The Journal

OF THE

United Service Institution of India.

Vol. LXII. JULY, 1932. No. 268.

EDITORIAL.

Disarmament.

In what we are content to call the Dark Ages the Popes undertook many of the functions the League of Nations now attempts to perform. They organized international movements against what they believed to be dangers threatening Christendom, arbitrated between quarrelsome Princes, and at times enforced their awards by direct action either spiritual or physical. The Papal judgments in these mundane matters may not always have been sound, but in some instances at least they anticipated in a surprising way the efforts of present day idealists. One Pope even went so far as to propose what would now be termed 'qualitative disarmament'. He declared that the recently introduced gun-powder was an ungentlemanly weapon, more suited to assassins than to soldiers, and likely to increase to an untold degree the horrors of war. All enlightened Princes should, therefore, abjure its use and trust to honest steel. Perhaps he was right. But there was always the Turk outside the Christian League, and the Princes themselves soon realized that artillery concentrated in their hands was the answer to their troublesome nobles whose strongholds had up to then been such hard nuts to crack. So the Turk took no notice, while the Princes returned polite replies full of admirable and chivalrous sentiments—and ordered a few more culverins a couple of inches bigger in the bore than any yet designed.

The Geneva Conference, having discussed various schemes for the prevention of war and for disarmament, found it impossible to agree on the practicability of any of them. It reached, however, in its turn the old Papal conclusion that certain types of modern weapons should be anathematized. Unanimously the nations agreed that those weapons which are particularly offensive in character or which are aimed chiefly against the civil population should be banned

or at least greatly restricted in use. So far so good; it then only remained to pick out these weapons. Expert committees were formed to select them, and it was only after they had met that it began to be realized how extremely difficult it is to divide modern armaments into those that are defensive and those that are offensive.

Great Britain and the United States point to the submarine as incontestably offensive and directed mainly against the civil population; lesser Powers at once reply that it is their only defence against great surface naval superiority. Tanks and heavy mobile artillery appear essentially offensive to some nations; to others they are merely a defensive counter-poise to the overwhelming numbers of their neighbours' conscript armies. Even the bombing aeroplane, which at first sight seems from its very nature the most offensive of all weapons, is claimed as really defensive. If one nation prepares an aerial offensive against another, the threatened nation has no effective defence but to collect a force of bombers that will enable it to put the attacker's ground establishments out of action and thereby paralyze his bombers. Thus identical types of machines may be offensive on one side and defensive on the other. The obvious answer that if *all* bombers are abolished none will be needed for defence is countered by pointing out that big civil aircraft are all potential bombers, and they cannot be abolished. As the instructors used to say at the Staff College, "It's all very difficult".

An interesting point which has emerged from these discussions is that the weapons which, generally speaking, are accepted by a majority of States as offensive are identical with those denied to Germany and the defeated nations of the Great War—in fact they were denied to them because they were offensive. If the allied nations now deprive themselves of these weapons what will become of the victors' relative superiority? What of the Treaty of Versailles? France and the bloc of smaller nations she leads wish to perpetuate Germany's military weakness. It is an understandable attitude, but it is a grave obstacle to any real disarmament and could be removed only by great self-sacrifice on France's part or by some guarantee of security from the other Powers accepted as adequate by France. Prospects of the difficulty being overcome in the immediate future by either of these methods are not hopeful.

Realizing this the General Committee of the Conference adjourned to allow the leading statesmen of the Great Powers to meet and try to reach some agreement. There can be no doubt that if any real progress at all is to be made, the discussion must be raised above the level of the detailed arguments of experts. All the same one need not envy the statesmen their task.

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The Hoover Proposals.

Into the midst of the conferring statesmen the American President has thrown his disarmament scheme, which, whatever its merits and whatever its eventual fate, has put new life into the almost moribund Geneva Conference. In detail there is nothing new about his proposals. The reduction of capital ships and submarines by one-third, of aircraft carriers and destroyers by one quarter; the total abolition of tanks, heavy mobile artillery, bombing aeroplanes and aerial bombardment; and the scaling down of land forces, have all individually in some form or other been put before the Conference by other nations. There are, however, two innovations. Mr. Hoover has combined both quantative and qualitative disarmament in one bold scheme, and he has attempted to divide land forces into two categories, with different scales of limitation for each. His first category he calls the "Police Contingent", composed of the forces required to maintain internal order and to police frontiers; the second, the "Defence Contingent" consists of all forces maintained to meet the fear of foreign aggression, *i.e.* all land armaments other than the "Police Contingent". The strength of the "Police Contingent" is to be based on that allowed to the defeated Central Powers, which, according to Mr. Hoover, averages 2·32 per thousand of their total population. Nations with large colonial possessions are to be allowed an increase on this to 2·64 per thousand of their overseas population. The "Defence Contingents" of all nations are to be reduced by one-third in numbers.

As was to be expected the American proposals have met with a mixed reception. Italy, and of course, Germany, accept them as they stand; Japan is distrustful, especially of the naval clauses; Great Britain gives a somewhat qualified approval; France is definitely hostile.

The French attitude towards the Hoover scheme is one of intense suspicion. In French eyes it emanates from a doubtful source. France has not forgotten, and will never forget, that a President of the United States once promised her a guarantee of security against future German aggression and then failed to produce it. Mr. Hoover is on the verge of a presidential election and Frenchmen cannot dismiss the idea that this dramatic attempt to gain what Americans are fond of calling the "moral leadership of the world" is designed more as a vote catching device for use at home than as a carefully thought out solution of European problems. Their doubts are strengthened by the enthusiastic acceptances of Italy and Germany. Many of the American proposals are unpopular in France, but the great stumbling block must be the limitation of land forces. Here France

will feel that her security is vitally affected. Her home "Police Contingent" would be only about 96,000 against Germany's 141,000, and even if the 163,000 which would be allowed for the French Colonial Empire were included, few Frenchmen would accept this as redressing the balance. The total French land forces, exclusive of reserves, number at present, about 694,000; subtracting from this 259,000 for "Police Contigent", a "Defence Contingent" of 435,000 is left. This is to be reduced by one-third, leaving France and her Colonies with a total force both "Police" and "Defensive" of approximately 549,000 only. In other words France is asked to reduce her army by over 145,000 men, deprive herself of tanks, heavy artillery and bombing aircraft, while the German land forces may be increased by some 25,000. It is most improbable that any French Government, which accepted such drastic reductions, without compensating and adequate guarantees against Germany, would continue in power for a week. Already the French representatives at Geneva have stated that the Hoover proposals can only be considered in connection with their original suggestion of an International Force under League control. As most nations are agreed that this particular proposal is impracticable, it looks as if another deadlock will be reached.

The attitude of the British delegates towards Mr. Hoover's proposals is one of general approval tempered with some criticism. In place of a reduction in the total tonnage of capital ships they advocate a decrease in the size of individual ships, and go beyond the Americans in urging the total abolition of submarines. Newspaper reports give the impression that Great Britain is prepared to accept the abolition of heavy artillery, large tanks, and bombing aircraft, but it is unlikely that with its overseas internal security commitments a British Government would be prepared to give up all forms of tanks and air bombardment. As for land forces, if Great Britain is considered alone, the total British Army falls just short of the numbers allowed for the "Police Contingent"; if the whole Empire is considered as one unit, its total land forces are very much below the permitted "Police Contingent." This only demonstrated the plain fact that no portion of the British Army is anything but a "Police Contingent" and there should, therefore, be no question of quantative reduction.

The American proposals must also be considered from the peculiar standpoint of India—and India in this matter is very definitely in a completely different position from any other nation. To begin with there is no relation between the strength of her armed forces and those of any Great Power. Every European country, including Russia, and every member of the League of Nations outside Europe could disarm completely without it affecting in any way the strength of

India's defence forces. India's requirements are based on what is necessary only to defend her land frontiers from aggression by her immediate neighbours and to maintain internal security. According to Mr. Hoover's allowance the "Police Contingent" for India would reach the respectable total of 815,000 men. At present her total forces, including military police, irregulars and Indian States Forces, amount only to about 275,000 men so that India could increase her army by 540,000 men before she was considered to have any "Defence Contingent" at all This astonishing figure brings out very clearly the smallness of the present Indian defence forces compared with those of other nations. Even were our small field army classed as a "Defence Contingent" and considered without any reference to its "Police" duties, there could be little argument for its reduction. States on India's borders are not members of the League, and he would be an optimist indeed who expected the Afghan tribesmen to join in the world fervour for disarmament to the extent of giving up a third of their rifles. Disarmament in India cannot be based on what is found possible or advisable in Europe—it must be considered separately on its own merits.

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The Irish Free State.

The personal negotiations between Mr. de Valera and British Cabinet Ministers, which at first raised hopes that a way out of the rather artificial difficulties between Southern Ireland and the rest of the Empire would be found, have broken down. They could hardly do otherwise when Mr. de Valera adopted so intransigent an attitude. He declared that his object was a Republican Ireland to include Ulster; that between this Republic and the British Commonwealth there might, in some circumstances and for some reasons, be some form of association; and that in this case the King should be recognized as the head of the association. Meanwhile, even before this happy state of affairs could be reached, the British Government must accept the abolition of the Oath of Allegiance and the withholding of the land annuities. From this position he has not retreated beyond stating that he is now prepared to accept the original British proposal for arbitration on the question of land annuities, but only subject to certain conditions of his own. These are that the personnel of the arbitration tribunal should not be restricted solely to citizens of the Empire and that other payments besides the annuities should be considered. Mr. Thomas, in the House of Commons, gave the only possible reply when he said that the Cabinet could not accept these conditions, and further that the Government would never consider the coercion of Ulster, nor could it enter into any agreements with a country which repudiated its solemnly accepted treaty obligations.

Southern Ireland is, therefore, faced with the choice of remaining in the Empire or leaving it. If she chooses to leave no force will be used to keep her in; but she cannot have it both ways, she must be either in or out, and if out, she becomes a foreign nation. There are signs that a great many people in the Free State are beginning to realize what this may mean to them, and it is by no means certain that Mr. de Valera will have a real majority of his countrymen behind him when it comes to following him into the wilderness. The Senate has considerably amended the 'Oath Bill' as passed by the Dail, and it seems that if he sticks to his guns he will be hard put to it to avoid another general election in the near future. He cannot be very confident as to its result. But he and his separationists backed by the intimidation of the "Republican Army," may carry the day so that it is by no means a mere academic exercise to estimate the effects on the Empire of a Free State secession.

The main implications of Southern Ireland becoming a foreign nation would be economic, military and political. As far as the Republic itself was concerned, it would become, as the *Times* describes it, "a small agricultural *cul-de-sac* in Western Europe." The foundation of its prosperity must remain agriculture, but its produce would be largely shut out of the best and nearest markets, Great Britain and Ulster, by the tariffs applied to foreign imports. British manufactures, which find at present a considerable market in the Free State, would similarly suffer, and the Republic might bargain for mutual preferences, but it would not be well placed either industrially commercially, or geographically to do so. It is safe to say that both countries would suffer economically from the threatened tariff war, but that the loss to the smaller would be incomparably the greater and might indeed be something not far short of ruin.

Militarily the Republic of itself would constitute little threat to the remaining United Kingdom—indeed it would be wise not to provoke its northern neighbour alone. Were the Empire at war with another foreign power, however, the position would be altered and Southern Ireland might become a serious menace. The loss of Irish harbours to the British Navy and still more their use as bases for hostile submarines, raiders or aircraft, to say nothing of the distraction of disturbances on the Ulster border, would cause considerable embarrassment. In addition food supplies to Great Britain from Southern Ireland would assume great importance in any war with a naval power.

It is for these reasons that, whether any part of Ireland is a Republic or not, the British Empire can never allow it in peace or war to be occupied or dominated by any great foreign power. When, if ever, the Irish Republic arrives, Great Britain will have to declare a very strong "Monroe Doctrine" concerning it.

The political aspects of separation, while they might prove tragic enough for thousands, are not without humour. Mr. de Valera has always relied on the overseas Irish at least as much as he has on the native population. All Southern Irishmen resident in the Empire would, if he had his way, become aliens, and as far as one can see, they would have little cause to thank him. The innumerable doctors qualified in the Free State who practice in Great Britain, the Civil Servants, the officers and officials of all kinds could no doubt preserve their livelihoods by taking out naturalization papers, but the large Irish labouring populations such as collect in Glasgow, Liverpool and other great cities of the Empire would be in an unfortunate position. With so many native unemployed in the United Kingdom there would be the strongest feeling against letting these foreigners become naturalized so that they could either take work from Englishmen and Scotchmen or draw the dole. Irish immigration into the United States has been drastically cut down of recent years; it is hardly likely that it would be permitted unrestricted into Great Britain.

The situation in India would be harrowing! The I. M. S. would be threatened with almost total extinction; the Police paralysed; the Veterinary Services would wither away; racing would collapse; there would be horrid gaps in the Army; the outlook would be gloomy indeed were we to lose the Southern Irish who now serve India. And if they all took out naturalization papers, it would never be quite the same. They could never pass as English, still less as Scotch—and they would not want to, why should they? Let us hope then for everybody's sake that Mr. de Valera will suddenly get a little common-sense, or, if that is too much to hope for, that his followers will.

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Languages and Efficiency.

The Indian Army as a whole is unquestionably a more efficient and more formidable fighting force than it has ever been in the past, yet in one respect, and a very serious one, most authorities are agreed that it falls below the pre-war standard.

That is in the British Officers' knowledge of their men's vernaculars. There are those who would have us believe that in the palmy days before 1914, all British Officers of the Indian Army spoke Urdu and a vernacular or two fluently, but the present generation of officers has seen too many of its seniors spluttering hopelessly in orderly rooms and on parade to believe that quite so high a standard prevailed. Nevertheless, most of them will admit, that in the old days not only was the average officer's power of expressing himself in Urdu greater than it is to-day, but a very much higher proportion could talk to their men in their own particular vernaculars. Not content with a working knowledge of Urdu, officers went on to learn at least one of the languages spoken by their sepoys amongst themselves and in their own homes—Pushto, Punjabi, Marathi, Nepali and the rest. Before the war every officer had to pass an obligatory test in the vernacular or most important vernacular of his unit, and many afterwards voluntarily took the Lower and Higher Standards of the language. During the war obligatory examinations naturally lapsed, and in the reorganization that followed only Urdu survived as a compulsory test—all other languages became optional. As a result, though most war and post-war officers have a smattering of their men's vernaculars, few have made any serious study of them, and in spite of the high monetary rewards offered for the Preliminary, and First and Second Class Interpretership Examinations in these languages, few candidates presented themselves for any except Pushto. There are six battalions of Mahrattas in the Indian Army, yet only one officer has presented himself for examination in Marathi during the past nine years; there are several regiments of Gurkhas not one of whose officers has attempted to qualify in Nepali; and the record of other classes is often not much better. Of course there are officers who speak languages well but have never bothered to pass examinations in them, yet it must be admitted that these are the exceptions and that, speaking generally, a lamentable neglect of the vernaculars prevails. Such neglect is definitely dangerous. It is difficult to know what a man really feels or thinks unless you speak his own language. The sepoy appreciates, more than is sometimes realized, the compliment the Sahib pays him when he strives to master his perhaps uncouth native tongue. The attempt is evidence of a real effort to understand him, a real desire to learn about his customs and beliefs, and it never goes unanswered. Knowledge of his language is the closest and strongest link in the

bonds between officer and sepoy. Without it there is always danger of misunderstanding; sometimes even of lack of confidence.

Why is it, then, that so many officers have since the war neglected Urdu and still more the other vernaculars? There are many reasons. Chief amongst them is the greatly increased amount of work the young officer is expected to do. In olden days when he had finished his parades and a modicum of office work, he was free to wander about the lines, chat to the men, study their languages; now he has three times as much to teach them on parade, twice as much office work, and on of top all this his own education—and it is this last which, however much we dislike to admit it, draws him away from his men and their languages. There is that T. E. W. T. for next Tuesday to be studied; the C. O.'s weekly discussion on a chapter of F. S. R. II that has to be prepared for; the Command or what-not essay that must be written; the entrance test for some small arms course that has to be mugged up; and, hanging like a pall over all, those never ending examinations, retention, promotion and Staff College. True these examinations at any rate were there before the war, but of recent years they have loomed much larger on the young officer's horizon. He simply has to pass the first two, he can take no risk of failure, for failure means he has lost his job. No wonder that he will spend no time on other studies until these are behind him. Then, rightly or wrongly, having survived two or three reductions, he expects more, and believes that only when he can write p. s. c. after his name will he be safe from future sweeps of the axe. So once more he shoves his legs under a desk and starts cramming. He would like nothing better than to see more of his men, speak more of their language, understand them better, but the principle of security cannot be disregarded.

A good deal to improve matters has been done in the last year or two by reintroducing for the compulsory Urdu examinations the old Higher and Lower Standards and—a most important innovation—allowing a choice of either Persian or Nagri script. Similar examinations have now replaced the Preliminary and Interpretership examinations in other Indian Army vernaculars and the War Office have agreed to give fifty bonus marks in the Staff College examination to any officer who has passed one of these within the previous five years. There has been a strong feeling in some quarters that qualification in at least one vernacular in addition to Urdu should

be made compulsory, but it has been decided for the present to give the new system a chance of producing larger numbers of officers who will study and qualify in their units' vernaculars. Many experienced Commanding Officers are now encouraging their young officers as soon as they have passed the Urdu Higher Standard to continue straight on with the study of the regimental vernacular. Allowing a subaltern two years with his Indian unit in which to pass in Urdu, another eighteen months or at the most two years should see him through the vernacular. He is then solidly grounded on the foundations for a useful regimental officer—a knowledge of his men's languages. Promotion, examinations, Staff College and the rest can, and should, come later. He will have plenty of time for them.

Lectures.

Arrangements have been made for the following lectures to be delivered in the Gaiety Theatre, Simla, commencing at 5-30 p.m. each day :—

Thursday, 14th July—

" A Head Hunters' Frontier ". By Dr. J. H. Hutton, C.I.E., I.C.S.

Thursday, 21st July—

" The International Economic Crisis and the Gold Standard " By J. B. Taylor, Esq., I.C.S.

Thursday, 28th July—

" The Committee of Imperial Defence ". By Lt.-Col. H. L. Ismay, C.B., D.S.O.

Thursday, 4th August—

" The Round Table Conference ". By W. H. Lewis, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.

All members resident in Simla will be sent tickets for these lectures. Members resident in other stations who will be in Simla on any of the above dates are asked to inform the Secretary who will send them tickets.

MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALS, 1932.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Council of the United Service Institution of India have awarded the MacGregor Memorial Medals for 1932 to the following :—

(*i*) *Silver Medal for Officers, British or Indian*, Captain E. St. J. Birnie, Sam Browne's Cavalry (12th Frontier Force).

(*ii*) *Silver Medal with gratuity of Rs.* 100 *for Soldiers, British or Indian*, No. 4013 Rifleman Shib Singh Negi, (10th Bn. 18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.)

Short accounts of the work for which these medals have been awarded follow.

Captain E. St. J. Birnie.

Captain Birnie accompanied the Smythe Expedition as Transport Officer on its successful ascent of Mount Kamet in May and June 1931, and on the 23rd June climbed to the summit of Mount Kamet himself. Afterwards he went with Messrs. Smythe and Shifton to the Arwa Valley where a three weeks' exploration of the glaciers west of the Mana Valley was carried out, including the climbing of an untriangulated peak placed by aneroid at 21,000 feet. A pass across the range was established on 20th of July, and Captain Birnie accompanied by a porter made the first crossing into Tehri-Garhwal. He returned into British Garhwal by a second pass later in the day.

A few days later Captain Birnie with six porters made a five days' reconnaissance in Tehri-Garhwal establishing two more passes, and returning across the range by a third route south of the only triangulated peak, Satopanth II, in the area. All the routes established were over 20,000 feet in height, and a map of the area was made.

Captain Birnie ran a considerable risk when already tired from the previous ascents, in carrying on by himself with porters, exploring passes, and establishing routes. His reports gave valuable information to the Military Survey Department of India.

Rifleman Shib Singh Negi.

Rifleman Shib Singh Negi underwent considerable hardship and at times personal risk of life in obtaining maps and photographs of the ice barrier on the Shyok, in addition to further maps and photographs of military importance.

On the 6th July 1931, he was sent up to the Chong Kumdun to carry out the mapping of the ice barrier. He camped there for the night, and was joined by a British Officer next day.

On 8th July they and three Ladaki coolies attempted to climb the ice barrier and gain the lake on the far side, with the intention of ascertaining the difference in level between the lake and the ice barrier and, if possible, the depth of the lake. The barrier was climbed at a point immediately below its junction with the small side glacier. After proceeding about two hundred yards across the ice, the party came on a sheer drop of about forty feet. The Ladaki coolies could not proceed beyond this point, their local shoes (Paboss) would not grip and they had had to be dragged up by sheer force on the rope. This meant that the British Officer and Shib Singh Negi (both wearing crampons) would have to proceed alone, and should either have become a casualty in the badly crevassed surface neither would have got out. The ice barrier could be properly crossed with safety only by a party of four or more, all wearing crampons and at least two ropes. In the circumstances further attempts to cross the barrier had to be abandoned.

On 17th July, Rifleman Shib Singh Negi mapped the upper portion of the lake.

SIDE-LIGHTS ON SOVIET ORIENTAL POLICY.

By Captain G. E. Wheeler, 5th/7th Rajput Regiment.

A proper understanding of the position of the U.S.S.R. vis-á-vis the Middle East requires not only a knowledge of the conditions, so different from those of twenty years ago, prevailing in the Middle East to-day, but also a dispassionate view of the nature and working of the whole Soviet machine.

There are two main theories regarding the policy of Soviet Russia in the Middle East which may be briefly examined. The first of these is that the U.S.S.R. faithful to its ideal of World Revolution, aims at planting Communism in the different countries of the Middle East. To this end it " disseminates propaganda " and strives to promote discord among tribal elements with a view to embarrassing the existing regimé and thus paving the way for Revolution. All the U.S.S.R.'s commercial operations are considered to be part of this policy. They have been described as " economically unsound " and must therefore be continued from purely political motives. The second theory, which is of more recent origin, is that Communism is being used as a cloak for pursuing the old policy of aggrandizement ascribed to Imperialist Russia.

It will be the object of the present article to discuss these theories both in the light of recent events and also of certain publications of both Soviet and other origins. An attempt will be made to show that while the ambitious nature and far-reaching effects of Soviet designs have been greatly exaggerated, that very exaggeration has led to a neglect of certain basic features of Soviet Oriental policy. By attributing to the U.S.S.R. plans which are not in its own interest or only realizable in the dim future, an attitude of mind may be induced which will ignore the gradual progress of an influence of which the very nature is imperfectly understood. Such an attitude will be dangerous, especially from the point of view of the British Empire.

In such a short sketch as the present one it will not be possible to discuss either the Modern East or the Soviet machine at any great length. It will be necessary, however, to pass in review one or two of the outstanding points in these problems. The situation prevailing

in the Middle East from the end of the Great War until about 1925 has been admirably described by Mr. Toynbee in his Survey of International Affairs. Briefly, this situation was, that with the wane of Imperialist influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and Turkey, the U.S.S R. sought to set itself up as the patron and mentor of these countries. Many initial successes were scored such as treaties, trade agreements and concessions, but it gradually began to appear that the unexpected growth of Nationalism resulted in the presence of all foreigners being resented alike. The revolt of these countries against Imperialist influence, moreover, did not mean that they wished indefinitely to oppose the " Imperialist " nations. They wished rather to be received into the comity of civilized nations and to participate in their political and cultural advantages. Such advantages were by no means apparent under the Soviet regimé and for this reason Soviet advances began to become less and less welcome. The gradual realization of this situation resulted in a modification of Soviet Oriental policy which began to be felt as far back as 1926.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that during the whole of this post-war period, the instigators of Soviet Oriental policy were very far from being in accord with each other. Although Soviet protestations as to the non-official character of the Komintern cannot be accepted, it must be realized that the Komintern and the Narkomindel (People's Commissariate for Foreign Affairs) are frequently at loggerheads just as in the British Empire two government departments, such as the War and Foreign Offices, may be unable to agree on a matter of policy. This lack of team-work in the Soviet organization is well brought out by one Agabekov in his book of memoirs recently published in Berlin. He shows, moreover, that the inferior ability of Soviet representatives and the intrigue, suspicion and cupidity which were rife both in Moscow and abroad, militated most seriously against the even march of Soviet Eastern policy.

Now it must be understood that, up to 1926, there was serious justification for the belief that the U.S.S.R. aimed at the rapid planting of Communism in the Middle East and particularly in Persia where Soviet agents and clubs existed in most of the larger cities. Several small disturbances were unquestionably provoked by Soviet agents and the support of many important commercial and religious personalities had been, at least temporarily, secured. In Afghanistan, also,

the Komintern was seriously at work and was at any rate spending considerable funds in propagating Communism. In 1926, however, a change could be observed. Many Soviet representatives were removed and replaced by men of a quieter and less obviously proletarian stamp. Attempts were made to interest Persians in Soviet culture, methods of locust destruction, etc., and from that time forward real evidence of intensive propaganda or of attempts to promote discord is lacking. But in the minds of many of the inhabitants of the Middle East and of European residents and representatives, a habit of thought had been acquired, namely, that all disturbance was attributable to Soviet intrigue and that all or much of Soviet trade was bogus and "a cloak for more sinister activities." It was at this time that a Persian was heard to observe that the increase in earthquakes was undoubtedly due to Soviet influence.

In order to study the period from 1926 onwards, recourse may profitably be had to Agabekov's book of memoirs mentioned above. This book, which consists of the revelations of an agent of the Oriental Section of the *Ogpu* in the Middle East, has attracted attention principally on account of the descriptions which it contains of intelligence "coups" carried out by the author in Persia and elsewhere. These descriptions are sensational and have, moreover, an undeniable air of truth; but the real importance of the book lies in the insight which it gives into Soviet Oriental Policy. Perhaps the most striking impression which can be gained from these "Memoirs" is the fact that the U. S. S. R. was, at all events from 1926 to 1928, genuinely afraid of British "machinations." The British were sabotaging the Perso-Soviet Trade Agreement; the British were behind the activities of the Armenian Dashnak Society and of the White Russians; the British had engineered a mutiny in the Persian Army and a rising in Pusht-i-Kuh; they had "built a road from Iraq to Lake Urmia and (*mirabile dictu*) had organized a flotilla on the lake itself"; they had handed over the Sheikh of Mohammerah to the Shah in return for His Majesty's agreement to employ British advisers in the Army and purchase munitions in England.

It will be clear to anyone who has followed recent history in Persia that many of these extraordinary reports were probably originated, for obvious reasons, by the Persians; others were mere figments of the imagination. It is, however, impossible for anyone acquainted with

Soviet mentality and its attitude towards "intervention," not to realize that, in almost every case, these preposterous stories were genuninely believed by the majority of Russians. To illustrate this point it will be convenient to recount briefly an incident of which the present writer had first-hand knowledge and to which Agabekov obligingly supplies the sequel. In 1926, a mutiny headed by a Persian officer named Salar-i-Jang broke out near Bujnurd in Khorassan. This mutiny which was comparatively easily suppressed, at first appeared to assume alarming proportions. General Jan Muhammad Khan, who was commanding the Persian Eastern Division at Meshed, attributed the whole affair to Soviet intrigues. This, indeed, was the general impression formed except by the American Financial Adviser, who knew of the arrears into which the troops' pay had fallen and the acquisitive proclivities of certain Persian Officers, and by one or two others. Agabekov, who was in Moscow at the time, relates how the Soviet Consul-General in Meshed reported that the mutiny had been provoked by the British giving the names of "the British agents who were in touch with the leaders of the movement"! Later, but too late, it was discovered that the mutiny had "a revolutionary character" and might have been profitably supported. It was at this juncture that Apresov, the Soviet Consul-General in Meshed, was relieved by a man of greater ability and quieter and more conciliatory character and Agabekov himself went to work in Persia. There are grounds for assuming that a change in Soviet policy begins at this point.

It is of great interest to examine the instructions which Agabekov received. All his tribal work was for the purpose of preparing the ground "in the event of a collision with England." The Kurds were to be "prepared" on account of the strategic position which they would occupy "in the future conflict between England and Russia." The Bakhtiaris were to be prepared, "in the event of an attack by the Imperialist powers on the U.S.S.R.," to harass the British rear and destroy the Anglo-Persian oilfields. Agabekov's other duties were of a more ordinary nature; he was to improve the espionage organization and examine trade possibilities in certain specified directions. He was also to study the question of planting an espionage organization in India.

Agabekov was of course an agent of the *Ogpu* and not of the Komintern who might reasonably have been expected to deal with

questions of revolution and provocation. He shows, however, that the Communist Party of Iran was, in Meshed simply a pro-U.S.S.R. group, while in Tehran its ranks were filled with Persian police agents.

Some mention must be made of Agabekov's account of the flutter caused in Moscow by the Afghan rising in 1928 for it surely affords a most interesting study in national psychology. It is certain, however, that the U.S.S.R. firmly believed that Great Britain had engineered the rising and this conclusion was reached by the most tortuous reasoning imaginable. In spite of the excellent information at their disposal, they found that the British had decided to overthrow Amanullah as, " relying as he did on the Southern tribes of Afghanistan, he would inevitably have to assume an aggressive policy against India." This same reasoning moved the U. S. S. R. to resort to armed intervention in favour of Amanullah with disastrous results for its policy in Afghanistan.

A word must be said regarding Soviet Commercial activities. Recent experience of Soviet dumping in Europe has probably by now brought the question of Soviet trade in the Middle East into proper perspective, but, up to the end of 1930, it was stoutly asserted by many that Soviet trade in Persia, and particularly in the Persian Gulf, existed for the sole purpose of political propaganda. It may well be that this fatal but persistent misapprehension has played some part in the serious losses which the British and Indian piece-goods trade has sustained in the Persian Gulf of recent years. It was always believed that the Soviet trade venture in this region would " fizzle out " owing to the alleged impossibility of profitably selling goods at such low prices. The fact is however, that under a system of state controlled production such as exists in the U.S.S.R., it is difficult to lay down the law about profitable selling-prices, and it now seems likely that Soviet enterprise in the Persian Gulf has not only secured a new market for its produce but has in the meantime actually paid its own way.

