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EDITORIAL

Munich and after.

The four days of debate in the House of Commons in October served to bring Mr. Chamberlain's actions and the Munich settlement into better perspective, and a majority of more than two to one was an emphatic endorsement of the policy the Prime Minister had adopted. Mr. Chamberlain himself made the policy of his Government as plain as could be desired. He explained that he had turned away from the system of power politics by which Europe had been brought to the brink of war and had attempted to set in its place a policy of reconciliation in which Britain was prepared to accept the leadership in removing those grievances which threatened a renewal of war. But British leadership was confronted by an excessive nationalism bred of the indignities and inequalities of the past and required to be supported by sufficient armed forces to ensure a hearing for the voice of reason. His policy might be summed up in two words, reconciliation and strength.

Against such a policy there emerged in Parliament and the country roughly three schools of critics. First were the advocates of preventive war, those who held that the object of British diplomacy should be to prevent the emergence of any outstanding military power on the continent of Europe, and who favoured intervention by force at such time and under such circumstances as the chances of victory would seem to justify. Theirs is the

policy which Britain has pursued almost since the days of Marlborough, which brought us into war in 1914 and to the verge of war last September. Second came the advocates of British prestige. They denounced the Munich Agreement as a dishonourable surrender to threats and held that an act of justice denied to a weak German Republic—here they were accurate enough in their facts, for the Sudeten problem had more than once been brought before and ignored by the League of Nations—should have been refused to a strong totalitarian state. The argument was advanced that Britain had always been the champion of the weak against the strong, but it was overlooked that Britain had also a tradition of being the champion of justice against injustice. To refuse a remedy for an admitted wrong to the German people merely on the ground of British prestige could have done nothing but strengthen the moral authority of National-Socialism as the one protector of the wronged. Lastly came those, and admittedly there were not many of them, who attributed Mr. Chamberlain's conciliatory policy towards Germany to a desire for an alliance with the fascist states in order to stem the rising tide of communism. In support of this contention it was pointed out that Russia had not been asked to play a part at Munich, but it was ignored that Russia could have contributed nothing to the cause of peace. She was never a party to the Sudeten dispute itself which concerned nationality, not political doctrine; and as mediator she must have been a hindrance owing to the mutual distrust between the Soviet and National-Socialist Governments.

More illuminating, however, than any of these arguments was the fact that no critic had any constructive plan to offer in place of the course pursued by the Prime Minister. Mr. Chamberlain had been faced with problems arising out of the Versailles Treaty and the resulting plans for the encirclement of Germany. When the question came to a head in September there were three possible courses open to Great Britain. She could have stood aside, shirked her moral responsibility for an unjust settlement and so abdicated all claim to leadership in Europe. She might have intervened on behalf of Czechoslovakia and used her armed forces to perpetuate what had come to be recognised as an error; and in this connection it is worth remembering that Lord Runciman, who had obtained an intimate knowledge of the whole Sudeten problem on the spot

had reported that a redrawing of the frontier was not only unavoidable, but desirable in the interests of self-determination. She could, and Mr. Chamberlain did, choose to intervene not as a combatant but as mediator, with the result that the Sudeten question was settled without recourse to war. And Mr. Chamberlain did more than this, for he brought back an agreement signed by the German Führer and himself which, if it settled no specific problem, at least recognised that the question of Anglo-German relations was of the first importance to Europe and proclaimed that consultation would be the method adopted to deal with any further questions that might concern the two countries.

While we are convinced that Mr. Chamberlain was right in what he did, at the time he did it, and that no better policy could have been devised in the heat and stress of the moment, it must be confessed that recent happenings in Germany have scarcely been conducive to a better understanding between the two countries. The reprisals taken by the German authorities for the murder of a German diplomatist by a young and irresponsible Jew, of Polish extraction, have not only disgusted the British peoples, but have also shocked millions of decent Germans. The German Press has maintained for some time a steady stream of abuse against British institutions, British policy at home and abroad, particularly in Palestine, and British statesmen. That it should pursue the colonial question or be opposed to Britain extending a helping hand to the Jews is, at the present time, perhaps understandable, but for an official newspaper, controlled by the Minister of Propaganda, to couple the name of a distinguished British statesman with that of the Jewish murderer passes the bounds of all decency. If we thought for a moment that actions such as these were supported by the majority of Germans, we could hold out no hope of better relations between the two countries. But it is clear that they are not, and the most that can be said is that excesses of this nature are wont to recoil on their author.

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The Anglo-Italian Agreement.

The accrediting of Lord Perth to King Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia carried with it official recognition by Great Britain of the sovereignty of Italy over the large territory she conquered two years ago. It marked the end of a phase of tension as uncomfort-

able as it was untraditional for the two powers concerned and the beginning, we hope, of a better. Signor Mussolini's declaration that he desires no change in the territorial *status quo* in the Mediterranean receives confirmation; the basis has been laid for a comprehensive understanding in the Middle East, especially perhaps in Arabia; and an intention to co-operate has been proclaimed in regard to Egypt. There are to be annual exchanges of naval and military information, the main purpose of the former being to ensure that no signatory of the 1936 Naval Agreement shall steal a march on another in building ships. In actual fact Italy has kept within the terms of that pact during the last two years, without being bound by it. The Anglo-Italian Agreement is a sound foundation on which to build and its conclusion has been accepted with satisfaction throughout the British Empire. In Italy an even warmer welcome was given. The Italian people have long been anxious to resume their traditional attitude of friendship with Great Britain. Commenting on the ratification of the Agreement, the Italian Press emphasised the fact that the revival of friendship between Great Britain and Italy was no more than a return to the normal and that an episode regretted by both sides had been obliterated. And it was interesting to note that the *Tribuna* went so far as to admit that the British attitude towards Italy during the Abyssinian War was not dictated "so much by motives of self-interest, as by the sensibility of imperialistic elements and the fanatical devotion to the League of Nations of the democratic and Bolshevist elements." "These two elements," the paper wrote, "adulterated the whole of moderate British opinion and forced the Government into a position of definite hostility towards Italy." Whether anyone in Britain would agree with this view is, perhaps, debatable, but there must be few who wish to continue an unnatural and unwarranted enmity with an old friend.

With the likelihood of genuine Anglo-Italian accord before us, we can but hope that Franco-Italian relations which are nothing short of deplorable at the moment will also soon be placed on a more stable and permanent basis.

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The Woodhead Report.

The Royal Commission presided over by the late Lord Peel published a report eighteen months ago recommending the partition of Palestine into an Arab State, a Jewish State and Mandatory Territory. His Majesty's

Government expressed general agreement with the proposals and shortly afterwards received permission from the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations to explore the practical application of the scheme of partition, with the result that the Woodhead Commission was appointed to recommend boundaries for the proposed states and examine the economic problems involved.

In their report the Woodhead Commission examine three plans, which they label "A," "B" and "C." Plan "A" was that recommended by the Peel Commission and is rejected on the grounds that a Jewish State with an equal number of Jews and Arabs and four-fifths of the land in Arab ownership is plainly inconsistent with the principle that the fewest possible Arabs and Arab enterprises should be included in the Jewish State, and vice versa. Plan "B" is identical with Plan A except that Galilee and a predominantly Arab area at the southern extremity of the proposed Jewish State are excluded. The Commission reject this scheme too on the grounds that Galilee can not be placed under Arab control without endangering the security of the Jewish State, its retention under mandatory control would deny the Arabs their independence, and Haifa—the one deep water harbour in the country—could not be included in either state without serious detriment to the other.

The majority of the Commission put forward Plan "C" as the best they have been able to devise. That plan divides Palestine into a northern and a southern part, both to be retained under temporary mandate, and a central part consisting of an Arab State, a Jewish State and the Jerusalem Enclave. The idea underlying the temporary mandates is that they should remain in being until both races agree to their surrender to one or other of the independent states, thus giving a binding assurance to the Arabs that they will not be placed under the political domination of the Jews against their will. The Jerusalem Enclave is intended to be permanently mandated. But the real difficulties in the way of any scheme of partition lie in the budgetary prospects of the small states created. Those prospects under Plan "C" are examined exhaustively by the Commission, who anticipate a comfortable surplus for the Jewish State but substantial deficits for the Arab State and the mandated territory. Moreover there is no chance

of the Arab State being in a better financial position under any other scheme of partition; the Jewish contributions to tax revenue alone have enabled Palestine to balance its budgets up to date. The Commission discard the recommendation of the Peel Commission that the United Kingdom should make a capital payment to the new Arab State on the ground that financial control would have to be exercised if such a grant were made, and the Arab kingdom could not then be called self-supporting or independent.

The Commission conclude that on a strict interpretation of their terms of reference they have no alternative but to report that they are unable to recommend boundaries for the proposed areas which will afford a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment of self-supporting states. They go outside their terms of reference however, and wisely so, when they suggest a modified form of partition which they term economic federalism. Under this both States would be required to enter a customs union with the mandated territories under which fiscal policy would be determined by the Mandatory Power, which would collect the customs revenue and distribute the net surplus according to an agreed formula. Even so the Arab State would have to receive a portion of the revenue which should, on purely financial grounds, go to the mandated territory. While the arrangement proposed withholds fiscal autonomy from both Arab and Jewish States the Commission recommend it as a satisfactory basis for settlement, provided His Majesty's Government is prepared to accept the large financial liabilities involved.

But the recommendations of the Commission are not unanimous and the real sting in the report lies in the reservations made by two out of its four members. Sir Alison Russell considers that Plan B is preferable to Plan C, because a Jewish State of the small area proposed in the latter is not in accordance with British obligations to Jewry. Mr. Reid considers that Plan C is the best that could be devised under the terms of reference, but deems it impracticable on account of absence of consent, absence of equity, absence of security, dismemberment of Palestine and absence of solvency.

Soon after the publication of the report His Majesty's Government announced that they accepted the view that the creation of

separate Arab and Jewish States was impracticable on administrative and financial grounds and would continue their government of the whole country for the present. They intended, as soon as possible, to invite representatives of the Palestinian Arabs, the Jewish Agency and Arabs of neighbouring states to a conference in London regarding future policy in Palestine and immigration into the country.

In Palestine the Woodhead Report was received without any sign of pleasure, though there were no violent reactions. Terrorism and sabotage reached a high water mark towards the end of October and have since shown a marked drop, but there is no reason to suppose that the revolt is over. The Arabs are suspicious about the continued lack of any statement regarding future immigration of Jews, and some at least are annoyed that the Mufti should be excluded from the coming conference. Meanwhile there is an ever increasing number of Jews clamouring to be allowed to enter the country. Altogether the prospects for the conference are not very auspicious despite the fact that Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan and the Jewish Agency have accepted the invitation to send representatives.

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The War in China.

October saw a considerable quickening in the course of events in China and by the end of the month one of those turning points had been reached which so often face a combatant who has obtained success everywhere but is still, apparently, not within measurable distance of final success anywhere.

In northern China, Japanese forces crossed the Yellow River and cut the Lunghai Railway to the west of Chengchow. In eastern Shansi Japanese troops took Wutaishan, a place which had served as headquarters for the famous 8th Route Army since the early days of the war and a centre from which guerilla activities had for some time been directed. But apart from these minor successes Japanese control in the north appears to be no greater and the guerilla menace no less than they have been for months.

In central China the Japanese were steadily reinforced throughout September and early in October had nine divisions above Wuhu on the Yangtze. Steadily the various columns

advancing on Hangkow closed in, successive Chinese lines of defence being turned by landing operations on both banks of the river, and on 25th October the first troops entered the capital. In isolated cases the Chinese put up a stout resistance but, taken by and large, they lacked the ability to take advantage of the facilities for defence offered by the nature of the country. The siting of positions was faulty, the artificial strengthening of defences rudimentary and the idea of fighting a planned defensive battle simply non-existent. Hangkow itself the Chinese authorities had decided not to defend and a vast exodus of the population, including General Chiang-Kai-shek and his wife who left for Yuanling, took place. Bridges, military equipment and buildings, public utility concerns and much Japanese property were destroyed before the invaders entered the capital.

Meanwhile in southern China there had been indications for some weeks that the Japanese were preparing a fresh operation, for a force of two divisions and a brigade had been assembled in convoys off Formosa early in the month. On the 12th the first troops of this force began landing on the northern shores of Bias Bay, the one time notorious home of pirates. Three separate landings were made and only at one point was any resistance encountered. The subsequent advance inland, the cutting of the Canton Kowloon railway and the capture of Canton itself followed so rapidly as to give grounds for a suspicion that on the Chinese side hopeless inefficiency had been combined with treachery. General Yuhan-mou, the Commander-in-Chief of the Canton armies, certainly withdrew with precipitate haste before what was, after all, only a small force, and then surrendered with some of his officers. It is not easy to reconcile his actions with the constant avowal of the Canton authorities to defend the city.

Whether these considerable successes will bring the China "incident" to an end remains to be seen. The loss of Canton has cut China's last major link with the outside world, but it has been estimated on fairly reliable authority that she has enough ammunition and equipment to continue resistance for some months, and it is possible that further small amounts may reach her from the Soviet or by the Burma Yunnan frontier. In fact, General Itagaki, the Japanese War Minister, reviewing events after the fall of Hangkow, stated openly that the Japanese Government had no

intention of relaxing its efforts to eradicate General Chiang Kai-shek and all influences embracing communism. If necessary Japanese troops would march into the remotest parts of China. This may well be necessary, for General Chiang Kai-shek's prestige still seems to be as high as ever, even if his material resources are dwindling.

Above Hangkow river gorges would complicate the problem of maintenance and rule out much of that close co-operation between the army and navy which has been a feature of the Yangtze advance. Elsewhere a westward move would also be handicapped by lack of communications. For the winter, then, it appears that a halt may be called and an attempt made to consolidate the enormous area at present under the nominal control of the Japanese armies.

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Kemal Ataturk.

The death of Kemal Ataturk removed one of the illustrious figures of the post-war world. Since May 1919 when Mustafa Kemal was appointed Inspector-General of the forces in Eastern Anatolia, the history of Turkey has been the history of his life. Within a few weeks of his appointment Mustafa had become the embodiment of Turkish resistance to the Greeks. Following on the Treaty of Lausanne he was proclaimed Ghazi and a year later President of the newly formed Turkish Republic. The following March the Popular Party of which Kemal was leader passed a law abolishing the Caliphate and banishing all members of the House of Osman. The Caliphate abolished, the President turned his attention to the secularizing of the country, and such measures as the emancipation of women and the compulsory adoption of surnames, the lack of which had for long caused confusion, followed. From internal reform he turned his hand to foreign policy and negotiated understandings with Russia, Britain, Greece and his Balkan neighbours. Here, too his policy was crowned with success, when in 1936 the Turkish Republic regained full sovereignty over the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Of the leaders who emerged in post-war Europe none was faced with greater difficulties and none accomplished more. In Kemal Ataturk Britain has lost a friend and Turkey a patriot and leader.

General Ismet Inonu, a former prime minister and close collaborator of Kemal Ataturk, was elected President of the Republic in November.

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The Royal Air Force.

Referring two months ago to air defence requirements, Sir Kingsley-Wood told the House of Commons that the Air Estimate for 1939-40 would amount to about £200, 000,000, compared with £120,000,000 for the current year, and that the first line strength would be increased by thirty per cent. over the programme already authorised.

The fighter aircraft now on order, or to be ordered in the near future, numbered between five and six thousand. The aircraft industry was working to full capacity on orders for a considerable period ahead. Output was already fifty per cent. greater than it was last May and by May of this year the increase would be one hundred and fifty per cent. Orders had been placed in the United States for four hundred training and reconnaissance machines and negotiations with Canadian manufacturers were in progress. Balloon defences would be in operation this summer in a number of provincial centres and requirements in London were already practically complete.

The Government aimed at producing a sound and well balanced Air Force on a high standard of preparedness and with adequate reserves. Satisfactory as recruiting had been, there was still need for a progressive increase in personnel to meet the new requirements.

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The Evacuation of London.

The problem of evacuating the civil population from industrial areas in the event of air attack is extremely intricate and it was hardly to be expected that a small committee of members of the House of Commons would, or indeed could, investigate that mass of detail which is properly the sphere of Government departments. Nevertheless the report of the Anderson Committee did cause some disappointment, since it was confined almost entirely to principles.

The Report infers that the advisability of evacuation from London and other centres is still an open question and points out that no adequate inquiry has yet been made into the administrative problems and financial demands which would be created by large

scale movements of the population. In any case it decides quite definitely against mass evacuation, on the grounds that no movement of the civil population will be a substitute for adequate efforts in active and passive air defence. The Committee considered that accommodation around London would suffice to take three millions of refugees without overcrowding and recommended that the acceptance of refugees be made compulsory. But that is as far as they went in demanding sacrifices of individual liberty. While they envisaged the possibilities, even the likelihood, of large scale evacuation, they did not consider that evacuation should be compulsory except in those areas in which the removal of the civil population would be of direct military advantage. The most pertinent remark made in the Report was that Greater London must be treated as a single unit for the purpose of Air Raids Precautions. The backwardness of the preparations last September could, apparently, be traced to a large extent to the division of tasks between nearly thirty boroughs, with the result that the police force, which in provincial centres is the basis of organization for Air Raids Precautions purposes, played a small part in the civilian defence of London.

This is certainly a matter which should be put right, for as long as there is doubt about government policy local authorities cannot be blamed. They must know who is to be evacuated, who is to remain and who is to pay for transport. The security of the population of London is of vital interest throughout the Empire.

THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGN, 1935-36

[*A lecture given before His Excellency Sir Henry Craik, Bart.,* K.C.S.I., *Governor of the Punjab, and the members of the United Service Institution of India, on 14th July, by Lieut.-Colonel A.C. Arnold,* O.B.E., M.C., *The Royal Fusiliers.*

The lecturer was introduced by Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., M.V.O., *Secretary, External Affairs Department.*]

YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

Before beginning this lecture I should like to emphasize that I give it purely and simply from the point of view of a soldier endeavouring to present a straightforward and unbiased account of the war, and at the end to draw certain deductions and lessons. I shall therefore refrain from giving any opinion as to the moral or political rights and wrongs of the Italo-Ethiopian quarrel.

Before dealing with the war itself it is desirable to understand its causes and to do this one must delve into back history since the causes of the war were as much historical and psychological as economic.

Italy is a young nation which arrived late in the scramble for colonies in Africa. When she did arrive she entered the already somewhat restricted field with zest and after a certain measure of success her efforts ended disastrously on the field of Adua in February 1896. The defeat of Adua left a deep scar. Not only did it cause the end of Italian colonial ambitions for a decade and a half, but it left behind a sense of bitter shame that a European country had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of a semi-civilized African race and had not had the will-power, perseverance or moral courage to return to the charge and bring the war to a successful conclusion.

By 1911, however, Italian imperialism had so far recovered its morale that it was decided to risk further colonial adventures, the result being the Libyan campaign of 1911. And questions of colonial expansion subsequently figured prominently in the bargain known as the Treaty of London, by which Italy entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1915. At the Peace Treaties following the conclusion of the Great War, Italian colonial aspirations were left unsatisfied, and from the Italian point of view the French and British were guilty of going back on their bargain.

This left a feeling of intense dissatisfaction and bitterness and from it grew a determination on the part of the Italians to achieve colonial expansion by their own action, should opportunity offer.

In 1923 Signor Mussolini came into power and at once began the systematic regeneration of the Italian people. As you know, he worked wonders internally and the Italian quickly lost the inferiority complex under which he had laboured for some decades and regained his self-assurance. Externally, however, all the other big powers were loth to regard the Italians with the respect due to a Great Power. This rankled, and as Italy continued to grow in strength so did the desire grow to show the world that Italy was, in fact, now a first-class power. In 1931, the financial crisis brought home to the Italians with a shock how utterly dependent they were on other nations for almost all their raw materials and, as a corollary, their eyes turned again to the need for good colonies as being the natural solution to their difficulties.

By 1932, therefore, Italy's foreign policy had become definitely aggressive, compound of a desire to show the world that she had to be reckoned with as a first-class power and of eagerness to expand colonially with a view to gaining a measure of self-sufficiency in raw materials. It was in 1932 that Signor Mussolini's thoughts first seem to have begun to turn seriously towards Ethiopia. Here was a country reported to be fabulously rich in raw materials of all kinds, a country with which Italy had a long account to settle, and a country which by its slack administration constantly gave its neighbours, of whom the Italians were one, serious cause for complaint. It was, moreover, a country which separated geographically two existing Italian colonies and the intransigent attitude of its rulers made collaboration between these colonies difficult.

In 1932 and 1933 much preliminary planning was done and by 1933 Signor Mussolini seems to have made up his mind definitely that Italy's colonial needs must be satisfied at Ethiopian expense, and at a date not later than 1936. It was at first hoped that an opportunity to intervene in Ethiopian affairs would occur either as the result of some revolt amongst the Rases or through some aggressive frontier action on the part of the Ethiopians which would place the Italians in the position of victims and permit a legitimate counter-offensive. During 1934, therefore, definite plans for such a defensive counter-offensive were elaborated by the Chiefs of Staff of the Fighting Services, and certain administrative preparations in the shape of increased rail and road programmes were set in hand. The exact reason why Signor Mussolini

selected 1936 as the latest date for a reckoning with Ethiopia has never been explained, but I suggest that three reasons were contributory. Firstly, the revival of Germany and her colonial ambitions warned Signor Mussolini that he might soon not be the only competitor in the field. Secondly, the rapid development, material, moral and physical, of the Italian nation, was due to reach its zenith about 1936, and this was obviously the moment for action, before enthusiasm waned. Thirdly, increasing economic difficulties on the home front may have indicated that an external diversion would soon be desirable.

By the end of 1934, from purely military indications in the two Italian colonies, the War Office in London became convinced that the Italians were planning operations against Ethiopia. Other departments of state, however, found it difficult to believe that the Italians meant to push matters to a crisis since Ethiopia and Great Britain, France and Italy were bound together by a number of treaties, pacts and arbitration agreements. It was only in late April 1935 that Italy really put her cards on the table, by which time she was so deeply committed that she could not draw back, even she wished to do so.

To return to the actual narrative, on 5th December 1934 a serious affray took place at Wal Wal between Italian irregulars and the Ethiopian escort to the British-Ethiopian Boundary Commission. This gave the Italians an excellent opportunity. No one will probably ever know who really fired the first shot at Wal Wal, but it is certain that the local Italian commander was fully ready for a fight whereas the Ethiopians were not. Italian tanks and aeroplanes were in action within a few minutes of the battle opening, although theoretically there were none within close call, while the Ethiopians still had canvas covers on their machine-guns. Again, it is not clear to what extent the affair was the responsibility of Captain Cimmaruta, the Italian commander on the spot, or of higher authority, but there is some reason to believe the former. Personally, I believe that Captain Cimmaruta was actually responsible for the fight, but that he was working on a generally aggressive directive from above. When the news reached Rome, Signor Mussolini was faced with the alternative of having to disown Captain Cimmaruta's action or else supporting him. He unhesitatingly selected the latter course and made demands for reparations which were sufficiently severe to ensure a long period of negotiation. During this period he matured his plans. His instructions to General de Bono, who was sent out as Governor-General on January 7th, 1935, are interesting and read as follows:

"You leave with an olive branch in your pocket. We will see how the Wal Wal affair develops. If it suits us to accept conditions arrived at by arbitration it will be your task to announce your appointment to the Emperor, telling him that you have been sent out to square up misunderstandings and to collaborate in restoring good relations between our two states. At the same time you must continue your preparations. If no solution of the incident is reached, or one which is not satisfactory to us, we will pursue events exclusively according to our own point of view."

General de Bono on arrival at Eritrea at once ordered the mobilization of the Colonial Army and set in train intensive administrative preparations for the reception of an expeditionary force and for improving existing communications. Signor Mussolini meanwhile had succeeded in obtaining from M. Laval what he apparently understood to be the promise of a free hand to do what he liked in Abyssinia in exchange for certain agreements in Europe.

Early in February 1935 Signor Mussolini was led to believe that the Emperor was considering offensive action against Somalia and decided to dispatch two metropolitan divisions to East Africa to counter this threat. By the end of February, however, he realised that the Emperor was unlikely to take the initiative so he wrote to General de Bono the following directive:

"In case the Negus does not intend to attack, we ourselves must take the initiative. That cannot be done unless you have at your disposal, in addition to native troops, at least 100,000 white troops, a number which must rapidly rise to 200,000."

He followed this up on March 8th with:

"It is my profound conviction that—we having to take the initiative in the operations at the end of October or end of September—you must have a total force of 300,000 men . . . without this force to keep up the pressure of offensive penetration, the operations will not have the energetic rhythm we desire . . . Also, in view of possible international complications it is well to hasten. For want of a few thousand men we lost Adua! I will never commit that error. I will err on the side of too many rather than too few . . . it is essential not to postpone the date of October that we have settled on for the commencement of operations."

Thus we see that by the middle of March 1935 the project had changed from a defensive counter-offensive to a deliberately planned offensive which was to take place as soon as the rains ceased. From this moment Signor Mussolini had no intention of accepting a settlement, and every diplomatic move made was with the sole idea of gaining time for preparations and of keeping the Ethiopians quiet until the Italians were ready to strike. If further proof of this were needed, it is only necessary to quote two more of Signor Mussolini's letters. In one dated May 18th he wrote: "There is talk of a compromise. . . I have let it be understood that we will under no circumstances turn back." And again, on 26th June, when informing General de Bono of Mr. Eden's visit and proposals, he wrote: "You can imagine my reply . . . the English attitude is helping rather than harming us."

By the end of September 1935 it was considered that in view of the European situation it was essential that a start should be made even if preparations were not entirely complete and on September 29th the advance was ordered for October 3rd without a declaration of war.

Meanwhile the Ethiopians who had no intention whatever of risking a single-handed quarrel with Italy had been carrying on negotiations and offering various concessions through the League of Nations and it was not until July 26th that, realising the danger, the Emperor ordered general mobilization.

So much for the history of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war and its causes. Now let us turn to the operations themselves.

The Italian plan was for General Graziani in Somalia to contain the largest possible number of Ethiopian troops while General de Bono in the north advanced rapidly and occupied that portion of Tigre which the Italians had held prior to 1896. From a purely military point of view, a quick advance in the south had certain advantages and might have forced a decisive battle sooner than the northern advance, but from the point of view of national morale the recapture of Adua was all-important.

The Ethiopian plan was dictated by the fact that they were caught before their concentration was complete, and consisted in a withdrawal from outlying provinces in the hope that an opportunity would arise later to develop a counter-offensive against the Italian lines of communication as they became attenuated, or that League action would gradually take effect.

The war itself falls into four distinct phases. The first phase is from the beginning of the campaign until the middle of

November 1935 during which period the Italians held the initiative. The initial advance on the northern front effected the occupation of Tigre up to the line Adigrat—Adua—Axum, while a second advance a month later reached Macalle and the line of the Tacazze river. General de Bono from an administrative point of view was not ready for this second bound but was ordered to undertake it by Signor Mussolini in the following directive: "There will not be complications in Europe before the English elections fixed for the middle of November. By that date all Tigre up to Macalle and beyond must be ours."

Actually both advances were made with very little opposition from the enemy though in the face of considerable natural difficulties, and the fact that the second bound was made prematurely led to serious difficulties later on.

On the southern front General Graziani made small advances in several places, the most important of which ended in the capture of Gorahai; but after the check at Ananle on November 11th he relapsed into inaction for two months. Though this was to a certain degree in accordance with his defensive rôle it was principally due to the fact that at Ananle the Italians lost three light tanks which had a bad effect on the morale of the Somali native troops who had hitherto regarded tanks as invulnerable. The disaffection was so great that some units actually had to be transferred to Libya.

The second phase lasted from the middle of November to the middle of January. During this phase, for a variety of causes, the initiative passed to the Ethiopians and the Italians found themselves everywhere on the defensive. On the northern front General de Bono's rapid advance to Macalle and the Tacazze had far outstripped the speed with which his communications could be built up and he found himself having to supply large masses of men over a most difficult terrain entirely unprovided with roads and with insufficient transport. Added to this the Tacazze River which had hitherto only been passable at certain known crossings fell and ceased to be a military obstacle. At the same time the Ethiopians had completed their much delayed mobilization and concentration and their forces were beginning to infiltrate into the Tembien and Shire. The first Ethiopian success occurred on 15th December when Dedjazmatch Ayelu suddenly forded the river near Mai Timchet and surprised the Italian garrison at the Dembeguina pass, driving it back on to Selaclaca with considerable loss including almost an entire company of tanks. Ayelu followed up his success and on December 24th occupied Selaclaca which was evacuated

by the Italians. He then planned a drive into Eritrea. Had this come off, we know now that the Italian 2nd Corps had orders to withdraw its right flank into Eritrea, evacuating Axum if necessary. However, the drive never came off. Mustard gas was dropped on Ayelu's troops by the Italians on December 24th with the idea of preventing their further advance, and it certainly had a delaying effect; but this excellent scheme was finally vetoed by Ras Imru who had been sent by the Emperor to take supreme command of the forces in Shire. It is rather a tragedy that Ayelu who was the most brilliant commander the Ethiopians produced in the whole war was never trusted by the Emperor and Imru, a man of inferior military calibre, was placed over his head in order to watch him. Thereafter, the customary jealousy between Ethiopian commanders prevented any useful co-operation between these two.

Fighting also took place in the Tembien between the 18th and 22nd December, when Ras Kassa advanced on Abbi Addi, and the Italians, though tactically successful in repelling his assaults, subsequently withdrew to the Warieu Pass.

Between January 20th and 25th, serious fighting again occurred in the Abbi Addi area as a result of an attempt by the Italian native corps to clear the area and to dispose of the threat which Ras Kassa's presence there constituted to the Italian lines of communication. A great deal of heavy but confused fighting resulted, in the course of which a column of Italian Blackshirts was very severely handled. When the fighting eventually died down both sides occupied roughly the positions that they had held before it began. Both sides subsequently claimed a victory; the Italians on the grounds that Ras Kassa's projected offensive against their lines of communication was nipped in the bud, and the Ethiopians on the grounds that the Italians had failed to dislodge them from the Tembien.

Actually, in the course of both the Dembeguina and the Abbi Addi fighting, considerable bodies of Italians were cut off and surrounded by the Ethiopians, and in both cases only escaped annihilation because the latter either dispersed to loot, or for some other reason failed to push home their advantage. Had the Italians experienced even a minor disaster at this period the whole course of the war might well have been different. As it was, the Italian High Command obtained a very good insight into the fighting capabilities of the Ethiopians and realised that, though personally brave, they were quite incapable of carrying out concerted movements,

By the end of January, therefore, the position of the Italians on the northern front was by no means happy. The Ethiopians were well established in the Tembien which prevented the Italians from using the Axum—Macalle road and constituted a permanent threat to the main Italian line of communication Adigrat—Macalle.

During this period, Signor Mussolini, considering that the military situation called for the best military commander that Italy could produce, had replaced General de Bono in November by Marshal Badoglio. On arrival the latter at once set about a thorough reorganization of the whole of the administrative arrangements—a task which taxed his energies and resources to the utmost.

Meanwhile, on the Southern front, the Ethiopian main forces had concentrated in the Jijiga area under Ras Nacibou while a second substantial force under Ras Dasta moved down from Sidamo towards Graziani's left flank about Dolo. In order to relieve the pressure on the northern and home fronts and to dispose of his threat to his own left flank Graziani, who had remained inactive since Ananle, attacked Dasta on January 13th with mechanized forces, defeated him heavily at Nighelle, and drove the remnants of his army back to Wadera. This easy victory was partly due to the fact that the morale of Dasta's army had been sapped by gross maladministration and partly to the fact that his forces tried to stand up to tanks in ideal tank country with disastrous results. Graziani's success not only had an excellent moral effect in Rome and on the northern army but also caused considerable alarm in the Ethiopian capital since it opened up a possible line of advance on Addis Ababa, *via* Allata and the Lakes. This resulted in the diversion of a number of Ethiopian troops intended for the northern front into Sidamo.

