

A LYSANDER AIRCRAFT
(By courtesy of "The Aeroplane.")
Army Co-operation Squadrons in India are being equipped with these aircraft.

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EDITORIAL

War Aims

The subject of war aims has already achieved some prominence in the press and in parliament. It was discussion of this question, particularly in Germany, that first ruffled the unity which had manifested itself on the outbreak of the last great war and which was later to be one of the main causes of controversy in the politics of the Central Powers.

The war aims of the democracies have been well expressed in Mr. Chamberlain's words:

> "We are seeking no material advantage for ourselves. We are not aiming only at victory, but looking beyond it to laying a foundation of a better international system which will mean that war is not to be the inevitable lot of each succeeding generation."

While it is necessary for the nation's efforts to be directed towards some specific goal, it is not necessary, even if possible, to express the aim in terms of territorial frontiers. It is supposed by some that abstract ideas are incapable of assimilation by that large percentage of the British people whose mental processes are conditioned by an elementary education and by the popular press. This overstates a partial truth. An ideal expressed in abstract terms can have inspiring effects. It was a comparable ideal, rather than exasperation, which led the United States of America into the last war, which gave that

nation's war effort its peculiar quality, which encouraged the allies, and which deeply shook the resolution of the Central Powers. Such an ideal was needed to give direction to the British nation since the events of last March.

This is not to maintain that an ideal in itself is enough and that it is unnecessary to decide, to the extent possible at any given time, on the steps required to achieve it. It was largely because the Americans gave up the struggle to achieve it soon after the fighting was over that the American ideal of 1917 and 1918 was not achieved. Though exact definition is impossible, the practical methods by which the aim is to be realised do require consideration unless victory itself is to be regarded as the end without reference to what may come after.

We must have ideas about what we are to do as well as about what we are to undo, on peace aims as well as on war aims. There has been discussion on the latter point, one extreme maintaining that we are fighting the present rulers of Germany only (as was the case in the last war) and that we have no quarrel with the German people as a whole; others, that it is practically the whole race which requires a lesson that will change its heart. The truth, as usual, lies between these views, though the latter and less optimistic is probably nearer to it. In a nation in which youth has been systematically regimented and brutalised from the earliest possible age, there are certain to be successors to the country's present rulers. A change of heart in the greater part of the nation will be necessary and this will require a definite defeat: an easy peace would be a short one. On the other hand it is not necessary to assume that German intellect, culture and kindliness are for ever eclipsed, nor to repeat the treatment given to Germany in the years immediately following 1918. What we can resolve is to do our utmost to oppose the rise to power of another upstart.

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Peace Aims

The final settlement cannot be foreseen in detail at present; but it can be seen in principle. It has been generally admitted that the future of European civilisation lies in the acknowledgment of some power to which individual states will surrender sufficient of their sovereign rights to end international anarchy. Are we to continue to assume that this is impracticable in the immediate

future? Can our efforts not be directed to that end from now on? If this is the determination, it is not necessary to assume that the 1937 frontiers of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria must of necessity be restored, nor to make any such definite pronouncement. Some sort of union or federation, not necessarily embracing the whole continent in the first instance, seems essential. Into this, Germany will have to be fitted. After reading the white paper containing reports of conditions in German concentration camps and after considering the country's record in international affairs, the political education of the Germans may seem an impossible task. In external as in internal affairs they respect brutal force as their law, and Germany in its present form could not be fitted into any society without trying to dominate it.

Union under the hegemony of one nation is not the type of union required, and Great Britain has twice, at least, intervened to prevent it. But it has to be realised that something more positive is needed. After the Napoleonic wars and again after the last war, we were unwilling for long to forgo isolation and to become a part of Europe. We supported the League; but the League was not European and, although the greatest nation outside Europe stood aloof, it had too wide a membership and attempted to deal with affairs beyond its practicable scope. It is not quite clear at the moment whether the supposition is true that air power has deprived Great Britain of any advantages attached to being an island. It seems, however, that our frontier is likely to remain about the Rhine. It is more necessary for Great Britain to concern herself closely in the affairs of Europe if Europe is to survive than it is for the United States of America to intervene in international affairs for the present world civilisation to be maintained. It will be necessary for us to reconcile our obligations to the British commonwealth of nations with those to the continent of which we are a part and to continue to make sacrifices after peace has been concluded. There must be no hasty disarmament.

There may be hope for Germany in freeing her from the domination of Prussia. Provided it does not entail the establishment of more mutually suspicious, economically independent, intolerant entities, there would be much to be said for a return to the old federation of principalities, where all that used to

be associated with German culture and intellect flourished and which were no worse than their contemporaries in international morality.

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Sir Neville Henderson's Report

Sir Neville Henderson's final report, issued on September 20th, is easy to read and worth reading. It gives a brief and clear account of the last fortnight of his stay in Berlin and traces events from that March day which showed that thenceforth no small nation in Europe could regard itself as secure and that Herr Hitler would remain true neither to his spoken word nor to his theories of racial purity.

Sir Neville does not deny the achievements of the Nazi regime. If much of these were obtained through the complete subordination of the individual to the state, if the union of greater Germany which could so much better have been achieved by reasonable means was precipitated by violence, and even if a mediæval barbarism subjected the Jews and the Christian churches to inhumane persecution, nevertheless the world was prepared to acquiesce rather than plunge into what seemed the even greater evil of war. But "revolutions are like avalanches, which once set in motion cannot stop till they crash to destruction at the end of their career." Herr Hitler was driven on until he finally overstrained that acquiescence.

In the meantime he has brought up the youth of his nation in his philosophy. A state has been organised for war to the neglect of all the arts of peace. That nation has to be reformed and provided with honest leaders if peace is to be established in Europe. Those leaders will be hard to find: Nazi education is not of a sort to have produced them. As Sir Neville Henderson remarks: "The tragedy of any dictator is that as he goes on, his entourage steadily and inexorably deteriorates," all but yes-men are eliminated.

A curious similarity can be traced between the circumstances of 1914 and of 1939. There is the same autocratic ruler with a sinister influence in his foreign office: the same contempt for "scraps of paper:" the same belief, in spite of far more definite assurances, that Great Britain was not prepared to fight: and the same pressure from a mobilised military machine with every passing day reducing the remaining period of campaigning weather.

The Campaign in Poland

The German campaign in Poland must be acknowledged to be a creditable military achievement even after due allowance has been made for great superiority in numbers, armament, aircraft, and mechanised formations: for the suitable nature of the terrain; for the kindness of the weather; for the absence of more than a few weak and isolated fortifications; and for the over-confidence of the Poles. Initial resistance was quickly overcome and mechanised columns then pushed boldly and rapidly past the bodies of Polish troops which remained fighting with the utmost gallantry, but which possessed neither the mobility nor the striking power to dislocate the German lines of communication. The plan followed the customary German pattern. Two pairs of thrusts first cut off the corridor and south-western Poland. In the difficult country of the Carpathians, the German advance northwards from Slovakia was slow; but elsewhere, except for a short pause about the 10th September when heavy rain fell in many parts, the advance was creditably rapid. The pairs of thrusts then became the two wings of an enveloping advance which met at Wladava on the Bug about one hundred miles east of Warsaw by the 22nd September, three weeks after the crossing of the frontier. At the same time a rapid advance eastwards on Lwow forestalled Polish attempts to withdraw south-east. The training of the German army is believed to have been specially designed for this type of warfare and to have stressed the need for maintaining momentum without excessive consideration for security. The advances into Austria, the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia must have provided useful undress rehearsals.

The German air force contributed greatly to the success of the operations. It was directed first against the Polish aerodromes which were quickly rendered unserviceable. Complete air superiority was thus enjoyed from the start and enabled the air force to interfere seriously with the concentration of the Polish army and to prevent the formation of reserve divisions. It is worth noting that the immediate objectives of the air force were purely military. Only after they had been achieved, was it considered desirable to spare aircraft to attack the civil population. Once the purely military objectives had been secured, however, the full weight of the German air force was turned ruthlessly against open towns and villages. There is no doubt

that in comparison with the results obtained against military objectives the attack on the civilian population achieved little.

Soviet troops crossed the whole length of the frontier in considerable force early on the 17th September. Practically unopposed, they were able to advance at an average rate of some thirty miles a day with their mechanised formations, a surprising achievement of Russian organisation which could probably not have been maintained for very much longer. After changes in the original line of demarcation between the Soviet and German portions of the conquered state a partition was arranged which gives Germany all the objectives which were included in her original ostensible aim: Danzig, the Corridor, the German minorities in Poznan and the industrial areas and railway junctions of Silesia. The majority of the Polish oil fields fell to Russia who also cut off Germany from a common frontier with Rumania.

The Poles have not accepted defeat. Their navy is still at sea and their army will fight again. The sympathy which the world feels for a nation that has been the victim of such cruel treachery and which is now suffering the hardships imposed by a conquerer is equalled by admiration at the gallantry with which a hopeless defence was conducted and the determination which persists to restore the nation once again.

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Russia

A contributor has suggested a solution to what is one of the main problems of to-day: what is Russia going to do? Russia's foreign policy, he suggests, is a continuation of that pursued by the Empire under the Tsars: it is one of expansion and imperialism. Faced with the possibility of Poland ceasing to exist as a nation and coming under the domination of another power, it was thus natural for Russia to ensure that what once belonged to her should become hers again. It is certain that Russia is unlikely to be handicapped by any altruism or indeed by any kind of scruple. It is in keeping with this that she has taken advantage of the preoccupation of the rest of Europe to take what no doubt constitute in her intention the first steps in the absorption of the Baltic States. It is clearly to Russia's interest, also, to prolong the war as far as possible without entering it herself, and we may expect her to do all she can to bolster up Germany's

resistance by supplying her with such commodities as she can succeed in transporting, even if Germany may not be able to make prompt cash payments.

There are perhaps two other aspects of the Russian problem for which clues may be sought from Tsarist days.

It is not new for the more popular type of military critic to make our flesh creep with descriptions of Russia's might. A number of writers have recently told us of the numbers and efficiency of the Red army and the excellence of its mechanised formations, while the Red air force is constantly extolled as second to none. Russia's air force is undoubtedly capable of doing considerable damage and, in areas where prepared lines of fortifications do not exist and where flanks can be turned, her mechanised formations are doubtless formidable. But modern forces need more efficient command, administration and maintenance than Russia has so far succeeded in producing. The Red army has not given evidence of any superlative qualities in its clashes with the Japanese. In spite of the faith in Russia's military powers which was often expressed in Tsarist days, Russia has never encountered a first class military power with success.

Secondly, it has been shown that a sustained attack on a suitable point on Russia's circumference can be sufficent to force her to sue for peace. Anyone faced with the problem of hostilities with Russia would now, as in the time before the revolution, be confronted by a country seemingly impossible to attack. Russia has industries on which she is dependent; but with the exception of those in the Ukraine which are themselves well protected by distance, most of the main industries required for war have been so sited as to be virtually inaccessible. The vast extent of territory, numbers, natural resources, climate, industry and discipline of Russia appear to render her invincible. And yet she has twice found the strain of attempting to defend a single and seemingly not vital area too much for her. It is possible that to-day when Russian industry and agriculture is kept working at high pressure the increased demands of a general mobilisation and the consequent reduction in the labour force would render the pressure too great.

In this respect the campaign against Finland is likely to affect Russia more seriously than her almost unopposed march

into Poland. Nevertheless, Russia has plenty of spare troops and aircraft and she appears so formidable that she may achieve some further gain by mere threats. The Russian press has begun to adopt towards Rumania a tone somewhat similar to that used before against Poland, Estonia and Finland: but it is doubtful if mere threats will achieve anything in the direction of south-eastern Europe which also provides a field of activity for surplus German forces and in which Italy has declared herself to be interested.

The problems of that area were not eased by the outbreak of war. Towards the end of August mobilisation appears to have been fairly general. The Italo-Greek agreement at the end of September quieted Greece's apprehensions about the Albanian frontier and later troops were withdrawn from both sides of the border between Hungary and Rumania. The approach of winter must have helped to lessen suspicion and it is to be hoped that it will be realised that the danger is a common one. Much depends on the continuance of the correct attitude hitherto displayed by the Bulgarians.

Italy would not remain indifferent to interference in south-eastern Europe. She may count on the war having relieved her to a certain extent of German rivalry there, and she would not welcome an extension of Russian influence. What action she would be prepared to take to resist it is uncertain. Russia may decide that she can count on this being done; but she is unlikely to take any hurried action which might lead to war in the Black Sea.

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The Three-Power Treaty.

The treaty of mutual assistance between Turkey, France and Britain was signed at Ankara on the 19th October. The treaty provides for all the aid and assistance in the power of France and the United Kingdom to be given to Turkey if a European Power attacks her, or if an act of aggression should lead to war in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved. Similarly, Turkey will "collaborate effectively . . . and will lend them all the aid and assistance in its power" in the event of France or the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities in the Mediterranean area as the result of aggression by a European Power or in fulfilment of their guarantees made to

Greece and Rumania earlier in 1939. If France or Great Britain are attacked elsewhere by a European Power, the treaty provides for consultation and the observance by Turkey of at least benevolent neutrality. Consultation is also provided for in the event of aggression by a European Power which menaces the security of one of the contracting parties or is directed against any state which one of the contracting parties has with the approval of that state undertaken to assist. The Treaty is concluded for fifteen years and is renewed by tacit consent for a further five unless notice of termination is given six months before the end of those periods. A protocol provides that the obligations undertaken by Turkey cannot compel that country to take action involving armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.

The treaty has been generally welcomed in Turkey and in the near east and has had a reassuring effect in Egypt and Iraq. It was equally welcomed by the democracies as a further instance of Turkey's adherence to the old-fashioned code of behaviour among nations. The fact that its signature followed the breakdown of the Soviet-Turkish talks has tended to obscure appreciation of the existence of the protocol mentioned above. Turkey's understanding with Russia is an old one, and not to be easily upset particularly at a time when the western democracies are pretty fully engaged elsewhere. This is perfectly natural and need in no way detract from our satisfaction that a leading nation in the Moslem world and one wielding considerable influence in the near east should have thus linked herself with the democracies.

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Aircraft and Armoured Fighting Vehicles

The war has been true to form in opening in a manner very different from that predicted. London and the other principal cities and industrial areas were not bombed before or immediately after the declaration of war. The movement of the British expeditionary force took place without interference as did the concentration of the armies on the western front. Up to the present the western front appears at least as stable as it did in 1915 and the infantry and artillery are the main arms on the ground. The war at sea is taking a generally similar course and bombs have not so far rendered capital ships useless.

Military critics would be able to claim that the authorities have once again prepared for the wrong type of warfare by training for the extensive movement of mechanised forces rather than for siege warfare whose routine and tactics have now to be learnt and for which specialised equipment will, as in the last war, have to be designed and produced. The British army is not, of course, in a position to specialise in peace time. In peace time, it is the military critic who insists that the army is out of date and busies itself with preparing for the last war, instead of for the war to come—which by a process of wishful thinking is represented as one of movement in which opportunities for generalship will at last be provided. Until realisation began to come a few years ago, it was represented that the tank provided an answer to barbed wire and machine-guns, and that the reliance of modern armies on industry and the increased number of men now needed behind the line to maintain one man in it, would prevent armies reaching the sizes of 1914—18, thereby making outflanking or penetration a possibility. Somewhat similarly, the last great war was to open with mass movements of cavalry and the effects of field fortifications, barbed wire and small arms fire were conveniently ignored although they had been evident wherever in the Russo-Japanese or Balkan wars approaches were restricted and frontal attacks necessary.

The fact is that most wars open very much where the last one left off and armies which can afford to specialise might well base their training accordingly. During peace time the energy of inventors and scientists and the money required to encourage them and for experiments are directed to the demands of peace rather than to those of war. Revolutionary changes in warfare are unlikely to take place except during war itself. If weapons are developed in peace it is rarely that the full advantages to be derived from them in use can be deduced by theory. Given similar theatres and similar circumstances, therefore, very similar conditions are likely to appear.

The remarkable progress made by the Germans in Poland was equivalent to that achieved by General Allenby in Palestine in the similar circumstances of numerical superiority, complete command of the air, suitable weather and terrain and better equipment. It can be explained as much by the above factors, the wide fronts and the absence of continuous fortifications as

by the powers of aircraft or of armoured fighting vehicles which do not appear to have been successful against prepared defences. The major part played by aircraft might have been much less if there had been effective defence.

The Spanish, Abyssinian or Sino-Japanese campaigns cannot be drawn upon for arguments either for or against armoured fighting vehicles or aircraft because the attackers did not possess them in the quantity or quality of the great Powers of Europe and because the defenders have been even less well equipped with antedotes. But it does appear that against a properly organised and equipped defence the tank is not likely to revolutionise warfare. No one can pretend that the development of aircraft has not provided new problems; but for the present the effect of the air weapon seems to be less than was at one time supposed. The surprise of this war may well be some entirely different weapon.

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War Precautions

The opening stages of the war *have* been unusual, however, in the absence of the customary salutary reverse and in the fact that precautions have been taken before they were too late or even, apparently, absolutely essential. The evacuation scheme in Great Britain imposed a great deal of unavoidable inconvenience to large numbers of people not all of whom have borne it philosophically in the absence of air raids.

In India, precautions which have appeared irksome to some are the series of measures taken to ensure an adequate supply of officers for India's defence services even before those services have begun any considerable expansion or to suffer casualties. Among these measures was the prompt return to India of the majority of the Indian Army Reserve of Officers and of those on the Special Unemployed List, so that staffs and units in India and formations which had been sent overseas are now well up to strength. At the same time, restrictions were placed on the departure from the country of those who might be required as officers in due course. These, prevented from returning to England to join the fighting forces there and at the same time unable to find an opportunity in this country, deserve sympathy. They have behaved with exemplary patience.

Restrictions have now been eased and a small number of commissions granted. The first fifty officers are under training

at the Officers' Training School at Belgaum. The problem of providing officers for the armed forces of India which became so acute during the last war is thus fortunately simplified.

At the moment of the outbreak of war we were faced with the possibility of hostilities closing the Mediterranean route and of India being called upon to provide forces for service overseas to supplement those which had already been sent. Those forces might also have found themselves engaged in active operations and suffering casualties which would have had to have been replaced. Prompt action had, therefore, to be taken to avoid the difficulties of 1914 when some ten per cent. of the officer strength of the Indian Army were detained in England for employment under the War Office and when the Indian Army Reserve of Officers totalled not more than forty. To make good deficiencies and to meet expansion which increased the officer strength of the Indian Army fourfold in four years, officers were drawn from England and the Dominions and also from the Indian Civil Service, the Public Works Department, the Indian Police and those in business or professions in India. There are now fewer Europeans in India than in 1914, both in government service and outside it, and many of these are likely to be more useful in their present capacity than in the armed forces. India seems likely to become an important source of supply and it is necessary that eagerness to serve should not be allowed to dislocate manufacture or administration, however irksome restriction may be to the individual. The officer situation is not at present serious: but it may become so, and most of those who are eager to serve will no doubt get their opportunity in due course. In the meantime the register of the European community with the assistance of the European Association's National Service Advisory Committees should assure that essential men are not withdrawn from key posts and that square pegs find their way into suitable holes.

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The Royal Tank Regiment

Since the disbandment of the 1st and 11th Light Tank Companies of the Royal Tank Regiment in November, there are no longer any units of that distinguished corps left in India. A number of officers, non-commissioned officers and men remain, however, to assist in the training of other units now mechanising.

Units of the Royal Tank Corps, as it then was, first came to India in 1922. There were three Light Tank Companies and five Armoured Car Companies. Withdrawal was decided on in conjunction with the mechanisation of cavalry regiments: the 8th and 10th Companies were disbanded in 1937, the 2nd and 9th in 1938, the 6th last March and the remaining three this autumn.

The record of these units in India is one of which their regiment may be proud. They have taken part in all the major operations on the frontier since their arrival in the country. Their value has not been obscured by the extravagant claims which were at first made by some as to the way in which armoured fighting vehicles would revolutionise frontier warfare. On the other hand, they have proved the error of those who doubted their ability to move over frontier country. The crossing of the Nahakki Pass in 1935 and the advance to the Sham Plain in 1937 are two examples of ability to cover difficult ground which have been repeated almost daily. The peculiar circumstances of the frontier have resulted in armoured fighting vehicles being employed in small detachments far from workshops or other maintenance facilities: they have been continuously employed wherever the situation was, or was likely to be, most critical: and a breakdown has generally been liable to have serious results. Most of us will have marvelled at the way in which their ancient armoured cars used to escort convoys day after day often over the most elementary tracks and at their performance across nullah-seamed country when accompanying columns.

The last units to leave have earned a rest which it seems unlikely that they will get: nor from what one knows of them would they ask for one. They have been relieved on the frontier by the 13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers and the Scinde Horse, the first regiments of Indian cavalry to be mechanised. These two regiments have completed conversion from horsed to armoured units in well under the scheduled period, a result which could only have been achieved by hard work and keenness. They can be relied upon to maintain the high standard which has been set for them and to continue to prove to be pessimistic those who maintained that the supposedly simple Indian farmer would find the intricacies of the internal combustion engine more than he could cope with.

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OBITUARY

SIR JOHN MURRAY EWART, C.I.E., I.P.,

Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India

The death of Sir John Ewart deprived India of a distinguished police officer and the holder of a post of great importance at the beginning of a war. It was also a loss to the Institution. Sir John Ewart served on the Council and was Chairman of the Executive Committee for the last two years. He took a keen interest in the affairs of the Institution which prospered under his guidance. In the North-West Frontier Province where he spent most of his service, in the Punjab and in the Sudan he must have appreciated the value of united services. He had expert knowledge of the people of northern India. Members of the Institution will sympathise with Lady Ewart in her sad bereavement.

CLOSE SUPPORT BY AIRCRAFT ON THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER

By A. I. L. O.

Although much has been written in the Service Journals at Home on low flying attack and the close support of troops from the air, little has appeared in print on this subject in India.

In the many articles which have been published in this Journal, both on the recent operations in Waziristan and on future mountain warfare tactics, little or no reference has been made to the value of aircraft.

The Manual on Frontier Warfare, India, contains much interesting and important information on the use of aircraft for "close support," but, as is often the case with service manuals, this information is found in various parts of the book and many officers have neither the time nor the inclination to search for it.

