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JULY - SEP 1983

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MODERN TRENDS IN WARFARE

MAJOR GENERAL SATINDER SINGH

THE first thing that has to be remembered in considering modern warfare is the fact that the principles continue to apply as always. Obviously the aim of war is to force hostile elements to accept political solutions to disputes. The only thing that has changed is the method of waging war with the introduction of modern techniques.

The most important changes in recent years have been the ever increasing use of electronic devices to improve the accuracy of firepower and the employment of helicopters to speed up operations and to lift troops over obstacles.

Electronic devices enable missiles to search out and destroy aircraft and ships. They can also be used to discover and destroy early warning systems.

The helicopter has an important place in anti-submarine operations in addition to providing fire platforms in the support of ground troops. And as stated earlier they give much needed mobility to the movement of forces in the battle field.

In obstacle-free terrain the tank continues to hold its own. The application of airpower to attack ground targets and ships also remains constantly vital.

A brief survey of recent outbreaks of hostilities would be of value. Let us take the Falklands War first of all.

The Argentines were able to occupy the Islands using a small seaborne force of about 200 specialised troops against a company's worth of Royal Marines. The techniques used were the time-tried ones, though helicopters were used to ferry troops from ships to the Islands. For a time the Argentines were able to black out the communications between the British Fleet and London. These were however restored by the use of powerful transmitters probably reinforced by the USA.

And throughout the war the British had the free use of spy satellites provided by the Americans and over-flying the battle zone. Thus they had complete information of all Argentine naval movements. Nuclear submarines were used by the British to patrol and bottle up the Argentine fleet in home ports. Their speed, endurance under water, and their ability to evade detection made them ideal for this purpose and the main battle fleet did not have to detach elements for this role. These submarines also employed advanced models of torpedoes with a long range and greater accuracy than heretofore.

The Argentines concentrated against ships, both naval and transport, when using their aviation. Low flying aircraft were able to evade radar detection and successfully attack ships in spite of ship-to-air missiles directed against them. The Exocet missile was effectively used on ship targets on three occasions by the Argentines, twice from the air and once from the ground. The lack of an airborne early warning system was felt by both sides. In spite of the fact that the Harrier is an inferior aircraft it was able to hold its own due to the latest US Sidewinder missiles fitted on them. But it seems that they are vulnerable to ground to air missiles as they contrived to remain out of range of those located at Port Stanley until they were knocked out by specially designed anti-radar and anti-missile systems carried by the British Vulcan bombers.

Helicopters were used by both sides to move troops, for air-sea rescue and to move equipment. In the case of the British artillery was moved from the bridgehead to gunsites for the final battle by this method. The last onslaught was facilitated by the use of British helicopter gunships to apply firepower in depth and to ferry forward troops of the reserve echelons. Some shoulder fired anti-helicopter missiles were used by the Argentines in the later stages of the war. It is not known how effective they were as they were introduced into the battle zone very late and the users had no time to familiarise themselves with the weapon. The British used some laser weapons to pinpoint targets for air attack during the battle. Reports seem to indicate that these were successful.

The next battle zone to be examined is the Lebanon. Here the Israelis advanced rapidly Northwards using classic 'panzer' tactics with their armour, possessing little or no armour, the PLO were not able to do much to counter this move. On the air side the Israelis were able to knock out many Syrian aircraft by the use of superior airborne early warning and air control systems. Similarly the Israelis were able to

attack a number of aircraft and destroy them by the use of special avionics fitted on their combat planes.

The War between Iraq and Iran resembles in many ways the desert war in the 40's between Britain and Germany. There are the same obstacle-free zones and this enables armour to be used in mass. The battle swings from side to side in the same way based mainly on the endurance of the tanks being operated. There are the same large number of prisoners being taken in this form of mobile warfare. Bulldozers are being used to build up some visual protection for tanks in the flat desert. This could be considered a new technique. The only aspect of note is the fact that this war continues and unlike the ones mentioned before has not yet come to an end.

Basically it can be seen the trend is to use new aids to enable operations to be carried out at greater speed and with greater accuracy. After all ever since Genghis Khan the armed forces have always tried to achieve mobility with the end of getting spectacular results with the least force and the least loss of time. The invention of the machinegun initially blocked mobility till the tank was invented. Even then the use of this weapon was conditioned by the mental block that existed in the minds of the commanders who had these instruments at their disposal. In fact while it was the British who had invented the tank they never got over their pedestrian inhibitions. Only the Germans, the Russians and the Americans really exploited their mobility during the Second World War. This is besides the point of this article. What is required is, to consider the impact of these trends on the Indian Armed Forces.

The possible adversaries of the Indian people can only be those who have to date attacked the country. These are the Pakistanis and the Chinese. Now that the former are in the good books of the Americans it can be expected that they will no doubt receive modern arms. In fact they have already obtained the latest model aircraft-the F 16. This weapon has caused considerable destruction of Soviet type aviation when employed by the Israelis against the Syrians recently. But the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has changed the geopolitical picture. For the time being it is unlikely that Pakistan is in a condition to once again attack India. May be they are awaiting the final development of the nuclear bomb before initiating another adventure. But for the time being this threat can be discounted.

In the case of the Chinese it can be seen that they are in the throes of a serious reorganisation. Their inability to take on the Vietnamese

has highlighted their weaknesses in modern armaments and tactics. And they too have the Russians on the Northern flank. This threat can therefore not be considered valid for the moment.

What of Iran? Should this country win its war with Iraq it could well turn to other fields to conquer. The present regime has a tendency to pontificate and proselytise. It also needs to keep the generals out of politics. The continuing Shiah-Sunni troubles in Pakistan could well be an excuse for some sort of intervention. In such an eventuality it would not be impossible for India to go to Pakistan's aid. Iran's choice of objective would naturally depend on whether it would be more convenient for her to continue onwards into other parts of the Arab peninsula in support of her co-religionaries. Geographically of course operations Eastwards would be more difficult than across the Persian Gulf.

Out of the Great Powers the only one in a position to operate into the Indian subcontinent is Russia as she is already poised all along the Pakistan border. The question is—what purpose would it serve? Occupation of another Asian country is not going to win it any more friends. Its very presence is enough to keep both India and Pakistan under check. An invasion could well result in US intervention especially should Pakistan call for help. This could spread into a general conflagration which would not be in the interests of anyone of the two super powers.

This very cursory survey therefore leads one to the conclusion that there is, for the present, no very imminent threat, at least to India,

This does not however mean that the Indian Armed Forces do nothing to fit themselves for modern warfare. The only constraint that there can be is that of money.

Let us take technology first. The electronics required to make even out dated aviation operate efficiently under modern conditions presupposes the matching of miniaturised radar systems with a mini-computer. This is something that Indian technologists could well do. Scientists working in the space field could be diverted to this end. They should also be able to develop the necessary rocketry too so as to design the missiles needed. The problem is to concentrate the necessary qualified personnel under some dynamic leader with the object of arriving at an indigenous system. Something basic could be evolved in the next three to four years. It will be necessary to overcome the inbuilt scepticism amongst leaders in the armed forces to accept such venture whole heartedly. This is a task for the technologists. The

right incentives are needed to push such a programme through. The tremendous dissipation of effort in the aviation field has to be avoided. An impulse similar to that of the nuclear scene has to be done.

Looking back at recent Indian military history one can see that great achievements have depended on dynamic leadership, and on a change in outlook. Basically there has been only one real success. This was the operation to free East Pakistan and establish Bangla Desh. Results were obtained only after the head on attacks on Pakistani positions were changed to fast bypassing movements. The occupation and capture of Dacca especially by forces of General Sagat Singh are an example of what can be done in mobile warfare. The expedient of using helicopters in a concentrated way to cross the Brahmaputra which is a major obstacle led to final success. Flexibility, improvisation and speed coupled with daring leadership were the ingredients of this victory.

Bold innovative leadership does not come to the top under the present peacetime conditions which have—especially in the infantry—acquired the Cease Fire Line complex. This is a prediction for safety first. Careerism, to coin a new word, is contrary to the taking of risks. If however we wish to achieve results we must encourage bold and aggressive leadership. And this must commence at the regimental and battalion level of command. Our wars are of such a short duration that we cannot afford to await the natural weeding out process that takes place in a long war. Poor leadership was the cause of the many initial defeats suffered by the British at the start of the Second World War. But then they had time to recover. In a way selection of leaders is more important than equipment.

The IAF has the least problem in this respect since there is a natural selection amongst pilots operating high performance aircraft. They have to have the correct balance between courage and prudence.

The main lesson of the War in the Falklands was the fact that even a conscript force can fight against a superior and better equipped enemy provided the leadership does not falter. Modern weaponry cannot alone provide a counter balance to this.

Once we have the leadership we can commence to reorient our tactical and strategical thinking on a more offensive basis. The very essence of pedestrian 'ideology', if it can so be called, is the fact that all present thinking springs from the Infantry School, in the Army of course. This needs drastic change. There has to be better exchanges of opinions between active formations and the military training part of

Army Headquarters. Training pamphlets should not be mere reproduction of foreign ones re-adapted for Indian conditions.

The basis of training must be related to our concepts of strategy thought out by the General Staff.

Let us take some examples. Should our only strategic idea be to fight in the so-called Maginot Lines now built up all along the Western border ?

or

Should we think of some way to get round this by superior offensive forces into the rear areas of the possible enemy where he is completely unprepared ? The Germans were able to do this more than forty years ago. Should we think of something similar for our Northern frontiers too or not ?

Certain elements in the higher echelons of command seem to think that the Indian soldier is not aggressive enough to operate under this type of environment that of an offensive. This is not correct. One has only to record the great elan amongst all ranks during the conduct of any well thought out offensive. What has always had an adverse effect has been the launching of unplanned and uncoordinated attacks with little preparation against strong defences.

We have a long service army which has little difficulty in adapting to field conditions. The Air Force and the Navy are efficient in their own fields. Unlike the British and American Services we have little inter-Service rivalry. Marrying the human element with the technical element together with a little more offensive outlook in our thinking we could really have the most superior war machine.

Once the concepts are clear we have to come down from the Brahminic heights and permit the free flow of ideas at all levels. Through full participation we will arrive at a much better state of readiness. And modern war will have no surprises for us.

GOVERNMENTS: THE GREATEST TERRORISTS

DR VK ANAND

THE release of 52 American hostages on 20 January 1981 by the Iranian government in exchange for the return of Tehran's 50 tons of gold valued at \$ 9 billion after 444 days of their captivity once again leads to the lamentable conclusion that the incumbent political authorities, right through the ages, have been themselves the greatest perpetrators of terrorism. The governments can also be accused of provoking, equipping and inspiring, directly or inadvertently, groups and organisations to resort to terrorism. The latest Israeli air raid destroying Iraq's 'Osirak' nuclear reactor marks the highest point in government launched international terrorism.

Coming to national levels, only recently, Brig Osman Khalid, chairman of the London based Pakistan Liberation Movement, branded Gen Zia a "super terrorist" who is "using half a million armed forces to keep the 70 million Pakistanis as hostages."

In addition, the chilling terror of impending violence organised by a few determined individuals for their personal benefit or the cause of some alienated classes or groups is another significant factor that has made the world shudder with a creeping sense of insecurity.

VARIED WAYS

The sensational disappearance of Patricia Hearst in the USA for a motive still uncertain, the execution of the Italian ex-premier Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades, blowing up of a vessel alongwith Lord Louis Mountbatten by the Irish terrorists, confining of a passenger train by the South Maluccans in the Netherlands, the seizure of the French embassy at the Hague, skyjacking of the Karachi bound PIA aircraft by Al Zulfikar and the latest Tehran bomb explosion killing Ayatollah Beheshti and 71 others are not the unusual deeds of contemporary terrorists.

In addition, cases of sabotage in El Salvador, assaults by Corsican fighters in France, murders by the American Ku Klux Klan, raids by the Basque guerillas in Spain, postal despatch of letter explosives and the numerous ways of bombing, kidnapping, besieging, torturing and assassinating innocent people have become "tactic of the dramatic gesture" for the terrorist to strike when, where and whom desired.

By creating a situation, howsomuch unethical, to jump the gun first, a few dare devils can not only hold the peace and lives of many at ransom, amounting to \$ 1 billion in the case of Aldo Moro, but also cause unimaginable panic, fear and publicity—the terrorists' main aims and gains. The negotiations which the authorities often feel compelled to enter into imply acceptance and recognition of the terrorist's standing.

Through there may be well over 100 small and large terrorist groups operating at levels ranging from local to global, no more than a few thousand acts of terrorism, including the 700 of 'international' nature are believed to have been committed during the 15 year period ending 1975. However, the 1979 overall figure of 1911 acts of international terrorism crossed the mark of 3,000 in 1980.

While during 1973, terrorism resulted in the death of some 300 people, the highest ever, the number of all the killed and wounded since 1973 could be computed at about 1,500 and 3,000 respectively. Because of the non-availability of figures, little can be said of terrorism revolving round 'internal' issues.

MAIN CULPRISTS

Howsomuch agonising such acts of terrorism be, their figures pale into insignificance when compared with the 100 million deaths caused by brutal terrorism organised and unleashed against innocent men, women and children by the authorities themselves during the last 50 years alone. This does not take into consideration the millions killed during the numerous wars.

Indeed it is difficult to calculate how many souls were tortured, people maimed, homesteads burnt and towns devastated during the race for the colonies which gripped the Spanish, Portugese, Dutch, French and the British alike from the seventeenth century onwards.

The horrible conditions prevailing in Namibia and South Africa portray a fairly representative picture of the early colonial terrorism. Not far back, over 20,000 Africans had to sacrifice their lives at the altar of white terrorism before Zimbabwe could be freed.

But what brought about the era of modern terrorism was the ideology of Marxism under whose shelter Stalin is accused of liquidating an estimated 40 million non-conforming Russians thus breaking the all time record of Chang, 'the butcher of all ages', who during "His Reforms" of 1643-48 exterminated 38 million people in the Chinese province of Szechwan. One researcher has concluded that Stalin, the greatest terrorist of all times, did not die of a stroke, as announced, but was got murdered by his closest associates when he proposed the purge of all the Russian Jews.

The terrorism resulting out of the successive communist regimes and Russian forces in Afghanistan could have, besides throwing out about 2 million Afghan refugees, caused over 250,000 deaths so far.

The Germans under Hitler, the world's most scientific terrorist, and other genocidal cohorts, however, evolved an entirely professional assembly-line approach for the "final settlement" of the Jewish problem and eliminated nearly all of them and other undesirable Germans and ethnic groups of occupied Europe aggregating to a tidy figure of 6 million. The lamp shades and gold necklaces made out of their skin and teeth fillings still ornate the sitting rooms of some fanatic Nazis and the figures of their ladies.

Out of the over 25 million Chinese believed killed during the internal struggle upto 1949, most were the victims of either the KMT or the communist sponsored ideological terrorism. Before Castro seized power, Batista's execrable terrorism had hacked over 11,000 Cubans.

While the guess of those killed by the government ruthlessness during and after the 1965 abortive coup-cum uprising in Indonesia vary from 500,000 to 2.5 million, the number of those slaughtered in East Timur since its 1975 resistance may have gone upto 100,000.

During their long struggle between 1940 to 1975, the Indochinese lost more than 7.5 million lives, many as a result of terrorism let loose by both the insurgents and the successive controlling authorities, i.e., the French, Japanese, French again and finally the Americans.

As if all this was not enough, the 1978 terrorism pogroms launched soon by the new indigenous Vietnamese authorities themselves compelled most of the 1.5 million Vietnamese of Chinese origin either to cross over to China or escape to the South China Sea for drowning or drifting in the subhuman state of the 'boat people.' The number of lives taken by the detestable Pol Pot regime in Campuchea, even by conservative observers, touches the 1.5 million mark.

Though Mujib's charge of 3 million lives lost during the Yahya Khan ordered genocide may be difficult to substantiate, yet during 1971, the imprint of terrorism lay writ large on every Bangladeshi's face. The regimes of Bokassa, in whose domestic refrigerator human limbs were allegedly discovered, and Idi Amin, believed to have savagely massacred 500,000 of his countrymen, survived for whatever periods they did mainly through the weapon of terrorism. Most of the 10,000 persons recently butchered in El Salvador were the outcome of official terrorism.

The recent UN human rights panel investigations discovery of over 13,000 'disappearances' mostly from the USA and another 80,000 found 'missing' from some Latin American countries only highlight the insidious aspects of terrorism.

CLANDESTINE AGENCIES

Besides the above, and numerous other unaccounted direct, naked and planned acts of official terrorism, many authorities have been unashamedly practising terrorism within and outside their countries through their much feared covert agencies. Besides the well known deeds of the SS and the *Gestapo*, the CIA is now being blamed for about 300,000 killings, mostly in the Third World. Though the British MI-6, West German BND, Pakistani ISI and Israeli MOSSAD may be playing junior's role, in the bigger cupboards of KGB more skeletons could be found.

It would not be surprising if somewhere around the killing sites of Lumumba, Allende, Che Gauvera, Diem, Mujib, Taraki, Amin, Ziaur Rahman and many others the finger prints of at least one of the above agencies are found.

To eliminate the innumerable accomplices, suspects and enemies like Trotsky, Stalin and Hitler displayed unrivalled mastery. Not one of those who headed the top Soviet secret agency died a natural death.

To avoid the worst, Rommel and many others preferred either cyanide capsules or bullets. Both Taraki and Amin fell victim to their own brand of terrorism.

The hunger of certain royal scions, political leaders, ideological zealots and religious bigots for remaining life-long monarchs, presidents, chairmen and premiers has caused some of the history's greatest holocausts. That they enjoyed little popular support by the time they turned virtuoso in terrorism did not bother supremos like Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Salazar, Mao and Yahya.

REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATIONS

Terrorist groups like the IRA of Ireland, TULF of Sri Lanka, PLO of Palestine, Red Brigades of Italy, Boader-Meinhof of Germany, Red Army of Japan, BTA of Spain, and FMNL of El Salvador are equipped with sophisticated devices, international connections and varied appeals.

Revolutionary organisations of the type operating in the north-eastern India for causes ranging from the ejection of 'foreigners' to independence could not have committed, all put together, more than 2,500 cases of major terrorism including the tragic blowing up of Divisional Commissioner Parthasarathy at Jorhat. With safe havens across Burma, the Nagas to be aided by the Pakistanis and later the Chinese. Similarly, Gadaffi is backing the Moro Muslims whose terrorism in South Philippines has caused 30,000 deaths.

Out of the little known outfits, the Shia terrorists who besieged the holiest Muslim shrine of Kabba may have enjoyed outside support, and the hijackers of PIA Boeing could have found sympathisers in Kabul.

It was perhaps the hand of fanatic dissenters than that of the militant revolutionaries which caused the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, Liaquat Ali and Martin Luther King. Besides the score of futile attempts made on the life of de Gaulle, it is difficult to keep a count of the abortive efforts made to assassinate Fidel Castro, President Ford, General Haig, Pope John Paul and many others. While L.N. Misra was killed by a bomb explosion, providentially, the hand grenade hurled on Chief Justice A.N. Roy turned dud. As to who and with what motive killed President Kennedy is still not established in spite of the voluminous probes. The recent miraculous escape of President

Reagan from close range shots only underscores the daring and imprudence which the terrorists have developed.

The innumerable independence movements, liberation struggles and resistance wars witnessed recently under the influence of communist dogmas seldom made any impressive gains without resort to some degree of terrorism.

While some of the contemporary intellectuals are advocating terrorism as a panacea for all ills, many learned professors, doctors and lawyers, specially of West Bengal, are directly supporting Naxalites for emancipating the depressed classes by terrorising the moneylenders and landlords who exceed in their own art of private terrorism. During 1980, the average of about 30 bodies, often victims of torture, that arrived daily at the Guatemala city morgue were the handiwork of "unknown people" belonging to both the extreme left and right factions.

Even the religious and cultural associations like the USA based Hare Krishna groups have been accused by the California police of stock-piling pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns and other automatic weapons for terroristic ends. The Anand Margis in India itself have been suspected of terrorising and liquidating the dissenters by chopping off their heads.

There also seems no dearth of the crackpots, malcontents, deranged and the disgruntled desiring momentary publicity, petty gains, perverted pleasure or sadistic thrills by ransacking banks, kidnapping, confining, torturing, murdering both the rich and the poor and raping prostitutes and nuns alike. Howsomuch despicable the crimes of such individuals and groups may be, their aggregate stands like a drop against the ocean of overt and covert measures perpetrated by governments.

