EDITORIAL

Premier and President

"The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world . . ."

These words looked strange upon the printed page because at the moment we read them the wireless was speaking with another voice. "Deutschland, Deutschland Uber Alles," a noble tune now fallen on evil days, was sung in tones which were vulpine. The moment thus presented three voices—those of the leaders of two great countries and that of a country great indeed but now become the enemy of the human race because of a flaw in its nature and through systematic perversion. Then, from the distance of 23 years, memory recalled a fourth voice—that of President Wilson enunciating his message to Congress on 8th January, 1918—the famous Fourteen Points.

Little remains to be said about the meeting of Premier and President at sea—newspapers and wireless commentators have said it nearly all. One or two allusions may perhaps be made. President Wilson's fourteen points formed a uni-lateral declaration, and in clauses VI—VIII were a grievously pedantic outline of the shape of things to come. It was not until October 1918, that the President spoke in language to be understood by a world at war. Then in sombre and memorable words he called attention to "one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. . . . The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice, disturb the peace of the world; or if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotency. The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. . . . It is indispensable that the governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.'

These words were uttered after four years of war, and too late. It is our good fortune that in the second year of this war Premier and President have spoken plainly and in time. "Sixth,

after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. . . . Eighth, they believe that all nations of the world for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten or may threaten aggression outside their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wide and permanent system of general security, that disarmament of such nations is essential."

In these words is the charter of our future endeavours.

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Two Years of War

We have now completed two years of war, and it is interesting to look back across a quarter of a century to the closing months of 1916, to compare the state of a world at war then and now.

At the end of 1916 Germany and her friends seemed to be enjoying a winter sunshine of success. During the year the military fortunes of the Allies had varied; many great enterprises had been undertaken but few had succeeded.

In January the curtain fell upon the failure and the glory of Gallipoli. In midsummer began the great Somme battle which was to rage for the next four months and result in mounting casualties and sinking hopes. By the winter Jutland was still being discussed, and it must be remembered that in Holland the news of this battle had been announced as the unimaginable thing that had come to pass—an English defeat upon the sea. It was also among the causes of the Russian revolution of March 1917. In September there began the battle of the Ancre, and this month saw also the first use or misuse of tanks. Those weapons, which were ultimately to become the very sword of deliverance, nearly died at birth in mud and ridicule.

The solitary beacon of a shadowed year was the tremendous defence of Verdun—a feat of arms which must always remain one of the glories of France. Even to-day there is a peculiar thrill in rehearsing some of the names of that astonishing struggle: Driant and his Chasseurs; Douanmont; Vaux; the "Mort Homme" ridge. The pride of great exploits attends these names and they are worthy of remembrance—the more so because the nature of their

achievements ran most counter to the ordinary stream of French national temperament.

1916 saw also in England a change both in government and the supreme command. In Germany Hindenburg and Ludendorff became the Chiefs of the German General Staff—two eminent German soldiers who appeared but two months after a great British soldier left the scene. For in June of this year Kitchener died at sea.

Finally, with the Rumanian catastrophe was completed the tale of the unrelieved failure of the Entente in the Balkans.

It may be thought that this picture of 1916 has been painted in colours which are too gloomy. At this distance in time it is hard to judge. We know now the strains which were developing in the German machine, but this knowledge must have been limited to a few at the time. It is in these strains and symptoms of weakness that the most valuable comparisons between the Powers at these times lie. Two only will be made. First, we know now that as a result of the Somme and Verdun there began the deterioration of the German Army from which it was never to recover. It was Ludendorff who then actually said that the German Army was seriously exhausted. Secondly, in 1916 Germany made proposals for peace. But his proposal and the peace note first forwarded by the U.S.A. were alike rejected by the Entente. This was a notable sign of Allied determination to win a decisive victory.

It is from this point that we leap forward 25 years to the present day. The German Reich after two years of war has made no peace move, though rumours have been numerous. America has put forward no peace note to the belligerent Powers. On the contrary, the Prime Minister of England and the President of the United States have made a very clear pronouncement of the aims and intentions of the sane and free nations of the world. Hitler and Nazism are to be overthrown and measures are to be taken to ensure that neither will rise again. The clarity and the certainty of this pronouncement brings to us, during the closing months of 1941, a clearer hope and a steadier determination than could be given 25 years ago.

We must consider what we know of the German Army. This great war machine presents, to all appearances, an aspect of undiminished efficiency and power. The morale of its soldiers has been heightened by success, and we may assume in them a continued and fanatical devotion to the Führer. One quality however

has not been proved in the German Army, nor need we assume it: this is a capacity to take punishment. So far, when the German Army has met British forces in France, Libya, Norway, Crete or Greece, it has been heavily mauled. The effect however has been trifling when contrasted with the general tide of success. It has now fallen to the Russians to administer to German forces the first large-scale punishment which they have been called upon to suffer. It remains to be seen how Nazi morale will stand this test. It is significant that German training has aimed at a high standard of endurance of self-inflicted hardships and privations. This method, one may surmise, has been carried beyond the bounds of psychological sanity; there is in it an element of hysteria. This element, coupled with mental force-feeding of "race superiority," is a poor preparation for those situations which strip from a man all the accretions of education and conditioning, and leave him only with a free man's determination not to be struck down by the brute bludgeonings of circumstance. It is here that Nazi morale will fail. It is now that German leaders, as did Ludendorff in 1916, may be beginning to feel the first cold onset of doubt.

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Combined Warfare

A valuable article in the July number of this Journal broke new ground in dealing with the relation of the three services—land, sea and air—in the operations of war. The article led up to its most interesting idea in the concluding paragraph. This was the suggestion of a new mental point of departure in considering the operations of the three services by thinking of them in terms of a new phrase—"Combined Warfare."

A phrase may be a catchword deceiving us into thinking that we have understood and so absolving us from further thought. It may, on the other hand, be the beginning of understanding and the focus of new thought. The phrase "Combined Warfare" belongs to the last category.

"Combined Warfare" is everybody's business and not that only of those who are charged with the higher direction of war. A natural reaction of the "man-in-the-street" soldier (for example) is: "I have my job. If the Navy or the Air Force get mixed up in it—very well. Let them come along at the right time; do their jobs; and thus help me with mine." This is a faulty reaction, for it indicates thinking in watertight compartments. It is the same type of thinking as that which, before war brought reality in its

train, divorced land warfare from air warfare. The airman, hostile or friendly, is now as real a figure to the soldier of one arm of the service as his comrade of another. It is time that this knowledge and understanding should apply to the sailor also.

It is a platitude that great things grow from small. The intimate co-operation between the Services implied in the phrase "combined warfare" demands a mutual knowledge of each other's work by the smallest sub-units of each service. To employ a simile—we are all players in the same team but our positions differ; it is therefore our duty to understand something of each other's places.

The same thought can be expressed in somewhat more generalised terms. We should now think of warfare as a whole, and of the three Services as the three arms necessary to its execution. Once this is grasped we have made a step forward, and the idea remains with us whether we think in terms of the largest forces possible or of their smallest sub-units. To think thus is not to indulge in doctrinaire speculation. A glance through an Atlas should convince anyone that the defeat of Germany will not be brought about other than by the waging of combined warfare. The terms "sea power," "air power," "land power" are now out of date. We should think of ourselves in terms of military power embracing all three.

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Ideas

People have been burned for their opinions, but very few have died of their ideas. It is therefore all the stranger that ideas are so hard to come by, so diffidently put forward when found, and treated with such general suspicion by their judges.

These sentences are not the beginning of an essay upon ideas: they are an attempt to call attention to a matter of great importance to-day. Ideas form a war-time industry, and one which is not working at war-pressure. There are of course qualifications to this statement. A war inevitably doubles the output of idiot ideas because it harnesses the energies of the woolly-witted, the day-dreamers and the insane, into a mill-race of imbecile suggestion. Death-rays, weapons which will not work, ingeniously contrived bombs which will not explode, vehicles which will not travel—ideas for these contrivances are put forward in plenty. Hard commonsense on the other hand—that faculty which produced the safety-pin and the corkscrew—is pitifully lacking.

One can overpraise and follow too slavishly the ideas of our enemies, the Germans. On the other hand they have had many efficient ideas and have pursued them with a tenacity of purpose unknown to us. Here are a few examples.

The Fifth Column, though an unsavoury weapon, is admirably effective in certain circumstances. It was in origin a Greek idea—everyone has heard of the Trojan horse or the carefully nurtured Opposition in the Greek city states. It fell to Germany to perfect this ancient idea over the last seven years. Again, the German General Staff advanced some way towards the solution of the problem of supporting armoured forces by their use of dive-bombers—a solution which British military opinion failed to consider, preferring to adhere to the orthodox employment of artillery. Finally, in their use of mortars and heavy infantry guns the Germans found—and developed—a supremely effective idea of the hairpin variety.

These slightly petulant sentences nevertheless ask the reader to absolve them from the sin of petulance. Their aim is simply to urge the production of simple ideas by those who are in touch with daily realities. A major part in the winning of this war can be played by the soldier who forgets the baton in his knapsack and remembers—and pursues—the hairpin idea in his brain.

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Guerilla Warfare

"The Scriptures say: put not your trust in Princes," wrote a certain Colonel Trant from a Peninsula battlefield, "but I say, put not your trust in a damnable militia." The attitude of the professional soldier to the guerilla has seldom been more picturesquely described. The attitude has survived many wars and is based on many very reasonable grounds. Nevertheless one may well think that the time has now come for professional soldiers to take a wider view, and to think seriously of how to use the art of the guerilla as one of the weapons of war.

Germany now holds down most of Europe. Sooner or later the day will come when Europe will be liberated. That liberation means the employment of forces in land operations. In whatever country these operations may be conducted the guerilla will be a valuable ally—if properly used. It is necessary then that we should now devote some thought to the conduct of this form of war.

The text-books on the subject are few. It is perhaps fortunate that, unlike most text-books, they are also entertaining. Mr. C. S. Forester's novels "The Gun" and "Death to the French" are excellent manuals of guerilla warfare, while T. E. Lawrence's "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" is a classic history of this form of war.

The guerilla is an extremely delicate weapon, because intensely individual. His outlook is narrow, his sympathies local, his morale volatile. He is a creature of maddening paradoxes, capable of intense exertion and long endurance for apparently no reason at all, and likely to sink into apathy and inertia when the soundest military reasons exist for precisely the opposite behaviour.

As far as may be deduced the plans of the greatest guerilla leaders (or should one say users of guerilla forces) have been based on three things. These are extreme opportunism, the care for supply which makes opportunism possible, and lastly human understanding. The formula is a simple one and yet, like most things in war, extremely difficult to apply.

The best fields for its application are at the moment somewhat hard to foresee. Guerilla forces in the past have usually been allotted a harassing role, but their operations have on very few occasions only been combined with the positive offensives of regular forces. This may have been because warfare to the present date has been linear in nature and slow moving. With the advent of "area" warfare and an immense increase in speed, a fresh field may be opening for the operations of guerillas. It is this. Armoured formations, supported by aircraft, are the most powerful weapons of modern war. No one however has yet satisfactorily solved the problem of the ground support of armoured forces. The guerilla may provide the solution.

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Sport in War

In one of "Ole Luke Oie's" admirably imaginative stories there is an excellent description of the Commander who went fishing, and whose staff informed him from hour to hour of those happenings which he had foreseen. In Xenophon's "Cyropaedia"—a sound text-book by any standards for the training of leaders—the place which the author considered fitting for sport in war is pleasantly described. Xenophon, it must be remembered, was no paper soldier. Throughout one of the most arduous and exhausting marches that history has recorded, 10,000 men rested securely upon this man's calmness and courage.

The Duke of Wellington was a man least apt to sentimentalize upon sport—or any subject—among all men who have

lived. He was not even particularly expert in certain field sports, for we can still hear Lady Shelley's remark to an aged and unlucky cottager: "My good woman, this ought to be the proudest moment of your life. You have had the distinction of being shot by the great Duke of Wellington." None-the-less Wellington admitted the place of sport in war, and his hounds added an air of England to many Peninsula mornings.

Lever has left us a lively picture of one of those mornings seen through the eyes of "Charles O'Malley—the Irish Dragoon." "Here the shell-jacket of a heavy Dragoon was seen storming the fence of a vine-yard. There the dark green of a rifleman was going the pace over the plain. The unsportsmanlike figure of a staff officer might be observed emerging from a drain. . . . " Only in the last sentence can we suspect Lever of a certain bias.

The place of sport in war, when Britain goes to war, is well authenticated and it would be a pity if it were not so. In Nazi Germany and in fallen France sport has become a Department of Government. This indicates populations so conditioned and schooled that even recreation must be cut to the pattern of the Leader's will. Troops, drawn from such people, cannot follow a dribbled football into an attack. Neither can they meet bad days with a joke. They are neither sane nor free, and freedom and sanity under discipline are the surest signs of that morale which will be one of the most potent factors in winning us this war.

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Of Military Head-dresses

War is admitted to play havoc with Dress Regulations because the advent of two or three prescribed forms of battle-dress calm the passions which in peace rage over gimp and lace, lancer braid, buttons half-round or ball—the whole intricate underworld of military millinery. Nevertheless, one item of uniform remains diverse in shape and of every colour of the spectrum. It is the headdress. War-time regulations indeed deal tenderly with the soldier's head and allow him to place upon it well-nigh anything he pleases. The forage cap, the field service cap, the pith helmet, the steel helmet, the *safa*—here or there all may be seen. The armoured vehicle has been responsible for the addition of the crash helmet to this wide range of headgear, and in certain theatres of war the Gurkha hat graces other than Gurkha heads. The issues involved are not important, and indeed tradition is on the side of a certain breadth of outlook in the matter. The inspection reports of units in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century reveal a pleasant eclecticism in the matter of headgear; and Sir Thomas Picton, one of the sternest of British Generals, died on the field of Waterloo as he had lived through numerous other battles—in his top hat.

NAZISM AND COMMUNISM

A COMPARISON AND A CONTRAST

By Percival Spear

For sixteen years the world was taught by Adolf Hitler, and Germany complacently mimed his lesson, that Communism and Nazism were two opposites, as far removed as the east from the west, as heaven from hell, and as different as light from darkness. For two years Dr. Goebbels trotting at the heels of his master, put it out that Communism was not so bad after all, and all good Nazis hoped it might be true. Now once more the Russians are savages, and Germany the guardians of civilisation.

In fact, one system has borrowed from the other, and both have borrowed from other systems. A study of the superficial resemblances is a useful introduction to an analysis of their differences.

The first common feature which strikes the observer is the concept of totalitarianism. Both systems claim the total control of life and all its activities by authority. Both try to control the expression of opinion by the censorship of press and letters, thought by propaganda, and action by the secret police. Both worship the great god propaganda and the Gestapo balances the Ogpu. In both systems, the individual is the servant of the state, not its master, and exists for its greater glory.

Both systems have relied upon violence to seize authority and terror to maintain it. The Bolsheviks seized power by violence, dispersed the Constituent Assembly democratically elected, and waged a long civil war to establish their position.

This they have maintained with the assistance of the powerful disciplinary force of the Ogpu and Cheka.

The Nazis engaged in street warfare while climbing to power, and maintained themselves by Himmler's Gestapo and concentration camps, by the Blood Bath of 1934 and by a scientifically organised system of terror ever since. Individuals, parties and groups of all kinds were either silenced, or ruthlessly liquidated.

A drive against religion is common to both systems, shocking religious opinion throughout the world. Beginning with the refusal to recognise the democratic election of Pastor von Bodelschwingh as Reichbischof, the Nazis proceeded to suppress the Confessional movement led by Pastor Niemoller who, after being

acquitted by the courts, is still confined in the concentration camp at Dachau. The concordat with the Roman Catholic church has been systematically violated, until the German bishops at Fulda recently drew up a pastoral letter of protest which was read in all German Catholic Churches on July 6th last. The Russians, while permitting the Orthodox church to exist, used every administrative means to undermine its influence, and by means of anti-God campaigns tried to promote philosophic materialism amongst the masses.

Both systems have developed propaganda to a fine, if twisted, art, international Comintern, officially dissociated from the Russian Government, has carried on subversive activity throughout the world ever since the Revolution. The Nazis, through the Schutzbund, have done the same for Nazi ideals. Both have used this weapon as freely at home as abroad. Both believe that propaganda can achieve what the Englishman believes is reserved to an Act of Parliament—do anything except make a man a woman, or a woman a man.

A closer study of these very resemblances reveals differences which are significant and suggestive. The concept of totalitarianism, in the first place, is not identical in the two systems. Both, it is true, postulate the subservience of the individual to the state in every aspect of his life—his thought, his speech, his action, his social and political relationships. But the state's control over the individual must be for some purpose or end, and it is here that a difference is discernible. The Communist rationale of submission is the cultivation of a particular kind of life, the community life of corporate ownership and corporate living. The ultimate end of the Marxian State is "to wither away" as men recognise the truth of Communist concepts, and accept the Communist order of their own free will. Rational men, freed of all prejudices, believe the Communists, will accept this regime as the natural order of things because it is rooted in reason and founded on human psychology. The element of compulsion is temporary and is justified by Rousseau's dictum that those who do not recognise what is good for them must "be forced to be free." Cromwell expressed the same idea when he said men must have "what's for their good, not what pleases them." This attitude has affinities, and indeed is partly derived from Plato's Repubic, where everything, down to family life, was communised in the interest of the state's pursuit of the good life. The Roman Church, in many things a pupil of Plato, adopted the same principle when it appealed to

authority to enforce the conditions necessary for the pursuit of its own conception of the good life. In other words, the Communist concept of totalitarianism has an ethical content, just as Plato's and Rome's and Cromwell's and Calvin's had, though to the non-communist it may seem a warped and incomplete one.

The Nazi conception of totalitarianism diverges from communism on this very question of purpose. For the Nazi purpose has no moral content. The aim of its totalitarianism is the cultivation of power. Power for what? it may be asked. More power, is the only answer which can be given. The Party must dominate the State, the State is to dominate the Continent, the Continent to dominate the world.

The same difference can be perceived in the respective attitudes to violence. In the Communist system, violence is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. It is the lever to the social revolution, made necessary by the baleful possessiveness of the capitalist class. It represents the cathartic process of purging a class which will never repent. Violence to secure power, and violence to suppress the counter-revolution (illustrated in the Red Terror) are means made necessary by the obstinacy of man in order to establish the classless society. But it is only a temporary expedient, made necessary by the weakness, not of man in general, but of men warped and twisted by capitalist society. Remove the cramping fetters of existing society and man will show himself for what he is—a reasonable, gentle, well-disposed, and social creature. Property, not sin, is the curse of man; a classless, forceless, viceless society in the true mirror of his nature.

To the Nazi these ideas are not only wrong, but repulsive. Violence—to the Nazi—is not only necessary, but desirable. The peaceful man is a weakling, the violent man a hero. "War," said Mussolini—before he embarked upon it—"is a biological necessity."

The Nazi attitude to violence is borrowed from Nietszche who wrote in his *Zarathrustra*: "You have heard that it has been said by them of old time: 'Blessed are the peacemakers,' but I say unto you: 'Blessed are the warmakers—for they shall conquer the earth'." The Nazi does not believe in either the nationality or the goodness of man. His is the Hobbesian conception, that man is compounded of competition, diffidence (fear), and glory. He is naturally unequal and falls into a series of descending categories from the Nazi superman, each more servile than the last. So while

both Communists and Nazis accept violence as a necessary stage in political evolution, to the Communist it is a regrettable means to a higher state of Society, to the Nazi it is an end and a good in itself. In Communist ideology, violence and force decrease as Communism progresses; in Nazi thought violence and the cult of force increase as Nazism progresses. If the Communist fails to explain how the cult of hate and violence can pave the way to brotherhood and perpetual peace, the Nazi fails to explain how violence and war can continue when there is no one left to fight. In Communism the means may sabotage the end; in Nazism the whole process stultifies both means and end.

In their respective attitudes to religion, the same kind of distinction can be seen. Both have admittedly persecuted religion, but their direction varies like the ascending and descending cars of a cliff railway. The track is the same, the direction opposite. The Russian Communists started with a religious terror because they regarded the Orthodox Church as an ally of Czarism and counter-revolution. Established in power, they ran anti-God campaigns on the theory that religion is the opiate of the people on lines which resembled the rationalistic dogmatism of the late Victorian scientists. But they have become in practice progressively more tolerant, so that twenty-four years after the revolution churches are still open and crowded, and the Orthodox Church, identified so closely with the old regime, is still an organised body. The proof of this is the Acting Patriarch Sergei's call to rally round the Government in defence of the Fatherland at the beginning of this war.

In Germany on the other hand, the Nazis began by appeals to the Churches for support against the godless Communists. By swift degrees respect changed to patronage, patronage to hostility and hostility to persecution. Hitler began by appeals to the Almighty to help him and ended by orders to the Almighty to obey him. The Protestant Churches were first herded into one organisation: their episcopal elections were first quashed and then rigged. The dissentient Confessional church was frowned on and then actively persecuted. The Roman Church fared no better, for its concordat was systematically violated from its inception. Nazi hostility to Rome has reached its climax in the wholesale execution and imprisonment of priests in Poland. Ideologically religion to the Communist is a superstition to be grown out of; to the Nazi it is a rival to be extirpated. Hitler is the NAZI GOD, and the Germans must have no other gods but him.

Even in the realm of propaganda differences are revealed by a closer study of resemblances. The Nazi technique of propaganda was admittedly modelled in the first place on Russian methods, with an envious glance at British Great War methods thrown in. But the two have diverged in practice because they differ in their ends. In Nazi propaganda the primary aim is to sap a people's will, to divide, to corrupt, to burrow with a termite destructiveness, until the facade of national unity crumbles at the touch of German power. All overseas Germans are regimented in the *Schutzbund* and become willy-nilly spies or potential fifth-columnists. The Nazis exploit divisions, suspicions, resentments, jealousies, hopes and fears, all to the end of greater German power. Its essential purpose is to destroy. Russian propaganda has for its ultimate aim the establishment of communism throughout the world. This means within any given society, the replacement of one government by another, of one social system by another. It does not mean, as Nazi propaganda does, the poisoning of a nation's soul and the destruction of a people's spirit. Russian propaganda means the replacement of one way of living with another; German propaganda the destruction of one way of living and the enslavement of the people concerned to Germany. The aim is not a swapping of ideological horses, but the killing of the horse and the tying of the rider to the tail of his horse's murderer. However much Marxian Communism may be disapproved as a system, the fact remains that it is an attempt to organize world society on a basis of justice. Faulty and false it may be in many respects, but this is entirely different from the German principle—the domination of the German race over, and its exploitation of, all others.