In view of the proved value of close support, further details of this form of air co-operation as carried out in Waziristan since 1936 should be of interest. The object of this article, therefore, is to supplement the principles laid down in the Frontier Warfare Manual.

History of Close Support.—In India the term "close support" by aircraft has come to mean any offensive action taken in support of a regular or irregular force or post engaged with hostile tribesmen. The use of the air for this purpose was, for a while, the cause of some controversy and has been described by its opponents as "a misuse of aircraft" and "turning valuable reconnaissance aeroplanes into mobile machine-guns."

It is true that to use fast long-range bombers for close support in Waziristan, or even to employ Army Co-operation aircraft which might be engaged in important reconnaissance, would be a misuse. But close support on the North West Frontier is the duty of Army Co-operation Squadrons, in a country where tactical reconnaissance in the accepted sense is generally of little value. This being so, what better form could Army Co-operation take than that which increases enemy casualties and lessens the difficulties of our own troops?

Low flying attack against troops is by no means a recent innovation. Aeroplanes were used for "ground strafing" in France in 1918, but suffered severe losses from an enemy equipped with, and trained in the use of anti-aircraft weapons. In Waziristan, in 1919, at the battle for the Ahnai Tangi, two aircraft inflicted heavy casualties on the Mahsuds. In Iraq, also, air attack against tribesmen was most effective. More recently in the Spanish civil war, the close support of infantry and low flying attack against partly trained troops was on occasions decisive. The conclusion drawn, that this type of attack will be successful against an enemy ill prepared to meet it, points to its use on the North West Frontier.

Though the tribesmen are not equipped with anti-aircraft weapons, they are adept at taking cover, and are, except from low altitudes, extremely difficult to see from the air.

In 1936, certain far-seeing officers realised that the best way to overcome this difficulty would be for troops on the ground to point out the enemy to the pilot above. A simple ground strip intercommunication code was accordingly evolved and practised on manœuvres the same autumn. This code, now known as the "X V T Close Support Code," was used for the first time in the warfare which broke out in Waziristan in 1936 and has been continued there with increasing success ever since.

The Close Support Intercommunication Code.—By means of the close support code, troops can signal to the pilot of an aircraft their own positions and the presence or not of hostile tribesmen in the vicinity. This is done by displaying two ground strips in the shape of either an "X," a "V" or a "T." But it should be noted that the code here described is merely the one in use at the present time on the North West Frontier of India. The symbols and their meanings are not hard and fast, but can be changed by mutual arrangement between the army and the air force at any time if circumstances make it desirable.

"X" shows the position of the picquet or troops nearest the enemy and means "All is well!"

"V" signifies that enemy are in the direction in which the apex of the V is pointing.

"T" is an S.O.S. signal. A call for help when a picquet is likely to be overwhelmed or a sign that the enemy are following up a withdrawal so closely that it is impossible to get away. It should, therefore, only be used on rare occasions. It is put out with the top of the "T" pointing towards the enemy.

The great advantages of this code over previous methods, such as the Director Arrow and Popham Panel, are its speed and simplicity. When using the code the following are the main points to be borne in mind:

The ground strips must only be displayed by troops nearest to the enemy, or to the direction of the enemy, if no contact has been made.

Troops when they halt, or a picquet when it reaches its position must put out strips immediately. These must be placed where they can be seen at all angles from above: and on the reverse slope of the hill or in some place under cover from hostile fire, so that they can be changed as necessary.

A "V" is displayed if the advance is opposed and troops are held up or if a picquet comes under fire and the place and directions from which the fire is coming is known. On enemy opposition being overcome or when hostile fire ceases, the "V" is immediately changed back to an "X." The pilot can then leave that particular area and see how other picquets are faring. If, on the other hand, opposition increases and troops are in extreme danger, the "V" should be changed to a "T." As soon as the danger is over the "T" is changed back to a "V" or an "X," depending on whether or not the enemy have left the area.

In the withdrawal it is most important that ground strips remain out until the last troops leave. As soon as the "X" has gone, the pilot knows that all troops have withdrawn and any men seen on the position are hostile.

Ground strips are required at the scale of two per picquet or platoon. They should be made of a strong white material and be kept reasonably clean. The usual size is 9 feet by 18 inches. They can be carried either rolled up under the haversack flap or over the shoulder on a webbing sling. When put out they should be weighted down with stones and examined periodically.

Although the close support code is simple in the extreme human nature being what it is, mistakes will happen. The following occurred, both during operations and in training, when troops, who were not familiar with the code, first commenced to use it:

Ground strips have been left behind in camp.

They have been put out on the forward slopes of picquet positions and under the shadows of rocks and bushes. The wind has blown them over so that an X has looked like a "V"

and the pilot wasted his time searching for a non-existent enemy, whilst the picquet slept peacefully.

On one occasion two picquets forgot to pick up their ground strips when they withdrew. The next day a mystified pilot dropped a message asking if it was correct that "Vs" were pointing at "Xs." On getting a reply by Popham Panel that enemy were near the "Xs" he took action. What had actually happened was that tribesmen had occupied the features where the "Xs" had been left and were, probably, hoping to safeguard themselves thereby from air attack. This incident brings out well what should be done in the very likely possibility of tribesmen making their own ground strips in order to deceive the air. Once the pilot knows that they are enemy strips, his task of carrying out an attack is simplified.

One of the commonest mistakes is that of pointing a "V" at our own troops. This is due either to troops not knowing how to put out a "V" correctly, to troops not nearest the enemy using strips, or to a party carrying out a flanking movement getting in the line of a "V." See diagrams.

Another fault is the unnecessary use of the "T." One unit during its first day's fighting never used a "V;" it was always either an "X" or a "T."

Units which at first made some or all of the above mistakes soon settled down, however, to using their strips correctly.

Action by the Pilot of a Close Support Aircraft.—Before carrying out a close support "sortie," a pilot is given instruction by the Air Intelligence Liaison Officer, who informs him:

(*a*) The time his "sortie" begins and ends.

(*b*) Where the column is going, and where he may expect to find column headquarters, picquet positions and advanced and rear guards.

(*c*) Information about the enemy and any special areas to watch.

(*d*) Details with regard to "call signs" and intercommunication.

He also reminds him of the action he can take on a "V" or a "T." A pilot may not, on any pretext whatsoever, take action against a village, even though troops are being heavily fired at from towers and houses, unless the village is in a proscribed area and the inhabitants have been duly warned.

On arriving over his area, the pilot relieves the previous sortie and informs column headquarters that he has done so. He then circles over the column at a height of two to three

thousand feet, watching the country about two miles on each side of the route. As the picquets put out their "Xs" he notes their position on his map, and if all is well he reports at half-hour intervals to column headquarters. Hostile movement is reported as soon as possible. On seeing an "X" change to a "V," the pilot flies in the direction in which the "V" is pointing and searches any likely areas where tribesmen might be concealed. On discovering them he attacks with bombs and machine-gun fire. This is known as the V.B.L. (Vickers, Bomb, Lewis) attack and is carried out as follows:

The pilot dives from a height of about two down to one thousand feet, using his front gun and pulling off one, two or three bombs. The number depends on the nature of the target. As the aircraft pulls out of the dive, the air gunner fires his Lewis gun, to cover the get-away, or at any enemy who may have been flushed by the attack.

These attacks are continued as long as the "V" remains out and any enemy can be seen. The difference in the attack when a "T" is displayed is that the pilot comes down much lower, thus endangering himself and his aircraft. As the loss of an aircraft and its crew through enemy action will tend to encourage the tribesmen and possibly have other undesirable repercussions, the reason for only using the "T" when absolutely necessary can be well understood.

V.B.L. attacks are made, as far as possible, parallel to and not directly over a picquet position. At times, of course, mistakes are made, especially by young and inexperienced pilots. The greatest fault is that of overeagerness to take action. Instead of searching carefully for the enemy and making quite certain that no mistakes have been made on the ground, pilots have been known to attack immediately they see a "V" or a "T" and bombs have been dropped on our own troops.

The "T" of the Popham Panel, also, has been mistaken for the S.O.S. sign. Irregulars, who could not be distinguished from the enemy owing to lack of ground signs, have suffered likewise. For this reason close support should not be used when khassadars are working in front of troops or by Irregular forces unacquainted with the close support code. Errors in map reading, failures to see tribesmen even though a "V" may be correctly directed at them, and carelessness in close support procedure all occur when pilots first commence flying in mountainous country having just come out to India after completing

their army co-operation course under modern warfare conditions on Salisbury Plain.

Orders to the R.A.F.—The general plan and details of air co-operation are arranged at a preliminary conference at which the Squadron Commander, his A.I.L.O. and the R.A.F. liaison officer who is accompanying the column as well as the military commander and his staff are present.

When planning the air side of the operation the following various ways of employing close support are considered:

Aircraft can be used to break up or hinder the advance of hostile lashkars. They can assist in the protection of picquets covering the line of march, during their establishment, tenure of occupation and withdrawal. They can participate in battle as a supplementary support weapon and can press the pursuit of a retreating enemy.

Close support action is the corollary of tactical reconnaissance for, without careful search, it is unlikely that a pilot can carry out any of the above tasks. But it will rarely be possible for one aircraft to carry out the dual rôle of close support and tactical reconnaissance in any but a very small area, because, once having become involved in close support attacks, the tactical reconnaissance tasks ordered by the commander tend to be neglected. So, although close support aircraft will report any enemy seen, it is better to allot a separate "sortie" for any special reconnaissance tasks which a commander may require if they involve flying at any distance from the column.

Close support can be either continuous from time of start to time of reaching camp, or for a part of that time or else aircraft can be kept on the landing ground ready to fly out at very short notice.

Nowadays, the tribesmen realise the dangers of air attack, and, if aircraft are in evidence, move in small parties exposing themselves as little as possible. The employment of continuous close support, therefore, often prevents a concentration of any size and may lessen the chance of tribesmen making a determined stand. On the other hand, if no aeroplanes are visible, the tribesmen may move more boldly in the open and aircraft called up after opposition has been encountered or to deal with a party attacking a picquet often obtain surprise effect and good targets.

This latter method has the advantage of being economical in flying hours; but to achieve results the landing ground must

be close to the scene of operations and communications between the column and the R.A.F. must be good.

Owing to the difficulties of intercommunication, once a column has left its base camp, daily operational orders sent to the R.A.F. will of necessity be short. The points which should be included are:

The time and nature of the close support required, either "continuous" or "in readiness."

The objectives and the route the column is taking with a rough picquetting plan. Any information known about the enemy and any special areas to watch.

This message should reach the Air Force as early as possible in order that the flying programme can be arranged and orders issued to Flights. Owing to poor communications, orders for the first sortie to take off at 05-00 hrs. have been received as late as four o'clock the same morning. One can imagine the state of mind of a battalion commander if he was to get orders to be Advanced Guard one hour before a dawn start; and yet the R.A.F. have just as many arrangements to make before flying commences.

Intercommunication and Liaison.—As in most combined operation of war, the success of close support tactics depends largely upon reliable means of intercommunication and good liaison between the two Services. Without these, co-operation will suffer and misunderstandings and even bad feeling may arise. It is essential that a commander who issues orders to the Air Force is in communication both with the landing ground and the pilot in the air.

Communication between the column and the landing ground is the responsibility of the army. It is usually W/T and should be direct. Communication from air to ground is either by W/T or message dropping and is entirely an Air Force matter. Ground to air communication can be W/T or R/T, Popham Panel, ground strip codes and message picking up.

R/T and W/T are the responsibilty of the R.A.F. and, when used, two Air Force operators with a pack wireless set are attached to the headquarters of the column, who arrange for their rations and accommodation. The other methods are worked by army personnel.

Experience has proved that for close support duties, the quickest and most reliable methods of intercommunication are message dropping and the Popham Panel and ground strip codes.

Wireless has not been successful owing to atmospherics in the mountains and time wasted in winding aerials in and out before and after taking action. For tactical reconnaissance and when aircraft are escorting M.T. convoys W/T is, however, essential.

It is not often that a commander has to send orders to a close support aircraft, and messages of this nature are kept to a minimum and as short as possible as they take the pilot away from his main task of search and attack. If a commander wishes to send important information, a smoke candle is lighted to draw the attention of the pilot, who, on seeing it, leaves his task and flies over to read the message. The Popham Panel Code is most comprehensive and if studied carefully beforehand, almost every message that it might be necessary to send can be signalled without having to resort to many single-letter groups.

In addition to the "XVT" Code there are certain other ground strip signs used only by headquarters controlling sorties. These are the Formation call sign and the following code letters for frequently used messages:

K.T. = "The withdrawal is about to, or has commenced." On reading this the pilot concentrates on the rear guard and the forward slopes of picquet positions about to be withdrawn.

C.I. = "You may go home, as no more aircraft are required." This is often forgotten when a column reaches camp earlier than was expected.

 = Sometimes called the "Closed H" or "the gate." This means "You may take action against anyone within two miles of the forward troops or picquet positions." This sign is only allowed to be used in areas where the political authorities have previously warned the tribesmen that any area within two miles of troops who are engaged by hostiles will be considered an area of hostilities. Further, to enable any friendlies to evacuate the area, the sign may not be displayed by troops until after they have been in contact with the enemy for more than half an hour.

F. = "Your message found" or "Yes" in answer to a question dropped by the pilot.

N. = "Your message not found" or "No."

Liaison is maintained by army officers attached to Army Co-operation Squadrons, known as "A.I.L.Os.," and by R.A.F. liaison officers who accompany column headquarters. The duties.

of the former in connection with the instruction of pilots have already been mentioned. In addition, they act as operational Staff officers to the Air Force commander, deal with demands for air photographs and send out daily air intelligence summaries. The R.A.F. liaison officer is not included in any establishment, but one is invariably sent out with every column. He advises the commander and his staff on the issue of orders to the air and assists in the working of communications on the lines laid down in the preceding paragraphs. At the same time he gains valuable knowledge of mountain warfare tactics and keeps an eye on the work of his brother pilots, noting any points for improvements.

Conclusion.—A brief description of the air side of the Kharre operations is given as a fitting conclusion to this article.

In the words of the official report: "This operation was one of the most successful examples of co-operation between land and air forces on the North West Frontier."

It was carried out in July, 1938, by the Razmak Column, the 3rd Indian Infantry Brigade, several platoons of Tochi Scouts and No. 20 (A.C.) Squadron, Royal Air Force. The object was the destruction of the headquarters of the Faqir of Ipi in the Kharre cave area, North Waziristan. This threat to their leader caused a large number of his supporters to make a determined stand, with the result that they suffered heavy casualties from ground and air attack. Prior to the move of the columns from their permanent camps the following were ordered: air photographs of the tracks which the columns might use; air reconnaissances for water; and continuous close support for both columns during their move to the concentration area. No particular air plan was made at so early a date.

On 12th July, all the troops taking part had concentrated at Degan. The Squadron Commander and his staff proceeded there with a supply convoy and the air plan for the move to Kharre was formulated. It was arranged that both columns would be given continuous close support during their advance to the objective and withdrawal and that separate aircraft would deal with any tribesmen approaching the column after the "Closed H" had been displayed. In addition. a reserve would be kept on the landing ground at ten minutes' notice ready to relieve those who had exhausted their ammunition or for any emergency. The same afternoon the two Brigade Commanders were flown over their objectives from Miranshah, returning to camp

in armoured cars. On 14th July all went according to plan. Numerous "Vs" accurately displayed gave excellent targets to the air. In the withdrawal a "T" was put out when some fifty tribesmen tried to rush a small party and after the resulting V.B.L. attack several bodies were seen lying out until dark. In the evening, as soon as it was obvious that the force would have to bivouac for the night in their battle positions, the number of close support aircraft was increased to four. These watched the nullahs and approaches to the picquet positions until dark and prevented concentrations gathering to attack at nightfall.

The following day the tribesmen did not follow up the withdrawal closely, though aircraft were able to locate parties of long-range snipers by means of well directed "Vs."

The valuable assistance rendered, and the excellence of the results obtained by air attack were mainly due to careful planning, good co-operation and the fact that both troops and pilots had worked together and had gained considerable experience of the close support code throughout the summer. The units who took part have by now left Waziristan and the majority of the pilots have returned to England. Those who replace them can only maintain the same high standard by training on the lines which achieved success.

DIAGRAMS.



Fig. 1. V. Correctly displayed.



Fig. 2. V. Incorrectly displayed.



Fig. 3. Use of ground strips by troops not nearest to the enemy.

THE VOYAGE OF THE "BRITANNIC"

By the Ship's Adjutant

At the beginning of July, 1939, three of us were having a long cold drink as we admired the best view of Bombay harbour. One of us remarked, "Well, chaps, we're off and we ought to get home, but I wonder how much of our furlough we will spend there." Little did we think that in less than three months' time we should be delighted to get the first view of Bombay from the bow of a ship, and the ship a hired transport.

The weather in the early part of the Summer of 1939 at home was dreadful, but after the bank holiday a period of perfect English weather set in. Unfortunately, as the weather improved, the political situation deteriorated and everywhere the one and only topic of conversation was "Will there be war?" The majority, especially those old enough to have experienced the last war, were optimistic and right up to the day that Germany invaded Poland the man in the street hoped and thought that war would be avoided somehow.

The Government of India were evidently not optimistic and the last week-end of August must have been a very busy one for the Staff at the India Office. On August the 28th, all Indian Civil Service officers, Indian Police officers, Army officers and warrant officers and many civilians on leave from India woke up to find instructions ordering them to report in four days' time at various concentrating stations to return to India. In addition to those on leave, many on the reserve and on leave pending retirement, and even a few already retired were ordered to return; the major proportion of these were the officers of the Special Unemployed List of the Indian Army. Many were the "hard luck" yarns that were told as to the effect of the receipt of these orders with the necessity for selling businesses, packing up houses, selling motor cars, arranging for one's family et cetera, "but that is another story."

We collected at three concentrating stations; in some cases no choice was given, in others officers were allowed to report at the station most convenient for them. The arrangements for reception, accommodation and despatch at these stations varied considerably. At one station they were excellent and there was no unnecessary waiting; the credit for this goes to an officer of the Indian Army, who with some volunteer assistants improvised an office from which all instructions were issued quickly and

smoothly. At the other stations the arrangements were not up to this standard. At the station where the greater number reported accommodation was very limited and in spite of doubling up and a number of fellows sleeping on floors and sofas, late arrivals in cars had to go as far as fifteen miles outside the city to obtain a bed for the night. However, no one was terribly depressed and the odd wife helped to cheer the party up. One overheard conversation such as, "Hello, I didn't know that you were home." "Shurrup! I got to Town on Saturday and my kit hasn't arrived yet." "What bad luck! I—, oh come and have a drink."

To the port of embarkation we were sent off in two special trains, one starting at 10-30 p.m. and the other at 7-30 a.m. The whole country-side was blackened out and as soon as the first train left the station (after everyone had got in once only to be told to get out again to have the role called!) all lights were put out. No one knew our destination but after an all-night journey we arrived at a large estuary in which were anchored a number of large ships of various hues and colours; their bright peace time colours were all being painted grey by their crews.

We embarked on a tender, where they served excellent bacon and eggs, and were taken alongside our home for the next three-and-a-half weeks, the motor vessel "Britannic," a liner of 28,000 tons belonging to the Cunard and White Star Line. No rolls of passengers had been received and accommodation was, therefore, allotted by the ship's purser as we arrived. The ship had understood that they were to have four hundred officer passengers and a thousand troops, whereas in actual fact we eventually turned out to be over a thousand first-class passengers and four hundred troops. Tenders continued to arrive alongside at odd intervals for two days until the ship was more or less full according to the Board of Trade certificate. The total numbers finally embarked were:

Naval officers	...	40
Military officers	...	701
Naval ratings	...	319
Army warrant officers and non-commissioned officers	...	108
Draft of R.A.M.C.	...	44
Draft of Royal Corps of Signals	...	90
Civilian passengers	...	254
Total	...	1,556

General "Q" arrived on board the first evening and discovered that no O.C. Troops had been appointed, so being the senior officer on board he assumed that appointment. He then had to appoint a ship's staff. The author of this article was woken at 11-15 p.m. the first evening and given the glad tidings that he was to be ship's adjutant and was to get on with the job first thing the next morning; Major "S" was to be ship's quartermaster.

The next few days were hectic. The ship's crew had been reduced from 433 to 296, whereas the number of passengers was more than double that carried on the last trip across the Atlantic before the ship was taken over by the Admiralty. There was a mass of baggage on the promenade deck and many tons of stores and drinks to be loaded from lighters; the ship had been ordered to leave her home port before she was fully loaded for the voyage and the stores still unloaded had therefore been sent by special goods train over 400 miles to meet the ship at our port of embarkation. However, things were soon put to rights. Volunteers were called for from passengers and the baggage was sorted out; passengers removed their own cabin baggage and the remainder was put into the hold. The stores were stowed by parties of naval ratings and the two Army drafts.

Then there was the question of an office. We discovered a number of personnel of the Indian Army Corps of Clerks on board so the formation of an orderly room staff was easy. But when we wanted to start work it was another story, as there were no regulations, stationery, nominal rolls, pens, et cetera. The only documents we received were a District Court Martial warrant (fortunately never required) and the rolls made out in various waiting rooms at concentrating stations. We were fortunate to be able to borrow amended copies of King's Regulations and the Manual of Military Law from a conscientious candidate working for the Staff College. Later a representative of the Command Paymaster arrived and presented us with an imprest of £1,350, which the O. C. Troops promptly asked to be increased by £1,000, as many officers had had no time to make any financial arrangements and required advances. The last arrival was a sergeant who reported as ship's orderly room sergeant and brought two typewriters with him; as, however, he had no experience of office work on board a transport and was not one of the world's best sailors he did not prove a tremendous asset. Finally as the ship's office could not possibly supply all our needs of stationery, the O. C. Troops paid out £10

from the imprest and an officer was sent ashore to purchase that amount's worth of stationery, paper, et cetera, in the local shops.

