

THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALAH, 13th JANUARY, 1849.



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EDITORIAL

The War in China.

Whatever one may feel about the rights and wrongs of the Sino-Japanese war, there is no doubt that the history of the campaign, when it comes to be written, will form one of the most interesting military studies. The campaign has been remarkable in more ways than one. It is unusual to find hostilities breaking out in two widely separated theatres of war, each opponent considering a different theatre as the more important; and it is even more unusual to find one antagonist suddenly, within the first few weeks of war, reversing his ideas as to the relative importance of the two theatres. Then, on the Japanese side, the campaign has been an excellent example of the correct timing of military movements to suit political conditions. Moreover, the rapidity of the advance of the Japanese armies in northern China, even granted the weakness of the opposition, and the close co-operation between Japanese naval, military and air forces in the Yangtse basin have been noteworthy.

To the Japanese, north China, with its mineral wealth, was from the start the prime theatre of war. Indeed, the campaign there had been expected ever since General Doihara's abortive attempt to create a five-province autonomous regime proved the desire of the Japanese army to establish a buffer state separating China proper from Manchuria and Soviet Russia. The question was only one of time.

To the Chinese, Shanghai, the outlet for Yangtse trade and the commercial and financial centre for a population of two hundred

millions, was almost as vital as London is to England. Northern China they might afford to lose as far as political control was concerned; short of the immigration of millions of Japanese peasants, they could never lose it entirely. The importance which the Nanking Government have placed on Shanghai is instanced by their employment of thirty of their best divisions in the Yangtse valley, as against the thirty-five second class divisions devoted to the whole of northern China. To Japan, Shanghai was at first an undesired escapade. The subsequent initiation of a major offensive on this front certainly revealed aims of a larger dimension than had originally been imagined. The attempted execution of those aims has no doubt been hastened by developments within China. During the last few years Japan has been forced to alter her view of China as a vast sprawling nation, rendered helpless by the jealousies of rival war lords. What Japan has feared has been the rise of a people's movement in China capable of organised resistance to Japanese economic and political aims. As soon as this appeared likely, and there were distinct signs of it in the unanimity with which Marshal Chiang Kai-shek was supported and in the stout resistance put up by Chinese forces at Shanghai in the early stages, it became necessary for the Japanese to attack the foundations of the Nanking Government, in other words to try to oust Marshal Chiang Kai-shek from his dominating position. Political strategy entered admirably into the timings of Japanese military advances. Soviet Russia was occupied with an internal purge and army reorganization. Great Britain was still too much concerned with the Spanish war, her Mediterranean interests, and European affairs generally to risk much in the Far East. The United States of America, with her growing isolationist policy, was unlikely to implement even her neutrality legislation much less to fight in defence of her interests in China. Last, but not least, Japan was assured of the moral support of Germany and Italy in any action she might take, which could even remotely be described as anti-communist.

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The Campaign in North China. Since the capture of Peiping, described in our last number, almost complete success has attended Japanese arms in north China. Their advance has followed the main railways leading west and south from Peiping and south from Tientsin.

The operations westwards from Peiping into Inner Mongolia developed out of the need for protecting the rear of Japanese troops operating in the Peiping area from attacks by Chinese forces based on Kalgan. Except at the Nankou Pass, an immensely strong position where the Chinese had forestalled the invaders, little or no opposition was offered to the Japanese advance. Faced with the prospect of a series of costly attacks at the Pass itself, General Itagaki, the Japanese commander, resorted to enveloping tactics and succeeded in passing a mechanised force round the north of Kalgan which was occupied at the end of August. By the middle of September he had captured Tatung in the north of Shansi Province and had before him the choice of two distinct objectives. He could advance westwards along the Suiyuan railway to Paotou, two hundred miles on, drive a wedge between Soviet and Chinese territory, prevent Chinese flanking movements towards Jehol, and protect the rear of any Japanese army subsequently operating in Shansi or he could risk the threat to his own rear, move down into Shansi and so attain one of Japan's principal economic objects, control of Shansi's mineral wealth. Not an easy decision to the commander of a detached force of only one division and one mixed brigade.

Reckoning presumably on the inefficiency of the Chinese provincial forces opposing him and on some help from the pro-Japanese Mongolian irregulars of Suiyuan, he took the bold decision to split his small force and to pursue both objectives. The advance into inner Mongolia proceeded as smoothly as could be wished and by the end of October Suiyuan was cleared of Chinese troops. The invasion of Shansi went less favourably at first. There are as yet no reliable details of what occurred in that difficult mountain country, but it appears that the ex-communist army, now enrolled under the Nanking flag as the 8th Route Army, put up a stubborn resistance. At any rate little progress was made until the end of October when the Chinese resistance seems to have broken and the Japanese advance on Taiyuanfu, the capital of Shansi, was resumed.

While these operations were in progress, the main Japanese offensive was put in hand. On 15th September, General Terauchi, commanding the Japanese forces in north China, commenced an advance with six divisions down the Peiping-Hankow and Tientsin-Puckow railways. He was opposed apparently by some twenty-five Chinese provincial divisions.

Again details of the fighting are meagre, but it is clear that the advance on both lines was practically unchecked, the Japanese steadily outflanking each successive Chinese position. The theatre of operations in Hopei is intersected with rivers and canals, which should have been easy to defend, and the weather was uniformly bad. The half-heartedness of the defence may be explained by the poor quality of the Chinese troops. The training and equipment of Central Government divisions bears some resemblance to those of European troops, but, as has been pointed out, the Nanking Government retained these divisions for the defence of Shanghai. The provincial divisions in north China were half-trained and lacked such essentials as divisional artillery, let alone heavy artillery, armoured fighting vehicles, and aircraft. Even so the Japanese advance of some three hundred miles in the six weeks following the opening of the original offensive in Hopei was a remarkable achievement. By the end of October, Suiyuan and Hopei were completely in Japanese hands. Early in November, Taiyuanfu, the capital of Shansi, was taken and the province isolated from all help except from south of the Yellow River, which the Japanese columns in Shantung had already reached. So successful had the advance been that General Terauchi felt himself in a position to dissolve the Hopei-Chahar Council, the last administrative link between north China and the Nanking Government. The slowing down of operations which took place during the latter half of November and December was probably due to the need for organising lengthy lines of communication, to political reasons, and to the withdrawal of troops to the Shanghai front. But whatever happens elsewhere, there is now no reason why Japan should not revive her old plan for political and economic domination over the two provinces of Inner Mongolia, Chahar and Suiyuan, and the three provinces of northern China proper, Shantung, Hopei and Shansi. She is already in effective military control of all five.

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The Shanghai Front.

Turning to the Shanghai front, at the beginning of September the Japanese detachment which had landed at Liuho was still isolated from the main Japanese forces, which themselves had only a precarious footing along the west bank of the Hwang Pu river from the Eastern Settlement of Shanghai to Wusung Fort. It was some weeks before the

Japanese managed to make any progress against the Central Government divisions, but towards the end of the month they succeeded in taking Paoshan City to unite their two forces. Even so they remained throughout most of October hemmed in to a narrow strip of land along the banks of the Yangtse and Hwang Pu rivers, a position not unlike that which the Allies experienced at Gallipoli. It was probably this deadlock, brought about by the unexpectedly firm resistance of the Chinese troops, that convinced Japan of the need for launching a major campaign in central China. Her economic objects in the north had temporarily at least to be subordinated to the political necessity for coercing the Nanking Government and destroying Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's prestige.

It was some time before the Japanese forces, amounting as they did at the time only to four divisions, succeeded in taking Taching, five miles north of Chapei and eight miles from the river banks; but the capture gave them the depth they so badly needed and from that moment their advance was steady, if slow. On 5th November two divisions, withdrawn from the north China front, effected a landing in Hangchow Bay, some forty miles south of Shanghai. The right wing of the Chinese forces on the Hwang Pu river was taken by surprise and within ten days operations in the immediate vicinity of Shanghai were over, the town being entirely surrounded by Japanese troops. The rapid advance which followed towards Soochow was aided by yet another Japanese landing, this time on the south bank of the Yangtse river, fifty miles north-west of Shanghai. This advance was almost certainly justified on military considerations alone, for the capture of Soochow not only split the Chinese army in two, north and south of Lake Tai, but gave the Japanese control of the most important junction on the railway lines leading to Shanghai.

It is too early to judge whether the subsequent offensive to Nanking was necessitated by military considerations. The decision appears to have been left to General Matsui, commanding the Japanese armies on the Shanghai front. Apart from other reasons, a consideration which may well have influenced the General was the formation, on 17th November, of Japanese Imperial Headquarters, a purely military body, headed by the chiefs of the naval and military staffs, responsible only to the Emperor, and therefore independent of political control from

Tokio. Whatever reasons lay behind the decision, once the die was cast operations were continued with increasing vigour. Wusih, the last Chinese stronghold, fell on 21st November and the road to Nanking lay open.

The threat to the capital led the Chinese Government to decide on evacuation. Important ministries, such as those of Finance and Foreign affairs, together with most foreign embassies moved to Hankow, while other departments went even further up river to Chungking. At the same time Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, who had until then combined the offices of Premier and Commander-in-chief, resigned his political post in order to be able to devote his whole time to the conduct of the war. The new Premier, Dr. Kung, is a relation of the Marshal's by marriage.

At the time of going to press, fighting is taking place within the walls of Nanking. That the city will fall to the Japanese seems certain. That its fall will mean a cessation of hostilities is by no means so sure.

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The League and the Far East.

Although negotiations between China and Japan have ceased for some months, neither country has declared war. What attempts there have been to find a settlement have been made by outside powers. At the end of August the Nanking Government addressed a note to the League of Nations indicting Japan on a number of counts and asking for help. The Advisory Committee to whom the matter was referred issued two reports; the first condemned the Japanese invasion of China as being in contravention of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 and the Pact of Paris and as out of all proportion to the incidents which gave rise to it; the second recommended that the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty be convened for consultation. Early in October the American Government signified its willingness to participate in the conference of Powers who were to assemble at Brussels. The task of the conference was hopeless almost from the start. In the first place it was born of a League of Nations resolution and that body carries singularly little weight among nations to-day. In the second, although the conference held itself out to be not a judicial tribunal summoned to condemn and punish but rather a gathering of nations deeply concerned in the life of the Far East, in point of fact Japan had already been condemned. In the third the disparity between Chinese and Japanese views was

so extreme as to hold out little hope of concerted diplomatic action being able to restore peace in the Far East. "Japan always protests that the Occident does not understand the Far Eastern situation," said Dr. Koo, "but the only point the West fails to grasp is the persistent aggression of Japan, not only in violation of her pledged word but in opposition to her self-interest." "Japan's present action is one of self-defence forced on her by China's challenge," stated the note containing Japan's refusal to participate in the conference, "and therefore outside the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty. It is impossibe for the Japanese Government to accept an invitation to a conference convened under the Nine-Power Treaty, when she has already been condemned of violating the terms of that treaty. In view of the special conditions in eastern Asia, the most just and equitable solution can be reached by direct negotiations between the two parties directly and immediately concerned."

Under such conditions it was hardly surprising that after a few brief sittings the conference should adjourn indefinitely. But it is unfortunate that the mere summoning of the conference should have led to an outburst of popular indignation in the Japanese Press against Great Britain.

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Palestine.

The League Council accepted the British Government's recommendations for the revision of their mandate over Palestine and Transjordan, and for the division of that area into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a neutral area under British mandate. The British Government has now to prepare a detailed scheme of partition for the approval of the Council and it is expected that a new commission will visit Palestine shortly for the purpose. Meanwhile, a most unfortunate wave of terrorism has swept over the country. The murders of Mr. Andrews, District Commissioner for Galilee, and Constable McEwen were the culminating acts to a long series of misdeeds by Arab extremists. They were clear proof moreover of the failure of the methods of conciliation tried during the last two years by the authorities in Palestine. Those methods merely encouraged Arab terrorists in their belief that the Mandatory Government had neither the power nor the will to enforce order. "To-day," the Royal Commission reported, "it is evident that the elementary duty of providing public security has not been discharged." "If

disorders break out again," it recommended, "there should be no hesitation in enforcing martial law throughout the country under undivided military control."

That the Palestinian authorities have taken those words to heart is evidenced by the proscription of the Arab Higher Committee, the issue of warrants for the arrest of six Arab leaders, including Haj Amin Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the establishment of military courts with power to pass death sentences for certain offences such as the discharge of firearms and the carrying of bombs. Although the Mufti escaped arrest, he has been deprived of his office of President of the Supreme Moslem Council and of his membership of the General Wakf Committee, of which he was chairman. His influence must have suffered a severe blow, for he has lost offices which gave him control of funds amounting to £67,000 a year, and the appointment of a large number of clerics who were prepared to preach his politics.

In Syria the Mufti has allied himself to the less desirable elements of the Pan-Arab movement which is taking on a new and disquieting form. Until recently Pan-Arabism was an academic subject rather than a live issue for Arab politicians. But Iraq is now an independent State, Syria and Lebanon will attain full independence within three years, and the Royal Commission has pronounced the Palestine Arabs to be fit for self-government. Neither France nor Britain, the Powers chiefly concerned, are hostile to the principle of Pan-Arabism, but they are fully justified in opposing the schemers of Damascus who are trying to turn a Pan-Arab into an anti-Zionist movement. Those extremists are not only doing all they can to promote further disturbances in Palestine, but are embarrassing the French authorities in Syria, who are still responsible for the welfare of that State. While the French and British authorities concerned are working cordially together for the maintenance of order, there are undoubtedly French critics who consider that Britain was wrong to acquiesce in the intervention of Arab kings in the domestic affairs of her mandate and who dislike possible precedents for the intervention of Arab politicians in Tunis and Morocco, where there have recently been serious disturbances at Marrakesh. One thing is certain, the new commission will have no chance of success unless terrorism is suppressed and public confidence restored.

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Spain.

The last six months have seen a steady progress on the part of General Franco. Since July the principal events of the Spanish War have been the insurgent offensive in the north resulting in the capture of Bilbao, Santander and Gijon and the failure of the large-scale Government attack at Brunete, near Madrid. The success of the insurgents in northern Spain is easy to understand when it is realised that the provinces of Viscaya, Santander and Asturias were cut off from the rest of Government territory and that General Franco had complete freedom of manœuvre. His troops were superior in equipment, particularly in aircraft, in training and leadership and his blockade of the northern ports proved at least reasonably effective. On the Government side there was an apparent indifference to the fate of northern Spain, the authorities at Valencia turning a deaf ear to Basque appeals for assistance. Whether that indifference was real or whether it was caused by the need to divert troops to quell the activities of anarchists in Barcelona is not yet known. Certainly the tide of success is at present running strongly in General Franco's favour. He has made an effort to unite, at least for the period of the war, all political parties fighting under his banner. He has been on the offensive from the start and morale is on his side. He has had better material than the Government have had, but he has also had the ability to make full use of it. Seeing that he is in effective control of thirty-five out of the fifty Spanish provinces, it is not surprising that the British Government should decide that they must have agents in insurgent territory. As the Prime Minister pointed out, the Government was bound to take into account its responsibility for the protection of British nationals and commercial interests throughout the whole of Spain, including the north-west and the south-west, as well as Spanish Morocco, now occupied by General Franco. Communist Spain had a British diplomatic representative at Hendaye and it would be unreasonable for British interests to remain unrepresented in insurgent Spain.

The agreement with General Franco provides for an exchange of trade agents without diplomatic or consular status. It in no sense implies *de jure* recognition of General Franco's government. The agreement has met with approval in France and has apparently been interpreted in Germany and Italy as a step towards the acknowledgment of General Franco's government sooner or later,

possibly when he has captured Madrid. The latter is not the view of the British Government, who seek merely to protect British interests while at the same time adhering to a declared policy of non-intervention in what they regard as a purely domestic affair of Spain.

As regards the future, a turning point appears to have been reached in the campaign. The subjection of the northern provinces has freed a large number of insurgent troops and it will be interesting to see what move General Franco decides to make. He can march again on Madrid, the capture of which would be a great blow to Republican morale. He can attack the main Republican forces about Saragossa, where a Government defeat would leave Catalonia open to invasion. He can move east of Madrid through Guadalajara into Castellan, cut the Government's road and rail communications along the coast, and isolate Valencia from both Catalonia and Madrid. Up to the present General Franco's movements have been deliberate, due possibly to the fact that although well-equipped with guns, tanks and aircraft, he has lacked adequate transport. It is likely that he will be forced to hasten his pace as soon as the worst of the winter is over both on account of the increasing pressure of non-intervention and the fact that the Government have stated officially that their "New Army," in which the Republican militia has been incorporated, will be ready by the spring.

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German Colonies.

Although this journal is a Service one and as such avoids entering into political controversies as far as possible, there has been too much correspondence in both the English and the foreign Press regarding German colonial claims for the matter to be passed over without comment. On November 4th a front-page article, the strongest in tone of the many that had already been written, appeared in General Goering's newspaper the *National Zeitung*. Having welcomed Italy's support of Germany's colonial claims and sympathised with her over the lack of understanding of Italian needs in authoritative British circles, the article returned to the attack. "The colonies," it said, "were voted from Germany by a *Diktat* to which Germany is no longer subject. Germany demands, and will continue to demand in ever increasing measure, the return of her African colonies. She not only needs them for her livelihood; she has every moral right to

possess them. The fiction of mandates is sheer hypocrisy. Great Britain's behaviour during the past ten years explodes the pretence that Geneva concerns itself with the mandates except as a matter of form; and it is for Great Britain, the country deriving most benefit from the territories which are Germany's by right, that Germany addresses her demands." Two points in the German campaign for the return of colonies are worthy of notice. In the first place the German Government has so far been much less pressing in its demands than has the German Press under the control of the Minister of Propaganda; in the second there is less mention of the value of colonies as a source of supply of raw materials since the League of Nations' statistics recently published showed that 97 per cent of the world's raw materials came in fact from sovereign States.

In Britain, views vary between those who hold that Germany lost her colonies as the result of a war of aggression, that her ambitions are insatiable and that no change in the colonial settlements of the Peace of Versailles can be countenanced for a moment to those who favour a wholesale return of her former colonies to Germany as a gesture of goodwill. Between the two there is growing up, both in Great Britain and the Dominions, a body of moderate opinion, prepared to discuss the case on its merits and as part of a general settlement towards peace. This body believes that a clear understanding with Germany would do more to further the cause of peace than any other move Britain could make, and there is probably much to be said for this view. The colonial question is a peculiarly difficult one. Although the greatest share in the pre-war German colonies was entrusted to Great Britain, the mandates have never been exclusively a British responsibility. The Dominions, and particularly South Africa, are deeply concerned, as are other countries though to a lesser extent. Many solutions to the problem have been put forward; a wide extension of the mandatory system, the creation of an international colonial bureau of the Powers concerned, the right of the native populations themselves to be consulted. As *The Times* pointed out in a leading article in November, there is surely no case for refusing to discuss the colonial issue as part of a general settlement, but the essential point is that the discussions must envisage a general settlement.

Waziristan.

The Command Paper regarding "Tribal Disturbances in Waziristan," which was issued in Great Britain earlier this year, gave a brief account of operations between November 1936 and June 1937. A further communique was issued by the Government of India last November, recording events from 14th June to the end of September. It would have been unreasonable to expect that conditions in Waziristan would revert to normal as soon as the Jirgas convened in September had departed. The Waziristan tribes are democratic and it is seldom that one finds a large proportion of any tribe willing to accept the leadership of any one headman in times of stress. In October there were still irresponsible elements at large, who wished to prolong hostilities against the Government. Moreover, the process of settling down was retarded by the activities of the Faqir of Ipi who reverted to his earlier tactics of sending out small bodies of tribesmen to commit offences on the roads and against posts with a view to embroiling the tribes once more against the Government. It was bound to take time for the *maliks* to regain control. In spite of this a marked improvement has taken place in conditions in Waziristan. The punitive action taken recently against the Bhittanis met with little opposition and the tribe soon complied with demands for rifles and hostages. In the Tochi the Daurs handed in the weapons called for and collected the fines imposed on them. A *jirga* of the Tori Khel Wazirs was held at their own request to discuss ways of controlling irreconcilable leaders. The only case in which genuine opposition has been recently encountered occurred during the advance of the 1st Indian Infantry Brigade into the lower Shaktu valley during November.

Throughout Waziristan there is a steady progress towards a return to normal conditions. The scale and frequency of minor offences is declining and several hostile leaders have made submission. The general improvement is illustrated by the running of motor transport convoys from Manzai to Wana for the first time since the attack made on the convoy in the Shahur Tangi last April, and by the gradual return of *khassadars* to duty on the Bannu-Razmak road. In the Shaktu valley the programme of new road construction is almost complete and it has been possible to withdraw certain units to their peace stations. Last, but not least, there is little doubt that the prestige of the Faqir of Ipi has seriously declined and that there is less inclination on the part of the tribes generally to follow his behests.

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The Territorial Army.

A change in the status of the Territorial Army was announced by Mr. Hore-Belisha, speaking at the Mansion House in October, and measures designed to recognize the Territorial Army as an integral part of the defence system have since been outlined in the House of Commons.

"In the Territorials," said Mr. Belisha, "we had an army almost as large as the Regular Army. Its voice must be heard in the highest councils. His Majesty had approved that its Director-General should be a member of the Army Council. Questions affecting the Territorial Army would be concentrated and administered under the Director-General, who would be given an adequate staff for the purpose. There would be opportunity for Territorial Army officers to reach the highest ranks and His Majesty had decided to create a new post of Deputy Director-General of the Territorial Army, an appointment which would be held for one year, so that the officer selected—a Territorial Army officer—would be able to undertake the duties without too long an interruption of his private interests. The limited tenure of the appointment would also provide a flow of Territorial Army officers to gain the valuable experience which the post would ensure. Another Territorial Army officer would also be appointed as an Assistant Adjutant-General at the War Office."

The change is not only a welcome and important one, in many ways it was inevitable. The Haldane reorganization of 1907 brought in the first Director-General of Territorial Forces, a post which has always been held, except for a short period during the war, by a Regular Army officer, as have the other posts on the directing staff of the Territorial Army, despite an implicit promise that the higher appointments in the force should be open to Territorial Army officers. So long as the Territorial Army remained a second-line force, its lack of a military representative on the Army Council was not perhaps a matter of very great importance. When it was decided to make the Territorial Army responsible first for coast defence and later for air defence, this state of affairs was no longer tolerable. The Territorial Army of to-day is as much a first-line force as the Regular Army and it is right that it should have direct military representation in the highest councils. Of even greater consequence is the decision to include senior Territorial Army officers in the staff of the new department. If Territorial Army officers are to command divisions and higher formations in

the field, it is essential that some of them at least should have experience in peace of the department which has to prepare and organize those formations for war. And these Territorial Army officers can bring to this task a first-hand knowledge of the difficulties and needs of County Associations, of employers and employees which the Regular Army officer can in the nature of things never possess to quite the same extent. The new plan is practically a reversion to the Territorial Forces Directorate of the Great War. One of the first tasks of the new department will be to undertake a comprehensive inquiry into the general administration of the Territorial Army, with special reference to organization, finance, and the simplification of relations between the War Office and County Associations and between the latter and units. In one respect the new department is fortunate. It comes into being at the end of what has been a record year for Territorial Army recruiting. During the year which ended on 31st October last, 43,923 recruits were finally approved for the Territorial Army, an increase of over 10,000 on the figures for the previous twelve months.

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The Army Council.

The Army Council has passed through more than one change in the last two years. When the rearmament programme was started, it was found necessary to reinforce the Master-General of the Ordnance, the manufacturer and wholesale supplier of the army, and Engineer Vice-Admiral Sir H. A. Brown was appointed head of a new department of Munitions Production. The creation of the new Territorial Army Department already referred to increased the total of the Army Council to ten members and the military representatives to six.

Early in December the army was surprised to hear that three military members, Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; General Sir Harry Knox, Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Elles, Master-General of the Ordnance, had resigned. Viscount Gort, who is well remembered in India as Director of Military Training, has been appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Major-General C. G. Liddell, who has been commanding the 4th Division, Adjutant-General. Vice-Admiral Sir H. A. Brown is to combine the duties of Director-General of Munitions Production with those of Master-General of the Ordnance, thus reducing the military members of the Army

Council to five. The post of Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff has been revived and Sir Ronald Adam, who was recently appointed Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley, will be the first holder.

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Air Raids. Precautions.

The Air Raids Precautions Bill, which passed its third reading in the House of Commons in December, dealt largely with the relations between Government and local authorities, between whom there have been differences of opinion regarding the burden of Air Raids Precautions expenditure. But the implications of the Bill are of interest to every resident in Great Britain.

