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The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

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THE DIFFICULTIES OF TRACING ADDRESSES ARE NOW VERY MUCH INCREASED. MEMBERS ARE EARNESTLY REQUESTED TO KEEP THE SECRETARY INFORMED OF CHANGES IN THEIR ADDRESSES.

THE COVER OF THE JOURNAL

The opposite page is a facsimile of the cover which it is proposed to introduce for future numbers of the Journal. It has been suggested that the colour of the printing might be varied for each quarter's number, say—

January	...	Red,
April	...	Blue,
July	...	Dark green,
October	...	Black,

or that the colour should be, say, red for every number.

The opinion of members is invited, because there is no intention of making any change which is contrary to the wishes of the majority of members. Members are, therefore, invited to complete the attached form and return it to the Secretary. An unsealed envelop with a half-anna stamp is sufficient if no writing matter is added.

Name: .....

I am opposed to any alteration in the existing cover.

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(Please mark the sentence which represents your opinion.)

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EDITORIAL

"The War"

The British Expeditionary Force has come well through its test in Flanders and France. On no occasion was its front ever broken and its tactics and equipment were proved to be suitable with few minor adjustments. Tactically the long winter of defence had slightly dulled the edge of its offensive spirit, and the German infiltrating tanks and infantry were not attacked with the vigour they deserved. This has been put right by the introduction of sub-units whose duty it is to hunt any enemy forces that penetrate the position. It was known that the infantry anti-tank weapons were not on a lavish scale, and these are being increased. Mortars have proved their value, and the armoured carrier has come through with flying colours. These carriers, as many people expected, were used as tanks when the necessity arose, and for many other tasks which were forbidden in training.

Our artillery suffered from lack of air support, and were outranged in the medium categories. Engineers' equipment is being simplified; the number of tools they carry will be reduced and the bridging equipment will be further standardized and reduced in variety. The Armoured Corps saw a lot of fighting; the armoured cars and the later models of cruiser tanks were both invaluable; the light tanks and the infantry tanks suffered from lack of armour and speed respectively.

That our hastily manufactured equipment has proved itself so well is very satisfactory though not unexpected; but what is most satisfactory is that the British soldier has proved himself man for man the equal of the German; and, since he proved it "man for three men" it is safe to assume that this is an underestimate.

The German surprised us by the quantity and quality of their tanks; and by the weight and efficiency of the air-support they gave their troops. Otherwise they did nothing to suggest uncanny value as soldiers, in fact they showed a marked dislike

of being attacked. This is probably a psychological result of Nazism, which is an aggressive creed, not designed to move in reverse.

* * * *

"The Fall of France"

The full story of the collapse of France will not be known until the war is over, but it appears that her military leaders were unable to stand the strain of misfortune. They admitted defeat before their men did, yet they were men who had been proved in battle twenty-one years ago. Perhaps the following quotation is relevant:

"I am doubtful whether the fact that a man has gained the Victoria Cross for bravery as a young officer fits him to command an army twenty or thirty years later. I have noticed more than one serious misfortune which arose from such assumptions. Age, easy living, heaviness of body, many years of promotion and success in time of peace, dissipate the vital forces indispensable to intense action. During the long peace the State should always have ready a few naval and military officers of middle rank and under forty. These officers should be specially trained and tested. They should be moved from one command to another and given opportunities to take important decisions. They should be brought into the Council of Defence and cross-examined on their opinions. As they grow older, they should be replaced by other men of similar age."

This was written ten years ago by the man who is now Prime Minister of England.

* * * *

After the War

It is always of interest to speculate on the subject of "after the war." There is one facet of this subject which seems inevitable. The Germans are waging a more ruthless war than any that has yet been fought in modern history. Their ruthlessness is almost as much against their own people as against us. It is ruthless leadership as much as ruthless execution and, as such, it must be met by ruthless leadership on our part. The Germans have regimented their population without regard to individuals' wishes; they have suppressed without mercy all who might be dangerous to their cause; as an example, they have killed all dogs that are of no use to the country. We are slowly following in some of the same directions; and it is quite certain

that before we achieve victory we shall have followed further still. This means that by the end of the war we shall be governed by men who are not used to the benign and bureaucratic methods of peace; nor even to the constitutional rigours that won us the last war. They will be men who have become used to sacrificing parts for the good of the whole, and to dealing with, and rendering harmless, unhelpful and disloyal elements. Such men are unlikely to be tolerant with people who could have, but have not, helped us when we most needed help. There are quite a lot of these people within the Empire.

* * * *

Air Co-operation

The question whether the Army should or should not have its own air arm was apt to become acrimonious before the war. We now have a lot of evidence on which to judge the true values of the problem. The Germans gave extremely heavy and effective close support to their armies in Flanders, whilst we used the great majority of the Royal Air Force on other tasks. The result of the land battle proves conclusively that direct support by the heaviest air forces is an essential of success. The results of the air warfare which is still continuing are not known, but no one can doubt that they will be found to have proved that Germany has lost vitally by neglecting the practice of purely air warfare. At first sight both sides of the argument have been proved right: close support of land forces leads to victory and purely air warfare may be able to inflict defeat. If this is so, then the correct answer lies in building an air force which can attack either land forces, or air forces and the enemy's country. Ours was trained primarily for the latter, the Germans' for the former. The problem is one of dual purpose machines and general training, for neither we nor Germany can hope to have two separate forces for the two rôles. There are already machines which can be switched from one task to the other, and these will be developed. In the past our training has leant unduly towards bombing and fighting, possibly because the army's claim for their own squadrons gave close co-operation with the army the reputation of being too specialised and highly trained work for the ordinary pilot. Certain aspects of army co-operation such as artillery co-operation are highly specialised; but the German methods of close support require no very different training from that of the fighter or bomber crews.

If the army is to have sufficient support for it to be successful in a decisive battle on land, nothing less than the entire resources of the Air Force will provide it, and if only the air force will accept this principle, the idea of the army having its own support squadron will soon die a natural death. The support of land forces is one of the tasks which the Air Force may be required to carry out and they, in their turn, must regard it as a normal rôle for which all must be trained. They will have to train a few specialists in artillery co-operation and other refinements, as they do now, and whether they or the army control the unexciting lives of those who pilot troop-carrying and supply aircraft is not very important.

* * * *

"The Far East"

It is not at present clear whether Japan is working in the East for herself alone or for others as well. The new Konoye Cabinet is undoubtedly under the influence of the militarists, but Prince Konoye himself is an experienced and responsible statesman who may be able to exert a steadying influence.

Japanese pressure on French Indo-China has had the result of bringing Japan into closer relationship with Thailand. It is generally recognised that Thailand wishes to recover the provinces west of the Mekong river which were ceded to France at the end of the nineteenth century as the price of her acquiescence in the Japanese invasion of Tonking.

The closing of the Burma road naturally provoked Chinese resentment against Great Britain but it has not altered Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek's determination to carry on the struggle. In point of fact Chinese forces have assumed the offensive in the north and in Shantung province. The Generalissimo has also announced his intention of actively assisting in the defence of Indo-China should the Japanese invade.

The United States Government announcement that they proposed to put an embargo on the export of oil and scrap-iron was taken by the Japanese as aimed directly at themselves. They may be right. The immediate result has been the despatch from Tokyo of a strong mission to the Netherland East Indies where ample resources of both commodities are available.

Finally, it is apparent that, Japan is seizing the opportunity to establish her policy of a new order in Asia while France is impotent and Great Britain occupied in Europe. It remains to be seen whether she can complete this policy and at the same time finish the war in China.

The Articles in this Number.

"FIFTY YEARS AGO"—These are short extracts from the U.S.I. Journal which was published exacty fifty years ago. It does not require any imagination, nor many changes of words, to apply these extracts to the present.

"THE VALUE OF MECHANISATION IN ASSISTING TO SOLVE THE DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF INDIA" is the essay which, although not awarded the Medal, was judged the best submitted for last year's Gold Medal Prize essay. Certain omissions have been made before publication in the interests of secrecy, but these do not affect the author's purport.

"MORALE OF THE INDIAN ARMY" is a strong and necessary plea for more interest being taken in the Morale of the Indian soldier. It gives a very just description of existing conditions and constructive suggestions for their improvement.

"MESSES AND CLUBS" is the financial article of this number. The belief that unit messes have outlived their day is widely held among junior officers and readers' views on this article will be welcomed.

"LEARNING PERSIAN" lacks the female interest we expect from "Karshish"; but nothing else.

"THE WAR IN EAST AFRICA—A ROLE FOR THE INDIAN ARMY" is a timely article by an officer with first-hand expereince of the subject. His comments on Italian prestige in East Africa are illuminating and encouraging.

"THE FUTURE OF THE TRIBAL AREAS" gives a description of the North-West Frontier and its history which is of interest to those who are new to the subject. The author advocates a scheme which will result in the replacement of regular troops from Frontier duty. Any scheme to this end merits careful study.

"MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS AGO" requires no comment.

"POLITICAL COMMISSARS IN THE SOVIET ARMY" is a short article on a subject which has been in the news lately.

It explains the events which have led to their absorption into the army.

"PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS".—The author of this article is no fumbling amateur. He is not wholly content with what is now achieved in India; and perhaps few people are. India has not got the resources of experts that are available in England, so some degree of amateurism must be accepted, but it is thought that more thorough efforts might be made to ensure that the right type of propaganda does reach the soldier and the ex-soldier and peasant in his village.

"A STUDY IN RUSSIAN STRATEGY".—This article is not quite correctly named. From a military point of view the subject is "Administration" rather than "Strategy," but as the military aspect of the article is obscure it does not matter much.

"O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR".—This is the last of the series.

"FIFTY YEARS AGO"

(*From the October, 1890, Number of the Journal of the U.S.I.*)

"The Council have chosen as the subject for their Gold Medal Essay, 1891, the following:

Our recruiting grounds of the future for the Indian Army, in view to obtaining the best material available for soldiers; the "Pax Britannica" having reduced the warlike spirit of some races which have hitherto supplied our native armies by inducing their youth to lay aside the sword for the ploughshare."

* * * *

Extracts from a paper read at the United Service Institution, Simla, on 10th September, 1890, by Captain C. M. Maguire on the Difficulties Attendant on Assuming the Initiative in Modern European Warfare:—

"Though continental warfare is of less immediate interest to us English, than to the other European nations, the armed peace prevailing on the continent is too burning a question not to affect a power of world-wide interests, like ours, at least indirectly. We have so long formed part of the European comity of nations, that sentiment alone will prevent us from regarding a great European war with indifference.

If the value of a discussion, a great part of which is involved in theory, be questioned, it may be argued in reply, that it was by forming tentative conclusions based on careful theoretical study that the Germans were able to prepare detailed plans of operations, and to impart a training to their troops, which enabled them after fifty years of peace to inflict during the space of five years crushing defeats on two of the greatest military empires in Europe.

. . . . .

It is, however, justifiable to anticipate that, in armies with a war establishment of some forty thousand officers, more military genius will be developed than heretofore, and that three or four great leaders will be able to exercise the same influence over a modern army as Napoleon did on the smaller armies of his day.

. . . . .

Therefore, if Germany is acting by herself, circumstances will compel her to violate the neutrality of Belgium, and perhaps (though this is less probable owing to geographical considerations) of Luxemburg also.

. . . . .

There can be no doubt but that the more highly civilised a nation is, the more acutely it feels the sacrifices entailed by war.

When war becomes imperatively necessary, there seems no reason to believe that patriotism will grudge the sacrifices required for the maintenance of national honour. Should it be so, little regret need be felt for the loss of a civilisation that renders a people too unmanly to defend its rights."

* * * *

The concluding paragraphs of an article entitled "The Resurrection of the Lance" by Captain G. J. Younghusband:—

Being a cautious nation, and ever fearful of spending a shilling, though our wealth is vast beyond the dreams of avarice, all things with us have to be done very gradually, so that the expense may be spread over a long period. Instead of manfully spending our shilling down on the nail, and all at once, as other nations do, we more frequently spread the expense over a series of years, and spend our shilling gradually at the rate of two pence per annum.

So with the lance, instead of going with the times and lumping for one weapon or another, we allow it to filter in, in a surreptitious and half-unauthorised manner. The Colonel of a regiment, on his own responsibility and expense, arms the front rank of his regiment with lances, possibly by the personal influence of the some one high in command. After several years, this regiment struggles manfully into the ranks of the lancer regiments. Why all this difficulty? I am sure I cannot think unless as I said before, the expense is what stands in the way. Curiosity has impelled me to calculate out the possible cost of turning a regiment into a lancer regiment. If I err not it would cost about £125 per regiment, and twenty regiments would therefore cost £2,500. Surely this is not much for the richest nation in the world to spend upon such an important matter. Every new experience shows us more clearly, how eminently suitable the lance is for our Indian warriors, and the over-whelming wave of European opinion cannot have failed to have driven the conviction further home amongst soldiers of learning and experience. We have at this moment fourteen regiments composed of men with an unmistakable penchant for the lance: why not therefore for once in a way spend our shilling all at once and arm them with it; raising our cavalry at once to a degree of excellence unsurpassed by that of any nation? Surely it behoves us to profit by the experience of past masters in the art of war; when men like Napoleon and Marmont exclaim, after years of gignatic warfare, that the only way to meet the lance is with the lance. Surely we might profit by the lesson taught them instead of insisting on proving again in our own persons the truth of their conclusions.

THE VALUE OF MECHANISATION IN ASSISTING TO SOLVE THE DEFENCE PROBLEMS OF INDIA*

By Major D. F. W. Warren, 8th Punjab Regiment

"Here, I thought, all difficulty was over.

And so it would have been had not those twin Virtues so fatal to the joie de vivre *of our civilised West, the sense of responsibility and the illusion, dear to well-regulated minds, that every action must have a purpose—had not these virtues of Responsibility and Purpose met me at every step with the embarrassing enquiry*: 'Why *are you here*?' *and*: 'What *do you intend to do*'?"—Freya Stark: "The Valleys of the Assassins," page 7.

1.—INTRODUCTORY

(*a*) *The Scope of this Article*

To most people, "mechanisation" means the introduction of machinery to replace more primitive equipment or methods, in any field of human endeavour. The army, however, has a facility, both brutal and licentious (vide Mr. A. P. Herbert's articles in "Punch"), for twisting the English language to its own ends; and generally uses the word to describe the more limited process of replacing older forms of conveyance, and particularly animal transport or the human foot, by mechanical transport. It is in this sense that the word "mechanisation" is used in this paper.

Other aspects of army mechanisation, such as the provision of power tools and workshop machinery, are in the main developments only made possible or necessary by the mechanisation of transport, and cannot be dealt with separately in a short essay of this nature. Nor, although the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force play a great and increasing part in the defence of India against external attack, are improvements in ships and aircraft relevant to the matter in hand; for ships were mechanised once and for all when sail gave way to steam, and modern aircraft were born fully mechanised.

Again the rearward portions of the army's lines of communication do not come under discussion; for railways are no new

* The Gold Medal was not awarded for any of the essays submitted for the 1940 Gold Medal Prize Essay. This essay was selected by the judges as the best submitted and recommended for publication with certain omissions. The omissions have been made.

development, and the value of the motor lorry for third and second-line transport tasks has been proved beyond all argument.

The direct concern of this article is with the mechanisation of unit first-line transport, as now being carried out in the Army in India; with the objects of this mechanisation; and with the results likely to accrue from it.

(*b*) *Army Mechanisation: the Present Position in India*

This process is still in various stages of provisional or experimental evolution. The greater part of the cavalry, British and Indian, is being fully mechanised; and, with the exception of the few remaining horsed cavalry regiments, the whole of its personnel, equipment and stores will be carried in mechanically propelled vehicles. The same is true of the horse artillery, the medium artillery, and a proportion of the field artillery and the engineers.

In many units of the infantry arm and in most of the remaining engineer units, it is the intention to eliminate all animal transport; and to provide mechanical vehicles for the carriage of all personnel, arms, ammunition and equipment which were previously animal-carried or drawn. In addition, mechanical conveyance is to be provided for certain reconnaissance, intercommunication, administrative and fighting personnel, who previously went on foot. It should be clearly understood that the majority of the personnel of these units will still walk, as in the past, but a small proportion will now normally be carried in mechanical transport at all times; and mechanisation on these lines will make it possible, when necessary, to embus whole units, by dumping stores, etc., and thus making mechanised first-line vehicles available for the carriage of troops. Embussing of infantry in this way must, however, be looked upon as the exception rather than the rule; for, broadly speaking, the first-line mechanical transport of infantry battalions is designed and primarily intended for the conveyance of those loads previously carried by animal transport. The secondary use of unit vehicles, to carry large numbers of personnel who are not normally so carried, involves considerable readjustment and dislocation of normal transport arrangements.

2.—INDIA'S DEFENCE PROBLEMS

The help that mechanisation can give in solving India's defence problems depends firstly upon the nature of the problems themselves, and secondly upon the nature of the proposed mechanisation.

The main tasks of the Army in India are defined as follows in Army Headquarters Training Memoranda Nos. 16 and 17:

"The main tasks of the Army in India are the defence of the frontiers and coasts from external attack, and the preservation of internal security." (Army Headquarters Training Memorandum No. 16, Paragraph 1.) "It must be recognised that, in its broader aspect, this defence may on occasions entail active operations beyond the confines of India, and that troops from India may be called upon to fight in an area that extends from Egypt to Malay. As a whole, this area is undeveloped and, except in parts of India and Burma, barren and sparsely populated. Its States are large, but poor, their armies small, and places of economic or political importance few and far between . . . . Physical conditions . . . . are unfavourable to the movement and maintenance of large forces and, although at important focal points something approaching intensive conditions may develop from time to time, generally speaking conditions are favourable to manœuvre and mobile warfare. Warfare in these areas is extensive in nature.

The salient characteristics of extensive warfare are:

(*a*) a theatre of war providing great scope for rapid movement and manœuvre,

(*b*) small and mobile forces not continually in close contact and operating at great distances from rail-heads and undeveloped lines of communication which,

(*c*) not being covered by the main army, are more exposed to interference by the enemy's land forces than in intensive warfare,

(*d*) the heavier weapons are less prominent than in intensive warfare."—*Army Headquarters Training Memorandum No. 17, Appendix I.*

There is the situation in a nutshell. The future campaigns of the Army in India will be extensive, not intensive; conditions will be mobile, rather than static; and it will be possible to take full advantage of the ability to manœuvre, and to move far and fast. The Army in India requires, therefore, the greatest possible degree of mobility.

What is true of warfare in other Eastern theatres is equally true of internal security duties in India itself. In a country where internal trouble is liable to break out at short notice anywhere between the Khyber and Cape Comorin, the only way of ensuring security at a cost within the country's financial resources

is to maintain reserves at a limited number of focal points. In order that these reserves may be able to reach any threatened point as rapidly as possible, they must be able to move fast and far; and in order that they may be able to exert the requisite pressure on arrival, they must have the ability to manœuvre. In short, internal security units, like units of the field army, must be as mobile as possible.

For both its main tasks, then, the Army in India needs the highest possible degree of mobility; and to give this increased mobility is the real object of mechanisation.

3.—MILITARY MOBILITY AND MECHANISATION

(*a*) *The Anatomy of Mobility*

Whether mechanisation, as described above, will in fact fulfil this object depends largely upon the kind of mobility which it is desired to achieve: in fact, upon the *detailed* answers to the questions "*Why* is mechanisation here?": "*What* is it intended to *do*?" and: "*How* is it intended to do it?" The first two have been answered above. Mechanisation is intended to increase the mobility of the Army in India. But what exactly is meant by the mobility that is to be increased and to what extent, and in what way, will mechanisation increase it?

Military mobility is a composite quality, made up of three elements: the ability to move fast, to move far, and to manœuvre in any type of country in which the army may be called upon to operate. These are the three elements which, in a horse, would be described as "speed, staying power and handiness;" and the speed of the fighter aircraft, the radius of action of the ocean liner and the "handiness" of the cat are extreme examples of the sacrifice of two of these elements, in order to achieve pre-eminence in the third.

The degree in which any arm of the land forces needs or possesses each of these three elements depends first upon its general characteristics, including the employment, size and weight of its armament and equipment, and secondly upon its method of transporting its personnel and fighting gear. For example, heavy guns on railway mountings can move both fast and far, within the limits of the lines upon which they run; but they have no powers of manœuvre away from these lines. To go to the other extreme, marching infantry, with pack transport, has the ability to manœuvre over almost any kind of ground, in any part of the world; but its pace and radius of action are limited to what a

man can cover on his feet in a given time. To develop its maximum efficiency, each arm needs the blend of the three elements of mobility best suited to its peculiar characteristics; and it is only by attaining this blend for each separate arm that the army as a whole can achieve its maximum mobility.

The ultimate military objective in war is the overthrow of the enemy's forces in the field; and the method by which this object is normally attained is the concentration and application of superior force at the decisive time and place.

The *concentration* of superior force is intended to forestall the enemy at the decisive point; and this can seldom be achieved without bringing large numbers of troops speedily, and from a distance. The *application* of superior force, once concentration has been effected, necessitates deployment and manœuvre. Thus all three elements of mobility are essential to the overthrow of the enemy; and no army which does not possess these three elements in the correct proportions can be said to be effectively mobile, in the military sense, for it is the combination of all three that enables an army to reach the decisive place by the decisive time, and there to apply the pressure requisite for victory. Superior speed and range of movement, alone, may bring the troops there; but, unless they also have the ability to manœuvre, they will be unable to press home an attack, or otherwise take advantage of their strategical position. On the other hand, without speed and range of movement in the approach march, the troops may never arrive, or may arrive too late to use their ability to manœuvre.

(*b*) *The Element of Speed*

The plan for concentrating and applying superior force must, like all other plans, be based on a survey of the considerations affecting the attainment of this object; and one of the main factors will always be time. "Time is the most precious element in war" (F. S. R., Vol. II, Section 11, 5); and the more time a commander has at his disposal, the more thorough can be his preliminary study of the situation, and the more complete his preparations for the action that he eventually decides to take. Joshua, the son of Nun, earliest of the Great Captains, once ordered the sun to stand still upon Gibeon, and the moon in the Valley of Ajalon, and so gained the time he needed to organise and complete a victory. Commanders nowadays have lost the art of successful interference with the laws of nature, and must be content with less startling, though not necessarily less efficacious, methods of saving time. The movement, "from A to B," of

individual officers on reconnaissance and liaison duties, or of units moving to rendezvous as part of the commander's plan of operations, have always taken and will always take time. But where communications are good, or the country is suitable for mechanised movement, mechanisation makes it possible to move more rapidly, and so to reduce to a minimum the time spent in movement; and obviously the more rapid the movement, the greater will be the saving in time.

It has been said that sweat saves blood. It is eqaully true to say that speed saves time; and that time saved in war will almost invariably mean a saving in both sweat and blood.

(c) Range of Movement

So much for the time factor: Another consideration that must be taken into account in almost every military problem is the range, or "reach," of the opposing forces.

The last century saw great increases in the range of individual weapons. These increases were, however, measured at most in hundreds or thousands of yards; and it remained for the internal combustion engine to multiply the reach and striking range of whole armies three and fourfold. Before the days of motor transport, the range of an army was limited first by the distance that troops could cover on foot in a given time; and secondly by the distance ahead of the base (or later the railhead), up to which it was possible to deliver supplies by animal transport. It is true that mobile detachments, and even small forces of all arms, could move self-contained, or live on the country, for short periods; but such operations could normally only be in the nature of raids. The deliberate advance of any large force, which intended to capture and hold ground, was limited to maximum stages of 25 to 30 miles in the day, generally much less; and a lengthy pause was necessary on each stage, to advance railheads or to build up new bases for the next stage.

The introduction of mechanical transport for third and second-line tasks increased the striking range of armies, by making it possible to reduce the pause on each stage to the few hours' rest required for the marching troops; while, more recently, the carriage of the troops themselves in mechanised vehicles has made it possible to increase the length of the stages.

The increase in speed and range made possible by mechanical transport has been exploited to the full by the German armies in Poland, Norway and the Low Countries; and the operations of these armies prove conclusively that mechanisation has conferred greatly increased strategical mobility.

(*d*) *Ability to Manœuvre*

There is, however, no form of land transport yet invented that can move both fast and far in every type of country, and over every kind of ground. Both speed and radius of action are limited by considerations of ground and communications; and mechanical transport, other than aircraft, can only reach its maximum efficiency where roads are good, or the ground is suitable for mechanised movement across country. Such mechanised movement is, of necessity, generally strategical rather than tactical for the points of departure and arrival will be predetermined; and both these and the route connecting them must be such as to suit the characteristics of the transport used. The ruling factor in such a case is the presence of facilities for mechanised movement.

Once contact is made with the enemy, however, the ability to manœuvre over any kind of ground becomes more important than either speed or wide range of movement. Movement is now tactical, not strategical. The point of departure is, of course, known, but it will be chosen for purely tactical reasons, and not to suit any particular form of transport; and the route and point of arrival will be at best a good intention, and at worst a pious hope. The ruling factor here, to which everything else must be subordinated, is tactical necessity; and transport which cannot accompany the fighting troops over the country most suitable for the exploitation of their characteristics becomes a liability rather than an asset.