When the two systems are studied side by side, it becomes clear that their common evils may be traced to a common source; that Nazism possesses, in addition, certain evils all its own; and that Communism displays certain gleams of virtue which the most suspicious cannot altogether overlook. The two evils which are conspicuous in both systems are the practice of absolutism and a belief in force and violence. Both systems are despotic in practice (whatever constitutional trappings may exist in Russia) and display the evils of what Cardinal Hinsley has described as "idolatrous absolutism." Absolute power is idolatrous because it places an individual, in relation to his fellows, in the position of God. It always breaks down because no individual can for long stand up to the strain. If a man showed the attributes of a

God, said Aristotle, it would be right to make him an absolute ruler, but not otherwise. No one knew better than Aristotle that such beings rarely if ever appear, and it was pedagogic vanity that made him see such a man in Alexander the Great. Plato subjected his philospher-king to a lifetime of mental and moral discipline and then gave power to a board rather than a single individual. The quest for the union of wisdom with power is like that of the Holy Grail—it will never be completely fulfilled on earth. Lord Acton, who knew the workings of human nature in history as no other man, summed up the matter when he wrote, "all power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely."

Here a distinction must be drawn between *absolutism* and *totalitarianism*. Absolutism is the complete disposal by man of others. Totalitarianism is the total control of life by one man or group of men. One refers to the *degree* of control, the other to the *range* of control. An absolute system may not be totalitarian, or a totalitarian system absolute. Germany and Russia, the one both in theory and in practice, the other in practice only, combine the two. The good or evil of totalitarianism depends upon the philosophy which lies behind it, but absolutism is evil always and absolutely. Plato's Republic, the Roman Catholic Church, and the sovereign British Parliament are all totalitarian constitutions, for they all claim complete control over every branch of life. The fruits of the last two are not the dead sea fruit of Nazidom because their principles of life are different.

The second evil from which both systems suffer is a belief in force which justifies violence in the first place, and terror in the end. The belief that force can change men's minds is the perennial delusion of politicians, the perpetual short cut to lure countless generations down the path to frustration and bitterness.

> He who is convinced against his will,
> Is of the same opinion still,

is trite but true in historical experience. The use of force is only valid in defence and when used aggressively, always rebounds on its user.

Communism and Nazism both inherit these two moral and political cancers from the German philosopher Hegel and his school of political absolutists. Hegel taught that the State was the embodiment of the developing Absolute on earth. It had therefore no limits to its claims and no bounds to its actions. The State was morality and the only sin which an individual could commit was disobedience of the State. His predecessor, the

Prussian Fichte, taught that the test of civilisation was power and proclaimed "the highest civilisation is the greatest power." Therefore the individual must bow to the State in all things, and the State must cultivate power in all its policies. Nazism inherited these ideas by direct succession, Communism through the Hegelian heretic, Karl Marx. Marx accepted Hegel's absolutism while he rejected the idealism upon which the whole system was founded. He adapted the Hegelian idea of evolution to his own materialistic analysis of society. And however humanitarian and benevolent a materialist philosophy may be, it has no defence against the insidious lure of violence, since it can find no valid reason for preferring a long cut to a short one.

Apart from these evils in common, Nazism has its own peculiar vices. They may be summarised as the belief in race and the belief in power as the ultimate good. Neither of these ideas is of course an original Nazi invention; it is only in combination that they achieve a certain grisly notoriety, like a macabre jazz tune played with the lights lowered. The doctrine of race is as old as the Aryan tribes, for it flourished among the Greeks and in ancient India. In its modern form it was propounded by a Frenchman, Gobineau, in the 19th Century, and developed by an Englishman, Houston Stuart Chamberlain. The doctrine that power or force is the only good was first advanced by Thrasymachus in Plato's *Republic* and repeated by Socrates in the same dialogue at the start of his enquiry into justice. In modern times it has been more trenchantly advocated than by any Nazi, by the Englishman Hobbes, who defined freedom as "what the laws do not forbid," and compared the state to the mythical monster Leviathan to whom "on earth there is not his like."

The Nazi doctrine of race has no scientific basis in anthropology whatever, for everyone knows that the European nations, to take only one group in the world, are not races at all in the scientific sense, but blends in varying proportions of the Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean stocks. Two of the most racially pure Nordic stocks in the world are the Norwegians and the Icelanders; the one is in revolt against Hitler and the other has called upon the Americans to save them from the Nazi embrace. Nevertheless Hitler asserts the superiority of the Aryans over all other races, and the superiority of the Germans over all other branches of the Aryan race, and the superiority of the chosen few amongst the Germans themselves over the common herd. The Germans are the *Herrenvolk* or master race, and within their ranks are

arising the new "supermen" from the élite of the Nazi youth. This construction may be called an aristocracy, and so it is; but it is an aristocracy not of talent or virtue, but of blood. Such an aristocracy cannot maintain itself by talent or virtue, for by definition it cannot possess a monopoly of either. It must therefore maintain itself by force. Force must call upon more force and leads inevitably to terror. How this system works itself out in practice can be seen in the working of the "New Order" in Europe to-day. After over a year some nations are cowed, some overwhelmed, but not one is reconciled; opposition has hardened to resentment and deepened into contempt. The path of force rapidly steepens to the abyss of anarchy.

These considerations lead on to the German cult of power. The popular writings of Nazi youth leaders like Baldur von Schirach, and advocates of Teutonism and pro-paganism, like Bergmann and Rosenberg, are only reflections, on this head, of the ideas of Friedrich von Nietszche. Nietszche was no nationalist and no race worshipper but he was the apostle of the ethical doctrine of power. His quest for truth started with a will to freedom and ended with a worship of power. The only way to win corporate freedom was by force, the only way to win individual self-fulfilment was by the cultivation of the will to power. From this follows, in due course, the complete reversal of ethics and the progressive brutalisation of man. Society based on evil principles would begin by plunging the world in war as the Germans have done, and end by developing a robot civilisation where work and activity would exist for nothing else but work and activity. If power and strength is the only ideal of man, only those qualities which conduce to power and strength are virtues, while those which detract from it are vices. Thus the higher virtues of mercy and sacrifice, the "mercy, pity, peace and love" of Blake, slide into place as the lower vices; and cruelty, pitilessness, ruthlessness and hardness of heart ascend to the range of higher virtues. The German aim is to purge from German civilisation the Christian tradition. But when that is done, nothing is left but the pitiless brutality of the natural man whose life, without rules, restraints or ideals is nasty, brutish and short." The more German culture is examined, the more clearly will the truth of G. K. Chesterton's saying be realised. "The great German civilisation was created by the great Christian civilisation; and its heathen forerunners left it nothing whatever, except an intermittent weakness for boasting."

If from Nazi theory we now turn to Communist, it will be found that beneath its crust of dogmatism and materialism, certain creative and constructive ideas can be detected. The starting point of communist thought, when all is said, is the public welfare, not the individual's and the state's lust for power. Public welfare, it is true, is conceived in material terms and the jargon of Communists is largely economic. But the life of the spirit is not denied; it is rather postponed pending the establishment of economic security and social justice. All the methods of communist agitation are largely means to this end. In consequence, its scale of values, its standard of ethics, is quite different. The individual is reckoned to be of equal importance and equally entitled to full share in life. The things of the mind are recognised as essentials, not mere decorative luxuries, and so education is esteemed as highly in Russia as in Scotland. It may be held that moral values are warped by Marxism ideology, specially by the doctrine of class hatred and revolution and the emphasis on the old fallacy that the end justifies the means. But standards and values still exist; they have not been overthrown or turned inside out. They may have been bent from the norm by the heat of Marxian prejudice, but they have not been replaced by their opponents. From the non-communist point of view, the spirit which presides in Russia is the spirit which errs, not the spirit which denies. The ideals of brotherhood instead of that of master and slave, of sacrifice instead of domination, of service instead of domination, of working for a common cause instead of for a common despot, are all still to be found in Russia to-day. Intellectual freedom is restricted by Marxian dogmatism but it is not destroyed. Marxian communism is a system which is avowedly built upon the bases of reason and justice, and as it becomes clear that the system departs from these two anchors of humanity, it must be and is being modified. Dogmatism impedes development, but does not rule it out. The Russian looks towards the light in blinkers; the Nazi, head down like primeval man, plunges ever deeper in the gloom of the jungle of force and fear.

Marxian Communism is, of course, by no means the only form of communist theory. The principle has had a long history, from its first exponent Plato, through the early Christian Church and the Middle Ages with its theory of the just price and the catchword

"When Adam delved and Eve span
Who was then the gentleman?"

to the Diggers of Cromwell's day and the immediate forerunner of Marx. Most of the features which seem to disfigure Marxian Communism in Russia may be traced to the first word of the title and are not inherent in the second. In Russia itself, signs are not wanting that this is being increasingly realised. The emphasis on international revolution is giving place more and more to that on patriotism and defence of the fatherland. Attacks on religion changed into rationalistic assaults upon superstition and had nearly subsided altogether when the German war swept their last vestiges away. Class hatred and distinctions have declined far enough to allow members of the old order like Marshal Budenny to reach high positions. The freedom of sex relations with its corrupting social effects has been modified. In the pure collectivism of Marxian theory a leaven of individualism has increasingly been working. Dogmatism in the intellectual sphere has been steadily declining.

It is no part of the purpose of this article to present Communism as a perfect form of society any more than Nazism. It is its purpose, however, to draw a distinction between the two and to maintain that while the one is a system which, with all its faults, exhibits some healthy features and is capable of improvement, the other is a system whose essential principles are evil and which must therefore become steadily worse the more it unfolds itself. In the one the light can be seen, as at the end of a long tunnel, in the other the light recedes with each lengthening stride towards the realm of darkness.

MANUSCRIPT DISCOVERED IN A BOTTLE

Seven years ago a traveller, voyaging through strange seas of thought alone, wrote down some of his impressions and committed them, sealed in a bottle, to the deep. This bottle was recently cast upon a friendly shore. The manuscript is reprinted below It needs no further comment.

"Saw the heavens fill with commerce, argosies of magic sails, Pilots of the purple twilight dropping down with costly bales."—
Tennyson.

When one considers that, speaking generally, since Man first put in an appearance on this globe up to 1914, the fastest means of movement on land had been the wheel and the horse and, on the sea, the sail and the wooden boat, and that, within 20 years from 1914, distance had been conquered to the tune of 11,000 miles in three days, one cannot help feeling that we stand now, like William Blake's agitated group, on the edge of the unknown, gazing apprehensively into space. These 20 years have chopped the history of the world—the course of mankind—in two; tomorrow will bear little semblance to yesterday. There has been virtually no twilight; only the very shortest transition period. The effect on the army is to be as great and as sudden as it will be on the community. The soldier has as much need as anyone else to single out tendencies that will guide him at least a few years ahead and along which he can direct his policy and so regain the constructive control which he seems in danger of losing. In other words, he must search always for the inevitable.

To illustrate what I mean, I put forward two such tendencies for consideration.

There are two factors, more than any others, which seem about to make a great difference to the organization and tactics of armies. The first is the accuracy of air bombing; the second is the increasing loads that aircraft are being designed to carry.

The Accuracy of Air Bombing

It seems futile that, in mobile warfare, aircraft should continue to indicate to artillery where and when to drop their shells, when the machine in the air can engage such targets itself with many advantages over the air-*cum*-gun method. The aeroplane can engage a target as soon as it is seen; can strike at a fleeting or moving target, and follow it up till it has destroyed or dispersed

it; it maintains direct observation from weapon to target throughout; it can interfere with the execution of the enemy's plans at a far greater range. It may be argued that the danger of losing a large number of aircraft under these conditions will be too great a risk to face. Against that argument it may be pointed out that it is more than likely that artillery reconnaissance machines will be shot down in fair numbers. It is true that an aeroplane is a more expensive equipment to risk than is a gun or even a section of guns, but its crew is even smaller than that of one gun. Men, more than machines, are precious in war; a fact that was fatally lost sight of in certain theatres in the Great War. We are soon to see a very large drop in the cost of aircraft comparable with the large drop in the cost of cars between 1914 and 1930. To-day one sees the tendency towards high speed in cars; such speeds as are not obtainable with reasonable safety on any roads in the world. There is this lust for speed tending towards claustrophobia and there is the outcry against the daily massacre on the roads. The inevitable result is that people must take to the air in their swarms as soon as aircraft are reasonably safe and that aircraft must cheapen as production rises. In any case, losses in war must be judged by the resulting losses and dislocation caused to the enemy. I maintain that direct air action will yield proportionately better results in mobile warfare than will indirect artillery action. It is incidental to say that gas, mechanised fighting vehicles and aircraft will keep wide areas of the next great war in a pretty fluid state. It does appear that the development of light weapons of accompaniment, of armoured fighting vehicles and the increased use of aircraft will tend to lessen the amount of field artillery required in battle, unless it is that field artillery is to make a radical change in its rôle and so in its equipment, tending to assume the nature of the tank.

Some people suggest that aircraft, instead of guns, could lay a smoke screen. For a big, deliberate operation this would be expedient and the idea needs development in peace; for any operation in which time is of importance it will probably be some years before communication is sure and quick enough to permit of such a use of aircraft. It is possible that our own aircraft will at times be used to screen our own movement some distance from the actual battle, e.g., the movement of columns on the road, or of tanks from and to points of concentration.

The British, we know, may have to fight in many parts of the world. It is, however, only against a first-class enemy that the

whole of the Regular Army will have to be employed, and in those places where we may have to fight a first-class enemy there will almost always be found scope in the terrain for the employment of armoured fighting vehicles in large numbers. For other purposes, such as the internal security of the Empire or the punishment of tribes on our borders, only a part of our army will be needed and probably no more than the local garrison. There appears to be plenty of room yet for mechanization, provided that we can carry these vehicles by sea.

There is no doubt that, as mechanised forces become more and more mobile and are more frequently used, aircraft will be increasingly needed to assist them in its destructive rôle as well as in that of reconnaissance. It is obvious, too, that aircraft used with very mobile forces will reach out a considerable distance in order to obtain timely information or to take timely offensive action against an equally mobile enemy, and it is very probable that a mechanised force, in order to get full use of its aircraft at the right time, will be controlled from the air.

To simplify the argument, one can say in general terms that we need aircraft to fit into the modern army where cavalry and long-range guns were fitted in in the past. This is only partially accurate, like most general statements, but forms a fair assessment.

So there are increasing demands from the Army for aircraft for its own peculiar domestic needs. It can hardly be expected that the Royal Air Force can fully attend to these needs or train its personnel to the knowledge of land warfare that we will require. In these circumstances we in the Army must have infinitely more air experience than we have to-day for at present we know far less than we should of aircraft and their limitations, while those outside the Army who do know tend daily to talk a different language from us. It seems probable that the independent air force will tend to produce machines more suited to its own great scope than to Army needs and that, unless the Army will fend for itself, no one else is likely to have the time to fend for it, and rightly too, for its needs are probably not the earliest needs of a great war.

Before many years have passed aircraft will be as common as motors are on the ground to-day. It seems that we in the Army are neglecting to study the immense potential destructive power of aircraft used to produce a direct effect on things tactical, and that we do not realise that with mechanised forces it may be the only weapon that can reach far enough out

to influence the battle immediately before the forces engage, or to check a beaten enemy.

It must be apparent that with this great increase in aircraft, it will be a normal thing to allot machines for tactical interference with a hostile army, and that slow-moving or large columns will seldom be permitted by aircraft to make use of the main roads. Small and fast moving bodies may escape their attention. To take this to its logical conclusion, armies will tend to be carried on mechanical transport and to possess a very high proportion of A.F.V.s while a great deal of the maintenance will be done by air to avoid huge casualties among the supplying M.T.

The conclusion is that the time is arriving when the Army must be prepared to finance its own air arm and to man it, for its own peculiar needs.

Increasing Aircraft Loads

It is inevitable that the heavy transport plane must come into ordinary commercial use before long. Slow machines with a big lift will evolve in great in numbers.

For the past hundred years, since Napoleon gained mobility by living on the country, we have, bit by bit, been losing it by dependence on our lines of communications. An era is coming when, by carrying stores by air, the Army will be less and less tied to its L. of C. This will give back the mobility we have lost and will make it possible for mechanised forces to operate over distances hitherto undreamt of, especially in those countries where they can live on the country as far as petrol and oil are concerned. But, even now, with aircraft as it exists at present, we can at least make detachments from our main force and maintain them for short periods at some distance from the L. of C. thus making wide turning movements once more possible. The autogyro helicopter may make the problem of air supply more simple in difficult country.

It seems, then, that the time is arriving when the Army needs a small experimental air transport service of its own on which later to build.

I do not intend to belittle the importance of the independent air force. In fact, I think it must be given greater prominence for it is hard to conceive its future limitations. In war the three services must work together for one common end. The independent air force will, however, always look wider than Navy or Army and it is wrong to bind it in to the domestic tactical needs

of the Army. These needs the Army should meet from its own resources. It must have its own air arm for reconnaissance, for offensive action and for transport.

To deprive the Army to-day of the right to pay for, to own or to use any type whatsoever of motor vehicle would be no greater injustice and no less inexpedient than, in the near to-morrow, to deprive it of its right to pay for, own and use aircraft for its own domestic purposes.

It is not germane to this paper but it is nonetheless of interest to speculate on the limitations that aircraft bombs have placed on combined operations in which the Navy seek to convoy and to land an Army on foreign soil in the face of an unbeaten shore-based enemy air force.

The deductions I have made from the two "factors" on which my argument is based are not all the deductions that can be drawn from them. For instance, we may urge that the new mode of fighting needs a new kind of infantryman.

HUMMET WEST

[The story of a railway station in Eritrea.]

BY "CAV"

On the railway between Agordat and Cheren there is a small station called Hummet. There may be a few Italian railway staff and local Eritreans who know of its existence. Nearby, for a few weeks, was the station called Hummet West. It does not exist any more, but it was well known to many hundreds of British and Indian troops in March, 1941. They probably remember it gratefully.

The Imperial advance into Eritrea started suddenly. When it was known that the Italians were evacutating Kassala, which town they had taken earlier in the war, the chase started, and continued until Agordat. Although the Indian Division engaged had not had time to concentrate, and battalions which had not arrived only caught up with difficulty, Agordat was captured, by very few troops, in a brilliant action. The advance had been rapid, and it was only possible to despatch light forces to hasten the Italian retreat. These light forces were stopped a few kilometres from Cheren.

Up to Cheren from the Sudan frontier the country is flat with steep "jebels" rising from the plain. Cheren stands on the edge of the Asmara plateau, and presents one of the few possible approaches onto the higher ground. Both the railway and the road here climb steeply and at one point are close together on opposite sides of the Dongolaas gorge. The "jebels" are joined together and only at Cheren is there a made approach onto the plateau. To north and south the escarpment is impressive and steep, and even mule tracks are few and difficult.

The advanced elements came under accurate fire from both sides of the gorge. The road had been effectively blocked. The forward Brigade seized high ground on the north of the road. This rose steeply, and half way up there was the railway eight hundred feet above the plain. At the spur of the hill there is a tunnel. That tunnel is "Cameron Tunnel."

The Italians had already occupied a permanent fort, guarding the gorge and other even higher crests, facing our position. They overlooked the approach, and could observe most of

our movements. Cheren was clearly a position of great natural strength, proof against armoured fighting vehicles and there was no back door. As the Indian Division assembled, so did Italian and Eritrean forces.

Maintaining troops on hill-tops is always a problem. At first food, water and ammunition were carried up by men to Cameron Tunnel and Cameron Ridge. Next, Italian mules captured at Agordat were lorried forward, Sappers and Miners made a mule track up the hillside to the ralway, and this part of the lift was done by pack mules. We occupied more ground to the north, but so did the Italians, and they remained in command of the "observation," Their maintenance was easier, for the plateau gave them a start of twelve hundred feet.

To the foot of the mule track supply was by lorry. As more and more Italian artillery assembled at Cheren, their guns paid increasing attention to the lorries bringing stores and water to the mule track. One point all vehicles had to pass was soon named "Hell Fire Corner," and the mules, although out of sight at the foot of the hill, began to receive attention. It became clear that supply by this route, even by night, would be difficult. An alternative was ready. The railway, which finally supplied nine battalions of Infantry, a pack battery and three hundred mules, ran under our positions, and at Cameron Tunnel had climbed 800 feet.

The Eritrean Railway is single-line, and remarkable in many ways. The guage, 95 centimetres, is unusual, and the curves and gradients are exceptional. For about 20 kilometres west of Cheren, the line climbs up to the plateau, winding round the valleys, and north of the gorge. The gradient is severe, long stretches being $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. It is a fine engineering achievement. For the most part the formation is cut out of the rock, and the hillside is sheer above and below.

On arrival, the Engineer Troops of the Division (Sappers and Miners) found the line little damaged. A first reconnaissance was done by a motor cyclist, who rode alongside the track, and only fell off four times. In a cutting near Hummet, where the climb begins, there were ten derailed stone wagons. In Cameron Tunnel there were three derailed wagons. In another tunnel, about two kilometres on our side of Cameron Tunnel, there were ten more derailed wagons and some mines. There were no booby traps and high viaducts over gullies, culverts and bridges had

been left intact. Three box wagons had been left at Hummet undamaged. There were no locomotives.

A Company of Sappers and Miners removed the smashed wagons in the cutting, and the rear tunnel. To do the work in the tunnel an acetylene cutting plant and a lighting set were necessary, and heavy jacks and timber baulks had to be taken up. It was one day's work to cut the top off a wagon at Hummet station, to try hauling it with a 15-cwt. Morris lorry, and to prepare short ramps so that the lorry could be put onto the wagon. It was impossible to turn the lorry on the narrow railway formation on the hillside, and therefore it was necessary to be able to put the vehicle onto the wagon. These first efforts all proved satisfactory. The lorry, with its tyres outside the rails, hauled the wagon, on which went up to the tunnel the new rails, jacks, electric lighting set, and other gear, and food, water and blankets for the men. Having unloaded on arrival, the lorry reversed onto the wagon, which then coasted back down the hill, a brakesman in control. From Hummet, where preparations were made, to the tunnel was 13 kilometres by rail and about seven for a crow.

All this happened in the first few days. Clearing the line was obvious Sapper work, and it was evident the line might be useful as a supply route, and save sweat of men and mules. Even before the tunnel was cleared, three small trolleys were taken to pieces, manhandled over the smashed wagons, and presented to the Infantry at Cameron Tunnel, so that they had a means of lateral transport. They were immediately of use, and helped in distributing stores from the head of the mule track to troops in positions above the railway. The fourth trolley found had a stranger destiny. A motor-cycle was mounted on it; the back wheel sprocket was cut in half, and welded to the trolley axle. This strange combination wrote off a motor-cycle, but the "M/C Trolley" proved at once a valuable addition to the rolling stock. On this machine the Sapper could go quickly to inspect work, and it was the fastest method of climbing to the tunnel area, and therefore in demand by officers who wished to visit forward units.

The Sappers finished the removal of wagons, brought them down to Hummet station and dispersed them along the line, repaired the track, and were about to commence other work when the attention paid by the enemy gunners to Hell Fire Corner, and the mules, made that route impossible for any convoys. A remarkable service of rail wagons, hauled by lorries, then commenced, and was perhaps the only alternative.