Sir Samuel Hoare introduced the measure by saying that a modern air force could drop every day for many days as large a weight of bombs as was dropped on England during the whole of the Great War period; but he denied emphatically that the danger could not be countered. Precautions against air raids differ in many respects from the activities of the fighting Services. For one thing the field is one for civilians, the householder, the local council and other organizations; for another every man, woman and child is interested, irrespective of class or calling.

The Government consider that the duties of local authorities will be divided into six main categories: Arrangements for the storage of equipment; instruction to the public; the provision of public shelters; the repair of roads, rescue of persons, and clearance of debris; arrangements for the detection of poison gas, for decontamination and the treatment of casualties and arrangements in connection with street lighting and air raid warnings. The question of protecting buildings against the high explosive bomb has been investigated and found to be prohibitive, but public shelters, proof against splinters, are contemplated, and instructions about shelter rooms in the home will be issued to every householder.

In moving the third reading of the Bill, the Home Secretary summarised the two main conclusions which had emerged from the debates. In the first place complete immunity from air attack was impossible. In the second it was false economy to concentrate a disproportionate amount of money and man-power on passive defence, which tended to create a dangerous bias in the public mind for that form of precaution rather than for a vigorous active defence. London's best defence was a strong air force.

In accordance with an undertaking Sir Samuel had given in committee, the third reading included a draft placing specifically on local authorities the duty to provide necessary information to enable Government to prepare plans for possible transference of the population in the event of hostile air attack. Members had stressed the need for preparing a scheme for the evacuation of the population, particularly of children, from large towns. Sir Samuel explained the magnitude of the problem and indicated that the Government felt they would be in a better position to gauge the difficulties and to evolve concrete schemes when they had received the proposals of local authorities.

Not directly connected with the Bill but of equal interest was the statement made by the President of the Board of Trade regarding damage to buildings caused by enemy air action. Neither the big insurance companies nor Lloyds consider that the risk is one that can properly be met by insurance, and the Government have been asked more than once to institute a nation-wide scheme for insuring property against the risks involved. Mr. Runciman, when he was President of the Board of Trade, held that no scheme of insurance against war risks could usefully be created in advance against the unknown conditions of a future war. While the Government still adheres to this opinion, Mr. Oliver Stanley's statement that consideration is being given to the preparatory work which can be undertaken in peace will under the circumstances be reassuring to householders.

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Reorganization of the British Army in India

In November, Lord Stanley, Under-Secretary of State for India, announced to the House of Commons the decision of His Majesty's Government to make a grant of £600,000 to assist the Government of India to meet the capital cost of mechanizing certain cavalry and infantry units of the British Army in India. The grant, which is to be spread over three years, will be in addition to the £1,500,000 which the Government of India receives annually as a result of the award of the Garran Tribunal on capitation charges.

The proposed changes conform with the general scheme for modernising the army at home and divide themselves into two groups; the reorganization of British infantry into machine-gun battalions and rifle battalions, and the conversion of British cavalry regiments into light tank units.

British infantry in India have for many years past consisted of what are known as mixed battalions, that is to say units which include both Vickers machine-gun companies and rifle companies in their composition. When the proposed reorganization has been completed, they will consist of four machine-gun and thirty-nine rifle battalions.

The units selected for conversion to mechanized machine-gun battalions are the 1st Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers; the 1st Battalion, The Devonshire Regiment; the 1st Battalion, The Royal Scots Fusiliers, and the 2nd Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. These four units began their reorganization on the 1st January this year and are being relieved of any specific war role during the period of change. Three other battalions at present serving in India, the 1st Battalion, The West Yorkshire Regiment; the 1st Battalion, The Cheshire Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, are also among those selected by the War Office for conversion to machine-gun units, but in their case conversion will not start until after they leave India in the trooping season of 1938-39. Although for war purposes they will remain as mixed battalions so long as they are in India, they have in the meantime begun specialised machine-gun training.

Of the remaining thirty-six battalions of British infantry on the Indian establishment, twenty have been ordered to start conversion to rifle units from 1st January this year, or, in the case of those battalions unable owing to relief or operational reasons to conform to that date, as soon as directions are received from General Officers Commanding-in-Chief. The remaining sixteen battalions will remain as mixed battalions for the present. Their conversion will not start until 1939 or, in the case of those due to leave India in the next eighteen months, until after they have left this country.

After reorganization British battalions in India will no longer have combatant Indian personnel permanently attached to them and the company at Jullundur which trains Indian ranks for British battalions will in time be abolished; the personnel thus set free are to be absorbed into the Indian Army as far as possible.

As regards organization, machine-gun battalions will consist of battalion headquarters, administered by a headquarters company including signal, administrative and transport personnel;

three machine-gun companies, each of three platoons of five guns; and a fourth company containing an anti-tank gun platoon, a light machine-gun platoon, and two rifle platoons. The battalion will be entirely mechanized, both equipment and personnel being carried in mechanical transport. In peace an allotment of chargers for the use of officers on training and manœuvres will be made, but in war the unit will have no animals. The intention is eventually to station the four machine-gun battalions at Rawalpindi, Quetta, Lucknow or Jhansi, and Secunderabad.

Rifle battalions will consist of battalion headquarters. administered by a headquarters company containing a signal platoon, a light machine-gun platoon, and an administrative and transport platoon; and four rifle companies, each of four platoons, each of three rifle sections with one light machine-gun detachment in platoon headquarters. Transport will be pack and mule drawn and battalions will have their complement of chargers in peace and war.

A further point of interest, not directly connected with the scheme of reorganization, is that new rifle and light machine-gun courses will be fired by both the British and Indian Armies next year. These new courses have already been fired by selected units and it is agreed that they are a great improvement on the present type of course. The new course will reduce the time and ammunition expended by the trained soldier in firing at the bull's-eye type of target, and will give him instead more practice at firing at targets and under conditions similar to those met with in war. Particular attention is to be paid to battle practices, to anti-aircraft and night firing.

The second half of the main scheme of reorganization will provide an increase in the total number of armoured fighting vehicles in India. It consists of the replacement of the five horsed regiments of British cavalry and the eight companies of the Royal Tank Corps, now serving in India, by four British cavalry light tank regiments. Of the five cavalry regiments concerned, three will be converted to a light tank basis in India, one will be relieved in due course by a light tank regiment from England, and the fifth will leave India as a horsed regiment and will not be replaced. The 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards) at Sialkot and the 17th-21st Lancers at Meerut started their conversion to cavalry light tank regiments on 1st

January this year. The name of the third regiment which will be reorganized in India has not yet been announced. The four cavalry light tank regiments will eventually be stationed at Risalpur, Sialkot, Meerut and Bolarum.

The 8th and 10th Light Tank Companies, Royal Tank Corps, have started disbandment at Cawnpore and Kirkee respectively. The remaining six units of the Royal Tank Corps serving in India will be eliminated gradually, on a programme to conform with the creation and training of the new cavalry light tank regiments. A Royal Tank Corps depot has already been formed at Kirkee to which Royal Tank Corps' personnel employed as instructors with cavalry regiments undergoing conversion will be attached. To carry out the scheme expeditiously the maximum use is to be made of Royal Tank Corps personnel. Men of that Corps will be attached to all mechanizing units of cavalry and infantry, and the existing Royal Tank Corps School is to be combined with the Ahmednagar Wing of the Small Arms School to form a new Small Arms and Mechanization School. The latter will have a Driving and Maintenance Wing, and a Gunnery Wing teaching machine-gun, anti-tank gun and armoured fighting vehicle gunnery. In addition there will be a small Indian Wing to deal with the instruction of personnel of mechanized or partly mechanized Indian Army units, such as companies of Sappers and Miners.

As regards organization, neither the peace nor the war establishments of the new light tank regiments have yet been settled, but the intention is that they shall conform as closely as possible to establishments at home, subject to their being suitable for Indian conditions.

It is expected that the whole programme will be completed by about 1941.

* * * *

Troopships.

Another of the measures to ameliorate the lot of the British soldier announced last year by the Secretary of State for War will soon be given effect.

Both the hired transports, "Neuralia" and "Nevasa," are over age and neither complies with present-day standards of comfort. They will be withdrawn from service before the commencement of the trooping season of 1939-40 and replaced by two new ships built specially for trooping requirements. In addition to the provision of these two new vessels, the

accommodation on all "pre-Dilwara" transports is being improved by increasing the space allotted to each man up to Dilwara standards and by increasing the washing facilities up to six per cent. of the number of troops the transports can carry. An amenity peculiar to the new transports will be reading and writing rooms for troops. These improvements will naturally mean increased expenditure on the trooping service, not so much on account of actual structural improvements as the result of increasing the space allotted to each individual. In the case of India the reduction in the number to be carried in each transport will necessitate one extra voyage out from and back to England every trooping season.

POLICE WORK IN INDIA

(A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India on 1st July 1937 by Sir John Ewart, C.I.E., Indian Police; Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India. The lecturer was introduced by the Hon'ble Mr. R. M. Maxwell, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

The original police system in India in early historical times was strikingly similar to that in England and was feudal in its principles. The landowner or the village community were responsible for meting out justice to offenders and compensating victims within their limits. The Moghuls developed a more bureaucratic system of administration, but did not materially change these principles. In large cities they had police officers called *kotwals,* with autocratic power, as administrators of revenue and law and order. Under the *subadar* of the province were a number of *faujdars*; these controlled a police force disposed in posts under *thanedars.* But this organisation aimed at no more than exercising some check on organised lawlessness, maintaining some degree of security on the high roads and upholding the authority of the ruling Power. Investigation of crime was not part of its duties. The criminal and his victims were still mainly the concern of the local community. Moreover, the Moghul police system was military rather than civil.

As British power extended from the original trading settlements, as little change as possible was made in the system of civil administration which the first-comers found in existence. The piecemeal and haphazard way in which British administration grew up in the provinces of India is perhaps more strongly reflected in the police system than in anything else. Most of our troubles and difficulties to-day are traceable to this. The revenue system was carefully regulated at an early stage because John Company wanted money. Other governmental activities, such as education, started from zero with a clean slate. The police system not only inherited crude and vicious traditions, but it was only thirty years ago that a planned and concerted attempt was made to eradicate the evils of the old system. Thirty years is not a long time in

which to break down traditions of many centuries in a tradition-bound country.

Much earlier than thirty years ago the process of improving the police had started, but sporadically and with no clear or co-ordinated plan. Repairs and alterations were made in the old fabric. In 1861 an entirely new legal fabric was created in the Police Act of that year, which gave the police their legal status in a form which has proved adequate up to the present time and which still requires little or no alteration. But it was not till action came to be taken in 1906 and subsequently, on the report of the Commission set up by Lord Curzon in 1902, that the internal organisation of the police forces in provinces was planned on lines which made it possible to aim consistently at killing the old and bad traditions.

Prior to 1861 the indigenous or Moghul police had been supplemented in many parts of the country by military police battalions, most of which did fine service in association with regular troops, particularly during the Mutiny. On the changes consequent upon the Act of 1861 these battalions disappeared, partly merged in the new civil police, partly forming the nucleus of several fine regiments of the Indian Army, for instance, the 3rd/11th Sikh Regiment and 1st/14th Punjab Regiment. The great advance in police organisation marked by the Act of 1861 was to some extent inspired by Sir Charles Napier, who, soon after the conquest of Sind in 1843, raised a police force on the model of the Royal Irish Constabulary. This was so successful that it was copied during the ensuing fifteen years in many parts of India. The cardinal principle of this system, which was later embodied in the Police Act, was the corps of professional officers. Thus was founded the service now known as the Indian Police. The manning of this service was at first haphazard like everything else in the police in those days. For the past forty years admission has been by competitive examination in England and latterly in India as well.

I joined the service just before the reforms advocated by the 1902 Police Commission were undertaken. There were then many old-fashioned *thanedars* who were little different from their Moghul prototypes in method. Such a man was a great power in the land, but was often uneducated, commanded fear but little respect, and was crude and ruthless in his methods. The constable was paid

Rs. 6 or Rs. 7 a month and was, almost without exception, uneducated. The supervising staff was much smaller than it is to-day and supervision was much less close owing to slowness of communications. Above all, the police service was a despised as well as a detested one. Even for a young Englishman joining it there were difficulties. It was natural to everyone, British or Indian, to treat the police with contempt. Under these conditions it is amazing what good work was done and how many fine, upright and gallant men, both officers and subordinates, there were in the Force.

I have said that it was left to Lord Curzon to realise that, while the legislation of 1861 was a first-class framework, drastic measures were needed to eradicate the old bad traditions and to enable the Force to rise from the position of universal obloquy in which it lay and take a pride in itself. Every policeman to-day owes an inestimable debt of gratitude to that great man and great Viceroy. Soon after Lord Curzon had started us on the upward climb another event of great significance occurred. In 1909, King Edward VII declared his intention to recognise—in the words of the Royal Warrant—"the heroic acts of courage and instances of conspicuous devotion to duty" of members of the police forces of the Empire by instituting the King's Police Medal. The inscription on the obverse of this medal—"To guard my people"—expresses in four words beyond possibility of improvement the ideal of police service. The institution of this decoration and more recently of the Indian Police Medal, for which every policeman, irrespective of rank, is eligible, has been a great stimulus.

I want to emphasise as strongly as I can the fact that the police is a civil force. As in Great Britain, to a great extent a policeman only performs in return for payment tasks which every citizen is in law entitled or required to perform. The police are of the people. It is inevitable that their standards of conduct and duty will always be in general relation to the corresponding social standards of the time, but, as they are constituted to guard the King's lieges, they should be trained to set an example. We are far from fulfilling the ideals of our service and there are men in the Force who discredit it, but the remarkable change which has taken place in the past thirty years in official and public opinion about the police and the increasingly constructive nature of the criticism levelled at the force are the most convincing evidence of improvement and the best stimuli to further progress.

The policeman in India appears before the public in a uniform that is liable to give the impression that he is some sort of soldier. He has many semi-military duties to perform, from furnishing guards and escorts to dispersing mobs by armed force and fighting gangs of raiders or dacoits, and he is proud to take the soldier as his model of smartness and efficiency for the performance of such duties. But the discipline required of a policeman and, consequently, the whole motive of his training is different from that of a soldier. I repeat that he is a civilian and his support is not armed might, but the law of the land whose instrument he is. The best illustration of this principle within my own experience occurred in the Sudan some years ago. In the Nuba Mountains, a particularly turbulent tract, the local civil officer heard that a murder had occurred some three days' march away from headquarters. He sent a single police constable to see what the position was. In due course the constable returned, bringing with him the murderer and 400 of his tribe. My point in relating this incident is that the policeman, if his conduct is right, upholds the prestige of the law and is himself upheld by it. The converse is equally true if the police act wrongly. Here in India I am glad to say that we get innumerable examples all over the country of the single police constable or the subordinate commander of a small detachment reacting instinctively to the spirit of the service and, without superior orders, taking charge in an emergency, being the one steadying influence over a panicky crowd, taking a heavy responsibility for drastic action in defence of the law, or a big personal risk just because he is a policeman. Only a few days ago high praise was expressed by the Premier in the Punjab Legislative Assembly of the conduct of the subordinate commanders of two very weak detachments of police engaged in protecting small groups of one religious community from attack by large mobs of another community. Though these police officers themselves belonged to the same community as the aggressors, they did not shrink from directing controlled and effective fire at the latter, when they could no longer protect their charges otherwise. Again, I recollect a few years ago that a young constable of less than three years' service, off duty at the time, heard that in a village several miles away a man had run *amok,* killed two men and was defying arrest. He commandeered a motor lorry and went to the scene. There he found the maniac murderer standing in the doorway of

a house brandishing an axe and a crowd of villagers standing round at a respectful distance. The young constable took a hatchet from a bystander and went straight up to the murderer and called on him to surrender. His boldness succeeded and the man came quietly. In circumstances like these nothing is easier than for the policeman to look the other way. He can evade action with hardly any fear of being brought to book. He cannot possibly receive an order from a superior. But a good policeman does the right thing on his own. That is police discipline.

The total strength of the police in British India, excluding military police, such as the Assam Rifles and the Frontier Constabulary, is approximately 187,000, or one policeman to every 1,455 of the population, as compared with about one to 420 in London. There is point in looking at the figures in this ratio, for it is the one policeman that on the vast majority of occasions the people of the country see. One policeman controlling a traffic point, one or perhaps two constables doing a night patrol in town or countryside or executing a warrant of arrest. That is "the police" to the average man in his daily life. In the biggest cities of the land it would be hard to find 100 police in one place in normal times. In many vast areas in India which seldom or never see soldiers, the policeman singly or in pairs is the only representative of the executive power of Government that the common man sees. According as he conducts himself well or ill, so are the law of the land and the executive Government respected or hated. It is therefore very well worth the while of any Government to take pains to have a good police force. It is not my object on this occasion to elaborate this point, but there is room for great improvement in the police and that can be brought about mainly by judicious expenditure on strengthening the higher control, on training facilities, on improved technical equipment to utilise the resources of science against the criminal and on better conditions of service for the lower ranks.

Out of the total of 187,000 police, 900 are officers and of those not more than 450 are British. This small British element is not new. Indianisation in the higher ranks has been increasing for a considerable time now, but the great mass of the Force has always been entirely Indian. I should like to take this opportunity of saying that, so far as my personal experience goes, the

increased admission of Indians to the highest branch of the Service, the "Indian Police," has done nothing to lower the standards of efficiency and duty. There are inefficient British officers and inefficient Indians, but it is beyond question that police efficiency throughout India has been steadily rising during the years when the policy of increasing Indianisation has been pursued. The spirit which fights the great temptations to wrong doing which beset a policeman and strives to strengthen the ideal of public service is not the prerogative of the British officer. The latter may justly claim to have set high standards, but our Indian brother officers are for the most part well maintaining them.

The "Indian Police" is an all-India service recruited by the Secretary of State like the Indian Civil Service, and its service, cohesion and spirit is very actively alive. This is the sole all-India element in police organisation, except for the Intelligence system, which is all-India by virtue of close liaison between provincial Criminal Investigation Departments. Every province has its own police force recruited and organised provincially. The size of such forces naturally varies greatly, but a strength of from 20,000 to 25,000 of all ranks may be taken as standard for the police under the control of an Inspector-General in a major province. The general law of the land including the Police Act ensures uniformity in the main lines of organisation for all these forces, for the police everywhere must operate under the law and for its enforcement. But in detail there are considerable variations from province to province. The general system is an Inspector-General for the whole province; three or four Deputy Inspectors-General in charge of groups of districts called "ranges" as assistants to the Inspector-General for administration and inspection, with another Deputy Inspector-General in charge of the Criminal Investigation Department and a Superintendent of Police in executive command of the police in each district. The district force is the essential unit and it may vary in strength from 500 to 1,500 or more. The Superintendent of Police has extensive disciplinary and executive powers as the commander of the district police and is responsible in that capacity only to his own service superiors, but in all aspects of the operations of the police in their relations with the public and as the instrument for the execution of the law the District Magistrate, as head of the district and local representative of Government, has a controlling authority.

Within the district the police are distributed on a permanent basis as part of the framework of civil administration. In this distribution the police station is the unit and it is in principle the same in urban and rural areas. The police station with its allotted jurisdiction of the whole or part of a town or of a rural area of several hundred square miles, is universal throughout India because the law prescribes it. The officer in charge of a police station—in common parlance the *thanedar*—is the authority responsible in law and in administrative practice for the prevention and detection of crime in the area notified as his jurisdiction. If that jurisdiction is urban he will have a large body of men under him for patrolling and watch and ward duties as well as for helping him in investigations. If it is a rural area, he will have generally one or two assistants, head constables or assistant sub-inspectors and ten or twelve constables through whom to control crime. It is quite impossible to describe a *thanedar's* jurisdiction, as it varies enormously according to physical, ethnographical and other conditions in different parts of India, but an area of some 250 square miles containing anything from 50 to 100 villages and a market town or two may be taken as fairly normal.

These *thanas* are the units through which the primary duties of the police are performed. *Thanedars* and their small staffs all over India investigate—in very round figures—some 6,000 murders and 4,000 gang robberies (*dacoities*) a year, and 1,000 thefts and burglaries a day, Sundays included, to say nothing of many other varieties of crime. Not only do they investigate but they take a big share in the presentation of their cases in court and their prosecution, and they get about *forty-five per cent* of all their cases convicted. Moreover, for every case they investigate they prevent many by a comprehensive system of intelligence and surveillance backed by certain preventive provisions of the criminal law. How they do it is a marvel even to those who know them intimately. The investigation and prosecution of offences in India present peculiar difficulties and the Indian criminal is versatile, ingenious and determined to an extraordinary degree. To control a police station effectively a man must have immense energy, marked personality, sound common-sense and readiness to act promptly with an instinctive knowledge of procedure, for he can seldom refer to a law book or expert advice.

Violent crime is prevalent in India; so are riots and mob disorders of all degrees and due to all sorts of causes; so the police have to be armed. A large proportion are equipped with and trained in the use of the rifle or bored out musket. Usually constables are equipped with a baton—why I do not know, for it is hardly ever used and is a very poor weapon. Officers carry revolvers when necessary, but the constable's weapon *par excellence* is the *lathi*—the quarter staff of Old England, and in the Punjab, *lathi* training as imparted at the Police Training School includes some of the "blows, chops, flirts, slips and falsities (or feints)" recommended for quarter staff play by one Zachary Wilde, a master of arms in the year 1711. The *lathi* is a very good weapon. You can greatly strengthen a cordon by *lathis* held horizontally between men; you can persuade an obstreperous crowd effectively by dropping the butt of a *lathi* on their bare toes; you can numb a man's sword arm, and you can, if necessary, in the words of Zachary Wilde, "knock a man down so far as the ground will let him fall." You may also, by following the technique of the same authority, "disoblige your adversaries' knuckles or eclipse one of his eyes." But it is very seldom indeed that a *lathi* does a man a dangerous injury. Nevertheless, for the milder type of crowd we often use cut-down polo sticks—a better weapon than the pick-axe handle.

The subject of riots and weapons leads on to that important aspect of the maintenance of the peace which brings military forces out in support of the civil power. I do not propose to speak of the extreme stage, when the military authority assumes control and martial law in full or modified form is applied. That is a highly interesting type of situation, but it is one for the soldier rather than the policeman to discuss. The lightly held civil and police control which I have been describing depends, however, all the time, on the existence of military force in reserve and the knowledge that we all have that court comrades in the Army and the Navy (witness the help the latter gave in Bombay in the autumn of 1936) are ready at all times to turn out to help us, is a factor of inestimable value. These combined operations require a great amount of study and practice. This is increasingly realised. At the Staff College at Quetta study of the principles and tactics of military aid to the civil power has been given special attention for a number of years

past and in many military formations exercises and conferences are regularly held. I think there is room for even more of this kind of practice, however, and exercises on the lines of the famous exercise at Quetta, with civil and police officers, including such officials as *tehsildars* and police inspectors, participating, might well be held more often in brigade areas and stations where calls for military assistance are to be anticipated.

Better application of the principles of riot tactics by police and troops in co-operation is probably more responsible than any change in Indian crowd psychology for the fact that, when disturbances occur nowadays, the phase of mass rioting is usually very short-lived and the task of the authorities becomes the prevention and suppression of sporadic affrays, stabbing attacks, arson and similar acts of hooliganism. It is generally recognised that the tactics which are most effective in such circumstances include the rounding up of all known hooligans, the prohibition of the collection of crowds and the carrying of weapons, and the prohibition of movement during the hours of darkness by what is usually called a "curfew order."

One rather disappointing aspect of this tendency for rioting to be sporadic is that, just when we have, after years of delay necessitated by experiment and research, got permission to use tear gas for the dispersal of mobs, we cannot find any mobs who will wait to be gassed. In all the prolonged disturbances in Bombay last autumn, it is very doubtful if gas could have been used effectively. On the other hand, the fluidity of riot situations creates an urgent demand for motor transport and the best possible control by wireless or telephone of a system of unceasing mobile patrols. The value of such patrols is inestimable, both in reassuring the well-disposed, deterring the ill-disposed, and getting to the scene of sudden outbreaks in time to make prompt dispersal and arrests.

Tear gas has proved its value beyond all question for securing the capture of desperate armed criminals without loss of life on the side of the police. As regards its use against riotous mobs, we are now at the stage when we want a chance to put experiment to the test of practice.

