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EDITORIAL.

The Cut in Pay.

In his pay bill for the month of November 1931 every officer in the employ of the Government of India found himself confronted for the first time by that unwelcome item, "Deduction on account of temporary ten per cent. cut in pay." He was told that the condition of Indian finances was such that this sacrifice was demanded of him as much by patriotism as by necessity, and he accepted it on those grounds, comforting himself with the assurance that it *was* temporary. He has now had ten months' experience of this reduction in his income, and he would be more than human if, as the year draws to its close, he were not wondering whether these reasons of patriotism and necessity still hold, or whether the time is approaching when it might wisely and safely be demonstrated that the cut was indeed temporary.

The truth is that the officer, especially the junior married one, whether civil or military, has found the effects of the cut much more serious than was anticipated. A good deal of nonsense has been talked, usually by those whose experience is limited, about the high standard of living amongst European officials in India, but no one who had any first-hand knowledge of conditions in the ordinary station believed that the average married couple wasted much of their substance in riotous living. Nevertheless when the cut fell upon them, the official and his wife started off optimistically enough to "reduce their standard of living." It was then that they discovered there

really was not so very much that they could reduce. They could not move into a smaller house—there were no smaller houses and the hotels of India are as expensive as they are bad. Servants were already reduced to the minimum unavoidable in a country where one domestic is permitted to do only a quarter of a man's work. The expenses of a hot weather separation could neither be avoided nor substantially reduced. Something could be saved by cutting out the short drink before dinner and by strict rationing at other times, by giving up the occasional dinner party to their friends, by passing on a fraction of the cut to their servants, and by bitter wrangles with the *khansamah*. But the sum total of their efforts—and they did make real, honest efforts—was grievously small; few of the larger items of the family budget could be seriously touched. Rent, servants' wages, regimental subscriptions, income-tax, family pension funds, clothing, stores bills, education and insurances, all were as before; any slight reduction in one was counterbalanced by increases in others. Indeed with increased customs duties and higher income-tax, the cut was in practice found to be fifteen per cent rather than ten.

After doing their best to reduce expenses to the utmost practical limit in a tropical country, it is safe to say that there are no junior, and few even comparatively senior Government officers, with families and without private means, who do not find it desperately difficult to provide for their children's education. Either the children are at Home—and there has been no cut in school fees—or they are still in this country and, if they are to have any hope of future schooling, money must be found for their educational insurance. The amount that could be spared for such educational and for life insurance was calculated before pay was cut, but the same premia must still be paid from the reduced pay. This has been one of the main factors in upsetting the family budget, and it is not often realized in how many cases the insurance policy has had to be pawned to cover either an overdraft at the bank or its own premium. On the surface things may not seem so very changed—less entertaining, families that stay longer in the plains, a greater keenness to get any job with a little extra pay; beyond this all is much as it was. But underneath is a growing anxiety as to what will happen if the overdrafts go on increasing, month after month, year after year. *The cut may be temporary, but if it continues much longer, its effects will be permanent.* For most married British officers of every Service in India the alternatives are a

gradually increasing indebtedness with all that this entails in anxiety, ill-health, discontent and loss of efficiency, or a restoration of the cut in some form.

It is not only because of the increasingly serious position of the individual officer, but because of its adverse effects on the contentment and efficiency of the Services as a whole that every possible avenue of alternative economy should be explored in order that the cut may be restored. Above all things it is essential that, before legislation to prolong the cut over another year is brought forward, it should be conclusively shown that its retention is necessary for the financial stability of India. Compared with a year ago the financial position of India has vastly improved. Civil disobedience with all its cost in disturbance and delay in collecting revenue is practically dead; agricultural prospects are on the whole good; drastic economies made in expenditure should produce a balanced budget. Unless there is some unexpected deterioration in the political or commercial situation the restoration of the cut ought not unduly to strain India's resources in 1933.

As far as the Fighting Services alone are concerned, there are good grounds for the belief that, in spite of the immense reductions in defence expenditure of recent years, ways could be found, even within the present reduced budget, to restore the cuts. If this for political or other reasons is not considered feasible it is to be hoped that, in the interests of efficiency, the temporary grant of some form of Children's Allowance will be considered. In England, not only is the cut actually less as it does not include allowances which form a large proportion of the Home pay, but married men with families receive substantial remissions in income-tax which have no counterpart in India. Failing the restoration of the cut, the grant of a Children's Allowance to British Officers and Officials in India would do something towards brightening a domestic financial outlook which grows more and more gloomy.

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The Untouchables' Bargain.

Mr. Gandhi was steadily becoming an example of the proverb, "Out of sight, out of mind," when, in masterly fashion, he regained the centre of the stage by his dramatic fast. In the spate of press articles dealing with his action there has been more than a tendency to overlook one very important thing. Mr. Gandhi had announced that he would die a hundred

deaths to remove the cruel and degrading disabilities that his fellow Hindus inflict on the Untouchables. If, then, he had decided to starve himself to death unless these disabilities were removed he would have had strong claims to sympathy, certainly to the sympathy of all Englishmen. But, however, much he might express concern for the Depressed, the fact remains that he was not fasting until their ghastly social and religious oppression was removed, but until they were deprived of separate electorates. This was the essence of the whole matter. Mr. Gandhi might want, as he said he did, the social degradation of the Untouchables relieved, but he did not want this to anything like the extent that he passionately desired them to be deprived of separate political representation. For the first he would preach ; for the second he would die. It almost seems as if the Politician had got the better of the Saint.

At any rate, the direct result of Mr. Gandhi's intervention has been the settlement of the dispute between the Untouchables and the Caste Hindus on the subject of representation in the Legislatures. At first sight the agreement reached might be hailed as a complete victory for the oppressed. Some English newspapers have even gone so far as to declare that it marks the end of Untouchability and the beginning of the break-up of the Hindu caste system. A study of the terms of the agreement would have shown them how false this view was. It is a political compromise, not a charter of social reform. At the beginning of the negotiations the Depressed Classes' leaders stood out for the grant, not so much of political safeguards, as of social concessions. Suddenly, for reasons best known to themselves, the social and more important side of the question was allowed to drop and the discussions fell to the level of mere political adjustment. Under the threat of Mr. Gandhi's suicide the Depressed Classes have given up their separate electorates, and in return have received an increase in the number of their members in Provincial Councils from some 71 to 148. On the face of it this should greatly strengthen their representation, but in practice the advantage is doubtful. In London Mr. Gandhi opposed the reservation of seats for the Depressed Classes just as he opposed their separate electorates. Now, while still prepared to die if separate electorates are allowed, he has changed his mind and accepted the reservation of seats. It is permissible to wonder why. Possibly an answer may be found in the method by

which the Depressed Classes' members are to be chosen. The Depressed Classes will first hold a preliminary election amongst themselves at which they will choose four candidates for each of the seats allotted to them. These candidates will then submit themselves to the joint electorate of Caste Hindus and Untouchables. This is where the danger lies. Of the four chosen candidates it is unlikely that the Caste Hindus, with their immense social, religious, and economic hold over the Depressed Classes, would fail to ensure that at least one was pliant to their wishes. At the final election they will be in a majority and can invariably elect this candidate. The result will be that, while actually of the Depressed Classes, the elected member will too often be the nominee and tool of the Caste Hindus. In ten years even the poor safeguard of the preliminary election is to vanish, and it will then be impossible for a Depressed Classes' member to secure election unless he obtains the Caste Hindu vote, and he will not obtain that if he presses too strongly the social claims of his own people. There can be little doubt that the Depressed classes would have secured better and more real representation under the Government award, even with its fewer seats, than under the present arrangement.

While they have thus in reality done little to strengthen their political position, the Depressed Classes have obtained no social or religious concessions by this Agreement. There were at one time hopes that they would wring a guarantee from the Caste Hindus of such elementary rights as freedom to enter temples, permission to draw water at public wells, equality in schools, and the like. There is no mention of these in the Agreement; it deals purely with political matters. It expresses the pious intention that there should be no disabilities against the Depressed Classes for election to local bodies or public services and that every endeavour should be made to secure them "fair representation in these respects subject to educational qualifications." In practice this will mean exactly nothing. The only item of the Agreement which is not purely political is the last which lays down that in each Province from the total grant for Education an adequate sum shall be allotted to the Depressed Classes. It is safe to say that if these sums ever materialize they will be used to segregate the Outcastes in separate schools, and thus to perpetuate their social inferiority.

The Untouchables would do well to examine the bargain they have made. Mr. Gandhi may honestly believe that, in return for the

questionable concession of more seats in the Legislatures, they can safely entrust their future to the brotherly love, so newly awakened, of the Caste Hindu, but others will have their doubts. It may be that by his vociferous professions of love for the Untouchables and horror at the wrongs inflicted on them, the Mahatma has antagonized the strictly orthodox Brahmanical section of the Hindu community, but the practical effects of his sympathy do not seem to have gone far. However that may be, Mr. Gandhi is in an agreeable position. To the Hindus he can claim to have saved their political supremacy at the cost of little or no social or religious concession; to the Untouchables he can pose as the sympathetic friend who has obtained for them increased political representation at the expense of the Caste Hindus.

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Bengal.

While the rest of India has shown a most satisfactory return to more normal conditions, in Bengal outrage has followed outrage. At first most of these Terrorist crimes had as their object the theft of arms or money; then to an increasing degree the murder of British and Indian officials became their aim; now the avowed intention is the indiscriminate slaughter of all British, Anglo-Indians and loyal Indians, irrespective of age, sex or occupation. The Terrorist Party has announced in its leaflets that it is as anxious to murder European children as it is foully to do to death their parents. It has adopted the methods and ethics of the mad dog—and there is only one treatment for mad dogs.

The trouble is of course to apply the treatment. The number of active Terrorists, as distinct from mere conspirators, is small, but they are drawn from a very large class and outwardly of course are indistinguishable from the mass of young middle class Bengali Hindus. Having committed his crime all that the Terrorist has to do is to sink back into the crowd and to leave the Police to try and pick him out from the thousands of apparently identical young men. Considering the immense difficulty of this task and the handicaps under which they have laboured, the wonder is, not that the Police have achieved so little, but that they have done so much in their campaigns against Terrorism. For it must be remembered that this is not the first attempt in Bengal to paralyse Government by organized assassination. From 1908 Terrorist activities, culminating in political dacoities and murders, increased to such an extent that in 1916 Government was compelled to make full use of the powers of the war-time Defence of

India Act. Armed with these, in two years the Police broke up the organisation, and, by 1919, Terrorist crime had practically ceased. In that year the Defence of India Act lapsed and the Terrorists gradually resumed their underground activities, until in 1923 there was another outbreak of political murder, which left the British Labour Government with no alternative but to approve the issue of the Bengal Ordinance of 1924. This Ordinance was incorporated in the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act 1925, and, while not nearly as powerful a weapon as the Defence of India Act, did confer on the Police powers which enabled them by 1927 to master the Terrorists. There were no assassinations in that year or in 1928. The Act, however, lapsed in 1930, the Police lost their powers, and Terrorism once more broke out with the Chittagong Armoury raid. Terrorist activity thus clearly follows a definite cycle. First, the stage of underground conspiracy; next the sudden outbreak of violent political crimes, with which, under the ordinary law, the authorities are unable to cope; then the grant of special powers to the Police and a hard struggle, lasting usually about two years, until the Terrorist organization is smashed and assassinations cease. After this the special powers of the Police are withdrawn or allowed to lapse, interned Terrorists are released to rebuild their organizations, and the whole wretched cycle repeats itself.

Depressing as this review of Terrorist activity and Government counter-action is, it might be anticipated from it that the present outbreak should be overcome by about 1933, but it must be confessed that this time the struggle promises to be more prolonged. The reasons for this are plain. The Civil Disobedience movement, although crushed, has left behind it a legacy of disrespect for the law, increased to contempt by the dilatory and undignified proceedings of the conspiracy trials. Added to this has been the virulent, mendacious and in Bengal almost universal press campaign of racial hatred, conducted by Congress and rendered possible by the repeal of the Press Act in 1922. This propaganda, unchecked for nine years, has resulted amongst a wide section of Bengal Hindus in a mentality which regards political assassination with sympathy or at least with apathy. Congress bodies, like the Calcutta Corporation, while paying lip service to non-violence, have not ceased in practice to condone and excuse, and thus to encourage, the cold blooded murder of officials. It is this almost complete lack of a healthy public opinion amongst middle

class Bengal Hindus which makes the stamping out of Terrorism so much more difficult to-day than formerly, and the first task must be to induce a sounder attitude towards crime in the ordinary population.

In this Government should have the active help of every Indian politician, but it is evident that in many of them the necessary physical and moral courage is wanting. All the more honour and encouragement is therefore due to those who realize that to combat Terrorism is the best service any Indian can now render his country. In addition to the organization of public opinion, it is evident that a thorough overhauling of the Bengal educational system is needed, even though the full effects of this might not be left for some years. Finally, while anything in the nature of indiscriminate reprisals is to be whole heartedly condemned, it is time that the inexplicable leniency that the courts have shown to those convicted of murderous crimes should cease. There is much to be said, too, for the enforcement of some form of collective responsibility. The sins of the children might with justice and effect be visited on the fathers, who, especially in the Hindu family system, cannot divest themselves of responsibility. So much for the guilty and their sympathisers ; there remains the vast number of inoffensive citizens who would willingly see an end to this murder campaign but who, fearing the Terrorists' vengeance, refrain from any action. Steps must be taken to convince these people that the resources of Government are not at an end and that they will not suffer in the future if they now refuse to countenance assassinations.

One of the main objects in the recent despatch of troops to Bengal is to inspire this confidence. In many parts of Bengal it is decades since a soldier has been seen ; no wonder many believe that, beyond the Police, Government has no means of enforcing its authority. The sight of troops will correct this. They are not being sent to occupy a hostile country but to restore confidence amongst the general public. They will in addition, of course, especially assist in the protection of Europeans, and, by relieving the over-worked police of many duties of a semi-military nature, will liberate them for their proper tasks of tracing and arresting criminals. Few duties are more distasteful to the soldier than those that fall to his lot when called to act in aid of the Civil Power, and the inconvenience and expense entailed by the move to Bengal are considerable. But all these will be accepted

cheerfuliy in the knowledge that the Army is doing something to safeguard Europeans, women and children, and to support those British and Indian officials and Police whose conduct and courage in the face of constant danger and difficulty have been the admiration of the Fighting Services.

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The Indian Military Academy.

Recently there passed almost unnoticed an event which will have more effect on India's future than many a political crisis that has filled the newspaper head lines—on 1st October 1932 the Indian Military Academy was opened.

The Army was fortunate in finding in the Railway Staff College at Dehra Dun a building, that with some alteration was well suited for its purpose, in a locality which enjoys a good all the year climate and offers ample training facilities. In March last preparations to receive the first batch of Gentlemen Cadets commenced, and it can be imagined that to start such an undertaking from the very beginning is no light task. Any doubts as to whether enough suitable cadets would be forthcoming were set at rest by the applications to sit for the first competitive examination in July 1932. There were only fifteen competitive vacancies, but 430 candidates offered themselves, and this in spite of the fact that the local civil officials carefully considered each applicant before submitting his name. A preliminary Admission Board selected 104, who in turn were reduced to 68 by the Interview and Record Board. The fortunate 68 then competed in the written examination and 61 of them qualified. Of these the first obtained 68 per cent. of marks in the whole examination and the fifteenth 57 per cent.—results which compare favourably with the scale of marks obtained by former Indian candidates for Sandhurst. It is interesting to note the communities from which the first fifteen cadets were drawn :—

Mahomedan	6
Hindu	4
Sikh	2
Parsi	1
Indian Christian	1
Anglo-Indian	1

To these fifteen have been added another fifteen cadets selected from well-educated and young non-commissioned and Indian officers of the Indian Army, and ten more nominated by Indian States. The Academy, therefore, opens with forty cadets.

For the first year cadets will be organized into two companies; for subsequent years as numbers increase into four companies. The course is to be one of four terms (2 years) for Indian Army Cadets, and of six terms (3 years) for other entrants. This shortened course for a proportion of the cadets introduces a considerable complication into training and it remains to be seen whether the military experience of the Indian Army cadets will compensate for a year less study. The new Academy has to train for all arms of the Service and is thus confronted with the difficulty—and a very real one—of combining in the same syllabus instruction given separately at Woolwich and Sandhurst.

But these, and a hundred other difficulties unavoidable in such an undertaking, cannot fail to be surmounted by a team composed of the Commandant and his Staff, all picked officers from the Army in India, and the Gentlemen Cadets, young men whom a rigorous selection has ensured are representative of all that is best in India.

NOTICE.

As the Institution has enjoyed a particularly successful year financially the Coucil has decided to assist officers suffering from the cut in pay by temporarily suspending the Entrance Fee. Officers may now become full members on payment of the annual subscription of Rs. 10 only. As a further concession those joining now will not be charged any further annual subscription until January 1934.

Members are earnestly asked to bring these advantageous terms to the notice of non-members.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1933.

The Council has chosen the following alternative subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1933 :—

(*i*) **" With the tendency of modern Military Organization towards Mechanisation, the increasing complexity of modern weapons and the dependence of troops on their maintenance services, it is asserted by many that Regular troops are losing the degree of mobility necessary for the successful performance of their role on the North-West Frontier.**

Discuss how this difficulty can be overcome so that freedom of action and tactical mobility are assured in the Army in India.

or

(*ii*) **" Discuss the tactical employment of Light Tanks,**

(*a*) with Cavalry

(*b*) with Infantry

in both the plains of India and in the mountainous country of the North-West Frontier ; particular reference should be made to the problems of Maintenance and Supply."

(NOTE.—For the purpose of this essay the following may be assumed :—

Organization—Light Tank Company of 3 sections each of 7 tanks ; 1 Company Commander's tank and 3 reserve tanks. Total 25 tanks.

Crew of Vehicle—2.

Armament—One ·303". Vickers gun (Special tank pattern).

Ammunition—3,000 rounds ·303".

Armour—Capable of resisting ordinary ·303" ammunition, ·303" A. P. and shrapnel.

Speed average—Across country. 4—12 m. p. h. Road and track 20—25 m. p. h. Reduced to 15 in convoy.

Crossing power—Trench 5 feet. Water 2 feet 6 inches.

Climbing power—Slope—1 in 2½. Perpendicular obstacle—2 feet.

Circuit of Action—Road approximately 100 miles.

Petrol fill—20 gallons.

The following are the conditions of the Competition :—

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and Auxiliary Forces.

(2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 20th June 1933.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has offered a Special Prize of Rs. 150/- for the best essay submitted on subject (*ii*). This prize is in addition to any awarded by the Council.

(8) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1933.

(9) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(10) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

THE GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1932.

The judges appointed for the 1932 *Competition*, viz., *Lieut.-General Sir Walter S. Leslie, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., Sir David Petrie, Kt., C.I.E., C.V.O., C.B.E., M.A., and Mr. G. R. F. Tottenham, C.I.E., I.C.S., have given first place to the essay submitted by Lieutenant R. G. Thurburn, 2nd Battn., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles). The Council of the United Service Institution of India has, accordingly, awarded a gold medal and Rs.* 150/- *to Lieut. Thurburn.*

The essay submitted by Captain M. C. T. Gompertz, Indian Army Service Corps, was placed second in order of merit.

SUBJECT :

"Disarmament, and its effect on the foreign policy of the British Empire."

BY LIEUT. R. G. THURBURN, 2ND BN. THE CAMERONIANS (SCOTTISH RIFLES).

I.—The Foreign Policy of the Empire.

Political tradition in Great Britain has long placed the conduct of foreign affairs outside the arena of party politics. The resultant continuity of policy which has ensued in our relations with foreign powers has consequently been a cause of envy by those peoples pursuing less stable courses. Any international arrangement or agreement which is likely to cause a departure from our settled policy becomes, therefore, a matter of considerable concern to the Empire in general and to such bodies as, for instance, the Committee of Imperial Defence in particular, whose business it is in the last resort to implement our foreign policy by recourse to armed force.

Prior to the twentieth century the foreign policy of Great Britain, could be summed up, in Lord Salisbury's phrase, as one of "splendid isolation." The Victorian era had witnessed a gradual but steady consolidation of the Imperial power, and at the same time a commercial expansion not previously imagined. Contemporary events in Europe and outside of it—the American Civil War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-German War, the Italian risings, and the Russo-Turkish War—had not inclined the people of Great Britain to view any closer contact with foreign nations as either desirable or necessary. 'John Bull' was the acknowledged strong man : his influence could be felt

without the necessity for intimate partisanship. But with the new century a new situation forced statesmen everywhere to reconsider the position. Commercial rivalry and nationalistic cravings for expression became stronger with each passing year.

The currents of world politics forced the Great Powers into the two groups which struggled for mastery during 1914—18. It was during this period that the Dominions of the British Empire came of age, a fact which was definitely recognised in the opinion of the world by the separate representation allotted at the League of Nations. Any question affecting the foreign policy of the British Empire to-day is one, therefore, which affects not only Great Britain, but the entire group of nations and dependencies which comprise that Empire. The Statute of Westminster has further elaborated their independence in this respect, nor does any provision apparently exist as yet for co-ordinated action in an emergency other than by the tedious and clumsy methods of general consultation.

The position is further complicated by the fact that Great Britain is a signatory to treaties guaranteeing armed action in Europe on the side of one State attacked by another, treaties to which the Dominions are not necessarily parties, and that should the necessity for British intervention arise, such action might be undertaken by Great Britain alone, or with the partial adherence of the Dominions. Such a situation arose in Chanak in 1922, when conflict with Turkey appeared likely, and yet all Dominions were not prepared to co-operate.

The tendency of late years has been for the British Empire to draw its component parts closer together, and to act in greater concert as a force for world peace, but while such treaties exist as require military action by Great Britain the possibility of isolated action on her part must be considered.

Europe apart, situations arise from time to time necessitating armed action by Great Britain. Such action may or may not be carried out with the concurrence of the self-governing Dominions, and in the first instance is bound to be done without their military assistance. Such situations have arisen since the German War ; in Afghanistan (1919), Iraq (1920), S. Kurdistan (1922—30), Shanghai (1927), and recently in Palestine and Cyprus. Any one of these situations might have developed to a greater extent than it did and have thereby necessitated the employment of larger forces.

A very brief consideration of the diversity of races in the Empire and the varying standards of their development will suffice to indicate the nature of present and future difficulties. In addition, the peculiar nature of Imperial communications, maintained almost entirely by sea and air, renders our supremacy in these directions a matter of vital concern to us. Russia and the United States of America, the States nearest approaching the British Empire in territorial size, are compact and almost self-contained. They do not lie under the necessity of safeguarding many thousands of miles of shipping routes, canals, naval bases, aerodromes, cables, and the host of means whereby the safety of the British Empire is secured in time of war.

It will be seen, therefore, that the problem of the Empire, in considering the armed forces which are to be maintained in peace to deal with unforeseen emergencies such as the above, is world-wide and therefore not comparable with that of any other nation.

The position in 1932 may, then, be summarised thus: the first requirement of Imperial policy is peace. The expansion of trade, the exploitation of the vast undeveloped areas and resources within the Empire, the capture of the world's commercial markets, are present aims only to be secured by an unmolested period of peace. But obligations undertaken to safeguard existing treaties may not always allow of unfettered and independent action. On the other hand, to secure peace the Empire is prepared to act in unison on the side of any movement or nation working to that end. Difficulties are bound to arise: *e.g.*, the Sino-Japanese conflict divided the Empire in that Canada and Australia were both anti-Japanese in virtue of their geographical position, while Great Britain was pro-Japanese because of her old and well-tried alliance with that people.

It must be remembered, too, that in foreign eyes the British Empire is still one unit, and that isolated action by Great Britain or by a Dominion is not to be contemplated. Similarly, hostile action against any one Dominion, whatever the Statute of Westminster may proclaim, is still war against the King, and must involve the whole Empire.

It has been shown, then, that the question of the foreign policy of the British Empire must be treated as a special case in world politics, involving as it does considerations not applicable to any other country, and having aims as dissimilar.

II.—International Cross Currents.

It has been said above that the main interest of the British Empire lies in the furtherance of peace. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Empire is in the fortunate position of being the richest and strongest power in the world. We possess one quarter of the earth's surface : untold wealth lies in areas undeveloped as yet, in many cases barely populated ; while the dominant position of our commerce and shipping is the labour of centuries. We, therefore, have much to lose and little to gain by embarking on any policy of military or territorial aggrandisement.

Such, however, is not the case with a great many of the nations of the world. In Europe alone the aftermath of the German War has left a wreckage of thwarted ambitions, strangled trade, fettered economic systems, and struggling populations for which no territorial outlet exists. Germany has lost her colonies, her rich provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, Polish Silesia and the Corridor ; Austria is having the breath crushed out of her by a ring of hostile states ; Italy is gravely perturbed to find an outlet for the overflow of her population, and does not find that France is an easy neighbour in the Mediterranean and in Africa ; the Balkans, always the powder magazine of Europe, require only the spark of financial assistance to be at each other's throats again. The United States of America, for long the dumping ground of surplus Europeans, has by a rigorous curtailment of immigration reduced her degree of usefulness in this respect to a negligible proportion.

Asia has recently provided an object-lesson in the effects of trade and population on foreign policy. Japan has admitted that her territorial limits cannot hold her increasing millions ; furthermore her economic position prior to the recent conflict with China was being seriously prejudiced by anti-Japanese propaganda. What the issue may be in Manchuria cannot at the moment be accurately forecast. The U. S. A. and Australia are barred to her ; her friendship with Great Britain and America has hitherto precluded any risk of open hostilities with these nations, but no student of history would venture to rule out the possibility. Russia, in the event of the failure of her Five Year Plan, may find herself forced into war to bolster up the credit of her communistic system, if war is not entered upon to further her commercial interests. The smaller states of Afghanistan, Persia, Iraq

and the Hedjaz may with increasing modernisation and contact with Western methods find themselves involved in armed competition in the struggle for existence.

Nor must the possibility be excluded of some new Napoleon or Jenghiz Khan arising, aflame with ambition to raise his country to a level of power hitherto unattained, or to display his own talents to an astonished world. The history of nations is the history of individuals, and the development of civilisation can be measured by the cycles of appearance of some human meteor who has raised or retarded the progress of humanity for a space of time. We cannot assume that the standardising influence of modern civilisation can be extended to the standardisation of a human type.

It must not be too readily assumed that such possibilities as are given above are the products of an imagination too easily stimulated. An age which has evolved the submarine and the aeroplane, wireless telegraphy and broadcasting, may well produce many other human developments equally astonishing, which could affect the march of history.

It will be agreed that the prospects for world peace, when candidly reviewed, present many disquieting features. International rivalries when urged by economic factors have always been the gravest source of danger. Financial exhaustion or depression at present precludes active hostility to most nations. But nations sometimes have no option in these matters, and are forced to embark on a line of action by causes beyond their control. We in the British Empire, which finished so well in the race for colonial possessions and which is now in the comfortable position of the successful business man regarding the plight of less fortunate competitors from the security of a well-furnished home, must not forget that we are the object of envy and strenuous competition on the part of many nations. To these we represent a giant guarding the entrance to the Promised Land—and perhaps, in some eyes, a giant of straw.

III. Disarmament Proposals.

Many attempts have been made throughout history to introduce a period, if not of permanent peace, at any rate of minimised opportunity for war. An example, induced as much by economic motives as by undue optimism, has always been given by Great Britain. After the wars of Marlborough the army was reduced and, under the

chloroform of a lengthy period of peace, so neglected that when next called upon to exercise its influence in a theatre of war it was quite unable to do so. The financially and morally wasteful system of hiring mercenaries had to be resorted to once again. Such disarmament as this proved, therefore, an expensive and useless procedure, which was certainly not justified.

The Napoleonic Wars found the army once more in a pitiful state. National lack of interest in the services combined with miserly financial administration had shamefully bruised if they could not break the spirit of the soldier. After 1818 when the last troops returned from the occupation of France the usual process was carried out of cutting down establishments to the minimum. Not many years passed before men began to say that the age of universal peace had arrived. They conveniently closed their eyes to such minor disturbances as the wars in India, the French conquest of Morocco, the Piedmontese struggles, and many other pacific indications. The great Peace Exhibition was held in Hyde Park in 1851. Three years later Great Britain was engaged in one of its bloodiest struggles in the Crimea. The people paid full measure for the neglect and decay into which the army had been allowed to fall, and the bitter lesson of the casualty lists, largely due to preventable causes, amply discounted the measure of disarmament adopted after Waterloo.

Longsighted men, towards the end of the nineteenth century, foresaw the inevitability of the German War, and in 1914, for the first time in her history, Great Britain entered upon hostilities with an army, too small, no doubt, but fully prepared and efficient. The previous lessons of experience show that it is impossible to pursue a line of policy without the ability to back it up by force of arms if need be. This country has always had the determination which has enabled it to carry through its policy, but it was not always a certainty that it would be carried through. Financial strength alone permitted it.

Experts may question whether the Sumerian or Babylonian civilisations were not greater and more advanced than ours : yet the eventual result was the extinction of each by force of arms. The utmost refinement in manners and culture, the height of science and education, the acme of mechanical and biological progress, are all of no avail against the sudden attack of a hostile power, determined to achieve a greater position in the world. Qualities such as those

instanced above may assist in staving off the blow for a brief period, but lack of preparation against a possible evil cannot be remedied every time after hostilities have begun.

It will be admitted, then, that what is chiefly desirable is disarmament of the spirit of aggression rather than a demobilisation of men or the " scrapping " of ships and weapons. But in view of the imperfect nature of humanity in general, it is perhaps advisable to begin with tangible propositions.

The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 inaugurated the League of Nations, which is not yet, however, a league of all the nations. The United States and Russia are the most notable absentees from its councils. The Disarmament Conference embraces a wider scope, since the delegates include representatives from States which are not members of the League. The chief difficulty in the execution of any international agreement made at the Conference and ratified by the respective Governments appears to lie in the lack of any guarantee that the measures decided upon will be carried out by every country. As far as the League of Nations is concerned, pressure may be brought, as is known, upon members to fulfil their obligations; such action, however, cannot be undertaken with regard to non-members.

This matter is one of very real difficulty: for the whole question of disarmament may be summed up in the word ' Security, ' and any nation might feel disinclined lightly to discard its powers of effective defence when such action is not general and simultaneous.

The Treaty of Versailles, while reducing the Central Powers to a condition of military impotence, did nothing to impede the victors from maintaining or developing their armed forces as they wished. The signatories to the Treaty, however, subscribed to the principle of a reduction of armaments, a reduction which it was to be " one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

Since 1919 little has been done except as regards naval disarmament. In this respect a marked advance was made in international relationships by the demilitarisation of a zone in the Pacific Ocean and Far East, within which no further fortifications may be constructed, and by the proportional regulation of the size of the fleets and warships of the Great Powers. As regards land and air forces, in most cases an increase rather than a reduction has taken place. But the Preparatory

Commission for the Disarmament Conference which concluded in December, 1931, produced a Draft Convention upon which the Conference which assembled in February, 1932, would be enabled to base its work.

In addition, the Conference in session has had before it a number of proposals, made by different countries, which vary considerably in principle and plan. Although these proposals are fluid, being the subject of discussion during the summer, the relationship of Disarmament to Imperial foreign policy must vary according to the degree and nature of the former. Before we can consider the effect of one upon the other, we must briefly summarise these proposals.

Naval.

1. Extension of scope of Washington and London agreements.
2. Abolition of submarines.
3. Reduction in size of warships and naval guns.
4. Abolition of capital ships and aircraft carriers.

Military.

1. Abolition of chemical warfare.
2. Limitation of effectives by most practicable course, not necessarily ruling out conscription.
3. Abolition of heavy guns above a certain calibre.
4. Abolition of tanks.

Air.

1. Protection of civilians against / Abolition of } aerial bombardment.
2. Abolition of military aircraft.
3. Internationalisation of civil aviation.

General.

1. An international Police Force, or League Army, with the control of heavy bombing aircraft, long range artillery, large warships and heavy submarines.
2. Total disarmament.

Such, in outline, have been the principal proposals put forward, some of which, if carried into effect, may very vitally influence the well-being and safety of the Empire. The variations of this aspect of the situation must now be considered.

IV. The Proposals and the Empire.

Naval. It has been continuously pointed out, that the warship most suited to our needs is the cruiser. As was shown above, our communications, under which our trade routes are included, are world-wide and therefore unlike those of any other nation. Our ability to reinforce any part of the Empire, no less than the route by which our food supplies reach Great Britain, must be secure. With the ability to despatch troops to any part of the world in safety, there is the means of striking a rapid blow in the maintenance of our foreign policy. Examples of this have already been given.

The necessity for fast cruisers on our part is, therefore, obvious. The day of the heavily armed capital ship has passed, if indeed a case for its necessity could ever be claimed in the light of our war experience. Nor do we require submarines, which, in the hands of a determined enemy, are a grave menace, to our trade routes and convoys. But conflicting interests are likely to cause these weapons to be retained.

We may say, then, that the naval proposals for disarmament, provided our cruiser strength or tonnage be not further restricted, will not affect our policy.

Military. There is a considerable danger here, that the Conference, in seeking to render war less horrible and more difficult to begin, will have made it cheaper and at the same time rendered it more difficult to reach a decision on either side. The proposed abolition of so many effective weapons spells another deadlock such as was witnessed in France from 1914 to 1918. The abolition of chemical warfare, almost universally subscribed to, deprives every nation of the disposal of a humane weapon, properly used. The abolition of tanks deprives an army of the only method by which it could, in modern war, compete with hostile fire power and gain a decision. It is futile to class tanks and heavy guns, as weapons of offence and so to deprive both attackers and attacked of their most effective weapons. The defenders will then be at the complete mercy of any attacking state which has devised a new weapon, which history shows as the answer in such situations.

As regards Great Britain, the instrument for the execution of her foreign policy, should such be required at any time, becomes immeasurably weakened. We have not a large army, and therefore it must be all the more mobile. To deprive the Army of tanks, apart from the increased casualties which would result in war,—(this aspect does not

appear to have been considered at Geneva)—is to increase its difficulties. Firearms and weapons generally are becoming increasingly efficient and armoured mobility as a protection as well as a means of avoiding utter stalemate has become a complete necessity in modern war.

There are other aspects attached to the abolition of tanks and heavy guns, but it would be irrelevant to discuss them in this essay.

As regards limitation of personnel, a reduction below present establishments would place the British Empire in the position of inability to honour her treaty obligations should the necessity arise, and is referred to later.

Air. Whatever decision is reached by the Conference in regard to military aircraft, the fact remains that the aeroplane has proved itself a necessity not only as a link of Imperial communications, but as a cheap and useful means of warfare. Iraq and the North-West Frontier of India have shown what effect aircraft can have in controlling large areas, in reinforcing threatened points, in supplying troops with food and stores, in the evacuation of personnel, including wounded and women, apart from their uses as a means of aggression, such as an aerial bombardment. The effects of the latter are often not as violent as perhaps is claimed. While there can be little objection to placing the bombardment of open towns or the civil population as beyond the bounds of civilised warfare, the aeroplane must remain a weapon of war without which we, with our special conditions, cannot guarantee the peaceful maintenance of our policy. It must not be forgotten that the moral influence of an air squadron, like a warship, can be of incalculable value in the prevention of hostilities before a dangerous situation becomes definitely beyond control.

In regard to aircraft generally, it must be remembered that the lead in civil aviation established by Great Britain is due to its control by a Service Ministry, and that it is through military aviation that the notable advance in flying reliability has taken place.

General. Theoretically speaking, an International Police Force, made up of proportionate contingents from all the Powers, and having at its disposal the only heavy bombing aircraft and long range artillery in existence, backed up by the only large warships and submarines, the whole controlled by a League Council, must be able at any time to crush resistance and punish any offender against the peace of the world. When coldly examined, however, the practical difficulties are seen to be incalculable in their effect. How will a Council make

rapid and clear decisions? How enforce them when made? How are international jealousies to be curbed, international sympathies and prejudices suppressed, so that the League army will work as one? It is possible to visualize a hundred difficulties. If the plan were workable, then its effect, so far as the British Empire is concerned, would be beneficent, for the main interest of the Empire, as already stressed, is peace.

That Total Disarmament lies within the range of practical politics at this stage in the world's development is an idle dream, and need not be discussed.

V. The Future of our Foreign Policy.

The two issues before the world to-day are those of War and Peace. As emphasized more than once already, the foreign policy of the Empire is based on the maintenance of peace. Any form of disarmament which conduces to a continuance of peace and the unhindered development of modern civilization is welcome to us. But it has been seen that some forms of disarmament would weaken the Empire and by so weakening it would render it less of a force for peace than it is to-day. Just as the law is generally respected because of the police which are maintained to enforce it when necessary, so it is essential that our position in the world, our policy and our aims, should be respected because maintained by a force not only strong enough but capable of executing its function when called upon to do so.

Again, the proposals that have been made at the Disarmament Conference are based upon the establishments and weapons which are known to be in existence to-day. But the greatest weapon of war—surprise—cannot be dealt with. It is possible to remove so-called aggressive weapons from the permitted list for armies: but a state intending to attack its neighbour may, and probably will, devise a new aggressive weapon, and the last stage of the disarmed nation will be worse than the first. One cannot disarm Surprise, or Necessity, well known as the Mother of Invention. This is a point which we cannot afford to overlook.

Situations may arise in the future for which the forces of the Empire, as regulated by the Disarmament Conference, may not be of sufficient strength. The close and constant co-operation of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Foreign Office is required, that time may not be lost by the necessity of referring matters to an International Board of Arbitration which would possibly not deal with them in sufficient time to be of use.

History shows that disarmament in the past has not availed to prevent us from going to war when the necessities of our policies required us to do so. We cannot to-day rule out the possibility of war, although the Locarno and Paris Pacts have immeasurably strengthened the cause of peace. Moreover, in the last hundred years we have, as a nation, generally avoided alliances or entanglements binding us irrevocably to intervention in the disputes of other nations: to-day, on the other hand, we have obligations which might quite easily lead to our participation in a conflict not immediately concerning us. In this connection one should bear in mind the gradual formation of two camps in Europe, which has been in progress since the German War. On the one side stand France, Poland and the Little Entente, pledged to the maintenance of the existing Peace Treaties. On the other side are Germany, Hungary, Italy and those countries whose claims to a revision of the Peace Treaties have been by many admitted as just.

Great Britain, it must be recognised, holds the Balance of Power. She is pledged with her late Allies to uphold treaties. Her sympathies and influence might bring about the peaceful revision of the latter. Meanwhile, her foreign policy must be based on the dual requirements of peace, and friendship with all nations. Should her armed forces fall below the strength requisite to an influential voice in the councils of the world, her policy cannot be supported and disarmaemnt to this extent would spell impotence, with the consequence of disaster.

Contemporary history shows the dangers (as much as the advantages) of immediate disarmament, unless carried out faithfully by all nations of the world. But how is this to be ensured ? Those nations which have lost the most in the last war may well feel that another appeal to arms cannot produce more intolerable conditions than those under which they now live. They may regard disarmament by the major powers as a Heaven-sent opportunity to improve their present circumstances. Nor can we yet say that all wars are necessarily evil. They have been fought, may yet be fought, for great ideals. Nor do the feelings of humanity invariably coincide with the dictates of policy.

We may conclude, then, that disarmament for the British Empire beyond the present scale is not a justifiable action, in that the Empire, which is to-day the greatest force for peace in the world, might not then be in a position to exert its authority in the maintenance of that peace.

PRE-WAR.

By "Mouse."

("*In the days before the war, my boy, the regiment was a wonder; we wore full-dress and the officers knew sword drill; we played polo, we entertained Lord Curzon, who gave me these cuff-links; we spoke the vernacular of our men—(Ho! Khitmagar. Bring some more whisky-soda and jaldi lao, tum.)—I used to know Pushtoo and Punjabi. We didn't waste our time and money going to dances and buying motor-cars. When we did dance we used to take four collars and another shirt. We shot tigers; we stuck pig; we never drank cock-tails—(Ho! Khitmagar. Kis waste the whisky-soda not bringing?)—those were the days, my boy, those were the days. Bungo!*" Extract from the conversation of a pre-war officer bent on the improvement of my mind after dinner.)

This is not going to be one of my serious, uplifting articles. I am for the nonce going to take sides with the junior officer and try to express some of his feelings; those feelings, beliefs and impulses which antagonise his seniors and which often lead to misunderstanding between them. I may be extravagant, I may be unfair, but I will try to be truthful, and if I succeed in making some senior officers laugh at themselves and thereby flex their heads to a more tolerant view of their juniors I shall have accomplished my object. Years of service have taught me that there is nothing really wrong with our seniors, except their age.

There is a thing called "The Pre-war Tradition" that gets my goat. It is a mixture of Victorianism and perverted snobbishness born and bred in those spacious days when the Army was at the peak of its social and political importance. Those days are no more, but the tradition still lingers. Mark you, I am not decrying the traditions which make the Army what it is. I grant whole-heartedly that the magnificent histories of the British and Indian Armies must be preserved with the most religious and rigorous fanaticism; I grant that those armies can now afford to cock snoops in respect of training and discipline at any other forces in the world; I grant that we are all devilish fine chaps, but.....My grievance is far less important and yet looms daily on the mental horizon. I don't like being button-holed by some elderly military officer who

was at Sandhurst at or even before the date that witnessed my birth, and being told by him that: "We never did *that* before the war, my boy." By "that" he by no chance ever means a purely military evolution or a question of tactical training. No, it is always something far more hideous. Like drinking a vermouth before dinner, or riding a motor bicycle or wearing a white waistcoat with a dinner jacket. The more one listens to senior officers the more one realises what amazingly fine fellows they must have been when young, and what low little worms we all are. Although I am aware from my researches into psychology that this superior attitude is a normal result of advancing years and that I too, in fifteen or twenty years, will succumb to the same ailment, nevertheless I feel that the present generation, who grew middle-aged in the maelstorm of the war, deserve consideration from their elders and begetters.

Our seniors were damned lucky. They lived their soldier's life in that halcyon period between the Boer wars and 1914. The profession of arms for seventy-five per cent. of its devotees was a pleasant diversion between shooting goals off horses and tigers off elephants. England experienced unexampled prosperity and prestige throughout the world. Her Government did not always appreciate the growing menace of Germany, but fortunately there were forces working in the background to forge her small army into a perfect instrument. The handling of that instrument in the initial stages prior to its embarkation from England might have been better done—(unhappily Mr. Churchill was at the Admiralty and I was at school at the time,)—but its wonderful development and its sheer indestructibility are now the greatest marvels in English history. I can never make out, even from our official Historians, how much this was due to the brilliance of our Generals, the statesmanship of the British Government, Mr. Lloyd George, or the British soldier. Personally I think they were all very lucky, and privately I think they all owe a lot to the obscure platoon commander.