Wagons retrieved from the derailments were brought into service. They had been damaged, but had low sides and were made into "flats," ideal for the loading of small stores which would finally reach the troops by mule or by carrying parties. Each fortunately had a hand-operated brake, and with few modifications, such as removing the buffers and altering hooks, they could be used like the original wagon which took up stores to clear the tunnel. They were just long enough to take a water tank, across one end and yet leave room for the lorry to mount itself for the return journey.

The organization of this service had not gone far, nor had the demands on it grown, when the loading station, Hummet, had a nasty afternoon from medium artillery. The troops knew about dispersion and were dispersed; but this range was a new and surprising effort, and the Italian disliked these events at his late railway station. He could not, perhaps, see what was going on; but a lorry got burnt, there was other minor damage, and Hummet clearly was not a place to stay in.

To have started at a station further away, or to move there forthwith, was not quite the obvious solution. The lorries could not haul the wagons by night, for no lights could be used, and no driver could be expected to steer his vehicle, hauling a 15-ton wagon over embankments and bridges in the dark. It was important, therefore, to save time and going further back meant more time would be necessary in the round trip. The ballast at the side of the rail track was being torn out by the lorry tyres; this also slowed down the service.

The "station" therefore was moved away about three kilometres to the west, where the line was close to the main road, and out of sight of enemy O.P.s. Near this straight stretch of track, a notice was put up: "Railway Station." Units were informed where it had gone to, and it was named "Hummet West," by "A/Q" when he was told of these events. A further difficulty now arose. The last wagon down the hill had to be the first one up, so it had to be loaded quickly, and sent off again at once. Work was started on the ballast outside the rails, and with sand and gravel the track for the lorry tyres was rapidly improved. To avoid attention, this work was done at night, when the dust and men would not be seen.

The impudence of enemy gunner O.P.s, which occupied new heights on our flanks and increased the nuisance of "harassing fire," resulted in more troops being sent onto the hills above the

railway. This meant more "maintenance." To prepare for the final assault on Cheren it was necessary to dump in the forward area water, rations, ammunition, wire. The demand for transport therefore increased and despite croakings in the early days, the demand was met. A few knew the appointed day, and the organization settled down almost as routine.

The train service went twice a day; about dawn and about noon. Variation was good for the Italian. Each service was of six "flats," each hauled by a 15-cwt. lorry. They went off, one behind the other, to climb the 15 kilometres to the unloading stations, which were points on the hillside where there was enough room to unload and dump stores. Of these there were three: Bro East nearest Cheren: then Centre: and then Bro West Bro East supplied most of the troops, and therefore the front four wagons usually went there. Centre and Bro West had one wagon each, numbers five and six. It was a strange sight to see the "flat" about to go, and quite amazing to see how much load a Morris lorry could pull. At one end, water in steel tanks: eight hundred gallons. Then, boxes of ammunition, grenades, wire, rations, biscuits; on top sandbags, tools, a few blankets; soldiers perched above, rejoining their units; an orderly with letters; and always a Sapper in charge of the brakes—a very important office. Perhaps an officer, with his greatcoat and a blanket, and minor necessaries for his unit, who had been down for a conference (and a bath and a shave). The Sapper hauling lorry would arrive and back onto the coupling. More would be piled into the lorry. The total load of stores often exceeded 10 tons. The wagon ahead would be given a couple of hundred yards' start, and off went the next one. If all went well, with all six wagons, they might be back in three hours.

All did not always go well. The strain on the lorries, always in the lower gears, was considerable, and there were cooling and other troubles. The Italian did not seem to realise each little service towed towards his defeat about 40 lorry loads of stores, but the vehicles annoyed him, and most days he shelled the line at some point. He could see almost everything, and shelled any movement. One favourite stretch earned the name of "Windy Corner." The drivers deserve much praise. They could not leave the narrow but not straight path. Such careful steering is a great strain on the wrists, and against time, with other wagons behind them, they could not wait until things were quieter, but ground steadily up the line. Day after day the same

drivers took the wagons, for it was difficult work, and changes led to accidents and delays. Four times shell fire cut the rails. But a breakdown gang travelled on every service, on the last wagon, and it is surprising how quickly a rail can be changed. There were injuries, of course: two men were blown off a wagon by blast from a shell: a lorry went off the track and overturned: omelettes take eggs.

Water always tells a story. The ration on the hill was a gallon per man per day, and 10 for each mule. At the end, 56 tons was sent up each day, a reserve of 20,000 gallons was stored in bulk at the forward "Stations," and 20,000 more had been taken even higher up the hills in tins as battalion reserves. So with food and ammunition: it was near and ready.

As soon as the line, rising to Cameron Tunnel, had been seen, a loco, steam, Diesel, or petrol had been asked for. But converting a locomotive to a new guage, even a small Diesel, is not easy nor can it be done quickly, and perhaps workmen in a machine shop, hundreds of miles away. never knew how urgently they were required. Something which could run at night was essential. When Diesel Locos finally did come, they were of great value; but this was not until the eve of the battle for Cheren and by then we were confident of our lorry-hauled service, and had no wish to excite Italian attention. The Diesels were 75 B.H.P., and could haul only two wagons each on the severe gradients. In the meantime the situation was saved by work in the field, and a strange creature, the "Night Hawk," was built.

The risk of losing a day through a bad break in the line from shells or bombs was serious and something which would run on the rails and therefore useable at night was most urgently required. Sappers in a Division do not carry much machinery, but they have one lathe and one drill, and with these and ingenuity the "Night Hawk" was constructed. The ingredients were one wagon chosen because the brake gear over one axle had already been smashed, and could be cut out without tears; one captured lorry chosen for its good condition; and one piece of good luck. Who left, years ago, in the public eye near Hummet West, the chassis of a Fiat lorry, with chain drive to the back axle? These Fiat sprockets and chains were—oh—so valuable. It is not simple to get a lorry drive onto the axle of a railway wagon, but it was done. and the Fiat gearbox and chains made it possible. The "Night Hawk" took 10 days to make, final assembly being 24 hours' continuous work by keen men. It worked, and would run

at night without being steered. Too precious to risk by day, it was used in the dark, and hauled up 1,500 gallons of water on each trip. The fact that it would not pull in reverse at more than one mile an hour did not matter, for the return journey of all wagons on the steep gradient was always the fastest. The "Night Hawk" merely grumbled blue smoke from its ancient gear box, fearful of such dangerous speeds backwards, downhill!

There were asides. Putting in a turnout at Hummet West was an obvious improvement. The rails and points were fetched from Agordat and proved to be of a different section but that did not matter. To get water to Hummet West another train of two wagons and hauled by a lorry went back to a station where there was a supply and brought it forward, slopping about in canvas tanks. This was the "Water Ferry." The water lorries of all units helped too, bringing water to Hummet West, and a small pumping plant was put down to speed up refilling the tanks on the wagons.

The trolleys were a godsend. The line forward of Bro East to Cameron Tunnel went straight under Italian noses. They "shot up" this piece of line, by day, but only once warmed it up at night, although tons of stores went forward in the dark, within machine-gun range, on trolleys pushed by men or hauled by mules. Four trolleys were found on the line. One was disclosed by a local inhabitant, in exchange for treatment of the many family ailments. Later, one a day was manufactured, altering two-foot guage axles brought from a gold mine 110 miles away. But the trolleys were a nuisance also. Several times those in charge let them go by mistake. They would hurtle down the line, and approach at 50 miles an hour. Quick work with a large stone would derail them, but more usually they ended their honourable career by hitting a wagon. Wagons are very solid, and do not mind little wooden trolleys.

Then too, there were unauthorised persons who would use part of the line as a road just as the hauling lorries used it. This was usually possible by arrangement and usually disastrous when otherwise. One night when a small water lorry met a wagon and was smashed the Sappers hardly commented; it was not their lorry. Next night when a petrol tin on the line derailed a wagon, they were quite furious and called for discipline and the removal of obstructions.

The traffic was not all one way. By the appointed date a space was cleared and a new track had been cut so that lorries

could return separately. During the battle many lorries came back in this way, leaving the wagon tops clear for wounded. The brakesmen brought back many tender loads. At night the Diesel pushed up other wagons and these ran straight through on the return journey to the Main Dressing Stations—a journey of 23 kilometres. This evacuation of wounded by trolleys and rail must have saved much pain, and was preferable to a jolting ambulance. It was also quicker. Many prisoners and enemy wounded came back in the same way. All showed much surprise. The wagons bowling back, some with wounded, some with water tanks and some with lorries, were a strange sight.

Little can the Italian have known that on his railway went forth against him each day the sinews of war: hauled in his wagons; each night water, hauled in his wagons, towed by bits off two of his lorries. For he left us sufficiently alone. The preparations went on, the trolleys each night, the wagons each day. Finally the assault was possible. In a few days he cracked and was broken.

With him went "Hummet West." It will never be a station again.

YOUR HOME BEFORE YOU RETIRE

By Aslim

In the July issue of this Journal was a very interesting and valuable article by Joycey, entitled "Your Home when you retire." This subject—and the ramifications of it—is one to which far too little thought is given; and while one can find little with which to disagree in what "Joycey" has written, it is felt that officers may like to hear of the tackling of a similar problem approached from a different angle.

The problem facing the writer was that, after a spell in England, he was returning to India and expecting to retire in seven or eight years. There were many personal reasons why his family could not accompany him at the time, the one which is likely to be a common factor in many officers' problems being that he was going to a non-family station. On top of this was the question of children to educate; grandparents, aunts and other relations were not well situated for such a responsibility, and in any case it was decided that it was preferable that the children should have a home with their mother rather than with relations; after all, taking this view does not prevent the wife going abroad for six months' holiday nor the husband from getting Home leave, and the period of separation can be brought within reasonable limits.

The factors which guided the writer in the choice of locality were somewhat different from those affecting Joycey's choice. In the first place the real country was ruled out because of the education problem. The children were too young to go to a boarding school and so the choice lay between day schools and a resident governess. (Admittedly, elementary daily education *can* be come by in the country, but it is the exception to find anything satisfactory, and if it proves unsatisfactory it is difficult to effect a change. A resident governess, apart from direct expense, involves much indirect disbursement; a larger house, bigger rent and higher rates; possibly an extra servant; bigger butcher's, grocer's, dairy and other household bills; extra lighting; to say nothing of the probable expenditure of your wife's patience and tact. Day schools having, then, been decided on, it followed that a "residential" area where there are many other

children wanting day schools was the alternative. Few families about to set up a home have any sentimental or other ties attaching them to any particular "residential" area, and in the writer's case the choice was dictated by distance from the place where he was then living. Except for an occasional long expedition on Sundays the radius of search was limited to areas within motoring distance on weekday afternoons or evenings. In the Home Counties this small radius will be found to include a number of localities entirely suitable from the points of view of health, type of country and type of neighbourhood.

The next point to decide in establishing the home was whether a furnished or unfurnished house was wanted, and if the latter, whether to lease, buy or build. Many people have a "few sticks of furniture" waiting for them, furniture which parents are only too willing to make available, and can usually spare, to start their sons and daughters in a new home. If such is the case, or even if it isn't, one's own furniture is always so much nicer than anybody else's, and if it can possibly be managed, an unfurnished house should be aimed at. More about furniture later.

The great advantage of buying or building over leasing is that a lease will never coincide with the period the house is required and the tenant—your wife—is almost certain to be worried at some future time with either trying to sub-let the small remainder of her lease—a broken period which will not suit anybody—or with trying to get an extension—and once more not knowing if the extended period is going to be convenient; whereas, on the other hand, if the house is your own you are not going to have any anxieties of that nature unless and until you decide to give up the house; you can then sell it or lease it without any restrictions other than those you impose or relax yourself.

There is much to be said for building and it must be great fun. The writer, however, decided against building for the following reasons. In the first place there wasn't time and there seldom will be for people similarly situated unless the wife is prepared to tackle the job single-handed. Next, either you take the advice of your architect or builder and find you have incorporated all the features, architectural and domestic, which he insisted upon and you really didn't want, or you overrule him and find he was right after all. There is some truth in the saying that it is the second house you build which will be a success.

When you start looking for the new home you are going to establish, you start off full of enthusiasm and the spirit of adventure. But take warning; acute depression supervenes as disappointment follows disappointment and expedition after expedition results in nothing but fatigue.

JOYCEY has considerably understated the house agent's optimism in regard to what he hopes to persuade you to buy. "Five bed-, three recep-" is not an unusual standard at which army officers will aim; this statement of your requirements will not prevent the agent from pressing you, or misleading you, into inspecting a house with 10 bedrooms and a billiard-room. Such a house will be a real "bargain;" but it is, of course, a white elephant, and its owners are selling it dirt-cheap because they cannot afford its upkeep in maintenance, repairs, servants, rates and taxes. Sometimes you will come across a real "gem," both architecturally and domestically—almost the dream house. The owner is asking double what you are prepared to offer but you assume that the agent knows that he is anxious to sell and will come at least half way to meet you. You will be wrong; the owner is insulted by your offer—and you sympathise with him—and you go away with your tail between your legs. Other minor unpleasantnesses are to be met with when a tenant, having a house sold over his head, receives you with hostility and when an occupant wont trust you out of his sight, even in the hall, to enable you to discuss things with your wife.

One develops quite a new vocabulary when house-hunting and one term which arouses a little curiosity is "an enter-and-return drive." It means a drive where you go in forwards but come out backwards.

Any wise amateur will have his house "vetted" before he commits himself. This may develop into a most depressing procedure. A surveyor likes to charge for his services a percentage on the value of the house; but as the value of the house should depend to some extent on the result of the survey, this method of assessing the fee seems unsound. The writer, after some discussion, persuaded the surveyor to charge 10 guineas per house. For that charge the surveyor twice made it quite clear that otherwise eminently suitable houses, discovered after much toil and perseverance, were shocking bad investments—jerry-built—no foundations—roof in need of replacement—liabilities of one sort, or another. The number of times one can throw 10 guineas

down the drain is limited, and every throw disheartening; but still it is better to throw guineas down the drain by the 10 than by the thousand, and to dispense with survey would be madness.

One snag which must be watched is the private or "undeveloped" road. Such a road is liable to be taken over by the local borough or rural council, and before it is taken over they will insist on its being brought up to council standards. For the compulsory pleasure of having your lane maintained by the council, you may therefore find yourself charged up to £1 per foot of frontage. Beware in particular of corner-houses which may have 400 feet of road frontage.

A little advice as to "decoration." It is only human nature that, while your predecessors are quite content with the state of the house, you will consider it in a disgusting condition and in need of renovation from top to bottom. Getting in a "builder and decorator" to do up your house is a very quick way of spending money, while your own efforts are not likely to be entirely satisfactory. A compromise is probably the best. Get a builder to do the two most important rooms in the house—the kitchen and the drawing-room—and do the rest yourself (assuming that only painting and colour-washing are required). £15 will be ample in most cases for brushes, paints, washes, etc., for a small house, inside and out. Before the war a builder would charge about £6 for one small room. Start yourself on the less important rooms; you will be surprised how much better your last efforts are than your first. Keep your mouth shut when whitewashing a ceiling or painting the roof gutters.

JOYCEY has said that it is extraordinary how many odd things find a home in the garage. He is not sufficiently emphatic. Prams, bicycles, scooters, children's wheelbarrows, and innumerable treasures make separate accommodation for these "odd things" almost indispensable. The writer wanted to get a "lean-to" added to the existing garage, to accommodate all this junk. Every builder and odd-job man in the neighbourhood was consulted and no estimate under £25 could be obtained. In desperation he decided to build the blasted thing himself, and found that £12 spent on materials covered the cost of everything, including a concrete floor, and more than half of this went on tiles for the roof—a local building condition. The only "cheating" was that some old cucumber frames were incorporated as windows. The building has stood for six years and is the cause

of great satisfaction to the amateur builder who incidentally discovered that this type of building is not really a "lean-to!" it is a "hang-on."

Intending home-builders will complain that it is not everybody who can splash £12 here and £15 there. Every individual, is, of course, the best judge of his own finances and extras must be curtailed; but when once the adventure of establishing a home of your own has been embarked upon and the necessary capital is to be raised, an extra £100 in the initial outlay will enable you to indulge in improvement for which you will find it much harder to find £100 when you have settled in.

To return to furnishing. The writer and his wife between them could raise a dining-room table, a sideboard, a cabinet, a wardrobe, a chest of drawers, a "secretaire" and a couple of oak chests; in addition they had adequate crockery, etc., and a few rugs to go on the drawing-room floor. It sounded a good start, and so it was; many thanks are due to generous parents and to friends who had "weighed in" with useful wedding presents. And this nucleus of furniture was of a much better standard than anything likely to be acquired later. But it represented a meagre proportion of what was required to furnish a house. You will notice that all rooms except the dining-room are devoid of any sort of seating accommodation and have no tables or bookshelves. There is not one bed or mattress and no floor coverings at all except the few rugs. All the bed-rooms, maid's bed-room, nursery and dressing-room require cupboards, dressing tables, chests of drawers, toy chests, etc. And what about curtains? The kitchen needs cupboards, cooking pots and perhaps a stove. Add to these housemaid's implements, dustbins and coal scuttles, and you will be able to carry on while you are finding out all the other "essentials."

It is not however, necssary to be too depressed. Assuming that "antiques" can be dispensed with, patience and pertinaceous attendance at sales in local auction rooms and at houses of a standard similar to one's own will produce all that is required at a very reasonable cost; not ideal, of course, but adequate and satisfactory. Gaps can also be filled in by the purchase of whitewood furniture at the local ironmonger, to be painted at home.

Is this home, established primarily for the education of children, to be a home for final retirement? A difficult question to answer. It was certainly not originally intended as such, but

whether or no it will so develop is a matter for individual decision. The answer probably depends a great deal on how the retired officer intends to spend his "declining" years, and that is a problem to which all-too-little thought is given. The writer has often asked contemporaries how they are going to employ themselves on retirement and the answer has always indicated, vaguely, perpetual leisure—and boredom. It is ridiculous to think that a man with 20 useful years ahead of him need willingly become a drone. Employment, remunerative or unremunerative, will defer the "decline" for a long period. And the selection of a home after retirement will largely depend on what occupation is contemplated or hoped for. In many cases it will probably be found that a home established before retirement will result in ties and friendships which may lead to employment after retirement. In such cases, unless there is a hereditary home waiting, or some similar call, the perpetuation of the home established before retirement will offer many attractions.

That is a problem the writer has yet to face. Meanwhile his home has given him several years of mental peace. Before this war started, domestic complications which go with courses, non-family stations, "small wars," Munich crises, etc., have been avoided; while a home to go to on furlough and at which to leave things and find them again has given a sense of security. And since the war it has been a comfort to know that there is only one peripatetic member of the family, now on his second tour overseas. If a bomb drops on one's own house it is admittedly more inconvenient than if it drops on one's landlord's house; on the other hand, the knowledge that one has a "stake in the country" may perhaps help one to carry out one's duty with a grimmer determination.

MOSUL TO DEIR-EZ-ZOR

A MECHANISED MOVE—LOW SCALE

By Lieutenant-Colonel F. Mackenzie.

"There's the crossing," said my driver, as the old Ford panted round the last sandhill and came out on to the sandy shore of the Euphrates where it sloped down to the river. I was disappointed; I had imagined a bridge and a pleasant drive in after a day full of fatigue and adventure.

We drove down to the water's edge and halted below a small block house, the only building within sight. There was no sign of activity on our bank, no boats, no ferry; just the blazing sun going down in front of us, and on the other side was the city, and the usual scene; women filling water jars, *dhobis* at work, and smoke going up from the fires of the evening meal.

This was exasperating; literally not a soul in sight on the Eastern bank. And so I turned towards the block house and as I did so a figure in a blue uniform with two stripes on his arm came to meet me. "Bon soir caporal," I remarked, cheerfully pulling out my best French, "Je desire aller a Deir Ez Zor." "A ce moment? Mais apres sept heure il est defendu." "Defendu." Impossible! Il faut que j'arrive chez M. le Gouvernour pour le diner." This was a half truth, as I had in my pocket an introduction to the Military Governor and in any case I hoped it might galvanise the corporal into action; but nothing of the sort happened. In a cool and indifferent tone he explained that the ferry did not work after 7 P.M. and that all the ferry men had gone home and were now literally or metaphorically in the bosoms of their families and there wasn't the slightest chance of their appearing before 6 A.M. next morning. With that he walked back into the block house.

This was the last straw and I was about to follow him with some choice remarks in my mother tongue when he appeared again and, to my surprise, remarked, "If monsieur would not mind a paliasse for the night, I could accommodate him in the post and perhaps provide a little dinner?" Never had a soft answer turned away wrath more quickly. Forgotten were my horrid thoughts on French administration in general and the absent ferry men in

particular. I had had visions of spending the night hungry and uncomfortable in the back of the old Ford with my strange companions, a Jewish Rabbi and his servant. Sanctified spiritually the Rabbi may have been, but not with soap and water.

I had left Mosul early in the morning, expecting to be in Deir-ez-Zor about tea time: I had taken the precaution of bringing some sandwiches and a water bottle (military pattern) with me. The Rabbi and his servant shared the back seat with a mountain of kit between them; I preferred the Mosulawi driver as companion.

Before we started, I noticed the floor was littered with inner tubes, many of them already heavily patched; so many of them in fact were there that I took them to be part of the very mixed cargo we were carrying. Later I discovered their purpose. After half a dozen false starts, I thought we were really going to clear the market place when I felt a tap on my shoulder and heard the voice of the Rabbi's servant saying in confidential tones: "Exguse me, zir, but you will take zis for me in your case?" and with that he tried to slip a little sealed box into my hands. Of all the brass cheek. Without any explanation as to its contents he thought I was going to smuggle some foul drug, or musk or jewelry into Syria for him. In vain he pointed out that the customs authorities would never search the kit of a British Officer, or if they did, would never break a sealed packet. All I had to say was that it was "a little present for Madame" and they would understand. It was all so simple; did I not understand? I didn't, and I repeated my refusal in English, Urdu and French, followed by a mixture of all three. I appealed to His Holiness in the back seat but, beyond a non-commital murmur from the depths of his beard, got little change out of him. In fact I was beginning to wonder whether he was an interested party when the driver decided matters by getting in to gear and chugging out of the serai.

We hadn't gone 10 miles when there was a resounding pop and the car swerved into some loose sand and came to a halt: the driver switched off and unconcernedly garlanding himself with one of the spare inners went round to the back of the car, got out the jack and did the necessary. This procedure was repeated at hourly intervals till we reached the frontier, where we were duly challenged and required to report at the Customs. It was a midday in August and a very sleepy inspector looked at our passports

and gave us documents to sign. I had no intention of arguing the point but when he indicated the dotted line on a document that was upside down, I jibbed. I wish his photo could have been taken at that moment. Was he really illiterate, or did he think I was trying to get at him? I shall never be certain. I presumed the clerical party had got away with their sealed packet or else bribed it through; anyway I had just got back into the car and was throwing my raincoat over the back seat when the now familiar voice remarked, "Exguse me zir," and, without the faintest sign of a blush extracted the packet from one of the pockets of my coat. When I got my breath back, we had a good laugh—what else could one do with such a man?

