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EDITORIAL

The League of Nations.

The reform of the Covenant of the League of Nations has recently been debated in more than one European capital. As Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister for Poland, put it: "The possibility of maintaining a state of affairs in which the statute and regulations of an institution set up to embrace all the nations of the world are applied only by some of them is illusory." And Hr. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, went on to warn the Council of an even more pressing danger. There is a tendency to transform the League into an alliance of countries in opposition to non-member countries. "Democracy against dictatorship" is very much the order of the day. If an attempt is made to set up a group of powers primarily concerned with the defence of a political doctrine, hostile to totalitarianism or to any other particular principle, then there is no hope whatever for the future of the League.

Experience has undoubtedly shown that too much was expected of the League at its inception. Adherence to the Covenant as it was originally framed implied the surrender by every member of a measure of national sovereignty in the cause of international co-operation; but national sovereignty has survived more stubbornly than the founders of the League had reason to foresee, and the world is still a long way off being ripe for the creation of a super State over-riding national governments. Then it was a most unfortunate mischance that linked the Covenant

with the Peace Treaty and, in the eyes of many nations, with the maintenance of the territorial settlements of Versailles. And it has now been proved, on at least one memorable occasion, to have been a grievous error to have included any regulation, such as Article XVI of the Covenant, which provided under given circumstances for the automatic and compulsory application of sanctions by member States. But when these mistakes have been admitted, it must in fairness be added that the League embodies, as nothing else has ever done, the principles of international co-operation. It provides *par excellence* a clearing-house for the exchange of information on which to base plans for the promotion of world trade, the economic welfare and raising of the standard of living of mankind. If the League were used in this way to relax economic tension, it could not fail to be a powerful factor for political appeasement. Despite the fact that pacts of non-aggression—one may instance that between Poland and Germany —have been concluded outside the auspices of the League, the latter has in fact a long record of the settlement of international disputes to its credit, many of which would have grown to formidable dimensions had they not been submitted to arbitration at Geneva.

The British peoples are as firm as ever in their conviction that the principles of the League and of the Kellogg Pact must be made to prevail if the world is to progress at all. In their view the Covenant carries into world affairs the outlook of a great and liberal democratic society, which they believe to be one of the greatest achievements of the human race. That the Covenant may need reform they are prepared to admit, but not that the Covenant itself is visionary. Indeed, the trend of opinion seems to be towards an admission of the fact that compulsory arbitration is as useless as compulsory sanctions have proved to be. It is the right of every State to submit its disputes to the Permanent Court of Justice or to the Council. It is the right, and should be the duty, of every nation to refuse to aid another which has committed an act of unprovoked aggression. But the decision to take an active part against that other nation is on an entirely different plane. It is one that must be taken by the individual government concerned and not placed on it as a duty necessitated by membership of an international body. And there is much to be said for this point of view, for genuine friendship and lasting

peace can only be achieved by the voluntary, not the compulsory, co-operation of democracies and dictatorships.

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The Van Zeeland Report.

The Van Zeeland report on the possibility of obtaining a reduction in the obstacles to international trade was published in London at the end of January. M. Van Zeeland had been asked by the British and French Governments to undertake an inquiry into the possibility of obtaining a general reduction of quotas and of other obstacles to international trade. His investigation carried him to most European capitals and to Washington and lasted for some ten months.

M. Van Zeeland summarises the three main impediments to international trade and makes recommendations in each case. Dealing with exchange restrictions and fluctuating currencies he recommends that creditor countries should resume foreign lending, that the external obligations of debtor countries should be finally adjusted and, when this has been done, that export and import credits should be made available to those countries through the medium of the Bank of International Settlements. While he believes that the best method of preventing fluctuating currencies is the re-establishment on a modified basis of the gold standard, he realises that such a course is at present impracticable and recommends instead an extension of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement between Britain, America and France.

M. Van Zeeland is emphatic that a concerted attack must be made on tariffs and other forms of indirect protection if international trade is to recover its health. He recommends that governments should undertake not to raise their present tariffs and that they should gradually reduce those tariffs which are exceptionally high. Taxes and other restrictions on the export of raw materials should be abolished. Bilateral commercial agreements, based on the most-favoured-nation cause, are to be encouraged.

Finally, he considers that industrial quotas should be suppressed and agricultural quotas modified. No new quotas should be imposed and no existing quota tightened up.

As regards procedure the report recommends that international collaboration might usefully take the form of a collection of joint declarations; partly negative, binding the signatories to

abstain from further harmful practices, such as the raising of present tariffs and the imposition of new quotas; partly positive, pledging the nations concerned to take up and examine in detail other problems arising in their economic relations. Among these presumably must be placed the extension of the Tripartite Monetary Agreement, the reduction of tariffs, the resumption of foreign lending and the suppression of quotas.

Previous attempts to promote the flow of international trade have, it is believed, failed to secure the support of the public because they were put forward on grounds not always evident to the layman. Economic nationalism has been denounced as an evil in itself, the revival of international trade and the stabilization of currencies on a gold basis have been spoken of as ends in themselves irrespective of their political and social effects. M. Van Zeeland avoids these errors. He emphasises that the object of an economic pact should be to assist the participants to raise the standard of living of their nationals by raising the general welfare and believes that this objective is more likely to appeal to Governments and peoples than the theoretical arguments of the economist. International trade, he points out, is not necessarily an end in itself, but is a means to an end—the improvement of the standard of life of the masses. It is because he has adopted this psychological attitude that we think his report may bear fruit. Measures of self-protection, both in democratic and totalitarian countries, have not been lightly adopted. Many of them, such as exchange restrictions, are necessary to maintain the small amount of economic stability that still remains. The difficulties of reconciling national self-sufficiency with the machinery necessary for free trade are great. No country whose economy is based on the control of exchange and imports can be expected to agree to suppress exchange control and to remove tariff restrictions at a blow. If States were suddenly freed from the restrictions on which they had built up their self-sufficiency, their economic stability would collapse at once. M. Van Zeeland recognises this when he calls attention to the fact that the first steps towards the re-establishment of international trade must be a common undertaking not to dam still further the small flow that now exists and the extension of the Tripartite agreement to include Germany and Italy. As the *Daily Telegraph and Morning Post* points out, "if politically the hour does not seem very propitious,

the very urgency of the case may tend to overcome hesitations which would otherwise be insuperable."

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National Service in Britain.

The proposal made by Mr. Boothby, M.P., that a system of compulsory national service should be introduced in Great Britain has received considerable attention in the Press. "We do not want conscription," he said, "but I believe the time is coming, if it has not already come, when we shall have to face up to the necessity of some form of compulsory national service. I can conceive of nothing that would do more good inside this country and bring more stability to the world. I would like to see young men given a period of one year's training by the State between the ages of seventeen and nineteen. Modern war is technical and complicated, and training in the use of arms would necessarily form part of the course, but not the predominant part."

Similar proposals have been made before in Great Britain and, except during the stress of war, have come to nothing because the bogey of military conscription has blinded the nation to the fact that it is the duty of every citizen to devote part of his time to the nation's welfare. That every citizen owes something to the State for his safety and well-being is shown in one sense by his liability to taxation. What Mr. Boothby is proposing is in essence nothing more than the addition of a form of direct and personal service to the indirect forms which citizens already have to give. Perhaps the most important argument that can be put forward in favour of compulsory national service is that it would foster comradeship and a sense of civic obligation in a way which indirect service can never do. In many countries to-day young men of different social origins live and work together at an impressionable age with the result that they carry with them through life an understanding of each other's point of view, which is not at present obtainable either in Britain or in India. And, putting aside questions of military training, there is undoubtedly work on which young men can usefully be engaged in any country; work such as the prevention of floods, the clearing of waste land, the construction and repair of roads, and, in Great Britain, the building of the public shelters required by the air raids precautions scheme.

The objections to a system of national service are well known. It would cost the State money and there are obvious limits to the employment of large numbers of young men on public works. It would inevitably mean a serious interruption in the education of those who are to follow the professions and finally there is the danger, and it looms large in the minds of the British peoples, that the system would carry with it the germ of military conscription.

Despite these objections we think that the proposal is one which merits detailed investigation. The essential condition for the success of any system of national service is, of course, that it should reflect the wishes of the nation as a whole.

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Supply in War.

The work undertaken by the government of Great Britain to perfect the passive measures of defence of the civil population against air attack is well known. Less spectacular, but no less important, measures for the control of supplies in time of war are nearing completion in the hands of the Food (Defence Plans) Department.

Supply in war can from a British point of view be summed up in two words—oil and food. There are many plants which can help to mitigate the difficulties, but it is only in the co-ordination of all those plans that a satisfactory solution is to be found. Primarily of course we require command at sea for the protection of our merchant shipping all over the globe and an air strength sufficient to protect that shipping as it nears home ports, the ports themselves and the stocks which have been accumulated. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that measures of passive protection can be no more than valuable supplements to a strong navy and air force. Of those measures storage, or at least steps for the creation of storage accommodation, come first in importance. While this is so as regards both food and oil, it is peculiarly important as regards the latter. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force are entirely dependent on the free supply of oil fuel, the Army is nearing the same degree of dependence, and oil is widely used by the Merchant Navy and civil industry. Successive governments have rejected the idea that the Royal Navy should revert to the use of coal and there is no hope of its use being resumed in industry where it has been superseded by oil fuel in modern

processes. We possess, it is true, an enormous tanker capacity and we draw oil from all over the world, but nominal ownership of oil assets will not necessarily secure supplies in war, and the British Empire has limited natural resources. Storage is an obvious solution and it is satisfactory to learn that steps have already been taken to increase Service reserves of fuel and to install them in places safe from air attack.

As regards food our position is comparable to that of 1917 and 1918. We are and must remain dependent on sea-borne supplies. Quite apart from what we do in peace, it is estimated that we would depend in war on imports for over half of our meat, cheese and sugar, and nearly all our fats and cereals. British merchant shipping totals some two thousand ships less than it did in 1914 and for that reason alone the position is serious enough. There are possibilities in the steps, such as the Wheat Quota Act, which have already been taken to increase home production. Even so there are very patent limits and the area of Great Britain under arable cultivation is less than it was before the war. In this sphere greater possibilities lie in the realm of food control, the distribution, rationing and limitation of the price of food. And it is in this respect that much quiet work has been carried out by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence and civil departments A shadow organization is being steadily developed which will be responsible for the control of supplies and prices. It is intended that food control shall come from the start, before there is a shortage and prices have risen alarmingly. On the outbreak of war the food controller will take possession of stocks in the hands of merchants and cargoes at sea. Working on behalf of the nation as a whole he will be the one purchaser in the open market and, since Britain is a very large importer of food supplies, he should wield a great influence over prices. The allotment to manufacturers at fixed prices of those foods which need to be processed will be made and retail prices will be fixed by government order so as to allow of a fair margin—but only a fair margin—for expenses and profit. The appointment of fifteen divisional food officers, which has already taken place, foreshadows the introduction of a system of rationing. In this way the State will be placed in complete control of the whole food supply of the nation.

The problem is indeed so large and one which interests

directly or indirectly, so many departments of government that it could never have been solved without a co-ordinating minister. Elasticity is essential and the primary object of all this planning is to create an organization sufficiently flexible to meet any emergency arising from either naval or air attack.

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Germany.

It is not easy for observers in India to arrive at any very definite conclusions regarding recent events in Germany and Austria, but Herr Hitler's changes in the civil and military leadership of Germany and his relations with Austria have certainly aroused anxious interest throughout the world.

The circumstances of the German Army purge, as it has been called, appear to have been as follows. The Minister for War, Field-Marshal von Blomberg, well-known for his close connection with the Nazi Party, recently contracted a marriage of which army officers, or at least those brought up in the very high pre-war traditions, disapproved. A protest lodged by General Fritsch on behalf of the army resulted in the removal of both Field-Marshal von Blomberg and General Fritsch, the resignation of a number of senior officers of the army and air force, and the assumption by Herr Hitler of the supreme control of the German forces. These, roughly, are the known facts, but it is clear that the roots of the trouble lay far deeper. It had been known for some time that the German army, which before the war had a large influence over the political direction of affairs, disapproved of some aspects of Nazi foreign policy. For one thing it was particularly opposed to a continuance of interference in Spanish affairs, once the necessary experience had been gained in the effect of modern weapons in war. For another it was on the whole opposed to the State control of armaments, a measure also disliked by many industrialists. And there was inevitably a clash of interests between the Nazi offices in Munich and the older secretariats in Berlin.

If the causes of the Führer's changes are a matter for speculation, the results of those changes must be even more doubtful. A new office, the "Supreme Command of the Armed Forces," with General Keitel as co-ordinating authority but under Herr Hitler's direct control, has been opened; and Baron von Neurath has been appointed head of a new secret Cabinet Council, which will tender

advice on foreign and political affairs. On the face of it these changes appear to have resulted in a substantial gain in power to the Nazi Party at the cost of the army. On the other hand the new council contains a very fair proportion of army representatives, who should still be able to give their opinion on matters of foreign politics. The most that one can say is that Herr Hitler has imposed his personal control in Germany more firmly than ever.

What is more important is that he appears also to have obtained almost complete control of Austrian affairs. The truce concluded in 1936 between Berlin, Rome and Vienna has not proved an easy one to keep. By its terms Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini agreed to recognise Austria's sovereignty and the right of the Austrian Government to control political factions within Austrian territory. Despite the agreement Nazi influence, even if it worked underground, steadily increased during the next eighteen months and in February this year Herr von Schuschnigg, after a personal interview with Herr Hitler, was forced to acquiesce not only in the grant of official recognition to Nazi activities in Austria, but also in the allotment of a number of cabinet posts, including the direction of the police, to prominent members of the Nazi Party. The casual observer might well have supposed that this would satisfy Nazi ambitions but within a few days of the formation of a new cabinet in Vienna German troops had crossed the frontier with the ostensible object of thwarting Herr von Schuschnigg's proposal to refer matters to a plebiscite of the Austrian people. What the result of a plebiscite, held under conditions of complete freedom, would have been will never be known. It might or might not have resulted in a victory for the Nazi Party. Now the time for a plebiscite has passed, a greater Germany already exists.

While Great Britain is not primarily concerned with either German or Austrian domestic affairs, events such as these are more than domestic and cannot fail to make themselves felt in all European countries. It is only to be hoped that they will not lead to a deterioration in the European situation in general and Anglo-German relations in particular.

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The Mission to Portugal.

The departure of a British Mission, composed of representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force, to Lisbon has received less attention than its importance merits. The alliance formed in the 14th century between Britain

and Portugal has been maintained for centuries not merely by sentiment or trade interest, but for strategical reasons. The accidents of geography and the naval problems resulting therefrom have been responsible for this unbroken bond between the two countries. The sea communications of the British Empire with the Mediterranean, South Africa and South America pass by the coast of Portugal and her island possessions of Madeira, Cape Verde and the Azores. Portuguese harbours have been of use to Britain in almost every major war in which she has been engaged and it is essential that they should remain in the hands of an allied power. Portugal too benefits by the alliance, for Great Britain undertakes the defence of Portuguese coasts, sea communications and land frontiers against an aggressor, a burden which might well prove too big for Portugal to shoulder alone in these days.

The outbreak of the Spanish civil war in 1936 placed Portugal in a peculiarly difficult position. The Portuguese Government of Dr. Salazar is a government of the Right, although the dictatorship is mild when compared with others in Europe. It had watched with growing anxiety the evolution of events under a communist government in Spain and they appeared not unlike the events which had occurred in Portugal in 1910 when the monarchy was overthrown. Throughout the civil war, Dr. Salazar's policy has been based on domestic considerations rather than on any fundamental desire to draw nearer to Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini. Two dangers appeared to be threatening Portugal – the infiltration of subversive influences from across the border, and the possibility of her national independence being impaired by the imposition of international control arising out of the activities of the Non-Intervention Committee.

The facts that Portugal accepted the principle of non-intervention only with reservations and that she severed relations with the Spanish Government have led to suggestions that she intended to abandon the British alliance. That suggestion received a categorical denial some months ago when Dr. Salazar publicly repudiated the idea and described the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance as unalterable.

While the detailed terms of reference to the Services Mission have not been made public, the nature and scope of the assistance to be afforded by each country to the other in the event of war

will, it is understood, form the basis of the discussions. Portugal, with a major war in progress at her door, will no doubt expect British naval power to keep her coasts and communications open for her. Britain for her part can never over-estimate the importance of the Lisbon-Azores-Cape Verde strategic triangle. The prospects that the Mission will succeed in its task of strengthening the ties of friendship which unite the two countries seem to be bright.

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Palestine.

A despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies laying down the terms of reference of the technical Commission which is now on its way to Palestine was published as a White Paper in January. The Commission is to inquire into the scheme proposed by the Royal Commission of last year and its functions are to be confined to considering the practical possibilities of partition. The new body has been asked to make specific recommendations regarding the boundaries of the proposed Arab and Jewish areas and of the new British mandate, and to report on the economic and financial questions involved in partition.

If this is all that the despatch envisaged, the future would at least be reasonably clear. Unfortunately the despatch opens up prospects of delay and confusion, which necessary as they may be, are nonetheless regrettable. It is asserted that, while His Majesty's Government have expressed their general agreement with the arguments and conclusions of the Royal Commission, they are in no sense committed to approval of the plan for partition or to the compulsory transfer of Arabs from the Jewish to the Arab area. It is pointed out that even if partition is found to be equitable and practicable, the British Government will in any case have to refer their proposals to the Council of the League of Nations. If the scheme is approved by the League Council, a further period will be required for the establishment of new systems of government under mandate in the areas concerned and, if the necessary consent is forthcoming, for the negotiation of treaties with a view to the eventual establishment of independent States. It may also be necessary, in the light of the technical Commission's report, for His Majesty's Government to consider further the suggestion of the Permanent Mandates Commission that the Arab and Jewish areas should be administered temporarily under a system of "cantonization." The investigations of the technical Commission

must occupy several months, and for some time to come any action taken can only be of an exploratory nature.

Under the circumstances it was hardly to be expected that the despatch would be anything but coldly received by all parties in Palestine. Jewish circles, while relieved to hear that the proposal for partition is at least maintained, fear that the proposed area of the new Jewish State will be much diminished. Arabs, seeing that the terms of reference are in principle limited to an investigation of the previous and unpopular scheme of partition which they themselves have rejected, profess to regard the coming of the new Commission with indifference. Many men of both races believe that a plan is foreshadowed to secure self-government for the Jews within the areas already heavily settled, in place of the establishment of a Jewish State with reasonable room for expansion as recommended by the Royal Commission. All parties agree as to the disadvantages of a further long period of uncertainty. Unfortunately uncertainty seems likely to prevail for many months to come. No one has ever considered partition as more than a regrettable compromise and it was perhaps a pity that the Government and the Press in Great Britain should at first have welcomed the report of the Royal Commission quite as readily as they did. The debates in Parliament and at Geneva soon damped the ardour of even the most enthusiastic supporters of partition.

Some delay in the settlement of the problem is inevitable merely because Great Britain is a member of the League of Nations; Palestine is not a Crown Colony and references to the Permanent Mandates Commission take time. But it would be a grave mistake to hasten a far-reaching settlement, which can not hope under any circumstances to gain more than the grudging approval of the parties most concerned. Meanwhile the work of government has to be carried on under conditions of peculiar difficulty.

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Japanese Aims in China.

We referred in our last number to the fact that the inauguration of a major campaign in the Yangtse valley revealed that Japanese aims were of a larger dimension than her previous penetration of north China had led people to imagine. It is an interesting speculation to consider what those aims are and it is only fair to present what we believe to be the Japanese standpoint

By the opening of the present century Japan had built up an army and navy which were strong enough to make her secure from attack under the conditions then prevailing and entitled her to a position among the Great Powers. By the end of the Great War she had, by adopting the technique of the West, built up an immense light industry and had established shipping and banking resources. Her fight for the lighter industrial markets of the world was at first most successful, but it was soon met by tariff action in almost every country except China and Russia. If other nations would not accept Japanese piecegoods, Japan could not hope to obtain the raw materials she required and it became apparent that, to achieve economic equality with other powers, Japan would have to found her economic life on coal and iron, as other nations had done. Up to 1920 there had been two great centres of heavy industry and it was largely due to their location that western European and American influence had spread so rapidly. After the war, however, Russia established a third. Unfortunately, from a Japanese point of view, not only was this industry in the Urals too far away for practical purposes, but the Soviet leaders appeared to be aiming to make Russia self-supporting rather than to co-operate in the sphere of international trade, except where trade could be combined with an expansion of Soviet territory, as in Mongolia and Sinkiang. China alone was left and Japan was forced to turn her attention to the problem of increasing China's absorptive capacity. This could best be arranged by the development and exchange of the raw materials which China possessed in abundance for the manufactured goods which Japan produced. Coking coal existed in Manchuria, Hopei, Shansi and Shantung; high grade iron ore in the Yangtse valley. It is true that low grade ore was to be had in the Philippines and high grade ore in India, but both countries were under the domination of a great power and India was on economic grounds too far away. Since iron generally moves to coal, the obvious area for a Japanese controlled heavy industry was in northern China in the vicinity of the Gulf of Pei-chi-li. While a measure of political control in the north was a first essential, by itself it was not enough; for the Chinese showed neither the ability nor the inclination to develop, certainly not to develop under Japanese tutelage, the ores of the Yangtse basin. The economic situation was further influenced by the fact that China, aided by Western capital and supervision, had already a considerable light goods

industry of her own and that industry was often in direct competition in the Far East with the mills and factories of Japan. This clearly did not suit the Japanese programme and the elimination of foreign interests, among which the British and American were predominant, became a secondary object, if for the time being it was a distant one, of Japanese policy.

Quite apart from foreign interests, there was a very real case for the Sino-Japanese co-operation of which Japanese statesmen have spoken so much. If co-operation and the development of China could be brought about, the advantages to Japan—and incidentally to the world—through the raising of the standard of living in the East would be enormous. But the achievement of co-operation was complicated by military and political issues. The fear of Russian aggression, particularly air attack, and the infiltration of communist ideas was a very real one in Tokio. The Japanese hate and fear Communism. They see in the Soviet army the one challenge to their ambition to be the acknowledged suzerains of eastern Asia. The double-tracking of the Siberian railway to the Far East neutralized to a great extent the strategic advantages which Japan had obtained by her purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the creation by the Soviet of a powerful Far Eastern Army Group did nothing to allay Japanese fears. In the view of Japanese soldiers, the best method of meeting these new dangers lay in an expansion of Japanese influence in Mongolia, far to the west. That Japanese expansion first in her northern provinces and then into Mongolia should be disliked by the Chinese was understandable; but it was less easy to see why other powers should object so strongly in view of the fact that Russia had in recent years obtained control of large stretches of what was nominally Chinese territory without calling forth any protest from Britain and America. On military grounds, therefore, there was also much to be said for the exclusion of foreign interference in affairs on the mainland of Asia.

Economic domination of China and the elimination of foreign interests are, we believe, the cardinal points of Japanese policy to-day. And on that score there is probably no divergence of opinion in Tokio. The question is not what is to be the ultimate aim of Japan, but how, when, and to what extent the accepted policy is to be carried out.

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The Course of the War.

After the capture of Nanking, the Japanese put forward tentative peace proposals through the German ambassador in China in the hope, presumably, that with the fall of the capital the Chinese will to resist had been broken and the prestige of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek so seriously impaired that he would have to give way. The terms suggested were the recognition by China of the independence of Manchukuo, the creation of a separate autonomous state in the five northern provinces, the dissolution of the Kuomintang, the adherence of China to the anti-Comintern Pact, the grant of a special concession to Japan at Shanghai, and the cessation of anti-Japanese activities.

Whether it was seriously expected that the terms would be accepted is not known. Certainly they could never have been accepted by a nation in whom the will to resist was still existent. From an English point of view they were equivalent to a demand that the independence of Scotland be recognised, that England north of the Humber should be separated into another State, that the National Government should be dissolved and a foreign power be given a special concession in the City of London. Not unnaturally the proposals were rejected at once by Marshal Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Government's will to resist was illustrated by the creation of fresh booms across the Yangtse, the commencement of a road from Szechwan, one of China's remoter provinces, to Russia, and a decree placing private manufacture under State control.

With the refusal of peace terms Japanese Imperial Headquarters was faced with the problem of planning a further campaign. The time and circumstances were reasonably favourable for implementing a policy for the complete domination of China and the creation of a Japanese-controlled regime for the whole country; no military interference by outside powers was likely and Japan could still place further troops in the field. On the other hand that policy would strain Japan's financial resources to the limit; it would leave her weakened for many years and it would entail a wholesale blockade of the Chinese coasts, including south China, with its attendant possibilities of friction with Britain and the putting into force of American Neutrality legislation. Again the decision taken is still a matter of speculation and one can only judge by events. But it appears likely that, while

Japanese Imperial Headquarters still firmly intends to impose its will on the Chinese Government, operations on a moderate scale have been planned and care is to be taken to avoid steps which will lead to intervention by any outside power. The latter point is borne out by the replacement of General Matsui, the General Officer Commanding in Central China, by General Shunroka Hata, a known moderate, and the reported arrival of high officials in Shanghai to prevent the recurrence of further incidents in the International Settlement.

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Any campaign in the interior of China was bound to resolve itself at an early point into a war of railways. After the fall of Nanking, the main Chinese forces retired to Pengpu, some ninety-five miles north of the capital, while the Chinese Government had already withdrawn to Hankow. Early in January there were strong rumours that a Japanese invasion of Kwantung, in southern China, was imminent. Hankow is at present the strategic centre of China and it could be reached either by a northward advance along the railway from Canton, a westward advance based on the Yangtse river, or a southward advance down the Peiping-Hankow railway line. The first course was superficially an attractive one, since South China was at the time denuded of troops and the invasion would automatically have closed one of the few remaining routes by which China could obtain arms. That the project was postponed was probably due to limitations in shipping resources and desire, which was becoming steadily more marked, to avoid estranging Britain still further. The second course had obvious difficulties, a river campaign is never the easiest form of operation, and it left unsolved the problem of the main Chinese forces which would have been left on the flank of a Japanese advance up the Yangtse. The third course has evidently been adopted, for towards the end of January the Japanese southward advance along the Peiping-Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukow railways was resumed. On the former line the objective was Chengchow an important arsenal centre at the junction of the Peiping-Hankow and Lunghai railways. A Japanese victory on this line will force the Chinese to withdraw south-west across a difficult river country, devoid of rail or road communications.

On the latter line the Japanese advance is being carried out both from the north and the south and is being fiercely resisted by the Chinese based on Soochow.

It is too early to say what the result of these operations will be, but it seems unlikely that the resistance of the Chinese regular armies can continue much longer. Lacking artillery, armoured fighting vehicles and aircraft, with a failing supply of ammunition and the equipment necessary for the prosecution of modern warfare, the odds are heavily against them. Should they decide to stand and meet the Japanese forces in open battle, they will have even less chance of success. But that is not to say that with the defeat of the Chinese regular forces Japan's task will be accomplished. Japan will still have to wear down guerilla resistance in a country the size of India and she will have to reconstruct the administration of a nation in the face of bitter opposition from many of its inhabitants. Her self-appointed task is a colossal one, a matter not of months but of years.