The final results of the Great War, disregarding the results which might have been if we had lost, are:—

(1) An impossible debt to America.
(2) The alienation of the Irish Free State, Egypt and India.
(3) The growth of the hideous thing, Democracy.
(4) The reduction of the British Navy.
(5) And now, a ten per cent. cut in my pay.

Indeed, the only sound thing that the war seems to have produced is the Manhattan cocktail. And yet, in spite of this dismal reckoning you find pre-war officers going about boasting of the good old days which engenerated these lamentable results for their sons and daughters. I do not for one single split second wish to blame soldiers for these pathetic results. I have read far too many of those nauseating debates in Parliament not to understand that the average senior general has a devilish hard roe to chew. (The House of Commons ought to have two hard-bitten soldier permanent members– one a Gunner and the other a Cavalryman, for these arms have a greater exuberance of language– whose job ought to be deliberate interference in service debates.)

But what I do wish to say most respectfully is, why do pre-war soldiers assume infallibility? They do not intrude this attitude militarily, for they now realise that such puritanism has only one decoration– a bowler hat—but they do insist on it socially and almost regimentally. Surely this is an absurd anachronism. I do not profess to have complete faith in my arguments and I am writing them mostly for my own amusement, but there are so many *jadoos* in Indian regiments particularly, so many religious rites and so many minor tyrannies imposed by the pre-war generation that I think it is only right to give them expression :—

(*i*) Ceremonial Parades.
(*ii*) Mess Regulations.
(*iii*) Horses.
(*iv*) Social Customs.
(*v*) Entertainments.
(*vi*) Motor Cars.

Ceremonial Parades. Bang! Twice a year every Indian infantry regiment undergoes the supreme and futile torture of a Ceremonial Parade. Prior to the auspicious event it suffers the valuable refinement of practice parades. Irrespective of the fact that half its complement may be engaged on the arduous guard duties that fall to the lot of every battalion on either internal security or frontier service; disregarding the different duties performed by an infantry unit in the plains and, say, a Gurkha unit in its quiet hill station; and supremely indifferent to the exigencies of our complicated modern training, what do our pre-war soldiers expect? They invite all their lady friends and give them awnings and car parks and then convey

all the words of command to the harassed infantry by the dipping of a flag over a horse's ears. The wretched soldiery comply with the various requests to the best of their ability and are enraged at their sheer inability to put up a Guardsman performance. It is not their fault. The Guards are not expected to furnish nine guards, three inlying picquets, four fatigue parties and a patrol on their officers' wives with the temperature at 120° in the shade. I do not for one moment say that our pre-war officers insist on Guardsmen's precision, but why are they so huffed when they don't get it? The two annual ceremonial parades are a survival of those old days when soldiers in India could afford to spend their time in carrying out those Victorian evolutions designed to satisfy the multitude and based on the tactics of Inkerman and Waterloo. They now destroy the Christmas holidays of overworked officers, and in the hot weather lead to many men using intemperate language. Why does not somebody with a p. s. c. mind evolve a simple, dignified parade which will show equal precision, equal arms drill and equal discipline without the present hurting of every modern soldier's feelings?

Mess Regulations.—"An officer's real home is his mess," a senior officer once said to me, and then, when I dropped a trick at Bridge, asked me in exceedingly Victorian language why the hell I had trumped his ace. I replied that I had been thinking about the Staff College, and then had to spend the next two months going about like an archangel so as to obtain a satisfactory confidential report. Mess life in India is not homely. The paucity of officers, the large overhead expenditure, the extra pettifogging given to the officers on the mess committee, the parade dinner with all its attendant courtesies and Elizabethian refinements—it is no more like home than a Y. W. C. A. social. No wonder that the Indian Army is given to early marriage. The average pre-war officer thinks that if he gives a mess concession to his juniors—such as dining in a dinner jacket or allowing him to leave the table before the decayed wine has been circulated nine times,—the whole discipline of the regiment will collapse. I don't know why this apprehension exists unless it is that the pre-war officer was accustomed to drink more red wine than we young fellows can afford. Ordinarily in mess there is far too much formality, often too much "shop" and generally too much obsequiousness. For Guest Nights certainly bring up all your blood-stained history, your historical formalities, your regimental customs and your ruby

wines—but for the love of modern democracy let your ordinary meals be family parties where Second Lieutenant Snooks can dispute a point as easily and as courteously with his Commanding Officer as he would with his own father.

Horses.—The spring and genius of our army are in the English countryside and English sport of half a century ago. And the Golden Calf worshipped by our High Priests—mostly cavalry—(one of these days I am going to write about the Cult of Cavalry, or the Worship of Mammals and then there will be stars in my firmament and hoof marks on my fundament)—as I say, the Golden Calf worshipped by every aspirant of military glory and every sycophant of military nepotism is that ornamental but expensive locomotive, the horse. I don't want to be low, or hide-bound, or horizontally confined, but I would like to know why every soldier who wants to get on has, first of all, to get on a horse. The number of chaps at the Staff College who spend two miserable years being horsey so as to satisfy the Moloch of all the Mammals has got to be counted to be believed. (They know of course that it is a well invested penance, for the remainder of their service will be spent in upholstered limousines).

Judging from these bitter remarks the reader may think that I am in the Royal Air Force or the Royal Tank Corps, services whose contempt for mammals or camels is well-known. If I were an airman (the only difference between an Airman and a Cavalryman is that one of them has a good market for part-worn plugs)—I also would spit on horses. I would say thus to myself; "Here I am up in the air with a range of vision, manœuvre, and power of offensiveness unrivalled by any land-bound forces. I can go across country, jump fences, and achieve spectacularity; I can do everything the Cavalry do except pin butterflies or the enemy to his ground. With me up in the air, with my enhanced visibility, my bombs, my cameras and my roaring engines I can ensure and demand victory so long as the infantry forces protect my base. The Cavalry—Pooh!"

If I were a Tank officer—(the only difference between a Tank and a horse is that one needs elaborate seduction and the other a gentle tickle)—I would also distend my exhaust upon all quadrupeds. I would cock my beret over one eye and say: "To blazes with the prehistoric fauna of Marlburian days. These fox-hunting squires, these gaitered yeomen, these be-spurred generals, and these polo-playing exotics—why should they impose their antique whims and pre-

ferences upon the organisation which in this age of mechanisation is the only logical, the only necessary, and the only perfect instrument of war? The airy way these cavalry conservatives talk gives me prickly heat; thank heavens for Fuller's Earth. The Cavalry—Bah!"

Thus and thus would I talk if I held rank in either of these arms, even as they do. Unfortunately I belong to the lowest type of military life—the Infantry. I am an untouchable; nobody dare touch me for a fiver, and I dare not, alas, touch anybody either. I spend my life walking on legs too short for cavalry and on feet too big for clutches and accelerators. Yet, in spite of my grotesque appearance, my aversion to horses expressed in my written and signed preference for infantry as a cadet and my strained circumstances, I find that one of the greatest essentials to the advancement of my military career is horsemanship. All my military life it has been impressed upon me that to be an efficient officer one must have a horse. I have always had a horse, but it has struck me as extraordinary that the authorities who insist on these principles and these conceptions of soldiering insist with equal forcibility that an infantry officer is not entitled to a horse until he is a company commander. When one is thirty-six years of age or older it is not the time to gallop into Olympia and make one's equestrian bow. If a horse is a necessity for an infantry officer—which I fully grant it is—he ought to have one from his first infantile pip. The cavalry officer gets every encouragement to improve and extend his horsemanship; line ponies, orderlies, polo tournaments, the bliss of three months at Saugor, and the balm of Gilead or Girth gall, but what of his foot-slogging brother? He gets an indifferent remount or buys a perambulating screw; he tries to hunt on an untrained charger or to play polo on a couple of pensioned bazaar tats, and, just because he falls off on a New Year parade in front of the grand-stand, his regiment is for ever blasted by the General who comments—"The officers need more training in horsemanship."

The dice are loaded against the infantry officer; he has got to be able to march, to direct artillery fire, to co-operate with tanks, to observe from aeroplanes and to sit on a horse and be veterinarysurgeon to mules. He has also got to win the war and sit on it when it is won, and after all this standing and sitting he invariably collects a raspberry from some senior officer because the tails of the mules of his Machine Gun Company are trailing below their hocks. It's a bit hard.

After all this tomfoolery I would like to say that I do like horses for their own sake. I have a few, none of which I am entitled to and none of which, *cela va sans dire*, I can afford. But we are like that in the infantry - dashing. The Cavalry - pish!

Social Customs.—An officer gets no married allowance until he is thirty; a private soldier until, mark you, he is twenty-six. Why? I am sufficiently conservative not to get socialistic at this proletarian decision regarding the respective amativeness of the classes, but upon my Sam, I don't see why the pre-war tradition regarding the Age of Consent for officers should be enforced in the present enlightened age. The pre-war feeling is against early marriages because wives and families add burdens to administrative arrangements. The fact that such sentimental liaisons are normal biological phenomena common to all strata of humanity is lost upon the Victorian hierarchy who rule us, and who were brought up to believe that such connections should be arranged by Mama, Papa and God, all in their own good time. I admit that if I were a commanding officer I would prefer that all my officers were bachelors because then I would probably have them always on the tips of their toes for service and hard-work, but if ever I did command such a unique collection in India I would not be surprised to hear that they were all eunuchs. Some psychologist ought to examine the causes for so many young officers in the Indian Army being married. An inhospitable country, home-sickness, mess-sickness; and, as the Prayer Book says, "a remedy against sin." I do not profess to know, but I do think that the pre-war soldier who damns so fiercely and so volubly the present matrimonial tendency might well dig into his own conscience. I would hate to examine the *debris*.

Entertainments.—In the pre-war days they entertained. They exercised the human faculties for giving and receiving pleasure to and from their guests. They dined them and wined them. They gave them champagne, chartreuse, marsala and all those other drinks with which I am not acquainted. They gave them buggy rides. They gave them tremors, fits and spasms. They gave them fun and fashion.

We are too poor to do that. Instead of the ten course banquets, the truffles, the *pate de foie gras* and the tinned asparagus we give them sausages and eggs and bacon. We cannot afford the rich sherries, and so we tempt them with cheap continental vermouths disguised with lemon and bitters to hide the taste and decrease the cost. (We call them cocktails). We give them honest whiskies and sodas and achieve the same results. We kiss the girls too, but our amours rarely

lead to scandal. And we don't wear long moustaches and we don't pretend to be archangels.

Motor Cars.—Nothing enrages my official fathers so much as the sight of a motor car containing me. " In my day," they say, blowing up their chests in a vain attempt to deflate their diaphrams, " we never had motor-cars. We were content with a horse, a buggy, a brake, a railway train or an ox-wagon." And then they look at me as if I were a Maharajah expending all the tribute of my subjects in a fleet of Rolls-Royces. Actually, I may be giving a lift to our Second-in-Command who has got four children at school and wants to teach me my profession by way of a T. E. W. T. ten miles from cantonments. Being a bachelor I can afford a Ford and am only too glad to save my brother officers unnecessary fatigue. This pre-war hostility towards motors is really rather ridiculous. A car is not a luxury now ; in India it is an economical necessity. From the professional point of view, an officer living in Army Mansions (because he cannot afford to compete with the growing class of Indian which is invading the security of cantonments) must have a car. He is separated from his barracks by three, five, seven miles. He has to appear on morning parades, and then at office, and quite frequently again in the afternoons. According to the pre-war conceptions of locomotion he ought to walk, ride, bicycle or use a tonga. Being modern he buys a dud car, and spends the remainder of his service lying awake wondering if the thing will start ; and Generals call it a limousine. I have done the walking, the riding and bicycling (I could not afford the tonga) and I know how very seriously my efficiency was impaired. I used to sleep for hours and hours in office. The modern junior officer is worked far harder than his seniors were. He has not the time to idle about cantonments on a slow horse ; he cannot afford the luxury of a tonga and he likes the fun of driving a car or riding a motor-bicycle. If he abuses the privileges offered to him by the conveniences of modern methods of transport by occasionally using his vehicle to take a pretty girl for a ride—well, point me out the general in the whole British Army who is not sorry he had only a tonga, or a bullock wagon, or a tandem or a hansom for exactly the same purpose.

In conclusion I would like to state that I notice a great deterioration in the class of young officers now being produced by our military colleges compared with what they were in my day.

DARDISTAN.

By Colonel H. L. Haughton, C.I.E., C.B.E.

After an interval of nearly forty years another attempt has been made, this time by a German party, to reach the unconquered summit of Nangaparbat, that magnificent peak of nearly 27,000 feet, the western buttress of the Himalayas, round which the Indus sweeps to make its final turn southwards. The distant view of Nangaparbat is well known to many in Northern India, for it so dominates the mountains around it that it is possible to see it, not only from comparatively short distances such as from Gulmarg, but also on clear days from certain vantage points near Murree, Nathiagali and even from the Peshawar Valley. Not a few also know well the country lying this side of the great mountain and the approaches to it; but it has been suggested that readers of the Journal may be interested to hear something more concerning the country in the immediate vicinity, and of the people who dwell there.

The best known line of approach to the Gilgit Agency, in which Nangaparbat is situated, is from the Kashmir side over the Tragbal or Rajdhiangan Pass down into the Gurais Valley, and up again over either the Burzil or the Kamri Pass to Astor, and thence down into the Indus Valley beyond. Nangaparbat may also be approached from the Khagan side and the lower Kishenganga Valley by the Babusar Pass, which leads one to Chilas. There is another, but little used, route over the Mazeno Pass leading into the Indus Valley at Buner, between Bunji and Chilas; but this latter pass is so little used that further reference to it may be omitted. There are of course other routes leading into the Gilgit Agency which may be briefly mentioned —that from Chitral *via* Shandur Pass through Yasin to Gilgit itself, and the Central Asian route from the North-east *via* the Killik or the Mintaka Pass through Gujal to Hunza and thence down the valley of the Kanjut stream to Gilgit.

The route *via* the Gurais Valley and the Burzil is the best known and is the one which has been in general use from the earliest days, when the forces of the Sikh and Dogra rulers of Kashmir were endeavouring to keep a precarious hold upon part of that country which now forms the Gilgit Agency. The road is good, and in summer there

is no difficulty in crossing either the Burzil or the Kamri Pass, but this has not always been the case and men in Kashmir may still be found to speak of the horrors of the Burzil and the Gilgit road in early days, when the Kashmir troops depended upon forced cooly labour for all their supplies. On the Hattu Pir, round which the old road, if road it could be called, passed down to the Indus Valley at Ramghat, hundreds of those wretched coolies, ill-clothed, ill-fed and over laden, met their deaths from starvation and disease, until the place became a perfect Golgotha. In these more enlightened times, supplies for the Gilgit garrison are carried up yearly by hundreds of ponies, which are collected at Bandipur. As soon as the passes open, all ponies are carefully inspected by the transport officer in charge, and all weak or sore-backed animals are discarded so that the minimum suffering is entailed.

The Burzil and Kamri Passes are both between 13,500 and 14,000 feet altitude, but the Burzil generally opens earlier than the Kamri, as it seems to hold less snow. Given fine weather, there is little difficulty in crossing either of these passes, and a single man or parties of a few men lightly laden might cross during any month of the year. All the same the Burzil is reckoned to be a pass of ill-repute, and from time to time has been responsible for a considerable loss of life. In 1891 a party of Gurkhas proceeding to Gilgit was caught by bad weather on the pass and suffered many cases of frost-bite, and in the spring of 1907, the coolies, who were accompanying two officers on a shikar expedition, were caught by an avalanche and twenty-two of them were buried alive.

From Bandipur to the Burzil, the country is as beautiful as any to be found even in Kashmir. Magnificent forests of spruce and silver fir clothe the slopes on the mountains leading up to the Tragbal. The Tragbal Pass itself is perhaps unrivalled for the profusion of wild flowers to be found at certain times of the year. In the Gurais Valley at an altitude of about 8,000 feet grassy slopes and dense forests, broken by towering precipices on either side of the rushing Kishenganga lend an air of prosperous fertility ; but actually the people of the valley lead a hard life, as the ripening of their crops at such an altitude is a matter of great uncertainty—in fact only certain hardy crops will ripen at all.

It is interesting to note that these people of the Gurais Valley are not Kashmiris but are Dards speaking the Shina language, of whom

more anon. Once the Burzil is crossed, the country changes. It cannot be said to be actually treeless, as it is practically true to say of the north side of the Zojila, for small stretches of forests do exist ; but generally speaking, on crossing from the south side to the north side of the range, one passes from a forest country into one of bare open hills.

The Gilgit Agency, in which Nangaparbat is situated, comprises a large part of the country often spoken of by the general name of Dardistan, and which includes many small States such as Gilgit, Astor, Hunza, Nagar, Puniyal and Yasin. It is a country which can perhaps best be described as stupendous. To some people it is very beautiful, with a hard almost awe-inspiring beauty of its own ; to others it is forbidding. The passes close behind them like vast doors cutting them off from civilization and all the normal amenities of life ; the vast mountains oppress and hem them in like prisoners in the narrow valleys ; to them the very grandeur and vastness of nature become terrifying. One can quite imagine that something such as this must have been the feelings of the unfortunate beings, who in early days were sent to penal servitude from Kashmir, and pushed across the Indus to fend for themselves. Many of these wretched Kashmiris were seized upon by Chilasis or people from Hunza and Nagar, and were sold into slavery in Chinese Turkistan ; but some managed to settle down, inter-married with low class people of the country, and their descendants may be found in Gilgit to-day. They are now hardly to be distinguished from the true natives of the country, and one man to whom I talked seemed to bear no ill-will on account of the punishment which had been meted out to his grandfather. I enquired what was the crime for which he had been transported, thinking that it might have been for killing a cow in Kashmir ; but I discovered that the culprit had been a butcher in Srinagar who had been caught out selling dog meat and calling it goat ! His grandson seemed to regard it as quite a good joke.

Perhaps the most curious convict that ever came to Gilgit was a cat. This cat, when rambling over the roofs of Srinagar, dislodged a tile or a piece of wood which fell upon a child's head and killed it. The cat was caught, tried and on being sentenced to transportation for life was taken up to Gilgit and pushed across the Indus. The delightful old Dogra General, who commanded the Kashmir troops in Gilgit when

I was there, told me the story and assured me that the cat, which must have been a lady, had many descendants still living amongst the cat population of Gilgit.

One more word only regarding the scenery. I have already described it as stupendous, even awe-inspiring, and this appears to be the impression it made upon the old Chinese travellers, who passed that way upon their pilgrimage to the Buddhist shrines in India. For it is of this country that Fah Hian writing in about 400 A. D. says "steep crags and precipices constantly intercept the way. These mountains are like walls of rock, standing up 10,000 feet in height. On looking over the edge, the sight becomes confused and then, on advancing, the foot loses its hold and you are lost." Another pilgrim, Sung Yun, writes "for over a thousand *li* there are overhanging crags 10,000 fathoms high, towering up to the heavens."

It is indeed a land of mighty peaks and deep, dark gorges, and it is said that within a radius of sixty-five miles from Gilgit, there are to be found, among a mass of innumerable smaller peaks, eleven of from 18,000 to 20,000 feet, seven from 20,000 to 22,000 feet, six from 22,000 to 24,000 feet, and eight from 24,000 to 26,600 feet. Everything is upon a vast scale. At times perhaps, standing upon some lofty spur, one's eye lifts from the sombre depths of the narrow gorges beneath to the sparkling snow-clad peaks above, silhouetted clear, sharp and silent against a deep blue cloudless sky. On some other day one may have the misfortune to crouch behind a rock for such poor shelter as it gives, whilst lightning flashes and thunder rumbles around one, a biting, wind-driven rain lashes the face, the roar of avalanches of snow, rocks and earth crashing down the mountain side rivals that of the thunder itself, and the clouds and mist whirl and writhe in a frenzied dance to the whistling of the tearing, shrieking wind. Then indeed does civilised man feel that he is but a puny creature and understand the superstitions of the untutored hillman who dwells in such surroundings and "sees god in the clouds and hears him in the wind."

Now let us turn to a consideration of Dardistan, and see if we can define what is meant by this term. Who are the Dards? Over what area do they extend? These questions, though they appear simple, are not by any means easy to answer. Dardistan, as we now understand the term, comprises the whole of Chitral, Yasin, Puniyal, Gilgit,

Hunza and Nagar, Astor, and the Indus Valley from Harmosh to Batera, the upper reaches of the Panjkora river and the Kohistan of Swat. The Indus Valley section may again be divided into two main portions—the upper portion being called Shinkari, or the country of the Shins, including Gor, Chilas, Darel and Tangir, and the lower portion generally known as the "Kohistan."*

It is probable that in early times the Dards covered a very much more extensive area than they do at present, for they appear to have been sufficiently well known to be classed as an important tribe by ancient writers. They are mentioned in the Vishnu Purana and also by Arrian, who speaks of the Dardai, "who inhabited the mountains towards the eastern borders." Ptolomey also speaks of them as living "at the sources of Indus," and Pliny, referring to the gold still to be found in some quantities throughout the upper Indus Valley, writes "*Fertilissimi sunt auri Dardoe.*"

It will be noticed that Chitral has been included in Dardistan. The mass of the people there are Kho, speaking a language called Khowar, but the ruling families are Ronus, who are still the most honoured caste amongst the Dards. It is justifiable to think that Kho people themselves were at one time more widely distributed than at present if, that is to say, there is any connection to be traced between their name and approximately the same syllable which is to be found in the ancient names of rivers, such as the Khophen, the Kunar and the Khoaspes.

The Dard people in the Gilgit Agency may, broadly speaking, be said to be divided into three castes. After the ruling caste of the Ronus, already mentioned, come the Shins, and below them the Yeshkuns, and lastly a collection of low castes, such as Kamins, Doms, etc., who provide the millers, potters and musicians of the community. It is interesting to note that in marriage the Shins will give their daughters to Ronus and the Yeshkuns to Shins; but a lawful daughter is never given to a man of lower caste. This, and the whole caste system, seems to denote a close connection with Brahminical Hinduism.

It is impossible to deal in any detail with this difficult matter in a paper of this sort, but there are reasons for thinking that whilst the

* There are still one or two small colonies of Dards tucked away in the most remote valleys of Baltistan where they have maintained until this day their own language and customs in the midst of the Tartar population which has swamped them out of most of the country.

Kho people of Chitral may fairly be considered very early if not the actual original inhabitants of the country, the other Dards swept up from the direction of the Punjab in later times either completely submerging the aborigines, or driving them and the remains of previous waves of invasion into the inmost recesses of the hills. The first of these waves appears to have been Yeshkun and the second, Shin.

It is said that there are no less than eleven different dialects spoken in Dardistan, and their distribution appears to confirm the above view of the waves of Dard invasion. In Chitral, Khowar is the language generally spoken, and it is to be noted that there are no Shins or Yeshkuns to be found there; their respective invasions having presumably spent themselves before they crossed the Shandur Pass. In Hunza, Nagar and Yasin, the Yeshkun language, known as Burishashki, is spoken, whilst Shina, the language of the Shins, is spoken throughout Gilgit, Astor, Puniyal and Gizar—the most accessible valleys in which the Shins established themselves when they forced the Yeshkuns back into the inaccessible fastnesses of Hunza, Nagar and Yasin. It has been suggested that the Yeshkuns may be descendants of the original Yuechi, those Scythian tribes who conquered Gandhara about the first century and ousted the last of the Greek rulers—Hermaeus—from Bactria.

All these people are now Mussalmans of sorts, Sunnis, Maulais and Shias, all being found within the limits of Dardistan. Apart from the historical records of the Chinese, there is still plenty of evidence within the country to-day to show that the prevailing religion must at one time have been the gentle faith of Buddha; for in numerous places the remains of stupas and Buddhist carvings upon the rocks bear silent witness to the faith now vanished and forgotten.

Curiously enough the name by which their neighbours, the Kashmiris, always refer to the Dard people is " Bhota " or " Bhota-log." The present inhabitants of the country appear to have forgotten entirely their connection with the Buddhist faith for they have no knowledge of it and take no interest in such Buddhist remains as still exist. The rudely carved figure to be seen on a rock face at the mouth of the Kirgah nullah, some three miles above Gilgit, they call " Yathini " who, they say, was a female demon who devoured human beings, but was turned into stone and fixed upon the rock by a holy man whom she endeavoured to seize.

In this legend, twisted round to suit Mussalman ideas, there may be some connection with the "Hariti" of Buddhist lore who, it may be remembered, was a similar female demon and devoured the children of others, though she is said to have had five hundred of her own. She was converted by Buddha who stole her youngest child and hid him under his begging bowl. The distracted mother nearly went mad with grief at the loss of her child, which gave the gentle teacher the opportunity he sought of making her realise the sorrow that she had inflicted upon others so that she came to be regarded as the lover and protector of children, the goddess of mercy and of fertility. The other form in which she has come down to us is as the goddess of small-pox—a destroyer of children—which title she evidently derives from the evil practices of her earlier years before her meeting with Buddha.

It is probable that the Buddhist faith gradually disappeared from the country with the coming of the Shins who certainly introduced some form of Brahminism. It is to be noted that all the Dard peoples other than the Shins apply to the latter the term "Dangarik" or "the cow people." This appears to be fairly strong evidence of their connection with Hinduism, though curiously enough the feeling for the cow seems to have become perverted in these days, for no Shin will milk a cow or keep chickens, the latter being a practice which is shared with them by most Hindus.

The existence of caste has already been mentioned and it may be added that the ruler of the Shins was always called the Ra. Again the burning of the dead was in vogue until comparatively recent times, concerning which Drew writes:—"One or two old men have told me that they could remember hearing it mentioned, as not an uncommon occurrence, in their youth, but none could recollect having witnessed any actual instance. So lately as in 1877, a very old man in Darel scandalised his neighbours by calling his sons to him on his death bed, and after having his arms and valuables brought to him, desiring to be burnt with them when dead. His wish, however, was not carried out. He and a man of Gor, who died twenty years ago, are known to have always refused to be circumcised or to call themselves Mahomedans. They were probably the very last Hindus in Dangaristan."

Behind these relics of Hinduism and in spite of the introduction of Mahomedanism, which gains strength yearly as education spreads, there are to be found many signs of still earlier idolatrous beliefs and

customs in the legends and festivals of the country. It is impossible to enter into a discussion of these in detail, but, as instances, may be noted the festival of Taleni which seems to be based upon some original form of sun or fire worship, and the general feeling of reverence for and frequent employment in ceremonials of the *Chili* tree, perhaps indicating the existence at one time of some kind of tree worship. Behind this again is to be found in the folklore of the people a wealth of stories showing how strong must have been the belief in demons, spirits and fairies, good and bad.

In this connection one cannot help wondering whether some of the difficulties experienced by the party which tried to climb Nangaparbat should not be attributed to such beliefs amongst the local coolies, who still undoubtedly entertain such sentiments though they would be reluctant to confess them. There is little doubt that about seventy-five per cent. of the local people firmly believe that Mummery and the two Gurkhas who accompanied him upon his last fatal climb were killed or carried away by fairies. That this would be the fate of anyone trying to climb the mountain was foretold, before the expedition started, by an old witch in Goona, a village towards Chilas ; and the avalanche which swept away Mummery and his two companions confirmed that belief in the eyes of the people at large.

There are few if any witches left in these days and I know not whether any of them have prophesied ill concerning the fairies' attitude towards the present expedition ; but it must not be forgotten that to the people of Gilgit "Dyarmir," as they call Nangaparbat, is the home of the fairies and on its summit is "Bathelo," the fort, the innermost sanctuary of these fairy folk, who would surely be unlikely to allow any mere man to enter it!

The failure of the present expedition in spite of pluck and perseverance will perhaps still further strengthen the popular belief that avenging avalanche, falling rock, baffling cloud and biting wind have come to the assistance of the fairies of Dyarmir and have once again rendered their fastness impregnable to the attacks of human beings.

A whole volume might indeed be written about these interesting Dard folk, their customs and beliefs, their mode of life and social organisation, their festivals, sports and pastimes ; but this paper has already grown too long.

However, at the risk of hearing somebody say " Yes, insufferably long ", it is felt that it would be almost indecent to bring the paper to a close without saying something of what may be called the national game of the country polo.

Gilgit indeed shares with Manipur the honour of being regarded as the home of polo, but, although the game has been played there for more generations than any one can remember, it is probably not indigenous but was introduced into the country from outside. Nevertheless it was from Gilgit and Manipur that we borrowed the game, naming it from the *Pulu* which, strictly speaking, is the name of the ball with which the game is played.

The game itself is generally called *Chargan* and the ground upon which it is played the *Shawaran*. Whence the Dards introduced the game cannot be said with any accuracy, but probably from Persia from which country it spread East and West in very early days. Does not Omar Khayyam use the word *Chaugan* in his quatrain which begins—

" The ball no question makes of ayes and noes,"

" But right and left, as strikes the player, goes."

How early the game was played in Persia I know not, but Constantine Porphyrogenitos, writing about the 8th century, speaks of its being played in Byzantium and uses for the polo ground the word *Zeuganisterion* which must be derived directly from the Persian " *Chaugan*." That great leader of the Muslim hosts, who made circles round our brave but heavy crusaders and was known to us through our school histories as Saladin, was an expert polo player. Who knows but that his prowess at the game may have helped him to overcome his more cumbersome and slow moving adversaries ? As far as India is concerned the game must have reached this country well before the 13th century for was not Sultan Kutb-ud-din Aibak, the builder of the Kutb Minar near Delhi, killed whilst playing polo at Lahore about A. D. 1210!

To describe the game as played in the Hindukush to-day would be a long business and it has been done before, so it must suffice to say that the ground is any flat piece of land that can be found and usually has a rough stone wall along either side, upon which the spectators and musicians sit. There are no fixed measurements, for in a mountain country one must take what one can get, even though it be the village street!

In important matches nowadays, the players are generally six aside, but in friendly games there is no limit and anyone who likes may "chip in," so that there may be ten or a dozen aside, all playing "on the ball!" There are no *chukkers*, but the side that scores nine goals first wins and hard fought games have been known to go on without pause for two hours! The best ponies are Badakhshanis and stand about fourteen hands.

The traveller Vigne was, though probably not the first European to see the game, about the first to leave a record of having seen it and was much impressed by what he saw. Travelling between 1830 and 1840 he saw the game played at Shigar in Baltistan and writes of it as follows:—

"At Shigar I first saw the game of the *Chaugan* which was played the day after our arrival on the *Mydan* laid out expressly for the purpose. It is in fact hockey on horse back. The ball, which is larger than a cricket ball, is only a globe made of a knot of willow wood and is called in Tibeti *Pulu*. I can conceive that the *Chaugan* requires only to be seen to be played. It is the fit sport of an equestrian nation and would be, I should think, an excellent exercise for cavalry.... and I should strongly recommend it to be tried on the Hippodrome at Bayswater."

It seems to have been some time before Vigne's advice was taken either at Bayswater or anywhere else, for polo was not introduced into India until about 1860 and took longer to reach England. It is not until 1871, that we read of a great match eight aside being played between the 9th Lancers and the 10th Hussars.

THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE GOLD STANDARD.

By J. B. Taylor, Esq., I.C.S.

A lecture delivered to Members of the United Service Institution of India.

It is a curious fact that, though there is nothing about which the average man is so intimately concerned as money, there is nothing about which he knows so little. The problems of money and particularly of international finance are generally supposed to be a matter for the expert, to be left to the trained handling of bankers and their like. This is all very well so long as things are going smoothly, but when they begin to go wrong it is a different matter. To all appearance, the experts have made a mess of their job, and the layman has a right to ask why, because there is no question, except that of social health, which is of more importance to the man in the street. A pestilence like the Black Death may sweep a country and decimate the inhabitants, but disorders of the monetary system may create almost equal suffering, in fact even greater suffering in scientifically organised and highly developed modern communities. The numbers of the unemployed have increased by tens of millions. People's life's savings, even when invested with prudence, have practically disappeared. International debts have climbed up to a figure where they are clearly beyond the capacity of any debtor to pay. In a desperate effort to make ends meet, Governments have screwed up taxation, cut down expenditure, reduced the pay of their staffs or retrenched them altogether, and, what is worse, there appears at present to be no real sign of a favourable outcome.

What is it that has happened? Prices have collapsed to one half of what they were six years ago and a third of what they were just after the war. This may sound exaggerated. You may reply, "My clothes, my house rent, my bearer's wages are certainly not half of what they were in 1926, and if they were, it would not be a bad thing." The tragedy is that this fall in prices is a fact. If the price of wheat or wool or cotton rises, up jumps the price of the loaf or of a suit of clothes within the week—if wheat falls it is a much more difficult

job to persuade the baker to put down the price of bread. He has a thousand excuses, he has his wages to pay, his rent is the same and so on. The fact is that people like having their pay put up and hate having it put down, so if there is a heavy fall in the wholesale prices of such things as food grains, metals and other raw materials, the retail prices will not come down nearly so quickly and the balance of things is upset. The latest statistical statement of the Bank of England bears this out. It shows that whereas wholesale prices in pounds sterling have now fallen to the 1913 level, the retail price of foodstuffs is still 25 per cent. above it and the general cost of living still nearly fifty per cent. above it. A heavy fall in wholesale prices is therefore a calamity and this is what the world is suffering from. But why should wholesale prices fall ? That is the problem which we have to examine this evening.

I have already pointed out the similarity of this crisis with some great pestilence and the analogy is close. It knows no national frontiers. There were countries like the United States of America which hoped that they could avoid the common plague, by drawing their skirts around them, by raising their tariffs so as to keep out the lower priced produce of other countries. They now find that they are suffering worse than the others. Again, as in the case of a pestilence, those countries are suffering less which are leading the more simple life, those which economically speaking are closer to the ground. India, for instance, has suffered very severely, but it has not been nearly so heavily hit as the United States, although it would be foolish to minimise the loss caused by the falling off in the price of India's staple exports such as cotton, jute, rice and tea. The gross money value of the export of Indian merchandise in the twelve months which ended last March fell to 156 crores as compared with 220 crores in the previous year. India's average annual exports for the previous ten years were worth 315 crores. In other words, the money which India gets from foreign countries for her produce is now about 160 crores a year less than it was a few years ago. When you remember that our whole national budget is only about 130 crores you will realise what a blow has been given to our finances by the collapse in the world's demand for our goods, and how impossible it is for the Government to maintain its previous standard of expenditure when the tax-payers' capacity has been so terribly reduced.

At the same time, the actual population of India because of its simpler standard of living has probably suffered less than the population of Western countries. The price of foodstuffs has fallen as rapidly as, if not more rapidly than, that of other commodities, so that the ryot has enough to eat. The people who are suffering, and suffering as badly as in any Western country, are the commercial and business communities, but they form a smaller proportion of the whole than in more highly industrialised countries.

Though we may derive a little miserable consolation from the fact that there are others who are worse hit than we are, that does not answer the question what is hitting us, and is there a remedy for it? It is sometimes said that this is a disease which must burn itself out and that it is no use trying to do anything. Any remedy which is a mere palliative may make the ultimate position worse. It is of course a truism that nature will find its own remedy. The turn must come sooner or later. This, however, is merely a counsel of despair. If this crisis is allowed to burn itself out, it may destroy in the process practically everything that is precious in our civilization and leave us to build up laboriously again from the bottom, as happened when the Roman Empire destroyed itself. What we are now suffering from is usually described as an economic blizzard. I do not like the description. It suggests a visitation of nature which is entirely outside our explanation or control, like a volcano or an earthquake. I would prefer to describe it as a world-wide epidemic, because the monetary systems of the world are factors which can be controlled, even though we may not yet have discovered how to control them. The present crisis is like a disease, the cure for which has not yet been discovered, rather than some blind phenomenon of nature. I am convinced that sooner or later the cause of this wide monetary disturbance will be recognised and isolated, and with its isolation the remedy will follow.

I do not mean by this that there may not be contributing factors, as disease is fostered by unhealthy habits of life. We have all been inclined, governments and private individuals alike, to live beyond our income. After a world-wide war, in which men and material were destroyed on a scale never before known, we had the mad illusion that we were emerging wealthier than we went in, that we could live better and work less. All this may be true, but common sense argues that there

must be a root cause for this undoubtedly extraordinary phenomenon, and though there is disagreement among experts as to that cause, I think that most of them now agree that this catastrophic fall in wholesale prices is due to the inadequacy of the world's gold reserves, as at present managed, to support the present volume of the world's trade and commerce. In other words, there is not enough gold to go round. Expressed in this bald form it is a platitude. Everybody knows it. In order to find a remedy, we must examine the problem more closely to try to find out why, and by how much, the world's gold stocks are inadequate, and whether anything can be done either to stretch them out so as to meet our requirements, or whether we can bring in anything else either to serve instead of gold or to help it out. On these, which are the really practical and important points, there is still much doubt and disagreement.

This brings me to the lines on which a scientific investigation of the problem should proceed, and here I am afraid that I must slur over the various details of a somewhat complicated theory in order to put the broad results before you. What is money? In a modern State money, from the point of view of the man in the street, is the common standard for measuring the value of commodities authorised by the State. In other words, the first essential of money is that it is the legal tender of the country, the kind of coin you have to do business in if you are in a particular country. The State, except on very rare occasions, does not fix the actual price of any particular commodity. It leaves that to individual negotiation, but it says that the price when fixed must be expressed in terms of its money. It would appear to follow from this that the State could declare anything which it chose as money, so long as the quantity of the thing was limited by nature, or so long as the State could limit the quantity itself. For instance, it would be useless to call pebbles or sea-shells money in a country where anybody could pick up handfuls of them, though they have both actually served as money in places where they are rare. Also, if a State made its paper notes money, and printed them as fast as the printing press could turn them out, their value would sink to nothing, like the rouble or the mark.

This, however, is not the whole problem because foreign trade has to be considered. The foreigner is under no compulsion when he sells his merchandise to a particular country to accept the legal tender of that country. He wants something which he can convert

into the legal tender of his own country. In order to facilitate international trade, therefore, something is required which will be universally acceptable, and gold, because of its rarity and durability, has fulfilled this function of an international medium of exchange from time immemorial, at first in companionship with silver and latterly to a continually greater extent alone. From this you will see that there is no necessarily indissoluble connection between the internal currency of a particular country and the price of gold in that legal tender. Since last September, for instance, the price of an ounce of gold in pounds and in rupees has varied considerably according to the fluctuations of the exchange with America and France, where the price of gold, in dollars and francs, respectively, is still fixed by law and remains the same. In order to facilitate international trade, however, it was soon realised, primarily by Great Britain, which has been the world's leading merchant country for the last three hundred years, that foreign trade would be enormously encouraged if a country could maintain a definite parity between the internal and external values of its currency, that is to say, that the international commodity—gold—would always have a fixed price in pounds, shillings and pence. Such a fixed parity clearly lessens the risk to a foreign trader of finding that the price in his own money which he eventually gets is less than what he originally anticipated. Equally also it makes it tempting for him to leave his spare funds in such a country because he realises that he can draw them out when he likes on the same basis on which he put them in.

So far, the argument is simple enough. The next conception, that of credit, is more complicated and it is the misunderstanding about the nature and the limitations of credit which is the primary source of the present trouble. I shall endeavour, however, to make the explanation as simple as I can. In its baldest form the proposition which I have just stated would mean that if a country wished its money to have the maximum possible stability in relation to the outside world, all its money would be gold and nothing but gold. This, however, would clearly be impossible in practice, but you must realise that every single step forward from this position brings in the conception of credit, that is to say, of one man trusting another.

For instance, there are large payments which would involve the physical transport of impossibly large masses of gold if they had to be paid in specie, and the mercantile community to avoid such remittances

introduced such expedients as payment by cheque or bills of exchange or bank notes, that is to say, promises to pay the amount of gold specified in the document if called upon to do so. At first these documents were issued by private individuals or banks on their own credit, and if you accepted a note you definitely knew whom you were trusting to cash it. It was soon found that there was a certain amount of bank notes in the case of each country which would never in practice be cashed because they were much more convenient than cash for large transactions. The amount would naturally rise and fall according to the state of business, but there would be a minimum below which it would not fall though it might be difficult to decide what exactly that minimum was. Once banks realised this, they also grasped the logical consequence, that they need not keep a sovereign for every pound note they issued, but could lend out a proportion of them in full confidence that they would never be called upon to cash every note. At this stage Governments saw that there was money in the business, and began to issue notes, either themselves or through State banks which had to pay for the privilege. The profit, as I have said, was derived from the fact that a certain amount of the notes were not backed by gold. In England before the war this uncovered amount was fixed at £18½ millions. In other words, the Bank of England was allowed to issue as many notes as it liked. These notes were declared by the Government to be legal tender money up to any amount, and anybody could present them in any quantity at the Bank of England and receive gold sovereigns in exchange. For any notes issued over £18½ millions the Bank of England had to retain a reserve of one sovereign for each pound of notes issued as a reserve against encashment. It is obvious that if any particular country either through misjudging the situation or through the desire to make profit out of the issue of its notes did not keep an adequate reserve in gold, it would have to put difficulties in the way of the conversion of its notes into gold, or even in the extreme refuse encashment altogether. In such cases it is equally obvious that the notes would circulate at a discount in relation to gold. It was to prevent this that the reserves of the Bank of England were framed on the most cautious lines, so that in practice before the war London was the freest market in the world.

I have discussed these comparatively simple developments in monetary credit in considerable detail, because the effects of further developments of credit on money, though apparently more complicated,

are really governed by the same principles. The ways in which one individual may trust another in matters involving money payments are innumerable. They also vary in degree from time to time. For instance, when prices are rising manufacturers are eager to sell their output so as to bring in fresh raw material and increase their trade. They are, therefore, prepared to give liberal credit to shopkeepers who, in turn, are eager to borrow to lay in large stocks because they see a quick turnover. Business booms in consequence: there is plenty of employment at good wages and lots of money about. Investors and speculators see that business is making good profits and that the shares of the companies concerned are rising. They are, therefore, eager to trust them with their money by buying their shares, and so the improvement goes on.

It might appear that there is no reason why such a process should stop of itself or why anybody should want to stop it. I have already told you how disastrous a sudden fall in wholesale prices is, so it might seem that the contrary, a rise in wholesale prices, would be equally beneficial. The only people who suffer from a rise in prices are those on fixed incomes or those who have invested in Government securities or debentures with a fixed rate of interest. As prices rise, since they merely get the same amount of money, that money is able to purchase less. On the other hand, though they do not benefit so quickly as the merchants, they get their benefit in time. People on fixed rates of wages can stand out for higher rates of pay which will generally be conceded because there is plenty of money about, and the investor in Government securities will benefit, because the Government will be deriving more money from customs duties on the increased volume of trade and income-tax on the increased incomes of the trading community. It will, therefore, be in a position to lower the income-tax on fixed securities.