How can the individuals, groups and large organisations be restrained from indulging in violence when the governments and their agencies are themselves demonstrating increasing reliance on terrorism. If the present trends continue, the day is not far when the entire human society may find itself being governed by the whip of terrorism alone. Therefore, rather than tackling the acts of terrorism, which are mere symptoms, it is imperative that the roots which produce them are identified and weeded out.

RADICAL VIEWS

According to Hobbes' social contract theory, since all men are naturally enemies because of the scarcities, they can be held together only through terror for subordinating their private ends to the greater social goal. Satre expounding that all political societies rest on institutionalised terror considers it impossible to hope for a better world since scarcity has always governed all history so far.

But if scarcity was the sole criterion than the "street terrorism" in the USA could not have attained such proportions as to convert the residents of the land of plenty into "hostages within the borders" of their own "self-styled enlightened civilised country." Therefore, what may possibly be more relevant is not the entire philosophy of Fennon but his postulation that "violence committed by the people, violence educated and organised by its leaders makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and give the key to them."

Keys available with the people today are not mere swords, spears and arrows but deadly weapons like the silencer mounted pistols, hand grenades, telescopic rifles, light machine guns, bazookas, mortars and a variety of other highly sophisticated contrivances encompassing a wide range of explosives, mechanisms and electronics.

The spread of western liberal ideas and the disappearance of strong arm colonial rulers have brought into being a number of new indigenous authorities generally weak, inept and corrupt. The acute poverty, chronic shortages and disparities of sorts alone with the rising tides of expectations, dreams and aspirations have only helped to widen the old cleavages or create fresh ones on ideological basis where none existed before.

The desire of the numerous internal dissenting groups to seek support from some neighbouring or distant states whose aim does not often go beyond promoting their own interests and the Super Power hunger for global control, whatever the cost to others, has helped the proliferation of arms, advisors and agents leading to a variety of destabilisation mechanisms, often brutal and terroristic.

INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

In the absence of details regarding Russia and China which could be quite impressive, the USA alone, in 1974, received 14,000 export applications for military hardware and approved of \$ 8.3 billion worth arms and equipment sales to 136 countries. The following year, the

USA was operating 132 technical assistance teams and over 686,000 of its personnel remained deployed at 222 major bases and 2,000 minor outside bases. Besides the American inability to trace export despatches of \$ 30 billion worth of military equipment, the USA is feared to have lost enough weapons and equipment to raise a dozen full fledged battalions. Out of the \$ 1 billion worth of military hardware abandoned in South Vietnam by the Americans in 1975 and the 19,406 weapons stolen in West Germany during the period 1972-1978, many would have already reached the terrorists' caches.

For example, five of the Sherman tanks deployed by Idi Amin to oust President Obote in 1971 belonged to the Russians who having received them from America under its Lend-Lease policies during the Second World War, later despatched them to Egypt. Some of these very tanks captured by the Israelis during the 1967 war were aided to Uganda.

At the organisational level, the terrorists who killed 26 and wounded 80 persons at Lod (Israel) in 1972, enjoying widespread Arab support, belonged to the Red Army of Japan with weapons procured from Italy, training obtained in North Korea and money coming out of West Germany.

While the Japanese Red Army terrorists may be getting trained in North Korea, Italy's Red Brigades seem anchored in Czechoslovakia. Cuba is believed to be providing facilities to some of the leftist terrorist groups of Latin America and their counterparts, *i.e.*, the rightist terrorists of South America show enough evidence to substantiate active American involvement. While the suspicion that the Palestinian terrorists are being trained in Libya and Russia may not be entirely unfounded, the Karmal regime and the Russians maintain that the Afghan terrorists are being trained, equipped and financed in Pakistan and China with American connivance.

PRIMITIVE CONCEPTS

But terrorism has not erupted all of a sudden. That Alexander razed to ground the city of Thebes to subdue the revolts is understandable. But consider that after a drinking festival, the Macedonian burnt down the beautiful palace of Darius and destroyed the magnificent city of Persepolis: Crudest terrorism was manifested in the flogging of chained slaves rowing the Roman galleys across the Mediterranean.

The sacking of the towns and butchering of thousands of people by Attila, the Hun, in the fifth century and the cruelties heaped on the common people by the wars between the cross and the crescent could not have been less tormenting than the terror ridden internecine warfare engulfing the rest of the world. In the thirteenth century, the terrorism caused by the 'hills of human skulls' raised by the rampaging Mongols under Jangis Khan was such that a pretty damsel wearing only a bag of gold could go horse riding from Peking to the Dnieper unmolested by the local populations.

In the medieval ages, during his at least 17 authenticated expeditions to India, Mahmud Ghazni "felt it to be a duty as well as pleasure to slay idolators," and took away all the wealth and slaves he could carry. The terrorism of Muhammad Ghuri, Timur-i-lang and Nadir Shah who "commanded and watched for nine hours the indiscriminate massacre" of the people of Delhi "in uncounted thousands" was so horrendous as to fail quantification.

The irrational concepts which come to manifest in the form of magico-religio rituals during the early civilisations could not have been practised without the backing of fear. The killing of a train of servants to 'accompany' the dying Pharaohs and the haulage of about 5 million tons of granite down the Nile for the tallest, 450 feet high, pyramid, could not have been possible without the application of terror.

GORY POSSIBILITIES

Even the early man, frightful of the celestial phenomena, is believed to have sacrificed virgin maidens to appease the sun. The later tribal world's fertility cult inspired institution of head hunting has been so terrorising that some of the Nagas even today dare not venture out alone. As late as in 1625 and 1628, the Bishop of Wurzburg is said to have burnt 9,000 persons for witchcraft. That the wife and 18 year old son of Lon Nol, the former Cambodian prime minister, have been recently arrested in California for whipping one of their children only demonstrates man's faith in terrorism, even in domestic affairs.

Though the real impetus to the "merchants of death" for making the best of the world's populations and resources was provided by the Industrial Revolution, the numerous brands of Nazis and Fascists, neo and social imperialists and racists, and obscurantists acquired varied forms of terrorism. But what is disturbing most is the 1976 attempt, though abortive, of certain Palestinian terrorists to smuggle out of Kenya a dismantled SAM-7 just 3 years after some Arab terrorists had failed to take out of Rome a heat seeking rocket.

With the finances, sophistication and trans-national relations of the terrorists improving, it may be difficult to discount the possibility of a rebel, sadist or an imbecile acquiring control over an atomic weapon, laser beam 'death ray' or a 'killer satellite' to threaten a metropolitan city, industrial complex, nuclear installation, super power plant, luxury airliner or a leader of great eminence.

UNO'S HELPLESSNESS

Overcome by the massacre at Munich Olympics, Dr Kurt Waldheim included on the agenda of the General Assembly meeting of 1972 the topic of international terrorism. But the UNO, with all its officials and agencies, got bogged down at the very defining stage. Being a "complex social phenomenon" with "multiple causes and effects" the conceptualisation of "international terrorism" became all the more difficult without first clearly identifying the roots and their far and wide ramifications.

Since the 35 member ad hoc committee set up for resolving the controversies also failed, the problem was posed to the Fifth Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders at Geneva in 1965. But even this non political body, unable to delink terrorism from its "underlying causes," made little headway. Nevertheless, the 1978 modification of Britain's traditional jurisprudence encompassing the convention adopted by the Council of Europe is indicative of at least some progress being made.

India, quite justifiably, believes that the causes which lead to terrorism are of at least as much concern as the acts of terrorism itself. While the Russians consider terrorism primarily the consequence of capitalism and racism, the USA's Secretary of State General Haig only recently accused the Soviets for undertaking the "training, funding and equipping of international terrorists" as part of their "conscious policy." However, a distinction needs to be drawn between terrorism of the mundane genus and that of the liberation movements.

But any attempt at rational classification only deepens the polemical pitfalls. For instance, the Vietcong, *Mukti Bahini*, Khampas, Afghans and many more of their ilk could be considered nationalistic by some and terroristic by others. Also, when should terrorism, whether committed within or outside certain boundaries, be treated 'internal' or 'international' would invite widely ranging interpretations.

While in the eyes of every Indian, Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, Sukhdev and Uddham Singh were patriots of the first order, the British hanged them for 'terrorism.' Even immanently peaceful movements led by the acclaimed prophets of non-violence cannot be kept free from terrorism. Mahatma Gandhi himself had to call off the non-cooperation movement when a furious mob killed 22 constables at Chauri Chaura (UP). Neither were the passive resistance movements of Martin Luther King and Mujib free from similar happenings.

Further, is terrorism limited to physical violence alone? What about the spiritual killing caused by the denial of freedom of religion, expression, movement and equality. Would not tearing away of people from their familiar and traditional environments for 'secret fighting', 'collective labour' and 'political education' amount to killing of the mind? Is not bondage of the depressed, segregation of lower castes and malnutrition of the poor a form of terrorism which keeps an anachronistic social system going.

MORAL COURAGE

To find out why the governments of all times, more so of today, have failed to curb the rising tide of terrorism, the authorities at various levels must search their own hearts, for are they not the greatest fountainheads of all forms of terrorism?

Realising that a government which sows wind will, as the old Chinese saying goes, only reap a whirlwind, Mahatma Gandhi stressed much on the purity of means. Once people, particularly in authority, taste violence, terrorism starts providing the least line of resistance. The peoples of Indochina, having achieved independence and sovereignty after nearly 40 years of ghastly struggle are still spilling each others' blood while the Indians have achieved a considerable measure of success in adopting peaceful co-existence and non-violence. It is a remarkable development in the history of mankind that all the post-Independence Indian governments, beset with such diverse, complex and explosive problems as no country has ever faced, have opted to solve them without resorting to institutionalised terrorism.

In the dictatorial and totalitarian countries like Pakistan, South Africa, China, Russia and others, if the whip of terrorism, the basic tenet of governance, is removed, their entire social structure and even the prevailing geo-political order could collapse.

In America, perhaps, the conditions are already bad enough. According to the recent remarks of their Supreme Court's chief justice, "crime and fear of crime have permeated down the fabric of American life" and "the current statistics on street crime are not merely grim but frightening."

Terrorism being only a syndrome of social decadence, any efforts made and sums spent to safeguard and protect material assets and human lives, essential though they are, cannot override the need of tackling the very roots that give birth to terrorism.

Ironically, the authorities and institutions are bothered more about the few terrorist acts ignoring completely the cold blooded campaigns of terrorism launched by the governments themselves.

Tragically, even at the international level, the delicate peace that prevails today is due entirely to the balance of terror created by the Super Powers in the form of their abominable nuclear stockpiles.

The authorities can check terrorism only if the internal relationships and trans-national equations are entirely based on moral force, spiritual strength and righteousness. But if the increasing reliance of the authorities on illegal physical and mental violence is any indicator, modern terrorism is not only going to stay, but proliferate.

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

MAJ GEN KL KOCHAR, PVSM

INTRODUCTION

THE term National Security covers vast spectrum and hence compulsively becomes not merely everybody's concern but an integrated business of all of us. It must be noticed carefully that the word integrated becomes the central point and it is to this end that the intensification of civil-military relations must be directed. In particular, there is a dire need to build up public opinion which can come about by first causing public awareness of security, nay defence problems, and then to mobilise it for the sole aim of integration.

It is truism that India is a vast country and in the post independence era, the vastness and geographical outlay has on the one hand exposed some states to the onslaught of direct attack from across the border, on the other, some states, in fact, a vast number, have not experienced any fighting. It is the latter part of the country who need to be oriented fully to the needs of National Security. Public opinion must become our one of the principles of war. Implicit in this concept is the desired objective of creating and enlarging the civil-military inter-face, an activity which has been singularly absent from the threshold of civil-military relations. Since the whole gamut of developing of civil-military inter-face encompasses a large scope and wide spectrum and which by itself would mean a thesis, its full ramifications are not covered in this article and the author has dwelt mainly on essential elements that cover the basic philosophy approach to the development of civil-military inter-face.

If the oft-reflected skepticism amongst the public over the prudence of continuation of absolute military role of the Indian Armed Forces in general and Indian Army in particular even during peace time such as now, and the fervent appeals of intelligentsia for a defence review to realise better value for money and in it the implicit postulation by the politicians of a purview that diplomatic alternatives are more cost effective

than the military ascendancy over our potential aggressors in matters of National Security, are the manifestations of public apathy towards and misperceptions of the problems of National Security, then, clearly, the main underlying cause of these is the complete lack of communication between the civil and the military. That the growth of such an apathy was in essential phenomenon of the British rule in India needs hardly to be questioned but the perpetuation of it even during the times of independent statehood of the country and in a democratic set-up when the matters of National Security become the concern of not only the Government but the entire population of the country would tantamount to relegating the importance of the problem of National Security to the matters of limited public concern. There is, therefore, a compelling need of our times to cause public awareness in order to mobilise public support for tackling the problems of National Security in correct perspective. The aim of this article is to estimate the need for enhancing the public awareness of defence problems and to examine the ways and means to develop this facet of public attitude.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The averseness of Indian public towards defence matters is a legacy of the past—the British rule in India. There is no gainsaying the fact that the Indian Armed Forces were kept insulated from the public as these, comprising the main instrument of enforcement of British policy, could not be allowed any liberal inter-face with Indian public for the fear of causing erosion of its effectiveness. The Indian public in general remained almost ignorant of the problems of National Security—neither the Government found it necessary to take the public into confidence nor the public extended itself to become a party to any decision pertaining to National Security. Lorne J Kavic in his book—‘India’s Quest for Security’ reflects—“under British rule, the Armed Forces had constituted a professional body which, though regarded by Indian nationalists as an instrument of sectionalism in internal politics, and as a mercenary force loyal to an alien rather than to a popular indigenous authority, evoked genuine national pride..... Their contribution to Indian independence from British rule, though generally ignored by the publicists, was an important one and perhaps of greater significance than the frequently irresponsible actions and attitudes and characterised the nationalist movement”. This is a classic example of misperception of the performance of the Armed Forces.

The apathetic profile of Indian public towards the defence matters continued even after independence. The hang-over of the nonchalant attitude developed during the British regime persisted even after the independence. The throw up of Gandhian philosophy "*ahimsa parmo dharma*"—on the politico-social threshold brought in euphemism and myopia which caused the shelving of the matters pertaining to National Security—an issue of paramount importance to any nation. War was considered to be a very unnecessary evil which could always be avoided and the age-old dictum that "war remains an instrument of policy" was disregarded. Even the conflict with Pakistan in 1947-48 failed to awaken the Indian public to the needs of National Security. Resultantly, the Nation had to court disaster in 1962 at the hands of Chinese—a classic example of unpreparedness for war of a nation facing perpetually the threats from two directions. The years following the Chinese debacle did witness some reorientation of public attitude towards the problems of National Security and steps taken to redress the shortcomings but this dynamism did not last for long. Had the re-orientation been affected in real terms, our force level preceding the 1971 war would have been built-up to the degree that the 1971 war would have been brought to an end much earlier with lesser casualties and with some decisive results in the Western Theatre. Although the victory against erstwhile East Pakistan brought into focus the need for constant readiness of the Nation to meet any challenge but once again the public presently is slumping into the age-old complacency and is speculating on political and diplomatic means to attain National Security, rather than confronting the threats squarely and countenancing the compulsive requirement of building-up the force level.

From the foregoing it would be apparent that our military debacles in the past and ever continuing under-estimation of threats and, consequently, under-structuring our combat power find their origin in the apathetic stance of the public towards the matters of National Security.

THE NEED FOR INTER-FACE NOW

*It needs hardly any emphasis that no national development of enduring nature is deemed possible without the nation acquiring National Security. Whilst efforts to explore avenues other than the military confrontation admittedly should be made constantly, there is no escape from building up required strength for a nation, militarily, to avoid war. If this basic philosophy be accepted then it follows that in a contemporary environment, the problems of National Security

become everybody's concern, more so in a democratic set-up. There is a constant inter-action between the people and the Government and the voice of parliament reigns supreme. It is imperative, therefore, that people must understand what National Security is all about. Once done, the mobilisation of public opinion would automatically follow.

WAYS AND MEANS TO DEVELOP PUBLIC AWARENESS

The whole business of development of public awareness can be wrapped up in one single word : communication. That the communication should be effective hardly needs any emphasis. The basic question is with whom and how to communicate.

The target of communication is the people. The form of communication would depend upon the type of target. An easy grouping of people would be : the decision makers, the intelligentsia, business community and the masses. While the terms Business Community and the Masses need no elaboration, the decision makers are essentially the politicians and the beurocracy and the Intelligentsia comprising the academic and the press world.

In order to maximise the effectiveness of communication, it is imperative that a joint machinery be set-up which should evolve the themes of communication, coordinate the requirements of the three services, decide on the form of communication and evaluate the feedback. It is essential that this organisation functions directly under the Chiefs of Staff Committee so that there is a direct and total inter-face between the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the organisation.

The forms of communication that would be available are :-

- (a) Use of mass media—radio and television.
- (b) Increased coverage in news papers and journals and free distribution of military journals to some selected civilians.
- (c) Documentary films.
- (d) Lectures amongst the academic world.
- (e) Seminars under the aegis of both the colleges and universities and military institutions.
- (f) Exchange of military officers with members of intelligentsia community on advanced studies programme.
- (g) Exchange of visits between military officers and civilians to each others establishments.

THE USE OF MASS MEDIA

As is well known, Mass Media provides the most effective means of transmitting the military thoughts. Although its appeal to the masses is the largest, it can also cover the topics and subjects which are more than mere mundane in nature. Debates and discussions can be put with effectiveness and which would have appeal to the Intelligentsia. Some of the projections that can be made through the mass media are :-

- (a) Debates and discussions on contemporary military subjects, put out either purely by military officers or an admix of military officers and civilians—journalists, academicians and so on.
- (b) Expose on subjects ranging from somewhat mundane military matters to topics of some intricacies.
- (c) Interviews by some selected officers and JCOs to cover some important facets of current military operations, eg counter-insurgency operations, aid to civil authorities, social programmes launched within the precincts of military organisation.

Much though the Mass Media is a very effective vehicle for convenience of military thoughts, it must be remembered that it provides only one-way traffic, and therefore, it is that much less effective with intelligentsia in whose case two-way traffic and meaningful dialogue is imperative. There is, therefore, a need to explore other means of invoking active participation by the intelligentsia.

LECTURES

Selected service officers should deliver lectures to colleges and universities, both in English and Hindi. In the past some efforts were made towards this direction but owing to either lack of aptness of the subject matter or some form of dis-coordination, the project turned out to be feeble. The pre-requisite of the success is careful and effective coordination involving guaranteed turn out of minimal audience, carefully chosen subjects—the subject matter of which should extend beyond the purview of mere militarism and fielding accomplished lectures whose intellect, personality and ability should leave a deep imprint on the minds of the audience.

The choice of subject must not be circumscribed to conform to purely military nature ; it should cover the aspects of socio-political ramifications of the military problems. The basic idea should be to convey to the audience, not only that the military problems have a

strong bias of economic and socio-political constraints and hence the compulsive requirement for the public to perceive the nature of military problems, but also that the lecturer—a representative of the military community himself is fully armed with the required knowledge.

DOCUMENTARY FILMS

There is a compelling need to project the basic structure of the military to the public. Appealing mainly to the masses, the films should cover the following aspects of military life :-

- (a) Life of a soldier-sailor and airman.
- (b) Type of warfare in vogue.
- (c) High mechanisation of warfare and sophistication of equipment.
- (d) Secular and egalitarian character of the armed forces.
- (e) Social programmes executed by the Services. Little is known amongst the civilians (for the lack of projection) that some substantial social programmes are being executed by the services as a matter of routine. Some of these programmes are : adult education of both men and women (though, in the case of the latter it is purely voluntary), rehabilitation of retired personnel, religious instructions and national integration.

COVERAGE IN NEW MEDIA

It is imperative that not only the News Media—the daily news papers and periodicals should provide extensive coverage to military matters but the coverage itself should be appropriate and unbiased. In order to lend truism, not only the number of retired officers contributing to the news papers and periodicals should increase, we should liberalise our views on serving service officers writing articles for these, indeed, within the constraints of security. The appearance of serving officers' writings for the media would lend credibility to the subject themes.

There would be need to relax the presently operative security restrictions on the serving service officers contributing to various papers and journals.

Equally, to give some advanced and inside specific knowledge, there is a need for the service journals to find circulation amongst the politicians, beaurocrats and the journalists. Various military institutions should be encouraged to send their journals to these selected civilians.

