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EDITORIAL

Czechoslovakia.

We dealt with the Eight Demands made by Herr Henlein, the Sudeten leader, at Carlsbad in our last issue. In reply to those demands the Czech Government outlined proposals which took the form of three draft statutes. A Nationalities Statute embodied a more liberal interpretation of rights which minorities already enjoyed and confirmed the principle that every national group should have schools in proportion to its numbers. Amendments to the Languages Act were drawn up to remove German grievances and allow minorities to use their own tongue in business with State officials. But an Administrative Reform Bill was by far the most important of the measures put forward by the Czech Government. This last bill was designed to provide for a considerable decentralization of the work of Government by the creation of four provincial diets in Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. Each diet was to be composed of *curias,* or sections, representing the nationalities involved. In Bohemia, for instance, the *curia* was to be Czech and German; in Moravia, Czech, German and Polish; in Slovakia, Slovak and Hungarian; and in Ruthenia, Ruthenian and Russian. The members of each diet were to be elected by direct vote, and the diet was to have an executive committee of twelve members on which nationalities would be proportionately represented. As regards

powers, diets were to control every detail of provincial administration and have also the right to object to legislative measures of the central government affecting the welfare of the local population, but questions of defence, finance and foreign policy would remain in the hands of the national government at Prague.

Such were the initial proposals of the Czech Government and, from the start, they met with little response from the Sudeten leaders who maintained, not entirely without reason, that they consisted of concessions which had long been withheld and no longer went far enough. The amendments to the Languages Act were admitted to contain useful provisions, but the Administrative Reform Bill was stigmatised as being wholly inadequate and likely to create more problems than it solved.

While negotiations for a settlement were in progress, the Sudeten leaders, acting—it is believed—on instructions from Berlin, submitted a fresh series of fourteen demands. These did not receive the publicity which was given to the Carlsbad demands, but undoubtedly went a great deal further and practically amounted to a demand for a self-governing German state within Czechoslovakia, a proposal which Dr. Benes and Dr. Hodza had frequently stated they could not entertain.

It was to find a way out of what was rapidly becoming a deadlock that Lord Runciman left for Czechoslovakia at the beginning of August. His mission, an unofficial one, had the concurrence of Berlin and Prague and the well-wishes of almost every other government in Europe. The possible gains for peace were enormous. So also were the difficulties, which daily became clearer. In the first place, there were the immediate differences between the Germans and the Czechs; the Germans holding out for a degree of autonomy which in effect approached secession, the Czechs going far in conceding local autonomy within districts and wide measures of decentralization. Then there were the problems of race inseparable from a state consisting of half a dozen different nationalities, Czechoslovaks, Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Jews and Poles. Lastly there was the problem of the relations of the Czech State as a whole with its neighbours, and particularly with Germany. Lord Runciman's task was far more than the immediate settlement of Czech Sudeten disputes. Not only had he to find a way by which all minorities in Czechoslo-

vakia could be satisfied within the framework of a democratic constitution, but a means by which the relations of the State with her powerful neighbour could be placed on a footing of permanent friendship.

At the beginning of September, when Lord Runciman had been barely a month in the country, events took a sudden turn for the worse. The change was heralded by a chorus of indignation and hostility in the German Press and increased reluctance on the part of the Sudeten leaders to entertain any proposals, adequate or inadequate, for a settlement. The fact was that what had started as a local quarrel was rapidly developing into a major dispute likely to embroil Europe in war. Herr Henlein, Dr. Kundt and other Sudeten German leaders who might have been prepared to settle their differences with the Czechoslovak Government in view of the latter's great concessions had ceased to count. It was no longer a question of what Dr. Hodza would offer or Herr Henlein accept, but whether Herr Hitler, urged forward by the unrest in Germany which had been showing itself for the first time since the Nazis came into power, would risk a war which he knew might involve the great nations of the world. The German Army, though not officially mobilized, stood for practical purposes at war strength. Men, women, vehicles and material had been conscripted and commandeered for manœuvres on an unprecedented scale and intended to last for a period of weeks, not days. Across Germany's western frontier, all leave had been stopped in the Services in France, reservists called to the colours and the Maginot Line manned.

It was in these circumstances, on the eve of Herr Hitler's speech at Nuremburg, that Great Britain indicated that it would be impossible for her to stand aside if war broke out. Either the warning came too late or it was couched in language that was not forcible enough. German demand followed German demand with startling rapidity only to culminate in an ultimatum to Prague of extraordinary severity. Possibly the clear desire of the German people to avoid war and the news of the mobilization of the British Navy may have caused the Führer to hesitate at the last moment, but the major credit for the avoidance of war must be given to the untiring efforts of the British Prime Minister and

the calm dignity with which the Czech Government faced an intolerable and unprecedented situation.

It is impossible as yet to judge the agreement reached at Munich in true perspective. That there will be many searchings of heart and wide divergences of opinion is inevitable and time alone will show whether or not Britain was justified in the course she took.

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Anglo-American Relations.

There have been increasing signs of late that responsible circles in the United States of America are no longer content to remain indifferent to political developments in Europe. Shortly after the tense situation which occurred between Germany and Czechoslovakia last May the *New York Times* devoted a leading article to the subject of America's attitude in the event of war between the democratic and totalitarian states. "The aggressor nations will make a mistake," it wrote, "if they assume from our unwillingness to pledge ourselves to a specific course of action that it is safe to leave us out of their calculations. We shall be fully prepared, if war envelops Europe, to choose the side of the democracies." More pertinent perhaps was the recent speech of President Roosevelt while on a visit to Canada. "We are no longer a far away continent," he siad, "but have become a consideration to every propaganda office and every general staff. The United States will not stand idly by, if Canadian soil is threatened."

It would be unwise to assume from either of these pronouncements, still less from the speeches of Mr. Cordell Hull who, for long, has been a voice crying in the wilderness of American isolationism, that any marked change in the foreign policy of the United States is likely. They constitute, nevertheless, a very definite warning to aggressors that Americans will fight, if occasion demands, despite their ingrained hatred of war. They do more; for they indicate both the need for and the possibilities of a true Anglo-American understanding.

Under the circumstances the appeal made in the House of Lords, during the debate on the Finance Bill, that a settlement of the American debt should not be consigned to the category of permanently impossible ideals should have aroused approval among

thoughtful men on both sides of the Atlantic. The atmosphere for a re-opening of the question has been unfavourable for some years and, indeed, Lord Stanhope, on behalf of the Government, did indicate that there is little prospect of immediate negotiations for liquidation of the debt being started. Officially, of course, the door is still open, as is evidenced by the half-yearly reminders from the United States of the sums owing and the British acknowledgments thereof.

But the fact is that there has been so much popular misconception on the subject ever since the Balfour Note, which inferred that America lent the money to Britain because her credit was better than that of her allies, that negotiations for a settlement would be a delicate matter. Actually there were two categories of borrowing from America. Prior to the entry of that country into the war, loans were raised in the ordinary way from the American people, and undoubtedly much of the money so obtained was used for the benefit of Britain's allies, particularly Russia. But these loans have all been repaid and are no longer a controversial matter. After the entry of America into the war, borrowings took the form of loans from the United States Government and were utilised by a joint purchasing organization acting on behalf of the allies as a whole.

In previous wars loans advanced by Britain to her own allies had always been written off as subsidies made in a common cause, and this was the basis of the proposal made in the Balfour Note which stated that Britain was prepared to cancel her claims to reparations from Germany and to debts due from other allies, if America would, in her turn, cancel the sums owing by Great Britain to her. But American opinion not only refused to admit the thesis that inter-allied debts and reparations formed parts of an indivisible problem, but was hurt by attempts to belittle the war effort put forth by the people of America.

In the meantime arrears of interest have brought the total of the British debt in the books of the United States Treasury not only to a figure far in excess of the original debt but one that is impossible of repayment. Under the Johnson Act of 1934, Great Britain suffered the unprecedented experience of being stigmatised as a defaulter. The only possibility of repayment now would be

for the United States voluntarily to forgo the interest agreed to under the Balfour Note. Even so the capital due for repayment would be extremely large, though perhaps not impossible of liquidation. Since this is now the only major problem dividing the two English speaking nations, almost any reasonable solution, even one involving heavy sacrifices on both sides, would undoubtedly meet with the approval of the peoples of both countries.

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Non-intervention in Spain.

The White Paper issued in London in July contained not only a review of the labours of the Non-Intervention Committee over the last two years but a detailed plan for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers in Spain, a plan, moreover, to which twenty-six governments had unanimously agreed.

Non-intervention is essentially a departure from pre-War practice. It was then usual to supply arms and munitions without restriction to belligerents, whether in a civil war or a war between states. The belligerent could search vessels suspected of being engaged in arms traffic, but the neutral stood to do an extremely lucrative business. Two years ago most European countries reached an agreement by which they undertook to "take the profit out of war" by refusing to deliver munitions to either side in Spain. Unfortunately, by the time the agreement was reached, a substantial measure of material help had already been given to both Republican and Nationalist parties in Spain, and the Soviet ambassador made it clear that his government could not consider itself more limited as regards intervention than any of the other participants. Since 1936, despite a tacit acceptance of the principle that non-intervention is desirable, there have been continual efforts on the part of outside nations, with the exception of Britain, to check the aid rendered by the various governments interested in the outcome of the Spanish struggle and to ensure that material supplied to one side was counter-balanced at once by material supplied to the other. Great Britain alone has remained impartial, although there have been, and still are, Englishmen who are fervent partisans of the Republican and Nationalist causes; and it has been largely, if not entirely, due to British efforts that the war has been kept localized.

Until recently the work of the Non-Intervention Committee could only have been described as restricting, not abolishing intervention. It was a great step forward, therefore, when twenty-six governments agreed on the details of a comprehensive plan for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers in Spain. In brief, it was proposed that two international commissions should proceed to Spain to count the foreign combatants and, when that had been done, there should begin a systematic withdrawal according to a fixed time-table. When 10,000 combatants had been withdrawn from the side found to have the fewer, and a proportionately larger number from the other side, both Republican and Nationalist parties would be granted belligerent rights; but the withdrawal itself was to go on until, it was hoped, no foreign soldier remained on Spanish soil. Even so the belligerency was to be a limited one, for the governments were agreed that no further arms or munitions should be exported directly or indirectly to Spain.

In view of the facts that the twenty-six States represented on the Non-Intervention Committee had declared the plan to be both practical and desirable and that it had been accepted immediately and unreservedly in Barcelona, General Franco's somewhat tardy reply, which was hedged about with so many restrictions as to be tantamount to rejection, can only be described as a deplorable development. And it is difficult to see why the General should object so strongly to certain features of the scheme. The Insurgents cannot be left any worse off as the result of withdrawal, and the opinion is widely and authoritatively held that the grant of belligerent rights would, if anything, help the Insurgent cause, since General Franco has the more effective means of enforcing a blockade. Moreover, both parties in Spain have repeatedly declared that their ultimate aim is Spain for the Spaniard, not for the foreigner. Had the scheme received General Franco's approval, the commissions might have been in Spain this month and most foreigners would have been evacuated by the end of the year. The Spanish problem settled, the only remaining hindrance to the putting into effect of the Anglo-Italian agreement would have been removed.

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Palestine.

After a number of sittings *in camera*, the Technical Commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead, held its first public inquiries in Palestine in June and has now left the country. The Commission has been concerned less with policy than with questions of fact, questions such as the economic and social consequences of partition, the number of immigrants which the proposed Jewish State can bear and the possibilities of development of waste areas in Palestine and Trans-Jordania.

Meanwhile the situation in Palestine has been steadily deteriorating. When troops and police occupied Galilee and Samaria in May, the larger bands of terrorists were forced to split up into small bodies. Since then there has been a pronounced increase in the number of incidents, and little, if any, reduction in their seriousness. To counter the actions of terrorists, and more particularly to impede the traffic in arms from Syria and Lebanon, the Government decided, on the advice of Sir Charles Tegart to construct a wire fence along a portion of the Palestinian frontier. The decision aroused considerable feeling, some of it based on the fact that the fence would be an obstruction to legitimate trade, but for the most part systematically fostered by the Arabs. And it was unfortunate that the construction of the fence considerably outstripped the erection of the blockhouses which were a necessary part of the plan of defence.

An important cause of the recent disturbances has been the reprisals undertaken by the Revisionist Jews, a small body of extremists, opposed to partition and not recognising the control of the more moderately inclined Jewish Agency. The arrival of two battalions of infantry and a regiment of armoured cars from Egypt did much to get the situation in hand in the towns, but not in rural areas, where the difficulties of the troops have been increased by the fact that the available police are far too few and its Arab element unreliable. As a result the prestige of Government in the countryside has tended to decline.

Then there is the fact that diplomatic representations to Paris with a view to obtaining the extradition of the Muftie of Jerusalem have, so far, met with no success. The Muftie is still at Beirut and has been influential in securing the establishment of various

"Committees of Palestine Defence" in Cairo, Baghdad and Damascus with the object of disseminating propaganda and collecting funds for the Arab cause. Those committees have obtained, and are still obtaining, considerable support from the peoples of neighbouring countries but during the last few months the enthusiasm of the governments of such countries for the cause of the Palestinian Arabs appears to have been on the wane; whether as a result of the Muftie's relative lack of success, a suspicion that funds are not always devoted to the purpose for which they have been collected or a realization that Britain not only cannot, in the long run, be coerced, but is the one power which may yet stand between the Middle East and dictators, is not known. But it is probable that all three of these considerations are slowly having their effect between Suez and India.

While interest in the Arab cause has been decreasing abroad, the Muftie's own position, as titular head of the Arabs in Palestine, has become increasingly difficult. Hitherto he has been able to embarrass the Government in Palestine in a hundred different ways without actually bringing about an armed insurrection. Now, however, Jewish and Arab tempers are near breaking point, indeed there is probably no moderate Arab feeling left, and the Muftie may find his hand forced. That either Arab or Jew can gain anything from actual insurrection is of course impossible, but until the influence of the Muftie is eliminated, the activities of Revisionist Jews brought under control and terrorism eradicated the situation must remain extremely grave. Certainly no lasting settlement can be achieved while these factors remain.

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The Balkan and Little Ententes.

During August, while the fear of a major war in Europe was steadily increasing, two notable steps were taken by certain small powers in the cause of peace. On 1st August an important agreement was signed at Salonika between Dr. Kiosseivanoff, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, and General Metaxas, Foreign Minister of Greece and President, for this year, of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente. The agreement emphasised the desire of Bulgaria on the one hand and the Balkan Entente, composed of Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, on the other for co-operation and peace. The Balkan Powers renounced the application of the military clauses of the Treaty of

Neuilly, so freeing Bulgaria from the severe disabilities imposed on her in 1919, and agreed to the remilitarisation of the areas on each side of the Turco-Greek and Turco-Bulgarian frontiers. Although the agreement appears at first sight to do little more than permit an unlimited measure of rearmament and fortification, it is essentially a contribution to the cause of peace, for it means that Bulgaria's neighbours are so confident of her peaceful intentions that they are prepared to surrender advantages substantial to themselves, but which have long rankled in Bulgarian minds.

The second step towards political appeasement relates to the conference at which, after a year of negotiation, a non-aggression pact was signed between Hungary and the nations of the Little Entente —Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania. It is true that final agreement has not yet been reached on all outstanding questions in the Danube region, but these questions have been discussed in detail and it is hoped that a solution to them will be found before long. This latter pact has, in one sense, been facilitated by the German annexation of Austria which ended Magyar hopes of a Hapsburg restoration, an event which would never have commended itself to the nations of the Little Entente. Whether the result of the conference will be to weaken German influence in the Danube basin has yet to be seen, but the agreement should relieve Czechoslovakia from the fear of attack on her southern frontier.

It will indeed be a turn of the wheel if European peace is brought about by the action of Balkan countries.

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The War in China.

In our last issue we recorded that the Japanese armies in north China were pressing westwards along the Lunghai railway and the fall of Chengchow, the junction of the Lunghai and Pinghan lines, seemed imminent. On the 11th June the southern bank of the Yellow River was breached at a number of places. Whether the banks collapsed through lack of maintenance, were damaged by Japanese shell fire or, as the Japanese state, deliberately cut by the Chinese army is not known. But there is certainly nothing improbable about the Japanese version, since the loss of life and the suffering which the breach has entailed would have counted for little with the Chinese in comparison with the resulting delay to the Japanese forces,

Within a week Japanese operations in the north had been brought to a complete standstill, and there the position remains. The Japanese Higher Command was forced to transfer its main weight to the Yangtze valley. Here, too, the rate of advance gives some indication of the difficulties experienced by the Japanese and the steadily increasing resistance of the main Chinese armies. Hukow was taken on the 5th July, but Kiukiang, fifteen miles further up river, held out for another three weeks. The Japanese forces took, in fact, a little over six weeks to push eighty miles up river, and that in spite of the easing of their supply and reinforcement problem as a result of the greater carrying capacity of the river compared with Chinese railways. The probable explanation of this slow advance is that mine-sweeping had to be undertaken, the weather was abominable and disease, particularly cholera, rife in both armies and among the civil population.

To capture Hankow is now the declared policy of the Japanese Government. The town is important politically, commercially and strategically. For months it has been the virtual centre of Chinese rule; it is the most prosperous town in central China and the Yangtze valley terminus of railway communications with the Chinese armies in the north and Canton in the south. That the Japanese will be successful in their new venture, we have little doubt. They have already taken Kiukiang, the first key to the prepared lines of defence covering the capital. A more interesting matter for speculation is whether Marshal Chiang Kai-shek will defend Hankow to the last round and the last man. He may well prefer to keep his field army intact and defend the town merely for a reasonable period. By withdrawing he would avoid the loss of much war material, no longer easy to replace, and force the Japanese to maintain large numbers of troops in the interior of China for an indefinite period, which is probably the last thing the Japanese Government desires. A strategic withdrawal is possible in two directions: to the north-west with the object of bringing the Chinese armies closer to Soviet aid, or to the south, towards Kwantung and Kwangsi, which have always been strongholds of anti-Japanese feeling.

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During the early part of August attention was focussed on the frontier clash between Soviet and Japanese troops. The facts

of this incident appear to have been as follows. About the middle of July Russian troops occupied a ridge on the Soviet Manchukuo border, south of Hunchun. One of the features of this ridge overlooks Possiet Bay, a potential Russian submarine base, on the one side and the defences of the Korean port of Rashin on the other. Attempts were at once made by the respective governments to solve the matter by diplomatic action, but the Japanese forces on the spot became impatient and decided to eject the Soviet troops. This led to hostilities and the Soviet detachment was reinforced from the Far East Red Army. On 30th July the Japanese launched an attack on the heights which they occupied next day. From that time until the truce, which came into force on 11th August, the Russians staged a series of counter-attacks which achieved a measure of success, but failed completely to dislodge the Japanese.

During the negotiations M. Litvinoff insisted that the map attached to the Sino-Russian treaty of 1886 should form the basis of discussion and that a condition of the granting of a truce should be a return of the disputed ridge to the Russians, while the Japanese ambassador in Moscow pressed for the restoration of the position obtaining at the beginning of July. It was eventually agreed that the troops should remain in the positions held at midnight on August 10th pending the demarcation of the frontier by a commission of two Russians, one Japanese and one Manchukuon representatives.

If the incident did nothing more, it at least showed that neither the Soviet, with one eye turned towards events in central Europe, nor Japan, with her hands already full in China, wished to embark on a major war. It showed even more clearly the truth of the statement which was stressed by Major Nicolls in his lecture* before the United Service Institution that the struggle in the Far East is not only a Sino-Japanese struggle, but a triangular fight between Russia, China and Japan.

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Waziristan.

The last few months in Waziristan have been chiefly notable for the activities of the Shami Pir, the operations against the Faqir of Ipi's *lashkar* in the Kharre area, north of Datta Khel and the raid on Bannu.

During June a serious situation arose in south Waziristan owing to the presence of Saiyid Muhammed Sadi of Damascus, a cousin of ex-King Amanullah's queen Souriya. This man, locally

* Reproduced in this issue.

known as the Shami Pir, had entered Waziristan earlier in the year ostensibly to settle tribal religious questions and blood feuds. It was not long, however, before he aroused the suspicions of the Afghan Government who asked for his removal. That the Afghan Government were justified in their suspicions that the Shami Pir's real object was to raise a force of Mahsuds and Ahmedzai Wazirs with a view to joining the Ghilzais in a revolt in the Kandahar Province was proved when he moved towards the Durand Line on the 23rd June. Vigorous political and air action was at once taken by the Government of India and troops were moved from north Waziristan towards the danger area. The Shami Pir's following began to disperse and on the 27th the Pir arrived at Wana, where he agreed to cease his activities against the Afghan Government and to return to his home in Syria.

The operations in the Kharre area, to which the Faqir of Ipi had withdrawn when he was ejected from Madda Khel country, arose as a result of the attacks on Datta Khel fort and the Faqir's continual efforts to instigate serious offences. The operations were undertaken by the 3rd Indian Infantry Brigade and the Razmak Brigade and resulted not only in the dispersion of the hostile *lashkar,* but in the infliction of a larger number of casualties than usual. The Faqir's cave area was thoroughly searched, and stores, ammunition and other belongings which had been abandoned by the enemy were destroyed or removed.

The raid on Bannu, which was made by a force of some two hundred men on the evening of the 23rd July, was one of the most daring of its kind. And it was remarkable that the first intimation received in Bannu City that a hostile force was on its way from tribal territory was given by three lorry drivers of the Frontier Constabulary, who happened to be walking on the Kurram bridge. Timely information could, undoubtedly, have been given by the inhabitants of the countryside which the tribesmen had to traverse during their approach. The fighting in the city lasted for an hour after which the tribesmen were ejected, but not before they had succeeded in setting fire to a considerable area.

In comparison with recent months, August and the first half of September were a period of relative quiet. Minor offences continued, mostly in north Waziristan and the Kohat District, but their number tended to decrease. This improvement is probably due to two factors, the approach of colder weather and the consequent desire of the tribes to move down to the lower valleys

which they know can easily be denied them, and the fact that the Faqir of Ipi has been, more or less, on the run since his eviction from the Kharre area. But it would be premature to anticipate any permanent improvement in the situation or to hope that there will be no recrudescence of trouble before the spring. The situation in Waziristan is still much too unsettled for that.

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New Terms of Service for Officers

The announcement of new terms of service for officers in all the three Defence Services was a natural corollary to the progressive improvement which has been apparent for some years in the conditions of service of the men.

The lot of the average Army officer was perhaps worse than that of officers in the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force for a variety of reasons. The Royal Navy had been reduced relatively less than the Army since 1918, and for years the Admiralty had sternly wielded an axe which, while it was hard on many deserving officers who found themselves no longer required as they neared middle age, nevertheless improved the prospects of those who remained. The Royal Air Force, though grievously reduced in post-war years, adopted a policy of granting large numbers of temporary commissions, so improving the chances of promotion for its permanent officers. But in the army stagnation prevailed. That that stagnation was due in part to the large numbers of officers who entered the Service during the war is undeniable; but it was due far more to a regimental system which produced the most extraordinary anomalies in promotion and to the fact that the proportion of junior to senior officers in the Army was far higher than in either of the other two Services. In fact, it was calculated that the chances for a subaltern to reach the rank of colonel were about half of those of the midshipman to reach the rank of captain.

The most welcome change introduced by the Admiralty will be the abolition of half pay for captains and flag officers, a practice which has borne heavily on many officers in the past. At the same time, flag officers will be retired as soon as it is certain that they will not be re-employed, instead of being allowed to remain until their next promotion and draw the pension of a rank in which they have never served. But increased rates of retired pay come into force with this provision, thus bringing naval pensions into line with those in the other Services.

In the Royal Air Force, promotion of flying officers of the General Duties Branch to flight-lieutenants after two years' service in the rank will be the standard practice in future. Improvements have been made in the scale of pay of squadron-leaders, wing commanders and air commodores. In the case of the two latter ranks these improvements have been accompanied by the withdrawal of command pay, which only a few Royal Air Force officers were ever able to draw, and by an extension of the allowances granted to station commanders in aid of the expenses of official entertainment to which they are put. Half pay has been abolished in the Royal Air Force, as it has in the other Services, and the maximum ages for retirement have been brought into line, rank for rank, with those in the Army.

The prospects of the average British Army officer have been greatly improved under the new conditions introduced by the Secretary of State for War. A reduction of the age-limits means that those who are capable of filling the higher ranks will reach them earlier, to their own advantage as well as that of the country. At the same time the security of tenure of the average officer is considerably improved by the fact that he will be assured of at least ten years in the rank of major, with an adequate, if small, pension on retirement from that rank.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the reforms is the assistance offered to parents who cannot afford the fees charged at Woolwich and Sandhurst. In future it will be possible for a cadet, whose parents are in straitened circumstances, to pass through the colleges without any charge being made; while, to meet the need of the officer on being commissioned, there will be available one hundred post-commission scholarships of £20 a year, tenable for three years. Whether this sum of £20 a year will really suffice in the case of an officer with no private means remains to be seen , but the step is undoubtedly one in the right direction; and it is a useful aid to the main object of the reforms—that of enhancing the efficiency of the Army as a whole by offering better prospects.

THE SINO-JAPANESE STRUGGLE

A lecture given before His Excellency the Right Honourable the Lord Brabourne, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., M.C., *Acting Viceroy and Governor-General of India and the members of the United Service Institution of India by Major J. E. H. Nicolls,* M.C., *on 21st July* 1938. *The lecturer was introduced by Major-General C. J. E. Auchinleck,* C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., *officiating Chief of the General Staff.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I hope I shall not disappoint you when I say that in this lecture I am going to devote very little time to the actual war that is now in progress between Japan and China. Most of the time I shall devote to a study of the main events in the Far East during the last forty years, so that you may see the present war in its true perspective as a stage in a struggle for supremacy that has now been going on for half a century. I have a great deal of ground to cover and therefore must omit an enormous amount of detail, but I hope, none-the-less, to give you a connected and impartial outline of the main issues. I propose first of all to say something about Japan and the Japanese, then to give you a brief sketch of Chinese history since the Boxer rising and to discuss the principal events in the foreign relations of Russia, Japan and China as they have affected the Far Eastern situation. Lastly, I shall give a very brief description of the present war together with a few comments.

The modern era in Japan dates from what is known as the Meiji restoration in 1868, when the policy of isolation which had been practised for two and a half centuries was abandoned and a deliberate programme of westernization adopted. As regards the Meiji restoration all that need be said is that it meant the restoration of absolute power to the Emperor and the end of a system that had obtained for some hundreds of years by which the Government of the country was in the hands of the head of the predominant clan or group of clans. The Japanese are an intensely proud race but they are also a race of realists. They realised that a policy of exclusion could not be maintained and that the only way to get on terms with the foreigner was to attain his standards and to equal him in every way in proficiency. Japan, therefore, set out deliberately to learn all that the West could teach her and to adapt to her own use all that she found worth while in

foreign civilization, science and industrial practice. The result, as you know, has been one of the most extraordinary transformations in history.

Now I want to revert to this pride of race that the Japanese have to such a marked degree. The first Emperor is claimed to be descended from the sun-goddess and the whole Japanese nation feels itself to be extracted from rather more than mortal clay. The indigenous religion of Japan is called "Shinto," which means the "way of the gods" and the Japanese have also a code of chivalry known as "Bushido" which means the "way of the soldier." It is not very easy for us to appreciate the intense racial pride of the Japanese, his veneration for his Emperor who epitomises for him all his ideas of patriotism, and his narrow but compelling ideas of personal honour. None-the-less we must accept the fact that these things exist and we must realise and respect the strong individualism that actuates him once his conscience is aroused. It is this personal attitude towards public affairs that makes it equally imperative and honourable to the Japanese in certain circumstances either to take his own life or that of his opponent.

From this I can turn to the system of government in Japan. While superficially some of the elements of democracy are present, the government is really modelled on the pre-war Prussian system. The Emperor is supreme and sacrosant. All authority is derived from him. The cabinet is nominated by him and is answerable to him and not to the elected parliament. The heads of the Fighting Services are also directly responsible to the Emperor without even the Cabinet interposing. This position of responsibility is acutely felt by the Services, which accounts for their frequent and what seems to us unwarrantable interference in politics. The Army, and the Navy too for that matter, looks on itself as literally responsible for the welfare of the whole nation and the more extreme elements, whom we generally refer to as the Young Officers class, are apt to regard the intrusions of politicians, financiers and liberal thinkers in affairs of State as little short of blasphemy. It is the conviction of many Japanese, and this is not confined to the military class, that it is their destiny to control and lead the other races of Asia. In these circumstances it is easy to realise how intensely repugnant to the Japanese must be the creed of communism, both in its essence and also because of its victory, in one case temporary and in the other apparently permanent, over the despotisms in Germany and Russia, which the Japanese political structure so closely follows.

I have not the time to describe the struggle that has developed in recent years between the extremists and the more moderate democratic elements. But it is worth noting that this struggle has been not so much on questions of principle as on methods of procedure. In foreign policy particularly there has been no great divergence in aims. What divergence there has been has taken place over the means of attaining those aims.

There is one more point to note in connection with Japanese politics. While in the broad division of opinion between the extremists and the moderates, the Services are on the whole more identified with the former, there is at the same time a division of opinion between the army and the navy. The former pins its faith to conquest on the mainland as the solution of Japan's problems, while the latter advocates economic expansion, and probably political domination, in the zone between Hong Kong and Australia. The present war is very much the Army's "show" but if they fail to deliver the goods, there may be a revulsion in favour of naval thought. The adoption of the navy's policy would affect us very closely.

Now let us consider the factors that have determined Japan's policy during the last forty years. Broadly speaking there are three: the problem of security, the economic problem and what I will call the spiritual factor.

The problem of security is easy to comprehend. The Russo-Japanese War was for the Japanese a war of self-preservation. They had and still have good reason of their conviction that Russia is their inevitable enemy and that there can be no peaceful development between the two nations. The acquisition of Manchukuo did something to remove the threat but the danger of a combination between China and Russia still existed and has been responsible for Japan's policy of infiltration into Inner Mongolia and domination of the provinces of North China. I need not labour the point, but it is well to remember that the Japanese feel very strongly the danger of their position. They feel about Manchuria in much the same way that we have felt for centuries about the Low Countries.

The economic issue is also tolerably straightforward. Japan's population has been expanding rapidly for years. At the same time she has deliberately turned herself into an industrial nation. While she is still able to feed herself from her own resources she can only equip herself in the fullest sense of the word by maintaining her various industries. To do that she requires cheap raw

materials and large markets in which to sell finished products. As a country she is notably deficient in most valuable raw materials and must sell widely in order to buy what she needs for the support of her economic structure. She has from the start been in competition with the established industries of countries with far greater resources than her own. The protagonists of conquest in China maintain that China can supply many of the needed raw materials and a vast market for Japan's manufactured goods. Much the same arguments were put forward to justify the Manchurian adventure.

Thirdly, there is what I have called the spiritual factor. This is far more difficult to define or to assess in its influence on Japanese policy. It is perhaps enough to say that the conviction held by many Japanese that it is their destiny to assume the leadership of Asia, their collective sense of superiority and their individual sense of honour combine to produce a mental background and an attitude of mind which, other things being equal, will decide their reactions in any given situation. The spiritual factor explains, I think, why subordinate Japanese so often take the law into their own hands regardless of the wishes or policy of their government.

I am inclined to think that the economic issue, important as it is, is easily overshadowed as a factor in Japanese foreign policy by the question of security and the spiritual factor, both of which are closely related. The Japanese being as they are, I feel that the policy they have followed abroad has been inevitable. Whatever we may think of their methods and however easy it is to say what they ought to have done in a given situation, we must bring ourselves to realise that, whether we like it or not, they have acted consistently, in the only way, broadly speaking, that a nation with their traditions, outlook and convictions could have acted.

I cannot attempt to generalise about the Chinese as I have just done about the Japanese. In race, language and customs there are great divergences between the different parts of China. Like India the country has suffered great invasions and like India it has always absorbed its conquerors in time. But the people are not homogeneous and that explains why, in contrast to Japan, their renaissance has been stormy in the extreme.

The outcome of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 was a great shock to the Chinese and resulted in a number of movements in the direction of governmental reform and westernization. The Boxer rising in 1900 was the culmination of these movements,

with a predominating anti-foreign bias added. After its suppression the reform movement, now sponsored by the Imperial Government, continued at a rate that was too fast for the country and not fast enough for the democratic intelligentsia. The first serious revolutionary society was founded by Dr. Sun Yat Sen in Canton in 1905. The Chinese Revolution which followed was precipitated by a chance occurrence in Hankow in the autumn of 1911 and was a haphazard affair which might easily have been suppressed at the start. It was in fact well on the way to failure when the revolutionaries, almost inadvertently, captured Nanking and, feeling that they ought to do something about it, proclaimed a republic with Sun Yat Sen as provisional president. A collapse on the Government side followed and the boy-Emperor abdicated. Sun Yat Sen had a much clearer appreciation of the realities of the situation than his supporters and, realising that too rapid a transition was impossible, arranged for the substitution of Yuan Shihkai, the ablest statesman of the old regime, as president. But there was naturally a great divergence between the latter's ideas of government and the socialist theories of the extreme republicans. Yuan Shihkai proved the stronger and maintained a qualified dictatorship until his death in June 1916.