To take an analogy from boxing: To win a fight, the boxer must first reach the ring by the time appointed. This might be called a "strategical move;" and provided that the boxer arrives in time, and in condition to fight, the distance from which he comes, the speed with which he travels, and the route and conveyance that he employs, are governed by no laws save those of his own convenience. Once he enters the ring, however, and the fight begins, his movements become "tactical," and are governed almost entirely by the immediate necessity of hitting his opponent or of defending himself. To do either, he depends as much upon his footwork (his "ability to manœuvre") as upon his punch.

Like the boxer, a military force can employ, during the approach march, the form of transport and the route which will bring it to its place of deployment with the greatest degree of speed, safety and comfort, thereby ensuring that it is in time,

and that it is fit to fight on arrival. Once deployment commences and battle is joined, all other considerations must give way to that of hitting the enemy as hard and as effectively as possible. Ground must be chosen for its tactical value, not for its suitability for any particular form of transport; and unless the transport for fighting equipment can accompany its parent unit over the ground chosen, it must be left behind, and the equipment manhandled.

This brings us to the third great factor, ground (time and space being the other two), which affects the solution of almost every military problem. The Army in India's potential theatres of war are described in Army Headquarters Training Memorandum No. 17, quoted above, as "an area that extends from Egypt to Malaya." In the light of developments since that Memorandum was issued, it appears possible that this area may have to be enlarged.

Generalities about such an expanse of territory are apt to be misleading, but the area described can, for purposes of this article, be roughly divided into the following three main types of country:

I.—"M. T. COUNTRY," where cross-country movement by mechanical vehicles is almost everywhere possible, at all seasons of the year. Such country is to be found in the plains of India, in the south-western portion of Afghanistan, in parts of Iraq, and in the Libyan Desert.

In this type of country, it is possible for an army to operate on a purely mechanised basis; though even here riding animals would be invaluable for reconnaissance; and, when in contact with the enemy, pack transport would provide a less conspicuous, and therefore less vulnerable, means of carriage, and one whose pace would approximate more to that of marching troops.

II.—"THROUGH-ROAD COUNTRY," where regular movement by mechanical transport is possible on certain through routes, but difficult or impossible off the roads. This type of country may be exemplified by Waziristan, where roads are now available to carry men and supplies by M. T. to within marching distance of any likely objective; but where the protection of these roads, and any subsequent advance across country, necessitate movement on foot, with equipment and supplies carried on pack, or manhandled.

Here mechanical transport is needed for third and second line tasks, and for rapid long-distance strategical movement by

road; but pack transport alone can accompany troops operating away from the roads.

III.—"PACK COUNTRY," where roads are non-existent, and cross-country movement is only possible on foot. This includes the greater part of Malaya, Burma and Assam, and the hill country on India's North-East Frontier generally.

Any operation larger than a small "burn-and-scuttle" punitive expedition will necessitate the improvement of communications in this type of country, which will then gradually approximate to "through-road country." Until the through roads are ready, however, the only possible transport will be pack or porter, used in conjunction with a rail or river L. of C.

The area from Malaya to the Balkans includes a large proportion of each of these three types of country. In all, mechanical transport will be needed for third and second line tasks, either from the start of operations, or very soon after. In "M. T. country" and "through-road country," the mechanisation of unit first-line transport will increase the speed and range of strategical movement of all arms, and therefore of the army as a whole; and will not reduce in any way the power of manœuvre of the heavier, "vehicle-bound" arms. In all, however, except those areas where mechanical vehicles can move freely, everywhere and at all times, the absence of riding animals and pack transport will greatly reduce the infantry arm's power of manœuvre, and therefore its fighting efficiency; and, even in the most perfect M. T. country, a proportion of animals will be desirable for reconnaissance and the carriage of infantry fighting gear, when contact with the enemy is established, or likely.

When it is considered that the infantry is still the only arm capable of occupying and holding ground for any length of time, of fighting its own way forward in ground unsuitable for the other arms, and of consolidating gains and confirming victory, this reduction in the infantry's power of manœuvre is a serious matter for the army as a whole, and does much to offset any gain in strategical mobility.

(*e*) *Summary of Deductions from the Analysis of Military Mobility.*

It follows that mechanisation as at present projected, with its corollary of the elimination of animal transport, will increase the speed and range of strategical movement of the Army in India as a whole; and that it will not greatly affect either way

the power of tactical manœuvre of those arms which are inseparable from their wheels or tracks. It will, however, undoubtedly rob infantry battalions and other marching troops of "the little something that the others haven't got:" the ability to manœuvre in any sort of country; to operate over ground, suited to their particular characteristics, where mechanised movement is impossible; and where the ground favours this form of operation, to fight their way forward unassisted by the other arm. It is obvious that the opportunities for this kind of action will be greater in extensive warfare than they ever will be in an intensive campaign.

It also follows that neither mechanised first-line transport alone nor animal transport alone will give forces of all arms the most suitable blend of speed, range of action and ability to manœuvre, in any but a small portion of the Army in India's potential theatres of war. The Army in India can, therefore, neither afford to retain its first-line transport on a purely animal basis, for by so doing it will sacrifice speed and range; nor can it afford to make a clean sweep of its first-line animal transport, replacing it entirely by mechanical transport, for thereby troops that march and fight on their feet will lose their ability to manœuvre. In the case of the heavier arms, mechanisation can only be beneficial; but infantry and those portions of other arms which normally work in close conjunction with infantry need a practical combination of mechanical and animal transport: mechanical transport to "get them to the ring," and pack transport to ensure that their "footwork" is adequate when they engage the enemy. And since it will be necessary, on occasions, to embus infantry, it will also be necessary to have the means of delivering their animals at the debussing point in time to take over their loads from the lorries, and accompanying the marching troops on their further advance.

4. COMPOSITE FIRST-LINE TRANSPORT FOR INFANTRY

(*a*) *The Weakness of the Present Mechanisation Scheme*

The ultimate purpose of unit first-line transport, as of all other administrative components of the army, is to assist the fighting man in his mission of delivering shells, bullets, bayonets, etc., where they will do the enemy most harm; for, reduced to its simplest terms, it is only by lethal weapons that superior force can be applied. This is the ultimate object of that increased mobility, which is itself the immediate object of

mechanisation. But mechanisation that entails the manhandling of heavy weapons and other fighting equipment for long distances across country will help little towards achieving this object. In such a case, much of the time saved on the road will be wasted in slow and painful cross-country movement; and men will reach their initial battle positions late, and too tired to handle their weapons effectively. If this is to be the result of mechanisation, then mechanisation will defeat its own object.

In the delivery of destruction to the enemy, each link, from the factory to the man behind the gun, has its own part to play and each is essential to the effective waging of war. A weak link, or an unsuitable transportation agency, at any point in the chain, will impair the efficiency of the whole; and will cause shortage of vital stores with the fighting troops, and the vicious circle of congestion in the back areas. Unless unit first-line transport is so designed that the fighting troops can carry their essential fighting equipment with them in any type of country in which they themselves can operate, the whole complicated machine may be brought to a standstill, and destruction remain undelivered, for want of an efficient link between the second-line transport and the fighting man. In the present provisional infantry organisation, this link is missing.

(*b*) *The Cure: Composite First-line Transport for Infantry and other Marching Troops.*

The solution appears to be a composite first-line transport organisation, designed to give individual units, and so the army as a whole, balanced mobility, tactical as well as strategical, in any theatre of war where the Army in India may be called upon to operate. The materials out of which this composite organisation must be evolved are obviously mechanical vehicles and pack animals; for animal-drawn wheels have no advantage over mechanical transport in ability to manœuvre, and are vastly inferior to it in speed and range of movement; while only pack transport can go almost anywhere a man can go on his feet. This composite transport will, therefore, only be needed for units whose essential fighting equipment is light enough to be carried on pack: that is to say, infantry battalions, and those portions of other arms which normally work in close conjunction with infantry. Units whose fighting equipment is too heavy to carry on pack need wheeled or tracked vehicles at all times and in all circumstances. They have, therefore, no use for pack transport; and, within the limitations imposed by their heavier

armament, mechanical transport will give them maximum mobility at all times.

In the case of those units which need, and can use, pack transport for tactical movement, the mule will normally be required to take over its load from the lorry at the point where troops leave the road, or are called upon to traverse ground unsuitable for mechanised movement. The mules themselves must arrive at this point as soon as the troops; so if the troops are to be embussed, the mules must also be carried in mechanical transport.

At two mules to a 30-cwt. lorry (and most of our infantry first-line transport lorries will only carry *one* mule), this may appear at first sight to necessitate a large increase in mechanised vehicles, stores and technical personnel, with no corresponding reduction elsewhere. But need this be so? It is suggested that here, as in other matters, we may learn from the military experience of others, and from current civil practice. The French Army tows a proportion of animals behind its lorries, in trailer horse-boxes; most large racing stables use trailer horse-boxes to transport race-horses to fulfil their engagements; and fox-hunting, described by Mr. Jorrocks as "the h'image of war," has now this further similarity, undreamed of in Jorrocks's time, that the fox-hunter, like the infantryman, may come to his "road-head" in a car, and, again like the infantryman, would then be completely at a loss without his "animal transport" for "cross-country movement." Many fox-hunters have solved this problem, which is identical with that of the infantry arm, by adopting the same kind of "composite transport" used by the French Army. They use their "M.T." for its normal load, themselves, and bring their "animal transport" to "road-head" in trailer horse-boxes, towed behind their cars.

In spite of these known examples of an efficient and economical composite transport organisation, provisional establishments ordain that the infantry of the Army in India is to be entirely deprived of its vital pack transport; and, at the same time, the importance of this pack transport is tacitly admitted by the encouragement of experiments in transporting pack animals in lorries which are not only quite unsuited for the purpose, but are actually required for other loads. For want of a better organisation, the British infantry in Palestine has been compelled to resort to this same uneconomical method. It works—after a fashion, and for small detachments—but only by dumping

essential loads, and by employing an immoderate proportion of the available M.T., thus immobilising the bulk of the available troops. With the elimination of animal transport, the infantry will be reduced to the expedient of manhandling all its fighting gear, with the consequent restriction of cross-country manœuvre and waste of trained fighting manpower. In this connection, one of the earliest handbooks on the Lewis gun laid down that "the gun should be carried by a mule or an intelligent N.C.O." Of the two, the mule is the more suitable animal for the purpose —and the mule is not called upon to think and fight, in addition to carrying a load.

The inclusion in unit first-line transport of an adequate number of trailer horse-boxes, which are comparatively cheap to produce, and both cheap and easy to maintain, would enable infantry units to carry with them a proportion of animals; and would also make it possible to reduce appreciably the number of expensive lorries now needed for first-line transport tasks. Mules, like infantrymen, will normally move on their own feet; and when they do so, the trailers would be available for a proportion of the loads now carried in lorries. Admittedly, this would necessitate dumping a proportion of the unit's stores when animals are to be carried; but the necessity of dumping is now accepted when it is desired to embus men, so why not when animals are to be carried?

If these trailers were designed for traction by either a lorry or a team of mules, they could be used, when not otherwise employed, as G. S. waggons, thus making the animals earn their keep, even in peace, and saving petrol and mechanical wear and tear on short carries, both in peace and war. Even in London, the animal-drawn milk-cart and brewers' dray can still compete successfully with motor transport in what might be called "station duties."

5. CONCLUSION.

The military object of mechanisation is to increase the mobility of the army.

Real military mobility is a balanced blend of the elements of speed, range of action and ability to manœuvre; and an army, as a whole, can only achieve its maximum mobility when each arm and unit of which it is composed possesses each of these three elements in the proportions best suited to its own peculiar characteristics.

An increase in mobility implies an increase in one or more of the elements that go to make up mobility. Where such an increase, in any of the three elements, can be attained without any corresponding sacrifice in the other elements, the result will naturally be an absolute increase in the mobility of the arm or unit, and consequently of the army as a whole. In the case of the heavier, "vehicle-bound" arms, the present scheme of mechanisation gives this absolute increase in mobility; for it gives these arms increased speed and range—and that without any sacrifice of their somewhat limited ability to manœuvre.

Where, however, an increase in one of the elements is made at the expense of another element, the resulting gain or loss in mobility to the arm or unit concerned, and therefore to the army as a whole, can only be assessed by weighing the gain in one element against the loss in another. Those units whose fight-equipment, suitably carried, should be little hindrance to them in manœuvring over any sort of ground, and which in consequence should possess the highest degree of ability to manœuvre over any kind of country, will have their long-distance strategical mobility increased at the expense of their tactical mobility, and therefore of their striking power and range *on the battlefield.* In short, they will lose their handiness, and their footwork will not be what it used to be. Such units will not only fail to achieve the blend of mobility best suited to their characteristics, but they will actually lose in that element of mobility required for the successful exploitation of those characteristics; for they will now be denied the use of ground where the characteristics of the infantry arm once did, and still might, make it most valuable—ground generally quite unfit for mechanised movement. And the infantry's loss of balanced mobility will be a grave loss to the army as a whole, for infantry is still the arm that sets the seal on victory.

On balance, it would appear, therefore, that while mechanisation as at present projected will increase the mobility of a large part of the army, and particularly of the supporting arms, it will do so at a price which will more than offset any advantage gained; for, with its pack transport, the infantry will also lose its most valuable asset: the power of tactical manœuvre, and the ability to make full use of "infantry country," either offensively or defensively, unassisted by the other arms. No army can gain in effective mobility by immobilising its infantry on the battlefield.

Even in the case of the infantry, however, it is not the principle of mechanisation that is at fault; for greater speed and range of action are as essential to the infantry as they are to the other arms of which the army is composed. The fault lies in the method of application, which is based on the fallacy that the motor lorry and the pack mule are incompatible, and cannot be combined in a single transport organisation. In fact, each should be complementary to the other, for the infantry role provides each with an essential task which the other is incapable of performing.

The damage done is not yet irreparable; nor does its correction involve any great outlay, or any sacrifice of the undoubted increase in speed and range of movement conferred by mechanisation. The adoption for infantry battalions, and for units working in close conjunction with them, of a composite first-line transport organisation, on the lines suggested in this article, would in no way diminish the strategical mobility of these units, and would restore to them their lost tactical mobility; and not only is this establishment a better article for its purpose than the one it would replace, but it is probably also a more economical article, both in first cost and in upkeep.

MORALE OF THE INDIAN ARMY

By Lieutenant J. L. A. Bell

INTRODUCTION

A dictionary defines morale as "the moral condition of troops as regards discipline and confidence." This definition, though very concise, is quite clear and it shows plainly that the fruits of a good morale are confidence and discipline. It is surely more logical to say that discipline depends on morale than to say, as does Part 1 of M. T. Pamphlet 23, that "morale is primarily dependent on discipline."

There is no need to stress the overwhelming importance of a high morale in time of war. But it may well be stressed that the frightfulness and strain of modern war demand a higher standard of discipline and more confidence and faith than ever before. This is the more important in the Indian Army where the knowledge and experience of modern methods are necessarily limited. Yet in few armies can there be so little an effort made to build up morale.

Also it is an undoubted fact that nations cannot easily be flung into war in these days, except in self-defence. In other cases long preparations are necessary to persuade the people of the inevitability of war and of the justice of the cause.

The fact that this has nearly always been found comparatively easy to do does not make it less of a necessity.

THE TEACHING OF MORALE

The basis of morale can only be the existing beliefs and spiritual roots of the people. For instance, it would be useless in Switzerland to base morale on pride of Empire or in Germany to base it on love of democracy. Either one must build up on existing foundations or else build new ones. This building anew needs time and much care. It took nearly 15 years to spread the Nazi philosophy over Germany. Yet in a small and compact nation this may not be very difficult, for in the 20th century an energetic and well-conducted propaganda is capable of almost anything.

The British Empire is neither small nor compact. It comprises many races all over the world each with ideas and outlooks of its own. It is inevitable that world events are seen from

many angles inside the Empire, and it is also inevitable that their interpretation is affected by such factors as geographical position, self-interest and race.

Thus to evolve a common and vital war morale throughout the Empire may be extremely difficult.

Here the morale of the Indian Army only will be discussed.

MORALE IN THE INDIAN ARMY TO-DAY

As a corollary to the fact that morale must necessarily be built up on existing spiritual foundations, it is necessary, before setting out to instil a high morale, to search out the foundations on which to build.

The Indian soldier is a simple person. He is not much swayed by the fierce ideals which rush across the world of to-day; in most cases he never hears of them. His religion, his family, his plot of land, his race, in the narrowest sense of the term, his regiment, these are the limits of his horizon. And so long as he fights for these things only, and realises that he fights for them, his morale is unlikely to be called into question.

In parenthesis, it is worth while mentioning that the Indian is not, by nature, a mercenary. He joins the army less for economic reasons than for family reasons, or because he loves honour; and he seldom joins because of an inborn love of fighting or adventure. These feelings may exist to a certain degree but deeper still lies a love of family and home.

The bases of the sepoy's morale, mentioned above, are good enough for peace or for small Frontier Campaigns but will they sustain him in a long and terrible world war? The love of adventure, even if it was a deep sentiment, soon fades away in modern war. We seem to expect miracles from his great loyalty, but a sense of loyalty itself is thin armour against the sacrifices he will be expected to make. He must have an unshakable belief that that cause will prevail and that it is worth dying for.

THE PRESENT WAR

This war, we have been told many times, is being fought to maintain freedom and democracy and individual self-respect and the sum of culture which the world has up to now achieved or, as Lincoln puts it, for our conception of liberty and the proposition that all men were created equal.

Does the sepoy know this? Does he even understand these high phrases? How many regimental officers are able to give a passable definition of either democracy or freedom to their men in Urdu?

The sepoy is often told that in this war the security of India is threatened; that in the event of a German victory she will be dominated by new and ruthless rulers. But it is very hard for him to imagine all this. Firstly, he does not know what democracy really means; he himself has had very little experience of it. Secondly, he does not see India as a whole and has no Indian patriotism. His allegiance is to the Punjabis, or Madrassis, or Pathans, and sometimes it is even narrower than this. Thirdly, the break-up of the British Empire does not occur to him. And if it did, his knowledge of it is so vague that it would stir him to no great resolve. The great British Ráj is, to him, a material force and nothing else.

There is no intention here to make out that the expressed war aims are wrong. The idea is to show that the average Indian soldier is not yet "in" on this war. It is easier for us with our background of European and world history to understand it all. But he looks at European upheavals from his background of family quarrels and fights over land. The tension over the Italian invasion of Abyssinia was comparatively simple. It was looked upon as an attempt to jeopardise the prosperity of Egypt by controlling the headwaters of the Blue Nile. That was the sepoy's interpretation of the trouble and with such trouble he was quite at home and could sympathise with the victims.

In this war it is much less easy. From his slender sources of information he learnt of German rearmament and of the growth of an aggressive spirit, of the absorption of Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, and to him these were merely events. He then learnt of our guarantee to Poland and to other States and eventually of our entry into the war because of a German attack on the former. Before they were mentioned in newspapers or talks he had never heard of these places; still less did he know where they were, or how and why they affected us. Least of all did he and does he understand the real underlying causes of this war. He is fighting because he has been told to, for a cause he does not understand. As such he is little better than a mercenary.

He has no feeling of insecurity to urge him on, no ideals to inspire him, no patriotism. It will not be surprising should he show less enthusiasm and staying power than is expected of him.

Faith is needed in a long war; faith and a conviction that the cause is just and an inner strength to withstand the many inevitable calamities.

Instead, the sepoy gropes about, unaided, in a strange and incomprehensible world, in the midst of slogans and mottoes and 'isms about which he knows nothing.

Inevitably the conclusion is reached that the Indian soldier of to-day is totally unprepared spiritually to fight a war which may well turn out to be more fierce, more prolonged, more exhausting and more terrifying than anything of which he has even dreamed.

REMEDIES

To change such a situation, radical alterations are necessary. To begin with, the Indian soldier must be brought out of the isolation in which he lives. His ideas and thoughts now are little different from those he held after the Mutiny. In a changing world he has stood quite still.

It is essential for him to be brought face to face with the modern world and what is happening in it. And it is exceedingly important that we should do this for him of our own free will, through recognised educational channels, in which are included, of course, the military schools.

There is a spirit over India to-day which has been gathering force for many years. As a result there are demands for equality of opportunity and even independence. At present it appears to be the policy to divert these irksome currents from the martial classes, but we have as yet invented no kind of segregation that can prevent the passage of ideas. The demands are, fundamentally, so natural that, without a true knowledge of the facts, subversive propaganda is bound to have an increasing ill-effect on the Indian soldier. It is quite useless to say that he is loyal and leave it at that. It would be unfair to him and disastrous to us if we thus blindly traded on his loyalty. Nor is it any use trying to persuade him, as is so often attempted, that the various political parties of India are evil things which must be distrusted and avoided at all costs. If we expected success that way we should be very presumptuous. There is nothing in the desire for Independence or for Indianisation, that is fundamentally wrong. But from the way these subjects are brought before the Indian Army, it would seem that there is something very shameful in our policy for meeting these desires. With a great war on us, it is extremely probable that Indianisation will increase and that there will be changes in the political situation. Yet the Indian soldier is very hazy about these great currents which are passing through India. It is essential that he should know of

them and equally essential that he should not learn of them from sources which may poison his mind. He should be told exactly what is happening, with reasons. We must have confidence in him so that he can have confidence in us. Secondly, there is the question of Indian unity. At present the Indian soldier is extremely narrow-minded. The village or the district are the limits of his vision. His loyalty does not coincide with political boundaries and he has hardly any provincial loyalty, much less has he any loyalty to, or understanding of, India as a whole. It is surely unnecessary to stress how much the spread of a feeling of unity and oneness is important for the armed forces of India. Feelings such as these are important for any nation but much more so in India where the contribution of the various provinces to the armed forces is so unequal.

It is not suggested, by any means, that pride of class and sub-class should be ignored. On the contrary, great use can be made of such local loyalties. The attempt to dilute classes puts the cart before the horse and begs the wider and more important question. It inevitably causes disappointment and dissatisfaction. But it is suggested that side by side with these narrow prides there should be fostered that wider feeling of Indian unity without which a national army, as opposed to a mercenary army, is not possible.

The great traditions of the English County regiments have shown that the two are not incompatible. In fact these traditions provide a most useful outlet for the strivings of local nationalism.

The third remedy suggested is that the Indian soldier be given a more inspired view of the Empire with which he is fighting. His knowledge of it at present is limited to a few of the larger countries, strategic ports and air or shipping routes. He can usually point out New Zealand on the map, but turn the map upside down and he still points to the bottom right-hand corner.

He needs to know something about the ideals and aims of our Empire. He needs to know what we stand for and what we are fighting for. He should have some idea of what, with Indian help, the future can have in store. It is not enough for him to know that we are the strongest, richest and most widespread Empire the world has seen. After a few defeats he might begin to question our strength and perhaps his confidence will begin to fail him. Napoleon, surprising as it may seem, said that

there were two great forces in the world: the spirit and the sword. And, he added, in the end the spirit always won. The sepoy is as well able to dream dreams and see visions as any of us. But unless he has faith in his cause, and in our causes, the visions will pass and the last state of disillusionment will be worse than the first state of disinterest.

This article deals with aims rather than with methods. It is well realised that the remedies suggested are not strictly military but, when dealing with the morale of what should be a national Army, non-military elements are bound to play their parts. Also the martial races of India have, inevitably, become somewhat insulated from the rest of the population.

We have the choice, either of letting them be and finding their own level, or of teaching them ourselves with the means at our disposal. The former method, when thought in India is so little crystallised and when so many cross-currents sweep over India, is unsatisfactory.

We, as the leaders of the Army, should first of all do as much as possible ourselves.

In the *Fauji Akhbar* there is a method already to hand. It has immense possibilities. Before the war it was often a rather unimaginative publication in which the same features appeared year after year. It is still, sometimes, too objective. It should have a tremendous and decisive effect on the education and morale of the Indian soldier. It should be a live publication with a live message to galvanise its readers. Lastly, every effort should be made to make its circulation as wide as possible so that it reaches not only serving soldiers, pensioners and reservists, but also those who may be called upon to serve in times of special need. Money spent in developing such a paper, which would give a lead to the Indian Army, would repay a hundredfold.

That the officers, as leaders of the Indian Army, should help, has been already mentioned. In order to do this they themselves need a lead, and need help and guidance from the authorities. The whole subject of morale is a difficult one, and one that needs much study. Mistakes, through ignorance, are easy and can do much harm. Adequate help from the highest authorities can do much to avert these.

CONCLUSION

The reason for this article was the conviction that the morale of the Indian Army was not such as it ought to be at the beginning of a long war. Active steps must be taken to improve

it, for it is no good expecting that morale improves of itself. It is just as susceptible to a lack of care as any other military virtue.

The state of the Indian Army as it stands to-day has been described. Already there are signs that a large expansion lies ahead. As a result, sources will be tapped that are less imbued with loyalty and high traditions than existing sources. It is likely also that the new sources will be more infected with undesirable and mischievous propaganda. All the more necessary will it become to go deeply into the state of the morale of the Indian Army so as to make it unshakable.