Though it might look as if it was to everybody's interest that this delightful progress should continue indefinitely, there are factors which will come into operation to stop it. The first of these is the increased demand for legal tender money, either bank notes or cash. Though the original impetus has been given by people trusting each other more, there are numerous transactions in respect of which trust is not given, and cash has to be paid—servants' wages, railway and taxi fares, purchases in shops and the numerous demands on peoples' petty cash: and as prices rise, obviously more cash will be required.

There will, therefore, be a demand on the Government of the country to create more legal tender money, both token coin such as shillings and pence, and bank notes.

It may be asked, and it has been asked on many occasions, why a Government should not meet such demands ? Why should it refuse to expand the currency and thus put a stop to this highly desirable process which would seem to benefit them as well as the public ? The usual answer is that if they do so, they will weaken their gold reserves. As all this increase is due to the growth of credit and not to any increase in the actual legal backing, that is to say gold, it follows that if a Government is to increase its currency notes to meet the demand of the country, that increase must decrease the proportion of gold in its reserves. Also if, as a result of this trade boom, prices have risen in that particular country higher than elsewhere, then foreigners will cease to buy the products of that country which are standing at a higher price than similar articles manufactured by themselves. On the other hand, they will be eager to take advantage of the higher prices prevailing in that country to unload their own produce in it. The balance of trade will therefore be against the country. As it will not be able to export its own highly priced goods, it will have to export gold to maintain its exchange and thus weaken its reserves even further.

This was the orthodox argument of the political economist before the war, but it has been hotly disputed in many quarters since. It is argued that a distinction must be drawn between inflation due tc Government extravagance and a rise in prices due to an increase in trade. It is generally admitted that it is wrong for a Government not to balance its budget but to meet the deficit by churning out notes from the printing press. That can only end in a collapse, and that currency will share the fate of the rouble and the mark. But, they say, it is quite different if the currency is demanded by trade, and if traders are prepared to borrow the extra currency from Government against the security of their goods.

The exponents of that theory, and they are many, say that in the latter case, the increase in trade activity will have started in one country not because of some phenomenon peculiar to that country alone, but because of some world-wide development. In other words, a rise or fall in prices in a particular country will not be a purely national

phenomenon but an international one. If, then, the stage is set for a rise in prices all over the world, all that is required, they argue, is a reasonably liberal policy of co-operation between the authorities responsible for money in the various countries to prevent prices in any one country materially outrunning another and so creating a dangerous flow in the precious metals.

There is, however, one definite and final answer to all these arguments. Reasoning on these lines is based on the same fallacy as many schemes for disarmament. They would work quite well if every nation was prepared to play the game, but they suffer from the fatal defect that any nation which does not play the game will find itself in an overwhelmingly strong position should co-operation collapse. In the event of war breaking out with its inevitably disastrous results on international trade and credit, those countries which have piled up an enormous edifice of credit on slender gold reserves will find themselves in a hopeless position as compared with those which have retained a larger reserve in gold. No individual country can carry on modern war for any length of time on its own resources. It must borrow abroad, and the foreign creditor, before lending, will want to know that its gold reserves are reasonably adequate. We could effect marvellous reforms if there was no more war, if there was one world State. An international currency policy would be one of them, but so long as politics are run on national lines, currency policy must be governed by practical national considerations, and among these considerations, the possibility of war must always be at the back of the mind of every prudent statesman. There must be practical moderation in all things. A nation which arms itself to the teeth is a nuisance to its neighbours, by compelling them to increase their expenditure on armaments. So a nation which, for a similar motive, grabs all the gold it can, lowers the economic standard not only of itself, but of all its neighbours. But it is equally foolish to fly to the other extreme by either disarming completely or by following a credit policy which puts us financially at the mercy of other countries.

All this boils down to the axiom, that, though in theory credit might go on expanding indefinitely on a given basis of gold, in practic there are limits, and that over a long series of years prices must depend on the actual quantity of gold in use as money or reserve for money and not on the credit edifice which it may be possible from time to

time to construct on a given quantity of gold when men are feeling particularly benevolent or optimistic. I hope that I have made this point clear because it constitutes the whole basis of what is known as the quantity theory of money. I shall put it in another way. Though mutual co-operation between bankers and what may be called "sunshine" talk to encourage people to lend money to each other and to buy freely may temporarily increase the amount of credit on any given amount of gold and may consequently keep prices steady, or even make them rise for the time being, the equilibrium so created is essentially unstable. Sooner or later something will turn up to prick the bubble, and down prices will crash to a level which bears a truer relationship to the gold which forms the foundation of the whole fabric.

The broad view of the history of prices in the world bears this out. They have always moved in relation to the quantity of gold and silver available. For instance, we know that the discovery of the New World by Columbus and of the untold riches of Mexico and Peru liberated vast quantities of gold and silver. These spread through Europe and, as a result, prices practically doubled between 1500 and 1600 A. D. After the Napoleonic wars our information becomes much more complete and we can trace the relationship more closely. The world's gold output* was, roughly, worth about five million pounds sterling a year. This was inadequate for the rapid growth of population and industrial development which followed exploration, colonisation and the development of railway and steamship traffic. The result was a serious fall in prices between 1839 and 1851; the general average taking 1850 prices as the basis at 100 falling from 133 to 97, a drop of more than a third. This led to labour agitation and revolutionary troubles in practically every country in the world—1848 being a year famous for its revolutions in France, Germany, Austria and Italy, while we had our own Chartist troubles. In the immediately following years, however, the large gold areas in the west of America and in Australia were opened up with the result that the world's gold output rose rapidly from five million pounds a year to twenty millions. This eased the situation, and prices rose to 132 by 1855. The world's gold production, which was now varying between 20 and 30 million pounds a year, was sufficient to maintain this level of prices until the Franco-Prussian War.

*See chart at page 488.

In 1873, after the conclusion of that war, which was marked by the payment of a large indemnity by France to Germany, a new and very interesting development occurred. Up to that time, with the exception of England, practically every country was either on a wholly silver basis or on a basis of bimetallism, that is to say, it had a silver currency as well as gold, and maintained the price of silver in a fixed relation to gold. The ratio was roughly one to fifteen, that is to say, the silver rupee was worth one-tenth of a sovereign, or two shillings. Germany had long been envious of the position acquired by England, and the indemnity which Germany extracted from France put it in a position, as it thought, to adopt what it considered one of the main causes of England's mercantitle supremacy, namely, a standard based on gold alone. It therefore melted down its silver marks and dumped the silver bullion on the market, along with the silver extracted from France, and used the proceeds to buy gold. The action was well timed. The United States of America were just recovering from the Civil War, and there was a large party there which favoured the abolition of the bimetallic standard based on silver circulating with gold and the adoption of a purely gold currency like England. The large quantities of silver thrown on the market caused considerable difficulties to the silver using countries. The rupee exchange, for instance, was driven down from two shillings to one shilling and six pence. France and the Latin countries were compelled to abandon the free purchase of silver, and the United States eventually followed their example. The abolition of silver clearly narrowed the metallic basis or currency by casting an additional burden on gold, which it was not able to stand. Prices, which had risen to 144 in 1873, fell steadily to 79 in 1895, with the usual results of narrowing trade and socialist and labour agitation, particularly in England. The fall again was arrested by fresh discoveries of gold. The Rand mines in South Africa began to produce in the early nineties. The gold output of the world which was worth about 30 million pounds was doubled within a few years, and then rose steadily to its record of 96 millions in 1915, prices rising correspondingly from 79 in 1895 to 110 in 1913.

When the world war broke out, the credit structures based on gold were quite unable to stand the strain, with the result that every country engaged in the war, had to issue paper money which could not

be exchanged for gold. To prevent the foreign exchanges collapsing, large credits were arranged between the various allied countries, and the expenditure, for instance, of England in France to pay the troops and of France in England to buy munitions were set off against each other and the balance lent by the country in which the balance was incurred. Until the United States entered the war, the purchases of the Allies there were similarly financed by loans to the United Kingdom. In this way the exchanges were pegged. If the French Government, for instance, had to spend more money in England than England was spending in France ordinarily, the French Government would have had to purchase large amounts of sterling with the result that the quotation for francs, which was 25 to the pound at the beginning of the war, would have fallen away possibly to a very large extent. The British Government undertook to peg the franc round about 40 or 50 to the pound by giving the French sterling at that rate and lending them the balance which they could not purchase in the open market. This is obviously a fairly simple matter between countries both of which have inconvertible paper currencies, but it might be asked how could a country which still agreed to exchange its notes for gold, like the United States, peg the exchange of a country like France which did not? The explanation is that just before the war the United States had introduced a new banking system called the Federal Reserve System which enabled the Reserve Bank to issue additional notes which were not completely covered by gold as in the pre-war Bank of England system, but of which a proportion only was covered by gold, and the rest by trade bills, that is to say, lent to traders who promised to pay when they sold their produce. In other words, for every dollar of gold they could issue, let us say, two dollar notes, one covered by gold, the other by an I. O. U. As the Allies were tumbling over each other to buy munitions, there was any amount of trade bills, and so notes poured out and prices soared. The important point is that this meant that whereas in previous wars there were countries which were still on a gold standard, in the last war, there really were none, because though United States notes could still be changed to gold, in practice the structure of gold which the States had built up on their gold basis, was so excessive that in normal times no prudent banker as a business proposition would have allowed it. As a result prices soared to 248 in 1919, a higher level than they ever reached in the Napoleonic wars.

After the war came the settling up. The fundamental mistake then made was to assume that because these debts were expressed in dollars and because dollars were in the inflated circumstances of the time exchangeable for gold these were real gold debts. They were nothing of the kind. The amount of commodities which they would have purchased was less than half of what a similar amount of gold would have purchased in markets which were operating under ordinary economic law. The farce was carried a stage further when the whole debt balance was dumped on Germany. On top of this was the disquieting fact that the gold supplies of the Rand had been dwindling since 1915, and that there did not seem to be any parts of the world left unexplored where new gold deposits on a sufficient scale could be discovered. The world's output of gold which was worth 96 million pounds in 1915 had fallen to 65 by 1922. It was obvious that if the world meant to go back to the old proportion of gold to notes, the most appalling fall in prices was inevitable.

The Bank of England made a desperate attempt to keep things going by international co-operation and by lending money to other countries. It hoped that the central banking institutions of the more important countries in the world would also voluntarily restrict their gold holdings and maintain the credit edifice on them in such a way as to keep prices up. Theoretically in an ideal world it might have been possible, but in practice, the whole project collapsed because of the reason which I have already mentioned, and the pound was forced off gold in the forlorn hope. Why? Because there was one country which put what it considered the necessities of her own national security before the common prosperity of the world. This is not blaming France. Remembering how often and how terribly she had been invaded in the past, no one can blame her if she felt that the international pledges for her security were insufficient, and determined to follow her own way with ruthless realism. She thought that by piling up gold she could compel the nations of the world to recognise her political claims. But she did not get the gold for nothing. She had to pay for it. A certain amount of it was derived from reparations receipts, but the bulk of it was the outcome of her own hard work and her thrift. By lowering the exchange of the franc from 25 to the pound to 123, she destroyed four-fifths of the value of every investment in the country, but she made France a cheap country for the foreigner to buy things from, and a cheap country for the tourist

to travel in. By these means she acquired large amounts of the money of other countries, which she could compel them, when the time came, to turn into gold. Between 1925 and 1929 she more than doubled her gold reserve, raising it from 164 million pounds to 336, while America's holding remained more or less stable at 800 millions and England's at 145.

The bubble was pricked in 1929. The banking authorities in America, in taking steps to stop a stock exchange boom, started a crisis of unprecedented magnitude of which we cannot yet see the end. Within these three years the gold held by France has risen to 640 millions, a rise of 300 since 1929, while the gold in the States has fallen by 260 to 540, England's holding is 130, a drop of 15. The prices of all important commodities have meanwhile fallen to roughly 76, thirty per cent. below the prices of 1914, lower even than they ever were in the last century, and they are still falling. It is a preposterous situation. What is to be done about it ?

In the first place, as a practical proposition, war debts and reparations must be cleared out of the way. That is the British case, and there can be no doubt that without the removal of those enormous international liabilities, no progress is possible. It is not a question of ethics ; whether one Ally should pay another for services rendered in a common war. On that question there are obviously two sides. This is a simple business proposition. These loans, as I have shown, were floated at a time when, owing to artificial conditions, they purchased just about half and in many cases, a third of what they would now purchase. The debtor countries have not got the gold or the capital to repay them ; and, even if payment was allowed in goods (and goods are held back by high tariffs), their export would be on such a scale as to ruin the industries of a country which took payment in them. The world, instead of recognising the impossible, kept fiddling round with impossible promises to pay thousands of millions, terrifying the wits out of every business man and every investor. It is just as if you were to punish criminals by inoculating them with small-pox germs. It might be unpleasant for them, but it would be equally unpleasant for the ordinary peaceful citizen, who would almost certainly be infected too. America in the last three years must have lost far more than the whole value of its foreign debt though that is about three thousand three hundred million pounds at the present rate of exchange. The value of some 15 to 20 representative premier

American railway securities has fallen since 1929 from 3,500 million dollars to 280 million—a clean loss of nearly £900 million—four-fifths of the whole of our debt to her. When one remembers that the falls in their Motor Car Shares, Bank Shares and Land Values have been on a similar scale, there can be no doubt that it would have paid America over and over again to wipe out the entire debt years ago if by so doing it could have retained the level of prices of a few years back. It may be argued that it is not fair to let Germany off everything because she is the ultimate debtor, and then if she is let off, the taxpayers of the various countries will still have to pay to make up the interest which she has surrendered. That is true and it is obvious that Germany must pay something. What is even more obvious is that if the negotiations are unduly prolonged, the world and the taxpayers of the creditor countries are losing more than they could possibly hope to get in the final settlement.

Even when this problem is removed, however, the main problem will remain unsolved, though it will not be so serious. As I have shown, the world's production of gold has been falling steadily since 1915, while the world's population as a whole, has been increasing. In 1915, it touched 96 million pounds, it is now about 80. It also seems unlikely that any new gold mines will be discovered on a sufficiently extensive scale to make up the deficiency. Experts have calculated that, even if there had been no war, prices would have fallen about 10 per cent. below the pre-war level by last year, and that they may fall in future at the rate of about 1 per cent. a year. This, of course, is nothing like the fall which has actually occurred, but though the world could stand such a reduction, it would not be a healthy position. With prices continually falling, trade would be continually depressed and enterprise stifled. It therefore appears that, unless more gold is discovered, the world will have to revise its attitude to it. Possibly the solution may be to take in some other metal, such as silver or platinum, into the currency reserves as a supplement to gold. It is more likely that world currency systems will develop on the lines inaugurated by the Bank of England when it went off the gold standard last September, that is to say, that the authority responsible for issuing legal tender will issue it in such a way as to maintain a reasonable stability of prices in the country itself without too much regard to the actual price of gold in the terms of its own money.

This means in practice that foreign exchanges, instead of staying put, will constantly be moving up and down as the dollar and franc do now. A reasonable quantity of gold will be held in the reserves because gold will still remain the most expeditious method of settling foreign payments, even though foreign countries also may have unfixed the price of gold so that it will have to be accepted as a result of individual bargain. This, as you will see, is a totally different matter from reducing the proportion of gold to notes in your reserve, while still offering freely to change gold for notes at a fixed price. International co-operation on these lines has often been suggested as the way out; it would certainly enable Governments to print more notes, but as I hope that I have already shown you, it is essentially unsound because it plays into the hands of any country which does not play the game according to the rules. What the Bank of England has done is much more drastic and courageous; it is making the value of its notes in the world at large depend not on their gold backing but on the credit of England, the world's belief in its honesty—that it will not turn on the printing press to meet its requirements, but will balance its budget by economy and taxation however severe. There are obviously grave defects in such a development, which must be described as retrograde, and only to be justified by the direct necessity. It is clearly to the advantage of traders and investors that they should have certainty as to the price which one currency will command in terms of another. This, however, is not an insuperable difficulty, and the ruin of the financial fabric of a country is too high a price to pay for it. There is the far greater danger of a Government or a Currency Authority being inefficient or corrupt and using the printing press to meet its budget deficits. To such a course there can be only one end; that of the rouble and the mark. All the same, retrograde though the step may be, it appears inevitable; we have gone too far forward in the internationalisation of finance as compared with the internationalisation of politics. Financial disarmament has outrun political and we must retrace our steps. The British Empire, however, in the long run would seem to have little to fear from such a development. There is no institution in the world so highly trusted as the Bank of England for its impartiality and incorruptibility. If other countries are not prepared to co-operate by lowering their gold reserves, they may find in time that they are left sitting on useless heaps of gold which nobody will buy at the fancy monopoly

value they have put on it, and that the place of gold has been taken as an international currency medium by the pound sterling.

What will be the effect of all this on prices ? As I have already shown, the greatest immediate cause of all the trouble from which the world is suffering is the catastrophic fall in prices in the last two or three years which, coming on the top of the big fall immediately after the war, has made it almost impossible for business men and Governments to carry on.

Is there any hope of any immediate rise ? Here it is impossible to predict. There are currency enthusiasts who, intoxicated with the discovery that it is the lack of gold which is the cause of all trouble and the consequent fact that if we can make our paper money worth less in gold we can put up internal prices, imagine that all they have to do is to turn on the printing press and issue fresh notes until things come right. The problem, as I hope I have made clear to you, is by no means so simple as that. Even those theorists who consider that paper money should be increased, are generally cautious enough to hold that it should only be increased when there is an actual demand from the business and trading community for such money ; in other words that merchants are prepared to pledge their stock as security against the loan of the newly created money from Government. This panacea has been tried time and time again by making the borrowing rates of the central currency authorities as cheap as possible. The bank rates in London and New York are lower than they have been for nearly 40 years, so that any trader who wishes to launch out can get his accommodation fairly cheaply. The difficulty is that they are afraid to do so because they see no hope of selling their produce. Other currency enthusiasts go further. They point out that if a new gold mine is discovered, the adventurers who join in the gold rush, obtain gold with its actual purchasing power which they can dispose of as they like without having to borrow anything from anybody. The new theory has been stated in its crudest form in the United States where, recently, a large number of ex-soldiers marched on Washington to claim a bonus for their war services. The idea was that these men should be paid in paper notes printed up for the purpose. This would give them purchasing power, they would use the money to buy commodities and have a good time generally in exactly the same way as Bret Harte's gold rush heroes, and the large scale demand for commodities thus created would stimulate trade generally.

It sounds very plausible, but there is a definite distinction between the two. In the case of discoverers of a gold mine, the common sense of the world based on thousands of years of experience has realised that the amount of purchasing power so created will be limited. Nobody outside the Arabian Nights or a bucket shop has ever discovered a solid mountain of gold nor is anybody likely to. That is a risk which the world is quite prepared to meet when it comes. The difficulty about printing paper is that there is no limit, and, what is more important, the ordinary business man and investor would realise clearly that there was no limit. If a Government begin by giving a bonus to their ex-soldiers, there is no reason why they should not go on to give a much larger bonus to themselves. Why balance the budget by such unpopular methods as ten per cent. cuts and screwing up the income-tax? Why not print paper to make up the deficit? Why tax at all? If a Government tried that game, it is perfectly obvious that every man with any common sense would do what they did in Germany when marks were being churned out of the Government Printing Press. They would rush to buy goods, furniture, property, anything, so long as the money had any sort of value, in the certain knowledge that however little it might be worth to-day, it would be worth a good deal less to-morrow.

It might be answered that this may be all very well about the rouble and mark, but that a common sense government would, in practice, limit the creation of such purchasing power. That, however, is not the point. Once the purchasing power has been so created and prices begin to go up, producers see that they can turn out their goods at a profit and are eager to borrow freshly created notes against the security of their stocks because they realise that the more they can expand their business the more profits they will make. The Government will, therefore, be confronted with the difficulty of refusing to lend money against perfectly legitimate demands. It has started the snowball rolling and cannot stop it. If it simply flatly refuses to issue any more money, it will precipitate a crash. The Banks will have to close their doors.

It is possible that later on the world may evolve methods of making prices rise by monetary action, but I doubt whether it knows enough to try it now. The first step which the Bank of England has taken into the untrodden land of monetary theory is quite sufficient to go along with; that is to say to try to keep internal

prices more and more stable. If the Bank of England continues to do this, other countries will realise that it is suicidal for them to cling to their present currency systems if they mean a continuous fall in prices. They will then work round to something like the same system though of course conducted on national independent lines. When the internal prices of the more important countries of the world have been roughly stabilised in this way, it is obvious that the exchange fluctuations between one and the other will also dwindle, and if, at the same time, they have common sense enough to keep their tariffs down and do their utmost to foster internal trade, abandon the childish delusion that they can sell things to people without buying from them, traders will gradually pluck up courage with expanding markets, and prices will begin to move up. In any case, like all crises, this fall in prices, even on the most rigid monetary theory, has overreached itself, so that, even on the old orthodox gold theory, we are due sooner or later for a rise in prices of some 15 per cent. on their present level.

When that upward movement occurs—as occur it certainly will—the various currency authorities of the world will be confronted with a very difficult problem. It will be disastrous to stifle the movement at birth ; on the other hand, they must be careful to prevent it degenerating into wild speculation, or prices may bound up too far with a corresponding set-back later. It is impossible to say when this rise will occur. It may be soon, it may be delayed. It may be rapid, it may be gradual, but come it will. In the meantime, we have to eschew fancy theories, keep our heads and wait, sticking it as best we can. We, India equally with England, depend for our livelihood on international trade. We cannot be prosperous while the rest of the world is not. We cannot expect any real revival of our prosperity until international trade also revives and prospers. At the same time, however dark the immediate outlook may appear, we, in the British Empire at any rate, have the consolation that we have now discovered the source of the trouble, so that things for us cannot become appreciably worse, and that later when the rest of the world sees sense, there must be a very general and large improvement.

DIAGRAM OF WHOLESALE WORLD GOLD PRICES FROM 1800 to 1932 (See page 478).

(BASIS 100 FOR 1850 AND 1910).



SHOOTING IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

By A Forest Officer.

In the Journal for July I tried to give some hints on the preliminary arrangements for a shoot in the Central Provinces. Proceeding still on the assumption that the reader really has no experience to fall back upon, it is possible I may be able to save him from some of the mistakes which it is so easy to make.

People do such queer things. Darya, Gond, *shikari* of Dudalpani (there must have been chalk in that water) came to me obviously fed up. I had told him to help the Colonel Sahib and now asked how things were going. The tenor of his reply was, "Rotten, the Sahib never walks a yard if he can help it and never carries his own rifle; once he had a shot at a bear and insisted on resting his rifle on my shoulder. Does he think I am a tripod and want my eardrum burst? Worst of all, I and my son have to sleep by his bed at night." "I expect" I said, "he wants to visit the kills before it is light." "Visit the kills! The last thing he wants is to see a tiger while he is on the ground; no, he puts a black box under his bed and keeps us there to guard his money. Does he think Gonds are dacoits, and that I am a chowkidar?"

That Colonel wrote and told me he had a very disappointing shoot and thought the junglies a poor lot. He would not have understood if I had told him that aboriginals don't steal from sahibs and only want to be treated as man to man.

Then as regards weapons, more than one man has found on arrival that he could'nt close the breech; cartridges right bore, but wrong shape. *Ruat coelum*! Try that rifle and those cartridges before you start. Buy your cartridges in sealed tins: if they have been in stock through a monsoon in cardboard packets, beware. One man, hard up too, arrived with 250 H. V. cartridges, just 200 too many, and a rupee a piece; another, from England, had 2,000 shot gun cartridges, he took back 1,800; another, this time from America, had six rifles for himself and two for his wife, and in the only emergency he ignored his D. B. ·450 and used a small bore Mauser on the tiger; yet another, worst of all, in a jungle fowl beat, gave a boar a charge of No. 6 in the backside. "Just to tickle him up," he said. I could have done the same to him.

One more instance of queer things men can do. They had had their Christmas camp, all as happy as the day is long, a tiger, no contretemps and many thanks. A month later I was out for an evening stalk in that area with my old friend Budaung, Korku, of Tōtley Doh by Pinkapāthar, (say that again, is there no music in that address ?), and at a certain spot he kicked the earth and laughed to himself. " What's the joke ? " I asked. He told me it was here the *burra* sahib had buried the cheetal head. I said the sahib had shown no cheetal shot when he returned his permit, nor had the Forest Guard. " No " he said " it was only a *baccha* in velvet and the sahib told me to cut off the head and bury it there. " How much did he give you !" " He gave me Rs. 5, but I heard afterwards he gave the Forest Guard Rs. 10 and the Forester Rs. 20."

What a pity to disturb the harmony of our correspondence ! But you cannot take less than Rs. 50 from a man who tampers with subordinates. Confession, and explanation of the circumstances, might have cost him nothing ; the wider your experience, the better you appreciate how easily mistakes occur.

But who am I to talk of the queer things others do. Was it is not on the sandy shore of the Wainganga that the panther and I gazed into one another's eyes, and was there not, for one fleeting second, a thought, why should you die, you graceful creature ? Begone the thought, now for the *coup de grâce*. But, alas, to appropriate a happy verse from " *The Field*,"

" Until age leaves me withered and one eyed
At the ultimate end of my road
I shall hear the click, click of the gun I'd
Forgotten to load."

The panther skipped up the bank—and down below, the river rustled to and fro over the shingle, and a peacock screeched to mock me.

A few remarks about kills and machans may be useful.

Kills are generally young buffaloes, though goats serve the purpose for a panther. Tact is required to obtain them. It is not the thing to sell your stock for sacrifice in cold blood. If possible, leave the transaction to a local official. In any case if negotiations appear inexplicably protracted, try to keep your temper ; the best solvents for problems in the jungle are patience and a sense of humour.

If it is a panther you are after, the *boda* should be small. If you are going to sit up and you don't want the kill taken away the rope should be strong. If it is likely to be difficult to see the animal's track, clear a small area round the kill so that you can see whether a tiger, panther, hyæna or wild dog has done the deed. A tiger feeds clean, a panther often makes a filthy mess of his dinner.

Screen a *machan* for sitting up as much as possible. In a beat an animal is hustled and his thoughts are occupied with the enemy on the ground, but coming on to a kill is a different matter. Generally an animal circles round for some time and approaches this unnatural meal with extreme caution. He will spot any movement: when you are stalking yourself notice how it is movement which attracts your eyes, a trembling blade of grass, a leaf falling fifty yards away. So it is with the cats, only more so, as it is on their eye-sight they depend for their daily bread. If you shoot from your right shoulder, and if you have a companion in your *machan*, always have him on your left; sit on a rug, eat soft food, not biscuits, and don't smoke. I don't feel competent to go into the subject of torch devices, but this is worth mentioning. A friend of mine was mauled, sitting on the ground, because the first barrel of his ·450 H. V., in addition to hitting the tiger, broke the bulb of his torch; biter bit with a vengeance, his position indubitably marked by the flash of the torch, himself blinded and a wounded tiger with all the cards to play.

When you have a beat take the trouble to inspect the army, dismiss the halt and the maimed and children too small to look after themselves. Satisfy yourself that every individual there knows the meaning of the whistle which you blow. The second they hear that, it is every man for himself, up trees and stay there. Otherwise, it doesn't matter how many shots are fired, how fierce the *gul mul*, the line is to come steadily on; if there is any danger to any man you will blow the whistle. Always have a shot gun in your *machan*,—you may want to search spots hidden from view, if you are not quite certain how the land lies, before you take up your task of finishing off a wounded animal.

And now for three short tales, all true and each with the moral sticking out a mile.

April is the month of "manna," by which I mean that then all creatures, human, wild and domestic, wait for the fleshy flowers of

the *mohwa* tree to drop to earth and provide both bread and wine. The early bird catches the worm. Twice have I known the keen *shikari*, thirsting for the blood of a bear, sally forth alone before the dawn to do the round of *mohwa* trees. See, there in the morning mist she crouches, shuffling from side to side on her hunkers as she gathers in the flowers. Bang! up she rears, with that almost human scream of the wounded bear,—bang again—she's down!

One fellow has never pressed a trigger since, that's thirty years ago. Old women must rise early when all the world wants *mohwa*.

A young man's first beat, early in the year, the undergrowth still green and very thick along the river bank. Movement behind that clump of *lantana*, a speck or two of fawn, surely a cheetal's back, anyhow I'm going to let fly. By Jove, it's down! Up comes the beat hook behind that bush, I've shot a deer. Cries and angry shouts,—his own *shikari* in a khaki coat, dead for his folly in acting as a stop on the ground away on the wing.

A tiger beat. Away there on the left, he slinks like a wraith through the rocks, halts a second and listens to get the direction of the beat. *Crack!* He speaks to the shot. *Crack*, again! He's out of sight. A shout to Bill, "He's hit, finish him off;" again, "For God's sake, fire." Why won't he answer? Curse this din the beaters make. Oh, hell, ought I to blow the whistle. "Bill, is he dead?"

The beat is over there lies the tiger, dead, and there in his *machan* sits Bill all huddled up—a *ricochet*.

THE BATTLES OF THE MASURIAN LAKES.

By Lieutenant-General N. Golovine, late Russian General Staff.

Lieutenant-General Golovine is the author of numerous works on tactics and military history which have gained for him a European reputation. His "Problem of the Pacific" is probably his work best known to English readers.

During the Great War, General Golovine held several high appointments on the General Staff of the Russian Army, which gave him exceptional opportunities for actual experience and for observation. Later, in 1918, *while recuperating at Odessa, he succeeded in collecting and documenting a vast quantity of the army archives that had been jettisoned during the debacle. The valuable material thus obtained, added to his own knowledge and supplemented by information received from colleagues of the Russian General Staff, placed General Golovine in a position to write a really authoritative history. The result is his "The Campaign of* 1914 *on the Russian Front," which is recognised as one of the really important contributions to the history of the War.*

This work has not as yet appeared in English, though the late Marshal Foch wrote an enthusiastic preface for a French edition. The Journal is thus fortunate in being able to give much information from Russian sources which has not hitherto been available to English readers.

The length of the original volume prevents its being reproduced in full in the Journal and what follows is a series of necessarily incomplete excerpts from an authorized translation of the Russian edition.

General Golovine's book deals first with conditions in Russia preceding 1914 *and with the original Russian War Plan. He then describes mobilization, followed by the advance of the Russian First Army under General Rennenkampf into East Prussia—a successful but precipitant offensive which culminated in the victory of Gumbinnen. The extracts which follow are taken from succeeding chapters, and give an account of the Battles of the Lakes and of the ill-fated offensive of General Samsonov's Second Army.*

Operations of the Second Army.

Unpreparedness of the Second Army for a Rapid Offensive.

We have seen how seriously "precipitancy" in the invasion of Eastern Prussia had affected the operations of the First Army, but this "precipitancy" had yet more harmful results in the Second Army. Even the very persons responsible for the Plan of War had begun to recognise the difficulty of fulfilling the obligations therein undertaken for the first days of the war. In his memoirs Paléologue, the French Ambassador, states that it had reached the ears of Sazonov, our Minister for Foreign Affairs, that General Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and General Jilinsky, Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, were of opinion that a hasty offensive into Eastern Prussia must inevitably break down "as our troops were still too much dispersed and the transport problem involved many difficulties." "But," added our Minister for Foreign Affairs in this conversation, "as we have no right to leave our Ally in peril, despite the undeniable risk in the operation which has been undertaken, it is our duty to attack immediately, even as the Grand Duke has ordered . . . ." This was the answer to the words of M. Paléologue: "Remember what a critical time this is for France."

The work of the Russian G. H. Q. was carried on under the influence of this ideal—the urgent necessity for coming to the rescue of France at the earliest possible moment. On the 20th.[1] August, the day of the battle of Gumbinnen, a telegram had been received from our Military Attaché in Paris stating that the French War Minister "believed in all seriousness that it was possible for us to invade Germany and march upon Berlin from the direction of Warsaw." Such an idea could only have arisen from a loss of mental equilibrium in this crisis. It was evident from the expression of this desire that even the expedient of accelerating our offensive into Eastern Prussia was considered inadequate. In the memoirs of Paléologue, the French Ambassador in Petrograd, it is noted: "On the Belgian front our operations have taken a bad turn. I have received orders to urge the Imperial Government to hasten as far as possible the commencemen of the offensive of the Russian armies."

Finally, on the 26th. August M. Paléologue received a telegram from Paris, in which it was stated: "We have received information

[1]. Throughout the dates given are according to the usual European calendar, not the Russian "Old Style" which was thirteen days earlier.

from a most reliable source that two army corps, at first facing the Russian army, are in course of transfer to the French frontier, being relieved on the Eastern frontier of Germany by Landwehr units. The war plans of the German Great General Staff are too clear for it to be necessary to insist on the need for a determined offensive on the part of the Russian armies advancing on Berlin. Convey this urgently to the Russian Government and insist upon this."

Incidentally, owing to the effect of the battle of Gumbinnen, exactly the opposite had actually taken place—*two army corps were being moved from France.* This fact shows the extent to which "nerves" influenced the demands of our Allies upon us. The appeal could not fail to give the Emperor and our Supreme Commander-in-Chief the idea that France was at her last gasp. During these days the rôle of Commander-in-Chief, not of the Russian army alone, but of all the Allied armies, was imposed upon the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich, and therefore his decisions were dictated not by the interests of Russia alone, but by those of the Allies as a whole. This point of view must always be borne in mind in studying the campaign of 1914.

On the 12th. August, *i.e.*, on the 13th. day of mobilization, in his telegram No. 513 the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group informed the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief that "although the orders (issued to the Second Army) to assume the offensive refer to their execution *with the utmost speed*, and although the units of the army have been moved to their starting-points for crossing the frontier, this crossing can hardly be expected to be carried out by the cavalry, supported by infantry, earlier than the 16th day (the 15th August), and by the main forces of the army earlier than the 19th.-20th. day (18th. 19th. August)." It should be recalled in this connection that General Yanushkevich's letter (No. 345) had ordered the offensive to commence on the 14th. day (13th. August), *i.e.*, 4 or 5 days earlier.

The haste with which the Second Army was embodied had dire effects upon it. The army consisted of three corps of its "own" military district, the Warsaw, together with one corps (the IInd.) of the Vilno Military District, and one corps (the XIIIth.) of the Moscow Military District. Unquestionably this of itself was an obstacle to the "Speeding-up" of the commencement of the offensive. The result proved to be even more unfortunate than in the First Army.

General Samsonov's army, like that of General Rennenkampf, took the field with its rear not properly organised, but the degree of this disorganisation in General Samsonov's army amounted to absolute confusion. Not only had the army failed to reach its proper establishment in field bakeries and in corps and army transport, but there were divisions, for example, the 2nd. Infantry (belonging to the XXIIIrd. Corps), without even their divisional trains: the Howitzer Group of the same corps had no transport park, and the ammunition was loaded on country carts, the ingenious gunners wrapping the shells in plaited straw. Consequently the XXIIIrd. Corps units were a heavy burden to the neighbouring corps, which for the time being became responsible for their supply, and were thus upset in their own calculations. As might be expected, the supply situation was eased to a certain extent by the circumstance that the corps of Samsonov's army, as was also the case in General Rennenkampf's army, took the field short of their establishment of infantry units: for example, instead of the 32 battalions laid down, the VIth. Corps had a total of 24½; the XVth. Corps had 28, and the XIIIth. 31.

In the descriptions which individuals who had actually been present gave at the inquiry into the reasons for the catastrophe to Samsonov's army, one reads again and again how the commanders of fighting units begged for an "unhurried offensive," and how the divisions of the XIIIth. Corps on the march were not like fighting units at all, but reminded one more of a "Pilgrimage." This latter fact was a direct consequence of the circumstance that the XIIIth. Corps did not maintain an extra strong peace time cadre, as was the case with certain of the frontier corps, and therefore the units of this corps required a certain period for the "digestion" of reservists reporting upon mobilization.

It is stated in General Klyuev's [1] notes that upon his arrival in Byelostok to assume command of the XIIIth. Corps, he was suddenly faced with the picture of the total unreadiness for immediate action of units, 60 per cent. of which consisted of newly reported reservists. As we had no territorial system of bringing units up to strength, these two-thirds of the rank and file were complete strangers to their officers. In this state units were straightway entrained, transported to Byelostok and embarked upon a forced campaign. "The men in the ranks had honest Russian faces, but they were only peasants in disguiss, whom

[1] The Commander of the XIIIth. Army Corps.

it was necessary to train." Having formed this opinion of the corps placed under his orders, General Klyuev visited the Second Army Commander to acquaint him personally with it, and to report that the only way to make these units militarily efficient was to exercise deliberation in the offensive, which would at the same time permit of the proper organisation of the supply system.

The incomplete organisation of the rear had its effect even upon a service so purely concerned with operations as the Signal Service. The XXIIIrd. Corps had not yet received all the technical signal material laid down by schedule. Even in a corps where this material was complete, it was insufficient to establish the communications necessary under the conditions of the manœuvre to be executed.

The following example will serve to show how real was the lack of organisation of the Signal Service of the army. An officer in charge of the Signal Service of the newly formed Ninth Army, visited the central telegraph station at Warsaw on business concerned with the equipment of the Army Signals. To his horror he saw that a whole stack of telegrams addressed to the staff of the Second Army was lying untouched in the central telegraph office of the town. These telegrams had not been sent on owing to the fact that direct telegraph communication had not been established with the Second Army, and that the subsidiary lines were completely blocked. This officer carried off the whole pack of telegrams and at once took them personally by car to the staff of the Second Army.

What must the situation have become when the Second Army entered the territory of Eastern Prussia, where the whole population was in arms, and where telegraph communications were cut upon our invasion, the apparatus being destroyed and the personnel taking to flight! The immediate consequence was that corps, having exhausted all their signal resources to get into communication with their divisions, were unable to extend their lines to Army Headquarters and to their neighbours, and A.H.Q. could not aid them with its own resources. A further result was that even by the 23rd. August line communication had not been established between certain of the corps and the Staff of the Army was forced to have recourse to wireless telegraphy as a means of transmitting messages. But here in the employment of this new device of science the disorganisation resulting from the haste with which the army had taken the field was especially

in evidence. For instance, it was discovered that the XIIIth. Corps was not in possession of the key for deciphering telegrams sent out by stations of the VIth. Corps. For this reason or for some other reason equally due to the disorganisation of the Army Signal Service, Army Headquarters sent important operations orders *en clair*. The despatch of messages in this way must of course also have been due to complete lack of training of the staff itself, but this very unpreparedness still further emphasises the impossibility of an efficient accomplishment of that speeding up of the commencement of operations which was demanded of the Army.

The confusion in the staff work of the Army had its effect upon all the lower staffs. Most of the Corps Commanders complained that Army Headquarters had not acquainted them with the objectives given to corps for their operations. A perusal of the so-called "*directives*" for the Army is sufficient to determine the justice of this accusation. These documents in no way differ from commonplace orders and correspond little with what should be understood by the word "*directive.*" The Staff of the Army likewise kept corps but poorly informed of the situation. The confusion in the staff work of the army seriously affected the troops. "The corps staff used to receive orders only late at night," testifies General Klyuev. "This became such a custom that the staff officer on duty was ordered always to despatch at 1 a.m. the following telegram: 'Orders for to-morrow not received: am waiting.' Sometimes also at the moment a march was commencing orders would be received from the staff of the Army changing the direction of the march. The units had then to be halted, new advance guards sent forward and those already put out withdrawn, the troops generally shifted about and the march order destroyed."

The unpreparedness of our higher staffs was felt more acutely in the Staff of the Second Army than in that of the First. The latter was formed entirely from the staff of the Vilno Military District, but the Staff of the Second Army came from that of the Warsaw Military District, which had also to provide the staff of the North-Western Army Group. This latter, with the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Military District at its head, had taken all the best officers. The Staff of the Second Army filled up its General Staff personnel from other districts and therefore was essentially a composite of great and little. Owing to the lack of thought given to our mobilisation, the Army

staffs had not assembled in peace time for their members to become acquainted with one another at war games and staff rides, as was the case in Germany and France. Moreover, his very appointment was kept secret from an officer, thus making it impossible for him to prepare himself for his allotted rôle. The chaos which reigned in many of the higher staffs at the commencement of the war was the natural result of this state of affairs.

To complete the tale of the infirmities of the Second Army yet one more must be added—one of which General Rennenkampf's army was also the victim. Army corps found themselves deprived of divisional cavalry, properly so called. In most corps second and third grade Cossack units, untrained at the commencement of the war, had been detailed to fulfil this rôle. Owing to delay in their arrival, measures were taken in the Second Army for the temporary attachment of units in their place. But what happened in actual fact? General Martos, commanding the XVth. Corps, requested that one of the regiments of the cavalry divisions which in peace time were part of the establishment of the XVth. Corps should be left temporarily in that corps in the rôle of corps cavalry, "as had been arranged, in the provisional tables for the employment of units in case of war—the 6th. Glukhovsky Dragoon Regiment being detailed therein for the XVth. Corps." This was changed and he was given the Orenburg Cossack Regiment from the 13th. Cavalry Division. Corps Cavalry should know the corps they are serving, and the corps commander should train them and have confidence in them, but instead he knew that the Orenburg Regiment was only accustomed to police service in Warsaw, and knew nothing of service in the field. But this request of General Martos was "categorically" refused. "As a result," he continues "the corps was left without cavalry reconnaissance on the march and in action. The Cossacks also turned out to be untrained and to be chary of running into danger."

The situation in the XIIIth. Corps was no better. "The cavalry reconnaissance," writes General Klyuev, its commander, "was carried out by four sotnias of the Frontier Guard, attached to the corps. In peace time the Frontier Guard, while executing its arduous duties, received its cavalry training in units no larger than a troop, or, rarely, a sotnia. It was therefore completely untrained for carrying out distant reconnaissance, and it fulfilled its duties in near reconnaissance just as any N. C. O. of the Transport would have done."

The Approach of the Army to the Battle-field.

The situation created in the French theatre by the criminally thoughtless Plan of War had a serious influence upon the strategy of the Russian theatre. There was also the influence of the general politico-strategical situation, which is evidenced in G. H. Q. orders dated 8th. August for the concentration of the Guards' and the Ist. Army Corps in Warsaw. The idea of immediate pressure upon Germany by the shortest line of operations upon Berlin is still more forcibly expressed in the memorandum dated the 26th. August, drawn up by the Operations Branch of G. H. Q. under the direct influence of the impression of General Rennenkampf's victory at Gumbinnen and of the alarming news received from France. According to this memorandum it was proposed to " expedite the occupation of the Lower Vistula," and with this object to develop an offensive from Warsaw along the left bank of the Vistula ; " to expedite the clearance of enemy forces from Eastern Prussia," and for this purpose to transfer General Rennenkampf's army, to the strength of 4 or 5 corps, by rail to the left bank of the Vistula. General Samsonov's army was to remain on the right bank of the Vistula. Of this force one first line corps and 2 or 3 second line divisions would guard Konigsberg, 1 or 2 first line corps, with 2 to 4 second line divisions in strongly fortified positions in the area Preussisch Holland—Saalfeld—Deutsch-Eylau, and two first line corps echeloned in rear at Soldau would guard the front Marienburg-Graudenz. On the left bank of the Vistula the Ninth, First and Tenth Armies, to a strength of, say, 15 corps, would be deployed in order to develop operations into the interior of Germany. In case of the evacuation of the Lower Vistula by the Germans, General Samsonov's army also would be transferred to the left bank of the river, on the right flank ; the Armies would then be deployed in the following order—the Second, Ninth, First and Tenth.