There was already a distinct cleavage between South China which was republican and North China which tended towards militarism and the restoration of the monarchy or at least of a dictatorship. A period of complete chaos followed Yuan Shihkai's death. In the north various factions struggled for supreme power, one of the outstanding figures being Chang-Tso-lin, Governor of Manchuria. In the south the republicans were not only unable to influence affairs north of the Yangtze but were hopelessly divided among themselves, Sun Yat Sen being hard put to it to maintain his control. Looking round for outside help he found the Great Powers, with the exception of Russia, absorbed in their post-war problems. Russia offered assistance and the offer was accepted. A Russian mission was sent to Canton and under the organising genius of the notorious Borodin soon gained ascendency over the Kuomintang or republican party. It was the Soviet aim to work for communism and the expulsion of foreigners through the Kuomintang, and Great Britain in particular was singled out for attack. Sun Yat Sen's death in 1925 removed the last check on Bolshevik ascendancy. Strikes, boycotts and murderous attacks on foreigners became the order of the day. The student class provided the ringleaders in all these disturbances, which were especially frequent in Shanghai. A competent observer described

the anti-British movement as "the most perfect and complete attempt of one nation to destroy the influence of another without warfare in the whole of human history."

In August 1925 Chiang Kai-shek, who had been with the revolutionary party throughout and had received military training in China, Japan and Russia, made his first public appearance on the scene. At the time he was president of the military College near Canton. The assassination of the communist finance minister in Canton led him to take control of the Kuomintang and to a purge of the moderate elements. Borodin became his political adviser and in addition he had a Russian Chief of Staff. Russian ascendency had about reached its peak.

The Nationalists now felt that the time was ripe to extend their rule over the rest of China and an advance to the Yangtze was decided on. North of that river various warlords were still jockeying for power and it did not seem probable that they would be able to present a united front. The campaign commenced in July 1926. The Nationalist armies carried all before them and in September Hankow was captured. In Hankow a deliberate and very dangerous attempt was made to embroil the British. The Concession was invaded and only extreme forbearance on the part of the British defeated Borodin's manœuvre. The British Government followed a policy of conciliation and showed itself ready to negotiate concessions with the Nationalist Government. These overtures were looked on as a sign of weakness and did nothing to stop the anti-British movement.

In March 1927 the Nationalists captured Nanking and there occurred massacres and outrages perpetrated against foreigners. You will remember that the situation was so dangerous that we had to send a division to Shanghai and other nations followed suit.

Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek had decided to break with the Communists and he came to Shanghai to enlist the support of "Big Business" to this end. In this he was successful, even the student classes coming over to his side. A vigorous anti-communist purge commenced and the Russian Mission was expelled.

Chiang Kai-shek now turned his attention to the north, where Chang Tso-lin was a virtual dictator. To cut a long story short, Chiang Kai-shek, assisted by the defections of various warlords, was completely successful by the summer of 1928. Chang Tso-lin retired to Manchuria where he lost his life in a bomb outrage on arrival at Mukden. The new unity of China was signalised by the formation at Nanking of the First National Government on

October 10, 1928. This unity was, however, entirely superficial. There was deep hostility to Chiang Kai-shek below the surface in many quarters and it was not long before it took concrete form. By May 1930 the Nanking Government was practically bereft of supporters and a civil war broke out which lasted six months and cost 150,000 casualties. Although Chiang Kai-shek was finally victorious, he was not able to subdue the South where a rival national government was proclaimed at Canton early in 1931.

Let us now pause for a moment and attempt to sum up the situation in 1931. For fifteen years China had been devastated by civil wars and impoverished by industrial disturbances and the exactions of militarists. Never in the worst days of the Manchus had there been such destitution and chaos. Although now the Kuomintang was at last more or less supreme, the political balance was still unstable and there was no probability that the exhausted country could look forward to a period of settled government. Anti-foreign disturbances were still commonplaces, while the Government was breaking all records in the matter of the unilateral denunciation of agreements. The conciliatory policy of Great Britain and America was construed as abject weakness and the position of foreign interests had become desperate. The Chinese Government had even gone so far as to promulgate a decree abolishing extra-territoriality from January 1, 1932 and in this decree the British and American Governments looked like acquiescing. Then literally as well as figuratively came the bombshell of the Mukden incident on the night of September 18, 1931. By the following morning Mukden was under Japanese military control and the whole outlook for China changed. Before going on to deal with those events, it may be noted that the decree abolishing extra-territoriality was withdrawn in December. China now needed friends.

In considering events in the Far East, we shall be wrong if we look on them purely as a Sino-Japanese issue. We must remember that the contest is a triangular one and has been in progress for at least fifty years. Russia has intermittently followed a forward policy in eastern Asia for centuries, but in this review we need not go further back than 1860, in which year a treaty was negotiated between Russia and China which gave the former what is known as the Maritime Province and the Port of Vladivostok. These concessions did not appease Russia's appetite and from that date on until 1904 her pressure southward was continuous. In 1894 war broke out between Japan and China over the question of the protection of Japanese interests in Korea. An

easy victory for Japan followed and the peace terms included the independence of Korea and the cession to Japan of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula. The cession of the latter was, however, more than Russia could stomach and, backed by France and Germany, she successfully brought pressure to bear on Japan to relinquish it. This is an important point because it constituted for Japan her first public humiliation.

Shortly after this, in 1896, the Chinese signed a secret treaty with Russia directed against Japan, the existence of which was not known till after the Great War. The outward and visible sign of this treaty was the grant of permission to Russia to build the Chinese Eastern Railway, which gave her a short cut to Vladivostok. In 1898 Kiaochao was leased to Germany, ostensibly as reparation for the murder of two missionaries. Russia's reaction was to occupy Port Arthur and to secure a twenty-five year lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the right to link up Port Arthur with the Chinese Eastern Railway. Harbin became a great military base and Port Arthur was fortified. The expansionist aims of Russia were then as clear as daylight and contemporary observers in 1900 believed that Manchuria was lost to China.

It is not difficult to realise how humiliating and frightening these developments must have been to the Japanese. One of the direct consequences of Russian policy was the signature of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 1902. In this connection it is worth recalling that at that date we ourselves had very lively apprehensions as to Russian designs on India.

The immediate cause of the Russo-Japanese war was again Korea, then nominally an independent state. Japanese fears of Russian intentions led them in 1903 to ask for a specific guarantee of Korean independence. This Russia refused to give and war became inevitable. It is interesting to note that Japan commenced the hostilities by a raid on Port Arthur without any declaration of war. The Russo-Japanese war was fought by Japan for self-preservation, in revenge for previous indignities and for empire. When exactly the idea of empire took concrete shape I do not know but I think it must have been after the war of 1894. As you know Japan won the war, but by the narrowest of margins only. The war for her was a tremendous thing and called for a colossal effort. The result must have been staggering even to the Japanese themselves. All that, I think, explains something of the half reverent, half proprietary feeling the Japanese have about Manchuria. South Manchuria is to them what Belgium has been to us. As the result of the war, Japan succeeded to

Russia's interests in southern Manchuria and secured the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the recognition of her paramount interests in Korea, over which country she asserted her sovereignty in 1910. Her position, however, was still precarious as it was obvious that Russia was steadily preparing for another conflict.

Japan entered the Great War on the side of the Allies and was responsible for the reduction of the German fortress of Tsingtao. This put her in a position to negotiate with China as to the future of German leased territory and other rights in Shantung. But she went much further than this. Without any outstanding quarrel or cause for complaint she presented China with a series of terms, which are generally known as the Twenty-one Demands. These demands fell into five groups. The first dealt with Shantung. The second dealt with the Japanese position in Manchuria. All Japan's leases were extended to 99 years and special rights of residence, travel and commerce were granted in south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. The other three groups need not be detailed beyond saying that the fifth contained provisions relating to finance, armaments and advisers that would have put China in the position of a Japanese protectorate. The first two groups were accepted by China under threat of an ultimatum. The remainder were rejected.

Now there are two important comments to make on this treaty. The Twenty-one Demands were in one sense a piece of pure opportunism. In another they were a far reaching declaration of policy and show that Japan's aims on the mainland have remained constant for approximately twenty-five years. The second point is that the treaty was signed under duress. Whether the ultimatum was genuine or was, as has been stated by some Japanese, presented at the Chinese request as a face-saving device, the Chinese have since argued that the Manchurian clauses should be null and void as the treaty was executed under pressure. This is a most important point. If the Chinese thesis is tenable the Versailles treaty and half the treaties in the world's history, as the Japanese point out, become inoperative. Actually, the Shantung Settlement embodied in Group I of the Demands was recognised in the Versailles treaty. Nevertheless, since the war the Chinese have consistently behaved as if the treaty was non-existent and done their best whenever practicable to attack Japanese interests in Manchuria and to embroil the League of Nations and America on their own side.

Our next landmark is the Washington Conference of 1921 which incidentally led, as a natural corollary, to the dissolution

of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The results of that conference were firstly, a treaty of naval limitation, secondly, an agreement to adjust disputes in the Pacific by arbitration, and thirdly, the famous Nine-Powers Treaty. That treaty bound the signatories to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China, to maintain the principles of the open door and equal facilities for all, and to afford the fullest opportunities for Chinese self-development. The Japanese position in Manchuria did not come within the scope of the conference.

The results of the Washington Conference constituted a severe setback to Japanese ambitions and a blow to her self-esteem. Remembering what I said about a triangular contest, it is important to note that Russia was not a signatory to any of these treaties. In Japanese eyes that must have detracted enormously from their value and that consideration must always be at the back of their minds when any appeal to the provisions of the Nine-Power treaty is made by third parties.

There is not very much to be said about the period between the Washington Conference and the year 1931. Japan went ahead with the development of her interests in Manchuria and north China and for some years did not meet with much obstruction, as the northern warlords were not ill disposed. But towards the end of Chang Tso-lin's time the situation deteriorated and after his death friction steadily increased. In a number of ways the Chinese tried to discriminate against Japan in Manchuria and there were a number of breaches of the Twenty-one Demands treaty which, as I have just said, the Chinese refused to consider as binding.

Who was responsible for the bomb explosion at Mukden on September 18, 1931, is not known. What is beyond argument is that the Japanese army authorities had a cut-and-dried plan of a comprehensive nature ready for the occasion and that it was put into operation with a swiftness and decision that the situation did not in the least justify, except in Japanese eyes. Japan had a good case as regards Manchuria, but she put herself completely in the wrong by her high-handed action, which rapidly developed into blatant conquest of the whole country. Japan herself proposed that the League of Nations should send a commission of enquiry to Manchuria, but prejudged the issue entirely by proclaiming the country's independence before the commission could start work, and then left the League because she did not like its findings. Early in 1933, Jehol, the most eastern province of Inner Mongolia, was annexed and in the following year P'u Yi,

the ex-Emperor of China, was installed on the throne of Manchukuo, as the new state was now called.

We must now turn back to Shanghai for a moment. The immediate reaction there to events in Manchuria was the imposition of an effective boycott of Japanese goods. Feeling was running high and early in 1932 there was an incident in which a Japanese was killed, which led to fighting between Japanese marines and Chinese troops in Chapei. For this result the Japanese were primarily to blame. They at once treated the whole affair as a major issue and there was virtual war for several weeks. The Japanese had to bring over two divisions from Japan before the Chinese could be defeated and honour satisfied. The Shanghai incident of 1932 was a bad political blunder on the part of the Japanese in that it was unjustifiable, achieved no useful purpose and greatly increased the hatred between the two countries.

The next year (1933) Chiang Kai-shek commenced a long-drawn-out campaign against those centres of communism in central and western China which remained as legacies from Borodin's day. The only points to note are that the communist armies were not exterminated but were gradually driven north into the provinces of Kansu and Shensi and that in the process Chiang Kai-shek was able to consolidate his influence in several remote provinces, where his authority had previously been only nominal.

By the end of 1935 the situation from the Japanese point of view had deteriorated considerably. Russia had immensely strengthened her forces in the Far East and was making open preparations of a warlike nature. Her influence in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia was paramount and the Chinese Red Army was now in contact with Russian spheres of influence. Border incidents involving fighting were of frequent occurrence in Manchukuo which was proving more of a liability than an asset. China was more united than ever before and her army was slowly improving under German instruction. Anti-Japanese propaganda and boycotts had proceeded more or less vigorously for years and murders and assaults on Japanese were not uncommon although Japanese behaviour, admittedly, did nothing to decrease Chinese hostilities. In these alarming circumstances, it must have seemed imperative to the Japanese to secure a hold, either political or otherwise, on North China and Inner Mongolia, before it was too late. In the autumn of 1935 the Japanese militarists attempted to stage an autonomy movement in the five north-eastern provinces

of China. For various reasons the attempt miscarried, but that of course did nothing to allay Chinese suspicions or to make for a more peaceful atmosphere.

The year 1936 opened with what is known as the February revolt in Tokio, when a number of young officers assassinated various pubic men, including the Finance Minister, in an attempt to secure a change in Government policy. For some months the political situation in Japan was highly unstable. In China too, the political situation was delicate as the southern provinces of Kwangsi and Kwangtung, whose leaders had never become reconciled to Chiang Kai-shek, virtually threatened to revolt unless war was declared on Japan. The bluff, however, was called and Chiang Kai-shek's position was strengthened considerably. Towards the end of the year a much more serious incident took place, to wit, the arrest and temporary detention of Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Hsueh-liang, better known as the "Young Marshal," the general who was supposed to be engaged in rounding up the Reds in Shensi. The inner history of this business is still obscure and it is far too complicated to discuss here. Its importance lies in the fact that Chiang came very near being assassinated and because it led to something like an entente with the Communists. In North China, and to a less extent elsewhere, there was constant friction between Chinese and Japanese interests and a vast amount of smuggling went on with Japanese connivance to the detriment of China's customs revenue. During the year Russia signed what amounted to a defensive alliance with Outer Mongolia, to the alarm of Japan and the annoyance of China.

The Sino-Japanese atmosphere was a little clearer at the beginning of 1937 and it did seem for a time as if Japanese policy was to be more conciliatory. There were, however, a number of quick changes of government in Tokio, as the result of which the Army's say in affairs was strengthened. In North China there were indications that the Kwantung militarists were getting restive and observers on the spot were convinced that trouble was imminent. Tension was considerable and there was great nervousness on the Chinese side. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the firing of a chance shot at Loukouchiao on the night of July 7th/8th was sufficient to produce the long expected explosion. I am inclined to think that the fact that the explosion took place at a time when there was acute international tension in Europe and when Russia was in the throes of a political purge which had eliminated most of her best soldiers was not purely a coincidence.

The war proper in China started at the end of July last year when the Japanese, after non-compliance by the Chinese with an ultimatum, proceeded to "clean-up" the Peiping-Tientsin area. It was caused by the usual incident and there followed the usual recriminations on both sides before matters took a serious turn. It is unprofitable to go into the rights or wrongs of the particular episode, because both nations were on the tips of their toes to find fault with one another, although I don't think that the leaders of either actually wanted war.

I want to emphasize here the fact that a war in a country the size of China is a war of communications. Distances are so great, the country in parts so difficult, roads and railways so few that there is no question once one gets inland of fighting on a continuous front with fixed and secure flanks. It is a question of fighting along axes, whether roads, railways or waterways. Railways are naturally a first choice owing to their carrying capacity.

The obvious lines of advance for the Japanese in North China were the three railways, the Pingsui, for protection of their northern flank, the Pinghan and the Tsinpu. I cannot attempt to describe the operations in detail. Generally speaking, the Japanese were everywhere successful. There was serious fighting at a few places only, owing to the fact that the majority of Chinese troops and commanders were of the poorest quality. By the end of October the Japanese had reached the line shown on the maps you have got. I call it a line for convenience, but please remember that Japanese influence did not extend permanently beyond their main arteries of communication. There were, and still are, large areas which were most of the time uncontrolled by them.

We must now go back in time and consider Shanghai. There again hostilities were due to an incident, for which the Chinese were mainly to blame, but from what I have said earlier I think you will have realised that Shanghai has always been the focal point of anti-foreign feeling and that it was, therefore, inevitable that something should happen there sooner or later. In any case it was to the Chinese advantage strategically to split the Japanese effort and there is a presumption that the hope of embroiling foreign powers was an added inducement. For nearly two months the situation at Shanghai approximated to trench warfare. Subsidiary causes of this were the difficulties of the flat, waterlogged country, and the bad weather and faulty tactics on the Japanese side. The main cause was that the Japanese underrated the opposition and employed too few troops. The mistake was

rectified in due course and towards the end of October the Japanese struck a series of heavy and well prepared blows on the Chinese positions. On November 5th an audacious landing was carried out on the northern shore of Hangchow Bay. This turned the Chinese right flank at Shanghai and started a collapse that did not stop until Nanking was captured five weeks later.

About the time that Nanking fell, various circumstances caused the Japanese to resume the offensive in Shantung and by the end of the year they had overrun the more important parts of that province. There ensued a lull of about a month in both north and central China.

Early in February of this year the Japanese advanced again in north China, both in Shansi and Hopei, and, generally speaking, reached the line of the Yellow River, both to the south and the west. In Shantung they attacked towards the end of March with the intention of capturing the eastern end of the Lunghai railway. The fighting round Taierchwang and the Japanese efforts to capture Suchow, which were unsuccessful for two months, are matters of recent history. When at last, on May 19th, Suchow fell, as the result of converging movements from north and south, the Japanese advanced westwards along the railway with Chengchow as objective. They had not got far beyond Kaifeng when their operations were brought to a complete halt by the flooding of the Yellow River between Chengchow and Kaifeng. These floods have flowed south-eastwards and interpose an effective barrier between the Japanese and their objectives. There is, I think, little doubt that the Chinese were responsible. The loss of life and hardship caused to their own countrymen would count for little compared to the strategic advantage to be gained. The net result of this flooding has been to throw the Japanese back on to the Yangtze River as their line of advance on Hankow, which is now their avowed objective. So far they have made reasonable progress and have now reached the neighbourhood of Kiukiang.

I have no time to consider either political developments in China since the war started or the Japanese naval blockade or aerial warfare. But in connection with the latter I will say that the results obtained by the Japanese during six months of undisputed air supremacy have not been very great compared with the effort involved. Latterly the Chinese have got on terms again to some extent, owing to the supply of Russian aircraft, pilots and mechanics.

I now want to comment on a few aspects of the war. The war started in north China. That was the logical area for it

to start in and the Japanese would have been well content had it been confined to that area. The added commitment at Shanghai was unwelcome to the Japanese but was inevitable sooner or later unless they were prepared to evacuate Shanghai and abandon all their interests there. That I think was impossible to the Japanese and would have been equally so to any other nation in their position. The Shanghai commitment had very important consequences. In the first place it disclosed a power of resistance on the Chinese side that was certainly a surprise to the Japanese and probably to the Chinese also. The war at once became a serious affair to the former, face had to be saved and prestige restored. The result was that Japan transferred all her weight to the Shanghai theatre with such results that the Chinese defence cracked and what had originally been undertaken purely to teach the Chinese a lesson became rapidly transformed into a major campaign to capture the capital of China. This, it was confidently predicted, would mean the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's government. As we know, it did not. We are now told that the capture of Hankow must be achieved because it will lead to the same results. Personally I don't think it will by itself. I make the point because I think it shows how considerations of prestige have overridden ordinary questions of strategy and turned the war into an unlimited liability for the Japanese, which was not at all their original idea.

The next point I want to touch on is that after the capture of Nanking the Japanese turned back to North China as soon as the winter was over to round off their conquests there. In doing so, however, they met with a resistance unlike anything they had met with before in the north, and it took them two months' hard fighting to capture the eastern end of the Lunghai railway. The slowness of their progress was initially due to the fact that, as usual, they underrated their enemy. Subsequently when they reinforced their front, all went well, but to do so they had to denude their other fronts to what proved a dangerous extent. Now the point to note is that since last October Japan has had a more or less constant number of troops in China, about 500,000. Japan can mobilize about three times that number and has in fact mobilized about a million men. But she must, as she feels, keep roughly half a million men partly in Manchuria and partly in reserve in Japan, to meet possible intervention by Russia. She also wishes to avoid the grave dislocation of industry which would be involved by a general mobilization. The result of all this is that the number of troops available for the war in

China is strictly limited and the problem of being strong everywhere becomes more and more difficult as the conquest of China proceeds.

Now, if we consider the limitation of the number of troops available in conjunction with the ever increasing scope of the war, we shall realise the very serious dilemma in which the Japanese have placed themselves. Apart from the difficulty of the military problem of gaining a decisive victory, the fact that they must be weak in secondary theatres encourages guerilla warfare and makes it difficult for those areas to settle down and for ordinary commerce and cultivation to be carried on therein. The problem of garrisoning and administering the occupied territory is a difficult one in any case. Every day that the war continues makes it more difficult. Japanese economic policy must be to exploit these territories both as markets and as producing areas with the least possible delay. But the dislocation caused by the continuance of the campaign, and that continuance is of Japan's own choosing since she has never put forward any peace terms that had a ghost of a chance of acceptance, makes the early realization of her economic aims daily more hopeless.

As regards the financial position of the two countries there is reason to suppose that Japan can continue at the present scale of expenditure for at least another year. While the situation will naturally get more and more serious for her, it seems doubtful whether it will ever get bad enough by itself to cause Japan's collapse. China's financial situation is harder to assess. It is definitely very bad now, but then China's internal economy is so unorthodox that I gather that even the experts will not commit themselves to prophecy. As long as she can scrape together enough money to pay her troops and for war materials I think she will manage to carry on.

The last point I want to make about the war is this: We are apt, I think, to look on it rather as a "ragtime" war. So it is, to some extent. The Japanese have made obvious blunders and the Chinese have not merely made blunders but have at times shown such a complete ineptitude for war and such a disinclination for battle that it is not always easy to take their efforts seriously. Yet their efforts have been serious, far more serious than anything in recorded Chinese history and serious enough to extend Japan's available resources very fully. When we are inclined to look on it as a ragtime war, let us remember that the total casualties on both sides, so far, in one year of war, amount, as far as can be estimated, to about 800,000 killed, died of disease.

and seriously wounded or seriously ill. In the four years of the Great War the casualties sustained by the British Empire, albeit in killed only, amounted to roughly a million.

You may think that in this lecture I have been something of a Japanese apologist. It is quite true that I have taken pains to present the Japanese side of the question carefully. I have done that deliberately because it is less well known than the Chinese side and because the present war tends, I think, to prevent our seeing events in their proper perspective. At the moment our sympathies appear to be all with the Chinese. Let us remember that thirteen years ago we were, with the possible exception of the Japanese, the most cordially hated foreigners in China. Let us remember that Chinese policy has been for a century purely opportunist and still is so, as far as one can judge. When it suits her to do so China may be found just as ready as Japan to squeeze out any or all of our interests in the Far East. I suggest, therefore, that in considering the present war in China we should do so in a strictly objective fashion and always remember that it is, as I said at the beginning, only one phase in a struggle that has been proceeding for half a century between three unsentimental and quite unscrupulous nations.

THE IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM

New Articles of Indian Army Interest.

By Major F. G. Harden.

Many officers of the Indian Army have, no doubt, at some time or other, visited the Imperial War Museum, either at South Kensington, where it was lodged until recently, or at its present site on Lambeth Road.

Until this year they would have found articles of general Service interest of the World War period. The only exhibits special to the Indian Army were a few pictures and photographs and the service-dress uniforms worn by half a dozen regiments.

Some of those who were commanding officers or adjutants at the close of the war may have remembered a letter addressed to them, soliciting a set of buttons, badges and articles of regimental interest for preservation in the War Museum, then being formed. If so, they may also have wondered what happened to these souvenirs, for they were certainly not on show.

Actually, they had not, as I had often thought, been sold to a metal-broker or annexed by some badge-collecting maniac. Owing to lack of space at South Kensington, and pressure of work since, it has only this year been possible to have them sorted out, ticketed, mounted in glass frames and suitably displayed.

The museum articles special to the Indian Army are housed together in the west wing.

Large glass-fronted show-cases contain a sepoy's khaki drill uniform, complete with buttons, badges and chevrons of each of the following corps:

Q.V.O. Sappers and Miners.	107th Pioneers.
9th Bhopal Infantry.	2nd Gurkhas.
15th Sikhs.	Army Bearer Corps.
57th Rifles, F.F.	

These uniforms are fixed on frames with the pagris on top or else placed by the boots. Naturally they would be displayed to better advantage if they were worn by dummies; but it is perhaps as well that they should not be, for, unless the heads of the dummies were modelled by an artist who had studied the physiognomy

of our Indian fighting classes, the result to the discerning would be grotesque.

The wall-cases contain various badges, buttons and small articles, grouped by regiments and clearly labelled. There are several hundred items, including such things as badges for caps, pagris, collars, titles for shoulders, buttons, waist-belt clasps, and different varieties of cloth-embroidered patches and "flashes."

Theoretically they are all of World War period, but we suspect that earlier articles have found their way in. We cannot believe that the curious old shoulder-strap made of leather with three strips of brass curb-chain sewn on and bearing badge XII BC. was in use as late as 1914.

Similarly, above the ivorine label "49 Bengalis," we noticed the title-numeral of that war-time regiment grouped with a button and badge of the old 49th Bengal Native Infantry, which, thirty years before the World War started, had been reconstituted as Garhwal Rifles.

The number of articles pertaining to regiments varies greatly. Some are represented by as many as eight items, others by but a single button. Quite a number of corps are, I was sorry to find, unrepresented. In one or two cases an old regular regiment has nothing to mark it, though a brass title of the 2nd or 3rd battalion perpetuates its war-time expansion.

It is interesting to see the relics of those Indian units raised for the war, and now forgotten. We realise how great was the effort of the Indian Army when we read again names such as 45th Cavalry, 4th Bn., 9th Bhopals, 111th Mahars, 3/153 Rifles, and so on . . . .

Why, to-day even titles such as Brahmans, Deolis, Erinpuras, Merwaras, Carnatics, Hazaras and, alas, Pioneers begin to seem unfamiliar to us, and to belong to the army of some far-off age!

Mistakes there are, naturally, in the setting-up and labelling, but, considering the difficulties, surprisingly few. For instance, a brass XL is shown as title-badge of the 40th Cavalry, though those with memories know it to have come from the shoulder-chain of a 10th Lancer; again, a button embossed with $\frac{XX}{DH}$ has found its way into the 20th Hussars area, and must, perforce, remain attached to them till a reorganization enables it to rejoin the Indian Cavalry Corps, in the 20th Deccan Horse sector.

A brass 54 SCC has also gate-crashed into the 54th Sikhs, F.F. and must wait there till it is convenient for it to be removed to the S. & T. serai, amongst the other Sillidar Camel Corps relics.

Since these badges, etc., have been on view many officers have become interested in the exhibits, and have found and presented numerous additional articles, which will, as new cases are completed, be displayed. In the meanwhile, we can recommend any one on leave in London to go and view the Imperial War Museum. It is very well worth a visit. You will find it full of interest, and, like the best things in life—it is free.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1938

By Major J. D. Milne, The Royal Scots

SUBJECT

"Discuss the dictum that the size of modern armies has rendered strategy wholly subordinate to tactics."

Definitions and Principles.

Military, as distinct from national, strategy is usually defined as the leading of troops up to the time of contact with the enemy, and, "has as its object the direction of the movements of an army so that, when decisive collisions occur, it shall encounter the enemy with increased relative advantage." (*Operations of War*: Hamley). Tactics are the methods of employing troops in contact with the enemy.

An army draws all that it needs in food and material from its base along its lines of communications; it is obvious that any threat to these lines of communications constitutes a menace which no commander can afford to ignore and is one of the surest means of forcing an enemy to conform to a commander's movements.

Strategy is, therefore, fundamentally concerned in the following three factors: "The relations of the position of the base and the line of communication to the positions of the opposing armies, the conditions of time and the conditions of space." (*British Strategy*: Maurice). Whilst seeking to secure his own communications, a commander endeavours to "menace the enemy's communications with his base, to destroy the coherence and concerted action of his army by breaking the communications which connect the parts, and to effect superior concentration on particular points" (*Operations of War*: Hamley).

From the foregoing it will be evident that communications are the "Achilles Heel" of an army; this is even more so now than in the past. Since no commander will voluntarily expose his communications to an enemy, it follows that, air attacks apart, an essential preliminary to a thrust against an enemy's line of communication will be the envelopment or penetration of the forces covering that line of communication. In many cases manœuvres designed to create a favourable opportunity for attack precede the decisive attack.

Before considering the matter further, it is necessary to be clear on one other point; the meaning of the word subordinate.

From time immemorial strategy has, to a certain extent, been subordinate to the tactical act of batile in that the finest strategic conception can be made or marred by the equipment, fighting spirit and ability of the troops. This fact is particularly evident in operations on interior lines against converging attacks where any attempt to follow the classic prescription of striking first at the most dangerous opponent will almost certainly lead to disaster unless tactical success is achieved. The subordination of strategy to tactics can, to this extent, be accepted as axiomatic. The dictum under discussion would appear, however, to visualise a more complete subordination; a subordination in which all strategy is still-born until rendered possible by prior tactical success. It is from this view point that the dictum will be considered.

Lessons and Examples.

The lessons of history prove conclusively one fact—that for success in war an offensive strategy and offensive tactics are, sooner or later, essential.

The tactical difficulties in the way of a successful offensive require only brief comment, *i.e.*, the delaying power of modern weapons, barbed wire, defence in depth, trenches, and the difficulty of concealing movement and offensive preparations from hostile air observation are well known. To these must be added the administrative difficulties in pushing the attack to any depth, in the face of constantly stiffening hostile resistance over ground pulverised by concentrated artillery fire. In the Great War, on the Western Front, these conditions combined with the increase in strategic mobility afforded by modern communications to make the achievement of rapid success impossible. The conditions of time and space thus operated in favour of the defence. The advent of armoured fighting vehicles, when employed correctly, created once again the possibility of tactical surprise and obviated the necessity for prolonged artillery preparation, thus preserving the surface of the ground. These factors materially contributed, during the autumn of 1918, to the success and increased depth of penetration of our attacks. Nevertheless, the power of the defence was sufficient to prevent a complete strategic break-through on a scale large enough to produce a decisive victory.

Bearing the foregoing paragraphs in mind, let us now review in broad outline the course of operations in certain recent campaigns and attempt to deduce the extent to which the strategy in those theatres was influenced by the size of the contending armies.

This done, let us consider the problem afresh in the light of modern conditions and experience and draw conclusions applicable to modern times.

The Western Front; the Period of Manœuvre.

In August 1914, on the Western Front, the strength of the opposing forces was roughly as follows: Germans, 1,500,000; Allies, 1,250,000.

Along the common Franco-German frontier the main lines of possible advance were protected by permanent fortifications.

Germany required a quick decision in the west and to obtain this it was essential that these fortifications be side-stepped; hence the necessity for the German invasion of Belgium. By utilising their reserve divisions in the front line and by economy of force on their defensive front in the east the Germans were able to obtain the necessary superiority of force to carry out their enveloping attack through Belgium and at the same time to meet and break the French advance in the Ardennes and in Alsace Lorraine. As soon as the extent of the German thrust through Belgium was understood, the French realized that Plan XVII, on which their concentration was based, was unsuited to the situation then existing. Plan XVII was discarded and troops taken from the southern French armies were hurriedly moved to the north to stem the German advance. The strategic surprise obtained by the enemy through the strength and direction of their advance through Belgium at once threw the Allies on the defensive and forced them to conform to the German plan. The German advance threatened not only to envelop the Allied left flank but to sever the British communications with their bases at Havre and Boulogne. It was only our command of the sea which made it possible for the British Expeditionary Force to avoid this disaster, by establishing a fresh base at St. Nazaire on the Atlantic.

In this case the German plan was rendered possible by the use of reserve divisions which increased the size of the force at the disposal of General Headquarters.

Note well, however, that an open flank existed.

By the beginning of September, 1914, the German right wing had begun to outrun its communications. The German 1st Army under Von Kluck, pushed on to the south-east of Paris in an attempt to envelop the Allied left wing. In so doing, it exposed its own right flank to attack from the Paris area. The counter-offensive of the 6th French Army from Paris was, indeed, checked by the Germans but in so doing, Von Kluck was forced to denude his left of troops and lost touch with the 2nd German Army

under Von Bulow. Into the gap thus created advanced the British Expeditionary Force and the left of the 5th French Army. This advance menaced Von Kluck's flank and rear and also threatened to cut the communications between the German 1st and 2nd Armies. To avoid this, the German right wing commenced a general retreat and with this defeat on the Marne passed the German hopes for a short war. Had the German right wing not been weakened by an increase in the numbers employed in Alsace Lorraine and by the despatch of troops to the Russian front it is probable that their plan would have succeeded and the war might well have ended in 1914. Failure was due not to too many troops but to insufficient numbers being employed on the vital flank.

The Allied advance was checked on the Aisne and the whole front began to stabilise; trench warfare had begun. Mutual efforts to envelop each other's open flank resulted in the so-called race to the sea and by mid-November trench warfare had supervened along the whole front from Switzerland to the North Sea.

The Western Front; Trench Warfare.

A flankless trench barrier now protected the communications of both sides. From this time until the autumn of 1918, although strategy could dictate the strategic axis of advance, strategic fulfilment was entirely dependent on the tactical act of penetration of the hostile front, and this in sufficient width and depth to render a break-through possible. Both sides sought the solution to the problem of obtaining, or preventing, a break-through in a multiplication of material resources. In addition, the numbers on both sides were steadily increased. The enormous increase in material of all kinds now found necessary for the support of an attack further operated to rob strategy of the limited scope still left to it, because purely tactical considerations such as the state of the ground at certain seasons of the year and suitability of the terrain for tank attacks tended to dictate, even more than the strategic advantages likely to accrue from success, the locality in which an offensive should be staged.

