonged.

After the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, China also experienced acute ideological pressures during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60). The country was pushed to the verge of a collapse and suffered the worst famine claiming 20 to 30 million lives. During the period of the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1971), China again suffered from anarchy and its education system further deteriorated. The dramatic events of Tiananmen further dampened the spirits.

On the contrary, India has shown relative stability despite difficult times. Events like the excesses of the emergency period, the assassination of two Prime Ministers, ethnic riots and the political instability thereafter, the reservation imbroglio snowballing into widespread demonstrations and self-immolation attempts all over the country by the students were painful. India also exhibits a vast degree of diversity with respect to languages, religions, castes, political entities and ethnic groups. In China, for instance,

the Hans are a majority community whereas national minorities consisting of nearly 56 ethnic groups (Tibetan, Kazakhs, Mongols, Muslims, to name a few) account for only six per cent of the total population and generally live in marginal and sparsely populated regions. In contrast, India has more than 2,000 ethnic groups, castes, tribes, and so on, and the minorities constitute more than one-fifth of the total population.

Political Perspective

Aspirations for a world power status ipso facto imply assertiveness in the diplomatic field. Also, the unsatiable appetite for technology to support the pace of economic development demands closer relations with the world, particularly the advanced countries. In the words of Tony Walker, "China's ambitions to be a world power economically and politically by early next century mean that retreat into breeding isolation has long ceased to be an option." Her need to promote trade with South East Asian countries would prevent her from creating a fear psychosis in the minds of these countries. In fact, she would like to participate in regional economic cooperation groups including ASEAN. The process has already commenced with the Chinese initiative to mend fences with Vietnam.

The collapse of the USSR, which led many to apprehend internal trouble in China, brought subsequent admiration for China's handling of its affairs. Liao Wang has been quoted by A G Noorani as writing, "China arrived at a correct understanding of itself in handling the relationship between internal and foreign affairs. China puts emphasis on the former by focussing on economic development. China's foreign policy will naturally serve this central task." "This", Noorani has said, "is the core of current Chinese outlook of foreign policy."

Internally, transition from an old to a new generation of leadership appears to be dominating the thinking of the main personalities in the ruling clique, who are well aware of the fact that the transition is unlikely to be without difficulties. What will be more important is how the party as a whole deals with the situation.

Growing regional aspirations too have a bearing on the domestic scene. Among the developments that could upset China's military modernisation programme, Bharat Karnad has attributed two to the internal situation. These are : "The growing regional inequalities in China exacerbated by the divide pitting the impoverished hinterland against the prosperous coastal states", and the "possibility of separatist movements flaring up in the Muslim provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu and in the so called 'autonomous region' of Ningxia and the long smouldering fight for freedom catching fire in Buddhist Tibet."

The situation in Tibet is also likely to play a significant role in any conflict between China and India. Agitations for the independence of Tibet have increased. The White Paper called "Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts" issued by the Tibetans in June 1993 as a counter to the Chinese White Paper titled "Tibet – Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation" issued on 22 Sep 1992, clearly highlights the prevailing discontent. "After 34 years of occupation, there is more openly expressed hostility than ever before". The *National Herald* has quoted Governor Gyajncajn Nerbu as saying that it will take a long time, several generations, before the striving for independence in Tibet comes to an end.

Economic Development

The democratic aspirations of the people of China started long before the Tiananmen Square incident. The assessment of Ma Zongshi is that "China has got fed up with turmoils and their overriding concern is aspiration for calm life, pursuit of personal wealth and fulfillment of the national dream of prosperity." In his view, what China needs is "a rich country with satisfied people". The restructuring started by Deng Xiaoping is aimed at achieving just that. No doubt the economy has grown phenomenally since 1978, but as Ma Zongshi has said, "Formidable, daunting difficulties confront China on its way towards modernisation; an exploding population, shrinking arable land, high illiteracy, fragile infrastructure and insufficient resources."

The enormity of the task of upgrading the infrastructure in the

case of China can be best expressed in the words of Simon Holburton who states in a recently published article that "China has embarked on the world's largest expansion in railways, roads, ports, electric power capacity and telecommunications. By the end of the century, however, the nation will still be unable to meet the demand for these key services, thereby capping China's ability both to grow rapidly and maintain a semblance of price stability." For financing upgradation of the country's infrastructure, resources have also emerged as a pressing problem for the authorities. Some specific problems pertaining to infrastructure as highlighted by him may be summarised as under.

- (a) **Railways** – Only about 60 per cent of the industrial requirements can be met by the railways. China's plan to expand its 53,000 km railway system by 16,300 km in the Eighth Five Year Plan is unlikely to be met fully because of inflation.
- (b) **Ports** - Its eight ports can handle about 80 per cent of China's sea-borne trade. About 50 per cent of the ships coming to China's ports have to wait for days before they can be unloaded. The Ministry aims to double this capacity.
- (c) **Roads** - China has one of the most underdeveloped road networks in the developing world. Of its one million km of roads, only about 6,000 km are class 1 or 2 highways. An ambitious development plan for the next 30 years envisages 30,000 km of highways linking China's main urban centres.
- (d) **Oil** - Rapid industrialisation has led to increased requirements of transport and hence of oil. Consequently, from being an exporter of oil, China will soon become a net importer. According to Fereidun Fesharaki, President of the International Association for Energy Economics, China would need to import between 600,000 to 1,000,000 barrels a day in a decade or so.

Commenting on the coal and energy requirements, Bronwen Maddox opines that "shortages in these two are one of the economy's tightening bottlenecks". Though coal production has doubled, it has failed to meet the demand.

Military Doctrine

Despite tremendous economic growth, China has a long way to go. Stress on development will perhaps be the highest priority for her for the next couple of decades.

Modernisation of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been one of the critical subjects in 'Sinology.' The concept of modernisation in the PLA indicates the changes to be brought about in the organisation so as to make the Armed Forces more professional; impart ideological and political education among the cadres of the PLA; infusion of new weapons; arms export and business activities of the PLA. Professionalisation of the ranks of the PLA, streamlining and enhancement of the combat effectiveness of the troops form the PLA's watchwords in this programme. The seriousness of the process of modernisation can also be seen in the concrete projections the PRC leaders made in this regard for the PLA. The Central Military Commission recently projected a modernization programme for the Armed Forces which includes three stages, viz., an initial modernisation of the three branches from 1992 to 1996; a second phase of "fundamental modernisation" by 1998; and a third phase of "basic advanced modernisation", to be completed by 2001.

Among the changes brought about by Deng Xiaoping's regime, the change in strategy from "People's War" towards that of "People's War Under Modern Conditions" in 1977 remains one of the primary aspects. The changes in international relations - end of the Cold War, expansion in the scope of relations with the United States and the erstwhile USSR and its successor, Russia, emphasis on economic modernisation and close interdependence - were all said to contribute to this change in strategy. No longer were the CCP leaders laying stress on "imminent war, early war, major war, and nuclear war," or mobilising the entire population for the war effort, or drowning the enemy through the use of the militia, etc, or stressing the Four Firsts including the "human" factor, and so on. Instead, the effort of the CCP leaders seems to be on "postponing" or even "preventing" war as the Four Modernisations are slated to be on the priority list. In the words of Deng :

"Growth in the forces of peace has transcended the growth in the forces of war and it is possible that for quite a long time to come, there will be no large-scale world war."

FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA

Mobilisation of all people is not possible as their energies have to be diverted into "indirect roles such as development or production, support of war, enhancement of scientific research and improvement of weapons and equipment i.e., into subordinate roles". Again, this change in strategy also facilitates the PRC to take a war outside China, as surrendering or "luring deep" the enemy into PRC territories with burgeoning economic assets would be incompatible with the modernisation process. This strategy also involves a shift from a single service branch combat of various forces to combined combat of the ground, air, and naval forces, specifically after the PRC leaders' assessment of the Persian Gulf War. This also involves shifting the focus from total war to local war, i.e., regional and limited wars from coastal defence to a blue water defence, i.e., in the PLA's terminology, "green water defence strategy", as the PRC's interests in the South China Sea in recent times indicate. Though the concept of "local war" is contrary to Leninist precepts, this forms a major aspect of current PLA strategy.

Under Deng Xiaoping, China made a U-turn from the policy of a rigid, controlled Communist economy, to one open to foreign investment. This had the effect of greater cooperation in the political field also. The eighties were a decade of economic liberalisation and political acceptability in the West. This opening up of the economy was accompanied by greater individual freedom.

The eighties were otherwise a successful decade for China, but they ended up in an unfortunate denouement. In May 1989, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Government, the students of Beijing University staged a sit-down in Tiananmen Square. The crowd was originally in a good mood but gradually the demonstration was taken over by liberal hardliners demanding greater individual freedom of communication through anti-government posters and banners. At

this juncture, the Army was called in and tanks rolled down the Tiananmen Square to disperse the crowds. Ring leaders were arrested. The repressive measures that followed were severe because the Army had at first fraternised with the crowds. The Prime Minister was dismissed and censorship made strict. The episode revealed the yearning of the people for a freer society, and revealed that when the chips were down the party rule was a clique that had an iron hand. There was a world-wide outcry against the repressive measures. A campaign was waged by the USA and by non-official organisations for greater human rights in China. The Tiananmen Square crack-down left a scar on the memory of those who lived through it, both those who had to face the tanks and those who were in power. The Army gained in status because it was realised that they were vital in an emergency.

With Vietnam, the Chinese continued hostile relations after the dispute over Paracel Islands. In Cambodia, China helped the Pol Pot regime and supported the demand for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. In 1979 China invaded Vietnam to "teach them a lesson" as Deng phrased it. The Indian Foreign Minister, then on a goodwill mission to China, had to cut short his visit. China had to make peace with Vietnam without achieving its objective. However, China made up with Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Japan and India. In trying to make up with the rest of the world, China wanted to ensure that it did not have to depend solely on the USA, but develop its own links and alliances.

There were many other uncertainties China faced after 1989. The question of succession loomed large before the leadership. Li Peng, the Prime Minister, is young but has many rivals. In the field of foreign affairs, the rapprochement between the USA and Russia has shifted the power balance. The new upsurge in the economy has created many opportunities but also many difficulties, with the Americans. The Afghan invasion by Russia in 1979, and the Gulf War in 1991 were danger signals for the Chinese outlook in Central Asia. This was accentuated by the birth of new Central Asian Republics and a new relationship had to be established with them by China.

At the same time China had to be inward looking on account of major internal problems, like regional imbalances. The coastal regions have benefited from the new policies of industrialisation but central and western China remain backward. Agriculture is receiving a secondary treatment and the farmers are a discontented lot as was revealed by their recent revolt in the Szechwan province against poor farm prices.

A major question in China's international relations is its attitude to nuclear power. China continued to conduct fresh nuclear tests at Lop Nor even after signing the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. China had five different nuclear weapon designs already and four to five hundred nuclear warheads. In December 1993, it tested a warhead for a new submarine launched missile.

Another significant development in China's foreign policy is its entry into the world arms market. China helped Iran and Pakistan to build nuclear capacity and reactors. The sale of weapons, tanks, aircraft and submarines is an established channel of supply of arms by China to the Middle East and Pakistan. Assiduously, China has built up this lucrative trade in competition with established suppliers as it has a potential both for earning foreign exchange and of winning friends by influencing countries that are barred from getting such supplies from the West.

INDIAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS CHINA

Goals for Indian Foreign Policy

In her quest for national security, India has indeed come a long way since independence. She has, over the years, acquired a military clout that no one in the region can challenge. India has always been a dominant factor in South Asian politics. Regardless of the historical period, the geo-political environment or the socio-economic conditions, the country has always occupied the central stage in the area. India is the only country that is contiguous to, all the other six states, while none of them have any common borders with each other. Her geographical centrality is accentuated all the more by the important fact that there is no other country,

equally big in size and sufficiently close by to counter the predominant Indian position.

This quest for national security has gone through three phases, each of which has been influenced by different motivating factors. During the first phase when the motivating factor was reactive, the prime objective was to increase India's military arsenal for the limited and very specific goal of facing up to China in the North after the fiasco of 1962. The second phase - inaugurated after the successful intervention in Bangladesh in 1971 - was characterised by the new Indian goal of becoming the undisputed land power on the subcontinent. And the third phase - inaugurated at the time of the Sri Lanka crisis (1985) - witnessed the emergence of a more ambitious goal - that of acquiring the status of a South Asian naval power possessing the capability of operating within the region and beyond.

China does not appear to be seriously opposed to the idea of India becoming a South Asian power. In fact, it has apparently accepted the role India is playing in South Asia, and has even been encouraging Pakistan to normalise her relations with India. But moving beyond South Asia is different; the Chinese, in this case, may react differently.

Why is China's power - its huge army and its intercontinental missiles - considered acceptable while India's is not? Why do Western analysts speak with concern of India's drive to build a blue water navy but remain silent when China tests ballistic missiles? There is no reason why India should not have military power commensurate to her size.

The dangers to India are indeed very great and the pitfalls immense. Indian policy makers will have to guard against this, while searching for a viable national security policy that encompasses the new eventualities that India will be faced with in the future. The important fact is that defence against external attacks must remain the principal consideration of national security.

India has considerable leverage over her neighbours. In fact, this is more significant in international relations than in the domestic sector. This makes it possible for her to protect the neighbouring countries against external threats, to assist them economically, and to permit them to benefit from the educational, medical and even employment facilities that exist in India.

However, Chinese influence in the four states of the subcontinent (Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan) continues to grow despite India's efforts to erode it. And, finally, internal strife, particularly in Kashmir - actively supported by Pakistan - has escalated into an international issue with no current hope of its resolution.

It therefore becomes all the more imperative upon India to rise up to this challenge. This can only be met by building a strong economic and military power.

Role in International Affairs

India's goal of playing a significant role in international affairs has evolved through the years. Originally defined in global terms during the Nehru period, it became a significant objective of Indian diplomacy, centering around rhetorical diplomacy against imperialism and racism; a non-aligned model for emulation by others; and mediatory diplomacy to manage international crises.

India had backed China's entry into the Security Council. But China may not favour India's entry into the Council as this will give impetus to democratic powers in South Asia who would then look towards India for solving many a turmoil that the region is witnessing.

The decision to globalize the Indian economy was certainly a defining moment in contemporary Indian history. It is impossible to predict, with any degree of certainty, if India will be better off as she moves towards the end of this century. In any event, two things are certain. Internally, before things get better, they will get

worse as is invariably the case with the liberalization of economies. It will need more than a minority government and more than a dithering leadership to assure a smooth transition. It will, therefore, take some time for the Indian economy to face up to the challenges of the new century.

Conclusion

India's economic, diplomatic and military development will always be a pin-prick for China's policy makers. Ideologically, in the eyes of the world, India symbolises democracy and freedom of expression, whereas China represents the 'iron curtain' with hegemonistic intentions. Each of China's neighbours eye it with suspicion and mistrust. It, therefore, is beyond doubt that South Asia would prefer a free and democratic society with liberal economy like India to be the dominant power rather than having the China threat looming large over the continent.

India's ideological closeness to the West by virtue of its being the biggest democracy sounds alarms in Beijing. Slowly but steadily, in the post Cold War era it is being realised by the US, that to effectively contain and finally remove the last seat of communist power, it is essential for it to forge better bilateral relations with India and other littoral states of South East Asia. In all likelihood, there are going to be major changes in US policy towards South Asia which invariably will turn out favourable for India. Beijing seems to be reacting already. It has made economic development its main aim, since it believes that economy is essential to build a strong military machine. By opening its economy for US investment, it has made sure that the US policy which to a large extent is controlled by the business houses in the US, is for the time being favourable to Beijing. At the same time, there is no let up in China arming Pakistan against India so as to thwart the Indian economy.

China's policy of building a strong economic base so as to be able to modernise its war-making capability is self-evident. The arms acquisition by China include the latest in the inventories of the erstwhile USSR. Its development of nuclear arsenal, and its

secret military and nuclear liaison with Pakistan does not augur well for India.

The next century is likely to see a major power tussle between China and India. The areas of interest being common, both eyeing third world markets for their exports, there are bound to be economic clashes, and history is witness to the fact that military confrontation follows economic clashes. Hence, to keep abreast with these developments, it will be necessary for India to pursue a policy of buying time for economic development which should form the base for strong defence forces.

The recent transfer of Hong Kong to China has given a great economic boost to Beijing. It has furthered its quest for amalgamating Taiwan, another economic power, into the mainland. At the moment Beijing wants to send the right kind of signals to Taiwan and the world that it is going to treat the people of Hong Kong respectfully so as to lower opposition to its claims over Taiwan.

India must project to the West the importance of India vis-a-vis China and use this leverage to counter China's aim of draining the Indian economy by involving her in an arms race by transferring the latest in missile and nuclear technology to Pakistan.

We can safely presume that with its modernisation plan yet to be completed, with Taiwan still a thorn in the belly, and the huge investments coming in from the Western world, it will be difficult for China to embark upon any adventurous conflicts against India or any other South Asian country in the coming decade or so. However 2020 AD or beyond, the economy of China will be a force to reckon with. Along with economic development will come the fuel crunch because of the ever growing population. Both Indonesia and the Middle East have oil fields within China's geographical reach. Foreign policies are decided by national interest. If the national need for fuel becomes acute then with its modernised army, China would launch a campaign to gain access to these oil fields. Also as the Indian economy develops and Indian investments clash with those of Chinese in the third world countries, one of the ways out could be a military confrontation with China.

In all probability, 2020 AD will see both India and China as economic giants but with common economic interests in a common market, i.e. the third world and with technology and quality of products from both the countries at par. Hence the decision as to what is right would again be the prerogative of the mighty. While not adopting a confrontationist attitude towards Beijing, New Delhi must ensure an independent economic development devoid of any pressures from China. This, in turn, calls for exerting pressures on the Chinese by adopting a more assertive and straightforward foreign policy : of letting the world know about our concerns regarding Tibet, and defining in clear terms to the Chinese our interests and spheres of influence. It also calls for furthering economic and diplomatic relations with all Asian countries including Taiwan and Vietnam and stronger ties with Japan.

History has always respected the strong and it stands testimony to the fact that the weak was always cowed down.

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India – Pakistan Relations

ASHRAF JEHANGIR QAZI

Introduction

For any Pakistan diplomat to be posted to India is a privilege. But to have the honour of heading the Mission in Delhi is the crowning privilege that one can aspire to, as a member of the Pakistan Foreign Service. For Pakistan, India is by far the most important country. It is the country with which the quality and state of relations determine our security and the economic environment as no other relationship does. Our relations with India have not been as they should be and can be, and 'Insha Allah' will be. Unfortunately, the importance has been of a negative rather than a positive nature in the past. Even so, the number one priority on Pakistan's national or external policy agenda is to work towards a normal relationship with our great neighbour to the East - India. It is my good fortune to have arrived in Delhi at a time when the prospects of movement in our bilateral relationship look more encouraging than it has been for some years prior to my arrival here. During the past three or four years, the relations were almost frozen. With the election of our Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, and with Mr IK Gujral as the Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of India, our relations have entered a new era of promise and hope. An ambience has been generated at the highest level within which it is realistic to begin to think in terms of movement. It will not be easy. But the very fact that it will be possible is indeed extremely encouraging.

