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**Lt.-General Sir Henry E. ap Rhys Pryce, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.,
Master-General of the Ordnance in India.**

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EDITORIAL

In spite of the efforts made by the League during the summer of 1935 to avert war, Italy refused to be turned **Italy and Abyssinia.** aside from her object and on the 3rd October commenced operations against Abyssinia without a formal declaration of war. It is not proposed to give a detailed account of the progress of these operations. Enough has appeared in the Press, not only to interest all students of the situation, but to mystify them thoroughly as to what is really the true state of affairs.

After a practically unopposed Italian advance to Makale in the North, and to a short distance into Ogaden in the South, there has been little movement on either front for some time.

The original Italian Commander-in-Chief, General de Bono, apparently hoped to gain his object by the employment of mechanized forces to as great an extent as possible, coupled with a definite road-building programme. Considerable friction was reported between the various Italian Commanders in the field, a parallel to the Adowa Campaign, and, finally, General de Bono was superseded by Marshal Badoglio, the Italian Chief of the General Staff.

It appears that the Italians have relied on mechanization to a greater extent than is warranted by the nature of the country, and that Marshal Badoglio has been forced to halt, not only partially to convert his transport system from a mechanized to a pack basis, but also to clear the country behind, and on the flanks of his advancing columns. It is unlikely, in view of the difficulties on the L. of C.

that a further general advance will be possible in the near future. The time factor operates against the Italians, who hope to gain as much ground as possible before the spring rains ; and in favour of the Abyssinians, who need time in which to organise and equip their forces with the munitions that are now allowed to be imported. There are signs that the Abyssinians are already adopting a more aggressive attitude, and the next few weeks should be more fruitful of events.

It is not the local situation in Abyssinia, however, that is the chief object of world interest at the moment, but the efforts of the League and of its leading members to bring the war to a close. On October 12th fifty-one out of fifty-four nations voted in favour of the application of sanctions. The date on which these were introduced was the 18th November, and it was decided to place an embargo on the supply of certain raw materials and key products to Italy. Considerable protest was made by Italy, but the action of the League has not yet had time to have any marked effect upon her actions.

A "Sanction" is the name which legal writers give to measures for securing obedience to the law. These may consist of either (a) moral, (b) diplomatic, (c) financial, (d) economic, or (e) military measures. Of these, only the economic and military measures are likely to be really effective. In view of possible reprisals by the nation against which the latter are applied, and in consequence in this case, the almost certain disturbance of the peace of Europe, if not of the world, it is necessary to avoid military sanctions except in the last resort. The danger is that economic sanctions, if applied really stringently, may lead to military sanctions. It is this danger that politicians fear, and this is the cause of the hesitation to apply restrictions on the supply of oil to Italy.

It is probable that this is also the cause of the desperate efforts that have been made by certain politicians to find an alternative solution acceptable to all parties. The main principles on which what may be termed the Paris proposals were based are :—

- (a) Exchanges of territory advantageous to both Italy and Abyssinia.
- (b) League assistance to Abyssinia for the purpose of social and economic development.
- (c) Special facilities for Italian settlers and companies in connection with this economic development.

In answer to the severe criticisms levelled from many quarters it has been stated that these proposals are a basis of discussion only and before being brought into force must be acceptable, not only to the League, but to Italy and Abyssinia as well.

Whilst it is not possible to foretell the reactions of Italy and the League, Abyssinia has already expressed her disapproval. From her point of view this is understandable. She does not see why a country which has been deemed the aggressor and is acting in defiance of the veto of the League and who, up to the present, has not achieved any real military success, should be given considerable territorial gains at the expense of a fellow member of the League. In the words of the Ethiopian Minister in France "If there is any question of handing over territory to Italy, we shall fight on until no Abyssinian is left alive rather than yield of our own free will to the aggressor."

The Italian point of view may still be taken to be that expressed in an article in the *Popolo d'Italia* of July 31st: "The essential arguments absolutely unanswerable are two, the vital needs of the Italian people and their security in East Africa..... The solution of the problem can only be totalitarian. Any action of expansion or any protectorate must be accompanied by military measures. Italy is the only judge of her security in East Africa. Put in military terms, the Italo-Abyssinian problem is simplicity and logic itself. The problem admits of only one solution, with Geneva, without Geneva, or against Geneva."

Such being the case, and unless Italy has undergone a change of heart, any arbitration between the two countries would seem to be of no avail. The most surprising thing is that Italy has still remained a Member of the League, whilst challenging its authority.

It is impossible to see what the final reaction of Italy to the sanctions will be, but the future cannot be described as hopeful. The prospect of a complete collapse of Italy due to economic pressure, or the disintegration of the League as a possible result of its failure to achieve any result in the present dispute, are factors which, to put it mildly, would tend to increase the feeling of insecurity in Europe.

* * * * *

The Naval conference which met in London on December 9th
The Naval Conference to review and, if possible, revise the existing ratios
in the size of the fleets of the leading naval powers,
is not likely to conclude its deliberations for some time. Previous

attempts to discuss the problem have hitherto met with little success, as none of the Powers has been prepared to sacrifice any of their principles in order to reach a common ground of agreement.

From previous discussions, and from what has appeared in the Press up-to-date, it is evident that Japan, with her demand for parity with the British Empire and the United States, is likely to prove the greatest obstacle to agreement. Her demand for parity and for a quantitative reduction in the size of fleets is based on the theory that "The equal strength of all navies will afford security as the attacking side will always be at a disadvantage."

It is difficult to see the force of this reasoning, as a nation whose territorial interests are limited to the Western Pacific can not have the same naval problems as one whose interests are world-wide. The effect of parity with the British Empire would mean that, in the Far East, at any rate, Japan would have an overwhelming superiority. It is possible that Japan is considering only her policy of penetration in China, and is afraid of anything that would prevent her having the free hand she desires.

It is fortunate that agreement has already been reached between England and Germany, and that we are in close accord with France.

Whilst any plan that would result in a cessation of competitive naval building would be welcomed, recent events have shown more clearly than at any time since the end of the Great War, that the British Empire needs a sufficient and well equipped navy if its interests are to be safeguarded. It is to be hoped that any solution found will not prevent the deficiencies in this respect from being made good.

* * * * *

The disturbances in the Mohmand country, which were mentioned in the October 1935 number of this Journal, led to N. W. F. P. a decision to extend the motor road from Yusuf Khel over the Nahakki Pass into Kamalai-Halimzai territory. The Nahakki Pass was captured without difficulty and with very little opposition, but subsequent operations on the 29th September resulted in heavy casualties in the Nowshera Brigade, especially in the Guides.

The losses inflicted on the enemy on that occasion seem to have been the final effort that was needed to enforce submission, and on

October 1st the Mohmand *Jirga* came in. On October 14th an agreement was signed by which the Mohmands agreed :—

- (a) That the motor road to the Nahakki Plain should be completed without interference.
- (b) That they would be responsible for maintaining friendly relations, and for the action of all outlaws and bad characters against Government or the friends of Government.
- (c) That Government was to be freed from the restrictions imposed by the Ghalanai agreement of 1933.
- (d) In the event of failure to observe these terms, Government to take such action as was necessary.

In return, and in consideration for the number of casualties inflicted, Government decided to impose no fines and to take no hostages. The road to the Nahakki Plain was completed on October 28th, and by the beginning of November all troops had returned to their peace stations.

The situation in the Hazara District was restored comparatively quickly, and a show of force was all that was required to disperse a demonstration of tribesmen who have never been noted for their martial qualities.

The Mohmand operations necessitated the employment of four infantry brigades together with a large amount of artillery and other troops and No. 1 Group, R. A. F. It is to be hoped that the Mohmands will respect the recently concluded agreement better than they did that of 1933. It is doubtful though if the Upper Mohmands will ever be really pacified until such time as a road policy similar to that in Waziristan has been completed.

* * * * *

FIELD MARSHAL SIR PHILIP CHETWODE.

(A slight sketch)

“ I followed power to the last,
 Gave her my best and Power followed Me.
 It’s worth it—on my soul I’m speaking plain,
 Here by the claret glasses, it’s worth it all.
 I gave—no matter what I gave—I win.
 I *know* I win. Mine’s work, good work that lives !”

Kipling.

It is probably as unfair to use these rather bombastic lines as a heading to an article on Sir Philip Chetwode as it was for Kipling to put them into the mouth of the late Lord Dufferin. And yet, although it is inconceivable that the late Commander-in-Chief in India ever consciously followed Power, it is undeniable that Power followed him and that he can, if he chooses, declare in equally unmeasured terms that his work in India will live. But, that is the last thing he will ever do. In the Victorian era Empire builders suffered from no illusions or inhibitions regarding their labours and were gratified to see their splendid exploits advertised in verse or song; it took a great war and victory to teach Englishmen to hide their heads in confused modesty.

When one of the lesser known Greek philosophers stated that a man’s destiny was to be found in his character he possibly had in mind such a man as Sir Philip Chetwode. For when one surveys the career of a young man, who in 1889 joined the 19th Hussars from the militia, and finished his active service last November as a Field Marshal, one of the greatest Commanders-in-Chief that India has ever had, the secret of his success must lie necessarily in the fundamental springs of his character, tradition and upbringing.

Sir Philip was wont to admit that he owed his success in some measure to the education or training he received in the Cavalry arm, which gave him a certain independence and width of outlook. These qualities he certainly has, but it is a moot point if he would have utilised them so advantageously for the Empire if behind them were not that driving character and clearheaded personality.