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Waziristan.

The withdrawal of troops from Waziristan continued during December and on the 15th of that month "Wazirforce" ceased to exist. The 3rd Indian Infantry Brigade, a mountain battery and light tank company, and a few administrative units were the only troops over and above the normal garrison left in Waziristan at the beginning of the year. The withdrawal of the remainder had marked the close of a long period of unrest which had its origin in events which occurred in April 1936 and came to a head in the following November.

During the last eighteen months many parts of Waziristan have been visited for the first time by troops, and large areas hitherto more or less inaccessible have been opened up by the construction of dry weather motor roads. New Scouts' Posts have been established at Biche Kashkai and Ghariom; others are being stocked with a reserve of supplies so that they may serve as temporary bases for columns of regular troops. The possibility of constructing additional landing grounds to facilitate maintenance by air, a feature of the recent operations, is being investigated. From a tactical point of view the strength of the Wana garrison has been increased by one battalion with the object of allowing the Wana column to operate at a more effective strength.

General policy in Waziristan remains unchanged. No attempt at disarmament has been made, but disarmament and the peaceful settlement of the tribes are more than local problems. For the present a considerable extension of the system of protected areas has been undertaken and, judging by experience, this should lead to more peaceful conditions of life, although it is realised that the system is one that will be gradual in its effects.

As regards events there is little to record. Cases of wire-cutting, attempts to damage culverts, and sniping still occur and there were minor operations in the Spinwam area in January. The Faqir of Ipi, in Madda Khel country, is still a potential centre of unrest. Although the tribes have evinced little inclination to follow his behests during the last three months it remains to be seen whether he will be able to rally hotheads to his cause when the summer migration begins.

* * * *

The Indian Defence Budget.

The speech of the Honourable Finance Member introducing the Budget proposals for 1938-39 contained several interesting comments on the cost of Indian defence. Referring to the financial year 1937-38, he estimated that the increase in defence expenditure over the budget estimates would amount to Rs. 260 lakhs. The most important single item was the cost of operations in Waziristan, which accounted for Rs. 176 lakhs. Another considerable item was the abandonment of the Lahore abattoir and the associated scheme for the establishment of cold storage facilities in Northern India, which he now anticipated would cost Rs. 26 lakhs. The balance was made up of a variety of smaller items, the most important of which were additional expenditure on Quetta reconstruction, a general rise in prices, initial expenditure on the reorganization of British cavalry and infantry, and the increased cost of British troops occasioned by the grant of His Majesty's Government of various improvements in the conditions of service in an attempt to arrest the growing shortage of recruits.

Referring to the Defence estimates for the year 1938-39, Sir James Grigg went on to say that, putting aside an apparent increase due to a change in accounting procedure, the net increase over the estimates of the previous year was Rs. 38 lakhs. Two agreements had recently been concluded with His Majesty's

Government on the subject of defence expenditure in India. The first related to His Majesty's Government's contribution of Rs. 80 lakhs towards the capital cost of mechanising British cavalry and infantry in India. Rs. 27 lakhs, the first instalment of that sum, which was payable over a three-year period, would be available in 1938-39. The second agreement related to naval expenditure. The Government of India in conjunction with the Admiralty had recently had under examination the question of India's naval defence. Under long-standing arrangements India paid to His Majesty's Government a direct contribution of £100,000 a year towards the cost of the naval defence of India and the protection of trade in alien waters, and also defrayed various charges amounting to two or three lakhs a year on behalf of vessels of the Royal Navy. The conversion of the Royal Indian Navy into a combatant service capable of assisting in the work of the Royal Navy in war and the steps which were being taken by the Government of India to build up their local naval defence had rendered it desirable to review the existing arrangements. His Majesty's Government had agreed to forego the annual payments hitherto made, on condition that the Government of India maintained a sea-going fleet of not less than six modern escort vessels which would be free to co-operate with the Royal Navy for the defence of India and in addition fulfil their responsibility for local naval defence of Indian ports. The Government of India had accepted these conditions and the contribution would cease on April 1st.

Adding the nett increase of Rs. 38 lakhs in the estimates, the contribution of Rs. 27 lakhs from His Majesty's Government and Rs. 90 lakhs which represented a nett saving resulting from the temporary shortage of British troops in India, the total to be accounted for was Rs. 155 lakhs. Of that Rs. 85 lakhs would be expended on the mechanisation of British cavalry and infantry, the remainder being utilised to cover an increase in the standing charges of the Army.

That, however, did not exhaust the defence programme of 1938-39. The Defence Reserve Fund and the military expenditure equalisation funds would be drawn on to the extent of Rs. 80 lakhs to provide further funds for improvements to coast defences, the erection of a factory to make India self-sufficient in high explosives and the mechanisation of certain Indian units, a scheme for which was now under consideration.

Last year Sir James Grigg had warned the House that the nett figure for defence expenditure had only been achieved by the curtailment of services which were bound to be provided sooner or later, and that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief considered the provision to be seriously inadequate for the real needs of defence. In view of the present world situation and the large increase in defence expenditure of almost all other countries, Honourable Members would not be surprised that some increase had also been found necessary in India.

Indian Cavalry.

The decision to convert two regiments of Indian cavalry, the 13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers and the 14th Prince of Wales's Own Scinde Horse, into armoured car regiments was announced in March and marks an important step forward in the modernization of the Army in India. Although there has been a considerable degree of mechanization in the Indian Army for some years, that mechanization has been more or less confined to the transport of certain combatant units such as Sapper and Miner and Signal troops and companies, and to maintenance units such as the cavalry brigade transport companies of the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. The present proposals, which embrace the mechanization of two complete fighting units, inaugurate in effect a new policy.

Recent experience in the Mohmand operations of 1935 and the Waziristan campaign of last year has shown that armoured cars are essential both for distant reconnaissance and the support of troops operating on the flanks of the line of advance of a column, as well as for the close protection of lorry convoys. The two regiments which have now started conversion will have important tasks to perform in future and may be looked on as the pioneers of development in the Indian Army. One of them will eventually be stationed at Peshawar with a detachment in Waziristan, and at a later date a training squadron for both regiments will be formed at Sialkot.

"IBLANKE"

The Advance to the Sham Plains 11/12th May 1937

(See sketch maps)

The stone walls of Dosalli Scouts' Post, perched as they are on the crest of a sixty-foot cliff which drops to the dry bed of the Khaisora River, are dwarfed by the tangled, scrubby hills rising seventeen hundred feet above them on the further bank of the nala. Through these hills, running north to its confluence with the Khaisora directly opposite the Scouts' Post, the Sre Mela stream falls steeply from the springs that give it a perennial flow through a gorge biting into the northerly rim of the Sham Plains, which would be better named "The Sham Plateau." This gorge opens out into a gradually widening valley a mile and a half from its head, until, at the junction of the Sre Mela with the Khaisora the valley is roughly a mile in width. Two towers on the left bank mark the point where the gorge finally surrenders in favour of the valley. From the Scouts' Post these towers appear to be perched half way up the hillside, but in fact, owing to the rise of the river-bed, they are only a few feet above the stream. These towers were later to be included inside the perimeter of what became known as Kach Camp.

On the right bank of the Sre Mela the hills rise almost vertically in places to the knife-edge crest of the Iblanke Ridge. The left bank is seamed with wide deep tributary streams each of which forms a serious obstacle to any advance across them. The Iblanke may be compared to a colossal *lion couchant*, sadly in need of a square meal with its Spine and Shoulder Bones showing sharply above its lean scarred ribs. The Tail of the monster rests in the Khaisora nala on the north, while its outstretched Forelegs merge into the Sham Plateau six miles to the south. A shallow, dry nala bed runs between the Forelegs southwards, becoming the main headwater of the Sham Algad which traverses the plateau from north-west to south-east. The Neck, a mile and a quarter long, slopes down from the prominent Shoulder Bones, gradually narrowing to the Scruff, which, four hundred yards long, is razor sharp and rises steeply to the dome of the Skull. This Scruff of the neck is in fact the Iblanke Narai, and is overlooked on three

sides at close range by the peak that forms the Skull and two well defined ridges running downwards to the east and west and curving back towards the shoulders. These ridges may be likened to the Ears. The comparison to a lion is further enhanced by the scrub which clothes the body giving place to a thick mane of tall holly trees, which, growing shoulder to shoulder, completely cover the Skull Ears and Forelegs. The Skull, and the ridge of the Right Ear are plainly visible from the Scouts' Post standing boldly up on the skyline, but the knife-edged Narai is lost against a background of tree-covered hills.

Returning to the Scouts' Post; past its front gate running due east and west is the Central Waziristan Road, level here after its 3,000 feet climb from the Bannu plains, but rising a few furlongs to the west till it eventually climbs the Razmak Narai.

Such was the ground, but a superman would find it difficult to draw this picture from the one inch map available at the time. With naive frankness the Survey of India show in an inset that the area is mapped from an untriangulated eleven-year-old air survey, while the contours that cover the rest of the sheet, here give way to close packed from lines of even more dubious integrity. The sketch map attached has been compiled from a R. E. Survey carried out at a later date than the period under consideration. The one inch map shows few if any spot points on or near the Iblanke Ridge and it is therefore difficult to gauge from it the order of importance of the tactical features.

Normally life at the Scouts' Post must be a dull affair, the only change from the daily routine being the traffic making up time on this God-sent level stretch of road on the run to and from Razmak. By May 11th, however, things had changed. For the past six months the Faqir of Ipi, backed by the Tori Khel Wazirs and an ever changing following from other tribes attracted to his banner by religious fervour and the hope of loot, had been openly "agin" the Government. The scene of active operations had now shifted almost to the gates of the Post itself. To the west the road had been torn up till touch with Razmak was only possible for wheeled vehicles by a two-hundred-mile detour through Bannu, Tank and Jandola. For pack transport this eighteen-mile gap was made the more difficult by the destruction of the only intermediate water-supply at Razani. Eastwards severe fighting had taken place in the lower reaches of the Khaisora in November



DOSALLI CAMP and SCOUTS' POST from the IBLANKE RIDGE. The motor road constructed after the operation can be seen disappearing into the bed of the KHAISORA RIVER, and again in the foreground.



Looking towards the Right Shoulder Bone (centre) and Skull (extreme right) from the centre of the Back.

1936 and again in April 1937 while just over a month before the Abbottabad Brigade, engaged on road protection duties only four miles away, had been embroiled in one of the more unpleasant engagements of the campaign.

These events had been followed by the concentration at Dosalli of the Waziristan Division consisting of the Abbottabad, Bannu, and 3rd Infantry Brigades with the usual proportion of divisional troop. The open space in front of the Scouts' Post had been transformed into an outsize in perimeter camps, while within the Post itself Divisional Headquarters had usurped barrack-rooms and stores for use as offices. Following on this the Abbottabad Brigade had moved two miles up the Sre Mela, and had established themselves in Village Camp on May 8th. For the previous three days the almost ceaseless sound of small arms fire with the occasional dull thump of 3.7 howitzers had showed that the enemy were present in large numbers and that the thickly wooded hills on either side of the valley afforded them ideal cover for sniping the camp and attacks on piquets.

It was obvious that these operations heralded an advance to the Sham Plateau, which formed the summer refuge of the Tori Khel Wazirs, our chief opponents. Were they and their flocks to be denied the coolth and green grazing of these plains during the hot weather already beginning, their submission was only a matter of weeks. But the enemy were aware of this, their Achilles heel, and were undoubtedly prepared to resist any advance southwards from Dosalli. The Sre Mela gorge had been strongly fortified by sangars cleverly concealed from both ground and air observation, and an advance by this route could only be slow and costly. Though numbers to comb the ground still count in the frontier hills, especially when these are thickly wooded, this narrow gorge did not give room for an advance on any but the narrowest of fronts, nor did it give much scope to use the automatic weapons which are our chief assets against the tribesman. Again, politically, it was essential to prick the bubble of the Faqir's reputation before the neighbouring Mahsuds, who were growing restive. threw in their lot with the Wazirs.

Such was the situation that faced the Divisional Commander, nor was the problem simplified by the fact that he had only taken over the appointment a fortnight before. To counteract this, however, he brought to bear a mind fresh to the frontier and

untrammelled by conventional mountain warfare tactics, which so often resolve themselves into a bludgeon advance along the line of least resistance—the nearest nala bed. The solution he adopted was a bold one, original in conception, and one that in twenty-four hours altered the whole trend of the campaign. Briefly, a night advance up the Iblanke Ridge directed on the Sham Plateau was planned. Once the enemy's position blocking the Sre Mela gorge was turned, the Abbottabad Brigade at Village Camp was to push forward and establish Kach Camp at the entrance of the gorge. Thereafter the turning force, by then established if all went well in Camp "A"* in the north-east corner of the plateau, were to be maintained by a track constructed up the bed of the Sre Mela. On May 9th verbal orders were issued that Tocol, as the Bannu Brigade is styled when on column, was to carry out the turning movement by means of a night advance, and preparations were at once set on foot by the brigadier and his staff.

Secrecy was of primary importance, and to attain this the resources of the whole of the Waziristan Force were called upon. A night operation, by reason of the special preparations required, such as the cooking of rations, dumping of surplus kit and personnel, and the making and issue of distinguishing badges, can seldom be concealed from the troops. Both at Dosalli and Village Camps there were several "friendlies," such as *kassadars* and contractors for local produce, in daily contact with the rank and file, and all of these were potential enemy agents. The best that could be hoped for was to conceal the line of advance and objective of Tocol, no easy matter when all tongues were discussing the prospects of an advance towards the Sham Plateau. Accordingly, by various means it was let slip that Tocol reinforced by eight platoons of the Scouts was to move on the night 11/12th May with a view to repairing the road to Razmak and reopening the water-supply at Razani Camp. To lend colour to this story, orders were issued and all preparations made for the Razmak Brigade to move out from that camp on Razani on the morning of May 12th. These orders were only cancelled at 11 p.m. on the 11th, well after the camp gates were shut and there was therefore no likelihood of the news reaching the enemy before reveille next day. Again on the 10th May a section of light tanks escorted a

* Coronation Camp—Editor.

subordinate of the Military Engineer Services to Ranzani, where a thorough examination of the damage to the water-supply was carried out. Commanding officers of units in Tocol were only given full details verbally on the morning of May 11th, and were ordered to complete their preparations without further orders, and not to divulge the route or objective of the column until 6 p.m., three hours before the main body was due to pass the starting point. Confirmatory written orders were not issued until 5 p.m.

The success of these measures may be gauged by the fact that a *lashkar* of 400 tribesmen gathered in the Razani area to oppose either Tocol or Razcol as opportunity offered.

Now for the plan in detail. Reconnaissance, the first preliminary emphasised in the text-books for a night operation, was obviously impossible, since any activity in the Iblanke area would have roused the enemy's suspicions, and would have led them to lock this their only back door. The brigade commander, therefore drew upon the local knowledge of the Tochi Scouts, eight platoons of which Corps had been placed under his command for the operation. The Scouts were of opinion that a track up the ridge line, not shown on the map, was practicable for a force of all arms with pack mule transport. Not very encouraging in an area where experience had proved that many tracks with the distinction of being marked on the map were impassable for animals even in daylight without considerable improvement. Air photographs were little better. The thick scrub effectively hid all signs of the track, and a study of these stereoscopically made the backbone stand out so vividly that to the uninitiated only a Blondin, aided by innumerable arc lamps, would be able to pass over it by night. Accepting the Scouts opinion, the next step was to pick on an objective to be made good by first light beyond which daytime dispositions would have to be adopted. A study of the map showed the two Shoulder Bones boldly ring-contoured, and these appeared to be the highest points on the ridge. A comparison with the ground as seen from Dosalli made it appear that these two peaks were those so prominent on the skyline, whereas in fact the peaks seen were the lion's Skull and the tip of his Right Ear. On this the brigadier decided that by dawn he must reach a line south of the two Shoulder Bones so clearly marked on the map. Strangely enough the immense tactical importance of securing the knife edged "Scruff" of the neck was not stressed by the Scouts, who,

possibly, had never patrolled so far south under the British officers then present with the wing at Dosalli. Nor was it realised that this feature lay well to the south of the Shoulder Bones, and was so thoroughly overlooked at point blank range by the Skull and Ears.

To compensate for the lack of reconnaissance and to gain full value from their characteristics, the eight platoons of Scouts were given a role equivalent to that of advanced guard mounted troops, with the special task of piquetting the two Shoulder Bones and seizing an east and west line three-quarters of a mile to the south of them by first light. Here they were to halt until relieved by the advanced guard, whereupon they were to precede the latter down to the Forepaws and cover the occupation of Camp "A."

Behind the Scouts the 2nd/11th Sikh Regiment with a detachment of the 12th Field Company Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners were detailed as advanced guard. They were ordered to relieve the Scouts in their piquets on the Shoulder Bones, which would then become the first two normal daylight piquets covering the passage of the main body, and to take over from them the line of their "first light" objective.

Immediately in rear of the Sikhs the 2/4th P.W.O. Gurkha Rifles were to "close piquet" the route as far as the Shoulder Bones, so as to protect the column and prevent it from straying off the track during the hours of darkness. Their piquets were to consist of a road sentry, who was not to leave the track, and four riflemen. Piquets were to be posted personally by the commanding officer at a hundred yards interval on alternate sides of the route, and distant only ten yards from it. Extra piquets were to be posted at points where there was any possibility of the column going astray. To carry out this task the normal organisation of platoons and sections marching in column of fours or file was replaced by companies organised in piquets of five men, the commander of each being marked by a white arm band. Company headquarters were dropped with the first piquet found by their company and platoon headquarters with the last piquet from their platoon. This ensured a double check on the withdrawal of piquets by the rear guard, since the company commander knew at the outset the number of piquets into which his command was organised, while the platoon command could check up with the former the number withdrawn from his command. To ensure



Looking West from the centre of the Back. The SRE MELA Valley with DOSALLI VILLAGE and the perimeter of VILLAGE CAMP beyond it on the left.



Looking up the SRE MELA Valley from the South bank of the KHAISORA RIVER. The IBLANKE RIDGE left background. The Skull with the Right Ear sloping down from it is the highest peak on the skyline in the right centre.

that the next piquet for posting was immediately ready, each piquet commander was instructed to grasp the commanding officer's left hand as soon as he found himself at the head of the battalion. It took the adjutant some little time that afternoon to impress on youthful lance-naiks the importance of this familiarity with the man who controlled their destiny. All Vickers and Vickers Berthier gun mules marched in rear of the battalion, so as to prevent any gap in the column of piquets ready for posting. And, to increase the rifle strength, mule leaders were replaced by men armed with the pistol, who in any event were useless should it come to a rough and tumble in the dark, and who, in addition were better fitted to lead mules over rough ground unencumbered as they were with a rifle. In the main body, column headquarters were to be followed by the 2nd Argyll and Southerland Highlanders (less one company), the 7th and 19th Moutain Batteries, the 12th Field Company (less detachment with the advanced guard), the 8th Field Ambulance, and finally the Supply Issue Section and the second line pack transport of the column. Not a single follower was permitted to accompany the brigade, which in at least one Indian battalion led to the junior subaltern being appointed *Mess Khansamah* in addition to his other duties when dinner was called for the next night in Camp "A."

It was realised that animals would be severely taxed by the rough going, so these were reduced to the barest minimum. All riding animals, including those on charge of the field ambulance for the carriage of sick and wounded, were excluded, while the Argylls left behind a platoon of their machine-guns. Second line transport was reduced to that sufficient to carry one blanket per two men and tea, milk and sugar ration for two days. For an Indian battalion only ten mules were allotted for this purpose with other units in proportion, battalions being at equal strengths of 600 other ranks. Each animal carried its own grain for two days, and all fodder was jettisoned. In addition to these loads each mule carried two filled water *chaguls*,* since the information regarding the water-supply in the vicinity of Camp "A" was conflicting. Actually the majority of these *chaguls* were either torn off by the undergrowth or drained of their contents when the mules carrying them stumbled or fell. In spite of this rigid economy in transport a total of 725 mules moved in the column,

*Canvas water bags.

of which only 60 were in the second line. Further to assist the animals over the ground, and to guard them against attack in the dark, one driver was allotted to each mule, while a company of the Argylls and two companies of the 1st/17th P.W.O. Dogras were distributed among and along the flanks of the batteries, field ambulance and train, these being additional to unit's own baggage guards.

In regard to supplies, animals have already been dealt with. Each man carried two days cooked or preserved "hard scale" rations in his haversack, less the ingredients for tea, which were carried on the second line. Though it was hoped that supplies for the third day (May 14th) and thereafter would reach the column *via* the Abbottabad Brigade in Kach Camp, arrangements were made for the Royal Air Force to drop rations on Camp "A" on the afternoon of the 13th.

Intercommunication was ensured by the allotment of the four pack wireless sets to column headquarters, the advanced and rear guards, and to the 12th Field Company towards the rear of the main body. These sets were to report position half hourly. A Royal Air Force set to keep touch with the air after first light was accompanied by a R. A. F. liaison officer, and was carried on one of the spare battery mules. Each unit in addition provided a British liaison officer with column headquarters, while a pair of Scouts were detailed as guides to the advanced and rear guards and to the main body respectively. Touch was to be maintained by the marking of the route by the Gurkha piquets and by intelligence personnel at the head of each unit ready to double forward in pairs as connecting files.

As to the problem of time and space, an officer acted as pace-maker at the head of the main body, and was instructed not to exceed a rate of one mile an hour. It was realised that in all probability this was an optimistic estimate of the rate of advance, so an ample margin was allowed when calculating the time of start. This was fixed so that should the advance be only at half a mile an hour average, the Shoulder Bones would be made good an hour before first light. Included in the calculations were short halts at 10-30 p.m., and thereafter at every half hour to allow of the column closing up. The answer to this sum gave 9 p.m. as the time the head of the main body should pass the gate of the Scouts' Post.

Finally, the rear guard was to be found by the Dogras, less the two companies escorting mules, and was charged with the task of withdrawing the Gurkha route piquets and those put up next day in the normal manner.

Instructions issued to the Abbottabad Brigade by divisional headquarters on May 11th laid down that the brigade would leave Village Camp at 6 a.m. on the 12th, and establish itself in Kach Camp at the entrance to the Sre Mela gorge. Camp piquets to the east of Village Camp were to be warned at as late an hour as possible of the move of Tocol across their front, and were not to put up Verey Lights or to fire to the East except for their immediate protection. It was stressed that the bed of the Sre Mela was likely to be extremely difficult even for pack transport, and every effort was to be made to clear a camel and later a motor track up the gorge. A camel convoy was scheduled to run through from Dosalli to Camp "A" *via* Kach Camp on May 13th, otherwise Tocol would have to be rationed by air.

So much for the preparations, and now for a description of the operation. By 9 p.m. the column was formed up on the Central Waziristan Road facing east with its head at the Scouts' Post, but it was only at this time that the Tochi Scouts cleared the starting point, as a sinking moon in the first quarter lit up the countryside to a far greater extent than had been anticipated. It was not until 10 p.m., therefore, that the head of the main body filed past the shaded red light at the gate of the Post, and this delay gave officers time to reflect on the operation before them, which, owing to the hurry and bustle of preparations, had not been possible before. The prospect was not particularly inviting, and the sudden breaking of the silence by the *maulvi* in the Post calling the Faithful to prayer, caused at least one heart to miss a beat until the reason for the outcry was realised. At about this time two rockets climbed up the sky and hung for some little time before falling approximately to the south-east, and apparently in the wrong direction to have been fired from any of the camps down the road. Speculation was rife as to whether they were signals of the enemy, but so far no solution has been offered, nor do the enemy appear to have profited by the warning, if warning it was.

The ample time allowance was very soon justified, and from the outset the pace nowhere approached the maximum figure of a mile per hour. Only four hundred yards from the starting point

the route plunged down a steep stony nala to the bed of the Khaisora, and, though it was a bright starlit night, progress was painfully slow, especially for the mules. As soon as troops and mules cleared this defile, the advance became almost a run across the open shingle of the wide nala bed, only to slow down again as the real climb began on the far bank and continued without intermission until the Right Shoulder Bone was reached. In the river-bed touch between the Sikhs and Gurkhas was almost irretrievably lost. All the connecting files had doubled forward into the dark from the head of the latter, until the commanding officer and adjutant with the numbered piquets behind them could see or hear nothing to their front. To divert the leading piquet to the duty of regaining touch forwards would have thrown out the sequence and numbering of piquets memorised by company and platoon commanders. There was nothing for it but for the adjutant to cast forward and hope to hit off the line while the commanding officer continued to drop the piquets. The noise of a Sapper and Miner mule, at the tail of the Sikhs, failing to surmount the rocky far bank, and falling in a shower of clanging picks and shovels saved the situation, and touch was regained by thinning out the connecting files into single men.

From this point onwards the night advance was monotonous, yet at the same time crammed with incident. The only sounds were the sudden rattle of stones dislodged by man or mule, or a greater clatter when one of the latter stumbled, fell and rolled down the hillside until his headlong progress was arrested by a bush strong enough to hold his weight. Time after time the same men stumbled and fell down the steep hillside to right the frightened beasts, grope about in the dark for the loads, adjust these and lead the animals back to the crest line. That the mules were scared was obvious from their almost continual trembling, and it was only by the greatest determination of the officers and men concerned that all of them were brought on without loss, until daylight disclosed one or two so hideously cut as to necessitate their destruction. In places the route crossed a solid sheet of rock, offering scant foothold for the laden animals, and on occasion the rock formation would be stepped as much as two feet, at each of which every mule would jib until forced to jump up to the next level. Halts were frequent, and at these the sweating men closed up and then huddled together, the keen night air soon chilling them once they ceased their exertions. The



The Scruff of the Neck (The IBLANKE NARAI) from the Western slopes of the Right Shoulder Bone. The Skull extreme right background



Typical of the ground covered by TOCOL in the dark. On the IBLANKE RIDGE.

scheduled half hourly halts were as a result cancelled, and the column crawled forward, the men halting, crouching and finally rising to their feet again as those in front moved on. That a track existed at all was doubtful in many places, and at least one of the extra long halts was due to the guides having lost their way and taken the Sikhs on a long detour.

At 1 a.m., column headquarters heard on the wireless through the set with the Sikhs that the Scouts had halted on the northern end of the "Scruff" of the neck at half an hour after midnight, and were within shouting distance of the enemy on the Skull four hundred yards to their front. The backchat that always passes between the Scouts and the enemy elicited the fact that the latter were still in ignorance of the presence of regular troops behind the Scouts, and were fully confident of being able to stem the advance of the "militia." The Sikhs reported at the same time that their head was about a mile in rear of the Scouts and that they had relieved the piquets on the two Shoulder Bones. The main body at this time had lost distance from the Gurkhas, closed up on the tail of the Sikhs, and could not assess the length of the gap in front of them. The only proof that they were on the right path were the piquets they encountered every few yards. Almost simultaneously the rear guard reported clearing the starting point, from which it was evident that the column was strung out over three and a half miles of appalling going with four hours of darkness still to go.