The Bilateral Dialogue

Within this new phase of Indo-Pak relations, we have resumed our bilateral dialogue after more than three years. At the level of foreign secretaries, we have had three formal meetings. In addition, the Foreign Secretaries have met when accompanying their Prime Ministers abroad. Our Prime Ministers have met

Excerpted from a talk given by His Excellency Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, High Commissioner of Pakistan to India at the USI, New Delhi on 28 January 1998.

on four occasions during the past year and our Ministers of State have also met once at Male. As a result, there has been specific and palpable movement in a number of fields, even though they might not receive the kind of publicity that more salient features of our relationship tend to. It must be noted that from 50 visas a day granted to people going to Pakistan, the number has risen to 400. At times the media in India tends to portray the liberalising of the visa regime as a unilateral measure which has not really been reciprocated by Pakistan. There have also been exchanges between the business chambers of the two countries and useful discussions have taken place. There has been an increase in the number of items that we import from India, even though the increase is relatively modest compared to what we can look forward to, when we have normal trading relations between the two countries. In the field of culture, a beginning has been made with the exchange of artists between the two countries. Similarly, the media of both countries have begun to print items from each other's media with greater frequency than was the case in the past. There are other items of significance like the release of fishermen who were detained by both countries. All of these add up to movement of a considerable degree. Nonetheless, they are far less than what can legitimately be termed as normal relations between two neighbouring countries. We are faced with problems which we cannot minimise. Problems are rooted in mutual perceptions. We see them in totally different terms. This is the legacy of history, that led to the partition of the subcontinent. Despite this, we are aware of the emotional, cultural, historical and linguistic links, that bind the people of both countries. We need to address the problems which have kept us apart, in order to realise the hopes of the people of both countries.

The Development of Economy

The geo-political environment has changed. The costs of integrating into the global economy are palpable. These must be minimised by enlightened domestic and social policies. The costs of not successfully integrating into the global economy will be extremely high. We have the SAARC framework available to us. We are aware of the recent developments and geo-political changes and the regional imperatives.

India and Pakistan both have plans to grow. Their GDPs should grow at the rate of eight per cent plus annually for the next twenty years to emulate the performance of the East Asian countries. Attracting foreign investment, foreign technology and foreign managerial expertise, will play a catalytic role. Of course the vast proportion of investment has to be financed by domestic sources. India has done very well in that respect. Pakistan recently has had a difficult economic situation; but over the span of five decades, performance of both countries has been more or less equal. We are confident that with the economic reform packages that are underway in Pakistan, we will turn round the economy within a year or so. But the basic point that I am making is that neither India nor Pakistan will get the catalytic foreign investment, technology and management expertise, if we are in a state of confrontation with each other. The international business community does not look at things through fine details. For them, two countries which have gone to war in the past, have nuclear threshold status and could go to war again, give a wrong signal. Other projects such as the natural gas and oil pipeline project, could be a link between India and Pakistan in the future. None of this will happen if we do not make a break through in our bilateral relations. The cost will be very high for both countries and both will suffer if the world sees us as two countries locked in confrontation, unable to make break throughs on the basic issues that divide us.

The Issues to be Discussed

Last June, we had succeeded in concluding the modality phase of our talks which would have enabled us to move towards taking up each of the issues that needed to be discussed. In the aftermath of the Islamabad round, the agreement on a mechanism for that dialogue eluded us. We are making efforts to conclude this modality phase of the talks. I believe the recent talks that our Prime Ministers had in Dhaka, will enable us to overcome whatever differences remain in the way of concluding the modality phase of talks. In all, eight issues have been identified. These are : peace and security including confidence building measures, the Kashmir dispute, the Siachin problem, the Tul Bul project, the Sir Creek, trade and commerce, drugs and terrorism, and cultural

cooperation. We wish to move on all these fronts. But unless we move in a coordinated manner along the path that we both subscribe to, whatever movement we make would probably be non-sustained, non-significant and over a period of time, non-contributory to a transformation of our bilateral relations. I am confident that whatever government is elected or whatever coalition takes office in New Delhi, we shall build upon the achievements of the past year in order to move ahead. I am motivated by the knowledge that my Prime Minister and Government are dedicated to bringing about an improvement in the bilateral relations with India. Because we believe it to be in the interest of the people of Pakistan and the people of the subcontinent. And for that purpose we do need to address issues that we have not addressed with the kind of empathy and largeness of vision that is required, to find common ground between us.

The Kashmir Problem

We have our points of view on the various issues, particularly, the Kashmir issue, which we regard as the 'core issue'. I shall explain why we regard it as the 'core issue'. We are so convinced, and we reiterate our point of view with regard to this matter, and so easily rubbish each other's points of view that we fail to realise that in doing so, we miss out on the common ground and fail to build the basis for the movement towards the shared relationship that our peoples want. So in order to bring about the larger objectives of India-Pakistan normalisation, we have to be aware of, and respect each other's points of view, even when we find ourselves in deep disagreement with that particular point of view. We must not try to exclude it from discussion. We must begin to respect each other's politics in addition to respecting each other as individuals and as friends, because whenever Indians and Pakistanis meet, whenever Indians visit Pakistan, and Pakistanis visit India, we have nothing but stories of absolutely spontaneous friendship, generosity, warmth and affection; such that people are sometimes amazed, as to why we can not agree on matters relating to statecraft when we relate to each other, at the personal level, with such spontaneity and warmth. But we need to address our problems to be able to respect each other's sensitivities, politics, perceptions of history, and psychology. If we

merely see each other as the victims of ignorance, prejudice, misinformation and irrationality, then we can neither build on that basis nor have a constructive dialogue on issues which are sensitive and which have divided us. It is in that framework, and I put it to you my dear Indian friends, such as I would not address any other audience. If I were addressing any other audience, I would seek to demonstrate our point of view as the moral high ground, as the political high ground, as the legal high ground and that your point of view is deficient in many of these basic respects.

The one problem that has kept us apart, has in the past fed negatively into our relationship and continues to feed negatively into our relationship is the Kashmir problem. Although we have mutually exclusive points of view on it, we can and should agree, this is the one problem that, had it not been there, there would have been a normal relationship between India and Pakistan. It would be normal for any two neighbours in the model example that is often quoted, i.e. the US-Canada relationship. They are model neighbours. But I am sure, if you were to ask the diplomats of Canada and United States, do you have any problems between you, they would say not one but several. They have got several important problems, like the economic problems, the visa problems, immigration problems, and so on. And those problems are not discussed without heat especially when they differ. But none of those problems individually or collectively add up to a political problem as such that would negatively impact upon US-Canada relations. Occasionally the media might try and blow some particular problems out of proportion, but in fact they do not add up.

Similarly, with the other problems that exist between India and Pakistan, none of these problems are insignificant, or uncomplicated. But none of these problems account for the non-normal, subnormal relations between India and Pakistan. Indeed some of these problems flow from, rather than cause, the subnormal relationship between our two countries. While MA Jinnah and Gandhi differed on how to resolve the problems that confronted us before independence, neither of them differed on the need for the people of the subcontinent to live in harmony with each other. And the creation of Pakistan was seen by Qaid-e-

Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as a necessary means to bring about a state of co-existence and harmony such that the non-creation of Pakistan could not bring about. Now, there are differences of points of view within India on that subject. But the fact is that the Pakistan movement was not a movement of not wanting to have anything to do with the majority community. It was a movement towards bringing about circumstances which would enable co-existence. The creation of two independent countries leading to friendly and normal relationship between them was hampered by two events which were largely unforeseen. The scale and the tragedy of the exchange of population, the uprooting of the people from their homes, and the miseries perpetrated on them were not foreseen by the leaders of both the countries. However, with the passage of time, people have settled down. The second event was the Kashmir dispute. This problem has not been resolved by time. It can only be resolved by concerted efforts. We have such mutually exclusive positions on it and we are emotionally involved. If we are able to tackle this core issue, which divides us, and feeds actively into our relationship on a negative scale in the larger context of ensuring forward movement for better relations, then we can make progress towards meaningful talks. Because if we fail on this issue, there will be no support in Pakistan for a dialogue.

Having said this, let me add that we do not say in Pakistan that the Kashmir issue must be resolved before there can be any movement or any progress in our relationship towards normalisation. What we say is that we must address this issue and we must find a way of making progress towards a resolution of this issue, the first step of which would be an agreement on how to discuss it. Once we agree on how to discuss, we shall then have to make progress towards the common objective of that discussion. And once we do that, we bring about an atmosphere within which simultaneous progress on a whole range of issues, particularly, the eight issues listed in the joint statement of 23 June 1997, can be made. We are realistic, we realise that what has eluded us for 50 years can not be resolved in one year or two years. It will take time. But it must be seen to be addressed with sincerity of purpose and meaningfulness. I know,

some Indian friends see this demand as being politically unfeasible for any government. But we do not think so, because we are already committed under the Simla Agreement to discuss a final settlement of Kashmir. We might interpret this phrase in different ways, but we will enter into meaningful discussion with a mutually exclusive initial position and see where we go on from there. We must similarly seek to bring about an improved human rights situation in Kashmir because these things feed in a negative way into the public opinion of both countries. Once again these reports are mutually exclusive and if we rubbish each other's points of view, while insisting on our own, we will make no progress.

Moulding of Public Opinion

We need to adopt a different approach and do something that we have not done before. It may be unfair for us to leave the two governments alone and expect them to do everything. We need to mould public opinion by taking help from academia, the media, the business community and various components of the states both in India and Pakistan. Let us reach out to each other at every level in order to bring about a greater public understanding of each other's points of view. We need to transcend those in order to see why we have to do things somewhat differently in order to move ahead. And I want to assure you that our Prime Minister is wedded to bringing about a better relationship with India. He is willing to take a chance because his position is based on principles. There is no betrayal of principle as far as Pakistan foreign policy is concerned. Kashmir policy also must get linked by a wider perspective, a wider vision, that we can and must address in harmony with policies towards bringing about a better and more substantive relationship between the two countries in all fields. We cannot have one preceding the other. And unless you are able to do this, in a manner that can be perceived by our public opinion, we will not generate the kind of public understanding and support for the process that is necessary to sustain. To make progress we have the requisite ambience. I am absolutely convinced that this ambience will be sustained even in the aftermath of your elections, but we need to do a lot of things. The real challenge lies with the way we see each other, we see the problems that divide us. I believe public opinion can be moulded by a whole set of players, of which this august audience is one.

Strategic Issues and Destabilizing Forces in West Asia

M H ANSARI

Introduction

We in India had the good sense, many years ago, to call the region by its correct geographical name of West Asia. Generally the earlier name Middle East is used – a term invented in 1902 by the American naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan to designate the area between Arabia and India with its focus on the Persian Gulf.¹ It is also worth recalling that five centuries earlier the advent of the Portuguese in India in 1498 emboldened the kings of that land to describe themselves as "Lords of the conquest, navigation, and commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia, and Persia."² This perception, and the subsequent struggle of the European powers to dominate the region, highlights its strategic relevance even before the discovery of oil.

In more recent years the connotation of the term West Asia has varied to suit the occasion or the focus. For the purpose of this paper the term is restricted to 14 countries of western Asia and two of Africa namely Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Yemen, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Egypt and Sudan. A quasi-state, in the shape of the Palestine National Authority (PNA), must be added to this list since it is pivotal to any strategic scenario in West Asia. The reason for this selection is geographical continuity as well as strategic relevance and interaction. In conceptual terms, however, a watertight compartment is neither feasible nor desirable and countries on the immediate periphery of this area could, from time to time, have a decisive impact. A look at the map will make this evident.

There are distinguishing features of West Asia in geograph-

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ical and historical terms. It stands at the junction of three continents - Asia, Europe, and Africa - and has influenced in most periods of history, regional and global politics as well as trade. It is an area of immense aridity, of two great river valleys which were cradles of civilization, of three great religions which have a history of strife, of supremacy and above all, of that one source of energy - oil - without which the 20th Century technological progress would have been unimaginable. For this latter reason, the stability of West Asia is of paramount interest, more so because the potential for instability is so preponderant.

The Strategic Issues

The strategic issues in West Asia, as anywhere else in the world, relate to factors impinging on national security. The term includes, but is not restricted to, military security and in regional terms inevitably incorporates the conflicting national security perceptions of all the actors. Any quest for regional stability, therefore, is inevitably an exercise in reconciling these conflicting interests; any factor impeding this is a destabilising force. In the nature of things, such a force could be domestic, regional or even global.

The West Asian countries have certain noteworthy characteristics (details in Annexure I, II and III). These are :-

(a) The countries in question have small populations. The exceptions to this are Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. All the countries, however, have very high population growth rates as a result of which their population will double by the year 2040 or earlier (except for the tiny Kuwait). The social and economic implications of this would be considerable and need to be probed.

(b) The military potential of the states of the region is considerable. Vast amounts have been spent and continue to be spent on the acquisition of new and sophisticated weaponry. There is, in addition, the prospect of technical diffusion which would sooner or later offset to some extent the tech-

nological edge of Israel and would, therefore, fuel further upgradation. The possession by some of these states, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and of long-range delivery systems, adds a qualitative edge of frightening dimensions.

(c) While the Arab-Israeli dispute remains the central issue in the region and determines the threat perception of the traditional antagonists, its successful resolution would not by itself solve other inter-state as well as domestic problems of individual countries of the area.

(d) Long-term solution to regional problems would necessitate a satisfactory water-allocation regime which, on objective evidence, would compel drastic changes in the water utilization pattern with all its economic and psychological consequences.

(e) Given the outside world's dependence on West Asian energy resources, external involvement in the region's political and economic problems would persist in the foreseeable future.

Demography

It is conventional wisdom to commence any analysis of the West Asian scene with the Arab-Israeli problem. It is useful, however, to proceed differently and address in the first place some underlying realities. One of these is the region's demography. The data given in Annexure I clearly indicates the population growth projections. This implies a population which is predominantly young; it also means that the pressures on the educational system, and on the job market, will continue to grow. The richer states will find the funds to open more schools and universities but would find themselves increasingly helpless with regard to the employment situation where a very rapid growth in the supply of labour will confront only a sluggish increase in the demand for labour. According to the World Bank, the region's labour force is growing at the rate of 3.1 per cent per year, the fastest rate in

the world. (The comparable rate for Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa is 2.6 per cent each and for South Asia 2.2 per cent). This would also mean higher rates of urban unemployment, higher rates of youth unemployment, and higher rates of unemployment amongst the educated. These together will bring about a fall in real wages. According to one American expert "the employment problem constitutes the most politically destabilizing economic challenge in the region."⁶ No easy answers to this are forthcoming. In the coming years, therefore, social and political upheavals can be anticipated.

Water Problem

Another long term factor with a potential for friction is water. The data given in Annexure II highlights the projected reductions in water availability. The point to note is that the border demarcation of the West Asian States was political rather than hydrological. Consequently Israel, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria obtain most of their water from sources originating outside their own territory. Iraq and Syria (Annexure IV) rely on water from the Tigris and Euphrates which spring in Turkey. Syria, Jordan, and Israel (Annexure V) all depend on the Yarmouk River which flows through the Golan Heights and Jordan. Egypt's sole water supply (Annexure VI) comes from the Nile which first flows through Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia.⁷ Each of these states, therefore, fear a water stoppage or diversion by the upstream water users which will, as a result, dry up, or reduce, water flow for the downstream users. The current tension between Syria and Turkey over the latter's construction of the Ataturk Dam (which could reduce the Euphrates water available to Syria by 40 per cent and to Iraq by 60 per cent), the 1974 problem between Iraq and Syria over the Euphrates Dam at Tabqa, the 1965 Israeli reaction to Syria's attempt to divert Jordan River tributaries, and the problem of the 1970s between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia over Nile waters, are all instances of the type of trouble which can be anticipated in the future. They lend credence to Boutros Ghali's remark of 1979 that the next regional war will be fought over water, not politics.

It is for this reason that the Madrid Process included a

multilateral sub-group on water. Subsequent to it the Israel-Jordan Sub-Agenda Agreement of 7 June, 1994 provided for the negotiation of "mutual recognition of the rightful water allocation", both of the river waters and of the renewable fresh water and fossil aquifers. The World Bank had the same objective in mind when in October 1995 it called for a Regional Water Summit. These water negotiations, whenever they take place, will be far from easy particularly because Israel is using its dominant position to consume more than its rightful share. A possible solution would seem to lie in the reduction of water levels being used for agriculture since, in regional terms, agriculture accounts for 90 per cent of water consumption but contributes only 16-20 per cent of the GDP. Israeli agriculture, which is the greatest consumer of water, accounts for 3 per cent of Israel's GDP and employs under 5 per cent of the workforce. Apart from this, other solutions have also been suggested. These include a Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal and a Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal both of which could use the considerable difference in altitude to hydrologically power the desalination of sea water. These solutions, even if technically and environmentally feasible, would involve huge investments and presuppose comprehensive peace and regional co-operation.

Ethnic Conflict : The Kurdish Problem

Ethnic conflict in parts of the region is yet another destabilising factor. One refers here to the Kurdish question which impinges on Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria and also to the ongoing conflict in southern Sudan between the Government of Sudan (Muslim and Islamic) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) - Christian and secular - which is seeking regional autonomy. While the latter is essentially a domestic problem of Sudan, the former has international implications involving as it does four regional states. The Kurds constitute the fourth largest ethnic group in West Asia.⁸ Their total number in 1990 was 25 million and this is expected to increase to 87 million by the year 2050, 45 per cent of these would be in Turkey and 25 per cent in Iraq. The problem has serious potential for trouble because the states concerned have followed assimilative policies with regard to their Kurdish

populations and have not been accommodative of Kurdish ethnicity (except Iraq which, in theory at least, accepts the idea of a bi-national state). Local Kurdish nationalism is particularly strong in Turkey and Iraq; a pan-Kurdish consciousness, however, does not exist. The question has also had an international dimension since the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 and Western powers have from time to time taken interest in it for wider strategic considerations. This is also true of Israel which has developed intelligence links with Kurdish groups as a means of keeping Syria, Iraq and Iran under pressure. On the other side Turkey, Iraq and Iran have at all times retained a tacit understanding aimed at containing the Kurdish aspirations. Syria, on its part, uses the Kurdish card to offset the complications of a more difficult relationship with Turkey involving territorial claims and water disputes.

Given the conflicting perceptions and aspirations, the Kurdish problem in a way has, as Churchill once said, "no solution, neither now nor in the future". However, there may be some who would be tempted to indulge in the dangerous pursuit of cartographic surgery. The interests of the countries most directly affected by the problem would, therefore, seem to lie in accommodating Kurdish aspirations within a framework of decentralisation and regional autonomy in order to preserve their own territorial integrity. There is no evidence as yet that this would be done in the immediate future. On the contrary, Turkey's hardline approach to the PKK, the Turkish Army's frequent cross-border operations in northern Iraq, and the power vacuum in Iraq's Kurdish areas are all suggestive of a prolonged period of instability in Kurdish lands.

Border Disputes

In a region in which new states and new borders abound, boundary disputes are understandably many. Iran-Iraq, Iraq-Kuwait, Bahrain-Qatar, Iran-UAE, Saudi Arabia-Yemen, and Yemen-Eritrea remain on the active list. An international agreement, however, exists with regard to the Shatt-Al-Arab border between Iran and Iraq. The boundary between Iraq and Kuwait was accepted by the UN in the wake of the war of 1991. Each one

of the other four is the subject of ongoing bilateral negotiations and/or of regional mediation. The successful settlement of the earlier disputes between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and among Oman, Saudi Arabia and Yemen are indicative of a desire in the region to resolve these problems on the basis of existing realities.

The Oil Resources

The role of the West Asian States, and particularly of their regional Big Five (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait) on the world energy scene has already been highlighted in Annexure III. The Big Five between them possess 64 per cent of the world's oil reserves and 25 per cent of the output as well as a quarter of the world's gas reserves and 10 per cent of gas production. The relevant factors to consider are short term market stability and the possible consequences of a short term disruption of supply. On the latter, most experts are of the view that "short term disruption of Gulf oil production could still have devastating effects on the world's economic circumstances". They also feel that "the current 'disconnection' between the Arab - Israeli issues and oil is the product of a particular set of regional circumstances and world oil market forces, all of which are subject to change." The present production level of OPEC, and the commitment of its moderate members to supply and price stability, is therefore contingent on political tranquility in the region.

