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EDITORIAL

Britain and War.

Shortly after the German annexation of Austria three months ago, at a time when many Englishmen were both perturbed and excited, the Prime Minister gave the House of Commons a calm and reasoned statement of the circumstances under which British arms might be used. He explained that while British foreign policy must always be directed towards the maintenance of peace, since peace was the greatest interest of the British Empire, there were definite circumstances under which we would fight. Firstly, we were committed to the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression in accordance with our existing obligations under the Treaty of Locarno, as reaffirmed in London in 1936; and we had treaty obligations towards Portugal, Iraq and Egypt which would lead us to fight if the occasion arose. Secondly, we would fight for the defence of British territories and the communications vital to our national existence. Thirdly, we would fight when we felt that war was the only alternative to abandoning all hope of averting the destruction of those things we hold most dear, our liberty and our right to live according to our own national standards. Fourthly, we might intervene as a member of the League of Nations for the restoration of peace and the maintenance of international order, if circumstances made such action on our part necessary and appropriate. But since the earliest days of the League it had been accepted that the responsibilities of member

states varied from one area to another according as their interests were more or less immediately involved. British policy could not take the form of a wholesale undertaking to engage in war unconditionally, instantly and wherever offences against international order were being committed. It had been contended that, for the sake of security, Britain ought to give a pledge of military assistance to France should that country ask for help in the fulfilment of her obligations under the Franco-Czechoslovak Treaty, or that a similar pledge should be given directly to Czechoslovakia in the event of a forcible interference by Germany with her independence. To give such pledges of military support, Mr. Chamberlain explained, would be to remove the decision whether or not Britain should be involved in war from the control of His Majesty's Government, and that was not a position which the Government could accept in relation to an area where the vital interests of Great Britain were not concerned in the same degree as they were in the case of France and Belgium. But, he added, if war broke out it would be unlikely to be confined to those who had assumed obligations. It was impossible to say where it would end or what governments would be involved.

As regards present problems, the Government considered that now was the time when all the resources of diplomacy should be enlisted to keep the peace in Eastern Europe. The Government were glad to note, and in no way underrated, the definite assurances given by the German Government as to their attitude; and Britain would do all she could to help towards a solution of difficulties likely to cause trouble between Germany and Czechoslovakia. At the same time His Majesty's Government had decided on an acceleration of the rearmament programme and an increase in the strength of the Royal Air Force and the anti-aircraft defences of Great Britain.

That the Prime Minister's statement reflected a very large body of informed opinion was perhaps evidenced by the fact that the Opposition did not divide against the Government on this issue of foreign policy. What is still more important is that his speech received a warm welcome throughout the Empire and in most foreign countries. Neither in Paris nor in Prague was there a shadow of resentment at the refusal of the Prime Minister to commit Britain forthwith; on the contrary, in both capitals, the need of the British Government to retain its freedom of action was

understood, and the reaffirmation of existing pledges was appreciated. In Rome the speech met with Italian approval perhaps more on the ground that the British Government had again declared its determination to adhere to a policy of non-intervention in Spain, than on the refusal to undertake commitments in Eastern Europe. In Berlin the speech was accepted with reserve, but it was stated officially that Czechoslovakia did not present an actual or critical problem. Certainly a clear statement of British policy such as this can not fail to be of assistance to the cause of peace, especially when it is becoming more and more steadily backed by an increasing scale of armament, which it is recognized may well prove a tranquilising factor in the Europe of to-morrow.

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Czechoslovakia.

For fifteen years after the signing of the Peace Treaties Czechoslovakia was regarded as one of the most stable and successful of the new states created out of the wreck of the Austrian Empire. As far as was known, the democratic constitution worked well, the country had strong defence forces—certainly strong enough for the conditions of that decade—and enjoyed a trade prosperity which was envied by many older states. Yet within a fortnight of the annexation of Austria, Czechoslovakia was rivalling Spain as the chief danger centre of Europe. The reason for this state of affairs did not lie in the fact that the Republic was encircled by German territory or that it was cut off from the sea and so could not export the goods on which it was dependent, but in the incorporation within its territory of three million persons of German stock. During the post-war period there is little doubt that the existence, let alone the well-being of this minority, had been largely ignored by the Allied Powers. It is difficult to believe that Sudeten grievances could not have been remedied if the Allies had paid more attention to the new states which they had created. That a solution may still be found within the Czech State is possible, but in view of Herr Hitler's declared policy of absorbing all persons of German stock within the Reich it is difficult to see how a permanent solution can be found without some surrender of Czech sovereignty or territory to Germany. If Czech and German could live amicably, side by side, their frontiers demarcated by a purely artificial line such as exists between the United States and Canada, there would be little reason for Dr. Hodza to oppose a surrender of Sudeten territory to Germany. Unfortunately there appears to be little

likelihood of a powerful democracy living in prefect harmony with a state whose leader has avowed intentions of acquiring dominance in Central Europe. To find an answer to the question whether the Sudeten Germans can be satisfied and yet remain citizens of the Czech Republic, one must turn to Herr Henlein's speech at Carlsbad. "If Czech statesmen want a permanent understanding with us Germans and with the German Reich," he said, "they will have to fulfil our demand for a complete revision of Czech foreign policy, which has hitherto ranked Czecholsovakia among the enemies of the German people." Herr Henlein went on to make eight demands on behalf of the German minority. He asked for equality of status between Czech and German, and a guarantee of that equality by the recognition of the Sudeten Deutsche as a legal entity; for determination and legal recognition of the German regions in Czechoslovakia and full autonomy for those regions; for legal protection for every citizen living outside the region of his own nationality, and the removal of injustices inflicted on the Sudeten Deutsche since 1918 and reparation for them; for recognition of the principle of German officials for German regions; and for full liberty to profess German nationality and political philosophy.

That there should be full equality between German and Czech is reasonable, as also are the pleas for German officials in German regions, legal protection for every citizen wherever he lives, and the removal of injustices. Recognition of the Sudeten Deutsche as a legal entity and autonomy in Sudeten regions may mean much or little according to interpretation. But the demand that the Sudetens should in future have full liberty to profess German nationality and German political philosophy can hardly be met if Czechoslovakia is to remain the sovereign state she is to-day. No civilised country could permit a section of its permanent residents to accept a political philosophy greatly at variance with the accepted philosophy of the state. The only practical consequence of the Nazi *Weltanschaung* would be an agitation for the incorporation of Sudeten provinces within the Reich. Because a solution to the Sudeten problem may prove impossible of attainment within the Czech State is, however, no reason why that solution should be sought by resort to war. It is one thing to wage war for an ideal or principle. It is another to fight solely to perpetuate what is admittedly an unfortunate state of affairs.

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The War in Spain.

It is six months since we commented on the war in Spain. At the end of 1937, General Franco had reached a turning point in his campaign; he had conquered northern and western Spain, there remained Catalonia in the north-east and a substantial portion of territory extending from Madrid eastwards to Valencia. Three courses were open to him; he could invade either Catalonia or Valencia, or he could attempt to cut the coastal communications between these two parts of Government Spain. It was indicated at the time that he would probably adopt the latter course, if only for the reason that an advanced party under Colonel Rey was besieged in Teruel. The surrender of the Insurgents in Teruel was hailed as a Republican victory, the forerunner of a vast Government offensive in the spring. In fact it turned out to be no more than a local success. As soon as the weather permitted, General Franco was in a position to concentrate in eastern Spain a large force of seasoned troops and his offensive through the provinces of Arragon and Teruel had an immediate success. By April his troops had reached the Mediterranean seaboard south of Tortosa and closed communication between Valencia and Barcelona on the one hand and Madrid and Barcelona on the other. Moreover, a flank-guard has started operations in the Pyrenees with the object of closing the French frontier to the Catalonians.

The causes of the Republican reverse must for the present remain conjectural. The Government claimed that the Nationalists had been better supplied with men and material from abroad, but there is evidence to show that large quantities of war material from France, Russia and other countries had in fact been imported into Catalonia and Valencia during the winter; and it is interesting to note that few foreign troops were identified on either side during the Insurgent advance. The truth appears to be that General Franco had been manoeuvring on interior lines, with better trained and better led troops at his disposal. Nor had he had to contend with a firmly united enemy. The *Frente Popular* has never been a solidly democratic alliance. There have been divisions between the communists, the socialists and the anarcho-syndicalists, while the average, as opposed to the politically minded, Catalonian is war-weary and equally afraid of the communist from south-eastern Spain and the fascist from the western provinces.

General Franco has claimed that the war is as good as won, and, failing a great increase in outside aid to Government Spain, it appears that he has justifiable grounds for his announcement. Admittedly he has much to do in the purely military sphere; he has to complete the conquest of Catalonia, where fierce resistance is still to be expected; he has to take Madrid, where he has already suffered reverses; and he has to occupy the country between Madrid and Valencia. Even so these problems may well prove to be little more than the tail-end of a successful war. The true test will come when he has overcome all Spain. His reputation as a patriot and his prestige in the world will depend on what he manages to create as a result of his victory. Will he be able to construct, or will he prove again that it is easy to destroy, but hard to build? From behind the Nationalist front, one can get a fair indication of the future. Nationalist Spain is a dictatorship, with every power vested in General Franco. Despite this the General has presided for some time over a ministry on the democratic pattern. Each minister is the head of a separate department of state, and the ministry includes men as varied in their political origins as Senor Cuesta, a member of the Old Guard, Senor Suner, a leader of the Accion Popular, and Senor Redezno, a Carlist. The ministry is steadily evolving an economic organization and a propaganda of its own. It has repudiated Marxism on the one hand and capitalism on the other; there is to be no class war and no domination of one section of the people over another. And curiously enough, successive declarations have laid increasing stress on the importance of the Catholic Church in the national life. But, although General Franco's ministry bears some resemblance to a democratic executive, in fact it pursues its own course with little reference to the people. Perhaps this is inevitable during war time, but it seems reasonable to conclude that a dictatorship will be the only possible form of government for some years after the war is concluded and that that dictatorship will be based on the Falangists who have already become the strongest element on the Nationalist side.

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The War in China.

Interest in the Sino-Japanese struggle has during the last three months been confined very largely to events in Shantung and Kiangsu. It will be remembered that the plan adopted by the Japanese Higher Command, after the

fall of Nanking, took the form of a dual advance, from the north and south, on the line of the Tientsin-Pukow railway. The Japanese advance northward from Pukow soon came to a halt owing to the action of Chinese irregulars, who maintained a steady pressure against the Japanese lines of communication and necessitated the diversion of first-line Japanese troops to what were essentially internal security duties.

It was in the north, however, that the Japanese, despite the arrival of reinforcements from Manchuria, received their first serious reverse. Towards the end of March the Chinese launched a vigorous offensive north of Suchow. The Japanese had, it is believed, omitted to take adequate protective measures on their flanks and were forced to retire, leaving behind a quantity of arms and ammunition, some tanks and armoured cars. On 3rd April the town of Taierchwang, forty miles from Suchow, fell to the Chinese. But by this time the Chinese offensive had spent itself, casualties on both sides had been heavy, and fighting died down until late in April, when the Japanese renewed the attack. The capture of Suchow and the eastern half of the Lunghai railway in May brought the Japanese both military and political advantages. It has enabled them to use the Tsinpu railway throughout its length and to turn Haichow into a base for troops on the Lunghai railway. On the political side, territorial connection between the two Japanese controlled regimes at Nanking and Peiping may lead to the strengthening of each.

For all that, the campaign in Shantung must have been a severe disappointment to the Japanese. For two months a body of Chinese provincial troops not only held up a Japanese regular army, but counter-attacked several times with success and finally managed to extricate itself from the converging Japanese forces without excessive loss. At no time did Marshal Chiang Kai-shek have to call on his reserve of 300,000 men, who are training in the interior of China. The fact is that China has been displaying an unexpected strength, both militarily and politically. The Chinese Government has announced that it has material resources to carry on the war for another nine months and a sufficient reserve of trained man-power to defend Hankow. At a congress of the Kuomintang in April, a further vote of confidence was passed in Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, who was given dictatorial powers. Under the circumstances it is possible that he will be able to extend

operations sufficiently long to wear out the Japanese, who have still to consolidate the Lunghai railway before they can operate against Hankow—And the monsoon rains have broken.

On the other hand the setback in the north has certainly not damped Japanese ardour. There are indications of a national determination to prosecute the war more vigorously, and even moderate opinion in Tokyo appears to be veering in favour of an advance into the interior of China. A National Mobilization Bill to co-ordinate the activities of the nation with a view to providing uninterrupted services to the army has been passed by the Diet, and the inclusion of General Araki in the Cabinet almost certainly portends a more forward policy. Failing a settlement which commends itself to the army, the nation is preparing for a long war. In that case the outcome would appear to rest on two factors, the will of the Chinese to resist from a military point of view and their ability to do so from a material and financial standpoint. A factor which may influence the Chinese will to resist in the field is the decision of the Reich to recall the German military advisers, who had been employed to reorganize the Chinese army before the war and have since its outbreak been advising on the course of operations. It is noteworthy that those advisers, whose recommendations regarding the advisability of defending Nanking were not adopted by the Chinese, were actually given a measure of executive control during the operations at Suchow.

As regards material and financial factors, the position is too involved to justify any forecast of events, but the agreement recently concluded between His Majesty's Government and the Japanese Government regarding the servicing of foreign loans must to some extent strengthen Chinese credit. Under that agreement revenues collected at Chinese ports within Japanese occupation will be handed over to the Yokohama Specie Bank, by whom sums due on foreign loans and indemnities secured on the Chinese customs will be handed over to the Inspector-General of Customs. From many points of view the agreement is a satisfactory one. It not only protects legitimate foreign interests and removes a source of friction, but it lessens the chances of an arbitrary seizure of the customs by local Japanese commanders and preserves the integrity of the Customs administration with its international personnel.

Cable and Wireless.

It was British private enterprise which developed cable communication throughout the world, and in 1914 not only were most of the important submarine cables owned by British companies but those companies were obtaining traffic at a remunerative level. It was not until 1924 that their prosperity was threatened by the development of beam wireless. So serious did the competition become, however, that an Imperial Wireless and Cable Conference was held in 1928 to consider what steps should be taken to save the overseas telegraph services of the British Empire. For strategical reasons alone it was clear that we could not afford to allow cable communications to be entirely ousted by the new invention, and the Conference recommended the merger of British cable and wireless resources in one company, Cables and Wireless, Ltd. The four beam wireless stations in the United Kingdom, which were owned by the Post Office, were leased to the company for twenty-five years, in return for which the company was to pay a beam rental of £250,000 and 12 per cent of any profits earned over and above a standard revenue, which was fixed at approximately 6 per cent of the company's capital. The object of the scheme was in fact to provide for co-operation between the governments of the Empire, for the maintenance and development of a great overseas cable and wireless system, and the operation of that system by private enterprise working under semi-public utility conditions. It was unfortunate that the company was formed just before the beginning of the economic depression, and its difficulties, due largely to over-capitalisation, have been extreme. It has managed to pay its beam rental regularly, but there have never been profits in excess of the standard revenue.

The policy inaugurated in 1928 has in recent years been endangered; partly because the operating company has never earned enough revenue to enable it to reduce telegraph rates to the extent that had been hoped; and partly owing to the threat of foreign competition on Empire routes, by the introduction of new direct wireless services competing with the company's system. To meet these difficulties a fresh settlement was announced in April. The new scheme provides for a standard rate throughout the Empire varying from 1*s.* 3*d.* a word for ordinary telegrams down to 5*d.* a word for letter telegrams. The company is relieved of its obligation to pay a beam rental; to that extent shareholders

will be better off, and in return the Government acquires a substantial holding of 9 per cent of the equity of the company.

The boldness of the move may readily be conceded and hopes may be built on the results which the Post Office has achieved from its analogous policy of reducing and standardising rates for inland communications. This judgment must, however, be tempered by the reflection that the measure is not only an offensive one, designed to meet foreign competition, but that it is also defensive. It is no coincidence that the steep cut in cable rates has come in the year in which the new Empire air mail services have been started. A part of the advantage which Cables and Wireless, Ltd., will derive from their lower rates will be in retaining existing traffic in the face of air competition. But, while the change remains financially a speculation, it is not one that can be viewed solely from that point of view. The cohesion of the Empire to-day depends on the good-will of its members, and that depends in its turn on mutual knowledge, of which cheap and rapid communication is a sure guarantee.

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The Rhodesian Commission.

The British South Africa Company received a Royal Charter to develop the territory of Southern Rhodesia as far back as 1889, but it was many years before the political federation of that country with the Union of South Africa was envisaged. Combination of some sort between Southern Rhodesia and the Union held the field, however, for some twenty years, until 1924 in fact, when the Union, shortly after Southern Rhodesia had been formally annexed to the Crown, prohibited the import of meat and scrap tobacco and placed restrictions on the import of Rhodesian cattle, thus dealing a heavy blow at the chief exports of the infant colony. While this action did much to destroy the economic basis of union, circumstances were tending to destroy the political and psychological bases. The dislike of official bi-lingualism and centralization of government, the fear of an inflow of poor whites, the manifestations, particularly the anti-British manifestations, of South African nationalism were steadily convincing the Southern Rhodesians of the need to pursue a destiny apart from the Union, and attention was turned instead to the prospects of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In 1931, however, the British Government declared its conviction that amalgamation of the two Rhodesias was not yet practicable and was not likely to be practicable for some years.

Although the Government did not reject the principle of amalgamation, it repeated its declaration in 1935 and pointed to the sparsity of the European population north of the Zambesi and the problems of native development which still required that His Majesty's Government should retain direct responsibility for that area.

The announcement that a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Bledisloe has just sailed for Africa with a view to reporting whether any, and if so what, form of co-operation is desirable between the two countries, is of more than passing interest to the peoples of the British Commonwealth. The problem which the Commission has to solve is not an easy one. The difference in status between the two Rhodesias is as great as the difference in the conditions prevailing in the two countries. In the Northern territory the European residents have merely the power to elect unofficial members to the Governor's Council. Southern Rhodesia, though not yet included as a dominion within the implications of the Statute of Westminster, is nevertheless self-governing. Northern Rhodesia has, as the recent economic commission headed by Sir Alan Pim pointed out, only one economic resource—her copper industry. The land is not suitable for extensive settlement, certainly not by Europeans, the area is huge and anything but compact. The European population numbers only eleven thousand among a million and a quarter natives. Native services are backward and the country could not hope to enter a federation as an equal partner with Southern Rhodesia, which is essentially an agricultural country, suited to European settlement and possessing already a white population five times the size of her northern neighbour.

But there is no doubt that there is a strong feeling, headed by Dr. Huggins, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, in all the three territories in favour of amalgamation. The Commission will have to examine the arguments put forward to show that the situation has changed sufficiently since 1931 to justify political union. Even if the Commission reports against amalgamation for the time being, there is undoubtedly scope for closer economic and administrative working between the countries concerned. At present each has its own police, public works, agricultural and veterinary services, to mention only a few, and there is reason to believe that substantial economies could be brought about by some form of common public service.

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Statement relating to Defence.

The statements relating to defence presented to Parliament in 1935, 1936 and 1937 dealt primarily with the circumstances which led His Majesty's Government to undertake an extensive programme of rearmament and the costs which it was estimated at the time would be involved. The White Paper laid before Parliament this year was a survey of the progress already achieved. It was not to be expected that a great rearmament programme could be carried through without some setbacks. Increased production was bound to make demands on certain types of material and skilled labour which could not be met at once, unless there was to be considerable interference with private industry. It is satisfactory to learn therefore that, although deliveries have not in every case come up to expectation, progress on the whole has been satisfactory and the rate of production is now rapidly expanding. Measures for the protection of the civil population against air attack took an important stage forward with the passing of the Air Raids Precautions Act, 1937, to which we referred in the January issue of this Journal. Local authorities have been made responsible for the preparation of schemes of passive defence, for which purpose they will receive technical guidance from the Home Office and financial assistance in respect of approved schemes from the Treasury. A training school for Air Raids Precautions officers of local authorities has been opened in London, and schools for air raid wardens and first-aid parties are being set up all over the country in increasing numbers. Most of the gas masks required to supply the needs of the civil population are already available and the balance will be produced by the end of the year. In the White Paper of 1937 it was explained that it was not then possible to determine the peak year of armament expenditure, but it was indicated that it would be imprudent to contemplate an expenditure of less than £1,500 millions. Last year expenditure on the Defence Services totalled £280 millions. This year expenditure is estimated at £350 millions and it is stated that, while 1939 may prove to be the peak year of expenditure, the rearmament programme as a whole will exceed substantially the original estimate.

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The Navy Estimates.

To turn to the Services individually, the net total of the Navy Estimates is £123,707,000, of which £30 millions will be met by borrowing from the Consolidated Fund under the Defence Loans Act of last year. The record of

progress made by the senior service is impressive enough if one is to judge by the figures of tonnage building at successive dates. On 1st January 1935 there were 139,345 tons on the stocks, a year later the figure had doubled and on 1st January this year it was just short of 550,000 tons, or four times as much as it was three years ago. Some sixty vessels of all classes are to be put into service during the year, while the programme of new ships to be laid down consists of two capital ships, one aircraft carrier, four large and three small cruisers, three submarines, three minelayers and a miscellany of small craft. Detailed plans are being worked out by the Admiralty and Air Ministry to give effect to the decision, taken last July, to transfer the administrative control of the Fleet Air Arm to the Admiralty. To keep pace with the growing strength of the fleet, personnel have had to be expanded at a steadily increasing rate, but there seems to have been little or no difficulty over recruitment.