Of his early years in his regiment, both at home and in India, there is no record, and we may suppose that he followed the traditional pursuits of his contemporaries, polo, racing and shooting. Indeed Sir Philip himself tells the sad story of his racing career brought to an expensive conclusion when it was discovered that his head jockey was in the pay of bookmakers.

Then in the South African War which threw up a select coterie of cavalry leaders all destined later for greater things, Sir Philip was in Ladysmith and lived on horse flesh. After the relief he and a brother officer went to Durban and celebrated their release with lobster mayonnaise and other delicacies. That gastronomical experiment nearly killed him, but may have, for all we know, laid the foundations of his celebrated culinary knowledge.

From 1906 until 1908 Sir Philip was Assistant Military Secretary to General French, then G. O. C.-in-Chief, Aldershot, and it is not unlikely that these few precious years mark the first big stepping-stone of his military career. He got command of his regiment when only forty years of age, and five years later was a Brigadier-General earmarked for the Expeditionary Force.

Of his war services it is unnecessary to write here except to mention in passing their extraordinary variety. The Retreat from Mons with the 5th Cavalry Brigade, followed by command of the 2nd Cavalry Division and promotion to General rank. Then Egypt and Palestine in various high commands (culminating in the command of the corps which took Beer Sheba and Jerusalem) concluding the war as a Lieut.-General commanding an Army Corps. These years of active service brought him several honours and awards, and of these one which gave him great pleasure was an invitation to consider himself a member of "I. Z." for having kept his wicket intact.

Then followed several years of unrelenting toil at the War Office. First as Military Secretary when much of the work of demobilisation of officers and their reposting fell on his shoulders; then a spell as Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff with Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson as his Chief. Two years more as Adjutant-General, and eventually Aldershot reclaimed him as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

When Sir Philip Chetwode came to India in 1928 as Chief of the General Staff it was a foregone conclusion that he would be the next

Commander-in-Chief, and his appointment to that post, the most responsible military command in the Empire, occasioned no surprise.

It is too early yet to appraise his work in India or to place it in its historical perspective. Every year, every month, almost every week produced its major problem until latterly the Field Marshal was in the habit of asking his staff officers; "Well, what's to-day's bombshell?" No problem was too big, no question affecting the training, equipment or health of the forces in India too complicated to daunt him. Indeed, the more difficult the task, the more obstacles to its fulfilment confronted, the more "Oriental delays" encountered, the more did the Field Marshal enjoy its pursuit.

When one looks back on those past five years some idea of the amount of work done can be gained.

We might first of all cast our minds back to the various field operations, particularly those on the North West Frontier. In 1932 and in 1934 the tribesmen tried to interfere with the biennial reliefs to Chitral necessitating military and Air Force action. In 1933 also, 12,000 tribesmen entered Khost in Afghanistan and a serious situation was only averted by the success of the Army in preventing a further exodus and taking measures which secured the return of those who had already crossed the border.

These annual operations, for so long accepted as a necessary evil, were at last recognised as a waste of lives, time and money—if some effort were not made to deal more quickly in future with hostile tribes by crushing incipient rebellion, and it was during Sir Philip's tenure of office that it became axiomatic that every expedition should leave a road (if even a few miles) behind it. Thus in 1933 twenty miles of road were built in the Gandab Valley. In the spring of last year a Brigade with the Royal Air Force assisted the political authorities to re-establish authority in the Loe Agra Salient, and the troops built a road through the hills, and last summer the Gandab road was extended over the Nahakki Pass. Time will show the military and civilising value of these roads, and the credit for them is shared between the Governor of the N. W. F. Province and Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode who loyally supported him.

Whilst the covering troops and field army were thus engaged, Internal Security units had their own less pleasant duties. The activities of the Red Shirts in the N. W. F. Province; nearly twelve months of armed rebellion in Burma; terrorism in Bengal; serious

situations in the Indian States of Kashmir and Alwar; bloody communal riots in Cawnpore and Bombay; a massacre narrowly averted in Karachi. All these called for military intervention, and the Chief, watching these grim happenings anxiously and carefully, never interfered with the "man on the spot" but gave him wholeheartedly his support, confidence and backing.

It has been said that "G" work was Sir Philip's especial favourite, and to a certain extent this is true if it means that he waxed more enthusiastically over questions of training than he did over drains. But there are files in every branch of A. H. Q., dealing with every imaginable subject, which bear the impress of his clear brain and rapid grasp of the pith of "the matter under reference." His knowledge, for instance, of Ceremonial Drill was as detailed as his conception of how an officer's bungalow should be constructed. He took a deep interest in the welfare of British troops in the East and introduced several reforms which will add to their comfort and well-being.

These are all minor points when compared with the two major problems which were in the foreground throughout his whole tenure of office, Indianisation and Economy. Increased Indianisation of the forces in India was one of the foremost demands made by the delegates at the various Round Table Conferences. The logic of the demand in the new Constitution is impeccable, and Sir Philip was confronted with the unenviable task of satisfying legitimate political aspirations so far as it seems possible to go at present without imperilling the efficiency of the services. He himself would say it now rests with Indians to prove that it can be carried further.

Giving every encouragement, personally and officially, to the birth and growth of the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun, he set his face sternly against any forensic political pressure in the legislatures until each step had been tested, each rung surmounted. At the same time he faithfully carried out the Indianising policy of the Government of India and the Home authorities and, in place of the eight-unit scheme, threw open to Indians all the different branches of the services, including Engineer, Artillery and Air. He has called upon India to train and produce the officers required for the number of units equivalent to a Cavalry Brigade and a Division, with the proper complement of staffs, services and departments. Naturally enough in such a great experiment he met with opposition.

of diverse character; from "Diehards" and traditionists of the old school who oppose all reform whether constitutional or unconstitutional; from Indian politicians who appear to imagine that Major-Generals are born and not made in the most rigorous school of service. Between these antagonising opinions the Chief steered a serene, steady course, as ready to whip the obstructionists as he was to lash the extremists. Above all he ensured that real sympathy and encouragement should be given to this great adventure and did everything possible by personal endeavour and personal touch to guarantee its success. The Academy at Dehra Dun, which he loved to visit, pays eloquent testimony to the reality of his purpose.

When the great depression set in and rigid economy in all services was the order of the day, the Indian Defence Budget was the special target of politico-economical criticism. Determined to maintain efficiency and at the same time to give practical support at a time of unparalleled financial difficulty the Chief, assisted loyally by all his officers, reduced the Military Budget by seven millions sterling. This entailed a large reduction in mobilisation stores and equipment, the hardship of a 10 *p'r cent.* cut in pay and the postponement of many measures of modernisation dear to his heart. And yet, despite the shortage of money and the preoccupation with riots on our border and within our compound it is no exaggeration to say that the Defence services have weathered the storm at any rate for the time, and that the efficiency of the officers and men of the Army in India is as high as ever it has been.

Apart from his service activities Sir Philip had other public duties no less exacting and onerous than his purely military affairs. As a Member of the Council of State he had on occasions to deliver public pronouncements on Defence matters which were statements of Government's policy, although generally expressed in characteristic straightforward terms which came—sometimes—as a shock to his more verbose audience. As a Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council the Field Marshal was closely associated with all the large questions of policy, both inside and outside the Defence sphere. It is an open secret that his ripe wisdom and sane judgment on matters, even those outside and unrelated to Defence, carried great weight with his colleagues.

This concludes a rather hurried and totally inadequate sketch of Sir Philip Chetwode's career. If it makes the reader ask what

is the equipment of a man who can look back without misgiving on a record of such multifarious achievement, one can only quote the words recently written about him in the "Observer."

"An unrivalled mastery of his own profession, a flair for selecting and concentrating on the essentials in every problem, a readiness to take quick decisions and, on occasion to depart from the orthodox course—these are the attributes of a big man; and Sir Philip possesses them in abundance."

Finally, those privileged to know Sir Philip Chetwode as a friend (and he spent his life making friends) will always remember his infectious good humour, his gift for lucid and forcible expression, his complete absence of "side," his friendliness, his generosity and his charm. Those who served him received a liberal education in the arts of soldiering and living.

THE DIFFICULT ROAD

BY "M. C. K."

Many interesting articles have been written during the last few years describing journeys by road between India and England and every year more cars set out to follow the projected line of the international highway that the A. A. has planned to link London with Calcutta. Some people avoid the difficult portions of this road by railing or shipping the car, but by doing so they increase their expenditure and sacrifice some of the most interesting and lesser known parts of the route for comfortable but monotonous journeys by train or ship.

Last March, two rather old and dilapidated cars containing five army officers, left India and arrived in Syria three weeks later. The occupants were determined to be in England for Jubilee week, but had set out to see as much as possible during the trip without spending more than the equivalent of a second class fare from Bombay to London. We had been given vivid accounts of the difficulties to be encountered in Turkey and these became more alarming as the distance to that country decreased. In Beirut the only advice obtained was to embark on a Messagerie or Lloyd Triestino in order to avoid Anatolia, but we wished to see this country where Cook's tours are unknown and where the new Turkey can be seen rising from the historic surroundings and primitive conditions of Asia Minor. After we had found out the Steamship Companies' fares and investigated the state of our own finances, we decided that our wish would have to be fulfilled.

A short description of the journey through Turkey at a time when weather conditions were unfavourable, may help some intending travellers with the route and prevent them "running out" when they approach the greatest obstacle.

Arriving in an unknown foreign country always produces a feeling of adventure and subdued excitement. One is conscious of being a guest and possibly unwelcome and one realises that information, advice or help may be difficult to obtain. Although this was the fourth frontier we had come to during our trip, the feeling of suspense was even greater than when we left India three weeks before and

entered Iran at the unattractive village of Mirjawa. We knew that Turkish roads were bad, but the disused and grass covered track leading North from Alexandretta seemed appalling after the excellent roads of Syria. We had been told that we might expect rain during April which would increase our difficulties and all we could see of Turkey, across the Bay of Iskanderun, was a range of forbidding looking hills banked up with dense clouds. But our greatest anxieties were that none of us spoke Turkish and that we had been unable to obtain a map of Anatolia.

