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EDITORIAL

Great Britain and France have continued their efforts to secure peace in Europe. Great Britain has, with this object, broken with tradition both in foreign and internal policy. President Roosevelt has also taken the initiative in the hope of securing a period of peace. It is impossible to say with certainty what effect these important steps have had or whether the fact that physical war has not yet broken out in Europe can be attributed to action taken by the democracies or to a pause for preparation on the part of the totalitarian states. Herr Hitler's immediate answer to President Roosevelt was given in a speech whose irrelevant points included the repudiation of the Anglo-German naval treaty and of Germany's pact with Poland.

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Guarantees

It does appear, however, that the guarantees to European states which we have now clearly expressed, together with the steps taken to improve our capacity for implementing them, have had an effect in raising the morale of threatened nations. Our pledge to France in February was no departure from tradition except in so far as it made plain that in these times the fulfilment of obligations can no longer follow rather than precede the national inclination. The pledge was followed by a toning down of Italian references to demands on France; but also by Germany's annexation of the Czech provinces

and of Memel, and the opening of a campaign against Poland in the German press which bore sinister resemblance to the preliminaries of previous acts of aggression. Poland, however, showed no signs of capitulating to threats or of the intention not to resist superior force. Remarkable unity was evidenced in a country of minorities, and the "miracle of German statesmanship" which has driven Great Britain and France into unity appears to have been repeated in Poland. On the 31st March, the Prime Minister, in a statement in the House of Commons, said that the government had offered Poland all the support in their power should Poland's independence be threatened. France stood in the same position. During Colonel Beck's visit to London, the terms of a reciprocal agreement to render each other all assistance in their power in the event of a threat, direct or indirect, to the independence of either country were accepted on behalf of Great Britain and Poland. The debate in the House of Commons revealed general support of the principle of this momentous departure from tradition, and only such criticism was voiced on points of detail as it is the duty of an opposition to provide. There was then, and since, general repudiation of articles which appeared in *The Times*, drawing attention to the fact that assistance would be given if independence, as opposed to integrity, were threatened and attempting to assess the value of Danzig against a general war. Abroad, and to a certain extent at Home, *The Times* is obstinately regarded as a government mouthpiece and phrases quoted without their context seemed to have unfortunate intentions.

Whether Germany was in fact contemplating an immediate attack on Poland is a matter for speculation. The press campaign has continued and—in the customary sequence—acts of hooliganism have followed. The Poles have no love for Germany and their government is no longer inclined to suppress their feelings. It is to be hoped that no gun will go off unnecessarily. Even with the certainty that Germany would be faced with war on two fronts if she attacks, the Poles should not feel too confident.

The Polish army comprises some thirty infantry divisions and fifteen cavalry brigades on which expansion is doubtless planned. The air force is not comparable with Germany's. There are adequate industrial resources in the interior of the country which are being intensively developed and Poland's industry has been

strengthened by the acquisition of the Teschen area which would, however, be in a vulnerable position in a war with Germany. Like other nations, Poland has been modernising and re-equipping her forces as fast as financial considerations permit. She is not a rich country and one way in which Great Britain might assist her directly is financially. Communications on the eastern frontier are comparatively undeveloped. Assistance by land forces from Russia would be difficult even if willingly given or received and from this direction reinforcement would come most easily by air. There is an alliance, recently strengthened, with Rumania.

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South-East Europe

As suggested in our last number, it was Italy's turn. On Good Friday the Albanians were rescued from the tyranny of the Albanian government. This action may have contributed to the maintenance of Signor Mussolini's prestige at home, and served as a rejoinder to the democracies whose guarantee to Poland might seem to have given them the initiative. But in other respects it appears to have had small effect on Italy's control of Albania's raw materials or strategic position. The threat to the peace of south-eastern Europe was followed by guarantees by Great Britain and France to give all the support in their power to Greece and Rumania should either state resist with its national forces a clear threat to its independence. The policy was extended by the conclusion, announced on the 12th May, of an agreement with Turkey which provides for either country to lend the other all the aid in its power in the event of an act of aggression leading to general war in the Mediterranean. This is to be developed into a long-term reciprocal agreement and consultations are to take place with the object of establishing security in the Balkans.

The agreement is of importance both strategically and politically. The Turkish position in the eastern Mediterranean is of great strength. One of the entrances to the sea, through which communication with the wheat and oil of Russia and Rumania passes, is under her control (the Montreux Convention which permitted Turkey to re-fortify the Dardanelles is in no way affected by the new agreement). Her coast-line and islands are rich in harbours, which are of added value owing to the scarcity of good sites for naval bases on the southern and eastern shores of the

Mediterranean. And her mainland is within comfortable flying range of the Italian islands.

Politically Turkey is a stabilising factor in Balkan and Middle Eastern spheres. She is united with Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia in the Balkan entente and with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan in the pact of Saadabad. Her strong friendship with Russia dates from 1921. The question of the Sanjak of Alexandretta is the only outstanding point of dissatisfaction in her foreign policy, and this seems likely to be settled with the conclusion of a reciprocal agreement with France by the time these lines appear in print. Turkey is believed to have been largely responsible for the agreement at Salonika last year which, as described in our issue of October last, removed one of Bulgaria's grievances in releasing her from the military clauses of the Treaty of Neuilly. It is hoped that in the consultations for which the Anglo-Turkish agreement provides means may be found to relieve the remainder of Bulgaria's grievances, since grievances anywhere in Europe are dangerously liable to exploitation. Bulgaria wants the Southern Dobrudja, which passed to Rumania after the Great War, and an outlet to the Aegean. She wants to ensure reasonable treatment for her inevitable minorities. Though her correct behaviour has so far gained her little, she has shown no inclination to seek her aims by force; and though she has remained unwilling to join the Balkan entente, she regards friendship with Turkey and Yugoslavia as an essential policy. One would be rash to predict peace anywhere in Europe, but the Balkans do not, at present, seem to be danger-spot number one, even excluding Danzig.

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Yugoslavia

The integrity of the Balkan entente is threatened by the position in which Yugoslavia now finds herself, more certainly the victim of encirclement than the Axis powers who so over-work that word. Ever since the state came into existence, Yugoslavia has suffered from the minority troubles which seem inevitable in that area. The main problem is between the Serbs and the Croats. After the fall of M. Stoyadinovitch, agreement between these two peoples seemed nearer and it was believed that a solution had been reached between Dr. Machek, the Croat leader, and M. Tsvetkovitch, the Prime Minister, on the 27th April, though no announcement has so far

been made. The existence of the Slovenes and of the Bosnians, who demand a measure of autonomy but whom the Croats wish to include in their boundaries together with much else to which they are doubtfully entitled, make a settlement particularly difficult. There are also powerful, if less numerous, German colonies along the Danube and in the south, Macedonians susceptible to Italian propaganda since the annexation of Albania.

In these circumstances, Yugoslavia, in direct contact with the Axis powers and with hitherto not conspicuously friendly Hungaria and Bulgaria on her flank and rear, is anxious above all to keep quiet and avoid giving offence. She has a coast-line which might prove attractive to Italy and iron ore which Germany would doubtless like to secure more certainly than by concessions. A tongue of her territory is crossed by important railways serving Fiume and Trieste. The Regent, Prince Paul, has followed the fashion of going on tour and has been received by the rulers of the Axis powers; not we hope as other statesmen of countries now absorbed were received before him. It is probable that Yugoslavia will not willingly join the Axis or the Anti-Comintern Pact and that she wishes to retain her alliance with Rumania and membership of the Balkan pact. But no guarantee could help her much and she is in a difficult situation. She is understood not to have welcomed the Anglo-Turkish pact.

In Hungary a non-aggression pact with Yugoslavia has been mooted. Hungary has ambitions in the Danube basin and would be glad of a means of strengthening her position against Germany. But before such a pact were concluded, the question of Hungarian territory transferred to Yugoslavia after the war would have to be settled, and another obstacle is the Yugoslav-Rumanian alliance, which Hungary would like to break, for her ambitions are directed chiefly against the latter country.

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Russia

The system of guarantees and agreements entered into by Great Britain appears to have a logical extension in the conclusion of a pact with Russia, and this step has been hotly debated for the last two-and-a-half months. As usual where that country is concerned, arguments tend to be influenced by sentiments which have nothing to do with the case. The internal organisation of Russia is enough to convince those who wish it that the country is our natural ally and one endowed

with phenomenal powers, and that any delay in concluding an agreement with her is due to the determination of the conservative element of the government to have nothing to do with a state whose form of life they mistrust.

Facts which appear to be overlooked include the reluctance of Poland and Rumania to receive direct help from Russia. There seems, also, to be no particular reason why Russia should be ready, without receiving substantial guarantees in exchange, to come to the help of nations with which she has had strong differences in the past and which have shown no very great liking for her. On a superficial view, a policy of splendid isolation seems the most suitable one for Russia to adopt, though she could hardly avow this publicly. The significance of M. Litvinov's retirement is unknown. But the demand for the extension of the proposed system of guarantees to include Finland, Latvia and Esthonia, all of whom are determined not to be guaranteed and the last two of whom have signed pacts of non-aggression with Germany, has proved, whatever the intention, a fruitful cause of delay. Even if Russia is more long-sighted than to adopt a policy of isolation, her military value in a war of resistance to the Axis is uncertain. Her numbers are great: her equipment is relatively better than in 1914, and her industry more organised: but her communications are not in first-class order and there is no guarantee that her higher command, even after extensive purging, is more efficient than it was then. Any form of pact between Russia and the powers which the Axis chooses to regard as enemies may induce Japan to reconsider the decision which she appears to have come to, not to extend her adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact into a formal alliance with Germany and Italy.

An agreement to be of practical value must overcome these various difficulties and could not be concluded in a day.

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Compulsory Military Training

Great Britain's prestige suffered a serious decline after 1919 through a failure to equate announced foreign policy with the means to implement it should occasion arise. In the present circumstances, our increasing intervention to counter aggression and to preserve the peace of Europe has been preceded and accompanied by steps to improve the strength and efficiency of the fighting services, and has now required the final gesture of compulsory

military training. The re-armament policy attracted considerable attention when first announced and its progress has been watched with interest and with a measure of admiration: but probably without an adequate appreciation of the efforts entailed. The nations which look to us for support have, from their own bitter experience, acquired the habit of judging war potential—and even war effort—by the size of armies. We are familiar with the contention that during the Great War the French were inclined to ignore the proportion of the national effort devoted to the maintenance of Great Britain's navy, mercantile marine and industry: and there is no doubt that in spite of the re-armament programme, with its immense expansion of the air force and of naval construction, and in spite of the recent announcement of our intention to double the Territorial Army, the French found themselves unable to believe that Great Britain could seriously contemplate coming to their assistance with all the support in her power when she would not face the introduction of compulsory military training. We should be able to sympathise with France in this respect because both during and since the war there has been a tendency to judge France's war effort and potential from the ingredients which we ourselves understand best, the navy, industry and air power, and largely to ignore the contribution of France's magnificent army. In particular, the part played by the French army in the early days of the war in 1914 have been overlooked in many quarters. France is anxious not to have to face the strain of such days unaided again.

There has been much muddled thinking on the subject of compulsory military service. It has frequently been enforced at times of crisis in our history: but we have so long enjoyed the protection of our geographical position that we have come to regard military service as largely alien to our tradition and have complacently relied on the voluntary system, which conveniently throws its burdens on the willing and which provides unpredictable numbers for whom equipment and instructors must be arranged by estimation. Opposition has proceeded chiefly from "labour," many of whose members were absolved from voluntary service by the schedule of reserved occupations, and which has never objected that the compulsory payment of taxes was undemocratic in principle. Because compulsory service is introduced it does not mean that the whole nation is to be taken at once or

necessarily for long periods. The present plans will only affect some two hundred thousand men each year for a period of six months. It is probable that, with experience of its working, the benefits of the system will be more fully realised and opposition largely disappear, though it is no use pretending that it will cease altogether. The voluntary system is to continue and there is no indication that the intention to supplement it by compulsion has adversely affected recruiting. This is as well, for we must continue to rely on voluntarily enlisted men for service overseas in peace.

The effect of the adoption of compulsory military training on European opinion is everywhere reported as excellent.

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Labour's Defence Policy.

Before its conference at Whitsun, the Labour Party published its statement of policy for the organisation of defence. The document shows, on the whole, a reasonable appreciation of the problems. Dealing with higher co-ordination, it recommends that a reconstituted Committee of Imperial Defence should consider the defence problems of the Commonwealth as a whole; put the problems to the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence; review his proposals and submit them to the Cabinet. The Minister of Defence should head a council of the ministers for the service departments, for civil defence and for supply, which should prepare detailed plans and, after their approval, take executive action to put them into effect. The Minister of Supply would have the powers which it is apparently the intention of the present government to give him in war and which a considerable section of public opinion thinks he ought to have now. He would release all three services from the task of arranging for their supply, leaving them to concentrate on what is considered to be their proper task. He would have powers to ensure priority for government orders and to check profiteering. His Ministry would replace the ninety bodies and twenty-seven thousand persons which are at present said to be employed in the separate supply organisations of the three service departments.

Dealing with the reform of the forces themselves, proposals are made which display an idealism unlikely to commend itself in all respects to those who have the efficiency of the services at heart, but which should not therefore bar consideration of all of them

or discredit the policy as a whole. The pay of tradesmen should be similar for the three services; non-tradesmen's pay increased to a level which will compare more favourably with what they might get in civil life: service should be for three years: vocational training increased: more government posts reserved for ex-servicemen: discipline relaxed in leisure hours; and representation given on the lines of the Admiralty welfare committees. The reduction of the age for marriage allowance has already been announced. A similar reduction for officers is recommended. In all services more officers should be found from the ranks and all applicants for commissions should first serve for a year in them. Expenses on messes and uniforms and customary expenses of a social nature should be severely reduced. Similar steps giving increased pay and prospects of promotion should be taken in the Territorial Army.

We can sympathise with some of these proposals.

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Dominion Rearmament: Canada

The Dominions have been following the United Kingdom's lead in re-arming and re-organising their forces. In Canada, as far as the army is concerned, the process was begun some two years ago with the re-organisation of the Non-Permanent Active Militia and this year's army vote shows an increase of about 33 per cent. on last year's. Coast defences are being improved, considerable sums spent on armament, and the opening of an armoured fighting vehicles school at London, Ontario, evidences the interest taken in mechanisation.

The Navy vote has also increased substantially. A flotilla leader is to be purchased from the United Kingdom; effectives have been increased; new reserves are to be formed; and the purchase of motor torpedo boats and more destroyers is understood to be under consideration. The present navy consists of six modern destroyers and four minesweepers.

About half of the defence vote goes to the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Non-Permanent Air Force, for which new units are to be formed. The Royal Canadian Air Force has hitherto been employed in a semi-civil capacity on such tasks as survey, but has now been organised on service lines. A first line strength of twenty-three squadrons is aimed at, and this will be two-thirds achieved this year. Some fifty pilots for the Royal Air Force are

to be trained in each of the next three years at the aviation schools at Trenton and Camp Borden.

These preparations are at least adequate for a country which can rely on the assistance of Great Britain and the United States and indicate perhaps that the very natural determination of large sections of the population not to be dragged unwillingly into a war do not mean that Canada would not be found on the side of the democracies in case of need. At present, however, as indicated in the speech of the Minister of National Defence when submitting the estimates, defence schemes aim primarily at the protection of Canadian territory and of foreign trade with the help of the British navy. But, as in 1899 and 1914, Canada's man-power and industry may be prepared to come to the assistance of the rest of the Commonwealth.

Canada's industries played a significant part in the Great War and are probably the greatest factor in her war potential. Her mechanical transport industry is well known. The armament industry is at present in the early stages of development, but already Bren guns and gas-masks are under production. The Canadian and British governments have placed orders for trainer and bomber aircraft, deliveries of which have begun. Supplies of important raw materials are available.

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Australia

The article on exchange in Australia in this number is, it is hoped, the first of a series in which we shall hear more about the important development of the Dominion's defence services. Speaking on the 23rd March, the late Prime Minister outlined a three-year programme involving an expenditure of £65,000,000. This total has now risen to £80,000,000, which tax-payers have been told may increase further. The year's defence expenditure at £26,000,000 will be more than eight times that of 1931-32.

The naval programme provides for two cruisers, two destroyers, two sloops, motor torpedo boats, and vessels for working anti-submarine booms. All but the first will be built in Australian yards. The present Royal Australian Navy of five cruisers, five destroyers, two sloops and two other vessels is undergoing renovations. Merchantmen are to be stiffened and their crews trained to enable them to arm if need arises. Port Moresby, in Papua, and Darwin are to be developed as bases. The addi-

tion of capital ships has been discussed. Without them the Royal Australian Navy would be unable to compete with a raiding force which included them. But for Australia to contemplate the complete defence of her territory and commerce without aid would impose an impossible burden and she can safely count on assistance which would include the presence of capital ships in Far Eastern waters. The provision of capital ships would carry with it the need for docking facilities, escort vessels, and reserves, and would be prohibitively expensive.

The Royal Australian Air Force is to be expanded from its present first-line strength of 132 to 212 exclusive of reserves, and a number of new stations and landing grounds are to be established which will facilitate co-operation with the naval forces. Pending delivery of aircraft from the United Kingdom, training machines have been borrowed from the Royal Air Force. Other machines have been ordered from the United States. Two-seater fighters have been under construction and deliveries have begun. As a result of the British Air Ministry's mission, orders have been placed for the construction of air-frames for the new Beaufort aircraft for Australia and for Royal Air Force requirements in the Far East. Engines for these aircraft will come from the United Kingdom until they can be produced in Australia. Other air engines are, of course, already being turned out by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation.

The new Cabinet includes a Minister of Supply. Australia's munitions production has been doubled in recent years and her industry is likely to become of increasing importance in Imperial Defence. A national register has been instituted; sums devoted to air raid precaution work; and steps taken for the formation of a civil defence organisation.

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New Zealand

New Zealand has left no doubt of her intentions should the Empire be involved in war. Mr. Savage, the Prime Minister, pointed out to the Labour Party Conference that since the party had taken office, defence expenditure has been trebled. This year, £2,000,000 is to be spent overseas on equipment. The country's peace time economy is being planned to meet an emergency. Attention has been chiefly concentrated on air defence. Existing air force squadrons are to have detached flights in provincial centres and a new squadron

will be formed for the protection of Cook Strait. Progress is being made with the formation of a civil reserve for the Royal New Zealand Air Force.

The British air mission which went on to New Zealand after visiting Australia was impressed by the development of civil aviation and is understood to have recommended the manufacture in New Zealand of aeroplanes of a suitable type. The de Havilland Aircraft Company are to establish workshops near Wellington.

Speaking on the 22nd May Mr. Savage indicated the government's intention to bring the Regular Forces up to establishment. The peace establishment of the Territorial Army is to be raised from 9,500 to 16,000. A special reserve is to be raised for coast defence, and all men of military age were urged to enrol in the National Military Reserve.

A conference was held in April to consider questions of common concern in the Pacific with special reference to defence. It was attended by representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

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South Africa

South Africa is somewhat fortunately placed at a distance from potential enemies and is unconcerned, as her politicians have pointed out, in the affairs of Poland or Albania. The United Kingdom has undertaken responsibility for the defence of her coast-line and it is unthinkable that she should not come to the assistance of South Africa if that country were in any way threatened. Nevertheless, affairs in Europe and the reiteration of Germany's claim to colonies have led the Union to review its defence organisation. Mr. Pirow, the Defence Minister, visited Great Britain last year and arranged for the provision of arms and equipment which South Africa cannot manufacture herself. He introduced a three-year defence plan to cost approximately £6,000,000, which has been adopted. The plan aims at the strengthening of coast defences; the maintenance of an Active Citizen Force of three divisions backed by Defence Rifle Association forces and commandos; and an air force of five to six hundred first-line aircraft.

In his annual defence statement of the 23rd March, Mr. Pirow referred to the satisfactory state of provision of arms and equipment and said that South Africa would soon be able

to produce enough ammunition to satisfy her own requirements. In coast defence, protection on a scale greater than that recommended by the Committee of Imperial Defence would be provided. Capetown, Port Elizabeth, East London and Walvis Bay are to have 15-inch and 9.2-inch guns. The monitor "Erebus," lent by the Admiralty, is being reconditioned at the Union's expense and will arrive at Capetown in September to act as guardship. A South African crew will take her over as soon as they are trained. The Air Force now has nine squadrons, each with reserves of 25 aircraft, and 2,080 of the 3,000 pilots contemplated in 1934 are available.

All men of military age are required to serve in time of war. The introduction of a register for the South African Voluntary Reserve, which will simplify mobilisation, met with a remarkable response, and enrolment offices ran out of forms.

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The Rhodesias

In Southern Rhodesia, provision has been made for compulsory registration of all non-native males between the ages of sixteen and sixty. The Defence Force is to be reorganised with the assistance of specialist officers from the United Kingdom and will include units of all arms. In Northern Rhodesia, steps are being taken to establish a volunteer force and the appeal for voluntary registration has led to a satisfactory response.

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India

It is too early yet to give any details of the steps being taken in India to improve the efficiency of the Defence Forces. Action must depend largely on the reception by the United Kingdom government of the recommendations of the Chatfield Committee. Financial limitations, necessarily imposed, have hindered the development of the Defence Forces in this country and it is no secret that on account of these limitations they have fallen in some respect behind modern standards. Nevertheless, India can feel that she has contributed her share in the burdens of Imperial Defence even though her Defence budget has not risen in the same spectacular manner as those of some of the other members of the Commonwealth.

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Shipping

The importance of the mercantile marine in the defence of the Empire in general, and of Great Britain in particular, is stressed at all Imperial Conferences and was once more brought to notice by the annual reports of the Chamber of Shipping and the Liverpool Steamship Owners' Association, and by the report of the Imperial Shipping Committee on "British Shipping in the Orient." The reduction of our total mercantile tonnage since 1919 is a matter of concern in peace which in war may determine the national existence. Shipping interests and others concerned with the defence of the country have periodically pressed for government assistance to help British shipping to hold its own in commerce with mercantile marines which receive Government assistance by subsidies and more indirect manners, or which are freed from restrictions as to conditions of employment. The complacent view has hitherto been that the reduction in British tonnage is, to a certain extent, offset by increases in Dominion-owned ships and that, in any case, the improved efficiency of modern vessels enables an equivalent tonnage of goods to be carried. Much of the increased Empire tonnage would, however, not be available in war because it is locked up in the Great Lakes of America or in coastal waters such as the Malay States, or pledged to meet purely local needs.

Fortunately, the Government has now decided to act. A subsidy of £2,750,000 a year is to be available for deep sea tramp shipping; £500,000 a year is to be available in grants to ship-owners ordering cargo vessels in the United Kingdom; £10,000,000 is to be provided for loans to ship-owners over two years for building tramp and cargo liners; an advisory committee will consider requests for assistance to liner companies suffering from subsidised foreign competition; and a sum of £2,000,000 will be used for the purchase of vessels which would otherwise be sold to foreign owners or broken up, but which will now form a reserve for war requirements and may be of use for storage purposes. These grants and subsidies are conditional on co-operation from ship-owners and shipbuilders, and an obligation will be laid on owners to offer vessels to the Board of Trade before they are sold or broken up.

Before these measures were announced, world shipping under construction had increased while British construction, in spite of the *Mauretania* and *Queen Elizabeth*, had fallen to a quarter of

the country's capacity and a low level of 22 per cent. of the world total. Within a week of the announcement by the President of the Board of Trade more orders were placed with British yards than in the whole of the previous year. It is hoped that our builders will no longer be unemployed and that British shipping will secure fair-play in the freight markets of the world.

The difficulties with which our shipping has to compete in this respect are well illustrated by the report on "British Shipping in the Orient," which presents the conclusions of a painstaking and extremely lengthy enquiry undertaken by the Imperial Shipping Company on behalf of the Government. This area is of particular interest to this country—since for the present many of our defence supplies, as well as other essential commodities, must be obtained from outside India, while India's export trade will retain its importance in war,—British shipping is described as suffering from a "creeping paralysis." While able, perhaps, to compete with subsidised German and Italian shipping, the British mercantile marine is not meeting successfully the challenge of the Japanese ship-owner, assisted by a lower standard of living, a depreciated currency and the concentrated support of all commercial interests which a totalitarian state can supply. None of the members of the British Commonwealth immediately and directly concerned in oriental waters, India, Australia, New Zealand and British Malaya has more than a few ships engaged in trade there, though each sends out large cargoes by sea. It is, perhaps, hard to expect them to take the long view and to realise before it is too late the importance of supporting British shipping. In any case, no arrangements made could be at the expense of Dominion or Indian mercantile marines. But some form of co-operation seems highly desirable and Government action should give the lead.

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Palestine

The proposals for an agreed settlement which the British Government placed before the Palestine Conference in March were rejected by the Jews and dissatisfied the Arabs. It was therefore left to the Government to devise a plan of its own and to put it into effect. The plan has now been published.

It may be useful very briefly to recall the events which led up to the present situation. In 1915 the Arabs were encouraged

to revolt by promises of assistance in securing their independence in an area from which parts of Syria were, out of deference to the French, explicitly excluded, but from which the exclusion of Palestine was doubtful. In 1917 the Balfour declaration might have been interpreted as reserving Palestine as a national home for the Jews. Jewish immigration began after the war and continued on a scale which led in 1936 to an Arab revolt headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem. Troops were sent to Palestine, order restored, and a Royal Commission sent out under Lord Peel. The unanimous report of this commission concluded that it was impracticable to suppose that Jews and Arabs could be brought together in governing an independent state and recommended partition into separate Jewish and Arab states with a British mandate over the Holy Places with a corridor to the sea at Haifa. The Jews and Arabs both opposed the solution recommended. The British Government accepted it, but unfortunately failed to put it into practice. In the meantime opposition in Palestine and its effect on neighbouring Arab states and on Moslem opinion increased. In September 1937 the Government informed the League that they were not committed to partition. In the meantime terrorism on a scale amounting to rebellion had broken out. The Woodhead Commission was sent to Palestine in April 1938 to examine the detailed problems involved in partition and to make recommendations. The report of this Commission, which was submitted last October, was referred to in detail in our January number. The Government accepted the view of the Commission that partition was impracticable. An abortive conference attended by representatives of the Jewish Agency, the Mufti's party, the Arab Defence Party (a more moderate body) and of neighbouring Arab states was then held in London. Later an unofficial Arab conference in Cairo toned down Arab demands to something resembling the Government's proposals as now issued.

These aim at the establishment within the next ten years of an independent Palestine State in treaty relations with Great Britain. As soon as peace and order have been restored, Arabs and Jews will be given an opportunity of taking part in the government of the country. The intention is that by degrees Palestinians will be placed in charge of all the departments of government. They will be assisted by British advisers and will be sub-

ject to the control of the High Commissioner. Presumably about one-third of them may be Jews, if Jews should decide to co-operate. During this period Jewish immigrants will be admitted at the rate of ten thousand a year and to these will be added twenty-five thousand more as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem. After this five-year period, a body representing the people of Palestine and His Majesty's Government will review the working of the administration during the first part of the transitional period and will make recommendations concerning the final form of the constitution. If after ten years the establishment of an independent state still appears impracticable, further consultation with the people of Palestine, the League Council, and neighbouring Arab states is provided for.

This policy was approved by both Houses of Parliament; in the House of Commons by a majority which must have been disappointing to the Government. An immediate reaction was the outbreak of Jewish rioting in Palestine and the Jews have declared their opposition to the plan. The Defence Party are apparently prepared to try to work it. The Higher Arab Committee under the Mufti, who is to remain in exile, are determinedly hostile. The Egyptians were not too pleased. As Mr. MacDonald said, the problem is one of reconciling right with right, and no solution to a problem of this complexity could hope to appease both parties. It may be claimed as a sign of impartiality that the solution now proposed pleases neither.

The main features of the policy are:

1. That the ultimate aim is the establishment of an independent state in which "the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured." This appears to discard the principle laid down by the Peel Commission.

2. That the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine is to be secured before the mandate is given up.

3. That after five years, during which immigration is restricted, further Jewish immigration can only take place with the consent of the Arabs who can be relied on to ensure that the Jews do not achieve a controlling say in the government.

It appears that these features can only be combined in a federal state. This is the organisation proposed by former members of

the Peel Commission, and the Colonial Secretary has made it plain that federation is not ruled out. It has been suggested that by the time ten years have passed it might be possible for Syria to join the independent federation, and Canada has been instanced as a country in which federation gives security to a racial minority.

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Waziristan

Although a settlement has been reached with the Madda Khel and the Tori Khel, the situation in Waziristan remains much as before. Ipi's personal prestige is high and he continues to receive support from religious leaders and other opponents of the Government whose influence would be diminished by a return to normal conditions. There has been no main centre of hostile activity and such periodical gatherings as have taken place have not diverted the numerous small gangs from their profitable raids and kidnappings. This raiding coupled with sniping, sabotage on roads and telegraph lines, and highway robbery have kept the troops, scouts and civil forces in the administered districts fully occupied. The gangs are small and easily hid in the difficult country from which they operate. They are apt to receive sympathy from the districts which they raid as well as in their own areas. Indirect punishment, as so often, falls on the least guilty while fines and the forfeiture of allowances are off-set by profitable contracts and other financial gains which follow the presence of troops. Measures of civilisation such as transport contracts and opportunities for enlistment in government service can only take effect slowly.

During February a lashkar of all sections of the Madda Khel who had not held to their promises of the previous June attacked Datta Khel post with two tribal guns. The air action described in our last number had the main role in breaking up this force. A blockade of Madda Khel territory was then applied. This coincided with very severe weather. After some delay due to internal dissensions the tribe complied with the terms imposed and once more submitted.