That the estimates came in for singularly little criticism was due not only to the satisfaction which is generally felt with the progress made by the Admiralty, but also to the growing recognition that in the long run the security of the Empire depends, as it has done for centuries, on naval strength. Disquiet was, however, expressed by more than one speaker at the absence of destroyers from the building programme for the current year, and the adequacy of the armament of our latest cruisers was also questioned. Mr. Shakespeare, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, explained that the reason why no destroyers were included in the 1938 programme was that, when the Admiralty had placed an order for the last flotilla of eight destroyers in completion of the 1937 programme, there would be no fewer than forty destroyers on the stocks. He went on to refer to the convoy system and to make clear the attitude of the Admiralty on a question about which there had been considerable misunderstanding. The danger to our shipping on trade routes might arise anywhere, but the nature of the attack would vary according to whether the enemy was dependent on bases and according to the distance of those bases from our trade routes. Throughout the long ocean routes the danger was likely to come from fast ocean raiders, but when our merchant ships were confined in narrow waters they might well be open to attack by submarines and aircraft. It was clearly impossible to design a single vessel combining all the characteristics required to meet such diverse forms of attack. Two conclusions arose from a consideration of the danger and the means

of meeting it. In the first place the protection of merchant ships sailing individually against a full scale attack was clearly impracticable, although some measure of safety could be secured by a system of routeing. In the second adequately escorted convoys would be the surest means of protection from intensive and persistent action by submarines, aircraft and surface vessels. As regards air attack it might be argued that aircraft would find it easier to locate convoys rather than individual merchant ships. That might be true, but it was easier to protect ships in convoy than isolated ships. Attacking aircraft would come under the intensive fire not only of escort ships but of such merchant ships as were defensively armed. To deal with attack in narrow waters from aircraft or submarines the escort ships must therefore be of moderate speed, equipped with strong anti-aircraft armament, and able to detect, hunt and sink submarines. These characteristics were being combined in a type of escort vessel of which we already had a number, and of which the earlier ones were being rearmed. To strengthen the anti-aircraft power of the convoy, the Admiralty proposed a steady programme of conversion of old cruisers of the "C" and "D" classes to anti-aircraft vessels. Plans for the co-operation of shore-based aircraft as convoys approached our shores had already been worked out with the Air Ministry. Admiralty policy could be summed up as follows: Different areas of the world would require different treatment according to the scale and nature of the attack to which they might be subjected, and to the density and importance of trade in those areas. Where trade was of great importance or density and was liable to attack by surface vessels, submarines or aircraft, the Admiralty view was that suitably escorted convoys would provide the best means of defence. Where trade was sparse or scattered, or was unlikely to be attacked by enemy forces, its safety would be sought by dispersion and evasive routeing, combined with such patrols as circumstances required. The Admiralty recognised that convoy might be necessary as early as the outbreak of war and they were ready to put it into operation, where and when required.

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The Army Programme.

The Army Estimates for the current year amounted to £106,500,000 of which a little over £21 millions are to be met by appropriations in aid from the Consolidated Fund. The increases over last year's expenditure are accounted for mainly by the provision for warlike stores, supplies

and transport, various works services of considerable magnitude, and the additional allotments made to the Territorial Army and Reserve Forces. Although there is no material increase in the establishment of the Army, as there is in the case of the other two Services, certain readjustments of personnel between arms have been effected. By the end of 1938 the fifteen cavalry regiments on the British establishment will consist of twelve mechanized and three horsed regiments. The Royal Engineers are to transfer their responsibility for anti-aircraft and coast defence searchlights to the Royal Artillery, which will be reconstituted in two separate branches. Of the four new infantry battalions and the two new army tank battalions referred to in the White Paper for 1937 two infantry battalions and one tank battalion have already been raised. During 1938 the second tank battalion, but not the remaining infantry battalions, will be formed.

The improvement in recruiting which became evident last August has continued fairly steadily and there appears to be a growing appreciation among the recruitable population of the importance of the army and the advantages it offers. Even so, the Regular Army was 1,200 officers and 22,000 other ranks below establishment on 1st April and some 32,000 men are expected to leave the Colours during the course of the year. A more cheerful picture is, however, presented by the Territorial Army, the strength of which has increased by 1,176 officers and 16,514 other ranks during the past twelve months. The growth of national interest in the Territorial Army has indeed been a great one and may be attributed largely to the improvement in the status of, and conditions of service in, a force, the importance of whose role in the defence of the country can hardly be overestimated, and is certainly becoming better understood.

The period through which we are passing is one of major military reorganization, comparable perhaps with the Cardwell and Haldane eras, and we have summarised some of the many reforms being introduced into the army in some miscellaneous notes which will be found at the end of this journal. The real interest in the Army programme for the year lies, however, less in the reforms themselves than in the new conception of the way in which the Empire should apply its military strength, a conception which the Secretary of State for War defined with the force and clarity we have learned to expect from him.

Introducing the Army Estimates, Mr. Hore Belisha said that the fact that the number of British units to be stationed in India was predetermined produced an element of rigidity in the strategical distribution of units at home and abroad, and affected the organisation of the army and the terms of service and amenities of the soldier. To examine these questions, discussions between the War Office and the India Office would be initiated under the auspices of the Prime Minister.

He went on to establish an order of priority of the roles of the British Army. The first purpose of the army was home defence. In preparing the army for war the menace of air attack was a primary consideration. On the outbreak of war, defence against air attack might be the primary requirement. In this respect home defence was in the first category of importance and in a form unknown in 1914. The priorities in home defence were in order: air defence, internal security which had assumed a wider scope in the light of air raid precautions, and coast defence. Second in importance to home defence came the discharge of British commitments overseas, including defended ports on the trade routes. The size and type of garrisons were being made to conform with the principle that each one, where communication could be interrupted, should be maintained at a strength adequate for its responsibilities at the outbreak of war. Third in importance came the provision of a strategic reserve. The uses to which such a reserve might be put were, firstly, to serve as a reinforcement, wherever required, for internal security; secondly, to help the defence against external attack of those territories for which we were responsible oversea; and, thirdly, to co-operate in the defence of the territories of any allies we might have in case of war.

A description such as this of the role of the British Army, disclosing both the responsibilities of our military forces at home and the need for a fresh distribution of those forces throughout the Empire, emphasised the way in which factors had changed since 1914. It was no longer intended to have a fixed type of division, but two types and variations within each. One type would be a motorised division based on the light machine-gun; the other a mechanized armoured division based on the tank. The first type might consist, when used for internal security operations such as the recent operations in Palestine, of six battalions with the ancillary troops necessary for their maintenance and communication. In war, it might consist of nine battalions with artillery

and other arms according to need. Light machine-gun battalions would each have fifty Bren guns, some of them carried in armoured carriers. A heavy machine-gun battalion per division would be retained as Corps Troops. Another development would be in the Royal Artillery, where the fire unit would in future be twelve guns instead of six. The object underlying all these changes was to provide a flexible organisation at home capable of providing a greater number of divisions, better suited than existing divisions to meet the varied commitments which might devolve upon us. Smaller divisions were easier to manage, to move, to supply and to transport, important considerations for a country which had to operate overseas.

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The Royal Air Force.

The Royal Air Force estimates for the year, allowing for £30 millions to be met by appropriations in aid, amounted to £102,720,000, five times the expenditure of 1934. During the last three years the strength of the metropolitan air force, which inevitably occupies a place of paramount importance, has been increased from fifty-two to one hundred and twenty-three squadrons, and now comprises sixty-eight bomber, thirty fighter, fifteen general reconnaissance and torpedo bomber, and ten army co-operation squadrons. This large increase in the number of home defence squadrons and the training and reserve organisations which have had to accompany them has necessitated an extensive reorganisation of the Royal Air Force system of command and administration. The responsibilities of the former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Air Defences of Great Britain, have been divided between an Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in control of the striking force and an Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in command of the fighter and army co-operation squadrons; the latter also being in charge of the country's ground defences, comprising anti-aircraft, searchlight and balloon barrage units.

The programme authorised in March 1936, the main features of which were the re-equipment of the Royal Air Force with more powerful types of aircraft and the provision of reserves on a comprehensive scale, required the provision of aircraft, engines and equipment on a scale at that time substantially in excess of the maximum capacity of the industry. To meet these demands it was decided to make use in peace of motor car manufacturing firms which were allocated to the Air Ministry for production in

war. The establishment of two aircraft and six engine shadow factories, which followed the adoption of this policy, was intended to serve two main objects: to provide for the production of those war reserves of aircraft and engines which were beyond the capacity of the aircraft industry proper, and to afford training in the manufacture of aircraft and engines of the utmost value to firms which would be allotted to the work in emergency. In the statement accompanying the Air Estimates for 1938, it is stated confidently that the shadow factory scheme gives promise of proving highly successful. As a result of the measures decided on two years ago a great extension of capacity has already been effected. The number of persons employed in the aircraft industry has increased from thirty thousand in 1935 to ninety thousand to-day.

As regards newly formed squadrons the provision of aircraft fell into two distinct phases. The first phase called for the provision to these units of sufficient service aircraft to enable them to train. It was the second phase, that of rearming with modern and more powerful types, which met with difficulties. The process of rearming proved slower than had been hoped owing to three factors: the need to construct new shops and to supply the jigs and tools necessary for large-scale production; the fact that the decision to expand coincided with far-reaching developments in design; and the shortage of draughtsmen and skilled labour. These difficulties have now been largely overcome and rearming to the scale laid down two years ago will be substantially completed this year.

On the personnel side the expansion programme has necessitated an average annual entry into the Royal Air Force of 1,500 pilots and 13,000 airmen during the last three years, as compared with 300 pilots and 1,600 airmen in pre-expansion days. The majority of new pilots have entered under the short service scheme, but the cadet college at Cranwell has been expanded to capacity and there has been an increase in the grant of permanent commissions to candidates from the universities and the Dominions.

* * *

In spite of the statement which accompanied the estimates and the categorical assurance of the Under Secretary of State for Air that there had been no mismanagement over the air expansion programme, the House of Commons refused to accept the position as satisfactory. The debate on the estimates was undoubtedly influenced to some extent by the recently published Cadman Report, which had shown the demand for an enquiry into the

state of civil aviation to have been justified. But military and civil aviation are not entirely analogous and the Cadman Report admitted that the neglect of civil aviation might well have been due to the concentration of the Air Ministry on rearmament. The real ground for the anxiety expressed by members in air matters was not that the programme planned two years ago, under which the Royal Air Force first-line strength was to reach 1,750 machines by March 1939, was unlikely to be fulfilled, but that the programme itself had long been out of date and that the production plans of the Air Ministry were not of the kind that would lend themselves quickly to a further large increase on mass production lines. Mr. Baldwin, it was recalled, had given a firm assurance that Britain would build to at least air parity with the strongest European Power within range and there was evidence to show that we were falling behind in this matter of air parity, despite the 1936 programme. Despite the persistent demand for it, the Government was probably justified in refusing to permit a second enquiry into conditions at the Air Ministry, but the announcement that a British air mission was to be sent to the United States and Canada to purchase aircraft and the plans which were soon afterwards published for a second large increase in the Royal Air Force indicated that the House of Commons had been right in refusing to accept the Air Estimates, as they were originally framed, with complacency.

In May Lord Winterton announced a revised programme of air rearmament to be carried out by March 1940. The first-line strength of the Royal Air Force was to be raised to 2,370 aircraft at home, 500 aircraft in the Fleet Air Arm and 490 aircraft in squadrons overseas, a total of 3,500 machines. This second expansion would require another 40,000 officers and men during the next eighteen months. The earlier expansion programme had been designed to create a reserve of productive capacity which could now be brought into use. To this end a new Supplies Committee would be created at the Air Ministry to bring into closer relationship the research and supply branches, to simplify the financing of orders, and to maintain continuous consultation with the aircraft industry.

AN OPERATION IN THE VICINITY OF SPINWAM—20TH OCTOBER 1937

By Lieut.-Colonel C. J. Wood, M.C.

The operation described in this article took place in the neighbourhood of Spinwam, a post seventeen miles north of Mir Ali on the motor road which connects the Tochi valley with Thal in Kurram. The country in the vicinity of the Mir Ali—Spinwam road, for the first four miles after leaving Mir Ali, consists of a series of low knife-edge ridges rising to between two and three hundred feet. These terminate somewhat abruptly in the Shera-tala Plain, some ten miles in length, and varying up to eight miles in breadth. Towards the north or Spinwam end of the Plain, the high ground closes in on the west and eventually the road passes over a massive known as the Tabai Narai, which rises about a thousand feet above the level of the surrounding country. The road then descends to the Kaitu valley, across which lies Spinwam Fort. The only water near the road, except at Mir Ali and Spinwam, is one small well.

The road had been in fairly constant use since July. A civilian mail van ran daily and there were bi-weekly military convoys to the Spinwam Scouts' Post, which was at the time garrisoned by a company (less one platoon), 3rd/7th Rajput Regiment and one Post 4.5″ howitzer. One military convoy had been fired on from the high ground to the west in August, otherwise there had been no incidents. Between July and October opportunity had been taken by the commander and staff of the 9th Infantry Brigade, which was located at Mir Ali, to carry out frequent reconnaissances of the area over which subsequent operations took place. During the first fortnight of October, the presence of the Faqir of Ipi near the country of the Madda Khel Wazirs, combined with propaganda spread in neighbouring areas by his brother Sher Zaman, had an unsettling effect amongst the less stable elements of the tribes in North Waziristan. In particular, there was deterioration in the area of Spinwam, owing to the reappearance there of two notorious hostile leaders, by name Gagu and Ghazi Mullah. They both owned property in the neighbourhood, and incited the tribesmen to revive hostilities.

At this period the main concentration of troops in Waziristan was in the country south and west of the central Waziristan road, the troops being employed on road construction and the protective duties connected with it. The 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigade with six battalions under command, was responsible for protecting over fifty miles of road between Saidgi and Razani, as well as providing escorts when required for convoys from Mir Ali to Spinwam in the north and to Biche Kashkai in the south. The only troops available for immediate operations in the vicinity of Spinwam were one rifle company and one machine-gun platoon, employed normally for the defence of Mir Ali, and one section of light tanks. Other sectors on the lines of communications had similar reserves which could only be moved away by day, as they were needed for camp defence by night.

The effect of the propaganda previously referred to soon materialised. Early on the morning of 15th October a hostile *lashkar*, estimated to number between a hunderd and fifty and two hundred men, compelled the *khassadars* to leave their posts in the vicinity of the Tabai Narai on the main road some four miles south of Spinwam. At the same time the tribesmen blocked the road with large boulders and effected two demolitions which rendered it impassable even to light tanks. The immediate problem was to induce the *lashkar* to remain in the neighbourhood of the Tabai Narai while sufficient troops were concentrated to reopen the road to Spinwam and at the same time to engage the *lashkar* successfully in battle.

Consequently on the morning of 15th October the available company and machine-gun platoon of the Mir Ali Garrison (3rd/7th Rajput Regiment) were despatched in lorries, together with a section of light tanks, with instructions to reconnoitre the enemy position. They were to withdraw if opposed. To augment the column some workmen of the Military Engineer Services were sent out in case the *lashkar* had moved away. Fire was opened on the column as it approached the Tabai Narai, so it withdrew to Mir Ali.

Information was now received that the hostile tribesmen had taken over and garrisoned two *khassadar* posts, near Pt. 2695. As an act of defiance they were displaying a white signal for the benefit of aircraft. The next night more *khassadar* posts on the Sheratala Plain south of Tabai were attacked and burnt. Hostile

activities extended as far south as the central Waziristan road, where Tori Khel *khassadars* on duty were threatened.

On 16th October, a company of the 4th/6th Rajputana Rifles was brought in by lorry from Tal in Tochi and sent out along the Spinwam road towards the Tabai Narai with orders to ascertain the strength of the *lashkar* and where it had prepared a position. By drawing fire it was hoped to ascertain the enemy's dispositions so that some indication could be obtained as to his probable plan if he were attacked. In this the company was most successful. The men debussed and were engaged by the tribesmen in the foothills on the low ground. As they withdrew the tribesmen closed in on their flanks, one piquet having difficulty in withdrawing. The original estimate of about two hundred hostiles was confirmed.

From the information now available, and from previous reconnaissances it was decided that at least three battalions would be required to reach Spinwam and a further additional battalion for subsequent operations in that neighbourhood. It was known that various reliefs were due to take place between Razmak and Bannu, and permission was accordingly obtained from Force Headquarters for two battalions to be moved earlier than had been intended and for them to be detained at Mir Ali *en route*.

A third battalion was obtained by temporarily thinning out the Damdil section, placing the whole of the 3rd/1st Punjab Regiment into piquets and withdrawing the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment to Mir Ali. The fourth battalion materialised by retaining the reserve from Tal at Mir Ali, and arranging for one battalion, the 2nd/6th Rajputana Rifles, less a company from Kohat, to move to Thal in Kurram, and thence to Spinwam. All available mechanised artillery, amounting to one and a half howitzer batteries and one 18-pr. battery, was withdrawn from the brigade sector.

News was received from local sources that the hostiles in the neighbourhood of Spinwam did not anticipate that more than one infantry battalion could be sent against them. They were convinced they had already driven back that number during the operations of 15th October and 16th October. Their tails were up.

In the meantime, as already mentioned, the propaganda was affecting the *khassadars* on the central Waziristan road and

information was received that there were seventy armed tribesmen in the vicinity of Nitasi, four miles south of Mir Ali, where there were houses of several well-known hostiles. It was decided therefore to stage a minor operation with the object of destroying these houses at Nitasi and at the same time distracting the enemy's attention from the impending operations towards Spinwam. This was successful; local friendlies at Nitasi, wishing to secure their own property, ensured that there was no opposition.

On the afternoon of the 19th October, a light tank section conveying unit commanders carried out a reconnaissance of the Tabai Narai and drew fire, showing that the *lashkar* was still in position.

By the evening of the 19th, the troops shown in the Order of Battle had concentrated at Mir Ali.

It was decided to advance to Spinwam on the 20th with the objects of driving off the hostile *lashkar,* inflicting as much loss as possible on it, and repairing the road. Permanent piquets were to be established at Pt. 2695 and at the Tabai Narai. On arrival at Spinwam, camp was to be established as a base for further operations in the area.

To give effect to these intentions an assembly area was selected at Pt. 2119 at which the troops were to concentrate.

To cover the route to this point the 3rd/7th Rajput Regiment (less two companies) moved out from Mir Ali and by 3 a.m. had occupied piquets up to Pt. 2047, the existing *khassadar* posts on the route being found deserted.

The remainder of the troops moved to the assembly area in three columns:

(*a*) A marching column comprising the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment, the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment and a section 22nd Field Company Sappers and Miners, accompanied by all animal transport of the brigade. This column left Mir Ali at 2-30 a.m. and reached the assembly area about 5-30 a.m.

(*b*) A fast mechanical column, including Headquarters, 9th Indian Infantry Brigade with artillery and infantry reconnaissance parties moving in M.T., and escorted by one section 9th Light Tank Company. This left Mir Ali at 5-30 a.m. and arrived in the vicinity of Pt. 2119 by 6-10 a.m. by which time it was beginning to get light.

(*c*) A slow mechanical column comprising the artillery and the 1st/17th Dogra Regiment, escorted by armoured cars of the 7th Light Tank Company, reached the assembly area and had debussed by 6-30 a.m. There was a bright moon and driving lights were not used on vehicles.

The brigade commander carried out a short reconnaissance and decided to advance on a two battalion front. He gave out verbal orders to the assembled commanders. On the right the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment was allotted as objective the ridge east of Pt. 2695 to the *khassadar* post lying south-west of that point, whilst on the left the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment was to occupy the foothills about Pt. 3130 and the ridge running thence north-east to Pt. 2300. When these objectives had been occupied the 1st/17th Dogra Regiment was to advance in the low ground between the battalions on the right and left flanks and seize the high ground about Pt. 2703 and Pt. 2706.

The 4th Field Battery (How.) was to support the advance of the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment on the right; the section 7th Field Battery the advance of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment on the left and the 66th Field Battery (How.) was to be prepared to support either flank as required.

The 9th Light Tank Company (less two sections) was in the first place to protect the deployment of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment, and then to move to the right flank and patrol the area of Zara Mela. It was anticipated that the ground on the east would prove unsuitable for tanks to move direct to Spinwam by that route.

Leaving the assembly area at 7 a.m. the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment reached the nala north of Shamiri where the commanding officer made his reconnaissance and issued orders for the attack on the objective. At 8-12 a.m. the attacking troops came under well aimed fire from tribesmen who were estimated to number a hundred and fifty men on this flank. They had occupied skilfully concealed positions on the sides of the hills from which they could bring fire to bear on an advance by the main road and on the intervening spurs; caves and boulders were utilised as cover, and fire positions were so well concealed in the shade and at the foot of cliffs that they provided practically no target to artillery or aircraft. The Sikhs, however, pushed up the ridges with great determination; by 8-55 a.m. aircraft reported that tribesmen were with-

drawing eastward by the Sarwek Nala, and fifteen minutes later the battalion had reached its final objectives, with a loss of three killed and ten wounded. The tribesmen left twelve dead bodies and eight rifles on the ground passed over by the Sikhs. During the mopping-up process two wounded tribesmen concealed in a cave were captured with their rifles.

The advance of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment on the left flank began simultaneously with that of the Sikhs. Shortly afterwards fire was opened on them by tribesmen disposed in small groups on a hill feature as shown on the sketch. This feature was captured at the cost of one British officer, Major J. Moriarty, and three Indian other ranks wounded, and opposition was thereafter limited to sniping at long range.

By 8 a.m. two companies of the 2nd/6th Rajputana Rifles in lorries and one section of the 11th Light Tank Company arrived at Kaitu Bridge, having come from Thal in the Kurram, seventeen miles to the north. The light tanks then patrolled the road near the bridge and moved up the Kaitu Nala to Shadi Khel village, but it was impracticable to use them towards the objectives of the troops from Mir Ali owing to the danger of their coming under the fire of our own artillery.

At about 9 a.m. the 1st/17th Dogra Regiment, who were then at Pt. 2140, advanced to the final objectives, Pts. 2703 and 2706, which were reached without opposition by 11-15 a.m. Meanwhile the company of the 4th/6th Rajputana rifles, working under sniping fire, had cleared the first road block and then set to work to assist the section 22nd Field Company, Sappers and Miners, to repair the motor road.

There was now some delay owing to the difficulties presented by the ground on which the two permanent piquets were being established near Pt. 2695; the site for the piquet at that point was on a cliff the only approach to which lay by a difficult track from the northern side. By 2-15 p.m., however, the work was completed, and the piquets were established and provided with reserves of food and water. The advance of the main body to Spinwam was then resumed; sniping at long range only was encountered and all troops were in camp near Spinwam Post by 6 p.m.

Our own casualties during the day amounted to three Indian other ranks killed, and one British officer and fifteen Indian other ranks wounded. Tribal casualties included twelve dead left on

the ground and two wounded prisoners. In addition twenty-five were estimated to have been seriously wounded. These operations had an excellent effect on the situation in the area, the bulk of the hostile *lashkar* dispersed, and efforts by its leaders to revive opposition met with no response. On the 21st and 22nd October the demolition of six towers and twenty-nine *kots* was carried out in Spinwam and Datta Khel with no regular opposition although there was some sniping. On the 23rd October troops returned without incident to Mir Ali, which was reached at 3 p.m., the seventeen-mile withdrawal from Spinwam having been carried out in nine hours.

In conclusion attention is drawn to a few points which may be of interest in considering the operation. In the first place, the time necessary to concentrate the column. The necessity for the concentration of a force equivalent to an infantry brigade and attached troops became apparent on the evening of 15th October, but the force was not actually concentrated until the evening of 19th October. The limiting factors were the necessity of moving animals from other sectors of the line of communication by march route to Mir Ali, and the diversion of mechanical transport from a prearranged programme to move two infantry battalions with animals from Razmak to Mir Ali.