A few miles from Alexandretta we were delayed for a considerable period at the Syrian frontier post while an official examined our baggage and passports.

Half a mile further on we could see the small building of the Turkish post but, before we could reach it, we were stopped by a zealous sentry. It appeared that the frontier was one hundred yards south of the building and was marked by a large stone lying by the track and the sentry. He seemed to be prepared to use his bayonet if we proceeded and appeared to have selected our radiator as a vital-looking spot. We produced our passports and pointed out our international driving plates but he remained immovable. However, when we invited him to inspect the numerous and complicated car papers he acknowledged defeat and escorted us to the building to obtain assistance.

A young officer, who spoke a little French, gave us a charming welcome to Turkey, dealt with our passports and took us to the railway station where our luggage was examined. An interested crowd immediately collected, but we were now used to such audiences and they were only too willing to assist unloading our baggage. They showed great interest in the car and while they talked we frequently recognised the words "chuma chok" (deep mud), they would then indicate a level to show to what depth they expected we would sink. The most pessimistic appeared to think that our radiator cap might not be covered when we ploughed through the softest portions. When we left the Customs there still remained an hour of daylight in which to cover the ten miles to Doryol. We bumped along a stony and muddy track, threading our way between large masses of rock and clumps of bushes. When about a mile short of Doryol we came to a swiftly flowing river and, not wishing to attempt the crossing in darkness, we camped on the bank for the night. Early next morning, with the

assistance of the usual crowd that collected from nowhere, we carried our heavy kit across, waded into the ice cold water to clear away some of the largest boulders and, after about two hours, succeeded in bringing both cars over without any damage.

The police in Doryol were very helpful and we were lucky in finding a man who spoke a little French. He was able to point out the track leading to Djehan, the next village, thirty-nine miles away. It took us nine hours to cover this distance. There had been some rain a few days before and the road was not metalled but consisted of soft, "black cotton" soil. It passed through cultivated areas and sometimes a farmer had increased the size of a field by extending his ploughing over the road. Often the track disappeared completely and we were forced to retrace our way for some miles. There were also several unbridged streams which had to be reconnoitred as the fords were ill-defined and not always suitable for motors.

The country was beautiful and appeared to be very fertile. When not under cultivation a profusion of wild flowers covered the hills, and old ruined castles overlooked the railway line which was the only sign of civilization. Once, when we were close to the line and discussing whether we should drive the cars along the track, the Taurus express passed and the Wagons Lits, with neat tables set for lunch, looked strangely out of place.

The soldiers and village people in Djehan showed us every kindness and hospitality and again the crowd never left us, taking a great interest especially when we were washing, shaving or eating our meals. The so-called hotel provided a bare room, but water was hard to obtain and sanitary arrangements were non-existent. We had our meals in a small eating house nearby.

The next day, continuing through the same type of country, we were only able to cover nineteen miles during the first three hours. We arrived at Adana early in the afternoon, but cashing a travellers cheque at the Bank was a long business and we were delayed for over two hours. At last we managed to buy a map. It was a kindergarten affair, very highly coloured and with inter-provincial boundaries but not very much other detail. We noticed that we were on a first class road and had already crossed the Taurus mountains! We camped for the night one mile beyond Tarsus, having covered sixty-four miles through some of the most beautiful country we had seen.

From Tarsus we climbed up towards the massive range of the Taurus and the road improved. The scenery was magnificent. Pine trees, blossoms and wild flowers covered the hillsides and deep gorges ran down from the snow-covered mountains. We had to buy some petrol at Bozanti and were charged about four shillings and sixpence per gallon. After Bozanti we passed through the Cilician Gates, and suddenly the great Taurus range was behind us and it was impossible to pick out the pass in the mountains where the road had come through. We were now on the central plateau and could see the enormous mass of Mt. Argaeus standing up about fifty miles to the north. From Bozanti to Uli Kishla must be familiar to many British prisoners of war in Turkey who worked on the construction of the railway and maintenance of the road, or marched through on their way to concentration camps. We had a quaint meal in a shop at Nigde and continued for another ten miles, camping for the night after a day's run of one hundred miles.

Rain began at midnight and lying in our valises we tried to persuade ourselves that it was only a light shower. When we experienced that uncomfortable feeling of water running down our necks we bundled bedding, stores and cooking utensils into the cars and struggled into our clothes. Very cold and horribly wet we drove off hoping to reach a better road before the condition of the present one became impassable. The road was atrocious. Deep ruts filled with water were responsible for much pushing and spade work and often the car ploughed along crab fashion with the rear wheels in different ruts to the front pair.

The rain stopped and at daylight we came to an unknown village where we changed our clothes and drank numerous glasses of hot tea. The cafe proprietor soon had a stove nearly red-hot and the male population collected and showed a friendly interest. After our enforced early start we decided to try and reach Ankara that evening. We felt confident that the road must improve as we approached the capital, but conditions became worse and we spent the night in a filthy lodging house at Kushire instead of a modern hotel in Ankara.

The next morning we were early on the road and imagined that we would be in Ankara for lunch. From the top of the hill near Kushire we could see that the surface of the road appeared to change a few miles further on. We thought that all our troubles were now

over and slithered down the greasy hill only to meet a fresh difficulty. Many tons of loose stones had been spread over the road and the surface had been badly cut up by heavy lorries—the ruts were far too deep for our cars and it was impossible to avoid them. After about one hundred yards the leading car came to rest in a hole where some lorry had sunk axle deep, but only our running boards were damaged. We dug a way out and, although the ground alongside was soft and greasy, we continued across country and for the rest of the morning ignored the highway. We reached Bala that evening and once again spent a night under squalid conditions.

On the morning of our seventh day in Turkey we were still fifty miles from Ankara and were now experienced enough to know that we might take as long as two days to cover this distance. However, with our well known cry of "Ankara for lunch," we set off. It had snowed during the night and we were very short of petrol owing to continual low gear work. A gallant attempt of our Ford to run on paraffin was not a success, and we were stranded in a village for two hours while the Chevrolet went ahead with only one gallon of petrol in the tank. The villagers brought us glasses of tea and refused to accept any payment. As soon as we finished drinking more appeared and we did not like to refuse. They seemed to think we were inveterate tea tipplers, but the local supply of this beverage was saved by the arrival of a lorry which sold us a tin of petrol.

Early that afternoon we slid down a mountain road deep in mud, past groves of fruit trees in full blossom and entered the city of Ankara. Only then, for the first time since leaving Alexandretta, were we on a modern tarred road.

The phenomenal development of Ankara has occurred in the last ten years. Nearly all the buildings are of the ultra-modern style of architecture, but the flowing lines and rounded corners appear meaningless when crowded together. When a building stands in an open space—and there are many open spaces in Ankara—it is often very impressive. The Military Staff Headquarters, Ismet Institute and the Sergievii are the most striking.

Modern Ankara was created after the treaty of Lausanne in 1923 to take upon itself the dignity of a capital, and it owes its selection to its strategic position and historic association. It is far from ports and manufacturing areas and, as the cost of transport

is high and there is very little competition, prices of goods are excessive. There are two thoroughly Europeanized hotels, but the rates are enormous and the bill contains a staggering list of extras however simply one has attempted to live.

A rocky hill with a precipitous North face dominates the valley. The old citadel stands on the summit and appears to have been built at a time of great emergency, for its walls contain many fragments of statues, broken columns and stones bearing Greek and Hittite inscriptions. The old town stretches down the Southern and Western slopes of the hill to the modern city and the open plain beyond.

There is a road from Ankara direct to Haider Pasha and Scutari but, as it passes through the Ismid military zone, it cannot be used without special permission. We had been told in Ankara that transit *visas* were seldom given and could not be obtained at short notice. Accordingly we had to take the road through Eskeshire and Bursa to Mudania on the sea of Marmora.

We left Ankara early one morning. The tarmac road extended for about four miles and then changed to a metalled surface full of pot holes. At Estimut railway station, about ten miles out, we were directed on the wrong road to Polati. We did not realise that it was a short cut only possible in fine weather, so that when rain and sleet appeared we struggled on, pushing, digging and becoming plastered with mud. Chains on the wheels were of no assistance and only held the clay which formed a solid mass between the mud-guards, wheels and under-carriage. This was too much for our engine and we had to work our way under the car and free the wheels every few miles.

Late in the afternoon we returned to Estimut and only then discovered that we had been on the wrong road. Two hours later we reached the village of Ayas with our speedometer reading a day trip of seventy-three miles but we could still see the lights of Ankara about twenty miles away. From Ayas to Beybazari there are some fair stretches of road in the hills where stone is easily obtained, but there is no solid foundation so the surface is quickly cut up into ruts which are a serious obstacle to the average touring car. The motor traffic in Anatolia consists almost entirely of Ford and Chevrolet lorries ; touring cars are seldom seen except in the large towns. We only passed one car between Alexandretta and Ankara, and that

contained a party of English botanists who had landed at Mersin and were making their way to the region round Lake Van.

We were delayed in Beybazari for two days when the Chevrolet broke its differential. We lived for this period in a bleak room above a stable in a building which called itself an hotel, taking our meals in a small restaurant. A newly killed lamb hung in the corner and did not make our usual dish of garlic flavoured stew, bread and "yogourt" any more appetising. We spent many hours in the local cafe where the entire male population assembled in the evenings to drink coffee or, more often, small glasses of very sweet tea.

