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EDITORIAL

The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance

After intermittent discussion, which had lasted for over five months, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance was signed in London on the 26th August. Before commenting on the provisions of this treaty, it seems desirable to recapitulate very briefly the attempts, all of them unsuccessful, which have been made during the past fourteen years to arrive at a solution satisfactory to both Governments.

In 1919 a strong nationalist movement was set on foot in Egypt with the object of ending the British Protectorate and obtaining the recognition of the country as a sovereign state. From 1919 to 1921 various conversations were held, but no agreement was reached, and matters came to a head in the winter of 1921-22. Owing to the efforts of Lord Allenby in February 1922, the Declaration of Independence of Egypt was published at the end of that month. By this Declaration, the British Protectorate was abolished, and Egypt was declared to be an independent sovereign state in which the Sultan took the title of King. It is important to note that the following subjects were declared as absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it was possible to conclude agreements by friendly discussion on both sides:

(*a*) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.

(*b*) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

(*c*) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.

(*d*) The Sudan.

It had been hoped that the Declaration would prove to be a preliminary step in a constructive policy, and that agreement on the four reserved points would be reached at an early date, but Egyptian political sentiment refused to admit the validity of what it termed a unilateral instrument. A period of violent agitation followed, which terminated in disturbances in the Sudan and in the murder of the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack, in November 1924. As a result, all Egyptian troops were withdrawn from the Sudan. A further discussion with a view to reaching a settlement was held in that year, but it came to nothing.

The period 1924 to 1927 was one of political ferment in Egypt in which governments succeeded one another with some rapidity, and in 1927 fresh negotiations were opened with a view to settling the four reserved points. It was hoped that, owing to the friendly attitude of the Egyptian Premier, agreement would now be reached. After submission of draft treaties by both sides a third draft was agreed upon which established an alliance, undertook to secure Egypt's entry to the League, and recognised Great Britain's right to maintain a military force in Egypt. The question of the Sudan was left for future discussion. Owing to the influence of the Wafd, the official opposition party, these negotiations finally fell through in March 1928.

Further discussions took place in 1928 and 1929 which had no better luck than their predecessors, but in the early part of 1930 an Egyptian delegation, which appeared to have a full mandate to conclude a satisfactory treaty, proceeded to London. Agreement was soon reached on the subjects of the termination of military occupation, including the location of all British forces in the Canal zone, and on British support of Egypt's application for League membership, but no agreement could be reached on the Sudan. The British Government could not accept the Egyptian claims to unrestricted immigration into the Sudan and to the virtual abolition of the Condominium. Consequently the negotiations fell through, and the British Government reverted to the position represented by the Declaration of 1922. Although the attempt to make a treaty failed, the Egyptian politicians felt that a happier understanding had been arrived at.

From 1930 to 1935 there were no further attempts to arrive at a settlement, but in September 1935 Egyptian politicians realized the necessity for deciding what action should be taken if Egypt was required to collaborate in measures to counteract the Italian threat to peace. In December 1935 a Note was presented which requested the British Government to reopen negotiations. It was stated that Egypt was ready to conclude the treaty negotiated in 1930 and " to settle questions on which agreement is not reached in the same friendly spirit." The Note did not mention the Sudan. The British Note in reply drew attention to the need for settling the military questions and the Sudan, the latter being treated as especially important in view of the recent events in East Africa. Preliminary discussions began in March 1936 in Cairo and the Egyptian delegation proceeded to London in August.

The main clauses of the new Treaty are briefly as follows :

(*a*) The military occupation is terminated and an Anglo-Egyptian alliance is established. This alliance is to continue for 20 years, after which it is subject to revision at the request of either party. Negotiations for revision may be commenced after a decade, if deemed necessary.

(*b*) Each party agrees to come to the aid of the other as an ally in the event of war, subject to its obligations under the Covenant of the League and the Pact of Paris. In this connection, Egypt agrees to accord Britain all facilities of ports, aerodromes and means of communication, in the event of war or apprehended international emergency.

(*c*) For the defence of the Suez Canal, Britain is authorised to maintain in the Canal zone forces not exceeding 10,000 land forces and 400 air pilots until the two parties agree that the Egyptian army is capable of ensuring the security of the Canal. These numbers may be increased in the event of an international emergency. If, at the conclusion of the Treaty period, the two contracting parties do not agree on the question of the capability of the Egyptian army, this shall be submitted to the League Council for arbitration.

(*d*) The Egyptian Government will build barracks for British troops in the Canal zone, and improve communications between the Canal zone and Cairo and Alexandria. On

conclusion of this work all British forces will withdraw to the Canal zone, but those stationed in Alexandria will remain there for a period not exceeding eight years. This being the time estimated necessary for the construction of barracks and improvement of communications.

(*e*) The British and Egyptian air forces will be permitted to fly on a reciprocal basis wherever they consider necessary for training. Adequate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages will be provided.

(*f*) British personnel in the Egyptian army will be withdrawn, but the Egyptian Government will accept advice from the British Military Mission. Arrangements are provided for training of Egyptian personnel in the United Kingdom, and for a similarity in armaments and equipment.

(*g*) The Condominium of the Sudan is to continue, but Egypt is allowed to take an increased share in the duty of garrisoning that province.

(*h*) Other provisions allow for the disappearance of the European Bureau and Public Security Department, the eventual dissolution of mixed tribunals, and for British support to Egypt in an approach to other Powers with a view to ending existing restrictions regarding Egyptian legislation.

(*i*) Britain will support Egypt's application for membership to the League of Nations.

The Treaty has yet to be ratified, but it will be seen that much has been achieved by a policy of give-and-take on both sides. Britain has given way on the question of the location of the garrison of Egypt and the Sudan, in order to appease Egyptian sentiment; whilst Egypt has made considerable concessions with regard to the movement of air forces and the use of Alexandria as a base. The Treaty should do much to remove misunderstandings and to place our friendly relations with Egypt on a firmer basis.

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The Dardanelles Convention

On the 20th July a Convention was signed at Montreux by all signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, except Italy, which had the object of regulating the navigation of the Straits in order to give more security to Turkey and the Black Sea Powers. At first there were some differences of opinion between

Britain and Russia, but finally the following main points were agreed upon:

(*a*) Commercial vessels remain free to use the Straits by day and night in peace, and also in war if Turkey is neutral. If they fly a neutral flag they may also use them by day, if Turkey is a belligerent.

(*b*) Any external Power may send a force of "light surface vessels, small warships and fleet auxiliaries" up to a maximum of nine vessels and 15,000 tons, through the Straits by day, by giving Turkey a week's notice. This means that the heaviest type of ship which may pass is the "light surface vessel" defined as one of not more than 10,000 tons and carrying no guns heavier than 8-inch calibre.

(*c*) The total tonnage of warships belonging to non-Black Sea Powers, which may assemble in those waters, is limited to 30,000 tons. If the Soviet Black Sea Fleet should be increased by 10,000 tons over its existing strength, then the foreign tonnage will rise proportionately to a maximum of 45,000 tons.

(*d*) No single Power may send in more than two-thirds of the total tonnage, and then for a limited period of three weeks.

(*e*) External Powers may, with Turkey's permission, also send in up to 8,000 tons "for humanitarian ends," but if the Black Sea quota is thus filled, the consent of other Black Sea Powers will be necessary.

(*f*) The states within the Black Sea retain the right to send out their warships almost without hindrance, but these must pass through one at a time on the return journey, and be escorted by not more than two torpedo boats.

(*g*) Naval forces from outside are exempt from tonnage restrictions when paying courtesy visits at Turkey's invitation.

(*h*) In time of war, if Turkey is neutral, the Straits are closed to belligerent naval forces, unless they are executing missions ordered by the League against an aggressor; or, if the League has failed to act, they are proceeding to the help of a victim of aggression under "a neutral aid pact concluded within the framework of the League Covenant."

(*i*) Turkey may close the Straits if she is at war or feels she is menaced by war, but the latter action is conditional on the approval of a majority of the League Council.

(*j*) Civil aircraft may fly between the Mediterranean and Black Sea, if they give due notice and avoid prohibited zones.

(*k*) The International Commission for the Control of the Straits ceases to exist.

Whilst there may be some misgivings that the freedom of navigation of the Straits is now a thing of the past, it is a matter for congratulation that Turkey has secured her aims by legitimate methods, and her desire for additional security at the present junction is understandable. It is to be hoped that Italy will eventually sign the Convention and that this Treaty will be an effective contribution to the maintenance of peace in the Mediterranean.

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Palestine

In contrast to the satisfactory settlement of problems in Egypt and the Dardanelles, Palestine at the moment presents a rather gloomy picture. For five months the Arab population of that country has indulged in a strike, coupled with measures of violence, against the influx of Jewish immigrants. This has resulted in considerable loss of life and damage to property, and necessitated the increase in strength of the normal garrison from two battalions to that of nearly a division. The recent decision to carry out in full the mandatory responsibilities of the British Government, and to despatch a reinforcement of a further division, with the supreme military control of the country vested in a Lieutenant-General will, it is hoped, end the present state of disorder with little delay. Let us hope that the Royal Commission, which is due to sit as soon as the situation permits, will be able to clear up the grievances of both sections of the population and produce a settlement agreeable to all parties as early as possible.

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Europe

It is with great diffidence that we venture to comment on the extremely complex situation in Europe. The disastrous civil war in Spain is a calamity in itself, it is fortunate that other countries have agreed to a non-intervention pact. In the July number of this journal we mentioned the fact that Germany had given no reply to the British Note of May 6th with regard to a solution of the problem of the maintenance of peace in Europe. No reply

has yet been given, and the nervousness displayed by both Germany and Russia and the decisions made by both countries to increase materially their already large armed forces does not augur well for the success of the next meeting of the League at Geneva.

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Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition

Out of all the gazetted officers of the Civil Administration and of the Defence Services in India, only one entered for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936; there was one entry from overseas. We are sorry to notice this decline in quantity.

In order the encourage officers to express their views on defence problems and on current affairs, a choice of two subjects is allowed for the 1937 Competition. It is to be hoped that officers will enter in greater numbers in the future.

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THE INDIAN REFORMS SCHEME

By W. H. Lewis, Esq., c.s.i., c.i.e., i.c.s., on Thursday, 30th July 1936.

The Honourable Mr. M. G. Hallett, c.s.i., c.i.e., i.c.s., in the Chair.

The Chairman introduced the Lecturer.

LECTURE.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am much obliged to Mr. Hallett for his exceedingly kind remarks. As he has indicated, it has been the habit for some years past of the United Service Institution to honour one or other of the officers of the Government of India Reforms Office with an invitation to lecture on constitutional reform. There must, I think, be some of you here this evening who will recollect with pleasure the two very successful lectures given to crowded audiences in 1930 by Sir James Dunnett, who took as his subject the recommendations of the Simon Commission, then recently published. On this occasion, too, had it been possible to arrange an earlier date, Sir James, who left for England this afternoon, would again have lectured. But, when it was known that he was leaving, I was asked to step into the breach.

In other years subsequent to 1930, when these lectures have been given, the Reforms proposals were still incomplete, the precise intentions of His Majesty's Government still uncertain. Much was forbidden ground on which, in these official surroundings, no lecturer might safely tread. Nothing could be said with certainty of the exact form the new constitution might take. The lecturer, in those conditions, could do no more than trace in outline the gradual but steady growth of representative institutions in India, and deal in a general way with the course of events at the Round Table Conference.

But now we are more fortunate. The period of incubation is over. The new constitution for India has been enacted by Parliament. Accordingly I have thought that, in speaking to you, I might best proceed by indicating the state of preparations for introducing the scheme; and then if there is time and you have the patience, I might examine, but very briefly, some of its main features.

The Government of India Bill was introduced in Parliament in January 1935. It followed closely the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament over which our Viceroy (H. E. Lord Linlithgow) presided with such great distinction. The Bill ran to more than 400 clauses and contained not less than 16 schedules. Never before on the basis of a single measure was the British Parliament invited to sit down to so vast a legislative feast. But its digestion stood the test; and right till the end clause after clause was consumed without appreciable loss of appetite. We may congratulate ourselves that we are not called to take direct part in political life. Let me give you this illustration. For some months before the Bill was passed, a very distinguished Under-Secretary of State, himself a member of the House of Lords, proved to his own satisfaction that no one, unless he were very foolish, would recommend a system of direct election to the Federal Upper House. But when the Bill reached the House of Lords, the pendulum swung the other way; the amendment was accepted by Government; and the same very distinguished Under-Secretary of State was left with no choice but to advocate with the same fervour the very proposal he had so vigorously condemned. However, except for some changes of detail and a few supplementary provisions, the Government of India Bill emerged from both Houses, in all its main substance, unchanged and intact. It received the Royal assent on the 2nd August 1935.

As near as may be, that is just one year ago. At the same time, you will have read in the papers that the date for the introduction of Provincial Autonomy is the 1st April 1937. In other words, a period of not less than twenty months must elapse from the passing of the Act until the date of its effective commencement; and then again we must wait a further period for Federation to complete the scheme.

Those of you who may be impatient to pass from the present to the new conditions may ask why so long a period is required to effect the transition from this constitution to the next. There are two main reasons why the passage could not be achieved in a less space of time. They may be described under the heads of the preparation of the Orders in Council, and the time required for the conduct of the new elections.

This procedure by Orders in Council marks an important change from past practice. The Act—it has since, by subsequent legislation entitled "The Government of India Reprinting Act," been divided into two Acts, one for India and one for Burma; that Act though far more detailed than any other written constitution, necessarily leaves large gaps uncovered either by its specific provisions or its numerous schedules. The Act of 1919, our present constitution, also leaves large gaps uncovered by the sections of the Statute. At present we proceed to fill those gaps by rules made by the Secretary of State in Council. This procedure has the merit of flexibility. But, under the new conditions, as the Secretary of State recedes into the background, it would not be appropriate to retain him as the authority to fill the gaps. For that reason, Parliament has decided that the gaps in the constitution should be filled by orders made by His Majesty in Privy Council. But at that point we seem to discern a certain distrust on the part of Parliament of future Secretaries of State. Thus it is not left to the Secretary of State directly to advise His Majesty as to the Orders he should make. On the contrary, there is the most explicit provision that no action whatever is to be taken on these Orders in Council until they have first been approved by affirmative resolutions in both Houses. By this device the direct authority of Parliament is maintained in full vigour over the entire constitutional structure. Nor is it without significance that these affirmative resolutions are required from both Houses, since it follows that future changes in the Indian Orders in Council, which are themselves an important part of the Indian Constitution, are not left to the whim or the caprice of the changing political elements in the British Lower House.

We need to clear our minds, with reference more especially to the introduction of Provincial Autonomy, as to how much the Act gives us and how much it leaves to be filled by Orders in Council. The Act makes a complete distribution of powers between the Central and Provincial Governments. It provides for the setting up of provincial executives. It deals in great detail with the composition of the provincial legislatures. The Schedules of the Act regulate the franchise qualifications. On the other hand, the delimitation of constituencies and other electoral matters are left to be filled by Orders in Council. The Act deals partially only with the distribution of resources between the Centre and the Provinces. The selection of excluded and partially excluded areas is made by Order in Council.

The whole adaptation of the statute law of India is again a matter for an Order in Council.

For the purpose of introducing Provincial Autonomy a carefully planned programme was required. In the arrangement of this programme there were three governing considerations. In the first place it was estimated that the time required for the conduct of the new elections would be somewhere about eight to ten months. It followed in the second place that the more relevant Orders in Council must be passed through Parliament somewhere in the course of this summer, in June or July. Thirdly, it was early apparent that no date would be suitable for the change-over to the new constitution other than the first day of a new financial year. To introduce the scheme by the 1st April 1936 would have been impracticable. In the circumstances, the 1st April 1937 suggested itself as the only suitable and possible date.

There has been much incidental work of a varied kind; for instance, the Provinces of Sind and Orissa were set up from the 1st April last under a transitional form of government, but you will perhaps find it easier to keep in mind just the two broad divisions of the preparations of Orders in Council and the time needed for the conduct of the new elections.

For some of the Orders in Council specific investigations and enquiries in India were necessary. Thus we have had the committee, over which Sir Laurie Hammond presided, for the delimitation of constituencies. We have had the financial enquiry of Sir Otto Niemeyer. The work of the one is now contained in the Electoral Orders in Council, the work of the other in the Distribution of Revenues Order in Council. There is also a third very important Order in Council, to which I shall again refer, known as the Commencement and Transitory Provisions Order in Council, which fixes the date for Provincial Autonomy and also contains a number of provisions designed to remove difficulties which arise when we pass from one system of government to another. All those Orders in Council early this month received the final approval of Parliament and were made by His Majesty. As soon as they were passed the stage had been set for the electoral machinery to be put in motion. It is therefore to the electoral programme that I now turn.

Under the present constitution, in the British Indian Provinces (less Burma), the provincial electorate numbers somewhere about

seven millions. If, for no other reason, a wide extension of the franchise was needed to support a system of responsible government. Assuming that the calculations made work out correctly, we shall now have provincial electorates numbering somewhere about 36 millions. That would mean the enfranchisement of 14 per cent. of the total population of India—men, women and children. It would mean the enfranchisement of 40 per cent. of the adult male population and 27 per cent. of the total adult male and female population. This has been a large step in advance. The numerous administrative problems connected with it have for some time past engrossed the attention of the Provincial Governments. But up to the time of these Orders in Council everything they have done has been on a provisional basis. It was only when these Electoral Orders in Council were made that this electoral work was brought into its true constitutional and statutory setting.

It is not only a question of an electorate increased in size. The new franchise qualifications themselves are by no means simple. For instance, you have qualifications dependent on taxation and qualifications dependent on property. These are the two main bases of the future franchise. But in addition to these there are differential qualifications for women, and differential qualifications for Scheduled Castes, in order to bring them in sufficient numbers into the new electorate. Then again a number of qualifications are dependent upon application by the would-be elector.

However, here we now are at the end of July and the position which has been reached is that every Provincial Government is ready for what is called the first publication of the electoral rolls. At this stage, under the normal procedure, claims and objections are heard. It will take some weeks to dispose of these, but by the beginning of October, the final electoral roll will, according to expectations, have been published in every Province.

When that has been done, we shall come up against another of the complications arising out of the new constitution. I refer to the primary elections for the Scheduled Castes. The Scheduled Castes are, as you know, our old friends the Depressed Classes. Their representation on the scale allotted to them in the new legislatures is according to what is called the Poona Pact. The Poona Pact was a compromise reached in September 1932 by the leaders of the Depressed Classes and the leaders of the caste Hindus. You will remember

the part played in it by Mr. Gandhi, who started his "fast unto death," for the purpose of obtaining an agreed solution. As a result of the compromise, the Depressed Classes secured a considerable increase of representation in the legislatures, and at the same time there was introduced this new system of a special primary election under which the Depressed Class electors first vote as a separate electorate, and choose panels of candidates for their reserved seats. Then, when these panels have been formed, the Depressed Classes and the caste Hindus vote together as a single electorate. Seats are reserved for these Depressed Classes in every Province except the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. These primary elections for Scheduled Caste candidates will take us to somewhere in December. At that point every existing provincial legislature will be prorogued and the stage will be set for the general elections to take place some time in January or February next year.

At this point let us take what we may call a forward glance. Let us forget that we are in July 1936 and imagine ourselves somewhere in the beginning of March 1937. Let us assume for a moment that all these general preparations have been successfully completed. There will still be a host of matters to which the Governor of each Province will need to give his attention, if he is to be ready for the introduction of Provincial Autonomy on the 1st April 1937. One of the first matters to which he will naturally turn will be the selection of his future Ministers. If the Governor is wise and prudent—and all Governors are *ex officio* wise and prudent—he will first consult the Act. On turning to the appropriate section he will find provision that the Ministers will be "chosen and summoned by himself, that they will be sworn of the Council, and will hold office during his pleasure." The tenure of the Indian Ministers will thus in all material respects be similar to the tenure of the British Cabinet Ministers at Home. It may be expected that the Governor would then consult his Instrument of Instructions. This Instrument is what is called a prerogative document. It is given to every Governor by His Majesty at the time of his appointment. It confers on the Governor no new powers, but instructs him as to the manner and spirit in which he should exercise the powers conferred on him by the Statute. At the present time the Instrument of Instructions, though it has been published for information, is in draft only, and there is special provision in the Act, that the draft Instrument must, like the

draft Orders in Council, be approved by both Houses of Parliament before it is submitted to His Majesty for issue. The Governor, when he receives his Instrument of Instructions in the form in which it will have been approved by Parliament, will find in it very specific instructions as to the manner in which he is to choose his Ministers. He will be told in the document that he should first select that person who, in his opinion, is best calculated to command a stable majority in the legislature; and in consultation with him to choose those persons whom he thinks best qualified to command the confidence of the legislature. He will be further instructed, so far as possible, to include representatives of important minority communities in his Cabinet. Neither in the Act nor the Instrument is there any reference to a Provincial Chief Minister or Prime Minister, but it is clear that the person in consultation with whom the Governor will choose his Ministers, that person will in effect be the Provincial Prime Minister. Having studied these documents the Governor will then, we may suppose, scrutinize very carefully the election results and set about forming his Cabinet in advance, though the Ministers will not, of course, assume office until the 1st April 1937.

When the Cabinet has been selected there will be a great number of matters which the Governor will wish to arrange in consultation with them. For instance, he will have to decide the date on which the new legislature should be summoned, whether early or late, after the introduction of the new scheme. He will need to consider with them the business he should place before the legislature, and to consult with them as to the arrangements to be made for the budget of 1937-38.

As you know, in India the practice is that the budget proposals are put before the legislatures and passed in the closing months of each financial year, and come automatically into effect from the first day of the next financial year. At Home, the position is entirely different. There the financial year starts like ours, at the beginning of April, but the estimates do not go to Parliament before the middle of that month. They are sent first to what is called the Committee of Supply which is a committee of the whole House of Commons; and then to the Committee of Ways and Means, which again is the House of Commons under another name. The Appropriation Act which makes effective the financial provision for the year, is not

ordinarily passed until towards the end of the summer session. This means that at Home there is a gap from April to July which must be filled, and the practice is that in the closing days of March there is rushed through Parliament the Consolidated Fund Act which makes available votes on account required for the purpose of filling the interval until the Appropriation Act is passed.

I mention this difference in procedure between Home and Indian practice because, for the purpose of starting Provincial Autonomy, a modification of Home practice has been adopted. It was thought inappropriate that the existing legislatures, themselves unrepresentative and expiring, should pass the budget for the following year, when they would have no responsibility and would have ceased to exist. It was also felt to be wrong that the existing legislatures should sit and transact business at the time when the general elections are being held. It was not of course possible to introduce exactly the Consolidated Fund Act procedure, but in the Commencement Order of Council, which I have mentioned, provision is made to empower the Governor in his discretion to authorise such expenditure as he deems necessary to carry on the provincial administration for a period which is limited to six months. That is to say, the new Finance Minister is given time to consider and pass his own budget through the new legislature, and, in the meantime, he will have been put in funds by the action taken by the Governor on his own responsibility, but after at least in formal consultation with the Ministers. In March next the Governor will ascertain from his Ministers the date on which they expect to be ready with their budget, and he will adjust his own grant on account accordingly to bridge the gap.

When all these preliminaries have been completed and the 1st April 1937 dawns, the Provincial Ministers, subject to safeguards in the Governor, will assume responsibility for all provincial subjects. We may leave them with our good wishes for success in their endeavours, since the use they make of their new opportunities will be the kernel of the whole matter. If any of you have been reading Sir Austen Chamberlain's book entitled "Down the Years," you will find in it a story of a British Minister of Education who recorded a portentous note, which he concluded by saying "And this is the *COLONEL* of the whole matter!" The original of the note is said to be carefully preserved in the Board of Education.

I would like, if you will allow me, to say a few words on the implications of Provincial Autonomy. The term is misleading. It suggests change in the Provinces and none elsewhere. The term in the Act is " the Commencement of Part III." But that phrase again is one of those legal fictions with which the lawyers are pleased to entrap us. So far from Provincial Autonomy being merely the Commencement of Part III, it is in fact the commencement of all the fourteen parts of the Act less Part II, which is the part of the Act which refers to Federation.

But first there are certain geographical changes which will take place on 1st April 1937, which you should not overlook. On that date Burma will be separated from India. Burma, as has been said, is not India. The ancient rulers of India never ruled in Burma. Hitherto under British rule Burma has been treated as one of the British Indian Provinces simply for reasons of administrative convenience. It would have been impossible to fit Burma appropriately into an Indian Federation. The Burmans themselves, by a majority, favoured separation. Separation has been accepted by Parliament, and Burma has been given a constitution not less progressive than the constitution for India.

Again, on the 1st April 1937, Aden will be separated and will become a Crown Colony under the Colonial Office with an Order in Council constitution which contains provisions to protect Indian interests.

Again, on the 1st April 1937, Sind and Orissa, the two baby provinces, will have completed their term of pupilage and will enter the new constitution on exactly the same terms as any other Governor's province.

What then are the constitutional implications of Provincial Autonomy ? In effect, as soon as Provincial Autonomy is introduced, the unitary features of the 1919 constitution will disappear, and in its place we shall have the federal conditions of the new constitution. At present, if you refer to the 1919 Act, you will find that the Indian Legislative Assembly is empowered to make laws for " all persons, for all courts, for all places, and all things." I have always liked that phrase. It has a grand air about it. But that now disappears. In place of the Legislative Assembly which, in law, now has those superior powers, the legislative jurisdictions of the Centre and of the Provinces will now be regulated in the main by exclusive lists and

enumerated powers, though over a comparatively small selected field the legislative power will be concurrent. At the same time, in the sphere of executive action, the most important unitary aspect of the present constitution, namely, the superintendence, direction and control, which the Central Government now exercises over Provincial Governments will also disappear. There will be a measure of Central control, but in future the directions will not be given by the Central Government, but they will pass from the Governor-General to the Governors, and not from the Central Government to the Provincial Governments.

One way of describing the situation, which will arise in British India on the 1st April, is to say that, we shall have Federation, minus the States and minus the federal executive and federal legislatures. That is a brief way of putting it. It means that, until Federation is established, we shall have at the Centre or rather in all the relations between the Centre and the Provinces the permanent conditions of the new Federation. But that temporarily and until Federation is formed by the accession of the States the executive at the Centre will be exactly the same as it is now; the legislature also will be unchanged. But there will be important changes at the Centre which the short description given above does not cover. Thus the Central authority is at present all in the hands of the Governor-General in Council, but from the 1st April 1937 these functions will be distributed between three authorities, and H. E. the Viceroy figures in each of these three. The Governor-General in Council will, as now, administer the Central Government, but within its new demarcated field. But as an authority distinct from his Council the Governor-General personally in his own discretion will discharge a number of very important functions not the least of which will be his control over the action of the Provincial Governors in the sphere of their special responsibilities. The third executive authority at the Centre will be His Excellency again, but in the new capacity of Crown Representative for the conduct of relations with Indian States. It is one of the paradoxes of Federation that when the Princes first took up the idea it seemed to them that it was a very good way of escaping from Paramountcy, but as the scheme developed, no one was more insistent than the Princes on the use of Paramountcy as a buffer between themselves and the Federal Government, in which they would themselves be partners. At the time of the first Round

Table Conference, the Princes were given an explicit assurance that in all matters outside the Federal field the conduct with them of the relations of the Crown would not, as in the past, be in the hands of a Department of the Central Government, but would be entrusted to the Viceroy personally and persons acting under his authority. To implement that promise, this new position has been created of the Crown Representative. In ordinary terms it means that, from the 1st April 1937, the Political Department will cease to be one of the departments of the Government of India and will be a separate agency under the Viceroy for the conduct of relations with Indian States.

Now let us turn to the Secretary of State and the changes in his position. At present the Secretary of State is the statutory head of the Indian administration. But for the purposes of our new constitution all powers, including those hitherto vested by statute in the Secretary of State in Council, are resumed by the Crown. Being resumed, they are then distributed to the Governors of Provinces and to the Governor-General. Some of them, as I have just explained, have been entrusted to the Crown Representative. There is also a further set of powers which the Crown will confer on the Governor-General by Letters Patent outside the specific provisions of the Act. All this rearrangement tends to leave the Secretary of State in the air. Instead of being, as now, the statutory head of the Indian administration, he becomes, with some exceptions, no different from any other of the principal Secretaries of State at Home. Excepting in matters of his own Services he loses his administrative powers. But we should not think, because of that, that we are rid of the Secretary of State. Though he loses the power of direct administration, he retains undiminished his powers of control over the transitional government of the Centre and throughout the conditions of the Federation he will have his powers of control over the Governor-General and, through the Governor-General, over the Governors. These changes have other important consequences. The India Office is at present borne on Indian estimates with contributions from the Home Treasury. Under the new conditions, and as from the 1st April 1937, that position is reversed. The India Office will become one of the civil departments of His Majesty's Government and will be paid for by the British Treasury. Only if the Secretary of State discharges agency duties for the Government of India will any contributions be made to the India Office from the Indian Treasury.

Then again there is the India Office building. As you know, it is a treasure-house of pictures, of objects of art, and of other things of value. Though the India Office building will now vest in the Crown for the purposes of His Majesty's Government, special provision has been made in the Act that the Home authorities may not part with any of these treasures without first obtaining the approval and consent of the Governor-General. The India Council disappears on the 1st April 1937 and in its place the Secretary of State will be assisted by Advisers.

This is a very sketchy outline of some of the changes that will come in on the 1st April 1937. The immediate object is Provincial Autonomy, but plans and preparations have at once to be got ready also for Federation, since until Federation is established the general scheme is incomplete.

I have already taken enough of your time. There is not time now to deal with these Federal aspects. But I would like in conclusion to leave one sentiment with you. We are told that the normal span of a man's life is three-score years and ten. It is only four-score years since, with the repeal of the Charter Acts, the responsibility for the administration of India was formally assumed by the Crown. Study the constitutional history of these few years and you will find in India an epitome of the progress of public and personal liberty which has carried us through the centuries of our own history. Under the safe ægis of the British Crown political institutions have been set up in India expanded and developed on lines parallel to institutions of our own country. Do not look to me for an anticipation of events before they occur. But remember that we stand now at the centre of a great historical development; and when you consider the political changes on which we are embarked, be sure of this, that this general plan of self-governing units and a federation embracing the whole continent has been constructed with a fine and splendid purpose. The traditions of the British Empire and its strength are bound up with the progress and liberty of *all* its elements. That is its purpose, inexorably sure and eternally true.

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The customary vote of thanks to the lecturer was passed by acclamation.

SHOOTING FOR BURIALS—NOT BULL'S-EYES

By Major S. W. Bower, 7th Rajput Regiment.

Warning.—*All True Believers in Bisley and Bull's-eyes, painstakingly amassed by calculated changes of aim, should avoid this article as it is rank heresy.*

It appears from the last report on Individual Training that the range course fired by riflemen is under revision. The present moment therefore appears opportune to consider whether our methods of training are correct.

The one aim of peace training is to prepare for war and the efficiency of training methods can be judged by only one standard: whether they are the best to produce the effect we require in war. Let us therefore start by looking at war.

We see a picture where fire predominates and where the section is the fire unit, fire being controlled by the section commander as long as may be possible. It is at once evident that the efficiency of our fire is centred round the section commander. We find him in the forefront of the battle, surrounded by distracting circumstances and much personal danger. Here he is called upon to make rapid appreciations of a situation of which he can normally see little. He has to estimate ranges accurately, frequently from a prone position, and describe targets which, particularly in the attack, are inconspicuous. Having opened fire he has to issue corrections to men now intent on pumping lead into what they hope is the enemy.

To summarize—it is the section commander who *applies* fire in battle, and no mean task it is. Many Generals would consider their job the easier when they had tried his just once.

We talk of fire and movement being the bedrock of infantry tactics. When it comes to training the man on whom falls the task of applying this bedrock to minor tactics, we allot only a small proportion of the ammunition available to his instruction. If you assume that half of the fifty rounds allotted to Part III, Table "B" are employed in collective field firing it means that a beggarly 16 per cent. has been devoted to his instruction.

Now for the individual rifleman. He is also provided with "front seats" for the show. Bullets are distracting things and we

can rest assured that action which has not been made instinctive by good training will be forgotten or badly executed.

The rifleman has to obey intelligently the section commander's orders and, when actually firing, *to maintain a constant aim at the spot which has been indicated to him.* In range parlance he *groups.* Under modern conditions he never sees the strike of his own bullet—in fact Small Arms Training goes as far as to warn us that the section commander may even have difficulty in picking out his section's beaten zone.

If in battle the rifleman *never applies* his fire then there appears no valid reason why we should spend 48 per cent. of the ammunition devoted to his annual range training to Application practices. They appear to me to be *misapplication* practices.

Having proved, I hope, that we pay too little attention to our section commanders and waste a great deal of time and ammunition on practices of no value to the rifleman in war, I will outline what I feel would be a more practical training system.

We have first to strike a balance between the demands of the section commander and his riflemen.

If we had totally inefficient section commanders in command of marksmen our controlled fire would probably be totally inefficient. The accuracy of the riflemen would merely accentuate the effect of incorrect ranges and bad indication of targets.

On the other hand highly efficient section commanders in charge of third class shots would be sadly handicapped by the dispersion of the section's beaten zone. In both cases the riflemen would be useless unless they had a high standard of fire discipline.

Moderation, as usual, seems to pay best, so let us divide our 155 rounds per man roughly between the two, our aim being to produce a well-disciplined rifleman not below our present first class standard with a section commander brought up to the highest pitch of efficiency obtainable.

Up to the present I have dealt with controlled fire only. As the two sides get closer and closer in battle, probably from about 300 yards range downwards, the control of the section commander will decrease and decrease until he will have no power to influence the fire of his men and will only be able to control movement. Targets during this period will be of a fleeting nature and *snapshooting* will provide suitable peace training to ensure that fire remains effective.

During both controlled and uncontrolled fire the power of the rifleman to produce rapid and accurate fire, when required, will remain as heretofore.

At the end of this article the reader will find my suggested Table "B." Table "A" would naturally be based on it.

Table "B" has been drawn up keeping in view those two essentials of all good training: simplicity and progress. Practices will be fired in the order given. Grouping at slow rates of fire is completed before speed is introduced. Snapshooting practices are placed before rapid grouping as it appears logical, and of tactical value, to teach a man to get off his first shot accurately before you ask him to fire a number of accurate rounds in quick succession. Except in the first elementary grouping and the fire discipline practices, firing takes place at two ranges only; at 600 yards, the normal limit of effective rifle fire, and 300 yards, the range about which control is likely to break down. To fire at intermediate ranges appears an unnecessary complication. It does not teach judging distance as conditions are too artificial and in my system a man has not to learn the behaviour of his rifle at the various ranges—a behaviour which the conditions of active service soon change. Where, as in Practice 3, the number of rounds is shewn as 2 plus 3 the man will start loaded with two rounds and will reload with a full charger of five rounds after the first three rounds have been expended. He will, however, fire only two rounds from the second charger.