But large-scale disturbances such as communal riots and disorderly political agitation are just as distasteful to the police as they are to the army. The really interesting part of a police-

man's job and the one he likes to concentrate his efforts on is the immense variety of crime that he has to study, prevent and detect. This varies from the mediæval to the most modern American-type racket. It is impossible to present anything like a complete picture of the wide field that crime covers, but I will endeavour to convey some idea by a few examples. A type of criminal who deserves special mention is the criminal tribesman. He is peculiar to India and, in spite of organised and in many respects successful efforts to reform him, still constitutes a major problem. There are a great number of these hereditary criminal tribes, some of them with close ethnical and historical affinity with the gypsies of Europe. Most of them specialise in particular types of crime and from among them come the most incorrigible and skilled burglars and thieves in India. Hardly less organised in their criminal methods are the makers of false coin and their agents for putting their products into circulation. Cattle theft—a trade or sport rather than a crime in public estimation among many rural communities—is highly organised. It is most prevalent in the neighbourhood of rivers with vast areas of grazing. A few years ago professional cattle thieves from Sind came by train, as had been their habit for years, to the country between Multan and Dera Ghazi Khan. They rounded up a large number of cattle grazing in the islands of the river and swam them off down-stream. But on this occasion they had been spotted and they were intercepted by parties of police and villagers in boats and swimming with the help of inflated skins. A battle ensued in the middle of the Indus in summer flood resulting in the rescue of the cattle and the capture of many of the thieves. Another cattle theft incident is pure Scottish clan warfare, but happened only some three years ago. The local Phearsons rode into the land of the McTavish's and successfully raided their cattle. But the McTavish's sent out the call to their clansmen and, mounted and on foot, pursued and overtook the raiders, had a lovely battle with them and not only got back their cattle but several of the Phearson's horses. This was not in any wild frontier tract but more or less in the centre of the Punjab. For crime—as we class it—of this sort a simpler code than that of the Indian law is required. Ingenuity is certainly an attribute of the Indian criminal. It was shown in humorous fashion by a simple yokel who used to lead a bitch in an interesting condition round the roads of the

civil station in Lahore and so became the possessor of a number of valuable dogs. More highly developed was the ingenuity of a group of aspirants for easy wealth, including the Treasurer of a well-known College, who managed to insure the life of a servant of one of them with several insurance companies and then tried to bring off the perfect crime by a method which I think almost deserved to succeed. They caught a cobra and made it bite repeatedly a piece of meat. They then made soup of the meat and gave it to the intended victim—but it only made him very sick. After this disappointment they disposed of him by cruder methods and got caught and paid the penalty. In the same category is the famous case when, with the object of securing a big inheritance, a man was skilfully inoculated with plague and duly died. The criminal is very knowledgeable about the ways of the law. There died recently a lawyer, who had practised at a certain High Court Bar, who specialized as consultant before the crime. He gave his clients a method of committing a murder and guaranteed to get them off in the trial if they followed his instructions carefully. Getting rid of the corpse is, of course, one of the elementary steps in a successful murder. Canals and rivers are useful in this connection. A *thanedar* of my acquaintance heard in the course of his rounds that a respectable farmer of the neighbourhood was reported to have got to the stage when he could stand his wife no longer. So the *thanedar* thought he would look him up. He met him in the road, riding a horse with a large bundle on his saddle bow. After a little conversation he said, "Where is your wife?" The answer was, "As you have butted in where you were not wanted, I may as well tell you. Here she is; in sixty pieces. I was on the way to put her in the Sutlej."

There is one thing about crime which is a little disappointing to the professional policeman; it does not observe detective story rules. Under those rules everything from crime to detection happens between tea and dinner or at most between tea and breakfast next morning and no detective bothers about such a tiresome formality as judicial proof. I could quote from memory a dozen outstanding cases where no clue at all was obtained for two years. Even though in the end the culprit was hanged, you can't make a detective novel on such foundation. In October 1926, a Mills bomb was thrown into a dense crowd returning from the Dusserah celebrations in Lahore. We chased several hares but

got no smell of a real clue. Dusserah in 1927 was uneventful. At the same place and on the same occasion in 1928 a bomb was thrown again. On each occasion a dozen persons were killed and 60 to 80 wounded. Continuously from 1926 the best detective I have ever known was on these cases and he did the best detective work I have ever seen, but he got nowhere at all. He was working under my general direction and from a very early stage we had both had a theory about the case, but nothing supported it. One day in the summer of 1930 one of his watchers came and reported that he had seen two men moving house with an odd-looking basket of goods. Then things moved. We found fourteen Mills bombs cleverly concealed in a recess on the underside of a staircase; the whole story unrolled itself; our original guess was proved right and two men were convicted. The detective of fiction would have got away with it on his first guess without waiting four years.

I will end, ladies and gentlemen, by thanking you most sincerely, not so much for your patience in listening to me, as for the encouragement which your interest in the obscure doings of the police, as indicated by your presence here, gives to all members of the Force.

THE ACTION OF THE 1ST (ABBOTTABAD) INFANTRY BRIGADE NEAR DAMDIL ON THE 29TH MARCH 1937

During February and March 1937 the situation in Waziristan had deteriorated as the result of propaganda by the Faqir of Ipi. Accordingly additional troops, of the 1st Division, had been sent to North Waziristan. By the end of March the Tochi Column, from Bannu, was located at Miranshah to watch the Madda Khel Wazirs, whilst the 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade was at Damdil.

Hostile tribesmen had on several occasions indulged in acts of hostility, such as the sniping of camps or determined attacks on piquets. Several hundred tribesmen were known to be gathered in the Lower Khaisora valley, a few miles south-east of Damdil, ready to seize any opportunity for hostile enterprises; but in the last days of March negotiations in progress between the combined representatives of the Utmanzai Wazir tribal sections and the Faqir of Ipi had not yet proved completely abortive.

During this period, the action of troops was confined to the protection of their camps and the main lines of communications, air action was being taken only on a very limited scale at the request of the political authorities, and the initiative necessarily lay to some extent with the tribesmen.

The 1st (Abbottabad) Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier R. D. Inskip, D.S.O., M.C., consisted of the 1st South Wales Borderers, the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 6th Gurkha Rifles. The 13th (Dardoni) Mountain Battery, R.A., and the 15th (Jhelum) Mountain Battery R.A., were also in camp at Damdil and under the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade.

In the account which follows it is necessary to remember that the Gurkha battalions had proceeded to Waziristan at short notice with a strength of 5 British officers and 500 Gurkha officers and other ranks. The strength of a battalion for operational purposes after provision had been made for camp protection, for the garrisons of camp and water piquets, and for necessary camp duties, fell considerably below the figure of 500, and rifle companies consisted of three weak platoons each.

The troops at Damdil were responsible for opening the road two or three times a week for the passage of M. T. convoys from Mir Ali to Razmak and back. For this purpose they were required to protect the road concurrently in two directions: northwards for a distance of six miles towards Tal-in-Tochi, and south-westwards for six miles towards Dosalli Scouts' Post—a total of twelve miles of road.

On the 29th March the northern sector of the road, from Damdil towards Tal, was opened by the 1st South Wales Borderers supported by the 13th Mountain Battery (less one section).

The 1/6th and 2/6th Gurkha Rifles with the 15th Mountain Battery were given the task of opening the road for the six miles of the southern sector, towards Dosalli.

The 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles was responsible for the protection of Damdil camp and for various administrative and escort duties. One section of the 13th Mountain Battery was in action near one of the Damdil camp piquets from where it was able to afford support in either the north or south sectors.

No opposition was met by the 1st South Wales Borderers, and the fighting which occurred was confined to the south of Damdil.

The country in this area is extremely difficult. Although the features at Ring Contour, Point 4641 and Point 4792 are higher than any ground to the immediate south, the country lying between them and the main road consists of a series of low ridges covered with heavy scrub, and intersected by numerous small *nalas* with steep and scrub-covered sides affording abundant cover for an enemy. Air reconnaissance of the areas in which the action took place revealed no indications of the tribesmen actually concealed there.

The procedure adopted for the protection of this sector of road was varied on each occasion. On the 29th March the plan was as follows:

(*a*) The 2/6th Gurkha Rifles with the 15th Mountain Battery (less one section) was to occupy the features from Ring Contour westwards to Point 4641.

(*b*) The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, less the detachments mentioned below, was then to pass through, moving between Ring Contour and Asad Khel, and secure the road up to milestone 52. One company and one section of

machine guns. 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, were to be brought up in lorries from Damdil as soon as the first objectives had been secured.

On this day no troops were to move south of the Khaisora river.

The 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, less one company in brigade reserve, left camp at 6 a.m. on the 29th March, and by 7-25 a.m. had occupied without opposition Ring Contour and Point 4641, and a forward locality at "W." At this stage the battalion had in reserve two rifle sections and one section of machine guns. The 15th Mountain Battery (less one section) was in position on the col between Ring Contour and Point 4641.

The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles (less "A" Company and one machine gun section to follow later in lorries) with one section 15th Mountain Battery left camp at 6-30 a.m. Moving to the south of Ring Contour the battalion passed through the positions held by the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and prepared to secure their first objective, a ridge running to the north of milestone 50½, whilst also watching the left flank and searching the difficult and broken ground to the front and north. The advanced guard, commanded by Lieut. R. A. L. Marks, consisted of one company (less two platoons) and one section of machine guns.

At 8-5 a.m. the advanced guard was moving along the low hills immediately north of the road near "X" on the attached sketch. At this time heavy fire was opened, from south of the Khaisora, on the main body of 1/6th Gurkha Rifles who were also on the hills north of the road, moving towards the first objective.

A few moments later the advanced guard also came under heavy fire from south of the Khaisora and almost simultaneously tribesmen emerged in considerable numbers from the deep wooded *nala,* north of and parallel to the road, and attacked the advanced guard. Details of this fighting are inevitably somewhat obscure, but it is evident that the enemy attacked with fanatical fury and actually closed with the advanced guard in hand to hand fighting. The advanced guard suffered heavy casualties, including Lieut. Marks and two Gurkha officers killed. The remnants were pinned by heavy fire to whatever positions they happened to be in, and there defended themselves against further repeated attacks.

Meanwhile the sound of firing had reached Dosalli, and Lieut. H. O. Stibbard, Royal Tank Corps, immediately moved down the road towards Asad Khel with his section of No. 6 Light Tank Company (armoured cars), dispersing parties of tribesmen as he approached the survivors of the advanced guard. In addition to supporting the advanced guard these armoured cars kept down the enemy fire by patrolling the road and engaging tribesmen south of the Khaisora valley at long range. They also rendered invaluable assistance in evacuating casualties from that part of the advanced guard which was near the road. Later in the day this section was joined by a further section of the same company which had accompanied the M. T. convoy from Mir Ali to Damdil. These armoured cars patrolled the road continuously covering the south flank, and without their assistance it is doubtful if the casualties could have been got away.

At the time of this attack on the advanced guard, Battalion Headquarters, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, had the equivalent of one weak company and one machine gun section in reserve. A piquet, supported by a section of machine guns, had been posted to watch the south flank. The section of the 15th Mountain Battery was in action near milestone 49.

A piquet from "C" Company had just moved off under covering fire of one machine gun section, to occupy a spur running south-east from Point 4792. Almost concurrently with the attack on the advanced guard this piquet was stopped near "Y" by heavy fire, and although reinforced by another platoon was unable to make headway. It was now becoming apparent that large numbers of tribesmen were concealed in the *nalas* north of the road.

By about 8-20 a.m. battalion headquarters, with about 30 men from "B" and "C" companies was in position at "Z." Attempts to gain touch with the advanced guard were unsuccessful; partly because all signallers with the advanced guard had become casualties but mainly because of the heavy fire in the forward area which prevented any movement along the ridge.

At 8-35 a.m. "A" company, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, arrived in lorries at milestone 49, and were ordered to drive the tribesmen from the *nalas* north of the road and establish a piquet on the spur of Point 4792, which the original piquet had been unable to reach. This company covered by the fire of two machine gun

sections, and of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, advanced as indicated by the arrow on the sketch map. They were finally held up by the close fire of concealed tribesmen, after suffering several casualties including the company commander.

At about this time the tribesmen began to present good targets to the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and 15th Mountain Battery. Fire from these units secured "A" and "C" companies from any further attack, but any movement continued to draw instant fire at close range from concealed tribesmen, and the troops were virtually pinned to their ground. Attempts were also made by parties of tribesmen to attack the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and to outflank their positions north of Point 4641. These attempts were frustrated by rifle and light automatic fire, and by the fire of the section of 13th Mountain Battery from camp. The company in brigade reserve, which arrived opportunely, was used to reinforce and extend the north-western flank where several minor but determined attacks were repulsed.

The 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles were now ordered out from camp, and at 1 p.m. attacked Point 4792 from the north-east, with a view to relieving the pressure on the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. This attack was successful, and the battalion then worked southwards driving numbers of tribesmen out of cover so that they came under small arms fire. Artillery also shelled the *nalas* and drove out other parties of tribesmen who suffered heavy casualties during this phase. This movement by the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles practically surrounded many of the tribesmen, and it was only the approach of dusk that prevented full advantage being taken of this favourable position.

The attack by the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles immediately relieved the pressure on "A" company, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, about "Y," and enabled it to withdraw covered by fire from the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and 15th Mountain Battery.

Whilst this was taking place Captain O. C. T. Dykes, who was commanding the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, accompanied by Lieut. N. F. B. Shaw and Lieut. L. N. Smith, R.A., the F. O. O. of 15th Mountain Battery, collected some 30 men from those at battalion headquarters and in spite of persistent and heavy sniping from both sides of the road worked his way forward along the ridge and brought in the remaining casualties of the advanced guard. These were evacuated by motor ambulance and lorries which,

escorted by the armoured cars, had come up to milestone 50.

The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles having evacuated their casualties withdrew at about 4-30 p.m. assisted by the armoured cars and covering fire. Coming into brigade reserve they took up a position in rear of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles to cover the withdrawal of the latter.

It was now evident that the withdrawal of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles would present difficulties owing to the intersected nature of the country, the close proximity of the enemy and the approach of dusk. The battalion had suffered casualties on the summit of hill 4792 and on its southern slopes, and the evacuation of these and the subsequent withdrawal would occasion further delay if opposed. Accordingly the 1st South Wales Borderers, who had returned to camp at about 2 p.m. from the northern section, moved out and took up a position to the north-east of Point 4792 to support the withdrawal of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles. The latter battalion having under great difficulties collected and evacuated its casualties, withdrew successfully, covered by artillery fire and by fire from the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and the 1st South Wales Borderers, without sustaining further casualties. At about 6-45 p.m. it passed clear of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles who then withdrew followed by the 1st South Wales Borderers.

The tribesmen had suffered heavy losses and although the final stages were carried out in failing light the withdrawal was not followed up. The last troops reached Damdil camp by 7.45 p.m.

Throughout the day aircraft of No. 5 (A. C.) Squadron R. A. F., operating from Miranshah, co-operated closely, and took close support action on several occasions.

The strength of the tribal *lashkar* is reliably estimated to have numbered from 700—1,000. Their casualties were subsequently confirmed at 94 killed and 64 severely wounded, with a proportionate number of slightly wounded. The high percentage of killed is an indication of the severe nature of the fighting, and the effect of this action was such that the Tori Khel Wazirs took little active part in the fighting which subsequently took place in north Waziristan.

Our own casualties amounted to 34 killed (including 2 British Officers) and 45 wounded (including one British officer).


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GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY, 1937.

In the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1937 the following four essays were received:

1. "Fire descended from Heaven"
2. "In bello quies."
3. "If a strong man be not armed, how shall he secure his house?"
4. "He is come to open the purple testament of bleeding war."

The judges appointed for the competition, *viz.*, Mr. C. MacIvor G. Ogilvie, C.B.E., I.C.S., Air Commodore R. H. Peck, O.B.E., R.A.F., and Colonel G. N. Molesworth, I.A., have given first place to the essay "Fire descended from Heaven," submitted by Lieutenant-Colonel R. P. L. Ranking, M.C., 2nd Royal Lancers (Gardner's Horse).

The Council of the United Service Institution of India has, accordingly, awarded a gold medal to Lieutenant-Colonel Ranking. The winning essay is published below:

SUBJECT

"Mr. Baldwin has said that 'The Rhine is our frontier.'" Discuss this.

"*Let us never forget this; since the day of the air, the old frontiers are gone. When you think of the defence of England, you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover; you think of the Rhine. That is where our frontier lies.*"—Mr. Baldwin (Official Report, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 30th July, 1934).

What is a frontier?

In the first place let us consider the meaning of the word "*frontier,*" and the implications which arise therefrom. The "Concise Oxford Dictionary" defines this word as "part of a country that borders on another;" this is correct as far as it goes with reference to the strict application of the word to a geographical frontier, but is there any other kind of frontier? What does the word imply? There seem to be three primary implications which bear on the subject under discussion. Within the frontier of any country which wishes to maintain its integrity

(*a*) no hostile Power can be allowed to establish a footing;

(*b*) defensive measures against hostile attack can be provided in time of peace and initiated as required;

(c) preparations for the counter-offensive can be made.

This seems a case in which the converse may be applied, so it follows that any area in which the above three needs can or must be fulfilled may fairly be held to lie within the zone of interest or "strategic frontier" of the Power concerned. It is these three implications of the word, rather than the word itself, which provide us with the key to Earl Baldwin's meaning.

Geographical Factor

Although the geographical situation of the United Kingdom is so well known as to require no elaboration, yet it is useful, since this factor has such an important bearing on the subject, briefly to consider its salient features. The United Kingdom lies (as in reality it is) like a piece thrown off from the main Continent of Europe; geological disturbances in past ages have resulted in the separation of the islands from the mainland by a stretch of sea varying in width from 23 to 370 miles. The longest axis, a distance of 610 miles, lies at an angle of approximately forty-five degrees to the coast line of the mainland, with the result that the whole of the east flank gradually approaches the Continent as it comes further south. At no point is Great Britain wider than 325 miles and in many places it is considerably less; this means that its life is constricted into a narrow strip, of which the long face lies open to possible assault. In days gone by, when man was dependent upon nature for his motive power, the prevailing westerly winds could be counted on as an ally to defeat or delay the approach of an enemy; but since the advent of mechanical means of locomotion, the value of this help has materially decreased. The "moat defensive to a house" of Shakespeare's time has now lost a great portion of its strength through the development of transport methods which have rendered man to a great extent independent of the elements.

Defence

It is axiomatic that in any scheme of defence the "line of foremost defended localities" must be sufficiently in advance of the positions vital to the defence to ensure that these latter are not over-run or overwhelmed by fire at the beginning of the assault. When all is said and done, the first point at which a nation attacked can at the outset defend itself is along its frontier; that is to say, its border with the neighbouring hostile Power. Some

countries, by reasons of geographical chances, are lucky enough to have their vital points so far from their frontiers that distance itself renders it difficult for an attacker to strike a decisive blow. It was the distance to a truly vital point which to a great extent ruined Napoleon's campaign in Russia in 1812. Modern developments, however, have considerably reduced the defensive qualities of distance alone; and in case where sufficient distances do not exist, special protective measures have to be taken in order to defend any vital centre.

Vital Centres

As this stage it is well to consider what constitutes a vital centre, and what these are in the case of the United Kingdom. Put in its simplest form, a vital centre is a place the capture, destruction, or neutralisation of which by a hostile Power must directly or indirectly jeopardise the whole system of defence. What are these points? The first which comes to the mind is London itself, with its docks and its network of railways, both of them essential to the life of the country from the transportation point of view: its banks and other centres of financial activity, not to mention its political, administrative, and social institutions. Situated nearby are the arsenal at Woolwich, the small arms works at Enfield, and the dockyards at Chatham. The danger and the importance of London have long been recognised; in "Air Defence," by Ashmore, we read:

> "As a capital London is indispensable to its nationals to a degree unequalled in any country of the world;"
>
> and again:
>
> "In London to-day (1929) is centred at least one-third of the total activities of England; this vast agglomeration of wealth and energy is so disposed as to form the most convenient target for bombs; it is too near the coasts that give on to the Continent to be easy of defence; it possesses an ideal leading mark in the Thames estuary."

Many of the most important industrial areas so essential for war production lie in central and east-central England; although attempts are being made to palliate this dangerous state of affairs by the move westwards of some important munition installations, yet the large-scale move of factories is out of the question, both from the point of view of the expense involved, and by reason of the fact that in most cases their location has been dictated by economic factors. A judicious sub-division of essential factories would render

a complete stoppage less probable, but the industrial concerns of the Midlands and the London docks and railways must always remain a large commitment to be protected. Besides these, the various shipbuilding yards along the coast, the many electrical power and control stations, the communication centres inland are all possible targets; in addition to the strictly military objectives such as aerodromes, arsenals, and administrative installations.

Geographical Frontiers, now and in the past

What are the *geographical* frontiers of the United Kingdom from the direction of which danger is to be apprehended? On the east the North Sea, and on the south-east the English Channel. It is unthinkable that our zone of interest should ever again be confined to these narrow limits, unless the British Empire is to vanish and England decline to the level of a state similar to that which existed at the time of the Roman or Danish invasions. The conjoint island of England and Scotland has always been peculiarly susceptible to events in the Low Countries and northern France. In the time of Elizabeth, English volunteers went overseas to help the Dutch resist the onset of the Spaniards. Some of the greatest campaigns of Marlborough and Wellington were fought to prevent the domination by France of the eastern shores of the North Sea; Napoleon realised to the full that Antwerp was "a pistol pointed at the heart of England" and articles in past treaties have been primarily designed to ensure the integrity of Belgium. History repeated itself during the Great War, when the possession by the Germans of the greater portion of Belgium, with the resultant establishment of hostile submarine bases along the shores of the Channel and air bases inland, caused, to say the least of it, very considerable difficulty and danger to the British Empire. This point has been brought out again and again; one of the more recent occasions being in Mr. Eden's speech of 26th March, 1936:

> "We have never been able to dissociate ourselves from events in the Low Countries, neither in the time of Queen Elizabeth, nor in the time of Marlborough, nor in the time of Napoleon, and still less at the present day when modern developments of science have brought the striking force so much nearer to our shores. It is a vital interest of the country that the integrity of France and Belgium should be maintained, and that no hostile force should cross their frontier."

Scientific Development—the Air

There is no need to ask what is this scientific development which has thus increased the importance of the Low Countries and northern France; aircraft with its rapidly increasing range and striking power comes immediately to the mind. No count need be taken of action by carrier-borne aircraft; besides the fact that the proximity of the United Kingdom to the Continent renders such form of attack unnecessary, the feasibility of such attack would presuppose the defeat or neutralisation of the British Home Seas Fleet, a contingency which must never be allowed to arise. Added to this, recent exercises at Singapore have shown that within about 225 miles from the land, aircraft carriers are likely to be a comparatively easy target for the defending torpedo-bombers. Imagine for a moment the eastern shores of the Channel and North Sea to be in the hands of a hostile Power with an air force only the equivalent of our own. What would be the result? Our sea communications by the east and south-east coast would be rendered precarious in the extreme; the whole of England, southern Scotland, and part of Ireland would lie open to air attack, thus necessitating the retention of considerable air forces for defence, besides the fact that our essential industries would lie within *close* range of hostile bombing. Even climatic conditions, which in time past have formed one line of defence against attack from the Continent, must now largely be discounted as an auxiliary; the cloudy weather which all too often obtains in the British Isles now tends to help the attacker by reducing visibility and thus screening his approach. What are the chief characteristics of air attack—the secrecy of preparation and speed with which the assault can be delivered; these confer on the attacker the advantage of being able to deliver a stunning blow at the outset. This necessitates the defender being in a state of constant readiness.

> "Although no official figures have yet been announced, the maximum speeds of German military prototypes seem to be in the neighbourhood of 300 miles per hour."—(*Golovine—"Air Strategy."*)

This figure may not yet have been achieved, but at the present rate of progress it cannot be long before it is attained, and it is one which should be kept in our minds. If we take a speed of 275 m.p.h. to be possible at the present time we shall not be far out in our calculations. The radius of modern high performance medium

bombers may now be taken as 450 miles, and this is a figure which must increase as time goes on. Turn for a moment to the diagram and by striking the arc of a circle of 450 miles radius with the centre at London, it will be seen from what localities air attacks on south-east England can be sent out. If we strike a similar circle with the centre at Manchester, it will be seen that Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield and Birmingham are all within range of air attack from the Continent. Hostile bombers based on aerodromes situated between the Belgian frontier and the Rhine can deliver attacks over the greater part of England, including the western ports such as Liverpool and Bristol. As the range and speed of bombing aircraft increase, the area open to hostile attack must also become larger. Taking the two factors of speed and range of aircraft together and reducing them to a matter of time, it will be seen that approximately only one hour forty minutes will elapse between the time the attacking aircraft start from the furthest hostile aerodrome and the time the attack is delivered on London; as a result, the time available for full defensive measures to be put into operation will be considerably less. It is a platitude to say that to counter an attack, early information of such an attack is essential; the more swiftly the attack can be delivered, the more speedily must the warning come in, and the further out must the observers be to give the requisite information. This brings us to the first essential of air defence—depth, without which no successful opposition can be made to enemy attacks.