During this period the Ethiopian northern armies had completed their concentration and at the beginning of February Ras Mouloughetа's army was astride the "Imperial road," Ras Kassa and Ras Seyum were in the Tembien and Ras Imru and Dedjazmatch Ayelu were still in Shire.

The third phase opened early in February when Marshal Badoglio had so far put his administrative house in order that he felt in a position to regain the initiative. The Italian Government was being subjected to heavy pressure from the League, the effect of sanctions was beginning to tell, the Italians held comparatively little enemy country with which to bargain, and the rains were already within sight when the season for offensive campaigning

must cease. He had therefore several powerful incentives to vigorous action, and the Ethiopian concentration gave him his opportunity.

Marshal Badoglio decided to strike first at Ras Mouloughetа's army which was occupying a strong position on and forward of the Amba Aradam massif. He therefore concentrated, in and forward of Macalle, two corps, the First and Third, a total of seven divisions and a mass of eighty-one pieces of medium artillery. This I think you will agree was a fine administrative achievement as these large forces had to be concentrated and maintained on the single road Adigrat—Macalle while, in addition, reserves of supplies and ammunition had to be built up.

On the 11th February Marshal Badoglio launched his attack under cover of a heavy artillery bombardment, and by the evening of the 12th the Italians had captured the Ethiopian position which protected the approaches to the Amba Aradam massif itself. They then paused for two days while the heavy artillery moved forward and attacked again on the 15th, the Amba being finally captured in the evening by the Alpini who stormed the crest from the rear.

On the 13th an Ethiopian force led by Bitwoded Maconnen had carried out a counter-attack round the Italian left flank and had actually succeeded in entering Macalle, but on Maconnen becoming a casualty his force had dispersed. Had the Ethiopians been able to maintain themselves in Macalle for even quite a short time the position of the Italians would have been precarious.

Meanwhile on the Italian right flank Ras Kassa and Seyum within sound and almost within sight of the battle made no move, though they could have intervened with large forces by the second day, and in fact had instructions from the Emperor to do so.

On the 16th the remnants of Ras Mouloughetа's army retired in disorder towards Dessye and were subjected to continuous and concerted air attack including a proportion of mustard gas. The last straw was when the Raia and Azebu Gallas, who had been in touch with the Italians for some months, rose and attacked the fugitives. From this moment the retreat became a complete rout and all hope of rallying the fugitives was lost. Ras Mouloughetа himself was killed by the Gallas.

Having defeated Ras Mouloughetа, Marshal Badoglio next turned his attention to Ras Kassa and Seyum. He diverted the 3rd Corps from the pursuit of Ras Mouloughetа westwards along the south bank of the River Gheva, afterwards turning them north and throwing them across the river. This was a fine administra-

tive performance as it entailed feeding the whole corps for three days partly by air and partly by rations carried on man-pack. At the same time the Eritrean Corps was set in motion from the north-east so that the two Rases would be caught between the two corps. Actually after one day of somewhat confused fighting the Ethiopians managed to escape by night past the right flank of the 3rd Corps, and it is possible that the Italians meant them to do so. Their retreating columns were discovered by the Italian air forces the next morning and were subjected to heavy air attack with both bombs and gas which very soon turned their retreat into a rout. Both forces subsequently broke up into small bodies and dispersed towards their home districts.

Marshal Badoglio's third blow was directed at Ras Imru and Dejazmatch Ayelu in Shire. His plan of attack here was to advance the 2nd Corps westwards in the direction of Selaclaca—Coitza while the newly formed 4th Corps made a wide detour and came down through the waterless country in northern Shire onto the Ethiopian left flank. The attack opened on the 26th February but the 2nd Corps met strong opposition and made little progress during the first three days. On the fourth day, however, the advance of the 4th Corps, which had been entirely supplied and watered by air since it left Eritrea, made itself felt and the Ethiopian armies retreated towards the crossing of the Tecazze at Mai Timchet. Again, the Italian air force intervened and subjected the fugitives to air and gas attack especially at the crossing. After crossing the river Ayelu's men who were close to their home district immediately dispersed, whilst Imru's men broke up into small bodies and continued their headlong flight southwards, harried by certain sections of the local population.

Thus in the short space of three weeks Marshal Badoglio had destroyed the three major Ethiopian armies on the northern front, had regained the initiative and had opened up the way to Addis Ababa.

He now paused to appreciate the situation. His intelligence service, which was very good, informed him accurately of the complete state of disruption of the three defeated northern armies. He also knew that there was a serious rebellion in Gojjam for the suppression of which considerable forces had been diverted, and that the only remaining enemy force between him and Addis Ababa was the reserve army, including the Imperial Guard, which was under the personal command of the Emperor in the Quoram-Dessye area. The Marshal therefore decided that if he could defeat this army there was a chance of being able to reach Addis Ababa

and base himself on the railway before active operations were stopped by the rains, an event which would normally occur in about ten weeks' time. He realised that if he could not reach Addis Ababa and use the railway, the line which he must hold during the rainy season would be limited by the location of his weatherproof roadheads and could not on reasonable estimates be far south of the Tacazze. He therefore took the bold decision of attempting the occupation of Addis Ababa before the rains rendered further movement impossible, and with this end in view ordered a general advance on all fronts. We now know how bold a decision this was, seeing that with unlimited labour and under peace conditions the road only reached Addis Ababa in June 1937. The 1st and Eritrean Corps were directed down the Imperial Road with the task of gaining contact with the Ethiopian reserve army and bringing it to battle. The 3rd Corps was directed on Socota where it could to a certain degree protect the flank of the 1st Corps, while three new lines of advance were initiated—one from Assab to Sardo in the heart of the Danakil country; one through the Semien viâ Debat towards Gondar, and one parallel to the Sudan border with Gondar as its objective. The advance on Sardo was carried out by quite a small body of native troops over a waterless volcanic desert, all supply, evacuation of casualties, etc., being carried out by aircraft which landed near the column daily. Sardo was occupied on March 11th. The advance through the Semien was carried out by the 2nd Corps and 3rd Eritrean Brigade, its object being to protect the flank of the Gondar column and prevent Ras Imru's and Dejazmatch Ayelu's forces from re-uniting. The advance on Gondar was made by an improvised mechanized column of five hundred vehicles under Starace, the Secretary-General of the Fascist Party and a lieutenant-general in the Militia. It was a remarkable performance. The column advanced through trackless country often covered with grass ten feet high and relied on aircraft for information and local protection. Had the Ethiopians set alight the grass which was tinder dry it is more than possible that the whole column would have been annihilated. However, they did not and Gondar was occupied on 1st April.

At the same time, Marshal Badoglio ordered his Quarter-master-General to collect a large column of motor transport and to hold it in readiness to march on Addis Ababa as soon as he should give the word.

The 1st and Eritrean Corps continued their advance southwards with little opposition until they reached the area of the

Mecan Pass. Here on March 27th the Marshal intercepted a wireless message from the Emperor to the Empress and learnt that the Emperor was assembling the reserve army for attack. The two Italian Corps therefore took up a strong defensive position about Mai Cio.

On the morning of April 1st the Ethiopians, led by the Imperial Guard, attacked with great violence and attacks continued throughout the day. Though at times the situation was anxious the Italians were well entrenched and stood firm, and the Ethiopian losses were enormous. In the evening the Italians counter-attacked and occupied part of the Ethiopian position, and during the night the Ethiopian army commenced its retreat. The next morning, harassed by the Italian Air Force, the retreat became a rout, and to make matters worse several local tribes attacked the fugitives.

With this defeat all hope of organized resistance in the north vanished, and after spending a miserable month as a fugitive the Emperor left the country.

The reasons which decided the Emperor to risk all at Mai Cio are still not known. He seems to have suddenly reverted to the primitive attack methods of his ancestors probably due to a state of mind engendered by extreme exhaustion, physical and mental, pressure from his remaining chiefs and disappointment at receiving a negative answer to a last desperate personal appeal to Great Britain for help.

Marshal Badoglio, directly he had news of the victory at Mai Cio, moved his headquarters by air to Dessye and ordered forward the mechanical transport column which had been collected for the march on Addis Ababa.

The actual advance on Addis Ababa was a very fine example of endurance and administrative improvisation. It was carried out in two columns. A mechanized column of seventeen hundred and twenty vehicles manned by the 1st Corps moved along the so-called main road through Debra Brehan, while a lightly equipped Eritrean brigade moved on foot over the hills by the direct track through Emberta. The former column was followed by the bulk of the Eritrean Corps on foot. The advance began on 23rd April. No enemy resistance was encountered but the mechanized column found that the so-called road was little better than a track without foundations, rendered almost impassable by the rains and by Ethiopian demolitions. In many places every

vehicle had to be man-handled and in others entirely new diversions had to be cut out of the solid hillside. The Eritrean dismounted brigade arrived within sight of Addis Ababa first and it was not until May 4th that the motorized column made contact with them. On the afternoon of May 5th the two columns entered Addis Ababa together, the city having been a prey to looting and murder for the previous four days

To turn back to the southern front. Early in March Ras Nacibou thought, or was told, that it was his duty to produce a diversion. He therefore called for his Turkish advisers, Wehib Pasha and Farouk Bey, and demanded an appreciation.

The latter advised against an offensive and recommended on the contrary that he should withdraw to the Harrar foothills and there dig in and carry out intensive training; leaving small forces on the low ground to harass the Italians whose line of communication, already long enough, would in the event of their trying to advance be still further drawn out. Nacibou as usual ignored their advice and decided to stage an offensive in the direction of Denan. If successful, his troops were then to turn eastwards and take Gorahai from the rear. As usual, much time was wasted in fruitless discussion and it was not until April 13th that Nacibou attacked. Not only were his forces inadequate but General Graziani, who had intercepted all his opponent's orders, had massed the Libyan division on his left flank to counter the threat. The Ethiopian attack met with a small local success near Dagamodo and was then checked by General Graziani who, on the 15th, passed to the counter-offensive in three columns. The left column consisted of the Libyan Division and a mechanized force for exploitation. The centre column consisted of a native brigade and irregulars under General Frusci and the right column of Forest Militia and Irregulars under General Agostini.

Fierce fighting took place on the front of the Libyan Division during the 16th and 17th and on the 18th the Ethiopians started to withdraw along the whole front. The Italians followed but the weather had by this time broken, thereby limiting air action, and in spite of several days' fierce fighting, especially on April 24th and 25th, the Ethiopians managed to make good their retreat with their forces still maintaining some sort of cohesion.

Daghabur was occupied on April 30th, Harrar on May 8th and contact with Marshal Badoglio's troops was made by means of the railway on May 9th.

So ended organized resistance.

Since then the Italians have been gradually but steadily occupying and pacifying the country. Their methods have been drastic, by our standards even ferocious. Broadly speaking, their policy seems to be to eliminate the Amhara and a proportion of the Shoans altogether, both by direct action and by encouraging the one-time subject races to persecute their old oppressors. They have had many minor reverses in the course of pacification and have in every case exacted a savage vengeance. They have undertaken an ambitious road programme which is going on reasonably well and the importation of Italian military colonists has begun. The real trouble is that the whole framework of the development scheme is too big. It was drawn up in the first flush of victory when Signor Mussolini's favours were all for the new colony. Since then Spain has come into the limelight and the East African colony has found itself with a huge framework and slender resources. Perhaps a little disillusionment is also discernible in that the country is not the El Dorado which the Italian people were led to suppose, but one requiring years of patient toil and development before it will pay dividends.

Nevertheless the Italians are there to stay and it is futile for "Diehards" to try and keep alive the myth of Ethiopian independence. The old Empire broke up on the field of Mai Cio and the Emperor could not return to Ethiopia to-day even if the Italians were not in occupation. Everything is topsy-turvy, the Amhara and the Shoans are scattered and the Galla and other one-time subject races are up.

The constant opposition which the Italians are meeting is no longer the opposition of a desperate nation but of a number of independent tribes, races and districts who resent the white man's disciplined rule and methods. Whether the world recognises Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia or not, affects them not one whit. They are not in touch with the outside world and they will go on giving trouble until they are tamed. Italy has a long and hard road to travel in her East African colony just as we have had in most of our colonial adventures, but barring a major outside diversion such as an European war she will win through.

Before finishing, I would like to consider the military lessons we can learn from the campaign, and appreciate how at the cost of only some four-and-a-half thousand admitted casualties, Italy was able in seven months to conquer an Empire, contrary to the prognostications of all the chancelleries and general staffs of Europe not excluding their own. To take the latter first. The initial mistake the world made was not so much to underrate the

capabilities of the Italians but to overrate the cohesion of the Ethiopian Empire. We now know that the outwardly united front presented by the Ethiopian Empire was a facade, behind which the bonds of Empire were loose indeed and quite incapable of standing strain. The extent to which Italian propaganda and gold had undermined the loyalty of many of the Ethiopian subject races was also not realized. Later, when the war had begun, the failure of sanctions to take early effect and the lack of visible assistance gradually induced a feeling of despair amongst the Ethiopians. It was the reaction of a primitive people let down by methods which they could not understand. When the edifice did start crumbling poor communications prevented the Emperor from exerting personal control, and a merciless use of the air arm and of gas made the break-up complete. Italy was a signatory to the Gas Convention and it had been assumed that she would hesitate to use it.

The Ethiopian individually fought well but his higher leaders were mostly men of straw, jealous of each other, dilatory and incapable of sudden or sustained action. There was no competent "small leader" class between the big feudal lords and the soldiers such as is found amongst our own Indian frontier tribes. When the feudal lord fell or was discredited, his whole force at once lost cohesion and discipline.

To turn to the military lessons:

The most important I will give in Marshal Badoglio's own words: "The war has upset much theoretical data, capacity of roads and tracks, use of mechanical transport, length and speed of marches, needs of the soldier. All this requires re-study in accordance with the underlying conception of making greater demands on all by all. This applies especially to mechanical transport which has now been proved capable of employment under conditions previously considered impossible."

Secondly, the whole administrative organization was on a lavish, not to say wasteful scale, but it proved to be economical in the long run since the war was finished in one year. The wastage in lorries particularly was enormous. Are we not sometimes inclined to be overcareful of our material?

Thirdly, the Italians are very much more competent in every way than they appear to be to the average Anglo-Saxon observer. The appearance of their troops and equipment is often slovenly by Anglo-Saxon standards but because troops appear slovenly it

SKETCH MAP OF NORTHERN ETHIOPIA



Sketch Map of Ethiopia



does not mean, as it would with us, that their morale has deteriorated. It is a matter of difference in temperament and different values set on different qualities.

Fourthly, use of the air arm was interesting and novel. Apart from wholesale supply by air, aircraft often took the place of ground troops in both defence and attack. In the latter case low flying aircraft were used for providing covering fire instead of artillery. It is important to note that this was done against an enemy possessing no air force, but nevertheless the subject merits careful study for our own small wars.

Fifthly, the quality of the Eritrean troops and of their white officers proved to be high. At present the expansion of Italy's colonial army in Ethiopia is not excessive for the task of pacification, but should Italy ever think fit to build up a large colonial army there, the quality will be high.

In conclusion, I think one must pay a tribute to the generalship, power of accurate appreciation and will-power of Marshal Badoglio; to the inherent hardiness of the Italian soldier; and to the genius for improvisation of the Italian administrative staff. In my opinion, Marshal Badoglio will find a place in history amongst the great commanders. It is also worthy of note that few great commanders have ever received from their Home Government such complete confidence and whole-hearted support as Marshal Badoglio received from Signor Mussolini. Perhaps we as a race would do well to profit by that lesson.

RAID ON ARSAL KOT AND GULZAMIR KOT, 21st JUNE 1937

During the Spring of 1937, when the fighting in Waziristan was at its heaviest, the Faqir of Ipi, the leader of the tribal forces, had held his headquarters impervious to continual air bombardment in the big caves known as Arsal Kot. After the occupation of Sham Plain in May 1937 troops had advanced in a converging movement on Arsal, and Arsal Kot and the caves were destroyed.

The Faqir and his adherents disappeared into the mountainous regions bordering the Shaktu and the troops had again withdrawn to the Sham Plain where they were busily engaged in opening of the country by road making. Taking advantage of their preoccupation the Faqir began to feel his way cautiously back to his old haunts, conveniently situated, as they were, on the borders of Mahsud and Wazir land. By June he was back in Baramand, only a mile from Arsal Kot, and the sniping of camps and road protection troops and other acts of hostility were frequent. The organisation and encouragement came from the Faqir of Ipi.

At that time the Faqir had no large immediate following. The gangs would come and go and there was always a number of visitors, but the large *lashkars* had disappeared. On the other hand the Faqir still had the sympathy of the tribes and his capture would have had the greatest possible effect in bringing peace to Waziristan.

On the 17th June reliable information was received that the Faqir was at Gulzamir Kot, one mile south of Baramand, and a plan was made to capture him. The plan was formed under the following circumstances:

(*a*) There were two infantry brigades at Ghariom and one infantry brigade at Coronation Camp.

(*b*) Ghariom is five and a half and Coronation Camp eight and a quarter miles as the crow flies from Gulzamir Kot. The intervening country in both cases is difficult and hilly.

(*c*) If Scouts were to do the raid it was estimated that sixteen platoons would be necessary. But neither the Tochi Scouts nor the South Waziristan Scouts could, individually, raise sixteen platoons and at the same time hold their existing forts and camps. Therefore, if Scouts were chosen this would entail a combined force from both Corps.

(*d*) The imperative factor was to ensure secrecy. The only hope of the raid being a success was that it should come as a complete surprise.

(*e*) It was not expected that the Faqir would have a large following with him. But it was realised that if fighting started at Gulzamir Kot a *lashkar* of a thousand upwards might collect in two hours from the villages north and south of Barari Narai and intercept the raiding force in its way back to Sham.

In consideration of these factors it was decided that the raid should be done by Scouts. Their speed, their practice in village searching and round ups and their capabilities in breaking off an engagement quickly and extricating themselves from a difficult position made them suitable for the task. On the other hand, there was danger of loss of secrecy in concentrating the force. In the case of the South Waziristan Scouts the concentration entailed a two hundred mile lorry move.

On the night 18/19th June eight platoons of the South Waziristan Scouts under Major Skrine were moved by lorry from Jandola via Tank and Bannu to Mir Ali, where they arrived in day light and stayed for one day. On the 20th this party moved by lorry to Dosalli where eight platoons of the Tochi Scouts under Major Felix Williams had already been collected. At 6 p.m. on the 20th the sixteen platoons, in lorries and escorted by tanks, proceeded from Dosalli to Ghariom.

The arrangements from here were as follows:—The Scouts were to move out by night and raid the Gulzamir Kot area at daybreak. As soon as possible after daybreak the 1st Indian Infantry Brigade was to arrive at Pasal, a point two miles up stream from Arsal Kot and cover the Scouts in their retirement.

Major Felix Williams' plan was as follows:—

(*a*) A combined march of both Scouts corps to the Shaktu at Pasal along the nullah as shown in the sketch map.

(*b*) At Pasal the two corps were to split. The South Waziristan Scouts were to make for the high slopes on the south bank of the Shaktu and bear down on Gulzamir Kot. The Tochi Scouts were to advance through Pasal to the Baramand area, block the Shaktu, search the area and, if necessary, provide a reserve to send to the South Waziristan Scouts if needed on the south bank. Both corps were to act independently in their areas, but when ready to retire the order would come from Major Skrine.

The Scouts were to follow their usual method of night patrolling, but special emphasis was laid on "No shooting." If the enemy opened fire men were to kneel, fix bayonets and wait for an officer's order.

The Scouts had six British officers and were accompanied by a gunner subaltern as forward observation officer and by their own medical officer. The men numbered six hundred.

At 11 p.m. the party moved off with Tochi Scouts leading, Captain Gimson commanding the van. A last minute report that twelve Mahsuds had been seen that day piqueting the route was disregarded on the supposition, afterwards proved correct, that this was only a day piquet.

The route followed was *via* the Sham Algad, the track in squares 0726 and 0825 and thence down the nullah from 086254 to where it joins the Shaktu. There was a small moon, which enabled the column to thread its way through the innumerable boulders which lay across the narrow path, lying deep between steep faced cliffs which closed in from time to time to form unscalable ravines. The column moved in a loose file march formation spread over the best part of half a mile. The forward platoons moved slowly enough, but those behind were running most of the way in the endless concertina characteristic of night marches. After three hours the Shaktu was reached, the distance covered being about five miles. All was quiet and it seemed that the mass of Mahsud villages which began one mile upstream in the Shaktu were still unaware that the Scouts were now between them and their Faqir. The South Waziristan Scouts now moved to the south bank of the Shaktu, the Tochi Scouts remaining on the northern side. From here the two corps moved independently. The going was still difficult though less confined. There was now no track to follow, but the bed of the Shaktu lay below, forming both a guide and a dividing line. The last two miles of the advance took up two hours, and by 4 a.m. the Scouts were formed up behind the areas to be searched. Forward reconnaissances were made in the dark and at 4.45 a.m. the Scouts, breaking up into smaller formations, moved forward into chosen positions round the area. First light was at 5 a.m., and by 5.15 a.m. the Scouts were established in positions as under:—

Tochi Scouts.—The ridge from (exclusive) Arsal to (exclusive) Knoll 156278, with a block in the Shaktu about 158275.

South Waziristan Scouts.—The high ground on the general line 154264 to 143263 with a block in the Shaktu about 141266.

At 5.15 a.m. the search began in the following areas:

Tochi Scouts.—The ground lying in squares 1427 and 1527.

South Waziristan Scouts.—The nullahs in square 1426 to their junction with the Shaktu; later Gulzamir Kot and the other Kots shown on the map in square 1426 and the ground in square 1426 and 1526. The blocks remained in position and the searching parties with fixed bayonets moved off in well opened formations into their areas. The first thing to be noticed by the Tochi Scouts was a small village on the left bank, not marked on the map, at 157270. Scouts entered the huts which they found to be deserted except for one of them in which were two Hindus, lying bound and gagged in a corner of the room. While the Hindus were being released another party of Scouts noticed some caves near the village which were occupied. One man in the mouth of a cave was laying a careful aim with his rifle, but seeing the Scouts advancing rapidly towards him he hastily abandoned his rifle and he, together with three companions surrendered. He afterwards proved to be the much wanted Arsal, the host of the Faqir of Ipi throughout the spring fighting. The two Hindus had been kidnapped from Bannu four months previously and were being held to ransom. They were in a half starved condition being little more than skin and bone, and were incoherent in their gratitude on being released.

In the South Waziristan Scouts area seven Mahsuds were arrested in Gulzamir Kot. There were also a few women about the place who were left, but were not allowed beyond the blocks. At 6 a.m. a man was seen approaching the village from the Shaktu. He was ordered to halt but attempted to run away. When surrounded he calmly lay down and loaded his rifle, whereupon he was shot dead. He afterwards turned out to be a Mahsud mullah who had been a figure of some importance in the Faqir's headquarters.

At 6.30 a.m. the search was over. The Faqir was not in the area. The countryside was quiet and the one shot fired during the operation did not appear to have attracted attention. The withdrawal was organised and commanded by Major Skrine and the Scouts of both Corps fell back through a series of blocks. There was no following up and the 1st Brigade was met holding their position at Pasal. Ghariom was reached without incident.

Many days after the raid it was established that the Faqir had received information on the 20th (the day before the raid) that a raid was likely to be made on Gulzamir Kot, and had accordingly

moved to Marsanzai Mela (not marked on the map), on the evening of that day. On the arrival of the Scouts at Gulzamir Kot he was said to have left Marsanzai Mela in an easterly direction, his head muffled in a sheet. He thus very narrowly escaped capture. But the area of the search had been stipulated and the limit fixed. A non-observance of this limit might have led the Scouts through an endless number of unnamed Kots extending down the banks of the Shaktu until they were beyond supporting distance of the brigade.

The results of the raid were the release of the Hindus and the capture of Arsal. Following this capture the son of Arsal made his peace with Government, and has since kept this area quiet in the hopes of obtaining the release of his father from prison.


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INDIA'S SEA HISTORY AND ITS LESSONS

By Lieut.-Commander H. E. Felser Paine, *Royal Indian Navy.*

In the earliest days of India's sea history, Indo-European trade was carried on by Arabs and Phœnicians; the former in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean, the latter in the Mediterranean. Although the control of trade in the Mediterranean passed through many hands in the succeeding centuries Phœnician, Greek, Roman and Venetian, the Arabs managed to retain their monopoly on the seas east of Suez until the discovery of the Cape Route and the arrival of the Portuguese.

As regards the Far East, trade between India and China seems to have been carried on almost entirely by the latter country. There are several excellent descriptions of Chinese craft from such early writers as Ibn Batuta, Friar Jordanus, and Nicolo Conti, all of whom agree that the junks of those days were large and well built. Ibn Batuta mentions that thirteen Chinese junks were lying off Calicut when he was there. He describes the largest as carrying six hundred sailors and four hundred soldiers, others write of them as carrying crews of from two to three hundred. Each large junk was accompanied by three or four tenders, which were often used to tow their parent ship during a calm.

Gradually the Arab seamen must have penetrated further and further east, for when Vasco da Gama first arrived at Calicut the Arabs seem to have had a complete monopoly of the sea trade of the Indian Ocean. Apart from pirates, who were a menace from the first, and private quarrels with rival traders, they had indeed had little opposition to fear. But an entirely new situation was created by the arrival of Vasco da Gama and his four ships. It did not take the Arabs long to realise that this new rival would soon become a real menace to their trade and they did their best to destroy the newcomers. Although greatly outnumbered in their early fights, the Portuguese possessed two distinct advantages, superior armament and greater tactical skill, as a result of which both Da Gama and Albuquerque gained striking victories over their opponents.

At that time the centre of trade in the East was the Malabar Coast. From there ships sailed for the west either through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea or by the Persian Gulf, and ships trading between India and China passed through the Malacca Straits. For any hostile fleet the obvious points of attack were the entrances to these narrow seas, and it did not take the Portuguese long to discover this. Some eight years after Vasco da Gama first sighted Caliçut, a fort was built and a garrison established at Socotra. Albuquerque with his squadron next sailed to Muscat where the Sultan surrendered after a short action and agreed to allow the Portuguese to build a fortified trading station. From Muscat he proceeded up the Persian Gulf to Ormuz which surrendered unconditionally after one of the most amazing actions in the whole of naval history. The capture of such places as Malacca and Goa followed later, and for a time the Portuguese had squadrons of ships based on Goa, Aden, Ormuz and Malacca, besides having additional bases at such places as Cochin, Diu and Muscat. Thus they became complete masters of the Indian Ocean. At one time Albuquerque even ordered the blockade of the other West Coast ports so that all trade would have to pass through Goa. His was undoubtedly a master mind in the control of sea communications.

With the arrival of the Dutch and the English the whole outlook of the Portuguese was changed. Up to that time their sea communications had been comparatively safe but now, in addition to defending their stations from attacks by land, they had to be prepared to withstand attacks at sea. Still, they had the great advantage of being in possession of fortified bases from which their squadrons could pick up fresh supplies of ammunition and stores.

While the Dutch had been penetrating the Malay Peninsula, the English had been trying their luck in the Gulf of Cambay. The Portuguese had a fortified base at Diu, and when, during the sixth voyage of the East India Company, Sir Henry Middleton arrived off Surat the presence of a Portuguese squadron prevented the Gujeratis from doing any trade with him.

In February 1612 Captain Thomas Best sailed from Gravesend with the "Dragon" and the "Hoseander." Six months later these two ships anchored off Surat. As there was no

Portuguese squadron present Best at once started trade negotiations and a treaty was signed with the Governors of Ahmedabad and Surat. As soon as the Portuguese heard of Best's arrival a squadron of four galleons was sent to drive him away.

The Portuguese ships were bigger and far more heavily armed than the small English vessels, but they were chiefly manned by soldiers. The "Dragon" and the "Hoseander" were handy and manned by expert seamen, with the result that the Portuguese were continually outmanœuvred. After the first engagement, at one period of which three enemy ships were ashore, Best went across to the other side of the Gulf for water and supplies. When the Portuguese followed, he at once put to sea and attacked them and, after an engagement lasting two days, damaged them so severely that they had to retreat to Diu for repairs and supplies. Best, however, was also in a difficult position as he was running short of ammunition and had no base to which he could return for a further supply. Had the Portuguese attacked him again a very different story might have been written, but although they once again appeared in sight, they left his two ships severely alone, neither did they interfere with the merchants who had been left on shore. Thus was struck the first blow for English trade in the east.

Meanwhile the Dutch had concentrated on the Malay Archipelago. Although they failed for some time to capture Malacca from the Portuguese, they were able to found their own headquarters at Batavia, close to the Straits of Sunda, and to destroy any English trade which existed in that region. And the Portuguese themselves were unable, owing to shortage of ships, to interfere seriously with this establishment of Dutch trade. By the beginning of the seventeenth century the three European powers were fighting, more or less openly, for control of the Indian Ocean. Shortly afterwards the Dutch and the East India company at home concluded an alliance against the Portuguese and a combined Dutch and English fleet blockaded Goa. This meant that, although the Portuguese still held Goa, no merchandise or ships could get back to Portugal. It also meant that no reinforcements from Indian shores could reach the Portuguese squadron in the Persian Gulf, a fact of which the East India Company were quick to take advantage. An expedition was despatched, which destroyed the Portuguese squadron in the Gulf

and, with the aid of Persian troops, captured Ormuz. By 1650 Portugal's sea power in the east had vanished. Malacca had been captured after a siege of over ten years, Goa had been blockaded several years in succession so that its trade with Lisbon had come to a standstill, Muscat had been taken by the Arabs, Galle and Trincomalee had fallen to the Dutch. The Portuguese who had started the century with the tremendous advantage of being the only nation with good fortified bases in the east had lost them through having insufficient ships to keep their sea communications open. The Dutch, in particular, with their superior fleet, were building or capturing bases as they required them. Meanwhile the English, who were badly in need of a fortified harbour, were ill-prepared in the east for the war which broke out with Holland in 1652, and an English fleet was severely defeated in the Gulf of Cambay. Fortunately, however, for the East India Company, English fleets in home waters gained decisive victories, with the result that they could await and capture the rich convoys from Batavia as they proceeded up the English Channel. When peace was declared, the Dutch were compelled to recognise the rights of the East India Company in Eastern waters. In spite of this it may be said that throughout the second half of the seventeenth century the whole of the eastern trade was, more or less, controlled by the Dutch and it was only the superiority of the English fleet in home waters that prevented the former from taking action against the East India Company settlements. And the latter were steadily expanding. The foundations of Fort St. George were laid at Madras in 1639. Bombay was acquired as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza in 1662, and by 1686 Englishmen had started to settle at Calcutta.

The closing years of the century brought trouble of a different sort. There was a shortage of both English and Dutch ships in the east, with a consequent loss of European prestige. A Mohammedan fleet of nearly a hundred ships blockaded Bombay, which had recently become a headquarters of the East India Company, but failed to capture it. At the same time the Sultan of Muscat's fleet attacked the Mahratta sea forces and raided many of the Malabar ports. A few years later this same fleet attacked and captured a great part of Portuguese East Africa, which for a time became a colony of Muscat.

It is at the end of this century also that a new factor appears on the scene in the person of the European pirate. Chivers in the "Soldado," Babington in the "Charming Mary," Bowen in the "Speaker" and Culliford were operating at about this time, to say nothing of the famous Captain Kidd. A squadron of Danish pirates was cruising in Eastern waters. Not unnaturally native pirates, who had been active since ships sailed the Indian Ocean, became more dangerous than ever before.

The most famous of these were the Mahrattas who operated from their headquarters at Viziadroog along the whole of the coast between that place and Bombay. Indeed, it was not until 1756 that they were finally attacked and destroyed by Admiral Watson who had with him fourteen hundred men commanded by Clive. Other notorious pirates of the period were those of Kutch, with headquarters at Beyt, the Joasmi of the Persian Gulf and the Muscat Arabs. The last named were deep sea pirates and for that reason, next to the European, the most to be feared.