With regard to the second theory mentioned above, that Soviet Oriental policy could be identified with the old policy, it can be asserted with considerable confidence that, in the present condition of the U.S.S.R., to follow such a policy would be ruinous not to say impossible. According to the best authorities, the U.S.S.R. has no wish whatever to involve itself in war for the present, for war would inevitably prejudice its vast economic plans. Now an active imperialist policy

presupposes a readiness to go to war. Moreover, as an attempt will shortly be made to show, war, as an active instrument of advancement in the East, has been discarded by the U.S.S.R. in favour of something much more dangerous and subtle.

It will be convenient at this stage to summarize the conclusions to illustrate which an attempt has so far been made :—

(*a*) The possible original designs of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East were checked by the growth of Nationalism.

(*b*) Sporadic attempts to promote discord or overthrow existing regimés were, to a great extent, abandoned in 1926.

(*c*) Soviet policy in the Middle East has been, since 1926, largely defensive being actuated by an exaggerated fear of England. Espionage, however, has been developed and elaborated and the work of "*osveshchenie*" (throwing light upon) of social and economic conditions, sedulously pursued.

(*d*) Trade conducted on lines peculiar to the Soviet system has been pressed forward and has had some success.

(*e*) Inability and lack of desire to go to war militate against the possibility of the U. S. S. R. pursuing a policy of Imperialist aggrandizement.

Assuming the foregoing conclusions to be correct, it would, however, be the very greatest error to suppose that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned its idea of soveitizing and "emancipating" the East or that the profound and drastic alterations which are being made in the vast stretch of country between the Caspian and the Himalayas, will not, in time, produce an effect on the rest of the Middle East. In addition, it should be realized that the U. S. S. R. actuated as it is by a spirit of burning fanaticism, is firmly convinced that the Middle East needs and seeks emancipation from British rule and influence. Failure to grasp these facts connotes a fundamental inability to understand the potentiality of Russian influence in the Middle East.

At this juncture it may be asked why Russia, which has so often failed signally to appreciate the situation in Persia and Afghanistan and under whose rule millions of Moslems are reported to be groaning, should be likely to succeed in winning the sympathy and allegiance of Middle Eastern peoples. To answer this question it will be necessary to enquire into the present situation in Turkestan in order to get a general impression of the U. S. S. R.'s method of treating its own subjects.

In the absence of strictly impartial accounts of present day Turkestan, recourse must be had to publications of Soviet or quasi-Soviet origin. In her "Orient Sovietique," Lydia Bach writes of the seven and-a-half million Soviet citizens in Soviet Central Asia that "what is done to them and what they do has a repercussion beyond the frontiers amongst their neighbours of the same race in Persia, in Afghanistan, in China and in India. The Soviet Government's Oriental policy is based on the policy of nationalities. According to the doctrine proclaimed by Lenin, the East, thanks to the support of the victorious proletariat and by means of the Soviet system, will attain directly to communism without passing through the capitalist phase. It is necessary to rouse its mentality, create a new culture which will, according to Stalin's formula, be 'national in form and proletarian in essence.' The social reconstruction in U.S.S.R. extends also to the eastern Soviet republics. There is a Five Years Plan for Central Asia. It envisages the economic survey and the industrialization of the country, the building of factories, of railways, of electric power stations, and the intensification of agricultural production, notably that of cotton which will tend to become the sole product of certain regions."

This then is the Soviet plan in Central Asia. The criticism will at once be made that the plan is only workable with the willing co-operation of the population whose culture is of too long a standing not to revolt against enforced innovations. It is just this error that prophets of the U. S. S. R.'s downfall have fallen into so many times during the past twelve years. Calvin Hoover in his admirable study of Soviet commerce has shown that force is the keynote of Soviet policy. He believes that without force a socialist regimé could not be inculcated. The Russian people have been forced into their present position; they are being forced to collectivize and industrialize the country, forced to change their mentality and forced to despise the past and glory in the present and future.

No serious student of affairs in "European" Russia who has based his studies on impartial authorities, can fail to be aware that, in spite of numerous obstacles and countless mistakes, impressive successes have been scored on the industrial, and, latterly, even on the agricultural "fronts." Collectivization, in spite of its unpopularity, has been applied and, according to the "Times," there is little doubt that it will increase the agricultural output of the U. S. S. R. beyond all

knowledge. The fact must be faced that if there is a strong likelihood of the success of Soviet economic planing in the West, the same likelihood exists in the East.

Apart from the book above quoted, another and more detailed account of Soviet work in Turkestan exists in " Kochevniki " (The Nomads) by N. Tikhonov. This is a well-written account of a journey carried out by a Soviet publicist in Turkestan who aims at acquainting the rest of the U. S. S. R. with the political and social condition of their Oriental comrades. Allowing for the fact that the book is certainly biassed and that many awkward facts are probably glossed over, it cannot be denied that it contains an extraordinarily graphic description of the people with whom the author came into contact. The accounts of collectivization at work among the Jamshedis, Baluchis and Turkomans may be highly coloured, but their extreme interest cannot be ignored, more especially as they are accompanied with telling criticism of existing Soviet methods. The remarks of the educated Turkoman who made comparisons, highly unfavourable to the former, between the Soviet workers in Turkmenistan and British officials in India, will come as a surprise to those who believe that self-criticism in the U. S. S. R. is non-existent.

The whole question of the stabilization of nomads through the medium of collectivization should and must be studied by anyone interested in the future of Central Asia, and if any measure of success results from the experiment, it must be expected that repercussions will be felt in Persia and Afghanistan. It must be regretted that " Kochevniki " is not a more serious and connected study, but the suggestiveness of these fragmentary sketches and impressions is nevertheless effective.

A digression must now be made to the subject of the scientific study of conditions in the countries of the Middle East which forms an important part of the Oriental policy of the U. S. S. R. It is here that the U. S. S. R. shows itself in a particularly enterprising and therefore dangerous light. While the rest of the world seems to regard the Middle East either as a repository for attractive antiques or as a plastic mould for the reception of Western civilization, the U. S. S. R. is trying to understand it as it really is. In this connection, a few words must be said of the Leningrad Oriental Institute which has already produced many works of an original character. These works contain much that will be distasteful to Western European orientalists

for they are confined almost exclusively to the Modern East and have little to do with ancient literature and language. The Institute has pointed out that its publications are not intended to have an international appeal, and this is insured by the fact all the grammars and dictionaries are in Russian. The general object of the Institute is to teach the most modern forms, not only of the many Tartar dialects spoken within the U. S. S. R., but also of Arabic, Persian, Turkish and the principal languages of India. The chrestomathies published by the Institute make a special point of selecting material likely to give information on or stimulate interest in the social and political conditions prevailing in the countries in question. The chrestomathy of modern Arabic is an extremely important work, not only from the language point of view, but for its bringing into prominence the literary work of Arabs, both men and women, in the field of politics and social reform. The very existence of such work must be unknown to many. The Persian and Urdu chrestomathies too, are surprisingly up-to-date and practical in their scope. The effect of such work may easily be that the Middle East is presented not as a vague world, shrouded in religious prejudice though coloured with romance and poetry, nor yet as an arena for foreign political, commercial and military prowess, but as a real world where real people are striving to tackle modern problems and expressing themselves in modern languages.

If the Soviet economic menace is a real one and of the nature indicated above, what is the remedy for it, or rather what is the prophylactic against it ? To expatiate on this theme is beyond the scope or ability of the present writer. It will be sufficient to say this : that most Englishmen are convinced that whatever success Communism may register in the U. S. S. R., it is not the proper unit of progress in the world as they know it. Military science holds that success in war consists in obtaining and maintaining the initiative. It also urges the importance of studying the weapons and methods of the enemy and adjusting one's own weapons and methods accordingly. Soviet influence in the East is of a nature more complicated and subtle than armed force and requiring even more skill and foresight to combat it. That influence is operated and aided by fanatical zeal, ruthless reconstruction, and painstaking and penetrating research. To fail to realize this situation and take intelligent steps to meet it, is to court danger.

SIGNAL SECURITY.

By Major R. T. O. Cary, M.B.E., Royal Corps of Signals.

The Signal Service of an army equipped with reasonably modern apparatus for the transmission of orders, reports, etc., is under two very definite obligations to the commander:—

(*a*) To provide for the accurate and speedy handling of its signal traffic,

(*b*) To guarantee that, as far as is humanly possible, the subject matter of its signal traffic shall, where necessary, be denied to the enemy, *i.e.*, a reasonable degree of signal security must be provided.

In considering the second of these obligations it will be simplest to discuss in turn each of the four main systems of military communication, Visual Signalling, Line Telegraphy, Line Telephony, and Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony.

Visual Signalling presents comparatively little difficulty to security methods. In mobile warfare messages sent by visual will be normally of only such local importance, the signaller will be so much on the move, and the difficulties of interception so great (except in the case of flags) that the correct handling of the apparatus at his disposal will grant to the operator the security he desires. In fact, a high standard of training and discipline amongst signallers generally in the use of visual methods will solve fully ninety per cent. of the problem.

In position warfare visual signalling is not, generally speaking, a suitable method to employ. During the Great War as soon as the opposing forces settled down to trench warfare, visual methods of signalling, with the exception of the daylight lamp, were almost completely dropped. The success of the lamp was due in no small measure to its adaptability to concealment. It could be operated from a distance, and with careful sighting, as for instance aligning the lamp on the distant station through a length of drain pipe, it was almost impossible for signals to be intercepted by an enemy station.

Line Telegraphy.—For line communication between two points A and B, two main methods, may be employed.

(*i*) Earth return circuits,

(*ii*) Metallic return circuits,

With the earth return one half of the circuit is an insulated wire or cable, and the other the earth itself; the complete circuit being from the instrument at "A" through the wire or cable to the instrument at "B," and back through the earth to "A," thus completing the electrical path.

With the metallic return the earth is not employed as a conductor, the return path being provided by a second wire. The latter system therefore, though admittedly more efficient, necessitates the use of twice the quantity of wire for any given distance—a serious consideration especially in mobile warfare.

When a current of electricity is said to flow through a circuit, the following effect, amongst others, is always present. Lines of force are thrown out from the centre of the wire, even though it is insulated, and spread away from it in the form of concentric circles, gradually diminishing in force the further they get away from the wire. If one were to throw a stone into a perfectly calm pond it would illustrate very clearly the effect produced by passing a current of electricity through a wire, the ever widening rings in the water corresponding to the lines of force emanating from the centre or core of the wire.

If we then produce a second circuit and place it within range of the lines of force emanating from the first circuit, the result will be what is known as an "induced current" in this second circuit, due to the lines of force of the first cutting it. Thus it is possible to pick up and record the signals sent out by one circuit in another, even though they may not be actually touching.

Most people, at some time or another, have experienced the annoying situation when the third, and generally unwanted, voice appears in an ordinary civilian telephone conversation. It is quite likely that they have been the victims of "induction," and that certain telephone circuits have become mixed up without actually touching. In metallic circuits this effect is hardly noticeable unless cables run close to one another for considerable distances, and for all practicable purposes we may take a well laid and well maintained metallic circuit as safe.

With earth returns risk of the enemy's over-hearing is largely increased. The earth, though quite a good conductor for the passage of a current of electricity, does not confine it to a narrow and well

defined path as does an insulated cable. For example, in a telegraph circuit from "A" to "B" using an earth return, to complete the circuit the current has to pass either one way or the other through the earth. The majority will of course pass in a direct line from "A" to "B" or *vice versa*, but the remainder will radiate out through the earth in the form of "earth currents" in the same way, but to a far greater extent, than would the lines of force from a cable.

Now the fact of the earth being common to any two opposing forces simplifies the task of the listener-in. All he has to do is to employ sufficiently sensitive apparatus to pick up these earth currents and the trick is done. It is obvious that the closer the listener is to the opposing circuit the more effective will be his listening apparatus. Equally the more sensitive and up to date the apparatus employed the greater will be the distance from the cable line at which this form of listening-in can be employed. With the almost daily improvements in valves alone, the risk to signal security from earth currents has correspondingly increased, until at present the employment of ordinary telegraph methods with earth returns in forward areas is dangerous.

A safeguard would be an instrument that, while capable of transmitting and receiving Morse signals, would make it impossible for those signals to be intercepted without direct access to the line. Such an instrument has been designed. Briefly, it employs such a minute quantity of electrical current in the line circuit that the earth currents, though still present, are so reduced and controlled in their effect that, unless the line is actually cut and a similar instrument joined in the circuit, over-hearing is impossible. Even in the most forward areas the likelihood of an enemy agent, armed with a suitable instrument, being able to establish himself in such a position as to allow him uninterrupted use of the cable lines of the opposing force, is very remote.

Line Telephony presents a different problem. It can definitely be overheard on either earth or metallic circuits, though as in the case of telegraphy, to a far greater extent with earth returns than with metallic. At the present time there does not appear to be a telephone instrument which cannot be overheard. It has not yet been found possible to reduce and control the electrical currents used in telephony as can be done for telegraphy, and telephony with earth return circuits is, therefore, a real danger to signal security.

The danger can however be anticipated and minimised to a very great extent by care on the part of those using the telephone. The substitution of false names for units can be employed, and will go a long way towards making conversation unintelligible to the enemy, though it should be impressed on all concerned that in no circumstances can users of the telephone be too careful. During the Great War on several occasions a chance remark by a telephone operator gave the enemy listener-in the information he required. Such instances usually occurred when a combination of telegraphy and telephony were employed. A message might be transmitted by Morse signals with the safe form of instrument already described, but when the message was sent, the same cable line could be used for speech, which was *not safe*. An operator would frequently use the telephone to acknowledge the message sent by Morse, and in the normal course of events this gave little or nothing away. If however he was careless he would sometimes slip in a chatty remark, such as, "I got that message O. K. Cheerio, we're over the top to-night," thus notifying the enemy that an attack or a raid was contemplated. Of course such incidents were comparatively rare, but they illustrate the care which is necessary in using the telephone.

Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony are in a totally different category from the systems already described and it is in the employment of these means of communication that the greatest danger to signal security lies. Wireless has reached such a pitch of perfection today that it is undoubtedly the exception rather than the rule for communication by this means to break down, and this reliability increases rather than decreases the danger to security. It may be taken that any signals sent by wireless either by telegraph or speech are broadcast. The more reliable the set, the easier it is to intercept its signals.

Take first the telegraphy side of wireless. Every user of the ordinary civil telephone system is allotted a number, which, used in conjunction with the name of his town or district, identifies him as the possessor of a telephone and enables him to communicate with others similarly provided with identification numbers. To enable one wireless set to communicate with another, it is necessary to use a similar system. Every army wireless station must therefore be allotted a call which may be either a group of figures or letters, or both. By sending out a call to the station desired, followed by its own call, one

atation is able to get in touch with another, but, this communication is being broadcast and both friend and foe will know that A B C is calling D E F. It may be argued that such information by itself is not of much value to the enemy's intelligence service, and up to a certain point that is true. It is only when it is considered in relation to other factors that its real value to the enemy is apparent. By the use of direction finding apparatus the position of a wireless station may be more or less accurately determined. A B C calls D E F, and immediately the enemy's intelligence service intercepts these signals and locates the two stations. At the moment we will assume that the calls A B C, D E F mean little or nothing to the enemy intelligence. As traffic between these two stations proceeds however, the situation clears. The actual volume of traffic, even if the subject-matter is not understood, will enable the intelligence branch, in conjunction with the known position of the stations, to determine which is the higher and which is the lower formation to which the sets are presumably attached. An increase in the volume of traffic may indicate the movement of troops, or again, an attack. In a comparatively short time it will be possible to put together a fairly accurate 'order of battle' which will, of course, be checked by other means at the disposal of the intelligence service. Further, no wireless station specially serves one particular unit; it is rather in the position of a local post office, from which deliveries of messages to individuals and units must be made. This involves the use of "Addresses to" and "Addresses from" as a portion of any signal message to be sent. These addresses can be, and of course are, disguised by the use of code names in substitution for the real ones. These may be satisfactory for a limited period only, but it will not take the enemy intelligence long to realise that "Mutt" and "Jeff" are in reality 1st Brigade and 1st Division. It will therefore be necessary to change these false names at frequent intervals. This in itself involves a tremendous amount of organization and a very perfect system of distribution. All such names must be in possession of units at exactly the right moment and all units have to take them into use at the same time. Should distribution in any way fail chaos will ensue and may take days to put right. In the meantime communication by wireless may become hopelessly disorganized and therefore unreliable.

Secrecy can be preserved by the use of a suitable cipher, but this method has its disadvantages. Enciphering a message of any

length takes time and needs highly skilled personnel, while deciphering at the other end again adds to the length of time it takes to deliver a message. It will therefore frequently be found that it is not worth while to send a particular message by wireless, as the time taken in enciphering, transmitting, and deciphering, will delay it so long that it will not be of much practical value to the recipients. Unquestionably the necessity for cipher does restrict the use of wireless on many occasions. Even though by the use of cipher the meaning of the message is denied to the enemy, there are many other factors which may enable him to obtain valuable information. The use of an originator's number is a case in point. When the Brigade Major of a Brigade uses the letters B.M. and a number to identify a message, it may mean that he is in fact giving to the enemy the information that it is a message from a brigade to another unit. From his point of view the frequent change of his originator's number is likely to lead to confusion when a reference to a previous message has to be made, and provides yet another of the straws likely to break the camel's back, yet if he continues to use the same reference letters he is undoubtedly giving away information to the enemy.

It is not of course for the Signal Service to decide the relative importance of signal messages. This is entirely the responsibility of the originators, who, in the majority of cases, will be the staffs of the formations engaged in the operations. A very thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of wireless on the part of the staff is therefore necessary before "Signal Security", certainly as regards wireless, can be made really effective.

Should an originator consider that his message will be of little or no value to the enemy, then he can instruct the Signal Service to send it in clear by any system they like. On the other hand he may frank his message so that if it is sent by wireless it must be in code. This understanding on the part of the staff is an absolute necessity to the efficient working of such a system. A mistake in the franking of a message may mean all the difference between success and failure in an operation. Replies and references to previous messages sent should also be treated with great care. A doubtful point of identity revealed by the interception of a message may be completely cleared up by a reference to the reply to that message.

With wireless telephony the difficulties are of course magnified considerably. One force will possess experts in the language of the other, and even though the users of the wireless telephone exercise the greatest care to avoid using the real names of units, formations, etc., the very tone of their conversations may give away valuable information. A study of telephone conversations will soon enable a listener-in to determine who is giving orders and who is receiving them. The natural anxiety of a user of the phone under particularly trying conditions may also help the listener-in to a better understanding of the situation.

The question of volume of traffic has already been mentioned as a source of valuable information to the enemy. The regulation and control of such traffic will, of course, be an important contribution to wireless security. Well thought out and carefully manufactured false messages, sent by the less frequently used wireless stations, and at times mixed up with traffic on all sets in the area, may prove to be a source of great embarrassment to the enemy intelligence. If a code that is not too difficult to decipher is employed, an even greater confusion may be created in the minds of the opposition. This again requires very careful organization, as, if badly handled, it is likely to defeat its own ends.

This article has dealt only with the main difficulties of signal security. Visual signalling, line telegraphy and telephony can all be dealt with by the exercise of reasonable care. Wireless is undoubtedly the main problem and, in order to ensure a system of "Signal Security" capable of guarding against the dangers inherent in wireless communication, the following measures must be taken :—

(*a*) Wireless calls must bear no relation to the units served by any particular W/T station and they must be changed at frequent and irregular intervals.

(*b*) Addresses "To" and "From" must be suitably disguised by false or code names and changed frequently.

(*c*) The same procedure must be enforced with names of units, etc. appearing in the text of the message.

(*d*) Originator's numbers must bear no relation to the originator himself.

(*e*) Employment of cipher will in the majority of cases be necessary.

(*f*) The volume and direction of signal traffic must be controlled.

There is one school of thought which maintains that the measures necessary for a really efficient system of signal security are too complicated, cause too much delay, and throw too much of a strain on staff and signal service to make them worth while. Their contention is that the gain in speed and simplicity will more than outweigh any advantage the enemy may obtain from lack of secrecy. Whether this opinion is correct or not is a matter for argument, but it is one which every officer should consider. The true solution lies, probably like that of most war problems, in the nice balancing of security against simplicity and speed.

HINTS ON MAKING A *BANDOBAST* FOR A SHOOT IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

By A Forest Officer.

Whenever I come across in remote spots young men, who generally have never had an opportunity of learning about the India outside cantonments, I fully realize how much more difficult things are for them in every way than for an official with local influence and plenty of subordinates to help him. However, my experience is that most men enjoy the novelty of the situation, and I am sure those who have tried would agree with me that no one, who is keen to get out in the jungle and can put up with roughing it, should be deterred by the difficulties of the *bandobast*. If two men go together I believe the problems that arise will be more a source of amusement than anything else. I recollect my feelings of puzzled embarrassment on meeting two subalterns of a British regiment in the jungle, who solicited my help as regards "*madchens*" and a "*charmer*". I realized just in time that it was "*machans*" and a "*chamar*" that they were after, and though my mind jumped to all the problems they must be facing with so meagre an equipment of Hindustani, I realized later that I never met two fellows who enjoyed themselves more. I shall assume that the reader is equally new to the country and wants information *ab initio*.

The shooting in Government Forest, the only forest areas where any control over shooting is exercised, is administered by the local forest officer on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner who is the head of the District. It is always wise if you visit the headquarters of the district before proceeding to your shoot to call not only on the Forest Officer, but also on the Deputy Commissioner and the District Superintendent of Police; their advice is sure to be helpful and you may get quite unexpected assistance, as nowhere are you likely to meet a finer tradition of helping the stranger at your gate.

The local forest officer is called the Divisional Forest Officer and it is to him you address your application for a Shooting Block. His Division is divided into about half a dozen Ranges of 100 to 200 square miles each, in charge of Range Officers who rank with Indian Officers

in the Indian Army. These Ranges contain two or three shooting Blocks ; some good but most of them indifferent. The first consideration is to find out the names of one or two good Blocks and the name of the Division, and the only way to do that is to keep your ears open and jot them down against the day you may require them. You can, of course, leave it to the Divisional Forest Officer, but there is always a demand for his best blocks, and if the choice is left to him he will naturally incline to give the most popular ones a rest.

The rules allow you to apply for a Shooting Permit for a Block up to three months in advance of the day you mean to enter it, and you will be wise to do so. Possibly you may be able to get two Blocks the cost of each being Rs. 25 per month, but if your leave is only a month I advise you to concentrate on one area and get to know it. March and April are the best months.

Don't expect game to abound in India as it does in the pictures of " Africa Speaks " ; wherever you go in the Central Provinces you will have to look for it, and you will find your powers of patience tested far more than you expect. Against my will I once gave an inferior Block at a moment's notice to two subalterns who had got their leave and nowhere to go. Ten days later I got a note, " You were quite right this Block isn't much good. As a matter of fact the only living animal we have seen is a pig, so we have decided to spend the rest of our leave in Mussoorie." Two days later, " I am awfully sorry I wrote you that note when we were feeling rather fed up. We have had a wonderful time since then. Yesterday I got a solitary bull bison in the morning, and in the evening I saw tracks of tiger and sat up over a live kill. I got three tigresses in five minutes and my friend got the fourth further down the *nullah.*" Again, I lay emphasis on patience. Tigers trek round in wide circles and there is always hope.

The permit issued to you will show you the number of sambhar, cheetal, barasingha and bison you may shoot, the address of the Range Officer and details about closed seasons. The numbers allotted are governed by the annual limit for the Block and by the length of your permit. You will never be given more than one bison and generally two of each of the others. Tigers, panthers, bear, nilgai and pig are unlimited, but that is because they are classed as " vermin " and not because they are so numerous, except in the case of pig. Always shoot pig, there is no question of their being ridden, they are a plague

to the crops and your best means, not only of testing your shooting and your rifle, but what is also important, of making friends with your hosts, the local junglies. A dead pig the first night in camp is a fine introduction and it has helped beginners more than they know. All concerned appreciate evidence that this strange Sahib, who cannot talk to them, can anyhow hit the mark and that his *bandook* can kill, because no one knows what circumstances may not arise before the uninvited guest takes his departure from the neighbourhood, and not everyone looks forward to being mixed up unarmed in other people's tiger beats. Kill all the bears you can and don't treat them with contempt. The villager has no more dangerous enemy.

When you are told the Block you want is available, send the fee by Money Order and make out a concise list of questions, leaving space for brief answers, *e.g.*, Railway Station, Post Office, Distance to Block, best centre, is there a Forest Rest House, may I ask the Range Officer to get me kills and send carts to the Station, can I take a car or hire a motor lorry? Ask the Divisional Forest Officer to fill in the answers.

And here a word of warning. The Forest Officer's duty is confined to issuing a permit, providing a Forest Guard to watch your movements and keep him informed, and to running you in and finding you if you break either Forest laws or Game laws. Dismiss the illusion that Forest Officers are maintained by Government to run shoots for themselves and other people. Whatever the Forest Officer, or his Range Officer, or his Forest Guard do to help you is done of their own free will.

Help you will certainly want one way or another from all these individuals, and you are pretty certain to get it so long as you set about it the right way, *e.g.*, always offer a Range Officer a chair.

It is difficult to think of all the things you want to know, especially as I must be brief. Note the following:—

(*i*) *Maps.* Ask the numbers of the one inch sheets which cover the Block and order on a Money Order form from—The Map Record and Issue Office, 13, Wood Street, Calcutta, paper Rs. 1-8-0, linen-backed Rs. 2-4-0 per sheet.

(*ii*) *Weapons.*

(*a*) If you can afford it a D. B. H. V., 400 or 450, and a small bore magazine rifle for stalking—Rigby, Mannlicher or Springfield—is the best equipment you can have. The former is only really necessary for bison.

For tiger or panther you are just as well off with the old ·500 D. B. black powder rifle, using low pressure cordite cartridges, which are smokeless. This should cost about Rs. 150 compared with Rs. 750 for a H. V. rifle. Bullets for bison should be nickel-capped and pointed; for the soft skinned cats they should be hollow-nosed or copper-tubed so that they break up at once. There is always a danger with H. V. rifles that the bullet will pass straight through a tiger. You may not be able to tell if you have hit at all and it may be difficult to find any blood trail to help you. Remember with all game it is often the second shot which counts, so what you want is to knock the animal down with the first and be able to finish it of with the second shot, preferably without frightening the animal or giving away your position by having to click a magazine. You are more likely to do this with the old ·500 D. B. rifle than with any H. V. rifle. If you do use a H. V. rifle be sure to have soft-nosed or hollow bullets.

Whatever rifles you take, practice with them on the range first. Confidence in your weapon is half the battle and always carry your rifle yourself, otherwise you will miss your chance.

(*b*) 12 bore shot-gun with

(*i*) 50, 4's and 50, 6's for peafowl, jungle-fowl and green pigeon.

(*ii*) 20 lethal bullets. Try them on the range. I saw one gun give a bull at 100 yards.

(*iii*) 25 S. S. G's.

Increase your confidence by having more ammunition with you than you are likely to want.

I suggest following up a wounded panther with S. S. G's. in both barrels, and a wounded tiger with a lethal bullet in right barrel and S. S. G. in left barrel, especially if on foot and you can't locate the animal. If possible always have buffaloes or dogs ahead to distract the animal's attention from human beings. Buffaloes are no use in the heat of the day. Dogs can be invaluable and can generally be trusted to look after themselves.

(*iii*) *Expense.*—Rs. 500 a head per month should cover you, apart from travelling expenses. Take fifty rupees worth of annas and plenty of silver rupees. Notes and four anna bits are not popular in the jungle. Pay beaters

and villagers with your own hand—don't leave it to your orderly or soldier servant, he will regard aboriginals as monkeys quite unworthy of full pay. Ask the Range Officer the daily rate for labour and carts and pay it out yourself at once. Nothing serves to establish good relations more, and it accords with the tradition of the best men in the country. The friends you can make among these simple folk will be one of your pleasantest memories.

Kills (buffaloes) cost about Rs. 10 and you should ask the Range Officer to help you arrange. Two men are required for tying up and visiting each kill. The rope should be one a tiger can break.

All you can hope for in the way of supplies are a few eggs, chickens and milk. Take stores, vegetables, fruit, etc. If there is a Forest Rest House it will be furnished, but has no lamps, crockery or plate. See yourself that drinking water is boiled and guard against being bitten by mosquitoes as much as possible.

(*iv*) *Rewards.*—Tiger and panther Rs. 15. Wild dog and bear Rs. 5. Send a receipt to the Divisional Forest Officer, quoting details and he will arrange payment by Money Order from the Treasury to the address given. It is customary to give the amount to the man who is with you at the time.

(*v*) *Miscellaneous.*—Don't forget :—Mosquito nets, quinine, aspirin, chlorodyne, permanganate, bandages, etc., plaster, iodine pencil, mosquitol for sitting in *machan*, soda sparklet, alum for skins, skinning knives, water bottle, cough lozenges if you are liable to cough in a *machan*, torch and refills, whistle, kukri, crepe-soled boots (not shoes), spine pad, pigsticker topi, fishing rod, field glasses, camera and books.

Books of local interest recommended are :—

(*a*) Shikar Notes for Novices, by the Hon. James Best, I.F.S.

(*b*) The Animals of Central India, by A. A. Dunbar-Brander, O.B.E., I.F.S.

(*c*) The Highlands of Central India, by Forsythe.

(*d*) Seonee, by Sterndale,

PICKLES, A. D. C.

By "Mouse."