> "It is this room that is the essential in a large-scale air defence problem. Room will give time for warning, time to get patrols to their fighting height; room will allow you to organise the service of information vital to a successful defence."—(*Ashmore—"Air Defence."*)

Air Defence Measures

Let us now consider the time necessary to set active defence measures in train to counter the hostile attack. Under favourable circumstances this may be taken at a fair estimate as twenty to twenty-five minutes, including the time taken for the warning to be given and the intercepter fighters to gain operational height. In terms of distance, what does twenty-five minutes represent at 275 m.p.h.?—approximately 114 miles. This in itself means that the warning of the impending attack should come in from a point 114 miles away from the target. If reference is again made to the

diagram and other arcs struck with centres London and Manchester and radius 114 miles, the points from which warning of air attack should be given will lie along the arc of these circles. It is therefore a self-evident fact that this depth referred to above cannot, by reason of geographical characteristics, be adequately obtained within the United Kingdom. Assuming that the danger is to come from the east, south-east and south, at no point is the centre of London further away from the coast line (along which the most advanced home ground observation and warning stations can lie) than 75 miles, or at 275 miles per hour a period of seventeen minutes. We must remember also that London covers a very considerable area, that vulnerable targets exist on its circumference and that others lie nearer to the coast than London itself; these facts alone must reduce the safety margin. The result of this must be that a warning given from the coast line of the United Kingdom will not allow sufficient time, taking all factors into consideration, for full measures for the defence of south-east England to be put into operation. Some warning can perhaps be given by ships cruising in the Channel and North Sea or by small airships fitted with sound locators patrolling over that area; no great reliance could, however, be placed on these, as such airships would of necessity be an easy target for hostile attack and, both from the point of view of transmitting information by wireless and observing the approach of hostile aircraft, moving patrols could not give as effective results as a well co-ordinated listening organisation on the ground with fully established means of communication by land line.

The widening of the "Zone of Interest"

The factors of time and space, added to the development of weapons, have pushed the zone of interest, and hence the strategical frontier, further afield; and this extension must tend to grow as the speed and range of bombing aircraft increase. The strategical frontier can, therefore, never coincide with the geographical frontier. By reason of the development of air forces the United Kingdom has lost its insularity and is more than ever susceptible to the conditions obtaining in the Low Countries and northern France.

> "One may safely assume that the defensive frontier of the British Isles in any future war will be extended far beyond the English coast line. Fighter and reconnaissance patrols will operate over the coasts of Belgium and

> northern France, and perhaps even further afield."—(*Golovine—"Air Strategy."*)

The security of the British Isles renders it essential that no hostile Power should be permitted to establish air bases within close striking distance. For this reason alone British policy must preserve as one of its cardinal points the maintenance of the freedom of the Low Countries and the assurance that the coast line of northern France shall never be in the hands of a hostile Power.

Co-operation required

It is hardly sufficient that the countries on the east coasts of the North Sea and Channel shall be benevolently neutral towards the United Kingdom. What is required, in order that a really adequate measure of air protection shall be put into effect, is their active co-operation. This means that the era of "splendid isolation" is gone; the United Kingdom and France are already bound by treaty obligations and the recent announcement by Belgium of her independence of the Locarno Treaties seems well calculated to advance this co-operation. The Franco-British declaration resultant on the Belgium statement notes:

> "The determination expressed publicly and on more than one occasion by the Belgium Government (*a*) to defend the frontier of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression against another State, as a *passage* or as a base of operations by land, by sea, or in the air; (*b*) to organise the defence of Belgium in an efficient manner for this purpose."

The declaration goes on to state that Great Britain and France maintain towards Belgium their undertakings of assistance given under the Locarno Treaty and the London Agreement of 19th March, 1936. In addition, the Belgian Government has categorically stated its fidelity to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and to the obligations which devolve on members of the League. This in itself presupposes that Belgium will be ready to take action against any Power which the League has declared to be an aggressor; and as a result the use of Belgian territory for defensive air or land operations under Article 16 of the Covenant is likely to follow. It must be noted how the theme of "aggression" is stressed throughout. Setting aside all ethical considerations, from the point of view of self-interest Great Britain could never appear in Belgium as an

"aggressor;" so Belgium in opposition to Great Britain is straightway ruled out. A source of danger to the United Kingdom would be an attack upon Belgium by a stronger Power to the east; but as the Government of Belgium has declared its intention to resist such an attack and to prevent Belgian territory being used as a passage for attack, these, combined with the undertakings given by Great Britain and France to help Belgium, must result in the active co-operation of the British, French and Belgian air forces. If this can be assured, the essential network of observers will be pushed out further in the direction from which the potential danger will come and use can be made of the ground organisations on the mainland to enable interceptor fighters to start off further from the vital targets. This perhaps is a counsel of perfection and it is probable that in the initial stages it may only be possible to utilise the territory of our allies across the Channel as an "outer warning zone;" but the ability to locate a portion of the British air striking force nearer the outer periphery of the zone of interest must in itself afford a measure of protection to home territory. By judicious bombing of hostile aerodromes, the enemy's preparations may be greatly impeded or his air bases may even be pushed back out of range of the vital positions which it is desired to protect. Admittedly, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and our own forward aerodromes will doubtless receive some measure of attention from the enemy; but, unless the air force of the enemy is predominantly overpowering, the more he can be forced to dissipate his bombing resources over a number of minor objectives, the more respite will be obtained for the more important ones which lie within the chain of protective aerodromes.

The Rhine

Admitted then that the adequate air defence of the United Kingdom requires a depth greater than can be obtained in the British Isles alone, and that our interest in the "Low Countries" is as great now—or greater than it has been in past history—why did Earl Baldwin choose the Rhine as our frontier in the wider sense of the word? It is not because Germany to the exclusion of all others is regarded as a potential enemy; *any* hostile first-class Power which possessed itself of Belgium, Holland, and the north coasts of France would constitute a threat. The reasons actuating this statement seem in the main to be twofold; in the first place, the Rhine is a geographical feature which, in the light of present-day condi-

tions, is located sufficiently far away to form the outer fringe of our "zone of interest;" in the second place, it is a simile easily understood and recognised by the man in the street, who thus may be induced to cast his gaze further out than he otherwise might. But does the Rhine really fulfil all requirements as our strategic frontier? For a portion of its course the Rhine has German territory on both banks, so here we cannot prevent in peace time the location of German aerodromes to the west of our "frontier." Strictly speaking this is tantamount to an infringement (although an unavoidable one) of our zone of interest. To the north of where the Rhine enters the sea there is Dutch territory whereon hostile aerodromes could be established, and the amount of this territory must increase as the various land reclamation schemes come to fruition; our interest in the integrity of Holland is as acute as in the case of Belgium. As the speed and range of aircraft grow in the future, so the advisability of pushing further afield our zone of interest must also increase. This, however, from practical considerations, is not possible, as it would entail the location of the "strategic frontier" actually within German territory where it could never be utilised.

Conclusion

We see then that now and for some time to come, until all danger of war in Western Europe is definitely and finally removed, the Rhine must remain our "frontier." This statement was made by Earl Baldwin in no sense of hostility to Germany or any other Power, but in order to reiterate in a form intelligible to all the essential points of British policy that the freedom of northern France, Belgium and Holland must be maintained, and that no modification of the present eastern frontiers of these three countries can be tolerated. "Die wacht am Rhein" is as essential to the British Empire as it is to Germany.


Cologne 450 miles
Liverpool
Manchester
Manchester 114 miles
LONDON
Bristol
London 114 miles
Antwerp
B E L G
Manchester 450 miles
F R A N C
London 450 miles

"ANY COMPLAINTS?"

By "Explorer"

Second-Lieutenant Jones of the Loamshire Regiment approached the battalion messing office, observed the artless notice pasted on the door, "Keep out unless on duty," and entered the sanctum.

"Good morning, Sergeant Rushton," said he to the meticulous, white-frocked cook-sergeant, who was wrestling with the A.B. 48.

"Good morning, Sir," replied the N.C.O., springing to attention. "Come to take over, Sir?"

"Yes, curse it; I can't think why I was selected as messing officer as I know nothing about the job and I haven't done a course at Poona."

"Pardon me, Sir, but I don't think you'll need to worry about the actual cooking. Your job is to look after the accounts, supervise generally and utilise the daily ration to the best advantage. And I think you'll enjoy it, Sir, once you get going."

"Well, you'll have to teach me and you'd better start now. As the last messing officer went off to hospital so suddenly I shall not be able to 'take over' in the usual way. You do the talking and I'll make a few notes."

"Certainly, Sir. Do you know what the daily ration consists of?" asked the Sergeant.

"No, I'm afraid I don't. A pound of bread, a pound of meat, I suppose, with a few bits thrown in. I used to know the English ration when I was at Sandhurst but no one ever discusses the ration in India."

"Very well, Sir," said the Sergeant, warming to his subject. "Each individual on the ration strength of the battalion is entitled to the following:

1	lb.	bread.
1	„	fresh meat—(12 oz. preserved).
4	oz.	flour or rice.
2½	„	sugar.
5/7	„	tea.
½	„	salt.
10	„	potatoes.
8	„	fresh vegetables.
2	„	beans.
6	„	onions.

Plus, of course, a cash allowance of 4½ annas a man; this for 650 men is Rs. 182-13-0 per day or Rs. 5,485 per month."

"That seems rather a lot. Do you mean to say the soldier eats it every day?"

"Ah, one moment, Sir, if you please. I should like to explain something. There are, roughly, three methods of feeding a British unit in India:

(*a*) By messing on the official ration and cash allowance only; this calls for a balance of income and expenditure and the A.B. 48 must be square at the end of the month. Many units use this method.

(*b*) The next method is as for (*a*) but supplemented by a daily charge against the men: in some units, this charge is as much as three annas.

(*c*) The third method is the 'under-drawn ration' idea. Of course, Sir, we underdraw."

The young officer appeared quite unperturbed by this disclosure. "Now, Sergeant Rushton," said he, "will you please explain what you mean by under-drawing? I'm an expert at over-drawing myself!"

"I'll try to make it clear by showing you two diet sheets, Sir; let's take the Royal Blankshires. They run their messing by the first method. They draw up the full ration and the A.B. 48 is all square at the end of the month. During the month they would draw:

21,004	lbs.	meat.
21,004	,,	bread.
937	,,	tea.
5,051	,,	flour.

The messing officer would have just over Rs. 5,000 or Rs. 182 per day to spend on groceries. The diet sheet would run out something like this for one day:

Early meal.
Tea

Breakfast.
Tea, bread, fried battered steaks; fried onions, gravy.

Dinner.
Meat pies, potatoes, vegetables, custard, apricots.

Tea.
Tea, bread and butter.

Supper.
Tea, bread, potato cutlets, fried onions, gravy.

Purchases from cash allowance.

	lbs.	Rs.	a.
Milk	100	10	15
Butter	24	24	0
Dripping	79	39	8
Sugar	40	6	4
Apricots	30	15	0
Custard	14	7	14
Condiments	..	6	0
Meat	175	32	13
Potatoes	175	32	13
Tea	7	2	10
Bread	178	5	9
		183	6

Of course, Sir, if the men were charged, say, two annas a day, the messing officer would have a little more money to play about with and the diet could be improved."

"Yes, I suppose that is so, but I'm sure the soldier hates the idea of paying extra for his meals."

"Quite right, Sir, extra payment is most unpopular in the barrack room. Now, let's take our battalion of the Loamshire Regiment. We usually . . . . ."

"Now the mystery is to be explained. Sergeant Rushton, you remind me of a conjurer about to let the audience into a secret!"

"It really isn't a secret, Sir; I can show you best by this little table. This is what we did last month, Sir.

Monthly Ration.	*Under-drawn.*	*Balance.*	*Price.*	*Cash value.* Rs.	a.
Meat, 21,004	8,201	12,803	Rs. 7-14 per 100	645	13
Bread, 21,004	6,992	14,312	Pies 7 per lb.	244	0
Tea, 937	100	837	As. 5 ,,	31	4
Flour, 5,051	1,700	3,351	Rs. 5-4 per 100.	89	4
				1010	5·0

Now, Sir, we feed about 650 men each day. We find that with care in preparation and economy in issue we can still give the individual soldier as much meat, bread, tea, etc., as he has always been used to but, at the same time, use less in the operation! I'll explain the special economies later. As we have not drawn the full ration, we are entitled to the cash value of the 'under-draws' at the end of the month. In this case, you will find that in addition to the Rs. 5,000 you have to spend you can rely on an extra Rs. 1,000 from the C.M.A. That little bit extra will make all the difference in improving the messing. Our diet-sheet, as you will see, is slightly better than the Blankshire one I showed you and I have underlined the little something the others haven't got.

Early meal.	*Breakfast.*	*Dinner.*
Tea, *ginger biscuits.*	Tea, bread, *butter*, fried battered steaks *Marmalade, pease pudding* fried onions, gravy.	Meat pies, potatoes, vegetable, custard, apricots.
	Tea.	*Supper.*
	Tea, bread and butter *Jam.*	Tea, bread and *butter, fried fish, chipped potatoes.*

That particular menu costs exactly Rs. 225-14-0; you will remember that the Blankshire menu ran out at Rs. 183-6-0. But we've got the money in the till, Sir."

"Do we spend the full amount each day?" asked Second-Lieutenant Jones.

"No, Sir, the amount varies and you will find, if you look through the messing account, that we make a profit of Rs. 300 a month on the average."

"Doesn't the Government claim that?"

"No fear, Sir! You see, as long as the money is spent on the *men's messing* no auditor can object and the cash balance accumulates and pays for the Xmas Dinner, extra expenses in camp and such like. That is another advantage about this system as the P.R.I. does not have to pay out anything from battalion funds."

"Now, suppose some senior inspecting officer comes round and asks me about all this wangling. What authority have we got for it?"

"You will find it in R.A.I., Sir; correction slip 222 of 1932 first drew attention to it; now it's para. 488."

"Any snags about it?"

"No, Sir, but we are not allowed to under-draw vegetables and we are not allowed to under-draw anything issued by the R.I.A.S.C. with a view to purchasing the identical commodity locally. That, I think, is just plain common sense."

"How do we collect the extra cash?"

"At the end of the month a statement is sent to the Quartermaster showing the number of rations admissible and the amount of 'under-draws.' This is checked and later on the value of the under-drawn articles is credited to the messing officer's account."

"And you think this is the best system?"

"I'm sure of it, Sir. It enables the messing staff to improve and vary the diet and to try experiments. If a menu has never been tried before this constitutes the main reason for trying it once. But you can't do this unless you have a small cash balance behind you. Recently, we have found several dishes the men like. Also the money seems to go farther, Sir. We can give them butter for breakfast instead of margarine, bully-beef, fish and chips, jam, cake and several other things but, of course, we never give them luxuries."

"How about supper?"

The sergeant laughed. "The supper question is rather funny, Sir. As you know, we now have an extra anna cash allowance per day to provide suppers. Well, for a long time before we got it we gave the men supper. But only about a quarter of the battalion used to turn up. Directly the men knew they were *entitled* to supper things changed. Now we get nearly the whole battalion in each night except on pay days."

"What financial effect has it had on the messing account?"

"Before we collected the anna, Sir, we used to give them bread, soup and sometimes stew for supper. Now we dish up

fish and chips or a proper meat meal. This is a bit more expensive and instead of clearing about Rs. 300 a month our profit has decreased by half."

"What about the economies you mentioned?"

"Well, Sir, it's like this. There is usually a lot of waste in army messing and you will remember the swill tubs we used to see in England. We have no waste meat because we use only what is necessary and it is all eaten; the bread is cut up into small slices, put on the issue table and each soldier helps himself. At the end of the meal the spare bread is collected, returned to the messing store and reissued for the next meal. We have practically no *waste* bread. The making of all tea is strictly supervised and food is issued from a central store. The messing corporal looks after that."

"What about swill? Don't we sell that?"

"Swill, Sir?" replied the Sergeant with some slight indignation, "why, no contractor would offer to buy our swill 'cos there aint none! We've got no swill tubs!"

EDUCATING OUR SONS FOR AN ARMY CAREER

By Major N. S. Rawat, Kashmir State Forces

Given sons, the problem is to give them suitable education. The problem of a son's education is a difficult one for many fathers, but it is even more difficult for the majority of officers of the Indian States Forces who have, rightly or wrongly, high ambitions in this respect but far fewer opportunities of being able to attain them.

By suitable education is meant here not the attainment of many high-sounding degrees such as B.A. and M.A., but a good all-round education which will develop the mental and moral qualities of the boy, his character, his ability to stand on his own and to assume responsibility whenever required; which will ensure that the boy is well acquainted with present-day affairs of major importance, is perfectly at home in all social functions or activities in which he may be called upon to take part; that he looks people straight in the face at all times and does not feel shy or labour under a self-imposed "inferiority complex:" in other words the sort of general education usually imparted at the public schools in England and to which attention has of late been given in India both in the press and on the platform. It is felt that, equipped with this sort of education, the youth should have far better chances of holding his own, doing well in this world and ultimately proving a good Indian citizen than with the purely academic or theoretical education which the majority of present-day Indian schools or colleges give.

Much has been said about the poor quality of education within reach of over 75 per cent of Indian youths but mighty little, if anything, has been done to improve matters. Who has not seen the modern "matric" or undergraduate coming up in hundreds for practically any post carrying a salary of Rs. 20 p.m.? Yet some of them are completely ignorant of who the Viceroy is, or who Riza Shah is. Some of them will tell you that the importance of Singapore lies in its being the capital of Assam and that Delhi is hotter than Bombay in summer because of its proximity to the equator and so on. Many of them will hardly be able to utter a word in public or look at you while

speaking, whereas others will be trembling with an unknown fear and perspiring profusely. Now, armed with this type of education will it not be sheer luck, a fluke, a miracle if the boy does anything out of the ordinary in life's battle?

It is all very well to preach that India is an agricultural country and that there is an urgent necessity for Indian youth to receive agricultural and industrial training. But, in actual practice, a soldier's son in nine cases out of ten likes to follow the footsteps of his father. An army career still appeals to him as being far more honourable than a quest for wealth and rank alone, in spite of the challenge that is being thrown out more and more now against the martial (or the enlisted) classes.

"Bah! the profession of arms, martial classes! What nonsense! Is there any such entirely separate class called 'Martial Class' anywhere else in the world? Give a man a musket, train him in its use and he will become as good a soldier as any. This is true in countries like England, Japan and America so why should it not be true in India too?" This assertion is at times boldly made by men whose religion "Not to kill"—the best of religions—prohibits them even from taking their evening dinner for fear of eating or drinking by chance some insect with their food or drink. Some of these people have seldom seen or heard an ordinary shot-gun fired, much less heard the late Commander-in-Chief's "Whine of bullet on the frontiers." Yet a number of their sons are already officering the Indianised units of the Indian Army!

All this makes the father think seriously, scratch his head, get advice from various persons as to what he should do regarding his son's or sons' education. It is generally the latter, *i.e.*, the plural number, for to the average Indian father in middle life sons are born in much too rapid a succession and his worries and responsibilities increase many times. He cannot in the already overpopulated India look forward, as his contemporary in Italy or Russia can, to any appreciation or help from the Government or State for having done his bit to increase the population. He applies to various Indian and European schools or colleges for a prospectus and before long collects an amazing mass of literature on the subject. He pores over this for days and at last makes a choice of the school he would send his boy to. His choice in this respect is mainly governed by the tradition or reputation of the

institution selected, its expense, climate, distance, and the social status of the boys usually admitted into the school. As far as entry into the Indian Military Academy is concerned, the Royal Indian Military College beats hollow all other schools in India. But for reasons of expense, this and also another equally fine institution, the Doon School, are simply prohibitive. Much as the father would like to send his son or sons to these schools, his purse does not allow it and he has with reluctance to look elsewhere. It is very seriously doubted whether the above schools will be within easy reach of any Indian commissioned officer until he has attained his captaincy or more! The choice thus often falls on one of the European schools situated in the hills. In such schools boys of European or Anglo-Indian descent receive their education up to Senior Cambridge standards and Indians are hesitatingly and reluctantly allowed up to a limit of 25 per cent. The father argues with himself, "Now, for all the open competition for the Services or even for entry into good business concerns one must, in addition to other qualifications, possess 'go' and 'drive' and be well up in the English language; one must be able to read, write and speak English fluently and correctly if one wishes to make any impression at all at the Examining Board. So why should I not pinch and scrape—save something monthly and send my son to a European school, the fountain head of the English language and manners, where the chances of developing character are greater?" He is probably not far wrong in taking up the above line of thought. For the profession of arms, especially for leadership in the wider and the correct sense, we Indians have to learn from the British officers, who have proved their worth in this respect for the last hundred years or more not only in India but over the different battlefields of the world. We have to learn the art or science of war, whatever one may like to call it, from them and in their language. Ask any British officer, no matter how good a linguist he may be, to explain his ideas in this respect in our language; he will not be able to do it half as well as in his own mother-tongue and naturally so. He will fumble for suitable words and the trend of his thoughts and ideas will be obstructed. The whole charm will have gone, vanished. Even an educated Indian military officer finds difficulty in translating into simple, every day Urdu phrases like "Appreciation of a situation;" "Use your imagination;" "Paint the picture;" "Initiative." Hence the

extreme importance, amongst other things, of the English language for an officer who elects to make the army his future career. He must not only be able to read, write and speak it, he should also be able to understand the language really well and to express himself in it as he would in his own mother-tongue.

So the poor boy is despatched to one of these European schools, where he finds the first term or year of his stay very trying indeed; the manners, the living and the food are all entirely new to him (I am not talking here of the few isolated cases where the father or mother of the boy happens to be a European, or an Anglicized Indian). The boy having gone to the school at a young and impressionable age makes headway. It is amazing how well some of these little imps do and how they become thorough little *sahibs*! These boys generally come to look down upon Indians, except those Indians who speak English and dress in European ways, as aliens and foreigners and call them "Indian chaps." They naturally lose the little they know of their own religion, for, as far as I know, none of these European schools cater for the religious training of Indians. The Indian boys begin to understand the significance of the church, the chapel, and the Bible, and forget the importance of Ramayan, the Quran, or the Granth Sahib. Not that it makes a vital difference, for after all there is good in all religions. But it does put the boy completely out of gear when in later life he is called upon to attend a temple, a mosque or a gurdwara or to perform some religious ceremony. The poor lad feels completely out of touch with his own people. It takes a good time, years in fact, for the lad to re-establish himself in this respect.

In addition to this denationalisation, another drawback of these European schools for an Indian and especially for a Hindu boy is the quality and type of food. He simply cannot accustom himself to the boiled stuff called "Irish stew" and similar dishes. A constant appeal is made by the boy to his parents: "Can I be given some Indian food, please, occasionally?" The father writes a polite letter to the headmaster, or principal as they generally like to be called in India, and gets a curt reply: "Eminent authorities have declared the food given in our school to be good and wholesome and your lad must accustom himself to it. He is a delicate lad in this respect. We can only comply with your request if you are prepared to pay an extra 33 per cent

on the monthly charges" and so on. And the matter ends there. The vacations come and the boy returns home skin and bone—a perfect skeleton! It requires all the arguments and persuasions on the part of the father to make the mother, an Indian mother too, agree to her son's return to the school next term.

It costs the father in the neighbourhood of Rs. 8,000 before his son passes the Senior Cambridge at such schools against not more than one-sixth of that sum for the boy to matriculate at an Indian school; and in both cases the boy will require a further four years to get a degree from one of the colleges in India.

A good many fathers therefore try the cheaper method, that is they let the boy matriculate at one of the local schools and then enter him for one of the colleges nearby or put him under crammers for a couple of years while he works for the Indian Military Academy or for some Service. This alternative, though much cheaper and quicker, cannot ensure the same standard of genuine education or the same strong foundation and background. The boy is always handicapped in after-life. So, as far as knowledge of the English language and manners, character, and a general "toning up" are concerned, the European school education is probably well worth the expense and the sacrifice.