SEMINARS AND DEBATES

In order to stimulate the minds of intelligentsia and render them more perceptive and responsive to the needs of national security, seminars and debates should be conducted under the aegis of both the military and the civilian institutions. Establishments such as College of Combat, Defence Services Staff College and various universities are eminently suited as venues for seminars and debates. The subjects chosen should essentially be of a contemporary nature and the content demanding exercising of the faculties on the participant intellectuals.

EXCHANGE OF VISITS—CAUSING OF INTER-ACTION

It is necessary that in order to step up the knowledge of civilians, the visits of some select journalists, university professors and other academicians to the Military educational institutions and establishments, including the forward areas should be organised. By the same token, not only should the service officers be detailed to visit universities, in fact, in order to step up inter-action, a chair for military science should be created for senior service officer in practically every university. Accomplished service officer could also be deputed to hold jobs like professors and assistant professors for certain length of time. Service officers should be detailed to write books and theses on subjects of military importance.

Since communication is a phenomenon based on two-way traffic system, and just as it is imperative for the civilians to understand the problem of national security, it is important for the military to understand the modality of the functioning of civilians and their language. During peace time conditions the periodical transactions with the civil governmental departments and "eye ball to eye ball" consultations and discussions with them warrant an understanding of the ways of the civilians too. Just as prospective administrative officers are attached to military establishments, the military should also organise some such attachments with the civil Government departments both at the State and Centre level. The modality of such attachments is a matter of detail which can be worked out separately in due time.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations evolved in the preceding paragraphs are:—

(a) *Transmission of Information*

- (i) Increasing use of mass media—radio, television and news papers.
- (ii) Television interviews of selected officers and JCOs on current military operations, aid to civil authorities programmes and social programmes.
- (iii) Serving service officers should be encouraged to write for news papers and journals. More objective view should be taken of the security restriction in vogue and required relaxation be made.
- (iv) Debates and discussions and seminars on problems of national security.
- (v) Selected services journals and magazines be sent to journalists, academicians and politicians.
- (vi) Visits of journalists and academicians to military educational institutions and visits including forward areas.

(b) *Exchange of Views*

- (i) Seminars of mixed gathering of military officers, journalists and academicians be organised both at the universities and military educational institutions.
- (ii) Journalists and academicians be invited to attend National Defence College. Equally, increasing number of military officers be assigned to the universities for writing theses and books.
- (iii) Lectures by some selected officers to colleges and universities.
- (iv) Universities to introduce the discipline of military science in their curriculum. The chair of this discipline should be held by senior officers—serving or retired.
- (v) Military officers should undergo some kind of attachment with the Governmental department, both at the Centre and State level.

CONCLUSION

If the military preparedness of India has suffered in the past by default and if even in the present contemporary environment which has thrown up a historical perspective which is replete of numerous lessons, the problem of National Security continues to receive less than full public focus, the cause clearly lies with the poor state of civil-military relationship. That there is a crying need to mobilise public opinion and bring to bear problems of National Security in full focus, hardly needs to be debated. To avoid war

one has to be prepared for it—an age old dictum that would scarcely lose its validity under any circumstances. In order, therefore, to create an intimate and meaningful interface between the military and the public there is a need to undertake a project which should be all encompassing and resultantly provide full scope for interaction between the civil and military with one predominant aim *i.e.* enhancing the National Security.

“The country’s defence expenditure has increased from Rs 1,199 crores in 1970-71 to Rs 5,100 crores at present. Out of each rupee spent by the Government, 17 paise are earmarked for defence. If the Government further enhances military expenditure, it should be made to give a detailed justification, lest the quest to meet legitimate defence needs should degenerate into militaristic jingoism—something a poverty-ridden nation can ill afford.” (by a Special Correspondent in the Illustrated Weekly of India, Feb 13, 1983—page 28.)

This is one of the typical outbursts of public representatives to distort the defence perspective and resultantly mislead the public. The increase shown from approximately 1,200 crores to 5,100 crores between 1970-71 to 1983 includes inflation/escalation price index on an average of 202% during these years which alone would take 1,200 crores in 1970-71 to approximately Rs 3,621. Then is the effect of inflation abroad and price escalation on equipment. This explanation, however, does not suggest that there has been no accretion in defence equipment and manpower but the distinguished correspondent would have done well by laying out the perspective correctly.

SERVICE IN PARA MILITARY FORCES

BRIGADIER SC SARDESHPANDE

PARA-military forces over the last century and a half have been an adjunct to the Army. Various known as Irregulars, Levies, Scouts, Guides, Special Police and so on, they were raised at various times to cater for varying tasks and in specific areas. They had substantial military and police contents in the purpose, organisation, equipment, training and leadership of the force. As the British Raj extended its political influence and administration farther and farther towards and across the Himalayan barrier the para-military forces also kept on increasing. Their main functions became two fold, viz :

- (a) Assist the Army by providing guides and intelligence, and add their strength to bolster that of the regular army in the event of armed struggle.
- (b) Assist the Civil Administration in extending and maintaining its hold on the people and the areas as political power reached farther a field and act as a peace-keeping force by lending armed strength to civil administration in remote areas.

After Independence political, social, regional, ethnic, economic and industrial development necessitated more and better power for the state machinery to maintain national integrity, social and regional harmony and industrial peace. These were pushed to the fore by our wars with China and Pakistan. There was a spurt in new para-military forces under various ministries. The Ministries of Defence, Home, External Affairs and Cabinet Secretariat have all had their own, and some still have their own, para-military forces.

Most para-military forces today are an amalgam of police as well as military ethos, except an odd few which have predominantly military/ guerilla overtones, if one has to go by what Shri BV Mullick says in his "Chinese Betrayal". Their peculiarity lies in their being, in ordinary circumstances, a stronger and better police force, and, in extraordinary

circumstances, in rising to the realms of military methods and approaching military efficiency. As a result of this peculiarity both the police and the army evince keener interest in effecting, retaining and increasing their respective influence and hold on the para-military forces. As these forces proliferate a rational demarcation emerges. Those para-military forces which are likely to operate more frequently and more intimately with the army must have greater influence of and associations with the army than those which are less likely to operate with it. Examples of the former are SFF, ASSAM RIFLES, BSF (border security elements, and not the internal security elements) and ITBF. As of now only SFF and ASSAM RIFLES are within the Army sphere. It is indeed essential to extend the Army sphere to the BSF and ITBP in so far as border security elements are concerned. This is necessary because these forces will be put under Army's command during war. It is therefore in the interest of everybody, prejudices and power-game notwithstanding, to take such a step.

Such para-military forces are organisations with ample scope for adventure ; study of human, social, political and military administration ; and contribution to pacification, unification and peaceful integration of tribal, peripheral and warring factions in the State, especially in its far-flung corners.

Characteristics of such para-military forces are as follows :

- (a) A mix of police and military ethos, or guerilla-conventional war ethos.
- (b) Basic police obligation of helping civil administration in its functions, with inbuilt flexibility to resort to military methods of enforcing them.
- (c) Acting as tentacles and vital subsidiary of the army, bolster its strength on the battlefield and enhancing its potential in all types of military operations.
- (d) Maintaining goodwill and confidence of the populace, while fully helping the civil administration in its obligations.
- (e) Absorbing the first shock between the civil administration's inability to control it ; and between the enemy and the Army on national borders.
- (f) Live gracefully with the pulls and pressures exerted by the Ministry of Defence on one side and other concerned Ministries on the other side when both of them try to wield influence over and gain control of the force.
- (g) Function efficiently with the leadership provided by deputationists and its own cadre officers.

(h) Maximum adventure in terms of types of terrain, nature of job, scope, of study, breadth of experience and experiments with leadership qualities.

It will thus be seen that para-military forces have a mixed ethos, diversified obligations, dual control, changing leadership and great inherent capacity for initial absorption of shock. They act as a strong and reliable, if also lovable, catalyst between the people, the civil administration and the Army ; no mean achievement.

And into this environment an army officer on deputation lands.

Used as he is to a well known crowd of people and to a familiar and well-ordered regimental life in the Army, where his rank, appointment, custom and the inevitable Army Act help him along, he finds himself quite disturbed in the new set-up in the para-military force. He has to know people around, assess them, build up mutual trust and confidence, and establish himself in the eyes of his new men, new subordinates, new colleagues and new superiors. Very frequently he has to rely heavily on his leadership qualities, that greatest promoter and savior of good officers. It takes him a considerable time to find his feet and establish himself. His contribution starts much later. But now the deputationist hesitates to do something better than remaining afloat because he knows that he is merely on deputation, would stay for a couple of years or a little more, and that the organisation is a para-military force. More often he tends to go slow and delay his personal involvement and identification with the para-military force. Moreover the mixed ethos of the force and its dual control, multiple obligations and peculiar functioning are something he does not grasp and resolve quickly because of his conventional, blinkered grooming in the Army. Some deputationists tend only to get personal benefits out of their tenure, unmindful of their effect on the force.

The difficulties are compounded when para-military units/sub-units are put under civil administration or the Army. Then the deputationist has two superiors, i.e. the operational commander and the administrative/organisational commander. This can be quite tricky at the best of times, but it can be deadly when results expected of deputationists in command of para-military forces are of the same calibre as of commanders of regular army units. In treating, tasking, helping and assessing a deputationist one often tends to forget his peculiar situation, his particular environment and his constraints. Frequently the whole para-military force finds itself in the same predicament, because the ethos, organisation, administration, training and leadership of the force are not fully appreciated by the Army and the Civil Administration.

Para-military forces tread a very delicate path between the people, the Army, the civil administration and their own reputation for fair play, efficiency and credibility.

Para-military forces are the first trip-wire. They must be well led. Deputationists have a big moral obligation to provide this leadership and enrich their credibility, potential and utility. Here lies the challenge to good leadership, to the adventurous spirit of officers and to their ability to widen their mental horizon and human experience. His difficulties, constraints, job content and problems are many more and varied than regular army unit commanders. His responsibilities too are wide-ranging. It was not for nothing that the British deputed their pick of officers to the Irregulars, Scouts and Levies. Some of the best British soldiers and administrators were frontiersmen like Jacob, Nicholson, Roberts and Caroe. Some of our present famous infantry and armoured regiments are descendants of the old Irregulars, Levies and Scouts. Well trained, well motivated and well led para-military forces can take considerable load off the Army, boost up civil administration's efforts in controlling nasty situations, and yet maintain the confidence and goodwill of the populace. It must have the best officers deputed by the Army. In fact it should be a prize job. And the deputationist must give his very best to the force physically, morally and intellectually. And the end of his tenure he will be a better soldier and maturer human being, with wider experience, and better grasp of integrating the para-military forces into not only national military effort but also with civil administration.

The organisation and employment of some of the para-military forces needs rationalisation. For instance the BSF should concern itself with the security of national borders. For IS duties the CRPF can be increased. In any case the BSF and the ITBP must have greater association and professional interchange of operational theories, training schedules and officer leadership with the Army, as they are intimately concerned with the nation's border security. Inter-ministry prejudices, jealousies and reservations will be harmful to national interests.

COMBINED ARMS CONCEPT AND TRAINING

BRIGADIER GURDIAL SINGH, LDMC, PSC

TWO days after the start of Yom Kippur War in Oct 73, leading newspapers of the world flashed in their headlines 'Tanks and aircraft will disappear from the battle field just as horse did in World War I'. This was not the fantasy of a journalist but was based on actual results of the battle raging on the Suez Canal at that time. Maj Gen Albert Mandler Commander of the Israeli 2 Division was responsible for defence of the Suez Canal. He had approximately 300 tanks under command before the start of war on 06 Oct 73 organised into three armoured brigades. By the morning of 07 Oct 73, nearly 200 tanks out of this force were destroyed by the Egyptian anti tank fire. In a counter attack on 08 Oct 73, Israel's 190 Armoured Brigade was decimated by the Egyptians. Similarly Israel suffered prohibitive losses in combat aircraft by surface to air missiles. Yet we see that almost 10 years later, progressive armed forces of the world are spending crores of rupees in the development and acquisition of tanks and combat aircraft. Why did Israel suffer such grievous losses ?

An analysis of the Yom Kippur War indicates that Israel army did not employ combined arms teams in the counter attacks to throw the Egyptians back across the canal. The air support was ineffective because of the Egyptian surface to air missile umbrella in the battle zone. There was hardly any suppressive artillery fire. In fact one battery (with only four guns) supported the attack of an armoured brigade. There was no infantry accompanying the tanks to eliminate the Egyptian anti tank guided missile nests. It was a plain and simple charge of the Light Brigade with the tanks instead of horses. After their stupendous success in the six days war in 1967. Israel Military leaders thought and practiced an all Tank Army Concept believing that tanks could achieve everything in battle. Consequently there was lesser thrust on the infantry and artillery by the Israel General Staff. How wrong were

they in this concept was proved in the first few days of battle along the Suez Canal ?

FUTURE WARS

Unlike the two World Wars of this century, future wars would be short, sharp clash of arms to achieve the political objective by force. The belligerents would go all out and use every means at their disposal. In such a conflict, the outcome of battles would depend on the degree of integration achieved by various arms and services during peace time training. The cooperation between Army, Navy and Air Force at the strategic level and between Army and Air Force at the tactical level in the land battle would be of utmost importance.

In offensive operations in the plains, a formation may have to move across the desert and eliminate enemy nodal/strong point to capture the objective in depth or cross a canal/Ditch-cum-bund type of defensive position reinforced with mines. The success in such an operation would depend upon the armour and infantry teams advancing with maximum speed through the minefields with minimum casualties. get intimate and maximum fire support from Artillery and Air Force and combat engineers to provide a passage through the obstacles for move forward of combat troops and logistics columns. Similarly in the defensive battle, the combat power of armour, infantry including ATGMs, Artillery and Air Force must be brought to bear on the enemy advancing columns to inflict casualties and stall his offensive. The combat engineers would lay minefields and create demolitions in the path of advancing columns of the attacker to impede his progress. Thus we observe that all arms and services must operate as a team, each one doing its own allotted task with precision and at the right time to ensure success. Thus team work in battle is most important and we must train to achieve this cohesion during peace time training.

Present Method of Training. At present, Armoured, Infantry and Artillery units spend a major portion of the training year in carrying out individual training. During the field firing, the units do company level tactical exercises using live ammunition. Similarly a tank regiment does its own field firing culminating into a squadron/regimental battle run. Even the practice camp by the artillery regiments is done under the aegis of artillery brigade commander where an artillery regiment is put through a tactical exercise [in support of an armoured/infantry brigade using live fire.

Tanks, artillery observation post officers, engineers and air effort is normally not available during the field firing or the tactical exercises conducted at unit and Brigade level. The only exception is the infantry tank cooperation training week wherein upto a squadron of tanks may be made available. This period is invariably spent in lectures, demonstrations and target indication ending with a ride by infantry men on the tanks. Thus we see that the most of the training year is spent in compartmentalised individual training by units where interaction with other arms and services is negligible.

SHOWMANSHIP IN TRAINING

Every alternative year, a division may be put through an exercise with troops where all arms and services take part. The commanders, staff and services are trained considerably in such an exercise. These exercises are somewhat like map exercises wherein the major effort of commanders is spent on getting the enlargements prepared, appreciation and presentation of their plans to their superiors in the chain of command who come to see those exercises. Thus the thrust is on the showmanship and stagemanagement for the presentation on a sand model or map enlargement. The only difference being that camouflage nets are draped around the operational shelters and trenches are dug all round for the 'order group' to give it a semblance of field exercise with troops. The potential of the commanders being exercised is decided in these exercises and therefore they go all out in making it a success. A commander with the gift of the gab would perform well in such an exercise because his superiors spend maximum time in listening to his appreciation and orders. Comparatively lesser time is spent on seeing the move and battle drills of the troops.

LIMITATIONS OF PRESENT SYSTEM

The major weakness of this system is that the training value of these exercises for the troops which close in with the enemy is insignificant. The system is not conducive to mutual understanding between the troops which would be operating together in battle. The aim of each commander is to make the troops reach the laid down objective given in the plan and they can easily do so because there are no live mines and fire. The only skill required is to win over the umpires by impressive and intelligible talk. The team work between various arms is not practised. No wonder in real war situation, the success of an armoured brigade in battle is not as brilliant as it was in exercise.

'Grand Slam'. This is amply borne out by the failure of our attacks on 'Chawinda' in 1965 and 'Shakargarh' in 1971.

REALISTIC TRAINING FOR BATTLE

Though we may have a marvellous and brilliant plan for battle, the success will depend as to how it is executed by the troops. Historians have always praised the successful Generals for making excellent battle plans but few have written about the training, weapons and spirit of the soldier. For example Rommel's brilliant plan of attack to debouch the British from the Gazala line in June 1942 is highlighted by the military historians. However an analysis of this campaign indicates that the important factors for success were that the German soldier was better trained and better led ; (Rommel used to be invariably in the van with the fighting troops much to the consternation of his staff) ; Panzer, infantry and Stuka Bomber team had been perfected ; Panzer Mark III and IV were qualitatively superior to the contemporary British tanks and German 88 mm multipurpose gun was far superior to the British Two Pounder anti tank gun. Students of military science normally tend to gloss over these battle winning factors and concentrate only on the intricacies of battle plan.

COMBINED ARMS CONCEPT

In the training directives/instructions, we lay emphasis on infantry tank cooperation. Instead our thrust should now be on all arms co-operation *i e*, tactics of infantry supporting tanks or vice versa, artillery suppressing anti tank and anti personnel weapons, Engineers and Signal providing the requisite combat support and attack helicopters and close support aircraft providing the necessary support. This concept is based on the close and uninterrupted interaction of all the forces that participate in the battle. Thus each arm (tanks, infantry, artillery, air defence, tactical air support) provides strength or protection where other arm is weak or vulnerable. This team work gives the necessary strength to the task force leading it to success in battle. Clever officers in various discussions use cliches coined by the journalists like 'Infantry is the queen of battle'. 'Armour is the combat arm of decision' or 'Artillery is the God of war'. In actual fact the real God of war is a well trained and highly motivated all arms team. The success in battle is to a great extent dependent on the team work between various arms including combat aircraft and reliable logistics services. As such training of the all arms team is the most sacred duty of a commander in peace. How can it be done ?

INFANTRY TANK INTEGRATION

In sand model discussions remarks like 'I will Churn up the area with my tanks and decimate the enemy', are made by some commanders with great gusto. Evidently it shows lack of understanding about the employment of armour. This is borne out by the fact that after the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan there was a great debate that armour was not employed properly. Tank is just another weapon in the hands of a commander. It is a mobile platform for weapons with a certain amount of armoured protection. Thus employment of this weapon in conjunction with other arms has to be studied and understood for integrating it with other arms prior to the battle. Every year training directives and instructions are issued for achieving high standards in infantry tank cooperation. In my view, the word cooperation should be replaced by integration so that tank and infantry become one team. This can be achieved by carrying out the tactical training of infantry battalions and armoured regiments together at all stages *ie*, when the troop/squadron training is going on, the infantry battalion should do platoon/company training in the same area. Subsequently the Regimental training and battalion training should also be done together. Such a training schedule would result in better understanding and integration of tanks with the infantry. This would also solve the problem of meterage restrictions to some extent because when the troops/squadron training is going on, the infantry unit/sub units are also training side by side and practising various operations of war.

TRAINING OF COMBAT ENGINEER TEAMS

At present some of the combat engineer tasks like making of the bridges, roads, water points, preparation of operational shelters and demolitions are being done quite realistically. However, laying of mines and other assault tasks require integration and realism. To accomplish this Research and Development should develop mines which contain a certain amount of explosive which is not lethal. Whenever there is mishandling of the mines or a soldier/tank goes over it, there should be a loud enough bang. During the tactical exercise with troops, the defenders would lay these mines as per the tactical plan. In this situation the attacker will be forced to follow the laid down drills for crossing the minefield as the bangs would clearly indicate the casualties. Wherever the tank trawls are being used, dummy anti tank mines with anti personel mines as fuzes should be used, so that the engineer parties while laying and breaching the minefield are fully alert of the danger. Thus the combat engineers would get realistic training.