The rapid and accurate adjustment of sights has been introduced into Practices 8, 9 and 11. Thus the elements of fire discipline are introduced at an early stage without detriment to the pure range training. In tactics we place much importance on enfilade fire. From a rifle training point of view this means a crossing target, and it therefore appears logical to introduce one into our range table. Practice 11 provides the soldier with more advanced training in fire discipline.

The classification practices are marked with an asterisk and in these no coaching would be allowed.

A soldier would be classified as "Efficient" if he reached the standard laid down in Practices 3, 6, 9, and either 10 or 11. Otherwise he would be classified as "Inefficient."

The pool of 21 rounds is placed at the disposal of the Company Commander for zeroing rifles and repeating any man in any practice

(including classification) as many times as he likes and ammunition permits.

It may be argued that the standard of shooting will be lower by this Table. I disagree. I consider that the simplification of training will raise the *general* standard and, although there may not be as many marksmen, there will certainly not be a tail of indifferent second-class shots. If it is considered desirable, men can be encouraged to do better than just become " efficient shots " by the judicious use of prize money. Our object must be to produce riflemen whose shots will produce in war an efficient beaten zone. Once this has been accomplished the whole of our energies and resources must be devoted to producing a highly efficient section commander.

We have now expended 85 of the 155 rounds allotted and have 70 left with which to train the section commander. I see no reason for devoting any of these rounds to individual battle practices. The rifleman should have received on the parade ground instruction in the drill of fire discipline—there will have been a lot more time available to do this—and on the range he has received opportunity to put this drill into use. The collective battle practices will provide him with plenty of further instruction.

Collective battle practices are outside the scope of this article. Sufficient that increased ammunition and time has been produced so that adequate training can be given to the section commander in his highly important and difficult task in war.

Some method of judging the efficiency of a unit is necessary. I suggest that the Figure of Merit should consist of half the percentage of " efficient shots " to men trained, plus up to 50 marks for the skill shewn by section commanders in collective battle practices. Brigade Commanders would, by regulation, be bound to set and watch test schemes for at least the section commanders of one Rifle Company. Marks would be allotted on the result of this test and not on written reports.

I contend that the training outlined above would produce higher efficiency in war than our present system, and at no increased cost. Section commanders themselves, experienced in the observation and tactical application of fire, would have at their disposal a section of well-disciplined riflemen capable of producing highly efficient fire.

When control of the section commander broke down the individual rifleman would be fully capable of carrying on the fire fight.

Our mountain warfare experts may shake their heads and say, "This would never do for our warfare."

I beg to differ. Against the Pathan offensive action is essential, and the offensiveness of fire is measured by its *volume* rather than by its duration.

The fleeting nature of the targets offered again demands *volume*. My system is designed to produce *volume*, and at short notice.

Finally, why do automatic weapons have such an influence over the modern battle-field? Mainly because they can produce rapidly a very effective beaten zone. Let us learn from this that we do *not* want in war individual marksmen, we want *sections that have the above characteristics of an automatic weapon.*

TABLE "B."

No.	Range.	Rounds.	How fired.	Standard.
			Slow Grouping.	
1	100	5	Lying	6 in. group.
2	300	5	Lying	2 ft. group.
3*	300	2 plus 3	Lying	18 in. group.
4	600	3 plus 2	Lying	3 ft. group and one wide.
			Snapshooting.	
5	300	2 plus 3	Kneeling behind cover ..	3 hits.
6*	300	3 plus 2	Ditto ..	4 hits.
			Rapid Grouping.	
7	300	3	Lying	2 ft. group.
8	300	3 plus 3	Lying, sights to be adjusted	2 ft. group and one wide.
9*	300	5 plus 5 plus 5	Lying, sights to be adjusted	2 ft. group and three wide.
			Movement.	
10*	300	2 plus 2	Kneeling or standing behind cover, 2 shots at each run of the crossing target.	2 hits.
11*	400 to 200	4 plus 2	Lying at 400 yards. Kneeling at 300 yards. Standing at 200 yards. Two shots fired at each range.	3 hits.

NOTES.

Total rounds 64; add 21 for Company Commander's pool; Grand total 85 rounds.

Bayonets to be fixed at 300 yards and lower ranges, except in Practice 1.

Targets made of the same materials as now. For all grouping practices up to 300 yards a six-foot target with an aiming mark the shape and size of a Figure No. 5. At 600 yards an eight-foot target with a Figure No. 4 aiming mark is required. The snapshooting target to be 3 ft. in diameter, with a Figure No. 5 aiming mark and an invisible 22″ scoring circle. The present snapshooting target is unsatisfactory in that a man seldom knows where his shot has gone and is therefore unable to detect his faults. An enlarged target would permit of shots which are near, but outside the scoring circle being indicated by means of spotting discs. Similarly for Practices Nos. 10 and 11 a No. 6 and No. 2 Figure respectively would be pasted on to a six-foot target.

The above targets accustom the man from the beginning to a service type of aiming mark.

I have not added time for rapid and snapshooting practices and the standard groups are suggested with great reserve. Both would require experiment and experience before a satisfactory standard could be evolved. An allowance for wind must be made in the grouping practices, especially at 600 yards.

AN EVEREST DIARY, 1933

With a Few Comments on Past and Future Attempts.

By Captain E. St. J. Birnie.

As this article is being written, news has been received that yet again Mount Everest has been victorious and sent another party back from its glaciers, having failed in its attempt on the summit. The deepest sympathy will be felt for Mr. Ruttledge who might certainly have been entitled to feel that the reward of a successful expedition was his due, for with the experience of 1933 behind him, a successful reconnaissance by Eric Shipton in 1935, and a wealth of material to choose from, he was in the strongest position to take such a party to Everest that could hardly fail in its task.

That his party was in fact a very strong one, proved at high altitudes, and magnificently equipped against all emergencies, is an undisputed fact. Yet this expedition, equipped with wireless not only at the Base, but for its high Camps, and with every device to fight the cold and the rarified air of high altitudes, with scientifically selected food, and the accumulated experience of four expeditions, accomplished less than any of its predecessors.

When an expedition takes seven months and costs somewhere in the region of £10,000 it becomes a matter of great importance to study carefully the factors which may cause just such a disaster as occurred to the 1936 Expedition.

Though there are a number of experienced travellers, including Dr. and Mrs. Visser, the Dutch explorers, who consider that an attempt on Everest should be made in late September and October, most of the members of the various Everest Expeditions are unanimous that the best time to attempt the Peak is in the six weeks just previous to the breaking of the monsoon. At this time the terrific winds of February and March have swept the North face clear of snow and rendered it safer for climbing. It has therefore been the aim of previous expeditions to arrive at the Base Camp about the 20th April, to establish the North Col Camp by the 15th May and so have a fortnight to three weeks in attempting the summit. In this, I think, a great mistake has been made; Everest weather does not remain tolerant for long, therefore the whole of that six weeks should be

spent in the vicinity of the North Col Camp. This should be established by April 26th at the latest and all the assault parties ready to advance from the Col by the 1st May, taking the first opportunity of fine weather. It was therefore decidedly a shock when we heard that the 1936 Expedition was to start later this year than in 1933, and that the North Col Camp was established on May 15th, a week *earlier* than they had intended to establish it. Little things have far-reaching effects and it is a matter of speculation as to what would have happened had the 1936 Expedition arrived at the North Col in time to start from it on May 1st. The weather this year, in strong contrast to 1933, was exceedingly good and mild and it seems inconceivable that they could have failed had the party been above the Col from May 1st to May 15th.

A failure caused by weather conditions was to be avoided at all costs; this was the main reason for the failure of the 1933 attempt, and if failure it was to be, then it was naturally hoped that it would be caused by the severity of conditions at, say, 28,700 feet, rather than the danger of the North Col slopes after monsoon conditions had set in, the one as yet an unknown quantity, the other already too well known.

There appear to be only two factors which govern the issue, firstly, is it possible to reach Base Camp from India by April 10th and, secondly, is it possible to move up the glacier in time to establish the North Col by April 26th ?

The answer to the first question must certainly be "Yes," the second would depend on snow conditions for the year; but even then I am convinced that it can be done, if necessary, by making provisionally five Camps to Camp III. Once the assault party is established with its high altitude gear and rations, consolidation of the Camps behind can quickly be carried out and the Camps reduced as soon as the trough of the East Rongbuk Glacier begins to melt.

The plans for the establishment of the higher Camps and the assault of the Peak need careful thought and I do not myself think that the correct policy has been carried out in the past. The guiding principle must certainly be the careful nursing of the experts who will be required eventually to put forth their utmost efforts between 27,000 feet and the summit.

Unfortunately the North Col slopes are sufficiently difficult to insist on the necessity of the experts being called upon to make the

route, but even here all the step-making should be done by those who have not been selected in the first two assault parties, and the more difficult portions only should be the work of the experts. Once this route is established the first two assault parties should undoubtedly remain resting no higher than Camp III at 21,000 feet, while the lesser lights should speedily push on, establishing Camps at 25,700 feet (Camp V) and 27,400 feet (Camp VI) and stocking at Camp VI one light tent capable of holding two persons; for I am convinced that the chances of success will be far greater if the first assault party on leaving Camp VI concentrate entirely on merely getting themselves and two porters across Norton's traverse and the great couloir, and bivouacing for the night as far up the final pyramid as possible, leaving a maximum of 800 feet for the final day's climb. The chief difficulty of a third Camp above the North Col lies in the problem as to whether any porters can be found who will sleep at a second Camp and advance on the third day. In 1924 this was not thought probable, but the morale of the Porter Corps has increased so much since those days that there is little doubt now that it would be accomplished.

In 1933 eight porters stayed 3 days and nights in an almost continuous blizzard at 25,700 feet. Of these one had a complete mental collapse, three had their hands frostbitten and two had their feet frostbitten, only two were fit to continue the attack, yet in two days' time 9 men, including Anturki, who had been amongst the previous 8, immediately volunteered to carry on to Camp VI, and an hour later three more men came forward to complete the 12 required.

The desirability of a third Camp lies in making a certainty of the final assault and not risking a whole expedition in finding out the still unknown quantity of what happens above 28,500 feet. Everyone who has been over 24,000 feet has experienced the sudden change which occurs at that height, the difficulty of climbing becomes suddenly far greater in proportion, which seems to show that the difficulty of progress does not increase evenly. Smythe in 1933, while still nearly 1,150 feet from the summit, was so well acclimatized that he considered he was doing 250 feet an hour, when at 28,000 feet the loose snow on the slabs of Norton's traverse became so dangerous that he was forced to turn back. It was then 10 a.m., and had he been able to continue he would have had approximately 9 hours of light in which to reach the summit and return to Camp VI. Allowing

him even in his exhausted condition 2½ hours for the downward journey, this would have left him only 6½ hours to reach the summit, an *average* of 180 feet an hour. It is certain that one great effort above 28,000 feet is all any man can make in any one expedition, so that it is more than possible that had conditions allowed him to continue he might have suddenly, at 28,500 feet, found himself reduced to a limit of 100 feet an hour with no possibility of reaching the summit and yet getting safely back. To turn back under those circumstances would require a great mental effort even at those heights where the wish to go downwards is predominant, for he would well know that he could not repeat his effort; yet he would be forced to abandon the attempt, for to reach the summit in face of certain death, besides being unsound mountaineering, does not form part of the policy of Everest Expeditions.

If Smythe could sleep for 12 hours on his third night at 27,400 feet in 1933 as he did, he could most certainly have a good enough night's rest at 28,300 feet and so be fit to make the summit a certainty on the next day. If it is considered that no porters on the expedition are capable of crossing the traverse, an effort to establish the Camp should be made by spare members of the party. Needless to say, it would assist the climbers materially if a *Sahib* is established as cook at both Camps V and VI.

The discovery of a possible route up the west side of the North Col is of great interest and, if it proves a fact, will shorten the line of communications by two Camps; but, of course, the real importance of the discovery will depend on whether the ascent and descent of the possible new route is definitely a safe one in avalanche conditions. It is only this fact which will make the discovery of any marked importance, and at present there does not seem to be any definite information regarding this.

So much for suggestions; none are new and it is certain that a future expedition will do all in its power to prevent a recurrence of the unlucky events of 1936.

Let us hope that negotiations will quickly be opened with the Thibetan authorities for permission to grant another expedition to go while Mr. Ruttledge is available to lead yet again and those with experience above the North Col are still fit and young enough to compete.



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

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

SHEKAR DZONG MONASTERY



EVEREST FROM RONGBUK CAMP

Everest Diary, 1933 (*Extracts*).

March 12th . . . . . Left Kalimpong.

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March 18th . . . . . Crossed the Natu La into the Chumbi Valley and Thibet.

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March 26th . . . . . To Mating . . . . . 15,300 feet.

A lovely morning. We started across the plain rather vaguely north-westwards from under Chomulhari at 7-15 a.m., breakfasting in the open. The wind started at 8-30 and by 9 we had a real taste of what the Thibetan plateau can do in March. The snow was blown in our faces in a blizzard and our ponies had considerable difficulty in crossing several deep drifts of snow. A bad day for the porters who came in still very cheerful and uncomplaining.

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March 29th . . . . To Kampa Dzong . . . . 14,500 feet.

Marched by the southern route up a valley which looks about 4 miles long, and is actually nearer 9 miles, to the Pass which is approximately 17,600 feet. We saw masses of gazelle at close range and rode amongst them on our ponies; there were also 30 to 40 *kiangs* (wild asses) though they kept further away from us. We climbed the ridge to the south of the Pass and lay there watching the wonderful panorama spread before us. The Bavarian Ridge of Kanchenjanga dominated the view to the south and was surrounded by the many peaks of the Llonak valley. Over 100 miles to the west the Everest group stood out with the magnificent snow-covered south-east face of Everest plunging down to Nepal. At the foot of the valley we turned suddenly south-westwards into Kampa Dzong with its lovely fort situated on a rock high above the village.

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April 10th . . . . . To Shekar Dzong . . . . 14,500 feet.

Again about 15 miles. Following a winding valley we crossed the river by a good bridge and started across an open plain for Shekar, already visible some 6 miles distant. The monastery is built on a rock which rises 600 feet above the plain, and is the nearest thing one can imagine to the castles of Fairy Tales. There is a most fantastic fortress on the summit of the hill, and the town itself, consisting

of a cluster of white houses with black windows, is built on the rock some 200 feet above the plain. By moonlight it looks incredibly lovely.

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April 17th .. To Base Camp .. 16,800 feet.

The entire Expedition visited the Rongbuk Monastery for the blessing ceremony and afterwards started for Base Camp, which is about 4½ miles from the Monastery.

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May 7th .. At Camp III .. 21,000 feet.

A most unpromising day. We (Hugh Ruttledge, Longland, Smythe, Shipton; Boustead and myself) started, however (without crampons), for the North Col, Nima Tendrup and Pasang carrying rope and pitons. The latter was unwell, so was sent back. The whole of the upper glacier was one sheet of blue ice and a strong gale was blowing across it. It was quite impossible to work on the Col itself, so we dumped the rope and started back. Eric (Shipton) appeared to enjoy sliding about on the slippery descent, but most of the rest of us came down very cautiously. It is decided to move four people and an arctic tent to the foot of the Col to-morrow.

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May 9th .. At Camp III .. 21,000 feet.

Went up to IIIAwith Wyn Harris and Waggers. "Policee," our Thibetan mastiff, accompanied us. In spite of 52 degrees of frost last night she refuses to come into a tent and lies curled up in the snow all night. More snow is falling which may make the North Col dangerous to work on. There are still the same anxieties—

1. The continued bad weather which is delaying us considerably.
2. The lack of porters (the Sola Khombu men have still not arrived).
3. The difficulty of the route to the North Col, the immediate establishment of which is essential if we are to have sufficient time to make two or three attempts before the monsoon arrives.

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May 12th .. At Camp III.

Went up with 15 porters to IIIA, the whole party out working on the Col. Frank and Eric in front reached the ledge on which we may place Camp IV. Jack (Longland) Wyn and Yula Kita on

another rope and Waggers, Hugo (Boustead) and Qusang on a third, all helping to rope the route, the two porters worked splendidly.

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May 13th .. To Camp IIIA .. 21,800 feet.

Hugh (Ruttledge) and Ferdy (Crawford) have returned to Camp II, the former's throat being still very bad. Frank (Smythe) and Eric came down from IIIA to fetch kit and onions! I went up with Raymond (Greene), Eric and Frank, all carrying small loads and going well. Tom (Brocklebank) accompanied us half the way. George (Wood-Johnson) very upset at not being included in the original assault, but he is doing invaluable work at III.

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May 14th .. At Camp IIIA.

A stormy night with a high wind. Hugo, Frank, Eric and I started at 10 a.m. to escort the first 12 men to the North Col Camp. The route has been splendidly roped by the advanced parties, and it's a mystery to me how Frank first surmounted the ice wall which is perpendicular for 12 feet and then slopes steeply upwards for 30 feet more. The porters behaved splendidly on the extremely steep route and with the help of the fixed ropes returned singly to Camp. Eric *will* go to sleep in my hat.

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May 15th .. To North Col Camp .. 22,700 feet.

A very stormy night, one pole of our arctic tent came loose, so we spent rather a hectic night wondering whether the whole tent would be blown down on top of us. Made out a final plan for establishing Camps V and VI which Jack is taking down to Ferdy who has arrived at III. Started late and reached Camp IV in the evening. The tents are pitched on a ledge about 20 yards long and 20 feet broad with a high protecting ice wall above; to the east we look straight down to IIIA and far away in the distance the whole of the Himalayas are spread below us. There are five of us here—Boustead, Smythe, Shipton, Wyn Harris and myself.

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May 18th .. At North Col Camp .. 22,700 feet.

The sun shining and a fairly strong wind on Everest. No movement yet from below, but we hope they will try and come up as every day delays the establishment of V and VI. This is the third day now that we have been cut off from below. After lunch we

visited the top of the North Col. The route is a very steep snow route which will have to be roped. The ridge itself is quite narrow, dropping gently westwards for 50 feet to rocks and then perpendicularly to the main Rongbuk Glacier. The views of snow ranges are magnificent.

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May 20th . . . . . At North Col Camp.

A fine morning. As loads arrived yesterday Wyn, Hugo and myself started with 11 porters (one unloaded) to try and dump 10 loads at Camp V. As soon as we were on the ridge the wind started, the porters carried splendidly in spite of it, but on reaching the top of the snow-tongue, at about 24,800 feet, some of them were so affected with numbed hands and feet that I decided it would be best to dump the loads there rather than risk loss of efficiency from frostbite and fatigue. The establishment of V could not be affected as 20 loads were required there and 20 fit men, half going unloaded to the dump on the 22nd should make the establishment safe in two days, according to the plan already made. Wyn and Hugo decided to reconnoitre towards V, but after a short distance the latter was overcome by the altitude and both decided to return.

* * * * * *

May 22nd . . . . . To Camp V . . . . . 25,700 feet.

A lovely morning. Hugh had arrived from III the previous evening. Everyone up by 5-15 a.m., and I stood by the porters until everything was ready at 6-45. Hugh then made a speech and away the party went under Wyn, Waggers, Hugo, Jack and Raymond. I stayed behind to get my breakfast. Left at 8, but met Hugh just above Camp on his way down from the Col and sat talking until 8-45. Two hours later met Jack escorting Yula Kita, the latter very sick with stomach trouble and vomiting frequently. Near Camp V, which had been pitched after a splendid carry at 25,700 feet, I met Raymond coming down, his heart was affected by the climb and he had decided to return. Trying to sleep two and two in small Meade tents at 25,700 feet with a quantity of Everest's stones sticking into one's back will not be too easy. We have eight porters here, all seemingly cheerful for to-morrow's great carry to VI as near 27,700 feet as we can manage.

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PORTERS AT CAMP IV

EVEREST " TIGERS " FOR CAMPS V AND VI



CAMP V—25,700 FEET

MAJOR BOUSTEAD AT CAMP V (*collapsed*)

May 23rd . . . . . At Camp V . . . . . 25,700 feet.

A very stormy morning, no chance at all of going on to VI. Wyn and Waggers very gallantly went 100 feet down the mountain to place our "no advance" signal on the rocks. Did not sleep well last night, too many stones combined with lack of breath. . . . Frank and Eric have turned up unexpectedly; we have had an emergency conference. Wyn and Waggers are going down to IV and the remainder of us will attempt VI to-morrow.

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May 24th . . . . . At Camp V.

A very stormy night, the snow blew continually into the tents. Hugo and I had an amusing midnight episode searching the "property box" for candles and matches while taking a sip each from the Thermos of tea we had prepared for the morning. Much refreshed with aspirin also, I believe we did actually sleep a little. A move towards VI was quite impossible, the wind increased to a gale and no food support even could reach us from below. Lakpa was unwell and we intended to send him down but the conditions have become too bad, the rest of the porters are putting up a brave show and smile cheerfully when we visit them. Their rations are finished this evening, but they say they are willing to carry to VI in spite of this and then get down to IV. We have given them Ovaltine and ginger biscuits, but have very little left for ourselves, the chief difficulty is to make the porters eat at all. We have a wonderful view now, but the wind is still very strong.

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May 25th . . . . . To North Col Camp.

Hugo woke me up at 1-30 a.m. in a temporary lull and said he thought it was time to get the porters going! I soothed him down and we again drank some of our Ovaltine brew. The storm, which had been so strong that we had doubted whether our tents could stand the strain, now subsided completely and we managed to get a little rest until 4 a.m. when Hugo insisted on dressing and at 4-20 went out and "started the porters going." He really did wonderfully, taking food to the men and trying to make them eat. He then returned and slept. The wind had started again but we were all dressed and loads ready by 7-15 a.m. We all collected ready to start for VI, but it was bitterly cold and Frank eventually decided against going. His decision was undoubtedly correct, the men

were bitterly cold and would certainly not have gone far. We bundled the men back into the tents and spent an hour warming hands and feet. We started down after striking the tents in one of the strongest and coldest blizzards I have ever experienced. Our fingers were frozen stiff and it was necessary to work them continuously to prevent frostbite. Half-way down we met a party trying to come up but they were forced to abandon the attempt. On the way down I slipped badly during a glissade, and losing control, went for some 150 feet before a porter stopped me: no damage except a sprained left leg. The casualties of this reverse were a great deal more than we liked, six of the eight porters were out of action with frostbitten hands and feet, and of the remaining two only Anturki is keen to go back.

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May 26th . . . . . To Camp IV-A . . . . . 23,000 feet.

A very warm night, about 6″ of snow fell and there were several ominous roars of avalanches. As one avalanche would swamp our ledge it is decided to move Camp to the top of the Col. Smythe, Shipton, Wyn Harris, Waggers, Longland and myself to go up and the remainder down to III. I was asked to review the porters and in spite of severe casualties nine are willing to return to the attack.

Mid-day.—A dreadful shock, the porter selected as head of the assault men has suddenly caved in and says he cannot move, it is really quite understandable after the hammering the previous party have had. Coming at this moment, however, from the leader, it is most serious, and I have regrettably been forced to ridicule him seriously. Datsering is appointed leader and the remainder are still staunch, which is remarkable. I have, however, taken the precaution of sending them up to IV-A with their beddings as first loads.

2 p.m.—A good influence from below, four excellent men have just arrived, all begging to go up, I have accepted three.

6 p.m.—Two arctic tents pitched at IV-A; the 12 porters extremely cheerful; we took a bottle of brandy into their tent and to-morrow is to be a rest day for us all.

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May 28th . . . . . To Camp V . . . . . 25,700 feet.

Wyn, Waggers, Jack and I started with 12 porters for V, eight to be retained. I immediately found myself going extremely badly with my sprained tendon and was well left behind, reaching V with difficulty after nine hours. The porters had again performed

a wonderful carry in five hours, the first four getting in in front of Wyn who is moving very well; only poor Qusang "Poggler" was forced to drop his load and return after trying very hard. The final eight were determined to do a record carry and joked heartily at the prospect; curiously enough they were practically all of one type, the tall, strong porter was out of it and we had eight small, tough, young men.

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May 29th . . . . . At Camp V. . . . . 25,700 feet.

At 5 a.m. I went out to rouse the porters and reported to Wyn. It was a lovely day, but we could not tell what the wind would do, so waited and kept the porters in their tents.

At 7-45 a.m. Wyn decided to move and away they went. Jack took my place and I stayed at V preparing drinks for their return. The men *did* their record carry, Jack stopped them owing to the time at about 27,400 feet, where Camp VI was pitched, a splendid achievement. Arriving back at V they drank their Ovaltine, collected their beddings and went on down to IV, with the exception of Kipa and Rinzing who were too tired to descend below V and are staying the night. Jack went on down with them having done a sterling bit of work. Frank and Eric have arrived from IV. Kipa, the next day on his arrival at IV, insisted that he was dead and was therefore unable to dress or proceed further. He persisted in this belief at intervals, even after reaching the Base Camp, and eventually followed Raymond faithfully about in the belief that he had brought him back to earth. He did splendidly all the way up.

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May 30th . . . . . At Camp V.

Frank and Eric went on up to VI. Although I went out frequently I saw nothing of the reconnaissance party who were presumably out somewhere between VI and the summit.

(Wyn and Waggers were actually out on Norton's traverse and reached about the same height as he did, 28,000 feet, finding conditions too dangerous they returned, Waggers visiting the ridge. They were led against their better judgment from making the reconnaissance of the "second step" by the seeming ease of the traverse.)

Spent the day melting down snow and cooking Ovaltine, hot milk, and tea, and storing them in Thermoses. By 5 p.m. I came to the conclusion that Wyn and Waggers had decided to stay at VI for

the night (we had two extra sleeping bags there and an emergency Marco Pallis tent), and so left the spare Burns tent collapsed and went to bed. At 7-15 I was awakened by voices, and in came the reconnaissance party. Luckily I had hot drinks for them, and we talked of their traverse of Norton's route. They then insisted on going to the other tent and I felt rather guilty that it was not ready for them.

* * * * * *

May 31st . . . . . At Camp V.

Woke early and took a brew of hot milk to Wyn and Waggers who looked comfortable enough wrapt in their sleeping bags. They left about mid-day for Camp IV. It has snowed above us all day but there was a warm sun. (Frank and Eric did not go out this day from VI because of the snow.) Spent the night alone, my seventh night at V.

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June 1st . . . . . At Camp V.

(Written on June 2nd at Camp IV-A.) Spent the day cooking as usual, saw nothing of the party above. At 5 p.m. the most terrific hurricane started, lasting about half an hour. Luckily my tent having collapsed on me the night before, I had secured it pretty firmly. Nothing could prevent the snow coming in and I soon had my cooking supply for at least a day lying around me. At about 6-15 Eric came in, having weathered the storm between VI and V; he was covered in icicles and obviously rather affected by his experience. Luckily a brew of soup was actually boiling and this was followed by the contents of all the Thermoses. We then did a very stupid thing and sat talking of his and Frank's attempt that day. The result being that when he went to bed the wind had sprung up again and he found he couldn't get into his tent, and that it was (of course) half full of snow and he didn't know which end the sleeping bags were. (Eric Shipton was just starting a temporary loss of memory which lasted for about 4 or 5 days eventually.) Twice he came back to me and we both got frozen trying to fix the wires of his torch; eventually I insisted on his staying in my tent in one of the extra sleeping bags there. He still tried to go and fetch another bag but I managed to stop him as already we were practically in a frostbitten state. I think that night the worst I have ever spent, with the one comfort of having Eric there. It was one continual blizzard and Eric and I talked all the night through. (Frank at Camp VI in contrast to

EAST RONGBUK GLACIER



DR. RAYMOND GREENE AND MR. LONGLAND IN THE TROUGH OF THE EAST RONGBUK GLACIER

us had four sleeping bags to himself and slept the clock round in comparative comfort). The snow came through the side of the tent and the door. My feet were frozen and it was certainly on this occasion that my frostbite became serious. The morning found us covered in about an inch of snow.

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June 2nd . . . . . To Camp IV-A.

A fine but windy day, Frank was coming straight from VI to IV. Eric and I were keen to go down as soon as possible, especially as it was probable that my feet, already numbed, combined with the sprained tendon, might delay our descent. Just after 11 a.m. I saw Frank some way above the Camp, we immediately started down ahead of him. What a ridge this is! we descended in a gale against which we could hardly stand up. Eric waited for me all the way down. Lower down it was better and we were met by Jack with a very welcome tot of hot water and brandy. Frank was close behind and had not taken advantage of the hot tea we had left for him at V.

Willie (McLean) is here at IV and put us straight to bed with hot soup, looking after us wonderfully. That ends the second assault. Everest wins again. Frank certainly, and probably Wyn also, would have reached the summit if falls of snow had not made the condition of the slabs unjustifiably dangerous. When Willie examined us, Frank and I were both normal and our pulses 62 each. This was about an hour after we reached IV. Eric had a slight temperature and higher pulse rate. My heart was out by about an inch but Frank was still perfectly sound.

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June 3rd . . . . . To Camp III.

All evacuated to III. Willie suddenly taken very ill and reached III with difficulty. We met the "She-Bear" (Shebbeare) on the old Camp IV ledge on his way up with a "permit" to visit the North Col ridge. As usual he was carrying a heavy rucksack, but managed to eat his lunch on the Col before the clouds arrived to hide the view. Willie's illness appears to be sheer altitude exhaustion, and seems hardly possible after all the cooking and doctoring he did for us yesterday.

At IV-A yesterday, after our arrival, Frank decided to take oxygen for 20 minutes to see if it affected his pulse. After about 5 minutes

I remarked that as the whistle was not blowing the apparatus was obviously not working. Jack facetiously remarked that "it only blew when the patient was dying," and no further notice was taken. After 20 minutes Frank solemnly took his pulse and found it exactly the same, *i.e.*, 62. He remarked how strange this was and Willie, duly impressed, took out his note-book and made several interesting medical notes on the fact. We asked Frank if the oxygen had had any effect on him, and he said that it had soothed him but made his throat a little sore. Rather amusing—being all imagination.

Conference at III. It is decided to evacuate to the Base for a week to recuperate and then make a final assault.

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June 5th . . . . . At Camp II.

My feet now too sore to allow me to move, the others went on down. Hugh, She-Bear and Willie arrive from III, the latter very ill. In spite of this he writes round offering advice and apologising for not being able to come and see me.

* * * * * *

June 6th . . . . . To Base Camp.

Was carried down in turns pick-a-back all the way to Base Camp by 4 porters, it was not as exhausting as I had expected. Have just heard that during the consolidation of Camp IV poor "Policee" insisted on climbing to the foot of the ice wall (22,500 feet). While the porters were re-laying loads up the ladder she disappeared. It is most distressing as we had all become very fond of our Mascot, who would tolerate us but flew at any Thibetan who approached our Camp. As no barking or noise was heard by anyone it is hoped that in falling she was knocked unconscious and so died painlessly.

* * * * * *

June 14th—21st

Willie, George, and myself at Tashi Dzom, Willie quite ill with a patch of bronchial pneumonia, but is better now. It is very restful here, the trees a lovely green, and the grass six inches long. We have our tents facing into the garden and can watch the hare come nervously off the hillside in the early morning. To-day a female bhurrel walked into our garden and grazed 50 yards away in full view of our tents until a dog arrived and chased her away. My feet much improved, can walk about 100 yards now. Pasang is here and seems to enjoy his blackened fingers, two of which must come off.

In spite of the pain he still laughs all day and works hard, allowing no one else to touch my belongings. No news from above yet of the third attempt.

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June 23rd.

News at last from above. After continual snow and bad weather it is reported that Camp III has been evacuated yesterday, everyone returning to Base Camp. No progress was possible above III, this sounds like a final withdrawal.

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July 2nd.

A letter arrives from Hugh giving definite news of our plans. The Everest Committee has recalled the Expedition. Messages by wireless have been received from the King, the R. G. S., the A. C., Colonel Norton and others. The King especially mentions his hope that another expedition will be possible. Hugh's reasons for advising a withdrawal were cabled home, and as they are of considerable interest I reproduce here what he says in his letter to me :

"I have come to the conclusion . . . that Everest, in ordinary circumstances, remains a snow-peak and therefore unclimbable during the period July—September inclusive. This does not apply to lower peaks so much, but above 25,000 feet it seems almost certain that—

1. The air temperature never rises above freezing point, therefore clouds on Everest invariably imply snow.

2. The snow is powdery and never consolidates otherwise the North face of Everest would be like the South face—iced.

3. The sun has little or no power to melt snow except when there is a thin coating on slabs. Sublimation hardly occurs therefore.

4. The only agent for removing snow is wind, and this hardly comes into operation till the north-west wind establishes itself towards the end of September, by which time it is too cold to climb.

The Rongbuk Lama has sent me a special message to the effect that the snow never leaves Everest during the next three months. I attach no special importance to this but it is corroborative."

So all is over and we are to go back.

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July 27th.

Arrived at Darjeeling.

TWO FURTHER LECTURES ON THE MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN—4TH OCTOBER 1915 to 11TH MARCH 1917

By Lieut.-Colonel J. E. Shearer, m.c., 1/15th Punjab Regiment.

1. *Scope of These Two Lectures*

These two lectures cover one of the Military History periods set for the Promotion Examinations in October this year and March next year, *i.e.*, from the commencement of General Nixon's unsuccessful advance on Baghdad in 1915 up to its capture by General Maude in 1917.

There are so many military lessons to be derived from this campaign that I shall have to concentrate on them and keep the narrative of events as brief as possible. But I would recommend all examination candidates to read the Staff College "Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917," copies of which are in every Station Military Library. It is an excellent and very clear book.

It is impossible to understand this campaign properly unless you have some idea of the unusual conditions of topography, climate, floods, mud, mirage, entire lack of drinkable water, except in the large rivers, and so on, in Mesopotamia (or Iraq as it is now called). I have tried to summarize these conditions as concisely as possible in two lectures of mine on the earlier part of the Mesopotamia Campaign which were published in the July and October 1934 copies of the Journal of the United Service Institution of India. I would recommend examination candidates to read the introductory pages of those two lectures, as well as Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Staff College "Critical Study," in order to put themselves into the picture regarding the peculiar difficulties with which everyone had to contend during this very trying campaign.

2. *Phases of Campaign*

This campaign falls into six distinct phases. These are—

(*i*) General Townshend's advance towards Baghdad and the battle of Ctesiphon.

(*ii*) General Townshend's retirement to Kut-al-Amara and the siege of Kut up to Christmas 1915.

