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EDITORIAL

Italy and Abyssinia.

On May 9th, 1936, the annexation of Abyssinia by Italy was formally announced, and the world and the League of Nations were thus presented with a *fait accompli.* Addis Ababa had been occupied by Marshal Badoglio on May 5th, and Harrar fell shortly afterwards, the main campaign in Abyssinia being brought to an unexpectedly early and successful conclusion.

" Italy has at last got her empire, a Fascist Empire, which bears indestructible signs of determination and the power of the Roman emblem . . . . This empire is the goal to which for 14 years the eruptive energies of the young generation of Italy have been disciplined." These words, spoken by Signor Mussolini when announcing the annexation, are a full confession of the true reason for the invasion of Abyssinia, which began in October 1935 with the ostensible object of safeguarding Italian interests, and which has been persisted in, despite the resistance of the Abyssinians and the efforts of the League to call a halt. At the time of publication of the last number of the Journal it could not be foreseen that the war would be ended with such rapidity; the distances yet remaining to be covered by the Italians, the difficulties presented by the country and the consequent administrative problems, the apparently unbroken morale of the Abyssinians, all tended to show that decisive Italian success could not be expected before the summer rains broke.

It would appear that the first real error on the part of the Abyssinians was their abandonment of guerilla tactics in the battle of

Tembien in February, and that after the defeat of the Emperor at Mai Chio on April 2nd, all organized resistance ceased, on the northern front at any rate. In Ogaden there was considerable opposition till Sasa Baneh had been captured on April 30th. The Italians were thus enabled to push forward mobile columns which encountered very little opposition, some delay being caused by the state of the roads and by the break of the rains in April. The extensive use of gas sprayed from the air by the Italians from the month of March onwards seems to have destroyed the morale of the Abyssinian forces, since these were totally unprotected. The defection of many of the tribes to the side of the invader possibly also contributed to the final collapse of the northern front and the ringing down of the curtain with the flight of the Emperor on May 2nd. The decision to use mustard gas was a definite breach of the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, and its employment, though unscrupulous, was very successful. Whatever criticism can be made on this score, there is no doubt that the boldness displayed by the Italian Commander and the speed with which he brought operations to a decisive conclusion reflect great credit on him. In spite of the occupation of Addis Ababa and of the publication of a constitution for Italian East Africa, it is doubtful if all the Italian problems in Abyssinia are settled as yet or will be for some time. The Abyssinian main forces have been dispersed, but there is always a possibility that guerilla warfare will continue. Though this may not affect seriously the ultimate issue, it may delay the pacification and exploitation of the country. An immediate problem is that of supply ; the roads leading from Makalle are liable at present to break down in the rainy season and it seems that the Italians will have to rely largely on the Djibouti-Addis Ababa Railway. As the sea terminal of this is controlled by one of the sanctionist powers, the situation is curious, if not delicate. Assuming that the country will be quickly pacified, a problem that awaits Italy is that of the dispersion of her forces in Abyssinia. Will she withdraw the majority and demobilize them, or will she attempt to colonize Abyssinia with her victorious soldiers, as has been rumoured in the Press ? There is no guarantee that the latter will voluntarily remain in large numbers, and if they return to Italy and are demobilized it is possible that the unemployment problem will again become acute. We do not envy the Duce the task before him.

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Sanctions and the League.

In the October 1935 edition of this Journal, mention was made of the object of sanctions and of the fact that all sanctionist nations hesitated to apply an " oil sanction " in case it lead to a spreading of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict to Europe. An embargo on the supply of oil to Italy has never been enforced, in spite of the setting up of a special committee in March this year to study the subject. Up till very recently the policy of the League has been that those sanctions which are in force should continue to be applied, but lately there has been an increasing feeling in many quarters that sanctions have ceased to be of any value. That is, they were applied to help a member of the League who was the victim of aggression on the part of another member, and now that Abyssinia has been conquered the maintenance of sanctions only serves to embitter Italy and achieves no useful purpose. Not only has the continuance of sanctions recently been described by a responsible statesman as " Midsummer madness," but the British Government has declared in favour of abandoning them. Whilst this decision will probably be regarded by many as a betrayal of the League and as a mere attempt to save face, it is considered that the reasons for the decision are very sound. The length of time needed to make sanctions effective, the fact that Italy has defeated Abyssinia and can only be driven from the country by military action, which no nation is prepared to take, and the fact that such action would, in all probability, lead to a war in the Mediterranean, all tend to show the danger of their continuance. It is gratifying to note that France is prepared to follow the lead given her, and that both countries will recommend the discontinuance of sanctions at the League meeting to be held in the near future. The truth is that the imposition of sanctions implies the will and the power to back up the embargo with armed force, if necessary. As no sanctionist nation is prepared to run the risk of war, either singly or collectively in support of Article 16 of the Covenant, the sooner the whole status of the League is reviewed and, if necessary, revised to come into line with present-day conditions, the better.

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Germany and the Rhineland.

Not only has the League failed to prevent aggression on the part of Italy, but up to date no solution has been found to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland. Germany sent a delegation to attend the meeting of the League Council on

March 19th, at which her representative attempted to justify Germany's action. It was then declared by vote that Germany had infringed Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Locarno.

On that date the Locarno Powers (excluding Germany) drew up a memorandum which announced the institution of General Staff talks to study certain technical aspects of the problem and, amongst other things, suggested that Germany should lay her case before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, and that an international conference should meet to examine the system of collective security, the problems of colonial equality and of the divorcing of the League Covenant from the Versailles Treaty.

Strengthened by the result of the German elections on March 29th (this was really a foregone conclusion), the German Government sent a reply on April 1st which rejected the Staff talks, refused to submit the case to the International Court of Justice and proposed various pacts as a solution to the problem. It also stated that Germany was willing to re-enter the League if the questions of colonial rights and of the separation of the Covenant from the Versailles Treaty were settled.

The French Government issued a reply on April 8th, which was not a very helpful solution, but largely advocated the establishment of an international police force or the strengthening of sanctions.

The General Staff talks were held on and after April 15th, in spite of the German protest, to make plans for action in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany on France or Belgium.

On May 6th a despatch was sent by the British Government which asked if Germany was ready to enter into definite treaties, drew attention to various contradictory statements in the German note and asked her to confirm that the pacts proposed by Germany could be operated within the framework of the Covenant of the League.

It was to be anticipated that there would be some delay in the preparation of a reply to this despatch, but so far no answer has been given to this demand for a clear and frank exposition of policy. It is to be hoped that the German reply, when it eventually does arrive, will make an effective contribution to the restoration of confidence in Europe and to the settlement of the many problems now before the League. Whilst it is satisfactory to note the proposed improvement and expansion of our fighting forces and the intention (as stated

recently by the Foreign Secretary) to maintain a stronger defensive position in the Mediterranean, we trust that the desire to solve the Rhineland problem and to restore to the League its full authority will not involve us in any further commitments before we are ready fully to play our part. The Palestine situation and the question of making a treaty with Egypt which is acceptable to both parties, though, perhaps, describable as minor commitments, are factors affecting the safety of our Imperial communications which seem to need urgent attention.

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The Dardanelles.

In view of the general discredit into which the League has fallen in Europe as the result of the successful direct action taken by Italy and Germany to release themselves from situations which had become irksome, it is pleasant to note that Turkey still has sufficient faith to submit her case for refortifying the Dardanelles for discussion at the Montreux Conference. Taking into account the general rearmament in Europe and recent activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, her desire for increased security is very understandable. It is to be hoped that the Conference will reach an agreement at a very early date.

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Rifle Shooting.

From articles published recently, and in this number of the Journal, it is patent that more interest is now being taken in the improvement of rifle shooting. It has been appreciated for some time that training in rifle shooting should be made more akin to the use of the rifle in war; and with this object a new rifle course evolved by Waziristan District is being fired as an experimental measure during the current Weapon Training Year. We are therefore publishing an "Address to officers of Razmak Brigade by the District Commander" on the subject. It is understood that no reports on this experimental course have as yet been received by Army Headquarters, and consequently no indication can be given of any decision that is likely to be reached in regard to it. The factors which led up to the experiment are, however, of interest.

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The War Block.

The Information Bureau, Army Headquarters, has recently published the final edition of its "Summary of Information" for the benefit of War Block and other officers of the Indian Army. The information contained in all the

earlier editions has been brought up to date and many additional facts and figures of a useful nature have been included.

Whilst such a publication cannot claim to answer all the questions which an officer about to retire would be likely to put, it should prove of great use for several years to come to officers who are faced with the difficulty of making up their minds whether to retire at home or to settle in one or other of the British Dominions Colonies.

A RETROSPECT: 1920—1935

By Major H. C. S. Minchin.

General.

1. Fifteen years ago Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, and, for the time being, was left negligible as a fighting power.

At the same time Great Britain turned to the idealistic concept of the League of Nations and became as non-militaristic as it was possible to be.

2. During these fifteen years the vital necessity and probable certainty of Eternal Peace has been emphasised *ad nauseum* by public men; our army, navy and air force have been reduced to bedrock; the mention of future war has been graded as akin to blasphemy.

3. To-day conditions have changed. Germany is re-arming and Great Britain is at least taking some steps, however apologetic, towards the goal of bringing her defence forces up to a reasonable standard.

4. The fifteen years, therefore, since the signing of the treaties marks a definite epoch in military history—an epoch when one of the most virile and militaristic of European powers was forcibly disarmed, while our own military forces remained in abeyance, following the dictates of a political ideal.

5. It may be of interest to summarise the history of that period in order that we may evaluate the circumstances which have brought back to politicians a desire, however mild, to depend again on our own military forces, and not exclusively on the good offices of the League.

The Peace Settlements of 1920

(*A*) *Financial Enactments*

6. These comprised the payments of Reparation, War debts, etc. The payments were based, or should have been based, on economic factors. These factors are incomprehensible to the layman, and appear comprehensible to the expert only in so far as to convince him that the opinions of other experts are erroneous. There are those who are convinced Germany was asked to pay too much. There are those who deny this. The matter is now immaterial. Suffice to say that the history of reparations and war debts falls into three clear-cut phases.

(*i*) *Phase i.*—*During this phase Germany indulged in passive resistance to payment. The French retaliated by marching into the Ruhr, the indirect result of which was the crippling of German industry mainly fed from the raw materials of that region. The mark crashed; the powers intervened; the Dawes plan laid down definite and reasonable payments to be made by Germany; the French left the Ruhr, and the Locarno pacts ushered in a period of comparative peace.

(*ii*) *Phase ii*, 1925—1929.—During these years, the boom period of post-war history, the German plan was one of classical simplicity. She borrowed (mainly from America) sums far exceeding the amount payable in Reparations, etc. She paid the Reparations, etc., out of the borrowed money and spent the rest in magnificent schemes of social relief, construction of housing centres, swimming pools, etc. She made no attempt to put her financial house in order.

Then came the economic "break" in America, and in 1929 the flow of American money to Germany ceased. Bereft of its life blood, the German market began to totter. It is obvious that since America had poured money into Germany, German bankruptcy would produce further American repercussions. In fact (intentionally or not, as the case may be), the reckless borrowing and reckless spending of Germany had tied America to her. Germany appealed to America, but at the same time brought up the question of improving her financial position by the formation of a tariff union with Austria.

In this latter step France saw or imagined she saw, the first step to the dreaded Austro-German political union, the hated "Anschluss" elsewhere discussed, and she at once blocked the proposal for a moratorium brought forward by Mr. Hoover, and later blocked international attempts to aid Germany, by insisting on quite unacceptable political guarantees.

The Germans, bereft of help, were left to face the financial blizzard unaided, the miseries of which led direct to National Socialism and Hitler.

Phase iii.—At least, however, the second phase led to the third and present phase when War debts and Reparations are dead. Even the French were forced to acknowledge that the Germans were unable to pay Reparations after 1929, and as Reparations died so did War debts.

**Cf.*—"A Short History of International Affairs, 1920—1934. (Gathorne Hardy.)

7. The history of the post-war financial jumble need, therefore, hardly have been considered except that it brings out the fact that seems so clear in any restrospect of post-war history, namely, that while everyone has talked of peace, actually there has been no peace. Even in financial enactments the Germans fought the French as hard as they had ever fought them in the war, and the French twice smashed the Germans more completely than they had ever done during the war. The International Amity of Mr. Wilson seemed to have gone astray.

(*B*) *Territorial enactments*

8. The pre-war diplomatic system was based to a large extent on the factor known as the "Balance of Power."

9. As Mr. Gathorne Hardy has pointed out, there is really not a tremendous difference between the Balance of Power system and the League system. The latter says, in effect, "thou shalt not make war." The former system merely started further back and said, "thou shalt not grow too powerful." This meant, in effect, that whereas the Great Powers were not particularly interested if Guatemala fought Ecuador, or even (all things being equal) if Italy seized Abyssinia, nevertheless they were all vitally interested if the policy of any one great power amongst them was likely to give her so much strength as to make her dangerous to the others. Against power they would ruthlessly combine and the balance would be restored. In the 16th century world domination by Spain was stopped by a combination of France and England, in the 17th and early 18th France was resisted by the world, and in the same century a combination of forces temporarily robbed England of her naval supremacy and thus permanently lost her the United States.

10. Now it is an oft-repeated assertion that this Balance of Power system led to the late war. The facile theory put forward is that the Great Powers (apparently from sheer wilfulness) grouped themselves in opposite camps, a race of armaments started, and war came as a result. No opinion could be more erroneous.

Actually, losing sight of the Balance of Power, in the excitement of industrial expansion or of internal Parliamentary activity, the Great Powers permitted Germany (Prussia) to run three short and highly successful wars—against Denmark, against Austria and against France. From that time on the phrase "thou shalt not grow too powerful" was an empty one. Germany *had* grown too powerful.

" She grew so powerful that like the mass of the Sun she attracted satellites into her system and the final stage before the Great War was not the application of the principle of the Balance of Power but a frantic and hopeless attempt to redress a balance for which no sufficient counterpoise was now available." (*Hardy.*) In short, *it was the surrender of the balance of power, and not the balance of power, which caused the last war.*

11. Mr. Wilson, however, thought otherwise, and to defeat the Balance of Power system he formed the League—an international concept and his major objective.

12. Unfortunately Mr. Wilson had a minor objective known as Self-determination. All who desired to retire into themselves and make for themselves a little nation of Poles or Czechs were to be helped to do so. In other words (though Mr. Wilson failed to see this), the spirit of burning nationality was to be encouraged. The situation, in short, was as if a sentimental school-master implored his pupils to pull together for the sake of the Dear Old School (The League) and at the same time urged a few of them to display their individuality at all costs (Self-determination). It is impossible to be violently individualistic and to fit in with team work ; it is equally impossible to be violently national and to fit in with an international concept. Mr. Wilson was barking up two unparallel trees.

13. Moreover, by the formation of the new countries of East and South-East Europe (Poland, Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, etc.), Mr. Wilson was in fact stressing the effectiveness of war as an instrument of national or racial liberation. The Horrors of War-cum-Pacifist school is a large one, and all of them sincerely believe that any argument on war can be clinched by pointing to the losses, which accrued to all (as they argue), in the Great War. They forget that the late war spelt salvation to Poles, Czechs, Slavs, Rumanians, etc. " When . . . one passes German, Austrian or Hungarian frontiers, it is to enter countries for whose inhabitants the great conflict brought Liberty and Unity and in whose eyes the World War holds the same place as the American Revolution in those of the people of the United States."*

14. Mr. Wilson and his colleagues tried therefore to make eternal peace when that peace was based on two conflicting ideas and was in itself an excellent advertisement for war. This is in itself

*Frank H. Simonds.—" Can Europe Keep the Peace ? "

difficult, but it is when the Self-determination theory is examined in detail that the real difficulties of Mr. Wilson's self-appointed task become apparent.

15. The nations of Western Europe—France, Germany, Spain, England—are separated, one from another, by clear-cut boundaries, the isolation ensuing resulting in a series of clear-cut races with distinctive civilizations and languages. In Eastern and South-Eastern Europe the exact reverse is the case.

It is impossible in the confines of this article to enter into the hopeless intermingling of races in East and South-East Europe, but suffice to say that when, in such a region, Mr. Wilson attempted to carve out in the name of Self-determination a geographical entity fit for (say) the Czechs, he was forced to include in that area a large number of alien races, mostly Germans.

Germans live under foreign rule in Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia; there are Magyars in Rumania, in Czechoslovakia and in Yugoslavia, there are Russians and Lithuanians in Poland.

Before the war Alsace Lorraine was an international danger point simply because it consisted of a group of individuals who wished to be under French rule, and were, in fact, under German rule.

Mr. Wilson and his colleagues in drawing up the peace treaties formed an Alsace Lorraine in every country in East and South-East Europe, and even at first sight it was hard to believe that the danger points had not been multiplied.

The Moral Standard (Post-War)

16. It might, however, have been argued, at that time, that the difficulties referred to above were immaterial provided that the League spirit of international amity had permeated Europe.

17. Unfortunately the exact reverse appears to have been the case. It has already been pointed out that, on the financial side, idealism failed to survive. A study of the political side of post-war history brings this fact into even greater relief. There can have been few periods of history where hard, determined, self-seeking diplomacy coupled, where necessary, with cold international banditry has flourished so successfully.

The last fifteen years in retrospect appear a strange mixture of pious hopes and impious acts, and of conferences to end war which merely served to show that Europe in general still contained all the

differences in national outlook, and all the points of contact of national ambition, which have caused war throughout history.

We may examine the moral post-war outlook, and estimate the conciliatory (or otherwise) spirit of the Nations in—

(*a*) The actions of various powers since the Peace Treaty.

(*b*) History of disarmament conferences.

(*c*) Attempts at evolving Peace Pacts.

(*a*) *The actions of various Powers since the Peace Treaty*

18. Quite apart from recent exploits by Japan, Mussolini and Hitler, the following acts followed the formation of the League:

(*i*) The Burgaland dispute between Austria and Hungary. The details need not be discussed. Suffice to say that Hungary "jumped" a territory containing a majority of Austrians from Austria.

(*ii*) The Italians seized Fiume with no legal right. In the same epoch the murder of an Italian on Greek soil caused the Italians (quite unnecessarily), to bombard Corfu and land there. They were eventually paid to remove themselves.

(*iii*) The Poles, in open defiance of all treaties, first largely increased their territories at the expense of the Ukranians, and later wrested Vilna from the Lithuanians.

(*iv*) The Lithuanians, who appear intelligent, at once perceived the trend of modern diplomacy and seized Memel, which was under League control and predominantly German.

19. Instances could be multiplied, but the above suffice. As Mr. Hardy remarks, "the moral likely to be drawn from the circumstances narrated, augured ill for the prospects of a new world based on the renunciation of force . . . . In practically every instance in which a nation had resorted to force or the threat of it, its ends had been promoted if not wholly achieved." These words were written before the exploits of Japan, Mussolini and Hitler. It is interesting to note, therefore, how precisely they apply.

(*b*) *History of Disarmament Conferences*

20. It is quite impossible in the confines of an article such as this to summarise effectively the thousands of pages which must have been written on this subject. Suffice to say: (*i*) the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1930 started with a flourish of trumpets. It ended with a wrangle between the French and Italians, the latter

claiming the right to naval parity in the Mediterranean, the former denying this right: (*i*) The Washington Conference of 1922 has been extolled as a triumph of post-war diplomacy, and has been a matter of much self-congratulation. Unfortunately all post-war historians hasten to point out that, before this particular conference was held, all political differences between contracting parties had been settled. Japan had no intention of attacking America; America had no intention of attacking Japan: England had no desire to attack either country. In these circumstances it is easy to make a treaty.

21. But in conferences on military disarmament in Europe, where mutual political trust is lacking, the situation was entirely different to that of the Washington Conference. Each nation saw its own point of view, and no other.

The French, for example, demanded an International Commission to supervise disarmament. The Italians and Americans refused to countenance such an idea.

The French then advanced the theory that one should consider "War Potential." They maintained that military efficiency is not only effected by the number of guns, etc., but by such matters as birth-rate, raw materials, railways, etc., and that these should be taken into account. A most logical suggestion, but quite impractical.

The British on the contrary put forward the view that one should take into account the potentialities of trained reserves. One would have thought that no one would have the temerity to argue against this self-evident fact. But in international conferences anything seems possible and France and all conscriptionist countries repudiated the suggestion.

Finally, in the last disarmament conference of 1932-1934, there were two opposing and conflicting ideas. The French held out for an International force; the Germans for equality in Armament. Many attempted solutions were advanced. None was acceptable to all, and finally Germany walked out of the Conference and the League. Disarmament was dead. Ten years of Disarmament Commissions have ended with the whole world (less England and Germany) armed to the teeth.

(*c*) *Attempts to evolve a Peace Formula*

22. (*i*) The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1922.—An idea produced by Lord Cecil and the French in combination,

It suggested, roughly speaking that, whereas everyone should frown extremely darkly at anyone who tried to make aggressive war, and the aggressor, if he did not mend his ways, should be crushed by combined military intervention, no one was forced to join actively in this military intervention unless situated in the same continent as the aggressor. It was rejected by the British, as their dominions extend into every continent and as, under the above system, they would be subjected to a wholly disproportionate share of the burden of resisting aggression in all parts of the world.

(*ii*) The Geneva Protocol.—Fostered by the Labour Party of 1924. It meant, in short, that if two nations quarrelled, they should be asked: "Are you ready to arbitrate?" The nation which refused or proved recalcitrant should be attacked by all. Unfortunately by arbitration the Labour Party implied that both parties should accept some sort of compromise. (Typically British.) Unfortunately the problems that cause difficulties in Europe are such that no compromise is possible. For example, either the "Polish corridor" remains Polish to the eternal annoyance of the Germans, or one can attempt to return it to Germany, at which the Poles would mobilize. One cannot compromise.

The Kellog Pact.—100 *per cent.* American idealism. Of itself the Kellog pact undertook to do two things—to make war illegal, and to pledge nations to renounce war and settle all disputes by arbitration. This pre-supposes that nations have acquired the League spirit. There is nothing in post-war history to support such a contention.

The Locarno Pact.—It would seem unkind to say anything against this pact since it did bring temporary peace to a troubled world, but, as Mr. Hardy points out, by its form, we as a nation are tied to attack the aggressor on the Franco-German or Belgo-German frontier. In short, we have no definite ally, but a choice of alternative allies. We might find ourselves called upon to attack Germany or to attack France. "A democracy can hardly resort to war without the support of national opinion, and while it is comparatively easy to enlist this on the side of a known ally, the existence of two alternative allies or opponents complicates the situation. During the crisis preceding an outburst of war, sympathy may well have rallied to the side which eventually proves to be the aggressor. A sudden *volte face* is then difficult. It is still more probable that, in such a

case, public opinion would be hopelessly divided." Locarno, in short, is not quite the masterpiece it is claimed to be.