It is with the greatest diffidence that I approach the question of *aides-de-camp* at all. Although he follows the second oldest profession in the world, the A. D. C. has suffered the derision, the abuse and the envy of all the centuries and centurions. Wits have used him for their gibes. Humorists have caricatured him for their base ends. Novelists, dramatists and diarists have dragged him in by his shortest hairs to establish their *aplomb* with the *au fond* of the *haut monde*. He, poor devil, is the whipping-boy of society. Nobody treats him seriously; nobody loves him; nobody sympathises with him, and nobody has stood up for him—until I undertook to write this article. (In Australia he is called a "Gent's help"; but the Australians are low.)

The *genus* A. D. C. is neither so distinguished nor distinct that it deserves the exaggerated isolation which falls to its ordinary lot. By some historical mischance the idea has grown that an *aide-de-camp* is a hot-house bloom; it looks beautiful, it smells agreeably, it is nice to touch, it has been nurtured amid the most delicate and refined surroundings and—if exposed to the blasts of the outside world—it wilts. Nothing could be further from the truth. Most As. D. C. thrive on blasts. The job calls forth a soldier's greatest attributes; force of character, courage of a high degree, verve in dealing with subordinates and ladies, quickness of judgment in an emergency, leadership, organization, administration, decentralisation, tact in dealing with superiors and in getting your own way (think of the number of Generals who failed to persuade or cajole politicians during the Great War all for lack of training as junior officers), and a cheerful appearance in the midst of the most depressing circumstances. There has never been a perfect A. D. C. Such an one would combine the appearance of a rejuvenated Field-Marshal with the sex appeal of a film star, the originality of a Fortnum or Mason, the character of a Sir Galahad, the plausibility of a Colonel House, the charm of a Henry Wilson, the ability and tenacity of a Ford, and the versatility of a polo pony in a pagal gymkhana. A few As. D. C. have reached almost these heights, but two of the best just failed the attainment of perfection on their appointment as Commanders-in-Chief in India.

Personally I am rather sorry for *aides-de-camp*. When they appear officially they are in the limelight of pitiless publicity. If one of them loses his stirrup, his head or his temper, it is a matter for six months discussion and a lifetime of memory. This may appear to be an over-weighted statement, but I know a man in India who is still trying to live down an upside-down spur and he has told me in confidence that he owes his present obscurity to this ghastly aberration of his bearer. There is the unfortunate story also of the young gallant who kissed the wrong woman at the right moment and has spent his time ever since kicking his heels and himself in the backwater of a garrison town. As. D. C. have many opportunities certainly, but temptation and disillusion are their step-sisters.

Having written this long-felt want among *aides-de-camp* it is, therefore, with peculiar sadness that I conduct the reader to an historical aspect of A. D. C.-dom wherein the hero shows up in a sorry light; but the same reader will concede, I hope, the truth of the old saying that this exception proves my rule. By holding up "Pickles" to the horror of the multitude I do not wish to testify that all As. D. C. are of immaculate conception, but rather do I wish to show that even the most inefficient of the breed may conceal virtues which place him definitely upon a higher plane than the late Captain Scott Jervis, 106th Light Infantry.

Captain Jervis, A. D. C. to His Excellency Sir William Mansfield and Comptroller of the Commander-in-Chief's Household, was court martialled in Simla in 1866, and the proceedings form one of the most remarkable events which convulsed Simla society since the Mutiny. Jervis was apparently a popular young character with a quick temper, an easy-going nature, and an astonishing disregard for the ordinary rules of discipline and everyday courtesy. He was the defendant. The plaintiff was His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Sir William Mansfield, late Chief of the Staff in the Bombay Army where he had "served with much efficiency during the mutinies and thus carried great weight in all military affairs." If one hazarded a judgment of his character from reading between the lines of the court martial proceedings the result would be the figure of an irascible, foolish, badly advised old gentleman who allowed his better feelings to be overcome by his natural anger at finding that for several years he had nursed a viper in his bosom.

This famous court-martial assembled on 25th June 1866 and finished its work about nine weeks later—on 30th August. The President was a Brigadier-General and the Members were seven Colonels, four Lieutenant-Colonels and three Majors. The prisoner was arraigned on five charges which I will condense from their legal phraseology into more homely language :—

1*st Charge :* Scandalous behaviour, unbecoming the character of an officer and gentleman while employed as Aide-de-Camp, in that he—

(*a*) At Mahasoo during the months of September, October and November 1865, misappropriated property valued at Rs. 920-10-8 "for the entertainment of his own guests." The list of property included :

100 bottles of sherry.
61 bottles of champagne.
88 bottles of claret.
114 bottles of beer.
1 bottle of Worcester sauce.
1 tin of ham.
1 tin of pate de foie gras.
3 tins of truffles.
4 tins of asparagus.
1 lb. of tea.
1 bottle of mixed pickles.

(*b*) At Calcutta in February 1866 debited the sum of Rs. 700/- in His Excellency's accounts, the same sum being the cost of his own private table expenses.

(*c*) At Calcutta or Simla dishonestly misappropriated to his own use stable gear of the value of Rs. 275/-.

(*d*) Charged to His Excellency's debit the sum of Rs. 47-14-0 which sum was expended privately by Captain Jervis for his own use.

2*nd Charge :* Refusing to produce his account books before a Military Court of Enquiry on 14th May 1866.

3*rd Charge :* Neglecting to obey the order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to attend a Committee of Audit on the 22nd May 1866.

4th Charge: Disobeying the lawful command of his superior officer (the Deputy Adjutant-General) to deliver him his sword when placed under arrest on 9th June 1866.

5th Charge: Conduct unbecoming the character of an officer in having at Simla on the 22nd June made use of highly insubordinate expressions in a letter to the Adjutant-General in regard to his appearance before a General Court-Martial:—"In reply, I have the honour most solemnly and emphatically to protest against this proceeding as unwarranted by law, principle or justice, and to state with every respect to His Excellency that nothing short of physical force will induce me to be present at the Court, and that if dragged there as a prisoner by violent means, I shall take no part in the proceedings."

Before this odious arraignment the prisoner adopted a defiant attitude. With the able assistance of a civilian counsel, M. W. Taylor, he made three pleas in bar of trial. Before these were accepted by the Court it had to close twice in order that it might discuss quietly the shockingly forcible language used by the accused. If one observes the chronological order of the five charges preferred against Pickles, one sees that he imagined from the beginning that he was being made the public and official delinquent for a personal and private spite, and that the injustice of such a proceeding turned his mind so violently "redwards" that he threw all caution, all discipline and all ordinary feelings of gratitude or respect, to the winds in order either to save his skin or vindicate his character.

In his pleas in bar he reiterated vehemently (*a*) that the Commander-in-Chief being in fact the plaintiff could not legally convene the court to try him; (*b*) that the orders he was charged with disobeying were illegal and (*c*) that the Commander-in-Chief had overridden the Judge Advocate in not allowing him, the accused, to call certain witnesses for the defence. To this the Judge Advocate made good legal answers which led to further judicial quibbling and counter-pleas—all too involved to follow—which resulted in the Court closing again. Eventually all the pleas were disallowed and the prisoner was asked to plead "Guilty or Not Guilty."

The prisoner replied: "Under protest—not guilty."

The Prosecution.—The case for the prosecution lasted for twenty-one days and was a long, tedious business brightened by passages at arms between the prisoner, the court and the various witnesses. Pickles was assisted by his civilian counsel whose arguments and

suggestions were so technical and abstruse that the court had to keep closing for days at a time to enable it to counter the various legal points raised. The first witness for the prosecution was His Excellency, Sir W. Mansfield. He produced an excellent memorandum written by himself for the guidance of his Personal Staff. Two extracts make quaint reading: " The Commander-in-Chief expects that his Personal Staff will not give in to the temptation of high play," and " Pique on the part of a member of the Staff towards their guests, cannot be permitted." In the evidence later produced it was found out that this latter order had been included for the special benefit of Captain Jervis, who on one occasion had been rude to the Quarter-master-General of the Bombay Army.

The " Pioneer " published the daily proceedings, and unpleasant excitement ran high through Northern India during the *six days* when the Commander-in-Chief had to submit to a merciless cross-examination. Jervis, prompted by his skilful counsel, plied his late master with embarrassing questions in an attempt to prove that the " mis-appropriation " was normal and had been practised by all members of the Staff for many years. He got the admission that the Commander-in-Chief himself had been his guest for four days during the period of the alleged consumption of the stores in Mahasoo. He insinuated that Lady Mansfield was at the bottom of the whole trouble. It all makes very distressing reading, and no one was more distressed than the Commander-in-Chief. He kept his temper admirably but on occasions was stung to make some acid answers. For instance: " The prisoner, although trusted in so many things was, I am happy to say, not trusted with my banker's book." (Here the prisoner rose and threw himself on the protection of the court). And again: " I consider that there is a suggestion of untruth running through both the letters which have been read by him in which he tries to make out that three officers of high rank on the Headquarters Staff of the Army were under my influence."

President: (who had evidently during the latter part of witness's answer been reflecting over the previous portion and who spoke with a dignity and deliberation which produced a profound impression upon the whole assembly) " Your Excellency, the prisoner has asked for the protection of the Court; it is the wish of the Court that Your Excellency should in giving evidence refrain from all expressions and remarks distressing to the prisoner....."

After the Commander-in-Chief's evidence there was a host of witnesses; the Military Secretary, an Aide-de-Camp (who, it was insinuated, had been expelled from a Masonic Lodge, black-balled at theBengal Club and assaulted in the Simla Club), a khansamah, Nunee Khan, a khitmatgar, Hussein Khan, the English butler, Abbey, a Chaprassi and finally the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army.

The Defence.—The prisoner produced a defence which covers thirty-one foolscap pages of close print. On the first charge of misappropriation he pleads that no fraudulent intention was proved. He had merely *borrowed* the stores intending to pay them back later. He cited instances of the Commander-in-Chief lending stores to his Staff on previous occasions. He showed that the present action had been taken against him after Sir William Mansfield had held a private enquiry among the menial staff at which he, the accused, had not been present. In his indignation Jervis made some splendid oratorical flights: "For, gentlemen, while the evidence shows His Excellency exerting himself for the purpose of eliciting evidence against me, while it discloses members of His Excellency's Staff hunting for proofs, writing and telegraphing to Calcutta tradesmen with a view to the preparation of these charges, I myself have scrupulously avoided holding any, even the slightest communication with any soul, European or Native, from the first commencement of the controversy until now. I have met accusation with open and indignant denial, nay, I have given offence by the warmth, perhaps even the defiance, of my manner and language, rather than exhibit any desire to conciliate or conceal." He concludes his refutation of the first charge with the native admission: "I have, as I have before stated, *never made out the accounts at all.*"

The second charge, that of neglecting to obey an order to attend a Court of Inquiry, Jervis counters by producing a letter from the A. G.'s Department "requesting" him to attend. "How then my neglecting to comply with a "request" which I submit is synonymous with an "invitation" can be converted into the military offence of "neglecting to obey an *order*" I am unable to understand. I submit this point, Gentlemen, to your serious attention." He adopted a similar defence for the third charge and pointed out that at the time of the Audit Committee the whole case was under discussion. and therefore *sub judice*, between the Commander-in-Chief and his counsel.

Equally ingenious is his defence against the charge of disobeying the lawful command of his superior officer regarding handing over his sword when placed under arrest. The prosecution could produce no order or regulation to show that an officer should deliver up his sword. " The warrant for such a demand, it may be said is *custom*, but the prosecution has altogether failed to establish it, Colonel—himself having only been able to state in his evidence that he " thinks " such a custom exists. And he, Gentlemen, is the Deputy Adjutant-General of the Army." Pickles clinches his argument with a recent ruling (hearsay) made by the authorities of the Horse Guards that such a demand is unauthorised by law and " may with impunity be resisted."

The last charge, that of using highly insubordinate language in a letter to the Adjutant-General, the accused finds "extremely difficult to meet." He pleads that owing to his sense of deep anger and indignation at the whole proceedings which " if I may say so without disrespect were so unfair, so illegal and so ruinous to me that I might as well submit to *any* penalty as a stand such an ordeal ". In other words he preferred being hanged for a sheep than a lamb.

The prosecution replied for thirty-one pages, and on the whole appeared to demolish fairly successfully most of the accused's defence. New documents were produced to which the prisoner took legal objection and after much bitter argument was allowed eight days to make a rejoinder.

On Wednesday, 29th August, the Judge Advocate made his summing up, on the whole fairly impartial, but showing here and there a certain amount of bias against the prisoner.

Finding.—The Court found Jervis Not Guilty of the 1st and 2nd Charges, but Guilty of the 3rd, 4th and 5th Charges. He was sentenced to dismissal from the Service and " in consideration of the extenuating circumstances disclosed in the proceedings " the Court recommended him to mercy. The Commander-in-Chief ordered the Court to re-assemble on 12th September to re-consider its finding of acquittal. The Court adhered to its previous finding. The Judge Advocate was then ordered to prepare a general critical report of the whole case which he concludes with a valuable paragraph showing how a skilful civilian counsel had " made rings round " the Court. This led to useful corrections in the Army Act regarding the laws of evidence and legal procedure. The Commander-in-Chief confirmed the sentence

and in his remarks wrote that the finding of acquittal on the first and second charges was contrary to the clear and sufficient proof produced by the prosecution. He refused to countenance the recommendation for mercy and Captain Jervis was dismissed the Service.

I have it on good authority that Pickles returned to England, and appealed to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, who befriended him. Jervis was re-instated for one day in which he sold his commission for £1,800.

I am dashed if I can see where the moral of this story lies, except perhaps that it shows that for *Aides-de-Camp* it isn't all beer and pickles.

THE TRAVELS OF RISALDAR SHAHZAD MIR KHAN.

This is the first of a series of extracts translated from the autobiography of the Late Khan Bahadur Risaldar Shahzad Mir Khan, O.B.I. of the 11th K. E. O. Lancers (Probyn's Horse). An Urdu edition of the book under the title of "Shah Safar Sari-i-Dunya" has been issued to units of the Indian Army, but portions of it are, it is thought, of such general, and at times historical, interest as to justify publication in the Journal.

The author was the son of Rahmatullah Khan, a Lambardar of Pirpai in the Nowshera District of the North-West Frontier Province. He enlisted in Probyn's Horse on 14th February 1882 and right up to his death at his home on 12th October 1924 he continued to render devoted service to his country.

It must be remembered that Shahzad Mir Khan's descriptions of people and places are those of fifty years or so ago, and that he looked at both East and West through Oriental eyes. Times have changed and many of his strictures and comments might not now be justified, were perhaps not justified even at the time he made them. But they were made in good faith and by a trained and keen observer, while many of the more unusual of his personal experiences have been vouched for by independent witnesses.

Only a few copies of the original book in lithographed Urdu were published, and as in it names were spelt more or less phonetically it is difficult and sometimes impossible to identify them. In translation the author's turns of phrase have as far as possible been preserved, but, in deference to Western susceptibilities, it has been necessary at times to depart from his honest habit of calling a spade a spade.

It is hoped that these articles in the Journal will be some tribute to an Indian Officer of the best type.

INTRODUCTION.

I have written those things which I have seen and heard. All religions are treated equally in this book, and no one should cast religious aspersions at it.

The Reason for Writing this Book.

Several British Officers, and Indian friends of mine, who knew that I was a great traveller, have encouraged me, and even insisted that I should write a book telling of my adventures during my various

travels. This meant, of course, that I should write an autobiography. It was no easy matter to compile the book, as the events covered a period of twenty-seven years, but as I had kept careful notes of each journey in my field books, the task was not impossible.

Now the writing of books is the business of poets and their ilk, and so it will be unnecessary for me to say that all I have done is to write down in my own uncouth language what I have seen and heard. I have been fated to travel much in my time, and have experienced the ups and downs of fortune, and I record these paltry details merely as a memorial to myself in this world. Moreover, I do not think it right that I should keep sealed up in my heart the wonders that I have seen. I have never had any idea of making money out of selling books, or becoming a merchant. Indeed my intention was to have sixty or seventy copies of the book printed at my own expense, and to present them to my friends as souvenirs. Should any Sahib think that the book is not in good taste, and that I have written it with the sole object of self-aggrandisement, I ask him to be good enough to spare me from such criticism. In truth my only desire was that I should leave these memoirs of my adventures, and so complete my life.

Concerning Myself.

I was born in 1863. Without going into the details of my childhood, suffice it to say that I stayed at home till the 31st January 1882, when I started on my travels as you will see from what follows.

On the 1st February 1882 a boy friend of mine persuaded me to go off with him and see India. I was sure that my father and mother would highly disapprove of our scheme, so the initial difficulty was to find some way of obtaining the money necessary to put our plan into execution.

In accordance with the well known proverb, "All is fair when necessity presses," I went to a native banker, or '*sahukar*,' called Das Mull, a splendid fellow, with whom I used to deal, and told him that I wanted some money. He asked me what I was going to do with so much, and I told him that my brother, who had taken up a road repairing contract, wanted it to pay the coolies. He thereupon gave me the money, and I went home. That evening, in order to put my near and dear ones off the scent, I told them that I was thinking

of going over to Peshawar for a day or two, and asked them if I could do anything for them. Some of them gave me commissions to do, and the others thought nothing of it.

We started off that very night and next morning reached Khairabad. In those days the railway had not reached Peshawar, and I knew nothing of the world at all.

The only place I had heard of was Calcutta, so I asked the *Babu* at the Station to give me a ticket to Calcutta. He told me that I could not get a through ticket to Calcutta, and gave me a ticket to Lahore. There I took a ticket to Amritsar, where I remembered that there was a young man called Hikmat, of my village, who had enlisted as a sowar in the 11th Risala which was at that time in Umballa Cantonment. I thought that, as I had got so far, I might as well go and look him up. So I took tickets for us both to Umballa City, for in those days I knew nothing about Cantonments and such things!

We arrived at Umballa City at about 6 a.m., and went straight away to the Cantonments, and eventually found our way to the 8th Troop of the 11th Risala. I remember that it was a Sunday, but notwithstanding that, Colonel Prinsep Sahib Bahadur was going round the lines, and my companion and I were brought up before him. We were then sent to the Doctor Sahib for medical inspection! Well, I was passed fit, but my companion was not and I told them that I refused to serve without him. However, no one would listen to what I said, so what could I do? They sent my friend back to his home, and kept me. A few days later, the news reached my home that I had run away, and had enlisted in the Army. My brother was sent off post haste to the Regiment to bring me back. He turned up sure enough, but, the Risaldar Major, the late Muhammad Akram Khan Sahib, told him that it was impossible for me to go, and packed him off home again! For a few days I remained on as an '*umedwar*,' but on the 14th February 1882 I was enlisted, and so all the plans I had made to see the world and to make my fortune were dashed to the ground.

I now began to get a little sense in my head. I had been taught to read and write a little at home, and so I was able to start straight away learning Urdu in the Regimental School. In two years' time I had learnt quite a lot of Urdu, Persian, sums, and so on. It took me five months to pass out of riding school. I learned a little English, but

acquired a thorough knowledge of the Roman alphabet, which is used for signalling, and managed to pass top of the signalling class.

Personal effort is a good thing, and it was thanks to my hard work that I did pass first. Nevertheless I must own that my success was chiefly due to the instruction given me by my Commanding Officer, Colonel Boyle Sahib Bahadur. This Sahib treated the men as if they were his own children, and was an indefatigable worker. He was especially kind to me, and helped me in my work tremendously. It was he who made me efficient, and made a man of me. He praised me very highly in Durbar before everyone when I passed my signalling examination.

Two and a half years later, I was given leave home, and I saw my relations and dear ones again. On return from leave I got orders to go with a Commission, the details of which will be found in the account of my first journey.

This introduction was written on the 25th November 1909.

My First Journey.

The Herat Boundary Commission under General Lumsden, via *Multan, the Bolan, and the Quetta Valley,* 1885.

I do not know exactly how many men there were, but there must have been about two hundred of our Regiment, and two companies of the 20th Punjabis. We all assembled at Quetta, and moved off towards the Registan, or the sand desert of Baluchistan. Our first camp was at Chaman where we met the Afghan detachment under General Qazi Sad-ud-Din Khan, who was ready to help us in every way. Up to that time no troops had ever traversed the route by which we were going. In the whole of Afghanistan there was no sign of a road of any kind, and, as our way lay through heavy sand. The going was terribly difficult. If men strayed to the right or left of the track they were soon lost in a cloud of sand that was just like a stream of water. In order to cope with this difficulty we arranged with the local Baluchi nomads who graze their herds and flocks in these parts, to get fires lit on mounds by the side of the track. Thereafter, the smoke from these guided us by day, and the fire by night.

In camp everything was covered and buried in sand. Our cooking pots and other vessels were full of it. The water was dreadful. At one halt, to taste it by way of an experiment, I put half an ounce of

sugar into a small quantity of it, but even so it tasted as if I had put a half ounce of salt into it. Many a time we obtained our water on camels sent by the Amir of Kabul.

The Koh-i-Zal.

Zal was the father of Rustam, the famous hero, and in this country there is a mountain called after him. About nine miles to the north-east of the mountain is a large pond on the north side of which there is a stone fort, encircled with broken down wall. It is said that in this fort was the throne of Rustam.

I would very much like to know what the kingdom of these "Hero Kings" consisted of in this desert. No one lives here, there is no sign of cultivation whatsoever, and the wind that blows makes one's ears bleed. The only people we saw from Chaman to the Helmand were wild Baluch shepherds and cattle drivers. Every now and again, they brought for sale melons, wrapped up in leather, which were very sweet. There was good water in the Helmand, and when we reached Herat we saw a lot of vineyards. Herat is a fine city surrounded by a moat. The inhabitants, however, are just like Indians: that is they have soft tongues and flabby bodies. They were very afraid of us soldiers, and the shop-keepers would run away from their shops to the hills at night: the only discomfort, though needless, which our presence caused them.

The Commission waited for about a year in the hope of meeting the Russian Mission, and of settling the frontier between Russia and Afghanistan. The Russians, however, did not turn up. Eventually General Lumsden, in despair, returned to England, and the command devolved on Colonel Ridgeway Sahib. Half the escort, both Cavalry and Infantry, returned to India. The first winter we spent under canvas in Bala Murghab, and the second at Charshamba, where the Shrine of the 'Ashab-i-Kahf' is located. The whole story of these people will be found in the fifteenth Chapter of the Holy Qur-án.

The Ashab-i-Kahf.

There is a cave in a hillock near Charshamba, the entrance to which faces the east. A man can walk in without bending his head. The path inside the cave winds about till a wall is reached. Against this wall is a ladder about four feet high. On climbing the ladder, in a cavern can be seen the recumbent forms of three men, covered over

by a sheet; the bodies are moulded in clay and are quite recognizable. At their feet, on the face of the rock, has been carved the figure of a deer, and beyond that a greyhound, and beyond that again a hawk. About twenty-five paces to the east of the entrance to the cave is a round grave, on which there is a large grave stone. The story of the Ashab-i-Kahf is well known so I will only give a brief summary of it.

Oqianus was a shepherd who used to graze his flock on the slopes of the hill of Charshamba. One day he discovered a gold mine. By degrees he collected a number of servants and retainers, and made himself a king. He gave out that the hill had become gold, and that henceforth all men should bow down and worship him and his idols. Then two of the Ashab-i-Kahf, who were relations of Oqianus, refused to obey this edict, and said that man should bow down to God alone.

Oqianus gave orders that the Ashab-i-Kahf should be arrested and executed. In terror of their lives, they started off that night, and at dawn met a shepherd, to whom they told their story, and asked if there was any place in which they could hide as they feared that the King's horsemen must be very close. The shepherd showed them this cave, and went in with them. His dog tried to follow him but they would not let it go in. However, it insisted on following them, so they cut off its legs, and killed it, and buried it just outside the cave in the grave to which I have referred. This was the dog which is spoken of by Shaikh Sadi (on whom be peace). All three of them then lay down and went to sleep. At last when they woke up, one of them went off to the bazaar, and paid for his purchases with coins of the time of Oqianus. The shop-keeper informed him that Oqianus had been dead for 309 years, and that another King was then reigning. People asked him if he had found the treasure of Oqianus. He was then taken before the King, to whom he told the whole story. The King ordered two of his courtiers to investigate the matter. Off they went, but for many days did not return and all hope of them was given up. So the King, accompanied by his Wazir, went out to find out for himself what had happened. They pretended, however, that they were going hunting. From the models of the hawk, deer, and hound, which I have described, it would appear that they found the cave. There are many variations of this story, and the numbers of the sleepers given vary from seven to three.

Whilst in Afghanistan most of my time was taken up in signalling and survey work. When General Ridgeway was sent to Persia, I volunteered to go with him, and was fortunate enough to be selected.

In Persia.

One day when I was walking through the bazaars of Meshed, I gave a baker three pice, and asked for some bread. He gave me three flaps of bread, each of which was about one foot broad and two long. I told him that I only wanted three pice worth of bread and asked him why he had given me so much. He replied that he had only given me what was due to me. I took one of the flaps and gave him back the other two. On another occasion I bought a pice worth of grapes, and was given about a pound of them. In those days everything was wonderfully cheap, especially cloth and silk. The Persians keep their houses scrupulously clean. In Meshed is the Shrine of the Eighth Imam, Imam Reza, who died from taking poison. The dome is covered with gold tiles, and a priceless turquoise is suspended from the roof. I fancy that this must be the most beautiful shrine in the whole world. In Meshed, prisoners are released every year in the month of Muharram. The best turquoises, cloth, and silk in the whole world are sold in the bazaar, a part of which belongs to the Shrine.

Immorality in Persia.

During the course of an evening stroll through the bazaars, one will be asked right and left if one wishes to arrange a *sigha* or temporary marriage. The natural answer is, " Yes, for everyone must marry !" Whereupon it will be asked if such a marriage is to last for an hour, a night, or a year. Such marriages are obviously illegal, and so all the women in Meshed are prostitutes ; which, indeed, is the case throughout Persia. Moreover, should a Persian woman do any small thing to annoy her husband, he always has three stones up his sleeve to throw at her ; that is to say, the words "*talaq, talaq, talaq,*"—the threefold divorce. Thus all the women are without husbands, and so become prostitutes. The beauty of Persian women compares favourably with that of any women in the world, and you can ' marry ' as many as you please in Persia, but they will not leave their own country. No woman is treated with any respect, for even if the wife of an important official be seen going for a drive in a carriage, the soldiery and other passers by will call out to her " Hullo, old strumpet ! "

Barbers are freely enlisted in the forces of the Shah, and it is quite a common sight to see a sentry on guard, with his rifle leaning up against the wall, busy shaving a client. The troops seem to be always on guard, which duty they will gladly undertake for an indefinite period for a few pice. The men are very strong, but, like the Chinese, are a drunken, besotten lot of hermaphrodites. They drink all day long, and all night as well.

The Shah is very easy-going, and has not much authority. The British, and Russians have their Trade Agencies everywhere; the Russians especially in the north, and the British in the south.

The Affair of Panj Deh.

On our return from Persia we received the Russian demands regarding the frontier, which were to the effect that whether the Amir liked it or not, the village of Panj Deh was to be included in their territory. The Russian commander then wrote a letter to the Afghan Officer commanding the garrison in Panj Deh, telling him that he intended to occupy Panj Deh at 10 o'clock the next morning, and advised him to evacuate the village forthwith if he wished to avoid open hostilities. He added that the Russian Government had decided on this course of action as the Afghans were friendly to the British, and because Panj Deh was a Turkoman village, and all the Turkomans were Russian subjects. The Afghan Commander of Panj Deh replied that, as the Amir happened to be in India at the moment, he could not evacuate the village without orders and he was prepared to take the consequences.

Prior to this the Russians had got their infantry into an entrenched position in the snow at some distance from the village. At 10 a.m. on the next day some Russian cavalry were to be seen approaching Panj Deh. The Afghan infantry and cavalry deployed, and, a long way in rear, the Kabuli levies made a great to-do. When within striking distance of the Russian cavalry, the Afghan cavalry charged. It appeared that the Russian cavalry were immediately thrown into confusion, for their troops wheeled outwards and fled right and left. The Afghan cavalry careered on, and ere long came under very heavy fire from the positions occupied by the Russian infantry in rear. The Afghan force was thrown into confusion and was decisively defeated. They suffered very heavy casualties, which included a Colonel killed.

Some of our fellows had managed to attach themselves to the Amir's troops, and had a great time. Dafadar Qutab-ud-Din of the 11th only just managed to get away with the British flag! Our Mission retired to Charshamba in a blinding snowstorm, and the Regiment only just managed to get over the pass. I was with the rear guard. The whole baggage train, including the officers' kits, went astray and was looted. About forty of the hired transport mules died from the cold, and a number of our own camels and mules also perished. Many of our followers, including the armourer, died and the whole party suffered terribly. I personally had my foot frost-bitten.

Our men pitched their tents in the snow, though no one would have believed it possible, and gave shelter to those who were unable to proceed. God reward them for their bravery! Eventually we reached Herat, the place where they call a chittank a maund. From here as I have related above half the party returned to India, and General Lumsden went home to England.

This fight at Panj Deh suited the British well, as before that, for twelve years, the Amir had been practically a pensioner of the Russians, and lived either in Bokhara or Samarkand. The British had established him on the throne at Kabul, and the action at Panj Deh had definitely made him an ally of the British. A year later the Russians announced that they were ready to settle the frontier question!

The Russian Troops.

Political pourparlers continued, and at last we received orders to meet the Russian Mission, which consisted of about a troop of cavalry and a company of infantry, and was located at Zulfiqar. Their Company Commander was a Muhammadan, whose name I have forgotten. In the Russian Army they promote Native Officers to high ranks. They said that there was a Turkoman General called Muhammad Ali with the escort, but I never actually saw him.