When the last man arrived on board, we proceeded to work out how many were in the ship. The "waiting room" lists did not agree with the purser's lists, but this was not entirely due to the lists being inaccurate. The early arrivals on board were asked by the purser if they wished to share a cabin with any one ("Are you travelling alone, sir?") and several passengers gave the names of friends whom they had met *en route* but who had not come off in the same tender; unfortunately, in several cases the friends were sent to another ship. After numerous checks there was a discrepancy of twenty-six, so it was decided that every passenger should fill in a card with full particulars regarding his rank, service, occupation; it says much for the co-operation shewn by all on board that only two passengers failed to hand in their cards at the first request. From these cards we obtained firm figures and the preparation of nominal rolls was easy. These rolls in conjunction with the ship's printer became the ship's passenger list. These passenger lists were in great demand but, unfortunately, owing to a shortage of paper, only eight hundred could be printed; two thousand could have been sold with ease.

As soon as the Quartermaster and Adjutant became known we were continually accosted with remarks such as "I say, old boy, I know that you are frightfully busy but about my cabin... I'm Major Snooks and I'm in a four-berth cabin on 'C' deck and I know of a number of fellows junior to me who are on 'A' and 'B' decks." Similar requests were also being made by the civilian passengers. It was no one's fault but with the prospect of a voyage of at least three weeks in front of us something had to be done. The allotment of accommodation to military officers by ranks presented no difficulty; it was decided, therefore, to form a committee of civilians to grade all civilian passengers according to military ranks. Cabins were then re-allotted on the general basis of Lieutenant-Colonels and above and their equivalents to "A" deck, Majors and their equivalents to "B" deck, Captains and their equivalents to "C" deck and Subalterns and their equivalents to "D" deck. This readjustment provided some of the brains of the Army with one of the best problems ever set either in or out of the Staff College and necessitated over four hundred moves. The moves were carried out the third day at sea and passengers had to hump their own baggage. On

the whole this general post gave satisfaction although there were naturally a few who considered themselves unfairly treated.

Other appointments had also to be made to the ship's staff and most of them fell to previous acquaintances of the Adjutant and Quartermaster. Special mention must be made of two not still young officers of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps who took over the baggage. With the aid of volunteers they sorted all the baggage in the hold—no mean task under the circumstances—and thereby saved endless confusion and delay at our port of disembarkation.

The degree of discipline to be enforced presented a pretty problem. There appeared two alternatives—a Prussian system enforcing all orders as for private soldiers or a more gentlemanly method of treating all first-class passengers as ordinary passengers on a liner. In view of the fact that many people's nerves were rather on edge, that the majority fully appreciated the necessity for obeying implicitly all instructions issued for the safety of the ship, and that although it was unlikely in the circumstances there might be difficulty in enforcing military discipline with so many civilians on board, the O. C. Troops decided on the second alternative. At first many passengers did not agree with this policy and wished very much stricter discipline enforced, but later the majority came round to the view of the O. C. Troops. The proof of the pudding is in the eating and during the whole voyage only one officer was put under arrest and he was ultimately disposed of as a medical case. A number of officers, however, were interviewed by the O. C. Troops for various minor misdemeanours; his remarks on these occasions clearly conveyed his ideas as to future behaviour and on his instructions these ideas were passed on to their friends by the offenders. This peaceful penetration had a tremendous influence for the good descipline of the ship and yet was entirely unknown to the majority. Certain civilian passengers had interviews with the Captain for various reasons! The discipline of the warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men was of the highest standard.

At the start of the voyage the wearing of uniform tunics at breakfast and lunch was insisted on for disciplinary reasons. On leaving the Atlantic, as the majority were in possession of serge uniform only, the hot weather necessitated the relaxation of this order. On all other occasions mufti was worn.

Duties were kept to the minimum. Extra look-outs for submarines were provided by naval ratings; this not only saved

passengers from carrying out duties for which they were not trained but also gave a pleasant feeling of security. One officer was detailed with each ship's watch for duty on the bridge to maintain liaison between the Captain and the O. C. Troops in the event of emergency. Senior officers were detailed from dusk till 11-30 p.m. for each deck to ensure that no lights were visible and that there was no smoking on deck; naval officers and civilians voluntarily took their share of these duties. For emergency boat stations one senior officer was appointed to command each side of the promenade deck, from where the boats would be loaded; they in turn detailed other officers to supervise the embarkation into the boats in co-operation with the naval officers detailed to each boat. Two officers were made responsible for the decks being cleared of chairs at sunset; the actual shifting of the chairs was done by passengers who happened to be on deck at the time. This was the limit of the duties demanded of first-class passengers.

It soon became apparent, however, that the stewards were unable to deal with the requirements of so many passengers. Asssitance was, therefore, given in a number of ways. The number of courses and alternatives at meals was reduced. No drinks other than water were served in the dining saloons. Volunteer waiters were enrolled to pass drinks in the lounges and bars. The entire sale of tobacco and cigarettes was taken over by passengers. Afternoon tea was served by volunteer waiters. Later in the voyage the demands on the troops for helping the stewards generally became so heavy that volunteer working parties brought up the full barrels and bottles from the hold to the bars and removed the empties; this was also done by the warrant officers for their sustenance. As the number of books in the ship's library was inadequate five senior officials formed a library pool from books loaned by passengers; a small fee was charged for each book and by this means a sum of £23 was handed over to the Red Cross. Yeoman service was also given voluntarily in the painting of the ship and the making of a protective screen of sand-bags on the bridge; the former task kept a number of passengers amused for several days, although it may not have been beneficial to their clothes.

Before the ship was taken over by the Admiralty the short-wave wireless sets in the passenger accommodation were removed, only the broadcasting apparatus being left. Before we sailed a very public-spirited officer went ashore and purchased two wireless receiving sets; they were fitted to the broadcasting

apparatus and proved absolutely invaluable. Apart from a few days in the Indian Ocean we had the latest B.B.C. news at regular intervals throughout the day. The sets were bought from this officer by a shilling subscription from all first-class passengers and were handed over to the Captain for use in the ship so long as she is employed as a transport or a hospital ship.

The promulgation of orders to such a large number of passengers presented difficulties. These difficulties were solved to a large extent, however, after the first few days by a ship's daily broadcast at 11-30 a.m. when all notices and instructions apart from daily duties were announced. By this arrangement not only were some really amazing rumours nipped in the bud, but passengers were more likely to know of, and comply with, the various requests and announcements than if they had been posted on a board.

The queue complex developed rapidly in the majority of passengers. It was germinated at the concentrating stations and grew steadily throughout the voyage. It even became so highly developed that if anywhere on the ship one passenger stood behind another those in the immediate vicinity would stand up and form a queue and then someone would say, "What's this queue for?" By the end of the voyage we were all so well queue disciplined that any jumping of places was unknown.

Gradually the convoy collected until there were ten ships, all over 20,000 tons; a number of destroyers were also anchored in the estuary. Our original time of sailing was postponed on account of fog, but we eventually sailed one evening at 5 p.m. It was an unforgetable sight to see all these large ships in single line ahead with the destroyer escort on the flanks and in front steaming into the setting sun.

The realities of war had been brought home by the sinking of the Athenia and emergency boat stations were held daily for the first week and later at longer intervals. At night darkened ship was the order and we found that all scuttles and windows had been painted with A.R.P. paint, double curtains had been fitted over all doors leading on to decks and smoking was forbidden on deck. The ship was fitted with an excellent bulkhead door system but to increase the chances of the ship remaining afloat in the event of her being torpedoed, the Captain ordered that all scuttles on C and D decks were to remain closed. Scuttles on A and B decks were allowed to be open provided that no light was visible; this was made the responsibility of the

passengers concerned and carelessness in this respect resulted in more than one rude message from the 'Gay Duchess' in which the Commodore of the convoy was posted.

The great excitement of the voyage was when two escorting destroyers suddenly turned about and dropped a number of depth charges one morning about 11-30. By late that night a number of passengers had definitely seen one if not two periscopes, but we had to rest content with the official message that "It is possible that a submarine was sunk." A certain amount of excitement was caused by an amateur semaphore expert, who intercepted the message being sent by the destroyer to the Commodore but did not start reading the letters until after the word 'that' had been signalled.

The weather was kind to us and we had a very smooth passage. Eventually we steamed past Gibraltar one morning into the Mediterranean, where under normal conditions the trip would have been ideal. With all the scuttles on C and D decks permanently closed, however (the two dining saloons were on C deck), the atmosphere was beginning to get unpleasant. It was therefore decided that smoking should be forbidden in the dining saloons and in cabins on C and D decks; this was certainly an improvement although to a minority it was an unpopular order. To make things more difficult the ship was fitted for service on the North Atlantic and not for the heat of the Orient; fans were fitted in the cabins on A and B decks but there were very few in the cabins on C and D decks, and for some technical reason they could not be transferred from the upper to the lower decks; there were no fans in any of the public rooms apart from a few small corner fans in the dining saloons; the blower system was for ventilating purposes and did not function like the blower system on ships normally serving the East. The atmosphere can better be imagined than described.

The evenings presented the main difficulty. An officer suggested that to reduce the 'fug' a kind of inverted coffin should be fitted in one of the windows of the card room, which was situated forward on the promenade deck; the object of this was to suck a strong draft of fresh air into this room to help to dispel the foul air. Unfortunately it worked the other way and the bad air went out of the coffin instead of the fresh air coming in; however every little helped! Another suggestion produced excellent results; the fitting of a screen aft of the smoke room provided a through draft and thereby helped to clear the atmosphere inside the public rooms. We tried putting

out all lights in the lounge and having the windows open; passengers were allowed to smoke provided that struck matches were screened from the open windows. Unfortunately whenever the Captain took his evening stroll certain passengers seemed to forget this precaution and the Captain on these occasions was decidedly peeved. However, as a result of shrieks from other passengers, whenever anyone offended in this way our habits improved. Later the card room was blackened out and all the windows looking on to the forward deck opened; this was beneficial as long as we had a head wind.

Another problem presented itself as we approached the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, namely, the provision of topees. The use of the ship's wireless was forbidden, so we could not discover whether we were going to be allowed to land at Port Said. There were many passengers without topees, so orders for Bombay bowlers were registered before we arrived, some money was advanced from the imprest and as soon as we anchored permission was given for the topee party of four officers to land. This party purchased over four hundred and fifty topees and on their return set up branches of Mr. Woodrow and Mr. Scott on the promenade deck where the topees were sold to those requiring them. Surplus and misfits found willing purchasers among the crew.

During our stay at Port Said and the trip through the canal all scuttles were opened and the ship was thoroughly aired; it was also a pleasant change to have the lights on for one night. The trip through the Red Sea had been dreaded by the majority of passengers and although the greatest optimist could scarcely describe it as a pleasure cruise it might have been very much worse; fortunately there was ample space for sleeping on deck. The doctors fitted up a heat stroke station and this proved a godsend to several members of the crew; the whole crew was European and the temperature in the galleys and washing-up places was terrific. Altogether twenty-two cases of heat exhaustion were treated, of which eighteen were crew personnel; fortunately only one case proved fatal. A short stop at Aden relieved the monotony and when we turned the corner into the Indian Ocean the weather became pleasantly cool.

Mails provided one of the main topics of conversation, both as regards their possible receipt and their despatch. Apart from a lucky few who found letters waiting for them at Bombay, no one got any letters. We got no orders regarding censorship till we arrived at Port Said and so all letters posted before our

arrival there were posted uncensored by the ship. For the mail to be posted at Suez, senior officers, civil and military, were appointed censors. A few letters were returned as unpassed for giving too much information and two for criticising the administration; it might have been good for the ship's staff to have read these two latter, but they didn't! All mail at Bombay was posted ashore and was therefore uncensored by the ship.

To make up for the absence of the fair sex on board we had various diversions to help to pass the time. A sports committee very wisely decided not to have organised games, the bane of many an otherwise pleasant voyage; the usual deck games were available and could be booked for reasonable times. Bridge provided amusement for many at all times of the day and some of the poker parties in the stifling atmosphere of the smoking room would have done credit to the wildest west picture. A number of talks on interesting every-day subjects were given through the loudspeakers and an excellent concert was staged by some enthusiasts by moonlight on the boat deck in the Red Sea. The outstanding turn in the concert was a monologue entitled 'A Naval Occasion' a là Sam and Albert; this was composed and recited by a naval doctor and described the submarine incident. It has since been printed and has enjoyed a wide private circulation.

And so one fine morning after twenty-two days sailing we approached Bombay and, without casting any aspersions at a very noble shipping company, few passengers were sorry to see the first of Bombay from the bow of a ship. The arrangements for dispersal at Bombay were well nigh perfect. Posting orders for all civilian and military passengers were issued within two hours. All civilian passengers left Bombay the same day as trains for the following days had been earmarked for military passengers. Those military passengers leaving Bombay the next day slept on board, the remainder being accommodated in hotels at very moderate rates. Customs inspections and import duties were limited to fire arms and the arrangements for clearing baggage and loading it on to the trains provided no worries for the individual passenger. We all owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Railway and Embarkation authorities for their excellent organization. The terrors of prohibition were even avoided by the establishment of officers' messes in the Taj Mahal and Majestic hotels; these two hotels must have made as much profit in two nights as they normally make in two months since the introducton of prohibition.

It was a memorable voyage and it is certain that for years to come many a yarn in a smoking room of a ship plying to India will start with—"Well I went out to India in the Britannic on the outbreak of (whatever they decide to call it) war and . . . ." For the ship's staff it was an unique experience, which was made comparatively easy by the amazing co-operation of everyone. The ship's officers could not have done more and they invariably agreed to every suggestion made for the comfort of the passengers so long as the safety of the ship was not affected. In spite of all the queer orders, demands and requests one had to make from time to time, never once did one receive a rude retort from a passenger either civilian or military. The grousers were few and let us presume that they did not realise that there was a war on! If any one of us experiences no worse discomfort by the end of this war than he had to put up with in the Britannic, he will be either in a very soft billet or amazingly fortunate. How many times before peace is signed will the remark be made—"Oh for a glass of the Britannic's iced lager."

HOW DOES A JOURNALIST GET HIS NEWS ?

A Lecture given before the United Service Institution of India, at Simla, on July 6, 1939.

By Jossleyn Hennessy

Sir John Ewart, C.I.E., in the chair.

Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have paid you the compliment of preparing a serious lecture for you. A few days ago, however, I met a distinguished personage who said he hoped my lecture was not too dry. "You won't have a very intelligent audience; be funny," he said and added as a gloomy afterthought, "If you can." But a brief glance at you convinces me that my informant libelled you all. Intellect and a lively perspicacity shine on every brow and I feel that I need not apologise for a serious lecture to so serious an audience.

I ought to say that all the solid parts of this lecture are directly lifted from that most excellent document, "The Report on the British Press," published in 1938 by the Political and Economic Planning Group. No more authoritative or detailed account of all the business and editorial ramifications of the press has ever been published and I warmly commend it to anyone anxious to understand the problems and social significance of the press.

Finally, I ought to emphasise that, although I am an official of the Government of India, nothing that I shall say to-day has the authority of, or reflects the views of my employers. I speak purely in my private capacity.

* * * *

How does a journalist get the news for you? Let us first ask ourselves what news is; the simplest definition is "Some fresh event about which a large number of people want to read."

In principle, news should be true; but in fact anybody who has ever tried to tell the whole truth about any subject has found it impossible; this may seem a surprising statement; but you will probably agree that if six members of this audience were asked to write an account not exceeding 750 words (the length of a popular newspaper column) of what I said, you would get six quite different accounts. My lecture covers about 7,000 words; to summarise it in 750, you would have to decide what you thought were its essential ideas and only those who have written a news story and then compared their effort with those of half a dozen other people can really appreciate how entirely different six honest accounts of the same thing can be.

Only too frequently, especially with the activities of governments, it is impossible to ascertain the whole truth or to express it with completeness and accuracy until it has ceased to be news; that is to say, by the time that public interest has forgotten all about it and is absorbed in other matters.

The press is, therefore, constantly working against time to produce the best practicable synthesis of news and truth.

Although anything that happens is potential news, if nobody connected with a newspaper hears of it, it is still-born. Even if it reaches a newspaper, it may be impossible or inadvisable to print it, or it may be crowded out by more important news. Again, why is it that so many would-be tellers of stories become known as Club bores? Because they do not realise that both technique and art are required to tell a story, however simple; likewise news may be so badly written up that the sub-editor spikes it impatiently.

Although some news is read by nearly everybody, what is news for one paper is not necessarily news for another. Papers which cater for restricted localities, trades or professional groups, naturally attach more importance to news concerning those localities, trades and groups than do the national dailies, and even these place different values on the same item of news. The journalist's problem is to present his news in such a way that it will interest readers. Some readers are better educated than others; news about the splitting of the atom, for example, presented in a form suitable for a reader of *The Times* would probably be unintelligible to the average reader of the *Daily Express* or *Daily Mirror*.

A London newspaper receives every day about 1,500,000 words of news in its office; this is about twenty times more than the space available in a twenty-four-page popular paper, which is 70,000 words. *The Times* finds room for about one-tenth, *i.e.*, 150,000 words.*

The consequent intensive condensation leads to a selective discrimination that sometimes results in the same event giving rise to different stories in different newspapers and even in different editions of the same newspaper. In criticising journalists for inaccuracies, it should be remembered that the sub-editing of a newspaper is carried out under the greatest pressure against time, frequently in a room reverberating with the

* Since the outbreak of war newspapers have been about halved in size owing to the increased cost of newsprint.

roar of neighbouring printing presses, buzzing with typewriters, punctuated by shouts for messenger boys and by the ringing of a score of telephones; the tension is usually so great that the wonder is rather so few mistakes are made.

The popular English newspaper caters for a public the majority of which finishes its education at the age of fourteen. At that age interest in abstract ideas or in intellectual matters which every graduate of a good university takes for granted as elementary, does not exist. The uneducated man is interested in *people* and the only way to get him to understand an abstract idea is to explain it to him in terms of a person; hence the greater stability of a monarchy, with its humanly interesting Royal Family, than of a republic; hence the power of Congress through the human appeal to the masses of Mr. Gandhi's striking personality; hence the human interest treatment of news.

News may be spontaneous or worked up, predictable or unpredictable, general or specialised.

Spontaneous news comprises a mass of events, from the assassination of a Dictator to a contest between singing mice, whereas worked up news consists of matter that is dug out on the initiative of a newspaper, such as an interview with Bernard Shaw, or a survey of the economic situation in Scandinavia.

Predictable news consists of such events as coronations, cattle shows, and the return of cricket teams from Australia. These will be noted in the News Editor's diary and planned for in advance.

Unpredictable news, such as crimes and railway calamities, call for adjustment in the News Editor's plans when they reach him unexpectedly over the tape or telephone.

Specialised as opposed to general news is that dealt with by the City Editor, Sports Editor, Fashion Editress, etc.

A newspaper, then has to give a highly condensed account of news and to relate it to the outlook and experience of its readers. Some events, such as great catastrophes, are news to everyone almost regardless of presentation; others may appear to a given editor not to be news for his readers unless they are treated from a special angle. *The Times* will summarise the possibilities of a social revolution in France in abstract terms and with plentiful references to political theory and constitutional history; the *Daily Express* will discuss the same problem by explaining who Colonel de la Rocque is, what colour of ties he wears and what chances of success *he* has; references to the

theories of such unknown people as Spinoza or Jeremy Bentham would be cut out.

A great deal of news comes from regular sources: it is important for the Editor to arrange that his reporters shall be in regular touch with the police, hospitals, fire brigades, the secretaries of political parties, trade unions, and other institutions.

Much news is found buried in the publications of Government and scientific institutions. Parliaments, local authorities, law courts, conferences of various societies, Government Publicity Officers, the B.B.C., the London Passenger Transport Board, private companies, all these are regular sources of news, either given unofficially and verbally or in a communiqué.

Such news is far from invariably used, partly because it may not be of sufficient news value, partly because it may contain "puffs" and most often because the sender chooses such an unsuitable time or form for communicating it that its news value is lost before it can be used. Valuable news is frequently offered to journalists by the disgruntled parties to a conference.

The "Date Line" on a news item usually shows the channel by which it has reached the paper, that is to say, "From Our Correspondent" means that it comes from a local resident correspondent who is shared by several newspapers, English or Foreign. "From Our Own Correspondent" means that it comes from a salaried staff man appointed as the paper's permanent representative in the town or country. "From Our Special Correspondent" means that a correspondent has been sent specially to some centre to cover a particular event. "From a Correspondent" means that it comes from a "free lance." It should be noted that these terms are, however, far from strictly used in the Indian press.

A large proportion of predictable and spontaneous news comes from the news agencies. It is impossible as well as uneconomic for a newspaper to send its own correspondents to cover masses of ordinary news such as meetings of Parliaments, local authorities, hospitals, etc.

The covering of routine news is left to the news agencies. Their news is subscribed for by all newsapers and is, therefore, common to all; a newspaper summarises agency items and reshapes and headlines them, according to its policy and to its estimate of their news value. Where a News Editor considers that an agency message contains the raw material of a special

story for him, he will send out one of his own correspondents to work this up. For example, where a news agency may have reported briefly an accident which may have happened to the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, the *News Chronicle*, being a Liberal paper, would probably consider it of greater interest to its readers and send its own correspondent to get a column story with photographs.

A news agency is for the national dailies a form of insurance that enables them to concentrate their star reporters on what they consider important to them. The smaller the paper, the greater proportion of its news emanates from news agencies.

Government officials and scientists frequently complain that information which they give the press is hopelessly distorted. I do not say that these complaints are necessarily unfair, but I think that the majority of them arise from lack of understanding of the facts of the newspaper industry. An educated person realises that the chemical industry, for example, has its specialized problems of science, manufacturing, distribution, sales and relations between employers and employed; the way in which these problems are being solved is doubtless open to criticism, but few people I imagine would venture to write a letter to the *Times* criticising aspects of the chemical industry, unless they had previously taken trouble to acquaint themselves with the facts. But when the newspaper industry is concerned, it appears that any fool can criticise without firsthand knowledge.

In handling serious news, it must be remembered that the British journalist is not writing for a scientific audience but for the reader whose education was completed at the age of fourteen.

The daily circulation of the six popular London national dailies is over 12,000,000 while the circulation of the serious *Times* and *Daily Telegraph* combined is less than 1,000,000; these figures do not include the millions who read the scores of provincial papers, of which only one or two can be termed serious. The average newspaper reporter in London has himself missed the advantages of a university education; consequently he is usually unable to grasp scientific facts and regards scientific exposition as academic and incomprehensible; this much may legitimately be charged against the newspapers; but the widespread success of popular handbooks on every kind of serious subject—a glance through the list of books on weighty topics

published by the Penguin Library will show what I mean—proves that if trouble is taken, serious subjects can be popularly explained. And here it is usually that the Government official and the scientist must share the blame for newspaper inaccuracy.