Signor Mussolini's Four-Power Pact.—Stated by the author to be the way to eternal peace. Actually, in order (as we see now) to obtain a free hand in Abyssinia, he wished to placate Hitler whom he recognised as a prototype. He had no wish that Germany should interest herself in South-East Europe, as he himself had interests in that region. It was, however, immaterial to him if Germany expanded in the Polish direction. Apart from moral sentiment it was equally immaterial to Great Britain.

If, therefore, he could arrange a pact between England, Italy, France *and Germany*, which would tie Germany for ever with regard to her Western (French) frontier, but made no mention of her Eastern frontier, it would leave Germany with a free hand in the East, take her attention off the South-East, and leave Italy to her expansionist designs.

The nations were, however, more honest than Signor Mussolini expected. His suggestions raised a storm of protest, were emasculated out of all significance and signed. Even its signature in this emasculated form so annoyed the bellicose Poles that from that time they drifted away from France and towards Germany. This was the last of attempted Peace Pacts, and they would hardly be worth mentioning were it not to show the difficulty which has existed in any international peace undertaking.

23. In short, a survey of the *actions* of Nations during the war seems to show the aggressive spirit increased rather than decreased; the history of *disarmament conferences* shows a total lack of international agreement, while the practical value of *Peace Pacts* is so small that one wonders why they were ever signed, and why each was greeted as a step towards Universal Peace. Mr. Simonds, unfortunately, can give the answer in his shrewd but scathing remarks, in which he explains the unenviable position of the modern statesman in the new open post-war conference as opposed to the old pre-war diplomacy:

"Their prestige being engaged, because they have prepared their publics for achievement, they are condemned to sustain the illusion of progress, to continue to hold out the promise of success, and in the end, in the face of a failure always inevitable, to claim a triumph which is promptly disclosed to have been lacking. Thus that secrecy

and unveracity, which were the worst features of old-fashioned diplomacy, have been adopted and even exaggerated by the new."

24. Since this inability of nations to agree must spring from divergent policies, it may be of interest to trace the post-war policies of the powers and to attempt to estimate if international agreement, which has pathetically failed in the past, has any chance of succeeding in the future.

The Post-war Policies of the Powers

Germany

25. Whatever Herr Hitler may say to-day there can be little doubt that behind all German policy lies the fixed intention to obtain Treaty Revision. The Revisionist programme has two main planks :

(*i*) Revision of her Eastern frontier, at the expense of the Poles, Baltic states or Russia—the Drang nach Osten of pre-war days. To quote Von Kuhlmann, a former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the German Government—" Above all stands the fact that the Peace of Versailles created most unfortunate frontiers between Germany and Poland. *It must be stated quite frankly that these frontiers injure the vital interests of Germany so profoundly that the revision of them will remain a standing demand of German policy no matter who happens to be responsible for its conduct.*"*

For years the prophets pointed to the Polish corridor as the " cockpit of Europe." In 1934, however, Hitler confounded the prophets by signing a Pact with Poland, swearing off all aggression for ten years. It is, however, difficult to believe that Von Kuhlmann's words are not still true. It appears probable that as his next step Herr Hitler prefers to fish in the troubled waters of South-East Europe, and Poland (for the moment) can wait. In history ten years is no space of time.

(*ii*) Political union with Austria or Anschluss. This word creates more panic in Europe than most words. A glance at the map will show that if Germany combined with Austria, it would bring a sea of Germans round the jerry-built products of the Peace treaties and especially round Czechoslovakia, herself with a discontented and downtrodden German minority. Political domination, if not annexation, of the Little Entente, would be merely a question of time.

*The Foreign Policy of the Powers, p. 45.

Moreover, it would bring the German Empire against the Italian border which is itself populated by Germans, who since the war have endured the most brutal Italianization. It would be impossible for Italy to hold this frontier were the Germans their immediate neighbours. There is no doubt that Germany has actively worked for this union, which is, of course, forbidden by the peace treaties. The revolution of Austrian Nazis in 1934 was indubitably backed, if not actually set on foot, by Germany. Had it been successful, union with Germany might have followed without further ado.

The murder of Dr. Dolfuss, for which German propaganda was also responsible, temporarily alienated the Austrians; but, as will be shown later, eventual political union is by no means universally unpopular in Austria.

France

26. It will be noted that neither the move of Germany to the East nor the political union directly affects the territorial integrity of France.

In fact, it may be said without doubt that Germany has no territorial ambitions against France in Europe. She has no desire to reconquer Alsace Lorraine. The Germans held that province for 47 years "during which the Reichslanders—German speakers and French speakers alike—had remained subjects of Germany without ever becoming bone of her bone or flesh of her flesh. Germany's failure to win their hearts had become a European laughing stock . . . . *The Reichsland brought its conquerors neither prestige nor strength."

If, therefore, France has nothing to fear territorially, it may be wondered why the slightest move by Germany causes such an ebullition of anti-Germanic sentiment in France.

The answer is also given by Mr. Toynbee, who points out that if Germany advances both in the East and South-East "she would dwarf and overshadow France so completely that she might be able to dictate to her and to dispose of her resources without needing to annex any of her territory. This was the nightmare that tormented French imaginations during 1934."

We must acknowledge, therefore, that France has the right to be apprehensive, and may examine the methods adopted by the French to allay this apprehension.

*Survey of International affairs, 1934. Toynbee.

27. At the termination of the war, France hoped for an Anglo-American guarantee. This was denied her.

She fell back on alliances with Poland and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania).

These alliances had various repercussions:

(*i*)—They gave her a dominant position in the League. She was able to resist all attempts at German revival (see para. 8, Phase III).

(*ii*)—On the contrary she soon found that it was no sinecure to be tied irrevocably to the ultra-national, ultra-excitable products of the war. She was henceforth forced to become the champion, not only of her own *status quo*, but also of the *status quo* of every new-formed frontier in Europe.

These pacts were, moreover, purely political and military. There was no economic backing behind them. France has neither the need to buy nor the ability to sell in South-East Europe, her allies being actually in the economic orbit of Germany by reason of unalterable geographical circumstances. The French alliance, from the point of view of these countries, therefore, is merely a matter of military or political convenience and, if it suits them, they are perfectly ready to play fast and loose with France. The history of Poland proved this.

France can almost be said to be the creator of modern Poland. The Ukranian war was backed by French money and munitions. The new port of Gydnia was built by French money. Yet, when it pleased them to do so, the Poles, as stated, allied themselves in a ten-year non-aggression pact with Germany. Their reasons for this action, such as they are, will be considered later, but gratitude to France for past favours simply did not count.

As it was with Poland, so it would be, if it suited them, with her other South-Eastern Allies.

The French alliances, in short, bring her no particular comfort.

(*iii*)—Not only, however, are these alliances uncomfortable in themselves, but they bring discomfort elsewhere. Italy, at the end of the war, hoped for economic penetration in South-East Europe. But since the new states had concluded the above treaties with France, were backed by French money and safe in French support, they were able to treat the blandishments of Signor Mussolini with considerable insouciance, a state of affairs quite intolerable to that godlike being, and which considerably incensed him against France.

France, therefore, in gaining the above alliance lost the friendship of Italy which she much desired. Lately, it is true, the recovery of Germany and the fear that her next step may be towards Austria has caused Signor Mussolini to unbend sufficiently to form an alliance with France, guaranteeing the independence of Austria. A recent historian has remarked: "This marriage of convenience for the purpose of adopting the orphan child, Austria, was registered with almost indecent haste, and in view of the antipathies which had existed between France and Italy . . . one was left wondering whether indeed the age of miracles was still in being."

Finally, and even more surprisingly, France has allied with Russia.

(*iv*)—These alliances with Russia and Italy in their turn irritated Poland and Yugoslavia, the former being violently anti-Russian and the latter violently anti-Italian. Poland went deeper into the German alliance. Yugoslavia formed an economic agreement with Germany.

28. Enough has been said to show the amazing difficulties of France. Refused security by the hoped for Anglo-American treaty at the end of the war, "recognising in her heart of hearts that, fundamentally and intrinsically, twentieth century France is no match for twentieth century Germany," seeing the latter (as France believes) slowly working towards European dictatorship, France is forced to dash round Europe seeking any or every alliance which will, to some extent, counter-balance the Germanic superiority. This in turn involves her into pandering to the nationalistic tendencies of the new nations, and forces her into unending political complications and military commitments in every field.

29. It is for this reason that the French have always demanded an International Force to back the League. It is not only that they suspect that such a force could only and would only be used against Germany, but it is because such a force would relieve them of the necessity of these unending and wearying alliances with minor but exigent powers.

Italy

30. So much has been written on Italy lately that it would appear presumptuous to write more.

Shortly, from her point of view, the situation would appear to be:

(*i*)—She has a real economic need for colonies. This is admitted, especially since immigration has been restricted,

(*ii*)—She received no colonies at the end of the last war.

(*iii*)—Since political influence leads to economic gain, she attempted to obtain political influence in the Mediterranean. She was rebuffed by the French.

(*iv*)—Thwarted on the sea she attempted economic exploitation in South-East Europe. The Yugoslavians, however, have been incensed with the Italians since the peace treaties because—

(*a*) The Italians obtained by the treaties a considerable portion of the Yugoslav coastline, a most ridiculous provision and one calculated to cause endless complications even between well-meaning races.

(*b*) The Italians, as stated, seized Fiume. The Yugoslavians, therefore, led the Little Entente, backed, as stated, by French money, against any economic supremacy by Italy, and the Italians were again thwarted.

(*v*)—Finally, Signor Mussolini made his bid for Abyssinia and at the same time did his utmost to deter Germany from any move towards Austria and the Italian border—

(*a*) By the treaty with France already mentioned in para. 27 (*iii*).

(*b*) By an Italo-Austrian-Hungarian pact which also guarantees the independence of Austria.

31. *The Little Entente*—Yugoslavia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia—created after the late war by the process of dismembering Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. They all possess large minorities and they all oppress them. These minorities, of course, clamour for local self-government and look for help to their kinsmen across the border. In particular this refers to Rumania which contains 1½ million Hungarians, and Czechoslovakia containing 3 million Austrians. To grant local self-government is difficult since national feeling is so great in Central Europe that any concession to national sentiment is dangerous. The internal situation then of the Little Entente is one in which compromise seems impossible. It is difficult to imagine that Austrians and Hungarians will ever be content to be ruled by Czechs and Rumanians, etc., of a lower grade of civilization. It is even more difficult to imagine that the Czechs and Rumanians are likely to give the Austrians self-government. As stated, each of these countries, therefore, contain a minor edition of pre-war Alsace Lorraine.

32. Externally the only consistent policy of the Little Entente lies in a fixed determination not to yield one inch of territory gained. They would ally with any one or break with anyone in order to promote this end. They are not concerned with the higher ethics of the League of Nations, and merely regard it as an excellent device for maintaining the *status quo*.

33. Actually the members of the Little Entente have little in common provided the words " treaty revision " could be forgotten. Czechoslovakia is geographically a part of Central Europe, a natural ally of France against any threat of German expansion. Rumania is mainly concerned with Russia, and Yugoslavia with Italy and the Adriatic.

But with Hungary, Bulgaria and Austria in the background, the words " treaty revision " cannot be forgotten and a common fear of these countries has bound the Little Entente together. Two of its members, Yugoslavia and Rumania, are also members of the Balkan Pact, together with Greece and Turkey, which is directed in particular against the revisionist claims of Bulgaria.

Moreover, since German and Italian influence in South-East Europe is inclined to be disruptive, both these powers having political ambitions in this sphere, the Little Entente, as stated, have irrevocably turned to France with results already noted.

Poland

34. Her only policy is to keep what she has. According to Mr. Toynbee, her late coldness to France and alliance with Germany has been mainly caused by—

(*a*) " a swift appraisement of Germany's recovery to strength,

(*b*) " a private prognostication that Germany was destined to increase and France to decrease, and

(*c*) a determination to be once more on the winning side."

The last of these reasons could apply equally easily to any or every action of the Little Entente.

Hungary and Bulgaria

35. Were ruthlessly sub-divided up at the peace treaties to create the new countries. Commenting on lands removed from Hungarian control, Mr. Simonds remarks : " No frontier, of all the many traced at the Peace Conference, was at once as fantastic and as inequitable as that which . . . cut off three quarters of a million of Magyars from Hungary, and without ethic or economic

justification transferred them . . . to Czechoslovakia. Not less wanton were the mutilations incident to the satisfaction of the Rumanian demand to possess . . . strategic railways . . . which created still another Magyar minority."

Many other similar mutilations occurred and, in all, three million Magyars were transferred to Slav and Rumanian rule.

The Magyars, from the signing of the peace treaty to the present date, have fiercely demanded Treaty Revision, and the Little Entente have as fiercely denied it. At present, ringed round by the anti-Revisionist powers, Hungary is helpless, but should Germany obtain influence in South-East Europe by union with Austria, affairs would be quite different.

36. The Bulgarians are in like case, their principal causes for grievance being the handing of Macedonia to Yugoslavia, while their outlet to the Aegean sea was given to Greece. If *væ victis* was the order of the day, the Bulgarians would have no complaint. But if self-determination is the order, the Bulgarians have every complaint, since the above territories are ethnically purely Bulgarian. The only Bulgarian policy, therefore, is aimed also at Revision of treaties.

Austria.

37. The key of the situation in South-East Europe. Was left ruined by the peace treaties. The conglomeration of states in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire was not a mere dynastic coincidence. The region was a natural economic entity and its financial and economic heart was Vienna.

Its division (against all the dictates of geographic factors) into the fiercely nationalistic fractions of the Little Entente, each of whom introduced tariff walls for their own benefit, which were, *ipso facto*, to Austria's detriment, blocked and impeded the lines of Austria's trade communications. "Factories which lay within Austria's territory had drawn their oil from Gahaa, their coal and many of their material resources from what is now Czechoslovakia, which was, in any case, the centre of her former industrial activity," and when the routes between these places and Austria were dammed by the tariff walls of a jealous economic nationalism, Austria was ruined.

In 1931, in order to find a way out of her difficulties, she attempted to conclude a customs union with Germany, a movement which raised fury amongst the French and anti-Revisionist countries

(see para. 6, Phase *ii*). Various other attempts have been made to right her position, but all have failed owing to the self-centred national spirit of her neighbours.

38. It is, therefore, not surprising that a certain percentage of Austrians would willingly unite with Germany even on the certainty of Austria becoming that country's appanage. Such a union would bring economic salvation, though against the dictates of patriotism. That virtue, however, does not flourish on an empty stomach. At the moment the somewhat blatant efforts of Germany to obtain command of Austria by the Nazi revolution and the murder of Dr. Dolfuss has caused an anti-German reaction, but these matters will be forgotten in time.

39. Another section of Austrians, not desiring union with Germany, wish for the return of the Hapsburgs. It is hard to see what economic advantage would accrue, but the Hapsburgs would certainly prove a rallying point for Austrian sentiment.

As this would stir up the sentiments of those Austrians now in the Little Entente this solution is as abhorrent to those countries as the Anschluss. Threats of mobilization follow any suggestion of it.

40. Austria, therefore, has no policy except to wait for help from someone, and unless others give her help in time the Germo-Austrian union will come, or at least will be attempted.

Great Britain

41. In this turmoil of pact and counter-pact, where does Great Britain stand? Should we state our own opinion we might be accused of prejudice. We will, therefore, quote Mr. Simonds, an unprejudiced American:

"It is a nation which, although victorious in battle, unmistakably lost the war. Traditionally and inherently a great power, it is to-day physically and morally unable to play its historic rôle . . . (and) . . . it is to-day quite impossible to foresee whether the Britain of the latter half of the 20th century will be a world Empire or little more than another Holland."

He then proceeds to describe British war weariness in 1918, and adds: "As a consequence the British people, with amazing swiftness, swept away their huge military establishment. . . . *But when this transformation had taken place, a voluntarily disarmed Britain was actually almost as destitute of power as a forcibly disarmed Germany.*"

It is not in our province to criticise the policy of our statesmen, and as an offset to Mr. Simonds we may acknowledge that the country has emerged in 1936 with a financial stability and an internal solidarity which is the envy of the world. For that our statesmen are entitled to their just reward.

We have, however, asked ourselves if, in the future, as apart from the past, international co-operation can succeed.

When (to summarise the article) we consider the history of the last fifteen years and we see the fierce aggressiveness which helped towards the financial ruin of Germany and the even more fierce aggressiveness of Germany, Redivivus, when we note the total lack of political morality exhibited in the land-snatching exploits of the post-war powers, the inability of statesmen to produce any tangible agreement in disarmament, the practical futility of peace pacts, and finally, the hopelessly divergent ambitions of the Powers, we can only, with Mr. Hardy, doubt the benefit of striving for International Peace and we can only agree with him when he says, " if the world does not possess the requisite . . . cohesion, then we had better abandon our dreams of a warless future, and revert to the limited objective of ' peace in our time. ' " That, however, is the affair of the politicians, and except for wishing Mr. Eden every success in his attempts to form a garden after his own name in the far from serpentless expanse of Europe, we will say no more.

But when we note responsible politicians still inveighing against our totally inadequate rearmament scheme, on the grounds that we are militating against that Eternal Peace which the treaties are said to have ushered in, we can only say that we are unable to discover the grounds on which their contentions are based. Certainly not on the facts of history.

OPENING OF HOSTILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR WITH COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER YALU, 30TH APRIL-1ST MAY 1904.

By Colonel A. H. C. Kearsey, D.S.O., O.B.E.

It is first necessary to introduce this battle by running through the main points leading up to it, and to consider the characteristics of the Arms of the opposing forces engaged thirty-two years ago.

Korea was vital to Japanese policy and strategy. The Russians, by various pretexts, remained there after they had agreed to evacuate it. They wanted an open port, and so planned to stay in Port Arthur to develop Dalny and to establish a navy to safeguard their interests in the Far East. The Japanese, therefore, built up and trained their navy and army for the definite object of fighting for their existence. There was a unanimous national feeling that these forces must be as fit as possible to carry out the nation's policy of taking Port Arthur, of controlling Korea, and of driving the Russians from Manchuria.

In every way their training increased their endurance and self-confidence, strengthened their self-control and made them recognise their own possibilities. Their soldiers thus became loyal, efficient, and full of resource, as well as expert in the use of their arms. Commanders carried out the orders of superiors thoroughly, intelligently, and without criticism. They co-operated with one another and with the Higher Command.

They were, thus, able to defeat the Russians, whose resources were considerably greater and whose trained land forces were four-and-a-half million men.

With reference to the employment of the different arms, the following points may be noted—

Cavalry.—On the Japanese side they acted defensively, and did not go far ahead of the infantry, as the Japanese were reluctant to risk them against the superior numbers possessed by the Russians. Also they were at a disadvantage with the Russians, as they had no horse artillery and they were badly mounted. Had the Japanese larger numbers of cavalry they might, during this period of the campaign, have been able to turn some of their successes into complete victories.

On both sides the cavalry acted dismounted for the most part. However, they covered their front and prevented their opponents from seeing their movements up to the battlefield, but except at the Battle of Telissu, the action of the cavalry was not an important factor in the fighting on either side.

Artillery.—As to the artillery, the Japanese guns were inferior to the Russians' in weight and range of projectiles, and in rapidity of fire. They did not closely support the infantry by moving forward in the attack. This was partly due to the difficulties of the ground and to their dislike of moving guns by daylight. The Japanese did not concentrate their guns. This, again, may have been due to the difficulties of the ground, but it was also due to their anxiety to gain concealment and to bring enfilade fire to bear on to positions from two sides. They nearly always made use of indirect laying in order to save casualties, but they lost in fire power at the crisis of a battle.

Engineers.—As to the work of the engineers, the Japanese used them with the artillery to improve their lines of advance and to construct cover. In the attack they facilitated the advance of the infantry by removing obstacles, and even in the firing line they helped to fire mortars.

Infantry.—As to the infantry, the Russians were trained in shock tactics with the bayonet. The value of fire and movement was not properly appreciated. Their reserves were not in close touch with the forward troops to enable them to exploit success, and they did not make full use of their mobility to combine frontal and flank attacks. Local commanders did not, as a rule, show initiative in taking advantage of an adversary's mistake or in carrying out the spirit of an order. On both sides the infantry carried 250 rounds of ammunition. The Japanese infantry were trained to make good use of cover during their advances. They carefully reconnoitred the ground over which they were going to attack with trained men, and they always endeavoured to gain accurate information as to the extent and weak parts of an enemy's position, where the flanks were, and what obstacles there were to the advance.

At first they were extended in their firing lines to one yard per man, and later up to five yards. The Russians always advanced in close order. The Japanese maintained a steady advance up to about 1,000 yards from the enemy's position, when they tried to

obtain superiority of fire before advancing by rushes to an assaulting position. The Russians in their attacks did not endeavour to obtain this superiority of fire to support their advance to the final assault. The Japanese always endeavoured to combine flank with frontal attacks in order to increase their morale and fire effect. The Japanese used their reserves boldly, often engaging their whole force in the firing line. The Russians, on the other hand, as a rule, had a passive defence, and did not use their reserves.

The difficulty of passing from the offensive to the defensive was emphasised in this campaign. Such an operation was often employed by Wellington, Lee and Jackson, and notably by Napoleon at Austerlitz. At first the Russian infantry took no steps to conceal their trenches; later they took more trouble in siting them. The Japanese entrenched during the advance to the attack within decisive range of their enemy, and as soon as the position was captured. They carried entrenching tools, and could dig when lying down.

The Russians used their machine-guns effectively to bring flank fire to bear against the lines of the advancing infantry. The Japanese used their machine-guns in depth to cover their flanks during an advance, and to be a reserve of fire power in the hands of unit commanders. They were normally used in pairs. The Japanese carried out night operations usually when they had not been able to capture a position by day. Then they were, as a rule, within assaulting distance, and could plan with accuracy what their operations would be under cover of darkness. Otherwise they made an approach march up to the enemy's position by night preliminary to an attack at dawn. It was found that night or dawn attacks against an unknown position, which had not been reconnoitred, were hazardous and costly.

The lesson from all the fighting in this campaign appears to be that morale, discipline and training will always be a paramount part in obtaining a victory if developments of armament and science are fully utilised; for men, nature, and strategy always remain very much the same. In this campaign the strategy of both sides was complicated by Port Arthur; especially for Japan by a desire to secure Korea, as Oyama had then a double objective—the Russian field army and Port Arthur. He gained the advantage of the initiative owing to the local weakness of the Russians. His strategy then was dictated for him. He had to make a converging movement from

Korea and from Port Arthur and in order to maintain contact between armies advancing from Kuan Tung and Korea, a central army must advance in a northerly direction to assist the converging movement.

The Japanese, however, might have advanced more rapidly, as every day the Russian reinforcements arrived, and their isolated armies were liable to defeat in detail. They might have brought their 7th and 8th Divisions from Japan to add to the strength of their field army.