A wireless message was therefore sent to divisional headquarters that the "Gateway," as the Scouts daybreak objective had been named, had been reached, but that it was not known if it was closed or not. The column commander now decided that it was essential to make good the ground gained, and the Sikhs were accordingly wirelessed to halt and close up preparatory to taking over from the Scouts. It was equally essential to close up the main body, so orders were issued for the head to halt, although in doing so there was a risk of the Sikhs and the remnants of the Gurkhas getting out of reach of quick support should they require it. By 2 a.m., the main body was closed up in single file and the advance was resumed, the Sikhs being ordered at the same time to take over from the Scouts who were to push on. At about 3-30 a.m., the Sikhs reported the route to be getting even more difficult, and it was obvious that the pace was beginning to tell on the mules, falls becoming even more frequent among them. The column

commander now decided to move forward to the advanced guard and assume control personally.

Progress was painfully slow, but by 4-30 a.m., contact was established with the Scouts, and the Sikhs, less their piquets on the Shoulder Bones, were closed up just short of the "Scruff" of the neck. At 5 a.m., the column commander reached the headquarters of the Sikhs to see the Scouts moving on the Skull by way of the Left or Easterly Ear. He ordered the Sikhs to piquet various features that could be dimly seen so as to cover the column when full daylight disclosed its nakedness; in addition they were ordered to take over the Skull when it was captured by the Scouts, and extend their right flank along the Right (Westerly) Ear. Support was to be given by the machine-guns of the Gurkhas, who were practically all that was left of this battalion after dropping night piquets over four miles by the route followed, and also by the 7th Mountain Battery which came forward at a magnificent pace considering the very difficult going.

At 5-30 a.m., enemy fire broke out all along the line of the Skull and Ears, but the Sikhs and Scouts, supported by four platoons of machine-guns and the 7th Mountain Battery, one section of which moved well forward in close support, quickly drove the enemy from their positions. By 6-30 a.m., the real "Gateway" was forced with total casualties to us of three killed and five wounded, of whom one killed and three wounded were Indian officers, testimony to the short range at which the enemy had been firing. At this juncture the Air reported the left of the Abbottabad Brigade to be just reaching point 5,869, a mile west and two hundred feet below the top of the Skull, while the enemy were seen to be on the run and affording excellent targets to the close support planes. The advance continued until at 7-15 a.m., the Sikhs were holding an area a mile and a quarter in depth and upwards of a mile in width at the front, extending from the Shoulder Bones to the tip of the lion's nose. They were accordingly replaced as advanced guard by the Argylls supported by the 19th Mountain Battery. This battalion took on the piquetting of the two Forelegs, while the Scouts manœuvred to their right front down the Right Foreleg and to the west of it. In the meantime the rear guard had been calling in the Gurkha night piquets, and as each company of this unit closed, it moved forward to the Narai, where the battalion was reformed and ready to be re-employed by 7 a.m.

Enemy opposition had by now almost ceased, and by 10 a.m. the Argylls had piquetted down to a line level with the right forepaw, with the Scouts on their right overlooking the site of Camp "A." By this hour the Abbottabad Brigade was consolidating Kach Camp. The Gurkhas now took over from the Argylls with orders to relieve the Scouts, piquet the left forepaw, and occupy the hills to the west and south of the camp site. A few enemy concealed in the dense scrub that covered these last features slowed up the advance across the billiard table surface of the plain, while a deep nala between the hills and the plain, unmarked on the map, swallowed the leading company for half an hour and caused some anxiety to the battalion commander.

The South Wales Borderers from a grandstand on the hills to the east of Kach Camp (point 5853) had during the past few hours witnessed large parties of the enemy streaming across the plain in a southerly direction, and subjected to numerous accurate dive-bombing and machine-gun attacks from the close support machines in the air. They had also seen the advance of the Scouts and the Gurkhas across the plain, the whole looking like a battle of the Lilliputs.

By 11-30 a.m., the site of Camp "A" was safe from enemy interference, and at 1-30 p.m., the rear guard, which had not been followed up, closed into camp. Next morning after a considerable amount of work in the head of the gorge a camel convoy came through from Dosalli *via* Kach Camp bringing with it rations, tents, blankets and the followers of all units. In the afternoon the R. A. F. dropped the necessary supplies for consumption on the 14th, thereby duplicating the rations brought up by the camel convoy. On this day a wireless message was received from divisional headquarters renaming the camp "Coronation Camp" in recognition of its having been established during the hours of the ceremony at Westminster Abbey.

Reliable intelligence estimated that the enemy strength opposed to the two brigades during this operation amounted to about 500. Of these 47 were killed and 42 severely wounded, the majority of these latter being doomed to die of their wounds owing to the complete lack of medical aid. In addition, two of the enemy were captured, one of them a mere boy from the other side of the Frontier. Casualties in Tocol have already been given. Those in the Abbottabad Brigade amounted to one killed and five wounded, of whom two of the wounded were other ranks of the South Wales Borderers.

And now for the lessons that can be derived from this operation. There is little need to call attention to the importance of detailed preparation, which is adequately dealt with in the narrative. Nor is it necessary to comment on the arrangements made for intercommunication, maintenance of touch and the marking of the route during the hours of darkness.

In the administrative sphere the question of the training of animals becomes one of great importance to fit them for night operations. Though orders were issued to exclude mules liable to bray, how often is this failing noted in peacetime, and can it be truthfully said that any mule accustomed to be continually with others will refrain from announcing his loneliness when separated from the herd? Undoubtedly the massing of all the mules of a unit in one party at night has much to commend it, not only to prevent braying, but also to facilitate their protection and to reduce the number of gaps in the column. Attention should also be paid to "night blindness" to which many mules and horses are prone, while transport mules almost always require more training in rough ground work especially at night, in order that they may be as mobile as the Ordnance and Equipment mules of the fighting units.

The complete lack of reconnaissance is perhaps the most noteworthy feature of this operation. To some this omission would have preceded almost certain failure, but in frontier warfare reconnaissance is often impossible, and must be dispensed with. Although the difficulties of the Iblanke route were very great and were fully realised, it was known that the ridge led to the objective, and it was obvious that, provided the high ground was rigidly adhered to, it was impossible to go far astray.

Justification for the lack of reconnaissance was the attainment of almost complete surprise. As an army, with several years of peace training behind us, we are inclined to over-estimate the prowess of the Pathan, and to invest him with almost superhuman attributes. That he is easily hoodwinked by well thought out and concerted false trails is proved by this operation. Again, his mobility and power of quickly summing up a tactical situation would appear to lend weight to the immense value of night operations, when it is impossible for him to see our dispositions or to guess at our strength. In this connection it is worth remembering that the tribesman shares with all uncivilised peoples a fear of the dark, more especially when the movements of his enemy are entirely a matter of conjecture.



CORONATION CAMP from the North-East. The gorge of the SRE MELA begins to the left of the camp and runs north behind it.

The lack of reconnaissance leads again to the time and space problem. The difficulties of the route were an indeterminate factor, but the method adopted in working out the time and space made it impossible not to reach the daybreak objective laid down, unless an impassable natural obstacle was encountered, an unlikely eventuality in view of the information tendered by the Scouts.

From a tactical viewpoint, the value of an advance on a broad front is well illustrated. This term is rapidly degenerating into a catch phrase where the essentials are lost sight of. A corollary to the broad front theory is the necessity for adequate supporting fire to be readily available on all parts of the front. In view of the known difficulty of the Iblanke route, there must have been a temptation to reduce or even eliminate the supporting weapons with Tocol. This is supported by the exclusion of a platoon of the Argylls' machine-guns. That no further paring down of the supporting weapons was countenanced, in particular of the artillery, was justified by the value of guns and machine-guns in the attack put in at first light by the Sikhs and the Scouts to make good the Narai. It must be accepted, therefore, that when employing broad front tactics each detachment even down to a company must be provided with readily available fire support.

The psychological moment when the change over from night to day dispositions must be carried out needs accurate gauging. In this case the knife-edge conformation of the Iblanke Ridge helped the main body at daybreak, since it was on the highest ground and could not be overlooked from the flanks. Nevertheless the consolidation of the two Shoulders and the minor feature between them and of the Narai before it was light enough to shoot undoubtedly saved a number of casualties at the head of the main body.

As to the qualities required of a commander in such an operation, it must be stressed that the mental outlook must be one of complete confidence of success. The prospect of even partial failure must be ruthlessly shut out of the mind. The more careful the preparations the greater the odds on success, but once these are completed and orders have been issued no doubt must be allowed to intrude. Calm, unshakeable confidence must be the keynote, and must pass right down the chain of command until it imbues all ranks with the belief that victory is certain. Added to this mental quality must be physical fitness. Night operations impose a great physical strain, and a fit man will endure this better, and thereby be mentally more acute, than one whose resources cannot stand up so well to the expenditure of bodily energy.

Let this be the end of the narrative. A road now zigzags up the Iblanke, a fitting memorial to the mind that conceived and the men that carried out the advance up its rugged length. May it in the future be an incentive to others to make night operations the normal in frontier warfare, and not as hitherto as rare as flies in amber.*

NOTE.—*In the operation order which follows, the names of features have been inserted in brackets after map references in order to make the orders intelligible to readers. As one of the battalions taking part in the operation had only just joined the brigade and so had not had time to assimilate standing orders, some detail which would normally be unnecessary was purposely included in the written orders for the advance*—EDITOR.

THE OPERATION ORDER ISSUED BY TOCOL FOR THE ADVANCE TO THE SHAM PLAINS

TOCOL OPERATION ORDER No. 83. SECRET.
Ref. 1" map 38 H/13. Copy No.
11th May 1937.

INFORMATION.

1. (*a*) The advance of WAZDIV to the SHAM PLAIN 0233 is to continue on 11th and 12th May. 1 Inf. Bde. and attd. tps. have been ordered to secure a new camp, KACH CAMP at 006356. They are advancing from VILLAGE CAMP 06.00 hrs. 12th May. Two Bns. 3 Inf. Bde. arrive DOSALLI 11th May to take over TOCOL CAMP and camp pqts.

8 pls. Tochi Scouts are placed under comd. TOCOL from 20.00 hrs. 11th May.

(*b*) R. A. F. is to provide continuous Cl/R and Cl/S on 12th May.

INTENTION

2. TOCOL will advance to the SHAM PLAIN on night 11th/12th May, and will secure CAMP "A" at 023336 on 12th May.

METHOD

3. *Route.* Between SCOUT POST and house at 022409 (just east of POST)—KHAISORA R. to 0240 central (the base of the Tail)—IBLANKE 0239, 0238 (The Backbone)—S. E. of features in 0337 (The Shoulder Bones)—Spur in 0336 (The Neck)—nala running South in 0335, 0334, 0333 (nala between the Forelegs)—thence West across the SHAM PLAIN.

* Night operations were a prominent feature of the Mohmand operations of 1933 and 1935—Editor.

4. *Tochi Scouts.* Will cover the advance moving by IBLANKE to features in 0337 (The Shoulder Bones), which they will piquet thence as in para. 3.

They will halt on the general line of 36 Grid Line (a line East and West through the join of the Neck and Skull) to allow TOCOL to close up.

5. *Adv. Gd.* Comdr.: Lt.-Col. KEY, 2 R. Sikh.

Tps.: One sec. 12 Fd. Coy.

2 R. Sikh.

Det. 8 Fd. Amb.

(*a*) Will relieve Tochi Scouts pqts. on features in 0337 (The Shoulder Bones).

(*b*) First bound to 36 East and West Grid Line (a line East and West through the join of the Neck and Skull).

6. *Piquetting Tps.* Comdr.: LT.-COL. MURRAY LYON, 2/4 G. R.

Tps.: 2/4 G. R.

(*a*) Will post pqts. of five rifles at intervals of approx. 100 yds. on alternate sides of the route, and at any point where the track might be mistaken. Pqts. will NOT be more than ten yds. from the track. Piquetting will begin where route leaves main road.

(*b*) Duties of pqts. To prevent enemy from approaching Coln., and prevent Coln. from losing its way.

(*c*) Pqt. Comdrs. will wear white arm-bands on left arm.

7. *Main Body.*

		Time at S. P.
One pl. 3 Rajput Coln. H. Q. Sigs.	...	21.00 hrs.
2 A. & S. H., less one Coy.	...	21.02 „
7 Mtn. Bty. ...	...	21.08 „
19 Mtn. Bty. ...	...	21.12 „
12 Fd. Coy., less two secs.	...	21.16 „
8 Fd. Amb., less dets. ...	...	21.19 „
28 S. I. S. 2nd Line Tpt.	...	21.21 „

S. P.—SCOUT POST. Will be marked by one RED Lamp.

8. *Route to S. P.*

Unit.		*Route.*		*Gate.*
2 R. Sikh	...	Rd. from right of own lines		
Pl. 3 Rajput	...	East of Coln. H. Q.	...	S.E.
Coln. H. Q.	...	Main Camp Rd.	...	S.E.
Sigs.				
2/4 G. R.	...	Own perimeter	...	S.W.
2 A. & S. H.	...	Along Dogra perimeter	...	S.E.
7 Mtn. Bty.	...	Rd. East of own lines	...	S.W.
19 Mtn. Bty.	...	Rd. East of own lines	...	S.W.
12 Fd. Coy.	...	Main Camp Rd.	...	S.E.
8 Fd. Amb.	...	Main Camp Rd.	...	S.E.
2nd Line Tpt.	...	As for units to which attached.		

9. *Escorts.* One coy. 2 A. & S. H. will escort 7 and 19 Mtn. Btys. One sec. 12 Fd. Coy. will escort 8 Fd. Amb. Two Coys. 1 Dogra will escort tpt. Escorts will move in file on both flanks of the units they are protecting. They will be distributed throughout the length of the units protected, and will move close in to them.

Duties: To prevent unit from being rushed or stampeded.

10. *Rear Gd.* Comdr.: Major SEED, 1 Dogra.
Tps.: 1 Dogra less two coys.
Det. 8 Fd. Amb.
Duties: Will withdraw and retain route pqts. and 2 R. Sikh pqts. in 0337. (The Shoulder Bones.)

11. *Animals.* No riding animals will accompany Coln. Only authorised pack mules will be taken.

12. *Guides.* Tochi Scouts will detail guides as under:

Adv. Gd.
Main Body ... Two each.
Rear Gd.

Guides will be handed over at S. P. by Maj. GARROW, and will wear two white arm-bands.

13. *Pace.* Maj. WEALLENS, 2/4 G. R., will set the pace which will NOT exceed 50 yds. per minute. He will move at head of Main Body. One sec. 3 Rajput will escort Maj. WEALLENS.

14. *Halts.* Coln. will halt at 22.30 hrs., and thereafter half hourly (*viz.*, 23.00, 23.30, etc.).

15. *Lights.* On no account will there be any lights or smoking.

16. Rifles will NOT be loaded, but magazines will be charged. Bayonets will be fixed.

17. *Action if enemy met.* If the enemy is met or makes any attempt to break into the Coln., the bayonet only will be used. Coln. will halt and lie down until ordered to proceed. There will be no firing before 05.30 hrs.

18. *Distinguishing marks:*

All Officers	. .	White band on head-dress.
Coln. Comdr.	...	Two white cross-belts.
Bde. Staff	...	One white cross-belt on left shoulder.
Unit Comdrs.	...	One white cross-belt on right shoulder.
Officer leading coln.	...	White patch on back.
Officers at rear of each unit.		
Guides	...	Two white arm-bands.
Pqt. Comdrs.	...	White arm-band on left arm.

19. *Position of officers:*

(*a*) Coln. Comdr. ... Head of Main Body.
C. R. A.
O. C., 2 A. & S. H. ... With Coln. Comdr.
O. C., 12 Fd. Coy.
Other Unit Comdrs. in Main Body ... At head of own unit.

(*b*) An officer will move in rear of each unit.

20. *Touch between units.* Every endeavour must be made to keep closed up. Connecting files will be sent out if there is any danger of touch with the unit ahead being lost.

21. 2 A. & S. H. will take out *only* two M. G. Pls.

ADMINISTRATION

22. *Supplies.* (*a*) The following rations *only* will be carried:

On the man B.T.	...	Two days hard scale.
On the man I.T.	...	Two days cooked. Tea, sugar and milk.
On the animal	...	Two days grain (NO bhoosa).

(*b*) Cookers will NOT be taken.

23. *Water.* All water bottles, *chaguls* and *pakals* will be carried full.

24. *Baggage.* One blanket or greatcoat per two officers or men only will be carried in 2nd Line Tpt.
25. *Colour Parties and Police.* Will march with own units.
26. *Baggage Gds.* 1 N. C. O., and 10 men per Bn., other units in proportion will march in formed bodies in rear of own tpt. Will assist in adjusting loads and assist mule leaders in negotiating difficult places.
27. *Tpt.* (*a*) Allotment—See Appendix "A."
    (*b*) Mules will NOT be linked together. A. T. Coys. will supply one driver per mule for all animals sent to units other than inf. bns. In the case of inf. bns., one R.I.A.S.C. driver per three mules will be supplied. Bns. will detail additional mule leaders to complete to one per mule.
    (*c*) Baggage mules will form up on SCOUT Football Ground on East face of Camp by 21.45 hrs. 1st Line mules will accompany units to which attached.
    (*d*) Mules which are known to neigh at night will NOT accompany the Coln.
    (*e*) Loads must be so secured as to minimise noise.
    (*f*) Mules for 2/4 G. R. will be detailed from 10 A. T. Coy.
28. *Ammunition.* Full unit echelon will be taken.
29. Men will be rested as far as possible on 11th May and must have a full meal NOT later than 20.00 hrs.
30. *Tents.* Will be left standing. 50% will be vacated by 18.00 hrs.
31. *Surplus kit.* Will be dumped in Bde. H. Q. area commencing 17.00 hrs. Gds. will NOT exceed one pl. per bn., other units in proportion. 20 lbs. per B. O., and 10 lbs. per I. O., or O. R., to be dumped separately. Units will submit statements showing order of priority and maundage of balance for subsequent transport to Coln.
32. *Surplus animals.* Will remain in units lines on night 11/12th May.
33. *Packs.* (*a*) Will NOT be carried.
    (*b*) Following will be carried on the man in addition to two days' rations:
    Jersey, spare socks, soap and towel.

34. *Followers.* No followers will accompany the Coln.

35. *Pqt. Stores.* Sufficient materials will be carried by 12 Fd. Coy. for wiring six pqts. each of one pl.

36. *Tools.* Bde. reserve tools will move with 12 Fd. Coy. "A" ech. tpt.

37. *Medical.* (*a*) All ranks will carry First Field Dressing.
(*b*) 8 Fd. Amb. will be prepared to take over casualties of Tochi Scouts.

38. *Rifle kotes.* Two mules carrying rifle racks will accompany 8 Fd. Amb. (total capacity 24 rifles).

39. *Provost.* S. C. will post traffic control posts shown on attd. sketch by 20.00 hrs. (Not attached, as only administrative detail covering the move to the Starting Point.)

40. *Messing—Additional Officers.* Officers will be attached to messes as under:

Capt. GIMSON, Tochi Scouts	...	Coln. H. Q.
Capt. TAYLOR, Tochi Scouts	...	2 A. & S. H.
Lt. PRENDERGAST, Tochi Scouts	...	1 Dogra
Sqn. Ldr., R.A.F.	...	Coln. H. Q.
A. L. O. ...	...	Coln. H. Q.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

41. *Liaison Officers.* Each unit will detail a British officer to accompany Coln. H. Q. They will report at S. P. at 20.50 hrs.

42. *No. 1 W/T Sets.* Adv. Gd.
Coln. H. Q.
12 Fd. Coy.
Rear Gd.
} One each.

43. *Reports.* Adv., and Rear Gds., and 12 Fd. Coy. will report their situations by W/T at all half hourly halts. Messages will be "log" messages and need NOT be written. Units in Main Body will similarly report verbally by runner at each half hourly halt.

44. *Synchronization.* Unit reps. will report Coln. H. Q. 20.00 hrs. to synchronize watches.

Ack.

L. B. D. BURNS, CAPTAIN,
B. M., Tocol.

Signed at 11.55 hrs.
Issued by orderly.

Distribution: List "A" Plus Tochi Scouts, DOSALLI, A. L. O., 3 Inf. Bde.

APPENDIX "A" TO TOCOL OPERATION ORDER No. 83,
DATED 11TH MAY 1937.

Allotment of R.I.A.S.C. Mules.

Unit.	*1st Line attd.*	*Baggage.*	*Total.*	*Remarks.*
Col. H. Q. .. / Pl. 3 Rajput ..	15	1	16	
Sigs. ..	3	1	4	
7 Mtn. Bty. ..	..	4	4	
19 Mtn. Bty. ..	..	4	4	
12 Fd. Coy. ..	55	4	59	
2 A. & S. H. ..	45	10	55	Unit finds 37 mule leaders.
1 Dogra ..	43	10	53	do.
2 R. Sikh ..	43	10	53	do.
2/4 G. R. ..	43	10	53	do.
A. T. Coys. ..	6	4	10	
8 Fd. Amb. ..	15	2	17	
Vet. Det. . / S. I. S. ..	1	Baggage with A. T. Coys.	1	
Spare mules ..	..	20	20	
Total ..	269	80	349	

Details of First Line:

Coln. H. Q. ... Office 1, Water 2, Tools 6, Mess 1, Rifle kotes 2, Grenades 3, Total 15 R.I.A.S.C. mules.

Sigs. ... No. 1 W/T set 1, Water 2, Total 3.

Fd. Coy. ... Water 3, Tech. stores and explosives 12, Water stores 14, Mess 1, Wire and Pickets 19, Additional cutting tools 6, Total 55.

Fd. Amb. ... Tech. Eqpt. 9, Water 3, Tents 2, Mess 1, Total 15.

Inf. Bns. ... Sigs. 4, S. A. A. 19, Water 11, Med. 3, Tools 4, Mess (Ind. Bn.) 2, Mess (Br. Bn.) 4, Total 43 (Ind. Bn.), 45 (Br. Bn.).



SREMELA
THE BACK BONE
VILLAGE CAMP
THE RIGHT SHOULDER
THE LEFT SHOULDER
THE NECK
THE RIGHT EAR
THE SCRUFF (BLANKE NARAI)
THE SKULL
THE RIGHT FORE-LEG
THE LEFT FORE-LEG
KACH CAMP
THE SREMELA GORGE
CORONATION CAMP
THE SHAM PLAIN
SHAM ALGAD
T. N.
G.N.
M.N
FURLONGS 8
6
4
2
0
1
2 MILE

SKETCH MAP OF WAZ

SHOWING COMM



ABYSSINIA TO-DAY

By Major A. H. J. Snelling, r.i.a.s.c.

In discussing Abyssinia it must be remembered that most of the sources of information are necessarily Italian and are thus not exactly disinterested. *The Times* correspondent at Jibuti sometimes supplies a corrective but news from this source is scarce. Thus the initiation and, still more, the alleged completion of some of the grandiose projected schemes must be taken with a grain of salt.

Abyssinia was one of the oldest independent kingdoms, having existed for at least thirty centuries. Italy considered that it could not, therefore, be looked upon as a colony populated by primitive tribes in a semi-savage state. Also the word empire was flattering to Italian pride and a soporific to quieten any unrest caused by the expenditure of lives and still greater expenditure of money. India was quoted by Italy as a parallel for the use of the word but, as mentioned later, the Italian Government made it quite clear that there should be no self-government in their new acquisition. In a speech made on the 5th of May 1936, Signor Mussolini stated that "the defeated and fugitive chiefs and *rasses* no longer count." Last May Signor Lessona, Minister for Italian Africa, announced in a speech "no continuation, no resurrection, either open or covert, of what was Ethiopian feudalism." Again there is confirmation from the remark of Marshal Graziani when announcing to the Duce the capture and execution of Ras Desta. He said he was pleased to place in the Duce's hands the "clear and totalitarian victory that will allow us to devote ourselves without anxiety to the civil development of the empire." The extent to which Italy proposes to carry this policy of absolute control was manifested on December 1st, 1937, when an Abyssinian Metropolitan of the Coptic Church was invested in Addis Ababa by the Viceroy. Until then, and for centuries past, the Coptic Church in Abyssinia has owed allegiance to an Egyptian Metropolitan. All this makes it clear that Italy decided early to start afresh and not attempt to rule through the remnant of the ancient feudal system, still less to allow any meed of indigenous rule.

Many people are under the impression that a full feudal system was in vogue in the country until the Italians arrived.

This, however, was not so. When, after Adowa, Menelek formed his empire he was naturally nervous of the considerable power of the almost independent *rasses.* His throne rested entirely on their goodwill, an unenviable position when each province has its own armed forces. To consolidate his own power the emperor initiated the policy of replacing the regional chiefs when opportunity arose, by trusted henchmen drawn chiefly from his own province of Shoa. Hailie Selassie continued this policy at an increased tempo giving as his reason the pretext that a government on European lines was more suitable for the country in these enlightened days. Whether the Abyssinians really agreed with this sentiment is doubtful but silence was the wiser course, as it is likely to remain under the Italian regime. Thus, at the time of the Italian invasion, Menelek's policy had progressed so far that the feudal overlord had vanished except in Tigre, Shoa and a few minor provinces. The rest of the country, possibly ninety per cent geographically, was governed by officials who were controlled from Addis Ababa. In these areas, therefore, there was no feudal system through which Italy could govern. This gave her an excellent ostensible reason for the elimination of the "dreaded yoke of the rapacious Shoan" and its substitution by the "beneficent" direct rule of Italian officials. Where feudal chiefs still existed the system was equally simple of application. If a feudatory submitted to the Italians (*e.g.,* Tigre) he was given the honorary rank and was told that his province would be improved for him. If a chief resisted the invader his followers were defeated and the chief either killed in battle or executed, as was Ras Desta. Where overlords had departed with the Negus the situation was even simpler and the improvement of the area could begin at once. And so an authoritarian direct rule has been brought into force unencumbered with native states and brooking no interference from internal or external sources. Finally, to round off the empire, Eritrea and Somalia have now been added to Abyssinia proper and the whole has received the title of the "Italian Empire of East Africa."

While Italy has decided to import direct rule into the country she does not propose to instal an exact copy of the form of government and jurisprudence now existing in Italy. This would be not only impracticable but would preclude the possibility of giving certain Abyssinians the pretence of even assisting as advisers. Nor

is it proposed necessarily to replace all local usage and custom by Italian law. Differences in mentality, level of civilisation, social development and religious beliefs would, in any case, make such an arbitrary change impossible. Some adaptation is essential. Hence the fundamental principles of the future government which were defined by Signor Lessona in the Italian Senate. These may be briefly summarised as follows:

1. Government and all political power is to be exercised by Italians alone and no interference with or qualification of this will be allowed.
2. Eminent Abyssinians may be appointed as advisers to the Central Government. Local administrators may also call upon such notables to assist them.
3. The governmental action of the Italian authorities can be exercised through these advisers in such a way as will avoid deviations from local law and custom but such native administration will not be allowed to conflict with law and order nor to interfere with the ethics of European civilisation.

These principles, again, make it clear that there is no implication whatever of future self-government. The principles themselves have been implemented by the basic rules already existing in Eritrea and Somaliland. This, it is hoped, will weld Italian East Africa into a homogeneous whole while avoiding complications in the older territories.