In the meantime the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades were operating in the lower Khaisora valley in the country of the Tori Khel who had failed to control their hostiles. Some delay was caused by bad weather until on the 13th March the 1st Infantry Brigade began operations in the Shaktu valley where Mullah Sher

Ali had been reinforced by Mahsud parties. A sharp action took place on the 16th March when salutary casualties were inflicted on the enemy who had been concealed in caves and broken country. The Tori Khel made no submission, however, and proscriptive air action against them was continued.

During this period raiding into the settled districts tended to increase and additional areas where gangs harboured were proscribed for air action.

In April the submission of the Madda Khel on the 10th was immediately followed by a return to the normal system of political control which reverted from the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Northern Command, to His Excellency the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province. The 1st Abbottabad Infantry Brigade returned to its peace stations. By this time the blockade on the Ahmedzai Wazirs was taking effect. They evicted Mehr Dil and undertook to prevent his return. There were also signs that the Tori Khel, who remained subject to air action, were becoming more anxious for peace. On the 13th May representatives of the dissident sections were interviewed at Miranshah when they released four kidnapped Hindus, which they then said were all they had though they have since handed back six more. The air proscription and blockade were lifted and Tori Khel khassadars reinstated. A full jirga which was interviewed on the 1st June reaffirmed the undertaking to dissociate themselves from hostile persons.

In south Waziristan also there have been indications of more sincere attempts at co-operation with the government and rumours about the return of the Shami Pir which were at one time prevalent have slightly diminished.

In general, it can be concluded that at the moment the situation is better than it was at this time last year; but that this provides no guarantee of a speedy return to normal. As already stated, sniping, raiding, and kidnapping continue: the Ahmedzai salient harbours notorious outlaws: and Ipi is still apparently hoping to raise a lashkar.

THE STRUGGLE IN THE FAR EAST

By Captain A. D. Ward, The King's Regiment

On the 21st July 1938 Major J. E. H. Nicolls, M.C., delivered a lecture on the Sino-Japanese struggle to the members of the Institution. This lecture, which was published in the October number of the Journal, discussed the background of the conflict between China and Japan, and described the course of events during the first year of hostilities. The object of the present article is to carry on the story of events in the Far East for another year.

The situation on the 1st of July 1938 was briefly as follows. The Japanese attempt to capture Chengchow, as a preliminary to an advance on Hankow down the Kinghan Railway, had been foiled by the breaching of the Yellow River dykes. The centre of gravity had moved to the Yangtse, where the Japanese, with the final objective of Hankow, were approaching Kiukiang. In the air the Japanese had been able to obtain almost complete superiority in any area they wished, and air attack on Chinese centres of government and places of strategic importance had been carried out with little interference from the Chinese air force. The Japanese efforts to cut the Kowloon—Canton—Hankow railway by air action had met with no more than very occasional temporary success, and war material continued to be imported by this route, and to a lesser extent by the Haiphong—Yunnanfu railway. In order to administer the areas which were at least in nominal occupation by their military forces, the Japanese had set up governments with Chinese personnel in Peking for North China and Nanking for Central China. These administrations had achieved very little. They had not gained the confidence of the Chinese, and their authority was entirely limited to the areas in which their orders could be enforced by Japanese bayonets. The German military advisers to the Chinese Government had been recalled and their places taken by a Russian military mission. There was consequently a tendency for Russian influence to increase, particularly in North China. This appeared to have had no effect on the supreme position of General Chiang Kai-shek who remained the personification of the unity of China

in her struggle against the Japanese. On the Soviet-Manchukuo border, frontier incidents had been frequent and there was the possibility of some form of intervention by Russia in China's favour if a convenient opportunity should arise.

The principal military events during the past year have been the successful termination of the campaign for the capture of Hankow, and the fall of Canton after operations whose brevity surprised even the Japanese. In North China there have been no major operations. Here the year has been devoted to guerilla activities by the Chinese, and attempts at pacification by the Japanese. The claims of success by both sides have been grossly exaggerated, but the general result of hostilities in this area has been that the Chinese guerillas have failed to exercise appreciable influence on the campaigns elsewhere, while the Japanese have failed to establish the peaceful conditions necessary for the development and economic exploitation of the occupied areas.

The course of operations in the Yangtse Valley is illustrated in Sketch Map "A." From Kiukiang, which was captured on the 26th July, the Japanese started offensives in two directions, westwards along the river, and southwards along the Kiukiang—Nanchang railway. The immediate objective of the westward move was to force a way up the Yangtse by capturing the fixed defences at Tienchiachen on the north bank and Panpihshan or Split Hill on the south, and by destroying the boom joining these two places. The final objective was of course Hankow and the Canton—Hankow railway. The objective of the drive south was the railway junction of Nanchang, the capture of which would cut rail communication between Chekiang and Hunan. While these operations were progressing, columns set out across Anhwei and southern Honan, directed both on the Peking—Hankow railway and, through the Honan—Hupeh border on Hankow.

The offensive westwards progressed slowly; Juichang was captured on the 25th August and then for a time there was no appreciable advance. The Chinese resistance was stubborn, and by the 12th September the Japanese were still some miles from the Hupeh—Kiangsi border. On the 13th a naval landing party landed downstream of Matow on the south bank of the river and with the assistance of an army detachment in the area captured Matow the next day. Meanwhile on the northern bank, floods and Chinese counter-attacks prevented any further move until, on

the 1st September, the advance recommenced and by the 6th Kwangtsi had been captured. The occupation of this town was an important strategic gain as from it roads and tracks radiate south, which would enable the Japanese to take the river defences in rear. On the 16th a naval landing was effected six miles from Wusueh under cover of extremely heavy air and naval bombardments. The landing party, together with troops from Kwangtsi, then closed in on Wusueh which, despite stubborn resistance, was captured on the 17th September. The advance was continued up the river bank towards Tienchiachen, and again troops from Kwangtsi co-operated by a converging movement from the north-east. Tienchiachen proved a tough nut to crack and the defences were not captured until the 29th after a twelve-day battle, during which the Chinese positions were heavily bombarded by the Japanese naval guns, artillery and aircraft. On the fall of Tienchiachen the Chinese withdrew to Kichun which was not captured until the 8th October. Throughout September Japanese reinforcements had been arriving and by the end of the month over nine divisions were operating in the Yangtse Valley above Wuhu. The Japanese troops on the southern bank of the river captured Fuchihkow on the 24th September and then on the 4th October they staged a dawn attack for the capture of the Panpihshan or Split Hill position. The attack, which was preceded by a heavy bombardment, was successful and the last of the Yangtse defences fell into the hands of the Japanese.

Further inland the Japanese had advanced to within a short distance of Yangsin by the 16th September but made no further progress for some time. After the capture of the Split Hill position a way through the boom was cleared, and a number of dominating points on the south bank of the river were secured by a series of combined operations. These operations culminated in the capture of Shihweiyao on the 16th October. The troops from here advanced up the river bank, and Hwangshihkang was captured on the 19th October. Yangsin had fallen the day before after very severe fighting. With the loss of Yangsin and Hwangshihkang, the resistance of the Chinese became steadily weaker. Such will to fight as would have remained was not strengthened by the gradual knowledge of the course of events in Kwantung, and no more effective opposition was offered to the Japanese advance. On the north bank of the river, troops from Kwangtsi

and Kichun captured Kishui on the 21st October. From here a strong mechanised force captured Sinchow on the 22nd October and then advanced on Hankow. Hwangchow on the river was captured on the 24th October by troops moving along the bank of the river assisted by a landing party. The Chinese made no attempt to defend the Wuhan cities and on the 25th October the leading Japanese troops, a mobile detachment from Sinchow, entered Hankow to be followed the next day by the first of the ships which had played such a big part in the frequent combined operations. Prior to evacuating Hankow, the Chinese blew up anything that might be useful to the Japanese and destroyed what they could of Japanese property. The general withdrawal of the Chinese was carried out without any great loss of war material, except in south Hupeh where the troops suffered a considerable loss of morale. The Japanese advance to the Hankow—Canton railway was practically unopposed, and Sienning was captured on the 28th October.

The behaviour of the Japanese on entering Hankow was a very marked improvement on their actions at Nanking. Although there were reports of looting and some shooting of prisoners and civilians, the discipline of the army was generally of a high standard.

For a month after the fall of Hankow the Japanese were engaged in extending their control over the areas to the north-west and south-west of the Wuhan cities. The advance north-west was apparently directed on Siangyangfu with the left flank of the force engaged moving along the Han River. During the second week of November this force encountered considerable resistance, and made no further progress. The situation on this front remained practically unchanged until in March the Japanese attempted to extend their control of the left bank of the Han River. Chinese resistance was again stubborn, and by the middle of the month the offensive was abandoned. To the south-west the immediate objective was Yochow which controls rail, road and river communications to Changsha, the capital of Hunan. The main advance was down the line of the Hankow—Canton railway, but it was assisted by landing operations on both banks of the Yangtse. In addition a mechanised column moved parallel to the railway and about twenty miles to the east of it. The offensive in this area made good progress and Yochow was completely occupied by

the 13th November. The advance continued for about forty miles to the north bank of the Mishui River, which runs from south-east to north-west into the Tung Ting Lake. This rapid advance so demoralised the Hunan provincial authorities that they ordered the firing of Changsha on the 13th. The morale of the Chinese troops, however, did not seem to have been very seriously affected. The Japanese then consolidated their position in the Yochow area and there has been little alteration in the situation since the conclusion of these operations.

The advance southwards from Kiukiang met strong opposition from the Chinese in the Shaho-Lushan Mountains (Kuling) area, and little progress was made until the Japanese 101st Division from Shanghai was sent through to effect a landing on the north-west shores of Lake Poyang. This force captured Singtse on the 20th August and turned the position of the Chinese who were opposing the advance down the railway, and eventually, after very heavy fighting, the Chinese were pressed back from the hilly country in which they had taken up their stand. The advance was continued south-east by troops from Juichang, south from Shaho and south-west from Singtse, but the Chinese resistance continued to be stubborn, and, although supported by heavy artillery and air bombardment, the Japanese moved forward at an average of only one mile a day. By the 10th the Japanese were still three miles north of Teian, and the Chinese were continuing to put up the best fight since the early days on the Shanghai front. During September a Japanese column had been directed south-west from Juichang on Wuning. This force also met strong resistance, but by the 10th October it had succeeded in drawing about level with the troops operating against Teian. There was severe fighting on the Wuning and Teian fronts until, on the 28th October, the Japanese forced their way into Teian and operations in this area came temporarily to a close. During March the Japanese again took up the offensive and before the end of the month they had captured Wuning, and had entered Nanchang and cut the railway from Hangchow to Changsha. During these operations the Japanese did not complete the mopping up of the Lushan Hills area and a small party of Chinese troops remained in the vicinity of Kuling. The Japanese finally occupied this place on the 18th April 1939, the defenders escaping at the last minute through the mountain passes.

The offensive across the Anhwei plain was launched on the 24th August. This operation was subsidiary to the advance along the Yangtse, and the tasks of the force engaged were to cut the Peking—Hankow railway, and to assist in the capture of Hankow by a converging movement from the north-east. The column progressed at a good pace, Liuan was taken on the 28th August and Yehkiatsi on the Anhwei—Honan border on the 3rd September. Here the force divided, one part going towards Kushih which was occupied on the 7th September, the other, whose probable strength was one division, moving on Shangcheng. This place was taken on the 16th September, and an attempt was then made to force a way through the difficult country of the Tapieh Hills on the Honan—Hupeh border to the Macheng area. This division met serious opposition from Chinese troops of good quality and high morale, and its progress was slow. The force which had occupied Kushih then marched on Kwangchow in the capture of which it was assisted by a column which had left Pengpu on the 30th August, and, after moving up the Hwai River to a point north of Kwangchow, had turned south. Kwangchow fell on the 17th September and the combined force, which was about the strength of a division, then advanced towards Sinyang on the Kinghan railway and captured Loshan on the 21st.

During the last week of September the Chinese staged a number of counter-attacks to check the advance westwards but, although some of these met with local success, they were on the whole ineffectual. At the beginning of October the advance was resumed, at first against considerable opposition, but resistance cracked on the 6th October when a Japanese cavalry detachment, working round the south, attacked the railway and cut it at Liulin, south of Sinyang. After a half-hearted attempt to dislodge this party, a general Chinese withdrawal began. Sinyang was occupied on the 12th October and Chinese rail communication between the Yellow River and the Yangtse irretrievably broken. Weather conditions and difficulties over the length of its lines of communications prevented the force which had captured Sinyang from exploiting vigorously down the railway. Meanwhile the column advancing through the Tapieh Hills was encountering stiff resistance and Macheng was not captured until the 25th October. Then, with the general disintegration of Chinese resistance, part of the column drove westwards and

reached the railway on the 28th October, while the remainder pushed on to Hankow.

The Chinese do not seem to have taken advantage of the time at their disposal to perfect the defences of the Sinyang area. The country around Sinyang and for some way south of it is eminently suitable for defence, but there seems to have been no co-ordinated defensive plan. Where obstacles existed, the defences were so sited that fire could not be brought to bear to cover the obstacles, and generally, little attention was paid to the natural advantages of the ground in siting positions. The higher commanders were often unaware of the location of the defences of their subordinate units. The trenches themselves were all dug with an eye to a quick get-away. It seems reasonable to assume that a similar state of affairs existed to a greater or lesser degree throughout the armies defending Hankow, and it is difficult to discover the elements of a planned defence in the Chinese operations, or to find the hand of a co-ordinating and controlling authority.

During the latter stages of the operations for the capture of Hankow, the Japanese launched their long expected invasion of Kwangtung. Operations against Canton had undoubtedly been contemplated for some time, but owing to the effect on British and American opinion of the "Ladybird" and "Panay" incidents the project was postponed. By September, however, the course of affairs in Europe convinced the Japanese that they were justified in risking the effect that such operations might have on their foreign relations, and the capture of Canton was decided upon. The concentration of the necessary troops and transports around South Formosa was ordered and was completed early in October. A force of three divisions left Formosa on about the 5th October but waited at sea for a week, presumably for news of calm weather in Bias Bay which at that time of the year is subject to heavy swells.

On the night of the 11th October the Japanese transports entered Bias Bay (sketch map "B"). The night was brightly moonlit with the moon almost full; there was no wind and the sea was perfectly calm. The first flight embarked into landing craft at three a.m. and effected a landing at Hachung at four-thirty. The disembarkation of the 5th Division was begun at Aotowkong, while at Nimshan the 18th Division started landing, to be fol-

lowed later by the 10th Reserve Division. At daylight the Japanese warships began a bombardment of probable objectives ashore, under cover of which the covering force moved further inland to protect the landing of the main body. There appears to have been no opposition whatever, and the Japanese claim to have sustained no casualties at the actual landing is probably correct. On the 13th October feint landings were carried out at Swatow, and on the east shores of the Pearl River, and the Japanese navy secured the base at Bias Bay by landings at several points of vantage.

The advance inland was made in two columns, each of one division, along the Aotowkong—Tamshui and Nimshan—Waichow roads. Tamshui was occupied without opposition early on the 14th October. Here the division divided, the main body moving north on Waichow, while a detachment went westwards towards the Canton—Kowloon railway. Meanwhile the other column had also been closing on Waichow which was captured on the 15th with little loss. On the 16th Poklo was taken and the force which had moved from Tamshui to the railway cut the line and finally stopped all traffic from Hong Kong. Sheklung and Tsungcheng were both captured on the morning of the 19th. The main body now moved steadily on Canton while a detachment advanced further north, and on the 21st the Chinese abandoned Canton without resistance.

After the fall of Sheklung the Japanese sent a detachment south-west to co-operate with a landing force which was to leave Bias Bay on the night of the 21st October, and land on the eastern shores of the Pearl River, with the object of capturing the Bocca Tigris Forts. On the 21st the forts surrendered, after practically no resistance, to the force from Sheklung. The need for secrecy having been thus removed, the convoy sailed up the river in daylight.

During the course of the Japanese advance the Reserve Division completed its landing and, moving by the eastern route, deployed to protect the right rear of the other two divisions.

The Kwantung Army's defence of its capital was completely contemptible. The country was suitable for defence and had been strengthened by the construction of pill-boxes and other defensive works, particularly in the Waichow area, but no attempt was made to fight a defensive battle. In some cases the troops bolted

at the sight of the Japanese, and the higher direction of the defence is a story of inefficiency, corruption and disloyalty. The value which the Japanese set on the resistance likely to be encountered may be gauged from the fact that one divisional commander gave strict orders that any unit meeting Chinese resistance was to attack at once without waiting to carry out any reconnaissance. This, in spite of the fact that the Japanese artillery was left behind, and did not catch up until the infantry was within forty miles of Canton. Judging from results it would seem that the tactical idea that "time spent in reconnaissance is really wasted" is thoroughly sound when fighting Cantonese! The speed of the advance, about a hundred and fifty miles in ten days, astonished the Japanese and they experienced considerable maintenance difficulties. These difficulties were partially solved by dropping supplies from the air on the leading troops. Throughout the operations they took what, against even a second-class enemy, would have been unwarrantable risks, but their assessment of the Kwantung Army was sufficiently accurate to justify the adoption of tactical methods which, in the peace time training of most armed forces, would have earned their employer a pension.

Before the fall of Canton, practically all the civilian population was evacuated and, as the Chinese troops retreated, government offices, public works and Japanese property were blown up. The attempt to destroy the Pearl River bridge was unsuccessful, only one arch being damaged.

After occupying the city the Japanese pushed the Chinese back to a safe distance (for the position at the end of October see sketch map "B") and then attempted to clear up the brigand and guerilla situation. A drive to the south-east brought them to the borders of Hong Kong leased territory with the result that thousands of Chinese refugees flocked into Hong Kong. Subsequent operations have made little alteration in the position, except that the Japanese have extended their area of control to the south-west to include Kongmoon. There have, at various times, been claims of successful counter-offensives by the Chinese, but, although they may have had minor victories in encounters between small parties, they have never staged any operation which could be considered a threat to retake Canton.

The Japanese retained their superiority in the air throughout the period under consideration. Aircraft have co-operated closely

with most ground offensives, in some cases delivering such a heavy air bombardment on the objectives of the ground troops that either the defences have been destroyed or else the morale of the defenders has been so lowered that the attacking infantry met with no opposition.

The lines of communications along which war material has been imported into China have all been subjected to air attack. Except for a period of eighteen days in August 1938 the air operations against the Kowloon—Canton and Canton—Hankow railways met with little success. The Japanese took a very long time to discover an effective way to cut a railway and, although for long periods the railway was bombed almost daily, traffic was seldom interrupted for more than a few hours at a time. The Chinese anti-aircraft defence of the railway was negligible, and the bombers seldom met with any interference in carrying out their tasks, but although hundreds of bombs were dropped, the effort was generally dispersed, and individual bombing did not attain a high degree of accuracy. During the raids trains were halted and passengers and railway personnel dispersed; then, as soon as the hostile aircraft departed, repair gangs set to work and the trains resumed their journeys. The railway administration produced a most efficient organisation for the repair of the line and the effects of a raid were countered very rapidly. The higher officials in the railway are reported to have said that they feared a typhoon or heavy rain much more than Japanese aircraft. On the 11th August, however, the Japanese damaged a bridge thirty-five miles north of Canton, using a powerful German bomb, and then for fifteen days they kept up an aerial attack on the same point, and on the repair gangs. This had the effect of preventing a repair being effected until the 29th August, when through traffic was again resumed. Air operations against the railways continued but without occasioning any further stoppage of traffic until, on the 11th October, the day of the landing at Bias Bay, a small bridge was damaged on the Kowloon—Canton line and through traffic ceased.

The route from Russia through Lanchow and Sian has been heavily bombed on occasions and recently Yungchang (Paoshan) on the Burma—Yunnan road and Mengtz on the Haiphong—Yunnanfu railway have been attacked in an attempt to interfere

with the supply of munitions which are being taken into China along those routes.

Until their capture, Hankow and Canton were the principal objectives in the aerial offensive against centres of importance, while Nanchang, Changsha, Ichang, and more recently, Chungking and Yunnanfu have been amongst the other cities subjected to heavy air bombardment. In some raids the objectives have been of a definite military nature, but it is impossible to account for all the civilian casualties that have occurred as being due to the inefficiency and inaccuracy of the Japanese airmen, and there is no doubt that particularly at Canton and Chungking the object of a number of raids has been to terrorise the civilian population. It is also difficult to believe that the attacks that have been made on foreign mission stations, hospitals and consulates have not been deliberate. These attempts at intimidation do not yet appear to have produced results satisfactory to the Japanese.

Chinese fighter aircraft have on a very few occasions met with considerable success in attacks on the Japanese raiding aircraft, but generally the principal concern of the Chinese has been to get their aircraft into the air, and away from the vicinity of their aerodromes before the arrival of the enemy. Anti-aircraft fire on both sides has been most inaccurate and badly controlled and altogether it has been most ineffective.

The Chinese stood the shock of the loss of Hankow and Canton within a few days of each other with surprisingly little deterioration of the national morale. The government spokesmen at the time declared that these events ushered in the second stage of hostilities, in which the Japanese forces, having become deeply involved in China, would be harassed and weakened by guerillas in preparation for the third stage, when the invading armies would be hurled back to the sea. The activities of guerillas up to now have given no grounds for the belief that they will be able to reduce the Japanese armies to such a condition that the Chinese will be able to launch a successful general offensive. This does not mean that individual guerilla operations have not met with considerable success, or that the guerillas as a whole have not been a source of nuisance and annoyance to the Japanese; but there is no doubt that the Chinese have been incapable of co-ordinating the activities of the various bands and units, and

have had no plan for directing their efforts towards a definite military object. Until the necessary co-ordination can be achieved, and the prospect of its early achievement is not bright, the guerillas, although they are fulfilling a valuable function in preventing the Japanese from obtaining a return commercially for their expenditure, will not be able to play the part which they should in wearing down the morale of the Japanese main forces.

Chiang Kai-shek has maintained his position throughout the year, and has shown no signs of departing from his attitude of uncompromising resistance to any proposal of peace which infringes China's sovereignty. There is no doubt that peace parties exist in China but the defection of Wang Ching-wei in December showed that these have little influence, and that there is little likelihood of any challenge to the Generalissimo's authority. Soviet influence, which strengthened its footing when the Russian Military Mission was introduced in place of the German advisers, has increased during the past year. This is a matter of considerable concern to the Kuomintang Government who fear its growth at their expense, and realise that they will eventually be faced with resisting this attack on their conception of a unified China. At the same time, it is extremely difficult for the Central Government actively to counter this increasing influence, and it seems probable that it will become more powerful, particularly in the area of activity of the ex-communist 8th Route Army. It is also very probable that, as resistance by the Central Government to Soviet encroachment increases, Soviet assistance and supplies of war material will be more and more confined to the 8th Route Army in north China. So far the communists appear to have made no attempt to undermine the authority of Chiang Kai-shek, and it is most probable that they will continue to co-operate with him, at least until some decision is reached in the struggle with Japan.

In the occupied areas the Japanese sponsored governments have made little progress in establishing their position. Their activities have been confined to the introduction of new customs tariffs, favourable to Japan, and to the issue of manifestos denouncing the Kuomintang, communism and, above all, Chiang Kai-shek, to whom all the present trouble in China is attributed. The chief difficulty facing the Japanese in constituting these administrations has been to induce Chinese of sufficient standing and ability to come forward. There has been a natural reluctance on

the part of suitable public men to accept office under Japanese control, and this reluctance has been accentuated by the campaign of assassination that has been carried on against those who join the puppet governments. Attempts to set up a form of new central government have also failed to achieve any results, partly because the Japanese are unable to decide whether they shall try to inaugurate a unified government or some form of federation embracing the present Nanking and Peking regimes together with such administration as is eventually established in south China, and partly from failure again to produce a suitable head for the new government. Tong Shao-yi, who was at one time being approached in this connection, was murdered on the 30th September and since his death the Japanese have been trying to persuade Wu Pei-fu to accept the position. Neither Wu Pei-fu nor Tong Shao-yi showed much enthusiasm for the prospect and the conditions laid dawn by Wu Pei-fu as the terms of his taking office are such that their acceptance by Japan would virtually rob her of all that she has been fighting for.

Relations between the Soviet and Japan have been strained throughout the year, first as a result of the Changkufeng affair and then on account of the fisheries dispute. Incidents on the Soviet-Manchukuo frontier have been a common occurrence, but the outbreak in July and August assumed much larger proportions. The dispute was over the ownership of a ridge of which the principal features are known as Changkufeng and Shatsaoping. On the 11th July Russian troops occupied this ridge, which overlooks Possiet Bay, believed to have been developed as a Soviet submarine base, and also the defences of the Korean port of Rashin. An attempt was made at finding a solution by diplomatic means, but the Japanese troops on the spot became impatient and decided to eject the Russians. This led to hostilities which continued until the 11th August. The terms of the truce which terminated the affair contained provision for the demarkation of the frontier by a commission of two Russians, one Japanese and one Manchukuo representative. So far there is no news of the commission having met, but it is probable that the final result will leave the disputed territory on the Russian side of the border.

For some time there has been considerable trouble over the renewal of Japanese fishing rights off the Soviet coast. According to press reports this dispute was temporarily settled by the signing,

on the 2nd April, of an agreement which will be valid until December of this year. The Soviet has reserved, for strategic reasons, thirty-seven of the lots previously rented to Japan and has replaced only ten of these by sections in other waters. At the same time, Russia is to receive an increase in rent of approximately £17,600.

There seems, at present, to be no prospect of an early end to hostilities. The Japanese are deeply committed in north, central and south China. In each theatre they hold little more than their lines of communication, and they are getting no return for their expenditure. There is little doubt that, if they wish, they can advance further westwards, though the physical difficulties will increase; but it is equally certain that further advances will only increase their commitments, and will not bring them nearer to a satisfactory settlement. It would seem that their best policy would be to cut their losses in central and southern China, withdraw from those areas, and concentrate on producing conditions in north China which would allow them to exploit it as a source of raw materials, and develop it as a market for their industrial products. Such a solution is, however, impossible, as the loss of face incurred by the Japanese Army in withdrawing and leaving the unmilitary Chinese unbeaten would, in all probability, so discredit the Japanese military authorities that, at any rate for a time, they would be forced to forfeit their position as arbiters of their country's destiny. On the Chinese side, the will to resist appears to remain strong, and sufficient arms and ammunition are said to be available for war on the Chinese scale for some time to come. Communications have been opened through Yunnan to Burma and so to Rangoon, and although the much vaunted Burma—Yunnan road is really a very indifferent highway, parts of which will have disappeared as a result of the advent of the rains—before this article is printed—it does provide a line by which, at the lowest estimate, the requirements of guerilla warfare can be imported into China. On the other hand, lack of co-ordination and direction will most probably continue to prevent the Chinese from taking full advantage of the opportunities for guerilla warfare that the existing situation presents, and there has been little in previous actions of the Chinese Army to suggest that, if the guerillas were successful in their operations, the main armies would be capable of sustained offensive action. Military inter-

vention by Russia on China's behalf is now most unlikely and, although the Japanese military authorities will never consider their country safe until they have occupied the Russian Maritime Provinces, it is improbable that they will embark on a fresh venture unless the world situation develops overwhelmingly in their favour. The question seems to resolve itself into one of which nation will crack first. Chiang Kai-shek is confident that the Japanese will. It is unwise to prophesy, particularly in days when bankruptcy appears to be no deterrant to re-armament and waging war, but it seems unlikely that the next twelve months will see a decisive deterioration in the national morale of either side and the prospect for the next year appears to be one of stalemate and deadlock.

Sketch Map showing

JAPANESE OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL CHINA SKETCH MAP "A"



SKETCH MAP OF CANTON AREA.



Scale 1 inch to 27 miles.

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 Miles

Course of Japanese advance in October 1938.

Limits of Japanese occupied territory 30th November 1938.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN LIGHT TANKS AND INFANTRY

[With Special Application to Mountain Warfare vis-a-vis Infantry Battalion Officers]

[A lecture delivered to officers of the 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade in October 1938.]

Before I get down to the actual detail of my subject, I think it will be of help to deal, very briefly, with the development of the use of light tanks in frontier warfare and with the organisation of a light tank company in India.

Development of the Use of the Light Tank in Frontier Warfare.—Since the Mohmand operations of 1935, the policy affecting the employment of tanks on the frontier has, much to our delight, undergone a drastic change. Before those operations, the rôle of the light tank was, very briefly, to remain in the commander's hand for the main decisive blow. As you all know—on the frontier—the opportunity to deliver the main and decisive blow very rarely, if ever, occurs. In fact, tanks were kept severely in cotton wool for, I think, two main reasons:

(*a*) We were a new arm and few knew anything about us or how to use us;

(*b*) There was a tendency to be scared stiff that a light tank might be lost.

From experience gained in the operations, the policy affecting our employment is now governed by the words "we may be used for any task worth while." "What," you will say, "is the definition of a 'worth while task'?" The answer is: "A task whereby some definite tactical advantage can be gained; to achieve an object more effectively or in a shorter space of time than would be possible without tanks."

During the employment of my company in the Khaisora Operations from 29th November 1936 to February 1937, there were one or two slight arguments as to the "worth while task" and occasionally we felt rather like changing our name from the "11th Light Tank Company" to the "11th Light Taxi Company." I remember on one occasion in December—when the new road, having reached as far as Khaisora Camp, became practically impassable to anything except mules and light tanks owing to heavy rain—I was ordered to turn out my section and escort a

large consignment of goats "on the hoof" (which, I am told, is the correct technical expression) from Mir Ali to Khaisora Camp. Our comments on the elasticity of the term "worth while task" became somewhat terse by the completion of the task in hand.