One of the methods of awakening national consciousness is the display, in all public rooms, of posters showing important episodes of the past. The usual set consists of a rather badly drawn picture of the British fleet which appears to be charging a fort on Gallipoli, a view depicting Turkish women working on the lines of communication through the Taurus, and Turkish cavalry chasing the Greek army into the sea. There is always a picture of Kamal Ataturk looking very ferocious, but arrayed in full evening dress.

During our stay in Beybazari we made many firm friends and, but for the assistance of the local chemist, hotel proprietor and Singer sewing machine agent, we would have been delayed in this out of the way village for several days longer. We were advised to take a guide for the next part of the journey and the man our friends selected to accompany us proved invaluable.

From Bozanti to Eskeshire is a cross-country journey of about one hundred miles over tracks, fields and hills. We averaged about nine miles per hour and were fortunate in having dry weather so that we only stuck twice. After a hurried meal in Eskeshire we continued through lovely country but over awful roads to Yenishere. We knew that there were only three boats from Mudania during the week, so decided to continue in case there was one sailing the next day for Istanbul. It was now about one o'clock in the morning, but when we saw a well-patronised cafe we could not resist stopping for a few minutes to drink a glass of tea. Our sudden entrance at this early hour and our weird appearance in poshtees and "caps comforter" roused a certain amount of suspicion. We were not actually detained until we reached the next village which was being patrolled by soldiers. We gathered that travelling by night was not

allowed, and in any case we could not proceed without seeing their officer who was in bed and could not be disturbed.

When we insisted on an immediate interview they took us to a cafe and ordered glasses of tea for us all, preparing to spend the remainder of the night in a friendly manner. We sent the most persistent and talkative member of our party to the officer's house armed with all our passports and he succeeded in making it clear that we had no time to waste.

We reached Bursa at daybreak after twenty-two hours on the road. The hotel was comfortable and possessed a bath-room, but the supply of hot water was very limited. We learnt that there was no boat from Mudania that day but that arrangements could be made to ship the cars from Yalova. After a short rest we set out on the last stage of our journey in Asia. This sixty miles was through beautiful country and the view from the hills above Gemlik, which takes in both the sea of Marmora and the snow-covered mountains near Bursa, made us forget our hurry to reach Europe.

Yalova is an attractive town, and during the summer excursion boats bring many people from Istanbul. We bargained with several ruffians, one of whom spoke a little Urdu, and we were assisted by the local dairy shop proprietor who had spent several years in America. On receiving thirty-five Turkish pounds they contracted to land both our cars at Istanbul that evening. It was not until we had paid the money that we were allowed to see how precarious the transport arrangements were. With great difficulty we loaded the cars on to a thirty-foot fishing boat, but as there was no deck we had to build up a platform amid-ships. There was a serious list to port and we were making a great deal of water. An antiquated oil engine was coaxed into life and, as the evening set in, we chugged across the Gulf of Ismid to the twinkling lights of Istanbul.

It was pleasant to be in Europe surrounded with modern luxuries and comforts, but Constantinople would be a disappointment to those who were out there immediately after the war. We spent some time sightseeing, but objected to the large crowds from cruising ships which were being herded round the town. But we concealed our annoyance when we were swept up with a large party from a German liner and carried into the mosque of St. Sofia without paying. Returning to our hotel we found that the British Empire representatives of an International Womens' Congress had arrived and in the evening

we were the only men in a large and crowded dining room. We decided to leave early next morning.

The road to Erdine can be classified as first class for the first few miles and then deteriorates into a bumpy track. Our leading car passed the police post at the outskirts of Istanbul and the sentry then came to life and stopped the second car. Climbing on the running board he gave chase, and eventually we all returned to the post where extracts from our passports were copied out and the details on the first page were verified item by item. A recent law had made family names obligatory but the officials were perplexed until we admitted being Monsieurs Gerald, Edward and William.

We were now in a military zone and had to carry a soldier for the next twenty miles. The road runs close to the sea and a considerable amount of work was being done on it, necessitating us driving on the grass alongside. Turning inland to Chorlu we again met the vague track that we now regarded as typical of a Turkish main road. Fortunately there had been no rain and we were able to keep up a good speed over rolling country very like Salisbury Plain. Erdine is a melancholy town and we camped outside, descending on Madame Marie's hotel in the morning for a wash and breakfast. We were provided with saucers of warm water and a truly continental breakfast for which we paid a high price.

Eleven miles from Erdine we came to the frontier and completed our Customs formalities in about half an hour. After much hand-shaking we drove into Bulgaria and were sorry to leave the country where we had experienced nothing but courtesy and friendliness during our thousand miles journey, and where the scenery is some of the most beautiful in the world.

THE BRITISH ORDERLY ROOM

By "ISLWYN."

A well organized and efficiently run Orderly Room is an important factor in the general efficiency of the unit as a whole. That this essential efficiency is often missing (but due to no fault of the unit) is a fact sometimes brought clearly to light, and often discussed.

The necessity for constant maintenance of a high standard of efficiency in the Orderly Room does present a problem. Much more so in the case of units which recruit from certain areas, *e.g.*, South Wales and the North of England where the vast majority of men are coal miners or manual labourers in some form or other. To find suitable clerks from this material must then be the exception rather than the rule.

The constant turnover in the British Army of to-day is also a factor which retards the attainment of a high standard. Take, for example, a soldier with two years' service, perhaps even more, taken into the Orderly Room for the first time. By the time he becomes reasonably well trained and capable of carrying out any task in the Orderly Room, his remaining service as a trained clerk is limited. The necessity therefore for a high standard of ability in the Orderly Room Sergeant is clear. He must have a thorough knowledge of regulations, office organization and all branches of clerical work. His efficiency commands respect and increases the standard of knowledge in his subordinate clerks.

Having examined the method of obtaining clerks for the Orderly Room and having decided that the most important essential is a first class Orderly Room Sergeant, let us consider how he is to be obtained.

The Adjutant, faced with the necessity for finding an Orderly Room Sergeant owing to a casualty, looks through the qualifications of all his N. C. Os. Failing to find an N. C. O. of real clerical ability, as is only too often the case, he takes the one who appears to be the most intelligent. The disadvantages of this system, if it can be so called, are obvious. The Orderly Room fails to get its efficient Orderly Room Sergeant and the Company probably loses a first class

N. C. O. Furthermore, the N. C. O. is taken away from his legitimate work and, when he again returns to it, finds he has lost touch.

The entirely different conditions obtaining in India from those at Home and Colonial stations are, without doubt, a considerable handicap to the Orderly Room Sergeant. This is particularly so during the first few years of a British unit's tour in India. The vast number of new regulations and books confuse him (it is probably no exaggeration to say they are never really understood by many) and it takes him a long time to shake down to the changed conditions.

His knowledge of the staff and its various branches is vague and this lack of understanding adds considerably to his work, and no doubt to that of the staff also.

The writer has endeavoured to show clearly the difficulties which militate against a high standard of efficiency in the Orderly Room, and now suggests a remedy which would not only bring about the desired effect, but would effect it at no great expense.

Units have at present attached to them an Ordnance Armourer. Why not, in the same manner, attach a trained clerk in the Orderly Room to replace the Orderly Room Sergeant ? The latter is every whit as much a "technical expert" as the former.

Where are these clerks to come from ?

The R. A. S. C. (Clerks Section) for units at Home and in Colonial stations, and the I. A. C. C. for units in India, are the suggested sources of provision. Trained clerks of these Corps would do a tour of duty of, say, four or five years with a British unit. After completion of their tour of duty they would return to the Staff and be replaced by another trained clerk of the same Corps. By trained clerk is meant one who has had at least "A" and "G" experience.

The interchange of units between stations under the Imperial Government and India should be no obstacle to the scheme. The R. A. S. C. Orderly Room Sergeant would take over from date of disembarkation, and *vice versa*.

The advantages of the scheme are many. A closer understanding would be brought about between units and the Staff, to the benefit of both. The services of a staff clerk would be invaluable to the C. O. and the Adjutant in many ways, while the company organization would not be interfered with by the need to provide the Orderly

Room Sergeant. Furthermore, the attached Orderly Room Sergeant could, in addition to training his own subordinate clerks, put all company clerks through a course in the afternoons or evenings. Not only would this tend to improve the company office but it would also enable the Orderly Room Sergeant to keep note of the clerical ability of men in companies and to earmark potential clerks to replace casualties in the Orderly Room staff.

The actual cost of such a scheme would, it is thought, be by no means prohibitive. The increase in the strength of the R. A. S. C., and I. A. C. C., would be set off by the decrease of one N. C. O. in each unit. In regard to pay; as Orderly Room Sergeants are already in receipt of tradesmen's rates there should be little or no increase under this head at Imperial stations. There is, however, in India a difference between tradesmen's rates and that of the I. A. C. C. Pensions of course would be slightly increased by the normally longer service of the staff clerk and, in India, by the addition of the Indian element.

Such a scheme already obtains in the Royal Artillery which has its own clerical section. The Royal Artillery need not therefore necessarily come into this scheme, but the existence of such a system in the R. A., is mentioned as it does lend still greater force to the contention that something on the same lines is required for all units.

KING GEORGE'S ROYAL INDIAN MILITARY SCHOOLS

BY CAPTAIN T. H. L. STEBBING, M.C., M.A., A.E.C.