When a Government wants publicity, the press is, usually, quite willing to give it, provided there is news interest in the story; but too many departments are highly suspicious of journalists. In other words, Governments regard publicity as their own prerogative, and when a newspaper seeks to throw a searchlight on any department's activities, the characteristic reaction is too often that the newspaper cannot be up to any good, comments the P. E. P. "Report on the Press." Thus a vicious circle is set up. Newspapers do not find it worth their while to send their best men along to Whitehall because experience has shown that Publicity Officers can seldom persuade the departments which they represent to disgorge good copy, and civil servants disclose as little as possible because they distrust the irresponsible or unqualified reporters who come for information.

In recent years, politicians have been forced to recognise that in a democratic country it is essential to keep the public informed about the plans and activities of Government. *Unless Government can inform the public of its policies and achievements, the Opposition will be happy to explain that they do not exist.* Hence has sprung up that unpopular hybrid, who gets the worst of both the official and the newspaper worlds—the Government Publicity Officer.

The Government Publicity Officer has got to understand both the services' and the newspaper points of view. But he can rarely hope to persuade newspaper men that he is anything but an obstructive official, and civil servants, that he is anything but a nosey parker.

To the press he has to explain only too frequently that the reply to a particular question is (1) that the department has not got the information; (2) that the disorganisation of ordinary work involved in getting it would be out of proportion to its value, (3) that although it exists, it must remain confidential for reasons of State or cannot be disclosed pending its announcement in Parliament.

To the civil servant, the Government Press Officer must explain that if none of the foregoing legitimate reasons for

refusing to answer the question exist, it is in the interests of the department itself to help the journalist because:

(1) Sooner or later the department will itself need to secure publicity for one of its activities, and if journalists have met with rebuff after rebuff in the previous months, they are not likely to co-operate when their help is sought.

(2) If no official information is forthcoming, a journalist is forced to rely solely on rumour or on sources hostile to Government and what he writes may therefore be seriously damaging to Government and may indeed necessitate an official denial which, in most cases, only confirms the average newspaper reader in his belief that what is denied must be true.

When I was a foreign correspondent in Paris, Robert Dell, the famous *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, coined a phrase which became a proverb amongst Paris newspapermen.

In his squeaky, slightly effeminate voice, he used to say: "It *must* be true because the Quay d'Orsay denies it!"

Another unpopular duty of the Government Press Officer is the hopeless task of endeavouring to persuade officials that in most cases you cannot suppress news; sooner or later one of the persons affected by a decision of Government or by an occurrence which it is sought to suppress will gossip or even go out of his way, if disgruntled, to inform newspapers.

Yet another unpopular duty of the Government Press Officer is to persuade the head of a department that there has been no leakage when he sees a column in the *Statesman* revealing matters which he regards as confidential. It must be remembered that a professional newspaperman spends his whole time following the course of events in a manner for which persons who have their daily bread to earn in other professsions simply have not the physical time.

When I was a foreign correspondent in Paris, I read and card-indexed as a matter of routine, every speech made by all members of the Cabinet, by the leaders of the Opposition, by the chairmen of Parliamentary Committees, all the official White Papers, leading articles by newspapers known to represent particular interests, important speeches from all parties, and I spent hours chatting with politicians in the lobbies of the Chamber. It would have been impossible for any stock broker, Government official or Company Manager to have found

time to do this. The result was that, in general, I was able to form a fairly sound idea of the likely course of Cabinet policy on any important subject, or to reduce the possible alternatives before the Cabinet, as well as the reactions of the Opposition, to a manageable minimum.

Consequently if the Foreign Minister announced that he was discussing *A* with his British opposite number, it was frequently possible to know with almost mathematical certainty that *B* and *C* must have already been decided in a limited number of ways. If there were any doubt, there were a score of ways of checking up without specifically asking for information on *B* and *C*. As soon as *A* had been announced in a communiqué, I could go to a leading politician whom I met in the lobby and, without mentioning *B* and *C* discuss at length the implications of *A*. It was rarely that I was not satisfied as to the general lines of *B* and *C*. On this basis I was frequently enabled to publish decisions which had not yet been disclosed or to forecast trends of policy, and I dare say that harrassed Government officials put the Intelligence Service on to find out where the "leakage" was!

You all of you have recently read accounts of the disaster to the submarine "Thetis." It might interest you to know that the bulk of the news which you read appears to have been obtained from unofficial sources. There is complaint to-day at what is described by Fleet Street as the negative attitude of both the Admiralty and the submarine's builders. If it was thought that by saying nothing, the press would only be able to publish exactly what it suited the authorities to let the public know at the end of the efforts to save the trapped crew, a miscalculation was made. This attitude merely puts the press on its mettle to get the public the news that it wants; if attempts at secrecy were made, how laughable they were can be seen from the following account given by the *World's Press News*—a weekly professional paper—of how easily Fleet Street got you the detailed news:

"At the *Daily Mail* office, directly the news broke, it was decided that the story would have to be gathered from at least six centres—Liverpool Bay, Birkenhead, the Admiralty, Gosport, Devonport and Liverpool.

On duty at the time was Richard Jones, Night News Editor. He communicated with the Night News Editor of the Manchester edition, and found what reporters were available on

the spot. After a hurried telephone conference, it was decided to rush W. F. Hartin to Liverpool to be ready at dawn to get to the scene of the wreck as soon as the spot was established.

Meanwhile, Jones sent H. K. Ferguson, Brighton correspondent, to Gosport to assist the local man. Reporter M. Wiltshire was sent to rush any news from the Admiralty.

Eldred Reeve, Manchester News Editor, was back at the office sending Manchester reporters Kenneth Bolton and John Starr to help Alexander Kenworthy, Liverpool staff reporter, already at Birkenhead.

Stanley Hickes, Leeds staff reporter, was brought to Manchester to lend a hand.

Thus, when the Thetis was located at 8 o'clock on Friday morning, the news team was properly positioned. Hartin, with photographer, J. Tuson, was flown to Conway to board a fishing boat, already chartered by Reeve; Hicks was in the air with photographer Tuson and Kenworthy; Bolton and Starr were at the Cammell Laird yard to record the scene as the relatives of the men heard the news.

Hartin was the first and only man to board the ship to get the news brought up by the survivors. So, too, was Hartin a lone and close spectator of the salvage men's valiant efforts on the jutting tail, to save the ship and those on board. Meanwhile, Hickes and photographer A. Thompson were flying over head, recording the scene in pictures.

Sean Fielding was rushed by air to Llandudno. He was there when the lifeboat returned, from the men of which he secured one of the outstanding stories of the disaster.

Bolton was flown from Birkenhead to Llandudno and in a fast motor-boat relieved Hartin while the latter telephoned his story. Then, back to the scene went Hartin with a basket of pigeons for early morning flashes.

Similar co-operation is the keynote of the *Daily Sketch's* coverage of the story.

The Birkenhead end was covered by E. G. D. Lewis, *Daily Dispatch* reporter, J. Jerome of the Liverpool office, and F. Skinner, Liverpool office cameraman.

After a dash by road to Birkenhead they found every tug commandeered by the Admiralty and Cammell Laird; eventually they discovered an old paddle tug boat in Birkenhead docks and chartered it.

Even then there were anxious hours to wait for the tide before the three could get into the Mersey.

With only an elementary map and little information as to the position of the submarine they set out, and as daylight broke they saw what they thought was a small boat off the Great Orme.

As they approached they were hailed by destroyers, who told them it was the stern of the sunken submarine, and asked them to keep a watch-out for any men who might arrive at the surface in the Davis safety apparatus.

By several hours, Allied claim, their boat was the first on the scene and actually saw the four men come to the surface.

Lewis and his colleagues were on constant duty for thirty hours.

The shore side of the story was covered at Birkenhead by W. F. C. Campbell, in charge of the Liverpool office, who did great work for hours on end with the assistance of T. Walters.

At midnight on Thursday, Jimmy Rowe, of the *Daily Dispatch* and other Allied papers, Victor Lewis, of the *Daily Sketch*, and Bob Bremner, Allied photographer, dashed by car to Llandudno. There a fishing trawler was chartered and used as a base ship.

From early Friday morning till early Monday morning, Lewis, Rowe and Bremner worked in relays going out to the base ship in small motor boats carrying food and camera supplies, doing the best they could to change their clothes which were saturated every journey out in the small motor boats.

Rowe and Bremner worked unceasingly and did not get any sleep until late on Saturday night.

Every journey out to the trawler took two-and-a-half to three hours and, in order to get copy and plates back, the boats had to be kept running incessantly.

The Allied "fleet" was supplemented on Friday by Gannon, Southport; Evan Williams, Cowlyn Bay; Horace Tonge, Allied photographers; and Armstrong, Liverpool office cameraman, all of whom were used in the relays to and from the boats to keep watch over every move made.

Pictures were sent to Manchester for Northern editions and for wiring to London by portable telephoto."

The lesson to be drawn from all this is that wherever it is possible, the Government Press Officer should be put by the departments in a position to give guidance to a newspaper correspondent who has got to fill a column for his editor. The newspaperman in nine cases out of ten is going to publish something on the subject in any case. How much more useful is

it therefore from Government's viewpoint for the official spokesman to be allowed to discuss the matter with the correspondent, limiting his remarks, if need be, merely to points already known, in order to prevent the correspondent from publishing inaccuracies or from making forecasts which are completely off the mark and which would be damaging to Government if much publicity were given them.

Apart from official and routine sources of news, a great deal of news is obtained by correspondents who have built up personal social contacts. Sometimes these contacts have a deliberate interest in revealing information to a correspondent; sometimes they reveal it without being aware that they are doing so because they are not educated in news values, they do not think in terms of headlines and stories.

Hitherto I have been discussing the duller side of news-getting, parliamentary debates, official communiques and so forth; but life itself is the journalist's raw material and in the course of ten years of journalism I have been an eye-witness of such diverse happenings as the guillotining of the assassin of a French President, the Sarre Plebiscite, the trial of Arlette Stavisky, the beautiful widow of the swindler who rocked the foundations of the French Republic, the Catalonian revolution in Spain, the Nazi revolution in Germany, front line fighting in the Spanish Civil War, and the marriage of the Duke of Windsor.

I have heard the story of a discarded mistress of one of the two best known European dictators from the lady's own lips; I have followed a murder investigation from the finding of the body to the sentencing of the criminal; I have seen an innocent man undergoing third degree; I sailed on the maiden voyage of the Normandie; I have wandered accidentally into a king's bedroom to find His Majesty without his shirt and Her Majesty clad in nothing more (and I hasten to add nothing less) than a charming slip. All this was done in the normal quest for news and such experiences would easily be surpassed by journalists of longer standing than I.

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The lecturer then concluded by quoting three news messages of his own. The first was an eye-witness account of the battle at Irun in the early stages of the Spanish Civil War; the second, the departure of a convict ship from the island of Ré and the third a luncheon party with fifteen national representatives in a competition for Miss Europe.

CONTROL, COMMAND, LEADERSHIP.

By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

The terms employed in the title of this article are intended, without, perhaps, strict etymological justification, to convey degrees in directness and immediacy of authority varying at the one extreme from the exercise of a general directive influence over preparation and strategy and at the other to the tactical conduct of troops in action.

Control may be either political or military. Political control may be either authoritarian or democratic. We may prize our democracy and enjoy the freedom it entails, but we have to acknowledge that fascism possesses many advantages over it in the waging of war. These advantages have been repeatedly catalogued. Only the most important will be mentioned here. It is that a dictator is able to make of his state a single unit and to organise it at his pleasure into a powerful instrument ready enough and strong enough to be employed for the threat of war, or even for war itself, in order to achieve the ends he may consider desirable in the national interest.

This unity of purpose and constitution transcends all other factors in military value. Easy of attainment to the totalitarian state, it is exceedingly difficult to a country governed on the party system. The British disaster at Munich may be ascribed almost wholly to lack of unity in prospective emergency. For some five antecedent years, the Government had been warned publicly and privately of the aggressive intentions of Germany and of her growing forces. Yet they were afraid to take the necessary steps to meet the danger for fear of hindrance and misrepresentation by the Opposition and of consequent adverse repercussions at the polling-booths. From such a severe political defeat the statesman must draw lessons, just as the soldier draws them from a great battle such as Austerlitz. From it emerges a problem which has to be faced by all the democracies: Party strife runs high. There is a tendency among politicians in time of peace to exalt the capture of votes above the needs of defence. Only when clouds are closing to the thunder-clap are they ready to sink dissension and coalesce. By that hour, all the immense value that derives from unity in preparation has been lost and there may lie upon the democracy concerned the blood of its ill-

equipped and ill-trained manhood and the destruction or enslavement of the state. Unless democracies can be sure of closing their ranks at such a moment as will give them ample time for preparation prior to an impending emergency or unless they form a truly national government, they will surely suffer irretrievable disaster.

A sound system of defence is the most important matter for safeguarding the continued existence of a state. Collective security, balance of power or appeasement may, indeed, be effective from time to time; but, ultimately, a nation must rely upon its own strength, for the full development of which the vital point is that the state should fight as a single unit four-square to all the winds that blow. As already stated, however, unity is difficult for democracies in normal circumstances. Its achievement may not indeed be beyond their capacity, but it certainly cannot be reached except through a resolute and positive spirit of compromise and sacrifice in all parties—a spirit which has fortunately been displayed by Great Britain in the present crisis. Unity, however, apart from its other values, is so important a military factor that every endeavour should be made to retain and cherish it as a permanent possession.

A natural direction of effort in this respect lies in the elimination of the causes of the habitual animosities of mankind which derive ultimately from disparity of property, social disparity and disparity of opportunity. It would be out of place in a military essay to go deeply into this matter; and in fact, it has been introduced only because of the vital military need of unity. It may suffice to mention what expedient, in the writer's opinion should be explored as a cure for disunity. His recipe is that of regulated industrial co-operation. This is a system which has been tried in many countries with a considerable degree of success; but it has never achieved any serious popularity because it carries no appeal either to the capitalist whose high profits it would endanger or the trades unions whose *raison d'être* it would remove, and it contains, therefore, no votes for the politician. The long-drawn struggle between employer and employee and its accentuation through the formation of employers' associations and trades unions have, however, implanted a deep discord between classes which will if we except authoritarian methods, yield to no other treatment. Given a real and fully understood interest, both regulatory and pecuniary, in the planning, working and results of business, the labourer will be happy and will compensate the employer for the curtailment of profits by an

increase of production due to the heart which he will put into his tasks and to a discard of strikes resulting in smooth operation.

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A government may, conceivably, consider that the achievement of national unity is beyond its powers of accomplishment or even the scope of its duty. It cannot, however, escape the responsibility for ensuring that it is, itself, properly organised for the efficient conduct of policy and war. In 1914, the Prime Minister in Great Britain had to handle, without intermediary, twenty-two cabinet ministers. Councils of war consisted of this unwieldy group supplemented by any other persons, military or otherwise, thought helpful. Such a method promised and actually entailed a minimum of efficiency. It was replaced some three years later by a war cabinet presided over by the Prime Minister and containing two or three ministers without portfolio —a method that worked admirably. Nevertheless, in September 1938, owing to what Mr.Churchill describes as "the confirmed unteachability of mankind," the British Prime Minister found himself with precisely the same organisation as darkened counsel and delayed action in 1914. Instinctively and without warrant, he discarded it; and as there was nobody authorised to take its place, he settled matters through a "Big Four" which included himself, Lord Halifax and two other Ministers—the latter selected, not from any signal distinction in the sphere of control, or because they were responsible in any way for defence, but rather because they were ancient allies of his in office. Such a rough improvisation was unlikely to prove successful; and the very fact that the oldest of the democratic governments of the day should have had to improvise in two successive major crises indicates very clearly the need for reform. Reforms in the right direction have indeed been introduced since the outbreak of war. But the system now in being should be regarded not as a war measure but rather as the normal method of government. Why it should be delayed in each case until the crisis arises is not clear; for around the Government and within it are many examples of sound organisation.

In the fighting forces, for example, and in all large commercial companies, a system of decentralisation prevails. A corps commander, who controls 30 battalions, makes no attempt to deal directly with each of these units, nor does a brigade commander handle personally his 30—40 platoons. In the one case, the battalions are incorporated into brigades and the brigades into divisions so that the corps issues orders directly only to three

formations. In the other, the platoons are embodied in companies and companies in battalions, so that again the commander deals directly only with three units. The objects of such decentralisation are, in the first place, to ensure a sound and flexible articulation of the unit or formation concerned; and, in the second to afford a commander time to think by preventing him from being overwhelmed with work in dealing directly with a multitude of subordinates. Some such organisation receives unquestioned acceptance in every army in the world.

Moreover, an army commander, even though given time to think through decentralisation, considers it necessary to provide himself with a thinking staff, at whose disposal all available sources of information are placed. It is the duty of this staff not only to deal with immediate events but also to be continually looking ahead, to be considering what will be the effect of new weapons on operations and what novel types of weapons are demanded by changes in conditions. It is their duty, too, to submit, both at regular intervals as a matter of normal routine, and on special occasions when emergencies are impending, detailed appreciations of the situation on which their Chief will give the necessary decisions. Such arrangements are not, however, confined to armies. They embody principles—one might almost say laws—to which, in the conduct of all great affairs, whether of arms, industry or government, obedience must be rendered if policy is not to be purely opportunist and if satisfactory results are to be expected.

But here again the democracies are at fault. Their governments ordinarily contain no body of eminent men free from the work and cares of office and equal by character and intellect to play a leading part in the direction of policy. To await the outbreak of war before instituting the needed reform is to deny to a nation the prospects both of a consistent policy based on its ideals, its armed strength and its economic requirements and of the sound preparation of the state as a unit for defence which is the principal answer to the danger of sudden aggression.

In brief, the normal system of control in democratic governments should be such that the head of the state would have to deal direct only with a few super-ministers—say, four to eight directors of groups of ministries—who, together with a small advisory committee of two or three ministers without portfolio, would form the inner cabinet. Unless the direction is soundly organised, it is idle to expect any high degree of efficiency in the subordinate department.

All super-ministers would have to be graded as superior in rank to the members of their group, and they alone would ordinarily have direct access to the head of the state. All would have authority; but some would act only as co-ordinators and need but a comparatively small staff at their disposal. The (Super) Minister of Defence would, however, have to exercise direct control over the ministries of the fighting forces and would, therefore, require the services of a full ministry which would contain a General Staff drawn from the three services of sea, land and air. The Chief of this General Staff would advise the Minister on the assignment of money to the three ministries and would direct preparation in peace and operations in war. Neither the Minister nor the Chief of the General Staff would interfere with the internal administration of the subordinate ministries or with that of the fighting forces or with the tactical handling of the latter. Control would be exercised in the upper strata alone, chiefly in the distribution of funds, in the determination of priorities as regards the supply of equipment and man-power and in the general direction of operations. The navy, army and airforce are now so intimately bound together that, to allow three separate and untramelled war ministries to operate independently subject only to the control of the head of the state, who would be unassisted by any responsible General Staff, would be as suicidal as it would have been in 1914 to send infantry, cavalry and artillery to battle, each under its own commander, trusting to mutual co-operation for combined action. The co-ordination of the work of the Ministry of Defence with that of other ministries would be a task for the small group of ministers without portfolio at the disposal of the head of the state.

In most cases where a ministry of defence has not been instituted, the cause had lain in the obstruction of the vested interests. Dictators have been able to sweep all such obstacles away; and France, with the memory of the two great invasions of her soil hot upon her, and threatened by yet a third, has managed, under the pressure of all her great soldiers, to do the same. But there are others who have yet to realise that, under a near and continuous menace, every interest must be subordinated to that of defence.

This brings to a conclusion the subject of the organisation of the governmental control of defence. We may now turn to the problems of command in a democratic state which, whether

political or military, are among the most urgent questions of the day.

The soldier is not by nature a democrat, and soldiering in general is a totalitarian affair. The soldier has no use for government of the soldier, by the soldier, for the soldier. On the other hand, democracy does not take kindly to leadership with its concentration of power in the hands of one man. Commanders have too often in history taken advantage of their position to enslave or otherwise degrade the masses or deprive them of hardly won privileges. Democracy recognises, indeed, that leaders are needed; but it likes to see them spring from the ranks, and to place a curb on their activities and on their advance to power.

Where, however, it insists on putting its views on this subject into practice in the military field, it is endangering its existence; for the more fettered the leader and the less his superiority over the led, the smaller will be his chances of success. A marked superiority is needed. It may be social or educational or the result of personality or of skill at arms; or it may be a combination of some or all of these qualities. Napoleon's marshals were chosen from the ranks; but, as the Emperor was anxious to widen the gap between leader and led, he made of them princes and dukes so as to create a social gulf between the general and the *poilu*. That happened, however, only after France had ceased to be a democracy.

Great Britain has hitherto drawn her officers almost exclusively from the public schools and universities. That is because she is truely democratic only in the polling booths. In the Great War, her principle leaders were picked almost without exception from those corps in which it is expensive to serve— Guards, Cavalry, etc.— or from old Etonians, from the class, that is, which has been accustomed from childhood to give orders with the expectation of their being obeyed and to take part in those field sports which form an excellent apprenticeship to war. They may not in every case have been wisely chosen; but the army was to a remarkable degree content with them.

The system, however, holds two disadvantages: the one, that the field of choice is narrow; the other, that the members of a rich class, not having to work for a livelihood, lack one of the chief incentives to professional study. So here we have, as so often in life in general as well as in war, an "option of difficulties." Broaden the area of selection and we obtain a high

level of quality but find obstacles to the creation of a sufficiently large gap between leader and led. Select from a privileged class, and a valuable gap—social and educational—is at once created, lacking, however, in the quality which springs out of selection from a numerous category of a fair order of education.

In democracies, a levelling action is in progress all the time with the enlargement of education and the widening distribution of wealth—both in themselves desirable processes. Hence it seems advisable in the interest of maintaining the gap betwen leader and led, in the first place, to develop leadership in every sphere in the state—in schools, games, clubs, etc., and also—and mainly—by an extension of the principle of equal opportunity which is at once a sound foundation for democracy, for unity, and for leadership; and, in the second place, to seek among officer candidates, those possessed of the qualities such as personality, courage and intelligence most desirable in a commander and to cultivate those qualities in them intensively.