The martial classes of India can no longer be segregated from the rest of India and kept as a people apart. Not only is it undesirable but it will eventually prove impossible. They constitute the national army of India, and must learn to love their India. They must share in, and have a pride in, the common Empire. To do less would be unfair to them and dangerous to us. If we do not believe in them they will not believe in us. We must take them out of their narrow and outworn world and show them the new one. And from that new world they must be able to draw the faith and the resolution to fight, for only the spirit will overcome the sword.

Lastly, we must give them of our absolute best; so shall we in turn continue to get the best from them, who have served us so brilliantly in the past.

MESSES AND CLUBS

By Balu

How often has one heard the senior officer say "Mess life nowadays is not what it was when I was young" and that same senior officer is inclined to blame this state of affairs on the present occupant of the Mess, namely, the young officer of to-day, and to label him as an undisciplined, bumptious young pup, who has no respect for his betters, no sense of decent behaviour and a general blot on the military and social landscape.

Our senior officer does not perhaps realise that it is his insistence on the spirit of "Mess life when I was young" that has helped to make the average Officers Mess the unpopular institution that it is to-day. For there can be no doubt that it *is* unpopular with the young officer who is compelled to live there and also with the more senior officer who has to use it when hot weather moves or other domestic upheavals reduce him to grass-widowerhood while for the rest of the year he pays out considerable sums for the upkeep of a building he seldom uses and for a staff he seldom sees.

It is certain that quite a number of those young officers, who rush into early matrimony, would, if asked, give as one of their reasons that "they are fed up with Mess life and want to have a home that they can call their own." And why are they fed up with Mess life? That old friend of ours, the senior officer, likes to say that the Mess is the home of the subaltern and a very comfortable home he made of it when he was a boy. *Autre temps, autres moeurs.* Formerly the Mess was popular because the young officer of the day was not accustomed to great personal comforts and as long as the Mess provided him with reasonable food and a man to answer his call of "Koi hai," he considered it the height of luxury and elegance. The young officers' quarters at that time consisted probably of a bare barrack of a room with the minimum necessities of furniture, when it was considered rather soft and effeminate to confess to anything in the way of frills like carpets or easy chairs. Living as he did, the luxury of Mess armchairs, cold drinks and other comforts was all he required. In those days, too, the young officer was brought up on and content with the rather rigid discipline, the uniform, the clicking of heels and the excessive deference due to the seniority of rank.

Nowadays, while discipline on parade and on duty is probably as good as it ever was, a more democratic atmosphere has arisen when off parade and in some regiments it has been for many years the practice to drop rank and titles in the Mess and to treat that institution more as a common meeting ground, where "A" can talk to and argue with "B" without interspersing the conversation with "Yes Sir," No "Sir." The upholder of democracy might wonder why it should seem necessary for the younger members to wait kicking their heels until the more senior officer has finished his second short drink before they can go into dinner, which is eaten and paid for by all in equal proportion. The more enlightened and far-seeing commanding officers have realised this and permit dinner jackets and a movable feast on most nights of the week and do not expect all to wait on the whim of one. There are, however, still a number of the old school who consider that a very strict Mess discipline is the hall-mark of a good regiment.

Next comes the all-important question of expense and it is this question that has prompted the writer to embark on a proposition which may have many opponents.

Mess subscriptions throughout the Army vary according to the number of officers in the unit and their tastes. Even in the most economically conducted Messes one will find that, by the time Mess Subscription, Furniture, Books and Papers, Lighting, Entertainment and other smaller cuttings have been made, the total probably comes to sixty rupees a month for a subaltern. On top of this comes the upkeep of Mess and Garden Staff, replacement of crockery, donations on promotion and other odd items, all of which accumulate to make a big hole in an officer's pay, before he starts to pay for what he eats and drinks. This affects the junior officer as much as the senior, while the married man has to contribute equally with the bachelor, irrespective of whether he is living in his own house or not. Some Messes like to keep up greater state than others, some have a very enviable reputation for great hospitality and it is obvious that all such extra expenses must create a bigger hole in the pockets of the officers contributing.

In some cases Mess expenses are so heavy that junior officers just cannot afford to join the Station Club, while in others the Commanding Officer, fully realising the inroads made on the subaltern's pocket, does not encourage—if he cannot actually

forbid—him to become a Club member but to confine his exercise to hacking, to the Mess tennis court and to games of hockey with the men. All this makes for great insularity and the officers of one regiment are thrown too much together. They see only each other all day and every day; on parade, in office, at their games and in the Mess. On all sides one hears the remark "What do those fellows in the So and So Regiment *do*? One never sees them about the place." Poor devils, they probably can't afford to be seen about the place. With increasing Indianisation and lower rates of pay the problem of combating heavy Mess expenses is becoming more pressing every day.

This brings us to the question of the Station Club. It should be made clear that we are referring to the smaller military cantonment, ranging from two to five major units, where the club is largely a military officers club with a few other government servants and civilians as members. Big towns with large civilian populations are not within our scope nor are the one-unit stations where probably a small gymkhana is maintained as an offshoot of the unit mess.

On all sides one hears complaints that military clubs are dying of inertia. They usually comprise big buildings with a heavy ground rent and require large staffs to keep them even reasonably clean. They belong to the times that are gone, when it was the habit of *tout le monde* and his wife to congregate there of an evening, to play bridge or billiards, to sit about and gossip and to drink. Later came the era of cocktail dances and gentle poodlefaking. Nowadays there is a very different story. The average member uses the club purely as a "gymkhana," possibly has a soft drink after he has finished his exercise and returns to his own bungalow. Once a week the club springs into rather forced life and the "Saturday Dance" takes place. In the majority of stations this is a sad affair; the large ballroom looks singularly empty with a few couples dancing to a band that is dispirited and dull. This dance has cost the club a considerable sum of money with the hire of the band, the lighting and the overtime for the staff, all for the benefit of a few bright souls who are keen enough—or dance-mad enough—to turn out in a forlorn endeavour to keep up the party spirit and to keep the club alive. For ten days or a fortnight in the year, when the local "Week" is on, the club really *does* liven up, dances are well patronised and the Secretary can rub his hands and announce a decent profit on the sale of drinks.

The reasons for the above gloomy picture are not far to seek. Firstly we must consider the bugbear of expense. As we have seen, a number of officers, both married and single, cannot afford in these hard times the club subscriptions or, while they can afford to pay them, they do not consider the outlay commensurate with what the club has to offer in the way of social entertainment. There are a number of good souls who pay their club subscriptions because they think it is "up to them to set a good example" and "not to let the place down." Such philanthropists seldom use the club and often cannot really afford such altruism.

Secondly there is the modern trend to make your bungalow or quarter as comfortable as possible and to enjoy its comforts. There you can entertain whom you want (and not buy a round of drinks for people you hardly know and possibly dislike), you can be comfortable, if you wish, in dressing gown and slippers in a warm room (instead of in a large barrack of a building), you can read, write and, if you want to, drink (without adding club profit to every sip you take).

Thirdly there is the vogue of throwing cocktail parties instead of more normal entertaining to dinner. The reasons are again partly financial, as it is much cheaper for the young marrieds to work off a number of people to a cocktail party than to have a series of dinners. The bachelor gains considerably (in pocket if not in conscience) as he is asked out to a number of such parties in the course of the year and has few opportunities of returning hospitality to those who have entertained him.

Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that military clubs are dying fast and the less the custom at the bar the higher the subscriptions need to be raised to keep the show alive. The general exception to such decay is to be found in clubs which are residential as well as social.

They have enough permanent residents to justify the club staff; more drinking is probably done in the club (or anyhow of club liquor) and their very presence gives a certain amount of life and gaiety to the building.

And what of the solutions to relieve the frightful gloom that has so far pervaded our survey. Some will say that the Station Mess gives the answer. The larger numbers of dining members allow overhead expenses to be reduced, the argument of insularity is automatically refuted and the Mess itself becomes a species of military club, allowing probably of squash and tennis courts

and a more communal life. The objections, however, are also cogent. In the first place the Mess discipline Gorgon raises her head; Lieut. Blank of the Blankshires does not appreciate the "old-Mess-life" attitude of Major Dash of the Malabar Lancers. In a Station Mess cliques are bound to be formed, cliques arising out of the differing interests, dislikes and incomes of the various members.* One shudders to contemplate the atmosphere of the quarterly Mess meeting in such a mess. Premeditated objections, heated words and sullen apathy will render any meeting abortive and will only tend to make breaches where none existed before or to widen those that did. With an unwieldy heterogeneous crowd as one would find in the Station Mess, formulation of Mess policy, acceptable to all, would, to say the least of it, be difficult and one could imagine that after a short while all the various members, units and cliques would be crying out to "d—n the expense and get back to our own Mess."

No! The solution must be to *Scrap the Mess.* (It is feared that the old senior officer who featured at the start of this article is due for an apoplectic fit.) It is suggested that the Government Mess Allowance be reduced by half and that the new allowance be devoted by units to the upkeep of a "Field Mess." By this it is not intended that only canvas chairs, rickety tables and enamel plates shall be maintained but that a certain amount of stout furniture, crockery and decent cutlery such as can be used, and is used, when a unit is located in one of the frontier stations, where families are not permitted and when all live in a smallish mess building, where exigencies of space and service conditions do not permit of any great state being kept up. Such stations as Razmak and the Khyber are good examples of those where such Messes are suitable. This field Mess furniture would also be of use in training camps and for hot weather moves. Alternatively this Government allowance could be utilised for the hire of furniture in any of the above circumstances if, by chance, the unit did not maintain its own.

In peace stations—and we are still referring to the smaller military cantonment—there are two answers to the problems arising from the abolition of the Mess. Firstly that the club can be persuaded to sink money for the erection of residential

*As is usual, an exception is to be found in the "Piffer" Mess in Kohat. There, however, the community of interest and the general level of incomes permit of a happy and tolerant brotherhood.

quarters—and by so doing put their own finances on a sound footing—and bachelor officers be asked or persuaded to live in the club. Here we can make no objection on the plea of insularity nor of "oppressive" Mess discipline, nor of failure to support the club. Nor can the residential member be accused of "never being seen about the place." To his advantage is a reasonable charge for quarters and messing without large overhead expenses and without double subscriptions. In stations where the club is not prepared for the venture of residential quarters, there may be an hotel which will make reasonable charges for long periods of residence.

To this hotel all the arguments of the club quarters apply equally well, except that the alcohol will be a trifle more expensive, as the average hotel hopes to make its profit on all wines sold.

The second solution and one which can be adopted if the club cannot provide quarters and where no decent hotel exists, is to permit officers to live in "chummeries." This is done throughout India by young civilians, young I.C.S. and young Policemen, so why should it not be copied by the young army officer and by his senior also, if he happens to be a bachelor? Three or four young officers can club together and run a bungalow very inexpensively. The extra "staff" required will only be a cook and a *chokra* and the necessary dining room furniture and crockery can be hired, while the running expenses can be curtailed to suit the pockets of the members. A chummery *can* be treated as a home, while the only discipline enforced would be that of not grousing at the menu chosen by the catering member, where officers, young and old alike, would have companions of their own age, interests, tastes and incomes, and where they can, if they be so minded, indulge in mild entertainment of their friends. As is obvious, the real great advantage is the saving of expense and with the saving thus effected the young officer can afford to join the club, to use the club and be seen about the place.

To summarise, therefore, it is suggested that the solution of our problem is:

(*a*) To abolish all but field messes (and, in doing so, to save Government half the present mess allowance).

(*b*) To permit unmarried officers to live and have their social being as they wish, be it in residential clubs, in hotels or in "chummeries."

It is considered that if the above suggestions were put to the vote to-day, there would be an overwhelming majority in its favour *amongst regimental officers* and, after all, *they* are the ones that are affected.

LEARNING PERSIAN

By Karshish

Most people know that what Europeans used to call "Persia" is now called "Iran" and that the people of the country are now known as "Iranians." Iran is what the Iranians themselves have always called their country, but they call their language "Fársi" and it is still, therefore, correct to speak of the Persian language which is also spoken to a great extent in Afghanistan. The "Iranian Language" is an incorrect term as are also "Iranian Gulf" and "Iranian Cat." Something, after all, must be conceded to usage.

Having settled the not-unimportant matter of the correctness or otherwise of my title, I must go on to say that there exist, especially in India, some grave misapprehensions as to the nature of the Persian language as spoken by the Iranians, for it is Iran and the Iranians of which I propose to treat in this article.

The Persian taught in Indian universities and spoken to-day in Afghanistan differs widely from the Persian of Iran. The former can be described as the Persian of Akbar and in construction bears a closer relation to classical Persian than the latter. It is legitimate to believe, however, that the pronunciation and intonation of the ancient Iranians finds to-day a closer counterpart in Iran than elsewhere.

It is only comparatively recently that the Board of Examiners in India awoke to the fact that a knowledge of classical or Indian Persian was almost, if not quite, useless in Iran itself. Even after the war when the inadequacy of the standard of the Higher Proficiency Examination had been abundantly demonstrated, the old ideas persisted for a time. Even now, though the Interpretership Examination has been greatly modernised, some of the set books are out of keeping with modern ideas, and the recent suggestion to include in these the *Gulistan* of Saadi must be regarded with astonishment and alarm. On the whole, however, the General Staff has accepted fairly good-humouredly the axiom that modern Persian, as spoken in Iran to-day, is a useful language for officers of the Indian Army to know. They have even, in my opinion, gone too far, for Afghan Persian is still of considerable importance and Interpreters should give evidence of a familiarity with the distinctive Afghan idiom and syntax. I

understand, however, that the Interpretership Examination may be modified to meet this obvious requirement.

I shall now slip into that slovenly and discursive style which has so much irritated some of the readers of my previous articles. I shall try and tell of my own sporadic attempts to learn one of the most polished languages in the world, in the hope that my obvious mistakes and general "leichtsinnigkeit" may be a lesson to my more prudent readers.

I began my Persian studies in Istanbul and my teacher was a curious old man who had been in turn Moslem, Greek Orthodox, Maronite, Roman Catholic and again Moslem. I do not quite know whether he really knew Persian but he had a pleasant daughter who sang Persian *ghazals* very nicely. The daughter had a most beautiful Turkish friend who was a professor in the University for Girls. She knew English and obligingly translated the *ghazals* for me. I sometimes even learned a little Persian during my visits to old Daud's house, but I fear I had only the merest smattering when three years later I found myself in India with four months to go before I took up the post of Military Attaché in Meshed. In Rawalpindi I found a *munshi* who had taken "Honours" in Persian at Lahore University, and with him I read "The Shah's Journey to Europe" and "The Narrative of Mrs. Horteste." We spoke together in Persian and I left India in May 1926, feeling that I could at any rate speak and read Persian with some address. I was completely mistaken.

I discovered the full extent of my ignorance on my journey from Zahidan to Meshed. I had been a little dashed to find myself quite unable to understand the passport officials at Mirjawa and as time went on I realised that I should have to start almost from the beginning. I was, however, somewhat heartened to find that I could carry on a fluent conversation in Turkish with some Azerbaijanis who like me were on their way to the shrine of Imam Reza.

Travelling in Iran in 1926 was no light matter. I hired a Dodge $\frac{3}{4}$-ton truck and took 6 days to cover the 600 miles between Zahidan and Meshed. We travelled the whole day and seldom exceeded 15 miles per hour. In the middle of the waterless tract between Hormuk and Safedawa we broke a back-axle. The spare proudly produced by the owner proved to belong to another make of car, but in four hours we had filed it down with rasps until it fitted, and proceeded on our way.

In 1926, Iran was beginning to change but when I arrived in May, everything seemed very backward and inefficient. The post of Governor-General of a province was still open to the highest bidder and financial abuse was rife, though the American Financial Mission was beginning to get busy. There was a low state of security in the country generally, the army was ill-clothed and ill-equipped and the men's pay about three months in arrears. Communications were in a deplorable state and there were constant rumours of imminent Soviet aggression. Religious fanaticism was still at its height and an American Consul had recently been lynched by a member of a Muharram procession which he was attempting to photograph. The *mujtahids* and *akhunds* wielded enormous influence, especially in a place like Meshed. In spite of this unpromising background I began to enjoy myself almost at once. Few residents in India realise how completely life in an Iranian city differs from that of an Indian cantonment. One of the best ways to realise this difference is to take, as I did, an Indian servant to Iran. He was a good type of man but a bad mixer and he was a total failure in an Iranian household. My Iranian visitors looked aghast at his clumsy manners and I very soon had to send him back to India. He regarded the ceremonies of Iranian society with the deepest suspicion and I must admit that it took me considerable time to grasp the intricacies of Iranian etiquette.

I had been selected as Military Attaché partly on account of my knowledge of Ottoman Turkish and had been told that this was largely spoken by all Iranians in North-Eastern Iran. This I found to be a most misleading notion. A great number of the inhabitants of Khorasan speak dialects of Turki and many Iranian officers and civil officials had a smattering of it. But to speak to an army officer in Turki gave the same impression as a French Consul in India conversing with British officials through the medium of Hindustani, and I soon found that Persian was quite essential. One of my successors in Meshed succeeded in existing for three years in Iran without learning any Persian. I am afraid I do not at all understand how he managed to get on.

Although I had difficulty in learning Persian in India, I had not the smallest difficulty in learning it in Iran. To my shame I recall that I hardly took any regular lessons, but I did talk it on every conceivable occasion. There are two very obvious reasons why English people pick up Persian in Iran so much

more quickly and so much better than they learn Hindustani in India. Persian is, in the first place, a far more complete and crystallised language than Hindustani. It is also far easier to pronounce, especially for the British. The short "a" is pronounced almost exactly the same as in "hat" and this is a sound which presents grave difficulties to other foreigners. I have met many British business men who, after only a few years' residence in Iran, could speak Persian with a fluency and accuracy very rarely achieved in Hindustani by officials of long standing residence in India. The other reason is, of course, that Persian is spoken with only slight differences all over Iran and the language of society is, as a matter of course, Persian.

Before I had been many weeks in Meshed a mutiny broke out among the Iranian troops in Bujnurd in the Turkoman country and not far from the Soviet frontier. As is, or was, customary in Iran, wild and alarming rumours began to reach Meshed and these included the report that 40,000 Turkomans had been armed by the Russians and were marching on the city. The local Iranian commander informed us that this last was certainly true and that the whole affair was the result of a long-standing Soviet intrigue. The Governor-General, on the other hand, was sceptical of the reports which were being received and refused to commit himself about the Russians. The *tertium quid* was Mr. John Loomis, the American financial adviser, an experienced man brought up in a hard school of *pronunciament* in Cuba, Mexico and elsewhere. He informed me that the cause of the mutiny was simply that the local commander had been putting the troops pay in his pocket. The stuff about Turkomans and Bolsheviks was, he affirmed, all hooey, and the sooner the Central Government were informed of the real situation the better. About this time I received word of an individual who had just returned from Bujnurd and who was persuaded to visit me late at night. He was some sort of minor official and it was some time before he could decide whether I wanted to hear invented stories of prodigious battles in Bujnurd or simply the truth. At last, aided with copious potions of a villainous brand of whisky known as "Blue Diamond," he chose the latter course and I learned that an officer called "Salar-i-Jang" had crossed the Soviet frontier with about 40 men as a protest against the non-arrival of their pay. There had been no casualties. Meanwhile, a mixed forced was being rushed from Tehran in lorries many of which were driven by British drivers, one of whom I interviewed on his

arrival. The force which arrived was not very well equipped or disciplined, but it did arrive quickly and it seemed almost a pity that there was nothing for it to do. It was closely followed by the Shah himself who was determined to settle this discreditable affair in person. This he did by summarily reducing the local commander to the ranks, by appointing in his place General Prince Amanullah Mirza with a new staff and by replacing the Governor-General. The Shah received the staff of the British Consulate-General and made himself very agreeable. One could not fail to be impressed by his commanding presence and strong intelligence, and by the awe in which his subjects stood of him.

The rapid progress which has been achieved in Iran must be entirely attributed to the remarkable personality of Reza Shah Pahlevi. He has shown firmness and moderation as and when each was required. There is no comparison between the local administration, communications and security of the Iran of today and that of twenty years ago, and critics of the present Government's policy cannot but admit that its achievements have been little short of miraculous.

Under its new commander the Eastern Division began to make considerable progress. Very shortly the troops were uniformly armed and provided with boots instead of *givehs*. Proper training programmes were worked out and the general discipline and turnout of all ranks very greatly improved. I remember being invited to a regimental "gaff" given by the Shahpur Regiment, and I still recall it as one of the best shows of its kind to which I ever went. We were received in the officers' club and given tea. We then went into the theatre to see a play which was entirely performed by soldiers and began with the singing of the regimental march. The play was extremely well acted and the actors, especially the female impersonators, received huge applause. In the interval we were given an excellent champagne supper. The play was followed by fireworks, after which we gave three cheers for the Shah and left. Any soldier could see that this was a happy, well-disciplined regiment, and it presented a striking contrast to the slipshod rabble of a few months back.

It is popularly believed that the Azerbaijani Turk is the backbone of the Iranian Army. This is quite untrue. The Turk is simply the Scot of Iran: his accent is a joke and his justifiable reputation as a redoubtable fighter has been greatly exaggerated. Purely Iranian regiments acquitted themselves very well in the Kashgai campaign of 1930-1931. Their physique is quite as good as of the Turks and their intelligence considerably superior.

There is to be found among the British, and especially in India, an unreasoned prejudice against the Iranians. Travellers complain of obstruction and discourtesy and speak disparagingly of Iranian methods. My own experience is entirely different. Two things are essential in Iran—a knowledge of Persian and a sense of humour. The Iranians are almost always sympathetic to people who have troubled to learn their language and they can seldom resist a joke. I never met a people with a more subtle sense of the ridiculous than the Iranians and genial fooling is one of the surest roads to their hearts. It is, I believe, perfectly true that officially there is a strong feeling of xenophobia in Iran at present. This results in officials of all sorts being forbidden to associate with Europeans. Regrettable as this is, the impartial critic must admit that there is some justification for it. During the century which ended in 1920, Iranian history was little more than a catalogue of the rivalries of Iran's powerful neighbours. What the country suffered during the Great War from the presence of Russian, German, Turkish and British forces can hardly be described, though a good dispassionate account of it can be found in "Jang-i-bein ul Milleli" published in Tehran last year.

During my stay in Iran there were none of these irksome restrictions on intercourse between foreigners and Iranian officials, and I spent a considerable time each day in visiting them. No Iranian will readily miss a chance to talk, especially with any one who is also ready to laugh. One official in Meshed I remember as by far the most humorous man I have ever met. We had a number of private jokes which he used to work into conversation with other people in a way which made me almost choke with laughter. There was a certain Turkish proverb which I, told him and which is, I regret, unrepeatable here. He was enchanted with this and was always referring to it. For some reason, he liked to pretend that I had strong Bolshevik sympathies and always addressed me as *tovarishch* even in front of Soviet officials who did not know whether to be amused or scandalised. On one occasion I visited him to protest officially against the accidental arrest of a British subject. I was surprised to find him sitting cross-legged on a sofa with an extraordinary expression of pompous gravity on his face. He immediately began to speak in sonorous tones, using long, resounding periods packed with Arabic phrases. After a few minutes of this he broke off with a roar of laughter to explain that he was imitating an Iranian

official of fifty years ago. He added that he had already given orders for our subject to be released and we spent another delightful half hour of light conversation.

A less pleasant side of life in Iran was the continual atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue, a regrettable result of the rivalries to which I have just alluded. I remember once at a dinner party sitting next to a high official whom I engaged in conversation on the subject of fruit. In the course of the discussion I asked him whether he had noticed the remarkable orchard in the Soviet Consulate-General. He said: "No" and changed the subject abruptly, but the next morning he sent his confidential man to see me. This individual, after interminable circumlocutions, told me that his master had been gravely disturbed by my oblique references to his alleged pro-Soviet sympathies. With perfect truth I disclaimed any such intention, but it was fairly clear that he did not believe my protestations of innocence.

One of the best ways of getting to know the Iranians is to travel through Iran taking care not to be in too much of a hurry. Almost all Iranians are experienced road travellers and servants enjoy the road as much as their masters. Nowadays most travel is, of course, by car. In the days of the leisurely *Kaliskeh* it was customary to leave one's house in the early afternoon and proceed to the road house which is still to be found about five miles from the main entrances to most towns in Iran. Here the night was spent before starting the journey in earnest the next morning. The object of this quaint process, known as "nagl-ul-magam," was to soften the blow of parting with one's friends, who always accompanied one on this first easy stage, and also to afford an opportunity of sending back for all the things one had forgotten.