Actually, for the move from Mir Ali to the place of assembly it was found necessary to have three columns. The distance from Mir Ali to Spinwam was seventeen miles, a long way to march in a day and participate in an engagement with the enemy on the way. Though it was desirable to move everyone by mechanical transport there were not sufficient lorries available for anything like the animals which had to accompany the column. Therefore, a marching column which comprised the animals with the bulk of the infantry as escort, had to leave at 2-30 a.m.

The timing of the mechanised reconnaissance column was determined by the necessity for getting the artillery to their battery positions and ready to open fire as soon as light permitted. The guns could be expected to move at 12 m.p.h. and so the reconnaissance column which comprised reconnaissance parties escorted by light tanks moving at 20 m.p.h. had to leave just before them. Passing would have been impracticable on account of the narrowness of the roadway and the dust. The reconnaissance parties left at 5-25 a.m., and the guns with an infantry escort five minutes later.

The lorries subsequently returned to pick up baggage and piquet stores from Mir Ali, which they left again at 8 a.m. and

passed through to Spinwam as soon as the road was mended and considered safe.

All the artillery with the column was mechanised, and being field artillery it fired heavier shell than is normal in frontier warfare; but the communications between the observation post and the battery presented difficulties. In normal warfare forward observation officers and their parties can move comparatively freely, but in frontier warfare, once a F. O. O. party leaves with the infantry headquarters with which it is co-operating, it is difficult for it to move to another unit, supplement its signal communications or salve its material. Perhaps a portable wireless is the solution, carried on mules which would normally accompany the infantry. In any case, it was found that infantry, accustomed to operate with mountain artillery, found working with the heavier artillery difficult, especially when the gunners engaged their targets at 4,000 yards.

The light tanks proved most useful, but their movement was limited by two factors. It was anticipated that the enemy withdrawal when it started would be to the east, *i.e.*, to the village of Datta Khel where Gagu had a residence. Unfortunately, the tanks from Mir Ali found the ground to the north of the Zara Mela impassable, and could not get into position to intercept movement between Tabai Narai and Datta Khel. The other limiting factor was political. The tanks from Thal were not permitted to move beyond Shadi Khel as it was not desired to draw in any tribesmen, at that time peaceful, from the west.

The presence of the company headquarters tanks provided means of wireless communication to sections. This was essential, and a welcome change from previous experiences.

The chief difficulty throughout the operation was the maintenance of efficient intercommunication. This difficulty must be expected when a column is hastily collected, and has been accustomed to working under very different conditions. In frontier operations commanders of sectors on the lines of communication never seem to have a spare man. Everyone is fully occupied with genuine lines of communication tasks. Nevertheless too much emphasis cannot be laid on the necessity for troops keeping in practice for more mobile operations, even if this can only be managed by the frequent relief of troops stationed on the lines of communication.

APPENDIX "A"

ORDER OF BATTLE

Concentrated at Mir Ali by 19th October 1937

Brigadier E. P. Quinan, C.B., O.B.E., A.D.C.

Headquarters, 9th (Jhansi) Infantry Brigade and Signal Section.

Headquarters, 4th Field Brigade, R. A.

4th Field Battery (How.), R.A.

One section 7th Field Battery, R.A.

One section 66th Field Battery (How.), R.A.

7th Light Tank Company, R.T.C. (less $1\frac{1}{2}$ sections) (armoured cars).

9th Light Tank Company, R.T.C. (less 2 sections).

One section 22nd Field Company, Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners.

One W/T "C" Set, R.C.S.

Cable detachment, R.C.S.

One Company 4th Battalion (Outram's) 6th Rajputana Rifles.

2nd Royal Battalion 11th Sikh Regiment.

3rd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment.

1st Battalion (P. W. D.) 17th Dogra Regiment.

Mir Ali Garrison

3rd/7th Rajput Regiment (less two companies).

Spinwam Garrison

One company (less one platoon) 3rd/7th Rajput Regiment.

One Post Howitzer 4.5".

Kohat Detachment.

At Thal on 19th October.

2nd/6th Rajputana Rifles (less one company and one M. G. Platoon).

One section 11th Light Tank Company, R.T.C.

One "C" Set W/T, R.C.S.

Royal Air Force

One flight, No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron, one flight, No. 20 (A.C.) Squadron and one flight, No. 1 Squadron Indian Air Force co-operated from Miranshah with an R.A.F. liaison officer and R/T tender attached to Brigade Headquarters.

APPENDIX "B"

SECRET.
Copy No.
19 *Oct.* 37.

9 *Inf. Bde. Operation Order No.* 12

Ref. Map N.W.F.P. Sheet Nos. 38 K/8 and L/5 1" to 1 mile.

Information

1. Hostiles have occupied the Khassadar Posts in the vicinity of Pt. 2695 (4079) and blown two culverts at 404788.

   They have been occupying high ground in the vicinity of TARAKAI (3576) TABAI (4177) and Pt. 2700 (4175). Their numbers are estimated at about 200.

2. SPINWAM Post (4484) is garrisoned by one coy. less one pl. 3 Rajput and one Post Gun.

   2 Raj. Rif., less one coy., and one Sec. 11 Lt. Tanks are co-operating from the North.

Intention

3. 9 Inf. Bde. and attd. tps. will concentrate in the vicinity of Pt. 2119 (3974) preparatory to an advance on SPINWAM.

Method

4. 3 Rajputs accompanied by Political Representative will relieve Khassadar Posts and piquet the road up to incl. Bridge at 2047 (Se. 3769) by 0300 hrs. 20 Oct. At daylight they will establish a post at 383694. These piquets will remain in position until Sec. 66 Fd. Bty. has passed on its return to MIR. O. C., 3 Rajputs, will give the orders to withdraw.

5. *Marching coln.*

   Comdr. Lt.-Col. B. W. KEY, M.C. 2 R. Sikh.

   Tps. 2 R. Sikh.
   3/15 Punjab.
   One coy. 4 Raj. Rif.
   One coy. 18 Fd. Amb.
   All animal tpt.

   S.P.—RZK Gate, MIR. Time—02.30 hrs. 20 Oct.

6. Marching coln. will take up position of readiness by 06.00 hrs., 2 R. Sikh about Tree 404739.

   3/15 Punjab astride the road about Pt. 2119 (3974). Bn. H.Qs. on inner flanks.

7. Animal tpt. (except for 2 R. Sikh and 3/15 Punjab) and 18 Fd. Amb. will halt at road crossing the NULLAH at 389724, escorted by one coy. 4 Raj. Rif. When halted all tpt. will be kept off the road.

8. Units will detail two men to accompany each led mule.

9. *Tank Coln.*

Sec. 9 Lt. Tanks will escort Bde. H.Q. to vicinity of Pt. 2119 (3974). Recce parties 4 Fd. Bde. and 1 Dogra will accompany this coln.

S.P.—RZK Gate. Time—05.25 hrs. 20 Oct.

Speed—20 m.p.h.

On arrival at Pt. 2119, Sec. Lt. Tanks will take up position protecting the front and left flank of 3/15 Punjab.

10. *M.T. Coln.*

Comdr. Major R. B. SEED, 1 Dogra.

Tps. 4 Fd. Bde.
Sec. 7 Lt. Tanks.
One Sec. 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M.
1 Dogra.
Heavy Lorries Bde. H.Q. and Sig. Sec.

S.P.—RZK Gate. Time—05.30 hrs. 20 Oct.

Speed—12 m.p.h.

11. Roads allotted to S.P.—1 Dogra through Supply Depot.
4 Fd. Bde.—The MALL.
7 Lt. Tanks—Punjab Rd.

S.S.O., MIR, will control traffic in the vicinity of RZK Gate.

12. Comdr., M. T. Coln., will arrange for Arty. to move at head of coln. with only small escort.

13. I Dogra and one Sec. 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M. will debus in vicinity of two trees 391732.

14. As soon as tps. debussed lorries will return MIR with escort one sub. sec. 7 Lt. Tanks.

15. One sub. sec. 7 Lt. Tanks will remain in Arty area for close escort duties and will return MIR with sec. 66 Fd. Bty.

16. *No* lights will be used by mechanical vehicles. Marching coln. will show no lights nor will fires be lighted before 06.30 hrs. 20 Oct.


N
Shadi Khel
Thal
Det.
Spinwam
Spinwam Post
Tari
Kaitu
2706
2703
1/17 Dogra
Rgt.
3023
Sandsar
2300
3/15 Punjab
Rgt
3130
Picquets
2/11 R. Sikh R.
2695
△3144
Tabai Narai
Datta Khel
Sarwek Nala
ZARA MELA
Tarakai △
3198
Tribesmen
2140
Tribesmen
2700
Shamiri
2119

Adm.

17. *Transport.*

(*i*) *A.T.* Units will send guides to 18 A.T. Coy. at 01.30 hrs. 20 Oct. A.T. carts may be drawn and parked in unit lines overnight.

(*ii*) M.T. Allottment—see Appendix. "A" M.T. for kits and followers will arrive in unit lines at 17.00 hrs. 19 Oct. and will remain there till called for on 20 Oct. at approx. 08.00 hrs.

(*iii*) Baggage lorry coln. will proceed under orders Staff Captn. 20 Oct., but Not before 08.00 hrs. Orders of march: Escort one sub. sec. 7 Lt. Tanks.

Camp colour parties	2
Ammunition	7
Camp wire and water stores	3
Kits and followers	21
Supplies	18
Baggage lorries mech. units	—
Piquets 2 R. Sikhs	5

(*iv*) All lorries (less those for 1 Dogra) will NOT park on any camp roads overnight 19/20 Oct.

18. *Amn*

Amn. guard 1 Dogra will report 3 Rajput Quarter Guard 07.00 hrs. 20 Oct.

19. Camp colour parties and police will report Quarter Guard 3 Rajput 08.00 hrs. 20 Oct.

20. 22 Fd. Coy. S. & M. will detail 6 men as water party, who will travel direct to SPN with the water stores.

Intercomn.

21. 9 Inf. Bde. will open on road at 389,735 at 06.15 hrs. Bde. Sig. Officer will detail one R/T set to each Inf. Bn.
Popham Panel will be used by Bde. H. Q.

22. ACK.

Issued to Sigs. 17.10 hrs.

(Signed)
Maj. B.M. 9 Inf. Bde.

RUSSIA AND THE EAST

By Major G. E. Wheeler.

"The policy of Russia . . . is practically unaffected by the life of man and the lapse of time—it moves on as it were by its own impetus; it is silent, concentrated, perpetual, unbroken, it is therefore successful."

—*Lord Rosebery.*

"So far from regarding the foreign policy of Russia as consistent, or remorseless, or profound, I believe it to be a hand-to-mouth policy, a policy of waiting upon events, of profiting by the blunders of others, and as often committing the like herself."

—*Lord Curzon.*

"You should not take a fellow eight years old
And make him swear to never kiss the girls."

—*Robert Browning: Fra Lippo Lippi.*

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Rather more than five years ago, in an article published in this journal,* the present writer discussed certain aspects of Soviet oriental policy. That article, which was largely based on personal observation and experience, aimed only at a brief study of Russian activities in the Middle East under the auspices of the Soviet régime. A certain crystallization in Soviet Eastern policy which seems to have taken place during the past few years, now makes it possible to view Russian activities in Asia as a historical whole without any special reference to one or another régime or period, and though such a task cannot properly be performed within the scope of a short article, it may be possible to pass in dispassionate review the salient events of a problem of unusual interest and complexity, and to attempt some explanation of their significance.

Like many other questions on which accurate and unbiassed information is difficult to obtain, the question of Russia's designs in Asia is one around which a storm of controversy has raged for many years. A great number of books has been written on the subject. Some of them extol and others vilify Russian methods in Asia; to some the Russian menace appears of gigantic importance, while others scoff at it as being either chimerical or not worth consideration. A haphazard selection from such books leaves the reader in a state of total bewilderment. Russia seems to have

* "Side-lights on Soviet Oriental Policy" (*United Service Institution of India Journal*, July 1932).

no clear history and few public records to aid an impartial examination of her aims and policy.

Before attempting to arrive at any coherent idea of Russia's position in Asia it is essential to grasp four facts which are often ignored or glossed over:

(*a*) The Russians are not by origin an Asiatic people. The Slavs had their origin in the Carpathian Mountains and the history of Russia is the history of the gradual spread of the Eastern Slavs over the great Eurasian plain as far as the Pacific Ocean. This expansion was inevitable.

(*b*) The Russians were never absorbed by the Tartars. "Scratch a Russian and find a Tartar" is a catchpenny phrase which never had any real meaning. Intermarriage between Russians and Oriental peoples was practically confined to the Cossack settlers. At the present day about 80 per cent. of the population of the Soviet Union is purely Slav (Great Russian, White Russian and Ukrainian). The remainder consists of Turkomans, Jews, Tartars, Georgians, Armenians, etc., none of which peoples represents more than 3 per cent. of the total population, now reckoned to be over 150 millions.

(*c*) There are not and never have been two Russias, Russia in Europe and Russia in Asia. No such division has ever been known to the Russians. Between the Baltic and Black Seas and the Pacific there are no natural boundaries which could have limited the expansion of the Russians from west to east. To the south, however, Russian expansion is limited by a chain of mountains, deserts and inland seas, *i.e.*, the Caucasian Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Ust Urt Desert, the Kizil Kum Desert, the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, the Tian Shan Mountains, the Gobi Desert and the Khingan Mountains.

(*d*) Though the Tartars neither absorbed the Russians nor intermingled with them their invasions and temporary domination of the Russian people are of the first importance in a study of Russia's relations with Asia. Long before Russian lands became the objective of the organised invasions of Genghiz Khan and Tamurlane, at the very dawn of Russian history, Turko-Mongol tribes had begun to settle round the

> Dnieper Basin. The movement of these tribes towards the west was the result first of large-scale military operations by the Chinese and Persian empires and later of the Moslem domination of Central Asia in the VIIth century. Thus, when the originally peaceable Slavs wandered east into the Dnieper Basin and began the history of the Russian people they found themselves in close proximity to wild and predatory Asiatic tribes who constantly threatened their existence. Their struggles with these tribes were followed by the organized Mongol invasions. The final overthrow of the Tartar Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in 1556 brought the Russians to the Ural Mountains and it is from this date that Russian expansion in Asia may be said to have begun.

The key to Russia's Asiatic orientation can be found in an early event of Russian history. In 1147 when George Dolgoruki founded a military colony on the site of the present Moscow he unconsciously changed the political centre of gravity of the Eastern Slavs. Had the centre remained at Kiev, Russia might early have become associated with the comity of European states. "The geographical position of Moscow," says Bury, "determined the current of Russian history." The vast distance of Moscow from the frontiers of the nearest western State and its situation in country devoid of geographical frontiers made expansion inevitable and was also the reason for Russia's isolation from Europe from the XIIIth to the XVth century. This fact, no less than the period of Tartar supremacy retarded the march of constitutional freedom in Russia and ensured that great spread over Asia which so alarmed the Western world and at one time threatened to be limitless.

The final removal of the Tartar yoke was immediately followed by the conquest of Siberia. It is important to notice that the first movement of expansion was due east along the line of least resistance. It was not a realization of imperialist policy but the result rather of private commercial enterprise backed by the military force of the Cossacks. Before proceeding further a word must be said about these remarkable people who played an extremely important part in the expansion of Russia. They were originally men of roving disposition who preferred an adventurous to a settled life. Settling on the outskirts of Russian lands they came into close contact with Tartar raiders and eventually were employed as a kind of irregular frontier police. In time they formed themselves into large communities settling permanently in the open

steppe which they had helped to reclaim. The first and largest of the Cossack communities was that of the Cossacks of the Don. From this community others were formed by the more restless spirits following the tide of commercial exploration. The names of the various Cossack "hosts" tell the story of Russian expansion: Don, Terek, Kuban, Ural, Orenburg, Semirechinsk, Transbaikal, Amur, Ussuri. Even up to the Great War the Cossack hosts retained a measure of independence and privilege. They have at times developed unruly and brigandish tendencies but the value of their services during the Russian expansion to the Pacific can hardly be overestimated.

The story of the Russian conquest of Siberia is a romantic one. The promoters, as it were, of the Siberian venture were a family called Stroganov who in 1558 were granted a tract of land on the Kama river just west of the Urals. From here, with the assistance of Don Cossacks, they pushed across the Urals into Siberia where the first important centre to be established was Tobolsk. As early as 1586 a constant flow of peasants, runaway serfs, adventurers, Cossacks and merchants began to filter into Siberia. From Tobolsk the Yenissei was reached in 1620 and, to the south, the Russians came into contact with Jungaria, the present Sinkiang. Yakutsk was founded in 1632 and Irkutsh in 1651 and from these two centres exploration was carried out in all directions. In 1645 the Arctic Ocean was reached. Finally, Kamchatka was discovered in 1697.

After the first determined resistance of the Kirgiz leader, Kuchum Khan, the opposition met by the colonizers was not great. The difficulty was not to advance but to hold what was captured against the natives who greatly outnumbered the invaders. The solution of this difficulty was found in the creation of chains of blockhouses. With the influx of settlers from Russia the numerical superiority of the natives decreased and security achieved with the result that by 1710 the Slav population of Siberia had risen to 250,000.

The conquest of Siberia brought Russia into direct contact with China. Relations were at first merely commercial: the Chinese bartered textiles, silks, gold and silver against hides and foodstuffs. Political issues eventually arose over the spheres of influence which both countries wished to exercise in the three buffer states of Jungaria, Mongolia and Manchuria. Various attempts by Russia to establish diplomatic relations broke down over the question of the "Kotow" or bow of servility which China, who regarded all foreigners as barbarians, was wont to exact from

foreign envoys and which successive Russian ambassadors refused to perform. Matters at last came to a head on the Amur river. Prolonged operations eventually found the Russians established in Albazin and the Chinese at last signified their wish to negotiate a settlement of the frontier question. Conversations took place at Nerchinsk where a Treaty was signed in 1689. The frontier was fixed well to the north of Mongolia and no Russian colonists were allowed to settle south of the Amur river. China was granted a free hand in the buffer states of Jungaria and Mongolia. In return for all this China was opened to Russian trade. As a result of this treaty, the first ever signed by China with a European power, the two countries remained at peace with each other for over two centuries.

The appearance of the Russians on the shores of the Caspian Sea in 1556 brought them quickly into touch with the Central Asian states which represented the relics of Tamurlane's empire. During the reign of Ivan the Terrible, envoys appeared in Moscow from Bokhara and Samarkand and mutual trade concessions were agreed upon. Proper diplomatic relations were not, however, established with Bokhara until the middle of the XVIIth century when a Russian embassy was established there. In 1644 the secretary of the Russian envoy in Bokhara succeeded in reaching Balkh, then an important city and capital of an independent state in north Afghanistan whose frontiers marched with the Mogul Empire. This was the prelude to the first Russian Embassy to India sent by Tsar Alexis in 1675. This embassy was a failure, for Aurungzeb considered, and not without reason, that the only object of the Russians was to get money out of India. There were no questions to settle and no grievances to adjust. The presents of sables brought by the Russians were confiscated, valued at a low price by merchants and the cash value, less a special customs duty, paid to the incensed envoys. The embassy left India in 1678 without having accomplished anything.

More important at this time than her relations with Central Asia and India were Russia's relations with Persia. As in China and India the first attempts at establishing diplomatic contact were a failure. "Some trouble," writes Prince Lobanov Rostovski, "arose over customs duties." According to Sykes the matter seems to have been that Shah Abbas, the then Persian ruler, regarded the "embassy" as a commercial venture attempting to evade customs duties under the cover of diplomatic privilege. There is little doubt that he was partly right, for at this period Russia's foreign activities were almost entirely in the hands of merchants. Never-

theless trade between Russia and Persia seems to have developed rapidly and by 1670 there was a colony of Persian merchants in Moscow.

Russian territorial "designs" on Persia do not seem to have entered the head of the Government until the accession of Peter the Great in 1689. This extraordinary man early conceived the idea of establishing trade relations with India. His first plan was to conquer Khiva and from there to investigate a route to India presumably along the valley of the Oxus. The total failure of the expedition despatched under Prince Bekovich Cherkassky in 1717 caused him to try another alternative. Already in 1708 and 1716 embassies had been sent to Isfahan without, however, any conspicuous success. The second ambassador, Artemii Volynski, furious at the treatment he had received at the hands of the Persians, recommended to Peter that war was the only way to bring Persia to her senses. Accordingly, in 1723, when the war with Sweden was over, Peter invaded Persia and easily defeated her. Persia ceded Derbent, Baku and the provinces of Gilan, Mazenderan and Astrabad. This nearly led to war with Turkey and Prince Lobanov Rostovski relates that the British Ambassador in Constantinople tried to persuade the Turks that war with Russia would not be a dangerous project as a revolution against Peter the Great was on the point of breaking out. The present writer has not, however, been able to discover the source of this information. Later, during the reign of Anne, Russia's Persian conquests were handed back to Persia for the simple reason that the climate was found to be unsuitable for Russian colonization.

Not only the Middle East but the Far East entered into the vast purview of Peter the Great. As a result of his perfervid and infectious energy considerable advance was made by Behring, Spanberg and others in the realm of Arctic and Pacific discovery. Relations with China were further improved and a permanent embassy established in Peking. Yet Peter's energies were principally directed towards the west and "his great achievement," writes H. A. L. Fisher, "is that, clearly apprehending the superiority of the west, he succeeded by the effort of a lifetime, and in the teeth of violent prejudices, in lifting his country on to a palpably higher level of civilization." Himself a typical Russian, he ignored and even trampled upon the national susceptibilities of his people. His contempt for Russian and admiration of foreign institutions were almost equally profound and it has long been the opinion of many Russian historians that he stifled the expression and development of the Russian national character. His attempt to

change Russia's orientation and to bring her on to the level of Western European states came too late and his apparent successes now seem too many to have been largely spurious or superficial. However great, indeed, the effect of Peter the Great's reforms may have been on governmental institutions and on the position of Russia *vis-à-vis* Western Europe, it is doubtful whether they affected the tide of Russian expansion in Asia to any important degree. The conquest of Central Asia was of course facilitated by the existence of a regular army the formation of which had been one of Peter's greatest works, but the enterprise, determination and above all imagination which have throughout characterized Russian expansion have little to do with the efforts of this or that Tsar. It is not unreasonable to suppose that these qualities are natural to the Russian character when it is allowed to develop untrammelled by artificial Western growths. Whatever objections there may be to the present régime it does, by virtually isolating the people from Western European culture, give the Russian character a chance to develop on its own lines.