Leadership implies both the capacity to lead and the willingness to obey. If one or other of these conditions is absent, there can be no leadership. Nearly everyone is ready instinctively to follow a first-class leader and is glad enough to hand over to him the responsibililty for action. Born commanders, obvious as such to the senses, are, however, rare. The everyday problem of leadership lies, on the one hand, in endowing with capacity to lead the ordinary beings who find themselves entrusted with that task and, on the other hand, in creating a willingness to obey them in other ordinary men who would not in normal circumstances look to them for guidance.

The difficulty is met—in part automatically in that the sense of responsibility in a leader drives him to fit himself for that post by study, by practice and by developing his martial faculties; in part by the special training in leadership which all officers receive; in part by the inculcation of discipline—the factor by which the soldier singly and in mass learns to obey the orders of his superior.

Besides discipline, there are other aids which tend not merely towards the somewhat negative ideal of a willingness to obey, but towards a burning desire and a resolute intention —come fair, come foul—to do so. The principal of these are patriotism, a just cause, *esprit de corps* and a human relationship between officer and man, deeper though less openly expressed than the official connexion.

Thus for command and obedience there are controlling influences within and without. When both one and the other approach perfection, it becomes possible for leader and led to concentrate all their powers on the objective to be gained. It has to be recognised, however, that the problem of leadership will remain refractory in the democratic state until reforms directed towards its solution are instituted and, even then, will require continual study and attention.

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The principal qualities required for command have been much under discussion in the military press lately. They are, in the main, character, a cool head, "caution wedded to audacity," a sense of realities, balance and intellect. This paper will not continue the discussion on them but will make a few brief reflections on other less obvious or less tangible qualities needed.

The choice of a commander depends to a high degree on the nature of the task. It would hardly be sound, for instance, to choose a general who had, from long service on the Indian frontier, become a specialist in mountain warfare, for the command of a mechanised force on the Continent of Europe. And the converse is of course equally true. Then, for the rough and tumble of the soldiers' battle of Inkerman, heavy-handed, hard-swearing Pennefather was admirably suited. It was fine, the soldiers thought "even when his radiant countenance could not be seen, to hear the 'grand old boy's' favourite oaths roaring cheerily through the smoke." But such leadership, splendid as it was, might have been of less value on occasions demanding more finesse than brawn and more skill than drive. Again, where allies have to be considered, the choice of a commander would depend largely on whether or not he was possessed of tact and a readiness for compromise; and those qualities would determine the decision only if combined with dignity and strength of purpose. Haig was admirable in these respects; but in 1914, the quarrels of French and Lanrezac gravely hampered the co-operation and even endangered the security of their respective armies.

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A commander must be something of a psychologist. He must be a judge of individual man—as to his worth for a particular place in a team and of his treatment—curb, snaffle or spur, and he must know how to deal with man in the mass. The

choice of subordinates and their appointment to appropriate posts will often decide the fate of armies. Napoleon had a perfect eye for a man; but he allowed family affections to influence him with baneful results. It was to his brother Joseph almost as much as to Wellington that he owed the loss of Spain. He was a wonderful mass leader. He won and held the revolutionary armies by his resounding victories, his courage and his unparalleled endurance; and therewith he combined an intimacy of communion with the troops that made the soldier regard him as the apotheosis of himself. Hitler, prince of demagogues, employs the same artistry and arouses a similar devotion. He is the German deified. There is a whole science in the psychology of crowds which should be studied; but, to be able to sway the masses over a considerable period of time, the divine spark must be there as well as the technical skill.

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The commander neither in peace nor in war must allow himself to run in a groove. While consistency of general policy tends towards smoothness and efficiency in normal services, it must not be permitted in any serious degree to descend into routine. A certain amount of routine is, of course, unavoidable. Its toils must not, however, be permitted to tighten unduly, and an eye must be kept to a proper sense of proportion. 'First things first' is a motto which might well receive daily affirmation in any military headquarters. The mind will decay unless it is continually conceiving and creating and setting its progeny in the dry lights of discussion and test. It should be readily receptive, too, of the ideas of others. The sterilising by senior officers of youthful imagination is a common and criminal practice and a serious handicap to an army.

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The commander in peace thinks mainly of material matters: of plans, preparation, the use of weapons, administration....The moral element is absent. It cannot be rehearsed, nor can it be represented like an anti-tank gun by a green flag. Hence, at such time, it is terribly difficult to test and encourage leadership in which art the moral element plays the vital part. A partial solution only can be found for the problem. Manœuvres apply moral tests to a certain extent, especially in the reactions of commanders to surprise; but the best way of ensuring that there shall be a sufficiency of leaders in war lies, apart from

insistence as the primary need on the study and practice of the profession of arms, in the encouragement of sports that stiffen morale such as hunting, ski-ing and pig-sticking and of games definitely calculated to teach leadership—perhaps invented for that purpose.

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Anglo-Saxons are, on the whole, opportunists. They meet crises unperturbed, but also unprepared. Their high moral qualities fit them to bear the strain and a certain rough skill at improvisation has hitherto, in an age when time was not vital enabled them to ride the storm. But time is now, except, perhaps on the American Continent, the essence of the problem and can be conquered only by adequate preparation. Moreover, a succession of tempests are wearing to even the most seaworthy of vessels. The signs of the weather should, therefore, be observed and observation should be translated into thought and thought into purpose. It was because Marlborough and Washington, Nelson and Wellington posssessed the long view as well as the other great qualities inherent in the blood that they rank first among Anglo-Saxon leaders.

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A general should have something of the make-up of a poker player. He must be prepared to take risks, provided they are calculated risks. Just as, subconsciously, the poker player, before he bluffs, balances his own character in its force and finesse against the characters of the other players, so does the leader in the field weigh his own personality against that of his opponent in seeking the justification of any risk he may take. Napoleon would never have dared his flank march to Piacenza against an adversary more active and venturesome than the aged Beaulieu; and it was because of Rennenkampf's known lack of enterprise that Ludendorff was able to ignore the Russian First Army and overwhelm Samsonov at Tannenberg. For long, British regulations contained the sentence—"The security of a force and of its communications is the first responsibility of a commander" —a most damning pronouncement, in that it implied a policy of safety first and the prohibition of risk taking. It is now made clear in the revised regulations that though security must be always in mind, it may best be pursued by aggression, by winning and maintaining the initiative and by concentrating on beating the enemy. But there is no doubt that the sentence quoted exercised over a long period a pernicious effect on British leadership.

A commander has of course many more chances and contingencies to calculate than the poker player. Besides the play of character upon character, he must have regard to the skill of his subordinate leaders, to the morale and training of his troops and those of his adversaries and to the weather—factors many of them not easily or wholly ponderable. Then again, he must balance the probable risks against the probable gains. There could be no greater folly than wittingly to incur grave dangers when aiming at small profit. Wellington allowed Cuidad Rodrigo to be captured under his very nose to the disgust of his troops, to the scorn of his allies, to the jeers and jubilation of his enemies and to his own inward mortification. But a commander must be a law unto himself and he has to marshal his own lonely thoughts to a decision unswayed by irrelevent influences such as sentimentality and personal bias. To the Allies, defeat, of which there was high probability, would have meant the loss of Portugal, inaction the loss only of the fortress. The possible gain was not worth the risks involved. Events were amply to justify the British commander's judgment.

Napoleon was a born gambler, but he eschewed the risks of night operations as dependent on such chances as the saving by the geese of the Capitol, and he made it a principle never to give battle unless he believed the prospects to be 70 per cent. in his favour.

Risks have to be taken, though to a less extent than in armies, in other forms of activity, especially in government and commerce. Here is an appropriate quotation on the subject from the *Economist*:

> The moral is that the people will forgive the bold experimentalist his occasional errors in gratitude for his strenuous good intentions. They will never tolerate the cautious pedant who waits before moving to be sure that every last detail of his plan is approved by the orthodox and consequently seems never to move at all.

This passage might well have been written on Hannibal or Caesar. Actually, it forms part of an encomium on President Roosevelt.

A word here on orders—the means by which the intentions of the leaders reach the led. The regulations concerning them are common to all nations and embrace the wisdom of ages. They should be absorbed by all who would aspire to command.

The nature of orders hangs much on the grade of the headquarters of origin and upon the type of operations. In the higher grades—Army or Corps—and in open warfare, 'clear instructions' devoid of detail are issued. In the lower grades—Divisions, Brigades, Battalions—and in trench warfare, the general form of order capable of a fairly elastic interpretation gives place to more 'exact prescription.' Where doubt exists as to the type of order needed, it is well to issue the 'clear instruction' as that gives rein to initiative with its priceless possibilities of the furtherance of the plan through the audacity and judgment of junior leaders—that initiative which, according to the elder Moltke (who, however, had no part in the years of trench warfare) is the determining factor in war. Above all, in a sphere of activity where the unexpected is normally to be expected, rigidity of regulation is strongly to be deprecated.

Napoleon's orders, when he was present on the field, were plain, pithy, positive and unequivocal; but, when far from the theatre of operations, he sought to control his marshals by 'exact prescription' in carping, long-winded epistles on a situation often already three weeks dead. He had not enough confidence in them, brilliant on the whole as they were, to decentralise his authority to the extent of limiting himself to the 'clear instruction.' The elder von Moltke, never far from the field, exercised command by the shortest and most courteous of directives. And his system, profiting from the unity of doctrine in which commanders and staffs were trained and to the cult of the initiative, worked on the whole admirably; but it was never put to the high test of a reverse. It is desirable that orders on their way to the ultimate recipient should pass *en route* through as few hands as possible, especially if they are verbal. For example, the orders for the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava were issued by Raglan to Airey and then transmitted in succession to Nolan, to Lucan and to Cardigan suffering as a prelude to their disastrous results much misinterpretation in passage. Form is important but not vital. "Get to them, Granny" was an order lacking in formality; but it worked. It was sent during the action of Abu Tullul in Palestine by an Australian Brigadier to Colonel Granville commanding the reserve and was correctly interpreted by him in an immediate move to a decisive and successful counter-attack.

A final word on the subject of orders. A commander should never issue an order on whose execution he does not intend to

insist. Otherwise orders in general fall into a discredit dangerous to leadership. In the Great War many orders, especially those of an administrative nature were openly ignored. It was a common sight for instance to see officers and soldiers walking on a railway line past large notices to the effect that traffic by pedestrians was prohibited. This in itself was not a serious matter; but it made it very difficult for the soldier to know which orders he need obey and which he need not.

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Perhaps sufficient attention is not ordinarily paid to finesse as an essential attribute of a commander. In the study of war, we find that nearly all the Great Captains of history owed the persistent success which won them fame largely to their skill in effecting surprises. Resolution of character played its part in the execution of these feats by stimulating troops to amazing efforts such as Napoleon's passage of the St. Bernard prior to Marengo and Wellington's march through the de Oca mountains on his way to Vittoria. But the conception of such enterprises demanded imagination (which is the parent of finesse) in high degree. Is sufficient attention paid to these qualities (which are by no means synonymous with brain-power) and to the preparation and execution of surprise in military study and practice? Certainly not at manoeuvres, where the various limitations imposed by private property, harvests and a general shortage of time and space present almost prohibitive obstacles. Nevertheless, the writer has participated in two sets of manœuvres where in each case a high degree of finesse on the part of the commander, coupled with care in preparation, brought overwhelming success. The importation of reality into peace-training in perhaps its most important aspect need not therefore be excluded from consideration.

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What is nerve? Perhaps a compound of character, confidence and balance. The younger Moltke suffered in the opening exchanges in 1914 from lack of this quality. Joffre won the battle of the Marne because he possessed it in abundance (in superabundance according to his detractors who hinted that the direst calamity availed not to extract him from his bedroom between ten of the night and nine of the morning).

Nervousness is often, though wrongly, regarded as the opposite of nerve; but curiously enough, it is by no means wholly a disqualification for command any more than stolidity

is a necessary qualification therefor. Turenne was notoriously nervous when going into action but never failed in courage. The writer lived for a year with a gallant airman—also distinguished in the fields of mountaineering and boxing—who could never eat breakfast before flying and never entered an aeroplane without shaking all over. And he had then flown for ten years and is flying still, fifteen years on. In the same way, a friend of his, famous after pig, used to acknowledge to extreme nervousness waiting for a pig in a drive though perfectly happy after it had broken. Lloyd George, in a widely different sphere, relates that, before rising to speak on great occasions, his nervousness made him almost physically sick.

Nervousness is an emotional quality and has the advantage in this respect of a connection with imagination, ardour and self-sacrifice. There are moments in the heat of battle when the most stolid courage will not avail and when such qualities as balance and the sense of proportion normally so valuable actually imperil success. It is then that an impulse proceeding from an emotional soldier in the sudden flame of a breathless enthusiasm may snatch victory from impending defeat. Unemotional men find it difficult to rise to the heights or to inspire devotion in others. Haig failed there and Wellington before him. The Peninsular army honoured and feared the Iron Duke but did not love him, and with some reason. "By God," said Anglesey to him as the two stood together on the ridge at Waterloo, "I've lost my leg." "Have you, by God?" replied the Duke without lowering his glasses.

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In what exactly the power of a commander consists is often difficult to discern for it is usually a combination of many factors. A fine physique is an important element engendering as it does a certain bodily superiority, and its brutish force is of value not only in the rough and tumble of battle but also, on occasions, in the assertion of discipline. Botha, regarded at 35 as ridiculously young for leadership in a land where greybeards were the insignia of rule, experienced difficulty in winning authority. He achieved it early in the campaign by knocking down a rebellious burgher at a critical moment at Spion Kop. But that was a method beyond the capacity of a Nelson or a Wolfe. Jeb Stuart, Murat and Mangin captured the imagination of their troops and lit their charges by gorgeous apparel. Ball threatened his foes in an all-red aeroplane. Picton

died at Waterloo in a top-hat. On the other hand, Grant of the one coat, Stonewall Jackson and Pétain scorned adornment but were none the less effective. Some leaders—Napoleon, Roberts . . . insist on sharing the hardships and the fare of the soldier. Others hold that the commander must be kept fit and that he will work all the better in comfortable and undisturbed surroundings, thus giving his troops a higher prospect of victory. Age follows no rule, for Alexander conquered Asia at 20 and Napoleon, Italy at 27, whereas Moltke and Foch began victorious careers at 66 and 67 respectively. Moreover, although the value of early training and study cannot be questioned. Cæsar and Cromwell started serious soldiering after the age of 40. An even stranger case is that of Hitler. During some four years of war, the Führer managed only to reach the rank of Lance-Corporal. Yet when, at the age of 44, he entered upon his kingdom, he succeeded in gaining his ends by means which, if we exclude the question of morality, not one of the Great Captains could have bettered. According to Rauschning* he held that "in the relations of states, right and the conventions have no real existence;" and he laid down three rules for his own guidance. Rule 1.—In every enterprise the unlikely succeeds rather than what is considered possible. Rule 2.—Always keep the offensive; never allow oneself to be thrown back on to the defensive. This is the primordial rule of policy. Never allow oneself to be attacked without making an immediate counter-attack delivered at the heart of the subject and carried far beyond the ground of discussion chosen by an opponent. Don't fiddle with accessory questions. ,Rule 3.—Never enter into discussions when one wishes to reach some end effectively. Refusal of discussion upsets the nerves of an opponent.

Hitler's methods are those of policy rather than war; but in the latter sphere, they might be equally effective.

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It is commonly said in racing circles that horses can gallop in any shape; and it would seem from what has been written above that, similarly, men can be great leaders without necessarily being cast in one mould. There are, however, nine times out of ten, certain qualities in the one case of shape and breeding and in the other of character and capacity which mark the champion; and, when a misshapen horse or a man such as Wolfe, physically infirm and spiritless of aspect, forges ahead of his fellows, we shall surely find in a noble eye the expression of inward power. For, in every true leader, the moral rises superior to the material, giving rule to the spirit over the body.

*Die Revolution des Nihilismus, p. 318. Quoted Revue des Deux Mondes.

FROM PESHAWAR TO MEERUT IN 1839

By "Zarif"

The First Afghan War being ended, the 16th Lancers, who had marched from Meerut to Kandahar, been present at the capture of Ghazni, ridden victorious into Kabul, and threaded the Khyber Pass to Peshawar, were on their way back to their cantonments. They had been feasted and fêted in Peshawar by Runjit Singh's Governor, General Avitabile, the "ferocious Neapolitan," and were glad to leave, for "the Fort is so unhealthy that neither European nor Hindostanee constitution can bear against it, and it appears that both nearly equally suffer."

Their march from Pabbi on the 24th November, 1839, was "over a plain extending miles and miles, a splendid area for the movement of a large force of Cavalry." How many Generals have thought so since, and have hurried home to devise manœuvres for the Risalpur Cavalry Brigade! How many reputations have been made and lost on that rolling downland! Those who won and those who lost can take pride and comfort from the fact that it was on that very ground, north of the river from Nowshera, that Maharaja Ranjit Singh, after very heavy loss, gained his victory over the redoubtable Dost Mohamed. Those who gained "bowler hats" may remember that Dost Mohamed lost an empire.

Attock.—On the 26th, the Regiment crossed the Indus. Captain Lowe, of the 16th Lancers, described the scene in a diary.

> "The approach to the Indus is by a defile through some low hills which is called the Jackal's Throat. At the entrance on a commanding height there is a small fort garrisoned by Seik (Sikh) troops, and to the right of the gorge near the river, there is a much larger mud fortification at Kyrabad. We crossed the Indus, running like a mill sluice, on a bridge of 24 boats; about a mile above the town the river runs a complete rapid and must, I imagine, stop the navigation. A high stone battlemented wall surrounds the town of Attock, and is carried over a rocky hill overhanging the river; the gateways are very strong, but the town

> is completely commanded from the south-east, and the fortifications may be considered as only valuable as completely commanding the river. The site of this very old Mohamedan fort is in a perfect amphi-theatre of hills, and rises on the left bank of the Indus; and from the river it has more the appearance of an old Norman baronial castle than any fortification I have seen in the East."

Hassan Abdul.—On the 30th the Regiment camped at Wah, where the cement works are now. In the evening, Lowe walked back to Hassan Abdul, where he met the Political Agent.

> "I accompanied him to a sacred well of the clearest water in which numbers of very fat fish are kept, which it would be sacrilege to destroy. This beautiful spot, although sanctified by a Mohamedan, is held in great veneration by the Seiks, and is esteemed by them only second to Amritsar.
>
> The tradition is that an overwhelming mass of rock was precipitating itself down the hill and threatening inevitable destruction to the mosque of Hussain, who stretched forth his hand and instantly stopped its progress, and immediately from underneath the rock gushed the sacred spring.
>
> I was very pleased with the scenery about Hussain Abdal; a direct road branches off northerly to Cashmeer, whence it is six days' journey. As evening drew on I went to see the ruins of the Palace of the Fairies, of which, unfortunately, little is left but the name. The water is the purest and most transparent that I have ever tasted; almost every particle of sand is distinctly visible at the bottom of the stream."

On the Regiment went, and halted for a night in Rawalpindi which Lowe describes as a good-sized town with a large, well-supplied bazaar; but he comments adversely on the outrageous number of beggars. On the 5th of December, they came to Manikiala, where that large mound of masonry stands to this day on the north side of the Rawalpindi-Jhelum road, some twenty miles from Pindi. To-day it is popularly but erroneously supposed to be the grave of one of Alexander's chargers; and the local inhabitants believe that Alexander the Great built it. In 1839 Lowe described it as being "in shape exactly like the Coliseum in Regent's Park, and from a distance

looks like a large beehive. It is three hundred and eighty feet in circumference, and seventy feet high. The masonry almost entirely round the base is still in excellent preservation, and is so on the south side nearly two-thirds up the building.

From the top, which is flat and about forty feet square, a shaft of masonry, so admirably built as to be still perfect after a lapse of two thousand years, descends about thirty feet to a chamber covered with immense slabs of rock. This chamber was opened some years ago by a French officer in the Seik service, and he discovered several coins, and an urn containing a liquid supposed to be the heart of one of the Bactrian monarchs."

Disaster at Jhelum.—On the 11th December, the Regiment arrived at Jhelum, and had to ford the river, over which in those days there was no bridge.

"Leaving the town a little on our right, we found the river immediately in front of us, fully five hundred yards broad at this point. The river was reported fordable by H—who was to act as our guide. He had been sent forward to make a reconnaisance, and had ridden across earlier in the morning; he said that there was no difficulty as the water was just up to the knee-caps of his horse.

Well, on we went for all the world as though we were about to cross a little trout stream. There were plenty of boats on the shore, but we ignored them.

The Advance Guard entered the water first, followed by the Band; then came the Regiment.

The ford ran across in the shape of a half-moon, but bending more acutely back from the centre, making the distance more than a third of a mile.

Small twigs or rods were just visible here and there above the surface, and these were to mark the ford; but no one was told that they were there for that purpose, and I for one supposed that they were marks for fishing nets.

When we had gained rather more than the centre of the river, and had to turn back against the stream, we found ourselves in deep water; some of the weaker horses, I suppose, tiring of breasting the stream, kept edging away off the actual ford until they found themselves out of their depth.

We had not turned far up when I saw the Band in difficulties, and some of the horses were quickly carried downstream. C—, just in front of me, was swept off his horse, but he swam away strongly, though he was considerably hampered by his sword, which he had failed to unbuckle.

I now found my horse off his legs. I tried to keep him up and to regain the ford; but he appeared to be wasting his powers, so I turned his head downstream and made for the nearest point which was about a hundred yards away.

I threw my stirrups across the saddle, unbuckled my sword and carried it across my holsters. My head kept perfectly cool and steady, and I felt my horse obedient to a slack rein, and swimming strongly under me. I knew I could not swim myself, and must leave it all to him. He carried me to the bank, and I was the first man up it. When I got there, such a scene was passing as I earnestly hope I may never again witness; the Regiment being in such a state of utter confusion and helplessness that there appeared no calculating the extent of our loss.

At this time I think fully fifty horses, and many of them without their riders, were being swept rapidly down the river; here and there just the top of a cap might be seen indicating that a man was sinking; and it seems wonderful that a man, who had once parted from his horse, should have escaped, considering the weight of his accoutrements.