(*iii*) The operation of the Kut Relief Force up to the surrender of Kut on the 29th April 1916, after a siege of 143 days. During this period the defenders of Kut were having a very bad time indeed, but the attentions of the Turks were directed mainly against the Relief Force and the determined efforts to take Kut by storm had ceased.

(*iv*) From the 30th April until the 13th December 1916 there was practically no fighting. The heat was intense, and the original Relief Force was having a really wretched time through the almost entire breakdown of " Q " arrangements on the L. of C. But conditions improved steadily from the time General Maude was made Force Commander in August 1916, until he was ready on the 13th December to resume the advance upon Baghdad.

(*v*) The period 14th December 1916 to 24th February 1917 was a period of intense fighting which resulted in the capture of Kut and the precipitate retreat of the whole Turkish Army towards Baghdad.

(*vi*) The period 25th February to 11th March 1917 consisted of the pursuit of the Turks towards Baghdad, finishing up with the forcing of the River Diyala after hard fighting on the 10th March, and General Maude's entry into Baghdad on 11th March 1917.

I shall now go into each of these phases in as much detail as I can in the time available.

FIRST PHASE—GENERAL TOWNSHEND'S ADVANCE TOWARDS BAGHDAD AND BATTLE OF CTESIPHON

3. *Opening Situation* (vide *Sketch Map No.* 1).

Our story opens with the arrival at Aziziya (60 miles by road above Kut-al-Amara), on 5th October 1915, of General Townshend in his attempted pursuit by river of the Turks, whom he had defeated a week earlier at the battle of Kut-al-Amara. The sudden drop in the level of the Tigris had delayed his pursuit and the Turks had got clear away to the Ctesiphon Position, some 20 miles further on. General Townshend had consequently.

through no fault of his own, finally lost his chance of hustling the demoralized Turks through Ctesiphon and entering Baghdad on their heels. So he halted and asked for orders.

4. *Decision to Advance to Baghdad*

General Nixon, the Force Commander, was still full of optimism about General Townshend's ability to capture Baghdad, but he considered that he would require two extra divisions to safeguard it against recapture, once taken. He consequently asked for permission from the War Cabinet to advance to Baghdad, and requested the early despatch of the two extra divisions which he required.

General Nixon's optimism is nothing short of amazing. He cannot have forgotten the "Q" difficulties, because he was at that time repeatedly asking A. H. Q., India, for more river transport and for a railway, neither of which there was any likelihood of his obtaining in time. The transport situation was in a really perilous state. The Striking Force (6th Indian Division) was very short of 1st Line Transport. 2nd Line Transport was shorter still and consisted mostly of Arab sailing boats (Mahailas), while the river transport on the L. of C. could only deliver 150 tons a day to General Townshend, although his daily maintenance requirements were 208 tons a day. Yet General Nixon was proposing to extend his already over-strained river L. of C. by a further 200 miles. General Townshend protested, but his protest failed to shake General Nixon's optimism.

The details of the telegrams which passed between General Nixon, the War Cabinet, A. H. Q., India, and the Viceroy, before sanction for the advance on Baghdad was given, make wearisome reading. The argument took three precious weeks and was a chapter of misunderstandings. The War Cabinet did not realize the transportation shortage and so thought in terms of "G" only. The India Office and A. H. Q., India, knew the "Q" difficulties, but did not realize that the War Cabinet was ignorant of them. So the unfortunate sanction was given.

Anyhow, the lesson which this rubs forcibly into us is the old one which it is so fatally easy to forget in the enthusiasm of a successful advance; that the best "G" plans are useless in war unless the "Q" side of them has been given due weight in their preparation.

5. *Preparations for Attack on Ctesiphon Position*

While this correspondence was going on, Generals Nixon and Townshend were making all preparations for the advance. Drafts were sent up, supplies were dumped well forward, and the Turkish covering troops were driven in.

General Townshend received his last batch of river transport on the 18th November, and advanced towards Ctesiphon the next morning.

The five weeks delay at Aziziya were unavoidable, but this respite was invaluable to the Turks. The defeated 35th and 38th Divisions had pulled themselves together and had been reinforced by the 45th and 51st Divisions of real Anatolian Turks. These two divisions had a splendid fighting record and were of very different quality to the divisions which General Townshend had previously defeated.

The Turkish strength at Ctesiphon had risen from about 9,000 men and 30 guns to 20,000 men and 45 guns, whereas General Townshend had only 14,000 men and 30 land guns. The War Office had warned General Nixon that Von der Goltz with 30,000 men was *en route* for Mesopotamia, but he did not believe this report and estimated that there were only 11,000 to 13,000 Turks at Ctesiphon.

6. *Description of the Ctesiphon Position (called Sulaiman Pak by the Turks)*—(vide *sketch Map No.* 2).

The sketch map shows the position clearly. It consisted of two main lines of defence in the bend of the Tigris about Ctesiphon, and a third position six miles further back at the junction of the Diyala River with the Tigris. The first line of defence was fully dug in depth and wired, and had a field of fire of 1,000 yards cleared in front of it by burning the grass. The second and third lines of defence were only partially dug. The first and second lines were mainly on the left bank of the Tigris, but had extensions across the river defended by very broken nullah country which would have been difficult to attack over.

The northern portion of the first line of defence was strong, but the position had three weaknesses. These were—

(*i*) The only communication between the right and left bank positions was one boat bridge behind the second line of defence.

(*ii*) The southern portion of the first position could only be attacked in enfilade from High Wall, but it was of no great value to the defence, sited as it was.

(*iii*) The outer flank of the first position on the left bank was too near the Tigris and so could be easily turned and attacked in flank.

The Turkish Commander, Nur-ud-Din, had, however, disposed his troops well (*vide* Sketch Map No. 2). His three forward divisions were in depth with adequate local reserves, and he had the whole of his best division and his cavalry brigade in general reserve. He was, therefore, ready to meet any emergency, and in fact handled his reserves most effectively throughout the battle.

7. *General Townshend's Plan of Attack on Ctesiphon Position*

(*a*) *His Appreciation.*

General Townshend had originally intended to advance up the right bank of the Tigris, thus forcing Nur-ud-Din to abandon Ctesiphon and fight in some hastily prepared position elsewhere, but he abandoned this idea upon hearing of the difficult going on the right bank.

He had no maps and so had to rely on eye sketches made from aeroplane reconnaissances, but these turned out to be reasonably accurate. He knew of the arrival of the Turkish 45th Division, but did not know of the 51st Division.

Taking all these points into consideration he decided to attack the left bank position from the north-east.

(*b*) *His plan was as follows—*

(*i*) He split his force into four columns as under:

Column "A"—Commander, Major-General Delamain.

Troops—

16th Infantry Brigade (less 2 battalions),

30th Composite Infantry Brigade 3½ battalions plus the 2 other battalions of the 16th Infantry Brigade.

Two Field Batteries.

Column "B"—Commander, Brigadier-General Hamilton.

Troops—

18th Infantry Brigade.

One Field Battery.

Column "C"—Commander, Brigadier-General Hoghton.

Troops—

17th Infantry Brigade.
48th Pioneers.
One Squadron Divisional Cavalry.
One Field Battery.
One Section Heavy Battery.

Flying Column—Commander, Major-General Melliss.

Troops—

6th Cavalry Brigade.
One Maxim Battery.
Two Armoured Cars.
76th Punjabis (with A. T. carts to carry half the battalion at a time).

General Townshend retained *no* General Reserve at all in his own hand.

(*ii*) *The role of each column was as follows—*

Column "C" to make an ostentatious holding attack between Water Redoubt and High Wall.

Column "A" to capture V. P., from the east and roll up the Turkish first line of defence.

Column "B" to attack the Turkish second line about Qusaiba, from the east, to divert attention from Column "A's" attack.

Flying Column to outflank the Turkish second line and take up a position behind it.

The "Naval Flotilla," of all the gun-boats and heavy guns on barges, to enfilade the Turkish position upstream of Bustan.

Divisional Headquarters at Bustan.

(*iii*) *Time Table of Attack*

Column "C" to march ostentatiously to Bustan on the afternoon of 21st November to draw Turkish reserves south from V. P., and to commence attack at first light on 22nd November.

Columns "A," "B" and Flying Column to "Old Canal Embankment" on night of 21st/22nd November, dropping Column "A" 5,000 yards east of V. P., Column "B" 1½ miles further north, and Flying Column 1½ miles still further north.

Column "B" and Flying Column to commence their attacks on the morning of 22nd November, as soon as Column "C's" attack had properly started.

Column "A" to attack V. P., as soon as the Turks' attention was turned towards Column "B's" attack.

8. *Criticisms of General Townshend's Plan*

It is easy to be wise after the event, but this very elaborate and ambitious plan lays itself out to many criticisms. Perhaps the principal of these are—

(*a*) *The plan was not elastic enough*

The plan was complicated and rigid. The whole force was scattered in independent detachments over a wide area, and so the plan could not be modified at short notice to meet unexpected emergencies. This was very risky in view of General Townshend's distinctly vague and, as it happened, very inaccurate knowledge of the enemy strength and dispositions.

He risked defeat in detail and was only saved from that by the first-rate fighting qualities of his troops.

(*b*) *Each Column Commander's orders were conditional upon the action of some other column*

This again is risky, particularly in that country where lack of landmarks, and mirage, make it very difficult to keep direction. As it happened every Column, except Column "A," lost its direction more or less. F. S. R. specially warns us against conditional orders.

(*c*) *There was no General Reserve* with which General Townshend could influence the battle, once joined. Compare Nur-ud-Din's wise precautions in this case.

(*d*) *The whole Force was split into weak detachments* so there was no real weight anywhere, either of infantry or guns, to force a decision. The weak columns gained their objectives through sheer grit and bravery, but at terrible cost, and after having to improvise their local reserves out of any men they could scrape together on the spot.

(*e*) *Surely a concentrated Flank Attack of the whole 6th Division, supported by the co-ordinated fire of all its artillery,* although much less Napoleonic and spectacular, would have won success more quickly and surely and at far less cost in

valuable lives. Moreover, General Townshend would then have been able to modify his plan rapidly to meet the unexpected counter-attacks of the 51st Division, and his splendid troops might after all have obtained a victory in spite of the disparity of numbers.

9. *Battle of Ctesiphon—First Day (22nd November)*

I have no time to give the details of this very interesting battle, which is well worth reading in the Official History. Column "C's" original advance was hesitating and bewildered, owing to the fact that their orders prevented pushing home their attacks; and because the Turks opposite them "refused to play" and withheld their fire until Column "C" had arrived within 800 yards of the position. Moreover, Column "C" started attacking towards High Wall in error, and so had eventually to do a costly flank march close to the enemy in order to capture their objective of Water Redoubt.

As Column "C" were failing to create the necessary diversion, General Townshend ordered Column "B" and the Flying Column to attack without waiting for them. But they also lost direction and attacked too close behind V. P. Nur-ud-Din had been fully aware of the night march round his exposed flank and was prepared. As soon as this attack started he counter-attacked with the bulk of the 51st Division. Neither side could make headway against the other and the result was a bitterly contested stale-mate on that flank.

Hearing the firing, Column "A" then commenced a most gallant attack on V. P. at 09·00 hours; and after a terrific "dog fight," in which our men lost terribly, and in which the 45th Turkish Division practically ceased to exist, Columns "A" and "C" had captured the whole of the Turkish first position by noon. But our casualties had been so heavy, and the remnants of units were so mixed, that we were only just able to hang on to the fringe of our gains against the determined counter-attacks by fresh troops of the 51st and 35th Turkish Divisions, which lasted all afternoon and evening.

At dusk both sides ceased firing, both too battered to fight any more; and General Townshend concentrated the remnants of his force at V. P. Thanks to the lack of reserves on our side the fight had been a most gallant "soldier's battle" with little generalship displayed, but with quite a lot of generalship on Nur-ud-Din's part.

10. *Battle of Ctesiphon—Second Day (23rd November)*

On the morning of the 23rd, reorganization was taken in hand. Column "C" held V. P., Column "A" (less 2/7th Gurkhas and 24th Punjabis) held Water Redoubt; Column "B" held High Wall while the 2/7th Gurkhas and 24th Punjabis (only 400 rifles altogether) held Gurkha Mound to protect our exposed left flank.

The day passed quietly in evacuating our wounded and preparing defences, but at dusk the Turks started a general counter-attack which lasted all night. However the Turkish attacks fell into absolute chaos, made no headway at all, and retired at dawn. The whole 35th Division attacked Gurkha Mound but failed to capture it.

11. *Battle of Ctesiphon—Third and Fourth Days (24th and 25th November)*

On this day General Townshend concentrated his whole force at High Wall, but took all day to do so on account of the Turkish shelling.

That morning an Arab patrol mistook the 51st Turkish Division returning from its night attack for a British Column advancing towards the Diyala. Nur-ud-Din believed this and ordered his army back to the Diyala. This move was actually carried out during the night of the 24th/25th but when he discovered in the morning that the British had not moved, Nur-ud-Din ordered his force back again to Ctesiphon.

This forward movement was reported to General Townshend by aeroplane. He thought the Turks were being strongly reinforced, and he, in his turn, decided to retreat, and reached Lajj on the night of 25th/26th.

12. *Comments on Battle of Ctesiphon*

During this battle the British lost 4,600 casualties, as opposed to the Turks' 9,500, but this represented 60 per cent. casualties in many of our units and a high proportion of British officers had been knocked out, so reorganization was very difficult.

This Turkish victory was undoubtedly due to Nur-ud-Din's efficient handling of his reserves, but even so, the fog of war was very heavy on both sides, and had General Townshend, in the first instance, obeyed the precepts of F. S. R. and concentrated his maximum force on the vital point, and kept a strong reserve in hand, it would seem reasonable to suppose that victory would have gone to him instead of to his opponent.

As it was, it was only the extreme grit and bravery of his troops that prevented a complete disaster to General Townshend's force.

SECOND PHASE—RETREAT TO KUT-AL-AMARA AND COMMENCEMENT OF SIEGE

13. *Retreat to Kut-al-Amara*

General Townshend at first out-distanced the Turkish pursuit, but information on both sides was bad, and the Turks caught up General Townshend's force at Umm-at-Tabul during the night of the 30th November and 1st December without either side knowing this. This strange situation could not have happened had the cavalry of either side been doing its job properly.

At dawn, both sides were amazed to find their camps only $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles apart and in full view of each other, but General Townshend was absolutely brilliant in this emergency. Before the Turks could pull themselves together he carried out a rapid counter-attack, which relieved his force of all further pressure until after Kut was reached on the 3rd December.

But many supplies had to be abandoned at Aziziya, and owing to the low level of the Tigris, our shipping could not move fast enough to escape from the Turkish artillery fire. We consequently lost three gun-boats, a large river-steamer and some barges.

14. *Decision to Hold Kut-al-Amara*

We now come to another very controversial subject which I have no time to discuss (*i.e.*, was General Nixon right in agreeing to General Townshend's proposal to hold Kut-al-Amara ?) The question is fully discussed in the Official History, Vol. II, Chapters XVII and XVIII.

15. *Siege of Kut-al-Amara—First Phase* (*December* 1915)

On 4th December, the day after his arrival at Kut, General Townshend evacuated all his sick and wounded ; and on the 6th December the 6th Cavalry Brigade was sent to join the reinforcements which were then just beginning to reach Mesopotamia. These were the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions from France and Egypt ; the 34th, 35th and 36th Indian Infantry Brigades from India, which were to form a new division.

On the same day the Turks first began to shell Kut, and by the night of the 7th the investment was almost complete. From the 9th to the 13th December the Turks made many determined but unsuccessful assaults.

Von der Goltz had meanwhile arrived to take command of the Turkish Forces in Mesopotamia. He was nervous about the threat to Baghdad of our reinforcements which were landing in Basra, and of a Russian Army which was steadily advancing south-westwards in Persia. So he decided to starve out the Kut garrison, while moving his main strength downstream to oppose our Relief Force. He also sent a detachment to guard Baghdad from the Russian threat.

However, the Turks made one final effort to take Kut by storm before finally settling down to starve it out.

On the morning of Christmas Eve and twice more during the following night, they made the most determined attacks on "the Fort" (*i.e.*, the north-east corner of the Kut defences). These attacks were repulsed with great slaughter on both sides, and for the rest of the siege the garrison was left in comparative peace except for constant shelling and sniping.

But General Townshend's firm belief that he would be relieved within two months had meanwhile led him into a fatal error. He had considered eliminating all "useless mouths" by sending all the civilian population of Kut away before the siege commenced. But he knew that this would mean that many homeless women and children would have died of cold and hunger, so he allowed 6,000 of them to stay. He had two months' full rations for his own troops and plenty of ammunition; and he calculated that the 6,000 local inhabitants could feed themselves for 3 months. So he was not in the least perturbed about the ration situation. Consequently he made the fatal blunder of not straight away commandeering all the civilian food supplies in Kut and of not putting civilian and troops alike on a reduced ration from the beginning of the siege. He had to do this much later, after much valuable food had been squandered or concealed by the local inhabitants.

THIRD PHASE—OPERATIONS OF THE KUT RELIEF FORCE AND SURRENDER OF KUT

16. *Concentration of the Tigris Corps (Kut Relief Force) at Ali Gharbi (6th December* 1915 *to 3rd January* 1916)—(vide *Sketch Map No.* 1).

The story of the concentration of the Tigris Corps at Ali Gharbi and of the appreciations of the various British Commanders is most confusing reading, and most difficult to summarize clearly and briefly in the short space available in this lecture. The fog of the war was

great, and the administrative difficulties of the forward concentration and organization of the Tigris Corps almost insurmountable.

In packing the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions into ships the mistake in the original despatch of our force to Gallipoli had been more than surpassed. That lesson had evidently not yet sunk home to our staffs. Economy in shipping appears to have been the only consideration, with the result that formations, and even units, arrived at Basra incomplete. Units arrived without their horses and vehicles, staffs arrived long after their formations, field ambulances arrived without their ambulances, which had been loaded into ships too large to cross the bar of the Shatt-al-Arab and had to go to Bombay for reshipping before they could reach Basra; and so on. Also, the three Infantry Brigades from India had been hurriedly scraped together by picking out units here and there. They had scratch staffs, inadequate ancillary services and no transport, and had not previously trained together. That was unavoidable as the situation on the N. W. Frontier of India, as well as the Internal Security situation in that country were deteriorating rapidly; so complete brigades could not possibly be spared from India at that time.

Added to this was the really appalling lack of river transport in Mesopotamia. There had not been sufficient river transport to maintain General Townshend's force before Ctesiphon. But there was now even less for a much larger force, as some had been lost during the retreat from Ctesiphon, and a certain amount had been retained in Kut.

General Gorringe had had the foresight to have a road of sorts constructed along the river bank from Basra to Amara between the 1st and 14th December. This relieved the congestion a little by enabling Infantry to march up to the Front with all their baggage in *mahailas*. But this was a slow process; and as the *mahailas* had to stop with all units as 2nd Line Transport, it took these *mahailas* permanently away from the transportation of supplies on the L. of C. (and incidentally, the Arab *mahaila* men were an excellent spy organization who kept the Turks well informed of our numbers and movements).

These were some of the many difficulties with which General Nixon had to contend when he hurried back to Basra after the battle of Ctesiphon to organize the rapid relief of Kut. (Chapters VII and

VIII of the Staff College "Critical Study" describe the administrative situation much more fully than I have time to do here.)

The 28th Indian Infantry Brigade (7th Division) from Egypt was the first of the reinforcing Brigades to arrive. It was pushed straight up to Ali Gharbi by river steamer, where it began to concentrate on 6th December, and where it was joined the same evening by the 6th Cavalry Brigade from Kut. General Younghusband, the commander of the 28th Infantry Brigade, was promoted to command the 7th Division; and on 8th December General Aylmer, who had arrived from India the previous day, was put in command of the Tigris Corps, which consisted of the Kut Relief Force, plus the 6th Division in Kut. But there were no Corps or Divisional Staffs. These had to be improvised from officers already in the country, many of whom had had no previous staff experience or training. No staff at all could be found for the new division from India; so the 35th and 36th Infantry Brigades had to become Corps Troops, while the 34th Brigade was sent to General Gorringe at Nasariya, on the Euphrates, where the Arabs were showing signs of rising again and threatening Basra. Meanwhile the 3rd Indian Division were also beginning to reach Basra, and they and the 36th Infantry Brigade marched up from there piecemeal, as units arrived. These were much hampered by rain and floods which started about the New Year and turned the whole country into a morass, where wheels could scarcely move at all, and where infantry and pack animals could only move slowly, picking up pounds of peculiarly tenacious mud on their feet at every step.

When the advance from Ali Gharbi to Sheikh Sa'ad commenced on 4th January 1916, the situation was as follows:

(*a*) *At Ali Gharbi*—

(*i*) General Aylmer, with Headquarters Tigris Corps.

(*ii*) 7th Indian Division (General Younghusband) consisting of 19th, 21st and 28th Infantry Brigades.

(*iii*) 6th Cavalry Brigade and 35th Infantry Brigade, also under command of General Younghusband.

(*b*) *Scattered in odd units on march between Basra and Ali Gharbi*—
3rd Indian Division and 36th Infantry Brigade.

(*c*) *At Nasariya (under General Gorringe)*—
12th and 34th Infantry Brigades (both incomplete).

(*d*) *Also various L. of C. units along the Tigris*, to protect our shipping and Advanced Base at Amara.

17. *Topography and Campaigning conditions of area of operations of Tigris Corps*—(vide *Sketch Map No.* 3)

(*a*) *Drinking Water*

The only drinkable water was in the Tigris, as all the marshes shewn on the sketch map were too strongly impregnated with Epsom Salts to be fit even for drinking by animals. So both armies were tied to the Tigris. Wide turning movements were ruled out through lack of the necessary land transport to form water columns. Consequently head-on collisions with the enemy were unavoidable.

(*b*) *Lack of Land Transport prohibits Strategic Manœuvre*

The Tigris was the maintenance L. of C. of both sides.

Generals Nixon, Aylmer and Townshend all made the mistake of thinking that the Turks' notoriously bad "Q" arrangements would tie them to their river transport in the same way that we were and that therefore, as their river craft could not pass Kut, the Turks could not maintain any appreciable force below Kut, in order to oppose the Relief Force. They were entirely wrong in this. The Turks had sufficient land transport to maintain practically their whole army several marches below Kut for as long as they wished to do so.

(*c*) *Strategic Effect of Marshes*

Looking at the map you will see at once what an ideal delaying position the defile between the large Suwaikiya Marsh and the Tigris gives to the Turks, when it is remembered that the water in the Suwaikiya Marsh is undrinkable; and that the distance round it is far too big to have allowed the Relief Force, without water, to turn the Hanna-Sannayat defile by that route.

Any attempt to turn that defile from the right bank of the Tigris would have been equally out of the question, as General Aylmer had not the transport to carry any bridging material there overland.

It seems amazing how Generals Nixon, Aylmer and Townshend all seem to have overlooked the importance of this defile. They all considered the possibility of the Turks holding the Es Sinn position, in which they had been defeated by General Townshend the previous September, but

I can find no reference to the Hanna-Sannayat defile. However, we must remember that General Aylmer had no maps at all, and he had as yet not seen the country. He was being worried by General Townshend for early relief before the Relief Force could possibly be concentrated. He had only two aeroplanes altogether, of which one only was serviceable; and the weather was too bad for aerial reconnaissance most of the time. Moreover, Generals Nixon and Townshend, who knew that part of the country, do not seem to have noticed that fatal defile either. So it is little wonder that General Aylmer also seems to have overlooked its importance.

But Von der Goltz had not overlooked it, as we shall see.

(*d*) *Weather*

As I have already said, the rains had begun by this time, and the whole country was becoming a quagmire of deep, very tenacious mud, where free movement was almost impossible. The Tigris had not yet risen and inundated large portions of the scene of operations, but that too was to happen in February.

Added to this, the weather was bitterly cold, and there was no wood for fires for the men to dry their clothes. There are no trees in that part of the country, so *all* firewood had to come from India. This used up much precious space in the daily maintenance transport. Another resultant evil of the shortage of transport was that the Relief Force had to be put on short rations. So conditions were at their very worst both for manœuvre and for the powers of physical endurance of the men.

(*e*) *Medical*

The medical situation was unspeakable. The Medical Officers on the spot "worked like Trojans," but they and their material were hopelessly inadequate. The wounded suffered terribly and a great many died of neglect and exposure.

(*f*) *Intelligence* was bad, although General Townshend was able to report fairly accurately the movements of the Turks passing Kut.

(*g*) *Terrain* is absolutely flat and featureless, making it extremely hard to keep direction or see one's objective in the attack; while reconnaissance was made more difficult still by the daily mirage. The ground was soft and digging very easy, while deep trenches stood up without any revetment. So it was ideal country for the defence, and very bad indeed for the attack.

I think I have said enough to put you in the picture to a certain extent as to the very great difficulties against which both General Aylmer and his troops had to contend. But I do not think that anyone, who was not with that unfortunate Relief Force, can really visualize their difficulties and hardships fully.

18. *General Aylmer's Appreciation and Order for Advance to Sheikh Sa'ad* (vide *Sketch Map No.* 3).

The orders which General Nixon gave General Aylmer were to relieve Kut, as quickly as possible, and then to take up a position west of it and await orders regarding a further advance. General Townshend was to co-operate by sallying forth with as many men as he could. General Nixon thought that the Turks might hold the Es Sinn position to cause delay, and he knew that a few Turks were in position at Sheikh Sa'ad, but he thought that the Turkish main position would be found west of Kut and that the actual relief of Kut would not be strongly opposed.

General Aylmer decided to advance by the left bank because General Townshend wirelessed that he could only co-operate with 5,000 rifles at most, and that it would take at least 6 days to ferry them across to the right bank.

General Aylmer wanted to wait at Ali Gharbi until his whole Corps was concentrated about there, and then to make a methodical advance in force; but General Townshend's repeated requests for an early relief gave the false impression that Kut could not hold out beyond the 15th January. General Aylmer therefore decided that he *must* advance from Ali Gharbi by the 3rd January at the latest with what force he had ready by then. He calculated that that was the earliest date by which the 7th Division would be ready to move.

Actually Kut held out until the 29th April. But throughout the siege General Townshend kept forcing General Aylmer into premature attacks before he was ready, by giving him earlier dates beyond which Kut could not hold out. Had General Townshend

commandeered *all* food supplies in Kut on the 4th December, and put the local inhabitants on a definite ration straight away, he would surely have been able to make a more accurate forecast of the length of time his rations would last. That would have given General Aylmer time to develop his full strength for each attack, and so given him much more chance of relieving Kut.

General Nixon's final estimate of the Turkish dispositions on the 3rd January, just before General Aylmer's advance, was—

(*i*) *On right bank, 9 miles west of Kut*—36th and 45th Divisions.

(*ii*) *On left bank, round Kut*—38th, 51st and 52nd Divisions.

(*iii*) *On left bank, possibly at Es Sinn*—35th Division.

(*iv*) *Astride Tigris at Sheikh Sa'ad*—4 Battalions of Gendarmerie, 800 Cavalry and 1,200 Camelry.

Grand total about 30,000 *men and* 83 *guns*, but he again stressed that he thought the Turkish morale to be low and that he did not consider that the Turks would oppose General Aylmer west of Kut.

It was on this information, which we now know to be wrong, that General Aylmer based the orders for his first attempt at the relief of Kut. Actually the Turkish strength was more like 20,000 men and 50 guns, and they were mostly on the left bank directly opposing the Tigris Corps' advance.

General Aylmer had only 18,000 men and 46 guns, and the tactical advantage was all with the defence. So it is difficult to understand General Nixon's optimism about the early relief of Kut. General Aylmer was by no means so optimistic about the situation.

Action at Sheikh Sa'ad (vide *Sketch Map No.* 3)

General Younghusband advanced from Ali Gharbi on the 4th January with the 7th Division (less 21st Infantry Brigade), 35th Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade, with orders to choose and entrench a position at Sheikh Sa'ad. On the 5th January it was discovered that the Turks had at least 10,500 men entrenched astride the Tigris at Sheikh Sa'ad, and not only an advanced guard as previously reported. So General Younghusband was told to pin the Turks to their ground and await General Aylmer's arrival. He interpreted this order to mean that he must attack, and he did so on the 6th January.

His plan was to envelop the Turks on the right bank and drive them into the angle of the Tigris just beyond Sheikh Sa'ad, thus enabling the Turkish position on the left bank to be enfiladed. He

detailed the 28th Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade for the main attack on the right bank. On the left bank the 35th Infantry Brigade led the attack, with the 19th Infantry Brigade following one mile behind. The criticism seems justified that, as his right bank attack was his decisive one, he should have put more strength there than he did, and kept less for his holding attack on the left bank.

The fighting on the first day was indecisive. There was a thick mist in the morning, then a mirage; so the day ended with the 28th and 35th Infantry Brigades held up, in battle outposts, with the enemy not in the least shaken and their flanks still unlocated. The 19th Infantry Brigade had not as yet been used.

That night General Aylmer arrived with the 21st and 9th Infantry Brigades and took over command. He had a boat bridge which could be erected rapidly, and so had the advantage over the Turks of being able to transfer his reserve rapidly from one bank to the other. He had the alternatives of smashing the weaker Turkish detachment on the right bank or defeating their main force on the left bank.

He decided on the latter course for two reasons—

(*i*) A defeat of the Turkish main force would be the surest way to ensure the rapid relief of Kut.

(*ii*) If he transferred most of his force to the right bank the much stronger Turkish force on the left bank might overwhelm his holding force and play havoc with his shipping, as had happened to General Townshend's shipping at Umm-At-Tabul.

He consequently sent the 19th and 21st Infantry Brigades up to General Younghusband, about 10·00 hours on the 7th January, and ordered him to turn the enemy's left flank with them, while the 28th Infantry Brigade, supported by the 9th Infantry Brigade, made a simultaneous attack on the right bank.

But it must be remembered that the enemy's flanks had not as yet been located. As it happened the enemy were expecting a turning attack on the left bank and had dug a flanking position, 3 miles from the river, to stop any such attack. The result was that our outflanking attack on the left bank was itself outflanked and counter-attacked. Our men suffered very severely, but with great bravery hung on to the ground gained.

On the right bank the 28th Brigade captured the enemy front line and was then held up.

The 8th January was spent in reorganization and further attempts to push on on the right bank, but the air reports, which reached General Aylmer throughout the day, were amazingly conflicting. It was raining hard, turning the ground to gluey mud, and there was also a mirage.

On the morning of the 9th January it was discovered that the Turks had retired. It is not known why, because they had had decidedly the best of it, and had inflicted 4,000 casualties on us. Perhaps they were afraid of their supply columns sticking in the mud and so wanted to shorten the distance from their river transport at Shumran.

This battle is a good example of the danger of staging an attack hastily on imperfect information. But information was always extremely difficult to obtain in the mirage in the featureless country of Mesopotamia. Both sides also proved the inefficiency of observed artillery covering-fire under Mesopotamian conditions. Under such conditions barrages would have afforded the only really useful artillery covering fire. But General Aylmer had neither enough ammunition nor enough river transport to replenish his ammunition, if used in large quantities. So here also he was hopelessly handicapped by the deplorable deficiency of river transport.

I have described this first battle somewhat fully in order to give you some idea of the fighting problems of the Tigris Corps, but lack of space forces me to skim very rapidly over the rest of this phase of the Campaign.

Actions of Wadi and Hanna, followed by stale-mate up to the end of February 1916.

(*a*) 10*th to* 12*th January* 1916.

After the fight at Sheikh Sa'ad General Aylmer had again to decide whether he would await his reinforcements or follow the Turks at once. By the morning of the 11th January he knew that the Turks were entrenching the Hanna Defile, but they still seemed to be giving him a chance, as a large number of them were in position between the river Wadi and the Suwaikiya Marsh. He therefore decided to try to overwhelm the Turks in this advanced position and get through the Hanna Defile on their heels. The longer he delayed the more time would the Turks have to make the Hanna position impregnable.

The distance from Sheikh Sa'ad to the Wadi is only 7 miles, and 4 miles on from there to the Hanna Defile,

(*b*) *Action on the Wadi, 13th January* 1916.

After some feints on the 12th January to mislead the Turks, the 7th Division (less 28th Infantry Brigade), plus 35th Infantry Brigade and 6th Cavalry Brigade, did a night-march with the object of attacking the Turks on the Wadi from the North and cutting them off from Hanna. The 28th Infantry Brigade and gun-boats were to co-operate by a frontal attack along the Tigris.

But owing to the early morning mist, and to difficulties in crossing the unreconnoitred Wadi, the infantry attack did not start until after 10·00 hours and the artillery did not cross the Wadi until 13·00 hours. The Turks had been warned and had occupied flank positions in time to hold up our attack. Our observed artillery covering-fire was quite ineffective, as nobody could locate the new Turkish positions in the scrub-fringed irrigation channels, and in any case our artillery observers could not see through the mirage.

The day ended in stale-mate, but the Turks retired to Hanna during the night, having inflicted another 1,600 casualties on us.

Again the same mistake had been made of launching an attack hastily against an unreconnoitred position. And in planning the night march no allowance had been made for the delay in crossing the Wadi. The fact seems to have been overlooked that a rapid advance was essential after the Arab villages on the Wadi had been reached, if the advantages of surprise were not to be thrown away by giving the frightened villagers time to warn the Turks, as they evidently did do. And lastly, the 6th Cavalry Brigade allowed themselves to be held up by a little long-distance fire. They had a good opportunity for a mounted attack against the enemy's rear (such as was often entirely successful in Palestine in 1918), but they did nothing in this case.

(*c*) *First Attack on Hanna, 21st January* 1916.

On the night of the Wadi attack it began to rain again and continued almost incessantly for some weeks. The whole country soon became a morass of soft, deep, clinging mud, and there was a constant icy gale straight off the snows of the Pusht-i-Kuh mountains. Our troops had no adequate shelter, and no fuel to dry their clothes, so their condition was unspeakably miserable. Added to this, they were on reduced rations, and were tired out by making constant night advances under heavy fire to bring our front line nearer to that of the Turks at Hanna and they knew that if they were wounded they

could not be properly attended to. The troops from France had serge uniforms, but those from India were still shivering in khaki drill. So it says a very great deal for them all that their morale remained high and that they were still full of fighting spirit.

