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Reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Headquarters

THEIR RELATIONSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITIES/AUTHORITY

Rear Admiral S S Venkateswaran, IN

AND

Wing Commander R Gopalaswami, VSM

Let Noble Thoughts Come to Us From Every Side

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INTRODUCTION

IT has, so far, been a historic tradition for the people of India to know very little about the defence apparatus of India and the way it functions. The tradition has extended over several centuries and a veil of secrecy has surrounded the working of the Armed Forces in India, their structure, strategy and development.

Never in the history of our civilisation has there been such an urgent necessity for an informed public discussion on this subject. Thirty-three years have passed since Independence. The world having emerged from two global holocausts in this very century, has plunged once again into a massive argument race. The armouries of belligerent nations are burgeoning with vast stockpiles of lethal weapons both tactical and strategic. The rivalry between the Big Powers is closing in on our land and sea borders. Age old religious fanaticism has been revived once again and fuelled by the fire of petro-dollars. A bursting population is creating severe problems of social disharmony, violence and secession.

The most powerful of all defence strategies, in the face of seemingly overwhelming odds is a national unity of purpose. The essential requisites of such unity is an informed public discussion, and a sense of participation by the nation as a whole.

In a parliamentary democracy, where the people are ruled by consent, the principle of ultimate political control over the armed forces is a fundamental axiom of paramount importance for the existence of this form of Government. In the Indian context, due to historical reasons, the matter is more complex, made so due to imbalance in the flow of executive power between the military executive services and the civil administrative services, both working under the ultimate control of the political executive. It is this

**Awarded Cash Prize*

imbalance that is rapidly eroding the authority and status of the Armed Forces, and hence affects the exercise of power by the elected representatives of the people for the public good.

THE AIM

The aim of this paper is to propose reform, reorganisation, restructuring and redistribution of functional responsibilities within the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Headquarters so as to provide for effective growth of the Armed Forces in synchronisation with the revolution of the state as a parliamentary democracy, and the socio-economic system of India.

ORGANISATION AND REORGANISATION : 1600 TO 1946 A.D.

The East India Company (1600 — 1857)

The growth history of the Indian Army goes back by 380 years, to the time of the arrival of the East India Company of Britain on our shores. By 1696, they skillfully expanded their trading base in Surat to three fortified enclaves in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, where independent armies were raised and maintained. The English King gave the trading company permission to issue coins, and declare war or peace where necessary. During this period, there were several reorganisations of the British-Indian Army throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The main objectives of reorganisation of the Armed Forces at that time were :


- (a) To increase the strength of the forces ;
- (b) To coordinate and centralise their control in the hands of the East India Company
- (c) To extend their effectiveness in including new portions of the land within their ambit
- (d) To consolidate the power and authority of British rule wherever the Union Jack could fly.

Thus, the organisation of the Indian Army, constituting the total armed forces at that time, could be conceived quite simply as shown in Fig. 1.

The Crown and the First Major Army Re-organisation

The East India Company was finally abolished after the 1857 insurrection. A central Government was established representing the Imperial Power in India. The Army structure was reorganised in stages.

The major objectives of the great reorganisation, restructuring and reform of the Indian Army which took place leisurely over a period of 38 years were as follows :



NOTE : NO DUAL CONTROLS ON ARMIES

1600 AD - 1857 AD

ORGANISATION OF INDIAN ARMY UNDER THE
EAST INDIA COMPANY

FIG. 1


- (a) To create a Unified Army in India under the overall command of a Commander-in-Chief (This ended the first form of compartmentalism which existed in the days of the East India Company, namely separate armies for each garrison).
- (b) To create a unified army officers cadre (This ended the second form of compartmentalism of the days of the East India Company, namely, a separate officer corps for each regiment each with its own system of rewards and promotions, cross-transfers between regiments being then unknown).

The Commander-in-Chief who was responsible for all operational matters was next only to the Governor General himself, who was the senior member of the council. But there was another member of the Council, known as the Military Member, who was also a military officer, somewhat junior in rank to the C-in-C. The function of the Military Member's department was to examine all the proposals emanating from the C-in-C and his

Headquarters, and to issue orders of the Government of India on behalf of the Governor-General. Many of the proposals would go direct from the Lieutenant Generals in charge of the regional commands to the Military Member's Department (by-passing the C-in-C) to be examined in all aspects including the financial.

It is not difficult to see why such a situation could have led to a destructive conflict between the C-in-C and the Military Member-in-Council. (One of the important findings of this paper is that history has repeated itself inexorably. After Independence in 1947, the functions of the historical Military Member-in-Council were reestablished and enhanced, to become that of the Secretary, Ministry of Defence).

The organisation of the Indian Army after 38 years of reform and reorganisation took the shape as shown in Figure 2.



ORGANISATION OF INDIAN ARMY UNDER THE CROWN 1857-1905

FIG. 2

Everything of importance and significance of course went from the Governor-General's Council to the Secretary-of-State sitting in White hall in UK, who, in consultation with his own Council or the British Cabinet or War Office, took the decision and issued the necessary sanctions and approvals.

This final point of control (Secretary-of-State) seems to have acted as some sort of restraint upon the building up of major controversies; but it could not last.

First Organisational Crisis

Because of the duality of jurisdiction and control between the Commander-in-Chief and the Military-Member-in-Council, with a junior officer sitting in judgement upon the proposals made by a senior and experienced officer both with equal voice in the council, matters rapidly came to a head. The change factor responsible for the turn of events was the arrival on the scene of Lord Kitchner, as Commander-in-Chief, at a time when the dark clouds of World War 1 were gathering on the horizons.


An overpowering personality, Lord Kitchner condemned outright the 'dual—control' from which the military command suffered. In a well chronicled, and now classic controversy, the C-in-C pressed for the abolition of the post of Military Member, against a well reasoned opposition by the Governor-General Lord Curzon who was of the view that "such a change would create a military despotism in India where, unlike in Britain, there was absence of Parliamentary or Public Control, that the Viceroy would be denied expert advice other than from the C-in-C himself, who could not be trusted to put up all the facts of the case, and as a consequence the revenue of the country would be at the mercy of the C-in-C".

Thus, the Viceroy and Governor General opposed the proposal of his own Commander-in-Chief, who stated that "the present system is faulty, inefficient and incapable of expansion necessary for a greater War.....no needed reform can be initiated, no useful measure can be adopted, without being subject to vexatious and for the most part unnecessary criticism not merely as regards the financial effect of the proposals but as to its desirability or necessity from the purely military point of view."

(For those who have lived and worked in the Defence Ministry of Independent India from 1947 onwards, these words and issues would evoke deep chords of feeling. For it is precisely this controversy that was again aroused, when, after Independence the Defence Department was upgraded to a Ministry and the Defence Secretary brought into existence a new system of relationships, re-establishing himself in the role of the erstwhile Military Member-of-Council, without realising what blind forces of confusion and destructive conflict would inevitably be released within the Ministry-conflict

forces which are even today in existence, and causing grave apprehensions whether our country will ever be able to face the threat to the security of the country in a future context of technological warfare).

The decision of the Secretary-of-State went in favour of the proposal of Lord Kitchner. The post of Military Member-in-Council was abolished in 1906. Lord Curzon resigned. The reorganised Indian Army then took shape as shown in Figure 3.



ORGANISATION OF INDIAN ARMY 1906-1946
AFTER KITCHNER REFORMS

FIG. 3

The Army Department was administered by a civilian Secretary who enjoyed the right of access to the Viceroy. However, all orders concerning the Army were issued by the Commander-in-Chief.

Thus a parliamentary democracy represented by its Secretary-of-State took a decision that has stood the test of time. *None of the apprehensions expressed by the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, were realised in practice.* On the other hand, the Indian Army, now really unified in theory and practice, evolved

rapidly as a result of this fundamental reform, to acquit itself with glory through two World Wars by which time it had expanded to a force of 2 million men under arms. The Indian Army acquired a great tradition for valour in battle and rather a remarkable deep rooted system of loyalties and attachments, but entirely outside anything related to the political and economic life of the country. This organisation lasted till 1946.

It is a matter of interest that among all the nations of the world which freed themselves from the yoke of British imperialism, Canada stands as an outstanding example of a democratic country which after creating three arms of the Armed Forces—the Army, Navy and Air Force—proceeded to organise the defence structure, on the lines followed by Lord Kitchner, with the three Chief of Staff reporting directly to the Defence Minister, and being endowed with full administrative and functional powers to discharge their responsibilities. This will be discussed further a little later. India after Independence could not however trust itself, because, neither the political executive nor the Civil executive found it wise or feasible to delegate full financial and executive powers to the Service Chiefs.

THE TRANSITION YEARS : 1947 — 1980


Era of Dual Control Begins Again

On 15 August 1947, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Armed Forces was appointed Supreme Commander for the exclusive purpose of reconstitution of the Armed Forces into two separate forces, respectively for India and Pakistan. But he found it impossible to carry out the task impartially and recommended that his Headquarters be wound up. On 30 November 1947, the Supreme Commander's Headquarters ceased to exist. On 28 February 1948, three hundred and six years after the British set up their first fortress in India, the last contingent of British troops left the shores of India. The Defence System was immediately restructured and reorganised and took shape as shown in Figure 4.

The deployment of Indian troops in the Kashmir Campaign almost immediately after Independence had a number of far reaching results. One among them was the feeling of immediate necessity to speed up the reorganisation and consolidation of the whole military apparatus. Alas, this did not happen, because the Service Chiefs had already lost their executive powers for such development.

Almost all the present woes of Indian Armed Forces may be traced back to the period 1947 — 1962. Throughout the fifties, no decision could be taken regarding the strategy to strengthen the Armed Forces. Our poor performance against Chinese attacks in 1962 proves the point. A general sense of shock and anger ran through the masses of the country.

Then and subsequently what one saw was a series of "UNTOLD STORIES" published, mudslinging and character assassination of people in



ORGANISATION OF INDIAN ARMED FORCES 1947-1980

FIG. 4

power being the main theme of these publications. None came out with constructive suggestions for the good of the country.

National humiliation arising out of defeat at the hand of Chinese thus gave rise to further recriminations and controversy. The historical perspective reveals that the debacle of 1962 which was due to a breakdown in the organisation and performance of the Armed Forces, could be attributed to the following reasons :

- (a) In the period 1950-62, Government gave priority to socio-economic development of the country, and deemphasised the need for military development and preparedness. Our foreign policy also placed blind faith in peaceful coexistence and principles of PANCHSHEEL.
- (b) The civil administrative services expanded enormously and in the process developed a feeling of well nigh omnipotence. There was a mad scramble for status and posts. The status of the Service

Chiefs was downgraded progressively to be perceived as that of a mere department head in a civil beurocracy.

- (c) The new system of relationship between the Chiefs of Staff, the Armed Forces Headquarters, the Defence Minister and Secretary, Ministry of Defence began to take effect. The ghost of the Military-Member-in-Council appeared to be back at work in the higher defence mechanisms of India.

The Defence Ministry was organised as shown in Figure 5 (from ref. 1) Even a cursory glance at the functions of the Defence Ministry as shown in Figure 5 would reveal how the Service Headquarters were rendered subservient to the civil executives services. For example, the *authority* for budgeting, recruitment of staff, discipline, welfare, infantry weapons and equipment, air force and naval projects and equipment, even printing and stationary, office administration in the Armed Forces Headquarters, not to speak of subjects like military movements, naval cruises and operations were taken over by the Civil administrative services in the Defence Ministry — yet, the *responsibility* for efficient performance in each of these subjects, was made that of the Armed Forces Headquarters !


It is an elementary principle of management that authority cannot be separated from responsibility without loss of organisational effectiveness. Even today it is a mystery as to why and how the Service Chiefs of that day accepted this division of responsibility and authority immediately after the Independence without effective protest.

Thus, the era of DUAL CONTROL over the Armed Forces dawned once more. India had ignored the lessons of history yet again !

The relationship between the Service Chiefs and the Defence Minister rapidly deteriorated. Total confusion and chaos descended into the higher mechanisms of the defence of the country.

These conditions are best highlighted by the events leading to General Thimayya, Chief of Army Staff and a forceful personality, handing in his resignation to Mr. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister. No attempt was made then, as even now, to analyse the state of and reasons for *organisational behaviour* leading to such a drastic step. Then, as even today, all events were interpreted in the light of *personal/individual behaviour* and it was therefore widely and perhaps erroneously believed that it was the arrogant behaviour of Mr. Menon, "power struggle" etc which were responsible — in actual fact, no one realised then, *as even today* that *reimposition of DUAL CONTROL on the Armed Force was the source of the problem.*

By 1959, in the words of Mr. S.S. Khera, ICS (Ref. 2), the state of organisational behaviour in the Defence Ministry and Armed Forces Headquarters descended into total confusion "...there was little sharing of common tasks, there could be no meeting of minds, not even the minimum essential for the flow of information. The internal lines of communication in the highest



NOTE : MASSIVE OVERLAPPING OF JURISDICTION & CONTROL

**ORGANISATION OF THE MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE AFTER INDEPENDENCE**

echelons of the country's defence apparatus were clogged with dislike and suspicion. There was a grave weakening of the foundation upon which a cogent defence apparatus could be planned, assembled, organised and deployed. Any display of initiative, any new idea or proposal for the improvement of the defence mechanism could be certain of meeting with immediate opposition. Personal animosities prevented the objective examination and appraisal of any new suggestions or proposal; on the contrary, the abilities available were employed in the effort to delay, defeat, or deflect on almost every occasion...."

Such a graphic and vital description of the state of relationships between the Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces Headquarters — *A State which exists even today* — should be a cause of alarm and concern for the country as a whole. Yet, the source of the difficulty was never understood, let alone accepted viz. that it was the change in the relationships after Independence resulting in reimposition of DUAL CONTROL over the armed forces, which had caused this unimaginable situation.

THE BEGINNING OF REFORM

Without understanding the roots of the problem, the Government after 1962, began in right earnest to strengthen and reform the Armed Forces. Among the most important of these reforms were :

- (a) The Defence Minister was chosen very carefully and Shri Y.B. Chavan, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra State, who had a record of successful administration behind him, and also had a strong political base, was appointed as Defence Minister. Thereafter, care has always been exercised in the choice of the Defence Minister. This, perhaps, explains why the post is still vacant today though the present Government took over in January 1980 and the Prime Minister herself continues to hold this vital portfolio in addition to her other important departments.*
- (b) The advice of the Chiefs of Staff was given a strong backing by the Defence Minister. Defence allocation increased from Rs. 280 crores in 1960-61 to Rs. 970 crores in 1967-68.
- (c) A strong effort to standardise Military stores and hardware was started.
- (d) The Defence Production Organisation was expanded and activated. Outstanding results were obtained in the manufacture of the Ishapore Semi-automatic rifle, the MIG-21 aircraft and its aero-engine, the Vijayanta tank, a frigate for the Navy etc.
- (e) Guided Missiles of many types were procured from Western Sources and the USSR, and deployed by the Army, Navy and Air Force.

* (The Defence Minister Since appointed.)

- (f) A new impetus was given to the growth of the Research & Development Organisation of the Defence Ministry.
- (g) A Five year Defence plan was prepared by the Defence Ministry in 1964 envisaging an expenditure of about 1000 crores a year for these purposes.
- (h) New Mountain Divisions were raised by the Army, the Air Force was expended to reach 45 squadron strength and a phased programme started to modernise the Navy and acquire submarines and missile boats.
- (i) A general programme of technological and management education was commenced for the Armed Forces officers cadre.

These reforms, though widely welcomed, gave but superficial relief. They never confronted and united the ancient knot at the root of the problem viz dual control ; and hence did not result in genuine inner progress. In fact, they preceded the dawn of technology, and the disintegration of functional unity in the Defence Ministry.

The Age of Technology Dawns

The beginnings of reform in the Defence Ministry in 1960's saw the dawn of the era of modern weapon system technology aircraft, missiles, submarines, electronics etc. The bulk of weaponry was either bought outright, or manufactured in India under licences in the Defence Production Organisation.

The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 thus saw the Armed Forces better armed, able at least to face the enemy with confidence once again.

The age of technology has brought massive problems of coordination in the Defence Ministry due to the complex processes involved from perception of the technological state-of-art and recognition of military need, to design, development, production and deployment. It is here, with no past experience to guide, with the organisation eroded of real authority, that the new problems of technological warfare are to be perceived and faced.

All these limitations notwithstanding, the Armed Forces entered yet another challenge, the Bangla Desh War of 1971. Given the finest political leadership any Armed Force of the World could ask for, they succeeded gloriously, and 24 years after Independence, established the "supremacy" of India as the leading power in the sub-continent. This "supremacy" however is to be very short lived, given the condition of global shifts in balance of power and of nuclear proliferation.

With this mighty war operation of 1971, peace descended on the troubled land. But deep within the higher thinking in the Armed Forces, a sense of great uneasiness prevails which can be directly traced to central issues which remain unresolved.

The Problems of Defence

As of today, then, the central problems of Defence revolve around the following core of unresolved issues :—

- (a) The continued existence of duality jurisdiction and control in the Defence structure.
- (b) The massive problems of technological growth, creating vast new compartmentalisms and severe problems of technological co-ordination in the Ministries—an issue of functional unity.

The years 1971-79 have thus been ones of sober silence and contemplation, and, as one almost fears, of complacency all over again, as in the 1950's. The staggering magnitude of the problem has boggled the minds of most thinkers. Individual establishments continued to grow and stagnate. Policies changed and continue to change with personalities—both political and governmental. But the central problems of Defence continue to remain, a dark shadow made increasingly ominous by violent events within and outside the country in the past few years.

ANALYSIS OF STAGES OF GROWTH OF THE ARMED FORCES


The Historical Perspective

The stages of evolution of an organisation has for long been the subject of study for sociologists, and, of late, forms an important aspect of management sciences. To suggest reform of a highly complex organisation calls for a historical perspective, a study of the patterns of growth, placing these patterns in a conceptual framework, and attempting to seek an understanding of the prevailing laws of evolutionary growth, before proposing fundamental changes.

One interesting and useful contribution in a theory developed by Larry E. Greiner in the work "Evolution and Revolution as Organisations Grow" published in the Havard Business Review of July-August 1972 (Ref. 6). This theory postulates that growing organisations move through few relatively calm periods of evolution, each of which ends with a period of crisis and revolution. According to Greiner, "each evolutionary period is characterised by the dominant management style used to achieve growth, while each revolutionary period is characterised by the dominant management problem that must be solved before growth will continue". The stages of growth of an organisation are illustrated in Fig. 6. This shows how organisations pass through alternating phases of 'evolution' and 'revolution' as a function of age of the system (young or mature) and size of the organisation (small or large).

Such a conceptual framework is taken as a starting point in the analysis of the growth of the Armed Forces Organisation in India. But here we confront a basic problem of definition—is the Armed Forces Organisation 'young' or 'mature'. is the organisation 'small' or 'large'—how

do we coordinate the base of relativity of these concepts? There are, however, some striking analogues. For example, for the Army Organisation at least, the period 1600—1857 was certainly a period of 'growth by creativity'—by the managers of the East India Company. Inevitably, came the 'crisis of leadership'—one can postulate that the inner crisis was




one between the Crown and the East India Company, precipitated by the Sepoy Mutiny; and this crisis was finally ended in the classic Kitchner-Curzon Confrontation of 1906 leading to a new period of 'growth by direction' 1906—1947. On these assumptions, it is now postulated that since 1947 'the

Army Organisation is passing through a 'crisis of autonomy'. Greiner describes organisational behaviour of this 'crisis of autonomy' as follows :

"...yet it is difficult for top managers who were previously successful at being directors to give up responsibility. Moreover, lower level managers are not accustomed to making decisions for themselves. As a result, numerous organisations flounder during this revolutionary period, adhering to centralised methods, while lower level employees grow more disenchanted and leave the organisation".

To this, when one adds the description of organisational behaviour in the Defence Ministry and Armed Forces Headquarters in the period 1947-1967 given by S.S. Khera (Ref. 2) above, it would be evident



NATURE OF GROWTH STAGES AND RHYTHMS—INDIAN ARMY

FIG. 7

that the present state of organisation behaviour in the higher defence mechanisms does truly correspond to Griener's "Crisis of autonomy" as the dominant management problem in today's context.