The Russians could have concentrated at a central position, and could have carried out the principles of forces acting on interior lines. However, they had to endeavour to relieve Port Arthur. This necessitated a detachment from their central force. Other detachments were sent to delay the Japanese advancing from Takushan and from the Yalu. The result was that, though they had numerical superiority at the first big battle in which each side had full strength under their respective commanders, yet they had lost morale in their continued retreats. This affected the Commander-in-Chief and his subordinate commanders.

In addition, the Russian Commander-in-Chief was not well informed as to the strength of the Japanese. He made, accordingly, no definite plan. This led to a weak offensive in the use of his reserves in a desire to prevent defeat. The basis of the Japanese success was their co-operation and determination to win at all costs.

In 1875 Russia had been forced by the Japanese to give up Saghalien Island.

In 1891 Russia began to build a railway across Siberia to join up with her territory in the Far East.

By 1895 the Russian railway nearly reached Lake Baikal. After a war with China in the previous year, Japan was granted a lease of the Kuan-Tung Peninsula from Chinchow to Port Arthur. Korea was declared independent. The Russians wished to obtain an ice-free port in this area.

France, Germany, Austria and Russia forced Japan to give up her lease in return for a money indemnity. Russia also obtained permission from China to extend the railway through Manchuria to Vladivostok, instead of along the left bank of the River Amur.

Russia had joined up the trans-Siberian railway with the Pekin line at Yingkou by 1897.

The Russians also leased Port Arthur from China, and gained the concession of building a line from Yingkou through the Liao-Tung and Kuan-Tung Peninsulas.

By 1900 the extension of the railway from Harbin to Port Arthur was completed.

Russia occupied Manchuria to protect her railway.

In 1902 the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded. Each of the signatories agreed to help the other if either was attacked by two powers.

By August 1903 the railway was completed to Port Arthur. Russia sent more troops into Manchuria and did not carry out the agreement to withdraw from the occupied territory. Russia nominated Admiral Alexieff to be Viceroy and Commander of the Provinces and garrisons of their Far East possessions.

On the 11th December, the Russian Government replied to Japanese protests that they would not discuss the Manchurian evacuation.

On the 13th January 1904, Japan presented a final draft treaty to the Russian Government on the Manchurian question. No reply was sent by Russia.

On the 6th February, Japan recalled her Ambassador from Russia. The Japanese began to embark at Sasebo for Chemulpo.

On the 8th February, Japan sent a torpedo flotilla into the harbour of Port Arthur, where two Russian battleships and a cruiser were torpedoed and seriously damaged.

Four Japanese battalions arrived at Chemulpo.

On the 9th February, Admiral Togo, commanding the Japanese Fleets, opened fire on Port Arthur. His object now was to confine the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur harbour. One Russian battleship and three cruisers were injured. At Chemulpo a Russian cruiser and a Russian gunboat were destroyed.

Two Russian cruisers at Chemulpo were sunk. Two Japanese battalions began to march to Seoul.

On the 10th February, Japan declared war on Russia. Her object now was to secure Korea, to regain Port Arthur, and to prevent the Russians from controlling Southern Korea. The Russians wished to gain an ice-free winter port in the Far East, and to control the sea communications from Vladivostok.

It was essential for Japan to take the offensive as early as possible before the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur was reinforced by their Baltic Squadron. Otherwise, as the initiative lay with the Japanese, it would have been better had they commenced the war when all the ports of Manchuria and Korea were ice-free. The Russians would then not have had three months in which to collect troops for the first battle.

The Japanese plan was to capture Port Arthur, and after obtaining control of Korea, to make a converging movement with the bulk of their troops (*i.e.*, with the first, fourth, and second armies), while they left one army to besiege Port Arthur. Their active army and first reserve totalled 380,000 men.

Their second reserve was 200,000 men. Their trained conscript reserve was 50,000. Their untrained conscript and national reserves were 4,250,000 strong. Their trained national army was 220,000 strong. Of these numbers, their immediate fighting value was 257,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry and 894 guns, divided into thirteen divisions, 13 Kobi, 2 cavalry, and 2 artillery brigades.

A division consisted of two infantry brigades, each of three battalions, a cavalry regiment or three squadrons, an artillery regiment of 36 guns, and an engineer battalion.

A Kobi brigade consisted of two 2-battalion regiments and one 6-gun battery. The Russians had four-and-a-half million trained soldiers, of whom three-and-a-half millions were in the active army and the reserve. Actually in the Far East, however, they had 92,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, 196 guns and 2,700 engineers, 7,780 fortress and 11,400 railway troops.

A European Russian Corps consisted of 28,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry, and 124 guns, divided into two divisions, one cavalry division and Corps Engineers. The division consisted of two brigades, each of two regiments of four battalions each, an artillery brigade of 6 or 8 batteries, each of 8 guns, and an Engineer Company. The Russians had four cruisers at Vladivostok, a cruiser and a gunboat at Chemulpo ; the remainder of their fleet was at Port Arthur. Each of the combatants had seven battleships. The Japanese had no reserves and no means of building battleships. They possessed, however, four naval bases.

The Russians could reinforce their fleet in the Far East from the Baltic with twelve cruisers, nine destroyers, and eleven battleships,

The Russian plan at first was defensive. They determined to garrison Port Arthur and Vladivostok, to delay the advance of the Japanese in Korea by a detachment, while they concentrated the bulk of their forces in Southern Manchuria.

The Japanese decided (*a*) to secure the safety of their transports by keeping the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur, and (*b*) to pursue a double objective, namely, the siege of Port Arthur and the Russian field army. They, therefore, landed troops in Korea in order to draw off part of the Russian field army from Port Arthur, they landed troops in the Liao Tung Peninsula to besiege Port Arthur, and they subsequently made a converging movement against Kuropatkin's field army.

On the 14th February, the Japanese torpedoed a Russian cruiser in Port Arthur.

On the 16th February, the Japanese 12th Division began to disembark at Chemulpo.

On the 23rd February, Korea made a treaty allowing Japanese troops to pass through the country.

On the 24th February, the Japanese made a first attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur.

The Japanese 12th Division completed disembarkation on the 27th February at Chemulpo.

Admiral Kaminuras' squadron bombarded Vladivostok.

On the 11th March, the 2nd and Guard Divisions left Japan for Chinampo. The 12th Division began to march towards Ping Yang.

The Japanese Guard and 2nd Division completed disembarkation at Chemulpo on the 20th March.

This First Army, consisting of the Guard, 2nd and 12th Divisions, assembled in the vicinity of Chinampo and marched towards Anju.

On the 27th March, Kuropatkin took command of the Russian Manchurian Army, consisting of 57 battalions, 34 squadrons and 140 guns. Linevitch commanded the Ussuri Corps of 10 battalions, 6 squadrons and 4 guns, at Vladivostok, and Stœssel commanded at Port Arthur, where the garrison consisted of 43,000 men and 540 guns when the investment began. All these troops, as well as the fleet, were under the Viceroy Alexieff.

The Japanese made a second attempt to block Port Arthur.

On the 28th March, the First Army was in touch with Russian cavalry at Tiessu, west of the Chechen River.

On the 1st April, the First Japanese Army reached Anju and began to march on Wiju, being much delayed by the effect of the heavy rain on the bad roads. Kashtalinski's 3rd East Siberian Rifle Division was by this date at Antung.

The Russians now decided to concentrate the Manchurian Field Army near Liao Yang, where they would wait for reinforcements, so that they could then have superior numbers at the decisive place.

On the 3rd April, the Russian cavalry retired to the west bank of the River Yalu. The movements of the Japanese up to the date of the Battle of Yalu were, therefore, not accurately known to the Russian Commander.

On the 13th April, Admiral Makarov issued with the Russian Fleet from Port Arthur. His flagship was destroyed by a mine and he was killed. The Russian Vladivostok Squadron sank two Japanese transports and one troopship near Gensan and then returned to harbour.

On the 13th April, the head of the 12th Division, leading the march of the First Army, reached Wiju.

On the 20th April, the Japanese First Army reached Wiju. Kuroki sent a detachment to Chyangsyong. His outposts were south of the river. Kuropatkin now had his headquarters at Liao Yang. In this vicinity he had five divisions and two Cossack regiments. At the Yalu River there were 2,940 mounted troops, 62 guns, 8 machine guns, 16,300 infantry on a front of 170 miles from Pitzuwo to north of Chyansyong. These troops were two East Siberian divisions and a Cossack Division. The garrison of Port Arthur was three divisions of approximately 43,000 men.

In Vladivostok was a Cossack brigade and the infantry and artillery of two divisions.

Japanese ships began to cruise about the mouth of the Yalu River.

On the 21st April, the Russians sent cavalry under Madritov to raid the communications of the First Japanese Army. They crossed the Yalu near Chosan. The Japanese First Army concentrated at Wiju.

Zasulich assumed command of the Russian Yalu detachment. Kuropatkin told him to avoid a decisive battle, as he did not want any of his advanced troops to be defeated in detail.

Alexieff, on the other hand, ordered Zasulich to make a stubborn resistance. Kuroki had clear orders to advance in a north-westerly direction up to Fenghuangcheng and entrench there, and wait until the Second Army had finished its disembarkation south-west of Pitzuwo. Zasulich occupied a main position between Antung and Chiuliencheng and Chinkou with 16 battalions, 640 mounted men, and 40 guns, in addition, a detachment watched the coast from Pitzuwo to the mouth of the Yalu. There were outposts on Kanshi Island and Tiger Hill, and 1,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry and 8 guns north of Anpingho. His reserve was behind his right centre at Tientzu.

During 25th April, the Japanese collected bridging materials for crossing the Yalu. During the night they occupied Kyurito and Kinteito. General Trusov withdrew his troops from Tiger Hill. The Russians also evacuated Oseki Island.

On the 26th April, a bridge was made to Kintei Island by the Japanese.

On the 27th April, three more bridges over the Yalu were completed.

On the 28th April, orders by Kuroki were issued for his 33,000 infantry and 128 guns as follows :—The 12th Division was to cross at Suikuchin and march south-west to cover the crossing of the other two divisions of the army. They were also to send a detachment to threaten the Russian retreat. The 2nd Division was to cross by Kyunri, Oseki and Chukodai Islands, covered by their guns from Kintei Island. The Guards were to follow the 2nd Division and to operate between the other two divisions. There was to be a general reserve on Kyuri Island.

On the Russian side Kashtalinski succeeded to the command of the left centre, holding it with 5,200 infantry, 240 mounted men and 16 guns, from the south-west of Chiuliencheng to the north-west of Chinkou.

Battle of the River Yalu, 30th April-1st May.—The 12th Division crossed at Suikuchin and advanced towards Anpingho. The 2nd Division took up a position on Kintei Island, the Guards extended the position to Litzuyuan, where the 12th Division continued the line in a northerly direction.

On the 1st May, at 6 a.m., an artillery duel began. At 7 a.m. orders were issued by Kuroki for a general attack. By 8 a.m. the Japanese attacks developed on their whole front, so that by 9-15 a.m.

Kashtalinski had retired west of the Ai Ho, slowly followed by the right of the 12th Division, while the 2nd and Guards Divisions halted on the right bank of the river.

At 1 p.m. the 12th Division again attacked. Kashtalinski was now in position west of the Hantuhotzu brook holding Hill 570 south-east of Hamatung. Zasulich did not reinforce his left flank, which was driven back. Zasulich made no active defence, the demonstrations by the Japanese ships at the mouth of the River Yalu detained the Russian right centre at Antung.

The Russians with a loss of 3,000 men, 21 guns and 8 machine-guns withdrew to Fenghuangcheng. Kuroki did not press the pursuit.

Kuropatkin sent forward detachments to Lienshankuan and to Saimachi

1. *Value of information.*
2. *Value of offensive action.*
3. *Influence of topography on operations.*
4. *Value of security.*
5. *Value of surprise.*
6. *Value of maintenance of the objective.*

1. Zasulich, who commanded the Russian detachment at this battle, owing to his ignorance of the intentions of the First Army Commander, disposed his troops over a frontage which was too extended for the troops available. Thus he had 2,500 infantry, 400 mounted men, 8 guns, with outposts on Kanshi Island, from Antung, for ten miles south-west towards the sea; further north, up to Chiuliencheng and Tiger Hill, there were 240 mounted men, 5,200 infantry and 16 guns under General Trusov.

The position was continued in a north-easterly direction along the Hushan Hills up to Anpingho. In this sector there were 1,200 cavalry, 1,000 infantry and 8 guns. He was thus weak everywhere.

Zasulich, owing to lack of information as to the general situation, did not dispose his general reserve in rear of that portion of the position which offered the best line for the eventual counter-stroke. He placed this reserve of 5,200 infantry and 16 guns at Tientzu, and kept it there until after Kashtalinski, on his left flank, had fallen back from the Ai Ho behind the Hantuhotzu brook. This was owing to the presence of Nakagava's flotilla at the mouth of the Yalu, where he thought that the Russians might land troops in order to turn his right flank.

While Zasulich was waiting to be attacked, ignorant as to the strength and direction of the blow, Kuroki, being fully informed of his enemy's position and numbers, was able to issue definite orders on the 28th, in ample time for all ranks to know them, for an attack to be carried out on 1st May.

Kuroki was able to attack the left flank of the Japanese position with the 12th Division against Kashtalinski holding the Ai Ho position with 5,200 infantry and 16 guns and to bring superior numbers to bear against him.

During this phase of the battle, owing to lack of information, Kashtalinski found his position untenable and was unable to take counter-measures in time for them to be effective, as he was unaware that the Commander on his northern flank had retired from Chinkou and that his communications were thus threatened. Kashtalinski, therefore, had to withdraw on Hamatung.

2 (*a*) The value of offensive action is illustrated by the operations of the Japanese at this battle. The basis of Kuroki's plan was an offensive action by his three divisions to be resolutely carried out with the 12th Division crossing at Suikuchin and advancing on to the Hushan Hills from the vicinity of Anpingho towards Chinkou. On their left, the Guards were to advance in the centre towards Makou *via* Kyuri and Oseki Islands.

On the left of the Guards, the 2nd Division was to advance also through Kyuri and Oseki Islands, Tiger Hill and Chukodai Island towards Chiuliencheng.

By the 30th April, the 12th Division crossed at Suikuchin and marched towards the Ai Ho, covered by the guns of the 2nd Division bombarding at first Chiuliencheng and then the whole Russian position.

By 7 a.m. on the 1st May, the three Japanese divisions were in position to continue the offensive towards the Ai Ho. In spite of the fact that the attack was a frontal one, the Japanese maintained the progress of their advance, and in spite of losses forded the Ai Ho and were able to get their guns across to Chiuliencheng and to Makou by 1-15 a.m.

By 1 p.m. the pressure of the 12th Division on the Russian northern flank was felt when the Russian position, west of the Hantuhotzu brook, was turned and the 2nd Division moved on Antung.

The Japanese continued their offensive in a general advance on Hamatung. The Russians by this time were routed, having suffered 3,000 casualties and having lost 21 guns. Thus, in spite of the fact that the frontage on which Kuroki attacked was unduly extended, that his formations were dense, and that he had 867 casualties, he was successful owing to his resolute offensive action.

(*b*) Offensive action on the part of a battalion of the 11th Rifle Regiment, about 2 p.m., north of Hamatung, enabled the Russians to organize resistance at this place and to secure their retreat.

(*c*) The fear of offensive action by superior numbers from the vicinity of Liao Yang prevented the First Army from pursuing the Russians on the 1st May. Their main body did not move, after this battle, till the 5th May, and it was not till six days afterwards that this army was billeted in Fenghuangcheng.

3. *Topography.*—(*a*) The loam soil and the absence of metalling on the roads made progress very slow. Kuroki's army took a month to march 125 miles from Pingyang.

(*b*) The Yalu, from its source to the sea, forms the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. Steamers drawing over 13 feet cannot proceed above the mouth of this river. Native junks can reach Antung. The Yalu is unfordable in the area of these operations. It was, therefore, a strong line if held by the Russians, for whom the Hushan heights and Tiger Hill, Chukodai, Kanshi and Oseki Islands were specially important.

The direct communications between Chiuliencheng and Chingkou were bad. The road between these two places runs through Hamatung, four miles west of Chiuliencheng. Therefore, Zasulich could not move troops quickly from one locality to another. It was, therefore, essential for him to gain early and accurate information, to keep a large reserve in a central position, and not to spread out the bulk of his troops on a wide front.

By neglecting to hold the Hushan Hills and Tiger Hill, Zasulich afforded every opportunity to Kuroki to surprise him, nor could he prevent the passage of troops over the River Yalu north of Wiju.

Once across the Yalu, the Japanese with Tiger Hill in their possession to cover their further advance, had no serious obstacles in front of them, as the Ai Ho was everywhere fordable.

4. *Security.*—(*a*) Early in April the Russian cavalry retired to the west bank of the Yalu. In consequence, they did not secure

the Russian front, and enabled Kuroki to reach the river with his strength and dispositions unknown to the Russians.

By the 20th April, Kuroki was east of the Yalu, from Wiju in a southerly direction.

Every precaution was taken to protect and cover the front with outposts on the river. The positions were hidden by artificial screens and all natural cover was utilised. The Russians, on the other hand, freely showed their positions and did not assimilate their trenches to the surrounding country.

(*b*) On the night of 25th-26th April, when Kintei and Kyuri Islands were captured, respectively, by the 2nd and Guards Divisions, the Japanese secured their crossing of the Yalu in this area.

At this time the weak Russian outposts on Tiger Hill and Oseki Island failed to secure their own front, as they evacuated their positions.

(*c*) Kuroki added to the security of his position on the 29th by erecting six bridges over the River Yalu.

(*d*) Owing to defective intelligence, Alexieff ordered Zasulich to make a desperate resistance against the Japanese. Kuropatkin told him not to fight a decisive action against superior numbers.

Owing to these conflicting orders, Zasulich had great difficulty in carrying out a rôle to satisfy both sets of orders and at the same time to secure the safety of the troops.

(*e*) The Russian position west of the Ai Ho, though naturally strong with a good field of fire commanding the river, was not adequately secured. The flanks were not strengthened, lateral communications had not been made, wide, shallow trenches were on the forward slopes of the hill, and they were not concealed; nor were the numbers, available for holding the position six miles long from Chiuliencheng through Makou and Potetientzu to Chinkou, adequate.

5. *Surprise.*—(*a*) In order to safeguard the lines of communications and to enable the First Army to land at Chemulpo preparatory to their advance to the River Yalu, Admiral Togo's fleet escorted the first transports. The Admiral completely surprised the Russian Fleet in Port Arthur on the 8th April. During the night two Russian battleships were torpedoed.

At Chemulpo, the Japanese squadron surprised two Russian ships, which they attacked. The Russians sank their ships. Part

of the 12th Division, was, therefore, able to land at once and to occupy Seoul.

(*b*) The feinting by the Japanese flotilla at the mouth of the Yalu misled the Russians as to the direction of the Japanese attack. Zasulich did not, therefore, move his reserves from behind his right centre at Tientzu in time to make his defence active, nor did he strengthen the left flank where the Japanese made their decisive attack.

The Japanese naval demonstrations gave the impression to Zasulich also of a crossing below Wiju. The 12th Division was thus able to cross at Siukuchin on the night of the 29th-30th April and to march down the west bank of the river to cover the passage of the Guard and 2nd Division.

6. Zasulich did not maintain his objective. As he had occupied a defensive position, he should have occupied the best ground in the vicinity chosen for defence. He should have utilised his cavalry to cover and watch his front east of the Yalu, then to protect his flanks, and to operate against the right flank of the 12th Division. He should have used his reserve actively. He should not, at 9-30 a.m., have ordered his troops holding his right centre at Antung to retire.

Conclusion.—It must be noted that the Japanese had been extremely cautious at a time when their strategy demanded rapidity of action. In view of Kuroki's superiority of numbers and his knowledge of the Russians' dispositions and resources, he might have acted with vigour and less caution soon after he first gained contact with the Russians at Wiju on 20th April. He was delayed for ten days by a Russian force with half as many guns and approximately twenty thousand less rifles than his own.

Kuroki attacked with the bulk of his army deployed for the first encounter, so that he had little reserve in hand with which to exploit success. The result was that there was no effective pursuit. It was not until the 6th May that the Japanese cavalry, followed by the main body of the First Japanese Army, reached Fenghuangcheng. By that time Zasulich had been able to withdraw his force unmolested to Penshuiling Pass, seventy miles from the Yalu battlefield.

Had Kuroki kept a strong reserve in hand at the initial encounter, he would have had the opportunity later of making his success decisive at the time when Gromov retired to a second position about 9 a.m. on 1st May.

Had success been exploited in this area with a fresh Japanese reserve on the left flank of the Russian position, the collapse of the whole Russian system of defence might have been caused.

Success here would have meant ultimate success at all points, as the whole Russian position would have become untenable and their line of retreat would have been in danger.

By the skilful use of command of the sea, Kuroki had gained the initial advantage of creating a false impression as to his intentions in the mind of the opposing Commander, who was thus induced to keep his reserves on his right flank where they were of no use. Had Kuroki kept a reserve in hand and used it to break down the enemy's resistance at the vital point where their line of retreat was threatened, the Japanese reserves could have closed the Hamatang defile so completely that the bulk of the Russian force would not have been able to reach Fenghuangcheng safely on 2nd May.

On the other side, it must be noted that the Russian Commander did not show either by his original dispositions, or by his handling of his troops during the operations, that he had any clear idea as to how he could achieve his object.

If his object was to delay the Japanese, he should have retired when they were deployed for action on 29th or 30th April.

Zasulich's force was outnumbered and unsupported.

No victory was possible against such strength as the Japanese had in front of them. A defeat would considerably embarrass Kuropatkin, and would enormously add to the morale of the Japanese in their first encounter with a Western power.

Zasulich, however, decided to hold his position and fight a battle in spite of the telegram received from Kuropatkin stating that he was not to fight a decisive action against superior forces.

None of the requirements for carrying out a rear-guard action were fulfilled by Zasulich's force.

Zasulich made no attempt to withdraw until he was engaged on the whole front from Makou—Potientzu—Chinkou by the 2nd Guard and 12th Japanese Divisions.

His force then was in serious danger of being destroyed by the superior numbers on his front and by the enveloping movement of the 12th Japanese Division towards Luchiakou.

No lines of withdrawal or positions to be occupied in rear were reconnoitred or prepared. Nor was there any attempt made to co-ordinate the withdrawal.

For a constructive criticism from the point of view of Zasulich the following points may be noted, namely, that he had in his front an obstacle admirably suited for delaying action.

He could, therefore, have checked the crossing of the Japanese on their extended front of attack between Chinkou and Chiuliencheng with the minimum of his force.

He could have concentrated superior numbers against their 12th Division in the vicinity of Luchiakou and Chinkou.

In such an encounter he must have been successful against troops as they crossed the Ai Ho. Success at this point would have been a death-blow to the whole Japanese plan of attack, as the Japanese pinned their hope on envelopment.