The Arab - Israeli Dispute

It is within the framework of these wider ground realities that the current state of Arab-Israeli dispute is to be viewed. The history of the problem is of little relevance today except for the deep scar it has left on the Arab psyche. One observer of the Arab world has noted that "the contemporary Arab mind cannot be understood without the analysis of attitudes to Israel."⁹

It is useful to recall that the Arab-Israeli question involves not one but two disputes :-

(a) Between the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and the State of Israel.

(b) Between Israel and the Arab states of West Asia and North Africa. The Israeli defiance of the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 was finally rewarded when Egypt undertook direct negotiations in November 1977 and signed a peace treaty in March 1979. This was a bold, individual effort and left Egypt ostracised in the Arab world for many years. No tangible progress in negotiations with others was made in the 1980s. The Israelis discovered the limits of their power when they invaded Lebanon in 1982. The PLO retreated from Lebanon to the backwaters of Tunis and discovered in the process, the utility of secret contacts aimed at breaking the impasse. Arafat conceded some ground in his Cairo Declaration of 4 November, 1985 and more substantively in his Stockholm statement of 7 December, 1988 and his UN General Assembly speech in Geneva of 13 December, that year. These, together, paved the way for the 'doves' on both sides to work for a possible settlement. In contacts between Jordan and Israel, the idea of an international conference took shape. It was soon shelved because of internal developments in Israel. In the meantime a qualitatively new factor, in the shape of the Palestinian Intifada, emerged on the scene. It challenged the PLO's near monopoly of Palestinian politics. The Intifada gave birth to Hamas. For Israel, the effort to suppress the Palestinian uprising was economically expensive and politically and media-wise embarrassing.

Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations and the Peace Process

The international and regional environment in the wake of the Gulf War, as also PLO's isolation and financial problems, finally brought forth conditions which made a wider peace process possible. The first step in this was the multilateral Madrid Conference in Oct-Nov 1991, which paved the way for bilateral negotiations between Israel, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians. A framework for discussions on five regional issues, involving 40 nations, the UN and the European Union, was also evolved. The

next step was to resort to second track diplomacy, undertaken by Israel and the PLO in great secrecy and without the knowledge of the United States and other Arab countries, whose product was the Oslo Agreement of August 1993 which was made public with great fanfare on the White House lawns in Washington on 13 September that year. Thus was born the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as for permanent status negotiations aimed at implementing UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Then followed a series of agreements between Israel and the PLO on the details of Palestinian autonomy in the interim period.

These agreements were a defining movement in the recent history of West Asia. The French journalist and diplomat Eric Rouleau, whose knowledge of the region is unrivaled, described the Madrid gathering as a final admission of defeat by the Arabs.¹⁰ The Israeli gain was best summed up by an Israeli Minister who said "Israel has been created anew by the (Oslo) Agreement"; until then, Israel had victory without legitimacy: "now it has recognition and acceptance."¹¹ The accord, with its deliberately vague wording on some crucial issues, also gave Israel a great measure of control over the negotiating process which was to follow. It freed Israel from negotiations under UN sponsorship. The Palestinians, in turn, gave up the military option but could claim major gains in being recognised as a negotiating party (rather than as an adjunct of Jordan), in the listing of the territories and the issues involved, and in the stages of negotiations being specifically mentioned.

Developments over the past four years clearly indicate the limitations and pitfalls of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The change of government in Israel in May 1996 has aggravated matters further. Israel has controlled the pace of negotiations and has sought to create new ground realities through its policy of settlements. The PNA's track record of administration in the West Bank and Gaza has not added to its popularity. The economic situation in those areas can only be described as grim with 50 per cent unemployment in the West Bank, 65 per cent in Gaza and

over 70 per cent in the refugee camps. As a result of Israel's frequent blockades, the per capita earning of the Palestinian areas has dropped by 39 per cent in the last four years.¹² Matters are further aggravated by the fact that a good part of the aid package, promised to the PNA by donor countries and financial institutions, remains undischarged. The *Financial Times* reported on 5 June, 1997 that according to the Palestinian Ministry of Planning, only \$ 1.5 billion has been disbursed out of a pledged amount of \$3.4 billion.¹³ The rising tensions and tempers therefore give no reason to believe that tranquility and quickened negotiations would be forthcoming in the immediate future. It is for this reason that the Egyptian Foreign Minister recently described the Arab-Israeli relations as being at their lowest point in 20 years.

The Attitude of the USA and the Peace Process

An intriguing factor in recent months has been the US attitude. Writing in the *Foreign Affairs Journal* in September 1996, a former Advisor to President Bush, Richard Haas, described Middle East peace as "over-valued stock" in need of correction.¹⁴ More recently, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has made a renewed US role contingent on the parties first making some "hard decisions". This would suggest an attitude of calibrated disinterest or disengagement. Such an approach, as *the Economist* of London pointed out a few weeks back, "is precisely what the hardliners in the Israeli Government would most like America to do".¹⁵ On the other hand, an approach of deeper involvement in peacemaking has recently been suggested by an independent task force of the Council of Foreign Relations, New York. This proposes a new declaration of principles focussed on the final status negotiations and aimed at the creation of a Palestinian State on contiguous territory of West Bank and Gaza as well as agreement that the territory of the existing Israeli settlements will be incorporated in the State of Israel. This proposal too, would like to leave out the question of East Jerusalem but with the proviso that Israel must refrain from action aimed at changing the demography of East Jerusalem.¹⁶ Such an approach, if accepted by the Clinton Administration, might bring down the

temperature in the region and may lessen the Arab anger and their determination to boycott the Doha economic summit. It would, by the same token, give credence to Mohammed Haikal's apt remark that "every initiative so far has been based on finding a way for Arabs to surrender with a figleaf of dignity."¹⁷

The Emerging Scenario

Could war be an option? In an editorial on 14 July, 1997 the *Jerusalem Post* observed that the peace process "seems to only keep slipping into a deeper and deeper freeze" and that "Yasser Arafat appears intent on taking matters to the brink in order to extract concessions from Israel". Earlier, the British journalist Robert Fisk wrote on 9 June, 1997 of "a tangible drift towards war" even if it does not involve Egypt and Jordan. In a similar vein a former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, James Akins, spoke in Washington on 3 July, 1997 about a complex but predictable scenario in which Israel's use of excessive force against Palestinian protests could initiate a chain reaction in which Israel may reoccupy some of the relinquished West Bank territory, force out the Palestinian population, and also carry out preemptive strikes against Syria confident in the knowledge of Syria's low combat readiness (which, according to some informed sources, is said to be 20 per cent for the tank force and 25 per cent for the air force). Such an action could create newer ground realities, unravel the Oslo accord and its "land for peace" formula, weaken the Palestinians further, and be more in keeping with Netanyahu's and the Likud party's approach to a settlement.

The hiccups in the peace process, and the resultant Arab misgivings about the United States policy, has propelled other variables in the politics of the region. The most significant of these are the military co-operation arrangements between Israel and Turkey, the recent detente between Syria and Iraq and the perceptible movement in Saudi-Iranian relations. The first clearly impinges on Syria's threat perceptions and would make more difficult the complex negotiations between Syria and Israel which focus on the Syrian demand that Israel recognize Syria's sovereignty over the entire Golan Heights and withdraw to the line of

4 June, 1967. Israel, on its part, has conceded in negotiations the principle of a withdrawal but without specifying its extent. It has been suggested in some quarters that a US peacekeeping force on the Heights, instead of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) stationed there in 1974, may give Israel the credible guarantee it seeks before agreeing to a total withdrawal as part of a comprehensive peace agreement.

The Syria-Iraq detente, if it develops, would have strategic implications for Israel. It has already caused unease in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and would be resisted by the United States. On the other side, the recent moves in Saudi-Iranian relations could only have a benign impact on the geopolitics of the Gulf. What its implications would be for Iran's role in West Asia and the Gulf, and for Iran's relations with the United States and the European Union countries, remains to be seen.

Religious Radicalism

The last but not the least of the destabilising forces in the region is radicalism in the name of religion. The reference here is both to the Jewish and Islamic radicalism. The former has little to do with Rabbinical or Orthodox Judaism both of which were and remain opposed to Zionism, the official ideology of Israel.¹⁸ Religious Zionism, therefore, is a political creed developed initially to justify and sustain the Jewish homeland argument at the expense of the native population, and subsequently to reinforce the hardline policies concerning the occupied territories, settlements, negotiations with the Palestinians, and the question of the creation of a state for the Palestinians. The international significance of Israeli religious radicalism lies in the sustenance it derives from its followers and supporters in the United States. It is not perceived to threaten western strategic interests; it reinforces the status-quo rather than destabilise it.

The genesis of Islamic radicalism in West Asia, and its sources of inspiration, is somewhat different. It is, in its origin, a product of introspection on the condition of Islamic societies, and of the conclusion that this condition is the result of deviation from the fundamentals of Islam and from the ideal state which is said to

have existed in the earliest period of Islamic history. Hence the urge to test the legitimacy of the existing political systems with reference to this benchmark, and the effort to change it by violent means if preaching and persuasion did not produce the desired results. The basic ideological framework, when pitted against the authoritarian regimes of West Asia, left little or no margin for peaceful dissent. The social conditions of individual societies, and the marginalisation of liberal forces, add to the complexity of the situation. The Islamist ideology found adherents easily. They discovered in the mosque the only available sanctuary, and in the religious idiom the only language which could be used in relative safety and could be comprehended by the rank and file. It is another matter that this model of change is utopian, is a product of nostalgia, and is unimplementable; also that the Islamist movements have failed to go beyond the protest stage and have as yet produced no viable blueprint for addressing the socioeconomic problems of individual societies. Their resort to violence has brought forth counter violence; their transnational network has sounded a global alarm and their authoritarian ways have abridged the social space necessary for orderly political evolution. The experience of Jordan, however, is encouraging, as is the recent trend in Iran.

Since the stability of West Asia is inextricably linked - at least in the short run - to the stability of the regimes, Islamic radicalism in its present shape has to be seen as a destabilizing factor, notwithstanding the role it may eventually play in inducing these overwhelmingly Muslim societies to evolve avenues for political development, for participatory governance, and for acceptable international behaviour.

The foregoing suggests a region in turmoil. The modern state system in West Asia has yet to reconcile the competing atavistic postures and divergent perceptions. The resultant tensions are aggravated by the centrality of the region in economic and geostrategic terms and the consequent involvement in its affairs of the great and lesser powers. This situation is likely to persist in the foreseeable future; dramatic developments and drastic course corrections, however, are deemed unlikely.

Desirability of Regional Economic Cooperation

Is a more benign prognosis feasible? It has been suggested that greater economic cooperation would lower the barriers of suspicion and further a common stake in mutual prosperity. The focus of such an exercise would be the triangular relationship between Israel, Palestine and Jordan in the first place and subsequently between Israel and the other Arab states in the region. The trouble with such an approach is that on available evidence the West Asian region accounts for only 4.2 per cent of each other's exports and 5.9 per cent of the imports.²⁰ Israel's economic integration with the area would certainly change matters but would be overwhelmingly to Israel's advantage²¹ and would, in the words of an Israeli academic, result in "a virtual Bantustan" being developed on Israel's doorsteps.²² A study by Tel Aviv University in 1994 showed that Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE may buy as much as US\$ 2 billion worth of goods annually from a post-peace Israel.²³ What would attract the Arab states to such a proposition particularly when, politically, Israel's hardline approach to peace talk is all too evident?

The economic road to peace in West Asia has a great deal of potential provided a simplistic and hasty approach is avoided, due allowance is made for the difference in the levels of economic development between Israel and her Arab neighbours, and the political process kept in the lead at all times. The initiative for such an approach lies with Israel and not with the Arabs.

The coming months, and years, will show whether Israel has the will and the wisdom to opt for such an approach. If not, its state-of-siege mentality will persist and its integration in the region, including the all important psychological acceptance and eventual emotional integration, will remain a distant dream.²⁴ The state of war will not, in reality, end, and the peace dividend will be patchy and unenduring.

Conclusion

It is thus evident that most, though not all, of the destabilising

forces influencing the West Asian scene converge in one manner or the other on the Arab-Israeli dispute. Stability in the region, therefore, requires a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement. Only such a settlement will make possible wide-ranging cooperation needed to resolve the problems of water and environment and to create a stake in regional prosperity. This, in itself, would ease the internal tensions of the states of the region and would hopefully pave the way for political reforms aimed at accommodation of diversity. The twin benefits of such an evolution would be participatory governance, and a possible resolution of the problem of the Kurds and of southern Sudan.

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President Clinton's political debt to the American Jewish Community has been the subject of some comment. "It is estimated that 80 per cent Jewish voters supported Clinton. Perhaps more importantly, 60 per cent of all non-institutionalized campaign funds going to Clinton came from American Jewish donors. While these facts may not have enduring long term impact on Clinton's foreign policy, they were bound to have at least some short term impact," Shibley Telhani, "US Policy in Middle East and Arab-Israeli Conflict", *Emirates Occasional Papers No. 7*, ECSSR (Abu Dhabi, 1997), pp. 14-15. The reference is to the Presidential election of 1992.
16. Henry Siegman, "For the Middle East Peace to Advance, America Must Act", *International Herald Tribune*, 4 July, 1997.
17. Mohamed Haikel, op. cit., p. 551.
18. *Financial Times*, 27 July, 1997. The ultra-orthodox Jews (the Haredim) constitute "10% of the population and receive \$ 2 bn a year from taxpayers to fund their schools and political organizations, even though they do not recognize the state of Israel or serve in the army."
19. Hisham Awartani & Ephraim Kleimean, "Economic Interactions Among Participants in the Middle East Peace Process", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 51, no. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 221.
20. *MEED*, 4 July, 1997, p. 3.
21. Mark Tessler, "Israel At Peace With The Arab World", *The Emirates Occasional Papers No.2*, ECSSR, (Abu Dhabi, 1995), p.11 : "With an annual GDP of approximately \$ 60 billion the Israeli economy is more than twenty times larger than that of the West Bank and Gaza, and more than seven times that of the Occupied Territories and Jordan combined."
22. Shalomo Avineri, "Sidestepping Dependency", *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1994), p. 13.
23. *Anti-Defamation League : Beyond the White House Lawn*, n. 7, p. 53.
24. The domestic implications of peace for Israel also need to be assessed. Tessler feels that the "advent of peace between Israel and Palestine would leave the division between Arabs and Jews inside Israel largely unchanged, improving relations in some important aspects but sharpening problems and contradictions in others and, in the end, leaving this important social cleavage as deep and potentially troublesome as ever", op. cit., p.27.

STRATEGIC INDICATORS

Country	Population million in 1993	Population doubling year	GDP 1993 US\$ in billion	Military exp. US\$ in million 1994	Military exp. as %age of GDP	Perceived primary threat
Bahrain	0.5	2021	-	246	5.5	Internal
Egypt	60.3	2028	35.8	2641	5.9	Internal
Iran	64.2	2025	107.3	2237	3.8	External
Iraq	19.5	2017	-	2628	14.6	Internal & External
Israel	5.3	2043	69.7	6543	9.5	External
Jordan	4.9	2011	4.4	422	7.1	External
Kuwait	1.8	2195	22.4	3009	12.2	External
Lebanon	2.8	2023	-	301	4.4	External
Oman	2.0	2010	11.7	1854	15.9	-
Qatar	0.5	2029	-	294	3.8	-
Saudi Arabia	17.1	2015	121.5	13917	11.2	Internal & Regional
Sudan	26.6	2019	-	298	3.5	Internal
Syria	13.7	2013	17.2	2358	8.6	External
Turkey	59.6	2030	156.4	5242	3.2	Internal
Yemen	13.2	2011	12.0	401	5.2	External
UAE	1.8	2025	34.9	2055	5.7	External

Annexure II

WATER : AVAILABILITY AND WITHDRAWAL

Renewable resources per capita*				Share of withdrawals**		
Country	1960	1990	2025	Domestic	Industry	Agriculture
Bahrain	NA	NA	NA	60	36	4
Egypt	2251	1112	645	7	5	88
Iran	5788	2152	1032	4	9	87
Iraq	14706	5285	2000	3	5	92
Israel	1024	467	311	16	5	79
Jordan	529	224	91	29	6	65
Lebanon	2000	1407	809	11	4	85
Oman	4000	1333	421	3	3	94
Qatar	NA	NA	NA	36	26	38
Saudi Arabia	537	156	49	7	2	91
Syria	1196	439	161	7	10	83
UAE	3000	189	113	11	9	80
Yemen	481	214	72	5	2	93

* cubic metres per year

** per cent


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
Source : World Resources Institute, World Bank Estimates, MEED data.


**REGIONAL HYDROCARBON RESERVES AND
PRODUCTION (1995)**

Country	Oil Res bn/brls	Gas Res TCF	Oil Prod 000 b/d	Gas Prod BCM
Bahrain	0.2	5	40	7
Egypt	4	22	920	11
*Iran	88	745	3700	35
*Iraq	100	110	550	?
Israel	>1	>1	105	--
Jordan	>1	0.2	95	?
*Kuwait	94	55	2100	6
Lebanon	--	--	--	--
Oman	5.1	25	870	6
Qatar	3.7	250	460	15
*Saudi Arabia	260	185	8900	40
Syria	2.4	7	610	3
Turkey	0.5	0.4	70	--
*UAE	98	205	2485	27
Yemen	4	15	335	--
Total "Big Oil 5"	640	1300	17735	108

* Major oil producing countries.







Insurgency In the North East

Part II

GENERAL K V KRISHNA RAO, PVSM (RETD)

In part I of the article on 'Insurgency in the North East' published in the USI Journal (Jan-Mar, 1998) the following aspects were covered :

- (a) Historical background.*
- (b) Genesis of the Insurgency.*
- (c) Major problems connected with insurgency in the states of Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram.*

In part II the following aspects are being covered :

- (a) Problems connected with insurgency in the states of Tripura, Assam, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh.*
- (b) Suggested measures to restore normalcy in the region.*

Tripura

Tripura was a princely State, which had acceded to the Indian Union at the time of Independence, and its administration was taken over in October 1949. It became a Union Territory on November 1, 1956 and a full-fledged State on January 21, 1972.

The predominantly tribal population of the State was swamped by the influx of large numbers of migrants who were forced out from the then East Pakistan, and the demographic balance had been upset to the extent that while migrants constitute about two-thirds of the population, the tribals have been reduced to one-

Excerpted from the text of the National Security Lecture - 1997, delivered at the USI, New Delhi on 12 December 1997.

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third of the population of the State. Further, although the tribals have about two-thirds of the area, the one-third land under occupation of the migrants is more fertile. The tribals are very poor, illiterate and backward; and do not have much representation in government services. In June 1967, the various tribes joined together and formed a party known as the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS), to fight for the tribals. They demanded an autonomous district council under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, adoption of Kokborak as official language, restoration of tribal lands earlier alienated, and larger plan allocation for speedy development. In 1970, it was felt that only armed action would secure their demands and a Tripura Sena was formed for the purpose. Subsequently in December 1978, the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) was formed, with the aim of securing independence for Tripura by armed action. As no redressal could be obtained, and as the tribals were not satisfied with the Seventh Schedule status given to them by the State Government in March 1979, tension kept building up and violence was resorted to in 1979-80. Non-tribals were attacked, police stations were ransacked, communications were disrupted and an atmosphere of terror was created. The Army was inducted in June 1980 and the situation was brought under control. The militants escaped into the adjacent Chittagong Hill Tracts. A faction of the militants known as the All Tripura Peoples Liberation Organisation (ATPLO) surrendered.