When I went from Meshed to Tehran in September, 1926, we went in the greatest comfort. A touring car carried the three of us and one servant while the remainder of the servants with our considerable luggage went in a lorry. The Governor-General had advised all the local officials along the 600-mile route of our journey and at every stage we were met outside the town and entertained most royally. Iran is a country of exaggeration, but there is no exaggeration in the fame of Iranian hospitality. That hospitality forms an important part of the Iranians' social code is proved by their kindness and indulgence to the many refugees who have sought asylum in their country, but what always

attracted me about Iranian society was the obvious pleasure which entertaining even complete strangers gave the hosts. Their whole houses were turned upside down and the delight of the servants in serving the guests was all the more astonishing when, as most frequently happened, they refused to accept any tips. The first thing on arrival was always tea, for the Iranians are among the world's great tea drinkers. This sometimes went on rather too long for the jaded traveller who longed to remove the stains of travel, but due time for this was always allowed before the elaborate dinner, always served European fashion with a profusion of good food, drink and polished conversation. By this time, I could take a full part in this and could appreciate most of the subtle wit and about half of the apt quotations and proverbs with which our hosts regaled us. Iranians, who in those days had not travelled much outside Iran, always displayed a naive and gratifying curiosity about "Landan" (London) which is, or was, the usual way of referring to England. When they are not wrangling over stupid matters of finance and politics the Iranians and British get on extremely well together principally, I believe, because of their close affinity in the matter of humour. Iranian sayings such as "He sits on the moustaches of the Shah and plays the drum" (cheeky aplomb) and "He puts horse-shoes on flying mosquitoes" (adroit cunning) find a ready appreciation in the British mind. The conversation, in Persian, of the educated Iranian gentleman reminds one forcibly of the brilliant, ironic wit of Congreve and Steele.

Sabzevar, Shahrud, Damghan and Semnan were the stopping places on that memorable journey. Each seemed to vie with the other in hospitality and when we finally reached Tehran over the beautiful and mountainous Firuzkuh road we felt that the capital could offer little that could be more agreeable than that six days' journey.

At the time of which I am writing, Mr. Harold Nicolson was Chargé d' Affaires in Tehran and Major W. A. K. Fraser (now Brigadier) was Military Attaché. The latter put me up and I had the privilege of talking at some length to one whose practical and unprejudiced knowledge of Iran and the Iranians I have never seen equalled. Years later I read the monthly letters which, over a considerable period, he had written to the War Office describing the military and political situation and was deeply impressed with the balanced judgment and sane and reasoned foresight which they displayed. I met Harold Nicolson

several times. Apart from his intellectual and professional reputation he was well known for his kindliness and good humour. I doubt if there can be many pleasanter places to live in than the summer residence of the British Legation in Gulahek. It is a beautiful and richly wooded park in which the sound of running water can be heard almost everywhere. The weather in September was quite perfect and there was on all sides that debonair atmosphere of leisurely and gently organised enjoyment which is such a feature of life in Iran. I went to many lunch and dinner parties and met several interesting people among whom were Dr. Millspaugh, Chief of the American Financial Mission, Count Schulenburg, the German Minister and now German Ambassador in Moscow. With the latter I played poker one evening. He was a remarkable player and his gifts in this respect must have stood him in good stead when he was negotiating the Soviet-German Pact.

In 1926, Iran was still the happy hunting ground of the concession seeker and the business adventurer. Tehran was full of foreigners of every description, many of whom were in government employ. Financial control was in the hands of Dr. Millspaugh's mission. The departure of this mission was abrupt and premature, but most Iranians admit that its work was highly beneficial and of lasting value to the country. The Belgian-controlled Customs was another institution which contributed to the wealth of the country. This too was sharply criticised by the Iranians and exists no longer. The only two concessions of importance which remain are the Imperial Bank of Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and the scope of both has been considerably curtailed. It has been my fate to live in three middle-eastern countries, Turkey, Iran and Iraq, just before European financial control was removed. On each occasion, business men of great experience have prophesied immediate bankruptcy which has however always failed to materialise. I do not by this mean to suggest that the repeated charges of "exploitation" which have been made against foreign concessionnaires in the Middle East can by any means be fully substantiated. On the contrary many, if not most, of the British concession holders in Iran contributed greatly to the prosperity of the country. The Imperial Bank of Iran and the Indo-European Telegraph Department (now abolished) were held in great respect by the vast majority of Iranians. I do believe, however, that the belief still held by the majority of Europeans that the peoples of

the Middle East are incapable of administering modern institutions is a grave and dangerous exaggeration. It argues an ignorance of the greatly changed conditions in these countries and especially of the genuine growth of nationalist feeling.

I have spoken of business adventurers in Iran. It was my lot to meet a number of these gentry but I do not ever remember a more curious case than that of Mr. Herbert Collinson. One very hot afternoon in Meshed I was informed by my servant that a "Farangi" wished to see me. An elderly European was shown in. He was unshaven, extremely dirty and obviously completely exhausted. He told me he had just arrived by road en route to Tehran, was a Canadian geologist named Herbert Collinson and could I tell him where he could put up. There was nothing like a hotel in Meshed in those days so, moved by Mr. Collinson's appearance of fatigue, I offered to put him up in my house and ordered a room and bath to be got ready for him. He reappeared shaved and well-dressed and sat down to tea. He soon told me that he was representing a firm of oil prospectors and was going to Tabriz on behalf of the Sinclair oil concession. He also said that he had lost his passport in Paris and had been issued with a temporary one which was marked "Renewable on production of further proofs of identity." We were unable to renew this in Meshed but I thought they might do it in Tehran where, he said, the "further proofs" would be available. Mr. Collinson stayed with me four days and a very pleasant guest I found him. On the day before his departure he suddenly said: "Look here, you've been decent to me and I've not played square with you. Now I'm going to come clean." Mr. Collinson then told me a strange story. Besides being a geologist he was also an osteopath. He had heard that Amir Amanullah of Afghanistan was suffering from an obscure complaint which he believed he could cure. He proposed thus to ingratiate himself into the Amir's favour and to obtain a concession for working the ruby mines in Afghan Turkestan. He had letters of introduction to important Afghans which he showed me. To further his plan he had decided to become a Moslem. This he had done in Lahore and showed me papers to prove it. Mr. Collinson thought he might be useful to me in Afghanistan whither he proposed to go on his return from Tehran.

I thought Mr. Collinson's story true but suspicious. My suspicions increased when he came back from Tehran with a story that they had not renewed his passport but had advised

him to tear out the page with the endorsement on it! This I recognised as a lie and made him put the page back again. A few days after he left ostensibly for Afghanistan. I never saw him again. Many months afterwards I read in the *Continental Daily Mail* a long account of a well-dressed man who had been apprehended by the police in Hampstead having completely lost his memory. In a mental home it was learned that some years previously he had suffered a severe injury to his head and, after apparent recovery, had travelled extensively in the Middle East. He was, it appeared, very wealthy but had in his possession many cheque books on Banks where he had no account. There was a photograph at the bottom of the report. It was an excellent likeness of Mr. Herbert Collinson.

I left Iran in 1928 but before the end of the year I had taken up an appointment in Iraq which involved frequent visits to Tehran, Kirmanshah and other places. Occasionally I travelled by road but more often by Junkers Air Line. Many and frequent at this time were the stories of Iranian incivility and obstruction to travellers but I am bound to admit that I never encountered any such thing. I remember once travelling by air to Tehran in company with a minor British official of the Iraq Government. At Kirmanshah where we landed for Customs examination this individual positively refused to open his suitcase for inspection. The officials were polite but adamant and he was told that he could not proceed. For a time he blustered in bad Arabic which was quite as unintelligible to the Iranians as it would have been to Arabs, and eventually gave in. With pardonable glee the Customs officials then laid out the entire contents of his suitcase on the aerodrome and examined each article with meticulous care.

Though incidents of Iranian hostility towards foreigners have no doubt been exaggerated it cannot be denied that Iran's attitude towards all her neighbours is one of intense suspicion. Her apprehensions at the present time can be more easily imagined than described. What the British Government is doing to counter possible anti-British propaganda in Iran I am not in a position to say, but it is to be hoped that the extraordinary so-called Persian Broadcasts from Delhi do not form an important part of any plan of fostering goodwill towards the British Empire in Iran. These Broadcasts may not be intended for Iran, but the Iranians certainly listen to them with mingled sensations of amusement and disgust. It is hard to understand why this

peculiar state of affairs cannot be remedied. With a very small effort and financial outlay it would be possible to arrange for daily broadcasts in both Iranian and Afghan Persian which would not at all events be open to ridicule and contempt and might even, at long last, give the impression that we at least took some cognisance of our neighbours.

Faithful to the plan of my previous articles, I will now endeavour to give such advice as I am able to give on the subject of learning Persian. First and foremost, it is essential to draw a firm line between "Iranian" and "Afghan" or "Indian Persian." An important point to grasp is that while the latter is despised and laughed at in Iran the former is regarded with great admiration by Afghans. There is a great lack of suitable books for the study of modern Persian. The only book which can be called at all comprehensive is "Modern Persian Conversation Grammar" by St. Clair Tisdall (Otto Saner Method). This is now somewhat out-of-date and the exercises are stilted and unpractical. Still, it does present Persian Grammar in a fairly logical way and deals well with the large Arabic element in Persian.

In my opinion, by far the best way of studying the language is to buy the Linguaphone Course. This course, which comprises a succinct and practical grammar, consists of 30 lessons clearly declaimed in a perfectly correct Persian accent. The student is quickly introduced to a good representative vocabulary and a wealth of idiomatic expressions. Unfortunately, the course is entirely in the Latin character, so it is little use for learning the written language. Unless a fully competent Iranian teacher is available, the best plan is to work through the Linguaphone Course and St. Clair Tisdall at the same time. Indian teachers should be avoided, however high their Indian University qualifications. They not only very rarely know modern Persian but are obstinate about even admitting the existence of such a thing. Others, who claim to have a thorough knowledge of Iranian Persian, persist in using such words as *taklif, sust, istiglal, tajwiz* and many others in their Urdu or Afghan-Persian sense.

An extremely full though deplorably arranged book is Higher Persian Grammar by Philott. It contains a vast amount of information if one can only find it.

For reading I recommend the standard school books issued by the Iranian Ministry of Education. They are up-to-date and remarkably well arranged and contain sufficient extracts from the

classics for practical purposes. For advanced reading, students (especially those who know Russian) are advised to get *sovremennaya Persidskaya Pressa v Obraztsakh* (Extracts from the Modern Persian Press) published by the Leningrad Oriental Institute. This contains a remarkable collection of leading articles, news telegrams, parliamentary reports, advertisements, law reports and other matter. The vocabulary is unfortunately in Russian only, but the extracts themselves are well worth having.

The best dictionaries are those by Haim (Persian-English and English-Persian) published by Beroukhim, Tehran. Old dictionaries such as Steingass are extremely expensive and quite out-of-date.

One of the main difficulties of modern Persian is the number of new words which are constantly being introduced by the government. List of these are issued from time to time but they are not easy to acquire. The best way of keeping abreast of the new vocabulary is to read the newspapers. For military terms a most useful book is *Jang-i-Bein Ul Milleli* (published in Tehran in 1939) in which the new words are sedulously employed.

THE WAR IN EAST AFRICA

A Role for the Indian Army

By Captain S. G. D. Jones 2/2 Punjab Regt.

[*A sketch map is at the end.*]

"Before the Germans overran their victim countries they trained their troops for those specific operations. They thought out the best technique and then practised it with every soldier who was to take part. It was a different technique for each country."—Editorial *J. U. S. I. of India,* July 1940.

Public attention is becoming more and more focussed on Italian overseas possessions, and my six years with The King's African Rifles spent largely on the Kenya-Abyssinian, and Kenya-Italian Somaliland borders, convinces me that East Africa is eminently suitable for the employment of the Indian Army. It is considered essential, however, that any Indian Forces which may be sent there should first be conditioned and rehearsed by special training for such operations.

THE THEATRE AS A WHOLE

The Sudan separates Libya from Italian East Africa by a distance of nearly 1,000 miles and has a frontier with Abyssinia of 800 miles. Lake Tsana which largely controls the waters of the Blue Nile is less than 100 miles from this frontier, and Maji the capital of S. W. Abyssinia which was the last district to hold out against the Italians and is the focal point for starting an insurrection against that country is within 50 miles of the Sudan Frontier.

Eritrea possesses the ports of Assab and Massawa on the Red Sea, and is the gateway for the best line of advance into Abyssinia. This line namely Asmara-Adowa-Makale-Magdala and thence to Addis Ababa was that originally chosen by Napier and copied by the Italians for their campaign. Khartoum and Kassala based on port Sudan are conveniently situated for an attack on Eritrea.

French Somaliland is now presumably in Italian control, it is of little value except for the port of Djibouti on the railway from Addis Ababa.

British Somaliland is easily re-enforced from Aden, it has a useful port in Berbera, and is of some political importance because the Italians recruit their Askaris almost exclusively from Somali tribes.

Italian Somaliland possesses the strategically important port of Mogadishu near the Webbe Shibeli river which was the second line of advance in the Italian attacks on Abyssinia.

It is perhaps of interest to mention here my visit to the Italian post of Lugh on the Juba river in 1933. Jubaland was ceded to Italy by us in recognition of her 'gallant services to the Allies' in the last war. Taking with me a small escort I motored from Moyale to Mandera, crossed the Dawa river at Dolo, and was met at the Juba by an imposing guard of honour of Italian troops. Lugh stands in a loop of the river and magnificient barracks and bungalows have been built in place of our former grass and mud huts. Conversation on both sides was rather of the 'school-boy' French variety but a measure of fluency was attained later in the evening. So much so in fact that the *Commandante* tapping me on the knee said with marked interest "What did you do to be sent out here?" Being very young and rather taken by surprise (at that time there was a waiting list of some 400 names for the K. A. R.), I stupidly replied that I had volunteered. This was greeted by a most expressive Italian gesture of horrified amazement, and most unfortunately stopped some interesting disclosures as to the reasons why my hosts had been banished from Le Roma. I. E. A. being at that time a punishment station for Italian officers. Throughout I. E. A. the Italians used to listen in to all our wireless messages, for which they used chiefly their Naval personnel. Their armed forces include regular Italian troops (all arms), Somali Askaris, and Bandas. The last are similar to our Khassadars and equally trustworthy.

Italian administration, and this is similar in Abyssinia, is through native chiefs and very corrupt native police. There is little or no direct touch between the Italian administrator and his natives, nor are their districts often visited. Italian officers take little interest in shooting or in the Somali tribes and their customs, very few take the trouble to learn the language.

On my return from this visit I asked my escort commander a Sudanese 'shawash' (sergeant) what he thought of the Italians. He replied in Ki-Swahili "Tell me Effendi, are the Italians a slave race of Europe?"

The above digression helps one to assess the psychology and morale of our opponents, and it is illuminating to note that as late as 1934 the greatest insult it was possible to make to a lazy Askari was to say that he drilled like an Italiano.

Abyssinia is a triangle 900 miles wide by 760 miles long with an area of 350,000 sq. miles. The inhabitants number some four to five millions, of which the true Amharic provides only one-fourth of the population. Of the conquered tribes who compose the remainder, mention must be made of the Gulubba and the Bume, who live round the Northern shores of Lake Rudolf and are magnificient fighters. Naked save for a cartridge belt, they carry a rifle and a spear and are the Pathans of Africa. The country of Abyssinia consists of high plateau, mountain ranges and deep ravines. The main rivers are the Blue Nile, Hawash, Takkaze, and the Webbe Shebeli. Prior to its conquest by Italy there were no roads and most of its rivers were unbridged. The one railway was that of Addis Ababa to Djibouti. The highlands may be said to be self-supporting in regard to meat and crops but only for a low density of population, such as existed before the Italian occupation.

Much has been written about an Abyssinian rising against the Italians but it must be remembered that of the four to five million inhabitants, only one-fourth are of the true Amharic race; the remaining African tribes were treated as slaves by the Abyssinians and although they have little liking or respect for the Italians, they are likely to remain apathetic in any struggle between their old and new masters.

Lake Rudolf discovered by an adventurous Hungarian, named Count Teleki, owes its discovery to an affair between the Count and the Crown Prince's wife. Challenged to a duel on this account which he accepted but was not permitted to fight Teleki was banished by the Emperor and set forth to explore Africa. Traversing Abyssinia from the North he eventually arrived after a long and thirsty march at a delightful lake with sweet waters set in a surrounding of cool and shady trees. This he named Stephanie after his lover. A few days later when he encountered another lake without a vestige of vegetation the waters of which were bitter and alkaline, he named it Rudolf after the Crown Prince. Lake Rudolf has an area of 2,004 sq. miles but is rapidly drying up. Its shores are shallow and shelving for several hundred yards, the water full of crocodiles and alkaline. This last unpleasantness was overcome by a party of scientists exploring the Southern end by neutralising the effect for drinking purposes by acids.

The strategic value of this lake is that the Kenya-Abyssinian border runs through the Northern end, and its possible use as a seaplane base in a region unsuitable for landing grounds.

TURKANA AND THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF KENYA

West of lake Rudolf lies Turkana the tribesmen of which are very hardy and were described by the old explorers as a race of giants. They grow no crops and their staple food is a mixture of fresh milk and blood, the latter is 'tapped' from the veins of the living beast which is duly marked as having been bled on such and such a date.

Except where roads have been made, Turkana is not suitable for M. T. the ground being rocky and intersected by innumerable nullahs. There is a military post on the Labur hills at Lokitaung connected by a laboriously constructed motor road with railhead at Kitale in Kenya.

East of lake Rudolf the following posts are encountered; Moyale, a mud fort with a tower, situated on the Abyssinian border on a low range of hills. It was recently the scene of an action against Italian forces in which the small K. A. R. detachment holding this post was surrounded by a numerically vastly superior force and forced to retire, which it did by cutting its way through the Italian lines. Mandera, a similar post, is situated on the Dawa river which constitutes the boundary with Abyssinia and is about a mile from the Italian Somaliland border.

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER PROVINCE

This province comprises an area of 93,568 sq. miles and a population of some 75,000 which, except for certain tribal Retainers, has been disarmed as regards rifles. The country is largely desert and thorn bush intersected by dry sandy nullahs in some of which water, in small quantities, may be found by digging. There are few crops but abundant game, and in the dry season it is suitable for M. T. provided sufficient water can be carried; in the rains, which start in April, considerable areas are impassable for M. T.

The Post of Wajir lies some 130 miles South of the Abyssinian border and is, on account of its abundant well water, the focal point in the Eastern half of the province. This post consists of a sand-stone fort and is indefensible against modern arms. The map shows the fair weather motorable roads which radiate from Wajir. It should be noted that it lies within 70 miles of the Italian Somaliland border. In the Western half of the province a similar post but of less importance is situated on Mt. Marsabit which has a large and deep crater lake. A certain American cinema producer lecturing to a bored audience in Nairobi, rashly claimed to have been the first white man to have set foot on the

shores of this "mysterious lake," whereupon a tired voice asked him if he had also discovered the concrete pier built by the questioner in 1900. The tactically defensive line for the N. F. P. is that of the Uaso Nyiro river based on Meru, Nanyuki, and Thomsons Falls, with a comparatively good line of communication to Nairobi.

THE KING'S AFRICAN RIFLES

A brief sketch of this famous Regiment is not out of place here as any Indian forces sent to this theatre would have to co-operate with African Askaris. It is probable that a platoon of the K. A. R. would be attached to each Indian Brigade, and if possible to each Indian battalion. Raised in about 1895 these battalions have been almost permanently on active service ever since. They are magnificent fighting material and quite unbeatable in their own country. Recruited from many different tribes they are about 30% Mussalman and the rest Pagan. Every man is a natural hunter with fully developed senses of sight, hearing and smell. Extremely loyal, not to a vague Government but to their own British officers, they will endure great hardships. It is necessary to emphasise this point as to them there is no distinction with the exception of the Italian, the Portuguese, and the Greek, between the white races which they class together as "Wasungus." Many of the Askaris of the K. A. R. 2nd Battalion, disbanded in 1913, formed the nucleus of Von Lettow Vorbeck's famous force which he describes so well in his book, and which fought so bravely against us in the last East African Campaign. These Askaris, months in arrears of pay, almost in rags, up against vastly superior forces, and given 'paper' decorations, remained loyal to their German officers until ordered by them to lay down their arms.

One of the wisest gestures of the British Government was to honour all these 'chits' for pay and decorations, with the result that the majority flocked back to the K. A. R., and as late as 1928, a number of men in my battalion were in possession of Iron Crosses as well as our African G. S. Medal. It is unlikely that they would serve their Italian masters as loyally especially as there was considerable resentment in the Italian Abyssinian campaign over Askaris always being used as 'shock' troops, and Italian regulars for the triumphant entry into conquered territory.

A ROLE FOR THE INDIAN ARMY

Mention has been made of specialised training required for operations in East Africa. It is suggested that the Indian Army with its experience of fighting on the North-West Frontier of

India, would be especially adaptable to the conditions in Africa. Of this special training required the following suggestions are made:

The importance of all transport in any one column being wholly pack or motorised, a mixture of the two such as marching infantry and mechanised first line is quite unsuitable. Note that the Germans in France with their "dull brute mass of marching infantry" with horse-drawn transport, following behind their armoured and motorised formations, have avoided this unhappy partnership which on account of the difficulties of terrain is of far greater importance in Eastern theatres of war especially in Africa. If this view is accepted then the problem must be considered separately, *i.e.*, the special training required for columns on an all-pack basis, and that required for a wholly mechanised force.

In considering pack transport it must be remembered that there are many parts of East Africa, which owing to tsetse fly are impossible for horses and mules. Camels, however, are immune and porters are always available. The inference is that such columns must be lightly equipped and trained to move as Light Infantry. Although adopting guerilla tactics they should be highly trained, of great endurance, and conditioned to operate as self-contained units without an L. of C. or base for at least three months. This was the normal training for K. A. R. patrols and is not nearly as difficult as it sounds. The essential rations for Indian troops as for Africans are easily carried in bulk, fresh meat is always available (wild game), and the British Officer soon gets accustomed to living on tinned food and marching his 20 to 30 miles a day.

Similar endurance is required of mechanised forces which would have to carry large supplies of petrol and be prepared to maintain themselves for long periods away from their base. Not necessarily on the move all the time, they could provide most useful 'floating' patrols, lying up by day under cover near oases and wells, and moving mostly by night.

Co-operation between the above types of forces is of course essential, but the point is made that they must not be tied to each other. Bush, desert, and mountain warfare only differ in application not in principle; they all require a high degree of adaptability and resource in junior commanders and a readiness to accept responsibility.

It must be remembered that in Equatorial Africa night is as long as day and there is practically no twilight. Advantage of


32°
36°
40°
44°
14°
10°
6°
2°
KHARTOUM
Kassala
MASSAWA
ASMARA
ERITREA
RED SEA
ADEN
Adowa
Takkaze
Tigre
Danakil
Assab
Amhara
L Tsana
White Nile
Blue Nile
Magdala
Wallo
FR. SOMALILAND
JIBUTI
Zeila
GULF
BERBERA
BR. SOMALI
Salale
Shoa
ADDIS ABABA
Diredawa
Jiyiga
HARAR
SUDAN
ABYSSINIA
Sasa Baneh
Arussi
Ogaden
Jimma Kambata
Kafa
Sidamo
Bako
Maji
Bale
Ogaden
Webbe Shibeli
Bagheri
Marehan
L Stephanie
Boran
R Dawa
Alia Bay
L Rudolf
Moyale
Mandera
Marsabit
R Isiba
ITALIAN SOM
KENYA
Wajir
MOGADI
E Uaso Nyiro
Rumuruti
Archer's Post
Thomson's Falls
Nanyuki
Meru
Lorain Swamp
Afmado
Scale of Miles
Miles 100 50 0 100 200 Miles

this may be taken by making midday and evening attacks with lighter armed forces than those of the enemy, breaking off the action on the sudden fall of darkness, and by a wide night movement, undetected by aircraft, be in position for another lightning raid the next evening from a fresh and unexpected direction.

Abyssinia and Italian Somaliland are cut off from Italy, their frontiers provide few geographical difficulties, and are open to deep raids by small independent self-contained columns, operating on a co-ordinated plan.

The rule of life is to adapt or die. The Germans, and to a lesser extent the Italians, have been adapting themselves for a decade to the system they planned to impose on Europe. We have one great advantage in that for years most of our officers have practised for pleasure the very qualities which our enemies have had to instill and teach by a rigid and boring regime. The East African theatre with which we are far more familiar than our opponents, and in which we are already more suitably trained to fight, offers us the chance for a bold offensive before the African's "Slave race of Europe" can be stiffened by German personnel and equipment.

THE FUTURE OF THE TRIBAL AREAS

By B. Bromhead

This paper is an enlargement on a previous article written in regard to policy and control in Waziristan, and is an attempt to take a broader view of the same problem as well as to touch on that of the tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province, in general.

The writer owes much to a great deal of helpful criticism of his previous paper and admits that in consequence he has changed some of his former ideas on this subject.

The outbreak of war has intensified the need to solve the problem of the tribal areas. The rhythm of political progress in India and the world has quickened, strong currents of unrest have been released, and the future cannot be foreseen. All this must have its effect on the tribes who, if the struggle is long and their uncertain loyalties are strained, will need strong inducement and firm handling, otherwise they may become a real danger. After the struggle, war-weariness and the inevitable crusade against militarism and army expenditure will occur. Such are my excuses for again writing about this subject.

THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE

It is difficult to describe briefly a country which varies so greatly in different parts; but here is a picture which may be applied to much of the border, and which may give those not familiar a background to the problem.

A traveller approaching tribal territory from many parts of the administered districts of British India leaves cultivation and enters on a stretch of barren plain rising to a line of broken foothills. These foothills and belt of desert mark roughly the limit of tribal territory. The plain may be scrub-covered or bare, level or undulating, the general monotony broken seldom by any definite feature, though in winter nomadic tribesmen with their scattered groups of black tents and grazing flocks bring life to the scene. The line of foothills is cut at intervals, where the main watercourses from tribal territory have broken through, scarring the belt between hill and cultivation with deep ravines, and these with others of smaller origin give numerous covered ways for raiders between the plains and the hills.

Spaced so as to watch the chief routes following the water-courses, occasional small forts manned by Frontier Constabulary stand sentinel along the line of cultivation to protect villages in their neighbourhood from tribal raids. The main gateways into the hills, cut by water, are few, but in between them other smaller paths mostly fit only for men and unladen animals zigzag steeply over the foothill barrier. From here in general the country rises towards the Afghan border, the foothills changing from bare ridges to higher hills overgrown with scrub and holly oak, culminating in various parts in tree-clad mountains. In many places the sudden level of a plateau or broad plain breaks into the tangle of precipitous hills and valleys. The levels and valleys are cultivated where water and the will to work are sufficient, but both are scarce and undeveloped.

The country in most parts produces insufficient crops. Timber cut for firewood or into planks and poles is taken to the bazaars in the plains for barter. The reserves of timber are being gradually eaten into without replanting, and ere long this source of trade will be extinguished. Dwarf palm made into ropes and matting is also traded. These, together with the flocks and camels of the tribesmen, represent almost solely their means of living.

Certain of the poorer tribes are saved from semi-starvation by their tribal allowances paid by Government in the form of wages to tribal police or 'Khassadars,' in allowances to 'maliks,' and in money earned by work on roads. These 'maliks' are the leaders or headmen of the various tribes and their subsections and for the most part are hereditary.

The climate varies as greatly as the country. In winter, snow falls at an altitude of three to four thousand feet, and the cold is intense. In summer the heat in the lowlands is indescribable. The tribes about whom I write live in this belt of independent territory which lies between the administrative border, following roughly the line of the foothills, and the Afghan border or Durand line.

They are Pathans of the same race as their neighbours in the Frontier Province and in Afghanistan, and are separated from them by the arbitrary lines of these two boundaries which in places cut through the territories of individual tribes. Numerous families of these tribes are semi-migratory within their own limits, moving according to the seasons with their flocks, and living partly in caves or in goats' hair tents and other shelters, near the

foothills in winter, and in their villages in the highlands in summer.

The Pathan is very jealous of the freedom of his barren hills, his feelings perhaps being best described by his own proverb to the effect that everyone considers his own country to be like Kashmir, and he resents the tactless breaking of his tribal privacy as much as that of his own home and of his women's purdah. His bad characteristics, such as treachery and greed, are largely due to poverty and to a public opinion which condones murder, the bloodfeud, faction feeling and revenge. His ignorance leads to a foolish conceit and intolerance towards those who do not believe in the Muslim faith, a religion about which he sometimes knows little, but of which he is a fanatical follower. These characteristics combined with a liking for excitement and trouble make him an easy dupe for the religious firebrand and agitator. The picture is dark, but in many cases it is difficult to paint it dark enough to do justice to the grown-up generation of certain tribes who have, in addition, been further spoiled by our own uncertain dealings with them. Kindness is mistaken for weakness by such people, who only understand stern justice and strong control.

The other side of the picture shows that many, when freed from the shackles of environment, are able to put aside these characteristics. This fact, together with their sense of humour, courage, their hospitality and intelligence, make them an attractive people.

Tribal fighting values vary considerably from the good tough fighting spirit of people such as the Mahsuds to the poor but fanatical fighting qualities of tribes such as the Lower Daurs. Sufficient rifles and low cunning, combined with endurance, marvellous speed across country and inbred tactical sense make even tribes of little courage potentially dangerous.

These tribes are not subject to the laws of British India, and pay, with few exceptions, no revenue. The greater part of the tribal territory is divided into Political Agencies, and the Political Agents concerned carry out their duties under the orders of the Governor of the N. W. F. P. and the A. G. G. in Baluchistan who are responsible to the Governor-General for these tribal areas. To complicate affairs, certain tribes are controlled in the same way by the Deputy Commissioners of the adjoining settled districts.

Control where possible is exercised by the political authorities through the 'maliks' and the tribal council or 'jirgah.' The

'maliks' are numerous and are paid allowances for their services varying from small amounts in most cases, to larger sums in a few. These 'maliks' are not necessarily great leaders, but may be weak men occupying hereditary positions. The Pathan is exceedingly democratic, as is shown at these tribal councils or 'jirgahs' where any man may voice an opinion. The tribal 'maliks' lead such opinion as far as they are able, but having no dependable organisation behind them other than their own individual followings, and being the slaves of faction feelings, they are generally unable to exercise wide control. Decisions of 'jirgahs' or orders of the political authorities with which strong public opinion disagrees often cannot be enforced. Such hostile opinion is generally centred in the natural leaders thrown up in times of war and raiding. These men attract to themselves the more adventurous and discontented elements and through personality, ruthlessness and courage often gain a leading position in the councils of the tribe. Such men, unless they be induced by acceptance of 'maliks' or 'Khassadars' allowances to co-operate, or unless their influence is crushed by force, remain a menace. Tribal law which is based upon Islamic law is enforced only when public feeling demands it, and normally the law that might is right supersedes all others.

Behind all looms the power of the mullahs or religious leaders. These have produced a succession of turbulent priests who have kept alive the fanatical spirit of the tribes, and whose drums throbbing and echoing across the hills may still suddenly lure a peaceful tribe to war, and render the 'maliks' powerless to restrain them. In fairness it should be said that certain mullahs do exercise a wholesome restraint and are a good influence, but others, whose religion is a cloak for self-seeking, hatred, intolerance and fanaticism, fill the pages of frontier history with tales of bloodshed.

These then are some of the difficulties with which we must contend. A hard country breeding poverty with its attendant evils. Ignorance and a misguided public opinion breeding treachery and fanaticism. Collectively a picture of democracy at its worst with a many-tongued tribal council, unable to enforce its decisions through lack of unity and any organised force to back its authority. This does not apply to the Northern 'Khanates' such as Dir, Swat and Chitral, whose rulers are virtual dictators, and who generally possess the forces necessary to impose their authority, or to some extent to a few of the tribal leaders of Baluchistan.

I have attempted to describe the country and people so as to give some background to the problem, and further, before suggesting a solution, must make a short excursion into recent history; for "where there is no knowledge of the past, there can be no vision of the future."

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Some hundred years ago the British took over the riverain tracts of the present North-West Frontier Province, and from that time a gradual infiltration into the bordering hills has taken place. This infiltration has been caused partly by the need of tribal control, partly to protect trade, and partly by the old siren 'strategy' ever beckoning from the horizon. The salients thus occupied were held for the most part by regular troops who together with those along the foothills, were engaged continuously in a life of raid and counter-raid with the neighbouring tribes. During the last years of the nineteenth century, however, there occurred the birth of certain Corps of locally enlisted tribal levies and militias, trained and led by British officers, who were entrusted under the orders of the Political officers concerned, with the duty of maintaining law and order in their own tribal limits.

Such Corps were the Zhob Levy Corps, the Kurram Militia, and the Khyber Rifles, and it is with these, and similar corps that my story is largely concerned.

It is a story of patient endurance, hard work and loyalty, stained at intervals, in areas such as the Khyber and Waziristan with infidelity and treachery, and it is a purpose of this essay to try and show the reasons for such weaknesses when they have occurred. The first picture of these Corps is of the Khyber Rifles, all local tribesmen, who were garrisoning the Khyber Pass in isolated posts, when the great tribal rising of 1897 occurred. There were no regular troops in the Pass, and their British officers had been recalled to Peshawar when the rising threatened. The Khyber Rifles were attacked by very large bodies of their own tribesmen, and the smaller garrisons, some of less than twenty rifles, evacuated their posts in face of superior opposition. Ali Masjid with a strength of some 100 rifles, put up a short defence until ammunition became scarce. The garrison of Landi Kotal, some 370 strong, but completely isolated and unsupported, defended their post for a day and a night against heavy attacks by their own kith and kin, and inflicted over 200 casualties on the attackers. The garrison ceased fire on hearing of the capture of the smaller forts and on being told the false news that regular

troops had evacuated Jamrud, and that the British were in danger in Peshawar itself. It seems that, if in those days it had been possible to make known the true situation by wireless, and if Air support had been available, the story might have been different.

Before leaving this incident, it is interesting to note some of the reasons which led to the rising. The tribes were worried by the recent delimitation of the boundary with Afghanistan, and saw in it a threat to their independence. In this they were supported by the mullahs, ever jealous of any curtailment of their power and influence. Again the garbled accounts which were spread of the original outbreak of the rising at Maizar in the Upper Tochi, and of the Turkish victories over the Greeks, show the ease with which fanaticism can be aroused amongst ignorant tribesmen, and their interest in world as well as tribal affairs, and also show the vital need to counter rumour and false propaganda by every means possible.

HISTORY FROM 1900—1920.

The twentieth century opened with an orgy of raiding and other outrages which were the work of that irrepressible tribe, the Mahsuds. These offences had been gaining momentum since 1898, and on 1st December 1900 a blockade of the tribe was commenced. After nearly a year of blockade, raids and outrages still continued, so that beginning in November 1901 operations were varied with a series of sharp counter-attacks by mobile columns into the heart of Mahsud country. These succeeded in breaking the spirit of the tribe for a while, and in January 1902 they sued for peace.

This third blockade of the tribe since the first campaign of 1880 had again shown them to be less sensitive to such an operation than tribes like the Afridis which are dependent on the adjoining settled districts economically and for winter grazing. As an example of this, as also of the danger of weak discipline in small isolated posts, here is a brief account of the capture of the South Waziristan Militia Post at Kashmir Kar during the blockade in 1901. Kashmir Kar lies well inside Zilli Khel Wazir grazing limits south of the Gomal river, bordering Baluchistan. Mahsuds grazing their flocks in this area on account of the blockade noticed the slackness of the Militia garrison who left but one sentry on the main gate of the post during the afternoon siesta. The leader of a gang of Mahsuds bent on mischief gradually made acquaintance with the garrison, and frequently passed the post

with his sheep. Collecting his gang in dead ground near the fort one warm afternoon, he approached the sentry at the main gate with a request for a drink of water. As the sentry turned to draw the water, he was throttled from behind, whereupon the gang entered and attacked the somnolent, taking thirty rifles. One follower, feigning death, alone survived to carry the news to Kajuri Kach.

This most unfortunate incident, typical of a frontier the seeming peace of whose sleeping hills has so often hidden sudden attack, must serve as an introduction to the North and South Waziristan Militias, raised in the summer of 1900. Their duties were to relieve the Regular Army, as far as possible, of police work in Waziristan. This work, carried out in a country whose inhabitants were armed, requires correspondingly suitable armament, military training and tactics. These corps were composed largely of local and other transborder tribesmen, and did good work in co-operation with the military columns during the winter of 1901.

Mention of these militias brings us to the subject of the new era in frontier policy and administration, which was the work of Lord Curzon whose Viceroyalty had just begun. This great Viceroy separated the Frontier Province from the Punjab under whose distant and somewhat unsuitable administration the country had been governed from Lahore. At the same time, as already mentioned, the duties of 'watch and ward' were handed over as far as possible to tribal militias, whilst the occupation by, and operations of, the Army in tribal territory were correspondingly limited. These reforms were later followed by military reorganisation in which the Punjab Irregular Frontier Force, previously responsible for 'watch and ward' along the border, became absorbed into the Regular Army.

The reputation of the South Waziristan Militia suffered from time to time through the murder of various British officers at the instigation of the notorious Mullah Powindah, which led to the disbandment of four hundred Mahsuds in this corps. Apart from these incidents and an occasional minor disaster such as the capture by Mahsuds of Tut Narai Post in North Waziristan, the militias successfully carried out their duties of policing tribal territory until 1919. After the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon ended the policy of sympathetic control once more swung back to that of the more frequent use of punitive, burn-and-scuttle military operations.

In the course of this paper it is not possible to mention the many minor operations which occurred along the border before and during the period of the Great War, but suffice it to say that thanks to the attitude of the Amir Habibullah during the war the Indian Government was faced with no major adventure. Despite this, tribal unrest brought about by minor Afghan intervention and World chaos, locked up considerable numbers of troops for frontier control.

Habibullah was murdered in 1919 and was succeeded by his son Amanullah who, encouraged by reports of unrest in India and the Punjab, invaded British territory, declaring a 'jehad.' From a military point of view the Third Afghan War showed how a war-weary and hastily trained army with one hand tied behind its back by finance and caution was more than a match for the ill-equipped and ill-trained Afghan forces of that time.

The Afghans were defeated, but in the peace that followed were granted full political independence. In tribal areas, the campaign threw into high relief the weaknesses of our political policy and control. The militia system in the Khyber and Waziristan broke down. The Khyber Rifles, being considered unreliable were disbanded at the outset of the war, whilst the threat of General Nadir Khan's invasion of the Kurram, followed by the evacuation of the Upper Tochi militia posts caused the subsequent desertion of the transborder elements. This was followed by the tragic happenings at Wana and the evacuation of it and other posts in South Waziristan accompanied by wholesale desertion and treachery on the part of the Afridis and Wazirs in those posts. As a result, although the Third Afghan War was quickly ended, Waziristan went up in flames.

Then followed the fierce and bloody campaign of 1919-20, in which a force in part ill-trained, sometimes dispirited and badly mauled, eventually beat the tribesmen to their knees after fighting its way into the heart of Mahsud country. This victory was in great part due to the fine leadership of a man who knew the frontier as intimately as he understood the feelings and capabilities of his troops.

What are the lessons that can be drawn from this period?

One perhaps is the difficulty of solving this frontier problem when policy is changed before it has a chance to accomplish its aim. Another is the difficulty of military control owing to the fact that the enemy cannot be driven back against a wall, and seldom can be ringed from behind since they can so easily slip

across the Durand line when hard pressed. This fact makes the problem an entirely different one from that of the French control of the Atlas tribes in North Africa.

Again, we learn that the militias as then organised and constituted, could not stand the strain of invasion followed by the evacuation of forward posts and of a religious 'jehad,' although they had shown themselves capable, with minor setbacks, of carrying out their work of watch and ward in tribal territory. What were the reasons for this breakdown? and can the shock of major invasion be expected to be borne by such corps?

It seems that despite a large proportion of local enlistments the system was not sufficiently incorporated in the tribal life and was looked upon in peace as a fairly tolerable yet 'foreign' organisation, and therefore fair game for occasional mischief. In war, owing to this 'foreign' element, every blow to the militia was a blow to British prestige, and therefore the militias were a target for tribal attack. Isolated posts of such corps where communications are vulnerable, and when out of harmony with tribal life, prove a danger and merely useless commitments in the event of major operations and increase, instead of ease, the problem. Is it not possible to use a system more in touch with tribal life, not meant rigidly to take the strain of invasion, but sufficiently elastic to give before the force of such opposition without loss of prestige?

HISTORY 1920—1939

Shortly after the campaign of 1919-20, and the subsequent months of occasional fighting, a new half forward policy was started in Waziristan. Regular troops occupied Razmak, the Lower Tochi and later occupied Wana. To supplement these and provide civil control, two new corps of South Waziristan and Tochi Scouts were raised from the ashes of the old militias. 'Khassadars' or tribal police were also put at the disposal of the political authorities for escort duty, road protection and, in limited ways, the maintenance of order.

The two new corps of Scouts differed in composition from the former militias in that a much larger proportion of the strength was enlisted from the cis-border tribes of the North-West Frontier and a smaller proportion was enlisted locally and from other trans-border tribesmen, a composition which gave added reliability. The Gomal and Wana were not reoccupied by permanent Scouts posts; but most of the remaining larger posts

were again occupied, and gradually new ones were built extending control over a considerable area, though leaving the outer belt of country adjoining the Durand Line, the Ahmedzai Salient, and a larger bloc in central Waziristan, including Bhittani country unpoliced.

The tendency was to occupy larger posts, and patrol in greater numbers than hitherto. These new corps soon showed the tribesmen that they were fully capable of carrying out their normal duties of patrolling, protecting roads, arresting individuals or surrounding villages and encampments to arrest gangs or levy fines on livestock, and whatever other task they were required to do to enforce control in the areas occupied. Later, they showed themselves to be equally formidable in war when they more than fully maintained the good reputation earned in more peaceful times, acting either independently or in co-operation with regular forces, whose backing they require, in the face of very heavy opposition. In peace the Scouts were tolerated, on the whole good humouredly, by the inhabitants of those areas that were in reach of patrols, they far preferred their presence to that of troops; but still the fact remained that they were 'foreign' and, in war, fair game.

Much lower down the scale, are the 'Khassadars' so much in harmony with tribal life that they very closely reflect it, and who particularly in war and time of tribal unrest are in large part not dependable, being totally without training or discipline, occupying small posts, mostly unsupported and indefensible.

With the increase in strength of the regular army of occupation, and of the scouts, and the number of posts and forts, came the roads. These, together with the supply and tactical bases formed by posts, eased the problem of military or scouts' control; but it cannot be said that they have proved to be roads of peace. Roads assist control, but they do not in themselves solve the problem of the causes which necessitate control. They should however, given settled conditions, eventually increase trade with the tribal areas.

I have wandered from the story, and will return to history. In 1929, the Barakzai dynasty suffered temporary eclipse, at the hands of Bacha Saqao, the water carrier; who, carried high on the wave of indignation which swept Amanullah and his unpopular reforms out of Afghanistan, found himself a king. This impossible regime was quickly and skilfully ended by Nadir Khan, the uncle of Amanullah who, thanks largely to the help of the

Waziristan tribes, fought his way to Kabul. This is only one of the recent occasions on which our tribesmen have taken a leading part in attacks on the existing regime in Afghanistan—attacks which have, with the exception of King Nadir Khan's, fortunately been failures. This potential menace of attacks by our tribes largely dictates frontier policy, and except in the case of tribes over which we have large economic control, entails some form of occupation in order that we may prevent such attacks from recurring.

This failure on the part of Amanullah to bring about social progress throws an interesting light on the dangers of reforms tactlessly introduced into a Pathan country. The strength of mullahs and other enemies of progress is great, and they see in it a danger to their own powers and interests. The problem if approached must be approached with tact, backed by good propaganda and education.

Returning to our own frontier after the post-war lull, unrest swept through the border again in 1930. The old trade winds of trouble from the west and north had been added to by more frequent gusts from the east. Little matter that these eastern gusts were as yet chiefly 'wind'; to the ignorant mind they bore the semblance of reality. Political changes backed by lying and unscrupulous propaganda, giving to the ignorant tribes the impression that the British were weakening, at first led to somewhat half-hearted repercussions, involving the Mahsuds, Afridis, Mohmands, and Utam Khels in trouble.

Embarrassment to the British through unrest among the Border tribes must increasingly be looked upon as an asset by those who in open enmity or with hatred concealed by the cloak of political freedom wish to see the downfall of the British. The ignorance of most of the people, worked upon by the unscrupulous propaganda of agitators, makes possible the belief of any lie.

In 1932, the North-West Frontier Province was brought into line with the remaining provinces of India, becoming a Governor's Province, with its own legislative council. In the same year the Frontier Crimes Regulation was withdrawn, and with its withdrawal, the brakes on violent crime were weakened. In 1935, the Government of India Act followed with its wide powers conferred upon an elected Provincial Government. These events in the administered districts caused a deep impression in tribal territory, the belief that the British were on the run, being strengthened by speeches, some openly seditious, made during

elections by agitators in the guise of politicians in the bazaars adjoining tribal territory. To the ignorant tribesmen such license of speech could only be a sign of extreme weakness, and wonder gave way to contempt.

In 1935 the Afridis had agreed to certain roadmaking and educational projects in Tirah in exchange for enlistment being reopened in the army. As a result of agitation by the 'Sarishta' party, or faction which was opposed to the 'maliks,' and those of the tribe in favour of this road, the project had to be abandoned. The 'Sarishta' party were encouraged by agitators from British India, and naturally by men in tribal territory such as the mullahs, who saw in these activities for the good of the tribe, a weakening of their own authority. The maliks were unable to overcome this formidable opposition.

In Waziristan, apart from the unrest of 1930, there was a long spell of comparative peace from 1922 onwards which was finally broken in November 1936. The causes of this peaceful period seem to be first that the Mahsuds and Wazirs had in 1919-20 been very badly hit and required a long period to recover from loss of blood. Secondly, money flowed into the country on a scale unheard of before the war: money for allowances, for construction of roads and forts and for contracts in connection with supplying the army. Again, Britain had shown her strength after the stern struggle of the Great War. Combined perhaps with these reasons was the less tangible one that the tribes could occasionally be controlled by men with strong personality and sympathy backed by understanding, and these prevented unrest in their own time.

In 1930 the tide began to turn. Political agitation from British India had its repercussions which gradually gathered in strength with the years.

As a result of political reforms the influence of the District Officers and headmen in the settled districts adjoining tribal territory was much weakened, and therefore the high degree of co-operation necessary between the settled districts and tribal areas, to deal with the problems of outlaws and mischief makers, and also of defence against tribal raids, was made more difficult.

The stream of money weakened, and the tribes forgot their punishment, as a new generation which had not been castigated grew up. Following this and the growing feeling that the British were weakening came the cry of "Islam is in danger" so that once more the drums began to speak. The ostensible reasons for this religious outcry were the Shahidganj Mosque dispute

with the Sikhs in Lahore, and the Islam Bibi case in which a Hindu girl from Bannu was forcibly abducted by a Muslim and later returned by law to her Hindu parents. Violent propaganda on account of these and other incidents calculated to rouse fanaticism continued through the summer of 1936. The chief instigator of this agitation, the Faqir of Ipi, remained at large. After some months of violent propaganda, the tribes became angry, and eventually lost their temper and slender stock of reason. Two columns which advanced into the lower Khaisora where the Faqir of Ipi had collected a lashkar, were strongly opposed. The rest of the story is well known.

After three years of war and minor skirmishing, Waziristan still remains unsettled. A lull through tiredness, winter migration, and other reasons may occur; but the symptoms of unrest in the shape of raids and small attacks continue. With firm and tactful handling, and with favourable outside conditions, a period of peace may ensue. In certain ways peace may be bought; but the past has shown that once cupidity is aroused it must be kept satisfied and ever becomes more rapacious. Peace cannot permanently be maintained by these methods, for the root causes of trouble remain and it only needs a sufficient jolt to these causes for the flimsy structure on top to collapse.

Therefore until a policy is evolved which will deal with these root causes troubles must recur. Much has been done in the past three years in strengthening the machinery of control by construction of roads and posts; and this is not a criticism of the measures taken, both military and political, which have succeeded in restraining the tribes to a great degree, despite lack of a policy, and perhaps with only cautious backing from an oft-bitten Finance.

Before ending this historical survey, mention must be made of the recent Afridi troubles in which an Afridi lashkar, stirred up by agents of Amanullah, entered Afghanistan to be driven back by Afghan troops and tribesmen. The incident once more shows the inability of the 'maliks' to exercise control. It also shows once again the necessity for control in some form or other in order to prevent such attacks by our tribes on the present Afghan government. History has shown that Waziristan is not very sensitive to the weapon of blockade, being as yet insufficiently dependent for grazing and for trade on British India. The Afridi is more sensitive, as the recent successful blockade has shown. In winter especially, the tribe depends to a great extent

for its grazing on the Khajuri plain which was occupied by us in 1930 in retaliation for the disturbances of that year. This does not mean that some degree of internal control is not wanted. Without such control, the unwieldy and unpopular system of exacting tribal responsibility must be more often enforced, bringing punishment on the just and unjust alike.

THE FUTURE

In order to profit from looking into the mirror of history it is essential to be unbiassed. This, whatever its faults is an attempt to look without prejudice.

The main lesson appears to be that the root cause of the trouble has never been cured. This is, the weakness of the 'maliks' and other influences working for law and order in the face of an intense democracy and against the power of the mullahs and hostile elements. The latter are aided by ignorance, poverty and a low standard of public opinion. Discontent through possibly uneven distribution of allowances and the repercussions of events in the outside world distorted by lying and unchecked propaganda also help the trouble-maker. A strong sense of freedom and dislike of foreign control, more pronounced in certain regions than in others, is also a factor to be reckoned with. Into some of these regions we may have been drawn by strategy as well as for reasons of control, and it seems that if other means of control can be substituted in such places the demands of strategy should be modified as much as possible.