COMBINING TACTICAL EXERCISES WITH FIELD FIRING


In the ultimate analysis, the success of an operation would depend upon the manoeuvre and fire that is put into the enemy guts. Accurate fire would cause casualties and demoralise the enemy. Therefore, the realistic training for war can best be done at the field firing ranges wherein combined arms teams manoeuvre and fire according to the tactical plan. To put this into practice, it is essential to allot the field firing ranges to the formations and not to individual units. All infantry, artillery, armour and engineer units of the formation should move to the ranges and should carry out sub unit training and firing. After the sub unit battle drills have been perfected, the complete formation should be put through a tactical exercise involving manoeuvre and live fire. All operations of war *i.e.*, attack, defence, covering troops, counter attack should be practised. Tanks, infantry, mortars, artillery guns, combat engineers should be employed as they would be in actual battle. The combat aircraft and attack helicopters must be integrated in such exercises to produce the total effect. These can also be organised as two sided exercises keeping the safety factors in view. Wherever live ammunition cannot be fired due to reasons of safety, blank ammunition should be used. The hits on the targets must be counted to prevent the troops poisoning the ammunition off. The critics of this idea would say that such large field firing ranges are not available. I would submit that where there is a will there is a way. We carried out a brigade level exercise using live fire on a small range like Naraingarh. At the termination of the tactical cum field firing exercise, one could observe the self assurance and confident sparkle in the eyes of men for the job well done. Gunners were particularly happy because they not only shot accurately but also brought the fire as close as 450 meters from the assaulting infantry. We had brought them as close to battle as the peace time safety restrictions permitted. Every one realised the importance of team work in battle.

CONCLUSION

One of the most successful commander of World War I Lt Gen Sir Jhon Monash who commanded an Australian Corps, wrote after the war that a perfected battle plan is like an orchestral composition where various arms and units are the instruments and the task they perform are their respective musical phrases. Every unit must make its entry precisely and play its part in the general harmony; the whole programme is controlled by an exact time table to which every infantry men, mortar, gun, tank and aircraft must respond with punctuality, otherwise there will be discords which will impair the success of the operation.

In wars of longer duration, there was time to get the troops, train them together before launching them into battle. It is not possible to do so in the short sharp wars of modern times. The victory in battle will go to the side which employs better trained and highly motivated combined arms teams. Therefore, all the arms and services should be kept at a high state of operational readiness by training them together. Full emphasis should be laid not only on infantry tank cooperation but on combined arms training. This can best be done by combining tactical exercises with field firing where all arms and services including air force are brought together and trained using live ammunition. It is said that only that thing gets done best which the boss checks. Therefore, all Commanders from Brigade Commanders to the Army Commander and Air Force Commanders should check such exercises personally to improve the combined arms training and team work in our Armed Forces.

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EXAMINATIONS AND SELECTION FOR PROMOTION

BRIGADIER N K MAYNE

INTRODUCTION

According to the dictionary, an examination is, 'testing of knowledge or ability by questions'. Examinations are of three types, *i.e.* diagnostic, summative and selection. Whereas diagnostic examinations are conducted by a teacher to find out the weaknesses of each student in what he has or has not grasped out of what has been taught, summative tests are designed to find out whether the aim of imparting instruction has been achieved. Thus diagnostic and summative examinations, as far as we are concerned, fall in the realm of schools of instruction. The third type *i.e.* selection examination is conducted after a dose of formal instruction or purely after private study or a combination of both, for the purpose of selecting suitable candidates for appointment, promotion, training etc.

In this article, I propose to touch upon the selection examination and its applicability to the selection for promotion, officers in the Army.

WHAT IS TO BE TESTED BY AN EXAMINATION

The following aspects of knowledge and ability can be tested :—

(a) *Cognitive domain or Mental ability.* This includes ability to recall a subject matter learnt, understanding its significance and the ability to apply the knowledge understood to an unknown situation by analysing, synthesising and evaluating the various criteria and aspects of a problem. This is the realm of the written examination.

(b) *Psychomotor domain or Mental-physical coordination.* This covers the use of the body or its parts in conjunction with the brain *e g* drill, weapon training, map-reading, drawing of diagrams and maps etc. This is the realm of the practical examination. However, some aspects can be covered by written examinations also *eg* in History, drawing of maps and so on,

(c) *Effective domain or Attitude of the Heart.* This aspect touches upon attitudes of the person in question. This, in fact, is the sum total of what Education, with a capital E, has done to a person. This is a demonstrated performance in day to day life and cannot be tested by a written examination or even by a practical examination. This can only be observed over a period of time e.g. Confidential Reports.

It will be seen from the above that examinations are not just mechanical tests set to find out what a person knows or does not know. These are, on the other hand, tools in the hands of the management to find out what a person remembers, how much he understands out of what he has learnt, and how much he can apply that knowledge and understanding in a practical situation. The real test, therefore, is in the test of application of knowledge in an unknown field and not in the field of recall *eg* it is no use only learning or testing the recall of the choronological sequence of events of say the Burma campaign even if it includes the course of various battles in detail. What is of use to an officer is the WHY of each action and HOW the knowledge of this WHY can be applied to a similar situation which might arise in the future. Thus an examination would be best based on a problem similar to that faced in Burma in a similar terrain and the officer should be asked to study the data and maps provided and prepare a plan. This is the test of application. Unless one has learnt and understood something from the study of the Campaign, one will not be able to apply this knowledge to a new situation and one will not pass.

SUBJECTS OF EXAMINATIONS

At present the examination for promotion to Captain is conducted in Administration ; Military Law ; Current Affairs and Science ; and in Military History. The examination for promotion from Captain to Major has two additional subjects *ie* Tactics and Special to Corps. On the other hand, the competetive examination for selection for Staff College has two additional papers in Tactics.

If we analyse the content of Current Affairs and Military History papers, we find that they are different sides of the same coin. Current Affairs comprises general knowledge of events of common interest, Military Geography, Economics, Civics (political Science) and Science (applicable to weapons, equipment and other war like activities). History is a study of the same types of events but of the past and Military History is no different. In fact, at times, it becomes difficult to draw a line separating Current Affairs from Military History *eg* we

can study the Iran-Iraq War as part Military History as also as part of Current Affairs. Further, the Current Affairs paper of the Entrance Examination for the Staff College held in 1980 expected the students to explain the history of the Sino—Indian Border. Dispute and this goes back to the late 19th century and the latest position dates to 1960-62.

As regards Administration, the history or even the evolution of administrative practices and concepts is covered in Military History. The present concepts and practices as also their future application can be covered under this subject. So is the case with Tactics. Military Law is purely an applicatory subject of day to day use by all officers.

It will be seen that the subjects are of three kinds :

- (a) Tactical and administrative practices and concepts of the past, present and future.
- (b) Effects of Military Geography: Economics, politics and science on society in the past, present and future.
- (c) Ability to use legal powers vested in officers.

STANDARDS OF THE EXAMINATIONS

These days all officers are University graduates. Some hold post graduate degrees also. Thus academically they have had the same exposure and the depth of knowledge and mental abilities developed in them do not vary with rank. All officers have been exposed to general knowledge and its ramification in the knowlege of events of general importance; effect of Economics, Politics and Science on these events and their geopolitical importance—in fact, Current Affairs and History. Given a minimum standard of mental ability in these subjects (they all had to pass a common examination before entry), it is only appropriate that we expect a non variant standard in the cognitive domain from all of them in these subjects in our examinations. Thus, in the Current Affairs and Military History papers of all examinations, the depth of knowlege and level of ability expected from officers should be same. However, the scope of these subjects should vary for each examination eg questions should be set to test application of knowledge for all examinations in Current Affairs paper but in part 'B', we could restrict ourselves to India and countries on its periphery; in part 'D', to Asia and Africa ; and in the DSSC Entrance Examination to the whole

world. Similarly in the case of Military History, the examination should test the application of knowledge, but for part 'B', it could be one campaign, for part 'D', it could be two campaigns, and for DSSC it could be three to four campaigns and a text book on war. There is a school of thought which feels that the officers appearing in part B are not yet mature and that they should not be tested at such depth. This is a fallacy. They are graduates, they are in charge of a number of men's lives and they cannot and must not be treated as morons while testing them in *those* subjects in which they and their contemporaries in other civilian services are already well versed. Our officers should be told only 'what' to do and 'when' to do it. BUT never 'how' to do it. After all, if they had joined the IPS or the IAS, they would be placed in independent charge of a department at the district level if not the district itself with the same service. If anything, our officers are selected after a more rigorous test and we must not kill their personality by expecting too little of them. On the other hand they must be put on their mettle at the earliest like the IAS and IPS does.

The level of testing of promotion examination should be kept at the level to which the promotion is due. At present in part B examination, we are testing officers at the level of Company Commander (Major's Command) and at the level of Battalion Commander (Lt Col's Command) for Part 'D'. An officer, holding a rank one below the desired level of promotion, should not be expected to master one level above the rank to which he is to be promoted. This double jump in expectation is unfair. A subaltern should know a captain's job and a captain should know a Major's job for promotion to Captain and Major respectively. This will also be in line with our policy of training for one up and two down.

EXAMINATIONS AND SELECTIONS FOR PROMOTION

According to the terms and conditions of service, officers are promised promotions to the rank of captain and major by time-scale irrespective of vacancies, *provided* they pass their promotion examinations and if their record of service so warrants. Thus despite opinion commonly held to the contrary, promotion examinations are designed to act as one of the selection filters for promotion upto the ranks of Captain and Major in the Army *ie* covering the cognitive and psychomotor abilities. The effective domain *i.e.* confidential reports is covered by the record of service. The fact that a long time span is available to each officer to pass these examinations, even in one subject at a time, helps most of them to pass and get substantive promotions in time. At present only 9 to 10 percent of the officers sitting the whole examination

pass in one attempt. There is a feeling that the standards of these examinations could be lowered so that most officers should pass them quickly. This is a fallacy. If an examination is to be conducted, it must act as a filter. If everyone or most of the officers have to be passed, then why have an examination at all? It is more honest to cancel it altogether and just promote them.

It has to be borne in mind that even though promotion is by time scale, it is to be given *ON COMPLETION* of the laid down service limits and NOT before. Therefore, the examinations are, perforce, to be taken at the right time eg for promotion to Captain (Part B) after grant of commission and for promotion from Captain to Major (Part D) after becoming a substantive Captain (as the name of the examination implies clearly).

It will be seen that for promotion upto the rank of Major, in addition to on-the-job training provided in the units or formations, officers are sent on courses of instruction where it is ensured that instruction imparted has been absorbed. These inputs alongwith self-study by the officer himself helps him to pass his promotion examinations. Thereafter, depending on his record of service, he gets his substantive promotion upto the ranks of Captain and Major on completion of 6 and 13 years reckonable service respectively.

Beyond the rank of major, all selections for promotion are based on the record of service. However, except the senior command courses and on-the-job training all other institutional inputs are more or less stopped for the majority of the officers, eg all brigadiers do not undergo the Higher Command course, nor do all Major Generals undergo the NDC course. Therefore, it is worth considering whether the present examination-cum-evaluation system needs revision. To explain, the evaluation material available upto the rank of Lt Col comprises course including Senior Command Course. On-the-Job training and record of service i.e., a three dimensional approach to selection to ensure objectivity. On the other hand, on-the-job training at the present level and the record of service are the only filters for promotion to more senior and more responsible jobs.

At present we are training a fairly large group of officers every year at Defence Service Staff College. The selection is made after a competitive examination, the order of merit being prepared by combining the result of this examination with the record of service. This training is designed not only to produce staff officers at grade 2 level (majors) but also to fit them for higher command and staff appointments. Since the vacan-

cies do not match the annual intake of officers, a large number are unable to get this elite training. The graduates of this course are also placed at a more advantageous position viz-a-viz those who have not done this course at the time of promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. Further more, even staff appointments at grade 2 level do not easily come to non-graduates. This way not only does the service not have enough staff trained officers, but the officers themselves also suffer. To overcome this problem, it is suggested that we should de-link training in staff duties upto grade 2 level from this course, and merge it with the Junior Staff Course. This course should now be made obligatory for all officers to be done before completion of 10 years service.

For training in staff jobs at higher levels and in command of troops at Battalion level, we should combine the present Senior Command Course with the Technical and Administrative portions of the present staff course and run it as a Command Staff Course.

We should select candidates with between 10 and 14 years service for this course through an open competitive examination. However, the record of service should be examined first and only those permitted to take the examination, who are fit material for promotion to Lt. Col. Those officers from amongst this list of candidates, who do not qualify in the examination, should be permitted to undergo a Correspondence Course (with upto 17 year service), followed by a contact programme, followed by an on-the Job test before being granted an Associate Qualification. Qualifying on this course by either of the above mentioned methods should be made obligatory for promotion to the rank of Lt. Col. As those who qualify in the examination will be at an automatic advantage over those who do the Correspondence Course, we will be separating the wheat from the chaff, yet permitting deserving officers to make up for lost time and opportunity and the service will also gain in the process. Qualification in the Command and Staff Course should make the officer eligible for MSc degree in Military Science as at present.

Whereas we are testing junior officers in mental ability, psychomotor ability and correlating it with the effective domain before promoting them upto the rank of Lt. Col., we are taking the effective domain only into account for promotion to higher ranks. Whereas effective domain, the inner man, is more or less well formed by the time a person matures, his cognitive and psychomotor abilities continue to develop. Therefore, it is not entirely logical not to test these qualities before granting promotion to higher ranks.

Therefore, it is felt that it would be more appropriate to redesign the filters for promotions as follows :—

(a) On-the-job training, courses of instructions, record of service and promotion examinations for promotion upto Captain and Major as being done here-to-fore.

(b) Compulsory attendance at Junior Staff Course for all officers upto 10 years service.

(c) Selection for attendance at a Command and Staff College by competition for officers with 10 to 14 years service. However, it should be possible to earn an associate membership by a longer correspondence course including a contact programme followed by on-the-job training-cum-test for officers with upto 17 years service.

(d) Promotion to Lt Col should be given only on completion of (c) above and if record of service so warrants.

(e) Promotion to the ranks of Brigadier and above should be granted on the basis of the record of service as here-to-fore but with an additional filter of a promotion examination and/or after having written a thesis or paper on a suitable subject. This professional thesis or paper should then be *published so that every one knows the standard of thought prevalent in and required of officers of the service*. It goes without saying that writing of such papers or theses should require *independent* research or thought. After having this paper or thesis approved, the officer may be awarded a Doctorate-PhD in Military Science for Brigadiers and DSc in Military Science for Major Generals.

I can visualise a protest from the senior officers about the desirability of an examination and/or writing of theses or papers for promotion. I would like to state that except for the merchant marine, other civil services do not have examinations for promotion of officers. Further, our criterion for selection of officers at the Selection Board is that a candidate should make an Average officer on completion of training at NDA and/or IMA as the case may be. An Average officer is expected to be promoted to the rank of Major by time scale. Thus any testing by an examination should be necessary only for ranks higher than Major. However, if promotion examinations are considered good for the junior officers, in order to keep them abreast of their profession, I suggest, they are even more necessary for the enhancement of professional expertise of the senior officers, who do not have any one supervising their training and self improvement to the same degree as is available for junior officers. I think, if any arguments are put forward against the introduction of an examination and/or writing of a thesis or paper, these selfsame arguments would apply even more forcefully for the discontinuation of the

examinations for the junior officers. Surely, we can select officers for *all* promotions, appointments and courses based on the record of service.

One can foresee a problem regarding the award and international recognition of the degrees mentioned above. Here I suggest, we have a look at the staff of the Military Science Faculties of the Indian Universities. It will be apparent that the military knowledge of the faculty members themselves is not too bright, be it in tactics or in Military History or in any other military subject. Most of them are retired officers, some of not so senior a rank. Not one of them has **ANY THING ORIGINAL** by way of **RESEARCH** to his credit. Therefore, there is a case for the establishment of a Defence or Army University which should be established with the Prime Minister or the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee or the Chief of the Army Staff as a Chancellor and the Chairman of the Joint Training Committee or the Director General of Military Training as the Vice-Chancellor. The faculty members should be drawn from the College of Combat, the Defence Services Staff College and the National Defence College. The other Category A establishment should provide members of the faculties in their specialist subjects.

At present, I do not think there is any serious student of Military Science, who is willing to place any value on a Military Science degree awarded by a university, whose faculty itself is not competent to talk on Military matters, leave alone pass any judgement on them. In fact, the Military Science degrees awarded by all Indian Universities should be validated and approved by the external examiners provided by this Defence or Army University so that a certain minimum standard can be maintained in this subject in India.

CONCLUSION

In view of the above, I recommend the following :—

- (a) There should be no difference in the depth of knowledge required for the candidates in any of the examinations in Military History and Current Affairs. However, the scope of the syllabi should vary according to the seniority of the officers being tested and the type of the examination being conducted.
- (b) We should make junior staff course compulsory for all officers upto 10 years service.

(c) We should introduce a competitive examination for the command and staff courses (combined DSSC and SC) for officers with between 10 to 14 years service.

(d) A correspondence course for associate membership of (c) above for those who are unable to qualify in the examination should be introduced. This should be possible for officers with upto 17 years service.

(e) A degree, MSc Military Science should be awarded to those qualifying at (c) and (d) above.

(f) Promote officers to the rank of Lt Col based on their record of service subject to their qualifying at (c) or (d) above.

(g) Introduce a new examination and/or evaluation of a thesis or paper on a given concept or idea relating to higher command for officers aspiring for promotion to Brigadiers and above. This should lead to an award of a Doctorate—PhD for Brigadiers and DSc for Major Generals.

(h) The selection for promotion to Brigadiers and above should be based on the record of service and the award of a PhD or DSc as at (g) above.

(i) A Defence or Army University should be established with the Prime Minister or the Chairman of the Chief of the Staff Committee or the Chief of the Army Staff as the Chancellor and the Chairman of the Joint Training Committee or the Director General of Military Training as the Vice Chancellor.

(k) This Defence or Army University should not only award all degrees to cadets and officers but should also be the sole authority in the country to validate degrees in Military Science awarded by all other Indian Universities.

KAUTILYA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE ART OF WAR

MAJOR ASHOK ANAND

"There have existed in all times fundamental principles on which depend good results in warfare.....these principles are unchanging, independent of the kind of weapons of historical time and of place."

Jomini

INTRODUCTION

KAUTILYA'S Arthasastra is better known as a treatise in statecraft though a fair portion of its contents is devoted to the art of war and related aspects. Kautilya's views and conclusion on various aspects of warfare are nothing new. But what is significant is that he expressed these views 2300 years ago and Chandra Gupta Maurya used them to build an empire which even Alexander feared to invade. Later, Machiavelli, Jomini and Clausewitz were to reach similar conclusions and become apostles of the art of war. Arthasastra's oblivion can be attributed to many factors but let the lack of interest in our heritage be not one of them. Therefore, I propose to enumerate a few of Kautilya's contributions to the art of war in the succeeding paragraph. These are based on my interpretation of Dr Kalinge's English translation of the Arthasastra.

HIGHER DIRECTION OF WAR

State Policy. Territorial expansion through both covert and overt means was common during Kautilya's time. Therefore the State Policy was largely centred around war and peace. Six forms of State Policy advocated by Kautilya are briefly described below :—

- (a) *The Policy of Peace.* A state weaker than its enemy was advised not to wage war.
- (b) *The Policy of Hostility.* A stronger state could wage war.
- (c) *The Policy of Remaining Quiet.* Two equally strong states were advised to refrain from war with each other since no substantial gains were likely for either of the two.

(d) *Undertaking an Expedition.* The stronger state wishing to pursue the policy of hostility was advised to undertake an expedition.

(e) *Seeking Shelter.* The weaker state was advised to seek shelter from another state or in its own forts. Alliances during the two world wars, and present day NATO and Warsaw Pact are examples of the application of this policy.

(f) *Double Policy.* This form of state policy envisaged maintaining peace with one potential enemy while waging war with another. Germany's treaty with Russia before the invasion of Poland, Low Countries and France in 1940, is one example of its application.

WHEN TO RESORT TO WAR ? A cursory look at the above forms of state policy may indicate that Kautilya was a strong exponent of war. But this is not true. In fact according to him, 'war was to be undertaken only when other means of polity had been exhausted.' He attached more importance to diplomatic manoeuvres than an armed contest. He also maintained that 'When advantages desirable from peace and war are of equal character one should prefer peace, for disadvantages such as the loss of power and wealth are ever attendant on war'.

TYPE OF WARFARE. Kautilya classified warfare as follows :—

(a) *Overt Warfare (Parkasa Yudha).* This is the conventional form of warfare as known today. When the terrain and weather are favourable and the enemy is inferior in strength and resources, this type of warfare was recommended. In this type of warfare the place and time of a battle was indicated well in advance.

(b) *Covert Warfare (Kuta Yudha).* This type of warfare was similar to guerilla warfare of today. This included stirring of rebellions, attacks at night, 'surprises', 'devastations', murders and 'Inderjalas'.