In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the militants reorganised themselves and started carrying out depredations into Tripura. Hrangkhawl became the President of the TNV and continued terrorising the people, while persisting with his demands for independence.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi acceded to the legitimate demand of the tribals for the creation of an Autonomous District Council under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and the Council came into being in July 1985. While TUJS was satisfied with this fulfilment of the long standing demand, the TNV persisted with its demand for independence and continued with its depredations. The State Government was reluctant to take firm

measures and the killings by the militants kept increasing particularly in 1987. There was clamour among the public for strong action and for elections to the Legislative Assembly to be held on the due date in early 1988. The Central Government intervened and declared the entire State of Tripura as a disturbed area on January 29, 1988; and inducted the Army to deal with the situation. The Army along with para military forces carried out vigorous operations and soon brought the situation under control. Elections were held in February 1988 and a Congress-TUJS alliance Government replaced the Communist Government which ruled the State for about ten years.

Subsequently, in May 1988, the President of the TNV indicated his willingness for negotiations with the Centre, under the Constitution. After protracted negotiations, a satisfactory Agreement was arrived at on August 12, 1988. In accordance with this, the TNV came overground and laid down their weapons. However, there are persistent complaints that the Agreement has not been implemented, in the way of resettlement of the militants, restoration of tribal lands, development of the tribal area, solving unemployment problem, and so on.

In the subsequent elections to the Legislative Assembly in 1993, the CPI(M) with its allies came back to power. New militant organisations have since come into being and there has been a resurgence of militancy in the State. These are National Liberation Front of Tripura(NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). It is clear that unless the tribals are satisfied that their legitimate interests are being cared for, trouble will continue in Tripura.

The insurgent groups in Tripura have been indulging in kidnapping, killing, intimidation, extortion, and other violent activities. They have been operating from secure bases in Bangladesh, although the Bangladesh authorities deny giving any formal support to these groups. There is also the allegation that these groups enjoy political patronage. The border needs to be better guarded. The Civil Administration needs to get a better grip on the situation.

Apart from the various problems mentioned earlier, it may be reiterated that Tripura is one of the poorest States, with inadequate infrastructure, recurring floods, inadequacy of power and considerable unemployment. The ethnic problem aggravates the situation. Unless these root causes are attended to effectively, permanent peace cannot be expected in Tripura.

A connected issue is the future of fifty thousand Chakma refugees who migrated to Tripura in 1986, owing to repression in Bangladesh. While some have returned, many are still staying in camps in Tripura and are awaiting repatriation.

Assam

From the 13th Century till the British conquest, Ahoms from Thailand and Burma, who invaded the region, ruled Assam. The Ahoms assimilated themselves with the local people and the Assamese are proud of this Ahom period, as they resisted the Moghuls. After the British conquest, Assam became part of Bengal Province. In 1874, Assam was made a separate Province, with its capital at Shillong. The Assamese feel that they were dominated by the Bengalis, and therefore, entertain a certain amount of antagonism towards them. Since Independence and particularly during the Pakistani rule over the then East-Pakistan, a number of people were forced out or migrated to Assam and settled down there. In the 1977 Assembly Elections, when many non-Assamese were elected to the State Assembly, the indigenous Assamese got apprehensive and started an agitation in July 1979 for the eviction of the 'foreigners'.

The All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) led the agitation with the following demands :-

- (a) Detection of foreign nationals since 1951 as per the Constitution and Laws of the land including Citizenship, Passport and Foreigners Acts, framed and adopted under the Constitution.
- (b) Deletion of foreigners' names from voters lists before any

election was held in Assam (the Parliamentary elections were due in November 1979).

(c) Deportation of foreign nationals to their country of origin. If deportation was not feasible, they were to be equitably distributed all over the Country including Assam.

The Assamese demanded that the process of detection should be started from 1951 onwards with the help of National Register of Citizens (NRC) 1951 and voters lists of 1952, which were prepared on the strength of the 26th January 1950 declaration which was used in the past to identify foreign nationals in Assam. The Government of India was agreeable to use 1971 as the base year for detection of foreigners, but this was not acceptable to the Assamese who insisted on 1951 as the base year. The agitation launched by the AASU and AAGSP Combine was initially peaceful; and they even appealed to the Army not to use its guns against the volunteers of the Movement, whose sole objective was to protect Assam and so to protect India's sovereignty and independence. The agitation gathered momentum fast and by the end of November 1979, all organs of the Government were infiltrated into, oil production and distribution were taken over by them, NEF Railway took orders from them, transport was controlled by them, AIR Gauhati was broadcasting their programmes, local media was fully supporting them and nobody dared to challenge them in the State, having been terror stricken. They ran a parallel government, as Sheikh Mujib did in the former East-Pakistan. The State Government lost control and President's Rule was imposed in December 1979.

In January 1980, the agitationists resorted to mass violence and terrorism in Nalbari, due to which many people were murdered and about fifteen thousand refugees had to be moved to relief camps. The minorities lost confidence and separated themselves from the agitation. The Army was moved in and given responsibility for internal security from March 28, 1980. The State excluding North Cachar District was declared a disturbed area, and the Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955 and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 were promulgated on April 6, 1980. The Gauhati High Court stayed the implementation of this notifi-

cation on April 8, 1980 but later they modified the stay order partially and enjoined that the stay would remain in respect of Section 4 of the Assam Disturbed Areas Act and Sec 4A of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act. This partial stay constrained the powers of the forces to a considerable extent and put them at a serious disadvantage. Subsequently, the Government had to approach the Supreme Court for necessary relief. During this period the Army was also given responsibility for flushing and production of oil, which they did successfully and which in turn affected the image of the agitators. A popular Government was formed on December 6, 1980, but owing to loss of support in the Assembly, President's Rule had to be once again imposed on June 30, 1981.

A number of rounds of talks were held between the agitation leaders and the Central leaders during the period 1980-83, but no solution could be reached at that time. Elections had to be held before March 1983 to fulfil the constitutional requirement. The agitationists indulged in intimidation and assassination of prospective candidates, threats to government employees against participation in the election process, kidnapping, sabotage and so on. About seventeen hundred lives were lost in the disturbances on February 18, 1983 in Nellie, and other places. However, elections were held in February 1983 and a popular Government under Hiteswar Saikia came to power. With the help of the Army, normalcy was restored, and measures were initiated to prevent further infiltration.

After the assumption of power by Rajiv Gandhi, talks were resumed with the agitationists and an Agreement was arrived at in August 1985, which was announced by the Prime Minister in his broadcast to the Nation from the Red Fort on 15th August. In accordance with the Agreement, January 1, 1966 was agreed to as the base date for the detection and deletion of foreigners; and those foreigners who came to Assam on or after March 25, 1971 were to be detected, deleted and expelled. Effective measures were to be taken for the protection and promotion of the identity and interests of the people, as well as for preventing future infiltration. Subsequent to this, elections were held in Assam and an

Assam Gana Parishad Government under Prafulla Kumar Mahanta came into power.

A terrorist organisation known as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) formed in April 1979 under the leadership of Paresh Baruah, constituted the armed element to support the AASU and AAGSP, in their struggle throughout. The minority communities felt insecure and sought greater protection. The tribal people of the Bodo area, Karbianglong and North Cachar Hills also started demanding separation from Assam. Owing to the alleged inability of the State Government to maintain law and order in the deteriorating situation, the Mahanta Government was dismissed on November 28, 1990 and President's Rule was imposed. The ULFA was banned and the Army was deployed in April 1991 to restore order, which they did. In the following Assembly elections, Hiteswar Saikia came back to power on July 1, 1991. The ULFA restarted their depredations and Army operations had to be resumed on September 15, 1991. There was a split in the ULFA and Paresh Baruah fled away to Bangladesh and functioned from there. Saikia tried during his time to bring the ULFA round, but could only succeed partially.

The AGP Government under Prafulla Kumar Mahanta came back to power in the elections held in May 1996. With this, the insurgent organisations such as ULFA and Bodo Security Force, tried to take advantage of the situation, for their own ends. Insurgency got revived and violence seized hold of the State once again. The ULFA, apart from carrying out the usual depredations, forced out NGOs working for the people, in order to prevent people turning to them for succour. The recent elimination of Sanjoy Ghosh and activating their own front organisations is a case in point. Extortions from Tea Estates forced the Managements to cooperate with the Underground as, allegedly, they could not obtain protection from the Government. In view of the deteriorating situation, the Army had to be called in once again. The Army in turn, found that they were not getting the requisite backing and cooperation from the Government, but instead, all kinds of baseless allegations were being levelled against them. In order to bring about closer cooperation and coordination between the civil and military, the Unified Concept successfully practiced

in Jammu and Kashmir was set up here also, but on a somewhat different pattern. The situation is slowly improving from the law and order point of view but the recent blowing up of the Oil Pipeline and other continued violent activities are a cause for concern and permit no room for complacency. It has to be realised that the Underground organisations built themselves up during this period, with help from other militant outfits such as NSCN, as also from Pakistan ISI which has extended its activities to the North-East also. A concerted effort is required in order to root out insurgency; and this needs much greater cooperation and coordination between the civilian government and the Security Forces.

Separately, some efforts are being made to deal with complaints of non-implementation of the Assam Accord. There were complaints that the Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunals Act 1983 (IMDT), instead of identifying illegal migrants and expelling them, has only resulted in encouraging infiltration of more Bangladeshi nationals. The guidelines of the Election Commission on the electoral status of the progeny of illegal immigrants have been contested and there is a demand for revocation of these. The developmental activities promised under the Accord still remain to be fulfilled. As such, the All Assam Students Union (AASU) has demanded immediate action on these, as well as clause-wise implementation of the Assam Accord. Tripartite talks between the representatives of AASU, the State Government and the Union government are being held to resolve the problem. It is needless to reiterate that non-implementation of such agreements leads to dissatisfaction and becomes one of the causes for resurgence of violence.

The Bodos, a major tribe in North Assam started an agitation in the mid-80s for a separate State, as they felt that they were neglected and exploited by the Assamese and Bengalis. They formed an armed element known as the Bodo Security Force, subsequently renamed National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and resorted to terrorism to secure a separate State of Bodoland, North of the Brahmaputra river. They developed strong bases in Bhutan across the border. Saikia managed to hold talks

with the Bodo Peoples Action Committee and the All Bodo Students Union (ABSU) and an Agreement was signed on February 20, 1993. According to this, formation of a Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC) was announced on December 10, 1993. However, as the population is mixed in a number of villages, and as the non-Bodo population is more than the Bodo population in the area, delineation could not be carried out. The Bodo leaders wanted 515 additional villages to be included, over and above the 2750 villages already notified. Unfortunately, the Accord was arrived at in haste. The Bodo Security Force, the militant wing of the Bodo agitationists has been indulging in killings, explosions, arson attacks on police, and other terrorist acts, and have been demanding a separate State within the Indian Union. The present Government in Assam under Mahanta which came back to power in May 1996 has been making some efforts to resolve the problem by negotiations. Every effort needs to be made to hold elections to the Bodoland Autonomous Council as early as possible, so as to give the necessary measure of satisfaction to the Bodos.

It has been noticed that, apart from the Pakistan ISI extending its activities into Assam and other North-Eastern States, a nexus has also developed between the various insurgent groups such as the ULFA, NSCN, PLA, Bodo Security Force and so on. The situation needs very careful watching.

Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh

In the case of Meghalaya, there has been no significant insurgent activity, but underground groups of the other States do sometimes use the territory for their movements and visit Shillong. Within the State itself, there are some inter-tribal problems, but violence is not resorted to.

As far as Arunachal Pradesh is concerned, with the exception of the Tirap district, the situation is generally peaceful in the rest of the State. The Tirap district borders Nagaland and is used by insurgent groups for transit between Burma and Nagaland. There is also some Naga population, which helps these groups. Here again, a careful watch needs to be kept on the movements and activities of insurgent groups.

Measures to be Taken

The review of the situation in each State, would have given you an idea of the specific measures to be taken in different States. I would like to emphasise that, while relentless efforts are made to put down insurgency, concurrently effective measures should be taken to deal with the root causes of insurgency. Much greater coordination is required of these aspects. Certain other aspects that need attention are covered in the succeeding paragraphs.

Clear Aim, Sound Policy and Holistic Approach

The review would have revealed that a clear aim, a sound policy and a holistic approach are lacking in dealing with the North-East. In most cases, legitimate aspirations of the people, apprehensions with regard to their identity, urge for protection and promotion of their interests, have not been fully appreciated and requisite measures taken. Illiteracy, backwardness, unemployment, a feeling of neglect and lack of concern, and a lack of sense of belonging to the Nation, continue to prevail in the Region, even after fifty years of Independence. Added to these, were exploitation of the people by countries inimical to us. When people ill-advisedly took to arms to obtain redressal of their grievances, force had to be used against them. However, after the situation was brought under control, follow up action on political, economic, administrative and sociological fronts was not taken, or proved to be inadequate. Thus, the process of renewed violence, resurgence of militancy and use of force to counter it, got repeated from time to time. Unfortunately, this cycle continues up-to-date, and will persist in future also, unless appropriate measures are taken. For these, our aim with regard to the North-East should be clear to everyone dealing with it, namely, to bring the people into the mainstream willingly, and thus ensure the integrity of the Nation. To achieve this aim, a sound policy needs to be worked out, which while ensuring that insurgency is controlled and ultimately put down by the Security Forces, concurrently and effectively attends to the root causes that brought about insurgency. As far as approach is concerned, mere dispensation of economic

packages is not good enough! The approach has to be a holistic one, covering all aspects, i.e., political, economic, administrative and sociological, but preferably under a single authority chosen for the purpose by the Centre. The North-East should also be treated as a national problem like Kashmir, and political parties should not indulge in political skulduggery for promoting their own party interests. I would like to reiterate that the North East is of great strategic importance for our country and that we must do everything possible to ensure peace, progress and a contented population with confidence in the Nation that their interests will be protected and promoted. For this, the requisite will, determination and vision are vital.

Agreements

It will be noticed that in many cases, agreements have been arrived at, particularly at the time of Rajiv Gandhi, but there are serious complaints that subsequently, many aspects of these Agreements have not been implemented. Owing to non-implementation, agitations are renewed and more and more demands are made. It would, therefore, be better if agreements arrived at are fully implemented within the time frame envisaged. There should be a proper monitoring system.

Talks

Sometimes, operations are suspended and talks are attempted, when the insurgents are negotiating from a position of strength. Under such circumstances, either national interests have to be sacrificed or the talks fail. Experience has shown that no talks can succeed, unless the insurgents are made to realise the futility of violence and give up armed action. Further, it has also been noticed that, whenever talks are held and agreements are arrived at, a dissident group generally disassociates itself and continues with insurgency. It should be the endeavour to involve all insurgent groups in the talks and get them to go along with the ultimate agreement.

Stability

While most of the States have been having elected Governments by and large, these have not been able to function effectively due to internal dissensions, apart from insurgency. Further in many cases, the duly elected governments have been destabilised by the Centre for various reasons, particularly when the party in power in the State was different to that in the Centre. This has resulted in instability and disturbed conditions. The stability or otherwise at the Centre also has a profound impact on these sensitive States. It is essential to realise that peace is vital for progress and that political stability is vital for peace.

Foreign Interference

One of the main causes for insurgency thriving in the North-East has been interference from countries unfavourably disposed towards the Nation. Diplomacy must play its expected role to eliminate or at least minimise such interference. Since some of the countries involved are themselves suffering from the adverse effect of insurgency in their own areas, it should be endeavoured to obtain their cooperation for a regional approach in dealing with the menace. Further, the influx of infiltrators from Bangladesh must be stopped.

Autonomy

There is a general feeling that there is over centralisation and undue interference from the Centre in these States. The Founding Fathers were wise enough to cater for the apprehensions of the people in these areas with regard to protection of their identity and promotion of their interests, by providing constitutional safeguards. This they did, in order to bring the people into the national mainstream willingly and of their own volition, and not by force. Sometimes there is talk of doing away with these provisions and sometimes these provisions are not observed strictly. It would be disastrous to tamper with the safeguards provided. Further, it must be ensured that requisite autonomy, without detriment to national interests, is provided to the people of these areas, so that they develop according to their genius. In this connection, it

would be worth remembering the guidelines that the first Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru laid down for the development of the tribal areas, particularly with reference to allowing the people to develop along the lines of their own genius and not imposing anything on them. Further, the Prime Ministers themselves must visit these areas more frequently, understand the problems and issue necessary directions for remedial action, as was done by Pandit Nehru and Indira Gandhi, who are fondly remembered by the people of these areas even now. Overall, every effort should be made to bring about greater harmony between the Centre and the States, without compromising on the unity and integrity of the Country.

Intelligence

Past experience has shown that many a time, the State Governments and the Centre were surprised by sudden strikes by the Underground in unexpected places and by the resurgence of insurgency. This shows that intelligence of the activities of the outfits was either lacking or was inadequate. Further, there is a tendency for intelligence organisations of different agencies to function in watertight compartments on their own and trying to indulge in one-upmanship. It is essential that much greater coordination of intelligence activities is carried out, which would enable prior warning to be received by governments, and much more actionable intelligence to be provided to the Security Forces to plan and conduct their operations. It should always be the endeavour to nip the trouble in the bud, before it gets out of control.

Administration

The quality of administration in the region needs considerable improvement, if the area is to catch up with the rest of the Country within a reasonable time frame. For this, it is essential that the administrators selected are of a high calibre and are dedicated. To motivate them to volunteer for service in these difficult areas, liberal incentives should be provided. Further, good work carried out by them should be given due recognition. Financial management, which leaves much to be desired, needs greater attention.

It must be ensured that funds are properly utilised for the purpose for which they are allotted. Constant monitoring in this regard is essential. A perspective Plan covering a reasonably long period of 20 to 25 years should be made for these areas by a committee of experts in consultation with the States concerned. Based on this, Five Year Plans should be prepared. Unemployment is a major problem in these States and needs to be tackled effectively. It should be noted that most of the states in the region have missed the benefit of the early Five Year Plans due to insurgency; and this handicap has to be made good by accelerated development. Further, to ensure that the benefits of development are not diluted, population control should be sincerely attempted.

States' Police

While each State has its own police, effectiveness of this leaves much to be desired. Political interference, inadequate training, weak leadership, lack of motivation are some of the major weaknesses, which need to be rectified. Given the necessary backing and encouragement, there have been cases where some of the police performed well. It should be the endeavour to so bring up the police of these States, that ultimately they are themselves able to deal with law and order effectively. There is far too much use of Army on Internal Security duties, to the detriment of their preparedness for war, their main role, and should be curbed.

Drug Trafficking

By virtue of having a common border with some neighbouring countries, considerable smuggling of narcotics take place in some of the North-Eastern States. This has resulted in not only the local people being addicted to drugs but also subsequent smuggling of drugs to other States. Further, AIDS is spreading fast in some of these areas. These aspects need careful attention.

North-Eastern Council

The North-Eastern Council was set up on August 1, 1972 to make recommendations on matters of common interest, to formulate a coordinated regional plan and to secure a balanced devel-

opment of the area. There is a feeling among the peripheral States that balanced development has not taken place, due to inequitable allotment of funds. The urge for speedy development among the people is indeed legitimate. The functioning of this Council needs greater attention, with a view to creating the requisite confidence among all its constituents. It is felt that the Home Minister himself should be the Chairman and that the States should be represented by the Chief Ministers only, as in any other Zonal Councils. Further, if the Prime Minister himself takes a meeting at times, it will create considerable confidence among the people.