The car had only just got clear of the village where the Customs Post was situated when, crossing a small *nala*, we saw a man, carrying a rifle, running towards us. Perhaps he wanted loot, or perhaps only a lift. Anyway the driver waved him off, the Rabbi shook his beard at him, the pickpocket said yalla and I added "no room old son" and thought the matter finished when there was a loud bang. This time it wasn't a back tyre and it was quickly followed by another and the bullet ricochetted off the radiator. Fortunately the road in front was moderately good, the ruts being not more than a foot deep, so the driver trod on the gas and the cloud of dust we raised must have put up a useful smoke screen and we had no further trouble from the gentleman behind.

From now on we ran for several hours between red-hot boulders and deep ruts of sand: the old car stood it marvellously well but eventually the inevitable happened and the cap of the radiator blew off. The driver and I bent double and it was while I was gazing at the floor boards that I noticed we had only two inner tubes left; in other words we could only enjoy another couple of bursts. After the radiator had stopped pretending to be a geyser, we all got out and the driver emptied the last *chagal* of water into it to make up for some of the water lost: I pulled the cork out of my water-bottle and inserted a finger; the water would have done nicely for shaving, so I virtuously offered it to the radiator. The next two hours passed without incident, except that we were all developing a raging thirst and it was with a cry of relief, nearly equal to Xenophon's "Thalassa, Thalassa," that we came over a ridge and saw the Euphrates just below us. At the same moment there was a familiar pop but nothing could stop us now and we bumped down the slope to the water's edge

The water was grey and thick, full of suspended matter commonly known as mud and was only a few degrees cooler than our bodies—but it was wet. I thought of chlorination, filtration and pot. permang. and all the horrors of coccis, cholera and the typhoid group, but none of them stopped me. The only precaution I used was to take out my whisky flask and hope that a 50% mixture would kill the germs—it did, and me too nearly.

It was from this point that we ran alongside the east bank of the river till we reached the ferry post opposite Deir-ez-Zor.

F. M.

SOME IMPRESSIONS OF THE BLITZ

By Captain G. R. W. Beal

"And gentlemen in England now abed . . . . "

There was no real reason, or perhaps to put it better, there was no absolute urgency to go to town, but as the oldest inhabitant had so succinctly put it in the pub the evening before, "We can't let that there 'itler stop us doing ordinary things."

My first contact with the blitz came at a neighbouring town in the shape of a little rat-faced, shifty looking man, who, as the train pulled out from that station, said to the carriage at large, "We can't stick it ye know."

The conversation in the carriage stopped, and its inhabitants regarded the shifty looking man uncomfortably. He was obviously not a West-country man and, perhaps, therefore, to be classified as a foreigner. Then, just as the conversation was about to start again (for we talk more in our railway carriages now), he reiterated his remark. Again there was a silence. Then a youngish woman sitting beside him opened her mouth:

"Can't stick wot?" she said.

Her tone was almost belligerent.

"This 'ere bombing," he said. "Lost me 'ouse I 'ave.

The carriage made noises of sympathy and seemed prepared to leave it at that; but not so the little lean man.

"T'ain't worth it, ye know," he said. "T'ain't right. Can't ask people to put up with this sort of thing."

A man—sitting in the far corner, who up till then had been playing with a little girl, took his pipe out of his mouth and surveyed the man critically.

"You're English, aren't you " he said.

"Yus," was the reply, "wot of it "

"Well," said the quiet man, "I think we will be able to stick what the Spaniards stuck in Barcelona, and a bit more. I admit I have not seen any of it yet, but if I know my fellow countrymen at all, which I think I do, Hitler is going to get nothing out of this show.

"That's all very well," said the other, "but I tell you London won't stick it, and it ain't right to ask 'em to."

The man in the corner stirred uneasily.

"What would you have thought," he said, "if the lads at Dunkirk had turned round half way through the show and said that "

"I ain't no perishing soldier. I ain't bloomin' well going to be. Anyway, wot's it got to do with you?"

The other sighed gently, and gathering the little girl from the seat opposite him, and removing some suitcases from the racks, he opened the door of the carriage and piloted the party into the corridor.

"The air, I think," he said, "will be fresher out here." And he left.

Thus ended the episode of the first and last Englishman I met who could not take it.

The next realisation of the blitz was when we stopped and sat in the train for over an hour and a half outside a suburban junction. The third realisation when on arrival at the junction we were told that a London station was out of action. Enquiries about return trains and kindred matters delayed me for some ten minutes on the station after the train got in, and my fellow passengers had all gone their several ways when I left the station.

I walked down the exit steps to the road side by side with a Tommy in battle dress. As we did so it struck me that there was something odd, something missing, something un-London-like about it all. As we started to cross the road I suddenly realised what it was. All the traffic had stopped, and apart from a couple of people who were running quite rapidly along the pavement towards us there was not a soul to be seen. Just at that moment there came the sound overhead of aeroplane engines, and in foolish and idle curiosity I turned to look at them. As I did so one of the planes broke formation and seemed to dive direct at the station itself. I am afraid my reflexes were not working very quickly. I was just preparing to stand and gape, when a hefty smack in the back propelled me across the road and under an archway, and I realised that Thomas Atkins was shouting in my ear all sorts of encouragement to head for cover because the "beggar was a Bosche"

From beyond the archway a voice called to us, "In here, in here." And we nipped across a small courtyard and down a flight

of steps towards a doorway which was marked "Shelter," at the door of which was an A. R. P. warden calling to us. The steps were rather steep and I was preparing to take my time negotiating them when somewhere behind us was one of the most colossal crashes I have ever heard in my life. The warden ducked: Thomas Atkins said a few of those things that only Thomas Atkins can say on these occasions; and I arrived inside the shelter with my coat tails almost up the back of my neck. My progress was stopped by a large and odoriferous gentleman who had obviously not washed for many moons, but who had a particularly genial and unperturbed smile.

"Come in out of the rain, ducky," he said, "or you're likely to get wet."

Inside the shelter were all sorts and conditions of people, but I saw absolutely no sign of panic. Indeed one little incident is perhaps significant of the attitude of these people to the whole business. The way into the shelter was open, and possessed no form of barricade to stop blast or splinters from a bomb should it fall directly in front of the doorway. A young fellow noticed this, and also noticed that a girl who was sitting on the end of one of the benches was in the direct line for any such blast or splinter. Getting up from where he was sitting he went across to her and said, "I think you had better have my seat. It's a bit draughty where you are."

She looked at him for a moment, then at the doorway, and then realising quite what sort of a draught he implied, shook her head.

"That," he said, "is quite silly," and picking her up quietly bundled her into his seat and sat fairly and squarely on that which she had left.

As one does on these occasions, people talked in rather hushed voices, and when the all-clear at last sounded the sudden spontaneous roar of London coming to life again reminded me most forcibly of "In Town To-night" on the wireless, when the announcer says "Carry on London."

When we emerged from the shelter, which everybody did as fast as they could in order to catch buses, trams, etc. and get home for tea. The first sight that met our eyes was really humorous. Sitting on the pavement outside the station, their slouch hats on the back of their heads, their feet in the gutter,

smoking, and playing chukey stones, were about fifty or sixty Australian soldiers, whose one concern in life seemed to be to find out from everybody who passed, if a 76 bus ran anywhere round there. Apparently they have been there all the time!

Night was spent in a flat in a garden square, where I found myself a sort of unofficial lord of a minor harem. The two bright young things, one of them married by the way, who normally inhabited the flat had been reinforced by a third, and no sooner had I arrived than they propounded to me the day's great problem. Namely, should we feed then and there before the evening blitz started, or should we transport to the basement with us some form of cold support, or should we leave the supper on the table in the flat and dash up between bombs and see what we could do about it. Disliking consuming a meal at its wrong time intensely, and not being as agile as I used to be, and also quite frankly not really being prepared to argue for my supper with a thousand-kilo bomb, I plumped for the middle course. We were in the middle of our preparations for our basement picnic when the evening alert went, as the harem plaintively complained, an hour early. I must say we made a picturesque gathering. Myself in a gent's natty suiting, less collar, tie and coat (for I knew only too well the agonies of trying to sleep in them) over which I had pulled a Free Forester sweater, the property of my hostess's husband; the harem in various forms of beach pyjamas and corduroy bags of rainbow hue, and in one case I must say positively devastating cut. On top of each member's head was balanced the blankets, eiderdowns, pillows, etc., with which they intended to make their night's rest as comfortable as possible, while any spare arms, elbows, and even teeth, were used to manhandle the baskets of provender.

Apparently our preparations for the night had taken such a time that when we arrived in the room provided in the basement for the tenants of the flat to use it was full. Various muffled and surly looking figures were deeply ensconced in every sofa or armchair, and the legs stretched forth from the same sofas or armchairs occupied every vacant foot of floor space. Finally a large notice saying "No smoking" decided us to try the passage outside. Here we packed down like sardines. One of the harem ensconced herself on a somewhat rickety settee, the two others and myself giving a somewhat somnulent version of the thorn between two roses. First we ate supper, and then on my suggestion the

party tried to settle down for the night. Here I found I had the bulge on the harem. Years spent sleeping on charpoys, camp beds, and nullah beds had accustomed my frame to sleeping where and when it was laid down. The roses, it must be confessed, were a blamed nuisance. First of all they wanted to talk. Secondly they seemed utterly unable to lie on the same side for more than thirty seconds put together. Thirdly, one of them, the married one, when she did get to sleep kicked like a mule. Fourthly the lady on the settee was under the impression that every bang she heard was a bomb, and quite failed to realise that three-quarters of the noise going on was one of our own anti-aircraft guns that was situated not too far away and whose crew must have put up very nearly a record for the number of shells in the air at the same time. Indeed, firm action had to be taken with this lady, who was not in the least panic-struck but insisted on keeping aloud a tally of the bombs dropped for her own edification. The steps taken to reduce her to a sense of the correct behaviour in communal shelters will not be divulged.

One thing that did strike me, for the short period that I was awake during the night when bombs were falling, was the amazing promptitude with which police cars, and I presume A.F.S. and A.R.P. personnel, were getting to the scene of trouble. Hardly did a bomb fall before one heard a whistle, and the drone of a car heading in the direction of the crash. The organisation must be superb.

The "All-Clear" coincided with dawn, and the first thing I did was to open the sitting room windows and walk out on to the balcony. It was a greyish dawn, and had been raining slightly. I looked about to see what damage had been done. At one time it had certainly sounded as if bombs had fallen all round us, yet look as I would I could not find a single brick out of place. Down below in the street a black cat was disconsolately washing his face. Further along the road a horse and cart, a delivery van of some sort, was proceeding at a steady amble. All was peace.

Returning inside I went to see how the harem were faring. From the bathroom came the sounds of song; evidently one of the ladies believed in having a bath whatever happened during the night. From the kitchen came the pungent and crisp smell of frying bacon. From the room at the far end of the flat a vision appeared in dressing gown and pyjamas, who announced that the programme was breakfast and then sleep. I gave the harem full

marks for breakfast. Not only were the sausages and the bacon superbly done, but one would hardly have recognised in the embryo film stars who surrounded the table, clad I must say almost disconcertingly transparently, the rather dishevelled and somewhat sleepy-eyed lasses which the "All-Clear" had disclosed.

That really finishes this story of the blitz, but one little anecdote of the aftermath of that night may be amusing. The city branch of the Westminster Bank had every window in the place blown in that night. At ten o'clock next morning workmen were busy repairing the damage with new glass. And that was the spirit I found all over London.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN DESERT, IRAQ, 1927-28

By Captain W. J. M. Spaight.

The operations carried out in the Southern Desert of Iraq from November 1927 to June 1928, to repel raiders from Nadj, are of interest because they were brought to a successful conclusion by the offensive action of the air arm alone. The enemy was similar in characteristics to the Pathan of the North West Frontier of India and the terrain resembled that over which our forces are now operating in the Middle East. Military considerations were secondary to political. While the operations were themselves of minor importance, had they not been carried out effectively Iraq might have been faced with a large-scale invasion from Nadj.

The writer's sole justification for this article is that he had the good fortune to be employed as a pilot with No. 70 Squadron R.A.F. throughout the operations.

Events leading up to the Operations

The Southern Desert of Iraq has always given trouble to the rulers of Mesopotamia. The desert stretches South and West from the Euphrates valley right across Arabia. For a distance of about 300 miles south of the towns of Samawah and Nasiriyeh on the Euphrates there are no permanent dwellings. During the winter months, after the rains, there is grazing for animals and water in hollows all over the area. The desert is then visited by nomadic tribes. In the hot weather, when all pools and nallahs dry up, water is only found in occasional deep wells, grazing is non-existent and the Arab only travels for necessity or loot. On account of the shortage of water, when the frontier with Nadj was demarcated, a neutral zone was left in the extreme south which contains most of the wells in the area, in order that the inhabitants of both countries could have free access to the water.

The tribes on the fringe of the Euphrates valley are semi-nomadic and in winter move out into the desert to graze their flocks. While in the desert they have, normally, in the past had to pay money to the desert tribes to gain immunity from raids. On return to the settled districts they have objected to paying taxes to a government which could not protect them. At times

the desert tribes have actually carried out large raids into the cultivated lands of Mesopotamia proper.

The Turkish government attempted to control the desert border by the establishment of forts some way out into the desert, but they were never successful and after the loss of some forts abandoned the scheme. When the British government took over the mandate of Mesopotamia they formed a Camel corps, circa 1922, for the protection of the Southern desert, but this was destroyed by the tribes. For some years no definite steps were taken to ensure the security of Iraq inhabitants in the southern desert. In 1925 a small fort was built, and occupied by the Iraq Army, at Abu Ghar, but this only guarded a small sector of the frontier.

The rise to power of Ibn Sa'ud, the Wahabi Sheik of Riyadh, altered the situation. Since 1913 this chief had been engaged in a continuous war of conquest, the climax of which was the capture of Mecca in 1926. During this period he had gained control of almost the whole of the Arabian peninsula. A large force of fanatical tribesmen, called the 'Akhwan'—a military brotherhood—were the basis of Ibn Sa'ud's army. The Akhwan are austere Muslims who look upon Sunni and Shiah alike as heretics. The sole object of the Akhwan was war, and unless Ibn Sa'ud could keep them at war it was quite possible that they would get out of hand. In an endeavour to settle them on the land Ibn Sa'ud placed the Akhwan in colonies on his borders. The colonists of the Mutair tribe soon started raids against the Iraq nomads in the Southern Desert. Efforts by the British and Iraq governments to settle the matter through diplomatic channels with Ibn Sa'ud failed. In 1927 it was decided that a new post, farther south than Abu Ghar, would be more effective and a Fort was commenced at Busaiya, where there were some important wells frequently used by raiders.

On the 5th November 1927 this post was attacked by a body of Mutair Akhwan, whose chief was Faisul ad Dawish. The post was almost completed but had not been garrisoned. The sole occupants were ten Iraq policemen and about twelve workmen. The attack was launched after dark, the fort gates were open and some of the men were sleeping outside. All the occupants were killed and mutilated; amongst the dead was a woman, who was also mutilated. One of the policemen had been visiting a near-by encampment at the time of the attack; he at once fled towards the Iraq Army post at Abu Ghar, about 30 miles away. This man

brought the news of the attack next day; and a wireless message was sent to Shaibah but aircraft failed to locate the raiders, who had crossed the border by this time.

Killing of women is most unusual in Arabian tribal warfare and mutilation of women almost without precedent. Shortly afterwards some Iraqi shepherds were killed by raiders in the neutral zone and their dead bodies thrown down wells. The fouling of water is also most unusual in the desert. This pointed to a particularly bitter feeling among the Akhwan. The attack on the fort was a definite challenge to the Iraq government and operations had to be undertaken to establish the situation.

Forces Available

In November 1927 the defence of Iraq was the responsibility of the Air Officer Commanding. Ground forces had been reduced until only one battalion of Indian Infantry, the Iraq Army and the Iraq Levies remained. No serious trouble had occurred in the country for some years and the Air Force strength had recently been reduced by three squadrons. The following Royal Air Force units only were available:

No. 6 (A.C.)	Squadron	(Bristol Fighters)	at Mosul.
No. 30 (B)	Squadron	(D.H. 9-A)	at Hinaidi.
No. 55 (B)	Squadron	(D.H. 9-A)	at Hinaidi.
No. 70 (B)	Squadron	(Victorias and Vernons)	at Hinaidi.
No. 84 (B)	Squadron	(D.H. 9-A)	at Hinaidi.

In addition there were sections of R.A.F. Armoured Cars (Rolls Royce), stationed at Basra, Hinaidi, Kirkuk and Mosul.

The Iraq Levies were stationed in the hill country on the North and North-East frontiers. The Iraq Army was not equipped to maintain large forces in the desert. The one Indian Infantry battalion (3/5th Mahratta Light Infantry) was stationed at Hinaidi. The situation in the Mosul district was unsettled, where Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan was threatening to give trouble.* It was thus necessary to leave No. 6 Squadron and some Armoured Car sections at Mosul.

The striking force was therefore reduced to three R.A.F. Squadrons (Nos. 30, 55 & 84), to be supplied by No. 70 Squadron and supported by about four sections of Armoured Cars. The

* Operations were undertaken against Ahmed of Barzan about five years later.

Iraq Army was available to garrison all posts of a semi-permanent nature. No. 30 Squadron was kept in reserve and was only employed in the operations for a short period in the spring of 1928.

First Phase. 5th November 1927—8th January 1928

On receipt of the news of the massacre at Busaiya, No. 84 Squadron was moved to Abu Ghar and supplied by aircraft of No. 70 Squadron, operating from Shaibah. Armoured cars were sent to Busaiya and coolies were flown out by 70 Squadron to complete the fort. Active patrolling of the southern desert was carried out by 84 Squadron. Diplomatic negotiations were entered into with Ibn Sa'ud. Aircraft were forbidden to cross the border into Nadj. Steps were taken to withdraw Iraq tribes away from the border, in order to make the identification of enemy raiding parties easier. The tactics of the Akhwan, at this period, were to approach the border riding camels, perhaps two men to a camel, leading horses. At convenient wells, near the Iraq frontier, they would leave their camels, under a small guard, and mounted on horses carry out a swift raid into Iraq. They frequently travelled by night to avoid air observation. Knowing that they were safe across the border, they sometimes halted to rest either before or after the raid at a camp just inside Nadj.

It soon became obvious that Ibn Sa'ud had either no desire to stop his Akhwan raiding into Iraq or that he had no control over them. This led the British government to authorise more active measures and permission was given to pursue raiders, found in Iraq territory, across the border. Steps were taken to concentrate a force nearer the frontier. During this phase in the operations several small raids were intercepted and engaged.

Second Phase. 8th January 1928—June 1928

The force so concentrated was called 'Akforce.' The Headquarters were located at Ur Junction, on the Baghdad-Basra railway. Two forward bases were established at Busaiya and Nugrat Salman. No. 70 Squadron was stationed at Ur, 84 Squadron at Nugrat Salman and 55 Squadron at Busaiya. Both Nugrat Salman and Busaiya were protected by two sections of R.A.F. Armoured Cars. Busaiya Fort, now completed, was garrisoned by the Iraq Army, which had been flown out.

The Iraq side of the border was now fairly clear of tribesmen grazing their flocks but on the far side the Nadj tribes were still scattered along the whole frontier. Before effective action could

be taken against raiding parties, forming or resting, just across the border, it was necessary to clear the whole area of its peaceful occupants. Warning notices were dropped on all encampments ordering them to withdraw to a distance of four days march from the border. When these notices were not obeyed warning bombs were dropped near the camp and in a few cases it was necessary to machine gun a few of their animals. No personnel were injured and in the space of a few days a large area on both sides of the border was clear of tents.

The border was divided into two zones. The Western zone was patrolled by 84 Squadron from Nugrat Salman and the Eastern zone by 55 Squadron from Busaiya. All supplies, petrol, bombs, ammunition and spare parts for these two Squadrons were flown out, from Railhead at Ur, by 70 Squadron. A perimeter camp was constructed at Nugrat Salman, which was in time protected by a double-apron barbed wire fence, and garrisoned by the Iraq Army. This post was later partly supplied by road, Ford Vans operating from Samawah. A small Fort was afterwards built at Nugrat Salman.

The first big raid came in late January, aircraft of 55 Squadron locating them at Al Riki, on the Batin, on the 29th January. This raid was attacked by both 55 and 84 Squadrons on several occasions on the 30th January, considerable casualties being inflicted. The raiders had penetrated deep into Kuwait territory, had been attacked by the Sheik of Kuwait who had sent a force out in taxis and motors commandeered in Kuwait City, and were actually on their way back when located by our aircraft. The Sheikh of Kuwait had inflicted casualties on the raiders and had forced them to abandon some looted animals, but, unfortunately, one Kuwait car had run into an ambush and all its occupants had been killed before they could de-bus.

This raid brought out the desirability of carrying out reconnaissances over Kuwait, which until then had been considered outside the sphere of operations. Permission was obtained from the British government to operate over Kuwait and from February onwards patrols were carried out over Kuwait.

During attacks on this raid on the 30th January an aircraft of 84 Squadron was shot down, with a bullet through the radiator, within 400 yds. of the raiders. The Flight Commander (Fl.-Lt. J. F. T. Barrett) at once landed beside the disabled machine

and picked up the pilot*, who had been flying solo. Several of the enemy were within a few paces of the aircraft, running forward and firing, as it took off.

Information was now received that large parties of Akhwan and other Nadj tribesmen, rumoured to number as many as †40,000 were massing for an attack on Iraq. H.M.S. Emerald, a modern Light Cruiser on the East Indies station, was ordered to proceed to Kuwait, where a landing party was put ashore. A Company of the 3/5th Mahratta Light Infantry was sent to Ur Junction in an Armoured Train. The Gulf Sloops, H.M.S. Lupin and H.M.S. Crocus, also proceeded to Kuwait.

Preliminary steps were taken to reinforce the Iraq garrison, if necessary, from overseas.