The three King George's Royal Indian Military schools at Ajmer, Jhelum and Jullundur are well run and have shown good results. But these are open to the sons of Indian Viceroy's commissioned officers and N.C.O.s only and would probably require much reorganization to convert them into public schools. To do this great expense would have to be incurred.

For boys intending to make the army their career the best schools in India, therefore, taking everything into consideration are, in my opinion, first, the Royal Indian Military College and next the Doon—the newly started Indian public school. Both of these schools are situated amongst lovely surroundings in Dehra Doon with a good healthy climate; possess an excellent and highly qualified staff; provide first-class food; admit boys of reasonably good status (no driver's or ticket collector's sons here!) and have good arrangements for imparting religious training to young Indians. Great stress is laid on the development of both brains and brawn. Plenty of games and sports are available. The life is an outdoor one and provides opportunities for building the boy's character and power of leadership. The only disadvantages

are the lack of society of European boys and the excessive expense. In these two schools there are, as far as I know, very few, if any, European boys, and the advantages of mixing and living with them as pals and comrades and of learning from them are not obtainable as in the European schools I have mentioned. I wonder whether this shortcoming could not be removed by encouraging the admission of a proportion of boys of European parentage of good status.

About the high expenses. I fear I am repeating myself once again. My question is: "Are the martial classes enlisting into the army to obtain their full opportunity of officering the Indian units of the future, or are they not? Is the Government going to raise its little finger to assist them in doing so, or is it not?" If the answer be in the affirmative, and if there be a genuine desire to give such opportunity to those who have all along been considered and declared by competent authorities to be the ideal material, then something must be done, and done quickly, to reduce the monthy charges at these two schools in favour of fathers who are or were in the army and who wish to send their sons into the army too! If this is not done, the majority of officers in the future Indian Army may certainly be sons of monied people but rarely will they come from the martial classes! How can one expect a soldier (generally poor) to compete with a rich man in the matter of spending money—a man who has generations of hoardings to gloat over? If such a concession should ever be made the State Forces should surely have a claim to it too, considering that their strength is about 50,000 all told, and that they have for years, directly or indirectly, rendered service to the Empire in some form or other. Should not the purse-strings of the nation be loosened for a cause of this nature, a cause aiming at the improvement of the soldier who is the nation's mainstay in its hour of danger?

EXPANSION AND PROBLEMS OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE IN GREAT BRITAIN

(*A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India on 15th July, 1937, by Air Commodore R. H. Peck, O.B.E., R.A.F.*

The lecturer was introduced by Major-General C. J. E. Auchinleck, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., O.B.E.)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I have been asked to lecture to you to-day on the expansion of the Royal Air Force and some of the air problems which face us in Great Britain. I do not think I can start better than by explaining to you the phenomenal strides which air development has made in the last two or three years, and how the truly amazing technical advance, which has occurred, has altered the whole air situation and the air problems with which we are confronted.

A change has taken place no less revolutionary and sweeping than that caused by the discovery of steam as a means of motive power, or the use of metal for the construction of ships; more sweeping than the invention of the screw propellor or the turbine. Inventive progress seems to take the course not of a steady upward curve, but of sudden upward movements alternating with periods of very gradual ascent. We are still in the middle of one of those sudden, steep upward movements and will not have exploited the results of current technical possibilities for another three or four years. Then we may hope and, as taxpayers, we should earnestly pray for a period of comparative quiet.

During the past few years we have grown accustomed to aircraft of a certain standard of performance of which the following examples are typical:

The day bomber.—A light two-seater of about 500 h.p. carrying 500 lbs. of bombs for 500 miles at 90 to 130 miles an hour, and mounting one gun forward and one gun to the rear.

The army co-operation aircraft of very similar characteristics.

We in India know these types well in the Wapiti, the Hart and the Audax.

Besides these, there has been the heavy bomber mainly designed to operate at night; slow in speed, perhaps 80 to 110 miles per hour, conveying half a ton or a ton of load, and of

perhaps 800 miles in total range; one gun forward, one gun lowered beneath in what is known as a "dustbin" mounting, and one gun in a tail turret.

Finally there was the single seater air defence fighter mounting two guns forward and flying at 230 to 240 miles per hour.

There are many other classes and sub-classes of service aircraft, but those described above have been the bread and cheese of the bill of fare.

A few years ago America took the lead in technical development, spurred on by the splendid flying opportunities her country affords, her stable weather, vast distances, lack of national frontiers hampering air transport and her overwhelming wealth. The struggle for the blue riband on the transcontinental coast to coast journey with mails and passengers led to a white-hot competition for performance, and in the course of this struggle were evolved almost simultaneously several remarkable technical inventions and features of design. These include:

The retractable undercarriage;
The variable pitched propeller;
The low resistance engine housing;
The all-metal stressed-skin wing and body structure, with its low structure weight and low frictional resistance;
The split flap for slow landing, coupled with the large aerodrome; and
High octane petrol.

These various devices, appearing as they did simultaneously, effected an astonishing revolution in aircraft performance. It became possible at once to fly with double the load at double the speed for double the distance.

The typical medium bomber became capable of flying 1,000 miles at 250 to 260 miles per hour with 1,000 lbs. of bombs. The heavy bomber became capable of flying 1,500 miles at 240 miles per hour with a ton to two tons of bombs. If, moreover, for reinforcement purposes, we slow down the speed to a beggarly two miles a minute, the new aircraft will fly twice the distance, or all the way from Baghdad to Lahore in 16 hours, without landing to refuel. Our pilots will now have to grow cushioned seats if they are to stay the course!

The new fighters mount several guns and possess a speed of over 300 miles per hour. Higher octane fuel allows of higher

compression ratios in the engines with higher output and lower fuel consumption.

I explained that we were not yet at the end of the present sharp upward curve of advance. Higher landing speeds and therefore high maximum speeds may be accepted; still higher octane fuel is being developed and the engines to use it; improvements in propellors and superchargers are being made; and all these have to be exploited before the scientists have to return to their laboratories and evolve any fresh inventions. Most of the speeds quoted above should be capable within five years of an addition of 100 miles per hour or its equivalent in other characteristics.

The beginning of the Royal Air Force expansion in 1935 found us with the old types in our squadrons and old style designs on the stocks. We had to face not merely an expansion in numbers, but a revolution in aircraft, in engine and in accessory design. No time was available in which to experiment with or test these new designs. We had to order straight off the drawing board what seemed sound and promising experimental prototypes. We have been very fortunate in that almost all of them have fully justified the advice of our technical staff and to-day we have coming into the Service fighters and bombers better, for the moment, than any possessed by foreign powers. But the race is keen and incessant, and the next designs of other Powers will, therefore, surpass our own and, until the progress of technical development slows down again to a steady gradient, we shall have continually to issue new specifications to take advantage of the latest progress and to re-equip a proportion of our units with the latest types.

So much for the technical race which is in headlong progress. Now let me turn to numbers and first-line strength.

As Joffre once said, "In the air this is always a crisis." Throughout the brief life of the Royal Air Force we have suffered from violent changes of policy, and if sometimes our organisation seems incomplete and imperfect in detail, bear in mind that we have been through some devastating disruptions.

At the beginning of the war we mustered in the Royal Flying Corps some 100 odd aircraft in all, some of these very odd! At the end of the war we had expanded to 187 squadrons, 3,300 first-line aircraft, 30,000 officers and 264,000 other ranks.

By March 1920 we had been broken down to 23 squadrons. In March 1923 our Home Defence Air Force consisted of three squadrons.

Then we were told that we should expand to 52 squadrons for Home Defence, but successive postponements in the cause of economy and disarmament had set back the completion of this programme to 1938.

In 1934 we had still only 42 squadrons, and this was the position when the Government suddenly came to realise how we stood relative to the rearming of continental Powers. We were then thrown, after the lean years of starvation, into a series of expansion schemes following each other like cascades. Between 1934 and March 1936 we had received successive orders to expand from 42 squadrons to 52, to 75, to 123, and then to 129, the latter including considerable increases in squadron strengths and re-equipment with aircraft of twice the power and capacity. The total strength at home is fixed, for the present, at 1,750 first-line aircraft. To this has to be added appreciable increases overseas, a very substantial increase in the Fleet Air Arm, and an adequate scale of war reserves.

This expansion virtually trebles the numbers of first-line aircraft at home. The greater part of this expansion was to be completed by March 1937, and the whole of the squadrons were to be formed by the summer of 1937, that is to say, in less than two years.

These figures will show you more clearly than anything I can say how colossal the problem has been which the Air Ministry has been called on to solve and will enable you to gauge the difficulties which have confronted the Service in striving to maintain the quality of units of which the quantity had so suddenly and drastically to be increased. It represents an expansion as rapid as can be achieved under pressure of war, while at the same time we have had to strive to maintain the characteristics and qualities which a service should possess in peace.

I looked through the Air Force List recently and noticed that only one squadron in the whole Service had its complement of flight-lieutenants—many had only one. This is now rapidly being rectified. Responsibility has had to be given at far earlier ages and to those with far less service experience than we should ever have contemplated. I think, however, that those of you who have

met and worked with some of these young officers and N.C.O. pilots in our squadrons in the recent operations on the North-West Frontier will agree with me that they have stood up to the test well and have carried their increased burdens and responsibility in a way which leaves no doubt that, taking it by and large, the material is right and that the training is sound.

And now a few words as to the Home Defence problem which this expansion is being provided to meet.

The continental Powers, like ourselves, are aiming, at present, at the creation of large air forces of a first-line strength in the region of 1,800 to 2,000 aircraft, except for the U.S.S.R. whose aim is nearer 3,000. Each is providing a large proportion of bombers including again an appreciable proportion of heavy bombers. It seems at present as if bombers will fall into two classes—medium bombers carrying half a ton of bombs and a crew of three at as high a speed as possible, say, about 250 miles per hour, and heavy bombers carrying two to three, or even more, tons of bombs at a somewhat slower speed, say, 220 miles per hour. These speeds are, however, being increased. The heavier bombers, offering a larger target, may be employed mainly by night, but, of course, both classes will be able to operate by day or night.

Naturally there are many other tasks besides bombing for which aircraft are required in war; army co-operation in all its forms, air fighting, oversea reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrol, naval purposes, and so on. In an air force of 1,800 to 2,000 aircraft, however, 1,000 to 1,200 may perhaps be bombers, and 300 or so may be employed as fighters.

Now that leads me to one of the first problems which the air staff have to solve—the problem of the numbers which might be brought against us. We may know that in peace there is opposite us a first-line strength of 1,800 to 2,000 of which, say, 1,000 are bombers, medium and heavy. But it is impossible to say whether that is the number which may be sent against us at the outbreak of war. A large strategic bombing air force is a new thing in war. We do not know whether it will be organised for war on military lines or on naval lines. An air force, remember, has as many characteristics in common with a fleet as it has with an army. An army is organised to take the field at a strength of so many divisions and arrangements are made to maintain the army at that strength for a period of, perhaps, many months of hostilities, if

not indefinitely. Its reserves are designed to last till replacements can be trained and constructed. Therefore, if one takes into account the potentialities of reserve divisions, one knows more or less what force will come against one. Navies have reserves, but reserves in quite a different sense. They do not remain in dock to replace casualties in the line of battle in order to maintain it at a given strength in capital ships. Every first-class capital ship is put into the line at once because a naval battle can be lost in a few hours or without prolonged hostilities. We cannot be certain how air reserves will be employed.

Some foreign Powers have sports flying associations and large numbers of reserve service aircraft. In a totalitarian State these could, without great difficulty or publicity, be organised as additional squadrons. Such a State may decide that a short war is essential, that it will be better to put the whole fleet into the battle rather than use its reserves to maintain a smaller force for a longer time. In that event one may be faced not with 1,000 bombers, but with 1,200 to 1,400 bombers. That might make all the difference to the issue of the air compaign.

That is why we are so anxious to ensure that every aeroplane, no matter what may be the role ordinarily allotted to it, shall be capable of acting as a bomber if the need arises. That is why we have striven and will strive for a central air force able to concentrate the maximum strength on whatever may be the critical point at the moment. That is why we have resisted the provision of three separate air forces, each able to be defeated in detail while the one that is hard-pressed is unable to obtain assistance from the others because they are under some other control. So much for the problem of numbers or relative strength.

Successive Governments of Great Britain have stated that in air strength and in air power the air forces in Great Britain will not be allowed to fall into inferiority to those of any Power within striking distance of our shores. The principal Powers so placed are France and Germany and it is, therefore, convenient to consider the air defence problem in relation to one or other of them.

And here I want to say a word of warning with special emphasis. In choosing, as I propose to do, Germany as the example wherewith to illustrate the air defence problem, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I do not do so because I consider in any way

whatever that that great Power has any intention of hostility towards Great Britain or that there need be any apprehension of attack from that direction. On the contrary I believe that the Fuehrer's repeated assertions that his aims are peaceful are perfectly sincere; as sincere as are our own. I believe and hope that the present good relations between the two countries will improve further and that we shall draw closer together in pursuit of our common aim of peace in Europe. I am, therefore, taking that example merely as an example to illustrate our problem and am regarding it as an academic example.

Now for the difficulties involved actively in the defence of Great Britain. It is a truism and a platitude that, with the invention of the aircraft, the prized isolation of Great Britain is over. But I think that many people do not quite realise its significance. Practically one-third of the activities and livelihood of Great Britain is concentrated in the Greater London area, and this concentration is still increasing. Many of the industries and imports on which we depend vitally, such as for example the cold meat supply, are handled mainly through the Port of London. The seat of government, of shipping control, of banking and finance are all concentrated in a confined space, and to this target the Thames, by day or by night, is an an ideal pointer. The distance from the coast, when warning of attack is gained, is but a few score miles. No country in the world has so many major interests concentrated in so vulnerable a spot.

It is a great mistake, however, to regard the problem as being that merely of the defence of London. A very few years ago when air raids were small, London was the principal target within range. To-day, owing to the recent inventions of which I have spoken, the whole of the industrial midlands, Liverpool, Bristol and the Tyne area are within range of attack. No less important, the shipping approaching our east and south coasts ports is also within range of attack and, as ranges increase, so will the number of ports, the approaches to which are within range, also increase. The initiative lies with the attacker, of course, and his choice of objectives, which we must defend, is vast. Aircraft can be switched more easily than any other instrument of war from one target to another situated a long distance away. It should not be difficult, for this reason, for an enemy to contrive to be in superior strength to the defence at each successive point selected for attack.

Formerly our infamous British weather afforded us a large measure of protection, but to-day, with better means of navigation and the advanced development of no-visibility flying, this sure shield has worn somewhat thinner.

Now a word as to the weight of attack and what attack by a force of 1,000 bombers actually means. It means that for an intensive period of a few days perhaps 500 tons of bombs might be carried and for an indefinite period 200 to 300 tons.

A bomb contains about three times as much explosive as a shell of the same weight. A bomb load of the kind I have described has, therefore, the same explosive content as 15,000 to 20,000 six-inch howitzer shells.

That relates to high explosive. We have also to consider the incendiary bomb, weighing perhaps 2 to 4 lbs. The incendiary bomb has this difference, that its action continues after its own destructive power has been exhausted. The incendiary bomb constitutes a big problem if the aim of the enemy is to interrupt the life of cities, delivery of supplies of grain, fuel and so on. I will leave you to multiply out for yourselves the numbers that can be dropped by a bomber force of the kind I have described. So much for the weight of attack.

What forms might the attack take? We have to consider what are the various plans which might be found for the employment of a large bombing force against us, of the kind which the great Powers are developing—a force, say, of 1,000 bombers, medium and heavy. I propose first to concentrate attention on the attack and to touch on the defence afterwards.

What forms of pressure might the enemy employ? There is first the much ventilated "knock-out blow" to be directed against cities, designed to force a panic-stricken people to compel their Government to sue for peace. Such an attack would have its best prospect of success against a people ill-defended, ill-educated, and ill-prepared against air attacks. Its chances of successful employment against Great Britain are, I think, steadily dwindling.

We may next consider the surprise attack on London and other centres on, or even shortly before, the declaration of war; a blow directed mainly against the seat of government, of finance, the power-houses, and communications. The aim of this form of attack would be to disorganise rather than merely to terrorise. Terror, though incidental, would, however, also be formidable.

Thirdly, an attack might be directed, as a first stage, upon the air forces and air resources of the country. The aim of this plan would be to destroy the air forces on the ground and in the air, the stored war reserves of aircraft, engines, spare parts, and fuel, and the aircraft and aero engine factories and repair shops. A powerful enemy air power operating against one smaller, or possessing older aircraft of inferior performance, might stand a good chance, in a campaign of several weeks, of crippling the output of the factories and in reducing the effective first-line strength. The initiative lies with the aggressor. The war of transgressors is hard, but that of aggressors in a totalitarian State is easy. Th aggressor can choose his own moment; he can arrange for his peak factory output to be attained much earlier than can the victim of attack, and thus, if the reserves can be seriously reduced, there is a definite danger that the attacked air force might be got down and prevented from getting up again. If then the attacker still retained an effective number, or could build up a substantial proportion of his bombers, I do not think that the crippled Power could indefinitely continue the struggle.

Fourthly, an attack might be concentrated on imports and food resources in conjunction with a submarine campaign. This might include shipping approaching port, the docks and shipping in port, the cold storage installations, and so on.

Then there are, of course, other plans which might assist the army's and navy's pressure. These are self-evident and do not call for special comment. It will suffice to mention the munitions industry which might be attacked with a view to reducing military expansion and the means for carrying out an offensive, and the fleet in harbour that might be attacked with a view to its affection preparatory to a sea battle.

Now a word as to the various tactical forms of attack which the defence has to meet. Air attack can be made in a variety of forms and the defence has a good many problems to consider.

At the outbreak of the campaign attacks could be prepared in almost complete secrecy at the home bases and launched as a surprise at the shortest notice with no more difficulty than the movement of a fleet to sea.

Aircraft could, as I have explained already, be diverted against any of a very large number of targets on a front of 300 miles, switching now here and now there.

Bomb attacks could be made from high altitude, not very accurately of course, but accurate enough to "brown" large targets. Our fighters would have to be ready, at a height not too far below the bombers, to be able to climb the difference and engage them.

In combination with a high altitude attack a low flying attack at a few hundred feet might slip over and would then be unseen by these patrols far overhead.

Attacks coming in at high altitude could shut their engines and approach on a shallow dive, but at greatly increased speed.

Attacks could be made in mass formations appearing at the objective in superior force to the defence, or in hundreds of formations of, say, three aircraft with the object of tiring out the defence.

The problem of warning of approach of these attacks must be remembered. We rely upon warning being received from watchers on the coast. Ships at sea are hard to listen from and would be vulnerably placed. Our chief vital interests on shore lie mainly between 60 and 120 to 150 miles from the east and south coasts. At 240 miles per hour that represents a quarter to half an hour from the time of crossing the coast line.

Warning must be received at the aerodrome from the coast watchers, the aircraft must be started up and climbed to fighting height, there to begin the first stage of pursuit. This does not leave much margin, if the fighter is to "catch the bus." On the other hand standing patrols mean many more aircraft. What we need is longer warning. A nice problem.

There is then the problem of the fight itself. How to close with the enemy, himself flying in a formation of several aircraft giving mutual support. How the enemy formation is to be broken up to enable the fighters to close. What the best formation is for the fighters to adopt. How an enemy, navigating by wireless on a dark night over a cloud layer which the searchlights cannot penetrate, is to be found and engaged. There are, of course, many other problems, and I have only touched on the more obvious.

Of the defence I do not propose to say very much. I should add to the indications I have already given that it will take the form of a zone of guns, searchlights and fighters, through which the enemy aircraft must pass, to reach our vital centres, except, of course, such as lie on the actual east coast itself. There will be

a very comprehensive intelligence system for marking down the course followed, in and out, by enemy attack and radio touch with the aircraft to direct them to the points where contact will be gained. All intelligence and control will be centralised; centres will also have special anti-aircraft gun defence and anti-low-flying defence weapons will also be suitably allotted. I should say here that I regard the A.A. gun defence as an essential and most valuable part of the defence system. Recent experience in Spain indicates that against the large aircraft of to-day, a well-trained and effective battery possessing the latest equipment can be an effective destroyer of aircraft. I hope that this side of the defence will be carefully fostered and encouraged.

I should, perhaps, add a word about the balloon barrage for the London defence. There is a layer of cloud over our weather beaten isle on a large number of days in the year. The presence of the barrage will keep pilots above the cloud layer especially at night, and thus appreciably diminish their efficiency, and it will catch the low-flying attack. I think it will be a very useful adjunct.

You will note that in this lecture I have dealt only with the active defence. I should emphasise that this is only one of the essential elements in air defence which are three in number. Firstly, the counter-offensive to break up the attack at its source. This is the main element in air defence. It is a separate subject which it has not been possible to include within the scope of this lecture. Secondly, the active defence to take toll of the attackers as they come through. It must be realised that, except for the balloon barrage, there is no physical barrier in air defence comparable to the barbed wire covered by the machine-gun and the fixed defence system on land. The defence must gain its supremacy by taking toll of the attackers as they come. If one or more aircraft could be shot down out of each squadron that came over the effect in diminishing the actual scale of attack and in deterring the less determined from pushing through resistance would speedily make itself felt.

Thirdly, the passive defence to diminish the effect upon personnel and material of those bombs which are brought through our active defence and released at their objective.

For the reasons given under the second element above it will be appreciated that until the brunt of attack has been broken,

many bombers must inevitably get through to their objective. To diminish their effect is the role of the passive defence.

Passive defence is a vast subject in itself with which I have no time to deal. Suffice it to say that for two years it has been pursued and is being pursued by His Majesty's Government with great vigour and thoroughness. We have started behind other nations, but strenuous and comprehensive efforts are being made to reduce the vulnerability of Great Britain to the air attacks which succeed in getting through. It is an enormous undertaking with ramifications into every aspect and every corner of the life of the country.

In conclusion let me say just this. A great deal that I have said may seem somewhat pessimistic. I may have given too deep an impression of the extent and difficulty of the problems involved. That is perhaps inevitable in a lecture setting out to describe problems.

There is, as I see it, no reason to despair whatever and every reason for satisfaction with the solutions that are being evolved. Air defence is not an insoluble problem. Air attack, like any other form of attack, has its answer. That answer means years of research, thorough and elaborate organisation, careful and constant training and the expenditure of millions of money—but it is steadily being worked out.

It may be that the potentialities of air attack may give pause to nations hesitating on the brink of war. If war should come, then the preparations now being energetically pushed forward by our Government will, I am certain, justify themselves and the Royal Air Force and the Anti-Aircraft Defences will, I believe, equally give a good account of themselves in close and effective co-operation.

BADGES AND DEVICES WORN BY THE SILLIDAR TROOPER

By Yusuf

In this short paper no attempt is made to discuss the badges and devices worn by the officers of the various Indian cavalry regiments. Any one wishing to study these may do so by perusing the Indian Regulations, published from time to time, or by consulting military outfitters. Neither do we propose to deal with the question of dress, arms, equipment or horse-furniture—a subject the recording of which would fill a large book, even supposing that the details of such are extant, remembering that every regiment under the sillidar system provided its own particular requirements, made to its own particular pattern, and that, moreover, with changes in time and commanding officers, these patterns were also prone to alteration.

Prior to 1862 the difference between the regular cavalry and the irregulars of the armies of the Honourable East India Company was well defined.

Their appearances were also widely dissimilar, for, whereas the former were dressed in French grey uniforms, cut like those worn by the British Light Dragoons, and supplied with the arms, equipment and horse-furniture of the Light Horse pattern, the latter wore native dress and enlisted with their own *tulwars*, lances and saddlery.

The Light Cavalry troopers were provided with the Maltese cross shaped cap-plates and silvered buttons, bearing the regimental number and "Light Cavalry" embossed round the rim. The 4th Bengal Native Cavalry were the only regular Lancer regiment. We presume that their lance pennons, following the British fashion, were red over white.

The sillidars of the irregular *rissalahs* had no need for badges. The difference in pattern and colour of their various articles of clothing were sufficiently distinguishing.

Usually the horse-hair tuft, fixed below the lance point, was dyed to regimental colour.

After 1860 the Native Cavalry, both regular and irregular, was gradually reorganised on the old Moghul sillidar system. This system, modified from time to time in order to keep pace with

more up-to-date ideas of efficiency and uniformity, pertained until the Great War.

The Madras regiments were, however, retained on a semi-regular basis.

Like their predecessors, the Irregular Cavalry, the sillidar regiments found no necessity for badges in the first twenty years of their existence. The colour and patterns of the regimental *lunghis, alkhalaks, kamarbands* and trimmings were sufficiently distinctive.