Conclusion

To conclude, the North-East is a strategically vital region. It comprises of numerous ethnic groups, with each concerned about its identity and interests. Due to various reasons, the area remained backward and under-developed. In order to secure their rights, in many cases legitimate, some people allowed themselves to be misled and resorted to insurgency, with the help of countries inimical to us. Influx of migrants from across the borders aggravated the situation. While counter insurgency operations succeeded in restoring law and order, on the political, economic, administrative and sociological fronts, the measures taken remained inadequate, to deal with what are essentially political problems. Further, agreements arrived at in the past have not been fully and sincerely implemented. The area, therefore, remains in turmoil. The tendency to neglect the area, perhaps because of the very limited number of seats available to the Region in Parliament with which they can exert influence on national affairs, must be overcome. The vital need for maintaining peace and meeting the legitimate aspirations of the people in order to secure the unity and integrity of India, cannot be over emphasised. For this, a clear aim, a sound policy and a holistic approach are essential.

Myanmar : The "Strategic Hub" of the 21st Century Asia

SWARAN SINGH

Introduction

With a land mass approximately equal to France and Britain combined and twice the size of Vietnam, Myanmar is the second largest member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It has vast natural resources including gas and oil, a long coastline, and other ingredients of becoming the next Asian tiger.¹ It is this potential of Myanmar that has compelled ASEAN, the United States and Japan to change their decade-old policy of boycott and come to terms with the military regime in Yangon.² Myanmar can be described as a poor country which has begun developing infrastructure and whose 'open door' policy has begun to attract foreign investments.

In the post-Cold War world, it is Myanmar's strategic location as a bridge between China, India and other nations of South East Asia that makes it central to the peace and prosperity of this region comprising China's provinces of Tibet, Yunan and Sichuan, Indian states in the North-Eastern region, as also much of Bangladesh, Thailand and Bhutan. Myanmar forms the axis where most rail-road highways, waterways and gas and oil pipelines are going to cross each other. The Malacca Straits, through which shipping destined for East Asia must pass, lies south of Myanmar's tide-waters and this obtains Yangon an easy access to this important choke point between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In the future, as Asian countries begin evolving closer inter-regional relations, Myanmar is going to increasingly play the "strategic hub" and can either facilitate or hinder their mutual rapprochement.

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Strategic Location

Geographically, Myanmar occupies a strategic position. Traditionally, its major cities and lines of communications follow the North-South flow of its mountain ranges, valleys and rivers. And this topography between the soaring mountains of Tibet and Yunnan, the South Asian archipelagos and the Indian subcontinent is girdled with mountain systems which ensures Myanmar's security and peace against unwanted external interference.³ This advantage has been further heightened by Myanmar's closer ties with China. This has helped Yangon's military junta in bringing under control the Upper Burma Region. This also helped the military regime to stay in power during the last ten years.

For centuries Burma had offered southern China a trade outlet on the Indian Ocean. It also worked as a springboard for the spread of Indian culture amongst East Asian nations in ancient times. However, its successive ruling regimes continued to defy all attempts by these two Asian giants to obtain direct control over Myanmar and it often succeeded in using one against the other. In the modern times, however, it obtained global significance, which was first evidenced during World War II when both the Axis and the Allied powers used Myanmar to consolidate or defend their positions in the Southern Asian region and expand into the larger Indian Ocean region. According to military historians, while the successful Japanese closure of the Burma Road had resulted in "completing the Japanese blockade of China, it was Myanmar that provided the exclusive land route for the Allies to the Nationalist Chinese regime in Chungking. Conversely, Japanese control over Myanmar had threatened Britain's control of her great empire in India."⁴ Justifying Myanmar's strategic significance in their war efforts, American Lieutenant General, Joseph W Stilwell, spent the next four years in regaining the Allied control over Burma.

Myanmar's strategic significance was not debated in public as long as it remained part of the British Indian empire. However, during America's anti-Communist struggle of the 1950s, Myanmar was used as a sanctuary for the Koumintang forces fighting against

Mao's communists and later the old British formula of growing opium was put to use against the Chinese for a second time. During this period, Myanmar was considered by the Western democracies to be an Asian 'domino' of as much value as Thailand or Vietnam. Myanmar's strategic importance for the West declined following Mao's consolidation of power. After taking over power in 1962, General Ne Win decided to withdraw into self-imposed isolation. It was only in 1988 with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) coming to power that Myanmar once again emerged as an important factor in regional security calculations of most Asian powers.⁵ The SLORC has developed close ties with China.

China's Influence Declines

Beijing's patronage has been an important factor in bringing Myanmar back to the regional mainstream. In the late 1980s trade sanctions were imposed on China and Myanmar following their attempt to suppress pro-democracy movements in their respective countries. The two pariah countries became strategic partners out of necessity. They revived the ancient Asian channels of communication and their trade routes which resulted in the spread of opium and heroin making their nexus a major concern for even the global powers. China's increasing indulgence in developing Myanmar as its strategic outpost has posed problems of security for other neighbouring countries.

During the 26 years of General Ne Win's self-imposed isolation (1962-1988), the China connection had survived through Beijing's support to the Communist Party of Burma and to other ethnic rebels who virtually ruled as a parallel state in Upper Burma. Later, this came to a halt with the SLORC regime choosing to evolve direct state-to-state ties with China thus facilitating Beijing's reach to the length and breadth of Myanmar. Also, keeping in mind that Tibet, Yunnan and Sichuan provinces of China have generally lagged behind in economic boom, China has lately been working towards using Myanmar for mutual benefit by developing infrastructure in the Sino-Myanmar border region. Despite being prone to earthquakes, China has cleared a propos-

al establishing a 30,000 square mile Sino-Burmese economic zone around Delong prefecture of the Yunan province on the basis of its "strategic importance" with the "hope to develop China's first sea outlet in the south to Asian countries and to the Mekong delta."⁶ China is involved in upgrading and expanding cargo-handling facilities at Myanmar's five major ports and building a major naval base on Haingyi Island at the mouth of the Bassein River and a major surveillance base on the Coco Island which has strategic implications for this region.⁷

China was not the only external power seeking to influence Myanmar's military regime. Despite American denunciations following the massacre of 08 August 1988, US corporations invested over \$ 250 million in Myanmar during the 1988-92 period.⁸ By comparison, US investment during 1970-88 was only \$ 158 million. Later it has been as high as \$ 768 million for 1995-97.⁹ Following the August 1995 visit to Myanmar by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ms. Madeleine Albright, foreign investment by multinational companies (MNCs) has increased substantially. Japan was the first to release \$ 1.6 billion in aid that it had withheld since 1990.

The SLORC regime has also been trying to gradually come out from China's excessive indulgence and to evolve lasting networks with other Asian countries. Its efforts have resulted in a major change in regional perceptions about Myanmar's future profile. Myanmar became a member of ASEAN on 23 July, 1997. She has opened border trade with India, Nepal, Thailand, Laos and Sri Lanka. There have been proposals in SAARC meetings to include Myanmar as part of South Asia. It has obtained observer status at the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand (BIST) Economic Cooperation Group which was formed in May 1997. There has also been another Thai proposal of January 1996 for setting up a Bay of Bengal Rim Community which will comprise of Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Thailand.¹⁰

The Indian Connection

Apart from India's traditional role in Burma's culture and commerce from ancient times, it was actually part of British India

for 62 years since 1886.¹¹ From that year until 1923, the administrative set up in Burma was not even that of a province. Only in 1923 it was given the status of a province of India.¹² The annexation of Burma to India led to the influx of a large number of Indians into Burma. They gradually dominated the Burmese economy and bureaucracy.¹³ This resulted in a backlash against the Indian community when Myanmar obtained its independence from the British, and the Burmese elite tried their hand at nation-building.

Following their independence, relations between the two countries generally remained friendly. The Indo-Burmese land border was demarcated in December 1967 in the wake of the Sino-Indian border dispute, except that the delimitation of the trijunction between India, Burma and China at Diphir near Rima at the eastern tip of the McMahon Line was left open until India and China had arrived at a settlement. An agreement on the delineation of the maritime boundary between the two countries was initialled in March 1984. With the enactment of the new Citizenship Law (1982), the problem of the undefined status of some people of Indian origin in Burma has been largely solved but the problem of compensation to Indians who left Burma during 1963-67 has not yet been resolved. Another problem that continues to engage the attention of both governments is the problem of rebel Nagas, hostile Mizos and Tripura extremists operating along the Indo-Burma border from the areas controlled by groups hostile to the Burmese government.¹⁴

From the early 1990s, New Delhi's good-neighbourly ties began to be overshadowed by Beijing's increasing influence in Yangon's decision-making. The local Chinese opium-growers who traditionally controlled Upper Burma had begun to expand their control over Myanmar's growing and opening economy. Two more factors affected the relations. First, India's continued policy of strong support for the pro-democracy movement of Daw Aung Suu Kyi resulted in New Delhi's decision to shun any reconciliation with the military junta for a long time. Secondly, China's indulgence was no longer limited to culture and economy but extended to Myanmar's politics, decision-making and foreign policy.

It is only recently that, alongwith the rest of the world, India has realised Myanmar's strategic profile in the 21st Century Asia. After the 1993 visit by the then Foreign Secretary, JN Dixit, India opened its first border post at Moray (near Imphal, Manipur) where trade has been flourishing ever since.

Three more trade centres (weekly bazaars) were earmarked on each side for free trade.¹⁵ The Indian Government has adopted a more proactive approach and has sanctioned large sums for infrastructure development in the North-East as also for building roads into Myanmar. While China's influence has declined in recent years, India has had some success in opening its trade and commerce with Myanmar.

Myanmar's "Open-Door" Policy

Having been kept closed during the 26 years of General Ne Win's rule (1962-1988) the SLORC opened up to the outside world and undertook economic reforms. According to the statistics the economy had been declining for the last three years since 1985-86. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined in real terms by 15.2 per cent and per capita income by 20.5 per cent. By 1987, the country's foreign exchange reserves had dwindled to US \$20 to 30 million. This forced Myanmar to apply for the status of least developed country at the United Nations.¹⁶ Compared to this, the Fourth Four Year Plan 1992-1996 achieved an overall growth of 8.25 per cent compared to its modest target of 5.1 per cent. Myanmar's gross foreign investments went up from Kyat 27.6 billion for 1991-92 to Kyat 71.7 billion for 1995-96 which accounts for over 50 per cent increase. Accordingly, in their Fifth Four Year Plan 1996-2000, the focus is on creating a more diversified economic infrastructure conducive to the emergence of a modern market economy. The GDP, for example, is expected to grow by about 6 per cent per year and rise from Kyat 68.5 billion for 1997 to 91.8 billion by the year 2000.

The SLORC appears to be more liberal than earlier governments. Its shift towards "open-door" appears to have become both the cause as also the consequence of increased diplomatic

recognition. Yangon has been projecting its unspoiled long coastline, numerous historical sites and opportunities in the field of aquaculture that offer attractions in terms of environment, tourism and food production. According to Myanmar fishermen, theirs is the only country where fish die of old age. To cite its intangible assets, Myanmar has the advantage of having a legal system based on English law and a non-aligned foreign policy which provides a familiar environment for foreign businessmen who are not much concerned with domestic political issues unless these threaten their operations. Moreover, internal situation is now under control which is beneficial for economic development.

The SLORC had enacted the Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law in November 1988. This law established a Foreign Investment Commission (FIC) which was expected to meet fortnightly and promised to clear fresh proposals within a period of two to three weeks from the date of submission. By the end of 1994, the FIC had approved about 112 projects worth an investment of \$ 3.5 billion.¹⁷ The 1990s also brought about other measures towards transforming Myanmar's formerly autarchic state-planned system into an internationally integrated, market-based one.¹⁸ Myanmar's economy during 1994 grew by 10.9 per cent, although foreign observers believe the actual figure to be closer to 4 to 6 per cent.¹⁹ The number of tourists increased from 5,000 in 1989 to 30,000 in 1994. In January 1998, Myanmar opened up its first Industrial Zone at Mingaladon near Yangon and two more such zones are being developed at Thanlyin-Kyauktan and Hlaingtharya. Myanmar plans to develop 17 such zones in the coming years.²⁰

Asian Highway

The SLORC has decided to open its roads to international traffic and become party to the Asian Highway project of the Economic and Social Council for Asia Pacific (ESCAP). Conceived by 15 countries under the ESCAP in 1959, the 40,000 km long Asian Highway provides linkage amongst 25 member-countries running from Turkey to Singapore. Conceptually, the Asian Highway incorporated links amongst all the capital cities and in-

dustrial centres as also their major inland container depots. This project had been lying incomplete due to non-cooperation from Myanmar. General Ne Win's government had been reluctant to allow international traffic to pass through Myanmar. As a result, the Asian Highway, which was to establish the world's largest road link, remained incomplete after reaching the borders of Thailand and Bangladesh, thus leaving the entire South Asian subcontinent without a land route into South East Asia.

Not much activity was seen until the first road map of the Asian Highway was published in 1976. China joined the Asian Highway project in 1988 and Myanmar followed suit in 1989. This was followed by the seven Central Asian countries joining the project in 1996 leading to some major diversions in the original route-map, thus linking Myanmar to Kunming in the Chinese province of Yunan and to India's North Eastern region besides providing it direct access between Bangladesh and Thailand, as also Vietnam and Laos.²¹ This, in turn, has opened a unique new linkage for inter-regional interactions amongst the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

At a two-day Asian Land Transport and Infrastructure Development (ALTID) Seminar in Dhaka on 4 and 5 January 1997, some of the issues were discussed. Apart from differences on the diversions that have occurred due to the addition of China and Mongolia, issues like the criteria for determination of the routes inside each member country, border-crossing problems, tariffs setting and funding of the project still remain. Most countries have not signed the seven conventions required to facilitate international trade through land routes. These conventions cover even elementary issues such as road traffic; road signs and signals; TIR Carnets; customs on the temporary import of commercial vehicles; customs on containers; the harmonisation of frontier control of goods; and on the contracts for the international carriage of goods by road.²² On the positive side, the ALTID Seminar recommended an alternative route which also runs through Myanmar. Whereas the first Asian Highway links India's

North-East through Sylhet-Dhaka-Tamabil-Yangon, the second route shall connect SAARC and ASEAN through Chittagong-Cox Bazaar.²³ Though the first route remains the priority for ESCAP, it has already initiated a feasibility study on the second route and the issue is also being discussed at the bilateral level between Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Rail, River and Other Linkages

Since 1992, the Asian Highway project of the ESCAP has added the concept of Trans-Asian Railway and put together the enlarged project that has come to be known as the integrated Asian Land Transport and Infrastructure Development (ALTID) Project.²⁴ Similarly, amongst its air links, Myanmar has about 80 airports which can be put to use. Just like Myanmar's old roads and rail links, these are also being revived and are bound to facilitate movement in and around this region. Singapore flies its C-130 Hercules transport planes to Rangoon twice a week which reportedly handles airborne signals intelligence operations in the Bay of Bengal.²⁵ An air service agreement, for example, was concluded on 26 August 1996 between Nepal and Myanmar allowing multiple destination and capacity upto 600 seats per week in each direction for the designated airlines of both the countries. The 4,800 kms long Lancang-Mekong River project, dubbed as 'Oriental Danube', flows through China, Laos, Myanmar and Thailand. It has led to an international water transport boom.

China is keen on strengthening its relations with Myanmar for developing alternate trade routes towards the Indian Ocean. There have been talks about China using the Salween River as an outlet for Yunan's goods into the Andaman Sea in the Bay of Bengal.²⁶ Yunan, in South East China, traded 10,655 tons of goods with Laos, Myanmar and Thailand on the river, and handled 5,083 travellers, in the first half of 1995. China plans to sign agreements with these countries for expanding trade. The feasibility studies have been done.²⁷ These linkages should provide a strong impetus for expanding inter-regional trade which constitutes nearly 50 per cent of Asia's trade per year. Myanmar's

formal induction into ASEAN is bound to bring forth its "strategic hub" role.

There have been proposals for evolving a "SAARC Electric Power Grid" for power exchange between India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar.²⁸ India has an installed capacity of 83,288 MW and has an energy shortage of 7 to 16 per cent between lean and peak seasons. Projections show that due to its ambitious targets for developing nuclear power, India's dependence on importing power is likely to increase. Myanmar is planning to exploit its hydro-power by connecting North Eastern India with its power grids. A beginning is likely to be made with a double circuit of 400 KW.²⁹ Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) has contracted with the Electricity Generating Authority (EGA) of Thailand to supply about 400 mcf per day for their Ratchaburi Thermal Power Station (near Bangkok) leaving about 125 mcf per day for domestic use in Myanmar.³⁰

Gas Pipelines

Gas and oil pipelines are going to play a dominant role, as the energy component of national power becomes increasingly decisive in determining inter-state equations. Myanmar has large reserves of oil and natural gas yet to be explored and exploited. MOGE was established during 1989 and has been inviting foreign companies to establish joint ventures in its onshore oil exploration. In February 1995, MOGE signed a deal worth \$ One billion with Total of France and Unocal of the United States for oil exploration in the Gulf of Martaban where the Yadana oilfields alone are estimated to have reserves of more than five trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

The gas pipeline project has been completed and supply is expected to begin from late 1998, rising optimally to 525 million cubic feet (mcf) per day. The construction of a 669 kilometre pipeline to transport offshore natural gas from Myanmar's Yadana gas fields across its southern peninsula to Ratchaburi power station (near Bangkok, Thailand) has generated prosperity in Southern Myanmar. This pipeline is expected to be extended to

Singapore.³¹ This has resulted in Myanmar developing its uninhabited Heinze Island which falls in the shipping lanes of the French partner Total, which helped in the construction of a helipad to transport equipment to build the pipeline.³² The helipad on this island also extends Myanmar's operational reach for surveillance in the Bay of Bengal.

The Drug Menace

Myanmar's drug warlords continue to pose the greatest challenge to the evolving network for cooperation. Even though much publicity was given to the surrender of Khun Sa in 1996, various smaller groups have replaced his monopoly over the drugs trade. They have established new smuggling channels and routes across the Mekong delta into India. Interception of narcotics is only a fraction of the actual quantum.³³ According to SLORC's statistics for 1997, various agencies captured 22,850 kilograms of opium and 3,400 kilograms of heroin. Over 25,000 acres of illicit poppy plantation was destroyed in the Shan state during November-December, 1997 alone.³⁴ Drug smugglers pose a serious threat with far reaching security implications for the entire region.

There have been accusations of SLORC itself using drug-dollars for financing its military modernisation since the early 1990s. Myanmar shares long and permeable borders with five Asian countries and rebellious ethnic groups. Bangladesh, for example, has about 500,000 Rohingya muslims from Myanmar. According to official records, a total of 51,120 families comprising 250,877 men, women and children arrived from Myanmar between September 1991 and April 1992. The total number of refugees has increased following the birth of 25,811 babies, and 6,962 refugees have since died. But Myanmar has been slow in taking them back and, till January 11, 1997, only 196,688 Rohingya refugees had been repatriated.³⁵ The United States regards it as a serious problem and has been trying both containment as also engagement with Myanmar's military regime.³⁶ Similarly, for other regional powers like India and China, seeking engagement with SLORC can help to control the spread of drugs, weapons, insurgencies

and AIDS and for development of their backward regions adjoining Myanmar.

Narcotics in Myanmar constitute a regional problem requiring an international solution. Being the world's largest exporter of opium, Myanmar's internal situation has major implications for the peace and stability of the region. Drug-trafficking, proliferation of small arms, weaponisation of societies and the resultant violence are accepted as major global problems. The Vienna based United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) had begun its negotiations with representatives of Cambodia, China, Indonesia Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam since March 1991.³⁷ Consequently, a major agreement was signed in July 1997 with Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. Signed under the auspices of the UN Drug Control Programme, it is aimed at providing alternative development and monitoring the poppy crops in areas held by the United Wa State Army.³⁸ All this clearly shows that most neighbouring countries as also the other global powers had come around and adopted the policy of engagement vis-a-vis Myanmar's military regime which should obtain Yangon an important role in defining the future Asian profile.