Meanwhile the 3rd Indian Division, under General Keary, was beginning to arrive in the Wadi area. General Kemball was afraid of a Turkish attack on the right bank of the Tigris on his shipping, and so ordered the 3rd Division to that bank to safeguard it and to enfilade the Hanna position from there, but his bridge of boats was broken by the storm three times between the 14th and 19th January. Meanwhile, every day's delay meant that the Turks were improving their defences in the Hanna Defile. So General Aylmer's problem was not an easy one to solve. As he was on the spot and saw all this first-hand he was naturally somewhat despondent; and he was not helped at all by a constant stream of acrimonious messages from General Townshend, who kept on insisting that he could see the Turks retreating daily past Kut, and complaining at not being relieved immediately. But General Townshend eventually told General Aylmer that he could hold out on half rations up to the 17th February. So that gave him a little more time.

General Nixon, at Basra, continued to be optimistic. He could not realize that the Anatolian Turks, who now faced the Tigris Corps, would not run away when attacked, as the Turkish Arab troops, who had opposed General Townshend before Ctesiphon, always did. So he ordered General Aylmer to attack without delay.

Consequently, after a whole day's bombardment, as intense as General Aylmer's inadequate artillery with their inadequate supply of ammunition could carry out, the 7th Division attacked the Hanna position on the 21st January. The enemy were holding a 1,300-yard front with unturnable flanks, so a direct frontal attack could not be avoided. Our infantry toiled gallantly through the mud up to the Turkish front line and were simply mown down by the Turks, who had not been in the least shaken by our inadequate preliminary bombardment. The attack was a costly failure, as it was bound to be under those conditions.

General Aylmer had lost 8,000 battle casualties in three weeks, and seemed no nearer relieving Kut than at the beginning. He was fighting the elements and our own bad administration just as much as he was fighting the Turks, with everything in the enemy's favour.

They were strongly entrenched in country ideal for the defence ; their morale was at its highest on account of their success in Gallipoli ; and their strength was fully equal to that of the Tigris Corps. Under existing conditions General Aylmer's task of relieving Kut by the 17th February was humanly impossible, as I am sure history will agree.

(*d*) *Changes in Control of Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force.*

On the 18th January, General Nixon, who had been ill since before Ctesiphon and had asked for relief, was relieved by General Lake.

On the 26th January the War Committee in England ordered the 13th British Division, which had been in Gallipoli, to be sent to Mesopotamia forthwith.

In February the War Committee reorganized the higher control of all operations in Mesopotamia and Persia. In future the Commander-in-Chief in India was to receive all instructions regarding policy and operations through the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, but India, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief in India, was still to remain the main base for the Mesopotamian Force, although the War Committee undertook to help India with material when necessary.

(*e*) *General Townshend Commandeers Arab Food in Kut*

On the 25th January, General Townshend altered General Aylmer's whole problem by telling him that he had purchased all the Arabs' food in Kut, and had now food for 84 more days (*i.e.*, up to 17th April). Had General Townshend known that before he forced General Aylmer to advance prematurely from Ali Gharbi, he would have saved the Tigris Corps all those unnecessary casualties in the January battles, and would have facilitated his own relief by allowing General Aylmer to give the Turks a real knock-out blow after his whole Corps had been concentrated.

(*f*) *Operations in February* 1916

Early in February the remainder of the 3rd Division and 36th Infantry Brigade had arrived at Orah, on the right bank opposite the Wadi. So General Aylmer left the badly-battered 7th Division at Hanna and continued his efforts to relieve Kut with the 3rd Division and 36th Brigade, which had suffered few casualties up to then. He first sent the 36th Brigade to wade about in the Suwaikiya Marsh behind the left flank of the Turkish position at Hanna to try to

frighten the Turks into retiring, and to prove definitely whether a flank attack by that route was possible or not. It was *not* possible. (I was one of that wading party, and it was a most unpleasant business. Moreover, instead of being frightened by that threat, the Turks took no notice of us at all.)

General Aylmer then tried unsuccessfully to bluff the Turks out of Hanna by an advance up the right bank. On the night of the 21st/22nd February, the 3rd Division and 36th Infantry Brigade did a night march up the right bank of the Tigris to Abu Roman, opposite the Turkish third position at Sannayat. As dawn broke our machine-guns and artillery, spread all along the Tigris bank, opened a hot fire on the Turkish Camps behind Hanna. The 128th Pioneers staggered realistically down to the river bank with dummy pontoons made of packing cases and canvas, and pretended to launch them, to make the Turks think that a crossing was intended, but again the bluff failed and the Turks at Hanna refused to move. However, General Aylmer attained his real object of getting nearer to the Es Sinn position without awaking the Turks' suspicions.

21. *Second attempt to relieve Kut—Battle of Dujailah, 8th March*, 1916 (vide *Sketch Map No.* 3)

(*a*) *Introductory Notes* re. *Battle of Dujailah.*

By the beginning of March the rain became less frequent and the ground began to dry up, enabling free movement of wheels almost anywhere on the Right Bank. But the snows in Persia were beginning to melt and the Tigris was rising rapidly. Soon the water level would be well above the surrounding country and very extensive inundations could only be prevented by the Turks and ourselves working incessantly at building and keeping in repair large "bunds" along the whole of the area of operations. There was always the danger of the Turks breaking the bunds just below their positions and flooding out the whole of the Tigris Corps area, so General Aylmer had to make his next attempt at the relief of Kut, while the ground was still dry enough for free movement. He had reinforcements of 12,000 men and 26 guns waiting at Basra for river transport to bring them up country, as the marching road was by now blocked by floods, but he could scarcely feed the force he already had at the Front, much less transport and feed these reinforcements. The expected large rise in the level of the Tigris arrived on the 15th March.

His plan was a bold one, which very nearly succeeded in relieving Kut. This was to carry out a night march from Orah with the 3rd Division and the 28th, 35th, 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades, and 6th Cavalry Brigade, to the Dujailah Redoubt (the extreme southern end of the Turkish Es Sinn position on the Right Bank), and roll that position up northwards. General Townshend was to co-operate by a strong sally across the Tigris south-east of Kut. Meanwhile the 7th Division (less 28th Infantry Brigade) were to hold our Hanna position and cover our Camps at Wadi and Orah. (*Vide* Map No. 3.)

I have only time to go very briefly into this very interesting battle with its many useful lessons, and its sad story of the successful relief of Kut thrown away by the error of judgment, at the critical time, of one subordinate commander. Those who are sufficiently interested will find a detailed lecture of mine on this battle in one of the United Service Institution of India Journals for 1927. As it happens, I " had a front seat " at this battle, for my battalion, the 26th Punjabis, was advanced guard during the night march. We were in two attacks during the day, and we were one of the two battalions which provided the covering party for the first stage of the retirement next morning. Also, I happened to be close to General Kemball when he made his fatal error of judgment at dawn on the 8th March and heard personally what happened then. Three months later, I was able to make a detailed sketch of the battlefield. I was thus able to clear up the extremely confused idea of the battle which I had carried away in my own mind at the time. A copy of that sketch is attached to the lecture in question.

You will also find pages 237 to 241 of the Staff College " Critical Study " very interesting. I think you will agree that those pages prove that wholehearted co-operation by General Townshend, on the 8th March, would almost certainly have enabled us to relieve Kut that day, but of course it is easy for us to criticise. We have not got the responsibility, which General Townshend had, of knowing that if his sortie failed, it would mean absolute disaster for his whole Division.

Now let us revert to the narrative.

22. *Brief Outline of Plan of Attack on the Dujailah Redoubt.*

(*a*) *The force was split into five main groups as follows :*

(*i*) *Column* " *A* "—36th Infantry Brigade. } Under command
(*ii*) *Column* " *B* "—9th and 28th Infantry Brigades. } of General Kemball.

(*iii*) *Column* " *C* "—3rd Division (less 9th Infantry Brigade) 37th Infantry Brigade } Under G.O.C., 3rd Division.

NOTE.—The Corps Artillery, under General Aylmer, also moved with Column " C."

(*iv*) *6th Cavalry Brigade.*

(*v*) *35th Infantry Brigade.*—To protect rendezvous for night march and then protect the 2nd Line Transport and Ammunition Reserve from Arabs.

(*b*) The whole (less 35th Infantry Brigade and 2nd Line Transport) was to night march 11 miles from the rendezvous to the Dujailah Depression (an ancient, dry, scrub-covered bed of the Tigris), and by first light (06-00 hours) deploy as follows :

Column " *B* " to attack Dujailah Redoubt from the south.

Column " *A* " to protect left flank of Column " B " and to move behind Dujailah position in readiness to cut off retreat of Turks from their ferry at Maqasis in second phase of attack by the 3rd Division on Sinn Abtar Redoubt.

Column " *C* " to feint against Dujailah from the east during Column " B's " attack thereon ; and then to capture Sinn Abtar Redoubt from the south-east and roll the Turks into the Tigris.

6th Cavalry Brigade to protect the left and rear of Columns " A " and " B " from the swarms of hostile mounted Arabs who always hung round the outskirts of every battle in Mesopotamia, and to reconnoitre certain crossings over the River Hai.

(*c*) *Criticisms of this Plan*

(*i*) This plan was a bold and desperate venture. It gambled on complete success in one day in order to let our troops get their drinking water from the Tigris at Maqasis. For there was no other drinking water in the area. This was risky, for no other attack since the arrival of the Anatolian Turkish Divisions had succeeded in one day. But after all, the plan came within an ace of succeeding.

(*ii*) It contained all the points which have already been criticised in the plans for the battles of Ctesiphon, Sheikh Sa'ad and the Wadi. That is to say :

It was not simple enough for a country in which the keeping of direction and mutual co-operation in battle are particularly difficult.

The whole force was spread over a 6-mile front in weak detachments under subordinate commanders; and *there was no general reserve* in the Corps Commander's own hands.

Its essence was surprise at dawn, but there was grave risk of such a large force *not* hitting off its exact forming up areas after such a long night march, without the Turks getting previous warning from Arabs or from their own outposts.

Again normal organization was broken in the formations of the various Columns.

(*d*) *The Night March*

This was a really marvellous piece of work. The formation adopted is given on page 522 of the Official History, Vol. II. Yet this mass of men and animals, 160 yards broad and 2 miles long, *did* reach their appointed places at the right hour and *did* entirely surprise the Turks.

(*e*) *General Kemball's action at Dawn, 8th March* 1916

As the 26th Punjabis, the leading Battalion of Column "A," reached the bend of the Dujailah Depression, dawn was just breaking, and the Turks were obviously entirely unaware of our presence. At about 06-30 hours we consequently commenced to advance rapidly towards the Dujailah Mound, which was clearly visible. But General Kemball ordered us back to the Dujailah Depression, which soon became a seething mass of men and animals. The 28th and 9th Infantry Brigades were then ordered to come up to the front, keeping under cover in the Depression and to deploy for their attack, as previously ordered. Meanwhile, General Kemball ordered fire to be opened at the Turkish Camps and unsuspecting watering and grazing parties by our artillery and machine-guns. We then had the mortification of seeing the Turks hurrying out of their camps and running to man their defences against us. (We also saw large reinforcements of Turks continue to double up from the direction of Maqasis at intervals all morning until 13-00 hours. Meanwhile, soon after 06-30 hours Major Leachman, a Political Officer, dressed as an Arab, who had ridden round the Turkish position that morning, galloped up to General Kemball and tried to persuade him to advance at once, because he had seen that the Turkish trenches were then held only by weak piquets.

But it was not until 09-30 hours—after 3 precious hours had been wasted and the fruits of surprise entirely thrown away—that Columns " A " and " B " were allowed to start their attacks. It had taken that time for the 28th and 9th Infantry Brigades to thread their way under cover in the Depression through the close packed mob of men and animals in it, and to deploy for their attack.

It appears that General Kemball's hands had been tied by very detailed orders, which he obeyed. But the battle was already lost by the time he advanced at 09-30 hours. I do not think that anyone who was there has any doubt that, had he obeyed the spirit of the orders instead of the letter, and attacked straight at the Dujailah Redoubt with the whole of Columns " A " and " B " at 06-30 hours, without waiting for any previous reorganization of his columns, we would have captured the whole position at the first rush with few casualties. The Turks are slow thinkers in an emergency.

This is an admirable example of the danger of tying the hands of the Commander on the spot by rigid and inelastic orders; and also of a case where the Commander on the spot was justified in departing from the letter of his rigid orders in order to take advantage of the obvious unpreparedness of the enemy.

(*f*) *Battle of Dujailah and Retirement to Orah*

By the time Column " B " commenced its attack the mirage had come on again and the attack failed for the usual reasons (*i.e.*, inability to locate one's own position or that of the enemy properly. Consequently our artillery fired all day at the Dujailah Redoubt while Column " B " was really held up 1,500 yards south of it).

In the afternoon, Column " A " which had gained its first objectives west of Dujailah, was recalled, and attacked through Column " B " instead of coming in on its flank. That attack advanced our line a little, but was also held up.

In the evening the 8th and 37th Infantry Brigades assaulted the Dujailah Redoubt from the east and got into it with much gallantry, but were soon bombed out of it again.

At midnight, General Aylmer ordered the withdrawal to Orah, owing to lack of water, where we then were.

We had lost 3,400 more men and gained nothing, although we had been very near indeed to complete success.

23. *Final Attempts to Relieve Kut—and Surrender of Kut on 29th April* 1916

(*a*) *General Situation*

On 11th March, General Aylmer was relieved in command by General Gorringe, his former Chief of Staff. About this time, too, the 13th British Division (Commander General Maude) commenced to arrive; and the rest of the month was spent in building and repairing bunds to prevent floods, in consolidating our positions, and in bringing up food reserves; for river transport was insufficient to transport men and food at the same time.

By the beginning of April the weather became unsettled again and most attacks had to be postponed at the last moment on account of mud, while the Turks increased our difficulties on the right bank by flooding large areas there. The Turks still had the advantage, as their strength and General Gorringe's were equal—each about 30,000 men.

The defile between the Suwaikiya Marsh and the Tigris was now very strongly entrenched and wired. There were 3 lines of defence at Hanna, another at Felahiya, 3 more at Sannayat, and behind that many more defences right back to the Suwada Marsh. Moreover, a northerly wind was apt to blow the waters of the Suwaikiya Marsh southwards, thus still further narrowing our front of attack.

(*b*) *Capture of Hanna and Falahiya positions, 5th April* 1916

In spite of every effort at secrecy the Turks were aware of the projected attack on Hanna by the 13th Division, for when the latter carried out its attack on the night of 4/5th April, they found it empty. But unfortunately the 13th Division was not allowed to capture the Falahiya position, which was only lightly held, until that evening. This mistake caused disaster next morning to the 7th Division, as we shall see.

(*c*) *First Attack on Sannayat, 6th April* 1916

During the night of 5/6th April, the 7th Division relieved the 13th at Falahiya and then passed through to attack Sannayat at dawn. But they did not have any chance of success. The late capture of the Falahiya position resulted, firstly, in confusion in the dark in the relief, and then in the 7th Division having to do a night-march over an entirely unreconnoitred, entrenched area. The result was that at dawn the 19th and 28th Brigades were caught by the Turks in

Sannayat at close range undeployed, and they were decimated by fire in the first five minutes.

(*d*) *Second Attack on Sannayat, 9th April* 1916

The 13th Division carried out a dawn attack on 9th April, but with no success whatever.

The 7th Division remained to hold such of our Sannayat trenches as were not flooded, and the 13th Division were moved to the right bank for operations there.

(*e*) *Capture of Beit 'Isa Position and Turkish Counter-attack*

Meanwhile, the 3rd Division had been steadily gaining and consolidating ground on the right bank beyond Abu Roman, in spite of the floods. It was, however, necessary to capture the Beit 'Isa position before the Es Sinn position could be captured, because the Turks were controlling most of the inundations from Beit 'Isa.

The plan was for the 3rd Division to capture the Beit 'Isa trenches and be relieved in them early that night by the 13th Division. The 3rd Division were then to night-march to Dujailah and seize our old trenches there preparatory to an attack.

The attack on Beit 'Isa was successfully carried out on the 17th April, but the Turkish Force Commander, Khalil Pasha, getting nervous about the relief of Kut, collected every available man (10,000 of his best troops), and counter-attacked that night while the relief of the 3rd and 13th Divisions was in progress. There was unutterable confusion all night, and the Turks were driven off with great slaughter the next morning. But they had attained their object of stopping our offensive on the right bank.

After that the 13th Division made one or two abortive efforts to capture Chahela Mounds, but no other real attacks were made there before Kut fell.

(*f*) *Third Attack on Sannayat, 22nd April* 1916

Kut was now on minimum rations but they were kept going a little longer by 5,000 lbs. of supplies dropped by our few old-pattern, war-worn aeroplanes.

The s.s. " Julnar," one of our best river steamers, had tried to run the blockade with a cargo of food for Kut. It was a most gallant effort, but did not succeed.

So General Gorringe made a last desperate effort to capture Sannayat on the 22nd April. The Suwaikiya Marsh had by then

flooded almost all "No Man's Land," and the attack was defeated by the mud. The 21st Brigade could not cross "No Man's Land." The 19th Brigade slopped bravely into the flooded enemy second line, knee deep all the way in mud and slime, but when the Turks counter-attacked, the muddied bolts of our men's rifles would not work at all, so they were pushed back again to our own front line.

(*g*) *Surrender of Kut on 29th April* 1916

With the fall of Kut the fighting on the Tigris died down. The Tigris Corps had done wonders in the time available, fighting under the greatest difficulties of lack of covering fire, lack of H. E. shell for trench destruction, shortage of food, clothing and firewood, and the maximum of difficulties from mud, storm, cold and mirage. In 4 months they had had 23,000 battle casualties (*i.e.*, 60 per cent. of their effectives) not counting many sick. So I do not think anyone can accuse us of not having done all that was humanly possible to relieve Kut.

Kut had held out for 143 days, but this time could have been appreciably lengthened had General Townshend taken the obvious precaution of commandeering *all* supplies on the 4th December 1915, and perhaps he ought to have been hard-hearted and evacuated *all* the civilian population then also.

He has been criticised for his entirely passive defence. After 24th December 1915 he was not attacked again and was contained by only 1/3rd of his own numbers. But it is very easy to be wise after the event. Very grave responsibility hung on his shoulders while none hangs on those of his critics. Also, we are not feeble from hunger, as his men must have been.

FOURTH PHASE—PERIOD OF REORGANIZATION OF MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE—30TH APRIL TO 13TH DECEMBER 1916

24. *General Situation*

During this period there was no serious fighting. The heat was intense and the miseries of our forward troops are hard to realize by anyone who was not there at the time. Our men were in rags and in many cases without boots. Rations were inadequate, and no vegetables at all, except potatoes and onions, reached the forward troops. Even these were often too bad to eat; so the force was decimated by scurvy and other diseases to such an extent that battalions averaged

a little over 100 rifles. Luckily the Turks were so swollen-headed, as the result of their success in the early part of the year, that they underrated us, and they made no attempt to hinder our reorganization and preparations for a large-scale offensive in the coming winter.

25. *" G " Reorganization of Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force*

The 35th, 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades were formed into the 14th Indian Division, and the Tigris Corps was re-formed into two Army Corps as under—

1st Corps—3rd and 7th Indian Divisions.

3rd Corps—13th and 14th Divisions.

Cavalry Division—6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades.

Also, the troops on the Euphrates were reorganized as the 15th Division.

The War Office took over complete control and from that time co-operated wholeheartedly in supplying the necessary shipping, railways and war material.

General Maude was, in August, appointed to command the Mesopotamian Forces, while General MacMunn was appointed Inspector-General of Communications.

Distribution of Troops

In May, the Turks, on the right bank, retired behind the Hai and we advanced to the Dujailah Depression.

Our dispositions up to December then were—

(*i*) *Area Maqasis, Es Sinn, Dujailah*—14th Division.

(*ii*) *Sheikh Sa'ad, Arab Village, Es Sinn*—3rd Division.

(*iii*) *Sannayat position*—7th Division.

(*iv*) *Amara* (for training and to reduce ration requirements forward)—13th Division.

(*v*) *Arab Village*—Force H. Q. and Cavalry Division.

27. *Reorganization of " Q " Services and L. of C.*

As soon as the lull in the fighting allowed, General Lake laid the foundations for the improvement of the L. of C. But when General Maude got command. and had the backing of the War Office, he *insisted* upon an adequate " *Q* " organization and got it. By November he had a properly organised, and adequate inland Water Transport service. He had railways from Basra to Nasariya, from Qurna to Amara, and from Sheikh Sa'ad to the Sinn area. He had much more and heavier artillery, with plenty of H. E. shell. His

troops had been issued with Lewis guns, Mortars and Mills grenades, none of which had been available before. The land transport was reasonably up to establishment. The troops were at last properly fed, properly clothed, and had reasonable shelter from the weather. And finally, a point of immense importance, he had a proper bridging train which could move across land. Without this latter item he could not have attained the success which he did in the cold weather of 1916-17.

In fact, General Maude, through his own energy and determination, started his offensive on the night of the 13th/14th December 1916, with a properly organized, properly-found, modern army with an adequate "*Q*" organization behind it, which were things which Generals Aylmer and Gorringe did not have during the Kut Relief Operations. Public opinion at Home and the Mesopotamia Commission had immensely strengthened General Maude's hand in his demands for efficient organization, and he took full advantage of this.

FIFTH PHASE—BATTLE OF KUT-AL-AMARA, 1917 (VIDE *SKETCH MAP No.* 4).

28. *Strategic Situation*

Perhaps the greatest strategic advantage which his efficient transportation services and proper bridging train gave General Maude was that he was no longer tied to the Tigris, as his predecessors were and as the Turks still were. He could easily maintain himself on the Hai, and if necessary, change his L. of C. to the Euphrates, *via* the Hai. He had now, therefore, much greater power of manœuvre than the Turks.

His initiative was, however, considerably cramped by the C.I.G.S., who had imposed a more or less defensive rôle on him, forbidden him to sustain many casualties, and had warned him that the 13th Division might be taken away from Mesopotamia in the near future.

On the other hand, Khalil Pasha, the Turkish Army Commander in Baghdad, played into General Maude's hand by refusing to strengthen the Turkish forces on the Tigris, as he fell into the error of underrating the fighting qualities of our troops on the Tigris. Also, he was a very conceited young man who considered himself to be a second Napoleon, and so kept a disproportionate preponderance of his

strength in Persia in a grandiose scheme of defeating Baratoff's Russians there, and then capturing our Tigris army from the rear. Consequently General Maude was able to mass a strength of 3 to 1 against the Turks on the Tigris.

Moreover, in his false security, Khalil allowed the five defensive positions, which the sound and cautious Nur-ud-Din had prepared between Kut and Baghdad, to fall into disrepair.

29. *General Maude's First Plan*

In view of the above consideration and limitations, General Maude considered that the best defence was a limited and cautious offensive. He therefore decided to manœuvre the Turks out of the Sannayat—Kut area by stretching their defences along the left bank of the Tigris to breaching point and by increasing his hold on the right bank and threatening to cross the Tigris well behind the Turks.

It was with this limited objective that he opened his offensive on the night of the 13th/14th December 1916.

30. *Advance to the Hai and First Attempt to cross Tigris at Shumran*

The line of the Hai about Atab was captured by dawn on the 14th December, without casualties, by the 13th Division and Cavalry Division, while the 14th Division protected both flanks of the advance. Our force then turned north and advanced up the Hai towards Kut, round which the Turks had been digging hard all summer, as Sketch Map No. 4 shows. Two bridges were built across the Hai about Atab, and the railway was pushed on to there. The 3rd Corps then consolidated its position with one Infantry Brigade of the 13th Division on the eastern bank of the Hai, and the remainder of the 13th and 14th Divisions and the Cavalry Division on the western bank of the Hai, almost as far as the Shumran Bend. Of the 1st Corps, the 7th Division remained at Sannayat and the 3rd Division held the right bank from there to opposite the Turkish position near Mahomed Abdul Hassan. General Maude's Tigris Force was thus spread out on a 30-mile front.

On the 20th December the Cavalry Division, supported by the 35th Infantry Brigade, was sent to bridge and cross the Tigris at the southern end of the Shumran Bend. The whole movement was made in broad daylight, without any attempt at secrecy, so the single

battalion of Turks at Shumran easily prevented the crossing. General Maude was asked whether he wanted the crossing to be forced in face of opposition, but he repied " No," and withdrew the Cavalry Division and the 35th Infantry Brigade.

Lack of secrecy in making his plans was very much the reverse of General Maude's usual method ; so we can have no doubt that his real object in this case was to frighten the Turks into evacuating Sannayat. But the Turks refused to be bluffed.

31. *Capture of Mahomed Abdul Hassan, Hai Bridgehead and Dahara Bend Positions*

After this abortive attempt at Shumran, however, the C.I.G.S. entirely changed General Maude's problem by giving him permission to lose up to 25 per cent. casualties.

General Maude then determined to destroy the Turkish Corps on the Tigris, instead of trying merely to make them retire by threatening their L. of C. He, therefore, determined to drive all the Turks from the right bank and then cross the Tigris behind their left bank positions.

There is no need to describe the very heavy fighting which lasted unceasingly from the 22nd December 1916 to 16th February 1917 before all the Turkish positions on the right bank of the Tigris were captured, as this was all normal trench warfare. Our attacks were done systematically and without hurry, step by step from one limited objective to the next. The Turks fought like tigers all the time, but were gradually and steadily pushed back from trench to trench until the last 2,000 of them surrendered as we were assaulting their last redoubts, on the river bank in the top of the Dahra Bend. Our guns were not of heavy calibre, but we had sufficient by then to give really adequate covering fire for these limited attacks ; and by then we had the Mills bombs and Lewis guns with which to meet the Turks' immediate counter-attacks, which we had not had during the Kut Relief operations. Also, we had sufficient serviceable aircraft then to make accurate trench maps of the enemy's positions ; and Artillery Survey Parties had been formed and so gave us good counter-battery work. So throughout that long, seven weeks' battle we were at last fighting as a properly equipped modern army.

This period of trench to trench attacks contained many useful lessons, but as an infantry company commander throughout that

fighting, two lessons stand out in my mind above all others. These are—

(*a*) *The value of the immediate counter-attack.*—Almost invariably the Turks carried out a local counter-attack with the utmost bravery and determination within the first 10 or 15 minutes of losing a trench, before we had time to prepare the trench for defence from their side. It was in meeting these that our newly-acquired Lewis guns and Mills grenades proved invaluable. But woe betide those who stopped to "mop up" or reorganize before getting ready for this immediate counter-attack. Once we had had time to dig fire-steps in the captured parados we had drawn the sting from these gallant Turkish counter-attacks.

(*b*) *The unfairness to the attacking troops of attempting to gain surprise by dispensing with a preliminary bombardment.*—I personally witnessed two occasions when excellent battalions were practically wiped out of existence when this method of surprise was attempted.

On the first occasion my own battalion reported certain enemy machine-guns. The next morning, the 1st February, the 36th and 45th Sikhs made quite a short distance attack with the utmost gallantry but both those two fine battalions literally ceased to exist, except for the small nucleus which had been left out of the fight. Those enemy machine-guns had not been put out of action by a preliminary bombardment before the attack commenced.

On the 2nd February my own brigade carried out exactly the same attack successfully and with very few casualties, because those same enemy machine-guns had been literally blotted out of existence by a short but intense bombardment just before we "went over the top."

Later on, towards the end of the clearing of the Dahra Bend, I also saw the 41st Dogras and 102nd Grenadiers suffer very heavy casualties indeed, in an attempt to capture a weakly-held trench without any preliminary bombardment.

32. *Crossing of the Tigris at Shumran on 23rd February* 1917, *and Precipitate Retreat of the Turks from Kut Area*

We completed the capture of the Dahra Bend on the 16th February and General Maude had intended to carry straight on with

his crossing at the Shumran Bend, but that very night it began to rain so heavily that we were again entirely immobilized by mud, and the crossing had to be postponed until the 23rd February.

But the 7th Division had been ordered to attack at Sannayat on the 17th to draw away the attention of the Turks from Shumran. This attack was carried out and was a costly failure on account of mud, exactly as in the case of the third attack on Sannayat on 22nd April.

Meanwhile, General Maude was carrying on all possible preparations for the Shumran crossing with the utmost secrecy, and doing everything he could " to mystify and mislead " the enemy as to his intended crossing place. 800 men of the 14th Division, which was to do the crossing, were given intensive training in rowing pontoons in the Hai (no easy task to learn), while the 27th Punjabis did a very successful night raid across the Tigris at Naqasis which was quite a possible place for a crossing.

At dusk on the 22nd February, the 14th Division moved into position opposite the toe of the Shumran Peninsula, where our pontoons had previously been taken at night and concealed, and at dawn, on the 23rd February, the pontoons were launched and crossings attempted at the three ferries marked on Sketch Map No. 4. The Norfolks at No. 1 Ferry were lucky and got across and rushed the Turkish piquets there before the latter woke up, but the 2nd and 9th Gurkhas at the other two ferries suffered so heavily in their most gallant attempts to get across that those two ferries had to be abandoned. All the remaining pontoons were then concentrated at No. 1 Ferry, where a sufficient bridge-head was eventually established after very bitter fighting all day.

Meanwhile a bridge was being built, under constant shell-fire, also at No. 1 Ferry. It was ready by about 17·00 hours, when the remainder of the 14th Division crossed. General Maude had most of the 13th Division and all the Corps' Artillery in position by dawn on the 23rd February on the right bank of the Tigris, opposite both flanks of the Shumran Peninsula. This covering fire helped very materially to break up the Turkish counter-attacks while the bridge head was being consolidated at No. 1 Ferry.

Moreover, General Maude had materially assisted to mislead the Turks by ordering the 40th Infantry Brigade to make " bridge-building noises " throughout the night of the 22nd/23rd February on the river bank opposite Kut. A. T. carts were driven about

without grease in their axle-boxes, and planks were thrown about and splashed in the water with as much noise as possible. The result was that when dawn came, a large column of Turks was seen marching away from Shumran to the Kut Peninsula, so reducing the opposition to our crossing during the critical first hour or two.

At dawn on the 24th February, the 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades, supported by the 35th, swept up the Shumran Peninsula and had captured the whole of it after some stiff fighting by about 07·30 hours. My own battalion, the 26th Punjabis, captured 2 field-guns and 5 machine-guns in that rapid advance. By that hour I personally saw the whole plain between us and the Suwada Marsh covered by bodies of Turks in full retreat from the direction of Sannayat. It was a glorious opportunity for the Cavalry Division to carry out a mounted attack and complete the destruction of the Turkish Tigris Corps, but the Cavalry Division failed to do anything and the opportunity was lost. They crossed the Shumran Bridge at about 09·00 hours with orders to take up a vigorous pursuit, but they took two hours to go the two miles up the Shumran Peninsula, got mixed up in the counter-attacks being made by the Turkish rear guard on the 14th Division, and instead of going wide round this rearguard, got off their horses and remained where they were.

On 22nd February, the 7th Division had attacked and captured the first three lines of the Sannayat positions, but for some reason their attack at dawn, on the 23rd, was very slow in starting, so they failed to pin the Turks to their ground there. This delay, combined with the amazing apathy of the Cavalry Division, enabled the bulk of the Turks to get clear away in comparatively good order, instead of quite probably being destroyed as an organized force.

33. *Lessons of Shumran Crossing*

(*a*) *Secrecy and Misleading the Enemy*

General Maude was always extremely secretive in his plans. In this case he told no one but the R.E. officer concerned exactly where he intended his bridge to be.

Similarly I had the luck to be selected to lead the night march of the 13th Division from Imam-Al-Mansur to Atab on the night of the 13th/14th December. I had been sent out every night for a week previously to carry out various reconnaissances of the Turkish outposts, but it was not until I got back to my own unit on the afternoon of the 13th December that I heard for the first time that

the 13th Division was anywhere in the forward area, much less that I had to lead them that night.

(*b*) *The Value of Adequate Flanking Fire in an Opposed River Crossing*

The site chosen enabled excellent cross flanking fire right up both flanks of the peninsula on all the Turkish counter-attacks. This was particularly useful on the early mornings of the 23rd and 24th February, before the daily mirage commenced.

(*c*) *The Value of Determined Non-Stop Advance by Infantry*

On the morning of the 24th February, the 36th and 37th Infantry Brigades penetrated to a depth of 3,000 yards in one continuous, rapid advance, without halting, until they had reached their final objective, having captured several Turkish defences during this advance. We had good, observed flanking artillery covering fire, and the Turkish trenches were not wired ; the Turks whom we killed or captured *en route* fought bravely and kept firing at us until we were close enough to rush them with the bayonet, but our casualties were comparatively few until we had reached our final objectives at the head of the Peninsula.

(*d*) *Cavalry must use their Mobility if they are to Pull their Weight Properly in Battle*

Compare the action of the cavalry on this occasion with the tremendous results they obtained by using their mobility and by mounted attacks in Palestine in 1918, and with the results obtained by General Cassels with this same Cavalry Division in Mesopotamia later on in the campaign.

Once cavalry dismount, they move more slowly than infantrymen, and their led horses are very vulnerable and a constant source of embarrassment to their units.

FIFTH PHASE—PURSUIT OF TURKS AND CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD (VIDE *SKETCH MAP NO. 1*)

34. I cannot afford time to say much about this stage of the operations. General Maude pursued the Turks as far as Aziziya, but had to halt there until the 5th March, partly because he had outrun his supplies, but principally because he had to obtain permission from the C. I. G. S. at Home before continuing his advance to Baghdad. This permission was given in view of the moral effect of the capture

of Baghdad in India, Persia and Afghanistan, but from the point of view of Grand Strategy it seems to have been a mistake, because for the rest of the War, it required a much larger force to defend Baghdad than the Turks had to detach from their main theatre in Palestine to contain us in Mesopotamia.

This delay should have given Khalil time to defend the flanks of his Diyala position by inundations, but he completely lost his head and shilly-shallied. The result was that our advance met no real opposition until we reached the Diyala, where the Turks put up a very stout resistance to our attempts to cross.

At midnight of the 7th and 8th March, the 38th Infantry Brigade attempted to cross the Diyala on the heels of the retreating Turks, but they were unsuccessful. This was a good example of how *NOT* to attempt to cross a river in face of opposition. There was no proper reconnaissance, or previous organization, no covering fire, no feints and no alternative crossings.

But after three more days of very heavy fighting on both banks of the Tigris and on the Diyala, General Maude forced a crossing and threw a bridge across the Diyala near its mouth.

On the night of 10th/11th March the Turks extricated themselves with great skill and Baghdad was captured without further resistance.

35. *Conclusion*

In conclusion I should like to say that I have necessarily, in the short space available in these two lectures, had to leave out a great many interesting points which I would have liked to discuss, but I hope that I have brought in sufficient detail to give you a really comprehensive bird's-eye view of these extremely interesting phases of the Mesopotamia Campaign.