The actual course of operations necessitated the expenditure of corps " under orders for the offensive into the interior of Germany " to reinforce the North-Western Army Group (the Ist. Corps) and the South Western Army Group (the Guards' Corps). Moreover, the hasty strategy of concentrating troops to carry out operations directed against Poznan led to the violation of one of the basic principles of military science—the concentration of force in the decisive place at the decisive time. The present Second Army operations were now to

decide the fate of our first manœuvres against Germany, and the battle impending before the Army was the decisive moment. One is reminded perforce of the words of the great Suvorov: "Go into battle, assemble your troops, drain the lines of communications...."

In consequence of this, the desire of General Jilinsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, to use the corps which had been concentrated in the Warsaw area to aid in the operations of the Second Army, was entirely justifiable. He included the Guards' and the First Army Corps in the establishment of General Samsonov's army.

But on the 9th. August General Yanushkevich, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, warned General Jilinsky by telegram that one of these corps—the Guards' or the Ist.—was to serve as an "active-operations-reserve" (?) in the hands of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and, in view of the move by General Jilinsky of the Ist. Corps to Plonsk, "under no circumstances was the Guards' Corps to be moved out of the Warsaw and Novogeorgievsk area."

The epithet "active-operations" could not alter the hard facts of the case: as events turned out during the days that were critical for Samsonov, the Guards' Corps was astray in the area of the left bank of the Vistula.

On the 21st. August General Jilinsky enquired of G. H. Q.: "Can the Ist. Corps take part at Soldau?" The reply was returned, under the signature of General Yanushkevich, that "the chief rôle of the Ist. Corps is to secure the offensive operations of the Second Army on the Thorn flank. If it is certain that there is no danger to the left flank of the Second Army from the direction of Thorn, it is permissible for the Ist. Corps to take part in the fighting on the army front." The evasive tone of this reply limited the co-operation of the Ist. Corps in the Second Army Operations to the Soldau area.

The battle of Gumbinnen had caused General Jilinsky to ponder upon the risks involved in the task which had been imposed on General Rennenkempf's army. By his orders of the 22nd. August he had taken the IInd. Corps off the establishment of the Second Army and had transferred it to Rennenkampf's army. Thus General Samsonov's army was weakened by yet another corps, and the IInd. Corps, which had taken no part in the battle of Gumbinnen, was now left out of the

Second Army battle—yet another corps gone " astray." Finally, the departure of the IInd. Corps from the Grodno area forced General Jilinsky to leave the 3rd. Guards' Infantry Division (of the XXIIIrd. Corps) in this area.

In the final analysis, instead of seven corps (the Guards', the Ist, IInd, VIth, XIIIth, XVth, and XXIIIrd.), with a strength of 15 Infantry divisions, being placed at the one time at General Samsonov's disposal, he was given only 9 infantry divisions (the Ist, VIth, XIIIth. and XVth. Corps and half the XXIIIrd). Moreover, of these 9 divisions, two (the Ist. Corps) by the instructions given above were fettered to a specified area (Mlava-Soldau). It should be remembered here that the fire strength of 9 Russian infantry divisions was less than that of 6 German.

We will now examine in detail the operation task imposed upon General Samsonov's army, weak as it was.

The original proposals of General Jilinsky for the operations of the Second Army are set forth in his telegram to G. H. Q. dated the 10th. August. It was stated therein that General Samsonov's army would attack with two corps (the IInd. and VIth.) on the front Lyck-Johannisburg, and with the two other corps (the XIIIth. and XVth.) on the front Rudschanny-Ortelsburg, and later on the front Rastenburg-Rothflies. Thus the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group left General Samsonov's army upon the centre line of operations, the line leading from the Graevo " rail approach " to Eastern Prussia. It was also in accord with the Plan of War that the Second Army should be deployed upon this line. But when the *directive* (letter No. 345) of the same date, the 10th. August, arrived from G. H. Q., the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group altered his original proposals.

Letter No. 345 demanded the speedier exertion of pressure upon Germany, with which object it was proposed to extend the objectives of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, the actual suggestion being that the Second Army should attack " turning the line of the Masurian Lakes from the West with the object of shattering the German Corps which had deployed between the Vistula and the Masurian Lakes, and thereby preventing a German withdrawal behind the Vistula."

The operation about to be carried out by a part of the corps of the Second Army, to turn the Masurian Lakes from the south, was not sufficient to fulfil this task, and General Jilinsky decided to alter the line of operations of the Second Army to one to the west of the Masurian Lakes, leaving one corps (the IInd.) covering the Lyck flank. He reported this decision to G. H. Q. on the 12th. August, and sent General Samsonov *Directive No.* 2, dated 13th. August. According to this directive the main forces of the Second Army were to be deployed upon the frontier between Mishinets and Khorjele, to attack the front Rudschanny-Passenheim, and subsequently to attack northward in flank and rear of the line of the Lakes.[1]

The Army Commander, having received this directive from the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, on the 14th August issued Army Order No. 1 for the deployment of the army before crossing the frontier, and on the 16th. August sent out to Corps Commanders his *Directive No.* 1. It will be seen from these operation orders that General Samsonov had shifted the line of deployment of his Army still further to the left, linking the left flank of the XVth. Corps to the Ist. Corps right flank, which was operating on the Mlava-Soldau line. In his telegram No. 1012, dated the 17th. August, General Jilinsky objected to this change of the front of deployment (of the XVth, XIIIth. and VIth. Corps) still further westwards. In this telegram he said: "On the basis of my proposals, approved by the Grand Duke and set forth in *Directive No.* 2, the front specified for the attack of the Second Army to the west of the Masurian Lakes was from the line Mishinets Khorjele to Rudschanny- -Passenheim. You have extended your left flank to Jaboklik, and consequently the front of the three corps of the Second Army during the march to the frontier will cover 60 versts, which I consider excessive. In view of the fact that the 1st. Corps, being part of the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, has been placed at your disposal to support your forces, I consider it better to put the 2nd. Infantry Division into the front line."

General Samsonov's army had in fact been "pulled" westwards. We use the word "pull" with intent. Factors relating to the basing of armies have acquired far greater importance in modern warfare than was the case in earlier periods. A modern army cannot fight a battle unless continuously served by transport of all sorts. The Second Army, which had commenced its offensive before the formation

[1] See Diagram No. 1.

and organization of its lines-of-communication and subsidiary services had been completed, was fatally bound to the Russian railway lines. We emphasise the word " Russian," as owing to the difference in gauge, technical work on a large scale would be required before the German railway lines could have been used. At the commencement of the invasion by the Second Army this work was still more incomplete than in the case of the First Army. The railway line Novogeorgievsk-Mlava naturally acted as a powerful magnet.

Modern strategy does not complete its task in the theatre of war merely by concentrating large forces on the field of battle ; it is confronted by another problem of equal importance—that of organising the lines of communication of the fighting troops. This aspect of command in the field was completely overlooked in planning the first operations on the North-Western Front, just as at the Kiev war game conducted in April 1914 by General Sukhumlinov for members of the higher command. The very first contact with the realities of the situation caused the plan, by which the Second Army was to circumambulate the Masurian Lakes to a distance of more than a hundred versts, to burst and disappear like a pricked bubble.

A careful study of the East Prussian network of railways will show us how " fantastic " in another regard also were the projected operations of the Second Army : the front of the River Alle, continued by the belt of lakes extending between Allenstein, Gilgenburg and Lautenburg, had been so well equipped by the Germans with railway communications, that twelve lines served it from the west, of which three were double. It would be difficult to admit the supposition that the Germans, should they decide to defend Eastern Prussia, would permit General Samsonov's army to march peacefully northwards between the chain of the principal Masurian Lakes and the River Alle. In this case a German flank attack from the front Allenstein—Lautenburg, which was served from the west by seven lines of railway, would unquestionably have ensued, and under these conditions it would follow that the further General Samsonov's army proceeded, the more dangerous its situation would become ; it would literally fall into a strategical trap.

In " A Brief Strategic Outline of the War of 1914—1918," published by " Voennoe Delo," appears the statement that General Samsonov on the 11th. August addressed a memorandum to the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Army Group, in which he insisted on the necessi-

ty for disposing his army further to the West. In order to obtain an explanation of General Samsonov's point of view, which did not coincide with that of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group, we requested General Postovsky, the late Chief of Staff of the Second Army, to enlighten us upon this historically important question. Its great interest induces us to reproduce in full the reply received.[1]

"In 1911 or 1912, I cannot recall which, the Staff of the Warsaw Military District [2] succeeded in obtaining through agents an account of the War game of the German General Staff, the subject of which was a similar offensive.[3] One of the armies on the Russian side was attacking on the line upon which General Samsonov's army subsequently came to attack, and the German forces ordered to operate against it were concentrated in the Western part of Eastern Prussia, in the area of Deutsch Eylau and Osterode. Having turned the left flank and rear of the Russian army, which had penetrated far into Eastern Prussia to the West of the Masurian Lakes, they annihilated it.

"This German plan of operations at the war game answered exactly the peculiar conditions of the East Prussian theatre. In fact, the offensive of an army from the Warsaw district northwards, as it developed, enabled the Germans—equally those concentrated in the Western part of Easten Prussia, and those arriving by rail from the more central districts of Germany—to take the attacker in flank and rear by means of a simple frontal movement.

"Those responsible for working out the plans for the offensive therefore considered it essential to take as axis the railway line Novogeorgievsk-Mlava, but strictly on condition that part of the army be disposed westward of this line, and moreover, that the flank of the offensive be made secure by marching the left flank units of the army in echelon. It was essential to leave the railway line Novogeorgievsk-Mlava covered by the flank of the army, because this was the sole line of supply in a country full of swamps and quicksands, where transport was a matter of great difficulty.

"If the attacking army was not strong enough to occupy the whole front from the Masurian Lakes to Mlava and considerably further westward, it appeared better to remove it from the belt of lakes and lead it westward thereof. Communication between the First

[1] "The Offensive of General Samsonov's Army in Eastern Prussia" by General Postovsky: manuscript in the possession of the author.

[2] General Postovsky was at this time Quartermaster-General on the Staff of the Warsaw Military District.

[3] An invasion by a Russian army, similar to the offensive of General Samsonov's army. (Author's note).

and Second Armies was in any case impracticable of attainment. Therefore it was better not to attempt it, and to operate against the area Deutsch Eylau—Osterode."

These considerations were conveyed to General Samsonov after his arrival in Warsaw on the third day of mobilisation, and were approved by him. Unfortunately, when the decision was taken to embark on an immediate offensive of the army into Eastern Prussia, General Samsonov was not given any sort of choice as to the means by which the task imposed upon his army was to be carried out. The offensive was regulated by the *directives* of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, and these laid down with exactitude the trace of the Army front and even the lines of advance. Therefore, to keep within the limits of the *directives* which he had received, it only remained to General Samsonov to try to extend his front westward as far as possible, and to have strong echelons in rear of his left flank. The first of these echelons was the Ist. Corps, and the second, the Guards which up to the commencement of operations had been included in the establishment of the Army. The Commander of the Second Army attached special importance to the tasks allotted to this corps. To General Samsonov's extreme chagrin, at the time ordered for the commencement of the march of this corps, the corps commander received from the staff of the Front direct orders for the removal of the corps from the establishment of the Second Army. He did not immediately report the orders he had received, so that only after the lapse of twenty-four hours, when the offensive had already been developed, did General Samsonov learn of the removal from the Second Army of the more important of the corps in echelon. Subsequently the Commander-in-Chief of the Front also limited the rights of the Second Army to issue orders affecting the Ist. Corps.

On the 19th. August the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group despatched the following telegram to General Samsonov: " The delay in the Second Army offensive is placing the First Army, which has already been fighting for two days at Stalluponen, in a difficult position. Therefore expedite the offensive of the Second Army and develop operations as energetically as possible, bringing the Ist. Corps into action if necessary for this purpose."

Such efforts were indeed necessary, owing to the strategic situation created by the hurried advance into Prussia of General Rennenkampf's weakened army, but they were beyond the demands that

could practicably be made upon the troops of the Second Army. The strategic conception of the operations planned for this front was based upon an overestimate of the capacity even of the best troops in the world. General Samsonov could only reply: "The army has been advancing without a pause since the receipt of your orders, traversing daily more than 20 versts of sands, and consequently further acceleration is impossible."

An eye-witness thus describes the march of the Second Army: "The surface of most of the roads was soft and sandy, which made transport movement extremely difficult. I myself saw a convoy being moved forward thus: from one half of the vehicles the horses would be removed and harnessed to the remainder, which would then be moved forward a verst; then all the horses would be taken back to the vehicles left behind, and so on throughout the entire march. The troops never saw their supply trains. A day's halt was never given. In this way the XIIIth. Corps, having completed nine marches without its transport and without bread, became especially disorganised. The reservists unused to marching were worn out."

Thus exerting themselves to the limit of their strength, the corps of the Second Army on the 21st. August had reached the line Friedrichsfelde-Mlava. In advance of the right flank of the army marched the 4th. Cavalry Division, in advance of the centre, the 15th,[1] and in advance of the left flank, the 6th; the 5th. Cavalry Division remained on the left bank of the Vistula.

Information obtained from reconnaissance gave it to be supposed that Divisions of the German XXth. Army Corps, reinforced by Landwehr units from the garrison of the Vistula forts, were opposite the Second Army. This was the case. The following were the German forces opposite the Second Army:—

	Battalions.	Batteries.	Squadrons.
The XXth. Army Corps consisting of the 37th. and 41st. Infantry Divisions. ..	25	29	6
The 70th. Landwehr Brigade.	6	2	4
General Unger's Division (the 20th. Landwehr Brigade and General Zemmern's Brigade).	12	6	4
Total ..	43	37	14

1. When the fronts neared one another the 25th. Cavalry Division was transferred to the left flank.

During the 20th. August reports were received that the enemy was hastily retreating before our troops, and an air scout stated that he had seen two long columns leaving Mlava for the north. But at the same time cavalry patrols reported that they had come across numerous barbed-wire entanglements, sited in good defensive positions, in sectors of the frontier belt at Ortelsburg, Neidenburg, and to the west of the latter. The outskirts of villages and the ditches draining the swamps were everywhere heavily wired. Upon the declaration of mobilization trenches had been dug behind this wire, and the outskirts of most villages had been turned into strong points.

This caused General Samsonov to decide on a cautious approach to those areas which would probably be fortified, and on the endeavour to capture them by the use of enveloping and flanking tactics. His *Directive No.* 3 issued by him on the 21st. August and containing operations orders for the 22nd. August, was based on this idea. This directive provided for the staging by the VIth. Corps of an operation to obtain possession of the Ortelsburg area, and of one by the 1st. and XVth. Corps, to obtain possession of the line Neidenburg-Soldau; the XIIIth. Corps was to remain in the Kutzburg-Kannwiesen area and to be ready to turn the Ortelsburg or Neidenburg position; the 2nd. Division was to march on Mlava.

General Samsonov's superiority in strength was not sufficient to enable him, in planning his operations, to calculate on taking the German positions at one blow, even taking into account the exaggerated intelligence concerning the "German defeat at Gumbinnen," which had been communicated to Samsonov by the Staff of the North-Western Army Group.

General Jilinsky remained extremely dissatisfied with General Samsonov's *Directive No.* 3. On the 22nd. August he telegraphed (in his No. 1145) as follows: "..... I consider the dispositions for the 22nd. show a great lack of resolution and I demand immediate and resolute operations." In his telegram No. 6295 in reply General Samsonov pointed out the extreme exhaustion of the troops, the impossibility of bringing up the 2nd. Division, which had been left behind, the disorganisation of the lines of communication, and the fact that units, especially in the XXIIIrd. Corps, were not at full establishment.


R. Passarge
R. Alle
Bartenstein
Heilsberg
Korschen
Bischofstein
Rastenburg
Wormditt
Gen. Jilinski's 1st. Modification
Guttstadt
Seeburg
Gen. Jilinski's original orders
Rothfliess
Sensburg
Bischofsburg
Nikolaiken
Allenstein
Gen. Jilinski's 2nd. Modification
Osterode
Gen. Samsonov's proposal
Gen. Jilinski's 1st. Modification
Passenheim
Rudschanny
DEUTSCH EYLAU
Hohenstein
Ortelsburg
Gen. Jilinski's original orders
Gilgenburg
Front on the 23rd. August
Jedwabno
Willenberg
MISHINETZ
Lautenburg
Neidenburg
Koslau
Main front of the Second Army
Gen. Jilinski's 1st. Modification
Lensk
Gorzno
Soldau
Khorjele
Jaboklik
XIII Corps
Ostrolenko
MLAWA
XXIII Corps
I Corps
XV Corps
Tzekhanov
Rojany
R. Narev
Pultusk
S.D.O. No. 6991, 9-32.

Ortelsburg, Neidenburg and Soldau were occupied by our troops on the evening of the 22nd. August. At the same time it was discovered that the Germans were closing in westward in the Gilgenburg area.

On the evening of the 22nd. August, when reporting the occupation of Ortelsburg, Neidenburg and Soldau to Army Group Headquarters, General Samsonov considered it necessary to remind them of the complete disorganization of the lines of communication. " It is essential to organize the lines of communication, which has not yet been done," he stated in his telegram. " The country is devastated. The horses have long been without oats. There is no bread. Transport from Ostrolenko is impossible."

(*To be continued.*)

A SPASM.

(Due to Internal Unrest).

By Phoenix.

There are, I believe, supermen who can sit down and read such works as Field Service Regulations, the Army Act, and so on.

(*i*) Without going to sleep.

(*ii*) With some benefit to themselves.

The ordinary kind of man has to have some incentive in order—

(*i*) To avoid going to sleep.

(*ii*) To grasp what it is all about.

Incentives include, for instance, a promotion examination or one's last shot for the Staff College, the fact that one has to speak at a Tactical Discussion or find a sound reason for an unsound action which has been censured by the C. O.

There is, however, one other stimulant to interest and understanding and that is Experience. It is so easy for a senior officer, all plastered with war medals. He opens his F. S. R. and reads :—

"— will depend on—

(*i*) The nature of the country.

(*ii*) The strength of the enemy.

(*iii*) The weather.

(*iv*) The plan of the higher commander—"

and so on. His eyes gleam with interest! Why? Because it all reminds him of the Somme in '18, or Ypres in '17, or Shaikh Sa'ad in '16, or Tanga in '15 or Crecy in something or other.

"How true! How true!" he murmurs. He neither goes to sleep nor does he fail to get a kick out of it.

Now answer me this. How many of us really have any experience of Aid to the Civil Power? D——, I mean, very few. All right. That being so, how can you expect to read intelligently all the instructions, rules, laws and things on the subject? I'll tell you—by reading the following experiences of my young friend Bobby B.

II.

Bobby was desperately keen and enthusiastic. Enthusiasm is his father and temerity his mother as one might say. So, when he came out to India a full-blooded 2nd. Lieutenant, he was quite decided in his mind to do everything a soldier should do. He had read several (abridged) lives of great men, and very rightly considered that what was good enough for Marlborough, Wellington and Stonewall Jackson would do nicely for Bobby B. Anyway he intended to take his profession seriously and get all the experience he could by fighting Pathans, Nagas, Kashmiris and what not.

It was therefore a terrible blow to his martial ardour when he joined his regiment in Bombalpur, shall we say, and found that in a year it was due to move to Lucknabad, so to speak. The blow was the more bitter when he discovered that in both places his regiment was allotted to Internal Security and not to the Field Army.

He soon found that there were compensations for his enthusiastic mind. He had not been a month in Bombalpur before a friend in the Indian Police, who had been at his public school, said to him,

"There are going to be doings in the city during the Muharram. I expect you fellows will be called out in aid."

Now, this was a new one on Bobby who had so far spent his time on the barrack square relearning his drill, which the Adjutant seemed to think he had forgotten during the two months since he left Sandhurst, and doing musketry and things. Tactical training and so on had not yet been meted out to him. So Bobby was completely mystified by the Policeman's remark and replied

"Oh! Really! You mean—?"

The policeman who had been out in the country for two years (and had also been captain of the school rugger fifteen) looked pityingly at him, nodded, and walked away.

Bobby felt shamed and worried. Next morning he asked his Platoon Sergeant, quite casually of course, whether he had been out in aid of the Muharram at all. The Platoon Sergeant, who was lately out from the Home battalion, had not; but naturally he did not say so.

"That will be quite all right, sir," said he, "You don't need to worry about that, sir. I was in Ireland you see, sir."

So Bobby stifled any qualms he may have had. After all there couldn't be much in it. The majority of natives he had observed in Bombalpur were a measly looking lot, and the very sight of Bobby at the head of his platoon would doubtless put them to flight. Nevertheless Bobby was keen, as I said, and after lunch he had a look through F. S. R. I. and II. and also Infantry Training Vol. II. He was on the point of opening his Manual of Military Law when he fell asleep. This was bad luck because he was getting 'warm' in his investigations as one might say. Not that the Manual of Military Law would have been the slightest use to him because the Indian Penal Code and extracts from the Code of Criminal Procedure, which tell one something about these things, happened to be in the Manual of *Indian* Military Law which as a self-respecting British Service officer Bobby very naturally did not possess.

A few days later he found himself with his platoon, paraded in front of a line of lorries all ready to move off in aid of the Civil Power—whatever that might be. The Adjuant was giving a lot of, to Bobby, completely incomprehensible instructions and ended up by saying,

"Whatever you do, remember—Minimum Force, or else we'll all get into the devil of a row."

This remark gave Bobby much food for thought as they rattled along the street into the bowels of Bombalpur city, which was completely strange to him.

Suddenly, on reaching a place where several roads met the two lorries containing his platoon stopped and he observed the Company Commander (who was always very rude to Bobby) talking to a police officer.

"This will be your piquet position, B.," he said? "You are to watch all roads coming into this square. Get busy with it. I'll be back when I've fixed up the other platoons."

Bobby's mind worked quickly.

"Am I to make barricades, sir?" he asked.

"Don't be a damned fool. These are communal riots, not the lines of Torres Vedras. Oh! by the way, there's your magistrate. Take your orders from him."

Bobby gazed upon his magistrate. He had always had a vague idea that a magistrate was an elderly kind of bloke with a wig,

spectacles and a gown. This one was an anaemic, emaciated and very nervous individual who bore a marked resemblance to one of the Mess khidmatgars. Bobby didn't feel at all like taking any orders from him.

There were six roads leading into the hot and dusty square. Bobby put a double sentry on each and collected the remainder of the platoon beside a kind of disused fountain near the centre of the square. The sentries were given orders to report at once any movements of the enemy—as you were—suspicious looking Indians. So far, so good, but Bobby knew a lot about war and was not going to remain inactive. Two patrols, of a corporal and three men each were detailed to reconnoitre the roads round the post. He couldn't explain much to them because the Company Commander had the only map of the city available and none of his N. C. O.'s had ever been in this part before. His reserve was now reduced to twelve men which, as the Platoon Sergeant pointed out, was not enough for reliefs for the sentries.

It was at this point that Bobby remembered the card, I.A.F.D.-908 which had been issued to him the previous day from the regimental office. He sat down to read it.

"*Act in closest possible communication with the Civil Authorities throughout.*" Bobby glanced up. The magistrate was about three yards away. He didn't want him any closer than that!

"*Maintain inter-communication if possible by telephone.*" If that meant inter-communication with the Civil Authority a telephone was not necessary; he could talk direct. If it meant inter-communication with the rest of the Company—well, he hadn't the faintest idea as yet where it was, and anyway he had no telephone. He told the Platoon Sergeant to look round for a Telephone Office or Box in the neighbourhood. The magistrate here spoke up.

"There is telephone in shop of Ramatool Friendshipwala, wine merchant." This was some two hundred yards from the piquet but was something, and he could talk to the regimental Orderly Room. It was not till later that he discovered that Mr. Friendshipwala had closed and barricaded his shop, and access to the telephone was not possible.

"*Avoid using small parties as far as possible and never use single men.*" That was all right so far as the sentries were concerned. He had posted them in pairs; but those patrols!! He hoped they would be back before the Company Commander returned.

"*The military are not to be used as Civil Police.*" Now, what the——did that mean ? It said already that single men were not to be used, and Civil Police always so far as he knew walked about singly. Why repeat the caution ? He was puzzlin gover this point when the sentries on opposite sides of the square spoke simultaneously.

"Lot of suspicious looking Indians at the end of the road, sir."

"Kind of procession like, approaching the piquet from the west, sir."

"Load" roared Bobby, who as I said, was a quick thinker.

"Sir, you must not fire without my order." The magistrate had become extremely agitated.

The Lewis Gun section commanded the road now occupied by the suspicious looking Indians. The remainder of the Platoon some ten rifles in all, were drawn up across the other road blocking the approach of the procession.

Suddenly Bobby remembered the Adjutant's final warning anent Minimum Force. He had not yet quite grasped the meaning of this. It seemed to him that his platoon was already a minimum force for the job in hand and they were scattered all over the place. Orders were orders however (and besides the Company Commander might arrive at any moment!), so he withdrew two men of the party of ten, into reserve as it were. Surely, he thought to himself, eight rifles is about a minimum force for blocking a road.

The procession, which seemed to be several hundreds in number, had stopped on seeing the military across the road ahead of it. A tall, thin man, to whom Bobby took an immediate dislike was haranguing the crowd.

On Bobby's enquiry the magistrate said, "Sir, the man is telling them that this is a public thoroughfare and that they are a peaceful procession and that no one has the right to stop them."

"Tell them to go another way and that they can't come along here." Bobby was firm.

The magistrate went forward a few paces and shouted to the crowd whereupon the tall, thin individual approached, followed by the procession. He addressed Bobby in English.

" Your Honour has not right to prevent us using this public right of way. We are peaceful group of persons pursuing peaceful avocations. We are doing no harm to any person or thing. We are not therefore unlawful assembly."

Bobby was puzzled. He had been told to watch the roads leading into the square and to take orders from the magistrate.

" Well, magistrate, what about it ? " he asked.

" Sir, this is legal point. I am uncertain."

The Corporal standing next to Bobby spoke, " Beg pardon, sir, but perhaps if I gave the chatty bloke a clip over the head with my butt it might help him to choose another road."

At this moment several things began to happen simultaneously. The suspicious looking Indians on the other side having caught sight of the procession across the way became much excited and their numbers increased rapidly.

" Can I fire on this lot, sir ? It is looking a bit dangerous over here." The N. C. O. commanding the Lewis Gun section had an anxious look.

" No. You can't. Wait for orders." Bobby was getting cross. The procession had stopped but the noise was increasing and there were shouts of defiance. The Platoon Sergeant's voice at the head of another side street could now be heard.

" No You can't come this way. So back you go. *Footsack ! No bon ! Mafeesh* ! " The sergeant appeared to be a linguist.

An angry voice replied to him. " You cannot prevent me. I am M.L.A., Bombalpur Legislature, and I claim protection of military. My car is smashed by Mohamedan rioters and I wish to go to my house."

As Bobby turned to investigate this new complication a stone struck him on the helmet and another hit the ground near by. The Corporal looked towards him expectantly. The magistrate was registering an agony of indecision. A broken soda-water bottle hit one of the men full in the face opening his forehead and cheek which poured with blood.

Out of a side street now appeared the Company Commander, in a car, accompanied by a Police Officer and two armed constables. The former took in the situation at a glance and turned to the magistrate.

" I am going to disperse this crowd. Do you agree ? " The magistrate nodded. " Into them with the bayonet, B."

At this moment, in the distance, two shots rang out. The suspicious looking crowd in the street facing the Lewis Gun section melted away as if by magic. The procession too was in full retreat leaving two on the ground who had been unable, owing to pressure from the crowd behind them, to avoid the steadily advancing line of bayonets. The Police Officer examined the fallen men and a smile of satisfaction spread over his face.

" Good," he said. " This is a man we have wanted for a long time." It was the tall, thin individual.

No one would accuse Bobby of being too calm and collected. This was exactly the kind of stuff he wanted and he was scarlet with excitement and satisfaction. Here was his platoon attacked from three sides. On one, a riotous procession ; on the other, a threatening crowd and on the third, a voluble M. L. A. ; and they had all been repulsed. Good work.

He had failed to see the danger approaching from the fourth side.

" And now, young fellow, will you explain to me what you have done with your rose coloured platoon ? " There was a kind of suppressed look in the Company Commander's eye which made Bobby go suddenly cold.

He explained his dispositions, slurring over to some extent the matter of the two weak patrols.

" Exactly ! Weak everywhere and strong nowhere." The Company Commander looked grim. " Just come out of earshot of the men. I have a few remarks to make to you," he said.

" The first responsibility of a commander, Mr. B.," he went on, " is the safety of his men. I arrive here and find your platoon scattered about in small packets, any or all of which could have been rushed and swamped by a determined crowd. Luckily for you the Indian in this part of the world is a comparatively weak-kneed individual. Farther up north you would have been for it. You allowed a threatening crowd not only to come close to your men, but you actually permitted them to stone you and badly damage one of them That man Thompson will probably lose the sight of his eye, poor chap."

Bobby was indignant.

"How could I do anything without the magistrate's order? You told me——"

"When your men are in danger there is no question of waiting for a magistrate's order." He let this sink in for a moment. "And now, can you tell me where your two patrols are?"

"No, but I told them not to go far."

"Exactly. You let them loose in this maze of an Indian city and expect them not to lose themselves. I'll tell you about one of your patrols. There it comes."

Bobby noticed that one man had his arm bound up and that the Corporal was going lame.

"That bright patrol of yours lost itself. When it turned into the main market street it found itself hemmed in by an excited crowd of Mahomedans. The Corporal did his best to get clear but had to use his butts to do it. This attracted some Pathan *badmashes* who closed with them and got away with one man's rifle. Fortunately the Pathan ran straight into a police patrol and we have got the rifle back. Perhaps that will show you the danger of using weak patrols on these occasions."

The Police Officer now came up.

"We have patched up those two bayonet wounds, and I'll take them off to hospital. I had better take your man too? By the way, have you discovered who fired those two shots. They must have been responsible for clearing the Mahomedan crowd away on that side."

Bobby had an uneasy feeling that his second patrol might have got mixed up in a scrap. He was saved the trouble of further investigation by its appearance at the far end of the street. The Corporal made his report.

"I sent O'Leary and Jones ahead as scouts, sir," he said, "about fifty yards ahead of me and Simpson. We reconnoitred the roads on this side. I have made a rough sketch of them, sir. Most of the roads were deserted, sir, but as we turned back in this direction we came across a few natives walking along. They seemed to be quite peaceful. When we turned into the main street back over there, two Indians with beards ran out of a house and stabbed two others who

were passing. I shouted to O'Leary to stop them, but they were too quick and ran up a side street. O'Leary and Jones each fired a shot at them, sir, but missed. The wounded Indians were taken into a house by some others. I then brought my patrol back here, sir."

" Don't split up your patrol like that again in this kind of work. Keep together. And I don't like that firing . . . . ." The Company Commander looked distinctly puzzled and this surprised Bobby.

" Surely that was all right " he said. " They had to do something about it."

" I'm not too sure. A N. C. O. can take action only in protection of his men or property in his charge. Even an officer unaccompanied by a magistrate, can only disperse an unlawful assembly, and I don't think you can class two cut-throats as an unlawful assembly. I'll go into that later and let you know."

" And now, my lad, I want you to realise that you have made about as big a mess of this show as you could—"

At the end of half an hour Bobby had been reduced to a proper sense of his complete uselessness as an officer and leader of men; but, as I said before, he was full of enthusiasm and soon recovered. Before his platoon had been dismissed late that night his active mind had formed several conclusions. These he wrote down in his note book. Right or wrong they may be of interest. He showed them to the Company Commander, and for convenience sake the latter's remarks are given in their appropriate place.

" *Aid to the Civil Power is no job for the soldier. He is armed with fighting weapons and is not allowed to use them.*"

(Company Commander :—Quite so ! but the army in India has no other job in peace, and, in war, a large proportion of it is reserved for Internal Security purposes alone).

" *The safety of the men is my chief responsibility. Since they cannot, in the ranks, take action to protect themselves, I have to take it for them.*"

(C. C. : Quite right. In other words, do not let a crowd get so close to them that they cannot fire, or so near that they can close with the troops hand to hand. It may be difficult to do this. You must use your ingenuity. I once got the magistrate to warn a crowd that any man crossing a certain line would be fired on. I did not have to fire !

If a crowd stones or attacks your men, fire at once. Always fire for effect, at the actual offender if you can. One shot will generally be enough if you act soon enough.

(C. C. :—Oh ! yes, I know I told you to go in with the bayonet yesterday. That was because you had let things go too far and there was'nt time to issue controlled fire orders. I took a risk I know. Hand to hand work is to be avoided if the crowd shows any fight).

"*Do not send out small patrols—never less than a section of eight men.*' "

(C. C. :—Yes. Stick to military units, that is sections or platoons. If people are hostile to the troops you take a great risk in patrolling with less than a platoon. In communal disturbances you can probably use sections, but remember they can do nothing except self-protection unless accompanied by a magistrate or policemen in whose aid they can act).

"*Find out the meaning of* '*The military are not to be used as Civil Police.*' "

(C. C. :—That is difficult to explain. I will try, but remember that these are only my private opinions.

Troops are only allowed to use the weapons with which they are armed. Since they are so strongly armed it is necessary to protect the public from them. They are therefore not given the same protection by the law as policemen are. That is one of the reasons why soldiers cannot use police methods in these cases.

There are times when troops will have to do certain police duties, for instance when the police are insufficient in numbers, or tired out or fully engaged in another place. Of course, the duties we may have to do are those definitely due to and connected with the riots or disturbances. We cannot be asked to do normal or routine police duties.

The crux of it all is that whatever we do *we must not use police methods*. We are not trained or armed to use police methods.

The police employ actual contact with the people. They mingle with and accompany crowds. They attempt to divert, stop and control crowds by physical contact and pressure. They allow single constables and small parties to be scattered about an area. Experience has shewn that these methods are suitable for men armed as policemen

and trained to the work, and, I may add, permitted by law to take action which we soldiers are not allowed to take. The police methods are suitable for normal conditions and, up to a certain point, in abnormal times. They definitely cannot be used by forces armed as we are and who are brought in to act at the stage of disturbances when it is necessary for troops to take action.

All this accounts for the warning in our instructions and the fact that the military commander is made responsible for the action the troops take. Were it not so, police officers would, of course, attempt to use soldiers in the manner of police, with fatal results. I imply no slur on the Police. They, very naturally employ methods which they understand and to which they have been trained.)

"*Troops cannot legally take action against individual murderers only against unlawful assemblies of five or more persons.*"

(C. C. :—That is not correct. There is the right of private defence which entitles any man to protect himself or any other person or thing. You will find it clearly put down in sections 96 to 102 of the Indian Penal Code in the Manual of Indian Military Law.

O'Leary and Jones did wrong in firing at those two men yesterday. Under the Right of Private Defence they could, strictly speaking, only take action while the fear of danger lasted. In that case yesterday the danger had already ceased. Therefore, in my opinion, they could not act under the right of private defence.

As private citizens, however, they had the right and duty of effecting the arrest of men who had committed a non-bailable offence. Look up the Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 59. Even then, in my judgment, they had no right to fire, since they were not requested to do so by a policeman or magistrate. You must warn your men not to do so in future, except, of course, in the right of private defence.

If, therefore, you want to send out military patrols to enforce an order such as a curfew order or to prevent crime, you must see that they are accompanied by a magistrate or policeman in whose *aid* they will act."

"I see", said Bobby B.

But when he came to think it over he found that visibility was still not too good. He wondered how much more there was for him to learn by experience.

Anyway he decided to have a dive at these mysterious books on law. To his astonishment he found them almost sane and intelligible. It must have been quite half an hour before he fell asleep.

EDITOR: *This article is based on an absurd assumption. No officer as ignorant as Bobby B. would have been allowed to go out in aid of the Civil Power.*

PHOENIX: *Of course not. That's why I enclosed a stamped envelope.*

A HOLD UP IN ANATOLIA.

By Captain E. R. Greer.

I.

The opportunity of a journey by car through Anatolia is not one thatf all sto the lot of many Englishmen, even in these days of universal motoring, and it was therefore with alacrity that I accepted the invitation of Major H., the military attaché to the British Embassy in Stamboul to accompany him on a tour of the Anatolian Provinces of Asia Minor. Being myself in Stamboul on language study from my regiment in India at the time (1929), the prospect of a three weeks' motor tour was a welcome change from grappling with the intricacies of the Turkish language. Further, having motored a good deal in such countries as Persia and Baluchistan where some of the roads, if indeed they can be called roads, are indescribably bad, I imagined that I knew fairly well what we were in for. I was destined to be disillusioned on that score before the end of our trip.

Preparations for a motor tour in an undeveloped country naturally require a good deal of forethought. Petrol, we knew, could be obtained at various towns on our proposed route, but food and lodging were not so easily to be found. Major H., in whose car we were to travel, settled the latter problem, fixing up an ingenious arrangement by which the front seat of the car was made to tip backwards and join up with the back seat, thereby forming a not uncomfortable, if slightly cramped bed for two. He also fitted a mosquito net to be let down from the roof for use when necessary. We were thus independent of *serais* and rest-houses with the accompanying breeds of insects, crawling and flying, which infest roadside hostelries all over the East. We were obliged to take a quantity of tinned food with us, but we determined to keep it as a reserve, and to live on the country as much as possible.

Our proposed route lay through Brusa, Eskishehir and Afium Kara Hissar to Konia. From there we intended going through the *Vilayets* (Provinces) of Kayseri, Sivas, Tokat and Amasiya, to Angora, returning to Stamboul by a northern route. This itinerary which was to cover some 1,500 miles was planned subject to the state of the

roads and the conditions of the country, about both of which we possessed only the most meagre information.

One fine morning in June, we shipped the car from Stamboul across the Sea of Marmora to Mudania, the scene of the Armistice between General Sir Charles Harington and the Turks in 1922, and from there started for Brusa. The first one hundred miles or so being fairly well populated, we found the roads good and no difficulties whatever were encountered. The country near the sea coast is of striking beauty. Ranges of mountains covered with pines and cypress trees and neat well-kept villages leave a pleasing impression, and the snowy peaks of Mount Olympus tower above the landscape. As we got further into the interior the country underwent a complete change. Thinly populated and barren, with occasional bleak hills dotted like islands on a bare plain, one can travel for hours without seeing a sign of life. The soil is poor and only in the vicinity of the few streams are any signs of cultivation to be seen. Extremes of heat and cold in summer and winter add to the difficulties of life, and breed a hardy race in the Anatolian Turk.

The Turks have an ambitious road programme in hand, and we certainly came across a good deal of what might be called "road activity." Our principle concern, however, naturally lay in the state of the roads as we found them at the time, and they were in a sorry condition. In the proximity of towns they were generally good, but beyond that they petered out into cross-country tracks overgrown with grass and completely neglected.

Such maps of the country as are available are very inaccurate. The direction of the roads changes continually. Diversions, sometimes of several miles, are frequently made by cars finding the "main road" impassable. The result is often confusing, and roads and tracks radiating in all directions are very bewildering to the traveller. We often lost our way and had to go back on our tracks for several miles to get on to the right road again.

The small amount of motor traffic in the interior was very noticeable, and in view of the great development of motor transport in Eastern Countries generally during the past few years, this is all the more remarkable. In Persia and India one passes on a day's journey numbers of the ubiquitous "Chev" or "Dodge" lorries and cars laden to the roof with passengers and goods, and one

never ceases to wonder how they ever get anywhere without the vehicle falling to pieces on the road. In the country districts of Anatolia we did not see a single lorry and only one or two cars.

The Anatolian Turk is a very different type from his brother of the town. The new European modes and customs have not yet penetrated into the interior and we found the Turk there just as he must have been fifty years ago. The comparison was in favour of the country peasant. In Stamboul and other large towns the picturesque baggy trousers and turban have almost disappeared and the modern Turk wears the felt hat and lounge suit of Europe. He has no option in the matter, it is the law, and however he may dislike having to discard his ancient dress, he is forced to do so. Once in the interior we felt that we were back in the Turkey of the ancient Sultans. The people are all peasants and eke out a precarious existence on the barren soil. Poverty appears to be rampant and the standard of living low. In spite of this, the old traditions of Eastern hospitality still flourish. We had frequent experience of this when halted near villages during our tour. The headman invariably came out to greet us and insisted on our partaking of a meal before we proceeded on our way.

On one occasion when we had taken the wrong track out of some village and had lost the road, we picked up a peasant at a small hamlet who offered to accompany us to the next large town, one hundred miles away. He informed us that we would have great difficulty in finding the way without assistance, as there was no road for miles, and he said he would pilot us to our destination and return to his home on foot. On asking him what he wanted for his services as guide he said he would be very happy with four *liras* (eight shillings), but would take less if we thought that excessive! We took him along and eventually dropped him at our destination with a liberal tip and a couple of tins of fruit. He thereupon started off on his one hundred miles trek home singing and dancing down the road we had just come by. He told us on parting that it was years since he had possessed such wealth as was now reposing in his belt.

On the third day after leaving Stamboul we reached Afium Kara Hissar, an important railway junction on the Turkish—Iraq Railwa y and one of the largest towns in Anatolia. During the Great War Afium was the site of a large British prisoners of war camp and there

are doubtless many British soldiers who have lively recollections of the place. Later, in the Greeco-Turkish War (1919—22), Afium was the scene of much fighting when it was captured by the Greeks in 1921 and finally re-taken by the Turks a year later. It is an interesting place, typically Turkish, with its rows of tall wooden houses and ancient mosques and minarets, while jutting up in the middle of the town towers a great black rock several hundred feet high, from which the place takes its name of Kara Hissar or Black Castle.

Major H. paid an official call on the Commander of the troops at Afium and was received with much courtesy. On our departure a Staff Officer accompanied us for some miles out of the town to put us on the right road.

The following day we reached Konia where we spent a night at the local hotel—a course which we had cause to regret before next morning. Sleep was out of the question and we spent the night in repelling with a tin of " Keatings " the attacks of innumerable bugs of varying shapes and sizes which appeared from every corner of the room as soon as the lights were put out.

II.

It was beyond Konia that our real adventures started and we ran into tragedy in the lonely Anatolian country-side.