At the death of Peter the Great (1725) the southern frontier of the Russian Empire stretched from the Altai Mountains, along the Irtysh River to Omsk. From Omsk it reached the Yaik or Ural river and then along the Yaik to the Caspian Sea. To the south of this line roamed the nomad hordes of the Baskhir, Kirgiz and Kalmyks all of whom constantly encroached on Russian territory. During the reign of Catherine II. attempts were made to stabilize these nomads by peaceful methods. Education was encouraged and teachers were brought from Moslem colleges in Kazan, for the Russians had made the mistake of thinking that the Kirgiz were Moslems, whereas they were, in actual fact, pagan Shamanists. The result of this missionary campaign was that the Kirgiz embraced Islam thus eventually making a tiresome addition to the Moslem minority in Russia. Of more importance than these cultural attempts was the advance of Russian influence in the Central Asian states of Khiva and Bokhara.

The principal events of the XVIIIth century which affect this narrative are the conquest of the Crimea and the annexation of Georgia. Between 1768 and 1791 Russia fought two wars with Turkey and in both she completely defeated the Turks on land and sea. War was in both cases declared by Turkey and historians generally agree that the right was on Russia's side. The Tartar Khanate of the Crimea had, up to this time, been a dependency of Turkey and Russia was subjected to constant loss and irritation from Tartar incursions, which on one occasion reached as far as

Voronezh and which the Turks made no attempt to control. The principal results of the two wars were the complete annexation of the Crimea by Russia and the establishment of Russian power along the whole northern coast of the Black Sea. "The conquest of the Crimea," writes Nevill Forbes, "may be regarded as having been legitimate in the interests of civilization: it was necessary to the free development of the Russian people, which was unquestionably of superior 'cultural' value to the Tartar races which dominated the coasts of the Black Sea."

In the annexation of Georgia, too, Russia can to a great extent be exonerated from the charge of imperialistic greed. In 1783 King Irakli II of Georgia fearing Persian aggression had asked for Russia's protection and agreed to recognize her suzerainty conditional on the support of Russian troops. That same autumn two Russian battalions and a battery of guns arrived in Tiflis and in 1784 a Proclamation of Suzerainty over Georgia was published. Later, however, the troops were withdrawn until 1795 when the Persian Army invaded Georgia and captured Tiflis. After a gallant struggle the Georgians recaptured the city, but it was only the timely appearance of a Russian force which caused the Persians to retire. In 1800 the crown of Georgia was offered by King Giorgi XIII to the Tsar and accepted. "Russian intervention," writes Prince Lobanov Rostovski, "undoubtedly saved the Georgians from complete extermination."

The foregoing narrative has, from considerations of space, been condensed and staccato and, from the point of view of the reader, very probably dull. Some sort of survey of Asiatic Russian history up to the end of the XVIIIth century was, however, necessary to form a background for a study of one of the main topics of this article—the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. The writer does not mean to suggest that Russian expansion in Asia was or is bound up with Anglo-Russian rivalry. Indeed, up to the end of the XVIIIth century, if there were any alarm in the mind of the British Government at Russia's expansion it seems to have been unjustified. If Peter the Great's commercial designs on India were known of at the time, it was only much later that they can be found as an integral part of that great Russian plot to seize India which Russophobes have exposed with such remarkable dexterity. It has been said above that Russian expansion was scarcely affected by Peter the Great. This statement the writer believes to be strictly true, but a rider must be added to the effect that the new interest in European politics which Peter the Great stimulated in the minds of his countrymen and particularly of the "dvorianstvo" or nobles

was to a great extent responsible for the birth of Anglo-Russian rivalry. A sinister indication of this interest can be found in that clause of the Treaty of Küchük Kainarci which recognized Russia as the spiritual protector of all orthodox subjects of the Sultan. From this, as will presently appear, serious trouble arose.

Prince Lobanov Rostovski mantains that British apprehension with regard to Russian designs in Asia was first aroused by Peter the Great's invasion of Persia in 1723. The fact that the present writer has failed to find any confirmation of this statement may merely be due to chance or to his lack of skill in research. There is no mention of such apprehension in the better known histories which he has consulted. It seems, indeed, that up to the end of the XVIIIth century the feelings of England towards Russia had been of the friendliest description and she even welcomed her entry into the comity of nations: politically, as a potential counterpoise to the aggrandizement of France. "I am quite a Russ," wrote the elder Pitt to Shelburne in 1773: "I trust the Ottoman will pull down the House of Bourbon in his fall." Fox, who was in office when Russia annexed the Crimea, cordially approved of it and would have been glad to form an alliance with Russia and the Northern Powers.

The first British statesman to be assailed by misgivings on the score of Russia's advancement was the younger Pitt. With the conversion of the Black Sea from a Turkish to a Russian lake the whole position in the Near East changed and Russia began to play a prominent, almost a dominant, part in the Eastern Question. In 1791 when Pitt vainly attempted to excite the alarm of the House of Commons over the question of Russia's advance in South-Eastern Europe he referred to the words used by Montesquieu, with strange prescience, in 1734. "L'Empire des Turcs est à present à peu près dans le même degré de faiblesse où̀ étoit autrement celui des Grecs: mais il subsistera longtemps. Car si quelque prince que ce fût mettoit cet empire en pèril en poursuivant ses conquêtes les trois puissances commercantes de l'Europe connoissent trop leur affaires pour n'en pas prendre la défense sur-le-champ." Pitt saw that it was preferable to shoulder the awkward commitment of bolstering up the effete Ottoman Empire than to allow Russia to establish herself at Constantinople. He proposed to the House that Britain should make a naval demonstration in the Black Sea but, although the motion was carried, the majority did not reflect the general tenor of the debate. Hansard reports Fox as insisting that Russia was "our natural ally" and that we had encouraged her "plans for raising her aggrandizement upon

the ruins of the Turkish Empire." Lord Fitzwilliam said that "no ill consequence was likely to arise from Russia's keeping in her hands Ochakov and Akerman." Pitt deferred to public opinion and no demonstration was made.

It is not surprising to find that Russophobe literature makes great play of Tsar Paul's ill-fated Indian expedition in 1801. Furious at the lack of British and Austrian appreciation of Russia's efforts in Italy under General Suvorov the half-mad Tsar threw himself into the arms of his late enemy, France. At first in collaboration with Napoleon and later on his own account he planned an invasion of India and a force of 22,000 Don Cossacks actually marched for Orenburg with India as its ultimate objective. The force was recalled on the assassination of Tsar Paul and the expedition can hardly be considered as anything more than the irresponsible act of a demented autocrat. The present writer has been unable to find any confirmation of Prince Lobanov Rostovski's statement that the expedition of Paul I "was considered by the British as a substantiation of their fears and a proof of Russia's designs upon India." It seems, indeed, that all through the Napoleonic wars the British Government did not regard Russia's "designs" with very great misgiving. Even the Tilsit rapprochement between Napoleon and Alexander I which virtually handed over Constantinople to Russia failed to make much impression and Russia's subsequent volte face and defeat of the Grande Armèe on the retreat from Moscow elicited considerable enthusiasm from the British public. This is not to say that Russia had no "designs." She most undoubtedly had a defined policy of gaining control of the moribund Turkish Empire and later of establishing herself at Constantinople. The point is that little real evidence can be adduced to show that, up to the end of the Napoleonic wars, Anglo-Russian rivalry had reached a serious stage either over the Eastern Question or in the Middle East. Only in Persia had the interests of the two Powers been found to cross each other and then only, as it were, by chance. The object of the four British missions sent to Persia between 1800 and 1810 was to combat French rather than Russian influence. Indeed, the defeat by General Gudenich of a Persian army under French officers caused the rapid decline of French influence in Tehran and made possible the visit of Sir Harford Jones with his important gifts of a magnificent diamond and a subsidy of £120,000 a year. Sykes says that this subsidy was to continue so long as Britain was at war with Russia. Lobanov Rostovski maintains that it was conditional on *Persia* remaining at war with Russia. Whichever may be the truth it does not appear

that any of the British missions regarded Russia as the main enemy. Peace between England and Russia was signed in 1811 and Sir Gore Ouseley, the British Ambassador in Tehran, ordered British officers to leave Persian service. He acceded, however, to the Persian request to retain Christie and Lindsay who in 1812 virtually led a vast Persian army against a Russian force at Aslanduz. In spite of the valiant efforts of these officers the Persian force was defeated. The Russian army was at that very moment engaged in turning the tide of the Napoleonic campaign in Russia!

The part played by Russia in what is commonly called the Eastern Question is, properly speaking, outside the scope of this narrative and only a brief mention of it need be made. J. A. R. Marriott summarizes the Russian connection with the Eastern Question as follows: "The problem of the Black Sea: egress therefrom, ingress thereto: the command of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and, above all, the capital problem as to the possession of Constantinople" . . . . Russia's "natural impulse towards the Mediterranean; her repeated attempts to secure permanent access to that sea by the narrow straits; her relation to her co-religionists under the sway of the Sultan and more particularly to those of her own Slavonic nationality." It is unnecessary here to attempt a recapitulation of the events surrounding Russia's endeavours to realize the above mentioned aspirations. They have been described in detail in many histories and notably in Marriott's "Eastern Question." What is more important from the point of view of this narrative is to decide when Anglo-Russian rivalry took on a definite shape and what were the underlying causes of that rivalry. Of neither of these matters is it easy to speak with precision. The writer has tried to show that up to the end of the Napoleonic wars Russia was not regarded by Great Britain as a potential enemy or rival in either Europe or Asia. She had materially assisted to bring about the downfall of Napoleon and at the close of the war was still sufficiently powerful to command respect. The character of Tsar Alexander I, at once idealistic and shrewd, was attractive to the British and it almost seems as if it were not until the formation of the Holy Alliance that serious doubts began to assail the British people and government as to the integrity and good-will of Russia. The Holy Alliance appeared to Castlereagh, and also to Metternich, as an undesirable exhibition of misplaced religious fervour which probably had a sinister ulterior motive behind it. Metternich's description of the Holy Alliance as a "sonorous nothing" seems, however, to fall short of the truth. In welcoming the "*Christian*

nations" of Europe into one fold of mutual esteem and confidence Alexander was believed to be unmistakably announcing his intention of overthrowing the Ottoman Empire and the events which followed certainly seemed to bear this out. Yet neither here nor for many years was Russian action based upon any considered policy. It was dependent entirely upon the will of the Tsar and mental tergiversations assailed Alexander with bewildering frequency. He was by nature a liberal and shared with the majority of his countrymen a genuine sympathy for the Christians under Turkish suzerainty. It is highly probable that he knew of and countenanced the activities of numerous Russian agents in the Christian provinces of Turkey. But on the outbreak of the Greek rebellion in 1820 he at first disavowed any connection with the leader of the revolt, Hypsilanti. The fact was that Alexander had recently come under the influence of Metternich who had persuaded him temporarily that the Greek revolt was one more manifestation of those dangerous revolutionary ideas which threatened to overthrow legitimist government in Europe. What followed is a tangle of cross-purpose and misunderstanding. Alexander's position as head of the Orthodox Church proved stronger than Metternich's influence and in 1821 Russia came into the field as the acknowledged champion of Greek independence. And so, under the enthusiastic tutelage of Lord Byron, was England, and the student of history is treated to the astonishing spectacle of Great Britain and Russia vying for the honour of sponsoring the Greek revolt. For the British Foreign Secretary Canning, though a member of a Tory government was, writes Fisher, "an exponent of that new type of popular and liberal diplomacy which since it descended to Palmerston, an adoring disciple, was for nearly half a century a thorn in the flesh of continental autocrats."

Canning died before the Battle of Navarino in 1828 and Wellington who openly disagreed with his predecessor's policy caused the King to make what was tantamount to an apology to Turkey. Henceforward Great Britain's relations with Russia were characterized by unrelieved opposition. Nicholas I who succeeded Alexander I in 1825 was considered to be an opponent of all liberal thought and institutions. He was popularly described by Tennyson as "the o'ergrown barbarian of the East" and the British Government and people agreed in thinking that nothing good could come out of Russia. Such sentiments made possible the prolonged retention at Constantinople of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe who can with reason be regarded as one of the principal originators of the useless and dangerous Crimean War.

Further east events were occurring which fitted in well with anti-Russian feeling. After the conclusion of peace with Russia in 1828 Persia wishing to compensate for her losses in another direction and perhaps, *certainly* according to some, on the advice of Russia decided to lay siege to Herat. This city, however, ably defended under the direction of the British subaltern Pottinger, resisted all attacks. It may well be that this was the first genuine sign of Russia's attempts to oppose Great Britain in the Middle East for, as Lobanov Rostovski writes, once British opposition to Russia in the Near East had become chronic "a vicious circle was created, the British finding confirmation of their suspicions in the events which occurred, and consequently opposing Russia all the more violently, and the Russians in their turn, infuriated at this opposition where they had historic claims and the British had none, consequently became the more aggressive further east where the British were more sensitive for the security of India." Many years later, in 1889, the situation was admirably and succinctly appreciated by Lord Curzon. "To keep England quiet in Europe by keeping her employed in Asia, that, briefly put, is the sum and substance of Russian policy."

Lord Palmerston went to the Foreign Office in 1830. During the tedious years of his office as Secretary of State for War he had found relaxation in the company of the beautiful Princess Lieven, the wife of the Russian ambassador. This clever and patriotic lady laboured hard to impress Palmerston with the just nature of Russia's aspirations and the nobility of her fellow countrymen. The result of her efforts seems to have been, however, that her pupil entered the Foreign Office rather as a Russophobe than a Russophil and seems to have been more ready to exaggerate Russia's power and ambitions than approve her claims to sympathetic consideration. Whatever his real sentiments, Palmerston arranged the early recall of the Lieven family and shortly after the disappearance of his first teacher in diplomacy, he took up the Russian question in earnest. In 1836 he appointed McNeill, a well-known Russophobe, to Tehran and in the same year wrote a letter to Lord Auckland, then Governor-General in India, pointing out the need of counteracting "the progress of Russian influence in a quarter which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian alliances and possibly to interfere even with the tranquility of our own territory." Auckland was to take what action he thought fit when he should feel that "the time had arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghanistan."

Quite apart from any Russian machinations the situation in Afghanistan at this time was far from satisfactory. After the murder of Nadir Shah in 1747 Ahmad Shah Durani had established a power which stretched from the Oxus to the Sutlej and the Indus and far into Persia. This power decayed under his successors, Timur Shah and Shah Shuja and a period of anarchy ensued. The upshot of this was that in 1830, Dost Muhammad of the Barakzai family had established himself at Kabul while Kamran of the Sadozais ruled at Herat. The Indian provinces with Kashmir and Peshawar had been entirely lost. The Persian expedition against Herat greatly alarmed Dost Muhammad who feared the next Persian objective would be Kandahar. He therefore gave considerable attention to the proposal of British and Russian envoys who appeared in Kabul in 1837. Russophobe literature seems to convey the impression that the appearance of Lieutenant Vitkevich was one of the reasons which prompted England's action. In actual fact he arrived in Kabul after Alexander Burnes and only began to have dealings with Dost Muhammad when Burnes' project for the grant of a subsidy to Afghanistan and partial cession of Peshawar by Ranjit Singh was repudiated by Lord Auckland. The sequel to these Russian gambits was that Vitkevich was recalled by the Russian Government who denied having entrusted him with any official mission. On this Vitkevich committed suicide. Burnes fared no better. He was murdered in Kabul and, according to Kaye, his despatches were intentionally mutilated in India in order to make him appear responsible for the failure of the mission followed as it was by the unparalleled disaster of the First Afghan War.

Whatever the justification for British alarm it is perfectly clear that the steps taken to counteract Russian activity did not improve the situation in the slightest. That the Russian Government had at this time formulated the vast scheme for which the Russophobes give it credit must be regarded as extremely doubtful. That they instigated the Persian expedition on Herat is certainly highly probable and Prince Lobanov Rostovski's argument that if the Russians had desired the capture of Herat by Persia the presence of a small Russian force would have ensured it is really too thin to be accepted. But the idea of "strong action in Afghanistan" when the Sutlej was still the frontier of British India and Russia had not begun the conquest of Khiva seems to have been one of the wildest notions that ever entered the head of a British Government.

Leaving Anglo-Russian rivalry more or less firmly established in Europe and the Middle East some reference must be made to Russia's continued expansion in the Far East and Arctic regions. Like the British Empire the Russian Empire owed much of its far-flung acquisitions to the initiative of merchant-adventurers. Of the exploits of Russian pioneers very little is generally known with the result that the persistence of Russian colonization and culture is largely ignored by Western European historians. Apparently, during the reigns of Catherine and Paul, preoccupation in Europe caused a falling-off in the interest taken by Russia in the Far East but, as early as 1803, organized expeditions began to press forward to new fields of discovery. The Russian colony in Alaska was firmly established in 1804 and, in searching for a possible source of supplies for this colony down the coast of America, San Francisco was reached and in 1811, with the consent of the Spaniards in California, a chain of Russian settlements was established in the Californian coast and remained there for ten years. The rapidly increasing importance of trade in these distant lands aroused great interest in Russia and their inaccessibility by any existing land or sea route caused eyes once more to be turned to the question of navigating the Amur River. This was contrary to the existing Treaty of Nerchinsk, but the situation suddenly became acute on the outbreak of the Opium Wars (1841-1842) between Great Britain and China. The capture of Hong Kong and the establishment of British commercial influence in the Yangtse valley caused grave disquietude in the minds of Russian statesmen who prognosticated an attempt on the part of England to gain control of the mouth of the Amur River and thus make Russia's position on the Pacific impossible. "There appears to have been as much ground for these apprehensions as for British suspicions of Russian designs on India."

To protect Russian interests in the Far East a remarkable man Nikolai Muraviev was appointed Governor of East Siberia. Muraviev was a man of great foresight, ability and of an independent will which frequently found itself opposed to the more moderate aspirations of the Government. To his forceful forward policy which amounted to an arbitrary violation of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Chinese appeared to be either complacent or indifferent. Profiting by the disorder following on the Sino-British war of 1856-1857 Muraviev concluded with China the Treaty of Aigun which gave Russia all the country on the left bank of the Amur and the right to use the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri rivers for the purpose of navigation. The successful

mediation of Russia after the occupation of Peking by an Anglo-French force in 1860 paved the way for the Treaty of Peking which gave to Russia the whole of the Ussuri region down to the sea and preferential trading rights in Mongolia and Sinkiang.

The final phases of Russian expansion in Asia were the conquests of the Caucasus and Central Asia or what is now known as Soviet Turkestan. A number of clear and fairly accurate accounts of these operations are available and a reference to any of them will serve to refresh the reader's memory on the dates of the various advances. Until 1860 the Russian forward movement did not excite any particular comment from Great Britain though apprehension had long been felt as to the ultimate effect which these advances would have upon India. In 1864 Count Gorchakov felt it necessary to issue his famous note in which he discussed the whole problem which resulted from civilized states finding themselves in proximity to wild and unsettled tribes. Drawing parallels from other parts of the world, he pointed out that when frontier tribes are of necessity subdued, "they in their turn are exposed to the aggression of more distant tribes and hence the frontier line must be expanded until it comes into contact with a regularly organized state." He went on to indicate the line which Russia proposed to consolidate and beyond which she did not "intend" to advance. Subsequent advances to the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan raised howls of execration from the Russophobes and the Russian Government was stigmatized as hopelessly perfidious and incorrigibly "Asiatic."

That the Russian Government did from time to time give specific undertakings to refrain from further advance in this or that direction and subsequently repudiated them cannot, of course, be denied. With regard to the general principles enunciated in the Note, however, some notice must be taken of Russia's retort that the expression of an intention does not imply a fixed undertaking for all time. There are two other points not always taken into account: there is nothing to prove that the Russian Government was not sincere in its belief that the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand were "regularly organized States" whose frontiers might constitute the limit of Russian expansion. That they subsequently proved to be no such thing and that their turbulent state rendered further advances necessary was an example of a phenomenon common enough in India, America and elsewhere. Secondly, commanders on the spot often on their own initiative carried out operations which were highly distasteful and embarrassing to the Government. Thus, on receiving news of a

concentration of Kokandians at Tashkent, Colonel Chernayev attacked without orders. Having failed to capture the city the first time he attacked again, this time successfully but in direct defiance of the Tsar's orders. Time and recent history have possibly made people less censorious of failures on the part of Governments to realize their declared intentions and of late actions far more high-handed than Russia's advances in Central Asia have failed to elicit one quarter of the same protest and alarm.

In 1865 Turkestan was declared a frontier province with Tashkent as its capital. The policy of the Russian Government with regard to Central Asia was at this time by no means clear. The hands of the Cabinet were to a great extent forced by the vigorous and often high-handed line taken by men like Kauffmann, Chernaiev and Skobelev. The many assurances given by Russian diplomats regarding the cessation of further operations were, it may be believed, given in good faith, but such assurances were treated by local officials and commanders with a mixture of indifference and contempt. They trusted to their own local knowledge and instinct to tell them when and where to stop and it must be admitted that, on the whole, they appear to have been right. When the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand had been successfully brought under Russian suzerainty there still remained the resistance of the Tekke Turkomans to overcome. At the time these people were probably the most warlike people in Asia not excluding the Pathans, and the problem as to whether they should be humoured or conquered at all costs was one which it required the independent resolution of men like Kauffmann and Skobelev to solve. After General Lomakin had with heavy losses failed to take the Tekke stronghold of Geok Tepe, Skobelev was placed in command and took the fortress by storm after a siege of twenty-three days. The limits of Russian expansion had now (1881) at last been reached and her frontiers marched with those of Persia, Afghanistan and China.

The conquest of Khiva, the capture of Geok Tepe and the eventual voluntary capitulation of Merv were events which profoundly disturbed the British Government and public. A long memorandum handed by Sir Edward Thornton, ambassador in St. Petersburg, to M. de Giers, the Russian Foreign Secretary set forth with telling clarity the numerous assurances given by the Russian Government and by the Tsar which had, with hardly an exception, been repudiated or disregarded. The memorandum, however, was not a prelude to any firm action and ended, moreover, on a weak and unsatisfactory note, the ambassador merely saying: "I have the

honour to convey to Your Excellency His Lordships (Lord Granville's) hope that an early opportunity will be taken of communicating to Her Majesty's Government the proposals which the Russian Government may have to make to them, in order to provide against the complications which this further extension of Russian sovereignty in the direction of the frontiers of Afghanistan may give rise."