(Commandant, K. G. R. I. M. School, Jullundur)

Speaking at Jullundur, in the Punjab, on February 25th, 1922, to a large and representative assembly of pensioned Indian officers and soldiers, H. R. H. the Prince of Wales said: "Many Indian soldiers have pleaded for better educational facilities for their children. Their plea reached the ear of my father, the King-Emperor, who commanded that the moneys of the King-Emperor's Patriotic Fund should be devoted to building special schools for the sons of Indian soldiers, and that these should be called the King George's Royal Indian Military Schools. It is my privilege to lay the foundation stone of these Schools to-day."

Such was the definite approach to materialization of a project formulated at Army Headquarters, India, in the early months of 1920. The scheme had been steered through the various difficulties of ways and means by the Directorate of Military Training who had recognized the urgent need in India for institutions which might, whilst serving the purpose of two similar schools for soldiers' children in the United Kingdom, at the same time, produce for the Indian Army soldiers whose early environment would especially fit them to become intelligent leaders of a rapidly changing Army.

The original intention in the foundation of the King George's Royal Indian Military Schools was to provide institutions in which the Indian officers and men of the Regular Indian Army might find a means of obtaining for their sons, at a cost which was within their limited means, the type of education which would enable a boy to find a suitable career in his father's regiment or corps. Difficulties consequent upon the necessarily long absence of a father from home: the Indian mother's natural reluctance to part with her children, the extremely sporadic nature of the Indian system of elementary education—the majority of isolated villages in the great recruiting areas having no schools whatsoever—together with a general suspicion on the part of the martial classes for the intelligentsia of village life: all militated against the Indian soldier's son obtaining an education which was fitted to the new demands of the Army. A more intelligent class of recruit was required who should be capable

of understanding the changed methods of warfare which had marched with the progress of civilization and science.

Apart from domestic hindrances, few Indian soldiers could afford to send their children, even if it had been desirable, to the better organized and more advanced schools in the larger towns and cities of the provinces.

Funds, however, were not easy to raise. The years immediately after the War were not those in which to inaugurate expensive philanthropic schemes of which the immediate cost outweighed any potential value in the economic scale. Every rupee was precious to a Government whose financial dangers were daily emphasized in a succession of committees for retrenchment and economy.

Yet, the future of the soldiers' son was secured, to an extent little expected, by help from a source which was deeply interested in the welfare of the Indian Empire. Late in 1920 His Majesty the King-Emperor commanded that the whole of the King-Emperor's Patriotic Fund should be appropriated to the provision of suitable schools for soldiers' children. This Fund, which was at the personal disposal of His Majesty, had been started in July, 1918, and consisted of gifts from the ruling princes of India to Their Majesties on the occasion of their silver wedding. It was at first decided that the Fund should be known as the King-Emperor's Patriotic Fund, and that it should be invested and its income devoted to the relief of Indian sufferers with claims, based on the war, which are not covered by any other fund in existence or which may only come to light when such funds have been finally closed. In 1920 the Fund contained approximately ten lakhs of rupees.

The personal intervention of His Majesty at a stage when the claims of economy in public finance were paramount saved the situation, and the laying of the foundation stone at Jullundur by the heir to the Throne in 1922 set the seal on a project which has made the education of her soldiers' sons an especial care of the Indian Empire, whose troops had rendered such signal service in the world struggle of recent years.

Progress was of necessity slow, since, even though the capital expenditure had been provided by the King-Emperor, recurring charges had to be accepted in the Army Budget. It was not until September 15th, 1925, that the Schools of Jhelum and Jullundur were able to open the doors of a partially constructed institution to

their first pupils. The School at Jullundur—to which this article particularly applies, though the School at Jhelum and, later, that at Ajmer, are organized on identically the same lines—began with thirty-four pupils.

At the outset the Schools were controlled by one superintendent, Colonel O. H. Radford, whose enthusiasm and keenness had already left its stamp on the Army School of Education at Belgaum. A Commandant who was an officer of the Army Educational Corps, and a staff of specially selected Indian officers and non-commissioned officers, comprised the initial administrative and teaching personnel of each School. In 1927 the difficulties of the administration of the two Schools by one superintendent were realized and, as a measure of economy, the post of superintendent was abolished; but not before Colonel Radford had been able to infuse both Schools with that characteristic spirit which had marked his spade-work at Belgaum.

To be eligible for nomination a boy has to have certain qualifications which, except for physical, educational and age limits have not changed since the inception of the Schools. In order to maintain regimental interest and connection, boys are required to be nominated by units of the Indian Army to whom vacancies are allotted by enlisted classes in proportion to their requirements. Selection rests with the Commanding Officers, whose nomination implies a unit's agreement to accept its candidate at the conclusion of his school career. Preference is given (though, of course, this is now a diminishing need) to boys whose parents have been killed or suffered subsequently from injuries received in the Great War. Definite medical standards are insisted upon, and in the case of serving personnel a parent must have at least ten years' service before his son is eligible for nomination.

The idea lying behind the original scheme was that after five years in the School—a boy was then admitted at the age of ten—the boy should be given a short period in which he could renew his interests in village life. (It must not be forgotten that the Indian Army is recruited chiefly from the Zemindar (yeoman) class whose land connection and continuity are inseparably bound up with the economic interests of India.) The intention was, then, that the boy would enlist when sixteen and a half to seventeen years old and follow the normal training of the average recruit. But, before the conclusion of the first five years of the Schools' existence, it was

obvious that much of the good which had been achieved by five years' routine of healthy school life and discipline might be nullified by a return to domestic conditions likely to counteract any advantages already gained, whilst the opportunities for a boy to continue his education would be comparatively negligible. There was, in addition, the danger from undesirable influences which might be brought to bear on the boy's life and outlook at an age when he was most susceptible. Consequently, in 1930, it was decided to raise the age of admission to the Schools to twelve—with its corresponding civil educational qualification—and to retain a boy in the School for the normal course of five years or until such time as he attained the necessary physical standards for direct enrolment in the Army.

During the Schools' early years the main object of the syllabus was to provide an education up to the conclusion of the primary stage of the Punjab Civil Educational Code. This may be considered as approximating roughly to Standard III of the English Board of Education Elementary system. It must here be remembered that, on admission to the Schools, a large number of boys were practically illiterate. Later the standard of the syllabus was raised to the equivalent of the Punjab Middle School or Vernacular final examination, which corresponds approximately to a stage slightly beyond the conclusion of the English Primary system. However, it was soon realized that, if the boys of K. G. R. I. M. Schools were to be able to compete with their confrères from the civil world, the standard of their attainments must be again raised to keep progress level with the equivalent product of local schools. Especially was this necessary if boys of the K. G. R. I. M. Schools were to produce, as is hoped, a quota of Indian Army cadets for the new Indian Military Academy, which was launched on its career in the autumn of 1932. Henceforth, it was of paramount importance that, while having a military bias, the standard of education in the schools for soldiers' sons should be in no way inferior to that obtaining in the civil schools of the Punjab.

With this object in view, in 1932, a new syllabus was framed by which a boy will be given an education up to the standard of the Matriculation examination of the Punjab (which must not be confused with the Matriculation standard of an English university)—and also to the examination for the Indian Army Special Certificate of Education. The latter certificate, it may be mentioned, is a

qualification for nomination by the Commander-in-Chief to the Indian Military Academy. Finally, in the spring of 1933, an India Army Order was published enabling boys of King George's Royal Indian Military Schools to sit for both the 1st Class and Special Certificates of Education while still in residence at the School.

The result has been that competition for vacancies in the Schools is now showing signs of improvement. Previously, it was doubtful whether serving and pensioned Indian Army officers and soldiers realized the immense advantages to be obtained from the educational facilities afforded by the Schools, but it is now anticipated that, far from fulfilling merely their original purpose, the K. G. R. I. M. Schools will also provide a fertile recruiting ground for a proportion of the future leaders of the Indian Army. At the same time it must be stressed that the mere fact of having been at a K. G. R. I. M. School does not guarantee promotion. It is carefully explained to every boy (and to his parent) that his future lies entirely in his own hands and is dependent upon his being fitted by proved merit for the leadership of his men. Every boy enlists as a sepoy and carries his own destiny in his personal keeping. But it is not without omen, perhaps, that the first nomination of an ex-schoolboy of K. G. R. I. M. Schools to the Indian Military Academy was made by the Commander-in-Chief in India in February, 1933.

The establishment of the Schools is limited. Originally, in 1925, two Schools were founded in the chief recruiting areas of the Punjab. One located at Jhelum caters for Mohammedans, and the other, at Jullundur, for Sikhs and Dogras. To the classes admitted by the latter have now been added Punjabi Hindus, Garhwalis, Kumaonis and Gurkhas. The success of the two original Schools and the advisability of extending their facilities to classes whose main recruiting areas make it financially difficult to attend in the Punjab, led to the opening in 1930 of a similar school at Ajmer, designed for other Hindu classes of the Army which are drawn from recruiting areas to the south of the River Sutlej. The establishment of the School at Jhelum provides for 303 boys, while those of Jullundur and Ajmer allow for 258 and 210 pupils respectively.

So far as the parent is concerned, expense is not heavy. While it is the intention that only a limited proportion of boys shall be the sons of Indian officers, it must be borne in mind that the Indian officer holding the Viceroy's commission commences his military

career as a sepoy, and every boy is considered as a potential Indian officer who must be trained accordingly. A large proportion of boys—*i.e.*, sons of deceased soldiers and those with a very limited income—are admitted free, whilst in addition, a number of regimental and civil scholarships, based on income as well as proficiency, are available for deserving cases. The most a parent is asked to pay is Rs. 7-8 annas per month for a school term of nine months—*i.e.*, approximately £5 per year.