We had reached the small town of Karaman where we heard reports of flooded and impassable roads due to heavy local rains. Nevertheless we decided to push on about fifty miles to Eregli which we hoped to reach in one day. The roads were vile, and soon after leaving Karaman we saw that the reports of floods were not exaggerated. The country here is very low-lying and we found the road little better than a swamp in many places. Major H., who was a very fine driver indeed, did his best, and we shot through great pools of water and skidded through quagmires in our endeavours to get on, but it was a hopeless business. We soon got bogged in a sea of mud a few miles out of Karaman, and stuck there for three hours while we endeavoured to round up men from the nearest village to pull us out. This accomplished, we went through the same performance another few miles further on, and by nightfall we had only covered some fifteen miles. By this time we were hungry, tired and covered with mud from head to foot, and we therefore decided to spend the night in

the car outside a small hamlet and hope for better things next morning. Meanwhile we found ourselves the centre of interest of a small crowd from the wayside hamlet and soon got into conversation with the inhabitants. When we told them our next destination, two of them pushed their way forward through the crowd and offered their services as guides. They were a curiously contrasted pair, one dressed in old-fashioned European clothes with a battered felt hat pulled down over a villainous-looking face. The other a respectable-looking old man wearing the turban and baggy pantaloons of the Anatolian Turk. The latter told us in course of conversation that his name was Mustafa and that he was the proud father of sixteen children. Seeing a heaven-sent opportunity of earning *bakhsheesh* for the support of his large progeny he expressed an earnest desire to act as our guide, saying that he knew of a route over high ground which was not under water, and swearing by Allah to bring us safely to the town which was our next stopping place. Although it was by this time dark we decided to push on the thirty or forty miles in the hope of finding a hot meal and a bath. We therefore yielded to Mustafa's assurances, put him in the back of the car, and started off. This arrangement was strongly disapproved of by the other would-be guide who jumped on the running board of the car volubly declaring his intention of accompanying us. We told him that one guide was quite sufficient but he refused to listen to reason and I was obliged to push him gently but firmly off the running board. We left him standing on the road on the outskirts of the village glaring and cursing after us.

We had not gone far on our journey before it was apparent that our newly found guide was taking us a long way off the direct route. After a lot of gesticulating and a torrent of Turkish we gathered that he was obliged to take us a wide detour of some fifteen or twenty miles to avoid the flooded area and that we would join the direct route at a point about six miles from the village which we had just left. We would then be on the so-called main road again which was clear of floods from there on. A twenty mile detour to get to a point only six miles away in a straight line seemed a round-about business, but feeling too tired and bored to argue the question at any length, we accepted the inevitable and hoped for the best. The track we were on could scarcely be called a track at all and we were actually driving across country most of the time. However, our headlights were good

and our guide seemed to know every inch of the country, so we began to hope that we would reach our destination by midnight.

I was sitting in the front of the car beside Major H. with Mustafa in the back, now quite at home and smoking numbers of our cigarettes. The night was dark and silent and I had settled back comfortably in my seat preparing to doze when I was suddenly and unpleasantly brought to my senses by the crash of a rifle bullet at close range. It smashed through the windows of the car, covering us with splinters of broken glass. Almost before we had time to realise what had happened another shot followed. I saw the flash of the explosion not twenty yards way. With a groan our guide fell back in his seat. Major H. involuntarily stamped on the brake and pulled up and we both sprang out. I dodged round the front of the car and found myself presenting an excellent target in the full glare of the headlights before realizing that they had been left on. We instinctively stood away from the car, an obvious target for further bullets. We were unarmed, it being deemed inadvisable by the Powers that Be for us to be in possession of arms when travelling in Anatolia. So we were helpless. We could do nothing but peer into the darkness and wonder what was going to happen next.

A minute passed and no one appeared. Then two more minutes and still no sound except for the moaning of the unfortunate Mustafa who was lying on the floor of the car. It was apparent that the poor fellow had been badly wounded. When another minute or so had passed without anyone showing himself we discussed our next action in low tones. It was indeed a case of "What does A do now"? Should we go back or forward? It was obvious that our guide could guide no longer and we had no hope whatever of finding our way to our destination across-country in the dark without his help. Therefore to go forward was ruled out; but to go back seemed almost as hopeless as we had nothing to guide us, the road being, as I have explained, almost non-existent. The only hope was that we might pick up the tracks our car had made, but the darkness of the night would make this a difficult business. It was obviously our first duty to obtain medical assistance for Mustafa as soon as possible so we determined to return the way we had come and try to get back to the village we had left an hour or so before. Once there Mustafa would be with his own people again. This settled, Major H. walked over to the car and took his seat at the wheel. It was a ticklish moment

as for all we knew there might be rifles trained on the car waiting for us to return to it. But the enemy, wherever he was, gave no sign. Major H., pressed the starter, swung the car round and we were off back the way we had come.

I stood on the running-board and tried to pick up our old track, but I could see nothing, and we had not gone half a mile before we were completely lost. We stopped and got out of the car and judging ourselves to be out of the enemy's field of fire examined Mustafa's wound by the aid of a pocket torch. He had been hit just where the arm joins the shoulder. It was a horrible wound and it was apparent that the bullet was a dum-dum as his arm was nearly severed from his shoulder. We bandaged it up with our handkerchiefs, applied a rough tourniquet and forced some brandy from a flask down his throat, but it was little we could do for him with the means at our disposal. We then proceeded to search round for some signs of our previous tracks. Eventually we found the marks of tyres, but it was not long before they completely disappeared on a hard piece of ground and we were again obliged to stop the car and make a further search round. The night was cloudy, so we could get no help from the stars. It is a most unpleasant sensation to feel oneself completely lost, as we were, and I have no wish to repeat the experience.

It is unnecessary to go into details about the three hours which followed. Sufficient to say that we picked up our old tracks a dozen times and lost them again as often. Mustafa had relapsed into complete unconsciousness in the back of the car and we gave up all hope of getting help in time to save his life. We had almost decided to sit down and wait for daylight when we found ourselves on an ancient broken-down culvert which we immediately recognised as having crossed shortly after setting out from Mustafa's village. From that point onwards all was well. The track was clearly defined and in the very short time we found ourselves on the outskirts of the village. Here a fresh problem presented itself. How were we to account for our return with Mustafa lying desperately wounded in the back of the car? Could we explain in our very indifferent Turkish what had happened and what was more to the point, would we be believed? What would the villagers' attitude be towards a couple of "ferengis" who had descended out of the blue a few hours previously, picked up one of their pals, and were now returning with him

unconscious and dying in the back of the car? The outlook was not too bright, for these were wild and primitive people. However, we had no choice but to go through with it, so we drove into the sleeping village blowing the horn and shouting to the inhabitants to turn out.

In a few moments we were surrounded by a crowd. A lantern was brought and its light showed Mustafa lying in a pool of blood in the back of the car. For a few moments things looked unpleasant. The villagers seemed to make up their minds at once that we were responsible and closed round us with threatening attitudes and scowling looks. We were vainly trying to explain what had happened when by a great stroke of fortune, Mustafa, who was being lifted from the car by his friends, recovered consciousness for a few seconds. He gasped out a few words and almost at once lapsed again into insensibility. But it was sufficient to turn the villagers from enemies into friends and their threatening attitude immediately changed to one of helpful friendliness. We at once offered to drive the car back to Karaman where the nearest doctor lived and fetch him back to the village. We thought it wiser to leave Mustafa behind, partly because we judged him too far gone to stand any more jolting in a car and partly because we did not know what fresh troubles lay on the flooded road to Karaman which had delayed us so much the previous afternoon. The villagers, who were now our firm friends, agreed.

It was by this time about midnight and taking one of the villagers with us we started back on the fifteen mile journey to Karaman Major H., had been driving for hours under vile conditions and practically without a break, but he was indefatigable and it was due to his skill at the wheel that we got through without difficulty and arrived at Karaman about an hour later, where we went at once to the local police station. Here we met with interminable delays. The Captain of Gendarmes, who was summoned from his bed and appeared after some delay, insisted on recording our statements before he would do anything else. It was in vain that we protested that our statements could wait and that we had come to fetch a doctor for a dying man. It appeared to us that it made no difference if the whole population of Anatolia was in its death agonies; official routine demanded first and foremost a statement in writing. Seeing it hopeless to argue we told him as briefly as possible, using French and Turkish

indiscriminately, what had happened. He took down our statements with maddening deliberation and an hour went by before he expressed himself satisfied with what he had written. In the meanwhile a doctor had been found, and putting him in the car together with the Captain of Gendarmes and a couple of his men, we started back for Mustafa's village. On the way we passed several parties of mounted gendarmes riding hard for the same destination, so it was apparent that our friend in command had taken some action.

Dawn came on the way and we reached the village in broad daylight. There we found more mounted gendarmes and we were informed that still more parties were out scouring the country-side in the direction where the shooting had occurred. The doctor carried out his examination of our wounded guide and expressed his opinion that, though very weak from loss of blood, he would probably live. This information naturally cheered us considerably.

In the meantime the villagers, with the unfailing hospitality of the Anatolian peasant, insisted on preparing a meal for us which we were more than ready for, having had no food for over twelve hours. Just as we had finished we heard a great hullabaloo outside the village and a party of gendarmes appeared dragging along at the end of a rope an unpleasant-looking individual in dirty European clothes with a battered felt hat pulled down over this eyes. It was the same man we had pushed off the running-board of the car not twelve hours before!

Much investigation and cross-questioning followed and our Captain of Gendarmes eventually told us he had got the whole story. According to his account a feud over a woman had been in existence for some time between the villainous-looking gentleman in European clothes and Mustafa. For months the former had been waiting his opportunity to put Mustafa out of the way and finally thought he saw his chance when we picked on Mustafa as our guide. He did his best to accompany us hoping apparently to find some opportunity of settling accounts with Mustafa when they had left us at our destination and would be returning to their village together on foot. This plan having failed when the was pushed off the car, he at once determined to cover the six miles or so along the main road on foot, knowing that he could reach the same point where we would arrive, after our twenty mile detour, before we could get there. He rushed to his house,

seized his rifle, got to his position with a few minutes to spare, and fired into the car from a distance of about 15 yards as we passed him. This, the Captain informed us, was the true account of the incident and he went on to express the deepest regret at the inconvenience to which we had been put and the unfortunate chance which led us into unwittingly getting mixed up in a private vendetta. He added his personal assurances that the unpleasant-looking individual in question would soon be swinging at the end of a rope.

We pointed out that if this account of the incident were really true, then all we could say was that Mustafa's enemy had gone about getting rid of his rival in a curious way. To fire into a car travelling, at fifteen or twenty miles an hour in the dark and hope to hit the person intended, struck us as being a bit optimistic, not to say dangerous for the other passengers. Our friend assured us that such a target would present no difficulties whatever to men with the high standard of marksmanship of the Anatolian Turk!

We could see that our gendarme friend wanted to convince us that the crime was the outcome of a personal vendetta. He foresaw that awkward complications might ensure should he be unable to produce a satisfactory account of an incident in which two British officers, one of them the Military Attaché, driving in a car with a British Embassy number, were fired at and held up on the road. The Turkish authorities prided themselves that under the new regime Anatolia was safe for the traveller and had publicly declared on several occasions that the bands of brigands and robbers which had for some years infested the interior had now been completely stamped out and that travellers could go where they wished with perfect safety. Unless, therefore, some good reason could be put forward for the adventure which had befallen us the British Embasay at Stamboul might make the incident the subject of an official protest. This, we guessed, was in our gendarme Captain's mind.

Our opinion of the affair was that we had been held up by some wandering thieves or brigands who saw the lights of our car in the distance and lay up on the roadside for us. They were probably under the impression that the car contained some local merchant from whom loot might be reasonably expected. Having fired into the car they heard our voices, and realizing that we were foreigners,

became frightened of the consequences to themselves and beat a hasty retreat.

However, we were obviously not in a position to prove the truth or otherwise of the story we had been told. Being strangers travelling in a foreign country we were naturally unable to dispute the opinions of the police, whatever we might ourselves think of them. We therefore made our adieus to our gendarme friend, having assured him that we would take official steps to have our thanks expressed to him for the trouble he had taken on our behalf.

The Anatolian Gendarmerie impressed us as a very efficient force. Almost every village had its gendarmerie post and the whole country is systematically patrolled by mounted gendarmes. All villages of any size have a telephone and in an emergency the gendarmes of the area concerned can be warned and quickly got on the move. The officers and men are recruited from the pick of the army. We met with nothing but courtesy and kindness at the hands of the various Gendarmerie officers with whom we came in contact during our tour. The insistence of the officer at Karaman on getting our written statements before he would move from his Headquarters was annoying, but is probably not uncommon in the police forces of even more highly organized countries. Certainly there is no question that the state of the interior of Anatolia has improved very considerably during the last few years. Previous to that bands of brigands roamed the country-side and travel in the interior was a hazardous undertaking.

III.

Having left the little village which had been the starting point of our adventurous night we had to decide on our next step. Our gendarme friend had told us that the whole country-side ahead of us was under water and that road communications were almost completely cut in the direction in which we wanted to go. We therefore decided to cut short our itinerary, return on our tracks to Konia and go from there to Angora, the capital. We reached Konia the same evening, stopping on the way for a couple of hours sleep and a bathe and shave in a wayside stream. With the recollections of insect life in the local hotel at Konia fresh in our memories, we determined to drive a few miles out of the town and spend the night in the car by the road-side. While at dinner in the hotel we received a message from the *Vali* (Governor of the Province) to the effect that he hoped

to see us before we left Konia. We therefore went round to his office after dinner where he presently joined us full of apologies for the adventure which had befallen us. He had been informed by telephone of the details of the incident and repeated the same story as that given us by the Captain of gendarmes. He added that the unfortunate Mustafa had died shortly after our departure from his village, but before dying had made a statement corroborating the story of the feud. We were naturally distressed to hear the news of the old man's death but the *Vali* assured us that the Government would compensate the family for the loss of the head of the house. We found in the *Vali* a very courteous Turkish gentleman. He insisted on sending his own car to accompany us to Angora, some 170 miles away. The road, he explained, was very difficult to find and his driver would guide us there by the best and quickest route. He would take no refusal. On informing him that we proposed to spend the night in our car outside the town and start for Angora at dawn the next morning, he expressed great surprise at our not availing ourselves of the amenities offered by the local hotel; however, he personally accompanied us to a spot where there was a well of good water about three miles out of the town. There he insisted on posting over us two sentries whom he had brought along with him, to prevent our being disturbed by passers-by. He then left us with fresh protestations of his regret at the affair in which we had been involved.

Next morning at dawn, having dismissed the sentries, we started for Angora, with the *Vali's* car as pilot; but after fifty miles or so finding the road to be fairly well-defined we sent the pilot car back to Konia renewing our thanks to the *Vali* by the driver, and proceeded on our way alone. The route was uninteresting, consisting of long stretches over barren and dusty country varied by an occasional climb over low hills, the whole very sparsely inhabited with small cultivated areas in the vicinity of villages. We reached Angora the same evening without further incident.

Angora, the seat of Government and the heart of Mustafa Kemal's regime, is full of interest. Formerly an unknown town in the middle of Anatolia, it has sprung up, mushroom-like, almost overnight, into a modern and scientifically planned city. It was in Angora that Mustafa Kemal, driven from Stamboul after the armistice, gathered a few kindred spirits round him and planned the coup which

led to the revolution in Turkey, the defeat of the Greek Army in Anatolia, the overthrow of the Sultanate and the establishment of the new Republic. This accomplished, Mustafa Kemal chose Angora as his new Capital. He was suspicious of Stamboul with its undercurrent of political intrigue, and, determined to cut adrift from these influences, set up his seat of Government far away in Angora, the place so closely associated with the origin and accomplishment of his great ideals. Whether this decision was a wise one or not time alone will show. Certainly it has resulted in the decay of the ancient capital of Stamboul, which has sunk to the level of a neglected and second-rate Levantine port. Most of the Foreign Embassies have transferred to Angora, now the first city of the Turkish Republic. Large modern granite buildings stand in well ordered rows and the services of the most expert town-planners and architects have been secured for the lay-out of the new capital. The result gave me the impression, as we drove into the town, of some modern American city miraculously set down in the heart of an Eastern country.

Having reported at our Embassy we drove to the Angora Palace Hotel. It was an astounding contrast with the accommodation we had had up to date. Only recently completed, it is the equal of any first class hotel in London or Paris. Loud speakers provided the latest jazz music during the dinner hour. The cuisine was perfect and the service of the Swiss waiters highly efficient. Here we spent a couple of days, Major H. having business with the Embassy.

IV.

The route by which we decided to return to Stamboul lay through the *Vilayets* of Bolu and Ismet. This route which runs through Northern Anatolia is little used by ordinary traffic, the most direct road being *via* Eskishehir and Brusa. We knew that our proposed route crossed several high ranges of mountains, but we could obtain no information in Angora as to the state of the road. Nevertheless we started out full of hope refreshed by our two days' stay in the luxurious surroundings of the Angora Palace Hotel.

Shortly after leaving Angora we entered mountainous and picturesque country. The road was good and we made excellent progress, spending the night in the car by the road-side some one hundred miles from Angora. Continuing our journey early the next morning we soon found ourselves in difficult country. The road become more

and more neglected and it was apparent that it was little used by motor traffic. Numbers of ravines crossed our route all spanned by rickety wooden bridges made from the trunks of pine trees and ill-suited to the passage of anything more than a light cart. Fir trees began to appear on the rugged hills surrounding us and frequent waterfalls and streams came leaping down the mountain sides. We were not, however, destined to make much further progress that day. It was still early in the morning and we were crossing a more than usually rickety bridge which began to sway and creak in an alarming manner just as we reached the middle of it. Major H. accelerated a little to get off the bridge as quickly as possible. We reached the far end of the swaying structure and saw two yards in front of us where the bridge ended, a drop of a couple of feet on to the road. It was too late to do anything. With a horrid crash the car bounded off the bridge on to the road below and came to an immediate standstill.

We found that serious damage had been done. The gear box and clutch were smashed beyond hope of repair except in a garage. We were stranded nearly one hundred miles from the nearest railway with no immediately apparent means of getting there or anywhere else.

The first thing to be done obviously was to find some signs of human habitation, and after a short search round we found a track leading up a valley at right angles from the road. I followed this, leaving Major H. wrestling with the car in the faint hope of being able to effect some temporary repairs. After following the track for a mile or so I came upon a small hamlet built of wooden houses tucked against the mountain-side. I explained the situation to the headman and asked him if he could provide us with transport of any sort. This, he said, was impossible, but he explained that he was connected by telephone with a large village some ten miles away which was in its turn in touch with the town of Bolu, forty miles away, where he thought a motor vehicle of some sort might be obtained. It was curious to find a telephone in an out-of-the-way hamlet like this. It was, as has been said, part of the system of telephone lines which cover the interior for use by the gendarmerie in their maintenance of law and order. I asked the village headman to put a message through whereupon he explained that the only person who knew the working of the machine was the local *hoja* (priest) and that no one except him was allowed to use it. After a short delay the *hoja* turned up. When we had explained

the situation to him he started to telephone. The instrument was a primitive one and a considerable time elapsed before anything happened. Finally however, the *hoja* managed to deliver his message to be passed on to Bolu. After that there was nothing to do but wait. I returned to the car, which Major H. had found to be beyond repair and we sat down by the road-side and proceeded to pass the time as best we could.

By evening, about nine hours later, we were still waiting, further telephone calls through our friend the *hoja* having elicited no satisfactory answers. Just before dusk, as we were making up our minds to spend the night by the roadside, we spied, a party of travellers coming down the road. They were some five or six in number headed by a person apparently of some importance and mounted on a good-looking horse. On seeing us and our car by the side of the road he stopped and courteously enquired whether he could be of any assistance. We explained the situation to him, whereupon he informed us that his house was some twenty miles further on and was at our entire disposal if we could only find some means of transport to get there. He was, we gathered, a farmer on a large scale, the owner of a lot of property and a person of considerable local importance. As we were discussing ways and means over a friendly cigarette a lorry suddenly appeared round a bend in the road. It was the answer to the *hoja's* efforts on the telephone, so our luck was in once more. Our newly-found friend insisted on removing our kit into the lorry in which he said he would himself accompany us to his house where we were to be his guests for the night. The problem of Major H's car, however, remained. If we left it stranded one hundred miles from the railway what chance had he of ever seeing it again? This problem was soon settled by our newly-found host who informed us that he would arrange for a pair of bullocks to drag the car to the railway, whence its transport to Stamboul would be a simple matter. We therefore packed ourselves and our kit into the lorry accompanied by our friend who handed his horse over to one of his retinue.

The journey which followed was distinctly unpleasant. It was by this time dark and the road had become very precipitous. Numbers of precarious-looking wooden bridges and hair-pin bends followed each other in rapid succession. The lorry driver was a most indifferent performer, the head lights were extremely bad, and we rocked and swayed over the mountain road in the most alarming fashion,

Time after time while crossing a bridge the whole structure groaned and swayed, and a crash into the ravine below seemed inevitable.

Several times we were obliged to descend and examine bridges about the safety of which our host was particularly doubtful, before the lorry could proceed gingerly across in bottom gear. He informed us that the road was practically never used by motor traffic and he was therefore unable to guarantee the bridges for such modern inventions!

Eventually, about midnight, we reached our friend's house, a large building on the outskirts of a village situated on the mountain side. Here we were treated with extreme kindness. The servants were quickly roused and the guest-room made ready. We were given most excellent Turkish dinner of *pilaf*, stewed fruit, curds and coffee, our host himself waiting on us.

Early the next morning, having thanked our host very heartily for his hospitality, we resumed our journey in the lorry, our objective being the railway station of Geyve. We had crossed the steepest ranges of hills the day before and the remainder of the journey was comparatively easy. In due course we reached the railway where we had not long to wait for a train to Stamboul. Before departing we made arrangements with the Station-master at Geyve, for the carriage of the car to Stamboul and he promised to send it on as soon as it arrived.

That same evening we reached Haider Pasha terminus on the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus and crossed its sparkling blue waters to Stamboul in one of the excellent ferry boats that ply between Europe and Asia.

Three weeks later the car followed. Dragged by bullocks over some hundred miles of one of the worst roads in Anatolia, its condition can better be imagined than described. It was a battered wreck, almost unrecognisable from the smart-looking car in which we had set out from Stamboul a fortnight before; while inside the seats were covered with a large and ominous brown stain, a reminder of how the ill-fated Mustafa had met his end while travelling in our company.

I have often wondered what became of the villainous looking individual who was accused of Mustafa's murder. I suspect that as soon as we had left the district he was allowed to go, having served the purpose of scape-goat for which the Police required him. It would be interesting to revisit that little village near Karaman one day and try to find out the true story of our hold-up in Anatolia.

THE BURMA MILITARY POLICE AND THE REBELLION IN THARRAWADDY.

By Captain J. F. Bowerman, 10th. Baluch Regiment.

"As regards the Military Police I need say no more than that if there had been sufficient reserve of strength in the force, and if they had had enough officers, they could have dealt with the rebellion themselves"—Extract from speech by W. Booth-Gravely, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S., Special Commissioner, Rebellion, at the Burma Dinner in London on June 3rd, 1932.

Tharrawaddy was the only district in the rebellion area in which it was possible to collect anything like an adequate number of men of the Burma Military Police to deal with the situation. In all other parts of Lower Burma small parties of men wore themselves to shadows trying to prevent the rebellion from spreading, and in attempting to cope with a situation which became increasingly difficult from day to day.

The strength of the Burma Military Police prior to the rebellion was six frontier battalions, two garriso battalions and one reserve battalion; since the rebellion one other garrison battalion has been raised. The frontier battalion garrison posts on the frontier, and have small reserves at their headquarters to provide the columns which are sent out every cold weather. The garrison battalions have detachments all over Lower Burma whose duties are mainly to find treasury guards at district headquarters, and escorts for prisoners and treasure; at battalion headquarters they have small reserves which are allotted tasks in the local defence schemes of Rangoon and Mandalay. The reserve battalion, approximately eight hundred rifles, is the reserve for the force, and in the cold weather it supplies detachments to different frontier battalions, whose numbers have been depleted through column duties.

It can thus be seen that the end of December while well chosen to commence a rebellion from the rebel point of view, was the worst possible time, as far as the Military Police were concerned, as most of their cold weather columns had started and could not be recalled. The outbreak which occurred in Tharrawaddy District on December 24th, spread with alarming rapidity, and as the post of seventy rifles at

Tharrawaddy itself was quite unable to cope with it, additional help was demanded. A company of regular troops was sent from Mingaladon, and additional Military Police were rushed out as rapidly as possible.

As the Military Police arrived, they were split up into small parties and sent out in all directions, generally with no rations or bedding, and with no instructions except to try to restore order. No accurate information was obtainable, the wildest rumours were afloat, and the whole country-side appeared to be rising. The Military Police parties wandered about until they bumped something, fortunately in all cases with considerable losses to the people who were bumped. The heaviest casualties inflicted on the rebels were at Pashwegyaw on December 30th, where a combined force of 2/15th Punjabis and Military Police was attacked by a large body of rebels, which was only saved from almost complete annihi ation by the coming of darkness. As a rule, however, the strength of the Military Police parties rarely exceeded, twenty-five rifles under an Indian Officer, they had no automatic weapons and were on a number of occasions attacked by rebel gatherings of strengths varying between one and five hundred. At that time, too, the rebels considered themselves invulnerable and came on with a fine disregard of their own safety. The fact that they merely adopted mob tactics undoubtedly saved many a small party of Military Police.

By January 1st, 1931, four hundred and twenty Military Police of all classes had been collected in Tharrawaddy district, and two hundred mules of the Eastern Battalion had arrived from Myitkyina, but very few British Officers were available for duty in the area. However, those who could be released were sent down, and others from regular units at Mingaladon were attached to the Military Police, and it now became possible to work out a scheme to try to cope with the situation. It was apparent that it was courting disaster to send small parties of men into the blue with no definite tasks, so the policy was adopted of basing small columns on Okkan and Tharrawaddy, while a larger one of eighty rifles was given a roving commission in the villages and forest reserves bordering on the Yomas. By this time, however, the rebels had discovered that they were not invulnerable and, as it had become almost impossible to get into touch with them, a change of plan became necessary.

The new plan was based on locating detachments of regular troops in different parts of the district, with the task of patrolling

by day and night in the vicinity of their posts. The Military Police were employed in working through reserve forests and areas where it was thought that rebels might be hiding, with the idea of driving them out into the open to be dealt with by the regulars. This plan, however, proved to be a failure, as the area of country to be beaten proved very much too large to be effectively combed by the small force of Military Police, and the rebels continued to be as elusive as ever.

The method now decided on was known as the Sub-Area Scheme, and formed the basis on which operations were planned in most districts after the Military authorities took over control in July. Under this scheme all Military Police in the district were put under the command of a British Officer, the whole district was divided up into areas with boundaries allotted and these were again divided into sub-areas. Area Commanders were appointed and were made responsible for establishing posts, seeing that systematic patrolling was carried out, and that posts co-operated with those in areas outside their own. At the time of the introduction of this scheme, February 14th, it was not possible to find sufficient men to establish all the required posts, but these were gradually occupied by men from frontier battalions, who were sent down directly their columns returned to battalion headquarters.

Within five days of the commencement of this scheme a detachment of thirty rifles under a Subedar, which had reached a village named Zaingthwe, was attacked by a party of two hundred rebels. In this action the rebels made excellent use of ground and cover in their attempts to get to close quarters, but all attacks were beaten off, and on the morning following the attack, thirty-five dead bodies were found round the post; the only Military Police casualty was the Subedar who was severely wounded in the thigh.

By the end of March sufficient men had been drafted into the district to allow of all posts being occupied, and although there were only one or two minor actions, the general situation had become appreciably better; it was impossible, however, to get any reliable information about rebel movements.

Throughout April the same systematic patrolling was continued and there were a number of small encounters, two of which are worthy of mention. In the first, a patrol of nine rifles under a Lance-Naik

was ambushed by a small party of rebels, who fired one burst and then ran; one sepoy was killed and two wounded. The Lance-Naik sent back his wounded with a message to his post commander that he was following up the party which had ambushed him, and that re-inforcements should be sent out. The post commander led a party of twenty-five rifles to the scene of the ambush, and then found that the Lance-Naik was fighting a retiring action against nearly three hundred rebels whose camp he had attacked with his five men. On seeing re-inforcements arrive the rebels fled and their camp, stores and rations were destroyed.

In the second, a Naik and six sepoys encountered a party of seventy-five rebels armed with eighteen guns. The sound of firing was heard by the post commander who sent out additional men to assist the Naik. In this action too the rebels bolted on seeing re-inforcements arriving, but left eleven dead and one severely wounded man on the field; eight guns were also picked up.

During May patrolling became even more intensive, and small parties of rebels were again roughly handled on several occasions. The most important engagement during this month was an attack on a camp occupied by Boh San Htu and his gang, which was carried out by twenty-three rifles under an Indian Officer. This camp was hidden in dense jungle which afforded wonderful cover for the defenders, but the attacking party captured the position with a loss of only two men wounded. The rebels lost four killed and ten wounded, eleven unwounded prisoners were taken, while the camp and all stores were destroyed.

By the end of May, although the morale of the rebels had been very considerably shaken, and the large gangs had had their numbers very much reduced by casualties and desertions, the situation was still far from normal. With the near approach of the rains, however, it was necessary once again to review the situation, as many of the Military Police posts were very isolated and it would be impossible to ration them once the rains had broken. A large proportion of the men too were badly in need of rest, as the strenuous time they had gone through had left its mark. It was, therefore, decided to reduce the numbers of Military Police from 750 rifles to approximately 300, and to hold a smaller number of posts, which for the most part were off the main road and railway line, while the regular troops were split up in small detachments at stations on the line itself.

The Military Police rains posts each consisted of a post commander and twenty rifles, and were ordered to send out patrols three times a week, to assist the Civil Police as much as possible, and to follow up any information they might obtain. As the rains drew on, this task became increasingly difficult as a considerable area of country became completely under water, but the men stuck to their work well and, considering the scanty medical supplies which were available, there was very little sickness.

By the end of the rains the situation was very much better, and the rebellion was considered to be practically over as far as this district was concerned. An out-break at Zigon was quickly nipped in the bud, and by the middle of February it was found possible to reduce the numbers of regulars and Military Police. Since then conditions have steadily improved, and everything now appears to be normal again, but small detachments of men are still stationed in different parts of the district to show that the rebellion has not been entirely forgotten.


ROUGH SKETCH MAP OF THARRAWADDY DISTRICT.
Scale 1 inch approximately equal to 7½ Miles.
TO PROME
ZIGON
GYOBINGAUK
No 4 AREA
PEGU
OKPO
TEINMYOKGI
DIDUBIN
MINHLA FOREST RESERVE
YOMA
No 3 AREA
SEINKANLAN
MINHLA
FOREST RESERVE
OMONYO
TAYAWGON
SADON
No 2 AREA
KAMONZEIK
LETPADAN
HMAWIN
THONZE RESERVE
THARRAWAW
ZAINGTHWE
BILIN
HLELANGU
THINDAWYO RESERVE
PASAWEGYAW
FOREST RESERV
No 1 AREA
THARRAWADDY
SABAGYIAIN
WINGAIK
OKKAN
MAGAY FOREST RESERVE
SANYWE
THAYAGON
IRRIWADDY RIVER
SINGLE
MAYMAKA RIVER
TO RANGOON
TO RANGOON 53 MILES.
REFERENCES
PLACES UNDERLINED ARE M.P. RAINS POST.
PLACES UNDERLINED ARMY POSTS.

THE TRAVELS OF RISALDAR SHAHZAD MIR KHAN.

PART II.

In August 1888, I attended the "Guides Class" at the College at Roorkee. This college is the very home of promotion and advancement. There can be few who have not benefitted from instruction there. One is taught surveying, the work of an overseer, engineering, etc. Baldev Pershad, the head instructor, was a first class teacher and took no end of trouble with us, but I only passed somewhere half way down the list, for we Pathans are a thick-headed lot.

MY JOURNEY WITH CAPTAIN WELLBY SAHIB BAHADUR THROUGH CHANG TANG AND GREATER CHINA IN 1895-96.*

(See Map at end).

My fourth journey was with the famous traveller Captain Wellby Sahib *Bahadur* (Captain Montagu S. Wellby, 18th Hussars) through Chang Tang and Greater China to Peking and Tientsin.

In April 1895, I went home on two months' leave from the regiment at Nowshera. One day a camel sowar of the regiment came and couched his camel at the door of my house and told me to report myself to the Colonel at once. I mounted the camel behind him and in due course was brought up to the Commanding Officer who told me that there was a certain Captain Wellby Sahib going to China and that I was to go with him. I left Nowshera with Lieutenant Malcolm Sahib of the 93rd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and went to Kashmir where I met Captain Wellby. In Kashmir we bought clothes and other necessities for the journey and off we went to Laddakh. In Laddakh we bought camels, mules, ponies as transport to the value of about nine thousand rupees.

We started off along the Indus river for Shoshal which is a hill on the southern bank of the Indus ten marches to the east of Laddakh. Here we loaded up our seventy camels, mules and ponies with flour, grain and bhoosa and our journey started in real earnest.

* All the statements in this narrative have been confirmed from Captain Wellby's Book "Through Unknown Tibet, 1898".

From Shoshal village, I started sketching. We took no guide with us and relied entirely on the compass to find our way.

Chang Tang is a great plain which no one had ever thoroughly explored up to that time. The few travellers who had attempted to cross it had either died on the road or merely ventured into a corner and then come straight back. We, on the other hand, were to go right through the middle of it and were to find out all about the resources of the country, and to see if there were anything that might be of use to the Sarkar. Notwithstanding the great care we took in making preparations for the journey, we met with all sorts of difficulties from the very start and very soon the local inhabitants tried to prevent our further progress. This happened as follows :–

At the twelfth stage from Shoshal we camped by the side of the river east of Bandolah Dawan. Here we saw some savages of a tribe called the " Changpa " (people of Rudore and Rudok. Trans :), the number of whom gradually increased till there were about forty or fifty of them, and more and more came till by nightfall they had surrounded our camp.

They told us that their Chief Lama would not allow foreigners into his country. We of course paid no attention. They then threatened us with their rifles and swords, and actually threw stones at us. We got ready for a fight, but Wellby Sahib *Bahadur* said we had not come out to fight but to travel. Next morning we went back the way we had come. One of the Changpa went with us, but we gave him no fire to warm himself nor water to drink, so he soon got fed up and returned. We then gave up hope of travelling by that road and chose one more to the North over the Lanak La which they told us eventually led to the East. It was a dreary lonely track, and for seven months we saw no signs of human habitation.

A Shooting Accident.

One day Captain Wellby Sahib had gone out shooting small game. On his return he gave his gun, which he thought was empty, to his servant to carry. One barrel, however, was still loaded. One of our servants called Lassu tried to snatch it away from Esho (a Laddakhi servant) on whose left a mule driver, Sadiq by name, (called Sulloo in Captain Wellby's book) was walking. Esho whilst struggling with the gun cocked it, pressed the trigger, and let it off; and the whole charge of shot hit Sadiq in the face and smashed his lower jaw. He collapsed

on the ground groaning. We had no appliances on the spot—not even any tea to give him—nothing. So I put him on my mule and we took him along like that. In camp we fed him on bread sopped in tea. The situation was serious for he was in too great pain to move and implored to be left where he was to die. Captain Wellby pointed out that supplies were running short, and it was impossible to tell how long the journey was going to take, and that the whole party could not be held up for Sadiq. We left one man and one pony with him and went on. The first night—a long time after we had got into camp, the pony led by its driver, and carrying its huddled burden straggled into camp. We never saw them again—though for many evenings we strained our eyes to catch sight of them. They must have died for there was no sign of human habitation within at least four months' journey of where we left them.

Now our troubles began, for the road was deep in snow and the mules could get nothing to eat. After a week or so of such conditions one of the ponies died. The Sahib then decided to feed the animals on bread. As a result of this our own rations came to an end in a very short time. We then had to rely on our guns for food.

*Wild Horses.**

We saw great herds of wild horses, which career about in long lines and look like a Brigade of Cavalry drilling. They are small and chestnut coloured. They had never seen a man before, and would come right up close to look at us, and then run away for a mile or so and come up again

One evening on getting into camp we shot one of these horses for food, but its meat was very unwholesome. It gave me the most dreadful stomach ache. The Captain Sahib gave me some medicine, but it did me no good and I could not keep up on the march next day. At nightfall there was a heavy fall of snow, and in a short while the whole country was covered as with a white sheet. I made myself vomit, after which I felt a little better. I then fell head over heels into a snow drift and lay there unable to move. When dawn broke I staggered on, but the snow had obliterated all signs of the road. How-

* The Kyang or wild ass of Tibet and Laddakh usually stands about 14 hands; he is of a light brown colour, with white throat, belly and legs; rather heavy in neck and shoulders, he is nevertheless a graceful mover and there are few prettier sights than a herd of them scampering over the wide plain. (Through Unknown Tibet—Wellby.)

ever I started off in the general direction of our journey and soon met some men the sahib had sent to look for me. They helped me into camp. They gave me some hot soup of sorts which was all we had. After the meal we started off again.

Yaqs.

We now got to a part of the country where the Yaq, which is a sort of snow ox, abounds. The Yaq has long hair reaching nearly to the ground. I have never seen any other wild herbiferous animal so fat. There must be quite 30 lbs. of meat in one haunch.

One day a couple of these animals, a male and female, were going along in front of us, when all of a sudden the male turned and charged us. I could not shoot it as my rifle was in its canvas case, but I brandished it at the animal and he shied off and ran away.

The Servants Desert Us.

When the followers saw that our rations had come to an end they refused to obey orders, and objected, they said, to eating the flesh of wild animals. Twelve of our mules died and we had to leave the least important loads by the road side.

The experience I gained from this journey was that so long as you have even one Sahib with you, you will never die of hunger. For they have with them all the necessary implements for shikar ; double barrel guns, fishing rods, tackle, etc., etc.

When we could not get game, we used to eat wild onions which we found by the side of the road and collected in the spare nose bags of the animals that had died. Firewood was practically unobtainable.

One day, when a servant called Juma was watering his mule, he let it down into some filthy water which it proceeded to drink. The Sahib asked him if he was mad to let the mule drink such filthy stuff. Whereupon all the followers began to insult the Sahib and to shout at him. The Sahib Bahadur then kicked Juma hard, after which all the followers, including the Sahib's personal servants, packed up their belongings, and taking the Sahib's pistol which was in their keeping, left us and ran away back the way we had come.

The Sahib managed to persuade Lassu and Esho to stay with us. The other ten wandered about for several days, but as they found nothing to eat they came back and followed in our tracks for two or three days.

They obviously intended to murder us and take our stuff, so we took all possible precautions by day and night. One day they came up very close and shouted out that they were ready to obey our orders. We decided to take back one of them—Shukar Ali, and sent the others away. They were a constant source of danger to us for they were so many and we were so few.

One day our camp was by the side of a nullah to the east of which was a small hill. From the west we saw the mutinous servants coming along the nullah towards us. Wellby Sahib told me to have a shot at them with my rifle. Instead of this I drew out my long knife and went up the nullah towards them. The two Sahibs followed me up in support. As soon as the servants saw us they retreated precipitately. I tried hard to catch them up, but they got away in the jungle and right out of sight. We never saw them again, and heaven only knows what happened to them. They probably died, as there was no sort of human habitation within hundreds of miles.

The Mules Die.

We continued our march through country, the average height of which was 16,000 feet above sea level and where for several days our twelve mules got nothing to eat whatsoever. At length we came to a patch of vegetation at the foot of a hill and there we camped.

The unfortunate mules grazed till night fall. Then we rounded them up and picketed them, and went off to sleep. At about ten o'clock I saw the mules lying down as if they were dead and reported the matter to the Sahib. He came along with me to the mule lines and caught hold of a mule's head and I of its tail, and we tried to lift it on to its feet; but it collapsed on the ground again. To cut a long story short, eight of them died that night; one was dreadfully ill and died shortly afterwards. Of all our transport animals, only three mules remained. Before this, we had thrown away some of the loads, but that day we had to drop eighteen loads of clothes, uniforms, etc., and to leave the tents standing where they were. We left some very fine coats, poshtins, etc., including all the Sahibs' writing materials. It seems that Europeans find it very uncomfortable to sit down without a chair; for the Sahib threw away everything that he had, but carried his camp chair on his shoulder. I cut up the tripod of my plane-table for fire-wood. I took with me one blanket and the suit of clothes and Kashmiri sandals that I stood up in. The Arabs say that

"Travelling is Hell," and verily it is so. Wellby Sahib now said that from the theodolite it appeared that China was quite close, but the theodolite turned out to be wrong.

At last our clothes got completely worn out and threadbare. From continually wading through water, the skin of my feet had chapped and cracked and they were black with dirt, for we had no soap. We only had snow water to wash in, and after our journey it took us nearly a year to get clean for the dirt had eaten right into our skin.

Signs of Life.

We now began to see some signs of human habitation. After six months' march, one day we saw some sort of Buddhist inscription on a stone. Some ten days after this, we found some broken pieces of china tea cups and saucers by the edge of a pool, and this cheered us up tremendously. One morning after a heavy snow fall we had marched about four miles when Esho, the bearer, drew our attention to something black at the foot of the hill in front. The Sahib looked at it through his field glasses and said it was a black camel-hair tent. Esho went forward to investigate and came back and told us that it belonged to a merchant from Lhassa who was taking a thousand yaqs to China. We decided to go with him and caught him up next day. From him we found that China was more to the north and that if we had not met him we would have had yet another six months' journey in the desert; for we had been making for the sea, due east.

I had suffered a great deal from hunger, and now saw a chance of eating my fill. The merchant, however, refused to sell us food except at famine prices and the Sahib decided that the best thing we could do was to leave him and to push on ahead.

We bought a pony off him to supplement our three worn out mules. When we told him of our intention to push ahead, he warned us that we would lose the way and would again have to eat the flesh of dead animals in the wilderness. However, we managed to find out all about the road from the drivers in his caravan, and then we left him. Eventually our supplies came to an end, and the merchant's words came true.

One day Wellby Sahib shot a black bear which was very fat. We had a lot of difficulty in cooking it, as we had thrown away our cooking pots and the followers only had one each. I did not like the idea

of eating bear, but there was nothing for it, so we washed the flesh as well as we could and roasted it. From the very beginning I had told the Sahib that I was ready to eat anything that he thought was all right, but I did draw the line at big fat rats and bears.

We had been travelling at 16,000 feet when we suddenly had to come down to 8,000 feet. Here Captain Wellby Sahib found some black-berries and called out to us, "Hurrah! here is the fruit of China!

We were delighted.

A little further on we saw some houses, and later, when we saw more signs of life, the Captain Sahib told me to go ahead and reconnoitre. I went as far as I could, but saw no one and came back. That evening the Sahibs themselves went out and discovered that the local inhabitants were shepherds. We met some of them next day and they gave us some mutton to eat. We were now sure that we had really reached a civilized country where we should be able to get food and transport to relieve our exhausted mules.