In support of this contention, let us consider the German offensive of March 1918. At that time the opposing forces in France were roughly as follows: Germans, 3,574,000; Allies, slightly less.

These forces were disposed on a front of some three hundred and fifty miles. The German problem was to defeat the Allies before American reinforcements arrived in sufficient strength to restore the former Allied superiority in man-power.

four possible offensives were discussed:

(*a*) An attack at St. Quentin against the junction of the British and French Armies—a point known to be weakly held, but where penetration to a considerable depth would be necessary before strategical results could be expected to materialize.

(*b*) An attack between Armentieres and La Bassee.

(*c*) An attack at Ypres.

(*d*) An attack between Arras and Notre Dame de Lorrette

Attack (*d*) was abandoned as being too difficult; attacks (*b*) and (*c*), owing to lack of depth between the front line and the sea, would, if successful, soon have placed the Allied communications in jeopardy, but were abandoned because the ground was too dependent on the weather.

Plan (*a*), the only plan remaining, was, therefore, adopted, since an attack in the St. Quentin sector was not influenced by weather conditions. Ludendorff himself says: "In adopting the St. Quentin plan I was guided by the question of time and by tactical considerations. I was swayed in the first instance by the weakness of the enemy. Further, tactics were more important than pure strategy; strategy was indeed impossible without a tactical success," and again, "A modern battle compels the general to look for the enemy's weakest spot . . . if the plan succeeded the whole British front might be shaken." It was not, however, this alone which decided Ludendorff in attacking at St. Quentin, for strategically his object could have been gained more quickly in Flanders, but "the Flanders battle would have to be postponed until late in the spring and Ludendorff was not in a position to wait." (*Ludendorff: The Tragedy of a Specialist.* Karl Tschuppik).

Similarly, our tank offensive at Cambrai in November 1917 was staged in that area entirely because the terrain was suitable for the employment of tanks.

The Western Front; the Rupture of the Trench System.

By the autumn of 1918, however, the Allies had accumulated sufficient artillery and shells to enable them to mount more than one big attack at a time, thus making manœuvre and surprise once more possible.

Tactical success was still an essential preliminary to strategic exploitation but the chances of a strategic break-through were now enhanced, particularly as the German morale had started to decline. It is true that the Allies did not succeed in encircling or

cutting off any part of the German army, nor was the German army decisively or utterly defeated. Although their trench lines were broken, the German armies continued to preserve an unbroken front and to protect their communications. The vital railway lines feeding the German front were only captured by the Allies after the Germans had fallen back from them in good order.

Generally speaking, the opposing forces on the Western Front were well matched in all respects. In addition, the theatre of war was, in comparison with the numbers engaged, small. Thus, from the moment that open flanks ceased to exist, strategy was hamstrung until tactical success re-opened the possibility of a war of manœuvre. It is worth noting that the nearest approaches to a complete break-through were attained as a result of either the employment of new tactical weapons or the novel employment of existing weapons, *e.g.*, the German use of gas in April 1915, the British tank attacks at Cambrai in November 1917, and on the 8th August 1918, and the German use of infiltration tactics following short and violent artillery bombardments from masses of guns, many of which had not previously registered, in their attacks of 1918.

The Eastern Front.

The troops employed on the Russian front were approximately as follows:

Russians from a minimum of 130 to a maximum of 140 divisions.

Austro-Germans from a minimum of 90 to a maximum of 130 divisions.

The Germans were far superior in every way to the Russians and the Russians to the Austrians. In particular the Russians were markedly inferior to the Germans in the matter of equipment and material resources, and poor communications made the Russian armies extremely immobile. Although the forces employed were large, the front was extensive and the trench system was not nearly so highly organised as was the case in the West; in many cases open flanks existed or could be created by penetration of a weakly held front.

Much of the strategy on both sides was of a high order, but that of the Russians and Austrians almost invariably broke down through lack of mobility, poor execution on the part of subordinate commanders and poor equipment and training of the troops.

In contrast, the German strategy was brilliantly supported by subordinate commanders and troops and striking successes were achieved.

The fact that, in this theatre of war, strategy and not tactics reigned supreme can be seen by a study of the following operations:

(*a*) The Tannenburg Campaign—a brilliant example of correct operations on interior lines.

(*b*) The German Campaign in South Poland in 1914, undertaken to extricate the Austrians from the consequences of their defeat at Lemberg. Of this campaign Hoffman, on page 78 of his "War of Lost Opportunities," says: "In my opinion the campaign in South Poland is the finest operation of the whole war: the rush from Cracow towards the Vistula to relieve our confederates, the retreat on Czenstochau, the throwing of the army from there to Thorn, and the renewed attack on the wing of the fleeing Russians are, as operations, to be classed much higher than the plan for Tannenburg or any other of the victorious battles of the Eastern Front."

(*c*) The defeat and double envelopment of the 10th Russian Army during the winter battle in Masuria, in which the bold decision of the German commander to throw forward his left wing along the outskirts of the Augustovo Forest to the district northwest of Grodno, wihout paying any regard to the fortress, resulted in the capture of 110,000 prisoners. (*The World Crisis*: Churchill.)

(*d*) The battle of Gorlice, in 1915, is an example of successful penetration followed by a wheel of the attacking front so as to envelop the enemy armies in the Carpathians. Although 140,000 prisoners were taken by the Germans and the Russians forced to retire from the Carpathians, the speed of the Russian retreat enabled them to escape envelopment and the attack rapidly developed into a pure frontal advance without prospect of a major strategic decision. Foreseeing this, Hoffman wished to switch all available troops, together with reinforcements to be obtained from France, to the exposed right wing of the Russian force opposite Kouno. He claimed that an enveloping attack from this area, directed on Vilna and Minsk, would cut off the Russian forces in the Warsaw area, who would not have been able to escape the blow by retiring, and would have led to the decisive defeat of the Russian army. This plan was not adopted and the truth of Hoffman's assertions cannot be proven, but it would appear that the possibility of a big strategical success was lost.

(*e*) The Russian offensives against the Germans almost invariably broke down in the face of the superior German equipment and training but against the Austrians the Russians obtained numerous successes. Examples of these are the encounter battle of Lemberg 1914; Brusiloff's offensive in the Bukovina in June 1916 (a frontal attack without previous preparation); and the Russian defeat of the Austrian 3rd Army south of the Dniester in July 1917.

Other examples could be quoted but enough has been said to illustrate the contention that on the Eastern Front strategy remained the dominant partner.

The Macedonian Front.

In the autumn of 1918, the front stretched from the Gulf of Orfano to the Adriatic and, although the rival armies were of approximately equal strength, the Bulgarian armies were known to be war weary.

The main natural lines of advance northwards *via* the Struma, Vardar and Crna Valleys were strongly entrenched and defended but, whilst no open flanks existed, other parts of the front were not heavily entrenched.

Former Allied attempts at advance over these recognised routes of invasion had met with either small success or definite defeat. In September 1918, however, the main Allied attack was directed against the Dobropolje, the most mountainous part of the whole front. This sector, though naturally formidable, was not strongly fortified. A comparatively short advance in this area held out immense strategic possibilities since the most northerly of several lateral lines of communication, the road Tetovo—Skoplje—Kyustendil, was only some fifty miles from the front line. If this road could be reached the Bulgarian armies would be cut in half and the western half faced with the alternative of surrender or retreat into a mountainous and roadless area. Furthermore, the lack of communications in that mountainous area would hamper the arrival of enemy reinforcements and, once initial success had been obtained, co-operation and adhesion between the enemy forces would become extremely difficult. The attack, which was a brilliant success, certainly depended on tactical success for its strategic fulfilment, but the plan, whilst making full use of tactical considerations, was formulated mainly on the strategic results likely to accrue from success. (*Official History*: Macedonia, Vol. II.)

The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1938.

The forces at present engaged in China proper appear to be as follows: Chinese, 1,600,000; Japanese between 500,000 and 600,000.

The theatre of war is extensive and the Japanese enjoy immense superiority over the Chinese in leadership, training and material resources.

In the absence of authentic accounts of this struggle accurate analysis is impracticable, but it is possible to deduce that in all cases where space for manœuvre exists the superior mobility, equipment and training of the Japanese enables them to carry out their strategic conceptions without great difficulty. It is only when manœuvre is cramped or where frontal assaults on entrenched positions have been attempted with inadequate forces, such as occurred at Shanghai and Hsuchow, that the Chinese have been capable of offering serious resistance. Even in these areas, ultimate success seems to have rested with the invaders as soon as they employed sufficient men and materials to enable them to develop a properly organised attack.

In spite of the successful action of Chinese guerillas against the Japanese communications, the successful employment by the Japanese of small mechanized columns in wide enveloping movements seems to have been one of the main features of the campaign.

Another noteworthy feature has been the inability of aerial attack either to destroy the Chinese will to war or to interrupt, for more than a few hours at a time, the railway line from Kowloon to Hankow. Too great importance must not, however, be attached to this as the scale of attack is small compared with the forces which could be made available in Europe, and the methods of bomb release employed by the Japanese appear to be primitive. Moreover, the Japanese attempts to sever communications along the Kowloon-Hankow railway reveal that their ideas as to how air forces can best achieve such an object are immature. Thus, instead of concentrating on continuous attacks on a few really vital points on the railway system, their attacks have been dispersed in sporadic raids over numerous stretches of the line.

Summary.

From the foregoing, it is evident that the delaying power of modern weapons has, in all cases when the opposing armies are equipped in an approximately equal manner, altered the conditions of time and space in favour of the defence. Improvements

in communications and in means of transportation have resulted in an increase of strategic mobility but this has been offset by a loss of tactical mobility. This again operates in favour of the defence. As applied to the Western Front, the advent of the tank restored, to a certain extent, the possibility of tactical manœuvre and surprise but post-war developments in anti-tank weapons make it problematical whether tank attacks of the future will attain the same degree of success as in the past, particularly if tanks have to be used in frontal assaults.

From a study of the campaigns in Russia and China, it can be deduced that mere numbers have little restraining effect on strategy, even when no flanks exist. The limiting factor is proved beyond doubt to be equality of armament and training when combined with lack of space for manœuvre. Thus it would appear that scope for strategy exists when:

(*a*) Space for manœuvre exists.

(*b*) The equipment and training of one side is markedly superior to that of the other.

(*c*) Conditions hampering the mobility of the defence are present.

(*d*) Material resources are great enough to enable several big attacks to be mounted at once, thus causing the enemy to dissipate his reserves and so re-creating the opportunity for surprise.

(*e*) New tactical weapons, or novel methods of using existing weapons, can be employed in sufficient strength and backed by sufficient force to warrant hopes of a strategic break-through.

The Future.

As has been explained, strategy is fundamentally concerned with three factors, the conditions of time and space and the situation of the lines of communication in their relation to the position of the base and the position of the hostile armies. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the lines on which modern armies are being developed and attempt to deduce from the organization of these armies the probable effect of modernization on strategical operations.

The outstanding facts appear to be:

(*a*) The enormous increase in the numbers and technical performance of air forces, the increased accuracy in aerial bombing and the great advance which has been made in the study of the methods of employing such forces.

(*b*) A similar increase in the efficiency and number of anti-aircraft units and weapons, whilst providing better defence, holds out no possibility of absolute prevention of air raids.

(*c*) The great increase in the numbers of automatic weapons with which infantry units are equipped.

(*d*) The increase in the numbers and performance of armoured fighting vehicles which now form part of the armament of all great powers and of many small powers.

(*e*) The universal development of anti-tank weapons.

(*f*) The great advance made in methods of communication by wireless telegraphy and radio telephony.

(*g*) The great increase of civil motor transport with, as a natural corollary, a corresponding improvement in the surface and numbers of roads and the development, for military purposes, of motor vehicles with a good cross-country performance.

(*h*) At the same time, the artillery power of modern armies is, compared with the standards of 1916—1918, small. A feature of the Spanish civil war, however, appears to be the successful employment of bombing and machine-gun attacks by low flying aircraft in direct support of infantry assaults. Against efficient anti-aircraft small arms defence such attacks may be costly but the possibility of aircraft being employed in this manner in substitution for, or to bolster up, weak artillery support cannot be ignored.

The above factors have had, as might be expected, the greatest effect on the way in which continental armies are now organized Horse-drawn transport has largely disappeared and has been replaced by mechanical transport. Mobile divisions, largely composed of light and medium tanks, have been created and a certain number of motorised divisions have been organized as a strategic striking force. Within the infantry the general tendency has been towards an increase of fire power by augmenting the number of automatic weapons and anti-tank rifles and including, within the infantry organization, groups of close support weapons such as trench mortars and "infantry guns."

The mass of continental armies are, however, not permanently motorised although strategic movement of formations from this mass would undoubtedly be carried out by motor transport when desired.

The dominating idea in this organisation appears to be the creation of a powerful aerial striking force, supported by a small, but highly mobile, land striking force, composed of mechanized and motorised divisions. Behind this force would be concentrated the

mass of the land army which, though not permanently motorised, could be moved by motor transport for strategic purposes on specific occasions, or rushed up to consolidate ground won by the striking force.

The war of the future is thus likely to open suddenly, and probably without formal declaration of war. The comparatively small mechanized and motorised forces employed should have ample scope for strategic manœuvre. The success or failure of the initial onslaught may largely depend on whether or not the anti-tank weapon cancels out the tank; or, in other words, whether the conditions of time and space operate in favour of the attack or the defence. Should the initial campaign fail, it would seem that a war in the west of Europe must develop on somewhat similar lines to the last war, *i.e.*, the slower moving mass of the main armies would come into action—both sides would go to ground and as soon as open flanks ceased to exist a war of attrition would commence once more.

It has been suggested, however, that a war of attrition is only unavoidable when equally matched armies face each other in a flankless theatre of war. What, therefore, are the conditions under which such a situation may obtain?

The first condition is obviously a theatre of war in which the area for manœuvre is small compared with the size of the rival armies. The second is that the rival armies shall be equally matched in equipment, fighting spirit and training. A third condition is that the armies shall be of sufficient size to enable them to occupy the whole front in strength and that no flanks shall be exposed to envelopment; in fact, armies such as opposed each other in France during the last war.

The question naturally arises whether armies of the 1916-1918 size will be possible in future war. In brief the factors influencing the size of a well-equipped army are:

(*a*) The size of the population and the extent of the industrial resources and materials at the command of a nation.

(*b*) The advance in medical science which enables large forces to be crowded together without danger of disease.

(*c*) The development in modern communications, and in particular, the development of motor communication in advance of rail head.

As regards (*a*); the material demands of a nation at war will necessitate the employment of a large part of the able-bodied population on production, distribution and transportation of war material, food and other commodities. Large numbers will also be

employed by us in ensuring the security of our sea communications and centres of production. This fact was evident in the last war and may be even more evident in the future.

As regards (*b*); it is problematical whether armies of the size of the 1918 forces can be maintained in the face of modern air attacks on production centres and communications.

Although press comment has recently been made on the inability of the rival air forces in Spain and China to interrupt seriously the communications of the land forces, too great importance should not be attached to this failure. As has already been stated the handling of the Japanese air attacks on communications has been faulty. The writer is not in possession of the facts regarding the method of employment of air forces in Spain but the comparatively small numbers of aircraft and troops employed relative to those available in a war of the first magnitude preclude the formulation of deductions applicable to a first class war. The matter is still not proven. Past experience has, however, proved that, to be effective, attacks on communications must be continuous and must be concentrated on the really vital spots on each separate line of communication. In Western Europe, where many railway lines and good roads exist, complete interruption of communication would be at least difficult, if not impossible, and would entail the employment of a large portion of the available air force on this task alone. Although in well developed countries complete interruption of road and rail communications is thus not likely to be obtained, it should be possible to sever all communications for short periods over a restricted and carefully chosen area.

Interruption of this nature would be of great value if carried out at the time of a big offensive, the part of the hostile front selected for attack being isolated for a period of three or four days by concentrated air attack on the communications leading to the area.

A more profitable method of protracted attack, however, would be the concentration of air effort against the enemy's bases which are constitutionally immobile and which have to be concentrated in order to facilitate smooth working. In the case of a seaborne army similar attacks on its ports of embarkation and disembarkation would, at the least, seriously inconvenience its concentration and subsequent maintenance. In the face of such a concentrated attack on a modern scale, it is difficult to visualise how the enormous quantities of stores, supplies and material of all kinds required for static warfare on the 1918 model could

possibly be assembled and transported. If this proved to be so, large armies could not be maintained and the requisite force to present an unbroken and flankless front would not be available. Thus a higher form of war than that of pure attrition would once more be possible.

Conclusion

The mere size of modern armies does not limit in the slightest degree the carrying out of strategic operations.

Poorly equipped and ill trained masses remain now, as in the past, at the mercy of well equipped and highly trained opponents In these circumstances increased numbers merely lead to increased casualties.

When, however, well matched opponents face each other, the delaying power of modern weapons makes the attainment of rapid tactical success increasingly difficult. As long, however, as space for manœuvre exists, so long will scope for strategic manœuvre remain. It is only when well matched armies face each other in a circumscribed theatre of war, when flanks do not exist and frontal attacks alone are possible, that strategic conception must be largely subordinated to tactical considerations. Even under these conditions the power of the air to isolate a sector of the hostile front and thus delay the arrival of enemy reinforcements, may make it possible for tank supported infantry assaults to effect a strategic break-through before the defence has time to concentrate.

But concentrated air attacks on an army's base and ports of embarkation and disembarkation may well make the maintenance of large armies impossible. If this is so the disappearance of large armies will automatically ensure the disappearance of the flankless front with its corollary of static warfare.

With the departure of these bogies will disappear also the claim of tactics to dominate strategy.

THE NEW INFANTRY TRAINING, 1937

By Lt.-Colonel E.R.S. Dods, M.C.

The object of this article is to point out some of the differences between the new volume of Infantry Training and the old one, and also to discuss briefly the merits of some sections whether new or carried forward from the past.

The preface on page *viii* is interesting in that it foretells the issue of a revised volume about two years hence.

It is good to see that a recruit will now receive instruction in the use of ground, night work and as a scout. Section 9 (12) (*viii*). There can be no question but that a soldier should be taught these subjects very early in his career.

The idea of posting a squad of recruits to a platoon is excellent and should simplify the preparation of training programmes by company and platoon commanders. Unfortunately the majority of battalions in the Indian Army have three or more classes. Even so, if the squads are large enough to enable complete sections to be formed, that will be better than posting men separately to different companies. Sec. 9 (16).

Sec. 11 (i) relating to the individual training of the soldier in war is unfortunately unchanged. It reads as follows:—"The training will consist of:—(i) The training of soldiers in their individual duties in the section in war, including close order drill, fire discipline and the use of ground." Why should those three items be included in this paragraph? There is, or anyhow was until quite recently, a general tendency to neglect the training of soldiers in their individual duties in the section in war during the individual training period, except where they were specially catered for in other paragraphs of this section of Infantry Training, *e.g.*, digging, wiring, scouting, etc. There is a tremendous amount of instruction which can and should be given to the soldier concerning attack, defence, outposts and patrols during this period, and as for mountain warfare there is hardly a limit as to what can be taught. If these subjects are not taught at this period, then collective training is almost bound to suffer. It is hoped that the next volume of Infantry Training will bring more emphasis to bear on this point.

[Infantry Training, 1937 (Training and War), did not reach units in India until May 1938.]

Chapter V, Field Formations, is new and its inclusion in the manual is very welcome.

Chapter VII, Training in Fieldcraft, is also new, and a useful addition to infantry training. Anyone who served on more than one front, or in varying terrain on the same front, during the Great War will realise how vitally important ground always is. Its use to the best advantage must become instinctive to every individual man, and more attention must be paid to it in our tactics during collective training if heavy casualties are to be avoided at the beginning of another war.

The earlier sections of Chapter VIII, Battle Procedure, are also new, and it is important to note that it is now recognised that throughout the battalion orders will usually be issued verbally. (Sec. 42.) Gunner officers carry in their haversacks a pro forma for issuing orders, and the writer has found that this procedure can be applied to battalion orders in the field with good effect. A useful note-book can be made by taking two soft file covers, quartering them and then looping them together, giving fourteen inside pages. Then turn up Field Service Regulations and Infantry Training and devote a page each to warning order, attack, defence, night march, night advance, night attack, outposts, patrols or anything else you fancy. A quick glance at the relevant heading during training will ensure that important points for orders are not overlooked or forgotten.

Patrols are now dealt with separately in Chapter IX which is undoubtedly easier to follow. It is a little unfortunate though, when, having read Sec. 49, you are cheered with the news that there are now only two kinds of patrols, reconnoitring and fighting, to discover in Sec. 53 that the standing patrol is not dead as you hoped. It would appear that the duties of a standing patrol can be performed equally well by a fighting patrol or by a reconnaissance patrol according to the task required of it, and it is considered that the title "Standing Patrol" could well be done away with.

Chapter XI deals with the attack, certain aspects of which will be discussed more fully. Before doing so it may be advisable to look back at the past, and then forward to the future, in order to see whether our instructions for the offensive are adequately framed to meet present-day tactical conditions. For many years the keynote of our training may perhaps be summed up as having been based on mobility plus offensive action. Both of these have been, are, and always will be most necessary in order to achieve victory, but it is thought that too often in the past they have not

been modified to suit the requirements of a particular phase of war or a particular battlefield. At times we have been prone to take our lessons from that phase of a war which appealed to our offensive nature. A classic example of this is Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign in the American Civil War. The lessons of any campaign are manifold, but the writer, quoting from Major-General Fuller in his "Grant and Lee," suggests that the following are of far greater importance than the lessons deduced from the Valley Campaign. It must be remembered that the rifle's effective range at the time was between three and five hundred yards.

Lesson 1. "The great feature of this campaign is the earth-works. When they halt, the rebels make a rifle pit; the second day a regular infantry parapet; the third day an abattis. This is often all done in twenty-four hours. Our men can and do do the same."

Lesson 2. "Throughout the American Civil War seven out of eight frontal attacks failed, whilst seven out of eight rear attacks succeeded."

Lesson 3. "The powers of the rifle were only discovered through trial and error, and it took a year of fighting to realise that a trench, the by-product of a rifle bullet, was as valuable as the product itself."

There can be little doubt that those were, at least, three very important lessons of that war, and they were lessons which have been largely disregarded ever since. They do not decry mobility and the offensive spirit, but rather emphasise that there is a time and place for everything.

The Boer War had many useful lessons but the value of the long range rifle was not fully appreciated by us. Many attacks were successful but others such as Paardeburg where, after nine days' fighting, Cronje surrendered cost us over a thousand unnecessary casualties. Liddell Hart tells us that at Biddulphsburg eighteen Boers defeated two whole battalions, which only goes to prove how difficult it is to attack even a few resolute enemy who can use ground skilfully.

Turning next to the Great War no one can deny that the trench was the keynote to all fighting. Whether the country was flat and undulating as in France, flat and devoid of cover as in Mesopotamia, or rocky and hilly as in Gallipoli, to mention only three battle fronts, we find trenches. That *rara avis* the encounter-battle, for which we have done so much training in the past, was

seldom met with even at the beginning of the Great War. In one or two instances French and German forces did meet in an encounter-battle in 1914 but on the rest of the front, as at Mons, and on other fronts such as East Prussia, Mesopotamia and Palestine, and in the American Civil, Boer and Russo-Japanese wars it will be noticed that one side had nearly always adopted the defensive before the two forces met. Nor was it always the defending force which had the worst of the ensuing battle. At Sheikh Saad in Mesopotamia, for example, where the Turks were inferior in numbers but greatly assisted by the flat desert country, no fair critic will deny that that three days' battle was a Turkish success. Too often has the commander of an attacking force forgotten the value of two of Wellington's principles: "Never fight except on your own ground and at your own time" and "never knock your head against a strong position."

The trench was again much in evidence in the Grand Chaco in South America, and appears to play an equally prominent part in Spain to-day. Why should it not do so in the future and why do we not train more for its use? Some people hope that the tank will restore permanent mobility to operations, but if the lessons of the past have been correctly interpreted a nation likely to be invaded will have an anti-tank line from which to operate, so that a really mobile campaign from the outset of war to its finish is not very probable. It appears more reasonable to suppose that in a future war our tactical successes will follow the general lines of those gained in the last Great War, which appear to continue in Spain to-day. These can be divided into two categories. The first, which requires the offensive spirit, is similar to those gained in France, from 1915 onwards, by the aid of surprise in one form or another, whether in the time of attack, the weight of numbers or shell, the use of artificial weather conditions or of new weapons. The second, which requires both the offensive spirit and mobility, is also gained by various methods of surprise, but is less dependent on shell power, and is comparable to those victories achieved in Mesopotamia and Palestine in 1918.

It should be remembered that in both cases our attacks started from trenches in close proximity to those of the enemy.

Infantry training is written for the Army at home. Here in India from a fighting point of view we can justifiably say there is a shortage of tanks and artillery. The moral seems to be that we must be more careful of what we set our infantry to do, especially in the attack. In war, principles hold good for ever, but little else. The weapons of the enemy and the nature of the country

will always vary, and it is almost impossible to advise generally on minor tactics without taking these two factors more fully into consideration. For this reason it is considered that Sec. 62 of Chapter XI contains some matter which can easily be misinterpreted. Remembering Wellington's dictums how does Sec. 62 (5) now strike the reader? It deals with the action of rifle companies during advanced guard fighting and the second paragraph is as follows: "When the leading companies come under the effective fire of machine-guns and rifles, they will be forced to fight their way forward with their own weapons and such assistance as may be obtained from machine-guns, mortars, artillery and tanks." Is this really possible in war? It is unfortunately too often seen during collective training since no amount of instruction to date has enabled the most willing umpire to paint a really warlike picture. Nor can the rank and file be easily slowed down during field training.

The fourth paragraph of this same section reads: "When, owing to increasing opposition, the advance shows signs of coming to a standstill, commanders should take steps to ensure that all necessary viewpoints and tactical features on the front are seized and held in order that the further attack may be planned and prepared successfully."

There may be times when this is possible but since the enemy are mentioned as having machine-guns, and assuming that our advance guard has not been given any tanks, it is more than likely that any battalion or battalions which, in one day, have got as close to the enemy as is envisaged, will have suffered very heavy casualties. It would seem that Foch's third task for an advanced guard, to find and fix the enemy is of easier interpretation. To anyone who is doubtful about these minor tactics and who has not tested them out for himself, it is suggested that he should do so in the following manner. The test is preferably carried out with a battalion, but could also be performed by a smaller or larger force. The first day act as an advance guard, with a skeleton enemy of from half to a quarter of the attacker's strength. Criticise all work fairly as you normally would. Next day repeat the exercise with yourself commanding the enemy, and then criticise from their point of view. It will be surprising if you are not converted to the view that advance guard attacks will seldom succeed. The enemy must be very demoralised, or the country very favourable, one might almost say unusual, as in Waziristan, if the use of the trench is to be disregarded. Nor, with the best battle drill in the world is it likely, even against a hastily prepared

position, that any commander higher than a battalion commander will be able to develop a successful attack on the same day that his advanced guard encounters such opposition. The men have to be given orders and it takes long enough for a battalion commander to stage an attack on his own; it takes even longer for a higher commander to appreciate the situation and issue his own orders for a properly co-ordinated attack. And often it is hoped that such an attack will be a flanking one. The conclusion reached, therefore, is that we want to teach our infantry to gain contact and then go to ground as a preliminary, possibly the next day, to a frontal attack from trenches (offensive spirit) or to a night march and rear or flanking attack (offensive spirit and mobility). Such tactics, it is thought, are more normal than those taught at present and would form a better basis for training for a future war.

Officers working for examinations should note that the intelligence section is now referred to in the intercommunication paragraph of orders [Sec. 64 (5) (viii)].

During the assault the platoon commander now leads his men [Sec. 67 (4)].

When a raid is carried out it is essential that the enemy should not be able to identify the unit to which a captured man belongs [Sec. 72 (3)]. This being so, the raiders must leave their identity discs behind and care should be taken to see that rifle butt discs and equipment are not marked with the unit's abbreviated title. This may be difficult during the initial stages of a war.

Chapter XII dealing with the defence has certain changes of which [Sec. 74 (8)] is the most important. This section deals with the question of the sort of trenches which should be dug. The "crawl" trench is a useful expression which has undoubtedly come to stay.

Appendix IV is new and contains useful information on the development of field defences. It must not be forgotten that the calculations on page 221 are for tasks in "average" ground. Possibly "easy" ground would be a better term to use and, since this type of ground is far less common in India than may be supposed, it follows that most of the trenches dug during training take considerably longer to construct. The same remark applies to wiring, since it is often necessary to dig a hole for every screw picket before it can be sunk sufficiently deep to carry out the work required of it.

In concluding this short attempt to review the new manual it must be pointed out that there are many minor changes to which no reference has been made. Special sections in various

chapters dealing with mortars and anti-tank weapons for example have not been referred to, but to compile a full and detailed comparison of the new and old books would take up too much space for an article of this nature. Not everyone will agree with the writer's views on the necessity for the revision of our attack tactics, but it is hoped that many will do so. Apart from frontier fighting, regarding which it is understood a new manual is in the course of preparation, it has been pointed out how difficult it is to frame minor attack tactics to suit every possible kind of enemy and any and every sort of terrain. It is suggested that if anyone feels inclined to rewrite a chapter on infantry in the attack that a passably good solution would be obtained if it was sub-divided into the following three main headings:

Firstly, the gaining of contact. This would include the action of advanced guards and would normally end with the leading troops going to ground in weapon pits.

Secondly, the attack proper. In the case of a frontal attack it would include the break-in and the break-through. It would also deal with the attack from the flank and the rear.

Thirdly, the pursuit. Once an enemy is on the run, every endeavour must be made to prevent him rallying. Infantry will often co-operate, possibly being carried in mechanical transport for this purpose, and mobility combined with offensive action will be the basis of this phase of the operations.

SECOND ECHELON IN FRONTIER OPERATIONS

By Major J. E. Hirst, 2nd Punjab Regiment

Note.—For the benefit of readers who may be unacquainted with India it is necessary to explain briefly the scope and purpose of the Special Procedure Pamphlet referred to in the following article.

This Pamphlet is the outcome of the periodical minor wars (involving reinforcement of the normal garrison) which have become an almost hardy annual on the N.-W. Frontier. For some time the administrative arrangements and orders governing these operations were worked out ab initio *on each occasion.*

The Pamphlet provides a means by which a selected force can be placed on an operational footing at short notice without the use of the word "mobilize." At the same time it introduces the provisions of Mobilization Regulations except as modified in the Pamphlet. It is designed so that if general mobilization occurs after a force has been despatched under its provisions, no administrative difficulties should arise. For example, the Pamphlet provides for the adoption of the war system of accounting for pay, rations, clothing and equipment. It also provides for the creation of "temporary" unit depots which remain at peace stations, and can later be merged into the war system of depots without difficulty if this becomes necessary. And it provides for the creation of a "2nd Echelon" office and system if this is warranted by the size of the force.

The Pamphlet does not attempt to cater for the administrative problems peculiar to any particular situation which may arise once the force has been despatched to its destination. Nor does it cater only for Frontier operations. It was used for the preparation of troops for despatch to Aden and Abyssinia in 1936 and to Hong Kong in 1937. In the latter case, many difficulties arose because the local authorities were not allowed to administer the unit on the war system of rations, clothing, etc.

The Pamphlet can be applied in whole or in part to any selected force or in any selected area or areas.—Ed.

By far the most important responsibility of the Adjutant-General's Branch in war is the supply of personnel to the forces in the field, and arrangements for the selection and despatch to units of all ranks to make good deficiencies. This demands the collection and compilation of detailed statistical information which is carried out by what is called 2nd Echelon.

During the past few years, much attention has been paid to the working of 2nd Echelon during Frontier operations, and the Special Procedure Pamphlet now states that the formation conducting the operations will be responsible for forming a nucleus 2nd Echelon to carry out the duties summarized in Field Service Regulations. There is still, however, a good deal of doubt and misunderstanding regarding its functions. Even the name conveys little, and it might be changed with advantage. Those with experience of the Great War may have a hazy recollection of a big office at the Base, but the majority, unless they have been actively engaged on the Frontier in recent years, probably regard a 2nd Echelon as a peculiar institution with which they are not concerned, and which only emerges when mobilization is ordered.

There is a story told of an officer who was detailed as O.C., 2nd Echelon (N); (N referring to Nucleus). Whilst hastily packing his kit he casually asked a friend what his duties would be. The reply he got was: "Something to do with burying the dead, and disposal of deceased officers' kits. Anyhow it is all in the book!" There is a germ of truth in this reply, but the O.C. designate soon discovered that his duties were rather more numerous and onerous. Information of a general nature is to be found in F.S.R., Vol. I, in the Special Procedure Pamphlet, and in a lengthy publication known as The Regulations for the working of G.H.Q., 2nd Echelon. None of these references, however, completely cater for the peculiar conditions of operations on the Frontier, and the object of this article is to collate the experiences of the past few years as a guide for those who may have dealings with, or who may be interested in, 2nd Echelon. It is proposed, therefore, to examine the staff duties side of the problem first and then to proceed with an account of how 2nd Echelon works; what are its difficulties, and how they may be overcome.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Captain E. H. Cotterill, M.B.E., 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, who allowed me to make use of his Report on the 2nd Echelon (N) 1937.