Taking the total perspective, it would be apparent that the rhythm of the cataclysmic cycles of change, of evolution and revolution, of growth and crisis, are rapidly increasing in frequency (i.e. reducing 'wave length') a concept which has an analogue in the analysis of purely physical systems, where it is called an 'oscillation'. This is illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 7.

On the basis of this study of organisational rhythms, one comes to the conclusion from Figure 7 that these violent cycles of change are likely to occur more rapidly, and would perhaps in the next few years lead to a stage where equilibrium is likely to be upset at various levels. If it is now accepted that this concept of 'growth cycles' is credible, it may serve as a useful basis for managerial reform in the highest mechanism of Defence.

In case of the other services in the Ministry of Defence, viz. The Navy, Air Force, The Research and Development Organisation, Production and Inspection, the factors which are common to all these services as compared to the Indian Army are that :

- (a) They are all relatively 'young' organisations with growth histories ranging from 30 to 50 years only.
- (b) They never had a long and independent 'growth by creativity' stage because the experience, concepts and organisation practices of the Indian Army were grafted to these services in the very beginning, starting at the 'top management' level.

There is also evidence that at the 'micro-level' viz. at the level of an individual establishment, like say an R & D Laboratory, the institution by itself in the brief period of 20 years history of its growth has rapidly and painfully grown through its stages of evolution and revolution.

It is now the assumption of this paper that, in an overall sense, all these, services in the Defence mechanism ARE ALSO IN PHASE II OF THEIR GROWTH (ref. Fig. 6) and it is therefore postulated that all the major services of the Defence Ministry have passed through the stage of 'growth by direction' and have entered the stage of 'crisis' of autonomy'.

This is one of the basic assumptions for the proposed reforms. Hersey and Blanchard (ref. 6) after reviewing all the prevalent theories in the management of organisational behaviour, believe that Man himself has reached a level of evolution when he can consciously choose to 'leap-frog' certain 'inevitable' stage of organisational growth, so as avoid the 'inevitable' crisis in the path of evolution. Such a belief is in tune with the spiritual tradition of India and is another basic assumption for these proposals.

India is now in a most vulnerable position with hostile powers sitting face-to-face across land frontiers—a situation unique to our civilisation. Under

Period	Time year	Nature of Growth		Important Factors
		Evolution	Revolution	
1600 - 1857	257	Growth by Creativity		East India Company
1857 - 1906	49		Crisis of Leadership	1. Crown Vs East India Company 2. Kitchner Vs Curzon
1906 - 1947	41	Growth by Direction	-	1. World War I 2. World War II
1947 - Still Continuing	33 years & Still continuing		Crisis of Autonomy	1. Indian Independence (Crown Vs India) 2. Reintroduction of Duality of Jurisdiction and Control (Defence Secretary vs Chief of Staff)

STAGES OF GROWTH OF INDIAN ARMY AS AN ORGANISATION

TABLE 1

these circumstances, we have no option but to call for a resurgence of military strength in parallel with socio-economic development.

Recognising this and seeking to accelerate the process of organisational evolution, this paper proposes a reform to help resolve the present 'crisis of autonomy', to 'leap-frog' in evolutionary growth and avoid the ensuing 'crisis of control' and crisis of red tape', so as to place the Armed Forces Organisation of the country directly on the path of a royal road of 'Growth by National Collaboration'.

THE FIRST GREAT REFORM

Restoration of Balance of Executive Powers

The First Reform of fundamental importance is to ensure that the relationship between the military service executive and civil administrative service executive is one of partnership in a national collaboration for military strength under the overall control of the political executive.

This 'collaboration' phase "emphasises greater spontaneity in management action through teams and the skilful confrontation of inter-personal differences. Social control and self-discipline take over from formal control" (Ref. 6). For the Armed forces in India, this primarily calls for equality in the balance of power flow between the civil Administrative Service executive and the Military service executive both under the overall control of the political executive.


Constitutional Framework for the Proposed Reform

A diagram illustrating the constitutional framework for the reform is in Fig. 8.

From the earliest days of man, the problem of relationship between the Civil and Military elements of State has furnished a Gordian Knot for political theorists and empire builders to unite. Over the last 33 years of experience the processes of parliamentary democracy in India have established the supremacy of political control of the representatives of the People over all aspects of Government and society. The elected representatives of the People, functioning through the Cabinet and the person of the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, exercise ultimate control over the military directly through the Chiefs of Staff on the one hand and through the Defence Secretary on the other.

As discussed and established earlier in this paper, it is this overlapping of jurisdiction of authority and control between the functions of the Defence Secretary and the function of the Chief-of-Staff that is to be the first object of reform, a mandatory step required to resolve the 'crisis of autonomy' and to ensure a continuing 'growth by collaboration'.

The first step is to restore the freedom of initiative to the Chiefs of



CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROPOSED UNIFIED
ORGANISATIONAL DEFENCE

FIG. 8

Staff, by carefully identifying and eliminating the overlapping areas of jurisdiction and control in defence administration. This is elaborated in great detail in Appendix 'A'.

FIRST REFORM OF THE CIVIL EXECUTIVE

The proposed *First Great Reform* of the organisation and structure of the Civil Executive will then be :

- (a) to abolish the post of Defence Secretary
- (b) to create a new post of Secretary General Defence
- (c) to create a new Department of Defence Administration to absorb all those functions and work of the defence administration which

do not overlap the jurisdiction and control of the three Service Chiefs. The details of the re-distribution of authority, functions and work is given in Appendix 'A'

- (d) to create the new post of Secretary, Defence Administration to Head the new Department of Defence Administration
- (e) to establish a Defence Council of which the Chairman shall be Secretary General Defence.

Functions of Secretary General Defence

The function of the Secretary General Defence will be :

- (a) He is the Principal Civil Adviser to the Minister of Defence on all matters concerning the civil executive and internal security of the nation.
- (b) He is responsible for the coordination of the work of all the Civil Executive functions of the Defence Ministry (viz. the Secretary to Department of Defence Supplies, Production, Research, and Administration) through the Defence Council.
- (c) He is responsible for the Internal security of the nation and exercises control over all internal security forces of the Central Government (BSF, CISF, MDSC etc). *This specific recommendation, however, may be further debated, as it goes beyond the scope of this paper.*

The post of secretary General Defence will carry very high status and prestige, and control is exercised by coordination. He is the sole and principal source of coordinated advice to the Defence Minister on all matters affecting the defence departments, and internal security of the nation. The Secretaries of the four Defence Departments will come under the direct executive control of the Defence Minister (so will be the Chiefs-of-Staff of the three Services, as will be discussed later).

The Defence Minister will thus exercise effective control over the functioning of the Civil Executive departments while he has always available to him the best coordinated advice on all matters of overall interest to the four Civil Executive departments through the person of Secretary General Defence.

FIRST REFORM OF MILITARY EXECUTIVE

The proposed First Great Reform of the Organisation and structure of the Military Executive will be :

- (a) to abolish the Chiefs of Staff Committee,
- (b) to create a new Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief of Defence Staff (a new post to be created).
- (c) to create the post of office of Chief of Defence Staff (of the rank of Field Marshal/Admiral of the Fleet/Marshal of Air Force),

- (d) to create a Combined Armed Forces Headquarters.
- (e) to place the three Service Chiefs under the direct executive control of Defence Minister with full delegated financial powers as now exercised by the Defence Secretary.

Functions of the Chief of Defence Staff

The major functions of the Chief of Defence Staff (an officer of the rank of Field Marshal or its equivalent) are described below :

- (a) He is the Principal Military Adviser to the Minister of Defence on all matters concerning the Military Executive and for all War operations (i.e. external security).
- (b) He is responsible for the co-ordination of work of the three Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, of which he will be Chairman.
- (c) He is responsible for the conduct of military operation in War, and the conduct of training in peace. For this, he shall be assisted by a small combined Armed Forces Headquarters.

One of the privileges of the Chiefs of Staff which they now enjoy which will continue unimpaired by this first reform will be that the Chiefs of Staff will continue to be in attendance at all meetings of the Defence Committee, and may be invited to attend meetings of the full Cabinet as necessary.

In addition, the Chief of Defence Staff will be responsible for :

- (a) ensuring that military matters affecting the responsibilities of the Chiefs of Staff are referred to them for consideration.
- (b) Keeping the Chiefs of Staff informed of the views of the Minister of Defence and for keeping the Minister of Defence informed of the view of the Chiefs of Staff.
- (c) Seeking from the Minister such decisions as are required.
- (d) Arranging representation of India, where appropriate, at International Conferences.
- (e) In War, operational orders will be issued in the name of the Chief of Defence Staff as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Consequential, or single Service orders will be issued under the authority of the individual Chiefs of Staff.

Further details of the responsibilities of the proposed Chief of Defence Staff are given in Appendix 'A'.

GAINS AND LOSSES

In the implementation of the First Great Reform, there will, naturally, be an adjustment of status and powers which will be perceived as 'gains' and 'losses' by both the civil and military executives. These are listed below :

- (a) The Chiefs of Staff 'lose' a certain amount of status, but 'gain' correspondingly in executive power.

- (b) The Defence Secretary 'loses' a certain amount of executive power, but 'gains' correspondingly in status.

A closer view, however, will show that neither the military executive, nor the civil executive 'lose' anything at all in a total sense; that the whole defence system 'gains' a joint power by this reform.

Balance of Power

It would thus be seen that the FIRST GREAT REFORM will lead to a perfect balance of power between the civil service executive and the military service executive, both under the overall control of the political executive, responsible, as before, to the people of the country through the processes of parliamentary democracy.

Thus, the status, powers and responsibilities of the Secretary General Defence will be exactly the same as that of the Chief of Defence Staff; the one as the Principal Civil Adviser, the other as the Principal Military Adviser to the Defence Minister.

The status, powers, and responsibilities of the Secretaries to the various civil departments in the Defence Ministry become precisely equal to those of three Service Chiefs. *In addition, the three Service Chiefs shall be delegated full financial powers, thus permanently resolving the fundamental "crisis of autonomy" that the Armed Forces are now passing through, and setting the stage for the Second Great Reform* required to place the higher defence mechanisms of the country on the path of a national collaboration for the rapid growth of military strength of the country through the method and means of science and technology.

Distribution of responsibilities and work

The detailed re-distribution of responsibility for work of the three Service Headquarters and the proposed new Department of Defence Administration and the Chief of Defence Staff are placed in Appendix 'A'.

SECOND GREAT REFORM

"The tools of the mind become burdens when the environment which once made them necessary no longer exist. It is the old which prevents us from recognising the new".

Functional and Executive unity in Defence

Neither the military executive nor the civil executive, preoccupied as they are with the culture of the past, and the imperative of day-to-day problems, can have failed to notice, within the Defence Ministry, a growth over the last 20 years or so, of a "scientific executive" and a "technological executive". Science and technology, in its widest sense, have arrived to stay as a permanent feature of the defence mechanism.

Much rhetoric has been recorded over these years on the impact of science and technology on the wars of the future. Nuclear deterrence, delivery systems, satellite communications, precision munitions, death rays—this is the jargon of the age. To us in India, they are more of intellectual significance, rather than a credible threat to physical security of the individual and nations. But the conflicts of the world have closed in on our borders. At least some of these concepts may soon turn out to be horrifying reality, which will catch the country unprepared. The reason is that defence technology, organised and growing on the traditional lines of the past, in vast watertight compartment has not yet recognised the need for a unified executive control of Defence Science and Technology which will make national defence a genuine functional unity.

There is a growing realisation that within the defence ministry, science and technology have delivered the goods — but the basic problem of the day is the acceptance of, and absorption into the three Services, of modern, complex, sophisticated weapon system. Science and technology in defence finds that this process of assimilation of indigenously developed weapons systems has come up against massive resistances to acceptance and absorption for use and further growth that comes inevitably when the acceptance gap is closed.


From where does this resistance to acceptance of the need for self-reliance in defence technology emanate? It is seen that the solution to this problem awaits the implementation of the proposed SECOND GREAT REFORM, the restoration of a FUNCTIONAL AND EXECUTIVE UNITY between the three Services on the one hand, and the DRDO, Defence Supply, Production, and Inspection Departments, on the other. ¶

“The equation of defence”, said Jawaharlal Nehru in 1955 “is your defence forces, plus, your industrial and technological background, plus, thirdly the economy of the country, and fourthly, the spirit of the people.”

The second major reform proposes an organised method to realise the ‘plus’ of science and technology to the Defence Forces. As before, before proposing any fundamental change, the pattern of growth of science and technology is to be conceptualised for this analysis.

A study of Table 2 shows that the ways of evolution in science are distinct from the ways of evolution of technology. Each is impelled, as it were to pass through distinct growth stages, the passage in each case calling for special intellectual powers. The consequences, and not so much the ways, of evolution of *science* are of vital importance to the armed forces. But the ways and the consequences of growth of *technology* are critically important to the defence services.

Two important axioms flow from a careful study and understanding of Table 2. These are :



STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF SCIENCE
& TECHNOLOGY
TABLE 2

NOTE :
THE POWER OF "ACCEPTANCE"
AND "COMMUNICATION" IS LEAST
DEVELOPED IN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Axiom No. 1

From now onwards, defence will be a field of endeavour which will demand the service of major intellectual disciplines.

Axiom No. 2

The acceptance of indigeneous technology for absorption and use by the armed forces will be the critical factor in the evolution of self-reliant defence oriented technology in India.


The first axiom calls for reviewing traditional concepts that the armed forces officers is selected more for the qualities of the vital warrior than for the qualities of the intellectual. In the years to come, the growth of a technology oriented military organisation will be prominent in the way that specialist support functions (where work will be rooted in civil rather than military tradition) will have to outnumber combat functions. This situation will, and already is, creating major stresses and strains in the traditionalist military management cultures. Both the civil as well as military executive have to accept the need for large scale intellectual advancement in the armed forces.

The second axiom would call for a greater involvement in, nearly amounting to an ultimate responsibility for the development of defence oriented technology by the military executive itself. The only credible means of achieving this would be a redistribution of functions and responsibility with the scientific and technological executive. This concept of joint responsibility would have to be based on the military executive being responsible for the direction and orientation of weapon system development to the ultimate missions of defence, while the scientific/technology executive is made responsible for the method of accomplishment of these missions.

Functional unity of the Scientific/Technological Executive

Arising out of this axiomatic analysis, the following reforms are proposed in the domain of relationships between the military executive and the scientific/technological executive in the Ministry of Defence. The principle of this unity of executive control is shown in Fig. 9.

- (a) Every major scientific and technological establishment in the defence ministry shall be unified with the service concerned by the means of redistribution of functions for joint military executive and civil technological control.
- (b) The Director of every scientific/technological establishment shall be responsible to the Secretary of Defence Research/Secretary of Defence Production for :—
 - (i) The priorities and techniques of research/development/production.
 - (ii) The career advancement of all civilian staff.
 - (iii) The build-up of scientific and technological competence in the specialised field of the establishment concerned.




ORGANISATION FOR FUNCTIONAL UNITY OF MILITARY AND SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL ESTABLISHMENTS

FIG. 9

- (c) The Chief of Staff, through a Vice Chief, shall be directly responsible for the executive control of specific scientific/technological establishments through an Executive Director who shall be uniformed Service Officer on tenure.
- (d) The pay and professional status of the civilian Director shall, if necessary, be higher than that of the Service Executive Director.
- (e) The Service Executive Director shall be responsible to the Chief of Staff concerned for the accomplishment of specific technological missions.
- (f) The money for specific service programmes shall be supplied and controlled by the Chief of Staff, the money for specific scientific/technological competence build-up programmes shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of Defence Research/Defence Production.
- (g) For undertaking specific large scale technological programmes such as tactical/strategic missiles, submarines, etc a special cadre of Programme Managers shall be created to operate under the direct control of a Secretary (Technology Co-ordination) who may be either a service officer or a civilian officer (structure in Chart 1).

- (h) A Defence University shall be created for evolving a new breed of intellectuals among the military executive and the scientific executive. The control of the University shall rest jointly with the Chief of Defence Staff and the Secretary Defence Research (Fig. 10).



STRUCTURE FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN ARMED FORCES

FIG. 10

- (j) The recruitment of scientists/technologists to the various establishments and civil departments in the Defence Ministry shall be only from appropriately qualified Short Service Commissioned officers who have completed 3—7 years of satisfactory military service.

RESTRUCTURING OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS

The proposed restructuring of the Ministry of Defence so as to embody the principles of the two Great Reforms is shown in Chart 1.

An intimate study of this structure will reveal that the basic objectives of the proposed reforms have been met in this new unified organisational structure, which were :

- (a) Balance of executive power between the civil executive services and the military executive services resulting in a vastly greater joint power.
- (b) Functional Unification of the Military executive services with the scientific/technological executive services.

The new structure demarks with great clarity not only the paths of flow of executive power, but places the complex relationships between the organisations of responsibility, decision, management, consultation, control, inspection and operations in their proper perspectives.

CONCLUSION

Complex systems with long histories and strong traditions are always vulnerable to damage during periods of doubts and change. The Armed Forces of India, in historical perspective are now passing through an internal "crisis of autonomy" in the course of their 380 years of growth, and therefore are most vulnerable to irreparable damage in this period of massive social change.

The orderly evolution of the Indian Armed Forces is not a narrow professional problem, but it is one of the questions underlying the survival of our nation. Far greater dedication to the military-technological profession, in an integrated sense, is now needed in order to stay at peace than was once required for war.

The global military balance of power has once again shifted. The violence of global conflict is now poised on the land and sea borders of India.

A conscious choice has to be made by the nation to accelerate the growth of our military strength by a process of national collaboration. This process should emphasise greater spontaneity in management action through civil-military, and scientific-military teams, and the skilful confrontation of interpersonal differences. Social control and self-discipline should take over from formal control in many facets of defence organisation.

Two vital and immediate major reforms are required to be debated, decided upon, and implemented with speed. They are :

- (a) restoring the balance of executive power between the civil executive services and the military executive services. While greatly increasing their joint power, the lesson of the Kitchner-Curzon conflict of 1906 and its resolution by the then Secretary of State for Britain should not be lost sight of by the political executive today. This is the vital Gordian Knot to be once again untied.
- (b) Functional unification of the existing highly compartmentalised scientific and technological services with the military services in the Defence Ministry, by a structure and a method which will ensure a balanced military executive responsibility for technological evolution of defence interest.

These steps are not alien to the spiritual tradition of our civilisation, to our parliamentary democracy, or to our nation's foreign policy. They fall into the pattern of evolutionary progress of mankind. Ignoring the impulses for a conscious acceleration of the growth stages of the armed forces organisation in this critical phase (where internal and external crisis are synchronising), will be the invitation to another Dark Age for India.

APPENDIX 'A'

REDISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY, WORK AND FUNCTIONS OF EXISTING MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

As discussed in the body of this paper, there is a need to avoid dual jurisdiction of authority and control between the Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces Headquarters.

The existing functions, authority and work of the Defence Ministry (Ref. 1 and Fig. 5) are redistributed to the Army, Navy, Air Force Headquarters; and the proposed Secretary, Defence Administration and Chief of Defence Staff as follows :—

EXISTING AUTHORITY AND WORK OF DEFENCE MINISTRY PROPOSED TO BE DELEGATED TO ARMY HEADQUARTERS

1. Discipline and welfare of Army Personnel
2. Security
3. Quartering of troops
4. Printing and stationery
5. Military Farms Remounts Veterinary
6. Supply and transport
7. Military movement
8. Canteen Stores
9. Planning of Army Works and projects, Army Works budget.
10. Recruitment and term & conditions of service of Army Personnel.
11. Pay and allowances of Army personnel
12. Administration of Army Headquarters
13. Military Secretary's Branch
14. Infantry Weapons and Equipment
15. Weapons Evaluation Directorate Work
16. Armoured Corps, Artillery and Signal Directorate
17. Cantonment work
18. Army Budget

EXISTING AUTHORITY AND WORK OF DEFENCE MINISTRY PROPOSED TO BE DELEGATED TO NAVAL HEADQUARTERS

1. Navy projects
2. Navy establishment and works
3. Navy stores

4. Navy cruises and operations
5. Security
6. Recruitment and terms and conditions of Navy personnel
7. Discipline and welfare of Navy personnel
8. Pay and allowances
9. Navy budget.