If their enveloping force, the 12th Division, had been overwhelmed their whole scheme would have foundered, and their Commander in the first engagement of the campaign would have been shaken in his belief as to the infallibility of an enveloping movement leading to victory.

The result might have been far-reaching on the whole campaign.

At this battle, if the Japanese offensive had been checked at one point, the whole operation would have collapsed. Zasulich would then have realised where his greatest danger lay, namely, not on his right flank but on his left and centre.

His reserve could then have been moved to a more central position, where he could operate vigorously against the heads of the advancing Japanese columns as they crossed the Ai Ho.

Even the Japanese superiority in artillery should not have enabled their infantry to cross such a serious obstacle as the Ai Ho under the close and effective fire of the defenders, especially as their infantry were operating on such a wide front with no reserves available for action at any one point.



15th May, Two Japanese battleships and one cruiser were lost owing to floating mines

A PILOT FOR A PASSENGER

By Captain A. J. Staples, 8th Punjab Regiment

Let it be clearly understood from the beginning that the suggestions to be put forward in this article are intended to apply primarily and particularly to Indian infantry.

That they apply equally to British infantry there is little doubt, but it is only proposed to touch on that subject at the conclusion.

It is considered that the appointment of second-in-command of an infantry battalion is an anachronism and should be abolished.

In the past a second-in-command was a necessity for several reasons, but it is maintained that the necessity has now disappeared.

With the introduction of the three years period of command, during which time a commanding officer is not permitted to take leave other than privilege, the necessity for an understudy no longer arises.

Moreover, few seconds-in-command nowadays ever remain for any appreciable period of time with the one unit. Numerous instances can be quoted of seconds-in-command who remain only a few months with a unit before transfer elsewhere, of others who are appointed on paper, but remain seconded on different employment. Very few officers at the present time are ever given this appointment in their original battalion, or even regiment.

With this lack of continuity it is considered that such a second-in-command can be of little practical value to a commanding officer, either as an understudy or as a potential source of advice; indeed any company commander with continuous service in the battalion would be far more useful.

In the past it was possibly normal for a second-in-command to be considerably senior to most of the company commanders; nowadays it is seldom more than a matter of a few months, the difference being so small as to be negligible should the question of command in an emergency arise.

The writer well remembers hearing of the answer given by a General Officer some years ago when asked whether it would be all right if both the C. O. and second-in-command of a certain unit were to go on leave at the same time, leaving a captain of fifteen years service to command the battalion for two months. The gist of the

reply was that if a captain of fifteen years service was not fit to command an infantry battalion for two months he had better get out!

When the matter is carefully examined it is apparent that a second-in-command has now no real duty to perform; that is, no real duty that cannot be as easily undertaken by some other officer in addition to his own.

The accounts and battalion institutes can easily be divided amongst company commanders and the quarter-master, whilst the training of young officers is a matter which it is considered should be the responsibility of the Commandant, assisted by any p. s. c. officer in the battalion, if necessary.

To maintain an officer for whom there is no real employment is waste, and in these days of ever-increasing pressure and efficiency waste cannot be afforded.

A question of vital importance which must here be considered is that of the relations between the Commandant, his second-in-command and his adjutant.

The old saw that two is company and three is none is no less true in this case than in other aspects of life, in other words one of these two staff officers is liable to be in the nature of a sleeping partner.

In the past, when the service of the average adjutant varied between five to ten years, this question did not arise so frequently, unless the adjutant happened to possess an exceptionally strong character and the second-in-command the reverse.

Now, however, the situation is completely changed. Out of 118 infantry battalions in the Indian Army, 76 have adjutants of over ten years service, and in 36 the adjutant has over fifteen years service! When it is considered that a large number of seconds-in-command have just twenty-one years service the change is apparent.

The difference in the length of service between commandants and seconds-in-command is now, in the majority of cases, very slight and, human nature being what it is, this equality of seniority is bound to intensify any degree of friction which may exist—and friction frequently does exist to a greater or lesser degree.

It is maintained that at the present time commandants are coming to rely upon their adjutants to an ever-increasing extent, not only on account of the reasons just quoted, but because in

questions of policy they can obtain the advice of an officer with several years continuous experience in the battalion as opposed to that of an officer who, in so many cases, is a newcomer and also frequently a quick " goer " !

It has also been noticed in recent years that a custom has arisen, at least in some regiments, of consulting all officers in the battalion on any question of policy which has been considered beyond the scope of the Commandant and his staff to settle, even absentee officers being consulted in writing, and what could be a better way of arriving at a sound and popular decision?

The question must now be considered as to whether the tactical duties of the second-in-command are still essential and, if so, whether for this reason only the appointment must be retained.

It is suggested that, at the present day, the Support Company Commander is the officer most concerned with the layout of a defensive position or a subsidiary position upon which the battalion can fall back, and that this being so he should be the man sent back by the C. O. to select such a position. As the Support Company Commander is nowadays always a senior and, *ipso facto*, a reliable and efficient officer, the necessity for a second-in-command to perform this tactical duty would appear to have vanished.

To conclude the arguments in favour of the abolition of the appointment of second-in-command in an infantry battalion, it is considered that many heart-burnings would be saved to those who see themselves unfavourably placed and their juniors sometimes obtaining the appointment in other battalions and regiments before they themselves do, and that the loss of Rs. 50 per mensem would not be greatly felt, whilst it is considered that the said Rs. 50 allowance could be more profitably employed in a manner which will be now suggested.

If the appointment of second-in-command be abolished it is obvious that one officer per battalion is thus available for other employment.

In these days the growth of mechanization is ever increasing, and our weapons and training become yearly more elaborate and technical.

The machine-gun is of paramount importance. We now have the Vickers-Berthier, and the advent of an anti-tank weapon and the infantry mortar to India may only be a matter of time; training in defence against gas is universal, and it cannot be long before the

signallers of infantry battalions are issued with portable wireless sets.

In view of all this it is submitted that the time has come for the appointment of a specialist officer in every infantry battalion who must be an expert, and who shall be the adviser in the use of, and responsible for training with, these new weapons.

Such an officer should have between ten and eighteen years service, have passed all the necessary courses and should be permanently on battalion headquarters staff for a period of three years, drawing the Rs. 50 monthly allowance at present drawn by the second-in-command. It is considered that three years should be the maximum period of tenure for this appointment to preclude staleness, and to avoid the possibility of the officer becoming out of date in his training; four years being too long and two years too short when the question of the number of specialists in the battalion proceeding on annual leave and furlough is considered.

This specialist officer should never, in any circumstances whatever, be called upon to do any office work—there should be none for him to do—and so one officer at least could be kept solely for training and not expected to spend the major part of his soldiering performing the duties of a babu. It must, of course, be realised that a specialist officer in an infantry battalion is only intended to exist in peace. On active service ordinary training naturally ceases, but, should occasion arise when the battalion is not engaged in active operations and the services of such an officer were required, sufficient officers should exist from the ordinary three years turnover, irrespective of casualties, to supply the need.

How these suggestions would work if introduced into the British infantry the writer does not propose to state, not being sufficiently conversant with the conditions pertaining to that service.

It would appear, however, that the position must be much the same and that the substitution of a specialist officer for the present senior major (it must be remembered that in British infantry a second-in-command, as such, does not exist) would be of even greater value owing to the more rapid progress of mechanization in the British than the Indian service. It is, however, considered that the period of tenure of appointment of specialist officer in the British service might well be two years instead of three for the reason that British troops in India do not get annual leave or furlough, so that specialists

would always be present ; and also because of the greater number of officers in a British than in an Indian battalion, which allows a quicker turnover.

In conclusion, it must be realised that the Army to-day is no place for the retention of worn-out institutions, either for sentimental or any other reasons, and it must be seriously considered whether the appointment of second-in-command in the infantry does not come into this category.

If it be proved to have passed its period of usefulness, then let it be scrapped forthwith. It is suggested that the appointment of an adjutant with not less than ten and for preference with more nearly fifteen years service, plus a specialist officer of between ten and eighteen years service would prove far more valuable under modern conditions.

It may be argued that continuity would be broken by the fact that many adjutants of between ten and fifteen years service would obtain admission to the Staff College, and that therefore the ideal length of service would be nine to thirteen years. Whilst admitting the possibility, it must be remembered that whilst many are called but few are chosen, and it is not considered that casualties from this cause would be so numerous as to outweigh the manifest value to a C. O. of the extra one or two years of his adjutant's seniority.

HOW'S THE EMPIRE?

By Brigadier F. Dickins, C.I.E.

It is a commonplace that modern war enmeshes the whole population of a state. Not only is every individual exposed to merciless attack or to the risk of starvation, but the entire energy of the country has to be directed to one end—the successful prosecution of the war. Universal sacrifice is demanded, and there is no room for the *bouches inutiles*. Journalists, pamphleteers, professors, politicians, soldier-scribes, scaremongering amateurs—they all repeat the same blood-curdling prophecies. But it is difficult to ascertain how thoroughly the grim story is assimilated by the vast bulk of those who read their sensational forebodings. The general effect is probably much the same as that derived from an Edgar Wallace penny-dreadful; a temporary titillation of the senses, coupled with the pleasing assurance that it is the previous generation to whom we owe the present unstable condition of the world.

If all the races of the world had reached the same level of social and moral progress at the same time, there would be some reason for blaming the unfortunate Edwardians and Victorians. But, considering that contemporary generations in different countries are, at a given date, at different levels of social evolution and are possessed of different standards of social conduct, it is really quite ridiculous to father on the inhabitants of any one country, living during a particular reign or period, all the ills which are festering in the body-politic of the modern world. Moreover, the individual members of a state are themselves at different stages of social evolution at any given date. There has never been, so far, a universal dead level of human conduct, and it is extremely problematical whether there ever will be. Considering also that the overwhelming majority of a population does not, in normal times, exercise, or desire to exercise, or is capable of exercising, any real control over the policy of a nation, it is equally ridiculous to blame a whole generation for the faults and miscalculations of the minute proportion which in reality sets the policy and guides the action of that generation.

The "little man" is at the mercy of forces, not only beyond his control, but quite beyond the grasp of his intellect. He is led into the mazes of free trade, of protection, of subsidies, of output

restriction, of inflation or deflation of currency, of national isolation or combination, of war and peace, not because of conviction based on his own very restricted knowledge and experience, but because the tide has turned and he has to drift with it. And the tides of world events are not controlled by any cold aloof moon, but by just a few men who think, and plot, and plan, or who plot and plan without much deep thought. The measure of the true utility of these few men to the world is the extent of their knowledge, capacity, and honesty and decency of purpose. The measure of their personal success is the distance to which the multitude drift in the required direction, and the unanimity with which they throw themselves into the stream.

With the growth of education and the levelling of caste and class that is so marked a phenomenon in the civilized world, it would be natural to think that the difficulties in the way of the emergence of small controlling bodies were almost insuperable. Yet in point of fact, never, since the days of Napoleon, and, to a less extent, of Bismark, has the power of one individual man to hypnotize the masses been so strongly exemplified as in these post-war days. Hitler, Mussolini, Pilsudski, Mustapha Kemal, Reza Shah, Ibn Saud, Marsaryk, Lenin, Roosevelt—what will be the verdict of history on the generation which produced these super-men? What share has the generation in the good or ill that arises from the actions of these men? Without them, what would the generation have achieved?

What may be the secret of their power, beyond implacable fixity of purpose, no man can say. The fact remains that they have the power and know how to exercise it, and that millions obey them unquestioningly.

The fact that they have emerged, and still persist, is evidence, if any further such were required, that the world is not yet ripe for the League of Nations, at least as at present constituted and operated. The growth of a world-conscience is necessarily a slow affair; so slow, indeed, as to be almost imperceptible.

The wise citizen will therefore accept the paradoxical situation that, in a civilized world where knowledge and education appear to have made remarkable progress, the capacity for discrimination, for individual judgment and foresight, does not seem to have progressed in equal measure. On the contrary, the multitude, in spite of its demi-semi-education, bears a remarkable resemblance to a flock of

sheep. Thinking and planning are done for them; practical organization and effective action are done for them; all they have to do is to follow their leader, or leaders, down any slippery slope or up to any difficult height indicated to them. A syndicated or controlled press sees to it that propaganda is properly distributed.

It is only because of the extreme individualism that has hitherto been so marked an English characteristic, due, doubtless, largely to geographical accident, that the emergence of a leader, a führer, a dictator, has yet to be chronicled in our island history. Where individuality is common property it is obviously more difficult for a super-individual to impress himself. Hence, in England, the loud voiced vendor of a national or international social panacea can seldom hypnotize more than a minority of the population. We have an instinctive dislike of the strange or unusual, and the old saying, "' Ere's a stranger, ' eave 'alf a brick at 'im," is indicative of a fair average of mentality in England even to this day.

Artistic, scientific, literary, philosophic geniuses—in fact any sort of intellectual genius—appeal to certain esoteric circles and perhaps achieve world-wide reputations. But the enthusiasm of the public is reserved for some preposterous film-star, and their interest is excited by football and racing results, by spectacular pageant and devastating noise, by insensate speed, but by nothing that gives cause to pause and think. The dislike of the English for the abstract is deep-rooted and illuminating. There are certain grounds for self-congratulation that such is the case. A people of this character is less likely to be led astray by national hysteria than one which allows its thoughts and actions to be entirely regimented. It is not until the "little man" in England is persuaded, generally by force of circumstances beyond his control, that he really must give thought to his next step, that he will take the trouble to consider the future. There is less cause for self-congratulation here, as by the time he has decided what ought to be done, circumstances may have nearly overwhelmed him, and in his efforts to escape the consequences of his own former indifference the "little man" may become very hysterical indeed. We do not believe in the possibility of national danger until we actually experience it. In spite of the lessons of history, a subject on which perhaps ninety-nine *per cent.* of our population is either ill-informed or not informed at all, we always hope that the storm-clouds on the horizon will clear away. Our attitude towards the

laws of cause and effect bears a remarkable resemblance to that traditionally ascribed to the ostrich.

It is true that there are signs that we are beginning to wonder whether our position is quite so secure as it used to appear to be, and that some of us at least are growing distrustful of the capacity for "rugged individualism" to shape the nation's policy with permanent success and so stabilize her position. We have not made so complete a *volte-face* as that which is being engineered by President Roosevelt in the U. S. A., where, to atone for the mischief of quite insensate individualism, the strong individuality of Mr. Roosevelt seems to have stepped into the breach. But there are comforting signs that in England there is slowly developing a recognition that collective security within the boundaries of a country, or of a comity of countries, is a necessary prelude to the establishment of collective security between nations throughout the world. There is even to be heard occasionally expressions of regret—and astonishment—that so far we have not produced THE MAN to guide us, a sure indication of the first faint stirrings of an element of—fear.

The fact is that we have lost faith, or are in the process of losing faith. We have lost faith in our old political creeds and party cries, and to a large extent in our old social structure and our methods of government, but so far have found no substitute. We distrust our political and social guides, together with their circumambient quacks and hacks, because we have a suspicion that they are only opportunists in disguise. They all contradict one another, and even when members of one party they are unable to agree as to ways and means. Indeed, they appear unable to distinguish one definite and common objective. So that, not unnaturally, we are beginning to wonder whether it would not be better if we could produce a single individual, one-idea'd and clear-idea'd, above all party ties and class prejudices, who could give us something better than the half-measures and compromises of which we are beginning to tire. Alas! we have no 5-year plan, no 10-year plan, no real plan at all. From year to year we drift and, if we do not awake to our situation, the strong tides of Welt-politik may drift us towards a very grim lee-shore.

Are our Parliamentary institutions the best that can be devised? Is Cabinet rule the ideal machinery for framing policy? Oh, shades of Gladstone, Disraeli, and Sir Robert Peel! What a change is there!

It is a strange paradox. To settle the bewildering doubts and fears that have sprung indirectly from the excessive individualism of the past, we are forsaking our old fixed ways, and even go so far as to deplore the fact that we have not produced The Man, The Individual, The Führer, who can indicate to us the way out of the maze of trouble. We distrust the men whom we ourselves elect to govern us and, I suppose, expect that Providence will work in some mysterious way and will produce the Man for the Occasion. Although we hastily deny that we could accept a Hitler, a Mussolini, a Lenin, yet we wonder why we can't be delivered of a super-man. We are likely to go on wondering.

Now, if we examine the attitude of their followers we will find that these three outstanding personalities, have been invested with almost god-like attributes. Their commands must be obeyed, their teaching must be imbibed, their principles must be followed, in exactly the same spirit as a god must be feared, obeyed, and worshipped. There must be no questioning of their sayings and doings, and they take good care that there can be none. The vast multitudes who obey them and are prepared to follow them to the death, do so because they believe in them. The faith in an omnipotent, omniscient, infallible Deity, that science and philosophy have so largely contributed to destroy, which formerly served to keep large bodies of men together as united entities, and to which the futile massacres and the universal distress of the Great War gave so rude a shock, has, in certain countries, been transferred to a national man-deity, a demi-god. In reality it is only an exhibition of that pathetic, universal need of all mankind—a safe and permanent anchorage, something to believe in—Faith. Without faith the world must perish. Not necessarily a religious faith, but some universal belief in a universal standard of ethical conduct between nations.

It is fear that has produced these men : it is faith which maintains them in power.

Fear of national economic disaster, of loss of national prestige, power, and position, fear of the blight of communism or of the tyranny of capitalism—here is the breeding-ground of the Dictator, who is sustained by the faith of his people, but who maintains the position of his country by inspiring fear throughout the world. The vicious circle is complete.

The time and the occasion have produced these men, and in the

process of time the occasion may disappear or the faith may die. But what then? What will take its place?

There can never be any assurance that, when one frightened country has been soothed and satiated, some other one will not be seized with panic and follow the same uneasy path, and elect its own man-deity to trouble the peace of the world—or can there?

Whatever precautions we in England are forced, by fear, to take in these unstable times, when shall we be justified in abandoning them because the world has found stability? In other words, when will collective security be so universally understood and practised that all national safeguards may be universally dropped? Idealists and fanatics will say that it can be done now. The very existence of the man-deity gives them the lie. So does the existence of a new religion, a new faith, in the Far East. The spirit of *bushido* that permeates Japan, the worship of the Flag, here takes the place of the worship of the man-deity. The form of the worship is different; its cause, its objective, its effect are precisely the same. Fear is its cause, national supremacy its objective, and its effect is the death of collective security.

In dealing with the disillusioned and cynical inhabitants of the modern world, to undertake to instil new faith into them in any cause whatsoever is no light task. But the answer to that is that it is a waste of time pleading a cause unless you can inspire faith in it. The whole object of pleading a cause is to establish faith in it, and the greater the difficulty the greater must be the effort. If, then, the objective of a movement is to establish Empire unity, that movement must be supported by proof that it is worthy of faith, and those who preach must be possessed of absolute faith themselves. It is desperately easy to give lip-service to a cause.

The word propaganda has deservedly acquired a somewhat unsavoury reputation, so much so that it is associated in the mind of the "little man" with the cruder expression—"damned lies." "Crusade" unfortunately connotes an impression of failure. "Gospel" sounds too purely religious, but derivatively it just means "good news." The word has this advantage it connotes the impression of faith.

Earlier in this article it was stated that the vast majority of a population has no voice in the normal policy of a nation. On special occasions, however, public opinion has confounded

governments; and even on normal occasions governments prefer not to run counter to public opinion when strong expression is given to it. They know that there is a latent power in the will of a people which is stronger than any government. But strong expression is only given to it when feeling runs very high, when the occasion is of extreme importance, when great danger or great injustice is in view, when the people have been deliberately instructed and their feelings worked up. Public resentment is a spirit not to be summoned light-heartedly, and difficult to exorcise, as many governments have discovered. And, therefore, in spite of the fact that the public in most cases appears supine and indifferent, yet a careful eye is always kept on public opinion and, if the occasion warrants it, steps are taken to feed it according to the prescribed recipe. When the necessity is urgent, steps are even taken to influence public opinion and so invest the preconceived policy of government with the glamour of a cause inspired by the people. No one knows this trick better than does your dictator! The difference between the actions of a constitutional government and those of a dictator is a difference, not of kind, but of degree. The dictator's methods are more crude, more direct, more ruthless—that is all the difference. The one sometimes tries to persuade, the other always bullies.

If there is any truth in the preceding paragraph, then we must accept as a fact the futility of attempting to spread the gospel of Empire unity without first exciting the interest and arousing the sympathy of the people of England and the Dominions. Their attention must first be focussed, then their understanding helped, and, finally, their faith established. The practical methods of translating faith into work will then be simplified. In this sort of business the dictator has an advantage, for he has his personality to conjure with, and no corporate body, such as a government or a cabinet, has personality, while the dictator has no need to argue with partners, no need to effect compromises. He speaks with one voice—he just dictates.

Where stands the Empire in this paradoxical modern world? According to some observers it is standing on feet of clay. It is interesting to recall that during the Boer War a favourite French sneer was—"le colosse à pieds d'argile." Nobody is more prone to cry down his own country than is a certain type of Englishmen, but their judgment must generally be discounted on account of religious

or political prejudice. It is safer to rely on the judgment of a skilled, professional observer whose impartiality can be relied on. Such a one is the well-known American writer, Mr. F. H. Simonds. A few quotations from Chapter XII of "The Price of Peace," by Simonds and Emery, may be worth consideration. Indeed, the whole of that chapter might be read with advantage by all those to whom the British Empire means something greater and better than mere Imperial greed and selfishness.

"Only a rash prophet would undertake to forecast early or even eventual dissolution of the British Empire politically, although economic separation proceeds apace. Not impossibly the Dominions would fight again for the Empire as they did in 1914—1918." (It should be recalled that they would not at the time of the Chanak bluff.)

"Nevertheless, it is self-evident, that the old relation between them and the mother-country has largely disappeared and politically no substitute has yet been established. As a consequence, the British Empire is to-day the greatest question mark on the map of the world."

The greatest question mark! Can this indeed be so? It is a statement that cannot be lightly disregarded. If there were no doubt as to Empire unity there would be no necessity for the continual investigation that is being taken as to ways and means for composing conflicting interests within the Empire. There would be no reason for uneasiness at the trend of certain policy on the part of the Union of South Africa during recent years, at the policy of Mr. Mackenzie King with regard to Canada's relations with the U. S. A., at the continued recalcitrance of the Irish Free State, at the declared policy of the Republican party there, at the separatist movement that is so vocal in India, at New Zealand's concern about the quota system as applied to her products, at Australia's determination to become industrially self-supporting. All these are symptoms, not necessarily of any desire for complete national independence of Empire ties, but at least of causes which lead to friction and so to dissolution rather than to cohesion. The seeds of dissolution are certainly there. It should be our concern to prevent their germination.