The next century opened fairly quietly, the three European Powers were at peace, and apart from the continual raids of pirates, there was little fighting. The latter half of the century, however, brought a new rival into the field, in the shape of the French. For the first time in the history of the Indian Ocean most of the fighting took place in the Bay of Bengal.

The first of the three wars between the English and the French was chiefly remarkable for the brilliance of the French naval commander, La Bourdonnais. Early in the war he took Madras, but later had the misfortune to have nearly the whole of his fleet destroyed by a cyclone, which necessitated a hurried retreat to Mauritius, at that time the nearest French base, for repairs. A further blow to French chances of victory in the East was struck when a squadron of their ships sent to join La Bourdonnais in Mauritius was completely destroyed by an English fleet in the Bay of Biscay. Finally at the treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle Madras was handed back to England.

The Seven Years' War again renewed the struggle between the two countries. This time, after three bloody if indecisive battles, the French were forced to retreat for good. The cause of this was, to a great extent, lack of bases and stores. After the first engagement the French squadron refitted at Pondicherry. After the second the supplies at Pondicherry were exhausted and

the squadron was forced to go to Mauritius, only to find that supplies there were also very low. The English fleet had in the meantime had a complete refit in Bombay. Thus, after being badly damaged in the third engagement, the French ships were forced to return to France, and for the first time in history the British were left in undisputed command of the eastern seas.

For fifteen years England was at peace, and then once again she found herself at war, this time to be opposed by the combined fleets of France, Spain and Holland. Even more serious from the point of view of her ships out east was the fact that the French fleet was commanded by Admiral Suffren, probably the most brilliant sailor of that period. After four rather indecisive engagements, in which Suffren had been badly supported by his captains, the English fleet was severely defeated in the fifth. Thanks, however, to the victories of Howe and Rodney in western waters, Britain was able at the peace which was shortly afterwards declared to keep her Indian possessions, so that Suffren's brilliance was of little value in the end. With his departure ended the challenge to British supremacy in the Indian Ocean.

In the years 1914-18 no big fleets invaded Indian waters, but we learnt yet another lesson, the lesson of the damage that can be done by a single modern raider such as the "Emden."

In 1914 the East Indies Squadron consisted of the battleship "Swiftsure," the light cruisers "Dartmouth" and "Fox" and three sloops. At the outbreak of war the "Swiftsure" and the "Dartmouth" at once sailed to cut off the cruiser "Königsberg," then based at Dar-es-Salaam, from the Gulf of Aden. The "Fox" and one sloop were left to patrol off Colombo and along the route between Colombo and Minikoi. It was obvious that with so few ships on guard the Indian Ocean was almost an ideal hunting ground for a raider. The "Emden" was soon to demonstrate this. As soon as her depredations became known the "Hampshire" and the "Yarmouth" from the China squadron were sent to look for her, as also were the Japanese light cruiser "Chikuma" and the Russian light cruiser "Zhemchug." In spite of these ships the "Emden" continued her raids with such success that in the space of two months she accounted for twenty-four ships. Their total value together with their cargoes was estimated at well over £2,000,000. In addition to this she did considerable damage at Madras and Cocos Island and sank the "Zhemchug" and a French

destroyer at Penang. Perhaps the greatest sign of her success was the fact that, except for a short period during the 22nd and 23rd of September, all trade routes in the Bay of Bengal were closed from 14th September to 2nd October.

Such, then, is a brief summary of India's sea history, and in studying it the following four points have, I think, stood out in the past. In the first place naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean alone has seldom proved sufficient. This was shown on several occasions, especially perhaps in the Dutch war of 1652 and in the third French war. In the second place the importance of having fortified bases at strategic points is obvious. Every war that has been fought in the Indian Ocean has shown the need for them. Singapore to-day is many times more important to us than Malacca or Batavia ever were to the Portuguese or the Dutch, for in those days there were no great naval powers in the Far East. In the third fortified bases without sufficient ships to keep communications with them open are of little use. This was demonstrated in the history of Malacca and in the blockade of Goa by Dutch and English ships. Lastly, although no hostile fleet may be threatening the Indian Ocean, it is a fatal policy to leave trade routes insufficiently protected. The increase in piracy at the end of the seventeenth century was directly due to this, and so, to a certain extent, was the success of the "Emden" in 1914.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY 1938

The following essay by Lieut.-Colonel C. M. P. Dunford was highly commended by the judges.

SUBJECT

"Discuss the dictum that the size of modern armies has rendered strategy wholly subordinate to tactics."

INTRODUCTION

This paper is not in agreement with the view which the dictum expresses, which, it is felt, is based on too narrow an application of the term "strategy" and results, to a great extent, from a failure to appreciate the events of the war of 1914—18 in their true perspective.

If, for example, the future of strategy is under consideration, it is necessary to take into account many other factors than the size of modern armies. The mobility conferred by sea-power and perhaps, in future, by air transport, must be given due weight. Then again, the flexibility of air striking-power and the additional mobility conferred on modern armies by mechanization must be taken into account, while beyond these lies the influence exerted by such weapons as blockade, contraband control, financial and economic pressure and propaganda.

Strategy in future wars will thus, it is suggested, reflect the influence of many factors varying from the political to the military and will by no means be solely subordinated to tactics by reason of the size of the forces engaged.

While, however, making every reservation in connection with this interpretation of strategy in its widest sense, it still remains to examine the dictum in its more narrow application—in a situation in which opposing armies are present in a theatre of operations—a situation which must still presumably arise in spite of all that may occur in the wider field of the grand strategy of any particular war as a whole.

It is in this narrower application that the suggestion is made that the dictum results from a faulty perspective of the course of the War of 1914—18, particularly in France and Belgium.

The average man who survived the experience of service on the Western Front retains a mental picture—as evinced in many books of reminiscences—of weeks or months of alternating duty in the trenches or at "rest," interspersed by nightmare periods of incredible experiences during one of the great offensives. To

him the new tactical methods as they were evolved, the new weapons as they became available and, above all, the limited objective, seemed the ultimate horizon. Could he with his platoon,—his company, or even his brigade,—but seize and hold an allocated fragment of the enemy's defences in front of him, or keep the enemy out of his own bit of the line, his task was done, his heart was full of thankfulness and pride. He might hear from time to time, almost with a sense of pity, some whisper of a great strategical conception, but to him the immediate tactical problem was the beginning and the end of everything.

It is believed that the collective effect of thousands upon thousands of such personal impressions has gone largely to produce the feeling that the size of modern armies places strategy in the background and will cause tactics to become the dominant factor in future campaigns,—

> "So that the ram that batters down the wall,
> For the great swing and rudeness of his poise,
> They place before his hand that made the engine,
> Or those that with the fineness of their souls,
> By reason guide his execution."*

In this paper it is proposed to examine some of the main phases of the Great War on the Western Front, as far as may be done in the space available, in an attempt to confute the dictum in the very circumstances in which it would, at first sight, appear to be most easily supported. An endeavour will also be made to present what is believed to be a truer picture of the relationship between strategy and tactics, the size of modern armies notwithstanding.

It will be impossible to exclude all mention of operations in other theatres owing to their connection with and influence on events in France and Belgium, but considerations of space will keep such references to a minimum and at the same time will limit even a brief examination of operations on the Western Front to the following main examples:

(*a*) The Opening Phase in 1914 (Germany).
(*b*) „ „ „ „ „ (Allies).
(*c*) September 1915.
(*d*) 1916. Verdun and the Somme.
(*e*) 1917. Ypres and Passchendaele.
(*f*) 1918. The last German attacks and the final phase.

*"Troilus and Cressida."

THE OPENING PHASE IN 1914 (GERMANY)

Lest it be said that the opening period of the War forms no good basis for the examination of our dictum, because the forces then engaged had not grown to the enormous size which later subjugated strategy to tactics, it is worth recording that the Allies' casualties on the Western Front in the first three months amounted to just under one million men and those of the Germans to some 677,000. It is of this phase that Mr. Winston Churchill remarks: "The scale and intensity of the first shock in 1914 has not been fully realised by the well-instructed French public, and is not at all understood in England."*

The German plan was conceived by Schlieffen as far back as 1905 but was modified in the years before the War. Its aim was the destruction of the French army before Russian intervention could make itself seriously felt. Speed being essential, it was decided to avoid the French fortress system by moving round it to the north. The success of this plan depended on the provision of overwhelming strength in the mass on the right wing, together with the consequent retention of none but the minimum essential holding and security forces on the French frontier and in the East. No attack was to be delivered by the German left until the French had been enveloped and driven back against their own fortifications and the Swiss frontier.

In spite of the strategic surprise which the Germans immediately attained by augmenting their first line with reserve formations, and thus producing far larger forces than had been anticipated, the plan failed and it is for us to consider whether this failure resulted from the size of the forces having subjugated strategy to tactics.

Schlieffen had intended that, in order to gain space for movements, save time and facilitate maintenance, the German right wing should move not only through Belgium, but also across South Holland and the Limburg "Appendix." Moltke, who succeeded Schlieffen as Chief of the Prussian Staff in 1905, abandoned this idea in order to avoid forcing Holland also into the ranks of Germany's opponents. The administrative difficulties of the German armies were thus increased and they were rendered additionally susceptible to the delaying power of the Belgians.

Moltke also strengthened the German left at the expense of the all-important right and thereby decreased the proportion between the two wings, according to German accounts, from 7 to

*"The World Crisis 1916—18." Part 1. Chap. 11.

1 to 3 to 1. It is true that the passage of time probably compelled some readjustment of the plan and that the intention was to return the borrowed formations as soon as the situation permitted. In the event, however, the Belgians effected damage to the strategic railway by which this movement would have been carried out and thus frustrated the idea, although the Germans actually had the railway rolling stock in readiness. After the campaign had commenced the German right was further weakened by the premature despatch of reinforcements to East Prussia and by an over-generous provision to contain the Belgians at Antwerp. Finally, the mistake was made of launching what had been intended as the final phase of the Schlieffen plan—the attack by the German left—before the French had been surrounded.

The result of these actions in the strategic field was that the redoubtable German right could only muster some 13* divisions against twice that number of Allied formations when the latter turned on the invaders at the Marne, and it was these same strategic factors which caused the failure of the German plan, rather than the effects of the size of the forces which took part in the many severe tactical encounters of the early weeks of the War, at Mons, Landrecies, Le Cateau, Guise, and elsewhere.

Our dictum is, in fact, confuted categorically by the British Official History of the War, which says that Moltke failed, not because the presence of such large forces undermined the power of strategy, but because he had not the forces necessary for so vast an operation.† In General Ironside's words, "the German enveloping movement failed through lack of numbers."‡

THE OPENING PHASE IN 1914 *(FRANCE)*

Swayed by Foch's doctrine of the supreme importance of the offensive and with no intention of violating either Swiss or Belgian neutrality—which they anticipated would be similarly respected by Germany—the original French plan was to attack the German centre through Alsace and Lorraine

The French plan of concentration made no provision "to meet an envelopment carried out through Belgium west of the Meuse or to cover the gap between the western flank of their Fifth Army (about the river Oise) and the sea." (§) In other words it was admirably conceived to aid the German plan. Even

*See "The War in Outline." Liddell Hart. P. 36.
†"Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914." P. 61.
‡"Tannenburg." Ironside. P. 285.
§"Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914." P. 17.

when it was learned that Belgian neutrality had been violated and the Belgian appeal for assistance was received, Sordet's Cavalry Corps, which reconnoitred to the vicinity of Liege, failed to discover any large German forces. The fact was that the Germans had not yet crossed the Meuse, but the inference drawn by the French High Command was that no important German forces were present in the north.

The French offensive in Lorraine was repelled because tactical training had failed to appreciate the enormous strength of fire-power when combined with the intelligent use of ground in the defence. Nor had the French forces which participated a sufficient margin of superiority over their opponents to provide a reasonable chance of decisive success.

It appears that the French strategy was inherently faulty in undertaking an initial major offensive in face of a potentially superior enemy who held the initiative but, for the purposes of examining our dictum, it will suffice to pass this point and to explain how the complete defeat, which the dictum would infer must have succeeded the tactical failure of their main conception, was averted by the French.

Did the size of the forces engaged render strategy wholly subordinate to tactics?

By the 15th August Joffre at last realised that large German forces were advancing through Liege and at once commenced to extend and strengthen the French left by forming a group of divisions around Arras which, in part, consisted of formations withdrawn from the Lorraine front. The Fourth Army was also moved from the rear of this front towards the Ardennes with the Fifth Army on its left and the B.E.F., on its arrival, further to the left again. These strategical movements were successfully carried out in spite of the size of the forces concerned and of the fact that important battles continued on the Lorraine front as late as the 23rd August. From these battles, moreover, the French were also able to extricate themselves and to withdraw to the shelter of their fortified zone.

Even with this redistribution successfully accomplished, and in spite of the reductions in the strength of the German right to which reference has been made, the Germans were able to bring 400,000 troops against some 270,000 of the Allies when their blow fell on the Allied left, between Dinant and Mons, on the 22nd August. As General Maurice remarks, "Almost before they had fired a shot (*i.e.* before the influence of tactics had been felt) the French and British armies on the left flank were compromised."*

*"Forty Days in 1914." Maurice. P. 55.

The forces involved were large and had strategy been completely dominated by tactics the situation must surely have resulted in a decisive action. But again the Allies were able to avoid being pinned to the ground and successfully carried out their strategic withdrawal to the Marne, in spite of daily tactical encounters.

During this withdrawal the German strength of purpose weakened and the stubbornness of the French resistance to a premature offensive by the German left seems to have drawn the German armies of the centre and right, as they advanced, away from their true route for the encirclement of Paris and the envelopment of the left of the Allied armies.

From this "closing to the left" arose the vitally important change of direction by Von Kluck's First Army which, passing to the east of Paris instead of around it to the west, presented a flank which Joffre and Gallieni were able, in turn, to threaten with envelopment. This threat—for the tactical situation, in fact, hardly developed—caused the Germans to withdraw, and with the Allied advance to the Aisne which followed there ended a phase of the War in which enormous armies had concentrated, deployed, advanced and retired and in which countless severe tactical engagements had taken place. Yet it is suggested that throughout the phase the power of movement had enabled strategy to dominate the main currents of the campaign.

In the somewhat leisurely Allied pursuit of the retiring German forces to the Aisne it is possible to perceive examples of the way in which inadequate tactics may prevent the full rewards of strategic success from being gathered. In a situation where speed and boldness meant everything it appears that for some time the necessity for neither was emphasised by the High Command. Cavalry are seen advancing behind their own infantry, while short marches and excessive caution prevented the gaps in the German front from being exploited or the exposed flank from being rolled up. Allowance must be made for the fatigue of the troops but the conduct of the operations cannot avoid comparison with the tactical doctrine contained in the 1909 edition of Field Service Regulations which taught that, "the force will take up the direct pursuit . . . and will continue it night and day without regard to the exhaustion of men and horses" . . . "all pursuing troops should act with the greatest boldness." Tactics in this case dominated strategy to the extent of robbing it of its just rewards, but the size of the forces engaged was not an important factor.

The next phase of the operations in France, sometimes referred to as the "race to the sea," consisted of attempts by each side to locate and envelop the exposed flank of their opponents and to prevent a similar process being applied to themselves. It may be said to have terminated when the Germans, realising too late the importance of the Channel ports, attempted to break through at Ypres. The greater part of the phase consisted in strategic moves to the northern flank in which formations, withdrawn from other portions of the field, were diverted and augmented by new formations from reserve to extend the front. Neither side attained its offensive object, partly because insufficient forces were available and partly because the strategic conception on neither side was sufficiently bold. The German attempt at Ypres was an example of the way in which a failure in the strategic field (lateness in appreciating the value of the Channel ports) can present tactics with an insoluble problem.

It is believed that, as far as this review has gone, it will be agreed that the dictum cannot be upheld. But those years were still to be endured in which the enormous resources of manpower and the strength of modern weapons in an organised system of defences seem at first sight to have doomed strategic conception to failure. We must therefore see whether the dictum can be refuted on the basis of the experiences of 1915, 1916 and 1917, those years of deadlock and apparent stalemate on the Western Front. Before doing so, however, it appears desirable to offer certain general observations on the conditions in France and Belgium and on the relationship between the situation there at the end of 1914 and the wider strategic field of the War as a whole.

It will be recalled that, when their attacks at Ypres died down, the Germans, on account of preoccupations in the East, passed to the defensive in France and Belgium. The experiences of the War had already indicated the seriousness of the tactical problem which an attack on organised defences would present. On the Allied side the original first-line formations had sustained extremely heavy losses and the unforeseen and unparalleled expenditure of munitions had reduced reserves, particularly of artillery ammunition, to disappearing point.

Flanks which might be enveloped no longer existed and neither the tactical training of commanders and men, which had prepared them for open warfare, nor the numbers available, were adequate to deal with the new problem of penetrating systems of field defences which grew more formidable with every day that passed. The High Command in the field, on both sides still

believed that mobility might be re-achieved and a decisive blow inflicted in the comparatively near future, but looking back these twenty and more years and with access to material for a more complete picture than was possible amid the distractions of the time, it seems that a lull was inevitable on the Western Front, while new formations were raised and equipped; their commanders and staffs selected and trained; supplies of munitions replenished and increased; and the new tactical problems appreciated and solved.

It is true that there are evidences on the Allied side of a general desire to use the lull in order to take stock of the situation as a whole, so as to evolve some plan which would re-achieve the mobility which the exercise of strategy, in general, demands. But the lack of any adequate organization for the Higher Direction of the War rendered agreement on any new wide strategic conception impossible. Moreover there were two factors in particular which exercised a determining influence on the course of events.

In the first place the Allied High Commands in France, basing themselves on the principle that France was the critical theatre of the War, held most strongly that the employment of any forces elsewhere than on the Western Front would be prejudicial to success at the decisive point. The weight of this contention defeated the proposals of those who advocated that the enemy should be merely held in France, where he was strongest, while the flank of the Central Powers and their Allies, as a whole, should be sought for and enveloped. It appears that, in the end, larger forces were actually employed in subsidiary campaigns, and less results achieved, than would have been the case had co-ordinated measures been adopted promptly when the opening period of mobile operations ended on the Western Front. Space, however, will not permit any examination of the possibilities which existed at the end of 1914, and it must suffice to remark that the defeat of the broader strategic conception of the War as a whole—to which the eventual collapse of Russia cannot but be largely attributed—played an important part in shaping the future course of events in France; in limiting the possibilities open to strategy, and in proportionately raising the importance of tactics.

The second of the two factors, of which mention has been made, was the undue importance which for long was attached to the possession of every yard of ground in France and Belgium for reasons of sentiment and prestige, and entirely apart from any tactical or strategic considerations. It is not difficult to sympathise with the determination of the French that not another

yard of their soil should pass into the possession of the invaders, but at the same time it must be recognised that adherence to this view tied down large forces in immobile proximity to the enemy's defences; resulted in heavy losses, and assisted in keeping tactical necessities in the foreground, while the possibilities of strategical manoeuvre were correspondingly reduced. It is, of course, true that the training of the newly-raised formations, and their staffs, might not have been equal to the demands of more mobile operations for a considerable period.

The conclusions drawn from these observations may be summarised as follows:

(*a*) The size of the forces enabled both sides in the West to present a continuous front, with flanks which could not be enveloped.

(*b*) Non-acceptance of the "War as a whole" theory and lack of a proper organization for Higher Direction, precluded any adequate and properly co-ordinated attempt to widen the field of strategy and to seek for a solution of the stalemate in a subsidiary theatre of operations.

(*c*) The importance attached to the possession of ground on the Western Front, and the standard of training in the new formations, militated against the possibilities of a restoration of more open warfare, which would have offered greater opportunities for strategic as opposed to predominantly tactical efforts.

These three factors limited the first phase of any future strategy in France to an effort at penetration in which, in turn, the first essential would be tactical success. But penetration is just as legitimate a form of strategy as envelopment, though admittedly more difficult of tactical achievement particularly when time has enabled the enemy to organise his position for defence. Marlborough had faced a similar problem at the Lines of Brabant, though on a smaller scale.*

Moreover, it is hoped to show that though initial tactical penetration was dictated by the continuous front, the objects of the great battles of the years of stalemate were strategic, and were often, though to a varying degree, achieved in spite of apparent local failure in the tactical plan and of the size of the forces engaged.

It will also emerge that "tactical success and good strategical plans are bound up together"† and that, without a harmonious

*"Marlborough, His Life and Times." Winston Churchill. Vol. 11 Chap. XXV.

†"German Strategy in the Great War," Neame, P. 116.

balance between the two, results will almost inevitably be disappointing.

SEPTEMBER 1915

At this period of the War the main portion of French territory in German occupation formed an enormous salient having its apex in the vicinity of Noyon. The French High Command, dominated by the desire to evict the enemy from France, planned to break in the flanks of the salient and to envelop the German forces which held its apex, so producing a favourable situation for a general advance to the Frontier. The final plan was for Castelnau's army of 34 Infantry divisions to attack northwards in Champagne while d'Urbal, with 17 divisions, carried out a covering attack near Arras, with the British 9 divisions on his left directed on the Loos area.

Sir John French had drawn attention to the formidable strength of the German positions on his front which, in his opinion, called for far larger forces and much more heavy artillery if success were to be achieved, but the disasters which the Russian armies had experienced since the beginning of July, together with the effect of the Italian failure on the Isonzo and the British disappointment at Gallipoli, demanded energetic action in France if Russia were to be kept in the War. Local tactical difficulties were outweighed by this chain of considerations of grand strategy and the attacks in France were launched on the 25th September.

Strategical surprise was deliberately surrendered in return for what was hoped would prove adequate artillery preparation over a period of several days, but an attempt at tactical surprise was made by the first use of poison gas by the Allies. The basis of the infantry tactics was an advance by successive lines of men, so crowded as to be almost shoulder to shoulder. The outcome of the battle was a bitter tactical disappointment, for several days of severe fighting led, generally speaking, to no more than had been gained in the first few hours—portions of the enemy's first line of defences. The reasons for the failure of the plan, which are discussed fully in the British Official History, may be summarised as follows: —

(*a*) Lack of surprise.

(*b*) Shortage of heavy artillery and of shells of all natures, with the consequent failure of the artillery fire to destroy the German wire.

(*c*) The power of defensive machine gun fire.

(*d*) Partial failure of the gas attack owing to an unfavourable wind.

(*e*) Inadequate training of staff officers, officers and men.

(*f*) Delay in the exploitation of local successes by the use of reserves.

The Official History, however, goes on to remark—"the event had shown that it was possible, given some element of surprise, sufficient guns, ammunition and other appliances, and adequately trained troops, to break the enemy's front."* Of the strategic side Colonel Neame writes, "The great attacks in the West on the 25th September, 1915, tested the German army almost to the limit. All the general reserves on the West were absorbed on the first day, and the Third German Army on the Champagne front nearly commenced a general retreat. Divisions from Russia were absorbed as fast as they arrived."†

It is suggested that in this case tactical short-comings on the Allied side frustrated the achievement of the strategic aim, but the only influence exercised by the size of the forces was to compel resort to penetration. The Germans were finally saved from an important Allied success by their strategic ability to move reserves, in sufficient time, from east to west.

1916. *VERDUN AND THE SOMME*

Diverse as were the views of the wider strategic possibilities which existed for the Allies at the commencement of 1915, there appears to have been general agreement that, by 1916, those possibilities no longer existed and that the situation on the Western Front then dominated all else.

The German strategic aim for their 1916 campaign was based on a growing realization that the British were their most dangerous opponents. They therefore decided to strike at Britain's allies, in the hope that their destruction would induce her,—rendered single-handed—to abandon the struggle.

The German High Command therefore selected Verdun,—which the French, for many reasons, could be depended on to hold to the last, as a suitable objective for an offensive which was primarily designed to exhaust French manpower, and to force France to make peace. The Germans, by new tactical methods, hoped to keep their own losses at a minimum.

The German attacks commenced in February and by their new tactical policy of short but intensive artillery preparation, and the consolidation of limited objectives before the French reserves could intervene, steadily ate their way into the defences in spite of the most desperate and gallant conduct of the French.

*"Military Operations. France and Belgium. 1915." P. 399.
†"German Strategy in the Great War." Neame. P. 79.

To release additional French troops for the defence, the British front was extended, but neither this nor attempted diversions by the Italians on the Isonzo and by the Russians near Vilna, succeeded in stemming the relentless German advance, though in these efforts will be seen the attempts of Allied grand strategy to intervene. By early June, Forts Douamont and Vaux had fallen and later in the same month the successful employment of a new type of gas shell brought the Germans to the last outworks of the defences. A great victory for German tactics seemed at hand.

Yet on the 24th October Fort Douamont was recaptured by the French and Verdun continued to be held throughout the War.

Among the factors which contributed to this reversal of an apparently certain outcome it must first be mentioned that the Crown Prince introduced a modification of the tactics which were proving so successful and by increasing manpower in proportion to fire-power in an endeavour to accelerate progress on the ground, instead of maintaining the strategic objective of using up the French reserves, added considerably to the cost of the project in German casualties.

A more important influence was exercised by a renewed Russian offensive, in which Brusilov achieved a sensational, if transitory success. This, besides bringing Roumania into the War, compelled the Germans to despatch eight divisions from the Western Front to retrieve the Austrian armies from the chaos in which they had become submerged.

The decisive factor, however, was the Allied offensive on the Somme, where the completion of the necessary preparations and the opening of the artillery bombardment, on the 24th June, were the signal for the discontinuance of all movement of German reinforcements and artillery ammunition to Verdun.

The immediate strategic conception underlying the Allied attack was the penetration of the enemy's line under cover of an artillery bombardment of unparalleled intensity, followed by the rolling-up of the exposed flanks which penetration would disclose. The tactical results of the battle, which continued until the middle of November, were disappointing, and, in that the German defences were never penetrated, the immediate strategic object was not achieved. The tactical shortcomings of September 1915 again appeared in the provision of inadequate heavy artillery support, the surrender of tactical surprise in favour of prolonged artillery preparation; the over-crowding of the attacking infantry, and failure to exploit local success.

The British losses amounted to 420,000 men; those of the French 194,000 and those of the Germans 440,000. "The French agony at Verdun had compelled a British relieving counter-attack in France, before the new British Armies, and particularly their vastly expanded artillery, were sufficiently trained.*

Yet, in spite of the heavy losses—which are a measure of the size of the forces engaged—and of tactical, and therefore local strategic frustration on the Somme, Verdun and the French Army were saved and the main strategic object of the battle gained. Moreover, "Never again did the mass of German rank and file fight as they fought on the Somme."*

1917. *YPRES AND PASSCHENDAELE*

1917 is, above all, the year of which a superficial study, particularly of the operations on the Western Front alone, is likely to result in an impression that the size of the opposing forces rendered strategic objectives unattainable and subordinated all else to a merciless tactical process of attrition.

To obtain a more balanced perspective the immense political and economic repercussions, which the progress of the War had brought about in the different countries which formed the opposing groups, must be taken into account.

Of these factors it is only possible to mention the following:

(*a*) The growing possibility, and later the fact, of the Russian collapse.

(*b*) The manpower position in each country and the possible rate of American participation.

(*c*) The effects of the German submarine campaign on the Allied shipping situation, and

(*d*) The state of the national morale and the effects of war-weariness in certain countries, particularly France and Italy, and in the armed forces of those countries.

The German problem, less complicated than that of the Allies in that interior lines and the capacity of their strategic railways conferred on them freedom of choice as to the front on which they would operate, resulted in a defensive policy in the West while Russia was finally disposed of. In pursuance of this plan the Germans, in order to forestall an anticipated offensive by the Allies and to increase their reserves, effected a voluntary withdrawal to the Siegfried line and so straightened out their

*"The World Crisis, 1916—18." Winston Churchill. Pt. 1. Chapt. VII.

salient between Arras and Rheims. This strategic surprise, while displaying a true appreciation of the value of ground in proportion to other considerations, contributed in an important degree to the tragic failure of the Nivelle offensive in Champagne in April 1917, with its consequences of grave deterioration in the morale of certain French formations.

Nor would Ludendorff allow himself to be diverted from his strategic conception for the year, even when the capture of the Messines Ridge by the British, on the 7th June, caused the Germans grave anxiety.

On the 10th July the Germans again, by a correct appreciation of the local strategic factors, and by appropriate action in seizing the British bridgehead near the Sea, struck a shrewd anticipatory blow which removed one of the main hopes of the Passchendaele offensive which was launched on the 31st.

By October the Germans felt sufficiently secure in the West to provide six divisions for Northern Italy where, in conjunction with the Austrians, they achieved the strategic success of Caporetto, so nearly fatal to the existence of the Italian army which sustained a loss of some 600,000 men. This disaster dictated the diversion of Allied formations from France in order to stabilise the Italian front and so contributed to the eventual discontinuance of the Passchendaele offensive.

On the Allied side the year opened with serious disagreements on the subject of the High Command which undoubtedly hampered initiative.

The principal courses open to grand strategy in the West were:

(*a*) To continue pressure on the German army, a course which involved attacks on the strongest member of the enemy team in strongly organised defences and with a bare margin of superiority in manpower.

(*b*) To despatch forces and munitions to Italy with a view to striking a decisive blow at Austria, which was already putting out peace-feelers.

(*c*) To remain on the defensive while awaiting the arrival of important American forces.

In addition to arriving at a choice between these three main courses the Allied policy in regard to subsidiary theatres of operations had also to be determined. The situation at sea probably exercised a decisive influence in the decision which was arrived at for, at a critical moment in the deliberations, Jellicoe gave it

as his opinion that the capture of the enemy submarine bases on the Belgian coast was essential if the Allies were to retain sufficient shipping to enable them to continue the War for another year. This enforced the adoption of an offensive policy in the West which it was hoped would not only free the Belgian coast but would also constitute a sufficient drain on German manpower to relieve the pressure upon Russia.

In the event the year, for the Allies, proved one of keenest disappointment and of frightful losses. Vimy, Messines and Cambrai all showed that where surprise was present and efficient tactics practised, limited objectives could be attained without unduly heavy losses. At Cambrai the possibilities of far greater success were lost and even the greater portion of original gains were sacrificed owing to the absence of reserves. The main British offensive towards Passchendaele was launched on the 31st July after an artillery preparation in which 4½ million shells were fired. It lasted until the 10th November. At the end of this period, when the British losses totalled 400,000 men, although Passchendaele was reached and taken, the Germans remained in possession of the Belgian ports and Russia meanwhile had collapsed to her doom.

In comparing these strategic disappointments with their terrible cost it seemed to many that, with the enormous masses of men which both sides had available, there was no future in the War except a ceaseless tactical struggle and many bitter criticisms of the conduct of the operations have been expressed. This paper will not enter into any controversy which those criticisms may have initiated, but, for the purpose of examining our dictum, it is desirable to remark that the continuance of the Passchendaele offensive was held to be essential, by those upon whom the responsibility lay, in order to give the French army time to recover from the effects of the Nivelle offensive.

In spite of strategic failure, a study of* different accounts of the fighting does not give the impression that it was the size of the forces which rendered tactics temporarily supreme. The tactical problem had certainly become more formidable, particularly as the new German "pill boxes" enabled machine gun nests to survive both artillery bombardment and tank attack. But the principal unfavourable influences appear to have been exercised on the attackers by the weather and by the fact that the incessant bombardments had destroyed the local land drainage system and this, together with the rain, turned the ground into a quagmire.

*N.B. The Official History of this period has not yet been published.