**EXISTING AUTHORITY AND WORK OF DEFENCE MINISTRY
PROPOSED TO BE DELEGATED TO AIR HEADQUARTERS**

1. Air Force personnel policy
2. Air Force reserves
3. Air Force organisation
4. Policy and Plans
5. Air Force works
6. Air Force operations
7. Provisioning of petrol, oil & lubricants in Air Force
8. Air Force budget
9. Air Force accounts
10. Recruitment and training of Air Force personnel
11. Provision of MT, Rations etc
12. Discipline and welfare
13. Pay and allowances

**EXISTING AUTHORITY AND WORK OF DEFENCE MINISTRY TO
BE DELEGATED TO THE PROPOSED CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF**

1. DGAMFMS and Medical Directorate
2. Military Training including NDA, Sainik Schools etc.
3. Combined Military Operations
4. Staff duties
5. Joint Intelligence Committee
6. Inter-Service Organisations
7. National Cadet Corps and Auxilliary Cadet Corps
8. Planning
9. Defence budget
10. Ceremonials including work related to Republic Day etc
11. Military Intelligence Directorate
12. Military Attaches
13. Indian contingents abroad
14. Territorial Army
15. Border Defence and Operations
16. Maintenance of War Book

BALANCED AND UNIFIED ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE MINIST



**EXISTING AUTHORITY AND WORK OF DEFENCE MINISTRY
TO BE DELEGATED TO PROPOSED SECRETARY
DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION**

1. Administration and contracts of MES
2. Military lands
3. Pensions—policy claims, appeals of officers and ORs
4. Service pension and gratuity of service personnel
5. Vigilance cases
6. Civilians in lower formations—pay and allowances. discipline, retrenchment, central manpower board, recruitment, confirmation, promotion.
7. Staff welfare
8. Exhibitions
9. Parliamentary affairs
10. Co-ordination in connection with Emergency, legislature etc
11. Foreign aid matters.

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Nuclear Weapons—Options for South Asia

Lieut. Gen. A.M. VOHRA (Retd.)

FOR a few years the USA held a monopoly of nuclear weapons until in 1949, the USSR joined the nuclear club. Since 1964, the USA, the USSR, the UK, France and China are the five declared nuclear weapon powers. It is suspected that there are, in addition, some clandestine nuclear powers, such as South Africa and Israel. A number of other countries are considered to be on the verge of achieving nuclear weapon capability.

Many analysts have deliberated on the reasons that make nations go for or consider the nuclear weapons option. Nuclear weapons have added a new dimension to deterrence. In case of the super powers, nuclear arsenals have become the basic criteria of their military strength. Mutual assured destruction (MAD) has ensured a balance of terror and has avoided a direct conflict. Wars by proxy have been restricted to conventional weapons. Apart from deterrence, nuclear intimidation of a non-nuclear adversary is a possible reason. Among a large list of other reasons, a very plausible one is status and political influence. Among the countries of the third world, most of which are anxious to preserve status quo, deterrence is likely to be primary motive.

As long as the nuclear 'haves' restrict their efforts to control nuclear proliferation only to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to continue. It is an unequal treaty. "Forms of abstinence, which apparently do not apply to the nuclear 'haves' are urged upon potential nuclear powers.¹" When the NPT was presented, the non-nuclear weapon states held a conference in August-September, 1968, and asked for more specific undertakings in nuclear arms control. A comprehensive ban on testing of nuclear weapons was sought as also a halt to development of nuclear weapons, delivery systems and reduction followed by subsequent elimination of atomic weapon stockpiles. The actual developments are too well known to bear repetition. Vertical proliferation continues unabated. At present the counter-force objective is the motivating factor for better performance weapons. It is estimated that the number of strategic nuclear warheads with the two super powers will increase to almost 20,000 by the end of this decade.

1. Marwah, Schulz—Editors *Nuclear Proliferation and the Nuclear Countries*, Cambridge, Mass 1975, Page 1.

Both India and Pakistan are perceived as countries on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapons. It is also believed that both are facing fissile material as well as technological problems and that it may take 5 to 10 years to achieve this capability. There is, therefore, still time to debate the issue which will have far reaching effects on the region's economic and political development.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

The massive destruction caused by nuclear weapons is well known. The first atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 killed 60,000 Japanese and injured another 1,00,000. Almost the whole of the sea-port city of 2,50,000 people was destroyed. Since then, more destructive weapons of higher yield have been added to the arsenals of nuclear powers and different means of delivery have been developed.

A low yield weapon of 20 KT (20 Kilotons—equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT) delivered by air for a low burst over a city with a population of 30 lakhs would kill 5 lakhs immediately and another 8 lakhs over a period of time due to cancer, genetic injuries and other disorders. It is horrifying to visualise this and to imagine the devastation that would be caused by, let us say, an ICBM of 3 megaton warhead on a value target such as large city or a metropolis.

Tactical nuclear weapons used against purely military targets such as a defensive sector or a bridgehead in the field would cause no collectoral damage and the casualty figures would be of a size comparable to those caused in conventional warfare. The question however arises whether a nuclear weapon exchange can be controlled. Bundy, Keenan, McNamara, Gerard Smith, four former senior US officials in an article in the spring 1982 issue of 'Foreign Affairs' magazine advocating renunciation by Washington of the possible first use of nuclear weapons say that, "no one has ever succeeded in advancing any persuasive reason to believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain limited..... Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the Alliance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none".

The avoidance of collateral damage is certainly conducive to the control of escalation. However, even tactical strikes or highly selective demonstration bursts may produce an irrational response or a response against a quasi-strategic target leading to collateral damage and consequent escalation. Field Marshal Lord Carver and Prof. Michael Howard of Oxford have recently, in Nov. 1981, challenged the West's nuclear strategy. According to Lord Carver, "Ever since the Soviet Union gained the capability to answer back in kind.....to initiate a nuclear war would not redress or restore the situation. It would be an act of unredeemable folly". Because the West is

weaker in conventional forces, it relies on the first use of nuclear weapons to defend Europe against a Soviet attack. Prof Howard considers this doctrine not only morally dubious but politically and militarily incredible.

Deterrence and balance of terror

Deterrence aims at making war unprofitable by credible counter threats. Both in conventional weapons warfare and a nuclear weapon war, it is the ability of the adversary to deliver a telling counter riposte that deters an aggressor. The strategy of nuclear deterrence has gone through various stages in keeping with the nuclear weapon capability of the super powers and other members of the nuclear club. In the early 1950s, when the USSR had just acquired nuclear weapon capability (1949), the strategy of the USA was based on 'massive retaliation', that is an all out nuclear attack in case of Soviet aggression. As the Soviet nuclear weapon capability improved, the USA evolved the doctrine of 'flexible response' in 1957 which relegated the ultimate response to only such circumstances which made this unavoidable. In 1962 the doctrine of "assured destruction" was adopted as a deterrent against a Soviet first strike by developing a survivable second strike capability which could inflict unacceptable destruction. This strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD) established a balance of terror and ruled out the possibility of a nuclear war among the super powers.

However the nuclear arms race continued and search for better weapons of greater accuracy as well as lethality goes on. For some years (since 1974), the incentive has been counter-force ; precision nuclear weapons to destroy the adversaries nuclear force. This doctrine is based on a disarming first strike. This, in fact, is not achievable as both the Western Alliance as well as Warsaw pact would have at least a percentage of their mobile missiles, SLBMs for instance, intact to cause unacceptable damage.

The latest US concept of PD59 (Presidential Directive 59) which is more in the realm of war fighting rather than deterrence and seeks to limit the escalation of nuclear war. It is a combination of flexible response and counter-force. The Soviets have never accepted the strategy of a limited nuclear war. Like some Western strategists they are of the view that a nuclear exchange would lead to an all out use of nuclear weapons and a general holocaust. They do, however, subscribe to nuclear deterrence which permits a conventional war. This explains their belief in strong conventional forces.

Some of the other nuclear powers, because of their circumstances and smaller holdings, have evolved the concept of minimum deterrent. They feel that so long as they possess some mobile nuclear missiles (mainly sea based), with which they can hit back at value targets, a super power with high level holding of nuclear weapons would not use these against them as the retaliatory strike would not be acceptable.

In this plethora of doctrines of nuclear deterrence, logic would seem to lie in the inevitable escalation school of thought and MAD. The game of numbers would therefore appear to be meaningless. Whether the US retains the first use option or renounces it, controlled nuclear war fighting does not make sense. It is also clear that under various concepts of nuclear deterrence, conventional weapons war can take place and conventional equivalence will continue to be an objective of nuclear weapon nations.

Nuclear weapons and the third World

All the present members of the nuclear club have gone through a stage of low level holding. Lessons of their nuclear weapon deterrence and development are available to us. If a country of the Third World were to acquire 8 to 10 air deliverable 20 KT bombs, militarily this would make the position of a neighbouring non-nuclear weapon adversary untenable. In this situation of nuclear weapon asymmetry, the non-nuclear weapon state would be constantly under the shadow of nuclear blackmail. It would be inhibited from resorting to military action even when other courses have failed for fear of nuclear weapon retaliation which would cause unacceptable loss. If attacked, it would be deterred from delivering a strong and meaningful counter-riposte so as to carry the fighting to the enemy territory, again for fear of nuclear weapon retaliation.

On the other hand, if the adversary establishes a balance by acquiring a low level nuclear weapons capability, a situation will be created in which these will not be used in case of conflict. As neither state would be in position to accept the collateral damage that nuclear weapons would cause, a conflict is likely to be avoided and, if it does take place, it would be restricted to conventional weapons only.

Specifically, if Pakistan achieves even a low level nuclear weapons capability and we do not, our conventional deterrence will become ineffective. Statements that a non-nuclear weapon state could meet a low level nuclear threat by strengthening its conventional forces ignore the logic of nuclear terror. Moral consideration and world opinion would not count for much if military defeat was imminent in conventional weapons warfare. In such circumstances, nuclear weapons state would resort to use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. It should, therefore, be evident that if either Pakistan or India were to acquire nuclear weapons, the other would be impelled to do the same and thus restore balance. Both countries are conscious of this and are taking preparatory measures for this eventuality.

Pattern of development

Acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead to a nuclear arms race. In the initial stages the delivery system would be limited to aircraft but the development of intermediate range missiles, intercontinental missiles and

submarine launched missiles would follow. The pattern of development followed by France, for instance, is likely to emerge. France went nuclear in 1960 and by 1965, it had 80-100 nuclear warheads of 20KT yield. In the late sixties, its strategic force was limited to 50 Mirage IV. By 1970, it had added 18 MRBMs and 3 nuclear powered missile submarines with 16 missiles each. According to "The Military Balance 1981/82", it has 5 SLBMs, 18 MRBMs and 6 squadrons of Mirage bombers with AW-22 nuclear bombs.

This then is what might well happen in South Asia if either India or Pakistan develops nuclear weapons capability; a nuclear arms race which would be over and above the ongoing conventional weapons race. Since a nuclear weapons balance tends to prevent a nuclear arms war, in such circumstances, a resort to arms by nuclear weapons countries in the Third world is likely to be restricted to conventional weapons. The competitive build up of conventional arms continues. It is not offset by nuclear arms.

Spiralling defence budgets

As it is defence spending of India and Pakistan has been going up over the years. A look at the 1964/65 as well as 1981/82 figures shows that the defence budgets of India and Pakistan have gone up from Rs. 893 crores and 129 crores respectively to Rs. 4200 crores and Rs. 1520 crores respectively. The 1982/83 figures would be even more telling.

Some idea of the costs involved in acquiring nuclear weapons can be had from the French experience. The French nuclear programme upto 1970, that is, the first 10 years, cost \$12 billion (equivalent to \$40 billion in today's money). It is often said that a country of our size and resources would have no difficulty in financing a progressive nuclear weapons programme. There is no doubt that if we decided to acquire nuclear weapons resources would be found but it would be at the cost of development. In this context, it is pertinent to mention that the report of a study group of 24 governmental experts appointed by Secretary General of UNO on the direction of the special session devoted to disarmament (SSD-I), concludes that there exists a strong conceptual relationship between disarmament and development.

Options for South Asia

All that India and Pakistan would achieve by both the countries going in for the nuclear weapons option is a state of nuclear arms balance. It is clear that if one of the two countries acquires nuclear weapons, the other will follow suit. Leaving aside the controversial issues of prestige and political influence, the only concrete result of this course of action would be nuclear arms balance, a state which exists in a way today, when neither of the two countries has the nuclear capability.

India's attitude to the NPT and the issue of universal nuclear arms disarmament is just. As there is no sign of achieving this objective, it has

announced its proposal of global freeze on nuclear arms to be placed before SSD II. In light of this, it would be pragmatic to keep South Asia free of weapons of mass destruction. While there is still time, India and Pakistan should give top priority to achieve an understanding on this issue and accept mutual inspections to ensure compliance of nuclear arms ban. South Asia should be declared a nuclear arms free Zone.

Although China is not part of South Asia, its nuclear arms programme is of relevance to our region particularly in view its close relationship with Pakistan. However, it is clear that the main reasons for China's going in for nuclear arms stockpiling is defensive vis a vis Russia. In any case we should avoid making the South Asian situation more complicated by both India and Pakistan developing nuclear weapon capability.

India's Policy Towards Arab-Israeli Conflict

Dr. BHARAT KUMAR*

INDEPENDENT India's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict has been governed basically by the historical attitude of the Indian National Congress, which led country's independence movement and formed the government, towards the Palestine problem. The resolutions adopted by the Indian National Congress in its annual session of 1938 and 1939 appealing to the Jews "not to seek the shelter of the British Mandatory and not to allow themselves to be exploited in the interest of British imperialism" and wishing Palestinian Arabs, "complete success in attainment of their objective", indicated the pro-Arab position of the party.

Indian leaders during British rule sympathised with the aspirations of the Arab people and were in full agreement with them on the colonial question. Nehru's abiding interest in Asian resurgence and world affairs led to establishing personal contacts with Egyptian, Syrian and Iraq's nationalist leaders. Fraternal delegations from Egypt, Iran, Syria and Palestine usually attended Indian National Congress sessions in the pre-independence days.

Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru and Azad, who took keen interest in West Asia, consistently upheld the cause of the Arabs. Gandhiji, though sympathized with the Jews, was opposed to the idea of the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine with big power connivance. On 26 November 1938, he wrote in his paper *Harijan* : "The cry for the national home for Jews does not make much appeal to me. Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to English and France to the French. It is wrong to impose the Jews on the Arabs." In the same vein Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that "Palestine is an Arab country and Arab interests must prevail there".¹ All these had great influence in shaping India's official attitude towards the West Asian problems after independence.

It was Nehru's basic faith that India needed closer links with the Arab world even at the risk of losing support of pro-Israeli camp. He held that Israel was a creation of those who still believed in imperialism and pursued the policy of divide and rule in Asia. It was for this reason that at the United

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¹ The Hindu (Madras), 17 December, 1938.

Nations in 1947, the Indian delegation argued first for the federal state of Palestine and when that plan failed, for recognition of Palestine as an independent state, with wide autonomy for Jews in the areas where they were in majority.

Origin of the Arab-Israeli Crisis :

India's involvement in the Arab-Israeli crisis started with her appointment as one of the member of eleven member United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP). In September 1947, UNSCOP submitted two plans for the solution of the problem. While the majority plan favoured the partition of Palestine in two states, the minority plan suggested setting of federal system with Jewish and Palestinian units.² Indian representative on the Commission pleaded that the partition of Palestine would not lead to any lasting solution and expressed doubts even about the political viability of the two states. As India considered the partition of Palestine impracticable, unworkable and anti-Arab, its representative supported the minority plan claiming that it recognized the nationalist aspirations of both the Arabs and Jews, and at the same time preserved the unity of Palestine. India along with Afro-Asian states voted against the adoption of partition resolution in the General Assembly on 29 November 1947.³ Indian support for the Arab cause was based on moral and practical considerations. India had supported the liberation movements in Afro-Asian countries and the cause of the local inhabitants in Palestine. With bitter experience of partition India could not support the idea of imposition of outsiders on Arab land leading to division of Palestine lands. The idea of an independent State of Israel never found favour with Indian Government which saw Zionism to be a form of Western imperialism.

The emergence of the State of Israel led to the first Arab-Israeli conflict as a result of which the post-armistice Israel became larger than was proposed by UN resolution. The Arab zone was completely absorbed by Jordan and Egypt. The eviction of over a million Palestinians from their homes created refugee problem. India rejected the Israeli position regarding its boundaries and favoured restoration of Palestinian rights. It favoured the solution of the problem through peaceful means. India having deep sympathies for Palestine refugees, consistently supported Arab demand concerning their rehabilitation. India strongly believed that the problem had arisen because of UN decision to partition the Palestine against the wishes of the large majority of population.

² *UNSCOP was appointed by UN General Assembly on 15 May, 1947 to submit proposals for the solution of Palestine problem. India alongwith Iran and Yugoslavia supported the minority plan.*

³ *Resolution 181 (II). It was basically on the lines suggested by the majority report with some territorial modifications. The partition plan was approved by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions.*

Awareness of the reality that existence of the independent State of Israel was a fact, India granted recognition to Israel in September 1950. But this recognition was qualified and dominated by considerations of Indian National interests.

Military Pacts and the Suez Crisis

In the fifties, India's foreign policy became practically oriented due to her awareness concerning security requirements and world torn in cold war between two power blocs. India faced two fold challenge to her political and security interests in her relations with the West Asian region. While British attempts to bring about military pacts to safeguard, its oil and colonial interests in the region threatened to bring East-West cold war at India's door-steps, the Pakistani design to isolate India from the Arab world by arousing the sentiments of Islamic solidarity alerted India to the possible consequences of Pan-Islamism. The Arab nationalist leaders, who believed these moves to be part of calculated Western moves to prolong their military and political supremacy in the region, reacted in a hostile manner.

India's strategic interests required that West Asian region should be friendly and enjoy peace and stability. Strategy involved India's relations with her neighbour Pakistan which posed a serious threat to India's security after it became member of the Baghdad Pact in 1954. India's desire to prevent Pakistan from gaining the sympathy and support of the Muslim countries of the region on issues such as Kashmir and other Indo-Pak tensions forced her to come closer to the non-aligned pan-Arabist forces led by President Nasser of Egypt. India's diplomacy also sought to abort the Pakistani efforts in forming and leading a Muslim bloc from which it could gain active support for its cause.

The crisis in West Asia aggravated when President Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal on 19 July 1956 as a retaliation to US Secretary of State Mr. Dulles's withdrawal of US offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam. India was not critical of Nasser's action of nationalization of Suez as it regarded Nasser's act as signal of "weakening of the European powers' domination over West Asia". Nehru rather greeted this act and remarked "Asia is on the march and is emerging to take rightful place in world affairs". In accordance with her policy of peaceful co-existence, India made concerted efforts to counsel moderation on all sides and to help resolve the dispute to the satisfaction of Egypt and canal users.

Indian approach to the Suez question in 1956 was related to national self-interest as well as the desire to assist and contribute to the peaceful settlement of the question. The closure of Suez Canal temporarily upset India's second five year plan. Referring to India's interest in the crisis, Nehru remarked in the Lok Sabha on 31 July 1956 : "India is not a disinterested

party. She is a principal user of this waterway and her economic life and development is not unaffected by the dispute."

At the London Conference held during 16-23 August, the Indian representative sought to evolve a peaceful solution which would safeguard the legitimate interests of the canal users without detracting from the sovereign rights of Egypt. V.K. Krishna Menon while presenting Indian Plan said that India's approach to the Suez question was dictated by considerations of national interest and by the desire to assist and contribute to a peaceful settlement of the question as about 76 per cent of India's total imports and 70 per cent of exports passed through the Suez Canal.⁴

Interruption of these efforts by the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt evoked a sharp reaction in India. The threat by the neo-colonialist forces represented by the invading forces posed a challenge to India's known stand against colonial and imperialist forces. Nehru publicly branded it as a case of "clear naked aggression and reversion to the past colonial methods". Speaking in Lok Sabha on 19 November he termed the great power intervention as "gross and brutal exercise of violence and armed might" against weaker countries and remarked that it in fact challenged the "conscience of the world". V.K. Krishna Menon while speaking on this issue in Lok Sabha on 26 March, 1957 termed the Anglo—French action in Egypt as not only contrary to UN Charter, but "to any kind of civilized law", and termed it as "wantonly brutal". He further stated, "Our position with regard to the Middle East is exactly the same as in Kashmir, that is, you cannot establish rights by invasion ; that conquest does not confer any legal rights."