"My only surprise," wrote Lord Curzon, "is not that Russia invented the pleas, or gave the undertaking, but that England, with childlike innocence, has consented time after time to be gulled by the same transparent device;" and later, "The fact remains that in the absence of any physical obstacle, and in the presence of an enemy whose rule of life was depredation, and who understood no diplomatic logic but defeat, Russia was as much compelled to go forward as the earth is to go round the sun; and if any have a legitimate right to complain of her advance it is certainly not those who alone had the power to stop her, and who deliberately declined to exercise it."

Now that Central Asia had been conquered without rousing England to resolute action de Giers permitted himself to make a definition of Russian policy to Baron Staal, the Russian ambassador in London. This is quoted as follows by Lobanov Rostovski:

"This position . . . is purely defensive, considering that we have neither the intention nor any interest in menacing England in India. But it gives us a base for operations which if required can become an offensive one." And again, "England could strike us everywhere with the aid of continental alliances, whereas we can not reach her anywhere. A great nation cannot accept such a position . . . . This has led us to build for ourselves in Turkestan and the Turkoman steppe a sufficiently strong military position. . . . We are satisfied with this defensive position."

Russia had good reason to be satisfied with her position. Central Asia was subdued for ever. Even the Revolution gave rise to no revolt of any importance.

Quite apart from the threat which Russia's Asiatic expansion was believed by the Russophobes to imply, Russian methods of conquest in Central Asia were subjected to grave criticism. A discussion as to whether the massacre of 8,000 Turkomans is more cruel than, for instance, a systematic attempt to starve a whole nation to death would tend to become metaphysical and therefore useless for the purpose of the present narrative. But it may be of some interest to quote without comment some remarks of General

Skobelev during two interviews which he granted to the British journalist Charles Marvin.

"In your official report of the siege," said Marvin, "you say that during the pursuit after the assault you killed 8,000 of both sexes."

"That is true," observed Skobelev, "I had them counted. The number was 8,000."

"This statement," I continued, "provoked great comment in England, for you admit your troops killed women as well as men."

Skobelev replied: "It is quite true. When the dead were counted, women were found among them. It is my nature to conceal nothing. I therefore wrote, in making the report, 'of both sexes'."

On Marvin's remarking that it was the great defect of our last Afghan war that we entered the country without a policy, and never applied his principle (and Wellington's) of hitting the enemy as hard as possible, Skobelev said: "Those executions of General Roberts at Cabul were a mistake. I would never execute an Asiatic to strike terror into his countrymen, because you are sure to fail. Whatever punishments you resort to, they can never be so terrible as those inflicted by a Nasrullah, or any other despotic native ruler: and to these crueller punishments the natives are so accustomed, that your milder ones produce no effect. Then, worse than this, the execution of a Mussulman by an Infidel provokes hatred. I would sooner the whole country revolted than execute a man. If you take a place by storm and strike a terrible blow, it is the will of God, they say, and they submit without that hatred which executions provoke. My system is this—to strike hard and keep on hitting till resistance is completely over, then at once to form ranks, cease slaughter, and be kind and humane to the prostrate enemy. Immediately submission is made, the troops must be subjected to the strictest discipline; not one of the enemy must be touched."

During the second interview Skobelev said:

"In dealing with savage tribes the best plan is to fight as rarely as possible; and when you do fight, to hit as hard as you can. By incessantly attacking them, you teach them the art of war. Your policy is the same as that which we pursued in the Caucasus, and has had similar results. Prince Bariatinsky, however, replaced it with a fresh policy. Wherever he advanced, he stopped and made roads to the point, and fortified it. In this manner, in course of time, we were able to put down the lawlessness of the tribes."

It is doubtful whether such views as these were ever placed on record by the Russian Government or whether indeed they would ever have been officially subscribed to. They are illustrative

of the independent attitude of the real builders of the Russian Empire, an attitude strikingly similar to that shown by many of the pioneers of British power. Another example of this independent attitude is the action taken by General Kauffmann in Sinkiang in 1871. Alarmed by the apparent cognizance given to the upstart Yakub Beg by both the British and Turkish Governments and by the actual presence of a British mission in Kashgar, Kauffmann occupied the Mujart Pass and, when Yakub started to extend his power to the Tarantchi sultanate of Kulja, General Kalpakovski was ordered to occupy that city, one of the most important in Sinkiang. Russian troops remained in occupation of Kulja for ten years until 1881 when Chinese territory was evacuated under the terms of the Treaty of St. Petersburg. It appears that the original occupation of Kulja was ordered by Kauffmann without the knowledge of the Russian Government who were mystified and embarrassed by such dangerous tactics. Faithful, however, to a system from which they have scarcely, if ever, deviated the Russian Government proceeded to back up Kauffmann's action, however unexpected and distasteful it might have been to them. When after ten years the Russian force was eventually withdrawn it was by no means under compulsion from China, but simply because it was not then Russia's wish or intention to remain in Sinkiang. It is interesting to observe that Peter Fleming while describing, in "News from Tartary," the long-standing and sinister desire of Russia to establish herself in Sinkiang omits all mention of the occupation of Kulja and seems to wish his readers to believe that the first Russian soldiers in Sinkiang were the White Russian refugees fleeing from the Red Armies.

The story of Anglo-Russian relations with regard to Afghanistan is not one which reflects much credit either on Great Britain or on Russia. Russia on more than one occasion was guilty of bad faith. England very frequently showed weakness which, as the ex-Kaiser used to say, though not the same as treachery often produces the same results. Both nations displayed considerable ignorance of each other's nature and an almost chronic misunderstanding of each other's intentions.

The first apprehension and alarm caused by Russian advances in Central Asia between 1860 and 1870 were somewhat allayed by the Granville-Gorchakov agreement of 1873. By this instrument the Russian Chancellor formally declared that "the Emperor looked upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia might be called upon to exercise her influence." Such a declaration was of particular importance in view of the presence at

Samarkand of Abdur Rahman. Grave doubts had assailed the mind of the Government of India regarding the relations between the future Amir and General Kauffmann. These relations were, in actual fact, of the most correct description. Kauffmann having informed both Abdur Rahman and Shir Ali that Russia would not interfere in Afghan affairs. A copy of his letter to Shir Ali in this sense was in 1879 found by Lord Roberts in Kabul among other less reputable documents. The agreement like some others made with Russia did not have the desired result. The Russians considered that Britain's object had been to tie their hands in the Middle East in order to pursue her policy of supporting Turkey at the expense of Russia. The treacherous intrigue conducted by General Stolyetov's mission to Kabul can be compared with Fra Lippo Lippi's excursion on to the titles in Browning's famous poem. Morally it was indefensible but there may have been some extenuating circumstances.

Stephen Wheeler in his "Ameer Abdur Rahman" has referred to the fact that the Russian Government "argued that we (Great Britain) were bound by engagements entered into with them, if not with any Afghan ruler, to respect Afghan independence." This was denied by Lord Salisbury in December 1878, but in 1885 Lord Granville referred in a letter to agreements with the Amir "binding Her Majesty's Government to regard as a hostile act any aggression upon his territory." "The fact," writes Stephen Wheeler, "that no such agreement . . . was in existence, detracts somewhat from the importance of the Foreign Minister's observation." It also suggests the fallible and brittle nature of agreements entered into with a country like Russia over such questions as that of Afghanistan.

Up to 1895 the northern frontier of Afghanistan was the subject of almost perpetual disputes between the British and Russian Governments. In 1883 Abdur Rahman, then Amir of Afghanistan, had annexed the small principalities of Roshan and Shignan extending from the Pamirs across the Panja or Upper Oxus. His claim to this territory was supported by the Indian and at first by the British Government. A strenuous protest against this annexation was made by the Russian Government on the ground that it was contrary to the 1873 agreement. This was denied by Lord Granville and the matter remained unsettled until 1895 when the British Government formally admitted the justice of the Russian claim. "Why," writes Stephen Wheeler, "this admission was not made when the dispute first arose is best known to our diplomatists. Nothing was gained by the delay, which on the contrary, caused an

immense amount of needless friction and avoidable irritation." The existence of this unsettled dispute did not tend to sweeten the work of the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission. The blame for the Panjeh incident has never been finally apportioned, but it may well be that if a greater measure of mutual confidence and understanding had existed between British and Russian officers the incident might have been avoided. The Panjeh affair was, incidentally, another instance of drastic action taken by local commanders without the knowledge or approval of the Russian Government. "There is reason to believe," wrote Curzon, "that . . . it was an impromptu on the part of Komarov and Alikhanov that burst with as much novelty upon the Foreign Office of St. Petersburg as it did upon that of Whitehall."

During the XIXth century, the most important period of Russia's expansion, the country had been ruled by Tsars of outstanding personality. Inefficient and inadequate as absolute monarchy had clearly become for a country of Russia's extent, the determination and ability in their different spheres of Nicholas I and the three Alexanders had made for the continuity of foreign policy. The character and abilities of Nicholas II would be regarded as inadequate and unsatisfactory in a county churchwarden. Amiable and kind-hearted, he was highly susceptible to influences of the most pernicious kind and "the Court," writes Lobanov Rostovski, "became a happy hunting ground for all kinds of adventurers for occultists and cranks, including a Frenchman from Lyons, a Buriat quack doctor and the notorious Rasputin, to much more dangerous speculators and promoters." Such a state of affairs was fatal to a vast country like Russia where economic conditions were in a state of flux and where there was a steady undercurrent of revolutionary ideas. The Tsar listened more and more to the advice of worthless counsellors and at length appears to have come completely under the influence of one Bezobrazov, a captain of cavalry and of Admiral Abaza. These persons proceeded to exploit a timber concession granted by the King of Korea in 1896 and this resulted in Russian troops being sent into Korean territory. It was the last of a series of reckless and unwarrantable actions taken without the knowledge of the people and against the advice of responsible ministers, and it precipitated the Russo-Japanese War.

The war with Japan was a most disastrous undertaking of which the history is well known. The Russian people were unanimously opposed to the war. The administration of the army was riddled with corruption and the commanders selected were

extremely disappointing. The results were bound to be unfavourable and were made doubly so by selecting the most unsuitable moment to ask for an armistice, that is, when the army now under General Linevich was in better condition and when the Japanese were just beginning to show signs of war-weariness. It needed all the genius of de Witte to secure the comparatively favourable terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth.

The attitude of Great Britain towards Russia during the Russo-Japanese war was unsympathetic and not without reason. A spirited attempt to exploit this feeling was made by Kaiser Wilhelm II. Harold Nicolson recounts how the Tsar showed Lord Carnock a personal letter received from the Kaiser which contained the following passage:

"An excellent expedient for cooling British insolence would be to make some military demonstration on the Perso-Afghan frontier, where they think you powerless to appear with your troops during the war. Even should your forces not suffice for a real attack on India, they would do for Persia which has no army; and pressure on the Indian frontier from Persia will have a remarkably cooling effect upon the hot-headed Jingoes in London."

The advice was not taken by Russia.

The disastrous consequences of the Russo-Japanese war made the Russian Government lend an attentive ear to British proposals for an agreement which would lay the ghost of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East. To formulate such an agreement was the principal task of Sir Arthur Nicolson (afterwards Lord Carnock) on his appointment as British ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1906. Nicolson was admirably suited for such a duty. He was a man of great experience and, having been minister in Tehran, was well acquainted not only with the views of the Government of India on such questions as that of the Persian Gulf but also with the reports, both real and exaggerated, of Russia's designs in the Middle East. His character was at once firm and conciliatory; his mind shrewd and sympathetic. In his admirable book "Lord Carnock," Harold Nicolson gives us his father's impressions on taking up his appointment. "Personally," the ambassador recorded in his narrative, "I was most anxious to see removed all causes of difference between us and Russia. I considered that many of these differences were caused by simple misunderstanding of each other, and because each country attributed to the other plans and projects which in reality were not entertained." The convention after innumerable difficulties patiently and skilfully circumvented by Nicolson, was duly signed and

ratified. It dealt with Anglo-Russian relations with regard to Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet and was, as Harold Nicolson says, "a masterpiece of drafting."

The Anglo-Russian Convention was prepared with sympathy, knowledge and understanding. It was fiercely criticized by Lord Curzon as a surrender to Russia. Faithfully observed by Great Britain, it was recognized neither by Persia nor by Afghanistan and it was not observed by Russia. At the time the Foreign Office had expressed some doubts as to whether any useful purpose would be served by concluding an agreement of such far-reaching nature with a government that was neither friendly nor stable. Influences were at work not unlike those which assailed Fra Lippo Lippi as he "leaned out of window for fresh air." Russia's imperialist policy had almost become a perquisite of an ever-growing class of business adventurers and it needed something more than an agreement to stop their ambitious designs in Persia and the Middle East generally. They seem to have ignored Afghanistan as, at that time, not being worth the trouble.

From the Anglo-Russian Convention to the Revolution no striking changes in Russian Eastern policy can be observed. A confidential memorandum written to the Tsar in 1916 by General Kuropatkin and subsequently published by the Soviet Government is, however, worth requoting from Lobanov Rostovski. Kuropatkin, though an unsuccessful commander-in-chief, was an acknowledged authority on Eastern affairs:

"I take the liberty of expressing the opinion that the necessity of making secure the enormous state border of Turkestan after the end of the Great War . . . will demand a definite decision with regard to Persia which should be equal to the greatness of Russia. It appears to me that the return to Russia of the provinces of Astrabad, Gilian and Mazanderan, the heritage of Peter the Great, is imperative, as well as the establishment of a Russian protectorate, with British consent, over northern Persia with Tabriz, Teheran and Meshed.

With regard to Afghanistan, there appears to be no necessity for an alteration of the existing border, but an alliance with England enduring also in peace, ought to enable us to modify the attitude of Afghanistan and the Afghan Government, which has been hostile and undignified for Russia, and open the Afghan market for us. At present Afghans have free access across the Russian border, whereas Afghanistan is closed to Russians. Apart from this Russia ought to secure full control over the waters of the Amu Darya, the Murgab and the Tedjen within Afghanistan,

and finally with British consent, Russia ought to connect by railroad through Afghanistan with India.

As for China, the danger menacing Russia in the future from that empire of 400,000,000 people is not to be doubted. The most vulnerable point on the Russian border, as 800 years ago, will be the Great Gateway of the Nations, through which the Hordes of Chengiz Khan invaded Europe. So long as Kulja will remain in Chinese hands, the protection of Turkestan against China will be a matter of great difficulty and will require considerable military force. It is impossible to leave this gateway in the hands of the Chinese. The alteration of our frontier with China is absolutely imperative. By drawing the border line from the Khan Tengri range (27,000 feet high and the highest in the Tian Shan Mountains) in a direct line to Vladivostok, our frontier will be shortened by 4,000 versts and Kulja, northern Mongolia and northern Manchuria will be included in the Russian Empire."

During the early days of Soviet power attempts were made to achieve some part of the above quoted programme. In his previous article the present writer was at some pains to explain what he considered to be the history of Soviet oriental policy from the Revolution up to 1931 and how the Soviet Government failed in the first place to appreciate the situation with regard to Middle Eastern nationalism. It is unnecessary to recapitulate this but a word may be said here about two important matters which were omitted from the previous study, namely, Soviet policy in the Far East and the application in Turkestan of the principle of federation.

The Soviet Government did not fully establish its authority in Asia until 1922. Up to 1920 it was believed in Western Europe that a "front" could be created in Siberia to stem the tide of communism. Admiral Kolchak was at first aided by the presence in Siberia of the Czech and later of Japanese, American, British and Italian troops. In September 1919 there were 60.000 Japanese troops in Siberia. The position was enough to appal the stoutest-hearted revolutionary but determination aided a good deal by circumstances and dissension among its enemies enabled the Soviet Government gradually to fight its way to the Pacific and it was finally established in Vladivostok in November 1922.

While Soviet Russia was, as it were, on probation *vis-a-vis* the Middle and Far East, she was ready to make considerable concessions to Eastern nationalist feeling. In 1919 she had declared the complete abandonment of her rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway—a somewhat meaningless act as the railway was actually under

the control of an Allied Commission. As the position of the Soviet Government became more assured, they again wished to control this railway, but relations with China had become strained owing to the practical establishment of Soviet rule in Outer Mongolia. From 1924 onwards strenuous negotiations resulted in agreements with the Peking Government and with Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord, who was virtually independent of Peking. At the same time the Soviets conceived the plan of associating themselves with the Chinese revolutionaries as represented by Sun Yat Sen and the Kuomintang whose stronghold was in southern China round the city of Canton. Soviet military and financial aid gradually gave rise to a war between north and south in which the Soviet-trained armies at first gave a good account of themselves. Soviet progress had, however, been too swift in China. They had, as elsewhere, underestimated the inherent resilience of the middle-class intelligentsia who, while ready to accept Soviet material aid, greatly feared the anarchy which might ensue from too deep a draught of the heady wine of revolution. These sentiments were reflected in the opposition led by Chiang Kai-shek against the left wing of the Kuomintang and, in the revulsion of feeling which followed, a wave of anti-Sovietism spread over both north and south and Soviet citizens were everywhere expelled or ill-treated.

These events coincided with a lessening of Soviet influence elsewhere in Asia, but the high-handed action of Chang Tso-lin and his son in Manchuria caused the Soviet to send troops into Manchuria in 1929. These troops easily defeated the Chinese and Soviet prestige rose accordingly. Profiting by Soviet example Japan later proceeded to overrun Manchuria with results which are well known. The Soviet reaction to this and to recent events in China testifies to the truth of Lobanov Rostovski's statement that "the longer Soviet Russia is able to keep out of actual hostilities, the stronger her position will be because of . . . the inevitable exhaustion of the contending parties."

Before the Revolution, government in Russia was centralized to an impossible extent. The dangerous results contingent on the granting of wide powers to men like Muraviev and Kauffmann have already been noticed in this article. The possibilities and indeed the necessity of some form of federation were more than once considered by pre-Revolution statesmen, but it needed the powerful stimulus of revolutionary ideas to bring such a plan to fruition. In the Declaration of November 1917 the equality of all nationalities within the Union was announced and this with occasional lapses is the basic principle on which the U. S. S. R. has

been built up. Of the 174 different races who are citizens of the U. S. S. R. the peoples of Turkestan form important and distinct elements and a genuine attempt to sort them out seems to have been made. Turkomans, Uzbegs, Tajiks and Kirghiz are represented by four republics to which those races have given their names and when their former backwardness is considered, it must be admitted that astonishing progress has been made in inculcating a spirit of nationality. It should be noted, however, that in each republic the controlling officials are all members of the Communist Party and in the great majority of cases are Russians or at any rate Slavs. Yet the encouragement given to local peoples to take an active part in government, the campaign against illiteracy, the exploitation of agricultural and mineral resources, the improvement of communications and hygiene must be regarded as a real effort and not merely dismissed as a Soviet scheme for sucking the life-blood of subject peoples. These reflections will be highly objectionable to those who believe the Communist Party to be solely a power for evil, but it should be recognized that were at any time the control of the Communist Party to be relaxed the application of some other principle might become necessary to avoid anarchy or absorption by neighbouring States of the new national republics.

An attempt to summarize Russia's activities in Asia would hardly be complete without some remarks, conjectural though they may be, on the potentialities of Russia's future position in Asia. The first two quotations at the head of this article give some idea of the wide divergence of views on the subject of Russian foreign policy as a whole. Since the Revolution two other important schools of thought have come into being; these may be described as the "Brave New World" and "Foul Baboonery of Bolshevism" schools. Then there is the dismissive generalization that all Russians are orientals which recalls the story of the old gentleman who, when asked his view as to the most southerly limit of the negroid races, replied, "I suppose you mean niggers, Sir. Well, I don't know where they end but I know they start at Calais." It is useless to attempt to understand Russia without realizing that her position in the world is unique. No other nation has straddled east and west in the same way. No other nation answers so fully to the description of Eurasian. Historians of the future will no doubt regard with surprise our sharp distinction between east and west, but for us the difference looms very large and in Russia where the two are fused as a result of the inevitable easterly expansion which has been outlined above, we try vainly because too

literally, to orientate ourselves. Experts on Europe and Asia exist everywhere in profusion, but the cult of Eurasia is a new one to the understanding of which the social and political isolation of the Soviet Union has not contributed. Soviet efforts to publicize the Union have had on the whole little appeal either to Western Europe or the East. Their accounts of their progress, which is actually impressive, are usually written in a style at once so turgid and so euphuistic as to be almost unreadable.

However distasteful, however dull the methods and mentality of Soviet Russia may be to Western Europe or the older East, there is no doubt that the force of socialism, communism, Marxism or whatever the real essence of the Soviet regime may be, does constitute a revivifying influence which may be the beginning of a general fusion between East and West. Great, almost unbelievable progress has been made in Turkestan and the Far East and observation of that progress and the study of Soviet methods should be of the utmost importance to Great Britain who is also working for the advancement of Eastern peoples, though admittedly from a different angle. Anglo-Russian disagreement in the East has for many years lain dormant but over the Hindu Kush there still hangs an atmosphere of suspicion which can only be dispelled by better understanding and closer intercourse. This is beginning in the West where monstrous allegations and fantastic fears are less common than before, but the recent trials in Russia where mention was made of a British intrigue to create a buffer state out of Uzbegistan show that in the East the same mistrust exists as in the darkest days of Anglo-Russian rivalry. There is, however, this important difference: formerly it was England who suspected the intentions of Russia, now it is Russia who is nervous or alleges that she is nervous for the security of her frontiers against British intrigue. Such a state of affairs is deplorable and is likely to grow worse rather than better unless a determined effort is made to improve relations and mutual understanding. It has been the object of the present article to show that in the past misunderstanding and ignorance have often been the principal causes of friction. There is a grave danger that those causes still remain.

(In compiling material for this article the writer, while freely consulting all the better known histories, has made considerable use of Prince A. Lobanov Rostovski's "Russia in Asia," George Vernadski's "History of Russia" and Stephen Wheeler's "The Ameer.")

THE MORTAR ON THE FRONTIER

By "Auspex"

This article is written in order to plead the urgent necessity for a mortar or similar weapon to accompany infantry in frontier fighting. The mortar is already accepted as a vital weapon for civilised warfare. In that field no better example of its right and effective use can be cited than the fighting by the New Zealanders about Beaumont Hamel in March 1918, which was admirably described by Captain G. H. Clifton, M.C., of the New Zealand Staff Corps, in the Royal United Service Institution Journal of November 1935. Mortars have, indeed, been used in frontier warfare. They were used in 1918-19 on the North-East Frontier but, although I was there myself, I have no record at hand of their effectiveness. To judge, however, by a close acquaintance with the mortar in somewhat similar country round the Caspian, I find it difficult to imagine a weapon better suited to dig a savage enemy out of his rocks and stockades or for general offensive use in that thick country in which the attacker's bullet is so seldom vouchsafed a target on which to play. Most of us still believe in the power of infantry, given favourable ground, to decide an issue offensively in circumstances where tanks cannot do so, provided always that a suitable form of support is at hand. On the North-West Frontier of India it is usual for us to act offensively and we have to rely for the purpose mainly on infantry. It is appropriate therefore to consider first whether the supporting weapons at present available to the infantry are wasteful or inadequate in the hills.