Low cloud for several days hampered air reconnaissance and, though intelligence reports of an advancing raid came in, it was not located till the 19th February at Jiribiyat, near Jarishan. This raiding party was attacked by both 55 and 84 Squadrons on the 19th, 20th and 21st February. Casualties were inflicted on the raiders on all three days but, unfortunately, one pilot of 55 Squadron was lost. He had been flying solo, was shot down in the middle of a party of enemy and killed on the ground, while fighting with his pistol. This occurred when all the machines of both units were scattered, carrying out low bombing and machine gun attacks. His body was brought back by Fl. Lt. Barrett of 84 Squadron. This officer located the machine and saw the body of the pilot lying on the ground, surrounded by tribesmen. Fl. Lt. Barrett had expended all his ammunition and bombs but he at once dived on the enemy several times, scattering them to cover. He then flew low round the machine and ascertained that there was no sign of life in the pilot. Fl. Lt. Barret then flew to Shaibah, replenished his ammunition and returned to the disabled machine. By this time the tribesmen had retired; he landed and took the body of the pilot back to Shaibah in his aircraft.‡

On the 21st February Armoured Cars, which had been sent towards Al Hafar in an endeavour to intercept the raiders, captured an Akhwan, who had been wounded by aircraft action.

* The pilot was P/O R. Kellett, now W/Cdr Kellett, led the non-stop flight to Australia in 1938, and who has recently been decorated for leading raids against Germany.

† Arms are plentiful in Arabia, imported from the Continent through Muscat and other ports. Many come from Belgium.

‡ For this and many similar deeds, such as the rescue of P/O Kellett, Fl. Lt. Barrett was awarded the D.S.O.

This prisoner stated that Faisul ed Dawish was himself present on the raid and that the raiders would concentrate at Es Safa to distribute the loot. On this information it was decided to carry out a bomb raid on Es Safa.

Es Safa is a small hamlet in Nadj, about 100 miles south of the Iraq border. It was marked on the map, but the maps had been found to be very inaccurate, particularly those dealing with Nadj—having in the main been compiled by the reports of travellers. An R.E. officer was employed in mapping the area. A political agent was found who stated that he had visited Es Safa. It was proposed to take this man as a guide but, just before he was to emplane, he admitted that he had only visited the place as a child and that all he could remember about it was that there were some palm trees near the wells. He was therefore left behind. The raid was carried out by aircraft of 55, 70 and 84 Squadrons, under the command of S/Ldr. G. S. L. Insall, V.C., of A Flt. 70 Squadron. The Victorias of 70 Squadron each carried two 520 lb. bombs and four 20 lb. bombs, the D.H. 9-A.s of 55 and 84 Squadrons each carried twelve 20 lb. bombs.

The raid set out at dawn on the 24th February, from Rukhaimiya, a forward landing ground in the neutral zone. A Section of Armoured Cars, with tins of petrol, was sent to Al Hafar to refuel aircraft if required or to rescue machines which might be forced to land. This was necessary as the distance to be flown was not known. Es Safa, which was found to consist of a few mud huts near wells, was located and near it was a large camp. On account of the size of one tent it was decided that this was the tent of Faisul ed Dawish, the Sheikh of the Mutair Akhwan and our main opponent in the operations. The camp was bombed successfully and camels nearby machine-gunned. All the aircraft returned safely, only one having to land at Al Hafar to refuel. It was later learned, from intelligence reports, that Faisul ed Dawish had left the camp that morning, at dawn, but that his tent and household cooking pots had been destroyed. The large tent had suffered a direct hit from a 520 lb. bomb.

This bomb raid was the turning point in the operation. Just before it was launched there was a most distinct possibility of a large-scale invasion of Iraq by the Nadj tribes. The success of the raid discouraged other tribes from joining the Mutair and caused Ibn Sa'ud to make a decision. He declared Faisul ed Dawish an outlaw and started to take steps to stop raiding into

Iraq. It was rumoured that he stated that the R.A.F. had bombed Es Safa at his request, because ed Dawish had failed to obey his orders.

The excellent effect of the bomb raid was not at first realised, and it was necessary to take steps to counter large tribal raids. No. 30 Squadron was sent to another advanced base farther West at Shabicha. This base was also garrisoned by the Iraq Army, who moved by road from Najaf. A section of R.A.F. Armoured Cars was also sent to Shabicha. The Iraq Army raised an Armed Ford Van unit (Ford Vans with a Lewis Gun on a Scarf mounting in the back), which was also sent into the desert South of Najaf.

The months of March and April were quiet. Active patrolling was carried out by aircraft and a few small raids intercepted and scattered. In May Sir Gilbert Clayton (later High Commissioner of Iraq) proceeded to Jeddah to meet Ibn Sa'ud. An agreement was reached in late May and the operations came to an end. All aircraft and armoured cars returning to their peace stations in early June.

Faisul ed Dawish and other leaders afterwards surrendered to one of the Naval Sloops in the Persian Gulf; they were handed over to the Nadj authorities but, unfortunately, all died on the journey to meet Ibn Sa'ud.

Tactics—Attack on Raiders

The D.H. 9-A.s of 55 and 84 Squadrons normally patrolled in Flights of three machines, one of which was equipped with wireless and one of which was in ballast, with an empty back seat. The empty seat was to take off the crew of a forced-landed machine: in an emergency two men could be put into the back seat. It is interesting to note that of the two machines shot down very near to the enemy both were in ballast, so the only crew lost in the whole operations consisted of one man. On locating raiders the machine with wireless informed all concerned, wound in the wireless aerial, and the flight proceeded to attack. All D.H. 9-A.s carried 20 lb. bombs (the main bomb for use against personnel in the open). The first action was to attack with bombs, which were released by the pilot from a low height and who normally dived and aimed the machine by the radiator cap. When bombs had been expended, or when no bomb target offered, the machines used the front Vickers Gun in a dive attack; as the machines climbed away, normally in a turn, the back gunner fired with his Lewis Gun.

The enemy invariably fired at attacking aircraft and their standard of marksmanship was high. In spite of this few aircraft were shot down, the majority due to the radiator being punctured; all except two managed to fly clear of the enemy before landing. Several passengers were wounded, at least one seriously. Many aircraft were hit in non-vital parts. In view of the low top speed and the poor manœuvrability of the D.H. 9 A it is surprising that more were not shot down.

Armoured Cars were always sent out to intercept large raids but unfortunately never got to close quarters. The Armoured Cars travelled enormous distances, but late information or difficult weather or terrain prevented them from coming into action against any large bodies of the enemy.

Defence at Rest—Advanced Bases

For several short periods during the operations aircraft operated from bases near the border, where no infantry guard was available. Rukhaimiya and Aqubba were two places so used. To protect the aircraft when on the ground, particularly at night, Armoured Cars were sent out. A small perimeter camp was made, normally square, with an armoured car at each corner. The car faced outwards, so that its head lights could be used if required, and a sentry sat beside the Vickers Gun of each car. If possible some barbed wire was taken out by the armoured cars; this generally permitted two strands of wire being put round the perimeter. A small trench was also dug, and all aircraft pulled inside at night. At dusk a single aircraft was sent out to search the country round, up to a depth of 50 miles, for enemy parties. It was quite possible that this dusk patrol might not see small parties of the enemy but, owing to the open nature of the ground, it was improbable that a large party would be missed. Had an enemy party been seen near camp, sentries would have been doubled. In these forward camps there was a shortage of men to man the perimeter, only the crews of aircraft and cars being present. The forward camp normally only held one flight and one section of cars. Fire power was, however, ample for, in addition to the Vickers Guns of the Cars, the flexible, back-seat, Lewis Guns of the aircraft could be used. No enemy party was seen near any forward camp and no camp was attacked.

The troop-carriers, Victorias and Vernons, carried a ground-type Lewis Gun for protection in the event of a forced landing. At night the crew were ordered to leave the aircraft and to take up a position in low ground in the vicinity.

Equipment

Nos. 30, 55 and 84 Squadrons were equipped with the De Haviland type 9 A, two-seater bomber. The D.H. 9 had been designed in 1916 and flew in 1917. It was found to be underpowered (it had a 230 h.p. engine), so the type was adapted to take the new American 400 h.p. Liberty engine. When fitted with the Liberty engine the type was called the 9 A. Large numbers of D.H. 9 A.s were used by the Independent Air Force, as day bombers, in France in 1918. It was a heavy, unmanœuvrable machine when new. As used in Iraq it was fitted with an extra radiator, an extra petrol tank, a spare wheel (carried outside) and carried reserve rations and water for use in the event of a forced landing. The result was that the top speed of the D.H. 9 A in Iraq was about 100 m.p.h. and it cruised about 75-80 m.p.h.

The extra weight of the tropical equipment and the thin air of summer caused the machine to have a high stalling speed. Thus it would have been hard to have found a more unsuitable aircraft for low flying attack on ground objects. The D.H. 9 A was fitted with one fixed Vickers Gun and one flexible Lewis Gun. The type was obsolete at home and was being replaced in India by Westland Wapitis.

No. 70 Squadron was being re-equipped with Vickers Victorias, replacing Vickers Vernons. Both of these types were twin-engined, troop carriers, fitted with bomb racks. The Vernon was a version of the Vickers Vimy—a night bomber which had been built to bomb Berlin in 1918. The Victoria was a modern machine, with a far greater load capacity than the Vernon, but as yet untried under tropical conditions. Both had two Napier Lion engines and about the same speed range. Neither had an automatic weapon as part of the normal equipment. The Victoria could carry 24 and the Vernon 12 passengers, including crew but excluding Pilots. Disposable load, with full tanks and equipment, was about 1,700 lbs. for the Victoria and 500 lbs. for the Vernon. Both carried petrol for 7 hours flight. All aircraft of 70 Squadron carried wireless and normally flew singly.

All Armoured Cars in Iraq were part of the R.A.F.; they were Rolls Royce cars of an obsolescent type. Their only armament was one Vickers Gun. Each Armoured Car section had some armed Ford Vans. The Ford Vans were useful for scouting and in an action the Lewis Gun could be taken from the van and fired from the ground.

Terrain

The southern desert of Iraq is a stony waste devoid of marked features. The Batin, a peculiar ridge of land running down the border from just S. W. of Shaibah to Al Hafar is the only definite help to navigation. The various hillocks and hollows of the desert changed their appearance with the angle of the sun. During the early spring there is fair grazing for animals. Water is scarce and the difficulty of finding water near possible landing grounds reduced the number of advanced bases for aircraft. On the whole a forced landing could be carried out safely in most areas. The original maps of the southern desert were so inaccurate that many pilots preferred to fly without one. During the operations Captain A. Prain, R.E., produced an excellent map, on which the location of all landing grounds was correct. As, however, there were no definite land marks, pilots found their way about by the use of the compass and a knowledge of the country. There was no case of a machine becoming lost through bad navigation, though there was one incident, at the beginning of the operations, which might have had serious consequences. In November one of a flight of D.H. 9-A.s force-landed with engine trouble. The flight-commander landed beside him, ascertained that the machine required a new engine and that the machine had its full reserve rations and water, and promising to send out a new engine the next day, took off again. The machine was well inside the Iraq border and it was considered safe to leave the crew with it. The next day a Victoria of 70 Squadron went out with a new engine, led by the same Flight. They searched all day and failed to locate the machine. A further search the next day also failed. The crew was reported missing to the Air Ministry, as it was thought that raiders had found and burnt the machine. On the third day the missing machine was found. The pilot, an Australian, was furious, as he thought that his squadron had not bothered to send an engine to him. He had seen aircraft flying round on all three days and had fired all his Verey lights in attempts to attract attention. The area where this machine was located was without any feature and while the searching aircraft had never been far away from the right spot they had never flown near enough to see it on the first two days. Tests were afterwards carried out to find a more suitable colour, other than the service silver dope, in which to paint the top planes of aircraft, so as to make machines on the ground more visible from the air.


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BUSAIYA
KUWAIT
RUKHMAIYAH
NEUTRAL ZONE
EL RIQAI
AL HAFAR
ES SAFA
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ARTAWIYAH

No satisfactory colour was discovered, for unless an observer is almost over a grounded machine, and in which case he would be very near to it, the top plane is not discernible.

Weather

From December to February the temperature was low, with some thunderstorms and heavy rain. On occasion the wind reached gale force. At least one machine was wrecked by wind, the pickets failing to hold the ground. It was necessary to detail men to stand by all machines at night. All aircraft on the operations were continuously in the open and conditions were not good for normal maintenance and repair work. In March, April and May it became very hot, sandstorms were a daily occurrence, making overhauls difficult. One feature of these sandstorms was that, on account of the stony nature of the surface, they did not penetrate far into the desert but they were very severe in the Euphrates valley. Sandstorms, with very few exceptions, did not affect aircraft operating from the advanced bases but 70 Squadron, operating from Ur, encountered them daily. At first pilots were allowed some latitude in continuing a flight under sandstorm conditions but after several incidents, which might have ended disastrously, orders were issued that pilots on receiving a negative report from their destination landing ground would land short of the sand belt.

Conclusion

The operations were brought to a successful conclusion without a large engagement. There is, however, no doubt that had not Akforce carried out such extensive patrols and engaged all raiding parties seen (which was the large majority) a large invasion of Iraq by the tribes of Nadj would have probably taken place. After the operations, which certainly caused Ibn Sa'ud to sign the Jeddah agreement, the few minor raids carried out by the remaining rebels of the Mutair were dealt with, unaided, by the newly raised armed Ford Van unit of the Iraq Army.

The operations continued for a period of over six months; throughout this period regular long reconnaissance flights were carried out. Climatic conditions were most trying to men and machines, and the work monotonous. Aircraft crews had to be ready to take instant action at any time and crews knew that if they fell into the hands of the enemy they could expect no quarter. Long flying hours were done over country which, though easy for forced landings, was yet one over which it was difficult to find one's way. That no pilot was lost was due to the previous knowledge that all had of that desert. There is no good substitute for local experience in desert flying.

AFRICAN MEDALS AWARDED TO INDIAN SOLDIERS

By Lieut.-Colonel H. Bullock

Details of the African campaigns in which Indian soldiers served, and of the medals awarded to them for such services, are not easy to find. The notes which follow may be of some assistance to the regimental historian as well as to the medal collector. Medals awarded for the Abyssinian, Egyptian and Sudan wars have not been included, nor those for the Somaliland operations of 1902-04 and 1908-10.

SOMALILAND 1888-1890

During 1888-90 detachments of the 3rd Bombay Light Infy. 17th Bombay Infy., 4th Coy. Bombay Sappers and Miners, and the Aden Troop served in Somaliland and East Africa (Cadel, *History of the Bombay Army*, p. 251). No British medal was given for this service, but it is believed that some of these men received medals or decorations from the Sultan of Zanzibar.

MWELE 1895-96

The East and West Africa medal, without a bar but with the words "Mwele 1895-6" impressed on the rim, was granted for the operations leading up to the recapture of Mwele on 4th April 1896. The troops engaged were the 24th Bombay Infy. with which battalion a Hazara company of the 26th Bombay Infy. was serving in place of a company of the 24th detached on other duty in India; and the Indian Contingent. The latter consisted of 300 Punjabi Musalman sepoys, volunteers from regiments in India, and left India for Mombasa in October 1895 for service in the British East Africa Protectorate. I have a Mwele medal awarded to a sepoy of the 33rd Punjabis who must have been a member of this Contingent.

Some British and Indian officers of the 24th Bombay Infy. received from the Sultan of Zanzibar the Order of the Brilliant Star of Zanzibar for their services in this campaign.

CENTRAL AFRICA 1891-1898

The Indian troops engaged in British Central Africa—now called Nyasaland—were men who had volunteered for temporary service under the British Central Africa Company. The first contingent, 70 strong, arrived in the Protectorate about July, 1891, under Captain C. M. Maguire, of the 1st Lancers, Hyderabad

Contingent. About 40 were Mazbi Sikhs of the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers, and the rest Deccani Musalmans of the 1st and 2nd Lancers, Hyderabad Contingent. Of this original party a number were killed and wounded, chiefly in expeditions against Yao chiefs, and no less than 16 received the Indian Order of Merit. Captain Maguire and three of his men were killed on 15th December 1891, and six more Indian soldiers were killed on 18th February 1892.

In June 1892 Captain C. E. Johnson, 36th Sikhs, arrived, with ten more Sikhs as reinforcements, to replace Maguire, as Commandant of Police in British Central Africa. In April 1893 Lieutenant C. A. Edwards, 35th Sikhs, went out with 100 Jat Sikh sepoys; and a few months later the Mazbi Sikhs and the cavalrymen returned to India on expiration of their agreements. Later, in 1893, Lieutenant W. H. Manning brought out another 100 Jat Sikhs, who were paid for by Cecil Rhodes. In 1895 Sir H. H. Johnston came to a six-year agreement with the Government of India to employ 200 Sikhs in British Central Africa; and by 1899 there were 215 Sikhs there, seconded for three years from the Indian Army, of whom 40 were for service in Northern Rhodesia. An Indian Contingent, all Sikhs, continued to serve in B.C.A. for many years.

For various expeditions between 1891 and 1898 the Central Africa medal was awarded. In design it was exactly the same as the Ashanti medal of 1874, but had a different ribbon—three equal stripes of black, white and terra-cotta—and hung from a ring-suspender instead of from a straight bar. For expeditions between 1894 and 1898 the same medal was given, but with a straight bar and a clasp inscribed "Central Africa 1894—1898." Both types of the medal are rare and collectors find them difficult to acquire. The second issue with clasp for no apparent reason commands about double the price of the first type with ring-suspender, though it would seem that many more of the second type must have been issued.

The details of these expeditions are briefly:—

Medal without clasp.—Mlanje (Chikumbu), July and August 1891. Makanjira, October and November 1891. Kawinga, November 1891. Zarifi, January and February 1892. The Upper Shire, January and February 1893. Mlanje (Nyassera and Mkanda), August to October 1893. Makanjira, November 1893 to January 1894. Chiradzula, December 1893. Unyoro, December 1893 to February 1894. Mruli, April to June 1894.

Medal with clasp.—At and near Fort Johnston, January 1894. Kawinga, March 1895. Matipwiri, Zarafi, Mponda and Makanjira, September to November 1895. Mlozi and Mwazi, December 1895. Tambala, January 1896. Odeti and Mkoma, and Chikusi, October 1896. Chilwa, August 1897. Mpezeni, January and February 1898. Southern Angoniland, April 1898.

The following awards of the Indian Order of Merit, third class, have been traced:—

For gallantry in action against Makanjira, 30 Oct. 1891.

894	Sowar	Salamat Ali Khan	1st Lancers Hyderabad Contingent
895	„	Mir Murad Ali	„ „ „
610	„	Wazir Khan	2nd Lancers „ „
2973	Sepoy	Bachan Singh	23rd Pioneers
3017	„	Bachan Singh	„
2500	„	Hakim Singh	32nd Pioneers
2577	Naik	Badhawa Singh	23rd Pioneers
881	Sowar	Kifayat Khan	1st Lancers Hyderabad Contingent

For gallantry in action against Kawinga, 21 Nov. 1891

846	Sowar	Kale Khan*	2nd Lancers Hyderabad Contingent
3028	Sepoy	Jagat Singh	23rd Pioneers
3039	„	Prem Singh	„
2667	„	Lal Singh	32nd Pioneers

For gallantry at Kisungale, 15—21 December 1891

1015	Sowar	Anwar Khan	1st Lancers Hyderabad Contingent
2558	Havr.	Nand Singh†	23rd Pioneers
1909	Naik	Isar Singh	„
1179	„	Jhanda Singh	32nd Pioneers

For gallantary near Fort Maguire, 6 Jan. 1894

2188	Havr.	Bulaku Singh	45th Rattray's Sikhs

For gallantry at Malemya Outpost, 7 Feb. 1895

2237	Sepoy	Karm Singh	15th Ludhiana Sikhs
3041	„	Sundar Singh	24th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry

For gallantry against Zarifi, 22 August 1895

	Sowar	Jawala Singh	11th Bengal Lancers
2815	Sepoy	Narayan Singh	19th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry

For gallantry against Zarifi, 27 October 1895

2167	Havr.	Atma Singh	45th Rattray's Sikhs
259	Sepoy	Pertab Singh	35th Sikhs
470	„	Sundar Singh	„ „
2680	„	Sham Singh	15th Ludhiana Sikhs
3005	„	Mahtab Singh	45th Rattray's Sikhs

* Died of wounds, 20 Jan. 1892.
† I have this N.C.O.'s I.O.M. & medal with ring suspender.

UGANDA 1897-98.

In September 1897 there were 289 sepoys of the Indian Contingent serving in British East Africa; and Macdonald (later Major-General Sir James Macdonald, K.C.I.E., C.B., who commanded in the Tibet Expedition 1904) had 30 Sikhs with him North of Lake Rudolf. The Indian Contingent went up into Uganda in November 1897, taking 300 or more Indian soldiers there, as well as a number of Africans. The 27th Bombay Infantry (Baluch Light Infantry) arrived at Mombasa on 12th Dec. 1897, but does not appear to have reached the front at the date of the defeat of the Sudanese mutineers at Kabegambe on 24th Feb. 1898.

By Army Order 29 of 1899 the East and Central Africa medal with clasp "LUBWA'S" was granted to all H. M. forces and allies who took part in the operations against the Sudanese mutineers from 23rd Sept. 1897 to 24th Feb. 1898. The clasp "UGANDA 1897-98" was given to those who took part in the operations in Uganda, *other than* those against the mutineers, from 20th July 1897 to 19th March 1898, *or who reached Uganda within those dates.* The Lubwa's clasp does not seem to be found alone, but only in conjunction with the "UGANDA 1897-98" clasp.

The Indian Order of Merit, 3rd Class, was awarded to Jemadar Bhagwan Singh, 1733 Sepoy Kaka Singh, and 1752 Sepoy Bagga Singh, all of the 14th Sikhs, for their gallantry at Lubwa's Hill on 19th October 1897. For gallantry at Lubwa's Fort on 11th December 1897 it was awarded to 3036 Sepoy Sahib Singh and 3277 Sepoy Phuman Singh, both of the 15th Sikhs. The latter is still alive as Lieut. Phuman Singh, Bahadur, I.D.S.M. Three other men of the 15th Sikhs also received the I.O.M. on the same occasion: 3184 Sepoy Golab Singh, 3434 Sepoy Bishan Singh, and 3385 Sepoy Karpal Singh: while Jemadar Bhagwan Singh, 14th Sikhs, was advanced from the 3rd to the 2nd Class of the Order. For gallantry at Kabegambe on 24th February 1898, 87 Sepoy Jehan Khan of the 27th (Punjab) Bengal Infantry, 1545 Naik Sham Singh of the 14th Sikhs, and 2354 Havildar Atar Singh of the 15th Sikhs received the I.O.M. 3rd Class.

UGANDA 1898.

The East and Central Africa medal with clasp "UGANDA 1898" was awarded to the forces employed in the expedition against the Ogaden Somalis from April to August 1898. The 4th Bombay Rifles and 2 companies of the 27th Baluch Infantry

were already in the country when the expedition began, though the two companies of the 27th seem to have left for Uganda about that time. There were also 4 companies of the Uganda Rifles, who were I believe all Indians. In July 1898, 350 men of the Indian Contingent came as a reinforcement.

A number of I.Os.M., 3rd Class, were given for gallantry in this campaign, namely:

For gallantry at Mruli, 26th April 1898—226 L./Naik Wazir Ali, 31st Bengal Infantry.