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SHEIKH SAAD
ALI GHARBI
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
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
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QASAIBA
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V.P
BOAT BRIDGE
SECOND LINE OF DEFENCE
WATER REDOUBT.
TURKISH
CTESIPHON ARCH
GURKHA MOUND
38TH DIV.
TURKISH FIRST LINE
HIGH WALL
BUSTAN
35TH DIV.
OBSTRUCTION WITH TORPEDOES.
RIGHT BANK SECTION
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OLD COURSE OF RIVER (SANDY)
MUCH ACCIDENTED AND CUT UP BY DRY WATER COURSES.
R. TIGRIS


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
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NUKHAILA
SUWADA MARSH
BAIT ISA
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2'6" GAUGE RAILWAY
TOBAGH DAM
90 M. BY RIVER
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TURKISH BRIDGE
SHUMRAN
DAHRA BEND
R. TIGRIS
SINN BANKS
POSITION
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MD. ABDUL HASSAN
KUT AL AMARA
SHUMRAN BEND
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GENERAL MAUDES CROSSING ON 23RD FEB 1917
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MUHAIRJA
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SOME NOTES ON MAHSEER FISHING IN INDIA

By E. A. W.

I have to thank Colonel Gowlland, R.E., and Colonel Taylor and Major Grant, I.M.S., for invaluable assistance in preparing these notes.

Somebody once said, " No one who is a fisherman can be entirely bad."

I feel, therefore, that these fragmentary jottings on mahseer fishing may be of some use to a large body of brother officers who may be held to belong to the above category.

They also may interest another class, those men who are keen salmon or trout fishermen at Home and who, not having tried mahseer fishing seriously, consider it a long way inferior to the sport one can get in the British Isles. I have caught salmon ever since I was a boy, and trout ever since I was a very small boy and honestly consider that the mahseer, pound for pound and minute for minute, is every bit as good. This, of course, where he is fished for in the proper place, which is just where the great rivers emerge from the hills and where you have plenty of rough broken water, rapids full of boulders and strong deep runs over gravel. If you hook a five-pound fish on fine tackle on a dry fly-rod, such as I use, you will get all the sport and all the thrills you want before you land him. Also fish for him as fine as you dare, you will kill more fish and have far better sport.

Another form of appeal lies in the fact that you are independent —you can cut out all the shikaris, beaters, and so on, required for other forms of sport in India. All you want is a coolie to carry your kit; he will soon learn how to land a fish by getting a grip behind the gill plates after you have persuaded it into a shelving beach. All the rest is up to you, when and where to go, the type of water most likely to hold taking fish, the kind of tackle to use and so on. There is a great satisfaction in solving all those problems unaided.

Hitting off the right season has always been to me the major difficulty of fishing in India. Roughly, there are only two seasons in the North of India, the first one in the spring when the weather gets warm enough to get the fish moving and yet not so hot that the snow water has commenced to come down.

Snow water is fatal for big stuff, though one can still catch small fish with a fly-spoon on the edges of the heavy runs, in shallow water.

I should put this period as, roughly, between the 15th February and the 15th April, but one cannot be dogmatic; good fish have been caught at Tangrot and Hardwar at Christmas. If you get a few hours rain at this time, and it is not too cold, the fish often take fairly well.

If I were asked for an optimum date I should say round about the 10th to the 25th March.

The second period is when the rains are over and the water has cleared, and yet has not got too cold. We might put this as from the 15th September to the end of October, depending of course on the monsoon. The time when Government moves from Simla to Delhi generally coincides with good mahseer fishing, and I should say the middle ten days of October are about the best time. I prefer the autumn fishing to the spring, on the whole, as one is free from the fear of snow-water, also if one gets there early enough conditions should improve day by day.

In my experience four essentials are necessary for successful mahseer fishing. They are—

(*a*) it must be hot or at least fairly warm, preferably about 80°F. in the shade;

(*b*) Clear sky;

(*c*) Absence of wind or at least nothing much more than a gentle breeze; and

(*d*) Gin clear water.

One can and does catch fish under modifications of all those conditions, but the more we approach an ideal day under those four heads the more likely we are to get a decent bag. Mahseer are intensely moody fish, much more so than salmon and very sensitive to what one might call "atmospherics." Still they seem to come on at some time of the day every day. This involves a lot of hard work, especially if one is using heavy spinning tackle, but is the principle of the old ghillies advice, "Aye keep your flee in the water." I saw General Macmullen fishing one day at Khara from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. without a touch, and by 7 p.m. he had three fish 40 lbs. on a small rod and fly-spoon.

The habits of the fish vary with the place and the season, but on the whole 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. may be considered the best time.

Very often the period during which the fish take may be half an hour only, then they go right off for some hours. It follows from this that one should kill one's fish reasonably quickly. I hate to see the fish playing the man.

Everyone have their fads about tackle, I think most people fish too heavy. I do my heavy spinning with an old grilse rod cut down to 12′ 6″, a Silex reel, and a 24 lbs. B. S. American spinning line called the "Lignum Vitae." This is the best spinning line I have ever used and it is cheap—Rs. 20 per 100 yards from Manton, Calcutta. With this I use a fine Punjab wire trace (Hardy's).

For fly-spoon I use my two dry fly-rods, one is 5 oz. and one 8 oz., with a fine gut trace, say, loch trout, and have killed fish up to 14 lbs. on the 8 oz. rod. All the books on mahseer fishing say that spinning a dead bait, *i.e.* a chilwa, is the most deadly method for large fish. I have used the spoon constantly against the chilwa over the same water, and have done on the whole just as well or better than the dead-bait expert. The spoon is easier to use and less messy, and I prefer it. Fish in different rivers seem to prefer different types of spoons, *e.g.* in the Sarda a 2″ mother-of-pearl, on the Jumna a $1\frac{3}{4}$″ Hardy's kidney spoon, and this year I got all my fish on the Ganges on a very big 3″ Mytikyna spoon. Trial and error are indicated here. Of the fly-spoons I prefer a $\frac{3}{4}$″ bar-spoon, a $\frac{3}{4}$″ mother-of-pearl or a plain silver spoon from $\frac{1}{2}$″ to 1″. I have never done any good with aluminium fly-spoons. As regards flies, the only two rivers where small mahseer take fly well to my personal knowledge, are the Song and the Asan in the Dun. The best flies for these rivers are given later on in this article.

I have never tried a thread-line outfit for mahseer, but think it would be excellent for the smaller fish up to five or six pounds, in fact I know friends of mine who have done very well with it. It is, I consider, useless for heavy fish in a big river.

It is not necessary to spend a small fortune on spoons and traces. A reel of Killin wire, a pair of pliers, swivels, some solder, along with a hank of gut substitute, silk and cobbler's wax, will make all the traces you want. Any *mistry* in the bazar will cut out spoons from brass or copper sheet for a few annas, and electroplating is also generally available. Add to this some triangles and Hardy's "Attachment Links."

I recommend you always to bind your knots and loops when using gut substitute : it is very apt to slip.

PART II—LOCALITIES.

1. *N. W. F. P.*—The only two places I have done any good are on the Swat River, at Chakdara and Khar. This is, or was, very nice fly-spoon or light spinning water. The Kurram River, above Thal, looks very good and I have favourable accounts of it from officers stationed there.

On both the Swat and Kurram Rivers local politics are apt to interfere with the fishing.

2. *Rawalpindi.*—There are a lot of small rivers quite near 'Pindi, but they are dreadfully poached—the Rawal, Sohan, Chiblat, Hurroo, etc. They are easy to get at by car and one can use a fly-spoon on all of them. The mulberry on a single hook and fine gut is good in May.

3. *Tangrot.*—One of the most famous fishing places in India, a bit fallen from its high estate, but still very good. The best way to go is to motor up the canal bank from Jhelum, cross the river at the head-works of the Upper Jhelum Canal, and ride about four miles. Tangrot is at the junction of the Poonch and the Jhelum and there is a very fine long run and pool at the junction which is fished from a boat. The rest of the fishing is in the lowest three miles or so of the Poonch—lovely water which can be fished from the bank in places. There are good boats and boatmen who know their job and are very cheap; there is a dâk bungalow and camping sites. The point of Tangrot is that both the rivers are rarely running dirty at the same time and one can generally rely on getting fish. I have been there several times and always got fish; my most successful trip was in June 1915, when, with another officer, we got fifty fish in four days—best 28 lbs.—fishing from 5-30 a.m. to 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. till 8 p.m. Fish have been got at Tangrot every month in the year, although, of course, the spring and autumn are best.

4. *Lower Beas.*—This is an excellent bit of water, it has to some extent eclipsed Tangrot the last few years. Mrs. Gowlland got a 45-lb. fish there this spring.

How to get there—

Rail to Jullundur, change and go to Makerian or Hoshiarpur by a local line.

From Makerian by car over a bad road (20 miles) to Tolwara where there is a District Board bungalow.

From Tolwara there is a track, passable for cars, to Rora where there is a camping ground.

From here you can walk Rora Pool.

By crossing the river and camping at Pant (about 2 miles from Rora) you can fish Pant Pool and another pool above it. The road from Hoshiarpur to Tolwara is bad, but people get along it.

The best time to fish is between the 1st and the 30th April, and the 1st and the 30th October, but with luck you may extend these periods at either end.

Fish up to 70 lbs. were caught in Pant last spring.

5. *Sialkot.*—There is fishing here at Marala below the weir of the Upper Chenab Canal head-works and also above the weir. A very pleasant spot, easily reached by car from Sialkot, with good canal bungalow.

One can also reach from here the Lower Tawi above Jammu. This is in Kashmir territory and His Highness' permission is required. I fished it once in April when the river was as thick as pea soup after rain and appeared hopeless, but the shikari produced a disgusting mess of clotted goat's blood in a chatti. This was fixed on a triangle with some difficulty, and with it I killed two nice fish of 17 and 13 lbs. I should think the fishing farther up would be good, but it has been very little explored.

6. *Rupar*—

Situation.—On the Sutlej at the head-works of the Sirhind Canal.

Reached by road from Kalka. Turning off from the Kalka-Delhi road, about 6 miles from Kalka; a road with very rough surface goes another 20 miles, crossing numerous sandy nullahs which may be temporarily impassable in the rains. The head-works are about a mile from Rupar town.

Head-works.—Consist of a long barrage above which the canal takes off, several bungalows and administrative offices.

Fishing—

Season	.. Best in the end of April and May.
Conditions	.. Fishing is best in hot, calm, dry weather and is spoiled by sand-storms or rain.
Sizes of fish	.. Although an occasional fish of over 20 lbs. is caught, the average run is from 3 to 10 lbs.

Best Fishing Places.—These are marked by crosses on the sketch.

(*a*) Below the barrage. Fishing from the bank the best place is the vicinity of the groyne, half-way across the barrage beside the fish-

pass. For satisfactory fishing some of the sluices must be partially opened to give a fair current. Fish down the groyne and outside the submerged portion of the fish-pass, and if the water is not too deep wade across to the right bank below and fish the next 50 yards. Fly-spoon (1″ to 1½″ Hardy's Skene Dhu spoons) are effective. Fish up to 10 lbs. have been had here with fly, fishing in slack water, sink and draw (Patterns, Silver Doctor, Durham Ranger and Dusty Miller; salmon, sizes 3 and 4). Bank fishing from the left bank below the barrage is not very satisfactory. When the chilwa are running the natural bait on a light spinning tackle is very effective.

The Sutlej, for about 250 yards below the barrage, may be fished, trolling from a boat, with a 2″ to 2½″ gold and silver hog backed spoon.

(*b*) Above the barrage. When there is a flow in the river, fishing from the groyne running up from the middle of the barrage, especially at the top end, may be good. Trolling may also be tried here.

(*c*) In the canal. Here the part to fish is the left bank for about 200 yards down from the sluices. Fly-spoon may be used or a heavier spoon fished off the spinning reel. Some good fish are caught here. Some anglers dangle a spoon close up against the sluice gates, but it is weary and uncertain work.

There are believed to be some good spots a mile or two upstream. With a launch it would be worth while starting several miles upstream and fishing successive spots on the way down which are known to the local shikaris. The fishing at Rupar is not very interesting as it is usually in slow water and the number of good places where a fish may be expected is limited.

7. *Okhla* (*Jumna*).—Is worth trying when the chilwa are running, say, in March; the locals get a lot of fish, but there seem to be very few mahseer. I don't think fishermen in Delhi have taken Okhla seriously. I am sure there are possibilities here and it is only twenty minutes in a car. Even if one gets no fish it is a delightful place for a picnic.

8. *The Jumna*—(From the Giri Junction down to Tajuwala)—I have fished this river a lot in the last few years and am very fond of it, and have had some good days, *i.e.*, three fish 85 lbs. on the heavy rod, and seventeen fish 40 lbs. on the fly-spoon. I have also had some very bad ones, but very few absolutely blank. The best time to fish the river is difficult to hit off, but I have done well from the 20th to the 30th March, and again about the 15th to 20th

October. After April 1st in a normal year snow-water is apt to come down, and it may come sooner. The charm of the Jumna is that it is in many places broken up into several separate streams and you can start off in the morning with your heavy spinning outfit and also your light rod with a fly-spoon, and use either, or both, as you please. There are nearly twenty miles of good water available and, except at the Asan Junction near Khara bungalow, it is not over-fished. Both the wading and the walking are hard work, as both the bed of the river and the banks are in most places a mass of heavy shingle or small round and very slippery boulders; there are also long stretches of heavy sand. It is generally possible, by giving previous notice, to arrange for a *surnai*, which consists of a *charpoy* on two inflated nilghai skins with one or two men to work it. This is a great help in getting about. Similarly at Khara I carry a length of grass rope and, towards evening when I may be four miles upstream, the shikari collects eight or ten stranded sleepers, makes a raft and on this we sail home.

I have fished this part of the Jumna from three centres (*a*) the Asan Junction, (*b*) Khara, (*c*) Tajuwala.

The Asan Junction and the water for about two miles below on the left bank is preserved and controlled by the Dehra Dun Fishing Association (annual subscription Rs. 25; visitors' tickets available), the right bank for several miles is preserved after a fashion by H. H. the Maharaja of Sirmoor. The Fishing Association maintain a small shelter, but at the junction, which can only be approached by a forest road (motorable). This road has several locked gates on it, members of the Dehra Dun Fishing Association have keys for these gates, but the road is not open to the general public. You can either live in Dehra Dun and motor out (30 miles), or camp at the junction or two or three miles down, where there is some lovely water, including the famous Paunta Pool. The junction is pretty hard fished by the Dehra Dun people who use a chilwa almost exclusively, but it is a good bit. There is also the Lower Asan at hand, full of small fish up to 5 lbs. and very pretty fishing. Below the junction there are miles of good water till you come to Khara bungalow, which is by river, about 8—10 miles off. Khara is reached by car from Saharanpur railway station, 26 miles up the Chakrata road, then four miles over a forest road; pretty rough going. The bungalow is an Irrigation one (Executive Engineer, Western Jumna Canal, Saharanpur), and has a sitting-room and three

small bed-rooms, and is beautifully situated on a cliff above the river. There are at least 7 miles of very good water at Khara of all types, heavy runs, deep pools, and lots of delightful fly-spoon water. The best fishing is, I think, about four miles upstream in the Fakir's Pool—look out for mugger in the small backwater you have to cross on the right bank going upstream, they got a local man a couple of years ago.

I have always done best with a $1\frac{3}{4}$" Hardy's copper and silver kidney-spoon here; though I have fished the chilwa carefully as well, I have never done much with it. Much of the water is very suitable for thread-line fishing. Colonel and Mrs. Brodrick had a very nice bag this spring with thread-line outfits.

The chowkidar at the bungalow is quite a good shikari, and if not available he can get you one of the men off the sleeper rafts. Khara is on the western edge of a quite good shooting block: plenty of tiger, cheetal and sambhar.

Tajuwala and Hathnikund.—These two places are from 4—6 miles downstream from Khara, but on the opposite bank; there is a very good Canal Bungalow at Tajuwala (Western Jumna Canal) and a forest bungalow at Hathni kund. Both these places are reached from the Delhi-Saharanpur road by motoring up the canal bank at Jagadhri, and have excellent fishing at the proper season.

9. *The Ganges near Hardwar.*—There is a lot of good fishing here, but two points have to be remembered. One is that a good deal of the water is sacred and in certain areas fishing is prohibited, in fact a fish caught in a non-sacred area cannot be carried through the town of Hardwar unless it is wrapped up in a sack. The second is that the Asan Junction is preserved by the Dehra Dun Fishing Association, who also maintain a boat and watcher in the famous Raiwala Pool.

There are various bungalows where one may stay: Mayapore Canal Bungalow below Hardwar, Bhimgoda Canal Bungalow at Bhimgoda Weir—a very good bit of water here but the bungalow is hot—Motichur Forest Rest House near Raiwala, and a very good Railway Bungalow at Raiwala. There is also good fishing above Rikhikesh—all the water at Rikhikesh and for a mile or two above and below the town is sacred.

All the difficulties about sacred water can be avoided by fishing from the left bank which is in Chila block of reserved forest, and

there is a good Forest Bungalow at Chila. Most of the water about Hardwar and Rikhikesh is heavy spinning water, and the fish run big in a big river. You want sound tackle and 200 yards of line.

Fishing in the Doon.—All the fishing in the Doon is controlled and preserved by the Dehra Dun Fishing Association; annual subscription Rs. 25; visitors' tickets available; apply Honorary Secretary, Dehra Dun Fishing Association, The Club, Dehra Dun.

To those resident in the Doon the fishing is a veritable paradise and, if most opportunities are taken, many will be the red letter days. To the visitor, the fishing may be sometimes disappointing as he or she may not just hit off the right time. If one takes 10 days leave one cannot count on, say, two good days, at least two or three average and the rest doubtful, but one can always catch fish. If the big ones are not stirring good sport can be had with a light rod and light tackle. There is a tendency to use too heavy tackle, and still worse to "barge" into a stream instead of working one's way quietly and slowly to drop your fly over the selected spot. Mahseer are totally different to trout, for one thing there are very many more mahseer in any pool than there would be trout in a similar pool at home. There are literally dozens and dozens of small fry usually lying about in the shallows, and if you splash your way in you send them scurrying in all directions with the result that the bigger fish take fright and go down to the bottom. The only essential difference between this light fishing and that at home is the reel. One must have a reel capable of holding 80—100 yards of line and with a quick wind up.

The great joy of light fishing in the Doon is the fact that the mahseer take a fly readily. One fishes downstream with a single fly and a 2 x cast. One fly is quite sufficient, more so in the days when every second or third cast produces something; these days usually occur in April and May when fish start to move up from the large rivers like the Jumna and Ganges into the smaller rivers, the Song and the Asan, etc.

Some time before the rains break fish start running up smaller streams to spawn, but unlike salmon mahseer do not spawn at once, but lay a batch of eggs at one time several times during the rains. One never catches a mahseer in bad condition.

The reason for this periodic spawning is that Indian rivers and streams vary tremendously. Spawn and fry could never exist in the

large rivers during the rains. The smaller streams, too, vary greatly; what was a mere trickle one day may be a good sized stream a few days later and *vice versa*. So, if all the spawn was laid at once the danger of it being left high and dry or baked in the tropical sun is very obvious. The mahseer is essentially a bottom feeder, and this, no doubt, accounts for its many vagaries, and why some days when conditions are perfect you can hardly move a fish. He feeds but little on the surface, and why he takes a fly except out of curiosity is hard to understand. One can understand why a fly-spoon is a good all-round "taker," because it resembles the small fry which the mahseer feeds on. However, the fact remains that mahseer take fly readily and a variety of such, too, with the following:

Yellow Spider (Loch Erne May hackle fly)
March Brown
Zulu
Alexandra
Jock Scott
Teal and Red
Teal and Green
Grouse and Claret

All about 6—8 size (Loch and Sea Trout size).

As regards fly-spoons ½ inch to ¾ inch in aluminium, copper and silver, or pearl; the latter two very effective when the water is slightly coloured as they show up well when the water is coloured. If you can see your spoon in 6 inches of water you have a good chance, if you can't see your spoon in 6 inches of water pack up. When fishing in coloured water fish for preference along the edge and fish deep, well down. The best time for fishing in the Doon is April, May and June till the rains break, and again in September and October or as soon as the rivers have cleared, till October.

The time is a break in the rains and when the rivers run clear for a day or so. It's muggy and stuffy, but the fishing can be wonderful. There are places where one can get fish any time of the year, and small though they may be, give excellent sport if you fish light; usual weight 1 to 2 lbs.

Localities in the Doon.

There are really two, West—the Jumna and its tributaries. The Asan and Giri (latter not in the Doon) and East—the Ganges with the Song and Suswa.

Of the two undoubtedly the Eastern Doon is the better. Apart from the fishing point of view the Song and Suswa jungles are wonderfully pretty. The Song, from Khansrao to its junction with the Ganges, has some most attractive reaches and pools, particularly the Jakhan pool which always holds good fish.

The Suswa is worth a try, it runs much slower and does not hold such good fish as the Song, nevertheless, one can put in a pleasant evening or morning on it. The Suswa is often clear when the Song is dirty. Both streams have gravelly and pebble courses and easy to fish.

The Western Doon.—The Asan, unlike the Song which runs through jungle, runs through arable land and varies from the Song in that the pools are not so deep, but in some cases longer, and being shallower is more easily poached, hence it is not so good as the former; still it holds good fish, and the reach, from about two miles above the junction with the Jumna down to the Jumna, affords good sport. Though mahseer will constitute 90 per cent. of one's catch in the Doon, there are other fish which give good sport. The Indian Trout or Baril, a pretty silver coloured fish running to 2½ lbs., a game fellow and a grand fighter, usually found in slackish water and where the river bed is sandy, rarely takes fly, but goes for your fly-spoon. The murral or sowli is really an amusing fish to hook, he may feel a dead-weight or bore down to the bottom, then suddenly break water and crash half out of water across to the other bank. His best virtue is his table value as, unlike the mahseer, he is practically boneless and very good eating. He is really a mud fish and invariably to be caught at the edge of a stream where it flows past a low grassy bank, he lives in holes in the bank and has a partiality for frogs. A pearl spoon seems to attract him most, and the extraordinary thing about him is that if you cast your spoon on to the bank itself and then flop it into the river he goes for it, *but* your spoon must spin as soon as it has touched the water, otherwise if, as spoons have a habit of doing in slow running water, it remains flopped and inanimate, there is nothing doing. The spoon for slack water is the bar-spoon, it spins immediately it hits the water and this is the secret of its success. By reason of its build it has to spin and never "flops." The only snag about the bar-spoon is that one cannot get it in any small sizes, on account of its structure; nevertheless it is a very useful addition to one's tackle.

Other frills which occasionally succeed are the "Halycon Spinner," the Feathero minnow and the Dandy Lure, but seldom if ever will they replace the fly and fly-spoon.

Ramganga at Buxar.—This is now in the U. P. Game Reserve, but I believe fishing is allowed. A lovely river full of fish—no poaching, no villages—swarming with game. I have only fished it when tiger shooting on off days, but did very well; it is a good river for fly-spoon. The Forest Rest House at Buxar is approached with difficulty from Bijnor railway station.

Sarda River.—The Sarda runs between Western Nepal and British India of which it is the boundary, and is a magnificent river very little fished. Fishing is based on Tanakpur, which can be got to by a narrow-gauge line from Pilibhit or by motoring up the Sarda Canal bank. It is impossible in the early autumn because of malaria, and the forest roads being impassable before October 15th. March is very pleasant and free from malaria. There are four bungalows at Tanakpur—Forest, Bhaber, Railway and Dâk Bungalow. Do not fish at Tanakpur itself, but go four miles up the forest road (motorable in dry weather) to where the river comes out of the hills through a magnificent gorge, and fish downstream. Beautiful water. The opposite bank is in Nepalese territory.

Some 15 miles upstream the Ladiya comes in on the right bank, and the junction and the water near it are very good. This was Sir Malcolm Hailey's favourite place, but it is a hard, rough march, the track is only fit for coolies and is impassable for mules.

Cooch-Behar.—Anyone who goes to one of His Highness' tiger shoots should take a rod; the Sankos and the Torsa are full of fish, but I was always too busy with tiger to fish myself.

Poona.—There is quite a good lake with a boat on it called "Sheoratra" belonging to Tatas, about 30 miles along the Bombay road and four miles by trolley. Spinning with a light spoon we had ten fish, 50 lbs., there one day at the end of February this year. Permission from Tatas. All the fish are at the head of the lake and it is a five-mile pull.

Mysore.—Anyone who goes to Mysore should spend a little time on the Cauvery. The very big fish of 100 lbs. and over have all been got bottom-fishing with atta and coarse tackle. I have tried this but found it very dull.

SHALLOW AREA MOSTLY
DRY IN HOT WEATHER.
3000'
ROAD ALONG D.S. RIVER
R.H. No-2
R.H. No 1.
R.H. No 3.
ROAD FR. RUPAR TOWN



WESTERN DOON


MUSSOORIE
DEHRA DUN
SONG R.
LACHI WALLA
MOHAND PASS
SUSWA R.
JAKHAN R.
SIWALIKS
KHANS RAO
SONG R.
GANGES R.
RAI WALA
HARDWAR
EASTERN DOON

It is much more amusing to embark in a coracle with a dry fly-rod, 1 x cast, and a supply of grasshoppers, and fish under the trees for Carnatic carp. I had eleven up to 4 lbs. one afternoon this spring.

The man who knows all about this Mysore fishing is my friend de Wet Van Ingen, Taxidermist of Mysore—a very fine sportsman and naturalist.

Finally, tight lines to all of you.

AN "ALTER EGO"

By Forest Creek

As one who has just given up command of a battalion, I wish to express my disagreement *in toto* with the conclusions reached in the article entitled "A Pilot for a Passenger," from the point of view of the Indian Army. I cannot speak for British regiments. But I believe that in them the senior Major always does the duties of Second-in-Command, even though the actual appointment does not exist.

In most Indian battalions the middle piece is weak in numbers—that is, in numbers actually present with the battalion. From ten to twenty years service is the period when an officer should be getting that extra-regimental experience—which is so essential for his development—at the Staff College, on Staff appointments, Burma Military Police, Scouts, and all the other jobs which have to be filled. The presence of many whole-time regimental soldiers generally means a weakness in quality, even if it improves the quantity. The result of this is a considerable variation in the age and service of company commanders. A common distribution is that one company should be commanded by a V. C. O., one by a Subaltern, and two—one of which will usually be the Support Company—by Captains or Majors.

If the Second-in-Command is taken away to command a company, it is obvious that his duties must be distributed, as is indeed suggested in the article discussed. Whether this can be done without sacrificing efficiency is very much open to question. Regimental accounts take a lot of time, if done properly. To deal with them efficiently, both experience and continuity are essential. A company commander has not got the time to do them properly in addition to his other duties; particularly if he is Support Company Commander —which is a post that generally falls to a fairly senior officer. The I. O.s' Club and Mess, Havildars' Mess, Battalion Institute and Club (if it exists), Band, Officers' Mess, and such like, will give one officer all the administration he requires to keep him busy throughout the week. He will of course also command the Headquarter Wing, and may have to supervise the Welfare Centre.

But outside administration, a Second-in-Command has a lot of work to do in training.

A Commanding Officer is a busy man. He is responsible for everything in the battalion and, though he may decentralise a great deal, he must still exercise supervision in all departments, and must be continually thinking and meditating on how to improve the quality and decrease the quantity of administration.

The training of officers takes up a great deal of time. I purposely omit the word "Junior" because a Commanding Officer is just as much bound to prepare senior officers for command as he is bound to push subalterns through promotion examinations, and this is a task that makes great demands on his energy as well as on his time. He further has to organise the training of the battalion throughout the year or rather throughout his period of command. For training must be progressive, and in this he needs assistance. Anyway I did. Many points arise for discussion and consideration in which the advice of a senior and experienced officer is invaluable. This help is also much needed in the preparation and conduct of exercises, whether for companies or for the battalion. And here it should be noted that the only way that a Commanding Officer can practise himself in command is by getting his Second-in-Command to set him exercises during battalion training. To my mind it is essential that he should do so.

It must further be remembered that one of a Commanding Officer's main tasks is to co-ordinate training. Company commanders must be given a very free hand, but they must all train the same way. A Commanding Officer is often away on Cantonment and other duties, and in any case cannot be present everywhere. To make this supervision effective, without being obtrusive, an "Alter Ego" is needed.

It seems clear, therefore, that the demands made on a Second-in-Command's time are already fairly considerable, and that if he commands a company he will so often be taken away from it that the continuity of its training will suffer.

A Second-in-Command has further training duties of his own. Tactical cadres for N. C. O.s are essential. For their duration they are a whole-time job during parade hours. The Adjutant cannot do them. He has plenty of cadres of his own to supervise, in which he will be helped by the officer latest from the school concerned—not by

a sort of Admirable Crichton specialist. It may perhaps be urged that such tactical cadres are the responsibility of company commanders. But in the individual training season the shortage of officers generally demands centralization, and in any case the object of these cadres is to inculcate one tactical system throughout the battalion. These are obviously suited for the Second-in-Command.

He also has the school. This cannot be supervised by a company commander unless he neglects his own company, and every year it becomes a greater demand on the time of the officer in charge. He has to take all examinations and see that the correct standard is maintained. He has to organise instruction and prepare suitable men for Belgaum. He has to spend one or two evenings a week teaching English himself unless he is exceptionally lucky in his Educational Jemadar.

I have only dealt with a few jobs. There are many side lines which cannot be gone into, but I cannot help feeling that if the appointment of Second-in-Command was abolished the senior major would have to be struck off to carry out his duties.

There are certain arguments brought forward in the article dealt with, with which I feel compelled to express disagreement.

First of all—it is a fact that the substantive Second-in-Command is often absent. This is to be regretted. He should, I think, be present for at least the last two years of his time, but even if he is away, it is essential to put someone in his place. Nor is it any disadvantage to have a man from another unit. It may even be a great boon.

Fresh ideas are always helpful; criticism from a new angle is always useful; a newcomer may often see failings in old V. C. O.s and N. C. O.s, even in valued regimental customs, to which long acquaintance and false sentiment has made others blind. The idea that a long unbroken period of service with the same unit is essential to efficiency is surely out of date.

Nor do I think that the difference in age and service of Commanding Officers and Seconds-in-Command is very different from old days. Friction should not exist. Perhaps I was lucky, but surely friendship is a more usual quality between old companions. If there is friction, it will certainly be increased if the senior major is kept as a company commander and is replaced as chief assistant by the Adjutant. Neither Adjutants' nor Commanding Officers' wives make really good commanding officers.

I disagree profoundly with the suggestion that the Adjutant should be a senior man. Of late it has been unavoidable in many battalions of the Indian Army, especially in those which have not seconded enough officers. But the situation has now changed. Subalterns and junior captains are becoming quite common, instead of being curios. The training and experience of the Adjutancy are invaluable assets to a Staff Officer. It is an appointment which should be held by as many officers as possible who are going to the Staff College. It is also an excellent training in tact. An Adjutant should, like all other Staff Officers, be the connecting link between the Commanding Officer and his subordinate commanders. He should not be senior to them, should not be in a position to exert any authority on them independent of his position as Staff Officer to the Commanding Officer ; though he should exert it freely with subalterns and Indian officers. More senior officers should be used where their experience is most valuable—as commanders and trainers of companies.

I do not personally know any battalions run on Soviet lines as the article suggests. Surely the only matters on which all officers are consulted are certain Mess affairs, and possibly matters of uniform. In all things connected with training, administration and promotion, a Commanding Officer should—in fact must—decide for himself, aided by the counsel of his best friend and most experienced officer—his Second-in-Command.

OUR MILITARY FAIRY TALE

By Gilbert

Once upon a time there was a Good Soldier. (This was very long ago.) And he read all his Manuals and even pasted in all the Amendments, which was quite hard work, because if there is no Amendment in any one month you have to delete last month's so as to be able to reinsert it next month, differently worded, of course. (As you know.)

And so when he fell in love, as all Good Soldiers do, on reaching military puberty, that is, thirty years of age for officers but only twenty-six for soldiers, who ripen sooner, he decided to follow the Good Book's advice in everything. So, when he had got the right page and turned over the Amendments so as to get to the meat of it, he found there were several principles which he had to adopt to gain his objective, in this case a very beautiful girl who had just come of age and was very rich and had no parents and was quite dumb and was, therefore, very, very desirable indeed. And our Good Soldier saw that he must follow these principles if he was to compete successfully with all the Bad Soldiers who were after this beautiful girl for her money, but who didn't know their Manuals and always failed in their Promotion Examinations in consequence. (As you will realize.) And he saw the first principle was Concentration, so he knitted his brows and concentrated very hard and said, "I will be good, I will be good," fifty times, just like Queen Victoria on the Throne, only he was in the Company Office sticking in his Amendments, as he was Company Clerk, being such a Good Soldier. Then, having a great deal of time because all the Bad Soldiers were on coal fatigue or peeling potatoes and other military exercises, he looked up the dictionary and said, "I'm doing the wrong sort of concentration; I must go and visit my beautiful honey." He called his objective "honey" because he had been once to the Pictures (this was when he was sowing his wild oats before becoming a Good Soldier) and the only word he had understood the Hero to say was when he addressed a strange but beautiful lady as honey, so he knew this was correct. So being very clever, like all Good Soldiers who read their Manuals, he signed the Pass he had made out with a very good imitation of the Captain's signature and concentrated on the girl (which is termed

having a crush on someone by the Bad Soldiers, who don't know their military vocabulary). And then he knew the next principle was Economy of Force, so he was very gentle with her, but he realized he hadn't got the meaning right, so he changed his attitude, being too modest to change anything else in her presence, and she effected a surprise on him (which should have been his next principle) by slapping him on the face. So when this happened he could only think of the principles of Mobility and Security, and on the way home he remembered a poem he had read when he was sowing his wild oats, and this poem was all about a King watching a spider trying to climb a rope and there was something about Try, Try again. He didn't like to puzzle too much over this story because he knew that natural history was never very nice, but his afternoon's experience made him think (he could still do this in spite of six years' service), so he decided he would put his case before his Company Officer as advised to do by the Colonel when he first joined, who said: "When in any difficulty go and see your Company Officer." So he went into the Company Office next morning with his hat on (only Bad Soldiers take their hats off when entering the room—as you will remember) and saw his Company Officer. "Well, my man, and what can I do for you?" said the Company Officer who had an original way of expressing himself. "Well, it's like this, sir, you see," began the Good Soldier, "I was thinkin' of gettin' married like." "Ho! and what do you want to do that for?" said the Company Officer, "don't you know when you're best off?" At which the serjeant-major, who was filing correspondence with difficulty in the background, gave the appropriate laugh for the occasion and said, "Not 'arf 'e don't. That comes of being Company Clerk. 'E's been workin' aht marriage allowance 'e 'as. It's a change from filling in football coupons anyway." By this time the Company Officer was getting restive, so he gave the serjeant-major an order to fall in a fatigue, and when the last bellows had died away he said to the Good Soldier: "Who is the woman and do you have to marry her?" The Good Soldier said: "She's Miss Emingway, and I have to marry her because she's very rich and then I can buy my discharge and do nothing all day just like an officer." So the Company Officer was very haughty and said, "Well, well, fall out now, I shall have to look into this," and the Good Soldier fell out and like all Good Soldiers thought nothing more about it because it was already 10 a.m. and time for char and wads. But the Company

Officer thought he'd better look into this, so he saw Miss Emingway and, being an officer, he knew his principles very well and so he didn't get his face slapped—at least not on that occasion; but after he had found out that she was really very rich and had her own Austin Seven, he swallowed his principles and married her, and the Good Soldier got seven days soon afterwards for saying the serjeant-major had a beautiful face, which turned him into a Bad Soldier from then on because he thought he'd been unjustly treated. So he had a grievance and lived happily ever after.