A little above the ford, some camels were endeavouring to cross with baggage. These got adrift, and were carried through our second and third squadrons, increasing the confusion, making their loss the heaviest.

When on the bank, I saw three officers swept past; C—, who had been swimming so long with his sword on that I thought he would have been lost, managed to get to shore utterly exhausted; and so did Raymond Pelly; but poor old H—, who had been thirty-three years in the service, was soon afterwards picked up a corpse. Our loss, considering all things, has been wonderfully small: one officer, one corporal

> and nine privates drowned, and we have also lost nine horses. The bodies of six of the men have not been recovered. This is a most melancholy event to have occurred at the close of our campaign, especially as a little common precaution would have prevented all accident."

The bodies of the four men were buried round the body of the officer near the bank of the river. I wonder if the site of the little cemetery is recognisable to-day?

Five days later the Regiment came to the Chenab river, which they crossed in much better style. The men and baggage were ferried across in boats, and the horses were ridden across a ford lower down the river by syces.

Lahore.—Just after Christmas, while the Regiment spent a few days in Lahore, Lowe rode out to see the famous Shalimar Gardens about four miles along the Amritsar road. The Shalimar, which was a favourite resort of Runjit Singh's, was kept in very good order; the canals which intersect the garden from north and south and east and west were full of water, and the fountains were all playing. In the marble pavilion on the eastern side of the garden, Runjit Singh frequently gave "nautches," and on these occasions the gardens were brilliantly illuminated, which enhanced the effect of the fountains and water-works.

While the force was resting at Lahore, Sir John Keane, the Commander-in-Chief, who had "not been on horseback more than twice since leaving Kabul, having suffered acutely from gout," sent a diplomatic mission to the Governor's Palace at Lahore. A gorgeous deputation called on him in return, the "Seiks" dresses being very splendid, and the elephants and horses brilliantly caparisoned.

The next day the Regiment marched twelve miles to Lakpat on the Ferozepore road. Here they found a Sikh encampment, and a review of the troops was held there. The line consisted of 45,000 men, Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery with 160 pieces of cannon of different calibre. Everyone who passed down the line commented on the improvement to the Sikh forces, and considered them to be a formidable force, as indeed they were found to be some six years later in the First Sikh War.

Horse Thieves.—Three of the officers of the 16th Lancers, who had ridden at the review, had sent their horses back to camp with their syces. On the way, the syces were robbed of the horses,

and were sent back to camp covered with bruises. Lowe tells us that representations were made to the Sikh Government, who asked for a descriptive roll of the animals.

"A descriptive roll was duly sent, with their valuation. The price of one, I think, was Rs. 2,500, and Rs. 2,000 was claimed; the second was valued at Rs. 1,600. The third, a most disreputable-looking animal, scarcely fit to mount a butcher's boy upon, was worth at the very most Rs. 150; but Colonel P—, his owner, with peculiar Irish modesty, valued it at Rs. 1,200.

This must have occasioned the Seiks a good laugh—I am sure it did all of us—when they sent back the horses the next day, to the great grief of their owners, who can never hope for another such chance of disposing of them."

It is interesting to compare the price of horse-flesh of the present day with that of one hundred years ago.

Baggage Thieves.—Lowe obtained leave from his Regiment at this point, and hurried on alone to Meerut, whence he was to gallop thirty-six miles to the Ganges and take boats for Calcutta. On his arrival at Meerut, he went to bed, but presently he was woken by his servants to say that a large party had attacked their tent, and succeeded in carrying off the trunks in which he kept his "breakfast apparatus," as he called it, and his plate.

> "They said that the attacking party were fifteen or twenty in number; they had thrust spears through the tent and thrown brickbats at them as they ran out. It was a mercy that the thieves did not take the trunk containing my pay which I had been given only the day before. The next morning I ordered the two chowkidars to be marched before the Judge; but his reply was that since the robbery had taken place in Cantonments, in which he had no power, it was none of his business. I wrote to the Brigade Major, but he likewise denied any power of jurisdiction. It is rather hard, having escaped scot-free all through Afghanistan, to be robbed and refused redress in one's own station."

On the following morning he got his boats under weigh, and hoped to reach Calcutta in six week's time. Travelling in India in those days was not all Beer and Blue-Trains.

THE EMBODIMENT OF A PROVINCIAL BATTALION, I.T.F.

By Major E. A. Hamlyn, 1st Battalion, 4th Bombay Grenadiers

The following account of the embodiment and move from its peace station, of a provincial battalion of the Indian Territorial Force, is written to show how the difficulties, both foreseen and otherwise, were overcome.

Before commencing the story of the actual embodiment, it is necessary, for the benefit of the uninitiated, to say a few words on the composition of such a battalion, and the location of its personnel and material during the non-training season. At such a time (March till September, in the case of the battalion under consideration), the only personnel present at headquarters of the unit are the "Admincom," one clerk, one battalion quartermaster-havildar and four caretakers.

From this somewhat limited cadre, the entire battalion, consisting of four British officers, seven Senior Grade Officers, nineteen Junior Grade Officers six hundred and ninety-five Indian other ranks and forty followers, had to be produced within fifteen days of the flag falling.

Shortage of British Officers in the Indian Army generally had reduced the complement for the unit to two, excluding the "Admincom." These would, normally, have been serving with their active battalions and would have been sent off to their territorial unit immediately embodiment was announced in the Gazette. These provided the Adjutant and one company commander.

Senior Grade Officers were Indian gentlemen drawn from the legal profession and from neighbouring landholders. These furnished the quartermaster, three of the company commanders, and three company officers. One was newly commissioned and had never served with the unit. The calling up of these officers presented no great difficulty, as they were all working in well-known towns. In passing, it should be noticed that several of them had to say good-bye, for an indefinite period, to lucrative legal practices. This they did with the utmost cheerfulness.

Quite a different problem was presented by the calling up of the remainder of the battalion. These were entirely belonging

to the agricultural classes, like their prototypes of the regular army. They live for the most part in out-of-the-way villages, where the advent of the postman is something of an event. Furthermore, being in a famine area, many had migrated with the starving cattle to considerable distances from their homes.

Towards the completion of each year's training, calling up notices, including a railway pass are prepared for all men who will still be on the strength the following year. These notices are then available either for the next training or for embodiment. Dates are left blank, of course, and the notices are not signed until required.

As regards mobilization equipment. The only stores of this nature held on charge in the non-training period are the men's kits, in sealed kit-bags, a small surplus of clothing, and personal equipment (water-bottles, haversacks and greatcoat-carriers) for the whole strength.

Rifles are returned to arsenal at the end of each training and kept on charge for the unit there. Both this arsenal, and that which would provide the war outfit, were about six hundred miles away.

A certain number of articles of training equipment were kept on charge, but, beyond noticing how these added to the bulk to be moved, they are of no particular concern here.

The most important items, required with the utmost urgency, were tents, cooking pots and water tanks. The greater part of the remainder might well have been issued after the arrival of the unit at its war station. This was, in fact, suggested, but the suggestion found no favour, as the war station was served by a different arsenal.

Rations presented no great difficulty, as the nearest supply depot was only fourteen miles distant. But the number of rations to be demanded was a complete gamble, since it was impossible to foretell, accurately, how many men would be present on each day.

The factor, however, which demanded considerable thought affected the dates on which the various components of the battalion were required to arrive. Had everything and everybody, from British Officers to cooking pots, been demanded "at once," the natural sequence of arrival might have presented still further problems. There might, for instance, have been troops without tents; rations without cooking pots; rifles with insufficient personnel to open, clean and guard them.

The thought occurred, as a last-minute brain wave, that the last thing desired for the next five days after "Zero" day was for any troops at all to arrive. There could not possibly be any tents for them to live in, or any means of cooking their food. Nor did the permanent staff wish to be harassed by their personal problems.

Consequently, instead of "at once" being given as the time to report, the date of "Zero + 5" was inserted in the calling-up notices. This gave a most valuable breathing space, and saved not only a few extra grey hairs on the "Admincom's" head, but also quite a considerable amount of Government money in pay and rations.

The table below will show the sequence in which personnel and the main articles of equipment were demanded:

Tentage (F. S. Scale).

Tentage (F. S. Scale). Cooking Pots. Water Tanks. One Blanket per man. Groundsheets.	"At once" by passenger train. Demand sent by wire: "indent follows."
British Officers. Quartermaster (S. G. O.). One S. G. O.	"At once."
Remaining S. G. Os. Jemadar Adjt. and Q. M. Jemadar. Rations.	"Z + 4."
Remaining personnel.	"Z + 5."
Rifles and S. A. A.	"Z + 7."

By dint of the greatest and most broad-minded co-operation from Ordnance, everything went exactly to plan. Tentage and cooking pots arrived on "Z + 3." Camp was pitched by civilian labour, which was also used for unloading and storing the rations on arrival. Rifles arrived on the exact day, by when there were plenty of men to cope with the opening and issue. Be it noted here, that rifles were not issued, for obvious reasons, to the forty odd recruits, until after the train journey to the war station was completed. These rifles were returned to their chests and entrained with the quarter-guard.

Now comes the turn to deal with the arrival of the various categories of personnel. A grave set-back was experienced here at the outset. One of the two very precious British Officers. (He was second-in-command-*cum* adjutant, and had done two trainings with the unit), had been employed as officiating "Q" at District during the summer. Despite the circular wire from

Army Headquarters, ordering all British Officers to report back to their battalions, and the most piteous appeals from the "Admincom," District—not unnaturally—won the day. Nothing was seen of this officer until, on arrival at the war station, he had the temerity to meet the battalion, still sporting the red armlet of desertion.

The other British officer, having been on a command "backward boys" course, was sent post haste by Command Headquarters, and arrived on "Zero" day. Needless to say, he was of the greatest value, and saved the sanity of the lonely "Admincom." He was made Adjutant in place of the truant, but combined those duties with Assistant to "Q," Mess President, and very nearly O.C. advance party! This was avoided by the posting, to all territorial battalions embodied, of a fourth British officer. A subaltern arrived on "Z+7" and was despatched as O.C. advance party on "Z+10."

All the Senior Grade Officers arrived to schedule. They were all imbued with the excellent spirit that this was the "real thing;" and it was this spirit which carried the unit through the next difficult and busy week.

The necessity of opening a mess, and reclosing it again after a very few days was obviated by the kindness of a local I. M. S. Officer, who nobly offered to house and feed the S.G.Os. until departure. Feeding on the rail journey was done from refreshment rooms, so there was no necessity to open up the mess until after arrival in the war station.

The rapidity with which the remainder of the battalion assembled was a surprise to everyone, including the "Admincom." Based on the harrowing tales of the local Civil authorities as to the length of time even mobilisation letters would take to penetrate the District, it was estimated that at least twenty days would be required to assemble the whole unit.

As the battalion was, by now, booked to move on what amounted to "Z+13," it looked as though a representative rear party would have to be left behind to bring on stragglers.

These fears proved groundless. On the actual day named ("Z+5") 485 ranks reported. By "Z+7," over 600 had arrived, and the battalion moved only 16 short on "Z+13." These vacancies could easily have been filled from recruits clamouring on the office doorstep, but it was deemed expedient to leave these places open for late arrivals. These, it was arranged, would be sent on by the recruiting authorities, so nobody was left as rear party.

As regards training, some difficulties were also encountered in this sphere.

Regular instructors are normally furnished for annual training by the active battalions of the group. These consist of two Jemadars and twelve N.C.Os. Unfortunately, the two Jemadars who had completed three trainings and knew the unit well, had finished their time. Two new ones arrived, who did their best but had had no time to learn the ins and outs of a territorial unit, nor the system of instruction.

The twelve N.C.Os. were not, at the outset, forthcoming, since mobilisation regulations allot eight N.C.O. instructors to an embodied provincial battalion, to be detailed from the Command in which the wartime station is situated. These instructors did not, therefore, report for duty until the unit had arrived in its new station, and were not available to assist before or during the move.

At the time of embodiment, the annual training season was not far off. In other words, all the territorial ranks were at their most rusty stage. This is normally competed with by two months of cadres and refresher courses for officers and N.C.Os. before the bulk of the battalion is called up. New recruits also are called up one month before the remainder of the battalion.

On embodiment, a very different state of affairs existed, as the whole unit assembled at the same time, together with the forty recruits already referred to.

It had always been accepted that all provincial battalions of the I.T.F., on embodiment for service, would receive from thirty to sixty days' intensive training before being called upon to carry out their wartime roles. The exigencies of the situation overruled the possibility of this being carried out.

In the very few days left before departure, every attempt possible was made, but the doctors stepped in with medical inspections and the inevitable inoculations and vaccinations and full working days eventually dwindled to three prior to the move.

The unit's rôle was to relieve a regular unit finding nearly two companies of duties, mostly on small detachments. One of these detachments of two platoons was to be shed from the train *en route* to the headquarters station, complete with tentage, rations, ammunition, etc. The others were to proceed by bus, likewise equipped, immediately on arrival at the destination.

This, coupled with a break of gauge *en route* would, it is considered, present quite a nice "Q" problem for a regular unit. In the case of this battalion, none of the officers, save the C.O. and Adjutant, had ever seen a troop train before. Many of the men had never seen a train of any kind.

Nevertheless, any misgivings which may have existed deep down in the breasts of the regular officers proved unfounded, since the entire operation went through without a hitch. This was, of course, due to the way in which all the territorial ranks gave of their best and strove, throughout, to maintain a standard well worthy of a regular unit.

In conclusion, may it be stressed, that this unit moved, complete in every respect, within fourteen days of the official intimation of its embodiment.

SOVIET EXPANSION

By Capt. G. H. Nash, 2nd Bn., 16th Punjab Regiment

1.—*INTRODUCTION.*

During the last decade the Soviet Government has made frequent and sometimes violent changes both in its domestic and foreign policy: large scale planning has been encouraged and later people have been shot for indulging in "Gigantism;" Criticism has been encouraged—and the critics have been liquidated as enemies of the people; the Comintern has been alternately a champion of democracy and the vanguard of a proletarian revolution; and finally, the Soviet Government has concluded a treaty with the authors of the Anti-Comintern Pact. These changes have been many, but one factor has remained constant: the Soviet Union has never lost an opportunity to expand territorially or to extend her influence beyond her frontiers. She has suffered reverses, notably in the Far East at a period when she was so feverishly engaged in her Plans that she could not have embarked on a war without industrial, political and social chaos, but in the long run increased strength internally has, with some exceptions brought with it increased influence in the Asiatic countries bordering on the U. S. S. R. and finally in Europe she now dominates the Baltic and has occupied a considerable area of Poland.

The XVIII All Union Congress of the Communist Party was held at Moscow this year (1939). Statements made at the congress and during the months which followed brought out certain interesting points indicating—to use a Soviet slogan—"Activisation of Foreign Policy." The Comintern, though hopeless as a world force, is not entirely useless as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, and at the XVIIIth Congress its supporters abroad were instructed to establish themselves, not as separate bodies, but in existing organizations in the countries in which they were working. Their first object, it seems, was to create pro-Soviet feeling abroad. The plan was not a new one, it had been used with some success in France and Spain. The Military budget was increased, and the Red army which in 1937 was ". . . for the defence of the Socialist state of workers and peasants," and was ". . . to secure in all conditions the inviolability of the frontiers and the independence of the Union of Soviet Republics," became once more the Army

of the World Proletariat, and now (October 1939) one hears nightly on the wireless how it liberated the oppressed workers and peasants of Eastern Poland.

2.—*EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA.*

In no area has the constant factor of Soviet expansion been so marked as in Outer Mongolia. This region was a sphere of Russian influence in Tsarist days and the Red army originally entered it during the Revolution in pursuit of counter-revolutionary forces. The people of Outer Mongolia had struggled against Chinese imperialism before and during the Great War and their fight for independence had hardly ended when they were subjected to a reign of terror by the White Russian forces. Mongolia had thrown off its allegiance to China in 1915 and the Soviet Government appearing in the role of a supporter for this struggling and harassed Republic had no great difficulty in embarking upon a policy which was firmly to establish it in the country.

In 1924 the Soviet authorities in Outer Mongolia, maintained a garrison at Urga. This garrison was shortly afterwards withdrawn,—not before a Mongolian army had been armed and trained by the Soviet forces. But a sympathetic Mongolian army was only a first step; Soviet "advisers" were soon to be found in every walk of life. The life of the Republic was organized on strictly Soviet lines, the princes were disinherited, the Lamas' lands were nationalized, private trading was prohibited, and transport became a state concern. Bolshevisation proceeded at such a pace that in 1932 there was a revolution and a hurried return to less original methods. But the Soviets remain; they have had the wisdom to abandon their attempt to bolshevise the country immediately. Motor roads and railways have been built and wireless stations established and Outer Mongolia has virtually become Soviet territory.

In Sinkiang Province the process of infiltration has been carried out with equal energy and success. By 1931 Soviet influence had already become very considerable and the power of Soviet "trade" agents was such that they could and did, instigate the arrest and imprisonment of people in the province hostile to the Soviet Union—particularly White Russian refugees.

In October 1931 the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs concluded a Commercial treaty with the Provincial Government. The terms were most favourable—that is for the U.S.S.R.

They gave to the Soviet Government the right to open trade agencies and offices in all the important towns and the right of unrestricted movement of Soviet citizens for purposes of trade over what virtually amounted to the whole of Sinkiang. The Soviet Government was permitted to establish wireless stations and telegraphic communication between Sinkiang and the U.S.S.R. and the road from the U.S.S.R. to China via the Turgart Pass was opened for transport. In return the Sinkiang Government was given the very doubtful advantage of sending certain goods across Siberia to Eastern China. The Soviets next took sides in the civil war which raged up and down the province from 1932 to 1934; they supported a Manchurian General, Sheng Shih-Tsai, and finally, inducing the commander of the opposing force to visit Soviet territory, they kept him there as a hostage.

Sheng Shih-Tsai was gradually surrounded by Soviet advisers and now it cannot be too much to say that the province is militarily and economically part of the U.S.S.R.

What advantages has the Soviet Union gained through the absorption of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang? From Outer Mongolia comes a valuable supply of wool, hides, fur and cattle, also it is a potential source of mineral wealth. Strategically it protects—roughly as far East as Srietensk—the flank and communications of a Soviet force operating in Siberia. It also forms a buffer state against any thrust made by the Japanese through Inner Mongolia.

The advantages gained by the occupation of Sinkiang are chiefly economic and Sinkiang has become a dumping ground for Soviet goods.

Japan is already engaged upon a most difficult task in China; her friendship with Germany has proved worthless; she and the Soviet Union have patched up at least a truce between them, and the Bolsheviks are strongly installed in Outer Mongolia. It is fair to assume then that at least for the time being the Soviet Government need anticipate no great difficulties in East Asia.

3.—*THE BALTIC.*

> *"An alliance which is not for the purpose of waging war has no meaning and no value."* Hitler's "Mein Kampf."

The Non-Aggression Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany was ratified on the 31st August, 1939, and it was only a

matter of weeks before the full implications of the Pact became apparent—Germany had agreed to the partition of Poland and had surrendered her dominant position in the Baltic. Not without some truth had Hitler written in "Mein Kampf," "From the purely military point of view a Russo-German Coalition would be catastrophic for us." In giving the Soviets *carte blanche* on the Eastern Baltic Coast and in evacuating the Baltic Germans, Hitler has severed a connection with these lands which is more than eight hundred years old. The German city of Riga was built in the year 1200, and by the end of the 14th century the Teutonic knights and the Hansa merchants had extended their influence as far North as the Gulf of Finland.

Early in the 18th century, Peter the Great made his window onto Europe by occuping the Baltic lands; but the German land owning aristocracy continued under the Tsars to occupy a privileged position and the important Hanseatic towns of Tallinn (Reval) and Riga remained largely in German hands for hundreds of years.

It was not until the Russian Revolution that the Baltic Germans were seriously threatened, and they then appealed to the Kaiser for a union with East Prussia. This appeal met with immediate response and at the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which followed, a temporary German "police occupation" of Estonia and Livonia was provided for. "Germany and Austria-Hungary," it was stated, "intended to decide the future fate of these territories. . . ." At the end of the Great War, when the independent Baltic States were formed, the Baltic Germans owned no less than half the total area of Estonia; they were also the most important land owners in Latvia. Their lands were confiscated.

Before the Nazis came into power German relations with the Baltic States had gradually improved and by 1925 various treaties and trade agreements had been concluded between the Reich Government and these countries.

In 1923 Germany bought one fifth of the Baltic States' total exports; by 1927 she was buying well over one third. She was also Finland's principal buyer. The Nazi Government repeatedly avowed the necessity of expanding eastwards and during the period 1934-36, subversive movements organized by the Nazi Party in the Baltic States created a series of disturbances culminating in an attempt to overthrow the Estonian Government.

During the same period (1934-36), German relations with Finland were good, but later, as German aggressiveness grew, her popularity decreased, and finally, Finland joined the Oslo group of powers.

What has Germany given to the U.S.S.R. by the surrender of this sphere of influence—and potential conquest? Before the Russian Revolution the Western frontier of Russia stretched from Memel to the Black sea. After the Great War it continued as far North as Murmansk, and the armies of a major power landing in Finland and Estonia could advance eastwards, seize the Leningrad Industrial District, and turn the right flank of the Soviet frontier defences. With the Gulf of Finland held, the Port of Leningrad could be closed and the Soviet Baltic fleet bottled up at Kronstadt. Any such move could now be met at the outset by the Soviet land, sea, and air forces concentrated round the western end of the gulf of Finland.

The ice free ports of Riga and Tallinn have always been of the greatest importance to Russia, and the role of the Baltic States as transit countries has invariably formed a vital part of any agreement made between them and the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union is now in a position herself to safeguard this interest.

Finally the threat to the Ukraine has been minimised by the occupation of Eastern Poland, and with Germany at war on the Western front the Soviet Union can regard her Western frontier as secure for some time to come.

It has been said that Russia's foreign policy has remained unchanged for two hundred years and that it has been dictated by the geography of its frontiers—by the lack of ice free ports and natural barriers. The Russian policy of expansion, unification and consolidation which was so evident during the nineteenth century, certainly continues with unabated vigour under the Bolsheviks. How does this policy effect the Near East?