The Cossacks appear to be well-built and strong, and they wear hats just like those worn by Indian Christians in Railway stations in India. The Infantry wear long boots of soft Bulgarian leather, and coats down to their knees of some waterproof material. Their rifles are similar to the single-loader Lee-Metford. The Cavalry have stars on the front of their caps, and wear long coats, red leather breeches, and long Russian leather boots. They are armed with the same rifle as the Infantry and long swords with handles like that of a reaping hook. Their horses are nothing more than strong, sturdy, fat little

ponies. On the saddle they carry a sort of pad, which is kept in place by the surcingle. When a sowar wants to rest, he takes it off, and puts it under his head, the rest of the saddle being left on the horse. Their bridles are like our watering bits, and they have a drinking cup fixed to one of their stirrups. Their feeding arrangements are very simple. When they get into camp, they slaughter, and cut up a sheep. These joints are thrown into a large cauldron and boiled. Next day the cauldron is carried along on a camel. Each man has a tin bowl, which he dips into the cold greasy broth, and into this he throws pieces of cold and stale bread. This is all they get. There are no servants for the Officers or anyone else, and they have no 'followers' of any kind. The Officers' and mens' food is all cooked by the men themselves. 'Guides' are the only non-combatants in their formations.

Their Officers get very little pay. They all have beards, and are very clever at intelligence work. The men are conscripts, and have to do six years with the colours after which they can extend if they wish. They are all under-fed, and a portion of the little pay they are entitled to is usually appropriated by their Officers.

When the men are on guard, they have to find their own accommodation for the night. So they will force their way into anybody's house. I will not shock you by describing the dreadful things they do in other peoples houses. Once, when I was with the Pamir's Commission, a Muhammadan killed a Russian soldier who had assaulted the women in his house, but the unfortunate man had all his goods and chattels confiscated. The Russians are very friendly and hospitable, and a guest's health will be drunk two or three times, he being made to drink wine with his host whether he likes it or not.

Should an Officer get annoyed with a subordinate, he will merely order two of his men to knock him down, and to beat him as hard and as long as they like. I myself saw a Dufadar treated in this manner by a Captain when I was in the Pamirs. When a Russian soldier addresses an officer, he has to keep his hand at the salute the whole time that he is talking to him. Russia is a hard country. Every day the Cossacks break the ice on the frozen rivers, and wash their horses all over. We used to keep putties on our horses legs all day and night, and yet they would paw the ground all night, and suffer much from the cold. The Russian horses did not feel the cold at all.

Delineating the Frontier.

At last we started to delineate the frontier in co-operation with the Russians, starting from Zulfiqar. All Turkoman settlements and lands were ceded to Russia. We surveyed the whole line from Zulfiqar up to the Oxus, or rather the Hamun, as far as Chah-i-Gulfam.

The Oxus is crossed by a ferry pulled by horses. The river is very broad and when the boats are half way across the horses are nearly exhausted and one can hear them snorting, and puffing, and blowing from a long way off. It is the custom to let the foals follow their mothers. On the Oxus is Kelif, the Port for Balkh and Bokhara. Here too the boats are pulled across the river by horses. North of the river at this place there is a hill which is covered with trees, to the branches of which flags have been tied. Exactly opposite, on the southern bank is another hill on which similar flags have been erected. I climbed up this latter hill, which is called Mujawir. Here I saw a great big stone on the surface of which were some faint indentations. I asked what was the signification of the flags and of this stone with its indentations. They told me that when the Imam Ali was on his way to Afghanistan from Shahr-i-Sabz, some of the people of Shadian had set out to kill him. He, however, to escape them, jumped his horse, Duldul, right across the river from one hill to the other, and the horse landed with three feet on this stone and the fourth sank into the ground, and made the hill subside a little. One can see the hoof marks quite clearly. God alone knows the truth of this story, for the jump he is supposed to have made from one hill to the other was about a mile wide. It is beyond all human comprehension. However, everything is easy in the sight of God!

They told me that it is the big stone that is called Mujawir, for it is where the Imam Ali sat and rested.

The Oxus, at this point flows very quietly, though people say that in its course it can be heard to murmur, "Hazrat Ali has frightened me with his sword Zulfiqar!"

Most of the Turkomans are nomads and own large flocks and herds. The men wear long coats, long boots, and fur caps. Their women wear turbans on their heads, and long coats, which they fasten round their waists with a *kamarband*. On their feet they wear red leather shoes with broad toe-caps. They have flat noses, and their faces are wan and drawn: they are slipshod, untidy, and unattractive, and are of no use. The staple food of these people is milk and meat.

The stage beyond Kelif is Takhta Pul, and the one beyond that Balkh, which is a very ancient city. Here there are many gardens, but few inhabitants. The few people who live there are nearly all Jews. The people of Balkh, and the glory of the city have departed to Mazar-i-Sharif.

Mazar-i-Sharif.

This is a new city full of lovely gardens, one march to the east of Balkh. It is the Headquarters of the Governor of the Province of Afghan Turkistan. When I was there the Governor was one, Muhammad Ishaq Khan, who had made himself very unpopular with the Amir. The latter had ordered his recall for some time past, but Muhammad Ishaq fearing that the Amir would arrest him, had disobeyed the summons. I heard that eventually the Amir made him an outlaw. Muhammad Ishaq then collected a gang of ruffians and fought the Amir's troops well and hard, but was at last forced to take refuge in Russian territory.

The city is called 'Mazar-i-Sharif' or the 'Noble Shrine' because it is built round the mausoleum of Hazrat Ali Sahib (the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad). It is said that no one knows the exact spot where his grave is; but it is written in a book which is kept in the Shrine, that Hazrat Ali, before he died left instructions that his body was not to be buried. So when he passed away, they put his body into a coffin, which they tied on a camel and then drove the camel out into the desert. No one knows what happened to the camel, but in the book it is written that, one night Hazrat Ali appeared in a dream to two hundred pious Muhammadans of Balkh, and told them where his coffin was to be found. He ordered them to inform the King, and tell him to build a great dome over his resting place. These good people went off and told the King of the vision they had seen. The King's Wazir ridiculed the whole story, and so the King would have none of it. A few days later the Wazir was stricken down with some illness, and was sick nigh unto death. After a while those good people again saw the vision in their dreams, and again informed the King of what they had seen. This time the Wazir helped them and persuaded the King to have the dome and the surrounding courtyard built. This is the Shrine that one sees to-day, which is called the '*sakhi*' or 'generous' shrine. The coffin is ten feet long, and is surrounded by a railing four feet high. They say that Ali was fourteen feet tall; but God alone knows the truth!

Many cripples, the halt and the maimed are said to have been cured at this Shrine; and so its precincts are always thronged with the sick and poor.

About six miles to the south of Mazar-i-Sharif, and about twelve miles from the hill of Shadian, there is a fort on the top of a hill. In the days when Hazrat Ali was in the country, it was inhabited by infidels. A watercourse, which is used as a road, leads up to it; and along the side of this there are still the remains of a wall. The building itself is still in perfect condition, except for the doors, and it is just the same as it was in those days.

They say that Hazrat Ali, who on one occasion wanted to spend the night there, broke down the doors, and went in. The infidels, who were living there rushed at him, and he only just managed to get out of the door and escape. He then mounted his horse Duldul and galloped up a very steep hill which was as slippery as glass. At the top of the hill he found a vine from which he ate some fruit. I never actually saw it myself, but I saw the marks of his horse's hoofs on the hill-side; and I was told that the vine still exists.

We return to India.

We stayed for a long time in Shadian for the reason that after a long stay in a cold country it is not wise to go to India in the middle of the hot weather. We spent the summer therefore in Shadian and returned to India at the beginning of the winter. On our way back from Turkistan, we came to a village on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush. In all the countries I have ever been to I have never seen such a lovely village. It is called "Taj Kurghan," and certainly it is "The Crown Fort." It consists of a small bazaar, on both sides of which are shops. For some distance before you get to the bazaar you pass under an arcade of vines with their branches interwoven and clusters of grapes hanging down in profusion. The shops themselves, and indeed, the whole bazaar is covered and roofed in with vines which shade it from the sun.

Beyond the village there is a hill which is of a reddish colour on the slopes of which there is not a vestige of vegetation of any kind. I was told that this is attributed to the curse of Imam Ali, who during a battle in these parts, demanded his horse, and was told that it was out grazing on this hill. Imam Ali thereupon cursed the hill and the grass on it, after which the hill dried up and has been barren ever since.

When we arrived in Kabul we attended a Durbar, putting on the best uniform we had and turning out as smartly as we could in the circumstances. The Amir started off by saying that he blamed us, the British, entirely for everything that had happened; for having lost Panj Deh to the Russians, and for the casualties that his troops had suffered. "You obviously have connived at it all," he said, "or, at any rate, you must have known that it was going to happen—I am furious about it—You surely should have let me know about it!"

The Amir then continued in Persian:—"If only you had let me know, I would either have settled the matter with the Russians by peaceful negotiation, or would have forced them to accept our wishes at the point of the sword. So you see, all that has happened is thanks to you."

He then told us the following story:—

"Once upon a time the King Akbar was walking through the bazaars with Mulla Dopiaza and his Wazir Birbal, when a prostitute detached herself from the crowd in front of them, and with a wanton gesture embraced the Mulla Dopiaza. The latter at once turned and imitating her action, embraced the King in like manner. The King naturally was furious, and asked him what the Devil he was doing. 'I'm sorry,' said Dopiaza, 'but I thought that such behaviour must be some new form of etiquette which Your Majesty had approved of, for without Your Majesty's permission, she would never have dared to do such a thing."

"The cases are analogous," said the Amir "It was you British who started all this political whoring and caused all the trouble."

We were very disappointed that this was all the reward the Amir had to give us for two and a half years' hard work. We were too afraid to sleep that night. Everyone said that no one had ever been known to have returned safe and sound from Kabul.

However we were given a good breakfast next morning, and a band was sent to play to us. We were also plied with a surfeit of sweets and fruit, and were saluted right and left by the Afghan troops. These latter, in those days were not all dressed in uniform, moreover some were armed, but others merely carried sticks on their shoulders.

The best troops we saw in 1887 were the Turkoman cavalry, but now, I believe, they are all good. When, on our return from the

Herat Boundary Commission we emerged from the Khyber Pass, we found the troops of the Peshawar garrison lining both sides of the road from Jamrud to Peshawar. We were given a very good time in Peshawar, and were feted everywhere.

We then went by train to Lahore, where we camped near Anarkali. Here an English Prince and the Viceroy of India inspected us and then we were all given eight months' leave.

In 1888, when I came back from leave I rejoined the Regiment at Nowgong Cantonment where I was put in charge of the Signallers.

To be continued.

STONEWALL JACKSON—THEN AND NOW.

By Captain R. N. Gale, M.C., The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.

The Question.

Between the 22nd March and the 25th June 1862, Stonewall Jackson with a force roughly equivalent to the modern division covered 676 miles in 48 marching days: during this period at least five battles were fought. The romance and the glamour, quite apart from the military achievements, of the Valley Campaign have made it probably one of the widest read of military actions. There can, of course, be little doubt but that much of its attraction is attributable to the biographer of General Jackson. The telling way in which Colonel Henderson has woven the life story of the West Point graduate into his account of the exploits of the Confederates in Virginia, leaves one, in so far as the military aspect is concerned, with the impression of distinct bias. Granting all this, however, the actual facts must remain. Kernstown and the retreat to Elk Run; the move to Stanton and the battle of McDowell; the advance up the Lauray Fork resulting in the discomfiture and retreat of Banks over the Potomac; the miraculous escape of the Valley Army from the position in which it found itself after this exploit; and, finally, the battles of Crosskeys and Port Republic, are all military achievements which need the embellishment of no biographer to add to their lustre.

With the advantages that modern inventions would have given to the Federals, the student of military history is apt to wonder very much whether, given present day means of reconnaissance, communications and staffs, Stonewall Jackson could have achieved the strategical and tactical successes for which his campaign is so famed.

The Human Factor.

In considering their actions commanders, and often governments, are affected by the human factor. General Allenby's strategy in Palestine at the end of the War is an excellent example of this. It is claimed in some quarters that one of the greatest causes of our failure on the Gallipoli Peninsula was due to our not realising the fine fighting capabilities of the Anatolian Turk. In the campaign under consideration the actions taken by commanders on either side were again and

again biassed, either consciously or unconsciously, by estimates of the abilities or weaknesses of opponents In estimating the possibilities of achieving results in 1932 comparable with those realised seventy years ago it is, therefore, only fair to make the following presumptions.

In the first place we must presume that there are the same civil and governmental conditions. We must visualise Lincoln and Stanton, constantly worried about the safety of Washington, interfering with the plans of their military Commander-in-Chief ; and on the side of the Confederates, Jefferson Davies backed so strongly by Lee. Then again, we must assume the same military commanders. Jackson's knowledge of Banks and the latter's fear of Jackson ; Lee's knowledge of Abraham Lincoln ; Fremont's energy until he was faced with the prospect of battle ; Ashby's daring, as well as a hundred and one other equally important personal factors, governed the moves and countermoves of both commanders and politicians. Lastly we must presume that the troops of both sides were animated by the same spirit. A spirit which is so reminiscent of that which inspired the Anzacs and so many of our other Dominion and Colonial troops during the Great War.

Importance of Information.

It is difficult to say in which direction modern developments have made most difference to the conduct of war both in the strategical and in the tactical fields. The factors selected in this article are not necessarily claimed to be the most far reaching, for in war each development will play its part as a section of the mosaic which goes to make the whole.

Since 1862 great strides have been made in the collection, collation and distribution of information. The development of the air arm has made long distance reconnaissance more effective. Large concentrations and big movements of troops can, under reasonably good conditions, be seen from the air. Close reconnaissance makes it more difficult for troops to conceal positions which they have taken up ; the extent of positions can be gauged ; the movement of reserves can be located and the position of supporting artillery can be fixed. By means of wireless and other telegraphic means, information, from whatever source it is obtained, can be transmitted more surely and more readily than in the past. Finally the staff organization of a modern army is such that information from all sources can be readily

checked and systematically correlated. The same staff can be expected to distribute information in the shortest space of time and to all to whom it may be of interest.

It is difficult to over-stress the importance of information. Lack of it means doubt, and doubt and uncertainty are among the worst enemies a commander has to fight. Given knowledge and given ample warning, then bold movements can be made. These can be undertaken, moreover, in comparative certainty as to both their possibility and their effect. The gaining of information is a first principle, the neglect of which will nearly always spell disaster.

Two Principles Regarding Information.

There are, however, two fundamental principles in dealing with this question of information. If these are neglected, no matter how improved the means of obtaining, transmitting, collating and distributing, little, if anything, will be gained from all that the most modern of developments can achieve. In the first place it must be asked for. The commander must be quite certain what he wants to know. He must also ask in such a way that those who seek out his information can be in no doubt as to his requirements. The second principle in regard to information is that it is useless if not acted upon. Preconceived ideas as to the action that an enemy might take should never be allowed to discountenance contrary information, until every step has been taken to justify the commander adhering to his original idea.

Application of the Principle of Information in the Valley Campaign.

During this campaign there were many occasions on which, had information been fuller, in the Federal camps, vastly different results might have been achieved. The point of interest is the extent to which information would, in reality, have been fuller had all present day resources been available.

Among the most interesting of the occasions to which reference has been made were :—

1. The return of the Confederates to the Valley on Sunday, the 4th May.
2. Stonewall Jackson's rapid advance up the Lauray Valley.
3. The almost miraculous escape of the Valley Army on the 30th and 31st of May.

The Return of the Confederates to the Valley on Sunday, the 4th of May.

On April 30th, if not before, General Banks had certainly made up his mind that Stonewall Jackson was retreating to Richmond, disorganised and demoralised. It does not appear to have been until the 3rd May that he thought Jackson was advancing on Harrisonburg.

The concentration of railway vehicles at Gordonsville would, it is fair to presume, have been seen, had the Federal General had the benefit of air reconnaissance. This would merely have strengthened Banks in his belief that Jackson was leaving the Valley. The latter's movements between the 1st and 3rd of May were carried out in such appalling weather conditions that little or no air reconnaissance would have been possible. In any circumstances such information as the air would have given him would but have confirmed the fear which on the 3rd of May had definitely decided him, quite contrary to all his previous reckoning, that Jackson was marching on Harrisonburg.

General Banks knew that Ewell's division had concentrated at Elk Run, but over-estimated his strength. This General seems to have had a tendency to over-estimate the strength of his opponents, and it is extremely doubtful if his air arm, in view of the weather and the topographical conditions in the Elk Run, would have given him any more reliable information than that which he had.

As Banks, however, had by this time been ordered to withdraw to Strasburg, it is not likely that air confirmation of either Jackson's or Ewell's movements would have produced anything more than did his despatch of the 3rd May, which, in point of fact, only actually resulted in his being permitted to retain Shield's division.

Jackson's rapid advance up the Lauray Valley.

On the 23rd of May Banks was completely surprised by Jackson's rapid advance up the Lauray Valley. Whilst it is true that he was very inferior in strength to Jackson, it is not easy to understand why he did not make better use of the 3,500 cavalry under his command for providing him with information. On the 20th of May he sent a battalion of 100 infantry and 30 troopers 11 miles down the Lauray Valley. In spite of reports received from this reconnaissance to the effect that Confederate troops were expected to advance by this road, he took literally no steps to satisfy himself as to the truth of this report. His only action, in fact, was to withdraw this weak reconnaissance

detachment. A force of 300 cavalry with clear orders to look for an approach up this line, and to give him full details as to the strength of such columns as might advance by this route, might have told him much. One cannot help but contrast this negative attitude with the action which a man of the energy of Stonewall Jackson would have taken. Perhaps the most interesting lesson to be learnt from the study of these operations, is the bold offensive use Jackson made of his cavalry and the importance which he attached to the gaining of information.

To take the actual facts as we know them, General Jackson entered the Lauray Valley on the 21st of May and from the wooded slopes of the hills developed his attack on Front Royal of the 23rd May. During this period Banks did not send a single trooper down the Lauray Valley. He was convinced that Jackson would approach his position *via* the main turnpike. It is scarcely likely, therefore, that this same General, suffering from the same pre-conceived idea, would have ordered a close air reconnaissance of the Lauray Valley. Presuming, however, that he had been persuaded by his staff to do so, it is doubtful if he would have credited the resultant information as an indication of anything more than the move of a portion of Jackson's force. One can rather imagine him looking fruitlessly for his opponent on the direct road to Strasburg.

Topographically these valleys offer far greater chances of concealment to the movement of troops from air observation, than a commander might normally expect. Rain, and the almost invariable clouds which at this period hang over the hills, would all tend to increase the difficulties for the air observer. In fact, it would seem that with the display of a little skill the movement of troops could be so concealed as to make estimates of their numbers, if not their actual discovery, by close reconnaissance machines, extremely difficult. We can be quite sure that a man as astute as Stonewall Jackson would have taken full advantage of both these factors.

The almost miraculous escape of the Valley Army on the 30th and 31st of May.

The inactivity of Fremont and Shields which resulted in the Confederate Army being able to make good their escape on the 30th and 31st May, had only one cause. This was lack of information.

Had the two Federal commanders known Jackson's actual strength and had they been in close communication with one another, the dead weight of uncertainty which clogged their movements would very largely have been lifted. Fremont with a force of 15,000 had allowed his advance to be checked by Ashby, with but 300 troopers. Fremont, we know, was considerably stronger in cavalry, which, boldly handled, should have shown him the absurd weakness of Ashby, quite apart from indicating to him at least Jackson's movements if not his actual strength : but once again it is the Confederate General who makes full use of his reconnaissance troops gaining contract with his enemy and never leaving him unwatched for an instant.

Now to turn to the other side of the picture. On the Sunday, on the road to Front Royal, Confederate patrols only encountered a few scouts. Shields, apparently deceived by the demonstration of but a brigade from Winchester, had allowed the day to pass without decisive action ; beyond pushing a brigade towards Winchester and taking up a generally defensive attitude, the Federal General did nothing. It will thus be seen that neither Northern Commander seemed to realise the vital necessity of obtaining information of the enemy's real strength, movements or intention. Neither seemed to realise what the paralising effect of not having this information would be and, as a corollary, neither seemed to realise that to gain information no effort is too great. These Generals could not, moreover, complain that they were without adequate means of obtaining such information. Had both of them been equipped with up-to-date machinery in the form of air reconnaissance, wireless telegraphy and intelligence staffs, it may be claimed on their behalf that they would have shown greater enterprise, but once again climatic conditions, over which they had no control, would have reduced the effectiveness of close air reconnaissance to an almost negligible quantity. But both knew of Jackson's movements, each knew where the other was, and any more detailed information regarding their enemy would unquestionably, even under present day conditions, have had to be fought for.

Conclusion.

In fact it is extremely doubtful if Banks, Fremont or Shields would have gained materially had they had to fight their battles with all the advantages that modern communications, staffs and air

services would have given them. Each showed a fatal lack of appreciation of the real value of information. Where Stonewall Jackson fought to gain knowledge of his enemies, the latter appeared satisfied, either to wait on events, or to rely on their own judgment—judgments based on what they wished their enemy to do rather than what he was doing.

To many this indictment of these Federal leaders may seem to be too sweeping. I suggest, however, that without knowledge of the enemy's position, his strength and his movements, a commander is at so great a disadvantage that not only is he justified in taking almost any steps to satisfy his very justifiable curiosity, but that it is indeed his bounden duty to take such steps. At Kernstown Jackson fought for knowledge. He lost his battle, but he had gained contact and knowledge—contact, which from that moment until he finally left the Valley, he never for one hour lost. When he retreated he left Ashby in touch. When he slept, Ashby was awake. The Federals were always aware of Ashby's presence. When Jackson left the Valley on the 3rd May, Ashby remained in constant touch with both Banks and Fremont. When Banks went to Strasburg, Ashby followed.

Stonewall Jackson's secrecy, and the methods he employed for covering his own movements, are no more worthy of study than are the steps which he took to keep himself informed of the activities of his opponents.

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PACIFIC PROBLEM.

By Captain M. E. S. Laws, M.C., R.A.

The United States House of Representatives has recently passed a Bill under the terms of which the Philippine Islands will be granted complete independence within eight years. Though the bill in question is not yet law, it is unlikely that the decision to withdraw from the Philippines will be seriously opposed in the Senate, since, as far back as 1916, the latter body was in favour of granting independence to the colony within a period of four years. It is proposed therefore in this article to consider the probable effect of this policy on the Pacific problem, with special reference to the interests of the British Empire.

In 1898 the United States, already indignant at the mysterious destruction of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbour, declared war on Spain with the avowed object of freeing Cuba. On the last day of April, Commodore G. Dewey entered Manila Bay with a small cruiser squadron and next day destroyed the Spanish Fleet. Three months later after capturing the island of Guam, a force of 11,000 United States troops arrived and on August 13th Manila surrendered. The islands, together with Guam, were later ceded by treaty to the United States while Cuba became virtually an American Protectorate. Thus as a result of this war America abandoned her policy of isolation and became to some extent at least, an Imperial Power.

Cuba was evacuated in 1902, though the United States retained a naval base at Guantanamo and reserved the right to intervene at any time in order to protect the independence of the island. The inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, who had for years fought against Spain, expected to receive similar treatment, and when they were disappointed rose against the Americans. Spasmodic guerilla fighting went on till July, 1907, when a civil government was set up which included some Filipino representatives. From then onwards the policy of educating the people for the responsibilities of self-government has been pursued with great energy, and the demand for independence has become increasingly insistent. A general election was held in 1907 when the first Legislature met, and step by step since then American control has gradually been relinquished. During this period the

islands have developed, trade has prospered and a comprehensive educational policy has been firmly established. The time is fast approaching for America to withdraw her last vestige of control and for the complete independence of the islands to be announced.

The occupation of the Philippines and of Guam by the United States was followed by the opening of the Panama Canal. Though by the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, the Canal is "free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations, in peace or war, on terms of equality," it has been heavily fortified and is garrisoned by a division of American troops. The Canal allows the United States Navy to be rapidly concentrated in the Pacific if necessary, and its use would obviously be forbidden to an enemy Power in time of war. To protect her lines of communication from the Pacific Coast to the Philippines, America also established a series of naval bases in the Pacific—at Dutch Harbour (Aleutian Isles), Pearl Harbour (Hawian Islands 4,700 miles from Manila), Guam (1,500 miles from Manila) and Pago-Pago (Samoa). Of these, Dutch Harbour, an ice free port, flanks the approaches to San Francisco from Japan, while Pearl Harbour, which is now a first class base with a large military garrison, is a convenient station from which to operate in defence of the Panama Canal.

Just before America acquired the Philippine Islands, Japan extended her possessions by seizing Formosa and the Pescadores from China (1895). In 1902 she consolidated her position by making a defensive treaty with Great Britain, while three years later she virtually annexed Korea and established herself at Port Arthur. Her naval bases at the Pescadores (500 miles from Manila), Formosa and in the Japanese islands themselves, enabled her to threaten the Philippine Islands and the long line of communications to Guam, Pearl Harbour and the Pacific Coast. After the Great War, Japan acquired as a Mandatory Power, the Ladrone, Palau, Caroline and Marshall Islands, thus definitely establishing herself athwart the direct route between Manila and Pearl Harbour. It at once became clear that modern aircraft and submarines based on these islands, would make it very dangerous for an American fleet to operate in the Western Pacific and would prevent the movement of troops by sea between America and the Philippines.

The situation thus created appeared so dangerous that a conference of Powers was held in 1921, which resulted in the Five Power Naval

Treaty. By this it was agreed that certain restrictions on the size and number of naval units should be enforced by Great Britain, United States, Japan, France and Italy and that until the end of 1936, no fortification of naval bases in the Western Pacific should be permitted. This latter clause prevented the completion of the ex-German naval station at Jaluit in the Marshall Islands by Japan, and also stopped the further fortification of Guam by America, but the general situation still remained favourable to Japan at the expense of the United States.

The already difficult position in which America was thus placed as regards the defence of her possessions in the Pacific has been made still more dangerous by certain economic factors. It is now realised that Japan must face two questions which at present menace her very existence as a nation, and the possible solution to both these problems may well involve her in hostilities with other Powers. The first of these economic problems concerns trade and the second emigration. Japanese industries have developed at an extraordinary pace during recent years and the obvious market for her manufactured goods is China, where a large population only awaits tranquility and ordered government in order to absorb the products of the Japanese factories. Furthermore, Japan needs coal and iron which can most conveniently be obtained from China, so that the main requirements of Japanese industrialism—a source of raw materials and a market for manufactured goods—are available. Japan therefore is determined to capture this outlet for her trade and there is always the possibility that trade rivalry may lead to international friction, for at the present moment China is probably the most tempting market for the industrialists of Europe and America. It is this need for a market that has prompted Japanese policy in China for several years and has already led her into difficulties which she has attempted to overcome by the use of force.

The problem of emigration is no less likely to cause international friction. Japan is overpopulated and must seek an outlet for her surplus workers. China is already overcrowded and though Manchuria has absorbed a certain number of Japanese colonists, this province alone, even when it is fully developed, cannot accept the total number of those who will be forced by economic pressure to leave their own country. The United States has since 1903 restricted Japanese emigration into the Pacific Coast States by law, and it is evident that no outlet

for colonists can be sought in that direction. In 1924 a particularly stringent Anti-Immigration Act, designed primarily to prevent Japanese settlers entering the U. S. A., was passed by Congress. Australia and New Zealand, being thinly populated and having temperate climates, are suitable for Japanese settlement, but both countries are firmly determined not to admit aliens who would almost certainly introduce a racial problem which it is most desirable to avoid. Thus in whatever direction she turns in an effort to find a suitable outlet for her surplus population, Japan is bound to be opposed by one of the great Powers. This has naturally led Japan to safeguard her position in the Pacific as far as possible and she has succeeded in securing control of all the approaches to China by sea.

The British interests in the Pacific are more easily defined. We must at all costs retain control of the approaches to the Indian Ocean and keep open our sea communications with Australia and New Zealand. In addition our trade interests in China are considerable and we naturally desire to keep our share of this market, but no trade route vital to the Empire passes through the Northern Pacific. Our chief bases in the Pacific are at Esquimalt, Sydney, Hong-Kong and Singapore, of which the two latter are the most important, since it is in the Western Pacific that our chief interests and dangers lie. Hong-Kong is the chief British trade centre in China, but, under the provisions of the Five Power Naval Treaty its defences cannot be increased and its docking facilities are inadequate for capital ships. Singapore is now being developed as a Naval and Royal Air Force base suitable for a battle fleet and is well adapted for a naval force charged with the defence of the eastern entrances to the Indian Ocean and of our sea comunications with Australia. The minor naval base at Wei-Hai-Wei on the north China coast has now been given up by the British. Sydney is the principal base for naval forces in Australian waters, and defended fuelling stations exist at Thursday Island, Fremantle, Albany, Port Adelaide, Melbourne, Newcastle, Brisbane, Hobart, Auckland, Dunedin, Wellington and Port Lyttleton.

Under these conditions it is of interest to consider how the American evacuation of the Philippines will affect the general situation in the Pacific. Strategically America will profit since she will no longer need to maintain a garrison in a dangerously isolated situation far from support; the loss of a naval base in the Western Pacific is not so serious as it may at first sight appear, for the communications with



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Manila would be so precarious in time of war that it could hardly be expected to withstand a determined attack. Economically America will to some extent gain by the new situation since Philippine exports to the U. S. A. will be classified as foreign goods, and will have to pay tariff, while at present they are given preferential treatment. On the other hand the evacuation of a colony will affect American prestige in the East and particularly in China, where the U. S. A. has special trade interests. Japan will no doubt rejoice at the surrender of an American base in the China Seas, wherein she can brook no serious rival. Not only will the evacuation of the Philippines remove a possible menace to her trade activities, but it will also tend to open the way to her emigration policy southwards. Her island possessions in the Pacific will then stretch south-eastwards from Japan to the Equator, barring the westward routes from the United States.