For purposes of administration the country has been subdivided into five regional governments or provinces, the Central Government being at Addis Ababa. As far as possible efforts have been made to retain in a single province peoples with similar languages, customs, and economic conditions while ethnic and religious factors have also been considered. The provinces have again been split up into *commissariati, residenze* and *vice-residenze* the same ethnographical principles having been kept in view in their demarcation.

The official language is to vary according to the province and may be Amharic, Tigrigna or Arabic. Instruction in native schools may be given in any one of six languages according to the local custom while in all Mahommedan areas Arabic is compulsory. This is to demonstrate that Italy does not wish to interfere

with local conditions, always provided that they suit Italy and her colonists.

Naturally during the war and for some time afterwards the military commander was automatically governor of the newly conquered territory. From every aspect, particularly in the matter of recognition by other Powers, it was essential that a civil governor should be appointed as soon as possible. And so, it being considered that the military task had been accomplished, S. A. R. the Duke of Aosta[1] was nominated Viceroy on November 20th, 1937.

The colonisation of Italy's surplus population is a pressing and vital matter, both because its disposal was the advertised motive for the invasion of Abyssinia and because the Italian will soon want to see tangible results for the great expenditure that has taken and is taking place. The allotment for Italian Africa for 1938-39 is 1,785 million lire (say £18 million)[2] and this is exclusive of a grant of 3,000 million lire (say £32 million) for road construction in the next four years.[3] These are considerable sums for an impoverished Italy and the people will expect a commensurate return. Even these amounts are only a drop in the ocean if Italy proposes to send out millions. The sea journey for one person cannot cost the Government less than £10, while transport from the port will be at least another £4. These are conservative figures but a million persons will cost some 14 million pounds before a lira has been spent on their housing, land, tools, seed or settlement.

It is, of course, only in the uplands that the European can settle and work. Naturally the native also prefers these more productive and healthier areas and the problem of displacement with concomitant local friction will arise as it has elsewhere in Africa. Kenya is a case in point but Italy proposes to act on a far greater scale and the native is to get little compensation for his lost holdings which will be compulsorily ceded. However, there are areas in Abyssinia where the local situation may simplify colonisation. Caffa may be cited as an instance. Fifty years ago this country was a thriving coffee plantation with an estimated population of over a million. Continuous wars, expeditions, and

[1] Formerly Duke of Spoleto, leader of the Italian Karakoram Expedition.

[2] Provisional estimates, 1938-39, approved by Council of Ministers on December 14th, 1937.

[3] Royal Decree, dated October 15th, 1937.

slave raids (not to forget the "abuses of the Shoan overlord") are said to have reduced the population to a mere 50,000 while the greater part of the area has reverted to equatorial jungle with the coffee bushes, or trees now, still producing their berries which only fall and rot. In areas such as these the native problem may not be so serious but elsewhere eviction must be necessary. It is to protect and assist the colonists in such contentious areas that the Abyssinian element has been entirely excluded from the government of the country. Italy, of course, claims that the "juridical foundations of the Empire have been made sufficiently elastic to allow Italians and natives to live side by side in tranquillity and with respect for each others' spheres of activity." The British Empire has had such problems to deal with and has found that they cannot be settled by the mere utterance of a grandiloquent phrase.

At the moment, as Italy herself admits, there are few settlers on the land. There are, however, some quarter of a million Italians engaged in the construction of public works, communications, employed in commerce and industry and a few on the land itself. When the situation permits these will be joined by their families bringing the numbers up to about a million. The majority of these men and their families are to be the first of the future settlers on the land. This number Italy confidently expects to triple or quadruple in the next few years.

At the moment roads and buildings are of greater importance than colonisation as communications are essential before settlement can begin. The work must be done by Italians as the native refuses to do the work of a navvy.

To avoid friction in this process of demographic colonisation a survey of the ownership of the land has been undertaken as a preliminary step. Also the Minister for Italian Africa has announced a "six-year plan" (a "five-year plan" would hardly become Fascism) of public works which are to be put in hand at once.[1] The nine main features of this plan are:

1. Road construction.
2. Maritime works, Assab to be the imperial port. Inland waterways.
3. Hydraulic and hydro-electric works.

[1] Colonial Estimates. Speech in the Chamber, May 19th, 1937.

4. Hygienic improvements.
5. Construction of mining plant.
6. House-building and town-planning.
7. Reafforestation and land reclamation.
8. Telegraph and wireless development.
9. Military works.

Before leaving the matter of colonisation two recent edicts are of interest. Firstly, the word "native" is not to be used, possibly something that Italy has learnt from the British Empire. Secondly, there is the prohibition against inter-marriage between the Italian and the indigenous subject.[1] The main reason for this is undoubtedly an effort to preserve the prestige of the Italian labourer. Its ostensible reason is to prevent dangerous cross-breeding with consequent damage to public morality and to protect both races. As it is to be rigorously enforced, it would seem advisable to ship Italian families to Abyssinia as early as possible before large numbers of immigrant husbands are languishing in prison.

It is in the economic sphere that it is most difficult to obtain a true picture of what really is happening. In Italy itself almost all real news on the subject is suppressed and only inspired "information" appears. So I will give first the Italian side of the picture and then quote a report from *The Times* Jibuti correspondent. The reader can then draw his own inferences.

The whole object of the Italian demographic colonisation scheme is to enable the Italian to pass out quickly from the worker stage into the class of small proprietor with his own little farm. At present the Italians are chiefly labourers and, in a country where the standard of living is low and European amenities expensive, they have to be given an inflated state-aided wage. Many also have to support families in Italy. High wages involve the control of the cost of living or this latter will rise beyond all reason. Such control exists with some success in Italy and elsewhere though how long an artificial measure of this type can succeed is conjectural. But Italy is different from Abyssinia where there is a vast discrepancy between the cost of living of the native and the European. Eventually the wage scale is to be adapted to the controlled cost of living, a somewhat complicated undertaking.

[1] Royal Decree of June 24th, 1937. Punishment for those "maintaining such conjugal relations" is one to five years imprisonment.

Italy expects her Empire to provide sufficient for itself as well as the raw materials required by the mother country and also to export enough goods to foreign countries to maintain a favourable trade balance. Further, the Empire must not compete with Italian trade but only complement it. To supervise this ambitious programme a bill[1] has been passed providing for the creation of three colonising bodies. These bodies have been empowered to call upon the large trading corporations in Italy to collaborate with them in regulating private enterprise.

It must be admitted that the above schemes are excellent in principle but practice is another matter. The few colonists, less than 100,000, who have already settled are engaged in the production of meat, milk, wool, hides, coffee, oil-seeds, cotton, cereals and precious metals. It is interesting to see what *The Times* correspondent says about the preferences given or about to be given to even such a small beginning and their effect on the economic development of Abyssinia. In a message to that newspaper, published on January 4th, 1938, he paints a gloomy picture of the great Italian ideals already stated. The old Abyssinian export of hides, coffee and skins, worth over a million sterling in 1934, has ceased entirely. The natives persist in passive resistance and miles of valuable coffee plantations and agricultural land have been untended for two years. No new exportable commodity has been produced and it will be years before cotton can be grown in any useful quantity. Wheat and flour now have to be imported instead of, as in 1934, there being a small exportable surplus. Imports generally have greatly increased.

He goes on to say that the new decrees have strangled trade. To provide foreign currency no firm may export to Italy unless it sells a proportion of its products to foreign countries. In the case of hides only one-third of those sold abroad may be exported to Italy where prices have soared in consequence.

The Maria Theresa dollar has been replaced by the paper lira, the Government hoping that pressure and time would gradually eliminate the dollar. But the native is existing on even less than usual and hoarding his dollars which are now practically unobtainable. Italy wants the silver but so does the native who

[1] Approved by Cabinet on 19th October 1937.

does not trust paper, a fact which tends to stifle both the local and export trades.

As already explained the Italian labourer must have a high wage. As expected, this has forced up prices beyond the control of the price controllers which again goes to cripple the export trade. As state control multiplies, so does peculation. The extent of the control can be gauged by the organisations which the correspondent quotes. He mentions the Technical Commission for Control of Industrial Development; the Technical Commission for the Control of Agricultural Development; the Monopoly for Hotel Building; the Monopoly for Hotel Ownership; the Monopoly for Matches, Tobacco and Salt; the Commission for Controlling the Distribution of Building Materials; monopolies for petrol, commercial motor transport, and so forth.

That is the other side of Italy's ideology. Peace has been more devastating to Abyssinia's economic conditions than war and it seems clear that the present state of affairs calls for sweeping changes and a more practical outlook. Failing this the whole Abyssinian enterprise may prove a colossal financial and economic failure leading to growing dissatisfaction which may turn to serious discontent in Italy, a situation that not even a dictator can view with equanimity.

To maintain internal order and protect the frontiers a colonial army of the Empire has been formed. Its basic organisation is much the same as that of the Army in India. It is divided into two parts; the African Detachments being composed entirely of Italians while the Colonial Detachments are formed of Abyssinians with Italian officers. The regional system of recruiting is employed for the native army and families are allowed to live with their husbands in the camps. This last simplifies the obtaining of sufficient numbers of recruits and is also an excellent method of political penetration and dissemination of propaganda.

The basic unit of the Colonial Detachments (Abyssinian) is the battalion which comprises three rifle companies and one machine-gun company. It has a fixed headquarters within its own recruiting area but the battalion can operate at a distance for a limited period. Enlistment is on a voluntary basis though this may be of an Italian pattern.

The Colonial Brigade (Abyssinian) consists of the following:

Four battalions.
One artillery group { one battery 65/17 guns. two batteries of 81 mortars [1]
Engineer company.
Field hospital.
Services representatives.

Eleven brigades are organised as above while the remaining six have a platoon of cavalry instead of the fourth infantry battalion.

The African Detachments (Italian) form the mobile reserves in the hands of the Viceroy and regional governors. That at Addis Ababa contains two regiments of Grenadiers, one regiment of artillery, three companies of engineers and the usual supply detachments. Attached is a special motorised unit of the Black Shirts of Africa which is capable of transporting the entire division. In Addis Ababa the ostensible task of the force is to guard the Viceroy but, to relieve it of purely garrison duties and to enable it to operate as a fighting entity, there also exists in the capital a force of four battalions of Black Shirts and eight batteries.

The remainder of the Italian troops are at the disposal of the five regional governors. They consist of nine motorised units of the Black Shirts of Africa. The military organisation is completed by the Engineers of Africa containing various specialists and a railway company. Finally there are the usual ancillary services.

The approximate aggregate strength of the armed land forces is stated to be:

2,000 officers (regular).
500 officers *di complimento*.
1,800 non-commissioned officers.
20,000 Italian troops.
40,000 Abyssinian troops.
12,000 horses and mules.

The General Headquarters staff is at Addis Ababa with a chief and assistant chief of staff, an inspector of artillery, inspector of Black Shirts and the heads of the supply services.

The essential principle of the organisation is that the armed land forces of Abyssinia shall be self-contained and able to undertake the defence of the frontiers and enforce internal order without having to call for any reinforcements from Italy. This

[1] These are infantry weapons in the Italian army but are used as artillery in the Colonial forces.

principle is being extended to Libya to which country large movements of troops from Italy have been reported recently.

Given that the above numbers are approximately correct, and there is little reason to doubt them to any extent, there is admittedly no sign of that enormous force which, it was alleged, would be raised to conquer perhaps Africa or more possibly Arabia. But it is also equally certain that Italy could not afford such a vast army at present. Again Italy's main and most urgent need is for raw materials. To supply these will necessitate large areas being put under cultivation, mines developed and all the other concomitants of production. This will require native labour which, though large, is not inexhaustible, nor can the native both serve in the army and work in the fields and factories. Thus, though a large army does not exist at present, it is well to remember that the basic organisation for raising it can now easily be improvised and it is well known that men of an excellent fighting type can be found in emergency or when the economic situation permits their release from productive work.

Before leaving the subject of the land forces a quasi-military organisation must be mentioned. By a Royal Decree[1] the Italian governors of the five provinces have been permitted to enrol the Italian labourers now in Abyssinia into a Voluntary Militia for National Security. At the end of May 1937, there were said to be about 130,000 of these working on roads and buildings. The objects of this scheme are threefold. Firstly, to maintain the prestige of these men by giving them uniforms, arms and regulations. As the Abyssinians despise navvy work and will not do it, this matter of keeping up appearances as far as Italian labour is concerned is an important one. Secondly, the officers of the contingent maintain the "rights" of the workers *vis-a-vis* the contractors. The organisation also arranges all games and religious observances and generally supervises sanitary arrangements. Finally, they can be used in emergency as a disciplined body either to protect themselves or to assist in local security schemes.

[1] Cabinet approved this measure on October 19th, 1937.

MUNITION PROBLEMS BEFORE AND DURING WAR

A lecture given before the United Service Institution of India, by General Sir Henry E. ap Rhys Pryce, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., Master-General of Ordnance in India, on the 22nd July, 1937.

The lecturer was introduced by the Hon'ble Mr. J. C. Nixon, C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.

The essence of the munitions problem is to see that our forces in comparison with others are adequately armed both as regards the quality and quantity of their armament, and protected against hostile arms. This means constant research to improve our own weapons and the keeping of an unceasing watch on developments throughout the world, not only in pure armament but also in scientific matters. The need for this close watch will be appreciated when we remember how a simple thing like chlorine gas, ordinarily used for bleaching purposes, dyes or medicines, was unexpectedly utilised as a weapon of war by the Germans. We can neglect nothing and we have to be thankful to many men for their help in enabling us to keep abreast of other nations on land and sea and in the air, even if we are at times bothered by cranks and charlatans. The two worst cases I can remember of the latter were the crank who had a scheme for making icebergs under hostile submarines which brought them to the surface where you dealt with them as you willed, and the charlatan who dealt out death rays as he turned a handle. A general was sent down to inspect the weapon and much to his astonishment, when it was turned on a flock of sheep in a field, they died. However, being prepared for all things, he had brought along a veterinary officer who held a *post-mortem* then and there and discovered that the sheep had been given a dose of arsenic in time to ensure their death during the demonstration. But to many men we owe a deep debt of gratitude. Stokes for the Stokes mortar, Swinton, Churchill and others for the tank, Mills for the grenade.

Apart from keeping in touch with developments, we have to consider in peace the amounts of armament and munitions which will be required in war. It is no secret that we underestimated our requirements for the last war and that for two years men had to make good in lives and blood what they lacked in material.

When we see that the war plans of most nations to-day involve the mobilization of all adults, either for fighting, production, or necessary public services, it will be realised that we cannot afford to underestimate a second time. But this difference between peace and war requirements is hard to visualise. At the beginning of the Great War there were 486 guns in France. In 1918 there were 7,603 guns and 3,022 mortars, while the monthly shipments of ammunition had risen from a few hundred tons to some two hundred thousand.

Still this estimate must be made and for the sake merely of illustration I will assume that our war requirements are calculated to be eight times our peace requirements. To keep stocked in peace eight times our normal needs would be enormously costly. As a compromise, therefore, we have to decide what we must maintain in peace and what we shall have to or can expand to in war. We can then settle what arrangements must be made for the difference, until such time as Ordnance factories and the trade can get into full war production.

Now the problem for many articles, of which in the Ordnance alone we have close on thirty thousand, has usually to be worked out on the following lines. Ordinary monthly peace requirements are known and met by manufacture on a steady flow and there is usually no trouble, but in case of a breakdown through strikes, transport delays, or sudden rises in demand owing to minor operations and other causes, we in India keep a three months stock of indigenous and a six months stock of overseas supplies, these periods being about the time that the trade and government factories usually take to comply with orders. With the present feverish race in armaments this period for overseas delivery has lengthened considerably and we shall have to increase our stocks. It is therefore more important than ever that we should develop indigenous sources of supply and manufacture so as to ensure our being self-supporting as far as we can and to avoid the unnecessary locking up of capital. Having decided on our estimate of monthly war requirements, calculations have to be made for the plant, machinery, tools and motive power required to produce them and for the labour necessary to work the tools and plant. If all of these can be made available at about the same time, well and good. But usually one or other item will hold up full-scale production. For instance light and heavy machinery are now taking twelve and eighteen months respectively from the date of order to receipt.

The difference between what the factories and the trade can produce in peace and what they will be required to produce in war, and the time they require to get into full war production, are the basis on which war reserves must be maintained. You will therefore see why we in India are anxious for three things:

Firstly, an adequate supply of highly skilled labour;

Secondly, the development of indigenous resources, which will give us our full requirements quicker than overseas supplies; and

Thirdly, a substantial reserve of plant and machinery available within the country.

It is in the matter of labour that much requires to be done. As an example we may take the gland of the muzzle attachment for a Vickers machine-gun. Twenty-six operations and nineteen different tools are required in its manufacture, as well as thirty-one gauges to see that the work is correct. The extension in the use of machines in place of handwork, the greater accuracy and finer tolerances now demanded, the introduction of new metals, high speed tools and welding, and particularly the making of jigs and gauges require a higher class of workman than the old type. Thirty years ago Sir John Hewett wrote regarding technical and industrial education that on no subject had more been written and less accomplished. That is still true to-day, although a start has been made by certain Provincial Governments, by the Railways and by the Ordnance. What India needs so much is the imparting of technical education to people with a sound general education and not to ill-educated workmen who cannot grasp modern technicalities. Unfortunately the well-educated man dislikes the practical side and wants a highly paid appointment without the preliminary period of hard work which employers deem essential for the making of a successful supervisor. The finished products of industrial schools have little resemblance to a skilled worker and what is really needed are apprentice schools attached to large workshops and factories.

As regards indigenous supplies, it would probably be best to take another example, a .303" rifle cartridge. To the ordinary eye it appears to consist of a nickel bullet, a brass case, a cap with some explosive mixture in it and, from hearsay, some cordite. But the manufacturer wants thirty-two different materials to make the cartridge. The copper and zinc in it may have come from Australia, Rhodesia, or Canada, the nickel from Canada, the lead from Australia, mineral jelly from Burma, antimony from China,

aluminium from Canada or Scotland, tin from Malaya, glycerine from England, mercury from Spain, Italy, or the United States, sodium nitrate from Chile, sulphur from Japan or Sicily and manganese, shellac, beeswax, acetone, soda ash and cotton waste from India. In the same way, not in this cartridge, but in the processes required to make it, some sixty-nine articles have been drawn from all over the world. How much more advantageous it would be if we could obtain most of these from India and Burma.

We have done something towards this. We now get antimony from Burma instead of China, and we make glycerine in India. But the mercury required for fulminates in explosives, that is in the cap of the cartridge, is not to be had locally and, if supplies were cut off, we should have to substitute either lead-azide or diazodinitro-phenol. And the very small amount of sulphuric acid, which is the key to most chemical and metallurgical processes, produced and used in India shows that the country is still in its industrial infancy. From a munitions point of view the production of metals and metallic ores is of the greatest importance. India imports annually twelve crores worth of metals mostly in the shape of finished products, some of which she will be unable to get in war, and exports about six crores worth of ores, some of which are of the greatest value in war. India and Burma have large natural resources in manganese, wolfram and bauxite, the latter two being the ores from which tungsten and aluminium are produced. As regards manganese, India is actually the second biggest producer in the world and it was largely due to a Mr. Heath of the East India Company that this metal was introduced to the world to make an alloy with iron which revolutionized the steel industry in England. Of tungsten it has been said that to deprive a nation of access to supplies of the metal is to cripple its military power in war and to ruin its industrial life in peace. As you know, tungsten and steel, as an alloy, are necessary for all high speed cutting tools and are far more efficient than the ordinary carbon steel. Aluminium is not made in India because it is said that a 10,000-ton-a-year plant would be required to make production profitable and nobody is willing to put down the money for it, possibly because there is an insufficiency of cheap hydraulic power available. Yet factories with half this output are working in Europe.

Here we have three of the most important metals, not only for munition purposes but also for commercial uses, available in

plenty in their raw state in India and Burma. What an advantage it would be if some Indian magnate would start to manufacture them in the country instead of their being exported to come back as finished products.

More serious perhaps is the fact that India has to import in peace machinery worth thirteen crores of rupees and belting worth half a crore of rupees. In war a drop of, say, 20 per cent. in these imports caused by enemy action at sea and a further drop of anything between 20 and 50 per cent. due to the fact that the United Kingdom would have to supply her own needs first, might occur. All that we could do in the circumstances would be to patch up the old machinery and try to carry on.

From the little I have said, I think you will realize that in war a nation's strength is measured not only by its army, navy, and air force but also by the quantities of basic raw material it possesses or can obtain, by its machine power, its capacity for industrialization and its means of transportation; for it is on these that defence forces depend for their maintenance.

Let us now suppose that war has broken out and consider the problems involved from the broadest point of view. The first essential is the maintenance of credit and exchange. Manufacturers must know where they stand as regards prices if they are to carry on production at all. In the Great War, until America came in, one of our greatest troubles was this constantly narrowing bottle neck of money. The British Government had in the first place to guarantee £500 millions of overseas securities to provide money wherewith to extend munition factories and to finance the war generally. As time went on it became increasingly difficult to pay for imports and, as you may remember, the British Government had to call on such citizens as owned American securities to surrender them in return for a British war loan to the same value, so that they might pay with those securities for munitions bought in America.

The next requirement is the control of shipping, since import into India in one form or another—whether as natural ore or as finished products—will be necessary. Various expedients can help to economise shipping resources—good dock and clearing organizations, the drawing of supplies from the nearest source and so on. It may seem strange talking about shipping and finance, but India is dependent on them for her purchases and imports, and without them she cannot produce munitions on an adequate scale.

Having done our best to ensure a constant flow of raw materials, our next task is to turn out enough finished articles to meet demands. To make the necessary estimates of what will be required we must have information about the strength of our forces, where they will be employed and for how long, the climate of the theatre of operations in summer and winter, so as to provide adequate and suitable clothing and equipment, and the scale and severity of the anticipated fighting. These estimates must be made for periods of at least twelve months ahead, if raw material is to be readily available, and only a first-class prophet can give the right answer.

How divergent opinions can be as to the length of operations is shown by Sir John French's estimate of three months, Lord Kitchener's estimate of three years, and the actual four and a quarter years of the Great War with its repercussions for some two years afterwards in Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, and other places. One's judgment is apt to be affected by the disinclination to prepare for a long and costly war. But it is better to win than to lose, and anything still unused at the end of the war can be utilised to reduce budgets. So it is really sound policy to calculate wholeheartedly what effort is required, how long it will take to win and to prepare for that.

It will soon be evident whether pre-war estimates were sufficient or not, and there will nearly always be a deficiency in one form or another. The watch on supply and demand must never be relaxed. The moment it is seen that supplies are likely to be short a priority committee should be appointed by Government to decide how available supplies are to be allocated and what development of resources is necessary to ensure that likely deficiencies are made good. In addition to the Fighting Services there will also be other claimants; the railways, public services, and the trade. It will be necessary to consider which of these is really the most important claimant from the point of view of winning the war and to devote the bulk of available supplies to its use. The development of supplies will call for co-operation by Provincial Governments, who may have to appoint controllers for the materials required. Government, the Services, and the trade will all have to be represented in this control and it will be necessary to have, in addition to experts, men with powers of rapid decision, forceful men, full of intuition and ability to improvise.

The last major problem will be that of contracts. When war breaks out, peace contracts will still be running. They will have

tc be supplemented by war contracts for far larger amounts. There will be the danger of mushroom firms that spring up, put in low tenders, and usually fail to supply; there will be a rise in prices due to paucity of supply and inter-competition; and demands from firms for Government assistance in the way of procuring the extra machinery and raw materials required. Last, but not least, arrangements must be made at the time for the rapid liquidation of contracts on the cessation of hostilities. It was found in 1918 that many firms were in arrears with their deliveries and claimed that they should be allowed to make good those arrears. As the troops had had to do without the goods and had been inconvenienced by their lack, it was unthinkable that we should take and pay for them when we no longer needed them. Therefore, in contracts we must have a clause that on the cessation of hostilities the amount to be delivered shall automatically be reduced to the amount that has actually been delivered, the disposal of raw material and semi-finished articles being arranged by mutual agreement between the contractor and the State.

I have spoken so far from the producer's standpoint, but we must also look at matters from the point of view of the user. The first thing that the user has to do is to keep in thorough repair what is essential for fighting. If he does not do this, he not only lowers his own fighting efficiency but throws a great strain on munitions factories. Apart from personal care on the part of the user, the difference between peace and war is so great that we have to have specialists in the field—Ordnance inspectors, mechanical engineers, armourers and armament artificers, to see how arms, ammunition and equipment are standing the strain and to be ready with remedies. In war a single gun may fire as much in one day as a six-gun battery normally fires in a year in peace and it is not surprising that faults are discovered which have never before come to light. Amongst the things that have to be dealt with are periodical inspection of the bore of a gun to ascertain wear and erosion and the date when it is likely to become too inaccurate for further use; constant inspection of ammunition, especially if it has been imported from a foreign country or made under conditions of haste; and a special watch on new equipments started during the campaign. For example, in the Great War, the 6-inch artillery equipment, a new one at the time, had in the light of practical experience nearly one hundred and fifty modifications made to it, all tending to improve efficiency and many being devised and carried out in the field.

Salvage is another most important duty of the user. The savings can be immense, if it is carried out well. Units can help enormously in avoiding waste and unnecessary indents if they carry out salvage as a matter of routine. I can quote two instances. I remember after a battle having an indent put in to me for forty-one Lewis guns. I arranged for salvage parties to be sent out from each battalion concerned and they succeeded in picking up thirty-four guns in a perfectly good state, so that the indent was reduced to seven guns.

The second case was one of definite panic on the part of a certain division at Loos in September 1915, which wired its army headquarters that it had lost the whole of its equipment, which required instant replacement without the formality of indents or vouchers. Equipment there would have meant guns, rifles, machine-guns, bayonets, belts, pouches and ammunition. A sane and steady Ordnance officer was sent up to visit the division, its brigades and units, and found that the only important deficiencies were twenty-six machine-guns, seventy-six bicycles and five pontoon wagons, all of which were replaced within a few hours.

Apart from recovery of lost equipment, it is surprising what can be done with apparently worthless stuff. In the war old clothes that looked mere rags had a market value of nearly a thousand rupees a ton, were cleaned, torn, and rewoven into good cloth. Laces were cut from the uppers of old boots and roughly one new boot could be made from the remains of four old ones. It is wonderful too how an article that has finished its useful life as one thing can get a new lease of life as something else. Old tentage makes good cook's clothing or nose bags; worn out ground sheets become ration bags; spokes of condemned wheels make excellent legs for tables and chairs.

Apart from his workshop and salvage activities, an Ordnance officer's life in war is mainly one of estimating what troops are likely to require, ordering the same and receiving and delivering it. Estimates have to be based both on a long and a short view; the long one possibly a year ahead so that factories can make the munitions in time; the short view for the immediate necessities of the current month and the month ahead. The fluctuations in ordnance requirements will be large enough at any time. In France, for the two months before the German offensive of March 1918, the Royal Army Ordnance Corps were issuing a weekly average of seventy thousand rifles, packs, blankets, boots, and respirators and these are only some of the thirty thousand articles

with which, as I mentioned earlier, the Ordnance Services have to deal. During the three weeks following the offensive just on four hundred and seventy thousand of the same articles were delivered, or six times as many. With the great increases in demands for armoured fighting vehicles, anti-aircraft and gas equipment, the problem of estimating requirements will not be any easier.