During the nineteenth century Russia attempted three times to become mistress of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and each time she was frustrated. In October, 1939, history repeated itself. The Turkish Foreign Minister returned from Moscow without signing an agreement with the Soviet Government and the Turkish Prime Minister stated that it was impossible to reconcile Soviet proposals with obligations incurred between Turkey, Britain and France. "On the question of the

Dardanelles," said the Prime Minister, "Turkey considered that it was essential that she should not bind herself to stipulations other than those provided under her international engagements of general order."

Relations between the Rumanian and Soviet Governments have been strained over a number of years, and their common frontier remained completely closed until 1936. Trade with the U.S.S.R. began only recently. The immediate bone of contention in this case is Bessarabia and, uncertain as to Soviet ambitions on this frontier, Rumania has recently (October 1939) strengthened her garrisons in that province. Bessarabia, which has changed hands more than once, was last acquired by Russia in 1878 and held by her till the Revolution. Should this strip of territory become Russian once again the industrial district between Odessa and Kharkov will be some sixty miles further away from the frontier and the important port of Odessa will no longer be almost on the frontier. Before the Great War the trade and railway connections of Bessarabia were with Russia, and Rumania has done little since to reorient the rail and road system. Finally the annexation of the province by the Bolsheviks would give to the U.S.S.R. a new natural barrier—the River Pruth.

Rumania feels herself threatened and has met the situation by an agreement with Hungary, which has enabled her to leave her Western frontier lightly guarded and to send more troops to Bessarabia.

4.—*CONCLUSIONS.*

Outer Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan have been absorbed and Russo-Japanese differences referred to a boundary commission. The Baltic has been dominated and Eastern Poland occupied. Turkey has been unsuccessfully wooed and the security of Rumania's Bessarabian Province remains a matter of doubt.

What fresh fields are there to conquer? Through nearly two thirds of its length the Soviet-Afghan frontier coincides with a natural obstacle—the Oxus River. The remaining section of the frontier is covered by a desert with a Soviet railway line running through it from Merv to Kushk Post. There is little to gain by occupying Northern Afghanistan. A stronger natural barrier would of course be the almost continuous range of mountains including the Hindu Kush in the East and the Paropamisus Range, North of Herat, in the West, but Soviet

Turkestan is not threatened by British India and there is therefore no good reason for occupying this line.

If, however, we are to believe that the Soviet policy of expansion is but the continuation of Tsarist policy, then we must accept the possibility of attempts to penetrate into Northern Iran. The U.S.S.R. is one of the natural outlets for the produce of that region and economic relations of some importance to Iran have consequently been established.

The first treaty between the two countries was signed in 1921. All treaties between Russia and other powers concerning Iran were then denounced. By 1936 three more treaties had been signed and now (October, 1939) it is reported that still another is being negotiated. The Soviet may be tempted to imagine that it can convert the present measure of economic dependence into something more complete.

The requirements of an expansionist policy are: security on frontiers and at home; fighting forces which are highly trained, well equipped and numerically equal to the task, industrial preparedness, and lines of communication which permit the deployment and maintenance of Military forces of the right strength at the right time and in the right place. How far do present conditions in the U.S.S.R. fulfil these requirements? The answer to this question must be largely a matter of conjecture. Certainly in the Far East the U.S.S.R. is more secure to-day than she has been at any time during the last decade, whilst in the west Germany has made terms with her and she now dominates the Baltic and occupies Eastern Poland. The Military High Command suffered considerably from the purge of 1937-38, but whilst it weakened military efficiency, there can be no doubt that it strengthened the existing regime and all that it stands for. As a result of the purge the Army may still be in no position to undertake a major war, but there is no reason to suppose that it could not absorb new territory in Asia in much the same way as it has recently done in the Baltic.

In 1938, military expenditure was increased by seven thousand million roubles. In 1939 further increases have been announced and judging by recent figures published in the press the peace time strength of the army alone must provide the Soviet Union with about one hundred and twenty divisions, whilst in 1937 her trained reserves were estimated as not less than six million men.

Industrially the five-year plans were largely military in conception, but lines of communication are the weakest factor in the wide range of war requirements. The most energetic steps have, however, been taken in order to deal with this problem, and judging by articles which have appeared in the Soviet Press, railway workers must now be under what virtually amounts to military discipline. The third five-year plan provides for the construction of 11,000 kilometres of new railway lines and it is claimed that the average number of trucks loaded daily has increased from 68,000 in 1935 to 102,000 in 1939.

Finally, doubtful elements are liquidated and in the Soviet Union to-day lives a grown-up generation which has known no other regime. Soviet citizens have no means of comparing their lot with that of people in foreign countries and comparisons with internal conditions of a few years ago must, on the whole produce a favourable impression. Added to this is the watchfulness of the secret police and the ceaseless propaganda through press, radio and political institutions.

From the above conclusions it is fair to assume that the U.S.S.R. is more favourably placed for a policy of expansion to-day, than at any other time during the last decade, and recent events tend to show that the Soviet Government has already embarked upon the "Activisation" of this policy.

THE BATTLE OF MAIDA

By Lieutenant Colonel C. C. R. Murphy

One of the most interesting battles in English history was that fought near the toe of the Italian peninsula on the 4th of July, 1806, and known to us as Maida, to the French as Sainte Euphémie, and to the Italians as Santa Eufemia. Maida Hill and Maida Vale in London were so named in commemoration of this popular victory.

It will be recalled that after the battle of Austerlitz, when their fever of aggression was at its height, the French had appropriated the Kingdom of Naples. Sicily, however, was not conquered, and in that island was a British force under Major-General Sir John Stuart, which at the end of May, 1806, amounted to about 8,000 men. During the summer, the people of Calabria rose in insurrection against the French invaders, and Stuart decided to send a force to the assistance of our allies, the dispossessed Bourbons. With admirable secrecy, he made a sudden descent on Calabria. He was the mainspring of the enterprise, and very few were allowed even a share of his confidence. In England, scarcely a soul knew anything about it.

The expeditionary force, consisting of about 5,500 British troops, with two companies of Corsicans and one of Sicilians, set sail from Messina towards the close of June, and was convoyed by Sir Sidney Smith with two ships and two small frigates into the Bay of Santa Eufemia. Actually, however, there was no French naval force in that part of the Mediterranean at the time.

Sir John Stuart's force was made up as follows:

Advanced Corps under Lieut.-Colonel Kempt, 81st Foot: the light companies of the 20th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st and of de Watteville's Regiment; flankers of the 35th; two companies of Corsican Rangers, one company of Sicilians and two 4-pounder guns.

First Brigade under General Cole: 27th (8 companies); the Grenadier companies of the 20th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 81st and of de Watteville's Regiment; and three 4-pounder guns.

Second Brigade under General Acland: 78th (10 companies); 81st (8 companies); and three 4-pounder guns.

Third Brigade under General Oswald: 58th and de Watteville's Regiment (each 8 companies), and 8 companies

of the 20th, who were detached to threaten a landing at Scilla, but were to rejoin later.

The French Division, under General Reynier, was composed of the 1st and 23rd Regiments of Light Infantry, the 42nd Regiment of the Line, two battalions of the 1st Swiss Regiment, two weak battalions of Poles, the 6th Chasseurs (cavalry), and a battery of horse artillery, the whole totalling about 6,440 men. These troops were scattered about in the Reggio promontory, mostly in cantonments at considerable distances.

According to the French official account, the Anglo-Neapolitan army consisted of 6,000 British and 3,000 Neapolitan troops, who were joined by 4,000 insurgents. That authority, however, exaggerates the forces at the disposal of General Stuart whilst under-estimating its own. Actually, General Reynier's force was slightly the stronger of the two.

The expeditionary force anchored in the Bay of Santa Eufemia on the evening of June 30th. At dawn, Kempt's light battalion, with the Corsicans and Sicilians, landed unopposed about a mile from the village of Santa Eufemia, and quickly occupied the woods fringing the beach, together with an old tower standing near the foreshore. As these men were being pushed out cautiously through the trees and scrub, there came a rattle of musketry. Immediately, the Corsican and Sicilian skirmishers fell back, having been driven in upon their supports by three companies of Poles from the French post at Monteleone. Oswald, who was in command of the landing party, steadied his men, charged the Poles, and occupied Santa Eufemia. By nightfall, the whole force was ashore and holding a defensive position from that village to the sea.

Next day, the Grenadier Battalion pushed on and seized Nicastro, five miles inland. Colonel Bunbury, the Q.M.G., says that during July 2nd and 3rd, the British "were joined by about 200 straggling Calabrese, provided for the most part with fire-arms; but they were ruffians of the lowest description."

Having received news of Stuart's departure from Messina, Reynier collected a force at Monteleone and hastened to Maida where he arrived on the evening of the 2nd, bivouacking on the heights near the town. The next morning, the British and French generals set out from their respective camps to reconnoitre each other's positions from the woods separating them, where it is said they very nearly met!

At dawn on July 4th, the British moved out from their position in two columns marching parallel to the shore. After

crossing the Ippolito they turned inland and then, having formed line, advanced to the attack in echelon of brigades from the right over the boggy ground between that stream and the Amato.

The French Division passed the night of July 3-4 in their camp by the woods at the foot of the Maida heights. In the early morning of the 4th, they debouched on to the level ground, crossed the Amato, and 'came rushing down' the valley in three main columns echeloned from the left, with their cavalry and horse artillery out in front of them. But General Compère, who was commanding the advanced guard, soon got into difficulties, for his *voltigeurs* were almost immediately driven back in confusion.

The Amato was fordable everywhere, and so Kempt sent his Corsicans and Sicilians, together with the light company of the 20th, across the stream to scour the scrubby thickets on that side and to protect his right flank. Scarcely had they entered the wood when they were met by a brisk fire, followed by a headlong charge of some two hundred French. But the 20th stood firm, and matters were set right. In the meantime, the 1st Légère were being hotly engaged by Kempt's light companies, with whom Acland's Brigade had come up into line.

The whole fate of the battle turned upon Kempt's first clash with the enemy. In the opinion of Oman, this was the fairest fight between column and line that had been seen since the Napoleonic wars had begun. 'Steady, Light Infantry,' said Kempt: 'Wait for the word. Let them come close.' Then, with remarkable deliberation, they fired three volleys, at 150, 80 and 20 yards respectively. The 42nd Regiment of the Line were received in like fashion by the 78th and 81st under Acland. The French official account alludes to the *grands ravages* caused by these volleys, which it states, put between six and seven hundred men *hors de combat* in a few moments. Their casualties included General Compère, whose arm was shattered by a musket ball. Apparently, it was the remarkable steadiness of the British soldier, almost as much as his fire, that broke up the moral of the enemy at this phase.

The 42nd Regiment fell back stubbornly, but quickly reformed and took up a fresh position. Acland, pressing forward, came in contact with its supports, namely, two battalions of Poles and one of Swiss. In spite of all the efforts of Reynier, who himself rode up to rally them. the Poles broke and fled, the 81st capturing about 250 of them. In the meantime, the 78th had become engaged with the Swiss. The latter, being dressed in

red, had for the moment been mistaken for de Watteville's Regiment of the British force, and the enemy, taking advantage of this, poured in a volley which did our men much damage. The Highlanders rallied in a spirited manner and drove the Swiss back. The French cavalry now intervened and Acland, instead of pursuing the Swiss, prudently formed square, whereupon the chasseurs withdrew out of range.

The battle now spread to Cole's Brigade on the extreme left, and that commander, though he was supported by Oswald's Brigade, soon found himself fighting a more or less detached action. Ammunition was running short, and the situation was none too secure. At this important juncture, however, the 20th Foot, which had been detached to Scilla, returned and began disembarking at the very mouth of the Amato. Their intrepid commander, hearing the heavy fusillade, and without waiting for the disembarkation to be completed, dashed off across the marsh and, coming up on Cole's left in the nick of time opened fire on the enemy at a range of fifty yards. "The effect was decisive. Surprised and wholly disconcerted by the appearance of a fresh antagonist from an unexpected quarter, Reynier gave the order for instant retreat, his battalions going off across the open plain to the east, covered by two squadrons of cavalry and four horse-artillery guns."*

Reynier now detailed the 23rd Légère to act as rearguard and right well they did it, checking the British advance and covering with great stubbornness the retreat of the broken division up the valley of the Amato. The fine conduct of Colonel Abbé, who commanded them, gained for that officer the rank of brigadier-general.

The French casualties exceeded two thousand, whilst those of the British amounted to 327, all killed and wounded. It is a remarkable fact that only one British officer was killed.

General Stuart appears to have spent the day tittuping about the battlefield, eagerly watching the fight and thoroughly enjoying himself; but whilst showing a personal disregard of danger that was wholly admirable, he did little in the way of directing operations. The real hero of the hour was Kempt, the man who was destined to win great fame in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, and to become one of Picton's most trusted brigadiers.†

* The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, by Col. H. C. Wylly.

† There is a picture of this famous man in the Waterloo Chamber in Windsor Castle. Kempt took over command of the 5th Division at Waterloo when Picton was killed, and was afterwards Governor-General of Canada.

The news of the victory spread like wildfire through the countryside, and soon bands of armed peasantry began to arrive on the scene. The tocsin sounded in the neighbouring villages, and white flags were to be seen fluttering from the clock-towers. The insurrection quickly became general; workmen left their work and shepherds their flocks to deal out reprisals. If but for a short time only, the French had to let go their hold upon Calabria.

The victory of Maida was practically the only success achieved during the Grenville ministry. Moreover, it was quite unexpected, as hardly any one at home knew that a force had been landed in Italy. It came at a time too when there was much bitterness of feeling against the French, who were everywhere regarded as the disturbers of the world's peace; for it will be remembered that during the previous year Napoleon had made great preparations for the invasion of England, and that a medal—*frappée à Londres*, if you please, to commemorate his success—was actually ready for issue. In these circumstances, the news of the victory was the signal for great rejoicings in London, and people there still hang out their flags on Maida Day. Stuart describes the battle as 'a triumph over a boasting and insolent enemy;' and the ill-feeling against the French is further indicated by an inscription on a sword, presented to Lieut.-Colonel James Moore, 23rd Light Dragoons, for his services at Maida, and now in the museum of the Royal United Service Institution* in London, which records how on that occasion 'the pride of the presumptuous enemy was severely humbled.' The actual part played in the battle by the gallant Colonel is, however, not quite clear: he must have been seconded from his regiment at that time, as only the merest handful of British cavalry was present.

After the battle was over, some of the regiments were granted permission to bathe: but whilst they were thus disporting themselves, a cloud of dust suddenly appeared in the distance which caused the alarm to be sounded. The story runs that the Inniskillings and the Cavalier Companies, skedaddling out of the water and seizing their rifles, fell in *puris naturalibus* to await the threatened attack. The cloud, however, turned out to have been caused by the enemy retreating hurriedly along the dusty road to Catanzaro.

* There is also a sword there which belonged to General Reynier.


To NICASTRO
SANTA EUFEMIA
To NICASTRO
RIVER IPPOLITO
FRENCH
COLE
ACLAND
OSWALD
KEMPT
BRITISH
BAY of SANTA EUFEMIA
AMATO
RIVER
FRENCH CAMP
From MONTELEONE
THE BATTL
4TH JULY

PLAIN ENGLISH

Some Notes on Translation.

By Karshish

A state of War invariably produces a considerable increase in the amount of material in foreign languages which finds its way into military headquarters and which has to be translated into English. The following brief notes, based on considerable experience, may be of some value not only to translators but also to those whose duty it is to deal with documents translated from foreign languages.

Translation means the rendering of the precise meaning expressed in one language in terms of another. This somewhat obvious definition may be amplified by saying that the language into which the matter is translated, for the purpose of this article, English, must be intelligible and "good." By "good" is meant that it should be ordinary, idiomatic English and not mutilated by extraordinary distortions of syntax and grammar which, while not entirely obscuring the meaning, make the reading of the matter tedious and irksome.

The procedure followed by the translator should be firstly, to make sure he has thoroughly understood the exact meaning of the matter to be translated, secondly, to render it literally into English either on paper or in his mind and thirdly, to turn his literal rendering into idiomatic English while retaining the meaning of the original.

The foregoing would be trite and unnecessary were it not for the melancholy fact that a large proportion of translated material falls into two extremely undesirable categories, the first being that of meaningless nonsense and the second that of a cloud of turgid and distorted language through which the meaning of the original can only be dimly discerned.

One of the few recollections which the writer preserves of an unsatisfactory and unfinished education is that of a preparatory school master who used to say, "Before you begin to write anything on paper, say to yourself, 'Come what may, I won't write bosh'." It would be a fine thing if this excellent maxim were written in letters of fire above the table of every translator. The fact seems to be that many a translator both in the examination

room and outside it seems to have either an inability to distinguish between sense and nonsense or a fine disregard for the importance of such a distinction.

Before proceeding to consider the technicalities of translation some further comment must be made on this question of sense and nonsense. When the English translation of matter written in a foreign language turns out to be nonsense, this may be due to one or more of the following reasons:

1. The original is nonsense.
2. The translator is at fault owing to:
   (*a*) His defective knowledge of the original language, of English or of the subject matter.
   (b) His inability to distinguish sense from nonsense.

When the translator is certain that his nonsense translation is due to 1, and not to 2, it is essential that he should indicate either by notes or the use of the word "sic" that he has faithfully rendered into English matter which, from no fault of his, is nonsense. Unless this is done the person for whose benefit the translation is made is at a grave disadvantage for he does not know where the nonsense has its origin. For example, a translation of an intelligence report might contain the statement: "Every soldier in the Red Army carries a portable field gun." Unless the translator comments upon this in some way, the person reading the translation does not know whether he is dealing with a stupid or worthless agent or a stupid or incompetent translator.

The example given above is of a more or less concrete statement. The danger is far greater when it is a question of more abstract matter. A translator possessing either or both of the defects noted above may still have sufficient familiarity with the conventional drone of English jargon to write down strings of words which are, so to speak, in the similitude of sense. For instance the translation of a political indictment might read "He was accused of failing to exercise the principles of actuarial representation by exposing unreliable factors." Now this is "bosh" and "bosh" of a most dangerous kind for it is calculated, either intentionally or otherwise, to drug the reader into thinking he is reading sense and the conventional drone of the language stops him from analysing it. Once a translator's work contains matter of this kind unaccompanied by any explanation, his translations either of abstract or concrete matter can no longer be trusted.

We may now pass on to the consideration of the second category of bad translation. This consists of matter which, while it contains a discoverable meaning, is written in bad or muddy English tending to obscure the sense. This sort of thing is due either to the translator being unfamiliar with English or to his failing to range in his own mind the basic ideas expressed in the original matter to be translated. The result often occupies a position mid-way between absolutely literal translation and idiomatic translation and bears a surprising resemblance to the English of the foreigner. A charming young Greek girl once submitted to the writer her translation of a Greek Army official communiqué. "A sonorous counter-attack" she had written, "has persecuted the enemy's section."—Katrina's meaning was clear but she knew very little English and had made too free a use of her dictionary. Another translation, this time from the hand of an Englishman, read, "The Government has ordered in all cases of firing on our police, the obligation of aimed fire being returned on the firers." The trouble here was that the translator had kept his eyes glued to the original only turning them away in order to consult his dictionary. Had he allowed the meaning of the sentence, once grasped, to formulate clearly in his mind he would probably have written quite simply, "Orders have been issued by the Government that all aimed fire directed against the police will be returned immediately."

It must be recognised that some languages are much more difficult to translate than others. Each language has peculiarities of which the translator must take particular note. With a view to trying to demonstrate the processes of rendering one language in terms of another, the writer has selected three pas sages from French, German and Urdu books and papers and has subjected them to literal and ultimately to idiomatic translation.

1. French.

La présente Instruction s'set donc efforcée de préciser, dans l'état actuel des armements:

—les conditions d'emploi des chars.

—les modalités de la defense contre les engins blindés adverses.

En ce qui concerne l'emploi des chars, on ne saurait trop mettre en lumière qu'aujourd 'hui l'arme antichar se dresse devant le char comme, pendant la dernière guerre, la mitrailleuse devant l'infanterie.

This is a straight forward piece of formal French taken from a military manual. It contains no difficult words with the possible exception of "modalité." Yet it gives a good example of one of the capital difficulties of French from the point of view of the translator—the frequent use of the reflexive verb. Below are given first, a more or less literal translation which shows the plain meaning of the passage and second, an idiomatic translation which expresses the meaning of the French in terms of English.

"The present manual has, then, tried to lay down, in the present state of armaments:

(a) The conditions of the employment of tanks.

(b) The special features (modalitiés) of defence against enemy A.F.V.'s.

So far as the employment of tanks is concerned one would not be able to bring forward too much (the fact) that to-day the anti-tank gun stands in the way of the tank just as, during the last war, the machine-gun (stood in the way) of the infantry."

"Se dresser" is awkward. Mansion's Dictionary gives no meaning for it which will fit here and the translator will have difficulty in finding an idiomatic rendering unless he turns the sentence and makes "tank" the subject instead of "anti-tank gun.' The meaning obviously is that the tank is "up against" the anti-tank gun in the same way as the infantry, etc. "Up against" will not, however, do in formal language. A possible translation of this passage would be:

"The present manual endeavours to lay down, having regard to the State of modern equipment:

(a) The conditions governing the use of tanks.

(b) The special features of defence against enemy A.F.V.'s.

As regards the employment of tanks, it is impossible to emphasize too strongly the fact that the tank is to-day opposed by the anti-tank gun in the same way as infantry was opposed by the machine-gun during the last war."

2. German.

"Daher ist es nicht sehr wahrscheinlich, dass die heutige Ministerberatung nur aus diêsem Grunde zusammenberufen wurde, vielmehr leuchtet ein, dass die britischen Unterhändler ihre Kabinetskollegen vor allem auch über die Schwierigkeiten, die in der Sicherheitsfrage eingetreten sind, und zugleich über

> etwa für deren Überwindung in frage kommende möglichkeiten unterrichten wollten."

On the whole German is an easier language to translate than French as it is far less idiomatic and the presentation of ideas is similar to that of English. For the translator, the capital difficulty of German is the long and involved sentences which are such a feature of the language. Properly arranged and punctuated the long sentence can be effective in English but, generally speaking, the translator is advised to split up long German sentences into two or more English ones. The extract selected is from the "Frankfurter Zeitung" and is a straightforward piece with no idiomatic difficulties. The literal translation is as follows:

> "It is therefore not very probable that to-day's Council of Ministers was only summoned on this ground, rather it is apparent that the British negotiators wanted to consult their Cabinet colleagues principally also about the difficulties which have arisen in the security question, and at the same time about the possibilities which come to some extent into question for overcoming them (the difficulties)."