There are tribal areas such as the Khaiber which it is strategically necessary to occupy. Such areas, partly because they are recognised trade routes, are not so sensitive and the strategic necessity of occupation is recognised. Again, we see the lack of continuity in any strong policy and that the only policy which showed signs of success was partly based on a militia system which broke down in war. We see the weaknesses of such a militia system to be the danger from fanaticism and the fact that it was still sufficiently 'foreign' to be a target for tribal attack in war. We also see the dangers of small isolated posts in peace and war. Lastly we see that the building of roads in itself will not solve the problem of the tribal areas, though roads are necessary for control and for this reason the more we can afford the better.

These then are some of the lessons which history can teach. The question remains how can they be applied to the problem of Waziristan and to other tribal areas. The writer put forward certain proposals for the control of Waziristan in a recent article.

These were briefly as follows: Political control was to be strengthened by an increase of scouts posts, and the formation of a Bhittani Militia to police the areas at present unpoliced. The new units would be found by transferring the strength of the present Frontier Constabulary to the Scouts and Bhittani Militia and by increasing the numbers available for 'gashting' by the formation of a Reserve Wing, armed with light automatics and mortars, who could take over the duties of post defence. When control had been established, the posts in the centre of the controlled zone would be handed over to a tribal militia, eventually leaving the outer arc of the controlled zone protected by scouts and regular troops against invasion from outside.

As already stated, thanks to criticism and further thought I have changed some of these ideas. From a study of past history and also from the lessons taught by recent happenings it would seem that a 'foreign' army, and in a lesser degree scouts, are an irritant and sometimes a dangerous commitment when stationed deep in tribal territory at the end of vulnerable communications. I think my previous ideas of protecting the outer arc of the controlled zone by regular troops and scouts to be wrong and suggest the eventual withdrawal of the army and scouts to positions governed by three factors. These are: reasonably secure communications, the need for economic and political control, and lastly, the control of raiding. The forward zones would be policed by local forces or properly trained tribal militia. This would not prevent scouts from occupying occasional camps in the forward zone which could be evacuated when not required without loss of prestige.

An increase in the number of automatic weapons of scouts would obviously increase the safety of posts, especially of small posts and picquets, and decrease the number of men required for their static defence. Again, although realising the dangers of small posts and the disadvantages of dispersal, it would seem that a few small posts for the protection of dangerous places on communications or for blocking raiders' paths would prove a further economy of force. Such posts would not only act as bases and as pivots for 'gashts' operating in their area, but would also decrease the numbers required for patrolling in their neighbourhood, and decrease the number of calls upon the army for the assistance of scouts, possibly at a time when their action was required elsewhere.

A small post armed with a gun on the Tabai Narai between Mir Ali and Spinwan might reasonably have prevented the numerous incidents and operations which have taken place on that road.

I realise that it would not be possible to transfer the entire strength of the Frontier Constabulary to scouts as a certain strength is necessary for gaining contact with raiders and for the protection of the settled districts. It still appears however that a proportion of the present strength of the Frontier Constabulary on the borders of Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu could be better used by increasing Scouts, so as to obtain complete political control inside the whole tribal zone adjoining the administered districts, including Bhittani country and the Lower Shaktu, thus blocking the gateways along the whole foothill barrier.

Lastly, it is essential that the 'Khassadar' system be maintained until a more efficient tribal force can be evolved, chiefly as the system is in harmony with tribal life and is elastic enough for the members of a hostile section to be dismissed without the breakdown of the whole organisation.

Tribal militias might possibly be trained and administered through Scouts Corps, at any rate to begin with, and in part taken from their strength; but naturally such militias could not be expected to maintain the same high 'foreign' standards, especially of drill and discipline, as scouts nor their level of training be kept at unnatural heights.

The duties and location of a trained tribal militia would be as follows. They would occupy those posts which police forward and sensitive areas and areas difficult to support by ground troops in case of war. Their duties would be to carry out the work now done by scouts in those areas. They would form a tribal police at the disposal of the tribal 'jirgah' with the sanction of the political authorities, to enforce authority and form a rallying point for sane tribal opinion. Further to build up a sane public opinion, education, especially of the future leaders, must be encouarged, and propaganda spread against anti-social habits such as faction feeling and the blood-feud. Such propaganda can only be spread with good effect through men of tribal religion and race, and for this and other reasons the officering of the militia must eventually be made entirely tribal, thus also obviating the danger of fanaticism, and the feeling that the organisation is 'foreign.' It is possible that in the course of years a small and really educated class might be formed which would gradually be-

come the leaven of sanity for the whole tribe. Further, the militia would have a number of trained artificers and masons, so that in times of peace, apart from police duties, they might work on the improvement of irrigation, etc. Posts garrisoned by the militia should be if possible large ones to obviate the dangers attendant to small posts, and they should be equipped with wireless and be allowed to call on Air support, but would naturally not be given automatic weapons or guns. Finally the distribution of pay on the wide basis of the militia would much assist the economic problem, and the provision of pensions might prove a sheet-anchor when their loyalties were strained.

The duties and location of the Scouts would be as follows: They would occupy posts reasonably easy to support in war and with strong Lines of Communication. Their duties would be to act as an escort to the Political Authorities, to form a small mobile striking force which could be carried in armoured M.T. to support the Tribal Militia Wing, and lastly to prevent raiding and dominate winter grazing areas. The armament of Scouts would be improved to include a few four-wheel-drive armoured cars and armoured vehicles carrying mortars or small guns, thus enabling them to keep open their line of communications without army support unless against very heavy opposition. As already mentioned Light Automatics would be provided for static post defence and possibly a small proportion for 'gashts' or patrols.

The tribal Militia system could possibly be extended, as opportunity allowed, into sensitive areas like the Shaktu and to the outer belt, bordering the Durand Line, to include tribes such as the Madda Khel.

Concurrent with the formation of Tribal Militias the Scout Wings and Regular Garrisons must gradually withdraw. The Scout Garrisons to posts as already mentioned; the Army, with the exception of small forward posts in such places as Manzai and Mir Ali from where they give a moral backing to the Scouts, could go back to the settled Districts.

This is not an advocacy of any withdrawal at a dangerous period leading to the results of 1919. Isolated incidents might occur where the difficulties of defence and of support outweigh the dangers of withdrawal, but as a general rule it would seem that the policy of Lyautey in North Africa during the last war of holding the forward posts where possible, is essential. Owing to the recent use by tribal forces of guns and the possible improvement of tribal armament, isolated posts must have the necessary armament, including guns, to resist organised attack.

Next we come to the problem of raiding. This is caused partly by poverty but is chiefly the result of disturbed conditions in tribal territory. Such conditions are encouraged by the fact that in long stretches of territory adjoining British India there is weak political control, owing to a lack of police forces in these territories. The interception of raiding gangs is largely a problem of time and space, and it is considered that the present Frontier Constabulary posts are sited so as to give the raiders an unnecessary start, built as they are for the most part some miles from the foothills barrier or base line of the raiding gangs. It is considered that the duty of intercepting the raiding gangs must be primarily that of Scouts posts, sited to watch the main gateways from inside the foothill barrier where the gateways are fewer and tactical positions are stronger than in the plains. The duty of a smaller and more mobile Frontier Constabulary would be to gain contact with gangs and transmit news of them by pack wireless. They would naturally, where possible, also intercept gangs.

At the beginning of this paper an attempt was made to describe the country bordering the foothills, in which the Frontier Constabulary operates. This is largely featureless and lacking in tactical positions which give good command. On the other hand it is for the greater part reasonable country for mounted troops, and across which tracks suitable for mechanical transport can be found or made. There are exceptional tracts, such as the Bhain Pass, which are suitable only for infantry.

It is possible that a larger proportion of the Frontier Constabulary should consist of Mounted Infantry than at present. A few Frontier Constabulary posts, garrisoned by mobile groups of Mounted Infantry backed by motorised forces concentrated at Bannu and Tank, would seem sufficient to police the border, provided that the foothills and belt of adjoining tribal territory were strongly held.

Before leaving the subject of Frontier Constabulary, would it not be an eventual economy to amalgamate the separate organisations of Scouts and Constabulary? The specialised police work of the Frontier Constabulary in the settled districts could be supervised by police officers attached for this duty. Better opportunities for training would be afforded to units engaged in areas at present policed by Frontier Constabulary by taking their turn in policing tribal territory, and occasional relief from continuous service in tribal areas would be afforded to Scouts. The breaking down of water-tight compartments between civil armed Forces should lead to the more fluid use of reserves, and might make economies in total numbers possible.

The proposals have not mentioned other tribal areas. Is it possible that the Militia idea could be extended to certain tribes such as the Afridis and Lower Mohmands? For instance the old Khyber Rifles might be reformed, and when sufficiently strong might give the friendly maliks the backing necessary to extend the road into the Bazaar Valley, protected by their own posts. They might also eventually take over the Khajuri plain posts, releasing garrisons of Regular Troops for more normal work. A sufficient nucleus of trained men exists to form such Militias in many tribes. For instance the Mahsuds can draw on their company which was serving with the Regular Army, and those serving with the Kurram Militia for, although they have done good work at times, their reliability as yet is not sufficient to warrant retention in service outside their own tribal limits. The Bhittanis could draw on the South Waziristan Scouts and Frontier Constabulary, and the Afridis on the Scouts and numerous ex-soldiers.

CONCLUSION

The idea of raising locally enlisted Tribal Militias may seem Utopian, but the writer believes some such solution the only hope of real peace. As has been shown by the examples quoted from History, the records of such local Tribal Militias have been stained by treachery and lack of discipline. On the other hand it seems that in the past we did not handle them always with a full understanding of their weaknesses, not only did we expose their loyalties to exceptional strains, but failed to support them when in need of support. There are great risks involved in the raising of such forces, but if the record of good work which such corps have performed be remembered, and the lessons learnt from history be applied, the risks seem worth taking.

A considerable time must elapse before any such scheme can be completed. We must look years ahead, into an unknown new world in which Militarism will be detested and Air bombing condemned. If we are to be ready for such a time the foundations must be laid now and the training, and above all the education, of the younger generation, on whose shoulders such a scheme will rest, must begin at once.

As already stated earlier in this paper, the clouds are gathering and it is hard to see clearly how and where they will break. We have seen that the tribes take an immense interest in world events, and although to a fair extent they are shrewd judges, their ignorance makes them a good target for any propaganda. There are signs that many may be with us in this struggle; this

may be, but money also speaks, and there are many strange cross-currents of hatred and self-seeking let loose to bewilder and carry away ignorant men.

War aims are as necessary for the tribes as for other men, and perhaps the inauguration of some scheme such as that proposed might harness their energies and their thoughts to the exclusion of more harmful ideas. This is a plea also for the many men at present employed in the control of Waziristan, working in uncomfortable and unfriendly surroundings. If control can eventually be accomplished without locking up troops in such places, then no question of prestige or waste of money should be allowed to stand in the way of their withdrawal. That they will be necessary for a time is self-evident, as any scheme such as this needs time to develop, and the forces of reaction backed by the ignorance of the grown-up generations will possibly make the latter fight for their threatened powers.

Eventually if regular troops are withdrawn, and if this withdrawal leads to better relations with the Tribes, prestige will not have suffered, and, eventually also, the tax-payer may get some value for his money.

"MORE THAN FIFTY YEARS AGO"

Extract from a Memorandum by the Duke of Wellington on Sir W. H. Macnaughton's letter of 26th October, 1841

(THE RETREAT FROM KABUL STARTED ON 6 JAN. 1842 AND THE WHOLE FORCE PERISHED.)

But Mr. Macnaughton has discovered that the Company's troops are not sufficiently active personally, nor are they sufficiently well armed for the warfare in Afghanistan. Very possibly an Afghan will run over his native hills faster than an Englishman or a Hindoo. But we have carried on war in hill countries, as well as in Hindostan and the Deccan as in the Spanish Peninsula; and I never heard that our troops were not equal, as well in personal activity as by their arms, to contend with and overcome any natives of hills whatever. Mr. Macnaughton ought to have learnt by this time that hill countries are not conquered, and their inhabitants kept in subjection, solely by running up the hills and firing at long distances. The whole of a hill country

of which it is necessary to keep possession, particularly for the communications of the army, should be occupied by sufficient bodies of troops, well supplied, and capable of maintaining themselves; and not only not a Ghilzye or insurgent should be able to run up and down hills, but not a cat or a goat, except under the fire of those occupying the hills. This is the mode of carrying on the war, and not by hiring Afghans with long matchlocks* to protect and defend the communications of the British army.

Shah Soojah Khan may have in his service any troops that he and Mr. Macnaughton please. But if the troops in the service of the East India Company are not able, armed and equipped as they are, to perform the service required of them in Central Asia, I protest against their being left in Afghanistan. It will not do to raise, pay, and discipline matchlock men, in order to protect the British troops and their communications discovered by Mr. Macnaughton to be no longer able to protect themselves.

WELLINGTON.

29th January, 1842. *At night.*

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* Nowadays called Khassadars.

POLITICAL COMMISSARS IN THE SOVIET ARMY

By Capt. G. H. Nash, 16th. Punjab Regiment

I—REVOLUTIONARY YEARS 1917—20.

Although in process of disintegration, even before February 1917, the Imperial Russian Army still maintained some semblance of cohesion under Kerensky's Provisional Government. However, in almost every regiment, soldiers' committees were set up, and whilst the Provisional Government—which can hardly be said to have governed—gave lip service to the policy of continuing to fight, its War Minister, Sokolov, published the famous Order No. 1 "The declaration of soldiers rights," which gave further impetus to the process of disintegration.

"Delegates" of every socialist political shade visited the front in large numbers and addressed the troops. They attacked the authority of the officers and advised the soldiers to return to their villages in time to share in the redistribution of land.

In a welter of personal and party rivalries the Bolsheviks alone were an organised and disciplined political party and, unlike the rest, they knew what they wanted. They concentrated early on securing predominance in the soldiers' and sailors' committees, and special Bolshevik Military Commissions were established for this purpose at Petrograd, at the front, and in the Baltic Fleet.

In some units the officers were simply dismissed and the soldiers chose their own leaders and decided to go home. In other units soldiers' committees arrested the officers and sent them to the Bolshevik Military Commissions. Finally, there were units in which all the officers were shot. These soldiers' committees formed the first link between the Bolshevik Party, and the Armed Forces, and were the forerunners of the appointment of Political Commissars. At first their role was purely destructive, but after the October (1917) Revolution, in which the Bolsheviks seized the reins of Government and were faced with the urgent necessity of creating a Red Army, these committees were given the task of controlling, rather than undermining, the authority of the officers. Even before the October Revolution Bolshevik agitators were given some form of military training before being sent to the Army and a desperate effort was made to form a new army out of the demoralised red units of the old. It was soon seen that

this effort was foredoomed to failure, so the Bolsheviks demobilised what was left of the old Imperial forces and began to raise the Red Army in February 1918. Before this, they relied almost entirely on the Red Guards, who were workers armed and organised on military lines.

With the growth of the Red Army the need for experienced commanders became acute. Tzarist officers were soon employed in large numbers, and in order to maintain the revolutionary character of the Soviet forces, Political Commissars were appointed to the headquarters of all units and formations.

Armies were commanded by Revolutionary Councils of War which consisted of the Army Commander and the commissars attached to him. Friction was inevitable, and although Commissars were not supposed to interfere in purely military questions, they often did and the fighting efficiency of a unit or formation suffered gravely in consequence. In August 1918 Trotsky published the following Army Order:

"I note that quarrels between commissars and military leaders have lately been increasing. From the evidence at my disposal it is apparent that commissars often take a directly wrong line of action, either by usurping operative and leadership functions, or by poisoning the relations between officer and man by a policy of petty quibbling carried out in a spirit of undignified rivalry. At the same time it not infrequently happens that the presence of the commissar does not prevent the military commander from deserting to the enemy. In view of these circumstances, I must bring the following facts to the notice of all commissars:

(1) A commissar is not there to give orders, but to watch. He must watch carefully and sharply.

(2) A commissar must behave respectfully to military experts who fulfil their duties conscientiously, and must protect their rights and human dignities by all the means of the Soviet authority.

(3) A commissar must not seek quarrels, but if he finds it necessary to intervene, his intervention must be effective.

(4) Offences against this order will be subject to severe penalties.

(5) A commissar who fails to prevent the desertion of a commanding officer will have to answer for his negligence with his own life."

So much for the shortcomings of these early political commissars. Besides preventing the desertion of the commanding officer they had many other responsibilities. They had always to be by the side of the officer commanding when orders or instructions were received or issued, during an inspection, or when the regiment went into action. During an engagement they were required to set an example to the troops by taking a part in the fighting. All orders issued by the commanding officer were scrutinized and countersigned by them, and besides "procuring and managing all supplies needed by the regiment"—no mean feat in 1918—20—they were required to direct and supervise all departments of the regimental staff. Each regiment had an assistant commissar, who was also quartermaster and transport officer. Last, but not least by any means, the commissar was responsible for organising and conducting political work. How a commissar could direct and supervise all departments of the regimental staff without coming into constant and violent collision with the regimental commander is a question which perhaps not even Trotsky could answer.

II.—THE YEARS BEFORE THE PURGE OF 1937

In the next fifteen years the role of the Political Commissar underwent considerable change. It must have been assumed that during this period the Workers and Peasants' Red Army had become a component part of the Bolshevik life and thought, and that the political views of those officers of the old army who still remained were now in complete harmony with those of the Soviet Government. Indeed, at least one writer maintains that Tuchachevsky, "at one time Commander-in-Chief designate for the Red Army in war," went to the other extreme; he refused to denounce Trotsky and regarded Stalin as the betrayer of the Revolution.

In the Soviet Field Service Regulations issued in 1936 the duties of the Political Commissars were given in great detail. Although still concerned with supply and transport, by far their most important work was that of educating the troops politically and morally, and inculcating in them a high sense of discipline, and a spirit of patriotism and self sacrifice.

"Political work," to quote these regulations, "must be directed to maintaining the fighting spirit of the troops and strengthening and raising the fighting efficiency of the Red Army, at the same time closely uniting the troops around the Party of Lenin and Stalin and the Soviet Government.

Political work must create in every commander and Red Soldier love of his country and the will to carry out to the end his sacred duty of defending the Socialist Fatherland.

"Political work will be directed to creating in every soldier and commander a high sense of discipline, determination, self-sacrifice, military enthusiasm, initiative, decisiveness, steadfastness in battle, and the will to bear the privations of active service conditions . . . ."

After demanding that Commissars should set a high personal example at all times and that they should, in battle, "be where an individual example of self-denial and heroism is demanded," the regulations enumerated their administrative duties. These may be roughly divided into two: supply and transport duties, which have already been mentioned, and what may be summarised as "humanitarian and welfare duties" calculated to endear the political commissar to the hearts of Red Soldiers and prisoners of war alike. "Political Commissars," went on the regulations, "must continually interest themselves in the material needs of the troops." They were ordered to see that the troops get their food in good time and to test its quality. They were responsible for good relations between the Army and local populations and therefore took part in billeting arrangements.

The Commissars were required to take special care of their own and enemy wounded, gas-contaminated, or sick, and to ensure that arrangements were made for their evacuation and feeding. With regard to prisoners, they were further required to carry out political work amongst them to secure their protection from enemy air or gas action, and to arrange for their early evacuation from the front.

Besides ensuring that the troops were kept in touch with their homes, political commissars had also to organise their recreation. In addition to political lectures this included concerts, folk dancing, community singing, listening-in and entertainment by mobile cinema units.

Finally the commissar was made responsible for counter-espionage and for combating all that is summarised to-day in the phrase "fifth column activities."

The main point of interest in this long list of duties is that they all possessed some political significance, either as direct party action, such as lectures on political themes, or indirect action, such as the various welfare activities, calculated to endear the commissar—and through him the Bolshevik Party which he represented—to the hearts of the soldiers.

Although required to supervise supply and transport, it appears from these regulations that political commissars no longer occupied a position in which their duties might clash with those of a commanding officer. Quite a workable balance had been achieved between Party and Army interests.

III.—THE PURGE AND AFTER

In June 1937 Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven Soviet Generals were shot. "For dogs—a dog's death" said a leading article in "Pravda;" and added that "eight military spies have been smashed on behalf of a people of many millions." The men executed were for the most part men who had made the Red Army; but the Red Army, having reached a high state of efficiency, began to slip away from the Party and to become a law unto itself; then Stalin destroyed its high commanders, and this was merely a prelude to wholesale shootings both of commissars and executive officers in all the services, the purge also extending to the civil administration and to industry.

The drive to bring the Army back to the Party was bound to influence greatly the status and activities of Political Commissars, indeed their status was at once enhanced and they became the superiors of the officers to whom they were attached.

Since the purge big changes have been made in the curriculum at the Lenin Military Political Academy, which is the training centre for commissars of all the services. The Academy was moved to Moscow in 1938. In the same year, Voroshilov made a speech in which he said: "Commissars have more responsibility than anyone else in the Army. The commander and the commissar are together the unit of leadership in military and political training and in the education of a military unit. They are both responsible for the military, political, moral, administrative and domestic state of efficiency of their unit. They will both lead their unit or formation into battle. It is most necessary therefore that every effort should be made to develop qualities of leadership in every commander, commissar and chief in the Red Army. The commissar has a special responsibility in this respect."

A system of dual command had been introduced and henceforth the military commander was to do nothing without the approval and co-operation of the commissar. Whereas the commissar had formerly been the father and spirit of the regiment he was now also to be at least an equal partner in its training and leadership. This new role demanded a high standard of

military as well as political training, and the Lenin Military Political Academy was expanded to meet the new situation.. Little has been published in the Soviet Press regarding its purely military activities, but there is enough to indicate that military training is extensively studied; even tank driving and maintenance is taught, and the commissar is continually reminded that he must take an active part in all regimental work, including the drafting of orders by the Regimental Commander.

It is clear that after the purge the powers of Commissars became almost unlimited, but a new development has recently taken place with regard to their status. By a decree published in August 1940 the appointment of Political Commissar has been abolished, and the Seconds-in-Command will, in future, be responsible for the political education of their units. This would appear to explain the insistance on a detailed study of military duties which has, in recent years, characterised the training of Political Commissars trained at the Lenin Military Political Academy, they have now become an integral part of the Commanding personnel, and the party has thus established itself even more firmly amongst the leaders of the Fighting Forces. Finally the Red Army is no longer threatened with the dangers of dual Command.

PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS

By Procrustes

The currency of two flatly opposed deductions from the same evidence would suggest in the matter concerned a certain complexity. This is very notably the case with propaganda. That "we are doing nothing about propaganda" is one commonly heard view. That "everything you read or see or hear is propaganda" is another, equally easy to meet.

The existence of this latter attitude is worth preliminary notice. Its strength in the United States was exploited with considerable skill by the Nazis in "anti-propaganda propaganda," until the German invasion of the Low Countries and the subsequent march of events swung American opinion more strongly than any British propaganda could have done—an example (the Italian occupation of Albania was another) of the way in which the most expensive propaganda campaign can be nullified by a political act.

To large numbers of people propaganda is not only a suspect word but a suspect fact. As a weapon, it has the peculiar property, unless handled with extreme skill and with a knowledge of psychology which is by no means common, of setting up resistance by its own action. In Germany, which has been in many respects a closed field for an elaborately prepared experiment, newspaper circulations have markedly decreased—and this among a people naturally avid for factual knowledge.

At a certain level, propaganda-resistance can actually be turned to propaganda purposes. For example, the highly exaggerated and often contradictory statistics for British sea and air losses put out by the German radio have among their effects the probably intentional one of inducing in the listener a disbelief of *all* published figures—including, of course, British ones. The resultant state of mind is suitable for the building up of the picture which the Nazis wish to present. The victim flatters himself that he believes nothing that he hears from either side. But such a mental vacuum must be filled: and the total effect of reiterated German propaganda does in fact fill it, though individual broadcasts may be suspect.

The man who denounces as propaganda everything which assails his senses has this to support him historically: that long before the invention of moveable type, causes and castes and individuals have sought and kept and lost power through the influence of communicated ideas. More recently both Napoleon and Bismarck made deliberate use of propaganda. But the emergence of the word itself from an innocent designation covering the activities of Roman Catholic Foreign Missions, to the name of an instrument of politics and warfare, dates really from the last war—and indeed from the last year of that war, when Northcliffe took over the direction of British propaganda. Since 1918 two factors have sharpened and polished the weapon. One is the development of important new media—the radio and the cinema. The other is the growth of political systems exercising detailed control of large populations.

There is a certain fascination in the blatant exposure by the Nazi leaders of their own methods of propaganda and the ends to which they have been applied. When Goebbles writes of the necessity "to arouse outbreaks of fury, to get masses of men on the march, to organise hate and suspicion with ice-cold calculation" (*Der Angriff*, 18-2-29), we may turn the phrase against him, but we may consider at the same time how far it is valuable to the general technique of a new weapon. When Hitler declares that "in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility" (*Mein Kampf*), his opponents may easily be tempted to follow the hint. "These tactics," says Hitler in another passage, "based on an accurate valuation of human weakness, must lead almost mathematically to success, if the opposing party does not learn to meet poison gas with poison gas." And there lies the force of the argument that "we are doing nothing about propaganda." Are we in fact meeting poison gas with poison gas?