It was not till the gradual introduction of khaki (first a blouse only, later an entire ensemble), with its all-pervading sameness, that the need for badges in the cavalry arose.

Notes of various badges and devices are made under separate headings, including those worn by the non-sillidar regiments of Madras.

(*a*) *Belt Plates.*—Before the Afghan War of 1878—80, the *sowars* of most Indian cavalry regiments wore black or white belts. Some of these fastened by a snake fastening, such as rifle regiments use, and others by a belt-plate. In some regiments these belt-plates were circular brass affairs of the "union locket" variety, similar to those worn by the infantry. The 10th Bengal Lancers wore this type up to the second Afghan War.

Most regiments, however, wore heavy brass rectangular waist-plates about three inches long and two and a half inches high. After the Afghan war, with the introduction of khaki, brown leather belts took the place of the old black or white ones, and many regiments, like the 10th Bengal Lancers, adapted with these a light buckle fastening.

Although the waist-plates disappeared from the belts of the Punjab, Bombay and Hyderabad Contingent cavalry, the Guides and many of the Bengal cavalry regiments retained them with their brown belts for use both in full dress and in khaki.

About 1884 the non-sillidars of the Madras cavalry were issued with Native Infantry pattern brown belts having brass union lockets, but ten years later received another variety, furnished with plain brass rectangular waist-plates.

The plates of the 19th Bengal Lancers were of white metal without any design. The Guides also wore white metal plates. but had imposed upon them their title and the cypher of Queen Victoria.

The other regiments which wore brass rectangular belt-plates had usually upon them a simple design—XII over B. C.; 14 over B. L.; Crown over XVI, etc.—though the 6th Bengal Cavalry had the plume of the Prince of Wales, and the 7th Bengal Lancers a Crown, VII, and the title scroll placed upon the plates.

The 1st Skinner's Horse originally had 1 over B. C. on the plate, but, after becoming the "Duke of York's Own," substituted a rose set upon two crossed lances and tablet "D.Y.O."—a handsome design.

Regiments in possession of this type of belt wore them in the Great War.

(*b*) *Lance Pennons.*—The lance pennons of the Indian regiments have always been of the same colours as those carried by British cavalry, *i.e.*, red over white. There were, however, three exceptions.

The 10th and 19th Bengal Cavalry, who were amongst the first Indian regiments after the Mutiny to be made into Lancers (1864) carried pennons coloured respectively red over blue, and blue over white. The 3rd Skinner's Horse had pennons of blue over yellow.

(*c*) *Shoulder Chains.*—"Chains" and the sillidar—to the old *"Quai Hai"* they seem inseparable. It is a pity that they have been discontinued. They gave to the *sowar* a touch of *panache* that was unique. Admittedly a Mauser bullet in the shoulder is a thing to be avoided by the wearer of chains, but, for duty in cantonments, can we not have them back?

They are extremely smart and, unlike most military trappings, are entirely a British-Indian army article, and not copied from continental troops.

They seem to date from the second Afghan war, for photographs of sowars before 1878 show nothing, not even a shoulder strap, upon their *alkhalaks.*

Perhaps some of the Afghans may have worn part-armour of this type and suggested the idea to us? Old cavalrymen who served in this war have stated that they never saw chains worn till after it.

They were originally shaped like shoulder straps, but later became longer and overhung the shoulder.

Eventually every regiment of Indian cavalry adopted them for both full dress and khaki and, indeed, rode into the Great War wearing them.

There were many different patterns in use, as of course regiments placed their own orders for these.

Latterly all were made "bastion ended." Some were cut square at the narrow end, and others shaped so as to fit at the neck.

There were many variations in the type of link used. Some were made of split rings and others of steel or iron hoops. Some corps like the 1st Cavalry (Frontier Force) had large rings, others, like the 8th Cavalry and the 36th Jacob's Horse, very small ones.

The pattern in which the links were joined togther also varied with the regiment. The 10th Lancers, for instance, had theirs set in a peculiar harrow-like formation.

(*d*) *Buttons.*—The buttons worn by *sowars* were of brass, except for the 19th and the Guides, whose were of white metal. Most of the regiments used buttons impressed with their crest, the other *rissalahs* had plain ball or half-ball ones, similar to those of the Hussars. The buttons of the cavalry squadron of the Deoli Regiment were enamelled black and bore the number 42 upon them.

(*e*) *Badges.*—Metal badges were never worn by sowars, either upon their *lunghis* or upon their collars, as was sometimes done by Indian infantry. After the second Afghan war, however, all wore badges upon the shoulder-chains.

These "numerals," as they were called, were the only badges worn by the Indian cavalry soldier. They were usually made of brass by the regimental mistri, though the 11th and 19th Bengal Lancers, 7th Bombay Cavalry and Guides wore ones made of white metal. The shoulder badges of the Bengal and Punjab cavalry were simple affairs, and usually consisted of the regimental number followed by B. C., B. L. or P. C. The 3rd, 13th and 19th Bengal Lancers wore them in the form of a monogram, as did the 5th and 25th Cavalry after 1903.

More ornate were those of the 11th Bengal Lancers, who wore just the Prince of Wales's plume; and of the 3rd Madras, 2nd and 7th Bombay, 1st Hyderabad Contingent, 8th and 29th Lancers, who wore their number and title set upon two crossed lances; also the 4th, 5th and 6th Bombay Cavalry, who wore the number and title upon crossed sabres.

The 3rd Bombay Cavalry (Queen's Own) wore a crown over their badge, and later, as the 33rd Q.V.O. Light Cavalry, kept up

the custom. (To-day of course this crown on the title is the special mark of an Indian "Royal" regiment.) The 6th Bombay Cavalry incorporated the Prince of Wales's plume in white metal with their brass numeral.

All regiments altered their "numerals" at least once between 1903 and 1913, many twice; for instance, the 18th Lancers, 26th Light Cavalry and Central India Horse, who all, after 1906, mounted the Prince's plume over their badges. The 26th made a third alteration after 1910 by adding "K.G.O." below the plume. The 33rd wore after 1911 their new title "Queen Victoria's."

In this period full shoulder titles rather after the fashion of those now issued to Indian infantry were also used by the 3rd, 19th, 21st, 31st, 35th and 36th regiments.

The six corps raised during the Great War, *viz.*, 40th—45th Cavalry, also had this type. Perhaps the most surprising was the numeral of the 20th Deccan Horse; it was an almost exact replica of the cap badge of the 20th Hussars!

The Great War had a curious influence on some of these badges. The 10th, who originally wore X.B.L., after 1903 reduced this to X.L., a simple and effective device. When, however, in 1916, the 40th Cavalry was formed this "XL" became misleading and was changed for the title "10 Lancers."

Both the 35th Scinde Horse and the 36th Jacob's Horse used to wear Birmingham-made full titles in small brass lettering. Cut off as they became from sources of manufacture, their war-time badges had to be made up in the field and were fashioned in a much simpler form.

With the passing of the Great War the sillidar has also passed. The present-day excellent *sowar* is very much a regular light cavalryman. Unfortunately his badges and devices, such as remain, have for the greater part also become regularised and are now mere uninspired articles of Ordnance issue, die-stamped to sealed pattern, and displaying no individuality.

Fortunately there are signs that the regimental spirit is setting about to alter this!

THE FINAL PHASE OF THE MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN —12TH MARCH 1917 TO THE ARMISTICE, PART III— (*concld.*)

By Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Shearer, M.C., 1/15th Punjab Regiment

24. As the likelihood of Russia making a separate peace increased, so did the danger to India and Afghanistan from Bolshevik propaganda grow. The British Government consequently arranged to send General Dunsterville, with an armoured car detachment and a number of British officers, *via* Hamadan and the Caspian to train Georgian and Armenian levies in the Caucasus as a barrier against Pan-Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda. They also approached the Persian Government for permission to move British troops into Persia in order to maintain political stability in that country. This was the birth of "Dunsterforce."

25. *"Dunsterforce."* (Vide *Sketch Map No.* 6)

On 27th January 1918, General Dunsterville left Baghdad for Tiflis with a party of eleven officers and eight non-commissioned officers in Ford vans, protected by one armoured car. The only practicable route was through Kermanshah-Hamadan-Kazvin-Enzeli and Baku. The road was covered in snow and it was not until late in February that General Dunsterville reached Enzeli. There he was arrested by the Bolsheviks, who refused to let him go further, but he managed to bluff his party out of arrest and get back to Hamadan.

General Dunsterville then asked for the rest of his force (which even now totalled only 150 officers and 300 N.C.O. instructors) to be halted at Khaniquin and Shahraban, while he stayed at Hamadan to watch the Persian situation. At Hamadan he set out to gain the confidence of the local notables and distributed money to the famine-stricken inhabitants in return for road work. Bicherakoff, who was also at Hamadan with his small force of loyal Russians, placed himself under General Dunsterville's orders; and at the end of March seized Kazvin just in time to stop the Jangalis from capturing it.

Meanwhile, the last undisciplined remnant of Baratoff's Army had left Persia and the situation in the Caucasus was steadily deteriorating. The Turks were making determined advances between Batum and Lake Van with the evident object of joining up with the large Tartar Mohammedan population in Trans-Caucasia and Daghestan, while the Germans had just captured Odessa and were obviously intent upon securing the Batum-Baku corridor.

General Dunsterville was prevented by the Jangalis and Bolsheviks from carrying out his original task in Tiflish, but he pressed for a small British force to hold the road Qasr-i-Shirin-Enzeli. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff agreed and directed General Marshall to send troops to Kermanshah to keep touch with General Dunsterville in Persia. By the end of March the 1st/4th Hampshire Regiment, one squadron 14th Hussars and some armoured cars were spread out in small detachments between the Pai Taq Pass and Hamadan and General Dunsterville said that he then felt secure.

26. *The situation in Mesopotamia, January to March* 1918. (Vide *Sketch Map No.* 1.)

While these events were happening in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia the position in Mesopotamia remained a stalemate with the IIIrd Corps on the Diyala, the 15th Division in the area Ramadi-Falluja and the 1st Crops at Samarra.

The Turkish XIIIth Corps was in the area Altun Kopri-Qara Tepe and their XVIIIth Corps at Fat-Ha, so that neither could be hit easily. The Turkish 50th Division at Khan Baghdadi was, however, within easy reach and General Marshall accordingly decided to destroy it and to occupy the bitumen wells at that place.

27. *Action at Khan Baghdadi (26th March* 1918).

Khan Baghdadi was captured and the Turkish 50th Division completely "mopped up" by General Brooking and his 15th Division and General Cassels' 11th Cavalry Brigade. General Brooking's plan was almost identical with that for the action of Ramadi. Again he deceived the enemy by making all his preliminary concentrations by night, the reinforcing troops hiding in palm groves by day. He had dummy defensive positions dug at Ramadi in order to make the Turks think that he was settling in there for the hot weather and the last few days before the attack

the 1st Corps carried out ostentatious preparations for an imaginary attack from Samarra. The Turks in the Khan Baghdadi position were consequently deceived into remaining where they were long enough for General Brooking's net to close round them.

At dawn on 26th March the 50th and 42nd Indian Infantry Brigades made a frontal attack, while General Cassels with his 11th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars moved round the enemy's flank and cut his line of retreat up the Euphrates. After hard fighting all day the whole Khan Baghdadi position was captured. That night the Turks failed in their attempts to break through General Cassels' cordon and on the morning of the 27th began to surrender in large numbers. General Brooking had, however, a pursuit force of infantry and machine-guns ready in Ford vans. As soon as the Turks began to surrender on the 27th, he released this force together with cavalry and armoured cars in pursuit up the Aleppo Road. The pursuit was carried out relentlessly and resulted in the destruction of the whole Turkish 50th Division.

The main lessons of this skilfully-planned battle are—

(*i*) *Surprise.*—It is a first-rate example of the skilful application of this principle both before, during and after the battle.

(*ii*) *Mobility.*—Again the mobility of the cavalry was fully used, first to place their fire power astride the enemy's line of retreat, and secondly in pursuit. The mobility of Ford vans and armoured cars was also employed in relentless pursuit at a speed beyond the capabilities of horses.

(*iii*) *Use of "Contact" aircraft to guide troops.*—Previous aerial reconnaissance was reduced to a minimum in order not to frighten the Turks prematurely out of the trap; but aeroplanes were used during the battle to guide cavalry and armoured cars over unreconnoitred ground and to report the progress of infantry attacks.

(*iv*) *Control and "Team work."*—General Brooking's arrangements for getting back news, as at Ramadi, kept him better supplied with information than is usual during a battle. It is understood that mounted liaison officers were freely used for this.

But the dash and self-reliance of his brigade commanders, combined with their good 'teamwork,' are a perfect example of how a battle ought to be fought.

28. *General Situation in April and May* 1918. (Vide *Sketch Maps Nos.* 1 *and* 6).

The centre of interest shifted in April to Persia and the Caucasus. The Tartars of Russian Azerbaijan had revolted against the Bolsheviks and were actively helping the Turks in their advance on Baku. In addition, the Turks were making another drive from Lake Van and Urmia on Tabriz. Such resistance as the Armenians in the north and the Christian Jelus around Urmia were putting up could not last long. The threat to India through Persia and Afghanistan was therefore becoming really serious.

29. *Capture of Kifri and Tuz Khurmatli, 24th to 29th April* 1918. (Vide *Sketch Map No.* 1).

The security of the Qasr-i-Shirin-Hamadan Road having become of primary importance, General Marshall decided, early in April, to capture the area Tuz Khurmatli-Kifri-Qara Tepe which the enemy had for some time been using as a base for propaganda in Persia. He allotted this task to the IIIrd Corps.

General Egerton, while simulating a converging attack on Qara Tepe and Kifri, really aimed at capturing Abu Gharaib and Tuz Khurmatli in order to destroy enemy forces east and south-east of those places. The attacking force was divided into five columns:

Column A.—6th Cavalry Brigade.

Column B.—13th Division (less 39th Infantry Brigade) which was sub-divided into—

B. 1.—38th Infantry Brigade and attached troops.

B. 2.—Advanced H.Q. 13th Division, 40th Infantry Brigade and attached troops.

Column C.—37th Indian Infantry Brigade (less two battalions) and attached troops.

Column D.—14th Lancers, one horse battery and one section armoured cars.

Each column had its own bridging material supplies, transport and aircraft as they were to be widely separated and far from supply railhead.

The plan was as follows:

Column A was to advance north from Ain Laila and destroy the Turks at Tuz Khurmatli on 27th April. *Column C* was to cross the Diyala and close on Qara Tepe from the east while *Column B*-2 was to advance north from the Sakaltutan Pass and cut off the Turks' retreat to the north-west from Qara Tepe. *Column D* was to demonstrate near Abu Gharaib so as to induce the Turks to occupy the Jabal Hamrin, facing south, while *Column B*-1 destroyed them by an advance up the Narin river.

The operations were somewhat delayed by rain and mud, but Kifri and Tuz Khurmatli were occupied and the Turks in that region destroyed by the 29th April with little loss to ourselves.

One criticism of this plan is that it was too elaborate. The widely separated columns lacked real strength. The Turks were on interior lines and had early information of our intentions in spite of careful precautions for secrecy. General Egerton would have risked the defeat of his columns in detail had the Turks concentrated and attacked them in turn. As it happened, the Turks did concentrate round Tuz Khurmatli, but made the mistake of waiting there until Columns A and B had also concentrated to attack them.

30. *Temporary occupation of Kirkuk*

After this action the Chief of the Imperial General Staff ordered General Marshall to occupy Kirkuk in order to relieve Turkish pressure in the Urmia region. He did so under protest and had, as it turned out, to abandon it later on owing to supply difficulties. However, he obtained leave to advance on Mosul in September, on the grounds that the capture of the Turks' advanced base there would be the best safeguard to the Qasr-i-Shirin-Hamadan Road. Meanwhile, the extension of the railway from Samarra to Tikrit was also sanctioned.

31. *Advance to Resht, on the Caspian Sea.* (Vide *Sketch Map No.* 6).

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff also directed General Marshall to reinforce General Dunsterville by at least one infantry brigade, but General Marshall protested that he could not maintain that force in Persia and got permission to experiment first with a small mobile force. This force, the "Motor Mobile

Column," as it was called, was an interesting and successful experiment. It consisted of:

400 rifles 1st/4th Hampshire Regiment
600 rifles 1st/2nd Gurkha Rifles
One section 21st Mountain Battery
A field ambulance
One squadron of eight armoured cars
(Carried in 500 Ford vans.)

By the end of June it had secured the road from Kazvin to Resht and linked up with Bicherakoff at Enzeli. The action of the Motor Mobile Column checked the advance of further Turko-German agents into Persia and stopped the German-Jangali attempt to raise Persia against us as a preliminary to an attack on our lines of communication in Mesopotamia and a move towards the Indian Frontier.

32. *British plans to safeguard Persia and to gain control of the Caspian* (*1st June to 15th August* 1918)

A whole chapter of the "Official History" is devoted to the somewhat confusing events of the two and a half months from 1st June to 15th August 1918. During that time the amazingly thorough and widespread German plans to cause trouble in India became increasingly evident. The Germans were evidently determined to secure Baku for its oil, Krasnovodsk for its cotton crop, and the markets of Central Asia generally.

But the Turks were also determined to capture Baku as part of their pan-Turkish scheme, in addition to capturing Persia. They thus fell foul of the Germans who did everything in their power to prevent their allies getting Baku. On 8th June, Germany made peace with Georgia and forced the Turks to sign a non-aggression pact with that country and with Russian Armenia. She then took possession of the Georgian Railways in order to deny them to the Turks for their advance on Baku. The Turks were annoyed and continued to advance slowly on Baku by road in defiance of the Germans. Fortunately these dissensions gave us the time we so badly needed.

Early in June General Dunsterville suggested that we should occupy Baku at once and asked for one infantry brigade and one artillery brigade from Mesopotamia for the purpose. The Home Government after much discussion agreed to the despatch of a force of three battalions and a battery with the object of destroying the Baku oil pumps, pipe-line and reservoirs and obtaining control of all Caspian shipping to prevent its use by the enemy.

On the 3rd July, Bicherakoff, with his own Russians and some British armoured cars, sailed for Alyat, where he took up a position on the Kura river, 150 miles west of Baku, in order to delay the Turkish advance. He was slowly pushed back fighting until the Turks were within 3,000 yards of Baku Docks on 31st July, when he side-stepped northwards to Derbend.

Meanwhile the British Government became impatient with General Dunsterville for not taking reinforcements to Baku. General Dunsterville, however, did not consider himself strong enough to do so in face of Bolshevik hostility in Baku and Enzeli. A Menchevik *coup d'etat* occurred at Baku on 19th July and this led to the suppression of the local Bolshevik leaders and the despatch of ships for the purpose of transporting British troops from Enzeli to Baku. The first small party of British troops landed at Baku on 4th August, thus encouraging the local forces in their defence against the Turks. By 15th August, 400 rifles of the 1st/4th Hampshires and 7th North Staffords and some armoured cars, had reached Baku; the Jangali nuisance had been finally quelled and two more British battalions were on their way from Mesopotamia.

Our forces reached Baku just in time to prevent its immediate capture by the Turks, but the situation was still critical as the Turks were in a strong position close to the town and Bicherakoff was still at Derbend involved in quelling a local rising.

By the middle of August a small British mission with one battery were *en route* to Karasnovodsk to safeguard it from attack by sea and to buy the stocks of cotton stored there.

33. *Fall of Baku and break up of "Dunsterforce"*

On 17th August, when General Dunsterville arrived in Baku he found the situation there most unsatisfactory. The town was controlled by five dictators and they in their turn were controlled by the Fleet. Everything, including operation orders, was discussed at length by committees who passed resolutions but did little else. The ground west of the town was naturally strong for defensive purposes, but the local irregular troops had done practically no digging or wiring to improve it. They had not even filled the gap left in the line by Bicherakoff's troops, with the result that the Turks had infiltrated through to the Tartar oil-workmen's villages north and east of the town. Consequently, instead of holding a comparatively short line across the

peninsula from sea to sea, a long, straggling, line west and north of Baku had to be held. Added to this the local troops had no discipline and practically no training. No reliance whatever could be placed on them as fighting units. All General Dunsterville could do was to post his own troops on the more important tactical points of the position and hope that the local troops would remain in the gaps between our troops. He had a little over 1,100 rifles of the 39th Infantry Brigade, a few guns and armoured cars. In addition he had a small naval detachment, with guns and mountings, under Commodore Norris, which was intended to form the basis of a British flotilla on the Caspian. Opposed to this force the Turks had three divisions totalling 5,300 regulars with 26 guns, and 8,000 Tartar irregulars under Turkish officers.

Luckily the Turks thought that General Dunsterville had 3,000 British, 4,000 Russian and 6,000 Armenian troops at Baku and so were reluctant to attack.

General Dunsterville reported on 20th August that the position was far from hopeless. Our arrival had had a good moral effect in the whole Caucasus area. The Daghestanis had offered their help, and Bicherakoff had promised to arrive in the reasonably near future with 10,000 fresh troops from North Caucasia. All depended upon available British reinforcements from Persia being sent to enable General Dunsterville to hold out until Bicherakoff's arrival. He considered that our immediate withdrawal from Baku would be treated as bad faith, and would have a bad moral effect in Persia and Trans-Caspia. He pointed out, also, that he could only control the Caspian so long as he remained at Baku.

The first Turkish attack took place on 26th August. This was the first of a series of small attacks with limited objectives carried out repeatedly until 1st September. In every case the local troops ran away and left our troops with flanks exposed. General Dunsterville threatened to evacuate Baku unless the local troops would fight properly, but the dictators replied that their fleet would sink our transports if we attempted to retire. General Dunsterville then appealed again to General Marshall for reinforcements, but these were refused and he was ordered to destroy the oil installations and evacuate Baku. He could comply with neither of these orders as the local fleet would not let him retire

and the local oil owners refused to destroy their only means of livelihood.

Between 1st and 12th September the Turks kept up an intermittent bombardment but did not attack. During that time two more companies of the 9th Worcestershire Regiment and 500 rifles and 10 machine-guns of Bicherakoff's force arrived.

During the night 13th/14th September the Turks made a determined attack on most of the positions. As usual the local troops at once ran away. By nightfall of the 14th September, our line was back round the outskirts of the town and there was no alternative to immediate evacuation. General Dunsterville had worked out the evacuation scheme so thoroughly beforehand that the embarkation and escape to Enzeli of his force was carried out without a single casualty, in spite of the opposition of the dictators. As previously arranged the local fleet and merchant ships scattered to Petrovsk, Enzeli, Asterabad and Krasnovodsk, and so were of no use to the Turks. This turned out to be a blessing in disguise, as the scattering of the local fighting ships enabled Commodore Norris to gain control of the Caspian by putting his own guns and crews into ships which he managed to secure in Enzeli.

Now let us turn to the events in Persian Azerbaizan. The reason why General Marshall had peremptorily refused to send reinforcements to Baku was because the Turks had advanced from Tabriz to the Kuflan Koh and were threatening to advance on Hamadan from the south of Lake Urmia. In each area the Turkish strength was about ten times the strength of any regular troops which General Marshall could collect to oppose them. The Turkish move, bluff though it afterwards appeared to have been, had a direct bearing upon the fall of Baku, since it tied down the reinforcements which General Dunsterville required so urgently, a strategic lesson worth noting.

As soon as Baku fell, the Turks began to withdraw troops from Trans-Caucasia and Persia to Constantinople to meet the dangerous situation created in Turkey by Allenby's capture of Palestine and by the Allied successes in Salonica and France. The immediate threat to north-west Persia was therefore at an end.

In the latter half of September 1918 General Marshall broke up Dunsterforce, recalled General Dunsterville and sent General

Thomson to command "Norperforce," as the troops in north-west Persia were then renamed.

I think history will agree that General Dunsterville had achieved the main object for which he had been sent, with ridiculously inadequate forces. The main lesson which we can draw from Dunsterforce is the amazing success which a courageous bluff by a few determined men can achieve in oriental countries.

34. *Instruction to General Marshall, 2nd October* 1918.

On 2nd October the Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed General Marshall that the Turks might sue for peace in the near future. The British Government wished to exploit their successes at once so as to eliminate Turkish influence south of the Taurus mountains. General Marshall was to gain as much ground as possible on the Tigris, but work on the lines of communication to Enzeli was not to be retarded. The feasibility of helping Allenby by a cavalry raid up the Euphrates to Aleppo was also to be examined.