Government of India immediately pressed its diplomatic efforts to halt aggression as well as to get the invading forces withdrawn from Egyptian territory. India played a conciliatory and constructive role throughout the Suez crisis. It played an important role in the UN in securing the withdrawal of the British—French and Israeli forces from the Egyptian soil. For India the major issue was whether it was right and proper for great powers to try to impose their will over small and weak Powers. India considered the act of Anglo—French forces as an illustration of 'an old, familiar evil, a revival of 'old style colonialism.' India's very active and constructive role in the conflict over the Suez canal in the latter part of 1956 as well as lending of an Indian contingent to the UN Emergency Force in Egypt was as much motivated by self-interest as an important user of the canal as by considerations of the rest of the world.

India's Response to June 1967 War

Suez crisis ended with vacation of the invading forces and stationing of United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on the Israeli—Egyptian borders

⁴ The Suez Canal Crisis and India (*New Delhi : Information Service of India, 1956*).

on the Egyptian territory in Gaza. But the crisis persisted with border skirmishes on both Arabs and Israeli sides. The situation deteriorated in May 1967, when UN Secretary General U Thant ordered the withdrawal of UNEF from Egypt's territory in response to Egypt's request. As India was opposed to any move for supranational status for the UN, it therefore supported U Thant's decision to accede to Egyptian request for withdrawal of international forces.

India supported Nasser's move to close the Gulf of Aqaba and agreed with UAR's stand that Strait of Tiran was a part of its territorial waters. India's representative in the UN, G. Parthasarathi told the Security Council that "no state or group of states should attempt by force to challenge the sovereignty of the U.A.R. over Strait of Tiran." India's approach to the problem was to concentrate on the maintenance of peace and to evolve peaceful conventions for the use of the disputed Gulf for innocent shipping, while recognising the sovereignty of the countries concerned. Even before the war started, India extended full support to the Arab cause and Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 21 May, 1967 reiterated India's support to the Arabs. In a statement in Lok Sabha on 25 May, External Affairs Minister, Chagla declared that: "The creation of Israel has given rise to tension between Israel and the Arab countries". Although India affirmed its general support to the cause of the Palestinian Arabs, it also appealed to the nations involved for moderation for the sake of peace.

Once the war broke out, India concentrated its efforts for restoring of peace in the region and withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas occupied by them. On 5 June, India moved a draft resolution in the Security Council which called upon "the Governments concerned to take all steps necessary to effect a cease-fire forthwith and withdraw their armed forces immediately to posts they occupied on June 4".

Israeli pre-emptive action in June against Egypt signalled the beginning of third Arab-Israeli war which lasted for six days. India openly sided with the Arabs and took the position that Israel was the aggressor in the conflict since it struck the first blow. "I do not wish to utter harsh words or use strong language", Mrs. Gandhi said in the Lok Sabha on 6 June, but "on the basis of the information available, there can be no doubt that Israel has escalated the situation into an armed conflict, which has now acquired the proportion of a full-scale war.

Since India believed in the peaceful solution of disputes, it disapproved of a pre-emptive strike or a preventive war, which was against the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. Israel resort to arms meant a breach of principles enshrined in Art. 2, para 4 of the UN Charter which unequivocally stated that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state".

India considered the Israeli attack in anticipation as totally unjustified and essentially aimed at gaining a new status quo and balance of power in the region. India considered the Israeli action as against international law, practice and morality.

Justifying Indian policy towards the West Asian crisis, External Affairs Minister M.C. Chagla remarked in House of People on 18 July, that it was in consonance with both right and just and India's national interests. He observed :

The justice of the Arab cause and our own interests dictated the policy we pursued...and the reason why India stood by Nasser, and stands by Nasser, is because he represented certain forces and we must support. These are the forces of progress, of socialism, of non-alignment, of secularism.

In the United Nations, India stressed the need for lasting peace and wanted Israel to withdraw its armed forces to the positions held before the commencement of the hostilities. Chagla criticized Israeli resort to war and called upon UN not to permit the aggressor to retain the fruits of aggression and allow her to acquire Arab territory to bargain from a position of strength. He said that "rights can't be established, territorial disputes can not be settled, nor boundaries adjusted through armed conflict". He further stated that "no aggressor should be permitted to retain the fruits of its aggression" and no country should be allowed to "bargain from a position of strength"⁵. Speaking at the emergency session of the UN General Assembly, Mr. Chagla, on 21 June, remarked :

The foundation of a lasting peace in the region can be based only on a total, immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the areas now under its occupation....

He made it clear that India was not against the people of Israel. Referring to India's objective attitude towards Israel, he added, that India was the "only large state in western, southern and South East Asia to recognize Israel". But India was opposed to "The concept of a preemptive strike or a preventive war...is contrary to the letter and spirit of the UN Charter....What Israel has done is to confront the world with a fait accompli...."⁶

India's representative in the UN, Mr. G. Parthasarthy, while speaking on the three power draft resolution (S/8227) on 7 November 1967, stressed the need for the principles of withdrawal, non-belligerency and secure borders. Pointing out the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force, he said that any decision which left our territories occupied by military

⁵ *Foreign Affairs Record*, June 1967, p. 71.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

conquest from the provision of withdrawal would not be acceptable to India.⁷ India voted for the British sponsored resolution (S.C. Res. 242) on 22 November 1967 with clear understanding that it upheld the above mentioned principles. Mrs. Gandhi, while addressing the General Assembly on 14 October 1967, also stressed the need for solving the problem by 'political means' based on the principles of security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the area.⁸ In a T.V. interview in New York on 25 October 1970, Mrs. Gandhi denied that India was anti-Israel. She said, Israel, India felt, had every right to exist, but it should live in peace and understanding with its neighbours. Addressing the non-aligned nations meet at Algiers, on 6 September 1973, she again declared India's support for the "just cause of Arab people for return of their occupied lands and for restoration of inalienable rights of the people of Palestine and advised Israel to "realise that it cannot purchase security by incurring the hostility of its neighbours"⁹.

Indian policy during the June crisis was based on the principled opposition to acquisition of land by force. India was critical of Israel for resorting to pre-emptive strike and initiating the war. It wanted Israel to withdraw to pre-June frontiers so that progress could be made to resolve the crisis. India stressed this point at various international forums. Indian policy was not anti-Israel as India had recognized the state of Israel and at no stage advocated or supported the demand for its destruction as a state. But India made it clear that there could be no solution to the problem until Israel withdrew from territories occupied by force during the 1967 war.

October War—Continuation of India's Policy

Though on 8 October 1973, Egypt and Syria for the first time took the initiative in attacking Israel, India supported the Arab cause, as she felt that their action could not be termed as aggression, as Israel had provoked the war by not adopting a more flexible attitude in negotiating peace settlement. Government's official policy was contained in a statement on the eruption of fighting which declared "that the cause of tension in the area is Israeli aggression and refusal to vacate the territories occupied by armed force. This intransigence on the part of Israel is clearly the basic cause leading to the present outbreak of hostilities", Declaring India's sympathies with the Arabs, it further said that Arabs "cause is based on justice" and amended "immediate implementation by Israel of United Nations resolution 242 (1967)" for peaceful solution of the problem.¹⁰ Justifying Arabs' initiative in starting the war, India's permanent representative in the U.N. Samar Sen remarked :

⁷ S/PV/173, Yr.22, pp. 73-75.

⁸ *Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi* (New Delhi, 1971), p. 358.

⁹ *India & Foreign Review* (New Delhi), 15 September 1973, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Foreign Affairs Record*, October 1973, p. 357.

What Egypt and Syria are doing is nothing more than upholding the provisions of the Charter in asserting their right to self-defence and to territorial integrity.¹¹

While conceding Israeli right to exist as a sovereign state, he on 21 October demanded immediate vacation of Arab territories and a proper settlement of the rights of the Palestinian people.

The attitude of Indian political parties was identical with that of 1967 war. While ruling Congress party and Leftist parties whole-heartedly supported the Arabs, the Rightist parties were critical of Government's attitude and favoured Israel's viewpoint. Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, while speaking in Rajya Sabha on 6 December 1973, justified India's sympathies for the Arabs because of "centuries old friendship" and occupation of their territories by "aggression". In his statement in the House of People on 21 December he declared India's firm opposition to Israeli "right to remain in occupation of the territories or others seized by forces" and declared that "a stable peace should be based on respect for the right of existence of all the states in the area and that the full rights of the Palestinians must be restored". On 8 October 1973, Mrs. Gandhi, while reiterating India's total sympathy with the Arab world, gave two reasons for Indian attitude. Firstly India's old and solid relations with Arabs required India to "stand by its friends in the time of their travail" and secondly Israel's refusal to vacate the Arab lands occupied in 1967 war and its refusal to honour UN resolutions.

The Janata Party leaders, however, had little experience about the formulation and execution of India's foreign policy. Even those leaders who had functioned as ministers in the Congress Government had never directly held charge of Foreign Affairs. A.B. Vajpayee, a former Jan Sangh leader with R.S.S. links became the Foreign Affairs Minister in Janta Government. Vajpayee, an important opposition leader, was staunch critic of India's pro-Arab policies and had been making irresponsible statements mainly to arouse Hindus feelings against the Arab world and discredit Jawaharlal Nehru and Krishna Menon and others. With his assumption of the charge of implementation of foreign policy it was felt that he would follow a foreign policy based on aggressive national chauvinism. Muslim countries of West Asia feared that the new Foreign Minister with his 'Hindu sectarian background' would be against the Muslim countries. As the system of foreign policy evolved and nurtured during the Congress rule had by and large functioned successfully, Prime Minister Morarji Desai, in his inaugural address to the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries in April 1977 declared that foreign policy was "an area of consensus not one of controversy".¹²

¹¹ Satish Kumar, ed., *Documents on India's Foreign Policy 1973* (New Delhi, 1976), p. 553.

¹² *Foreign Affairs Record*, April 1977, p. 35.

Allaying the fears of the Arab world, Vajpayee in his first foreign policy statement in the House of People on 29 June 1977, while initiating debate on the demands for grants of the Ministry of External Affairs, declared that the new government "shall not only continue to seek to maintain old links with the entire Arab world" but would further strengthen India's economic cooperation with them. He assured the Arabs that India would continue to lend her full support for a "just settlement of the West Asian problem based on UN Resolutions which require the vacation of occupied territory." Addressing the Plenary Session of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, at New Delhi, on 7 April 1977, he demanded that "Israel must vacate occupied Arab territories" and recognise the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people".¹³ In his address at the United Nations General Assembly on 4 October 1977, while suggesting a peaceful resolution of international disputes by negotiations, he expressed India's opposition to any aggressors enjoying the "fruits of aggression" and denial of "inalienable right of their homeland" to Palestinians.

Addressing a meeting of Indo-Arab League at Hyderabad on 29 January 1978 he emphatically declared that Israel was an aggressor and that it would vacate every inch of occupied land. He further said that for lasting peace, PLO should not be kept out of any negotiation.¹⁴ In a speech delivered at the Seminar held in Jawaharlal Nehru University on 13 May 1978, he declared that the Janata Government had continued the country's traditional policy in West Asia as it was a principled one and observed that Israel's aggressive acquisitions and claims, arising from the mists of Biblical history were untenable.¹⁵

To remove any apprehension in the Arab countries about any shift in India's foreign policy, the Prime Minister sent Sikandar Bakht, as his special emissary to the West Asian countries. Muslim population was another important factor which compelled the government to follow the established pro-Arab policy as Muslim population sympathised with the Arabs. But there were bound to be deviations in policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, though invisible, because of super powers stakes in the problem and presence of pro-western elements in the ruling Janata Party Government. These contradictions were bound to become apparent in practice of foreign policy. The whole Arab world was opposed to President Carter's and President Sadat's peace efforts at Camp David. Indian Prime Minister on 24 October 1978 commended these efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the West

¹³ A.B. Vajpayee, *New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policy* (Delhi, 1979), p. 85.

¹⁴ *The Hindu*, 3 January 1978.

¹⁵ Vajpayee, n. 13, p. 64. This point was again stressed at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-aligned Countries in Belgrade on 26 July 1978, by the External Affairs Minister.

Asian crisis. While expressing India's unhappiness over the US stand on Jerusalem, the External Affairs Minister commended Camp David efforts. Expressing doubts about its success in the face of hostile Arabs reaction, he expressed fears that it might create new tensions in the area.

Commenting on Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty in the House of People on 2 April 1979, Vajpayee underlined the basic requisities, to which India was committed, for lasting peace. He felt that the treaty in face of unanimous Arab hostility would jeopardise international peace and adversely affect the economy of the world. The treaty under the US auspices, he observed, fell short of a comprehensive solution of the West Asian crisis. He called upon the super powers to defuse the existing situation by pressurizing Israel in accordance with UN resolutions. During the visit of Egypt's Vice President Hosny Mubarak, who brought special message from President Sadat, Indian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister made it clear that India would support comprehensive solution of the problem and there would be no lasting solution without the creation of Palestine state. But they did not react sharply or oppose the US sponsored treaty as they did not want to invite hostility of Carter administration and annoy Egypt—a leading partner in the non-aligned movement. But the Defence Minister while addressing the Indo-Arab Cultural Relations Council at Lucknow, criticized the treaty for further complicating the West Asian peace and called upon Egypt to "take commendable step of breaking off from the treaty". But the Government has maintained diplomatic silence when US sponsored West Asian peace grounds were being prepared for Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty at Camp David. It was mainly due to the presence of dominant pro-West leaders and a certain group in the ruling class which had been anti-Arab throughout. But the difference in the political and ideological complexion of the Government came in the way of its drifting away from the well established principles of our foreign policy framed and implemented successfully during 30 years of Congress rule. Though so far Janata Government's overall response to the West Asian crisis was in harmony with our national interests, the lack of perspective because of lack of experience in the field of foreign affairs, tended the government to resort to policy of ad hocism in response to the continuing West Asian crisis. Continuity in our attitude towards the crisis had served country's interests in past and any attempt to alter it to appease Western powers at the cost of Arabs would have affected India's interests adversely.

With Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in 1980, Indian's traditional policy towards the Arab-Israel conflict was revived in principles as well as in spirits. The issue on Moshe Dayan's visit to India during Janata Party rule was successfully exploited by Mrs. Gandhi in her election speeches to attract Muslim voters towards Congress (I). The new Government reassured the Arab world to pursue its policy of friendship.

As the Saudi initiative was in line with India's general position, consistently stated from time to time, Indian Government on 20 November 1981,

welcomed the Fahd Plan as a "declaration of the basic principles of peace in West Asia." It lauded the Fahd Plan for recognition of the "Palestinian issue as one of the important elements of any comprehensive and durable West Asian settlement."

When the UN Security Council met on 16 December 1981, India called upon Israel to revoke immediately its decision to apply Israeli enactments to the Golan Heights. Indian Permanent Representative N. Krishnan extended full support and solidarity of the Government and people to Syria and commented that "the annexation of Golan Heights would inevitably lead to further sharp deterioration of the situation in West Asia, posing a new and imminent threat to international peace and security". It worked in the UN for the revocation of Israeli decision to annex the Syrian territories.

CONCLUSION

India's relationship with the West Asian countries have been subject to certain ideological affinity—anti-colonialism, opposition to military blocs and solidarity with Afro-Asian nations—as well as to deep historical, economic, cultural and political bonds. Because of India's cultural, political and economic stakes in the region, West Asia occupies a position of major importance for India's total foreign policy. Muslim population has shown deep concern in West Asian developments because of religious affinity. Domestic compulsions as well as difficult relations with Pakistan, were the factors which prompted Jawaharlal Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy, to pay special attention to develop friendly relations with the West Asian countries.

India consistently followed a pro-Arab policy in the power politics. At the time of the creation of Israel, India supported the Arab position on Palestine and voted against the partition of Palestine into "Arab and Jewish zones of Administration". During 1956 Suez crisis Indian support to Arabs was governed by ideological as well as moral grounds. Rejection of Israeli position regarding its boundaries and support for Palestinian rights determined Indian policy towards Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973.

Though India acknowledged Israel's right to exist and recognized the desirability of solving the Arab—Israeli conflict through peaceful means without resort to arms. she expressed her disapproval of Israeli military retaliation and Israel's annexation of Arab territories. India's alignment with nationalist Arab states which were committed to secular, social and democratic ideals has served both India's interests and goals.

The nationalization of Suez Canal, failure of the Baghdad Pact and the victory of secular nations and socialistic ideals in West Asia added prestige to our foreign policy. The liberation of Arab and African territories further advanced the relevance and utility of our own international politics.

Even the change of Government in March 1979 and assumption of power by pro-West Indian leaders having sympathies for Israel could not affect India's pro-Arab policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In spite of their deep urge to deviate, they had to continue with the same foreign policy which was conditioned by domestic as well as economic reasons.

Whatever the virtues or vices of India's foreign policy, any shift in our attitude would earn the hostility of the Arab world, help Pakistan and China in isolating India in the third world, lead to an erroneous impression in the Soviet bloc about our commitment to the policy of nonalignment, affect the country's economy and alienate the Muslim intelligentsia at home.

Leadership Patterns in Military and Industry — The Difference

Brigadier NB GRANT (*Retd.*)

"I would rather be in an army of industrial sheep led by a lion, than be in an army of military lions led by a sheep".

WHEN I first joined industry, I remember the pep talk given by my MD, in which he told me that, I would now have to forget the military type of leadership pattern, and adapt myself to the leadership form prevalent in industry. Having now been with industry for over 12 years, I have come to the conclusion that, there is really no difference in the exercising of leadership whether it be in the military or in industry. Any difference that does exist, is only in the realm of leadership training, and the emphasis given to certain leadership traits. Although effective leadership has always been a popular subject in the military, it is only in recent years, that industry has turned its attention to leadership to supplement its extensive knowledge of management.

Leadership and Management—The Difference

To begin with, it would be necessary to clear up an old controversy about the difference between leadership and management, as I feel that this is where the lacuna lies. The thought is now gaining ground that, whereas leadership embraces the whole area of directing men, management is only one of its many parts. In general, it can be said that, whereas management connotes the five functions of planning, organising, directing, co-ordinating and controlling the resources of men and material to accomplish a mission, leadership stresses the influencing and directing the men to accomplish that mission. To quote FM Slim, "the leader and the men who follow him represent one of the oldest, most natural and most effective of all human relationship; the manager and those he manages are a later product, with neither so romantic nor so inspiring a history. Leadership is of the spirit, compounded of personality and vision; its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, of statistics, methods, time-tables, and routines—its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential". A good system will produce efficient managers, but more than that is needed. We must find managers who are not only skilled organisers

but inspired leaders, destined eventually to fill the highest ranks of control and direction. Such men will gather round them close knit teams of subordinates like themselves and of technical experts, whose efficiency, enthusiasm and loyalty will be unbeatable. Increasingly this is recognised in industry, and the search for leadership is on. If in the military there is a tendency to substitute leadership for management, in industry there is a danger of substituting business acumen for Leadership.

Leadership Style

There is a universal acceptance now in the academic community, both in industry and in the military, of the leadership continuum which teaches that, a leader's style ranges from autocratic (authoritarian) to democratic (permissive), which can be plotted on a 9 point managerial grid. A good leader must change his style, depending on the situation at the time and the group he is leading. Most of his time will be spent in the middle of the range or in the variable leadership category. Two of the traditional leadership tasks of the military leader have always been, the accomplishment of a mission and taking care of one's men. At times, especially under the stress of combat, the two conflict, that is, the leader faces the question, which is more important, his mission or his men? Because of this apparent contradiction, it has been (and still is) a subject for lively discussion in all leadership training.

Like in industry, the military also does have many of the 9-9 leadership types, who are capable of both mission accomplishment and willing involvement of the people under them. However, the 9-9 style perhaps might be considered as too permissive and democratic for the military leader, because it implies more of a 'committee' system or group decision-making which is so common to industry. For this reason, the proper position of a good military leader in the managerial grid would be more in the 9-5 position, since a military leader must ultimately decide on his own after the consultative process. That is why democratic style of leadership rarely applies to the military, while the variable is used extensively, and the autocratic only on the occasion of absolute necessity.