Whenever the weather was fine for a few days the British were able to carry out their attacks successfully, but the weather was unkind more often than not. In fact the tactics of the attack now showed themselves equal to the new tasks which the unforeseen conditions of the War had imposed and, as a final reflection on our dictum, the following may be quoted from the Official History which deals with a later period of the War,—"The Armies of the B.E.F. carried out successfully during 1917 several offensives *on as large a scale as the forces available permitted.*"*

1918. *THE LAST GERMAN ATTACKS*

Long before 1917 ended staff calculations were being made to compare the manpower situation as it would be in the opposing forces in 1918. The chief factors were,—the resources of France and Great Britain in comparison with the various demands for men, the release of German formations from the Russian front, and the estimated rate of arrival of American troops. These calculations showed that for a limited period in the earlier part of the coming year Germany, free for the first time since 1914 of serious pre-occupations on other fronts, would be in superior strength in the West. This superiority would, however, pass as soon as American participation began seriously to take effect.

In the event, Germany succeeded in massing no less than 186 divisions on the Western Front by March and a month later increased this total to 208 divisions. But the repeated Allied offensives during 1917 had so affected the morale of a large proportion of the German troops as to render them unfit to sustain a continued defensive role.

Thus on the German side, a final attempt to overthrow the Allies, before the Americans could effectually intervene, was clearly indicated.

Ludendorff's preparations for this 1918 offensive are of the greatest interest in their bearing on the subject of this paper. They were based on lessons deduced from a careful study of the earlier course of the War and, in particular, from the frustration of strategic aims in the Nivelle offensive by tactical failure. Ludendorff's conclusions emphasised the fact that, whereas in open warfare the strategic plan must first be developed before the tactical opportunity will arise, "in position warfare a tactical success, that is, a rupture of the front, is necessary first."† He therefore refrained from directing the attention of his subordinate

*"Military Operations. France and Belgium. 1918." P. 7.
"German Strategy in the Great War." Neame. P. 104.

leaders and staffs on dazzling but distant objectives and concentrated on perfecting the tactics to which he looked to produce his strategic openings. His main principles in this training were an insistence on the value of surprise; the direction of the strongest attacks where the enemy was weakest, and the immediate and independent exploitation of success by all formations, units and even sub-units,—each of which must be capable of fighting its own way forward.

Behind this thorough overhaul of German tactics, however, the dominating strategic idea must not be overlooked even though this remained, to a greater extent, perhaps, than hitherto, within the minds of the High Command alone. Lieutenant-Colonel Wetzell, Head of the Operations Section at O.H.L., feared principally the Allies' power of speedily switching reserves over the excellent lateral French railways. This flexibility in the defence had to be reckoned in comparison with the inevitable delays which growing distance from railheads and the difficulties of crossing a shot-to-pieces battle area must impose upon the attackers.

For these reasons the German strategic conception was a series of great attacks, each separate from and yet having a bearing on and a connection with the others, but none being carried beyond the point where the inevitable delays in the advance, and the intervention of the enemy's reserves, rendered further effort unduly expensive in casualties and so unprofitable. The main direction of the offensive was to be the junction of the French and British armies, where success would offer the possibility of separating the Allies and driving the British, whose destruction was to be the principal objective, back against the sea. At the same time the capture of Amiens would sever a vital link in the Allies' lateral rail communications. The rain and mud of Flanders and the difficult and hilly country in the south would, moreover, both be avoided, and the Allies would be attacked where their positions were weakest and where their reserves were least conveniently at hand.

Fortunately for the Allies, Lieutenant-Colonel Wetzell's governing proviso, that the Allies' reserves must be used up by subsidiary operations before the decisive offensive was launched, was not accepted by Ludendorff and, in searching for the reasons for the ultimate failure of the five great German attacks, which took place between the 21st March and the middle of July 1918, this strategic weakness in the German plan must be given a very important place.*

*See, "Military Operations. France and Belgium. 1918." P. 142.

Space does not allow any more detailed survey of the vast operations which took place, but it must be remarked that where surprise was effected, and in this connection the Germans on many occasions received most valuable assistance from fog or ground mist, it was amply proved that sound tactics rendered a break-through possible, in spite of the strength of defensive positions and the number of troops on the ground. It also emerged that, although there were occasions when tactical success apparently led the German High Command away from the maintenance of the strategical objective, it was the strategic mobility and the handling of the Allied reserves which proved the chief factor in defeating the German plan.

1918. *THE FINAL PHASE*

On the 18th July Foch launched the first great Allied counter-stroke between Soissons and Chateau Thierry and with its success the initiative passed finally to the Allies.

It is not necessary to go into the operations which took place between that date and the Armistice because it is a period of restored movement on which the opinion expressed in the dictum is not, it is felt, primarily based. It is moreover, a period in which powerful strategic influences other than those inside the actual theatres of operations were at work. The effect of contraband control on the stamina and morale of the German people, and the reactions of these on the German troops, is but one of many of such influences which almost preclude any brief consideration of the dictum in relation to the operations of the closing period of the War.

A study of that period will reveal many examples of the difficulties which are inseparable from the movement and maintenance of vast modern armies and the limiting effect which the capacity of the available communications must have on the size and flexibility of the forces which can be employed.

Before leaving the subject it is of interest to remark that in the first action of the Allied offensive the tactical success of the French attack brought the only broad gauge railway which served the Germans in their great Marne salient under artillery fire and this threat to their strategic artery forced the Germans to withdraw and so marked the turning of the tide.

CONCLUSION

This examination has been carried out with the Western Front in the Great War as its background because in that theatre the national manpower of the principal opposing Powers was

most thickly crowded on the ground, and it is believed that the dictum has been refused.

The organization and equipment of modern armies is tending to make them dependent on a proportionately larger industrial effort than ever before, while the development of modern air forces must also lead to a great demand for men in the factories and for anti-air defence, as well as in the ranks of the air forces themselves. These factors will reduce the proportion of any nation's manpower which will be available, in a future major war, for service in its army and so will tend to prevent any increase in the size of future armies in comparison with those of 1914—18. On the other hand, it is obvious from a consideration of the forces which already exist in Europe that, should another major war occur, immense armies would again take the field and that the problems of their movement and maintenance would again arise, together with the added complications which mechanization and the creation of armoured mobile forces have produced. The progress and expansion of air forces will also provide strategy with fresh problems.

An efficient organization for the Higher Direction of War will do much to clarify the issue in the field of grand strategy and thus ensure a true economy in the use of a nation's resources and general war effort.

In land operations as always in the history of war, there will be needed a due balance between strategy and tactics. Faulty strategy must obviously be in danger of imposing an impossible burden on tactics, while inadequate tactics will remain able to deprive good strategy of its full rewards and even to frustrate the achievement of its aims.

The exercise of strategy demands power of movement, which is only possible within the capacity of the means of communication and maintenance available. But although this has a limiting influence upon the size of the forces which can be employed in any given theatre of operations, it is not a factor which exercised a determining influence in 1914—18 in France and Belgium. It cannot be upheld that, where strategy failed to achieve even its immediate aims on the Western Front, it was because the size of the armies rendered strategy wholly subordinate to tactics. Nor, it is contended, will this be the case in future.

THE AMATEUR SOLDIER

By Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Phillips, v.d.

Excluding games, there are few professions which both attract and welcome the amateur. The amateur doctor, for instance, finds no welcome at the hands of those whom he would make his colleagues; on the contrary, they smash his pretensions with the heavy hand of the law. Likewise, the law itself excludes the amateur from its courts with no less rigour than banks exclude amateurs from their cash offices. The would-be amateur of such professions, therefore, finding the sacred portals of their temples banged in his intrusive face, can at best only hope to establish some bubble reputation in the local public house; never can he aspire to the rank and dignity of a Doctor of Medicine or King's Counsellor.

By a fortunate chance, however, a more liberal attitude to the amateur is shown by those two professions which exercise the strongest fascination upon him—I allude to the professions of engine-driver and soldier. It is true that the former is somewhat exclusive. Only if he is a king can the amateur engine-driver hope to attain his supreme ambition of hazarding the lives of his loyal subjects. All loyal subjects, however, are permitted, nay encouraged, to hazard their lives as amateur soldiers, and are gladly initiated into the mysteries of the craft by their professional brethren.

It is not difficult to see why the amateur soldier is encouraged. The government of the country, at comparatively small expense, obtains a large force of soldiers, not indeed of the same standard as the regulars, but certainly with a sound grounding in military science and discipline. In the event of war, a large proportion of these amateurs can reach the regular standard much more rapidly than the unmartial citizen who starts from scratch. Also, the fact that these amateur soldiers are scattered widely over the country, instead of being concentrated in garrison towns, gives the government some security against internal disturbances or even, in some countries, against sudden attacks from outside, by land, sea or air.

It is not, however, equally obvious what is the attraction to the individual of voluntary military service. Certainly the pay

is not the primary attraction. Neither in the Officers Training Corps in England nor in the Indian Volunteer Force did I draw any pay. In the Auxiliary Force, after paying my mess bill and subscriptions and providing cups for rifle meetings, I am lucky if I clear Rs. 200 *per annum*. A private in my battalion sees Rs. 32 per year. In either case the amount is hardly sufficient to jeopardise an amateur status. Call it if you will a tip, a graceful recognition of services rendered. It is certainly welcomed, but the majority of us would still be amateur soldiers even if we received nothing.

What about perquisites? The men of the Auxiliary Force receive a free arms license, but this privilege, for some reason, is not extended to officers. Until a few years ago, officers and men were exempted from all taxation on their motor cars. This was a very valuable privilege, particularly to the men, many of whom owned cars and motor cycles, and its restriction to a few special cases has caused a great deal of grumbling. Now it is an undoubted fact that every man dearly loves a privilege in its strict sense—a *private law* singling him out from his fellows. The intrinsic value may be little or nothing; it is the distinction which counts. Therefore, if I may venture to offer advice to the powers that be, it is this: if they want to encourage a volunteer force, they need not worry over much about pay. That is a matter which concerns more the regular soldier, whose livelihood is derived from his profession. Instead, let them look round for a few small privileges, which need not cost much, and confer these upon the amateur. They will make him feel that his efforts are appreciated and will have a marked effect on recruitment.

Apart from direct perquisites, we should also take into consideration the holiday and social aspects of an amateur force. To the British Territorial soldier the holiday side of his camp is undoubtedly a great attraction. Living, as he largely does, in big towns, a fortnight in the country or at the seaside with no expense and all arrangements made for him is extremely good value. In India, the appeal is hardly so great, for towns are with few exceptions more spacious and we normally live a more open-air life. At the same time, if a camp can be arranged at the seaside or in the hills in summer, it has a very good effect on the attendance. The social side of the camp, the renewal of old friendships and the making of new ones, the fun and games in the various messes,

the concerts, sports and field games are all of value as an attraction. Likewise, throughout the year, anything that can be done to bring the men together, such as rifle meetings, dances and team games, should be encouraged to make the service more attractive.

But, after all, these are merely adjuncts to amateur soldiering. What we want to discover is why soldiering in itself, with its hard work, discomfort and drudgery, attracts the amateur. It seems anomalous, but I think that the main attraction lies in this very hard work, discomfort and drudgery. We Britons are accused of taking our pleasures sadly. This means that any rightly constituted Briton will undergo an immense amount of hard work and discomfort for the sake of the glow of achievement which follows. Look at the climber, exhausted and risking his neck; the rugger player inspecting his cuts and bruises; the fisherman squelching homewards soaked and cold. And so with the amateur soldier. During his training he will sweat and grouse and limp exhausted back to camp, but at the end of it all he will fling himself back in his chair and say: "Well, that was a grand camp." And for years afterwards, the mighty march in 1930 or that awful trench digging in 1933 will crop up in conversation—and, if there are present mere civilians who can't endure such heroic hardships, well, so much the better. The moral of this is: don't coddle your amateur soldier. Don't expect him to do all that a regular can, but set him a high standard and work him to the limit of his capacity. Then he will feel that he has been found worthy and has achieved something worth achieving.

Another attraction to the right man is the discipline. There is a strange fascination in orderliness and rhythm which appeals alike to the amateur soldier and the amateur engine-driver. We cannot all be drivers, but, if we can believe Kipling's "The Ship that Found Herself," every part of the machine can take pride in its ordered work. So also we cannot all be officers. To the officer the pleasure of responsibility, of directing orderly masses on parade and in the field, the danger of a mistake that will not so much make him feel a fool as make him feel that he has let down his men. But those of us who have done our turn in the ranks know well also the thrill of pride that the keen private gets from his instant obedience, his perfect turn-out, his snap and smartness. The brave uniforms of the past have gone; the glamour of soldiering remains.

At this point I hesitate, for I cannot proceed without mentioning certain subjects which generally we prefer not to parade. But my picture of the amateur soldier will be incomplete without them. With apology, therefore, I continue.

So far I have dealt only with the attractions of soldiering for the amateur. There are, however, two incentives which tend to drive him into it. The first is loyalty and the second duty. The proportion of genuinely loyal Britons is probably higher in India than in Britain itself. In addition to being loyal subjects many are also actually servants of the Crown. In the Civil Services, there is not, however, the same atmosphere of personal loyalty to the Throne as in the Fighting Services. Civil Servants call themselves *Government* servants, and rarely focus their eyes beyond the Secretary of State. They do not generally acknowledge it even to themselves; but the fact remains that to many of them, Government servants and others, the joining of the Auxiliary Force is an expression of loyalty to His Majesty. And they are proud to hold his commission and to wear his uniform.

As for duty, it is of three kinds—to ourselves, to our families, and to our country. Every right-minded man in all ages has regarded it as his duty to himself to be able to protect himself when necessary. Some stop at the ordinarily accepted meaning of the noble art of self-defence; others go further and feel it their duty to be able to protect themselves from armed attack. Such are the amateur soldiers.

Again, many of us feel it our duty to be prepared personally to defend our families and homes. In Britain, with the increasing menace of air raids and the delegation of air defence and coastal defence to the Territorial army, this feeling is growing stronger daily, and is reflected in the recruiting returns of the Territorials.

Lastly, what of duty to our country? It is not an expression that we like or use. We put it much more neatly—"doing our bit." That is all it amounts to. We amateur soldiers are not content to sit back and let others do all the hard work of defending us, our families, our homes, our country and our empire. We feel that we also ought to do our bit.

So much for the amateur soldier. My endeavour has been to give an insight into his feelings and inspirations and to give

this insight particularly to his professional brother. May I conclude with a personal note to the regular? You regular soldiers are not only our brothers, but very definitely our *big* brothers and your attitude and advice makes more difference to us than many of you know. The influence of our regular permanent staff spreads far beyond the parade-ground and rifle-range. Remember that, and send us men whom we can look up to and who will be a credit to yourselves.

There is one way, too, in which every one of you, officers and men, can help us, and that is by fighting actively against the dreadful inferiority complex that some of us have—"Oh well, after all, we're only playing at soldiers, so what does it matter?" I resent that attitude and I consider it fatal if it spreads through a unit. I do not play at soldiers: I am one—an amateur, yes, but none-the-less a soldier, with a certain amount of knowledge of my job, a certain amount of experience and a certain definite worth. I have as much right to be called a soldier as Lord Tennyson has to be called a cricketer; and every other officer and man in the Auxiliary Force has the same right. They may be good soldiers or bad soldiers, and they are all amateurs (though many are *ex* professionals) but they are all very definitely soldiers. Yet many of them are ashamed to claim this title and thereby destroy their own morale and that of their comrades. They lack confidence in themselves and are afraid of ridicule. It is not your fault. I give you full marks for your attitude to us. All through my service, both officially and privately I have found you regular soldiers ready to welcome the amateur as one of the family, to help him in every way, and even to admire him for the show that he puts up and the discomforts that he voluntarily endures. But that is not enough. I ask for your active assistance. Whenever you meet the amateur, on duty or off duty, let him know at once if he shows an inferiority complex, help him to keep his tail up, and rub it into him good and hearty that he is "an important and integral part of the armed forces in India," that he is a soldier.

One thing more. When you inspect us, don't imagine that criticism will destroy our keenness and that flattery is essential. When we are very young soldiers we may feel complacent when the inspecting officer tells us what marvellous fellows we are; but we get tired of it when we hear it year after year. We have a fairly shrewd idea of how good or how bad we are, and if an

inspecting officer does not spot, or is too polite to mention, our bad points, we do not attach much value to his opinion of our good ones. So do be honest with us, and be sure that we shall appreciate the pointing out of our weaknesses and advice on how to improve them. We are not discouraged by healthy criticism. And don't think, though I fear that I may have given you that impression, that we always and all the time take ourselves dreadfully seriously. I can assure you that we get a lot of fun out of ourselves and are not averse to sharing the joke with a sympathetic big brother.

And now to end with a tale of an inspecting officer who could not tell a lie. I once found myself on a brigade field day in command of a detachment of a unit which had fallen upon hard times; so much so, that locally, almost every member had resigned except a few old stalwarts whom nothing and no one could shake from their loyalty to their unit. At the end of the day, the district commander, who was inspecting, ordered my detachment to perform a certain manœuvre. They did it, chiefly on account of their great age, badly, damned badly. The general, an Irishman of nimble thought, knew it, I knew it, the men knew it. He called me up, and, after a few remarks on tactics concluded, " and tell the men"—(*"usual thing," I thought, "delighted to see them so keen and efficient"*) "er, tell the men"—(*hullo! an honest man with qualms of conscience"*) "er, h—m, yes, tell them" —(*"completely stumped: wonder what he can say"*)—"Yes, yes! Tell them they're full of heart, full of heart"! ! *Le mot juste*! For after all, if the amateur soldier is full of heart, that is the great thing.

STRATEGIC ROADS AND MECHANICAL TRANSPORT IN THE DEFENCE OF INDIA

By Major C. McI. Delf

There are many signs that in Europe and America roads designed for modern motor traffic are at last being given the attention and importance they deserve. Germany has led the way and it is generally agreed that her *autobahnen* have a military as well as a civil significance; this in spite of the fact that Germany possesses a magnificent railway system with which almost incredible feats of transportation were performed during the Great War. The United States, another country with a fine railway system, does not rely on it to the exclusion of the road for the moving of troops over long distances, witness the recent move of an American mechanised division, reported in *The Times* of November 15th, 1937. That division consisted of 9,200 officers and men, 1,108 vehicles and over 1,000 tons of equipment. It left camp in Texas at 6 a.m. and thirteen hours later entered San Antonio, having covered a distance of three hundred and twenty-six miles. The whole march, including halts, had been carried out at an average speed of twenty-five miles an hour. The still more recent march of German motorised divisions on Vienna is another example of a strategic move by road where a good railway system was, nevertheless, available.

As mechanization increases, it is suggested that the tendency will be to use road transport for anything but the widest movements rather than go through the orthodox procedure of movement from base by rail to railhead and thence by road. Apart from the disorganization and delay due to entraining and detraining there is always the danger of air attack to consider. The author of the Gold Medal Essay of the Royal United Service Institution in 1936, himself an airman, stressed the point when he wrote: "It is an obvious truism that the nearer a railway system is worked to its maximum capacity, the more serious would be the cumulative effect of air interference: and the far more extended use of motor transport that is practicable to-day will undoubtedly afford a much greater margin of safety between the minimum essential and the maximum possible use of the railway in war, to allow for and alleviate the effects of air interference with the working of the system," and again, "the outcome of that policy"—mechanization—"will be to minimise the effects of air action on a modern

scale against supply and communications, firstly, by reducing to within reasonable limits the quantity of war material essential to the conduct of active operations, and secondly, by increasing the flexibility of our transportation system—and thereby its margin of safety against interference."

Again we find a distinguished military writer* affirming, in the April 1938 number of the *Army Quarterly*, that "Modern war is, in fact, mainly a matter of transportation facilities. Strategy is dependent upon what the railways and motor roads can offer."

Let us now examine India's roads, particularly those in the north-west from this point of view. We find that whereas there is an elaborate network of strategic railways, many of them of more than doubtful commercial value, penetrating Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province, good motor roads are comparatively few. There is admittedly the Grand Trunk Road running to Peshawar with its extension up the Khyber Pass to the Afghan border. There is also the frontier road over the Kohat pass to Dera Ismail Khan which is linked up with the excellent Waziristan road system. But to drive a car to Quetta from either the Punjab or Sind is still considered a feat to be talked about and even to be written up in newspapers. The railway remains the normal means of getting supplies and troops to the advanced bases on the Frontier.

In certain cases, such as Waziristan, this involves a break of gauge with, in consequence, much delay and damage. It is particularly in a case of this nature, where the commitments are known, that the building of a new road as a substitute for the narrow gauge railway offers interesting possibilities.

Let us assume that, in place of the present narrow gauge railway between Mari Indus and Bannu, there is a first-class motor road built on the alignment of the railway. There is no reason why, on such a road, the standard heavy lorry used at home and in Europe should not be run. This lorry carries five tons and can tow a three-ton trailer. It is usually powered with a Diesel engine. Taking a maximum war-time lift into Waziristan of two hundred tons per day, twenty-five such outfits would be required on the road each day. Allowing an average of 25 m.p.h. for the convoy, it would reach Mir Ali four and a half hours after leaving Mari Indus. This compares very favourably with the seven and a half hours which the train takes to reach Bannu, the run to which is shorter by twenty-three miles. It will be noted that Mir Ali is

*"Ludendorff" by Archimedes.

chosen as the road-head and advanced base to which bulk supplies are taken. There are many advantages, both strategical and administrative, in so doing, the chief administrative gain being that of breaking bulk twenty-three miles further forward. It will be seen that, if the situation demanded it, the vehicles would be able to return empty the same day but normally the service would be kept up by two mechanical transport sections.

Petrol would be delivered in bulk in eight hundred or one thousand gallon tank lorries. The lighter lorries already in the service would operate forward of Mir Ali over the network of roads now under construction in Waziristan. The cost per ton mile of freight carried in this way would be but a fraction of the cost with the type of road vehicle in use at present.

It may be objected that such a road, carrying abnormally heavy vehicles, is non-standard to India. It is felt however, that it is only a question of a few years before the general standard of Indian roads is raised very considerably and that this road would merely be a fore-runner from which, incidentally, much valuable experience would be obtained. The larger capacity vehicles, which are so much more economical from the ton-mile point of view, would then become the rule rather than the exception. Incidentally, these vehicles are more suited for Diesel engine propulsion than are the smaller ones.

It is quite likely that, for reasons of policy, it is not desirable to introduce such heavy vehicles into the service at present. In that case it is suggested that the lorry of three-ton capacity, as now used by a well-known contractor all over Waziristan, is capable of replacing the present narrow gauge railway with a far more flexible means of transport. The advantage of such a pool of transport, available for duty elsewhere, is well worth weighing in the balance when comparative costs are worked out.

Finally we have the possibilities of the road train. This consists of a five-ton tractor towing three or four trailers each carrying five tons or so. Such a unit was tried out on the Frontier in 1931 but owing to steering difficulties was a failure. The Overseas Mechanical Transport Committee in England then got down to the problem and produced a train, driven by a Diesel engine, which steered perfectly and successfully traversed difficult terrain on a south to north run in Australia, and also in Nigeria. Examples are now at work in both countries. Outfits of this type are primarily designed to replace branch railway lines which it is desired to close down, or as an alternative to building new ones.

It will thus be evident that there are several ways by which narrow gauge railways can be replaced by road transport. Each case must, of course, be examined on its merits but when the advantages and disadvantages are weighed up for an area such as Waziristan, not the least important aspect will be found to be the impetus to trade given by new roads. Increasing trade will raise the tribesman's standard of living and offers the best hope of permanent settlement with him. The roads designed to enable our troops to get to grips with him may ultimately render troop movements unnecessary. One of the most noteworthy features of the recent campaign was the activity which friendly tribes showed in operating mechanical transport on our behalf.

For some years to come the broad gauge line must be the main line of communication for troops operating on a large scale, if only because it is the most economical way of transporting bulk supplies where there is no change of guage. But, in these days of attack from the air, it is most important that every line should be duplicated by a first-class road. Railways in general and railway bridges in particular are sure to be singled out for attack from the air. A few minutes thought shows how much more vulnerable is the railway than the road. A convoy of lorries can, in most areas, scatter and very often each vehicle can get under a tree. A bomb dropped in the centre of the road in front of the leading lorry merely causes a more or less awkward dètour. A bomb dropped on a rail track under similar conditions holds up a train and leaves it at the mercy of following aircraft. If a bridge is hit the railway line is out of action until the bridge is repaired but, even when a road bridge is totally destroyed, there are very few places where temporary arrangements, such as diversions or bridges, cannot be rapidly constructed. At river crossings of the first importance, as at Attock, there are usually already in existence tracks to near river level, relics of a former boat or low level bridge. It is obvious that the flow of road transport is going to be kept up much more easily under aerial attack than is railway traffic.

Just as in the case of narrow gauge substitution there is much to be said for the first-class modern road capable of carrying five-ton lorries, so the same argument applies here. Any road programme must be drawn up with the future in view. It is a wise and economical precaution to design and plan roads now which will be up to the traffic they will have to carry, say, ten or fifteen years hence. In this connection it can be truly said of almost any part of India, that the military requirement of to-day will be the commercial necessity of the future. This does not mean that

railways will be superseded any more than they are likely to be in England. Rather will it mean a re-adjustment of the balance between rail and road so that each form of transport can serve the community in the most economical way.

One of the bug-bears of motoring in India is the way the animal drawn vehicle, which rarely obeys any rules of the road, impedes faster traffic. It is absurd to mix on the same highway traffic travelling at from 35 to 60 m.p.h. with the ambling bullock cart of a former era. The time has surely come when animal traffic, at least in areas of military importance, even though it still preponderates, should be confined to its own service roads alongside the main road. On the new German motor roads animal traffic is forbidden, as a result accidents are reported to be reduced by eighty per cent. Similar action is now being taken in England and although motor traffic in India is nothing like so dense, it is increasing; and accidents will also increase unless the necessary action is taken now.

The ideal road would have dual carriage ways on the lines of the German *Autobahn*. This would probably be too much for India's purse; but one of the German 25-foot wide concrete roads, with asphalted edges, sunk curbs, and minimum camber would be a vast improvement on the present design of road which, with its inadequate, hard strip of asphalted macadam, flanked on each side with eight or ten feet of dusty or mud-soaked berm, according to season, is the sort of compromise which satisfies no one and leads to totally unnecessary accidents. Alongside this road would be the service or animal traffic road which, in certain districts, at some future date, could form the basis of the second carriage way thus introducing the ideal of one way traffic.

Before leaving the subject of mixed traffic one is tempted to quote G. L. Steer on the roads of Addis Ababa before the Italian occupation. "In Addis the streets were only asphalted in the middle: there was a rough area on both sides for mules and beyond that, above the gutters, were the pavements for pedestrians. But there was one flaw in this neat lay-out. The pavements had never been asphalted or even levelled smooth. So the pedestrians took the centre of the road, the cars were forced into the area reserved for mules and the mules had to pick their way along the pavements." Is India so different?

Given the road, the most economical type of transport will ultimately appear upon it as long as licensing is wisely applied. To begin with, the existing civilian lorry of three to four-ton carrying capacity and powered with a petrol engine developing

from 70 to 85 H.P. would be used. This is the same as the three-ton lorry mentioned in the first part of this article and widely used in Waziristan. Eventually this will probably be superseded by the larger diesel-engined vehicle. It will thus be unnecessary for the army to maintain several lines of communication and numerous mechanical transport units to peace. One or two should suffice. The money would be better spent on road development, leaving it to commercial enterprise to produce the vehicles, which would be registered for impressment in an emergency.

In India, as elsewhere, the fully mechanized force is rapidly becoming a reality. Such a force would be robbed of half its value without a good road system. No doubt its component vehicles would have a good cross-country performance, but they would do better still on good roads and, in fact, a mechanized force should have no difficulty in repeating and improving upon the performance of the American division already mentioned, 326 miles in the day—given the roads. The effect on the numerical strength and distribution of the Defence Forces in India which would follow the possession of such mobility cannot be gone into here but would undoubtedly be great. Resulting economies can be foreseen to pay for the roads. Even on the North-West Frontier considerable changes can be envisaged.

This brings one to the important question of troop transport. In the 1937 Waziristan campaign much use was made of mechanical transport to move troops and their first-line animals. Another big feature of the campaign was the extent to which motor roads were driven through country hitherto inaccessible to any form of transport but the pack-mule. Frontier troops were able to reach many areas where they were required in a matter of hours whereas formerly it took days. The tribesman's strong suit, his mobility, was countered by the motor lorry and the motor road. No special passenger-carrying vehicles being available, the ordinary supply vehicles had to be used. These were not very satisfactory. The stowage of kits and arms is difficult; full use cannot be made of the chassis; while the men travel in considerable discomfort which on hill roads often leads to physical sickness. Also, embussing and de-bussing has to be done from the back. Under these conditions a unit is very unlikely to do itself justice if attacked on the move or required in action immediately after arrival at its destination.

It is understood that a re-design of the standard body is now under consideration. It is suggested that this body should be primarily for passenger transport with easily detachable seats so

that it can be rapidly converted for goods transport. The main design might well follow that of the civilian bus body, with a substantial roof and plenty of side doors for rapid loading and unloading. The fixed roof could carry kits while underneath it rifles and equipment could be clipped in readily accessible positions. The frames of the seats, all facing forward, could be of the modern light tubular metal work; while the seats themselves could be of cane.

The size of this vehicle is most important. The more troops that can be comfortably carried per vehicle the shorter will be the column. This is particularly important from two points of view, attack from the air and road space. On the other hand the chassis must be capable of working on the ordinary hill road. Availability from civilian sources in an emergency is also a big consideration. Evidently a compromise is necessary. The one suggested is a 28—30 seater, a size of body which can be easily mounted on the type of contractor's chassis in use in Waziristan. A number of contractors actually produced passenger-carrying vehicles of this type which were hastily converted for the carriage of goods. These had no difficulty in traversing the same routes as Service vehicles, reaching the foremost camps such as Asmanmanza. The writer had the opportunity of operating a vehicle of this type, during the 1937 Waziristan campaign, in competition with normal Service vehicles. It had no difficulty in carrying loads of three tons over newly built hill roads and proved an exceptionally useful and reliable vehicle. With regard to their availability in an emergency there is a distinct tendency for the commercial operator, at any rate in northern India, to go for this type, which, for a very small increase in running expenses, gives him an extra eight or nine seats for his pay load over the old 18—22 seaters, which correspond to the military 30-cwt. lorry. It is true that certain hill roads are banned to such vehicles, but if these roads are ever likely to have a military significance, there would appear to be a case for bringing pressure to bear upon the appropriate authorities to improve them. The hill roads of the North-West Frontier Province point the way. In the meantime there would have to be a few of the smaller vehicles available for service use. But this number should be kept to a minimum, for the reasons already given, and because the more they are used the more drivers, maintenance personnel and fuel are required. The word 'tail' of course, is usually given a comprehensive meaning which includes these factors.

The Italians were faced with most of these problems during the recent war in Abyssinia. The Italian Military Attaché in London, at a recent lecture in the Royal United Services Institution, stated that one of the important lessons learnt in that campaign was that motor transport types for the supply service (including passenger carrying) could be reduced to three: a special type capable of travelling at a limited speed along paths and cart tracks in the immediate vicinity of the troops; a light motor lorry of medium capacity and high speed capable of carrying at least 38 cwt. on hilly roads; and a larger vehicle capable of carrying at least 95 cwt. on hilly roads.

A more mountainous and roadless country to operate in than Abyssinia would be difficult to find; yet, even so, it is obvious that the Italians kept the size of the bulk of their vehicles to the maximum dimensions permissible. Let us for a moment consider the various categories. The vehicles in the first class were evidently used for the partial replacement of mules in first-line transport. Those in the second correspond roughly to the type now being advocated for troop transport. It should be remembered that a vehicle which can comfortably carry three tons on good roads would normally be loaded with only two tons on the more severe type of hill road. The third class correspond to the larger type of vehicle which, for economical and other reasons, has already been advocated for lines of communication work either in replacement of railways or to supplement them. This is the type particularly suitable for diesel engines.