There are still certain tasks which light tanks are definitely not allowed to be used for:

(*i*) We must not be frittered away on long-distance patrols or on independent or semi-independent missions where cavalry cannot accompany us and assist in ground reconnaissance.

(*ii*) Where armoured cars are available, we should not be used for escort work and protection generally on the L. of C. We are not designed for such work and it is wasteful to employ us in such a manner.

A possible exception to this rule is where road blocks have already been established by the enemy. Our cross-country capabilities will permit us to work *round* the road blocks and drive out the enemy detachments covering the blocks. The road blocks can then be removed.

Organisation of the Light Tank Company in India.—A light tank company on the frontier now consists of a company H. Q. of two tanks and one armoured car; one section of seven light tanks and two sections of five armoured cars.

You will notice that the commanding officer has both a light tank and an armoured car. This enables him to command and control the unit when it is working either across country or on roads. The second tank in H. Q. is used either by the adjutant or tank liaison officer or as a rear link tank (for increasing the range of W/T).

The type of light tank in the companies on the frontier varies. Some are the new three-men mark VI-B tanks and some are the old two-men Mark II-B tanks. The latter—*i.e.*, with two-men crews—we dislike for obvious reasons.

In the tank brigade at Home, the light tank section is organised in two sub-sections of three tanks each; but on the frontier for working with infantry it has been found by experience that three sub-sections of two tanks each is a much better organisation for the tasks given to us. The section commander in the seventh tank is able to control and direct his three sub-sections. Actually, owing to the fact that tank sections are so often detached for long periods from the company, you will often see us working on the frontier with sections of five and six. We do this as often

as we can so as to be able to keep a local mechanical reserve within the section.

As regards armoured cars: After some fifteen years' service in India, the old Crossleys have at last been replaced by Chevrolet engines and chassis. The Crossley armoured body has been removed and mounted on the Chevrolet chassis and the resultant armoured car appears very satisfactory and a great improvement on the old Crossley, especially in speed and climbing capabilities.

This new organisation of a mixed company has only recently been introduced. I would like you to realise that, from now on, I shall be dealing with a light tank company armed completely with Mark II-B two-men light tanks. This was the organisation we had when the incidents and experiences I shall be quoting occurred.

* * * *

Characteristics.—Now let us turn for a moment to our characteristics, namely: mobility, fire power and protection. On the frontier, so far, the enemy possess no anti-tank weapons. We are, therefore, more or less invulnerable to the tribesmen's fire and ground is our chief enemy. We are very sensitive to ground. Anybody who has seen us examining the various parts of our anatomy after a morning's tanking across average frontier country will realise *how* sensitive we are.

There is also the possibility of the construction of tank obstacles to be considered. In the last Mohmand operations, the tribesmen were so surprised to see us that they made no attempt to construct any tank obstacles or destroy any crossings that had been made over nullahs, etc. In the recent Waziristan operations, we encountered no efforts on the part of the tribesmen to build obstacles. At present, our moral effect on the enemy seems to be so great that, in the majority of cases, when they hear or see light tanks, they fade away instead of offering resistance. I do not think that this will always be the case or that we shall be let off so lightly in the question of obstacles in future operations.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down what is passable to tanks and what is impassable. Our chief snags on the frontier are nullahs and large boulders. There are, of course, certain bits of country which can be classified immediately as "tank-proof localities," but large areas of doubtful country depend largely on the skill and pertinacity of the drivers and tank commanders. On the whole, all infantry units with whom we worked in the Khaisora operations seemed extremely surprised at the ground over which we got our tanks, and never realised our capabilities. I don't

mind admitting that I got one or two pretty severe shocks myself when I had a look afterwards in cold blood at some of the places which we had got to.

One useful thing to remember is that very often, although a nullah appears impossible to tanks at first, the tanks can, given time, usually ferret out a way across. In doing this, they rarely hold up the advance of the infantry as they are usually so far ahead. A very good example of this was the crossing of the Jaler Algad during the advance to the Khaisora River in December 1936, and the construction of the new road. My section was acting as advanced guard to the brigade and our orders were to cross the Jaler Algad and establish ourselves on various hills to the south to give protection whilst Jaler Camp was sited and the perimeter constructed. On arrival, we were about two-and-a-half miles ahead of our leading troops. On first sight, the Algad—which is a deep broad nullah with a surface largely composed of big boulders—appeared to be a complete tank obstacle. However, after patrolling up and down the north bank, we eventually found a somewhat precarious descent into the nullah bed. Further patrolling in the bed produced a difficult but feasible way out which, before, had been completely hidden from view. The whole operation took just over an hour and, a few minutes after we had climbed out, the leading infantry elements reached the north bank.

In working with infantry, I think the basic principle of our employment is to regard us as mobile armoured machine-gun carriers, and use us as such.

It is a curious fact that the light tank, which was designed primarily for use with a highly mobile force has, on the frontier, to adopt the rôle of a supporting weapon to the infantry. In other words, our tactical rôle is much more akin to the rôle of the 'I' (or infantry support) tank battalion than that of the light tank battalion or the light tank sections of mixed battalions in the tank brigade. It might therefore be argued on first consideration that we have a wrong type of machine, but this, in fact, is not so, owing to special factors of the ground and of the type of enemy that we are opposed to.

The main consideration in designing an "I" tank is to ensure that it is sufficiently heavily armoured to be able to combat the anti-tank gun and, therefore, reach its objective. The second consideration is, of course, its cross-country capacity. The main consideration of armour is not applicable where the anti-tank gun

does not exist: the handiness and speed of the light tank has considerable advantages over the "I" tank when the large area of operations in Waziristan is taken into consideration. In carrying out its rôle of support to the infantry either in piquetting or in advanced or rear guard work, this high speed is of great value and it is considered that an "I" tank would be at considerable disadvantage in this respect.

There remains only the cross-country capacity of the different types and I would hesitate to proclaim the superiority of the "I" tank on the frontier until such a machine has been extensively tried out there. The areas on the frontier that are inaccessible to light tanks may be said to be inaccessible to almost any tank. Moreover, the light weight of the present machine possesses decided advantages on many occasions, particularly in the passage of hastily made khud tracks, as does its handiness and short-track base. We have, therefore, the paradox that the machine primarily designed for operations divorced from infantry in normal country has proved its special value with infantry in mountain warfare.

What the future problems of defence for India may be we do not know, but in the last fifty years all its wars have been settled on the frontier with infantry, and in these wars cavalry have had but little influence. It appears logical, therefore, to assume that the primary rôle of tanks in India will be in co-operation with infantry on the frontier, and that our training and development of tanks and their tactics should be towards this primary rôle.

* * * *

Now to turn to our actual employment with you in frontier operations:

The age-long restrictions to the employment of large forces on the frontier and the particular nature of the Waziristan operations—which, I am assuming, are typical of the majority of frontier operations—impose the splitting of the army's forces into a number of detachments of the size of a brigade or less.

Not only, therefore, are there constant demands for tanks from these different formations, but the scope of the country also limits the employment of tanks to that of sections only. More often than not, therefore, the light tank company is split up into three detachments of a section each and the limiting factor of the mountainous country makes the section—and not the company—the fighting unit. This was almost invariably our experience in the Khaisora operation. For practically the whole time we had detached sections working with Razcol, Tocol and the 1st Infantry Brigade and only on two occasions was the company

used as a whole. In each of these operations, one section was employed in covering the infantry advance guard, while the remaining two sections carried out the duties of right and left flank guards to the column during its advance. All three sections were in wireless communication with the company commander, who moved with column headquarters.

The point I really wish to make here is the fact that tactical command devolves upon the section commanders whilst tactical control remains in the hands of the company commander only to such a degree as he can influence the particular formation staff to which he is attached, and to the extent to which they, in their turn, are willing to accept his advice. This is a state of affairs which I think we, in the tank corps, are bound to accept and, luckily for us, our company organisation seems to fit the exceptional requirements with ease and no difficulty has been found in sections being detached for long periods. As an example, I was detached from my company with my section and worked with Tocol every day for three weeks and no difficulties arose.

In discussing the selection of suitable tasks for light tanks when working with infantry in mountain warfare, I propose to divide the subject into four main headings and four minor ones as follows:

Major
- (*a*) The approach march;
- (*b*) The attack;
- (*c*) The withdrawal;
- (*d*) The support of infantry piquets—
  - (*i*) When taking up position;
  - (*ii*) When withdrawing, and
  - (*iii*) On occasions when in position;

Minor
- (*e*) Night operations;
- (*f*) In camp;
- (*g*) Convoy duties over areas inaccessible to armoured cars; and
- (*h*) Reconnaissance by senior commanders.

(*a*) *The Approach March.*—In the approach march, I think we can be used quite legitimately for two tasks:

(*i*) As advance mobile troops in assisting the advance of infantry piquets by neutralising enemy fire. We should only be used for this task when it cannot adequately be performed by the machine-guns of the infantry. That is to say, on ground which can be moved over and reached by us but not by the infantry machine-guns.

If we can get behind or on the flank of the enemy who are holding up the infantry advance, we are carrying out a "worth while" task as we are making full use of our mobility and invulnerability against rifle fire. We can establish machine-gun posts in the rear of the general area held by the tribesmen, thereby threatening their line of retreat and forcing them to withdraw to a flank. This will cause opposition to the advance to be reduced, and should greatly accelerate the forward movement—thus saving time.

(*ii*) As protective covering to infantry in the advance up the main valleys. In this task we should again be used in the way I have just described. That is, to go forward and bring fire to bear on the rear of the positions held by the enemy. Having reached positions well forward we can be used to protect the inner flanks of the infantry by denying the enemy access to the valley. We can further form tactical pivots for the subsequent withdrawal.

Owing to the absence of anti-tank weapons on the frontier we are able, not only to seize but also to *hold* important ground for quite a long period without the speedy relief by other arms. The one essential proviso, though, is that we must be relieved before dark.

From the above, you will see, therefore, that it now appears quite legitimate to place a portion of your tanks—say a section—under the advance guard commander; but they should not be used as advance guard mounted troops, unless with cavalry.

(*b*) *The Attack.*—Opportunities for the use of tanks in a decisive rôle with wide objectives will seldom arise on the frontier but there is, I think, little doubt that, if the ground permits, they may be invaluable in forcing a decision. Should occasions arise when it becomes essential to force a decision, the chance of tanks being destroyed or immobilised must be accepted—provided always that the objective justifies the sacrifice. I think that the chief motto to remember in using us in the attack is that weakness rather than strength should be our objective and that, by separate action against the flanks or rear of the enemy, the best method of making use of our mobility is brought into play.

Before taking part in an operation of this nature two things are essential—reconnaissance, and ample time for withdrawal before night.

As regards reconnaissance, we like, if it is at all possible, as much information from the air as possible—especially in the shape of photographs. If this can be supplemented by information from the forward ground troops of the infantry, it is of the utmost value.

In the attack there is one problem which, to my mind, must always present itself to the commander and which is capable of being solved by him alone. It is obvious that the task of the tanks must be based on making the utmost use of mobility and fire-power. Up to date, the tribesmen have been very sensitive to the potentialities of the tank and very quickly make the best use of tank-proof ground if tanks are seen to be present with a formation. If there is no tank-proof ground, they fade away and very sensibly "live to fight another day." Now, if we want to hit hard and make the best use of the fire-power and mobility of the tank, it is obvious that surprise in the use of tanks should be sought. If the tanks are withheld out of sight, there will probably be opportunities for decisive action in that the enemy may be caught on ground accessible to tanks. If, however, the tanks have already been used with the advance guard during the approach march, the opportunity for surprise will have disappeared.

The commander's problem is, therefore, whether to use his tanks—or a portion of them—from the beginning and thus sacrifice the opportunity of giving the enemy a really heavy blow, or whether to keep his tanks up his sleeve until he sees an opportunity of launching them with complete surprise to the enemy.

Personally, I should always advise the use of tanks with the advance guard from the very beginning—provided, of course, that the ground is suitable for them. The impetus given to the advance and the saving in casualties to the infantry far outweigh, in my opinion, the problematic opportunity for a surprise attack by the tanks. This matter is, however, open to argument and certain senior officers think otherwise.

One thing is worth remembering, however. If you do decide to keep your tanks up your sleeve, and if you have the tank commander with you, he can—owing to their mobility—get his tanks up into action very quickly when the opportunity is presented.

(*c*) *The Withdrawal.*—In the withdrawal, we should be the infantryman's best friend. We are operating over ground which has been previously reconnoitred. We can move more freely than infantry machine-guns and so cover the enemy movements more adequately. We can pin the enemy down during the withdrawal

of the piquets. If necessary, we can often intervene by an immediate counter-attack with limited objectives to disengage troops pinned down by fire. Further, we can seize and hold ground and so enable the rear guard to withdraw or rally if hard-pressed. Finally, the mere presence of tanks will, I feel, often stop the enemy from following up.

(*d*) *The Support of Infantry Piquets.*—We are usually employed in this duty when working in co-operation with "road opening" and "road protection" troops.

To illustrate our task in this case, I think the best method would be to describe a normal day's work during the 1936-37 Khaisora operations.

The unit employed with the column was, invariably, a section. The section would leave the perimeter camp twenty minutes to half an hour before the infantry advance guard—usually just before first light—and take up a position commanding the first tactical feature on the line of advance. The section commander's tank would move on the axis of the advance with the section fanned out on either side, often on a front of a thousand yards. The section would be under the orders of the advance guard commander and would move by bounds ahead of the advance guard or, where necessary, covering piquets up into position.

On reaching the limit of advance for the day, all tanks would remain in positions of observation until the column commander was satisfied that all piquets were safely in position and everything settled. The section commander would then receive orders to carry out one or any of the following:

(*i*) To rally his section to a central position (usually close to column headquarters) from which the section could be launched to the assistance of any piquets very quickly;

(*ii*) To leave his section in observation supporting various piquets;

(*iii*) Having rallied, to carry out patrols at certain intervals of time over various sectors of ground which the column commander considered danger points: and

(*iv*) A combination of (*i*), (*ii*) and (*iii*) by sub-sections.

Ten minutes before the withdrawal was due to commence, the tanks would move out to their original positions—*i.e.*, covering the furthest piquets who would be the first to commence the withdrawal. When the withdrawal commenced, the section would move at least six hundred yards in rear of the red flag, working under the orders of the section commander who—this time—was

under orders of the rear guard commander. The section commander would gradually withdraw his section, watching each piquet carefully down, and moving always at least six hundred yards behind the red flag. It is of great assistance to the section commander if he can be provided with a copy of the piquetting plan. If he is in possession of this, he is released from the constant fear of missing a piquet and can check off each piquet as it comes down.

The infantry found, when working with us in a withdrawal, that the whole movement could be speeded up considerably for the simple reason that—owing to the fact that there were always five to seven mobile machine-guns covering their piquets down—there was no necessity for them to drop their own machine-guns in a series of "lay-backs."

* * * *

And now, before leaving my major headings I am going, if you will forgive me, to indulge in a number of "don'ts." Please don't think that these are given in any sense of carping criticism. They are not. They are merely the results of experience gained and are given with the hope that they will assist both of us when working together.

Firstly—when piquets are taking up a position or when advancing—we found on certain occasions that advance guard commanders tried to give us too much detail—even going to the extent of detailing the line of advance for individual tanks and sub-sections. Nobody can do this—not even the section commander—unless it is over ground previously reconnoitred. Give us our task and let the section commander get on with it—in the same way as you would to the gunners. If the advance guard commander wishes to keep in close touch with the tank section commander, he can, quite legitimately, order him to wait for him on each bound. The section commander can signal his tanks to advance to the next bound, and, after a conference with the advance guard commander when he arrives, can catch up his tanks again.

Secondly—when piquets are in position—it becomes the great desire—and quite a natural one, I think—for infantry commanders to replace infantry piquets by tanks. They saw a sub-section of tanks, say, on a ridge in observation supporting their piquet and the following thought occurred to them—again quite naturally.—"There are a couple of machine-guns immune from enemy fire concealed in armoured boxes. Why shouldn't I take away my men from that ridge and either place them in other positions

where I feel piquets are required or bring them into reserve and rest them?"

Gentlemen, those thoughts are a highly dangerous fallacy for the following reasons:

(1) There are only four, or, at the most, six, men all told in those tanks. It is too great a task and too great a strain to expect two of those men only—*i.e.*, the tank commanders—to keep a constant look-out all day over a large area or sector of country.

(2) Vision from a tank is limited and difficult at the best of times.

(3) Tanking in this climate is, to say the least of it, uncomfortable, and the consequent strain on the personnel is great.

By all means decrease your numbers on piquet duty if you have tanks in close support—*i.e.*, where you would normally use or require a whole company a half company would probably suffice. But *please* don't leave us out in the blue all alone. We like a bit of company in the same way as you do and the two arms can support each other mutually.

Thirdly—as I remarked previously, the tank section commander in the withdrawal is under the orders of the rear guard commander. We have always found a natural desire for the rear guard commander to have the section commander moving with him at his headquarters. Unfortunately, if this is done, the section commander cannot possibly do his job of controlling his section properly. He must be either in line with, or in the rear of his line of tanks—*i.e.*, at least six hundred yards behind the red flag. How then is the rear guard commander to communicate with the tank section commander if he wants to? The answer in practice is that he cannot, except by stopping the withdrawal and signalling the section commander to close.

Actually, it is not nearly so difficult as it sounds. Whenever a "schemozzle" occurred, the tank section commander launched a sub-section of tanks to deal with the situation and immediately closed on the rear guard commander for orders. If the rear guard commander feels really unhappy and wants a reserve of tanks up his sleeve to deal with any emergencies, he must ask for another section. This section will move with his headquarters.

One other thing—at one period, when working with Tocol from Tochi Camp towards the Jaler Algad, the column commander was allotted two sections of tanks. In the daily withdrawal to Tochi Camp, the column commander devised a scheme

by which one section covered one unit's piquets down—say the Dogras. Having reached the end of that unit area, the section leap-frogged through the next section and, in due course of time, covered down the piquets of the third infantry unit—say the Frontier Force Rifles. Meanwhile, the second section covered down the piquets of the second infantry unit—say the Northants—and on completion leap-frogged through the first section, and so on.

In practice, this proved to be unsound and we asked for it to be stopped. The section commanders were never certain where one unit's piquets stopped and the next began. It led to delay, muddle and, occasionally, the missing of a piquet.

The answer is to allot one section to cover the whole of the withdrawal and, if you have another section, to move it with the successive rear guard headquarters.

A good example of this scheme working smoothly can be quoted from the following experience:

On one occasion during the 1936 operations when my section was covering the withdrawal of Tocol, a piquet of the Dogra Regiment was shot up rather heavily whilst coming away. I was working with a section of five tanks—disposed with a sub-section of two tanks on each flank and my own tank on the axis of the withdrawal. When the piquet came away, they were roughly in line with the red flag, *i.e.*, about six hundred yards forward of the sub-section of light tanks covering them. This sub-section had first covered another piquet in, and was in the process of moving forward to cover the piquet in question down. Unfortunately, at the time this piquet was shot up, they were hidden from the view of their protecting tanks by a small hill. Luckily, however, there was another section of tanks moving with rear guard commander on that day. Three of these tanks immediately moved to the flank on which the piquet was being shot up, climbed a hill and within a minute-and-a-half of the commencement of the attack on the piquet, opened heavy fire with three machine-guns. The piquet was able to withdraw in safety with no casualties.

* * * *

And now we come to the minor headings:

(*e*) *Night Operations.*—Owing to our sensitiveness to ground, we are not much use in night operations. If, however, the ground has been reconnoitred and there is a moon, movement is practicable and we are trained to carry out night marches without lights. Owing to the noise we make, surprise is practically impossible, and for this reason, therefore, we should not be moved to our

positions when night operations are in progress until just before or just after dawn.

(*f*) *In Camp.*—We are not of much use to you in perimeter camp. We must have some little time for maintenance, and our gun mountings are not designed for indirect fire—although, of course, in case of emergency, we could be used. To employ us on night patrol work is dangerous and we should not be used to disperse snipers. Neither of these latter are, in my opinion, "worth while" tasks.

(*g*) *Convoy Duties.*—I have been asked to say a few words about convoy work. Light tanks are not designed for this work and it is really a waste, apart from the mechanical harm caused, to use anything but armoured cars. However, there are times when light tanks have to be used—occasionally no armoured cars are available and sometimes the country is inaccessible to them.

From experience gained, certain principles have been evolved for convoy work and they apply equally whether the A. F. V. escort consists of light tanks or of armoured cars. Before enumerating them, I wish to point out that these principles have been laid down for what we consider our most difficult task—escorting convoys through an unpiqueted area. They are as follows:

(*i*) Two sections of armoured cars (ten cars) are necessary in a column of fifty vehicles, if there is any possibility of serious opposition.

(*ii*) The following is considered to be the best distribution of the armoured cars:

Leading section.—One sub-section of two cars at the head of the column. Remaining three cars equally spaced from the head to the centre.

Rear section.—One sub-section of two cars at the rear of the convoy. Remaining three cars spaced equally from centre to rear.

In this way, the whole length of the convoy has immediate and close protection. In addition, there are two sub-units at the head and at the rear who are free of the column and can make use of their manœuvre in action. Further, the rear sub-section is in a position to protect and assist any breakdowns.

(*iii*) When passing through especially bad defiles, special dispositions should be adopted. The whole of the leading section of armoured cars should move on ahead and take up positions in the defile whence it can ensure the maximum fire effect from the guns of the cars. Meanwhile, the rear section of armoured cars will be disposed along the whole length of the convoy. The convoy will then pass through the defile as a whole or, as a further measure of protection, in three or four packets, each packet being passed through separately. On completion of the passage of the defile, both sections of armoured cars will take up their original positions.

(*iv*) If the above procedure is carried out, the infantry escort to the convoy, either as a whole or in part, should go forward with the leading armoured car section. They can then be dismounted and put to occupy such positions as may be selected by the column commander.

If entry into the defile is opposed, the infantry has at least the whole of an armoured car section to support them in de-bussing and getting into action. They are, therefore, in a much stronger position than if they remain with the column. Moreover, they can select their position for de-bussing which is seldom possible when within the column when their position is restricted by vehicles in front of and behind them.

We have strongly recommended that two of the lorries carrying the infantry escort should have armoured protection at least for the driver, and preferably side protection of the body for the occupants. This is not very difficult to carry out.

We think the best places in the column for these two lorries are one disposed about the head of the column and one (in which the column commander will travel) about the centre.

(*h*) *Reconnaissance by Senior Commanders.*—Light tanks were, and are being, used frequently by brigade and column commanders for this task. That they are so used would appear to indicate that they are of value for this purpose. We are also used by sappers to reconnoitre for water supplies, camp sites, etc., and for staff officers for various tasks. There is only one thing to remember when using two-man tanks for this purpose—the tank carrying the officer doing the reconnaissance becomes, to all intents and purposes, a "dead" tank as the officer takes the place of the gunner-commander. For one officer to carry out a reconnaissance

in a two-man light tank, therefore, the employment of a sub-section is involved. If two or three officers are reconnoitring, a whole section must be employed.

* * * *

To sum up—I think and hope that the advent of the light tank in frontier warfare is beneficial to the infantry.

Under suitable conditions of ground, light tanks in the hand of a commander provide him with one or more armoured machine-gun batteries, invulnerable to fire and of fairly high mobility. With these, when strong resistance is met, he may be able to accelerate the forward movements of his force. In the withdrawal, he has at his disposal, a stable buffer on which he can rely to hold off the enemy's advance and which will save many casualties—the bane of speed in frontier operations.

GENERAL SIR SAM BROWNE, V.C., G.C.B., K.C.S.I.

[Extracts from his Journal from 1840 to 1878]

1840

I was "sworn in" at the India Office, Leadenhall Street, in October 1840, just when I was sixteen. I embarked on board a new Barque, "The Worcester," 500 Tons, Captain Waugh, at Portsmouth on 20th December. Bad weather drove us into Portland or Plymouth (I forget which) whence we continued the voyage. My commission was dated from 22nd December 1840.

February 1841

Just before we arrived at "The Cape" nearly all the crew mutinied, and we had a scuffle with them, a rough tussle which ended in the most mutinous being put in irons along the deck. When we got to "The Cape" we were delayed some days in consequence until the arrival of a man of war with Admiral Elliott, to whom matters were submitted. A few were punished, but we sailed with a few in irons who were starved into promise of good behaviour: but the ship had to be worked with the aid of the Passengers.

We stopped some 3 or 4 days at Madras, where we landed some Passengers, and eventually reached Calcutta on 24th May—"The Queen's" Birthday—having been just over 5 months on the voyage.

Some time in June I left on a river Steamer for Allahabad, where I remained two or three days with Richard Lawrence of 73rd N. I., and continued my journey thence by "Palkee Dâk" to Delhi to join the 46th Regiment N. I. to which I had been posted, arriving there in end of July. Here I had a home at my sister's, Lady Metcalfe, the wife of the "Resident of Delhi," and commenced my drill at once.

October 1841

We were "told off" to join the force going to Cabul, but in consequence of the terrible sickness at that time prevailing the order was countermanded and we were ordered down country to Benares.

1842

We reached Benares about 15th December and were all housed by Xmas. The Regiment had a first rate Mess and Band and lived rather fast.

1843

At Barrackpoor the snipe shooting was superb. I have fired away a bag of shot at them during the day. I say nothing of the bag.

1844

In January 1844 we marched to Berhampoor. We were the only Regiment at Berhampoor. Some years before a British Regiment usually quartered there having been withdrawn, leaving unutilised the finest Barracks in India.

The life at Berhampoor was a most enjoyable one. The planters—a most hospitable and cheery set—ready to join in anything and a most hearty welcome when you visited them.

Close to our lines was a fine jheel which from beginning of August was a *mass of snipe* and a good many Cotton Teal. Dr. Young (Fagan) and myself were there every day and all day—bags were grand. We were accounted as "dead men," exposing ourselves as we did, day after day from 10 a.m. till 5 p.m. in a swamp. No one else attempted it.

1845

In beginning of 1845 we got orders for Lucknow, which we reached in beginning of March.

In the mean time, October 1844, I had got my Lieutenancy very unexpectedly, Captain Allcock on Staff employ being murdered near Agra by dacoits who were on the look out for the Magistrate.

The King of Oude occasionally gave grand entertainments to which we were invited. A specially grand one, on the occasion of Prince Waldemar of Prussia. At these entertainments there were animal fights of all descriptions—Elephants, Rhinoceros, Tigers, Buffaloes, Camels, Antelope, etc.

The King of Oude's troops on one occasion mutinied, and the whole force in Murrion was ordered out to attack them just outside the City. When we were forming for attack they "caved in."

Towards end of 1845 I was offered and accepted the Adjutancy of the Regiment.

In October 1846 we were ordered to Jullundur—a very nice place.

1847

In January 1847 I joined the Camp of The Governor General, Sir H. Hardinge, at Bhyrowal on the Beas to witness the signing of The Treaty with the Sikhs. A large force assembled under the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Hugh Gough, afterwards

Lord Gough. The five brothers (Lawrences)—*viz.*, Alexander, Henry, George, John and Richard, were in the camp. I mention this, as the old Sikhs said then, that there was a prophecy amongst them that when 5 (Punj) Brothers were brought together to assist in a council against the Punjab power, it foretold the downfall of that Kingdom—only too true as two years later The Punjab was annexed.

In July 1847 I obtained 30 days' leave and went to Kussowlie to visit my brother Clem, who was then Deputy Commissioner at Amballa and had his office for a time at Kussowlie. My sister Charlotte (Lady George Lawrence) was then in Camp at Sunawar looking after the children of the future "Lawrence Asylum." She was then superintending the building and looking after all the details of the work and working it herself.

At the end of the year we were ordered to march to Lahore—on arrival were quartered in the City, along the old Ramparts. Some of the officers got a room each, with Bath room in a new Barrack.

1848

Henry Lawrence was at this time "The Resident of Lahore." John Lawrence was Commissioner of the "Jullundur Doab." George Lawrence was appointed to Peshawur as Political Officer, to which place my sister Charlotte accompanied him. I spent many a day at The Residency. One evening sitting in a Room there before dinner, an officer came in and we entered into conversation on Military matters, when he remarked with reference to the military executions for the acts of gross insubordination then being carried out, that he "would be damned first before he would let his own Regiment shoot the comrades in his own Regiment." Shortly after I was introduced to him—our new Brigadier—Colonel Colin Campbell.*

August 1848

Matters in the Punjab were now looking serious. Sirdar Chuttar Singh and his son Shere Singh with a large force had broken out in open insurrection in Huzara.

Attempts were made to seduce the allegiance of the Native Troops at Lahore, but Harry Lumsden and the small body of Guides scented out the whole affair and the instigators were caught and hanged.

A small force of the enemy approached so close to Lahore as to set fire to the Bridge of Boats over the Ravee.

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* Field Marshal Lord Clyde.

Orders were now issued for The Army, and Troops began gradually to arrive near Lahore from down Country. In beginning of November we received our orders—and with 36th N. I. marched from Lahore and concentrated some 10 miles from Ramnuggur.

Ramnuggur, 22nd November 1848

After a stay of some days we received orders late at night to march at once, and by day-break we were drawn up about ½ mile from Ramnuggur with 14th Dragoons on our right. Lord Gough and staff with our Brigadier Colin Campbell then appeared on the scene.