(c) *Silent Warfare (Tusnim Yudha)* This type of warfare was carried out by secret means. Chemical, Biological and Environmental warfare of today can be included in this category.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

Kautilya did not lay down any formal principles of war. But he reached certain conclusions which he considered essential for achieving success. These conclusions are dispersed throughout the Arthashastra. Important ones are summarized below to facilitate comparison with the principles of War as they are known today.

(a) *Selection of a Theatre of War.* In case there were two or more enemies, the strongest should be tackled first. Such a course, if successful, will have a salutary effect on the remainder and could avoid further bloodshed.

(b) *Need for superiority of Resources.* Offensive operations should be undertaken only when superiority is ensured in all essential ingredients of a war machine. These ingredients, according to Kautilya, are energy & bravery of troops, personal drive of the ruler, material resources, treasury, Armed forces, good counsel and diplomacy.

(c) *Importance of Offensive Action.* Kautilya considered offensive to be the stronger form of warfare. According to him an offensive could be launched by an inferior nation also in case the enemy was deeply involved in its internal problems.

(d) *Importance of Terrain and Weather.* 'Power, terrain and season, are mutually helpful and are therefore of equal importance.'

(e) *Need for a Secure Firm Base.* (..... one whose base is undefended is easy to be subdued.....)! Kautilya suggested that the site for battle should be so chosen that there is a mountain or a forest in the rear to fall back on and to hold reserves.

(f) *Importance of Administration.* Physicians with medicines and instruments and women with food and beverages were required to follow the Armies. Administration for an expedition was planned in great detail making maximum use of local resources. Though these systems are outdated today but their essence still remains relevant. Medical and supply services form essential part of all modern Armies and are required to move close on the heels of an advancing army. Maximum use of local resources is an important principle of military administration.

Factors to be considered while Planning a Military Expedition

(a) *Consideration of Results.* An expedition should only be undertaken if expected gains outweigh the likely losses. Kautilya has classified various likely gains, mainly of land and property, in various categories and described them at great length in the Arthashastra.

(b) *Elements of Sovereignty.* These were the King, the Minister, the Country, the Fort, the Treasury, the Army & the Ally. Kautilya felt that none of these elements should suffer from any drawbacks (Vyasna) to ensure success of the expedition. The drawbacks of one element can hamper the efficiency of others also. In today's context also, the quality of political leadership (King and the minister), economic situation (Treasury), the quality of armed forces and defensive arrangements (Army and the fort) and assistance of friendly nations are important factors which determine a

nation's capability to defend its territorial integrity as well as to undertake offensive operations.

(c) *Superiority of Resources.* Superiority in material resources is not adequate. Availability of superior counsel and diplomacy are equally important.

(d) *Terrain & Weather.* Kautilya has described in detail the different types of terrain suitable for various components of an Army. As regards the weather, Kautilya considered three seasons suitable for campaigning. *Margasirsa* (Nov.—Dec.) is the month for starting a long campaign, *Chaitra* (Mar—Apr.) is suitable for a campaign of medium duration and the month of *Jyeshtha* (May—June) was considered suitable for launching a campaign of short duration. Monsoon months were to be generally avoided.

(e) *Safety of Base.* Possibility of an insurrection while the King was away campaigning, was also to be taken into account. Type of people who could rise in revolt, their likely motives and precautions to be taken by the King to tackle each one of these persons have been described at length in the Ninth Book of the Arthashastra. Kautilya suggested that one third of the army was to be left behind for the protection of the kingdom, the rear and borders with other states.

(f) *Other factors.* Financial situation, strength of own and enemy armed forces and strength and weakness of own allies were also to be taken into account while planning a military expedition.

TACTICS

Organisation of an Expedition. Salient points to be borne in mind, as suggested by Kautilya, are :

(a) The movement should be regulated according to a programme of short and long halts.

(b) Capacity of villages and forests enroute to supply fodder, firewood and water should be assessed in advance.

(c) Food and provisions should be carried in double the quantity to cater for unforeseen situations.

(d) The provisions should be kept centrally and carried with the Army itself.

(e) The force was to be so organised that the army commander was to lead the column. King was to be in the Centre, horses and bodyguards were to advance along the flanks and remainder were to march behind.

- (f) The best quality army was expected to march two 'Yojnas' (16.4 Kms) in one day.

Battle Formation. Arrangement of troops according to the needs of terrain, enemy dispositions and the tactical situation forms a crucial part of conventional warfare even today. Kautilya is one of the few scholars who had given a detailed thought to this problem. Though the composition of present day armies has drastically changed and these formations are no more relevant but the underlying principles of battle formations advocated by Kautilya make interesting reading. The basic components of these formations were a centre, two flanks, two wings and a reserve. These elements were arranged in a variety of ways to form different battle formations. Some of these are briefly described below :

- (a) *Staff Array (Danda Vyuha).* This involved the stationing of the army so as to stand abreast like a staff. All components had equal number of troops. This formation was like the extended line used by assaulting troops, today.
- (b) *Circular Array (Mandala Vyuha).* In this, the army was arranged in a circular fashion in order to guard all directions. While taking up harbour or when in concentration areas this formation is adopted even today.
- (c) *Snake-like Array (Bhoga Vyuha).* As the name denotes this formation looked like a snake on the move and was meant for advancing armies. Unlike the staff array, wings and the centre were flexible and capable of turning.
- (d) *Detached Array (Asamhata Vyuha).* This formation implied the arrangement of the army in small bodies for independent operations. Present day formations at battalion level and below for counter insurgency operations and special missions would come under this category.
- (e) *Combination of Formations.* Above basic arrays could be combined to form various other arrays or formations to suit a particular situation. These arrays carried fancy names like Eagle array, Crocodile array, Cart like array, Diamond array and Pin like array.
- (f) *Composition within the Array.* As mentioned earlier each array comprised of one 'Centre', two 'Flanks', two 'Wings' and one reserve. The nucleus of each of these components was 45 to 51 chariots or elephants arranged in three rows. Horses were held at the scale of 5 per chariot or elephant and foot soldiers were assigned at the scale of three per horse. Thus one unit consisted of 45 to 51 chariots or elephants, 225 to 255 horses and 675 to 765 foot

soldiers. From the point of view of composition, such arrays were called uniform arrays since they had a balanced proportion of all arms. Arrays consisting of purely infantry soldiers were called unmixed arrays. Armed soldiers were generally in front and archers were positioned behind. Infantry soldiers were also classified into four categories depending on their soldiering abilities. These categories were arranged in three rows in various combinations as dictated by the prevailing tactical situation. These combinations have been described in detail in the Arthashastra.

Flank Attacks and Turning Move. Western military thinkers normally consider Hannibal as the pioneer of flank attacks. This claim is open to dispute since Kautilya, who wrote the Arthashastra approximately a century earlier was not only aware of flank attacks but held more advanced views on the subject. A few excerpts from Book X, Chapter III are reproduced below to illustrate the point :

- (a) Striking in front, he (attacker) should strike in the rear with elephants and horses (Mobile forces), when the (enemy) is reeling or has turned back.
- (b) 'Striking in the rear, he (attacker) should strike in front with strong forces when the (enemy) is reeling or has turned back (to meet the threat in the rear).

Fortifications. Kautilya suggested construction of fortifications on the ground best suited for the purpose. These fortifications were to be a series of posts based on 'mountains, deserts, forests, lakes, water tanks and canals.' The area between the posts was to be covered by warriors from forest tribes. All round defence was to be ensured and ground skilfully used while constructing these fortifications.

Laying Siege to Forts :

- (a) Siege should be laid after ensuring that own troops are well equipped and properly supplied.
- (b) A siege will be ideal when enemy has run out of his supplies and his defences are weakened due to famine or disease.
- (c) Safety of civilian population must be ensured. They should be settled elsewhere.

Use of Covert Means. Kautilya suggested a number of unethical means to gain success in war. Some of these were :

- (a) To reduce principal officers of the enemy.
- (b) Smuggling own troops inside the enemy fort and inducing the enemy garrison to surrender,

- (c) Creating trouble in the aggressor's own country and thus forcing him to turn back to save his own kingdom.
- (d) Drawing enemy troops to a vulnerable position by feigning retreat and then turning around and attacking.
- (e) Having made the enemy sleepless by harassing him at night, strike during day when the enemy is weary for want of sleep and parched by the heat of the day.

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

Kautilya has described the organisation of an intelligence system and conduct of espionage at great length though he has laid more stress on espionage within the state but same principles can be applied to external intelligence also, even to-day. He classifies spies into 'Regular' and 'wandering' types. An orphan, a recluse, desperadoes and mendicant women were considered good potential agents. Purity of character of such persons was essential.

ADMINISTRATION

Kautilya suggested an estimate of local resources and carriage of adequate reserve of supplies before setting out for an expedition. Weapons and instruments were required to be frequently dusted & shifted from one place to another, exposed to sun and periodically examined to check the effect of heat and moisture.

CONCLUSION

Kautilya's writings lack the authenticity of illustrations either from his own experience or from various battles fought during that period. This is a serious lacuna. However, it does not mitigate the validity of his conclusions. And, it is in this light that Kautilya's contribution to the art of war needs to be studied further.

GROUND DEFENCE OF AIRFIELDS

MAJOR PARWEZ CAWASHI

INTRODUCTION

SECURITY of our air fields is very vital in order to launch offensive operations and to support land battles. The next war is likely to commence with pre-emptive strikes on our air fields in conjunction with well timed commando raids. Such commando raids are predicted to be more successful than hitherto due to the accumulated experience, and expertise gained by our adversaries in Mujahid type of operations. It is time, most of us burn some midnight oil to work and evolve a ground defence plan based on a logical appreciation of; threat, surrounding terrain, resources available, rehabilitation schemes, damage control, plan of defence, and finally decide a course of action when under attack.

The aim of this article is to highlight some aspects of this serious problem with a view to creating awareness amongst the younger readers.

NECESSITY

It is mandatory to emphasise, that guaranteed support by the IAF to land battles, or to destroy targets through strikes, can only be achieved when home bases are free of interference during critical stages of the campaign. A base may be of a very strategic importance, or it may even house the most potent of all weaponry, but it can all be very easily neutralised for a period, or permanently by a small group of commandos, if adequate peace time preparations are not ensured.

The above necessity must be viewed in light of the existing geopolitical situation in which no loss of territory during the ensuing battles is going to be accepted, and also when no troops from the front line would be spared for L of C duties.

Presently, this serious topic is not receiving adequate emphasis. Such defence exercises could be more realistic thereby promoting its importance.

THREAT

Before we set about this problem, we must be clear of what is the nature of a ground threat endangering our airfields. Keeping in mind the present commando capabilities of our adversaries ; and depending upon air parity, the enemy is likely to launch a surprise ground attack against any air field from which own aircraft are causing a set back to his plans. The attack will most probably be carried out during one night by about a company strength. This company could either be heliborne para dropped or infiltrating commandos. Considering that most of our airfields are away from sea coasts, such a threat from the sea can be ruled out. Likewise a surprise ground attack during one night by regular land forces is most unlikely due to the distances between the borders and the air fields ; Not forgetting the intermediate land battles that will result before the attacking forces reach our airfields. It may also be unlikely that the enemy will employ helicopters with under slung light armour and artillery because its recovery after the raid during one night is impossible.

The commandos too have a set way of operating. We can expect them to be landed or dropped about 10-12 km away from the airfield in order to avoid detection by ADAOPs. They would then RV at a predetermined place, subsequently trickle out in small groups for the attack. They would approach the perimeter fencing, snap it at various places, and ensure quick induction of the whole group leaving behind some at the entry points to cover the withdrawal of the main body. The main body would storm in and attack a few or many of the vulnerable areas. They would beat a well planned and lightning retreat in order to avoid casualties. They would generally go for parked aircraft, BPI's, ORPs or control and communication complex. They may leave behind a few casualties, and damaged aircraft and bunkers, but for certain they would have created a panic, reduced sense of security and low morale ; which would for certain affect air fields night operations.

AREAS OF INTEREST ON THE AIRFIELD

Vulnerable areas on any airfield which merit protection are as under :—

- (a) *Aircraft.* During war the aircraft would be generally parked in pens in which servicing, refuelling and armament loading activity would be in progress. Their protection is very vital.

(b) *ORPs*. Apart from the above there would be two ORPs one at each dumbell. These aircraft may be on readiness. Their protection is as vital as above.

(c) *BPIs*. Generally speaking the under belly or soft spot of any airfield. It stores ATF any thing upto 1000 KL. Its loss is not only going to cause a fuel starvation, but its fires are likely to cause incalculable damage which may put an airfield out of action on the first day of the war.

(d) *Bumb Dump*. Though a dump, but a very vital one. The commando's amongst them are noted to carry ammunition experts who may plant a series of explosives to cause sympathetic explosion which may deprive the next days missions of their choice of munition. Also going up in flames is likely to cause fires which may take days to put out. A current example is the army ammunition depot catching fire near Ambala.

(e) *Base OPs Complex*. This is the nerve centre of an airfield from where the base commander controls both the air and ground battles. Since both the Station Commander, Chief Operation Officer, and other officers are going to be concentrated here the great necessity of its protection.

(f) *Water pump and power house complex*. The commandos are noted for shutting off power before they start their operation. Also, leaving a disrupted water and power system of an airfield is a significant damage considering the environments are desert or semi-desert. Their protection is also important.

(g) Likewise other places that need protection are unit headquarters, dispersals, and domestic areas. Some of them may not be lucrative targets, but one cannot be sure that commandos don't make mistakes. Moreover these are generally good entry and exit points for the commandos.

TROOPS TO TASK

Keeping in mind the potential threat, and the spread of the airfield, the troops required will vary with the airfields. However, it is vital that we know what our resources are. These could be as follows :-

Resources available. Essentially, the most reliable resources are ones created by ourselves. Any system that is liaison and goodwill reliant is likely to break down in war. Though most of our airfields get infantry help from TA battalions, but it is finally the integral resources which will produce results. Therefore the great necessity of creating a soldierly outlook amongst our airmen, rather than cocoon them into specialism of technician only, leaving guarding, patrolling and ground defence to the infantry TA battalion, borrowed soldiers and

tarnished DSC personnel. While considering the allotment of troops to task, we should realise the incidental warning, security and defence being automatically offered by the air defence artillery. The L-70 is a very potent weapon in ground role. But its use in such eventuality will offer success only after very detailed liaison, coordination and briefing. Though the air defence artillery also has its integral warning system through ADAOPs (who can sense the landing or RV activity of the commandos) care should be taken not to offset its primary role of air defence. Likewise, when working out plans, realistic figures for the defence should be included. For example units not likely to fight wars from airfields (eg AOP units) should never feature on the ground defence plans lest they result in rosy pictures. The ground defence plans should include letters of commitment from local civil agencies like home guards, NCC units, and armed police who can help in security measures. Combined peace time practices must take place to avoid confusion at the last moment.

Suggested allotment of troops. From the resources discussed above, a suggested allotment of troops on ground could be as follows :-

(a) Aircraft in pens and ORPs—Qty 20	10 secs.
(b) BPI	2 secs.
(c) Bomb dump	2 secs.
(d) Base ops complex	2 secs.
(e) Water pump and power house	1 sec.
(f) Domestic area	2 secs.
(g) Reserve	9 secs.
(h) Mobile patrol for perimeter fencing	3 secs.

Note :—1x section : 1x 9 OR.

1x platoon : 30 OR approximate.

As can be seen from the above, the personnel worth nearly $3\frac{1}{2}$ Infantry companies are required to protect an airfield. Two Infantry companies TA are generally providing this support. $1\frac{1}{2}$ Infantry company worth may have to be generated from within. Some very reliable sources for this in the order of priority are as follows :

- (a) Officers, S NCOs and airmen from squadron and wings.
- (b) Security personnel.
- (c) DSC personnel.

Though the hazardous tasks could be given to the infantry troops like, perimeter fencing, patrolling and reserves, the technical personnel

of the airforce could closely guard the aircraft and their respective working areas, particularly the repair bays.

REHABILITATION SCHEME AND DAMAGE CONTROL

Commando groups are noted to carry portable weapons with great fire power. Though, the resultant damages are likely to be much lesser as compared to air attack, but they would be of critical nature which would demand immediate patch up to restore systems. As is generally observed, the current rehabilitation schemes are very isolated to the repair of two craters. All stores, equipment, manpower and timings are worked out on this standard term. It is time for all of us to realise that there is an immediate need to widen the scope of such repair and patch work. Some aspects to this emergency repair systems could be as follows :

(a) *Anti Inundation plans.* Damage to water storage facilities will not only create a water shortage, but is also likely to cause local inundation and its subsequent damages.

(b) *A Parallel Water System.* In case of damage to drinking water plants, the necessity to have a parallel water grid system based on tube wells which could be run manually and on power. Their quick activation will go a long way during such emergent needs.

(c) *Combined Action Groups.* Combined action groups may have to be formed at station level consisting of electricians and post and telegraph representatives, who could provide immediate repair measure to keep the system going. This of course, will be apart from the ones do exist at squadron levels whose prime job will be to repair damaged aircraft so that the next days potency of the base is not reduced.

(d) *Casualties.* Last, but not the least would be the mode of dealing with casualties on the base. Plans to augment the existing medical facilities with the local help should not only be worked out, but also reduced to writing. Letters of commitment must be obtained so that the civil organisation themselves remain aware to the commitment. Combined practices must be held and assessed under a central agency. This is a very important morale aspect which must be laboured upon during the home work.

PLAN OF DEFENCE

Any defended area should consist of the following :-

- (a) Early warning elements,
- (b) Holding troops.
- (c) Reserve troops,

So also, airfield defended areas need the above pre-requisites. Either we will have to create these, or borrow troops to get the job done.

Early warning elements. For any defended area to be alert there is a need for a well deployed early warning element. Keeping in mind the manpower constraints, this capability is not presently within us, though a potential does exist in the MOF units.

Holding troops. The holding troops will be generally divided into two groups. The perimeter localities and the inner localities. The perimeter localities could be the existing DSC guard posts and a watch tower. Infantry battalion troops may thicken on such nuclei. The inner localities may be work sites which may be guarded and protected by own personnel.

Reserves. For any defence to be offensive and potent, it must have a reserve who should inflict casualties on commandos. Their further aims and tasks could be as follows :

- (a) To disrupt the commandos before they regroup at any main RV, in case early warning of their landing or drop is available.
- (b) To comb the airfield area before nightfall and report all clear to the base commander.
- (c) To counter any commando attack or trap them in the base after their raid.

COURSE OF ACTION WHEN UNDER ATTACK

It must be understood, that the aim of the comandos will never be to totally destroy the airfield. Their aim would be limited to neutralising it for a period or to cause a sense of insecurity. Hence little panic, or confusion, or even cancellation of a few air missions on part of the defender will make his task accomplished. Keeping this in view it must be emphasised that as far as possible the nights tasks should remain unhindered; even during the attack. In a properly sited airfield defended area, in-built checks already exist. If the ADAOPs are able to locate the commandos during the RV stage or the fanning out stage, prior information could warn all localities within the airfield to be on guard which will force the commandos to enter in a pitched battle which he would avoid at all costs. It may also put off his time frame which will defeat the purpose of neutralisation. At all stages the commando's must be resisted with grit starting right from the yearly warning stage to the innermost locality when under attack. This has a great bearing in our technician who need to be trained in bush craft in order to expect any measure of success in defending the inner localities.

CONCLUSION

During the course of discussion we have seen that there is a vital need to defend our airfields. The image of our airforce is at stake unless such home work is done now. Since adversaries have gained expertise in guerrilla type of operations, they are likely to employ commando raids on our airfields in conjunction with pre-emptive air attacks. We have also seen that the commandos have limited capabilities, a knowledge of which can help us to ward off their attack and inflict casualties. We have also surmised that damage control and rehabilitation schemes in this context have to widen their scope with particular reference to dealing with casualties.

That the airfield defended areas should be so sited that the early warning elements, the holding elements and reserves have in unison inbuilt checks to continuously resist the commandos and finally weaken their attack or disrupt their plans. And lastly, during such attacks it should be the aim of every agency on the airfield to keep his systems going or else the commandos will achieve their aim. Such war like requirements, should make our training to the technicians a little more soldierly rather than isolate them into pure technicians.

The above needs should be viewed with seriousness in light of the present situation in the sub continent.