Before leaving the subject of the Military Attaché's lecture it is worth noting that he stressed the extent to which animals were transported by motor transport. "The transportation of animals by motor became a normal procedure and gave excellent results." In Waziristan, in 1937, increasing use was made of lorries for this purpose. The vehicle used, the 3-ton medium six-wheeler, is not very suitable owing to its high loading platform. Better results would no doubt be obtained with suitably adapted bodies on the suggested 30-seater, passenger carrying, four-wheeled chassis. In this campaign cattle were successfully transported in contractors' lorries of this type.

As already suggested, if full advantage is to be taken in India of the mobility offered by modern mechanization, road development must occur. In this connection let us consider the case of Rawalpindi as a base for operations in Waziristan. At present, the only all-weather road route from Rawalpindi to Bannu is through Peshawar and over the Kohat Pass. There is a direct

route to Kohat which saves forty miles but thirty miles of this road are *katcha* and there are several unbridged nullahs. The route is an easy one apart from the Indus crossing which, of course, is also the chief obstacle on the Peshawar route.

Let us consider what could be done if the direct road Rawalpindi-Kohat-Bannu were modernized and a fleet of 30-seater lorries, plus animal carrying vehicles, were available, sufficient to transport an infantry brigade with its tactical animals. Allowing for short halts, this brigade would have no difficulty in averaging twenty-five miles an hour. This means it could be in Bannu within eight hours of leaving Rawalpindi. Further a battalion, or for that matter the whole brigade, could, after a meal in Bannu, continue to any position in central Waziristan on the same day, if the situation demanded it and road protection were available. Space does not permit the repercussions of such mobility to be examined in detail. It is suggested that the moral effect on the tribesman would be considerable. But for his extreme mobility compared with that of our forces he would probably have ceased to be a problem already. Then the fact that help could be summoned so quickly might permit skeleton garrisons on the Frontier, leaving more troops to enjoy the amenities of stations such as Rawalpindi. There would appear to be no reason why, under certain conditions, the advanced guard of such a force should not go by air leaving the main body to come on by road. Then again, our hypothetical mobile brigade, based on Rawalpindi, would be available for equally rapid moves in other directions, its scope depending on the quality of the Punjab roads. This should lead to further economies in outlying garrisons.

Such road development would, of course, lead to serious competition with the State-owned railways. In certain cases, unremunerative branch lines, especially narrow gauge ones, would have to close down. The Wedgwood Committee has advised this and has also suggested that the railways should run their own road services. English railways find their road transport interests a very profitable investment. A whole-hearted policy of road development in India would not necessarily conflict with the ultimate interest of Indian railways as they would be freed from the burden of many unsatisfactory branch lines.

Northern India has to rely to a large extent on Bengal coal as its source of power. Hydro-electric schemes may alter this in due course, but, in the meantime, the situation would be serious if coal supplies were cut off from Northern India either by air attack or internal troubles. Oil, on the other hand, is produced in the Punjab in sufficient quantity to supply a large proportion

of the mechanical road transport in use in that area. Future developments might easily produce a surplus, even allowing for the greatly increased use of road transport. A re-adjustment of the balance between road and rail would tend to make the most important part of India more self-contained from the point of view of defence.

There is a case for reconsidering the balance between road and rail transport in war. The strategic road will play an increasing part in the defence of India. Better roads in general will confer greater mobility on the mechanised forces of the future. Events in other countries, particularly the Italian campaign in Abyssinia, lead to this conclusion. Much will depend on the way the money available is divided between road construction and the vehicles themselves. A liberal policy in regard to road development and the encouragement of civil interests to operate the type of vehicle required by the army in war will do much to lessen the necessity for maintaining large numbers of supply and troop-carrying vehicles in peace.

It is difficult to make the small vehicle pay commercially. Therefore the Services should, as far as possible run the type of vehicle which does pay. Roads should be designed to that end. Public opinion will eventually insist on this being done.

The danger of attack from the air is a real one and must be taken into consideration in deciding the relative merits of railway and road. In the future, it will be the rule rather than the exception, under active service conditions, to move troops over anything up to five hundred miles by road. Rapid means of road development, using modern machinery, will be a necessary part of any self-contained force.

In his new book on the Abyssinian War, Marshal Badoglio emphasises the use he made of mechanical transport. "I sent for the Quartermaster-General and directed him to be in readiness to organise a great transport column of over a thousand lorries with which I counted on finishing the war at no distant date in Addis Ababa." That was in March, when he was only just over the Abyssinian frontier. But his optimism was justified; in May, two months later, a column of seventeen hundred and twenty-five vehicles entered the capital and the war was won. Granted that, he met with little opposition once the main Abyssinian forces were scattered, still, it is suggested that the lesson to be learnt is the value of mechanised mobility for bringing a campaign to a rapid and successful conclusion, even when the country, at first sight, appears most unsuitable for a mechanised force.

THE QUASHING OR NON-CONFIRMATION OF A COURT-MARTIAL

By Brigadier L. M. Peet

Sometimes one hears a statement, and not always by junior officers, implying that trials by court-martial are quashed for inadequate reasons, thereby endangering not only the discipline of the speaker's unit, but of the Service as a whole. I have even been solemnly assured by a young officer that he knew for a fact that a trial had been quashed because the president had not crossed his "t's" or numbered the pages of the proceedings correctly. It is a fallacy to imagine that a court-martial is quashed without adequate reason, and, in fact, the proceedings of court-martial are reviewed in the same manner as the Court of Criminal Appeal or the High Court examine the proceedings of civil trials sent up to them, and are quashed or partially quashed for the same reasons. The only difference is that the Court of Criminal Appeal and the High Court do not see all civil trials, whereas all courts-martial are, as a matter of routine, reviewed several times. While no court-martial escapes review, many civil trials do, and the proportion of courts-martial quashed is probably greater as a natural consequence, but it in no way follows that courts-martial are worse managed than civil trials; and from the comments in England on the lower civil courts at least, it is fairly clear that trials by court-martial will bear favourable comparison with trials by civil court.

A conviction by court-martial has no effect until it has been duly confirmed, and a certain number of trials are not confirmed wholly or in part. Cases do occur, where, had a trial been confirmed, it could have been upheld, but something has occurred which leads a confirming officer to think that it would be fairer to an accused not to confirm the trial in question. In all cases of non-confirmation it would be legal to re-try the accused before another court, but in practice this is very seldom done, and never if it is the fault of the prosecution in failing to produce sufficient evidence, or in preferring a bad charge.

Since opinions are expressed as to inadequate reasons for the quashing or non-confirmation of trials by court-martial it may be useful to quote actual cases, which have occurred during the last thirty years or so, showing the errors necessitating the action taken, with an occasional example showing where quashing has

not been necessary even where mistakes have occurred. It should not be forgotten that it is often in the interest of the members of a court-martial that a trial be quashed, since, if a court had no jurisdiction, and any punishment were to be inflicted through a sentence awarded by such a court, not only would the members and the confirming officer be liable to an action for damages, but also to trial by court-martial or civil court. To put the matter at its worst, if an illegal death sentence were inflicted, the persons responsible might be tried for murder. A glance at Chapter VIII of the Manual of Military Law, or Chapter IX of the Manual of Air Force Law will show that punishments varying from £1,000 damages to death have been inflicted on officers for the use of improper or excessive jurisdiction. Incidentally, a commanding officer, company commander or other officer who exceeds his jurisdiction is equally liable to actions for damages or trial.

The examples given below have been arranged as far as possible in order of the procedure at a trial by court-martial. Some of the cases quoted are almost incredible, and could hardly occur again, but they illustrate matters to be examined by officers sitting on courts-martial and should also be useful to officers working for examinations in military or air force law. It will be noticed that some cases could be put under two or three headings.

Illegal Courts

A court may be illegal because it has been convened by a person without authority, or because the convening order is illegal, or because the members assembling were not detailed in the order.

Warrants

For trials by general or district court-martial a warrant is required to be issued by the proper authority. Both the Manuals of Military and Air Force Law state* that a court cannot enquire whether or not the convening officer has a warrant. This may be good advice in England, but is not so in India or Burma and, personally, I should have no hesitation in making this enquiry if detailed to appear on a court by an authority about whom I had any doubt. It is most unlikely that a court in England would ever be convened by a person not holding a warrant, but in India such cases have occurred. And there have been other cases in which courts-martial were illegal, not because the convening officer held no warrant, but because his warrant did not authorise

*Rule of Procedure 22, Note 5, in both Manuals.

him to convene the court in question. Some twelve years ago, in one station, five trials had to be quashed in rapid succession for this reason.

Under the Air Force Act and the Indian Air Force Act there are no different classes of the same warrant, but until recently there were four under the Army Act and the Indian Army* and Burma Army Acts; though now, in peace, two only are actually under issue in India and three in Burma. On the other hand, warrants in India at any rate frequently contain restrictions; for instance, they may be personal warrants, so that an officiating officer has not always the same authority as the permanent holder of an appointment. I have also known the holders, from General Officers Commanding in Chief to Brigade Commanders, to lose or mislay their warrants, so that, though the actual power existed, convening officers could not make certain of their powers or the limitations on them. While restrictions are generally incorporated in the warrant itself, further restrictions are frequently made by letter separately. Trials for which no warrant is necessary are field general courts-martial, summary general courts-martial and summary courts-martial. Though no warrant is required, the law must be complied with, and a field general court-martial and summary general court-martial will be illegal if convened by anybody not authorised by law to do so, and the court must be properly constituted.

In the war summary general courts-martial were convened to try personnel belonging to an irregular force raised at Aden by the War Office. The men were not subject to the Indian Army Act, but the Army Act, and in fact were described as privates, while the officers were Yuzbashis, Mulazims, etc. The trials had to be quashed, and the men re-tried by field general courts-martial.

A summary court-martial can only be convened by a commanding officer, but a *de facto* officer commanding is not always a *de jure* commanding officer; for instance, an officer commanding a detached company will not be a commanding officer merely through being the officer commanding a detached body, if the commanding officer of his corps still maintains control; but he will become a commanding officer, and therefore entitled to hold a summary court-martial as officer commanding a detachment,† if he is out of the control of the commanding officer of his corps, and it will then be illegal for the commanding officer of the corps

*The other warrants still exist, though not actually in issue. There is nothing to prevent a re-issue.

†Indian Army Act 64.

to try the man by summary court-martial. A soldier can never have two commanding officers at the same time.

Convening Order

A court-martial must be convened in accordance with the law, and a trial depends on the legality of the convening order. Everyone is familiar with the composition of the ordinary court-martial, so that if there appears anything unusual in the composition of a court and the members of a court-martial are not absolutely familiar with the law for convening a trial they should at once look it up in the Manuals. In fact it is generally advisable to do this, or some little point may be overlooked that will invalidate a trial.*

Some twenty years ago, a general court-martial was convened to try separately three officers, the commandant and the adjutant of a Hill Depôt and the officer commanding one of the detachments in this depôt. The charges all arose out of one incident, the looting of a treasure chest, and these three officers were charged with neglect of duty in their varying capacities. The trial of the officer commanding the detachment was first held, and he was duly convicted. The court apparently arraigned the other two officers, but proceeded to record that the evidence at the first trial satisfied them, and they acquitted both the commandant and adjutant immediately, without calling any evidence. By such action the court broke their oath to try the accused according to the Army Act and to give their verdict on the evidence, since they took none. Since an acquittal requires no confirmation the verdict in the case of the adjutant stood, however improper the procedure leading to this acquittal. In the case of the commandant, however, it was found on review that the court was illegally constituted, two of the officers being of lower rank than the commandant, and there being no written opinion in the convening order to the effect that this was necessary in the interests of the Service.† His trial was, therefore, no trial legally and he was liable to retrial, but actually no such action was ordered.

On another occasion a court was composed of officers from one battalion only, and in compliance with the Rules of Procedure‡ it was stated in the convening order that, in the opinion

*The main points regarding the convening of the court are summarised in the Manual of Military Law, page 767, the Manual of Air Force Law, page 554, and the Manual of Indian Military Law, page 406. As there is, as yet, no Manual of Indian Air Force Law, the statute and rules themselves must be consulted.

†Rule of Procedure 21 (A).

‡Rule of Procedure 20 (A).

of the convening officer, no other officers were available. The trial was nevertheless quashed, since the waiting member was an officer of another battalion, and therefore available to serve on the court.

The following case supports the belief that the idea of the junior officer quoted at the beginning of this article may be more prevalent than would otherwise be imaginable.

The convening order directed that a subaltern of a certain regiment was to be a member, his name being entered in the convening order. A subaltern of the regiment duly arrived, but must have pointed out that he spelt his name with an "e" at the end, while the convening order spelt it without. It is hard to believe, but the court then refused to let him serve and appointed the waiting member, though there was no other subaltern in the regiment of the same name, whether with or without an "e" at the end, and it was perfectly clear that the officer intended by the convening order was present. Any doubt felt by the court should have been resolved by adjourning and enquiring from the convening officer.

On more than one occasion a court under the Army Act has been convened by an officer officiating in command of a brigade, who, as commanding officer of the accused, had remanded him for trial. These trials are quashed, though only a King's Regulation has been transgressed and not the law, since it is inequitable for the same officer to act in both capacities, and it is most important not only that an accused should be treated impartially but that this impartiality should be clear to everybody. It is only on board ship and if especially allowed by the Army Council that a Commanding officer can remand an accused for trial by court-martial and subsequently himself convene the court.

Objections

The principle by which to be guided in regard to objections made by an accused to members of the court, the interpreter or shorthand-writer is to allow them, unless palpably absurd, on the principle of impartiality and fairness to an accused.

For instance, an accused objected to a member of the court, because he belonged to the same regiment as himself and must have heard about and formed his opinion of the case. The court disallowed the objection, but the trial was quashed on the above grounds.

Eligibility and Disqualification

Courts have turned out on more than one occasion to be illegally constituted because the junior member was ineligible to serve through not having sufficient service.

As an example of disqualification the following case may be quoted. A court-martial at a large station in Southern India, before the War, was convened to try several men of a fatigue party who had been working at the railway station and chanced upon a box of liquor of various sorts consigned to the gymkhana club. They had partaken of this as welcome refreshment. In those days all officers in a station, with practically no exceptions, belonged to gymkhanas, and so were disqualified from serving on any court that was assembled to try an offence concerning the gymkhana.* This was forgotten, and all the members were disqualified.

Swearing of the Court

It hardly seems possible that errors should occur here, but instances have happened where a court has not been sworn, and the trial has therefore been quashed.

One such error arose through carelessness on the part of the court. It frequently happens that a court is convened to conduct several separate trials, and in such cases it is legal, and saves time, for the court to call in all the accused together, to be sworn once in front of all and then to dismiss the other accused to await their turns while the first trial is carried out. On one occasion the court neglected to ascertain that all the accused whom they were directed to try, were present when they took their oaths, and in fact one was not present, and the court, when his turn came, were not sworn.

In another case the error arose from the same intended procedure by the court. All except one accused objected to one of the members, and the court allowed the objections, appointed a waiting member and then took the oath and proceeded to try all the accused with the reconstituted court. They had no jurisdiction in the case of the accused, who had not objected to any of the members of the original court.

And a case is on record of a court convened under the Army Act but taking the oath for a court convened under the Indian Army Act. It was therefore not sworn at all for the purposes of the Army Act.

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*Rule of Procedure 19 (B) (V).

Charge Sheet

A charge must be legal, *i.e.*, must be properly framed and disclose an offence against the law, under which the trial is being held. The charges are entered in a charge-sheet, which starts off with the heading, in which is entered a description of the accused showing that he is liable to military law and to the court by which he is to be tried, *e.g.*, if an officer of the Territorial Forces or Auxiliary Forces, India, is to be tried by court-martial under the Army Act, the heading should show that he is subject to that Act, by being embodied or for some other similar reason.

Then comes the charge itself, which is divided into two parts, the statement of offence which must be in the words of the Act, and the particulars, that part of the charge which describes in detail the actions of the accused. The particulars must be clear and must show every ingredient of the offence charged, and not show more than one offence. There is an exception to this in a charge alleging "conduct," where it may be necessary to state several actions which together amount to such improper conduct, for instance a brawl at a dance.

The remainder of the charge-sheet consists of the endorsement by the officer commanding the unit of the accused, and the order for trial by the convening officer.

This may sound complicated but the accuracy of a charge sheet is essential to our English ideas of justice, and in point of fact any indictment in a civil court is drawn up on almost identical lines.

Mistakes have occurred in all five portions of the charge sheet.

Heading

At a trial by field-general-court-martial an accused was described as a private (acting probationary second lieutenant). It is impossible for anybody to be both soldier and officer at the same time, but a field-general-court-martial has jurisdiction to try either, so the trial was held to be legal. The court however, awarded a sentence of detention, which is not a legal sentence for an officer, and this was quashed.

Mistakes of this are most likely in India on active service, since civilians who then become subject to military law are frequently given status as officers, warrant officers or non-commissioned officers. If a press-correspondent or a contractor, for instance, has status as an Indian Commissioned Officer or Viceroy's Commissioned Officer or Indian Air Force Officer he must be tried by a general court-martial. Trial by district court-martial of such a person is beyond the jurisdiction of the court.

Statement of Offence

The statement of offence must be in the words of the Act, and these must not be altered, except where variation is shown to be permissible. For example, in Section 25 of the Army Act, there is a long list of words, "report, return, muster roll, pay list, certificate, etc." followed by the words *"other document"* in italics. If no word in the list is correct, an appropriate word may be substituted. The following was incorrect:

Army Act, Section 33.	Making a wilfully false answer to a question set forth in the attestation paper which was put to him by, or by direction of, the assistant recruiting officer before whom he appeared for the purpose of being attested.

It was argued that under Section 94 of the Army Act various persons are made justices in relation to the attestation of soldiers and that under Recruiting Regulations, a recruiting officer had power to attest a soldier and therefore the conviction should stand. Unfortunately, no evidence had been produced to show that an assistant recruiting officer had been appointed an attesting officer, and Section 94 of the Army Act does not itself make an assistant recruiting officer an attesting officer, but merely authorises the Army Council to make regulations appointing attesting officers. Had this evidence been produced, the incorrect statement of offence might have been overlooked on the grounds that the accused had not suffered any prejudice thereby.

Particulars

As regards particulars of the offence, a charge for conduct prejudicial to good order and military or air force discipline sometimes causes difficulty. It is not enough to put certain actions of an accused, of which a superior disapproves, in the particulars of the charge and expect the charge to be legal. The actions must be clearly prejudicial to both good order and discipline. The following charge was, for example, held to be bad:

An act to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, in that he,

> at Poona, on . . . , was in possession of two rounds of ammunition.

There are plenty of circumstances in which a man, soldier or civilian, is entitled to be in possession of ammunition, and the particulars of the charge did not show in any way that this was not one of these.

It is also not correct to frame a charge under Section 40 of the Army Act,* or its equivalent under Indian Acts, as an alternative to a charge under another section, unless the circumstances show clearly that the action of the accused does amount to different offences according to the interpretation put upon it. For instance, an accused was charged under the Army Act Section 9 (2), and 40 alternatively, the particulars being in each case,

> "In that he at Nasirabad, on . . . , when ordered to fall out with the drivers by Sergeant *A*, commanding No. 9 sub-section, did not do so."

If the accused committed any offence it was one under section 9 (2).

On the other hand, alternative charges under sections 8 and 40 of the Army Act may be required. If an accused can prove he did not know the person he struck was his superior officer, the striking may still be an assault, and an offence against good order and discipline.

Charges under the Army Act Section 8, also cause difficulties, since the difference between the use of violence and an offer of violence is not always understood, nor that between threatening and insubordinate language.

The following charges have been held to be bad:

> "*Offering violence to his superior officer,* in that he at Secunderabad, on . . . , threw a bayonet at Corporal . . . , hitting him in the arm."

The particulars disclose the use of violence, an offer being an attempt to use violence, which fails.

> "*Using threatening language to his superior officer,* in that he at Bombay, said to Sergeant *A*: If it weren't for the stripes, I'd hit you," shaking his fist at Sergeant *A*."

The words used clearly disavow any intention of using violence, and therefore were not threatening.

Again an airman was charged before a court-martial under the Army Act with fraudulent enlistment into the Army.† An airman cannot commit this offence, but does commit an offence under the Air Force Act.‡ He should have been returned to the Royal Air Force for trial.

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*The same applies under the Air Force Act.
†Army Act, Section 13.
‡Air Force Act, Section 13.

Duplicity

Only one offence may be put in the particulars of a charge. If more than one is disclosed, there is duplicity and the charge is bad. For instance, the following charge is bad:

Army Act, Section 6. *When a soldier acting as sentinel leaving his post before being regularly relieved,*

in that he,

at . . . , on . . . , between 5 a.m. and 6 a.m., when sentry on No. I Post, Barrack Guard, left his post before he was regularly relieved and remained absent until he was apprehended at . . . on . . .

This discloses an offence under Section 15 as well as under Section 6. The particulars should have ended at "relieved," and a second charge been framed to deal with the absence without leave.

Endorsement by Commanding Officer

The Commanding Officer of the unit of accused must himself approve the charges and, to show this, should sign the charge-sheet. Formerly, a failure to do so invariably upset a trial, but now, if the commanding officer can furnish a certificate* that he did in fact approve the charges before trial, the trial may stand. It is clear, therefore, that the unit of the accused and the commanding officer must agree, though it is sufficient if the accused is attached

*Formerly a person making an accusation acted as prosecutor at a court-martial, even against his own commanding officer. Anybody can still bring forward a charge, but the commanding officer is now endowed by the legislature with power of deciding whether or not a soldier is to be punished for the offence charged. In this case he has full powers of decision whether military or air force law is to be invoked or not. In the case of an officer a commanding officer has no such powers of condonation or dismissal of a charge which ought to be proceeded with. The fact that a commanding officer has been endowed with these powers is probably the reason that a civil court can try or retry soldiers or airmen charged with civil offences, whether or not they have been punished under military law. Otherwise a soldier charged with murder could be let off by his commanding officer.

No other officer has this power of decision, and that is why the commanding officer's approval of the charges is required and it is necessary to ascertain that he has himself actually given his approval; and the best evidence only is accepted; either the commanding officer's signature on the actual charge-sheet or a certificate signed by him if he has omitted to sign the charge-sheet.

A commanding officer on leave has no powers and the person actually exercising command is *de facto* and *de jure* the commanding officer of an accused. A "second-in-command" cannot, under such circumstances, be restricted by his commanding officer from exercising these powers during the absence of the latter on leave, though cases of improper restriction have occurred.

to the unit of the officer signing as commanding officer. A signature "for" the commanding officer is not enough.

Order for Trial

A trial is illegal unless an officer holding a warrant to convene the court has ordered trial on the charge-sheet in the proceedings. A staff officer has no power to order trial without orders, but the signature of a staff officer signing "for" the convening officer is accepted, since it is the custom of the services for a convening officer to give orders for the convening of trial without actually arranging the court himself.

To quote an old case: In the days when a regimental court-martial under the Army Act was still legal, the commanding officer of a regiment thought the punishment awardable by such a court would not be sufficient, so convened what he styled a district court-martial to try the offender. He held no warrant at all, and his endorsement on the charge-sheet was of no value.

Again an officer holding a warrant proceeded on short leave, and his staff officer issued an order convening a trial in his absence. An officiating commander had been appointed in Command Orders, and confirmed the trial. This court was doubly illegal as an officer has no authority while on leave, and even if he had had the power to convene the trial, he had not approved the charges. The staff officer had no authority of his own to convene the trial or approve the charges.

Evidence

Evidence must be legal, but every trial is not upset because some of the evidence is inadmissible. The whole case is considered, and if the court must have arrived at the same verdict without the inadmissible evidence the trial will stand, but if the accused has in any way been prejudiced it will be quashed. Inadmissible evidence in favour of the accused has no effect on the results of the trial. A somewhat common error leading to the quashing of several trials in recent years has been a failure to comply with the Rule of Procedure* which directs that all the proceedings of a court, including the view of any place, must be in open court and in the presence of the accused. On one occasion, for instance, the court, after adjourning for the day, felt that they were not clear as to localities and went by themselves to examine the scene of the offence. They thus took what amounted to unsworn evidence, on which the accused, too, had not been permitted cross-examination, and based their verdict on this to his prejudice. On

*Rule of Procedure 63 (B).

another occasion, the court went and examined a barrack-room nearby which was not the scene of the offence. This view apparently took place in open court, but there was no evidence of similarity of the particular barrack-room with that of the place of offence, nor was there evidence that the furniture and fittings were in similar places, and any conclusions drawn by the court were therefore irrelevant and might have been prejudicial to the accused.

Violence

Once or twice on a charge under Section 8 of the Army Act for offering violence the verdict has been against the evidence, since there was clear evidence of the actual use of force, though the charge was good taken by itself as a charge. The reverse is, of course, correct, as on a charge of using violence it is legal to bring in a verdict of offering violence only.*

Absence from Parade

Convictions on charges for failure to attend a parade appointed by the commanding officer are not seldom illegal, through a failure on the part of the prosecution to realise the ingredients of the charge, and as a consequence the non-production of sufficient evidence to prove the offence. This is especially the case where a soldier has been absent from a company parade. Such a parade is not necessarily one appointed by the commanding officer. In all cases of such a charge it is necessary to prove the appointment by the commanding officer of both the place and time of parade, that the accused had notice of these, that he was absent without leave for causes within his control. If there is any doubt about there being sufficient evidence to prove all these ingredients a simple charge of absence without leave should be preferred.

Theft

In cases of theft it is always necessary to produce the articles stolen, or account for their absence if not recovered. This is clearly necessary in cases where there is a dispute as to ownership, *e.g.*, when the accused claims an article as his own. In one case where an accused was charged with theft of a bicycle, the identity of which was disputed, it was not produced at the trial, so that the court could not in its absence form any proper conclusions in the matter.

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*Army Act and Air Force Act, Section 56 (4B).

In charges for civil offences courts should be particular to make certain they understand the offence by looking up the definitions in the preliminary chapters of the Manuals.

Stealing is a technical civil offence, for instance, of which one of the most important ingredients is the intention of permanently depriving the owner of his property. At one trial an accused charged with theft stated he had taken the articles as security because the owner had stolen some money of his. The accused was mistaken as to his legal rights, but his action was not theft, which cannot be committed under a *bona fide* claim of right, another necessary ingredient of this offence, and as he only took the articles as security, he also did not transgress the other ingredient mentioned above.

Burglary

Burglary is another civil offence that often is not understood because it has many technical ingredients, the simplest of which is that it cannot occur except between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. An accused charged with burglary must, therefore, be acquitted of this offence if it was committed at 8 p.m., even if every other ingredient necessary has been proved, though he may be convicted of house-breaking.

Joint Trials

Joint trials frequently cause trouble, but are not really very difficult as long as it is remembered that the word "joint" means something. Though there are several accused, the crime is a combined one, and the procedure at trial is to treat them all as if they were one person, without depriving each as an individual of his rights. Therefore arraignment, rights of cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, and of giving evidence and calling witnesses are individual, but also combined in the sense that answers on cross-examination of a prosecution witness elicited by one accused may go against or on behalf of all, and an accused who gives evidence himself may be cross-examined by all his co-accused. The court must treat the defence by all as one combined procedure and close for the finding once only, though it records a separate finding for each person, and once only for the sentence, though again each convicted person is sentenced separately.

A court on one occasion treated the defence of each of three accused as entirely separate, allowing no cross-examination by the co-accused, and in fact, at one period of the trial, one accused was not even in court; and there were three separate closures of the court to consider their findings.

Bad Character

The rule as to when evidence of the bad character of an accused may be elicited is not always understood. This is practically a word for word copy of the ordinary law of evidence, which causes difficulties even in civil courts to judges of experience, so that an occasional error by a court-martial is not altogether surprising.

The rule is that an accused may not be asked questions tending to show that he has committed, been convicted of or charged with any offence other than the one for which he is being tried, or is of bad character, unless—

(1) the proof of such other offence shows his guilt of the offence with which he is being charged, or

(2) his defence has been conducted in such a manner as to establish his own good character, or to involve imputations on the character of the prosecution witnesses, or

(3) he has given evidence against any person charged with the same offence.

This rule is very strictly interpreted, and even if an accused has rendered it admissible it is very seldom indeed that such evidence will have any bearing on a case; it is safer for the prosecution not to attempt to elicit this evidence and, if there is any doubt whatever, it is foolish to do so.

An accused at one trial, giving evidence himself, said, "I was charged with another offence on the Saturday which was dropped." This offence was in no way relevant to prove the offence charged so that exception (1) above did not apply, nor was (3) applicable. Only exception (2) therefore remained. There had been no imputation on the character of the prosecution witnesses, so the only remaining applicable point was that the accused had tried to establish his own good character, which was not the case, and clearly the statement made by the accused did not do this. The court, however, permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine the accused as to the offence of which he spoke, and later to produce the minor offence report relating to that offence, which also had recorded on it another offence, also not the subject of the trial and not relevant in any way. The conviction was annulled.

Since the question is very important, it may be of advantage to quote the House of Lords on the matter in an Appeal case, as this was the ruling leading to the above annulment.

> "This rule is negative in form, and as such is universal and absolute, unless the exceptions come into play. There are three exceptions, but it does not follow that, when the absolute prohibition is followed by a permission, the permission is as absolute as the prohibition. When it is sought to justify a question it must not only be brought within the terms of the permission, but also must be capable of justification by the ordinary rules of evidence, and in particular must satisfy the rule of relevance."

The Lord Chancellor further stated, "In general no question as to whether a prisoner has been convicted or charged or acquitted should be asked, or if asked, allowed by the judge, unless it helps to elucidate the particular issue which the jury is investigating or goes to credibility, *i.e.,* tends to show he is not to be believed on oath: indeed the question whether a man has been convicted, charged or acquitted, even if it goes to credibility, ought not to be admitted, if there is risk of the jury being misled into thinking that it goes not to credibility but to the probability of his having committed the offence with which he is charged."

The law under the Indian Acts may be taken to be the same, though put differently, since the Indian Evidence Act merely states that bad character is irrelevant, with exceptions.

Documents

In general a document is evidence of nothing except that certain marks occur on it. It is not evidence of the truth of what these marks indicate, unless the law lays this down. In the case of private documents no law allows this, and it is only in the case of certain public documents that the law makes exceptions, and the exceptions with which a court-martial will be generally concerned are given in the Manuals.* All documents must be produced by a witness on oath to prove their identity, and the truth of all private documents must be sworn to by a witness who is competent to do so; and similarly with public documents, unless there is a law laying down that the document in question proves its own truth. Further, it is hearsay to refer to a document not produced in court; a document itself, even if produced, may be hearsay.

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*Army Act and Air Force Act, Section 163.
Indian Army Act, Sections 91, 91A, 92.
Indian Air Force Act, Sections 95, 96, 97.

On one occasion the defence was denying an order alleged by the prosecution to have been issued, but which was not produced in court. The president of the court interrupted the defence, and said the issue of the order was within the knowledge of the court. This was not a matter within their general military knowledge, and no judicial notice of the order was permissible.

On another occasion an expert on handwriting handed in a written statement and the accused was not allowed to cross-examine. A witness must give his evidence orally, but may refresh his memory from a document if he first satisfies the court that it was written correctly, while the matters entered were fresh in his memory. Even then the document does not become evidence, and remains written hearsay, and an accused may always cross-examine a prosecution witness.

Evidence by Accused

Under the Army and Air Force Acts an accused is entitled to give evidence on oath, but trials have had to be annulled because an accused has not been allowed by a court to do so. The reason for this error has sometimes been the use of the Indian Army Form of Proceedings instead of the Army Form, since there is no provision under Indian law for an accused to give evidence, and therefore there is no question recorded in the form of proceedings of an Indian court-martial asking if an accused wishes to give evidence himself.

An accused is also entitled not only to give evidence on oath, but to make an unsworn statement on which he may not be cross-examined. In one case cross-examination was permitted and the trial in consequence annulled.

Under the Indian Army and Indian Air Force Acts an accused is not entitled to give evidence on oath, but cases have occurred, where this has been permitted. The trials have not been quashed, provided the accused was not cross-examined, since on a statement not on oath, which is all an accused under these Acts is entitled to make, cross-examination is not permissible.