Staff Duties

From the staff duties point of view, the chief difficulty experienced has been to effect a quick change over from peace procedure to an operational footing under conditions not entailing mobilization. Operations on the Frontier may begin as the result of many causes, but it is usually only after a lapse of time that the provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet are introduced. This produces a lag that only strenuous work and careful planning can make up. It will be apparent, therefore, that the "A" Staff of the formation conducting the operations starts off in circumstances entirely different from those contemplated in Mobilization Regulations, and, at a slight disadvantage. A good deal can be done, however, as soon as it is known that the situation on any part of the Frontier is likely to deteriorate. (The necessity for close liaison with the General Staff does not require to be stressed.) At this stage "A" staff officers must begin to think in terms of units to be raised, personnel and establishments, so that there will be no delay in drafting their paragraphs of the administrative order which may have to be issued. Warning orders and, on occasions, demi-official letters can be very helpful. Army Headquarters is usually quite prepared to give authority in advance so that the various parts of the Special Procedure Pamphlet can be applied directly the necessity arises. Considerable forethought, however, is required, because once the Special Procedure Pamphlet has been applied, changes in administrative policy lead to confusion and make it even more difficult to overcome the time lag.

Strengths

2nd Echelon exists primarily to provide reinforcements, and the supply of personnel must be as systematic as the supply of any other commodity. But the necessary calculations are made more complicated and the reinforcement situation made more obscure unless all establishments are fixed from the beginning of the operations. These may be varied from time to time at the discretion of the commander, but the "A" staff require ample warning when such changes are contemplated in order that they can be put into effect smoothly and without dislocation of the 2nd Echelon machinery.

As a rule, however, difficulties are not likely to arise, except that Royal Indian Army Service Corps units have certain

peculiarities which require to be understood. The following are examples:

Minimum strengths are not laid down for an animal transport unit; it is expected to move with sufficient men and animals to enable it, in the opinion of the commanding officer, to perform its duties satisfactorily. The views of commanding officers, however, vary considerably and, unless some degree of control is exercised by the formation conducting the operations, no two units will arrive in the theatre of operations at the same strength, to the everlasting confusion and annoyance of 2nd Echelon. When supply units come on to a war footing, certain personnel, *e.g.*, lascars, who are employed in peace, are no longer authorized, because there is no mention of them in War Establishments. If the retention of this surplus is considered essential it must be regularized immediately.

Temporary Depots and Reinforcements

The functions of temporary depots are given in the Special Procedure Pamphlet, and the main point to notice is that they act as reinforcement camps to their own units. They each send returns to 2nd Echelon, and unless these are accurately compiled, and despatched at the correct time, much unnecessary correspondence ensues.

The temporary depots of units for which minimum strengths have been laid down do not give cause for worry; each has its own quota of reinforcements, and improvisation and special orders are not required. For units which do not work on minimum strengths, arrangements are necessary for the formation of temporary depots and the supply of reinforcements. The first requirement, therefore, is to decide which units and establishments shall act as temporary depots for these units, and also for those raised specially for the operations. Miscellaneous personnel, such as nursing sisters and the men of the Indian Army Corps of Clerks must not be overlooked. It should also be remembered that the Command in whose area the operations may take place is responsible, as far as it can, for providing all personnel for new units; after which Army Headquarters can be asked to help.

In 1937 No. 1 Temporary Personnel Depot, R.I.A.S.C., was formed as the temporary depot for—

Supply personnel.

Mechanical transport personnel.

Animal transport (mule) personnel.

Indian superior personnel of camel units.

2nd Echelon demanded its reinforcements from this depot, which in turn placed its demands as follows:

British officers ... British other ranks ... Viceroy's Commissioned officers (supply). Viceroy's Commissioned officers (animal and mechanical transport units). Indian superior personnel ...	On Headquarters, Northern Command.
Indian other ranks [animal transport (mule) units].	On the animal transport training companies at Lahore and Meerut.
Indian other ranks (mechanical transport) units.	On the mechanical transport training battalion at Chaklala.
Followers	By direct enrolment in consultation with the recruiting officer concerned.

This indicates the arrangements that have to be made to co-ordinate the needs of a number of comparatively small units. By dealing with one central authority, the work of 2nd Echelon was made much easier.

An account of temporary depots and reinforcements would be incomplete without a reference to followers. It is essential that the follower establishment of all units should be kept up to strength, but occasions arise when the numbers at the call of 2nd Echelon fall short of demands and, to remedy this, the Special Procedure Pamphlet authorizes the formation of a "Followers Pool." It should be attached to a unit, preferably an Internal Security unit, near a large recruiting centre. Its size is largely determined by wastage figures in which the medical directorate can be of great assistance, and both skilled as well as unskilled non-combatants are required. There is no such thing as a Corps of Followers, so followers have to be enrolled into the unit selected for the purpose, and attached for temporary duty with units in the area of operations as required.

The Forming of 2nd Echelon

Considerations of strengths, temporary depots and reinforcements having been satisfactorily settled, the "A" staff is now in a position to begin preparations for the forming of 2nd Echelon, but before discussing these there are certain matters of policy to which attention must be drawn.

The sanction which delegates to the commander of the force the authority to apply the provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet usually permits the application of the whole pamphlet, or individual paragraphs at his discretion. The first question which arises is: Should a 2nd Echelon be formed immediately, or at a later date? Experience shows that there can only be one answer: immediately. Apart from the difficulty of overcoming the time lag, to which reference has already been made, 2nd Echelon is the only method by which casualties can be quickly and accurately reported.

The manner in which the special procedure for war is brought into force is familiar to everyone. A punitive column perhaps encounters stiff opposition necessitating reinforcements from its own Covering Troops district. They may not suffice, and more are required from other districts as the situation deteriorates. The provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet are applied, and it is now for decision whether all the forces within the defined area of operations shall come under the control of 2nd Echelon, or only those who have moved, or may move, into it. In 1937 a compromise was made whereby 2nd Echelon reported all battle casualties in the area of operations, but the peace time units of the Waziristan Military District, with the exception of those of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps, were not under its control for other purposes. This led to a duplication of work; certain 2nd Echelon duties devolved on the headquarters of Waziristan Division which had not the staff to deal with them; and 2nd Echelon was never able to present a true picture of Wazirforce as a whole. It would be unwise, however, to be too dogmatic on an important question of this nature; the arguments on both sides are many, but from the 2nd Echelon point of view, it is desirable that all units within the area of operations should be under its control.

The third item on which a decision is required relates to the issue of orders; 2nd Echelon is part of the "A" branch of the formation conducting the operations, and it is preferable that the officer in charge should issue his own orders, subject to the policy laid down from time to time.

When 2nd Echelon working was first introduced in Frontier operations difficulty was experienced in arriving at a correct establishment. The war establishment and war equipment table for G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon appeared to have been designed for a world war and were too elaborate, and it was only after trial and error that a satisfactory establishment was evolved. Appendix I shows the organization of 2nd Echelon, as it existed in 1937. This is probably the minimum for Frontier operations of any size, and the number of senior clerks that was considered essential is noteworthy. There is always a shortage of clerks but it is advisable to send only the best to 2nd Echelon. It should be remembered that the provision of most of the record clerks is automatic —they are allowed for in war establishments, but in the case of units which do not exist in peace arrangements have to be made.

A statistical sub-section was not included in the 1937 organization, but it is now generally accepted that one is desirable. The maintenance of statistics is, however, skilled work, and if it is decided to introduce this sub-section, Army Headquarters should be asked to detail one of its experts, with a calculating machine, in the capacity of supervisor and instructor.

A standing committee of adjustment is not required. Temporary depots deal with the estates of deceased British officers and other ranks; all effects of casualties must be sent to temporary depots, and not to 2nd Echelon.

The command of 2nd Echelon is none too easy, and whenever possible an officer with previous experience should be detailed. If this is not possible there may be one with experience somewhere in India whose services can be made available for a few weeks to supervise the settling down process and preliminary work. In any case it will be of great assistance if the commanding officer designate visits the headquarters of the formation conducting the operations, where he can be put into the picture, and learn details of the medical plan. Eventually he will be intimately concerned with medical installations and it will be to his

advantage to know which are being used, and where they are. The officers employed with 2nd Echelon are part of the "A" Staff, and they should be graded for the purposes of pay, and included in the list of staff officers in the order of battle. The issue of brassards to denote their status has a marked psychological effect. The officer in charge requires an imprest account, and this should be arranged as soon as possible.

The composition of 2nd Echelon and numerous other details having been decided, it should not be forgotten that its location is of importance. It has been found that personal liaison has helped to smooth away many difficulties, and it should therefore be located as near the theatre of operations as possible. On the other hand, once fixed, it cannot be moved without considerable dislocation. Barrack accommodation with electric light and room for expansion is most desirable. The personnel work long hours, and their comfort is also worth consideration.

Like other units which do not exist in peace, 2nd Echelon is dependent on Delhi and Calcutta for its supply of books, forms, regulations, stationery and office equipment. Again the war equipment table is not helpful, but experience has produced workable scales. In order to save time it is advisable to ask Army Headquarters to authorize the supplying departments to despatch these articles by passenger train on the receipt of a wire from the formation conducting the operations. Even then some delay is unavoidable owing to the distance involved, and the staff can help very materially by providing a supply of essentials to tide over the first few days.

Rest Camps and Reinforcement Camps

To complete this brief survey of staff duties, mention must be made of rest camps and reinforcement camps.

2nd Echelon calls up reinforcements, which, having been despatched by temporary depots, gradually converge on the theatre of operations. They cannot, however, make their own way to their units, and a rest camp has to be interposed on the line of communication. In many cases rest camps exist in peace at suitable railheads, and only expansion is necessary; but if such an arrangement is not available, a special unit must be raised, consisting of British and Indian sections as laid down in war establishments.

In India a rest camp fulfils the functions of the reception camp referred to in F.S.R., Vol. I.

Occasions may arise when formations and units from other Commands are engaged. Temporary depots are left behind, but their distance from the theatre of operations is often so great that unnecessary delay occurs in the arrival of reinforcements. This can be overcome by forming a reinforcement camp at some suitable place, at which temporary depots maintain a specified number of personnel. Elaborate arrangements are not necessary; all that is required is the forming of attached sections to be administered by appropriate units in the selected station.

2nd Echelon

Having obtained all the information and guidance possible in the short time at his disposal, the officer in charge, 2nd Echelon, leaves the headquarters of the formation conducting the operations, and makes his way to the station where 2nd Echelon is to be formed. He probably has with him: one or two clerks, some boxes of forms and stationery, one or two typewriters and a duplicating machine; a small nucleus from which to form such an important office. Even if he has had previous experience he will, if wise, make notes of the hundred and one things he has to attend to. On arrival at his destination he must take over the buildings allotted to him, arrange for furniture, and make sure that the promise of a telephone is being implemented. In the course of the next few days the remainder of his headquarters will begin to arrive, and will require accommodation. Before long unit record clerks will also begin to arrive, and similar arrangements for them must be made. His office has been placed under the local commander for local administration; there are numerous people to see, and a good deal to do in a very short time; but although these preliminaries are essential, the most important of his instructions is that 2nd Echelon must begin to function on a definite date. His first task, therefore, is to issue, as soon as possible, an order to give effect to this instruction.

Appendix II is a copy of 2nd Echelon (N), Order No. 1 issued for the Waziristan Operations, 1937. It was subsequently slightly amended, but remained unchanged in substance and was the basis of very successful 2nd Echelon working. It will repay

examination, because it shows how 2nd Echelon gathers the threads into its own hands and how details have to be thought of and carefully co-ordinated (The references are to the old edition of the Special Procedure Pamphlet).

Although all the forms mentioned in F.S.R., Vol. I, Appendix III, were not taken into use, it will be seen that a good many are referred to in the order. The submission of routine forms plays a large part in office work on service, but judging from the complaints made by 2nd Echelon, unit clerks are rarely taught their use, or exercised in preparing them, in peace. The mobilization box kept by a unit in peace appears to be opened only when the latter is ready to leave for the theatre of operations, and incorrectly compiled returns during the first few weeks lead to unnecessary correspondence and much overtime work in 2nd Echelon. It is suggested that it is too late to learn the use of mobilization forms once operations have begun, and commanding officers could help considerably by giving their clerks opportunities for practice during peace training. Other opportunities occur on manœuvres—higher formations can call for the more important returns as part of the administrative problems.

Although operations on the Frontier are fought under conditions not entailing mobilization, mobilization forms are taken into use. They are designed on the supposition that units will be working on war establishments, but confusion sometimes occurs because so many units are on minimum strengths. This is particularly so in the case of the Field Returns (A.Fs. W-3008 and 3009). These are intricate forms, and units experience difficulty in interpreting the instructions printed on the covers, but since it is impracticable to hold two sets of forms, the officer in charge, 2nd Echelon, must issue explanatory routine orders.

The organization of a 2nd Echelon is given in Appendix I. This division into Sections "A," "B" and "C" is constant, irrespective of the type of operations; and the principles governing the working of each section remain unchanged.

"A" Section

"A" Section is responsible for the maintenance of records, the issue of Part II Orders, and statistics.

The records sub-section maintains a complete record of the service of every individual throughout the operations. Information received from various sources is entered on "Service and Casualty forms" (A.F. B-103 and I.A.F. F-958), and their safe custody and accurate completion are matters of great importance. On receiving orders to join 2nd Echelon, unit record clerks take with them these forms, together with the nominal rolls of the unit; when no clerk is detailed in war establishments for 2nd Echelon, they are sent by post to the officer in charge as soon as possible. The service and casualty form of every man proceeding as a reinforcement is similarly disposed of, unless he has already served in the area, in which case 2nd Echelon is in possession of his documents. It should be noted that Mobilization Regulations, India, 1937, authorizes the use of A.F. B-103 for officers, although no mention is made of it for them in F.S.R., Vol. I. The officer in charge distributes unit record clerks according to the work that has to be done; he may decide to group small units, *e.g.*, form a Royal Artillery and Royal Tank Corps group, and thus relieve men for other duties.

The unit record clerk has important duties to carry out, and only reliable men should be sent to 2nd Echelon. Besides keeping a complete and accurate nominal roll of his unit or group he is responsible for compiling each service and casualty form. He extracts his information from the casualty return sent in by units (A.F. W-3010 and 3011), from field ambulance returns (A-36), hospital returns and convalescent depot returns. In additon, he receives each week a collection of offence reports. In major operations, these are checked by the discipline sub-section, but in operations on the Frontier, a special sub-section is not necessary, and the checking is done by an officer or senior clerk. Difficult cases can be sent to the deputy Judge Advocate-General of the appropriate circuit for advice. Much unnecessary correspondence and work can be obviated by those awarding punishments ensuring that their awards are legal and that all the details given are full and correct.

It might be thought that a casualty return has special reference to a battle or an engagement, but from a 2nd Echelon point of view a casualty is an event affecting a soldier's service; for example, battle casualties, accidents, admission to a field medical

unit, any kind of promotion, transfers, attachments, courts-martial, field punishments, forfeiture of pay, leave, alterations of name or address of next-of-kin or transfers to the "X" List. The "X" List is a list kept up by unit record clerks on which are entered the names of men who have either been posted, not attached, to fill a vacancy on a headquarters or other unit, or evacuated to a field medical unit. Since men on this list are struck off the strength of their units, and are replaceable by reinforcements, changes must be notified to "C" Section.

Part II Orders are compiled and issued weekly; on A.F. O-1810 for other ranks, and A.F. O-1810-A for officers. They are published separately for each unit, but for Royal Indian Army Service Corps units, it is more convenient to group animal transport, mechanical transport and supply personnel, and to issue separate orders for each category. They are compiled from the various returns, and the main principle to be observed is that as full information as possible is published in them, in order that all concerned may be kept fully informed of every circumstance affecting the service or pay of officers, other ranks and followers. 2nd Echelon, however, cannot be held responsible if the necessary details are not forthcoming, and there are occasions when temporary depots are concerned. They hold the permanent records of all personnel engaged and when, for example, a soldier is entitled to an increment of pay, the officer commanding the temporary depot should inform the unit in the field, which in turn reports the fact on its casualty return. By this means the necessary Part II Order can be published. Mention is made of this because it is sometimes thought that 2nd Echelon automatically publishes orders regarding pay.

A reference has already been made to the fact that operations on the Frontier are conducted under conditions not entailing mobilization. Mobilization Regulations, India, and F.S.R., Vol. I, can therefore only be taken as a guide. This situation affects the distribution list of Part II Orders, and the lists given in the manuals require amplification. Officers in charge of Records in England, temporary depots, the Controller of Military Account's Clearing House and many others want copies, and it is necessary to decide at the outset on a comprehensive list.

It is interesting to know that, in 1937, 2nd Echelon maintained the service and casualty forms of 45,451 men.

Besides being responsible for providing statistical information regarding the man-power situation, both to answer questions and for historical use, the statistical sub-section prepares statements showing the reinforcement situation, the number of reinforcements required, strengths in the field and their distribution and wastage. The information is obtained from the various returns which are received in 2nd Echelon, and the sub-section must keep up a close liaison with the other sections and seek out what is required.

"B" Section

The primary function of "B" Section is the correct reporting of all battle casualties, and those caused by sickness and disease. This section also contains a "Returns" sub-section which acts as a clearing house for returns.

The reporting of battle casualties takes precedence over all other work, and since 2nd Echelon is frequently thought to be responsible for the delays that sometimes occur, it will serve a useful purpose to point out the difficulties with which it has to contend. The first necessity in reporting battle casualties is accuracy, and this is not possible unless all the details are given, and unless the information regarding the next-of-kin as recorded on the service and casualty form is correct. The following instances of incorrect information were noticed in 1937:

(*a*) Next-of-kin—"Wife, with husband."

(*b*) Old 1918 forms which did not show the next-of-kin had been sent to 2nd Echelon.

(*c*) Forms, purporting to refer to certain Departmental warrant officers, had not been brought up to date since their original enlistment in the British Army.

The responsibility of commanding officers in the matter of the correct completion of service and casualty forms cannot be over-emphasized.

The means by which casualties are reported by 2nd Echelon vary in accordance with the type of person concerned, and a complete list is to be found in the Special Procedure Pamphlet. In

most cases the first news is conveyed by telegram, but this is frequently anticipated by rumours which are always prevalent after an engagement. Uncertainty is often made worse by the incomplete announcements of the British Broadcasting Corporation, which cannot give full details. It is comparatively easy for a news agency to cable brief reports, mentioning numbers of casualties without names, but 2nd Echelon has to be more accurate. A definite routine must be followed which, of necessity, takes time.

Battle casualties are usually reported by wireless in the evening; that is when signal traffic is very dense and delay in transmission is often unavoidable. Moreover, if 2nd Echelon has the slightest doubt of the accuracy of any report, it must be referred back, because delay is preferable to inaccuracy.

It has been found that twenty-four hours usually elapse between the time a casualty is reported by a unit, and the time it is reported officially by 2nd Echelon. This may appear to be unnecessary delay, but in view of the many factors involved, it cannot be avoided.

In addition to reporting battle casualties, "B" Section reports hospital cases on the dangerously ill and seriously ill lists from any cause, and all deaths.

"C" Section

The task of "C" Section is to maintain units at their authorised strength by reinforcements. The authorised strength is either that given in war establishments, or the minimum strength or an establishment laid down for the operations, and this variation alone causes much additional work in verifying unit demands. When no statistical sub-section is formed the preparation of certain man-power returns also devolves on "C" Section.

In 1937 the daily strength state (Message Form A.F. W-3006), was not used, and reinforcements were calculated from the weekly strength returns. In the event, however, of large deficiencies owing to battle casualties or an epidemic, there is nothing to prevent "C" Section from demanding reinforcements without waiting for the weekly returns. "B" Section will give warning of such a contingency. Mention has already been made of the intricacy of these forms, and errors in compilation were very

frequent. Suggestions for their improvement are under consideration. After check, the strength returns are consolidated to show the strength of the Force on each Saturday night, together with deficiencies.

Having calculated the number of men required to make up deficiencies, "C" Section places demands on temporary depots and reinforcement camps, but before this can be done it must know the man-power situation. Information is obtained from the returns sent in by temporary depots showing, on Saturday night, the numbers, by ranks, of fit reinforcements on depot or station duties, on leave, sick or convalescent. Further information is abstracted from unit field returns, and returns from convalescent depots and rest camps.

The calculation of the number of reinforcements actually required is not, however, merely a matter of simple subtraction—authorised strength minus strength in the field. There are always a number of men absent from their unit who are classified as potential reinforcements, *e.g.*, those in rest camps after discharge from the local hospital, convalescents, men returning from leave and courses and so on, and these must be taken into account. Careful forecasts are therefore necessary to show when potential reinforcements will become available, in partial adjustment of unit deficiencies. The balance is then called up.

There are many factors affecting the man-power situation, and it will be of interest to outline the medical plan of 1937, because it materially affected the work of 2nd Echelon, particularly that of "C" Section.

Base hospitals were not formed; casualties were evacuated to peace hospitals in the same station as their temporary depots, where they eventually completed their convalescence. These potential reinforcements were therefore scattered, and a careful check on temporary depots returns was necessary. 2nd Echelon working is not facilitated by increasing the number of sources of information.

During the first few winter months casualties from the normal Waziristan District garrison were retained in hospitals in Waziristan, together with light cases from units which entered Waziristan for the operations. These light cases were not

transferred to their temporary depots when fit, but rejoined their units. This was a saving in man-power, but it made the calculations of "C" Section more complicated.

The winter policy was modified for the summer months, and it was decided to increase the hospital accommodation in Razmak, and to form convalescent depots there in order to accommodate, as far as possible, all casualties in the theatre of operations. This system of "Holding" was most successful. Apart from medical considerations there was no unnecessary wastage, and it reduced the number of reinforcements required from temporary depots, which effected a saving in transportation charges, but it produced problems for "C" Section which were almost unsolvable. The chief of these was the effect of a large number of potential reinforcements in the theatre of operations on reinforcement calculations. It could never be known, with any degree of certainty, when they would be discharged to units fit for duty, and it was therefore impossible to place accurate demands on temporary depots. Eventually it was decided that all sick and convalescents in Waziristan would count against unit field strengths, the only exceptions being personnel of the Royal Corps of Signals, Royal Tank Corps, Royal Indian Army Service Corps and medical units. By this means the difficulties were almost all overcome.

"Holding" in the theatre of operations was, however, peculiar to the 1937 operations, and it is not invariably applicable to all parts of the Frontier. Only the fortunate situation of Razmak, with its good accommodation, made the system feasible, and it is referred to, not as a contingency which must always be expected, but as an illustration of how administrative policy affects 2nd Echelon working.

Temporary depots and reinforcement camps are required to maintain reinforcements, equivalent to a month's wastage, ready for quick despatch on demand. "C" Section, from its returns and calculations, can say whether this number is likely to fall below the minimum, in which case a report is made to Army Headquarters. Arrangements are then made by the Adjutant-General's Branch to augment temporary depot and reinforcement camp strengths by reservists and men from recruit-producing units.

When operations are prolonged, questions of discharges, transfers to pension and reserve, etc., arise, and it is desirable that

wastage of this type should be controlled by 2nd Echelon, in accordance with the policy laid down by Army Headquarters.

The Closing down of 2nd Echelon

Operations eventually cease, the provisions of the Special Procedure Pamphlet are no longer applicable and 2nd Echelon must be closed down. This, however, has to be a gradual process, and in the first instance it is reduced to a cadre, with instructions to close finally on a definite date. As unit marching out returns are received, service and casualty forms are completed, leaving only those of sick and convalescents to be completed in due course by units themselves. These forms are finally sent to the units or peace record offices concerned, and other records are stored, usually at the headquarters of the formation conducting the operations. The extra pay of the officers of 2nd Echelon automatically ceases with the withdrawal of the Special Procedure Pamphlet, and sanction is required for it to be continued for those who are employed with the cadre.

In conclusion, it is hoped that this article has not created an impression that 2nd Echelon working is very difficult; it is not. All that is required is whole-hearted co-operation by the staff who should give every assistance, both before and after 2nd Echelon is formed; by commanding officers detailing efficient clerks, with complete nominal rolls and service and casualty forms; by all who send in returns, ensuring that they are accurate and rendered promptly; and finally, by the officer in charge keeping a sense of proportion even when the affairs of 2nd Echelon appear to be at their worst.

APPENDIX I.

ORGANIZATION OF 2ND ECHELON (N)—WAZIRFORCE, 1937.



NOTE :—I. A. C. C.—Indian Army Corps of Clerks.

APPENDIX II.

WAZIRISTAN OPERATIONS, 1937

2ND ECHELON (N) ORDER No. 1

2nd Echelon (N) Office is located in the Rest Camp, BANNU, telephone number BANNU 11.

"A" Records

1. 2nd Echelon (N) will prepare Part II Orders and maintain casualty forms (A.F.B-199-A, A.F. B-103 and I.A.F. F-958) for the following formations and units:

(*a*) 1 Div.

(*b*) All formations and units which have moved into Waziristan District from stations outside Waziristan, in connection with "Operations, Waziristan, 1937."

(*c*) R.I.A.S.C. formations and units as enumerated in H.Q. Northern Command letter No. CRNC/20046/1/4/A6, dated 12th March 1937.

2. The above formations and units will comply with Mobilization Regulations, paragraph 166, viz:—

(*a*) A.F. B-199-A (duplicate copies) for Officers of British Service, and specially prepared copies for Officers of the Indian Army; A.F. B-103 and I.A.F. F-958, will be despatched to 2nd Echelon (N) forthwith.

(*b*) Complete nominal rolls of formations or units in triplicate, written or typed in BLOCK CAPITALS, numbers in numerical sequence:

(*i*) As it existed in the Area of Operations at 2400 hrs. on 7th/8th March 1937

or

(*ii*) As it entered the Area of Operations on or after 8th March 1937 giving dates of entry, will be forwarded to 2nd Echelon (N) forthwith.

N.B.—Attached Personnel *will* be shown on these rolls.

(*c*) Record clerks from the above units will report to 2nd Echelon (N) on receipt of these orders.

Each clerk will be in possession of a typewriter.

3. A list of reports and returns to be submitted by the formations and units in paragraph 1 above is given in Appendix "A."

"B" Casualties

4. 2nd Echelon (N) is responsible for reporting casualties in the field (Battle Casualties), *vide* S.P.P., paragraph 55.

(*i*) All battle casualties of formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 above will be reported by W/T to 2nd Echelon (N) as under:

Brigade H.Q. . . . . For all units under their command.

H.Q. 1 Div. and
Os.C. Div. Tps. . . . . For all units and personnel under their command.

(*ii*) In all cases the sequence of the report will be as follows:

(*a*) Date of casualty.

(*b*) Regimental number.

(*c*) Rank.

(*d*) Name (SURNAME in the case of B.Os., K.C.I.Os., I.C.Os. and B.O.Rs. FULL NAMES in the case of V.C.Os., I.O.Rs. and Followers).

(*e*) Initials (In the case of B.Os., K.C.I.Os., I.C.Os., and B.O.Rs.)

(*f*) Unit.

(*g*) Nature and extent of wound.

(*iii*) Reports will be confirmed daily by post on A.F. W-3010 and A.F. W-3011 as applicable.

(*iv*) As soon as practicable Field medical units will inform 2nd Echelon (N) the degree of seriousness of casualties admitted since the last report or of any change in those already reported.

5. *Returns to be submitted by Field Medical Units.*

A.F. A-36, nominal roll of patients in hospital, is required to be submitted daily to 2nd Echelon (N).

6. *Returns required from Military Hospitals.*

All military hospitals which receive casualties of formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 from field medical units in Waziristan, *viz.*:

*C.I.M.H., Mir Ali, Bannu, Razmak and Kohat, †B.M.H., Rawalpindi; I.M.H., Rawalpindi; C.I.M.H., Abbottabad; B.M.H., Lahore; I.M.H., Lahore; B.M.H., Jhelum; I.M.H., Jhelum, Wana and Manzai, will forward the following reports to 2nd Echelon (N):—

(*a*) Casualties received on previous day from Forward Area.

(*b*) Transfers the previous day to any other hospital or convalescent depot (if formed).

(*c*) Discharges to temporary depots.

(*d*) Progress reports on sick and wounded officers.

7. *Returns required from convalescent depots (if formed)*: Admissions and discharges.

Evacuations from hospitals

8. Personnel of formations and units in paragraph 1 evacuated out of WAZIRISTAN will, when fit, rejoin their temporary depots.

9. Personnel discharged from C.I.M.H., RAZMAK, will join units (or temporary depots of units) as under:

British personnel	...	1 Northamptons.
Gurkhas	...	1/9th Gurkha Rifles.
Pathans	...	5/12th F.F. Regiment.
Other Indian personnel	...	4/8th Punjab Regiment.
Administrative personnel	...	Detachments of own Services in RAZMAK.

Os.C. above depots will render reports to 2nd Echelon (N) on Wednesdays and Saturdays, giving the following information:

(*a*) Number, rank, name, unit.

(*b*) Date of joining from hospital.

(*c*) Date personnel will be fit to join unit in the field.

(*d*) Date personnel have been despatched to join unit in the field.

10. Os.C. Bannu and Mir Ali hospitals will discharge personnel of formations and units in paragraph 1, when fit to:

(*a*) Temporary Depots if located in Bannu or Mir Ali.

(*b*) Rest Camps, for despatch to units in the field.

11. Os.C. Bannu and Mir Ali Rest Camps will forward a daily return to 2nd Echelon (N) showing:

(*a*) Personnel received from hospitals.

(*b*) Date of despatch to units in the field.

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* Combined Indian Military Hospital.
† British Military Hospital.—Ed.

**D.I. and S.I. Lists.*

12. Os.C. Hospitals will report to 2nd Echelon (N), on A.F. A-21-A, personnel of the formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 above who are placed on the D.I. or S.I. List. Next-of-kin will be given on A.F. A-21-A. 2nd Echelon (N) will render the necessary reports to all concerned.

"C" Reinforcements

13. Formations and units mentioned in paragraph 1 will submit the returns shown in Appendix "B" to 2nd Echelon (N) who will calculate and demand reinforcements for them.

14. Orders to despatch drafts or individuals will be issued by O.C., 2nd Echelon (N) direct to temporary depots of above units with copies to units concerned and Os.C. Rest Camp, Bannu, etc.

15. Under *NO* circumstances will drafts or individuals be despatched without the orders of 2nd Echelon (N), nor will units in the field make demands on temporary depots.

16. Drafts and individuals (including officers) from temporary depots will be ordered to report to O.C., Rest Camp, Bannu. Their onward despatch will be arranged by the O.C., Bannu, on information furnished by 2nd Echelon (N).

Waziristan District Signals

17. Demands for British and Indian reinforcements for Waziristan District Signals will be submitted to 2nd Echelon (N) by O.C. Waziristan District Signals when required. (CRNC/20078/Sigs., dated 9th March 1937.)

Action by Temporary Depots or Formations and Units mentioned in paragraph 1

18. The returns mentioned in paragraph 54 of the S.P.P.† will not be rendered by temporary depots.

In place of the above returns, the return given in Appendix "C" showing the state of the depot at 2359 hrs. on Saturdays will be submitted to 2nd Echelon (N).

19. The attention of Os.C. temporary depots of British units is directed to paragraph 18 of the S.P.P. These soldiers should not be treated as effective when considering the number of reinforcements available.

20. Temporary depots will forward copies of Depots Part II Orders to 2nd Echelon (N).

BANNU:
19th March 1937.

(Sd.) *F. H. C., Captain,*
Officer i/c 2nd Echelon (N), Bannu.

* Dangerously ill and seriously ill.—Ed.
† Special Procedure Pamphlet.—Ed.

APPENDIX "A."

How often rendered.	Army Form.	Return.	Remarks.
Daily or as often as practicable.	A. F. W-3010. F. F. W.-3011.	Casualty Return of B. Os. and I.C.Os. Casualty Return of V. C.Os., B. O. Rs., I.O.Rs. and followers.	These forms will show casualties from ALL causes and any other information normally published in Part II Orders.
Weekly by noon on Mondays.	A. F. N-2069.	Offence Report.	
First of each month.	A. F. B.-158.	Nominal Roll of B.Os. and I.C.Os.: attached officers shown separately.	In quadruplicate, quintuplicate for field medical units. 2nd Echelon (N) will arrange disposal as follows: 1 copy—M.S.,A.H.Q., 1 copy—C. M. A., Rawalpindi. 1 copy—Temporary Depot. *1 copy—D. M. S., A.H.Q. *1 copy—D. D. M. S., Northern.
When required.	Manuscript (in triplicate).	Nominal roll of unit, formation or party marching out of area of operations.	To be prepared in BLOCK CAPITALS. Numbers in numerical sequence.

*For field medical units only.

APPENDIX "B."

How often.	Army Form.	Return.	Remarks.
Weekly to reach 2nd Echelon by noon on Mondays showing the situation at 2359 hrs. the previous Saturday	W.-3008.	Field Return of B.Os. and I.C.Os.	Reinforcements calculated and demanded by 2nd Echelon (N) and supplied by temporary depots.
	W.-3009.	Field Return of V. C.Os., B.O.Rs., I.O.Rs. and Followers.	Ditto.

APPENDIX "C."

Temporary Depot Return

UNIT.

Week ending 2359 hrs.

	B. Os.	I. C. Os.	V. C. Os.	W. Os.	Sgts. Havs.	Cpls.	Naiks.	B. O. Rs. I. O. Rs.	Cooks.	Bhisti.	Sweepers.	Total.	Remarks.
Fit reinforcements available.													
Employed on depot or station duties.													
Sick or convalescent.													
Furlough or leave.													