For gallantry at Jass Camp, 26th April, and Mruli Post, 30th May 1898—Jemadar Bahadur Ali Khan, 1st Sikhs P. F. F.

For gallantry near Helishid, on Lake Wama, 22nd June 1898—756 Naik Butta Singh, 4 Bombay Rifles.

For gallantry near Kitabu, Uganda, 9th & 10th Oct. 1898—(All of 27 Baluch Infy.)

2657 Naik Yusuf Khan.
1765 Naik Sultan Mahomed, 30th Bombay Infy. (attached).
2737 Pte. Nur Mahomed.
262 „ Sharif Khan.
20 „ Ghulam Mahomed.
1441 „ Nur Dad.
2858 „ Barkatulla.
153 „ Shah Zad Shah.
767 „ Subey Khan.
959 „ Subey Khan.
188 „ Khuda Bux Khan.
403 „ Fazal Khan.
1361 „ Shazada Khan.
162 „ Karam Dad.
1132 „ Mir Firoz Ali Shah.
295 „ Sher Baz.
31 „ Nur Mahomed.

while it was announced that 296 Pte. Ahmed Khan would also have received the award had he survived.

UGANDA 1899.

By Army Order 254 of 1900 the clasp "UGANDA 1899" to the East and Central Africa medal was awarded to the forces employed in the operations against Kabarega in the Uganda Protectorate between 21st March and 2nd May 1899. A few members of the Indian Contingent or Indians serving in the Uganda Rifles, received this clasp, which is a rare one. I have a two-bar medal, "1898" and "UGANDA 1899," awarded to a Sikh rifleman of the Uganda Rifles.

UGANDA 1900.

By Army Order 133 of 1902, the clasp "UGANDA 1900" to the new Africa General Service medal was given to the troops who took part in operations in the Nandi country between 3rd July and October 1900, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel T. Evatt, D.S.O., Indian Staff Corps. This clasp also is a rare one. STEWARD, in *War Medals and their History,* states that the total number of clasps issued was 5 to British officers, 1 to a British N.C.O., 268 to the 4th King's African Rifles, and 105 to Indians, giving a total of 379. I have a medal awarded to a Sikh rifleman of the Uganda Rifles.

SOUTH AFRICA 1899-1902.

The medals awarded for the "Boer" war, though easily obtainable by collectors when awarded to British soldiers, are by no means common when given to Indians. Less than 500 Indian combatants went out to South Africa, where they were employed on non-combatant duties as orderlies and with remounts. Most of these were cavalry sowars. No less than six or seven thousand followers and other non-combatants went from India to South Africa. Many of these received the bronze Queen's medal, for which no clasps were issued. The result, so far as medals are concerned, is that the Queen's medal in silver *with clasps,* and the King's medal, are distinctly uncommon when awarded to Indians.

One Indian received the I.O.M., 3rd Class, in South Africa: No. 1306 Sowar (later Lieutenant, *Bahadur,* and I.D.S.M.) Dost Muhammad Khan, 18th Bengal Lancers, for gallantry at Hanna's Post on 30th March 1900.

Lord Roberts had a personal Indian orderly in South Africa, Daffadar Wadhawa Singh of 9th Hodson's Horse.

BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA 1899-1900.

By Army Order 133 of 1902 the Africa General Service medal with clasp "B. C. A. 1899-1900" was given to those who had taken part in (*i*) operations against Nkwamba, August to October 1899, (*ii*) operations in North-East Rhodesia against Kazenbe, September to November 1899, and (*iii*) operations in Central Angoniland against Kalulu, in December 1900. Some Indians received the medal: an example awarded to a Sikh sepoy of the 24th Punjabis was in the well-known Payne collection, broken up many years ago.

ASHANTI 1900.

Seventy Sikhs from British Central Africa took part in the advance on Kumassi and received the Ashanti medal, 1900, with clasp "KUMASSI." The Indian Order of Merit, 3rd Class, was awarded to Naik Hira Singh, 12th Burma Infantry, for gallantry near Kumassi on 6th August 1900; and Jemadar Kisson Singh, 28th Bombay Pioneers, was specially promoted Subedar for his services in this campaign. The Sikhs took part in the action at Obassa on 30th September 1900 when Captain C. J. Melliss, Indian Staff Corps, won the V.C.

JUBALAND 1901.

The Africa General Service medal with clasp "JUBALAND" was awarded to the troops who took part in the Ogaden Punitive Expedition, 1900-01. The Indian units were the Aden Camel Corps (52 rifles, apparently all Indians), one section of the 9th (Murree) Mountain Battery, and a wing of the 16th Bombay Infantry. The number of Indians who received this clasp must thus have been about 475. I have one awarded to a gunner of the Murree Battery, and have seen two others. Medals of the 16th Bombay Infy. sometimes come on the market in London.

SOMALILAND 1901.

The Africa General Service medal with this clasp was awarded (*i*) for operations against the Mullah in 1901 under Lieut. Colonel Swayne, Indian Staff Corps, and (*ii*) to those with the Abyssinian force which co-operated between 22nd May and 30th July 1901. Under 40 medals with this clasp are said to have been issued. I have an example awarded to a Punjabi Mahomedan sepoy of the 31st Punjabis, serving with the Somali Levy.

LATER CAMPAIGNS.

Other clasps of the Africa G.S. medal were awarded to Indian troops, but they must be considerable rarities. For the Somaliland operations in 1920 the medal with King George V's head and clasp "SOMALILAND 1920" was given to a wing of the 1/101st Grenadiers as well as to Indians serving in the Somaliland Camel Corps. I have one of the latter, awarded to a Mahomedan sepoy. I understand that about a dozen men of the 23rd or 32nd Sikh Pioneers received the rare clasp "SHIMBER BERRIS 1915," but I have never seen one.

I should appreciate authentic information of any other awards of African medals to Indian soldiers.

ADDENDUM.—In May 1898 one havildar, 2 naiks and 17 sappers of the Queen's Own Madras Sappers & Miners volunteered for service with the West Africa Frontier Force in Nigeria. They went and returned by way of England, being inspected by Queen Victoria at Balmoral on their way back late in 1900. One naik and 2 sappers had died in Nigeria. Two only, apparently, of the detachment received the East and West Africa medal with bar "1900"—Havildar Munisami and Naik Rajendram. The latter is recorded as having served in the expedition to the Upper Kaduna country. Muniswami's medal was sold in the Kennard collection, auctioned at Sotheby's, London, 30 June 1924.

THE DECLINE OF FOREIGN PRESTIGE IN CHINA AND ONE VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE FUTURE POSITION AT THE END OF THE PRESENT WAR

By Officer Cadet B. Beaumont.

Although prophecy is normally a somewhat thankless task, I think most of us who have left China recently must have given the situation there considerable thought. In the majority of cases we have received some assurance from our firms that after the war is over our jobs will still be open to us. Whether there will be a job to keep open and whether we will wish to return to it must depend to a great extent on how we answer the question "what will living conditions for the foreigners be like there after the war?"

I feel it is hardly necessary to say that I have assumed that the war in Europe will be won by the allies; but although I believe that the Japanese will not decide to extend the war in the Far East to include ourselves and America, I realise that this is a possibility and I will try and consider the question in this light also

Before trying to decide what situation may result from either of these possibilities I feel that I should first define the position of the foreigner (and by that I mean the European or American but not the Japanese resident) before July 1937, how it has been modified to date, how it is likely to be modified by subsequent fighting, and, finally, what permanent settlement can be made, satisfactory to all concerned.

The position up to 1937 may be divided into two parts; first, from 1860 when the second treaty arrangements were drawn up until 1914, and, secondly, from 1914 to July 1937.

During the first period foreigners could go very much where they liked and do very much what they liked throughout China. They were protected by their extra territorial rights, by which they were subject to their own laws and could only be sued in their own courts. They were given trading rights in certain so-called treaty ports, and in the bigger cities they had concessions or settlements governed by their own elected councils. This was the period when politics were mainly directed to commercial ends, when huge fortunes were made and when the foreign governments were strong and the Chinese Government was weak.

At this time the number of foreigners living in China was small, and those who had been there for more than a few years could usually speak the language sufficiently fluently to gain some knowledge of the customs and ideas of the Chinese with whom they came into contact. In spite of the Boxer rising and other anti-foreign movements many Chinese were prepared to treat the foreigner as an eccentric but on the whole tolerable creature so that relations between the two groups were comparatively easy. Moreover the foreign position was considerably helped by the prestige of Sir Robert Hart and others, whose character and whose services had made a deep impression both on the court and on the smaller provincial officials.

The second period is covered by the years 1914-1937. In 1911 the Imperial rule was overthrown and a republic under Sun Yat Sen formed. The early years of the republic were not easy and for some time China was too concerned with its own affairs to worry about the foreigners. But with the outbreak of the European War the eyes of many Chinese were opened to the defects of the much-vaunted Western Civilisation. At the same time they were compelled to imitate many western methods in order to keep themselves supplied with the goods to which they were accustomed, but which could no longer be imported from overseas. This was a period of great industrial expansion throughout the country one result of which was to force many Chinese abroad, particularly to America, to learn to manage and control their new machines. On their return these students, while praising the material progress of the foreigner, were equally able to condemn much of his intellectual and moral background. Thus Chinese nationalism was born and in the late 1920's and early 1930's it seemed in a fair way to sweep us out of China altogether.

In August 1917 at the insistance of the British and French Governments China declared war on the Central Powers, thereby inculcating in the minds of the younger Chinese a most dangerous doctrine. For the only effect of China's entry into the war was that they confiscated the German and Austrian concessions and deprived the nationals of these countries of their property and ex-territorial rights. The position of the foreigner was made worse when the Russian revolution drove hundreds of thousands of White Russians into Chinese territory where, being utterly destitute, they sank to the lowest depths of poverty: nor did their late allies, the British, French and Italians, do anything

worth while to help them. This lack of assistance and particularly the social barriers that were immediately raised against the Russian refugees made a great impression on the Chinese mind and twenty years later, at the beginning of their own war with Japan, references were made to it in the Chinese press.

However, the allied victory did something to raise the position of the foreigners in general, and the British and the French in particular, and on the surface, especially in the Concessions little seemed to have changed. In fact a great deal had changed although this did not immediately appear. The return of more and more foreign educated Chinese, the preoccupation of the European and American Governments with their own internal affairs, the "laissez faire" policy that was the result if not the intention of the Washington Conference, and above all the increased wealth and growing national consciousness of the Chinese people all tended to diminish foreign influence and increase that of the Chinese in the development of the country. Moreover the loss of the German and Russian communities instead of bringing any increased power to the rest of the foreign population only served to increase the resolution of the Chinese to deprive the remaining foreign communities of all their privileges.

The British had been the first to obtain these special privileges from the old Imperial government and even after the war British interests were still predominant throughout the country. It was therefore against them that the first anti-foreign attacks were made and it was British goods that were the first to be boycotted. Unfortunately the government at home was otherwise occupied and little attention was paid to the seriousness of the situation. That the Chinese did not succeed entirely in their aims may be ascribed as much to the decided attitude adopted by the French as to the exertions of our own government. Nevertheless much was lost both in trade and prestige, while more positively the concession in Hankow was relinquished and the naval base at Wei Hai Wei handed back. Even the relinquishment of all ex-territorial rights by the British was seriously considered.

Nevertheless before the position was entirely lost, the attention of the Chinese nationalists was diverted from the European community to the encroachments of the Japanese who had managed to acquire much of the influence and most of the trade that had been lost by the foreigners.

From 1930 onwards the Chinese Government under Chiang Kai Shek was devoting more and more of its energies to resisting Japanese aggression, and as a result was forced to suspend most of its anti-foreign activities and at times actively courted foreign help.

In spite of the loss of Manchuria in 1931, the failure in Hopeh and the Northern Provinces in 1933, and the serious communist risings in 1934 and 1935, China proper from 1930-37 was rapidly growing in strength. Foreign influence was forced to retreat more and more into the ports along the coast while the administration of the Railways and Salt Gabelle and even to some extent of the Maritime Customs fell gradually into Chinese hands. Even the biggest firms found it essential to engage Chinese advisers for their boards of directors and more and more of the senior positions were entrusted to influential Chinese. It is probable that had affairs been allowed to continue peaceably for a very few more years the majority of firms would have become semi-Chinese and in the end would have either been forced out of business altogether or else compelled to make such concessions that their eventual elimination would have been only a matter of time.

If this was clear to foreign eyes it was much more clear to the Japanese who with their ideal of a Far Eastern Empire were determined to cut short this rapid advance of industrial and financial power. Thus on July 18th 1937 that incident was provoked which led to the present war.

From this time onwards the foreigner's position has to be regarded from two points of view; one that of those communities living in Japanese occupied territory and secondly that of those who had to look towards the Chinese National Government.

In the first case it may be said that the immediate effect of hostilities was to weaken still further all foreign influence in every field.

More and more restrictions were placed on trade, foreign ships were unable to navigate the various rivers, taxes, permits and various charges were constantly being imposed to the detriment of all foreign business and to the great assistance of the Japanese. Financially the Japanese endeavoured to obtain control of both Chinese national currency and foreign exchange. Although they had less success in this field than in establishing direct commercial control they have succeeded in setting up one currency which has universal usage in all areas controlled by

their northern armies and have had less, but still appreciable, success with two other currencies. But perhaps the greatest factor in weakening foreign prestige and influence has been the successful imposition of many restrictions hampering and upsetting the general way of life of all foreign communities. This line of attack culminated in the blockade of the British Concession in Tientsin, but has existed in every part of China where foreigners lived and in many forms. Not only was all movement from place to place covered by complicated visa and passport regulations, but the ordinary daily life was constantly interfered with. Prices fluctuated widely from day to day, not only for imported articles but for local produce also; servants and other employees were arrested for no other reason than that they worked for a foreigner, while the rules regarding inoculation or vaccination, regarding motor car and other licences, regarding anything the Japanese could in some way control were constantly being changed, and at each change the maximum delay and inconvenience was carefully thought out and arranged for. The list might be continued still further, but it is sufficient to say that in a country where "face" is of great importance none of these actions of the Japanese has been overlooked by the Chinese community and although such actions are naturally disapproved of they will surely be remembered if ever any attempt is made to establish foreign prestige on its previous pedestal.

In considering foreign influence in unoccupied China it must be remembered that not more than about five per cent. of the foreign community is concerned. Yet since that five per cent. include the diplomatic body it was to be hoped that their efforts would have been able to regain much of the ground lost elsewhere. Unfortunately this was not the case.

At the beginning of the war when a European conflict was not clearly foreseen the policy of most powers was very half-hearted in its support of China. Appeasement was still the keynote of all diplomatic effort, and while Japan's action was strongly disapproved of in theory, no steps were taken to give China the help it deserved and considered it was entitled to. While private sympathies were enlisted both in Europe and America and large sums of money subscribed towards various charities in China the governments themselves did nothing to prevent Japan maintaining her full war effort.

Further, general uninformed opinion which was sometimes even quoted in the press took the line that the best thing for

foreign interests was that both sides should fight themselves to a point of exhaustion when the foreign powers could step in and by means of loans extort various concessions from both sides. The cynicism of this line of thought was felt deeply by every educated Chinese and was the cause naturally of very bitter feeling not only amongst government officials but amongst men of every walk of life. They could not believe that countries which had formed a League of Nations to protect the weaker nations against the strong and which had denounced unprovoked aggression in such strong terms could remain either apathetic or frankly self-seeking in this particular case. The League's action in regard to Manchuria had been excused and to some extent understood by those Chinese who had taken the trouble to consider the situation from the widest point of view, but the action of the supporters of the League in their present crisis could not be explained or condoned. Unfortunately on Great Britain, as the main supporter of the League, was concentrated the greater part of the Chinese Government's scorn and dislike so that it was not to be wondered at that little help was forthcoming from it to help offset the rigours of the Japanese attack on our trade and general position. But if Great Britain was the most unpopular of all foreign countries after the first year of the war there was no community that was especially popular—unless it was the Germans.

In 1930 Germany had sent to China a military mission, under General Von Seeckt, which had undertaken the training of the Chinese army and this mission had been maintained and enlarged until, in 1937, the main direction of the Chinese army was the German military mission and in the role of advisers they at first conducted the great part of the Chinese defence It was only natural therefore that these men should he held in considerable regard by the Chinese until they were withdrawn towards the end of 1938 at the instance of the Japanese. Nevertheless, their influence was exerted purely on behalf of their own nationals and did nothing to affect the position of the other foreign communities.

British influence suffered a further and most serious setback when as a result of Japanese pressure, it was decided to close the Burma Road. The effect of this move was felt immediately throughout China. It was given the widest publicity in the Chinese press, both free and controlled, and it has been said that probably no single act of the British Government did more to

lower the general opinion of the British amongst all classes of the Chinese public. The subsequent reopening of the road has done something to improve our position, but it will need very positive action on our part to remove the distrust which is now felt for British policy in general.

At the moment it may be said therefore that foreign influence in China is at its lowest point. The British have managed to offend both sides; as far as the Japanese are concerned because "of their lack of co-operation and insincerity" and because the Chinese consider that Great Britain has only co-operated with the Japanese and done nothing to assist China. France, since the armistice, has passed out of the picture and already Japan has virtually annexed those parts of Indo-China which are of interest to her. While one would expect the position of both the Germans and Italians to have improved in the Japanese-occupied areas, this is not entirely the case and although Germans are better off than other foreigners they are still subject to most of the restrictions. In occupied China Germans appear to be treated with as much suspicion as the British but probably with greater respect. Neither side at present pays very much attention to the Italians. The only country whose position has in any way improved is the U.S.A. and then only as far as the Chungking Government is concerned. Nevertheless this friendship is probably felt mainly for the American Government, and as far as the American nationals in China are concerned they are combined in Chinese opinion with all other foreigners and treated accordingly.

Whatever may be the outcome of the general fighting up and down China there can be no doubt that for all foreign communities, wherever situated, the position will become increasingly uncomfortable and precarious. There is no reason to suppose that the Japanese will let up on their restrictions, in fact the opposite is much more likely to be the case. As long as foreign industrial and other concerns are doing work that the Japanese consider they can do themselves, even if less efficiently, so long will they continue to make every effort to secure the retirement of every foreigner and every foreign interest.

As far as the Chunking Government is concerned the outlook is almost as gloomy. In order to maintain their position against increasing Japanese pressure the Chinese have been forced to develop a nationalist outlook which is really contrary to their own nature. The "New Life Movement" was the first attempt to

instil a new spirit into the Chinese youth, but it is now only one of many such movements, and as these progress so they will produce an ever-widening barrier between the foreigner and Chinese who, as is only to be expected, is taking himself and his cause with ever-increasing seriousness. How far this barrier can be broken down is difficult to say, but the trouble is that at present only those foreigners who have been in Chungking are attempting to do this and they unfortunately are too few to achieve very much. Nevertheless, it is possible that it is the British who can do most to remove this barrier since the problems of the two countries are in many respects the same, and the mental outlook that is required to win through should in many cases be similar.

An appreciation therefore of the future relations between foreigners and Chinese depends largely on the length of the war and the ability of the foreigner to come gradually to understand and sympathise with the Chinese outlook. If some material assistance is given to China and at the same time a real attempt is made to understand them, many of the present difficulties will disappear and any settlement that is eventually made will have a good chance of succeeding. Moreover, the statements recently made both in England and America that after the war the whole position of the concessions and ex-territorial rights will be revised is most encouraging. Particularly as it seemed possible at one time that some attempt might be made now to strike a bargain with China on the basis of immediate assistance against concessions at the conclusion of the war. Any form of compulsion such as this would certainly have been deeply resented by the Chinese and probably evaded when it came to the point.

The above is to regard the position mainly from the British point of view, but it is bound to be the decision of the British and the American Governments which will finally determine the question.

This sketch also leaves out of account the Japanese whose great influence must be considered from two points of view. Firstly, in the event of a fairly immediate declaration of war on either Great Britain or America, and secondly, if they decide to continue to extend their present restrictive methods.

In the first case the whole of the control of the foreign population (not only British and American) would pass entirely into Japanese hands. For with the removal of the British and Americans the entire social and industrial system, both foreign and Chinese, of occupied China would be disorganised and this is one

very good argument against the likelihood of Japan ever openly declaring war. In the second case by the extension of their present rigid control system the Japanese will eventually exercise supreme influence and when that stage has been reached it is possible that either Great Britain or America will themselves undertake direct action against Japan. This is the argument of those who consider Great Britain will find herself one way or another fighting on the side of China.

In either event our attitude must from the beginning be based on terms of equality towards China, and any pretence that we are acting from altruistic motives would not only be stupid but dangerous. It is to be hoped therefore that the position will be faced realistically. To do so must entail the discarding of all old ideas of special privileges and rights, yet the process should enable foreign enterprise to operate freely throughout the whole country. Thus when peace comes the foreigner may not be limited to special advantages in certain detached areas but should be able to assist in the general development of China as a whole.

SOME ASPECTS OF FOREST WARFARE

By Lieutenant-Colonel N. G. Pring (A.I.R.O., M.A., I.F.S.)

This note emphasizes certain tactical and strategical considerations, and offers some suggestions for greater efficiency in forest warfare.

One of the greatest assets afforded by the forest—that of supply—including timber, firewood and numerous by-products cannot be dealt with here. Sufficient to mention that, in order to meet the enormously increased war demand from India, a Directorate of Timber Supply at the centre is ably supported by the Provinces. This essential supply is a subject best left to the experts concerned.

The various types of forest, including tropical evergreen, savannah, thorn or scrub forests of the sub-tropics, deciduous and coniferous woods of the temperate and Alpine zones, high forest and coppice, deserve separate treatment. They can, however, be combined in respect of two common factors, i.e., the cover they afford to armies and the check they impose on manœuvre.

The Germanic tribes owed their successful resistance to subjugation by the Romans to their forests, for although the Romans possessed the finest army in the world, including superb infantry, they never succeeded in holding the country across the Rhine for any length of time.

During the thirteenth century the Mongol hosts swept across the Steppes of Russia and ravaged Poland, but although they defeated a mixed army of Poles and Germans at Liegnitz, they did not continue their drive westward because the woodlands and hilly country did not suit the tactics of these mounted hordes. The forest is essentially the infantryman's sphere.

One of the chief roles of woods throughout the history of modern war up to recent times was that of security for the flanks; two typical historical examples are afforded by the Battles of Blenheim and Malplaquet.

At Blenheim the Franco-Bavarian Army, although surprised by the decision of the Allies under Marlborough and Eugene to attack, were in a sound position with their right on the Danube and their left on wooded hills. The French Army under Tallard, holding the right and centre, was utterly defeated and it is with the left wing under Marsin and the Elector of Bavaria, opposing

Eugene, that we are concerned. The difficulty of the ground between the French and Imperial Forces had delayed Eugene's advance and his cavalry achieved little that day. Fighting at odds, Danes and Prussians were able to advance amid the bushes of the foothills and push back the French left two miles, but Marsin's Forces were not outflanked, and he and the Elector were able to retire in good order and actually rescued some of Tallard's Battalions, which had already surrendered. Without the security of the woods the French left flank would have been turned and Marsin's Army would certainly have been pursued, and probably most of them captured.