After a time Colonel Havelock, 14th Dragoons, galloped down to us from the front, where he had accompanied the Staff, shouting "Advance, Advance." We shouldered and prepared to move, but he called out "No, No, only H. M. 14th." They went on and we (the Infantry) followed. As we passed the Tower from which The Chief had been reconnoitring we could see the sand raised as the 14th were charging a body of the enemy who had crossed to our side of the River "Chenab." Some Horse Artillery followed the 14th. As we got nearer the scene on the lower ground—the dry bed of the River—we saw the Dragoons had wheeled to their right and some of our Guns were in difficulties having got into a quicksand. The enemy were kicking up a heavy fire from their heavy Guns in the opposite bank. We were ordered to halt just when we had got within range. Our 3 Guns were immoveably fixed and had to be abandoned.

After *this* we fell back out of range where, during the afternoon, we were joined by the remainder of the force, and we bivouacked "where we were" round log fires.

1849

On the 12th January we moved to Dingee.

Chillianwallah, 13th January 1849

We marched about sunrise from Dingee on this eventful day. Towards noon or perhaps a little later we found a small body of the enemy occupying a mound from which they were driven off by our Division. Our Brigadier "Hoggans" on the advance to the mound, supported our right Brigade, and I recollect how much we were all struck with the appearance of that strong Regiment, the 24th Foot in line in the new dress—french grey Trowsers and Albert Chakos.

We changed front and deployed—piled arms. Suddenly, shortly afterwards, Guns opened fire, and we found the enemy in

front of us. Speke, the African Traveller, of my Regiment had clambered up a Tree and called out to me. There were "no end of men in our front."

We were the extreme left of the Infantry, but on our left again a Cavalry force, 3rd Dragoons, and some other Regiments. We soon got the order to advance, but those on the right were engaged before us. The thick cover much impeded us and broke our line at one time when we were halted to reform. The enemy were in our rear (Cavalry) and we had to face about and drive them off. We continued our advance firing, when we suddenly became aware of a mishap on our right and got orders for the centre Regiment of our Brigade, 61st Foot and ourselves to change front half right. This disaster in the right Brigade of our Division occurred to the 24th Foot, which Regiment was frightfully cut up. The right Regiment of our Brigade, 36th N. I., was heavily attacked, the right wing giving away owing to this. The 61st Foot and my Regiment was ordered to change half front to the right, to take the enemy in flank. By this time the Sikhs were checked. The right flank Companies of the 61st having wheeled quickly and pouring in a heavy fire. When we got round a Sikh Battalion marched across our front in ¼ or close Column within 100 yards. We fired and 61st also as hard as we could, but they moved as on Parade, never hurrying. It was a grand sight, and my admiration of the sturdy, plucky character of a Sikh was formed from that occurrence.

But matters further on the extreme right of our line had been very disastrous. The Cavalry Brigade there, on meeting the enemy, retired in disorder. The 14th Dragoons and a Squadron 9th Lancers made a dash to the rear, riding thro' and over our General Hospital. The 6th Bengal Cavalry, one of the Regiments in the Brigade, held their ground for some time afterwards, but they at last went off. The result being that Christie's Troop of Horse Artillery attached to the Brigade was sacrificed and four of the six Guns lost.

Eventually the enemy were dislodged. We captured 49 Guns, but our loss was very severe.

We remained encamped for a long time, the enemy and ourselves watching one another.

Our stay in Camp at Chillianwallah was enlivened occasionally by a slight skirmish with the enemy.

Goojrat, 21st February 1849

One morning we discovered that the Sikh Army had abandoned their position quietly on the Kharian range and slipped

round our right rear towards Goojrat. We followed the next day. They, finding they could not cross the Chenab as all the Boats had been secured, determined to give us battle at Goojrat. We waited to allow the Force from Mooltan to join us, and then took place the final overthrow of the Sikhs. It was a glorious fine morning and open country, all young wheat and Barley Crops through which we advanced. As we neared the enemy we deployed into line.

The bed of a stream divided us from the enemy—the steep bank on their side, and they held 2 strong villages, Burra Kalra and Chota Kalra on their left.

At a fair distance from their position the whole of our Artillery came into action. An Artillery duel. We were much stronger, and after 2 hours they gave way. The Division on our right attacked the two villages Kalra and carried them with severe loss on both sides.

After the action we marched round the town destroying all the ammunition and securing the captured Guns. About sunset we got to the ground on the opposite side of the city, where we were to encamp.

April 1849

It was now decided to annex the Punjab, and a proclamation to that effect was issued. The Punjab Frontier Force was ordered to be raised, and I was offered the appointment of 2nd in Command of a Cavalry Regiment, which of course I accepted.

My new duties commenced at once and I had to select at first from the Sikh Troops who had been faithful to us during the late Campaign. Many of them declined service, but still I got a good many.

In the meantime I continued raising the Regiment, and when I had enlisted some 400 I was ordered to march towards Rawul Pindee, gradually, to pick up more recruits.

We then moved to Goojerat, the scene of the battle of 21st February. Here I commenced to drill the men I had got together.

1850

We remained here till March 22nd, 1850, when we received orders to march to the Eusufzaie to relieve the Guides who were to move into Peshawur.

We marched across the Eusufzaie for "Topi-Mainah" under the instructions from Government communicated to us by George Lawrence.

In May I was ordered off with a Squadron to encamp near "Shewa," as the village of Narinjee, just outside of our border, encouraged by the Sittana Fanatics, were inclined to be troublesome. One morning accompanied by one Duffadar I rode into the village of Narinjee. The inhabitants were taken aback at my appearance and asked my reasons for coming there. I told them I wanted to purchase some mules. Some old Grey-beards came forward, took hold of my horse's head, and politely led me out of the village begging of me never to come again or they would not answer for my life. That visit was useful to me as seven years later, when we attacked Narinjee, I remembered the positions.

In the vicinity of Gaza on the Indus the tribesmen beyond our border used, in small parties, to cross the Indus on their inflated Buffalo skins—called "Soornakh." They had marked down their prey, some well-to-do Bunyahs, some few of whom they would carry off, and on reaching the river he or they would be forced into these Skins and then the rider would blow into them thro' the mouthpiece fixed on purpose, and the unfortunate Bunyah was carried across inside the skin and landed more dead than alive on the other side and carried off into the hills and kept there till a handsome ransom was paid for their release—failing a ransom they were either murdered or brutally mutilated.

On non drill days—very early—we used to ride down Black Partridges, very easy work if your horse was well in hand and on his haunches. The country was very level and as you heard a cock calling, you rode up to the bush and had him out—full gallop after him—up again—out of any cover he had gone into. After three courses he was done, and you jumped off and laid hold of him.

Supplies for our Camp were in a great measure brought to us from across the river, 3 miles wide, and it was a curious sight to observe in the morning a whole fleet of men riding on "Soornakhs" (inflated Buffalo hides) lying on them full length with a big load balanced on their back and kept from sliding off by a cord round their forehead. All sorts of supplies used to come over to us, and as Maxwell, our doctor, was most skilful and generous in his medical help, I have seen sick and disabled men and women sitting on a man's back and crossing over in safety.

1851

On January 1st following I succeeded to the Command. I had in November moved the Regiment from Hoond to a ground close to Murdan, where we remained till end of February, when I received orders to march via Peshawur and Kohat to Bunnoo.

Directly we arrived I had to send out detachments to occupy various Posts, *viz.*, Goomuttie, another one near it which was shortly after attacked in force by the Wuzeeries who were beaten off, the Koorum outposts, and one at Tockie. Even if we were out for a day's shooting an express would hurry us in, one of the Posts being threatened or the enemy dancing the War Dance on the hills near the Goomuttie Posts visible from our Camp.

During the whole hot season we were encamped on the Glacis of the Fort, and a precious hot time we had.

Worth recording—Lieutenant J. K. Couper's Regiment, 2nd Bengal Grenadiers, being ordered to march from Rawul Pindee down country, wished to dispose of their Billiard Table, which I wrote for and bought and directed might be despatched and delivered to the Regiment at Bunnoo. My offer was accepted, and I was informed the Table had been despatched packed in one or more Native Carts (Gharries) under charge of a Chupprassie. The Table never arrived and nothing was heard of it. We refused to pay for it.

Some 10 years afterwards, on going over the Murree Church, the large slabs with Commandments over Communion Table were pointed out to me, and it was explained that a village near Rawul Pindee being searched for Arms during the Mutiny (1857) in a refuse heap outside the village a whole Billiard Table was found buried, and as no owners could be traced the Civil Authorities decided to make over the four Slate Slabs to the Murree Church, and on them were cut "the Commandments."

The Wuzeeries constantly enlivened us, and we had numerous little lively affairs.

1852

Sir Henry Lawrence—Lord Stanley (now Earl Derby) came down the Frontier and paid us a visit.*

During my absence on leave Lieutenant J. K. Couper, the Adjutant, had left for another appointment, and been succeeded by Lieutenant Dighton M. Probyn,† 6th Bengal Cavalry.

Our regulation system of shewing your sentries and calling out "Who comes there?" about the most stupid ever thought of. Conceal your sentries supported by his reliefs, in a different position—more in advance at night. No challenging—no talking. Ask no

*(I remember my father telling me that one morning when he was escorting this party along the frontier Lord Stanley commented on the number of weapons my father was carrying, the latter replying that he was designing a new belt for his regiment and was finding out by practical experience the best way of carrying his arms. This belt eventually became known as the Sam Browne belt.—S. D. B.).

† Now General Sir Dighton Probyn, K.C.B., V.C., K.C.S.I.

questions, but fire when within 10 or 15 yards, with Buckshot if possible. For this purpose we had all our .12 bore doubles out at night with our two or three "shooting" parties. I explained this to H. M'Pherson, my 1st Brigade Brigadier, at Jellallabad, and he was successful at once.

1853

October 1853.—We marched to Dera Ghazi Khan, where we relieved the 4th Punjab Cavalry and occupied their Lines (the old Sikh Cantonments) as a temporary measure.

We had a very pleasant time at Dera Ghazi Khan. During the cold weather constant shooting and Hog Hunting Parties on the various Islands on the Indus—no end of Pigs and some "Goinds," but the grass jungle was very thick.

In 1854 I obtained the sanction of the Punjab Government to enlist a few Beloochees. I offered a Commission to Ismal Khan, younger brother of the Logarrie Chief Jullach Khan, if he would come with 25 or 30 of his tribesmen, giving him also the Non-Commissioned promotions. After consultations *his* terms were "They were not to wear Uniform, not to be drilled, to wear their hair long as usual, and to remain at their homes to do 'watch and ward.'" These terms were not accepted.

1854

One morning as I was dismissing the Regiment after Parade the Native Officers came up and said, "A Petition to make" that the Regiment wished to volunteer for the War in the Crimea. Very satisfying. I went down the ranks and spoke to the men asking if it was their unanimous wish. They all yelled out "Yes." I forwarded their offer to Government.

1856

New Furlo' Regulations having been issued granting 6 months' Furlo' to officers holding Staff appointments, I applied for Furlo' and left by Steamer from Mooltan via Kurrachee and Bombay. R. F. Pollock accompanied me, and I took home a "Markhor," which was the first ever seen in England. I presented it to the Zoological Gardens.

1857

On the termination of the Bozdars expedition my Regiment was ordered to Kohat and we marched accordingly.

The day we arrived at Luttummur, just beyond Bunnoo, we learnt the first symptoms of the "Mutiny," little then expecting what it was to become.

We now heard of the outbreak at Delhi and the march of Troops for that place, and I got orders to move my Regiment to Peshawur.

We marched to Peshawur, leaving a small detachment at Kohat. By Edwardes'* management all the lawless border ruffians joined us and were packed off to be useful down country. These very tribes who had been a thorn in our sides for a long time past came to our assistance, and kept watch and guard over the Native Regiments who were mistrusted and had been disarmed.

After a fortnight's halt at Peshawur I was ordered to proceed to Hoti Murdan, where "The Guides" started and made their ever memorable march from Murdan for Delhi, under H. Daly, within 12 hours of receipt of the order, marching in 21 days 580 miles during the hot months of May and June, and making a detour one night 12 miles to attack Mutineers. The Guides lost 350 men killed and wounded at Delhi.

The Siege of Delhi was going on, and we all felt the precariousness of our position. The chances seemed against us.

1857

In beginning of July the Narinjee people, supported by the Sittana fanatics and some Mutineers of 55th N. I. who had escaped to the Hills, now became troublesome, and it was decided to give them "a turn."

About 9 p.m. of 20th the Force fell in "and we moved off towards Permouli," marching slowly and constantly halting in consequence of the close and pressing weather. So hot was it *during the night* that tho' riding, I was obliged to call for water and have my head watered. We skirted Shewa and moved on towards Narinjee, arriving there just as it was getting light. The enemy were taken by surprise, but at once took to their arms.

I imagine I was the only European who had ever before been inside of Narinjee. I remembered the situation and strength of the position, one of which surprised and *properly attacked* was easy of capture.

However, the whole force marched up the bed of the broad nullah running under the village and drew up in front of and under the village. The alarm having been given before we were ready to attack, they commenced to drive off their cattle, and their matchlockmen with the Sepoys of 51st N. I. (mutineers) and Sittana fanatics at once occupied the places of advantage.

I was ordered to pursue the cattle driven up the nullah, and secured some 100 head, losing 2 or 3 horses by the fire of their matchlockmen from the hill-side. I remained with my men till I saw there was some hitch in the front attack when I galloped down there and found the Mountain Battery had taken up a good

* Commissioner.

position on a rising mound in front of the village with the Peshawur Mounted Police drawn up just below them. I rode up to the attacking party of 5th Punjab Infantry—they had just emptied their muzzle loading (two grooved) Rifles, difficult to reload, when a band of Sittana Ghazees rushed out from behind some buildings most pluckily, led by a Standard Bearer, and swept in, sword in hand, cutting down some of the Infantry, who retired slowly, trying to reload. I called up the Mounted Police, who galloped down to me and they cut in.

A low thorn fence was then between me and the village, which my horse cleared and led me into a narrow fenced lane. As I rode up this lane a body of Ghazees came down. I drew my Revolver and shot the first 3 of them with one shot each. The 4th man I had to give two shots. This checked the remainder and now the Infantry poured in and the village was gradually carried.

Tho' not 9 o'clock, the heat was terrible. I never before or since ever experienced anything like it. After we had gone about four miles the Sergeant-Major of the Mountain Battery—the only European besides the British officers—rode up to my Doctor and complained of feeling very ill. Maxwell told him to ride in to Camp—which was then visible. We had not gone 200 yards when we picked him up—dead: and 49 natives were during the day brought in dead, tied on Ponies' backs—all from heat apoplexy.

That same afternoon a severe Tropical storm burst. We were deluged with rain, but it saved no end of lives and made it cooler for the remainder of the time we were in camp. We attacked "Narinjee" again and demolished the whole place.

We then again advanced on Narinjee, but in the manner we should have done in the first occasion, and there was no more trouble.

We remained pretty quiet after this at Murdan. All thoughts centred on Delhi and the terrible news reaching us from all parts of India. By end of September we heard of capture of Delhi, which relieved our anxieties as it smothered any irritation Trans-Indus which naturally would have broken out had there been much longer any doubts about our supremacy. We now breathed more freely.

In December I received intimation that the Regiment would have to march down Country, and I was ordered to raise an additional Squadron. I received every assistance from Edwardes, the Commandant at Peshawur, and in a very few days got together

a body of Pathans and Affreedies, a very rough lot and mounted on all descriptions of animals.

The Squadron of 2nd Punjab Cavalry, my Regiment, which started under my 2nd in Command Lieutenant Charles Nicholson and eventually when the latter was wounded and lost his arm and had to leave, was commanded by my Adjutant, Lieutenant D. M. Probyn, under whose command it remained, and did such glorious service. When I came down with the Head Quarters of the Regiment it rejoined.

I have written this last (above Para.) to record one misunderstanding made by so many correspondents and other book-authors, viz., "Probyn's Horse." As he was the only officer with the Squadron of 2nd Punjab Cavalry (Nicholson having been wounded and left), the Squadron was "called" after him. But as the following year he was appointed to the Command of 1st Sikh Cavalry (now 11th Bengal Lancers) and this Regiment also took his name, "Probyn's Horse," the services of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry during the Mutiny are erroneously scored to the other Regiment which did not then exist.

1858

On 1st January 1858 I marched from Murdan by forced marches for "Cawnpoor."

Notwithstanding this long march from Murdan to Cawnpoor—over 700 miles—I had only 16 horses on the sick list, nine of which were only serious.

After a few days' halt we marched with the Chief towards Lucknow. At "Onao" we joined the Army about to attack Lucknow.

23rd March, Koorsee

Marched out with a force under General Sir J. Hope Grant to follow some of the enemy and came up with them in Afternoon. I was ordered to take all the Punjab Cavalry and pursue them, as we found they were leaving their position. After going two or three miles, I came in sight of them and here copy from General Sir J. Hope Grant's Diary:

"Captain Browne, who commanded, seeing some Guns moving off, charged the Rebels in the most magnificent style. Five times he rode clean thro' them, killing about 200 and taking 13 Guns and a Mortar. His unfortunate Adjutant, Lieutenant MacDonnell, was shot dead in the act of cutting down a Sepoy. Captain Cosserat (1st Punjab Cavalry) was shot thro' the face and died shortly after."

Dighton Probyn, who had been very seedy, now left us for England, a Major, V. C., and the command of 1st Sikh Cavalry (later on named 11th B. Lancers), a worthy testimonial for his good services with the Squadron of 2nd Punjab Cavalry.

August

In August it was deemed advisable to occupy Philibeet some 32 miles from Bareilly.

29th August

The enemy had four Guns, and we heard the firing at Philibeet where I was ordered with my Regiment and some more Infantry. I arrived at Noorgah in the Afternoon and after hearing the report of the skirmish I went out to inspect. I found the enemy holding an elevated mound, the ruins evidently of an old village (Seerpoorah) some three miles distant. The ground separating us was one sheet of water—the inundation after the rains over Rice fields. It was impossible to attack from the front.

On return to Noorgah I decided to march during the night and get in rear of their position. Mr. Malcolm Low, C. S., the Assistant Magistrate, got a couple of Guides, an old woman and a boy, who promised to lead us by a circuitous route round the enemy's right and take me to the rear of Seerpoorah.

After some little distance we got into the jungle and kept just within the edge of it. It was close on sunrise when I found myself directly about half a mile in immediate rear of the enemy. Here I halted for a short time and made my dispositions for the attack.

30th August, Action of "Seer-poorah"

Hitherto all had been perfectly quiet and we had been unnoticed, but the accidental discharge of a musket gave the alarm and I saw the enemy's picket on our (then) right front, galloping into Seerpoorah. There was no time to lose, and the advance was ordered in the following order:

1. A line of skirmishers with supports 24th Sikh Pioneers (now 32nd P. N. I.) } under Lieut. Chalmers.
2. Detachments of Infantry Regiment 17th N. I. and Kumaon Levy. } under Lieut. Cunliffe.
3. One Troop of Cavalry in rear of Infantry.
4. A Squadron of Cavalry on either flank.

Orders were given to skirmishers to advance without firing and rush the position. From where we advanced there was grass from one to four feet in height to the foot of the slope, to the enemy's position.

As the advance commenced the enemy brought round their Guns from their front to the rear of their position and opened fire.

Accompanied by Mr. Malcolm Low, C. S., with my two Orderlies and the Tehseel Sowars following Mr. Low, I rode up the road towards the mound, on the right of Skirmishers.

When about 100 yards or so from the mound a 9-lb. Gun on the side of the road had been playing on the Squadron on the right under Craigie, and I had sent off an orderly to order them to push on and then wheel to the left and charge into the left of enemy's position; this 9-lb. now opened on us with grape, and its first round bowled over five men behind us on the road. I then, followed by my orderly, galloped on to the Gun, which was being re-loaded, and had a hand to hand business with the Gun's crew. Their leader attacked me with his Tulwar. One cut slipped down from my sword and caught the top of my knee, which it sliced, and before I could cover myself or get out of his reach gave me a slash thro' my left shoulder. As I wheeled round my horse reared and fell back on me. When I came to myself again I found myself in a Dooly minus my arm. The cut on my knee hid by the top of my long boot had not been noticed, and which I then pointed out, when it was sewn up. I was then carried into Noorgah, where again my knee cut had to be re-sewn.

1860

I had 18 months' sick leave, but got an extension of six months and returned to India and rejoined my Regiment at Kohat in December 1860, a married man.

1861-2

We remained at Kohat till October 1862, when we marched for Rajanpore.

1864

In January 1864 I was offered the Command of the Guides which I at once accepted. I rode up the Frontier from Rajanpore to Murdan, 480 miles, to take command and then back to Rajanpore, having got two months' leave to see the family off to England.

I rode the whole distance in five days by the aid of our frontier post horses and various chiefs, the latter friends on Frontier treks and shooting excursions. I rode back again the same way with the same help. I had 49 horses riding to Murdan and 52 riding back.

It was a great pang to give up the command of my old Regiment the 2nd Punjab Cavalry. I commenced to raise it in April 1849 and for two months held the temporary command, bringing the Corps up to 450 strong in end of June 1849. Major D. Keiller then joined and took up the duties. In November following 1850, on Keiller's death, I re-assumed command, in which I was permanently confirmed shortly afterwards and during a period of almost 15 years' service with it I held the command for 13 years, during which I was absent only once for six months to Cashmere 1852 and for 20 months in '59-60 on account of wounds.

1869

In 1869 I was again offered and accepted the Command of the Central India Horse, but before I took up the Command I received intimation I was to be appointed to the command of the Peshawur District, so in three months I wended my way back from Augur and relieved Donald Stewart at Peshawur in May.

In September a terrible outbreak of Cholera occurred. The disease worked its way up the main high road from Amritsar. All the British Troops, 36th, 38th and 104th, the Artillery, who were sent out into Camp, were hard hit. The Native Troops who remained in Cantonments also suffered severely.

The memorials in the Peshawur churchyard bear witness to the severe losses of the British troops.

1870

Having been promoted to Major General in February 1870, I had to give up my Command, but at the last moment, after I had sold off everything and was preparing to leave for England, I was told to hold fast as an "especial case" and received a complimentary letter from Lord Napier and I was re-appointed for another year.

1871

I gave up command of the Peshawur District in beginning of April and left for England from Bombay with "the family," Wife, Dollie, Laurie, and Percy, and travelled home via Brindisi, Verona, Munich, Cologne, Brussels, and Ostend, the route via France being closed in consequence of the Franco-German War.

1875

I remained "unemployed" till April 1875, when, having been offered and accepted the appointment of "Director of Remount operations in India," I started for India on 7th April and on arrival at Bombay received orders to report myself at Simla.

In August I was informed that H. R. H. The Prince of Wales had elected me to be the Chief of the Staff in India to arrange all matters and details connected with His Royal Highness' approaching tour in India, and I was summoned to Simla to receive Lord Northbrook's instructions and to arrange accordingly.

Lord Northbrook consented that I should not be dissevered from my Stud duties, which with the Members of the Committee at Stud Head Quarters and Secretary and Office with me on the tour should carry on the work at the same time.

1877

In April 1877 we went up to Simla again for the hot season, and again after the inspections and castings were over tried another line of country for a Run and succeeded in finding one some 20 miles from Lahore on the Mooltan line, which I later on strongly recommended should be taken up.

1878

In April 1878 I was offered and accepted the command of the "Lahore Division" and at once went up there to take it up in succession to Donald Stewart who had to leave on account of ill-health.

In beginning of August I was offered the seat of "Military Member of Council" and went up at once to Simla to succeed E. Johnson, who had gone home very ill. I was to officiate for him. I little knew what important events there were then on the cards. Fred Roberts met me some 2 miles from Simla and as we rode up I learnt from him how imminent and serious were our relations with Cabul.

Lord Lytton was "The Viceroy . . ."

Note

The following copy of a letter regarding the Sam Browne Belt was amongst my Father's papers. It was in an envelope together with two copies of the Army Orders, 1st September 1899. The original letter was evidently one written to the War Office when the War Office were considering the introduction of the Belt to general service.—*S. D. B.*

This Belt is an improvement on the one I saw at The Stores.

Over and beyond the exact waist measure there should be not less than 2 holes (3 inches) to admit of its fitting easy over outer coat.

The two studs on the sword sling and the one on the Frog should not be so high. Space under the head is only required for one leather's thickness.

The Tongues of the Buckle should be more solid and not so fine pointed.

The Pistol Pouch should have the upper portion of the loop (thro' which the Belt runs) broader—as broad as the Pouch will admit of. I have scratched it on the Pouch. This can easily be done by reducing the depth of the loop which should not be an iota deeper than is actually necessary for the belt. Yours is much too deep. The object of its being wide as possible at top and fitting the Belt tight is to prevent the Revolver from shaking at all, at whatever pace you may be riding and keep the point of the Revolver clear from your body, preventing any mishap to yourself or horse from accidental discharge. A Pistol Pouch as generally made invites serious mischief if accidentally discharged by the muzzle being pointed straight down on to the thigh. The particular slope and the breadth of loop at top in my proper pouch renders an accident to the wearer or to his horse impossible.

The Pouch, when buttoned on to its proper place, should lie in the right front hollow over right hip, easy and comfortable, the point of Pistol clear of thigh and pointing to the rear. The revolver easily accessible for withdrawal instantaneously when required, and when in Pouch not interfering in my way with sword arm.

Mr. R. Garden, Saddler, 200 Piccadilly (who retired from business in 1891) was the only maker who used to make my belts properly. He made the original one in 1856 from a pattern I brought that year from India. He used to seat the purchaser on a horse block and fitted him exactly, seeing to the lie of the Revolver and to the proper hang of the sword. He did credit to my invention but soon all sorts of Patterns under my name were made and all sorts of bastard things were issued.

The two extra Ds at back of Belt are superfluous and were only put on for a time when the Belt was worn over a sheepskin coat to bring the shoulder brace more to one side.

THE FORM OF APPRECIATIONS AND ORDERS

By Brigadier G. B. Howell, M.V.O., M.C.

Training Regulations state that a distinction must be drawn between appreciations elaborated in peace time and appreciations in the field. In the rest of section 22 however little attempt is made to do so, and the remarks therein are made to apply equally to both. In this paper the second form of appreciation only is referred to, *i.e.*, appreciations of strategical or tactical problems in the field which, in the case of minor tactical problems, may not be committed to paper.

In Training and Manœuvre Regulations 1923 there was no insistence on a definite sequence, in fact it was stated that "So long as the reasoning is logical and leads up to a definite plan the actual form of an appreciation is of minor importance;" but Training Regulations now insist on the accepted logical sequence. It is suggested that this sequence is neither logical nor suitable to modern conditions of warfare.

It must be the experience of all senior officers that the most difficult subject in which to instruct their juniors is the making of appreciations, in fact at a T.E.W.T. or examination the words "appreciate the situation" seem to have a stunning effect on the brightest. It is inconceivable that if the accepted sequence was really logical the vast majority of officers would find it so difficult to follow. One tries to persuade them that they are only going through the normal mental process which they do when they make up their minds about anything in their ordinary life; but this is obviously untrue, as otherwise appreciating the situation would come naturally to them, which it certainly does not. In fact it may be contended that to go through a laborious examination of all the factors and possibilities before considering a plan, however tentatively, is quite illogical. It is certainly not what one does in one's normal life in which such a process would lead to hopeless indecision.

Marshal Foch said "in war we do what we can to apply what we know." In other words our actions are decided by a combination of, or contest between, our natural instincts and our previous training. The less these two influences diverge the better, and the ideal is reached when they run parallel. Human nature cannot be altered—training can. To endeavour to train officers to

adopt in war a process which they do not follow instinctively and which they cannot even master in peace is to make these two influences definitely antagonistic. There can be little doubt that nearly all officers make their appreciations in a more natural form, and twist them round into the accepted form afterwards. This frequently results in a plausible excuse for a preconceived course of action, and any factors which reduce the plausibility are apt to be omitted or slurred over.

It is suggested that the following sequence is more in accordance with what happens in an officer's mind, and would therefore be a more logical one to accept.

1. Object.
2. Plan in general.
3. Considerations which affect the attainment of the object with deductions as to how the plan must be elaborated to nullify adverse factors and utilise favourable ones.
4. Courses open to the enemy which may affect the plan.
5. Plan in detail.

Not only is it contended that this sequence is more logical but also that it would lead to more decision and determination in commanders. Further it would ensure that adverse factors are given full consideration and plans made to nullify them and counter possible moves of the enemy without surrendering the initiative. In any case it would be more suited to modern conditions of warfare. With the great increase in mobility conferred by mechanisation and advent of armoured fighting vehicles in large numbers some change in the present sequence appears to be essential. There will be so many possible courses open to both sides and the factors of time and space will be so involved that, unless he had a tentative plan in his mind in light of which to consider them, a commander would become so confused that he would never be able to come to a decision.

To elaborate the proposed form in more detail:

1. The object. This paragraph must obviously remain as it is at present and no comment is necessary.

2. The plan in general. This paragraph might be headed "Courses open to own side with plan in general," as before the general plan is decided upon possible courses must have been considered. On the other hand there is seldom, if ever, more than one reasonable course open. In the present form of appreciation it will be found that the other "courses open" are either

set up to be knocked down like ninepins or are really only modifications of the general plan, and these are dealt with in paragraphs 3 and 4.

3. Considerations which affect the attainment of the object. In this paragraph all the relevant factors will be dealt with, but more objectively than heretofore as they will be considered with particular relation to the general plan. Consequently the deductions will be more useful. Take for a simple example:

"The ground is open and any advance across it will be liable to suffer heavy casualties."