"A."

Nominal roll of personnel rejoined from units in the field from 2359 hrs. (previous Saturday).

"B."

Nominal roll of personnel despatched to join units in field from 2359 hrs. (previous Saturday).

QUANTITY OR QUALITY?

To live beyond one's means has always been fashionable amongst a certain type of individual. It is of all vices perhaps one of the most insidious and difficult to eradicate. A standard once set can be lowered only with loss of personal pride and standing amongst one's own kind. One's best friends are fellow competitors, each striving to keep up false appearances and driving the other to further excesses.

What has for all time been common to a certain type of individual is to-day becoming commonplace amongst the greater nations of the world, and, to some extent, for the same reasons. In a world in which national waste means eventual international economic depression, and where sources of wealth, in the form of human energy or raw materials, are tending in some cases to dry up, all the great nations are, year by year, increasing by huge sums the amounts spent upon non-productive armaments. The money now being poured out is spent not so much on numbers of armed men as upon material, ships, guns, aeroplanes, tanks and mechanical transport. Such expenditure involves the greatest possible degree of economic waste. Men get worn out, and can be replaced at comparatively small cost; pensions are relatively cheap, and the money returns all too rapidly into circulation. Machines, on the other hand, wear out even faster than men, and even more quickly become obsolete; they are initially extremely expensive, and yearly tend to become more so. Up-to-date mechanical efficiency, therefore, swells the defence bill of a nation with increasing velocity.

Eventually there must come a time for all nations when, for financial reasons alone, some compromise must be reached. Either quality must be allowed to deteriorate or quantity must suffer reduction.

Machines grow yearly more complex and efficient, their costs rising to a corresponding degree. In the long run, therefore, one is likely to see a reduction in quantity rather than quality, since no nation will be prepared to accord mechanical superiority to its competitor. The tendency will be for the large numbers of men and vehicles now comprising a first class continental army to decrease, and for the nations concerned to spend their money upon a smaller, more efficient and better equipped organization. So far as the British Empire is concerned such an event could

only be welcomed. With the basis of a great industrial efficiency and the voluntary system we have always strived for quality rather than quantity, and the reversal of our competitors to the same standard of living must leave us relatively in a more secure position.

Whereas, however, most nations are faced with the definite problem of production of a fighting machine designed for use under certain specific conditions, the British Empire has a wide variety of divergent responsibilities. Our numbers, already relatively small, have to be organized to meet many varying demands: the protection of overseas bases, the policing of overseas possessions or mandates, and the production of an efficient striking force. With such commitments as India, the Far East, Palestine and the Mediterranean bases it seems extremely doubtful whether we can effect any considerable reduction in actual numbers. As has so often been the case in the past, we may be forced to effect a compromise, and to reduce to some extent our quality as well as our quantity. At present we aim at a common organization and standard of equipment and training for all our armed forces, irrespective of their immediate rôles. There are cogent reasons for such a policy, and, were money no object, it could not be seriously questioned. Money, however, is an object, or soon will be, and it appears reasonably certain that eventually this policy will have to be reconsidered, and must suffer extensive revision.

Our striking forces must continue to be given the most up-to-date and powerful machinery to enable them to meet on equal terms an enemy who may have sacrificed quantity rather than quality. They require the maximum hitting power, mobility, mechanical protection and degree of training. There is, however, no apparent necessity for our "police" forces to be organized or equipped to the same scale. They require mobility, reasonable hitting power in comparison with their probable enemies, reduced mechanical protection and a lower standard of general mechanical knowledge and training. Internal security units do not need tanks, machine-guns in large numbers, mortars or artillery; for the most part such weapons are the last which would be employed, since their use would be contrary to the principle of preserving internal peace with the minimum of force. What they do need is fine discipline, reasonable ability in the use of personal weapons, and great mobility. Similarly, the garrisons of our overseas bases do not need great mobility, but they do need stopping power and mechanical protection.

Since we must effect a compromise somewhere, it is upon these lines, that is to say, the elimination of a common standard

irrespective of rôle, that we can best effect that reduction of quality without which the maintenance of our small numbers may become financially impossible.

The financial burden which our present policy imposes will, it has been suggested, be intolerable, in the long run, for the British taxpayer. It is likely to be even more of a burden in India, where there is less wealth to tap and where the political atmosphere is hardly likely to be one which encourages a steady increase in the Defence Services' budget. In this country we have a considerable number of British battalions; of these a relatively large proportion are earmarked for internal security duties in war. We are in fact maintaining the majority of our British Infantry units at a scale of equipment in advance of that necessitated by their rôle; this policy will become more and more expensive as the process of mechanization in the United Kingdom forces us to follow suit in India. We, like all other countries, shall be forced to reduce quality or quantity, or to compromise and reduce both to the minimum necessitated by finance. It is suggested that this compromise should take the form of a reduction in the organization, equipment and numbers of our internal security units, both British and Indian. Could we not afford, without undue risk, to reduce the fire power of these units, the money spent on their collective training and their unit transport? India is becoming every year more full of mechanically propelled vehicles, whilst roads, if poor by European standards, become more abundant. In emergency the transport is available, by hire or impressment, for the rapid transportation of troops to any centre of unrest; if reliance upon civil vehicles were considered too dangerous, a pool of Government transport at each station would be adequate insurance. Is it now necessary, moreover, for internal security units to be scattered over the face of India? With modern means of transport, rail, road and air, we could afford to concentrate our internal security troops far more than is the case at present, and rely upon mobility to overcome the distance involved.

Let us take, for example, the mythical district of Bogipur, a typical central Indian area in which communal or other form of strife is liable to break out at short notice. To-day in this district we have four internal security units, one at Banga, one at Cippur, one at Detegarh, and another at Fatimurg. At each station we have hospitals and military dairies. Were these units to be concentrated at Fatimurg, which one may imagine to be fairly centrally situated, the administrative needs of the garrison could be met by one hospital and one dairy. Their concentration would

effect a fluidity of our internal security resources which dispersion must restrict; moreover, concentration would reduce the numbers required for the immediate protection of barracks and stores, and thus increase the numbers available for a more active rôle. Concentration does, however, necessarily demand increased mobility. One would not dare to rely solely upon the railway, or even perhaps upon the road communications available; both are liable to interference by the elements or the opposition. Air transport is far less liable to dislocation by climate, and is immune to enemy interference, provided landing grounds at potential centres of disturbance are maintained and guarded, in emergency, by the civil forces at the disposal of Government. Given concentration and a high degree of mobility, India could afford to reduce the numbers of troops earmarked for internal security. In the mythical district of Bogipur, for example, one such battalion could be eliminated and some of the money saved could be spent upon the provision of load-carrying aircraft. Such aircraft need not necessarily be located permanently at Bogipur, since dispersion of air transport would mean increased overhead charges, but could be located in areas from which they could move rapidly and in the numbers required to any centre of emergency.

Any reduction in the equipment and training of internal security units raises, of course, the question of reliefs. All units must, it will be suggested, take their turn of duty on the frontier, with formations forming part of the field army, and in the good and bad stations. Here again we are confronted with a rigidity of organization which must, it is suggested, eventually be demolished. The personnel of the Royal Artillery are not bound for life to certain specified units or armament; nor are the personnel of the Royal Engineers; why must those of the cavalry and infantry arms be so restricted? A general list, and, in the case of privates, enlistment into an arm of the service rather than a particular unit, would overcome this difficulty of reliefs. These could then be effected by changes of selected personnel rather than by units; the latter could still be moved if required, but obviously the scope of such moves would be considerably reduced.

There are, of course, disadvantages in such a solution, of which loss of *esprit de corps* may be quoted as the major item. Financial stringency will eventually, however, force us to sacrifice something. The problem is to decide with what we can most easily afford to dispense. Can we much longer afford to use the most expensive machine to do what can be done by manual labour? A scheme on the lines indicated above may enable us

to achieve much the same practical results with far less expenditure. The present organization of Indian Infantry lends itself to the scheme proposed. For British units the concurrence of the Home Government would, of course, be essential, but finance may well make concurrence an eventual necessity. In India the money we save, if not diverted to more pacific measures when the present war scare is over, can best be spent on, and will in fact be essential for, the creation and maintenance of a striking force equal to the standard set by our possible opponents.

THE SHANGHAI EMERGENCY, 1937

[*A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India on 30th June 1938 by Major H. McL. Morrison,* M.C., *The Royal Ulster Rifles.*

The lecturer was introduced by Lieut.-General Sir Bertrand Moberly, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O.]

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

We are within nine days of the anniversary of the incident which set alight the present conflagration between Japan and China, a blaze which shows little sign of diminishing. It was on the 8th July last year that Japanese troops, carrying out night operations near Pekin, were fired on by Chinese soldiers. The Japanese retaliatory measures which followed included the bombing of Pekin itself and roused the already bitter anti-Japanese feeling, prevalent throughout the whole country, to fever pitch. In no place was this more likely to take violent form than in Shanghai and several minor incidents culminated on the 9th of August in the murder of two members of the Japanese Naval Landing Party. These men were motoring in the vicinity of the Chinese military aerodrome at Hungao, some three miles from Shanghai, when they were murdered. The officer had eighteen bayonet and bullet wounds in his body and his seaman-chauffeur was wounded in the eyes, face and body in a similar manner. The actual details of the killing were never disclosed, the Chinese and Japanese versions being at complete variance. How the Japanese were able to issue any version at all is a mystery since both their men were dead, and the subsequent inquiry indicated that the Chinese story also was open to doubt.

There can be no question that the act of motoring in the vicinity of a military aerodrome at this time of stress was an act of extreme recklessness and folly. The fact that this officer had done the same thing, at the same time each day, for several days preceding the murders, made it all the more rash. One point was clearly demonstrated by the inquiry, namely, that the killing had been carried out by members of a corps, euphemistically named The Peace Preservation Corps.

This Corps had been formed at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1932 with the object of policing a demilitarized zone between the borders of the International Settlement and a

line some twenty kilometres beyond it. For some inexplicable reason the zone extended only on the north side of the Soochow Creek. One can only presume that the Japanese expected the other interested powers to ensure its application to their sectors also. Had they done so, it is unlikely that the 1937 emergency would have occurred. At any rate, there would have been no Chinese aerodrome at Hungao for the Japanese to spy on.

Under the 1932 treaty, which was witnessed by British, American and French representatives, the Peace Preservation Corps was limited to two thousand men. Its members were to be drawn from gendarmerie only, and it was not to contain artillery or tanks, all of which provisions, it was said, had been broken.

To ensure that the terms of the treaty were carried out, a Joint Sino-Japanese Commission was established, and was authorised to "call attention to any neglect in the carrying out of the provisions of any of its articles." From the first the Commission had failed to function, but both governments were determined to use it and back up its efforts to settle this particular dispute. Neither China nor Japan appeared to want a war in the Shanghai area; events, however, were too strong for them.

On the 11th August, that is two days after the murders, the Japanese 3rd Fleet arrived off Shanghai and landed reinforcements for the Naval Landing Party. That same evening German trained Chinese divisions occupied the North Station and the Kiangwan area, and thus all hope of a peaceful settlement vanished.

Some of you may remember that during the 1932 trouble, the Rev. Dick Sheppard made the novel suggestion that a party of peace-loving individuals should go to Shanghai and squat between the opposing forces. This incredible proposal was now renewed in a different form by the Italian Consul-General, who suggested that neutral troops should carry out this rôle. Needless to say, there were no Italian troops in Shanghai.

The foreign garrisons in Shanghai were there under no treaty rights, but simply on account of the claim made by every civilised power to protect its own nationals when the local authorities were either unwilling or unable to carry out that duty themselves. Consequently, at the beginning of August, we find in Shanghai a British battalion, 1,000 American Marines, 1,800 Japanese Marines and the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, about 2,000 strong. In the French Concession there were 600 troops.

In both the French Concession and the International Settlement, the work of government is carried on by a municipal council similar to a municipality at home. The powers of the Shanghai

Municipal Council are, however, much wider, the Council being responsible not only for internal security but also for the protection of the Settlements from outside aggression. While Chinese sovereignty is recognised, that sovereignty is strictly limited and no armed Chinese are allowed in either Settlement. At the moment the Council of the International Settlement consists of two Americans, one of whom is chairman, five Englishmen, two Japanese and five Chinese.

The 1938 Whittaker shows Shanghai as the sixth largest city in the world with a population of 3,500,000, and approximately 1,200,000 live in the International Settlement. In 1937 only 30,000 of these were foreigners and of that number 20,000 were Japanese.

China is said to be a philosophical country, and if one is to judge from the calm way in which the coolie class accept their hard lot, there is justification for the statement. Nevertheless, Chinese are easily inflamed, and rioting in Shanghai has become chronic. Without warning and in an incredibly short space of time they can and do become dangerous mobs. The 3,500 members of the Shanghai Municipal Police, all Chinese, except for a handful of foreigners, cope with the situation very well in normal times, but when China is at war their loyalty is somewhat strained and the internal security problem becomes a serious one.

On the 12th August it was learned that the Joint Commission had failed to solve the problem, so the Council decided to mobilize the Volunteers. In previous emergencies the commanders of foreign garrisons had been notified of the need to prepare to defend their sectors by a proclamation of a state of emergency, but in 1932, when the Japanese were moving out to man their sector in accordance with the proclamation, they were fired on by snipers of the 19th Route Army. They were thus able to answer the Chinese objection to their use of the International Settlement as a base for operations by stating that they were acting in defence of it, whereas they alone had a quarrel with China. The Council determined that in 1937 they would avoid this embarrassing state of affairs and contented themselves with the mobilization of the Volunteer Corps, leaving the respective commanders to carry on as they thought best. By agreement, Brigadier Telfer-Smollett was given the task of co-ordinating the defence arrangements and placed in nominal command. Fighting had commenced between the Chinese and Japanese on the morning of the 13th, and by that evening all the sectors had been occupied and were hurriedly being put in a state of defence.

We were never able to find out the cause of the Chinese failure to sweep the Japanese into the Whampoo. They outnumbered them by at least ten to one, and in addition had numerous troops on the Pootung side of the river. It was said they were restrained from entering the Settlement by orders from Nanking, but these, if they were ever issued, could hardly have applied, after the outbreak of hostilities, to the Japanese sector.

The first big problem with which the Council had to deal was the question of refugees. Within two days of the Hungao killing nearly a million sought the sanctuary of the Settlement. In addition, hospital accommodation was prepared for five thousand wounded Chinese soldiers.

Shanghai is not a sanitary paradise, and the fact that outbreaks of cholera, typhoid, dysentery and other diseases were kept under control reflects the greatest credit on the medical authorities of the Municipality. The next problem, and perhaps the most serious, was the threat of the Chinese commanders to take over the Settlement. As it was completely surrounded by at least 50,000 Chinese soldiers, it was no idle threat. And the strain which would have been placed on the Chinese members of the Municipal Police must not be overlooked.

Before we pass on to a consideration of the defence scheme I must say a word about the Shanghai Volunteer Corps. Its two thousand members are divided into three battalions; "A" is British, "B" American and "C" Russian. The Russians are regular soldiers, recruited and paid by the Municipal Council, and are a fine body of men. They are armed with rifles and machine-guns, have armoured cars and a number of lorries. In normal times their main task is support of the police, a duty which they carry out with the utmost vigour and efficiency. The commandant of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps is a British Colonel and he is assisted by a Brigade-Major and Staff-Captain, both regular soldiers. The Russians have a regular officer of the British Army as Adviser.

The 1937 scheme involved the occupation of areas in advance of the actual Settlement boundaries, which are unsuitable in some sectors for defence. Thus in "A" sector a huge salient extends into Chinese territory, whilst in "D" sector an advance has been made to the Hangchow Railway.

Excluding the French, who are entirely responsible for the defence of their own Concession, the perimeter is divided into four sectors, A, B, C and D.

"A" sector was held by the Japanese, and it is in this Hongkew-Yantsepoo area that most of the 20,000 Japanese live and work.

The sector also contains the Shanghai Water Works, the supplies of frozen meat for British troops and the municipal gaol, and there were frequent disputes with the Japanese over these three places.

"B" sector was held in the first instance by the Russian contingent of the Volunteer Corps, then by the Volunteers proper, and finally by British regular troops. It was considered the most dangerous of the neutral sectors, lying as it did between the Japanese and Chinese lines. It has permanent blockhouses of various types, lettered "A" to "F", and access to it is controlled by huge iron gates, the side entrances of which are appropriately marked "Not bullet-proof."

The American Marines held "C" sector which runs for the whole of its length along the Soochow Creek. The Chinese were careful to place their batteries opposite the centre of this sector so that the Japanese would have some difficulty in attacking them. On more than one occasion the Americans were requested to vacate their front line posts to let the Japanese do the job, but the answer was always an emphatic "No," and the Japanese were warned that they would be held responsible for any damage or loss of life.

British troops held "D" sector which runs along the Soochow Creek from Ferry Road, where it joins the American line, to the Hangchow Railway, thence southward down the east side of the railway, and eventually joins the French Concession at the junction of Haig Avenue and the Avenue Joffre.

Excluding "A" sector, the troops available to hold this enormous frontage were less than 4,000 strong, and of these nearly 2,000 were Volunteers. It is not surprising, then, that a call was at once made on Hong Kong for reinforcement.

The G. O. C. in China has authority to move one battalion to wherever it may be needed, but has to obtain War Office permission before other moves are made. The Royal Welch Fusiliers were earmarked to move in the first instance and the battalion was placed at twenty-four hours' notice on the 12th August. It sailed for Shanghai at 6 p.m. on the 14th August. While it was nearing the hour for sailing, tragedy had overwhelmed Shanghai. The Chinese Air Force, making its first effort in war, dropped two enormous bombs on the Settlement, and another two on the borders of the French Concession. The point where the latter fell was crowded with refugees and over a thousand of them were instantly killed and another thousand wounded. It is difficult to grasp just what these huge figures mean. If we picture in our minds what an infantry battalion at war strength

looks like then we have some idea of the numbers knocked out in a matter of seconds. It is thought that the second bomb, which exploded in mid-air, giving it the effect of shrapnel, was detonated either by the force of the explosion of the first bomb, or by a splinter from it. In the Nanking Road explosions 729 people were killed and 861 injured. A line of motor cars caught fire and many of the occupants were incinerated beyond recognition. Nanking Road is the city's shopping centre, and it was a stroke of good fortune that the bombs fell on a Saturday afternoon. Most of the shops were closed and streets, by comparison with normal days, were deserted. It taxed the efforts of both municipalities to cope with these disasters, and lorry load after lorry load of corpses was removed by the Russian contingent, police and fire brigade personnel. At one cemetery in the French Concession a doctor examined some four hundred bodies and found sixty of them still alive.

The experiences of the 14th decided the authorities to begin evacuation of women and children, and on the 17th August the first party was embarked on the P.&.O. Liner "Rajputana" at Woosung. They were taken there in destroyers, and while going aboard, had to undergo an air raid, the Chinese once more attempting to find the Japanese flagship which was lying close by. Fortunately, there were no casualties but one British mother gave birth to a son on H.M.S. "Duncan," and no doubt the Royal Navy dealt with the situation in true Nelson fashion. That same afternoon the Royal Welch disembarked at Shanghai.

When we waved farewell to the Royal Welch on the 14th August, we felt it would not be long before we followed them, and we were, in fact, warned to take their place as the next unit to move. Sunday the 15th, therefore, was spent in packing and making all arrangements to go. While busy doing this, Command Headquarters asked if we were taking any steps about it and, when told, advised us not to worry too much as we were guaranteed forty-eight hours' notice. Having proceeded so far, we decided to continue. Just as well too. Twelve hours later, that is at midnight, we were asked if embarkation on the "Empress of Asia" was possible by noon next day. The answer, of course, was "yes," but owing to three of our officers being employed on cipher duties at Command Headquarters, who were wanted back, we refrained from asking: "What about the forty-eight hours' warning?"

The "Empress of Asia" had been requisitioned to take refugees from Shanghai and its departure could not be delayed

beyond mid-day, but we were all on board by that time and sailed promptly to the hour.

The trip to Shanghai was uneventful except for an excellent lecture by Col. Tyndall of the R.A.M.C., who had been in Shanghai during the 1932 troubles. Amongst other things he told us that although the Whampoo was the dirtiest of rivers, yet its water, when treated by the Shanghai Water Works, was the purest in the world; better even than London water. The Captain of the "Empress of Asia" was a little dubious about this and said that the Canadian Pacific never took Shanghai water. When we arrived in the Whampoo we were inclined to agree with the Captain.

At 9 a.m. on the 18th we arrived at the Woosung anchorage and found two destroyers waiting to take us up river. The journey from Woosung onwards was most interesting, and it was not long before we came across the first of a line of Japanese warships busily engaged in shelling the Chinese positions. As we passed, each in turn stopped action to salute our ship. Not knowing what lay ahead of us we were engaged in filling machine-gun belts and Lewis gun magazines, and issuing ammunition. By the time this was done we had reached the outskirts of the city. Enormous fires could be seen all over the countryside and Japanese aeroplanes were bombing various localities around Shanghai and on the Pootung side of the river. We were landed on the Bund just eighteen hours after the Royal Welch. Shanghai itself was like a city of the dead. The Bund, in normal times teeming with life, was deserted, and the shuttered shops and empty streets seemed almost uncanny. Much to the amusement of our friends in Hong Kong, we were quartered in a girls' school.

We found that we were to relieve the Loyals in "D" sector on the 21st August and immediately began its reconnaissance. The frontage was not far short of five miles, but a company of marines and sailors from H.M.S. Cumberland were placed under our orders, also a party of a hundred sailors and marines from Italian gunboats.

The perimeter was held by a series of section posts, of which there were twenty-one in all, with liaison posts on each flank. Our first task was the rebuilding and resiting of some of these which, having been hurriedly constructed, were neither bullet-proof nor sited to the best advantage. In addition, traffic had to be controlled through the perimeter, only those carrying food-stuffs being permitted to enter, and the internal security of the sector had to be maintained. We were early afforded an example

of the latter problem. A large Japanese mill was located in the right sub-sector. Two of the staff, Japanese, elected to visit it soon after we took over. They were at once set upon by a Chinese mob and killed. A section cleared the street but was too late to save the men. Then followed a rather delicate task. You will remember that it had been found necessary to advance beyond the Settlement boundary to ensure proper protection. The area taken over was policed by Chinese Constabulary, responsible only to the Chinese Government. It was certain that some of them had taken a hand in the killing; in fact one of the victims had been blown to bits by German-made stick grenades. It was decided to disarm them. The presence of a platoon of riflemen made this somewhat ticklish task a simple matter.

Some two hundred yards in front of our centre sub-sector lay the two valuable Japanese Toyada Mills. In normal times these were garrisoned by Japanese marines. General Telfer-Smollett felt that the presence of a Japanese garrison surrounded by Chinese troops was an embarrassment to the peace of the British sector. He offered to take over the mills, but the Japanese would not hear of it. Eventually they saw reason and agreed, but when the time for evacuation came the Chinese would have none of it, so the general had to begin all over again. His diplomacy won the day and by the time we arrived in the sector they were in our hands. Then occurred an incident which one would imagine could only happen in some South American Republic. On the evening of the 20th August a Japanese airman made a bad shot at the Chung San Road bridge and hit one of his own mills, setting it alight. The Chinese fire brigade promptly arrived on the scene and extinguished the blaze.

Our most distressing problem was the refugee question. There were countless families trying to gain what they deemed to be the safety and security of the Settlement while an equal number were leaving it in order to escape the shelling and the bombing. The sorriest sight of all were the tiny children, almost too weary to walk, being dragged along by their bewildered parents. The problem was to take a turn for the worse before we left Shanghai.

An unique incident took place during our first tour in "D" sector. The municipal gaol was situated in Hongkew and suffered considerable damage from Chinese shell fire. On the 17th August one shell killed eight convicts and wounded others. At another time the gaol was completely cut off from the outer world by fires, and it was decided that it must be evacuated. Though not the largest gaol in the world it contained the most inmates,

and the 6,000 prisoners had gone through a very trying time since the commencement of hostilities. They were to be put through the perimeter in the centre of our sector. The convoy arrived at "O" post about 1 p.m. on the 22nd August and a queer sight it was. The escort comprised Russians in armoured cars and lorries, mounted Sikhs and British constables armed with almost every conceivable weapon ever invented. The sight was not an edifying one. The Chinese convicts were put across the wire in no gentle fashion. They were given their own clothes and a rice cake each and warned against any attempt to re-enter the Settlement. But by comparison, the lot of the fifty white prisoners was tragic. They had neither language nor money, and the argument that they had chosen to be released in this way was not valid. What man in such a situation would not choose freedom, not realising just what it meant until put across the wire.

Only some five hundred were released, the Japanese putting a stop to it. The Council had undertaken to place all the convicts over the perimeter, but presumed this did not apply to the hundred and fifty juvenile prisoners, who had neither parents nor guardians to receive them on the other side. Rather than put these children out they took them to a Chinese institution in the Settlement. The Japanese elected to treat this act of humanity as a breach of faith and refused to permit further evacuation.

On the following day, two huge bombs were dropped on the centre of the city, one of them, fortunately, failing to explode. The other landed at the junction of the Nanking and Chekiang roads, causing scenes of carnage similar to those of the 14th August. Two hundred and fifteen people were killed and nearly six hundred wounded. The 'plane which dropped these bombs was flying at a great height and its nationality was never discovered, both sides denying that they had any aeroplanes flying in the vicinity at that time. The same evening the British Ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Huggeson, passed through our left sub-sector, having been wounded some fifty miles from Shanghai by machine-gun bullets from a Japanese 'plane.

On the 30th of the month we were relieved by the Royal Welch and went into reserve, prior to taking over "B" sector on the 3rd September. It was the duty of the reserve battalion to provide various guards, and the most important of these was that over the Shanghai Water Works. These were situated right inside the Japanese sector, by the river, and our presence there was never much appreciated. It was not a pleasant place. Apart from the ill-concealed hostility of the Japanese, the place was

surrounded by numerous corpses, in varying stages of decomposition, the victims of Japanese brutality. It would seem that every Chinaman encountered in Yangtsepoo was treated as a sniper, his hands tied behind his back and the victim shot like a dog. If he happened to be found near the river, he was taken to the bank, shot, and tipped into it.

The nightly air raids on the Idzumo, the Japanese aerodrome and "A" sector generally resulted in many large bombs falling too close to be pleasant. However, no casualties were suffered by any of the units finding this guard, nor were the Water Works seriously damaged. Had this source of supply been interrupted, the situation in the Settlement would have been very dangerous. We were rather disturbed by the presence of so many corpses in the water from which our supplies were drawn but were assured by the experts that, if anything, it was improved thereby.

On the 3rd September we relieved the Loyals in "B" sector. Our letter to the regimental journal concluded with these words: " 'B' sector rests on the immediate flank of the opposing forces. Shanghai North Station is a favourite target for the Japanese artillery and air force. Sometimes both sides miss the mark and bombs and shells fall in our lines." We were soon to find out how true that was. On the very next day, a bomb was dropped within ten yards of block house "A." Fortunately, there were no casualties.

We then received the first of many visits from Japanese officers, all repeating the same refrain: "We are very sorry. We are taking steps to see that it does not occur again."

"B" sector being entirely built over was quite different from the open country of "D" sector. This factor played a considerable part in our avoidance of casualties, none being suffered during any of our tours in it, as either the shells burst on impact with the house tops, or protection was afforded by the walls from splinters. There were numerous casualties among the Chinese civilians, and hardly a day passed without several shells falling into the sector. The nature of the salient is clearly shown on the map. On the north and west Chinese, and on the east Japanese. Our posts on the western side almost touched those of the Chinese.

This was the first time we had come into close contact with Asiatic troops and their equipment surprised us. While we were still armed with Lewis guns, which had seen service in the Great War, both Chinese and Japanese were equipped with the latest weapons. Many of us obtained our first view of a Bren gun as it was carried past the North Station by a Chinese soldier. The

88th Division was in occupation of the station area and their bearing much impressed us. Contrary to our expectations, neither shelling nor bombing seemed to upset them. We struck up a strong liaison with this division and I must read you an extract from a letter sent to us by a Chinese Trench Mortar Officer. It was beautifully written and read: "It is rather funny to find yourselves along with the 88th Division, across a stretch of barbed wire in wrecked Chapei. What are all these fightings for? We are fighting a holy war for the salvation and existence of our father-land, while you are ready, I believe, to fight for humanity and that sacred covenant which mankind have to observe. (I fear he was speaking of the Covenant of the League of Nations.) We are trying our best to make ourselves worthy of your sympathy, and have made up our minds to make this North Station our last resting place."

He was not called upon to do so for the Chinese wisely withdrew from the North Station, and when we gained touch with this officer in "D" sector later, and enquired why he was still alive, he was furious at having given it up without a fight.

Although we had no casualties in "B" sector, there was never any lack of excitement or interest. Our observation post gave us a wonderful all-round view of whatever was going on. Japanese warships were rarely silent, either shelling the North Station area or the Pootung side of the river. The nightly air raids on the Idzumo, the Japanese aerodrome, and Yangtsepoo always produced magnificent firework displays, and we did not require to be reminded that everything shot into the air has to come down somewhere, be it dud anti-aircraft shell, splinter or bullet. The Japanese bombing of the North Station from "B" sector at first gave one a queer feeling. This was invariably carried out by planes operating in groups of three. They would approach over the sector and when well within our lines the bombs would be released. It looked as if they were coming right down on top of us, but we soon realised that the speed of the aeroplanes ensured their travelling in the direction of the target. Sometimes the 'planes indulged in power-dives, that is, as they approached the target, each in turn dived on it at full speed, and after releasing a bomb, zoomed up and away. One day they were not careful enough and a pilot dived into the machine below. This was greeted by the Chinese in the Settlement, who always took the utmost interest in these operations, by an outburst of clapping.

On the 13th October the Japanese carried out an intensive bombing attack on the North Station, and dropped their bombs

so close to our lines that they had to be evacuated temporarily. One sergeant found, to his horror, that a man was missing. He went back to the billet in haste and was relieved to find the missing man sleeping peacefully beneath bits of plaster, brickdust, rubble and broken glass.

The 14th was another hectic day. It opened with the dropping of a Japanese bomb in the American sector, twelve Chinese civilians being killed and seventeen wounded. In the evening the Chinese raided the Japanese lines and the resulting shell fire seemed to be directed against the Settlement rather than the opposing forces, "B" sector having a casualty list approaching a hundred—all civilians. Some of the shells came unpleasantly close to battalion headquarters, and the right of our line was subjected to a severe mortaring. I think the Chinese thought the Japanese were coming through our lines. They were most apologetic about it next morning.

We were back in "D" sector on the 24th October, and within 15 minutes of taking it over had our first casualty; a rifleman being killed by a machine-gun bullet from a Japanese aeroplane. The 'plane first machine-gunned a party of riders on the road between "M" and "Q" posts, then dived direct at post "Q." Several of the civilian riders had their horses shot under them, and were called into the post by the corporal in charge for protection. The corporal, seeing that the aeroplane was about to dive again, quickly mounted his Lewis gun on the parapet and opened fire. After that the 'plane sheered off.

Owing to Japanese pressure well to the north of Shanghai, the Chinese troops in the Chapei area were in grave danger of being cut off. On the evening of the 26/27th October, therefore, they withdrew to the south bank of the Soochow Creek, thus coming in contact with us again in "D" sector. At one point, in fact, one of their posts overlapped ours! The withdrawal was carried out in an orderly manner and there was no sign of haste or panic, but an important lesson stands out from this operation. Under German direction, a strongly fortified line had been constructed from Liuho through Quinsan to the Lakes. This was said to be well-wired and to contain concrete pill-boxes. The temptation, however, to stand, covered by such a difficult obstacle as the Soochow Creek, was too much for the Chinese to resist. But when they were forced out of this line, mainly by the landing in Hangchow Bay, fifty miles south of Shanghai, they were also forced into a running fight and never given an opportunity of settling down in

the Hindenburg line. Had they gone right back to this in the first instance, events might have taken a very different course.

We were affected by this withdrawal in two ways. First, the Toyada Mills became untenable and were handed over to the Chinese; secondly, the refugee problem took an acute form. In place of merely weary and bewildered refugees, we were now faced with a panic-stricken mob clamouring for admission to the Settlement. It was not possible to allow them in except in numbers that could be controlled, and there were literally thousands of them. Two instances will illustrate the chaos. I noticed, after one batch had been admitted, a little chap in a dreadful state of agitation, and found that his mother with one child on her back and another in her arms, had been carried through in the rush leaving him on the wrong side of the barrier. At another entrance a woman got down on her knees, a sure sign that something was really wrong. She had brought most of her family in, leaving her husband to come along with the infant. She had just heard that he had been commandeered by the Chinese to labour on defence works, and the infant was left alone. Neither the British nor the Chinese sentries would let her through the barrier to go back to the child. The point to stress is that for every one of the instances which came to light, hundreds must have passed unnoticed.