Again—

"In international conferences, the voice of Britain has lacked its ancient note of authority. In Europe, France, and not England,

has exercised the predominant influence in the post-war era. In the Far East, Japan has enhanced her prestige at British expense. To the United States, Britain has voluntarily conceded a naval parity which could no longer be denied in the light of the superiority of the financial resources of the American Republic. Yet a concession which disclosed wise statesmanship did not conceal a decline in world power. And, at bottom, all of these circumstances simply reveal the fact that, imposing as the Empire is in outward aspect, it does not possess that unity which once assured Britain of her position of primacy in the world, alike politically, financially, and industrially."

Well, that is a statement over the details of which much furious argument could be raised. But to its general tenor no exception can be taken. In our unity lies our strength, and this very competent observer considers that our unity has weakened. It is also evident that the key-stone of our unity is the strength of England herself, and that by our strength are we assessed by foreign nations. Also it appears that our deeds of wise statesmanship are forced on us by the weakness of our position: they are the children of necessity, not of wisdom.

On the other hand, only in yesterday's newspaper I read the headline—"Britain called upon to give a lead." That is, a lead to the Council of the League of Nations. It is an interesting speculation as to what would our action have been in the various crises of the last few years had we been a free agent and not bound, morally, by the famous Covenant. Dare one voice the heresy that the old system of a balance of power might possibly be a better one after all than the present one? As a matter of fact, the system of the balance of power still does exist in spite of the League. By no manner of means a perfect system, but a more adaptable, a more easily operated system. One may even go a bit further in one's speculation. Would it not be better, perhaps, to postpone the high ideal of the League of Nations system, and to concentrate on the more practical ideal of a League of Empire? To achieve the lesser before attempting the greater task? And, finally, is it possible to reconcile these two ideals; can they co-exist? Is it possible for a united Empire to exist within the League of Nations?

One should have some clear conviction in one's mind on these points before one can venture to consider the matter of Empire unity. We have, according to Mr. Simonds, lost our primacy in the world.

Is that a bad or a good thing for the world? Have we any right to try and re-establish that primacy? Have we really lost it? Does not a League of Nations pre-suppose parity of strength and prestige? One could multiply such questions almost *ad infinitum*, and no two people would answer them in exactly the same way. Not one can be answered without some qualification or reservation. But, to build up faith in Empire unity, we should attempt to answer them.

Once more: "And, although Britain still remains an Empire upon which the sun never sets, nowhere in that vast domain does the sun shine to-day with quite the same brilliance as in the closing years of the nineteenth century."

One should ask oneself whether this is really true, and, if so, is it a matter of importance?

Perhaps in this following and last extract the murder is out.

"And, as a consequence, for a decade and-a-half after the close of hostilities, British policy continued to be deeply and profoundly influenced by a spirit of defeatism."

I cannot congratulate Mr. Simonds on his "deeply and profoundly," two words which, to the uninitiate, appear to mean precisely the same thing. But I do think he has hit the right nail on the head—the spirit of defeatism. And a nasty, mean, tawdry, cowardly spirit it is too, that "craven fear of being great" which is mistaken by the wizened in intellect for a beautiful spirit of Christian renunciation, for an acceptable sacrifice, for a proof of a spirit of brotherly love. It leads to no greater stability, it ensures no better equity, it binds the world together with no stronger ties, than does the spirit of imperial militarism. It merely dissolves existing entities and leaves them at the mercy of any power which repudiates the spirit of defeatism. That which disintegrates cannot strengthen, and were defeatism ever to become endemic in the world all national existence would become flabby.

That such a spirit did become epidemic in the post-war years cannot be denied, and we now see that this American observer considers that it is due to this spirit that the prestige and strength of our Empire have diminished. Evidently he does not think much of it, and by implication I think we may assume that he reasons that our "primacy" has disappeared, not from any uncontrollable disruptive forces within the Empire, but merely because of a state of mind induced in a war-weary generation. There seems to be a glimmering

of hope here. All that has to be done to retrieve our position is to prevent such a spirit from ever making itself felt again. And it is just as well to realize that there is still a school of thought, very active in its propaganda especially amongst the young at school and college, which deliberately spreads the gospel of defeatism.

Before we can expect faith in Empire unity to be established we must exorcise this spirit of defeatism. This seems so obvious a conclusion that it may be asked why trouble to mention it. But the point is, not that a certain conclusion has been arrived at, but that something must be done about it. One cannot just sit down and expect things to happen. One has got to do something. It would be interesting to learn what is being done about it, in the home, the school, the college. It is a species of warfare and concentrated, planned attack is necessary. It is really no use just saying "pish" and "tush." It is no good leaving the job for somebody else to tackle.

One of the pet points of the defeatist is the doubtless deplorable fact that, in the acquisition of our Empire, the stricter laws of international morality and justice were sometimes disregarded. He seeks to stir our conscience and to guide us along the paths of atonement. Even the U. S. A. had its conscience-stricken period, and is proceeding with great rapidity to divest itself of its white man's burden in the Philippines. The quite unexpected result of this quite worthy action is that a section of Philippine political thought took fright at the looming spectre of Japanese ambition, and suggested that they would be safer if they were admitted into the British Empire! What was the fate of this gesture, I do not know. At any rate, it is some consolation for us to realize that we are not considered effete in every quarter of the globe.

It is quite immaterial to speculate from an ethical view-point as to how the Empire grew. On the whole, it grew very much like Topsy. What nation, or empire, or republic in the world can look back to its growing pains without some mental reservation regarding morality of purpose and method? Certainly some pages in our Empire history were better left uncut. But what has that got to do with the Empire as it is to-day? Certainly we pirated and profiteered. But what of our principles and actions to-day? For goodness' sake let the past bury its dead, the sinners with the saints, and let us occupy ourselves with the present, praying that we may produce MEN of a

calibre equal to that of the best of those who have gone before. What has Botany Bay got to do with the Australia of to-day? Doubtless, we were hardly inspired with the highest motives in starting that Opium War with China. But who would benefit if we surrendered Hong Kong now? If we should renounce because of past misdeeds, then let every country in the world renounce also, especially their contemplated misdeeds. Cromwell at Drogheda is something for tears. The atonement of 1921 has not built up a dry-eyed Ireland, nor endowed her with greater prosperity.

We will assume, then, that the Empire is worth while conserving, that it is an essential ingredient for the stability and prosperity of the world, that its disintegration would lead to a more chaotic world-condition than even the present one, that its strength and orderly progress set an example and form a central rallying point, that it is a shield against the too numerous disruptive forces both latent and active at the present time. In order to persist, its components must achieve some form of permanent unity stronger than any shocks to which they may be exposed; they must be the same throughout, possess the same outlook, the same ideals, implement the same policy, suffer and prosper together.

There have been plenty of events since 1918 which support this contention. Indeed, it seems a self-evident fact. But it is a fact, nevertheless, which, though accepted in rather a light-hearted way, is not realized as presenting immediate and pressing problems which call for investigation and action. If there are disruptive elements, bewailing them will not eliminate them. The growth of national consciousness and national pride, involving the development of economic and political independence, is a definite potential solvent. At the same time it is a perfectly natural phenomenon, and will tend to increase unless practical steps are taken to bring home to the people the possibility that complete independence can be achieved only at the loss of something greater than independence. There must be some limit beyond which independence may invite collapse. When it is considered that there has recently become vocal a school of thought which deliberately counsels the partition of portions of Empire among more needy nations, the familiar story of the "have-nots" claiming a right to the possessions of the "haves," we begin to realize that there are artificial as well as natural disruptive forces at work. But perhaps the most dangerous, because the most insidious

and intangible, of all is the force of ignorant, selfish, and narrow-minded indifference. The "little man" will not see the clouds on the horizon, or, if his attention is drawn to them, will not take the trouble to visualize the possible effects of the impending storm. He has little imagination.

In those countries which have given birth to men-deities, this smug tendency on the part of the "little man" towards stupid indifference has been eradicated by means with which we are all familiar. He has literally been kicked awake and beaten into action. He has not been allowed to remain indifferent. The operation has been made all the easier in these countries, because they have experienced a more acute condition of chaos, unhappiness, poverty and fear than we in England have so far experienced, bitter though our experience has been. And the "little man" on the Continent has, by force of circumstances, been brought face to face with the necessity for some form of action. We, so far, have only seen the flashes on the horizon and heard the distant thunder. But the atmosphere is heavy and stifling, and we are beginning to stir uneasily. We have even gone so far as to commence, at long last, the erection of a few shelters against the threat of storm. We may be lucky if we shall have erected them before the storm has burst.

But, with that extraordinary capacity for laissez faire which we possess to so intolerable a degree, with that school-boyish dislike for employing whatever imaginative capacity we may possess, with that Lower Fifth attitude of contempt towards Sixth form problems, we have neglected to raise the strongest storm-barrier of all—an Empire unity, based, not on empirical expedients devised temporarily to compose conflicting interests, but on conviction shared by all that the disruption of Empire would be a catastrophe for the whole world and that the ties which bind it together should be stronger than politics or economics. It is probably quite impossible to compose to the satisfaction of all parties the conflicting interests within the Empire. It is equally probable that the attempts to do so have merely disclosed the fact that these differences are even more acute and irreconcilable than was at first supposed, and that any attempt to settle them, in one quarter merely raises fresh complications in another. Such, at any rate, seems to be the lesson learnt from the results of the Ottawa Conference. After all, to approach the problems of Empire on a purely utilitarian basis is to confess that there is no real unity in the

Empire, that it is merely a loose confederation of countries owing to one another no allegiance of kinship or tradition, a sort of artificial League of Nations within the very artificial League of Nations; and that to keep together at all recourse has to be made to rather squalid bargaining. It will lead nowhere. Trade pacts, quotas, Empire preference—all these are temporary expedients which the least political storm may blow away into nothingness.

It is doubtful whether strategical unity would be lightly abandoned by any Dominion. Here the instinct of self-preservation would come into play, and for this reason the Dominions would presumably appreciate an England strong enough to defend them from attack. But here again something more than a purely utilitarian understanding between the various General Staffs is required, something more than strategical plans, which, incidentally, against certain combinations, might prove difficult to implement with existing material. Strategical agreements are, like any others, at the mercy of political experiment and charlatanry.

The unity that is required is of a nature comparable to that which binds together the counties of England, that makes England one country. The Empire must be one country. Obviously, in the face of the admitted independence of any central authority of each Dominion, such a unity is extraordinarily difficult to obtain. There must be some spheres within which independence cannot be admitted. There can be no independence of some single objective, some common purpose of life, some common standard of mutual conduct. There may be physical and legal independence but there can be no spiritual independence.

All this involves a readiness to subject local pride and ambition and greed to the requirements of the Empire as a whole, to the factors which give reality to its existence. This is asking a great deal of young, strong countries, conscious of their capacity and value, and anxious to assert themselves. Experience still lies ahead of them and always is there more knowledge to be acquired. In ignorance, indifference, and self-conceit lies the real danger. The unity that is indicated cannot be measured by any hard-boiled balance sheet, and reduced to terms of financial and economic gain. The latter is but incidental. Its real value and strength is the faith that is in it.

Presumably, no one would seriously wish to contradict the opening sentence of this article. But it is rather a nasty shock to

have to confess its truth. It upsets all sorts of pleasant philosophic dilettantism, all sorts of metaphysical philanderings; disturbs all sorts of lazy meanderings down the quieter back-waters of life; in short, it substitutes uneasy fear for placid self-satisfaction; it is a call for action on the part of people who dislike having to face up to brute fact; it is a call for sacrifice on the part of people who have had no occasion to learn the meaning of the word; it is a disturbing revelation that here, at least, is an occasion—WAR—where your duty to your neighbour is of more importance than your care for yourself.

One definition of war is that it is merely a continuation of policy, and, in spite of the existence of the Kellogg Pact, it still remains as good a definition as any other. The final recourse against strong opposition to policy affecting nations must be war—you may dignify it by the expression "sanctions" if you like; must be war if there is any real determination behind the policy. The very existence of Article 16 of the Covenant seems to confirm this statement. And close analysis does not disclose much moral difference between a gas-attack and the cutting off of essential supplies, the economic starving of an obstinate opponent. The innocent suffer either way.

War, then, is but an expression of policy, good or bad. But why should it be the only policy in furtherance of which the co-operation of the whole population is accepted as a necessity? Surely, if the success of any national policy is to be ensured, national co-operation is an essential ingredient of quick and complete success.

In parenthesis, it may be noted that co-operation does not automatically stifle individualism. What is required is co-operation in framing policy. The individual will still have to exert himself to give effect to that policy, to put in motion the various activities; but he and the other individuals will be working to one common end, each in his own particular sphere. Individualism must work on converging lines of approach, not on the parallel lines of Euclid. Co-operation that admits of freedom of individuality is good co-operation; individualism which hinders co-operation is bad.

It seems quite logical, then, to postulate that national co-operation is as essential for the establishment of peace as it is for the prosecution of war. And if the preservation of the British Empire is a stabilizing factor in world affairs, then we in the Dominions and in England should have our heart and soul in the cause of the unity of Empire. All our efforts should continually and undeviatingly be

diverted to that end. It must be remembered that, not only abroad, but also within our own island coast-line, there is at work propaganda the thesis of which is that the Empire is a standing menace to the peace of the world. Are we to stand by in smug and idle self-satisfaction? On the other hand, the Socialist Premier of France has just announced that he considers a strong England to be the greatest factor of stability on earth. It is queer that some of us in England cannot see that. Well, if the opponents of this type of defeatism do not do something about it, how can they expect their principles to win?

It is a pure waste of time to try and visualize what the world of humanity will be like a thousand years hence. No one has even the slightest claim to be in a position to speculate within the smallest degree of accuracy what it will be like; no, not even what it will be like a hundred years hence. Even if we could boast of such wonderful long sight, yet we, in the present, are not even remotely interested in so distant a future. We are concerned with to-day and to-morrow, and future generations must build up on whatever foundations we are able to lay to-day. It is undeniable that a world inhabited by men all motivated alike by the highest principles would be an admirable world, though we may venture to doubt whether it would not be rather dull. It is equally undeniable that the world of to-day falls somewhat short of so beautiful an ideal. So short, indeed, does it fall, that it is merely fatuous to behave as if the goal were in sight, the ways all smooth, as some good people would have us believe.

The Empire which we should aim to build, therefore, is one which will be able to exist in the world as it actually is and is likely to remain for a good many years yet, not in the world which President Wilson thought he had conjured up; an Empire which can negotiate on terms of equality, which can oppose equal force to force, whose constitution is framed with regard to the cold facts of an imperfect world; which has the will, and is in the position, to do right in a world where injustice, intolerance, tyranny, and rapine are as rife as they ever were and apparently ever will be. There are no signs of any real and permanent economic recovery throughout the world, no signs of any real and permanent political settlement, no signs that the pressure of population is diminishing and that the problems of equitable distribution of production are nearing solution, not the slightest hint that financial adjustment of exchange values is within sight.

Standards of living still vary, as do those of conduct. Indeed, where is there one single tittle of evidence that international barriers have been broken down or that there is any real, deep-seated will to break them down ?

In so unhappy and disturbed a world it should be a matter for pride to be a member of an Empire that stands firm and unmoved as a rock amid all the shouting and squabbling. But such an Empire will not be established until all its people rise superior to their own petty self-sufficiencies, and drop that attitude of indifference, based either on stupidity, ignorance, or conceit. It is deplorable to ascertain by questioning how lightly, indeed how scoffingly, responsible and presumably educated people regard the potential dangers that the condition of the modern world contains for the Empire. To such the only item of importance in the world is—themselves. It is time something was done about it.

Early in his life the late King uttered a warning. " Wake up, England," was his exhortation. On his death-bed he anxiously enquired, " How's the Empire ?" What is our answer?

NOTE.—Anyone who is even remotely interested in the subject of Empire Unity should read Professor Coatman's " Magna Britannia." I can commend no better book. Unfortunately I had not read it myself before I wrote this article.

MORE ABOUT AUSTRALIA

By Major J. S. D. Lloyd, The Suffolk Regiment

I was very interested to read, in a recent issue of the Journal, an article by Lieut-Col. R. H. Mylne—" Privilege Leave in Australia " —firstly, as I had just done the same trip myself and, secondly, because I returned on the same ship as the writer. I might add that I agree with everything he has written and strongly endorse his remarks.

My only excuse for attempting a similar article—after such an excellent one—is to offer, as I was considerably longer on shore (six weeks), some hints as to how to spend the time that may be of use to any officer contemplating making the trip and who may be wondering how to spend his time to the best advantage.

Being then stationed in Southern India I made the outward trip by the Orient Line from Colombo, returning by the P. and O. For those similarly situated I can strongly recommend this method and particularly lay stress on making the *outward* voyage by the Orient as, I was given to understand, more Australians travel by that line than by the P. and O., and it is the Australians one should endeavour to become acquainted with during the voyage rather than one's own kind; also few army officers travel by that line, so it is pleasant to get away, if only for a very brief spell, from the atmosphere in which one may have lived for so many years.

I have said that it is the Australians themselves that one should endeavour to get to know during the outward trip. They are all extremely kind, delighted to meet visitors to their country which, rightly or wrongly, they consider the finest in the world bar none, and are open-handed in their hospitality to the stranger within their gates; in this respect they are far more American than English, and as Col. Mylne has said, " Shipboard acquaintance develops into friendship on shore."

As likely as not some of them may invite you to stay on their " Stations " (an opportunity to be grasped with both hands), or, if business men, to look them up when visiting their particular town; this is not mere politeness but intended to be accepted in the spirit in which it is offered—in this respect they differ considerably from the Home stock. So much for the voyage.

Each State has its Government Tourist Bureau, located in its capital, which exists to assist travellers to see their own particular State; very often, however, there is a representative from a neighbouring State in the Bureau who can and will assist if a combined tour is required. The officials in these Bureaux are helpful to a degree, will suggest things to do, places one ought to see, and make all arrangements for one. All the traveller has to do is to express his wishes and pay the fees (which are very reasonable especially when the exchange is taken into consideration) and he will be "picked up" at his hotel and returned to it at the termination, whether it be long or short.

The cars provided are exceedingly comfortable, and their chauffeurs excellent drivers as well as being first-class guides. They point out all places of interest as they pass them, if required, and take a keen and lively interest in their passenger's comfort, wishes and enjoyment. To sum these drivers up—all I met, and I met many, were the most excellent fellows.

It is not generally known, I think, that during the Australian winter, winter sports are available in many places in Victoria and New South Wales and, compared with European centres, are comparatively cheap.

I mention two, Mount Buller in Victoria and Kosciusco in New South Wales, and will say a few things about the latter as I spent a fortnight there.

I made all my arrangements through the New South Wales Tourist Bureau by telegraph on reaching Fremantle, confirmed it by letter and by a personal visit as soon as I reached Sydney, when I found all arrangements made for me. (I might add that I received a telegram from the Tourist Bureau on arrival of the ship at Adelaide saying that accommodation had been arranged.)

There is an hotel only at Kosciusco (the nearest township being some 30 miles away) which is very comfortable, comparing quite favourably with those at Swiss winter resorts. It is at an elevation of 5,000 feet. The sports facilities afforded there are comparatively poor. If, however, the traveller wishes to "play at" winter sports and is keen on the social side of things, then he should remain there, but if he is at all experienced and keen on ski-ing, I recommend that he spend one night at the hotel (which he will have to do on account of the time of arrival there) and move on to the Chalet, 6,000 feet

and ten miles away at the head of Charlottes Pass, the next day on skis. This is the only means of getting there; the only method of communication is by dog-sleigh which takes over food, mail and light luggage for a small charge, daily—weather permitting.

All sports kit, with the exception of clothes and "skins," can be hired at the hotel and the small cost is included in the Tourist Bureaux bill.

If one wishes to go direct to the Chalet this must be made perfectly clear to the Tourist Bureau at the outset to enable them to make arrangements, as it only has limited accommodation and is often engaged for a week or so at a time by one of the many Ski and Alpine Clubs which abound in Victoria and New South Wales. Whilst there one is accommodated in dormitories, according to sex, holding as many as 16 to 20 in "double decker" beds, so there is little privacy. The feeding at the Chalet was, curiously enough, better than at the hotel.

This dormitory drawback is, however, well worth while as the ski runs to be obtained are excellent, and compare very favourably with those in Swiss resorts. One has to be very careful when out "on tour" as clouds, fog, wind and snow play the very devil and one may find that the visibility on the return route has been "blotted out" during the climb, and if not near a hut the situation may be rather dangerous. All huts are connected by telephone to one another, also to the Chalet and the hotel, and generally have a stock of "iron rations" hanging in sacks, and also a stock of wood. Many of them are exceedingly comfortless, but any port in a storm.

One point to be carefully considered if contemplating winter sports is: Is it worth while, having travelled so many thousands of miles to the Antipodes, to waste ten days or a fortnight ski-ing when it might be much better spent seeing as much of the country as possible? Personally, I afterwards regretted having done so, not that I did not thoroughly enjoy myself.

For those who wish to see as much of the country as possible, a motor trip from Sydney to Brisbane by the Tableland route, returning by the Pacific Highway, or *vice versa*, a journey of something like 1,000 miles, or doing a similar trip from Sydney to Melbourne either by the Coast road (Princes Highway) or *via* Canberra, has much to recommend it.

The former return journey takes seven days in all and costs £15-15-0 Australian. This, however, includes all expenses, *i.e.*, being picked up at one's hotel, meals and all hotel expenses *en route*, and being deposited at the door of one's destination on arrival. The passengers generally "tip" the driver 2s. a head—this being the recognised sum, and this need be the only "out of pocket" expense.

The return journey by rail would take one-third the time, but by the time all expenses were paid would amount to, roughly, the same figure, or perhaps very slightly less.

Personally, I consider the journey by road has much to commend it if the traveller can spare the time. The whole trip is done in daylight so that one can see all the country through which one passes. One sees many country towns, some big, some small; stays at country hotels, some of them amazingly good and comfortable with excellent, though plain food (in this respect Australia is far ahead of the Old Country in my opinion), and rubs shoulders with all sorts and conditions of mankind one might otherwise never meet.

In every way it is preferable and also very interesting.

The trip to Melbourne *via* Canberra (which every traveller ought to see in early September, if possible, when all the flowers and flowering shrubs are in bloom) takes three—and by the Coast route four--days, and costs, roughly, £8 Australian.

These are all regular runs and cars leave the capital cities so many times a week according to the season of the year. The drivers are excellent, the roads surprisingly good, and the cars, which hold twelve, very comfortable. Some of the cars are fitted with wireless sets. The amount of light luggage one is permitted to take is naturally limited but sufficient.

No visit to Australia would be complete without a visit to some "Station" up country, for that an introduction or some kind ship-board acquaintance is necessary.

I was fortunate and spent a very happy and interesting four days on a sheep station of 40,000 acres in the Riverina District of New South Wales.

I have said that Australians are an extremely kind and friendly people, and to prove my statement I will give two examples.