Before dealing with special problems arising in India, we must consider British propaganda in general in relation to that of the enemy. The obvious question arises whether poison gas is the only or the best antidote to poison gas. Though our own preparations for chemical warfare may be conducted under the label of an "Anti-Gas School" there is, after all, a matter of forty million gas-masks distributed by Government. The retaliatory Blenheim is not the whole answer to the Dornier. There are the Hurricanes and Spitfires. In other words—and however justified in certain cases may be the critics of the "defensive attitude"—there is a distinction to be drawn between two equally

necessary instruments, functioning differently towards the same end: between offensive and defensive propaganda.

If we are to follow, as many urge and as Hitler appears to have feared, the Nazi principles of offensive propaganda, it follows first that we must make similar use of the means of dissemination, and secondly that our general aim must approximate broadly to that of those who developed and perfected the instrument.

The first consideration is comparatively simple. "When we agree that propaganda control is necessary," writes Captain Rogerson in his study *Propaganda in the Next War*, "we shall impose it instantly, and label our control machinery 'democratic' or 'voluntary' in large letters." To some extent this has already been done. But propaganda control of the kind to which the label 'democratic' will stick convincingly is not the propaganda control which has forged the German weapon. That is far more rigid, far more complete. The *Reichsministerium für Propaganda und Volkserklärung* is not merely a Ministry of Information more efficient than our own. It is an organisation controlling, directly or indirectly and in either case absolutely, the Press, the radio, the theatre, the cinema, education, religion, literature, even village festivals and hotel advertising. Questions of labour, health, diplomacy, war itself, are affected by its policy. There is no doubt that we could have such an organisation if we wanted it. But we should have to drop 'freedom' and a number of other words from our propaganda vocabulary, and at the same time from our political vocabulary, as the Nazis have largely done. That is the whole issue, and those who hold that we can win the war by taking this about-turn are entitled to press for a British Goebbles.

The second important consideration gets less attention than it deserves. If we wish to adopt an instrument we must understand its purpose. It is a mistake to suppose that Nazi propaganda is primarily a means of obtaining converts to the Nazi "philosophy" or "system," and that we therefore require a similar means of propagating our own political faith and way of life. For a start there is precious little philosophy in Nazi-ism, however it may be dressed up for special purposes. Hitler's book was not called *My Faith* but *My Fight*. The affirmations of belief to be found in its pages are unimportant besides the frank analysis of the technique of power. It is not social development along one theoretical line or another that interests him and his

confederates, but simply and solely domination. Any political ideas which can be exploited towards this end will serve. A dozen political or religious ideas in a dozen different countries may serve at the same time. German broadcasts to India frequently pay fervent lip-service to *ahimsa*. One of the main items in the long and elaborately devised propaganda programme which really broke French resistance was the encouragement of Communism.

The German propaganda successes abroad have been successes for a system of disruption, dislocation, the spread of mistrust and confusion. Nazi Germany can profit, and has made careful arrangements to profit, by disturbances in almost any part of the world except her own territory. The British Empire, spread across two hemispheres with extended lines of communication, has no use for this sort of trouble, except in enemy-occupied territory, and only then at the moment when it can be successfully exploited. British leaflet-raids were successful in the last war because they were made at the right moment, when the German Army had three years of trench warfare behind it and German civilian morale was already cracking.

It appears, then, that for certain specific purposes Britain can make use of a propaganda technique which the Nazis originally copied from Northcliffe's Ministry and adapted to their own ends. An obvious task for this technique—and on the face of it it should not be difficult if the means of dissemination can be perfected—is the splitting of the Italian people from their German masters. Other propaganda campaigns, similar to those carried out efficiently in 1918, should be planned for each of the subject European nations, and timed to reach their peak in conjunction with other factors—the eventual military counter-attack and the maximum effect of blockade. We may also take note of Hitler's very sound principle that mass-antagonism should be concentrated upon one enemy. Hitler himself chose the easiest "enemy" of all for propaganda purposes. All his many and various opponents have been denounced before the German people either as Jews or in Jewish pay—Churchill, Hore-Belisha, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Reynaud, Mandel, Benes, Roosevelt, Negrim, Stalin (up to last summer), even Gandhi, have been tarred with the same brush. It should be a cardinal point in British war-publicity that however many enemies enter the field, all of them do so at the instigation of the Nazi arch-enemy of mankind.

In the main, however, it must be clear that a Power interested in preservation and construction cannot profit by an instrument designed for destruction and disintegration. "Valuable as an agent of war," says Capt. Liddell Hart of propaganda, "it is a dangerous ally for the cause of human progress." An outstanding example of a highly effective war-time propaganda exploit turning mercilessly against us in peace is the promise of a Jewish National Home. The fact is that Nazi-ism, which is essentially not a positive creed but, as Rauschnigg called it, a Revolution of Destruction, need look no further than at the immediate objects of conquest and disruption. Britain must look further. Every consideration compels her to do so, and the peace is going to be no easier to win than the war. The dissemination of trust is a very different matter from the dissemination of fear. Quite aside from any sort of idealism, Britain simply cannot afford to rule the world by military occupation. Germany is apparently prepared to do so, or to rule as much as she can get for as long as she can keep it.

Those, therefore, who advocate total propaganda warfare on the Nazi model as a temporary necessity, should remember the fable (a German one, by the way) of the Sorcerer's Apprentice. The Poltergeist will prove difficult to dismiss when his work is done.

In spite of the changes in weapons and tactics that have rendered anyone who talks in terms of the last war suspect as a Fifth Columnist, I do not yet see any reason to abandon the three main postulates laid down by Mr. Wickham Steed, Professor Seton-Watson and Mr. H. G. Wells at Crewe House in February 1918:

(*i*) Propaganda operations must not be started until general lines of policy have been clearly established.

(*ii*) Propaganda must never have recourse to distortion of the truth.

(*iii*) It must steer clear of inconsistencies and ambiguities.

These are not principles which can be carried out simply by occupying an office and pinning them up on the wall. They vitally affect organisation. They are being observed at present in India in face of difficulties which can and should be removed.

Some of the special problems of propaganda in India are those which confront administration of any kind in this country. On these there is little need to dilate. They are the problems of centralisation and distribution in a sub-continent of many

different peoples living in varying circumstances, according to varying beliefs, and under varying forms of government. For the general unification of policy, propaganda requires to be centralised. It also demands throughout the whole country full-time and properly trained officials with reliable means of assessing opinion in their districts and in constant touch with the central office. The organisation of the army and of civil administration provided a basis on which to begin operations. Results so far achieved have depended largely on individual efficiency and enthusiasm throughout these channels. That is not enough.

In India the terms "offensive" and "defensive" propaganda have their own application. There is at present no obligation for India to carry propaganda into enemy territory. The problem is entirely an internal one. It may accordingly be more appropriate to speak of "propaganda" and "counter-propaganda" —the latter term denoting all steps taken to refute and discredit enemy propaganda, the former covering positive publicity in India independent of enemy attacks.

Counter-propaganda, as a means of defence of the population of India against enemy propaganda, has only one line of attack to face (or possibly two if we include "whispering campaigns" started in neighbouring countries and spreading to India). This line of attack is the radio—primarily at present the German radio, for Italian broadcasts directed to India are still a pale reflection of the vigorous Nazi campaign. Although the enemy, by reason of efficient censorship, is restricted to the ether as a medium, counter-propaganda in India can make use not only of the radio but also to some extent of the Press, the cinema, and (an important medium if it were thoroughly developed) verbal communication. There is, of course, a further way of treating the attack, and that is to run away from it by attempting to prevent all listening to enemy broadcasts. Public dissemination of these broadcasts has already been forbidden as a means of checking the spread of rumours detrimental to commercial confidence and public morale. This step is said to have been effective. Its extension to include private listening would be disastrous.

German short-wave programmes directed to India and the Near East cover most of the day, either in English, Hindustani, Arabic or Persian, and the technical excellence of their transmissions is such that any listener idly twiddling, or even searching for another station, is likely to get Germany strongly and clearly. Italy broadcasts irregularly a news-review in Bengali, but apart

from this the principal choice offered by the enemy to the 103,000 Indian licence-holders is between the Hindustani broadcast at 8 p.m. and the main English broadcasts at 12.30 p.m., 5.30 p.m., and 7.30 p.m. All India Radio, on the other hand, puts out its news service in nine languages.

Opinions on the effect of the broadcasts from Berlin upon Indian listeners appear to be strongly held but are not infrequently conflicting. The impact of a standard broadcast in two languages upon the varied populations of India is not to be decided by the exclamations, however significant, of somebody's bearer, nor yet upon reports, however methodical, from army units. Although reaction-analysis undertaken in Germany by the Propaganda Ministry provided in some instances exceedingly interesting data (notably in election-campaigns), the perils of over-organisation to which German methods seem subject are to be avoided; nor is a Gallup poll in any way practicable in India. At the same time it would be wrong, until some roughly workable system of observation is developed, to generalise on Indian reactions either to enemy or A. I. R. broadcasts.

What can be determined with some accuracy is the purpose of German propaganda and the extent to which that purpose is being achieved, though it will still remain to be decided what part in the result is played by the propaganda itself, and what by other factors.

German broadcasts to India are of course not so much pro-Nazi as anti-British. This is no doubt due partly to the fact that Nazi-ism itself is nourished by antagonism to other creeds and systems rather than by any positive convictions, and partly to the futility of attempting mass-conversion to Nazi-ism in India. With the exception of isolated groups and individuals, most of whom sooner or later come within the reach of security legislation, it may be asserted that at the outbreak of war there was in India considerably less partiality to Germany than there had been in 1914. If that position has been in any way modified in Germany's favour during the past twelve months, it can only have occurred through one agency: fear.

"The effects of fear," records Dr. Serge Chakotin in his valuable book, *The Rape of the Masses*, "are greater in a man if he is hungry or thirsty, ill or tired, or already depressed on account of some earlier trouble; this explains the fact that propaganda based on fear always takes effect more easily with men whose economic situation is precarious, or who are worked too hard or have

been made apprehensive by other influences." The application of this paragraph to India requires no emphasis.

Despite the broadcast assurances of German sympathy with India's struggle for freedom, fear and hatred are undoubtedly the keynotes of Nazi propaganda. Germany is represented as successful rather than beneficent. Britain is the tyrant, but an effete tyrant, a crumbling monster. Sometimes there are direct threats of ultimate revenge upon Indians who persist in a pro-British attitude. Climb aboard the Nazi band-waggon, is the moral, before it is too late. The warning has been repeated again and again, and now there is a note of sorrow and reproof that it has not already been accepted.

After the first year of a determined Nazi propaganda-campaign, the widespread panic and civil disturbance at which it aims have not been brought about. There have been, and will continue to be, harvests of harmful rumours, though here it may be mentioned that not all the rumours confidently attributed to enemy broadcasts are actually to be traced to that source. If the effects of hostile propaganda cannot be precisely estimated, neither can the effects of counter-propaganda, and in the present position there are certainly no grounds for complacency. We have a long war to fight.

The psychologist, required to combat the effects of fear-propaganda, would recommend external or internal inhibition—the stimulation, that is to say, either of a brisk new excitement or of an effort of will. The counter-propagandist, exercising the limited functions at present permitted him, must see that correct information, encouragingly interpreted, reaches the public, and reaches it quickly. In the absence of effective organisation, the Crewe House stipulations Nos. (ii) and (iii) must prove a handicap. It is easier and quicker to invent a lie than to arrive at the truth. Moreover, the truth is not always particularly exciting. During the relatively "quiet" months of last winter and spring, Germany could always make news, true or false, of the sinking of Allied shipping. British blockade activities, on the other hand, were seldom the stuff of headlines. It is news that a ship has been sunk. It is not news that a ship has failed to leave port. In war the propaganda-advantage is distinctly with the aggressor, and accordingly as the military and political role of Britain develops along offensive lines, so will the effect of enemy panic-propaganda be more effectively offset.

As it is, the question arises, whether enemy broadcasts to India should be "answered" immediately and directly by the same medium, rather than indirectly by several media, as at present. An argument against direct procedure is that denials suffer in effect by comparison with the original allegation, which by such methods may be given a wider circulation than it would otherwise obtain. Another argument is that dog-fights are to be avoided on the ether, for the same reason—the fear of retaliation producing chaos—that jamming has for the most part been avoided by the belligerents.

But whether counter-propaganda is carried out directly or indirectly, there is one vital necessity if it is to avoid inconsistencies and be based upon the truth; and that is that the truth should be available. There have been, and will continue to be, cases where an enemy allegation calls for instant refutation or explanation before it has taken effect. Sometimes this can be done. More often (it would perhaps be imprudent to quote specific instances) silence has been the only answer to a statement later proved to have been damaging, simply because the appropriate source of information could not or would not release it. It seems moreover that in cases where responsibility for release is refused in India, a cabled appeal to London cannot be answered in less than two days. The German propaganda service, which lays so much less store by the truth, has ironically enough, by its superior status and organisation, far easier access to it.

On the actual eve of the Allied evacuation from Namsos, the B.B.C. broadcast a very interesting talk setting forth the numerous natural advantages which favoured the Allies for a campaign in the Trondheim sector. If the high prestige and organisation of the B.B.C., *plus* a Ministry of Information with a staff of 1,700, are insufficient title to confidences in the matter of current or pending operations, what has counter-propaganda in India to hope from departmental obscurantism?

This question of status is by no means one of diginity. It is necessary to efficient organisation. It applies still more to positive, "offensive" propaganda than to counter-propaganda. No commercial advertising manager would be expected to launch a campaign without a reasonable view and specification of the goods he was asked to sell. He might even, if the product appeared bogus or unsaleable, refuse to handle it. In the same way the first of the Crewe House requirements, that "propaganda

operations must not be started until general lines of policy have been clearly established," applies with its full force to India.

I am aware that this proposition implies a violation of the sacred mysteries. Those of whom propaganda is expected in India have access to the full text of what are still, probably, the most important pieces of publicity in the country. They have the same access to the declarations of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State as has the remainder of the public, and no more.

The first step that Northcliffe took after becoming Propaganda Minister in March 1918 was to press for a clear definition of Government policy. He got it, and used it with great success to give the European minorities under the domination of the Central Powers something to fight for. We have no Northcliffe in India, but propaganda cannot for ever remain static. It is a far more difficult task to keep people quiet than to rouse them.

The word "crusade" is now creeping into the English newspapers. It is argued that the dictatorships have given their people a clarion-call to which the democratic must compose a reply. The truth is, however, that so far both sides have only been offered something to fight *against*. The side that first presents something to fight *for*, and sticks to it, will win the propaganda war. And that is certainly no less true for bewildered India than for other parts of the world.

In the meantime, those who continually complain of the lack of British propaganda are not in themselves the best of propagandists.

A STUDY IN RUSSIAN STRATEGY

By Jossleyn Hennessy

The friend whom I had come to visit at a Paris hospital was "not ready to see me," so I waited in a room usually reserved for out-patients. There I found three people with the depressed and somewhat furtive air of those waiting to see a doctor: a small, tired, elderly woman, shabbily dressed; a tall, slim, golden-haired girl in the twenties, who wore her inexpensive but smartly-cut clothes with Parisian chic and Russian distinction; and a taxi-driver; with a trim black moustache, grizzling hair and handsome features, he looked what he proved to be—an ex-guards officer. His ruthless mouth suggested a certain disillusioned, irresponsible gaiety; his sunken blue eyes, wrinkled skin and nervy manner gave him a prematurely worn look, but I guessed him well under fifty.

They were, I was to learn, all Russian refugees.

The bitter winter damp chilled the dilapidated room, dark, bare, uncarpeted. We huddled in silence on rickety cane chairs near a radiator with the brown paint peeling off it. I sat tortured by anxieties for my friend, suffering somewhere in this desolate building. Nor did a casual glance at the others suggest that their thoughts were any happier.

The old woman unfolded a battered copy of a sensational evening paper. A few seconds later she let it drop with listless disgust, observing half involuntarily:

"These train crimes! Luckily I don't take a train from year's end to year's end, otherwise I should feel quite afraid to travel!"

This remark offered what, it seemed, three of us were ready to welcome—a chance to end unpleasant thoughts. The two women and I began recalling train murders and robberies, examples of which were at that time particularly frequent in France. Cheerful chat would have jarred on the moment; our topic suited our despondent spirits; thus we tactfully consoled each other for our unspoken personal sorrows and as the moments slipped by, a subtle atmosphere of friendly confidence was created between us.

Only the taxi-driver remained silent, but he edged his chair into the narrow circle and looked from speaker to speaker in turn, nervously clasping and unclasping his knees the while.

"You mustn't forget," I remarked, "that a train crime presents the police with an impossibly difficult job—"

"Two years ago I bought a railway ticket for a dead man," interrupted the taxi-driver leaning forward with a queer intensity, his face drawn with suffering.

"Why did you do that?" asked the old woman patting him gently on the shoulder.

He began to speak, at first rapidly in low tones that we could scarcely catch, the words tripping over each other in slightly hysterical haste.

"We were so happy in those days, Michel, Igor, Paul and I," he said; "We'd been together in good times and bad since we first met as officers in Wrangel's army. . . . That was a grand adventure. . . . and we'd have driven the Bolshevists off the face of the map, if the Allies hadn't let us down. We had wonderful material—fine officers, courageous, reckless, and men who would have gone anywhere for them! But no arms, no ammunition, no food."

Gradually he ceased to be aware of us as three total strangers and became conscious of our presence as an actor is conscious of an audience with whom he is in complete harmony; he slipped into the past; he relived the scenes which he described; he ceased to gabble; on the contrary, he varied the pace of his words and the tone of his voice, as he spoke now for one character of his drama, now for another.

The man had a streak of poetry in him; he slashed before his chance audience a series of extraordinary, clear-cut pictures; we saw the four penniless refugees—Michel, jovial, stout; Paul, unimaginative, dare-devil; Igor, tall and slender, dandy and courtier; and Alex, sensitive, imaginative, introspective—land up in Paris and become taxi-drivers. On the whole, times in those early post-war years were good; foreigners had money to spend on taxis; there was always a bottle of vodka somewhere in the two rooms and kitchenette which they shared in the Grenelle quarter. Their landlady, a down-at-heels owner of a noble French name, who lived in the flat's remaining two rooms, was flattered by her tenants' gallant ways with her.

"Not that she was unaware that there was self-interest in our pursuit, but she was a kindly old soul and we reminded her of the Faubourg Saint Germain salons of her youth. She called us her 'court.' We could always persuade her to wait for the rent with a flow of fine words."

"Madame!" Igor cried once, "the privilege of owing you a trifle is one that, even if we could, we would not forego. It increases the conviction of our virtue, since to be indebted to beauty is surely the proof of worth. . . ."

"Insolent!" chuckled the Countess, "Your virtue will ruin my reputation as well as my finances. Shall it be said when I am turned out penniless, that I was a keeper of four beautiful young men?"

"Rather will it be said that you sacrificed all to keep them virtuous and to endow them with the reflection of your beauty," replied Igor extravagantly.

We caught glimpses of riotous Russian parties at the house of a rare wealthy friend to which the four chauffeurs, their work done, would drive up in their own taxis. With malicious enjoyment they would startle the correct servants by stumping into the marble-pillared hall in their shabby oil-stained chauffeurs' uniforms, which they would peel off and hang nonchalantly among the opera hats and fur coats, revealing their faded but uncreased dinner jackets. Then they would stroll in to sing, dance, laugh and drink Russian healths till daybreak.

"Our whole existence was a gesture of defiance to poverty and misfortune," Alex declaimed proudly.

But stout, jolly Michel took to his bed with typhoid one January day. The doctor gave up hope. Michel became delirious.

To listen to his ravings was terrible for the three others; he laid bare his longings for what they had all lost—possessions, a home, an established place in the order of things; but especially did he talk to his sister, Nina, who had died from exhaustion on reaching Marseilles after the revolution. He played with her, quarrelled with her, defended her against his father's anger.

Towards the end he regained consciousness and saw Paul, Igor and Alex sitting there watching him hopelessly. He knew that he was dying and diffidently he asked them a favour.

"If it's possible. . . . only if it's possible, I'd like to be buried next to Nina at Marseilles."

"Of course," said Paul at once.

"See!" said Igor stretching out his hand, "We give you our word that you shall rest together."

Paul and Alex likewise stretched out their hands to comfort Michel with their promise.

Shortly after the doctor pronounced him dead.

Paul went out to arrange for a coffin and the railway transport. He returned with a long face.

"The thing's impossible," he announced. "Michel has got to be placed in a zinc coffin and loaded into an officially sealed railway wagon. It'll cost over 4,000 francs, besides which there seem to be half a dozen extras in tips and forms to buy, not to mention an authorisation to be obtained from the Prefecture of Police. How *are* we to raise the money?"

"I'm surprised at you, Paul, we gave our promise," said Igor coldly.

"How much money have we and how much can we borrow?" retorted Paul.

A search of Michel's belongings, as well as their own, produced a little over 1,000 francs of which 900 were earmarked for the quarter's rent. They estimated their credit as another hundred francs each.

The three friends went out to discuss the problem over lunch at a *bistrot*. The fruitless discussion was prolonged till half-past four by numerous glasses of vodka, which besides clinching their determination that Michel should be taken to Marseilles, induced a state of mind in which they were now profoundly serious, now seized with uncontrolable gaiety. Back at the flat, another bottle of vodka was opened.

"Michel, old friend, we'll get you to Marseilles even if we have to push you there in a hand cart," cried Paul, waving his glass to the corpse on the bed.

Alex contemplated Michel's once generous paunch, now sadly diminished after his illness.

"He looks like a deflated balloon; do you suppose if we inflated him, he would float there?" he asked earnestly.

"No," said Igor after reflection, "You couldn't depend on the winds—he might come down in Africa or be blown out to sea."

"Or he might get stuck in an air pocket for ever—that would be just like him," added Alex laughing bitterly.

"Don't joke about it," said Paul severely.

"I'm not," answered Alex, "and it would be just like him. Don't you remember when the Bolsheviks sprang that surprise attack and Michel was, of course, doing his morning's business and couldn't do his braces up in the hurry and his trousers kept on slipping down as he ran and he stopped to haul them up

again, lost his hold and down they fell once more and the Bolsheviks had to give up their attack because they couldn't run forward for laughing at the extraordinary sight? I tell you he's perfectly capable of being hung up for ever in an air pocket over Marseilles."

"More likely to be over Monte Carlo," suggested Paul with gloomy conviction, "He never gambled, but he liked watching it."

"He looks extraordinarily alive, poor old fellow," said Igor.

"Anybody who didn't know would think he was just sleeping off a 'drunk'," observed Paul, with a touch of envy.

There was a moment's silence as the three men gazed at Michel's face. Although the body in the untidy bed lay on its back, the head under its shock of dishevelled hair was propped up slightly by the pillow, making the chin rest at an angle, uncomfortable but curiously natural, which indeed suggested a drunken sleeper, unconscious or unable to deal with cricks in the neck.

Suddenly Alex's face cleared. He stood up.

"My God!" he cried exultingly, "Of course, he's dead—he is dead *drunk*! Don't you see! We'll dress him and—take him down to Marseilles with us by train—."

Igor and Paul looked at him uncomprehendingly, then Paul sank back in the only armchair, roaring with laughter.

"Of course!" he shouted, "We'll put him in a corner seat face to the engine with the window open. Nothing like fresh air for drink. We'll have a bridge four. Michel can be dummy —he always shone at dummy."

Alex and Igor were unable to resist Paul's prolonged mirth and within a few seconds all three were swept with gales of helpless laughter.

They staggered round the small room upsetting chairs and sweeping the mantelpiece clear as they slapped each other on the back; for five uncontrollable minutes they enacted the maddest moments of a nightmare slapstick comedy, in which the corpse alone preserved the unbroken dignity of death.

As they recovered their speech, the crazy plan took shape from their fevered imaginations. Each took a childish delight in contributing a detail, like schoolboys scheming some fiendishly illicit escapade.

"Three return tickets, *one single*," said Igor with the air of one announcing a profound scientific discovery.

"Travel *by night,*" stressed Alex sagely, "People don't get drunk in the morning."

"A game of cards," chuckled Paul, pursuing his original idea, "No one would think of *playing cards with a dead man.*"

"Pretend to be drunk *ourselves,*" howled Igor, whose flushed face suggested the need of no special histrionic ability to sustain the role; "Sing dirty songs at all the stations, then people won't want to get in our compartment."

"Sing them *in French,* not Russian, otherwise people won't know they *are* dirty songs," amended Paul.

Alex rose.

"Michel, dear friend," he said gravely to the corpse, "We laugh, we drink, we are frivolous before your mortal remains, but we love you, you shall rest with Nina—in Marseilles."

Paul and Igor joined him at the bedside, swaying slightly.

"Amen!" they said gravely.

Then they dressed the corpse.

At the Gare de Lyons late that night, Igor slung Michel's right arm over his shoulder, Paul likewise took his left arm and swaying drunkenly from side to side, they staggered up to the booking office window, with Michel's feet dragging behind them. There were few people about, but Igor and Paul with their unconscious burden attracted some attention. They were not entirely sober and were therefore pretending to be drunk a little too realistically, so that Alex, who throughout had been somewhat more sober than his friends, became nervous and begged them not to sing so loudly.