Without trying to wave a red flag and getting side tracked in arguments about personalities, according to Brig Hoefling of the US Army, military historians would probably say that although Gen Patton was a good leader of men, he was a poor manager of resources, and which proved very costly to his Third Army. On the other hand, one of the most outstanding scientific managers of the century, Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, was not a good leader in the true sense of the word in that, he slighted the "people" side of management, and consequently found it hard to obtain the willing co-operation of subordinates who did not belong to the company of his "Whiz Kids".

Leadership Traits

Whether it be in the military or industry, there are certain common traits in the lives and careers of all successful leaders. These are—bearing, courage, decisiveness, dependability, endurance, enthusiasm, initiative, integrity, judgement, justice, knowledge, loyalty, tact and unselfishness. The first thing we require in a leader are character and an alert mind, of course, it will be a different type of mind for the military and industry, as every profession produces its own type of mind which shows itself in its trained approach to any given question.

Command and Leadership

Notwithstanding the above, there is possibly one fundamental difference between the development of leadership qualities in the military when compared to that in industry. Unlike in industry, in the military, the officers are appointed as leaders, as opposed to the leader who has emerged as a result of spontaneous acceptance by a group. Thus by virtue of his appointment, as opposed to emergence, a leader in the military may or may not be imbued with all the important traits and functions mentioned above and which are essential to providing effective leadership. There is therefore a continuous requirement of training officers for developing at least some of their leadership skill. It is in this training aspect that, there exists a marked difference between the development of the military officer and the business manager.

CONCLUSION

During the last two decades, although literally hundreds of leadership studies have been conducted, both in the military and industry, there is at present, no universally accepted theory of leadership. In fact, many divergent and contradictory theories have been proposed. However, during the last few years, research has reached a point where some consistent findings have begun to emerge. What do people normally mean when they talk about leadership? If one were to ask any collection of people what they think about leaders and leadership, he would receive ready answers. Everyone has ideas and opinions about leadership, even children. Thus it would appear that people have all kinds of ideas about leadership. The general conclusion that one might draw is that, there is very little consensus about what leadership is or what it should be.

Firstly, as Brig Hoefling puts it, the scientific investigation of problems like leadership is a difficult task ; particularly, because it involves value judgments or statements implying that something is "good" or "bad". Scientists are notoriously poor at dealing with questions of value, and it has been difficult for them to separate their own armchair assumptions about what constitutes 'good' or 'poor' leadership from the variables they are attempting to study. It is only in recent years that investigators have begun to deal with the value question

in empirical terms. Thus, leadership is increasingly being defined in operational terms such as behaviour that increases production and employee morale or decreases turnover, absenteeism, and so on.

Secondly, and perhaps more complex, the problem has been of trying to find acceptable scientific definitions for terms like leader and leadership. For some investigators, leadership is viewed as a characteristic of the individual ; for others, it is seen a propriety of the group. Some workers define it in terms of prestige, status, or ability to influence others. The complexity of the definitional problem is reflected by the fact that, in a recent review one investigator compiled a list of 130 different definitions of leadership in a sampling of research literature.

While behavioural scientists may be able to provide some tentative "guidelines", leadership research can never specify the "proper" practices for all situations. In the concrete leadership situation, the final choice and responsibility for specific action must always fall back upon the judgement and good common sense of frail human beings, and in all due respects to the "leader", this is as it should be.

To sum up, the raw material of leadership is the same whether it be in the military or industry, and the worker, properly led can be as good as any more intelligent than most, even in a highly developed industrial State. But the words "properly led" are vital. Industry deserves and will need leaders, not just efficient managers. In industry although one never has to ask men to do the stark demanded of soldiers, but the men one employs are the same men. Instead of rifles they handle tools ; instead of guns they operate machines. They have changed their olive green uniforms for the workshop overalls. But they are the same men and they will respond in the same way to leadership of the right kind. As F.M. Slim used to say, "like me they would rather be led than managed"—I presume so would all of us.

(The author is grateful for being allowed to quote and use some of the ideas from the following : —

- (a) A talk given by FM Sir Willium Slim, as reproduced in the Australian Army Journal, June '47.
- (b) 'Leadership'—Brig Jhon A Hoefling, US Army Journal, July '70.

Territorial Army — A Neglected Force

Lieut Colonel D SARBADHIKARY

INTRODUCTION

MAX Werner in his book "The Military Strength of the Powers" said, "The War potential of a country is composed of three elements : its reserve of man-power, its economic resources and the extent to which both these have been militarised". No country, howsoever affluent and least so in case of our country, can afford to maintain a large standing army to meet all its defence commitments in the event of a grave national emergency. A second line of defence, in the form of a trained reserve which can be embodied for service during emergency, is an essential part of the armed forces. This reserve of civilians is known differently in various countries as 'National Guard', 'Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve' etc. In our country it is known as 'Territorial Army' but also fondly called as 'Terriers' or 'Citizen Soldiers'. The Territorial Army concept is not new to India and its history can be traced back to 1857 when they were called 'Volunteers' and subsequently the name was changed to 'Indian Defence Forces'. Recruitment was, however, open to Europeans and Anglo-Indians only. In the wake of political awareness in the country after the World War I, the TA was reorganised into two separate wings namely 'Auxiliary Forces (India)' for Europeans and Anglo-Indians and 'Indian Territorial Force' meant for Indians. The then Commander-in-Chief, while introducing the Indian Territorial Force Bill in 1920, said, "Our object in creating the Indian Territorial Force is to respond to the aspirations of those Indians who desire to see the formation of a second line to the Indian Army, whereby in time of need the almost unlimited man-power of India may be utilised to strengthen the military forces of the country on a scale commensurate with its vast population". With the attainment of Independence in 1947, the defence of the country assumed paramount importance. TA Act of 1948 was passed in the Parliament and it was planned at that time to have a strength of 1.37 lakhs for TA. TA strength and image have, however, fallen woefully short of the original estimate.

Aim

The main aim of this article is to analyse the problems affecting TA and discuss measures to revitalise it. The secondary aim is to encourage a more public discussion on this vital part of our armed forces.

Composition

TA consists of departmental and non-departmental units. At present departmental units comprise of Railway (TA) units and General Hospitals (TA) units. Enrolment in these units is restricted to personnel from concerned departments only. The non-departmental units are Infantry Battalions (TA).

Concept

Basically a part-time concept TA is designed to give part-time military training to citizens in their spare time without interference with their normal vocations in civil life, to enable them to contribute their bit for national defence as and when so required. It is the only organisation which provides free adventure to young people and helps in maintaining good health through a process of systematic training, games and other physical activities. It also provides extra income to the gainfully employed personnel to the tune of double pay during training (one to two months in a year) or embodiment for service. Spirit of serving the nation and present incentives have, however, not been strong enough so far to attract gainfully employed persons for TA service. Since it is not laid down anywhere that only gainfully employed persons can join TA, in order to make up the strength of TA units, unemployed and underemployed people have been accepted in non-departmental TA units.

In case of Departmental units, the response is far from satisfactory. Such acceptance of unemployed persons over the years, has become a necessity now. This has created a pronounced dichotomy of concept and practice. While the protagonists of the former blame acceptance of unemployed persons in TA as the main cause for diminishing of its stature and status, the advocates of the later argue that TA for only gainfully employed persons is unrealistic in the present day unemployment situation in the country as this concept does not cater for the fact, that the present incentives in TA can be easily achieved by an employed person through side business or other means. Such employed persons therefore, want incentives and status which are impractical. The controversy thus go on endlessly. Salvation of TA does not lie merely on modification of its concept. It suffers from many other weaknesses.

What Ails Infantry (TA)

Since inception TA affairs have been scrutinized by a number of committees. Notwithstanding their jaundiced view of TA, the fact remains that precious little has been done so far on these observations.

Mobilisation

TA has been found to take too long a time to be activated. This is a handicap in the context of modern wars which are sudden, short and intense.

Training and Effectiveness

Although there is a tendency to compare the performance of TA with the regular army which is unfair but it cannot be denied that the training standard and consequent effectiveness of TA leave much to be desired. Improvement in leadership standard is also essential for better performance of TA.

High Wastage Rate

Approximately 87% of TA personnel are unemployed and such jobless once get a job they leave TA thereby causing loss of trained manpower. As compared to the retirement age, the engagement period is also much less resulting avoidable wastage of trained personnel. The engagement period was kept less with a view to keep TA young which, however, has not worked.

Publicity

There is a widespread ignorance about TA and ironically even regular army personnel are not less blame-worthy in this regard. TA is yet to find a deserving place in the syllabus of various command and staff courses. Let more publicity can be done at TA unit level.

Image

Tardy mobilisation and doubtful effectiveness of TA units deprived TA of the confidence of our military planners thereby giving a feeling that TA has hardly any role to play in our National Defence. Preventing TA from playing its useful role has harmed its image. Infantry TA units at one time acquitted very creditably in Nagaland but subsequently their place has been taken over by CRP or BSF unit. The little scope TA had to exposure to field conditions and maintaining its image has now been lost. TA strength has now reduced to one third of the original planned strength whereas the strength of all para-military and regular units has increased steadily. The doubt, therefore, arises whether TA is capable of performing its assigned Role.

Role of TA

The aim of TA is to supplement the regular army in times of grave national emergency and the roles assigned to it with this aim in view are :—

- (a) To relieve the Regular Army of static duties and to aid the civil authorities in dealing with natural calamities and maintenance of essential services in situations where the life of the community is affected or the security of the country is threatened.
- (b) To provide units for the regular army, if and when required.

The strategic environment of a sudden war forced upon us dictate quick readiness of all reserve forces also. "The permanent war preparedness

of a country, and in particular those trained reserves and that war material which are immediately available, will be of decisive importance in these battles" opined General Von Metzsch. The disturbed areas of Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur have bottled up large number of regular units which otherwise could be employed for more difficult operational tasks. The above role and the strategic environment imply that TA units should be capable of undertaking same tasks as regular army units. We have, however, seen earlier the weaknesses in Infantry TA and lack of exposure to field conditions which preclude playing such role at short notice. Some countries have utilised their reserve forces with good results for development works. There is a wide scope for such development work in our country. In fact, reserve forces with better discipline are ideally suited for such work in remote areas.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Regular Reserve

The aim of TA being to supplement the regular army it acts as a regular reserve. TA units can also be converted into regular army for further expansion as it was done during World War II in many countries including ours. This capability of TA at a comparatively low cost is their biggest asset which should be fully exploited. TA infantry, therefore, ought to be made more effective.

Exposure to Active Conditions

Strategic environment and non-availability of regular reserves have imposed a heavy responsibility on infantry TA whereas it, in its present standard, will not be able to deliver the goods effectively. NATO countries, in order to keep their TA units in a high state of readiness, employ them in 'active areas'. There are suggestions, therefore, that we should also employ our infantry TA units at least in soft field areas like Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur to start with. Incidentally infantry TA units were employed in Nagaland earlier with laudable results. Advantages of such employment are :—

- (a) *Effectiveness.* Exposure to field service and experience so gained by TA personnel will improve their individual standard including leadership qualities. Such a military background will increase the effectiveness of TA units.
- (b) *Mobilisation.* Ready availability of a TA unit will do away with its mobilisation time. Even after disembodiment the military background gained by the unit, will enable it to mobilise quicker as less time will be required for pre-operational employment training.
- (c) *Economy.* Instead of raising more regular infantry units, TA infantry units can release regular units from such soft areas. Infantry TA units cost about 2/3 of similar regular units, thereby overall economy can be effected.

- (d) *Miscellaneous Advantage.* Longer embodiment will provide employment opportunities to unemployed ones. Less people will then seek discharge with consequent reduction in wastage rate. A chance to serve in active areas will also enhance the image of TA. It also provides better opportunity for publicity.

Attachment to Units in Field Areas

- (a) TA recruits are given only one month's recruits training. Post-commission training of Officers is also inadequate. Poor standard of training affects effectiveness of TA units. In the light of this background, it is recommended that all infantry TA personnel who so volunteer be attached for three years to a regular army unit of its affiliated Regiment in a field area to facilitate exposure to active conditions in the following manner :—

- (i) *Sepoys.* All sepoy after their recruitment and annual training.
- (ii) *NK/Hav.* One such tenure as NK/Hav. will enable TA NCOs to handle regular infantry sections in field areas, an experience of great value.
- (iii) *JCO.* On promotion to the rank of a JCO he should be offered another tenure of three years to help him gain practical experience of handling platoon in field area.
- (iv) *Officers.* One tenure immediately after post-commission training and another one as Capt./Major.

(b) Advantages

- (i) *Economy.* Since vacancies in regular army units will be filled up by TA personnel, this scheme will be economical to the State.
- (ii) *Effectiveness.* Adequate and requisite military training and experience can be imparted to TA officers, JCOs and men without incurring additional expenditure. This military background will contribute towards better operational efficiency of TA infantry units.
- (iii) *Permanent Staff.* TA personnel selected for permanent staff should have successfully completed this attachment. Personnel with such military background and professional qualification will enhance the image of TA as opposed to the present lot who migrate from one peace station to another and mainly handle administration.
- (iv) Such attachment with regimental units will foster better regimental spirit and tradition.

Air Defence Battery (TA). Last of the AD Regt (TA) was converted into regular army in 1976. These regiments played a very useful role in all the battles that our country had to fight. Several gallantry awards have also been won by AD (TA) personnel. Complexity of modern air defence equipment which require long period of training and other considerations were main

factors for disbandment of AD Regts (TA). Regular AD resource is far from adequate whereas our industrial installations are increasing. It is for consideration whether we should raise departmental AD Batteries (TA) with each big installation providing the manpower. Old L 60 guns can be provided to these units. Feeling of defending their own installations will be an added advantage from the point of view of motivation alone.

Development Work. We have vast desert areas in Rajasthan and Gujrat. Such areas can be developed and changed into green belt by a task force entrusted with the work by a time and area bound programme. This is a onerous task which can be performed by forces only and has the following advantages:-

- (a) It will prevent further desertification.
- (b) Transformation of vast area, into granary will give a boost to our economy. Pressure on Land particularly in these two states, will decrease.
- (c) Many times the cost of maintaining a TA unit for such work can be recovered ultimately and hence will not be uneconomical while at the same time it provides job to the unemployed.
- (d) During times of national emergency such task force will be readily available for supplementing the regular army. According to Field Marshal Viscount Slim, "Every territorial is twice a citizen—Once when he does his normal job and the second time when he dons his uniform and plays his part in national defence".

Continuous Embodiment of one or two Rifle Coys per Infantry TA Units. A similar practice was in vogue earlier wherein one AD battery per regiment used to be kept embodied continuously in rotation.

(a) Advantages

- (i) Reduction in mobilisation time.
- (ii) Ready availability will enable prompt utilisation in periods of natural calamities.

(b) Disadvantages

- (i) Some infantry TA units were kept embodied for long spells during fifties. In spite of such long embodiment they were found operationally unfit. Long periods in inactive peace areas stagnated them. It is unlikely that similar embodiment will give better results.
- (ii) It is not very economical and provides job only to job seekers.

Permanent staff. In spite of various recommendations for making permanent staff appointment as career appointment for promotion in regular army nothing has been done in this regard. Regular army personnel parti-

cularly Commanding Officers consider TA appointment as the end of their career. Related statistics since 1970 as to how many of these officers got further promotion will be revealing. They thus lose interest which harm TA units. TA appointments should not be considered inferior to NCC appointments. Criteria for selection of officers for posting to TA units should be same as NCC.

Post-Commission Training—Infantry (TA) Officers. The present system is unsatisfactory. It should be conducted in IMA or OTS or NCC College once or twice a year.

The above recommendations are only a few major ones which can be acted upon immediately without amending TA Regulations except for Post-Commission training. The important point to note is that TA now needs a fresh image and in order to achieve that it must prove its worth. Implementation of above recommendations will enable it achieve this immediate aim. Once it establishes its effectiveness further steps can follow.

CONCLUSION

'Sea Wolves' a film based on the book 'Boarding Party' which gives the actual exploits of a TA unit of Calcutta called 'Calcutta Light Horse' during World War II, proves that imaginatively used, TA can produce results far in excess of the resources employed.

Infantry TA in its present state has a doubtful capability due to long neglect. Even NCC which has no role for national defence gets preference over TA and its total annual budget is nearly 12 times that of TA.

Nothing is static in life and least so the military concept. It has to change with situations and circumstances. Part-time concept of TA is what we had made. There is nothing sacrosanct about it. What is more important is the aim of TA which is to supplement the regular army. TA units, particularly infantry, need better officers from regular army, more intensive training particularly exposure to field conditions, better publicity and more attention. Para 1 of the 'Regulations for the Army' says that TA is a part of the army and let us really make it so and revitalise it. Since Independence TA personnel have won many gallantry awards including VrC inspite of the limited opportunities offered to them and they can do better if given a chance.

Military History Writing

Dr. B. C. Chakravarty

What is Military History ?

IN the past, military history used to denote history of War, campaign or battle. In the context of India, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata can be described as the earliest military history of a sort, composed anywhere in the world, as these two great epics have described wars and battles in great details, although the authenticity of the incidents described therein cannot be proved historically. Similarly, in the West, Homer's Iliad of circa 7th century BC, which describes the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans (inhabitants of Troy, the capital of Ilios) can also be classed as the earliest military history of the Greeks.

But in the true sense, military history, for that matter all history, started with Herodotus of the 5th century BC, who wrote "History" of the Greco-Persian Wars of the same period. A century later, Thucydides, "History of the Peloponnesian War" (431-404 BC) came to be regarded as an important land-mark in historiography. The Western tradition of writing history was continued through Xenophon's "Anabasis", Caesar's "Commentaries", and the Works of Polybus, Plutarch and Livy. As the military art became more specialised during the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation, so did the literature on warfare. In course of years, when Europe witnessed bigger and longer wars like the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), military history became almost the exclusive haunt of soldiers. But later, military writers of the 18th century made little distinction between military history and military theory. Karl Von Clausewitz (1796-1830)'s writings, especially his *magnum opus*, "Vom Kriege", started a tradition of military studies based on history, which was later followed in other European countries as well as in America. Marshal de Saxe (1732-1780) in his "Reveries." Guibert in his "Essay upon Tactics", and William Lloyd in his history of the "Late War in Germany" used history as a base for their military theories. However, in course of time Clausewitz's writings were considered to be too philosophical, and hence soldiers turned towards Baron de Jomini (1779-1869), the renowned military theorist of the 19th century, who offered generalised principles for the strategists and soldiers to follow. But the fact remains that Jomini also formulated his principles of war after a thorough study of the history of the Napoleonic campaigns. Jomini considered that the true function of military history was to develop the relations of events with principles—a line of thinking

that was followed later by Sir William Napier in his "History of the War in the Peninsula," Gen. John Mitchell, and others.

Military history became the foundation of the professional education of the military high command in Germany, and provided the breadth and depth to German strategical outlook and led to the German military brilliance as shown in the two World Wars.

Since the Second World War, there has been a shift in the nature of military history, especially in the United States of America. Due to the emergence of operations research during the Second World War, which led to operations analysis and further on to systems analysis, all based on quantification, military history for a while was underrated by soldiers and strategists as being obsolete in a nuclear age. Walter Mills wrote in "Arms and Men" in 1956, that the advent of nuclear arsenals had at least seemed to render most of the military history of the Second World War as outdated and inapplicable as the history of the War with Mexico. But in a world of nuclear stalemate, conventional wars have not been made irrelevant as the post-Second World War conflicts have amply proved. Raymond Aron has said that under the nuclear umbrella, warfare is returning to earlier forms. Since the American experience in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the attention of the US defence forces again turned to the necessity of studying military history. The US Department of the Army Ad Hoc Committee on the Army Need for the Study of Military History in its 4-volume report, published in May 1972, recommended for the establishment of a rapport between the Army and the civilian military historians for the mutual advantage of both and also for the creation of three Army Chairs of Military History at West Point, Carlisle Barracks and the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. It also recommended an enlarged place for military history in the curricula of all service schools. The US military leaders have also realised that the dimensions of military history have expanded. There has been a shift from 'drum and trumpet', school which emphasised battles and campaigns, to the "ecological" school, which is concerned about placing wars and battles in their political, economic and social perspective. In other words, today military history not only includes the history of wars and battles, and regimental histories, but also insurgencies and counter-insurgencies, composition of armed forces, relationship between the armed forces and the society, research and development in scientific and technological fields for military benefit, broader aspects of national security, armed forces vis-a-vis politics and diplomacy, problems of command and logistics, so on and so forth.