The logical deduction from this is not to advance. If, as he is supposed to at present, the commander postpones consideration of his plan until the last, and it then is to attack, this deduction is useless to him. If, however, he has already decided that his general plan is to attack, the logical deduction will be to counter this factor by heavy covering fire, smoke, armoured fighting vehicles, etc.

In this way during this paragraph his plan gradually takes detailed shape.

4. Under this paragraph he considers the various courses open to the enemy and how he may counter any adverse moves or take advantage of any favourable ones.

5. His plan will now have taken definite shape, and it only remains for him to state it in sufficient detail for the staff to draft the necessary orders.

It is not contended that this proposed form is ideal. It is, however, contended that the present form is definitely in need of revision, and this is an attempt to make that criticism constructive.

* * * *

We now come to the form in which the orders to give effect to the plan would be drafted. It may seem revolutionary to criticise a form that has remained unaltered in anything but minor details for so long, but it is contended that here again modern conditions necessitate a change. The present form existed some time before the Great War and was designed for the conditions then obtaining, which were:

1. We had a small highly trained regular army consisting of only three varieties of fighting troops.
2. More insistence was laid on unthinking obedience.
3. It was not then realised that control on the battle-field would pass from the generals to the junior officers and non-commissioned officers, and that success or failure would depend on the skill and initiative with which they could contribute to the general plan.

That it stood the test of the war was due to the stability of fronts, the lack of movement, and the ample time that could be allowed for the detailed study of orders with boundaries, objectives, etc., marked on elaborate and accurate large scale maps. We hope that these conditions will not obtain again. We look rather for a war of movement, and wide scale movement at that.

Field Service Regulations Volume II says "The object of operation orders is to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of the commander and with full co-operation between all arms and services." It is important, therefore, that the intentions of the commander should be readily grasped by the recipient of the order. The intention paragraph as it now stands is of little help as it is kept so concise that it gives no clear picture of what the commander really intends to do.

"I Div will secure the high ground south of the TEST up to the line X—Y" is an example of the intention paragraph as at present written. This, however, merely gives the divisional objective and gives no indication as to how the divisional commander intends to secure it. In order to arrive at his plan one has to study the method paragraph, and possibly also the information paragraph, with the greatest care. This forms a sort of jig-saw puzzle which has to be laboriously pieced together before the plan of attack is disclosed. It was workable during the last war for the reasons already given; but in the complicated operations of future warfare it cannot be expected to produce the close co-operation between all arms and the intelligent initiative of junior commanders that is essential to success.

It is necessary, therefore, that the commander's plan should appear as a whole picture before the detailed orders are given for the pieces that make up that picture (infantry, artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, smoke, gas, anti-tank and anti-aircraft defence, etc.). In short, the recipient should be given the solution to the puzzle before he is given the pieces which compose it.

Where this disclosure of the commander's plan should appear, is really a matter of detail. At first sight the intention paragraph appears to be the place for it. This paragraph must, however, remain concise and decisive. Not, be it noted, so that it may impress upon the troops the will and determination of the commander: if he has not already impressed this upon his command by his personality he cannot do so in a short paragraph in operation orders. It must be concise and decisive so that the commander himself can know exactly what his intention is. If

he cannot express it concisely and decisively he may be sure that his own mind is not clear. The intention paragraph is, therefore, framed as much for the benefit of the issuer of the order as for the recipient.

On the other hand, the present tendency rigidly to exclude anything that savours of method from the intention paragraph, is unwarrantable.

"I Div will secure the high ground South of the TEST by enveloping the enemy's Eastern flank."

One can almost see the blue pencil scoring out the last six words! And yet, may not they express exactly what the commander's intention is?

A more suitable place for the plan would be in the method paragraph, but this is also open to objection. We are accustomed to the method paragraph containing the definite orders to the various components of the force, and the conditions under which these formal orders may be departed from are clearly laid down and well understood. It would be a pity to include in this paragraph anything indefinite such as the description of the plan.

It is, therefore, suggested that an extra paragraph called "Plan" should be added immediately after the intention paragraph. This would be a repetition of the plan arrived at in the appreciation and would normally be drafted by the commander. Then would follow the method, administrative and inter-communication paragraphs which would be drafted by the staff to put the plan into execution. For example, if "The left flank of the attack will be covered by smoke" appeared in the plan paragraph "I Fd. Regt. will put down a smoke screen on the line X—Y from Z + 10 till Z + 30" would appear in the method paragraph.

It will be readily apparent that the relative length and importance of the plan and method paragraphs will vary according to the conditions and type of operation. When situations are straightforward such as in an attack on a well-defined position the plan paragraph may practically disappear and the method paragraph be full and elaborate as it was in the last war. When situations are indefinite and obscure the plan paragraph may be long and elaborate and the method paragraph short. The orders will then be more in the nature of operation instructions. Thus the rigidity and formalism of operation orders will be lessened and they will be more likely to fit the conditions of future warfare.

THE NEW MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE ORGANISATION IN INDIA

By Major M. Glover.

From April the 1st this year the responsibility for the provision and maintenance of all mechanical vehicles of the Army of India was transferred from the Quartermaster-General to the Master-General of the Ordnance. As this is one of the most important administrative changes in the Army of India in recent years and in view of the increasing mechanisation of the Army, a description of the new organisation together with a brief account of the factors that affected its planning should be of interest.

The first mechanical vehicles introduced into the Army were for load carrying purposes, lorries, ambulances, staff cars. The Royal Indian Army Service Corps which was responsible for the transport arrangements of the Army, became also responsible for the provision and maintenance of these new vehicles. Subsequently, as vehicles for other purposes such as tanks and artillery tractors were introduced, the Royal Indian Army Service Corps took over a similar responsibility for their provision and maintenance.

The Royal Indian Army Service Corps maintenance organisation, which was the same in peace and war, consisted of three echelons:

Forward Light Repair Detachments (first line) which helped the artificers included in unit establishments in carrying out running repairs.

Mechanical Transport Workshop Companies (second line), which carried out to the extent possible in mobile workshops those repairs beyond the capacity of units: Royal Tank Corps and Royal Indian Army Service Corps load carrying units had second line workshops included in their establishments.

Heavy Repair Shops (third line) where all major overhauls and repairs were carried out.

From early times the Ordnance, now the Indian Army Ordnance Corps, have been responsible for the provision and maintenance of armaments and ordnance stores. The Indian

Army Ordnance Corps maintenance organisation in 1938 consisted of one echelon in peace and two echelons in war, namely, workshops in arsenals and depots (third line) and, in war only, second line Ordnance Mobile Workshops.

There were thus two parallel workshop organisations, one under the Quartermaster-General and one under the Master-General of the Ordnance, with a consequent duplication of technical personnel and machinery. There was some delay in repairing armoured fighting vehicles, artillery mechanical vehicles, etc., as the mechanical portions had to be repaired in Royal Indian Army Service Corps workshops, and armaments and instruments in Indian Army Ordnance Corps workshops: with the development of mechanisation this disadvantage would have increased proportionately.

The absence of any second line Ordnance repair organisation outside arsenals in peace entailed transportation charges and necessitated the maintenance of increased working stocks to cover periods during which repairable armaments and ordnance stores were non-effective. Moreover arsenals, owing to their being employed on second line repair work, were unable to carry out in full their proper function of third line repair, which had to be effected in ordnance factories. This again entailed transportation charges and prevented the factories carrying out in full their proper function of production.

With large scale mechanisation of the Army in view, it was decided that a reorganisation of the two workshop organisations was necessary. It was for consideration whether the Home system could be introduced in India. Briefly the Home system is that the Royal Army Service Corps is responsible for the provision and maintenance of all vehicles driven by Royal Army Service Corps personnel and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps is responsible for all other vehicles. After full consideration of the problem it was decided that the Home system was an extravagant one for India and that a new organisation should be introduced to include the provision and maintenance arrangements of all mechanical vehicles, armaments and ordnance stores both in peace and war under the control of the Master-General of the Ordnance.

In formulating the new organisation the following premises were accepted:

(*a*) For the supply and maintenance of the army in the field there were to be three echelons, first, second and third line in peace and war.

(*b*) All the technical officers and artificers in the detachments attached to units and in the second and third line repair echelons were to be controlled by one corps, namely, the Indian Army Ordnance Corps. This necessitated the formation of 'mechanical engineering' lists in addition to the existing 'stores' lists for all categories of personnel in the Indian Army Ordnance Corps and the transfer of all technical personnel from the Royal Indian Army Service Corps to the Indian Army Ordnance Corps.

(*c*) All repairs were to be carried out as far forward as possible, no vehicle being evacuated unless absolutely necessary. This presupposed the extension of the unit assembly system for the replacement of spare parts to units. The unit assembly system by which assemblies of such parts as engines and back axles are sent forward complete from third line workshops for fitting into vehicles, was introduced with great success by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps and has considerably reduced the number of vehicles to be evacuated.

(*d*) In the past there has been a tendency for the responsibility for the mechanical efficiency of the vehicles of a unit to be passed on by the commander to his technical subordinates. With the increased mechanisation of the Army this can be accepted no longer and in future the commander of a unit will be responsible for the mechanical efficiency of his vehicles as he has been in the past for the condition and efficiency of his animals. "Vehicle mastership" has replaced "horse mastership."

(*e*) With the slow programme of mechanisation of units, second line workshops had been raised on a unit basis: moreover Royal Tank Corps and Royal Indian Army Service Corps load carrying units had their own second line workshops included in their establishments. The result had been that in certain stations second line maintenance was not concentrated. It was decided that, for reasons of economy, second line workshops would be on an area basis and concentrated in stations in peace on the lines of a station garage. The Royal Indian Army Service Corps were about to introduce

this system, when the decision was made to amalgamate the two workshop organisations.

(*f*) For the purpose of calculating the requirements of personnel and workshops in the various echelons, all vehicles and armaments are reduced to the common denominator of a 'lorry unit': for example a 30 cwt. lorry is 1, a light tank or armoured car 2, an artillery tractor $1\frac{1}{2}$, a motor cycle or trailer 1/5.

A brief description of the functions of the three echelons, together with general details of the establishments of the various units and how they were arrived at, is given in the following paragraphs:

For first line maintenance, which may be summarised as running repairs, it is estimated that one trained artificer is required for every ten lorry units. It is hoped that fifty per cent. of first line artificers will be unit personnel and fifty per cent. attached from the Indian Army Ordnance Corps. The unit personnel will be termed motor mechanics and will be men of the unit who have attained the necessary standard of mechanical efficiency to pass the required trade test: this arrangement provides encouragement for unit personnel to improve their technical knowledge. Until such time as unit personnel attain the required standard, motor mechanics will be fitters attached from the Indian Army Ordnance Corps. The attached Indian Army Ordnance Corps personnel will assist the unit personnel and will thus help to develop what may be termed the mechanical education of the unit: they will be given the same title as at Home, a Light Aid Detachment. Light Aid Detachments will be provided for all major mechanical units and formations, namely, cavalry light tank and armoured regiments, field artillery regiments, infantry brigades, load carrying sections. Light Aid Detachments are entirely under the control of the unit commander and function in a similar manner to the veterinary officer and armourer. Personnel and vehicles have been allotted so as to be able to deal with any detachments that may be made in accordance with the normal rôle of the unit or formation.

For second line maintenance, which may be summarised as repairs possible in a mobile workshop but beyond the capacity of the unit personnel, including the fitting of major unit assemblies and recovery work, Ordnance Workshop Companies are provided. (The Home organisation of an Army Field Workshop

organised to maintain a corps consisting of two divisions and corps troops is not suitable for India either in peace or war.) Each Ordnance Workshop Company consists of a headquarters and a number of workshop sections. The company headquarters contains the administrative personnel and certain specialist artificers who are only required in small numbers. Each workshop section is capable of maintaining one hundred and sixty lorry units: this is a good average for the numbers of lorry units in the majority of major mechanised units and formations. The actual number of artificers in each section is based on past experience of the Royal Army Service Corps and Royal Army Ordnance Corps at Home and of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps in India, a small extra percentage being included at present over the Home figures to compensate for the lower standard of mechanical skill in India. This increase may well be removed after further experience.

Company headquarters and sections are organised on a stationary and a mobile basis. Those whose war rôles are similar to their peace rôles, namely, the maintenance of internal security and frontier defence troops, are stationary units, and their workshop machinery is run off the local power, whereas mobile units are provided with workshop lorries. As far as possible a workshop section which maintains a mechanised unit in peace will do so in war: thus, if a mechanised field regiment in Lahore is sent to Waziristan, the workshop section in Lahore which maintains the field regiment in peace will be moved to Waziristan, where it will join the Waziristan Workshop Company. In certain stations where the number of vehicles to be maintained does not warrant the provision of a complete workshop section, a workshop section on a modified establishment is provided. Stationary sections on special establishments are provided at the ports: these also maintain coast defence units. In stations where there are only a few odd vehicles, maintenance is carried out on a civilian contract.

A small reserve of vehicles for immediate issue to units is held by second line workshops in peace, and by ordnance field depots in war.

For third line maintenance, which may be summarised as overhauls and repairs to vehicles and parts beyond the capacity of mobile workshops, the Heavy Repair Shops at Chaklala, Bannu, Quetta and Deolali have become Ordnance Depots. The former Heavy Repair Shops and the workshops in arsenals are

to be reorganised so that there will be the minimum of duplication and maximum of economy in the repair arrangements for vehicles, armaments and ordnance stores. Also certain production work previously done in Heavy Repair Shops such as body building and leather work, will be transferred to Ordnance factories.

The control of all Heavy Repair Shops and also of the Central Mechanical Transport Stores Depot, Vehicle Depot and Experimental Section at Chaklala was under the Deputy Director of Transport (Maintenance), whose office was at Chaklala. This control has now been transferred to the Director of Ordnance Services at Army Headquarters to bring the mechanical transport maintenance establishments into line with other Ordnance establishments. The former Heavy Repair Shops, Central Mechanical Transport Stores Depot and Vehicle Reserve Depot at Chaklala have been amalgamated to form Chaklala Ordnance Depot.

The Experimental Section at Chaklala has been absorbed into the new Inspectorate of Mechanical Transport, whose functions are similar to the Inspectorates of Guns and Ammunition. The former Technical Inspectorate of Mechanical Transport circles have been abolished and inspection of unit vehicles is now controlled by an Ordnance Mechanical Engineer who is attached to the Headquarters of each District.

The Directorate of Artillery at Army Headquarters has been replaced by a Directorate of Armaments and Mechanisation, the previous title being a misnomer. The duties of this directorate in respect of mechanical vehicles are similar to those carried out by the Directorate of Artillery in respect of artillery, small arms and ammunition. The Inspectorate of Mechanical Transport is controlled by the Directorate of Armaments and Mechanisation. Various technical appointments previously included in the Quartermaster-General's Branch at Army Headquarters have been created in the Ordnance Directorate at Army Headquarters and a Chief Ordnance Mechanical Engineer has been attached to the staff at each Command Headquarters to co-ordinate the workshop arrangements and inspection of unit vehicles within the Command.

The new organisation has made a most auspicious start. Within a few days the new units were functioning smoothly and well. The whole organisation appears to be on sound lines and capable of dealing with the great problem of maintaining a

modern mechanised army. There is hard work ahead for all ranks in the new organisation. Many of the personnel will have to adapt themselves to new tasks, which may seem strange at first but which will soon be mastered. For the rest the strength of the new organisation lies in its simplicity. A motor vehicle will in the future be treated like any other ordnance store and the highly technical personnel in the Royal Indian Army Service Corps and the Indian Army Ordnance Corps will be blended together into one whole for the general good of the Army.

THE EUROPEAN LONG SERVICE SOLDIER IN INDIA

By Decurion

As the question of the practicability of a permanent long service force of British soldiers in India has recently been mooted, a short account of the long service soldiers of Crown and Company who served under such conditions from 1758 to 1870 may be useful. I have taken the year 1758 as that of the formation of the Bengal European force, the last to be constituted, and that of 1870 as the end of long service in the whole British army.

The regular forces of the East India Company, European and Indian, were constituted on a presidency basis, each having its own staff and command, but all subject to the Commander-in-Chief in Bengal, who was always a Royal Army officer. Establishments varied, but pay and conditions of service were alike in that they were fixed by the Court of Directors.

At first the Company's European forces in each presidency consisted of one battalion of infantry and one of artillery, but these forces were steadily increased until they reached their maximum strength shortly before the mutiny. They then amounted to seventeen troops of horse artillery, forty-eight companies of bullock-drawn artillery and nine battalions of infantry, the total being about 15,500 men. To this must be added about 2,000 men serving in the manufacturing and ancillary services, on the subordinate staff of native regiments and in civil departments. In all there would usually be about 17,000 men on the strength of the Company's European army, all of them recruited from Great Britain or Ireland. For that purpose offices were opened at London, Dublin, Edinburgh, Bristol, Cork and Newry. The general depot was at Warley in Essex where recruits received enough elementary training to fit them for military duty in the event of attacks being made on the ships in which they sailed for the east. No large drafts were sent out yearly, as was the case with the Royal troops, every troop-ship taking as many as it could accommodate or as were available. A draft of less than thirty men was commanded by a sergeant, over that by an officer.

For some years the Company enlisted men for short terms of service only, extensions being resorted to if men were still wanted and were willing. But this system was soon abandoned, because so many men declined to renew their contracts when they had become acclimatised and most useful to the Company. Instead the terms of service pertaining to the Royal Army were adopted.

These were limited and unlimited engagements. A limited engagement was for ten—later for twelve—years in the first instance with the option of extension to complete the qualifying period for pension which was twenty-one years for an infantryman and twenty-four for a cavalryman. At first unlimited service meant as long as a man was physically fit for military duty; later it was modified to a free discharge after seventeen years' service, with liberty to continue on for pension, even if disabled or too old for duty. Pensions were of several kinds and a very large proportion of Company Soldiers qualified for them, the majority retiring in India where the terms were more favourable. Those who did so were transferred to the Veteran Companies as "in" or "out" pensioners, the latter residing anywhere they liked in the presidency from which they were pensioned and being permitted to take up civil employment.

Men were posted to the Veteran companies either direct or through the Invalids. There was one Veteran company in each presidency, invariably stationed in an old fortress of which the men were the garrison. Veterans received rations, quarters, clothing and 3/4d. a day pay. There was a fixed establishment for officers and N.C.O.s, but none for privates. N.C.O.s from regiments became privates on transfer to a Veteran company and took their turn for promotion as vacancies occurred in the fixed establishment. Officers posted to the Veterans retained their rank, vacancy or no vacancy, and lived where they liked.

Originally the only provision made by the Company for men disabled or superannuated in their service was the "in" and "out" pension in India. No pension was payable in England until Lord Clive, seeing the discredit brought on the Company by destitute officers and men in England, established a home pension fund by the donation of a large sum of money which was added to by the Company. Pensions varied. Artillery sergeants and gunners received 9d. and 6d. a day, respectively, increased to 1s. for sergeants and 9d. for gunners who had lost limbs. Men from other arms received $4\frac{3}{4}$d. a day only, irrespective of rank.

The Invalid companies provided for men temporarily or permanently unfit. If a man recovered, he was returned to his unit. If he did not recover, he was employed on any suitable work until he either became permanently unfit or qualified for pension. Men of the Invalid companies were treated in all respects just as serving soldiers, except that N.C.O.s on arrival reverted to the rank of private unless there were vacancies on the

establishment or they were employed on outside duties carrying non-commissioned rank.

The actual cash pay of the Company soldier was little more than that of the man in the Royal Army. But he drew free rations, then worth about three annas a day, could live out of barracks if he had a native wife and was subjected to less harsh discipline. The greatest attraction, however, of which recruiters made the most, was the prospect of staff or extra-regimental employment, which meant more pay, greater freedom and better prospects, and was open to any Company soldier of fair education. For those who preferred purely military duty the staff of native regiments was open. There were over two hundred riding masters and staff sergeants attached to the native artillery, cavalry and infantry of the Bengal army alone. There does not seem to have been any age-limit for service in the native infantry if tombstones are anything to go by. For example, there exists in the old cantonment cemetery at Lahore a stone to the memory of Sergeant-Major R. Campbell, who died serving at the age of sixty-nine in May 1857. He had served for fifty years. The old cemeteries of the Veteran and Invalid companies at Chunar and Buxar show six centenarians and a goodly number between seventy and ninety years of age. If many died young, many survived to a ripe old age.

Here we may leave the Company soldier for his comrade in the Royal Army.

Until 1781 the regiments of the regular army serving in India were not part of the permanent garrison, being lent only for a particular campaign or undertaking on the completion of which they returned home, usually for disbandment. All, however, would leave behind a few officers and a number of men who had volunteered for the Company's European service. In view of their ever extending obligations the directors of the Company decided in 1780 to approach the Government in London with a view to obtaining the services of Royal Army regiments for periods of at least twenty years, at the same time undertaking themselves to maintain a limited number of European battalions and sufficient artillery for both Royal and Company troops. It was arranged that the British Government should keep their regiments at full strength, all costs from the date of leaving England in the case of existing regiments, with £10,000 extra to meet the charges of newly raised units, being paid by the Company, which had also to meet non-effective charges for pensions. The pay of soldiers in the service of the Crown

was to be increased to Company level. But each army was to be entirely independent of the other, having its own general and staff in each presidency. Many senior officers of the Company's service were given honorary commissions in the Royal Army to enable them to command a mixed force. Officers could not exchange, nor were time-expired men of one army allowed to enlist in the other. The only exceptions were when the Company was short of staff-sergeants in which case sergeants of the Royal Army were granted a free discharge to enable them to re-enlist in the Company's service. No finer soldiers ever came to India than those of the regiments that arrived during the last decades of the eighteenth century and remained until about 1805. All were unlimited service men, and we have contemporary testimony to the fact that many never left India from the time they arrived until they returned with their regiments after Bhurtpore.

It should be understood that one concession which made service in India popular was that, from 1788, all British soldiers serving in the East and West Indies were allowed to count two years' service as three towards pension. The concession was abolished in 1828 because it was found that a man could draw a larger sum as pension after long service in the Indies than he had ever drawn as pay. The concession never applied to men who had engaged for limited service and who left the colours on completion of their first period. A reference to a list of twenty-one Chelsea out-pensioners, permitted to remain in India on the ground that they had been there so long that it would be dangerous for them to return to England, discloses that the average length of service in India was seventeen years and nine months, equivalent to twenty-six years for pension purposes. Of the men shown on this list all but two had seen service in Nepal, the Pindari campaign and at Bhurtpore. Only four are shown as worn out as the result of bad heart, weak lungs or the effect of wounds. Such examples go to show that even then soldiers in the ranks could serve long years in India without ill effects. As to officers, in the combined Army Lists of the presidencies for 1858 we find no less than two hundred and forty retired and living in India, the majority having come out between 1808 and 1825.

The mortality amongst the Company's soldiers seems to have been even lower and their general health better than that of Royal Army men, due probably to the fact that they arrived in small batches and were absorbed among others who had been out a long time and understood conditions in India. The Company

was a commercial concern and had to take care of its soldiers. Their barracks were better built, and in 1840 the hill-stations at Sabathu and Dagshai were set apart for the Company's Bengal regiments as permanent stations. Convalescent depots were formed at Darjeeling and Kasauli, mainly for men of the artillery who shared them with invalids of the Royal Army. But the value of these health resorts was impaired by the long distances sick men had to travel in country carts and it was not until the coming of the railway that hill-stations became really useful.

Useful particulars concerning the health of men of the Royal Army are to be found in a series of articles published in the *Calcutta Review* of 1851. Bengal was the most unhealthy of the presidencies, its soldier-mortality being 7.3 per cent. compared with 3.5 per cent. in Madras and 5.2 per cent. in Bombay.

The percentages of deaths in Bengal amongst Europeans were 2.5 for civilians, 2.75 for officers, and 7.3 for soldiers. The excessive mortality amongst the soldiers was attributed to cholera, malaria, dysentery, alcoholic excess, badly designed barracks in unsanitary surroundings, crowded rooms, an unvarying diet of tough and badly cooked beef usually accompanied only by rice and potatoes and lack of outdoor or indoor recreation conducive to healthy conditions of mind and body.

The only libraries were in part of a rudely furnished barrack-room, lit by a dim oil lamp at night and without punkahs in the daytime. The books were mostly regimental histories supplied by government and old collections discarded by home going officers as not worth selling. There were no newspapers, these being expensive luxuries beyond the reach of soldiers. The one outdoor game was cricket which was played for a few hours a day during the cooler months and then only by a few. True, there was also handball played in the courts built by order of Sir Charles Napier in 1844, but, there also, only four at a time could play. Only the canteen was left.

It was particularly stressed by the medical officers that regiments on service or long on the march were far more healthy than those in barracks and they attributed the excessive sickness and mortality amongst the latter to lack of occupation inducing a lassitude and listlessness that made men peculiarly susceptible to sickness and epidemics of cholera. All these several causes are now practically non-existent. Cholera is almost unknown to British troops; malaria has been conquered; the sanitation of cantonments is good; the soldier drinks little or no liquor; he plays outdoor games all the year round; there are fine institutes

and libraries better than any working man's club in England and the food is plentiful, varied, and well cooked. Indeed the pendulum seems to have swung too far in the other direction and it may be that men will be too soft to stand a frontier campaign, cut off from any but the barest supplies as of old.

From the inception of the scheme, the Government of India objected to the short service system. The main arguments put forward were that India had no interest in a reserve the object of which was to provide masses of men for warfare on continental lines, that the hardy, seasoned long service soldier would be replaced by a much younger man of a lower physical standard, that, being less mature, the short service man would lack the stolid and stubborn endurance of the older and that, above all, the country would have to pay nearly three times as much for an inferior article.

The average long service man left India between the ages of thirty-two and forty, the latter if re-engaged. The short service man would go at twenty-six, just when he was becoming acclimatised and experienced. That there was some justification for the Indian Government's forebodings as to the inferior quality of the new soldier was seen in Zululand and Afghanistan where regrettable incidents in which young battalions were concerned occurred. They were hushed up as far as possible, but even so some of those in South Africa leaked out and Kipling alludes to others in his soldier tales of Afghanistan, of which proof also exists in unpublished despatches. But much of this was due to lack of suitable leaders. The long service soldier led himself in many battles and won them when leadership had failed or did not exist. The new style of soldier and the old style of officer often failed each other and took many years to gain mutual confidence and understanding. However, the prejudices and preferences of the Government of India had to give way to the needs of the army in general, for, without extending the short service system to troops in this country, a large reserve at home was impossible.

The most that the Government of India could obtain when short service was introduced was the inclusion of a clause permitting the retention of a man serving abroad for one year over his normal term of colour service. The clause saved India some expense and reduced the number of recruits which the home government had to find. The extension in 1881 of the term of colour service from six years to seven further eased the position.

From the start, however, there was difficulty in obtaining the additional numbers required, and by the time of the Zulu War the shortage was so acute that drafts of under-age men who had only fired a recruit's course had to be sent to South Africa. The shortage continued throughout the eighties and nineties. Nearly every year men due for the reserve were offered bounties to extend their colour service by one or more years. The usual amount was Rs. 60 for each year extended and the numbers required ranged between one thousand and three thousand. There was seldom any trouble about obtaining the men as the bounty was irresistible to most, in days when few picked up more than Rs. 3 a week. To conclude, it must be realised that the reintroduction of a long service army of British soldiers permanently located in India would be a very different proposition to what it once was. The young men of the working classes, from whom the army must necessarily draw its recruits, are no longer willing to accept exile for twelve or twenty years for a bare living. The introduction of long service in India to-day would have to be accompanied by inducements on a scale which other Englishmen serving in India enjoy in the way of pay, furlough and pension.

"EFFICIENCY, WHAT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED IN THY NAME!"

OR

MILITARY DISCIPLINE—CAN ANYTHING BE DONE TO STOP IT?"

By Gingerbir Pun.

I had a nightmare the other night. I think it was after a Sunday lunch at the club, where I had two helpings of prawn curry. The dream was most vivid, seemed to go on all night and every minute detail was imprinted on my mind so deeply that when I came-to the next morning, not realising I was in my own room, I shouted to my bearer to go away and covered my head up with the bed clothes. When my brain commenced to register properly, I leapt out of bed and rushed to my typewriter in order to put the story into print before I had time to forget.

Here it is:

For no apparent reason I was suddenly smitten with a bout of very high fever. In spite of all the aspirin I swallowed, the fever got worse. Feeling terribly ill, I managed to telephone for a doctor. He seemed to arrive before I was back in bed, took one look at me and hurried off saying he would send an ambulance for me. This vehicle must have travelled at a much greater speed than the regulation one of twenty-five miles per hour as I had hardly swallowed some more aspirin when I was seized by a brace of R.A.M.C. orderlies, thrust into a stretcher and slid into the ambulance. During the drive all I can remember are the blankets with which I was covered. They were made of coir matting and, I should think, in the local jail. I still bear the marks of quite serious scratches on all parts of my body that were not covered by my silk pyjamas.

I don't remember very much about that afternoon in hospital, as I had high fever, a splitting headache and my body ached as if I had been on the rack. I could not sleep and nobody came to see me. After years had passed, night came. I heard the whole gamut of bugle-calls from "Retreat" to "Lights Out." I then started to count the hourly gongs and in between clock hours amused myself by counting sheep-jumping stiles. There were millions of sheep and they all jumped beautifully. The last gong I heard was at 4 a.m. when I must have fallen asleep.