Conclusion

Known to Indians as *Swaran Bhumi*, Myanmar had always been part of India's geographical consciousness until the colonial invasions from its North West and partition in 1947 made New Delhi myopic to India's Eastern flank. In the 1990s, Myanmar promises to become India's major springboard, as we focus onto the high performance region of South East Asian countries. Myanmar has a critical role in New Delhi's efforts towards implementing its "Look East" policy as also in ensuring peace and prosperity in India's North Eastern region. Myanmar continues to remain a vital component in China's grand strategy of evolving it as a strategic outpost into the Indian Ocean. In the shortterm, the induction of Vietnam has the potential of ASEAN's focus becoming anti-China. This presents Myanmar as the only ASEAN member which does not have any territorial problems with the Chinese. Though China has been quick to improve ties with Hanoi,

Myanmar can still provide Beijing an important platform and a counterbalance in dealing with anti-China sentiment amongst ASEAN.

The Japanese are showing an increased interest in Myanmar's "open door" policy. The same is also true for the United States and the European Union and it is only a matter of time before they decide in favour of adopting *rapprochement* as their policy vis-a-vis Myanmar's military regime.

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Opening the Karakoram Pass

SAHDEV VOHRA

The Karakoram Pass and the Leh Kashgan route through it were on the main highway of trade in the Nineteenth Century. It lies closed and there is a case for resuming it now that there is a thaw in Sino-Indian relations over the border differences. The main population of North-Eastern Turkestan termed Sinkiang (meaning 'New Dominion') is the Uigur Turki people of the Islamic faith. They populate its northern part adjoining Kazakhstan and the Mongolian republic as well as the base of southern Sinkiang, including the historic cities of Kashgar, Yarkhand and Khotan. The Uigurs at present have some grievances as have the Tibetians, complaining in effect, that they are second class citizens in their own land - all the important lands and all the key positions in the economy, political, military hierarchies being held by people of the Han race. This is a matter for the Chinese to resolve. As far as we neighbours are concerned, we would stand to gain mutually by the reopening of the Karakorum Pass trade route.

At present the occupation of the Aksai Chin and the adjoining areas by China, from 1950 to 1962 in the instalments on the East, and the attempted occupation of the Siachen Glacier by Pakistan in the West have constricted access to the Karakoram Pass, and beyond it to Kashgar and other trading centres in Sinkiang. The area in our possession is vital for the Ladakh region as the Siachen glacier is the source of the Nubra River and its adjoining glacier to the East, the Remo, is the source of the main Shyok River as well as Yarkand River flowing North to Sinkiang. The economy of Sinkiang and Ladakh will no doubt benefit from the reopening of the old route here.

The Uigur people numbered 3.64 million in 1953, according to the Chinese. They live chiefly around the Tarim Basin. Accord-

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ing to an American writer, Shabad, the Ugurs had once ruled in Mongolia but were driven out in the Nineteenth Century by the ancestors of the present day Kirghis. The main River of Sinkiang, Tarim, is fed by major streams from the mountains to the South - Khotan, the Yarkand and Kashgar, and the Aksu River. The capital Urumchi is linked to Korla on a North-South route across the Tien Shan mountain system. It connects the northern part of the state with the important centres of Kashgar, Yarkand and Khotan. A southern road at Karghalik was built in 1957 linking it with Rudog in Tibet. (This reference is probably to the road passing through Aksai Chin).

The Chinese colonised the borderlands of North Sinkiang with Han soldiers, in close knit colonies to form a defence line in order to safeguard the dominion against the access from Kazakhstan. Today, the Han people constitute a major element in urban centres like the capital Urumchi, where they run business, industry and administration, particularly the new economic activities that have been installed since 1949 when the communist government occupied Sinkiang. The Ugurs still remain in the same state as before 1949 and feel aggrieved at being deprived of a proper part in the economic resurgence that has taken place. (The first atomic test was carried out by the Chinese in 1964 at Lop Nor in East Sinkiang. The area is a major testing centre for atomic devices).

The Chinese first came into the region before the end of the Christian era. The North Eastern part called Zungaria was however occupied successively by the the Sakas and by the white Huns (Epithalites) and the Chinese withdrew. The area South of Takla Makan desert was, in ancient times, flourishing, fertile and with a large population. A Hindu kingdom existed at Khotan and later the Buddhist monastries flourished in large numbers.

Hieun Tsang stayed there in the Seventh Century AD and mentions that large numbers of monks practiced religion and learning there. In 1901, Sir Gurel Stein carried out excavations at Oriya, Lou-Lan and other sites. Due to the desecration that has taken place in the subsequent centuries, the air was dry and the

remains were preserved in their original condition. He found evidence of a large administrative machinery and books and other compilations of writings in Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese and other languages. He brought out of the country silk tankas, paintings, hangings and other religious and artistic finds testifying to a flourishing and long continuing civilisation in Southern Sinkiang. Later, French and German excavations showed the existence of colonies of this civilisation in North Sinkiang as well. The so called silk route used two alternative ways through Sinkiang, one via Khotan in the South to Kashgar, the other via Turfan. Kashgar was the major mart before merchandise moved across the Pamir Region. Here again, the route bifurcated. Ptolemy mentions the Alai route across the Pamirs and the southern branch via Sarikol and Wakhan which is testified by Hieun Tsang.

Recent archaeological excavations have brought to light mummies in an excellent state of preservation. These show that there were Indo European people living in Sinkiang besides the Turkic Uigurs. A perfectly preserved mummy of a woman has perfect features of a classical type and show her to be an Indo-Aryan. The Uigurs have taken to it with enthusiasm and she has been named the mother of Uigurs. Other well preserved male mummies are interesting because their dress and horse riding equipment is the same as in use today. Their conical head dress is the same as are the felt boots, besides the horse riding accessories, thus giving proof of a remarkable continuity of the past into the present.

The Nineteenth Century trade over the Karakoram Pass from Yarkand in Sinkiang to Leh in Ladakh and from there into India, was a tradition of long standing. The British were tempted to find an alternative route via Aksai Chin as they wished to avoid paying taxes to the Kashmir Durbar. They established wool centres at Rampur Bushaur and at Sabathu in the hills, with shawl making being done at Ludhiana and Amritsar. The British settlers were given large areas in Kulu-Palampur area to grow tea for this trade and tea gardens were established by them. Ultimately, the Aksai Chin route was given up as untenable.

The Karakoram Pass route continued to be the main artery of trade. Another route from Gilgit and Hunza across the Mintaka Pass to Sarikol in Sinkiang was used by officials, now rebuilt as the Friendship Highway. Traders were subject to looting and plundering by the Kanjuts of Hunza, whose business was to waylay the caravans. The British made sure that these attacks were stopped by keeping Hunza under vigilance. The Chinese also claimed suzerain rights over Hunza as they had allowed Kanjuts pasture rights and the rights of collecting salt from Raksam and Taghdumbash Pamirs across the Karakoram range. The British tried to settle the dispute by offering an alignment in 1899, which tried to satisfy both the Chinese claim and the Hunza, i.e., of the British themselves. This was not responded to by the Chinese because they preferred to keep such disputes in abeyance, when they were weak. They were prepared to wait for the time when it would be ripe for negotiation from a position of strength. Hence the problem remained a legacy of history, till 1949, in the words of Chinese diplomacy.

In 1963, the Chinese made a treaty of interim nature with Pakistan over this boundary segment which gave the Shaksgam area to China, thus making China a neighbour of Siachen. They also built a road from Yarkand to Islamabad, called the Friendship Highway, which is used for a certain amount of bulk movement and passenger traffic. The road passes through a most difficult terrain, is at times perilous, and cannot form a substitute for trade via Karakoram Pass. Hence, the plea for opening the Leh route. We are negotiating other routes with Tibet, via the Himalayan Passes. We should do so for the only comparable route to Sinkiang also.

The Arthashastra – Kautilya's Scholarly Treatise on Statecraft

BRIG A S APTE (RETD)

Introduction

This article focuses on a representative sample of the wisdom of ancient India while stressing that many of the Kautilyan principles of management are valid even today. When, for instance, we talk of battlecraft, we think of the 18th century Clausewitz or the 19th century Moltke or even Fuller of the 20th Century. When we think of the art of management, names such as Peter Drucker and Northcote Parkinson flash through our minds. However, these are the men of today's world which has advanced tremendously in every field since the days of Kautilya, an epitome of all these experts, and many more, rolled into one. As classical India's greatest thinker, his genius is reflected in his comprehensive treatise on management of every aspect of statecraft including the art of war of his time - around 321 BC, ie, over 2300 years ago when his world was very different from ours.

Kautilya's Background

Vishnugupt, belonged to the 'Kautilya' gotra, and hence known as Kautilya, but, being the son of a man called Chanak, he was also popularly known as Chanakya. Born and educated in the university town of Taksha-Sheela in Gandhar in the North-West frontier of India, he travelled all the way to Pataliputra in Magadh (today's Bihar) in Eastern India with a view to win laurels and honours through the display of his knowledge in philosophic debates. There is little doubt that he was an egoist fully aware of his cerebral supremacy over the others.

This was the time when the State was under the rule of a

Brig A S Apte's interest centres around the fundamental scriptures of different religions and analysis of defence related matters.

despot, the son of a barber, who having seduced the queen, had assassinated the king and the princes, and installed his son -- Nanda -- as the king of Magadh. Debauched and arrogant, Nanda, who was hated by his subjects for his greed and meanness, insulted Kautilya who had gone to his court, and had him deported. The incensed Kautilya vowed to destroy the Nanda line especially when he learnt about the background of his ascendancy.

As he wandered disguised as an ascetic searching for a suitable replacement for Nanda, he chanced upon Chandragupt Maurya, a young cowherd, in whom he sensed kingly qualities after observing the way the boy dispensed justice and settled disputes among the village children. Discovering later that the boy was indeed of royal lineage, he took him to Taksha-Sheela and gave him an education fit for a future King. He succeeded in destroying the Nanda dynasty and installed Chandragupt Maurya as the King of Magadh in 321 BC.

Creation of Magnum Opus Arthashastra - Guidelines for Good Governance

Having achieved his aim, Kautilya retired from active life and reflected on all that he had learnt. He was distressed by the condition in which Indian kingdoms were left after Alexander's invasion for want of a sound system of ruling and guarding against external aggression. His profound knowledge of statecraft, his deep desire to set guidelines for rulers and his conviction that the earlier works on these matters were unsatisfactory in many respects, motivated him to create his 'magnum opus'.

Kautilya admits in his treatise that there were other 'arthashastras' before his (by Ambhi, Brihaspati, Bhardwaj, Parashar and so on) and that he was not the originator of the science, but at the same time, he asserts that he disagreed with much of the content of some of them and that his work is a refined and improved treatise incorporating his own ideas.

Unfortunately, all the earlier works were lost in antiquity and Kautilya's is the earliest book that has come down to us. Indeed, the first full text - 5600 sutras in prose and 380 in verse -- on

palm leaf, came into the hands of Dr Shama Sastry of Mysore only in 1904. He published not only the text but also an English translation in 1915. Subsequently, another original manuscript was discovered. Then followed numerous translations and commentaries in Indian and foreign languages by Indians and foreigners (mainly German and Russian). Scholars are of the view that Kautilya possessed a sharp intellect and skills.

The Indian Philosophy and Statecraft

In the context of Indian philosophy since the Vedic times, there are four aims to be achieved through human enterprise namely, *dharma* (moral duty and just behaviour), *artha* (wealth), and *kaama* (worldly pleasures), whose proper pursuit results in the achievement of the fourth and the ultimate goal of *moksha* (salvation). Therefore, although 'artha' literally means wealth, Kautilya employs it in a much wider sense encompassing the governance of a country through observance of *dharma* (justice) while following the management techniques and skills he prescribes in order to uplift the material status of its people. An important part of the Arthashastra, therefore, is the science of economics, including the setting up of productive enterprises, refining taxation methods, improving revenue collection, and so on.

Creating surpluses in the state treasury, while maintaining balance between the welfare of the people and augmenting resources, presupposes maintenance of internal law and order, defence against external aggression, waging war against another state for material gains and related diplomacy, politics and peace treaties. In the larger context, therefore, Arthashastra also involves framing of rules for proper regulation of the society in order to guide human behaviour on the right track.

Here it would be relevant to mention that such rules - whether incorporated in the scriptures or covered in the post-scriptural literature were codified centuries after Kautilya. Even the Manu-Smriti was compiled almost four centuries after the Arthashastra.

Indeed, the spectrum spanned by Kautilya's Arthashastra is so wide that one gets a feeling that such a book could not have been written by anyone who did not have the opportunity to test the validity of his teachings in practical life. The picture that emerges is that of a well-run state, prosperous and bustling with activity. But this picture is ideal; the reality could have been very different, for, as we all know, there were also kings who impoverished their subjects, and dishonest officials who cheated and robbed the people. Therefore, one must keep in mind the fact that Kautilya was writing a text book for the kings (today's prime ministers and their team-mates in democratic countries) and not a descriptive history of any particular state. The treatise is about an ideal state, not that such a state actually existed then or is even likely to exist in future.

Relevance of Kautilya's Magnum Opus in the Modern Age

Kautilya is relevant even today simply because human nature has not changed and states behave as they have always done. We still have the same distrust of one nation by another, the same pursuit of self-interest by every nation, the same kind of secret service maintained by one nation in the territory of another ... and so on, all of which we find in the Arthashastra. Indeed, Kautilya's teachings are constantly being practised by nations the world over though they may not have heard of Kautilya or his Arthashastra.

All that a modern management student needs to do is to substitute 'the king' with the prime minister, and the 'subjects' with the people, in a democracy. What Kautilya calls the 'interest of the king' would, today, be termed 'national interest'.

Kautilya lays great stress on the welfare of the citizens : "In the happiness of his subjects lies the king's happiness; in their welfare, his welfare. The king shall not consider as good only that which pleases him but treat as beneficial to him whatever pleases his subjects" (1:19:34). Is this universal truth any different today? It certainly does remind me of Field Marshal Chetwode's famous words immortalised in golden letters at the Indian Military Academy which counsel the budding commanders :

- * THE SAFETY, HONOUR AND WELFARE OF YOUR COUNTRY COME FIRST, ALWAYS AND EVERYTIME.
- * THE HONOUR, WELFARE AND COMFORT OF THE MEN YOU COMMAND COME NEXT.
- * YOUR OWN EASE, COMFORT AND SAFETY COME LAST, ALWAYS AND EVERYTIME.

Besides emphasis on people's welfare and impeccable powers of logic and analysis, Kautilya's most striking feature is his attention to the minutest details. While on the one hand, he draws a broad outline of the duties and perks of a king, his ministers and other officials, or talks of the comprehensive principles of war, on the other hand, he never fails to lay down his detailed instructions even on such apparent trivia as the ration scales for different kinds of animals or punishments prescribed for false documentation or cruelty to wife. Obviously, he was already aware of the dictum : "For want of a nail ... the kingdom was lost."

In its detail, whether on the code of penalties or battle formations or householder's duties, the Arthashastra, I felt, may be only of historical and academic interest in view of the changed times, but when he discusses management in the fields of economics, administration, inter-state relations and corruption-free politics, we can learn from his wisdom even in present times.

Flexibility in Approach

Kautilya recommends a flexible approach in following his teachings. His advice may be modified to the extent that any of the constituent elements of a state differ from the ideals he has set out. He lays down a rule simply as a general guide and recommends its modification to suit the prevailing conditions. In being so comprehensive, he only follows his own advice that every situation ought to be analysed thoroughly before an action plan is formulated; good counsel and good judgement are more important than power and might.

The Arthashastra contains many interesting examples of Kautilya's ability to provide for every contingency. For instance, he recommends that the forces for the defence of the city should be placed under a number of chiefs, to avoid the possibility of a single chief usurping power in the King's absence (2:4:29-30). A point to ponder : Could that be the reason for creating myriad para-military forces and placing them under a different ministry (the Home Ministry), so as to forestall an imagined coup d'etat by our Armed Forces which are under the Defence Ministry? At another place, he says, that a secret treasury shall be built in a remote area, using only those prisoners condemned to death (2:5:4). The reason, I guess, could be that the sentence was presumably carried out after the work was done, so that none but the king knew where the secret treasury, to be used in times of emergency, was located.

Welfare of the People of Occupied Territory

Basically, Kautilya's practical advice is rooted in the inherent fairness and welfare of the people. The best example of his fairness is his advice on how to treat a conquered territory: "The conqueror shall substitute his virtues for the enemy's vices, and where the defeated enemy was good, he shall be twice as good ... He shall follow policies which are pleasing and beneficial to the constituents by acting according to his *dharma* and by granting favours and tax exemptions, giving gifts and bestowing honours ... He (ie, the conqueror's officers appointed to administer the conquered territory, I presume) shall adopt the way of life, dress, language and customs of the people and show the same devotion to the gods of the territory and participate in the people's festivals and amusements ... The ill, the helpless and the distressed shall be helped ... "(13:153-15). These guidelines are in themselves a charter of just administration.

Supremacy of National Interests

The Arthashastra is a mixture of what we approve and extol today and what we consider blameworthy and objectionable. While this is understandable because, as a teacher of practical state-

craft, Kautilya had no compunction in advocating unethical methods in furthering national interests, it certainly is at variance with his declared policy of achieving one's aims through observance of *dharma*. Undoubtedly, some of his verses clearly bring out the cynical aspect of his teachings. An example : "A wife who shows excessive grief at the violent death of her husband should be suspected (though not necessarily accused) of having murdered him" (4:7:14).

As per Kautilya, "The King and his rule encapsulates all the constituents of the state" (8:2:1). He often used the term 'king' to signify the state. Besides the king himself, the other constituent element of a state are his group of ministers and principal chiefs, the state territory with its population, the economic power (ie, the wealth of the state), the internal law and order, and the defence forces, not forgetting the allies. All these are amplified throughout the book while never ignoring the apparently trivial but inherently and closely related aspects concerning the need to regulate the social life of the citizens without which no kingdom can survive.

The principal objectives of a Kautilyan state being wealth, justice, and expansion (not unlike today's business houses and industries, or the empire builders of yesteryears such as Britain), the book treats three subjects in great detail, namely, administration, the code of justice and foreign policy.

Administration

Administration covers a very large part of the book and deals with matters like responsibilities of the king and all his officers down to the lowest level, avenues and methods of revenue collection, budgetary control, state and private enterprises in agriculture, industries, mining, public's civic responsibilities, minting of coins, audit and accounts, enforcement of discipline in the civil service, maintenance of law and order, and above all, training of all concerned in all these matters.

Justice

The part dealing with justice covers civil and criminal law and is basically a penal code.

Foreign Policy and Employment of Defence Forces

The main aim of the sections on foreign policy is acquisition of territory by conquest. Naturally, this part is devoted to the maintenance of an elaborate secret service and an efficient war machine. In these sections, the term 'artha' is used in a very special sense, always combined with an adjective, as in : 'aapad-artha' (a risky acquisition); 'an-artha' (a debacle resulting from a wrong acquisition) (9:7:23-53).

Kautilya presumes the frailty of national behaviour in which nations pursue self-interest and distrust of the other nations. In essence, this theory is based on two power blocks -- each with its own allies (and friends of allies) and enemies (and friends of enemies). The USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union are a modern example of this thesis.

Kautilya's ideas and planning and conduct of war have much in common with Clausewitz's dictum 'War is a continuation of policy by other means', and some of our modern principles of war which emerged during the last two centuries as enunciated by Foch and Fuller. For example, Kautilya recommends the use of cavalry and chariots as one of the means of achieving mobility; attacking in the rear as one of the methods to surprise the enemy; generating enthusiasm by pep-talk and reward as a morale-raiser; deception; concentration of force against weak points; good logistical support; welfare of the troops; and so on.