I must apologise for having been able to give only a very brief and inadequate outline of my subject, but to try and compress the vast problem of munitions supply into the space of an hour is well nigh impossible. I trust, however, that I have made it clear that one must in future look on economic mobilization as of equal importance with the mobilization of armed forces and that the more a nation is self-supporting in economic resources and trained to use those resources wisely, the greater will be its chances of success in a prolonged struggle. If I have made this clear I feel confident that in time India will become more self-reliant from a war economic point of view, whilst at the same time improving her economic position in peace. Before closing I would like to express my thanks to the officers of the M. G. O.'s Branch, the members of the Principal Supply Officers Committee, and to the director of the Geological Survey of the Government of India for their assistance in preparing information and facts for this lecture and I would thank you for having listened to a somewhat dry subject.

PEACE OR WAR?

By Colonel H. H. Rich

At the end of the Great War a certain senior officer is reported to have said: "Thank Heaven, that is over, now we can get down to a bit of real soldiering." In effect his words meant that war was over and training for peace could again be started. The writer suggests that this idea is still prevalent to-day and that training of commanders is training for PEACE and not training for WAR. This is borne out by the fact that no sooner do units come back from operations on the Frontier than people start talking about annual collective training.

The opening words of Training Regulations show that training for war has but one aim—success in battle. Unfortunately training for peace has two major goals—the one numerical and the other psychological. The numerical goal makes us strive to produce better figures than last year; better figures than those of someone else. In this striving for figures the end sometimes justifies any means. The psychological goal makes us study the foibles of our superiors and, by pandering to these, acquire a superficial gloss which does not always represent the true metal underneath. Although the psychological goal has some slight value under the heading of "surprise and distraction of the enemy" which will be discussed later, the numerical goal is nothing but a danger. It inculcates a linear habit of thought and we fight our battles by measurement instead of tactics. How often is an attack anything but a succession of frontages divided into equal parts? We usually hear—

"Y" battalion right, "Z" left;
"A" company right, "B" left;

irrespective of the fact that "Z" battalion and "B" company have to cross an open plain to reach their objective, when by following behind "Y" battalion or "A" company and then attacking from a flank they would suffer considerably fewer casualties.

Field Service Regulations, Volume II, section 11, has a long paragraph on the art of command. The contents of this paragraph can be suitably summarised under two headings—destructive and constructive. Under the destructive heading are given some of the difficulties which beset a commander in war—danger and

fatigue; unforeseen incidents; the enemy doing something unexpected; important messages going astray; and imperfect knowledge of the situation. Under the constructive heading are included—clear definition and maintenance of object; surprise and distraction of the enemy; speed in action; concentration of all available means; offensive action; and constant thinking ahead. This last heading is not in the book, but it includes two headings that are, *viz.*, "quick thought in action" and "constant watchfulness."

We train our leaders by giving them tactical exercises either with or without troops. We differentiate between exercises designed to teach definite lessons and those intended to give practice in command. It is with the latter that this article largely deals and the writer proposes to consider both exercises with and without troops generally. Tactical exercises without troops will be referred to as "tewts," exercises with troops as "exercises" and manoeuvres as "manoeuvres."

Danger and fatigue

Danger, except of the bowler hat, cannot be brought into peace training. In "tewts," and usually in exercises, we make our plans under the most favourable conditions, often before any movements have taken place or, at the worst, after a short approach march. During manoeuvres commanders do occasionally have to work under conditions which involve approximately the same degree of fatigue as they would experience in war. As a rule it is extremely difficult to bring in fatigue without producing unreal situations or introducing boredom. In war we strive to keep commanders as mentally fit as possible and we do our best to prevent their undergoing undue fatigue and the same should hold good in peace training. In war commanders ride or drive about in cars. A long march for officers before a "tewt" would be a prodigious waste of time and we cannot start by making senior officers double round the race-course or ride twenty miles across country. Mechanization helps us a little in this respect, and officers who have driven some way in a covered lorry which ensures that the exhaust gases have their fullest effect will not be at their physical best when confronted with a situation. The use of gas masks might assist in producing a species of fatigue quickly. But to expect troops to make a long march as a mere preliminary to a situation is asking a lot of human nature unexhilarated by the excitement of war. Reluctantly the writer has come to the conclusion that it is almost impossible to introduce fatigue, except during manoeuvres, without, at the same time, bringing in unreality and boredom.

Unforeseen incidents

The British character is such that it likes to find a precedent for everything and we have carried this trait into the army to such an extent that we are, probably, the most regulation-ridden body in the world. The result is that our military minds are extremely orderly and we dislike anything unforeseen. The history of battles teems with examples, small and great, of unforeseen incidents turning the fortunes of war; the geese that saved Rome, Wolfe's track up the heights of Abraham, Wellesley's ford at Assaye and the landing in the wrong spot at "X" beach in Gallipoli, which the Turks had thought impossible. In spite of all these lessons our "tewts" and exercises are usually straightforward and if a director does produce something we had not thought of, he is immediately accused of being a conjuror and of producing "rabbits out of a hat." We must get rid of this habit of thought and realise that unforeseen incidents will always be occurring in war. By using our ingenuity we can bring unforeseen incidents into peace training so that we shall get into the habit of expecting them in war. We should remember Marshal Lyautey's words:

"No one ever sees enough of the unforeseen, of risks, of miscalculations; no one ever reckons broadly or largely enough."

And also General Fuller's:

"We must prepare ourselves for the unexpected in place of training others for the cut and dried."

The enemy doing something unexpected

We are still inclined to look on war as a kind of game and expect the enemy to conform to a set of rules framed by ourselves. Accordingly in most "tewts" and exercises the enemy is accommodating and plays the game. He waits patiently while we do our numerous reconnaissances, evolve our fire plan and fix our zero some three hours later. Almost the only unexpected thing he ever does is to slip away in this period and then we are apt to accuse him of doing the impossible. Imagine our feelings in a "tewt" if the enemy suddenly attacked us in the interval between first contact and the zero hour of our attack; we would certainly count it as an unfriendly act on the part of the director whom we would also write down as a super-magician. Again the enemy obligingly keeps the machine-guns which we have located in the same places; will he be so accommodating in war? We must train ourselves continually in peace to be ready for unexpected developments on the part of the enemy so that when they occur in war, as

they surely will, we shall be in the right frame of mind to receive them.

Important messages going astray

We are fortunate in our signal service in peace in that messages are almost always delivered into the hand of the right person in a reasonable time. Runners and despatch riders do not often get lost and are rarely made casualties. Eventually our peace training causes us to make the unwarrantable assumption that a message written is a message delivered. We do not think of the difficulties and dangers that arise in war. Wires are cut by enemy shell fire and by our own vehicles, runners get wounded or deliver messages to the wrong people, and places are not nearly so easy to find when bullets make one take a really covered line of movement. It is not very difficult to introduce into exercises and even "tewts" an air of reality in this respect; all that is required is an issue of wire cutters to umpires and the occasional loss of a runner.

Imperfect knowledge of the situation

One of our greatest errors in training, especially in "tewts," is that we give too much information and what is more we dish it up nicely. So much is this the case that commanders expect this in exercises and manœuvres and are inclined to do nothing until they get it. In war all information has to be sought for and often fought for. The information we get is in direct proportion to our efforts to obtain it. If we give general instructions we shall get vague information. The information-gaining officers—either on the ground or in the air—are never completely in the mind of the commander, however much he may strive to put them there, as the commander's mind never is or never should be stationary. There are always fresh gaps that the commander wants filled and he has perpetually to be giving his mobile troops and air force fresh instructions to try and fill these gaps in his information.

The details of information are collected by subordinate commanders who, in most cases, have to extract the news they want. To take a case in point, where a company from an Indian battalion is finding the enemy, a patrol reports that it saw fifteen enemy in a certain place; that is all to the good, but think what it would mean to the commander if he knew that the whole of the enemy was there or thereabouts. How can this be found out? Often by judicious questioning as to whether an officer had been seen or not. It is in these details that we must practise ourselves in peace and our schemes should not omit to impress these important

matters on the minds of all commanders. Again, in Field Service Regulations it is recognised that the subordinate in the front line is too busy doing other things to be keeping on sending back messages and that the superior commander must take steps to collect his own information. It is doubtful if this is brought out sufficiently in exercises. Too often we sit back and curse the man in front for not sending us news and use this lack of information as an excuse for doing nothing.

Clear definition and maintenance of the object

Theoretically the definition of the object is often one of the hardest military problems, especially in written exercises and academic discussions; in practice it is probably not so difficult, and often reduces itself to the words of General Sir Alexander Napolington who is reported to have said: "I never know what the object is, but I know what I want to do."

That is what we must be clear about—object, knowing what we want to do, or anything else it can be called. If our instructions are vague, it is up to us to tackle our superiors and make them give us something solid on which to bite. If a subordinate gets indefinite instructions and accepts them, he has only himself to blame when his subsequent actions meet with disapproval.

Once we have made up our minds about the object, all our energies must be directed on its attainment. Nothing is easier and nothing more likely to lead to failure than the attempt to do everything or, still worse, to chase each hare as it crosses our path. In war many things will tend to draw us away from our object, unsuspected enemy dispositions, threats of hostile action from unforeseen directions and information arriving in after we have made our plan. The last is always a source of danger and often exercises an undue effect on us, as, being the most recent, it leaves the most vivid impression on our minds. Rigidity in war is one of the seven deadly sins, and although we must at times, especially when vitally different information comes in, be prepared to change our minds, we must, at the same time, remember the adage—"Order, counter-order and disorder."

It is considered that this aspect should occasionally be introduced into training with a view to bringing out the difference in action when a commander sticks to his object and when he allows himself to be influenced by some, in reality, trivial information which takes too prominent a place in his mind.

Surprise and distraction of the enemy

War is chiefly a combat between the wills of the opposing commanders and often a battle is won or lost before a shot has been fired. Bravery and staunchness of the troops can, on certain occasions, mean the difference between victory and defeat, but when a commander starts with an inferiority complex it takes more than that to restore the balance. Fear of the unknown is, probably, the most cogent fear there is and this is equally true in war. Most commanders are, naturally, prone to consider their own doubts and uncertainties and do not realise that the enemy leader is in an equally parlous state. We should try and exploit this indecision on the part of the enemy until we get him into a dithering state of nerves. To achieve this we must always be thinking out ways and means, big and small, to keep the enemy guessing. A false reconnaissance can be made to cause him to think that an attack is coming from a certain direction when it is, in reality, coming from another; the use of artillery registration for the same purpose and the employment of smoke to deceive him are other possibilities. In fact there are a thousand and one ways in which we can gain the desired end, but do we do it? Are we not, as I have indicated before, creatures of habit and consequently too straightforward? The first thing to do is to make a plan and stick to it, but once the necessary steps have been taken to put that plan into execution then is the time to deceive the enemy. We can use our reserves, possibly, for this purpose and we can certainly employ our mobile troops.

We must get into the habit of thinking out how we can deceive the enemy and keep him guessing. Study and reflection are necessary; we should read the ruses employed by the commanders of old and recollect stories of human nature, stories like the "Second Degree" in the "Green Curve," and then we shall realise how easily gullible people are. This is particularly the case if the enemy has, for any reason, a preconceived idea and if we have been able to sow a wrong seed in his mind. It is well worth trying to keep such an idea alive by odd bits of information which tend to confirm his preconceived notions.

Speed in action

Speed in action is largely the result of organization and clear thinking in peace. In nearly every operation there is a preliminary drill and it is in this preliminary drill that we can gain time. Without taking an unjustifiable risk it is impossible to

speed up by cutting down the time allotted to other people—the junior leaders—for their reconnaissances and orders; their going wrong can mean the difference between defeat and victory, just as can the error of the highest commander.

Almost the first action of a commander when having to make a plan is a short appreciation of the time factor, and any minutes spent on this will be saved many times over. Take the case of a battalion commander who has been told to attack, crossing a start line at a certain time. He should sit down and consider the number of minutes before his battalion has to be at the correct place, this often means the difference between a full and a hungry man. Then the time factor for reconnaissances and orders of section, platoon, and company commanders and his own orders has to be calculated and the sum subtracted from the time available before zero hour. The result gives the amount of time that can be spent on his own reconnaissance. The commander will thus know whether he has time to visit both flanks or whether he will have to make his plan from some central viewpoint. The actual timings for the periods allotted for the reconnaissances and orders of platoon and section commanders will be based on figures worked out in peace. As their movement is small the time will not be much altered by the ground. Company commanders have bigger areas to cover and will be dependent to a certain degree on ground, but against this is the fact that they will be mounted.

There are various expedients for giving everyone a flying start, such as indicating the areas which subordinate commanders should be studying before they get their detailed orders, pointing out landmarks, and generally putting them into the picture so that the actual giving out of orders will be shortened.

As this speed in action is in peace so largely a question of organization, there should be no excuse for the commander who wastes time and directors should make a point of checking to see if there has been an avoidable loss of time. There is, of course, a difference in the time factor in peace and in war. Reconnaissances will always take longer in war when there are enemy bullets and shells and we have to crawl about instead of assuming the ostrich-like movement so often seen in peace; but the real difference in the time factor in war is noticeable after, and not before, troops have crossed the start line.

Concentration of all available means

Rarely, if ever, are we in the enviable position of having sufficient troops to be safe everywhere with a surplus for putting

in at the decisive point. Usually in order to concentrate all available means in one place, we have to take calculated risks in others. We must remember that the greater the strength we collect at the decisive point the greater will be our chance of success, and if we win there it does not matter if we are defeated locally elsewhere. Bound up with this concentration is the question of a reserve and in this we must keep our sense of proportion. The Englishman likes to *keep* a reserve instead of *having* one; that is, he likes to keep a unit or sub-unit always in reserve for use at the last possible moment or, preferably, not for use at all if the emergency does not arise. Having a reserve is slightly different. Here, to start off with, a unit or sub-unit is kept in reserve but, when a sudden opportunity (not emergency) presents itself, the reserve is pushed in, may be quite early in the operation. Then the reserve must be built up again by collecting troops that have done their job or been squeezed out when the first reserve was put in. A reserve is a necessity, but it is just as necessary to use it when opportunity offers.

We can do a lot towards getting this mentality in our peace training and directors should be prepared to encourage the "calculated risk" commander at the expense of the "safety first" commander. Exercises should occasionally be framed to bring out unexpected opportunities to teach commanders the use of their reserves when the chance presents itself.

Offensive action

It is a platitude to say that battles cannot be won without offensive action, but, at the same time, Field Service Regulations warn us against adopting the offensive just for the sake of so doing. When there is doubt as to what to do, offensive action almost always pays and on these occasions we should remember one of the earlier maxims of Sir Alexander Napolington:

"Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just,
But ten times he who gets his blow in fust."

The spirit of offensive action is one that should be encouraged in all leaders down to the most junior, since it is largely courage and endurance which, other things being equal, result in victories in war. The balance between victory and defeat is surprisingly small and there have been many examples in history of victory being achieved by the action of a few individuals or a sub-unit. We must, however, keep our sense of proportion over this, as the size of the sub-unit which is able to effect

a decisive result depends on the size of the force involved; for instance no one would expect a rifle section working independently to turn the scales in a brigade attack whereas a company, certainly, or a platoon, perhaps, occasionally could do this.

Our training could help very greatly over this spirit of offensive action; unfortunately it does not, as sometimes independent action on these lines may upset a director's carefully arranged day. When sub-units are not given credit for successful action they are discouraged and their leaders will not take similar action on another occasion. It is a question of intelligent umpiring and a sufficiency of umpires. There is no reason why a director should not allow his plans to go awry; he should be able to produce something fresh. We have an excellent system of "stand fast" and "continue" bugle calls and have only got to get the troops used to them.

Constant thinking ahead

This heading does not appear in the paragraph of Field Service Regulations quoted at the beginning of this article, but it includes two that are—"quick thought in an emergency" and "constant watchfulness."

A commander, however junior, can never "let up;" as soon as he has made a plan and issued orders to put it into effect, he must start thinking of the next phase of the operation. His thoughts will probably run on two lines; possible enemy reactions to his plan; and the movements of his headquarters and reserves to keep up momentum, to take advantage of success or to retrieve failure. He must try and put himself in the enemy's position and think out ways by which his plan can be embarrassed and then his method of taking advantage of the enemy's action. His ideas, in attack, might run on these lines: "Supposing the enemy discloses unexpected fire power from such and such a direction and holds up my attack, how can I best deal with it?" And he thinks out the answer which is probably more of his own fire power applied to that area. Also a commander should be continually asking himself if it is time to move his headquarters or reserves forward, remembering the principle that—

"Reserves should be moved forward . . . as the attack progresses, so that they can be used with the minimum of delay."

Here it is always a question of taking a risk. A commander may consider that when his forward troops have reached a certain place it is probable that the attack will succeed and that he should then move up his reserve and headquarters. If he has

guessed right his reserve is in a position to deal with any enemy counter-attack. If he has guessed wrong he is no worse off, provided that he has moved his reserve to a tactical bound; even in this case it will probably be to his advantage in causing surprise to the enemy who will not expect to meet it so far forward. It is largely a question of appreciation of ground, and the commander of a small force should put himself in a position from which he can get a general view of the area in which his unit is working.

So it seems that, in war, a commander's day is divided up into distinct phases. Phases of quick physical action in making reconnaissances or moving from old to new headquarters, alternated with phases of deep mental concentration in making plans and then thinking ahead as to their effect.

Is this so in our peace training? The tendency is often the other way, the commander does a reconnaissance and gives out the necessary orders. He then sits back, chats to the director and umpires, admires the view and does not do much until he gets back a report that the objective has been captured. He then sets in motion a leisurely advance and arrives on the objective in time to become personally involved in the enemy's counter-attack. We must do all we can in peace training to make a habit of this thinking ahead, usually the director will have to initiate it. Probably all that is necessary is a question as to when the commander proposes to move his headquarters and reserve, and if he seems dilatory then the lesson can be brought out by arranging an enemy counter-attack at an inconvenient moment.

Conclusion

Unfortunately Training Regulations uses the word "doctrine" on its first page. A consequence of this is that many people take it in the wrong sense of dogma and in their efforts to teach a common doctrine become doctrinaires. The step is not a very big one. Take a horrible example—the Battle of Dujaila in the operations to relieve Kut. The doctrine was that an artillery bombardment was essential to an attack. When the troops arrived a redoubt was unoccupied, but the bombardment was duly carried out; the Turks had time to reoccupy their trenches and the subsequent attack was a failure.

Our peace training is apt to run on these lines: common doctrine—doctrinarianism—rigidity—defeat in battle.

Training for war should be on these lines: common sense—appreciation of ground—wits—courage and endurance—success in battle.

IMPROVISED ARMOURED TRAINS ON THE NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY

By Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Phillips, v.d., The N. W. Railway Battalion, A.F.I.

The present training in the North-Western Railway Battalion in improvising armoured trains takes place in camp and consists of armouring a high-sided truck with sleepers and shingle and a low-sided truck with sandbags. It imposes a heavy strain upon the men most of whom are unused to manual labour. In actual practice they would never be called upon to undertake this labour since railway staff are far too valuable to be used for cooly work. The value of the training lies in the fact that by actually performing the work the men learn how to supervise it. From this point of view the training undoubtedly is of considerable use. For instance, when it was first started sandbags were heaved up into the truck from ground level. Now it is taken as a matter of course that the first thing to do is to construct a ramp by which the material may be carried in. At the same time it must be admitted that the training is wasted on a large number of privates who have not sufficient intelligence or military knowledge to supervise a job of this sort. On the other hand with really good detailed plans any intelligent N. C. O., or railway foreman without military knowledge, should be able to supervise the work without previous practice. It is considered, therefore, that the right answer is to cut out this training altogether so far as the men are concerned and to confine it to a theoretical lecture to the N. C. Os. But it is essential that plans should be issued to every detachment and it might even be advisable to keep material ready cut into the required length in loco sheds.

As regards the nature of the armouring, sandbags are very unsatisfactory. They take up an excessive amount of space, are very heavy, and are dangerously unstable if raised to more than kneeling height. Shingle and sleepers are better but they also have the disadvantage of excessive weight and bulk. As an instance of this may be quoted the case of a permanent improvised armoured train which used to be maintained some fifteen years ago by the Regular Army at Rawalpindi. The armouring of the barbette trucks was shingle held against the sides of the trucks by boards. Even in this case when at the request of the Army a

small amount of extra shingle was added, the trucks were condemned as unfit to run since, even when empty, the weight on the springs was excessive. Still more is this likely to be the case if sleepers are used instead of boards. However, if it is decided to continue the use of improvised armour, the best design would probably be a framework of sleepers holding the shingle against the sides of the truck (high-sided) by corrugated iron sheets. It is essential that an overhead framework should be provided over which tarpaulins may be stretched. This will serve the double purpose of protection from bombs and protection of the crew from the sun. Armouring with sandbags should definitely be abandoned as unsatisfactory both on account of the reasons given above and because it has been found to take longer to armour with sandbags than with shingle.

The question of the most suitable type of armour for these trains leads on to the further question of whether it is really necessary to armour them at all. Armoured trains may be used for three purposes:

(*i*) *In regular warfare where they are likely to be exposed to shell fire.*

In the Great War on the western front armoured trains became merely a vehicle for moving heavy guns rapidly from point to point. I believe I am right in stating that in some cases these trains carried armour of considerable thickness to protect them against shell fire. In open warfare the main theatre in which they were used was in Russia. The British in certain cases used them in teams of three the leading trains carrying infantry and "landing parties" of both infantry and cavalry while the rearmost train supported them with artillery. In all such cases it is obvious that the train must carry armour of sufficient thickness to afford protection not only against rifle fire but also against shell splinters. Hitherto the necessity for such trains has never arisen in India. Should it arise it is obvious that the trains will have to be specially prepared or built for the purpose.

(*ii*) *In Frontier warfare*

The permanent armoured trains, which used to exist in India but have now been scrapped, came into action more than once.

The essential condition for frontier warfare is that the train should be proof against rifle fire from modern weapons. The present method of improvising armoured trains provides no overhead cover and the personnel concerned are in consequence practically helpless if ambushed in a cutting. The point was well

illustrated in the Afghan War of 1920 when an improvised train manned by regular troops was derailed in a cutting at Kucha Garhi and the whole crew wiped out. For frontier warfare, therefore, trucks should be armoured with armour-plate. It is inadvisable that trucks should be kept permanently armoured both on account of the expense of maintaining them and of tying up rolling-stock in this manner and also on account of the fact that vehicles deteriorate when not used and it takes a considerable time to bring them into condition to run. For this purpose, therefore, designs should be got out for armouring with armour-plate, preferably bogie covered wagons. The design should provide for overhead cover and for cutting out the end of the wagon to convert it into a barbette truck. Obviously this is a job for railway workshops which should, if it is considered necessary, keep the material ready.

(iii) In Internal Security

This is the primary use for which our improvised armoured trains are intended, but it is doubtful if the armouring is by any means essential. Our chief experience of the use of armoured trains for internal security was obtained in the Punjab in 1919. Although armoured trains and improvised armoured trains at this time were of considerable use and on several occasions came into action, I am aware of no instance in which a shot was fired at them. A few examples of their use at that time may be given as illustrations from which to draw deductions.

In one case an armoured train doubled on its tracks and came suddenly upon a mob demolishing the line behind it. A number of casualties were inflicted on the mob which was caught by the searchlights of the train.

In another case a train proceeded under the orders of the G. O. C., Lahore District, to collect the *lambardars* of all villages near the line between Lahore and Montgomery. These men were brought in, interviewed and warned by the G. O. C., and returned to their villages.

In another case a train landed a party which attacked a group of rioters occupying a village and drove them out.

In other cases trains were used to patrol sections of the line in order to raise the morale of the railway staff and to arrest a few disloyal ones. In the western Punjab where roads are non-existent, whole sections of the line were cut off from all communications for several days until relieved by improvised armoured trains which toured the line, restoring confidence, gaining information and

giving demonstrations of the power of their weapons to interested local inhabitants.

In all these cases, however, it appears that their functions could just as well have been carried out by unarmoured patrol trains. Even if fired upon, the sides of the trucks provide protection from sight and a considerable amount of protection from fire which would probably be from shot-guns or from sporting rifles with soft-nosed bullets. I feel that on this question of armouring we are suffering from a similar obsession to that which I once found when I was attached to a contingent of light motor patrols. All their training and tactics were based on the Armoured Car Manual. They had entirely failed to realise that an unarmoured motor car is a very different proposition to an armoured one and has entirely different functions. The true functions of the unarmoured and very vulnerable motor car are not, as this unit imagined, to sail boldly up within range of the enemy and spray them with bullets from Vickers guns mounted in front of the car, but to serve as a highly mobile vehicle for the conveyance of machine-guns and riflemen from point to point—the vehicle itself being as far as possible kept out of sight or out of range during action. In the same way my view is that what are required for internal security are patrol trains for the purpose of conveying a small force rapidly from point to point in protection of the railways. Their crews should be prepared to fight just as much outside the train as in it and there is no necessity to armour the train.

One thing, however, that really is necessary if these patrol trains are to perform their functions at night is that they should have searchlights. From my experience as an armoured train commander, one searchlight at each end is insufficient for a train. The obvious way of attacking or putting out of action an armoured train is to derail it. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that a searchlight should be kept continuously focussed on the line in the direction in which the train is proceeding and in both directions when it is halted. If, however, the two searchlights generally provided are utilized in this manner the train is of little use as a military unit since it cannot illuminate the country on either side of it. Two searchlights are therefore necessary at each end—one for watching the track and one for swivelling to the sides. These searchlights could probably be improvised from engine headlights which are very powerful. The point which must be studied, however, is how the current is to be generated. The current for the single searchlight on an engine is generated by a small steam turbine. If it is not possible to fit additional

turbines to the engine to work all the lights required, it would be necessary to carry some sort of petrol or kerosene engine to work the generator. It is quite certain that without sufficient lights patrol trains would lose three-quarters of their value since it is almost invariably at night that attempts are made to tamper with the track or stations. It is thought that patrol trains should be marshalled much on the lines of the present improvised armoured trains with the engine in the centre. At each end there should be an exploder truck, that is, a low-sided bogie truck or preferably two low-sided 4-wheeler open trucks (since these are easier to re-rail) and a high-sided truck with overhead shelter. In the high-sided truck all that it would be necessary to improvise would be raised emplacements for a machine-gun or a light automatic and for two searchlights. The centre of the train would be occupied as at present with vehicles carrying stores and troops.

A further point which is well worth considering is the protection of the train. As noted above the enemy always endeavours to derail an armoured train. Every commander is supposed to provide for his own protection. But here we have the spectacle of a unit advancing with neither advanced guard nor rear guard. Almost every division of the North-Western Railway has a Drewry rail car which accommodates eight men in addition to the driver and has some room over for stores. These are fast, comparatively light, move with equal facility in either direction and are fitted with headlights. It is suggested that they should be earmarked to serve as advanced guards to patrol trains. In many cases they might even serve independently as patrol vehicles where the number of men which they carry is considered adequate.