The Utility of Military History

Some critics may argue that great military commanders of the past ages like Hannibal, Chenghiz Khan and Akbar the Great did not study military history to become great war leaders. But as those celebrities were also illiterate, one should not advocate illiteracy in our military high command. Indeed,

perceptive soldiers have immensely benefited from the study of military history. Count Von Schlieffen, the German Chief of Staff before the First World War, evolved the tactics of enveloping the enemy on the flanks by reading Hans Delbrück's first volume of "*Geschichte der Kriegskunst*", which deals with Hannibal's tactics in the battle of Cannae. Similarly in the 1920s, Liddell Hart developed his ideas about the future use of the tank after a study of Chenghiz Khan's campaigns of the 13th century. The study of military history does not mean that its military user will apply the same strategy and tactics which were used by a commander in the past without taking into consideration the changes in terrain, weather, quality of arms and equipments, quality and morale of the combatants, etc. If a professional historian or a military man, or a combination of both tries to cull lessons from military history to prove his theories, without taking into consideration various factors of time, terrain, morale and developments in socio-economic, political, scientific and technological fields, he will not only misguide people but also make military history unpopular with the common run of military men. During a conventional war a military commander can sometimes apply certain lessons from past strategies and tactics to the same kind of terrain, under the same climatic conditions. For example, the Russian terrain and climate presented a great obstacle to Napoleon's Grand Army as they did to Hitler's Panzer Forces.

What is more, military history also deals with military leadership of the bygone days. A study of military history will show how the great commanders in the past led and inspired their forces. According to Lord Wavell, the important thing in studying Napoleon's first Italian Campaign is not the strategy by which he defeated the Austrians, but "how he induced a ragged mutinous army to cross into Italy and fight at all". It may be recalled that in 1796, Napoleon, then only 27 years old, was sent as the commander of the French Army to fight Austria in Italy, and in one year he won 18 battles with his ill-equipped troops and compelled Austria to come to terms by ceding Belgium and North Italy. Besides, narratives of national victories or of patriotic devotion to a cause despite all adversities can inspire a soldier with pride and a desire to emulate. Again, regimental histories help build "esprit de corps". A tactical lesson illustrated with a historical example adds flesh and blood to the bare bones of theory which can be put across convincingly to the officers during military training. Bismark's statement that only fools learn from their own experience underlines the need to learn by others' experiences in wars and battles.

Military history is not only useful to the soldiers but also to political leaders, diplomats and other responsible persons of a country : In modern times, when wars sometimes turn into total wars in which the whole nation becomes involved in a variety of ways, when millions of people are enrolled for active service and large chunk of the national budget is spent on national security, the defence of a country becomes too serious to be left to the care of

a few military leaders. From that standpoint, a study of military history, or rather defence problems in general, has a great relevance to the present day world.

The Study of Military History in the Present Day World

Since the Napoleonic Wars a large number of books on military history have been published. The Duke of Wellington, the vanquisher of Napoleon the Great, has left behind numerous volumes of his memoirs. Official histories of the First and Second World Wars have also been written in many countries. The "United States Army in World War Two" series in 78 volumes, the "Army Historical Series", which contains the American Military History volume and also a book on logistics covering the period from American Revolution to Korea, the Korean War series, and the Vietnam War Series illustrate the great interest the United States of America has, of late, been taking in the study of military history, which has certainly gained popularity in that country in recent years. Compared to only one course in military history run at the University of Chicago before the Second World War, there are now 110 new ones which offer specialised study in this subject. About 10 per cent of all doctoral dissertations in History in the United States of America are on Military History only. The Duke University trains graduates and doctoral students in military history, and similarly several other Universities have also courses/lectures on this subject. In the Soviet Union also, a lot of interest is being taken in the study of military history right from the ancient times.

Although in India very little interest has been shown by the Indian Universities in the study of military history by way of offering any regular course of lectures in this subject, a few individual scholars and military men and the Historical Section of the Ministry of Defence of the Government of India have done some good work in this field. Among the early writings on military history published by Indian authors, Sant Nihal Singh's "India's Fighters, their Mettle, History and Services to Britain", (published in 1914), and Thakur Shri Jessraj Singhji Seesodia's "Rajputs—a fighting race, a short account of the Rajput race, its warlike past, its early connections with Great Britain and its gallant service at the present moment at the front" (published in 1915) need to be mentioned. One of the first Indian historians in this field was Sir Jadunath Sarkar who published his article entitled "Military Engineer in India" in the "Journal of the Institution of Royal Engineers" in 1935, and later published his classic work under the title "Military History of India". Dr. Amiya Barat's "Bengal Native Infantry" (published in 1962), Dr. K.K. Ghosh's "Indian National Army" (published in 1969), Maharaja of Jaipur's "History of the Indian States Forces", (published in 1967), Lt.—Col. B.N. Majumdar's "A Study of Indian Military History", (published in 1963), and "A Short History of the Indian Army" Vols. I and II (published in 1967), K.M. Panikkar's "India and the Indian Ocean" (published in 1945), Brig.

Rajendra Singh's "History of the Indian Army" (published in 1963), S.N. Sen's "Military System of the Marathas", (second edition published in 1958), Lt.—Col. Gautam Sharma's "Indian Army through the Ages", (published in 1966), Commander K. Sridharan's "Maritime History of India", (published in 1965), T.G. Subramanyams Famous Battles of India (Published in 1949) A.L. Venkateswaran's "Defence Organisation in India" (published in 1967), V. Longer's "Red Coats to Olive Green" (published in 1975), Major P. Sensarma's "The Military History of Bengal" (published in 1977), and "The Military Profile of Sher Shah Suri" (published in 1976), Major S.R. Johri's "Conflict over Kashmir" (published in 1979), and "The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965" (published in 1967), D.R. Mankekar's "Twenty Two Fateful Days—Pakistan Cut to size" (published in 1966), and other books, Gen. B.M. Kaul's "The Untold Story" (published in 1967), Brig. J.P. Dalvi's "Himalayan Blunder", (published in 1969), Gen. L.P. Sen's "Slender was the Thread" on Jammu and Kashmir Operations 1947-48, (published in 1969), Maj.—Gen. S.K. Sinha's "Operation Rescue—Military Operations in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-49" published in 1977), Hari Ram Gupta's "India-Pakistan War 1965, Vols. I and II" (published in 1967 and 1968 respectively), G.S. Bhargava's "Their Finest Hour—Saga of India's December Victory" (published in 1972), Lt.—Col. J.R. Saigal's "The Unfought War of 1962", (published in 1979), Maj.—Gen. N. Prasad's "The Fall of Towang 1962" (published in 1976), Major General Lachhman Singh's "Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan" (published in 1979), Air Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi's "History of the Indian Air Force" (published in 1978), Vice Adm. Krishnan's "No Way But Surrender An Account of the Indo-Pak War in the Bay of Bengal 1971" (published in 1980), etc. are examples of military history produced by Indian Authors.

Quite a number of Regimental Histories have also been published by Indian soldiers, e.g. Lt.—Col. D.S. Jind's "History of the 7th Light Cavalry" (published in 1967), Maj. K.C. Praval's "Indian Para Troopers" (published in 1974), and "Valour Triumphs—History of Kumaon Regiment" (published in 1976), Lt./Col. Abhyankar's "Valour Enshrined—History of Maratha Light Infantry (published in 1971) and "History of Corps of Engineers" (published by the E-In-C's Branch in 1976). In this connection it will be worthwhile to mention bibliographical publication on this subject, entitled "A Survey of Work Done on the Military History of India" by S.N. Prasad, which was published by K.P. Bagchi and Company of Calcutta, under the auspices of the Indian Council of Historical Research, in 1976. It has given bibliographical lists of Military writings published approximately up to the end of 1975.

Obviously, as an institution Historical Section of Ministry of Defence has contributed quite a lot to the study of Indian military history especially after the Second World War. The 24-volume "Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in World War II", edited by Prof. B. Prasad, comprising operational, organisational and medical histories are no doubt a monumental work. This organisation has also published several volumes on the post-Independence operations of the Indian Armed Forces, pertaining to Hyderabad, the portugese

colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu, UN Operation in the Congo, and the Indian Custodian Force in Korea. It will be a lapse on my part if I do not mention the name of the United Service Institution Journal, edited by Col. P. Lal (Retd.), and printed quarterly by the U.S.I. of India, which publishes articles on Military History, strategy and tactics, insurgency, counter-insurgency, logistics and other defence problems.

Writing Military History

The source material of military history can be divided into (a) Official sources like War Diaries, military despatches, situation reports, military intelligence reports, minutes of meetings of committees of the Cabinet, other high-level bodies, and Military Commander-level Committees, official broadcasts and press releases; (b) Unofficial sources like War correspondants' reports/despatches, unofficial radio broadcasts/interviews, articles published in the press, books, booklets, leaflets, letters, propaganda posters, films and photographs, personal interviews, etc. War Diary is prepared by all Units of the Army, Navy and Air Force and by their higher formations like Brigades, Divisions, Commands, etc. during both peace and War. But Military Despatches are sent only during the War, usually by senior commanders. During the Second World War, a large number of Military Despatches were issued and subsequently published also. Some of the well-known Military Despatches were issued by Lt. Gen A.E. Percival, Lt. Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Messervy, Gen. Sir Montagu Stopford, Lord Mountbatten, Vice Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, Field Marshal Wavell, Field Marshal Auchinleck, Air Chief Marshal Sir Keith Park, Lt.—Gen. Stratemeyer of the US Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Earl of Baudon, Air Cdre S.F. Vincent, etc. from the Burma and South-East Asian front; by Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and, Major Gen. C.M. Maltby from the Far East front; by Gen. Wavell, Lt. Gen. Sir William Platt, and Brig. H.R. Briggs from the Middle East front; by Gen. Wavell, Gen. Auchinleck, and Gen. Alexander, from the North African front; and by Field Marshal Alexander and Gen. Wilson from the Italian front.

Among the Indian Commanders who started sending military despatches during the post-Independence operations, Maj. Gen. G.N. Chaudhuri deserves mention for his Despatches on Operation Polo. Later, Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh issued despatches during the Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965. Biographies and autobiographies of Commanders form a good source of military history. Sir Winston Churchill's biography of his forefather, the Duke of Marlborough, in 4 vols (published during 1933-38) may be cited as an example. It will perhaps not be out of place to mention here that in the past, serving military officers used to send first-hand accounts of current operations direct from the battlefield to the Press. After joining the 4th Hussars as a subaltern in 1895, Churchill saw action in Cuba and reported the Spanish-American War for the Daily Graphic (London). Next year, he saw service

in India with the Malakand Field Force both as soldier and journalist, and on the basis of this report to the Press, he later published "The Story of the Malakand Field Force" in 1898. In 1898, he joined Sir Herbert Kitchener's Nile expeditionary force in the same dual role of soldier and war correspondent and got published "The River War" in 1899, brilliantly describing the campaign. After resigning his commission in 1899, he reported the South African War for the Morning Post (London). "The World Crisis" in 6 vols. written 1923-31, is a military history as well as an autobiography. His War Memoirs on the Second World War in 6 vols. (published during 1948-54), mainly for which he was awarded Nobel Prize for Literature, will be regarded as some of the most readable military histories written in the English language so far. Among Indian military biographical literature, the one book that readily comes to mind is entitled "General J.N. Chaudhuri an autobiography as narrated to B.K. Narayan", published by Vikas, New Delhi, in 1978.

It may be mentioned here that in the USA, oral history programmes of de-briefing key generals at the end of operations are being vigorously conducted at the Military History Research Collection in cooperation with the Army. Such an oral History Section has been set up in Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, recently, but not for the purpose of military history writing. Undoubtedly, tape-recorded interviews with important Commanders of a particular operation throw a lot of light on a particular operation. Although our official Archives follow a thirty-year time in connection with throwing the official records open to the public, for political and security reasons this is not sometimes observed in practice.

The correct methodology in writing military history should be thus : Both official and unofficial sources should be tapped and studied and then an account of a particular operation should be written. Copies of the manuscript thus prepared may be sent for comments to a few important Commanders of the Operation. Only after their comments are received, the manuscript may be revised in the light of those comments before its publication. But for a non-military writer there are certain difficulties to be faced in the course of studying official sources, especially War Diaries and Military Despatches, because the latter contain too many military abbreviations and jargons with which one should be familiar in the first instance. It would be ideal, of course, to get to study the official version of the adversary. To make the point clear I may say, for instance, that for writing an authentic history of the Chinese invasion of India of 1962; it would be advisable to study all relevant official documents of both India and China, besides other material on the subject.

Last, but not the least, a military historian should be careful about his style which ultimately makes his account readable or otherwise. However, one should bear in mind that too many details on a Company's or a Battalion's actions may lead the readers to miss the main thrust of the battle's aim. The author should take care that his reader does not miss the wood for the trees.

A Study of Offenders at Military Prison Trimulghery

Major. P K. Chakraborty * & R Kishore **

ABSTRACT

The study was carried out in Military Prison, Trimulghery (A.P.) with the object of finding out the type of personality, area of conflict, nature of offence and factors responsible for committing such offences amongst offenders of Indian Army with a view to minimize or eliminate such factors.

The sample consisted of 23 offenders of Indian Army undergoing imprisonment in Military Prison, Trimulghery. The control group consisted of 24 Jawans randomly selected from different local units. Interview by the psychiatrist, Questionnaire Completion Test and Sack's Sentence Tests were used.

Data revealed offenders were mostly young in service having less than five years (43%), majority were married (78%), they were more introvert (36.9%) compared to non-offenders (25%) and area of conflict was mainly with authoritarian figure and on sexual side (Sig at 0.01 level). Absence without leave (AWL) topped the list of nature of offences (43.5%).

Proper selection of recruits, better rapport amongst officers and Jawans and provision of more married accommodation are of the few remedial measures.

INTRODUCTION

PRISON, the universal form of penal institution, has undergone significant changes alongwith the human civilization. Social reconstruction and rehabilitation of offenders have been accepted as the ultimate objective of imprisonment. In the Armed Forces the attitude towards crime has also changed radically. Govt. of India established a Military Prison at Trimulghery, Secunderabad (AP)), with the idea of not dismissing military personnel from service only because they were awarded imprisonment exceeding 3 months and were committed to a Civil Jail. Military prisoners who were considered useful to the service could continue to serve in the Army after they have undergone their sentence in the Military Prison.

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Military prison affords an opportunity to a soldier convicted of a purely military offence to redeem his character and thereby become a useful member of the service and a law abiding citizen of country. Prisoners continue to receive basic military training and vocational training during their imprisonment. However they forfeit their pay and allowances during this period. On completion of their term of imprisonment they return to service where they are treated at par with other soldiers with sympathy and consideration and not as ex-convicts.

Nature of offence, interest of discipline, prisoner's character and service records are taken into account, before an offender is sent to military prison. Sentences of imprisonment exceeding two months but not exceeding nine months unless accompanied by a dismissal from service are being carried out in military prison.

The present study was carried out by the first author in Military Prison, Trimulghery*** during May-June 1975 with the object of finding out the type of personality, area of conflict, amongst military offenders and reason for committing the offence.

METHODOLOGY

Sampling—Two samples totalling 47 subjects were matched with respect of age, sex, education, length of service and social background as possible. The experimental group comprised of 23 offenders undergoing imprisonment in military prison, Trimulghery. The control group was made up of 24 subjects selected at random from different local units.

Methods Employed

The following procedures were used in the study :—

- (a) Interview by the Psychiatrist.
- (b) Questionnaire completion test. Each individual was given a test of 48 questions based on Maudsley Personality Inventory where he had to indicate whether he agreed or disagreed.
- (c) Sentence completion test—Sack's sentence completion test.

The military offenders were also compared with a similar sample of civil offenders from Model Jail, Lucknow.

Procedures

The subjects were interviewed before the administration of the test. The tests were self administered individually in front of the examiner. Instructions were made clear to them. First of all, each questionnaire was clearly read to them. Since the sample constituted of all literate subjects, a copy of test was given to them. The tests were printed in Hindi. Whenever they found any difficulty in understanding the meaning, it was clarified and explained in simple words.

Answers were recorded by the subjects. Only two individuals amongst experimental group did not know how to read or write Hindi but knew spoken Hindi. In these cases their answers were written down by an education NCO.

DATA

TABLE I : DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

(a) <i>Age</i>			
Average age of offenders		—	30.25 years
Average age of non-offenders		—	32 years
(b) <i>Education</i>			
	<i>Matriculation & above</i>	<i>Non-matriculation</i>	<i>N</i>
Offenders	15 (65.2%)	8 (34.8%)	23
Non-offenders	17 (70.3%)	7 (29.1%)	24
(c) <i>Marital Status</i>			
	<i>Married</i>	<i>Single</i>	<i>N</i>
Offenders	18 (78.2%)	5 (21.8%)	23
Non-offenders	20 (83.3%)	4 (16.7%)	24
(d) <i>Rank</i>			
	<i>Offenders</i>	<i>Non-offenders</i>	
Sepoy	12 (52.1%)	13 (54.2%)	
L/NK	2 (8.6%)	4 (16.6%)	
NK	8 (34.7%)	6 (25%)	
Hav	1 (4.6%)	1 (4.6%)	
(e) <i>Length of Service</i>			
	<i>Offenders</i>	<i>Non-offenders</i>	
Less than 5 yrs	10 (43.5%)	12 (50%)	
6-10 yrs	9 (39.1%)	7 (29.2%)	
11-15 yrs	4 (17.4%)	5 (20.8%)	
(f) <i>Nature of Offences</i>			
AWL	10 (43.4%)		
Insubordination	6 (26.9%)		
Misappropriation of Govt property	4 (10.7%)		
MT Accidents	1 (6.6%)		
Negligence in duty	1 (6.6%)		
Attempted rape	1 (6.6%)		
(g) <i>State</i>			
	<i>Offenders</i>	<i>Non-Offenders</i>	
Assam	1	1	
Andhra Pradesh	1	1	
Bihar	2	1	

It will be seen that both the samples are equally matched in Age, education, marital status and even in rank and length of service.

1	2	3
Gujarat	1	1
Haryana	1	2
Himachal Pradesh	1	1
Jammu & Kashmir	1	1
Karnataka	1	1
Kerala	3	2
Madhya Pradesh	1	2
Maharashtra	2	3
Punjab	4	1
Rajasthan	1	2
Tamil Nadu	1	1
Uttar Pradesh	2	3
West Bengal	1	1

All the major States are more or less equally represented in both the groups. No offenders at the time of study belonged to West Bengal, Orissa and union territories. This is probably due to low representation of these States in the Army.

TABLE - II HISTORY OF PREVIOUS CRIME

	<i>Present</i>	<i>CR</i>
Offenders N-23	21.8%	0.13 N Significant
Non-Offenders N-24	17%	

TABLE - III : P ERSONALITY TYPE (Maudsley Personality Inventory)

	<i>Extrovert</i>	<i>Introvert</i>	<i>Ambivalent</i>
Offenders	56.5%	36.9%	6.6%
Non-Offenders	67%	25%	8%

Significant at 0.01 level

TABLE - IV : COMPARSION WITH CIVIL POPULATION

	<i>Neuroticism</i>		<i>Extroversion</i>	
	<i>Military</i>	<i>Civil</i>	<i>Military</i>	<i>Civil</i>
	N-23	N-30	N-23	N-30
Mean	25.6	26.9	27.5	18.1
SD	8.16	10.27	5.68	10.1

Note : The civil population has been drawn from Model Jail, Lucknow.
Table supports the view that extroverts join the Army.