THE BHILS OF THE HILLY TRACTS OF MEWAR

By "Shiggadar"

A Bengali once wrote an essay on the Bhils, which began with the words: "The Bhil is a small black man. When he meets you, he kills you and throws your body into a ditch. By this you may know the Bhil."

The object of this article is to relate something about the habitat and characteristics of one section of this large tribe, which is scattered over Southern Rajputana, Central India and Gujrat, and to show that the Bhil of to-day, although he is still extremely primitive, is by no means just a wild and woolly savage armed with the bow and arrow, but rather a self-respecting person, a good soldier worthy of being classed amongst the best fighting races of India and, in his own sphere, an entirely reliable guardian of law and order.

In the early days of British rule in India, law and order was normally maintained by localised forces stationed at places where trouble was most likely to occur, and the present Malwa and Mewar Bhil Corps are amongst the few survivors of these old local Corps. The pacification of the Bhils was first seriously taken in hand in the year 1825, when the famous James Outram—then a boy of only 22 years of age—raised the Khandesh Bhil Corps; about which Rudyard Kipling wrote that intriguing yarn, "The Tomb of His Ancestors." The raising of this Corps, on the principle of "set a thief to catch a thief," was an experiment which at the time many people deprecated, but which turned out—owing greatly to Outram's amazing energy and force of character—so eminently successful that similar Corps were raised in Malwa and Mewar. It is with the latter area that it is proposed to deal in this article.

* * * * * *

Some fifty miles south-west of Udaipur, the capital of Mewar, there lies a region known as the Hilly Tracts, which is governed by a Hákim of Mewar State (corresponding to a Deputy Collector in British India), and is policed by the Mewar Bhil Corps.

Few Europeans ever visit—or even know of the existence of—the Hilly Tracts, which comprise a tangled mass of small hills varying from two to fifteen hundred feet in height, intersected here and there

by rivers. During the winter and hot weather months these rivers are almost dry, but in the monsoon they become raging torrents, sometimes impassable for days at a time, and many parts of the country become more or less isolated from communication with the outer world. The hills for the most part are covered with thick, low jungle, and such roads as exist—and they are few and far between—are little more than footpaths, a few of them passable in fine weather by bullock-carts or camels.

The inhabitants of the Hilly Tracts are almost entirely Bhils and Grassias, with a few Patels (the farmer class) here and there, and it is only in the bigger villages that Rajputs and Brahmans, both of them very few in number, are to be found. The Bhils are aborigines and the origin of the Grassias, who consider themselves to be slightly higher in the social scale, is obscure, but they are believed by many people to be the descendants of mixed marriages between Rajputs and Bhils. Both Bhils and Grassias are very simple folk and are quite unspoilt by contact with the outer world, for few of them have ever been outside their own country. Their needs are simple, as they build their own houses—either of rammed earth, or, in the more "jungly" parts, of wattle and daub, with roofs of country tiles—and live almost entirely on the *makki* (Indian corn) crop, which they grow on the land adjoining their homesteads, and on the milk of their goats and cows. Whereas in the past they were notorious as thieves and cattle-lifters, nowadays they are law-abiding people and, if treated with justice, give very little trouble. Their chief and almost only vice is drink, which they concoct from the fruit of the *mahwa* tree and of which they consume large quantities, specially during festivals and other great occasions. They are animists, but have adopted many Hindu customs and are full of superstitions and queer beliefs.

Amongst Bhils and Grassias will be found a certain number of "Bhagats," who take a vow to abstain from drink and the flesh of animals, and who bury their dead instead of cremating them. Every village in the Bhil country has its memorial stones, set up in memory of headmen or other well-known men or women, and these stones are worshipped by the villagers periodically.

There is no purdah amongst Bhils and they have great respect for their women, who are able to wander freely in the jungle without fear of molestation. The women do most of the work in Bhil-land

(in addition to their ordinary household duties) and they help with the crops by sowing, weeding and spreading manure, but are not allowed to handle a plough. Bhil girls are pleasant featured and well built, and their happy disposition is particularly noticeable—they are always laughing. They all dress much alike, in dark red *saris* with a faint black pattern, rather scanty " brassieres," and red pleated skirts, which, when working, they pull out between the legs and tuck in front, giving the appearance of a *dhoti*. On state occasions they usually wear a more elaborate skirt, often of some flowered blue cotton material. As ornaments they wear a number of brass anklets, sometimes covering the leg from the ankle to the knee, and on their arms highly coloured bangles, made of lacquer, which are manufactured in the local bazars and which they wear both above and below the elbow. Unmarried girls are not allowed to wear bangles above the elbow and married women wear a peculiar shaped brass anklet nearest to the foot, which fits below the ankle bone and is the equivalent of our wedding ring.

Widows are easily recognisable by their dark blue clothes and lack of brass anklets, signs of perpetual mourning, to which they are destined for life, unless they marry again : this they sometimes do if they are still young and attractive when they lose their husbands.

The men are not so picturesque, their dress consisting of the *dhoti* and a short jacket of cotton cloth (the latter they often dispense with in the jungle) and they nearly always go about armed with a bow and arrow, and often with a sword or country-made gun in addition. They have lithe, athletic figures and good, hard-bitten faces and are able, without apparent effort, to cover incredible distances on foot.

The Patels are very similar to the Bhils, but are much better cultivators and live in villages consisting of houses built all in a clump, as opposed to the Bhils and Grassias, who always build their homesteads at a distance from one another, usually on high ground overlooking the piece of land which they cultivate.

Bhils marry young as a rule, the boys between the ages of 18 and 21 and the girls at 15 or 16, and an interesting custom in connection with marriage is the ceremony known as "*Moria,*" which they are bound to perform : it is a form of penance which they both have to undergo in their own villages every day for a fortnight before the final marriage ceremony and which can best be described as " tossing the bride and bridegroom." The unfortunate bride, or bridegroom,

squats on a small board, about 1½ feet square, which is held up waist high by a group of men who proceed to dance round in a circle to the accompaniment of music and singing; every now and then the board is jerked up to the level of the men's heads and the bride, or bridegroom, is tossed into the air. This sometimes goes on for hours and must be most trying for the suffering spouse-to-be. Women are allowed to take part in the song and dance in the outer circle, but do not handle the board.

Another curious premarriage ceremony, which is performed in connection with *moria*, is the anointing of the bodies of both bride and bridegroom with an evil-smelling mixture of oil and spices called *pithi*. This they are not allowed to wash off until the day before the wedding, when they both have a good wash at the bridegroom's house.

Bhils are allowed two wives but, like the aborigines of Australia, they are not allowed to marry into their own clan and the wife automatically becomes a member of her husband's clan. Thus interbreeding is prevented and the beneficial results are apparent from the fine specimens of humanity one sees, particularly amongst the women.

All Bhil men have two, three or four brand marks about the size of a shilling, on their forearms. These are self-inflicted when they are boys between the ages of 9 and 12, the belief being that man after death has to pass through fire and that if he brands himself during his lifetime he will come to no harm thereby. They do this branding by placing small wads of cotton on the forearm, setting fire to them and letting them burn down to the skin, a slow and very painful operation for a young boy to undergo voluntarily and one which requires considerable physical courage.

The Hilly Tracts—or Bhumat, as the district is called—is divided up into estates (known as *thikanas*), each ruled by its own Rao. These rulers are the hereditary chieftains of the *thikanas* and, provided they manage their estates properly, are practically independent as far as their internal affairs are concerned, but they are responsible to the Mewar Darbar for the welfare of their subjects and pay an annual tribute to the Maharana of Udaipur, thereby acknowledging his sovereignty.

In the heart of the Hilly Tracts lie the two minute Cantonments of Kherwara and Kotra, which for nearly a hundred years have been occupied by the Mewar Bhil Corps. Each Cantonment consists of a

few bungalows and barracks, a hospital and a school, and a small regimental bazar and village. In Kherwara, which is the Headquarters of the District and of the Mewar Bhil Corps, there is a pretty little Church and a well-cared-for cemetery, the latter—as is the case with most old cemeteries in India—a pathetic testimony of the toll taken in the past by tropical diseases on little English children. Services are held in the Church by the Padré of the Bhil Mission, but in Kotra there is no Church and the Mission station, which was formerly located there, has had to be abandoned owing to lack of funds. In Kherwara, the Officers' Mess has long since ceased to exist as such, but the old custom of blowing the Mess calls on the bugle in the evening is still kept up. The Mess garden is still maintained, and in a shady spot by the old Mess well will be found a little graveyard where the memories of a number of favourite dogs and one or two horses have been perpetuated by grave stones, on which such names as "Tiger," "Whisky," "Peps" and "Jim" have been inscribed. Amongst them is an Arab pony which belonged to the late Sir Curzon Wyllie, a former resident of Mewar and Agent to the Governor-General of Rajputana, and a faithful old charger of 20 years' service, which was the property of a former Commandant of the Mewar Bhil Corps. Not far from here, by the side of another well, will be found a watering-trough which was erected recently in memory of the late Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Ayscough, who died in 1934 while commanding the Corps.

Nowadays Kherwara is connected with Udaipur, 52 miles distant, by a motor road, and the event of the day is the arrival of the postal lorry from Udaipur. This road winds in and out amongst small hills throughout its length, with patches of cultivation here and there and Bhil houses perched on the hill-tops. Every few miles there is a toll-post, usually situated in a village of a few houses, and two old Dâk Bungalows at stages on the road form a relic of the days when the journey had to be performed by horse-tonga. At Kherwara the metalled road ends and two *kachcha* tracks, passable by motor in fine weather, branch off; one to Dungarpur State to the south and the other to Idar State to the south-west. The road to Kotra, which is between 50 and 60 miles to the north-west, is motorable for a certain distance in fine weather, but the wise man who respects his car will perform the journey either on horseback or on foot.

The outstanding feature in the Hilly Tracts is the Mewar Bhil Corps, which was formerly a regular unit of the Indian Army and is

now a Military Police Battalion under the Civil Administration of Rajputana. This Corps was raised by Captain W. Hunter in 1841 on the model of Outram's Khandesh Bhil Corps, with the dual object of keeping the Bhils in order and of acting as a civilising influence in what was then an extremely wild and unruly part of the country. That the Corps has fulfilled its dual rôle and thoroughly justified its existence is very evident, both from its past history and from its present state of smartness and efficiency, to say nothing of the state of peace and tranquillity which prevails in the Hilly Tracts at the present time. The Corps remained staunch during the Mutiny of 1857 and did good work in hunting mutineers from other stations who had taken refuge in the hills.

The Bhil is a natural soldier, smart, as hard as nails and very amenable to discipline; there is tremendous competition for enlistment in the Mewar Bhil Corps. It is probably the only Corps in India—and possibly in the world at the present time—where amongst the recruits will be found a squad of youngsters learning their drill without pay and waiting to step into vacancies as they occur. The fault of the Bhil as a soldier is, of course, his objection to leaving his own country, and it was this that prevented this wonderful recruiting ground from being utilised during the Great War; but, had the Bhils of this area become used, like other soldiers of the Indian Army, to serve in out-stations in days gone by, there is little doubt that they would have made a name for themselves for their fighting qualities during the War. As it is, they serve the purpose for which they are required in Mewar admirably, and so long as the Corps exists there is little fear of the intervention of troops from outside ever being required for internal security in the Hilly Tracts. Funnily enough, the Bhils, although they are entirely loyal to their own people and essentially lovers of their homes, have no compunction in operating against their own people when ordered to do so and on such occasions as it has been necessary for them to open fire on their own countrymen they have never showed the slightest hesitation in doing so. In this way they are entirely reliable as a Military Police Force. Accustomed as they are to moving about the hills both by day and night and being able to live on the country, they are very mobile and are always able to arrive at the scene of action, wherever it may be, in the shortest possible time. They are wonderful marchers and evidence of their powers of endurance will be found in

the fact that men going on leave from Kotra to Kherwara will often cover the distance (over 50 miles) in 18 hours or less. The Bhils of the countryside have a very healthy respect for the *topi-wallas*, as they call the men of the Bhil Corps, owing to the pill-box hats which they always wear.

The bi-weekly mail between Kherwara and Kotra is carried by men of the Bhil Corps, and, in spite of the fact that during the rains the grass on the hills grows head high and several rivers in flood have to be crossed, the post hardly ever fails to come in at the scheduled time—at the end of the second day. In cases of necessity letters are sent by special messenger and a curious old custom in Bhil-land is the placing of a feather in the flap of a letter of special importance: it is a point of honour amongst Bhils to deliver such a letter or die in the attempt.

Service in the Corps brings in a lot of money to the Bhils and the gathering of some 400 pensioners at Kherwara every 3 months is a sight worth seeing. They are a motley and hard-bitten crowd, dressed in any sort of kit—some in uniform coats of ancient pattern, others in disreputable rags and a few quite smartly turned out—and they sit around the office cracking about old times. Some of them are very old, having gone on pension after 20 years' service as far back as the years 1894 and 1895, and a few are so ancient that they are bed-ridden and have to be paid at their homes by Indian officers sent out specially for the purpose. Amongst them are a proportion of old stiffs who, no sooner they get their pensions, are off to the grog-shop to celebrate the occasion, and when the officers are returning the pension papers and enquiring of each man how much he has received, it is not unusual to hear the Head Clerk shout out, "Where is so-and-so? he is a drunkard." Then so-and-so's friend quietly goes off and retrieves the bleary-eyed roisterer from the nearest "Pub."

In Bhil-land debts are hereditary, and when pensions are being paid a number of the local *banias* may be seen lurking around like a crowd of vultures, waiting to extract what they can of past debts, which many of the pensioners can never hope to liquidate during their lifetime.

The Bhils keep numerous festivals during the year, the chief amongst them being the Holi. The celebration of this festival lasts for a fortnight, chiefly by drumming, singing and dancing, and terminates on the last night with an orgy, during which a pot of water,

which has been buried in the ground under a bonfire for 24 hours, is dug up and inspected to see how much water has evaporated. If the pot is full, the Bhils look upon it as a sign of a good monsoon to come, but if it is empty, or partially so, they believe that they are in for a bad year.* Throughout the days of the Holi festival Bhil girls are at liberty to hold up strangers on the road and demand cocoanuts or money in lieu. They do this by forming a line with their arms interlocked across the road and singing a song, and woe betide the traveller who is unable to pay his due, either in a cocoanut or a few annas. An officer of the Bhil Corps, who went out a year or two ago without money in his pocket during the Holi, was held up by a party of Bhil girls and came back with the shirt torn off his back!

Another curious festival kept by the Bhils is the *Sakrant* (winter solstice), known to Bhils as the *Uterān*, when at early dawn all the men and boys go out into the fields and catch robins, which they do by chasing them from place to place until they become so exhausted that they can fly no more. They then bring them home, feed them on a mixture of *ghi* and *gur* and let them loose one by one. If the robin, when let loose, perches on a green tree, it is considered a good omen; if on a bare tree, a bad one. As, however, at the time of the year this festival takes place the trees are nearly all in leaf, the odds are heavily on the good omen. In the afternoon they amuse themselves by playing the only ball game known in Bhil country. The ball is made of cloth and the game is started by a man throwing it up into the air and hitting it as far as he can with a stick. The players then all rush after it and the one who gets it first has the next hit. When they are tired of playing this game they have a big feed, with plenty of strong drink, and so the day ends.

Such are some of the customs and superstitious beliefs of the Bhils, and there are many of them.

There is very little big game in the Hilly Tracts, though one would expect to find a good deal in the large and sparsely populated areas of dense jungle which exist. The reason is, presumably, lack of game laws and effective game preservation; for though the shooting of big game is nominally prohibited, it is practically impossible to enforce any prohibition in such an out-of-the-way and inaccessible

* NOTE.—It is a curious coincidence that this year (1936) the water-pot buried at Kherwara came out empty, causing considerable consternation amongst the Bhils; and, sure enough, the monsoon failed, resulting in the total loss of the *makki* crop in that area.

area, where every man is armed with either a bow and arrow or a blunderbuss and where the majority are naturally keen *shikaris*. There is, however, a good deal of small game, principally partridge, hare and sandgrouse, and in some parts good jungle-fowl shooting is to be had. Some Bhils, particularly those from Kotra District, are experts with their bows and arrows, especially at shooting hare and fish. The really keen fisherman has a special arrow with a barbed head which is so loose on the shaft to which it is attached by twine, that when the fish is struck the shaft comes off and floats on the surface, thereby indicating the movements of the wounded fish under water.

There are very few Europeans in the Hilly Tracts; only three officers of the Mewar Bhil Corps, two of whom are at Kherwara and one at Kotra, and half a dozen Missionaries distributed between 3 different Mission stations very far apart. The latter do a great deal of unobtrusive good work amongst the Bhils and they go about all over the country, often entirely alone but always cheerful, enthusiastic and unafraid. At one Mission station, miles from anywhere, the sole European inhabitant throughout the hot weather is a single Mission lady.

Parts of the Bhil country are really beautiful, particularly to those who love the hills and a jungle life and are not afraid of solitude, and a tour in this area during the winter months, when one can be out for days on end without ever seeing a vehicle—not even a bullock-cart—is a thing never to be forgotten; it makes one realise that in these days of perpetual rush and excitement there is at least one peaceful spot where the people never change and where one is always welcome.

Such are the Hilly Tracts of Mewar: a most attractive country inhabited by simple, unsophisticated and very pleasant people.

CHINA AND THE FOREIGNER

A Review of the Reasons for Anti-Foreign Feeling.

By Major A. E. Swann, R.I.A.S.C.

That the bulk of the Chinese people, who have not come into active contact with foreigners, both dislike and mistrust them is undoubtedly true. The minority, who may have been associated in one way or another with foreigners will probably except those whom they personally know from the general condemnation. But, almost to a man, the Chinese are anti-foreign in that they tend to regard foreigners and their governments as monsters from another world who have descended upon China with the main purpose of making their own fortunes at the expense of the Chinese. The foreigner who goes out of his way to try to understand the Chinese, however, may often receive kindness from them and may sometimes win their friendship. Hundreds of individual foreigners have done so, and have often enjoyed the esteem and respect of their small circle of Chinese acquaintances. Most foreigners, who have any dealings with Chinese, like them, and the majority of Chinese, who rub shoulders with foreigners in the Treaty Ports and other large centres seldom display feelings other than of courteous affability. Yet, for all that, the Chinese are anti-foreign. Their government is anti-foreign, the education in their schools is anti-foreign, and anti-foreign slogans will be found freely plastered over the hoardings of their cities throughout the length and breadth of the country. In the vastness of China, there must be many remote villages and even towns where the people have never even seen the white face of a European, but there will be few who have not seen or heard an anti-foreign slogan, and probably none who have failed to hear the common epithet of contempt applied to foreigners: "Yang Kuei Tzu," the equivalent of which in English is "foreign devil."

The causes which have led up to this unfortunate state of affairs will no doubt be familiar to those who have studied the history of China's foreign relations. But to others, the news that in China, as in so many other places, the white man, and in particular the Briton, is not appreciated at his real intrinsic worth may come rather as a shock. It may not even be believed. But it is true.

The Chinese show scant respect for a foreigner until he has done something to earn it. Far from thinking of him as a superior being, they are much more apt to regard him as an inferior, who may in certain circumstances be admitted as an equal, but never as a superior.

The object of these pages is to demonstrate to those who have not studied Sino-Foreign relations, how natural these feelings of dislike and superiority are, and how utterly impossible it would be for them not to exist. The reader will see that even the scandalous acts of the notorious Boxers in 1900 are capable of very simple explanation, which renders even those blood-curdling incidents readily understandable. The reasons for China's persistent anti-foreignism will become abundantly clear as the story unfolds itself.

It is in no way intended to criticize the actions or policies of the foreign governments in their relations with China, but merely to present the sequence of the main facts and to leave these to speak for themselves. They will show that China has always been the loser in her many essays at foreign diplomacy, that she has been divested of territory, first by one and then by another Power. No doubt she may not herself have been guiltless, and in many cases she may have given provocation which will have seemed to the Power affronted to be ample justification for the severe measures adopted. But China, almost defenceless against the armed strength of foreign invaders, has paid dearly for her several ineffectual attempts at revolt. Beaten into submission she has been forced not only to grant every demand of the aggressor, but to compensate him in addition for the expenses of her castigation. She is thus left with a grievance. And grievances beget hatred.

The superior attitude adopted by so many Chinese towards foreigners is very easily explained when it is remembered that China has enjoyed a moderately high degree of civilization and culture for centuries. When the ancient Britons were little better than savages, the civilization of China was probably not very far below its present level. Educated Chinese, who reverence the past, see little to admire in the parvenu civilizations of the modern world, and are prone to look upon them rather in the way that a hereditary aristocrat must regard the "nouveaux riches." That is, after all, a very natural view. The Chinese, with their complacent philosophy, do not hanker for the benefits of modern progress. They prefer to be left in peace. But modern progress has been forced upon them

by the circumstances of the times, and through the instrumentality of foreigners. Chaos and revolution, definitely traceable to these external influences, have followed in their train, and thus the interference of foreigners is blamed as the root of most of China's ills. The story of these interferences will show that the Chinese are probably right when they contend that, but for the invasion of the West, China's ancient civilization might never have collapsed into the chaos of recent years.

Until the discovery of the sea route to the East, China was more or less isolated and had few relations with the outside world. There was some trade with the Roman Empire, with the Arabs and with India. In the seventh century the Nestorian Christians came from Persia, were hospitably received and allowed to build churches and gain converts: Moslems, too, were permitted to enter and settle freely in the country: there was at this time no hint of any desire to exclude foreigners. In the thirteenth century the Venetian, Marco Polo, with his father and uncle, travelled overland to China, and were not only permitted to remain, but honours were showered upon them and Polo was eventually appointed to a Chinese governorship. Marco Polo, as he recounts in his "Travels," was awed by the magnificence, wealth, good order and government of the Chinese cities. The Europe of that day was backward, whilst China was comparatively advanced. We in Europe are sometimes inclined to forget this, and to take the present state of our own civilization as our absolute criterion.

The Portuguese were the first foreigners to come to China by the sea route from the West, two of their vessels arriving in Canton in the year 1517. They appear to have conducted themselves with suitable decorum, for they were allowed to trade and to send an envoy to the court at Peking. The first two ships, however, were followed by a third, the crew of which comported itself very differently and proceeded to loot and plunder. The Chinese attitude of hospitality was immediately reversed and the envoy who had been received at the court at Peking was sent back to Canton in chains. This incident may be cited as an early indication of hostility to foreign trade, but viewed in its proper perspective it would seem more in the nature of an act of reprisal. No hostility had been shown to the first two ships. It developed quite naturally in retaliation for the acts of the third.

As a result it was not until 1557 that the Portuguese succeeded, by bribing the local officials, in opening a trading station on the peninsula of Macao, at the mouth of the Canton river. With this they had to be content, for, with rare exceptions, the only foreigners whom the Chinese would now permit to travel in the country or settle in the interior were missionaries. To these China has been on the whole singularly tolerant, much more so indeed than Christians have often been with each other. Christianity suffered no serious setback until about 1704, in the reign of the Emperor K'ang Hsi, when the Pope issued a bull declaring ancestor worship to be idolatrous. This was considered to be an affront to the Son of Heaven—the Emperor—and, as it threatened the whole basis of Chinese civilization, it resulted in the expulsion of the Dominicans and Franciscans, and later on, in the reign of Yung Cheng, the next Emperor, in the repression of Christianity and the banishment of the Jesuits, with the exception of a favoured few who were retained for the sake of their knowledge of Western science.

The early Portuguese traders were followed by the Dutch, who, similarly excluded from the mainland, opened up a trading station on the island of Formosa in 1624. In 1637 Captain John Weddell of the East India Company forced the passage to Canton in face of the opposition of the Chinese forts, disposed of his cargo, and loaded his craft again with sugar and ginger. By 1685 the East India Company had secured the right to establish a trading station and a factory at Canton, and there was already a growing demand in Europe for the tea, porcelain and silks which came from China. There was as yet, however, little demand in China for European goods, and the merchants were hard put to it to find some commodity to give in exchange for their cargoes. This problem found its solution in the opium smuggled from India into China in contravention of the Chinese law.

The Chinese taste for opium-smoking had its origin in the Phillipine Islands, in the middle of the seventeenth century. The conquest of these islands by Spain led to a large immigration of Chinese, who there learned to smoke tobacco brought from the new world by the Spaniards. The smoking of tobacco mixed with opium and arsenic was locally believed to be a specific against fever, and from this the Chinese soon discovered that opium might be smoked alone with agreeable results. It was thus that the

demoralization of this large section of the human race by the misuse of a useful drug began.

As soon as the potentialities of China as a market for opium were realized by the British merchants, they were not slow to exploit them. Moral objections were no deterrent, if indeed they were considered at all; for by 1770 the East India Company had assumed a monopoly of opium in Bengal, and exported 200 chests of the drug to China during that year. By 1830 the figure had grown to 4,000 chests per annum, and during the next decade increased to more than seven times that quantity!

It was then that the Emperor decided to enforce the opium prohibition laws. The surrender by the merchants of over a million pounds worth of the drug was demanded and obtained, and was followed by a demand for the surrender of certain Europeans for alleged offences. This was refused, and the Chinese thereupon closed the port of Canton to foreign trade, at the same time seizing and destroying the entire stock of opium in the foreign warehouses. The step was a rash one for a country with no means of self-defence, and the insult was too much for the pride of the British of those days. The inevitable happened and Britain declared war; war which ended in the Treaty of Nanking of 1842 and secured for Britain the island of Hong Kong, whilst China was forced to open the five ports of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai to foreign trade. This war was brought about by the opium traffic, and when it was over it left matters much as they were as regards opium, but Might had vindicated its power and China had been compelled against her will by the British to make further concessions to foreigners. The British Government, whilst agreeing that the importation of opium into China was contrary to the law of that country, yet did nothing to restrict its export from India, where the poppy was a valuable source of revenue to the East India Company as well as to some of the Indian princes who had followed the example set them by the Company. When the British Government in India succeeded the Company, a myth which had been current in official circles that opium was necessary to the health of the Chinese seems to have been accepted as a fact; for the traffic went on unchecked.

It cannot be seriously advanced that the Chinese prohibition of the drug was very sincere or that vigorous measures were taken to enforce it. As with "prohibition" in America, the opium embargo

in China seemed to act rather as a spur to the cupidity of venal officials than as a hindrance to the traffic, which continued to flourish and increase whilst peculant mandarins amassed fortunes from their illicit incomes. Nevertheless, whilst it is true that wholesale importation, contrary to the letter of the Chinese law, was freely encouraged by local officials, it cannot be denied that the drug habit itself was originally acquired from foreigners, nor that its exploitation was accomplished by foreign traders, aided and abetted by their governments, who did not hesitate to use force.

Following upon the Treaty of Nanking the next step of British diplomacy in China was to secure, in the next year, the right that any privilege accorded to any other nation would, *ipso facto*, be accorded to England ;* an example which was speedily followed by every other Power with interests in the Far East, so that thenceforward the "most favoured nation clause" was included in all treaties which foreign nations made with China. Thus the United States† and France‡ quickly secured for themselves similar privileges to those obtained by Britain in the Treaty of Nanking, and the other Powers of Europe (and even some of the South American republics) wasted no time in following suit. The French in their treaty insisted upon the liberty of Catholic worship and the restitution of church property confiscated in 1724.§ This was immediately followed by a demand for similar freedom of worship and proselytization by the Protestant Powers ; and so the game went on until foreigners had gained for themselves the right to live, trade and preach an alien religion in China, whilst remaining immune from Chinese law. In addition to securing these "extra-territorial rights" for their nationals, the foreign Powers negotiated through their local representatives to obtain "concessions," or leased territory, at each of the ports established by treaty, where foreigners could live and trade under their own municipal arrangements, and subject to no other jurisdiction than that of their own Consul. Naturally the Chinese servants and employees and their families could not be excluded and thus the concessions soon became areas into which Chinese fugitives from law could find sanctuary, and were one of the factors which helped to undermine the authority of government in China.

* Treaty of the Bogue, 1843.
† Treaty of Wanghia, 1844.
‡ Treaty of Whampao, 1844.
§ By a rescript in 1846.

It is true that foreigners sought nothing more than the right to trade, but the results of thus forcing the pace upon a proud nation like the Chinese are not always appreciated. Unable to do anything but accede to the threats and demands of the foreign governments, the Chinese mandarins, not unnaturally, began to foment hatred of foreigners. Outrages on Christian converts and isolated foreigners became more and more frequent, and eventually led to further armed intervention; but in the meantime internal discord found expression in the form of the T'aiping rebellion, which broke out in 1850, and which was indirectly the result of foreign influences. The leader of this revolt called himself the T'ien Wang (Prince of Heaven). He was a Christian convert, who announced himself as the Messiah and proclaimed that his mission was to rid the country of the foreign yoke, replacing the Manchu dynasty with a new Chinese dynasty to be known as the T'aiping, whose first Emperor would be the T'ien Wang himself. Fantastic as his claims may sound, he gathered round him an imposing following, and by 1853 he had succeeded in dominating China south of the Yangtse, capturing Nanking with heavy slaughter in March of that year, and thereupon proclaiming himself Emperor in the ancient capital of the Mings. His attempt to advance further against Tientsin and Peking met with disaster, but as the Chinese became embroiled in a further war with the foreign Powers in 1856, the rebellion could not be finally crushed until 1864, and the T'ien Wang retained control of the Yangtse valley until that year.

The war of 1856 between China and the allied forces of France, Russia and Britain was the direct result of the anti-foreignism which had been fomented by the mandarins, and which rendered it impossible for foreigners to move freely in the city of Canton, or indeed anywhere outside the restricted areas of the foreign concessions. The indignation which this state of affairs engendered in the minds of the foreign governments may be readily appreciated, and their decision that the Chinese must be taught a lesson is not difficult to understand. But the attitude of the Chinese, who did not consider themselves the racial or cultural inferiors of the Westerners, is not so generally realized. If one conjures up a picture, however, of an invasion of our own shores in the Middle Ages by Chinese merchants backed by powerful fleets, and the attitude which our own ancestors might have been expected to adopt towards

Chinese settlements forcibly established in our principal ports, the feelings of the Chinese themselves will be more easily understood. They behaved much as our own similarly independent ancestors would have behaved if conditions had been reversed. It is hardly surprising that the atmosphere was explosive; so much so, in fact, that war was inevitable.

A dispute as to whether the crew of the British vessel "Arrow" was subject to British or Chinese law whilst in Chinese territory and waterways provided the spark, and the defences of Canton were seized by the British in October 1856. France shortly afterwards joined in the war, her excuse being the murder of a missionary; and in 1857 Russia, too, joined the allies. In December of that year the British captured and occupied Canton city. The Indian Mutiny somewhat hampered British operations, but by June of 1858 the British and French compelled the Chinese to accept treaties which were signed, for the first time in history, by the Emperor himself instead of by a local representative, at Peking on July 4th. The equality of foreigners with Chinese, toleration of Christianity, the opening of the whole of the Yangtse valley to foreign trade, and the reception of diplomatic missions of foreign Powers at the court of Peking were the main points of these treaties. Whether or not the precaution was necessary cannot be definitely established, but the British and French decided that their envoys should proceed to Peking for the ratification of their treaties by the water route *via* Tientsin and accompanied by contingents of their fleets. No such provision, however, had been accepted by the Chinese or specified in the treaties; consequently when the fleets drew abreast of the Taku forts at the mouth of the Tientsin river they were treated as invaders and met with a serious reverse. It was not until a year later that Lord Elgin and Baron Gros returned with greatly increased forces. Sir Harry Parkes was then despatched by Elgin to conduct preliminary negotiations with Peking for the reception of the mission, but he was captured and held prisoner by the Chinese and some of his party were murdered. As a reprisal for what was then thought to be an act of wanton treachery, the allied forces—in October 1860—advanced on Peking, where they sacked and burned the Summer Palace with all its costly treasures, thus perpetrating an act of vandalism which will live long in Chinese memories. Quite recently Sir Reginald Johnston* has established from archives

* "Twilight in the Forbidden City," by Sir R. F. Johnston (Gollancz).

found in the Imperial Palace at Peking that the capture of Parkes by the Chinese was not in fact an act of treachery, but was due to the mistaken impression that he was the British Commander-in-Chief, and that, deprived of his leadership, the British attack would subside.

A further treaty was now forced upon the Chinese by which the Emperor was forced to legalize the opium trade, and to sanction the recruiting of coolies for labour abroad, whilst Kowloon, opposite Hong Kong on the mainland, was ceded to the British. At the same time an indemnity of eight million taels was exacted, and the Imperial court was obliged to receive the ministers of the Powers. Pending a settlement of the points at issue the allied troops were maintained at Peking, and thus created the impression in Chinese minds that it was intended to retain them there permanently. Profiting by this illusion the Russian minister artfully induced the Chinese to cede to Russia the Amur Province, north of Manchuria * in exchange for a promise to persuade the British and French commanders to withdraw their forces. There was never any real intention of retaining the foreign troops in Peking once the various demands had been finally settled by treaty, but this was only realized by the Chinese about a year later, when they learned how they had been tricked into giving away territory for nothing. In 1861, England, France and Russia established legations in Peking, the U. S. A. followed suit a year later, and the Imperial court created the Tsung Li Yamen, which was in effect a board to deal exclusively with foreign affairs.