The new policy is perhaps not so favourable for the British Empire. In view of Japan's need for an outlet for her surplus population, it is natural that Australia and New Zealand should regard with suspicion the removal of any obstacle from her path towards the south. It will therefore be greatly to our interest to ensure the effective neutrality of the Philippines in order to prevent any power from obtaining a footing so close to Australia. At the same time the American withdrawal will not adversely affect the safety of our main line of sea communication with Australia, nor will it alter the problem of controlling the eastern entrance to the Indian Ocean.

It may be expected therefore that the strict neutrality of the Philippine Islands will be an essential part of our policy in the Pacific in the future. To enforce this justifiable demand a British fleet may at any time be required, and such a naval force must be provided with a fully equipped and conveniently situated base. The wisdom of developing the naval and R. A. F. base at Singapore becomes even more apparent in these circumstances and should to some extent allay any anxiety in Australia and New Zealand which the recently announced American policy in the Philippines may cause.

THREE ARMS AND SIX LEGS.

By "Phoenix."

Can we afford luxuries? Ask anyone. We cannot.

Can a desperately hard-up and hard-bitten army afford a Rolls-Royce which can do eighty miles an hour on a by-pass road, but which will ruin its lovely paint, damage its streamline body, and be a confounded nuisance if asked to move across muddy, stony and broken ground? It cannot.

This article isn't about Mechanical Transport or armoured cars. It is about cavalry. I propose giving the cavalry a bunt from behind. As a cavalryman myself I feel entitled to do so.

I have been through it all. The shining boots (seven pairs!), the perfect breeches, the thrill of the lance pennons and the feeling of compassion for the P. B. I. I know it well. I have known the keen interest and pride in a squadron of shining, well-trained horses; the anxiety for their welfare; the fear that they may get damaged, lamed or made thin and unsightly by overwork or rough usage. Any cavalryman worth his salt, feels all these things and quite rightly. Who has any use for the casual horsemaster, the horse soldier who does not care for his horses?

Equitation and the training of horses fills up so much of the horizon. For them we prepare soft riding schools. Carefully we deal with the ground round the jumps. We choose flat open parade grounds with as good surfaces as possible. On these we parade day by day. As for the jumps they are mostly imitations of obstacles found in England and places outside India; the thorn fences, brush-wood hedges, the banks and walls and timber jumps of other countries. Over these we train our horses. The take-offs and the landings are sound and soft. All this is good gymnastics—physical jerks which balance and supple a horse without risking the blemishes and break-downs of rough country. It is all estimable and necessary. True, but what is the effect on the mind of the cavalryman, both officer and man? Mentally well-balanced as he may be he cannot but regard these conditions as those normally suitable for the horse; he cannot but consider that anything rougher and more likely to damage a horse as a thing to be avoided. The fact is, however, that horses can adapt

themselves to circumstances. Given practice in moving over rocky country they learn to put their feet down without suffering damage and, what is more, their feet harden and so withstand the jar. It is surprising how much can be done to acclimatise a horse to the horrible going on the North-West Frontier.

We hear of the expression 'cavalry country.' In most minds this conjures up soft going, undulating country with obstacles, if any, of a kind to be found among the Troop jumps of a cavalry parade ground.

The army in India is trained for a specific purpose, for operations in country as is to be found on the North-West Frontier and beyo . Cavalrymen hope that when war comes they will be asked to move over great open spaces where the mobility of the horse can be used to the best advantage. But war on that scale, if it comes at all, comes but seldom and few men and horses will see it. The war we are all likely to see is something less pretensious and on not so grand a scale. It is the war we have in peace time; the little actions on the North-West Frontier in normal times and the bigger actions of small expeditions in the same place. If we can tackle these smaller operations we can with ease take on the bigger wars and the open plains.

The cavalry spirit is a thing to be nurtured. Much has been written of it, and it is continually referred to in speech. Many do not know its meaning and indeed the experts differ to some extent in its definition. A spirit of dash, of adventure, of taking risks, of speed, of quick results? Is it necessary to sit on a horse to achieve all this? The same spirit pervades the airman and the sailor in his destroyer. It will be found in the commander of light tanks and armoured cars.

There seems to be the fear that if you allow the cavalryman to get off his horse he will lose the cavalry spirit. Carry this to extremes and you will say that it is better for the cavalryman to sit on his horse and do nothing than to get off his horse and get busy on his feet. Mounted infantry tactics are looked on askance. They are contrary to the cavalry spirit which is epitomised in the mounted charge, the *arme blanche*. If to allow the cavalryman to get off his horse to fight on his feet is going to damage his cavalry spirit then by all means forbid any such thing. But it is not so. The spirit of dash, of adventure, of taking risks and of quick results can be introduced into all work. The methods employed by cavalry on foot necessarily differ from those practised by infantry, and they must be taught.

A perusal of the records of early frontier operations will show numerous references to "spirited cavalry charges," usually carried out by one or two troops or less. They were monotonously successful. In those days the cavalry had no firearm: the enemy often had no rifle or gun. There was only one thing to do—to charge. We can do more now; we have rifles. So have the enemy and the charge is consequently more hazardous and less likely to be successful if carried out haphazard.

II.

All the above has been a kind of turning movement. I could have said at once at the end of my first paragraph that cavalry which can only sit on its horse and charge may be lovely as the Rolls-Royce saloon but it isn't any use in, say, Waziristan. I could have gone further and said that a cavalry regiment that wins all the musketry and machine gun competitions, which gets an O. K. report for signalling, which scores full marks at inspections, whose officers have all passed for promotion or the Staff College, such a regiment, I say, is about as useful as a broken curb chain if, when called upon to work in rugged frontier country, its horses all go lame and knock themselves to bits.

The Rolls-Royce engine is all right and can negotiate Waziristan if given the means, say, another pair of wheels or a track. "But that costs money" sez you. "So does an investment," sez I, "and if you don't invest you don't draw any dividends." We cannot afford the Rolls-Royce which is fit only to adorn the garage and the broad highway. We cannot afford a cavalry which does not pull its weight in frontier operations.

"But" sez you, "the cavalry have rifles. Why can't they do all that is required?"

(Now, that is the question I wanted you to ask because it enables me to write what follows.)

"Because," sez I, "they havn't got bayonets!"

Isn't it curious that at the end of one of our big wars—I refer to the one about fifteen years ago—all cavalrymen whether in Europe, Asia, or Africa were armed with the bayonet, and a few years later the cavalry had no bayonets? The only reason for the adoption of bayonets was that the cavalry found that they had need of them. In peace, one presumes, they do not have need of them? They are not picturesque, they are an extra weight on the horse, they give the

cavalryman yet another weapon to learn, they are costly to supply, they—oh ! all kinds of things. Yet when the next war comes along the cavalry will demand bayonets and of course will get them.

One hot summer morning the writer of this paper took out a weak squadron, about fifty strong, to round up some raiders. The raiders were duly encircled. The cordon was drawn tighter, until the gang was confined to a small area intersected by deep fissures and caves. Bullets were being freely exchanged ; the horses had by now been left behind in safety under cover. The time had come to finish the show and go in. The time had come for the '*arme blanche*.' "What to do ?" as the *babu* says.

The alternatives were :—

Go in with the rifle alone and trust to snapshooting.

Go in with the sword or lance alone ; the rifle slung.

Go in with the rifle in one hand and the sword in the other.

No, Sir ! Not against a desperate gang of Pathans who are nice shots at fifteen yards and who also had knives. The Indian officer wanted to send back to cantonments for bayonets borrowed from the infantry. We were saved the trouble. The infantry came themselves in lorries, fixed bayonets and walked into the gang. There were a few casualties. The gang went to ground in the caves and eventually the remnants of them surrendered.

The cavalry regiment embroiled in this very small affair demanded bayonets and got them. (*N.B.*—The late war was still on). A mighty oath was taken that never again would the infantry be allowed to pick the fruit of such encounters. More however came of it than that. There was more doing on the North-West Frontier in those days than the chase of raiding gangs. This regiment decided that what an infantryman can do a cavalryman also can do—within limits.

Piquet a hill ? Yes, certainly, so long as it isn't too high.

Attack home across country which is too difficult for horses ? Oh yes, so long as we don't go too far from the horses. Armed with bayonets it was possible to relieve the infantry of many jobs.

Did this regiment lose its cavalry spirit ? It did not. Confident in its powers even if dismounted, it took chances when mounted which it would not otherwise have risked. The horses, after several years on the frontier had feet of iron, and what is more they knew how to put them down when moving fast on the rock strewn hills and valleys. Few went lame.

Our Rolls-Royce had its six wheels and its track. The cavalry could take on jobs it could not manage before. No longer relegated to the open country and fire action it could pull its weight under all circumstances.

If any cavalryman or other reading this article doubts the necessity of the bayonet for frontier fighting let him do this. Let him set his squadron the task of establishing a piquet on a hill which offers good cover and which is presumed to be occupied; occupied, not by the usual weak-kneed 'enemy' of T. E. W. Ts. but occupied by determined, well-armed tribesmen. Let him lead the foremost troop to the top. Let him meet the counter-attack of the tribesmen as the covering fire lifts. Does he want a bayonet? I'll say he does.

I'll say more. I'll say that it is definitely unfair to the men to ask cavalry to carry out their legitimate tasks in frontier warfare without bayonets.

As there is no manual which gives in detail and fully the tasks of cavalry in modern frontier fighting, the reader and I may differ as to what constitutes a legitimate task. He may take it that it is more than is contemplated by the "normal warfare" cavalryman.

III.

I like writing stuff like that! It makes a soldier's life seem romantic and what not. Let us now come down to real life, in other words money. Someone said that money and the medicals are the only things that matter now. '*Eheu fugaces*,' (whatever that may mean.)

It is said that one never sees a dead donkey. They occur all the same. What has happened to all the old bayonets? Less than 9,000 are needed to arm all the cavalry in India and less than 2,500 to supply those stationed on the North-West Frontier.

The real trouble is that the cavalry don't want the bayonet *Now*! Life is already full of difficulties. "Why add to them?" Well, because....Well, read this article again from the beginning.

[Editor's Note.—*Readers who may be interested in the subject of the above article will find much valuable and practical information in "The uses of cavalry in operations on the North-West Frontier of India," by Major C. A. Boyle, D.S.O., which appeared in the July* 1926 *number of this Journal.*]

SHAN HAI KUAN.

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF A BRITISH MILITARY CAMP IN NORTH CHINA.

By Major E. W. N. Wade, M.C., The East Yorkshire Regiment.

It does not fall to the lot of every British soldier to be stationed in far distant North China.

The pleasure of being encamped in such a delightfully quaint and picturesque place as Shan Hai Kuan, nestling, as it does, under the shadow of the "Great Wall of China" will, therefore, only have been experienced by a few lucky units and individuals.

To those who have stood upon the greatest wall in the world and gazed from mystic China into warlike Manchuria—the stronghold of the late Dictator, Chang Tso Lin—this brief account may revive pleasant memories and, moreover, it may possibly prove of interest to those who may be fortunate enough to draw "North China" out of the "Reliefs Bag."

The Great Wall is an everlasting monument to the labour of a great Empire now sadly shattered and rent asunder by internal strife. It was erected for the defence of the Empire against neighbouring hostile tribes; wild and savage hordes which swept down, from time to time, from the North.

The normal British garrison in North China is one battalion distributed as follows:—

At Tientsin	.. Battalion Headquarters. Headquarter Wing and three companies.
At Peking	.. One company, Guard to the British Legation.

The usual tour for a battalion in North China is two years. But owing to the very abnormal conditions which prevailed during the time that my battalion was quartered there, from 1925 till 1928, its tour was extended for an extra year.

"Abnormal times" indeed, for in these terms do the local foreign inhabitants describe the present period of unrest in modern Republican China.

The old " China-hand " will, however, tell the new arrival that everything in China always has been and always will be abnormal from a western point of view. Almost everything, one soon discovers, is topsy-turvy and contrary to British and European customs. For instance, amongst the things which appear strange to, and most impress the British soldier on landing in the country are, the wearing of trousers by the women whilst the males garb themselves in long full skirts; the wearing of white at funerals and scarlet at weddings and the inhuman and brutal public executions, where men are beheaded, for what we would call trivial offences. For example, two Chinese soldiers were beheaded in Peking in 1926 for forcing an entry into a theatre without paying. The writer saw their heads, suspended in baskets from poles, outside the theatre in question in the famous Chien Men. They remained there for several days. Great crowds visited the scene completely blocking the traffic in the street. It is all very strange and incomprehensible to the Western mind.

Shan Hai Kuan is the sea-side resort to which the Tientsin garrison moves for the summer. The move generally takes place early in May, the troops returning to barracks at the end of September. From May to September the weather is ideal, though a considerable rainfall is often experienced at the end of July and in early August.

There are two very good reasons for this move to the sea from hot and stuffy Tientsin. The first and chief one is to allow the Battalion to carry out field training and to fire weapon-training courses, both of which are impossible at Tientsin owing to lack of facilities, since no open range or suitable training areas are available. The second reason is a matter concerning the health of the troops and their families.

The climate of North China is one of extremes—extreme heat in the summer, (114 degrees is often registered in Peking in July), and extreme cold in the winter. Ice, snow and driving cold winds are normal conditions from November to March, whilst the river Hai Ho at Tientsin becomes filled with lumps of floating ice. Shan Hai Kuan is several degrees cooler than either Peking or Tientsin in the summer, since there is always a fresh breeze blowing off the sea.

Although it is not always feasible, owing to the various " war situations ", to send the whole Battalion away together, every

endeavour is made to get them down in parties and for the women and children to go also.

The City of Shan Hai Kuan is situated at the extreme eastern corner of the province of Chih-Li, about four miles from the Manchurian frontier. It is a walled city, the eastern face of which forms part of the Great Wall. It stands on the Peking-Mukden railway and for this reason is a city of some importance from a Chinese military point of view. A considerable number of the late Chang Tso Lin's troops (a weak Division), under the misnomer of "Security Troops", used to be stationed there. The city lies about midway in an open, but well cultivated, plain stretching from a high and imposing range of mountains to the sea. The name is very apt as the literal translation of Shan Hai Kuan is " between mountains and water."

Strategically it blocks the Mandarin road and railway from Peking and Tientsin to Mukden just west of the Manchurian border. Shan Hai Kuan played a very important part in the campaign of 1924-25. Much of the heaviest fighting took place to the north and north-east of the city.

Tactically, the walls and the series of ridges of hills in the vicinity, lying astride the main line of communications, form an exceptionally strong zone of defence against an enemy advancing either from east or west. The defence of the plain is also assisted by the main range of mountains which runs more or less, parallel to the road and railway communications.

The Shan Hai Kuan position, with one flank resting on the sea and the other secured in the mountains is, undoubtedly, the key to the defence of the bottle-neck entrance to Manchuria against any attack from the West along the railway.

Historically the city is interesting, for it was here in 1644 that the great Ming General, Wu Sen-Kwei, requested the Manchus to come to the help of the Mings and assist him to recapture Peking from the rebel troops of Li. The Manchus accepted and drove through to Peking, which they took. Having occupied it they refused to restore it to the Ming Dynasty.

The mountains which tower above the city, silent witnesses of the fierce and bloody battles of past ages, have also the reputation of housing the ever present bandit gangs. A Chinese bandit may be a perfectly peaceful farmer at one moment and a fierce cut-throat the

next. It is all a matter of necessity. The so-called bandit mobs of latter years have been recruited from disbanded, disillusioned and unpaid soldiers, who have deserted from their respective " War Lords" another curse of these never ceasing civil wars—illegitimate children of this impossible Republic. These self-styled and self-appointed War Lords have been in local control—as far as control in any shape or form is possible in China today—of vast areas ever since the fall of the old Empire.

The British camp, which takes its name from its proximity to the city, is located in a south-easterly direction, about three miles distant on the coast. The old Chinese Fort No. 1, now known as the British Fort, and over which the Union Jack flies, stands some sixty feet above the sea. The exterior of the fort itself is in a somewhat derelict condition, the bulk of the stones which faced the earthworks having been removed by enterprising Chinese to build houses for themselves and bungalows for the foreign summer visitors.

The fort is, however, of certain historical interest as it marks the extreme end of the Great Wall where it stops a few hundred yards short of the sea. There is an old Chinese legend that in B. C. 260, the Emperor, standing where the British Fort now stands, looked out to sea and called the place the" Beginning of the World". In those days it might easily have appeared to be so. But to return to modern times; the officers are accommodated in tents on a grassy plateau within the walls of the fort. Here, also, are situated the Commanding Officer's and the Quartermaster's bungalows, quarters for the married N. C. O's. and men; and the Officers' Mess. This is an airy building attractively placed amidst trees and fronted by brightly coloured flower-beds. All of these are permanent buildings of stone or brick. The Commanding Officer's bungalow, Officers' and Sergeants' Messes each have a hard tennis court.

Just outside the main entrance to the fort and to the north-west is a pretty and well wooded natural arena, known as the " Dell". Here, owing to the broken nature of the ground, the training of small units, *e.g.*, sections and platoons, can be carried out. In these pleasant surroundings the Band plays in the evening and the Drums beat " Retreat." Both of these performances provide endless entertainment for the Italian, French and Japanese troops who are also stationed

in ex-Chinese forts along the western side of the Wall. The Drums, in particular, seem to interest them considerably.

From the British fort the Wall runs almost due north for some twenty-five miles and then turns in a general westerly direction to the north of Peking.

The main camp is about a quarter mile from the fort and is exceptionally well placed on flat and dry ground under the shade of tall trees. There are permanent buildings for offices, dining-halls, Sergeants Mess, Stores and Institutes. A bath-house and modern stables have recently been erected. The camp runs its own Cinema which is greatly appreciated by the troops. The camp is surrounded on the north and west by cultivated areas, on the south by the river Ta Shih Ho, whilst on the east, and only a few hundred yards distant, is a 600-yards rifle range of eight targets, running almost parallel with the camp area. Still further to the east is private land reaching down to the sea, upon which a dozen or more modern bungalows have been built. They are very conveniently placed for the camp and several are usually occupied by officer's families, though the rent is rather exorbitant.

The camp and fort are connected with Shan Hai Kuan station by a trolley line off which branch lines run to the French and Italian barracks. The trolleys are mule or pony drawn and complete the journey in about twenty minutes, not always, however, without incident. These mules—even in China—live up to their universal reputations and become easily scared, with the result that the trolley leaves the line scattering passengers and baggage broadcast in the adjoining fields.

There are several rivers in the vicinity, all of which have their origin in the neighbouring mountains and flow in a general southerly direction to the sea. The most important of these is the Shih Ho; with the exception of this river they all become practically dry in the summer, being converted into rushing torrents when the snow and ice on the mountains melt in the spring.

The valley of the Ta Shih Ho is quite beautiful where it winds its way down the steep and wooded ravines in the mountains. Many pleasant and interesting trips can be made into these mountains and along the coast to the neighbouring sea-side resorts of Chin Wang Tao

and Pei Tai Ho. The former is one of the few ports in North China which is free from ice all the year round : it is at this port that the British regiments for duty in Peking and Tientsin disembark.

Pei Tai Ho is the Brighton of North China, it is the fashionable summer resort of the foreign communities of Tientsin and Peking. The majority of the personnel of the Peking Legations move here for the hot weather season. In the case of the British Legation a special compound was allotted to it by the Chinese Government after the Boxer rebellion of 1900. The chief attraction of the place, other than the bathing, is the low range, known as the Lotus Hills, situated near the western end of the Town. Though not of any considerable height, they are very well wooded and afford an excellent view of the surrounding country.

In the mountains above Shan Hai Kuan there are three temples which well repay the energy expended in reaching them ; they are, the River Temple (Erh Leng Miao), the Grove Temple and the Cave Temple. The River Temple is eight miles from camp and stands perched alone on a medium sized hill overlooking the Ta Shih Ho. From this point a superb view of the river can be obtained as it bends in and out in the valley below. Lying some half-mile beyond the temple hill, a gigantic single rock rises from the river ; in a cavity half way up the side is a shrine, this is known as the Grotto Temple. Good bathing can be obtained in a deep pool of very clear water which skirts the rock.

The Grove Temple is seven miles from camp, lying immediately north of the city. It is concealed in a grove of trees at the top of a mountain some 1,500 feet high. It is reached by a precipitous zig-zag path, terraced with rough steps, up which a donkey or sturdy little Mongol pony will carry one with little or no trouble. Some 300 yards to the east of this temple the Great Wall snakes its way up the side of the mountain lending quaintness to the scene and creating an atmosphere of antiquity. From here one can see for miles eastwards into Manchuria and looking towards the west, to the Lotus Hills beyond Pei Tai Ho.

The furthest and, perhaps, most interesting of the three temples, is the Cave Temple. This lies up in the mountains in a north-easterly direction, about ten miles from camp. It is approached through a

ruined gateway in the Wall built across a deep and narrow ravine. It is a strenuous pull up to the top. The temple itself is contained in a large cave which extends right through the hill, the exit overlooking a wild and rocky river bed, dry during the summer months.

All these temples are within walking distance, but in the hot weather season donkeys or ponies are the usual means of transportation. With the exception of the River Temple, they require a full day to do them properly and with comfort. A donkey and boy can be hired for the day for one dollar and fifty cents, equivalent to about two shillings and nine pence in English money.

With regard to recreation and sport available at Shan Hai Kuan, a most important item where the British Officer and soldier are concerned, the bathing in the camp area is excellent and the beach is sandy and clean. The troops take full advantage of it and it is more difficult to keep them out of the water than to get them in. Regiments in occupation generally hold aquatic sports with excellent results. Two football grounds are available and matches are played with the Italian Naval Detachment quartered in the next fort. The Italians have taken up " Soccer " with the utmost keenness and are rapidly becoming formidable opponents.

There are also facilities for cricket and athletics, a good hard running-track having been recently made.

Riding is a very popular pastime ; the troops patronise the China pony extensively. A pony can be hired for two dollars for a whole day. Just before returning to winter quarters a Gymkhana is usually held, it has proved very popular with all ranks.

Tennis has already been referred to. Fishing, both sea and river, is fair. Shooting is altogether another question, for Shan Hai Kuan and vicinity provides an excellent area for this sport. Snipe, duck and teal are plentiful and many good bags are obtained yearly.

Finally, there is the point of view of military training for which Shan Hai Kuan affords good facilities. A large portion of the time available has to be given up to firing the numerous weapon training courses which have to be carried out each year ; the Army Rifle Association competitions must also be completed. The time left for field training is, therefore, none too plentiful. In spite of this, however, much good work can be put in by companies on the Shih Ho

plain training area. In addition the area lying north of the railway and east of the city offers good ground for battalion exercises. Field firing can be carried out at the foot of the mountains though, owing to the distance from camp, it entails spending the night in bivouac. For the training of leaders, (Officers and N. C. O's.) a variety of suitable localities can be found.

This district being entirely agricultural, the country side is covered with high standing crops up till about the end of August. The month of September is, therefore, the most suitable for the training of the larger units.

To sum up, Shan Hai Kuan offers splendid facilities, both for work and recreation, to suit all tastes. There are, indeed, many worse places in which the British soldier finds himself encamped.

THE NEXT WAR MEDAL.

By B. Arless.

A Commandant of the Staff College once declared that, in his opinion, all young officers on first receiving their commissions should be issued with half-a-dozen assorted and artistic medals. After that, for every four or five years satisfactory behaviour they should be allowed to discard one, until, at last, with high rank they would attain the quiet dignity of unadorned chests. Then, as somebody said on seeing the plainly dressed American Ambassador surrounded by glittering European diplomats, they would look 'devilish distinguished.' Perhaps the Commandant's proposal went too far, but few fighting soldiers can have failed, at some time or other, to have shared his irritation at the fact that the amount of variegated ribbon on an officer's chest may sometimes be in inverse ratio to the number of times he has exposed the bosom it now adorns to the enemy's fire. Indeed a man may wear a brave array starting with a couple of decorations, and running through four or five war medals, *via* a Coronation medal, to the Ruritanian Order of St. Bibulous with palms, and yet never have heard the crack of an enemy bullet in his ear. Of course, one realizes, that an officer with a string of decorations and medals has probably at some time been under fire; the trouble is that there is no set relationship between the number of his medals and the amount of fire he has faced. It is quite arguable, and in many instances, no doubt, true that the soldier safe in rear can do as much to win a war as the one in the forefront of the battle. But human nature being what it is and physical courage being rightly rated as the first of military virtues, it is not surprising that there is a strong feeling that medals should have a closer connection with risks actually run in action.

War medals were originally intended only for those who fought, but it is interesting to see how the circle of their recipients has gradually widened. The Chinese claim to have invented war medals, as they seem to have originated most things, untold centuries ago, but the first British ones were those Queen Elizabeth struck to commemorate the Armada's defeat. They were granted only to certain officers who had taken a leading part in the sea fighting. Some fifty years later

Charles I presented 'badges of silver to wear on the breast of every man who shall be certified under the hands of their Commanders-in-Chief to have done Us faithful service in the Folorn Hope.' There is some doubt as to what exactly constituted the 'Folorn Hope' in the Royalist Army, but it was plainly intended to limit the award to men who had been closely engaged with the enemy. It is also noteworthy that, for the first time, men as well as officers were eligible. The Commonwealth, not to be outdone, followed this in 1650 by the issue of the Dunbar medal to commemorate Cromwell's brilliant defeat of the superior Scottish forces, his ' crowning mercie'. This was the first war medal in the modern sense, for every soldier in Cromwell's force got it, and there was no difference in size, design or metal between that given to the Commander-in-Chief and that received by the smallest drummer boy. No special condition was made that the recipient must have taken part in the actual battle ; in the words of the Parliamentary declaration, it was to be bestowed on all, ' both officers and soldiers that were in the Service in Scotland '. Still, the Protector was not likely to have left undue numbers in the back areas in an emergency and it is safe to assume that few men who got the medal did not see some fighting.

A most prolific issuer of medals in the next century was the Honourable the East India Company, and it is noticeable that it always endeavoured to limit their award to those who had been actively engaged by specifying the actions at which they must have been present or the particular commanders under whom they must have served. Battle fields were still small and fighting was at close range ; to be present at a battle usually meant to be under fire. It is curious that out of nine medals thus issued between 1784 and 1826 only one, that for the storming of Seringapatam, was awarded to all ranks, British and Indian ; the other eight were for the native ranks only, no Europeans, officers or men, being eligible. The type of medal also usually varied with the rank of the recipient—for Subedars a gold one, for jemadars silver, and for sepoys bronze.

The Waterloo medal was, like the Dunbar one, a general issue for all ranks, but special pains were taken to include certain units which had been sent on detached duties just before the battle and had for this reason missed being present at it. There was thus introduced into medal distribution a tendency to include those who, as one might

say through no fault of their own, did not take part in the actual fighting. Speaking generally this widening of the scope of medals persisted throughout the Nineteenth Century, although it was often limited by the custom of specifying that only troops under certain commanders or in certain formations were eligible. It was not until the South African War that all pretence that a medal of necessity meant fighting was abandoned. In 1901, the 'Queen's South African Medal' was awarded not only to all ranks, including nurses, in South Africa, irrespective of whether they had been in action or not, but in addition to the troops stationed at St. Helena, whose participation in the war had been limited to guarding Boer prisoners. In 1902 the range of the medal was further extended to include also the Militia Battalions* which had relieved regular garrisons in Mediterranean stations. For the first time, too, a man could receive two British medals for the same campaign. Medals were evidently becoming cheaper.

Finally the Great War came, and, colossal in everything, its scale of medal issuing passed all records. First, the '1914 Star' was awarded to all personnel, military and civil, who served in France or Belgium on the establishment of a unit of the British Expeditionary Force between August 5th and November 23rd, 1914. It thus included large numbers who had seen no fighting. An attempt was made to render the medal more valuable in 1919 when a clasp, which carried with it the small star worn on the ribbon, was granted to those who had come on duty within range of the enemy's mobile artillery, but a certain number of rear units were also specifically included. The '1914-15 Star' was even more widely distributed as it included everyone, who had not received the '1914 Star' and who was on the establishment of a unit of the military forces in any theatre of war up to 31st December 1915. The most widely embracing of all, however, was the 'British War Medal', whose familiar yellow, blue, white and black ribbon may be worn by anyone who either entered a 'theatre of war' on duty or left his or her place of residence and rendered 'approved service' overseas, *i.e.*, not necessarily in a theatre of war. The Royal Navy gave it to all personnel who performed twenty-eight days' mobilized service anywhere. The British edition of the

*For these battalions the medal was inscribed 'Mediterranean' instead of 'South Africa.'

Allied 'Victory Medal'* was somewhat more restricted than this, but it was given to all who had served on the establishment of a unit in any theatre of war at any time—a wide enough category.

Thus, after the Great War, when medals had been broadcast in millions, no one could tell what they stood for. A man might have all three British medals and yet have passed the war in greater safety than many a civilian in London; another man might wear only two and have endured almost three years of constant hardship and danger. Medals might mean nothing, or they might mean everything. Still, it is hard to see how this promiscuity could have been avoided in so tremendous a struggle. Whole nations were mobilized, contending forces were strung out across continents, and the complexities of modern armies, combined with the enhanced range of their weapons, made it almost impossible to draw a dividing line between combatant and non-combatant. There was, indeed, a great deal to be said for giving a medal or two to everybody who put on uniform. The vast majority who served were temporary soldiers, and, whether they risked their lives or not, they sacrificed much. To the regular soldier war with all its dangers is his opportunity, his great chance for advancement in his profession; to the civilian turned soldier it is almost invariably the opposite. He abandons or at the best interrupts his career, usually at its most critical period; man for man, he risks much more for his country than the regular, and, whether he fights or not, no one need grudge him his medal.

In great wars, therefore, medals must of necessity and probably in justice, be lavishly distributed without much regard to the relative risks run. But should this apply equally to the small wars that fall to the lot of our Regular Army even in these days of peace pacts and disarmament conferences? This question is especially interesting to the Army in India, for here every few years is almost certain to occur some tribal rising on the North-West Frontier or some disturbance elsewhere that will mean active, and really active, service for soldiers and airmen. These 'wars', insignificant though they may be compared with the great wars of history, entail severe hardship and not a little danger to those who take part in them. Should this be recognised

*America gave this medal to all who had served on active duty with the United States Army; France to all who served a minimum period of three months at the Front.

by the award of medals for them, and, if so, what should be the basis of distribution ?