TABLE - V : AREAS OF CONFLICT (On Sack's Sentence Completion Test)

<i>Areas of conflict</i>	<i>Offenders N-23</i>	<i>Non-offenders N-24</i>	<i>CR —</i>	<i>Sig. at —</i>
1. Father	27%	12.5%	2.5	Sig. 0.01 level
2. Mother	13.5%	—	—	— —
3. Family Unit	13.5%	—	—	— —
4. Woman	27%	8.3%	3.5	Sig. 0.01 level
5. Heterosexual	43.5%	—	—	— —
6. Friends and Acquaintances	13.5%	—	—	— —
7. Superiors at work	3%	—	—	— —
8. Boss	21.75%	4.15%	3.5	Sig. 0.01 level
9. Fear	43.5%	12.5%	4.76	-do-
10. Guilt feeling	40.5%	8.3%	5.5	-do-
11. Responsibility	18%	—	—	—
12. Past	4.3%	4.35%	—	N.S.
13. Future	18%	—	—	—
14. Goal	1%	4.3%	3.5	Sig. 0.01 level

The above data indicates that the main area of conflict is with an authoritarian figure like father or boss. There is also high percentage (27 to 43.5%) on sexual side. Conflict, frustration, or dissatisfaction in the sexual life is a significant factor in the genesis of crime.

DISCUSSION

Military Prison functions on the principles of Model civil prison. Study carried out by Sanyal (1974) indicated the hostile attitude of inmates towards their authorities in the prison. But all the inmates in Military Prison accepted a sympathetic attitude of officials towards them. Few have even expressed that life is better than that in their unit except that the segregation in the cell from dusk to dawn was most painful.

Examination of data reveals that offenders are mostly young having less than 5 years service (43%) followed by another (39%) below 10 years of service and the number decreased proportionately with length of service. The majority (78%) were married whereas Jetlay (1960) in his study found 75% offenders were unmarried.

In the present study Absence Without leave (AWL) has topped the list of nature of offence (43.5%). Amongst the motives given for such offence the commonest was deprivation of timely leave (70%). Other causes were prolong-

ed separation from families (42%), various domestic problems like death or illness of near relatives (28%), Wife-in-laws conflict (16%) and land dispute (14%). In the present day society wife-in-laws trouble is on the increase. It is one of the main reasons why more and more Jawans want to bring their families to their duty station, but are deprived of the opportunity due to acute shortage of Govt accommodation. The young soldier is in a dilemma once married owes his first allegiance to his mate and believes that his own happiness is more important than the wishes of his parents. But it is extremely difficult, even impossible for him to separate himself from the family of which he has so long been a part. Getting along with in-laws is usually a fine art calling for tact and diplomacy which is usually lacking in brides.

Sixty-five percent of offenders due to AWL reported on duty of their own after variable time revealing that motivation towards service was good but deprivation of leave compelled them to commit such offence. Although it is true that due to exigencies of service it is not always possible to send them on leave when asked for but majority of the offenders (73.4%) expressed that denial of leave in their cases were unjustified. Fifty-four percent non-offenders also expressed denial of leave sometime or other in their service career.

It is generally believed that attitude acts as a guiding factor in behaviour. Indifferent attitude towards service (30%) is the other main factor for AWL. Quite a few join service without any motivation and soon find the tasks hard and try to leave the service, but without success. Some of them take the extreme step of facing a Court Martial with the sole aim of ultimately getting out of service. Some expressed their inability to abide by the strict discipline of the Army whereas others expressed unhappiness with superiors.

Next in the list is insubordination (26%). Soldiers are more educated these days. Sixty-five percent of the offenders were matriculate and above. Being educated, soldiers are more conversant with rules and regulations. They try to question each order passed on them and it is no more a gospel truth "All orders must be obeyed at once". One has to be more tactful in his command these days.

Misappropriation of Govt. property (10%) follows next. Financial hardship and socio-economic structure are the main factors behind this.

The observation suggested by D'Nette (1971) that offenders are more extrovert could not be substantiated by us. The present study shows that the offenders are more introvert (36.9) compared to non-offenders (25%) and is consistent with the observation made by Franks (1956) that criminals have an introverted personality. Jetlay (1960) in his study of 56 offenders in the Indian Army found 16 psychotics and 12 psychopaths. There were no such cases in this study.

Certain psychological traits such as emotional immaturity, impulsivity, lack of socialization and decreased capacity to tolerate frustration are

frequently detected in the personalities of criminals prone to aggression (Duncan et al 1958).

It is observed from our study that feeling of insecurity, inferiority and guilt are a few emotional traits present among offenders rather than non-offenders. Offenders identify with rigidity and strictness. In majority of the cases there is suppressed fear from immediate authority as evidenced by that areas of conflict are with father, boss etc.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

1. This study was aimed at finding out the factors responsible for committing offences amongst offenders of the Indian Army with a view to minimize or eliminate such factors.
2. The sample consisted of 23 offenders of the Indian Army undergoing imprisonment in Military Prison, Trimulghery. The control group comprised of 24 Jawans selected at random from different local units.
3. A high state of introvert type of personality amongst offenders.
4. Area of conflict mainly with authoritarian figure and on sexual side.
5. The survey shows discontentment both among offenders and non-offenders with refusal of leave at the time of need.

This aspect should be looked into and emphasis should be made in each officers' course towards management and the importance of personal touch with the men under command. One should look at the reason behind the offence rather than at the offence itself. This will go a long way towards prevention of crime.

6. It should be worthwhile at the recruitment level to check the social background and reasons for joining the service. In the training centres proper indoctrination to build up pride in self, service and regiment is essential for good motivation and prevention of drop out in service. Proper selection of recruits, better interpersonal relationship amongst officers and Jawans are a few remedial measures.

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70-82, 1974.

BOOK REVIEWS

PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARISM

Ed. by Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee

(Published by Croom Helm, London, 1980 pp. 415 Price 14.95)

THE role of militarism in our society has acquired a global phenomenon with the ills of arms race, profiteering and the leviathan of the military—industrial complex. Co-authors Marek Thee and Asbjorn Eide in their book, *Problems of Contemporary Militarism*, have lucidly exposed the vested interests of the military-politico-industrial-bureaucratic structure.

The basic issues are two. First; is the notion of national security. The advocates of militarism profess the necessity of a strong military response to be able to guarantee national security. The fundamental question arises whether this is the only method of ensuring national security? The authors could have offered concrete suggestions in this regard. Instead they have launched into an academic exercise regarding the various meanings of the word militarism. Whatever be the sociological interpretation, that man is basically a violent animal by nature, the modern connotation of militarism has come to mean "more arms for the country's security than what is really needed". It might well be of interest to read Alva Myrdal's, *The Game of Disarmament*, in which she states convincingly that, increased militarism has only bought greater insecurity. Militarism is a vicious circle. National security through arms is a product of fear, leading a nation on to the purchase and setting of an arms industry. These swiftly lead on to alliances actual and implied; economic dependency on super power blocs, the inevitable arms race and finally the drain on the economy at the expense of development. National security has to be seen as human security arising through economic and industrial development. This is a matter of concern to third world countries, who perforce must view national security in perspectives entirely different to those of the super powers. For the latter, it implies collective security and finally global security. An example would be the Soviet fear of capitalist encirclement, and thus the need to extend the concept of national defence to the frontiers peripheral nations.

The second vital aspect of the problem is not so much the threat of the New International Military Order—which we are all aware of—but the wastage and prostitution of human and material resources. Only wish the writers had concentrated less on the socio-political dynamics of militarism—purely academic in content—and directed the thrust of the book towards decreasing the probability of war. The theme could well have been the opening sentence

of the UNESCO Charter, "...since wars arise in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed".

1981-82 world military sales have reached the astronomical figures of \$ 500 billion. Be it the Marxist view of defending socialism and the working class, or the contentious Western 'liberal tradition' of preservation of human rights and national security ; both have a common motive. And that is profit and nothing but profit, wherein bribery, extortion and economic gains are legitimate tools. Even profits are limited to a miniscule number of people or corporations. The arms bazar has no scruples or human dignity; and as the word goes around in this business, truth is the first casualty.

This book is a must for all serious minded officers especially those who have or will shape the destiny of the armed forces. The subject of militarism needs to be studied in great detail in all its ramifications if we are to avoid becoming pawns in a super power confrontation or getting embroiled in the Sub Continent arms race. Pakistan has been given the status of a 'front line state' as part of the US conceived 'Strategic Consensus'. With a 7 per cent GNP, the Pakistani arms build up poses a serious threat to stability in South Asia. Whereas we certainly have a right to acquire a matching response, the danger of over reaction has to be avoided. It is also vitally important for soldiers to appreciate that military means are not the only means of ensuring order and stability of a nation.

—A.R.

THE ARMS BAZAR : THE COMPANIES, THE DEALERS, THE BRIBES, FROM VICKERS TO LOCKHEED.

By : ANTHONY SAMPSON.

(Published by Hodder and Stoughton, London, pp. 349 1977 price \$ 5.95)

SELLING arms is a big business. Witness the expected sale of some \$ 23 billion this year by USA to re-emerge as the largest suppliers of various arms. Soviet Union topped the list last year with a total of \$ 17.5 billion worth of sales. Not only there is Super Powers arms race but a fierce competition is going on to sell arms to the Third World countries. This is a book worth reading.

Anthony Sampson traces the development of the giant arms companies like Krupp, Vickers and Armstrong. He also points out an important angle to it. A quotation from 'The Personal Papers of Lord Rendel' which has re-echoed through the armaments business over the next hundred years is still relevant : "his first patriotic duty was to maintain prestige of the system he had induced the Government to adopt and in which he still believed; that the manufacture of arms for foreign powers was far from an unpatriotic act, for the country was benefited to the extent to which its experience and power of

production were increased, where as foreign countries were disadvantaged to the extent to which they were dependent on us for their munitions of war”.

The author describes the recent origins of the boom in arms sales reading to the dangerous and cynical building up of weapons in the Gulf, while the Lockheed and Northrop scandals have rocked some of the world capitals like Amsterdam and Tokyo. According to the author, whether in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia or other newly independent nations of the Third World, the energies of the arms salesman were being unleashed, and with them the old technique of bribery and extortion. He also describes about the character and motivations of the companies and the men who run them and the problems of those trying to control them, the issue of bribery being always in the background. He says that the Americans, trying to outdo the Europeans at their own game, had begun to institutionalise it, substituting for ‘tact and diplomacy’ an elaborate organisation, with separate companies and fixed routines, so that bribery began to become a subsidiary industry itself, with its own built-in incentives.

Buying and selling arms have become a vicious circle. The Europeans felt threatened both as buyers and sellers : the more they turned to America for their advanced weapons, the more they felt the need to recoup their costs by selling elsewhere. But there, too, they were challenged by the Americans, and the predicament brought a new edge to the competition to arm the Third World. The oil boom has given added impetus to buying and selling arms. The high price of oil had given Libya and Iraq, particularly, Libya, huge scope to buy and re-sell arms, while in the background the richest of all oil States, Saudi Arabia, was financing the Syrians who in turn provided arms for the Palestinians. Most of the Palestinian arms originated in Russia or Eastern Europe, arriving through their left-wing Arab allies. The point to note here is—“Of course most of weapons come from Governments, not from private dealers; the idea that private dealers can arrange war is really Victorian”. In this topsy tervy world of the great arms bazar it does not look that it is only some of the Western countries who still trade in prohibited items with South Africa. Even Russian and Czech shotguns and handguns were flooding into the booming market of South Africa where nearly every White household had its gun : while Communists were proscribed and jailed, half the new handguns were coming from Communist countries and one of the most popular shotguns selling in 1976 was the 12-bore Russian Raikal, freely distributed in Johannesburg.

Many Western economies still depend on arms sales for their prosperity. “Every Californian politician knows that arms means jobs”. This seems to be an important consideration after the end of the Vietnam War and the energy crisis. The author feels that the humiliation of Vietnam, and America’s weakened economy had engendered more sceptical and short-term diplomatic attitudes, treating arms as counters in the world’s game with which to bargain for settlement or placate client-States.

This book on the face of it is as up-to-date as Carter's regime. But now with Reagan there, the book, as far as the Americans go, gets automatically updated with similar policy of Nixon and Kissinger back in circulation with greater display of muscle power. However, the saddest fact is that between gun and butter, the choice still is the gun for most countries in the world : the Super Powers generally make sure of that to gain foreign policy objectives. Anthony Sampson's contribution is invaluable in understanding the role of the arms bazar in the interplay of cold war manoeuvre, one build-up helping to justify another and world tension.

—BMB

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET SECURITY STRATEGY, 1965-1975.

By : Haselkorn, Avigdor.

(Published by CRANE, Russak & Co New York, 1978, pp. 139, price £ 9.95)

IN this very interesting study, the author has made a serious attempt to demonstrate how the USSR's strategy for its security is not a hotch potch affair treading from one crisis to another but a conscious, deliberate and developing concept aimed to fulfil its goals of national security and furtherance of "liberation struggles" anywhere in the world on a long term basis.

Haselkorn's assertion, supported by various policy declarations and developments that Russia has been, all these years, i.e., 1965 to 1975, trying to create a ring of second line defence states around its boundaries to meet any possible external challenges is not entirely unconvincing. It is to deny such buffers that the Americans have tried to "contain" first China and now with China's help are endeavouring to set up their jumping pads around the USSR.

The Soviet sponsored security set-up, in the view of the author is formed by three sub-systems, i.e., Warsaw Pact countries, the Middle East-cum-Mediterranean area and the South Asia-cum-Far East region. The last group have assumed greater importance after Mao tried to snatch the crown of the World's Marxist movement from the Russian leaders who succeeded Stalin. Had it not been within Russia's capability to convincingly flex its muscle against its southern ex-comrade, it is quite possible that the two communist giants might have gone on war against each other.

Adequate evidence has been provided to substantiate that for providing logistic, defensive and offensive support between the states of one sub-system, the sub-systems and finally between all of them and the USSR, the countries within a sub-system function on the intra sub-systems bases, and the sub-systems on an inter sub-system basis between themselves and with Soviet Russia.

By seeking permanent military relations with them, the USSR has no doubt extended its borders and acquired defensive reflexes which are more

flexible, meaningful and quick to launch. But what is of greater significance is the conclusion that by deploying its forces in numerous areas, providing mutual support functions, organising military and developing logistics and acquiring the capability of launching an extended offensive, the Soviet Union is quite in a position to mount large scale military operations to counter threat from any quarter. To prove this hypothesis, had the book been published later than 1978, the author would have positively relied on the operations which almost overnight resulted in the trooping of 80,000 Russian soldiers to Afghanistan.

Needless to say that mounting of such massive operations without the dilution of security elsewhere is not possible in the absence of a broad based and long drawn military perspective and developments, stretching over years.

Towards the successful evolution of such a security environment, the Soviets, ever since the problems with china became unreparable, has been developing a coherent and unified strategic design of collective security system, the long term ramifications of which have been practically felt only after the developments in Vietnam, Angola, Campuchea, Afghanistan and some other countries.

But to include India, purely on the basis of the 1971 agreement of co-operation and friendship with Russia, in the South Asian sub-system may be outrageous. For in spite of certain ambiguous clauses regarding mutual consultation and help in case of security threats, India has never allowed the stationing of any Russians or Russia supported troops on its soil. It has not even provided any facilities or courtesies that may not be available to other countries. Though India's stand on developments in Campuchea and Afghanistan may have disappointed some of the neutral observers, yet it is not an adequate proof of India having been successfully compelled to become an integrated part of the Soviet collective security system.

The author finally exhorts the western countries to develop a matching process of thought, policy and actions to counter the consistent and well nurtured Russian security arrangements for "without a viable strategy which can resist and hopefully defeat the Soviet effort...the US strategic arsenal may become quite irrelevant." Well, this may be too pessimistic a viewpoint, for in any long drawn conventional war, the economic muscle will play a significant role and which the Americans have developed without parallel in the history in the contemporary world.

—VKA

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR IN THE NEAR EAST

by Bruce R. Kuniholm

(Published by Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1980. pp. 485
price \$ 36.00)

THE roots of the post-Second World War cold war can be found in the 19th century concept of the balance of power amongst great powers. Although the United States, since the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, was not a party to the old World's balance of power system, she had to join the two World wars under the force of circumstances and became willy-nilly involved in great power rivalries and disputes. During the Second World War, the U.S., the U.K. and the Soviet Union were allies against the common foe—Hitler, and the exigencies of the War led to the occupation of the Northern Tier (Turkey, Iran and Greece) and the Eastern European States by the Allied forces. But at the end of the war, when the common foe was vanquished, the Allies became suspicious of each other's interests and objectives, as motivated by their political ideologies and economic programmes. Consequently, a psychological rupture appeared in the Alliance system. The Soviet Union soon set upon spreading her influence on all her flanks. "Of the thirteen non-communist States which bordered Russia before the war, only five were independent when it was over. Finland was neutralized, Afghanistan... retained its traditional role of a buffer state. Of the remaining three, Norway, Turkey and Iran, the latter two were in serious jeopardy of being drawn into the Soviet fold, and the United States was the only power capable of seriously confronting this turn of events." (p. 299).

The traditional British policy in the Northern Tier was to contain the Russian expansion, and the end of Second World War when Russia was trying to take advantage of the internal turmoils in these states, Britain, herself incapable of stabilising the situation in Greece, Turkey and Iran, gradually drew the U.S. into the balance of power game in this region. While President Roosevelt was either cautious or short-sighted to grasp the significance of the power game in the area, his successor President Truman was educated by Lincoln MacVeagh and others of NEA (the office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the U.S. State Department) into the realities of the situation, and as a result, the U.S. persuaded herself to take the place of Great Britain in committing herself to the protection of Greece, Turkey and Iran. Through the Truman Doctrine of 1947, America, responded to the "responsibilities of protecting the broad, complex, and inextricably interwoven strategic and security interests of the United States, and to the State Department's well-founded belief that those interests were best served by maintaining the balance of power along the entire Northern Tier".

Unquestionably well-written and well-researched, the book is a welcome addition to the existing literature on super power rivalry in the Near East. In

the first part of the book the author has traced the sources of great Power rivalry along the Northern Tier, while in the second part he has dealt with the developments in the Northern Tier States since 1945 and the resultant Cold War, diplomacy during the period and the evolution of the U.S. policy of commitment to defend the Northern Tier. The treatise contains ten useful maps, a selected Bibliography, and an Index. It is hoped that the book will be read with great interest by students of International Relations, History, Diplomacy and Political Science.

—B.C.

THE MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA.

by Ali A. El. Hakim

(Published by Syracuse Univ. Press, New York, 1979, pp. 293 price \$ 30.00)

THIS book has grown out of the Doctoral thesis of the author, who received his Ph.D. from the Cambridge University under the academic guidance of Prof. R.Y. Jennings. In this author has dealt with the law of the sea pertaining to the states of Bahrain, Egypt, UAE, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. He has dealt with existing national claims to offshore jurisdiction, trends in the UN-conference on the law of the Sea, legal problems of offshore boundaries in the Arabian Gulf, legal status of the Gulf of Aquaba and the Straits of Tiran and the right of passage there through, legal aspects of the Red Sea hot brines and other metalliferous mud deposits. Besides, there are seven Appendices on national legislation and international agreements. Declarations concerning Exclusive Sovereign Rights of Qatar and Exclusive Fishing Zones of Saudi Arabia, Decrus on the Territorial Waters and the Continental Shelf of the Yemen Arab Republic and Documents on the Island of Abu Musa, etc. The treatise also contains 17 useful maps, some statistical tables, a good bibliography and an Index.

The oceans and seas of the world, that cover 71 percent of the globe's surface having an area of some 140 million Sq. Miles with an average depth of 2.5 miles making up roughly 350 million cubic-miles of water, have been used in the past as convenient waterways and source of marine food, and also off-shore oil in recent times. But the rapid development of technology in the past few years have opened great possibilities of exploiting the vast mineral resources of the ocean bed. Scientists have estimated that black potato-shaped nodules of manganese-oxide are available on the ocean bed at depths of 10,000 to over 15,000 feet, in concentration of one million tons per square-mile at some places. They also think that on an average just one Sq.-mile of oceanbed could yield as much as 30,000 tons of managanese, 3,600 tons of aluminium

2,300 tons of Cardamomum, 17,000 tons of iron, 400 tons of cobalt, 1200 tons of nickel and 650 tons of copper.