It is no exaggeration to say that this sort of thing is often put up by translators as the finished article. The meaning is discernible but it is not English. A possible idiomatic translation would be:

> "It is unlikely, therefore, that to-day's Cabinet Meeting was on this account only. There are indications that the British representatives wished primarily to consult their colleagues concerning the difficulties which had arisen over the question of security and to discuss appropriate methods of overcoming them."

It will be observed that this translation is shorter than the literal translation or the German original. It often occurs that one language uses, in certain circumstances, redundancies which need not be translated in another. "In Frage kommende" cannot be translated literally. There is an English equivalent for the negative of this expression (das kommt nicht in Frage—that is out of the question) but not for the positive form. "Appropriate" accurately gives the meaning of the participial form. "British negotiators" is an awkward expression and "representatives" would appear in an English newspaper.

3. *Urdu.*

"Sar saiyid ko jo ṣariḥ fauqīyat aur imtiāz bā i'tibār jismānī aur dimāghī qābilīyat ke apne 'ām hamjinson men thā yih 'umdah shahādat is bāt ki hai kih jo paiwand yā izdiwāj do ajnabī khāndān men mutahaqqaq hota hai is se ghair ma'muli nata'ij hote haiṇ."

Oriental languages are, generally speaking, far more difficult to translate into English than European ones. There is a considerable difference in method of expression owing to difference in mentality and, in most cases, a technical difference in syntactical arrangement. The capital difficulty of Urdu syntax can be found in the use of the relative clause, a difficulty far too little indicated by writers of Urdu grammars. The passage chosen is from Hussain Hali's "Life of Sir Saiyad Ahmad" and adequately illustrates this difficulty. The literal translation runs:

> "What manifest physical and mental superiority and distinction Sir Saiyad Ahmad (possessed) among the general (run) of his fellow men, this (the superiority) is an important testimony of the fact that what union or marriage is contracted among two foreign families, from this (*i.e.*, the union or marriage) extraordinary results may arise."

It will be seen that, in spite of the apparently involved syntax of this sentence, it expresses an idea which is simple and easily grasped. There should therefore be no difficulty in expressing it in plain English thus:

> "The remarkable physical and mental superiority which Sir Saiyad Ahmad possessed over his fellows affords a good illustration of the fact that unusual results may emerge from a union or marriage contracted between persons of different stock."

To meet the requirements of idiomatic English the ideas here expressed in Urdu must be poured into a different mould Once the basic meaning is properly grasped there should be no difficulty about this. It will be observed that the figure of two abstract nouns in opposition to each other, here "fauqīat aur imtiāz" is usually conveniently translated into English by an adjective and a noun, here by "remarkable superiority." "Remarkable" also embraces the idea of "sarih"—manifest. "Mutahaqqaq" is literally "proved" or perhaps "established" but either of these words would be awkward in the English version.

One of the principal troubles of the English translator is that he is inclined to assume that foreigners are apt to express bizarre ideas which are incapable of being rendered into ordinary English. It is extremely rare to find expressed in a foreign language an idea which cannot be exactly expressed in English. Amplification or circumlocution may be necessary but if an idea is there it can be expressed in English. The position is not quite the same with isolated words. A language may have words for objects, persons or institutions which are unknown in England. It is usually safer to give the original word together with an explanation than to attempt a translation. Russian contains many of such words but there is a regrettable tendency to believe that all Russian institutions are extraordinary. In very many cases exact English equivalents exist. In other cases old words have been given new functions under the new régime. It is absurd to translate "militsya" as "militia;" it means "police." "Otryad" is no longer "a detachment" but "a force" or "troops" or, in the Russian Air Force, "a squadron." "Samolyot" once meant a "magic carpet" but it now means an "aeroplane." If some diehards were attended to it would be necessary to translate "otryad Samolyotov" as "a detachment of magic carpets" instead of "a squadron of aircraft." The B.B.C. recently announced what was evidently a translation of a French communiqué which contained the phrase "A German patrol involving strong effectives." The plain English for this is "a strong German patrol" so why in Heaven's name not say so?

By themselves words have no meaning: it is the context on which meaning depends. It is for this reason that the dictionary, widely believed to be the universal arbiter of meaning, is such a dangerous weapon in the hands of the inexperienced or inefficient translator. No dictionary ever contained or could contain the meaning of every word in every conceivable sense in which that word could be used. If a translator cannot make out the general sense of the matter he has to translate without constant reference to a dictionary it means that he does not know the language well enough He may legitimately require a dictionary to help him with unusual or technical words but he must not rely on the dictionary for the *meaning*. The writer does not wish to belittle the vast industry which lexicographers have put into their works and he himself is the proud possessor of two dictionaries which contain words meaning "a woman with a not unpleasing moustache" and "a place where two he-goats butt each other mutually."

The perspicacious reader will by this time have realised that what the writer advocates is this: If you have grasped a concrete idea either from a foreign language or some other source and wish to write it down in English, you should do so in plain but idiomatic language unembellished with turgid redundancies and without trying to capture what you think is the atmosphere of the original. To avoid misunderstanding it must be added that no reference here is made to poetic imagery. The writer is not suggesting that Keats instead of:

> "Full on this casement shone the wintry moon
> And threw warm gules on Madeline's fair breast"

should have written: "The winter moon shone right on this window and made red marks on Madeline's light-coloured chest."

We are living in an age when words count and count tremendously. They count even when they have no meaning. The demagogue, party leader or dictator will pour forth words to create a smoke-screen of hysteria behind which he will deploy his forces and advance towards his unromantically conceived objective. Stuart Chase has pointed out that when a Hitler shouts:

> "The Aryan Fatherland, which has nursed the souls of heroes, calls upon you for the supreme sacrifice in which you, in whom flows heroic blood, will not fail, and which will echo forever down the corridors of history. . ."

he may be, and in fact is, met with frantic applause. This is because words like "souls," "supreme sacrifice," "heroic" and "forever" are, to quote from Chase, "mere semantic blanks, which have no discoverable referent." If such a Hitler displayed his real intention in plain and ungarnished language and said, for instance,

> "Every adult in the geographical area called Germany will receive not more than two loaves of bread per week for the next six months"

his reception would be quite different. Here every word counts; every word means something.

We in England can consider ourselves fortunate that we have a Prime Minister who lays no claim to any oratorical gifts but who prefers to address the country, to use his own words, "in such plain language as he has at his command." Let the translator put this by the side of the maxim about writing "bosh" and if he has no plain language at his command let him quickly acquire some or else give up translating altogether.

O'REGAN PREPARES FOR WAR

By F.M.M.

[Being letters from 2nd Lieutenant Michael O'Regan, the newest-joined subaltern of the 1st Bolton Irish (Territorials) to his brother Pat.]

My Dear Pat,

Our soldiering is more advanced now and consists of lectures and exercises. I hate the lectures but the exercises are grand, and why they pay the Regulars I can't understand. Why, this is the best holiday I've ever had in my life!

Yesterday we were given a lecture on the attack by our Instructor, Captain Waverley, and he explained to us that Napoleon had conquered most of the world by always attacking.

Well, having learnt all about the attack, we went out to do a defence exercise. That may seem funny to you Pat, but instructors like to make us do things we know nothing about, so that they can tell us all the things we ought to have done.

Now you start off an exercise with an Opening Situation, which is meant to tell you what you are supposed to do, but seldom does, as it is all in army language. However, the enemy gets the same kind of thing just to make things equal and eventually one just asks one of the umpires all about it.

I didn't know this until I heard the Colonel saying to an umpire, "Well, Dick, I don't know what the . . . I am meant to do, but I propose to take up a position somewhere near the Blackdene Manor inn."

"For Heaven's sake don't do that," says Dick, "Sure the enemy is coming four miles to the west of that, and you've entirely misread the paper you've been given."

Now I know the east, because it's always on your right, but the Commanding Officer gets them muddled up, and he suggested several other places before Dick said to him, confidentially, "Go to the Cock's Toes."

So we marched there and we were told to dig ourselves in as quickly as possible.

I got my men down to work, and we'd made some fine holes, when up comes the owner of the field, and his language was something awful.

I tried to explain to him that I was digging by order and that if he didn't look out he'd be charged in the rear by a tank, but he just wouldn't listen.

Just then the C. O. came up and pacified him. "Mr. O'Regan," says he, "sure I only meant you to pretend to dig and you've gone and messed up the gentleman's field entirely. Fill up those pits at once and take your platoon into reserve."

So we threw the old earth back again and retired into some long grass, where I disposed my platoon (in imaginary trenches) and went off to eat my lunch.

I was smoking peacefully, with my back to a tree (and to the enemy) when I heard someone say: "Up with your hands. You're my prisoner." I turned round and saw Jimmy Peters, who was one of the enemy. I tried to explain to him that we had a whole battalion and that he seemed to be alone. But he replied that the board he was carrying meant he was a tank (and well chosen he was for it!) and that he himself represented a whole Tank Company.

Well, there we were arguing, when Private Murphy jumps right on top of us and yells: "Halt or I'll fire."

"Don't be silly," says Jim. "I'm a Tank Company."

"That's nothing," replied Murphy. "Sure, I'm the blinking Commander-in-Chief."

Well, you know, Pat, you can't have privates talking to officers like that, so I told Murphy to be off with himself and we'd compromise and let each other go.

We were still talking of old times in Dublin when there was hell let loose all round us. The C. O. was yelling: "Where's the reserve? Positions will be held to the last round and the last man. Steady, boys, and aim just behind the shoulder." The last remark referred to a tiger which he keeps telling us he shot, but you know as well as I do that he never left Dublin until he went to Bolton!

Well, I realised that we were being attacked, so I crept back and collected my platoon and then we crawled forward until we could see the enemy closing in on our men.

The C. O. was gesticulating wildly and shouting that fourteen machine-guns and the whole of the Bolton Irish had been firing on the enemy for half an hour and that they were all dead and that the whole show was absurd and a few other things.

By then there was a grand old muddle, our men and the enemy and dozens of umpires all mixed up together. And it was then that I remembered what old Nap had said, "To yours la attack" or something like that. So I let a piercing yell and thundered forward for the honour of the Bolton Irish and to rescue the C. O.

Private Murphy was shooting blanks all over the place and the other boys' bayonets were shining in the sun fit to frighten the devil himself. That finished it and the whole outfit ran like blazes with us chasing them like flaming demons.

Remembering what you had told me about taking three lines of trenches on the Somme in 1916, I led my gallant lads on until we reached a line of bushes and it was there the tragedy occurred, Pat.

Private Murphy is so impetuous. I saw him burrowing in a bush with his bayonet and shouting "Come out you silly old . . ., or be jabers, I'll give you the other three inches!"

A purple face rose, quickly, from behind the bush, with its mouth full of lunch, and, Patsy dear, I recognised the District Commander!

Between the muffled flow of bread and cheese, I heard him shouting for "this man's officer," and I knew he meant me.

But I went to ground like a rabbit, and when they did find me, I just told them I couldn't say a word, as I was dead.

And dead I nearly was by the time they'd finished with telling me all the things I'd done wrong. What with fixing bayonets and Private Murphy shooting off blanks at five yards range and digging up the poor man's field, I learnt a lot from that exercise.

Goodbye, Patsy. I'm glad the old sow's litter is doing well.

Your loving brother,

MIKE.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

It is hoped that the following few notes may be of interest to some of our readers.

War Measures.—Among other war measures taken in India are:

The mobilisation of the Royal Indian Navy whose escort vessels have come under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

The move to war stations of portions of the air forces in India.

The embodiment of fourteen battalions of the Indian Territorial Force and the constitution of five additional battalions.

The raising of nineteen garrison companies formed from *ex* soldiers to take over duties and free active units for training.

A number of new units have been raised.

Ordnance factories have been expanded.

Indian States Forces.—The loyalty of the Indian Princes to the Crown has again shewn itself, as it did in 1914, by their generous offers to place the entire resources of their States at the disposal of the King-Emperor. These comprise gifts of money towards the prosecution of the war, offers by Rulers of their personal services and troops including units of cavalry, artillery, sappers, infantry, and transport, also a field hospital, motor ambulances and labour corps. The War Office have already availed themselves of some of these offers. In India the situation is such that at present full advantage cannot be taken of all the offers of troops, although five Indian States Forces units have already moved into British India.

The Nepalese Contingent.—Nepal has generously offered a contingent of two brigades for service in and on the frontier of India. An advanced party has already arrived and the main body will follow in March.

Modernisation.—One of the results of the war has been to accelerate the programme of modernisation of the Army in India which had been drawn up before the outbreak of war. This

will affect a number of cavalry and artillery regiments and infantry battalions in the near future.

A wing of the Fighting Vehicles School has been formed at Kirkee.

Indian Cavalry Armoured Regiments.—The 13th D. C. O. Lancers and the Scinde Horse completed their conversion to fully trained armoured regiments in October and relieved the two remaining Companies of the Royal Tank Regiment on the frontier. The Royal Tank Regiment Companies were disbanded and the personnel sent Home with the exception of some who have remained to assist in the mechanisation of further units of the Army in India.

The Officers Training School.—Except for cadets now at the Indian Military Academy or about to enter it as the result of the October examination, no more permanent regular commissions will be granted in the Indian Army. Emergency commissions for the duration of the war and for so long thereafter as services are required will be given instead.

The Officers' Training School for young British officers has opened at Belgaum and fifty officers between the ages of twenty and thirty are now undergoing training. Subsequent pupils will enter the school as cadets and will be between the ages of twenty-one and thirty. The School will also cater for young officers of the Unattached List, Indian Army, and for junior officers of the Territorial Army on their first arrival in India.

Other Schools are being opened for officers of the Ordnance at Jubbulpore and for Engineers at the Headquarters of Sapper and Miner Corps.

The Senior Officers' School has closed down. The School of Education has moved to Pachmari.

Examinations.—Officers' promotion and retention examinations and the obligation to attend certain courses and to pass language tests have been put in abeyance until the end of the war.

The Staff College entrance examination is likewise not being held; but two short courses of about five months' duration will be given each year to selected officers to train them for lower grade staff duties.

Signals.—Considerable reorganisation of the Indian Signal Corps has taken place. Deccan District and Lucknow District Signals have been formed and other changes made.

Changes in Commands.—The term "Brigade Area" has been abolished and the equivalent command is now known as an "Area." The Poona Area has ceased to be independent and is included in the Deccan District. Jubbulpore Area has become "Independent."

Changes in Dress.—Except in cavalry and artillery units which remain horsed, or when actually mounted, all officers of the British Service in India now wear trousers or the equivalent on ceremonial parades, and on other occasions only wear breeches, boots, leggings, spurs and so forth until they are worn out.

The same rules apply to officers of the rank of colonel and above in the Indian Army. Other officers of the Indian Army retain their original order of dress when on parade with their own units; but if not on parade with their own units may either retain their original dress or conform with their senior officers or the British Service.

Recruitment of Anglo-Indians.—Recruitment in the Royal Army Medical Corps has been opened to Anglo-Indians and three hundred have so far been enlisted.

Pensions.—With effect from the 1st August, 1938, the British Army rates of pension, exclusive of Indian element, will apply to the following Indian Army officers: general officers, except in the Indian Medical Service, King's commissioned officers of cavalry, infantry or general service, Royal Indian Army Service Corps, and colonels promoted therefrom. The minimum service for pension is twenty years. "Non-combatant" officers remain under the old rules which were in force before the 1st August, 1938. Existing Indian elements are retained.

There are exceptions in the case of majors passed as fit for command who are crowded out and fail to get it. Officers of the Special Unemployed List remain under their special rules. Further details are given in Army Instruction (India) 186 of 1939.

AIR FORCE NOTES

Hitherto all pilots and mechanics for the Royal Air Force in India and all pilots for the Indian Air Force have been

trained at Air Ministry establishments in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

It has now been decided to commission, recruit, and train in India, British, Indian, and Anglo-Indian personnel for war services to fill existing vacancies in the Air Forces in India.

Training of pilots, air crews and mechanics is now being undertaken in Air Force units at two stations in India. Some mechanics have been entered into service units direct. The pilots selected for training will already have flown light aircraft in Indian flying clubs, and will only require training on service aircraft and in service subjects.

It is anticipated that, at a later date, training will be carried out by civil aviation. In this connection it is hoped to make use of the generous offer of assistance made by certain Rulers of Indian States.

REVIEWS

BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY

(The Royal Institute of International Affairs—1s.0d.)

"Long-term trends in foreign policy are, in the final analysis, the expression of a nation's vital interests." From this premise, Mr. G. E. Hubbard, Far Eastern Research Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, cites four British vital interests which he claims affect our foreign policy. In brief they are:

(*a*) Livelihood—the maintenance of the national standards of life.

(*b*) Security—safety from hostile action against British possessions and essential lines of communication and supply.

(*c*) Peace—preservation from the evils of war as such with its modern potentialities of unrestricted destruction.

(*d*) Political Liberty—the preservation of British liberties from the danger of submergence by antagonistic "ideologies."

In the safeguarding of these interests, the author considers that British Far Eastern policy has followed certain definite maxims.

The first of these is the doctrine of the "open door." This accords with British economic interests—for the present British standards of living are dependent on Great Britain's world-wide trade and her banking, financial and shipping interests. As a corollary to the maintenance of the "open door," British policy has aimed at preserving Chinese integrity. An independent China is the best guarantee against the danger of other Powers acquiring exclusive rights detrimental to British trade. To safeguard security, Great Britain has relied on forces for regional defence and the preservation of a balance of power to protect her position. This idea of maintaining a balance of power later evolved into the concept of collective security. As regards the general preservation of peace, Great Britain with many other nations, adopted, as a ruling principle, the support of the

League of Nations and favoured limitation of armaments and the renunciation of war, until the breakdown of the collective security system became apparent.

The threat to British political liberty is too recent a development for Far Eastern policy to have evolved a definite principle regarding it, but it has led to a linking up with nations of similar ideas and, in particular, closer collaboration with France and the United States.

The general objectives briefly described above, are traced in political action during the course of the last hundred years. The period is divided into five phases:

(*a*) From 1834, when the British Government superseded the ubiquitous East India Company in the conduct of relations with the Chinese authorities, to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.

(*b*) From the Sino-Japanese War to the first Great War of 1914-18.

(*c*) The period of the Great War.

(*d*) From 1919 to the "Manchurian Affair" of 1931.

(*e*) From 1931 to June, 1939.

Mr. Hubbard gives a masterly survey of British Far Eastern policy in this small volume. It is necessarily condensed, but it is presented extremely well and he succeeds in showing that British policy has been based on deeply founded and strongly persistent principles. The recent challenges to British policy and their environment overshadowed by force are described in some detail. Having finished the book, most readers will agree, we think, that the British policy adopted to meet the new situation has become much more comprehensible to them, and was generally in accordance with British vital interests.

A. J. M. W.

GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE, 1915-1939

(*The Royal Institute of International Affairs*—2*s.* 6*d.*)

Everyone is interested in international affairs to-day, and there can be few better guides through their maze than the concise and objective statements of facts which are issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The Palestine mandate imposes the following responsibilities, amongst others, upon the British Government: To safeguard Arab rights, to establish a National Home for the Jews and to develop self-government for the joint community. The Government have declared from time to time—rather optimistically—that these objects are not incompatible, but the efforts to attain them have necessitated eight commissions of enquiry to date and extensive military operations and the problem is yet not solved. There is so much to be said on both sides. The age-old longing of the Jews to return to the Promised Land and to possess at last a homeland of their own—a longing intensified by the violent anti-Semitism of the Nazis—must be considered together with the Arab desire for self-government, and a real fear of being overwhelmed by the increasing numbers, better organisation and economic power of the Jews.

That the problem is not only a national one is clearly brought out. The two communities are not merely local entities but form part of two groups with religious and racial affinities all over the world. It concerns 16 million Jews and over 200 million Moslems of which one half are within the British Empire. The Arab States and Egypt are also concerned, and British communications are affected. The League of Nations has been closely and often critically concerned with the working of its mandate; the United States have kept close touch with all developments, and in every other country where Christianity is taught, there is deep anxiety for the welfare of the Holy Land. The problems of Palestine, therefore, take on international dimensions.

The Arabs base their claims largely on the promise of the British Government made through Sir Henry McMahon in 1915 to (the then) Sharif Hussein of Mecca regarding the areas in which Arab independence would be recognised. The pledge can be interpreted in more than one way, but most readers will agree, we think, that the Arab interpretation is reasonable, inasmuch as Palestine was not specifically excluded. On the other hand, the Jewish claims to a National Home were publicly supported by the British Government before the war was over and appear to have been tacitly accepted by the Arab leaders. Incidentally, it is of interest to note that the Balfour

Declaration was not inspired by Imperialist motives. Dr. Weizmann has stated that the British Government agreed to the Declaration on one condition: that Palestine should not be the charge of Great Britain. Some readers will rate, more highly than before, the sense of the Government of that day.

There is little doubt that the present mandate could be implemented provided the Arabs and Jews had the gift of compromise, but there has been few signs of the development of this invaluable political lubricant. The authors quote from "The Seven Pillars of Wisdom"—"The Semites had no half-tones in their register of vision. They know only truth and untruth, belief and unbelief, without our hesitating retinue of finer shades." It is the recognition of finer shades which helps many illogically organised British institutions to function smoothly and, for the most part, efficiently. Lawrence was writing of the Arabs, but the description also applies to the majority of the Jews in Palestine, and it is the absence of compromise which makes the Palestine problem—and other minority problems nearer India—so difficult to solve.

"Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1939," traces the history of Palestine from the promises to the Arabs and Jews in 1915 and 1917 respectively down to the publication of the British Government's proposals in May, 1939. The problems connected with economic development, land settlement and Jewish immigration are clearly set out and the reports of the various Royal Commissions and the reactions to them are examined in detail and presented in succinct and readable form.

It is encouraging to note that since its publication the outlook has become brighter. After the declaration of war, there has been a return to more normal conditions and both Jews and Arabs have offered enthusiastic support to the British cause. It is to be hoped that the authorities responsible for the administration of Palestine and the two main communities will use the opportunity for a better understanding, leading to political and economic progress. The alternative is a bitter struggle which will postpone self-government indefinitely and prove a source of weakness to the British Commonwealth.

A. J. M. W.