Several Charge-sheets

Where there has been more than one charge-sheet errors have occurred through a failure to study the rules. The trial on each charge-sheet must be carried out up to the finding as though each case was a separate trial. Thus evidence on one charge-sheet cannot be considered on another, and if it is necessary to prove any of the facts already proved on the first charge-sheet to support a case on other charge-sheets, the evidence must be elicited afresh.

Failure to carry out this procedure correctly has necessitated annulments.

Findings

Sometimes a finding shows that a court has not understood the case, especially on a plea of guilty. After such a plea an accused is entitled to make a statement in mitigation of punishment, and if he says anything in this statement negativing the plea, the court must alter the plea to one of "not guilty" and try out the case. The test to apply is, "Does the statement, assuming it to be true, negative the plea?" It is not material that the court consider the statement false.

For instance, on a charge of striking his superior officer an accused pleaded guilty, and stated in mitigation that an affray occurred in the dark, and he could not see whom he was striking. This is a complete defence to such a charge as it is necessary for an accused to know that it is a superior officer whom he is striking and then to do so deliberately without lawful excuse. Failure to try out the case invalidated the trial.

A court may refer to a confirming officer for an opinion on a case before they come to a finding, but they must first state the facts they find to have been proved, and may then ask the confirming officer if these facts amount in law to proof of the charge. In one case, on a charge for desertion it was proved that the accused absented himself to ventilate a grievance, and surrendered voluntarily. The court referred to the convening officer and asked if this amounted to desertion. This was a reference asking for an opinion as to the facts, since the question whether the accused absented himself with an intention not to return was a question of fact for the court to decide. The proceedings were not confirmed.

In another, a man was charged with blackmailing six men, but evidence was adduced only as to three. The court convicted of the charge as laid. They should have recorded a special finding.

Again, an accused was tried on 25th May 1918 on a charge of desertion on 23rd February 1915. He was convicted of absence without leave only. This finding was illegal; the special finding could only find an accused guilty of absence without leave for a period limited to three years previous to the date of trial, since Section 161 of the Army Act forbids trial of any person for any offence except mutiny, desertion or fraudulent enlistment, committed more than three years before the date of trial.

A sentence of detention or imprisonment commences on the date on which the proceedings are signed by the president, and such signature authenticates the proceedings as a whole. Cases have occurred where a president has omitted the date, or his signature, or both.

(*a*) In one case a court omitted to record any sentence at all.

(*b*) In another a court awarded a sentence of forfeiture of rank and seniority specifying a date earlier than the actual date of promotion.

(*c*) Under the Army Act and Air Force Act a sentence of stoppages is illegal, unless evidence has been elicited as to the value of the article stolen, lost, or damaged. Under the Indian Acts judicial notice may be taken of the value of articles with regulation values. In all cases the value must be specified in the particulars of a charge.

Revision

Revision of the finding and sentence of a court which require confirmation is permissible once, and once only, and under the British Acts no fresh evidence may be taken nor may the sentence be increased. The powers of the court as to revision are limited at the discretion of the confirming officer. If the latter directs revision on the finding on one charge only out of several, the court have no power to revise their findings on the other charges.

Trials have been quashed because courts under the British Acts have taken fresh evidence on revision, and sentences have also been quashed because they have been increased illegally.

An order to a court to reassemble to complete an incomplete proceedings is not a revision. Thus a court revised its findings, but although this included convictions on some charges no sentence was passed. They were ordered to complete the proceedings by recording a sentence.

Confirmation

Only officers who hold warrants authorising them to do so may confirm the proceedings of a court-martial which requires confirmation. The rules as to confirmation vary somewhat under British and Indian laws, but the chief difference to be noted is that an acquittal under British law is final and requires no confirmation, while under Indian law it is not final and may be revised or not confirmed.

An officer who has convened a trial cannot confirm it, if in the meantime he has relinquished his command, or is on leave. A confirming officer's powers are limited to confirming or not confirming the findings. He may not substitute a special finding, but if he thinks a special finding ought to have been recorded he can order a revision by the court. A higher sentence may be commuted to a lower, and sometimes to more than one lower sentence, but these together must be clearly less than the original. Thus the commutation of a sentence of one year's imprisonment with hard labour to nine months' imprisonment and stoppages for £10 was ruled to be illegal as it was impossible to decide whether the two punishments were less than the original sentence. On the other hand, the commutation of a sentence of dismissal to a sentence of forfeiture of seniority of rank and severe reprimand was clearly correct.

If a sentence is wholly illegal it cannot be confirmed or commuted or mitigated, so that when three soldiers were sentenced to penal servitude for three years, one year, and one year, respectively, and the confirming authority mitigated these sentences to detention for six months, six months, and three months respectively, the accused were legally under no sentence at all, since no sentence of less than three years penal servitude can be awarded by any court. The convictions, however, stood.

The terms used in dealing with sentences are "confirmed," "commuted," "mitigated" or "varied." The first three are clear, but variation is often improperly used. A sentence is only varied if improperly expressed or in excess of the authorised punishment, and may only be carried into effect by a confirming officer in confirming the proceedings. For instance, a court sentenced an accused to 168 days' detention and discharge with ignominy. The latter sentence may not be added to a sentence of detention, and the sentence awarded was thus in excess of the punishment authorised by the law, and was varied by making it discharge with ignominy only, and confirming the sentence as so varied. Had the sentence been mistakenly confirmed, one part or the other would have had to be remitted, and there would have been no power of variation remaining.

ADEN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF BRITISH RULE

By Captain F. D. I. Wood, R.A.

On the 19th January 1939 Aden celebrates its centenary of British Rule. This is, therefore, a very suitable time to review its history, particularly as part of the Indian Empire, and to give an account of recent events and modern conditions there.

Perhaps we are rather apt to forget that our smaller possessions, like our larger ones, have a history; usually a history of individual and collective endeavour. Just as India has her Clive and Warren Hastings, so has Aden her Haines.

To begin with, let us go back exactly four hundred years to 1538, in which year a Turkish fleet under Sulieman the Magnificent captured Aden. Aden's history from then onwards can be divided roughly into four periods of approximately a century each.

The first period saw the visit of an English ship. In 1609 Captain Sharpey from his ship "Ascension" sighted the harbour and was bold enough to enter. Although well received at first, he and his crew were imprisoned later on and only released when the governor had taken as much as he could out of the ship.

The following year a visit was made by Admiral Sir Henry Middleton with three vessels which were attacked, but which managed to beat off their attackers and sail away.

The second period begins in 1630 when the Turks were compelled to evacuate the Yemen and Aden, the latter place passing to the loose suzerainty of the Imam of Yemen. The control of the Imams, like the Ottoman rule, lasted about a hundred years, until 1728, when Aden was seized by the Sheikhs of Lahej.

During this third period, from 1728 to 1839, Aden's history was uneventful until, towards the end, when a certain Colonel Murray and three hundred men occupied Perim, only to abandon it on failing to find water. It is interesting to note that they were entertained by the Sheikh or Sultan of Lahej at Aden, and such was his hospitality that he offered them the place. The offer was gracefully refused, but three years later, in 1802, a treaty was concluded with the Sultan and a plot of land in the now well known Crater allotted as a British factory and burial ground.

A search by the Indian Navy for a coaling station for the first steamship built in India resulted in coal being landed on Seera Island near the Crater. However, the natives proved to be indolent coal heavers, so Aden as a coaling station was abandoned and its place taken by Mukalla in the Hadramaut. In 1835 Sokotra having been captured and given up as unhealthy, the Bombay Government again turned their attention to Aden. Sultan Muhsin Fadhl of Lahej proved to be an inveterate plunderer of wrecks, but retribution was soon to fall on his head, for in 1838 his plundering, and outrages on the crew of the wrecked "Darya Daula," caused the Bombay Government to despatch Captain S. B. Haines to obtain satisfaction, or failing that to arrange for the purchase of Aden.

Haines, a bluff sea captain of the Indian Navy, had to bear with a great deal of haggling and prevarication before Sultan Muhsin finally agreed, on the arrival of troops, to cede Aden in return for an annual subsidy of eight thousand seven hundred crowns. The Sultan obviously thought no troops would arrive; however, Haines departed and returned in September in the sloop "Coote" with a bodyguard of thirty Europeans. He demanded the surrender of Aden in accordance with the pact, but the old Sultan, seeing the small size of the bodyguard, changed his mind and refused to cede it. The Sultan himself did not appear but used his son Ahmed as an intermediary. Haines' difficulties increased. He discovered plots against his life, supplies were refused and his pinnace was fired on. He retaliated by blockading the harbour and refusing entrance to the dhows carrying dates. Shortly afterwards he was reinforced by the schooner "Mahe" and the barque "Anne Crichton." The new year 1839 opened with a "very gallant skirmish" off Seera Island between the "Mahe" and the Arab battery manned by Egyptians.

More futile negotiations followed until a further reinforcement (H.M.S. "Volage," 28 guns, and "Cruiser," 10 guns, and 300 European and 400 native soldiers under Major Baillie) decided Haines on instant bombardment. The fleet accordingly stood into Holkat Bay and engaged the forts. The troops were unable to land until the "Mahe" schooner managed, by skilful manœuvring, to take up a position flanking the point near Seera. Then, two-and-a-quarter hours after the beginning of the bombardment, two parties of troops landed simultaneously from boats and took

the place by storm. Mate Rundle had the honour of planting the British flag ten minutes later on the Sultan's palace. This flag can now be seen at the Governor's residence in Aden.

The Sultan's sons fled, together with a majority of the Bedouins, of whom a hundred and thirty-nine were captured. The British losses were fifteen men. For his services on this occasion, Haines was rewarded with a sword worth a hundred guineas. Thus fell Aden on the 19th January 1839; the first capture in the reign of Queen Victoria.

After the capture Haines remained behind as the first political agent. For fifteen years he carried on, and undoubtedly laid the foundation of British influence in Southern Arabia. He was a remarkable man and, although forgotten by the British like so many of our Empire builders, his name is still renowned amongst the hinterland Arabs. He and his officers were all of the Indian Navy with the notable exception of Lieutenant Western of the Bombay Engineers. This officer completed the amazing ditch and field works which can be seen to this day and which helped in the successful defence of the Rocks against three Arab attempts to take them. Western was an early martyr to the climate and died of sunstroke in 1840.

After his third failure to recapture Aden, Sultan Muhsin craved forgiveness and a subsidy of five hundred and forty-one crowns was granted him. Haines won over successive Sultans of Lahej to our cause and the reigning house of Lahej has been amongst the most loyal ruling families in the Empire. The present Sultan, H.H. Sir Abdul Karim Fadhl, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., was an honoured representative at the Coronation last year.

Haines managed to pursue a consistent policy of sympathetic treatment although his orders from the Bombay Government were consistent only in their inconsistency. His final downfall is tragic to relate. In spite of his repeated pleadings he was never given a trained staff. Eurasians employed in his customs department were guilty of defalcations and dismissed by him. A commission of inquiry arriving in 1853 discovered a large deficiency. Haines and his chief assistant were recalled to Bombay. Like Warren Hastings, Haines had to face his judges. He was tried twice in Bombay and acquitted, but ordered to pay the deficiency. As he was unable to do so he languished for six years in a debtors' prison, only to die in Bombay on the 16th June 1860 shortly

after his release. Such was the reward and end of a man who, in a most difficult position, had served the Empire long and faithfully.

Aden's wealth, population and importance increased gradually during the second half of the 19th century. One day the fleet of a friendly power called, the admiral and his officers were hospitably entertained to dinner. During the course of dinner a lady discovered the real purpose of the visit. A British ship was hurriedly despatched to the island of Perim. Great was the chagrin of the admiral when he reached the island to find the Union Jack already flying there. Such is the story, or legend, of our occupation of Perim. A few years later the other side of the harbour entrance known as "Little Aden" was purchased and some twenty years later, in 1882, it was found necessary to purchase further land, including Sheikh Othman, to take the overflow of population from the peninsula.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 greatly increased the importance of Aden as a coaling station. Latterly, Perim has been closed down and most of the ships which previously coaled there now coal at Aden. More important, however, is Aden's rise as an oil fueling station which, owing to cheapness due to the proximity of Persian oil, has been considerable. Now some hundred and seventy vessels call at Aden each month.

In the early eighties came the suggestion that Aden should be abandoned, at least during the hot weather, when it was so unhealthy; a place called Jabel Dubiyat, sixty miles from Aden and at an altitude of 6,000 feet being chosen as a suitable hill station. However, the suggestion does not seem to have been acted upon, as, to the author's knowledge, it has never been occupied. Somaliland is still the favourite place for those who want to get away from the Rocks in the hot weather. During the last two years, a political rest-house has been built at Dhal'a and this and the improvement of the road from Aden to take motor transport enables Europeans, includng ladies, to make visits to Dhal'a.

Provision of water has long been a problem for those who have occupied Aden. The Persians are reputed to have solved the difficulty in 575 A.D. by making the celebrated tanks, of which more anon. It is probable that the rainfall was much greater in those days; to-day it is too precarious for us to rely on this source. For many years the garrison existed on water condensed

from the sea, until seven wells were bored at Sheikh Othman, of which two are in operation, one supplying seven hundred gallons an hour from a depth of over 1,500 feet.

The political situation, also, has not always set an easy problem. British protection over the neighbouring Arab Sheikhs gradually extended, until in 1904 a commission fixed the boundary between the British and the Turkish spheres of influence. The commission finished its labours in 1907 when the garrison was withdrawn from the hinterland. Although the boundary was scrupulously observed by both sides there is little doubt that the withdrawal of the garrison made it easy for the Turks to intrigue with the Arabs, who began to think that we were not interested in the hinterland. The Imam of Yemen, our most powerful neighbour in these regions, was placed in a difficult position and in 1911 made a ten years' truce with the Turks, with the result that the situation at the beginning of the Great War was full of possibilities.

The War as it affected southern Arabia is particularly interesting as it shows how military activities must be dictated by political considerations which, in their turn, are affected by military successes or reverses. Whether or not we adopted the correct policy is open to argument but the reader can form his own conclusions from the facts which are here briefly related.

When war was declared with Turkey, her forces were estimated at one army corps in the Yemen. The Aden garrison consisted only of a detachment of Indian cavalry called the Aden Troop, one British battalion, The Lancashire Fusiliers, one Indian battalion, The 109th Infantry, and some coast defence, but no field or mountain artillery.

In November 1914 hostilities commenced when the 28th Infantry Brigade moving from India to Egypt landed near Sheikh Sa'id, drove the Turkish concentration inland and departed. Shortly after this the Brecknockshire Battalion, Territorial Army, relieved the regular battalion and the 23rd Sikh Pioneers reinforced the garrison.

By June 1915, it was obvious that a Turkish division was preparing to attack the protectorate. Its commander, General Ali Sa'id Pasha was assured of support from certain Arab Sheikhs. His opposite number, Major-General D.L.B. Shaw, commanding

the forces in Aden, decided on an active policy and accordingly sent the Aden Troop to the help of our faithful ally, the Sultan of Lahej. The Aden movable column, one thousand strong, had already been formed, the numbers available being limited by the necessity for finding garrisons for Red Sea islands like Kamaran, which had been taken from the Turks in June. The 23rd Sikh Pioneers were employed in repulsing a Turkish attack on Perim.

At 3 a.m. on the 4th July, the movable column set out to march the fifteen miles from Sheikh Othman to Lahej. By 7 a.m. the heat was exceptional, even for July. The troops, many of them unacclimatised, suffered terribly. Men began to fall out with heat stroke. By midday, owing to the thirst caused by the intense heat and fatigue by the heavy going, the column was almost incapable of further movement. Just at this time firing was heard from the direction of Lahej. This was the advanced guard, consisting of the Punjabi Mussalman company of the 109th Infantry and four ten pounder guns, engaging the Turks, who had descended on Lahej from the north simultaneously with our advance from the south. The column started on its way again, many more men falling out from heat stroke, and eventually reached Lahej between 4 and 5 p.m. in a completely exhausted condition. Its troubles however had only begun. Our loyal ally, H. H. Sultan Sir Ahmed bin Ali, K.C.I.E. of Lahej, had been putting up as much opposition as his limited forces permitted when unfortunately, in the confusion of the fighting, he was wounded by a party of the actual troops sent to his succour. His Highness was fleeing from Lahej to Aden at about 2 a.m. and, failing to answer the challenge of a post with orders to stop anyone passing along that road, was fired at and wounded. It was an unfortunate and unavoidable mistake. His Highness died a few days later in Aden after the amputation of his leg.

Just before nightfall the column moved to a position within a walled garden and prepared for the attack of the Turks. The camp in the garden was shelled vigorously and Turks and Arabs advanced to the attack. Only a hundred men of the Brecknockshires were capable of fighting and whilst they kept off the attack on the left, the 109th Infantry and the Baluchis counter-attacked. About this time news reached Lahej that all the camel drivers, on hearing the firing, had bolted. This unforeseen mishap meant that the little force in Lahej had lost all their reserve ammunition,

food and water, and in addition the guns of the 15 pdr. camel battery were left stuck in the sand four miles to the south.

The night wore slowly on and just before daylight the defenders noticed that the Turkish pressure was easing. Even so the situation of the force was critical and the commander decided that the position was untenable, and at 5 a.m. gave the order to retire. Meanwhile as many Ford cars as could be obtained were requisitioned by the staff in Aden, filled with ice and sent up. None of these ancient cars reached Lahej, either breaking down or becoming embedded in the heavy sand *en route*. As it happened it was fortunate that this did occur since the cars were a very welcome source of strength to the exhausted troops retiring along the so-called track. The Turks had made an excellent forced march from Ta'iz but were, as a result, just as exhausted as the British column. For this reason they did not press their pursuit, a stroke of luck for us as the plight of the troops, bad as it had been in the advance, was even worse during the retirement. They had fought all night and had had little food and practically no water. The Ford cars and camels sent out from Aden with food and water saved many lives. Nevertheless the column could only move slowly and did not reach Sheikh Othman until 9 a.m. on July 6th. The Turks continued their advance towards Aden slowly. But, as the British troops were insufficient to hold Sheikh Othman and transport difficulties were great, the column commander decided to abandon the town, which was occupied by the Turks on the 8th July, and accordingly retired to Khor Maksar to protect the new Admiralty wireless station. The Khor Maksar position was a comparatively strong one with both flanks protected by British warships. Here at last the enemy was held at bay and Aden, having lost its main water-supply at Shiekh Othman, fell back on its reserve of water condensed from the sea. We had started the war in southern Arabia, as in many other countries, with a considerable reverse!

However, an improvement was soon to take place. Reinforcements in the form of the 28th Field Brigade and two Territorial horse artillery batteries arrived from Egypt on July 18th. Major-General Sir G. Younghusband, the new commander, lost no time in attacking the Turks, and on July 21st advanced against Sheikh Othman and retook it. The brunt of the fighting in this action was borne by the 53rd Sikhs. Sir G. Younghusband fortified the

town and, on receiving further reinforcements from India, advanced northwards. On the way, he engaged a superior force near Waht, punished it and returned to Sheikh Othman the same night. A similar attack was made on Waht on the 25th September after which the 28th Field Brigade returned to Egypt.

Aden was now left with one British and four or five Indian battalions until the end of the war. The strength of the enemy averaged about six thousand five hundred, including Turks and Arabs. On the 12th January 1916 an attempt was made to advance on Lahej, but the attacking force was held up at Subar, six miles short of its objective, where the Turks held a strong position covering the town. The column was therefore compelled to return to Sheikh Othman. It was now decided to hold what we had and not to advance further.

The local war was peculiar in many ways. Many small engagements took place which can best be described as reconnaissances in force. Caravans were allowed through the lines by both sides. The Turkish general, Ali Sa'id Pasha, allowed this because he received transit dues, and we allowed it because friendly Arabs behind the Turkish lines would otherwise have suffered greatly. Naturally, owing to the caravans, both parties knew everything about each other and the war was a *pax in bello*.

Whether our policy of halting where we did was correct is a debatable point. We had driven the Turks from the settlement but practically the whole of the protectorate was in their hands. It is true that the war here was only a side show. There was always the danger of our commitments becoming greater and greater. There was no very definite object. The Yemen was still Turkish and the retaking of our protectorate and the conquest of the Yemen would have been a major operation. Our lines of communication would have been lengthened and troops, urgently required in East Africa would have had to be deflected to southern Arabia. On the other hand there are two outstanding facts which may have a lasting effect on our prestige in this part of the world.

The first is that after the unfortunate shooting of H.H. Sultan Sir Ahmed bin Ali, his cousin, H. H. Sultan Sir Abdul Karim Fadhl, the present Sultan of Lahej, succeeded. He had the mortification of having to remain in Aden throughout the war, whilst a Turkish general lorded it over his territory and a Turkish army lived on his land. Nevertheless he never lost confidence in

our cause in spite of our apparent inability to resume control of his protectorate.

Secondly, the Turkish general was never defeated. The war continued after the armistice. There was some difficulty in convincing Ali Sa'id Pasha that it was really over. His communications with Constantinople were always cut so he could get no verification and it was finally necessary for the British commander to refer to Constantinople and request the Turkish government to give orders to Sa'id Pasha. He surrendered with 2,500 men after an action in December 1918. The Turks were fed, clothed and equipped and repatriated as soon as possible. And the Sultan of Lahej was re-instated at Lahej by the General Officer Commanding with all due ceremony.

General Ali Sa'id Pasha was a Circassian and a sportsman. His final entry into Aden was in the nature of a triumph. Like General Von Lettow Vorbeck in East Africa he had always held his own, fought with clean hands and surrendered only because his country had been defeated.

After the war the garrison was gradually reduced to one British and one Indian battalion, a troop of Indian cavalry, coast defence guns and lights, and one flight of the Royal Air Force. The metre gauge railway which had been brought from India in 1916 and laid beyond Lahej was pulled up in 1929. It is still, however, shown on many maps as existing.

Later on, the Imam of the Yemen laid claim to much of the northern part of the protectorate and between 1919 and 1927 gradually encroached upon it. Air action finally induced him to withdraw his forces. The matter was eventually settled by the signing on the 17th February 1934 of the important treaty of San'aa. Under this treaty the Yemen was recognised as an independent kingdom and the boundary between British and Yemen territory finally fixed.

Before this, however, a big change had occurred in Aden. Up to 1928 the defence of Aden had been a responsibility of the Government of India but in that year the Imperial Government took over military control and the defence was entrusted to the Royal Air Force. Political control had already been vested in the Imperial Government since 1927. British and Indian battalions left the Rocks, the Aden troop was disbanded, the Indian ranks

being replaced by the Aden Protectorate Levies. This force, consisting of a machine-gun troop mounted on camels and two dismounted companies, was formed from a nucleus of the 1st Yemen Infantry. It consists of Arabs and a number of seconded officers of the British army, and is under the Air Ministry. The whole re-organization saved the taxpayer £100,000 a year.

Other important items of historical interest about this time were the visits in January 1933 of Haile Selaissie and in November 1934 of H.M. King Victor Emanuel of Italy. Under an old treaty the Italians were allowed to enlist Arabs from southern Arabia and have done so in considerable numbers for service in Italian Somaliland. The King of Italy was naturally interested in his farewell guard of honour which was furnished by the Aden Protectorate Levies.

Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of San'aa a considerable stir was caused by the arrival by ship at Aden of part of the Imam of Yemen's forces. The Imam was waging an unsuccessful war with Ibn Sa'ud and his garrison at Hodeida had deserted him. The force was interned at Aden, and at one time it looked as if troops would have to be sent to Hodeida to protect British nationals from lawless tribes. However, this was fortunately averted by the timely arrival of Ibn Sa'ud's forces.

During the Italo-Ethiopian war Aden had once again to support a large garrison. The single Royal Air Force squadron was increased to four and a half, including flying boats. The harbour, instead of containing an occasional Red Sea sloop or visiting cruiser presented a warlike scene with a varying fleet of approximately three cruisers of flotilla destroyers, four submarines, various sloops and numerous small craft. Once again the Crater saw an Indian Army battalion. This time it was The 5th Battalion (Pathans), 14th Punjab Regiment, less its detachment at Addis Ababa. The officers of this regiment used the empty harem portion of the Sultan of Lahej's Palace as a mess. The 9th (Mindon) Heavy Battery R.A. expanded and the Aden Anti-Aircraft Battery was formed from the existing section reinforced by two sections from Great Britain and two from India. Royal Engineer anti-aircraft searchlight units and Royal Corps of Signals reinforcements also arrived. By October 1936 the garrison was reduced to normal again and the ships in the harbour had left on their lawful occasions.

Finally mention must be made of the latest administrative changes. On April 1st, 1932, the administrative control of the settlement was transferred from the Bombay Government and Aden became a separate province under the direct control of the Government of India. Thus the chief executive officer, who was styled Chief Commissioner, Resident and Commander-in-Chief, had to serve two masters. He was responsible to the Government of India for the administration of the settlement and to the Colonial Office for the control of the protectorate. This state of affairs ended in April 1937, with the coming into force of the Government of India Act; the settlement's connection with India finally ceased, control of the whole area passed under the Colonial Office and the Chief Commissioner, Resident and Commander-in-Chief, Sir Bernard Reilly, became the first Governor. So ended a hundred years of British Rule.

"YOU CAN'T MIX OATS AND PETROL"

By "Museum Piece"

Officers of the post-war army must, by this time, be quite accustomed to the numerous well-worn clichés and catchwords which spring into being from time to time and which, though quite clear and understandable to their gifted originators, are quoted by all and sundry, many of whom you do not trouble to understand what they really mean. "Don't mix oats and petrol" is the latest, and sound advice as it may be to a young cavalry officer joining a regiment and confronted by the problem of feeding his horses, or to a harassed staff captain of a cavalry brigade wondering where he can carry the reserve petrol without contaminating the forage, it is doubtful if it will bear detailed examination when the composition of mobile troops for employment in undeveloped countries is considered. Where a network of macadam speed tracks exists, as in Western Europe, it is admittedly too obvious that the horse is an unnecessary drag on mobility. In the East it is questionable whether the horse is going to prove the impediment that it is painted.

Unfortunately, yet another cliché has arisen since the almost total mechanization of the British Cavalry. It is now commonplace to hear a British Cavalry officer of one of the unfortunate (?) regiments which have been deprived of their horses stating confidently: "Of course, it won't be long before the Greys and the Royals are screaming to be relieved of their horses. No one wants to be a museum piece." This statement is made by those very officers who fought tooth-and-nail to save their own horses.

One outstanding cavalry officer who was listening-in to an acrimonious discussion on the above lines asked the representative of a "museum piece," this time an Indian Cavalry one, what he proposed to do if armoured fighting vehicles appeared on the scene or in the face of gas.

"Body-line" bowling, perhaps, but an attack which unfortunately cannot be dismissed by the words "it is not cricket." The problem has got to be faced. If horsed cavalry re-organized as suggested below cannot establish a case for itself by proving that it can carry out certain vital tasks, not only satisfactorily, but better than purely mechanized cavalry, then it looks as if the odious nickname has come to stay "pending the supply of funds,"

the same old bugbear that strikes terror into the hearts of the most ardent and efficient reformers.

It is now proposed to discuss the difficulties of terrain which face the light tank acting independently in undeveloped countries and then discuss the tasks which might be allotted to mobile troops. Before doing so, the reader will have to be presented at the outset with what mechanization protagonists will certainly describe as a heresy.

This heresy, contrary to all preconceived military beliefs, is that horses and armoured fighting vehicles, or if it is preferred oats and petrol, should not only be mixed, but mixed within the same cavalry unit in the same manner as in the Russian Army. It is hoped to prove that horsed cavalry and light tanks are not supplementary but complementary, for purposes of warfare in undeveloped countries. The basis of the organization is that each regiment should contain one light tank squadron to three sabre squadrons, the latter organized as at present but with tripods for all light machine-guns.

There is yet one more heresy to follow, which may result in the heart failure of conservative cavalry leaders of the old school. It is the substitution of the pistol and short bayonet for the sword, the immense time now spent in training with the sword being utilised to produce revolver shots of the "Wild West" variety; men, in fact, who can shoot accurately mounted and be guaranteed to kill a dismounted man taking cover behind a rock or cactus bush or even in a trench. Tight putties must be replaced by loosely fitting canvas gaiters, which will allow the cavalryman to climb hills as efficiently as the infantryman, and spurs should consist of a very short, blunt metal protuberance let into the heel of the boot on the lines of a box-spur.

Dressed and armed as above the cavalryman may possibly present a drab picture on ceremonial parades, but he does not exist solely for the purpose once described by *Punch* as "giving tone to what would otherwise be an unseemly brawl."

The tasks of mobile troops have been frequently summarised in Training Memoranda, but at the risk of calling down more contumely from the high priests of mechanization, it is proposed to produce an even fuller list which, it is suggested, is made possible by this very admixture of oats and petrol.

These tasks, which this differently armed and equipped cavalry should be able to carry out are:

(*i*) Reconnaissance.

(*ii*) Protection.

(*iii*) Delaying action.
(*iv*) Seizing and holding ground pending relief by slower moving troops or to deny such ground to the enemy.
(*v*) To form a mobile reserve.
(*vi*) To participate in the battle by offensive action in direct or indirect co-operation with the main attack.
(*vii*) Exploitation and pursuit.
(*viii*) Special missions such as raids, the value of which has always been problematical.
(*ix*) Operations on the North-West Frontier of India.
(*x*) Internal security.

The list set out as above is a formidable one and looks rather similar to the advertisements of a patent medicine. Were it not for a conviction that cavalry reorganized on the lines suggested can carry out these tasks in undeveloped countries, this article would now come to an abrupt close, but it is continued in the hope of persuading the advocates of complete mechanization, and more particularly their converts, that there is still a use for horsed cavalry in war outside Western Europe. Converts are unfortunately often more enthusiastic in their beliefs than their missionaries for fear of the accusation of lack of faith, and so may be more difficult to convince.

Before examining these tasks in detail, a short summary of the types of terrain likely to be encountered and their possible effect on the mobility and action of mobile troops would not perhaps be out of place.

Wide plains with hard surfaces, no obstacles to movement and little water which are the dream of mechanization pandits and the obvious despair of horse soldiers. These are to be found in the western desert of Egypt and in portions of Mesopotamia. In Mesopotamia, it must be remembered, the elements of rain and flood are apt to lessen the importance of mechanization during the only months when fighting is humanly, or if it is preferred humanely, possible and the terrain alongside the rivers in this plain becomes a morass of mud. There are also in the vicinity of most of the rivers miles and miles of irrigation cuts which dear as they are to the heart of the horseman as small jumps and a source of water for thirsty horses, would scarcely be regarded with favour by the occupants of a badly sprung light tank. Tank movement would be slowed down practically to a halt, and crossing these raised channels might possibly have to be carried out in the face of an unaccommodating enemy with

well sited anti-tank weapons. The north of Mesopotamia conjures up other visions of the type of terrain to be encountered.

Broad, deep rivers and canals, across which horsemen pass with comparative ease, but which would prove most unpleasant obstacles to the light tank, *e.g.*, the crossing of the Lesser Zab, and the Tigris above Sharqat in October 1918, where the water in the ford came up over the top of the 18 pr. guns. But one can hear the mechanization convert saying: "General Cassels could have used the other bank of the Tigris for his turning movement." The reply is surely that it was purely fortuitous that it happened to be open, and that it was only the knowledge that it was completely impassable to horsed cavalry brigades on account of lack of water that led the Turks to leave it completely unguarded.