On the 14th October we got to the city of Tonkar where we met a Swedish missionary, Mr. Rijnhart, by name. He had lived there for many years with his wife. He borrowed 200 dollars for us from the local Chinese officials. Thirty miles further on we came to Sining where we found a Doctor Ridley Sahib, who managed to procure a buggy for us.

The Hinterland of China.

The people look on all foreigners with the greatest contempt, and, as they all wear clothes of exactly the same pattern and colour, any foreigner is immediately recognisable. Even the Muhammadans wear little caps on their heads and pigtails down to their heels. The Buddhists and Christians wear long coats and trousers and sandals on their feet. The Chinese never cut their nails, which grow to an enormous length.

The currency consists of brass coins with holes in them which they thread on a string. About 250 of such coins go to a rupee. They also have a silver coin which they call a "Yambu" which is commonly used for exchange. Japanese dollars are also current, and Japanese matches and goods are sold everywhere.

One day I gave two men a rupee, telling them to take half each. One of them drew his sword and cut the rupee in half. I asked him why he had spoilt the coin. "Oh we always do that" he replied,

There are caravansarais at every stage, and everyone one meets in these, is just like the Persians rotten from drink and opium.

All Chinese women are lame and they are only able to limp for a short distance. When a girl is born, her feet are tightly bandaged up, so that even when she is full grown her feet remain like those of a baby. If a woman's feet are not so deformed, she is not considered fit to be married. I have seen the dhoolies in which they take the bride along to her wedding. She is seated in a sort of chair and is veiled, but any passer-by may ask the bearers to let him see the bride's face and they will put the dhooly down and she will unveil !

When a Chinaman dies, he is buried in the fields and all trace of his grave is soon lost in the cultivation.

On the 4th November 1896, we got to Chang Wei on the river Hoang Ho, where we embarked on a ship, and sailed for the city of Shabtiz, where one can see the Great Wall of China on a hill to the East. This wall is 1,600 miles long. For 450 miles between Shabtiz and Butan we followed the line of the wall. The wall is wide enough for a field gun to go along it.

The country is densely populated ; the villages are about a mile apart and every five or six miles you will find a town of considerable size. The road we followed ran through these settlements.

You can take it from me that all the idol worshippers in the world are concentrated in Tibet and China. In each and every street and lane in a Chinese town, there is an idol temple. Some of the idols are of gold, some of silver and others of brass. They are all placed in a row. At the gate of the temple there is usually a stone lion or some such thing. There are no metalled roads in China and carts merely follow each others tracks. Carts usually have two horses which are driven tandem. There were six of us and we hired three carts, in one of which Captain Wellby and I sat. One night we started at 10 o'clock and I asked the Sahib to let me walk for a little. We soon came to a stream which delayed me for some time, but the cart went on. It was pitch dark and I soon got lost. The road ahead split into two and I took the one to the left. At dawn, I came to a large hill on the side of which I saw a Chinaman. I had picked up enough Chinese to ask for what I wanted and to find the way, so I called out to him, " *Talu Pekin* ? " which means, " Where is the road to Pekin ? " He pointed to the other side of the hill and said," Down there." I found

that I had come a long way out of my way and could see nothing of the Sahibs. On I went. I was wearing a torn old fur cap, my breeches and coat were in tatters and my Kashmiri sandals in ribbons. I could not get rid of the people I met who followed along behind thinking I was a mad faqir. They jeered and hooted at me.

I met one good fellow who gave me an egg and a cup of tea. He refused to take any payment. On the morning of the third day I met the Sahibs in a caravansarai, but I felt very aggrieved that they had neither taken the trouble to wait for me nor had made any effort to search for me.

Pekin.

To the west of Pekin runs the same Great Wall, and here the road crosses the wall. At such points there are towers and the road splits up into three alley-ways and passes under the towers through tunnels. The road joins up again on the other side. There is a bridge to the west of Pekin which is built of stones of amazing length.

The road we had followed from Laddakh to Pekin was about 3,000 miles.

Pekin is a fine city which we entered by the Western Gate. We saw in front of us a fort, which we entered to find another fort, and inside that yet another and so on, the gates being all opposite one another. It is a very large and beautiful city, the shops are splendid and are decorated with coloured boards outside. One day I saw some Chinese soldiers in the bazar with banners in their hands marching along both sides of the road, and I heard that the King's daughter was coming along in a dhooly. A band was playing, but I must say that Chinese music did not appeal to me. It sounded like a lot of donkeys braying. I believe that the Chinese army has now improved a lot, but in those days their uniform was all in tatters and looked just like a faqir's blanket! Their rifles were mostly Russian single-loaders. There was nothing like discipline. When soldiers were walking along the street, they would often practise shooting at a stone. Officers were recognisable by a feather in their caps. No one pays any attention to the King's orders. The people do just what they damn well like and nothing else. There was a British Agent in Pekin, who did all he could to help us.

It is 100 miles from Pekin to Tientsin. In those days there were eighteen Sikh sepoys in Tientsin who acted as military police. They

got 18 dollars a month with rations, uniform, etc. In Tientsin, one finds ships from every country in the world. I saw a Japanese man-of-war in the harbour. The sailors seemed a very fine lot. Here we embarked in a ship and went to Hong Kong which we reached in seven days. Hong Kong is a lovely city and is built on a small island.

In seven days' time we reached Singapore. As I had no clothes fit to wear, I bought myself here a suit of clothes and some bedding. I then tied my old stuff into a bundle and threw it over board. Some onlookers asked me what I was doing and I replied "Thus have I destroyed the stronghold of the lice!" In due course we reached Calcutta *via* Penang and the Andamans.

Here I bade farewell to Captain Wellby. The Sahib *bahadur* went to Lucknow, and I rejoined the regiment in Nowshera. Some time after he sent me two hundred rupees and recommended me to the Quarter Master General in India for the MacGregor Medal which I was given with a reward of Rs. 150/-.

(To be continued.)


THE ROAD THROUGH CHANGTANG TO TIENTSIN.
Kyucha
PEKING
Tientsin
SINKIANG
Niyabi
Langchu.
Hoang Ho River.
Srinagar
Laddakh
CHANG TANG
Shoshal.
Rawalpindi
Tonkar
Sining
Lahore
TIBET
Lhassa
SCALE 500 MILES TO 1 INCH.

THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1861-62.

By Longtimber.

Some Short Notes on the Shenandoah Valley Campaign.

Policy and Strategy.—A Government has a right of control over its servants but Lincoln did much to ruin McClellan's plan, his action was ill-advised and defeated its own ends.

In framing a plan of campaign the commander must consider the susceptibilities of his Government. McClellan's plan to move by sea to Fort Munroe would have compelled the *Confederates* to conform and concentrate for the defence of Richmond, but he did not take the trouble to convince his Government of this; he also miscalculated the time required. Lincoln, however, realised this.

The battle of *Kernstown* (March 23rd '62) realised Lincoln's fears and upset McClellan's plan. Once political fears are roused, Governments will exercise their right of control.

Government control was just as severe on the *Confederate* side. But Lee acknowledged this right of control and was loyal to it.

Lee's policy was to let the enemy advance into difficult country where they could not profit by their numbers.

Each side had three ideas :—

1. To take the enemy's Capital.
2. To defend its own Capital.
3. To defeat the enemy forces.

Note the abnormal value attached to Capitals.

Strategy was disregarded because Public opinion :—

1. Does not understand concentration but only dispersion.
2. Fails to grasp time and space conditions.
3. Favours detachments.

At the commencement of hostilities tactics were Crimean in nature but soon altered to suit new conditions.

Topography.—Roads in Virginia few and bad. Natural obstacles very great. Eastern Virginia thickly wooded. Rivers very large, bridges few and far between, a few fords. The use of rivers by the *Federals* contributed largely to their ultimate success.

The *Shenandoah* Valley 20 to 25 miles across and 140 miles long, well cultivated with few fences. The valley of the *South Fork* narrower and more wooded than that of the *North Fork*. A number of vitally important gaps existed in the *Blue Ridge*. Note the salient frontier of the *Confederate* country.

1861 *War.*—In April 1861, the attack on Fort *Sumter* opened the war. Little of importance occurred, however, till the battle of *Bull Run* on 21st July 1861.

Dispositions. McDowell (F), 50,000 about Washington.

Beauregard (C), 20,000 at Manassas Junction.

Near Harpers Ferry, Patterson (F) with 14,000 was confronted by J. E. Johnston (C). with 11,000.

The *Confederates* succeed in debouching from the Valley. Afterwards, however, Jackson would have liked to advance, but halts at Winchester.

The *Federals* awake at last to their difficulties. McClellan assumed command, he held the confidence of the troops under him.

Jackson wished to take the offensive after Bull Run but Jefferson Davis would not weaken certain places in the south in order to provide the necessary troops. Abandoning territory a constant fear.

McClellan wanted time to organise his forces and undoubtedly got it as the *Confederates* made no move. By refusing to advance McClellan forfeited the confidence of his Government with disastrous future results.

Jackson on the other hand, always considered how his movement would assist Lee and hamper McClellan.

The Federals had three main lines of advance against Richmond.

(*a*) Via the Shenandoah Valley.

(*b*) Via Alexandria-Manassas Junction—Culpepper and Gordonsville.

(*c*) Via Aquia Creek—Fredericksburg and Hanover Court House.

Outline of events up to the commencemert of 1862.

1. Battle of Bull Run 21st July 1861.
2. McClellan re-organises the *Federal* troops.
3. *Confederate* leaders anxious to assume the offensive.
4. Jackson in command in the Valley.
5. The expedition to Romney 13th January 1862.

Situation, February 1862.

Federals.

200,000 round Washington under McClellan.

20,000 in the Alleghanies under Fremont ($\frac{1}{2}$ at Petersburg near Moorfield and $\frac{1}{2}$ 100 miles west of Staunton).

38,000 under Banks north of Winchester.

Fort Munroe was held by the *Federals.*

In all approximately 260,000 men.

Confederates.

32,000 at Centreville under J. E. Johnston with a detachment at Leesburg.

4,600 under Jackson at Winchester.

A force under Magruder near Yorktown.

A force holding Norfolk.

McClellan's plan of campaign.

The people of the North favoured a direct advance upon Richmond which would cover Washington and lead to a decisive battle.

McClellan, however, overestimated the *Confederate* strength, was deterred by the natural obstacles presented by rivers, forests and bad roads and also by the difficulties of supply up to Fredericksburg.

He proposed to overcome these difficulties by turning the *Confederate* right and using the York and James rivers to feed his men.

He calculated that the *Confederates* would hurry down to Richmond. Time and space were against him.

Jackson, from his position at Winchester, threatened western Virginia and Maryland and cut the communications by the Baltimore and Ohio railway and could menace Washington. In addition he could reinforce troops at Centreville.

Jackson's reputation was beginning to cause alarm in the breasts of the *Federal* leaders.

Both Lee and Jackson early recognised how vulnerable Washington was politically and as a junction of communications.

McClellan's original plan to land at Urbanna was vetoed by the Government who suggested that he could either (*a*) go to Fort Munroe or (*b*) advance overland. He chose (*a*). He was instructed to leave sufficient force for the defence of Washington. His plan was right in principle but wrong in detail. It required early success and

would be defeated by serious delay. An overseas expedition with untrained troops is more difficult than a direct advance especially when the hostile positions are known. His movement was on exterior lines leaving Washington uncovered. He therefore had to bear at once upon the enemy's main army and never relax.

Diary of events from 7th till 23rd March 1862.

March 7th—9th. *Confederates* fall back on Richmond. Jackson isolated in the Valley—3,600 Infantry, 600 Cavalry and 27 guns. Jackson's orders were to keep the enemy employed without exposing himself to defeat, in order to prevent them from reinforcing their main army.

7th. Hill retires from Leesburg.

9th. J. E. Johnston retires. This coincides with the *Federal* advance towards Centreville but was not caused by it. Banks ordered to occupy Winchester. His force divided into three Divisions of average strength 12,500.

11th. *Confederate* "Council of War" resulting in Jackson's retirement from Winchester. This caused McClellan to order Williams to Manassas, Sedgwick to join main army and Shields to remain to look after Jackson.

12th. Banks occupies Winchester and Jackson, Strasburg. Banks estimates Jackson's force at 11,000 men.

18th. Shields is pushed on from Winchester to Strasburg.
Jackson falls back to Mount Jackson.
His real strength is ascertained by Banks.

20th. Sedgwick, Williams and Banks ordered to move on Manassas. Shields to continue to watch Jackson and protect the Baltimore railway.

21st. Jackson learns that Shields is retiring. He decides to attack.

22nd. Ashby's cavalry get into touch with Shields, south of Winchester.

23rd. Jackson, after two marches of 14 and 21 miles, decides to halt. He finds his camp overlooked by the enemy. Bad staff work. This brought on the battle of *Kernstown*.

To realise the strategic result of this battle the general situation must be borne in mind.

General Situation.

A portion of the main *Federal* army had begun to land at Fort Munroe on 19th March ; but on 23rd March this was unknown to the *Confederates.*

Remainder of *Federal* main force had advanced to Centreville with cavalry on line of the Rapidan. *Confederates* had fallen back.

Banks' force—Williams to join main army *via* Snickers Gap. Shields to Winchester, Sedgwick to the west.

On 23rd March, Ashby's cavalry had a skirmish with the *Federals* and located 4 regiments of infantry, some guns and cavalry.

Jackson on coming up decided, at first, not to attack, then changed his mind thinking that he had a *rear guard* in front of him and correctly attacked. It was lucky for him that he had not attacked earlier since his movements were all exposed to his enemy.

The *Federals* did not profit by their opportunities. They had a weak holding attack in front and might have got through, but Jackson's boldness imposed on them. Jackson in this battle attacked at the start with 3 regiments ; this did not deceive the *Federals* who had 8 battalions opposed to him and sent away 6 to reinforce the decisive point.

Information.

The importance of early tactical information is brought out in this fight. In this case Jackson thought that he was in front of an inferior force though actually out-numbered by 3 to 1.

Would he have been justified in attacking, if he had been aware of the real facts.

The Battle.

Federals.—Tyler's brigade north of Winchester.
Kimble with 5 battalions behind Pritchards Hill.
Sullivan's brigade supporting Kimble, concealed from Ashby.

Confederates.—Stonewall brigade (Garnett) 5 battalions.
Hookhan's brigade 2 battalions.
Burke's brigade 4 battalions.
Ashby's cavalry and 3 horse-guns (280 men).

At the commencement of the fight 4 out of 5 batteries had been left south of Kernstown.

Jackson quickly saw that the occupation of the " Sandy Ridge " would cause the *Federal* rear guard to fall back to save their communi-

cations with Winchester. In about 20 minutes he had seized the ridge but came under heavy artillery fire from his right flank.

Jackson's containing attack had soon been reduced to a few men under Ashby, one battalion of Burke's brigade and the 48th Virginia Regiment.

On reaching the sandy ridge, Jackson had deployed into two lines and occupied a small stone wall. He had no reserve. His guns could only engage those on Pritchards Hill and were unable to keep down the hostile infantry fire.

By this time Tyler's brigade was attacking Jackson from the Toll Gate and Kimble had not been deceived by the containing attack.

As the situation appeared to be getting desperate, Garnett (without orders) sent back the Stonewall brigade to take up a position to cover the *Confederate* retirement. Jackson quickly realised that there was only just time to get the troops away. The *Confederates* retired to Newtown unmolested; a portion of Ashby's cavalry covered the retirement.

Note the difficulty of pursuit, almost always so in history.

Effect of the Battle.

The effect of this battle upon the *Federal* Government was far-reaching:—

1. Williams' Division (8,000 men) recalled from Manassas to Winchester.
2. Shields' command tied to the Winchester area.
3. Federal Government's attention drawn to Jackson's force and the Upper Potomac.
4. Blenker's Division (9,000 men) withdrawn from McClellan and ordered to Western Virginia.
5. Becoming concerned for the defence of Washington, Lincoln order the 1st Army Corps, 37,000 strong, under McDowell, to remain at Manassas instead of embarking for the Peninsula, thus McClellan's force of 150,000 men for the advance on Richmond was reduced by 46,000.
6. McDowell given an independent command covering the approaches to Washington.
7. Banks also withdrawn from McClellan and ordered to defend the Valley.

McClellan on the eve of his advance upon Richmond thus found himself considerably weakened and embarrassed by Lincoln's action.

Tactical Notes on Kernstown.

Jackson's tactics based on sound principles. His flank movement risky, but he believed his information reliable. His manner of execution was in accord with the principle of co-operation of all arms. He was, however, ultimately unable to use his artillery for the support of his infantry. His cavalry co-operated on both flanks.

If the *Federals* had pushed on they could have rolled up the *Confederate* right flank and compelled Jackson to get away across country.

Jackson did not consider the day lost as long as he had an untouched reserve. But for Garnett's order to retire, Jackson said he would have won the battle. There was confusion as to who was in command of the flank attack; Jackson did not make this point clear. Therefore question for consideration—" the position of a commander in battle ? " Very important from point of view of staff, especially now with complicated system of command.

Use of cavalry. In attack or defence, keep the mass of cavalry on one flank, but have some on the other. The *Confederate* cavalry, though few in numbers, was used to protect *both* flanks. Out of 600 *Confederate* cavalry only 280 were actually present in action. It was owing to the action of Ashby and his cavalry that the *Federals* did not pursue Jackson after the battle.

* * * * * * *

Following on the results of Kernstown, the *Federal* forces were divided into 4 armies under :—

(*a*) McClellan. (*b*) McDowell. (*c*) Banks. (*d*) Fremont.

All controlled from Washington.

Banks now halted 6 days at Strasburg.

Note the importance of the Massanuttons (50 miles long) as an obstacle, passable only by the road Newmarket—Luray.

Diary.—On April 2nd. Banks at Woodstock with cavalry 5 miles south of Edenburg. Jackson fell back slowly to Rudes Hill, 2½ miles south of Mt. Jackson.

Ashby in touch with *Federals*. Jackson's force increased to 6,000.

April 5th McClellan advanced up the Peninsula. His 60,000 men checked by 15,000 under Magruder for 5 days.

Ashby with 1 Sec. guns and 1 infantry brigade seperated from Jackson in order to check Banks at Edenburg.

He succeeds in holding Banks back for 14 days.

April 10th *Confederates* commenced to retire.

General Situation on 16th April 1862.

Confederates.	Main Army.	50,000	Johnston	Yorktown Peninsula.
		10,000	Anderson	Fredericksburg.
	Left Flank.	8,000	Ewell	Culpepper.
		6,000	Jackson	Rudes Hill.
		3,000	E. Johnston	McDowell.
Federals.		100,000	McClellan	Peninsula.
		37,000	McDowell	Fredericksburg.
		20,000		South of Washington.
		7,000		Warrenton.
		19,000	Banks	Woodstock.
		20,000	Fremont	Moorfield.
		9,000	Blenker	Harpers Ferry.

The *Confederate* front was 150 miles long, the *Federal* 220 miles.

The *Confederates* were on "Interior" lines with minimum of detachments. The *Federals* were on "Exterior" lines and held the initiative; the *Confederates* could do nothing but wait for a false move.

Jackson's Tasks.

(1) To contain *Federals*.

(2) Prevent them occupying the Valley and capturing Staunton.

(3) To be in a position to move to Richmond at any moment.

April 17th. Jackson at Harrisonburg. The importance of Staunton, *i.e.*, Supply depot—road junction—railway and strategical point.

Jackson prepares an alternative base at Gordonsville.

Courses open to Jackson.

(1) Wait at Harrisonburg and call up Ewell.

(2) Remain at Harrisonburg and order Ewell to act on Banks' communications.

(3) Retire on Staunton, between Fremont and Banks, but Valley south of Harrisonburg open and unsuitable to Jackson's small force.

(4) Join main army.

(5) Collect at Fisher's Gap.

(6) Move to Elk Run Valley, recalling Ewell to him, from here he could cover his own communications and threaten those of Banks better than from Harrisonburg. He was also safe from Fremont in the Alleghanies.

He decides to move to Elk Run Valley.

Consider his strategic position there and his appreciation of the situation.

Banks moves slowly forward towards Staunton with cavalry to Harrisonburg. E. Johnston pushed back to within 7 miles of Staunton.

Blenker sent to join Fremont and *Confederates* learn that McDowell is concentrating at Fredericksburg.

Jackson therefore submits 3 proposals to Lee.

1. Combine with Ewell and move by Luray Gap against Banks.
2. Combine with E. Johnston against Milroy at McDowell, and then deal with Banks.
3. Move *via* Front Royal against Banks.

Lee leaves the choice to Jackson and he selects the 2nd plan.

Possible ways of moving.

1. By Harrisonburg.
2. By Port—Republic—Cross Keys—Staunton.
3. Up the eastern side of the Shenandoah, across Blue Ridge by Brown's Gap to Mechums River Station.

He chose the third route and 8 days after his march started the *Federals* knew nothing about it.

Situation during May 1862.

May 3rd and 4th. *Confederates* evacuated Yorktown Peninsula.

5th. Rear-guard action at Williamsburg.
Federals occupied West Point.

10th. *Confederates* evacuated Norfok. Huger burnt his stores and fell back.

11th. Merrimac blown up.

Federals making arrangements to reinforce McDowell with Shields' division.

Anderson (12,000) near Fredericksburg facing McDowell.

Johnston falling back before McClellan.

Fremont strung out all along the Valley.

Banks falling back on Newmarket. Milroy at McDowell.

Fremont between Franklin and Romney. Jackson at Staunton.

E. Johnston at West View 7 miles west of Staunton.

Ewell at Swift Run Gap.

Note the doubt amongst the *Federal* leaders as to Jackson's intentions. Jackson thought that Milroy's force was the smaller and that it should, therefore, be attacked.

Situation in the Valley.

May 6th. E. Johnston moves a short distance and Jackson follows him from Staunton.

8th. E. Johnston halted 8 miles east of McDowell. The road to McDowell crossed Bull Pasture Run, a considerable obstacle but not unfordable.

Note Milroy's position at McDowell.

Jackson decides to hold Sitlington Hill and turn the *Federal* left during the night. But at 3 p.m. Milroy decides to attack to gain time to get away. The Offensive-Defensive.

Note moral effect of Milroy's attack :—

1. Jackson's plans frustrated.
2. Jackson surprised. It was an encounter battle.

The Battle.

May 8th. Five *Federal* battalions attacked.

E. Johnston had 6 battalions on Sitlington Hill, he was afterwards reinforced by the "Stonewall" brigade.

At about 6 p.m., *Federals* began to retire.

Federal guns had no targets—*Confederates* had no guns.

Confederates did not pursue. Was this owing to the difficulty of the country ?—or paucity of troops ?—or both factors ?

The *Federals* drew off towards Franklin.

Point for consideration—Milroy might have occupied Sitlington Hill originally and attacked the head of Jackson's column emerging from the Bull Pasture Mountain defile.

9th & *10th*. Jackson follows Milroy.

11th. Milroy at Franklin.

Note Jackson's foresight, after the battle, in sending cavalry to close roads entering the Valley from the west. In one case felling trees across the road on both sides for over a mile. A good after result when Jackson was withdrawing down the Valley.

12th. Jackson decides to return to the Valley as he might be required at Richmond at any moment.

May 17th. Jackson reaches Mount Solon, having separated Fremont from Banks.

Lee's Plan of Campaign.

The offensive-defensive. He decides to attack Lincoln in Washington and *not* McClellan near Richmond.

Lee wished to leave Johnston and Anderson where they were, attack Banks in the Valley and *thus* Lincoln and Washington.

Johnston appreciates the situation. He wished to concentrate at once and attack all forces in his front.

On 1st June *Lee assumes command* of the *Confederate* forces in the field.

* * * * * * *

Jackson in the Valley.

May 19th. Jackson at Mt. Solon. His force 17,000 men in 2 divisions, consisting of 48 guns, 3 regiments of cavalry, and 13,000 infantry.

He advances against Banks.

Note the position of Banks. It is always dangerous to operate from an insecure base. Note the position of the Massanuttons. His force was divided thus :—

At Strasburg, 3,000 cavalry, 15 guns, 4,000 infantry.

At Buckton, 1,000 infantry and the remainder about Front Royal.

Jackson reaches Newmarket. Ashby's cavalry held the fork of the roads from Luray and Newmarket, thus Banks never knew from which direction to expect attack.

Note Jacksons manœuvre in the nature of a raid and his method of approach against Front Royal.

He could always fall back by Staunton or Gordonsville.

From Newmarket he crossed the Massanuttons to Luray.

May 23rd. Approaching Front Royal Jackson left the pike about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of that place and moved towards the Front Royal *Federals* by an unwatched rough track. Kenley at Front Royal had no cavalry for reconnaissance.

Action at Front Royal 23rd May 1862.

Remarkable result of charge of 250 *Confederate* cavalry.

Jackson's reasons for attacking Kenley (weaker force) rather than Banks.

Contrary to the method of holding weaker force, Jackson thought that:—

1. He could annihilate Kenley.
2. He would be in a better position to attack from Front Royal than from the south.

Appreciation of the characteristics of the hostile Generals.

Jackson wished his enemies to think that he was moving in force up the North Fork, whereas he sent Ashby that way and slipped off from Newmarket across the Massanuttons.

Note his method of surprise and rapidity. He organised a "Corps of Orderlies." Wellington organised a similar Corps.

It was not till about 4-30 p.m. that Banks heard of the defeat of Kenley and not till 10 a.m. next day (24th) that he realised his danger.

Jackson was in doubt as to Banks' line of retreat from Strasburg. *There were 3 courses of action open to Banks.*

(*a*) He could move west towards Fremont's force near Moorfield and Franklin.

(*b*) Move east through Front Royal and Chester Gap towards Geary's small force.

(*c*) Hold on at Strasburg and wait for reinforcements from Winchester.

Jackson thought that he would adopt course (*b*), but Banks elected to fall back on Winchester. Had Jackson gone straight for Winchester he could have got there first. But then Banks by adopting (*b*) could have saved himself.

Action of Jackson.

He sent half Ashby's cavalry by the Front Royal-Strasburg road. Half to Cedarville and Middletown.

Ewell moved to Nineveh with his cavalry to Newtown.

Jackson did not want to let go of Cedarville before he definitely knew Banks' line of march.

At 10 a.m. Banks sent half his baggage to Winchester where it arrived safely, later he sent the second half with an infantry escort, this was captured by Ashby. Note the indiscipline of Ashby's cavalry and looting.

Banks sent one regiment to Middletown which delayed Jackson from Cedarville. Note rear-guard of 2,000 cavalry, and remarkable pursuit by night after battle in front of Winchester.

May 25th. Battle of Winchester.

Note:—1. The danger of detachments.

2. Indiscipline of Ashby's cavalry.
3. Steuart's "Pedantic Folly."
4. Difficulty of co-operation between detachments when attacking.
5. Jackson's expedient for replacing cavalry.

Jackson and Ewell attacked at Winchester, the former opposed by two and the latter by one brigade. There was no mutual support by either but the attacks were simultaneous.

The *Confederates* were double the number of the *Federals*, but when the *Confederate* cavalry was required to pursue it was looting.

The *Federal* cavalry charged to assist the retirement of Banks. Ashby went away to Berryville but Steuart would not take an order except through his immediate superior (Ewell). Jackson, therefore, put his gunners on horseback and sent them in pursuit.

Banks crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, north of Harpers Ferry.

Note the length of the *Confederates* marches.

Lee sends instructions to Jackson to press the enemy to Harper's Ferry and threaten Maryland.

May 29th. Jackson drives in the *Federal* piquets at Harpers Ferry.

Result of Jackson's Operations.

McDowell withdrawn from assisting McClellan and sent back to Washington for the second time.

Every available *Federal* in the west sent to Harper's Ferry.

McClellan told that he must either take Richmond at once or return to Washington.

Diary of Events.

May 24th. On 24th May, orders were sent to McDowell to send 29,000 troops *via* Manassas Gap and together with Fremont from Franklin, to cut off and capture Jackson's force.

Note how Jackson's action, in closing the roads after the battle of McDowell, operated on Fremont's march.

Note also Jackson's precarious position.

May 29th. Fremont had been ordered to move on Harrisonburg. This was changed on 29th. Fremont with 15,000 men was east of Moorfield. Shields was near Manassas Gap. But Jackson had good roads whilst the *Federals* had bad ones. Moreover the *Federals* had telegraphic communications but *no direct* inter-communication. Jackson had the choice of two routes and was superior to any single *Federate* force.

May 30th. Jackson marched south and reached Strasburg on afternoon of 31st. The 12th Georgia Regiment was overwhelmed at Front Royal. Ashby held off Fremont, who had stupidly taken up a defensive position at Cedar Creek.

June 1st. By night-time Jackson was safe at Woodstock.

McDowell should have marched on Staunton and *not* on Winchester as there was no time to go by Manassas Junction.

Jackson with his whole force at Woodstock finds his position untenable.

June 2nd. He falls back to the southern end of the Massanuttons in order to secure his line of retreat to Richmond. He burns the bridges at White House, Conrads Store, Columbia, Luray and elsewhere.

Fremont's force follows up the North Fork and Shields up the South Fork.

Note.—Intercommunication was only possible by the northern end of the Massanuttons. Jackson by retreating south would thus be able to keep his enemies separated and could communicate with Richmond as long as he did not let in Shields on his eastern flank.

The South Fork was unfordable below Port Republic. Jackson also burnt the bridge near Mt. Jackson. And at Harrisonburg he ferried his sick over the river to Staunton.

June 5th. Jackson's main force reaches Cross Keys.

Ashby killed in a rear-guard skirmish. A great blow to the "Army of the Valley."

Had Jackson burnt the bridge at Port Republic he could have attacked Shields, but Fremont's artillery could have assisted Shields in the battle. Besides Shields would have been directly on his communications. Thus Ewell was left at Cross Keys to stop Fremont whilst Jackson dealt with Shields.

Fremont, however, attacked rather earlier than was expected.

June 8th. Situation :—*Federals.* Fremont—15,000 men at Harrisonburg. Shields—13,000 spread out over 25 miles.

Confederates. Ewell—three brigades at Cross Keys. Jackson at Port Republic. } About 16,000 men.

Note how Jackson adapted his strategy to the configuration of the country.

The Battle. Fremont attacked at Cross Keys and at the same time Shields' cavalry made a raid on Port Republic.

The *Federal* attacks were *not* concerted and Fremont employed only half his force. With superior force he attacked Ewell's right. Ewell reserved his fire till the enemy were within 60 yards. A vigorous counter-

attack by Trimble (on his own initiative) followed, with the result that Fremont at once withdrew his containing attack.

Note:—1. Trimble's initiative, the effect of his counter-stroke, the proper use of reserves.
2. The importance of co-operation in the attack.
3. The effect of running short of ammunition.

June 9th. *Action of Port Republic.*

Strong *Federal* position, guns on Coal Pit Hill.

At 5 a.m. movement against Shields began. The bridge made over the river was indifferent. Shields was strung out but his advanced troops (4,000) were in a strong position between the river and Coal Pit Hill.

Jackson sends Taylor's brigade to turn the enemy left flank.

Federals counter-attack checked. Pursuit by *Confederates* for 9 miles.

Jackson bivouacs at Brown's Gap, 9 marches from Richmond. McDowell's force at Conrad's Store, 15 marches from McClellan. Fremont at Mt. Jackson.

Lessons:—Effect of strong containing attack.
Effect of weakly improvised bridge.
Loss of way.

Lee realises that if he supports Jackson, McDowell would not be allowed to move on Richmond. Thus McDowell's corps was finally concentrated as a separate command at Manassas.

Lee sends two brigades to reinforce Jackson.

June 14th. Shields at Front Royal. Fremont and Banks at Middletown. McDowell's corps concentrated at Manassas.

June 17th. Jackson withdraws his entire force towards Richmond; reaching Ashland Junction on 25th June.

June 28th. Even on this date Banks thought that Jackson was about to attack him at Middletown. This indicates the excellent use of cavalry by Steuart, who screened the withdrawal of Jackson's troops with great skill and success.

Remarks on the Campaign, from which lessons can possibly be learnt, for future guidance.

Concentration of numbers at the decisive point.

Jackson's skill lay more in his strategical object than in his actual tactics. At Kernstown he failed tactically.

A preponderance in numbers does not always ensure victory.

At Winchester Jackson employed 16,000; about double the enemy's strength.

At Cross Keys Fremont attacked, but used only some 7,000 men whilst Ewell had only 8,000.

At Port Republic Jackson had 6,000 against Shields' 4,500.

Jackson always combined a front with an enveloping attack.

Jackson's eye for country, a new idea at that time.

Development of tactics to suit possibilities of modern conditions.

Employment of cavalry. When Jackson moved from Elk Run, to Staunton, he used his cavalry to screen his movements; and afterwards to seal up the passes south of Moorfield.

Note the personal influence of Jackson and Ashby.

Not only the characteristics of hostile commanders, but the methods of warfare adopted by opponents must be considered.

Effect of a small force on major operations. McClellan's plan was good, but Jackson's detachment deprived him of some 46,000 men.

Had the Federals gone straight ahead with their converging forces they might have succeeded, but the difficulty of doing so was too great for them. For example, Jackson's retirement from Harper's Ferry. In spite of the fact that Fremont and Shields were in telegraphic communication with Washington, they failed.

Jackson would not have taken up a flank position at Elk Run, had he been opposed by a commander of equal calibre. He might easily have been bottled up and Banks left free to march on Staunton.

Note use of the Massanuttons and South Fork of Shenandoah to prevent co-operation of Fremont and Shields.

Use of offensive action to upset adversary's plan; example, Milroy's attack at McDowell which greatly interfered with Jackson's plan.

Value of counter-attack at Bull Run and Kernstown.

Necessity for discipline and training as exemplified in the early stages of the war, the evils of short term enlistments. In this respect compare the enlistment organisation of the North with Lord Kitchener's "three years or the duration" in the Great War; if the North had enlisted for the "duration," it is doubtful whether the South could have held out for any length of time.

Note the evils of "Individualism" in the lower ranks of an army.

Simple plans are most suitable for ill-disciplined troops.

Note the effect of an initial victory in a campaign (Bull Run).

Danger of detachments not uniting in time.

Results of "piecemeal" attacks.

Reserves should not be used merely to guard line of retreat, *e.g.*, Garnett's action at Kernstown. There were, however, several instances of the correct use of reserves in this campaign.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

Quetta or Camberley ?

Dear Sir,

I am writing to ask whether any of your readers could give me advice in a matter which is rather close to my heart. In the July number of an English Service Journal there is an article on "How to Succeed in the Army" by "The Mother of Four Officers", and in it she states that officers who have been through the Quetta Staff College are not rated quite so highly as those who have gone through Camberley. I have just passed through Quetta and am an eligible bachelor: and the idea that I am slightly below the Camberley standard has rather blighted my hopes, for I have long been aware, when straightening my tie on entering a drawing room, that I am being weighed up by calculating feminine eyes, and I had hoped that in future I should be able to overcome the awkward feeling by knowing that my fingering was drawing attention to the tie's distinctive colours, and by being able to drop a few casual references to "when I was at the Staff College." But the "Mother's" article has brought home the fact to me, rather forcibly, that I may be faced with the question, "Oh, which Staff College were you at?" and that I may find myself stammering confusedly to the girl's parent, "Er-er, Quetta", and trying to tread on the cat's tail in order to create a diversion. For it's this daughter question that is worrying me. My object is the same as it always has been, to observe rigidly the principle of economy of effort, but I am now beginning to feel that I need a secure base to work from, and so I am on the lookout for a really wealthy young woman whom I can fall back on in case I lose my job. The thought that I shall be competing in this with men rated at a higher standard of intellect than mine fills me with gloom, nor can I avoid its happening, because the principles of peace are immutable and the Camberley bachelors are bound to be on the same tack. Could any of your readers give me advice as to how to overcome this handicap of inferiority? I should be truly grateful if they would help me to spend my declining years in comfort and not let me lose my objective to some cupidous Camberley fellow. I am not really so very deficient intellectually, for I have written to my mother, and she says of course not, even though I may take more after father than after her.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
JOHN HOOKER.

WHO WAS THACKERAY'S MAJOR GAHAGAN ?

SIR,

The account of the career of Local Lieut.-Col. William Linnæus Gardner, given in the article " Was Thackeray's Major Gahagan ? " in your July unmber, requires some corrections and additions.

(*a*) Gardner's first commission was not in H.M. 89th Foot, as is to be inferred from the article. He was commissioned as ensign, H.M. 63rd Foot, from 20th March 1783 ; and transferred to the 89th on 23rd April following.

(*b*) In 1796, as Colonel Maunsell states, Gardner went on half-pay again, as Captain of an Independent Company ; but he resigned from H.M's. service in 1798.

(*c*) The date of his joining the Raja of Jaipur has so far as I am aware never been ascertained ; but I have the best authority for saying that he was in the Jaipur service and at Jaipur itself, on 1st Sept. 1803. That is to say, Gardner had left Holkar's service before (and probably some months before) the battles of Assaye, Delhi and Laswari.

(*d*) It is incorrect to write of Alan Hyde Gardner as " the last Lord Gardner ". This person was merely a claimant to the English and Irish baronies of Gardner of Uttoxeter and to the baronetcy of Gardner (cr. 9 Sept. 1794) : he never established his right thereto. The position is thus correctly stated in Burke's Peerage ; " Since the death of Alan Legge, 3rd Lord Gardner, 2nd Nov. 1883, the right to the baronies of Gardner has not been established, although an heir obviously exists ". The titles are thus dormant, and have been claimed in recent years by representatives of two branches of the family.

I am, etc.,

29th July 1932. B.

Three Arms and Six Legs.

Sir,

"Phœnix" in his article "Three Arms and Six Legs" has attempted to show that the bayonet is an essential weapon for Cavalry in order that it may carry out its duties fully, especially on the Frontier of India.

I do not think that the fact of its desirability will be disputed by many cavalrymen, most of whom have probably served at one time or other on the Frontier. I do not propose to enter into a discussion as to the advisability or otherwise of re-arming Cavalry with bayonets. That is a matter of weighing up the advantages of its re-introduction, against the disadvantages of efficiency lost in time taken in bayonet training, which is at present allotted to training in subjects which are considered more essential.

"Phœnix" (a cavalryman himself) states that "*The real trouble is that cavalry don't want the bayonet now*". He invites his readers to find the reasons for this objection, by reading his article again from the beginning. I have done so.

I will pass no comment on the somewhat irrelevant remarks concerning the cavalryman's possession of seven pairs of shining boots, and the thrill of the lance pennon; except that the lance has now been abolished as a weapon for war for Indian Cavalry, as well as British, and that seven pairs of shining boots are difficult to maintain at present for financial reasons.

His remaining (not entirely relevant) reasons, however are worthy of remark. They may be summarised as follows:—

(1) Equitation and training of horses receive too much consideration.

(2) Horses are incorrectly trained by the use of unnatural obstacles, and pampered by soft going.

(3) The cavalryman's objection to getting off his horse, and his apparent desire to sit on one to retain the "Cavalry Spirit."

I propose to comment on these subjects with a view to clearing up a certain amount of misunderstanding which may possibly exist with others as well as "Phœnix"

1. *Equitation and training of Horses receive too much consideration.*

It has been the policy for some years in the training of cavalry to eradicate this fault which existed some years ago. The training of a remount now takes on an average 12 months ; it is doubtful if this can ever be reduced appreciably and economical efficiency retained. Consideration must be given to the fact that if young horses are advanced in their training too rapidly, their legs are liable to not stand the strain, and that they may be prematurely broken down. When a horse has been passed into the ranks, he receives little additional training other than that received on equitation parades.

During the Individual Training Season 1932, the proportion of hours spent on equitation, in one Indian Cavalry Regiment, compared with hours spent on other subjects of training was as 1 is to $4\frac{1}{2}$.

(These are actual figures, taken from detailed records kept of one squadron, and do not include educational training or routine parades such as " stables ").

2. (*a*) *Horses are trained mostly over " Imitations of obstacles found in England and places outside India."*

This statement is incorrect. The obstacles used for the training of this same regiment, and of several others that I have seen, are mostly imitations of (or actual) mud walls, banks, ditches, water cuts, nalas, sunken roads and thorn fences, all of which are met with in India. There are a few timber and brushwood fences to give variety and to accustom horses to unusual obstacles.

(*b*) *Horses are Pampered by soft going.*

" Given practice over rocky country.....their feet harden and so withstand the jar." The horses (of his regiment) *after several years on the frontier had feet of iron.....Few were lame."*

I venture to question the soundness of the policy implied by these statements, for the following reasons :—

The regiment, to which I have already referred, during a tour of duty on the frontier, suffered remarkably little from casualties in lameness from the hard going. After leaving the frontier, the trouble started. A phenomenal number of horses showed signs of lameness due to ring bone, side bone and pedal ostitis. They truly had " *feet of iron* ", and eventually a considerable number had to be destroyed.

It is neither sound from a training point of view, economical, nor humane, to jump horses on to or train them on hard ground if soft going is available. Horses feet harden up remarkably rapidly as soon as hard and stony going is met with. Practice in this is unnecessary.

Also any soldier worthy of the name is capable of realizing that "*anything rougher and more likely to damage a horse*" than a parade ground or a prepared surface is not "*a thing to be avoided*" when the slightest necessity arises.

(3) *The Cavalryman's objection to getting off his horse, and his apparent desire to sit on one to retain the "cavalry spirit."*

I do not propose to discuss fully the subject of the "cavalry spirit." I will, however, state that it is in no way connected with "*sitting on a horse*" or "*the charge.....carried out haphazard.*"

In the last century very great advances have been made in the power of rifle and artillery fire; automatic weapons and A. F. V's. have been introduced. The principles of war still remain the same, but the method of employment of all arms has changed and is still changing.

By referring "Phœnix" to Cavalry Training Vol. II, 1929, Sections 1 and 49, and Manual of Operations on the N.-W. F. of India, Section 10, further comments by me will be unnecessary.

The bayonet is highly desirable for cavalry employed on the frontier. For this reason, a proportion of bayonets is now issued to all British and Indian Cavalry units stationed in that area.

But the reasons for bayonet training being excluded from the cavalry training programme, are in no way connected with shining boots, lance pennons, soft going or sitting on horses.

I have never shared with "Phœnix" his "*feeling of compassion for the P. B. I.*", and I hope that the Infantryman in the same way saves himself the trouble of having any feeling of compassion for the

"CAVALRYMAN."

SIR,

I read with much pleasure Cavalryman's critique of my article "Three Arms and Six Legs" and am proud that it spurred him to write so spirited a reply.

I will pass no comments on the irrelevant portions of his letter but will confine myself to the matter of bayonets. Here we seem to be almost at one.

He agrees that bayonets are highly desirable for cavalry on the frontier and concedes that most cavalrymen will not dispute the desirability of arming the cavalry with bayonets. Nevertheless he doubts the advisibility of so arming the cavalry because of the time lost in training in more essential work. If ever it is his fortune to face Pathans at close quarters on a frontier hill he will find that bayonet work ranks quite high among the essentials.