The logical outcome of these chaotic conditions is portrayed in an article which appeared in the Press a few weeks ago. Writing of present conditions in Shanghai, the correspondent says: "Wolf children, an outgrowth of Japan's war on China, are on the prowl in Shanghai. Singly or in packs of fifteen to twenty, these pariah-like youngsters scavenge the gutters and steal from small shop-keepers, then claw each other for a share of the spoils. If food-stuffs are displayed on open counters across shop fronts, then a clerk is stationed on guard. He is armed with a heavy stick to beat off the attacks of the wolf-children. Gaunt little bodies, eyes widened by fear and starvation, have even been seen in the Chapei area, where thousands of Chinese homes have been demolished by Japanese guns. These nine and ten-year-olds have found that loot from the shattered houses and shops give them a meal and the hope of another. Schooled by hunger and trained by fear in the desperate struggle to maintain their slender thread of life, most of these young Fagins have come to be suspicious of any show of kindness. They fight and bite the hospital attendants and health officers who try to take them to refugee camps and child hospitals. Some of them, speaking only the dialect of their parents' native province, are hopelessly isolated in a sea of

Shanghai pronunciation. Barely able to toddle, many of the smaller children who are loose on the streets of Shanghai to-day were separated from their parents in the mad rush of millions to leave their burning, shell-riddled homes during the early months of the war. Others found themselves holding the hand of a dead mother killed by bullet or shrapnel. They are too young to fend for themselves in the competition of the gutter existence. Hundreds have died each day. Each morning finds more of their blue little bodies waiting for the city undertaker."

On the 28th October while these poor creatures were pouring in at all approaches to the Settlement, the Japanese opened gun fire on the Jessfield Crossing. Twenty of them were killed and many others wounded. The wounded were rescued under this fire by some of our men, who exposed themselves fearlessly in the effort.

On withdrawing from Chapei the Chinese set the whole place alight. Never had any of us seen such a blaze. I hope to show you some photographs taken during the emergency, at the conclusion of this talk, and those relating to the Chapei fire will give a much better picture on the screen than I can ever give in words.

During the evening of the 29th October the Japanese artillery had moved forward and now commenced shelling the Chinese positions opposite our right at Jessfield Crossing. Innumerable shells fell in our sector and one gained a direct hit on post "J," killing three riflemen and wounding two others, one of whom died shortly afterwards. At the time a shell hit a café some five hundred yards behind our lines and another rifleman was killed. Two days later, the Japanese again dropped shells in the sector, this time in Jessfield Park Camp, three of our men being wounded and several having very narrow escapes. On the 1st November, we were relieved in "D" sector by the Loyals and went into reserve.

On the 4th November I left Shanghai in order to prepare for our move to India. Just as the ship was clear of the mouth of the Yangtse we were stopped by a Japanese destroyer and an officer, who came on board, told us that, as the Chinese had mined the sea ahead of us, we had better stop until 11 p.m., by which time the Japanese would have swept it clear. It was, of course, a childish statement, and next day we were not surprised to learn that a landing had been made that morning, from some forty transports, in Hangchow Bay.

A talk on the Shanghai Emergency should, I suppose, conclude with some reference to the future. The failure of the

Chinese to hold the Hindenburg line, in view of their earlier unexpected and courageous resistance, was a disappointment. They had been opposed by a nation strong in artillery, with command of the air by day, and with mechanised forces and tanks, yet they had given as much as they received. Perhaps the most important factors in favour of Japan were her superior organization, and the fact that only a few Chinese divisions were as well equipped and trained as those we saw in Shanghai. We thought that, man for man, the Chinaman had it all the way. Even from our limited viewpoint in Shanghai we felt that the Chinese had not only pricked the bubble of Japanese invincibility but blown it sky-high; a feeling which finds confirmation in the outstanding successes achieved by the Chinese last March at Suchow, when the Japanese left the field in great haste, leaving behind them large quantities of arms, ammunition, tanks and armoured cars. But without a better organization it is difficult to see how the Chinese can expel the Japanese from their country.

It would seem that only one thing can save China now, and that is, foreign intervention; but is it likely?

One thing I think is clear and certain. If we do not take steps to protect our interests in the Far East, those interests will vanish entirely. Japan does not seem to believe in the catch-phrase of Geneva that "War Never Pays." She has good reason for thinking otherwise. Her war with China in 1932 gave her all she wanted. The fact that the £200 millions, invested by her in Manchukuo, has not yielded the expected return has nothing to do with the cost of the war. It is the rigorous climate that has beaten the Japanese settler. It is too cold and hard, nor can he compete with the frugal Chinese farmer already in occupation. But North China is a different proposition altogether. The Japanese can settle there, and its development will make Japan independent of imports from other nations.

Our investments in China amount to several hundred millions, and of that, one hundred and fifty alone are locked up in Shanghai. In 1936 our imports from China amounted to £7,643,000, while exports were £5,839,000, the adverse balance, of course, being more than covered by interest on investments. Are we going to sacrifice all this, and all that it means to employment at home? Well, these are questions which must be answered sooner or later. And even if we answer "yes," it may still not mean peace.

SHANGHAI


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The millenium is always possible, but events in Japan and Europe have shown to-day that the weak still go to the wall and are deprived of their heritage! Indians should, therefore, watch the world's radio plate which is, as it were, televising war in the East and the possibilities of war in the West, and realise that the fate of India may well be decided hundreds of miles from her shores. They cannot take too broad an outlook on matters of defence to-day.

A VISIT TO PESHAWAR 100 YEARS AGO

By "Zarif"

In 1839 the 16th Lancers, who had taken part in the First Afghan War, were returning to India from Kabul. They arrived at Dacca in Afghanistan, and were preparing to ride through the Khyber Pass to Peshawar when they were told to expect trouble as the tribesmen were up in arms.

A Captain Lowe was with the regiment, and he has left a very good account of his travels and his visit to Peshawar in a diary. It is remarkable how little the scene has changed to-day; and from Lowe's description of the pass, it seems that he would have noticed little difference had he, like Rip Van Winkle, returned a hundred years later.

November 2nd, 1839.—About two miles from Dacca we entered the gorge of the Khyber Pass, and encamped at Landi-khana on the dry shingly bed of a torrent. On the heights upon our right an old ruined fortification is carried along the crest of the hill known as Torkham; near it on some tableland has been a very good garden (*bágh*), and some portion of a trellis-work for grapes is still standing. In the evening I walked through the most romantic glen that I ever saw.

November 3rd.—A long, and for the camels and baggage a very difficult, march the first three miles being a steep ascent by a well-constructed shelf-road winding up the side of the mountain.

On the summit where there is a good breadth of tableland, almost every spot appears under cultivation, and there are several small forts, each having a mud watch-tower attached. On a high mound, or rather on the shoulder of a hill, stands one of those *topes* supposed to be the burial place of the Bactrian monarchs; at a small distance this has the appearance of a Martello tower; the rough stone wall encircling the remains is still in good preservation. On the summit of the *tope* a mud Khyberee watch tower has been erected.

We encamped on the shingly bed of a stream, one-and-a-half miles below the fort of Ali Masjid. The fort is not strong but has a good breastwork, and the situation is admirably chosen

so as completely to command the passage of the defile; not an animal could get by undiscovered, or a man pass unscathed who omitted to pay tribute to the chief of the Khyberees.

The fort has for some time been garrisoned by two companies of the 21st Native Infantry and a Nazib battalion of Mussalman Sikhs. Few days or nights pass without their being attacked by these wild mountaineers. Three days ago a Nazib battalion occupying some high commanding ground, encircled by a low wall of piled stone, was attacked by the Khyberees and twice repulsed them. It is said that their ammunition now failed, and towards night they endeavoured to withdraw into their fort about two miles from the position. The Kyberees took advantage of this, swooped down like lightning upon them, and either killed or dispersed the whole battalion, which consisted of eight hundred men. Two hundred and sixty have been buried, and about two hundred made their way to Peshawar; of the remainder nothing is known.

I visited the scene of action, which was about half a mile to the left of our camp. The stench from the partially buried bodies was so great that it was barely possible to remain there. A leg was sticking up in one place, an arm in a second, and a grim-looking face, partly gnawed by dogs in a third; and amongst all this, numbers of our camp followers were grubbing in the hopes of finding something to repay them.

This defeat of the Nazib battalion is a most provoking event to have occurred at the end of the campaign; and the attack upon them is entirely attributable to the want of good faith shown by Colonel W——, the political agent at the Court of Lahore. When he was passing through on his way to Kabul, the Khyber chiefs waited upon him, and promised that, if the tenure of their lands was guaranteed them, they would give free transit to all men and supplies going to the army at Kabul.

Colonel W—— promised to bring with him on his return their exceedingly moderate terms duly ratified by Shah Shuja. In the meantime, the chiefs honourably fulfilled their promise; Colonel W——'s force and several small parties of officers passed through the Khyber and not one was molested or interfered with. To use the term of the chiefs, women and children might carry gold through the pass.

Colonel W—— returned from Kabul, and not a camel or follower was plundered. The chiefs again attended upon Colonel W—— who told them that he had not brought the ratification of the treaty, but that one of his subordinates would bring it with him in a few days' time. The chiefs, having once been deceived, would place no confidence in this assertion, and the affair at Ali Masjid—or, as our men call it, Sally Musgrave was the consequence.

These political people appear to think that it is their business to deceive all who have any business to transact with them, and that it would be a disgrace to a diplomatist to act in a straightforward manner.

Colonel W—— no sooner got safely through the pass with his detachment than he left the matter unsettled and, on the principle of "the devil take the hindmost," went on to Lahore, taking with him the greater part of the force which had been in possession of the pass.

We halted during the 4th of November at Ali Masjid, and heard that the Khyberees were determined to attack our baggage, so we were ordered to march with it for its protection: the Sappers and Miners in front; then a squadron, followed by two squadrons with the baggage, and the fourth squadron bringing up the rear.

November 5th.—We marched in that order, and arrived at Jamrud without incident. We most certainly ought to be grateful for ever to the Khyberees for their forbearance in allowing us to get through their stronghold scot-free. Had they allowed the Sappers and Miners and our leading squadron to pass, we were perfectly helpless; and had they attacked the baggage there would have been such a crush of camels, bullocks, ponies and camp-followers in the bed of the stream down which the road lay, that we would have been picked off singly, and our men could never have got through.

The fort of Jamrud has been allowed to fall into decay. It was here that Akbar Khan, the favourite son of Dost Mohammed, made his gallant charge with a small body of Afghans against the Sikhs in 1837, killing numbers of men and Hari Singh, their general.

A mile-and-a-half from our encampment a large body of Sikh infantry was assembled under the walls of a new fort called Fatehgarh, their frontier position in the province of Peshawar.

Till to-day I never thought it possible that I could look over plain country with such pleasure; everybody seems delighted at having emerged from the mountains, and the joy of our servants is boundless.

November 7th.—To Peshawar. The first sight that attracted our attention on approaching the town was a triangular gibbet with three men hanging on it. These must have been hanging for some time, and I understand that criminals are never allowed to be taken down and buried unless a tax is paid for the permission.

We passed a newly erected fort which is kept in admirable order, and looks a very fightable place.

Beyond the fort on our right we passed a mosque with two very heavy minarets.

When we got to the eastern side of the town, we saw two men and a woman suspended high in the air, on a beam slung between two lofty palm trees; and a little further on, to a square gibbet formed of four beams, hung six men, one by the heels and without a head. They certainly display a degree of taste in this country in the arrangement of their malefactors that I have never seen equalled.

The governor of the province, General Avitabile, the Italian who has been for many years in the service of Ranjit Singh, came out to see the regiment, and we filed past him. He immediately issued an invitation to all the officers to breakfast and dine with him.

In the evening a party of upwards of fifty dined with the governor, a tall portly man with a very shrewd expression of countenance, but without the appearance of high caste. He was dressed in a sky-blue dress, profusely braided with gold lace, like all officers in the Sikh service; he allows his beard to grow and always keeps his head covered. There is no difficulty in carrying on a conversation with him, for besides Italian, he speaks French, Persian, and Hindustani like a native, and partly understands English.

The palace (two wings of which are still unfinished) stands on a high ridge of ground east of the city, and commands extensive views of the country all round, and of the principal bazaar which runs up to its west front. Altogether the place is a large edifice, built quite in the eastern style, the exterior plastered with cement and completely covered with red figures of birds and women and monkeys and beasts and monsters and trees and flowers all higgledy-piggledy, topsy-turvy.

The governor received us in a room wainscotted all over, ceiling as well as walls, and covered with coarse paintings, principally of women in the extreme of undress. The room was half-full of nautch-girls, some of whom were extremely pretty. Soon after our arrival, we were ushered into a balcony, extending eastward the whole length of the building, to view a display of fireworks worthy of Vauxhall. The fireworks were no sooner expended than we went upstairs to a most excellent dinner, the best dish of all being two lambs roasted whole, and stuffed with rice, raisins, and pistachio nuts. It is several months now since I tasted wine or beer. The room in which we dined was inconveniently narrow, but to overcome this several recesses were let into the walls which were decorated with red paintings of dahlias.

After dinner we went down to the reception room where the nautch-girls were assembled, and where they danced for the rest of the evening. These girls were extremely greedy in asking for cigars, which they smoked with real enthusiasm.

November 8th.—Having procured a Sikh orderly, I rode through the town. Two bazaars intersect it from east to west, the principal one running close up to the back of the palace. These bazaars have been recently nearly rebuilt; each shop has a narrow verandah supported on wooden uprights in front, and the houses are in uniform line; every shop appears to be tenanted, and a vast deal of traffic going on. The streets are both paved, with a gutter running down the centre; and though they can in no way compare with the four-arched bazaars of Kabul, I consider them the cleanest and the best regulated that I have seen.

General Avitabile has certainly worked wonders in the three years that he has been resident here; he entirely built the palace; he remodelled the bazaars, and a high strong mud wall which will completely encircle the city is nearly completed, with a broad,

well-constructed road laid down by its side. He has also reconstructed the walls of the fort to the north of the city, so as to make it strong enough to defy the attack of a native force unacquainted with the use of shells.

When Ranjit Singh sent General Avitabile to govern this province, it was in such a state of disorder that there was great difficulty in collecting any revenue, and no Sikh could appear outside the city or away from his cantonments, without running great risk of being murdered; and I hear that in the first year of his residence five hundred Sikhs met with that fate. No two people can hate each other more bitterly than the Mussalman inhabitants and their Sikh conquerors.

One of the first acts of Avitabile was to disarm the population, and the Sikh soldiery are now the only people seen with arms. The revenue is nine lakhs of rupees annually, and the country is fertile, well watered and cultivated, and trade flourishes.

Avitabile has the reputation of having amassed immense wealth, and to have been fortunate enough to have got it out of the country, always a matter of great difficulty with Ranjit's servants. He is now most anxious to return to Italy, probably foreseeing the inevitable downfall of the Sikh dynasty, which could never have been kept together except by such a master-mind as Ranjit Singh possessed. Already everything is in confusion at the Court of Lahore, and lately one of the principal ministers was murdered in open court in the presence of Kurruk Singh, the present king.

November 10th.—We were in orders to march this morning, but it has been found necessary to send supplies to that accursed fort of Ali Masjid and we must wait the return of the Detachment sent as convoy.

I rode early to the palace to accompany General Avitabile. We had coffee in the room where the nautching was last night, and I noticed that the figures of the women which were painted on the panels of the wainscot in such extremities of undress were now all decently attired in trousers; I asked if this was the consequence of the winter setting in so suddenly; but was told that the wife of the envoy at Kabul was shortly expected to pass through on her way to join her husband, and the General imagined that she might be shocked at so much exposure of the female

form; and this, as the Irishman would say, was the instigation of the trousers.

Having drunk our coffee, we started for the fort, the General being in a "sociable" drawn by four mules driven at full gallop; the rest of the party rode.

We first visited a very extensive garden, kept in bad order and sadly neglected, and then proceeded to the fort.

On three sides it rises from a mound of considerable height, and these sides might be battered at till doomsday without achieving more than knocking down the battlements. On the north side a low swampy country and rice cultivation extend down to the Kabul river, about six miles distant, and this could at any time be flooded. The city runs nearly close up to the southern face. The only entrance is by a strongly fortified gateway on the north, and there is a double curtain of inner and outer defences; a broad and deep ditch is being dug round the walls, and a glacis will be formed on the north and east faces. The reconstruction of this fort confers great credit on the General. The earth in all directions appears to be strongly impregnated with salt-petre.

November 13th.—The detachment which convoyed the supplies to Ali Masjid delivered them safely, but on their return yesterday with the unladen camels, were attacked by the Khyberees, who killed six or eight of the Sappers and Miners forming the rear guard, and drove away upwards of four hundred camels.

We are to remain here now till the arrival of Colonel W—with the 48th and 37th Regiments at Ali Masjid from Jallalabad. Verily, these political people, who are the greatest curse that can be attached to any army, should be severely punished.

November 23rd.—At last we have turned our backs upon Peshawar; our delay here of more than a fortnight has been most provoking. There has been a third skirmish in the Khyber, in which two Europeans and four natives were killed, and we hear that Mr. M— is now in treaty with the chiefs, and that Colonel W——has arrived at Ali Masjid with the 37th and 48th Native Infantry. The fort is so unhealthy that neither the European nor Hindustani constitution can bear against it, and it appears that both nearly equally suffer.

THE MEDITERRANEAN TO-DAY

By H. Jay

In the past two or three years the Mediterranean has been one, if not the chief, preoccupation of British foreign policy. But to many the situation has been rather like that in China, a little too complicated and obscure to understand. Its pre-war history was left chiefly to statesmen who were trained to understand all the inferences. To-day newspapers of all shades and countries combine to muddle us and give us, aided by abbreviated slogans, their often uninstructed views of the picture. As Lord Lytton remarked in his wireless talk on April 28th, the modern diplomats must envy their predecessors who were left to do their work without the interference of a badly informed public, a press that has to maintain its circulation and the journalist who must earn his pay. One result of this propaganda is that the public in Great Britain has come to look upon the free passage of its shipping through the Mediterranean as vital to the war-time existence of the Empire. There is no doubt as to its value, convenience and economy at all times, but vital means essential to existence which is a very different matter. A short time ago, Mr. Hector Bywater* caused no inconsiderable flutter by stating publicly that he did not consider it in any way vital, quite the reverse in fact. He very rightly remarks that "the reiteration of a principle does not make it true" though this seems to have become the basis of the vital theory. Some of his arguments are mentioned later and their soundness is indubitable. But say that he is not correct and that the free use of this sea is essential, then the question arises as to whether unhindered passage through this narrow channel can be guaranteed or even hoped for. If not, and if what the Press calls our vital artery can be cut, then of what use is all this vast expenditure on armaments and ship-building?

Great Britain imports annually over fifty million tons of food-stuffs and raw materials. Of this 11 per cent. comes from the Mediterranean littoral while another 9 per cent. consists of transit

* Naval and Shipping Correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph."

goods. Very little of the 11 per cent. consists of foodstuffs, it is chiefly cotton from Egypt and minerals and chemicals from Spain. All of these could be obtained elsewhere in an emergency, their temporary loss causing only inconvenience during the period of change. At the most 10 per cent. of Britain's foodstuffs come through the Mediterranean and such a proportion could not be called vital. To diminish farther this small percentage the greater part of it could be diverted round the Cape, though this would require a considerable increase in shipping. The extra mileage would be greatest from the Persian Gulf oil port, an increase of about 80 per cent. while the extra from Australian ports would be about 10 per cent. This is admittedly serious as it has been estimated that Britain is already some seven hundred merchant vessels short of her war-time requirements. In 1914 there were 9,240 vessels on the British register, a figure which had fallen to 7,246 in 1937. But surely it would be better to face this deficiency rather than to risk the smaller number of ships that we have to-day in a submarine infested lake. During the war of 1914—18 the Mediterranean was the only sea in which the submarine was not brought under control and, out of a gross world total of thirteen million tons of shipping sunk, five million tons, or over one-third, were lost in that restricted area.

It is thus clear that the food imports that must travel by the Mediterranean come to only about 2 per cent., a figure that it would be ridiculous to call vital to Great Britain at war. Further, the delay caused by longer routeing would be compensated by the saving of actual losses. Finally, it is obvious that the closing of this route to merchant vessels in war time would relieve the Navy of vast responsibility and dispersion, and leave it free for its correct rôle of aggressive naval tactics and for its work in the Indian Ocean and Pacific where we are so weak at the moment.

The historical background of British interests in the Mediterranean is interesting in the way that it shows clearly how haphazardly our commitments there arose before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. At the beginning of the 19th Century France was our hereditary enemy and the base of her main fleet was at Toulon. Had it been on the Atlantic Coast Great Britain might never have worried about Gibraltar. As things were, however, it became

essential to hold this bottle-neck to prevent the junction of the French Mediterranean fleet with the smaller forces based on her western shore. To restrict still more any activities from Toulon we captured Port Mahon in Minorca. Three times did we take it, twice we lost it and finally at the peace of Amiens, in 1803, we handed it back to Spain. Malta, again, did not fall into our hands as the result of considered policy; it merely dropped like a ripe apple after the Battle of the Nile in 1798.

In 1869 the shorter passage to Britain's eastern possessions was opened and the necessity arose for protecting that route. At that time the bogey was Russia both as regards possible descent on India and encroachment in south-eastern Europe through Anatolia. When the crisis of 1878 died down it was found that the British had taken over the government of Cyprus, although the island was not actually annexed until 1914. But here again Disraeli's object was not so much to protect shipping but to have some point of departure from which to meet the feared Russian aggression. It may thus be said, as regards our present Mediterranean problem, that Cyprus also came to us fortuitously. At the time we occupied the island Anglo-French hatred had turned to friendship and, as a result, Britain offered France a free hand in Tunis at some unspecified date in the future provided the latter gave Britain a free hand in Cyprus. France demanded her pound of flesh in 1881. Mr. Gladstone's government, which had then come to power, was angry and, with the British virtual annexation of Egypt in 1882, friendship with France turned into sullen enmity leading to rivalry between the two countries in the Mediterranean. Italy at that time was very nervous of a French descent on her coast and so clung to the greater naval power with the result that the Mediterranean situation caused little sleeplessness to British statesmen. Then France retaliated by an alliance with Russia in 1891 and Great Britain saw her fleet sandwiched between that of France in the west and Russia in the east and the usual acute naval panic ensued as a result of the preceding years of unforeseeing economy. In Parliament Joseph Chamberlain said: "The British Navy in the Mediterranean would have to cut and run—if it could run."

In 1898 the Fashoda incident gave rise to a crisis. Russia was more than occupied in the Far East and could not help her ally

whose chief preoccupation was, at that time, the Dreyfus scandal. Delcassé had to give in and then initiated his policy of endeavouring to isolate Germany. His object was to secure a French rapprochement with England leading eventually to a triple entente with Russia as the third partner. His first success was the alienation of Italy from Germany which he brought about by offering the former a free hand in Tripoli in exchange for a similar liberty for the French in Morocco. Next Delcassé, to ensure the safety of France's frontier on the Pyrenees, offered Spain the slice of Morocco on the other side of the Mediterranean opposite her southern seaboard. But Spain, after her war with America, was almost defenceless and frightened of losing the Balearics and Canaries to Germany. Without Britain's support at sea she considered herself powerless to hold these islands and so insisted that England must also be a party to the agreement. Delcassé then had to offer Britain the free hand that she wanted in Egypt in exchange for her recognition of the Moroccan situation. England agreed with one important reservation. For years the British policy had been to oppose the presence of any Great Power in Morocco and especially in Tangier. As a palliative France agreed that no fortifications should be built between Mellila and the Atlantic and that Tangier should be neutral, or in modern terms a free city. Although this portion of Morocco was in her zone, weak Spain had no option but to accept this unasked control of her territory. All these negotiations were brought to fruition by the famous agreement of April 8th, 1904. Even for those days the diplomatic difficulties had been tremendous but to-day the full blare of newspaper publicity would have made such an agreement quite impossible, in fact no country would dare to attempt it.

Then came Germany's trial of strength in Morocco in 1905. Once the crisis was over, France and England had to consider this future threat seriously. To avoid the possibility of a German seizure of the Balearic or Canary Islands, Britain, France and Spain agreed in the Pact of Cartagena that they would all and severally maintain their rights over their islands and maritime possessions in the area. General Franco has recently reiterated this statement which has been officially recognised by Italy and Germany.

Except for the Agadir crisis of 1911 the situation changed little till September of that year when Italy took Tripoli. This

gave her a potential base at Tobruk which was serious enough, but the ensuing capture of the Dodecanese Islands in May 1912 was an international threat. As a result, Italy lay across the routes from the Suez Canal either to Constantinople in the north-west or westwards to Malta and Gibraltar. A line from the Dodecanese to Tobruk, only some three hundred miles long, virtually cut off the eastern Mediterranean and the Suez Canal from Europe. That was Britain's point of view, while France saw her position in the Near East being seriously threatened. There was also the fact that Great Britain had by now been compelled to withdraw the greater part of her fleet from the Mediterranean to meet the German menace in the North Sea while France had to concentrate hers to protect her line of communication to North Africa against the growing Italian fleet. As Italy was an ally of Germany, was it not also possible that the former might allow the Germans to use a naval base in the Dodecanese or Tripoli? In her treaty with Turkey, Italy had agreed to evacuate these Dodecanese Islands as soon as the Turks left Tripoli. In spite of British and French threats, she was slow to do so and managed to find endless excuses for the delay. Grey, Cambon and Barrére did all they could to bring about an agreement with Italy which would avoid unpleasant shocks in future. Italy's only reply was to offer to give up most of the islands provided she was allowed to retain one or two. All that this lengthy argument appeared to do was to destroy Delcassé's hard won policy by forcing Italy further under the wing of Germany and Austria. Then came the Great War and the matter was shelved.

There can be no doubt that Italy's declaration of neutrality in 1914 saved France. It ruined the Mediterranean portion of the Triple Alliance naval agreement and enabled colonial troops from Morocco to be brought safely to France. The Dodecanese argument was conveniently forgotten; the essential thing was to range Italy on the Allied side. After the war the matter of the islands arose again but Italy was adamant and finally the Treaty of Lausanne recognised Italian sovereignty. By then Mussolini was in the ascendant and the possibility of retrocession, particularly as the real owner was Turkey and an ex-enemy, was out of the question.

The Abyssinian adventure of 1935 suddenly showed up the enormously increased commitments of both Britain and France in what Italy had by then termed *mare nostrum*. The interests of both countries in the Far East were much greater, while, in the Near East, the Syrian and Palestinian termini of the Iraq pipeline were an extremely valuable source of oil supply, to France almost essential. Syria, Palestine, Transjordania, Iraq and Egypt all depended for defence on France or Britain, either directly or by treaty. Again, the eastern Mediterranean was rapidly becoming the junction of British Imperial Airways for the East and for Africa while France was also developing similar communications. Last but not least there was the fact that about a third of the French standing army was now stationed in North Africa and any hitch in its immediate transportation would have serious consequences for France. All these commitments were and are important but, if the bluff were called now, it might be extremely difficult to maintain them.

Now to consider briefly the defence of the British possessions in this troublesome sea. The measures to deal with the submarine are admittedly more efficient than they were in the past, but our not unlimited navy cannot be everywhere and has other duties than convoy work. The danger to merchant vessels from submarine attack is still so serious that we must not expect any improvement in the losses figure of the last war when one out of every three ships passing through the Mediterranean was sunk. The potential submarine danger to warships, though important, fades into comparative insignificance when compared with that from modern aircraft. Development in this sphere during the past five years has upset all calculations and it would be a brave man who would state that finality is yet in sight. The fighting aircraft of to-day is easily capable of 300 m.p.h. while 250 m.p.h. is nothing unusual for a large bomber. This has conferred advantages on maritime states like Italy and Spain such as they never had before and never expected to have. It has also considerably reduced the value of purely naval stations like Gibraltar and Malta. The former has always been threatened from the Spanish side, as was evidenced by the recent anxiety in Parliament as to certain guns alleged to have been sited on the

mainland. At the same time, if Gibraltar were attacked, it seems doubtful if we should lose the fortress, though some authorities think we only hold it on sufferance. But whether we could hold it or not does not alter the fact that the air menace will make it an extremely uncomfortable place for the fleet to lie.

Malta has recently experienced the possibility of war and so here there are more tangible facts to consider than at Gibraltar. The outbreak of the Abyssinian affair found our Mediterranean forces very inadequate. Ships were collected from everywhere possible, many not fully manned and even some of these short crews were found hurriedly from vessels undergoing dockyard repair. This modern armada collected, as a matter of course, at Malta. As bad as the naval deficiency at that time was the woeful absence of sufficient aircraft. Again as many as possible were sent to the Mediterranean, chiefly to Egypt and Palestine. All this showed up our weakness elsewhere but mainly in the Far East where, luckily, the problem is not yet at its height. However, September 1935 found the Grand Harbour at Malta packed with ships virtually unprotected from the air. Twenty minutes away by bomber aircraft was Sicily which, as well as several other southern Italian airports, was choked with aircraft. The entrance to Malta harbour is narrow and, even in good weather, the egress of a big ship needs the utmost navigating care. In bad weather or at night extreme skill is required. In any circumstances it would be impossible for a large fleet to put to sea rapidly owing to the congested entrance and the whole mass would provide a virtually stationary target for aircraft. Cramped as the fleet was in 1935, with inadequate anti-aircraft defences, the loss of a large number of vesssels would have had to be expected.

As a result of this recent severe shock the defences of Malta are being modernised though it is naturally impossible to make the harbour invulnerable to air attack. The visit of the British Secretary of State for War in April 1938 shows that the Government is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation. The fixed defences have been and are being greatly improved. Extensive anti-aircraft protection is being provided and also a considerable air force, not only for defence but also to carry out attacks on enemy bases and

flying fields. Even with all this an occasional raider will be able to get through and do great damage in an extremely short time. One is thus forced to the conclusion that Malta, in an emergency, is hardly to be relied upon in the face of modern aircraft and that it might be wise to let the fortress go. Instead of being an asset to a commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean it might become a serious liability should a war cabinet at home insist on its retention and use. Whether a cabinet would be likely to do so is admittedly extremely doubtful.

The question is whether Malta, with its restricted harbour entrance, can be replaced and it is here that Cyprus may prove valuable as an alternative, depending upon whom is the enemy. The harbour at Famagusta can be developed but only to hold a small fleet. The island can, however, be used as a base for any number of aircraft, the central plain providing aerodromes while Lake Akrotiri can be the seaplane base. From this strategic position we should be able to protect, to some extent, our commitments in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly the pipeline, and also be able to support any naval forces operating from Alexandria to cover the Suez Canal. Cyprus would also provide an answer to any air base in the Dodecanese Islands.

In reply to some of the British moves in 1936 Italy, as was to be expected, decreed the fortification of Pantellaria. This island is some hundred and fifty miles north-west of Malta lying between Sicily and Tunis. There is, however, another threat which is exercising considerable nervousness in France, and that is the Spanish situation. Although the three principal dictators have publicly stated that there is to be no alteration in the territorial *status quo* there remains the fact that friendly aerodromes and naval bases in the Balearics and Canaries could always be used by an ally of Spain. For some time now France has realised that Italy's position athwart the Mediterranean makes the possibility of obtaining oil from Syria an extremely doubtful one should there be trouble between the two nations. As a result she is laying in vast oil reserves. But an enemy base in the Balearic Islands might prevent the transportation of the French North African forces to any Mediterranean port. To obviate this possible threat arrangements now exist for these North African troops to make their way

to the Atlantic from where they would go by sea to Bordeaux. A longer journey with a short delay is better than complete absence. The threat to the Canaries is more serious as this would upset France's alternative embarkation plans and would also disturb Great Britain since it might interfere seriously with shipping on both the African and South American routes.

To return to the Mediterranean. With naval, submarine and air bases flanking this narrow 1,900 miles it seems obvious that we could not keep the route open in war for merchant shipping. As already explained, the necessity is comparatively small and the risk great. The most important loss would probably be the inability to draw oil from the pipeline terminus at Haifa. But, except for local requirements, it is probable that this source has already been largely discounted in our war-time arrangements. Iraq, Persia, Mexico and other countries across the Atlantic would supply our needs. It is, therefore, probable that the Government, on Admiralty advice, would declare the Mediterranean out of bounds for merchant shipping should Great Britain be at war with a first class power in that sea. There is little doubt but that this course would have had to be adopted in 1935-36 had the unfortunate tension then existing developed into war.*

Assuming that this sea is closed to merchant shipping, let us consider the possible action of our naval forces. For obvious reasons this can only be lightly touched upon. Unfortunately, there are two aspects of this action, the strategical or ideal from a war point of view and the political or essential from a human point of view. To take the strategical first.

If our enemy was dependent to any great extent, as is likely to be the case, on ship-borne food, then by closing the Mediterranean at Gibraltar and in the Red Sea we should be able to exert considerable pressure. Such a blockade would be more effective and could be carried out with fewer ships than had to be used for a similar purpose against Germany in 1914—18. This would also allow the freeing of considerable naval forces for service in the Far East where our present weakness is serious.

* As a result of this warning South Africa saw the future importance of her naval bases. Many ships from India, Australasia and the Far East were routed via the Cape during the emergency. Cape Town, or rather Simonstown, will shortly be one of the best equipped ports in the Empire with Durban not far behind.

Such a blockade seems a comparatively simple solution but unfortunately it is not as easy as that. We cannot leave our possessions, Malta and Cyprus, unprotected. The Palestine mandate involves certain commitments and finally there is the treaty with Egypt by which we are bound to protect her. And so, as usual in British history, strategy must be subordinated to policy. This does not affect the wisdom or necessity of allowing no merchant vessels in the *mare clausum* (as it would be in fact) but it would effect our naval dispositions. A small naval force to protect our interests in the eastern Mediterranean would be quite useless as it might be opposed by the whole strength, except for convoy guards, of an enemy fleet. Our Atlantic fleet could possibly be withdrawn secretly for a single battle but any enemy in the North Sea might take advantage of the situation if the absence of the fleet was known and prolonged. To concentrate the rest of our naval forces would leave the Pacific, where our greatest assets lie, virtually denuded. The alternative is a three-power standard, even though scaled down to allow for the naval ratio agreement with Germany, which is beyond the paying capacity of even Strube's "little man."