"Keep your songs for the stops at stations on the line to discourage people from coming in with us," he turned round from buying tickets to urge.

An appalling sight met his eyes.

Paul and Igor, with Michel hanging lifeless between them, were raucously singing what they intended as the duet from the Third Act of *La Bohème—Ah! Mimi Tu Piu.* Carried away by thoughts of "Mimi, false, faint, fickle-hearted," Igor turned to address dramatic reproaches to the corpse and in so doing let go its hand. Instantly the right arm fell away from behind his neck and the corpse's full weight, dragging on its left arm round Paul's neck, nearly pulled Paul over. Alex rushed forward in time, seized Michel's right arm and took Igor's place. Beads of perspiration stood on his forehead as he forced Paul almost by sheer will-power to step out with him towards the platform.

Over his shoulder, he heard Igor observing confidentially to half a dozen grinning passengers and porters:

"Terrible resh—reshponshibility—being only shober fellow, to get whole drunken regiment into troop train. Wild fellows," he shook his head philosophically, "Wild fellows. . . ."

Then, drawing himself up to his full height and throwing out his chest, he followed Alex and Paul, shouting: "Left! Right! Left, that fat man in the centre there—!! Hold your head *up*! Shuffling along, gazing into the future like that! Pick up your *feet*!"

They secured an empty compartment. Alex lay the body at full length on the seat as if Michel were sleeping.

Paul and Igor stood at the door singing humorous, bawdy songs with expressions of the utmost seriousness. Paul produced a bottle of vodka with which they refreshed themselves between choruses.

Alex suddenly found himself seized with deep, body-shaking sobs. He slumped down heavily opposite the corpse, with his head in his hands.

The train moved off. Paul and Igor were jerked off their feet into a sprawling mass on the floor. Paul lay with his back to the door, with Igor's feet in his lap. They rose to sitting postures and contemplated their mingled legs.

"Funny thing," observed Paul, fingering Igor's left foot with concern; "My legs have got twisted back to front."

"I see *both* my boots need new soles," said Igor examining Paul's boots sadly.

Further efforts to rise to their feet were rendered fruitless by the narrow space, misapprehensions as to the ownership of feet and their elaborate politeness to each other.

"No engine need ever start with a jerk like that," said Paul firmly, "Shteam should be applied gradually. . . ."

"Or not at all," agreed Igor.

"Engine should be handled with discretion," Paul pursued.

"The way I handled the Colonel's wife's advances when I was a subaltern," observed Igor.

Paul thought deeply.

"Don't see any resemblance between her and the engine," he said at length.

"Reactions powerful . . . smell of oil . . . ," Igor sketched an all-embracing descriptive gesture, "Cavernous. . . ."

The door opened and Paul, whose back was against it, disappeared into the corridor between the legs of a fat, jolly-faced conductor.

Standing astride Paul, he saw a sleeping figure stretched on one seat, a sobbing man opposite, and one obvious drunk regarding him with a certain sternness from the floor; incoherent sounds from Paul rose behind him.

"*Voyons, mes gars,*" he said cheerfully. With considerable difficulty he pulled Igor to his feet and pushed him into the seat next to the motionless figure; then he helped Paul next to Alex and shaking his head with good-humoured resignation continued on his way down the train.

Igor and Paul were sobered and touched to see Alex's distress, which recalled to them the object of their journey. They fell uneasily silent. Alex's sobs ceased. The three men looked at each other and then at the corpse, which seemed strangely alive as it was shaken by the train's rapid movements.

"Come. This won't do," said Alex, rousing himself, "We shall go mad if we sit and stare at him. Get out the cards."

The game was not a success. Michel's body oppressed them. The high tension at which they had lived throughout the day snapped; the fumes of alchohol which had kept them from thought began to clear, leaving them exhausted and face to face with the twin realities of their grief and their ridiculous position —three men with an inexplicable dead body. They began to see the risks to which they were exposed.

"I can't stand seeing him there any longer," Igor said abruptly, "Why don't we go and sit in the next compartment? It's empty; we can always come back as the train slows before a station."

Without a word they went next door, where they sat down glumly; first Paul dozed; then Igor; then Alex; then they slept. About four in the morning, Alex awoke with an agonising feeling of guilt. Paul and Igor were sleeping in a huddled heap opposite. Alex scrambled to his feet, went to Michel's compartment and opened the door.

There on the seat sat a living man—*alone*.

(Alex grabbed my arm convulsively and his breath came in quick gasps as in hoarse tones he described the scene.)

"It was a live man . . . fat like Michel, but much smaller. There was not a sign of the body. . . . It was clean gone. . . . The stranger looked up at me nervously as I clung for support to the framework of the door."

" 'Name of God!' " I said after we had stared at each other for a full ten seconds, 'I beg pardon, Monsieur, but I—I've made a mistake in the compartment, I think!' But I knew I hadn't. I staggered back to Paul and Igor and woke them roughly. 'He's gone!' I yelled in their sleep-stupid faces."

They needed no further explanation but struggled to their feet aghast.

"He's gone—vanished," Alex repeated savagely, "and in his place we've got a ridiculous little henpecked bourgeois."

"Come on," said Paul.

They returned to Michel's compartment, where the fat little man received their irruption with unconcealed nervousness. Paul, Igor and Alex sat down opposite and gazed at him, stricken dumb by the horror of the inexplicable climax of a day whose least event had been grotesque. Fear whipped torturing, chaotic pictures through their tired imaginations.

What had happened to Michel's body?

The question hammered in their brains to the rhythm of the train's steady progress through the night to Marseilles—to the police—to a charge of murder. . . .

What had happened to Michel's body?

To ask would be to incriminate themselves. The fat little man's purple jowls turned to green under their strained, fixed stare.

"What's the matter?" burst from him.

When Alex spoke he did not recognise his own voice. "Monsieur," he said, "We had a friend travelling with us who came into this compartment to lie down, what have you—what—where is he?"

"How the devil do I know? He got up half an hour ago and went down the corridor."

Paul, Igor and Alex reeled where they sat. Paul raised clenched fists to his temples.

"But it's not possible," he cried in anguish.

"But why not?" riposted the little man with increasing nervous irritation, "He may have gone to the lavatory and still be there for all I know."

Pandemonium broke out.

"A dead man go to the lavatory!" shouted Paul and was seized with the same gargantuan laughter which had shaken him first of us all, in what seemed years ago, the previous afternoon in the flat.

"A dead man—" shrieked the little man, now obviously panic-stricken. "A dead man—Messieurs, I assure you—I—I—."

Alex looked at him closely; he decided that attack was the best defence.

"Name of God!" he shouted suddenly. He leapt to his feet and towered menacingly over the fat stranger, "I see it all—you killed him!"

"I did! I did! I confess it," sobbed the little man. "But I didn't mean to—Don't give me away."

"What—?" The word escaped from Alex like a pistol shot.

"What—?" cried Igor and Paul.

The three looked at each other in uncomprehending consternation.

Then Paul collapsed afresh in peals of uproarous laughter.

"You filthy murderer," he spluttered, "Not give you away! Why I'll hound you to the guillotine through every court in France."

Igor folded his arms and puckered his brows in a comically fierce frown; then affecting the hollow tones of a barnstormer in the Fifth Act, he said slowly:

"What—have—you—done—with—the—body?"

Tears ran down the little man's cheeks. "Listen, listen, Messieurs, for the love of God. It was an accident. I swear it. I've got a wife and two children," he wailed abjectly.

"Explain yourself," commanded Alex sternly, "Shut up you fools," he added under his breath to Paul and Igor who were rocking in each other's arms; "This is no joke, we want all our wits about us if we don't want trouble with the police."

Alex paused in his story. Then he said, speaking with slow effort:

"The first rays of dawn shed a lugubrious light over that beastly third class compartment. Paul and Igor seemed complete strangers to me. They were stubbly-cheeked and hollow-eyed and their expressions were those of madmen. I daresay I looked the same. I had exhausted the gamut of grief, fear and anxiety in the previous forty-eight hours. I felt I had got to the bottom of all possible feeling. I could feel no more. I merely thought in a detached way that all for the sake of Nina we were supremely ridiculous. Prison or, worse still even, expulsion from France, certainly awaited us."

The little man was gabbling his explanations. His name was Cachin; he was a commercial traveller in books; he had got

on the train at Lyons; his timid soul full of the train crime committed a few days previously, he had followed his wife's advice ("Two people are more difficult to kill than one") and sought a compartment with an occupant. He installed himself opposite Michel's body; unable to sleep, he got out his evening paper; it devoted columns to the murder, of which, in the fashion of French papers, it gave the most lurid details, with a photograph of the mangled corpse found on the line. He became thirsty; he remembered that his wife had put a bottle of mineral water in his heavy book-laden suitcase which was on the rack; he tried to open it without getting it down by balancing it on the edge of the rack, but before he could open it, the fast moving train changed direction with a jerk over some points; he lost his balance and fell, while his heavy suitcase shot across the narrow compartment striking Michel's head violently.

Cachin picked himself up and offered profuse apologies; his fellow traveller made no reply. Cachin, a naturally timid man, became frightened; evidently the traveller had been stricken unconscious; he might even be severely concussed. Cachin quakingly foresaw all his savings swallowed up in a suit for heavy damages; he sat down limply, bathed in perspiration, a prey to every kind of anxiety; minute after minute passed; still the figure opposite remained motionless; not even a groan escaped from it.

Cachin could not tell how long it was before he pulled himself together to see what he could do for his victim, but it must have been a long time. Finally he got up, bent over and touched his face. He shrieked. It was stone cold. The man was dead. He had killed him. He was a murderer. Worse, he was a *train murderer*! The long list of train crimes which had gone unsolved had aroused deep public indignation; no one would believe his story. The police, delighted at last to have caught someone, would put him through the French version of third degree; he had read all about that in the papers; shrinking, he felt that he would not be able to endure it; "they always confess under third degree, even if they haven't done it," he had read; he too would confess; he gave himself up for lost.

Then in a flash it came upon him that none of the train crimes had ever been solved; another sentence raced through his brain, an interview with a detective—"It's hopeless. It's like looking for a needle in a haystack; the murderer may have got out at a dozen stations; he may be hundreds of miles from the place where the body was discovered, hours before it was discovered."

With the fearful haste of a frightened, stupid person, who does not wish to give himself time to think, he had opened the door and with great difficulty forced Michel's body out into the roaring darkness, almost before he realised that he had done so. Then another horrible fear seized him; he had not bothered to see if there were bloodstains; he turned the dimmed lights on full; there was no blood. Nor had the dead man left any luggage behind. There was nothing to suggest that he had ever been there, except Cachin's beating heart and shaking hands; these Cachin had hardly begun to control when Alex looked in on him.

"That's the truth, I swear it," Cachin repeated tearfully. Don't give me away, don't give me away!"

Alex, Igor and Paul looked at the piteous figure before them with disgust and contempt.

"You make me sick," Alex said at last.

That was the only comment made on Cachin's story. The three friends rose and left him.

Within twenty-four hours, the papers announced the discovery of another mangled body on the Lyons line. Reporters proceeded to build the most recondite hypotheses on the inexplicable fact, revealed by the post mortem, that the unknown man had died from typhoid. Alex, Igor and Paul did not care to read the papers; they never mentioned Michel between them again. The macabre adventure which they had shared broke up their friendship; they could not bear to meet each other's eyes when they were alone together. They parted company.

"I've never told anyone about this before," Alex ended, looking round at us with hesitating eyes. Once more the old woman patted him kindly.

"But we believe you," she said simply.

An unbearable weight seemed to lift from Alex.

"Thank you," he said.

O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR

By F. M. M.

[*Being letters from 2nd Lieutenant Michael O'Regan the newest-joined subaltern of the 1st Bolton Irish (Territorials) to his brother Pat.*]

My Dear Pat,

Our final exercise was designed to bring our training to a dramatic conclusion and General Sir Withering Blasting came over to see if we were ready to go to the war.

The Bolton Irish is part of the 122nd Brigade and the battle was between our brigade and a mechanised force.

The C. O. put me in charge of the battalion Intelligence Section and told me that he was giving me this command to keep me out of the way.

Little did he know that I was going to win the war for him!

At 2 P.M. I was ordered to go out and search for the enemy. So, I collected my army (eight men!) and we were on the point of moving off, when I received a wire from Micky that the bees looked like swarming any minute and that you were away.

I was in an awful quandary. Either I had to let the bees go, and I knew we couldn't afford to lose them, or I had to desert and make for home, because I knew there was no good asking for leave.

So, I issued orders to the men, sending them off in various directions and I took Tom Murphy with me, as he knows a lot about bees.

We boarded the first bus going to Lickserton and reached the farm at 4 P.M. Then we changed into mufti (Tom looked beautiful in your old blue suit!) and went out to look for Micky.

We found him next door with a kind man, who was helping him to collect the swarm. He turned out to be a Squadron Leader Ellis, who had flown down in his own plane for a dance in the village that night.

We got the bees safely home and I invited him in for a drink, in return for his kindness.

He talked so much that Tom and I couldn't get a word in edgeways and we were getting very bored, when suddenly he said: "Yes. Worse luck! I have to fly back after the dance

to-night, as I am going on manœuvres against the 122nd Brigade to-morrow."

He went on to tell us that the Tank Corps lads, for whom the dance was being given, were also due to set out early next morning. They had been ordered not to cross the starting line until then, so as to give the enemy, who were dismounted, twenty-four hours start. At this Murphy gasped and I sent him off to feed the pigs, in case he gave the show away.

I pretended to be very interested and soon got the whole plan from the unsuspecting Squadron Leader.

The tanks were to move to Crapeton at dawn, to attack from the right flank. There were numerous small woods there, in which they were to hide and it was hoped that the G.O.C.-in-C. would be provided with a wonderful spectacle, when they suddenly issued forth and completely surprised the 122nd Brigade.

His squadron of aeroplanes was to leave Wottle, at first light, to locate the enemy.

"Indeed, Mr. O'Regan," he said, "you ought to join up yourself. You take such an interest in our work, that you would find life in the Army or Air Force most entertaining. But, I am afraid I have been talking too much and I must have bored you."

"Far from it," I replied!

"Of course, this is all very secret, Mr. O'Regan, and I am sure you won't mention a word I have told you, except to those you are sure are 'all right.' You know what I mean?"

"Trust me, Squadron Leader," says I!

With that we adjourned and I got hold of Tom and between us we devised a plan of action.

I got hold of Ellis at the dance and, after a few drinks, broached the subject of the manœuvres again.

I explained to him that the more I had thought about the next day's fun, the more I wished I could see it. My difficulty, however, was to get to Crapeton in time.

After a lot of hinting, he understood what I was driving at and offered to take me and Tom in his plane.

Actually, Tom had sworn that nothing on earth would make him go in an aeroplane, because a fortune teller had told him that he would end his life "by falling from a height and breaking his neck." But, eventually, I got him in by explaining that the fall might as well be from an aeroplane as from a gallows and

that he was certain to be hanged for "desertion in time of war," if he didn't come with me.

So, two hours later, we took off, with our uniforms packed in a small suit-case.

When we had got well away from Lickserton, I opened the case, took out my revolver and placed the cold barrel to Ellis' neck. Then I shouted in his ear, "Obey my orders, Ellis, or I'll blow your brains out. Fly to Hooperton aerodrome and land there."

Well, Pat, I meant to give Ellis a fright, but I had no idea he was so nervous. He was so surprised that he let go the stick or pushed it too far over or something like that. The first I knew . . . . we were the wrong way up and tossing about like a dead leaf in a gale. We carried out the most astounding evolutions and I heard Tom reciting his prayers, as he thought the end was near. I did myself, for a bit, so I said, in a stern voice, "Hooperton, Mr. Ellis!" I just managed to get it out before I let out a second "hoop" and was violently sick.

It was so sudden that I must have pulled the trigger of my revolver (which ought to have been unloaded) and let off a blank within an inch of Ellis' ear!

That shook him and he made straight for Hooperton and arrived there an hour later. Ellis said it was too dark to land and we had to fly round for half an hour, until he could see.

Then I made him land in a field, about a mile from the aerodrome and Tom removed a part of the engine, so that he couldn't get away again.

Poor Ellis! He looked so frightened and depressed, but he maintained that true British attitude of "strong silence," as we marched him off to the main road. He probably thought he was in the hands of the I.R.A.!

Having given orders to Murphy to keep Ellis hidden, for another hour, and then to join me on the Crapeton field of battle, I went behind a hedge and changed into uniform and then boarded the first bus that passed.

I reached the regiment two hours later and found the C.O. He seemed furious, until I explained to him that I had discovered the whole of the enemy's plan. Then he rushed me off to the Brigadier and made me go through the whole thing again.

The Brigadier mistrusts me, ever since the day we watered him, and started to ask me all kinds of awkward questions. Thank Heaven, a few enemy planes flew over just then and,

while we were hiding, I implored him to act at once or it would be too late.

So he sent out a patrol to search a small copse and, when he had seen the whole lot captured, he believed me.

Hurried orders were issued to the Brigade and it turned right and marched to a position the far side of a small stream.

We had just got there, when the G.O.C.-in-C., old Blasting, arrived very annoyed. He is a small, fat man with a very red face and is known to all ranks as "Stop me and buy one!"

"Brigadier Smackit," says he, in a sarcastic voice, "may I ask why you have come here and what you propose to do?" You could tell, from the tone of his voice, that he was furious, because the battle, which he had been looking forward to, was not going to come off.

"I have located the enemy in those woods," replied Smackit, "and I am not going to be caught in the open by a mechanised force. If they want to attack me, let them come here and that stream, which is deeper and muddier than you think, will stop them. In fact, I hope to surprise them as much as they hoped to surprise me."

A smile came over Blasting's face and I heard him say, to a staff officer, "Tell the tanks it is about time they did *something*."

Then he turned and said, "Very good work, Smackit. You must have had good information to make such a sound appreciation of what the enemy intends to do."

"Indeed I had," replied Smackit, "and I have to thank the excellent Intelligence Section of the Bolton Irish for providing it."

What do you think of that, Pat?

Well, the tanks attacked, got stuck in the mud, and old Blasting was provided with a better spectacle than he could have hoped for.

Having won the war, we marched back to camp for food and a brush-up before the General's farewell speech.

We all assembled in the Pipeshires' gymnasium for the final pow-wow and it was amusing to see all our C. O.s looking so pleased and the Tank Corps C. O.s looking so depressed!

The two Commanders explained their plans and all they had done and then old Blasting got up to give his summing-up.

He explained how the battle had been won by the side which "sought and obtained information" and how much the

122nd Brigade owed to the Intelligence Section of the Bolton Irish. "In fact," says he, "their C. O. tells me that chief credit must go to a promising young officer called Mr. O'Regan." Unfortunately, he pointed at me and, at the same moment, there was a gurgling sound from the front bench, where the R. A. F. officers were sitting.

All eyes went round and there was Ellis, with a terrible look of hatred and aggression on his face, staring straight at me.

"That man's a spy," he shouted. "A dirty spy."

It was an awful moment, Pat, and I was only saved by Blasting's temper.

"Sit down at once," he bellowed. "Don't you know my order that there will be no interruptions when I am speaking? In any case, I was disappointed with the work of the Air Force this morning. They seemed to lack leadership."

Poor Ellis collapsed and I thought he was going to have an apoplectic fit!

"One question I wish to ask the Commander of the mechanised force," went on Blasting. "Why were they late in getting into position? Had they been ready to attack sooner, they might have secured success, before they were discovered by the 122nd Brigade's patrol."

"Unfortunately," replied Colonel Askwith, "we were afflicted by a bad attack of tummy trouble this morning, Sir, and simply couldn't get on the move any earlier. The doctor, who was affected himself, puts it down to bad water at Lickserton, where we spent the night."

"A very poor excuse, Colonel Askwith," replied Blasting, witheringly.

And indeed it was, Pat. You see the truth was that Tom and I had inserted castor oil into the ice-creams, and hoped that the heat of the dance would make them popular, even if a double dose of flavouring didn't make them too palatable!

Goodbye, Pat. I must go and find Tom. Heaven knows what's happened to him and I didn't like to ask Ellis where he left him!

Your loving brother,
MIKE.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

FINANCE

DEAR SIR,

In your July issue, an editorial, headed Finance, contains a grave misconception when referring to the question of pay cuts.

The pay of the Army in India is mathematically on a higher scale than Army pay in the United Kingdom if one converts the rupee to its sterling equivalent, *but* these are figures not facts.

The facts are that an income of £700 per annum in England is equivalent to £1050 approx. in India when essential costs of living are taken into account.

Any officer who has served for periods in both countries can substantiate this statement.

The war has not altered the comparison between the cost of living in India and the United Kingdom, admitted we have not yet had our increase in Income Tax, but Sea Passages, Rail Freights, Petrol and Imported Goods have all increased, and in particular childrens needs in respect of chemists stock, special foods etc. are already as much as 150% in excess for the same article as sold in the U. K.

In other words the "reasons which can be defended in peace time" to quote from your editorial, can equally well be defended in war time.

I would very willingly accept posting to the Home Establishment in present circumstances, knowing that I should be no worse off financially in England on British rates of pay than in India on Indian rates, and especially so, if unlike the U. K. a doubled income tax is to be accompanied by a cut in the means wherewith to pay it.

By all means let the Army pay its share towards war expenditure, but such contributions should be on a common community standard. Let us have a doubled income tax, and 100% excess profits tax as at Home.

The soldier fighting in the Libyan desert will not be inspired if he is selected for a special contribution in excess of that paid by those he is defending.

Yours faithfully,
J. WALSH, MAJOR (I.A.),
16-7-40.

REVIEWS

THE 25TH ARMY BRIGADE B. G. A.

On the Western Front in 1918

By C. S. B. Buckland

Basil Blackwell—7s. 6d.

It is unfortunate that this book should have been published at the present time, for the events of the Great War of 1914—18 have been rather overshadowed by the fast moving events of the present war. But, in spite of this Mr. Buckland's book is of interest, more especially to those who fought on the Western Front in 1918.

The author was adjutant of the 25th Army Brigade, which consisted of a group of batteries of long range and super-heavy guns and howitzers, and he has written an accurate and straightforward account of its movements and experiences from Ypres in April 1918 until the end of the war, when the Brigade found itself east of Courtrai, overlooking the Scheldt.

During this time, the guns of the 25th Army Brigade were almost continually on the move. Mr. Buckland has given us the details of these moves and the reasons for them and he does not hesitate to criticise many of the latter.

The book is illustrated by two sketch maps of battery dispositions and by two entire sheets of the large $\frac{1}{100,000}$ General Staff map.

J. R. R.

A HISTORY OF THE UNIFORMS OF THE BRITISH ARMY (VOLUME I)

By Cecil C. P. Lawson

(Peter Davies, Ltd., London.—12s. 6d.)

This is a delightful book, and it is hoped that Vol. II will follow soon.

In this book the reader is presented with much of the history of the weapons, tactics, organisation and life of the Army as well as the colourful dress of the period.

The author has presented his subject without the cobwebs which sometimes entangle the specialist in research.

Of great interest is the comparison of the Army of over 300 years ago with to-day. We read with reference to Artillery that "during the latter half of the 17th century the 3-pdrs. were attach-

ed in pairs to battalions of foot," to-day the German Infantry Gun, and our mortars fill the same role.

The pontoon of 1700, or the Mobile Workshop of Marlborough's Artillery Train, both illustrated, are still in use, though modernised; and when reading of the steel helmet, the grenade, and the underground fighting by mine and counter-mine at Tournay 1709, one might well be reading of the period 1914—18.

The illustration of the City Trained Bands of 1586 (page 189), has many counter-parts in the press to-day in the photographs of our Home Guards.

Though much remains the same, the colour has gone, the private soldier of 1699 who wore "a crimson coat, blue waistcoat and breeches, blue worsted stockings, a hat with gold orris lace, hat band of same," would think poorly of the private of 1940 in drab or dungarees.

J. W.

THE MARGARY AFFAIR AND THE CHEFOO AGREEMENT

By S. T. Wang

(*Oxford University Press.* 7*s.* 6*d.*)

A description of Anglo-Chinese relations during the period 1861—85. Particular reference is made to the diplomatic negotiations which followed the murder, in Yunnan, of Margary, during his attempt to establish trade connections between Western China and Burmah.

The actual journeys of Margary are not described in any great detail. Mr. Wang's principal task has been to record the investigations made after the murder of Margary and the diplomatic negotiations which ensued. These negotiations were ably handled by Sir Thomas Wade, British Minister in Peking, who succeeded in obtaining, by means of the Chefoo Convention, the regularisation of trade between Western China and Burmah and the opening to British trade of additional ports in China. This China-Burmah route is now one of the main arteries by which China receives her war supplies; a motor road connects Lashio with Yunnan Fu, and the journey, which, fifty years ago, took two months, can now be accomplished within a week.

Mr. Wang has evidently been granted considerable access to official British records (except for the India Office papers, which are still considered confidential) and his thesis provides an authentic description of a lesser known period of Anglo-Chinese history.

H. K. T.