General Marshall pointed out that, as his spare transport was already on the Persian line of communication, he could not carry out the cavalry raid; but that he could advance on Mosul by combing out all the available transport in Mesopotamia. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff consequently ordered this latter course to be adopted with as little delay as possible.

35. *Turkish dispositions covering Mosul.* (Vide *Sketch Map No.* 1).

The Turkish dispositions were thought to be as follows:

(*a*) *On the Tigris*—

(*i*) About 90 sabres, 2,600 rifles and 28 guns holding a strong position astride the Tigris at the Fat-Ha Gorge, on a frontage of eight miles.

(*ii*) About 30 sabres, 2,900 rifles and 14 guns in a supporting position on the line north bank of Little Zab-Humr-Ain Dibs.

(*iii*) Small bodies of troops at Sharqat and on the line of communication back to Mosul.

(*b*) *Altun Kopri-Kirkuk-Taza Khurmatli*—

330 sabres, 2,200 rifles and 30 guns, some of which might be on their way to the Tigris.

(*c*) In addition, the 5th Turkish Division was reported to be moving down the Great Zab river to Fat-Ha.

36. *General Cobbe's plan of attack.* (Vide *Sketch Map Nos.* 1 *and* 7)

General Cobbe was ordered to carry out the advance on Mosul with his 1st Corps (now consisting of the 17th and 18th Indian Divisions), the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades. General Lewin, with part of the 40th Infantry Brigade of the IIIrd Corps, was to co-operate by pinning down the enemy in the Kirkuk-Altun Kopri area.

The Fat-Ha position was a difficult one to attack. The Jabal Hamrin and Jabal Makhul were only passable in four places, the Ain Nukhaila and Darb-Al-Khail Passes, the Fat-Ha Gorge and Balalij. Water was available at the passes for a small body of troops only and there was none between Shuraimiya and Balalij. A frontal attack was, therefore, forced on General Cobbe, who made the following plan for the capture of the Fat-Ha position on 24th October:

(*i*) *The 18th Divisional Group* was to capture the position on the left bank of the Tigris, assisted by the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which was to cross the Darb-Al-Khail Pass and take the enemy position in reverse.

(*ii*) *The 17th Divisional Group* was then to capture the right bank position assisted by covering fire from across the Tigris by the 18th Division.

(*iii*) *Both divisions* were then to pass through the Gorge, advance up both banks of the Tigris and capture the Little Zab-Humr-Ain Dibs position.

(*iv*) *The 11th Cavalry Brigade* was to move unobtrusively over the Ain Nukhaila Pass and cross the Little Zab with the objects of intercepting Turkish movements between Altun Kopri and the Tigris and securing a bridge-head over the Little Zab for the 1st Corps. General Cassels was warned that his brigade would probably be required later to ford the Tigris above Sharqat.

(*v*) *The Light Armoured Motor Brigade* was to move by Tel Ajar and Hadr and place itself across the enemy's line of retreat about Sharqat.

To preserve secrecy, the water supply in the Ain Nukhaila and Darb-Al-Khail Passes was not developed until the last possible moment and ostentatious preparations were made on the right bank of the Tigris for an outflanking movement *via* Balalij.

37. *Actions at Fat-Ha Gorge and the Little Zab, 23rd to 26th October*

The enemy did not wait for the attack. On the 23rd October the 18th Division began to feel their way forward as hostile activity seemed to be lessening, and during the night of the 23rd/24th they discovered that the enemy had gone.

On the 24th, both divisions pushed through the Fat-Ha Gorge where progress was slow, as the Turks had blown up the roads on both banks. The 17th Division had such difficulty that they had to convert two infantry brigades to a pack transport basis by entirely immobilizing their third infantry brigade and leave behind almost all their wheeled artillery.

They found the enemy strongly entrenched about Mushak which they failed to capture until the enemy retreated during the night 26th/27th October.

Meanwhile, the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades secured bridge-heads over the Little Zab at Shumait and Zarariya respectively; the left bank of the Tigris was cleared completely of Turks: a bridge was built over the Little Zab where the main road is shewn crossing that river in Sketch Map No. 7, and by noon on the 26th most of the 18th Division had crossed and brought their artillery into action against the Turks about Humr. By nightfall on that date, General Cassels had forded the Tigris and established himself along the Wadi Muabba astride the Turkish line of retreat. The armoured cars were also astride the Mosul road between Huwaish and Sharqat. General Cobbe's plan was working successfully.

38. *The Battle of Sharqat, 27th to 30th October* 1918. (Vide *Sketch Map No. 7*)

(*a*) *27th October*

When it was realised that the enemy had retired from the front of the 17th Division, General Leslie, the divisional commander, organized a pursuit column consisting of a squadron of cavalry and such infantry as could be made available quickly. The country was broken and the column, although it started at 7 a.m., only managed to reach Qalat-Al-Bint that night. Meanwhile it was ascertained that the enemy was digging in south of Sharqat with half his force. General Cobbe appreciated that the enemy intended to use the other half either to break through the 11th Cavalry Brigade or to cross the Tigris.

Meanwhile, General Cassels' patrols discovered Turks in position astride the main road about two and a half miles south of Huwaish. General Cassels promptly decided to attack these, both to conceal his own weakness and to make the enemy disclose his dispositions. The advance was carried out by the 23rd Cavalry, but when the enemy disclosed his strength to be fully one thousand rifles and four guns, General Cassels stopped the attack and disposed his own brigade and the Light Armoured Brigade so as to hold the Turks and prevent them outflanking his weak line. These dispositions were successful and the 11th Cavalry Brigade passed a quiet night.

Now to turn to the 18th Division on the Tigris left bank. By 9 a.m. the 53rd Infantry Brigade and attached troops commenced marching up the left bank of the Tigris in order to gain touch with General Cassels and deliver a much-needed convoy of gun ammunition. By 8 p.m. they had arrived opposite Sharqat without meeting any enemy or seeing any signs of an attempt by them to cross the Tigris. So they continued to march all night and by 5-30 a.m. on the 28th had got touch with General Cassels. This march of thirty-three miles was a fine performance and helped materially in closing the net round the Turks.

(*b*) *28th October*

During the whole of this day General Cassels had to fight desperately. Soon after dawn the Turks commenced to advance northwards to try to break through the 11th Cavalry Brigade. General Cassels countered with an attack on the enemy's outer flank by the 7th Hussars (less two squadrons). This checked the enemy who continued a fire fight all day, spreading out wider and wider in their attempt to outflank General Cassels. The fact that the weak 11th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars succeeded in holding the Turks illustrates the delaying power of modern cavalry, when skilfully handled.

At 2 p.m. the situation was somewhat relieved by the arrival of the 1st/7th Gurkhas from Sanders' Column. This battalion took over the sector astride the main road, thus relieving the Guides Cavalry, who went into reserve.

At 4 p.m. General Cassels heard that the enemy detachment to his north had come to within three hundred yards of the detachment of 7th Hussars, but had not attacked.

At 4-15 p.m. the Commander, 7th Cavalry Brigade, reported personally to General Cassels for orders, and his brigade could at that time be seen crossing the Tigris at the Hadraniya Ford. General Cassels directed them to piquet the enemy to his north and to extend his own outer flank in an arc back to the Tigris at Hadraniya.

General Cassels' skill in making full use of his small force, combined with the endurance of his men, prevented large numbers of the enemy from breaking through and escaping. The Turks' real opportunity of escape was now gone. There was still some chance of them making a wide detour to the west during the night, but they did not do that. They could not escape across the Tigris, as General Sanders had the far bank well piquetted.

Meanwhile, although Wauchope's column was exhausted and the remainder of the 17th Division and its artillery was scattered owing to the difficulties of the road, General Cobbe insisted on their continuing to advance in order to relieve the pressure on General Cassels. Wauchope's column consequently resumed its advance at 3 a.m. on the 28th October. It was joined by Coningham's Column (45th Sikhs and 1st/10th Gurkhas) from the crest of the Jabal Makhul, and both toiled steadily forward over the atrocious nullah country. By 2 p.m. the position at Sharqat had been captured and the enemy were in retreat. But the 17th Division was so exhausted and so badly in need of water, that it was decided not to press the pursuit further that day.

(*c*) *29th October*

During the night the Turks advanced to within one hundred yards of General Cassels' line but made no real attempt to break through or to escape round his western flank.

At 7 a.m. the 1st/39th Garhwalis reached General Cassels as a further reinforcement. They had made a forced march of over forty miles from the little Zab, a very fine performance indeed.

Meanwhile, the 7th Cavalry Brigade were having trouble with the Turkish detachment near Hadraniya, which was pressing southwards and it was not until evening that this force surrendered and the threat to General Cassels' rear was finally removed.

The exhausted 17th Division continued its advance at 1-45 a.m. This advance across broken ground by moonlight is an interesting example of the use of a "double-headed" advanced guard covering a wide front. By noon the leading elements of the


JABAL SINJAQ
MOSUL
GREAT ZAB R.
ERBIL
KURDISTAN
ALTUN KOPRI
SHARQAT
LITTLE ZAB R.
KIRKUK
JABAL MAKHUL
AINDIBS
TAZA KHURMATLI
FAT-HA
JABAL QARA'AL-KHAIL PASS
AIN NUKHAILA PASS
SHURAIMIYA
HAMRIN
R. TIGRIS
TUZ KHURMATLI
KHIERI
JABAL
NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF BAGHDAD WALAYAT
TEKRIT.
DAUR
SAMARRA
SAMARRA-R.
ISTABULAT R.S.
SUMAIKA R.S.
SUMAIKA
BAGUBA
MUSHAHIDA R.S.
HIT
R. EUPHRATES
RAMADI
FLOODS
SAKHLAWIYA
FALLUJA
HABBANIYA
BAGHDAD
DIYALA
R. TIGRIS
MUFRAZ POST
R. EUPHRATES
CTESIPHON


BLACK SEA
BATUM
GEORGIA
TIFLIS
CAUCASUS MTS.
DAGHESTAN
DERBEND
CASPIAN SEA
TRANS-CAUCASIA
RUSSIAN ARMENIA
ALEXANDROPOL
ELIZABETOPOL
AZERBAIJAN
ERZERUM
ARMENIA
TURKEY
BAYAZID
RUSSIAN
KURA R.
BAKU
ALYAT
LAKE VAN
TABRIZ
PERSIAN AZERBAIJAN
R. TIGRIS
NISIBIN
URMIA
LAKE URMIA
ENZELI
KAFLAN KAH
RESHT
MOSUL
GREAT ZAB R.
RUWANDUZ
SAIN KALA
ZENJAN
SAQQIZ
LITTLE ZAB R.
ALTUN KOPRI
KAZVIN
BIJAR
KIRKUK
SULAIMANIYA
FAT-HA
PERSIA
SEHNEH
TEHERAN
TUZ KHURMATLI
ANA
TIKRIT
KIFR
QASR-I-SHIRIN
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R. EUPHRATES
KERMANSHAH
QIZIL ROBAT
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RAMADI
FALLUJA
BAGHDAD


SHARQAT
(RUINS)
R. TIGRIS
JABAL KHANUKA
BALALIJ
QAL'AT-AL-BINT
SITE OF TURKISH BRIDGE
TO ALTUN KOPRI 40M.
ZARARIYA
FORD
LITTLE ZAB R.
II CAV. BDE
HUMR
SHUMAIT
7 CAV. BDE
JABAL MAKHUL
17TH DIVISION
AIN DIBS
MUSNAD
TEL AJAR
DESERT ROAD
L.A.M.
(ARMD)
FAT-HA (RUINS)
JABAL HAMRIN
N
17 DIV.
SHURAIMIYA
18 DIV.
R. TIGRIS
TO TIKRIT 9M
NOTE
SUCCESSIVE TURKISH POSITIONS
SHEWN IN GREEN

two advanced guard battalions were held up about four hundred yards from the enemy's final position, along a series of ravines some two and a half miles south of General Cassels' force. The main body was scattered and it was not until 4 p.m. that General Leslie could commence an organized attack. This was successful at first, but a determined counter-attack at 5 p.m. caused considerable casualties to the leading battalion. In the growing darkness and haze of dust, however, the 112th Infantry succeeded in penetrating the enemy's position.

(*d*) *30th October*

The night of the 29th/30th was spent in confused fighting in battle outposts, but the Turkish commander and the whole of his force surrendered at 7-30 a.m. Between the 18th and 30th October, General Cobbe's force captured 11,322 prisoners, 51 guns, 130 machine-guns and three river steamers. This complete success had been achieved by the daring and brilliant leadership of Generals Cassels and Norton and the gallantry of their brigades, combined with the dogged endurance and courage of the infantry of the 17th Division, who continued to advance and fight long after they had reached the normal limits of human endurance.

This fighting is a good example of the skilful co-operation of all arms in a relentless pursuit which gave the enemy no respite to recover his morale. The 17th Division kept on out-marching its cable communications; visual signalling was not successful in that very broken country, there were few wireless sets with the force, and the local situation was often obscure. But contact aircraft and message picking-up were successfully employed and General Cobbe was able to keep control throughout of all his widely scattered detachments.

39. *The Armistice and Occupation of Mosul*

As soon as the Turkish Tigris Group surrendered, General Cobbe sent the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades and the Light Armoured Car Brigade to "mop up" any enemy who had escaped towards Mosul.

On 31st October they reached Mosul to be informed that an armistice had been arranged between the British and Turkish Governments.

ATTACK ON A TRAIN NEAR THE PEZU PASS, WAZIRISTAN—24TH MAY 1937

The following account is reproduced as it provides a typical example of the action of a tribal raiding gang. The combating of raids of this nature, carried out as they are by considerable bodies of tribesmen acting on a well organised plan, has been one of the problems in Waziristan during the past year.

The scene of the raid was the Pezu Pass, situated between Bannu and Tank, near the border of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, on the narrow gauge railway. The pass was formerly notorious for the bands of robbers who infested it.

It is of interest to recall that until the "Circular Road" was constructed in Waziristan, as a sequel to the operations of 1919-1920, and the whole area thereby brought under a certain measure of control, raiding by tribal gangs into the settled districts of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan was of frequent occurrence. In the year 1919, between the 1st May and the 1st November, a period when admittedly the 3rd Afghan War had produced an unsettling effect, the Mahsud tribe alone carried out 100 raids, in the course of which 135 persons were killed and 110 wounded, 448 camels and 1,674 head of cattle were lifted and property valued at Rs. 35,000 looted. During the same period numerous raids were also carried out by the Wazirs of the Wana and Tochi areas.

The unsettled conditions which prevailed in Waziristan during 1937, as a result of the agitation carried out by the Faqir of Ipi, led to a breaking away of certain of the younger and irresponsible elements from the control of their tribal elders, with the result that there was a revival of raiding on a scale almost unknown for the past fifteen years. This was the case particularly with the Mahsuds and Bhittanis who numbered amongst them hostile leaders such as Mullah Sher Ali and Khunia Khel, Mahsuds, and Din Faqir, Bhittanni. These leaders whilst outwardly ardent supporters of the Faqir of Ipi had taken advantage of the general atmosphere of lawlessness to encourage raiding gangs, possibly because this type of enterprise seemed calculated to offer surer profits and less danger than joining the *lashkars* in the field

in order to engage in direct conflict with the troops. Raiding was not confined to the settled districts; Mahsud gangs also preyed on *powindahs* travelling by the Gomal route and deprived them of goods and camels. Raiding by Wazirs took place in the northern portion of Bannu District.

Early in May 1937 the incidence of raiding had led to special precautions being taken with the administered border. Additional Frontier Constabulary had been drafted into the area, the garrison of the normal Frontier Constabulary Posts had been strengthened and others had been established. Extra armed police had been provided, and arms had been issued to certain of the villagers to enable the inhabitants to contribute actively towards their own protection. A special police officer, designated the "Civil Defence Officer," had been appointed, with headquarters at Tank, to control anti-raiding measures. In addition the civil forces referred to above had been strengthened by cavalry, armoured cars and mobile infantry stationed at Bannu and Tank, with detachments at Ghazni Khel and Khairu Khel, north of the Bain Pass. The possibility that raiders might attempt to hold up a train had been appreciated and infantry escorts were being provided on trains. Aircraft of No. 28 (A.C.) Squadron, R.A.F., specially stationed at Manzai, were available for reconnaissance, for escorting trains and for co-operation with mobile columns and with Frontier Constabulary.

The general efficacy of these measures had been tested on more than one occasion. For instance a gang returning to tribal territory from a daring raid on the village of Paharpur, on the 2nd May, had been intercepted by a detachment of the Scinde Horse, from Tank. On other occasions raiding gangs had been engaged by Frontier Constabulary and aircraft, and the difficulties of carrying out a successful raid and effecting withdrawal unmolested to tribal territory were known to have deterred other gangs, whilst in some instances raiders who had actually assembled for an enterprise preferred to disperse at once without taking any action.

On the 24th May the escort for the train running from Bannu to Manzai was provided by one rifle company and one machine-gun section 1st Battalion, 13th Frontier Force Rifles (Coke's Rifles) which was proceeding to Tank to augment the garrison there. The train left Bannu at 8-15 a.m. and at 10-45 a.m. arrived at

Lakki. Here the line bifurcates, the main branch running eastwards to Kalabagh on the Indus River, whilst the line to Tank and Manzai takes off southwards.

Southwest of Lakki the dangerous section of the line begins. The railway here crosses the Bhitanni hills. This range, bare, stony and almost waterless, rises abruptly from the plains and forms the dividing line between Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts. Scored by deep valleys and precipitous *nalas* the range is crossed by two passes. The Pezu Pass lies to the south-east, and through it runs the railway to Tank, in a series of deep cuttings, one of which is 400 yards long and 47 feet deep, and the motor road to Dera Ismail Khan. Further to the north-west is the Bain Pass over which runs the motor road from Lakki to Tank. It will be seen from the sketch that the administrative border adjoins the Bain Pass and is guarded by a chain of posts of Frontier Constabulary at Kairu Khel, Faqir Chauki and Bain. North and west of the administrative border lies the tribal territory of the Bhitanni tribe the eastern area of which is, in normal times, under the control of the Deputy Commissioners of Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts.

On arrival at Lakki the troops were disposed for the protection of the train. The object was twofold: to engage any tribal gangs that might be encountered by fire from the train, and to facilitate rapid detrainment with a view to taking offensive action.

The railway is a single line of 2′ 6″ gauge, rolling stock is limited, and even with two engines the length of the rake that can be drawn is governed by the gradients to be negotiated in the pass. It had not at this stage been possible to provide special armoured trucks, although these have since been improvised. The troops were disposed in the following way. One light machine-gun was placed on the leading engine, to fire forwards and clear the track. The machine-gun section was mounted in the leading coach in order to cover each side of the train. One rifle platoon, ready for action, was disposed in each of the next four carriages. One compartment was reserved as a hospital. The engine driver was to give a prearranged signal by whistle if danger or attack was apprehended.

The raid owed its inception to events of a few days before. On the night of the 19th/20th May a successful raid had been carried out on the village of Umar Tattar Khel, in Bannu District, about 9 miles north of Pezu, in which four Hindu girls were kid-

napped and a quantity of loot removed. In the course of this enterprise the gang had received, either voluntarily or as the result of pressure applied, promises of help and co-operation in future raids from an inhabitant of Shahbaz Khel, a village about six miles north of Pezu. On the 20th May this raiding gang returned to Hussain Khel, in Bhitanni territory and, having distributed the girls and loot, resolved to organise a fresh raiding gang on a more ambitious scale.

The new gang numbering 360 tribesmen, consisted of 80 Mahsuds under a son of the notorious Khunia Khel, and 280 Bhitannis under various sectional leaders. This gang assembled on the evening of the 23rd May at a village some seven miles from Bain.

The raiders started at dusk and at 9-30 a.m. crossed the Bain Pass between the Frontier Constabulary posts at Faqir Chauki and Bain. From the Bain Pass onwards the raiders were in the danger area and piquets were therefore dropped at intervals along the hills with a view to securing the unmolested retreat of the gang, hampered as they would be by booty. Out of the original gang of 360, some 260 were employed on this protective role; another 40 were left to act as a reserve and assist in conveying the loot, at a place where water existed, whilst the actual hold-up of the train was carried out by 60 raiders.

After covering some twelve miles the raiders rested a short time at Karghocha Oba, where there was some water and, continuing on their way, arrived on the morning of the 24th May at a rainwater pond near the village of Wazir Khan, west of Shahbaz Khel. Here the raiders were met, by prearrangement, by five men from Shahbaz Khel village, who brought food and meat for the party. Discussion then took place as to the most suitable time and place for the raid, the leaders basing their plans on the local information and knowledge given them.

Having settled their plan the raiding party moved to the Pezu Pass and at about 2-15 p.m. took up positions in the hills by a railway cutting some 500 yards north of Pezu village. A party was despatched to damage the track with a view to derailing the train, but the first sleeper had not been removed when the train, which somewhat opportunely for the raiders was running late, came in sight.

The train from Lakki Marwat was climbing the Pezu Pass when there was a signal whistle from the engine simultaneous with a burst of fire from the light machine-gun mounted on the engine, which engaged and scattered the party on the line. The leading engine driver losing his presence of mind brought the train to a standstill in a cutting so deep and narrow that it was impossible for the troops to detrain in order to engage the tribesmen more effectively or even to fire. The raiders now opened fire along the whole length of the train. Their fire was largely ineffective, particularly on the leading coaches, since the fire of the light machine-gun mounted on the engine, and later of the machine-guns in the leading coach, prevented the tribesmen from exposing their heads over the bank of the cutting. Some casualties however occurred amongst the troops crowded in the narrow carriages, the wooden sides of which were not bullet proof.

After a short period of little more than a minute the engine driver was prevailed upon to start the engine again. As the train left the cutting the troops were able to engage the raiders by fire and inflicted, it is believed, three casualties. The train now quickened its pace and the raiders had to content themselves with firing at lengthening range, which they continued to do for some time.

The remainder of the journey was completed with little incident, a few shots being fired at the train, and returned, between Tank and Manzai.

Casualties amounted to two men of the escort and one passenger killed, and four men of the escort wounded.

Surprised at finding troops on the train, and disappointed of loot, the raiders at once began to withdraw along the line of their piquets previously posted. As they did so they were observed by an aircraft of No. 28 (A.C.) Squadron, R.A.F., which attacked with machine-gun fire and wounded at least two raiders.

As soon as information of the attack was received, measures to intercept the raiders were set on foot. One company of infantry supported by one and a half sections of armoured cars, two squadrons of cavalry and a force of Frontier Constabulary were posted on a general line between Ama Khel and Khairu Khel, astride the Bain Pass across the line of withdrawal of the gang. Meanwhile four platoons of Frontier Constabulary moved out from Pezu with the object of driving the raiders against this cordon.

ON A TRAIN IN THE PEZU PASS, 24th MAY 1937.



Later it was learnt that at 5 p.m. a party of 100 tribesmen bearing 3 wounded, one of whom died shortly afterwards, passed the village of Teri. The raiders, however, were aided by a heavy dust storm which gave place later to a thunderstorm, natural agencies whose favourable intervention was attributed to the supernatural powers of the Faqir of Ipi. Although touch was gained with them on three occasions the raiding party which had by now split up into several small gangs the better to escape observation succeded in evading the cordon and, crossing the Bain Pass at about midnight in a heavy rain storm, they reached Bhittani tribal territory. The facts of this withdrawal were confirmed the next day by trackers.

Certain features of this incident, although characteristic of most tribal raids, are worth recapitulating. They are:

(*i*) The careful organisation of the gang and the precautions taken to secure a safe line of retreat.

(*ii*) The dependence of the gang upon local information, which may be obtained either voluntarily from willing supporters in villages or extracted under threat of reprisal and personal violence. Food and water may also be needed, and secrecy must be assured.

(*iii*) The ability of gangs to cover great distances. In this raid the distance from the place where the gang assembled, after dusk, to the Pezu Pass was some 25 miles. The gang, therefore, before recrossing the border, traversed approximately 43 miles within about 30 hours. Greater distances than this are, however, frequently covered.

SHOOTING IN ALBANIA

By Captain W. G. Hingston, 1st Punjab Regiment

Officers stationed in India do not often get home leave during the winter, but with the new orders recently published it may become less rare. Many of those who do get home would like to do some shooting, but the expense is considerable in England and it is not easy to rent a good shoot just for one season. There are, however, many places in Europe where excellent shooting can be obtained at reasonable cost. Hungary offers marvellous partridge and goose shooting; excellent duck shooting can be had in northern Italy; good varied bags are possible in Sardinia and in north-eastern Spain. Unfortunately in all these countries, with the exception of Spain, the sport is well organised and relatively expensive in consequence. For those who wish to shoot when and where they please and do not mind some discomforts, the Balkans provide as good sport as can be found anywhere in the world.