Everyone will admit that artillery is a most valuable auxiliary in frontier fighting. We never like being without its support if there is any likelihood of a stiff fight in front of us. The Mohmand operations of 1935 and the recent Waziristan campaign were, naturally, to a great extent fought on artillery. But artillery fire, however carefully it is arranged, does fail one. The Guides at Point 4080 in the Mohmand operations were left without support because the forward observation officer was badly hit and his signaller rolled, wounded, down a precipice with the telephone. Some of us have experienced the feelings of a battalion commander who has had to send a company forward to take a hill without artillery

Note.—There are several types of 2-inch mortars which would be invaluable to the infantry. These throw an H.E. or smoke bomb of about two pounds up to a range of 500 yards. The weights of the mortars vary from 12½ to 22 lbs according to the design and can be carried by one man.—Editor.

support because, by zero hour, the battery had been unable to get its forward observation post installed. Often the ground has been such that not one of the flat-trajectory supporting weapons could help the company in any way, but nevertheless the company has had to go on in order to protect the flank of a neighbouring unit. Further, it often happens that artillery cannot open fire because they are unable to see the forward troops or because the target is too close to those forward troops for safety. And if good infantry are doing their work, as they should in reasonably favourable country, neither the artillery nor the enemy should be able to see much of the forward elements. These disabilities we suffer from even with the very highly trained and experienced gunners of to-day. What of the gunners of a Great War period?

It frequently happens that artillery expend as much as four hundred shells in a single frontier action lasting only a few hours. The cost in money is enormous; the weight to be carried in shell alone is about four tons, more if 6″ howitzers are used, and four tons represent the equivalent of fifty infantry mule loads. And most of this shell is expended in searching for a fluid enemy who is occupying no definite position. Forward observation officers are bold men, but it is wasteful to try to keep them up with the leading platoons where they can see their enemy but where their chances of surviving are not too good. Their communications may be long and precarious and, should the most vital of all—the telephone wire—be interrupted, tedious work and much delay are needed to effect a repair. The infantry have good cause to be grateful for the skill and devotion of the artillery, but it would be irrational not to realise the latter's difficulties.

Here, then, briefly are the disabilities under which artillery labours in mountain warfare. The weight of its shell is high in proportion to the killing or neutralising it does; its eyes are often too far back to render the infantryman the service he needs, when he needs it; its communications are precarious and may fail, and have failed, at the crucial moment; the number of equipment and transport animals it employs is very high in proportion to its effectiveness, and this factor limits the number of guns that can be taken on column; fear of damaging their own infantry often keeps guns silent when they should be active; and finally one more limitation may be added, that of the immobility, when compared with the foot soldier, from which every mule-borne or wheel-borne weapon must suffer in frontier country.

And now for the medium, mule-borne, machine-gun. It can be quickly dismissed as a direct supporting weapon in the attack. It has already been segregated from rifle battalions in the army at home, and it is not a weapon that the infantry can always, or even nearly always, use in the attack on the Frontier since it suffers from certain limitations.

Immobility.—Frequently it cannot accompany infantry by night owing to the noise involved and the difficulty of getting it over rocks and nullahs and up slopes in the dark. Even by day the movement of mule-borne machine-guns across country is slow and requires reconnaissances; by themselves the guns are too heavy for man-handling up steep slopes.

Vulnerability.—Machine-guns mean a great string of mules. Their flat trajectory necessitates a commanding position, which is often difficult to reach and which usually exposes the guns to fire and gives away the movement of other troops.

Flat trajectory.—The flat trajectory of the machine-gun makes close overhead covering fire difficult at all times and makes it impossible to get at an enemy behind cover or just over the crest of a hill. The question of crest clearance is always present, and of all parts of the world where this problem occurs the Frontier is about the most difficult. That is precisely why the howitzer ousts the gun in hill warfare.

Ranging.—It is seldom easy to spot the strike of machine-gun bullets at anything over six hundred yards. This is one reason why there is often an undue expenditure of ammunition; another is that the machine-gun tends to be used as a searching weapon, presumably because it cannot keep up with the leading troops who alone can see the enemy. One might add that a very small inaccuracy on the part of the range-finder throws rounds clean off the target.

The result is that infantry who have been taught to rely on this unreliable weapon to get them on have been fast losing their ability to use their own weapons and can hardly get on at all unless artillery come to their aid. The British Army bases its infantry fire power on the light machine-gun, not on the medium gun; yet we have not the need for the medium gun that armies in Europe have, where they are more likely to have to sustain a long defensive.

To turn to the rifle grenade. As a supporting weapon, to give infantry the opportunity to advance from even three hundred yards against their enemy, it is useless. The effective range of the rifle grenade is two hundred yards. Infantry know that against the fire of an alert and active enemy they cannot, with the aid of their small arms only, hope to close to two hundred yards except at immense cost. Thus they seldom hope to be able to bring the rifle grenade into effective use in the attack. The grenade is nothing more than a very poor compromise between the accurate and specialised weapon represented by the mortar and nothing at all. Besides its lack of range, the rifle grenade suffers in other respects, from its inaccuracy and from the fact that it is regarded as, and is in truth, a weapon which infantry can only occasionally use. Thus it is kept back with the reserve small arms ammunition and, if not issued along with discharger cups before the action, is not there when it may be needed. This fact alone shows that there is not much confidence in its value. The grenade is not an essential weapon. In mobile or semi-mobile warfare it will not reach the forward troops at all unless it is distributed before the action, and then it may have to be carried round for days by a much encumbered rifleman without being used. Not only is it essentially not an all-purposes weapon, but it destroys the rifle from which it is fired and so disarms another man. On the hillside it has an unpleasant habit of rolling and bouncing before it bursts.

Lastly the light machine-gun. This is an excellent weapon on which infantry fire power must be based: but, in itself, it is merely a mobile attacking weapon with a flat trajectory and often has to be helped forward by the high-angle fire of other weapons.

From this brief examination it is obvious that Indian infantry do not possess the supporting weapon they require for attack in the frontier hills. The weapon that they need so much is one that will fulfil the following requirements:

(*a*) It must be a weapon that is always needed, not one that is parcelled out on occasion only. No one, after all, has the time to think whether the occasion is there or not, least of all a busy battalion or company commander.

(*b*) It must have a high trajectory in order to dig the enemy out from where the bullet cannot get him and to clear with safety the heads of attacking infantry.

(*c*) It must be reasonably invulnerable. That is to say it must be capable of being tucked away from view and yet brought close enough to the enemy to allow its commander to see his target and the infantry he is supporting.

(*d*) It must be light and mobile so as to be there where and when it is wanted.

(*e*) It must have an effective range of over five hundred yards in order that it can reach the enemy without itself being destroyed; and it must be accurate.

(*f*) It must produce a burst on which it is easy to range and it must burst on percussion so as to avoid rolling down on to attacking troops.

(*g*) It should be capable of producing smoke so as to allow the leading infantry to get forward after it has had to cease fire for safety reasons.

At present a light mortar of some sort is the only weapon that answers these requirements. Its introduction into the Indian Army would cause a great change for the better in infantry tactics and would make that arm far more independent of the artillery and therefore more enterprising and effective in the attack. Indian infantry tactics have not changed appreciably since the last war, but they should change considerably if infantry is to be expected to act with full effect in the frontier fighting of to-day and in the great war of to-morrow. The stagnation has been due primarily to the lack of a proper weapon of accompaniment for the infantry. The light mortar should furnish that requirement.

It may well be argued that to introduce the light mortar will only mean a further complication of weapons and that there will not be the transport available in battalions to carry mortars and their ammunition. This matter of further complication of weapons need not worry us if we remember that the medium machine-gun will have been removed from rifle battalions and that the light mortar will also do away with the need for rifle grenades. The medium machine-gun complicates training and has a harmful effect on it. A non-commissioned officer or man who has spent his time in the support company has to be tactically retrained on his return to a rifle company, for the support company battle is more of a battle drill than a battle of tactical manœuvre. To make a good machine-gunner is a prolonged process; the heftiest

and most intelligent Indian soldiers are employed in the support company and, if we are acting rightly, they will usually be fully trained riflemen with a reasonable educational qualification before they go to that company. In other words, those who go to the support company will be men of four to five years service; the best men in the battalion, yet those most seldom used in action.

The light mortar is a simple weapon the details of which can be quickly taught. With proper carrying equipment it should not require the strongest men in a battalion to shift it about. Its introduction would lead to less complication in weapons and training than is the case to-day with the support company, and we should very soon be able to set free a considerable amount of mule transport. The departure of the medium machine-gun into units of its own would diminish the total number of those weapons in the army. A further saving of mules could be got by putting the light machine-gun, its ammunition and equipment, on to the personnel of the section. The six riflemen of the section can, with proper carrying equipment, carry them over long distances and for long periods, if they are relieved of their packs and some of the articles therein. The packs of the four light machine-gun sections with two light fixed-line tripod mountings a company can be carried on one company mule, thus freeing three mules for other purposes. With the elimination of medium machine-gun mules and this saving on the present light machine-gun mules, a large number of animals would be set free for the reserve ammunition of the mortar and for additional light machine-guns which many of us would like to see in rifle battalions. That is, if all these animals are necessary and if trucks are found not to do the work equally well. War establishments at present provide for thirty-seven men in the four sections of a platoon. Working on three sections to the platoon, as at home, a reasonable margin would be left from which to find light mortar men.

Whether the mortar should be a platoon or a company weapon can be settled in a very short time by sending it to a battalion on the Frontier to be tried out. It seems as though one should favour a platoon mortar, for it will be on the spot with the leading troops at all times. The Italians have, I believe, a little weapon of this sort; we may need a slightly bigger or smaller one, so let us try out any type that is not more than a reasonable load for two men. Again one feels that we should favour a one-man

load, as being more mobile and less conspicuous, but one must see the weapons on the ground with their ammunition in order to decide. They are cheap, far cheaper than our mountain artillery and should often save that arm being needlessly used in battle. They will of course never supplant artillery whatever the form that arm may take in the future: each has its role.

A last word. It is on the outbreak of a minor war obviously far easier to scale down one's organisation and training to something more primitive than it is, on the outbreak of a great and vital struggle, to scale up from a primitive to a high organisation and a high standard of training. If the Great War impressed no other lesson on us, it certainly impressed this.

South of the Caspian is a wooded country of high hills. In 1920-21 we used the old Newton mortars in those parts and used them effectively even under most difficult circumstances. Of several occasions perhaps this one is the most telling example. A company went out at night to reconnoitre and report on a bridge and the strength of its garrison if it were held. It took with it two mortars to support it in case of trouble, but its orders were that it should not get heavily involved. As the party neared the bridge, the mortars got into position in the dark behind a steep bank ready to open on the buildings on the far side of the stream. Half the company had crept across the bridge when the enemy opened a murderous fire on them from three sides. Within a few seconds the mortars shells were crumping among the buildings. The forward platoons rallied and drew out with only a few casualties. Without these mortars those men could never have pulled out of the hornet's nest into which they had thrust. Infantry reinforcement across the bridge was impossible and the stream was broad, muddy and unfordable.

We all see battle with a different picture in our minds according to the situation from which we have beheld it. The picture that the infantry officer has is one of dogged fighting with every weapon he has at hand and of heavy and often needless casualties to his men suffered for lack of the one weapon that can give an enemy the sudden jolt that will enable his men to reassert their superiority.

INDIAN STATES FORCES

By Major-General Sir Arthur M. Mills, K.C.B., D.S.O.

Somebody once made the statement that "one half of the world has no idea how the other half lives." Whether this is an accurate generalisation I do not know, but it is probably true to say that eighty per cent of the Army in India have no knowledge of what Indian States Forces are, or of the part they fill in the scheme of things. It is in the hope of supplying this deficiency that I have written this article.

From time immemorial all the bigger Indian States have had armies, often commanded by French and British freelances of adventurous disposition, whilst the smaller ones have been content with feudal retainers for the personal protection of the ruler. Gradually, as the *Pax Britannica* spread throughout India, and the sovereignty of the various states was guaranteed by treaties or engagements with the British Government, the necessity for these armies disappeared. But for their own purposes, personal, processional, ceremonial, and to a certain extent imperial, many rulers retained some of their forces and modelled them more or less on the Army in India. It has been remarkable how in every emergency the ruling princes of India have been the first to place the services of their troops, the resources of their states and in some cases their own services at the disposal of the British Empire. How frequently these offers were accepted may be gauged from the fact that even prior to the Great War the campaigns in which units from Indian States took part comprised the Laswari Campaign of 1803, the first and second Afghan Wars of 1837 and 1879, the first and second Sikh Wars 1845-46 and 1848-49, the Indian Mutiny, the Hunza Nagar Campaign 1891, Chitral 1895, the North-West Frontier of India and Tirah 1897, the China War 1900-01, and Somaliland 1903.

The help afforded us in the Mutiny by the States of Bahawalpur, Bikaner, Jind, Kapurthala, Nabha and Patiala may well have saved the situation. It was not until 1887 that the idea was first mooted that units likely to be offered by states for imperial service should be trained under the supervision of British officers. In 1889 an Inspector-General of "Imperial Service Troops" was appointed, with a staff of British officers to assist him. In 1895 the Government of India sanctioned a free initial issue of arms to

Imperial Service units, but these arms were to be maintained and replaced at the expense of the Indian States concerned.

Between 1888 and 1907 the number of troops offered as Imperial Service Troops by various states reached an approximate total of four companies of Sappers and Miners, two mountain batteries with a depot, fourteen regiments of cavalry with three independent squadrons, three camel corps regiments, thirteen infantry battalions with a depot, and seven transport corps. The greater proportion of these were used overseas for service in the Great War, 1914—18, and some of them were employed on the Indian frontier. As this is not intended to be a history of the Imperial Service Troops, I will only say that in the main, and considering all handicaps and lack of adequate pre-war training, they did well. There were some units who were consistently good throughout the war, and who gained a reputation which any unit might have envied.

In 1920 a committee was formed to enquire into the future of the Imperial Service Troops. Without going into any detail it is sufficient to say that the great change, as always in our army, was to be in name. These troops were no longer to be known as Imperial Service Troops, but as Indian States Forces, which perhaps describes their position more accurately. They were to be divided into two classes, "A" and "B," dependent partly on their organisation and partly on whether they were to be offered for service outside the state (Class "A"), or retained entirely as internal security troops (Class "B").

Class "A" units were organised similarly to the Indian Army, armed with high velocity rifles and, in most cases, with machine-guns. A number of these units are earmarked (called Earmarked Units or "Emus" for short) for active service with His Majesty's forces on mobilization, and there is no doubt that a large number of non-earmarked Class "A" units would also be offered on the outbreak of war for active service as was done in the Great War. Class "B," intended only for internal security within the state, were to be armed with .303" * E.Y. (O.) rifles, but no machine-guns. The initial issue of arms to both classes of units was to be free, but the maintenance and replacement of them was to become the responsibility of the Indian State. As a rifle is not immortal it was obviously only a question of years before the States would have

* Note.—Nobody seems to know the meaning of these mystic initials, but I believe they are an abbreviation for Emergency Rifles: these are accurate up to 500 yards and cost Rs. 37-8-0 each. They are not to be confused with the E. Y. rifles used for firing rifle grenades.

paid for all their rifles by way of replacements. The scheme was based on a policy of "Let 'em all come; the more the merrier." No minimum numbers were laid down, and no stipulations were made as to conditions of service, barracks and efficiency. The consequences of the policy were not foreseen. The rush to take advantage of the offer of free rifles was great. Small states who had never before thought of having a regular army hastened to raise one or two platoons in order to get the rifles. The liability undertaken by the Government of India for arming all and sundry was unlimited. The pace became too hot, and at last in 1932, owing to the financial depression, the Government of India called a halt, and stopped the free initial issue of arms. Since then new entrants to the scheme have had to pay for their rifles. At the present moment there are forty-nine states in the Indian States Forces scheme and their armies vary in strength from the equivalent of a division, such as in Hyderabad, Gwalior and Kashmir down to two platoons, and even one platoon which by no stretch of ingenuity can be made to fit into any scheme of defence although they are useful for internal security within the state. In the majority of cases the troops are well housed, well clothed and equipped, but the variations are great. Most states are now coming into line on such matters as pensions at twenty years service, clothing allowances, ration allowance and central messing; and in some the barracks are better than those provided for the Indian Army.

The horse artillery batteries are armed with 18-pr. guns, the mountain batteries with 2.75″ guns. In Bikaner there is an unique force consisting of a 2.75″ battery and two squadrons with a machine-gun section, all mounted on camels, which would be exceedingly useful in desert warfare. All Class "A" infantry battalions are on the pre-1929 model of the Indian Army, with four rifle companies and one machine-gun group.

The total number of troops under the Indian States Forces scheme is about 52,000. They comprise eleven regiments, sixteen squadrons and eighteen and a half troops of cavalry; two horse, three mountain and one camel, batteries of artillery; one company and eight sections of sappers and miners; twenty-nine battalions, seventy companies and fourteen and a half platoons of infantry; and twenty-two troops of transport. Of the above sixteen and a half units are earmarked for employment with His Majesty's Forces on mobilization. These units will be accompanied in war by the appropriate number of special service officers* from the Indian

* Five special service officers to a battalion, four to a cavalry regiment, three to a battery, two to a field company and one to a transport unit.

Army to advise and help. As the education and training of the State officers increase, the need for these special service officers will automatically decrease. In peace, training is carried out under the supervision of a Military Adviser-in-Chief and a staff of sixteeen British officers as assistants, all of whom are lent to the Political Department for a term of four years. In addition there are officers, whose services are lent to a particular state for a term of years, and retired officers who have taken service with a state on leaving the regular army.

The Military Adviser-in-Chief is in civil employment and works directly under the Political Secretary to the Government of India, not, as many people think, under the Defence Department. All questions of policy are submitted to the Political Department, important decisions in connection with the Indian States Forces being communicated to governments and *durbars* by the Political Department through political channels. Correspondence on other matters, including training, organisation, and administration of the Indian States Forces is carried out direct between the headquarters of the Military Adviser-in-Chief and the nine Military Advisers' Circles. Military Advisers themselves correspond direct with commandants of States Forces, or with state governments and *durbars*.

The Military Adviser-in-Chief, to whom only the more important matters are referred, is left free to do his proper work of supervision of training. This entails some eight months touring all over India, as the parish extends from Kashmir in the north to Travancore in the south and from Kathiawar in the west to Tripura on the Assam border in the east. It is only possible for the Adviser-in-Chief to see the larger states some three times, and the smaller ones twice during a four years tenure.

India is divided into nine circles (see sketch map), and the number of officers allotted to each is dependent on the number of states and the size of their armies:

(1) The largest circle is the Punjab, which comprises seven states—Chamba, Jind, Kapurthala, Kashmir, Nabha, Patiala and Rampur. These have between them a total of thirty-three units. There is one military adviser in charge, with two assistant military advisers, one for cavalry and the other for infantry. The headquarters is at Ambala.

(2) The Central India Circle is the largest in actual area of ground to be covered and has nine states—Benares, Bhopal, Datia, Dhar, Gwalior, Indore, Panna, Rewa and Tripura with a total of twenty-five units. For this circle there is one military adviser, and

one assistant; one or other of whom must be a cavalryman. The headquarters is nominally at Agra (for income-tax purposes), but actually at Gwalior.

(3) The Rajputana Circle has eight states in it—Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kotah, Mewar and Palanpur with a total of twenty-three units. This also has only two officers: the military adviser with headquarters at Bharatpur, and the assistant military adviser (cavalry) at Jaipur.

(4) The Southern India Circle has four states—Hyderabad, Mudhol, Mysore and Travancore—with a total of nineteen units. The military adviser has his headquarters at Hyderabad, and his assistant is at Bangalore.

(5) The Kathiawar Circle has six states—Bhavnagar, Dhrangadra, Junagadh, Kutch, Nawanagar and Porbandar with a total of twelve units. For these there is one military adviser, generally a cavalryman, with his headquarters at Rajkot.

(6) The Gujarat Circle consists of six states—Alirajpur, Baria, Baroda, Idar, Rajpipla and Ratlam with a total of nine units. For these there is an assistant military adviser with his headquarters at Baroda.

(7) The Camel Corps Circle, which consists of three states—Bahawalpur, Bikaner and Loharu, has a total of nine units. This too is an assistant military adviser's appointment with headquarters at Bikaner.

(8) The Sapper Circle deals with Faridkot, Malerkotla, Mandi, Sirmoor, Suket and Tehri-Garhwal. This has sixteen units in it. Suket has only a small infantry detachment, but owing to its proximity to Mandi it is included in this circle for the sake of convenience. There is an assistant military adviser, a Royal Engineer officer, in charge, with headquarters at Roorkee.

(9) Then there is the Artillery Circle which deals with the batteries in Bikaner, Gwalior, Hyderabad and Kashmir; a total of six batteries. This is a military adviser's appointment and his headquarters is at Ambala. And last but not least comes the Technical Adviser for Signalling, an assistant military adviser who does nearly as much touring each year as the Adviser-in-Chief. And the signalling in the Indian States Forces is generally of a high standard.

The assistant military advisers in sole charge of the Gujarat Camel Corps and Sapper Circles are given the honorary title of military adviser.

As regards pay, military advisers, who are majors, draw Rs. 300 a month over and above regimental rates and assistant military advisers, who are captains, get either Rs. 200 or Rs. 150 a month in addition to regimental rates, depending on whether they have under or over fifteen years' service. The military adviser for Sappers and Miners and the Technical Adviser for Signalling, both of whom are captains, draw Rs. 1,355 a month if married, and Rs. 1,210 a month if they are bachelors.

Officers on the Military Advisory Staff must be good regimental officers, good trainers, keen on their job, likeable, with a genuine sympathy for Indians, and with a sense of humour and proportion; men who can be trusted to do a job of work on their own and to run a real live show. Unless an officer can gain the confidence and liking not only of the troops, but of the ruler, he will do little good. Gone long since are the days when a tour with the Indian States Forces was looked on as four years leave on full pay. Military advisers have a full day's work and more if they are going to pull their weight. But nobody on the Advisory Staff has any executive authority, hence the necessity for a strong sense of humour and proportion.

The work consists in arranging for camps of exercise, in periodical visits to states to judge and supervise the state of training or to hold classes for squadron and company commanders or non-commissioned officers. On these occasions officers are guests of the state, and it is a point of honour that this hospitality is never abused. In addition they have a considerable amount of office work in connection with the training and administration of the States Forces.