The recently signed agreement with Italy has considerably relieved the situation. The pact reiterates the statements made in the accord of January 2nd, 1937, by which both parties recognised that freedom of passage through, entry to and egress from the Mediterranean is equally essential to each of the two powers. The unrestricted passage through the Suez Canal for naval and merchant ships in peace and war has been re-affirmed. Both sides have agreed to inform the other of, and explain the reasons for, any increases in fortifications as well as of any major redistribution of troops in and around the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as well as in Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya and all possessions in north-east Africa. It has recently been suggested that Great Britain should have a strategic reserve of troops in the Near or Middle East. It looks as if the Anglo-Italian agreement might make it impossible to locate this reserve in Palestine or Kenya even if it was desired to put it in either of these countries. Our note to Italy explaining the redistribution would have to state that the force was merely to protect our scattered possessions which might be inaccessible owing to the increased difficulties in the Mediterranean. Italy might logically reply that the agreement had done

away with those problems and that if we insisted she would have no alternative but to increase the garrison of Libya, now being reduced to 30,000,* to its original total of 60,000. It thus seems that some part of this reserve may have to be placed in India with possible repercussions and difficulties in this country. There is, of course, the Persian Gulf area but that is hardly salubrious except in the distant hills where communications are conspicuously absent.

Though the agreement benefits us in many ways it has, as it is bound to have, its disadvantages. Unfortunately, the inception of the negotiations was the cause of a serious Cabinet crisis over the question of the good faith of Italy at that time. Only the future will decide whether the Prime Minister or Mr. Eden took the correct view, at the moment it looks as if the former was right.† The Pact was not to come into force until two conditions had been fulfilled. The first was that Great Britain was to sponsor a resolution at Geneva which would give individual states the right to acknowledge the conquest of Abyssinia. This has been done. The other was the withdrawal of the Italian volunteers from Spain. At the time the Pact was signed the end of the Spanish war seemed in sight. But it has dragged on and the international withdrawal of volunteers which has not yet started will be an extremely slow business in any case. Italy is becoming restive under the delay and has recently appealed to Britain to wait no longer and implement the Pact at once, a difficult problem for British statesmen. Hitler can only have minor objections, if any, to a rapprochement between Britain and Italy but, in "Mein Kampf" he has emphasised, with amazing frankness, that the previous defeat of France is essential to the completion of Germany's forward policy, now launched, in South-East Europe. The isolation of France in the Mediterranean, not her consolidation, would thus appear to be Germany's policy, unless this has recently been changed. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have altered and the French-Italian talks have receded into the background with little hope of resuscitation at present. Mussolini's speech at Genoa in May, which drew a strong protest from France, when he referred cautiously to the conversations and said: "They desire victory for Barcelona, we want victory for Franco," seems to have killed at the outset any possibility of agreement.

* The recent announcements by France that she proposes to increase her North-African forces is likely to make it difficult for Italy to carry out this part of the agreements however much she may wish to do so.

†Mussolini's first public speech after Hitler's visit to Rome—"It is our intention to respect the Anglo-Italian agreement scrupulously." Genoa, 14th May 1938.

France's interests, commitments and needs have not been considered here. That country daily becomes more dependent on an increasingly powerful Great Britain, her basic policy is almost identical with ours and mutual rapprochement has intensified as a result of His Majesty's recent visit. War in Europe is likely to find France arrayed with us or we with her. Whether, to help the naval situation, she would be prepared to hold the Eastern Mediterranean with her fleet and use the longer line of communication to North Africa is doubtful. The protection of her Mediterranean ports is a large commitment and there is always the fear of losing Nice again. This question of the possible distribution of the French fleet in time of war is an absorbing problem in itself.

There is another cloud, no bigger than a man's hand at the moment. Germany has begun her "Drang nach Oesten" movement and Austria is now an integral part of the Reich. Since she lost Trieste at the end of the war Austria has had no Mediterranean port. The famous map on sale in Vienna before the Hitler plebiscite* which shews the German speaking peoples in Europe has a scarlet Trieste and a large patch of the same colour in the hinterland. The "axis" did not keep the Germans from the Brenner Pass; there may be a "Sudeten Deutsche" movement in Trieste one day. Rumour has not been idle on the point and *The Times'* Berlin correspondent stated in May this year that the Nazi Press had been told to suggest that the voluntary cession of Trieste would enable Germany to give added help to Italy in the Mediterranean. As things are the trade of Trieste, in spite of official disclaimers, would vanish rapidly if Austrian commerce, which has used that port until now, were to be diverted under pressure to Hamburg. Alternatively Germany may develop her own shipping line to Trieste much as Italy may dislike this peaceful penetration.

Germany's farther intentions in South East Europe towards the Ukraine and the Black Sea raise many interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this article. For the moment the problem facing our statesmen and their advisers is to fulfil Britain's obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean while continuing to maintain order in the Atlantic and protecting the Dominions and our possessions in the Pacific.

* Published by Volksbund fur das Deutschtum in Auslande, Berlin.

MOHMAND MUSINGS

By M. K.

An almost insuperable difficulty which arises on all frontier campaigns is to distinguish friend and foe. The following incident illustrates how intermingled they can become. It occurred in one of the opening clashes in July 1935, between the *khassadars** guarding the road to Ghalanai and the young tribesmen who objected to the road being repaired. After a prolonged battle the *khassadars* succeeded in killing two of the enemy. One of the dead proved to be one of three brothers, the second was a coolie working on the road, whilst the third was one of the *khassadars* fighting on our side. So it is quite conceivable that a *khassadar* accounted for his own brother in this engagement. It was not surprising, therefore, later in the campaign, to find Mohmands who started by fighting against us eventually in our employ.

One tough scallywag, who trekked round carrying the survey officer's paraphernalia, had several interesting discussions with an Indian Officer of ours.

"Oh yes," he said, "I started by fighting against you. My brother, who was in action beside me, got two bullets in the thigh and then two in the head. I didn't mind that so much; it was, after all, the fortune of war. But when a belt of machine-gun fire sprayed right across his back and just cut him in two, I decided to quit and take employment with Government instead."

"Is it true that your women incite you against Government?" asked the Subedar.

"Oh no, that's not true at all. They are usually against us fighting and many of us don't want to fight either. But we are in the hands of our mullahs. What they say goes, and obey them we must.

"But what of the Government pensioners? Surely they don't want to risk losing their pensions?"

"No, but those who are near British territory get over the border as quickly as they can with their families and all they've

* "Khassadars" are armed tribesmen in Government employ. They are used for road protection duties, as personal escorts, etc.—Ed.

got. The others haven't any say at all. A **lashkar* descends on their homes, and if they refuse to fight they are destroyed lock, stock and barrel. Naturally, they join up. Not all of them are actually in the firing line, but they carry our water and provisions. Several of them have been signallers in their time and we use them to read your messages. We also use them as signallers ourselves. They haven't got any flags, but they wave bits of cloth or their puggarees and often communicate to each other in this way."

"Which of our arms do you dislike the most?"

"Oh, we hate your aeroplanes except when in position. Then they can't see us. But we loathe them when we are on the move. They prevent us ploughing our fields and sowing our crops. And at night we can't light fires in our villages, and so we have great difficulty in cooking our food. The fact of being watched upsets us and we get little comfort when at war."

"In actual fighting we're most frightened of your machine-guns and the hail of bullets which they send sweeping round us. The guns we don't mind so much, because we see which way they are pointing and when the shell comes, we dive right and left into cover."

"The way we organise ourselves in a fight is to have one sharp shooter firing and about fifteen others waiting under cover. On seeing an opportunity he waves to us and we take up our positions. Our water comes up to us on donkeys and we use them to send away our dead and badly wounded. For food—well, the nearest village is under orders to supply us and if they don't, we just loot their stores of grain and kill their sheep. It's a hard time for us, all the same, when we're fighting. There's one thing, however; we're seldom surprised. If there are none of us actually employed in your camp, there are always some with the wood or forage contractor. As soon as a column moves out, word goes ahead to the villages nearby and through them to the *lashkars* waiting in the hills. These *lashkars* vary a lot in strength, increasing if we gain success and dwindling to a few hundreds when things go against us."

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* "Lashkar," literally an army, is used to denote any hostile body of tribesmen.—Ed.

So much for the Mohmand's side. It is, I think, of interest to analyse him as well from one's own point of view.

As a marksman at shorter ranges he was not, as a rule, very accurate. This, I think, one may put down to the fact that he failed to show steadiness when being fired at himself. He lacked the deadly fire discipline of the Mahsud or the Wazir. When out of the reach of our covering fire as he was on the 29th September on Hill 4080, he showed that he could seize an opportunity when it was presented to him.

He disliked crowning the heights. His fire positions were as a rule in the rough ground in the nullahs, or often in caves in the hillside. From these, at longer ranges up to 1,500 yards, his shooting was unpleasantly accurate.

The case of one sportsman comes to mind. Throughout a long day in one of the valleys he sniped a stretch about fifty yards long. Although he did not have any actual success, he quickened the stride of even the most sluggish over his selected area. Ambulances gathered speed suddenly, unsuspecting horsemen broke into a trot. Those who had to cross it later can laugh reminiscently now.

On occasions, when roused, the Mohmand proved himself an intrepid antagonist. One case in point was after a reconnaissance up the Toratigga valley. Suddenly, on one flank, there appeared along the back wall of a village half a dozen gallants who took cover in a graveyard about two hundred yards beyond and loosed off several hearty volleys at a large group of senior officers. They then proceeded to pepper the brigade of artillery in action. The batteries got down to it first with their Lewis guns and then with their 4-5s. In an instant the whole valley was roused. The retirement was followed up with the greatest vigour, first of all by small parties as close as two hundred yards, and then by a large *lashkar* gathering in their rear.

The Mohmand who, throughout the operations, showed a great propensity for sniping camps at night that evening surpassed himself. He formed almost a complete ring round Ghalanai Camp and from 8-30 p.m. until 2-30 a.m. shot into it from all directions. "Granpop," a well-known character with an ancient .577, noisy as any howitzer, was well to the fore. Report has it that several hundred men formed up to make a *ghazi* rush

on camp. However, a timely burst of machine-gun fire damped their ardour.

Next morning when the brigade moved out against him, the Mohmand appeared to have lost his fiery spirit of the day before. The deduction seems to be that he is not capable of really sustained action. For the main part he is an ill-nourished specimen and his enthusiasm for a fight is even more spasmodic than that of other frontier tribesmen.

Experience, however, taught us that we could not afford to take liberties with him. When he found a position where his own safety was assured, the accuracy of his shooting improved a hundredfold. In the engagement where his fire action was successful he showed himself recklessly courageous in following up his advantage with shock tactics.

In conclusion, he deserves a meed of praise for the way he behaved after agreeing to our terms. It is true that he still continued to make repeated attempts to penetrate into those villages which we held as piquet positions and attempted almost to the end to carry off canvas water tanks and screens. With a wry sense of humour he also proceeded on occasions to enliven our camps with the most eerie jackal serenades. At the same time he definitely prevented the more unruly sections from taking actively hostile action against us, and sniping of our camps ceased almost entirely. So, in the later stages, whilst the road over the Nahakki was being completed, the slopes of Khazanasar became a happy hunting ground for a shot-gun. For this I feel we should thank him. After all, who does not appreciate an early season *chikor* with stuffing and bread crumbs, and roasted perchance to perfection by an artistically-minded cook?

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICE NOTES

THE ARMY IN ENGLAND

Conditions of Service for Officers

The conditions outlined below were brought into force for British Army officers in combatant arms of the Service from 1st August 1938. They do not apply to officers of corps such as the Royal Army Ordnance Corps and the Royal Army Pay Corps, which have their own terms of recruitment and service.

PROMOTION

1. Promotion, provided an officer is qualified and recommended, will be by time-scale up to the rank of major and thereafter by selection—

to captain at 8 years' service;
to major at 17 years' service.

The lowest rank from which it will be possible for an officer to receive accelerated promotion will be that of major, but officers who were brevet-majors before the 1st August will retain army seniority according to the dates of their brevets.

2. An officer selected to fill a lieutenant-colonel's or higher appointment will be promoted from the date on which he assumes duty in the appointment, or as soon afterwards as a vacancy on the establishment occurs. The rule that a lieutenant-colonel cannot become a substantive colonel until four years after the date on which he received his lieutenant-colonelcy has been abolished.

A lieutenant-colonel promoted to colonel will count seniority from either—

(*a*) the date of his promotion to colonel,
or (*b*) the date of his brevet-colonelcy, if he received one;
or (*c*) three years from the date of his lieutenant-colonelcy, brevet or substantive,
whichever is the most advantageous to him.

3. Generally speaking, officers promoted to colonel and above will be promoted to fill vacancies in appointments, not vacancies in establishments.

A colonel temporarily superseded for promotion to major-general by an officer junior to him will regain his relative position in the army when he is, himself, promoted to major-general. A similar rule will apply in the case of major-generals on promotion to lieutenant-general.

TENURE OF APPOINTMENTS

Except for certain technical and colonial appointments, all command and staff tenures will in future be for three years.

RETIREMENT

The Army Council retains the right to keep any officer in the Service beyond the age-limits shown below, if retention is in the

public interest. Otherwise the upper age-limits for retirement will be:

Majors and below	...	47 years.
Lieutenant-colonels	...	50 years.
Colonels	...	55 years.
Major-generals	...	57 years.
Lieutenant-generals and above	...	60 years.

A major permanently superseded under the age of 47 will, unless the Army Council decide otherwise, have the right to serve on to that age.

PAY

The old and new rates of pay are compared in the following table:

Regimental Officers

RANK.	OLD RATE.		NEW RATE.	
	s. d.		*s. d.*	
2nd-Lieutenant	10 0	..	11 0	
Lieutenant ..	11 10	..	13 0	(After three years' service.)
Ditto ..	14 6	(After 7 years' service.)	14 6	(After six years' service.)
Captain ..	19 0	(No time-scale, but average promotion took place at 11 years' service.)	16 6	(On promotion at 8 years' service.)
Ditto ..	..	..	19 0	(At 11 years' service.)
Ditto ..	23 6	(At 15 years' service.)	23 6	(At 14 years' service.)
Major ..	28 6	(Average promotion took place at 20 years' service.)	28 6	(On promotion at 17 years' service)
Ditto ..	33 6	(After 5 years' in rank, average 25 years' service.)	33 6	(At 22 years' service.)
Lieut.-Colonel	43 0	(Exclusive of command pay.)	43 0	(Exclusive of command pay.)

Pay of Colonels and above

	s. d.		*s. d.*	
Colonel ..	49 10	..	49 10	(On promotion.)
	58 4 (brigadier)		52 6	(After two years' in rank.)
			55 2	(After four years' in rank.)
			58 0	(After six years' in rank.)
Major-General	81 6	..	90 6	

Pay of Staff Officers

Pay classes in all staff and other appointments have been abolished. Such appointments will carry, instead—

For a lieutenant ... Regimental pay *plus* 2*s.* 6*d.*
For captains, majors and lieut.-colonels. Regimental pay *plus* 5*s.* 0*d.*

Retired Pay

The new rates of retired pay are calculated primarily on a basis of age, given a specified minimum of total service. They do not carry, as the old scales did, a substantial rank element for each year's service in a specified rank. The new rates of retired pay are larger than the old ones for most officers retiring in the rank of major.

1. Under the age of 40, with ten or more years' commissioned service—

£100 a year gratuity for each year's service.

2. For officers under the rank of lieutenant-colonel, having twenty or more years' commissioned service—

Maximum Pension £407-10-0

Age.	*Years service.*	*Retired pay.*
		£ *s.* *d.*
40 ...	17 ...	203 10 0
41 ...	18 ...	237 0 0
42 ...	19 ...	271 10 0
43 ...	20 ...	305 0 0
44 ...	21 ...	339 10 0
45 ...	22 ...	373 0 0
46 ...	23 ...	407 10 0

For each year's service over or under the scheduled amount at a given age, subject to a limit of five years either way, a sum of £13-10-0 will be added to, or deducted from, the pension in the above table. Thus, an officer commissioned at the age of 19 years and wishing to retire at the age of 43 (*i.e.*, with 24 years' commissioned service) will receive £305 plus £54, making £359 p.a. retired pay.

3. For officers of the rank of lieutenant-colonel—

Maximum Pension £543

Age.	*Years service.*	*Retired pay.*
		£ *s.* *d.*
44 ...	19 ...	407 10 0
45 ...	19 ...	440 10 0
46 ...	20 ...	475 10 0
47 ...	20 ...	508 10 0
48 ...	21 ...	543 0 0

The variable increment or decrement is the same as for captains and majors, *i.e.*, £13-10-0 a year up to the age of 48. Thus a lieutenant-colonel having twenty-five years' service at the age of 46 will receive the maximum pension on retirement at that age.

4. For officers of the rank of colonel there is a similar time-scale, except that the increment per year of service over and above the scheduled amount rises to £20 a year after the age of fifty. Thus, a colonel retiring at the age of fifty, with twenty-seven years' service, will receive £678-10-0 p.a., while a colonel aged 52, with twenty-eight years' service, will receive £732 p.a.

The maximum retired pay for a colonel will be £750. General officers will receive pensions, irrespective of length of service or age, as follows: Major-generals, £950; lieutenant-generals, £1,120; generals, £1,300.

VACATION OF APPOINTMENTS

To avoid hardship, no officer will be required to vacate any appointment, as a direct result of the new terms of service, before 1st August, 1939. Thus, an officer who, on 1st August this year, was serving in a normal four years' appointment or command and who had, on that date—

(*a*) completed three years or more will be permitted to complete his original tenure; or

(*b*) completed two, but less than three years, will not be required to vacate before 1st August, 1939; or

(*c*) completed less than two years will be required to vacate on completion of three years.

DRILL BY THREES

With a view to bringing close order drill more into line with the requirements of field service, experiments have been conducted at Shorncliffe. Instead of forming fours and marching in column of fours, the troops taking part formed threes and marched in column of threes.

SNIPERS

During the Great War snipers proved themselves of great value and undoubtedly obtained a very high proportion of hits to rounds fired. Seventy-two picked men per battalion of infantry are, therefore, to be thoroughly trained as snipers. Special equipment is to be issued and practice will be carried out on field service targets.

DIRECTOR OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Dr. H. J. Gough, M.B.E., Superintendent of the Engineering Department of the National Physical Laboratory, has been appointed to a new post as Director of Scientific Research at the War Office. He will be responsible to the Director-General of Munitions Production for the general direction and organization of research work for War Office purposes, for advising on the programme of research work to be undertaken and proposals for specific investigations, and for the efficiency of the various organizations for research and experimental purposes under the War Office. He will represent that Department on the inter-departmental research committees.

ROYAL ARMY ORDNANCE CORPS

The mechanization of the Army has necessitated the creation of the post of Inspector of Army Ordnance Workshop Services. The new Inspector will be responsible for the technical inspection of Royal Army Ordnance Corps workshops, mobilization equipment and field workshop units, and the organization and general supervision of Royal Army Ordnance Corps artisan training for men and boys.

The appointment is part of the recent reorganization of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps which is now organized in two branches, each with definite responsibilities in its own sphere, under the Director of Ordnance Services:

(*a*) The Stores Branch, under the Principal Ordnance Officer, who controls provision, storage and supply of ordnance stores and undertakes the general administration of ordnance questions throughout the Army.

(*b*) The Mechanical Engineering Branch, under the Principal Ordnance Mechanical Engineer, who is responsible for workshop services and technical inspections.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE ORGANIZATION

At the War Office an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general has been appointed Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Anti-Aircraft Defence). He will be responsible, through the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the Secretary of State for all matters connected with anti-aircraft defence, and will devote the whole of his time to these duties.

Under the Deputy C.I.G.S. (Anti-Aircraft Defence) a new Director of Anti-Aircraft Training and Organization, with the rank of major-general, has been appointed.

Existing Territorial anti-aircraft formations, with the addition of others to be created, will be formed into five divisions instead of two, as at present. The strength of the personnel will be increased to about 100,000. The five divisions will form a corps under the command of a lieutenant-general, who will be responsible for training, inspection and personnel questions. In war, his headquarters will be adjacent to those of the Air Officer Commanding the Fighter Command, Royal Air Force, to whom he will be responsible for operations.

ARMY TECHNICAL SCHOOLS FOR BOYS

New Army Technical Schools for boys are to be opened in Jersey, at Chatham and Arborfield, near Reading. The school in Jersey is intended primarily to train apprentices for the Royal Army Service Corps, that at Chatham apprentices for the Royal Engineers and that at Arborfield apprentices for the Royal Army Ordnance Corps.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

Vocational Training is to be allowed to soldiers during the period immediately before the termination of their service with the Colours. The Ministry of Labour assumed complete responsibility

for vocational training on 1st July this year, when the centres at Chisledon Camp and Hounslow were transferred to that department. The vocational training centre at Aldershot is being closed down.

THE SERVICES IN INDIA

MECHANICAL REPAIR ORGANIZATION

The Secretary of State for India has accepted the principle that responsibility for the provision, repair and maintenance of mechanical vehicles in India should be transferred from the Quarter-master-General to the Master-General of the Ordnance. The main reason for the change which, it is anticipated, will take place in April 1939 is to avoid duplication of workshops by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps and the Indian Army Ordnance Corps. The reorganization will necessitate the transfer of some personnel from the Royal Indian Army Service Corps to the Indian Army Ordnance Corps and the terms of service and conditions of transfer are under consideration.

Existing heavy repair shops will continue to carry out third line repairs for mechanical vehicles, but it is intended to rationalize all workshops both in heavy repair shops and arsenals, so that there will be the maximum of economy in the carrying out of third line repairs of armaments, ordnance stores and mechanical vehicles.

In the second line organization, workshop companies will undertake ordnance and mechanical transport repairs in peace and war. This will effect savings in transportation charges since, at present, second line ordnance repairs have to be sent back to arsenals. It will also reduce the size of working stocks now required to cover the long periods during which repairable armament stores are non-effective.

For first line organization it is proposed to attach light aid detachments consisting of artificers of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps to major mechanised units and formations. These detachments will assist unit artificers in running repairs.

At Army Headquarters the present Artillery Directorate will become the Directorate of Armaments and Mechanization, the duties of the mechanization portion of the new directorate being similar to those of the Directorate of Mechanization at the War Office.

INFANTRY

Interim organizations have been sanctioned for battalions in India to enable them, as far as conditions permit, to conform in training and tactical handling with rifle battalions in the United Kingdom. Battalions will have four rifle companies, each of three platoons of three sections. In battalions armed with the medium machine-gun, the headquarters company will include a platoon of eight guns.

FIELD SERVICE RATION

As a result of experience gained during the Waziristan Operations, 1937, the field service scale of rations for both British and Indian troops is under revision from the point of view of giving more "bulk" to men fighting in mountainous country or employed on arduous duties such as those of road protection.

CHARGERS FOR OFFICERS OF MECHANIZED UNITS

From the 1st November officers of mechanized cavalry and artillery units will be allowed one charger each. An additional fifty per cent. for the number of officers on the peace establishment of the unit has also been authorised. Officers will be allowed to buy a charger from Government at concessional rates if they do not already possess one. All chargers will be optional, not obligatory.

PROMOTION TO WARRANT OFFICER AND VICEROY'S COMMISSIONED OFFICER

Indian non-commissioned officers of cavalry or infantry will, in future, be eligible for promotion to warrant officer or Viceroy's commissioned officer provided they have qualified at either the small Arms School, Pachmarhi, or the Small Arms and Mechanization School, Ahmednagar, Armament wing.

ELECTRIFICATION OF INDIAN TROOPS BARRACKS

The Secretary of State for India has approved the electrification of Indian troops barracks in plains stations where British troops barracks have already been electrified. Work will be carried out only as and when the necessity for the construction of new, or the reconstruction of old, Indian troops barracks arises.

FAMILIES IN QUETTA

The situation regarding residential accommodation in Quetta has become easier and families of military ranks have been permitted to reside in that station, subject to the approval of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command.

DRESS IN MESS

Mess dress, or other uniform when mess dress is unsuitable, will continue to be worn on guest nights and other similar occasions in India. The wearing of dinner jackets on ordinary nights will be allowed at the discretion of commanding officers.

WOLSELEY HELMET

The "Wolseley" pattern of khaki helmet has been replaced as the official helmet in India by a pith khaki hat. Wolseley helmets and Cawnpore Tent Club pattern hats may be retained in use until the end of the year for wear on all occasions, except ceremonial parades and field service. The khaki Wolseley helmet remains the regulation headdress for officers at stations abroad other than in India.

ARMY RIFLE ASSOCIATION, INDIA

The central meeting will be held at Meerut during the week 18th—25th February 1939.

THE DEFENCE SERVICES IN INDIA, 1937-38

During a debate in the Legislative Assembly in 1934, the Defence Secretary promised to consider the possibility of producing annually for members of the Central Legislature an account of the chief activities of the Army during the previous twelve months. Extracts from the "Summary of Important Matters relating to the Defence Services in India," 1937-38, are given below.

Role of the Defence Forces in India

1. Defence Forces are maintained by the Government of India for the defence of India against external aggression and the maintenance of internal peace and tranquillity. This definition was accepted by the Legislative Assembly in 1921. The definition is qualified by the reservation that the forces maintained are not intended to repel external attack by a major military power, though the duties of those forces may include initial resistance to such an attack pending the arrival of Imperial reinforcements or the exercise elsewhere by Imperial forces of pressure which would relieve the situation.

2. The duties of each defence service are:

(*a*) *Royal Indian Navy.*—In so far as seaborne attacks by a major power are concerned, and also for the safety of her sea communications, India relies on the protection of the Royal Navy, supplemented by such assistance as the small sea-going vessels of the Royal Indian Navy can provide. The primary function of the Royal Indian Navy is the provision of local naval defence for the protection of shipping against raiders, mines and submarines in the immediate approaches to the major seaports of India. To this end, as finances permit, it is the policy of the Government of India:

(*i*) to strengthen the active service and training establishments of the Royal Indian Navy;
(*ii*) to organize a reserve both of officers and trained ratings;
(*iii*) to provide armament and other equipment for use in auxiliary vessels to be equipped for and employed on local naval defence in war; and
(*iv*) to maintain a small but efficient squadron of sea-going combatant vessels.

(*b*) *Army.*—The roles of the army are:

(*i*) to support and assist the civil armed forces in controlling the tribes on the North West Frontier;
(*ii*) to support the civil power in the maintenance of internal law and order in peace and war, to guard the main arteries of communication within India itself and to undertake the local defence of major ports in time of war; and
(*iii*) to undertake operations in the defence of the land frontiers and coasts of India against external aggression, in anticipation of the arrival of Imperial assistance.

As finances permit, the modernisation of the army to keep pace with new developments is being undertaken, particularly in regard to the mechanization of both British and Indian units.

(*c*) *Air Forces in India.*—The duties of the Air Forces in India include co-operation with the Covering Troops in the control of the tribes on the North West Frontier, with the Field Army in the defence of India from external aggression and with the Army and Navy in the defence of India's coasts and major ports.

In addition the Air Forces in India are prepared to act independently of the other defence services either in the defence of India against external aggression or in the control of the North West Frontier tribes.

Although the Air Forces in India are at present equipped and armed on a scale below that obtaining in the United Kingdom, steps are being taken, as finances permit, to introduce aircraft and armament of modern types.

3. *Units outside India.*—Certain units have been lent to the governments of the United Kingdom and Burma. All charges in respect of such units are met by the government concerned.

4. *Finance.*—The budget estimate for the Defence Services, which include the Royal Indian Navy, the Army and Air Forces in India, for 1937-38, was fixed at Rs. 44.62 crores, inclusive of a sum of 75 lakhs for the reconstruction of Quetta. The provision for the ordinary Defence expenditure is thus Rs. 43.87 crores or Rs. 98 lakhs less than the corresponding figure for 1936-37. This decrease was mainly due to the separation of Burma (Rs. 104 lakhs) and Aden (Rs. 20 lakhs), partly counterbalanced by an increase under Ordnance Services.

The budget for 1938-39 has been fixed at Rs. 45.18 crores inclusive of the sum of Rs. 75 lakhs for the reconstruction of Quetta. The comparative figures of Defence expenditure since 1930 are as follows:

Year.	Crores of Rs.	
1930-31	54.30	
1931-32	51.76	
1932-33	46.74	
1933-34	44.42	
1934-35	44.34	
1935-36	44.98	
1936-37	45.45	
1937-38	44.62	(Estimate)

Actual expenditure for 1937-38 has not yet been finally computed. It is approximately Rs. 47.22 crores. The increase over the budget estimate is mainly due to the operations in Waziristan and the abandonment of the Lahore abattoir scheme.

5. *Indian Units Overseas.*—There are at present three battalions of Indian infantry stationed overseas, excluding Burma, the cost of which is borne by His Majesty's Government. At Hong Kong the Kumaon Rifles form part of the normal garrison. Events in China in the latter half of last year rendered it necessary to reinforce the garrison of that place. The 5/6th Rajputana Rifles, an Indianized battalion from Secunderabad, was selected and embarked at Calcutta on the 24h August 1937. The 1st Bn., 2nd

Punjab Regiment, is serving at Taiping, Malay States, as a temporary measure.

6. *Separation of Burma.*—Consequent on the separation of Burma from India, the Burma Independent Military District ceased to be under the administrative control of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief and the Army in Burma came into being on the 1st April 1937. By that date the Indian garrison had been replaced by Burmese Forces and withdrawn, with the exception of one field company Sappers and Miners, one mountain battery and one animal transport company (mule), which have been loaned temporarily to the Government of Burma. Their cost, including non-effective charges in respect of their service in Burma after separation, will be borne by the Government of Burma.

The Government of India have further agreed to loan the services of officers and other ranks to the Government of Burma until such time as Burma can replace them from her own resources. The Government of Burma have agreed to bear the entire cost involved, including proportionate non-effective charges.

7. *Policy.*—The accepted policy of Indianization of the Army entails the introduction of Indianized units to the equivalent of one division, one cavalry brigade and ancillary troops. This decision embraces all arms and branches of the service and is being effected by the Indianization of existing units, such as cavalry and infantry, and by the creation of new units where necessary, *e.g.* artillery.

Apart from the eventual replacement of British officers by Indian Commissioned Officers from Dehra Dun, the most important change necessitated by the process of Indianization is the eventual replacement in the units concerned of Viceroy's Commissioned Officers by Indian Commissioned Officers on first appointment (*e.g.*, as platoon commanders in infantry battalions) and by Indian warrant officers.

8. *Progress.*—The normal output of the Indian Military Academy is approximately 56 every year. One hundred and eighty-four cadets from Dehra Dun have so far received commissions and been posted to Indianized units as follows:

Cavalry	...	...	...	...	11
Infantry	...	...	...	...	95
Artillery	...	...	...	...	3
Signals	...	...	...	...	1

In addition 55 are serving their first year's attachment with British units and 19 are undergoing training prior to appointment to artillery, engineers and signals.

Apart from the units which are being Indianized a number of Indian Commissioned Officers are being posted to services and departments and Viceroy's Commissioned Officers and warrant officers are replacing British other ranks wherever possible.

9. *Entrance Examinations.*—There was again a reduction, as compared with the previous year, in the number of candidates

presenting themselves for examination for entry into the Navy, Army and Air Force. At the Interview and Record Board for entry held in October 1937, 20 candidates presented themselves for the Royal Indian Navy and 116 for the Indian Military Academy—a decrease of 8 from the figures for 1936. At a Board held in April 1938, 61 candidates competed for 15 commissions in the Army, 3 in the Royal Indian Navy and 3 in the Indian Air Force. This figure is again less than the number presenting themselves in April, 1937, when 72 candidates took part.

The distribution of candidates by communities and provinces is given in paragraph 14 below:

10. *Indian Military Academy.*—During the year, cadets were admitted to the Indian Military Academy as follows:

August 1937	By competitive examination ...	15
„	From the Indian Army	17
„	From Indian States for the Indian States Forces ...	8
	Total ...	40
January 1938	By competitive examination ...	15
„	From the Indian Army ...	15
„	From Indian States for the Indian States Forces ...	10
	Total ...	40

In the passing out examination held in June 1937, of 32 cadets all were successful, and at the examination held in December 1937, all the 35 cadets were successful.

11. *Intake of Indian Commissioned Officers.*—The results of the year's intake of Indian Commissioned Officers are shown in the following figures. Those of the previous year are added for purposes of comparison:

	31*st March* 1937.	31*st March* 1938.
Number of commissioned officers in Indian Land Forces ...	285	348

12. *Indian Army Cadets.*—Of the 15 Indian Army cadets selected for admission to the Indian Military Academy in August 1938, 13 were taken from candidates at the Kitchener College and two from the Auxiliary Force (India). As regards their education, physical training and power of expression in English the 13 cadets selected from the Kitchener College were in advance of Indian Army cadets admitted under the previous system.

13. *New Measures.*—In the Summary published last year reference was also made to the conclusions of an informal conference of members of both Houses of the Legislature regarding the measures to be taken to improve the quality of candidates for admission to the Indian Military Academy.