The fun and games now began. I felt I had been asleep for about two minutes when an electric searchlight was turned on to my face; I woke with a start; a cold clammy hand seized my wrist and something was pushed into my mouth. I realised that my pulse and temperature were being recorded. When this was over I looked at my watch. It was half-past-five and pitch dark outside. Early morning tea was produced. I always wondered why it was called "early morning tea" and not just tea. I know now. I asked what the hurry was. I was told that "handing over" took place at 7 a.m. I did not know what was going to be handed over unless it was my body, but ventured to suggest that there was still an hour-and-a-half to go. This did not go down very well and I was told that there was a lot to be done. It was all too true—there was—but little knowing I turned over and went off to sleep. Again I was woken up by the searchlight and saw a basin, soap, sponge, towel, etc., being arrayed as if for kit inspection. It was still pitch dark outside and as cold as charity inside. I looked at my watch for the second time. It was 6 a.m. Still feeling terribly ill, as one only can in a bad dream, I sat up in bed and went through the motions of washing. I refused to shave and sank back into a sleeping position. I must have been unconscious for a few minutes when the searchlights were turned on again and I was confronted by two bearded Indians. I asked what was going to happen. They said they were going to make the fire. This was at 6-30 a.m. The coal must have been too big to fit into the grate as they proceeded to break it up with hammers. During the operation they must have dented the coal-scuttle, because they began to repair it. Before the fire was properly alight, the searchlights were turned off as the coal-heavers retired; but only for a moment, being turned on again by a sweeper who began to sweep out the room. Having done his job—I thought very quickly—he turned off the lights and disappeared—I suppose to some other unfortunates' room. I made another attempt to go to sleep, but the sweeper must have told the coal-miners that the fire was out, because they came back and began to beat it into activity, till I begged them to desist and go away. I then turned the lights out myself. I must have been reported for fouling by the firemen, because they came back again with the orderly, who had been so anxious to hand me over at 7 a.m., and it was nearly time. I felt that they were too many for me and covered my head with the sheet. After all this I must have got to sleep somehow as I was finally woken at 7-30 to find a large breakfast being put on the bed-side table. I couldn't eat

anything, nor could I go to sleep. I just lay wondering what I had done to deserve all this attention. Just before 8 a.m. a very nice and kind sister came in to ask if I had had a good night. I smiled at her; she was disappointed to find I had no appetite.

By 8 a.m. everything that could have been done appeared to have been done, so I settled down to make a final attempt to go to sleep. It was too bad, and quite useless. The O.G.P.U. were still at it, and were determined to carry on with the third degree. A senior Warrant Officer arrived to check certain statements I had made the previous evening regarding my religion and my length of service in India. I satisfied him to the best of my ability, but my answers must have been evasive or contradictory, as he came back again after about twenty minutes and took everything down in writing. I was not asked to sign a statement, nor was I warned that anything I said would be used as evidence against me. By now I was in quite a nervous condition and could easily have been intimidated, but no actual force was used. I realised that they were trying to break down my will-power; scenes I had witnessed of American police methods on the films flashed through my mind and I knew that any form of resistance would be fatal. So once more I covered my face with the blankets, in spite of their extreme roughness, and tried to seek oblivion in sleep. About this time—about 9 a.m.—the authorities must have run out of normal reliefs, because I was accosted by a Pathan newspaper-seller. This individual must have a free pass, or contract, to sell papers and very dirty magazines to the sick and dying. Anyhow I could not co-operate as I had no money, so waved him out of the room. The next turn was, I feel, meant to be a funny one. A Bhisti arrived with a large pail and brush and proceeded to whitewash the fireplace. He did this quite efficiently, although I must confess I did not give the exercise my usual close attention. Unfortunately he splashed the whitewash about slightly and thus put the fire out. He was, however, thoughtful enough to inform the coal-heavers, who returned to the attack with their coal-scuttle and hammers.

From about 10 a.m. they really got a move on. Feverish preparations commenced which I guessed must be leading up to the imminent arrival of the doctor. A lot of people of various denominations came in at odd intervals to warn me that he would shortly arrive.

I wondered if I was meant to stand to attention at the foot of my bed with my fever chart and diet sheet in my hand. I rolled over and turned my back to the door and shut my eyes.

Numerous people kept looking into the room, opening and shutting the door. I suppose some came in to see if I was asleep and others to see if I was still alive. I heard verbal orders being given *re* the making up of my bed. The time of start was not detailed, so the bed was never made up, but later on a sister came in and spread the white cover neatly over the top, which must have made it look quite tidy. I still feigned sleep. Just before 11 a.m. I heard the tramp of the marching feet of a large body of troops down the passage outside. I wondered if it was the firing squad at last. It was not. The doctor, followed by as many as could fit into the room, entered. The "star" had arrived. I was delighted to see him. I had been kept awake since 5-30 a.m. for this chap, and they had made certain that I would not be asleep when he arrived. I sat up in bed and clapped; then woke up with a start and a shout, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this quite impossible story.

ON EXCHANGE IN AUSTRALIA

By Major (Local Lieut.-Colonel) C. C. Deakin, 2nd Punjab Regiment

It is for those officers stationed in India, who are contemplating a visit to Australia that this article is written, with the object of placing before them the many attractions of this country, rather than a description of the Defence Forces of Australia or the duties of an Indian Army Exchange Officer.

To those, who have had a surfeit of hill stations or of big game shooting in India, a visit to Australia does provide a most pleasant change. The hospitality of the average Australian is too well known to need special mention, and those who do decide to spend their two months' privilege leave on a trip to this country can be assured of a most sincere welcome both from the members of the services and from the civilians. Having been stationed in New South Wales only, the writer's impressions are those chiefly of that state, tinged with impressions formed by visits to the other states. From the Imperial point of view, visits by officers stationed in India must react favourably upon relations between England and Australia and thus, apart from an enjoyable leave, the more officers who visit Australia, the better will be the understanding between the Mother Country and one of the Dominions.

The Australian has an immense pride in his country and he has every justification for this pride. It may or may not strike a visitor that the Australian is over inclined to emphasise the achievements of his country, but it is suggested that those who do take this point of view incline to the intolerant, and lack the knowledge of the progress that has been made by Australia in a comparatively short time. It was only last year that Sydney celebrated its sesqui-centenary, and to-day it is the third biggest city with a white population, and the fourth port—in annual shipping tonnage—in the British Empire. It must at least be admitted that this is in the nature of a definite accomplishment.

The last port of call the visitor strikes is Sydney, unless he wishes to continue the journey to Brisbane, the capital of Queensland, and it is in Sydney, of course, that one sees the harbour of which the New South Welchman is so justly proud. One's first impression is of low hills bordering the harbour with grey-green bush and of red roofs showing above the trees; of little bays like golden half-moons of sand; of scattered islands; and of the rocky

harshness of the headlands that guard the harbour. As one moves further in one becomes aware of roofs as thick as those of a London suburb extending in all directions; of spacious houses and gay gardens stretching down to the water's edge; of tall buildings resembling a miniature Manhattan jagging the skyline, and the sun glittering back from a thousand windows. Fascinating, too, are the ferry-boats like green and black toys hurrying to and fro and white-sailed yachts scudding before the breeze. Truly a sight of gay beauty and one that must impress even the least responsive. And, ultimately, the famous Harbour Bridge which, whilst striking the more prosaic as a wonderful feat of engineering, will not offend the taste of the most æsthetic.

It is in Sydney that the visitor will spend most of his time, unless he either disembarks at one of the intervening ports or goes on one of the several cruises arranged by the P. & O. and Orient Lines. It will be to his interest, therefore, to consider how he can make the best use of his time in this city. There is golf on some of the best golf courses that one could desire; sailing in the harbour; surfing on the many beaches; tennis and racing, whilst, if one is lucky, one may witness international Rugby football—All-Blacks and Springboks against Australia—and, of course, test cricket, if it happens to be a year in which the M.C.C. is touring, otherwise inter-State cricket which, needless to say, is of a high standard. By going further afield there is ski-ing at Kosciusko in New South Wales and Mount Buffalo in Victoria, whilst by going still further inland there is what many Australians will tell you is the "real Australia" to be seen. Which of the above the visitor will see depends on the season in which the visit is made. It is unnecessary to remind intending visitors that, as the seasons are reversed in Australia, the Army officer on leave will in all probability see Australia during the winter months, from April to October. This means he will miss the surfing which is one of the favourite sports during summer. Practically everyone surfs and there are dozens of surfing beaches all along the coast of New South Wales. The shark menace is always present, and at first, having heard much about it, and occasionally having read of shark fatalities, the newcomer may feel a little nervous. However, very few of the many thousands one sees surfing seem to worry about it, so one naturally very quickly loses one's fear. In any case, on the more crowded beaches there are shark patrols and aeroplane patrols which give warning of the approach of a shark—the ground patrols by ringing a bell and the aeroplane by firing a Very light. When this happens the rush to the shore is almost

indecent and, whilst the writer claims no prowess as a surfer, he takes great pride in his speed to the shore on such occasions. This, however, is a rare occurrence and, considering the millions that surf during the summer, there are remarkably few casualties. Each beach has its surf club and life savers who do excellent and entirely voluntary work. The physique of these life savers strikes one very forcibly and the number of lives they save during a season is considerable. This is partly due to the remarkable fact that many of the surfers themselves cannot swim and when undercurrents—which are not infrequent—carry them out of their depth, they have to be rescued by the attendant life saving squad.

Golf, of course, is played the whole year round and those who are even mildly enthusiastic about this game should bring their golf clubs. On Australian courses the nineteenth is worth the whole remaining eighteen, especially if one is an overseas visitor. For those who look upon this game as one to be treated with the utmost seriousness there are first-class courses in all the ports, whilst the beauty of some on the shores of Sydney harbour will soothe the tempers of even the most irascible golfers. Moreover, the general rule is for the clubs to extend a most cordial welcome to English visitors.

There are some excellent race courses out here and some of the big meetings are really worth attending. The quality and stamp of Australian horses is well known in India and one can thus realise that racing is of a high standard. The Melbourne Cup, held on the first Tuesday of November, is the premier race in Australia and is indeed a great social and high class racing event. It is closely followed in importance by the Australian Jockey Club Derby, held during the Spring Meeting—October—in Sydney. These two Races only are mentioned but racing goes on throughout the year and the enthusiasm and interest of all classes in this form of sport is remarkable. Starting price betting, which has recently been frowned upon by the state authorities, is carried out very extensively and it is a goodly proportion of the Australian public which has its daily bet. Peter Pan is a well-known racehorse out here, and it was amusing to hear at a military children's party the remarks of a boy of eight, the son of a sergeant-major. An impromptu little play was being arranged and the boy was selected as Peter Pan. After some preliminary instruction the organiser said to the boy: "Now, who was Peter Pan?" to which the small boy replied "A pretty good racehorse." It was quite obvious what was the chief topic of conversation in that household.

There is polo of a high standard, as instanced by the Ashton brothers' performance in England the summer before last. During the winter months it is played, amongst other places, at Kyeemagh on the outskirts of Sydney. The visitor, however, is not likely to have an opportunity of playing unless he is in the fortunate position of having some very close friends amongst the owners of polo ponies. Nevertheless there is always the opportunity of witnessing it and during the polo tournament in mid-winter a visit is well worth while.

Winter sports are available in many places in New South Wales and Victoria, the two main snow-fields, as already mentioned, being Kosciusko and Mount Buffalo. From the social and holiday point of view, these two places are the most popular and have modern hotel accommodation. It is, however, understood that for the more experienced and keener skier and for those for whom the social aspect has not such an appeal, the lesser known snow-fields provide better sport if one is prepared to rough it and camp in huts. The advantage of going to one of the more frequented spots is that all sports kit, with the exception of clothes and skins, can be hired at the hotels.

The greatest pleasure of all in Australia is, in the writer's opinion, to visit a station "up-country." In the short time available on two months' leave this, unfortunately, may not be possible for all. If, however, a fellow passenger does happen to invite you to his or a friend's station, the advice is "Accept promptly." One will find charming people, delightful homesteads and interesting surroundings, coupled with a generous hospitality seldom equalled elsewhere. With plenty of riding and a healthy outdoor life, this is the Australia which one, or at least the writer, always pictured and not the huge modern cities of Sydney and Melbourne. If one happens to strike shearing time while visiting a station, the shearing sheds are a great source of interest. They are usually situated a little distance from the homestead, together with the attendant living accommodation for the shearing gangs, who move round from station to station. This accommodation, incidentally, has to be up to certain standards as laid down by the Shearers' Union, and considering each is only occupied for a few weeks in the year, the standard, to the outsider, seems to be very high. Showers, electric light, roomy cubicles, dining rooms, modern conveniences, etc., all have to be installed. In the shed itself is a row of stands, with pens opposite, in which the unshorn sheep await their turn, with engines, wool presses and wool classing tables and bins, the whole scene being one of almost mad activity.

The manner in which a dignified, heavily woolled Merino changes into a naked, nervous looking animal shorn both of its dignity and wool, is somehow pathetic but at the same time comical. The shearers use electric clippers and the speed at which this transformation is effected is truly amazing. These men each average about one hundred and seventy-five sheep a day and the "Ringer" is the man who shears the most sheep during the shearing. The Champion Ringer of Australia holds the record at something over three hundred a day. It is understood that these men make a considerable amount of money at this work, and whilst some go off on a "binge" at the end of the shearing season, others save, and it is said that eventually many have themselves become property owners.

If the visitor happens to be at a station when picnic races are being held in the vicinity, he is indeed lucky. Picnic race clubs are private clubs formed by a number of station owners and are held in various places from time to time. All the station owners and their friends within a radius of a hundred miles or so gather at the meeting. And what an atmosphere of good comradeship, geniality, light-heartedness and hospitality prevails! In some respects resembling a hunt point-to-point in England, yet somehow quite different, it is a wonderful experience. It is as if the good spirits of the people are able to lift one out of one's normal self. Grassfed horses, good and indifferent, are mounted by amateur jockeys of the same category, but all apparently are imbued with the same spirit; the spirit either to win the race or win a good time. The picnic ball that follows in the nearest township, or sometimes in a hall built near the course, is just a riot of enjoyment. With the few hotels packed out, the novelty of six or eight changing in a room—usually of one sex—and of two or three in a bath—always of one sex—prepares one for the night to come. Gone are the days of horses and buggies, and with them the tales of the past, such as the interchanging of horses, with many a driver waking up in full daylight at his friend's homestead many miles from his own, and recognising that neither the horse nor the homestead is his; or the harnessing up of horses and buggies with a post and rails fence in between, and the irate, but perfectly sober driver, laying on because his "cow" of a horse would not pull. Although the car has taken the place of the horse and buggy, there still remain the high spirits that prompted such practical jokes and still many avenues for exploiting them, and for one who is immune, by the laws of hospitality, from such jokes, it is all highly amusing.

Those who come from the frontier or other similar localities, lacking social amenities, might well feel inclined to indulge in mild nocturnal adventures in addition to sight-seeing and recreation by day. Articles by, or interviews with, visitors from overseas have been seen in the press in which it has been stated that the cities of Australia are completely dead at night. This has not been the experience of the writer, and may have been engendered in the minds of some overseas visitors by the fact that all hotel bars close at 6 p.m. For those who might feel disheartened, let them be gladdened by the news that they open at 6 a.m.! Alcoholic refreshments are obtainable after 6 p.m. The writer's knowledge of the law regarding this question is far from perfect, but the general idea seems to be that if ordered before 6 p.m. it can be consumed in hotels and restaurants at any hour. It is believed that there are ways and means of overcoming even this restriction. As regards Sydney, besides one very good theatre, one good vaudeville theatre and scores of super-cinemas, there are a number of dancing places, some high and some not so high, where one may dance to the small hours of the morning. One or two are of the "Cafe-de-Paris" type with correspondingly high charges. If the visitor at 2 or 3 a.m. still feels that the night is young, there are the night clubs, entry into which can only be effected by a member, but here again ways and means can be found. There, if he is prepared to risk the thrill of a raid, he may stay until the dawn.

Lest some readers might think that the life of an exchange officer in Australia is one long round of pleasure, it would be as well briefly to mention the army and the work connected therewith, otherwise Army Headquarters, India, may be besieged with applicants for the one appointment of exchange officer in this country! It is not intended to give the detailed organisation of the Australian military forces. For those interested, a reference to the British Army List will give details. Broadly speaking, Australia is divided into certain military districts within which are the equivalent of five divisions and two cavalry divisions, as field army formations. These formations are, in peace, only skeleton formations, in fact until recently the total number of troops in Australia was only 35,000. This number is now being increased to a total of 70,000. These field army formations consist of militia officers and men, the equivalent of the Territorial Army in England. Militia units are enlisted on a voluntary basis, compulsory training having been suspended in 1929. There are no permanent forces in the true sense of the word, except a few

garrison gunners and sappers for the skeleton manning of the coast fortresses, which, by the way, are up-to-date and modern. Apart from this, and a new force of 250 at present being raised for the defence of Darwin, and known as the Darwin Mobile Force, the permanent strength consists of the Australian Staff Corps of about 250 officers and the Australian Instructional Corps of about 400 Quartermasters and Warrant Officers. To this tiny band of regular officers and warrant officers is given the task of training and administering the large force of Militia already mentioned. Its leisure hours to enjoy the many pleasures available, some of which have been mentioned above, are therefore somewhat limited. It is only the remarkable power of the average Australian to adapt himself to military training and his natural military instincts that make it possible to reach even a reasonable stage of efficiency. The efficiency they do reach is really amazing in view of the limited time available for training. Until quite recently they were only required to do six days' continuous camp training and six days' home training during the year. Of course many, in fact the majority, did a good deal more than this in voluntary week-end bivouacs, courses and tactical exercises without troops. This period has now been extended to twelve days' continuous camp training and six days' home training. As has already been stated, the Australian seems to be a natural soldier and with his keenness and enthusiasm it is surprising how much he learns during the few days of the year he devotes to military pursuits. Many of the senior officers have, of course, war service which holds them in good stead, but the majority of the junior officers and other ranks gain their military knowledge in the small space of time already mentioned. It is recognised that the permanent staff is sadly lacking in numbers and this is partly due to the short-sighted policy during the depression of reducing this staff and taking few, if any, new entrants during that period. Permanent staffs cannot be raised in a day and now the Australian military forces are suffering from this lack of foresight. Overworked individuals in any profession cannot give of their best and this applies equally to the profession of arms. Since the recent crisis, the Government has realised that the land forces must be strengthened, and it is hoped that from now onwards a gradual improvement, by the increase of permanent staff, which will be reflected in the increased efficiency of the Militia Army, will take place.

Nothing has yet been said as to the manner in which the visitor travels to Australia, what his probable expenses will be, where he may stay and the numerous other points on which an

intending visitor seeks information. For fuller information as to travel in Australia one can do no better than apply to the various Tourist Bureaux out here or the Australian Tourist Bureau recently established in Bombay. As to transportation, most people know that the P. & O. sail fortnightly from Bombay and the Orient on alternate fortnights from Colombo, and that the round trip takes two months. This gives about twenty-six days in various ports in Australia, of which about fourteen days can be spent continuously in Sydney.

Expense, of course, depends on the individual but for the thrifty no more need be spent than the actual fare and cost of living expenses at the port at which he decides to stay. But it can with safety be said that a great deal more value for money can be obtained out here than in a hill station in India, whilst the fact of always receiving twenty-five shillings in exchange for twenty has both a moral and material effect.

Where to stay, again depends on the taste of the individual. As far as Sydney is concerned, the most reasonable, combined with comfort and convenience, is the Imperial Service Club, where the committee and members are most hospitable and helpful. This club is affiliated with many clubs in India, but in any case it will always take in an officer from India, if he gives sufficient notice. It is understood that the Service clubs in the other capitals are equally hospitable. For those who may have more expensive tastes there is anything from a suite at the Australia Hotel to a luxurious furnished service flat.

To conclude, the officers of the Australian Staff Corps are always most pleased to meet overseas officers in their messes in each capital. They have all at some time or other served either in England or India, and are always anxious to renew old friendships or make new ones. A visiting officer is thus assured of a most cordial and sincere welcome when calling, and it is not necessary, as one writer of his experiences in Australia stated, for your "head to be a strong one," if your inclinations do not lie in that direction.

THE CANTEEN CONTRACTORS' SYNDICATE. LTD.— ITS ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONS IN PEACE AND ITS ROLE IN WAR

By Major A. M. Dore, r.i.a.s.c.

Foreword.—*The writer is indebted to Sir John Abercrombie,* m.c., *Managing Director, Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., who very kindly supplied him with detailed notes for the following article.*

From time immemorial, armies going to war have been accompanied by camp-followers, sutlers and the like, who provided the troops with those comforts and luxuries that mean so much to them in moments of relaxation, and in no small degree contribute to the maintenance of their moral. Similarly, those same providers have been of service to the troops in their peace stations. But the day has long since gone by when these functions could be fulfilled by individuals working upon their own unaided resources. The Great War saw the end of such individual effort in Europe, and made obvious the necessity for a central organisation to operate canteens both in peace and war. Thus the N.A.A.F.I. came into being.

In India it was not until the North West Frontier campaign of 1919 was undertaken, that the old system of unit contractors, who had to rely upon their own supply arrangements for stocking canteens on active service, broke down. It was then decided to introduce a system on somewhat similar lines to the N.A.A.F.I. at home, and as an outcome of this the Army Canteen Board (India) was organised to operate in the Punjab and North West Frontier Province. After functioning for nearly six years the Army Canteen Board (India) organisation broke down from causes not material to the subject of this article. A decision was then taken to revert to the former system of unit contractors but with these important provisos:

(*a*) That all contractors employed by units in India should be members of and shareholders in a central organisation, designated the "Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd.," and

(*b*) that they should purchase solely from the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., all goods specified in its current price lists for exclusive sale in institutes and canteens for which they held contracts.

So the wholesale purchasing organisation, now widely known as the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., came into being.

In addition to taking up shares in the Syndicate, each contractor who secures a unit contract must conform to the current Institute Rules (India). Shares are allotted in accordance with a fixed scale laid down, and which ranges from two hundred and seventy shares in the case of a contractor to a British Infantry Battalion or Cavalry Regiment, down to a minimum of ten shares in the case of small units such as a British Military Hospital. Normally when unit reliefs take place, shares are transferred from one contractor to another, but when units proceed overseas without relief, the shares allocated to their contracts are disposed of under instructions of the Board of Directors of the Syndicate. All shares are transferred from one contractor-member to another at par, and no member has the right to sell, or otherwise dispose of, any shares he may hold.

The Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., was formed and registered as a limited liability company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with an authorised capital of Rs. 25,00,000 consisting of 25,000 Ordinary Shares of Rs. 100 each: Twenty thousand one hundred and twenty shares have been subscribed but so far only Rs. 45 per share has been called, and the paid-up capital of the Company, therefore, stands at Rs. 9,05,400. Under agreement with the Governor-General, the Syndicate's dividends are limited to 6 per cent. per annum, and its reserve funds to a total of Rs. 3,00,000. So it will be seen that it is not allowed either to pay large dividends or to set aside large amounts to reserve. When the limit of reserve funds has been reached, all profits over and above the 6 per cent. for dividend are to be utilised for the reduction of prices of goods. Reserves now amount to Rs. 1,55,000.

The management of the affairs of the company is vested in a Managing Director appointed by the Governor-General. His salary is paid out of the Army Budget. He acts directly under the Quartermaster-General in India and there is a clause in the

agreement between the Governor-General and the Syndicate indemnifying the latter against any loss arising out of special emergency purchases of goods made by the Managing Director acting under the orders of the Quartermaster-General in India. In an emergency, therefore, the Managing Director will act in accordance with orders received from Army Headquarters, India, and will not have to consult the Board of Directors.

Government also has the option of taking over the Syndicate lock, stock and barrel, in war or in an emergency. This option will be referred to later when dealing with the Syndicate's functions in war.

So much for the organisation of the Syndicate. Its functions in peace are to ensure adequate supplies of good quality articles at the lowest possible price, and to maintain reserves sufficient to form the nucleus of the requirements of Base Canteen Depots in time of war.

At this point it is apposite to note some of the advantages that have accrued to troops and contractors from the formation of the Syndicate:

(*a*) The wholesale buying of commodities in bulk and for cash from all over the Empire has ensured the cheapest possible supplies.

(*b*) Careful management and an exact estimate of consumption has maintained constant supplies of freshly landed goods.

(*c*) The scrupulous examination of all goods at ports both on arrival and again before despatch to up-country stations ensures that only goods in perfect condition are forwarded. Very careful re-packing prevents damage *en route*.

(*d*) The small contractor operating, say, a British military hospital contract for twenty men, can buy at exactly the same price as the large contractor serving one or more British infantry battalions.

The Syndicate's buying system is to have regular monthly arrivals of all standard lines so as to ensure the freshness of stocks. Preference is always given to British Empire products. It is considerably more careful than the ordinary importer with regard to the acceptance of damaged goods.

The Deputy Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport, Sind Brigade Area, in the course of frontier campaigns over recent years, has frequently been called upon to take over from the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., and despatch up-country purchases made by the Director of Supplies and Transport. On such occasions as the actual duty of taking over has devolved upon the writer, he has been most impressed at the thoroughness with which such large despatches were inspected by the staff of the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., and the facilities granted to him to watch over the work. Cases were neatly laid out in rows on the godown floor, lids removed and then a 100 per cent. systematic examination of their contents carried out. No container about which there was a shadow of doubt as to its soundness was passed, though many so rejected were acceptable to ordinary canons. After this examination cases were carefully repacked and scientifically loaded into waiting railway wagons. All work was carried out systematically and expeditiously.

Nothing but perfect organisation could have enabled the Syndicate to play the great part it did in post-earthquake relief measures at Quetta in 1935. Within forty-eight hours of the call for help being received no less than seven railway wagon loads of goods were despatched as well as a trained staff to open up a relief canteen.

The storage and distribution of goods of so large a concern has, of course, been the subject of most careful consideration. Stocks are held at depots in Karachi, Bombay, Calcutta and Madras, and up-country stations are based upon whichever port can deliver at the cheapest price. There are also sub-depots at Rawalpindi and Delhi. The Rawalpindi sub-depot was opened about two-and-a-half years ago to function as a sort of forward depot for frontier operations as well as to cater for local units. It has been found that area sub-depots forward of ports are of great service to contractors since they are enabled thereby to get stocks quickly and so reduce their holdings. It is possible that these two sub-depots would be of use in connection with internal security measures.

The final function of the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., in peace is to hold sufficient reserves to enable the opening up of Base Canteen Depots in war as well as continuing services

to troops in peace areas. All the Syndicate's stocks are at the disposal of Government for canteen service in the event of war.

In so far as the Director of Supplies and Transport and the Director of Contracts are concerned, the position is that while the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., is under no obligation to supply them, it has always met their demands for stocks when it has been possible to do so without interfering with its normal commitments.

The rôle of the Syndicate in war has to be considered under two headings:

(*a*) Operations not involving mobilisation.

(*b*) Mobilisation.

In frontier operations the present system will continue, and contractors will accompany and continue to provide for their own units. The rate of rebate they will pay is subject to certain reductions as defined in the Canteen Manual (War) 1938. Base Canteen Depots for the supply of contractors will be opened by the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., in the area of operations as ordered by Army Headquarters, India.

Operations of this nature present no particular difficulty. From their experience of previous operations it is considered that the Syndicate's stocks will be ample to maintain for several months the troops engaged. The replenishment of these stocks is not likely to occasion any difficulty.

Full mobilisation, however, presents a very different picture.

In the first place, it must be assumed that full mobilisation will not be ordered unless there are serious disturbances in the country, or operations on the frontier, accompanied by war in Europe. Such a situation would immediately cause the mobilisation of all the resources of the Empire, the closing of normal trade routes and the general dislocation of all normal commerce through the commandeering of vessels and the restriction of exports. In such circumstances it is doubtful if the Syndicate could continue to function as a commercial concern. It seems probable that immediately upon full mobilisation, Government will exercise its option of taking over the stocks and the business of the Syndicate. On receipt of such a decision the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate, Ltd., will go into "hibernation" until the business is handed back, functioning only in order to fulfil the requirements of the Indian Companies Act. The business will

be carried on by the existing staff under the name of the Canteen Stores Department of the Government of India.

Units which have not been mobilised will continue to be catered for under the present Unit Contractor System. In the field the Field Canteen system will be introduced. Contractors of certain units will be appointed to run Field Canteens to cater approximately for 1,500 British other ranks, 3,500 Indian other ranks and twenty messes. These Field Canteens will be supplied from Base Canteen Depots opened by the Canteen Stores Department. All rebates will cease and contractors running Field Canteens will be supplied at the wholesale prices and will sell at the retail prices sanctioned by the Quartermaster-General in India. It is hoped that the wholesale prices sanctioned by the Quartermaster-General in India will enable the Canteen Stores Department to set aside a certain percentage of profit to be disbursed later to the units engaged, both British and Indian, in lieu of contractors' and banias' rebate.

The canteen staff employed by Field Contractors will not be enrolled but will be subject to military law under Section 2 of the Indian Army Act. They will remain the employees of the contractor though eligible for disability pensions. If they are killed, their heirs will be given pensions at such rates as the Government of India may decide. They will be entitled to draw rations and clothing on payment. Employees in Base Canteen Depots will be treated in the same way.

All persons engaged in canteen service will wear green armbands.

Field Canteen contractors will also be responsible for one or more light sections in the area allotted to them. Tentage, tables, benches, etc., will be provided on the scale laid down in the tables in the Appendix to the Canteen Manual (War), 1938, and free transport will be provided in the war area.

It is assumed that when the troops advance, established Field Canteens will remain in their original areas, and that advanced Field Canteens will be formed and operated by other selected contractors. In any case there will be no Unit Contractors in the war area and the special requirements of Indian troops will be catered for by banias engaged by the Field Contractors and attached to the Field Canteens.