I was very anxious to visit a Citrus Fruit Farm, and not knowing anyone in that line of business I approached the Travel Hostess in the Victorian Tourist Bureau in Melbourne (a very charming and

helpful woman). It was a very unusual request and outside her usual run of business, but she was not a bit nonplussed. She remembered having met the owners of two such estates and rang them both up, both said they would be delighted to see me, a complete stranger, and show me round.

I actually visited the largest Citrus Fruit Farm in Australia of 200 acres—the normal size is 20 to 40 acres. On arrival I was met by the son of the house, taken round and shown everything (after a cup of tea), all my many questions were answered to the best of his ability, and at the conclusion of my visit I was taken in for a drink and had no little difficulty in getting away.

On another occasion, hearing that sheep shearing was going on in the neighbourhood and wishing to see it, I approached a taxi-driver and asked him if he knew of any station where it was being done. He did not, but said he would find out, and find out he did. On arrival I walked into the shed and asked the first man I saw (who happened to be joint owner) if I might have a look round, and he said, "Certainly." His brother came along, took me in hand and showed me everything, answered my innumerable questions, and at the end of the shearers' two-hour spell asked me to stay to lunch, an invitation I had, most regretfully, to decline as I had a train to catch. I do not know his name to this day.

If the traveller has the time, the trip to Tasmania should be undertaken. It is only a twelve-hour sea trip from Melbourne, and I was given to understand that Tasmania is more akin to the Old Country in every way than any of the other States. On account of my fortnight of winter sports I had not the time unfortunately.

For those who may visit the Commonwealth with "an eye to the future" I was given to understand that Western Australia and Queensland were the two States with the greatest possible future as they are both still comparatively unexploited, whilst the possibilities of Victoria and New South Wales are generally well known.

THE PROTECTION OF TANKS IN BATTLE

By Captain G. W. Richards, M.C., Royal Tank Corps

In March 1934, when submitting the Army Estimates to the House of Commons, Mr. Duff-Cooper stated, "It is at least possible that in a few years time the most heavily armoured cars or tanks would be as vulnerable to the rifle and machine-gun fire of the future as a wooden caravan would be to the rifle and machine-gun fire of to-day."

With the recent invention of the anti-tank rifle and the introduction of the 2 pdr. anti-tank gun this prophecy has, to all intents and purposes, come true.

We have only to delve into history to discover that it was bound to be so.

In the era before the rifle, armoured man dominated warfare for about a thousand years. However, the penetrating power of the arrow was constantly being improved. As a result the mail-clad knight, by a constant augmentation of his armour, gradually sacrificed mobility for protection and faded into oblivion.

At the commencement of the American Civil War the "Merrimac," the only armoured ship in existence at the time, was supreme for a short period. She engaged the Northern sloop "Cumberland" and the frigate "Congress," sinking them both. Later we read of the engagement between the two armoured ships "Merrimac," and "Monitor," in which these two vessels fought for over two hours at very close range with little effect on each other.

This situation was not allowed to continue; the rifled gun and improved shell soon put armour into second place again.

All Tank Corps officers, who served in the Great War, will readily admit that a direct hit from a shell would penetrate the armour of a tank, and, more often than not, put it out of action. This was so where guns had not been specially designed for use against tanks.

Although great strides have been made in the resisting power of armour-plate since the war, the gun and the rifle have made even greater strides in penetrating power.

The problem facing the tank is to avoid being hit by an armour-piercing bullet which can be fired from a rifle or gun, however

mounted. We cannot rely on armour alone, so let us examine the other means available.

SPEED

1. *The Pace of the Actual Vehicle*

The last war showed that guns always saw tanks before the tanks saw the guns. I doubt whether you will find a single war-time Tank Corps officer who located a battery before it opened fire. An obvious example of this was the action round Flesquieres. Another was an incident which occurred at the Drocourt-Queant Switch battle on the 2nd September 1918, when a battery of German Horse Artillery galloped into action, knocked out 8 or 9 tanks of " G " Battalion, and were themselves dispersed by a diving air squadron, all in about two or three minutes. Not a single tank fired a round at them. Modern methods should ensure that many batteries will be discovered for the tanks, but mobility should assist materially in preventing a repetition of these incidents.

The war-time Mark IV and V tanks, moving at less than five miles per hour, were big and cumbersome and proved a fairly easy target for an enterprising gunner. At the battle of Cambrai the depth of penetration was limited by the mobility of the tanks. Owing to their small radius of action, tank units had to be given very limited objectives, then return for refilling and minor repairs before being committed again. This delay allowed the enemy to reorganize his defences, and at Fontaine, during the battle of Cambrai, " F " Battalion lost several tanks on this account. If the tanks had had sufficient mileage (there was nothing there to stop them) to have reached beyond the German detraining centre at Cambrai (the Germans say they detrained 730 train loads of troops there during the battle), there is little doubt that subsequent operations would have taken a different course.

It is interesting to note that on August 8th, the enemy were expecting tanks of the Mark IV pattern, and did not realise the extra speed and handiness of the Mark V model and the Whippet Tank. Consequently the German gunners were surprised and failed to stop the tanks, though most of their guns were trained with that object in view. It is doubtful whether many tanks of the Mark IV pattern would have passed their batteries.

In Palestine, the only time an armoured car sustained a direct hit was when the commander halted his vehicle to engage an enemy

battery. The Turks never succeeded in obtaining a direct hit on a moving armoured car, although twenty of these vehicles were often under shell fire from 1915 to the armistice.

Maintain mobility, and the target becomes far more difficult for the enemy gunner. But mobility is relative; as the gun improves in handiness so must the tank increase in speed and ease of manœuvre.

2. *Manœuvrability,* i.e., *R/T. Control and a Combination of the various types of Tanks.*

The machine should be built for its rôle as are destroyers at sea, or bombers and fighters in the air.

Secondly, a distinct homogeneity must be maintained in our tanks to ensure that they are designed to act together. During the Russo-Japanese War the Russian Navy consisted of ships of varied types, sizes, coal endurance, speed and armament. This seriously interfered with their employment in large squadrons, although the individual units were generally formidable and stood up to severe punishment.

The chief rôle of the tank is to drive a gap through the enemy lines, if for some reason it is impossible to get round the flank.

It was impossible in the last war to drive a gap through the enemy lines without A. F. Vs. for three reasons:

(*i*) Machine-gun fire;

(*ii*) Wire and mud;

(*iii*) The troops had insufficient strength and endurance to fight and march the distance that complete penetration of the enemy lines entailed. (The Germans made a big gap in our lines in March, 1918, but had not sufficient endurance to complete their victory.)

The tank is immune from machine-gun fire, unaffected by wire and mud, and can do the distance, carrying its arms and ammunition, very much quicker than other arms.

There remains opposing the tank only direct hits from artillery and anti-tank guns, against which armour is little defence. But both artillery and anti-tank weapons are very susceptible to machine-gun fire; tanks must therefore carry machine-guns. In war the tank machine-gunner will rarely see the target until after the artillery and anti-tank weapons have opened fire, and then it is usually too late. To overcome this difficulty, tanks must be prepared to put down a curtain of machine-gun fire in front of them as they advance,

so that the anti-tank weapons, both seen and unseen, are involved in it as soon as the tanks arrive within effective range. The attack should be at the highest speed consistent with the cohesion of the attacking force, and should go right through the enemy lines. Once through, there is adequate safety for reorganization and further attack, where necessary or required. The writer was behind the Turkish lines in Palestine, passing through at the same time as the cavalry in September, 1918. What impressed him most was the comparative safety when there. Officers of the 17th Armoured Car Battalion, who were behind the German lines during the battle on the 8th August, have told him the same thing.

Machine-guns are essentially a part of tank armament, but the increase of even one gun to a tank must be very carefully considered before being installed. It may increase the weight of the vehicle enormously.

It is considered that post-war policy in A. F. V. design concentrated too much on armament to the detriment of mobility, control inside the tank and comfort of the crew.

Secondly, tanks must be able to defend themselves against enemy tanks and attack them when required to do so. We must, therefore, have a tank equipped with an armour-piercing gun in an all-round traversing turret.

Thirdly, smoke is a very important feature of tank requirements. This can be supplied by other arms to support the tank attack, in the initial stages, but smoke will also be required by the tanks for—

(*i*) Blinding unlocated batteries or anti-tank weapons after the attack has begun;

(*ii*) Supporting the tank attack after the tanks have passed beyond the support of other arms.

A certain number of tanks, armed with smoke mortars or projectors of some kind, form part of the establishment of tank battalions now, and will continue to be required.

From the above, it will be seen, that three types of tanks are necessary—

(*a*) The small, extremely mobile type carrying a machine-gun, which can produce the maximum frontal fire, and armour-proof against small arm fire. Any extra weight in an armour or armament is unnecessary and leads to lack of mobility.

(*b*) To oppose enemy tanks, a medium tank is needed. Its obstacle-crossing performance must be good and it must be superior in speed to any other medium or heavy tank it is likely to encounter. To obtain this mobility, only the vital parts of the vehicle should be protected from armour-piercing bullets. The proportion of medium tanks to light tanks must be carefully weighed. It depends on many factors, the chief one being the type of enemy we are to fight.

(*c*) Smoke tanks must be available in sufficient numbers to render quick support to medium and light tanks when needed. Light tanks should also carry a small smoke bomb or cartridge which can be fired from the vehicles to cover their immediate withdrawal or "jink" when confronted by anti-tank guns. The weapon to propel this only requires a range of about thirty yards and should take up very little space in a tank. Some light tanks are already fitted with a suitable weapon.

(*d*) All tanks should be fitted with radio telephony. Only a certain percentage require two-way sets, but all vehicles must be able to receive. Efficient wireless control of a tank force increases its mobility considerably.

3. *The Effect of Speed on the Morale of the Enemy*

Although probably we still retain our foremost position in tactical handling of tank formations, our post-war superiority in tank design has been lost owing to financial stringency. Now that the defence problem has come to the fore again, this superiority must be regained and maintained. It should give us a great moral ascendancy over our enemy at the beginning of the next war. Speed of approach is always most demoralizing to the defenders.

It is doubtful whether sufficient credit is given to the moral factor of tanks in war. Ludendorff admitted that it was the presence of the tanks that made victory impossible for them. "August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of the war . . . . Divisional staffs were surprised in the Headquarters by enemy tanks."

Again he said, "Mass attack by tanks and artificial fog remained hereafter our most dangerous enemy."

The influence of nervous strain and other battle factors on the tank and anti-tank gunners must not be overlooked. This will affect the man in the open, *i.e.*, the anti-tank gunner, even more than the tank crew, the latter are given protection by armour and movement, factors denied to the former. Again, the noise of the machinery inside a tank prevents the crew hearing the enemy gun fire. Under these conditions the crew behave more normally then they would do otherwise.

We must regain our former place in tank design in the world. This, combined with the efficient handling of the tank by those concerned, will ensure a moral ascendancy over the enemy at the beginning of the next war.

COVER

1. *The Use of Ground*

In the past it is questionable whether sufficient attention has been paid to the use of ground by tank units. Ground should invariably be made use of to protect tanks from artillery and anti-tank fire.

Quite a common manœuvre by tank commanders is to lead their tanks on to high ground in order to benefit from the slope of the ground to gain speed when carrying out the actual attack on the enemy. The main reason for this was the slow climbing capacities of the war-time and post-war medium Vickers tanks, which offered an excellent target to the enemy gunner when moving uphill. Now that tanks are being produced that can climb and "jink" without great loss of speed, this manœuvre should be adopted with caution. In a tank *versus* tank battle the side which gains the high ground will be favourably placed to make the enemy conform to the movements. But in an attack where enemy tanks are not expected to be encountered, every effort should be made to protect the flanks of the tank attack by the use of ground. Anti-tank weapons capable of being brought to bear on the tanks will then be confined to a narrow frontage.

At Cambrai the frontage of the tank attack was selected so that the enemy could not interfere with either flank.

On August 8th the tank force was assembled without unduly alarming the enemy. During the attack the tanks on each flank were checked by enemy flanking fire.

Insufficient use had been made of the ground in this case to protect the flanks, but fortunately the frontage was sufficiently wide

to prevent the enemy action on the flanks affecting the centre of the attack.

2. *The Use of Bad Visibility*

Smoke is a very important feature of tank requirements. This can be supplied by other arms to support the tank attack in the initial stages and great assistance can be rendered by the air in the later stages, but smoke will also be required by the tanks for—

(*a*) Blinding unlocated batteries or anti-tank guns after the attack has begun;

(*b*) Supporting the tank attack after the tanks have passed beyond the support of other arms.

A few rounds of smoke might have dealt effectively with the German guns which caused serious damage to our tanks on numerous occasions during the war.

The use of twilight for attacking, and darkness for moving up to the assembly positions should always be given weighty consideration.

A bad light always makes accurate aiming difficult and most of the German moves prior to the March 1918 attack were successfully carried out during darkness.

FACTORS APPERTAINING TO A SUCCESSFUL TANK ATTACK

With the above considerations before us, the main factors relating to a successful tank attack appear to be—

1. Assembly and deployment of the tank attack at the highest speed so that little time is given to the enemy to move supports or make arrangements to meet it. The employment of other arms in various ways to obtain surprise is essential and should form part of the plan of attack. Marlborough's moves prior to piercing the " ne plus ultra " lines make an excellent example.

2. Selection of an area and/or method where all the attacking tanks can devote their attention to their front without being affected by hostile flanking fire.

3. The tank attack must be of sufficient strength to overwhelm the frontage attacked and to pass right through the enemy position. In the initial stages the curtain of fire, behind which it will advance, can be supplied by other arms. After the attack has penetrated beyond this range the frontage of the tank attack should be contracted, if necessary, so that the tanks themselves provide a

curtain of machine-gun fire and smoke in front of them when anti-tank fire is likely to be met, behind which the advance will continue.

4. If the enemy possesses tanks he will probably attack us when we have been successful and are through the enemy position. A sufficient force of the heavier type of tanks must be kept intact to meet this, otherwise the light tanks, which may have been disordered by the attack, will be destroyed.

In conclusion, it will be seen that tanks, like other arms, must depend very largely for protection on—

(*a*) Ability to manœuvre quickly in suitable formations;

(*b*) The use of ground;

(*c*) Bad visibility and covering fire.

It is true that metallurgical improvement which produces superior penetration of armour, tends, at the same time, to produce better tanks (by improving the power for weight ratio of engines and the resistance of armour).

I would ask the advocates of the infantry tank to consider the above points. Should we not rely on the more mobile tank, supported by artillery and the Air to effect a break through, with the infantry available to hold the positions gained?

Too much reliance must not be placed on armour for protection, otherwise the tanks may follow the heavily armed Roman infantry and the Knights of the Middle Ages into oblivion.

THE OBJECTS OF THE A. R. A.

By "Aslim."

An article appeared in the April number of this journal entitled "Weapon Training and the A. R. A." In this article the writer advocated support of the A. R. A. and encouraged units to take more interest in the competitions offered by that Association. It may be agreed that the A. R. A. is well deserving of support; it is an association which endeavours to keep abreast of the times, which welcomes suggestions for improvement and considers carefully any new ideas which may make membership more attractive and promote the aims for which it was founded.

What are the aims for which it was founded? Does the article referred to suggest methods of furthering these aims? The A. R. A. (India) explains in the Foreword to its Handbook that its object is to encourage team shooting as opposed to individual shooting. That is all right as far as it goes, but the real object is set out much better on the outside cover of the A. R. A. (Home) Handbook:

"... Maintained with the object of promoting interest in Small Arm Shooting for service purpose by means of individual and collective competitions, framed as far as possible to induce practice in methods which will lead to increased EFFICIENCY ON THE BATTLEFIELD."

The capitals and emphasis on the last words are those of the A. R. A.

The Rifle Associations do their part in improving shooting, but in the nature of things they cannot do the most important part. They have little personal contact with the man who actually fires and whom they wish to make efficient on the battlefield; in organising competitions their rules must be bound by an uniformity which is not the ideal in producing the type of efficiency required; nor can they take advantage of the varying conditions which can locally be directed towards that efficiency. It is questionable, therefore, whether indiscriminate support of the A. R. A. competitions is the best way of supporting the aims of the A. R. A. How then must we temper our support?

There is such a thing as over-enthusiasm which defeats its own object. An enthusiast finds unlimited interest in his own hobby and is apt to drive others, regardless of the fact that their interest may not have been aroused. This is where failure so often occurs in rifle shooting. Drive, assisted by discipline, is a necessary compulsion in a certain degree. It is an indispensable adjunct to early training both for a school-boy and for a recruit; without compulsory groundwork there can be no progress. Later in life a certain amount of compulsion and discipline is necessary to justify the emoluments attaching to a profession; a parson must hold his Sunday services, a financier must study prospectuses and markets, and a soldier must fire his annual course however much it bores him. Beyond that, discipline is seldom the best method of attaining a higher standard; it is interest which produces theological theses and works on economics and the gold standard, as it does enthusiastic rifle shots: not drive from outside coupled with discipline. In trying to improve shooting in a unit, therefore, we must guard against the officer, himself an enthusiast, who drives his men to enter for competitions, blind to the fact that it is discipline which produces the teams, not enthusiasm; and though his efforts will probably result in turning a greater number of men into more efficient range shots, he may have killed the latent enthusiasm which would produce efficiency on the battlefield.

It is to be noticed that men, officers and soldiers, will frequently spend hours of labour improving themselves in pastimes which matter far less professionally. Some will spend nearly all their spare time training ponies, others casting a fly on the lawn, others playing about with a football or a hockey stick; some are keen on photography or their gardens. Why, it may be asked, do comparatively few spend their leisure hours in improving their musketry? Before considering this point it must be realised that rifle shooting, like any other pastime, will have its maniacs who will be desperately keen in the face of the most adverse circumstances; and again, as with other pastimes, there will be a number whose interest cannot be aroused in any conditions. This state of affairs must be accepted in regard to rifle shooting as much as to cricket or horsemanship. The object must be to inspire enthusiasm into the majority, and it is suggested that a curbing of the maniacs, or a wise direction of their energies, is one of the essentials to achieve this.

There are many reasons for this lack of keenness. Amongst others may be mentioned that of unintelligent encouragement which leads to boredom. More will be said about this later; at the moment one may remember that rice pudding is an excellent body builder but loses its attraction when forced upon one daily. Another is the attention which has been paid for many years now to the development of new weapons; we must not, however, lose sight of the fact that the rifle is still the basic weapon, and so long as the rifleman retains his existence he must be as efficient as training will make him. The main answer, however, as to why this lack of keenness exists is twofold. Firstly, it is a nuisance arranging for musketry, a nuisance not only to the man himself but to others. Others are implicated in the procedure of obtaining ammunition, of firing on the range, and in some cases even of obtaining the rifle. One or all of these others may legitimately be expected to discourage the enthusiast; their leisure is made unproductive. It is difficult to put forward a useful suggestion for curing this evil; but it should be borne in mind and ameliorated as far as range facilities and local conditions permit. Secondly, most pastimes offer a reward in the form of personal satisfaction within a reasonable measure of time. The horseman looks forward to the thrill of sticking a pig, the fisherman to landing a large mahseer. But the rifleman has no reward to look forward to beyond the satisfaction of knowing that he is an efficient soldier. The small-game shot has the pleasure of seeing a snipe or a partridge bowled over; if the rifleman knew that he would occasionally be taken " enemy shooting " or game shooting his enthusiasm would increase by leaps and bounds. It is, therefore, the duty of the officer to overcome, as far as is possible, these two obstacles. Let him produce the enthusiasm, and the desire to enter for range competitions will follow. But if he drives men into competitions he will be putting the cart before the horse, and suppressing the enthusiasm which it is the object of the A. R. A. to promote.

It is this lack of tangible satisfaction which is the real factor militating against enthusiasm in rifle shooting. This has to be artificially created, and for its creation no rules can be laid down—by the A. R. A. or anybody else. It is a personal matter between the instructor and the instructed; and it depends on many factors, personal, psychological, topographical, which can be applied only by the imagination and sympathy of the " man on the spot."

Certain things which the man on the spot must avoid have been indicated, and may be summarised in the statement that he must not enlist military discipline to facilitate the pursuit of a hobby which gives pleasure to *him* and not to his men; compulsory parades out of working hours are a sure way to kill enthusiasm. Again he must avoid extending the boredom which necessarily attaches to mere disciplinary efficiency achieved in the annual course; in the existing state of things a sufficient number of unpleasantly hot hours have to be spent compulsorily on the range during the hot weather; to add a further compulsory ten days to this period is another effective way of damping enthusiasm.

What the man on the spot must do is much more difficult to suggest. As has been explained, it is an individual matter depending upon materials and personalities. No real peace time substitute for enemy shooting can be produced; regulation fig. 2 and fig. 6 targets will serve their purpose in the technical annual course, but are no real substitute for an enemy. It is not of much practical value giving details of a field firing practice and saying "carry this out; you will find it interests the men." The root of the matter is that nearly all practices will interest a man once; some will bear a good deal of repetition. But the essence of interest is variety. Some men will be tickled to death at seeing a chattie full of water burst occasionally; knocking over a falling plate appeals to others; sinking a kerosene tin floating down a river can be amusing; various forms of snap shooting will arouse interest in another aspect. An occasional pool shoot on the range can produce an incentive in a tangible reward combined with a visible result. Above all introduce as much variation as possible. When enthusiasm has been roused men will willingly devote their spare time to rifle shooting, and will be training themselves for what is needed—efficiency on the battle-field. But until they have become enthusiastic confine musketry to parade hours. There are many occasions throughout the year when a few minutes musketry can be fitted in. How often does it occur that there are so few men for parade that it is difficult to know what to do with them? and how often is the answer "squad drill and rifle exercises?" Why not a little musketry? The men will not grudge the time spent on rifle training, when the alternative may have been "left, right; left, right."

To conclude with repetition;

Don't expect to get enthusiasm by entering teams for the A.R.A. competitions; get your teams by developing enthusiasm; develop enthusiasm by interesting variety spread over the year.

THIS NEXT WAR BUSINESS

By "Mouse."

I don't think I have ever been so terrified in my life. From all sides I hear that either I or my relatives at home, will be bombed or gassed in our beds before the 11th November 1940. Every statesman, every military correspondent, every cavalry subaltern and every woman I know are now certain that Armageddon—having missed fire in 1914—is now on the crack of eruption.

I don't believe it. I cannot imagine that the so-called statesmen who control the destinies of their nations could be such blood-thirsty fools. It is inconceivable that even party politicians of all countries could use their electoral and cheap power to goad their opponents into some silly dramatic act (which would mean war), to uphold some trivial question of nationality, of prestige, of so-called national honour. Gone are the Fashoda days; gone, I hope, are the days of singeing a monarch's beard.

Being a good soldier I am a pacifist. A few years ago—how far behind the times we all and the War Office were!—the outlook of the Empire's Defence Forces were defined as police duties. This meant peace within the territories of the Empire with an occasional crack at the recalcitrant marauder on our borders. It showed to the world that all we wanted was pacifism in its best sense. Nobody paid the slightest attention to our childlike gesture; for ten years we retained our world power by our City of London money, and two men and a dog.