Let him disabuse himself of the idea that bayonet training need take up much time. An average of once a month over the assault course was found to be ample for a cavalry soldier, and (hush! dare I say it?) the time can be taken from that now allotted to anti-aircraft firing, field engineering and even from physical training itself! I nearly suggested cutting out half an hour of Educational Training a month, but that would be rank heresy. One would naturally, when approaching a hill top, prefer to be surrounded by 3rd or even 2nd class Certificates of Education than by men who can use bayonets.

The proportion of bayonets (50 per regiment I believe) now issued to cavalry units on the frontier is inadequate for fighting. Indeed they are only intended for guard duties. Either the regiments who have them do not train their men to use them or, worse still, they waste precious time in so doing.

Yours faithfully,

"PHOENIX."

MILITARY NOTES.

BELGIUM.

Conscientious objectors.

The Council of Ministers has refused to allow men incarcerated for refusal to carry out their military service to be treated as political prisoners. This decision is generally welcomed by the press.

FRANCE.

Ministry of National Defence.

On the formation of the Tardieu Government in February, the Ministers of the three fighting services were abolished, and their duties assigned to a Minister of National Defence assisted by two Under-Secretaries. The control of the commercial side of civil aviation was transferred to the Minister of Public Works.

This change had been suggested in the past on many occasions and the plan actually adopted had been under study for the past two years, the late M. Maginot, as Minister of War, having had an important part in its development.

The General Staffs of the three services continued as hitherto, as did also their *Conseils Supérieurs*, but for higher strategical purposes there was formed a " Committee of National Defence " composed of the Minister and the three Vice-Presidents of the three *Conseils Supérieurs*.

With the advent to power of the new Government with M. Herriot as Prime Minister, the National Defence Ministry, which was introduced by M. Tardieu, has disappeared and the three separate ministries for the fighting services are revived. The ministers are :—

War	.. ..	.. M. Paul Boncour.
Marine	.. ..	.. M. Georges Leygues.
Air	.. ..	.. M. Paul Painlevé.

A decree was published on 6th June constituting yet another new committee entitled *Haut Comité chargé de cordonner les besoins de la défence nationale.*

This committee will study the questions which affect the employment of the land, sea and air forces, their general organization, the general programmes of armament and the distribution of budgetary credits for this organization and these programmes.

IRAQ.

League of Nations.

As the result of a meeting of the Council of the League of Nations held on 19th May, a draft declaration was approved, in which is set out the guarantees required by the Council of the League of Nations on the cessation of the Mandate in Iraq. These guarantees cover :—

(*i*) The effective protection of racial, linguistic and religious minorities ;

(*ii*) The safeguarding of the interests of foreigners in the judicial sphere ;

(*iii*) Freedom of conscience and the safeguarding of the activities of religious missions ;

(*iv*) Rights acquired and financial obligations contracted by the Mandatory Power before the termination of the Mandate;

(*v*) Respect for international conventions ;

(*vi*) The concession to States members of the League under certain conditions of most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to reciprocity ; and

(*vii*) The right of the members of the League represented on the Council to lay before the Permanent Court of International Justice any difference of opinion arising out of the interpretation or execution of the undertakings assumed by Iraq before the Council.

The Iraq Government is expected to affix its signature to this declaration and to be formally admitted to the League at the meeting of the Assembly in September.

Oil Concession.

Early in the year negotiations were undertaken between the British Oil Development Company and the Iraq Government for the exploitation of oil concessions on the West bank of the Tigris. The concessions on the East bank, it will be remembered, are held by the Iraq Petroleum Company, who are building the pipe line to Haifa and Tripoli. The negotiations with the new company have now been completed, and the

contract was signed on 20th April. The general terms of the agreement include the following :—

(*i*) The lease of the concession shall be for seventy-five years ;

(*ii*) The rent shall be £100,000 for the first year, rising by £25,000 per annum to £200,000, which rent shall cease as soon as the transport of oil shall commence ;

(*iii*) The royalty payable shall be four shillings per ton ; and

(*iv*) The Iraq Government shall receive 20 per cent. of all oil produced, to be sold or disposed of as they may think fit ;

(*v*) Though German, Italian and French capital is sunk in the company as well as British, it is an essential part of the contract that the control of the company shall remain in British hands.

ITALY.

Alpine training in the Italian Army.

Exercises in the Alps and especially the training of Alpine troops in the use of skis have been the subject of special attention this winter in the Italian Army.

Ski training is divided into winter training, officers' training and advanced summer exercises.

LATIN AMERICA.

Peru.

Naval Mutiny.

On 7th May the crews of the Peruvian warships " Coronel Bolognesi " and " Almirante Grau, " which were in Callao Harbour, mutinied and imprisoned their officers. A loyal sailor swam ashore and warned the Government authorities, who were thus able to take immediate steps to deal with the mutiny. Troops were brought down from Lima and aeroplanes and submarines made a show of force against the mutineers who promptly surrendered. The Government declared martial law for 15 days. The mutiny was accompanied by disturbances in the streets of Lima, but the Government soon had the situation in hand.

The trouble was communistic in origin and was also said to be connected with plot by the " Aprista " or Labour Party to raise a rebellion in the northern provinces of Peru. Senor de la Torre, the

leader of this party, was arrested on a charge of complicity in the recent attempt on the life of the President, Colonel Sanchez Cerro. Eight of the mutineers were executed.

MOROCCO.

Spanish Zone.

On 29th March, speaking in the Cortes, Senor Azana (Prime Minister and Minister of War) stated that reorganization in Morocco had effected a saving of nearly 25 per cent. on last year's estimates, *viz.*, 174 million pesetas (£4¼ millions at 40 p. to the £1.) As soon as the main road from Melilla to Tetuan is completed the garrison can be halved and this saving doubled. (Work on this road appears to be seriously delayed at present owing to lack of funds).

ARMY REORGANIZATION.

Replacement of conscripts by volunteers.

A law published on 15th May enacts that :—

1. In future, as far as funds permit, the effectives of all the corps and units of the Army serving in Morocco shall be recruited voluntarily.

2. All Spaniards and naturalized Spaniards between the ages of 18 and 40 are eligible to enlist as volunteers, if unmarried or widowers without children. They are, however, to be required to produce proofs of identity and of good character, and be passed by a Medical Board as physically fit.

3. Volunteers will enlist for four years and receive a bonus of 500 pesetas. Afterwards they may re-engage for various periods. The rank and file cannot, however, remain with the colours after attaining the age of 45 (serjeants 48).

4. When the requisite numbers for the army in Morocco are not forthcoming, either through shortage of funds or because enough volunteers have not presented themselves, the contingents will be completed by conscripts, selected by ballot.

In the same way corporals and serjeants may be posted compulsorily to the units in Morocco.

FRENCH ZONE.

Tafilalet operations.

As a result of the Tafilalet and Ferkla Valley operations at the beginning of this year, more than 30,000 families have subsequently made their submission. Communication through this area will be improved by a track suitable in most parts for motor vehicles and throughout for motor cycles with a view to joining Agadir on the Atlantic coast *viâ* the Sous Dades and Ferkla Valleys to Colomb Bechar in Algeria. The only areas of dissidence now remaining are the sparsely cultivated mountainous regions of the Great Atlas and the waterless regions in the extreme south of the Saharan border.

SIAM.

The Political Situation.

A political upheaval occurred in Siam towards the end of June when by a *coup d'état* the newly-formed People's Party, composed principally of members of the Army and Navy, seized control of the capital and arrested as hostages Prince Paribatra, heir to the throne, and various other important personages. King Prajadhipok was absent from Bangkok at Hua Hin, a seaside resort about 140 miles from the capital.

Following the outbreak, a manifesto was issued on 24th June accusing the King of misgovernment and the princes of battening on the people ; it stated, however, that the King would be invited to retain the throne as a constitutional monarch with an elected assembly, and that failing this a Republic would be established. This invitation was extended to the King by letter, and at the same time it was pointed out that if he refused another prince would be appointed in his place. King Prajadhipok returned to Bangkok during the night 25/26th June, apparently in a warship sent to bring him to the capital, and, after a meeting with representatives of the People's Party, he issued a proclamation accepting the new régime and stating that his views were in accord with those of the Party as to the necessity for a new form of Government which he had for some time recognized as desirable. A proposed Constitution was presented to the King on 26th. This he accepted, with minor alterations, on the following day. According to press reports the new Constitution is partly democratic in character as power is to be invested in the people but exercised for the present by (*i*) a Monarch, (*ii*) a People's Senate, (*iii*) a Committee of the People's Party and (*iv*) the Law Courts. King Prajadhipok is to be the

Monarch and succession to the Throne is to be in accordance with the existing law. Amnesty has been granted to all concerned in the insurrection.

SPAIN.

Military laws.

A Decree was published on 25th February embodying the following provisions :—

(1) Authorising placing on the reserve by Government Decree such general officers who for more than six months have been unemployed, provided that during that period appointments have been made for which their rank qualified them.

(2) Providing that the pensions of 12,000 officers, retired under special conditions on full pay, when the army was reorganized after the fall of the Monarchy may be suspended when an offence is incurred against Article 1 (acts of aggression against the Republic) of the Defence of the Republic Act.

(3) Prohibiting the publication of military and naval newspapers with the exception of the technical publications of the War and Marine Ministries.

It is also interesting to note that Senor Azana now gives the number of officers who have retired voluntarily as 12,000. The previous figure given was 10,000.

The Army in 1931.

Terms of service.

In spite of the great changes carried out in the Spanish Army in 1931, there has been no change in the liability to serve or the length of service of the normal recruit.

Peace organization.

Peninsula.

As a result of the Decree of 26th May and subsequent Decrees issued by the Provisional Government, the whole aspect of the army has been changed. The following units have been disbanded :—

37 infantry regiments (out of 76).
4 mountain battalions (out of 12).
9 light infantry battalions (out of 17).
17 cavalry regiments (out of 27).
1 railway battalion (out of 2).
2 engineer battalions.

The infantry divisions have been reduced from 16 to 8. The cavalry division has been maintained. Two mountain brigades, composed of all arms except cavalry, also remain.

The new organization envisages two tank regiments, the formation of a new machine-gun battalion and the provision of essential ancillary troops.

The Regional Commands have been abolished and three Inspectors-General have been appointed to ensure co-ordination and inspection. These in no way inherit the political and social powers enjoyed by General Officers Commanding-in-Chief ("Captains-General") of the regions. Many of the purely military powers of the latter devolve upon the Divisional Commanders, who are now given authority over all troops located within their divisional area. Formerly in practice these only exercised command over the infantry or cavalry regiments of their respective divisions.

Strength of the army in peace.

The advent of the Republic found 22,000 officers in the Army List, of whom some 15,000 were on the active list. The new Government reduced the total number to 8,000 by allowing officers to retire on the full pay of their rank.

According to such figures, as are available, the strength of the army after the 1931 reduction is as under :—

(*a*) In the Peninsula and Canary Islands—

Officers.	Other ranks.	Total.
6,124	98,114	104,238

(*b*) In Morocco.

Officers.	Other ranks.	Total.
1,876	45,849	47,725

Infantry reorganization.

Each infantry division will include 2 infantry brigades, each of 2 regiments of 2 battalions. Each battalion will consist of—

4 rifle companies.
1 machine-gun company.
Specialists section.

Cavalry reorganization.

The composition of the cavalry division is as follows :—

Divisional headquarters.

3 cavalry brigades of 2 regiments of 2 groups. each group consisting of 2 sabre squadrons and 1 light automatic squadron.

1 (infantry) cyclist group consisting of 1 rifle company and 1 machine-gun company.

1 group of motorized machine-gun squadrons.

1 horse artillery regiment of 3 brigades of 3 batteries each.

1 field squadron

1 signal group (horse), consisting of 1 visual and 1 W/T section.

1 aviation (observation) squadron.

1 cavalry ammunition column.

1 supply company (M. T.).

1 medical section (M. T.).

1 mobile veterinary section.

Artillery reorganization.

In consequence of the recent changes, the Peninsular artillery will be as under :—

(*a*) *Divisional artillery.*—Each infantry division will include 2 field artillery regiments (one of guns and the other of howitzers). Each regiment will consist of 2 brigades of 3 batteries and will hold in reserve guns and equipment for a third brigade.

(*b*) *Cavalry divisional artillery.*—One horse artillery regiment of 3 brigades, each of 3 batteries.

(*c*) *Artillery in mountain brigades.*—Each of the 2 mountain brigades will include 1 mountain artillery regiment of 2 howitzer brigades, each of 3 batteries.

TURKEY.

Turkish visit to Moscow.

The Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Pasha, accompanied by Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a large party of Turkish notables, arrived in Moscow on 26th April on an official visit to the Soviet Union.

The visit closed on 8th May after an official announcement that the Soviet Union had granted Turkey credit for 8 million dollars worth of agricultural and textile machinery to be repaid over a period of ten

years in instalments of Turkish produce, and had presented the Turkish Army with ten tractors, five tanks and some other vehicles.

U. S. A.

The Reserve Officers Training Corps.

The objects of the Reserve Officers Training Corps are first to provide officers for the Officers Reserve Corps, and secondly to give such instruction to students who do not complete the full course, as will make them useful in the army in time of emergency or in the National Guard or Organized Reserves in peace time.

The corps is organized in Senior and Junior Divisions. The Senior Division is composed of units at universities, colleges and schools which grant degrees and at certain " military schools " designated by the Secretary of State. Units are formed for practically all arms of the service. The Junior Division is formed of units at other schools. It consists of infantry units only and the training is more elementary than that of the Senior Division.

The following figures for the year 1931 give an indication of the importance of the corps :—

—	Units.	Personnel.
Strength of Senior Division	220	75,000
Strength of Junior Division	106	41,000
Number of camps held	67	
Attendance at camps	6,700	
Number of regular officers employed as instructors.	679 active and 92 retired.	
Number of commissions given to graduates during the year	5,150	

REVIEWS.

The Desert Column. By Ion. L. Idriess.

(*Messrs. Angus and Robertson, Ltd., Sydney, Australia*). 6/-

This book is based on the diary kept by the author during his service in Gallipoli and in Palestine and in it he has managed to retain the vividness of the feelings which impressed him at the time. The author, who was a trooper in the Australian Light Horse, is at his best in his narrative of the work of the Desert Column from the Suez Canal up to the Gaza battles. Here he deals with open warfare and the many problems which still confront us in that form of fighting. The difficulties of keeping operations fluid ; of avoiding disorganization when troops get closely engaged ; of keeping the offensive spirit under most disheartening circumstances ; of retaining mobility in sandy, waterless country are all exampled, and the conclusion arising from their examination is that a spirit of individuality such as permeated the Light Horsemen is a necessity if the best results are to be achieved.

It is doubtful whether we in the regular army aspire to this ideal sufficiently and the Desert Column may help to convince some of us that the stereotyped is by no means always the best.

H. R. S.

The Indian Ocean. By Stanley Rogers. Illustrated by the Author.

(*George C. Harrap & Co., Ltd.*, 1932). *7s./6d.*

This is the third of a series of books by Mr. Rogers dealing with the great oceans of the world, the previous two being *The Atlantic* and *The Pacific*. In his Foreword the author remarks—"Histories have been written of peoples, of religions, and of countries, so why not of an ocean ?" and the result is a book full of interesting facts written in a simple yet fascinating manner. Mr. Rogers himself voyaged all over the world, often in windjammers, and when he writes of India, China and Australia clippers and their famous races, one realizes that he is writing from first hand knowledge. "To hell or Melbourne in sixty days" was the

boast of that gallant breed of seamen whose sole object was to make a quick passage irrespective of the weather. This work is intended to be more of an entertainment than a text book, but authenticity has not been sacrificed and the various chapters give an outline of events in the Indian Ocean from the time of the early Portuguese Adventurers to the present day. Many changes have occurred since passengers furnished their own cabins in preparation for a voyage lasting months, and the author hesitates to think what monstrosities will shuttle across to India in 2032. It is difficult to pick out the most interesting features of this romance of the sea, all chapters are equally enthralling, but perhaps the description of the Indian Ocean during the early months of the war 1914—18 will again remind one how vital it is to safeguard our shipping lanes. The exploits of the German raider *Wolf* are apt to be overshadowed by the feats of the cruiser *Emden*, but Mr. Rogers pays a tribute to her resourceful Captain (Karl Nerger) in his description of how she evaded capture for fifteen months and took fourteen vessels before successfully returning to Germany. The author has greatly added to the charm of the book by his delightful drawings.

J. E. H.

Indian Infantry Colours. By Captain H. Bullock, F.R. Hist. S., I.A. (*Times of India Press*, Bombay, 1931). Rs. 15/-

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Any book dealing with such an absorbing question as the colours of regiments of the Indian Army could scarcely fail to be of interest, and Captain Bullock's " Indian Infantry Colours " is no exception to this.

The author's ideas as to the origin of colours in the old East India Company " Nishan " is particularly interesting and deserving of further examination. To trace the present regimental colours back to the East India Company's Bale Mark is ingenious ; for the traders " Nishan " of 1658 did, indeed, become the soldiers' " Nishan " of 1805—13.

As symbols embodying the spirit of a unit, corps or company, the true origin of colours must be sought far back in the dim beginnings

of history. Small pieces of stone, which have been unearthed in excavations in India, have confirmed the cult of the standard in the East over 5,000 years ago. We know, also, from the Bible that the people of Israel recognized these symbols, as the following extract from Number II, Chapter 2, shows :—" The people of Israel shall pitch every man by his own standard with the ensign of their fathers house." It is, of course, common knowledge that the Knights and Barons of old had their company standards or colours.

The company " Nishan " is, thus, but a step in the long and interesting history of standards. Captain Bullock traces the change from company to battalion and regimental colours: this change, he points out, having been made in King William III's time in the Regular Army at Home.

The scope of " Indian Infantry Colours " is to trace in narrative form details in connection with these colours from their earliest days down to 1781, when the first known regulations were issued. The second part of the book deals with a summary of their successive development and design. Finally, the author has added certain chapters dealing with colours of various groups of past and present regiments, which are fairly representative of Indian Infantry as a whole.

The book should be of interest, not only to India Infantry units, but also to those British Infantry battalions, who spring from those famous regiments usually known by the collective title as " The Company's Europeans."

The book is well illustrated with several attractive plates in colour.

R. N. G.

" **Passing it on.**" Short talks on Tribal fighting on the North-West Frontier of India.

By General Sir Andrew Skeen, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., C.M.G.

(Gale and Polden Ltd.). 5/-

In this little book of only 128 pages a great frontier soldier " passes on the wise teaching of his seniors " to the present generation of serving soldiers—and may be to their successors, as frontier fighting, dictated as it is more by the nature of the country than the armament and methods of the enemy, changes slowly.

Although it was by no means his first frontier campaign, it was columns in command of the Tochi and Derajat in the operations against the Waziris and Mahsuds in Waziristan in 1919 that General Skeen made his reputation as a frontier soldier—a reputation which will not easily fade from the pages of Indian frontier history and will certainly remain always very high in the memories of all who took part in those campaigns with him. Coming, as they did, immediately after the Great War, they found India war weary and without troops or officers trained in mountain warfare. The tribesmen, on the other hand, were well-equipped with modern rifles and ammunition. with their ranks full of many ex-regular soldiers and militiamen well-versed in our methods, and flushed with the success of a series of damaging raids into British territory which we had been unable to prevent or to punish. In the resulting operations, in both of which General Skeen commanded the striking forces, the most stern and bitter fighting which has ever occurred on the frontier was experienced. That the Derajat Column eventually, after several severe reverses and heavy casualties, succeeded in turning the tables on the Mahsud and completely subduing him says much for the sticking power of the troops and the determination of their British officers, but only those who were brought into close contact with him from day to day during those strenuous and anxious times know how much was also due to the courage and leadership of the Column Commander himself.

General Skeen's last appointment in India was Chief of the General Staff during which time he brought out the present "Manual of Operations on the N.-W. F." which still remains the official text-book on Mountain Warfare.

To the great regret of his many friends and admirers he was compelled through ill-health to retire from the Army a few years later. There is no one better qualified to speak or to write on the subject of frontier warfare than he is and his book was certain of an eager welcome.

It is addressed "to the junior officer of Infantry, of the British Service in particular, as he is less likely in his wider range of service to be trained for the local problem which all officers in India have to keep in mind. To officers of Infantry, because that is the arm on which falls in chief part the need for adjusting its methods to the circumstances of this special form of war. And to junior officers, because in frontier fighting the junior officers' problems are many and varied, and their

correct solution far more important in immediate results than in any other form of war."

The book covers every form of frontier operation and it visualises each one in considerable detail. It may be considered that some of this detail is unimportant, but success in this form of warfare depends very largely on attention to detail and, if the reader is going to get full value from this book, he must read it with a very alert and concentrated mind. The book would undoubtedly have been improved by explanatory diagrams—the picture which the author sees so clearly in his mind may not be quite so clear to the average reader.

Of particular interest is the emphasis laid on the organization and the care of the transport, both animals and drivers. This was always a point to which General Skeen rightly insisted that the strictest attention should be paid.

The book is full of delightful flashes of humour of which the following are two examples.

"By the way, look out for bees. A certain Highland battalion might still tell you, if decency permitted, of the value the men got from their kilts in saving their faces at the expense of other parts when the bees of Maizar resented the burning of their homes. Another argument, if one were needed, against indiscriminate burning of houses."

"Another hint—do not halt your men on tracks or near conspicuous rocks and so forth. These are always known ranging marks. And your men will not halt near you."

"Officers and white stones"—the old soldier's rule still holds.

General Skeen has indeed "passed on" much that will not only be of value to the junior regimental officer, for whom the book is written, but the junior staff officers to whom a knowledge of the detail and procedure which has to be carried out within the unit is, of course, essential.

J. G. S.

United Service Institution of India.

JANUARY 1932.

CONTENTS.

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st September to 30th November 1931 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

Lt.-Genl Sir Torquhil G. Matheson, K.C.B., C.M.G.
Colonel Abdur Rahman Khan.
Captain H. F. C. Armstrong.
Captain G. F. X. Bulfield.
Captain L. A. Loup.
Captain A. V. Perry.
Lieut. F. W. Crafter.
„ B. H. Craig.
„ K. T. Darling.
„ E. Garnett.
„ L. N. Gibson.
„ S. Griffith.
„ H. G. Orr.
„ B. T. Paranjpe.
„ M. C. Perceval.
„ S. R. G. Scott.
„ W. J. M. Spaight.
„ A. E. G. Walker.
„ K. M. Wright.
2nd-Lieut. R. F. Barbour.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.

Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution. Articles may vary in length from three thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made at from Rs. 30

to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution. Payment is made on publication.

Articles submitted for publication must be typed in *duplicate,* on one side of the paper only. Drawings, plans, maps, etc., for reproduction should be in *jet* black. No washes or ribands of colour should on any account be used. If it is absolutely necessary to use colours (and these are only permissible in line work or names) the following will reproduce photographically, *i.e.*, dark red, dark orange, dark green. No other colour should on any account be used.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

Anonymous contributions under a *nom-de-plume* will not be accepted or acknowledged; all contributions must be sent to the Secretary under the name of the writer and the paper will, if accepted, be published under that name unless a wish is expressed for it to be published under a *nom-de-plume.* The Executive Committee will decide whether the wish can be complied with.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right of omitting any matter which they consider objectionable, and do not undertake to authorise the publication of such papers as are accepted in the order in which they may have been received.

Manuscripts of original papers sent for publication in the Journal will not be returned to the contributor unless he expresses a wish to have them back and pays the postage.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

Contributors will be supplied with three copies of their paper *gratis,* if published.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset.

The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of military interest that are published. Papers, magazines, "works

of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed from the Reading Room.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules:—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members of the United Service Institution of India. Members are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) The United Service Institution of India is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A. M. until sunset. Books may be taken out at any time provided Rule 2 is complied with.

(4) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(5) Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed.

(6) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member in Simla may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(7) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(8) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee.

(9) Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(10) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(11) A list of all books presented and purchased, and also a list of books useful to members studying for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations, will be found under Secretary's Notes in the quarterly issue of the U. S. I. Journal.

(12) Members are invited to contribute presents of books, maps and photographs of naval and military interest. These may be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. I. of India, Simla. They will be duly acknowledged.

(13) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

	Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
1.	Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series II.	.. 1931	.. S. W. Kirby and Kennedy.
	(Presented by Messrs. W. Clowes & Sons, Ltd., London.).		
2.	Strategy and Tactics of the Egypt and Palestine Campaign 1917-18, 2nd Edn.	.. 1931	.. A. Kearsey.
	(Presented by Messrs. Gale & Polden, Ltd.).		
3.	Saddle-Room Sayings	.. 1931	.. William Fawcett.
	(Presented by the Oxford University Press).		
4.	Lectures on F. S. Regulations, II.	.. 1931	.. J. F. C. Fuller.
	(Presented by Messrs. Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd.).		
5.	The Official History of the War, Military Operations in Togoland & the Cameroons 1914-16.	.. 1931	.. F. J. Moberly.
	(Presented by H. M. Stationery Office, London).		

BOOKS PRESENTED.

	Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
6.	Foch—The Man of Orleans (Presented by Messrs. Eyre & Spottiswoode Ltd., London).	.. 1931	.. B. H. Liddell Hart.
7.	The Elements of Imperial Defence. A Study of the Geographical Features, Material Resources, Communications and Organization of the British Empire. (Presented by Messrs. Gale & Polden Ltd.).	.. 1931	.. A. G. Boycott.
8.	The Story of the 9/7th Deccan Infantry (Presented by the 3/19th Hyderabad Regiment).	1929	.. W. C. Kirkwood.
9.	The Warning of Kashmir	.. 1931	.. G. S. Raghavan.
10.	History and Status of Landlords and Tenants in the United Provinces (Presented by the Pioneer Press, Allahabad.)	.. 1931	.. S.N.A. Jafri.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

1.	The Indian Mutiny in Perspective	.. 1931	.. Sir G. MacMunn.
2.	The War in the Air, Vol. III.	.. 1931	.. H. A. Jones.
3.	The Uneasy Triangle.	.. 1931	.. "Apex".
4.	Marshal Lyautey	.. 1931	.. Andre Maurois.
5.	Military Organization and Administration, 11th Edn.	1931	.. W. G. Lindsell.
6.	From Surtees to Sassoon	.. 1931	.. F.J.H. Darton.
7.	Allenby of Armageddon	.. 1925	.. Ramond Savage.
8.	The History of Coke's Rifles	.. 1930	.. Col. H.C. Wylly.
9.	The Burma Rebellion Report up to 3rd May 1931.	..	..
10	The Five Year Plan of the Soviet Union.	.. 1930	.. G. T. Grinko.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

	Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
11.	At G. H. Q.	.. 1931	.. Brig.-Genl. John Charteris.
12.	India in Revolt.	.. 1931	.. J.F.C. Fuller.
13.	Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 1789-1914.	.. 1929	.. A. G. Grant and H.W.V. Temperley
14.	The Shenandoah Valley Campaign. 1861-62.	.. 1930	.. A. Kearsey
15.	India Insistent	.. 1931	.. Sir Harcourt Butler.
16.	The Gas War of 1940	.. 1931	.. "Miles".
17.	The World Crisis—The Eastern Front	.. 1931	.. Hon. Winston S. Churchill.
18.	The Indian Empire Series (Pamphlets).—		
	The Simon Report and After		.. Sir Reginald Craddock.
	Mr. Sastri's Attack on the Simon Report.		.. Sir Michael O'Dwyer.
	The Power of the Indian Minorities		.. Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah.
	The Situation in India.		.. Retired Indian Judge.
	India After the R. T. C.		.. Sir Reginald Craddock.
	British Ideals and Indian Politics.		.. Member of the I.C.S.
	The Federation of India		.. Lord Sydenham of Combe.
	The Indian Crisis		.. Sir Mark Hunter.
	The Tragedy of India.		.. Sir Reginald Craddock.
	Echoes of Cawnpore		.. Sir Louis Stuart.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

1.	The Official History of the Great War, Military Operations, France and Belgium 1916, Volume V.	.. Sir J. E. Edmonds.
2.	Cohort of the Tropics—A Story of the Great War in Central Africa	.. Owen Letcher.
3.	Outline of the World's Military History	.. Lt.-Col. W. A. Mitchell.
4.	Days and Nights with Big Game	.. Lt.-Genl. Sir A. E. Wardrop.

VI.—Army Examinations.

(*a*) *Promotion.*—The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set from March 1932, for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head (*b*) (*iii*) and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head (*d*) (*iii*):—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of examination.	Campaign set for the first time.	Campaign set for the second time.	Campaign set for the last time.
1	March 1932 ..	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.	Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702—09.
2	October 1932	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.
3	March 1933 ..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..
4	October 1933	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).
5	March 1934 ..	..	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.

(*b*) *Staff College.*—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination:—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

VII.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated below there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

(The list of books presented and purchased as shown in the Journal should also be consulted).

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—Official History of the War.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to V.

B.—Other Books.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).
Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).
Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).
The Last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

The Official History, Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Parts I and II, with maps (Capt. Cyril Falls).

B.—Other Books.

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914—18 (Bowman Manifold).

The Palestine Campaign (Colonel A. P. Wavell).

Army Quarterly—January 1922 (Lieut.-Colonel Wavell and C. T. Atkinson's articles).

Cavalry Journal—October 1921 (Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's article)—July 1923 (Lieut.-Colonel Beston's article).

R. U. S. I. Journal—May 1922 (Colonel-Commandant Weir's article).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

Naval and Military Despatches.. A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q. standpoint.

Reports of the Dardanelles Commission. .. Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I, (C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—Other Books.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) ..The best unofficial account and criticism of the strategic conduct of the campaign.

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—Official Account.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV, (F. J. Moberly).

B.—Other Books.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917 (Staff College).

The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).

A Chapter of Misfortunes.

My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).

Mesopotamia, 1917—20, A Clash of Loyalties (Sir A. Wilson).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).

Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).

Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).

With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).

Waterloo (Ropes).

Campaign of 1815, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W. O'Connor Morris).

Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).

Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).

Wellington's Campaigns. Peninsula-Waterloo, 1808—15, also Moore's.

Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).

7.—*Marlborough's Campaigns.*

History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).

Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).

The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).

Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).

A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).

The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).

Marlborough and his Campaigns, 1702—1709 (A. Kearsey).

8.—*The American Civil War.*

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).

History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).

A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861—1862 (A. Kearsey).

The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).

History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buell).

Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

9.—*The East Prussian Campaign.*

Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).

Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War,* 1904, *up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).

Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military), 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.

Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).

A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

11.—*Napoleon's Italian Campaign*, 1796-97.

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).

Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12.—*Organization of the Army.*

A.—Organization of the Army since 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of the British Army, by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson.

B.—Forces of the Empire.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

C.—Foreign Armies.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—The British Empire.

Encyclopædia Brittannica—(Contains much concentrated information).

The Statesman's Year Book.

Whittaker's Almanack.

The Colonial Office List.

The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).

The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).

The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (C. P. Lucas, 1917).

The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).

The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).

The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).

The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).

England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).

B.—Books on Special Portions of the Empire or World.

The Rise and Expansion of British Dominions in India (Sir A. O. Lyall, 1894).

General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).

India in 1928-29 (J. Coatman).

India in 1929-30 (Bajpai).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).

The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).

International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse) (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).

What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).

Why China Sees Red (Putnam-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).

Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakeley).

Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson).

TACTICS.

15.—*Tactical Problems.*

Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).

Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady, 1926).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, 1927).

VIII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1931 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

It is obviously impossible for the Secretary to undertake the correction of individual solutions, but all the recent schemes include a suggested solution in the form in which it is considered that the paper should have been answered, with reasons for the solution given.

In order to simplify their issues, the schemes have been classified and numbered as follows.

They can all be obtained by V. P. P., *plus* postage, on application to the Secretary. When ordering members are requested to give the number and subject of the schemes required.

PROMOTION SERIES.

(*A*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). To illustrate the supply system of a Division ..Rs. 2.

(*B*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928), Complete with maps and solutions :—

Lieutenant to Captain.

(*i*) Mountain Warfare .. .. ..Rs. 2-8

(*ii*) Defence and Attack orders .. .. „ 2-8

Captain to Major.

(*i*) Outposts .. .. „ 2-8
Defensive position.
Withdrawal.

(*ii*) Tactical exercise without troops .. .. „ 2-8
Reconnaissance.
Attack orders.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES.

(*C*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). With one map for the three schemes and solutions :—

(*i*) Approach March .. .. ..Rs. 2-8
Reconnaissance before night attack.
Orders for night attack.

(*ii*) Outposts .. .. .. ,, 2-8
Defence.
Action of a force retiring.

(*iii*) Move by M. T. .. .. .. ,, 2-8
Occupation of a defensive position.
Counter-attack.

(*D*) *Army Headquarters Staff College Course Tactical Schemes*—

1928.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders and Appreciation.

(*ii*) Withdrawal—Operation Orders.

(*iii*) Rear-Guard, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

1929.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Withdrawal—Appreciation.

(*ii*) Advanced-Guard—Operation Orders with march table. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

1931.—Strategy and Tactics papers, complete with maps and solutions .. Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Training for War (Protection).

(*ii*) Advanced-Guard and Attack.

(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*E*) *Mountain Warfare.*

A scheme, with map and solution (Reprinted May 1928) .. .. .. Rs. 2-8

(*F*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram (Reprinted May,* 1928). To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2

(*G*) *Other Schemes and Specimen Examination Papers.*

(*i*) Supply Problem (without maps and solutions) (1930) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*ii*) The History and Organization of the Empire (1931) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*iii*) Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace), (1931) (with suggested answers), ...Re. 1 each.

(*iv*) Withdrawal (without map), (1931) ..Re. 1 each.

IX.—Precis of Lectures.

A number of precis of lectures delivered to the Army Headquarters Staff College Course is available for members on payment. These precis are sufficiently full to be of great value to those who have not attended the lectures. The date of the precis is given in each case.

(*i*) Night Operations (1931) .. ..Rs. 2/- each.
(*ii*) The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931) .. ,, 1/8 ,,
(*iii*) The Third Afghan War (1931) .. .. ,, 1/8 ,,
(*iv*) The Palestine Campaign, I (1930) .. ,, 1/8 ,,
(*iv a*) The Palestine Campaign, II (1930) .. ,, 1/8 ,,
(*v*) American Civil War (1930) .. .. ,, 1/- ,,
(*vi*) Military Evolution, and the Influence of modern inventions on Warfare (1931).. ,, 1/- ,,
(*vii*) Supply of a Division in War (1930) .. ,, 1/- ,,
(*viii*) History and Organization of the Empire (1931) ,, 1/- ,,
(*ix*) Hints on working for examinations (1930) .. As.-/8/- ,,
(*x*) The Employment of Artillery (1930) .. ,, -/8/- ,,
(*xi*) Artillery (1931) 1st lecture .. .. ,, -/8/- ,,

(*xi a*)	Artillery (1931), 2nd lecture	As. /8/	each.
(*xii*)	Anti-Aircraft Defence (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xiii*)	Wireless Communications in the R.A.F. (1931)	,, ,,	,,
(*xiv*)	Air Co-operation (1931)	,, ,,	,,
(*xv*)	The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xvi*)	Anti-Gas Defence (1931)	,, ,,	,,
(*xvii*)	Tanks (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xviii*)	Armoured Cars (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xix*)	Military Engineering (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xx*)	Signals in the Division (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxi*)	Mountain Warfare, II (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxii*)	The Organization of the British Army (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxiii*)	Mobilization (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxiv*)	Reinforcements (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv*)	Military Law, I (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv a*)	Military Law, II (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv b*)	Military Law, III (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxvi*)	The " Q" Administrative Services in Peace (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxvii*)	The Auxiliary and Indian Territorial Forces (1929)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxviii*)	Training (1930)	,, -/4/-	,,
	Course of five lectures given at the London School of Economics, 1925, on " Transportation in War "	,, -/12/-	,,

X.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

XI.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—*concld.*

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal, with Rs. 100 gratuity.

For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

(*i*) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

(*ii*) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS.

(*With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award*).

1889..BELL, Col. M. S., V.C., R.E. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890..YOUNGHUSBAND, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd.*).

1891..Sawyer, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
Ramzan Khan, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
1892..Vaughan, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
Jaggat Singh, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
1893..Bower, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Fazaldad Khan, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
1894..O'Sullivan, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
Mull Singh, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
1895..Davies, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
Ganga Dyal Singh, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
1896..Cockerill, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
Ghulam Nabi, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1897..Swayne, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
Shahzad Mir, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
1898..Walker, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Adam Khan, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1899..Douglas, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
Mihr Din, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
1900..Wingate, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
Gurdit Singh, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
1901..Burton, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
Sundar Singh, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
1902..Ray, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
Tilbir Bhandari, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
1903..Manifold, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
Ghulam Hussain, Lance-Dafadar, Q.O. Corps of Guides.
1904..Fraser, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
Moghal Baz, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1905..Rennick, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
Madho Ram, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
1906..Shahzada Ahmad Mir, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
Ghafur Shah, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.
1907..Nangle, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
Sheikh Usman, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
1908..Gibbon, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Malang, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
1909..Muhammad Raza, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd.*).

1910..Sykes, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
Turner, Capt. F. G., R.E.
Khan Bahadur Sher Jung, Survey of India.

1911..Leachman, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
Gurmukh Singh, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

1912..Pritchard, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Wilson, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
Mohibulla, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.

1913..Abbay, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
Sirdar Khan, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.), Central India Horse.
Waratong, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).

1914..Bailey, Capt F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
Morshead, Capt. H. T., R.E.
Haidar Ali, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1915..Waterfield, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
Ali Juma, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1916..Abdur Rahman, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
Zarghun Shah, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).

1917..Mian Afraz Gul, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.

1918..Noel, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).

1919..Keeling, Lieut.-Col. E. H., M.C., R.E.
Alla Sa, Jemadar, N. E. Frontier Corps.

1920..Blacker, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
Awal Nur, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)

1921..Holt, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
Sher Ali, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1922..Abdul Samad Shah, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
Nur Muhammad, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.

1923..Bruce, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
Sohbat, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
Hari Singh Thapa, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).

1924..Rahmat Shah, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
Ghulam Hussain, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*concld.*).

1925..Spear, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
Jabbar Khan, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
1926..Harvey-Kelly, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
1927..Lake, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
1928..Bowerman, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D.C.O. Baluch Regiment.
Muhammad Khan, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
1929..Abdul Hanan, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps, (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
Ghulam Ali, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1930..Green, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.
1931..O'Connor, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
Khial Badshah, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

Prize Essay Gold Medallists.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay*).

1872..Roberts, Lieut.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
1873..Colquhoun, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1874..Colquhoun, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1879..St. John, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
1880..Barrow, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1882..Mason, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
1883..Collen, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
1884..Barrow, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1887..Yate, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
1888..Maude, Capt. F. N., R.E.
Young, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1889..Duff, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
1890..Maguire, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
1891..Cardew, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
1893..Bullock, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
1894..Carter, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
1895..Neville, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
1896..Bingley, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(*concld.*).

1897..NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1898..MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.

CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).

1899..NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.C.
1900..THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.

LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1901..RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
1902..TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
1903..HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.

BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1904..MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
1905..COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1907..WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908..JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
1909..MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.

ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1911..Mr.D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912..CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913..THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914..BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).

NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).

1916..CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917..BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918..GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
1919..GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
1920..KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922..MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923..KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927..HOGG, Maj. D. McA., M.C., R.E.
1928..FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930..DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
*1931..FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

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United Service Institution of India.

APRIL 1932.

CONTENTS

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st December 1931 to 29th February 1932 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

Lt.-Colonel J. M. Brickman.

Major P. R. Quayle.

Captain J. L. Jones.

,, S. S. Lavender.

,, M. E. S. Laws, M.C.

,, P. L. MacDermott.

,. C. Mearns.

Lieut. A. G. Drake-Brockman.

,, H. Butterworth.

„ G. E. Cave.

„ G. W. F. Stewart

,, R. C. B. Waller.

2/Lieut. A. R. Hewson.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.

Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution. Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made at from Rs. 30

to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution. Payment is made on publication.

Articles submitted for publication must be typed in *duplicate*, on one side of the paper only. Drawings, plans, maps, etc., for reproduction should be in *jet* black. No washes or ribands of colour should on any account be used. If it is absolutely necessary to use colours (and these are only permissible in line work or names) the following will reproduce photographically, *i.e.*, dark red, dark orange, dark green. No other colour should on any account be used.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

Anonymous contributions under a *nom-de-plume* will not be accepted or acknowledged; all contributions must be sent to the Secretary under the name of the writer and the paper will, if accepted, be published under that name unless a wish is expressed for it to be published under a *nom-de-plume*. The Executive Committee will decide whether the wish can be complied with.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right of omitting any matter which they consider objectionable, and do not undertake to authorise the publication of such papers as are accepted in the order in which they may have been received.

Manuscripts of original papers sent for publication in the Journal will not be returned to the contributor unless he expresses a wish to have them back and pays the postage.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

Contributors will be supplied with three copies of their paper *gratis*, if published.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset.

The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of military interest that are published. Papers, magazines, "works

of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed from the Reading Room.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules:—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members of the United Service Institution of India. Members and requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) The United Service Institution of India is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset. Books may be taken out at any time provided Rule 2 is complied with.

(4) A member shall not be allowed at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(5) Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed.

(6) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member in Simla may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members: but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(7) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(8) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee.

(9) Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(10) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(11) A list of all books presented and purchased, and also a list of books useful to members studying for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations, will be found under Secretary's Notes in the quarterly issue of the U. S. I. Journal.

(12) Members are invited to contribute presents of books, maps and photographs of naval and military interest. These may be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. I. of India, Simla. They will be duly acknowledged.

(13) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
The Punjab Administration Report, 1929-30.	1931	Official.
The Land System of the Holkar State (Presented by the Oxford University Press, Bombay.)		C. U. Wells.
Jane's All the World's Aircraft (Presented by Sampson Low, Marston & Coy., Ltd., London.)	1931	G. G. Grey.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

England's Crisis	1931	Andre Siegfried.
Days & Nights with Big Indian Game	1923	Maj.-Genl. A. E. Wardrop.
The Romance of the Indian Frontier	1931	Sir George MacMunn,

BOOKS PURCHASED.

Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
Some Economic Consequences of the Great War.	1930	A. L. Bowley.
The Commerce of Nations, 9th edition, revised.	1923	C. F. Bastable & T. E. Gregory.
International Trade	1928	F. W. Taussing.
The Letters of Gertrude Bell		Lady Bell.
Whittaker's Almanack	1931	
Cohart of the Tropics—A Story of the War in Central Africa.	1930	Owen Letcher.
Modern India—A Co-Operative Survey.	1931	Sir John Cumming.
The Official History of the War, Operations in France and Belgium 1916. Vol. V, with maps.	1932	Brig.-Genl. Sir J. E. Edmonds.
Hindenburg, Peace—War—Aftermath.	1931	G. Schultze-Pfaelzer.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

Outline of the World's Military History	Lt.-Col. W. A. Mitchell.
The Duke—Wellington	P. Guedalla.
Six British Battles	Hilaire Belloc.
Behind the Scenes of International Finance	Paul Einzig.