At Malplaquet woods formed both flanks of the French position. Admittedly, this offer of an excellent defensive position was a gambit which Marlborough and Eugene felt it necessary to offer in order to induce Villars and Boufflers to accept the challenge. The Allies were superior in numbers and equipment, but the French, on meagre rations, were brave and experienced fighters recognising in their leaders the foremost captains of France.

The Allies achieved their design of first weakening and then breaking through the French centre by their attack on the wood of Taisnieres. This attack and subsequent advance through the wood was achieved by one of the heaviest infantry concentrations in history—no less than 85 Battalions were employed on this wing at the commencement of the battle where the French were outnumbered by four to one at least. Subsequently, both sides drew reinforcements from the centre. On the other wing, with their left flank in the wood of Lanieres and with the able support of batteries concealed behind the small wood of Tiry, the French were able to repulse and counter-attack the Dutch and Scots. On this wing the Confederate Infantry were only saved from rout by Marlborough's cavalry.

Europe was appalled at the slaughter of Malplaquet where the Allied losses were nearly double that of the French. As a victory it proved singularly barren of results for the victors, indeed the result was to stimulate the French who retreated unmolested and enheartened. Undoubtedly, Villars had made the best of his woodland position. As Churchill states: "Resting his wings upon the woods and covering his centre with intermittent entrenchments, he presented a front which no army but that commanded by Marlborough and Eugene, with superior numbers and eight years of unbroken success behind them, would have

dared to attack. He exacted from the Allies a murderous toll of life by his entrenchments and abattis; but all the time he fought a manœuvre battle around and among these created or well-selected obstacles. By a prodigy of valour, tactical skill and bloodshed they drove him from the field. The victory was theirs but no one of the allied generals, if he could have gone back upon the past, would have fought the battle and none of them ever fought such a battle again.*

The combination of woods and mountains still offers exceptional defence. During the Great War the wooded slopes of the Carpathians prevented the Russians from invading Hungary and allowed the Austrian Armies breathing space to reform after defeats.

The original Schliefen plan recognised the difficulty of attacking via the Vosges, and the 1914 costly French attacks there achieved little and risked much. Judging by the events of 1940 the money and effort spent on the Maginot Line east of the Vosges could have been used to better advantage elsewhere and the densely-wooded Vosges would have formed a secure and economic defensive flank.

In wooded terrain the inhabitants play a very important role if they are of fighting stock. In the campaign that preceded Wolfe's victory at Quebec, both the French and British colonials were superior to the regulars, and undoubtedly Washington's colonials fought with natural advantage among the forests of the Eastern States. Again The Finnish Rifles were among the cream of the Imperial Russian armies and no one will deny them first rank among infantry of the world to-day.

One of the greatest difficulties experienced by the attacking force is the maintenance of contact.

During the battle of Tannenberg it was Von Francois' decision to string his Corps along the southern edge of the forest area for a distance of 50 kilometres, thus preventing the escape of the Russian Army, that achieved one of the greatest victories of the Great War. Had Von Francois obeyed orders by attacking and plunging his Corps into the forest, instead of surrounding it, he would not have gone far nor achieved much; certainly not the capture of 60,000 unwounded prisoners which fell to his share.

In March, 1916, the dispersal of the German Forces during the earlier attacks on the wooded heights in front of Verdun,

* "Marlborough—His Life and Times," Vol. IV.

probably saved the situation for the French; in the confusion, the Artillery of both sides was neutralised to the great advantage of the defenders, who were able to reform and reinforce their broken line.

Turning to small scattered areas of woodland, one should contrast the very costly frontal attacks during the Somme campaign on Mametz, Dellville, and High Woods, etc., as compared with their recapture in the 1918 Spring advance. Infiltration tactics obviously exclude frontal attacks on woods where this is avoidable.

For artillery, speaking generally, the forest favours defence. Targets are hard to locate and the difficulty of observing is much greater. In high forest the wastage of fire power through shells or splinters hitting timber is appreciable. The greatest handicap in offensive warfare is the uncertainty of the accurate location of targets and of the results of a bombardment. Wire and well-sited trenches can be kept invisible from the air. The creeping barrage loses effect owing to bursts on trees and if followed up closely is likely to cause casualties to the attackers. After the initial bombardment, the dispersal of the attackers in the wood and the difficulty of observation enhances difficulty of controlling indirect fire, and it is better to support the advance with mortars and light pieces that can be brought up with the infantry.

In spite of a great preponderance of guns, including French artillery, the American Army's gallant and strategically important advance through the forests of Ardennes in 1918 was one of the most costly attacks of the Great War, because the observers could not locate wire and machine-gun nests hidden in the woods.

The defence will rely chiefly on direct fire by well-concealed light pieces. Wire and skilfully felled trees will force the advance into covered zones.

For anti-tank work, the defence will do best to rely on light high velocity quick firers capable of being sighted and fired by one man. Above all he must be able to aim quickly because if he does not get the target quickly, the target will get him. The soundest solution would be to mount the anti-tank guns in tanklets capable of manœuvring within the forest and affording protection against machine-guns.

The check to rapid manœuvre within the wood applies particularly to cavalry and armoured cars. The attackers are subjected to the risk of ambush, enforced concentration along vulnerable lines and general lack of cohesion. In the case of

tanks, assuming that the defenders have the necessary armament, the advantage lies with the defence. Armoured cars and tanks have, however, the several advantages of speed, range and, for their crews, comparative immunity from physical exhaustion which reduces the property of woods as security. After a long outflanking march your cavalry would meet his opponent fresh for the charge. Now the same distance can be covered in less than an hour, so that even though the defenders have the advantage of interior lines a constant guard by them on their flanks and rear is necessary. The chief danger to the defence is encirclement. It is essential for them to maintain constant contact with the flank outside the forest, to prepare for counter-attacks to assist those flanks and to have plans to withdraw so as to avoid encirclement in case their flanks retire. The effect of enfilading fire from the forest on forces advancing along the flanks is very great. Instance the deadly effect of the fire from the edge of the woods at the Battle of Wynendael (1708). Webb's task was to prevent a much superior French force under La Motte from seizing the precious ammunition convoy marching from Ostend. La Motte, debarred from marching round the woods if he were to reach the convoy in time, took the gap through the woods. Webb posted battalions in the coppice on one side and in the high wood on the other in advance of his main force with which he held the thousand-yard base of the gap between the woods. Webb, who had no artillery, and practically no cavalry, had to endure a three-hour bombardment before La Motte advanced in great depth. Fired on from both flanks as well as from the front, the slaughter was swift and heavy and the repulse of the French was utter. Were the same tactics employed under modern mechanized conditions, including the column, the tempo would change but the same result might be expected.

Within the forest the natural advantage of the defence is less conducive to counter-attack and the tendency of defenders sitting pretty is to stay put. The best opportunity for counter-attack inside the wood occurs when the attackers reach close quarters and following a withering fire.

For the purpose of attack or counter-attack the great value of woods lies in their use as cover for assembly. Many instances of successful charges by forces concealed in or behind woods can be quoted. A classic example was the skilful deployment and disposition of Stone-wall Jackson's Brigade, when he rushed up to save the critical position on Henry Hill during the Battle of Bullrun. It was his Virginian Brigade's subsequent charge from

the woods that gained the victory for the Confederates, in this the first battle of the American Civil War.

The use of mustard gas or other heavy gases is feasible. During the Abyssinian campaign the Italians used it with marked effect, but against an enemy quite unprepared; the use of gas on a large scale in forest areas would be wasteful and it would be better to confine its use within the forest to known or suspected targets such as located batteries, road junctions and assembly points, etc.

Of the other ground weapons the mine is probably the most important and, combined with trenches and tank-traps, will make an advance through forest very costly.

Over vast expanses of tropical jungle and in mountain forest where transport is limited to boats, pack, sledge or porterage, supplemented in future no doubt by aircraft, the foot-soldier and his rifle come into their own.

With the development of the air arm, completely new conditions obtain, which appreciably alter the values attributable to ground warfare. From the ground a spinney or even a belt of roadside trees hides all behind it, whereas from the air the cover is limited to the forest and is no longer afforded by clearings. On the other hand in many cases woods afford the only adequate cover from aerial observation and, where this is so, their value increases.

By night concealment from parachute flares is a valuable asset to troops encamped and on the march.

From the ground, fire is directional and is limited to the range of weapons situated in enemy territory. The aeroplane can attack from the direction most suited and there is practically no range limitation. The fire hazard increases and is likely to prove a menace during dry seasons in many kinds of forests, particularly among pine, and other conifers. Frequently, the only way to extinguish a forest fire is to counter-fire, and for this experience is necessary. Owing to this new danger from the air, it will probably prove necessary in many areas to burn the ground or clear it of inflammable material around gun positions, encampments, etc., and along forest roads.

On the ground assaulting troops must get through the forest or round it past the defenders. From the air troops can be dropped behind the enemy's lines and can take advantage of the forest to lie up until the time is ripe to participate in an attack.

Man has been waging war by land and by sea for thousands of years. Aerial warfare is really only just beginning and it would be foolish to try and draw conclusions at this stage. Certain it is that, even in huge forest tracks, the side having superiority in the air will have a tremendous advantage. Having gained complete air superiority, artillery fire on batteries and camps in clearings can be accurately directed, while further back bases and communications can be bombed and machine-gunned. Apart from purely offensive action aircraft is invaluable for contact and supply purposes in dense jungle country where lines of communication are few and difficult.

Finally, although observation and exact location may be impossible, aerial photographs, studied at leisure by experts, reveal a great deal that the eye cannot detect. Combined with a scrutiny of existing maps, including large-scale forest maps, aerial photography will play an important part.

Lee's and Jackson's operations in Virginia serve as an excellent example of skilful leadership where good use was made of the forest in attack and defence, but perhaps the finest example is afforded by Lettow-Vorbeck's East African campaign. This indomitable leader fought out the Great War, unreinforced throughout, against stronger forces constantly reinforced by men and material. The bush was his only ally and saved him from being rounded up on numerous occasions but he made the fullest use of it for attack, gaining several notable victories. Aggressive to the end, he had successfully re-invaded German East Africa, from which he had been driven, when the Armistice forced him to lay down his arms.

Mobility and the aggressive spirit count just as much in forest warfare as elsewhere, and it is the greatest mistake to regard the forest merely as a natural fortress. A skilled leader will use his woods for defence when opportune, but under modern conditions he must be ready for strategic advance or retreat as the occasion demands. He will use the cover they afford for protection, particularly from aerial attack and observation and for concentrations preparatory to surprise attacks. When he attacks a forest position he will employ infiltration methods at the most vulnerable points, possibly from the flank or rear, certainly with every available artifice to avoid unnecessary casualties.

Suggestions are offered as follows:

Personnel.—The Empire can call on men from many of her Dominions with experience of the forest and in India from among the Gurkhas, Garhwalis and Punjabis of the Himalaya are many

who are at home in the jungle. Whenever possible, use them for forest warfare. A number of Reserve or Emergency Officers are available from the Forest Service and large timber firms. Some of these will be needed as engineers or for supply services, but the remainder can most usefully be employed with units engaged in forest warfare.

Information.—Most countries with forest services have brought their Crown forests and many private estates under systematic management with working plans. These plans should contain much information of military value, including maps showing roads, paths and buildings not usually shown on ordnance surveys. The body of the plan also contains much that will be useful regarding local conditions, labour supply and information on the type of wood and the density, clearings, etc. All working plans are written in a regular sequence from which useful information can easily be extracted by a forester. Foreign working plans are easily obtainable in normal times.

Some of this information might be extremely useful to the R.A.F. for reconnaissance and raids. Where regular working plans or schemes are not available, reports and surveys of timber cruisers may contain valuable information.

R.A.F. Co-operation.—Prepare landing grounds and communication facilities where possible in advance. In dense jungle country, such as parts of Burma and West Africa, rivers are the highways and reaches suitable for landing need to be selected and improved.

Post liaison officers to the R.A.F. as early as possible so that effective co-operation between ground and air forces is established without delay.

Training.—Specialist training in forest warfare may not be feasible but woods could be included during tactical training and musketry practice. This is practical in most hill cantonments.

Rehearsal.—Whenever possible rehearse before an attack with the units actually employed. Let those who contemplate the planning of extensive night operations first try walking across country in a forest at night without lights.

Research.—In an Article entitled "Military Research," *Journal of the United Service Institute* of July, 1940, AUSPEX draws attention to the need of such research. The battle grounds in Finland, Norway, France and Belgium included much forest and the writer is convinced that a study of the technique employed by the various combatants would prove highly profitable.

DEMOCRACY AND THE TRAINING OF LEADERS

By "Hoplite"

The musings in the following paragraphs perhaps more properly belong to a soap box in Hyde Park setting rather than to the formal medium of printers' type. Free speech or writing however being one of the blessings of Democracy, it has been submitted as an article for your hospitable journal.

It is the unfortunate defect which accompanies all the blessings of Democracy, that elected governments do not seem to be able or willing to educate the electorate, and to save the nation from mass ignorance, and mass neglect, to support in sufficient time, military measures for self-preservation.

The events of the last few years in our own country have amply proved the truth of this contention. We no doubt all have our own ideas as to whom to apportion the blame for this state of affairs, but the fact remains, a country gets the government it deserves, and the governed cannot entirely disown responsibility.

It is a debatable point as to what form of Democracy our constitution represents. Many aspects of it are more in the nature of a plutocracy or bureaucracy. Whatever the constitution is at present, it must be conceded that the Old School tie class forms a large element in it. It is interesting to note some statistics concerning the composition of our present House of Commons. From a cursory survey of its members, the proportion of old school ties to non-school ties is about 60 per cent. to 40 per cent. A further scrutiny divulges the fact that of the 60 per cent., about 70 per cent. to 75 per cent. support the tie of one particular school. An analysis of the House of Lords would probably disclose a very similar proportion. What with the Peerage, Beerage, Coy. Directors, and Trade Unionists, the nation of shopkeepers seems to have had the government it deserved to mislead it. If ever a second chamber untrammelled by vote-catching consideration and party whips, had an opportunity to step in with a public-spirited policy, the present one had and missed. Before suggesting any remedies, it is advisable to try to clarify our minds as to what is

meant by Democracy. We as a nation are rather easily mesmerised by slogans and catch-phrases, which seduce the mind from really analysing the implications and complexity of the subject involved. It is necessary to crystalise ideas on the ideals for which the English peoples are struggling against the Axis and other ideologies, so that at the end we may continue to follow these ideals, and do not allow war weariness, and the lip service of politicians to deflect us from our true aims, and from maintaining that position of leadership to which our present efforts entitle us.

The slogan of Democracy, "Government by the people, for the people" is itself misleading. It produces a policy of giving all to the people and taking nothing from them; a policy which if carried to a logical conclusion would produce complete selfishness and independence. The slogan should be, "Government by the people for the general good of their country or empire."

Government by the people must place certain obligations on the people, for example a more active study of, and participation in politics. One of the means of giving the masses a chance of taking a more active and intelligent share in government is by a more liberal and moral education.

Another remedial measure will be reform of both Houses of Parliament. A third the creation of an Imperial Cabinet for defence and foreign policy. A fourth will be the realisation of what this empire means, and the responsibilities it involves. Hitherto knowledge and interest among the majority of people at home has been disgracefully scanty. Now, when a crisis has come, its significance is being realised and paid homage to. This fervour must not be allowed to wane.

A Democracy naturally requires leaders; and among all its departments the proper selection and training of leaders for its military forces is most important. With the progress of democratic institutions the field of selection will widen, and this widening process will be one of the objects of democracy and progress will be dependent to a large extent on educational facilities. Although in any social organisation, the talents and capabilities of individuals are, and will always be of varying degree, we must ensure that the system of education gives to as many as possible the opportunity of developing and exercising these capabilities to the fullest extent.

The ship of state needs, however, very expert navigating, and drastic changes in staff are liable to impair its stability.

In this connection one or two recent incidents vis-a-vis leaders and the army have given cause for considerable reflection.

In one case we hear of the Army Council expressing serious displeasure to an officer who championed the Old School tie element as the natural leaders; in another edict we learn of the abolition of the W.O. Class III as a platoon leader.

It is gradually being realised that what might be termed over-Democratisation in the French Army, was a contributory cause of its spectacular collapse.

Hitherto most of the officers of our Army have come from the big Public Schools; and we know that the average man among British other ranks generally looks up to the wearer of an old school tie. But the old school tie may vanish as a consequence of the war, because of the inability of parents to pay for the privilege of their sons earning one.

It is admitted that the Public Schools have produced good material, but it is considered that a better and higher average could have been achieved in return for the money expended and the advantages enjoyed.

Furthermore, it can be said in all fairness that most Public Schools have failed to adjust themselves to the pace and intensity of modern life, and to the conditions introduced by the stupendous inventions of the last 25 years. These have been on a scale greater than has been witnessed at any other epoch of the world's history. I refer to the aeroplane, wireless, the internal combustion engine, the cheap press, and the cinema. These inventions have far outdistanced our moral and social development. Many changes will be forced upon us, but at the same time care must be taken lest the thoughtless discarding of the past may upset essential balance.

As a first step Public schools will probably have to be subsidised by government, on condition of their receiving a certain number of state or secondary school students. Education curriculums must be revised, and in the process teachers must be taught how to teach. Most presume on an intuitive or self-inspired ability; it generally fails to inspire the classes.

Both in Public School and Army teachings a great many of the efforts are amateurish, with the results that only amateurs are produced. There has been too much of the "drawing stumps during the heat of the day for a gin and bitters" attitude. It is not even essential in diplomatic circles where it is prevalent,

though this does not mean that the Englishman must be denied his flagon of ale at proper times.

An important factor of the military side of the picture will be the future composition of the Army. The present regimental distinctions will have to disappear gradually. They still involve too much class snobbery, which is undoubtedly nourished by the Old School tie system. If conscription or a form of it remains, and it is desirable that it should, the acute forms of this infection will gradually disappear. Its disappearance will involve profound issues, and tend to undermine one of the foundations of morale, namely a highly developed *esprit-de-corps,* and something will be required to replace it. Regiments will be known by their numbers, with perhaps a territorial suffix; they will be dressed similarly. Exceptions might be made in the case of the Brigade of Guards and Highland regiments, provided the latter were wholly composed of Scots.

In olden days units were largely on a territorial basis, both in the British and Indian Army. Men of one platoon were largely composed of men from one village or district, and known to each other from childhood. There was a territorial *esprit-de-corps,* and a morale fortified by an unwillingness to let down one's pals.

It is suggested that we shall again have to concentrate more on the territorial aspect. Present conditions of life wherein people herd in large cities are a comparatively new phase of civilisation, to which society has not fully adjusted itself.

The danger which all in towns at home are now sharing, and the comprehensive A.R.P. measures which are in force, will result in the extension of the communal and civic spirit, and in the demise of the selfish "every Englishman's house is his castle" tradition. This will help to foster the democratic spirit.

The next problem concerns the appointment of officers to regiments in the Army under these new conditions. Officers in the British Army as a general rule should be appointed on a territorial basis; but this cannot apply to officers joining the Indian Army. Family connections might constitute a claim for appointment to a specific regiment in both services; and where these do not exist appointments should be made according to the best interests of the service. The system of touting at Sandhurst must cease. In both services choice of a regiment might be offered to a limited few of the most efficient candidates; their order of merit being decided by normal methods. It may be contended that

these reforms will prove a serious obstacle to the recruitment of officers. This will be overcome, it is hoped, by alterations in our educational system, and by the progress of democratic principles in other institutions. If not, other means can be devised to overcome it.

Another measure of reform will concern the training of the leaders. The field of selection will have been widened either by the dilution of the Public Schools with the secondary school element, or by the wholesale amalgamation of the two. It is probable too that some form of conscription will be retained in the British Army, and this will further widen the field.

It has been stated in a previous paragraph that school curriculums should be revised, and be of a more mind-broadening character. It is not proposed to enter into a discussion regarding the merits of classics as a part of school training. It suffices to say that with the introduction of new subjects some old ones may have to be discarded wholly or partially.

Education or the acquiring of knowledge may reasonably be subdivided into three categories:

(*a*) Subjective.—Reading, Writing, Arithmetic. The training of the mind how to learn, and training an individual to do a thing he necessarily does not like doing at the time when it has to be done.

(*b*) Informative.—Items such as Geography, History, Sociology, Natural Science and Ethical and Moral training.

(*c*) Professional or Occupational.

At present the average boy at an average Public School passes his school certificate between the age of 16 or 17, after which he can continue his academic activities in a recumbent attitude, presumably also continuing to develop character, but without much expert assistance. Few Public Schools offer facilities for professional or occupational training. It is at this period that some form of conscriptive work should be introduced.

As regards the Sandhurst training, this has been a compromise, with the object of trying to combine a 'varsity and military education within the space of $1\frac{1}{2}$ years; obviously an impossibility, even with a staff of professional teachers. A broader education is desirable, but it can only be achieved satisfactorily by lengthening the period to $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 years.

Proceeding further, and surveying instructional facilities in the Army. It should be a principle to aim for, that in the British Army the platoon commander should be a serjeant or a W.O. Class III, if you like. Although the W.O. has been given up, failure for all time must not be admitted. It may have been due to class snobbery, insufficient training for the job, or like the attempts at Indianisation, having been designed to satisfy a demand but implemented by a method which was bound to prove unsuccessful. If Sandhurst cannot turn out officers capable of training a platoon and its leader up to platoon tactics then there will have to be Army Schools for platoon commanders in the British Army. In the Indian Army the establishment of a V.C.O.'s school for platoon commanders is most desirable, primarily on account of the comparative fewness of British officers in a battalion.

The infantry officer has been taken as an example throughout, as the infantry's work is more difficult both as regards learning and teaching, than the other arms, in which technical efficiency, which can be put to the test in peace, counts so much.

A further stage in an officer's career should include a course at a Coy. Comds. school. The reiteration that this is a C.O.'s duty seems a cheap method of passing the baby to one who certainly in the Indian Army cannot do it so economically from a time and labour point of view, or so thoroughly as a school.

It is from a Coy. Comds. school that Staff College students should be selected. Those selected would carry on with a graduate course.

A Senior officers school must be retained as the final means of instruction for regimental officers.

Finally, we come to the provision and training of officers for the expansion of the Indian Army in the present crisis. In the event of the conflict being protracted over many years, and visualising the British Empire and the Americas ultimately having to be prepared to fight against Japan, the man-power of India must be made full use of. The men are there, the great need will be for officers. The resources of the universities in India must be exploited fully. There should be started in each, as soon as possible, military training cadres. These cadres should be formed of regular officers who had previously gone through a special course of training for this purpose. The object of these cadres will be to select suitable leaders to propagate military ideas and methods of teaching in the University. The provision of these

regulars will constitute another drain on regiments which will have to provide the officers. The British officer element may have to be reduced, as low as four or five in a regiment.