That summarises the arrangements for canteens in forward areas.

We now turn to the Base Canteen Depots necessary for the supply of Field Canteens. On receipt of mobilisation orders the Canteen Contractors' Syndicate or the Canteen Stores Department will open the number of Base Canteen Depots ordered by Army Headquarters, India. Information regarding the number of Base Canteen Depots that may be required and full details of the strengths of the troops and the number of Field Canteens to be supplied by each Base Canteen Depot has been received. Indents have been prepared for the thirty days' supplies needed to open each Base Canteen Depot working on the strengths indicated. These indents will go to the warehouse immediately warning notice is issued and the requirements of Base Canteen Depots could be ready for despatch very soon after. The date upon which Base Canteen Depots will be ready to commence issues depends on the time taken in railway transit, supplies during the interim period being made from contractors' own holdings of stocks.

Sufficient stocks are held in Karachi to meet all demands likely to be made by Base Canteen Depots for the first thirty days, and it is hoped also for a further period of at least as long. The stocks in the depots at Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Rawalpindi and Delhi, together with what is already in contractors' hands, will provide for the needs of the troops in back areas for several months, and some of these stocks will also be available to replenish Base Canteen Depots should Karachi stocks run out.

It has to be remembered in connection with stocks that the transition from ordinary peace scales to field service scales of rations will free considerable quantities of messing articles such as jam, cheese, etc., and these will be available either to augment the reserves held for troops in the back areas or for delivery to the Director of Contracts.

FROM INDIA TO THE IRRAWADDY ON FOOT AND BY CANOE

By Captain A. Simpson

Introduction

A month's holiday in India can be spent in several ways. For example, going to the hills and trekking, shooting, fishing or just staying in one place; or going on a sea cruise (which is bad for the brain and the liver); these are the ways in which the majority of people spend their spare time.

I had tried one or more of these ways but this time I wanted a new experience. As long as I had a complete mental and physical change I did not mind what I did. These two conditions I insisted on as they, in my mind, make a holiday really beneficial. So I thought of a canoe trip undertaken entirely by myself. The rivers in India are very long and for the most part flow through stretches of uninteresting, hot, dry plains. In Burma, on the other hand, the rivers flow north and south, *i.e.*, throughout the length of Burma, and in Upper Burma through dense forests and picturesque scenery.

The usual way to see Burma is to go by sea to Rangoon, thence by river steamer, train or car to Mandalay which is situated on the Irrawaddy River. From Mandalay one branches off north-west, north or east, according to what part of Upper Burma one wishes to visit.

The Chindwin river, the westernmost of Burma's main rivers, is nearest to India and flows through the Upper Chindwin and Lower Chindwin Districts eventually joining the Irrawaddy near Monywa about forty miles below Mandalay. The only way to visit these districts is by river steamer up the Chindwin river as there are no roads and the elephant is the only means of transport away from the river. Therefore if I wanted to paddle a canoe down the Chindwin river and to reach my starting point by the usual way, I should have to travel practically the whole length of Burma first and go up by steamer along the same route which I should eventually come down by canoe. This would take the gilt off the ginger bread; besides I might meet distractions (and there are many in Burma) on the way which would deter me from my purpose, or people would raise objections or put obstacles in my way. If on the other hand, I took the unusual way of entering Burma by walking across from India, all such difficulties would be solved. In addition I should get as much mental and physical

change as I needed because a one-man canoe on this route would entail going without any servant. Only those who have lived even a short time in India, where one is so dependent upon a host of menials, will appreciate what this means. I should have to cook, wash up, pack and unpack my canoe every day; and in fact do everything myself.

With the aid of a map I saw that a motor road ran from railhead, Manipur Road station, in North Assam for about one hundred and thirty miles to Imphal the capital of Manipur State. I wrote to the Political Agent of Manipur State asking if there was a road or track from Imphal to the Chindwin river in Burma. His reply was very reassuring and provided me with a lot of useful information. For my trip the most important information was that I should have to take all supplies with me from Imphal as none could be obtained on the way, that the journey would take six days to the river and that the coolies would not carry more than fifty pounds each. In other words I had to take a canoe which would suit a coolie's back and not necessarily one which would suit me best. This meant a canoe which could be carried in separate sections, each section weighing less than fifty pounds. My own kit and stores had to fit into the canoe when I reached the river. And the sections had to be made so that they could easily be fitted together.

The canoe was made of the thinnest tin in three sections of six feet each in length. The two end sections each contained an air-tight compartment which I could use for stowing stores. The centre section had a canvas covering which was clipped on along the top. This was meant to be used as a bed as I did not know the river at all and could not depend on finding villages at convenient intervals. Incidentally the Upper Chindwin District was regarded as a "backward state" until a few years ago, so I thought it would be safer to sleep in the canoe rather than on dry land.

I did not take any fire-arms since backward tribes, I reasoned, would be suspicious and even hostile if they saw me with a weapon, but would probably welcome me if they realised I had no ulterior motive behind my visit.

So I adopted Mr. Gandhi's ideal of non-violence and resorted to an umbrella.

I had bought the umbrella as a protection against the sun's rays during my walk across Assam into Burma and against the glare off the water while on the river. If there was one thing I could rely on, I considered it was fine weather. But it was actually as a protection against the rain that my umbrella came

in useful. For four continuous days and nights out of the six days of my trek it rained in torrents, and if it had not been for the umbrella I should probably have caught a chill.

A weapon would not have been of any use during that rain so I have a lot for which to thank Mr. Gandhi and his creed of non-violence.

Assam to Burma on Foot

After a long train journey, crossing the Brahmaputra river on a ferry steamer, I reached Manipur Road station in Assam and transferred my canoe to a bus in order to travel the one hundred and thirty odd miles to Imphal. The canoe rested on a number of tins of petrol in the bus, so on arrival at Imphal I was naturally anxious to find out whether it was still a canoe or merely a sieve. Once I left Imphal I could not rely on finding a helpful tin-smith conveniently sitting on the roadside who could repair the boat. I did not know at that time that I was going to have a leaking canoe on the Chindwin, nor that owing to the inherent hospitality and kindness of the villagers in Upper Burma I should have no trouble whatever in getting it repaired.

At any rate at Imphal the canoe was a canoe and had suffered no damage so far.

Imphal, the capital of Manipur State, is a delightful place and I stayed there several days as I knew I should not be returning the same way. The two most noticeable things about this place are, first the English type of architecture of the houses in which the Europeans live—black wooden beams and white plaster above a brick ground floor such as one sees in Staffordshire—and secondly, the bazaar which takes place every evening after dark and is run by women who come daily in hundreds to sell their goods.

The Political Agent was most helpful and, provided with five Naga coolies and a pass into Burma. I set off on the hundred-mile trek to the Chindwin.

At Imphal I bought stores to last me a week. Once I arrived at the Chindwin I could count on obtaining more supplies from the steamers which ply twice weekly up and down the river bringing food and merchandise to the villages. My food supply consisted of *dhall* (pulse) *atta* (coarse whole meal), coffee, powdered milk and sugar. I carried a kettle, but no spirit stove nor paraffin lamp as I could not take a supply of paraffin in the canoe and I should not be able to procure any on the way. I had to rely on firewood, so I carried a "kukri" or Gurkha knife.

The Naga coolies were "wild and woolly," whose ancestors were notorious for their head hunting expeditions. These expeditions are forbidden now, but they are almost impossible to suppress entirely on account of the difficult nature of the country.

I could not speak a word of their language, but the coolies had no difficulty in arranging the sections of the canoe to be carried in their own way. Their usual method of carrying a load is by means of a strap slung across the forehead which supports the load on the back and leaves the hands free for climbing up the precipitous hillsides. The centre section of the canoe was too unwieldy to carry like this and two coolies carried it on a long bamboo pole over their shoulders.

There was no difficulty in finding the way as the bridle path is broad and well defined and follows the telegraph line to Burma. The country is very hilly and covered with forest on the Indian side, while on the Burma side of the frontier it is undulating and covered with thick jungle. For this reason there is hardly any cultivation and I met very few natives. Even the villages were far apart and situated off my path.

The inhabitants are Kukis on the Indian side and Chins and Kachins in Burma. I could not tell the difference between my Naga coolies, Chins or Kachins as they all had Mongolian features and were short with thick legs and arms.

The only people I encountered throughout this walk were occasional parties of men carrying baskets of dried fish from Burma for sale in Imphal. The smell of this fish was so strong that I could detect the approach of any party long before I met it. Later on in Burma I was to eat this kind of fish as part of my daily diet.

The first two days of the trek were delightful and the scenery superb, range upon range of forest-clad hills on all sides; but on the third day the landscape was blotted out by the rain. It rained day and night until I reached the Chindwin. It was very depressing and I thought of turning back and throwing up the whole trip. But if I did turn back what should I do with the rest of my leave? Besides, I should be unable to face again the people who had made such discouraging remarks to me about my canoe trip. Furthermore pride and prestige in front of the Nagas, who were quite unconcerned about the rain, forbade my doing anything else except continuing the journey.

I slept in rough rest houses which were conveniently situated at stages along the way. Being built of mud and thatch they were not proof against the heavy rain, and consequently I was

not dry until I reached the Chindwin. I was provided with a "Lilo" mattress and a tin of Keating's. It did not matter whether I slept on the ground or on a hard bed; I rested on air.

I stored my food in the air-tight compartments of the canoe, and the rest of my kit with the coolies' belongings I put in the centre section covering it up with the canvas strip. In this way and with the help of the now priceless umbrella I managed to keep myself and my kit as free from damp as I could until I reached the Chindwin river at a small village called Sittaung.

Across the Frontier into Burma

The Burma frontier is passed halfway between Imphal and Sittaung where the path enters a small Burmese village called Tamu. At Tamu the police asked for my passport, but I had only the pass from the Political Agent of Manipur State. The names and nationalities of all foreigners entering Burma from India are telegraphed to the police headquarters of the Upper Chindwin district at Mawlaik. As I had to pass Mawlaik on my journey down river I wondered whether the police would find me, in my canoe.

At Tamu I could buy onions, potatoes and any amount of evil smelling dried fish. The natives all over Burma have a passion for this fish which is eaten, covered with salt and in a state of decomposition, every day with their rice. Hitherto I had cooked my own food which was very nutritious and sustaining, plain though it was. Little did I guess that before long I should be eating that highly salted dried fish myself nearly every day on the Chindwin river as a guest of a village headman. I knew no Burmese except the words for a village headman (the-gee) and rice and curry (thi-min-hin). I was assured that if ever I wanted anything to eat all I had to do was to stop my canoe at a village, say "the-gee" when the headman would be brought to me and if I then said "thi-min-hin" I would be given a large meal of curry and rice. No mention was made of any dried fish!

At Sittaung I had to part with my Naga coolies who, in spite of the incessant rain, had walked up and down hill with the agility of cats and had kept up with me throughout. I do not think they kept close to me for fear of wild animals in the jungle through which we passed, as they saw that my only defence was an umbrella. I was sorry when I had to part from them and did not envy them their journey back to Imphal through the forest and jungle.

The day I reached Sittaung a river steamer arrived carrying general merchandise, so I was able to replenish my larder. A young officer of the Burma Forest Department disembarked preparatory to making a five months' tour of the forests by elephant. It is from this part of Burma that a large quantity of teakwood is grown, cut down and floated down river to the saw mills in Rangoon where it is cut into various lengths and widths and exported all over the world. Teakwood and oil are Burma's most valuable exports. The Bombay Burma Company is the oldest company in Burma and handles most of the teak trade. This Company was trading in Upper Burma before the British had conquered it and had a trade agreement with King Thibaw in Mandalay. The Forest Department officers and the assistants of the Bombay Burma Company work together. The former decide which trees have a marketable value and the latter cut them down, mark them with their Company's mark and float them as rafts or as single logs to Rangoon.

It is very lonely working for months on end in the jungle and also unhealthy; but those men I met, Europeans and Burmese, who worked in this district were always cheerful and very hospitable to any stranger.

Down the Chindwin by Canoe

I put my canoe sections together for the first time since I started to the great interest of the Chins who had never seen a collapsible boat before, and tried the complete canoe out on the river.

This time there was a leak probably caused by the jolting on a coolie's back. The forest officer could speak Burmese so he called up the headman and asked him to mend the boat. Every villager on the river knows how to repair a boat, so in a very short time some dark brown resinous stuff was smeared over the leak on the outside of the canoe. When it dries this resinous stuff becomes very hard and is almost impossible to break off. So I was fortunate in being able at any rate to start in a water tight boat.

The captain of the steamer warned me to keep a look out for whirlpools. Of course I had never thought of any such dangers as I had never been alone on a river before. I was told that off each bend and headland I could expect a whirlpool, the strength depending on the strength of the current and the narrowness of the river at that particular point.

I must say that it was with no great confidence that I said farewell to the kind forest officer and launched out on the Chind win knowing only two words of the language. Thankful for the steamer captain's advice I kept clear of the main current for a while until my confidence increased.

After the heavy amount of rain the river had risen considerably and the current had grown stronger. I could see foam, looking like froth on the top of a glass of beer, floating down one side of the river. This scum indicated where the current was strongest. Mixed up with the scum were half submerged branches, refuse, and floating logs, all the result of the rise in level of the river. My canoe being very thin would not stand much damage so I had to be very careful of these floating objects. Naturally I wished to follow the current but when I came near a whirlpool I had to get out either in midstream or to the opposite bank and join the current further down.

I went very slowly and carefully and was able to appreciate the beauty of the scenery. On each side was a steep and narrow range of hills forming an escarpment, a noticeable feature of the Upper Chindwin. The hills were covered with forest which came down close to the water's edge and I noticed many beautiful kingfishers and other birds which took no notice of me as I paddled close to the bank. Occasionally a clearing in the jungle revealed a small village, each house being built above the level of the ground and supported on wooden piles. However small or poor the house, it was invariaby built on piles and this type is to be found all over Burma. In India to keep a house above flood level, the owner builds up the earthwork and puts his house on it. In Burma it is done in a different way; the water is allowed to flow under the house between the wooden piles.

On every river there is sure to be a "Lovers' Leap" and I passed the high cliff overhanging the river which was the local "Lovers' Leap."

The first day I travelled only twenty miles but when I grew accustomed to the current and not so afraid of whirlpools my average increased to between thirty and thirty-five miles a day. My starting time depended upon the mist which lasted from sunrise until seven or eight o'clock nearly every morning. Not knowing the river and being unable to see the landmarks which indicated the proximity of a whirlpool, I made quite sure of visibility before I started.

I was prepared to use my canoe as a bed as I had originally intended; but although my canoe was arranged to fit a mosquito

net I did not relish the idea as there was a very heavy dew at night and a thick mist in the early morning. However, not once did I have to sleep in the canoe because I was always provided with a room wherever I stopped. There are well built rest houses at intervals for the use of officials on tour and if I happened to stop at a village where one of these bungalows were situated, I slept there for the night cooking my own food. But the wonderful hospitality of the Chins, starting with the headman who was the first person I asked to see, saved me endless trouble. The magic word "the-gee" never failed to work and I seldom got as far as "thi-min-hin" since food, water and firewood were brought without question.

The headman followed by a score of women, either of his own family or a friend's used to carry my kit sufficient for the night to a rest house. It was always a woman who did the work. Then water and wood came along. I was not particular about where the water came from. I had neither filter nor alum but I used to boil the water and drink my coffee with great enjoyment. I did not give a thought to typhoid, dysentery or any other of the dreadful diseases about which my well meaning friends in India had warned me.

By the time I had finished my coffee the headman would march in ahead of one or more girls each bringing the local curry and rice. This was always cooked at the headman's house and was the same food which had been prepared for his evening meal. With the curry and rice was always the chief delicacy and pride of the headman—dried fish. To refuse this would be to cast a slur both on the food and the hospitality of my host, so I had to eat it. Eventually I grew accustomed to the taste but the saltiness never failed to bring on a violent thirst. The first time I ate it I had not reckoned on the after effects so I did not boil enough water to quench my thirst throughout the night. The fire had of course gone out and I did not dare to drink the water unboiled so I suffered agonies of thirst. After that lesson I knew better and always boiled a lot of water before the meal started.

I cannot speak too highly of the cheeriness and hospitality of these simple villagers. The language problem presented no difficulty to me as they had an uncanny way of foreseeing my wants and were always ready to laugh at anything I did.

I often left such stores and clothes as I did not need for the night in my unguarded canoe tied up to the river bank; but not a single thing was stolen.

Once I really was concerned. I had to walk about a quarter of a mile away from the place where I had left my canoe to reach the house which the headman indicated I could use. On returning the next morning after the mist had risen I was dumbfounded (literally too, because I could not speak the language) to find my canoe empty. Everything had disappeared, even the paddle. I had not long to wait, however, before the smiling headman appeared heading a procession of women carrying all my belongings.—The honest man had had everything taken out of my canoe for safety during the night and brought to his own house, and now he was returning it all to the canoe. Can hospitality do more? And this happened at a time when there were anti-Indian and anti-British riots all over Burma. I have often wondered whether these Chins would have shown me the same kindness and hospitality if I had taken a gun or a revolver with me.

I used to offer money every time but they used to burst out laughing and say something which, of course, I could not understand.

At another place I was presented with a large fisherman's hat, made of bamboo and plantain leaves. This hat is very light and of much more use than a sun helmet in protecting one's neck from the sun and one's eyes from the glare off the water.

It was not only this hospitality on the part of the Chins which made my journey so pleasant and easy, but also the hospitality and kindness, shown me by the officers of the Bombay Burma Company whenever I happened to come across their camps. It made me draw comparisons between India and Burma.

In a few days I reached Mawlaik where I was lucky enough to meet about a dozen Bombay-Burma assistants who were packing up ready to go on a long journey into the forests, each to his particular area. The District Forest Officer was preparing to do the same.

Mawlaik is situated high up on the river bank which is protected from erosion by a palisade of stones. The current flows strongly against this palisade and it is not at all easy to stop a frail canoe anywhere along this bank. I saw Mawlaik and the bungalows on the river bank long before I arrived, but I could not stop the canoe anywhere. I was swept past by the swift current until eventually I paddled into a small creek where the natives moored their boats.

Although they were all busy with preparations for their departure I was welcomed and entertained. The Forest Officer

put me up in his bungalow and made me stay much longer than I had intended and showed me the sights of Mawlaik.

It is only a few years ago that the Upper Chindwin District was a backward area inhabited by wild Chins and Kachins and there was no administrative station at Mawlaik. Now the District is ruled by a Deputy Commissioner from Mawlaik which is also the headquarters of two District Forest Officers, the Bombay-Burma Company's staff, Police and a battalion of the Burma Frontier Force. There is an English Church with a resident clergyman, a fine club overlooking the river and an eighteen-hole golf course. There is a small bazaar containing a few Chinese shops; but as Mawlaik is a new station no vegetables or fresh milk can be obtained. For from five to six months at a time Mawlaik is deserted. Officials and others go off into the forests; then a reunion takes place for a short period until the next exodus. I was fortunate to be there just before the exodus and shall always remember the happy time I spent there. If any of my friends in Mawlaik should happen to read this article let me take the opportunity again of thanking them for their hospitality. Whatever they thought of my wandering down their territory in a canoe they were kind enough not to say anything about it to me.

The delay in my departure from Mawlaik was fortunate for the police. I had forgotten since I crossed the frontier at Tamu that the police had sent information by wire to their headquarters at Mawlaik, but I was reminded about it the day before I left. This coincided with the arrival of the river steamer from Sittaung and the police naturally thought I was travelling by it. Hence an hour after the arrival of this steamer a harassed policeman came to the Forest Officer's bungalow and asked if Mr.—was staying there.

I suppose the police, having failed to find me on the steamer, had caught sight of an extraordinary looking canoe which no Burmese would ever be seen in, and had hunted for me in every bungalow. I could not produce a passport, nor even my pass into Burma because the police at Tamu had retained it. The police superintendent was out on tour so the sub-inspector wired down to the next police station on the river which was at Monywa, the headquarters of the Lower Chindwin District, telling them to look out for me. I had visions of this being done, all the way to Rangoon and wondered whether the police would ever find me either at Monywa or Rangoon.

Below Mawlaik the same beautiful scenery continued; an escarpment on either side covered with forest; a clearing here and

there where a village or rather a collection of wood and bamboo huts had driven the forest back, while on the river were natives in their one-piece dug out canoes who laughed and called out greetings when they saw me paddling down wearing one of their own large hats. Occasionally I passed a bamboo raft, sometimes one hundred and fifty feet long and about fifty feet wide, being slowly poled down stream. On these rafts were half a dozen thatch huts in which would live an official of the Forest Department or an overseer and staff besides the raftmen. The District Forest Officer at Mawlaik was very partial to this method of travel and would spend as long as a fortnight on a raft.

I found these rafts very convenient for stretching my legs as sitting for long periods at a time gave me cramp. I used to paddle up to a raft, tie the canoe alongside and walk about on the raft while all the time we were going down-stream. The raftmen were expert in steering their unwieldy craft clear of headlands and whirlpools.

A few days after leaving Mawlaik I crossed into the Lower Chindwin District and my canoe sprang a second leak. I had been paddling down for two or three hours one day when I noticed the water swishing to and fro between my legs and under the seat. The current at the time was swift and there were no villages or native canoes in sight. Just behind me a river steamer was bearing down and I had no time to cross over to the other side of the river. I could not hail the steamer as no one would understand what I was shouting out, and in any case I had to keep well clear of the wash of the paddles. These steamers are shallow draft "stern wheelers" propelled by a wooden paddle at the stern instead of a propeller. These paddles churn up the river and the effect is left long after the steamer has passed and is out of sight.

When I recovered from this seesaw motion I at once saw that the waves had considerably increased the flow of water in the canoe. Fortunately there was a large junk loading logs of wood moored against the bank further down. I stopped alongside the junk and pointed to the water in the canoe to one of the crew. Immediately several men knocked off work, beached my canoe, took all my belongings out, turned the canoe upside down and drained the water out of it. Then, some brown resinous stuff similar to that I had seen at Sittaung was brought from their junk, and in less than five minutes the leak was repaired.

All this happened without a word being exchanged between us. We could not understand each other's language; but they had no difficulty whatever in realising what I wanted done.

The canoe was then righted, my belongings carefully replaced and I was invited to continue my journey. Before doing so I offered them first money which they refused, then cigarettes which they also refused and to make sure I should not offer them anything else they pushed the canoe into the river and I was soon carried away from them by the current. This was another instance of the readiness to help a lone traveller which made my trip so enjoyable.

The scenery now began to change gradually. The range of hills, the escarpment of which I had found such a noticeable feature of the Upper Chindwin, disappeared and the forest became less dense. Villages were more frequent and I noticed patches of cultivation.

When I reached Monywa, the headquarters of the administration of the Lower Chindwin District I had entered the "dry zone." The forest had given place to dry open plains interspersed with a few small hills. The contrast was striking and reminded me at once of the plains of Central India except that Pagodas took the place of Temples and Mosques.

The climate at Monywa was hot and dry and I needed a mosquito net for the first time since I left Assam. The population consisted mostly of Burmese who are different from the Chins and Kachins of Upper Burma and there was a large Indian merchant community. There had already been trouble here between the Burmese and the Indians. More trouble was to come, and I was to come across it a few days later in Mandalay and Rangoon as well. In Monywa, as at Mawlaik, I was shown hospitality which made me stay longer than I had intended, and this, as before, enabled the police to trace me. As I was without pass or passport the sub-inspector said he would have to inform Rangoon. He evidently had a high opinion of the efficiency of the Rangoon police if he thought they could trace me there. I told him he was an optimist.

At Monywa the Chindwin forms a delta and joins the Irrawaddy by several channels. I had now spent three weeks of my month's holiday and had travelled nearly three hundred miles by canoe. I should not have the time to continue my journey further by river and in any case the dry zone which stretched from Monywa a considerable distance on each side of the

Irrawaddy would be too hot and uninteresting to make the journey pleasant. So I left the canoe, with its two scars showing where my friends the Chins had saved me from disaster, with my host of Monywa, and completed the rest of the journey by train to Mandalay and Rangoon. I had to discard my "fishing hat" but my canoeing kit caused some surprise in the Strand Hotel in Rangoon.

I left Rangoon by steamer and arrived in India exactly one month after I had started on my trip.

Looking back on my holiday now it seems like a story from "Alice in Wonderland" where everything turned out to be quite different from what I expected and yet with such happy results. It undoubtedly provided me with as complete a mental and physical change as I could have desired.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

ARMY NOTES

Great Britain

The following changes in organisation were announced in the Secretary of State's speech introducing the army estimates:

Field Force

The strategic reserve at Home will comprise nineteen divisions available for foreign service as follows:

4 Regular infantry divisions;
9 Territorial Army infantry divisions;
3 Territorial Army motorised divisions;
2 Regular armoured divisions; and
1 Territorial Army armoured division.

(The Territorial Army Field Force formations, to which are added two cavalry brigades and a number of unbrigaded units are now to be duplicated.)

The second Regular armoured division is to be formed by the addition of one brigade to those now in existence and the reduction in the number of brigades in the division from three to two.

It is not at present contemplated that the whole of this force will be sent overseas simultaneously. It would be despatched in echelons as productive capacity to maintain it in the field develops. By the time the last echelon goes new forces will have been trained and equipped.

Middle East Reserve

The 7th and 8th Divisions in Palestine which are organised in two brigades each of four battalions with a reduced complement of supporting arms are to constitute a Middle East Reserve as a separate force.

Coast and Anti-Aircraft Defence

Two anti-aircraft divisions are to be added to the present corps bringing the total up to seven. These seven divisions will form a Command. The Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the War Office will become the Director-General of Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defence.

All existing medium and heavy batteries and searchlight companies will be equipped this year. A quantity of light anti-aircraft guns have been purchased abroad and deliveries from Home factories will begin in the autumn.

At overseas ports, establishments of local forces are to be raised. The Royal Malta Artillery is to be increased by over one thousand gunners and enlistment in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps opened to Maltese. In Singapore and Hong-Kong, local and Indian personnel are to be added to existing establishments. Singalese soldiers are to be raised as regulars for the first time. The prospects of raising units in Cyprus are under investigation.

The Military Cadet Colleges

The Royal Military Academy is to be moved to Sandhurst. The combined establishment will be known as the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and will consist of a "Woolwich" group, an armoured group and the infantry group.

Mobilisation

Regular recruiting offices will close down on mobilisation. Thereafter all recruits will be enlisted into the Territorial Army, recruiting being carried out for the first three days at drill halls and after that at two hundred centres supplying training units for all arms.

* * * *

Compulsory Military Training

On the 26th May the Royal assent was given to the Military Training Bill which was announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on the 26th April. The Bill gives power to call up for six months' training all men between the ages of twenty and twenty-one. Provision is made for the exemption of conscientious objectors who undertake work of national importance, for the postponement of training for those at universities, and to safeguard employment. Its currency is three years.

Compulsory military service will enable the air defence of Great Britain to be always partially manned. It will also provide reserves for the Regular and Territorial armies, both to complete Regular units to war establishments on mobilisation and to meet wastage.

To assist in the provision of instructors, arrangements have been made for the re-enlistment of pensioners of all ranks and of suitable personnel of the Territorial Army for periods of three years. Reservists are invited to rejoin the colours.

The 1939 class consists of about 300,000 men of whom about 210,000 are expected to be suitable for military service. About 40,000 of these are already serving. Of the 170,000 left for the Militia some will go to the field force and the remainder to the air defence of Great Britain. Registration has begun. The men will be called up through Ministry of Labour offices, interviewed by a military officer, and posted as far as possible in accordance with inclination and aptitude. Most of them will go in the first place to depots or training centres for about two months after which those qualified will go to leaders' schools or train as specialists. The remainder will go to Regular units. Frequent tests will allow of the grading of squads in accordance with aptitude.

Training for the infantry of the line will be carried out for two months in Militia Recruit Companies at Regimental Depots; for two months in a Militia Training Company attached to home service battalions; and for two months in the home service battalions themselves. For regiments with both battalions overseas, Militia Training Groups will be formed. Regular recruits will be trained in Regular Recruit Training Companies which will move from the depots to Home service battalions or elsewhere in the United Kingdom until extra accommodation at depots has been provided.

Mobilisation

The introduction of the Reserve Forces and Auxiliary Forces Bill which has since become law was announced by Mr. Chamberlain on the same day as the Military Training Bill. It authorises the service departments to call up reserves and embody the Auxiliary forces by order in council instead of only after the more public and lengthy procedure of Royal Proclamation. The process of mobilisation is thus simplified and released to a certain extent from its political repercussions. Similar powers are enjoyed by every other country in Europe—and by India.

Reservists will be required to help train the Militia and to ensure that the Regular army after finding instructors for the Militia and the enlarged Territorial Army is up to strength in trained men. A large proportion of the Regular reserves are accordingly to be called up this year for periods not exceeding three months. Territorial Army anti-aircraft units are to be embodied this summer to serve at their war stations for not longer than one month.

As in the Military Training Bill, provision is made for the reinstatement of employees who are called up.

The Royal Armoured Corps

With effect from the 11th April, the eighteen regiments of the cavalry of the line which are mechanised or about to be mechanised and the Regular and Territorial units of the Royal Tank Corps were incorporated in the Royal Armoured Corps with a record and pay office at Canterbury and depots at Bovington and Catterick. Officers will remain for the present on the separate regimental lists of their previous corps though majors will be eligible for selection to command any unit of the Royal Armoured Corps. Other ranks will not be liable to serve outside their previous corps in peace during their current engagements with the colours. Thereafter they will be required to serve in any unit of the Royal Armoured Corps; and so will recruits now enlisted. The units forming the new corps retain their present titles, badges, battle honours and distinctions, and the position of Colonels-in-Chief, Colonels Commandant and Colonels are unaffected except that the Royal Tank Corps has become the Royal Tank Regiment, of which His Majesty has been graciously pleased to become Colonel-in-Chief. The Royal Armoured Corps takes precedence in the army immediately before the Royal Artillery.