Palestine, with its rocky, precipitous mountain regions or fertile maritime plains, in both of which tank movement other than along well defined tracks and roads would be slower than that of the horse, and where these delightful water cuts, and what is still pleasanter for the horse soldier terraces and vineyards, exist. One has only to see one of these terraces about two feet deep to bring to mind the comment of a private in a British Infantry Battalion in possession of a token anti-tank flag in a flank locality which was being attacked by light tanks. "How many blinking rounds a minute do these anti-tank rifles fire as, so far, I have had seventeen aimed shots at *stationary* tanks." Perhaps it should be explained in this connection that although reconnaissance and orders for this attack by tanks and cavalry took two-and-a-half hours, the enemy battalion had been cunning enough to place their flank localities just beyond three 2-ft. terraces, which terminated a gentle slope down towards the position and which could not possibly have been detected other than by air photographs. These in the existing circumstances could not possibly have been made available, and that the cavalry regiment trotting a thousand yards in rear of the tanks with a view to relieving the latter on the objective, arrived still at the trot, before the tanks, must therefore be considered a fortuitous piece of misfortune.

The thought of rocks in Palestine unfortunately turns one's mind to portions of India such as the Deccan, where the movement even of horses cannot be carried out through many of the ridges faster than a walk or at best a fast zigzag trot. Oh, yes, replies the mechanization convert, "but tanks would go round." This is admittedly possible in some cases, but takes no account

of the rice fields. Horses can get through them slowly, but not tanks. Under the circumstances, a commander detailed to expel or delay a possible seaborne invader would be somewhat nervous, if his only mobile troops consisted of armoured fighting vehicles or truck-carried cavalry and infantry.

Then again the Deccan seems to be covered with mile after mile of scrub. An imaginary conversation between Major A.F.V. Convert and Major Museum Piece might well run as follows:

Major A.F.V.C.: "Look at that country—tanks can move through it just as quickly, if not quicker than cavalry, and it is not obsessed by the possible danger that there is a potential source of death lurking behind every bush."

Major M.P.: "Admitted, but how can you search all these bushes and ensure the security of the main body if each bush is really a potential danger? You will have to travel with your visors down? Can it be done with fifty tanks or won't it need some colossal number?"

Major A.F.V.C.: "Yes, but an enemy which would do that would be gambling with death—how are they going to get away?"

Major M.P.: "The same way as they may have come; by the flanks presumably, and it is not impossible that they may find at right angles to the axis of the advance a long, conveniently placed *nala* with few tank crossing places, on the far side of which they would site anti-tank guns."

Major A.F.V.C.: "But it is not cricket;" which was the sole argument that presented itself in defence of horsed cavalry, when first confronted by Major A.F.V.C.'s questions.

Perhaps an unbiassed reader will already agree that there is possibly something to be said for both sides.

But here Major A.F.V.C. plays his ace of trumps:

"Horsed cavalry are useless on the *North-West Frontier.*"

Major M.P.: "As constituted at present they are admittedly of little use, but dressed, armed and equipped as I suggest, what could they not do that you can do now? They will have some tanks to produce fire support, and at the same time dismounted and mounted men. Once long spurs and tight putties are abolished would it not be quicker to use cavalry supported by armoured fighting vehicles and mechanized artillery to piquet the moderately wide valleys, save the infantry the fatigue of getting out to these hills and so preserve them intact to take on all the more ghastly defiles.

They can gallop at least to selected dead ground at the foot of the hills, if not to some convenient shoulder on a spur, and continue the advance on foot. I hope you are not going to insult the infantry by suggesting that a cavalryman armed with the bayonet and properly trained is any less ugly a customer than the infantryman. Both arms might be insulted."

Major A.F.V.C.: "What about your led horses and your reduction in strength when dismounted?"

Major M.P.: "I thought you would say that—the led horses will be taken away to the safety of the road and led horse leaders act as road sentries. If you want more dismounted men to take the hill, you must use more and then do exactly what the infantry do, leave what is required on the hill and remove the rest. Those not required can remove the led horses of those left in the piquets, and these can be "ringed" in a safe place near the road and guarded by one or two men or road sentries."

Major A.F.V.C.: "How will these miserable horse soldiers get away? Surely you know the saying, that no spectacle is more pitiful than a dismounted cavalryman?"

Major M.P.: "Really—I think you are going too far in insulting the infantry. You surely do not think they will run away, down hill at that, faster than a cavalryman."

Major A.F.V.C.: "All right—but what about all the food required and these huge columns of transport?"

Major M.P.: "A good point, but cavalry in such warfare is moving slow and the marches are short. They must therefore carry more food on the horse. If infantry are saved the long treks to the foot of the hills by cavalry taking on some of them, piqueting the route should be quicker and less tiring. If you used mounted troops in this manner, the Pathan would surely find it harder to forestall you on hills further down the valleys. Like everything else on the Frontier there would be no routine use of cavalry for piqueting parts of the route. The Commander would ring the changes between the cavalry and infantry as it suited him. Would not our columns possibly get along quicker and so give more time for supplies to get through by day? Besides, aircraft can drop essential supplies in case of emergency."

Major A.F.V.C.: "You are the first cavalryman I have heard of who wanted to climb a hill."

Major M.P.: "I do not propose to do so; I hope I shall be able to send other people up; otherwise, I should never have raised the point. Besides you forget that an Indian cavalry officer accompanied an Everest Expedition. In any case we are fighting

for our existence, and you know how people stoop to conquer in such circumstances."

At this point Major A.F.V.C. might well be acquitted of justifiable homicide, and the conversation will now close.

It is now necessary to examine the question whether this re-organized Cavalry can carry out the varied tasks enumerated above.

Reconnaissance.—Various points have inevitably arisen during the discussion on terrain. It is a platitude to say that reconnaissance demands dispersion and detailed search, but can light tanks provide these two necessary ingredients of successful ground reconnaissance? Furthermore, will there ever be such a glut of light tanks as to be able to risk them running into ambushes of anti-tank weapons or concealed armoured fighting vehicle formations waiting to counter-attack, that India will be able to afford them for such tasks?

It is suggested that the mixing of horsed cavalry and armoured fighting vehicles inside the same unit provides:

(*a*) The necessary dispersion and power of detailed search.

(*b*) The mutual protection of each other, the cavalry being used to search country and protect the light tanks from ambushes, the light tanks protecting the cavalry against tank attack; providing at the same time an overwhelming threat to hostile reconnoitring troops, unless similarly organized with armoured fighting vehicles.

Together they should be able to drive in all kinds of hostile protective detachments and collect the essential "pin-pointed" information of paramount importance to the commander in rear. The tank wireless set can send back this detailed information obtained by horsed patrols. The cavalry, moreover, will provide the tank ground reconnaissance, and if tanks are contained in the unit, this reconnaissance will be done by professional as opposed to amateur tank liaison parties. When distant and rapid reconnaissance over suitable terrain is essential this might be considered a task justifying the risk of the loss of some tanks, whose wireless would again be of the greatest value.

Protection.—Protective reconnaissance will be similarly simplified. When the enemy is eventually met in such strength that the mobile troops cannot get on, suitable positions to assist the infantry forward might be seized with the assistance of light tanks

and held: or ground already occupied secured by the dismounted cavalry with confidence in their ability to resist attack by armoured fighting vehicles.

For rearguard work cavalry can hold ground, use their mobility and ability to conceal themselves and use covered approaches, even narrow ones, to bring overwhelming and sudden enfilade fire against the advancing enemy, whilst light tanks protect them from attack by armoured fighting vehicles; or, firing from concealed positions, make outflanking movements by hostile mobile troops more difficult.

As regards flank guards cavalry can secure the terrain in which tanks find movement difficult, the tanks being ready to deal with hostile tanks on ground suitable for attack. They would have a considerable advantage over the hostile tanks as they would be fighting over ground of their own choosing. Cavalry anti-tank weapons and a distribution of anti-tank mines should further simplify their task.

In outpost work cavalry must hold ground in anti-tank localities, ground over which hostile tanks can move being covered by anti-tank weapons, with tanks held in reserve for counter-attack or ambush on ground of their own choosing. Cavalry will provide the necessary standing patrols and night patrols before dawn.

Delaying action.—By judiciously ringing the changes and continually misleading and mystifying the enemy as to what he is likely to encounter next, *e.g.*, enfilade fire attacks by light machine-guns, long range fire ambushes, sudden counter-attack by tanks with or without cavalry, the mixed regiment should be capable of invaluable work, the tanks providing confidence in the ability to operate against hostile armoured vehicles.

Seizing and holding ground.—The same arguments apply as to delaying action and the action of cavalry in driving in the hostile protective detachments, but the inclusion of the light tanks does give the cavalry commander the option of using his tanks alone and well ahead if he considers the risk is justified.

To form a mobile reserve.—The value of a mixed regiment of this kind for stopping a gap in the defences, for prolonging a flank, or for counter-attack over all sorts of varying types of terrain is, it is suggested, self-evident.

Participation in battle.—It is not only conceivable but, it is suggested, probable that vital hostile localities on the flank and rear of hostile positions will be occupied and secured primarily with a view to defence against outflanking armoured vehicles. Attack on such localities by tanks would therefore be

suicidal. It is suggested that many occasions can be visualised where cavalry using their mobility and dispersion, and heavily supported by artillery and the fire of concealed tanks, could penetrate the crust of such localities and over-run the anti-tank defence, the tanks taking advantage of the temporary confusion of the enemy by pushing through and overwhelming less carefully co-ordinated anti-tank defence in rear. The commander would have to assess each case on its merit and decide whether he was prepared to accept the tank or the cavalry casualties.

For such operations cavalry need the most carefully organized training in clearing and consolidating localities, description of which would be outside the scope of this article. The pistol in the hands of men trained for many hours daily in its use would be of the greatest value in getting at hostile infantrymen taking cover behind low walls, cactus bushes, hedges, etc. It might possibly make the ranks in front feel a little insecure, but this would surely tend to make them close with the enemy as rapidly as possible.

Exploitation and pursuit.—It is suggested that the value of wide turning movements of hundreds of miles by mechanized units, whilst adhering to the doctrine of avoiding the parochial outlook, can be exaggerated. The distance to which a hostile force with modern weapons can be driven back by a force composed mainly of infantry must be calculable and limited. An attack hundreds of miles in rear, even supposing the enemy failed to destroy bridges and was completely surprised, must surely be regarded in the light of a raid rather than as enveloping pursuit, where the hostile forces are caught in the pincers between infantry advancing and mobile troops delaying. It is suggested that the distances to which the 11th Cavalry Brigade in Mesopotamia went at Khan Baghdadi and Shargat will still remain about the maximum, so long as the main portion of the Indian Army consists of infantry marching on their feet.

Special missions and raids.—Provided circumstances are favourable, here is undoubtedly a task on which fast moving tank formations have an undeniable advantage. Whether all these favourable conditions will be present it is impossible to foretell.

Operations on the North-West Frontier of India.—These have already been discussed in general terms by Majors A. F. V. Convert and Museum Piece.

Internal Security.—It is universally admitted that, except in cases of armed rebellion, tanks are the most unsuitable weapons for internal security duties. Cavalry by their mobility and power

to disperse, dismount, form cordons and carry out wide reconnaissance across all sorts of country are still of the greatest value.

The question of gas and its uses is so incalculable that it is difficult to grasp all its implications.

In the attack the enemy is obviously not going to spray with persistent gas those areas over which he hopes subsequently to advance. Well trained cavalry formations, not larger than a brigade, should be able to avoid low-flying gravity spray whilst on the move by using their mobility to gallop into the wind or, if a long way from the aircraft, away from it. Against bombs they are no more vulnerable than against artillery fire, again provided that they are trained to move widely dispersed in small parties. It is questionable whether an enemy would consider such small mobile targets worth while diverting his aircraft from their more important tasks of obtaining air superiority and bombing maintenance establishments which offer more tempting and less difficult targets.

Lastly, comes the low-flying attack against cavalry bivouacs. This again must be countered by dispersion and by moving bivouacs wherever possible after dark. An enemy would be optimistic if he hoped to confine his contamination to certain clearly defined areas by pressure as opposed to low-flying gravity spray.

As regards personal protection it is questionable if a cavalry soldier is as vulnerable to gas as an infantry soldier when on the move. When he detects gas contamination, provided he moves slowly, he should be able to pass through it without undue loss, if he carries the necessary bleaching ointment; in fact he can cross ground by application of the ointment, provided he washes the ointment off within half an hour, *i.e.*, he can cross a two-mile badly contaminated area without loss if it is not covered by fire. He is, it is suggested, invaluable for that very reason for carrying out gas reconnaissances.

But at this point, Major A. F. V. Convert makes his last attack. "How are you going to protect the horse from gas spray in bivouacs?" The answer is by concealment of bivouacs, by moving night bivouacs from their day localities and, lastly, by covering the horse over in a light oilskin and providing a gas mask for the animal. The horse will then be no more vulnerable than the man and the decontamination of his covering will present exactly the same problem as the man's covering.

The discussion of the effect of gas raises the interesting question as to why both the German and Russian Armies include large

numbers of horses in their establishments. This seems ever more astonishing when the fact is considered that the Russian Army contains many chemical warfare units and has studied the subject so thoroughly as to issue seventeen manuals on chemical warfare. The reasons must surely be that the Russians have realised the limitations of the tank in the face of anti-tank weapons in countries with indifferent communications and do not consider the danger of gas to the horse to be insurmountable.

It is felt that a discussion on the total mechanization of Indian Cavalry units cannot be complete without reference to the type of personnel now enlisted.

The *sowar* is essentially of the *zamindar* class. Education though steadily improving is still far below that of the British Army. Even the more highly educated British soldier finds it difficult to be fully conversant with map reading, machine-gunning, the use and upkeep of wireless sets and the care, maintenance and driving of armoured fighting vehicles. It is problematical whether the present type of *zamindar* in the Indian Cavalry would be able to overcome these difficulties. The remedy, alas, would appear to be to enlist a more educated type of man, but for this it will be necessary to go to the cities rather than the villages of India. The question must then arise whether these city-bred *sowars* will be able to give as good an account of themselves in action as the descendants of generations of fighting men.

Mechanical breakdowns must be frequent under the easiest circumstances in hot, dusty and sandy countries. It is easy to visualise the possibility of preventable breakdowns occurring in war if tanks are manned by any but the stoutest fighters.

It would, moreover, be impossible to prove whether these breakdowns were entirely genuine.

Every Indian Army officer must have experienced the difficulty of supplying signallers and machine-gunners to the headquarters squadron or company. If whole regiments are to be mechanized, it is easy to see the complications which might arise. On the other hand the supply of educated men of the right type to man one squadron of tanks within a regiment should be little more difficult than the supply of signallers and machine-gunners is to-day.

Suggested organization.—Some minor changes in uniform, armament and equipment have already been discussed; they are the substitution of loose canvas gaiters for tight putties, and the practical aboliton of the spur, so that the cavalrymen will be more mobile when dismounted, and able to climb hills; and the substitution of the revolver and short bayonet for the sword; the

former to enable cavalry to reach dismounted men behind cover; the latter for use at night, on the frontier and in dismounted action.

The major changes suggested are:

A.—That an Indian Cavalry regiment should consist of a headquarters wing, administrative group and signallers; one squadron of light tanks, which must carry anti-tank guns to deal with hostile armoured vehicles, three sabre squadrons, each consisting of three sabre troops and one light machine-gun troop of four guns, with tripods for fire on fixed lines.

B.—That an Indian cavalry brigade should consist of:

(*i*) A British cavalry light tank regiment to provide the offensive punch in the hands of the brigade commander;

(*ii*) Three Indian cavalry regiments organized as explained above;

(*iii*) A regiment of mechanized horse artillery, preferably carried in armoured trucks, rather than drawn by Dragons, for use on the Indian frontier in close support of the cavalry regiments.

A regiment has been included on the assumption that fifty light tanks will be as vulnerable to the fire of four anti-tank machine-guns as five hundred galloping and widely dispersed cavalrymen were to the fire of the two machine-guns which a battalion had in 1914.

(*iv*) One field troop chiefly mechanized but with sufficient mounted portions to be able to disperse when required in support of horsed cavalry, on which occasions they must obviously be as mobile as the cavalry they are accompanying.

Bridging material could be attached from army sources as required. A small quantity capable of getting a covering party rapidly across an unfordable river would be invaluable and would enable craft, which had been removed by the enemy to the far bank, to be collected and made up into heavy rafts for the carriage of guns, tanks and transport.

C.—The remainder of the brigade should be organized on the same lines as it now exists, but brought up to date by modernizing the veterinary section and providing dismounted men in lorries with long ropes for the evacuation of wounded horses.

The workshops would also need increasing to meet the extra demands of mechanization, and a petrol unit would be necessary. A decontaminating section might be formed by the addition of some pressure hose lorries on the lines of the equipment of a fire brigade.

D.—The addition to the British cavalry regiment of a number of amphibious medium tanks would obviously be invaluable and might be provided as funds became available.

A brigade organized as above would certainly need a second "Q" staff officer to cope with its administration.

Though admittedly more expensive, it is suggested that this force could perform efficiently all the tasks enumerated earlier in the article of which the most important must always be that of reconnaissance, for which purpose a purely mechanized brigade is most unsuitable.

The above organization has been based on the following premises:

Light tanks are more sensitive to ground than horsed cavalry and are unable to disperse sufficiently to carry out detailed reconnaissance or indeed even such ground reconnaissance as is a necessary preliminary to their own employment across difficult country at any time. They are not, however, sensitive to ordinary bullets and under favourable conditions are able to achieve great mobility and offensive power in the assault.

Horsed cavalry lack offensive power and are very vulnerable to the fire of all arms. On the other hand they have great individual mobility and power of dispersion, can carry out detailed reconnaissance, are almost insensitive to normal ground and can be trained easily to carry out the ground reconnaissance which is essential for the employment of tanks.

Horsed cavalry and light tanks are therefore not supplementary but complementary in all essentials, each being able to provide the other with the tactical requirements it lacks.

Over normal country in undeveloped parts of the world their mobility during continuous operations is about the same. They are therefore ideally fitted for close co-operation, one with the other.

A regiment composed partly of mounted squadrons, and partly of light tanks will have the virtues of both arms and the vices of neither. It is also surely the best organization to adopt during the present critical international period, as there will always be a large number of trained horse soldiers ready to take the field at any time with a trained reserve available.

Last, but not least, the Indian Cavalry would continue to be an attraction to the ambitious young officer who could join it to gain experience of modern weapons, whilst still being able to lead the happiest of lives on moderate means.

WALKING TOURS IN KASHMIR

By Major-General, R. J. Collins, C.B., C.M.G.

Having derived considerable benefit from reading one or two articles in the J.U.S.I. (India) on trout-fishing in Kashmir, it occurred to me that some notes on walking tours might not come amiss. While making no claim to be an expert, I have certainly learnt a good deal during two delightful holidays there.

A combined fishing and walking tour in Kashmir takes a lot of beating, as even the wildest enthusiast may tire of flogging the water for more than a week, especially if the fish are unresponsive. In 1937 we walked wherever possible from river to river, sometimes —as for example when moving to the Sind River from the Liddar valley—over the intervening mountain-range. Our party included fishermen, botanists and just plain walkers, and the holiday was all the more enjoyable for thus ringing the changes. The following hints will, I hope, save those contemplating similar trips, time, trouble and expense. I have often heard it said that walking in Kashmir is expensive if not prohibitive. That has not been my experience. In fact, if you move direct from one camping-ground to another, hire ponies for the few days' march entailed and camp for about a week, paying off the ponies at once and engaging fresh ones for the next move, it is cheap, actual living expenses being small. In any case, there are ways and means of keeping expenses down, as I hope to show.

Where to go

There are innumerable tours that can be made. Perhaps the best-known is that up the Sind valley to Sonemarg, an easy four marches, or three if one motors to the Wangat bridge. A week can well be spent at Sonemarg, in May or June one of the loveliest places in the world. The three streams that join to form the Bringhi, the Naubug, the Arun and the Desu, all flow through beautiful valleys, and can easily be explored from a central camp, say near Wiyul bridge. One can now motor to this, and in fact for some miles more up each of the valleys. There are also lovely walks to be found round Kokernag, where there is a charming Forest rest house. A visit to Verinag, for instance, where the Jhelum rises vertically from beneath a hill and flows through an old Moghul garden, makes a good day's expedition.

Slightly farther afield lies the Gurais valley, through which the River Kishenganga flows. This is three marches from Sonawain on the River Madmatti which cars, though not always lorries, can reach from Srinagar. This walk entails crossing the famous Tragbal Pass, some 11,400 ft. high, but the ascent by a well-graded path is easy. The Gurais valley rivals Sonemarg in beauty, either in June when the hills are covered with cream-coloured eremurus and the air is full of the aromatic scent of wormwood, or at the end of September when the silver birches and poplars are turning from green through bronze to gold, and the hills all round are covered with a powdering of fresh snow.

The Wangat valley, with its old Buddhist temples at Naranag, a day's march from Kangan on the Sind River, is also well worth a visit. Those prepared to face a stiff climb should walk from Naranag up to the sacred lake of Gangabal at the foot of Haramukh, and I will guarantee that they will find the effort well worth while. If that climb gives them a zest for more, they can go on over the shoulder of Haramukh down to the Erin and the Madmatti, two more lovely valleys. Or they can turn eastward, climb the Zagibal Pass (13,300) and come down into Gadsar, where there are two small mountain lakes, one a very beautiful shade of peacock-green. From Gadsar they can either return by Vishen Sar and Kishen Sar, two high lakes, to Sonemarg, or bravely face the Mashid Gali Pass (13,700) and, after a long and heart-breaking day, reach the River Kishenganga at Badogam.

From Badogam a delightful path follows the Kishenganga valley for some nine miles and then ascends the curiously named Achuh Chish Pass, a mere 11,400 ft.; passes north of Habkhatun, the conical mountain that dominates the Gurais valley and comes down at Chorwan onto the Gilgit road, which here follows the valley of the Burzil, with its deep bottle-green pools. From Chorwan one can either descend easily to Gurais or turn north and climb the Kumri Pass, 13,400 ft.—and a long, long climb it is. Thence, if you get there at dawn, you will be rewarded by a magnificent view of the ill-famed Nanga Parbat, only twenty-five miles off.

There is another lovely walk up the West Liddar from Pahlgam and over the Yamher Pass (13,400), with a rather steep descent to the Sind near Gund. But before leaving Pahlgam a day or two should be spent walking up the Shishnag or East Liddar, with its pretty upland valley, a perfect place in which to camp. While on the way up to the Yamher a halt should be made at Sekkiwas and a visit paid to the beautiful Tar Sar, another 12,000 ft. high lake.

There are also walks west of the Wular Lake, in softer and less wild and barren country, which has a charm all its own.

The above walks can be combined into a variety of tours suitable to one's pocket and to any period of leave.

When to go

It is hard to say which is the best time of year. In the spring the apricot-blossom fills the Vale of Kashmir with its foam of shell-pink and cream, the poplars are bursting into golden leaf, the iris is scattered over the fields and roadsides and the higher pastures break into a blaze of flowers as the snow melts. In autumn the lotus-flowers cover the lakes, the silver birch turns to gold, the chenars to every shade of red and purple, and the famous saffron-fields come into bloom on the Islamabad road. From the botanical point of view, there are more varieties of flowers to be found in the lower valleys in August and September; but from the 8,000 feet level upwards the greatest number will be found during July and August. It should however be remembered that many of the passes that I have mentioned are difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate before early August.

Planning a Tour

For the planning of a tour maps are essential, one-inch maps for choice, as it is not easy to read or to calculate distances with any accuracy on the quarter inch. The date of each map should be noted, as most are very antiquated, and tracks marked as fit only for coolies may to-day be good pack or even motor roads. The Route Book will also be found invaluable, though at times it passes without comment over some really rough ascents and descents. Its distances are, I fear, only too painfully accurate, though the steepness of the slope sometimes makes each mile feel like two. When crossing a pass of over 12,000 feet it is as well to allow a spare day, as rain may render the track temporarily impassable, at any rate with wet tents weighing double.

Dak bungalows and forest rest-houses can be booked in advance, though in the case of the former other travellers have a right to their share of the accommodation. The latter, too, may sometimes be commandeered over one's head by State officials. The forest rest-houses are nearly always delightfully situated and clean; but the *dak* bungalows vary greatly.

Transport

It is, of course, essential to the success of a tour that transport should be satisfactory. Personally I avoid the *tehkidar* whenever possible and make my own arrangements with the pony-men. When feasible I infinitely prefer ponies to coolies, but on some of

the passes the former cannot be used. On my last tour I arranged to pay as. 12 per animal for a normal march; as. 14 when a stiff climb was included, say a 3,000 ft. rise, and as. 6 for a rest day. It is more economical to make a circular tour, paying the pony-men off where they were engaged. Otherwise they are entitled to a half fare per day back to where they came from.

For a long halt, as for a week's fishing, it is advisable to make special arrangements. If the chance of picking up other loads is small, as for instance in the Gurais valley, the men will often gladly accept Re. 1 per pony for the week, and it is simpler, better for the ponies, and usually cheaper to keep them on. The men too can then help in getting wood and water. After a month's walking I gave each man Rs. 2 *bakhshish,* and an extra Rs. 2 to the head man. The proportion of men to ponies was one to five.

When it is cold or wet, it is advisable, other conditions being equal, to choose a camp not far from a Goojah settlement, as their huts provide shelter for the pony-men, who otherwise spend the night in the open air, not too pleasant above 10,000 ft. An occasional issue of matches and cheap cigarettes will do much to raise their spirits when their outlook is gloomy.

To take a riding-pony is a wise precaution; less to avoid fatigue than in case of a strained ankle or blistered foot, which might otherwise mean an enforced halt for several days. In any case the pony can carry mackintoshes or coats; and one's Indian servants are more efficient at the end of a long day if they have ridden for a time. I paid Rs. 25 for the month, with Rs. 5 to the owner, who helped a good deal with the camp.

Loads

For ponies it is as well to work to a two-maund* load. It is a wise precaution to allow one spare animal for every ten loaded, but do not be surprised if you find him loaded up. It is best to leave the distribution of the loads to the pony-men, who know to a pound or two what each animal can carry; but, to save time and trouble both when loading up and when coming into camp, insist on all tents and personal kit being put on one group of ponies, the mess tent, chairs, tables, crockery and food-boxes on another, and the servants' tents, kit and cooking-gear on a third. You will be surprised how difficult it is to get this simple common-sense arrangement carried out as the days pass. As a rough guide I have given in Appendix A a table of our loads for a tour. Some-

*160 lbs.

thing of the kind must be made out before you can calculate how many ponies you want and even then it is as well to have one or two extra standing by the first day, since bulk as well as weight has to be taken into consideration, not to mention the pony-men's food if you are going off the beaten track.

Food

Food must, of course, depend upon individual tastes and upon how much you are prepared to spend on luxuries. Again, only as a guide, I have given in Appendix B a list of stores for a party of three for three weeks. This is on a somewhat luxurious scale. Arrangements for daily supplies are made with the *lambardar* of each village. Milk is usually As. 2 per seer, and small sums are asked for wood, help in clearing the camp and odd jobs. Sheep can generally be obtained locally.

With regard to supplies, it must be realised that one's appetite rises above normal as one climbs higher and that this must be catered for. More sweet things are needed too as you go higher up; good honey can be bought from many of the villages, but sweets and chocolate should be taken, the latter from Nedou's Hotel, which makes it fresh. Arrangements can be made with an agent to send out vegetables and fruit from time to time, apples and pears may be bought in Srinagar in season and are a joy on trek, but should be specially packed in a wooden box. All stores should be personally inspected before starting to ensure that they are fresh, as Srinagar is full of old tinned food which is offloaded on the unwary.

Cars and Lorries

Motorable roads are steadily spreading over Kashmir, too much so to some minds, as one feels sad to think of the lovely valleys being desecrated by ramshackle buses. Still, motors and buses are useful in getting quickly to the more unsophisticated country. For instance, one is now saved that first dull march up the Sind valley. With care and skill trailers can be taken over nearly all the so-called roads, but it is as well to seek the advice of the experienced in Srinagar. The appalling price of petrol in Kashmir must also be taken into account. One last word of warning. A sudden spate and the washing away of a bridge may mean that a car on the wrong side is held up for weeks. This happened to a friend of mine last year and, having no driver, he was in a quandary. He had to return home by train and have his car driven down later by a driver of whose skill he was completely ignorant. A driver is a great asset, as camp may be some distance

from the road. Without one it is usually advisable to pay a villager a few annas daily to act as *chowkidar.*

Medical

A small medicine-chest is essential. Iodine-pencils and a good supply of Elastoplast are always in demand for cuts and blisters. Constipation seems a common complaint at higher altitudes, and should be guarded against. After a long day or a stiff climb five grains of aspirin on going to bed is valuable in reducing stiffness. Some people find difficulty in sleeping above 10,000 ft., and an innocuous soporific like Soneril comes in handy for dealing with this. Mosquito-nets should be carried, as though they are not often required there are dangerous areas.

Apart from personal medicines I always carry a supply of extra bandages, antiseptics, quinine, aspirin and "No. 9s." Nothing puts one so quickly on good terms with the local Kashmiri or ensures the provision of porters, ponies, wood and milk so well as a little attention to his sick. The position of the villagers is often pitiable, as they may be two or three days' march to the nearest dispensary.

Miscellaneous Hints

It is essential to see that one's tents are waterproof, as a leaking tent can spoil both one's possessions and one's temper. It is nearly as necessary to see that the servants' tents are also waterproof, as no cook will produce a high-class meal when wet and cold. We took an 80-lb. tent each, in which we could double up when necessary. As a mess-tent we had a small double-fly marquee for a party of five, and on wet nights when no other shelter was available the pony-men slept in this; and their saddles could be kept dry under its outer fly. Pegs seem to get lost and broken easily and a supply of spare ones should be taken. Incidentally, if a little trouble is taken at first to make the pony-men and Kashmiri servants pitch the tents properly, much damage to tents and loss of time and pegs will be avoided. Drains should be dug whenever the sky looks at all threatening.

Yakdans are far better than suitcases, being stronger and making better loads. These can be bought cheaply in Srinagar.

We took Roorkee chairs and a patent collapsible table made of three-ply. For rough work five-ply would be better. The Roorkee chairs need to be carried in a bag to prevent pieces being lost.

A "Lilo" can be taken, but a modern tubular steel camp-bed weighs very little and is a great deal quicker to put up.

At least one Petromax lamp should be taken for the mess-tent. This should be carefully packed in a box, with the necessary spare mantles. *Bhutties* should be carried by the servants to reduce breakages.

A pre-war entrenching tool, often obtainable for a few annas in the bazaar, is most useful for digging drains.

A supply of drinking-water should always be carried in petrol-tins in case the water at the next camp has to be boiled. A load of firewood should also be taken; and for the higher camps one or two *sigris* and some charcoal are welcome additions.

Rain comes suddenly, and it is advisable always to keep one's bed covered with a valise or a waterproof sheet in case of a leaking tent.

As to clothes: Mackintoshes are necessary. For the rest, shirts and shorts, or trousers, with several woollies, preferably cardigans, which are easy to put on and off while on the march, and can be tied round the waist when not worn. A scarf and gloves are needed. In the evening a greatcoat and thick clothes will be wanted—corduroy trousers were worn by most of our party—and, above all, warm socks and slippers or Gilgit boots; and lastly, a hot water bottle for bed. One pair of nailed boots or shoes is essential in case of snow; though these can be rubber-heeled. For the rest, hard composition rubber is good. I always walked in army socks. *Chaplis* are very well for those who are used to them; but novices will be wise to keep to their heavy shoes or boots.

I brought my own cook, bearer and sweeper; and all these must be fitted with good shoes, boots or *chaplis* and made to break them in first. They should also be given a government blanket, a sweater and a thick coat. I engaged two Kashmiri servants, one of whom was a factotum to run the camp, get coolies, interpret, pitch and strike camp. He was paid Rs. 20/-, and Rs. 5/- food allowance, and given a pair of *chaplis*. The second was an assistant at Rs. 15/- and extras as above. He hewed wood, drew water, did the baths and carried lunch.

Letters should be sent c/o Postmaster, Srinagar, who can be relied upon to forward them, and never to one's agent, who cannot. They should be sent on to local Post Offices, to the postmasters of which it is advisable to write before one's arrival. Letters can be fetched to camp by a *dak* cooly at as. 6 to 8 per day. He should always be given a little money in case of payment due on parcels or tax on letters.