His lessons on war begin at the beginning and culminate in 'action after victory' in a logical sequence. First he deals with the method of avoiding war through diplomacy, psychological means (like instigation of treachery in the enemy camp) and covert means (like clandestinely assassinating the enemy king and his principal leaders). To avoid war, he also favoured subversion, double-

crossing, espionage and counter-espionage, use of women agents and even prostitutes. He favoured war when all other means failed.

Conduct of Military Operations

In the event of inevitability of an open war, Kautilya goes on to dwell at length on all aspects of mobilisation of standing army, territorial army, and even the friendly forces (9:2:1-5). The next step in the logical sequence is the establishment of a well-fortified base camp near the war zone, far away from the capital of the attacker. A well-illustrated sketch describes every detail of the planned defences in the base camp (10:1:1-12). Then follow the detailed instructions on the various aspects of the all-important march, first to the base camp and then again to the battle ground. The order of march suitable for different terrains and for night and day is discussed exhaustively, not ignoring the flank protection and the rear guard.

If attack is planned immediately at the end of the march or if enemy opposition is anticipated enroute, the march is conducted in pre-determined battle arrays (10:2:9), with a double to impersonate the king at the head of the battle formation (10:3:42).

Kautilya seems to prefer symmetry in his arrays, battle formations and even in the mode of advance. Verses 10:6:9-42 dwell wholly on this subject in minutest detail. Looking at Kautilya's symmetry in his mixed arrays consisting of more than one of the four wings of the army (chatur-anga sena) of cavalry chariots, elephants and infantry, in contrast with the 'legion' or the 'phalanx' formations employed in the days of Hannibal and Scipio (who lived almost 150 years after the Kautilyan period), I wonder whether Kautilya's fancy arrays were actually battle-tested or introduced simply for the sake of completeness.

The king shall motivate his men during briefing prior to the battle by declaring : "I am as much a servant of the state as you are. So, we shall share the wealth of the enemy state. Therefore, attack these, mine enemies." So says Kautilya in verse 10:3:27.

The battle over, the victorious king is advised to make peace with the vanquished enemy when the latter is stronger or equal, but, to destroy the weaker king. However, a defeated enemy population is never to be harassed to the point of making its army so desperate that it will return with reckless vehemence. Kautilya is categorical that there shall be no wholesale and mindless massacre of the civil population in the conquered territory, for, "There cannot be a country without people and there is no kingdom without a country" (13:4:5).

In the event of a defeat, Kautilya advises the defeated party to outwit the victor by fulfilling the terms of the treaty, and after abiding his time, to overthrow him. The Germans waited 20 years after the Treaty of Versailles consequent to their defeat in the First World War, and regained strength to wage another World War).

Besides a separate commander for each of the four wings of the Army under the overall command of the C-in-C, there was also a Chief of Ordnance. It is not clear whether he was a service officer or a civilian. I noticed this direction in the long list of his multifarious duties : "He will carry out periodical inspection of all weapons, armour and equipment to ensure its usability at any time. He shall, at all times, know precisely the demand for each type of weapon, the supply available, the distribution to different units, wear and tear and loss in battle and the cost of replenishment" (2:18:1-4 and 20). Surely, it does ring a familiar bell for today's armymen the world over.

Maritime Affairs

A separate section deals with maritime affairs. Among other matters, it mentions many types of ocean-going ships, river craft, fishing boats, etc, and prescribes charges to be paid by merchants for hiring government vessels. Private craft owners were required to pay port charges. Like the government-owned water craft, the ports were also to be under the control of a 'Chief of Ships' (Naava-Adhyaksha). At every port, pilots were to be provided. All ships entering and leaving harbour were required to be

piloted by government pilots at fixed rates. Foreign vessels were to be escorted by armed guards in government pilot craft till they crossed the border or from the border to the port. In the case of ships that had suffered damage due to cyclones and other disasters, port charges could be got waived upto 100 per cent depending on the extent of the damage.

Kautilya set down clear guidelines for confiscating cargo and taking vessels into custody if they carried contraband, if they belonged to the enemy, or if they tried to unload at places other than those specified. In addition to the mercantile marine, the Arthashastra also gives guidelines for the creation of an admiralty.

Conclusion

The Arthashastra, Kautilya's scholarly treatise on statecraft and strategic planning, is a masterpiece. It was compiled more than 2300 years ago, yet it is relevant in most parts even today. It will probably remain relevant for all times to come.

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Viewpoint

The China Threat : How Real Is It?

AIR MARSHAL J ZAHEER, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

The recent statement made by the Defence Minister, Mr George Fernandes, labelling China as a potential threat, has generated considerable debate, mostly supportive. This perception needs to be viewed in a broader global framework for a better appreciation of the strategic realities involved.

Following World War II, China and India had every reason to develop warm relations. But the "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" period regrettably culminated in the totally unexpected (on our part) border conflict of 1962 - and disillusionment.

Although much has since been achieved in normalising relations, serious suspicions persist in many quarters though not entirely without reason. However the more serious, if incidental, casualty of the traumatic experience of 1962 War has been the Indian mindset. This has inhibited its ability to look objectively at the strategic threats as would be perceived from the Chinese viewpoint and as such would have an important bearing on China's long-term ambitions in South Asia in general and in India in particular.

It should not be difficult to observe that the closer China gets to attaining a super power status, the more she becomes a threat to the big players of the Pacific - Russia, Japan and the USA itself. Whatever may be the ultimate power alignments between these four major powers, China's preoccupations on the Pacific front must be expected to severely inhibit the likelihood of adventurism to the South.

All this suggests that India has little cause for paranoia about China at present. It is important for India's future that she does not get dragged into an arms race which could seriously jeopardise the nation-building in which she must remain fully involved for some time to come.

Air Marshal J Zaheer, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) is former Air-Officer-Commanding-in-Chief Maintenance Command.

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

I

Dear Sir,

I have read with interest, Lt Gen JFR Jacob's book *Surrender at Dacca*, which deals mainly with the Army operations in the erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971. A few references have been made, *inter alia*, relating to *INS Vikrant*, the aircraft carrier deployed in the Bay of Bengal to enforce a naval blockade in the area of conflict. Certain inaccuracies regarding the role of the Carrier Task Force have been noted in the text of the book, perhaps due to the non-availability of authentic information on the subject. Therefore it would be relevant to offer my comments, as I was in command of *INS Vikrant* during these operations.

Firing on RAF C - 130 Aircraft

It is stated in the book that "the RAF reported that they had been fired on by the aircraft of the carrier *Vikrant* but fortunately they had missed" (p.134). Factually, *Vikrant's* radar had picked up an unidentified air contact about 200 miles to the East, crossing coast near Cox's Bazar. A combat air patrol of 4 Seahawks was launched, which on contact, identified the intruder as a C-130 aircraft bearing Canadian markings. The Seahawks were then ordered to disengage and escort the C-130 aircraft past *Vikrant's* position.

Abortive Amphibious Operations

The author's suggestion that *Vikrant* did not participate but withdrew from the area of the projected amphibious operations, due to threat from a Pakistan *Daphne* submarine (pp. 125 & 134), is far-fetched to say the least. By the time these operations were ordered, *Vikrant* had precariously fallen low on her fuel state and was scheduled to sail on 14 December to Paradip Port for replen-

ishment, Nevertheless, before departing from the area, *Vikrant* carried out an air photo recce of the beaches as also a final blitz of air strikes to sanitize the area while straining West for Paradip. Thus she had fulfilled her task before pulling out.

Entry of *USS Enterprise* in the Bay of Bengal

Vice Admiral N Krishnan, the FOCINC East is stated to have shared his concern with the author regarding the movement of the US Carrier Task Force in the Bay of Bengal. The Admiral, it is stated, was unconvinced that the Americans would not intervene to evacuate foreign nationals from Dacca (p. 134).

In his book *No Way But Surrender*, Vice Admiral Krishnan had dismissed the possibility of American intervention referring to it as the "flap of the Seventh Fleet" (p. 58). At no point was *Vikrant* cautioned about a possible encounter. The sole information elicited about the movement of the Seventh Fleet on board *Vikrant*, was from a BBC broadcast. I could not believe that the US Navy would try to break up our blockade and get mixed up in a local conflict. Nevertheless, out of curiosity and to ascertain the truth, I decided to steam southwards in a bid to establish an early contact. Nothing came of it and *Vikrant* returned to her patrol area. Later the BBC reported that the US Task Force had headed West for Colombo after rounding the tip of Sumatra. In retrospect, the Indian Navy had kept its cool.

Conclusion

Surrender at Dacca is an exhaustive treatise on the Army operations in the eastern theatre in 1971. The Indian Air Force did us proud to knock out the enemy air within 48 hours of the commencement of the operations. The *INS Vikrant* Task Force was responsible for effectively sealing the area of Army operations from the sea, thus isolating the Pakistan Army from their home-base. Denied of an option to withdraw, the enemy's standing army of 90,000 had no alternative but to surrender.

Yours Sincerely,

Vice Adm Swaraj Parkash
PVSM, MVC, AVSM (Retd)

II

Dear Sir,

I am a Life member of the USI, During the last three years your publications have been reaching me regularly as scheduled, containing articles of general interest to the retired officers and of immense value for the development of the serving officers, especially the younger lot.

I have been approached by Major Philip Mallins and Mr Gordon Graham and informed that a few British and Japanese Officers have got together and instituted in 1995, the Burma Campaign Memorial Library Project at the School of Oriental and African Studies, in London and in Tokyo, with all available literature in English and Japanese on the Burma Campaign 1942-1945.

They are trying to obtain copies of relevant articles and books published in India. As of January 1998 the bibliography is composed of 616 titles. Initially one copy of each of the titles will be placed in London Library and second copy in Tokyo.

Each book will carry an *ex libris* bookplate, acknowledging its source and thanking the donor. As the Libraries approach completion, plates will be sent to all who have pledged donations or bequests, along with a request to send the donated books to both the Libraries directly.

I request members of USI who are in possession of books related to Burma Campaign 1942-45, and are willing to donate or sell these books, should make these available to the Libraries. The immortal and illustrious role of the Indian Army and allied forces in the Burma Campaign will be perpetuated in both Libraries to tell the future generations of the great comradeship which existed between us and which we cherish to this day. They may contact me at :

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Review Article 1

The Services - A Stock Taking*

Lt GEN AM VOHRA, PVSM, IA (RETD)**

A survey of fifty years of history of the Indian Armed Forces provides for an excellent opportunity to review some important aspects of national security. In this light, it would be pertinent to analyse the strategic significance of Kashmir, purely in the context of Indo-Pak security concerns. In the first chapter, "The Formative Years", Ashok Krishna quotes Maj Gen Akbar Khan from the latter's book *Raiders in Kashmir*. Akbar Khan writes,

"One glance at the map was enough to show that Pakistan's military security would be seriously jeopardised if Indian troops came to be stationed along Kashmir's western border... The possession of Kashmir would enable India, if she wished, to take the war to Hazara and Muree - more than 200 miles behind the front. We would remain permanently exposed to a threat of such magnitude that our independence would never be a reality."

India and Pakistan have fought two full-scale wars in 1965 and 1971. No Indian threat or offensive developed from Kashmir. Its mountainous terrain does not permit the launching of mechanised forces and it is not suitable for a war-winning offensive. Operations in Kashmir have been of the nature of holding on to the territory with each side, albeit with local offensives of limited nature such as the Haji Pir Pass. The major offensive both in the 1965 and 1971 wars have been in the plains of Shakargarh-Sialkot or Lahore-Kasur-Khemkaran. The Punjab, and more so the Sind-Rajasthan border, that is the entire border from Pathankot to Kutch provides scope for telling offensive operations. Kashmir,

**India's Armed Forces-Fifty Years of War and Peace*. By Maj Gen Ashok Krishna, AVSM, New Delhi : Lancer Publishers and Distributors, 1998, pp. 181, Rs. 395.00, ISBN 1 897829 477.

**Lt Gen AM Vohra is the former Vice Chief of the Army Staff.

therefore, has little strategic value in the Indo-Pak context.

Apropos the Kashmir War of 1947-48, the author comments on the possibility of evicting "the Pakistanis from the remaining territory under their occupation" had operations been continued with additional forces in the middle of 1948. In this context, it would be pertinent to quote from the official history: *Operations in Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48* (Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1987). On page 276, it records:

"Plans were indeed considered in early November for recapturing Mirpur and Muzaffarabad... The plans required heavy reinforcement of troops, and uninhibited air support for assured success. This would have meant weakening the Indian forces along the East Punjab Frontier with Pakistan which could not be accepted."

Other reasons are also discussed which should set at rest an oft-repeated moan that India was in a position to liberate the entire territory of Kashmir before accepting the ceasefire.

The author carries out a survey of the Ladakh - Tibet border and provides a useful map on page 25 showing various claim lines of which the 1897 Johnson-Ardagh line goes right upto Kuen Lun mountains. A map is also provided of the Eastern Sector on page 28 and there is a brief description of the process of evolution of the McMahon Line. He concludes that by the time the British left India in 1947, there was no agreement on the boundary in the Ladakh region. The Indian government took a unilateral decision based on the forward most claim line - the Johnson-Ardagh line - which included the entire Aksai Chin whereas the only formal proposal made by the British in 1899 was along the Mustagh - Karakoram - Lakhsing Line. This includes the Lingzithang plain on the Indian side but not the north-eastern Aksai-Chin through which runs the Lhasa-Sinkiang highway.

On the question of the eastern border, the author brings out that in September 1951 Chou En-Lai suggested discussions between India, Nepal and China to stabilize the frontier of Tibet but

there was no follow up. During the 1954 negotiations on the representation issue in Tibet, no mention was made, by either side, of the boundary question. In December 1958, Nehru referred the matter of the Chinese maps and Chou En-Lai proposed a mutually agreed survey. Under increasing criticism for "being prepared to give way to China", Nehru maintained that there could be no negotiations about the frontiers claimed by India. China must withdraw from and renounce her claim to Aksai Chin. In proposing negotiation on the basis of actual position on the ground, China appeared willing to accept the McMahon Line in the East if India withdrew its claim to Aksai Chin.

In keeping with this decision, India decided to activate the 'Forward Policy' to block Chinese occupation of disputed areas by establishing small posts in the belief that China would not go to war to solve the border issue. Several Indian battalions were inducted into Ladakh and about 40 posts were established by mid-1962. On 10 July 1962, some 400 Chinese troops encircled the Indian post but withdrew as the Indian post stood firm. According to the author, this was interpreted as confirming the view that China would not risk an open clash.

The author brings out the reluctance of GOC 33 Corps to establish these forward policy posts in the Eastern Sector and the Chinese reaction, on 8 September 1962, to the Dho La post established in the Namka Chu Valley south of Thag La; culminating into the October 1962 War. He narrates the Chinese proposal of a meeting of local commanders to discuss "where the border lay" and Nehru's response to evict the Chinese south of Thag La ridge. The author feels that, it was assumed by the politicians, supported by Kaul, that the Indian Army would easily overcome the Chinese. In fact the local commanders pointed out that the Chinese "were well entrenched and were in considerable strength behind the Thag La ridge." These differences led to a change in command and the raising of a new Corps under Lt Gen BM Kaul.

Without going any further into the sequence of events, let it be said that the first two chapters of the book on Pakistan's strategic misconception about Kashmir, the possibility of clearing

the areas occupied by Pakistan in Kashmir before the ceasefire on 1 January 1949 and as to who started the 1962 conflict, are thought-provoking. In this context, the author quotes Palit's reference to "Chinese intransigence over the Aksai Chin and Nehru's refusal to negotiate" and to the "Indian government's aggressive handling of the situation on the Namka Chu, combined with its misappreciation of Indian Army's potential to wage war at Himalayan heights." (*War is High Himalayas*).

In covering the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the author highlights Prime Minister Shastri's strategic decision that Pakistan's aggressions on Kashmir would invite Indian retaliation anywhere across the Indo-Pak border as militarily advantageous to India. He also highlights the lack of coordination then, among the Services.

The action of I and II Corps of the Indian Army have been covered rather briefly and the author appears to have shied off from making any comments. Some observations would not have been out of place.

As a background to the 1971 War, the author describes the developments of events in East Pakistan; the repressive regime of Tikka Khan/Niazi, uprising of Bengali units and their disarming and the mass influx of refugees into India. The War on the Western Front, which began with a pre-emptive air strike by Pakistan on 3 December 1971, is well covered and observations on the land and air action are sound. Similarly the operations on the Eastern Front, where the full-scale crossing of the border took place at a dozen points on 4 December 1971, are clearly described: "The accent was to be on speed... positions were to be bypassed..." The author observes that this blitzkrieg exemplified the application of Liddell Hart's theory of the 'expanding torrent'.

The two page "Assessment" by the author is generally sound and well put. So are the "Concluding Thoughts". However, to my mind, the respective realms of the CCPA and the NSC are confused. This is so because the NSC, which is yet to materialise should appropriately be named the "Cabinet Committee for National Security" (CCNS). This would signify the correct roles of CCNS and CCPA.

Review Article 2

War and Peace in Kashmir*

MAJ GEN DIPANKAR BANERJEE (RETD)**

Why did Kashmir erupt so suddenly in December 1989? This did not happen during the earlier destabilising attempts by Pakistan, which the Kashmiris had so violently opposed. Many experts and scholars have noted the deep sense of alienation of the people of the Valley. Others have analysed the spread of the more extreme variety of Islamic teaching there in the 1970's and linked this to the beginning of militancy among the Kashmiri youth. But, the sudden uprising in December 1989 came as a major surprise to the Indian policy establishment as well as to the rest of the country. It need not have been so. Sumit Ganguly's fascinating book, *The Crisis in Kashmir, Portents of War - Hopes of Peace*, provides some clues that might help us look for the answers.¹

Ganguly, an American of Indian origin, is a formidable scholar on Indian security issues. He has authored a number of books and has written extensively in all major international journals on this and other subjects relating to the subcontinent. He is among a handful of scholars who advise the US Administration on policy towards India. His assessment of the Kashmir situation merits careful consideration. He asserts that, "the rise of separatist sentiment in Kashmir, as well as in other parts of India, is part of the second wave of ethno-linguistic assertion." He goes on to suggest that the "differential rates of modernisation in ethnically plural societies frequently ignite ethnic conflict." This is an interesting thesis on ethnic conflict with specific relevance to India. It provides an altogether new dimension to the Kashmir question.

In the early chapters, Ganguly deftly sketches the background to the current situation. His analysis draws upon all major

**The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace*. By Sumit Ganguly, Washington DC. : Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997, pp. 183, Rs. 395.00, ISBN - 0-521-59066-3.

**Maj Gen D Banerjee, AVSM (Retd) is the Co-Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

works on the Kashmir conflict and extensive interviews with most protagonists. In addition, he examines major studies on ethnicity and conflict from around the globe. Of particular interest is his analysis of the cause of the Kashmir crisis. He examines four prominent perceptions and considers them all inadequate. These are :- overt Pakistani support, India's denial of self-determination, the rise of ethno-national favour in the context of the death of *Kashmiriyat* and a combination of a diverse set of circumstances including misrule by the State.

Here Ganguly refers to what he calls the paradox of Indian democracy – success in mobilising the people, simultaneously failing to establish sound democratic institutions. Political mobilisation was possible with the spread of education, as was improvements in the social conditions of the people in the Kashmir Valley. Ganguly quotes extensive figures to prove that increasing literacy, spread of education and improvements in other social indicators have indeed been substantial. This largely demolishes the myth of 'exploitation' that is so often put out to justify insurgency. But, these positive factors were accompanied by the inability of the State to provide genuine democracy. Ganguly next examines the more proximate causes of the present situation and traces the deterioration of politics and governance in the State in the 1980's. Succinctly and with clarity he identifies the steps that led to the current situation in the Valley.