A further vehicle which would be of considerable value for scouting and advanced guard work, is the motor trolley of which we now own considerable numbers. These vehicles normally carry only two men in addition to the driver and crew but they have the great advantage that they are so light that their crew can re-rail them or even carry and push them past a small break in the line. They are reasonably fast but as a rule carry no headlights.

A final suggestion is in regard to the responsibility for patrol trains. At present the responsibility for improvised armoured trains is that the railway supplies vehicles and material, the Regular Army provides the escort and the Auxiliary Force, India, is responsible for preparing the trains. In addition to the escort these trains generally carry a technical staff provided by the railway in order to repair the track or the telegraph wires. It used to be laid down quite correctly in the Armoured Train Manual that the

first function of an armoured train commander is to get the traffic through. I would suggest that this is a function which the regular officer is not qualified to perform but that it is one to which an Auxiliary Force officer is pre-eminently suited as it requires the careful balancing of military and railway requirements. It is an undoubted fact that even a railway officer finds it difficult to realise that the particular train of which he is in charge, whether it is an armoured train, an inspection special, or any other train of this nature, is not necessarily the most important train on the line. The tendency is for him to feel that all other trains should give way to his train. If this is the case with railway officers, still more would it be so with Regular Army officers who are unaware of the relative importance of various trains or of the technicalities of train working. I, therefore, feel very strongly that the Auxiliary Force should endeavour to find an officer to command every patrol train. If this is impossible, then a senior N. C. O. should be appointed to advise the regular officer commanding the train. It is not enough that the latter should consult the guard of the train who is naturally primarily concerned with railway considerations. What is required is an adviser with some knowledge of both railway and military considerations.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA

(A lecture given before the members of the United Service Institution of India by Alexander Inglis, Esq., Staff Correspondent, "The Times," London, on 8th July 1937. The lecture was introduced by Lt.-General Sir John E. S. Brind, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.)

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

In 1795 the poet George Crabbe published a work called "The Newspaper" and his opinion of that institution reminds me of an anecdote that is told in the United States about the late President Coolidge. Known as "Silent Cal," Coolidge had a remarkable gift of laconic repartee and the story is told of a Sunday lunch party at the White House when a guest asked the President what had been the subject of the sermon he had heard at church that morning. Never given to wasting words Coolidge replied: "Madam, the subject was sin!" This was not very helpful, and the lady doubtless anxious to make the most of her temporary acquaintance with the President then asked: "What was the attitude of the preacher towards sin?" "Oh," replied Coolidge, "he was against it!"

George Crabbe, in his poem "The Newspaper," is certainly against it. One would have thought in his time, before the telegraph and telephone had been invented, before photography had emerged from its elementary stages, and before journalists had developed their flair for finding out things into something of a fine art, that the newspaper of his day would have been a delectable publication. devoted to the genial essay, the reporting of the casual and unimportant incident, and the dignified presentation, without headlines, of foreign intelligence. But Crabbe certainly thought otherwise and his poem is a serious indictment of the contemporary press, written with a bitterness that is generally absent from his other work.

When Crabbe was writing, the political journal was developing simultaneously with periodicals that were devoted chiefly to domestic and foreign news and to commercial affairs. It was Steele and Addison who introduced the social note that was the forerunner of the personal gossip column of to-day. Later came the

right to publish parliamentary reports, and by the close of the eighteenth century newspapers with quite large circulations were in existence. In 1808 Leigh Hunt brought out the *Examiner* and went to jail for expressing his views too freely. William Cobbett managed to reduce the price of his paper, the *Weekly Political Register,* from one shilling and a half pence to twopence, thus making an appeal for popular support for his particular ideals of reform. The introduction of cheaper postage encouraged the development of the press and the abolition of certain "taxes on knowledge" increased its growth. In 1828 the proprietors of *The Times* had to pay the State over £68,000 in stamp and advertisement taxes and paper duty. But after the reduction of the stamp tax in 1836 from 4*d.* to 1*d.* the circulation of English newspapers, based on the stamp returns, rose from 39,000,000 to 122,000,000 in 1854.

Improved machinery, cheaper paper, and the expansion of State education contributed to the development of the newspaper as we now know it, and the ever-increasing tempo of modern life encouraged that casual reading which has helped to create the popular press. The close of the Victorian era found the halfpenny newspaper in existence, and it did not have to contend with the snobbery that existed when the penny paper was first introduced.

The growth of journalism in England may be said to have passed through four important stages. The first was its establishment with the invention of printing, when news sheets dealt almost exclusively with happenings abroad and at home. The second was a period of persecution when journalistic activity was checked by the Star Chamber. The third period was one of liberation from official surveillance, which was also marked with the introduction of popular interest in the press. And the last phase was the process of expansion and organization which began with the opening of the present century and is still in course of evolution. During these stages the newspaper developed from being the cult of a few to the vogue of the many. In its early days it went largely into the country house, the rectory, and the club, and was in effect a medium for the aristocracy; its later years find it in every home. Some of the most important figures in English literature, from Defoe to Dickens, have been associated with the growth of the press. Steele, Addison, Johnson, Leigh Hunt, and a host of lesser literary lights did much of their best work in the periodicals of

their time. In our own day many of the leaders of literature play their part in the constant evolution of the press.

For the press is continually in a process of evolution which is leading to fields that cannot be conjectured. Its history from the first has been one that has aroused both praise and criticism, and those of us who are inclined to scoff at the inanities of the present day popular press are inclined to forget that the inanities of former centuries are only forgotten, which does not mean they did not exist.

It is a remarkable thing that the newspapers to-day which exert the most significant influence upon public opinion are those which still retain the essential features of the original news sheets. The first newspapers dealt very largely with foreign affairs, and the great newspapers which count in Britain and America to-day derive their material from the same source. Newspapers in both countries have undergone remarkable developments, particularly since 1900, owing to the improved technique in production and a vast expansion of the reading public. But the success of what is known as the popular press has been due more to the introduction of extraneous features than to the improvement of the genuine functions of the newspaper. These extraneous elements have been devised chiefly to increase sales, which in turn affect advertising rates. The advertiser is the backbone of the modern newspaper. But other factors contribute to large circulations. Newspaper insurance is now an established feature of many newspapers, and competitions which demand little skill, accompanied by large cash prizes are conducted mainly to attract and hold readers. Beauty contests, crossword puzzles, and competitions affecting all aspects of sport can scarcely be said to have any bearing on news, although the crossword puzzle has come as a godsend to many country clergymen, who are reputed to augment their stipends by devising crosswords for some of the better papers, which like to besprinkle their pages with classical allusions. Apart from these extraneous subjects, the modern newspaper endeavours to appeal to nearly all possible interests and has become severely departmentalized as a result. An extraordinary range of interests is catered for, many of which have no relation whatever to legitimate journalism. The specialist writer and the feature writer have come into their own, but the space devoted to the genuine news of the day is decidedly less than when the century opened, although newspapers are larger in size

and greater in number. Indeed, the journalistic door has been opened so widely that it is somewhat difficult nowadays to define a journalist. As the *Encyclopædia Britannica* points out: "Although there is a well defined qualification and status for civil servants, clergymen, dentists, barristers, solicitors and chartered accountants, journalism still continues to be such an indeterminate calling that there is no precise qualification or status for the journalist." The editor of *The Times* is equally a journalist with the more humble, but in his sphere no less necessary, police court reporter, and there are many people who call themselves journalists who supplement income from other sources by contributions to newspapers and periodicals. Especially during the present century there has been a notable increase in the number of people who have made their mark in other spheres, in politics, the Church, and public fields of activity, to embark in journalism and compete with the regular journalist for considerably higher emoluments, and so general has this practice become that the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Stanley Baldwin, was able to announce as a matter of self-congratulation that he had never contributed for payment an article of any sort to a newspaper.

The expansion of the telephone, the telegraph, and the wireless has contributed greatly to the development of the modern press and the competition among newspapers, and by widening the field of journalistic enterprise has increased the information and knowledge than can be brought daily to the breakfast table. Men typing out dispatches in London to-day actually set the type automatically in newspaper offices in Edinburgh, and wireless photography enables pictures of events taking place in Australia to be in London and New York the same day. One enterprising American newspaper is even contemplating simultaneous publication in Boston and London, and the proposal is not fantastic. The newspaper will be set up in the one country and wireless photographs of the pages will reach the other in time to enable the two issues of the paper to be published together. Mechanical inventions have thus greatly expanded the scope and influence of the press, which has further been developed by the monopolistic control of newspapers. Since the century opened the proprietor rather than the editor has been in the ascendant, so far as the popular press is concerned. In the case of those newspapers, both in Great Britain and the United States, which exert a real and

genuine influence on public opinion this is not so. There are only a few editors to-day, and they are generally anonymous, whose positions have not been weakened by proprietors who like expressing their personal views in print under their own names. In London there are not more than three or four such editors, but in the Provinces there are many independent newspapers whose editors exert an influence out of all proportion to the circulations of the papers they edit. The same is true in America, where a large number of admirable newspapers retain their individuality and distinction. The common habit of referring to the Beaverbrook press or the Hearst press indicates to what extent the system of multiple ownership has advanced. Like all such systems it tends to eliminate individuality and to develop standardized newspapers. It also tends to make the future of the press a matter of big finance. It is estimated that about seventy-five per cent. of the newspapers of Great Britain are controlled by large corporations or monopolistic companies. The journals under their control may be cheaper and more expeditiously produced, but they undermine the idea of the newspapers as an entity with a spirit and character of its own. On the other hand the reading public appears to be aware of the implications underlying mass produced newspapers, for the papers which seem to influence public opinion most are those which have held aloof from combines and monopolies. *The Times,* after a brief spell in harness with Lord Northcliffe, "has reverted to its traditional policy, as the first newspaper in the world, occupying its place with easy dignity," to quote again from the *Encyclopædia Britannica.* The *Observer,* the *Sunday Times,* the *Daily Telegraph,* and the *Morning Post* are among individual newspapers in which the proprietors rarely if at all intervene in editorial policy, and in the Provinces the *Manchester Guardian,* the *Liverpool Post,* the *Scotsman,* the *Glasgow Herald,* and a number of others show that independent journalism is still appreciated and is indeed the main medium for moulding public opinion.

I fear that many people outside the United States derive their ideas of the American press from the films. It is an inexplicable thing that the Americans, who are so quick to resent unjust criticism of their own country, should tolerate with equanimity the constant libels of American life and institutions which Hollywood disseminates throughout the world. Hollywood itself is a charming place, an artistic colony of delightful people who

themselves are the target for an international criticism which is wholly unjust. Men and women there work much too hard to find time for that reckless living which is so commonly believed to exist. Doubtless in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York, "newspapermen," as they are called, of the type to be seen on the screen are to be met with in real life, plying their craft on behalf of the popular press in much the same manner as their prototypes are doing in London, Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow. But in the main I have found the average American journalist to be much the same as the average British journalist—an alert fellow with an inquiring mind, well informed not only in the affairs of his own country but deeply interested in the affairs of the world. If his study of foreign affairs is less thorough than that which characterises his British counterpart it is frequently more extensive, for the average American is keenly interested in what is happening everywhere even although he may prefer an isolationist policy so far as his own country is concerned. American journalists have this international outlook developed to a marked degree.

It is true that the comprehensiveness of the average American newspaper tends to bring within its staff, as is the case with the popular papers at home, an extraordinary variety of journalistic types. After all few British newspapers employ their own poet who has to do his daily piece before the paper goes to press. Several American newspapers employ poets of their own. It is a somewhat unexpected experience to pass along the corridor of an American newspaper office and find a door with the inscription "John K. Quintal: Poet," and realise that John K. is part of the staff, turns out at the office at nine, as the other men do, and between breakfast and lunch composes a sonnet, a lyric, or just pure doggerel in time for the first edition. A great many American "folks," as they like to call themselves, read the poems of Edgar Guest before they read the news. Edgar Guest produces a daily poem that is syndicated throughout the country to hundreds of newspapers, and editors who might feel inclined to discontinue his poetry are flooded with protests from indignant readers. But the poet is only a sideline in an American office, which employs specialists in a wider variety of fields than applies even in the departmentalized British press. In this regard the American press is helped, even more than the British press, by advertisers. The simple

answer to people who ask why American papers are so large is that America is a land of advertisers (I mean it in its legitimate sense) and the press is the popular advertising medium. The motor car, the real estate market, the church, and other institutional activities are given great prominence in the American press, and most newspapers devote special weekly supplements or pages to these interests. Religion is given considerable prominence and the reproduction of sermons every Monday is a characteristic feature of many newspapers.

There is indeed scarcely any aspect of American life that is left untouched by the larger daily newspapers. Their interests range from breakfast clubs to women's movements, from service organisations to cultural activities, quite apart from the ordinary features which are common to the British press. Even experts in statistics are employed to circulate their graphs, charts, and figures and to use their statistics, as Andrew Lang once said in another connection, as drunk men use lamp-posts, for support rather than illumination. It is true that activity in an American newspaper office makes a Fleet Street office feel like a mausoleum, but the gum-chewing, slang-speaking "newspapermen" of the films are the invention of that medium and are not, in my experience, common to American journalism.

Journalism in the United States has followed much the same historical development as in Great Britain, with perhaps greater emphasis on the expansion of the popular press, and the elaboration of control by combines. Sensationalism has been greatly encouraged in recent years, partly due to the less rigid observance of libel laws than obtains in Great Britain. It is also a fact that in the United States, as in Great Britain, the newspapers which have the most influence on public opinion are not always those which have the largest circulations. Such influential papers are well distributed throughout the country. Indeed, the nationally popular newspapers wield less influence in America than they do at home, largely owing to the continental dimensions of the country, which tend to localise circulation in much the same manner as applies in India. Even with the aeroplane New York papers take some time to reach the Pacific Coast, which is unlike the situation in Great Britain where the important London papers are available in the north of Scotland on the day of publication. But there are several important papers which significantly influence public opinion outside their own communities and in some

cases outside their own countries. The *New York Times* is probably the most important of these, but quite a number have a significance out of all proportion to their circulation figures. Among them are the *Boston Transcript,* the *Baltimore Sun,* the *Philadelphia Public Ledger,* the *Kansas City Star,* the *Cleveland Plain-dealer,* the *Springfield Republican,* the *Los Angeles Times,* and several others. One of the most notable products of American journalism since the century opened has been the *Christian Science Monitor,* which is read throughout the world and is particularly appreciated in the chancelleries of Europe. It marks a genuine effort to emphasize the international note in journalism, by subordinating nationalism to the wider commonwealth of the race.

The popular newspapers in the United States have even a stronger vogue than at home, but they exert even less influence on public thought. Chain groups of papers circulate in all the larger towns of nearly every State, but they are often bought for features other than their news. These features include, as I have indicated, the daily poem; comic strips outlining the adventures of characters like Andy Gump and Aunt Het, who are fictional creations which genuinely reflect the oddities and humour of American life; daily sermons and a vast shoal of syndicated material which implies that a great industry exists for the output of all kinds of material that really belongs to the magazine rather than the newspaper. The serious treatment of literature and the drama is a feature of many of the best papers, but the society column common to many British newspapers is given a much more democratic range in America. Anonymous journalism is much less usual in the United States than in Great Britain, and writers are known by name throughout the continent. Some commentators, generally known as columnists, earn fabulous salaries, chiefly by supplying brightly written comments on the current news. The press agent or publicity man is also a popular institution, and is generally employed by large business concerns, theatres, institutional establishments, and even churches, to keep the affairs of these organisations before the public. This is made possible by a close collaboration between the advertising pages and the news columns, the one affecting the other much more than is the case in Britain. It is therefore true to say that in many American papers there is more material of the kind that cannot legitimately be called news than there is in the

papers at home. But American readers are well versed in the psychology of newspaper methods in their country and are quite competent to sift the grain from the chaff.

The average British reader picking up an American newspaper of the popular type is frequently bewildered by the headlines and general "get-up" of the paper. The headlines are a journalistic trick to cope with the rush of American life, and the opening paragraph of an American news article is drafted with a special purpose. The aim of the headlines is to give a quick idea of the news, and the opening paragraph of an American news message generally contains the gist of the whole article. This is invaluable to the busy reader faced with a large newspaper. Headline writing is an art acquired by experience, but brightness and brevity are essential. There is the often told story of how Mr. John Masefield, the Poet Laureate, on arriving in New York declined to be interviewed. This was treated to an attractive headline in one paper which said: "King's Canary Refuses to Chirp."

As the United States is not directly affected by the domestic politics of Europe the important newspapers give more objective treatment to the news than is the case in Great Britain. They are informative rather than partisan, aiming at educative interpretation rather than comment, although the same cannot be said of the average presentation of news from the Far East, where United States interests are more directly affected. Inaccuracies in presenting foreign affairs are due more to misconceptions than to wanton interpretations, the angle of approach as seen from a Republic being somewhat different from that obtaining in an Empire. In dealing with affairs in their own country the American papers usually show the customary political tendencies common to domestic journalism, either supporting the Republicans or Democrats, the two main parties. Socialism has not yet emerged to its full stature, its belated development being due in no small measure to the prosperity which characterized the country until the slump of 1929. But idealists in socialism exist and are making their influence felt, but not through the existing press to any appreciable extent. Mr. Upton Sinclair, who finds a ready hearing in Russia, appeals mainly to the *intelligentsia* in his own country, although the inquiring mind of the average American encourages him to examine all kinds of political developments, even although it is frequently done somewhat superficially. The principal newspapers in their treatment of international affairs do so with great

intelligence, both in leading articles and special articles, which often delve more deeply into their subject matter than is the case with British newspapers, whose readers are too often credited with a fuller familiarity with the subject than is in fact the case. American journalism is thus more elementary in its presentation of material, endeavouring to give readers a simple exposition of the particular subject under consideration. This has advantages, and while there are reams of trivialities in many newspapers there is invariably a solid mass of news, discriminatingly treated and presented with judgment. In effect, the situation is much the same in both countries. Each has a popular press securing wide national support co-existing with a series of sober, independent journals which have an immeasurable influence upon public opinion. The great difference between the press of the two countries is that the popular press in America goes to even greater extremes than does its counterpart in Britain, while the responsible press interprets world affairs from a political angle quite different from that obtaining at home. The mentality of the two races is inevitably affected by the contrasting character of their political institutions.

It is fairly clear in both countries that the reader of the popular press buys his favourite newspaper either for its news or some special feature peculiar to the paper. Such readers are not necessarily influenced by the editorial opinions of the papers they buy. This is frequently proved in both countries when policies supported by the popular press are discarded without hesitation by the public, which must inevitably include the buyers of these particular newspapers. This implies that reasoned and mature opinion, which makes the principal independent papers so important to discriminating readers, unconsciously influences the community as a whole, particularly in times of national and international emergency. It equally implies that independent newspapers, operated and edited with a political or social purpose, more than justify their policy by counteracting the less critical judgments of the popular press, which after all is not intended to be anything other than it is—an entertaining *pot-pourri* of current and fleeting interest. Millions of electors in 1929 voted for the Labour Party although most of the electors at that time were reading Conservative newspapers which were urging an anti-socialist case. Other factors naturally contributed to the downfall of the Conservative government, not the least important among them being the independent judgment of some Conservative news-

papers in offering criticism of what was believed to be a defeatist policy of the Government then in power. Similarly, during the last Presidential election in the United States Roosevelt achieved an astounding victory in the face of strong opposition from the newspapers with the largest circulations. This tends to prove that in both countries it is mainly the readers of the more sober journals who follow their political inclinations in buying them. This is obviously not the case with the readers of the more popular newspapers. Mr. Harold Herd, who has analysed the influence of the British press in some detail, contends that the "newspaper that appeals to the reason rather than the emotions, and pursues a consistent, well balanced policy, exercises the surest influence in the long run. That is why *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* and other serious journals command so much respect from their opponents, as well as their supporters."

In helping to mould public opinion the press also reflects it, particularly in Great Britain where an innate conservatism exists. This has the effect of toning down extreme views and encourages the ever-increasing tendency to make an all-round examination of a subject. Extreme views either to the Left or Right are not favoured, either in the sober or the popular press, so far as Great Britain is concerned. This does not mean that papers of extremist tendencies are circumscribed by any special handicaps. You may buy either the *British Fascist* or the *Daily Worker* in Great Britain, although their counterparts are not so easy to find in the United States, where the established press is inclined to oppose the expression of opinion of an extreme character. In Great Britain, Fascism or Communism is given free field to those who are interested in either creed. It implies a toleration that is absent in many countries, and suggests that the British reader is quite ready to examine any political philosophy which arises, although he may be slow or unwilling to adopt it. This patent willingness to tolerate every point of view has undoubtedly augmented the influence of the press, and this feature will undoubtedly develop in the future, to the benefit of newspapers and readers alike. The weeklies, fortnightlies, and monthly journals indicate that there is a wide public awaiting the objective presentation of political and international information and the press of the future will be wisely guided if it recognises this and seeks to meet the demand.

There are two quite widely held views of the press in both countries, and they may be summarised in contrasting statements

that were made in reference to the British press by two prominent public men in Great Britain a few years ago. Mr. Neville Chamberlain, when Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1932, is reported to have said: "Taking the press as a whole, you cannot find any country where the press is superior to ours, either in quality or extent of its news or in its literary distinction or sense of responsibility . . . its high standard of ability, integrity, and profound patriotism." Against that we have the statement of Lord Baldwin, as Prime Minister in 1931: "What are their methods [the methods of the press] ? Their methods are direct falsehood, misrepresentation, half-truths, alteration of the speaker's meaning by putting sentences apart from their context, suppression." Now it is clear that while speaking generally of the press in Great Britain both of these appraisals cannot be correct. Each may be true of some sections of the press, but is certainly not true of all sections of it. These opinions therefore tend to emphasise my point, namely that newspapers are valuable in moulding public opinion only in so far as they are conducted and edited with a purpose which aims at the fair presentation of news and its just interpretation. As the late C. P. Scott, the famous editor of the *Manchester Guardian,* once remarked: "A newspaper is much more than a business, it is an institution; it reflects and influences the life of a whole community; it may affect even wider destinies. It is, in its way, an instrument of government. It plays on the minds and consciences of men. It may educate, stimulate, assist, or it may do the opposite. It has therefore a moral as well as a material existence, and its character and influence are in the main determined by the balance of these two forces. It may make profit or power its first object, or it may conceive itself as fulfilling a more exacting function." That I think summarises the philosophy which should govern the press. That moreover does summarise the philosophy which permeates the editorial policy of the important newspapers both in Great Britain and America to-day. It is true that some of the sensational newspapers have immense potentialities for mischief, particularly in the sphere of international politics, but it is equally true that the value and significance of these papers is in the main accurately assessed in authoritative quarters and among ordinary readers, both at home and abroad. Doubtless there are many who are influenced by the biased and ill-balanced interpretations of such newspapers, but they are not necessarily those whose

influence is other than negligible. This weakness is one of the inevitable prices to be paid for the liberty of the press. The fact nevertheless remains that those newspapers whose reasoned policy derives from an ethical and philosophical outlook on world affairs are the papers which have a powerful, and frequently a decisive, influence on general opinion. When public opinion is running strong in an unfortunate direction, such papers may stem it; when it is moving sluggishly they may supplement its flow. There are of course numerous occasions when public opinion itself sets the course for the press; in Britain recently there were the episodes of the Hoare-Laval agreement and the Abdication crisis, when the majority of the influential newspapers merely emphasised what the man in the street was thinking; in America there was the elimination of the Eighteenth Amendment from the statute book, the demand for which became imperative in the press when it was realised that the man in the street disliked the liquor laws. In influencing public opinion the provincial press exerts a notable influence and is extremely important as indicating the independent and simultaneous judgments of people widely apart, a genuine pulse factor which applies in both countries. Politicians and statesmen often profess to be uninterested in what the press may say about them, but such is not the case. Newspapers which retain their political independence may radically influence government policy in both countries. Such power must naturally be used with wisdom and judgment, and it is to the credit of both countries that each contains important newspapers which so use the power in their command.

THE DREAM SECTOR, L. OF C.

By Auspex

A dream that is so vivid as to be virtually a reality has often inspired better writers than myself, so I make no apology for giving you this narrative. For me it has now become fact to all intents and purposes. I have been unable to separate the narrative from the many conclusions at which I have arrived in my semi-conscious or working moments, so you must have it all just as it tumbles out of my memory. You will not find the places I mention on any map, but I have drawn a sketch which is as accurate as I can remember. The great merit of this revelation is that the system used for the protection of this dream sector of a frontier line of communication has probably never been tried before in quite the same form; it is certainly different to any in use in Waziristan in 1937 and for that reason alone may be worthy of consideration.

The sector extended along a main road on both sides of Rustamabad camp and village, from the 25th to the 35th milestones, a defensive front of twenty miles. The situation which presented itself to the commander of the incoming garrison in mid-August was as follows: The Hajji, the leader and religious head of the opposition, had gone up into the Elburz plain west and north-west of Rudbar, where most of the tribes were wont to gather in the hot weather. The supplies and reinforcements, which the Hajji drew from the Shaitu Valley area, had to go round north and south of Rudbar. Through the sector which the battalion was to take over ran four of the favourite and most used of these routes from the Shaitu, all of them converging to the west of the main road on the Inzar Khel village of Barorogha, a hot-bed of wickedness throughout the operations.

The routes were:

1. By Juballi to Hatimbo. north-west of which village it joined a track from the Takki river to Barorogha.
2. By Sanni Algad to Barorogha Algad.
3. By Hatingmai Algad to Barorogha Algad or Faqiran.
4. By Muni Algad, east of the camp, to Barorogha Algad, or west of the camp to Rustamabad and Faqiran.

Supplies and reinforcements had, for months, been passing to and fro across this sector unimpeded, for there had been no troop activity at all between the hours of 2 p.m. and 7 a.m. as the road had been opened solely by columns operating from Rustamabad, unassisted by any sort of permanent piquets. These columns set out at about 7 a.m. daily and withdrew by about 2 p.m. Thus the sector belonged to the enemy for a half of each day and the whole of each night; in fact the Hajji himself had, a few weeks before, crossed the sector by the Barorogha Algad to get to the Elburz plain. A good bag to have made. Something drastic had to be done about this in spite of the fact that the incoming garrison was some two hundred rifles weaker than the outgoing one. It was obvious that by stopping all hostile movement across and along the sector, the garrison could exert a pressure on the Hajji far away up in the Elburz which might well have a big effect on the course of operations. This, then, was the new garrison's first object and it was certain that, in trying to attain it, they would have to set out on an offensive policy that would protect the road far better than even the strongest of defensive systems. So much for the higher tactics of the matter.