RELIGIOUS AMITY IN SRI LANKA

P. C. ROY CHAUDHURY

SRI Lanka has cherished the name and the teachings of Buddha for more than two thousand years, from the day King Devanampiyatissa (247—207 B.C.) received them from the saint Mahinda, the son of Emperor Asoka of India. Later what India lost Sri Lanka gained and the Sri Lankans not only cherished the Theravada form of Buddhism in its pure form but consolidated Buddhism in Sri Lanka by converting about 85 per cent of the population and sending out Buddhist missionaries far and wide.

It is Sri Lanka that has maintained most of the Buddhist centres in the world. The Maha Bodhi Society founded in late 19th century is now a great institution for propagating Buddhism throughout the world.

It is not that Buddhism in Sri Lanka has had a smooth sailing. For a short period, Jainism had taken a hold at Sigiriya but died out because its inner convictions and practices clashed with the Sri Lankan ethos. The nude Jain monks and a severe code of controls over food and drink habits militated against the daily life of the Sri Lankans. In a country surrounded by the sea and having rivers, marshes and ponds, fish is a natural and cheap food. The maritime activities that brought in foreigners with different food habits naturally affected the people. Besides, some Jain monks had unfortunately dabbled in local politics and thus spoilt the chances for Jainism to survive. Electric Hinduism literally Hinduised many local gods like Upulvan etc. and not only survived but flourished.

DEVOTION

The second in-road on Buddhism was made by the Tamils from South India. They made periodic attacks on Sri Lanka and tried to strike at Buddhism. Naturally, being Hindus, they preferred to patronise the ancient Hindu temples. The earlier Indian immigrants, headed by Prince Vijay Sinha from Bengal with several hundred men, colonised Sri Lanka and introduced the Hindu creed. There were ancient Hindu

temples and the Tamils too established a few more. At different times, the Cholas had also ruled a part of Sri Lanka. Ultimately however, the Cholas lost their kingdom but the Tamils remained and have now become an integral part of the Sri Lankans population. It was the devotion of the Sinhalese to Buddhism and their determination to withstand Tamil incursions that saved their religion. The Tamils however were not vandalistic in temperament and did not normally pull down Buddhist temples or icons.

The Arabs and the Muslims of other nations were in active touch with Sri Lanka for trade and commerce. They had no militant ideas of spreading Islam. There were no Muslim invasions as there were in India. The spices and precious stones had attracted the Muslims to Sri Lanka.

But the story was very different in the Portuguese era. The Portuguese, with their superior military force and ammunitions, invaded and conquered Sri Lanka about five centuries back. Unfortunately they had a feverish zeal to spread Catholicism by force. Roman Catholicism was forced on the Sri Lankans. The Portuguese were also vandalistic. They made the Sri Lankas bring their new born children to church for baptismal rites. The children were forced to take typical Portuguese names. Indeed a new comer to Sri Lanka is bewildered by Buddhists bearing surnames like Roderigo, Dias, D'Cruz etc. In Portuguese times, the Buddhist Sri Lankans used to worship Lord Buddha in secret. The setting up of Roman Catholic Churches in Buddhist centres like Kelaniya showed the trend. Most of the famous Hindu and Buddhists temples came under the vandalistic fury. What were left decayed neglect.

The Portuguese were followed in Sri Lanka by the Dutch who were less vandalistic. But they too were not sympathetic to Buddhism. The Dutch were great traders who were also artistic and even now some of their furniture and wood carvings can be seen. Sri Lanka has a reputation of furniture of high quality and this is a gift of the Dutch.

Then followed the British who held power till 1948. The British were patronisingly kinder to the Buddhists and there was no active interference. The British were more anxious to rule than to spread Christianity. Today, Christianity accounts for about a tenth of the population including non-nationals. Missionaries came in hundreds during the Dutch and the British regime. Due to colonial rule of the Portuguese, Dutch and the British who denigrated Buddhism and destroyed Buddhists shrines, the creed had become moribund.

A few Buddhist stalwarts the most prominent of whom was Anagarika Dharmapala made it their mission to revive Buddhism in Sri Lanka. They were successful to a large degree. Buddhism came back and the Buddhists no longer paid homage to Lord Buddha in secrecy.

Sri Lanka has at the moment a very attractive picture of different creeds and faiths co-existing in harmony. The Hindus, Christians, Muslims and those of other faiths, live in harmony with the Buddhists. Communal riots of the type in India are rare. The Muslims are more business-minded and have no appetite for spreading Islam by the sword. There is freedom to follow one's own religion.

This peace has given the Sri Lankans the latitude to make their own contribution to art and architecture. Unfortunately, Indian scholars are too conscious of the Indian influence on Sri Lanka's art and culture. This perhaps is natural when we realise that Buddhism is India's most precious export to Sri Lanka. Buddha images and Buddhist temples are the main themes in Sri Lankan art and architecture. Fortunately, a great Buddhist scholar and antiquarian, Sri D.T. Devendra, has written a fine book on the evolution of the Buddha image in Sri Lanka. His theory may be a little ambitious but he has amply shown that some of the Buddhist images of Sri Lanka have an exclusive identity. Sri Lanka's temples are not spoilt by eroticism. Sri Lankans have retained their ethnic culture and language in spite of the presence of many religious faiths and foreign attacks in the past.

INFLUENCE

In this connection, the very great contribution of Sri Anagarika Dharmapala in recent decades should be remembered. This man, born to wealthy parents and brought up mostly in Christian schools, came of a religious Buddhist family in Colombo. His mother had a great influence on him. A born patriot and religious zealot, he visited Buddha Gaya in India in 1891. He was shocked to find the Buddha Gaya temple precincts dirty and an abode of pigs. Before this visit, he had been to Sarnath where he saw as dismal a sight. Buddhism had been trodded on and despised. The great Buddha Gaya temple was under the control of a Hindu, Saiva Mohunt, who was one of the most oppressive landlords. He had turned the temple into a Hindu shrine. The Buddhists did not have even free access to the temple. When this young visitor paid homage by touching the Vajrasan, on which the great image of the Buddha is seated, he felt divinely inspired to revive Buddhism in India and free the Buddha Gaya temple from the clutches of the Hindu Mahant and make it again a Buddhist centre. Anagarika

Dharmapala carried this mission through for decades to his death in the thirties. He was persecuted, prosecuted and assaulted. But he did not flinch. He started the Maha Bodhi Society. He visited many foreign countries on his mission. He attended the Congress of Religion in the United States along with Swami Vivekanand and others where they made a great impact.

MESSAGE

India lost almost Buddhism after exporting it to Sri Lanka. A Sri Lankan Anagarika Dharmapala brought it back to India.

He was a valiant missionary criss-crossing the world to spreading Lord Buddha's message. He was misunderstood for a long time in his own country. His diaries, preserved at the Maha Bodhi Society Office in Colombo, show the great man that he was. Fortunately, Sri Lanka did not make him a Mahatma as India has done with Gandhi. Anagarika Dharmapala had his greatness and also his oddities and foibles. He revived Buddhism in India. His mission to restore the Buddha Gaya temple to the Buddhists, which was interrupted by his death, was partially successful. His dying wish was to be born again and resume the fight. His love for Ceylon was so deep that in one entry in his diary he had noted a wish to die in Ceylon. He was a truthful fighter and not a strategist or he would not have planted a Japanese Buddha image at Buddha Gaya and alienate the British bureaucracy. He was given millions of rupees by his admirers all of which he endowed to the cause of Buddhism. Today, because of Sri Anagarika Dharmapala Sri Lanka leads the Buddhist countries.

THE ACHINGMORI EPISODE-1953

MAJOR K. BRAHMA SINGH (RETD)

WITH a friendly Tibet acting as buffer between India and China, the British had contented themselves with just demarcating India's North Eastern Frontier with Tibet by what came to be called, the Mc Mahon-line, and then forgetting about it. The desirability of establishing outposts upto the Mc Mahon Line had, no doubt, been recognised but this never materialised due to the low priority that was accorded to this task. After independence, till such time that no threat to the Security of the country from this direction was involved, the Indian Government evinced little interest in the region. With the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, however, India could no longer afford to sleep over its North Eastern Frontier. It then became necessary for us to strengthen further our ties with the hill people and make known our presence upto the International frontier, in unmistakable terms. Consequently the NEFA administration, which had been till then functioning from places on the Agency's southern borders with Assam began to extend itself northwards by gradual stages. Thus by early 1953 the administration in the Siang Frontier Division had reached a line Daporijo-Gusar astride the River Subansiri. In addition there was an isolated administered area just below the Mc Mahon Line with an administrative centre protected by a 2 Assam Rifles post function at Mechuka. In the unadministered area north of the Gusar—Daporijo line and south of Mc Mahon line lived the Tagins whose hostility towards the administration led to the Achingmori Tragedy.

To bring this unadministered area under control, patrols were sent out from the Assam Rifles post at Gusar, into the lower Tagin area upto Kika-Siyom in July and August 1953. These patrols had met with hostility from the Tagins resulting in injury to some Assam Rifles personnel. Information had subsequently been received that some foreigners had infiltrated into the area and distributed presents among the Tagins with a view to win them over and instigate them to resist Indian administrative control.

In order to investigate the incidents of hostility by the Tagins, and also to confirm the reports of activities of foreigners, a column of 23 other ranks under Major R D Singh of the newly raised 7th Battalion of the Assam Rifles, accompanied by the Area Superintendent Shri P Barua, was sent out to the area. The column reached Achingmori on the afternoon of 22 October, and settled down in the camp erected by the Tagins for them in advance. Then a large number of Tagins started collecting there, ostensibly for obtaining salt and other political presents. When a sufficient number had got into the camp, they all of a sudden, on a given signal, attacked the sentries and overpowered them. Thereafter they brutally attacked the rest of the party who were going about their chores unguardedly. In this tragedy Major RD Singh, Shri P Barua, a number of political Jemadars, and most of the Assam Rifles personnel were killed, without getting a chance to defend themselves. A number of surviving political Jemadars and a few Assam Rifles personnel were taken away as hostages and all the Government property was looted.

Information regarding this tragedy reached Gusar on the morning of 23 October, through one of the Assam Rifles survivors and it was flashed to the Headquarters Inspector General Assam Rifles the same day. The incident was of great concern not only to the Assam Rifles but also to the Government. The NEFA Administration asked the Inspector General Brigadier K Bhagwati Singh to enquire into the incident and submit his considered plan of action to be taken. Consequently the Inspector General held a meeting with the political officer at Along on 28 October which was also attended by the Commandant 7 Assam Rifles. At the meeting it was decided that prompt action be taken to recover hostages; the state of unrest among the Tagins be brought under control before lack of action encouraged other tribes; and the looted Assam Rifles weapons and equipment be recovered before the hostile learnt to use them. It was also considered necessary that dead bodies of the ill fated patrol be recovered and disposed off in a befitting manner. To carry out the above, it was necessary that an Assam Rifles force accompanied by the Political Department officials and interpreters visit the affected Villages in the lower Tagin area.

A coordinating conference was held at Jorhat on 4th November under the Chairmanship of the Governor of Assam Shri Jairamdas Daulat Ram, which was attended by the Inspector General Assam Rifles, Adviser to Governor Shri Nari Rustom Ji, OC Air Force Wing, the Political Officers of Subansiri and Siang Frontier Divisions, Commandant 7 Assam Rifles and a Company Commander from the Parachute Regiment. The Inspector General's tentative plan was discus-

sed and approved. As per the general outline plan, three Columns each of 7 to 8 platoons strength from the Assam Rifles, with attached troops from the Army and accompanied by officials of the Political Department, were to converge upon area Achingmori from their three respective bases at Mechuka, Gusar and Daporijo. Direct offensive air support was to be given by the IAF on call when necessary. Necessary additional troops and tribal porters were to be made available for the columns. The operation was to be controlled from a combined headquarters of Assam Rifles and the Air Force wing, to be located at Jorhat.

The Mechuka column was to be commanded by Lt Colonel Mange Ram Commandant 1 Assam Rifles. It was to have eight platoons of the Assam Rifles (four from the 4th Battalion, three from the 1st and one from the 7th Battalion) one section Mortars from 1st Battalion Garhwala Rifles, 300 Assam Rifles fighting porters and 50 Agency Service Corps Porters. It was to move from Mechuka to Duli near Achingmori via Chatak pass.

The 'Gusar' column was to be commanded by Lieut Colonel Kaman Singh MVC Commandant 6th Assam Rifles. This column was to have nine platoons of the Assam Rifles (four from the 6th Battalion, four from the 7th and one from the 3rd Battalion) one section mortars 1st Battalion Garhwal Rifles, 240 Assam Rifles fighting porters and 110 Agency Service Corps porters. It was to advance along the east bank of Subansiri river and concentrate in area of the junction of Subansiri and Suji rivers near Achingmori.

The 'Daporijo' column was to be commanded by Lieut Colonel K S Rai MC, Commandant 5th Assam Rifles. It was to comprise of seven platoons of 5th Assam Rifles, half platoon of 3rd Assam Rifles, one section mortars, 80 Assam Rifles fighting porters and 270 Agency Service Corps porters. The column was to advance from Daporijo and concentrate on the west bank of Subansiri opposite Achingmori.

A company of the Parachute Regiment was held in reserve at Daporijo where it was also given the task of construction and maintenance of the landing ground till called up for any operational task. Three platoons from 2nd Assam Rifles were located at Jorhat airfield as reserve for reinforcing any of the three columns.

25th November was fixed as the 'D' Day. On that day the columns were to start self contained for seven days. Subsequent replenishment was to be done through air drops at selected Dropping Zones.

Before the operation was launched the Government of India laid down certain restrictions which were to be strictly adhered to. As a matter of policy large scale destruction was prohibited and killing was to be restricted to self defence only. Spitfires and Hawards could be used in an offensive role, if necessary, especially in the restricted area of Achingmori, but these air actions were to aim at only demoralisation of the population and avoid destruction of villages. Adequate measures were also to be taken to prevent tribesmen accompanying the column, and whose relatives had been killed in the Achingmori incident, from taking revenge on the Tagins. It was clearly laid down that hostages if necessary were to be all males and no force was to be applied on women and children to compel the surrender of the male hostages.

Each column was to be provided with sufficient wireless sets for Rear Link with the operational headquarters, inter communication within the column and for lateral communications with the other two columns. 22 wireless operators from the Army were attached to the Assam Rifles force to augment its signal strength.

Troops started concentrating at their respective bases by scheduled dates. Jorhat air-field became the main transit point for all troops other than 7 Assam Rifles and those located in Subansiri Frontier Division. Pasighat landing ground and Mohanbari airfield became the main transit points for 7 Assam Rifles while those located in Subansiri Frontier Division marched on foot to Daporijo. Along and Daporijo were to become the forward airfields for Jorhat and Pasighat/Mohanbari respectively. At that time there was no air-field at Daporijo and, therefore, before the concentration plan could be implemented an air-field had to be constructed at Daporijo. Accordingly work on it was started immediately by the personnel of the 5th Assam Rifles and a clearance in the jungle was made at the site of the landing ground even as the plans were being formulated. As a matter of fact when major U K Gupta, Lieut Bhatia, and 128 other rank of No. 3 company of the Parachute Regiment were dropped over Daporijo on 4th November to take over further construction work, the small detachment of the Assam Rifles post at Daporijo had not only cleared the site but also made some progress on the actual construction of the air-field. Thereafter the paratroopers and the Assam Rifles boys went all out with the construction work and in a superb joint effort they were able to make the ground fit for landing of a Dakota by 12 November, in record time. On that day a test landing of a dakota was made by Squadron Leader M S Gill. Transportation of troops on this landing ground started on the 13th of November, when the 'Daporijo' Column Commander Lieut Colonel

K S Rai landed with some troops. Concentration of the column was completed by 25 November.

Troops of the 'Gusar' Column concentrated at Gusar after marching from Daporijo/Along forward landing grounds to which they were first flown. The Column Commander Lieut Colonel Kaman Singh reached Gusar via Daporijo on 14 November and the entire column including the civilian element had concentrated there by 30 November.

The troops of the 'Mechuka' Column were first flown to Along and from there they marched to Mechuka, as a column, in nine stages. The Column followed the west bank of Syom river, through the Galong area upto Kityak from where a new route running north west across a 9000 feet high mountain ridge was taken to reach Yapuik. This route passed through extremely difficult terrain totally un-inhabited and where water was scarce. From Yapuik the route followed along the upper reaches of Syom river through areas inhabited by warlike, but friendly to the Assam Rifles, tribes. At Rego the local Ramos welcomed the troops with presents of fresh vegetables, eggs, chicken etc. Concentration of the Column was completed by 27 November.

As the troops in each column belonged to different units, on concentration at their respective bases the column Commanders carried out collective training and revision of battle drills etc. In order to give the commanders sufficient time for this training the 'D' Day was advanced to 28th November. The extra time now available was also utilised for checking and zeroing weapons. In addition demonstrations in fire power of Infantry platoon weapons and 3 inch mortars were organised. The local tribals were invited to witness these demonstrations so that news of the striking power of the Government forces could be carried to the hostiles and their morale shaken. Such demonstrations also helped in raising the morale and confidence of friendly tribals who were being threatened by the hostiles for showing loyalty to the Government. Demonstration in fire power, for the same purpose, was also organised by the Air Force. Some Havards and Spitfires showed a fire power demonstrating in Daporijo area. The desired effect on the morale of the hostiles could not, however, be achieved by this demonstration. For obvious reasons the targets chosen were not hostile villages but natural features adjacent to them. This was interpreted by the hostiles as inaccuracy in firing by the aircraft. Interestingly this fact (as reported by some friendly tribals), was also exploited by the Tagin 'Witch Doctors' to prove the efficacy of their magic spells. Further demonstrations by the Air Force were, therefore, discontinued.

Besides training and demonstration, the time available at the bases also used by the Column Commanders to obtain information regarding the terrain over which they were to advance and the hostiles they were to operate against. Reports varying in degrees of reliability, indicated that the hostiles were preparing to oppose the columns. A total of seven personnel of the Assam Rifles were reported to be held by the hostile as hostages. Major R D Singh's decomposed body was found near the river bank in area Subansiri-Monga river junction on 15 November, by some locals. The body was indentified by personnel of the Gusar post and was temporarily burried till it could be cremated with full military honours on 24 November. The cuts and wound found on the body indicated that Maj R D Singh was captured by the hostiles while trying to escape from the camp and then brutally murdered. This discounted earlier reports that he had jumped into the river to escape capture and had got drowned.

Friendly liaison with the locals was also established by the political staff during their stay at the bases. Leaflets were dropped by the aircraft in the affected areas apprising the villagers of the Government's strength and determination to deal with the insurrection and enumerating the various welfare schemes launched by the new administration for the well being of the loyal tribals. Through this liaison the tribals were also advised to release all hostages and surrender arms and equipment looted by them. The hostiles, however, failed to respond to these warnings. In fact these hostile tribesmen were seen brandishing spears and 'Doas' and shooting arrows at the aircraft during their leaflets dropping missions. Four hostages (civilian porters) who had escaped to reach Gusar on the 14th and 19th November informed that the leaflets were torn to bits by the hostiles who had made scornful acclamation to the effect that Government's might was restricted to dropping of leaflets only. As a display of arrogance and belicosity the hostiles hacked to pieces the two riflemen held as hostages since the Achingmori incident.

The hostiles being in no mood to surrender, it was decided to launch the operation as planned. Except for routine security orders and orders for a tactical advance, no firm operational orders could be issued at this stage. It was decided that fresh verbal orders would be issued to troops by the Column Commanders based on information received and situation obtaining at the end of each day during the advance. All the columns planned the grouping of the troops for the advance as for a conventional advance to contact with additional protective arrangements for the long baggage trains. The Inspector General Assam Rifles issued a special order of the day on 26 November to all troops taking part in the operations in which he, while wishing

them good luck, urged the Assam Rifles to wipe out the great scourage on their good name caused by the Aehingori incident and, through the greatest zeal and extreme effort, restore their past glory.

The 'Mechuka' Column commenced advance from Mechuka to area Achingmori on 28 November while the 'Daporiji' Column commenced advance on 30 November and the 'Gusar' Column as late as 3 December. The timings had been staggered to allow for the difference in the distances that were to be covered by each column.