For this a boy is housed, clothed, fed and educated under conditions which leave little to be desired. Uniform, books, bedding, regulation school mufti, medical attendance, games, and food, are provided on a scale which ensures that the atmosphere in which the boy lives shall be such as will cultivate the very best conditions for physical and mental development. The class-rooms, dormitories and School hospital are lofty, airy, well-lighted, built and equipped on the most modern hygienic lines, and compare favourably for conditions with many of the most recent educational buildings in England. Good playing fields afford ample opportunities for games and are put to their greatest possible use. Further, splendid facilities exist for elementary training in musketry and the initial routine drill of a soldier's life, while physical training forms a prominent item in a day's programme at the Schools.

The internal organization of the Schools endeavours to reproduce, as far as is consistent with Indian life and customs, the system of the English public school, and, at the same time, to develop the boy's inherited military instincts. The Schools are organized on the "House" system—three in Jhelum, two in Jullundur and two in Ajmer—and on a platoon basis. On arrival each boy is posted to a platoon with which he maintains his connection, except for cases of individual promotion, throughout his career in the School. Each platoon is commanded by an Indian officer (or non-commissioned officer) assisted by a platoon havildar (who is a senior prefect) and four section commanders (or junior prefects). The team spirit is fostered in every detail of the boy's daily life, and the ideal at which each platoon aims is that every member shall be capable of commanding a section both in administration and normal training. At Jullundur, a platoon competition for efficiency, embracing all branches of training both educational and military, and including all details of daily administrative routine, promotes a healthy

atmosphere of rivalry which assists in the maintenance of a high standard of discipline and competency. In addition, regimental *esprit de corps* is fostered by every means. Boys are encouraged to regard their nominating units as their military foster-parents. They wear their individual regimental crests and badges on all School ceremonial parades, whilst at all other times the badge remains in a position of prominence above each boy's bed. For educational training only, the boys are organized in the normal forms independent of their platoons.

As may be imagined, games play no small part in the system of training. The Indian sepoy has a natural aptitude for games, and his son takes to hockey as naturally as an English lad to cricket or football. Within the School, games are organized on a platoon basis in hockey, football and basket-ball. This ensures that every boy is occupied daily in one of these three games unless on duty or temporarily excused by the medical officer. Hockey is of a good standard. It may be interesting to remark that, in 1933, in the final of the Punjab Native Army Hockey Tournament, at Jhelum, which attracts some twenty teams from the whole of Northern India, no less than four old boys of the Jhelum and Jullundur Schools were playing. Each School can put up a School team which can give the average regimental side a moderate game.

It must be emphasised that, in these Schools, the medium of games gives the instructional staff an invaluable means of inculcating the spirit of unselfishness and *esprit de corps* which, at first, is a little difficult for the newcomer to the routine of a King George's Royal Indian Military School to assimilate. The Englishman is liable to forget that the sporting spirit which characterises him almost from birth is not always as fully developed in other nationalities whose history has not nurtured that priceless attribute. In the training of character at K. G. R. I. M. Schools too much emphasis cannot be laid on the assistance which has been given in the inculcation of sporting ideals and self-control by the organization of properly supervised games.

Each year a competition is held between the Schools at Jhelum and Jullundur for a flag of honour presented by Colonel Radford, the first Superintendent of the Schools. The competition includes hockey, football, basket ball, athletics, a cross-country run, wrestling and shooting. The conditions of the competition are so arranged

that each School is limited to a selection of thirty boys (excluding the shooting eight) from whom the competing teams in all events must be chosen. The conditions are such that they prevent either School "nursing" boys at particular games at the expense of others, and ensure a general all-round proficiency in the competitors selected. As can be imagined, the spirit of rivalry runs high, and the battle of the "Blues," which is held in alternate years on the domain of each School, in turn, is probably the event of the greatest import in the School year.

Through the generosity of the officers of regiments stationed at various times at Jhelum and Jullundur a collection of valuable challenge cups and shields gives the victors possibly a somewhat material interest in success in each event, but the writer can assure readers that in no athletic struggle he has ever witnessed has enthusiasm waxed so keen. The famous ground at Twickenham in early December can scarce contain a more tensely excited throng of spectators than those who line the touchline of the final event of a so far level contest for the Jhelum—Jullundur Flag.

As yet the distance factor has made it impossible to include the Ajmer School in the competition, but it is hoped that the day is not far distant when the representatives of Southern India will enter into the competition with their more northerly equals.

The routine of the Schools varies but little. A boy's average day commences with reveille at 6-30 a.m. (5-30 in the summer). First parade is usually one hour later, and consists of drill and physical training. Ordinary educational classes, preceded by an hour's private preparation, begin at 8-30 a.m., with intervals of approximately an hour for meals at 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. respectively. Afternoon work in the hot months is curtailed—one cannot enthuse over mathematics or history in a shade temperature of 115°—and four days in each week see every boy taking part for one hour in some organized game or other under the supervision of his platoon-commander. The remaining afternoons are holidays and, if not required for School or platoon duties, a percentage of boys are at liberty to take "walking out" leave, the granting of which is dependent on work and good conduct. Each evening, at Jullundur, an evening "Gurdwara" (Sikh temple) and "Mandar" (Hindu temple) parade is held at which every boy of the respective denominations has to attend at his particular religious building. This parade takes place half an hour before the evening meal, and is

part of the normal day's routine from which only boys on School duties are excused. Sundays, of course, are complete holidays except in so far as interior economy necessitates a certain amount of work which cannot be avoided.

In practice, therefore (at Jullundur), each boy—except those in the most junior classes—does thirty-two hours' work and nine hours' private preparation in each week. The School term lasts from September 15th to June 15th, when the boys proceed to their homes for a three months' recess. For the benefit of the uninitiated to Indian life who may possibly regard these hours and terms as a little excessive in comparison with Western custom, it is pointed out that there are a considerable number of religious festivals and holidays which have to be observed, and which considerably reduce the apparently lengthy stretch of unbroken school life. Moreover, when it is remembered that some of the boys travel as far as 600 miles from their homes—many live in areas which the postman visits but once a week—one can appreciate the economic advisability of making the term as long as possible consistent with the health of boys and staff.

A word or two about the boys themselves in comparison with English boys of a like age may not be without interest. When it is borne in mind that many of King George's Royal Indian Military School boys come from villages as yet untouched by modern communications—some have a journey of sixty to seventy miles on foot or pony before they get within reach of even a by-road—and when it is considered that their previous learning has been sometimes culled from a village schoolmaster whose own ideas of the outside world, other than those interpreted by a neighbouring high school, are possibly limited to a single visit to Lahore or similar city, one can estimate the quality of the material on which the future of India must partially rest. Yet the assets of the Indian Army's sons are not a few. Tales of the British Raj and the amazing wonders of its organization and development, stories of far-flung campaigns on the North-West Frontier, Iraq, and distant France, accompanied by yarns of a father's or grandsire's personal experiences, have all trickled through into Indian village life and made an impression on the mind of the Indian soldier's son much akin to that printed by Henty's books on the imaginative young English mind of nearly half a century ago.

The Indian enthusiasm for learning which, on account of the attendant status hitherto involved, has earned no little respect : a credulous belief in his teachers : a memory and power of application which are not without value ; and a pronounced aptitude for absorbing information ; have all tended to make the average Indian boy into material which can be easily moulded for the good. The soldier's son, who is no exception, adds to the normal qualities a quickness and alertness which readily respond to a training which demands smartness in movement and drill as well as the intelligent execution of an order. He appreciates discipline and does not fail to recognize its value to an organized social community. It is noticeable how quickly boys who have known no other than a rough uncouth village existence, far removed from the conditions of Army life, rapidly acclimatize themselves to their new surroundings and vie with each other in "turnout" and drill for the sake of their platoon. Little time elapses before a new boy takes a personal pride in giving, if possible, a smarter salute than the boy of the year before.

That the boys have faults, is true ; but most of these are not exceptional to their class, and they are not difficult to surmount. Consequently, an inherited and instinctive obedience to orders, coupled, in most cases, with an amazing desire to get the greatest value possible out of the educational facilities afforded, furnish, in the person of the K. G. R. I. M. School boy, the educationist with what might be thought almost an ideal ground on which to work. One would possibly welcome something of the normal devilment generally latent in the average English schoolboy ; but when it appears in his Indian counterpart it usually assumes a milder form, and is entirely divorced from work. The reason is, possibly, that the average Indian boy, at the present, acquires an idea of responsibility for his own future which the English lad has, as yet, generally no cause to accept until he has attained a more mature age.

To sum up : Quickly responsive to good leadership ; eager, as a rule, to please—a word of praise goes much further than with an English boy, who not infrequently regards commendation as his right ; usually enthusiastic in most things he does in the course of his School routine ; gifted with powers of imitation and imagination which are not to be despised ; simple in his pleasures and tastes, but anxious to drink deep of the stream of Western knowledge, which he is prone to think infallible ; the K. G. R. I. M. School boy offers to the Indian

Army, material whose future influence bids well to be considerable, not only in the Army itself, but also in the village life of the greater India in which that seasoned manhood must eventually settle.

What of the future? Apart from his potential value to the Indian Army as an intelligent leader of men, the K. G. R. I. M. School boy carries with him to the outer life of a new India a duty to his fellow countrymen which it is earnestly hoped he will not fail to discharge, if only in gratitude for that unselfish patriotism of his forbears which his School commemorates as each Armistice Day rolls by. If those who immediately benefit from the gracious gift of their King-Emperor bear in mind the precepts outlined for them by the Heir to the British throne, when laying the foundation stone at Jullundur, the purpose of the Schools will not be without avail, and the service of their boys to the Indian Empire will bear more practical and immediate fruit. H. R. H. the Prince of Wales then remarked, when concluding his speech, "I hope that the descendants of the soldiers who come to learn in this School will carry three simple facts in their minds as they daily pace this stone. Firstly, that this School was built by the desire and at the command of the King-Emperor as a token of his admiration and regard for the military classes in India, and in gratitude for their loyalty and devotion; secondly, that this stone was laid by me in loving memory of my comrades in the Great War; and thirdly, that the noblest use to which they can turn the education received here is to the upholding of the great tradition of loyalty, patriotism and service, which was handed down to them by their fathers."