You can hardly have too many thermos-flasks. Casualties amongst them seem to be severe however carefully they are looked after.

A lunch-basket with carefully-made carrying-straps is essential, and should be capable of holding a light lunch for the party as well as extra woollies and a book or two. With a midday halt for a meal and a rest one can generally time one's arrival at the new camp to coincide with that of the transport. This always seems slow in starting, but ponies at any rate, once off, maintain a steady pace without a halt for any march under twelve miles, and thus soon catch one up.

Khud sticks are a great help, especially when one has to drop three to four thousand feet straight on end, for they save the knee and leg muscles. They should be stiff and not too light, and the steel tip should be securely fastened and not too sharp.

The cheap blue army *dhurrie* is invaluable, not only by the bedside in a tent, but for protecting more fragile articles like folding table when on pack. Army waterproof sheets are equally useful, as thrown over a load they will keep it dry, and in camp can be rigged to make a useful shelter for the cook when at work. A repair outfit should be taken, especially if one intends to go far afield. It should contain such things as a screwdriver, hammer, screws and nails of various types, as well as copper wire, thread and adhesive tape for splicing, binding, etc.

APPENDIX A.

Table of Loads

Rough distribution of loads for a party of 5 with 7 servants, carrying 15 days' food for party and 10 days' for servants and pony-men.

Loads light in view of crossing three passes over 13,000 ft. high.

		Ponies.
5 tents (80 lbs.), less poles and pegs.		2½.
Poles and pegs for same.	..	1½.
1 dining-tent, poles and peg.	..	1½.
5 bedding-rolls	...	2½.
5 yakdans, tables, beds and chairs	...	3.
2 store yakdans.	...	1.
Petrol, oil, water and miscellaneous yakdan.	...	1.
Crockery.	...	½.
Cook's kit, oven, etc.	...	1
Kits of 7 servants.	..	3.
Tents for servants.	...	1.
Food „ „	...	1.
2 Latrine tents.	...	1.
Rods, fishing-gear, 4 dogs' kit, etc.	...	½.
	...	21.

Say 23 ponies, allowing 2 spare.

Appendix B

List of Stores for 3 people for 3 weeks

2	7-lb.	bags	Sugar.
3	,,	,,	Flour.
9	½-lb.	tins	Butter.
2	2 ,,	,,	Oatmeal.
2	2 ,,	,,	Golden Syrup.
3	1 ,,	,,	Marmalade.
6	1 ,,	,,	Jam.
3	1 ,,	,,	Cheese.
3	1 ,,	,,	Sausages.
3	2 ,,	,,	Biscuits.
3	22 ,,	,,	Fruit.
4	¼ ,,	,,	Ideal Milk.
1	1 ,,	,,	Cornflour.
1	½ ,,	,,	Baking Powder.
1	½ ,,	,,	Paisley Flour.
4		,,	Sardines.
1	½ ,,	,,	Cocoa.
4	1 ,,	,,	Coffee.
1	1 ,,	,,	Tea.
1		,,	Cerebos Salt.
1		,,	Mustard.
1		pkt.	Macaroni.
4	½-lb.	,,	Chocolate.
1		,,	Sunlight Soap.
1		,,	Lux.
2		,,	Matches.
1		bot.	Anchovy Sauce.
1		,,	Worcester ,, .
1		,,	Vinegar.
1		,,	Salad Oil.
1		,,	Vanilla.

1 bar Household Soap.
4 galls. Kerosene Oil.

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

THE ARMY IN ENGLAND

Territorial Field Army

On the 10th October the Secretary of State for War announced a complete reorganization of the Territorial Field Army. Under the Haldane scheme there were fourteen Territorial Force divisions. In future, there will be eighteen divisions, of which five will be anti-aircraft formations. The reorganization will affect both units and formations.

Unit Changes

Unit changes will be:

(*i*) The reduction of the infantry brigade from four battalions to three and the introduction of the modern organization, already in being in the Regular Army and based on the light machine-gun battalion in place of the old mixed battalion.

(*ii*) The introduction of machine-gun battalions.

(*iii*) The adoption of the new artillery organization of field regiments, batteries and troops.

(*iv*) The re-equipment, or conversion, of certain existing units to provide cavalry light tank regiments, anti-tank and anti-aircraft regiments R.A., tank and motor cyclist battalions.

Formation Changes

Territorial Field Formations will be reorganized to provide:

(*i*) Nine divisions, organized on the same pattern as Regular Army divisions, each consisting of three brigades of three battalions and divisional troops.

(*ii*) Three divisions of a new pattern, each of two brigades of three battalions and divisional troops. These divisions will mobilize as motorised divisions and will be given increased transport in peace. Each will include a motor cyclist battalion.

(*iii*) The units earmarked to form a Mobile Division on mobilization, though no Mobile Division headquarters will be formed in peace.

(*iv*) The necessary corps and army troops, most of which are already in existence but to which will be added: tank battalions, anti-tank and anti-aircraft regiments.

No existing unit is to be disbanded and Territorial divisional boundaries will remain the same. Two Yeomanry brigades and ten regiments of horsed cavalry will still be at the disposal of the Army as a whole to form a reserve of horsed cavalry.

The proposed reorganization will absorb all existing infantry battalions of the Territorial Army, which will be given a similar organization to the Regular Army.

Auxiliary Territorial Force

His Majesty has approved the raising of a new Women's Auxiliary Territorial Force with the object of freeing men for combatant duties in emergency. The number of women required initially is 25,000 and the categories to be raised will include motor drivers, clerks, cooks, orderlies and women for general duties. Women will be required to attend ten drills a year and camp for between one and two weeks in alternate years. Particulars can be obtained from Territorial Army drill halls.

Section "E," Army Reserve

The number of warrant and non-commissioned officers required by the Army on mobilization; especially for units which do not exist in peace, has for long been in excess of those which could conveniently be provided from peace establishments of existing units, from which they could ill be spared in any case. To meet this deficiency the Army Council have introduced a new section to the Army Reserve. Section "E" will be open to pensioned warrant and non-commissioned officers, provided they are resident in the United Kingdom and medically fit. Pensioners who have been away from the colours for over four years will not be eligible to enlist.

Enlistment into Section E and re-engagement will be for a year at a time, with pay at 9*d*. a day. Every man will be allotted to a specific mobilization post, and when he is called out will draw his pension concurrently with his pay. Applications to enlist in this section from serving warrant and non-commissioned officers should be submitted through commanding officers of units.

Officers' Emergency Reserve

The object of the Officers' Emergency Reserve is to enrol men of middle age who possess technical, academic or other qualifications and who are prepared to present themselves for military service in national emergency. Their names, addresses and qualifications will be registered at the War Office and there will be no limit to enrolment. Among the various qualifications required are engineering of all sorts and such occupations as architects, chartered accountants, barristers and solicitors, dentists, chemists, journalists and customs officers. Men proficient in foreign languages, or with a knowledge of sea or rail transport, or of foreign countries, will be particularly acceptable. Copies of application forms may be obtained from command and area headquarters, Territorial Army units or direct from the War Office.

Warrant Officers' Class III

About a thousand non-commissioned officers were promoted to Warrant Officer, Class III, on the 1st October. They were the first of those men from the ranks, of special character and ability, promoted to command platoons and equivalent units hitherto commanded by subaltern officers. Warrant Officers, Class III, will not only be trained in tactics, the use of weapons and administration as lieutenants have been in the past, but will be available for a host of miscellaneous duties such as regimental and garrison boards, courts of inquiry, orderly officers, the handling of money and the paying of the men. The new title of these officers is "Platoon" (or Section, etc.) Sergeant-Major.

Infantry Nomenclature

A new nomenclature has been introduced to denote the three different types of infantry. The home service battalions of the King's Royal Rifle Corps and the Rifle Brigade are now motor battalions. Units organized as machine-gun battalions are designated as such, their depots being termed machine-gun depots. The remaining rifle battalions are called infantry battalions.

THE ARMY IN INDIA

The Chatfield Committee

The expert Committee on Indian Defence, 1938-39, which commenced its sittings in New Delhi in November was composed of: Admiral of the Fleet—Lord Chatfield, chairman; Sir Ernest

J. Strohmenger; Major-General Sir B. N. Sergison-Brooke; Air Vice-Marshal C. L. Courtney and Major-General C. J. E. Auchinleck. The secretaries and assistants to the Committee were Mr. S. K. Brown, India Office; Mr. M. J. Dean, Air Ministry; Paymaster Captain R. C. Jerram; Mr. A. J. Newling, Finance Department of the War Office; and Major P. R. Antrobus, R. E., General Staff, India.

The terms of reference of the Committee are:

"Having regard to the increased cost of modern armaments, to the desirability of organizing, equipping and maintaining the Forces in India in accordance with modern requirements, and to the limited resources available in India for defence expenditure, to examine and report in the light of experience gained in executing the British rearmament programme how these resources can be utilised to the best advantage, and to make recommendations."

It is expected that the Committee will complete its report by about April this year.

Promotion Examinations

Certain major changes in the syllabi of officers promotion examinations are to be introduced in March 1939. The changes in the examination for promotion from lieutenant to captain are of a permanent nature, those in the examination for promotion from captain to major are temporary, pending the establishment of an officers tactical school referred to below.

Lieutenant to Captain

The syllabus for the promotion examinations from lieutenant to captain will be:

(*a*) A two-day practical examination in tactics and administration, syllabus as detailed in King's Regulations, 1935.

(*b*) (*i*) Part I.—Organization and Administration; a written paper as detailed in King's Regulations, 1935.

Part II.—Military Law, as detailed in King's Regulations, 1935.

(*ii*) Development and Constitution of the British Empire and Imperial Military Geography, syllabus as detailed for captains to major in King's Regulations, 1935.

Captain to Major. (Pending introduction of Tactical School.)

(*c*) A two-day practical examination in tactics and administration, syllabus as detailed in King's Regulations, 1935.

(*d*) (*i*) Part I.—Organization and Administration; a written paper as detailed in King's Regulations, 1935.

Part II.—Military Law, as detailed in King's Regulations, 1935.

(*ii*) Development and Constitution of the British Empire and Imperial Military Geography as at present.

(*iii*) Training, as detailed in King's Regulation, 1935.

The changes involved in the new syllabi are the abolition of the written papers in military history and tactics. The study of military history will in future be conducted under Command arrangements during the individual training season and will be based on the campaign set for study in the hot weather. The object of the changes is to abolish the somewhat academic features, especially in the tactical papers, of written promotion examinations.

Tactical School for Officers

The institution of a Tactical School for captains and the abolition of the Senior Officers' School at Belgaum have been approved in principle by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. It is hoped to open the former in 1940, in which event the last course at the Senior Officers' School will take place in the autumn of this year.

Object of the School

The objects of the new Tactical School will be to:

(*i*) disseminate sound tactical principles as laid down in the official manuals, and so ensure uniformity of method in their application throughout the Army;

(*ii*) teach officers how to instruct and give them practice in the preparation and conduct of tactical exercises;

(*iii*) instruct officers in the administration of a battalion or equivalent unit, according to the arm of the Service to which they belong;

(*iv*) give officers of all arms an opportunity to exchange ideas on matters connected with the training and administration of units, and

(*v*) test the fitness of individual officers for promotion to field rank.

Officers to Attend

All combatant officers of the Indian Army and of the British Service in India (unless they have passed through an equivalent school at home), who have not passed the Junior Wing of the Staff College will attend. It is anticipated that there will also be a limited number of vacancies for officers of the Indian Medical Service and Indian Army Ordnance Corps. A regular officer who fails to qualify on a course will be permitted to attend a second course, should such attendance be in the interests of the Service.

Length and Scope of the Course

The scope and syllabus of the course will be based on that at the Senior Officers' School and will be:

Theoretical tactical instruction (lectures, discussions and model demonstrations);

Practical tactical instruction (the setting and conducting of T.E.W.Ts. and solution of tactical problems on the ground and on paper);

Unit administration in peace;

Law;

Maintenance in war; and

Outside lectures and lectures by student officers.

Indian General Service Medal

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve of a new medal being struck to commemorate military operations in or on the frontier of India, to take the place of the medal instituted in 1909. The new medal will be known as the Indian General Service Medal, 1936, and will have a distinctive ribbon with khaki centre, flanked on each side by a narrow white stripe and edged with broader green stripes.

Vacancies at the Senior Officers' School

Vacancies at the remaining courses at the Senior Officers' School, Belgaum, for British Service officers will be allotted to non-p.s.c. majors commissioned before the 31st December 1921 and having at least eighteen months' service in the rank. About fifty vacancies remain to be allotted this year.

British Service Staff Officers

The tenures of staff appointments in India of British Service officers were reduced to three years on 1st August 1938. An officer who had completed three years on that date will finish out his

original tenure; an officer who had completed between two and three years will be required to vacate on the 1st August 1939.

As regards furlough, an officer who, on the 1st August next will have—

(*i*) completed less than three years will be entitled to a total of four months' furlough from his appointment,

(*ii*) completed three years, but less than three and a half years, to a total of five months' furlough, or

(*iii*) completed more than three years and six months to a total of six months' furlough,

combined in each case with any privilege leave which may be due to him.

Indian Army Promotion

With a view to coming into line with the new terms of service in the British Army, it has been decided that promotion in the Indian Army will in future be:

Second-lieutenant to lieutenant	...	at 2¼ years' service.
Lieutenant to captain	...	at 8 years' service.
Captain to major	...	at 17 years' service.

No change in the system of promotion to senior ranks will be made.

Furlough Accommodation

Warrant officers, N.C.Os. and men can be accommodated at the Soldiers' and Airmen's Christian Association Soldiers' Home at Agra for Rs. 2/- a day. Accommodation for married families is available at Rs. 2/8 a day. Applications should be made to the Superintendent, 201 Station Road, Agra.

Services Sports Diary

The Services Sports Diary, 1939, is on sale in two editions, at 2*s.* 6*d.* and 6*s*, with postage at 5*d.* a copy.

The publisher is the Secretary, Army Sports Control Board, 59 Palace Street, London, S.W. 1.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

THE NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION

DEAR SIR,

May I draw the attention of your readers to an organization which plays an important part in our national defence.

The 1938 Bisley meeting of the National Rifle Association was the seventy-fifth of a series which has suffered but a single break, the four years of the war, since its inauguration in 1860. These annual meetings are sometimes regarded as merely sporting affairs but they are more than that since they provide training for defence and opportunities for intercourse between citizens from many parts of the Empire, as well as facilities for taking part in the interesting pursuits of rifle and revolver shooting and clay-bird shooting with a smooth-bore gun. Bisley, moreover, provides competitions which it is a distinction to win and so focusses the attention of marksmen throughout His Majesty's dominions on the latest developments in rifled fire-arms. One often hears it said, and truly, that Bisley is the "Mecca of the marksman."

The National Rifle Association owed its foundation in no small measure to a nation-wide feeling of insecurity following on the muddles of the Crimean War and in the words of Lord Elcho, one of its prominent founders, its object was "to make every man a skilful marksman and every citizen a soldier." Officially the Association was intended to "give permanence to the Volunteer Corps and to promote rifle shooting throughout Great Britain:" and when it grew to become the parent organization fostering rifle shooting in the British Empire, the words "Great Britain" were changed to "the King's Dominions." To attain their ends, the early members of the Association decided to convene an annual competition extending over several days and it was planned to hold the "Rifle Derby," as it was called, in a different part of the country each year, with every third meeting in Scotland. But the enormous amount of equipment of a semi-permanent nature required on large rifle ranges soon proved the idea of a movable meeting to be impracticable. Still, training in shooting immediately evoked enthusiasm and throughout the sixties the strength of the Volunteers was maintained at about 120,000 officers and men. In those days the annual shooting

meeting was wound up with a field day or review; for example, in 1861 there was a review of twelve thousand volunteers witnessed by sixty thousand spectators.

The foundation and progress of the Association were due to public spirit, and although the Association now receives a grant from, and is closely related to the State, it has never been controlled by a Government department. To-day His Majesty is patron, H.R.H. The Duke of Gloucester is president, and many of the *ex officio* vice-presidents hold high rank in the Navy, Army and Air Force. The Secretaries of State for the Dominions and Colonies and the High Commissioners in London of the Dominions and India are invited to become *ex officio* vice-presidents and to act as members of council as a matter of course.

The main activities of the Association are directed towards developing proficiency in the use of small arms for purposes of national defence, and the competitions are kept constantly under review so that they shall remain in conformity with advancing military requirements. For consultative purposes the Association has access to the civilian and professional heads of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, the naval and military Officers Commanding-in-Chief at home stations and the Lords Lieutenants of Counties, in their capacity as presidents of Territorial Army Associations.

The first annual shooting meeting of the Association was held on Wimbledon Common in 1860 and for the next thirty years the venue remained the same. But by 1890 the "Rifle Derby" had outgrown the accommodation available at Wimbledon and the meeting was changed to Bisley. In the same year the Association was incorporated by Royal Charter. How great has been its development is shown by the following figures. The programme of the meeting in 1860 contained only nine separate events and provided for sixty-seven prizes, forty of which—to a total value of £1,288—were open to "all comers" and twenty-seven—valued at £950—reserved for volunteers. The competitors numbered seven hundred and twenty "all comers" and five hundred and ninety-four volunteers, while the entrance fees amounted to £1,380. Last year there were one hundred and twelve events and over six thousand prizes. These prizes were presented by the Association and many private donors and took the form of cash, cups, medals and badges of merit to the value of £10,723. To that figure must be added £8,805, the value of the permanent challenge cups

and trophies which winners retain in their keeping for twelve months. Forty-four thousand five hundred competitors took part and the entrance fees amounted to £13,598.

On the inception of the Rifle Club movement in 1900 the National Rifle Association undertook, at the invitation of the War Office, to organize the clubs; and of the many rifle clubs existing to-day in the Empire, there are four hundred and fifty in the British Isles and fifty overseas affiliated to the Association. Every year the Association presents these affiliated clubs with some six hundred and fifty medals and badges for proficiency in shooting, as well as two hundred odd certificates.

The encouragement given by the Association to young citizens may be gathered from the fact that between thirty and forty thousand boys, between the ages of twelve and nineteen, compete annually for that coveted prize, His Majesty the King's Trophy.

Yours faithfully,

T. W. MACALPINE.

DEAR SIR,

The other morning, while I was having my breakfast, there entered a rather heated and slightly excited young officer who remarked, "You know, I do not think they will ever get this new timing."

I saw looks of consternation flit across the faces of my fellow breakfasters; whether this was due to a sense of outrage at this military solecism or to their own ignorance of the new timing I shall never know. I had, myself, spent part of my morning watching the adjutant, the jemadar-adjutant, a man with a drum and the subedar-major, standing slightly apart as if to dissociate himself from my responsibility, drill ten naiks. The parade did not seem to be going well, except for the drum, and I passed on, only to hear of the result later at breakfast.

What had happened was that after a year of very active field service the commanding officer had decided that the timing of the rifle exercises was too fast, and a slightly reduced timing was to be introduced. Now, I can assure you that the time, damning and devotion to duty spent on learning this new timing of rifle exercises ran into many hours. The other day this unit returned after a year of active service, about three weeks before the New Year's Day parade. What was wanted, of course, was a few weeks' rest for the men, a rest of mind and body from all things military, as far as that is ever possible, a rest which would have been of the greatest value to fighting efficiency. But no, we have always maintained a very high standard on the parade in question, and so it was decreed—and rightly so—"to get down to it." It actually rained on the great day and to everyone's unconcealed joy the parade was cancelled.

You will realise by this time that I think too much thought and time are spent on drill. In these days of rapid modernization and new weapons there is hardly enough time to teach all that is needed to turn a unit into a reasonably efficient fighting machine for war. There is no branch of training which makes for fighting efficiency in which drill of some sort is not required, if a soldier is to be proficient in the arms he must use. In battle a soldier should be able to use all his weapons intelligently and automatically, and nobody will deny that to reach such a standard a considerable amount of drill is required; and with drill discipline is naturally acquired.

There has been a great deal heard lately about new drill. Let there be a new drill, with no half-hearted measure about it, and let it be the minimum. A soldier should be smartly turned out and have a soldierly bearing. He should be able to march in fours, turn his head smartly to the right and left and salute; stand in line and have his arms inspected, slope and present arms. What more is wanted? But believe me, in spite of it all, there will still be harassed adjutants trying to get the "timing" right. "Bless them."

Yours faithfully,
SPERO MELIORA.

DEAR SIR,

A recent India Army Order, No. 872 of 29th August 1938, dealt with the revised rules for British income-tax and their application to officers in India.

Like most income-tax regulations, they require an expert to elucidate their exact significance and to point out to officers how they may not dodge them, but apply them to their own case, in the way most suitable to them.

Might I suggest that it would be most helpful to all officers if an expert in income-tax matters might be induced to write for the journal, a short article, explaining these regulations and their effect. Simple examples would help most of us to an understanding.

Yours faithfully,
R. G. MOUNTAIN.

REVIEWS

THE RETENTION EXAMINATION AND HOW TO PASS IT

By Lieutenant-Colonel G. E. D. Mouatt, D.S.O. (*Indian Army*)

Revised and corrected up to 1938

By Major G. A. I. Sanders (*Indian Army*)

The object of the Retention Examination is to ensure that all officers appointed to the Indian Army are, within three years of their appointment, thoroughly proficient in matters of regimental routine and so qualified as efficient regimental officers. All officers appointed to the Indian Army or transferring to the R.I.A.S.C. must pass the examination within three years. Failure to do so may lead to removal from the Service.

"The Retention Examination and How to Pass It" deals with some of the written and oral parts of the examination and selects—

(1) Regimental duties in organization and administration.
(2) Military Law.
(3) Weapon Training.
(4) Horse Management (for cavalry officers).

The book was written in 1924 but has recently been revised. It is doubtful whether it is possible to revise and bring up to date a book of this nature which was written fourteen years ago. Herein lies the danger of young officers obtaining out of date and, therefore, false information. The chapters on "Discipline and Interior Economy" and "Indian Military Law" have been examined by legal experts and found to contain many errors. In these days of frequent changes in organization, it would be very difficult or even impossible to keep this book amended and up to date and thus not dangerous. Officers seldom have the time or inclination to do so.

A *vade mecum* of this type rather defeats the purpose of the examination for which it is designed to help officers. Young officers, relying on its accuracy, are inclined to regard it as an easy short-cut to knowledge, obviating the tedious but more thorough and lasting benefit which they obtain through making themselves acquainted with the official manuals.

T. R.

LEE, GRANT AND SHERMAN

By Lieut.-Colonel Alfred H. Burne, d.s.o.

(*Aldershot. Gale & Polden, Ltd.* 10*s.* 6*d.*)

The author outlines the operations of the American Civil War from April 1864 until the final surrender of the Confederate Armies and comments on a number of army and corps commanders, of both sides. He explains that the title of his book has been suggested by the fact that three notable books have recently been written, each by a military expert, on Lee, Grant and Sherman individually and that the aim of his book is to try and strike a balance between the rival protagonists.

The book opens with explanatory and bibliographical notes, both of which are most useful and should be read with care. Chapter I deals generally with the causes of the war and leads up to the situation in the spring of 1864. Chapters II to VIII describe the Wilderness Campaign which brings out the comparative values of Lee and Grant. Chapters IX to XV are devoted to Sherman's operations against Hood and Johnston and give us a clear insight into Sherman's character. The remaining chapters describe Early's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley during the latter half of 1864 and the operations in the West which led to the surrender of the Confederate Armies. The sections on the rarely studied campaigns of Generals Hood and Early are a useful contribution to the literature on the American Civil War. In the last chapter, the author assesses the comparative military abilities of Lee, Grant and Sherman and finally states that "the student must feel that the military leader *par excellence* is Robert E. Lee."

The author is a master of the detailed facts of his subject and, from his study on the ground of the battlefields of the Civil War, has put renewed life into the actions which he describes. His style is excellent; he avoids that detail which often requires such efforts of concentration in the study of military history and yet omits none of the important moves and facts which lead up to the climax of the various battles. The value of his story is much enhanced by the many clear sketch maps, all of which are conveniently placed in the book and can be followed with the minimum disturbance to reading. A chronological table is provided at the end, designed to convey to the eye a swift and proportionate picture of the whole vast war theatre of the 1864-65 campaign; this is followed by a most useful index. The whole

book, in fact, is well organized and makes clear and interesting reading.

Colonel Burne has expressed opinions which are both refreshing and original but which, as he himself points out, often run counter to generally held views. His conclusions, however, are based on his own opinions of the facts he adduces and, whether right or wrong, will provide readers with ample food for thought. In his criticisms he has endeavoured to be scrupulously fair and has paid little attention to the volume of opinion expressed since the war or the bias which ultimate success gives to the study of the life of any commander. He is, however, in places inclined to blame commanders for mistakes caused by bad staff work over which they seem to have had very doubtful control; his conclusions and comparisons in regard to commanders are also open to criticism in places. The miscarriage of General Hood's orders at Spring Hill surely denotes the necessity for a well-trained staff; it scarcely debars all soldiers with physical disabilities from responsible commands. Headaches, too, are not an entirely satisfactory basis for comparison between generals, even when they are prone to this unfortunate malady. The final chapter contains an interesting attempt to express the value of moral and other indirect factors in rifles and bayonets.

The outstanding characteristics of this book are candour, fair and unbiased criticisms based on personal opinion and a style and general arrangement which much facilitate the study of the campaign. It is an undoubted contribution to the critical histories of the 1864-65 campaign and will well repay careful study.

W. H. G. B.

WAZIRISTAN 1936-1937

By Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Bruce, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E., O.B.E.

(*Gale & Polden, Ltd.* 3*s.* 6*d.*)

In this little book the author, who spent many years on the North-West Frontier of India, as did his father before him, presents the problems of the Frontier and his solution to them. The reader may not agree with the policy he advocates, but undoubtedly it provides food for thought and is therefore well worth studying.

Lieut.-Colonel Bruce is a great believer in Sir Robert Sandeman's policy, which has successfully stood the test of time

in Baluchistan. He maintains that it was the successful working of this policy which kept Waziristan quiet from 1922 to 1933, and that the present disturbances which started in 1936 are due to weakness in carrying out the Sandeman policy.

In comparing the problems of Waziristan with those which faced Sir Robert Sandeman the author ignores certain factors which make the pacification of Waziristan an infinitely greater task: The armament of the tribesmen in Waziristan is far superior both in make and numbers to that of the tribesmen in Baluchistan when Sir Robert Sandeman started his policy of peaceful penetration. Also, ammunition is both cheaper and more plentiful. The task of dealing with the tribes through their headmen is easier in Baluchistan, where the headmen have always been more powerful and controlled much larger areas than those in Waziristan, where the headmen are legion and, in some cases, have little real control. In Waziristan the tribesmen are often made hostile to us by Afghan allowance holders, *i.e.*, tribesmen who live on our side of the border, and for past services receive an allowance from the Afghan Government. This allowance makes them independent and, therefore, difficult to control.

While everyone will agree with the author that we must protect the tribes if we disarm them, many will disagree with his view that disarmament should follow pacification.

The chapter suggesting the way in which the outlaw problem should be dealt with is convincing and of particular interest, as during the last two years villages in the settled districts have been raided frequently, and there is no doubt that on most occasions the raiders have been assisted by local inhabitants.

G. L. T.

GERMANY AND A LIGHTNING WAR

By Fritz Sternberg.

(*Faber and Faber, Ltd., 24 Russell Square, London; 12s. 6d.*)

This is a book of considerable interest to the serious student of war—particularly of the next war. It is not intended to be a strategical study, but an analysis of the material resources available to Germany and to her probable allies and enemies. It is based on the text that "God is now on the side of the battalions with the biggest production of iron and steel in support;" and it is definitely not a book for the bedside or the idle hour.

The book may be conveniently divided into two parts: Dr. Sternberg's opinions on the certainty of a social revolution in the near future, not only in the Fascist countries, but also in the great western democracies; and Dr. Sternberg's careful and detailed examination of the evidence bearing on the alignment and "war potentials" of the opposing parties in the next world war.

Dr. Sternberg believes that capitalism is doomed, and that it is the armaments race alone that is keeping this system on its feet—and that with difficulty. This part of the book was above the head of the reviewer who, frankly, found it unconvincing and rather too obviously coloured by Dr. Sternberg's own political views and based on his own reading of social and economic tendencies which have never yet been adequately understood or explained.

When he comes to the other part of the book, however, the reader cannot fail to be impressed by the imposing mass of detailed evidence that Dr. Sternberg has produced in support of his argument that Germany's only hope in a future war is a swift and smashing success—and that the existing and potential resources of Germany and her probable allies *vis-a-vis* those of her probable opponents, make such a success well-nigh inconceivable. His method is to compare, item by item, the components that make up the "war potential" of all the possible belligerents, as they stood in 1914 and as they stand to-day. The evidence is authoritative, detailed and well handled; and his conclusion is that Germany has less chance of a quick victory to-day than she had in 1914—and no chance at all of victory in a lengthy war. All his evidence is from sources readily available to the German General Staff and, in the interests of world peace, it is to be hoped that they have studied this evidence and have arrived at the same conclusions as Dr. Sternberg.

The diagrams and charts with which the book is illustrated are unusually clear and intelligible; and the translation, by Edward Fitzgerald, is so well done that the reader would seldom suspect that the book had not been originally written in English.

D. F. W. W.

AN ATLAS OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

By G. F. Hudson and Marthe Rajchman

(*Faber and Faber. 7s. 6d.*)

The stated purpose of this book is to provide, by means both of the text and the maps, a background to the study of events in the Far East.

The development of trade routes, the lands and the people, and the story of the activities of the European races in China, each receive a chapter with complementary maps. The history of the Manchu Empire and the Chinese republic is then traced, as is the expansion of Russia eastwards and of Japan southwards and on to the mainland of Asia. The remaining chapters deal with the conflict between these three powers in the Far East and with the southward policy of Japan.

The text, for which Mr. Hudson is responsible, gives as accurate a bird's-eye view of the history and development of the Far East as is possible in so small a compass. It is a little unfortunate that his convincing arguments as to why Japan would not attempt to capture Canton should have been proved wrong so quickly.

The maps, of which there are thirty-three, are Miss Rajchman's contribution. They are excellent, amplifying the text and, in themselves, constituting a satisfactory basis of fact for the study of events in the Far East.

A. D. W.

THROUGH THE FOG OF WAR

By Liddell Hart.

(*Faber & Faber. 12s. 6d.*)

Captain Liddell Hart's latest book does not deal, as its title suggests, with the difficulties which a commander experiences in discovering what is happening on the other side of the hill, but rather with the artificial fog raised after the war by the military and political leaders on each side, in an attempt to justify their actions. He maintains, repeatedly, that military history can only be accurately written by the professional historian, who alone is unmoved by sentimental encumberances of kinship, friendship or discipleship, and it is a pity therefore that in his efforts to prove the incapacity of the military leaders of the Allies he should present

so one-sided a picture and that he consistently neglects to give, in proper perspective, the arguments which may be urged in favour of other policies than his own.

The book is mainly a study of personalities and as such must be of value to the military student, since the personality of a commander may exert more influence on the result of a campaign than any other factor. The author's theory, which may not commend itself to soldiers, that far more can be learned from failures than successes results in the presentation of a rather gloomy picture from which it appears that nearly all the military leaders in the Great War, with the notable exception of Lawrence of Arabia, were fools if they were not knaves. Haig is the principal villain of the piece, and Captain Liddell Hart does not hesitate to repeat twice the story that, to prove his statement that the morale of the German Army was deteriorating, Haig showed Lloyd George a prisoners-of-war cage from which, by his own instructions, all able-bodied prisoners had been removed.

There is much in the book of interest and the history of the war given in the first chapter is a particularly brilliant piece of condensation, although this too suffers from the author's habit of quoting as facts matters which are still controversial.

P. R. A.