All the three columns followed more or less similar pattern of advance. They moved over precipitous and difficult terrain, especially the 'Mechuka' column which had to cross the 1300 feet Chatak pass covered with over four feet of snow. A continuous drizzle on 3rd and 4th December made matters worse. The men got soaked to the skin and the loads became heavier and difficult to carry over slippery paths. The 'Mechuka' Column particularly spent these two nights at high altitude without snow clothing in great discomfort. The advance, however, continued as scheduled, movement of the 3 columns being coordinated by the Inspector General who often appeared over the columns on an aircraft to receive first hand information about the advance and the tactical situation. Tactically also the columns followed a similar pattern. After the first few days of the march through friendly villages all the columns began to meet opposition from the hostiles. Their routes were blocked by felled trees, panjis and booby traps. Attempts on the part of the troops to change routes and by-pass obstacles were countered by the hostiles with hurriedly constructed obstacles on the new routes also. At Places leaflets dropped by the Air Force, were seen stuck on tree trunks which according to tribal custom was a sign of their having accepted the Government challenge. The columns sent out flying squads ahead which moved with speed and broke off hostile assemblies, by firing a few mortar bombs or a burst or two from light Machine Guns, before they could organise any collective resistance. The slightest indication of hostility on the part of the tribals was dealt with firmly. This shook the morale of the hostiles and after the first few of these actions by the flying squads, the hostiles started fleeing to the jungles at the sight of these troops, at times setting fire to their villages before fleeing. From one such village, set ablaze by the hostiles, the 'Mechuka' column recovered a three years old dumb girl abandoned by the parents. The troops became very fond of the child and carried her with them right through the operations after which she was handed over to the civil officials for restoration to her parents.

The friendly tribals proved to be of great assistance to the troops. They fed them with timely and useful information about the hostiles and also helped in tracing hostages and stolen weapons. They pointed out the houses of culprits who took part in the Achingmori massacre. It was also with the help of one of the village elders that the person responsible for the murder of a rifleman of 7 Assam Rifles, while on patrol from Gusar in July, was captured by the 'Gusar' Column. One Light Machine Gun was recovered through the efforts of 'Gam' of Mara Epror by the 'Daporijo' Column. The Havards of the Air Force were extensively used for supplementing or confirming information, regarding movement and concentration of hostiles, received from these sources.

The 'Daporijo' Column reached its objective Dupek on 11 December and 'Gusar' Column arrived at its destination at Dosuk on 13 December. The 'Mechuka' column arrived at its destination, a place one mile beyond Achingmori, after passing through the scene of the Achingmori tragedy, which presented a horrible spectacle. All over the open ground as well as under the debris of damaged huts, there were dead bodies mostly mutilated beyond recognition; some lay in heap of tangled masses of skeletons and decomposing flesh and others scattered without their heads and limbs. There was a corpse of a female Galong porter with head and breasts severed from the body; such had been the savagery displayed by the Tagins. Total number of bodies found in the area of the ill fated camp and its surrounding area, was twenty five (9 of Assam Rifles personnel and 16 of civilians).

After closing in at their respective objectives, the tasks for the columns now remained of rounding up the culprits, liaising with the friendly tribals and establishing two administrative centres in the Mara-Achingmori area with an Assam Rifles post at each centre. As the affected area came under the operational control of the 5th and 7th battalions of the Assam Rifles the task of setting these administrative centres was given to the 'Gusar' and 'Daporijo' columns which comprised mainly of troops from these two battalions. The 'Mechuka' Column was given the task of disposal of dead bodies with appropriate military honours. Besides these, all columns had the general task of rounding up the culprits and recovery of hostages and weapons from the hostiles. To this end patrols were sent out by all columns in their respective areas immediately on reaching their objectives.

As the patrols approached the villages one by one for searching, they found them deserted and in most cases destroyed. The hostiles

had taken to deep jungles along with their families and from these hide-outs they made, at times, determined attempts at ambushing and attacking the patrols on their way in and out of the villages. The attacks were, however, foiled by patrols taking timely action in firing into hostile concentrations before they could act. The hostiles had made a desperate bid to dislodge troops from their camp when on 15/16 December night, they launched a night attack on the main camp of 'Gusar' column and fired on them with rifles and sten guns looted at Achingmori. The column returned the fire with mortars and light machine guns and soon broke up the hostile attack. Thereafter the patrols mounted pressure on the hostiles and had them on the run from one hideout to the other till about 22nd December when the hostiles ceased to offer any further resistance. By this time moral pressure was also exerted on them by their distressed families and the village elders, to make them give up and they at last got down to negotiations with the political officers.

Most of the culprits of the Achingmori incident failed to surrender and remained at large but all the living hostages were freed and most of the looted arms were recovered.

Sites for Assam Rifles posts were selected at Taliha and Achingmori and on 25 December these posts were formally increased with due military ceremony. The ceremonial function was attended by the officials of the Political Department, the 'Gams' and the local Tagins. Addresses were delivered by the Political Officers and the Column Commanders conveying to the tribals the intentions of the Government to bring justice and welfare to the tribals by extending the new administration to these areas.

The operations thus came to a close after achieving the task to the maximum extent possible. The nature of the operation must not be judged by the smallness of the opposition met by the columns. As a matter of fact it was the crafty tactical manoeuvres, prompt and timely reaction to hostile moves, and the firmness with which the Assam Rifles acted, broke the determination of the hostiles to resist. Those who have had the opportunity to operate in these areas would know how much the hostiles could have opposed the troops even with their primitive weapons if they would have been allowed to have their way. The induction of such a large number of troops into the operation was in itself a great feat. The real significance of the operation, however, lies in the fact that never again after this have the tribals risen in hostility against the administration in these regions. The Assam Rifles with

their characteristic blend of restraint and firmness may well take the credit for the correct handling of the situation at that crucial stage.

For the Assam Rifles the operation is significant in another way too. It indeed forms a prominent land work in their history. For the first time, and perhaps the last, the Assam Rifles successfully planned and executed an operation of such a magnitude, involving cooperation of the Indian Air Force in its tactical and logistical support roles.

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WAZIR ZORAWAR SINGH'S OPERATIONS IN WESTERN TIBET AND THE BRITISH REACTION: 1841-42

LIEUT-GENERAL S L MENEZES

IN 1839 Wazir Zorawar Singh Kahluria, the commander of Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu, who was then a feudatory of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, put down a rebellion in Ladakh. His consolidation of Ladakh was now complete. In 1840 he consolidated Baltistan.

After the consolidation of Ladakh and Baltistan, Zorawar Singh revived Ladakh's claims over Western Tibet. This territory, having important places such as Rudok, Gartok and Taklakot, had been ceded by Ladakh to Tibet in the period 1680-1690. In April 1841 he invaded this area, and secured it by fortresses with small Dogra garrisons.

These operations of Zorawar Singh were deemed detrimental by the British to the interest of the East India Company. The trade of the British-protected hill states received a setback. In 1840 the quantity of pashmina wool imported from Western Tibet into Bashahr was 1548 maunds; in 1841 it fell to 169 maunds. It was also feared by the British that another aim of the Dogras was to enter into a friendly alliance with Nepal—the other independent Hindu State on the Indian sub-continent, which at that time was in search of an anti-British alliance.

In August 1841, Lord Auckland, the then Governor-General, wrote to George Russell Clerk, his Agent at Ludhiana, that the operations of the Dogras in the trans-Himalayas had caused excitement at Kathmandu which it was very desirable to check. Clerk, apprehending danger from a Gorkha-Dogra-Sikh rapprochement, also observed that it would never be safe for the then Government of India to allow any other powerful state contiguous to Nepal. B.H. Hodgson, the then British Resident in Nepal, had already cautioned his Government in the following terms, "the sooner these wanton encroachments of the

Jammoo family upon the states or districts contiguous to Ladakh are discountenanced the better."

Clerk had addressed the Lahore Durbar a number of times soliciting information regarding Zorawar's objective and movements in Western Tibet, but the reply which he received was that the "Sikh government had not received any intelligence from that quarter." Clerk wrote to the then Supreme Government that the replies of the Durbar in this case were dictated by Raja Dhian Singh, the younger brother of Raja Gulab Singh and the Prime Minister of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, and would continue to be so until the Maharaja became concerned at the prospect of the displeasure of the British.

Meanwhile the British Political Agent at Subathu, and the Commissioner of Kumaon sent detailed reports to their Government regarding Zorawar's movements in Western Tibet. Clerk informed his superiors that the Lahore Durbar knew little of what was happening behind the Himalayas. "Whatever little information it gets, Raja Dhian Singh keeps to himself." He, therefore suggested, "Some perfect system of intelligence of passing events, on the eastern frontiers of Chinese Tartary should be instituted, otherwise.....it may hereafter be found that a convenient means of introducing a vigilant superintendence there has been omitted, and that the substance has been abandoned for the shadow." Such a system, in Clerk's opinion, was that a competent British agent should go to that area; his presence would interrupt "political intrigues, should Zorawar or his master have conceived any in that quarter, detrimental or embarrassing to the interests of the British Government or its allies."

In pursuance of this advice, Lieutenant Joseph Davey Cunningham, the future historian of the Sikhs, and at that time Clerk's Assistant at Ludhiana, was appointed on a special mission and was asked to travel up the Satluj to a point near the Indo-Tibetan frontier beyond which active hostilities were going on between the Dogras and the Tibetans. To enable him to discharge his duties efficiently, Cunningham was accredited by the Lieutenant-Governor, North West Provinces, to the Raja of Bashahr. The instructions issued to Cunningham were quite detailed: he was asked to enquire the intentions of Wazir Zorawar Singh in advancing to or towards Rudok and subsequently moving down upon Gartok and Lake Manasarowar, the number and description of his troops, his system of tenure of the districts secured by him, the cause or pretext of these encroachments, and "the nature and ramifications of the trade which for sometimes past seems to have been a bone

of contention." The Supreme Government further desired Cunningham to be a witness to the evacuation of western Tibet by the Dogras.

Cunningham stayed on the frontier for about a year (September 1841—September 1842). He spent many weeks at Churit (Western Tibet), and at one time even determined to go to Zorawar Singh's camp, who was then wintering near Lake Manasarowar but, due to inclement weather, he could not do so and returned to Kinnaur, the north-eastern part of Bashahr where the boundaries of Ladakh and Western Tibet meet. It was from here that he submitted all his reports.

Zorawar Singh's army and its movements attracted Cunningham's attention. The strength of the army was about 6,000, of which nearly 3,000 were Dogra soldiers of Kishtwar and Jammu, and the rest were Ladakhis and Baltis. The former, mostly armed with matchlocks, formed the nucleus of the army and was the fighting force, whereas the Baltis and the Ladakhis constituted auxiliary troops. In addition, the local population was conscripted for carrying of provisions and tents. The Dogras also had six small guns which could be carried by men or mules. The Wazir also took with him some important dignitaries, both from Baltistan and Ladakh; these were Ahmed Shah, the former ruler of Baltistan; Gonpo, steward of the Hemis monastery in Ladakh; Nono Sonam, the brother of the former Ladakhi Raja, and Ghulam Khan, the son-in-law of Rahim Khan, the Kiladar of Spiti.

Zorawar Singh's attack on Western Tibet was three-pronged, the first under the leadership of Ghulam Khan, passing through Hanle, then headquarters of Rupshu district in Ladakh, overran the Tibetan posts of Churit, Chumurti, Tsapsang and Toling. After placing picquets at all the important places secured by him, Rahim Khan joined up with the main column at Gartok. Nono Sonam, moved at the head of the second column, and secured Tashigong. The Dogra general himself led the third column. With nearly 3,000 soldiers, following the route to the south of the Pangong lake he secured Rudok without much difficulty. Then moving south, he seized Gartok, where the other two columns also joined him. The combined force then secured Taklakot, and places around Lake Manasarowar. By September 1841, Zorawar Singh's conquest of Western Tibet was complete.

Besides the details about Zorawar Singh's army, Cunningham made a close study of the complex interrelationship of the Himalayan States. When he reached Kinnaur in October 1841, the Raja of Bashahr complained to him that for about the last sixty years, he had been

receiving a tribute of thirty 'Punkhees' or pieces of woollen cloth from Peri, a village of Spiti, but for the year under review he did not receive the pieces of woollen cloth. Cunningham, on further enquiries, found the statement of the Raja correct, but he was surprised to learn that the Raja Bashahr, under British protection, collected revenue from a village in Spiti, which was then under Dogra paramountcy. Similar was the case of village Geo, "situated at a good day's journey" to the north-west of Churit in Western Tibet. From this village the Bashahr Raja received annually an amount of Rupees seven and a half, and for the year 1841 this sum too remained unpaid : It was also observed that when a new Raja of Bashahr took the "gaddi", he received presents from the Tibetan Governor of Gartok. "The consolidated empires of England and China have met one another along the Himalayan mountains and it is time that the doubts should be at an end. It is not for us to share with others the allegiance of petty princes nor should we desire that our dependants should have claims upon the territories of foreign states. Our feudatories should have no political connection with strangers although we may allow them to interchange friendly letters and even visits with their neighbours under the rule of others."

Last of all, Cunningham submitted detailed reports of the import and export trade of Bashahr. Rampur in Bashahr was a busy trade mart, where fairs were held every year. The traders from Ladakh, Western Tibet, Kumaon, Bashahr and the Indian plains visited these fairs, and exchanged their commodities. Charas or opium, till the eventual prohibition by the Chinese Government, was an important item of export to Yarkand. But the most important and lucrative item of trade was shawl-wool, which was brought to Rampur from Rudok and other districts of Western Tibet. Cunningham diligently collected the statistics of imports and exports of Bashahr, and pointed out that if the British wished to improve the trade of their hill states with Western Tibet, "a road should be carried from the tableland of Tibet to the plains of India, and the transport of merchandise be simplified and rendered secure." Such a measure, Cunningham suggested, would induce the merchants of Delhi and Amritsar, "to come forward with their large means and to embark in the trade of the Chinese provinces and to secure among other advantages the continued manufactures of shawls in the plains."

Cunningham's mission led to a closer acquaintance of the British with the Western Himalayas : his suggestions and recommendations influenced the course of British Himalayan policy. His doctrine that British feudatories should not be allowed to pay any kind of tribute

except religious in nature was first put into effect in the case of Spiti in 1846. In consonance with Cunningham's other suggestions, transit duties in Bashahr were abolished in 1847, and the work of constructing a road linking the Indian plains with Western Tibet via Simla — later popularly known as the Hindustan-Tibet Road — was taken up in the eighteen-fifties.

For that period of time, it was under very inhospitable circumstances that Cunningham carried out his mission and kept his government informed about these happenings.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Correspondence is invited on Subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services

To

The Editor
USI Journal

R & D—PERMANENT SECONDMENT OF SERVICE OFFICERS

FOR a long time now, I have felt that the psychological gap between Defence R & D and the Services is getting bigger, instead of them coming closer together. In my opinion the major reason for this feeling of separation, is due to the policy of permanent secondment of Service officers to R & D.

There appears to be some confused thinking regarding the tenure of the Service officers serving with the R & D. When we started the R&D, the policy was, that Service officers would go to the R & D on a tenure basis, and would then revert back to regimental duties, and at a later stage may again go to the R & D for another tenure, and so on. It was then felt, and quite rightly too, that if the Service officer had to bring user knowledge to the R & D, he can only do so, provided he is periodically rotated round with regimental duties. Based on this policy, certain appointments (e.g. the Director, the Deputy Director and also heads of certain other faculties), were made tenable by Service officers only, irrespective of their inter-se seniority with the civilians in the organisation. There is no bar in the civilian scientists working under the administrative control of the Service director, to continue drawing their own rates of pay and allowance, which may be even many times higher than that of the Director. This is the practice which is followed in UK and America, and as far as we know even in the communist countries; and this appears to be the correct system if Defence R & D has got to remain 100% Service oriented.

During the last few years however, we seem to have digressed from the above policy, and have now started seconding Service officers per-

manently to the R & D. The disadvantages of such a system are obvious :

(a) After staying in the R & D for any length of time, say over three to four years, the Service officer loses touch with the realities of his arm's requirements, and tends to become theoretical and is not in a position to use his Service knowledge for the development of a military hardware. In this respect, it will be appreciated that, after a certain number of years in the R & D, there can be very little difference between a Service officer and his civilian counterpart. Thus the fundamental aim why Service officers are sent to the R & D is defeated.

(b) It has been noticed, that the Service officer permanently seconded to the R & D has very little allegiance or loyalty to his parent arm. This is to be expected. This being the case, the parent arm has also very little loyalty towards the officer concerned. This therefore does not lend itself to the intimate cooperation which should exist between R & D and the Service which it is supporting.

(c) If the officers of a particular arm are to be seconded permanently to R & D, it is only human nature, that the Service concerned not gives its best officers to R & D. If on the other hand, the Service officer goes to R & D only on a tenure basis, the arm concerned will make quite sure, that it gives its good officers for the purpose, as it knows, that they will have to return back to it after the R & D tenure is completed. Under the present system, the Service concerned loses confidence in the R & D, and the latter in turn, cannot deliver the goods, as basically it is not staffed with the cream of the arm concerned, and only has to 'make-do' with left-overs.

(d) If the Service officers are to be permanently seconded to the R & D, a time is fast approaching when all posts of Directors, Dy Directors, and heads of other facilities will be manned only by civilian officers, when the present few Service incumbents in these appointments retire. The fact that Service entry into the R & D is now only at Major's level (of which I understand that, against a vacancy of 237 in the permanent cadre there are today only 27 Majors in the establishment), will mean that, for a long time to come all senior appointments will continue to be manned by civilian officers.

In view of the above, it is for consideration whether we should not change the existing policy of permanently seconding Service officers to the R & D and adopt the system existing when we started the R & D and which still exists in other countries, whereby the Service officer after one or more tenures in the R & D, periodically keeps on coming back to his parent arm to do a tenure of regimental duty. Only then will the R & D remain Service oriented.

16A Shankar Seth Road, Pune-411002
25 Aug 1983

Brig N B Grant

SHADOWS OF 1984

ALL OFFICERS ARE EQUAL BUT SOME OFFICERS
ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS

MY apologies to George Orwell, but there would appear to have been here, in PUNE, an ardent disciple of the philosophy of Orwell's pig leader, Napoleon, and that disciple chose to somewhat modify, as above, that Napoleon's single Commandment, so as to make it applicable to the local Officers' Institute.

That one was brought up in the belief and practice that the status of all officers of the Defence Services was equal-period-would seem to be no longer relevant here in POONAH and every Colonel Blimp must be turning un-easily in his grave because of the denial of that belief and practice. Memory takes one back to 1949-50, to a minute on a file from the Ministry of Finance (Defence) through the Ministry of Defence to the Quarter Master General at Army HQ. That minute recommended the applicability to the Defence Services of the travel rules pertaining to the Civil services, where officers were entitled to 1st or 2nd class rail travel, depending on whether they were graded in their respective services Grade I or Grade II Officers. The QMG took the file down to the Chief (General K.M. Cariappa) and brought it back with the following minute from the Chief:—

"In the Army, there are no differences in status amongst officers, there are only differences in rank. A General and a 2nd Lieutenant have the same status as commissioned officers in our country's Defence Services. I am not prepared to discuss this case any further".

The case was not discussed any further, certainly not during General K.M. Cariappa's tenure as Chief.

There you had one side, the proper side, of the coin. Here, in Pune, one sees the not-so-proper other side. At the local Officers' Institute, the Cinema hall has two rows reserved for Major Generals and above and their spouses. These two rows are platformed at a somewhat higher level than the other rows, have been provided with special chairs, carpets, ceiling fans, peg tables. Unlike lesser mortals, the less equal officers, these gentlemen do not have to elbow their ways to the bar or to the snack counters during the interval, as they have a bearer from the Institute detailed to cater to their needs in these respects—hence the specially provided peg tables.'

Brigadiers also have two rows reserved, but, of course, sans specially-comfortable chairs, sans raised platforms, sans carpets, sans ceiling fan, sans, peg tables and hence sans services of a bearer. Nevertheless, to an extent, they are, in their reserved rows, more-equal than those of lower rank. However, all officers, General down to 2nd Lieutenant, pay the same amount for their entrance tickets.

What a far cry between the creed expressed so forcefully and purposefully by our first Chief and what is now the practice in an Officers' Institute in one of the biggest Cantonments in the country. Does one interpret it as a sign of an impending crack in the esprit de corps of our Army's Officer cadre ?

One does not really know, not after very many years after retirement, but one does feel sad and disillusioned.

PUNE
9.3.1983

Brigadier A.J.R. DYER (Retd.)

USI National Security Paper

LEADERSHIP IN THE INDIAN ARMY DURING
EIGHTIES AND NINETIES

By

Lieut General M.L. Chibber, PVSM, AVSM

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RAJAJI MARG
NEW DELHI

BOOK REVIEWS

CONTEMPORARY PEACE RESEARCH,
EDITED by G. PARDESI,

Radiant Publishers, E-155 Kalkaji, New Delhi-110019, 1982; pages:
374; price Rs. 150.