Arising out of the conference was:

(*a*) The question of reducing the fees at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun.

As a result of the quinquennial examination held in 1938, it was found that no reduction could be made in the fees now charged.

(*b*) A proposal to give additional emoluments in some form to young officers during their year's attachment to British units.

It was decided that, with effect from the 1st September 1937, all 2nd lieutenant Indian Commissioned Officers should be granted financial assistance to the extent of Rs. 40 per mensem whilst serving in that rank.

With effect from the same date all lieutenant Indian Commissioned Officers during their first three years and nine months' service in that rank will be granted financial assistance to the extent of Rs. 15 per mensem.

In each case the allowance will be paid to the Officers' Mess and will be credited to the officer against his individual mess bill.

These allowances will continue only for so long as the conditions of service and pay of Indian Commissioned Officers remain as they are at present.

(*c*) The value of the diploma at the Prince of Wales's Royal Indian Military College, Dehra Dun.

With effect from the examination for December 1938, the Cambridge School Certificate "A" will be substituted for the Royal Indian Military College Diploma.

14. *Communities and Provinces of candidates for entry to the Indian Military Academy who presented themselves before the Interview and Record Boards in* 1937-38.

(*a*) Candidates by communities.			October/ November 1937.		March/April 1938.	
Hindus	Brahmins .. 18	64	Brahmins .. 5	33		
	Kshatriyas .. 19		Kshatriyas .. 18			
	Kayasthas .. 9		Kayasthas .. 4			
	Vaishyas .. 9		Vaishya .. 1			
	Non-Brahmins .. 9		Non-Brahmins 5			
Muslims		17		13		
Sikhs		26		9		
Parsis		*Nil*		3		
Anglo-Indians		3		1		
Domiciled European		1		1		
Indian Christians		2		3		
No religion		1		*Nil*		
		114		63		

(*b*) Candidates by Provinces and States.	October/November 1937.	March/April 1938.
Provinces.		
Punjab	36	23
Madras	4	1
N. W. F. P.	7	2
U. P.	22	9
Bengal	8	6
Bombay	8	7
Burma	3	1
C. P.	4	2
Bihar	3	1
Sind	1	*Nil*
Delhi	2	1
Orissa	*Nil*	1
Coorg	2	*Nil*
Indian States	14	9
TOTAL ..	114	63

ROYAL INDIAN NAVY

15. *Personnel.*—The present strength of the Royal Indian Navy is 130 officers and 1,118 ratings, excluding boys under training.

For administrative reasons the cadre of officers was divided into two branches in March 1937, namely:—

List I.—Seagoing officers.

List II.—Officers permanently seconded for employment under civil departments.

Proposals are under the consideration of the Government for an increase in the cadres of officers and men to meet existing commitments. All existing vacancies for commissioned officers have been filled and there has been no lack of volunteers for entry as ratings. There has been an increase in the number of boys under training in the Depot, and recruiting is now being carried out three times a year instead of twice. Recruiting was extended to the Deccan as an experiment and this District will be included with others in future.

16. *Strength—Craft.*—The following vessels comprise the Royal Indian Navy:—

Escort vessels—"Clive," "Cornwallis," "Hindustan," "Indus" and "Lawrence."
Survey ship—"Investigator."
Depot ship—"Dalhousie" (Boys' Training Establishment).
Patrol vessel—"Pathan" (tender to Boys' Training Establishment).
Trawler—"Madras."

17. *Local Naval Defence.*—The protection of coastal sea-borne trade will, to some extent, be provided for, if the present scheme for expansion of the Royal Indian Navy is put into operation. It must, however, be realised that the Royal Indian Navy, as at present constituted, can only be considered as a local defence force. Against attacks on a large scale, and for the protection of shipping on the ocean trade routes, India must remain entirely dependent on the Royal Navy.

18. *Indianization.*—Since the re-organization of the service on a combatant basis in 1928, the ratio of British and Indian personnel recruited as commissioned officers has been fixed at 2:1, and that of warrant officers at 50:50. All ratings are Indians. On the 1st of April 1938, there were 7 Indian officers in the Executive branch and 6 Indian officers in the Engineer branch, while there are 13 Indian cadets and midshipmen under training in the United Kingdom.

19. *New Wireless Station at Bombay.*—In November 1937 the construction of a new wireless telegraph station at Colaba (Bombay) was undertaken for the Royal Indian Navy. When completed, it will be the most up-to-date naval wireless telegraph station in the Far East with the exception of Singapore.

20. *Visit of "Indus" to United Kingdom.*—On 5th April 1937, "Indus" left Bombay for the United Kingdom to take part in the Coronation celebrations. She arrived at Portsmouth on 30th April and proceeded to the Thames, where she remained until 14th May.

After leaving London, "Indus" returned to Portsmouth for the Coronation Naval Review when the commanding officer had the honour of being received on board H. M. Yacht "Victoria and Albert" by His Majesty the King-Emperor. On 11th June the ship sailed for exercises with the First Minesweeping Flotilla which provided valuable experience for both officers and men.

21. *Exercises off Singapore.*—At the end of January 1938, "Investigator," "Indus" and "Hindustan" took part in exercises off Singapore with units of the China and East Indies Squadrons. Their participation was favourably commented on by the Commanders-in-Chief of the China and East Indies Stations. On completion of the exercises, they proceeded to Singapore where they were present for the opening of the new graving dock by H. E. the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

ROYAL AIR FORCE AND INDIAN AIR FORCE

22. *Strength—Personnel.*—The personnel of the Royal Air Force in India consists of 249 British officers and 1,820 airmen with 668 Indian ranks. No. 1 Squadron of the Indian Air Force consisting of squadron headquarters and "B" Flight is located at Drigh Road and "A" Flight is located at Peshawar. The squadron, as at present constituted, consists of 12 officers (2 under training in England) and 100 airmen (33 *ex*-apprentices and 14 apprentices under training).

23. *Strength—Aircraft.*—The strength of First Line aircraft is 106 aircraft *plus* reserves.

24. *Operational and Training Flights.*—In addition to taking part in the operations in Waziristan, the Air Forces in India carried out the following long distance flights during the period under review:—

Between 5th and 7th June 1937, Herr Dr. Bauer and party were flown to Gilgit in a bomber transport aircraft in connection with the German Nanga Parbat relief expedition.

Between 1st and 2nd November 1937, four Wapiti aircraft carried out the annual flight to Gilgit. The Governor of Kuh Khizar and his son were carried in these aircraft from Gilgit to Peshawar on their return flight.

During January-February 1938, No. 39 (Bomber) Squadron (12 Hart) and No. 60 (Bomber) Squadron (12 Wapiti) together with a Bomber Transport aircraft flew to Singapore and back for the purpose of training the units in long distance navigation and for participation in the Singapore combined exercise.

On 2nd-3rd March 1938, two Hart aircraft carried out an emergency flight from Risalpur to Gilgit carrying anti-rabic vaccine.

25. *Indian Air Force.*—The formation of the 2nd flight of the Indian Air Force squadron has now been completed and the 3rd flight will commence formation on 1st April 1938. It is intended to move the squadron to Ambala during the forthcoming year.

As difficulty has been experienced in recruiting other ranks, rates of pay and allowances have been revised, leave concessions improved and a married establishment introduced.

The flight of the Indian Air Force squadron stationed at Peshawar was employed at Miranshah during the Waziristan operations of 1937. This is the first time in the history of the Indian Air Force that they have been called upon to undertake active operations.

MISCELLANEOUS

26. *Abattoir Scheme—Liquidation.*—Owing to the spread of agitation against the proposal on religious grounds, the Government decided to abandon the scheme for a central abattoir at Lahore Cantonment and connected cold storage facilities. The final winding-up of the scheme is not yet complete but the loss entailed is estimated to be not less than Rs. 20 lakhs.

27. *Mechanical Transport.*—The experimental scheme for the subsidizing, against a guarantee of availability in war, of civilian mechanical transport sections, each of 30 lorries, was continued with minor modifications in the terms of the contract. It is proposed to subsidize more sections during 1938-39.

Owing to the improved performance of four-wheeled vehicles, the policy of replacing six-wheeled by four-wheeled lorries has been, with a few exceptions, accepted, thus effecting considerable savings.

28. *Accommodation—Officers.*—The situation throughout India regarding housing of officers is a matter of grave concern. It is becoming increasingly difficult to rent houses in cantonments owing to the fact that reasonable repairs, are, in many instances, not carried out by landlords. A small programme of acquisition in certain cantonments has been drawn up but, owing to lack of funds, a satisfactory solution seems far off. In the few cantonments where it has been possible to carry out this programme, there has been a distinct improvement in the situation.

29. *Accommodation—Indian Troops.*—The lines of many Indian units are old and below modern hygienic standards. A programme of reconstruction and improvements has been drawn up. This again is held up owing to shortage of funds.

30. *Ordnance.*—During the year under review, the attention of the ordnance authorities has been concentrated in stimulating the production in India of various articles of war stores required by the defence forces. Extensions of plant have been made which enable the new light automatic gun (Vickers Berthier) to be produced in the Rifle Factory at Ishapore. A 3-inch anti-aircraft gun has been completed at the Gun and Shell Factory, Cossipore. This is the first gun of its type to be manufactured in India. Steps have been taken to establish the complete manufacture in India of respirators required for anti-gas purposes. As the result of endeavours made by the Central Purchase Organization of the Defence Services, indigenous manufacture of the undernoted stores, previously obtained from abroad, has been developed:—

Ground sheets; cells and batteries; cutlery; hurricane lamps; horse shoes; barbed wire.

31. *Cantonments.*—As a result of the passage of the Cantonments (Amendment) Act, 1936 (XXIV), the Cantonments Department was re-organised during 1937. The main feature of the re-organization is the constitution of a separate Lands Branch of the Department and a Service of Cantonment Executive Offiers.

The Land Branch consists of Military Estates Officers whose primary duty it is to manage military lands in and out of cantonments on more efficient lines, the necessity for such management having been felt for the past several years.

The rules for the Service of Cantonment Executive Officers provide for the recruitment of executive officers through the Federal Public Service Commission which method will automatically result in the complete Indianization of the Service.

The Cantonments Act was withdrawn from Dharmsala, and Cannanore was constituted as a cantonment, with effect from the 4th October 1937 and 1st January 1938, respectively.

32. *Maintenance Grant for Soldiers' Board Organizations*—During the financial year 1937-38 the Indian Soldiers' Board made a grant of over Rs. 55,000 from the Indian Soldiers' Board Fund to the various Provincial, State and District Soldiers' Boards subordinate to them. District Soldiers' Boards spent this money in the maintenance of their organizations and in looking after matters affecting the home interests of *ex*-soldiers and their families. These include the initial examination of pension and medal claims, applications for the grant of scholarships, the distribution of medals, the investigation of cases of relief from charitable funds, the explanation of what educational concessions are available for *ex*-soldiers and the promotion of vocational training and rural reconstruction schemes. Besides the sum mentioned above, these Boards also obtain assistance from the Indian Red Cross Society's funds for *ex*-soldiers invalided out of the Indian Army for chronic diseases.

33. *Grants of Relief.*—One of the most important functions of the Indian Soldiers' Board is to afford relief from the funds at their disposal to Indian *ex*-soldiers or their dependants who are in distressed circumstances. During the year 1937-38 the Board sanctioned grants totalling about Rs. 52,000 in 874 cases from the Indian Army Benevolent Fund and Rs. 19,000 to 210 applicants from the India and Burma Military and Marine Relief Fund. Loans or grants amounting in all to Rs. 1,500 were also made in 10 cases from the Sir Victor Sassoon Fund.

The Board also pays a special pension of Rs. 5 a month in addition to their service pensions to Indian soldiers who lost their sight while on active service during the war. Funds for this purpose come from the balance of the St. Dunstan's Fund which was raised during the war and handed over to the Board after its close.

34. *Employment for ex-soldiers.*—During the year 1937-38, employment was found for about 3,800 *ex*-soldiers in official and non-official appointments. Various District Soldiers' Boards and recruiting officers maintain lists of reliable *ex*-soldiers desirous of employment in their own districts.

35. *Rural Reconstruction (ex-soldiers).*—During the past year the Board decided to allot a sum of Rs. 10,000 a year for three years for promoting schemes of rural reconstruction in selected villages. The intention is that the inhabitants of a selected village shall decide upon a scheme of benefit to them, and provided they agree to meet half its cost either in money, kind or labour, the remaining half of the cost will be met from the Board's grant. Examples of the types of schemes which are now being worked out in districts of the Punjab are the provision of wireless sets, primary schools, wells, canals, irrigation and street paving, the training and maintenance of *dais* and improvements in village-hygiene.

36. *Vocational Training.*—The Board has made a number of efforts to promote vocational training for *ex*-soldiers after their discharge. Up to now they have not met with much success as *ex*-soldiers on the whole seem reluctant to undergo such courses even when the costs of training and of railway expenses to and from their homes to the place of instruction are met by the Indian Soldiers' Board. Further efforts are now being made to discover alternative methods of vocational and agricultural training in the Punjab and the United Provinces.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Protective Piquets

Sir,

The article by "Auspex" in your April number entitled "The Dream Sector, L. of C.," is as timely as it is interesting and instructive. As pointed out by "Punjabi" in his letter published in your July number, offensive patrols instead of passive piquets proved their efficacy *on the L. of C.* in the Mohmand operations of 1935. Indeed, they have frequently been advocated before and since 1935 by experienced mountain warfare practitioners for *fixed sector,* or *L. of C.*, defence.

From the paragraph beginning at the bottom of page 209 and ending half way down page 210, it is not clear whether "Auspex" condemns the classic, or "doctrinaire's" method of piquetting in a march NOT protected by piquets *in situ* before the column arrives. It seems to me that this is a different tactical problem from that of keeping an L. of C. sector open for nearly twenty-four hours every day, and it would be interesting, perhaps instructive, if "Auspex" would tell us how to give all-round and continuous protection to a marching column in typical Frontier country. The transport would, of course, be mixed pack and draught.

Yours faithfully,

24th August 1938. Edward Ramel.

A First-Hand Description of the Empress Josephine

Dear Sir,

The American writer, who in the year 1806 wrote a letter from Paris to his friend in Boston containing a description of the Emperor Napoleon, which was lately published in your Journal, was no less trenchant and observing in his comments when it came to a description of the Empress Josephine.

"As to the Empress," he writes, "she looks, from knowing a little of the old court, somewhat as becomes imperial majesty. There is an appearance of great anxiety, of that kind of disturbed feelings which a person has who is mounted on a high place, or in danger of being overturned in a carriage; a look which all her guard and splendour cannot banish from her countenance. She is generally

very well painted, well dressed, and seems to be about fifty. She is, or pretends to be, very religious. I saw on her toilette at St. Cloud several religious works and a splendid bible! It is said she is much troubled by the predictions of a fortune-teller when young. She was told that she would marry a nobleman, Count Beauharnois; that he would die an unnatural death; that afterwards she would pass a miserable and perilous life; would finally be a queen, and greater than a queen, but *gare la chute!* was the sentence (beware of the fall!). All this would naturally be invented, but I was told it by Frenchmen who were in the habit of meeting her during Bonaparte's absence in Egypt.

She is seldom seen in public, which I can account for only from her aversion to meet the eyes of some of her former gallants! —who would proudly proclaim their intimacy.

I should like to describe to you the wonderful magnificence of the apartments of St. Cloud, to which I had access in company with Madame Lauriston. Among other things, I could not help observing in the hall of the throne, fitted up, or begun before he was proclaimed emperor, that the cornice was ornamented by a cock (France) on the back of a crouching lion (England). The gentleman pointed at it very significantly. In four compartments of the ceiling were the Imperial Arms, executed before the people willed, so kindly, that he should be urged to do them the favour to accept the Empire!

The apartments of the empress are the most beautiful. The window curtains are principally of the finest muslin and silk, thrown over a rod or arrow, and drawn aside; silk on one, and muslin on the other side of the window.

Her bathing-room is a curiosity. It is about eight foot square and composed entirely of mirrors. On two opposite sides are narrow pilasters, which are so regularly and so many times reflected, that one is obliged to feel of the walls not to believe that there is a gallery three hundred feet long!

I could not avoid observing at Malmaison that in Bonaparte's library everything relates to Egypt; books, maps, and models. And at the annual exhibition the painting, which was crowned with laurel, represented him in the famous hospital at Jaffa, among the pestiferous soldiers, touching the virulent sore of one. I could mention other things, showing not only his penchant to Egypt, but

that he is proud and flattered by his bloody and abominable achievements there. Frenchmen are kept ignorant of, and many will not believe, what Sir R. Wilson wrote.

I often asked at Paris, whether he governed, or Tallyrand, or some others, and was always assured that he originates and conducts everything. Tallyrand may be ordered to draw up such a document; Cambaceres such a law: Marbois or Lebrun such a scheme of finance: but he is prime mover.

Bonaparte governs with an energy truly admirable; and although we hear of 'deeds of darkness' and all that, much exaggerated, the people of Paris, from the excellency of the populace, enjoy all the benefits which result from perfect order; benefits which I wish were to be enjoyed as surely in Boston!"

Yours truly,
N. G. GANE.

SIR,

In a lecture given recently at a Northern Command Intelligence Course on "The Organisation and Work of Frontier Corps," the lecturer laid stress on the importance of military commanders being acquainted with the characteristics and limitations of the Scouts, in order to get full value when employing them in co-operation with regulars. He also pointed out that the efficiency and morale of the Scouts depend largely on the support of regular troops.

I have read with interest the article "IBLANKE" in your Journal for April 1938, and would draw attention to a statement made in it, which might give quite a wrong impression of the Scouts to those of your readers who are unacquainted with their characteristics.

The author of the article was, no doubt, present, and possibly, on that occasion heard "The backchat that always passes between the Scouts and the enemy . . . . ."

The Scouts are irregulars, and some of their tactics may be irregular, but judging by the number of casualties received, and inflicted on the enemy by them, during the Waziristan Operations, I would say that the *usual* backchat that passes between the Scouts and the enemy is the bullet!!

YOURS TRULY,
"FRONTIER CORPS."

REVIEWS.

Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War, Volume I

By Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid

(The King's Printer, Ottawa, $2.)

This first volume of the history of the Canadian Forces in the Great War takes the story from August 1914 to September 1915. During that time the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were formed; the 1st Division had taken part in the battles of First Ypres, Festubert and Givenchy, and the 2nd Division had arrived in France. In fact, the book stops short of the formation of the Canadian Corps in the autumn of 1915.

To the reader, two phases stand out above all others—the story of the raising of the 1st Division in Canada and the description of the fighting in April 1915 by which the German attacks on the northern flank of the Ypres salient (aided for the first time by gas) were stopped.

Chapters one to four, dealing with the formation of the 1st Division, are most entertaining as well as instructive. Inevitably they are largely concerned with the exploits, there is no other word, of the Canadian Minister for Defence, Honorary Lt.-General Sir Sam Hughes. His amazing enthusiasm, personality and character permeated the whole of Canada's initial war effort. But they also led to the scrapping of all mobilization plans and to the formation of the 1st Division by personal orders from the minister direct to unit commanders. No attempt is made to hide the results of, or excuse, this unorthodox procedure; and Canada quickly learnt her lesson, for the 2nd Division was raised on plans worked out before the war. It is interesting to compare Hughes' action with that of Kitchener in raising the New Armies. Both have rightly been blamed for a mistake in organization. But due weight should always be given to the prestige and enthusiasm connected with their names. These undoubtedly exerted a great influence in countries wedded to voluntary enlistment; and it seems possible that, in Canada, Hughes' direct methods were more suited than any other to the temper of the nation at the outbreak of war.

The history refers to April 24th, 1915, as "a great and terrible day for Canada." Two days previously the Germans began their

drive against Ypres by launching their first gas attack against a French Algerian Division on the left of the Canadians. As a result, practically the whole of the previous inter-divisional boundary between the Algerians and the Canadians was added to the Canadian front line. Then, on April 24th, the Germans again attacked with gas against the apex thus formed, which was held by the 3rd Canadian Brigade. The story of the ensuing days is well known but still, when read afresh, it seems almost unbelievable. The effect is heightened by the simple manner in which it is told, and by a rigid avoidance of comment upon matters which are now the subject of argument. The reader is left to draw his own conclusions, and some of them are not comfortable ones. But the reputation of the troops was made; and as the historian truly says, in speaking of the Canadians, First Ypres set the pace for the remainder of the war.

The outstanding characteristic of this first volume is candour. It is more frank than the official histories to which we are accustomed, and in this lies its merit. No excuses are made; no blame is apportioned. But the facts are stated without evasion, and certainly with no attempt to shield the reputations of ministers, commanders and others in authority. It forms a refreshing corrective to the propaganda often provided from unofficial sources and, in this way, is typical of the men whose exploits it records, and of the country which gave them.

The maps are very good, and excellently arranged. All detailed ones are kept for the volume of Appendices; but throughout the main volume are a series of general maps which enable the reader to follow the narrative with the minimum of effort. Hardly ever does one have to turn back to find a reference—a matter of arrangement which many military historians would do well to copy.

G. W. W.

A NEW AMERICAN HISTORY

By W. E. Woodward

(*Faber and Faber, Ltd., 24 Russell Square, London.*)

The author presents the rise and development of the American nation, starting with the early emigrations in the reign of Henry VIII and ending at the point where "the way is open for the New Deal." It is both interesting and instructive for the Englishman to study the origins and growth of the American nation in order to appreciate points of contact with his American

cousins and, more important, differences of outlook. The country is divided geographically and historically into three sections, the eastern seaboard, the Middle West, and the Pacific coast, and the author traces the different types of people, and the differences of opinions both on internal and on foreign policies, from the early start of the various settlements to the present day.

He has made an interesting and consecutive story of all the phases of development; the earliest desires to throw off the yoke of the English Government and to become an independent nation; the penetration into and colonisation of new country; relations with South America, and the Monroe Doctrine; imperial ambitions, the Mexican War, the war with Spain and the acquisition of Cuba and the Philippines; the growing pains of a young nation, the rise of national sentiment and the evolution of the government of the country and of the democracy of to-day.

It is hard to decide whether Mr. Woodward is a bitter cynic or whether his attitude towards the American civilisation is inspired by a genuine desire to see an honest reconstruction. He exposes many scandals that have taken place during this century, and in a comprehensive review of the great men who have controlled the destiny of the United States of America he gives practically no praise but condemns character and ability in so merciless a manner that the reader is bound to wonder whether a less prejudiced historian could not have presented a fairer picture. His statement "we are a social democracy; we are not a financial or an economic democracy," sums up his disapproval of the power which money holds in America to-day.

Special mention must be made of the excellent chapters on the Mexican War, and on the secession of the Slave States and the Civil War. The fundamental cause of the Civil War, the conflict between the capitalist North and the agricultural South, is well brought out; with the victory of the North capitalism has continued to flourish throughout the years, and to affect the history not only of the American nation, but of the whole world.

E. S.

THE DOMINIONS AS SOVEREIGN STATES

By Professor A. Berriedale Keith

(*Macmillan.*)

When European overseas colonisation first began, in America in the 16th and 17th centuries, the settlements were established

by the authority and with the help of the respective states and it was therefore natural that at the beginning they should be regarded as mere possessions, as properties to be exploited for the benefit of the mother countries.

But it was equally natural that, Englishmen being what they were, the English colonies from the outset should develop a considerable measure of independence and should claim the right to manage their own internal affairs through representatives. Thus we learn from an old colonial historian that as early as 1619 "A House of Burgesses broke out in Virginia." This growth of independence indeed was so marked that a quarter of a century before the declaration of Independence, Turgot, the French philosopher-statesman, expressed the opinion that "Colonies are like fruits which cling to the tree only till they ripen," adding, "As soon as America can take care of herself, she will do what Carthage did," and it was not surprising that after the remarkable fulfilment of his prophecy England should regard the growth of her second overseas empire with little interest or satisfaction, although she made some attempt to control and supervise it.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, another school of thought arose, and in 1890 Sir John Seeley in his "Expansion of England" propounded the theory that the overseas communities were merely an expansion of the British race and that Australia and Canada were as much parts of Greater Britain as Yorkshire and Cornwall were of England. The developments of the last forty years have shown that Seeley completely under-estimated the importance of the growth of nationalism and self-interest in the Dominions, but we are not thereby driven to accept Turgot's view that as soon as the Dominions are strong enough to stand on their own feet, they will declare their independence.

History is being made every day, and as in the welter of current affairs we are apt to overlook the importance and the significance of events, it is desirable from time to time to take stock of the position. This is the task which has been undertaken in "The Dominions as Sovereign States" by one of the best-known modern authorities on the subject, Professor A. Berriedale Keith, who is well qualified for it, not only by his high legal and academic attainments, but also by his practical experience as an erstwhile Assistant Secretary of the Imperial Conference.

From the point of view of the general reader the more interesting part of the book is the first, in which the author deals with the relations of the Dominions with the United Kingdom, with one another, and with foreign powers, and discusses the extent to which the Dominions can claim to be considered sovereign states in international law and, on the other hand, the extent to which they must still be regarded as subordinate to the Imperial Government, a term to which no objection can be taken, for England alone was declared an empire as early as 1533. Their separate representation on the Council of the League of Nations and their powers of making treaties and of accrediting and receiving diplomatic representatives have strengthened their international position, but it must still be admitted that a declaration of war by Great Britain would involve the whole Empire in war and that at the most a Dominion could limit her participation therein to defending her own territory: a declaration of neutrality would amount to a declaration of independence, and even then might well be disregarded by the enemy power.

No one nowadays seriously doubts the right of a Dominion to secede, "any more than one doubts the right of a man to cut his own throat," but no legal provision is made for such secession, and from the preamble to the Statute of Westminster, 1931, on which the relations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions in internal affairs now rest, it may be inferred that the union of the parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations cannot be broken by unilateral action.

As Professor Keith well points out, this famous Statute "is not a revolutionary measure. It represents the outcome of a long process of development under which the Dominions had achieved almost full autonomy as regards internal affairs, and its importance lies mainly in the fact that it establishes as law what had before rested on convention." All the Dominions applied for and consented to the enactment of the Statute, but the measure received considerable criticism from many strong supporters of the Imperial connection on the ground that it was dangerous to define constitutions too closely and that the flexible, unwritten British constitution was the best model for the constitution of the Commonwealth.

The second and by far the longer part of the book deals with the systems of governments of the various Dominions under such headings as the executives, the legislatures, the judiciaries, the federations, defence, and so on, and it gives a very comprehensive

and authoritative account of the present position in these matters, with numerous references to the history and the legal decisions on which this position is based.

"The Dominions as Sovereign States" can be confidently recommended both to the general reader and to the student of Imperial affairs as a detailed and well balanced exposition of the present status of the Dominions, and it is particularly valuable at this juncture, for after the important developments of the last twenty years we have now reached a stage at which, as the author says in his preface, we may feel "a certain measure of assurance that no events in the near future will happen to disturb the essential principles affecting their (the Dominions') place in the Empire or the Commonwealth." How far this assurance is justified is a question which only time can answer.

C. S. W. R.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

(Oxford University Press. 15/-)

This book which is the report of a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs presents a short objective survey of the principal problems which came up for discussion at the Imperial Conference of 1937. It begins with a brief description of each member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of the institutions which bind them together. The rest of the book discusses the problems arising out of the Imperial connection. In this, the second and enlarged edition, attention has been drawn to each important development in the Empire during the twelve months which have elapsed since the first edition went to press in March, 1937. The published account of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1937 concerning defence is summarised in an appendix.

In Part I which provides a very valuable summary of the growth and development of each member of the Commonwealth, the objective method of presentation is particularly pleasing when dealing with a subject of this nature, and although the occasional omission of facts may tend to give rise to a suspicion of intent, each account forms on the whole a creditably impartial survey.

The chapters devoted to foreign relations and defence are of considerable interest in view of the many vital questions facing the Commonwealth at the present time. In that dealing with foreign relations there is a very able study of the principles on which the actual policies of the members of the Commonwealth are

based, and of the problems that arise in connection with their application. The chapter on defence follows logically on the examination of policy. An important section deals with the question arising out of the degree to which the Army in India is to be regarded as potentially available for Imperial purposes outside India, and attention is drawn to the fact that under the terms of the Government of India Act of 1935 "no burden shall be imposed on the revenues of the Federation or the Provinces except for the purpose of India or some part of India."

The book concludes with chapters dealing with problems of economic policy, population and migration, a commonwealth tribunal, and nationality and citizenship. There is an excellent index and a very clear map.

A. B-C.

HISTORY OF THE GUIDES, 1846—1922

(Gale and Polden, Ltd.)

It is the fate, inevitably, of an imperial power to be faced with the problem of its "Wall." Here is the story of our connection with the North-West Frontier, from the time of the overthrow of the Sikh power, and of the famous Corps which has borne a major share in compiling that story.

In the brain of Henry Lawrence originated the idea of a Corps of Guides which would be "the right hand of the army and the left of the political;" and to Lumsden, then a junior subaltern, was entrusted the task of raising the Corps which soon earned for itself the reputation of "ever ready, ever serviceable, ever soldier-like."

The history of the Corps of Guides is a record of constant service well performed, and the annals of no Army and no Regiment can show brighter feats than the historic march to Delhi, in 1857, and the defence of the Kabul Residency in 1879.

Among its officers the Corps has numbered some of the more famous names in the history of the Indian Army, and one has only to read these pages to understand the devotion that can be inspired by a handful of British officers who possess the gift of leadership. To the men who rendered this devotion no tribute can be too high, and every page is a record of loyal and unflinching service. Here one meets the original of "Gunga Din," who, for his bravery at Delhi, was awarded the Indian Order of Merit and raised to

combatant status, eventually reaching commissioned rank; and with slight imagination one can see in Subadar Dilawar Khan, who died eventually on patrol in Central Asia, the inspiration for "The Ballad of East and West."

For the deeds of such men this History is a worthy tribute, and must keep alive the spirit which has animated the Guides from the start.

To everyone concerned with its compilation, sincere congratulations are due for a most excellent and noteworthy addition to the literature and records of the Indian Army.

D. R. B.

ITALY'S FOREIGN AND COLONIAL POLICY, 1914—1937

By Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona

(Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.)

The authors have analysed Italian Foreign Policy in an impartial manner. The work, which is free from criticism or adulation of the type which so often emanates respectively from the opponents or partisans of the Fascist form of government, takes the form of a series of essays on various aspects of Italian foreign relationships. Separate chapters are devoted to tracing the development of Italy's policy towards each of the great European Powers or groups of smaller nations, and to her attitude towards disarmament, the League of Nations and colonial expansion. This arrangement, combined with a very full index makes the volume an excellent book of reference. Repetition has to a large extent been avoided by cross reference between the chapters.

The main theme is that foreign policy is controlled by certain definite factors and that changes in the form of the government of a country do not alter these factors, but only the methods by which policy is carried out. In the case of Italy, the main consideration is her dependence for existence on sea-borne traffic in the Mediterranean. Before the coming of Fascism her security, in the absence of sufficient military power, depended to a large extent on the traditional friendship with Great Britain. Signor Mussolini's policy on the other hand, has been to try and ensure that Italy can be mistress at any rate of the eastern Mediterranean by the power of her armed forces. Further to ensure this security, there has always been the tendency towards expansion in the levant and the extension of Italian influence in south-east Europe. The

chapters concerning the Peace Settlements and relationships with the Balkan countries show how this principle has been applied, particularly in the insistence on the maintenance of an autonomous Albania under Italian protection. It is also shown how this policy is no product of the Fascist regime, but was acknowledged long before the advent of Signor Mussolini.

Two chapters, "Italy and Colonial Expansion" and "The Founding of an Empire," deal with Mussolini's determination to stage a striking manifestation that Italy under his rule had become a Great Power capable of asserting herself unaided, and show the various steps that led to the war and the annexation of Abyssinia. These chapters explain the tangle of misunderstandings and misinterpreted secret agreements that existed over this question, and put forward the theory that Mussolini gauged fairly accurately what British reaction would be, and so set out to ensure that France would not fully support Britain in imposing sanctions.

Written before the absorption of Austria by Germany, the references to the Rome-Berlin axis emphasize the strength of that alignment and in the final chapter, on Italian Future Aims, it is argued that in the end there must be a conflict between Great Britain and Italy for supremacy in the Mediterranean.

A. W.

SCIENCE AND MECHANIZATION IN LAND WARFARE

By Donald Portway

(Cambridge. W. Heffer and Sons, Ltd.)

This little book is written as a text-book in connection with a course of lectures on the application of science to war given to students taking the "Military Special" at Cambridge University. While its special object is very obvious, it is a book which should prove of interest also to Regular and Territorial officers.

The author has had much varied experience, as a university lecturer, as an officer in the Royal Engineers (Signal Service) during the Great War, and as a unit commander in the Cambridge University O.T.C. ever since the Great War. He is, therefore, well qualified to write on the scientific side of warfare both from a theoretical and practical point of view.

The first chapter deals with fundamental scientific principles, but the reader should not be deterred by the highly scientific and theoretical nature of this chapter, since the remainder of the book deals with the more practical sides of the subject. There are

chapters giving good general accounts of the activities of the Royal Engineers and Royal Signals, and the long chapter on railways in war is perhaps the best in the book.

The author has dealt, possibly with rather less success, on certain controversial topics, and he appears to be inclined to underestimate the capacity of mechanical transport. His views, whether they commend themselves to the reader or not, undoubtedly provide food for thought, and all officers, of both technical or non-technical arms, will find something of value in this book.

P. R. A.