There seem to be two schools of thought on this subject. Indeed, one is reminded of the military attaché, who, when asked what importance was accorded to medals in the Balkan State to which he was accredited, replied that it was really rather hard to say, as the Commander-in-Chief never wore any, while the War Minister appeared at every ceremonial parade in an entirely new set ! On these lines one school would grant medals for a minor campaign or Frontier skirmish much as they were distributed in the Great War ; the other, arguing that this would be to make a farce of them, says no medals at all for anything less than a ' real ' war with thousands of casualties. While these two views are being urged one against the other, it is not unlikely that many a brisk little bit of fighting will pass unmarked by a medal.

The first point to be decided is whether for a regular army it is a good thing to have war medals at all. The almost unanimous opinion, in spite of Commandants of Staff Colleges, is that, properly distributed, they are an immense help to morale. Especially is this so for Indian troops, to whom, as the old ' John Company ' so well recognised, a medal means ' *izzat* ' and ' *izzat* ' means everything. But the award of a medal should be an individual thing, granted because a man has borne himself stoutly in the face of the enemy. Whether he did so with thousands of others in a great battle, or with only his own regiment or even company in a skirmish against the Badmash Khel is immaterial. We must get back to the old ideal that a medal is an acknowledgment of danger encountered or risk accepted. The rough test should be—has the soldier's duty caused him to run a real chance of death or wounds ? If it has, then he has risked his life for his country, and the least his country can offer him is a medal.

It may be urged that the difficulties of applying this rule in practice would prove insurmountable. What would constitute a risk sufficient to justify a medal ? How would it be possible to select men who had undergone the risk ? What about men, who, although in hostile country, had never actually met the enemy ? Would the higher commanders and their staffs ever qualify for a medal under these conditions ? Admittedly these are difficulties, but it has to be a very big difficulty to be insurmountable—especially if it is to be attacked by the British Army.

First, the test for risk should be casualties, both our own and the enemy's, with, of course, the assessment made chiefly on our own losses. The type of enemy should also be considered; fifty well armed Mahsuds would be a distinctly more 'risky' proposition than a hundred bazaar Redshirts. By combined consideration of the total casualties to the forces engaged and of the strength of the hostile resistance, it should be possible to decide whether any operation or action is worth commemorating. Again, to ensure that, generally speaking, only those liable to the risk qualified for the award, it would be essential to abandon the Great War practice of giving medals to everyone who happened to be in some huge area designated a 'theatre of war'. The man who unloads the *ghi* tins at railhead, twenty miles from the nearest hostile tribesman, performs an honourable task, and, no doubt, contributes by his labours to the success of the campaign—but the consciousness of this must be his reward. We cannot have a repetition of the Third Afghan War, when every man west of the Indus qualified for a medal. For the small Frontier or other operation in India definition by geographical area, always peculiarly liable to abuse, should be replaced by the older system of limiting the medal to those who served on certain dates either in particular units or under specified commanders. It will be known what units or formations were in contact with the enemy, and commanding officers can be trusted to see that correct rolls of men present with them at the time are submitted. In most minor campaigns this would restrict the medal to officers and men of mobile columns which had engaged the enemy, to the transport and supply personnel who had maintained them, to the garrisons of attacked posts and to airmen who had flown over hostile territory. Troops who remained in their cantonments or normal stations and those in posts not seriously molested by the enemy would not qualify. Higher commanders and their staffs would probably come under one of these latter categories, and would not, it is to be feared, obtain the medal, but, if the system had been in force for some years they would probably have had earlier opportunities of gaining it. In any case, they and similarly situated officers and men would be eligible for other awards in the form of decorations, brevets and mentions in despatches.

Some such recognised system by which troops who had actually fought in even a very small war could be sure of receiving a medal would have much to recommend it. In the course of years the number of

operations for which a General Service Medal was issued might be large, but the number of recipients would be comparatively small, and they would be carefully selected. The value of the medal as a morale raiser would be enhanced, for it would really mean something both to the man who wore it and to those who saw him wearing it. Frontier and similar service involving hardship and separation from families would become more popular, and the soldier, especially the Indian soldier, would feel that risks cheerfully faced were appreciated by those on whose behalf they were incurred. Those who venture their lives against the King's Enemies do not often gain great material reward; let them at least receive the little "badges of silver to wear on the breast of every man who shall have done faithful service" in face of the enemy.

EXAMINATIONS FOR PROMOTION—A FEW SUGGESTIONS.

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SUBJECTS (*a*) & (*c*).

BY " LONGTIMBER ".

" The principle duty of a commander is to make decisions. If his decisions are to be sound, it is not sufficient that he be possessed of personal courage, a strong and resolute will, and a ready acceptance of responsibility. He must have, in addition, a thorough knowledge of the principles of war,....."

(*Field Service Regulations* 1929, *Vol.* II, *Ch.* I. *Sec.* 5 (2).)

During recent years the writer has been given the opportunity to study carefully, as a member of several examining boards as well as from the Staff point of view, the arrangements for preparing and carrying out practical promotion examinations both at home and abroad.

As a result of these observations, it would appear that the percentage of " Failures " might possibly have been considerably reduced if the candidates had had a clearer conception of what was required of them. It is, however, fully recognised that it is the duty of all officers to keep themselves efficient and up to date, and to prepare themselves for promotion. There may, however, be some who find it difficult to make a start when they find themselves face to face with an approaching examination.

It is hoped that the following few hints and suggestions may be of some assistance to those candidates when commencing to work for promotion.

It will, no doubt, be admitted that the individual training of the officer is, unquestionably, of paramount importance. An officer should consider the passing of his promotion examinations to be a serious matter. He should also remember that his failure reflects indirectly upon his Commanding Officer and the unit responsible for his training.

It is contended that with efficient preliminary instruction and guidance, it should be well within the capabilities of the majority of candidates to pass their examinations successfully at the first attempt.

It is interesting to note that in the latest edition of " Training and Manœuvre Regulations ", which deals with, among other matters, the individual training of the officer, no mention is made of this subject. A few notes dealing with the necessary study and systematic preparation required for all types of examinations, would, perhaps, not be out of place in this volume.

From observations in the field, many candidates lack method when submitting their answers to problems. What they would appear to need is a guide to the type of problem they are likely to be set, a method to work upon together with suggestions of how to set about preparing themselves for these tests.

Although it would seem unnecessary to mention it here, yet it is desirable that candidates should realise the amount of work and forethought which is entailed in the preparation of the schemes which are set for solution.

Immense trouble is taken by the Board in making out the " Scheme " in order that it shall fit exactly into the available ground and be within the scope of the candidates. The scheme and problems, as worked out by the Board, are, in the majority of cases, submitted to the Headquarters of the Command or Formation concerned and are carefully checked by the General Staff to ensure that the examination complies with the official syllabus as laid down in King's Regulations, and that the problems are not too ambitious.

The Examining Boards of to-day fully realise their responsibilities and all possible steps are taken to perfect the scheme. Great care is also taken to see that only reasonable and common sense questions are asked.

Granted then, that the Board is correctly constituted, that the scheme complies with the syllabus and that the candidate is given every facility to display his knowledge. To what causes, then, may a candidate's failure be attributed ?

In the writer's humble opinion the cause of a candidate's downfall can generally be traced to one of the following :–

(*a*). Inability to apply correctly the " Principles of War " in a practical manner in the field.

(*b*). Insufficient instruction and guidance prior to the examination.

(*c*). A candidate's own neglect to prepare himself thoroughly for the test.

To deal with these in detail :—

(*a*). The most common cause of failure is the inability to apply in practice what has been learnt in theory. These practical examinations are, nothing more or less than, a test as to whether the candidate can put into operation on the ground the instructions which are contained in the training manuals. At the commencement of this article will be found an extract from Field Service Regulations, which lays stress upon this point.

It is the disregard of the doctrine expounded in our training regulations which is the root of the trouble. Many candidates, though they may be familiar with the principles contained in the text-books, are unable to transfer their knowledge to minor tactical situations in the field. In a recent report, issued by the War Office, on a written examination for promotion, the following appears :—

" Tactics papers showed the need of continual practice in applying the principles of Field Service Regulations to practical problems ".

These remarks apply in an even greater degree to those tests which are carried out on the ground, and nothing but sound training and perpetual repetition *on the ground* will overcome this source of failure.

(*b*). It has already been stated that the second main cause of trouble is due to lack of guidance and instruction prior to the examination. This may, or may not, be largely due to the candidate himself. Young officers are apt to refrain from asking their seniors for assistance, for reasons which are obvious to all. This should not, however, prevent senior officers from volunteering their help.

" It is the duty of senior officers with their greater knowledge and wider experience to encourage and guide their juniors in their individual studies ". (*Training and Manœuvre Regulations* 1923, *Ch.* 2, *Sec.* 8 (4).)

Again, King's Regulations 1928, para. 78 state :—

" A. C. O. is responsible for the systematic and efficient instruction of officers under his command in all professional duties, and for their due preparation for examinations for promotion..... "

There is no need to enlarge further upon this matter as the extracts from the regulations speak for themselves and clearly indicate responsibility.

There are some to whom the method of examination comes as a total surprise. They do not appear to realise that the old slow system of long-winded written answers with, more or less, unlimited time, is a thing of the past; and that quick and definite verbal answers are now required by the examiners.

Unlike the written papers, the authorities do not publish any reports upon these practical tests. The reports upon the written examinations contain specimen papers together with helpful remarks and criticisms on the candidates' work and are certainly of enormous assistance to future candidates. It will be understood, therefore, that officers working for the practical, as opposed to the written examinations, do so somewhat in the dark.

It is put forward as a suggestion that some form of circular, compiled from reports and remarks made by Examining Boards each year, in which attention would be drawn to prevalent faults, etc., committed in practical examinations, would be extremely useful to prospective candidates. The correct interpretation, as portrayed in the training manuals, could be indicated in this annual summary. It is a well known fact that a large number of officers patronise the "Crammer," chiefly because they do not know how to set about tackling an examination and require someone to put them on the right lines. In other words to teach them how to work systematically. In these days of financial stringency the "Crammer" is an expensive and quite unnecessary luxury. Any officer of average intelligence and possessing sufficient determination can quite easily dispense with his services.

(*c*). Finally, there is the individual who is responsible for his own defeat. Reference is made to those who approach the examination in a casual, apathetic and half-hearted manner. The candidate who considers that little or no previous study is necessary to defeat the examiners and who takes only sufficient interest to enable him to attain the minimum marks required to pass. This type of person is, happily, in the minority and the Army of to-day can well afford to lose him.

For some time to come, for economic reasons, " Quality not quantity " will have to be the Army's slogan. It will be necessary to make up for loss in numbers by increased efficiency in our officers.

An endeavour has been made above to outline briefly some of the reasons for failure in these examinations. The possible remedies will now be considered.

At a time like the present, when the Army is slowly but surely recovering from the effects of a great war, candidates will be well advised to present themselves for examination at the earliest possible opportunity. It is a mistake to put off the evil day in the hope that examinations will become easier or, perhaps, be abolished altogether. On the contrary, one is justified in assuming that, as the standard of military education and training improves year by year, there will be a tendency to increase the standard of efficiency required from officers.

Practical examinations are now held twice yearly, generally in the spring and late summer, in all Commands at home and abroad.

The first thing, therefore, is to decide when to take the examination.

As the winter months are set apart for the individual training of officers and men, this period should prove most suitable to the majority of officers for preparation for the written papers. Normally, the individual training season is one of progressive revision, it is, therefore, a time when the candidate can brush up his elementary knowledge and this forms a useful foundation upon which to build up a sound system of study in the required subjects

On the other hand, the collective training season presents the best opportunity for working for practical subjects, *i. e.*, (*a*) and (*c*) examination. Since the bulk of the training and instruction is taking place out of doors and on the training areas.

The next point to bear in mind is that sufficient time must be allowed in which to reach the standard of efficiency required in all subjects.

Individuals vary to a great extent in their aptitude for examinations. The length of time required for preparation must, therefore, be dependent upon the capabilites of each person.

From two to three months will, normally, be found to be sufficient.

How should the candidate set about his work?

To obtain the best results and in order not to waste time by unnecessary repetition, the candidate is recommended to work upon systematic lines. The importance of working methodically and with a definite object in view cannot be overstated.

For this purpose the following suggestions, which are not exhaustive, are put forward as a guide :—

(1). Commence by reading paras. 850—863 and Appendix X, of King's Regulations, 1928. These give in detail all the information available in regard to the carrying out of the examination.

(2). Study the Syllabus thoroughly. The syllabus indicates to the candidate what he will be required to know and the forces with which he will be called upon to deal.

(3). Digest the advice given upon "Individual Training" which is contained in the Training and Manœuvre Regulations.

(4). For easy reference write down on the first page of a note book the various headings of the subjects which are to be studied, together with the books of reference required.

For example :—

SUBJECT.		BOOKS.
Tactical Training.	Protection.	Field Service Regulations, Vol. 2, 1929.
	Attack	Infantry Training, Vol. 2, 1931.
	Defence	Section Leading in attack and defence.
	Co operation of all arms.	Notes on elementary Tactical Training. Artillery Training. Cavalry Training. Tank Training. Training and Manœuvre Regulations.
Weapons		Small Arms Training. Machine Gun Training (S. A. T. Vol. 3, 1931). Tank Training. Artillery Training.
Map Reading		Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching.
Field Works		Manual of Field Works.

SUBJECT.	BOOKS.
Military Hygiene	.. Manual of Military Hygiene. Manual of Military Sanitation.
Administration	.. Field Service Regulations, Vol. 1. 1930.
General Information	.. Field Service Pocket Book.
*Military History**	.. Selected works on the Great War 1914—18. Henderson's Stonewall Jackson, etc., etc.

(5). To organise the work systematically, divide the period of preparation into stages and make out a rough programme as a guide. This programme should be adhered to as far as possible otherwise continuity becomes broken and precious time will be wasted in unnecessary repetition. Moreover, there is the danger that important points may thus be overlooked.

For instance, it will be assumed that the candidate has allowed himself two months for the purpose.

The programme when roughed out will be something like this :—

PERIOD.	WORK.	REMARKS.
1*st Fortnight*	Read up training manuals. Make notes.	.. To get a general grasp of the subjects required.
2*nd Fortnight.*	Read in detail selected subjects. Work out small schemes on sand table. Work out short schemes on paper. Make notes.	.. Do not try to learn too many lessons at a time. Work subject by subject, *e.g.*, Read up Protection, then work out scheme on "Outposts." etc., etc.
3*rd Fortnight*..	Outdoor schemes on ground with assistance. Practice message writing. Short operation orders. Map reading and use of compass on ground.	Get C. O. or senior officer to set scheme, work out on ground with criticisms. Ask Signal Officer and Adjutant to help. Get p. s. c. or experienced officer to check. Ask experienced officer to train you in this.

* See list of books recommended and issued by the War Office with reference to study for examinations.

The above is only an outline and other books can be added as desired.

PERIOD.	WORK.	REMARKS.
4th Fortnight	Continue schemes with quick decisive answers. Revise notes. Get C. O. to test if fit to be examined. *Note your weak points.*	Include co-operation of all arms. Bring in Administrative, Hygienic and Supply questions.

(6). T. E. W. T's, visits and attachments to other arms are all excellent training for practical examinations. The candidate is also recommended to attend lectures and demonstrations which bear on the subjects under consideration.

(7). The following general hints may also prove useful. Work out in detail the establishment, equipment, armament and transport of the arms of the service with which you will have to deal.

A working knowledge of the characteristics of the different arms is essential.

Work out the system of supply of rations and ammunition in the field and of the evacuation of the sick and wounded. These are best shown by diagrams for instructional purposes.

Bear in mind that most of the undermentioned points are certain to arise during the course of the examination :—

Reconnaissance. (Personal and by Patrols.).

Protection on the move.

Attack, not on a large scale, but in order to bring out the action of small units, under varying circumstances. (*e.g.*) Companies, platoons, sections. Batteries, squadrons, troops, sections of Tanks and Armoured cars. Machine gun platoons.

Exploitation of success.

Message writing and simple operation orders, both verbal and written.

Communications.

Supply.

Billets, including Sanitation and Hygiene.

Defence, company and platoon areas, section posts.

Consolidation.

Field works, siting of trenches and obstacles.

Map reading, locating points, use of prismatic compass, use of reference points.

Remember that aircraft, armoured fighting vehicles, wireless, light artillery, smoke, gas and mechanised artillery must not be omitted when considering the battle of the future.

(8). Finally, on the day of the examination, study the scheme, map and ground very carefully.

Interpret the questions intelligently and give quick and clear concise answers.

Especially have a sound reason for every action you take and, most important of all, try to *apply* your book knowledge to the problems in a *common sense manner*.

The old saying—"He who hesitates is lost" still holds good on the modern battle-fields of to-day, it applies equally well to practical examinations for promotion.

WHO WAS THACKERAY'S MAJOR GAHAGAN ?

By Colonel E. B. Maunsell.

The originals of Thackeray's characters are always a matter of interest, and that of the very overdrawn personage—Major Gahagan—is no exception. A country like India will always produce wonderful personalities, though, unfortunately for the gaiety of nations, the now widely spread knowledge of the sub-continent causes them to become rarer and rarer. Many books harp on the yarns told by old Anglo-Indians, and Gahagan may, of course, have been merely a skit on the breed in general. If, however, we look into the lives of certain Indian officers we can discern a distinct resemblance between Gahagan and a certain adventurer officer, Gardner of Gardner's Horse, now the 2nd Bengal Lancers. Thackeray's swashbuckling major repeatedly refers to "one eyed Holkar," meaning Jeswant Rao Holkar of Indore, one of the most bitter enemies with whom the British have had to cope in India, and Gardner was, for some years, in his service. He was the son of an Irish officer of the 16th Foot, and his mother a New York lady. He was born in 1770, before the trouble with the American colonies broke out, and received his earlier education in France, and not, as most officers of his day, at the nearest grammar school. Certain of his idiosyncrasies, we may assume, were due to a combination of these facts. He was granted an ensigncy in the 89th Foot in 1783, at the advanced age of thirteen, but the regiment was disbanded the same year and he remained on half pay for the next six years, when he was appointed to the 74th Foot.

The 74th were in India and Gardner did not join them, but was transferred from corps to corps until 1794, when he joined the 30th Foot. Part of this regiment was on board H. M. S. Terrible in Admiral Hotham's action in March 1794 in the Mediterranean and Gardner was present with it. In 1795, however, he took part in the more serious operations of Quiberon Bay, one of those abominably mismanaged affairs in which the British politicians persist in dabbling, and here he came into contact with Lord Moira, afterwards better known as the Marquis of Hastings, Governor-General of India. Writing of the affair in 1814, when news had reached Gardner that Hastings

was about to make war with the Gurkhas, he states "The business made a great stir at the time, but His Lordship was strenuously defended .....and the constant attendance I gave him at the time, the strong expressions he then favoured me with, and the offer he made me to accompany him to La Vendée—he cannot have forgotten these things." Gardner was anxious to obtain employment in the campaign, but Hastings does not appear to have placed much stress on his service of twenty years previously. We see, indeed, a germ of Bill Adams and the Battle of Waterloo in the statement.

In 1796 Gardener went on half pay. In other words, he retired from the service, and, according to his own account, went to Alexandria and thence to India. In some quarters it is stated that he joined his regiment in India and then retired, but this is uncertain.

A feature which will strike the reader as curious is that Gardner had served in no fewer than five different units between 1789 and 1796, a fact which tends to indicate something unusual in an officer, and his going on half pay in the midst of a great war adds to the impression. The tone of certain of his letters and observations in later life indicate that he had not been too happy. He had a kink. In the regular service, we must remember, anything savouring of the flamboyant or the theatrical is strictly taboo, and ridicule will soon cure any trend to the marvellous. In other words, what in certain circles is described as a brilliant imagination soon becomes stifled—certain present day "students of war" and similar heroes attribute this to "the military mind." The cult of the tremendous demands freedom of thought and this is only obtainable in some irregular service, and the irregular horse in particular, for here the swashbuckler flourishes both among the officers and among the rank and file—and, to do them justice, when it comes to the pinch they are none the worse soldiers for it. Gardner, in strict point of fact, was an extremely quiet, gentlemanly man, much liked by those who really got to know him, but he may have taken some knowing. His kink lay in his capacity for the marvellous, and there seems but little doubt but that his idiosyncrasy was well known in India, though Keene attempts to defend him from being Gahagan's original.

The state of affairs in India in the late eighteenth century made the country the paradise for the adventurer. The Moghul Empire was in decay, and everywhere new principalities, based

on the stout heart and the strong arm, were arising from the chaos. No native chief was held of account unless he had Europeans to lead and train his troops. It is not too much to say, indeed, that without Europeans to do so he stood a very good chance of sinking to be a mere vassal. Under such conditions Europeans had risen to positions almost princely in their nature, and, in Hindustan, a Frenchman, Perron, was actually the ruler of the Doab, with the blind puppet Moghul in his charge, and with an army of 35,000 men, officered by Europeans, who included a number of British and British half-caste officers. This Perron was, in mild theory, the servant of Scindhia, the Mahratta. In the Deccan a certain Monsieur Raymond had attained much the same position under the Nizam of Hyderabad. Officers, both King's and of the Honourable Company, who had come to grief, either through their own misdemeanours or by bad luck, found salvation in such employment and among these was one Smith, who had fought under Abercromby in Egypt in the 36th Foot. This officer had a brother, also an adventurer, and it was due to this brother that we learn so much of adventurers in general, and of Gardner among them. In 1796, in so far as the British dominions in India were concerned, there was a period of peace, though the Company's officers were restive at the unfair conditions of their service as compared with the King's. Gardner may have been affected with this restlessness, or, like many of his type, may have found the discipline of the regular service irksome. Whatever the case, he decided to become an adventurer.

The service in India which held a prestige second only to that of the Honourable Company was that of Perron. This Perron's predecessor, the great Savoyard, de Boigne, had been careful to recruit his officers from every race in Europe, and British half-castes, the sons of British officers, formed nearly half the cadre. In 1796, however, there were signs that Perron was about to favour his own countrymen and oust the British from the more senior commands. This became more and more apparent as time passed. In the Deccan, under Raymond, only French officers could obtain service.

Gardner, accordingly, decided to try elsewhere and succeeded in obtaining employment under the Holkars of Indore, a state

at that juncture well administered by the wife of the reigning Holkar. This chief was succeeded by Jeswant Rao Holkar, a brave but ferocious ruler. Hence all sorts of trouble arose and the real adventures of Gardner commenced. War soon broke out with Scindhia and many bloody battles took place, in one of which, fought near Ujein in 1801, no fewer than eight out of twelve European officers on Scindhia's side were killed. The heads of these unfortunate men were cut off and carried to Holkar, who rewarded this piece of atrocious mutilation by giving the bringers a sum of Rs. 1,000 each. Three of these victims were the sons of officers in the Company's service, probably by native women, for it is extremely hard to say where the half-caste began and the pure white ended, for all, or nearly all, except James Skinner, called themselves European.

Gardner, an English gentleman, must, indeed have been edified at this act. Nonetheless, in common with sundry other British officers, he remained on in Holkar's service.

About this period Gardner was despatched on a diplomatic mission to the Nawab of Cambay. Here occurred a romantic incident. The flamboyant manner in which Gardner described it to Lady Fanny Parkes is worthy of repetition. " During one of the durbars at which I was present, a curtain was gently pulled aside and I saw, as I thought, the most beautiful eyes in the world. It was impossible to think of the Treaty ; those bright and piercing glances, those beautiful black eyes completely bewildered me. I felt flattered that a creature so lovely as she of those deep black, loving eyes should venture to gaze upon me. To what danger might not the veiled beauty be exposed should the movement of the purdah be seen by any of those present at the durbar ? On quitting the assembly I discovered that the black-eyed beauty was the daughter of the Prince. At the next durbar my anxiety and agitation were extreme to behold again the bright eyes that haunted my dreams. The curtain was gently waved and my fate was decided. I demanded the princess in marriage. Her relations were at first indignant and then positively refused my proposal. However the ambassador was considered too influential a person to have a request denied and the hand of the young princess was promised. The preparations for the marriage were

carried forward. " Remember " said I, " it will be useless to deceive me. I shall know those eyes again, nor will I marry any other." On the day of the marriage, I raised the veil from the countenance of the bride and in the mirror placed between us in accordance with the Mussulman wedding ceremony, I beheld the bright eyes that had bewildered me. I smiled. The young Begum smiled too. She was only thirteen years old when she was married, an event which probably saved both our lives."

When we remember that the officers of Gardner's day were far less well-read than those of the present, that their speech was far more direct, and that a " literary gent " or one of the type, was regarded very much askance, what wonder that the mere style of the narration did not excite ridicule? In what circle of officers of the present day would not the same thing happen? We know of one or two characters, both serving and retired, who are given to a certain flamboyancy, but how many men take them seriously?

In 1803 the great war between the British and the Mahratta Confederacy broke out, and this included the battles of Assaye, Delhi and Laswari. In its early phases Holkar held aloof, watching, with peculiar satisfaction, the routing of his brother chiefs, Scindhia and the Raja of Berar. Holkar, according to Gardner's account, decided to despatch him to negotiate with Lake, the Commander-in-Chief.

The negotiations, whatever they were, proved abortive, and Gardner returned empty-handed. It is significant, in this connection, to note that not one word of this attempted *rapprochment* appears in either Lake's or Wellesley's despatches, and these go into the dealings with Holkar prior to war with him breaking out, in great detail. No mention is made, even, of any visit to Lake's camp on the part of Gardner by any officer in the army. We are reluctantly compelled to believe that Gardner's diplomatic mission existed only in his imagination. About the end of 1803, however, things in Holkar's camp were becoming unpleasant, and Gardner, on visiting the chief after a short period of absence, was insulted by him. Holkar was sitting on the floor," propped up with cushions and more or less

intoxicated—his constant custom of an afternoon." After upbraiding him, Holkar wound up with an assurance that, had not Gardner returned when he did, he would have thrown down the wall of his private tent, in other words, he would have violated the sanctity of the zenana. Now prudence is but seldom strong in a European provoked by an Asiatic, and Gardner's case was no exception, for the insult was a deadly one.

" Drawing my sword " he afterwards used to relate (we can almost picture Gahagan holding forth on such a point) " I attempted to cut Holkar down, but was prevented by those around him. Ere they had time to recover from their amazement I rushed from the tent, sprang upon my horse, and was soon out of reach of pursuit.

In Gardner's account of the adventures and perils that followed we can almost recognise the great Gahagan.

In his flight he fell into the hands of Amrit Rao, the Peshwa's intriguing brother. The Peshwa, in theory the senior chief of the Mahratta Confederacy, was supposed to be the ally of the British, and of Arthur Wellesley in particular. Amrit Rao invited Gardner to take up arms against the English, who, it would appear, had just routed the armies of Scindhia and the Berar raja at Assaye. Gardner was lashed to a charpoy. The " colonel " remained staunch and, in the hope of wearing him out, his execution was suspended and he was placed under a guard. Walking one day by a steep cliff, which led by a precipitous descent to the Tapti, Gardner was suddenly inspired to make a dash for liberty. Crying out " Bismillah " (Gahagan went one better and said, " Bismillah, bobarchi bahadur", which, being interpreted, means " May the peace of Allah rest upon you, O cook of much courage ") he leapt down a precipice fifty feet high, and made for the river.

He plunged in and, taking cover in some friendly jungle, remained in the water with only his mouth above the surface. He then assumed the disguise of a grass-cutter—or says he did, for of all unlikely disguises to pass muster in Central India, that of a grass-cutter is the most unlikely. The fraternity are of miserable physique, wear but few clothes and are as unlike a

European as it is possible to be. Gardner, on the other hand, was exceptionally tall and well proportioned.

In this marvellous disguise Gardner tells us that he succeeded in finally reaching Lord Lake's army. Now the distance from the Tapti to near Agra, where Lake was at this period, is some four hundred and fifty miles. Arthur Wellesley, on the other hand, was barely one hundred miles off and had just routed Scindhia and Berar at Assaye and Argaum. Furthermore, we learn from the Wellington Despatches that quite a number of adventurers had succeeded in joining him. As to why our hero did not attempt to join Wellesley is, therefore, not quite clear. As, however, he says he was successful, we must leave it at that and assume that the swarms of banditti who ravaged the whole intervening country were bluffed into letting this simulated grass-cutter pass unmolested—a marvellous feat of itself.

In Lake's letters and despatches no mention is made of Gardner joining him, though in them we have the names of very many adventurers. The first mention of his name occurs when we find him in the service of Jeypur, who, consequent on the victories of Assaye and Laswari, had just become the ally of the British.

By now, Holkar had become definitely hostile, and war broke out with the British. The prelude to this had been the murder of the whole of his British, or British half-caste, officers—for most were of this last category. In accordance with the custom of this savage, their heads were stuck on pikes and paraded round the camp.

Lake advanced with the Grand Army from the north and Holkar fell back before him. The hot season being at hand and Holkar showing no signs of doing much damage at that juncture, Lake determined to watch him with a detachment and bring the main army back to cantonments, for his white troops were suffering greatly from the heat.

The detachment was commanded by a singularly brave, but most astoundingly incompetent officer, Colonel Monson, of the 76th Foot, and comprised, besides the Company's regular sepoys, sundry bodies of irregular horse, some in the Company's pay, others in the pay of native chiefs.

Among the latter was a corps commanded by Gardner.