The conclusion of this war with the allied Powers in 1860 found China still in the throes of the T'aiping rebellion, with the T'ien Wang controlling from Nanking the whole of the Yangtse valley and the territory to its south. Without foreign aid it is doubtful whether the Manchu dynasty could have survived, and it appears probable that it would have been overthrown and supplanted by the T'aipings. If this had happened the whole course of Chinese history might have been altered, for a new and virile dynasty, arising phœnix-like from the ashes of the old, might well have succeeded in resisting the influence which led to the revolution in 1911, and China might never have become a republic, and might have been spared the tribulations of the years of anarchy which have followed the overthrow of the Manchu Empire by Sun Yat Sen's reformers. Once the outstanding differences had been satisfactorily settled with the Manchu court,

* Subsequently extended to include Vladivostock.

however, the foreign governments were interested in retaining the old dynasty in power. They therefore not only permitted it to import munitions of war for use against the rebels, but also allowed foreign officers to be engaged in the service of the Chinese Government. The first of these was an American sailor, Ward, who, in 1860, began to organize foreign deserters and other volunteers in a militia created at the suggestion of the Chinese viceroy Li Hung Chang. In 1862 Ward was killed and Li Hung Chang then secured the services of Gordon, the British officer who later became known as "Chinese Gordon." Under his leadership Nanking was stormed and the rebellion finally crushed, in 1864. By thus permitting interference in the internal affairs of China, the foreign Powers were able to save the tottering Manchu dynasty for the time being, but have laid themselves open to the charge of altering the course of Chinese history for their own purposes.

It was in 1853, just prior to the events described above, that the foreign control of the China Maritime Customs was born. Rebels had captured the native city of Shanghai and the Imperial officials arranged for the British, American and French Consuls to control the collection of duties on foreign imports into the Shanghai settlement. In 1863, Robert Hart, of the British Consular Service, was appointed by the Chinese Government to control the collection of duties and to organize a service for this purpose as a branch of the Chinese Government. At the outset this service was possibly intended purely for the benefit of China, but as will be seen, it later developed into an instrument of foreign control, with its revenue pledged to provide the vast sums due to foreign Powers as war indemnities.

After the termination of the war with the allied Powers in 1860, China was free from armed foreign aggression until the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1894, but during this period her Empire was shorn of some of its former glory in that large neighbouring kingdoms, which had paid tribute and rendered at least lip-service to the court of Peking, were annexed by foreign Powers. In 1885 the French seized Annam, and in the following year Burma's continued resistance to British penetration led to the complete annexation of that country and its absorption in the Indian Empire. In the meantime Japan had been rapidly reacting to Western influences and by 1894 she felt herself strong enough to challenge China's

claim to control Korea, and to embark upon a war for the acquisition of this territory. By March of 1896 the Chinese fleet had been swept from the sea, Port Arthur had been taken, Korea invaded, and Peking was threatened. Peace was concluded in the Treaty of Shimenoseki, and China was forced to recognize the independence of Korea, to cede to Japan the large island of Formosa and the Pescadores, and in addition to pay an indemnity equivalent to forty million pounds sterling. The treaty actually provided for the cession of Port Arthur and the whole of the Liaotung peninsula of South Manchuria to Japan, but the Western Powers declined to recognize this clause, and under pressure from Russia, France and Germany, Japan agreed to withdraw her claim to this territory and to accept instead an increased indemnity. To raise the necessary funds with which to pay this indemnity China was forced to pledge the revenue of the foreign controlled customs.

The Western Powers now commenced to scramble for railway and mining concessions. Russia was first in the field and secured the right to connect Siberia with the port of Vladivostock by the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria. As a result of the series of humiliations imposed upon China by the foreign Powers, culminating in the crushing terms of the Japanese treaty, feeling against foreigners ran very high and resentment was again vented upon missionaries and other isolated groups of Europeans. In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung and the German Government promptly seized upon this incident as a pretext for the occupation of the peninsula of Tsingtao (in Shantung Province) and the exaction of railway and mining concessions in the Province of Shantung. Encouraged by this example the Russians proceeded to occupy Port Arthur, and France arranged to lease Chang Chia Wan. In order to maintain the balance of sea-power in the Gulf of Chihli the British Government deemed it necessary to acquire a lease of Wei Hai Wei. At about the same time various other Powers demanded new or increased concessions, which China, though unwilling to concede, was too weak to resist.

Meanwhile, fostered by the officials, resentment against foreigners was being fanned into hatred. In the north it was particularly acute, and a secret society called the " I Ho T'uan," the members of which are better known to foreigners as " Boxers," was becoming restive. The aim of this society was to exterminate and drive out

the foreigners from China. In 1900 the movement got completely out of control—if, indeed, there was ever any intention to attempt to control it—and missionaries and their converts were massacred by hundreds in various parts of the country. The Manchu nobles, possibly fearing that the anger of the mob might be turned against the dynasty, itself foreign, persuaded the Empress Dowager to agree to the siege of the Legations, where many foreigners had taken refuge. On the 20th June 1900, she declared war on the foreigners and ordered the Legations to quit Peking within 24 hours; an order which, if they had attempted to carry it out, would have led to their certain annihilation at the hands of the Boxers. The German Envoy who left his Legation to carry his protest in person to the Tsung Li Yamen was, in fact, murdered, and for the next eight weeks the foreign Legations were in a state of siege and fighting for their lives. On the 14th August 1900, they were relieved by a composite force furnished by Japan, Russia, England, the U. S. A., France and Italy, which was subsequently reinforced by 7,000 Germans who arrived in Peking on the 17th October.

The massacre of foreigners and the attack on the Legations were undoubtedly unprecedented acts of violence from which civilized people will recoil in horror. They were, however, the natural outcome of the behaviour of the foreign governments and were more in the nature of a reprisal for wrongs suffered than acts of natural barbarism. To the unarmed and defenceless Chinese the attacks which they had suffered at the hands of foreign navies and soldiery seemed just as one-sided and cowardly as their own acts of revenge upon the unarmed missionaries and the weakly defended Legations. The allied forces, however, from whom more moderation might surely have been expected, appear to have comported themselves with a lack of restraint at least equal to that of the Chinese, and to have wreaked a merciless vengeance upon a helpless countryside. Even the more restrained writers on modern Chinese history fail to find much to be said in extenuation of the excesses committed by the allied troops. Mr. Lionel Curtis in his valuable work "The Capital Question of China"* dismisses the affair in a terse but potent paragraph:

"By ordering a general massacre of foreigners and attacking the foreign Legations, the Manchu dynasty had done everything

* Macmillan & Co., 1932.

possible to discredit China in the eyes of the world. This explains, while it cannot excuse, the vengeance taken by the allies on the local inhabitants when Peking and the neighbouring regions lay at their mercy. Of this painful episode it suffices to say that contemporary records show that the Japanese were better restrained than the Europeans."

Not satisfied with reprisals on the spot, the Russian Government apparently considered the moment opportune for a forcible occupation of Manchuria. The following account is from a British commentary: *

"Their methods were brutal but effective. At Blagovyeshchensk 5,000 Chinese—men, women and children—were driven into the river and drowned, the feeble resistance of the Chinese was everywhere easily overcome, the whole of Manchuria was occupied and treated as though it were conquered territory, and at Newchwang the Russian flag was hoisted and a Russian administration established."

Thus once again was the lesson brought home to China that although foreign Powers might act with impunity in Chinese territory, any attempt at armed protest or reprisals would be severely and promptly punished. She was learning the futility of protesting against the aggressive tendencies of more powerful nations.

To drive the lesson home, the allied Powers in the final settlement with China after the Boxer Rising, imposed a colossal indemnity of 450 million taels, which, as it could not possibly be paid at once, was to be realized by instalments with interest at 4 per cent. It is somewhat refreshing to note that although Britain's losses had been greater than those of any other nation, her claims only amounted to 11 per cent. of the total crushing indemnity, whilst Russia headed the list with 29 per cent. To meet the charges the customs service, under Sir Robert Hart, had now to be empowered to collect the native as well as the foreign customs at the various ports, and the service became to an even greater degree the instrument for the collection of debts owed by China to creditor nations. Foreign Powers now had complete control of the Chinese customs and could fix the rates of duty. The amounts collected on foreign imports could thus be kept just high enough to bring in sufficient revenue to meet China's foreign commitments, whilst any attempt on the part of China to increase her revenue by raising high tariffs against foreign goods could be checked. This state of affairs persisted until 1929,

* From "Diplomatic Events in Manchuria," by Sir Harold Parlett.

when the Chinese, after years of effort, finally secured the right to regulate their own tariffs.* Another result of the Boxer settlement was the establishment of a fortified Legation quarter in the midst of the city of Peking, wherein all the Legations were housed, and in which the principal Powers acquired the right to station troops for the defence of their Legations.

An American writer, commenting upon the causes and results of the Boxer outbreak, has voiced his disapproval with candour and force. His conclusions may not be very wide of the mark: †

"There appeared to be left only the formal act of partition when China made her last gesture of revolt. This was the Boxer uprising in 1900 when the Legations in Peking were besieged, missionaries and other foreigners attacked in other parts of the country and many killed. It was an act of fanatic despair and unfortunate in that the innocent were victimized; but the motives are understandable. At any rate China was penalized for its defiance soon enough. An international expedition marched from Tientsin to Peking, sacked the capital with a degree of cruelty which has since become infamous, and then imposed an indemnity of 330,000,000 dollars—a sum far, far in excess of the actual damage done by the Boxers. For the thousands of Chinese peasants and town workers slaughtered by the foreign troops and the Chinese property looted, no reciprocal compensation was discussed. But a permanent military garrison was established in Peking, almost adjoining the Imperial Palace. It is there yet."

Meanwhile an awakening Japan was jealously watching the Russians who had already forcibly occupied Manchuria and seemed likely to turn their attention next towards Korea. Emboldened by the alliance with England, concluded in 1902, she now felt strong enough to challenge the Russian movement towards the Pacific seaboard and events moved swiftly to the Russo-Japanese war, which broke out in February 1904. During the next fourteen months this war between two alien Powers was fought out on Chinese soil. The Russians were evicted from Manchuria and the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and Port Arthur was transferred from Russia to Japan. Strong diplomatic representations from the Western Powers prevented a Japanese annexation of the whole of Manchuria, and Japan was forced to content herself for the time being with railway and mining concessions in South Manchuria. Another

* Treaties granting tariff autonomy were signed by most of the Powers in 1928, mainly as a result of the stand made by Britain; but Japan deferred signing until a year later.

† "China: The Collapse of a Civilization," N. Paffer (Routledge).

quarter of a century was to elapse before she felt able, in defiance of world opinion, to reap the full benefits of her victory over the Russians in 1905. In the interim, however, in 1910, she formally annexed Korea, and her action was not questioned by any of the other Powers.

The moral effect in China of the defeat of a European Power by the Japanese was considerable. Not only did it expose once again the weakness of the Chinese form of government and pave the way for the revolution which was to follow six years later, but it encouraged anti-foreign feeling and nerved the Chinese afresh to resist attempts to exploit their weakness. The desire to do as the Japanese had done and purge themselves of foreign interference was born. The reform movement gained increased impetus, a new educational system on Western lines was introduced and effective steps were taken to stop the production of opium in China and its importation from India. The British conscience began to be aroused and an agreement was finally signed which brought the traffic to an end and closed this unsavoury chapter of Anglo-Chinese relations.*

At the end of 1911 the revolution came and the dynasty was deposed. China lost her traditional form of government and became a republic, at any rate in name. But she was improperly prepared for the change, and the new administration found itself powerless to control the vast continental territories once the traditional fountain-head of authority had been removed. The republican party, which called itself the Kuomintang, or People's Party, had originated in Canton, and encountered difficulties at the outset from the more conservative elements in the northern provinces; it lacked the machinery and funds for the replacement throughout the vast empire of the system of government which it had destroyed. Yet the movement persisted, and in 1913 the republic was recognized by the Powers and loans were floated for the reorganization of China. A year later, however, the Great War effectively diverted the attention of the Western Powers from matters Chinese.

This was Japan's opportunity. Within three weeks of its commencement she blockaded the territory occupied by Germany

* Owing to the devastating effect of the abolition of the opium trade upon Indian revenue, the traffic was gradually and progressively decreased, and was not actually brought to an end until 1917. The fact that this sacrifice was agreed to by Britain is striking proof of the change of heart which had taken place, and an earnest of British sincerity. Whilst Britain incurs the full odium of her earlier opium policy, she is less often given the full credit due to her for its abandonment.

in Shantung, landed a force on the northern coast, seized the portions of that province which had been leased to Germany and proceeded to occupy and administer them despite the protests of China. China was a neutral country, but this did not deter Japan, and the other Powers were too much occupied with their own desperate affairs to intervene. Japan followed this up with her notorious "Twenty-one demands," in which she required China to transfer to her all the rights which the Germans had enjoyed in Shantung, to prolong considerably the lease of the Liaotung peninsula and the other concessions in Manchuria, and to grant valuable mining and other rights in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. She further insisted upon sharing the control of the largest iron mines in China, near Hankow, and required that no further territory should be ceded to any Power other than Japan. China was to engage Japanese advisers for political, financial and military affairs, and was to share with Japan the control of the police in "important places." Finally China was not to be permitted to raise foreign loans without Japanese sanction, and the terms of the twenty-one demands were not to be disclosed to any other Power. Their terms leaked out, however, and American intervention caused these humiliating demands to be somewhat modified; but the President of the Chinese Republic was forced to yield to most of them on the 25th May 1915.

In 1917 China decided to enter the war on the side of the allied Powers and, though she sent no troops to any front, the Chinese Labour Corps did valuable work behind the line in France, and made large numbers of other troops available for the actual business of fighting. Her decision to join was no doubt dictated by motives of expediency, as by her declaration of war on Germany and Austria all her unequal treaties with those countries would be automatically cancelled, and she would be in a more advantageous position at the peace conference to combat the claims of Japan to succeed to the privileges of Germany in China. The cancellation of the German and Austrian treaties would breach the whole system of extra-territoriality, opening the way to the annulment of all the unequal treaties with the other Powers. The Boxer indemnity payments due to enemy powers would be cancelled forthwith, and the prospect of their voluntary cancellation by all the Allies after the war would be considerably brightened.

But at the Peace Conference China was once more to suffer disillusionment. Secret treaties were revealed, which showed that the allies, in order to gain Japanese naval support during the war, had agreed to urge the Japanese claim to Shantung. America had not been a party to these treaties, however, and they had not even been revealed to her when she joined the allies in 1917. In consequence, President Wilson warmly supported the Chinese case, and the Japanese delegates agreed to the following modification of their earlier demands: "The policy of Japan is to hand over the Shantung peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany, and the right to establish a settlement under the usual condition at Tsingtao. The owners of the railway will use special police only to ensure security of traffic."*

The news of the failure to effect the complete eviction of the Japanese from Shantung caused great consternation in China. Help had been given to the allies at a time of crisis, but when China looked to her erstwhile friends for assistance there was no response to her appeal. This, in her view, amounted to betrayal, and it revived feelings of animosity against foreigners (with the exception of Americans) and prompted China to use the only effective weapon she could wield against Japan, in the form of a wholesale boycott of Japanese goods. The effect was so paralysing upon Japanese trade that at the Washington Conference in 1921, Japan agreed to evacuate Shantung within nine months, and to cancel all but four of the twenty-one demands which had been accepted by China under duress in 1915. Following upon the Washington Conference a further treaty was entered into by nine Powers, mainly at the instance of America and Britain, under the terms of which all the signatories, including Japan, agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." In another treaty the Powers pledged themselves to appoint a committee to report on means for assisting the Chinese Government to effect such reforms as would warrant the relinquishment by the Powers, progressively or otherwise, of their extra-territorial rights.

* "Far Eastern International Relations," Morse and McNair, p. 894.

It will be seen that after the Great War the attitude of the Western Powers towards China has completely changed and there have been no further attempts by any of them to exploit the weakness of that country. The policy has rather been to help China to put her house in order and to stand upon her own feet, though the nations have been somewhat tardy in giving effect to the sentiments expressed in their treaties. The Chinese National Government, with its new capital at Nanking, was recognized by the Powers in 1928, for instance, but despite reiterated requests from China not one of the Powers has yet moved its Legation from the comfortable quarters in Peking to the new capital, nor have any of the leading Powers yet relinquished their extra-territorial rights. Wei Hai Wei and the Hankow concession have been handed back by Britain, Belgium has surrendered her concessions at Tientsin, and some of the smaller Powers have agreed to the cancellation of their extra-territorial rights. Of the great Powers Russia alone has voluntarily renounced them; she did so as a bid for the alliance of China in the Bolshevik adventure.

Whilst the Western Powers have ceased to be aggressive, however, Japan has become more so. Unhampered by the treaties she signed at Washington, she has invaded Manchuria and Jehol, and has commenced inroads into the northern provinces of China. Her military activities in Manchuria and elsewhere have resulted in irreparable loss to China and caused the death of many thousands of her sons. She has bombarded the city of Shanghai and landed a force in defiance of treaty obligations to invade the very country she pledged herself to protect. The League of Nations, in whom China placed her trust, proved incapable of doing anything to check Japan or to enable China effectively to resist her, and the Powers, who had bound themselves at Washington to respect Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, proved capable of nothing more helpful than diplomatic protests and adverse Press comments. Small wonder that the Chinese continue to dislike foreigners. They have had cause enough.

When the record of foreign relations with China is thus impartially reviewed it is not one of which we, in this enlightened and peace-loving century, have any cause to feel proud. Much of what foreigners have done in China may be defended on grounds of provocation and economic necessity, but when the whole chain of

unfortunate events is studied, it presents a sorry sequence of calamities which might have been avoided if more effort had been made to understand the Chinese and appreciate their point of view. They are not a naturally hostile or warlike people and their original reception of foreigners was friendly and tolerant. It was not until excesses were committed by foreigners themselves that they reversed their attitude and became hostile. The opium habit, which has undermined the health of many of the Chinese people, is of foreign origin: it was supplied first by the British, and when the Chinese Government sought to put an end to the trade the infamous "opium war" was the result. Although the traffic has now ceased the drug is still cultivated and freely smoked in China, and provides an ever-present reminder of the unpleasant fact of its foreign origin. Foreign interference at the time of the Taiping rebellion, when the Manchu dynasty was tottering, saved it for a time and prevented the accession of a new dynasty, which many think might have been China's salvation, and which would at all events have forestalled the republic. The crushing indemnities imposed upon China in reparation for the defiance shown in the Boxer outbreak were a staggering blow to a poor and defenceless country. Though the balances of payments were remitted by the various Powers after the Great War and applied for purposes beneficial to China, the feeling of injustice which they engendered will not easily be eradicated, nor will the memory of the atrocities committed by the allied troops when the relief forces had the countryside at their mercy. The secret treaties, which the allies made with Japan, rudely affronted Chinese susceptibilities at a time when there seemed to be an all-round change of heart and a prospect of more cordial Sino-foreign relations. This seeming duplicity might have been forgiven the allies when its results were negatived by the treaties made at Washington two years after the Peace Conference; but the failure of those same Powers and the League of Nations to rally to the aid of China, when attacked by Japan in Manchuria and Shanghai, will not soon either be forgotten or forgiven. The failure of the League to act decisively to protect China from aggression has shattered the remnants of faith in Western sincerity and goodwill.

Young Nationalist China is impatient to throw off the foreign yoke. The foreign concessions still existing at the Treaty Ports, the extra-territorial rights still enjoyed by foreigners, the presence

of foreign naval vessels and merchant steamers in China's inland and territorial waters, and of the Legation Guards in Peking, and the delay of the Powers to remove their Legations to Nanking are amongst the main items of the "unequal treaties" which Chinese Nationalism is doing its utmost to abolish.

When the whole record is considered there can hardly be any surprise that the Chinese to-day are almost as anti-foreign as they were in the Boxer days. Japan now receives the major share of the hatred, but there is still bitterness enough for distribution amongst the other Powers.*

* America should perhaps be excepted. She has never occupied a "concession." Under the "most favoured nation" principle she has reaped the benefit of British aggression without incurring the odium. Her astute use of the Boxer funds for the education of large numbers of Chinese in American schools and universities has given a pro-American bias to many of the younger generation. By some Chinese to-day she seems to be looked upon as China's only friend.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The City of London and Regimental Privileges.

Dear Sir,

I have read with very great interest Mr. C. Grey's article, in the July issue of the journal, on the subject of the privileges of certain regiments in the City of London. I venture to ask that you will grant me the space to comment on two points in this article, in so far as The Buffs are concerned.

The writer states that it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that the Regiment first exercised its privilege of marching through the City. In the official Digest of Services of the Regiment, however, the first recorded exercise of the privilege is in September 1821. It seems more than likely that it was exercised before this, namely in 1793, when the Regiment was stationed in the Tower of London, but of this, admittedly, there is no record.

With regard to the march in "the middle of the nineteenth century," Mr. Grey presumably refers to the 13th October 1846; he goes on to assume that the then Commanding Officer *chanced* a march, "and having got away with it, established a precedent." His assumption is erroneous, for the Digest of Services of the Regiment contains a copy of a letter from the then Lord Mayor, dated 12th October 1846, acknowledging the claim of Lieut.-Colonel Sir James Dennis, K.C.B., to exercise the ancient privilege of his Regiment, as having sprung from the City of London.

This letter is reproduced on page 495 of the "Historical Records of The Buffs, 1704—1914" (Medici Society, October 1935).

In conclusion, Mr. Grey may find of interest the appendix included in the above mentioned volume, which deals at length with the question of the privilege of The Buffs and other regiments to march through the city, and was compiled as the result of researches among volumes and documents to which he was, in some cases, possibly unable to gain access.

Yours faithfully,
C. R. B. Knight, Captain,
Late, The Buffs.

REVIEWS

THE WAR IN OUTLINE

By Liddell Hart

(*Messrs. Faber and Faber, Ltd., London*, 1936). 5 *sh.*

The results of the last Great War were perhaps not greater than those of many wars of the past; its greater importance lies in the fact that it was fought by whole nations and not by professional armies alone. The further the Great War of 1914-18 recedes into the past the greater the number of people who require an introductory book. It must be remembered that to many for whom the Great War was a personal experience, the South African War was mere history; a longer interval has elapsed since the conclusion ot the last war. A concise outline is, therefore, a necessity if the new generation's interest is to be aroused and it is to be educated into studying a calamity which must not be repeated in the future.

A glance at this book gives the impression that Captain Liddell Hart has supplied just what is wanted. A vast subject, which until now it has only been possible to study in bits—a fact which tends to loss of perspective—is condensed into one well proportioned picture. He tells us in the preface that the outline " is a sequence of salient facts," and we see the text divided into five parts, each dealing with the salient features of a year. In a book of such modest size selection of the facts to be recorded was of course inevitable and difficult and with Captain Liddell Hart's selection we have no complaint; the salient facts and their interrelation are clearly put, and the balance of the war as a whole is well shown in a short and well-knit story.

Referring to the preface again we are told that " it is an attempt to let the facts tell the story . . . without the embroidery of criticism and argument . . . . It does not attempt to weigh men." This admirable intention is at once stultified by a dissertation at some length on the incompetence of all soldiers in general and of Haig in particular. Further on we find the whole story spoilt by criticism which is unbalanced, vindictive and futile. That it is unbalanced we cannot fail to realise when we see unrelieved condemnation of nearly all the great figures finding room in a book of 250 pages, whose avowed intention is to record facts of what happened in the

four most eventful years in history. It is the habit of vindictive critics to throw mud—and only mud—at those most prominently before the public eye; Haig is the most prominent military figure with the British public, and he consequently bears the brunt; Joffre and Foch are condemned at only slightly less length. The little praise there is goes to junior staff officers whose bright ideas were not taken up. Was Liddell Hart one of these, we wonder? Futility is apparent in foolish comments and bald conjectures as to "what might have happened;" How much more favourably events would have turned out, he says, if, for instance "they (the French) had sent a few army corps to reinforce the defence their small ally was offering" in August 1914. It is again shown when we are invited to note Joffre's abtuseness: "though a captured map was brought to him that evening, which made it perfectly clear that Kluck was changing direction, it did not change his own intention." It is to be hoped that no reader, even of meagre military intelligence, will be convinced by a criticism of all the leading figures on the side of the Allies, who did in the end achieve victory, set against praise—as far as Captain Liddell Hart can find any praise for a soldier—of our enemies, who were defeated. The writer takes advantage of the shortness of the book to leave out the "pros" while including the "cons."

According to the author we should give thanks to Mr. Lloyd George and to T. E. Lawrence, who appear as the only people who showed any ability. We do give them thanks for their share. But we believe that the public will not withhold their gratitude from bone-headed soldiers and sailors who, with all their failings and mistakes, did win the war; nor will they forget that it was nimble-minded politicians and writers who brought on the war, and lost the peace.

J. M. H.

CITIZENSHIP

THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF THE INDIAN CITIZEN.
BY BREVET-MAJOR J. WILLATT, M.C., M.A.,
ARMY EDUCATIONAL CORPS.

(*The Oxford University Press, Bombay.*) Re. 1-8-0.

The author has written a book which is primarily intended for the use of the Indian soldier in competing with the Higher Army School Examinations, but its use extends beyond those confines.

The conservative nature of the farmer is a matter which concerns the Governments of Eastern as well as Western countries, and in Part I of the Book the author has dealt with the rights and privileges of an Indian "country citizen" in terms of his family and village life, and has led him to see the advantages of the improvements in agriculture and education which the Government is devising. Also he is shown his responsibilities as a citizen and his duty to initiate such reforms and improvements as are within his capacity.

Part II is a fairly exhaustive exposition of the machinery of Government and the structure of the new Federation which the Government of India Act, 1935, will bring into being. This is of more academic than practical interest, and it is considered that the explanation of the technical terms in this part of the book will tax to the utmost the abilities of the Educational Instructors.

Part III is headed "The Responsibilities of the Government," and deals with some of its main activities in safeguarding the country from foreign aggression, political turmoil and commercial depression, and its efforts towards the improvement of the standard of living of the people of India in general and the agricultural classes in particular.

Citizenship is a subject which looms large in the life of not only the sepoy aspiring to commissioned rank, but it is also a matter concerning which increasing instruction is now given to his more humble brother, so that on his return to his village he may assist materially in improving the conditions of life now existing in the agricultural districts.

Considered from both these points of view "Citizenship" is a valuable addition to the Regimental Military Library, and its author is to be congratulated on the trouble he has taken and the skill he has shown in producing a very useful Army Text-book.

G. A. M.

Indian Wild Life

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE ALL-INDIA CONFERENCE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF WILD LIFE.

July 1936 witnessed the birth of a new publication entitled "Indian Wild Life."

This journal is the official organ of the All-India Conference for the Preservation of Indian Wild Life and hopes also to become the mouthpiece of the various provincial societies which have recently been formed for the same laudable purpose.

A Bird Club is to be formed in connection with this journal to encourage the study of bird life and bird photography, the membership of this club being free.

The Editors propose to publish a very useful feature in serial form which will contain the details of legislation in each province in connection with close seasons and game laws, orders and rules; if sufficient support is forthcoming, it is also proposed to issue these subsequently in the form of an up-to-date hand-book.

It is fitting that this publication should be issued in the U. P., as that Province was the pioneer in the work of wild life protection and already has a Provincial National Park as a sanctuary, an example which, it is hoped, will be followed by others.

The Editor's appeal for support in the form of articles on the fauna of India and on sport generally will, it is hoped, meet with a ready response, as it is on such support that the future attraction and usefulness of this journal will rest.

It is suggested that this is a publication which should be supported by all messes and clubs. The annual subscription is only Rs. 4 and full details can be obtained from H. A. Jafry, Esq., Managing Editor, "Indian Wild Life," Shahganj, Agra.

C. E. E.-C.

United Service Institution of India

JANUARY, 1936

CONTENTS

I.—New Members

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st September to 30th November, 1935 :—

ORDINARY MEMBERS

Brigadier R. Evans, M.C.
,, A. A. Evans-Gwynne, D.S.O.
Colonel Th. Pirthi Singh.
Lt-Colonel A. S. Mackay, M.C.
,, J. B. de W. Molony, O.B.E.
,, Piara Singh, Bahadur, O.B.I.
,, Maharaj Shri Nahar Sinhji.
Major N. R C. Cosby, M.C.
,, D. L. Duncan.
,, J. Darrell Hill.
,, Ghulam Moinuddin.
,, T. C. Levingston
Captain Atma Singh.
,, W. J Cardale.
,, J. C. Cotton.
,, F. H. Dixon.
,, R. S. Karki.
,, J. M. Lyons, M.C.
,, J. Murray.
,, Puran Sing Thapa.
,, N. P. Townley.
,, E. D. S. Woodruffe.
Lieut. Malik Abdul Waheed Khan.
,, A. Blair.
Lieut. A. W. Chamarette.
,, A. C. E. Devereux.
,, F. H. Fuller.
,, P. G. Goodeve-Docker.
,, E. H. W. Grimshow.
,, E. S. Holdaway.
,, H. B. Hudson.
,, J. R. Jennings-Bramly.
,, H. T. A. Lane.
,, R. G. Langran.
,, P. J. Palmer.
,, Z. A. Qizilbash.
,, L. B. H. Reford.
,, T. S. Taylor.
,, M. C. Waddilove.
,, W. C. Walker.
,, E. V. Whitehead.
,, J. G. N. Wilton.
2/Lieut. Akbar Khan.
,, R. E. G. Bartholomew.
,, H. O. Holme.
,, P. N. Narang.
Squadron-Leader C. J. S. Dearlove, R.A F.

II.—The Journal

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary or to Messrs. L. A. Stronach & Co., Advertising Consultants, Stronach House, Ballard Estate, Bombay.

III.—Contributions to the Journal

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204, and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library

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illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

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(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

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V.—Library Books

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—Promotion Examinations

(*a*) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (*iii*), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (*iii*), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of Examination.	Campaign set for first time.	Campaign set for second time.	Campaign set for last time.
1	March 1936.	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.	..
2	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
3	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
4	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
5	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
6	October 1938.	..	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns:—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— *March 1936 to March 1937.*	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV *et seq*).
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV *et seq*) and IV.
All ..	.. A brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M. C. (*Sifton Praed*).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II (*British—Military*).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(*b*) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended :—

" Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation " (Harding-Newman).

" Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).
" A. & Q. or Military Administration in War " (Lindsell).
" A Study of Unit Administration " (Gale and Polden).
" Military Law," 1932 (Banning).
" The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).
" Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II " (Kirby and Kennedy).

" Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh).

" Imperial Military Geography " (Cole).
" Elements of Imperial Defence " (Boycott).
" Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence " (Cole).
" A Practical Digest of Military Law " (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Quetta) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(*a*) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(*b*) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of :—

(*i*) Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings-Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(*ii*) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training memoranda—War Office.

Training memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it on (Skeen).

(*iii*) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe.—

"The Times."

"U. S. I. (India) Journal."

(*iv*) Books which can be obtained from libraries.—

(*Note.*—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

*The Principles of War (Foch).

*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesman (Robertson).

*Historical illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

* In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

*The re-making of modern armies (Liddell Hart).

*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Battle of Liao-Yang (Robinson).

*The World Crisis (Churchill).

*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(*v*) Books and articles on Transportation.—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic moves by Rail 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The lines of communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The lines of communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R.A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The supply and transportation problem of future armies. Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The supply of mechanized forces in the field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of operations. Major-General Taylor, R. E. Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The following tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2/- per map.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

Tactical Schemes

Continuous Exercises.

No. 1. Message Writing.
,, 2. Divisional Cavalry.
,, 3. March Orders.
,, 4. Military Appreciation.
,, 5. Attack Orders.
,, 6. Defence Orders.
,, 7. Withdrawal.
,, 8. Employment of (A. C.) Squadron R. A. F.

(*Note.*—The map required for all the above Exercises is Sheet No. 112, 1″ to 1 mile.)

Strategy, Tactics and other papers.

(*a*) Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1 (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 123).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 2 (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 93).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 3 (Ref. Map Sheet 44/16 S.E.)
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 4 (The maps required for this paper on Frontier Warfare Scheme are not available; they may be obtained on application to O. I/C Map Record and Issue Office, Calcutta).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 5.

(*b*) D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
,, ,, ,, 2.
,, ,, ,, 3.
,, ,, ,, 4. (Without solution).
,, ,, ,, 5.
,, ,, ,, 6.
,, ,, ,, 7.
,, ,, ,, 8.
,, ,, ,, 9.
,, ,, ,, 10.

(*c*) Map Reading Paper. (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 112).

Military Law Paper No. I.
,, ,, ,, II.

Transportation, Peace and War (Without solution).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (Peace).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (War).

Precis of lectures

(*i*) Staff College Examination.
(*ii*) Operation Orders and Instructions.
(*iii*) Military Writing.
(*iv*) Cavalry.
(*v*) Artillery No. 1.
(*va*) ,, ,, 2.
(*vb*) ,, ,, 3.
(*vi*) Engineers.
(*vii*) Signals No. 1.
(*viia*) ,, ,, 2.
(*viii*) A. F. Vs.—Characteristics and Organization.
(*viiia*) A. F. Vs.—Tactical Employment.
(*ix*) Army and R. A. F. Co-operation.
(*x*) River Crossing.
(*xi*) Night Operations.
(*xii*) Frontier Warfare.
(*xiii*) Strategy and Tactics. Surprise.
(*xiiia*) Strategy and Tactics. Morale.
(*xiiib*) Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
(*xiiic*) Strategy and Tactics. Interior Lines and Communications.
(*xiiid*) Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
(*xiiie*) Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
(*xiv*) Military Law. Charges and Charge Sheets.
(*xiva*) Military Law. Evidence.
(*xivb*) Military Law. Court Martial Proceedings.
(*xv*) Transportation. Nos. 1 and 2.
(*xvi*) " Q " and " O " Services in Peace including Mobilization.
(*xvii*) Organization and Administration other than " Q " and " O " Services.
(*xviii*) Maintenance of Material and Animals.
(*xix*) Medical Organization and Evacuation of Casualties.

IX.—Historical Research

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

**N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1936

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936 :—

"Certain conflicting requirements may be observed between the organization of the Army at Home and in India, owing to differences in the tasks of these forces. Keeping in mind the importance of the principle of standardization of training and organization in the Imperial forces, discuss the problems involved."

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian State Forces.

(2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1936.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to, or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1936.