VI.—Army Examinations.

(*a*) *Promotion.*—The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set from October 1932, for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head (*b*) (*iii*) and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head (*d*) (*iii*):—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of examination.	Campaign set for the first time.	Campaign set for the second time.	Campaign set for the last time.
1	October 1932	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.
2	March 1933 ..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War-Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..
3	October 1933	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War-Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).
4	March 1934 ..	..	France and Belgium, 1914 up to and including the Aisne.	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.
5	October 1934	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.	..
6	March 1935 ..	..	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.
7	October 1935	..	..	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.

(*b*) *Staff College.*—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations 1930, obtainable from the Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination:—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

VII.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated

below there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

(The list of books presented and purchased as shown in the Journal should also be consulted).

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—Official History of the War.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to V.

B.—Other Books.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

The Official History, Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Parts I and II, with maps (Capt. Cyril Falls).

B.—Other Books.

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914—18 (Bowman Manifold).

The Palestine Campaign (Colonel A. P. Wavell).

Army Quarterly—January 1922 (Lieut.-Colonel Wavell and C. T. Atkinson's articles).

Cavalry Journal—October 1921 (Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's article)—July 1923 (Lieut.-Colonel Beston's article).

R. U. S. I. Journal—May 1922 (Colonel-Commandant Weir's article).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

Naval and Military Despatches.. A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q. standpoint.

Reports of the Dardanelles Commission. .. Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I, (C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—Other Books.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) ..The best unofficial account and criticism of the strategic conduct of the campaign.

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—Official Account.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV, (F. J. Moberly).

B.—Other Books.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917 (Staff College).

The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).

A Chapter of Misfortunes.

My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).

Mesopotamia. 1917—20, A Clash of Loyalties (Sir A. Wilson).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).

Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).

Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).

With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).

Waterloo (Ropes).

Campaign of 1815, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W. O'Connor Morris).

Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).

Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).

Wellington's Campaigns. Peninsula-Waterloo, 1808—15, also Moore's.

Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).

7.—*Marlborough's Campaigns.*

History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).

Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).

The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).

Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).

A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).

The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).

Marlborough and his Campaigns, 1702—1709 (A. Kearsey).

8.—*The American Civil War.*

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).

History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).

A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861-1862 (A. Kearsey).

The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).

History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buell).

Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

9.—*The East Prussian Campaign.*

Tamenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).

Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War*, 1904, *up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).

Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military), 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.

Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).

A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

11.—*Napoleon's Italian Campaign*, 1796-97.

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).

Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12.—*Organization of the Army.*

A.—Organization of the Army since 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of the British Army, by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson.

B. —Forces of the Empire.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

C.—Foreign Armies.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—The British Empire.

Encyclopædia Britannica—(Contains much concentrated information).

The Statesman's Year Book.

Whitaker's Almanack.

The Colonial Office List.

The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).

The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).

The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (C. P. Lucas, 1917).

The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).
The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).
The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).
The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).
England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).

B.—Books on Special Portions of the Empire or World.

The Rise and Expansion of British Dominions in India (Sir A. O. Lyall, 1894).
General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).
India in 1928-29 (J. Coatman).
India in 1929-30 (Bajpai).
Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).
Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).
The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).
Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).
The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).
History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).
The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).
International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse) (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).
What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).
Why China Sees Red (Putnam-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).
Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).
Imperial Communications (Wakeley).
Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson).

TACTICS.

15.—*Tactical Problems.*

Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).

Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady, 1926).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, 1927).

VIII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1931 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

It is obviously impossible for the Secretary to undertake the correction of individual solutions, but all the recent schemes include a suggested solution in the form in which it is considered that the paper should have been answered, with reasons for the solution given.

In order to simplify their issues, the schemes have been classified and numbered as follows.

They can all be obtained by V. P. P., *plus* postage, on application to the Secretary. When ordering members are requested to give the number and subject of the schemes required.

PROMOTION SERIES.

(*A*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2.

(*B*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928), Complete with maps and solutions :—

Lieutenant to Captain.

(*i*) Mountain Warfare .. .. .. Rs. 2-8

(*ii*) Defence and Attack orders .. .. „ 2-8

Captain to Major.

(*i*) Outposts .. .. „ 2-8

Defensive position.

Withdrawal.

(*ii*) Tactical exercise without troops .. .. „ 2-8

Reconnaissance.

Attack orders.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES.

(*C*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). With one map for the three schemes and solutions :—

(*i*) Approach March .. .. ..Rs. 2-8
Reconnaissance before night attack.
Orders for night attack.

(*ii*) Outposts .. .. .. ,, 2-8
Defence.
Action of a force retiring.

(*iii*) Move by M. T. .. .. .. ,, 2-8
Occupation of a defensive position.
Counter-attack.

(*D*) *Army Headquarters Staff College Course Tactical Schemes*—

1928.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders and Appreciation.

(*ii*) Withdrawal—Operation Orders.

(*iii*) Rear-Guard, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

1929.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Withdrawal—Appreciation.

(*ii*) Advanced-Guard—Operation Orders with march table. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

1931.—Strategy and Tactics papers, complete with maps and solutions .. Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Training for War (Protection).

(*ii*) Advanced Guard and Attack.

(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*E*) *Mountain Warfare.*

A scheme, with map and solution (Reprinted May, 1928) .. .. .. Rs. 2-8

(*F*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram (Reprinted May,* 1928). To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2

(*G*) *Other Schemes and Specimen Examination Papers.*

(*i*) Supply Problem (without maps and solutions) (1930) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*ii*) The History and Organization of the Empire (1931) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*iii*) Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace), (1931) (with suggested answers) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*iv*) Withdrawal (without map), (1931) ..Re. 1 each.

IX.—Precis of Lectures.

A number of précis of lectures delivered to the Army Headquarters Staff College Course is available for members on payment. These précis are sufficiently full to be of great value to those who have not attended the lectures. The date of the précis is given in each case.

(*i*) Night Operations (1931) .. ..Rs. 2/- each.

(*ii*) The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931) .. Re. 1/8 ,,

(*iii*) The Third Afghan War (1931) .. .. ,, 1/8 ,,

(*iv*) The Palestine Campaign, I (1930) .. ,, 1/8 ,,

(*iv-a*) The Palestine Campaign, II (1930) .. ,, 1/8 ,,

(*v*) American Civil War (1930) .. .. ,, 1/- ,,

(*vi*) Military Evolution, and the Influence of modern inventions on Warfare (1931).. ,, 1/- ,,

(*vii*) Supply of a Division in War (1930) .. ,, 1/- ,,

(*viii*) History and Organization of the Empire (1931) ,, 1/- ,,

(*ix*) Hints on working for examinations (1930) .. As.-/8/- ,,

(*x*) The Employment of Artillery (1930) .. ,, -/8/- ,,

(*xi*) Artillery (1931) 1st lecture .. .. ,, -/8/- ,,

(*xi-a*)	Artillery (1931), 2nd lecture	As. /8/	each.
(*xii*)	Anti-Aircraft Defence (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xiii*)	Wireless Communications in the R.A.F. (1931)	,, ,,	,,
(*xiv*)	Air Co-operation (1931)	,, ,,	,,
(*xv*)	The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xvi*)	Anti-Gas Defence (1931)	,, ,,	,,
(*xvii*)	Tanks (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xviii*)	Armoured Cars (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xix*)	Military Engineering (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xx*)	Signals in the Division (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxi*)	Mountain Warfare, II (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxii*)	The Organization of the British Army (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxiii*)	Mobilization (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxiv*)	Reinforcements (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv*)	Military Law, I (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv-a*)	Military Law, II (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv-b*)	Military Law, III (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxvi*)	The " Q" Administrative Services in Peace (1930)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxvii*)	The Auxiliary and Indian Territorial Forces (1929)	,, ,,	,,
(*xxviii*)	Training (1930)	,, -/4/-	,,
	Course of five lectures given at the London School of Economics, 1925, on " Transportation in War "	,, -/12/-	,,

X.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

XI.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—*concld.*

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal, with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

(*i*) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

(*ii*) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists.

(*With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award*).

1889..Bell, Col. M. S., v.c., r.e. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890..Younghusband, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd.*).

1891..Sawyer, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
Ramzan Khan, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
1892..Vaughan, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
Jaggat Singh, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
1893..Bower, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Fazaldad Khan, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
1894..O'Sullivan, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
Mull Singh, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
1895..Davies, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
Ganga Dyal Singh, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
1896..Cockerill, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
Ghulam Nabi, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1897..Swayne, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
Shahzad Mir, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
1898..Walker, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Adam Khan, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1899..Douglas, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
Mihr Din, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
1900..Wingate, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
Gurdit Singh, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
1901..Burton, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
Sundar Singh, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
1902..Ray, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
Tilbir Bhandari, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
1903..Manifold, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
Ghulam Hussain, Lance-Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1904..Fraser, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
Moghal Baz, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1905..Rennick, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
Madho Ram, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
1906..Shahzada Ahmad Mir, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
Ghafur Shah, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.
1907..Nangle, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
Sheikh Usman, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
1908..Gibbon, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Malang, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
1909..Muhammad Raza, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd.*).

1910..Sykes, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
Turner, Capt. F. G., R.E.
Khan Bahadur Sher Jung, Survey of India.

1911..Leachman, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
Gurmukh Singh, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

1912..Pritchard, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Wilson, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
Mohibulla, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.

1913..Abbay, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
Sirdar Khan, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.), Central India Horse.
Waratong, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).

1914..Bailey, Capt F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
Morshead, Capt. H. T., R.E.
Haidar Ali, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1915..Waterfield, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
Ali Juma, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1916..Abdur Rahman, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
Zarghun Shah, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).

1917..Mian Afraz Gul, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.

1918..Noel, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).

1919..Keeling, Lieut.-Col. E. H., M.C., R.E.
Alla Sa, Jemadar, N. E. Frontier Corps.

1920..Blacker, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
Awal Nur, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)

1921..Holt, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
Sher Ali, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1922..Abdul Samad Shah, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
Nur Muhammad, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.

1923..Bruce, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
Sohbat, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
Hari Singh Thapa, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).

1924..Rahmat Shah, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
Ghulam Hussain, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(*concld.*).

1925..SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
1926..HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
1927..LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
1928..BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D.C.O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
1929..ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1930..GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.
1931..O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay*).

1872..ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
1873..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1874..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1879..ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
1880..BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1882..MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
1883..COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
1884..BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1887..YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
1888..MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1889..DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
1890..MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
1891..CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
1893..BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
1894..CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
1895..NEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
1896..BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(*concld.*).

1897..NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1898..MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.

CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).

1899..NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.C.
1900..THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.

LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1901..RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
1902..TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
1903..HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.

BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1904..MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
1905..COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1907..WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908..JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
1909..MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.

ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1911..Mr.D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912..CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913..THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914..BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).

NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).

1916..CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917..BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918..GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
1919..GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
1920..KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922..MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923..KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927..HOGG, Maj. D. McA., M.C., R.E.
1928..FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930..DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1931..FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

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United Service Institution of India.

JULY 1932.

CONTENTS.

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May 1932 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

G. R. F. Tottenham, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.
H. A. F. Metcalfe, Esq., C I.E., M.V.O., I.C.S.
Major-General G. Thorpe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O
Brig.-General G. R. H. Cheape, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.
P. R. Cadell, Esq., C.S. I.
Major H. M. Hamilton.
,, E. W. N. Wade, M.C.
Captain J. D. deWilton.
,, E. J. R. Emtage.
,, W. H. E. Gott, M.C.
,, R. A. Grant.
,, C. I. Jerrard.
,, W. H. Emsden-Lambert.
,, C. S. W. Rayner.
,, S. E. Tayler.
,, S. J. Pope.
Lieut. C. J. W. Simpson.
F. F. P. Gill, Esq., Indian Police.
H. C. B. Jollye, Esq., Indian Forest Service.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.

Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal

Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution. Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made at from Rs. 3 0

to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution. Payment is made on publication.

Articles submitted for publication must be typed in *duplicate*, on one side of the paper only. Drawings, plans, maps, etc., for reproduction should be in *jet* black. No washes or ribands of colour should on any account be used. If it is absolutely necessary to use colours (and these are only permissible in line work or names) the following will reproduce photographically, *i.e.*, dark red, dark orange, dark green. No other colour should on any account be used.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

Anonymous contributions under a *nom-de-plume* will not be accepted or acknowledged; all contributions must be sent to the Secretary under the name of the writer and the paper will, if accepted, be published under that name unless a wish is expressed for it to be published under a *nom-de-plume*. The Executive Committee will decide whether the wish can be complied with.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right of omitting any matter which they consider objectionable, and do not undertake to authorise the publication of such papers as are accepted in the order in which they may have been received.

Manuscripts of original papers sent for publication in the Journal will not be returned to the contributor unless he expresses a wish to have them back and pays the postage.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

Contributors will be supplied with three copies of their paper *gratis*, if published.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset.

The Reading oom of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of military interest that are published. Papers, magazines, " works

of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed from the Reading Room.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules:—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members of the United Service Institution of India. Members are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) The United Service Institution of India is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A.M. until sunset. Books may be taken out at any time provided Rule 2 is complied with.

(4) A member shall not be allowed at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(5) Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential," may not be removed.

(6) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member in Simla may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(7) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(8) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee.

(9) Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(10) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(11) A list of all books presented and purchased, and also a list of books useful to members studying for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations, will be found under Secretary's Notes in the quarterly issue of the U. S. I. Journal.

(12) Members are invited to contribute presents of books, maps and photographs of naval and military interest. These may be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. I. of India, Simla. They will be duly acknowledged.

(13) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
The Armaments Year-Book, Special edition	1932	The League of Nations.
Margaret Outram, 1778-1863 (Presented by Messrs. John Murray, London.)	1932	Mary F. Outram.
Elementary Tactics.—The Art of War.. Vol. I (Presented by Messrs. Sifton Praed & Coy., Ltd., London.)	1932	R. P. Pakenham-Walsh.
The Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institute, 1930 (Presented by the Smithsonian Institute, Washington.)	1931	..
The Handbook of the Turkish Army	1931	Official.
The Indian Ocean (Presented by Messrs. G. G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., London)	1932	Stanley Rogers.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

A Short History of British Expansion, 2nd edition.	1930	James A. Williamson.
The Duke	1931	Philip Guedalla.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
The Pound Sterling-History of English Money.	1931 ..	A. E. Feavearyear.
Six British Soldiers	1931 ..	Hilaire Belloc.
The Soviet Five-Year Plan and its effect on World Trade.	1931 ..	H. R. Knickerbocker.
The Life of Sir Charles Monro	1931 ..	Genl. Sir George Barrow.
The Religious and Hidden Cults of India.	1931 ..	Sir George MacMunn.
The Moral Issue of India	1931 ..	Robert Stokes.
The Unseen Assassin	1932 ..	Sir Norman Angell.
Behind the Scenes of International Finance.	1932 ..	Paul Einzig,
The Dragon's Teeth—A Study of War & Peace.	1932 ..	Col. J. F. G. Fuller.
Manchuria—The Cockpit of Asia	1932 ..	Col. P. T. Etherton & Hessell Tiltman.
The Official History, Military Operations in Gallipoli from May 15th to the Evacuation, Vol. II, with maps and appendices.	1932 ..	Aspinall Oglander.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. VII.	G. P. Gooch & H. Temperley.
The Caste System of Northern India	E. A. H. Blunt.
Problems of Imperial Defence	Cole
The Statesman's Year-Book, 1932	.. ..

VI.—Army Examinations.

(*a*) *Promotion.*—The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set from October 1932, for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head (*b*) (*iii*) and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head (*d*) (*iii*):—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of examination.	Campaign set for the first time.	Campaign set for the second time.	Campaign set for the last time.
1	October 1932	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the War with Germany to June 1917.
2	March 1933 ..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War - Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..
3	October 1933	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).
4	March 1934 ..	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.	..	Egypt and Palestine, as covered by the History of the Great War—Military Operations—Egypt and Palestine, Vols. I and II.
5	October 1934	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.	..
6	March 1935 ..	.	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.	France and Belgium, 1914, up to and including the Aisne.
7	October 1935	..	..	Mesopotamia, up to and including the capture of Kut-al-Amara, October 1915.

(*b*) *Staff College.*—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

VII.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated

below there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

(The list of books presented and purchased as shown in the Journal should also be consulted.)

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—Official History of the War.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to V.

B.—Other Books.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

The Official History, Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Parts I and II, with maps (Capt. Cyril Falls).

B.—Other Books.

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns 1914—18 (Bowman Manifold).

The Palestine Campaign (Colonel A. P. Wavell).

Army Quarterly—January 1922 (Lieut.-Colonel Wavell and C. T. Atkinson's articles).

Cavalry Journal—October 1921 (Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's article)— July 1923 (Lieut.-Colonel Beston's article).

R. U. S. I. Journal—May 1922 (Colonel-Commandant Weir's article).

U. S. I. Journal— October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

Naval and Military Despatches	A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q standpoint.
Reports of the Dardanelles Commission.	Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I, (C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—Other Books.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) ..The best unofficial account and criticism of the strategic conduct of the campaign.

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—Official Account.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV, (F. J. Moberly).

B.—Other Books.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917 (Staff College).

The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).

A Chapter of Misfortunes.

My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).

Mesopotamia, 1917—20, A Clash of Loyalties (Sir A. Wilson).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).

Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).

Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).

With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).

Waterloo (Ropes).

Campaign of 1815, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W. O'Connor Morris).

Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).

Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).

Wellington's Campaigns. Peninsula—Waterloo, 1808—15, also Moore's.

Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).

7.—*Marlborough's Campaigns.*

History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).

Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).

The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).

Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).

A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).

The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).

Marlborough and his Campaigns, 1702—1709 (A. Kearsey).

8.—*The American Civil War.*

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).

History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).

A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861-1862 (A. Kearsey).

The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).

History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buell).

Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

9.—*The East Prussian Campaign.*

Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).

Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War*, 1904, *up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).

Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military). 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.

Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).

A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

11.—*Napoleon's Italian Campaign*, 1796-97.

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).

Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12.—*Organization of the Army.*

A.—Organization of the Army since 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of the British Army, by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson.

B.—Forces of the Empire.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book.

Army List.

C.—Foreign Armies.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—The British Empire.

Encyclopædia Britannica—(Contains much concentrated information).

The Statesman's Year Book.

Whitaker's Almanack.

The Colonial Office List.

The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).

The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).

The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (C. P. Lucas, 1917).

The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).
The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).
The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).
The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).
England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).

B.—Books on Special Portions of the Empire or World.

The Rise and Expansion of British Dominions in India (Sir A. C. Lyall, 1894).
General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).
India in 1928-29 (J. Coatman).
India in 1929-30 (Bajpai).
Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).
Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).
The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).
Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).
The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).
History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).
The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).
International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse) (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).
What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).
Why China Sees Red (Putnam-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).
Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).
Imperial Communications (Wakeley).
Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson).

TACTICS.

15.—*Tactical Problems.*

Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).

Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady, 1926).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, 1927).

VIII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1931 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

It is obviously impossible for the Secretary to undertake the correction of individual solutions, but all the recent schemes include a suggested solution in the form in which it is considered that the paper should have been answered, with reasons for the solution given.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified and numbered as follows.

They can all be obtained by V. P. P., *plus* postage, on application to the Secretary. When ordering members are requested to give the number and subject of the schemes required.

PROMOTION SERIES.

(*A*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (*Reprinted May*, 1928) To illustrate the supply system of a Division ..Rs. 2.

(*B*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). Complete with maps and solutions :—

Lieutenant to Captain.

(*i*) Mountain Warfare .. .. ..Rs. 2-8

(*ii*) Defence and Attack orders .. .. „ 2-8

Captain to Major.

(*i*) Outposts .. .. „ 2-8
Defensive position.
Withdrawal.

(*ii*) Tactical exercise without troops .. .. „ 2-8
Reconnaissance.
Attack orders.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES.

(*C*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). With one map for the three schemes and solutions :—

(*i*) Approach March .. .. ..Rs. 2-8
Reconnaissance before night attack.
Orders for night attack.

(*ii*) Outposts .. .. ,, 2-8
Defence.
Action of a force retiring.

(*iii*) Move by M. T. .. .. .. ,, 2-8
Occupation of a defensive position.
Counter-attack.

(*D*) *Army Headquarters Staff College Course Tactical Schemes*—

1928.—Three Tactical Schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders and Appreciation.

(*ii*) Withdrawal—Operation Orders.

(*iii*) Rear-Guard, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

1929.—Three Tactical Schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Withdrawal—Appreciation.

(*ii*) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders with march table. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

1931.—Strategy and Tactics papers, complete with maps and solutions .. Rs. 3 each (Re. 1 without maps).

(*i*) Training for War (Protection).

(*ii*) Advanced-Guard and Attack.

(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*E*) *Mountain Warfare.*

A scheme, with map and solution (Reprinted May, 1928) .. .. .. Rs. 2-8

(*F*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram (Reprinted May,* 1928). To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2

(*G*) *Other Schemes and Specimen Examination Papers.*

(*i*) Supply Problem (without maps and solutions) (1930) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*ii*) The History and Organization of the Empire (1931) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*iii*) Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace), (1931) (with suggested answers) .. .. ..Re. 1 each.

(*iv*) Withdrawal (without map), (1931) ..Re. 1 each.

IX.—Precis of Lectures.

A number of précis of lectures delivered to the Army Headquarters Staff College Course is available for members on payment. These précis are sufficiently full to be of great value to those who have not attended the lectures. The date of the précis is given in each case.

(*i*) Night Operations (1931) .. ..Rs. 2/- each.

(*ii*) The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931) .. Re. 1/8 ,,

(*iii*) The Third Afghan War (1931) .. .. ,, 1/8 ,,

(*iv*) The Palestine Campaign, I (1930) .. ,, 1/8 ,,

(*iv-a*) The Palestine Campaign, II (1930) .. ,, 1/8 ,,

(*v*) American Civil War (1930) .. .. ,, 1/- ,,

(*vi*) Military Evolution, and the Influence of modern inventions on Warfare (1931).. ,, 1/- ,,

(*vii*) Supply of a Division in War (1930) .. ,, 1/- ,,

(*viii*) History and Organization of the Empire (1931) ,, 1/- ,,

(*ix*) Hints on working for examinations (1930) .. As.-/8/- ,,

(*x*) The Employment of Artillery (1930) .. ,, -/8/- ,,

(*xi*) Artillery (1931), 1st Lecture .. .. ,, -/8/- ,,

(*xi-a*)	Artillery (1931), 2nd Lecture	..	..	As. /8/	each.
(*xii*)	Anti-Aircraft Defence (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xiii*)	Wireless Communications in the R.A.F. (1931)			,, ,,	,,
(*xiv*)	Air Co-operation (1931)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xv*)	The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)			,, ,,	,,
(*xvi*)	Anti-Gas Defence (1931)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xvii*)	Tanks (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xviii*)	Armoured Cars (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xix*)	Military Engineering (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xx*)	Signals in the Division (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxi*)	Mountain Warfare, II (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxii*)	The Organization of the British Army (1930)			,, ,,	,,
(*xxiii*)	Mobilization (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxiv*)	Reinforcements (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv*)	Military Law, I (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv-a*)	Military Law, II (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxv-b*)	Military Law, III (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxvi*)	The "Q" Administrative Services in Peace (1930)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxvii*)	The Auxiliary and Indian Territorial Forces (1929)	..	..	,, ,,	,,
(*xxviii*)	Training (1930)	..	..	,, -/4/-	,,
	Course of five lectures given at the London School of Economics, 1925, on "Transportation in War"	..	..	,, -/12/-	,,

X.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

XI.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—*concld.*

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal, with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

(*i*) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

(*ii*) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists.

(*With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award*).

1889..Bell, Col. M. S., v.c., r.e. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890..Younghusband, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd.*).

1891..Sawyer, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
Ramzan Khan, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
1892..Vaughan, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
Jaggat Singh, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
1893..Bower, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Fazaldad Khan, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
1894..O'Sullivan, Maj. G. H. W., R.E.
Mull Singh, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
1895..Davies, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
Ganga Dyal Singh, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
1896..Cockerill, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
Ghulam Nabi, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1897..Swayne, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
Shahzad Mir, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
1898..Walker, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Adam Khan, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1899..Douglas, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
Mihr Din, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
1900..Wingate, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
Gurdit Singh, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
1901..Burton, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
Sundar Singh, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
1902..Ray, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
Tilbir Bhandari, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
1903..Manifold, Lieut.-Col. C. C., I.M.S.
Ghulam Hussain, Lance-Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1904..Fraser, Capt. L. D., R.G.A.
Moghal Baz, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1905..Rennick, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
Madho Ram, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
1906..Shahzada Ahmad Mir, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
Ghafur Shah, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.
1907..Nangle, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
Sheikh Usman, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
1908..Gibbon, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Malang, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
1909..Muhammad Raza, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd.*).

1910..Sykes, Maj. P. M., C.M.G., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
Turner, Capt. F. G., R.E.
Khan Bahadur Sher Jung, Survey of India.

1911..Leachman, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
Gurmukh Singh, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

1912..Pritchard, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Wilson, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
Mohibulla, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.

1913..Abbay, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
Sirdar Khan, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.), Central India Horse.
Waratong, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).

1914..Bailey, Capt F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
Morshead, Capt. H. T., R.E.
Haidar Ali, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1915..Waterfield, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
Ali Juma, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1916..Abdur Rahman, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
Zarghun Shah, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).

1917..Mian Afraz Gul, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.

1918..Noel, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).

1919..Keeling, Lieut.-Col. E. H., M.C., R.E.
Alla Sa, Jemadar, N. E. Frontier Corps.

1920..Blacker, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
Awal Nur, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)

1921..Holt, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
Sher Ali, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1922..Abdul Samad Shah, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
Nur Muhammad, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.

1923..Bruce, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
Sohbat, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
Hari Singh Thapa, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).

1924..Rahmat Shah, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
Ghulam Hussain, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALLISTS—(*concld.*).

1925..SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
1926..HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C.H.G.H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
1927..LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
1928..BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D.C.O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
1929..ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1930..GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.
1931..O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
1932..BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
SHIB SING NEGI, No. 4013 Rifleman, 10/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay*).

1872..ROBERTS, Lieut.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
1873..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1874..COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1879..ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
1880..BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1882..MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
1883..COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
1884..BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1887..YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
1888..MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1889..DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
1890..MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
1891..CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
1893..BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
1894..CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
1895..NEVILLE, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
1896..BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(*concld.*).

1897..NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1898..MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.

CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).

1899..NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.C.
1900..THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.

LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1901..RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
1902..TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
1903..HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.

BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1904..MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
1905..COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1907..WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908..JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
1909..MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.

ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1911..Mr.D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912..CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913..THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914..BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).

NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).

1916..CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917..BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918..GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
1919..GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
1920..KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922..MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923..KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927..HOGG, Maj. D. McA., M.C., R.E.
1928..FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930..DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1931..FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

United Service Institution of India.

OCTOBER 1932.

CONTENTS.

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June to 31st August 1932 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

A. C. Badenoch, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.
P. C. Bamford, Esq., C.I.E., Indian Police.
W. G. Leys, Esq., Military Accounts Department
A. H. Lloyd, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.
C. V. Salusbury, Esq., I.C.S.
A. F. Wylie, Esq.
Colonel F. Dickins.
Colonel P. W. L. Broke-Smith, D.S.O., O.B.E.
Lt.-Col. S. R. Wason, M.C.
Major R. T. O. Cary, M.B.E.
Major J. J. M. Soutar, O.B.E.
Major H. S. Woods.
Captain T. I. Bate.
Captain A. G. Bennett.
Captain P. C. Bullock.
Captain N. Burgan.
Captain J. H. C. Currie.
Captain S. G. Gardiner.
Captain E. R. Greer.
Captain N. O. Hill.
Captain J. E. Hirst.
Captain R. T. W. Macleod.
Captain E. J. Montgomery.
Captain J. R. Morris.
Captain J. Y. E. Myrtle.
Captain S. F. H. Williams.
Lieut. G. E. R. Bastin.
Lieut. A. Boyce.
Lieut. H. G. Fowler.
Lieut. C. I. V. Jones.
Lieut. N. H. Kindersley.
Lieut. N. M. W. Kyle.
Lieut. H. L. Lendrum.
Lieut. E. McDonald.
2/Lieut. J. C. E. Bowen.
2/Lieut. P. E. H. Latham

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9. A. M., until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
The Historical Record of the 4th Bn. 16th Punjab Regiment	.. 1931 ..	
Indian Infantry Colours	.. 1931 ..	Capt. H. Bullock.
The Handbook for the Indian Army Dogras.	1932 ..	Lt.-Col. W. B. Cunningham.
Administrative Schemes with Solutions	.. 1932 ..	S. W. Kirby and C. A. P. Murison
The Elements of Rifle Shooting	.. 1932 ..	J. A. Barlow.
The Desert Column	.. 1932 ..	I. L. Idriess.
Lectures on F. S. R. III Operations between Mechanized Forces.	1932 ..	Maj.-Genl. J. F. C. Fuller.
Passing it On Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the N. W. Frontier of India.	1932 ..	Genl. Sir Andrew Skeen.
Military Report on Ceylon	.. 1932 ..	Official.
Military Report on Malaya	.. 1932 ..	,,
A Short History of British Expansion, Part I.	1931 ..	James A. Williamson.
British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898—1914, Vol. VII.	1932 ..	G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley.
India and the British	.. 1932 ..	Patricia Kendall.
The Statesman's Year-Book	.. 1932	
Marlborough	.. 1932 ..	Sir John Fortescue.

The History of the Russian Revolution, Vol. I.	1932 ..	Leon Trotsky.
Honest Doubt—Or the Price of Modern Politics.	1932 ..	Ernest J. P. Benn.
The Strength of England ..	1926 ..	George W. F. Bowles.
Military Law, 18th edn. ..	1932 ..	Lt.-Col. S. T. Banning.
Military Organization and Administration, 12th edn.	1932 ..	Col. W. G. Lindsell.
Survey of International Affairs ..	1931 ..	Arnold and Toynbee.
Strange Intelligence-Memoirs of Naval Secret Service.	1931 ..	H. C. Bywater and H. C. Ferraby.
Ludendorff—The Tragedy of a Specialist	1932 ..	Karl Tschuppik.
The Game of Politics ..	1932 ..	Phillip G. Cambray.
The Caste System of Northern India ..	1931 ..	E. A. H. Blunt.
The Recovery—The Second Effort ..	1932 ..	Sir Arthur Salter.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

Fear and be Slain ..	..	Seeley.
Last Days of the German Fleet ..	..	Freiwald.
Life of Lord Carson. Vol. I. ..	..	Marjoribanks.

VI.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated below, there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list, he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The Great War of 1914—18 (Aston).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

At G. H. Q. (Charteris).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

The Empire at War (4 Vols.) (Lucas).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

The First World War 1914—1918 (Repington).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—Official History of the War.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to V.

B.—Other Books.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).

Memoirs of Marshal Foch (1931).

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Fifth Army (Gough).

The last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

The Official History, Operations, Egypt and Palestine, from June 17th to the end of the War, Parts I and II, with maps (Capt. Cyril Falls).

B.—Other Books.

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

With the Turks in Palestine (Aaronsohn).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914—18 (Bowman—Manifold).

How Jerusalem was Won (Massy).

The Desert Mounted Corps (Preston).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

Naval and Military Despatches ..	A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q. standpoint.
Report of the Dardanelles Commission.	Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).
Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I, Vol. II (C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—Other Books.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) ..
Dardanelles Campaign (Nevinson)
The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign (Wester Wemyss).

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—Official Account.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV, (F. J. Moberly).

B.—Other Books.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917 (Staff College).
The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).
Notes on the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Kearsey).
A Chapter of Misfortunes.
My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).
Mesopotamia, 1917—20, Loyalties (Sir A. Wilson).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).
Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).
Story of Waterloo (Hutchinson).
Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).
With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).
Napoleon and Waterloo (Becke).
Waterloo (Ropes).
Campaign of 1915, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W. O'Connor Morris).
Waterloo Campaign (Maguire).
Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).
Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).
Wellington's Campaigns. Peninsula-Waterloo, 1808—15, also Moore's.
Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).
A Study of the Waterloo Campaign ("Tacticus").

7. *Marlborough's Campaigns.*

History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).

Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).

The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).

Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).

A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).

The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).

Marlborough and his Campaigns, 1702—09 (A. Kearsey).

Marlborough : The Portrait of a Conqueror (Chidsey).

Marlborough (Fortescue).

Six British Battles (Belloc).

England under Queen Anne (Trevelyan).

8. *The American Civil War.*

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).

History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).

A Study of the Strategy and Tactics of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1861- 62 (A. Kearsey).

The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).

History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buell).

Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant (Fuller).

9. *The East Prussian Campaign.*

Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).

Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

Tannenberg (Kearsey).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).

Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military), 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.

Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).

A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

A Staff Officer's Scrap Book (Hamilton).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

Short Account of the Russo-Japanese War ("Footslogger").

11. *Napoleon's Italian Campaign, 1796-97.*

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).

Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12. *Organization of the Army.*

A.—Organization of the Army since 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of the British Army, by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson.

Short History of the British Army to 1914 (Sheppard).

The Empire and the Army (Fortescue).

B.—Forces of the Empire.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories.

The Statesman's Year Book

Army List.

C.—Foreign Armies.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—The British Empire.

The Strength of England (Bowles).
Splendid Adventure (Hughes).
Empire Government (Nathan).
New Imperial Ideals (Stokes).
How Britain is Governed (Ramsay).
Short History of the British Commonwealth (Ramsay).
The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).
The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).
The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (C. P. Lucas, 1917).
Cambridge History of the British Empire (Vols. 1—6).
Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).
Rise of the British Empire (Moncrieff).
The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).
The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).
The Origin and Growth of the British Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).
The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).
England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).

B.—Books on Special Portions of the Empire or World.

The Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India (Sir A. O. Lyall, 1894).
General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).
India in 1929-30.
India in 1930-31.
Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).
Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).
The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).
Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).
The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).
History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).
The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).
International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse) (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).
What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).
Why China Sees Red (Putnam-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).
Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).
Imperial Communications (Wakeley).
Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson).
Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).
Imperial Military Geography (Lee).
Military Geography of the British Commonwealth (Salt).

TACTICS.

15—*Tactical Problems.*

Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).

Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady).

Tactical Schemes with Solutions, 1st and 2nd Series (Kirby and Kennedy).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh).

Lectures on F. S. R. III, 1931 (Fuller).

VII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College Examination by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1932 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified as follows. When ordering members are requested to give the subject of the schemes required.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1932.

Continuous Exercise No. 1 "Message Writing," with solution	Re. 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 2 "Order Writing," with solution	,, 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 3 "Advance Guards," with solution	,, 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 4 "Appreciation," with solution	,, 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 5 "Attack Orders," with solution	,, 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 6 "Defence," with solution	,, 1/-
Continuous Exercise No. 7 "Defence," with solution	,, 1/-
(NOTE.—A copy of the map, which is same for all the above Exercises, can be had on payment of Rs. 2/- extra).	
Strategy and Tactics No. 1, with map and solutions	Rs. 3/8
Strategy and Tactics No. 2, with map and solutions	,, 3/8 (Rs. 1/8 without map which is the same as for S. & T. paper No. 1).

Strategy and Tactics No. 3, with map and solutions	Rs.	3 8
Cavalry Exercise, with map and solutions	,,	3/8
Tactical Exercise—Night withdrawals, with map and solutions	,,	3/8
Mountain Warfare, without map and solutions	,,	1/-

VIII.—Precis of Lectures, etc.

Military History.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914 (1931)		1/8
The Third Afghan War (1931)	,,	1/8
The Palestine Campaign, I (1930)	,,	1/8
The Palestine Campaign, II (1930)	,,	1/8
American Civil War (1930)	,,	1/-
The History and Organization of the Empire (1932)	,,	-/12

Tactical.

Military Evolution and the Influence of Modern Inventions on Warfare (1932)	,,	-/12
Tactical Lessons of the Great War (1932)	,,	1/8
Cavalry, I (1932)	,,	-/8
Cavalry, II (1932)	,,	-/8
The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)	,,	-/8
Artillery, I (1932)	,,	-/4
Artillery, II (1932)	,,	-/4
Engineers, I & II (1932)	,,	-/12
Tactical Employment of Tanks (1932)	,,	-/12
Armoured Cars (1930)	,,	-/8
Chemical Warfare (1932)	,,	-/8
Night Operations (1932)	,,	2/-
Frontier Warfare (1932)	,,	1/8
Air Co-operation (1932)	,,	-/12

Military Law.

Military Law, I (1932)	,,	-/4
Military Law, II (1932)	,,	-/4
Military Law, III (1932)	,,	-/4
Military Law, IV (1932)	,,	-/4
Specimen Military Law Paper (1932)	,,	1/-

Organization, Administration and Transportation.

Mobilization (1932)	,,	-/4
Reinforcements in War (1932)	,,	-/4
Organization, Administration and Transportation (Peace)—Specimen Examination Paper with notes (1932)	,,	1/8
Organization, Administration and Transportation (War)—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	,,	1/-
" Q " Services in Peace (1932)	,,	1/8
Movements (1932)	,,	1/8

Movements—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	..	Rs.	1/-
Supply of a Division in War (1932)	..	,,	1/8
Supply Problem—Specimen Examination Paper (1932)	..	,,	1/-

General.

Notes on Military Writing (1932)	..	,,	-/4
Essay—Specimen Paper (1932)	..	,,	1/-
Hints on Working for Examinations (1930)	..	,,	-/8

IX.—Historical Research.

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

**N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MacGregor Memorial Medal—*concld.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk, will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists.

(*With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award*).

1889 .. Bell, Col. M. S., v.c., r.e. (specially awarded a gold medal).
1890 .. Younghusband, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.
1891 .. Sawyer, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
Ramzan Khan, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.
1892 .. Vaughan, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
Jaggat Singh, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.
1893 .. Bower, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Fazal Dad Khan, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.
1894 .. O'Sullivan, Maj. G. H. W., r.e.
Mull Singh, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.
1895 .. Davies, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
Ganga Dyal Singh, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.
1896 .. Cockerill, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
Ghulam Nabi, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1897 .. Swayne, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
Shahzad Mir, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.
1898 .. Walker, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Adam Khan, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1899 .. Douglas, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
Mihr Din, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
1900 .. Wingate, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
Gurdit Singh, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.
1901 .. Burton, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
Sundar Singh, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.
1902 .. Ray, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
Tilbir Bhandari, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.
1903 .. Manifold, Lieut.-Col. C. C., i.m.s.
Ghulam Hussain, Lance-Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1904 .. Fraser, Capt. L. D., r.g.a.
Moghal Baz, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.
1905 .. Rennick, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
Madho Ram, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.
1906 .. Shahzada Ahmad Mir, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
Ghafur Shah, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd.*).

1907 .. Nangle, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
Sheikh Usman, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.
1908 .. Gibbon, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Malang, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.
1909 .. Muhammad Raza, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.
1910 .. Sykes, Maj. P. M., c.m.g., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
Turner, Capt. F. G., r.e.
Khan Bahadur Sher Jung, Survey of India.
1911 .. Leachman, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
Gurmukh Singh, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.
1912 .. Pritchard, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Wilson, Lieut. A. T., c.m.g., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
Mohibulla, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
1913 .. Abbay, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
Sirdar Khan, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.), Central India Horse.
Waratong, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).
1914 .. Bailey, Capt. F. M., i.a. (Political Department).
Morshead, Capt. H. T., r.e.
Haidar Ali, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
1915 .. Waterfield, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
Ali Juma, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
1916 .. Abdur Rahman, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
Zarghun Shah, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).
1917 .. Mian Afraz Gul, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.
1918 .. Noel, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).
1919 .. Keeling, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., m.c., r.e.
Alla Sa, Jemadar, N. W. Frontier Corps.
1920 .. Blacker, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
Awal Nur, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)
1921 .. Holt, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
Sher Ali, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.
1922 .. Abdul Samad Shah, Capt., o.b.e., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
Nur Muhammad, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.
1923 .. Bruce, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
Sohbat, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
Hari Singh, Thapa, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).
1924 .. Rahmat Shah, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N.-W. F. Corps.
Ghulam Hussain, Naik, N.-W. Frontier Corps.
1925 .. Spear, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
Jabbar Khan, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
1926 .. Harvey-Kelly, Maj. C. H. G. H., d.s.o., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.
1927 .. Lake, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*concld.*).

1928 .. Bowerman, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
Muhammad Khan, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.
1929 .. Abdul Hanan, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps (with gratuity of Rs. 100).
Ghulam Ali, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1930 .. Green, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.
1931 .. O'Connor, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
Khial Badshah, Naik, 1/12th Frontier Force Rifles.
1932 .. Birnie, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
Shib Singh Negi, No. 4013 Rifleman, 10/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

Prize Essay Gold Medallists.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.*)

1872 .. Roberts, Lieut.-Col. F. S., v.c., c.b., r.a.
1873 .. Colquhoun, Capt. J. S., r.a.
1874 .. Colquhoun, Capt. J. S., r.a.
1879 .. St. John, Maj. O. B. C., r.e.
1880 .. Barrow, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1882 .. Mason, Lieut. A. H., r.e.
1883 .. Collen, Maj. E. H. H., s.c.
1884 .. Barrow, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1887 .. Yate, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
1888 .. Maude, Capt. F. N., r.e.
Young, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1889 .. Duff, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
1890 .. Maguire, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
1891 .. Cardew, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
1893 .. Bullock, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
1894 .. Carter, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
1895 .. Neville, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
1896 .. Bingley, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1897 .. Napier, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1898 .. Mullaly, Maj. H., r.e.
Clay, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).
1899 .. Neville, Col. J. P. C., s.c.
1900 .. Thuillier, Capt. H. F., r.e.
Lubbock, Capt. G., r.e. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1901 .. Ranken, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
1902 .. Turner, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
1903 .. Hamilton, Maj. W. G., d.s.o., Norfolk Regiment.
Bond, Capt. R. F. G., r.e. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1904 .. Macmunn, Maj. G. F., d.s.o., r.f.a.
1905 .. Cockerill, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—(*concld.*).

1907 .. WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908 .. JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
1909 .. MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1911 .. Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912 .. CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913 .. THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914 .. BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).
NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).
1916 .. CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917 .. BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
1919 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
1920 .. KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922 .. MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923 .. KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 1/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927 .. HOGG, Maj. D. McA., M.C., R.E.
1928 .. FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1931 .. FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
1932 .. THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).

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