Officers can go on recess for two months in the hot weather to any place within forty-eight hours recall of their headquarters. This is not counted as privilege leave, which can thus be accumulated. But no long leave is allowed during the tenure of the appointment.

Some of the larger states have "Lent officers," that is, serving officers of the Indian Army, who have a whole-time appointment with the state concerned. At the present time there are only four such officers. They are valuable, but their cost is heavy as not only has the state to pay the officer his pay of rank plus 25 per cent. extra, but it also has to pay contributions to the Government of India on account of pension and passages. The cost to the state for a "lent" major works out to over Rs. 2,000 p. m.

Finally comes the retired officer whose services are obtained by a state to train and administer its troops. Prior sanction for

employment has to be obtained from Government. The sanction, when given, is in most cases only for a year at a time, but so long as the officer is doing good work and his services are required an extension of tenure is rarely withheld. Here too the old idea that the states were a dumping-ground for impecunious and inefficient relatives is dead. The pay given by the states varies from very good to adequate: it is free of Indian income-tax and is in addition to an officer's retired pay. The greatest care is taken to fit a square peg into a square hole. A retired officer must be keen on his job, and be not only a satisfactory administrator but a good trainer. At one time some of these officers had an idea that all that was required of them was two to three hours work a day on an office stool, and that all the training of the troops should be done by the Advisory Staff. This is not the case. A retired officer must be able to work in with the latter, who after all are the staff officers of the Military Adviser-in-Chief, and merely trying to carry out his policy. It is impossible for a retired officer to adopt a "hands-off" attitude as has been attempted on occasions in the past. An officer who is not prepared to go all out had far better keep away and look for a job elsewhere. At the moment there are a number of retired senior officers of the Indian Army serving with States and doing excellent work in the improvement of their troops. They materially lighten the burden of the Advisory Staff in this respect.

The training of the troops for work in the field is improving year by year, and the old idea that a straight line at a march past is the hall-mark of good troops is a thing of the past. Units of the Indian Army help by taking State officers and non-commissioned officers for attachment for periods up to six months. These attachments are much appreciated and are arranged by advisers direct with headquarters of districts. Vacancies are allotted at the various Army Schools—the Small Arms School, Machine-gun School, Physical Training School, Signal School, Educational School, Veterinary School, Artillery School, and the Equitation School; and it is hoped that in the near future four vacancies a term will be granted at the Kitchener College, Nowgong, for State candidates, to prepare them for entrance to the Indian Military Academy. If this can be arranged it will help to solve the problem of selection. It is most desirable that the full number of vacancies at the Indian Military Academy—ten per term—should be taken up, but the fees for the full course are heavy, and in the smaller states there is little scope and prospect for a highly trained officer.

Military advisers run courses for various military subjects, and

co-operation between states is improving. In Gwalior for instance there is a very good musketry course based on the Pachmarhi model, which representatives from all the states in the Central India Circle attend. In Kashmir there has been an excellent training school for the last fifteen years which trains unit instructors and holds three months courses in physical training, weapon training, Lewis gun, machine-gun and section training, and a five months educational course. The standard of physical training at this school is so high that students from it are accepted by the Indian Army Physical Training School without first attending a preparatory course at district headquarters. Hyderabad have now adopted the same system, and are making a success of it.

Every year a Senior Officers' School is held on the same lines as the Senior Officers' School at Belgaum. All the instruction is in English, and lectures are given by experts in their own subjects. The officers attending it are not always very senior, and they go to it more than once. But it gives them the opportunity of meeting officers from other states and of broadening their outlook. And if it does nothing else it does increase the military knowledge of the Military Adviser who runs it.

Every year, more and more States Forces troops are attached to regular formations for training. During 1937-38, the Jodhpur Sardar Risala was attached to the Meerut Cavalry Brigade (at a cost to the state of some Rs. 30,000), the Patiala Rajindra Lancers to the Meerut Division, the Bhopal Sultania Infantry to the Mhow Brigade, and the Hyderabad cavalry regiments to the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade. The Gujarat Circle held a small camp at Sant Road in connection with the battalion training of the 5/7th Rajput Regiment. While co-operation of this kind is invaluable to Indian States Forces, regular formations often find an Indian States Forces unit a useful addition to their strength during collective training and manœuvres.

The troops of Jaipur and Alwar held a week's manœuvres on the Jaipur boundary with great advantage to both. These manœuvres were run entirely with local resources. And so was the camp at Rajkot for the troops of the Kathiawar Circle.

All the batteries have their annual practice camps, and have reached a very reasonable standard of efficiency. It is a pity however, that the four mountain batteries cannot be armed with the 3.7″ howitzers in place of the 2.75″ gun. It is a question of expense but, if they were rearmed, they would form an even more valuable addition to the artillery strength of the army than they do at present.


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Tehri Garhwal
Malerkotla
Nabha
Patiala
Bahawalpur
Jind
VII
Loharu
DELHI
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Rampur
Bharatpur
Alwar
Dholpur
Jaipur
Jodhpur
III
Gwalior
Kotah
Datia
Karachi
Palanpur
Mewar
Benares
Panna
Rewa
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Ratlam
Bhopal
Tripura
Dhrangadhra
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Indore
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Nawanagar
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Bhavnagar
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Hyderabad
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Mysore
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KEY.
I. Punjab Circle.
II. Central India Circle.
III. Rajputana Circle.
IV. Southern India Circle.
V. Kathiawar Circle.
VI. Gujarat Circle.
VII. Camel Corps Circle.
Not shown on map :—
VIII. Sappers and Miners Circle (Faridkot, Malerkotla, Mandi, Sirmoor, Suket, Tehri-Garhwal).
IX. Artillery Circle (Batteries of Bikaner, Gwalior, Hyderabad, Kashmir
S.D.O. 9089

The troops are invariably keen and eager to learn. In the majority of cases the material is excellent. The weakness at present lies in the State officers, but they are improving. To-day there is much less nepotism than there was and there is a higher conception of the duties, responsibilities and privileges of an officer. The younger ones are generally well educated, and quite a number now go up for the regular army promotion examinations.

In some States there is a good opening for English-speaking pensioned Indian officers of the Indian Army to act as company commanders until such time as the young entry have more experience. They can be of great use in tactical training provided they are efficient and keen. There are at present several of them doing very good work.

The present situation may be described by the analogy that the tools are good but the carpenters are weak. We want to improve the carpenters.

I think it is probably true to say that the present state of discipline and training in the majority of States Forces units is considerably better than it was at the beginning of the Great War. And it would not take many months of intensive training, helped by suitable special service officers, to fit these troops to take their place alongside units of the Indian Army.

For the right type of officer, service on the Military Advisory Staff is extraordinarily interesting, with plenty of work, plenty of responsibility and plenty of sport; in fact, all the things which make life amusing and worth while. He will receive great hospitality, and he will make friendships which will last him his life time. It is remarkable how not only the troops, who are only too anxious to learn, but also their rulers, respond to keenness and enthusiasm.

Once more I want to emphasize that nothing but the best is of any use to the Indian States Forces, if they are to be trained up to the ideal; that is to the standard of the Indian Army.

THE ORDNANCE SERVICE IN WAZIRISTAN, 1937

By Major M. Glover

For previous campaigns on the North-West Frontier no statistics of the expenditure of equipment, clothing, and ammunition have been published. As a number of officers have only a small conception of the amount of ordnance stores that are required in modern war, this article has been written with the object of giving officers of staffs, units, and other services some details of the responsibilities and duties of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps in the operations in Waziristan in 1937. These operations did not involve fighting on the large scale of the 1919—21 operations in Waziristan, but give an indication of what is required for fighting on even a moderate scale. Accurate records were kept of all issues made to troops from the commencement of the operations on 10th March, and these have been consolidated up to 30th September. Figures quoted in this article apply to this period of six and a half months.

The strength of the forces in Waziristan varied from time to time, but in round figures the average number of personnel, for whose maintenance the Indian Army Ordnance Corps was responsible, amounted to 54,000. The main units which comprised the force were:

2 Cavalry regiments.
5 Field batteries.
11 Mountain batteries
6 Light Tank companies.
36 Infantry battalions.
12 Companies Sappers and Miners.
7 Signal units.
2 Motor transport companies.
9 Independent motor transport sections.
15 Animal transport companies.
46 Supply units.
7 Field ambulances.
2 Labour companies.
4 Road construction battalions.

The Assistant Director of Ordnance Services, Wazirforce was responsible for all the Ordnance arrangements in the Force. There was a deputy assistant director of Ordnance Services

(D.A.D.O.S.) with each division and a brigade ordnance warrant officer with each brigade. In addition, it was necessary to appoint a D.A.D.O.S. Lines of Communication to deal with units which did not form an integral part of a division.

Until the 1937 operations, the Ordnance field organisation, apart from mobile workshops which are dealt with separately, consisted of railhead ammunition depots, railhead Ordnance officers detachments and tent repair units. This organisation was found to be rigid and uneconomical in personnel, and a new organisation based on the home one was tried out successfully during the operations and is now being introduced into war establishments. This new organisation consists of a number of Ordnance field companies, each of which has a company headquarters and a number of sections. The company headquarters co-ordinates the working of the whole company and operates the main field depot. Sections are of three types, general duties, tent repair and oil cooker repair. General duties sections carry out the main duties connected with stores, ammunition and salvage; they assist in the main depot and operate subsidiary depots. The duties of the other sections are as their titles imply. Sections are sent forward from arsenals as required, and the organisation is thus elastic and capable of adjustment according to the situation.

All Ordnance installations in the field other than workshop units are now called Ordnance field depots. This nomenclature is similar to that in use in the other services and, it is considered, is a simpler arrangement for the rest of the army than the old titles. In 1937 the main Ordnance field depot was at Bannu (railhead), and all stores despatched to the theatre of operations passed through this depot. Small field depots were established at Dosalli and Razmak, where a number of important stores were held for rapid issue to the troops.

The system of supply of Ordnance stores and clothing is as follows: Divisional units submit indents through the brigade Ordnance warrant officer, one of whose main duties is to assist units in the preparation of indents. The indents are approved by the D.A.D.O.S. and are then passed to the Ordnance field depot for compliance. In the case of units on the lines of communication, the indents are approved by the D.A.D.O.S. Lines of Communication. Stores are despatched with supply columns and are normally received by units within a week of the despatch of the indent. The supply of ammunition is of course automatically carried out as laid down in Field Service Regulations.

Articles rendered unserviceable or no longer required by units are returned to the nearest Ordnance field depot or to the brigade Ordnance warrant officer, empty returning transport being used for the purpose. On receipt by the depot returned stores are immediately sorted into three categories: unserviceable, repairable and serviceable. Unserviceable stores are broken down, the serviceable and repairable components being salvaged. Repairable stores are either repaired in Ordnance mobile workshops or sent back to arsenals. Serviceable stores are absorbed into the stocks of the depot.

All equipment and clothing taken into the field must be serviceable and have a remaining life of at least three months under field service conditions. The replacement issues, therefore, in the early stages of a campaign may be few, but will increase rapidly after two months. In peace the Indian Army Ordnance Corps provides for a total of some 350,000 personnel. This total includes the Royal Air Force in India, Indian States Forces, certain militias, military police and other auxiliary corps in addition to the regular army. It is interesting to compare the average issues of certain articles in peace to 54,000 men for six and a half months with the issues made to a force of the same number under active service conditions in Waziristan over the same period.

Article.	Peace issues to 54,000 men in 6-1/2 months.	Issues to force of 54,000 men in Waziristan in 6-1/2 months.
Water-bottles	2,000	4,679
Web equipment belts	1,800	4,931
Haversacks	1,150	4,024
Mess tins	1,050	3,857
Nosebags	3,600	8,892
Collars	750	1,083
Girths	700	1,318
Helves for pickaxes	1,050	4,065
Ground sheets	4,350	3,806
Khaki drill shorts	13,000	50,804
Worsted socks, pairs	60,700	111,100
Boots	8,000	14,612
Flannel shirts	10,250	47,102

From the above figures it will be seen that there is no uniform relation between issues in peace and issues under war conditions. The difficulties, therefore, of calculating extra requirements for mobilization and for minor operations will be appreciated.

The actual supply of stores and the assessing of the cost of the extra equipment required were, moreover, complicated in 1937 by certain factors. During minor operations pressure cannot be brought on the trade to give precedence to military needs to the same extent as would be possible after mobilization. In 1937 firms were approaching normal conditions after years of depression and civil demand was increasing. This not only affected the time taken by the trade to supply but accounted for considerable fluctuations in price.

As regards ammunition, the expenditure in operations on the North-West Frontier is always small in comparision with a campaign against an organised enemy. The following details of ammunition expenditure may be of interest (numbers of guns and rifles are shown in brackets):

6-inch howitzer (2)	...	88 rounds.
3.7-inch howitzer (48)	...	11,086 rounds.
4.5-inch howitzer (14)	...	1,218 rounds.
18-pounder (10)	...	520 rounds.
Vickers guns (484), Light automatics (469), Rifles (25,073)	...	759,723 rounds.
Grenades	...	1,079
Guncotton	...	8,548 slabs.

Altogether 2.357 tons of Ordnance stores and clothing and 696 tons of ammunition, including R.A.F. bombs, were forwarded from arsenals and passed through the Ordnance field depot at Bannu.

To carry out all the duties in connection with the maintenance of the force in equipment, clothing and ammunition, the personnel of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps employed in the theatre of operations consisted of seven officers, forty British other ranks, thirty-four Indian clerks and store-keepers, and seventeen followers, making the remarkably small total of ninety-eight persons in all. The above figures include officers and clerical establishments, employed at Force and divisional headquarters and warrant officers with brigades, but do not include the personnel of the Ordnance mobile workshop. In addition personnel of labour companies were attached to depots for loading and other duties.

The Ordnance mobile workshop, of which the total establishment is forty-eight, carries out all second line repairs; that is to say those repairs which units with their hand tools cannot effect and

which do not merit being sent back to arsenal for a major overhaul. The workshop has two technical lorries on its establishment and requires three 3-ton lorries to move its personnel, tents and stores. Some details of the items repaired by the mobile workshop are as follows: artillery equipments, rifles and pistols, machine-guns, range-finders, dial sights, binoculars, visual, line and wireless signalling equipment, oil cookers, stretchers, water stores and saddlery.

An Ordnance mechanical engineer from the mobile workshop visits regularly all units in the war area, inspecting equipment and thus obtaining early information of defects in design. It is his duty to devise means to overcome such defects quickly and to report to Army Headquarters through departmental channels the nature of the defects and his recommendations to overcome them. If new items of equipment are considered by the General Staff to be urgently necessary experimental items are made up in Ordnance mobile workshops and put into use, pending their production in numbers by Ordnance establishments in rear.

During the 1937 operations the Ordnance mobile workshop was situated at Bannu. A few fitters were sent forward to Dosalli and Razmak to carry out repairs to oil cookers and small arms. From a departmental point of view the location of the workshop at Bannu was unsound, as time and transport were wasted bringing repairable stores back to Bannu and sending them forward again after repair. It was decided, however, by the General Staff that space in perimeter camps was too restricted to allow of the workshop being moved forward.

Everyone is apt to take things for granted, when all goes well. From all reports the Ordnance arrangements in the operations of 1937 worked smoothly and well. If the supply of stores was taken for granted by the other branches of the Army, it is hoped that this article will help them to appreciate the efforts of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps in the field.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY AND AIR FORCE LAW—AND ON COURTS-MARTIAL

By Brigadier L. M. Peet

There are three preliminary points on which it is desired to lay emphasis before embarking on the substance of this article. Firstly, there is no intention of worrying the reader with the presentation of a number of rules culled from books on military or air force law to which officers have access, and which they can read for themselves, but rather an attempt has been made to explain the reasons for such rules, and the general principles underlying them. Secondly, I would sound a note of warning regarding the tendency to destructive criticism of military and air force law. It is of no practical use to criticize the law and maintain that a strict observance of it is detrimental to discipline or that its interpretation by the authorities, who have to interpret it (*i.e.* the Judge Advocate-General's Department and staffs), is too narrow. The law is the law, whether it be military or civil, and everyone has to obey it and make use of it for the purpose of maintaining discipline and punishing crime. It should not be looked upon as an arbitrary code of rules to be followed when considered suitable, or to be ignored when it doesn't seem to apply to a particular case or difficulty. Thirdly, knowledge of the law and compliance with it are essential if justice is to be done and discipline maintained; without such knowledge on the part of commanding officers and members of courts-martial, there is grave danger that the ends of justice may be defeated and a guilty man escape with disastrous results, sometimes, to the discipline of the unit to which he belongs.

In these democratic days there is a feeling against military and air force law as being too great an interference, in time of peace, with the liberty of the subject, even though special codes may be required in time of war. So, if the powers given by such laws are misused, the hands of those who would abolish or at any rate modify them will be strengthened. This is especially the case as regards the trial of civil offences by court-martial.

The subject of military and air force law, even when these terms are restricted to the administration of the law by courts-martial, covers so much ground that it is difficult to do more than

give outlines of the main principles to be followed in administering it. This difficulty is all the greater in India where we have to deal with several codes of law; for soldiers mainly the British Army Act and the Indian Army Act, which differ in many respects in scope and arrangement, as well as in the law contained in them; for airmen mainly the Air Force Act and Indian Air Force Act, which are also very different. For officers serving in Burma there are the Burma Acts, which as time progresses will tend to differ more and more from their British and Indian counterparts. These codes also, it must be remembered, import, to use the legal expression, a considerable number of the provisions of the civil law of both countries, that is to say, their respective laws of evidence and their respective criminal laws or penal codes, and, to a limited extent, their codes of criminal procedure.

Now every officer of the Army, and especially every comparatively senior officer, is liable to serve as president or member of a court convened under the Army Act or the Indian Army Act and occasionally under the Air Force Act; and officers of the Royal Air Force may have to serve on courts-martial under the Air Force Act or Indian Air Force Act or Army Act and possibly administer the Indian Army Act as well. For example, an army officer of the British Service may have to sit on a court-martial under the Indian Army Act, and an Indian Service officer may have to sit on one under the Army Act, and similarly as regards the Royal Air Force. Further, many units of the British Army still have as integral portions of their establishment personnel subject to the Indian Army Act—not merely as followers, as in the old days, but as combatants. Therefore, for example, the commanding officer of a British unit is expected—quite apart from his liability to serve as a member of a general court-martial or district court-martial under the Indian Army Act—to have sufficient working knowledge of that Act to enable him to hold a summary court-martial thereunder. In the Indian Army, of course, the summary court-martial is the rule and the district court-martial is the exception. In the Indian Air Force, there is no court corresponding to the summary court-martial, nor indeed as yet is there a Manual of Indian Air Force Law. As the Indian Air Force Act and Rules differ considerably from the Air Force Act and Rules and from the Indian Army Act and Rules there is liable to be considerable misunderstanding at a trial under the Indian Air Force Act.

Now, the use of the expression a "working knowledge" is not meant to suggest that officers are bound to study their manuals of law continually, and to know them as thoroughly as they know,

for instance, the training manuals of their respective arms. That would be asking too much, since, when all is said and done, though the administration of a service law *is* an important part of the duty of an officer, it can hardly be considered as important as that of training his men for war, and in these days of comparatively little serious crime it is not a duty which an officer is very frequently called on to perform. But, since this duty or liability exists, it is necessary that officers—and especially senior officers—should have a working knowledge of all codes with which they are concerned to the extent of being able to find their way about the different law manuals.

It would be of little practical value to run through the procedure of a court-martial, referring to every possible incident which might arise during the course of a trial, and to show where the law relating to that particular point is to be found. It appears better to invite attention to the commoner incidents or difficulties that arise, those in which experience shows that courts most frequently go wrong, and to endeavour to show how to deal with these difficulties or avoid falling into the commoner errors. It is not proposed to deal with each Act separately or to discuss the differences between them, whether of procedure or of substantive law. The differences, though many, are not very great and, generally speaking, the basic principles are the same, especially as regards the method of conducting a trial and the admissibility and amount of evidence required to prove the charges laid against an accused. Remarks will therefore, so far as possible, be confined to what is common to all the Acts, and to all descriptions of courts-martial.

To start with, it is necessary to get down to bed-rock and consider what law is and why we are bound by it. I do not propose to wander off into a dissertation on the origins of law, the moral sanction for it, and so on. I merely want to emphasize the point that, if anybody breaks the law, whether it be the law that forbids murder or the law that says a witness must be sworn before giving his evidence, it is asking for trouble, though the nature of the trouble varies from a liability to be hanged to a liability to be censured for carelessness or even, in an extreme case, for causing a miscarriage of justice.

The law that we are concerned with at present consists essentially of two parts and it is important to keep the distinction clear in one's mind. They are the prohibition and punishment of certain acts, which are termed offences or crimes, whether military or civil, and the code of rules relating to the method by which

those crimes may be punished. Both these are equally inflexible, in the sense that it is just as much a breach of the law when unsworn or inadmissible evidence is admitted, as when a murder is committed. Of course, the breach is not such a serious one, but nevertheless it *is* a direct breach and, if it is the breach of a rule that goes to the merits of the case, it is sufficient to nullify a court's decision thereon and, in effect, to take away all powers of punishment, since officers, when serving as members of a court-martial, are only permitted to exercise those powers in accordance with the law, and not arbitrarily in accordance with their own ideas of what constitutes justice.

It is a fallacy to think that a court-martial is merely a court of justice and not a court of law. It is every bit as much a court of law as the Court of King's Bench in England or the High Court in India. Military courts no less than other judicial tribunals are bound and restricted by the statutory law from which they derive their jurisdiction, and material infraction of such law destroys their legal existence and nullifies their procedure, a matter which cannot be affected by any consideration of mere expediency. Of course, the ideal is a court that administers justice in accordance with the law that rules its deliberations, and this is what officers should strive to achieve—neither overriding the law where it is thought that it tends to defeat the ends of justice, nor on the other hand allowing a too narrow interpretation of the law to blind one to the interests of justice.

It must be realised that law, meaning thereby both its penal provisions and its code of rules for the proceedings of courts, has been created in two ways; first by actual statutes passed by the legislature, and secondly by the decisions of judges and other authorities in the past. Indian law is mainly codified, while English law, unfortunately, is mainly uncodified, though nowadays the tendency is more and more to crystallize the common law, as the uncodified portion is called, into the form of statutes. Even statutes and codes however cannot be made exhaustive in the sense of covering every possible contingency, for their wording may sometimes be open to doubt and argument. And therefore the substantive law itself is fortified and amplified by the authoritative decisions of those who have had to interpret it in the past, and we are bound by these interpretations just as much as by the substantive law. This will, no doubt, appear academic and abstruse to many officers, who are little concerned with a dissertation on the fundamental principles of law, but are ready enough to learn something that may be of practical use in the troublesome busi-

ness of administering law and justice. General principles have, however, been pointed out so far with the object of trying to emphasize the importance of two things: firstly, that one cannot, even in the interests of justice and discipline, override the law from which one derives jurisdiction—even in minor matters; and secondly, that a court-martial is bound, just as a civil court is, by precedent—that is to say, by rulings and interpretations of superior courts or authorities competent to give such decisions or rulings.