(8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

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

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United Service Institution of India

APRIL, 1936

CONTENTS

I.—New Members

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st December 1935 to 28th February 1936—

ORDINARY MEMBERS

Colonel S. R. Bhosle, O.B.E.
,, Girdhari Singh, Sardar Bahadur, Muzaffar-Jung Bahadur, O.B.E.
Lt.-Colonel M. M. Bashir
,, Bhagwandeen
,, Dattaji Rao Kakde, Sardar Bahadur.
,, B. A. Deodhar
,, Deo Rao Chauhan
,, R. H. Farren
,, Fateh Singh
,, Kalka Singh
,, Kashi Rao Powar
,, C. G. Phillips, D.S.O., M.C.
,, Shahmatullah Khan, Bahadur .
,, Sheo Narayan
,, B. G. Shinde
,, J. G. Smyth, V.C., M.C.
Major Abdul Aziz Khan
,, N. M. Anderson
,, J. F. Batten, M.C.
,, Y. R. Bhosle
,, T. H. Boss, M.C.
,, J. Gahan
,, E. W. Goodman, M.C.
,, Hamirji Jassaji
,, R. M. H. Lewis, M.C.
,, D. A. L. Mackenzie
,, Manaji Rao Ghadge
,, Walaqadar Mumtaz Ali Khan, Bahadur.
Major Fakhrul Mulk Nawabzada Saiduzzafar Khan, Bahadur.
,, Shankar Rao Powar
,, Sheonath Misra, Bahadur.
,, Sohrab S. Antia
,, C. F. L. Stevens, M.C.
,, C. H. Townsend
,, H. A. White
Captain A. R. Aslett, M.C.
,, Bapusaheb Jadhav
,, J. A. Barraclough, M.C.
,, Chiman Singh
,, E. P. Dickson
,, S. N. Dube
,, J. P. L. Eustace
,, A. C. Galloway
,, L. A. Harris, M.C.
,, J. A. Head
,, A. J. L. Hughes
,, E. S. Morley
,, Pandurang Rao Darekar
,, Ram Singh
,, K. M. Saeed
,, T. H. L. Stebbing, M.C., M.A.
,, A. V. Vokins
Lieut. J. K. Bhonsle
,, A. E. B. Brown
,, B. Chatterjee
,, A. E. Cocksedge
,, H. G. Croly

Major H. D. H. Y. Nepean, D.S.O.
,, A. R. Nye, M.C.
,, E. G. W. Pearse
,, Ramchandra Rao Shinde
,, Sadanand Rao Rangnekar, Bahadur.

Lieut. C. A. M. Cumberlege
,, R. B. S. Eraut
,, Ganga Singh
,, Gurbachan Singh
,, D. St. J. Hoysted

Lieut. R. H. Keenlyside
,, R. J. B. Kelly
,, S. Khalid Jan
,, R. D. Low
,, G. A. MacMunn
,, R. N. Nehra
,, P. H. D. Panton
,, H. A. H. Radcliffe-Smith
,, G. D. Renny
,, R. Richards
,, G. P. V. Sanders
,, S. Shah Husain Rizvi
,, A. Tyrer
,, J. F. Worsley

2/Lieut. Amar Datt.
,, D. Atama Ram
,, K. Bag Singh
,, Bakhtiar Rana
,, Balbir Singh
,, Bhola Nath Dubey
,, G. Dastgir Khan
,, M. G. Dewan
,, J. S. Dhillon
,, Dilbagh Rai Datta
,, Dina Nath
,, Chaudhri Fateh Khan
,, Gurkirpal Singh
,, S. M. Hussain
,, M. G. Jilani

2/Lieut. P. M. W. Doyle
,, F. A. Giles
,, Harbakhsh Singh
,, H. W. Holt
,, A. C. Iyappa
,, J. D. Moffatt
,, Moti Sagar
,, P. Parry-Evans
,, H. D. Parsons-Smith
,, D. L. Powell-Jones
,, G. M. Sayeed
,, Syed Abu Nasar
,, R. Steward
,, J. G. Wilder
,, Abid Ali Akbar Khan
,, Ajit Singh Butalia
,, S. Khushnud Ahmad
,, G. K. Mehta
,, K. S. Moghe
,, Mohamed Mirza
,, Mohammad Said
,, M. Muzaffar Khan
,, A. S. Pathania
,, Prabhu Singh
,, Rahim Ullah
,, M. Sarfaraz Hussain
,, Sawal Khan
,, Shahnawaz Khan
,, Sukhdev Singh
,, Taj Mohammad Khanzada
,, D. N. Thakar
,, P. S. Thapa

M. S. Netto, Esq., B.A.

Corrigenda.

In the list of new members published in the January 1936 number of the Journal, *for* "Lieut. R. G. Langran," *read* "Lieut. R. G. Langan."

II.—The Journal

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2	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
3	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
4	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
5	October 1938.	..	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns :—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— *March 1936 to March 1937.*	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV *et seq*).
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV *et seq*) and IV.
All ..	.. A brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M. C. (*Sifton Praed*).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II (*British—Military*).
	Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military). Vol. I, Chapters 1—17 (less 4, 7, 9 and 10).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1935 are published in I.A.O's. 651 of 1933 and 25 of 1934.

(*b*) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended :—

" Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation " (Harding-Newman).

" Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).
" A. & Q. or Military Administration in War " (Lindsell).
" A Study of Unit Administration " (Gale and Polden).
" Military Law," 1932 (Banning).
" The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).
" Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II " (Kirby and Kennedy).

" Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh).

" Imperial Military Geography " (Cole).
" Elements of Imperial Defence " (Boycott).
' Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence " (Cole).
" A Practical Digest of Military Law " (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—(See Staff College (Quetta) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta).

(*a*) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(*b*) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of :—

(*i*) Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings-Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(*ii*) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training memoranda—War Office.

Training memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it on (Skeen).

(*iii*) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe.—

"The Times."

"U. S. I. (India) Journal."

(*iv*) Books which can be obtained from libraries.—

(*Note.*—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

*The Principles of War (Foch).

*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesman (Robertson).

*Historical illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

* In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

*The re-making of modern armies (Liddell Hart).

*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Battle of Liao-Yang (Robinson)

*The World Crisis (Churchill).

*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(*v*) Books and articles on Transportation.—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic moves by Rail 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The lines of communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The lines of communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R.A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The supply and transportation problem of future armies. Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The supply of mechanized forces in the field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of operations. Major-General Taylor, R. E. Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The following tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2/- per map.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

Tactical Schemes

Continuous Exercises.

No. 1. Message Writing.
,, 2. Divisional Cavalry.
,, 3. March Orders.
,, 4. Military Appreciation.
,, 5. Attack Orders.
,, 6. Defence Orders.
,, 7. Withdrawal.
,, 8. Employment of (A. C.) Squadron R. A. F.

(*Note.*—The map required for all the above Exercises is Sheet No. 112, 1″ to 1 mile.)

Strategy, Tactics and other papers.

(*a*) Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1 (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 123).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 2 (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 93).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 3 (Ref. Map Sheet 44/16 S.E.).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 4 (The maps required for this paper on Frontier Warfare Scheme are not available; they may be obtained on application to O. I/C Map Record and Issue Office, Calcutta).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 5.

(*b*) D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
,, ,, ,, 2.
,, ,, ,, 3.
,, ,, ,, 4. (Without solution).
,, ,, ,, 5.
,, ,, ,, 6.
,, ,, ,, 7.
,, ,, ,, 8.
,, ,, ,, 9.
,, ,, ,, 10.

(*c*) Map Reading Paper. (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 112).

Military Law Paper No. I.
,, ,, ,, II.

Transportation, Peace and War (Without solution).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (Peace).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (War).

Precis of lectures

(*i*) Staff College Examination.
(*ii*) Operation Orders and Instructions.
(*iii*) Military Writing.
(*iv*) Cavalry.
(*v*) Artillery No. 1.
(*va*) ,, ,, 2.
(*vb*) ,, ,, 3.
(*vi*) Engineers.
(*vii*) Signals No. 1.
(*viia*) ,, ,, 2.
(*viii*) A. F. Vs.—Characteristics and Organization.
(*viiia*) A. F. Vs.—Tactical Employment.
(*ix*) Army and R. A. F. Co-operation.
(*x*) River Crossing.
(*xi*) Night Operations.
(*xii*) Frontier Warfare.
(*xiii*) Strategy and Tactics. Surprise.
(*xiiia*) Strategy and Tactics. Morale.
(*xiiib*) Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
(*xiiic*) Strategy and Tactics. Interior Lines and Communications.
(*xiiid*) Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
(*xiiie*) Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
(*xiv*) Military Law. Charges and Charge Sheets.
(*xiva*) Military Law. Evidence.
(*xivb*) Military Law. Court Martial Proceedings.
(*xv*) Transportation. Nos. 1 and 2.
(*xvi*) "Q" and "O" Services in Peace including Mobilization.
(*xvii*) Organization and Administration other than "Q" and "O" Services.
(*xviii*) Maintenance of Material and Animals.
(*xix*) Medical Organization and Evacuation of Casualties.

IX.—Historical Research

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The staff of the Institution is always willing to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

**N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Marine and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1936

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936 :—

"Certain conflicting requirements may be observed between the organization of the Army at Home and in India, owing to differences in the tasks of these forces. Keeping in mind the importance of the principle of standardization of training and organization in the Imperial forces, discuss the problems involved."

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian State Forces.

(2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1936.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to, or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1936.

(8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

ANCHOR LINE



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Castalia	.. Sept. 9	Castalia	.. Dec. 19

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KARACHI CALCUTTA BOMBAY

United Service Institution of India

JULY, 1936

CONTENTS

I.—New Members

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st March to 31st May 1936—

ORDINARY MEMBERS

Major-General N. C. Bannatyne, C.B., C.I.E.
Brigadier V. H. B. Majendie, D.S.O.
Lieut.-Colonel T. C. Greenwood.
Squadron-Leader A. L. A. Perry-Keene.
Captain Hiranand Dubey.
Captain K. D. Outram.
Lieut. B. M. Archibald.
„ E. H. Baume.
„ K. A. P. Fergusson.
„ P. H. Kyadoe.
„ M. H. Whyte.
Second Lieut. M. H. C. France.

II.—The Journal

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204, and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—Library Books

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—Promotion Examinations

(*a*) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (*iii*), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (*iii*), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1 Serial No.	2 Date of Examination.	3 Campaign set for first time.	4 Campaign set for second time.	5 Campaign set for last time.
1	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
2	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
3	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
4	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
5	October 1938.	..		Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns :—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— *March 1936 to March 1937.*	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV *et seq*).
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV *et seq*) and IV.
All ..	.. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M.C. (*Sifton Praed*).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II (*British—Military*), or Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military). Vol. I, Chapters 1—17 (less 4, 7, 9 and 10).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1937 are published in I.A.O.'s 72 of 1935 and 49 of 1936.

(*b*) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended :—

" Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation " (Harding-Newman).

" Military Organization and Administration," 1932 (Lindsell).
" A. & Q. or Military Administration in War " (Lindsell).
" A Study of Unit Administration " (Gale and Polden).
" Military Law," 1932 (Banning).
" The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).
" Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II " (Kirby and Kennedy).

" Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh).

" Imperial Military Geography " (Cole).
" Elements of Imperial Defence " (Boycott).
" Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence " (Cole).
" A Practical Digest of Military Law " (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—[See Staff College (Quetta) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications, Delhi or Calcutta].

(*a*) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(*b*) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of—

(*i*) Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings & Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(*ii*) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training Memoranda—War Office.

Training Memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it On (Skeen).

(*iii*) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe—

"The Times."

"U. S. I. (India) Journal."

(*iv*) Books which can be obtained from libraries—

(*Note.*—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

*The Principles of War (Foch).

*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson).

*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

* In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

*The Re-making of Modern Armies (Liddell Hart).

*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan Robinson).

*The World Crisis (Churchill).

*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

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*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

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*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(*v*) Books and Articles on Transportation.—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic Moves by Rail, 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The Lines of Communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R. A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The Supply and Transportation Problem of Future Armies. Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The Supply of Mechanized Forces in the Field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway Organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of Operations. Major-General Taylor, R.E., Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The following tactical schemes, complete with solutions and maps, and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas eight per copy, plus postage. The cost of maps is extra and is charged for at Rs. 2/- per map.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

Tactical Schemes

Continuous Exercises.

No. 1. Message Writing.
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,, 3. March Orders.
,, 4. Military Appreciation.
,, 5. Attack Orders.
,, 6. Defence Orders.
,, 7. Withdrawal.
,, 8. Employment of (A. C.) Squadron, R. A. F.

(*Note.*—The map required for all the above Exercises is Sheet No. 112, 1″ to 1 mile.)

Strategy, Tactics and other Papers.

(*a*) Strategy and Tactics, Paper No. 1 (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 123).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 2 (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 93).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 3 (Ref. Map Sheet 44/16 S.E.)
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 4 (The maps required for this paper on Frontier Warfare Scheme are not available; they may be obtained on application to O. I/C Map Record and Issue Office, Calcutta).
,, ,, ,, ,, No. 5.

(*b*) D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
,, ,, ,, 2.
,, ,, ,, 3.
,, ,, ,, 4 (without solution).
,, ,, ,, 5.
,, ,, ,, 6.
,, ,, ,, 7.
,, ,, ,, 8.
,, ,, ,, 9.
,, ,, ,, 10.

(*c*) Map Reading Paper. (Ref. Map 1″ Sheet 112.)

Military Law Paper No. I.
,, ,, ,, II.

Transportation, Peace and War (without solution).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (Peace).

Organization and Administration excluding Transportation (War).

Precis of lectures

(*i*) Staff College Examination.
(*ii*) Operation Orders and Instructions.
(*iii*) Military Writing.
(*iv*) Cavalry.
(*v*) Artillery No. 1.
(*va*) ,, ,, 2.
(*vb*) ,, ,, 3.
(*vi*) Engineers.
(*vii*) Signals No. 1.
(*viia*) ,, ,, 2.
(*viii*) A. F. Vs.—Characteristics and Organization.
(*viiia*) A. F. Vs.—Tactical Employment.
(*ix*) Army and R. A. F. Co-operation.
(*x*) River Crossing.
(*xi*) Night Operations.
(*xii*) Frontier Warfare.
(*xiii*) Strategy and Tactics. Surprise.
(*xiiia*) Strategy and Tactics. Morale.
(*xiiib*) Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
(*xiiic*) Strategy and Tactics. Interior Lines and Communications.
(*xiiid*) Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
(*xiiie*) Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
(*xiv*) Military Law. Charges and Charge Sheets.
(*xiva*) Military Law. Evidence.
(*xivb*) Military Law. Court Martial Proceedings.
(*xv*) Transportation. Nos. 1 and 2.
(*xvi*) "Q" and "O" Services in Peace including Mobilization.
(*xvii*) Organization and Administration other than "Q" and "O" Services.
(*xviii*) Maintenance of Material and Animals.
(*xix*) Medical Organization and Evacuation of Casualties.

IX.—Historical Research

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X.—The MacGregor Memorial Medal

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2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

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3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

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†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

ANCHOR LINE



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Tuscania	..	**Mar. 25**	Elysia	..	Oct. 16
Elysia	..	Mar. 31	Britannia	..	Oct. 21
California	..	**Apl. 8**	**California**	..	**Oct. 28**
Britannia	..	May 20	**Tuscania**	..	**Nov. 11**
Castalia	..	June 12			

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United Service Institution of India

OCTOBER, 1936

CONTENTS

I. New Members

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st June to 31st August 1936:—

LIFE MEMBERS.

2nd./Lieutenant Altaf Hussain.
,, Burhan-ud-Din.
,, K. S. Katoch.
,, Man Mohan Khanna.
,, Raj Bir Chopra.
,, Sarjit Singh Kalha.
,, N. B. Tandan.
,, Vijai Bahadur Singh Karki.
,, Waheed Haidar.

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

His Excellency Lord Erskine, G.C.I.E.
His Excellency Sir John Hubback, K.C.S.I.
E. Conran-Smith, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.
N. G. Pring, Esq.
M. Slade, Esq., I.C.S.
Lieut.-General Sir Walter W. Pitt-Taylor, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
,, Sir Ivo L. B. Vesey, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Major-General H. S. Gaskell, D.S.O.
Colonel Jaideo Singh, Bahadur.
,, C. G. Lewis, O.B.E.
,, H. E. Roome, M. C.
Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Chaytor, O.B.E., M.C.
Major S. W. Anketell-Jones, M. C.
,, T. F. Borwick, D.S.O.
,, R. de B. Devereaux.
,, E. V. Hansford.
,, W. G. H. Wells.
Captain J. F. R. Forman.
,, H. R. E. C. Fraser.
,, R. M. Hall.
,, R. G. P. Kilkelly.
,, A. G. Mackenzie-Kennedy.
,, R. J. Napier.
,, D. W. G. Ray.
,, G. W. Richards, M.C.
,, W. H. Skrine.
,, V. E. O. Stevenson-Hamilton

Lieutenant K. L. Atal.
,, Kanwar Bahadur Singh.
,, C. E. P. Chauvel.
,, J. B. Churcher.
,, H. E. M. Cotton.
,, J. S. Douglas.
,, G. K. Gowers.
,, S. G. Humphrys.
,, T. P. Keene.
,, J. A. MacRae.
,, K. F. Marks.
,, J. E. T. Pim.
,, C. R. Price.
,, L. S. Spearman.
,, W. H. C. Travers.
2nd./Lieutenant Ajit Singh Sodhi.
,, G. R. G. Bickley.
,, Altaf Qadir.
,, Balwant Singh.
,, J. R. deSouza.
,, Dhonkal Singh.
,, Kanwar Gajinder Singh.
,, Raja Ghulam Mohammad Khan.
,, Habibullah Khan Baber.
,, Habibur Rahman Khan.
,, Malik Haq Nawaz.
,, K. N. Kaul.
,, K. O. Law.
,, A. W. Litchfield.
,, J. Masters.
,, D. C. Misra.
,, Prakash Chand.
,, L. Sawhny.
,, Sayed Ghawas.
,, Sultan Ali Shah.
,, R. H. Tobin.

II.—The Journal

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October, which is issued postage-free to members in any part of the world. Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2, annas 8 per copy, or Rs. 10 per annum. Advertisement rates may be obtained on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal

Articles may vary in length from two thousand to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment is made on publication at from Rs. 40 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 535, action to obtain the sanction of

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit any matter which they consider objectionable.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

IV.—Reading Room and Library

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 a.m. until sunset. The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines and journals of military, naval and service interest.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution from which members can obtain books on loan free in accordance with the following rules :—

(1) The Library is only open to members and honorary members, who are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2) No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3) A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(4) No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the Library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member, it will be re-called.

(5) Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible and books are despatched post free per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of the date of issue.

(6) If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(7) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(8) The catalogue of the Library has been revised and is now available for sale at Rs. 2/8/- per copy plus postage. The Library has been completely overhauled and all books re-classified, hence the new catalogue meets the general demand for an up-to-date production containing all military classics and other works likely to be of use to members of the Institution. Members who have not yet ordered their copies are advised to send a post card to the Librarian of the Institution, Simla.

V.—Library Books

A list of the books received during the preceding quarter is enclosed in loose leaf form suitable for cutting into strips for pasting in the library catalogue.

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and, while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of old books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

VI.—Promotion Examinations

(*a*) *Military History*—(reference I. A. O. 257 of 1935).

The following table shows the campaigns on which military history papers will be set for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain in sub-head *b* (*iii*), and for Captains for promotion to Major in sub-head *d* (*iii*), with a list of books recommended for the study of each :—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of Examination.	Campaign set for first time.	Campaign set for second time.	Campaign set for last time.
1	October 1936.	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.	Gallipoli—inception of the campaign to May 1915.
2	March 1937.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..	Mesopotamia, from October 1915 to the occupation of Bagdad, 11th March 1917.
3	October 1937.	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).	..
4	March 1938.	..	Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.	The Russo-Japanese War, previous to the Battle of Liao-Yang until the 24th August 1904 (excluding the actual siege operations at Port Arthur).
5	October 1938.	..		Mesopotamia, from 12th March 1917 to the Armistice.

The following books are recommended for the study of the campaigns :—

Campaign.	Book.
Gallipoli	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Gallipoli, Vol. I.
Mesopotamia— *March 1936 to March 1937.*	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. II and III (less Chapters XXXIV *et seq*).
October 1937 to October 1938.	.. History of the Great War—Military Operations—Mesopotamia, Vols. III (Chapters XXXIV *et seq*) and IV.
All ..	.. A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—1918—Major R. Evans, M.C. (*Sifton Praed*).
The Russo-Japanese War	.. Official History of the Russo-Japanese War, Parts I (second edition), and II (*British—Military*), or Official History of the Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military). Vol. I, Chapters 1—17 (less 4, 7, 9 and 10).

The campaigns set for Majors, R.A.M.C. and R.A.V.C., up to and including 1937 are published in I.A.O.'s 72 of 1935 and 49 of 1936.

(*b*) *Other Subjects.*

In addition to the manuals and regulations mentioned in K. R. and R.A.I., the following books are recommended :—

" Modern Military Administration, Organization and Transportation " (Harding-Newman).

" Military Organization and Administration," (Lindsell).
" A. & Q. or Military Administration in War " (Lindsell).
" A Study of Unit Administration " (Gale and Polden).
" Military Law " (Banning).
" The Defence of Duffers' Drift," 1929 (Swinton).
" Tactical Schemes with Solutions, Series I and II " (Kirby and Kennedy).

" Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School," Vol. I (Pakenham Walsh).

" Imperial Military Geography " (Cole).
" Elements of Imperial Defence " (Boycott).
" Changing Conditions of Imperial Defence " (Cole).
" A Practical Digest of Military Law " (Townshend-Stephens. Pub. Sifton Praed).

VII.—Staff College Examination.—[See Staff College (Quetta, Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Manager of Publications) Delhi or Calcutta].

(*a*) *Campaigns.*

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination :—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign, up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The Strategy and Broad Tactical Lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War, up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The Strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917 to the end of the War.

The Action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the first battle of Ypres.

The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

(*b*) In addition to his official books every student is recommended to provide himself with a copy of—

(*i*) Military Organization and Administration (Lindsell).

Military Law (Banning).

British Strategy (Maurice).

Notes on the Land and Air Forces of British Overseas Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates (Official).

Outline of the Development of the British Army up to 1914 (Hastings & Anderson).

Imperial Military Geography (Cole).

An Atlas.

(*ii*) The following pamphlets, etc., can be borrowed from the Orderly Room, and should be studied :—

Examination papers for admission to the Staff College.

Training Memoranda—War Office.

Training Memoranda—A. H. Q. India.

Notes on certain Lessons of the Great War.

Passing it On (Skeen).

(*iii*) Periodicals, etc., to which students should subscribe—

"The Times."

"U. S. I. (India) Journal."

(*iv*) Books which can be obtained from libraries—

(*Note.*—Those marked with an asterisk should be used only as books of reference.)

R. U. S. I. Journal.

Army Quarterly.

Round Table.

Journal of the Institute of International Affairs.

Science of War (Henderson).

Transformation of War (Colin).

The War of Lost Opportunities (Hoffman).

*The Principles of War (Foch).

*The Direction of War (Bird).

Soldiers and Statesmen (Robertson).

*Historical Illustrations to F. S. R. II (Eady).

* In the Wake of the Tank (Martel).

*The Re-making of Modern Armies (Liddell Hart).

*The British Way in Warfare (Liddell Hart).

*Napoleon's Campaign in 1796 in Italy (Burton).

*Waterloo Campaign (Robinson).

*Outline History of Russo-Japanese War 1904, up to Battle of Liao-Yang (Pakenham Walsh).

The Campaign of Liao-Yang (Rowan Robinson).

*The World Crisis (Churchill).

*A History of the Great War (Cruttwell).

The Palestine Campaign (Wavell).

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia (Evans).

*The Dardanelles Campaign (Callwell).

*German Strategy in the Great War (Neame).

*Official Histories of the War—France, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Gallipoli.

*Waziristan 1919-20 (Watteville).

*The Third Afghan War (Official).

A. & Q. (Lindsell).

Changing conditions of Imperial Defence (Cole).

The British Empire (Lucas).

*The Government of the British Empire (Jenks).

*The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (Williamson).

*A Short History of British Expansion (Williamson).

*Expansion of the British Empire (Woodward).

(*v*) Books and Articles on Transportation—

Railways in War. Lieutenant-Colonel E. St. G. Kirke, D.S.O., R.E., Army Quarterly, January 1930.

Strategic Moves by Rail, 1914. Journal R. U. S. I., February and May 1935.

The Lines of Communication in the Dardanelles. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, April 1930.

The Lines of Communication in Mesopotamia. Lieutenant-General Sir G. Macmunn. Army Quarterly, October 1927.

History of the R. A. S. C., Vol. II (all campaigns).

The Supply and Transportation Problem of Future Armies. Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E., Journal U. S. I. India, April 1932.

The Supply of Mechanized Forces in the Field. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

The Board of Trade and the Fighting Services. Journal R. U. S. I., 1929.

Railway Organization of an Army in War. Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, D.S.O., R.E., Journal R. U. S. I., 1927.

What is required of a Railway in a theatre of Operations. Major-General Taylor, R.E., Journal, September 1932.

F. S. P. B. War Office, 1932. Read Sections 36 to 38. Do not memorize detail. Know where to find it.

F. S. P. B. India.

VIII.—Schemes, etc.

The following papers and precis of lectures set for the A. H. Q. Staff College Course, 1935, are available for issue to members of the Institution at the nominal price of annas four per copy, plus postage.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES, 1935.

Tactical Schemes

D. M. T.'s Paper No. 1.
" " " 2.
" " " 3.
" " " 4 (without solution).
" " " 5.
" " " 6.
" " " 7.
" " " 8.
" " " 9.
" " " 10.

Precis of Lectures

1. Staff College Examination.
2. Night Operations.
3. Strategy and Tactics. Political Objects in War.
4. Strategy and Tactics. Fog in War.
5. Strategy and Tactics. Gallipoli.
6. Maintenance of Material and Animals.

A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE, 1936.

The stock of complete sets of papers referred to in the notice published with I. A. O.s, dated 18th August 1936, is exhausted, but copies of the papers detailed below may be had at two annas each, postage free.

The following maps are for use with the papers noted against them, and may be had at Rs. 2 each, postage free :

Map 1" to 1 mile Sheet 93 (for paper Nos. 30 to 43)

Map 1" to 1 mile Sheet 94 (for paper Nos. 30 to 39)

Map 1" to 1 mile Sheet 38 N/14 (for paper No. 44)

Item.	Subject.	Serial No.
Notes for officers attending Course	.. .. ..	1
Lecture	.. Military Writing	2
Exercise	.. Message Writing	3
Solution	.. ,, ,, ...	3-A
Lecture	.. Operation Orders and Instructions	4
Lecture	.. Appreciations	5
Lecture	.. Contact	6
Lecture	.. Reconnaissance and Infantry Deployment Drill	8
Lecture	.. Some Hints on the Attack	9
Lecture	.. Tactical Aspect of River Crossings	10
Lecture	.. Defence	12
Lecture	.. Mechanization and Reorganization of the Army	13
Lecture	.. Withdrawal and Rearguards	15
Lecture	.. Divisional Cavalry and Armoured Cars ..	17
Lecture	.. Co-operation between the Army and R. A. F. ..	18
Lecture	.. Artillery No. 1. Characteristics and Organization	20
Lecture	.. Artillery No. 2. Attack	21
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Lecture	.. The Mobile Division	26
Lecture	.. Signals. Characteristics, Organization and Employment	27
Lecture	.. Frontier Warfare	28
Exercise	.. March Orders	30
Solution	.. ,, ,, ...	31
Exercise	.. Appreciation	32
Solution	.. ,, ...	33
Exercise	.. Attack	34
Solution	.. ,, ...	35
Exercise	.. Defence	36
Solution	.. ,, ...	37
Exercise	.. Withdrawal	38
Solution	.. ,, ...	39
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Solution	.. ,, ,, ,, No. 1	41
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Solution	.. ,, ,, ,, No. 2	43
Paper	.. ,, ,, ,, No. 3	44
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Lecture S. & T. No. 2.	Concentrations and Detachments ..	47

IX.—Historical Research

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*N.B.—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Royal Air Force, Indian Air Force, Royal Indian Navy and the Indian States Forces.

†Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

MacGregor Memorial Medalists

(With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the award)

1889 .. Bell, Colonel M. S., v.c., r.e. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890 .. Younghusband, Captain F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

1891 .. Sawyer, Major H. A., 45th Sikhs.
Ramzan Khan, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.

1892 .. Vaughan, Captain H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
Jaggat Singh, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.

1893 .. Bower, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Fazal Dad Khan, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.

1894 .. O'Sullivan, Major G. H. W., r.e.
Mull Singh, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.

1895 .. Davies, Captain H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
Ganga Dyal Singh, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.

1896 .. Cockerill, Lieutenant G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
Ghulam Nabi, Sepoy, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.

1897 .. Swayne, Captain E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
Shahzad Mir, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.

1898 .. Walker, Captain H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Adam Khan, Havildar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.

1899 .. Douglas, Captain J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
Mihr Din, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

1900 .. Wingate, Captain A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
Gurdit Singh, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.

1901 .. Burton, Major E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
Sundar Singh, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.

1902 .. Ray, Captain M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
Tilbir Bhandari, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.

1903 .. Maniford, Lieut.-Colonel C. C., i.m.s.
Ghulam Hussain, Lance-Dafadar, Q.V.I. Corps of Guides.

1904 .. Fraser, Captain L. D., r.g.a.
Moghal Baz, Dafadar, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.

1905 .. Rennick, Major F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
Madho Ram, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.

1906 .. Shahzada Ahmad Mir, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
Ghafur Shah, Lance-Naik, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.

1907 .. Nangle, Captain M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
Sheikh Usman, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

1908 .. Gibbon, Captain C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Malang, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.

1909 .. Muhammad Raza, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.

1910 .. Sykes, Major P. M., c.m.g., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
Turner, Captain F. G., r.e.
Khan Bahadur Sher Jung, Survey of India.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS—(*contd.*)

1911 .. LEACHMAN, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
GURMUKH SINGH, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

1912 .. PRITCHARD, Capt. B. E. A., 83rd Wallajahabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
WILSON, Lieut. A. T., C.M.G., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
MOHIBULLA, Lance-Dafadar, Q.V.O. Corps of Guides.

1913 .. ABBAY, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
SIRDAR KHAN, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.
WARATONG, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).

1914 .. BAILEY, Capt. F. M., I.A. (Political Department).
MORSHEAD, Capt. H. T., R.E.
HAIDAR ALI, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1915 .. WATERFIELD, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
ALI JUMA, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1916 .. ABDUR RAHMAN, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
ZARGHUN SHAH, Havildar, 58th Rifles, F.F. (specially awarded a silver medal).

1917 .. MIAN AFRAZ GUL, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.

1918 .. NOEL, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).

1919 .. KEELING, Lieut.-Colonel E. H., M.C., R.E.
ALLA SA, Jemadar, N. W. Frontier Corps.

1920 .. BLACKER, Capt. L. V. S., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
AWAL NUR, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)

1921 .. HOLT, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
SHER ALI, Sepoy, No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1922 .. ABDUL SAMAD SHAH, Capt., O.B.E., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
NUR MUHAMMAD, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.

1923 .. BRUCE, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
SOHBAT, Head-Constable, N. W. F. Police.
HARI SINGH THAPA, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).

1924 .. RAHMAT SHAH, Havildar, I.D.S.M., N. W. F. Corps.
GHULAM HUSSAIN, Naik, N. W. F. Corps.

1925 .. SPEAR, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
JABBAR KHAN, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.

1926 .. HARVEY-KELLY, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.

1927 .. LAKE, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.

1928 .. BOWERMAN, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D. C. O. Baluch Regiment.
MUHAMMAD KHAN, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.

1929 .. ABDUL HANAN, Naik, N. W. F. Corps.
GHULAM ALI, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).

1930 .. GREEN, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burmah Rifles.

1931 .. O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L., 1/9th Jat Regiment.
KHIAL BADSHAH, Naik, 1/13th Frontier Force Rifles.

MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDALISTS—(*concld.*)

1932 .. BIRNIE, Capt. E. St. J., Sam Browne's Cavalry.
SHIB SINGH NEGI, No. 4013, Rifleman, 10/18th Royal Garhwal Rifles.
1933 .. ABDUL GHAFUR, Havildar, K. G. O. Bengal Sappers and Miners.
1934 .. No award.
1935 .. FERGUSSON, Lt. K. A. P., R.A.
BOSTOCK, Lt. T. M. T., R.E.
1936 .. ANGWIN, Capt. J. B. P., R.E.
MUHAMMAD ISHAQ, No. 8372, Lance-Naik, 2/15th Punjab Regiment.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALISTS.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay.*)

1872 .. ROBERTS, Lt.-Col. F. S., V.C., C.B., R.A.
1873 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1874 .. COLQUHOUN, Capt. J. S., R.A.
1879 .. ST. JOHN, Maj. O. B. C., R.E.
1880 .. BARROW, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1882 .. MASON, Lieut. A. H., R.E.
1883 .. COLLEN, Maj. E. H. H., S.C.
1884 .. BARROW, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1887 .. YATE, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
1888 .. MAUDE, Capt. F. N., R.E.
YOUNG, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1889 .. DUFF, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
1890 .. MAGUIRE, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy., Hyderabad Contingent.
1891 .. CARDEW, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
1893 .. BULLOCK, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
1894 .. CARTER, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
1895 .. NEVILLE, Lt.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.
1896 .. BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1897 .. NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1898 .. MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.
CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).
1899 .. NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.E.
1900 .. THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.
LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1901 .. RANKEN, Lt.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
1902 .. TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
1903 .. HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded silver medal).

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALISTS—(*concld.*)

1904 .. MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
1905 .. COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1907 .. WOOD, Maj. E. J. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908 .. JEUDWINE, Maj. H. S., R.A.
1909 .. MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1911 .. Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912 .. CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913 .. THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914 .. BAINBRIDGE, Col. W. F., D.S.O., 31st Sikhs (F. F.).
NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O., Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).
1916 .. CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917 .. BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. B., M.C., R.E.
1919 .. GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A., 108th Infantry.
1920 .. KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., 2/15th Sikhs.
1922 .. MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D.S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923 .. KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927 .. HOGG, Maj. D. McA., M.C., R.E.
1928 .. FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929 .. DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1931 .. FORD, Lt.-Col. G. N., 2/5th Mahratta Light Infantry.
1932 .. THURBURN, Lt. R. G., The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles).
1933 .. Medal not awarded.
1934 .. DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.
1935 .. Medal not awarded.
1936 .. Medal not awarded.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1936

Two essays, bearing the following mottoes, were received in the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1936:

1. "Onward."
2. "Mark Time or Forward."

The Council of the Institution consider that neither of the essays is of a standard sufficiently high to justify an award.

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GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1937

The Council has chosen the following subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1937:

(*i*) "It has been stated that the Defence of India and of Burma is, from the strategic aspect, a single problem.

Discuss the truth of this statement, taking as the basis of your argument the threats which exist to the security of both countries in the world conditions of to-day;"

or, as an alternative subject,

(*ii*) "Mr. Baldwin has said that 'The Rhine is our Frontier.' Discuss this."

The following are the conditions of the competition:

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force, Auxiliary Forces and Indian States Forces.

(2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1937.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1937.

(8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.