In a perceptive chapter on "Strategies and Options", Ganguly lists out several possibilities and exposes their limitations. A listing is in order and, as they are self-explanatory, need no elaboration. From 'ethnic flooding', 'mailed fist', the 'wear down' option, 'conceding the Valley 'shared sovereignty', 'plebiscite', 'independence', and the 'protectorate option' – all are examined and proved inadequate.

Ganguly recommends an alternative approach. A logical and altogether practical one which merits attention both in India and abroad. He accepts that India cannot concede the territorial integrity of the province. He acknowledges the Indian Army's ability to handle the complex insurgency situation in the Valley

with competence and success. He recognises Pakistan's role in support of terrorism in Kashmir. From these basic assumptions he goes on to suggest a new politico-military solution that is not entirely new but, with the logic that he has evolved, appears more plausible. It includes restoration of law and order in the Valley as a prerequisite, and negotiations at two levels : with Pakistan as well as the insurgents. In actuality this process is already going on. Elections in 1996 and return of popular government in the province were key elements in the implementation of this policy. With it, law and order is being restored steadily. The Government is committed to discussions with the insurgents, within the bounds of the Indian Constitution and the principle of inviolable borders. Dialogue with Pakistan has begun, though haltingly. The next element is the reduction of security operations in the State. No doubt this will only be possible within the parameters of an improving security situation, which requires Pakistan's co-operation. What happens after this is the key question. Even though his thesis raises this question, Ganguly provides no solution. It is the challenge of meeting the second stage of ethno-political assertion.

The Indian polity and society will have to increasingly grapple with this question especially under the condition of economic liberalisation and the steadily decreasing power of the State. For ethno-linguistic assertion is indeed on the rise. For a plural, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and ethnically diverse country such as India, this is indeed a condition of grave concern. A multi-dimensional approach is essential to deal with this. First, a strengthening of institutions is required. Next is ensuring that political plurality has room to express itself fully within the limits of the Constitution. Finally, delivering good governance. A tall list indeed. But, the challenge of nationhood, in a complex country such as India, can be met with vision, a singleness of purpose and considerable sacrifice. Ganguly's book, if it opens up a serious debate in the country, will have served its purpose.

Review Article 3

**Dangerous Peace : New Rivalries
in World Politics***

DR SUBHASH KAPILA**

The last decade of the 20th Century witnessed the end of the Cold War, disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of the United States as a unipolar power. As the world approaches the 21st Century, the international academia and policy planners are faced with the problem of assessing and predicting the global power patterns and systemic transformations likely to take place.

Dangerous Peace : New Rivalry in World Politics by Alpo M Rusi, addresses this problem in a logical, concise and lucid manner. Major conclusions arrived at, in this predictive assessment are:- US unipolar structure would not survive till the next century, power vacuum created by the demise of Soviet empire will be filled, in Asia, by China and in Eastern Europe, by the European Union and Islam. The author foresees the emergence of four or five trading blocs which may acquire political and military overtones. These trading blocs would be the European Union; a Pan-American bloc; Japan as a strong economic power; and an East Asian bloc with China at the helm of trading. Russia seems to have been omitted from this analysis of geopolitical, geoeconomic game.

The author's perspectives on China, though logically argued and assessed, can be contended with. The overall importance of China has been exaggerated and her potential as a super power has been subtly propagated by the Chinese themselves and to a greater extent by the United States, simplistically, for reasons of explaining the logic behind US defence planning. It should not

**Dangerous Peace : New Rivalries in World Politics*. By Alpo M Rusi, Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1997, pp. 170, \$ 45.00, ISBN 0-8133-2258-8.

**Dr Subhash Kapila obtained his Doctorate from University of Allahabad.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXVIII, No. 532, April-June, 1998.

be forgotten that despite her colossal economic progress and military build-up, China suffers major strategic vulnerabilities - separatist movements (Sinkiang and Tibet) and lack of naval and force projection capabilities as compared to those of USA or even Russia.

China's most critical problem in reaching super power status is the absence of natural allies unlike the United States. Further, the United States has a crippling leverage over the Chinese economy which, in one stroke, can disable China. Hence, in the author's assessment, the rise of a new bipolarity, i.e. USA versus China sometime in the next century, is somewhat questionable.

Notwithstanding the above, Alpo M Rusi, Foreign Policy Adviser to the President of Finland and a professor at Helsinki University, has carried out a masterly analysis of the systemic transformation of power politics in the 21st Century. The author has vividly outlined the contours of the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape that would emerge in the 21st Century. The most admirable quality of this book is the precise and concise analysis of such a vast subject which has open - ended possibilities. The book prompts several re-readings, in view of the importance of the subject that it covers and its absorbing analysis. It is a must for all policy making professionals - civil and military.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War. Edited by Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, New York : Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 292, \$ 17.50, ISBN 0-231-10195-3.

This book is a collection of ten essays by noted US, German and Canadian academics covering various aspects of the Cold War. Gorbachev seems to be the focus in at least four essays, and rightly so, as he was instrumental in bringing the Cold War to an end. The major impact of this has been on the erstwhile Soviet Union itself. These essays are based on papers presented during a 1991 conference at the Cornell University, New York.

A serious book for professionals in this field but would be heavy reading for the ordinary reader.

-- Dr Subhash Kapila

A New Form of Warfare - The Rise of Non-Lethal Weapons. By Malcolm Dando, London : Brassey's, 1996, pp. 258, £ 25.00, ISBN 1-85753-127-2.

The breakup of the USSR and a halt to nuclear proliferation - laid the foundation for a new form of warfare - the use of non-lethal weapons. The quiet US move into non-lethality could pry open a Pandora's Box of chemical, biological weaponry "that diplomats have spent much of the 20th Century, trying to keep it closed". Once a weapon is fielded, it is almost impossible to prevent its proliferation and widespread use.

The author details the development of offensive measures and counter-measures like the mine-clearing undertaken in affected countries like Afghanistan.

The book is well tabulated and a technocrats' scientific treatise on the various types of, so called, non-lethal weapons. These weapons are more dangerous than their conventional counterparts. If preventive measures are not taken to check their proliferation these may prove even more dangerous than the nuclear weapons.

The book can be put to good use by defence scientists to develop special psycho-chemical, non-lethal weapons as defensive measures to guard against adversaries.

-- Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

The Politics of Difference-Ethnic Premises in a World of Power. Edited by Edwin N Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister, London : University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 210, £ 13.95, ISBN 0-226-90017-7.

In the post Cold War era, culture, ethnicity and identity have come to replace ideological differences. The welter of hetero-morphism that has fol-

lowed, has resulted in progress in the form of elimination of racial disadvantage exemplified by South Africa as well as regress denoted by the Bosnian cauldron.

This book is a collection of some of the papers presented at an international conference held at Rhodes University, South Africa, in April 1993. The aim was to explore the role of "Ethnicity, Identity and Nationalism in South Africa - Past, Present and Future". An attempt has been made to provide theoretical constructs for the role of ethnicity in nation-building, national conflict and "the politics of difference".

The causes for the rise of ethnicity and their impact on globalisation have been examined in diverse national settings, as in Africa and Europe. Their impact on integration of identities and nation-building provides an interesting backdrop. Of relevance in the South Asian context is Stanley J Tambiah's "The Nation-State in Crisis and the Rise of EthnoNationalism", which has portrayed the impact of ethno-nationalism in pluralistic countries like South Asia where language, development and population migration have witnessed major upheavals in traditional social and political structures. The authors of the book ascribe the cause of harmony in Western Europe to ethnic protection and tolerance, raising hopes for India. Nothing highlights this trend more than Tambiah's observation that ethno-nationalism in the states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir is fed by the communal card played by political parties as a prop for electoral support rather than genuine ethnic or religious dissension. His distress at the current contra-indications in the Subcontinent, however, is not justified because the ethnic upheaval of today is a temporary factor. Stephen Ryan's "The Voice of Sanity Getting Hoarse"? Destructive Processes in Violent Ethnic Conflict", also provides an incisive insight on militarisation of groups and resolution of conflicts wherever ethnic crises arises.

This well produced volume is highly recommended for those engaged in the task of nation-building.

-- Col R K Bhonsle

Keeping Together in Time - Dance and Drill in Human History. By William H McNeill, Cambridge, MA. : Harvard University Press, 1995, pp. 198, £ 14.50, ISBN 0-674-50229-9.

William H McNeill is one of the widely read and respected historians of America. He is the author of renowned books like *The Rise Of The West* and *Plagues and People*. Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Chicago, he was drafted into the US Army in 1941 and received his basic and rigorous training in Texas. This experience stayed on in his sub-conscious mind as a manifestation of the esprit-de-corps generated through close order drill in his platoon. He calls it muscular bonding.

With great erudition he discusses the possibility of coordinating rhythmic

movement, and the cohesion it promotes, as a prime motivating force in holding human groups together from primordial times. The extent of his knowledge is dazzling. This book not only provides an insight into the evolution of ancient societies, the community behaviour of chimpanzees, dynamics of village festival dances, dance-trances of dervishes and shamans, unison of goose-stepping high-morale Nazi units, and the value of calisthenics to modern Japanese workers as the motivational catalyst for increased production, but also provides for an intrinsic tongue-in-cheek humour for the laid-back reader.

In particular the chapter on "Politics and War" is masterly as the author is on home ground and also because the facts on which he bases his conclusions are firmly tethered to scholarly work of international repute. Students of military science and sociology alike, as also psychologists and anthropologists will find material of immense value in this treatise. By his own admittance the author warns, however, that it is by no means a complete inquiry but only a reconnaissance of force, in the muscular and rhythmic dimension of human solidarity.

A treat for the mind, *Keeping Together In Time* is an entirely satisfying book.

-- Lt Col A K Sharma (Retd)

Rivers of Silence : Disaster on River Nam Ka Chu, 1962 : The Dash to Dhaka across River Meghna during 1971. By Maj Gen Ashok Kalyan Verma, AVSM (Retd), New Delhi : Lancer Publishers, 1998, pp.221, Rs. 495.00, ISBN 1-897829-34-5.

This book is a soulful rendering of two battles fought by two Rajput battalions - one at Nam Ka Chu when 2 RAJPUT was decimated by the Chinese in 1962; and the second when 18 RAJPUT performed well to bring about the defeat of the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh. In the first part of the book, the author has ably reconstructed the scenario of the chaotic launching of the unit into the battle mentally and logistically unprepared, tactically hamstrung and strategically, in an impossible situation. The operation was fore-doomed even if it was not clear to our policy makers who were giving impossible orders. The national leaders lacked wisdom and the top military leadership, the moral courage to say "no".

The second part deals with 18 RAJPUT operations in Bangladesh. It gives a gripping description of the preparation, initial sparring and, finally, the battle at Akhaura and Ashuganj. General Verma has the advantage of having access to the accounts of battle from the Pakistan side also, so that the achievements come out in bold relief.

The third part of the book is devoted to some soul searching and reflections on the causes of our debacle in 1962, the unfinished task in Kashmir, the shaping of the military policy and its instrument till date. Here one can sense

a degree of naivete. For instance, why should India have felt betrayed at the turn of events in 1962? The Chinese had all along made it known that they will never treat "unequal treaties" as equal though she was ready to accept these as the basis for an overall settlement of the frontier. On this basis Chou En Lai had concluded boundary treaties with Korea, Afghanistan, Burma, Outer Mongolia and Pakistan. But India did not figure high in their list of priority at this juncture. The Chinese were far too preoccupied in their internecine strife between the 'revisionists' like Liu Shao Chi, their confrontation with USSR and the USA and their 'great leap forward'. In fact on 20 and 24 October 1962, the Chinese made proposals for a ceasefire, peaceful disengagement of troops and negotiations. India paid no attention to them.

The Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971 was, however, a victory of sound policy, strategy and good leadership, at all levels. This time it was the Pakistanis who played all their cards imprudently.

The fact however remains that Indian political leadership had, and continues to display, little understanding of matters military. The military continues to be treated like a robot which will perform when and whichever way desired. The goals and expectations can, therefore, be unrealistic.

A well written book. A must for defence planners and libraries.

-- Brig S S Chandel (Retd)

The Naked Warriors : The Story of the US Navy's Frogmen. By Cdr Francis Douglas Fane, USNR (Retd.) and Don Moore, Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995, pp. 308, \$ 27.95, ISBN 1-55750-266-8.

If the main battles of World War I were the infantry attacks against well entrenched defences on the Western Front in Europe, then in World War II the centre stage was taken by the numerous large scale amphibious operations that were undertaken in North Africa, Europe and in the Pacific theatres. These amphibious operations required the landing of large number of troops, with their equipment and supplies, from their sea transports on to selected beaches mostly against immediate enemy opposition. The final assault landings were carried out by troops, ferried in small assault landing crafts, to the selected beaches with naval warships providing the covering fire.

Though the landing beaches were carefully selected from aerial and submarine periscope photographs, there was initially no sure method of detecting and destroying dangerous natural and man-made underwater obstacles close inshore. It was this imperative need that led to the employment of swimming scouts, who were formed into Underwater Demolition Teams, to chart the beach approaches, to find and then destroy the underwater obstructions that might prevent or even retard the assault landing of troops and their subsequent re-supply. This extremely dangerous task was undertaken by an all-volunteer force from the US Navy, the Marines and the US Army.

These hazardous tasks, performed by these brave volunteers, were naturally top secret and could not be given the publicity that they deserved. *The Naked Warriors* is a gripping account of the brave actions carried out by these handful of courageous volunteers during the War. The results produced by these few men were disproportionate to their small numbers, and their efforts certainly reduced the loss of troops and boats. The only shortcoming of the book is the total absence of maps and sketches which would have made it easier for the reader to follow the interesting narrative of the gallant band of brave men.

-- Maj Gen SC Sinha (Retd)

Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century : Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Super Powers. By Alan P Dobson, London : Routledge, 1995, pp. 199, £ 12.99, ISBN 0-415-11943-X.

"The lion and the eagle : of twisted tails and plucked feathers" -- the heading of the first chapter says it all. The love-hate relationship of the two Anglo-Saxon countries started two hundred and fifty years ago and has continued till the present day, interspersed with spurts of intensity when their political and economic interests and sometimes common objectives in international affairs either clashed or merged.

The economic dominance of the UK over the US was reversed at the beginning of the 20th Century, which also marks the emergence of the US from its isolationism. Peace between them has survived since 1814, when the two countries were last at war and which ended with the signing of Peace of Ghent.

In particular from World War II onwards, their strategic and military concerns have been dominant, in concurrence or fierce divergence. A lot of people are not aware that the American railways, industrial and agricultural growth was possible with British capital and entrepreneurship. This was resented, quite naturally, and was shaken off by the beginning of the 20th Century, by which time the average standard of living in the US had overtaken that of Britain.

Despite their fierce differences in strategy and priorities over Europe and Far East, this relationship between the two countries survived. Even as Churchill expressed in his letter to Roosevelt "the moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and supplies" (7 December 1940), the US realised that "the greatest trading nation and the creator of the world's largest empire was reduced to de facto international bankruptcy", but it had the inherent strength to be a most useful ally for the future. This relationship continued for the next fifty years with the supremacy of the US in the world well established. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, US has become the economic, technical and military giant. Britain has very little option but to follow the 'leader'.

The author, an eminent scholar of international fame, has emphasised this subdued role of Britain, particularly in her 'new' involvement in the European community. He has likened the new relationship to a song whose "lyrics may have changed, but the tune remains the same even though it has been transposed over time from a major to a minor key."

An excellent book, with a vast amount of snippets of world affairs during the century, collated with dexterity by the author. His comments make it a valuable book on international affairs, both for the scholar and the layman.

-- Major General P Chowdry (Retd)

The Historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre, 1919. By Savita Narain, New Delhi : Spantech and Lancer, pp. 76, Price Rs. 115.00, ISBN 1-897829-36-1.

The author has attempted to examine the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, after eighty years since the event occurred and after India's fiftieth anniversary of independence. A dissertation towards Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree, it is based on the reactions to the massacre and reports written by various committees and analysis by various authors.

The first chapter describes in detail the events that eventually led to the massacre on 10 April 1919. The Indian crowd committed grave offences against life and property of the Europeans. This was in retaliation for the killing of 20 to 30 Indians earlier that day. This laid the basis for the subsequent massacre at the Jallianwala Bagh on 13 April 1919.

The killings at Jallianwala Bagh, absence of medical help to the injured and the atrocities committed by General Dyer under Martial Law, till 15 April 1919, gave the independence struggle a national face-lift. It brought Gandhiji to the forefront as the national leader and also motivated many Indians to join the fight for independence.

The study looks beyond the biases that other authors and writers of that period could have had. The author herself has a dual heritage, Indian and Britisher, and to that extent is able to draw an objective viewpoint of the event.

The author has made a major contribution by projecting a balanced assessment of a ghastly event in history.

The book is highly recommended.

-- P Tyagi

China's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East. By Hafizulla Emadi, Pakistan : Royal Book Company, 1997, pp. 102, Rs. 150.00, ISBN 969-407-219-6.

The book describes in a clear and concise manner, China's foreign policy towards the Middle East. The author has carried out an in-depth study of

China's foreign policy towards Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq. He has given his views on issues like China's disapproval of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait but at the same time not supporting the military involvement by the big powers; support and supply of military equipment to Iraq during the war with Iran; and suppression of Palestinians in the occupied Arab land.

By integrating Chinese economy with the world economy, the Chinese leadership intends to modernise China and transform it into a major financial and industrial power. The disintegration of the Soviet Union as a super power has in fact enhanced China's position as the world's fourth largest arms exporter and a major economic power.

A well researched reference book for research scholars.

-- Cmde. R P Khanna
Indian Navy (Retd)

'Biting the Bullet' - Married to the SAS. By Jenny Simpson, London : Harper Collins Publishers, 1996, pp. 303, Price £15.99, ISBN 0-00-255807-6.

This is an absorbing account of the life in the SAS (Speed, Aggression Surprise), for a British NCO's wife. Written in the autobiographical mode, Jenny Simpson has managed to convincingly portray the rivalry and betrayal behind the camaraderie and bravado of the SAS rank and file; and the intense pressures of prolonged and sudden separations forced on family life by the call of duty to any country or region. Of course, essentially it is the story of Ian and Jenny and their passionate and fiery relationship that endured incredible odds brought about by the tensions precipitated by the secrecy and dangers of serving with the SAS. The reader is taken on a tour-de-force of all the aspects of regimental life. What also comes out in good measure is the seriousness with which the SAS soldiers take their job. Their professionalism, dedication to difficult and dangerous duties and their will to achieve success at all costs is also well documented for, as they say, "We are the pilgrims' master, we shall go; Always a little further, it may be; beyond the last blue mountain barred with snow; Across that angry or that glimmering sea."

Easy to read, this is a rather nice novelette for army wives/young officers.

-- Lt Col A K Sharma (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter-Ending June 1998

(The books reviewed in January - March 1998 issue have been added
to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list.)

S.N.	Author's Name	Title	Year
Cartography			
1.	Madan, P L	Indian Cartography: A Historical Perspective, <i>New Delhi : Manohar, pp. 144, Rs. 425.00, ISBN 81-7304-177-6</i>	1997
Central Asia-Middle East			
2.	Menashri, David (ed)	Central Asia Meets the Middle-East, <i>London: Frank Cass, pp. 240, Rs.1237.00</i>	1998
Central Police Force			
3.	Pal, Bhisham H (Lt Col)	Central Police Forces of India, <i>New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs</i>	1998
China-Warfare			
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
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
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