The remaining regiments of the cavalry of the line not incorporated in the new corps are the 1st Royal Dragoons and the Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons).

Training

Army manœuvres are to be held in Yorkshire between the 15th and 23rd September. From the 10th to the 15th, the 1st Corps will assemble in the Aldershot area and will be made up to approximately war strength by drafts from the 3rd and 4th Divisions. It will then consist of the 1st and 2nd Divisions; various units of G.H.Q. and corps troops, Supplementary Reserve units; and the 70th and 74th Field Regiments, and the 51st and 52nd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments of the Territorial Army with their signal sections. The Corps will move the two hundred odd miles to Yorkshire by road and by special troop train, providing opportunities to test the organisation of such a move including the control of the very large number of vehicles. The supply arrangements will not be neutral, and will, with the co-operation of the railways, be organised as in war. The long period provided—previous army manœuvres in 1925 and 1935 lasted a few days only—will enable a proper test to be made of the functioning of the supply services and will also provide realism in the working of staff offices, and in the demands made on the troops.

Allied and enemy forces will be represented. The object of the manœuvres is to practise the functioning of a modern army corps on a large scale and not to test commanders against each other. The operations of the allied and enemy forces will therefore be subject to control.

* * * *

Prior to Army Manœuvres, the 1st and 2nd Divisions will train in the Aldershot area; the 4th Division will undertake brigade training and a combined operation in East Kent; the 5th Division will train in Yorkshire; and the Armoured and 3rd Divisions in the neighbourhood of their peace stations.

Courses for Officers

Courses for commissioned officers are to follow a natural sequence throughout their service. Every subaltern will take a course in the weapons in which his branch of the service is armed. In the technical arms, these courses will be of longer duration (for example, that for the Royal Engineers will include two years at Cambridge University) and will provide for advanced instruction in technical subjects. In all cases, the object is to fit officers to command a sub-unit in peace and war. All combatant officers with not less than twelve years' commissioned service will then attend either the junior wing of the Staff College or a ten weeks' course at the Tactical School. At this school, as already announced in these columns, fitness for promotion will be judged; and officers will be trained for command and to teach others. Finally selected officers of the Regular and Territorial Armies of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and upwards will attend a Higher Commander's Course in the latest organisation, tactical handling of the latest equipment and strategical doctrine. Naval and Royal Air Force officers will attend the first part of the course, which will be held at Aldershot. The second part of the course will be at Old Sarum, in close touch with the Royal Air Force.

New Battalions

His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve the reformation of the 2nd Battalion the Irish Guards and the creation of a 2nd Battalion the Welsh Guards.

Recruitment of Anglo-Indians

The War Office has decided to recruit Anglo-Indian fitters into the Royal Army Ordnance Corps for service in Egypt and Palestine and with British units in India.

Tour of Foreign Service

The tour of foreign service for warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men has been reduced to four years, except for short tour, emergency or temporary duty. This rule is expected to be fully operative by 1942-43: in the meantime, soldiers who cannot be relieved owing to drafting difficulties will be given the option of completing five years' overseas service or of taking six months' furlough with free passages for themselves and their families and then beginning a further four-year tour.

The foreign tours for officers remain as before for the present.

Inspectors-General

The post of Inspector-General of the Forces has been recreated. The duties of the Inspector-General of Overseas Forces include responsibility for arrangements for the reception of the field force should it be sent overseas. The Inspector-General of Home Forces has duties in connection with air raid precautions.

The Territorial Army

On the 29th March the Prime Minister announced that the field force portion of the Territorial Army, many units of which had been turning away recruits, would be brought up to war establishment and then doubled. The immediate response has shown that there should be no great difficulty in providing the 210,000 extra men required. The chief difficulty will naturally lie in the provision of equipment and accommodation. For the present new units are for the most part using the equipment and drill halls of their parent units.

The total establishment of the Territorial Army was doubled within six weeks, and in a number of counties all units are complete in personnel.

Ministry of Supply

Legislation has been introduced to set up a Ministry of Supply and the new Minister has begun the task of forming his department. The scope of the Ministry is at present confined to:

(*i*) Problems of army supply.

(*ii*) The supply of stores such as certain naval guns, ammunition and civil defence stores which have hitherto been supplied to other government departments under arrangement made by the War Office.

(*iii*) The acquisition of reserves of raw materials in connection with the defence programme.

(*iv*) Securing priority for government orders.

This is expected to entail the transfer of the whole of the existing supply organisation at the War Office together with responsibility for the Royal Ordnance Factories. Arrangements for supply for the Admiralty and Air Ministry are to remain as at present: they are working well and are not required to expand to the same degree as those for the War Office which have to compete with the equipping of the doubled Territorial Army, the air defence of Great Britain, the Regular Army at Home and abroad, the defended ports and the Militia. Provision to secure priority for government orders is of the greatest value. The powers given will probably be effective enough if kept in the background; but it is considered that much can be done to speed up deliveries for the defence services without interfering with manufacture for export. Questions of priority as between the services will be settled by a Ministerial Committee.

India

Reduction of British Troops in India

The following British units left India without replacement during May and early June:

17th/21st Lancers;
"C," "F," and "G" Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery.
7th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery.
1st Battalion the Dorsetshire Regiment.
2nd Battalion the Rifle Brigade.

There are now no regular Royal Horse Artillery units left in India, medium artillery regiments are reduced to one and British cavalry regiments to three.

The Sandhurst (Indianisation) Committee

This committee, which was originally intended to meet last January, assembled in Simla on the 29th May and is likely to continue sitting until August. The terms of reference are:

> "To examine the progress of Indianisation of the officer ranks of the Indian Army with a view to determining whether the results achieved justify acceleration, and if it appears from this examination that they do not, to consider such alteration in the system of recruitment to the Indian Military Academy as may be expected to lead to an improvement in the number of suitable candidates and to make recommendations."

Lieutenant-General Sir Roger Wilson is chairman of the Committee. The Defence Secretary and two British officers are members; all the other members are Indian gentlemen.

The terms of reference have since been extended to include the Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy.

Cavalry Mechanisation

The 13th Lancers and the Scinde Horse, which began mechanisation as armoured car regiments last year, are to have a mixed organisation with two squadrons of armoured cars and one of light tanks. Their description has been changed to Indian Armoured Regiment.

Three more regiments, Skinner's Horse, the P.A.V.O. Cavalry and the Central India Horse are to mechanise shortly.

Spit and Polish

It has now been decided that all equipment, including leather-work, which is liable to be used on active service shall be left dull and unpolished in peace, including ceremonial parades.

Mechanical Repair Organisation

With effect from the 1st April, the responsibility for the repair organisation for mechanical transport in India was transferred from the Quartermaster-General in India to the Master-General of the Ordnance in India. The Headquarters Maintenance Group, Chaklala, was abolished on the same date and its functions transferred to the Master-General of the Ordnance at Army Headquarters.

SCHOOLS

The Tactical School for Officers

The provisional date for the opening of this school is now the 1st August 1940. In 1941 and subsequent years, there will be three courses annually, each with about nineteen vacancies, for Indian Army officers.

Officers whose service for promotion counts from before the 1st January 1925, will be required to pass promotion examinations. Officers whose service counts from after that date will attend the school unless otherwise qualified for promotion.

Equitation School

The Equitation School at Saugor has begun to close down.

The Schools of Weapon Training and Mechanisation

These schools were formed last year from the Small Arms School, Pachmarhi, the Machine Gun School, Ahmednagar, and the Royal Tank Corps School, Ahmednagar. They are now to form a Small Arms School (with a Company Weapons Wing at Pachmarhi, whence it will eventually move to join the Support Weapons Wing which will be formed at Saugor) and a Fighting Vehicles School which will remain at Ahmednagar.

The Indian Army Ordnance Corps School

This School and the Indian Army Ordnance Corps Depot have moved to Jubbulpore where a new Indian Army Ordnance Corps Artificers' School has been formed to train men who have already gained some mechanical knowledge in civil life. These artificers are required in conncetion with the new mechanical repair organisation and to meet demands for skilled tradesmen which are expected to increase as mechanisation is extended.

AIR FORCE NOTES

Operations

In addition to the normal duties of watch and ward on the frontier, the Air Forces in India have, during the period under review, taken their usual part in maintaining order in Waziristan. Operating both by day and night, units on the frontier have provided sorties in support of columns in the Khaisora and Shaktu valleys and in the vicinity of Spinwam and the Ahmedzai Salient. Blockade measures in conjunction with ground forces have been taken in certain areas and co-operation has been provided with the Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts and on a few occasions with the Frontier Constabulary.

By June operational commitments had been very considerably reduced and units are at present engaged on normal training.

General Interest

On the 18th March at the Delhi Civil Airport His Excellency the Viceroy inspected the present and new replacement types of aircraft in service with squadrons in India. The inspection was followed by a demonstration of the performance of the several types. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, civil and military officers of the Goverment of India and Members of the Council of State and Legislative Assembly also witnessed the display.

No. 31 Squadron participated in the Northern Flying Club "At Home" held at Lahore on the 8th April and gave demonstrations of message picking up and formation flying.

The annual flight to Gilgit took place on the 6th April.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

SIR,

May I invite your attention to an inaccuracy made by "D. F. W. W." in his review of the History of the 1st Battalion, 6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's) in the April issue of the Journal.

In referring to the complete change of class composition in the battalion between the years 1892—1895 as a result of the reorganisation of recruitment, "D. F. W. W." states "The changes almost coincided with the selection of the unit in conversion into a rifle regiment." This statement is incorrect as the battalion was made a rifle regiment in 1841 (page 90 of History refers), being the first battalion in the Indian Army to be selected for this distinction. The changes, therefore, took place over forty years before the changes in class composition occurred.

Yours, etc.,

A. G. BUTLER, MAJOR,

1/*6th Rajputana Rifles (Wellesley's).*

REVIEWS

"THE WAR BEHIND THE WAR"

By F. P. Chambers

(*Messrs. Faber and Faber, Limited, London*: 16*s*.)

After weeks of study of some major operation between 1914 and 1918 in Palestine or Mesopotamia, or after reading some of the 2,768 pages of the "World Crisis," one has often wondered what sort of terrifying volume would confront the school-boy of the future in his historical study of that jumbled period of four years. But as the Great War recedes into the past, so does it become yearly easier to view it as a whole and in its true perspective.

This book is the result of a most successful attempt to clear this perspective by reaching past the military events, and by viewing the successive stages in the struggle in their moral and economic aspect and their effect on political and social developments among the civil populations of the warring nations. The author has in fact attempted, as he says in his preface, to "fill the gap left by that too common kind of political history of modern times, which seem always to end where the War began or to begin where the War ended, as if in the intervening years the political life of the nations had stood still."

Part I of the book starts with the outbreak of war, and gives just sufficient outline of military events on which to hang the author's main theme. He is pleasantly impartial as between Statesmen and Soldiers, and his military outlines are eminently sane and unbiased.

He then gives a chapter to each of the main fighting countries and the United States to explain the political effects upon them of the opening war years, and to show in many of them the degree and effect of the gradual encroachment of military authority in the civil sphere. The chapters on Russia and the U. S. A. are of special interest, particularly the account in the latter of the gradual changes in the American mentality and attitude to the war and towards Germany.

This first Part covers generally the first third of the war and shows how the nations adjusted themselves in some degree to the new and extraordinary conditions confronting them, and contains much which has not been previously included in a single volume.

Part II covers the middle period of the war, from the end of 1915 to the end of 1917. The political results of increasing war-weariness and effectiveness of blockade in the respective countries are tackled in a most readable way, a separate chapter being devoted to each country concerned. Here perhaps the passages of greatest interest are those which deal with the Balkans, internal affairs in Germany, and the gradual hardening of opinion in America.

Part III contains but a single chapter labelled "1918," and one might imagine that the author, grown weary of his subject, had decided to dismiss the final phases in the briefest space compatible with decency. It is, however, an excellent conclusion to an excellent book. While of necessity containing much that has appeared in other books, this final chapter consists of an absorbingly interesting and connected narrative of the major events leading to the overthrow of the Central Powers. The value and the shortcomings of our propaganda are duly stressed, and it is instructive to read of the intention to form an Inter-Allied Propaganda Committee which was interrupted by the armistice.

Perhaps the most interesting passages trace the interplay of political personalities in Germany when her home front was in process of breaking and the Kaiser was gradually becoming "de trop."

The book fittingly ends with the armistice. Then follow eighty pages of very carefully compiled Notes, Bibliography, Appendices and Indices.

So many books have appeared which deal with the Great War that one is increasingly reluctant to take up another. But this work does certainly appear to make a new and original approach, and reminds one of problems which are of ever-growing importance as the successful conduct of war comes to depend more and more completely on the security of the home front.

E. H. W. C.

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: INFORMATION DEPARTMENT PAPERS

No. 21: China and Japan

(*Second Edition*: 2*s.* 6*d.*)

This book provides an excellent background for a study of current affairs in the Far East. It does not go into any great detail, just sufficient to give one a clear picture without too much heavy reading; and—an essential in any book on Sino-Japanese affairs—the chain of events is easy to follow. The book starts with a concise exposition of the views taken by the Chinese and Japanese Governments on the object of the present operations. It follows on with a description of the political factors in China and Japan. In order properly to comprehend the Japanese point of view and also their occasional peculiar and high-handed dealings with foreign powers, it is necessary to understand their history and religion. Their religion enters very largely into politics and this is clearly explained in Part I of the book.

Part II traces the main events in Far Eastern history from 1860 to 1931. Thereafter there is an interesting account of the acquisition by Japan of Manchukuo and its present administration.

Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese relations from 1933 to the present time are dealt with in separate chapters. A chapter is devoted to developments since the outbreak of the present hostilities and gives one an excellent idea of the situation, not only as it affects China and Japan but also interested foreign Powers.

Part III is devoted to economic factors in China, Japan and Manchukuo. This makes interesting reading and the figures given are set out in such a manner that they are easy for the ordinary person to follow.

J. N. C.

No. 23: Germany's Claim to Colonies

(*Second Edition.* 1*s.*)

This pamphlet sets out in a fair and straightforward manner the many aspects of Germany's claim for the return of her former colonies. The authors do not attempt to suggest a method

whereby the problem might be solved, but confine themselves to explaining, in meticulous detail, the many practical difficulties which attend every aspect of the problem and every argument and suggestion that has been made for the return of colonies to Germany. The pamphlet is well worth reading and should go a long way to dispel loose thinking and generalisation on a very complex subject.

The impression one gets from the publication is that most of the Powers concerned realise that the placing of Germany's former colonies under a mandate was a mistake. The chance of restoring these colonies to Germany either in their original status, or by a transfer of mandatory powers subject to Germany re-entering the League of Nations has, however, gone, even if such were ever practical propositions.

The rise to power of the Nazi party, and the repeated manifestation of their belief in force, has made it abundantly clear that, having regard to their geographical position, the return of colonies to Germany now could result only in increasing the menace of the Axis powers. The conclusion is that the democracies have no alternative, should the question be raised officially by Germany, but to intimate that while they do not regard the question to be closed, they are not prepared to discuss it until such time as the Axis powers give practical proof of their renouncement of war as an instrument of policy. Such may be a pious hope, and for as long as it remains so, so must the present position remain unaltered. As a further act of appeasement, or to gain "peace at any price," the return of Germany's colonies to-day would be useless, and possibly fatal to the British Empire.

H. W. D.

INFANTRY IN BATTLE

(THE INFANTRY JOURNAL, INC., WASHINGTON, D.C.)

(*Second Edition*)

This is an extensively revised and rewritten second edition of a book prepared by the Military History and Publications Section of the Infantry School of the American Army and first published in 1934.

The work has many points of novelty and interest to one familiar only with British military writings. For one thing, nothing quite in this style ever emanates from our official sources. We have our text-books and our manuals which lay down doctrine and general principles, guides for every situation, wherein a justification for or against every conceivable course of action can usually be found; but, from their very nature, our text-books are impersonal and abstract to the last degree, devoid of concrete instance, example or illustration, and lacking all the interest afforded by human experience. At the other extreme are the official histories, careful and studious accounts of events, which avoid like poison or the plague anything savouring of criticism or of instruction in how to do better next time. The book under review is an interesting mixture of both text-book and history. Although presumably an official American manual, it is written in free and conversational style, well got up and printed and easy to read. It gives a large number of historical examples taken mainly but not entirely from American experience in the Great War to illustrate the application of important maxims selected from the regulations. The majority of the examples are taken from the "Personal Experience Monographs" of regimental officers of the American Army; they are excellently illustrated with clear and well produced sketches and they give a vivid picture of the conditions of war. And this last is the object of the book. The editor, in his introduction, states a fact of such universal application that it deserves to be quoted:

> "Officers . . . find themselves surprised and confused by the difference between conditions as pictured in map problems and those they encounter in campaign. This is largely because our peace time training in tactics tends to become increasingly theoretical. In our schools we generally assume that organisations are well trained and at full strength, that subordinates are competent, that supply arrangements function, that communications work, that orders are carried out. In war many or all of these conditions are absent."

And he goes on to mention "the extremely difficult and highly disconcerting conditions under which tactical problems must be solved in the face of an enemy."

In his opening chapter, which is on the subject of "Rules," the writer gives so good a summary of the art of command that it also may be quoted:

> " . . . the leader . . . must first close his mind to alluring formulæ . . . he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognise its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is . . . a process of years. He must realise that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war. The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feet on a well-travelled road to ruin."

Of its nature, "Infantry in Battle" is a book to be dipped into and consulted rather than to be taken in large doses, but it certainly fills a gap between the narrative of history and the precepts of the text-book; a want which in England is catered for almost solely by the crammer writing with one eye on the promotion and staff college examinations. It seems a sad lack that nothing of the sort has been produced for the British Army, and that we have none of the "Personal Experience Monographs" maintained by the American Infantry School. Our battle experience is immeasurably greater than that of the Americans and covers almost every country and condition on the face of the globe. As used by the Americans, such battle experience would breathe life into the dead and dry bones of "Field Service Regulations."

F. E. C. H.

HALDANE 1915—1928

The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan

BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MAURICE.

(*Faber and Faber*: 18*s*.)

The keynote of this great man's life was Education. It mattered not in what position he found himself; those over whom he had control must be educated. Thus when he was at

the War Office he strove to educate the Army to be fit to meet a great Continental War.

The salient fact that strikes a reader of this biography is that here was a man who could think clearly on any subject under the sun. Once in possession of the facts, he could be relied upon to give an opinion logically sound and utterly unbiased by class prejudice, political leanings, religion, or any other extraneous factors. This must have been recognised by all who came in contact with him and yet on the outbreak of the Great War, he was flung out of office as a result of political vindictiveness. Vindictiveness that was entirely unjustified and which followed him even into the realms of Musical Comedy.

And so throughout the war he was never really allowed to pull his weight.

Nowadays everyone admits that his was a master mind, that he was a very great War Secretary and that he was nearly always right. But then, during the Crisis, he was deliberately cast aside.

It is rather a black mark against our political system—indeed against democracy in general. It seems incredible that so great a man should be busy with the reorganisation of a provincial university, when his opinions would have been invaluable to the War Cabinet.

After the War, however, when Haig had hailed him as "the greatest Secretary of State for War England has ever had," and when the publication of relevant documents had utterly cleared his name, he again became a great national asset. In an advisory capacity, which was his real rôle—for he was an indifferent politician—he did much for the Defence Services and in particular the Committee of Imperial Defence. Chapter IV—"The Higher Direction of War" is of great interest to Service readers in showing how clearly and far-sightedly this man could think.

Later he drifted into politics again, into which he should never have returned, because his was a mind that should have been used by the nation irrespective of the party in power. His reasons for joining the Labour party are curious in the light of to-day. He conceived that they alone were interested in education, which was his creed. Perhaps he was too great a man to realise that education of the masses—with the necessary political

twist—is usually the aim of any new political party. Had he lived, I think, Nazidom would have enlightened him.

Nothing describes the man better than the inscription on his tomb:

"A GREAT SERVANT OF THE
STATE
WHO DEVOTED HIS LIFE
TO THE ADVANCEMENT AND
APPLICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
THROUGH HIS WORK IN
FASHIONING HER ARMY
HE RENDERED INVALUABLE
AID TO HIS COUNTRY IN
HER TIME OF DIREST NEED."

As regards the book itself; the last chapter, a careful analysis of the great man's services, is of particular interest. Perhaps the biographer claims a little too much, but nevertheless the arguments advanced carry conviction. To Service readers, too, the letter written by Lord Rawlinson and reproduced on page 177 is of interest in view of present policy. That letter was written in 1924!

As a whole, the book is of great interest, certain chapters of absorbing interest; but it is a pity that the author in his anxiety to do Lord Haldane justice should have quoted *verbatim* at such length from his speeches. Rhetoric is apt to be tedious reading.

H. V. S. M.

"ENGLISH CAPTAIN"

By Captain Tom Wintringham

(Faber and Faber, Ltd.: 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The Civil War in Spain has produced its fair share of literature but there is a particular interest in "English Captain" since it deals with the International Brigade on the Government side in general, and the British Battalion in particular.

The story begins in September 1936 with a visit to the German Thaelmann Grupo and at once shows up the difficulty of organising and training an army of civilians of diverse nationalities, arms, and political theories. Both here and later

the author compares with shrewd judgment and humour the characteristics of the various races encountered in the ranks of the government forces. The Spaniards with their foolhardy bravado, their dislike of digging in, and their cruelty, typifying the decay of Spain as a military nation and the mentality that has produced the national sport of bull fighting. Next the Germans; stolid, methodical and tidy in their fighting, their political belief, and their trenches and shelters. They alone of the foreign contingents took the trouble to learn Spanish to any extent. As to the English, the Battalion presents a cross-section of the nation, ranging through university graduates, *ex* officers and men of the regular army, to cockneys and Jews from the East end. The last members of the Brigade to be described are the Americans of the Lincoln and Abraham Battalions. True to form, they entered the campaign at a later date than the other nationalities, and, as in 1917-18, their almost complete lack of war experience was balanced by their adaptability and gift of being able to think for themselves in action.

The author next learns the mechanism of various machine-guns and imparts his knowledge to the elements of several machine-gun companies in the Brigade. The speed with which these weapons are mastered in spite of the almost complete lack of such essentials as lubricating oil, practice ammunition and belt filling tools is phenomenal.

The recital of the duties of a Political Commissar is absorbingly interesting. Though the authorities may have visualised political propaganda as his main work, in fact his rôle was a mixture of those borne by chaplains, quartermasters and medical officers in our service, and the value of a live wire in this appointment to an overworked commanding officer must have been immense.

The author commanded the British Battalion in its first action in February 1937 when General Franco, having failed to capture Madrid, made an anti-clock-wise drive to the south of the city in an endeavour to cut the road to Valencia. The description of the Battle of the Jarama and the doings of the English gives several lessons in minor tactics. Above all, it proves conclusively the necessity for leadership and tactical knowledge on the part of officers.

After being twice wounded, the author became an instructor at an officers' school and gives samples of the lectures he delivered at this establishment. Some of the theories, which he apparently learnt in Spain for the first time although three years in France in the Great War, are elementary and below the standard of the rest of the book, though probably of interest to the lay reader. General Franco's tanks and aircraft do not appear to have been altogether successful against experienced troops, and it is obvious that their tactical handling was not of a high order. The superiority of the militia-men in street fighting is well brought out, and can be summed up as due to the lack of trained leaders required for more open warfare combined with the individualism and bravery of the amateur fighting for his principles.

The book is well illustrated with sketches and photographs, and, though the reader may oppose the politics of the author and those whose doings are described, only the most bigoted will fail to have his admiration aroused.

W. D. A. L.

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECT OF OPERATIONS, STAFF DUTIES AND TRAINING

By Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Elliott

(*Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd.*: 4 *shillings.*)

This moderately priced work gives a vivid picture of the relations between a commander and his staff and between the staff and the services. It is written in a simple and attractive style and is not burdened with technical detail. It is thus essentially a counterpart of the manuals, dealing with the practical efforts required to implement their principles. The effect of the human factor on administrative problems is treated with a balanced outlook which provides a basis for constructive progress. Suggestions are given for future development and reorganisation which are based on solid foundations and which are particularly worthy of consideration by all those concerned in solving these problems.

The book should be of particular use to both staff college graduates and candidates; and by leading to a mutual appreciation of their respective tasks it should serve as a contribution to better co-operation between the various branches of the staff, the services and those they serve.

L. A. L.

BEHIND THE LINES

By Colonel W. N. Nicholson, C.M.G., D.S.O.

(*Jonathan Cape.* 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This book deals with military administration during the Great War and is written in the form of personal reminiscences. It should be read by every staff officer.

The author served on the administrative staff throughout the war: first with the 51st (Highland) Division of the Territorial Force when that formation was billetted in Bedford where there was much muddle, neglect of administration and indiscipline about which he is refreshingly frank. Later Colonel Nicholson joined the headquarters of the New Army 17th Division in France whence he went to Corps Headquarters and thence to General Headquarters which he found 'not really human.'

The two main lessons of the book are: first that administrative staff work in war cannot be learnt from the routine of service on the staff in peace, and secondly (that hardy platitude) that co-operation between the general and administrative staffs is essential. Some of the practical lessons which the administrative staff had to learn after the outbreak of war may appear elementary to-day. But we should not be complacent: in the next war the problems will be different, and only study and thought can remedy the lack of practical experience obtainable in peace. The book is full of examples from which the author can extract the moral that the work of the general staff must depend on that of the administrative staff, in particular that of "Q." One wonders once again at Lord Esher's division of the staff into two separate branches, one freed from all considerations outside those of leading and training troops and one doomed to spend the greater part of its peace time activities on details quite unconnected with war. This book will perhaps draw attention to another much-needed army reform.

It is not to be imagined that because of its numerous lessons the book is in any way pedantic or dull. It is written in a somewhat breezy style, full of anecdotes and of the human factor which the author found lacking at General Headquarters. For that reason it should appeal to a wider public than those to whom it is recommended for instruction.

J. S. H.

BOOKS RECEIVED.	*AUTHOR.*
Survey of India General Report, 1938 ...	Brigadier C. D. Lewis.
Behind the Lines ...	Colonel W. N. Nicholson.
Adm. Aspect of Operations, Staff Duties and Trg. ...	Lieut.-Colonel J. G. Elliott.
Haldane, 1915—1928 ...	Sir F. Maurice.
India in 1934-35 ...	Official.
600 Questions and Answers on Air Forces Law ..	Sqn.-Leader H. M. Shurlock.
Customs of the Service ...	A. H. S.

PRESIDENT'S REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1938

FINANCE

The Auditor's report is satisfactory. It draws attention to the increase of expenditure under the headings of "Lectures" and "Essay Prize and Medals" which is in accordance with the policy laid down by the Executive Committee, and to a decrease in income under the head "Members and Subscriptions" which is probably largely a result of the present unsettled conditions. The accounts show a satisfactory year's working, the excess of income over expenditure being Rs. 5,278-6-7 which compares with Rs. 6,324-13-1 in 1937. The financial position of the Institution is sound. The balance on capital account now stands at Rs. 1,17,812-0-0. During the year investments to the value of Rs. 1,700-0-0 matured and Rs. 5,574-6-0 was invested in $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Loan 1947-50 (Rs. 4,252-8-0) and Post Office Cash Certificates (Rs. 1,321-14-0) bringing the total investments at cost (or accrued value in the case of Post Office Cash Certificates) to Rs. 74,526-0-0. Cash and other balances amount to Rs. 5,630-0-0.

2. *MEMBERSHIP*

During the year 2 Life, and 86 Ordinary Members were enrolled. Against this 127 Ordinary Members died or resigned and 25 Members were struck off for non-payment of subscription leaving a net reduction of 64. Under the new rules a further 37 have been struck off this year and it is possible that other members may similarly have to be struck off. There is an unfortunate tendency for officers to cancel their banker's orders or leave the country and cease paying subscriptions without formally resigning.

On 31st December 1938 membership was:

Life Members	...	390
Honorary Member	...	1
Ordinary Members	...	1,465
Total	...	1,856

The number of regimental messes, clubs, libraries, etc., subscribing to the Journal was 194—an increase of 10 during the year.

It may interest members that in 1925, when the total membership was 1,510 and the number of subscribers to the Journal 134, the President regarded it as doubtful whether a further increase in membership could be expected. Efforts to increase membership are being continued.

3. *LIBRARY*

The library continues to be well kept up. A total of Rs. 974 was spent on books. Including presentations, 149 volumes were

added to the library during the year. Approximately 780 volumes were borrowed.

4. *JOURNAL*

The increased rates of premia payable continued to attract a good quality of articles and the standard of the Journal was maintained. More contributions on naval, military and air force matters of up-to-date interest are, however, required.

5. *LECTURES*

During the year the following lectures were delivered at Simla and were well attended. His Excellency the Viceroy honoured the Institution with his presence at the lecture on "The Sino-Japanese Struggle":—

1. "Experiences in Shanghai in 1937" by Major H. McL. Morrison, M.C.
2. "The Italo-Abyssinian Campaign, 1935-36," by Lt.-Col. A. C. Arnold, C.B.E., M.C.
3. "The Sino-Japanese Struggle," by Major J. E. H. Nicolls, M.C.