The local situation had been really bad for months. Earlier in the year, Rudbar had been cut off from the world for some weeks, the road torn up, bridges and culverts destroyed, and telegraph wire and poles torn down over great stretches. A small force had moved into Rustamabad in the early summer and had, with sappers, set to to repair the damage on the road. Night sniping of the camp at Rustamabad had been pretty regular; every now and then camp piquets were sniped by day; while small parties of tribesmen shot up the troops as they went out from Rustamabad to open the road. This road protection system was innocuous to the enemy for it gave him all he desired —the time, direction, method and destination of the daily movement. It was even obvious that the piquets must move to certain definite points. He needed to know no more and it was a tribute to his forbearance that troop casualties were not far greater. The local villagers were obviously just playing the fool in a most dangerous manner; the *khassadars* were to a great extent actively disloyal and taking part in this shooting by day and night. There was a secret bond between the local Shazi Khel and their

erstwhile enemies the Inzar Khel of Barorogha that neither would tell on the other. The result was that the troops were held in contempt and no local tribesman would give them a scrap of help or information. Most of these facts came out as the new garrison got the upperhand, but they acted from the first as though they knew them. To start with they set out to deal with the local pests and to prevent a single man moving by night or by day without their knowledge and except at the peril of his life if he were armed. As the country to the south of the road was extensive and thickly covered with scrub, the self-appointed task was no small one.

To attain their objects the soldiers had to have effective forces available at short notice at any spot in the sector and to know the country even better than the enemy. They set to work to build and man four strong piquets, each of which held in it a striking force of about a platoon in addition to a garrison of a machine-gun section or at least a machine-gun detachment. These piquets were heavily wired with two double aprons and trip wires between, the outer apron being thirty-five yards away from, and so out of bombing range of, the piquet. Beside these there were two "pin-points" piquets of fifteen men each and the usual camp piquets had a machine-gun and two gun numbers in them.

Before describing the system any further, I will make a few remarks about piquets. A piquet, with its garrison inside, is only effective at night up to the distance it can see to shoot. On a dark night, perhaps twenty yards; on a bright moonlight night up to a hundred and fifty or two hundred yards. So it is really not very effective. I term such a piquet a "pin-point" piquet. A piquet without a good wire fence is just a hostage to the enemy; unless sited on a precipice, it can, on any dark night, be bombed, rushed and overwhelmed by superior numbers with the greatest of ease while the garrison sleeps, provided the attack is a sudden one. Why this has not happened more frequently it is beyond me to discover. With sufficient wire, the attack can be checked and beaten off. No wonder some troops feel jumpy on dark nights in unwired piquets, for piquets cannot be concealed from the enemy. But in any case piquets should normally only be regarded as places of temporary rest. They should be looked on as bases for offensive patrols which creep out, sit up for attackers or snipers, kill, and return to rest. That is the way to handle

hostile night-birds. Such piquets can be termed "fighting piquets." They *may* be wired but must have more than one defiladed exit; "pin-point" piquets *must* be properly wired, even if the stay is only for one night. Fighting piquets must be active; theirs is the hard, strenuous and enterprising life that alone leads to success against the tribesman.

To return to my dream; all the machine-guns were out in piquets and none in Rustamabad camp. They had their night lines to sweep away any attack on the camp and to settle any snipers the patrols might conceivably miss. The camp was, contrary to ordinary practice, defended directly by fixed-line weapons enfilading its perimeter from the camp piquets, while the troops in camp made little attempt to defend those piquets with small-arms fire from the perimeter. The whole system of night defence in the sector was locked in by machine-gun fixed lines and by Vickers Berthiers wedged into ammunition boxes to give them their fixed lines. In fact the sector was, as I think is essential in all cases of piquet systems since the Pathan obtained small bore rifles and bombs, one big defensive locality. If only the troops had had light fixed mountings for their Vickers Berthiers that they could clap down on the parapets, how much easier it would have been. If only, too, their Vickers Berthier equipment had been made primarily for carriage on the man, its normal place, rather than on the mule and so unwieldly for the man, how much more easily these fighting patrols could have operated.

Machine-guns very seldom left the piquets; it was realised that their best role was defence, or at least a static role, and they were left to fulfil it. From the piquets they could help to cover the day movements of offensive patrols. In attack they would only have hindered the very mobile patrols and the central mobile column.

I do not like these heavy machine-guns in the battalion. They are too immobile, too wasteful of ammunition in action and too ineffective in attack. We need light fixed mountings for our excellent Vickers Berthier and we want two Vickers Berthier guns in the platoon and four rifle companies in the battalion. The light machine-gun is the most terrible and economical weapon that infantry possess. And it is a weapon with which the recruit can be quickly trained to become an

effective shot, more quickly than he can be trained with the rifle. Until we are rid of these heavy machine-guns in the battalion, commanders will never see the value of driving their light automatics right into the enemy's ribs. They will go on, as so many do to-day, sitting back on their machine-guns. And in a great war our rifle battalions will never get the men trained to replace casualties in their heavy machine-gun companies nor will the new machine gunners be interchangeable with rifle or light machine-gun men. It is a weak organization, the present one.

Down in the camp at Rustamabad were battalion head-quarters, a rifle company as mobile column with mechanical transport, a mechanized field battery which was quite invaluable, hospital, and supplies. It should be noticed that most of the strength was *on* the hills and this, it seems, should almost be a principle these days whenever troops are actively engaged with biggish *lashkars*. If troops present a big packed target on low ground to an enemy, he can and will hit them. The tribesman has obtained a quite undeserved reputation as a good shot by being presented with packed targets down in the valley bottoms where the dust allows him to see his bullets strike by day, where the lights show him a big mark by night, and where he has probably often registered before troops arrive. He now has a small-bore, long-range weapon and no longer uses the *jazail* against which the big perimeter camps and the normal road-piquetting systems of to-day were designed.

In the hills, my dream piquets actually occupied the ground from which the enemy could shoot at the road. Thus, the road was at all times secure by day, without a single man being moved. An occasional patrol downwards to comb out the low, wooded, slopes by the road was all that might be required. So the piquet garrisons started with a sense of security and comfort that no other system could have given them. In this way they were always fit for offensive action.

In addition, a section of armoured cars ran in from Rudbar daily and operated in the area. To give them mobility, tracks were levelled out from the main road to overlook all nullahs on each side and for half-a-mile along the bushy Muni Algad plain. Thus, offensive patrols could be covered when moving up these concealed lines of advance by day, and the rationing and relief

of piquets could be watched by armoured cars. One-way motor roads for 30-cwt. lorries were cut by the garrison up to the bigger piquets so that watering, rationing, and delivery and removal of stores and kits could be done by lorry, saving many men-and-mule-hours of work. The cutting of these rough roads was not half the job nor did it ask for half the skill that the troops expected. Rocks were cracked by heating them, sluicing cold water over them and were then attacked with sledge hammers.

The battalion, with a strength of about six hundred, operated with three sections in the platoon. In this way the section commanders had good strong, effective sections, with plenty of manœuvring and hitting power while the light machine-gun sections were strong enough to carry ammunition and guns quickly over great distances. In the rifle sections, I noted that directly they thought there was an enemy about, the section split up into pairs of men, one working forward and his friend covering him and observing. The reason for this was that the pair of men is the smallest tactical unit in the infantry and that, since the battalion had to be thin on the ground against an enemy armed with small-bore weapons, the leading sections had to split into their smallest tactical units.

The sector was split into two sub-sectors, each under a company commander; the action of the whole co-ordinated and directed by a daily instruction issued by the sector commander. The piquets opened the road at all hours, often by night, remaining in concealed positions to catch any enemy party that might approach either before dawn or just after dawn to worry the convoys. Patrols frequently moved at night, evacuating their piquets and lying up in dead ground to hit at any one who might try to attack their piquet. They put out ambushes all over the place; sometimes combining and sometimes acting separately by day and by night.

Snipers were only of interest for the first week, for, on the second night, a patrol followed up a bunch of them to one of the villages and then, having got the evidence asked for, shot up the stragglers. Two more fracas of this sort with snipers, a few rounds from the guns, three graves dug in a nearby graveyard, and sniping ceased for good at no cost in life to the garrison. Later on, the Hajji sent a party down by night to get a message through to his friends. The party was caught by an ambush

dropped "on spec" by a daylight patrol, the messenger killed and his letter taken. Still later, sixty men of the garrison lying up at night smashed up a lashkar of between two and three hundred bent on mischief, inflicted many casualties, drove them off and drew themselves out at a cost of one wounded. The area was unsafe for the enemy; they dubbed the battalion the "Wazirwala Paltan" and kept as far away as possible. In this way the garrison got complete control by night of the sector and of the surrounding area so that not a man could move for fear of his life. But, above all this, was the very high morale engendered by surprising the enemy and by small successful affairs, and the initiative and efficiency born in Indian officers and N. C. Os.

The system was essentially one of dispersion but designed also to allow of concentration against the enemy when the troops had him at a disadvantage. At short notice three hundred rifles could be collected at any part of the sector. Thus, one largish gang, which shot at a light machine-gun section protecting the road was set upon by the nearest fighting patrol and pinned till reinforcements came up, slipped round behind the gang by a big detour, and then fell upon it from the higher ground. Had the movement come from one place, the enemy could have watched this concentrated effort; as it was, it fell from the blue upon him although the country held very little cover, and so created such an impression that no further attempt was made to meddle with the road by day. And this little fight takes one to a point of much interest and that is that nearly all commanders like to tie their infantry in to their machine-guns and guns. The garrison could never understand this. It preferred to cast its net wide, so wide that it could place some of its men in behind the enemy and utterly surprise him. Most commanders hate to have any detachment "out of their control," yet this battalion could not see how any really decisive act could in the ordinary way come about by day unless secrecy was observed and dispersion used. Until we get man-carried radio telephony sets—and the sooner that comes, the better—a detachment will always be out of control for some period or other of an operation.

Thus the whole policy of the sector was aggressive; the system was one of strong, though small, fighting patrols, sitting in piquets here and there on the enemy's ground, getting about

day and night at odd times, occupying the best positions before the enemy could get to them and knowing the hills and valleys far better than he knew them. The valley floors were patrolled by armoured cars. Behind these, to extend control and by sharp, unexpected, movements to make the enemy fear to move, a rifle company with mechanical transport had its centre at Rustamabad. In fire support was the mechanised field battery and the whole sector was resigned as one long defensive locality, locked in by fixed-line machine-guns and light machine-guns which had registered with indicator bullets. Main infantry and artillery arteries ran along the length with spurs off to all piquets. Lines were laid from the nearest piquet to the arteries along the *algad* bottoms, so that listening posts could tap in at night and report movement to the fighting patrols above them. There were never enough signallers in the battalion, so most riflemen were trained to Morse and in a very short time many were fit to operate at five or six words a minute and replace signallers in the less important places. It was found that Morse could be taught quite quickly and it had so many advantages over Semaphore that the regiment found it hard to see why Semaphore should ever be taught at all. It seemed archaic.

That is the way in which this dream sector was organised; its success was immediate and phenomenal. I will now record, as I said I would, some of the general conclusions at which I have arrived in my semi-conscious or working moments. Mules are nothing but a curse in battle and it should be absolutely forbidden to take them on a surprise nightmove. On the North-East Frontier in 1918-19 porters were used; they offer possibilities on the North-West Frontier too.

In the place of armoured cars we should have tanks. Armoured cars have too limited a capacity for an aggressive scheme of battle. One feels that perhaps we have not yet fully realised the immense value of armoured and mechanised forces on the frontier; infantry in armoured trailers or carriers; armoured artillery and tanks; all fed from the air whenever required, and invariably using close support and artillery co-operation aircraft. These will give us the strategical surprise we have never yet had in the frontier. If we do not get them, we will drop behind.

Light mortars too would be invaluable. They would give infantry twice the punch and would save a large number of

casualties. Incidentally they might well have saved the Guides at Pt 4080 in 1935. Infantry must have them. They close the fatal gap between the artillery and the light machine-gun and enable infantry to lift their enemy sky-high out of his cover instead of having to beat him down into it with the bullet. The bayonet is dead. Even at night men use the bullet in all their fights. We need a light rifle both on the frontier and in civilised warfare, with a sporting sight, a shorter sighted range, and a very light bayonet-dagger, for use principally in the hand and only to be fixed to the rifle in exceptional circumstances. The fixed bayonet, by day or night, gives the owner away. It is a bad, clumsy weapon, as dead as the cavalry sabre. Our rifle must be "quicker on the draw" than the enemy's. With the advent of the Vickers Berthier confidence in the rifle will wane unless the weapon is improved. It is at present difficult to shoot with and to handle and an unnecessarily great burden to carry about. Infantry shock is a fire shock, not a bayonet shock, and this has been so since the magazine rifle first appeared. This little bit of knowledge would have saved millions of lives in the Great War. Even now, how many people have this knowledge? The "Cult of the Bayonet" has sacrificed more lives in its rites than any other cult the world has ever known.

We must save life by getting a non-shining fitting for our web equipment; we must save weight by getting some sort of warm light waterproof cape and a light quilted bedding.

In this dream sector, as in other places in Waziristan quite recently, the system of piquetting on the move had proved itself to be unsafe and ineffective. Surely, it can be put into the category of methods that one only uses under exceptional circumstances, when no enemy or only a very occasional sniper is to be met. It is a narrow-chested way of trying to fight. The mountain warfare doctrinaires must be stopped from propounding it as a normal and good method. The Pathan's small-bore weapons killed it thirty years ago; it only suited the *jazail*. The nearer a commander can bring frontier warfare into line with modern warfare, the nearer he comes to success, for he will bring his superior firepower to bear to its maximum extent and at the right time. To do this he must throw his infantry wide so that all its weapons can come into action. And then, where the country prevents the enemy from seeing these wide movements by

day, he must make every use he can of his mobility and strength to envelop and to hit from behind. To do this, the men must be trained in secrecy of movement and to occupy a position by stealth. Mule-borne small-arms have no part in this. Surprise is the salt of battle; most of us pay lip-service to it, how many have the imagination and courage to apply it? Not those who direct movements to the enemy's front in broad daylight, and rely for safety on the insecurity of a nullah bed. Of all stupid ways of advancing or fighting, that of poking piquets of ten men or so up to right and left of one is the most senseless, unless perhaps the depths of nonsense can be plumbed by rushing along the path before those piquets get to their positions. The tactics of fear are far too prevalent; they are the one form of tactics that bring with them a certain and fatal risk, but it is futile to go to the other extreme of recklessness.

The scrub country of Waziristan is a godsend to a good tactician for it aids movement and hampers the enemy bullet. It is the friend of secrecy and of surprise. The army needs far more training than it gets in scrub and wood fighting. On the Frontier, whatever the nature of the hills, one seldom sees one's enemy in position, so one should manœuvre to strike at ground in such a way that, if it is occupied, he will be surprised. Scrub-clad hills facilitate this by day and on moonlight nights. Heavy machine-guns, as usual, have no part to play.

Directly we go to war we have to eradicate most of the bad habits that our drill has inculcated. This is dangerous. Recent experience has only confirmed the opinion on drill expressed in the Army Quarterly in 1935. It must march with our tactics, no matter what the sacrifice to pageantry.

Lastly, which great soldier was it who said, "Read little, think a lot?"

ROUGH Sketch. L of C Dream



"GIVE ME FOUR YEARS' TIME"

By Brigadier G. N. Ford, C.B., D.S.O.

To one who has not visited Berlin for some years the improved appearance of the younger generation is most striking. The cult of physical strength and of open-air exercise in the minimum of clothing is having a visible effect on the physique of the race, and this, in spite of a standard of living which is considerably lower than in England.

Prices are much the same, though many of the most common foodstuffs are either rationed or unobtainable; but the wages of all classes are lower, taxation is very heavy and so-called "voluntary" contributions to party funds, welfare work, air fleet and the like, swallow up a large proportion of what is left.

The Nazis make much capital out of the fact that figures of unemployment have fallen year by year, but this is hardly surprising in view of the enormous armament programme and of the numbers withdrawn from the labour market into the armed forces and labour camps. The dole to the unemployed is about half of that in England, so that there is certainly scope for welfare work to supplement it. The enthusiastic young Party official who shewed me what was being done in this direction—and the thoroughness of the organisation was impressive enough—assured me, of course, that all cases of hardship were inquired into by members of the Party and that they received liberal help in free clothing, fuel, and remissions of rent, according to their needs. Perhaps; though one can with confidence add—according to their proved loyalty to the Party.

From what I heard, there is much bitterness and discontent with the present regime among the older men, though there is, for obvious reasons, little overt sign of it; one makes sure that one is not overheard before voicing any grumble or criticism. But the younger generation appears either to be its enthusiastic supporters or to accept it as a natural phenomenon, as something that can no more be displaced than can the sun, moon and stars. And, short of a major disaster, military or financial, I am inclined to agree.

It must be admitted, however, that Berlin still manages to amuse itself. Questionable establishments, which were a feature

of its night-life a few years ago, have suffered an eclipse, and propriety is now in fashion among the smart set. At the other end of the social scale, every Saturday and Sunday, hundreds of thousands of holiday-makers pour out to the surrounding lakes and woods, where the younger members bathe and boat while their elders settle down to the serious enjoyment of eating and drinking.

They seem contented enough; a thrifty, industrious, law-abiding people, polite and helpful (though any suggestion of criticism may provoke an outburst of indignation), unimaginative, very fond of their creature comforts; one would say the last nation wantonly to disturb the peace of the world.

This is the appearance. What is the reality?

When Hitler first seized supreme power he said: *"gebt mir vier jahre zeit,"* [1] and promised the German people that they should then judge what he had done for Germany. His answer is exemplified in a remarkable exhibition. One enters an enormous hall, empty except for tables holding small models of the new Air Ministry with its 2,500 rooms, of the projected military schools for officers, and of various other military buildings. Along the whole length of the hall from floor to ceiling are set slowly-revolving frames carrying photographs of Hitler in all his multifarious activities: inspecting serried masses of troops, launching battleships, turning the first sod at labour camps, or being acclaimed by thousands of enthusiastic 100 per cent. Nordics. The procession of photographs seems unending and, as they are all enlarged to about five times life-size, one creeps about the hall feeling like Gulliver in the land of Brobdingnag, and almost sharing the reverential awe with which the German gazes upon his leader. And the whole time from the cinema in a neighbouring hall comes the strident voice of the Führer pouring out his unending speeches. This completes what one may call the personal appeal of the exhibition. The remainder is given up to more material things: to aeroplanes, guns, tanks, mechanised vehicles, submarines, to models of the new fleet, to models of the new strategic roads, to chemical substitutes for all that Germany lacks in raw materials—to everything, in fact, which will make her more formidable in war. This

[1] "Give me four years' time."

is the only impression that the exhibition leaves and is intended to leave on the hundreds of thousands, from school children to old men, who pour into Berlin in special trains to see it—the glorification of Hitler, of war and of Germany's armed strength.

And as such, the exhibition gives a very true picture of what Hitler has indeed achieved. He found Germany sunk to the status of a second rate power; he has made of her perhaps the strongest, certainly the most feared nation in Europe—the most immediate menace to the peace of the world.

How has it been done, and what has been the cost in moral values?

Although the ideologies of communist and fascist are antithetical, their views on the virtues of orthodoxy are indentical, and they practise the same technique to attain it.

When Hitler was first made Chancellor in 1933 the Nazis formed the strongest single party in the Reichstag. They had, however, no clear majority, and an attempt to overthrow the constitution and to smash democracy must have resulted in civil war. So, on the eve of the new elections, they framed the burning of the Reichstag building, raised the cry that the communists had done it as a signal for revolution, arrested all their political opponents and stampeded the country into returning them to power with an overwhelming majority. As Gunther says: "this fire destroyed what remained of the German republic. It not only burned a public building; it incinerated the communist, social, democratic, catholic and nationalist parties of Germany."

Since then the Nazis have never looked back. The trades unions shewed no fight and were abolished without difficulty, and all suspected of opposition—and the air was thick with informers —disappeared into concentration camps.

Any sign of unorthodoxy was thus stamped out, but this was at best only negative. The positive problem to which the Government with German thoroughness now set itself was to breed orthodoxy; so to condition the German nation that there should be no danger of heresy because all would think alike. The striking success hitherto achieved is shewn by the only remaining concession to democracy: the periodical rite of voting confidence in the dictatorship, which results in overwhelming votes for Hitler. The story is told in Berlin—*sotto voce*—that someone was complaining of his bad luck. "I know that the present government

must be very popular because it tells me itself that 98 per cent. of the population votes for it; and it should know; it counts the votes. But I have no luck—I only meet the 2 per cent." A good tale, but it contains, I think, not much truth.

The three most obvious methods of producing orthodoxy lay ready to hand in the wireless, the press and the schools.

The wireless, being a government institution, presented no difficulty. We who are accustomed to the innocuous political pronouncements of the British Broadcasting Corporation are inclined to underestimate its value as an agency of propaganda; but it is a noticeable fact that, at the abortive Nazi *coup d'état* which resulted in the murder of Dolfuss, in Vienna in 1934, the first objective of the conspirators was the broadcasting station.

In addition to the ordinary household sets, all railway stations, public institutions and places of entertainment have their wireless and loud-speakers, which are compelled to relay, when ordered, any government pronouncement or speech. For instance, Goebbels recently delivered a bitter attack on the Roman Catholic Church. In the two hundred and fifty yards of the street in which I was staying no less than three loud-speakers were planted out in the road, blaring out his speech for two and a half hours.

The effect in forming opinion in times of crisis or public nervousness cannot be exaggerated.

The muzzling of the press was an equally easy matter. Certain painful examples had to be made and about one-third of the newspapers in Germany have ceased publication; but the survivors all purvey the same news and make similar comments on it. Some are more and some less violent; the weekly *Der Stürmer,* for instance, which is publicly displayed in the streets for all to read, specializes in anti-Jew propaganda, with illustrations to match. Foreign newspapers are confiscated if they contain a breath of criticism, and they would, of course, only reach a very small minority of the people in any case. The result is that the untravelled German necessarily bases his judgment of affairs on the facts and interpretations given him, which may vary from slight perversions and suppressions of truth to deliberate lies. This was especially noticeable in regard to the news from Spain; it was officially stated, for instance, that an international commission had found that the massacre and destruction at Guernica had been perpetrated by the Basque troops themselves; all eye-witnesses of

the reputed German aeroplane bombardment (including presumably *The Times* correspondent) were in Bolshevik pay.

So although the German realises that his own press is censored and biassed, he has no means of forming an independent judgment; he is cut off from all moral and mental contact with the civilized and informed opinion of the rest of the world.

Control of the schools was only slightly more difficult. As everyone knows, education in Germany has been a model to the rest of the world, and her professors and scientists have for generations enjoyed a deservedly high reputation for scholarship, for fertility of invention and for devotion to their profession. Her system was always far more democratic than ours. With very few and unimportant exceptions there are no privately owned schools and no boarding schools. Children, whatever their parents' income and social status, mix in the same schools; and the fees are so low that a very large percentage of them can afford to continue their education up to the universities.

To-day the same framework remains—the same number of boys and girls pass through the machine—but the spirit of freedom and independence has vanished. Education exists to teach what the Nazis want taught. As the Minister for Education stated recently, Germany has no use for international science, for the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, or for anything that does not subserve the needs of the Nazi State.

The universities and schools were purged; hundreds of men and women, some of them of international reputation, were driven out of their jobs rather than consent to sacrifice their principles. Conformity has now been attained, but the loss to education is incalculable.

In addition to the above three channels of propaganda which the Nazis found ready to hand, other organizations for moulding opinion have been built up or developed since their advent to power. Chief among these are the various "youth movements" which catch the rising generation at its most impressionable age—the Young Folks from ten to fourteen; the Hitler Youth up to the age of military service; and the Youth Labour Service.

The two former are nominally voluntary, but failure to belong is found to be unwise. Superficially they resemble our Girl Guides and Boy Scouts, and much of the training is identical; but in fact the differences of outlook are fundamental. The Scout movement

is essentially international, it does its best to promote understanding and brotherhood between nations, and it is therefore—or should be—an influence for peace. The "Hitler Youth" is exclusively national, it is militaristic in outlook, and every peace organization is anathema to it. The leaders of a proscribed Youth Association were recently sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment for having maintained affiliations with the international Youth League of Peace at Geneva. In addition to the usual Scout training the better educated boys, after they leave school, must join the Youth Motor detachments, which parade for about four hours a week after working hours and receive a very thorough training in the driving and maintenance of motor-cycles and cars.

The Hitler Youth is not, however, patently military as is the corresponding organization in Italy. It does not carry rifles, it is taught no exclusively military subject. But, as the Nazis themselves say, this is quite unnecessary The complete suppression of individuality in devotion to the State, the glorification of force, the insistence on the Nordic's divine mission to rule the world, which are the essentials of Nazi philosophy, combine to produce an ideal subject for the military machine to work on when its turn comes.

The Youth Labour Service is especially interesting as being the only item of the Nazi programme which is original, and which does not owe its inspiration to Italy; and it is therefore worthy of more detailed examination.

Its official object is stated to be "to create new economic wealth, actual and potential, within the Reich, by drainage, irrigation, reclamation and cultivation of waste land, which could not be carried out by private initiative; and to train the younger generation to realize the vital importance of German soil to the German nation of the future."

Every young German, whatever his social status, his previous education or his parents' income, must attend labour camp for six months between his eighteenth birthday and his being called up for military service. Each camp consists of about 150 men under a few Nazi officers and N. C. Os. who constitute a regularly organised corps ranking with, but quite distinct from, the regular army. The boys live in hutted camps, which can be packed up and moved from site to site. They work for seven hours in winter or eight in summer including the march to and from their

work and a half-hour's rest for food; and after dinners at 2 p.m. there are organized sports and drill on alternate afternoons.

There are claimed to be some 200,000 young men throughout Germany attending each six-monthly tour of service, at a cost to the State of about 1*s.* a day, of which 3*d.* is given as pocket money.

I visited one such camp and found much in it that was attractive. The huts were well-found and comfortable, and the food arrangements seemed adequate. The work being carried out was the construction of a deep channel to drain land which had become sour from over-irrigation—very heavy physical work. The boys seemed to enjoy it, however. They worked stripped to the waist in small groups, each under its own leader—usually a thick-chested young agricultural labourer. No officer was present; only a few N. C. O's, who supervised and helped with a complete absence of interference and nagging. In fact, although it was obvious that no slacking was allowed, the relations between the staff and the boys, and between the boys themselves, seemed to be excellent

I heard this confirmed by several young Germans, who said that there was no favouritism or bullying, no discrimination between classes, and that all were treated with the same sympathy and understanding. The boys' physique shewed the benefit of ample food, regular hours, hard outdoor exercise, and of the care which was obviously taken for their health. As regards the mental fare provided, I quote from the official pamphlet: "the training in National-Socialist principles permeates the service from early morning until bed-time;" and "every evening there is from one to two hours' instruction in politics along N. S. lines."

Our young German has now reached the age of about nineteen and should by this time be thoroughly well "conditioned." If he is lucky he may start his two years' service soon after finishing his labour camp, but the great majority are not called up until they are twenty or twenty-one. For those who are working for a profession the break in continuity must obviously have serious effects on their studies.

There are no exemptions from military service except on medical grounds, and no especially privileged one-year volunteers. All alike pass through the ranks. Officers and men are a well set-up lot, noticeably well-behaved, with no suggestion of truculence or swash-buckling. I did not see their barracks or training; but

I was told by young men who were still serving that the new barracks are excellent and have been built and furnished regardless of expense.