If these simple but impressive words of advice, spoken on the broad acres of the Punjab long before their future homes of learning had risen from the plain, are remembered by the boys; if the latter recognize, as we are confident they will, the obligations which they owe to their King-Emperor in return for that heritage which he personally handed over to India as a token of an Empire's gratitude for the devotion of her sons in her hour of need; and, lastly, if the boys bear with them to their village homes in the far reaches of the Indian Empire those precepts which their School tries to implant; then the efforts of those who, in the early days of the formation of the Schools, sought to instil ideals and traditions creamed from the best of English public school life, will not go unrewarded; nor will the scheme which was nursed through its infancy by the persistence of the late Lord Rawlinson and his General Staff prove at fault in its practical application to one of India's most pressing needs.

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

THE LANDING AT ANZAC

BY MAJOR H. C. WESTMORLAND, D.S.O., THE HAMPSHIRE
REGIMENT

Despite the lack of strategical preparation for the Dardanelles campaign by the General Staff at the War Office, and the consequent disadvantages under which the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Ian Hamilton, prepared his plan for landing on the Gallipoli peninsula, the verdict of history is that there was still a chance of success at the moment the attack was launched. Taking the landing at Anzac as an illustration this verdict will be examined.

On 24th March 1915, Enver Pasha, the Turkish war minister, placed the defence of the Dardanelles under the German General von Sanders. This officer, in his appreciation, considered that the main landings would be attempted at Bulair on the European side, and Besika Bay on the Asiatic shore. Thus for the defence of the western coast of the Gallipoli peninsula, from Suvla to Sedd el Bahr, some twenty miles in length, only one division (the 9th) was allotted. (Note.—The Turkish 9th division consisted of three regiments of infantry, three batteries of field artillery and two mountain batteries. A regiment consisted of three battalions and a machine gun company. Each battalion had four companies.)

At Ari Burnu, where the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps eventually landed, two forward company areas (2/27th Regiment) joined, each of these companies being responsible for the defence of about a mile and a half of coast line. The reserve company was about a mile east of Gaba Tepe. One mountain battery was in a position on 400 plateau (see sketch map), and guarding the coast at Gaba Tepe were two 12 cm. guns, while two 15 cm. guns were a little inland from that point.

Although on the coast the outer crust of the defence was thin, reserves were well situated to oppose a deep penetration. The two battalions forming the reserve of the 27th regiment were four miles from Ari Burnu in the direction of Maidos, and the general reserve of eight battalions (19th division), with a proportion of artillery, was located at Boghali, just over four miles away to the east of the landing place.

Concerning this portion of the front it was thought at British G. H. Q. that two or more divisions might be available for the defence of this western shore of the peninsula. The lack of accurate information about the enemy was attributable to the shortage of aircraft. This shortage was to be felt in many ways. By the first week in April 1915 no photographs had been taken over the enemy lines owing to a shortage of cameras. Bombing flights were however carried out and a certain amount of information collected. It is interesting to note that on April 23rd the reserve battalions of the 27th Regiment were bombed out of the village of Maidos, but unfortunately moved into bivouacs $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles nearer Gaba Tepe. At this stage, and particularly in this type of operation, air photographs would have been invaluable in checking the many inaccuracies in the maps provided. The impossibility of adequate reconnaissance of the ground over which the first battle has to be fought must always be a difficulty connected with a landing on a little known enemy coast.

The area into which the Anzac Corps was to advance may be described as a tangle of nullas, ravines, precipices and small plateaux. In addition to these difficulties of terrain, the high ground on the north flank of the operation was "for the most part covered with a low scrub. This indeed could be seen from the sea, but the resisting nature of that scrub was never suspected before the operations began. Standing some three feet high and interspersed with prickly dwarf oak, its stubborn bushes are often so close together, and so thorny, that even a strong man has difficulty in forcing his way through. In the attack, therefore, it is a serious obstacle to movement while it has the further disadvantage that men lying down in it are unable to see their neighbours on either flank. But for snipers, or for infantry delaying a hostile advance, the cover that it affords is almost ideal." (Official History.)

East of Ari Burnu the ground generally forms itself into three ridges. The first ridge comprises features subsequently known as Plugge's Plateau, Russell's Top, and Walker's Ridge. The seaward face of the long narrow plateau, known as Russell's Top, is almost unclimbable, being an almost vertical cliff some 300 feet high. At the south end of this "the ridge suddenly contracts for 200 yards into a veritable razor edge, impassable even by infantry, with a deep chasm on either side." (Official History). Nearest the sea is Plugge's Plateau. According to the map it appeared possible to advance from

here, along the high ground, to Baby 700. The razor edge was to play an important part in the operations.

The second ridge forms the eastern side of a deep ravine known as Shrapnel and Monash Gully. To the south it consists chiefly of a plateau known as 400. This narrows northwards to the southern slopes of Baby 700. This last hill commands Shrapnel and Monash Gullies, the only line of communication between the upper portion of the second ridge and the coast.

The third ridge was known as Gun Ridge. This starts south of Chunuk Bair and finishes near Gaba Tepe. Scrubby Knoll to the north, and Anderson's Knoll to the south of this ridge are features to note.

The task allotted to the Anzac Corps was to land north of Gaba Tepe and cut the Turkish communications between Gallipoli and Sedd el Bahr. The covering force was to be the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade who had orders to capture the guns on 400 Plateau and occupy Gun Ridge, their left resting on Chunuk Bair. On the right, troops were to clear Gaba Tepe and disable any guns found there. This gave the brigade a responsibility for about 6,000 yards of frontage.

The 2nd Brigade, which was to land immediately after the covering force, had instructions to extend the front northwards to the highest point of the third ridge, Hill 971, a mile North-east of Chunuk Bair, and protect the left flank by holding a line between there and Fisherman's Hut. The 1st Brigade formed the reserve of the 1st Australian Division. Arrangements were made for the 7th Indian Mountain Brigade to be landed as early as possible in the morning and to be attached to the covering force on arrival.

The orders by the O. C., Covering Force, were for the 9th Battalion to land on the right, two companies to clear Gaba Tepe and the remaining two to make for Anderson's Knoll; this battalion would therefore operate on a frontage of 3,000 yards. The 10th Battalion would land in the centre, capture the guns on 400 Plateau, and occupy Scrubby Knoll on Gun Ridge, while the 11th Battalion was to seize the northern end of this ridge and Chunuk Bair. The remaining battalion, the 12th, was in brigade reserve. The mountain guns, on arrival, were to go to 400 Plateau.

Naval support was arranged as follows:—

1. The O. C., Covering Force, was to ask for ships' fire by signal.

2. The fleet was to fire by observation on any Turkish troops or guns definitely seen.
3. On each flank an artillery officer was to act as an observer for the ships. Messages to the beach by telephone, thence by W/T to the flagship.

It should be here noted that in the actual operation no ship fired till 17-00 hours, largely owing to the difficulties of communication. Probably some form of timed programme would have been better.

The time the leading troops were to reach the shore depended on the hour of the moon's setting; on 25th April this was at 02-57 hours. This meant that the first tows could not be beached before 04-30 hours which was half an hour after first light. General Birdwood considered that a night landing was the best means of obtaining surprise, but the danger of ships being silhouetted against the moonlit sky made this not quite possible.

Corps orders laid down that wounded were not to be evacuated to ships till the infantry of the Australian Division was ashore. In the 1st Australian Division Operation order it seems as though this order was not made strong enough. It reads "The navy launches equipped as hospital boats will begin to ply from shore to ship after the infantry of the division is landed." Disobedience of the spirit of this order was a contributory cause of the programme for the landing getting nearly four hours behind schedule.

At 01-00 hours on 25th April the battleships had reached their rendezvous and boats were being lowered. At 02-35 hours all tows were ready and when the moon had sunk behind Imbros, the three battleships, with 1,500 men on board, destroyers carrying the remainder of the covering force, steamed slowly towards the peninsula. At 03-30 hours the battleships anchored within 2½ miles of the shore and 48 cutters, in twelve parallel columns, were being towed ashore by steam launches.

The landing was a complete surprise. Owing to an error in navigation the boats were beached a mile further north than had been intended, but the original place selected had been better prepared by the Turks. At Ari Burnu there was only one sentry group, who opened fire, and a few small posts overlooking the beach. Without waiting to re-organise, the troops pushed rapidly inland.

The effect of the error in navigation was to land the first tow on a very narrow front and to inter-mix units from the start. The

troops had been told to expect a low sandy bank skirting the beach, but they must have disappeared into the ravines before fresh orders could be given to them. It is improbable that the junior officers realised what had happened until it was broad daylight.

At 05-00 hours the situation was roughly as follows. The 9th Battalion was very scattered. About 100 men, under an officer, were being led across Shrapnel Gully to the north end of 400 Plateau. The 11th Battalion were reorganising in a gully forking North-east from Shrapnel Gully, just east of Plugge's Plateau. Some were still near the beach, pinned by machine gun fire from Fisherman's Hut. In the meantime the 12th Battalion landed from the destroyers, but instead of remaining in reserve, they got caught up in the advance. Parties of this battalion reached 400 Plateau ahead of the battleship parties and captured the guns there.