Co-operating with Gardner was another British officer, also in command of some irregular horse, one Lucan by name, and one of the most valiant of all this valiant band of free-lances. Lucan had come into Lake's camp from the Mahratta service the evening before the storm of Aligarh the previous year. Thanks to his advice and guidance, in very large measure, the fall of the fortress was brought about, and first and foremost among the stormers was to be seen this indomitable man. Such was his gallantry on this occasion that Lake gave him a commission in the 74th Foot; to grant a commission in the King's service, as distinct from that of the Honourable Company, was an honour indeed. It will be recalled that the great Gahagan performed marvels at this storm. Gardner, having been thrown into close association with Lucan, would have heard the details first hand—and we have heard of folk having their brains picked.

The two officers combined, and "bit on Holkar's tail"; in other words they succeeded in inducing two battalions and eleven guns to surrender. The "fight" was extremely bloodless and, between the lines, it looked very much as though the enemy was only too glad to have done with war, for pay in Holkar's service was non-existent and the country had been so thoroughly ravaged by constant war that no plunder was obtainable. Whatever the circumstances, there is no doubt but that both Gardner and Lucan did good work. It is amusing to note that, when an account of this operation was given in the official gazette, some cynic, writing to the Calcutta Journal, cast doubts on the whole affair—possibly Gardner's fame had already spread. Writing from Saugor in 1820, that is sixteen years after, Gardner states "Have you seen Major Thorn's Lake's War? I got hold of it this morning—lame enough, and in many instances incorrect, but I found an Account of my cutting up Holkar's rear, and taking two battalions and eleven guns (he says three battalions) and otherwise mangles it, but calls it a well managed business. 'Twas this that some fellow doubted in the Calcutta Journal, but as it was on public record I did not think it worth while contradicting."

At the time this action took place, Lake's army was well on its march back to cantonments and both Gardner and Lucan

were away by themselves. Faking despatches under such circumstances is not unknown, though there is no reason to suppose that it was done in this case.

In mid-July, 1804, Holkar suddenly advanced on Monson. This officer, one of the bravest of the brave in battle, was one of those who, when faced with responsibility in isolated situations becomes timid and pusillanimous. In lieu of offering battle as his very able subordinates and as both Lake and Wellesley deemed he should have, he decided to fall back, to his ultimate ruin. Where Gardner was at this juncture is not known. His name does not appear in either the official reports or in the journal of Colonel Don, an officer who was now to become prominent for ability and drive. James Skinner, then in command of his famous " Yellow Boys " under Lake—the regiment now known as the First Bengal Lancers—evidently disliked Gardner, and the dislike was mutual. He imputes that Gardner kept out of the earlier fighting and left Monson in the lurch. Whatever the case, Lucan with his irregular horse, together with certain horse sent by the Rajput chiefs friendly to the British, were overwhelmed in the first encounter, and poor Lucan was foully done to death by Holkar at Kotah.

Monson, falling back through country completely inundated with the monsoon rains, lost half his force through hardship and exposure, but expected help from the Jeypore raja when he reached a fort called Rampura, now known as Aligarh, and Gardner's name is mentioned in this connection in Don's journal. It was stated therein that Gardner was within a few miles of Rampura, though this may have been merely a guess.

The Jeypore raja, by now, was thoroughly overawed by Holkar's advance and, doubtless for this reason, no help, in so far as military assistance was concerned, reached the British commander. Gardner's explanation of events was given, in March 1805, to a young officer of the 15th Native Infantry who had just been wounded at the Third Assault at Bhurtpore. He was then in command of a body of irregulars in the Company's service at Agra. The explanation capped all previous records of marvellous adventure and, though believed by the young officer at the time, for it was given in a most serious manner, would appear to

have got about the army in general. The yarn went that when Holkar first fell on Monson, Gardner found himself cut off, a very probable explanation. The only recourse was to order his men to disperse and find their own way back as best they could. With irregular horse this usually meant that the corps would disperse towards, and remain with, the enemy, who were all of the same race, until the moment seemed propitious for rejoining what they deemed was the winning side. Gardner, with a few men appears to have got back to Jeypore in safety, but what he did when Monson was at Rampura is not known, although the latter was there for three weeks. Anyhow, on the approach of Holkar, the Jeypore raja, now in a state of terror, approached the British Resident, a Captain Sturrock, and told him that Holkar had demanded that a certain European should be handed over to him.

For some wonderful reason, the British Resident was not included in Holkar's demand. A few days later Sturrock was approached by a number of Mussulmans, who asked him if he would mind if they buried one of their number in the corner of the enclosure surrounding the mausoleum in which he was then residing—it was a common practice for Europeans to live in such edifices in default of bungalows. Sturrock assented, after much demur, for the ground was known to be consecrated. When the funeral procession arrived, Sturrock was surprised to see that it did not move directly towards the grave, but went to the door where he was standing. The body was covered with a white sheet, ornamented with flowers, as was the Patan fashion. To his astonishment, the dead man arose, and revealed himself as Gardner, almost as pale and emaciated as a corpse. When we recall the marvellous escape as a grass-cutter the complicated arrangements in masquerading as a corpse would appear somewhat overdoing it.

With regard to the tremendous adventures of Gahagan at Futtygarh, there is every ground for supposing that Gardner was really there when Holkar attacked. He would appear to have rejoined the British about September, 1804, after the escape described above. Futtygarh was then full of depots of corps in the field and Gardner was, in all likelihood, in the process of raising the irregular horse which he commanded when the subaltern of the 15th met him in March 1805. Holkar attacked in

November, 1804, hotly pursued by Lake, with the cavalry. We do not know the names of the officers shut up in the fort, together with the beautiful Belinda Bulcher, the Macans and the other fairies confided to the charge of our friend Gahagan, but it is a curious fact that there may, in very truth, have been a Mrs. Macan, with certain Miss Macans, for Futtygarh was the depot station of the 4th Native Cavalry commanded by Macan, one of the finest and ablest of Lake's many excellent officers. This regiment, like the whole of the rest of the Bengal regular cavalry, with the sole exception of the Governor-General's Bodyguard, disappeared in the maelstorm of 1857.

We now come to probably the most important link in our story. When Lake reached Futtygarh he was accompanied by a young Engineer officer, Carmichael Smyth. This officer was surveying the routes and his map can now be seen in the India Office. Smyth was no other than step-father to William Makepeace Thackeray, and a man much beloved of the writer. It is quite on the cards that Smyth and Gardner both met—they were both of a sociable nature—and Gardner's yarns may have excited interest.

That Thackeray drew largely on Smyth's characteristics in depicting the character of the immortal Colonel Newcome is undoubted, and it is to be noted that Gahagan is not in any way regarded in the light of a vicious liar. We can almost picture the old Colonel commenting on him as " a really ridiculous perverter of the truth."

To give a further example of Gardner's capacity to exaggerate we may quote the following. There had been some discussion of equestrian feats and skill at arms displayed by Skinner's corps. Gardner, then staying at Lucknow with the King of Oudh, breaks in with " An old servant of mine is now in Lucknow. He is in the King's service (meaning the King of Oudh). He is the finest horseman in India. I gave that man Rs. 150 a month (in those days the best part of £200 a year) merely for the pleasure of seeing him ride. That man could cut his way through thousands. All men who know anything of native horsemanship know that man."

A tactless individual asked him to produce this paragon, Gardner was apparently somewhat non-plussed, but got out of

the dilemma with the lame explanation "The man has informed me that he would willingly give a display but such is the jealousy with which he is surrounded that he dare not," oblivious to the fact that, in India, there is a golden key which will open the most obstinate of locks. On the conclusion of the Mahratta War of 1803-06, the whole of the irregular corps, with the exception of a portion of Skinner's which became a form of police, were disbanded, Lord Cornwallis making the not altogether unsound observation. "He would rather fight them than pay them." Gardner's corps went with the rest. Gardner's wife, generally known as the Begum, had been adopted by the old Moghul Emperor as a daughter, and Gardner had a property assigned him at Khasganj, in the Doab, held by a firman from the old man. The lady, thanks to her position as a Princess of Cambay, had been successful in escaping from the clutches of Holkar, no mean feat, for this ruffian was no respecter of persons as a general rule and, had she been a lesser personage, would have brought a young and beautiful woman into his zenana, Mussulman though she was. On this property Gardner remained as a farmer for the next three years. In 1809 he was directed to raise another corps of irregular horse, the regiment now known as the 2nd Bengal Lancers. In 1814, possibly by chance, possibly with the intention of seeing the lie of the land in which war seemed imminent, Gardner proceeded on a sporting expedition to Dehra Dun, then held by the Gurkhas. Here he was nearly shot as a spy, and was only rescued through the intervention of a Sikh priest.

In the ensuing war with the Gurkhas the corps did useful work, forming, in the earlier phases, part of the column commanded by General Marley, the extraordinary officer who so lost his nerve at the unexpected resistance that he actually deserted—Fortescue makes the charitable comment that he was probably insane. Gardner's brother-in-law, Hearsey, in these operations carried out a brilliant stroke with a squadron of the regiment—about the only redeeming feature of these abominably mismanaged operations. Another Hearsey, the future Sir John, of Sitabaldi, Chillianwallah and Mutiny fame, also served with the corps at this period and finally took over command when Gardner left the service in 1828. In 1817 the corps was honoured by being incorporated in the Company's army, for its previous status had

been anomalous. Gardner was rewarded by a brevet majority, dated back to September 25th, 1803, two days after Assaye, this being the day he quitted Holkar's service. This appears in the Army List of 1818.

His last campaign was in Arracan, though he was then almost too weak to sit his horse. His high spirit showed itself to such a marked degree that his corps, though irregular, had fewer desertions than any other which took part, for the campaign was abominably conducted and the unfortunate troops died like flies.

We learn much from Lady Fanny Parke of Gardner's domestic life, and this is of great interest. His Begum was a lady of distinction who lived the usual zenana life surrounded by younger ladies, princesses of Delhi and other leading aristocrats. These secluded woman led extremely dull lives, occasionally varied by acute quarrels. She witnessed the wedding of one of the girls to a scion of the Imperial House of Delhi, and she gives an account of the ceremonies, evidently survivals of the old desert life of the Mongols, from whom the Moghuls are sprung. One was that the bridegroom had to come to the house and carry the bride off with a show of force. This was explained by Gardner. "It is the old Tartar custom for the bridegroom to fight for his bride, and carry her away "vi et armis"; this is still retained." "The Begum would not omit a Timurian custom for the world." The other singularity—at first sight not very intelligible—was that the husband, after getting his wife and carrying her home, bade her put her foot through the litter, and touched her toe with the blood of a goat which he slaughtered for the purpose. The practice is said to be peculiar to the House of Timurlane, the Tartar.

The wife of his youth continued to be dear to the advancing years of the old adventurer, with one singular result, that all his offspring were married to natives of India, and have adopted the native life. It is not a case of their being members of the Eurasian community. One of Gardner's sons married a granddaughter of the old Mogñul, Shah Alam, and his descendants had what was probably the most remarkable geneaological tree in the British Empire, for one, although a native of India in every respect, inhereted the title of Lord Gardner from the Irish peer of 1800.

The last Lord Gardner was his grandson ; and of this nobleman Debrett gives us the following description:—

> Alan Hyde, born July 1st, 1836 ; sometime in the native police force ; described in marriage certificate as " A trader "; married March 12th, 1879 by a Methodist Minister in the house of his father to Jane daughter of Angam Shekoh, and has issue living, Alan Legge born October 25th, 1881. Residence, Village of Munowta, Nadri, Etah, N.-W. Provinces, India."

This Lady Gardner was the grandchild of the last King of Delhi, in whom terminated the line of Timurlane the Tartar, known as the " Great Moghul."

Gardner died in 1835, followed in less than a month by his faithful and broken-hearted Begum. He was buried in a very handsome marble mausoleum at Khasganj, Thus ended the career of an adventurer whose descendants are connected with the English peerage, the house of Timur, the kings of Oudh and the Begs of Cambay.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

Mobility.

Sir,

I trust that I shall not over-tax the patience of your readers if I add a few remarks on the above subject, "*à propose* of the interesting letter of P. B. I contained in your April 1932 number.

This letter states that "as a general rule, Officers serving with the Irregular Forces on the Frontier, look upon Regulars as ponderous and immobile, and unsuited at ordinary times to mountain warfare, against the agile and wily Pathan."

This statement is rather astounding, and especially so if one considers recent Frontier History. A study of this will show that of recent years heavy fighting on the Frontier has only occurred in 1897, 1901, 1908 (Mohmund) and 1919/20. Now, in dealing with Tribesmen, when once operations start, it is only by hard fighting, involving considerable casualties on both sides, that any permanent effect is gained. The expeditions mentioned, were carried to a successful issue entirely by the "ponderous and unsuitable" Regulars.

The heavy fighting in Waziristan in 1919/20 had an enormous influence over the Mahsuds which they have never forgotten; it killed off all their young fighting stock. In 1930, the heavy losses inflicted on the Mahsuds by a concentration of modern machine gun fire such as they had never before experienced, was the decisive factor in causing them immediately to come to terms.

From the writer's recent experiences of Regulars and Irregulars in the Field, he is convinced that the Regular Infantry of to-day is every bit as well suited to tackle the wily Pathan as he was in the past, provided the situation is duly appreciated. The Khajuri Plain operations in 1931 proved this. They are the same troops, only better trained, as those who fought so magnificently in the Great War. Experience will prove whether their present armament is suitable for mountain warfare: it may be necessary at times to modify this locally, to suit the situation. Similarly it is generally agreed that the new organisation is not so well suited to the individual work of mountain warfare as was the former. But we must make the best of this: each tiny corner of the Empire cannot have its own specialised organisation and troops.

There is always a danger in India of thinking only in terms of the N.-W. Frontier and of peace time patrol work and police duties on it. There is also a tendency during a prolonged peace to overlook the necessity of Fighting Power and to sacrifice everything to Mobility. It is certainly a platitude but one nevertheless apt to be forgotten, that the object for which Regulars are organised and trained is " To Fight ". No amount of running over the hills, no amount of "*gushts*" will win a campaign. Police work is often the unpleasant task of the Army in India but it is not its proper rôle.

When considering the reduction of arms, equipment and transport with a view to gaining more mobility, it is suggested that Fighting Power should always be the governing factor. Fifty rounds of ammunition go nowhere in a real fight. The heavy casualties sustained at Ahnai Tangi in Waziristan in 1919 were largely due to the fact that ammunition ran out and some of the troops had to fight with stones—a horrible situation.

By all means however let us give every thought to the ability to move and to move fast and far. In the writer's opinion, the main and paramount factor towards securing Mobility is the Will to Move.

This is ensured mainly by the Training of the Troops, and by the Leadership of all Commanders.

Yours faithfully,

3rd June 1932.

" *Light Infantry.*"

THE BURMESE REBELLION, 1931.

SIR,

As an officer of the Burma Military Police, I would be very grateful if you could publish corrections to a number of inaccuracies which appeared in an article " The Burmese Rebellion, 1931 " published in your April Number.

The first occurs in the section dealing with the course of the rebellion, in which it is stated that available armed civil forces were two

battalions of Military Police This the entirely wrong, as there were no battalions as such at the disposal of the Civil authorities.

In December 1930, the Military Police consisted of six frontier battalions, two garrison battalions, and a reserve battalion. The rebellion broke out in the area garrisoned by the Rangoon Battalion, but that battalion could scarcely be considered as available for rebellion duty, as it furnished the men in posts stretching from Mergui in the south to Paletwa on the Chittagong border, a distance of approximately 800 miles. The only men available from the Military Police, were detachments found by reducing the Headquarters strengths of all battalions in the force.

It is also added that by June 1931 five new battalions of Military Police had been raised and five others were in process of being recruited. This is very greatly exaggerated, for battalions one should read companies.

Your correspondent states that no Military Police were available for Tharrawaddy at the outbreak of the rebellion in December 1930. This is incorrect as Military Police were sent there and were in action on December 25th. before the arrival of the Military, and on January 1st. there were 420 rifles of the force in Tharrawaddy.

There are several geographical errors in the "Sketch map of Burma." Okkan shown on the Mandalay line about 20 miles North of Nyaunglebin, is in actual fact on the Prome line, 12 miles South of Tharrawaddy.

Thayetmyo shown as being on the Eastern side of the Pegu Yomas in Toungoo district, is on the right bank of the Irrawaddy about 60 miles West, and is about the spot where Allanmyo has been marked. Allanmyo is on the left bank of the river, and not the right.

I think too that most of those who operated during the rains in Thayetmyo district would have no hesitation whatever in saying that the Southern limit of the dry zone should be moved about 80 miles further North.

Yours faithfully,

Rangoon. J. F. BOWERMAN, CAPTAIN.

Editor's Note.

The author of the article " The Burmese Rebellion, 1931 " comments on the above letter as follows :—

(*a*) *Available Military Police.*—The article did not infer that two battalions of Military Police were available " as battalions " ; on the contrary it specifically stated that the two battalions were dispersed " among numerous stations," and that " this dispersion was a serious handicap to the Civil Authorities who experienced great difficulty in concentrating sufficient armed forces in any particular area."

(*b*) *Raising of New Companies of Military Police.*—It is very much regretted that by a slip of the pen the word " battalions " was used instead of " companies."

(*c*) *Military Police in Tharrawaddy.*—The article did not state that " no Military Police were available for Tharrawaddy at the outbreak of the rebellion." The words used were, " the Rebellion showed signs of getting out of hand. No *more* Military Police were available." This plainly means that *some* Military Police were present before the Military were requisitioned.

(*d*) *Errors in Map.*—Two of these were due to mistakes in an official map prepared in Burma ; one, to a printers mistake in reproduction. They are regretted.

Finally, the last thing that the author of the article intended was to minimise either the services of the Burma Military Police or the difficulties which confronted them.

A Sanatorium for Indian Consumptives.

Sir,

I hasten to add my plea to that of Major D. B. Mackenzie in the April number of this journal for a Sanatorium for Indian Troops.

It is pitiable indeed to see these men, who were fine, healthy-looking specimens and in their prime only three months before, stricken down by such diseases as tuberculosis and pleurisy and reduced in an incredibly short time to a miserable travesty of a human being.

" Five months to live—with luck " was the verdict on the last case to be boarded out in my own Battalion—a former long-distance runner whose times for the " three miles " and the " ten miles " still, I believe, stand as Punjab records. Could there be a more pitiable ending for a fine athlete to face than this galloping death awaiting him in his village, when expert treatment amongst healthy surroundings might result in years of extra life and health ?

" Five months to live " was the verdict again in another case last week—that of a young Khattak, under 19 years of age, the picture of health only four months ago.

Have we any right to wash our hands of cases such as these and callously allow them to creep away to their homes to die ?

The malady takes them young or old when vitality and powers of resistance to disease are sapped by the hardships to which they have been exposed in the service of the " Sirkar." There is not a whisper of complaint that Government treats them anything but liberally. Oriental fatalism steps in and saves the situation.

" The fate of man is writ upon his forehead at birth ; that he cannot escape. Moreover, Sahib, is not twenty-two rupees a generous monthly pension for man with only two and a half years service, who can be of no further use to the Sirkar ?" was the remark of his platoon commander.

Is it possible to agree with this opinion when one sees these piteous hulks being assisted by their sick attendants into the second class compartment in which they are allowed to make their last journey homewards—again by the generosity of the Government ? No one can cavil at the liberality of this treatment, but even so the germ of an insidious doubt is born in one's mind. One begins to wonder whether, after all, the Sirkar's responsibility can indeed be rightly considered to have ended with the granting of a liberal pension and a free passage home.

The record of Pulmonary Tuberculosis cases invalided out of one battalion alone during the last four years is not pleasant reading. A total of 18 wrecks of what, but a short time ago, were fine upstanding specimens of their race have been sent off during that period to die in their homes as quickly as the disease, untreated and neglected, may decree. Is then the responsibility of the Government altogether over when these poor wretches have reached their villages ? Further,

can one honestly say, without a twinge of conscience, that their subsequent fate need be no concern of *ours?* That though it is all very sad nothing can be done to lessen the tragedy, and that anyhow the world is full of " hard cases " which are best pushed out of one's mind—and then perhaps one quickly sidesteps from a painful subject and turns one's thoughts to polo or to that next fishing trip that we are planning for next month.

Again, take the case of that fine young P. M. who is now crawling back to his home in the Salt Range without the hope of seeing another sowing. Did he visualise the possibility of being stricken down in his prime by this malignant disease when the spirit of adventure led him into the service of the Sirkar, ready to take his chance in war but hardly prepared for this sudden death sentence in the piping times of peace Again that suspicion of a doubt creeps in to disturb one's complacency, a feeling of misgiving that perhaps one's responsibility has *not* entirely ceased with the signing of the pension papers and a muttered " *bara afsos ki bat* " as one takes one's final farewell of him at the hospital. And what of the Government? Does the sanctioning of the pension free *it* from all further obligations in the matter?

The obvious reply to this embarrassing question is that unfortunately the Government has no funds for any such object as the establishment of a Sanatorium. The matter is, however, too serious for this statement to be accepted as final. Certainly the easy course to take is to brand the idea at once as impossible and to let it die of inertia, banished to some musty file, but the raising of funds for a refuge for these human wrecks is, I submit, such a vital matter that it cannot be evaded. The problem has got to be faced—and solved.

Major Mackenzie has made some excellent suggestions regarding the raising of money from private sources. I would go further and urge that, funds or no funds, the State *cannot* be absolved from taking an active part. Let it show the way and set the necessary example with an allotment of money and an appeal for funds; let us then find some influential, philanthropic person to give the lead for private subscriptions, each one of us adding his share in spite of the cut in pay.

This is essentially a matter for the State to contend with first. Once the project has official approval and aid, public interest will be aroused and subscriptions flow in. The suggestion that an extra half lakh be appended to the Budget will doubtless cause no little dismay

in financial circles at a time when every avenue is being explored for further economies. When, however, the true object of this extra call is properly understood in the Legislative Assembly—when it is realised that the nature of the project is essentially a national one, a charity for brother-Indian and not for the foreigner, is it too much to hope that the House will recognise its responsibility sufficiently for all Parties to sink their differences and pass this new item of expenditure in spite of the " barrenness of the land " ?

There is no reason why the Army should be expected to bear the whole of this burden as it by no means holds a monopoly in the disease. The Sanatorium would be intended for patients from all Government Services, civil and military, covenanted and uncovenanted alike, and once it is established the aim should be to expand and enlarge it sufficiently to take in for treatment cases from every walk in life.

There is a pressing need for something more tangible than public charity to see it through, and the necessity of early action by the State is emphasised. May we look to it therefore to give a lead in establishing a charitable Institution which is as necessary in its way as the Leper Asylums which have existed for so many years ? The first gesture must come from the top. The movement requires the Government's official approval and support before there can be any hope of fulfilment.

This letter is written in the hope that it will catch the eye of some prominent member of Government, military or civil. Now that the matter has been aired it cannot and must not be allowed to drop back into that limbo of forgetfulness, the office pigeon-hole. That would be the convenient course to take—soothing to one's disturbed complacency, an anodyne for troublesome thoughts. Let us make certain that we do not follow it.

Yours faithfully,
O. D. BENNETT, Lt.-Col.,
2/15*th Punjab Regiment.*

Mingaladon.
8*th June* 1932.

" More or Less of a Mess."

Sir,

A mess is not necessarily expensive. Much depends on the C. O. and the Mess President. I believe that Officers of the Indian Police have died because they could not afford to take leave, and that this

was largely due to their being much on tour, when an Officer has to have a cook and other servants to himself, instead of, as in the Army, one to the whole Battalion.

As to dress, does " Economist " suggest that Officers should dine as guests with British units in ordinary evening clothes ? Or, if Field Officers of the week, turn out guards in that attire ?

I do not know when Messes were started in Indian Regiments. Sir Thomas Seaton, who was commissioned as Ensign 4th February 1823, writes of that year, in " From Cadet to Colonel," Ch. I :—

> At that time there were no messes in native regiments. Officers generally lived two or three in a bungalow, according to circumstances, and chummed together. Frequently six or more living in contiguous houses would for the time being form a little mess, and if one of the number happened to be an old officer, and a tolerable manager, it was a very agreeable and economical plan. Each officer kept his own wines and beer, and the table expenses were in common. If one of the party wished to invite a guest, timely notice was given to the manager, and a small extra charge was made. Each member of the mess sent his servant to assist in cooking the dinner, and each sent his chair, glasses, plates, knives and forks, and napkin. This was called " camp fashion." A small subscription provided dishes, cooking-vessels, and other requisites, and all the accounts were settled on pay-day.
>
> This system had the great advantage that it did not lead to such extravagance as regimental messes undoubtedly do ; the officer could live as economically as he pleased, there were no public nights with their following heavy bills for wine, no mess balls and parties with their attendant extravagance, and no member of the little mess was called upon for any expense beyond that of his daily food. If any member was economising to pay for a gun or horse, some member of the mess would be sure to share with him his bottle of beer or modicum of wine, and he knew exactly what his expenses would be. Regimental messes, as managed in England, are very pleasant for young men with abundant means. I can say little else in their favour.

I quite agree that Indianisation spells the death of the Regimental Mess in India. I also agree that there is " an enormous amount of

extra work to already overworked Officers." Also I think the Mess President gets no chance. When Mess President, I was often with my Double Company on the rifle range as early as one could see to shoot, and breakfasted there, or at the Orderly Room when I got there about one o'clock. After my Double Company work I got to my bungalow about three. The Mess was three quarters of a mile further on. What chance did I get?

Chummeries have their disadvantages. So have Clubs. I remember a British Regiment who, as their landlord would not make the Mess bungalow habitable, closed it and lived at the Club. There, they had their own table and dined as a Regiment—but there were about four cases of enteric among the subalterns, one of whom died. That, I fear, would be one result of chummeries. And chummeries would soon degenerate into dining in pyjamas.

In another station, many oddments, who had no Mess, lived at the Club. It was a very rowdy place and the ex-sergeant who was Steward ran about with a note-book trying to keep account of who broke what.

But a Station Mess is an abomination. Thirty years ago, as a Double Company Commander I lived in a combined Indian Infantry Mess. The Regiments quarrelled; the place was a pot-shop; everybody's attitude was "Thank God, it's not my Regimental Mess." I gathered that preceding Regiments had been the same, with the addition that the C. O. of the one occasionally put the Officers of the other under arrest. Twenty years ago, as a C. O. I had to live in another combined Mess. Same thing—a pot-shop, and occasionally a gambling hell. I go to bed early, but at breakfast next morning cannot help hearing young Officers of the other Regiments laughing about some appalling gambling game that was played overnight.

Chummeries have their disadvantages, but Station Messes are (to my mind) far worse.

Yours faithfully,

Oxford. C. A. B. P.

MILITARY NOTES.

AFGHANISTAN.

Internal Affairs.

" The fundamental rules of the Afghan Government," framed by the National Council, and signed by the King on 31st October, 1931, have now been published. They include several interesting features such as the composition and duties of the Upper House (Majlis-i-Aiyan), and its relation to the National Assembly ; the election of the National Assembly every three years ; its duty regarding the examination and approval of the budget, which will include an allotment for the King's expenses ; and the abolition of forced labour, except in war time. The succession to the throne is declared to be confined to the family of Nadir Shah.

AUSTRIA.

Army Estimates for 1932.

The Austrian Army Estimates, amounting to about £2,370,000 at par, show a decrease of some 25 per cent. on the 1931 Budget total. The total returns to approximately the same level as that of 1927 and brings the gradual increase, which had become a hardy annual since 1923, to an abrupt termination. The Estimates have been accepted by the Austrian Parliament in special debate in Finance and Budget Committee. It is unlikely that the figures will be subjected in the future to more than minor alterations. The total will be slightly reduced by small items of income from army shops and farms, various leased properties, swimming baths, &c.

BELGIUM.

Linguistic Law.

An interesting point has arisen which touches on the linguistic question in this country. All members of the *gendarmerie* are required to know French and Flemish. In those parts of the country far removed from Flanders, such as Luxemburg, naturally only those of

Flemish birth know that language. Thus in the really Walloon country this law has the anomalous effect of excluding any except Flemings from the *gendarmerie.*

Inventor of Mills Grenades.

During the month the British papers reported the death of Sir William Mills, who is referred to as the inventor of the Mills grenade. The Belgian press took up this point and pointed out it was an error to think that the grenade had been invented by Mills. It was stated that the bomb was actually invented by a Belgian, a Major Roland of Liége. The invention was first offered to the French and was refused by them. It was subsequently accepted by the War Office on the condition that it should be manufactured in England and Sir William, then Mr., Mills of Birmingham, was selected to manufacture it.

General Galet's Book.

During the earlier part of December a good deal of space in the press continued to be devoted to criticism of the book recently published by General Galet, the Belgian C.G.S. One effect of its publication has been that General Lantonnois van Rode has taken an action against General Galet for defamation of character. General Lantonnois van Rode was commanding the group formed by the 4th and 6th Divisions at the beginning of the War and considers that his conduct has been unjustly criticised by General Galet. He demanded a public apology and is apparently not satisfied with General Galet's reply to his demand, which was to the effect that he had misread the passages of which he complained.

Voluntary enlistment in the Belgian Army.

Owing to the large numbers of volunteers who have entered the army during recent months on a semi-permanent engagement, an order has been published forbidding any further enlistment of this sort.

This influx of volunteers is a result of the present economic crisis.

Standard of education in the Army.

Official figures of the percentage of illiterates in the army were published towards the end of January. In the year 1930, of 39,497 miliciens, 3 per cent. of the Flemings were illiterate and 1 per cent. of

the Walloons. Of the other 96 per cent., the standard of education was divided up as follows :—

Able to read only	1 per cent.
Able to read and write only ..	8 „
Able to read, write and calculate ..	75 „
Possessing a higher standard of education	12 „

Most of the illiterates are taught to read and write during their period of service.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

The Czechoslovak Army.

Military obligations and periods of service.

The Defence Law of Czechoslovakia lays down that in principle the armed forces of the Republic will be restricted to a militia, but until that object can be attained the army is based on conscription.

Under the law of 19th March, 1920, military service is compulsory and general for all male citizens between 20 and 50 years of age. The period of service with the colours is at present 18 months, beginning on 1st October in the year in which the youth reaches the age of 20.