THIS is the first volume of the three-volume work (the other two forthcoming volumes are entitled "War, Armaments, Strategic Models and counter Military Research", and "Peace Education and Peace Action") edited by Mr. G. Pardesi. This volume under review is divided into two parts—the first part dealing with priorities in peace research, and the second part analysing the international system mainly from the standpoint of the development of the capitalist productive system. In fact, the book has reproduced 14 articles, originally written by some eminent scholars and published in reputed journals, besides the Editor's "Introduction". These are: "Peace Research and Peace Movement"—by G. Myrdal, "Various Conceptions of Peace Research", Anatol Rapport; "Science and Reason in Peace Research", by Godfried van Benthem van den Bergh, "Limits or Boundaries of Peace Research", by Kenneth E. Boulding, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" by Johan Galtung, "Peace Research and the Industrial Revolution" by Ekkehart Krippendorff, "The State as a Focus of Peace Research", by Ekkehart Krippendorff, "Peace Research: Pacification or Revolution?" by Lars Dencik, "Dependency Structures as the Dominant Pattern in World Society, by K.J. Gantzel, "The Global Dominance System", by Helge Hveem, "The Theoretical Model of Capital Accumulation and of the Economic and Social Development of the World of Today," by Samir Amin, "Economic Crisis, Third World and 1984", by Andre Gunder Frank, "Migration in the Evolution of the International System", by Ekkehart Krippendorff, and "Conflict Formations in Contemporary International Society", by Dieter Senghass.

Although 20 million people had perished in the Second World War, even afterwards war could not be prevented by man. There had many so many wars, including the protracted 30 years' War in Vietnam, since

1945, that people are now sceptical whether the Third World War could be deferred for ever, because of the continuous spread of arms and military equipments, including the nuclear weaponry, throughout the world. Although the predominantly American "realist" thinkers believe in the inevitability of intra-national and international conflicts, placing reliance on Spinoza's reasoning that inherent human defects caused conflict between his reason and passion, and the idealistic realist School of thinkers like Raymond Aron, Q. Wright, A.J. Toynbee, K. Thompson, S. Hoffmann, C. De Visscher, W. Jenkins, and Phillip Jessup have broadened our understanding of the problems of war and peace, they have not gone deep into the genesis of human conflicts and wars.

While G. Myrdal has emphasised upon the influence of the military-industrial complex on the State apparatus to cause the production and sale of more and more arms and eventually conflicts, Marxists identify the exploitative social environment and socio-economic structure as the cause of conflict. Eckhardt thinks that social conformity may be a more important factor behind militarism than misanthropy at the individual level of analysis.

The present-day peace researchers have developed two different schools of thought : the American School or the narrow school which devotes its attention to the study of the international system separately from other social problems like poverty, exploitation, neo-colonialism, internal colonialism, imperialism etc., the European or the broad school emphasises the system of exploitation in the form of structural violence as the main cause of war. According to Galtung, structural violence is present in any social order which permits a monopoly of resources in the hands of a few people and thereby enables them to control the State apparatus and use it to promote their own interests even though the majority of the people may be deprived of even the necessities of life. Thus, to this school, the object of peace research is to eliminate "those structural elements of the system which engender war and collective destruction".

Hveem lays stress on the global dominance in terms of "a vertically integrated system of control and accumulation", brought about by the capitalist and the Socialist systems merging at the top. Looking at the economic system, Samir Amin thinks that import-substitution industrialisation would lead to further distortions and systematic destruction of industries producing goods of mass consumption and that the production of luxury goods and consumer durables has already resulted in increasing marginalization of the masses. However, Frank predicts further intra-national conflicts because of mounting repressive measures, and

international conflicts because of a scramble for markets and scarce raw materials. The decline in the rate of profits in the mid-1960s, the the currency crisis of 1970-71, the oil crisis of 1973-74 and the cyclical recession in 1974-75 have deepened capitalist crises. Hence, the global political economy should become the focus of a structural theory of society.

This interesting book, which deals with all aspects of peace and peace research, should be welcomed by all-statesmen and soldiers, political thinkers and scholars of international politics.

B.C.

THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY : A COMPARATIVE READER
EDITED by AMOS PERLMUTTER AND V.P. BENNETT
Yale University Press, 1980; Pages 508; Price S 10.95

THIS is a companion volume to Amos Perlmutter's earlier book "The Military and Politics in Modern Times", which was published by Yale in 1977. Actually it is a collection of pieces selected from relevant literature on the subject comprising books, articles, monographs, and documents. Although the main discussions in the book centre round the roles of the professional soldier, the praetorian army and the praetorian state and the revolutionary professional soldier, there are also some other interesting chapters dealing with useful subjects like 'The Impact of Modernization on the Military'. 'The Military and Politics in Asia' (including an interesting article 'The Indian Army After Independence' by S.P. Cohen), besides the introduction. The book is world-wide in scope and authorship. Besides Cohen and the two editors other experts whose articles have been included in this volume are : T. Parsons, B. Barber, P. Blaise, W.R. Scott, S.P. Huntington, W.H. Moris Jones, G. Mosca, G. Craig, M. Kitchen, J.W. Wheeler—Bennett, F.L. Carsten, D. Childs, R. Challener, D. Ralston, R. Paxton, M. Howards C. Barnett, V.O. Kluchevsky, N. Riasanovsky, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, I. Deutscher, R. Kolkowics, G. Erickson, E.R. Wolf, E.C. Hansen; R.L. Gilmore, R. Potash, R.A. Hansen, A. Stepan, A.F. Lowenthal, G.J. Linz, E. Be'eri, G.A. Nasser, R.M. Price, R. Luckhem, V.P. Bennet, J. Willame, M.P. Lofchie, J. Crowby, A. Iriye, H. Maynard, J.S. Sohn. M. Lissak and J.D. Jordan.

Although the military elite exerts a great influence on the political elite in all nations of the world, it makes and unmakes political regimes

in four parts of the world : the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, minus India.

This is a pioneering work in the field of civil-military relations. It has covered the Western societies, the Socialist countries like the USSR, the Latin American countries and the Afro-Asian nations, including Israel. However, an article on Cuba's military support role in other countries would have been useful. Although the book lacks Bibliography and Index, it will educate both politicians and soldiers, political scientists, and sociologists.

B.C.

DEFENCE YEAR BOOK 1983

(RUSI and Brassey's 93rd Edition, Flexicover S 20/-)

FIRST compiled by Admiral Lord Brassey in 1886, the Year book has now become an indispensable source of material on the world's strategic affairs. In general, the themes are presented on a five year cycle, so that successive volumes build a complete overview of international grand strategy. The 1983 Yearbook's contents are :

Part I—Strategic Review

Poland—Events Leading up to the Declaration of Martial Law; and the Military Significance of the Polish Crisis

Socialist France—Defence at the Crossroads

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Cuba 1959—Nicaragua 1979—What next ?

The Future of American Power

Middle Eastern Stability and the Islamic Challenge

NATO's Future—A View

Asian Pacific Security Alliances—Re-Evaluating Britain's Transregional Role

Yugoslav Armed Forces Since 1968

Part II—Weapon Developments

Recent Developments in the Field of Chemical Warfare

Electronic Warfare

Strategic Weapons

Weapon Development 1982—Sea

Trends in Maritime Warfare—The Importance of The Protection of Trade

Weapon Development 1982—Land

Trends in Land Warfare—The Battle against the Tank

Weapon Development 1982—Air
Trends in Air Warfare-Air Defence

Part III

Defence Literature of the Year

Main Events of Defence Interest April 1981—March 1982

Falkland Islands Chronology

Developments in equipment in all three Services receive their usual attention. The perspective in all the articles is contemporary, international and forward-looking.

SLM

SEA COMBAT OFF THE FALKLANDS''

By Anthony Preston

Willow Books Collins London 1985 pp. 144 \$ 7.95

On 15-6-1982 the Argentine garrison in the Falklands surrendered—the war was over, after $2\frac{1}{2}$ months of intense activity including six weeks of heavy fighting in which there were more than 1000 casualties. For the British Army this was the heaviest fighting since Korea and for the Royal Navy since World War-II. It was an unexpected and vigorous test for the British services from which, by and large, they emerged with credit. To take a large force of war ships and supply ships at short notice a distance of 8000 miles and at the end to land in face of heavy air attacks and defeat the enemy out-numbering the attackers by more than two to one is a remarkable achievement by any standards. Written within a few months of the termination of hostilities, this book by Anthony Preston analyses the controversial aerial and naval actions of the Falklands War.

British Defence policy prior to April, 1982 according to Preston, can be seen as following NATO orthodoxy by concentrating on land and airforces capable of blocking a conventional invasion of West Germany backed up by a nuclear deterrent. Therefore the most significant feature of the Falklands War was that it was fought well out of the NATO areas and with the Royal Navy the lead service. It was precisely the war for which Britain was least planning. The Falklands war was presented as a lesson in the nick of time before the senior service which lost its battle to retain fixed wing carriers 16 years ago, was rendered wholly incapable of coping with such an eventuality. Naval warfare has become a complex and inter-dependent business and the choice of what ships to build has been bedevilled by the rapid advances in military technology which have taken place in recent years. Not only have weapons become more destructive but also more accurate and so the

counter-measures to defend against them have become ever more complex and costly.

Preston would have us believe that the attack on the Sheffield was an extremely skilful operation which not only found the weak spot in the Task Forces defences but also brought to light a serious lapse by British Naval Intelligence. It was known that the Argentine Airforce had received six out of the fourteen Super Etendard Naval Strike Aircraft from France. It was also known that five or six AM-39 Exocets had been delivered but the French Defence Ministry had assured its opposite numbers in London that the French technicians had not started the crucial task of arming the aircraft as Argentine Navy pilots were still undergoing flying training--the conversion of Skyhawks to their new aircraft.

In his fascinating insight into the factors which led to the disaster, Preston holds that "the fundamental error made by both the French and British was an assumption that the Argentine Navy personnel would not have sufficient know-how to assemble the Exocets and connect up the complex circuits. Moreover a team of technicians from Avions Marcel Dassault, the makers of Super Etendard had been in Argentine since November, 1981. It has been alleged that this 9 man team used the test kit supplied with the missile to check out the launch pylons and firing circuits aboard the aircraft. It is also a fact that Universities in Argentina turn out enough electronic graduates to provide a high level of technical skill. The risky decision of using a new and untried aircraft with the hastily assembled complex weapons which could easily develop a fault, ultimately paid off." This disaster in the Falklands has at least demonstrated the need for most, if not all, major war-ships to have anti-missile systems in addition to decoy and jamming counter measures.

Britain recaptured the islands in a brilliantly executed campaign despite pitiful defensive armament in much of its fleet. Argentine lost despite the tenacity of its pilots. Neither side established air superiority over the Falklands during the critical beachhead assault and British casualties prove it; although the Sea Harrier vindicated itself with a disproportionately high kill rate, using the remarkably efficient AIM-9L Sidewinder missile. The other roles filled by this magnificent flying machine was that of a ground attack aircraft to soften up enemy defence on islands and as an agile troop supporting plane to cover British in forces as they advanced from their bridgehead towards the main Argentine garrison at Port, Stanley.

Lack of airborne early warning and lack of prolonged air patrol capability were the problem areas of Britain, limited combat radius was Argentina's nightmare.

The effectiveness of the Britain Seawolf, missile which is so fast and accurate that it can split a shell in two in mid-flight demonstrates that the latest generation of missile systems is now so capable that dedicated electronic warfare may well be needed for long range penetration of concerted defences.

The nuclear hunter-killer submarine was the real ace in the Falklands pack. It quietly demonstrated the value of deterrence through strength. Conventionally armed British nuclear submarines kept the Argentine Navy firmly bottled up in port.

The Argentine pilots, highly regarded and praised by the British forces, pressed home their attacks in a very determined manner at very low level and without the benefit of E.C.M. The problems Argentina had with its stock of old and unreliable bombs probably saved another 10 ships from serious damage. If these bombs had detonated the history of the Falklands campaign would have been different. The Royal Navy might well have been forced to retire from the bay and the essential supply lines would have been cut. The Royal Navy ships were at a disadvantage under attack as they had little room to manoeuvre. The Sea wolf performed particularly well as did Rapier and Blowpipe. The benefits of quick firing guns were quickly re-learned.

The sophistication of anti-ship missiles is now so far in advance of ships defence that once a sufficient number of missiles is on its way, it is difficult to deal with all of them. The best answer is not to allow the missile launching aircraft to get within range. To achieve this, far greater support for aircraft carriers is required. The most glaring omission was that of an adequate airborne early warning system. The Navy would be regretting the phasing out of its Gannets as much as it must be regretting the phasing out of its orthodox aircraft carriers. In other words, it must grievously regret being asked to fight a distant war after being equipped and prepared only to fight in the North Atlantic. Naval architects and weapon systems designer throughout the world as well as technicians will be rethinking their theories drastically after the Falklands war.

Yet another field for investigation during the coming months, however, is that happened after the Exocet struck. The Sheffield was fitted with all the latest antifire devices including sprinkler systems, fireproof doors and hatches and foam extinguishers. The hull was made of steel not aluminium yet the crew were forced to abandon ship because the high explosive missile caused a fire which was beyond the

control of the destroyers own fighting teams and those from other ships.

Without the helicopter, the campaign in the Falklands would have taken longer and costed more in men's lives and material. They were engaged in reconnaissance sorties landing on South Georgia and San Carlos; rescue missions, support of troop movements, resupply, casualty evacuation, maintaining the ASW screen around the fleet and acting as decoys for Exocets-the helicopters were everywhere.

The Falklands war represents a break in the pattern of recent British campaigns. In North Ireland, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Borneo, the British forces intervened on behalf of the civil authorities, and were also involved in prolonged jungle warfare. In contrast the Falklands war was short and sharp. For both sides war had to be limited. Argentina was fighting at the limit of its air range and the British could not pour extra men and equipment into the conflict. The undoubted British success against the Argentina's air force cannot conceal the fact that this was by no means, the most advanced threat the Royal Navy must prepare to meet, nor that the two Type 42 destroyers lost were advanced in design to air defence roles.

The human factor which contributed to the British success lay in the training, physical stamina and tactical ingenuity of its men.

The author had made use of almost all reputable sources available and has added some very perceptive conclusions of his own to give us what is possibly the first thorough, thoughtful and objective evaluation of the Falklands War. In providing us with a purely military evaluation the author can be criticised for ignoring the political aspect of the conflict but this would have required a much more cumbersome work. In this reviewer's opinion, the book deserves to become a standard reference work for the next few years, at least until fresh data on the operations and performance of various weapons systems becomes available.

JM

LEADERSHIP

by JAMES MAC GREGOR BURNS,

AMBIKA Publishers, ed 54 Tagore Gardens, New Delhi-110027; Pages 530, Price not Mentioned

JM. Burns, the well-known American writer, winner of the Pulitzer Prize and the National Book Award of USA, has written this book under review, after a painstaking analysis of recent findings in

social and behavioural sciences, history and biography. This study of Leadership—transactional and transformational—is rooted in his biographical works, namely, *Roosevelt : The Lion and the Fox*, *Roosevelt : The Soldier of Freedom*, *John Kennedy : A Political Profile*, *Edward Kennedy and the Camelot Legacy*, and other works like *Presidential Government : The Crucible of Leadership*, *Congress on Trial*, *The Dead-lock of Democracy*, *Government by the people*, *Uncommon Sense*, and also in his field experience of the American political scene as a political activist and reformer.

He has divided this book into the following chapters : (1) The power of leadership, (2) The structure of moral leadership, (3) The Psychological matrix of leadership, (4) The social sources of leadership, (5) The crucibles of leadership, (6) Intellectual leadership : Ideas as moral power, (7) Reform leadership, (8) Revolutionary leadership, (9) Heroes and ideologues, (10) Opinion leadership, (11) Group leadership : bargainers and bureaucrats, (12) Party leadership, (13) Legislative leadership : the price of consensus (14) Executive leadership (15) Decision and change. (16) Toward general theory, (17) Political leadership as practical influence.

The author has discussed the leadership qualities and family backgrounds of leaders such as Moses, Joan of Arc, Luther, Freud, Wilson, Gandhi, Eleanor and Franklin Roosevelt, Mao, Lenin, Stalin, Kennedy etc., and also analysed different political revolutions such as the French, the Russian and the Chinese.

Leadership cult thrives in both East and West. However, "If we know all too much about our leaders, we know far too little about leadership"—the author remarks. "Leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth." Burns says that the process of leadership must be seen as part of the dynamics of conflict and of power; that leadership is nothing if not linked to collective purpose; that the effectiveness of leaders must be judged not by their press clippings, but by actual social change measured by intent and by the satisfaction of human needs and expectations. His concept of moral leadership, which concerns him most, means a relationship, between the leader and the led not only of power but of mutual needs, aspirations, and values. "We search eagerly for leadership yet seek to cage and tame it. We recoil from power yet we are bewitched or titillated by it"—says the author. The two essentials of power, motive and resource, are interrelated; resources must be relevant to the motivations of the power recipients. "All leaders are actual or potential power

holders, but not all power holders are leaders", according to the author. An unselfish leader who commands compelling causes has an extraordinary potential influence over followers.

The most common and durable cause of conflict, according to James Madison, is "the various and unequal distribution of property". Again, as Alexander Hamilton says, the love of fame is "the ruling passion of the noblest minds." Leaders are partly born and partly made, but the followers create a personality cult around them that smacks of idolatry. A poem in *Women in China* (Peking), published in 1961 praised Mao thus :

"You are rain for the planting season,
Breeze for the hottest noon !
You are the red sun that never sets."

The book contains a long catalogue of source material. It should be read by all leaders and would-be leaders. B.C.

PRISONERS OF WAR, SECOND EDITION

by R.C. HINGORANI, OXFORD & IBH PUBLISHING CO.

New Delhi, 1982; Pages 315; Price Rs. 125/-

ORIGINALLY published in 1963, this book has been up-dated in this new Edition which contains *inter alia* parts of Additional protocol I, 1977. Besides an Introduction and conclusions, this monograph discusses POW status, the problem of maintenance of the PsOW, rights of the captor State (control and discipline of PSOW), welfare of PSOW, financial and labour problems, external relations, modes of termination of PsOW's captivity. Moreover, it contains a long table of international cases pertaining to PsOW, and the Geneva convention Relative to prisoners of War, 1949, the Geneva convention Act (India), 1960, and Relevant Articles of Additional Protocol I, 1977, list of States Parties to the Protocols, additional to the Geneva Conventions, a fine Bibliography and an Index.

It is a kind of misfortune of the mankind that inspite of peaceloving intentions on the part of many, were take place and despite the humanitarian rules laid down by the Geneva Conventions, Prisoners of War laws are sometimes violated. However, the author has said "that any violations that may occur should not be left unnoticed; the violators must be punished for their crimes". Furthur he/has pleaded for the creation of a World Criminal Code consisting of various species of crimes against PsOW and providing for their punishment, which should not preferably exceed 10 years, and an International Criminal Court to try the violators of the Geneva codes.

This well-written and informative book should be read by military officers, scholars of international law, civil servants and government leaders. B.C.

Secretary's Notes

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

I would like to thank all those members who paid their subscription so promptly at the beginning of the year. To those of you who have not yet paid may I remind you that your subscription was due on the 1st January. Would you please, therefore, put a cheque in the post to me today. There are some members who have also to pay their subscription for 1981 and 1982. They are requested to make the payment for these years to avoid unnecessary reminders. Effective from 1 Jan 1971, the annual subscription has been raised from Rs 15 to Rs 20.

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It has been reported by many of our members that though annual subscription for membership of the Institution is being debited to their account regularly by their Bankers, they are not receiving the USI Journal for quite sometime. The non-receipt of the Journal is because either the members have failed to notify change of address, or their Bankers have not duly sent the credit to the Institution or while sending the credit they have not given full and correct particulars of the member making it difficult to identify him in the ledger account. All these factors create accounting problems and result in names of members getting dropped from the mailing list.

It is requested that all members who have continued to send upto date subscription through their Bankers and are not receiving the USI Journal may kindly intimate to me direct their latest address and membership number so that the USI Journal could be sent to them immediately. They are also requested to write to their Bankers that while sending annual subscription to Institution, their membership number, correct name with units and latest address is invariably given.

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In case any of the members have issued standing instructions to their bankers for the payment of Subscription fee to this Institution, we shall request them to issue revised instructions to their bankers under intimation to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India.

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