Now, the reader will be impatient to ask how an officer, who is not specially trained in law, is expected to know all these rulings and decisions or to discover where they are to be found. The answer to this is that the greater part of them are to be found either in the notes in the manuals, in the chapters on ordinary law contained in the first part of the manuals, in King's Regulations, or in the various Notes on Military Law published in pamphlet form for the use of officers. This brings me to another main heading, *viz.*, in what the law consists and where it is to be found.

The term "law" in its widest sense includes statutes such as the Army Act and the Air Force Act, rules of procedure made under the authority of a statute, and regulations such as King's Regulations or Regulations for the Army in India. As regards the respective values of these from the legal point of view, naturally the Acts themselves are the most sacred, being substantive law; next come the rules of procedure, since they are made under the sanction of the law; and after these come regulations which are not, strictly speaking, law at all, either original or derived, but merely executive orders by the heads of the Services, to be obeyed and complied with as a matter of discipline and not of law. It is curious that courts-martial are inclined to invert the order given above and to treat regulations and orders as more sacred than the law itself. This, while a most praiseworthy attitude of mind in an officer in that it shows his reverence for the orders of his superiors, is not correct from a legal point of view, since the orders of the highest authorities cannot avail to override the law, which is supreme as representing the decisions of the whole nation formulated and passed by the Houses of Parliament or by the legislatures in India and assented to by the Crown.

Thus, if there should be a conflict between the substantive law, the rules of procedure and regulations, the law must prevail and from this it follows that we can postulate certain axioms:

(*a*) A breach of substantive law is fatal to the validity of a trial.

(*b*) A breach of a rule of procedure is fatal to the validity of a trial if such rule reproduces a definite provision of law or if the accused is prejudiced by the breach.

(*c*) A breach of regulations is only fatal if the accused is prejudiced by the contravention of the regulation.

To illustrate this, examples from the Army Act and military regulations will be taken.

Breach of substantive law

On the trial of a field officer a subaltern sits as member of the court. This is contrary to the statute* and is fatal to the trial. It is immaterial that no other officers were available, that the subaltern was a barrister, or had more service than the captains on the court.

Breach of a rule of procedure

In a small station the convening officer considers it necessary to hold immediate trial of a soldier, though only officers of the same brigade of artillery are available as members of the court. He directs the convening of the court accordingly, but omits to state his opinion in the convening order. This is a breach of a rule of procedure† which reproduces a definite provision of the law and is fatal to the trial.

But a court-martial is convened for the trial of a major, the court being composed of a colonel, two lieutenant-colonels and four majors. Unknown to the convening officer or the court, but known to the accused the latter is promoted lieutenant-colonel just before the trial. He does not challenge any of the members. The composition of the court is also a breach of a rule of procedure‡, but the trial can be upheld, as the accused must be considered to have waived his right to be tried by officers of equal rank, since he made no challenge.

Breach of a Service regulation

A company commander sends up a man of his company before the commanding officer who remands him for trial by court-martial. The company commander by virtue of a brevet becomes officer commanding the station, with a warrant to convene a district court-martial, and convenes the court for the trial of the accused. This is a breach of King's Regulations§ and the trial will be quashed on the grounds of prejudice to the accused, who

*Army Act 48 (7).
†Rule of Procedure 20 (A).
‡Rule of Procedure 21 (B), which does not reproduce a specific section of the Act.
§King's Regulations 633 (b).

has not had his case investigated by an impartial convening officer. The trial was legal and the accused cannot be tried again.

On the other hand the president of a general court-martial is a lieutenant-colonel. It is discovered after trial that a colonel had actually been available to sit as president. This is equally a breach of King's Regulations,* but will not upset the trial as it cannot be held that the accused has been prejudiced thereby.

Further, as supplementing the Acts, the rules of procedure and the regulations, we have, as has already been indicated, a number of hints, explanations, or interpretations contained in the several chapters in the first part of the manuals, the notes to the sections of the Acts and the rules of procedure, and the notes and circulars on law issued from time to time by Service headquarters, both in England and in India. This brings one to a series of points on which the greatest emphasis is laid, the first duties that a court should carry out before they proceed with a trial. These duties may be summarised as follows:

(*a*) The charge or charges must be read carefully to see that they agree with the wording of the Act in question and the specimen charges in the manuals.

(*b*) A reference should then be made to the section or sections of the Act under which the charges are laid and to the chapters at the beginning of the manual to see if they make any special reference to the particular offence or offences.

(*c*) If the court is then in doubt as to whether the charges are correctly framed, the case should be referred back to the convening officer.

This duty is only part of the preliminary duties enjoined upon a court and if the appropriate rules† are complied with before the actual trial is commenced, there will be *very* few cases in which a court's decisions will be nullified by the proceedings not being confirmed, or their being quashed after confirmation. It follows that in a complicated case a court may with advantage spend an hour or two carrying out these duties before calling the accused before them for trial.

Before dealing with the duties of the court at the trial itself, a few words about the preparation of the case for trial are necessary. The duties of a commanding officer in this connexion are

* King's Regulations 658 (a).
† Rules of Procedure 22 and 23.
Indian Army Act Rules 31, 32.

clearly laid down in the various manuals* and it is the duty of the court to ascertain, so far as it can, that these rules have been complied with. Further memoranda for the guidance of the court itself are given on the following pages of the various manuals.

In the first place, it is a commanding officer's duty to satisfy himself, before applying for a court-martial, not only that there is a *prima facie* case against the accused, but that the summary of evidence contains all the evidence that is needed to prove the proposed charges. He is not doing his duty if he merely orders an officer, probably his adjutant, to take a summary of evidence and frame charges and then forwards them to the convening officer without satisfying himself that the evidence is sufficient, if unrebutted, to prove the charges.

The convening officer too has to satisfy himself that there is a *prima facie* case before he orders trial; and he also should, therefore, make certain that the summary of evidence contains all the available evidence. If it does not (*e.g.*, if a witness who will be called or a document which will be required at the trial is not at the time available) the commanding officer should explain this in forwarding the application for trial. The commonest cause of delay in arraying a court-martial arises through the submission of an incomplete summary of evidence.

A summary of evidence should present the case exactly as it will be laid before the court; it is more than a preliminary investigation. It is, or should be, a "dress rehearsal" of the prosecution side of the trial. It is further required for four purposes: to let the convening officer know all the facts of the prosecution case and to enable him and his staff to check the proposed charges; to inform the accused of what he has to meet and enable him to prepare his defence; to enable the court, in a doubtful case, to test the credibility of a witness; to be read as evidence if the accused pleads guilty.

It is clear, therefore, how important the summary of evidence is, and that, to quote a dictum on the subject, "a bad summary of evidence usually means a bad trial." The Memoranda at page 401 of the Manual of Indian Military Law as to how to take a summary of evidence applies to all trials. If there is no summary of evidence, which is sometimes the the case on active service or at a summary court-martial, the court must, of course, take and record sworn evidence in the ordinary way, *i.e.*, as on a plea of "Not Guilty."

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* Manual of Military Law, pages 763—766.
Manual of Air Force Law, pages 550—553.
Manual of Indian Military Law, pages 404-405.

As regards the framing of charges before trial, there are certain golden rules, which, as the charge-sheet is the second most important document at a trial, should be borne in mind by everyone who has anything to do with the framing or checking of the charges:

(*a*) The statement of offence *must* follow the exact wording of the Act; it cannot be varied to suit circumstances; except in the particular places where the Act allows for such variations.

(*b*) The particulars *must* contain every element or averment necessary to constitute the offence.

(*c*) A charge, however simple, should never be framed without referring to the notes in the Manual, the Second Appendix to the Rules of Procedure and the Specimen Charge-sheets appended thereto.

(*d*) The charges should be as simple as possible and should contain nothing that there is not a fair certainty of proving if the defence produces no evidence.

(*e*) Charges should not be multiplied; nor should one transaction be split up into its component parts and a separate charge framed in respect of each part.

(*f*) Care should be taken over charges which involve legal technicalities; charges such as burglary, forgery or fraud in which case advice should be sought from the J.A.G.'s department.

(*g*) Care is necessary to avoid traps like that contained in Section 15 (2) of the Army Act, which involves absence from a parade ordered by a commanding officer. Before a charge is laid under such a section, it must be ascertained that the section is applicable and that all the ingredients of the charge can be proved.

It is not proposed to deal in detail with the procedure at a trial, but some of the important points on which courts are apt to go wrong will now be referred to. Reference has already been made to the importance of the charge-sheet and attention is now drawn to the other document on which the legality of the trial depends—the convening order. The issue of a convening order is no mere formality—it alone gives an officer power to sit on a court and to punish in accordance with the Army Act.

Therefore no officer can sit on a court who has not been appointed in the convening order, either by name or by rank and unit, and if the court is not composed as directed in the convening order, it is absolutely essential to have some written authority from the

convening officer amending the composition as laid down therein. One would think this was a matter of common sense, but apparently it is not so, as courts go wrong over this matter almost more often than they do over any other. There should be no alteration in a convening order, and certainly no court has any authority to make an alteration.

It is not necessary to say much about the other preliminary proceedings of the court, with the exception of the arraignment of the accused and recording his pleas. When there is no judge advocate at the trial, it is the duty of the president, and a most important duty, to make quite sure that the accused understands the charges laid against him. In the first place, it is only fair to the accused, and in the second place, if he pleads guilty, it is a necessary part of the compliance with the Rules of Procedure* the provisions of which are perfectly clear. If the charge, with all that it involves, is fully and properly explained to the accused, it can very rarely happen that it subsequently becomes necessary to alter the plea to one of "Not Guilty" and to try out the case; still more rarely will it happen that proceedings have to be quashed after trial on the ground that the accused's statement in mitigation of punishment negatived his plea. In this connexion it should be remembered that the accused's statement must be acted upon as if it were true, whether a court believes it or not.

To turn to the prosecution and to correct one or two false impressions, which appear to have crept in. The first duty of a prosecutor is to prosecute and he is guilty of a grave neglect of duty if he fails to make his case complete or to prove facts on which the charge depends. It is not, of course, right for a prosecutor to take an unfair advantage of his position or to endeavour to obtain a conviction at all costs, for example, by eliciting evidence which he knows to be inadmissible, with the object of prejudicing the court against the accused, and it is the clear duty of the court to stop him at once if he appears to be doing this. But he *is* responsible for bringing before the court the whole of the facts on which the charge or charges depend, and he is guilty of neglect of duty if he fails through carelessness to make his case complete. In this connexion there arises an interesting question as to which there is a good deal of doubt and room for a considerable difference of opinion. It is frequently said—and quite correctly—that members of a court should not in any way assist the prosecutor in making good his case: this would be to depart from the attitude of strict

* Rules of Procedure 35 (B).

impartiality enjoined on them by the law and by their oath. But, it is submitted, they will not be departing from that attitude if, in a case in which they are satisfied that evidence exists to prove a certain fact, they call the attention of the prosecutor to the fact that he has omitted to prove that fact, even though it may be a fact which is essential to the establishment of the charge.

The greatest error a prosecutor can commit is to fail to cross-examine an accused. Such a procedure is equivalent to an acceptance of the accused's story by the prosecution, and if this rebuts the prosecution case, the result must be an acquittal, or quashing of any conviction.

Finally a reference is necessary to the question of addresses by the prosecutor or the defending officer, as to which there appear also to be some misconception. The general rule is that each side is entitled to address the court *twice;* once at the commencement of the proceedings of that side and once at their conclusion. The first address of each side is merely for the purpose of outlining the case which that side is endeavouring to prove; in it no facts should be referred to which will not be proved by evidence and no arguments should be used. If, for example, the prosecutor in his first address refers to facts which do not appear in the summary of evidence, the court should stop him and ask him how he proposes to prove them, and, generally speaking, should make him confine his address to facts which are strictly relevant to the charges.

The second address of each side is mainly for the purpose of summing up and clinching the case which that side has been endeavouring to prove, and is often, especially in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, of the very greatest importance. In it the prosecution, or the defence, may use arguments and make submissions to the court as to the bearing of particular portions of the evidence, and may endeavour to show, for example, why one witness should be believed in preference to another.

It is often essential for one side or the other to piece together the evidence pointing to or disproving a certain fact, so that the court may be able to see it in its true perspective, and a case may often fall to the ground if the prosecutor fails to do this. In this second address also it is open to the prosecutor, in special cases, to press for a deterrent sentence, though, in doing so, he must not refer to facts which are not in evidence before the court, unless they are facts which are within the *general military knowledge* of the court—not their special local knowledge. Similarly the defence may, even if it has endeavoured totally to disprove the

charges, advance reasons why the court should, even if they convict, take a lenient view of the transaction. There is nothing inconsistent in this, though of course it rather tends to weaken the defence case, as amounting to an admission that there *is* a doubt, and it is usually better to reserve such remarks till after the finding. Thus it will be seen how important these addresses may be in a doubtful case and it is hoped that their scope and utility has been explained.

It is proposed in a later article to discuss the various reasons for which the proceedings of courts-martial are most commonly quashed.

SHOOTING IN KENYA

By Captain W. J. M. Spaight

The following notes are based on experience gained on a solitary two months leave shoot in Kenya in August and September 1936. The primary objective was elephant, so I had proposed to go to Uganda, where the cost of a licence, £15 for two elephants, was within my rather limited means.

On arrival in Nairobi I discovered that the programme had been drawn up on an obsolete time-table and that there was no boat across Lake Kioga for twelve days. This loss of time, combined with the probable costs of an enforced stay in hotels, necessitated an alteration in plan. On the advice of Captain Ritchie, the Chief Game Warden of Kenya, I decided to shoot in Kenya and gamble on paying for the cost of the licence by the sale of ivory. After all arrangements had been made it was found that twenty-eight days could be spent on the shooting ground. Twenty-one of these were used up in shooting an elephant and getting the tusks back to the railway. The shooting ground was then changed with lion as the primary objective. In this I was not successful, although ten varieties of antelope were obtained.

The Voyage

The B. I. run a fortnightly service, each way, between Bombay and Mombasa. The sailings are such that the full sixty days of one's privilege leave can be spent ex-India. All the boats are modern and the standard of comfort compares favourably with first class on the P. & O. A sixty-day return ticket first class costs Rs. 500. The boats also carry second class passengers, but second class accommodation is not normally used by Europeans. Alternate boats call at the Seychelles Islands and stay long enough for passengers to get several hours ashore. Mombasa is the only convenient port in East Africa for short leave. From Mombasa there is a good rail service to most parts of Kenya and Uganda, but connections to Tanganyika are indifferent.

Arrangements in India

No passport visa is necessary but passengers to East Africa are required to have a recent vaccination certificate, which must be

counter-signed by the Cantonment Health Officer. Several certificates, signed by one's commanding officer, to the effect that the bearer is a serving officer, should be taken. On production of these certificates at the railway offices at either Mombasa or Nairobi the bearer can purchase railway tickets at half fare—either first or second class—to any station on the Kenya and Uganda Railway. Second class on the K.U.R. is good and comfortable: any berth can be booked and bedding can be hired.

Kit.—All equipment can be hired from *safari* firms in Nairobi, but it is cheaper to take everything from India. A double-fly 40-lb. tent, full camp kit, bedding roll, cooking pots and arms were taken; the only cost being extra-luggage charges on the Indian railways. The K.U.R. have a rule whereby any reasonable amount of luggage can be taken into the compartment: this does not count against the free allowance, which is deducted from the weight of packages placed in the guard's van.

Customs.—Duty at 33 per cent. of declared value is charged on all arms imported into Kenya. This is refundable on export, when the receipt for duty paid must be produced. Before leaving Bombay it is necessary to get an export certificate from the customs for all arms taken.

Ammunition should be bought in Kenya, where costs are about the same as in India. All types can be obtained in Mombasa or Nairobi. Ammunition taken into the country is charged 33 per cent. duty, which is not refundable if any is exported.

Clothes.—Most of the shooting grounds are high and sufficient bedding and clothes for an Indian plains cold weather shoot should be taken. On account of the prevalence of thorn-bush slacks are preferable to shorts. A topee and glare glasses are necessary. A mosquito net was taken but was only used when sleeping on the ground, as protection against crawling insects. In Uganda a net would be essential. Medical stores are cheaper bought in India. A good type of shooting boot, with dubbed uppers and uskide soles, can be bought in Nairobi. Clothes are of little importance in Kenya. Store suits and dinner jackets are optional and tail coats quite unnecessary.

Shooting Grounds

It is possible to shoot in Kenya, Uganda or Tanganyika on two months leave. All these have, however, separate shooting rules and licences. Uganda is said to be, on the whole, unhealthy, with

very thick bush and a comparatively small variety of game. If a selection of the more common antelope, with the chance of a lion and a buffalo are required, Kenya appears to be the best.

All three territories reduce their fees for a full licence in the case of serving officers. The full Uganda licence is £5, Tanganyika £15 and Kenya £20. These all include lion and buffalo and the Tanganyika licence includes a rhinoceros. Elephant are an extra on all three. An extra can only be purchased by a full-licence-holder. Other extras are rhinoceros, giraffe and ostrich.

Kenya has a twelve-day licence, which can be post-dated to the day from which shooting will actually commence, this includes one lion and a buffalo. There is also a cheap Private Lands licence, but it is improbable that lion would be got on private land, though buffalo is possible. Lions certainly visit private land but the residents do not wait for visitors to come and shoot them.

Arrangements in Kenya

Nairobi is the best place to get one's outfit in and is also central for all shooting grounds. The head Kenya Game office is located there and its officers are only too willing to assist in the selection of a locality to suit individual requirements. Anyone going to shoot in Kenya, without ready-made plans or introductions to residents, is strongly advised to consult the Game Warden before pushing out into the blue.

Servants.—English-speaking cooks and bearers can be engaged at 50*s.* a month, or less. The head waiter of a Nairobi hotel found me a Zanzibar boy who successfully combined the duties of cook and bearer at this wage.

A good gun bearer can be found at about 80*s.* a month. Great care must be used in the selection of a gun bearer. It is best to ask the advice of the Game Warden. In any case local advice should be obtained before a man is taken on; members of certain tribes are considered unsuitable. Most of the good gun-bearers are permanently retained on the pay list of the big *safari* firms or by white hunters. It is improbable that a gun-bearer will be able to speak English. For elephant a tracker is necessary, the gun-bearer cannot track and perform his duties efficiently. The tracker should be found locally after the shooting ground is reached; wages are about 30*s.* a month.

Porters can be found anywhere, the normal wage is 15*s.* a month. All servants expect to receive food (*Posho*—a coarse

maize flour) and a small ration of cigarettes should also be supplied. The superior servants expect to be given a blanket or a pair of shoes each, the cost working out at about 5*s*. to 10*s*. a head.

Provisions.—Posho can be bought for the boys at any village shop, but all European foods must be taken from one of the big towns. Tinned foods are expensive. Drink and cigarettes cost about the same as in India. African servants cannot make *chappattis;* so unless one is prepared to eat bearer-made scones or take an oven to make bread, biscuits must be bought. Ryvita is expensive but a hard ration-type biscuit, as used by the King's African Rifles, can be obtained cheaply from a confectioner's shop in Nairobi.

Transport

A reasonable lorry can be hired from about £15 a month. To obtain a driving licence a local driving test must be passed, neither Indian nor English licence-holders are exempted; the fee for the test is 20*s*. and the licence costs 10*s*. Petrol is about *sh*. 2/50 a gallon but the price increases with distance from the railway.

Porter *safaris* are cheapest for short trips but it must be remembered that food must be carried for all the men, so several porters will be employed in carrying their own food. After buying the Kenya licence (£45) I found that I was unable to afford either of these methods; so, on the advice of the Game Department, I worked from the railway, employing porters by the day to move the camp away from the railway when necessary. I found that by moving on a light scale—inner fly of tent and sleeping on the ground—a five-day trip could be done on four porters.

Hotels

There are several excellent hotels in Nairobi, the charges being in the vicinity of 20*s*. a day. The Queen's Hotel was found to be good and considerably cheaper, as it is used more by residents than by visitors.

Shooting

In the open country the bright light and absence of features make one tend to underestimate distances. The common antelope of the plains are easy to approach, up to a distance of about two hundred yards, but a close shot is difficult to get. The oblique approach march is the best method. It is similar to black buck shooting and not very exciting.

The bush animals are hard to get. Two days were spent in shooting a gerenuk and all attempts to get a lesser kudu failed, though several were seen within easy range when tracking elephant.

Lion eat carcasses and the normal method is to shoot an antelope or a zebra and to stalk the kill at dawn. Owing to the open nature of the country and the presence of carrion eaters lions normally lie up on the kill. As, however, lions rarely hunt alone, unless several animals are placed for them, they may eat up all the kill and leave the vicinity before dawn. This was discovered by bitter experience. A Coke's harte beeste was killed within half a mile of camp, four lions came on to it about one o'clock, cleaned it, then roamed round the camp until about four o'clock making nasty noises. A 40-lb. tent does not seem very secure when it is too dark to shoot and several lions are grunting within fifty yards. Kills should be placed near water. The lion, to a certain extent, hunts by scent and if a lorry is available it is a good idea to tow the kill around in a large circle before tying it down.

Elephant, whatever they may have done in the past, live in thick country and are found by tracking. An elephant walks at five miles an hour and once disturbed may go as far as twenty miles before stopping. An elephant feeding makes such a noise that it is doubtful if he could hear any sounds made by a man approaching. Great care must be taken not to allow the elephant to get the wind. The shot is taken at very close range, but the thick bush makes shooting difficult. The heart is located lower in the body than one might expect. The brain shot is best but requires steady nerves and good shooting. The spoor of a warrantable bull is about two feet across.

In thick thorn country rhinoceros were found to be a curse. They are stupid animals with bad eyesight and bad hearing but with a good sense of smell. When disturbed they rise with loud grunts and charge into wind. All natives appear to be very frightened of rhinoceros and on hearing one grunting or crashing about in the bush will normally throw their loads and run. It was found that if an unseen disturbance of this nature was piqueted, with rifle at the ready, the porters were reassured and could be moved out of wind complete with their loads.

When, however, a rhinoceros was seen nothing could prevent them climbing into the nearest tree or bush—with a glorious disregard for thorns and fragile articles in the loads. The need to