Administration, therefore, must be simplified by bringing organisation on to a field-service basis throughout India.

The turnout of the officers training schools must be further increased, and schools established for training prospective instructors.

As the war progresses, there will be an increasing number of officers who may be suitable only for the more sedentary jobs. Many of these might usefully be employed as instructors in training establishments; they will have the added advantage of having had war experience.

CORRESPONDENCE

"LETTERS BETWEEN A BRITISH OFFICER AND AN INDIAN GENTLEMAN"

September

My dear "Y",

When we were discussing Indian culture some time ago, I mentioned a problem in which I was interested, and you very kindly said you would put it to an Indian friend of yours, who was interested in matters cultural. So here it is:

I recently spent two years in the Indianizing battalion of my regiment. I have always been a keen advocate of the Indianization of the officer cadre of the Indian Army, and I, therefore, had a most interesting time. There were problems of many kinds. But one of the most difficult to my mind was that of maintaining and stimulating the young officer's interest in the culture of his own country. I realise of course that many British officers—probably a big majority—see no problem in this. A few officers to whom I have put the point, have replied: "And a damned good job too—anyway what culture is there in India?" But I am not satisfied. So far as military science is concerned, the young officer must turn to British books, unless he reads French or German. I never felt happy, however, to see their reading consisting wholly of "Punch", "Blackwoods", "Illustrated London News", "The Tatler", and "The Statesman" or "The Times of India"; and perhaps the odd English novel from the library. It seemed to me that if all their intellectual food, so to speak, was European, there was a danger of their becoming more and more alienated from their own country and its culture. That would be tragic from the Indian point of view. Not only will it lead eventually to a sense of frustration in the individual, but from the nation-building point of view, the remarkably valuable contribution of these men will be lost. I say "remarkably valuable" deliberately, because I feel that in their training and service they acquired that self-disciplined and social and religious toleration, which is lacking in Indian youth generally.

Well, am I right, or am I wrong? If I am wrong, then there is no problem. If I am right, then how can the intellectual diet be adjusted to a more healthy balance? What Indian papers and journals are there that can be taken by an Officers' Mess? What

authors are there, other than Tagore, whose works they should be encouraged to read? What other methods are there by which the educated young Indian officer can retain what is best in the tradition and culture of his own country, whilst imbibing what is useful and beautiful in European thought? Politics, of course, must be barred. The gladiator may be a national tragedy. The political gladiator would be a national disaster.

Yours ever,
"X".

October.

Dear Colonel "X",

My friend "Y" has shown me your letter, and I would like to have a shot at answering your problem.

"Anyway what culture is there in India?" What a comment! But I fear that having regard to the life led by most British military officers of the Indian army, no other question could have been expected. It is difficult to define culture. The best set of definitions of culture I have so far come across is in a book which unfortunately is out of print now. It is "Culture and Anarchy" by Matthew Arnold. Considering the level of culture that obtains in the English Public Schools it is not surprising that the book has gone out of print. There has been recently a great deal of revival of interest in 'culture' in the British universities, led mainly by T. S. Eliot and Dr. Leavis George. I am referring to English authors and English literature, firstly because they give me an apparatus to use in the question you set, and secondly because you will understand this apparatus better. Culture in short is awareness of the value of one's tradition as it has been handed down. It presupposes on the part of the cultured individual the capacity for value-judgments. Are Indian military officers aware of this tradition and have they capacity for such judgments? I know about 20 of them who used to be with me in college and later in England, and I am afraid that with one or two exceptions, they have not. But in this do they differ from other Indians? I doubt it. Most Indians, as a result of a deplorable educational system, have little or no culture. A cultured man has good taste; for this there is no *substitute*. Most Indian officers have no taste except for good living and alcohol. They are completely divorced from the cultural traditions of their country. They are not good thinkers because they do not possess a good mental apparatus. Most of them are good

healthy animals because they feel that that is in keeping with the tradition of the British Army.

But what is this tradition of India of which they should be aware? Indian tradition in its superficial aspects is rather ugly. It is a pity that the people who stress it are often old-fashioned, dogmatic, sectarian and in many ways unpleasant old fogeys. That puts off the healthy younger set. But as I said, a cultured man is not only conscious of his tradition, but also has a capacity for value-judgments. The old-fashioned set have no value-judgments but only knowledge of their tradition which is of no use to anybody. It is easy to be fond of the French tradition or of the rather less attractive English tradition. In short, it is easy to be fond of the European tradition, but to be fond of Indian culture demands an effort. This can only be done by means of right education from childhood. What Indian army officers, and in fact a large number of westernised Indians cannot reconcile in their minds, is a semi-western mode of living, dress and training, with a proper understanding of the Indian tradition. Since they do not like the old-fashioned set who love it, they begin to hate the Indian tradition as something stupid, conventional and unclean.

Indian tradition is not unified. In certain essentials it is, but in detail it varies from province to province, and certainly shows up different aspects among Hindus and Muslims. This means that it is not easy to understand and handle. This is another difficulty. Perhaps I could summarize it as follows:

A knowledge of Indian History, not the school text-book history which catalogues battles won and lost, but Indian social and economic history; and of some classics including Ramayana and Mahabharata and Kalidas on the one hand and Persian poets on the other; sufficient knowledge to be able to derive genuine pleasure from Urdu and Hindi poets such as Ghalib, Mir, Iqbal, Surdas, Kabir, etc.; sufficient patience to be able to read Hindustani prose-works of the 19th century which are neither thrillers, nor best-sellers; an interest in Indian architecture, frescos and mural paintings, etc.; and sufficient patriotism to enjoy Indian festivals. Indians who possess some of these qualifications would also take to the best in Western culture and literature. Alternatively, Indians who have learned to love the best in Western culture and literature would like some of these things. But how can those who cannot be called educated, cultured and intellectual turn to anything good, whether Indian or Western?

With Indian officers it is not merely that they are not aware of the Indian tradition, but that they are not aware of any tradition. In short, they are not cultured. To read thrillers, best-sellers, or to be keen on films, etc. etc., or to derive real enjoyment from "The Tatler," etc., except only as a pastime when one is very fatigued, is what I may call anti-culture.

But there—India's educational system and the whole outlook of the Indian Army are non-cultural.

What are the magazines and books they can turn to: some Urdu, Hindi, and Persian poets, Munshi Prem Chand and Iqbal, Tagore, books on Indian architecture and paintings, Indian music as a hobby, Radha Krishna's books on Indian philosophy, Indian Economics: of magazines—unfortunately very few.

In a brief letter like this, I cannot say more. Are my ideas at all helpful?

Yours sincerely,
"Z"

LETTER FROM A BATTERY COMMANDER WITH THE B. E. F.

[*By the courtesy of a correspondent there has come into our hands this interesting footnote to history. The writer was serving with a Field Regiment in India in June,* 1939. *He went home on leave and, at the end of August, joined a Field Regiment in England. He went to France in early September,* 1939, *and he is still serving with his Regiment "somewhere in England."—Ed.*]

One saw so little of the thing as a whole that even now events that happened in the battery and regiment are still coming to light.

First of all, I'd like to say that the B. E. F. was never once beaten by frontal attack. Many counter-attacks were made successfully at the point of the bayonet. What was happening the whole time was that the French and the Belgians were being pushed back on either flank.

At the start everything went according to plan and we took up our position on the N. E. of Brussels. Actually we got our first taste of fire the evening before we got there, when 4 M. E.-110 came over our hide and machine-gunned us (no casualties on either side), but we were rather afraid they would come back later and drop some bombs, which, thank goodness, they didn't.

I can't remember the exact date on which we fired our first round in anger, but we had our first misfortune that evening.

We had to send a F. O. O. off at speed in our armoured O.P. and in trying to avoid a mass of refugees the driver wrote it off. A great pity as it would have been invaluable later. Our first march back by night was a bit trying. Maps a trifle out of date and all sorts of bypasses around Brussels not marked. Parts of the city burning furiously and the odd shell coming over. Luckily the whole time we had a moon as all the marching was done at night.

The first part of the withdrawal was according to plan—and then the French gave way on our right and things went pretty quickly. About this time (after the first move) we were in one position for over 48 hours—the longest time we were ever in one place till we got to the beach. Here we got our first real taste of shelling. They found my Bty. H.Q. but only managed to kill four cows in the field outside the farmhouse. One cross-roads on the way to R.H.Q. was particularly unhealthy. We did a longish march that night, meeting our guides about dawn, who led us by a very tortuous way to selected positions. (You'll see the reason for this explanation shortly.) That day we did a fair amount of shooting, but had very vague information about the enemy. We also milked the cows and made butter and slew several pigs which we took along with us. (Anything—pigs and cows—we couldn't take, we shot.)

Just at dusk that evening the adjutant arrived in a great hurry on a motor-bike saying I was wanted at R.H.Q. He led off at a great pace, me following on a 8-cwt. truck. Orders were to withdraw immediately—Boche had broken through on our left (quite close). I got on the 'phone and had just got as far as "Cease-firing" when the line went. So I started off back to collect the Bty. Then came a most frightful nightmare for two hours nearly. Could I find the Bty. position? Could I hell? . . . (It was dark then.) All I had to guide me was a farmhouse on fire which I knew was about 800 yards from the Bty. I went around and around that farmhouse but not a sign could I see. Then I got on a main road and I saw, coming towards me, lots of our own troops, who had had a pretty gruelling day. I had to go on because I knew the way I'd come from was wrong. Then to a cross-roads in a town with a signpost. I didn't stay long looking at the signpost as they had the place pretty well taped and there were many corpses lying about there. I eventually found them. The words "Cease-firing" had been just enough to get them out of action and formed up on the road.

I was two hours late at the starting point but that didn't matter much. It was from that position, I think, that we put down a Regimental concentration on a factory where a lot of Boches had been forming and whence most unpleasant mortar fire had been directed on our infantry. It was a grand sight I'm told and the infantry in the front line stood up and cheered like mad. Twenty-four 25-pounders putting over stuff at rapid or intense for 10 minutes makes a bit of a mess at the other end. They are damn good guns and we had absolutely no trouble with them. In the next 36 hours we came into action four times —by which I mean we had to move four times and I may say I was pretty tired by then—no sleep for nearly three days and three nights.

By this time we were back near Lille, near the positions we had been spending months constructing. I think I managed to get a bath somewhere here and a few hours' sleep.

Then came a notable day, May 26th, when we were as good as told that we would probably never get away. We had heard that before, but this time it was looking pretty sticky, and we were told to send off certain officers and N.C.O.s to train the next B.E.F.

Next day was a red-letter day. It was a thing that every gunner officer dreams about. Sitting in a wonderful O.P. (though rather obvious) and seeing the Boche going across your front. I think I got amongst them a dozen times that morning and literally must have put hundreds out of action. I had two points accurately registered. I saw the Boche coming and gave "Tgt P.B. 2, fire by order, 5 rounds gun-fire"—and as they passed a certain point—"Fire"—then followed them up till they got into a wood, and plastered the wood for a bit. We had plenty of ammunition then, and had had the whole time, till towards the end. I shall never forget my Bt. captain, coming up to me one night, just after we had come into action, and I was going to try and get some much-needed sleep, and saying that 27 3-ton lorries were arriving full of ammo.... and I was the only person who knew how to get to all three troops. Well, to continue—during that same morning, I suddenly saw a Boche battery open up, 5.9" I think. I could see one gun through a telescope, and ranged on it. About the third round of fire for effect landed amongst the ammunition and it went up in a sheet of flame. Then I strafed the farm buildings where I thought the other

three guns were and set them on fire. That battery did not fire again.

Our next stop was, I think, at the famous "Plug Street," and then they sent us—a Field Regiment—on what appeared to be a suicide trip—to go posthaste to Dixmude and hold the bridge there. Information about the enemy—Nil. In fact it was quite probable that they were there already! We should get there about 2 a.m. and no infantry could get there until 6 a.m. at the earliest. Just as we had about arrived there we were told that the bridge had been blown and that we need not go. What had happened was that a troop of cavalry had arrived at one end of the bridge as some Boche arrived at the other. They shot them up and blew the bridge.

Then we moved on to the Dunkirk area—actually about 12 miles E. of it. We came into action, then out again, and that evening came into action amongst the sand dunes. That night I got my first good night's sleep as I knew we could not move back any more. Next morning the Boche were within range and we stayed there for, I think, four days while thousands were embarking. Amn. was a bit short now. In the earlier stages one troop got through 250 rounds per gun in 24 hours (in one day). Now we were down to 16 R.P.G. per day. I managed to scrounge some more, then, miraculously, more arrived. It had just been put into a barge and run ashore at high tide. The same with food—it was just dumped and you went and helped yourselves.

The ground is very flat there but there was one hill with a restaurant in the form of a windmill on top. I had to have an O.P. there. It sustained over 50 direct hits with 4.1″ and 5.9″ H.E. and was still standing (or half of it was) and only one man wounded.

On the last night two troops had to be destroyed and the detachments sent on to LA PANNE and I had to keep one troop in action until 1-30 a.m. I still had an F.O.O. out with the infantry, but his wireless was dis. and I could not get in touch with him. He came in about 11 p.m., badly wounded in the face, on a motor-cycle. His truck was also out of action. Three signallers were still out, so I had to get into my truck and go and fetch them. Pitch-dark. Along the coast road littered with vehicles that had been destroyed—road full of shell-holes—tram wire poles all over the place. Then through an avenue of trees, rather the same, only for poles read trees. All this time I had

seen our infantry withdrawing, then I didn't see any more and quite expected to see the Boche following up. Then up to a cross-roads at Oost—Dunkirk where there wasn't a brick standing for 100 yards in any direction, then on for half a mile till I couldn't get any further because of holes in the road and a burning farmhouse falling across. Still no signs of the signallers. So back I went and they rolled up a little later, having marched with the last infantry.

By 2 a.m. we had destroyed the last gun. My truck and a 30-cwt. for the skeleton detachments were quite close, but when we went to start it off, my car had been knocked out of action and the 30-cwt. so riddled that it blew up after half a mile. So we proceeded to walk only two miles to where we were supposed to embark—La Panne. We were met by the Div. Cmdr. who said that it was impossible and that nothing could live on the beach. We were to wait while his staff were doing a recce. for another route. We lay in the sand dunes, luckily, as some people in houses on the other side of the road got wiped out. Then, eventually, on to the beach, and tramp, tramp, tramp. Came the dawn and we were just inside France and the beach was black with people. Then the Boche planes arrived. We went into the sand dunes and slept for an hour or two. Then on again till about mid-day when we climbed into a boat. More bombing—one either side of the ship. Six p.m. arrived Folkestone. Everybody very tired, unwashed, unshaved and with our tails between our legs. But what a reception! The whole way every station we passed through, every village we passed, were crowds of cheering people.

One little sidelight before I finish. The N.A.A.F.I. had a huge warehouse in Lille. On our way back we were short of cigarettes so sent a three-tonner down. There was no one there so we borrowed about 500,000 cigarettes and a few crates of whisky, gin and champagne. But do you know that we never had time to drink that whisky. I tried hard but many a time just fell asleep over it. In the end we had to break the bottles and pour the cigarettes down a well.

Well, there you are—a rather disconnected series of events, very much potted, but I hope they may be of interest. Total casualties in the Bty., one Officer and three men wounded in action, and one Officer and 14 men drowned on the way home.

REVIEWS

OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

(Oxford University Press, 3d.)

The Gestapo	O. C. Gibs	No. 36.
War & Treaties	Arnold D. McNair	No. 37.
South Africa	E. A. Walker	No. 39.
Latin America	Robin A. Humphreys	No. 43.
The Military Aeroplane	E. Colshn Shepherd	No. 44.
The Jewish Question	James Parkes	No. 45.
Germany's "New Order"	Duncan Wilson	No. 46.
Canada	Graham Spry	No. 47.

In the latest batch of these excellent booklets the most topical, perhaps, is the brilliant little summary of Germany's "New Order." The author, writing in March last, makes the interesting point that full-blast German propaganda on this elusive (and illusory) theme only began after the defeat of the Luftwaffe in August-September, 1940. Renewed emphasis on it since the attack on Russia confirms the view that it is only brought into the foreground when Germany faces determined resistance. The implications of the New Order—the reduction of the rest of Europe beyond to the status of agricultural serfdom, providing food for Germany and consuming the products of German industry—are well known, but it is interesting to find that Italy is already being openly relegated to the "harvest helpers" class. Mr. Gibs, writing on the Gestapo, surveys the New Order from another angle, that of the Nazi Secret Police, whose organisation and rather sensational brutalities are described in a well-informed manner.

Of great general interest is Professor McNair's Essay on War and Treaties. We are inclined to forget that international law is a bulwark of the *status quo* and the author rightly points out that until some machinery—more satisfactory than Article 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations—is set up for treaty revision, wars are inevitable.

The pamphlet on the Jewish Problem throws some stimulating light on another international question but the admitted growth of anti-Semitism in countries where this disease has

hitherto lain dormant—Lindbergh's recent speeches in the States are significant—makes it difficut to be hopeful of any final solution, the author of the pamphlet himself does not offer one.

Anti-Semitism also features in the pamphlet on South Africa. Any reader of this must feel conscious of the many disintegrating factors in South African life. It was fortunate for the Empire that Field Marshal Smuts was able to direct a sufficient volume of opinion towards the common cause against Germany and away from the dangerously Nazi sentiments of Dr. Malan and Mr. Pirow. Canada, too, has its problems of unity and, for some years before the war, as Mr. Spry shows, it was by no means certain that another European war would not find Canada a friendly neutral rather than an active participant. People in the United Kingdom are dangerously complacent about these matters and it is interesting to find Mr. Spry pointing out that by Canadians the Royal Visit, so happy in its timing before the war, was regarded as a symbol more of Canadian than Imperial unity.

Dr Humphrey's pamphlet on Latin America is necessarily a great feat of compression when it is realized that it is "the richest raw-material producing area in the world free from the domination of any great power." There are signs that Britain's neglect of this part of the world is ceasing and in spite of the large population of Axis descent, the help given by many famous Britons in the South American Wars of Independence should prove of great value.

The last pamphlet, on the Military Aeroplane, deals with general principles rather than existing types of machines and hence does not "date" in spite of being written last February. Laymen, particularly, will find their appreciation of the radio and newspapers greatly improved by reading this.

V. E. S.

BRITAIN'S BLOCKADE

By R. W. B. Clarke

(Oxford University Press, 3d.)

First added to the "Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs" in October, this small volume had already been reprinted twice before the end of last year. And with reason, for its thirty odd pages contrive to cover most of the ground. The author, a specialist in the economic problems of war, here sets forth the

aims and methods of the blockade, with special reference to the strategy of aerial bombardment, in a manner that makes for easy reading.

In an extremely clear, though necessarily condensed, review of our objectives, the admission is made that, in the first eight months of the war, owing to technical difficulties the blockade failed in possible effectiveness. By last autumn, however, these obstacles had to a large extent been overcome: fewer neutrals made for simpler administration. Mr. Clarke then goes on to describe the relative poverty of Europe's natural resources. From oil and coal to metals and textiles, all the vital raw materials are inadequate. It is not fully realised that although it receives most publicity, the European deficiency in food is actually less striking than that of other supplies. As the author explains, save in abnormal harvest years she is self-sufficient in food—of a sort. The next section of the pamphlet, dealing with the position in 1940-1, makes even more interesting study, since it gives the results of last year's harvests, this year's prospects and the effects of German aggression upon agriculture in general: going on to deal with the question of relief for occupied territories. Stress is laid on the big adjustment from former scales of living to the dreary standards of the Nazis: in the author's neat phrase "The market-place has become the Adolf Hitler Platz."

In view of the present situation in France and the Low countries, it is useful to be reminded of how, in the last war, American attempts to relieve near-starvation were impeded. The survey there concludes with a brief outline of the prospects of Britain's blockade in perspective; Mr. Clarke has good reasons to suppose that from this summer onwards the enemy will be conscious of definite economic weaknesses. So, on a note of restrained confidence, ends a valuable contribution to an excellent series of pamphlets. Economists are not noted for their optimism—very much the reverse; even this degree of hope is therefore most encouraging and reassuring.

A. G. B.

PRESIDENT'S REPORT FOR 1940

FINANCE

The auditor's report is before the members of the council: the statement of accounts has been issued to all members of the Institution. The auditor's report is satisfactory. Income from subscriptions and advertisements in the journal has declined. Expenditure has been generally reduced, principally on the journal which has, however, maintained a satisfactory standard under prevailing circumstances. As a result the year's working shows an income over expenditure of Rs. 6,403-8-10 against Rs. 4,989-13-7 the year before.

The financial position of the Institution remains sound. The balance on capital account stands at Rs. 1,29,205.

Rs. 15,000 were invested in 3 per cent Defence Bonds, 1946. Investments, Post Office Cash Certificates and fixed deposit total Rs. 87,596. Investments had however depreciated in value at the end of the year by a net amount of Rs. 1,008 below cost. Cash and other balances amount to Rs. 10,570.

2. *MEMBERSHIP*

The result of the war has apparently been that a number of members have resigned prematurely while others have failed to pay their subscriptions while neglecting to resign.

Sixty-five ordinary members were enrolled during the year against 74 ordinary members died or resigned. 22 members were struck off for non-payment of subscriptions leaving a net reduction of 31. This is a lower net reduction than the previous year, but only because special measures were taken to extend membership.

A further 53 members have had to be struck off for non-payment of subscription, since the close of the year; although it is possible that some of these may pay up in due course.

On 31st December, 1940, the position was:

Life members	...	391
Honorary member	...	1
Ordinary members	...	1,398
		1,790

The small reduction during the last two years is satisfactory in the circumstances and there are signs that membership will continue at a satisfactory total.

3. *LIBRARY*

The library has now been fully card-indexed on a proper system and the new catalogue has been issued. Purchase of suitable books continues and the popularity of the library is maintained.

Eighty-three books were added during the year and 540 borrowed.

It is hoped that members will make suggestions for the purchase of volumes likely to be of interest or value.

4. *JOURNAL*

As mentioned, the standard of the Journal has been maintained; but more contributions would be welcomed. Entries for the Prize Essay were disappointing in numbers and did not merit the award of the medal.

5. *LECTURES*

During the year the following lectures were delivered at Simla and were well attended. His Excellency the Viceroy honoured the Institution with his presence at the lecture on the "Air Warfare."

1. "Archæology" by Mr. H. Waddington.
2. "Air Warfare" by Air Commodore A. Claud Wright, A.F.C.
3. "Naval Warfare" by Commander J. Ryland, R.I.N.
4. "Land Warfare" by Brigadier E. E. Dorman-Smith, M.C.
5. "The Theatre of War in Africa and the Middle East" by Lieut.-Colonel C. A. Osborne.