By the law of February, 1927, the annual quota of conscripts actually to be called on to serve for 18 months was fixed at 70,000. All remaining fit men in the annual contingent are enrolled in an Ersatz-Reserve, and only a portion of them are called up for a shortened period of 12 weeks' training ; subsequently they are called up for 4 weeks' " special training " and are then transferred to the ordinary reserve, and are liable to the same reservist training as the 18-months conscripts.

Reservists are liable to 4 weeks' training in each of the 3rd and 5th years of their reserve service and 3 weeks in each of the 7th and 9th years. At present, however, for reasons of economy, reservist training is being restricted to 3 weeks in all cases, and only 3 classes instead of 4 are to be called up each year.

Compulsory physical training.

A Bill has recently been introduced which makes physical training obligatory for all male citizens between the ages of 6 and 24 and for all females between 6 and 21. The training will be in charge of the military administration working through the schools and authorized institutions for physical development, and the programme will be worked out by the Ministries of Health, Education and National Defence.

Recruitment of officers and long-service other ranks.

(*a*) *Officers.*—These fall into two main categories, namely those with war service and post-war entries.

Post-war officers practically all come into the army through the Military Academy at Hranice ; a small percentage for the services are recruited from reserve officers of their respective service.

Reserve officers at present consist mainly of ex-Austro-Hungarian reserve officers. The future replenishment of the Reserve Officers' Corps is effected as follows: Conscripts with a secondary school education are sent, shortly after the commencement of their 18 months' service, to a reserve officers' school; on passing out, successful candidates may be nominated to commissions as reserve sub-lieutenants before the conclusion of their 18 months' service. Reserve officers are liable to 4 weeks' training in each of the 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th and 10th years after their transfer to the reserve.

(*b*) *Warrant officers.*—These are recruited from long-service non-commissioned officers, from other personnel serving with the colours, or from reservists in the first 2 years of their reserve service, and must not be more than 25 years old. After a special preparatory course they are nominated to the rank of warrant officer and must serve for at least a further 4 years.

(*c*) *Long-service non-commissioned officers.*—These consist of men who, after their 18 months' conscript service, voluntarily take on for further periods of 1 year (or sometimes 6 months) at a time.

Strength of the army.

The approximate total strength of the Czechoslovak army is as follows :—

(*a*) *With the colours.*

Officers	..	10,070
Warrant officers	..	8,800
Long-service non-commissioned officers	..	4,630
18 months' conscripts— October—March, 140,000 / April—September 70,000	average..	105,000
12 weeks' conscripts	..	6,500
Total	..	135,000

(*b*) *Trained reserves.*

Under age 40	..	850,000
Ages 40 to 49	..	520,000
Total	..	1,370,000 including about 43,000 officers.

Army organization.

(*a*) *Higher command, administration and organization.*

(i) *The President of the Republic* is the supreme military commander, but delegates most of his powers to the Chief of the General Staff on the one hand and to the Minister of National Defence on the other. Each of these individuals has the right of personal access to the President.

(ii) *The Military Secretariat of the President* constitutes the means by which the President maintains contact with the army and performs certain acts which are not delegated to the Chief of the General Staff or to the Defence Minister.

(iii) *The Chief of the General Staff*, as the actual commander-in-chief of the army, is directly responsible to the President for the training and military efficiency of the forces. In all else he is subordinate to the Minister of National Defence. The General Staff is the executive organ of command within the army.

(iv) *The Minister of National Defence* has the power of the purse and through the Ministry of National Defence directs the administration of the army. As a member of the Cabinet he is responsible both to the President and to Parliament.

(v) *The Army Committee of Parliament* consists of two sub-committees, one from each house, representation on which is proportionate to the strength of the parties in Parliament. This committee forms the channel of complaint from Parliament to the Minister of Defence and all measures concerning the army are submitted by the Minister to the Committee, where they are examined and, if necessary, modified before being presented to Parliament.

(vi) *The Inspector-General of the Army* is appointed by the President and is directly subordinate to the Minister of Defence.

(vii) *The French Military Mission.*—In 1919 a mission of over 100 French officers was sent to train and organize the Czechoslovak

Army. Its strength has been gradually reduced and it now consists of only eight officers, under the leadership of General Faucher.

(viii) *Territorial organization.*—Czechoslovakia is divided into four military areas, each under a command headquarters (Prague, Brno, Bratislava and Kosice), and each sub-divided into divisional districts. The country is also divided into 48 recruiting districts, which correspond generally to the civil administrative districts.

(*b*) *Divisional troops.*

There are 12 divisions, each comprising :—

2 infantry brigades, each of 2 regiments of 3 battalions each. Each regiment also has 1 reserve battalion. Battalions consist of 3 rifle companies and 1 machine gun company.

1 artillery brigade consisting of :—

1 mountain artillery group of two 7·5-cm. gun batteries and one 10-cm. howitzer battery.

1 field artillery regiment of 2 groups each of three 8-cm. gun batteries, and 1 group of three 10-cm. howitzer batteries

1 medium artillery regiment of 2 groups each of two 15-cm. howitzer batteries and one 10-cm. gun battery.

The field and medium regiments each have a reserve battery in addition. All batteries are 4-gun, but some are on reduced establishments in peace.

1 reconnaissance group of 1 cavalry squadron and 1 section of armoured cars.

1 engineer battalion.

1 signal company of 3 cable platoons and 1 W/T platoon.

1 M.T. company.

1 divisional train (H.T.).

1 supply depot, with bakery and slaughter-house.

1 field hospital.

1 motor ambulance column.

1 mobile dentistry.

1 disinfection column.

Note.—A number of units exist *en cadre* only in peace.

(*c*) *Air service.*

This forms an integral part, and the most efficient part, of the army.

FRANCE.

Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre.

The *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* consists of the marshals of France and 12 to 14 senior generals, with the Minister for War as President. The Vice-President is the Commander-in-Chief designate for war and most other members are commanders designate of armies or groups of armies. Each member has a senior officer as his chief staff officer and one or more other staff officers. These form the nucleus of his staff for war.

Members who are appointed as inspectors of arms, &c., report to the Vice-President and not to the Council as a whole.

The Vice-President receives his orders as to the country's policy from the Government, and under his instructions the General Staff draw up appreciations, plans, &c. He is solely responsible for the plan adopted; he may discuss it with the Council, but they have no collective responsibility for it.

If plans involve the co-operation of other services, they would probably be discussed unofficially through the staffs of the services concerned, but there is no existing machinery for such consultations. The ministers, each backed by his senior service representative, for the army the Vice-President of the Council, would then meet to discuss the plan officially. Should they fail to come to agreement, the matter would be referred to the *Conseil Supérieur de la Défense Nationale,* which is practically the Cabinet, certain minor ministers being omitted.

When an important overseas operation is contemplated *ad hoc* committees to ensure co-operation between the services might be appointed.

In the case of a war or an expedition based on one of the colonies, the plan would in the first instance be drawn up by the local commander-in-chief and submitted to the Minister of the Colonies. The latter has a military section in his ministry, and touch with the *Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre* is maintained through the member of that body who is appointed Inspector of Colonial Troops (at present General Claudel). If such a war took on a really serious nature, the Inspector of Colonial Troops might possibly be appointed as Commander-in-Chief, and eventually the control and administration of the war might be

handed over from the Ministry of Colonies to that of War. This had to be done in 1925-26 when the Ministry of War took over from the local administration the direct control of the Riff campaign in Morocco.

GERMANY.

Changes in organization and drill movements.

1. The German rifle company has been organized until recently in 3 platoons, each platoon consisting of 3 rifle and 2 light automatic groups (only 6 light machine guns to each company were allowed by the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany).

Amendments to German Infantry Training show that the rifle company is in future to consist of 3 platoons ; each platoon will have 3 homogeneous groups (*Einheits Gruppen*) each consisting of a light automatic section (1 *M.G. Trupp*) and a rifle section (*Schutzentrupp*). The strength of the *Einheits Gruppe* is 1 group leader, 4 men in the light automatic section, and 8 to 10 men, including an assistant group leader, in the rifle section.

2. In column of route the infantry now march in threes, each of the 3 groups in the platoon being in single file behind its leader, with the light automatic section in front of the rifle section.

This system facilitates the deployment of the company or platoon into columns of groups in single file.

The light automatic section normally comes into action first, followed by the rifle section at 50 paces distance.

IRAQ

Iraq and the League of Nations.

On 28th January the Council of the League adopted the following resolution in regard to the emancipation of Iraq from the mandate :—

" The Council having to consider the special case of the termination of the mandate for Iraq :—

(1) Notes the opinion formulated at its request by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the proposal of the British Government.

(2) Considers that the information available is sufficient to show that Iraq satisfies, generally speaking, the *de facto* conditions enumerated in the Annex to the Council resolution of 4th September, 1931.

(3) Declares itself prepared in principle to pronounce the termination of the mandatory regime in Iraq when that State shall have entered into an undertaking before the Council in conformity with the suggestions contained in the Report of Permanent Mandates Commission, it being understood that the right to apply to the Permanent Court of International Justice may only be exercised by members of the League represented on the Council.

(4) Accordingly requests its rapporteurs for minorities questions of International Law and mandates and the representative of Great Britain on the Council to prepare in consultation with the representatives of the Iraqi Government, and if necessary with a representative of the Permanent Mandates Commission, a draft declaration covering the various guarantees recommended in the Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, and to submit that to the Council at its next Session.

(5) Decides that, should the Council after examining the undertakings which would be entered into by the Iraqi Government, pronounce the termination of the mandatory regime over that territory, such decision will become effective only as from the date on which Iraq has been admitted to the League of Nations."

ITALY.

Libya.

Marshal Badoglio, Governor of Libya, marked the anniversary of the capture of Kufra by the publication of a manifesto in which he declares that the rebellion in Cyrenaica is now " completely and definitely crushed " and that " for the first time since Italian troops disembarked on these shores twenty years ago the two Colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are completely occupied and pacified."

He concludes by stating that this is not only cause for the legitimate satisfaction of all Italy but " serves as a new point of departure for a more vigorous impulse in the civil progress of the two colonies."

In recent years there have been several premature announcements of the successful conclusion of the campaign in Libya, but on this occasion the Italian claim appears to be justified following as it does on a series of well-executed minor operations during the past twelve months which have resulted in the capture of the more important rebel chiefs and the seizure of their strongholds.

The pacification of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, which together form the colony of Libya, will enable the Italian authorities to make further progress with the work of civil development. Much has already been accomplished in the coastal regions. Olives and barley are being successfully cultivated, date-palms flourish and the afforestation of the sand dunes is progressing steadily. These achievements have been almost entirely due to State action. The Italian Government supplies the greater part of the necessary capital, supervises the undertakings of the colonists and is at any time prepared to confiscate and re-allot land which is not being efficiently exploited. Unfortunately Libya is singularly barren by nature. It has no rivers worthy of the name and no rainfall comparable with that of the northern sections of Morocco and Algiers. The Italian authorities are thus confronted with a task of enormous difficulty in developing the country and it seems unlikely that it will ever be able to absorb as colonists any considerable proportion of Italy's surplus population.

MOROCCO.

French Zone.

Atlas operations.

Since the last report the operations in the Todra and Gheris valleys have apparently ceased, and the construction of posts to consolidate the area occupied is being carried out. The northern flank guard has now been withdrawn to Mzizel. The force sent down the Draa has reached Amzrou and is constructing a post at that point.

On 15th January, 1932, the French occupied the very important oasis of Tafilalet which has been the refuge of dissidents from the mountainous regions and of the raiding bands from the Sahara. Large

forces of regular troops were concentrated on three sides of the oasis and bodies of auxiliary troops were pushed in. There was apparently not much fighting except around the citadel of Bel-Kacem N'Agid, the principal chief, who finally escaped westwards with a small party. He was pursued by cavalry and his chief lieutenant and a number of his rearguard were killed, and all his lieutenants have since been captured. A road is now being pushed through the oasis from north to south and is to link up Erfoud with Risani and will doubtless eventually join the existing track to Taouz. No opposition has been offered by the tribes now in the occupied area and the leaders have given assurance of their loyal co-operation with the Maghzen and to France.

The *Bataillon d'Afrique* (penal unit) has been disbanded, what remains of its personnel being sent to Tunis.

Of the new railway line from Algeria to Morocco the press reports that the section Oudjda to Guercif has been opened to traffic and will be open for normal use in 3 months.

Tafilalet Area.

The occupation of the Tafilalet continues to bring about the submission of large numbers of families. Bel-Kacem N'Agid is now reported at Zegdou, 200 kilometres east by south of Tafilalet, and 70 kilometres east of the Draa. Towards the end of January, Monsieur Lucien Saint, the French Resident-General in Morocco, travelling by car through Itzer, Midelt and Erfoud, visited the advanced posts in the Gheris and Ferkla valleys and held a review of troops, including the Foreign Legion, French artillery and armoured cars and native auxiliaries, in the oasis of Tafilalet. The establishment of posts along and on the flanks of the new line from Imiter to Erfoud is being continued, not without opposition. The post of Mecissi, 50 kilometres west of Tafilalet, was unsuccessfully attacked on 20th February, and a force moving from Ifech, on the north of the Ferkla plain, to establish a post at Bou Tarart was attacked by tribesmen from the north; these were driven off after hand to hand fighting, the French losses being 14 men killed, 2 officers and 8 men wounded. An officer with some auxiliaries was ambushed and killed at Touroug, near the junction of the Gheris and Ferkla valleys.

These operations will result in clearing the last obstacle to the suggested road and railway from Agadir by the Souss, Dades, and Ferkla valleys through Erfoud and Bou Denib to Algiers.

A working party on the new road to Akka, one of the passes through the Bani Mountains, 200 kilometres south-east of Agadir, was attacked on 26th January by raiders who, after being driven off by the covering party, were pursued southward across the desert by aircraft.

Spanish Zone.

A Decree dated 29th December 1931, provides for further changes in the administration of the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco. This Decree confirms the duties of the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief, and defines the relationship between the military and civil powers, at the same time emphasizing the subordination of the latter. The main interest attaching to the Decree is the provission made in it for the creation of both civil and military political districts, and the reorganization of the political service generally. The political officer in a civil district exercises no military command; in a military district the political officer commands all native troops within its geographical limit and is a serving officer of the army.

ROUMANIA.

Military Estimates.

The military estimates for 1932 are for a total of approximately 7,914,000,000 lei (equal to about £9,700,000 at par) of which 4,357,000,000 lei appear in the ordinary, and 3,556,000,000 in the extraordinary budget. The total state budget is approximately 25 milliards of lei ordinary expenditure and 11 milliards extraordinary so that the military expenditure for all the fighting services represents 23 per cent. of the whole, as against 29 per cent. in 1931.

Considerable reductions have been effected from the level of last year's estimates, and for purposes of comparison a table of the two years' estimates is appended.

The policy has been to confine the ordinary estimates strictly to those items absolutely necessary to the bare maintenance of the services, all others being transferred to the extraordinary, which are liable to cancellation in case revenue fails to reach the level estimated.

Since the Finance Minister in introducing his budget stated that receipts were not expected to exceed 25 milliards of lei—a forecast which is considered if anything to err on the side of optimism—it is not plain whence funds will come to cover the extraordinary estimates, of which more than half is accounted for by debts incurred on the 1930 and 1931 budgets. All payments earmarked for contracts already entered upon have been included in the extraordinary budget.

Provision is made for the following establishment of officers and other ranks—

Officers (including Navy and Air Force) ..	15,765
Re-engaged M.C.Os. (including Navy and Air Force)	13,737
Civilian officials (including Navy and Air Force)	4,319
Conscripts (including Navy and Air Force) ..	118,924
Total (including Navy and Air Force) ..	152,745

U. S. A.

Department of National Defence.

In view of the fact that the new French Government includes a Minister of Defence, it is interesting to note that a Bill for the creation of a Department of National Defence is now being examined by a Committee of Congress.

The subject has been discussed at various times since 1923 and numerous bills have been introduced to Congress without success. However, the present sponsors of the Bill claim that it will effect large economies, an argument which carries great weight in these times of economic depression.

The proposed Department of National Defence would be in charge of a Secretary, under him there would be three Assistant Secretaries in charge of the Army, Navy and Air Forces. The present Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments have given evidence before the Committee of Congress which is examining the Bill ; both are opposed to it on the grounds that the present organization of the War and Navy Departments is the most suitable for carrying out the tasks required. The consolidation of the Army Air Corps and the Naval Air Service

under a single assistant secretary, instead of being under the War Department and Navy Department as at present, is strongly opposed by the Secretary of the Navy. On the other hand, the Chief of the Army Air Corps contends that consolidation would be beneficial, but that a thorough investigation must first be carried out as to how it should be done.

The Bill has got a considerable political backing and there is a possibility that it may fare better than its predecessors.

NOTES ON MILITARY REVIEWS.

"BULLETIN BELGE DES SCIENCES MILITAIRES."

Published by Imp. Typo. de l'Institut Cartographique Militaire, Brussels.

Price, 1·50 Belga.

December, 1931.

1. *The Operations of the Belgian Army during the War* 1914—18.

The chief interest in this article lies in the correspondence between Marshal Foch and the Belgian G.Q.G., which brings out once more the Belgian contention that their army always maintained its complete independence and was in no sense under Foch.

2. *Pages of the History of the Belgian Army in the Great War.* By Major-General Deschacht.

Quite an interesting account, particularly to those who have no knowledge or experience of these Belgian forts.

But one is left wondering whether troops properly entrenched in the open would not have achieved as much.

3. *The Citadels or Permanent Fortification of Antiquity.* By Major F. Delvaux.

A continuation of the series of articles on this subject which was commenced in the October number. It is well written and of distinct interest to those who make a study of ancient fortifications.

4. *French Provisional Field Service Regulations.* By J. V.

A continuation of the review of the new French Provisional Field Service Regulations which commenced in the November number.

5. *An "aide-mémoire" for Group and Section Commanders.* By Captain Collin.

This article is an effort to simplify the tactical instruction of Group and Section Commanders. It seems a little complicated.

January, 1932.

1. *The Operations of the Belgian Army during the War,* 1914—18.

An interesting account of the fighting on the Belgian front, north of Ypres on 17th April, 1918.

The German attack met at first with a certain success, penetrating to a maximum depth of 1,200 metres on a front of 2 kilometres. Here it was definitely checked and a well-staged counter-attack delivered the same day restored the Belgian position practically in its entirety.

2. *Pages of the History of the Belgian Army in the Great War.* By Major B. E. M. Boutra.

Quite a well-told story of an affair of outposts on the Belgian front.

3. *The Battle of Kemmel, April,* 1918. By Captain Deruer.

An account of the French intervention in 1918 on the front of the British Second Army in Flanders. The author, Captain Deruer, a graduate of the French Staff College and at present employed at the Belgian Ecole de Guerre, was serving at the time in the French 28th Division, the first infantry division to be sent to General Plumer's assistance.

4. *The H. Q. of an Infantry Division at work preparatory to the occupation of a defensive position.* By Lieut.-Colonel B. E. M. Derousseaux.

An infantry division is detraining in the area of operations with a view to occupying a defensive position.

This is a detailed study of the necessary preliminary work of the H. Q. staff which has proceeded in advance of the bulk of the troops.

The article is very carefully thought out and has undoubtedly a certain instructional value, but it cannot of course take into account the innumerable unexpected happenings which contribute to the interest and instruction of an exercise of this sort in practice.

5. *The Citadels or permanent fortifications of antiquity.* By Major F. Delvaux.

This is the third of the series of these very interesting descriptions.

February 1932.

1. *The Operations of the Belgian Army during the War* 1914—18.

A continuation of the series of articles on this subject, and deals with the events of the late spring of 1918 so far as these affected the Belgian front.

2. *The Battle of Kemmel, April,* 1918. (Captain Deruer).

Continues the account commenced in the January number. This article deals with the German attack and capture of Kemmel on 25th April, 1918, and is of considerable interest. The writer emphasises the mistaken policy of the French command in ordering offensive action by the divisions in the line in order " to give Kemmel some more air," even though they knew that a German offensive on a great scale was to be launched in a few days. These partial attacks by the French achieved no results, caused numerous casualties and great fatigue to the troops, and disorganized their defensive positions, and probably contributed in no small degree to the rapidity of the German success on the 25th.

The writer stresses the futility of the counter attacks (ordered by the 2nd British Army) of the 39th French and 25th British Divisions on the morning of the 26th, with no proper reconnaissance and no artillery support possible, but it is open to discussion whether these counter attacks did not justify themselves by achieving the disorganization of the further German attack planned for 8 a.m. on the same day. But when all is said, it was probably the German High Command who had lost their confidence in victory, who were quite as much responsible for the eventual failure of their offensive as the defensive measures of the Allies.

3. *The Man of Destiny.* (Lieut.-Colonel B. E. M. Van Overstraeten).

A review of Liddell Hart's " Foch, the ' Man of Orleans.' "

4. *Disarmament Conference.* (Major B. E. M. Diepenrykx.)

A short article explaining the armaments truce which preceded the present Disarmament Conference, together with the text of the French and British memoranda on disarmament addressed to the

League of Nations and an appendix containing a statement of the terms of service obtaining in the armed forces of the various powers. The author is well qualified to write on this subject since he is a member of the Belgian delegation to Geneva.

"REVUE MILITAIRE FRANCAISE."

Published by Berger Levrault. Price, 5·50 francs.

December, 1931.

1. *The effort to reach a decision.* (Part IV.) By General Faugeron.

The difficulties of effecting a break through between 1914 and 1917 are fully dealt with. Owing to the length of the front it was never possible to fix the enemy reserves, and as no attack was staged on a front longer than 50 kilometres he was always able to bring up sufficient troops to block any gap. Only artillery could break down his wire and other defences and the extent of preparatory fire required gave sure warning of the front threatened.

2. *The Government and National Defence.* (Part III.) By Chef de bataillon Guigues.

Deals with the training and administration of the national armies.

3. *The 10th Russian Army and the Disaster of Augustovo.* (Part III.) By Colonel Aublet.

A pathetic story of the retreat of the army when both its flanks had been turned, with an amazing incident when the army commander refused a request of a corps to withdraw in a southerly direction as it would block the retreat of other corps, while at the same moment the Chief of Staff of the army was telegraphing a direct order for this withdrawal southward.

4. *The 1st Corps from Belgium to the Marne.* (Part V.) By Lieut.-Colonel Larcher.

Describes a night attack in massed formation by a brigade some three to four thousand strong on a misty night, which was entirely routed by a sudden outbreak of machine gun fire in some cases at 15 yards range; the disengaging attack by the 33rd Regiment, and the unmolested withdrawal of the whole corps on the 30th is well described. It is interesting to note that one artillery brigade, whose batteries had fired 900 rounds on the 29th, succeeded in completely

refilling their limbers and wagons by the morning of the 30th. The total losses of the corps were 3,500, including almost all the 2nd. Lieutenants of the latest batch from Saint Cyr, who had made the united vow to go into action wearing their plumes and white gloves. The troops felt they had gained a victory and the value of this victory was very quickly magnified in popular legend.

January, 1932.

1. *The effort to reach a decision.* (Part V.) By General Faugeron.

This instalment deals almost entirely with Ludendorff, tracing his career from the bold effort that resulted in the penetration of Liége, through his collaboration with Hindenburg on the eastern front, to his period of virtual supreme command of all the German forces from September 1916 up to the armistice. His successes in Russia, where twice he brought off his strategy of double envelopment led him strongly to criticise Falkenhayn's policy on the west, and not until taking over a supreme command did he fully appreciate the difference between fighting Russians and opposing British and French troops. A suggestion is made that by treachery Ludendorff was always aware of the Russian plans, but these were more probably obtained from the Russian wireless which was grossly misused (*c.f.* article in " Revue Militaire Francaise " of August, 1931), Ludendorff came in 1917 to rely on the submarine campaign and the defeatist propaganda rather than on his troops to obtain a decision. In 1918 when the collapse of Russia gave him numerical superiority on the western front, the author feels that his tactical successes led him away from his real strategic objective (*c.f.* article in " Revue Militaire Francaise " of July, 1931.

2. *The Government of National Defence.* (Conclusion.) By Chef de bataillon Guigues.

Describing further the immense difficulties of organization of the National Armies, and the drastic disciplinary laws which were passed but were of little avail owing to their not being enforced. There was the greatest difficulty in producing maps, for although the plates of the 1 : 80,000 survey of France had been sent from Paris to Brest. the Government at Tours was not informed and they were never used. The author draws the lesson that improvisation is more dangerous and only sound organisation can ensure security.

3. *The 1st Corps from Belgium to the Marne.* (Conclusion.) By Lieut.-Colonel Larcher.

Follows the continued retreat from Guise to the Marne which was successfully covered by a weak cavalry rearguard. The author sums up by saying that this corps had covered 350 kilometres, had fought three battles in a month, and had met nothing but success. It is of interest to note that in July, 1914, Marshal Franchet d'Espérey had told his officers that the war which was then imminent would be bitter and costly and would last several years.

4. *The 10th Russian Army and the Disaster of Augustovo.* (Conclusion.) By Colonel Aublet.

Follows the movements of the 20th Corps up to its being completely surrounded on 21st February. The losses of this corps were some 75 per cent. of its effectives in killed, wounded and prisoners.

5. *Organization of defence on the wing of an army.* (Part I.) By General Chauvineau.

The writer, who is at present Commandant of the Engineering School at Versailles, and was formerly Chief Instructor in Engineering at the *Ecole Superieure de Guerre*, considers in detail the tactical and technical questions of the preparation of defensive lines against a threat of flank attack. The problem of defending river lines is carefully argued, the decision being in favour of an outpost line along the obstacle with a main line of resistance drawn back so that the attackers have to deploy after crossing the river ; the position should, however, be sufficiently near for the defending artillery to be able to fire on the river crossings and in front of the main line of resistance without changing position. The distribution of technical personnel and of working parties is fully gone into, and detail of the work to be executed will be dealt with in later articles.

REVIEWS.

"The Soldier and the Empire." By Captain F. P. Roe, F.R.G.S., A.E.C. (*Gale and Polden, Ltd.*) 5/- nett.

Captain Roe has been inspired by the new syllabus in "Educational Training" (1931) which lays down that the soldier shall have a knowledge of the Empire as it is to-day, the part played by the Army in acquiring it in the past, and the Army's share in maintaining and protecting it. Particular attention must also be paid to Regimental History. This is a very wide field for one publication, and in compressing it into a book of 271 pages the author of necessity has had to guard against too much detailed description. The result is therefore an outline only and instructors will have to turn to other sources if they wish to give a thorough grounding in the subject. The style is simple and easy to read but the thread is often broken by accounts of how units acquired Battle Honours. On page 123 the Sikh Wars are dismissed in four lines and the paragraph ends by saying "Eight British Regiments of the line and three Cavalry Regiments carry this name (Sobraon) on their colours." One can imagine that this subject of Battle Honours presented many difficulties. In most cases they are not stressed to such an extent as to occupy valuable space, but an exception is an account of how the Twenty-eighth Foot acquired the privilege of wearing the "back badge" in 1801, and how this badge was increased in size by the gallant behaviour of a battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment in the Great War. As the Author remarks it is an extraordinary example of the maintenance of tradition in a Regiment, but its description rather breaks into the narrative of "The Acquisition and Consolidation of the Empire." Imperial Geography is touched on and the chapters dealing with Canada, Australia and New Zealand contain notes on immigration.

Besides a general index there are useful indices to battle honours and regiments and the book contains a number of interesting illustrations in monochrome and colour. Captain Roe has provided a text book which will be of help to instructors who have to teach the new syllabus, but a bibliography would be a valuable addition.

J. E. H.

Armaments Year Book (Special Edition).

(LEAGUE OF NATIONS, GENEVA). 7/6.

This is a special edition of the Armaments Year Book prepared for the use of the delegates to the Disarmament Conference. It gives the organization and composition of the various armies in a more condensed form than the usual edition which makes it a much better reference book for students. The paragraphs in the various monographs on the " Main characteristics of the Armed Forces " and "The organs of military Command Administration " are the most interesting and give the ideal potted reviews required by staff college candidates.

The Budget figures, however, lose much of their interest in that there is no means of comparing the percentage of the total Budget devoted to defence by the various powers.

As a standard reference work this special edition of the Armaments Year Book should be in all Libraries.

H. S.

Historical Record of the 4th Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment.

(PRINTED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION).

This is a well-produced battalion history. The Bhopal Battalion has existed, under various names and with one small break in continuity, for well over a hundred years ; and it was high time that some of its actions and traditions were put on record. To my mind this book (about 175 pages, crown octavo) is just about the appropriate size for the history of an Indian battalion ; and the subject also has been treated in an appropriate manner.

On a few points the book requires some supplementing and correcting. Doubt is expressed (p. 3) whether Captain James Johnstone (whose name is wrongly spelt) was the first British officer commanding. He *was*, however, Commandant from 1825 to 1828 *vide* Major V. C. P. Hodson's *List of Officers of the Bengal Army*, Vol. II, p. 563. The name of Captain Cawthorn is correctly spelt at p. 160; but wrongly given at p. 141; and is omitted from the index.

Indeed, the index has not come well out of the few tests to which I have put it. The Colours of the Bhopal Contingent Infantry, which are stated to have disappeared in 1886 and not to have been traced, are now in the Royal United Service Museum in Whitehall, where I have myself seen them.

There are some useful and clear sketch maps ; but no illustrations. As regards the early part of the history, which was compiled over twenty-five years ago and is an admirable outline, insufficient revision would appear to have been carried out in the light of subsequent works, such as Col. C. E. Luard's *Bhopal State Gazetteer* (1908) and Major Hodson's monumental book already quoted. But these are small blemishes on a record which is well above the average of Indian regimental histories in the quality of its presentation.

H. B.

Note.—Copies are obtainable from the Adjutant, 4/16th Punjab Regiment, Drosh, Chitral, at Rs. 15-10-0 each and from Messrs. Gale & Polden, Aldershot, at s. 21/6.