Albania is the nearest and most accessible of the Balkan countries. Desperately poor, its people are spirited, fierce, hardy mountain folk, very hospitable and extremely proud of their freedom. In the days when the Turks ruled Albania, their control was always less complete there than in any other part of their empire. Since the war Italy has poured money into the country; many Italian goods are on sale; roads have been built and attempts made to develop the meagre local resources. Despite this progress the country people are still turbulent and blood feuds are carried on much as they are amongst the Pathans.

Albania supplies some of the best scatter gun shooting in the world. It is particularly famous for woodcock, although duck, geese, snipe, quail and pigeon also abound. There are not many centres, but of the few Scutari, Tirana and Santi Quaranta (Sarande) are the best. The latter is probably the easiest to reach. It lies on the coast, sheltered by the Island of Corfu, and quite close to the Greek frontier. The town is very small and primitive, although electric light and running water have recently been installed and both can be relied upon to work for a few hours each day. The hills rise straight from the tideless sea, the

houses being built in two tiers on the hillside. The one road winds up over the hill into the interior, its surface so bad that the worst road in India would be good in comparison. There is but one hotel, consisting of some rooms on top of a warehouse on the water front, but dignified by its one star in the Automobile Association Handbook. The food is cheap, plain and wholesome. The bathroom is also used as the game larder, and the water is heated by a large stove just beside the bath. On the rare occasions that the bath is required for washing, the stove is lit and soon the room is like a veritable inferno. Having removed the day's bag of woodcock from the edge of the bath, and dodged beneath the hanging clusters of snipe and duck, the bather will be well advised to touch the water with care. In some mysterious way the stove and bath become connected with the electric light system and a nasty shock can be taken. In fact the lighting system must have been installed by a practical joker, for it is apt to become connected with all sorts of objects. On one occasion the author, half-asleep in the early hours, grasped the iron end of his bed and the next moment an electric shock so galvanized him into action that he beat all previous records for rising on a cold morning.

The shooting is at its best from the middle of December until the end of February. Sarande is about five or six miles from the shooting area. The hill behind the village rises to a height of some two thousand feet and from the top there is a magnificent view. Below is a broad, flat valley, through which a river flows, and on the far side rise snow-capped mountains ten thousand feet high. The valley is a paradise for the shooter. To the south the river flows into Lake Butrinka, through a wide marsh, where duck are found in their millions. All through the valley are maize fields, at this time of year deep in mud and full of snipe. In between the fields are wide briar thickets in which the woodcock lie. The road winds across the valley on a low embankment, for after rain much of the land is under water. But the road is of little use to anyone wishing to get to the marshes, for they are never nearer to it than five miles of heavy going.

It is not possible to describe the duck shooting without an overdose of superlatives. Mallard and teal are there in their tens of thousands, pochard, pintail, shoveller, gadwhal and garganey also abound. Grey lag are numerous. During the day the duck

have to be shot from a punt poled through the marshes and large bags can be obtained, but the morning and evening flights provide the best sport. The shooter must be in position before light and then, from the first glimmer of dawn, the duck can be seen coming down the valley at a great height. Down they dive to the water at tremendous speed the wind roaring through their wings, surely the most thrilling sound on earth. For over an hour the flight lasts, until sunrise, when the task of picking up begins. It is advisable to make the hide in a bush or in the reeds on the edge of an opening, for birds falling in the high reeds can rarely be found. The evening flight is different. A place on a spit of higher land stretching out into the marsh is the best and, there, crouching on the damp ground, the shooter must wait. The sun goes down, the dusk creeps up, until one despairs of the flight ever beginning. Then, just when one is deciding that it is too dark to shoot, there is a roar of wings from the marsh. Hundreds of thousands of birds appear to rise together and to start off up the valley. Every sort of shot is given, high birds, low birds, crossing from all directions until dark has really arrived and it is only possible to hear the beat of wings in the air. As one trudges home through the mud, birds can be heard all around one landing to feed. Tired, dirty and happy, one reviews a day's shooting that can have fallen to the lot of few. If there is a moon it is possible to continue shooting on the way home, and can there be any more exciting form of shooting than that?

The snipe are very wild, if anything more so than in England and they provide far more exacting shooting than do the snipe in either India or Africa. Common snipe predominate, but there are many pintail; neither jack nor painted snipe were seen although they are reported to be there. Walking up was almost impossible, but it was easy to enlist small boys as beaters to drive the birds towards the hills and then to catch them breaking back. By this method the author on two occasions bagged more than twenty-five brace in an hour.

But the woodcock provide the greatest joy of Albania. Lurking in the briar thickets, which may be anything from five to forty yards wide, they give most sporting shots. Suddenly flitting out silently, breaking back, swerving between the trees, they keep the shooter on the alert the whole time. Dogs are essential for pushing them out, and are difficult to obtain. Local dogs are

bad. Wild to start with, but refusing the thickest places, they soon tire and will not work at all. To take a good dog out from England is both expensive and inconvenient owing to the quarantine on return. The best plan would be to buy from a keeper a couple of dogs who have just about finished their usefulness, and to have them destroyed before leaving Albania; an unpleasant thought, but probably the soundest and kindest in the long run. Bags of a hundred woodcock a day to two guns are frequent, while the odd pigeons, hare, quail or duck can also be picked up.

Sarande is not difficult of access. By train to Brindisi and thence by a Greek coastal steamer, it is only sixty odd hours from London. Second class is not expensive and is quite comfortable, while considerable reductions are given in Italy on the normal train fare.

The greatest difficulty is with regard to guns and cartridges. Their transit across France presents no difficulty, but in Italy the regulations are so numerous as to make the taking of guns hardly worth while. The guns are confiscated at the customs on entry and rejoin the traveller, with luck, at Brindisi. Cartridges cannot be taken at all. Italian cartridges are indifferent and they alone can be obtained in Albania. In fact English cartridges are much coveted and a present of a box of twenty-five is regarded as very handsome. The best plan is to send both guns and cartridges round by sea, although this means shipping them some six weeks in advance. Any tourist agency will do this, as well as arranging tickets and berths. For Albania there is no need to go to an agency to make shooting arrangements, shooting being free everywhere. The sole expense is a licence which costs approximately twelve shillings.

The language of the country is Albanian. A knowledge of Italian is useful, but does not get the best value out of the inhabitants. Greek is also spoken widely. French and English can be useful, but far the best value will be obtained from a knowledge of low class American. Many of the villagers went to America during the boom years, and they are delighted to have the chance of airing their "English." A party of peasants will always greet the stranger in Italian, but on receiving a reply that they are meeting an Englishman, some bashful man, wrapped in a sheepskin rug and probably carrying an old flint lock gun

over his shoulder, will be pushed forward to converse in a language that both he and his friends proudly imagine is English.

The author made the hotel his base of operations, going out by himself with his bedding, change of clothing and cartridges on one of the small hill ponies, and sleeping in the huts down in the valley. Although very poor the Albanian is proud. He takes the stranger into his house, as a guest, gives him his bed and treats him as a friend of the family. To offer money for the lodging is an insult. Payment is most easily made by engaging the host or his son as "*shikari*" for the next day, for thus are his scruples overcome. One miserable wooden hut, kept by a lonely man in the marshes, was a sleeping place on four occasions. After the ceremonial Turkish coffee has been drunk, everything goes with a swing. At night there are apt to be other tenants of the bed. Rats scamper over the sleeping forms. On one occasion the author on retiring for the night removed only his braces, hanging them on a nail on the wall. In the morning they had disappeared, but after a long search were found in the rafters. Only the back loops remained, the rest having provided a luscious meal for the rats. In spite of the discomfort the author has very fond memories of the evenings, spent in an atmosphere of smoke, reeking with the smell of wet clothes and unwashed bodies, sitting round a log fire burning on a stone in the middle of the room. Neighbours come in to help amuse the guest, and the air of friendliness and goodwill is very pleasant.

For a keen shot, who also wishes to see a little-travelled part of the world, this primitive country is ideal. The author will be delighted to give any further information he can to anyone thinking of going out there. The cost for four weeks, including the time of travel, comes to about £65, and this includes board and lodging, travel and tips, as well as the shooting. To give some idea of the extent of the shooting the author in twenty days got just over fourteen hundred head of game to his own gun. With two guns this bag would have been considerably more than doubled.

REVIEWS

REMEMBERING KUT

By Dorina L. Neave—Edited by John Brophy

(*Arthur Barker, Ltd.* 12s. 6d.)

The sad futility of General Townshend's advance to Ctesiphon is now a matter of history. Without a clear policy or military objective the ill-equipped Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force was given a task far beyond its capacity. The initial stages of the campaign found units short of stores, transport and equipment. Inadequate base organisation at Basra, with an ever-increasing line of communication along the treacherous, Arab-infested reaches of the River Tigris, did little to remedy the situation. The tragedy which resulted from this lack of foresight and administrative chaos was inevitable. After a difficult withdrawal and a long siege at Kut-el-Amara, General Townshend was forced to surrender with some 13,000 officers and men.

The investment of a beleagured garrison seems, for some not easily defined reason, to capture the imagination at the expense of less colourful operations of war. Although military history proves the strategical folly of confining a field army within the limits of a fortress, it is the successful sortie or the eleventh-hour relief that has provided traditional heroes since the legendary days of Troy. Perhaps this explains that special chivalry which is so often extended to a garrison which capitulates after a gallant and protracted defence. The troops in Kut might well have been entitled to the honours of war. The absence of even a vague sense of humanity on the part of the Turks towards their defeated enemies becomes all the more despicable. All prisoners of war must sustain a blow to their pride of race and self-esteem, but the prisoners of Kut were more than unfortunate to receive from the hands of their captors a callous treatment which is all too commonplace in countries where life is cheap. Their troubles too were greatly aggravated by the climatic conditions of the barren, unhappy land through which they were driven at the point of the bayonet.

Lady Neave's book gives us a brief but comprehensive resumé of the early stages of the campaign. The rest of the volume is largely devoted to the personal records of survivors. These accounts—and they are pathetic reading—leave us in no doubt about the dreadful state of the so-called prison camps and the cruelties of a 2,000-mile march under a burning sun. But the figures speak for themselves: scarcely one-third of the prisoners returned to their homes, and of these many must still suffer from their grim experience. On the other side of the picture we have a story of dour courage and unbroken spirit. It would be hard to forget the desperate attempt to run the blockade up river into Kut in the steamer "Julnar," a last hope that deserved a better fate; or to remain unmoved by tales of self-sacrifice for dying friends and of brave jests in the face of adversity.

It is easy to be wise after the event, and so criticism must be tempered by an understanding of the difficulties existing at the time. In this respect the authoress is fair, if not almost too lenient, for surely in peace time steps can be taken to allocate responsibilities, and to make plans based on a careful study of potential theatres of war and a sound estimate of our own resources. And again, there is little excuse for lack of supplies and medical equipment. But the main object of this book is to recall the deeds and sufferings of the Sixth Division rather than to stress any particular military lesson. Our thanks are, therefore, due to Lady Neave for her memorable work and for her generous wish to devote the proceeds of its sale to a survivors' fund. It is not too late to remember Kut.

G. R. B.

THE BRAVEST SOLDIER—SIR ROLLO GILLESPIE

1766—1814

By Eric Wakeham

(*William Blackwood & Sons.* 12*s.* 6*d.*)

The author has taken his somewhat flamboyant title from the claim made by Sir John Fortescue in his sketch of Gillespie in "A Gallant Company." "Had he (Gillespie) lived in these days," wrote Sir John, "he would have been smothered with V.C.s, D.S.O.s and M.C.s. . . Reviewing his career again, I still think him the bravest man who ever wore the King's uniform."

Gillespie began his service in the year 1783 as a cornet of the 3rd Horse, or Carabiniers, then stationed in Ireland. After a runaway marriage, and trial and acquittal on a charge of murder rising out of a duel, he sailed for the West Indies, where he took a prominent part in the fighting at San Domingo. He performed deeds of almost legendary bravery, and his superior officers spoke of his ability and devotion in glowing terms. They were confident of the success of any enterprise on which he was employed. He was loved by his men, and far ahead of his time in matters of administration. He saw that the accommodation for troops and the hospital arrangements in Jamaica were appalling and set about reform. This was so successful that, on his return to England, he disembarked a regiment 300 strong. Such an effective strength was unprecedented for a corps which had served for a long time in the West Indies.

In 1805 Gillespie made the hazardous journey overland to India and had many exciting experiences and encounters. Soon after his arrival at Arcot where he commanded the garrison, the native troops in the neighbouring fort of Vellore mutinied. It was here that Gillespie performed one of the most spectacular exploits of his life, remarkable throughout for deeds of daring. Hearing of the mutiny while out for his morning hack, he hastily summoned his troops and set out for Vellore at a gallop. He soon outstripped his men, however, and arrived in front of the fort with only one officer and four men. It was at once clear that the few British soldiers within the fort were in desperate straits; so Gillespie decided to attempt an entry without

waiting for his troops and actually succeeded in forcing the wicket gate before they arrived.

Throughout his service in India, and later Java, he performed many such exploits, always in the face of incredible odds and followed by his troops with the utmost confidence and devotion. It was an understood thing that if an impossible task was to be performed, Gillespie was the man to do it.

On his return from Java in 1813, he took part in the Nepal Campaign, where he met his death while leading the troops to an assault on the fortress of Kalunga.

Sir Philip Chetwode, who has written an introduction to this book, remarks on the fact that Gillespie, whose name was so renowned in his own day, and the story of whose deeds reads like the legends of the knights of old, should be unknown to the general public to-day.

The book is well worth reading, not only for the story itself but also for the commentary it offers on the art of colonial warfare in Gillespie's day, when men fought literally face to face and chemical and mechanical weapons, as we understand them to-day, were non-existent. It calls to mind the dreadful conditions under which soldiers serving abroad were compelled to live, the lack of proper quarters and hospitals, the difficulties of transport; and, in contrast, the gallantry and devotion with which they carried out their duty.

R. L. G.

HALDANE 1856—1915

By Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice

(*Faber & Faber.* 18*s.*)

I finished the first volume of Sir Frederick Maurice's "Haldane" with the hope that I should soon be able to read the second. This is not always one's reaction to a lengthy biography. If the earlier pages of this work are rather full of quotations from correspondence and details of the upbringing and ancestry of Haldane, perhaps, without this foundation, the author could scarcely have produced such a comprehensive picture of the man. Without such a picture it would be difficult fully to appreciate the reasons for Haldane's meteoric rise, and equally dramatic and sudden fall.

It is as a Secretary of State for War that Haldane is best remembered by soldiers. But for him we should in 1914 have had no organized expeditionary force, no Territorial Army; we should have had none of that uniformity of organization and training which made possible the rapid employment of Dominion forces in large numbers. Few politicians could have achieved as much as Haldane did in the face of opposition from financial and vested interests.

The author's facility for character-painting is such, however, that the success of this philosopher at the War Office seems to the reader to be assured from the start, even though charge was assumed at a time when he might be, and was by his own chief, expected to fail. The story of his acceptance of the office is illuminating. It presents one with the key both to Haldane's success

and to his ultimate downfall. His self-confidence, which in a lesser man would be termed conceit, his ability for clear thinking, his somewhat ruthless handling of political "strings," brought him many admirers, but a greater number of enemies. "Schopenhauer," as Campbell-Bannerman caustically dubbed him, was put into the War Office in the expectation, almost the hope, that he would fail. His success, the logical outcome of ability and almost fanatical devotion to duty, even if it had been realised as clearly at the time as it is to-day, was always precarious, undermined by the very factors which made it possible. His ability and self-confidence forced him, throughout his life, to take whatever line of action seemed to him to be of advantage, not necessarily to himself, but to the nation as a whole. He trod no narrow path of party policy, and, if respected by many, was ultimately trusted by few of his political equals. Actions based on none of the accepted party policies of the day made him a suspect, as an unknown quantity will always be suspect, to "the man in the street." His philosophical creed was never capable of examination, because rarely understood by even his more educated colleagues. The semi-hysterical rumours and suspicions of the early days of the Great War were almost bound to be directed against a man well known and respected in the highest German circles. With the people clamouring for his downfall, the opposition welcoming it, and many of his colleagues lukewarm in his defence, the issue could never be in doubt. He must have needed all his philosophy at such a time.

The inner histories of many international and political issues are disclosed in this volume, and make fascinating reading. They illustrate the many facets of a brilliant personality. In the end one is left with the impression that it is as an educationalist rather than as a lawyer or leader that Viscount Haldane will be remembered by posterity. The provincial universities represent for him the memorial which he would most have valued.

C. M. H.

THE ART OF THE ADMIRAL

By Commander Russell Grenfell, R.N. (Retired)

(*Faber & Faber*. 12s. 6d.)

Commander Grenfell has presented his readers with an exposition of naval strategy written clearly and expressed in a language consistently free from those service tags which are only understandable to the favoured few. His book should therefore appeal to the great British public, in whose blood the call of the sea can generally be found in some degree, as well as to the professional sailor, soldier, or airman.

The first seven chapters deal with purely naval strategy as it existed up to 1918, and avoid the complications due to the advent of air power. This leads to simplicity and enables the reader to grasp the basic facts before he is forced to think in a third dimension, which is still a matter of difficulty to most of the present generation. Nevertheless, it results in many statements being made in the early chapters which have to be heavily qualified when the effect of the air has been considered and the reader is left to qualify them himself.

The next three chapters deal with the psychological side of naval warfare and make most interesting reading. The author is to be congratulated in bringing this side of warfare into true relation to the strategical and other problems he discusses. This side of war is so often forgotten that it is refreshing to note the weight given to it by the author.

The greatest interest of the book, however, lies in the last two chapters dealing with the influence of the air and the composition of the fleet.

The author has approached the problem of the influence of air on naval warfare in a very unbiassed fashion and his conclusions appear to be sound. One is left with the feeling that within, what the author describes as the coastal area, aircraft, assisted as necessary by the small surface vessel, will become the primary weapon whereas, outside that area the aircraft is likely to remain an auxiliary to the warship and that the control of the sea in the future as in the past depends on co-operation between the various armed units operating in it or over it. The ardent protagonists of the surface vessel on the one hand and of aircraft on the other appear to forget that, whenever a new weapon is introduced, wild claims have always been made about it, which have dissolved into thin air as soon as the test of war has been applied. In naval warfare of the future it is the co-operation of all weapons controlled by one directing mind which will decide the issue. In this respect the author appears to have made the case for shore-based as well as ship-borne aircraft being under naval command in war.

A further point brought out, but not fully developed, is the great difficulty of securing overseas bases in face of hostile air superiority. This fact leads one to realize the importance of possessing territory in the right geographical and strategical positions and the vital necessity of developing such territory in peace or certainly taking active steps to ensure that it cannot be utilized by the enemy through lack of preparation to defend it. Great Britain is well endowed with such territories, except in the Mediterranean, but she is slow to realize the importance of developing them due to the altered conditions produced by the advent of air powers. Failure to do so may well give the initiative in the next war to our potential enemies.

The last chapter is highly controversial dealing with the problem of the battleship in modern naval warfare. The author clearly favours its abolition but is wise enough to leave it an open question for his readers to decide. It is clear, however, that the British Empire cannot as yet abandon the capital ship though it would appear that its days are numbered.

The book can be recommended to both the student of war and the general reader who should both receive advantage from its perusal.

S. W. K.

"I FIND AUSTRALIA"

By William Hatfield

(Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d. net.)

In this book, Mr. Hatfield describes how, because of an innate desire to know Australia, he threw up a safe job in England, and reached Adelaide by working his passage out at the age of nineteen. Faced on landing with the necessity of living, he was himself surprised at being given a job at the first office at which he enquired: a job of boundary-riding on a sheep station did not deter this young man, who had never been in the saddle; heat, mosquitoes, snakes, hard work, and rough companions weighed nothing against the fact that this was a job with pay and food, and above all that it was his "Open Sesame" to the interior of the country he had travelled so far to know.

From his first sheep station the author trekked into Queensland to cattle work, and thence to almost every kind of occupation in the great continent; learning first-hand as he went, and amassing an intimate knowledge of the life and problems of Australia. The story of his adventures makes excellent reading, giving the reader a living picture of conditions "down under." The attractive maps on the inner cover make it easy to follow the author's travels, although they would have been much improved by the marking of rivers as well as place names. To those who have never felt the wander-lust it may seem strange that any one could let the years slip by so aimlessly with no apparent object other than ultimately to write a book about Australia, but years of experience have qualified him not only to write, but have inspired him to present to his public an interesting picture of Australia which must stimulate in them a desire to know more of the vital problems of the continent.

Amongst other things may be mentioned the subject of the colonisation of the vast empty Northern Territory; the practicability of which the author hopes to be able to demonstrate personally. He has presented his case with such enthusiasm and sincerity that, in spite of the fact that general opinion does not entirely concur with his, his readers must surely look forward to the successful launching of his experiment, and wish him luck in his new and great adventure.

E. S.

"STAND TO"

A DIARY OF THE TRENCHES, 1915—1918

By Captain F. C. Hitchcock, M.C.

(Hurst & Blackett, 15s.)

Captain Hitchcock, the author of "Saddle Up," gives a straightforward account of what he saw and did as a subaltern of the 2nd Battalion, The Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment, during the war. He makes no attempt to write up his tale, even so his diary grips the attention from beginning to end. It is in marked contrast to so many war books we know in that the author is never morbid and never indulges in introspection. He writes plainly of the horrors and hardships of trench warfare in France

and yet shows what little effect they had on officers and men in a good regiment.

We have read other war books and plays full of morbid, super-sensitive characters and it is easy to fall into the error of imagining that the average man in France was mentally unbalanced. Captain Hitchcock's diary is a corrective and shows the British soldier adapting himself to strange conditions in his usual cheerful manner.

From a military point of view there is much of interest. Routine in trenches and rest areas is well described and there is an admirable account of a large scale trench raid. The author, like many others, questions the value of these raids ordered by the higher command. It is interesting too to be reminded that neglect of the rifle as a weapon of defence was an early failing. Even in 1915 the infantry in France had lost their skill in musketry and had come to rely on bombs. Of interest to all soldiers, we commend this volume especially to those who were fortunate enough to be too young to fight in the Great War.

W. A. S.

"BETTER VILLAGES"

BY F. L. BRAYNE, M.C., I.C.S.

(*Oxford University Press, Bombay Indian Branch, Rs.* 2.)

To all who take an interest in rural reconstruction, Mr. Brayne's name is a household word. Particularly is this so amongst the Panjabi classes which supply the Indian Army with the bulk of its recruits.

India is predominantly a country of village communities. Uplift movements that originate in her few large cities touch only an infinitesimal proportion of her three hundred and fifty million inhabitants, and are dead almost before they reach the suburbs. The village community is the basis of India's national life, and if India is to take her place once more amongst the nations of the world, she must build herself a place by raising the standard of living in the villages, which *are* India. In recognising this fact, Mr. Brayne is following in the footsteps of Kabir, Guru Nanak Dev, Mahatma Gandhi, and a host of other Indian reformers.

In Mr. Brayne's own words, "Better Villages" is a book "pointing out briefly what has to be done and how it should be done. It is intended for the lay worker, official or non-official, and only contains what every intelligent person living or working in a village should know for his own and his neighbour's well-being."

The Army in India has long realised the connection between rural reconstruction and an adequate supply of fit, mentally alert and contented recruits and the principles of rural reconstruction are now taught to all candidates for the Indian Army first and second class certificates of education. Those responsible for instruction in this subject should find "Better Villages" of the greatest assistance.

D. F. W. W.

"LEGS, GENTLEMEN, LEGS!"

By C. H. Burns

(*Constable & Co., Ltd. 7s. 6d.*)

The author of "Legs, Gentlemen, Legs!" is a man of sense and understanding who writes of horses as simply and directly as he deals with them. This explains the obvious success which he has obtained with his methods. He is also one of those who prefers "to spoil his own horses," thereby getting the last penny-worth of enjoyment out of them.

Some of his views are not orthodox, but he argues his case logically and with a refreshing diffidence. His book will help anyone who sets up and runs a small stable for amusement and, in spite of what the author says, it will also help those who are beginners in horsemanship and horsemastership, or who only ride for exercise.

There is a lot of horse sense in this compact and inexpensive volume.

T. S.



THE STORMING OF MOOLTAN, 2ND JANUARY



THE STORMING OF MOOLTAN, 2ND JANUARY, 1849.