All that has changed. The money is still there. The forces—even police forces—are absent. So now, we all have to view, with either the exasperation or the philosophy of our various temperaments, the sight of England spring-cleaning her Defence Forces. To me—a pacifist with a deep-rooted instinct that the last instrument of any policy should be Force (*vide* F. S. R.)—this spectacle of the British Government rushing at the last moment for a poker when confronted by well-known burglars is sickening.

But there it is. We are now confronted with a world situation far more serious and far more inflammatory than the 1909—1914 period. The Government at home appear to be not asleep to the situation and have appointed a Defence Minister to co-ordinate

all systems and schemes of Imperial Defence. What a lovely job! We are increasing the Navy, Army and Air Force. We are entering into Staff talks with continental powers. We are, in fact, impressing the man in the street with our readiness and our ability to wage war in Singapore, the Suez Canal, or the Rhine, the seven seas and the Bosphorus. I hope the man in the street, bless his tax-paying heart, believes it.

Obviously all this demonstration of power is bluff, and incidentally one of the few signs recently evident of British statesmanship. Bluff is the Joker in the greasy pack of cards with which the Foreign Minister plays at Geneva; our Minister has drawn it far too infrequently, although often when he has had it in his hand he has been too gentlemanly to use it. I don't think one should be a gentleman in Geneva.

This brings me to the League of Nations. It is such an easy target for ridicule that all the gutter-snipes in the world throw stones at it. And yet in the bottom of my bones—a vast unexplored region of unsorted thoughts—I cannot help feeling that if civilisation and progress in our common humanity is to exist a League of World Powers, represented by the elderly statesman type of Lloyd George, Hindenburg, Woodrow Wilson, Smuts and Gandhi might prevent another damned silly war.

When I survey the wondrous cross-word puzzle of the world at the present moment, I hesitate to comment. Indeed, I am frightened that some hard-working officer, sweating for promotion or the Staff College, might think my words are inspired. There is so much confusion, so much thoughtless criticism, so much undigested and indigestible matter being flung in front of us by our newspapers every day that I almost fear to sort out my own impressions.

First of all, I think it a fair basis for anything in the way of a discussion on world affairs to state the ordinary chap's standpoint. I think the O. C. would say, "The British Empire, as it is painted, however red, on the map, must stay; if any other nation tries to grab any portion of it, I'll fight him." This blatant, public-school assertion may offend the ears of all sorts of people and peoples—but, paradoxically enough, I think if the peoples of the British Empire uttered these bellicose sentiments at sunrise and sunset and taught them to their children at even prayer there would be a great striving of other nations to hold their hands, if not their tongues.

To get the British Commonwealth of Nations to speak with one tongue is a task seemingly beyond the power of the British Government. That is our greatest weakness, but there are now signs that the great Dominions, Canada, South Africa and Australia, are realising that the great Cow England has teats which may run dry. The U. S. A. are making overtures to Canada; these are to be welcomed as they may be the forerunners of an English-speaking (or American, if you like) Union in the world, which is the obvious and inescapable solution of World Peace. South Africa, so uncomplaisant, so hard to woo, so suspicious, is now trimming her sails to the storm on her horizon. Australia, having given her best in the last war and then been mauled by the economic slump, felt for a while that London, like Delhi, was very far away and could, if necessary, be disregarded, is now taking a more rational and personal view of her imperial position. Whether they like them or not, I always feel the Australians take their imperial responsibilities to heart. As for India, it is difficult to size her. I am very prejudiced in my judgment. Apart from Ulster and New Zealand, I don't think there is any other country in the Empire so loyal, so ready "to unsheath the sword" in the defence of a wantonly attacked weaker nation than India. The peoples of India have a lovely chivalrous streak, inherited individually, often directed in the mass unwisely, but which at times of stress could, guided and controlled, produce a force almost incalculable in its power. That, for me, is a big thought, and I don't think I am being sentimental.

This concludes the main argument; solidarity of the British Empire. If that can be achieved privately, and then shown publicly and unmistakably that our motives are complete union and a shoulder to shoulder front, the first battle in the next Great War is won.

Unfortunately, this does not extricate us from the grip of all our continental girl-friends. We are up to our eyes in the Treaty of Versailles, Locarno and Stresa. We are the only nation which has—good old Eton—tried to play to the rules. The rules were drawn up in the middle of a dirty game in progress and gave temporary satisfaction to the excited onlookers, but the umpires, it must be admitted, never thought that the idling goal-keepers, Mussolini and Hitler, would become centre-forwards.

Behind Mussolini and Hitler there is such a surging, tumultuous, kaleidoscopic background of European pieces of coloured glass that

every time one tries to focus them into shape the pattern changes, sometimes into a quiet church window, more often into an incomprehensible chaos of clashing colour. We all ask each other the meaning of these technicolour silly symphonies, and wish to God for some intelligible answer.

Personally, I don't think there is any answer. Dictators cannot, from their very nature and power, be answerable to any human chord or conception; they must live on their own fat, vanity and personal achievements; they must conceal their failures by their successes; they must be successful. Mussolini succeeded beyond his wildest dreams and established a new Roman Empire in the face of all the sanctions imposed by the League. Hitler, gaining confidence from his ruthless and admirable colleague, is now driving a reluctant and unattractive Britannia into the arms of a love-weary France. France (politically), a ripe prey to Communism, has already succumbed to the overtures of a suddenly discovered white Russia. Turkey is busy in the Straits and Japan goes from strength to strength in China.

Britannia should now waive all the rules. This is a very saddening subject, and it is not for me to criticise what is being, or has been, done to alleviate our distress and manifold wickedness. All the same I would like to see two things tried energetically or purposefully—

1. Get the British Empire together, and
2. Have an *Entente Cordiale* with the United States of America—

the joint slogan being "Peace" for the overture, and for the finale "Hell let loose" if necessary.

BREAKING A DOG

By Major G. A. Mitchley, 4-2nd Punjab Regiment.

The use of the word "breaking" is yet another instance of the inaccuracy of the English language. A word which nearer fits the process under discussion is "bending."

My article is not intended for people who keep gun dogs for shooting purposes; they make use of text-books and normally have a well-trained dog. Further they are dealing with a highly intelligent animal, who for generations has been the assistant of man.

I am mainly addressing my remarks to those people who occupy the next room to one at a hotel or an adjoining flat, whose dogs yap furiously at all times of the day and night, and who, in defiance of the shrieks of their owners, do every thing they ought not to do. Also to the owners of another type of dog which invariably drags its master along the road; and to the owner of those dogs which suddenly dash off into the blue and are found again only after a long and tiresome search. I would also include those owners whose dogs, though obedient, obviously are not happy. No one but will admit that the habits I have outlined are reprehensible in the extreme and do not add to the joy of the owner nor his neighbours, and I very much doubt whether the dog gets much fun out of his disobedience.

A factor one can always bear in mind in dealing with a dog is that whatever master does or says is right, and that a dog, if handled in the right way, will take a pleasure in any thing he does.

The object one sets before oneself in breaking a dog is to make him obedient to certain orders, capable of performing certain actions, and to be possessed of character and individuality.

Stated in detail, a dog should when trained—

1. Come when called, and stay until sent away.
2. Lie down when ordered, and stay until released.
3. Walk at heel until ordered away.
4. When roaming at large, to stay within call with one eye on master.
5. Respond immediately to encouragement or discouragement.

To break a dog there are certain essentials without which success is impossible.

Firstly, patience. If you lose your temper with your dog there is no hope of success. Secondly, understanding of the dog's mind. Thirdly, ability to impress your own superior nature on the dog.

Probably the most frequent cause of failure in breaking a dog is due to misapplied thrashings, reprimand, or encouragement. I don't say that thrashing is not necessary but certainly the less physical force applied, the better. Mistakes occur because the owner does not look at the question from his dog's point of view.

Take, for instance, walking at heel. You have got your dog there, when suddenly he shoots off. After much irate shouting and running you collect him, rate him soundly and beat him; you say for leaving your heel. He says for coming back to you, and that the "come here" call or whistle is not to his advantage.

Before proceeding to definite methods of attaining the perfect dog, let us settle the question of beating and reprimand. It is fatal to call a dog to you for a beating; coming to master should always be connected in his mind with some thing good. It's no good running to catch a dog. He has the legs of you every time, and it creates in the dog's mind a sense of superiority over you. A method many trainers adopt is to make the dog lie down and then taking him by the collar lead him away for a few yards: and then thrash him. In this way you stop him from connecting lying down with a thrashing. But you must be certain in your mind that the dog knows the cause of the thrashing and you must be sure that your dog will benefit by a thrashing. Another point, after a thrashing try to wait until the dog shows penitence before you show forgiveness. Now let us take the five things a dog should know and do:

1. *Come when called and stay until sent away.*

That means come at full gallop because he likes coming, and stay until ordered away because you have impressed your will on him.

In all training the system should be by reward. You call the dog and when he comes give him a reward, pat him and tell him what a good dog he is. Do not let him go away until you tell him to do so. As you are presumably training a puppy you will at first have short lessons, increasing the length later. The dog must not get bored at the idea of coming to you. Later, kind words replace rewards and eventually the dog acquires the habit of liking to come to you and will come whatever the distraction.

If in the puppy stage your dog will not come to you, never run after him. A successful trick is to run away from him calling as you go; it is almost invariably successful. If, however, the dog will not come, you must stay in your place calling the dog and have somebody bring him to you.

2. *Lie down when ordered and stay until told to go.*

Here again rewards and kind words achieve the desired end. Gently put the puppy in the desired position saying, "Drop, drop, good dog, good dog," or some such words whilst you keep him down. Later, he will lie down to the word "drop" as he will realise that drop means a piece of meat. When he has learned to drop, increase the distance between you, at the time of giving the order, and the time you keep him down. Later, test him by running away from him and by going round a corner out of his sight. He will at first fail to pass these tests, and on such occasions it is essential that you put the dog back on the very spot where he committed the error.

3. *Walk at heel until ordered away.*

This is a trial to most energetic young dogs. First have the dog on a lead and start by insisting that he is actually behind one knee, not with nose poking round your leg, for that shows he is wanting to get away. Lessons at first must be very short with frequent reward, and here again repeat the words "Heel, good dog" so that he learns the order. If you catch him actually escaping, a sharp tap will assist, but it is no good beating him once he has got away and other ideas have entered his mind. This does not mean that you should overlook a fault. To overlook a fault is fatal in dog training. In this case, as in similar ones, you must content yourself with reprimanding the dog.

4. *When roaming at large, to keep within call with one eye on master.*

As I have said above, a dog always has the legs of his master, but master has the superior mind. From puppyhood never let the dog see that you are worried about his whereabouts. Make him find out where you are. During a walk, at a suitable time hide from him. If he comes, misses you and returns to find you, the lesson has well begun, otherwise call him. When he comes rail at him for losing you. Repeat the process and you will soon have a dog who will not turn a corner without looking back to see if you are following, and

such a dog will not suddenly shoot off into the blue, nor disappear when let out at night.

5. *Respond immediately to encouragement and discouragement.*

This will be a recognition of the encouraging words " yes " and " good," and the discouraging words " no " and " bad," by which a dog is kept under control in all his actions. They are words which will enter into training naturally, and their teaching will result in the dog looking to its master for instructions.

As I said above, each item of training is twofold in nature. First, the performance of an act, and, secondly, the submission to his master's will. The dog is taught to come readily and, having come, to await his master's pleasure. Here is exemplified the great secret of training animals, *i.e.*, impressing one's own superior nature on the lower animal.

During all training this should be borne in mind. If the dog is lying looking at you, stare him out. If away from you, direct your gaze and thoughts at him until he turns towards you. Will him to come to you. This is the way of making an obedient, but not a cowed dog.

From the action of sending a dog away arises another point. Like children dogs need play and here again you as his master should keep him in control during play time by providing the form of amusement, and exercise your control by calling him from amusement, to come to heel or to drop. The amusement may be carrying a stick, chasing and recovering a ball or dashing ahead to investigate the scent of birds hidden in bushes. Whatever it is, do not let him go wild.

Now, the dog's vocabulary. However intelligent a dog may be, he does not understand your conversation. He responds to intonation readily, but the less words he has to learn the better. The following will cover most situations :—

No	..	A deterrent.
Yes	..	An encouragement.
Good	..	Praise.
Bad	..	Reprimand.
Come here	..	To come.
Seek	..	To go and play.
Drop	..	To lie down.
Heel	..	To come in to heel.

Whilst on this subject, remember that in choosing a name for a dog, do not select a name ending with " No " and select one which is not difficult to shout. For instance, Slip or Spot are bad names though popular with dog-owners, Rover and Sandy are easily sounded. Do not try training a puppy in company with friends or other dogs. Take him away by himself where there are no distractions. Later, when training has progressed, you can run him with other human beings or dogs and so perfect his training.

In this short article I have tried to show the main accomplishments a dog should possess, the mental outlook of the dog towards that most difficult subject punishment, the principles on which breaking must be based and the methods of producing the results.

Every dog presents a different problem. Some resent a beating, some thrive under it. Some are timid and must be encouraged, and some are boisterous and must be restrained; but bearing in mind always the principles and your own dog's peculiarities, you will by these methods achieve obedience and trust, and produce a happy and well-mannered dog, who looks to you for his games and amusement and who looks on you as something most marvellous.

THE WAZIRISTAN EXPERIMENTAL RIFLE COURSE.

An Address to the Officers, of the Razmak Brigade by the District Commander.

1. Our object in war is to kill.

2. What arms have we got with which to do this killing ?

Artillery

The targets presented being usually small, vague and elusive, the effect of the 3·7″ howitzer is mainly moral. Targets like those at Pioneer Piquet in 1919 are rare exceptions. The Mahsuds, at any rate, learnt a lesson they will never forget.

Machine guns

Their effect is largely preventive. They prevent hostile movement. They force the enemy to keep his head down, whereby they help our own movements. Targets on which really destructive M. G. fire can be brought down are rare and then are highly fleeting.

Rifle

There remains the rifle, which, in competent hands, used to be and must again become the real casualty inflicter in war. To do this we must restore the confidence in this weapon lost in the war, due, partly, to siege conditions but even more to the untrained men then in the ranks who lacked the skill to use the rifle effectively hence all belief in its value as a man-killer. The inferiority complex, thus begotten, must be got rid of. When confronted with an enemy, the tendency is still for the rifleman to look over his shoulder for the M. G. or the automatic to do his killing for him. Whereas he can and must exterminate them himself without more ado.

3. Now to hit anything with reasonable certainty we must see it clearly; and to do that we must be comparatively close—say within 300 yards of head and shoulder targets.

At longer ranges, we need to eliminate the factor of human error, to increase the stability of the barrel and to make up for the loss of visual clearness, hence of accuracy, by increasing the volume of fire.

Here the automatic comes in, especially to produce covering fire, which is its special rôle.

4. If we are to achieve our object and improve our killing capacity on the hill-sides, as indeed in all wars, we have got to set ourselves an ideal. And here it is.

The rifleman must never fire a shot except with the firm and reasonable intention of killing.

Otherwise, his virtue as a killer becomes debauched and his confidence in himself deteriorates.

Firing to frighten, prophylactic fire are utterly taboo ; apart from the waste of ammunition, which on the frontier we cannot afford, it heartens the enemy to find we are noisy but harmless.

5. Our rifle training must aim at ability to hit targets which are both small and inconspicuous with only brief exposures ; often coming as a surprise ; usually uphill or downhill and not on the level ; moreover they may have to be engaged whilst on the move.

So here is a second ideal to work up to.

In the conditions just given, if we can score one hit out of three shots, inside 300 yards, we shall unquestionably win our fights.

6. How are we to reach this efficiency ?

The Bisley method with its wholly artificial conditions ; the large conspicuous target, indefinitely exposed to a firer on a smooth platform, over level ground, bears no relation to the needs of training for war.

The firer can dally till a cloud shadow has passed, till a puff of wind is over, till his breath and heart-beats are just right, till his sights and trigger pressure are perfect.

Then and not before does he release his bullet.

Such methods, if not overdone, have their value in the preliminary introduction of the recruit to his rifle ; thereafter having no relation to war conditions, they become positively harmful.

We have got to unlearn a lot of what we have drummed into our men before they can become effective snapshooters.

You will find this very much so with the use of the sights, wherein we have got to get nearer to shotgun methods.

7. To start with the most difficult form of snapshooting, from the soldier's standpoint, namely, when on the move. Try out the following procedure :

(*a*) He must come to a standstill, facing his target, with his left foot and left shoulder forward.

Unless his foot-work is right he will not be balanced, without which good shooting is impossible.

Forthwith, he must point at the target with his left hand.

(*b*) The weight of the rifle must be *between* the hands; this is impossible if the left hand is at the "point of balance," hence push the left hand forward as far as the sling will allow.

The rifle must be horizontal or the impetus of the swing, when coming up to the aim, will cause wild shooting; keep both elbows close to the sides: this is a position which can be maintained without any strain on the muscles.

(*c*) When mounting the rifle to the shoulder it must be kept horizontal, the left hand constantly aiming at the target.

In snapshooting the smooth mounting of the rifle is far more important than smooth trigger pressure.

If the left hand has done its job, and after a little practice its accuracy is remarkable, only small adjustments of alignment will be necessary after the butt has been brought firmly to the shoulder. Then, without any pause, the shot is fired.

The men must be taught to aim low, at the ground line of their targets, to overcome the usual tendency to fire high; even if they do shoot low the ricochet or stones thrown up may strike the target.

This aiming low is doubly necessary in poor light conditions.

8. As to snapshooting when halted—

The position adopted must suit the ground and the cover available; the less strain it imposes on the muscles the better.

Here again, the left shoulder must be forward, the rifle horizontal and the left hand be aimed at the target as soon as it appears.

Again, we need swift, smooth mounting of the rifle to the shoulder and the firm bedding of the butt.

Due to the tribesmen's love of being on higher ground, most of our shooting will be uphill and unless a sangar is available the best position is probably lying on the stomach.

For downhill shooting that position is unsuitable—the blood runs to the head and the neck muscles are strained. So try lying on the back with legs crossed and feet locked, the rifle resting between the knees, the butt in the right arm-pit.

For accurate shooting without a rest, this latter position has no equal.

Another useful position both downhill and on the level is sitting with the feet crossed and inter-locked, thereby making the knees a firmer support than when sitting with the feet apart.

Do not merely try and then discard these suggestions because they are unfamiliar to you; they are worth a full trial.

In this matter, don't have cut and dried notions. What suits a long, supple fellow will not necessarily suit the short sturdy type.

9. Try working the men in pairs; whilst the one shoots, the other observes the enemy and the strike of the bullet.

Before a battalion starts this course, I suggest the need of forming a British Officers cadre to show the way, to find out the difficulties and to overcome them.

10. Remember this course is still in an experimental stage; we hope to become wiser and to be able to improve it as we proceed. In this, I look to you for help. You know the object which is to make our shooting battleworthy.

Apply this acid test to any suggestion you think of putting forward.

It is not enough that you should put your men through this course as a routine. I want much more than that. I ask for your enthusiasm, that you should believe as firmly as I do in the need of restoring our rifle efficiency in battle to its proper place, and that in this experimental course we have the nucleus of a method, if no more, whereby we can achieve this important, indeed this vital object.

THE CITY OF LONDON AND REGIMENTAL PRIVILEGES

By C. Grey

The privilege claimed and exercised by certain English regiments and the Royal Marines of marching through the City of London in "panoply of war" is one whose origin is impossible to trace, there being absolutely no documentary evidence as to its grant in the records of the regiments concerned, the War Office, or the City of London. All the claims are based on an original connection with the armed forces of the City and its Liberties (adjacent suburbs), these being the "Trained Bands," or the garrison of the Tower, both existing before the institution of the regular Standing Army.

All these forces being local troops, composed of citizens, both officers and soldiers, paid (when necessary) by City funds or subscriptions, were what may be called a domestic body, never likely to use their assembled armed formations to the detriment of their fellow citizens. Hence it was a matter of course that they should march fully armed and with the military music of the period, through the City they were armed and trained to defend at need. Why this matter-of-fact ceremonial should be so highly prized by those who claim descent from the Civic troops is a mystery to those who do not know or realise the supreme importance regiments attach to anything which singles them out from the mass.

At present there are four regiments which claim and exercise the privilege on opportunity; these being the Grenadier Guards, the Buffs or East Kent Regiment, the Royal Fusiliers or City of London Regiment, and the Royal Marines. Up to the late decades of the last century the only one said to be entitled to the privilege was the Buffs, but since then it has been claimed by and conceded to the others. Before proceeding to analyse these claims, the evidence on which they are founded and the possible origin of the ceremonial, it will be useful, in view of so many of the claims being based on descent from the London Trained Bands, to give some brief account of that once justly famous body of Citizen soldiers.

The Trained Bands of the Counties and Cities were composed of men selected from the general body, liable to military service and trained to the use of arms and military movements by experts. Those of London were controlled and maintained by the City itself (including

the Liberties) and no other troops were permitted to enter the City without special permission, for in those days an apparently peaceful progression might turn into a sudden assault or armed occupation. Hence the present privilege of certain regiments may be taken to mean that they are adopted by it (the City).

Even now the right of the City to forbid entrance to any armed body other than of their own men, is perpetuated by the fact that even the King, when he has occasion to enter the City with his escort, asks formal permission from the Lord Mayor at Temple Bar Memorial. After the institution of the Standing Army, no troops belonging to it were allowed to enter the City, either as regiments or recruiting parties, without displaying a written request from the Secretary of State in Council to the Lord Mayor. It seems to me that it is from these recruiting orders permitting small parties to enter the City with arms, drums and colours (of sorts) that the present elaborate procession of a whole regiment has evolved. "Great trees from little acorns grow."

This supposition is confirmed by the admissions of the historians of the Buffs and the Royal Marines, both of whom have been unable to find any orders relating to the passage of troops through the City since the coming of the Standing Army, other than those for what were called *beating up* parties desirous of obtaining men *in* the City. Such parties invariably consisted of a small party of soldiers of the regiment, a drum and fife, the company colour, so long as they existed, and later a regimental flag of sorts, the whole under command of a sergeant or subaltern officer. They are frequently mentioned in the works of Smollett and Fielding.