In recent years the first serious attempt to codify international maritime law was made in 1958 when during 24th Feb 28 April the First Law of the Sea Conference was held at Geneva under the UN auspices. The second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was also held in the same city during 17 March—28 April 1960. In August 1973, the UN appointed a 91-nation Committee to prepare the ground for a comprehensive world conference for drafting the law of the sea. This resulted in a series of the sessions of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) since 1973 : its first session at New York, during 3-14 December 1973, in which 147 nations attended the inaugural session, the second session at Caracas in Venezuela during 20 June—29 August 1974; the third session in Geneva during 17 April—9 May 1975; fourth session in New York during 15 March—7 May 1976; the fifth session in the same city during August-September 1976; the sixth session also in New York during May 1977; the seventh session in Geneva and New York, for four weeks in each city in 1978; the eighth session in Geneva in two halves during 19 March—27 April and 18 July—25 August 1979, the ninth session in 1980 in two halves, i.e. in New York during 3 March—4 April and in Geneva during 28 July—29 August; the 10th session during 9 March—24 April 1981 in New York and during 3 August—4 September 1981 in Geneva; the 11th session is being held in New York from 8th March 1982. Although the Law of the Sea is yet to be finalised and signed by the States concerned, certain basic points have been accepted by their representatives. They are :

- (a) The limit of the territorial water has been increased from 3 miles to 12 miles.
- (b) Beyond the 12-mile limit of the territorial water, there will be a 188-mile economic zone. By end 1978, over 100 countries have declared the establishment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
- (c) The land-locked countries have been given the right of access to and from the Sea through transit states.
- (d) Archipelagoes such as Indonesia and the Philippines have been allowed to declare their waters encompassed by the baselines joining the outermost islands as their territorial waters, but with rights of free passage and over-flight to other countries.
- (e) On the issue of the 'continental shelf', the sub-marine prolongation of a country's land territory comprising the sea-bed up to the deep sea startline, it has been agreed that the outer limit of the continental shelf, based on geomorphological criteria such as the thickness of the sediments will be 150 miles beyond the EEZ or 100 miles beyond the 250-meter depth line.
- (f) For exploiting the sea bed under the high seas an International Sea-bed Authority with a 36-nation Governing Council would be set up and its mining arm, to be known as ENTERPRISE, would exploit 50% of the sea-bed, while the rest would be allotted to the industrialised nations for economic exploitation.

The author has rightly pointed out that the significance of the law of the sea to the Middle Eastern States hardly needs emphasis as their coasts are long enough to embrace the heart of world Communications. The continental shelf areas, together with the land territories, of these states are supposed to contain between 50 and 75 per cent of the world's proven oil resources. Thus for the Middle East countries the sea is of vital importance to their economic progress. Moreover, the narrow straits of Tiran, Bab-el-Mandeb, and Hormar, etc. in this region are strategically important and the issue of free passage through them in peace and war will be the cause of disputes in the future. All the Middle Eastern states have agreed to the 12-mile limit of the territorial water, and excepting Kuwait, they have also accepted the 200-mile limit of the exclusive economic zone, but most of them have so far abstained from making jurisdictional claims of considerable dimensions.

In conclusion, the author has rightly said: "In so far as the region itself is concerned, there is still a great deal to be done by way of pooling arrangements and regional cooperation and the utilisation of existing international bodies—for example, for scientific research and pollution control. In addition to multilateral instruments, a need arises for the setting up of more effective regional treaties, based on agreement between all States in the region, irrespective of creed or political views, for the purpose of fish farming and marine education. More specifically, it is of importance to study the issues of scientific research on, and monitoring of the environment and their relationship with the rationalisation of exploitation and development on a scientific basis of marine natural resources." There is no doubt that after the codification of the Law of the Sea, when the littoral States of the Middle East will start demarcating the boundaries of their EEZ and continental shelf, and try to enforce their respective jurisdiction, disputes are likely to arise. For the prosperity of all the states of this region the author's foregoing remarks should be given proper consideration.

This is an excellent book which should be read by all who are interested in the Law of the Sea pertaining to the economic and security problems of the Middle East.

—B.C.

WHY THE VIETCONG FOUGHT : A STUDY OF MOTIVATION AND CONTROL IN COMBAT.

by : Henderson, W.D.

(Published by Greenwood Press, U.S.A. 1979, pp. 164, price not mentioned.)

THE Americans can perhaps be credited with the maximum number of research works that have been published on the war in Vietnam. The credit for this goes not to their government but to the numerous research organisations and centres that have been established, particularly at the univer-

sity level. But evidently, the US authorities are throwing open to the researchers documents the type of which would remain classified in our country for years to come. Also, investigations and interviews are being allowed to civilians, if not in the forward lines, atleast right during the war.

Whereas such a mass of military research work being produced in the States deserves appreciation and notice, it must be kept in mind by the readers that all is not well with what their academics are churning out. Besides being accused of CIA backing for certain projects, some of the works may be of an inspired nature, deliberately showing a tilt for one side or a biased viewpoint to suit their national interests or those of certain lobbies or even the research workers themselves.

From this point of view, the preface to the book, normally a mundane verbose preview by itself, makes an illuminating reading. While accepting that inspite America having committed "40 per cent of all its combat ready divisions supported by 50 per cent of U.S. tactical air power and 33 per cent of US naval forces costing "in excess of \$ 35 billion" per year by end 1967," the "North Vietnames Army endured, maintained its cohesion and remained on the battlefield when all others had retired", the author plunges headlong to demolish certain deductions arrived at by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage in their work, *Crises in Command, Mismanagement in the Army* published by Hill and Wang, New York in 1978.

Their observations that the US forces firstly underwent a "progressive disintegration of cohesion" which culminated in the early 1970's in Vietnam, secondly the "disintegration" process "operated independently of the socio-political factors in the larger American society," and thirdly, "the disintegration of the army and loss of small-unit cohesion" was directly related to the loss of officer professionalism caused by malfeasance and careerism has been rebutted, and with good reasons by the author on almost every count.

The background of the two authors, the sources of their information, the methodology adopted, frequent misstatements, ignored details, false assumptions, misleading analyses and "emotive indictments of the officer corps" have, according to the author, produced a hypothesis which is of "questionable scholarship" and that their "unsupported assertions lead them far beyond the bounds of academic responsibility".

So much for the acrimonious debate and controversy which this book is bound to initiate on some of the aspects of American participation in Vietnam and the causes of their defeat by PLA which "endured and survived" according to the author "the most continuous and intense fire power" ever focussed against an enemy "in such a limited area".

However, the burden of this book lies in identifying such factors, mainly at the section or squad, and more intimately the three-man cell, i.e., primary group level, which helped the Vietnamese to maintain their cohesion and fighting spirit against overwhelming odds.

Though primarily relying on information collected from the Vietnamese who were familiar with the PLA and related subjects by the RAND Corporation interviewers during the period 1965-67, the author has been successfully able to uncover some of the subtle aspects that make the unconventional forces as operated in Vietnam invincible. Without his experience in the Vietnam war in the capacity of a company commander, he could not have made such lucid observations.

While maintaining a three tier set-up right down to the cell, both the political and military cadres were loyal party members. With the supremacy of party over the army, the military cadre functioned more as an expert technician for furthering the party goals. In a democratic country it may be difficult to visualise such an inter-relationship emerging.

In the type of warfare fought in Vietnam, the hazards and risks to which the local forces were exposed were so varied and real that the spit and polish of the barrack type discipline taught in the drill square had to be replaced by an "internalised sense" of and "normative control". While the organisation determined and laid down the objectives and values to be achieved by the primary group, the cadre leaders functioned to ensure that the intrinsically different values of the organisation and the primary group coalesced to emerge as one. To accomplish the difficult task, the cadre leader had to combine in himself the role of a real leader, sympathetic comrade and dedicated party agent while "manipulating the surveillance and criticism mechanisms" and operating the "morale informants system."

However, what may be more difficult is to assign the cadre leaders with the task of making "good communist soldiers" for had they not been successful in doing so, the results of the Vietnam War could have been quite different.

—VKA

CHINDIT

by Richard Rhodes James

(Published by John Murray, London 1980 pp 214 price £ 10.50)

THIS the story of Wingate's Chindits who made history during the Second World War. (The term 'Chindit', the name of Wingate's two Burma operations and the men who took part in them, is a corruption of the word 'Chinthe', meaning a mythical animal, half lion and half flying griffin, which is sculptured as sitting at the entrance to Burmese pagodas to ward off evil spirits)

In February, 1943, Wingate had led his Long Range Penetration Force (77 Indian Infantry Brigade) into Jap-occupied Burma to operate behind the enemy lines. This Special Force, Supplied entirely from the air, in two months,

succeeded in blowing up some bridges, damaging some stretches of railway line, and killing some Japanese soldiers at the cost of untold sufferings and considerable casualties. But its impact on both the allies and the enemy was great due to its sheer audacity and the exciting possibilities it had opened up for the maintenance of operating troops through supply by air. "For a defeated and jaded army, it was a wonderful shot in the arm".

The book under review is on the Second Wingate operation into Burma behind the Japanese in 1944, in the midst of which Major-General Wingate was killed in a plane crash in March. Although his Special Force received a great shock, Brigadier Joe Lentaigne, who was commanding the 111 Brigade as part of the Special Force, succeeded him to execute Wingate's ambitious plan involving a force much larger than the first Wingate expedition. The second Wingate Operation involved 16 British Brigades, which was to advance on land, 77 and 111 Indian Infantry Brigades to be flown into Burma behind the enemy lines, the 3rd West African Brigade which was to provide garrisons for the strongholds to be established, and the 14th and 23rd British Brigades in reserve. Surely "never before in the history of British arms had a Major-General commanded so large a body of troops, to say nothing of its private air force". (p. 51)

The author, R. R. James, was the cipher officer at the HQ of 111 Indian Brigade or Parachute Brigade. After his education at the Queen's College, Oxford, he joined the 3rd Gurkha Rifles in 1942 to see action later as a Chindit. Many, of whom most were Chindits, have written on the Chindits and Gen. Wingate, and these Chindits, - M. Calvert, B. Fergusson, John Masters, S. Bidwell, C. Sykes, D. Tulloch, S.W. Kirby. etc. - have, proved themselves equally at home with the gun and the pen. The present author has given his own account of the exploits of his Brigade - 111 Brigade - based on his personal day-to-day diary, and he has done it admirably well. He has not only written about the training, marches and battles, but also drawn lively pen-portraits of many interesting personalities like Wingate, Louis Mountbatten, the Gurkhas, and the American pilots who came from California, "because they thought the authorities had said 'Berlin' and not 'Burma', and one of them "would get nostalgic over the girl he had met at the Brass Rail in Chicago, reading us extracts from letters." (p. 48)

About the aloof and enigmatic Wingate, with his untidy, wispy beard, atrocious hat, hard, ungracious voice that sounded like the grating of stone against stone, and elusive greatness, the author has provided an anecdote showing his exemplary leadership: "When he came to a river he stripped and swam across, he the brigadier, and he did not ask for anything but to share the dangers and discomforts of his men."

About the Gurkhas who were "cheery, carefree, soldierly crowd, not overly particular about their living conditions provided there were sufficient supply of water and good officers the author says the following: "The

Gurkha has no inhibitions and his thoughts express themselves freely in words and action. He reacts naturally to the stimulus of everyday life. These attributes have shielded him from many of the vices of civilisation and the Army is careful to maintain this guilelessness. His faults are easy to see : wine and women.....To this may be added a third vice, the love of gambling... These three defects the Army seeks to control without fettering the Gurkha's from expression. In my opinion, it has succeeded brilliantly."

This book will naturally be welcomed by all adventure loving soldiers to whom privation, suffering and even death are easy things which have to be encountered for the sake of the motherland.

—B.C.

JAPAN-TO-DAY

By William H. Forbis

(Published by Happer & Row, Ny. 1975, pp 463 price 12.95)

THE book, Foreworded by Senator Mike Mansfield of the US Senate, deals with various aspects of the people, past traditions, beautiful places, magnificent achievements, centres of political and economic power, Japan's economic and foreign policies and also future trends. Over the last three quarters of a century, a number of American journalist-scholars have written on Japan after a first-hand study of the country and its people. Of them mention should be made of Lafcadio Hearn, Edwin O. Reischauer, John Hersey, James Michener and John Gunther. To this galaxy, the name of W.H. Forbis must be added for his excellent book under review.

Indeed, Japan, with its annual GNP reaching half a trillion dollars in mid-1970s which was more than 1/3 that of the U.S., and 2/3 of Russia's, is a riddle to the outside world. The Japanese are 111 million people living 800 to the square-mile (as compared to 64 in the U.S.), but taking into consideration the mostly mountainous nature of the country (4/5ths mountains), the plains have about 3,100 persons per sq.-mile, (Japan is the 5th most densely populated nation in the world, after Bangladesh, South Korea, the Netherlands, and Belgium). With only a few brilliant people among them, they have attained a unique position in the world's industry and economy by their collective characteristics-diligence, thrift, courage, and unity. "At work they are steady, intelligent and loyal." According to Chie Nakane a sociologist, "Japanese energy is like a typhoon", and the Japanese workers and employers are basically collaborators rather than adversaries. The Japanese also save prodigiously, 17% of disposable income, as compared to 7.5% in Great Britain and 5.7% in the U.S. The orchestration of government, business, and labour in a great national effort to industrialize and modernise had made Japan into what it is

to-day - a country with low crime and divorce rates, few slums, near-absence of racial divisions, and full employment. "Japan is indeed a bicultural borrower, the world's first and only Eastern-Western nation. But the components mingle unschizophrenically, both because borrowing is not an unnatural process and because the Japanese have the racial unity to absorb it without strain" (p.7)

Japan is the industrial colossus of Asia, producing more than the rest of continent, including China, put together, the second most important trading power after the U.S., the world's most integrated nation-family, ruled by a constitutional ruler, the 124th in an unbroken royal line, having the world's largest public television system, largest steel company (Nippon Steel Corporation) largest ship-building and auto-manufacturing concerns, despite the well-known fact that she has hardly any significant quantity of raw material of her own. In mid-16th century, St. Francis Xavier wrote about the Japanese. "The people whom we have met so far are the best who have as yet been discovered, and it seems to me that we shall never find among heathens another race to equal the Japanese." It is amazing how in a matter of only 50 years since 1868, when the nation - shaking Meiji Restoration reasserted the primacy of the monarch abolishing the 'shogunate', and started modernizing Japan by reversing its seclusionist policy, Japan emerged as a big modern power on the international scene.

The author has listed "consensus, hierarchy, family, eclecticism, energy" as the main gears in the Japanese social clockwork. But he has also found out the Japanism variety of racism practised against the six lakh Korean residents and two million Japanese outcasts. Family life in a paper house, tea ceremony suicide, religion (Japan is presently the largest practising Buddhist state in the world), 'a spoonful of medicine' (two kinds of death afflict the Japanese more than the Westerners: brain strokes and stomach cancer) and education fever (European rigour, American scale and Japanese intensity capsule education in Japan), characterized by (1) home work, (2) travel (the Japanese today are the world's most assiduous travellers), and (3) Sports, have all been dealt with in this book with incision and wit. In the prestigious University of Tokyo the student-teacher ratio is 4 to 1, and the range and number of scholarly journals published in Japan is perhaps unmatched by any other country. Although Japanese, an Altaic language like Turkic and Mongolian, and a distant cousin of Korean, is the world's toughest major language, "it is also one of the best". The Japanese art, music, Kabuki theatre, movie, sumo wrestling, golf and baseball have also received adequate attention in this book. According to the author, the Japanese appetite for books is third in the world, after that of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

About 1 lakh Japanese live abroad as businessmen, students, diplomats, artists, or expatriates. Besides, millions of Japanese travellers go abroad each year. A Japanese vegetable pedler of Kamakura told the author that he had

just returned from his vacation in the south of France. Another aspect the author has emphasised is the ever-present Japanese past which still survives Japan's modernity. His chapters——'A ride on the pea-green line' (a circular railway that links various important areas of greater Tokyo), 'Ticky-Tacky Tokaido' (the legendary Tokaido corridor which runs from Kyoto to Tokyo, along the under belly of Honshu, connecting a number of industrial cities of Japan), and 'Kyoto the Microbeautiful'——have dwelt on the heartland of industrialised Japan, while the chapters——'The Outer spaces', 'Okinawa Redenta' (Okinawa, which invented the martial art of Karate - the word means 'empty-handed'-witnessed the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War with total of 2' 2,520 men dead or missing,) and 'Defeat and Transfiguration' deal with outlying regions like Hokkaido and Okinawa.' While dealing with power and politics in Japan, the author has discussed the position of Hirohito, the emperor of Japan,-who was reduced to the position of a constitutional ruler by the constitution of 1947, and the political parties - the Liberal Democrats, the Socialists and the Communists. Japanese Companies legally provide campaign funds to political parties. The Socialists are good, considerate people. "When they paint political slogans on the sides of rail road cars and locomotives, they do it whitewash, and clean them off a few days later". (p.325) Conservative Japan has a conservative and 'Lovable' Communist Party, which recruits doctors and lawyers to give free medical and legal aid to the poor, attracts wives of 'absentee husbands' to the fold of its New Japan women's Organisation, and its Red Flag publishes cartoons, detective stories and entertaining cultural news in place of dull ideological preachments. It is the "sole clean political party in Japan, having no financial support from the business world". (p. 327). While the Japanese socialists are on friendlier terms with Peking and Moscow the Japanese Communist Party is completely 'naturalized' to Japan, independent from both China and the Soviet Union. The lovable JCP has on pull on Japan's far-left young extremists like the Red Army whose number is quite limited. In mid-1970s, leftist mayors and governors were in power over about 2/5 of the Japanese population living in 137 cities.

After discussing the quadrilateral relationship amongst, Russia, China, U.S.A and Japan, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, and Japan's swift 180-degree turns of policy from international seclusion to wholesale Westernisation, from militarisation to abnegation of offensive power, the author has made thoughtful observations about her future when Japan would be able to tackle her problem of pollution and expand welfare not by more trade, but by improving housing and sewage and taking better care of the environment. He says : "Japan will certainly be post industrial,.....and it may be not only post capitalist but also post-Marxist."

It is an extremely well-written book, characterised by keen perception, exhaustive treatment, variety of information and, above all, a lovely literary style. It should be read by everybody who wants to know about Japan. It contains a fine bibliography and an index.

—B.C.

Correspondence

Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

To
The Editor
'USI' JOURNAL

LET US REORGANIZE OUR LOGISTIC SERVICES

Colonel Gurdial Singh in his "Let us Reorganize our Logistic Services" has raised a most constructive response from Major Gogate and Brigadier Grant. Looked at basically, all three of them are correct if we tried to seek the cure for what is today. The cause, the incurable cancer, which these suggestions try to offset is the national *diseases* of sloth, irresponsibility and chaos which pervade the equivalents of military services in the civilian life of the nation from start to finish.

What is the cry of today but for a *public distribution system*. What is the A.S.C. but a public distribution system in uniform? Is there not a justified demand for a public, storage and preservation of consumable and economic consumer goods and for preserving them, so as to put them into the pipeline for distribution? No one will realize this more than the M.G.O. and the D.S.T.

When Major Gogate says that we should enrol E.M.E., Signals and Engineers with I.T.I. certificates, he mentally excludes the fact that civilian Road and Rail transportation workshops and all civil engineering, electronics to heavy machine building, can be covered by these three services.

We have most of us taken a few years off our lives with periodic rise in our blood pressure, at least twice a day, because we have a telephone in the house and it never works. Where then is the national involvement. Is it not an involvement in peace and war? I only refer the reader to Hitler's campaign in the East to show how he was resisted by a whole nation of all professions and callings. Marshal Koniev's advance to Berlin shows what a country and its allies can do to leave no stone unturned to provide military logistics for the forces. General Shtemenko's "The General Staff at war" shows how it is done.

What has to be confessed is that the Military has to make up by having to have an 18% logistics organization today; because in its present condition, the social order cannot be relied on to provide, the quality or the manpower

needed to support the waging of war, to the armed forces. This brings out the vital necessity of even progress of the whole nations economy to be able to be "ready for all eventualities." It brings out absolutely emphatically that the armed forces have to make up for their lack of national support, by having to direct 18% of their potential bight in order to provide themselves with a tail. That means really 20% of their punch is gone. Should some patriotic civilian not ask why ?

S. E. Habibullah
Major General (Retd.)

11, Mahatma Gandhi Road,
Hazrat Ganj, Lucknow. 27.2.82

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