After completing his service the reservist comes up, of course, for periodical military training. In addition he has to belong to one of the soldiers' associations which meets about once a month for social intercourse—and for the maintenance of official touch with its members. When past the age for reserve service he joins the Veterans' Association which, by a pretty irony, is the only organization encouraged, or indeed permitted, to talk about international peace.

As regards entry into the officer cadre, a boy has to apply during his last year at school to the commanding officer of the unit which he desires to join He is then invited to meet the C. O. and other officers, and is later interviewed by an expert committee of psychologists which reports its opinion to the C. O. The latter then decides whether or not he will accept the candidate, and his decision is final. If it is favourable, the embryo officer does his labour service, joins his unit for nine months' service in the ranks and is then sent to a military college.

Two other bodies deserve notice. The *Schutzstaffl* or "Black Shirts" are picked men, well-paid, enlisted for four years and exempt from conscription. They consist of the brigade of Hitler's personal bodyguard and of some twelve other battalions, all mechanised and equipped with machine-guns and light guns.

They constitute the striking force of the Nazi Party and are very smart, efficient, and entirely ruthless.

Since the removal of their leader, Roehm, the *Sturm Abteilung* or "Brown Shirts," by whose means the Nazis seized supreme power, have fallen from their high estate. Three years ago this organization was said to number two and a half millions; but now that it is largely unpaid, its popularity has decreased. Membership is voluntary and, to judge by appearances, consists of the least attractive elements of the population. Brown Shirt activities are spasmodic and ill-defined and appear to consist of obligatory attendance at Nazi celebrations and speech-makings and of much parading about in uniform on Sundays and holidays. The uniforms, of a rusty, khaki colour, are remarkable for their ugliness and slovenly appearance. For all that the organization remains a potential "army of the streets" in the event of trouble.

Dr. Robert Ley, chief organizer of the Party, has said: "We begin with the child when he is three years old. As soon as he begins to think, he gets a little flag put in his hand; then follows the school, the Hitler Jugend, the S. A. [1] and military training. We don't let him go; and when adolescence is past, then comes the *arbeits front* [2] which takes him again and does not let him go till he dies, whether he likes it or not."

On the forcible liquidation of the Trades Unions, the Labour Front was formed after Mussolini's model to take their place. Every industry and factory has its branch, and most of them claim to have 100 per cent. membership of all concerned—directors, managerial staff and workmen. Theoretically each of these three classes elects representatives to a joint committee, which decides all questions of wages and conditions of labour in the interest of the industry as a whole. In practice the men's representatives are selected, as in Italy, by the Party machine. Strikes are, of course, illegal. Membership of the Labour Front is nominally voluntary: how far it is so in fact Dr. Ley's remarks show. The loss of his job and the certainty of never getting another would be the least that would befall a refractory workman.

In the foregoing notes I have tried to give as objective a sketch as possible of present-day Germany The Nazis boast that they are organizing the entire population, economy and ideology of Germany into a single, co-ordinated and disciplined machine. As one of their ministers has put it picturesquely: "a German has the right to individual life only when he is asleep; at all other times he is the soldier of the Fuhrer."

Side by side with this, the expenditure on war preparation has reached astronomical figures and shows no sign of decreasing.

Is it merely designed for self-defence, as the ordinary, unofficial German hopes and believes?

Hitler himself, when making speeches for foreign consumption, passionately denies that he wants a war—and perhaps he is right. "The Germans do not want war; all they want is the rewards of victory." Besides, he has for so long fulminated against the so-called encirclement of Germany and the imminent danger to her of Russian aggression that he may have come to believe it himself. It is a discouraging reflection on human

[1] Brown Shirts. [2] Labour Front.

intelligence that propagandists first invent and then believe their own propaganda.

However that may be, Hitler's own views on foreign relationships are on record for all the world to read. "Mein Kampf" was written some years ago, so that its programme of action would obviously need some modification of detail to-day. But, so far from its policy ever having been repudiated, millions of copies are still circulated under government auspices as the authoritative exposition of Nazi doctrines, to be studied by every German. A few quotations are sufficient to show what these doctrines are:

"In eternal warfare mankind has become great; in eternal peace mankind would be ruined."

"An alliance which does not include the intention of war is senseless and worthless."

"It is necessary to understand clearly that the reconquest of our lost territories can only be achieved by armed force . . . and through a well-sharpened sword. To forge this sword is the object of the people's domestic policy."

"Germany must of necessity win the place in the world that befits it, if it is led and organized according to these principles."

NOTE.—This article was written in July 1937.

PROPAGANDA

By Lieut.-Colonel H. L. F. Dimmock, Royal Artillery

Propaganda is a much abused word and is often used in a sinister sense to describe the efforts continually being made to upset existing institutions. Efforts to strengthen the existing social structure or to preserve established institutions are euphemistically called counter-propaganda, which really confuses the object with the means. Propaganda and counter-propaganda are similar means of furthering a set policy, propaganda being the direct means and counter-propaganda being a secondary method aimed against existing or anticipated opposition to the policy in question. In the sense in which we propose to consider it, propaganda may perhaps be defined as the art of influencing the mass mind by suggestion in order to propagate an idea or, at least, to infuse a spirit favourable to the propagation of an idea. It is an art that was used by the ancient Greek orators to sway the masses and it is one that the soldier cannot afford to ignore today, for the means of influencing the minds of a large number of people are much more numerous than they were and the most fantastic ideas can now be propagated with success. The enforcement of prohibition in America is a striking example of the way in which an educated people can be persuaded, under the nervous tension of war strain, to accept ideas which may eventually undermine the whole social fabric and to which they had previously been impervious. In war time appeals to the spirit of self-sacrifice latent in all gregarious creatures are frequently very successful, but legislation to control social behaviour and morals, while it is possible both in peace and war, is a dangerous form of control. Unless it genuinely accords with public opinion, it is apt to lead to worse abuses. A safer method is to raise the general tone of the public by precept, example, and propaganda and to regard legislation as a last resort. At home propaganda is continually used by statesmen and politicians to prepare the minds of the community to accept some distasteful policy. This is peculiarly difficult in matters affecting the pocket. In this respect it may be remarked that legislation aiming at the taxation of the richer members of the community always has some success in democratic countries where the protests of those affected are

swamped by the acclamations of those who escape. Abroad "open diplomacy" was regarded by many European politicians as a heaven-sent opportunity for disseminating their ideas, but it has not proved very effective. Few nations are interested in principles except when they favour their own ambitions, and the actions of even the United States of America are seldom as altruistic as the utterances of her public men. The reason for the failure of the League of Nations and the somewhat blunt methods of open diplomacy are therefore not difficult to understand. Hitherto the soldier has paid little attention to propaganda as a force because he has always felt that discipline and *esprit de corps* were more powerful factors in maintaining the cohesion and determination of an army. Yet the last war proved clearly that discipline and *esprit de corps* could be so undermined by enemy propaganda as to disintegrate an army with startling rapidity. That astounding personality Leon Trotsky used it not only for the purpose of establishing the communist regime in Russia but afterwards as a strategical weapon with which to defeat the various armies of "White Russia."

It has already been pointed out that the means of applying propaganda are more numerous than they used to be, but science has done more than multiply the means of application, it has also revealed the processes of the human mind, both conscious and sub-conscious. The soldier must study psychology not only because it enables him to train brain and muscles to work together effectively, but also that he may understand and foresee mass reactions to suggested concepts. The effectiveness of propaganda depends almost entirely on the proper application of psychological principles. The greater the tendency of humanity to herd together and to indulge its activities collectively, the greater is the need for its leaders to study psychology and to apply its principles. The suppression of individualism by custom and legislation, the factory, league football, dog racing, multiple stores and other movements are all combining to mould the mentality of the nation in such a way that the vast majority will eventually be incapable of individual action and initiative, and therefore the more susceptible to influence by propaganda. This tremendous power of controlling the morale of the masses (the word morale is here used in its strictly military sense) alters among other things the whole problem of Press control in war. But the problem of controlling the means of disseminating propaganda, of which the Press,

although admittedly the most important, is only one, will be discussed later. It is necessary first to consider the objects to be achieved by propaganda. Some of these have already been touched on, but undoubtedly the most important legitimate object is to create solidarity of opinion in support of a prearranged and considered policy.

Since force is still a dominating factor in international relations it will readily be appreciated that the principles of successful propaganda are similar to those of war. Foremost among these, as far as propaganda is concerned, is the principle of maintenance of the objective. The propagandist must know the end he wishes to attain and keep this constantly in mind, using every artifice to attain it. There will necessarily be failures due to the efforts of opponents and to the appearance of plausible alternatives, and these failures can only be kept within bounds if the propagandist refuses to be diverted from his set policy.

Propaganda must be regarded as a definite and effective weapon of war. Its uses may be briefly summarised as, firstly, to weaken enemy morale, secondly, to create a favourable atmosphere in neutral countries, and, thirdly, to improve the morale of the masses at home and strengthen them to resist enemy propaganda. The use of propaganda to weaken enemy morale will always be difficult, since enemy governments will be well aware of the danger and continually on the alert to counteract it. A democratic State is more susceptible to attack by enemy propaganda than is a totalitarian State, since drastic countermeasures, such, for instance, as an extremely harsh censorship or the rigorous control of the civil population, can be easily applied in the latter, whereas in the former their tactless application would be interpreted as an unjustifiable interference with personal liberty. To attain success it is essential to have a sound knowledge of enemy psychology. Propaganda is essentially a weapon of subtlety and, if used in an obvious way, its effect may be the reverse of that desired. The enlargement of a legitimate grievance is often a most effective method and was used by the Allies in the Great War when they tried to develop the existing grievances of the minorities in the Austrian Empire.

The influence of propaganda on neutral peoples can never be ignored. In the present war in Spain the art of propaganda has from the outset been more effectively developed by the Valencia Government than by the Insurgents. It contributed in no small degree to the success of the counter-attack at Guadalajara, while

its effect in neutral countries tended to render the Insurgent blockade of Bilbao ineffective.

As regards the use of propaganda to improve morale at home, it may on occasions be necessary even to inflame the mass mind. The slogan "poor defenceless Belgium" was extremely good propaganda in 1914, when few people realised that it was necessary for England to enter the war for her own defence and preservation. At the same time it must be remembered that to inflame the mind of the masses is a dangerous step to take unless control is effective at the same time, for a passionate mob may wreak vengeance in any direction. The crowd never thinks but is swayed by catch phrases. At any time it may turn against its own leaders.

Turning to the question of application, the most obvious means is the Press, but the methods used by the Press vary. In democratic countries individuals are inclined to read only those journals and publications which accord with their own taste, so that great skill is necessary. The poorest members of the community usually indulge in the cheapest literature and are of very limited mentality. Those on the illiterate border-line are also prone to have a pathetic faith in the printed word. "It's true enough! Didn't I see it printed in the paper with my own eyes?" With such, the method of *suppressio veri suggestio falsi* has considerable effect, but if used to excess it is eventually damaging to the periodical using it. Moreover, in a country where the Press is free, this method exposes the publishers to attack by their literary opponents. In a totalitarian State the result is rather to discredit the State in the eyes of the world; its internal effect is slight because readers are unable to form any unbiased judgment. Indeed, it is a principle of government in a totalitarian State that the masses shall not be encouraged to think for themselves or to form independent opinions.

A more subtle method of applying propaganda is by the manipulation of facts. There are always two sides to a controversial subject for otherwise it would not be controversial. A careful avoidance of false statements, and a skilful insistence on those facts which support the idea to be propagated have a very strong influence on a semi-educated public.

The use of sensationalism is a third method. A sensational occurrence may often be entirely distorted, or its sensationalism accentuated by a lavish seasoning of sentimentality. A minor grievance can thus be elaborated to appear as a gross injustice.

These and similar methods are commonly used by the subversive elements in any State. A section of the community can be stirred up to commit disorderly acts requiring the use of force for their suppression, thus creating opportunities for further propaganda. The acts of the "suffragettes" in 1912, the "civil disobedience" organised a few years ago by Congress in India are both examples of these methods. Skilful and timely exposure of motives and firm handling of the situation are the remedies usually most effective.

Next to the Press as a means of dissemination must be placed broadcasting, which is steadily becoming a more and more powerful force. The two means are co-related and interdependent, except that the Press expresses the views of every party and creed, whereas broadcasting organizations express the views of none, at least in theory. These commentaries are not applicable, naturally, in a totalitarian State. Anyone with leisure to listen to the discussions organised by the British Broadcasting Corporation will readily appreciate how effectively propaganda could be disseminated by the conduct in a biassed manner of discussions on controversial subjects, because it is always possible to create an atmosphere of apparent impartiality.

The stage and the cinema, especially the latter, rank next in importance, and these too are co-related as means of disseminating ideas. The spy plays performed on the stage and the screen during 1914-1918 were unconscious propaganda and served as a reminder to many unthinking people to guard their tongues and be discreet. An unforeseen effect was to induce a craze for spy hunting in which many innocent persons suffered unpleasant persecution; but on the whole the results of such plays were good.

Lectures, discussion, and travel talks are other useful means of dissemination, which the propagandist should use to strengthen morale and solidarity. The pacifist elements in Great Britain during the war used them subversively with some success, and it will be essential in future to watch such activities and to arrange for the presence of skilled debaters and hecklers. On the other hand the lectures, arranged to prepare the minds of the rank and file for organised demobilization failed because the need to enlist the sympathies of a powerful Press was overlooked and the lectures were confined to the armed forces overseas. The result was that a newspaper campaign organised with a political motive entirely dissociated from the motives of those who had prepared the scheme for demobilization caused the complete breakdown of

the latter and necessitated the lavish application of the dole. We are still suffering from the disastrous effects of this failure, although the scheme as originally devised would have saved much loss and suffering and was a triumph of good staff work and planning.

Other methods of disseminating propaganda will doubtless occur to anyone studying the problem, but enough has been said to show how difficult and subtle is the manipulation of propaganda generally. Some of the methods explained above can be used to affect hostile communities, but they will usually require considerable modification if they are to be effective. As a preliminary it is generally necessary to create "cells" from which ideas can be inculcated upon a hostile people, but cells are not easy to organise and the agents employed run very considerable risks.

In conclusion it may be said that, although the soldier is not concerned in peace with civil propaganda or the political motives inspiring it, this does not imply that he ought to ignore its study and shun the devices used in its application. However distasteful it is to soldiers brought up in the old military tradition of regarding all political and social activities as outside their sphere of interest, it is essential to-day that there should be a branch of the staffs of the Defence Services in every country of the Empire whose sole duty would be the organization and study of propaganda and counter-propaganda. Reduced to its simplest elements the fostering of *esprit de corps* is a form of propaganda, but in the wider aspects of the subject the close co-operation of the intelligence service is necessary. Among the permanent forces of the Crown the fostering of *esprit de corps* should go hand in hand with measures to prevent the infiltration of subversive propaganda even in peace time. The one is as necessary as the other if the British Army is to remain the cohesive non-political entity which has for so long contributed to the stability of the British Empire.

CHAOS

We were discussing recently which foreign tongue was the most difficult to master. Russian, German, French, Magyar, Greek, Persian, Arabic, Chinese, Japanese—we ranged throughout the world. So fast and furious waxed the argument that I determined to approach other sources, and I have found my answer.

The poem below was written by a distinguished Dutch linguist and jurist, the late Dr. Nolst Frinite. Having read it, I have no doubt as to which is the hardest and most inconsequent language in the world; and I realise why I can never hope to master a foreign tongue. I have not yet learnt my own.

De Chaos*

Dearest creature in Creation,
Studying English pronunciation,
I will teach you in my verse
Sounds like corpse, corps, horse and worse.
It will keep you, Susy, busy,
Make your head with heat grow dizzy;
Tear in eye your dress you'll tear.
So shall I! Oh, hear my prayer,
Pray, console your loving poet,
Make my coat look new, dear, sew it!
Just compare heart, beard and heard,
Dies and diet, lord and word,
Sword and sward, retain and Britain,
(Mind the latter, how it's written!)
Made has not the sound of bade,
Say—said, pay—paid, laid, but plaid.
Now I surely will not plague you
With such words as vague and ague,
But be careful how you speak,
Say break, steak, but bleak and streak,
Previous, precious; fuchsia, via;
Pipe, snipe, recipe and choir,
Cloven, oven; how and low;
Script, receipt; shoe, poem, toe,
Hear me say, devoid of trickery:
Daughter, laughter and Terpsichore,

*With acknowledgments to L'Orient and to Messrs. G. Kloff & Co., Batavia.

Typhoid; measles, topsails, aisles;
Exiles, similes, reviles;
Wholly, holly; signal, signing:
Thames; examining, combining;
Scholar, vicar and cigar,
Solar, mica, war and far.
From "desire": desirable—admirable from "admire";
Lumber, plumber; bier but brier;
Chatham, brougham; renown but known,
Knowledge; done, but gone and tone,
One, anemone; Balmoral;
Kitchen, lichen; laundry, laurel;
Gertrude, German; wind and mind;
Scene, Melpomene, mankind;
Tortoise, turquoise, chamois-leather,
Reading, Reading, heathen, heather.
This phonetic labyrinth
Gives moss, gross, brook, brooch, ninth, plinth.
Billet does not end like ballet;
Bouquet, wallet, mallet, chalet;
Blood and flood are not like food,
Nor is mould like should and would.
Banquet is not nearly parquet,
Which is said to rime with "darky".
Viscous, viscount; load and broad;
Toward, to forward, to reward,
And your pronunciation's O.K.
When you say correctly croquet;
Rounded, wounded; grieve and sieve;
Friend and fiend; alive and live;
Liberty, library; heave and heaven;
Rachel, ache, moustache; eleven.
We say hallowed, but allowed;
People, leopard; towed, but vowed.
Mark the difference, moreover,
Between mover, plover, Dover,
Leeches, breeches; wise, precise;
Chalice but police and lice.
Camel; constable, unstable;
Principle, disciple; label;

Petal, penal and canal;
Wait, surmise, plait, promise; pal.
Suit, suite, ruin; circuit, conduit
Rime with "shirk it" and "beyond it",
But it is not hard to tell,
Why it's pall, mall, but Pall Mall.
Muscle, muscular; gaol; iron;
Timber, climber; bullion, lion,
Worm and storm; chaise, chaos, chair;
Senator, spectator, mayor.
Ivy, privy; famous, clamour
And enamour rime with "hammer".
Pussy, hussy and possess.
Desert, but desert, address.
Golf, wolf; countenance; lieutenants
Hoist, in lieu of flags, left pennants.
River, rival; tomb, bomb, comb;
Doll and roll and some and home.
Stranger does not rime with anger,
Neither does devour with clangour.
Soul, but foul and gaunt, but aunt;
Font, front, wont; want, grand, and, grant,
Shoes, goes, does Now first say: finger,*
And then: singer, ginger, linger.
Real, zeal; mauve, gauze and gauge;
Marriage, foliage, mirage, age.
Query does not rime with very,
Nor does fury sound like bury.
Dost, lost, post and doth, cloth, loth;
Job, Job, blossom, bosom, oath.
Though the difference seems little,
We say actual, but victual,
Seat, sweat, chaste, caste; Leigh, eight, height;
Put, nut; granite, but unite.
Reefer does not rime with "deafer",
Feoffer does, and zephyr, heifer.
Dull, bull; Geoffrey, George; ate, late;
Hint, pint; senate, but sedate;
Scenic, Arabic, Pacific;
Science, conscience, scientific;

* No, you are wrong. This is the plural of "doe".

Tour, but our, and succour, four;
Gas, alas and Arkansas!
Sea, idea, guinea, area,
Psalm; Maria, but malaria;
Youth, south, southern; cleanse and clean;
Doctrine; turpentine, marine.
Compare alien with Italian,
Dandelion with battalion,
Sally with ally; yea, ye,
Eye, I, ay, aye, whey, key, quay!
Say aver, but ever, fever,
Neither, leisure, skein, receiver.
Never guess—it is not safe;
We say calves, valves, half, but Ralf!
Heron; granary, canary;
Crevice, and device, and eyrie;
Face but preface, but efface;
Phlegm, phlegmatic; ass, glass, bass;
Large, but target, gin, give, verging;
Ought, out, joust and scour, but scourging;
Ear, but earn; and wear and tear
Do not rime with "here", but "ere".
Seven is right, but so is even;
Hyphen, roughen, nephew, Stephen;
Monkey, donkey; clerk and jerk;
Asp, grasp, wasp; and cork and work.
Pronunciation—think of psyche!—
Is a paling, stout and spikey;
Won't it make you lose your wits,
Writing "groats" and saying groats?
It's a dark abyss or tunnel,
Strewn with stones, like rowlock, gunwale,
Islington and Isle of Wight,
Housewife, verdict and indict!
Don't you think so, reader, rather,
Saying lather, bather, father?
Finally: which rimes with "enough",
Though, through, plough, cough, hough, or tough?
Hiccough has the sound of "cup" . . . .
My advice is—give it up!

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dated Lahore, the 31st January 1938.

SIR,

I have read with great interest the article "Education and the Indian Army" in your journal for July 1937.

I suppose it is because it was beyond the scope of his business that the writer has made no reference to the biggest handicap of all education in the Punjab—the neglect of the education of those who are to be the mothers of the officers and other ranks of the Indian Army.

If we could only get hold of them when they are little girls, educate and train them, our difficulties would be considerably reduced. As long as the mothers remain illiterate and untrained, whatever education we give to the children is largely wasted. The soldier slips back into the old life and ways as soon as he leaves the colours, and the school-boy slips back into illiteracy. No one can live permanently beyond the standard of his home, and that is why we see so many of our efforts ending in disappointment. We train school-masters, and we civilise recruits. When we visit them in their schools, or in their homes, we find that all our instructions have had no permanent effect.

The school-master is teaching in the same old routine manner, the old soldier's buttons are dirty, and his village is higgledy-piggledy.

If only the Army could open some King George's Royal Indian Military Schools for the daughters of its officers and men, the Punjab would soon be civilised.

I am not suggesting that the Army can do anything in the matter except what it is already doing, and doing splendidly, in the way of welfare centres and women's institutions in its regimental lines. But I do think that Major Richards would have been right and wise to have mentioned the extra handicap from which the soldier suffers, as he could then have claimed that the progress Indian Army education has made is not merely phenomenal, it is miraculous.

My fear, however, is that all the education that the Indian Army is giving will be no more permanent than what we are

giving to school-boys in civil life. The environment and the atmosphere of the homes are illiterate and anti-literate. There are practically no Roman Urdu books and newspapers for men and their families to read, and the combination of these two obstacles to permanent literacy will soon bury the soldier's newly acquired skill under the silt of village stagnation. It would be a very interesting thing if these soldiers could be tested five years after they have left the colours to see how many of them have maintained their standard.

Yours faithfully,
F. L. BRAYNE,
Commissioner,
Rural Reconstruction, Punjab.

REVIEWS

"THE 14TH KING GEORGE'S OWN SIKHS, THE 1ST BATTALION (K. G. O.) (FEROZEPORE SIKHS), THE 11TH SIKH REGIMENT."

By Colonel F. E. G. Talbot

The Royal United Service Institution

This is a careful and painstaking history of a great regiment, and should be of considerable interest to those who know the unit.

Those who do not will be rather handicapped by the almost complete lack of illustrations, while all will miss the lighter touches which can do so much to make history live.

The accounts of the numerous campaigns in which the 14th Sikhs took part are well and clearly written while the many sketch maps illustrating the actions of the regiment are much above average.

A point that is well brought out by the history of this regiment is the weakness of the 1914 Indian Army organisation as a basis for expansion in war. The 14th Sikhs had 4,600 men through their ranks between August 1914 and September 1919, and of this number only 1,800 belonged to the regiment. The remainder came from five other regular battalions, the 1st Patiala Infantry and the Burma Military Police.

D. F. W. W.

"HORSEMEN ALL"

By Major-General Geoffrey Brooke, D.S.O., M.C.

(*Constable & Co., Ltd.*, 12*s.* 6*d.*)

General Brooke has written this book, to use his own words, "for parents of the rising generation and young aspiring horsemen." The description is apt, for no parent could wish for a wiser or more sympathetic instructor and no child could fail to be interested by the fascinating way in which each stage of learning to ride is presented. The illustrations by Miss Pamela Searight are delightful, and each contains its lesson.

The author rightly lays stress on three points; the need for making friends with and understanding the pony; the need for

perfect confidence on the part of the child at all stages of his instruction, and the value of a hack in the country as a means of teaching children to appreciate nature. Unfortunately he does not touch on the problem of teaching children in India to ride; possibly because he does not believe in Nimrods and Dianas of less than eight years, and few English children remain in the tropics after that age.

While the book gives the impression of having been somewhat hastily edited—there are clumsy sentences and occasional lapses in grammar—we commend it unhesitatingly as the child's guide to riding.

E. S.

"THE ROYAL ENGINEERS IN EGYPT AND THE SUDAN."

By Lt.-Col. E. W. C. Sandes, D.S.O., M.C., late R.E.

(The Institution of Royal Engineers, Chatham. 18 *sh.)*

Lt.-Col. Sandes is already well known as a military historian from his "The Military Engineer in India" to which the present work is no unworthy successor. The book is divided into two parts, of which the first deals with the achievements of Royal Engineers in campaigns in Egypt and the Sudan since the year 1800, and the second describes their work in various civil departments during the last half century.

Outstanding events in Egypt and the Sudan in the last quarter of the nineteenth century were so closely associated with the names of two great Royal Engineers, Kitchener and Gordon, that much of the book is in reality a general history of the two countries. The part played by other Royal Engineers, also, both in war and in the administration and development of the countries, was so important that there is no lack of interest either to the general reader or to the soldier or engineer.

To military readers the main interest will centre in the descriptions of the Tel-el-Kebir, Dongola and Omdurman campaigns. The campaign of 1882 in Egypt was an "Infantry war," but the author gives a comprehensive account of the fighting leading up to the decisive battle of Tel-el-Kebir, in paving the way to which an important part was played by a sapper, Lt.-General Sir Gerald Graham.

Like so many of the small wars in which the British Army has been engaged, the Dongola and Omdurman campaign of 1896 to 1898 provided far greater difficulties in the sphere of supply than in that of strategy and tactics. The greatest achievement of the campaign was unquestionably the construction of the desert railway from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed and beyond; and to Kitchener, an engineer as well as a soldier, the credit is mainly due. Kitchener's genius is well described by the author in these pages, which bring out clearly his strength of character, his capacity for selecting able subordinates, and his anxiety, almost a mania, for economy, which lasted until the end of his life.

Civil Engineering works in Egypt can challenge comparison with others in any part of the world, and the second part of the book gives a good account of the most important; the chapter dealing with irrigation, on which the life-blood of Egypt depends, is of special interest.

The book is written in an entertaining and eminently readable style, and the author is to be congratulated on his illustrations and sketch maps, which, though small in scale, are extremely easy to follow. The foreword is written by General Sir Reginald Wingate, himself a great figure in the history of Egypt and the Sudan, to whom Lt.-Col. Sandes acknowledges much help in the preparation of the volume.

P. R. A.



THE BATTLE OF SOBRAON, FEBRUARY 10TH 1846.