Each was provided with an order of which the following is a copy. With one exception all these orders on the City were for the one occasion and a limited number of men specified therein. That exception, which also relates to the Buffs,[1] will be mentioned later.
Charles Rex

"Wee doe hereby authorise you John Mowat, one of the Serjeants of Captain Manleys Company of the Holland Regiment, now in garrison at the Isle of Jersey, to raise by beat of drum thirty-two volunteers for the said Company. Provided that, in case you beat your drum in the City of London or the Liberties thereof, you shall, before you beat the sayde Drum, shew this our Warrant

[1] History of the Buffs, pp. 143 and 153.

to Our Right Worthy and well beloved the Lord Mayor of London . . ." The rest which relates to billeting, passage, etc., may be omitted. The exception runs—

Charles Rex

"These are to authorise you, Colonel Thomas Howard, to give orders to Captaines Henry Pomeroy and Baptist Alcock respectively, of the Holland Regiment under the Command of Our Trusty and Well beloved Colonel Sir Walter Vane, to raise, by beate of Drumm twenty volunteers apaice for the recruiting of their Companies. And also to *give orders, from time to time to anie captaines of the sayde Holland Regiment*, by beate of Drumm, to raise volunteers for the recruiting of their companies. Provided always that when, and soe often as anie of them shall goe about raising the sayde volunteers within Our Citty of London they shall first show this Our Warrant to the Major (mayor) of the Citty of London and the Liberties thereof and *that they shall raise no more than will be sufficient to complete their establishment* . . . .

Given at Whitehall the 29th Day of April 1672

Arlington (Secretary) "

The order to Serjeant Mowat is dated September 1670. Though it is known that such orders for recruiting were issued to the Guards and other existing regiments up to the end of the Century, that to Colonel Howard is the only one giving a general and unlimited sanction. It is on this that the Buffs apparently rely to shew that their claim on London as a birthplace was acknowledged. Having in mind the fact that the first time they made such a march was not until the middle of the Nineteenth Century, which may have been for want of opportunity, certainly, Line regiments being very seldom quartered in London, it would appear that the then Colonel, knowing the history of the regiment, took the opportunity of being stationed at the Tower to *chance* a march and, having got away with it, established a precedent. I see no other solution.

Let us now enter upon the account of the Trained Bands as being one essential to an understanding of the claims. The earliest mention of the armed forces of the City of London is in 1509[1] when Henry VIII reviewed 3,000 Bows and Bills at Cheapside where they had marched from the Conduit through the City and home again to their assembly ground at Moorfields. This is the first known mention of any procession of troops through the City. In 1539[2]

[1] Mackay's History of London, p. 201.
[2] Stow's Annals of London, p. 39.

he again held a review at Westminster of no less than 15,000 soldiers with " drums, music, etc.," they having marched there through the City.

A few months later the Honourable Artillery Company was formed from these forces, whose claim on it was recognised by the fact that the governing body must, according to the Rules of 1659[1] always include four Field officers of the Trained Bands. In 1562 Queen Elizabeth reviewed 3,000 London soldiers in Hyde Park, and in 1572[2] (February) she gave orders in Council to the City to select and specially train 3,000 of the best men in view of danger from Spain. These men she reviewed at Greenwich on May Day 1572, and what then happened is thus described by Roger Williams, one of them:

[3]" On this time there was a faire muster of Londoners before the Queens Maiestie at Greenwich. Amongst them were divers captaines and soludjers who had served some in Scotland, some in Ireland and some in France and, having nothing to doe with the help and countenance of great men who favoured the cause and the Deputties of Flushing Captain Thomas Morgan levied a faire company of 300 men of whom many were officers who had commaunded before together with manie gentlemen to the least of 100 of whom I was one. This band was the first that served the Netherlanders and arrived in good time for them (a week later) Flushing was in great distress."

This body of Trained Band men was the first of the many score thousands which England sent over during the next 90 years, many from London which at times furnished complete regiments, and always a greater or smaller number of recruits as needed. Many of the survivors returned to London, there to retake their place in the Trained Bands and, by example and precept, bring them up to that excellence which made them the best of all the troops engaged on the Parliamentary side in the Civil War[4]. The Muster Roll of the City troops in the year 1588 shews them as consisting of 45 Companies of 150 men in each, of which 40 belonged to the City and 5 to the Liberties.

Though those of the City were classified into East, West, North and South regiments, that was not strictly correct; for each company

[1] Journal Army Historical Research, Vol. VII, p. 5.
[2] History of Buffs, p. 7.
[3] Actions in the Low Countries, H. B., p. 7.
[4] J. A. H. Research, Vol. IV, p. 64.

was independent under its captain and flew its own colour of different combinations, the only thing in common being the Red Cross. Westminster only had a Captain and Colonel to each company. The total was 7,150, of whom a third carried pikes. For the Armada menace London contributed 10,000 men, of whom the 1,000 at Tilbury appear to have been brought back (temporarily) from Holland. By 1599[1] the companies had dropped to 15, having a total strength of 3,375 men. In 1612[2] a revival set in, the men being now assembled in regular regiments complete with Colonel and staff and trained by officers and soldiers returned from Holland.

There were eleven regiments in all, these being the Red, Blue, Yellow, Orange, Green and White of the City itself, the Red and Blue of Westminster, and the First and Second Tower Hamlets. Strype[3] records that they became regular academies of military training, outsiders resorting there for training which proved useful in the Civil Wars when such men largely officered the Parliamentary regiments. Increased to 15 full regiments numbering 18,000, the City troops under the command of Phillip Skippon, a veteran of the Dutch Wars, were the most reliable of the Parliamentary troops until the institution of the New Model Army. Of them Clarendon[4] wrote :—

> " The London Trained Bands and auxiliary regiments, who men till then had held too cheap in estimation, behaved themselves to a wonder and were in truth the preservation of that army that day (Newbury). For they stood as a bulwark and rampire to defend the rest and, when their wings of horse were scattered and dispersed (by Rupert), kept their ground so steadily that though Prince Rupert Himself led up the choice horse to charge them he endured their storm of small shot, but making no impression on their stand of pikes was forced to wheel about."

They behaved similarly well at Naseby and Marston Moor, and it was a tribute to them that Phillip Skippon,[5] who had risen from private to Captain in the " English Dutch Brigade," was selected to raise and train the New Model. After the war he returned to London as Captain General. The next we hear of the Trained Bands was when they were called out to quell the Fifth Monarchy Rebellion

[1] J. A. H. Research, Vol. IV, p. 69.
[2] Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 161.
[3] Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 161.
[4] Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 161.
[5] Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 198.

in which, though at first driven back by the insurgents,[1] they rallied and held them until the arrival of the Guards whom they assisted to break and capture the rebels.

In 1662 Charles II had the Militia Act passed, though it only affected the Trained Bands by changing their titles and by taking away the Tower Hamlets Regiments for the Lieutenant of the Tower. But the old title still held good in general until the force was broken up in 1784. In 1688 they were called out for the defence of London. Incidentally, one of their Companies[2] rescued Judge Jeffries from the mob, while two regiments held strong points in the City. In 1692 the City forces were increased to 9,000 in view of a possible invasion by the French, but were not required, whereon the additional men were discharged.

The Muster Roll of the Militia of London and its Liberties in 1710[3] shews six regiments in London City and two at Westminster. Each was commanded by a Knight and consisted, with the exception of Westminster, of eight companies of 120 with three officers. The Red Regiment of Westminster had 12 companies, and the Blue 9, the total strength being over 7,000. They were called out for the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, after which we hear no more of them till the Gordon Riots of 1780, when they were again called out. The new Militia Act of 1784 removed the old Trained Bands entirely from the control of the Civil authorities, thus ending a body of citizen soldiers who in their time had served both London and their country exceeding well. We now turn to the connection of the regiments claiming the privilege, with the Trained Bands.

The English soldiers who had served the Dutch for so many years, were, after the Peace of Munster in 1648,[4] reduced to the regiments that had been permanently instituted in 1595. In 1664 these numbered about[5] 60 officers and just over 1,700 men, all on garrison duty. Besides these there was a Scots Brigade of about 45 officers and 1,100 men, similarly employed. Though these Brigades had been left untouched during the war of 1652, it was now resolved to give them the option of renouncing their British allegiance, uniforms, colours, etc., or immediate dismissal.

[1] Mackay's History of London, p. 309.
[2] Old and New London, Vol. I, p. 136.
[3] J. A. H. Research, Vol. XII, p. 103.
[4] History of the Buffs, pp. 78-79.
[5] History of the Buffs, p. 87.

All but three Scots officers accepted the terms, but of the English only 25 officers, most of whom had served the Parliament, and a small number of men accepted. All the *recusants* were immediately disbanded in Holland, but being repatriated were, soon after arrival in England formed into the Holland Regiment under one of their old Colonels, Robert Sydney. They were placed on the Naval establishment as an additional Maritime unit, and as such remained until 1667 when they came on the land establishment of the Standing Army. As the "Holland Regiment" they remained until 1689, when on the Duke of York's Regiment being *broken*, its then title of Prince George of Denmark's passed to them as the next senior.

It is, therefore, fairly evident that the Buffs may claim descent from the Trained Bands. We will now take the case of the Royal Marines, who claim to inherit from the Duke of York and Albany's Maritime Regiment of Foot, raised for sea service on the 28th of October 1664.[1] It was commanded by Sir William Killigrew, though he was then still the Colonel of the 3rd Regiment of the English-Dutch Brigade, and during the interval between the disbandment of the English Regiments in Holland and their re-formation in that country seems to have taken into its ranks the repatriated privates.

It also passed into the land service in May 1667, dropping the title of Maritime, though it was for some time still occasionally called the Lord Admiral's Regiment. It is said that this regiment was largely recruited from the City Trained Bands, which is doubtful, as by that time these had dropped back to their normal composition of employees and apprentices of the merchants, etc., of London, and were hardly likely to have enlisted as temporary soldiers—the regiments of those days being greatly reduced after the end of a war. Probably they got a number of London-born men as they were known to have *beaten up* in the City.

As the Duke of York's Regiment it served afloat and ashore (in common with all other existing regiments) also providing companies for emergency regiments, formed from the Guards and Holland itself, for service in France, Virginia and at Tangiers. Now, though on his accession, James II relinquished the honorary Colonelcy of the regiment to Prince George of Denmark, husband of the future Queen Anne, he still considered it his own and, in accordance with

1 History of the Buffs, p. 113.

his policy of Catholicising the Army, introduced a number of Catholic officers and men into it ; a policy which ended it in 1689 and caused it to be kept in the background during the troubles which ended in his deposition.

After the accession of William III, he decided to retain his Dutch Guards and the English and Scots Dutch Brigades (newly formed in 1674, three regiments in each), and to replace them in Holland by those thought or known to be dissatisfied. Amongst these were the Guards, the Royal Scots, the Prince George's Regiment and the Holland Regiment. The Guards were humiliated by the inglorious part they had taken in the late revolution, the Royal Scots had Stuart sympathies, the "Prince's" Catholic officers and men, and the "Holland" had recently been commanded by a Catholic nobleman.

These regiments and others were ordered to different ports for embarkation in February 1689. The Royal Scots mutinied at Ipswich on the way to Harwich and turned back for Scotland. Being at once pursued, they were rounded up and brought back to Harwich where they embarked only 300 strong, nearly all of whom deserted to the French later. The others eventually embarked except the "Prince's" which now disappeared, the only trace being an order for its payment as having been "Broake" on the 28th of February 1689,[1] and another order transferring men to the Coldstream Guards. No reason is given, but it would appear that the sailing of James II with an invading force precipitated the end.

The order is laconic enough, as contained in a Treasury Pay Roll, merely stating that the regiment was "broke" on the 28th February and directing payment "of such further sums as you have paid the sayd regiment from the first of March 1689 to the date of their disbandment." This apparently refers to the men mentioned in the following order :—

> "Our Will[2] and Pleasure is that the Sevll private soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Prince George of Denmark's Regiment now at Gravesend be put aboard the ships bound for Holland and incorporated, as they are hereby incorporated in Our Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards."
>
> "Given at Whitehall the 19th Day of March 1689."

[1] History of the Buffs, p. 280.
[2] History of the Buffs, p. 281.

The title of the disbanded regiment passed to the next senior, "The Holland," which henceforth dropped its old title. The fate of the officers is nowhere explained. Probably many had already deserted to the deposed King, and the others accepted their dismissal quietly to avoid further trouble. By the mention of *ships* it would appear that there were still a number of men to be turned over to the Coldstreams, these probably being the Protestant soldiers. As will be seen by the foregoing, the men passed to the Coldstream, and the title to the Holland, thus making these regiments, especially the former, heirs to anything the old Maritime Regiment could claim.

The only historian who gives any reason for the sudden and unadvertised disbandment of the regiment is Hannay in his "History of the Navy" who states that it was due to its "being too much attached to the deposed King," which was undoubtedly the real reason. A further difficulty in the claim of the present Marines is the fact that, between 1689 and 1755, there were many other regiments of Marines raised and disbanded. These were *Pembroke's*[1] and *Torrington's* in 1690, disbanded two years later. Next come four regiments (unnamed) that lasted only a year. We now find *Holt's* and *Harmon's*, raised in 1702 and disbanded in 1711. Then comes a gap of 28 years, when six regiments[2] *Moreton's*, *Wynyard's*, *Lowther's*, *Douglas'*, *Robinson's* and *Wolfe's* were raised, to be also disbanded in November 1748.

As the present regiment was raised in 1755, it would be interesting to have the reasoning which bridges these ditches and climbs the fences, or levels them to form an unbroken connection with the regiment of 1664. The only thing we can find in connection with the claim of the Marines is the following anecdote quoted in the history of the Buffs, which curiously enough takes it as proof. All it does really establish is that a party was recruiting for the Marines in the usual manner, and that these were one of the Marine Regiments disbanded in 1748. It runs:

> "In the year 1746[3] as a *detachment*! of Marines were beting along Cheapside, a magistrate came up to the officer and told him to desist from disturbing the peace of the City with his drumming. The officer immediately replied 'Sir, we are Marines.'

[1] J. A. H. Research (Army Lists), Vol XI, p. 155.
[2] J. A. H. Research (Army Lists), Vol XI, p. 155.
[3] History of Buffs, p. 155.

'Oh Sir,' said the magistrate, 'I did not know that. Pray continue.'"

The claim of the Grenadier Guards is based on the allegation that their 3rd Battalion was raised in London, mainly from the Trained Bands. I can find nothing for or against it in the general military history of the City, so at that must leave it for the Royal Fusiliers or City of London Regiment. As this was raised in 1685 from a nucleus of three old companies of Independents garrisoning the City, and as they have also absorbed the Tower Hamlets Militia as auxiliary battalions, their claim to be considered "sons of the City" seems indisputable.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

The Changing Aspect of Operations on the North West Frontier

Dear Sir,

Shpagwishtama's article on the above subject, which was published in your April number, is very interesting reading and there is much food for thought in the various points he brings up. I think, however, that he overstates the case when he remarks on " the vast strides made by the Pathan in sniping," at any rate, as far as sniping at night is concerned. It is a curious fact that the tribes inhabiting the country North of the Kabul river have always expended a vast amount of ammunition in night sniping during frontier operations in comparison with the Afridis, Orakzais and Mahsuds of the South, who are much more canny in this respect. Those who took part in the Mohmand Expedition of 1908 will have vivid recollections of sniping at night, and I think I am right in saying that, beyond Ghalanai, every camp occupied during the operations was heavily sniped, sometimes only for an hour or two and at other times nearly all night. In those days there was less ponderosity and steam-roller business in frontier operations than at present, and in the course of three weeks two brigades traversed practically the whole of Mohmand country. The result was that, as troops were never in one camp for more than a night or two, it was almost impossible to initiate anti-sniping measures which, to ensure success, require an intimate knowledge of the ground and a close study of the habits of the snipers. On one occasion a party was sent out (from Nahakki camp as far as I remember) to snipe the snipers, but the result was most regrettable. They were Afridis, all volunteers for the job, and instead of stalking the snipers they stalked off to their homes in Tirah, taking their Government rifles and ammunition with them. Again at Rustum camp on the Buner border in 1915, the sniping was very heavy every night for about a week, until the lashkars occupying the passes into Buner had dispersed and all opposition ceased. There the snipers were Bunerwals and Hindustani Fanatics, the latter easily recognisable by their cries (in Hindustani) of " Takra ho jao," to which our men would reply : " What are you doing in our latrines ? Come out and show yourselves," and other remarks of an indelicate nature. What Shpagwishtama describes as " a 1935 invention " was tried at

Rustum with complete success, the target being a wooded graveyard within 200 yards of the perimeter, which snipers were in the habit of occupying. One night, as soon as sniping started from this locality, a section of field guns loosed off ten rounds gun-fire from the perimeter ; whereupon the sniping stopped abruptly and the graveyard was never again occupied. Another expedient which was tried with success at Rustum was the construction, by an ingenious sapper, of a Heath Robinson fougasse, operated by a trip wire and located in a likely place. It went off with a roar the very first night and next morning a sword and a pair of blood-stained chaplis were found on the site. Yet another expedient was the digging of a deep pit, filled with spikes and covered over and camouflaged with grass and sand, in a *nullah*-bed close to camp. This was successful in so far that a would-be sniper fell plumb into it—and no doubt got the shock of his life—but he left no blood or other trophies behind him. A very important item for protection at night, of which Shpagwishtama makes no mention, is light, which the Pathan hates above all things and will not face. At Rustum we successfully blocked a *nullah*—which had been regularly used by snipers—for a night, by the simple expedient of placing a hurricane lamp shaded with a kerosene oil tin so that it lit up the *nullah*-bed. The second night, however, the lamp was hit by a bullet (as was inevitable sooner or later) and smashed to smithereens.

Then we got hold of a searchlight, which in those days was a curiosity on the frontier ; and thereby hangs a tale !

The camp was situated on open ground, easily defended on all sides except the east, where a number of small *nullahs* converged to within 75 yards of the perimeter. To guard this flank a camp piquet was built overlooking the junction of the nearest two *nullahs*. The searchlight was placed on the perimeter behind this piquet and it was arranged that as soon as the piquet commander telephoned that the snipers had arrived (they used to creep up extraordinarily close as we had no bombs), the light would go on and the piquet open fire. This sounded grand and both O. C. Piquet and O. C. Searchlight were all of a " doodah " in anticipation. As soon as it was dark, Searchlight could be heard at intervals whispering hoarsely down the telephone : " Sister Anne, Sister Anne, are they coming, are they coming ? " And eventually the reply came from Sister Anne " By Gum, they've come. Turn on the light." On flashed the light—a

pause—and then BANG from the piquet. " Did you get him ? " says Searchlight. " I don't think so," replies Sister Anne, " the blighter keeps bobbing about. Hang on a minute." Another nerve-wracking pause—then BANG—BANG. Searchlight, with his eyes popping out of his head and his ear glued to the phone, heard a gurgling noise and the voice of Sister Anne who sputtered: " Damn, I've been shooting at my own shadow."

So that was that ! But nevertheless the searchlight proved invaluable and sniping at short range ceased forthwith.

Note.—Sister Anne is not, like the writer, a sojourner in the sloth-belt—one of the " By Jove boys " mentioned by Shpagwishtama—but is still serving bravely upon the Bloody Border and should these lines catch his eyes, he will no doubt blushingly recall the searchlight incident and be able to vouch for the truth of it.

Yours faithfully,

" SHIGGADAR."

REVIEWS

Mountain Warfare on the Sand Model

By Major D. B. Mackenzie, b.a. (Oxon.)

(Messrs. William Clowes, London) 5sh.

This book gives a series of sand model exercises, designed to teach the more elementary routine and tactics of mountain warfare. It should help to overcome the difficulties of this type of training in stations where suitable ground is not available.

The introductory sections and the full notes which accompany the exercises and solutions give a clear picture of the problems which troops operating on the frontier can only overcome if properly trained.

There is much sound practical advice in the book, which, though perhaps common knowledge in units with long experience of frontier warfare, should prove very useful to units and individuals new to frontier conditions. There are also a series of questions and answers suitable for N. C. O.'s examinations.

The Advanced Guard exercise is open to the criticism that adequate covering fire has not been provided by the Advanced Guard Commander, in that a vital piquet is moving up with no machine gun support. This may be due to the author's desire to teach one lesson at a time and to keep the exercise simple. There is, however, danger in neglecting to arrange for covering fire to be immediately available.

One other small criticism concerns the loading of pistols. The point of only loading five chambers is to avoid accidents. The chamber under the hammer should be empty and not the one " next for duty " as the author suggests on page 47. The danger of accident lies in the pistol falling and striking the hammer when equipment is removed. When the trigger is pulled it should be for business, and there may be no chance to pull it twice !

Major Mackenzie's book should prove of value to units both on and off the frontier, and will be found very useful for the training of junior leaders in the individual training period.

R. L. G.

The Liao-Yang Campaign

By A. H. Burne

(*Messrs. William Clowes, London,* 1936) 5*sh. nett*

The writer excuses himself for adding to the literature on this campaign by the fact that the Russian Official History has received too little attention: a translation of this—and then only in French—did not begin to make its appearance until after our own Official History. A study of the Russian History naturally throws more light on the personalities of the Russian Commanders than was previously available.

The book sets out to study leadership and the clash of personalities on the Russian side, and the human element receives far more attention than usual. By cutting out tactical and other irrelevant details, the writer succeeds in his task and gives a broad view of the campaign in a very easily read narrative.

Being wise after the event, historians have been prone to attribute every failure to Kuropatkin's incompetence. In the introduction we find a suggestion that Kuropatkin may have been a Jellicoe where a Beatty was required: the text does not attempt to maintain this over-statement, but it is refreshing to find Kuropatkin getting a fair deal.

The dangers of political appointments to command in the field, the resulting lack of team work, and the lack of initiative in subordinate commanders which follows upon repeated interference from above are amongst the lessons which are excellently brought out.

No one is more fitted to write an introduction than Sir Ian Hamilton, who gives the book his blessing.

J. M. H.

Survey of International Affairs, 1934

By A. S. Toynbee and V. M. Boulter

(*Oxford University Press, London*) 28 *shillings*

This is the latest in the series of volumes on this subject published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In effect it is a world history of the year under review, and is full of detail which would hardly find a place with the ordinary historian. There are four main sections: World Economic Affairs, The Middle East, Europe and The Far East.

In the section on Economic Affairs, Mr. H. U. Hodson deals in a lucid manner with the many occurrences of 1934, starting with the devaluation of the American dollar and its results. The European countries still on the gold standard have a chapter to themselves, as have German financial affairs. Perhaps the most interesting part of this section deals with the progress of the British Empire towards economic recovery. The whole section is well written and particularly easy to follow, while the conclusions drawn are such as to give rise to much speculation.

In the section dealing with the Middle East prominence is given to the problems of Iraq and Palestine, the latter being of more than usual interest at the present time. The march of events in Austria and the relations between Austria and Germany form the subject of a long article in the Europe section, as do the history of the Franco-German relations in the Saar and the development of the foreign policy of the U. S. S. R. As regards The Far East one would have wished for more on the subject of China and Japan, though 1934 was a year in which affairs in this area were more quiescent than they are to-day.

This is definitely a book for the student rather than the casual reader. It is a mine of information, but the very prolixity of the subjects dealt with and the detail which it contains make it difficult to assimilate. An invaluable reference book, its subject-matter can only be absorbed in small doses.

D. H.

His Excellency Sir HARRY HAIG, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.,
Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, India.