The Commander, 3rd Australian Bde., arrived at the southern end of Plugge's Plateau about 04-40 hours. Owing to the scrub and the ravines which hid the troops, he was unable to appreciate the situation. He knew there were no troops between him and Gaba Tepe, but the volume of the enemy's fire was negligible and there were no signs of any further enemy approaching. He decided to advise the Commander, 2nd Bde., that his troops should be employed on his right instead of on his left. The wisdom of this decision seems doubtful, since the points of tactical importance were on the left flank, namely Chunuk Bair and Baby 700.

About this time the C.-in-C. appeared in *Queen Elizabeth*, and received the report that the troops were a mile inland. Presumably this was the report from General Birdwood timed 06-39 hours in which the capture of 400 Plateau was reported, although the Official History records the fact that at 06-00 hours the C.-in-C. headed south for the toe of the peninsula. It would appear that G. H. Q. still thought that the thrust from Helles was to be the decisive blow. Possibly had the Commander-in-Chief remained a little longer and learnt the real situation at Anzac, a brigade might have been diverted from Helles and employed where there was obviously a tactical advantage worth exploiting. Gaba Tepe is two miles nearer the heights overlooking the Narrows than Helles, and it is surprising that so much importance should have been attributed by G. H. Q. to the southern landing. In the light of after knowledge one organised brigade to hold some sort of covering position, behind which the

Australians might have reorganised, would have turned the scale easily in our favour.

At Maidos the commander of the Turkish 27th Regiment heard of the landing an hour after that event, at 05-30 hours. His troops however were not ready to move until 07-30 hours and it was not until 09-00 hours that they were seen by the Australians filing up Gun Ridge from the south. At this hour therefore the Turks opposing the advance could not have been numerous, and already 8,000 Australians had landed, although in the original orders it had been hoped to have landed more by this time. The delays and their cause will be referred to later.

The real trouble, however, was to begin when the 19th Turkish division, under Mustapha Kemal, was ordered to detach one battalion towards Chunuk Bair to watch the right. This officer quickly grasped the threat to the Turkish communications and ordered a whole regiment to move as quickly as possible. He himself rode forward with a company to gain first-hand information. At 10-00 hours this company came in contact with our troops on Baby 700 and to the North-east of it. Later in the afternoon, counter-attacks here seriously threatened our hold on this part of the peninsula. A Turkish force moving south from Baby 700 to Russell's Top would outflank a position on 400 Plateau or even take it in reverse. Chunuk Bair and Baby 700 were of considerable tactical importance, and had they been strongly held by the first troops to land, the Turkish reserves would not have interfered to such purpose as to cause talk of evacuation.

In the meantime, 07-00 hours, an officer and two scouts had reached Scrubby Knoll and scattered groups of men were in possession of Pine Ridge. These forward elements remained unsupported owing to delays in landing the 1st and 2nd Brigades and to a decision by the Commander, 3rd Brigade, to entrench 400 Plateau instead of supporting troops in front. Delays in landing at this time were caused by the shelling of the anchorage, which made the transports stand out further from the shore, and the disregard of orders for the evacuation of wounded. The return of boats for more troops was held up while wounded were being embarked. Added to this there was lack of organisation on the beach, no naval or military personnel for this purpose being landed until 10-00 hours. Even when troops were landed the change of orders for the 2nd Brigade must have

caused further confusion, since the issue of orders under the conditions prevailing at this time must have been difficult.

At 10-45 hours one and a half battalions of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, under Brig.-Gen. Walker, were made available. General Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, decided to use them to restore the situation on Baby 700. This situation had been caused by the advanced elements of Mustapha Kemal's 19th Division. The New Zealanders started off by way of Walker's Ridge, but General Walker decided that the ground was too difficult and changed the line of advance to that *via* Plugge's Plateau and Russell's Top. The change of orders caused confusion and the troops also got involved with the razor edge east of Plugge's Plateau. The result was that not more than one company reached a position west of Baby 700, and that not until 13-00 hours. By 15-00 hours no one seems to have been in command of this left sector. The scattered companies were not co-ordinated and no one seems to have known the plan. The troops had done very well but casualties in officers had brought movements to a standstill.

At 16-00 hours the full weight of the counter-attack on Baby 700 was being felt and troops fell back, gaps appearing in the line. Initiative had passed to the enemy. By 17-00 hours the remainder of the New Zealand Brigade and 4th Australian Brigade had not yet landed and there were no troops to restore the situation on the left, where the absence of counter-battery work was trying the troops very highly. Enemy batteries from the direction of Chunuk Bair had been troubling our troops since 13-00 hours.

About this time further delays were caused at the beach owing to lack of decisions by the divisional staffs. It could not be decided whether more troops were to be landed or whether evacuation was to be ordered. Lack of orders, the consequent demoralising rumours, failure of beach organisation, resulted in the lack of support to forward troops at a critical time.

During the evening Turkish counter-attacks were to add to the general discomfiture by preventing reorganisation.

LESSONS.—The narrative of events points plainly to several lessons. Bad beach organisation means grave delays. Delays in this type of operation, where success depends on exploiting any surprise, are absolutely fatal. A tactical surprise had been achieved, but numbers could not be produced quickly enough to take advantage

of it. The confusion and difficulties caused by deploying from a narrow front, although this was no fault of a military commander, confirms the wisdom of the original order to land on a frontage of nearly a mile. Overcrowding on the beach is to be avoided, particularly when the beach is narrow.

The influence of ground over the movements of troops is well illustrated, providing an example also of the need for reconnaissance by all means available so as to avoid being surprised by the ground. The delaying power of well concealed marksmen in this scrub covered country was most apparent, and snipers took heavy toll of those who put their heads up to reconnoitre.


The operations furnish an example of the need for leadership. Numbers are useless without co-ordination, illustrated by the lack of progress made by 8,000 of our troops against about 500 of the enemy, otherwise the situation at 09-00 hours would have been in our favour entirely. The opportunity to make progress after this hour in the morning never reoccurred.

The landing of H. Q. 1st Australian Division three hours after the initial disembarkation might be considered a contributory cause of failure. The decision to employ the 2nd Brigade on the right might not have been made had Divisional H. Q. been represented on shore. The position of commanders needs careful study in landing operations. The position of the Commander-in-Chief, confined in "Queen Elizabeth," at Sedd el Bahr is open to the gravest criticism. He could not have been fully aware of the situation of the troops at Anzac until very late in the day.

The Official History states that the ease of the initial landing may have caused a false sense of security. The will to win can never be too highly cultivated, but this must be tempered by a reasoned respect for the enemy. The study of the characteristics of foreign armies might well be deserving of study by regimental officers; better facilities than those now prevailing might be given.

The value of discipline and training are self-evident, but this type of operation calls for the highest form of both. The lack of covering fire was a handicap to the troops; the ships did not open fire till 12 hours after the landing, and the orders cancelling the landing of the artillery deprived the troops of this moral support. Absence of aircraft was to deprive commanders of the information about the progress made by forward troops and neutralised the

ANZAC



presence of naval artillery. The maps issued were of little assistance ; in this type of operation good maps are of paramount importance because of the limited reconnaissances possible.

Many other lessons may be deduced from the landing at Anzac. As General Callwell (*The Dardanelles Campaign* ; Gen. C. E. Callwell) points out, a maritime descent against the coasts of a well organised enemy with good rail and road communications is a most hazardous and difficult enterprise.

A TRUE FISHING STORY

BY "MUGGER."

Since the following account was written, many sportsmen have captured many tunny fish, and every successive year successively heavier fish are recorded. A tunny fisherman now killing anything under 500lbs. in weight would seriously consider returning it "to let it grow up;" however, up to the year 1932, tunny fishing was still in an experimental stage in home waters and any tunny caught off our shores was worth keeping.

This story was originally produced in my regimental magazine of 1933, but, as although the matters of expenses and tackle used have met with some alterations, and the facilities for fishing have increased, the method of fishing for tunnies as described is still used, and I therefore venture to reproduce it for all those of the services whom it may interest.

Here is the story.

Many of us have done some big game shooting, but very few of us have any experience of big game fishing. Those who have caught heavy fish, say of over 40lbs., may have some idea of what playing a fish of over 400lbs. means. Fishermen, shikaries and others of the services will all be interested to read a first-hand account of such an experience.

In September 1932, having completed a fortnight's attachment to the 1st Brigade at Aldershot, I felt that I had earned a holiday. I decided to try my hand at tunny fishing.

On calling at Hardy's, 61 Pall Mall, I was informed that all I had to do was to catch a train for Scarborough and that their representative there would be ready to receive me and fit me out. Accordingly, and without any other preparation I boarded a train the next night and the morning after I found myself in Scarborough. I called in at Hardy's and was provided with an outfit which consisted of a 6 ft. cane rod, 400 yds. of 54 thread line, a 9 in. Fortuna reel, harness, a 12 ft. steel trace with hook, and a gaff. These articles were hired at, I think, three guineas for two days, with a decreasing rate per diem for longer periods.

It was on the 14th of September that I got aboard my tunny boat for my initiation. The tunny boat is a sea-going motor boat

and is locally called a coble ; it is about 35 ft. long and very broad in the beam. This boat takes a light dinghy in tow and about which more anon. The motor boat hire is £5 per diem and the dinghy £1 per diem. This includes a total crew of three.

It was 9 A.M. before we left Scarborough pier in a choppy sea. Spray was coming over us continually and we shipped an occasional wave. The weather was cold and I was feeling by no means happy as we forged our way eastwards through the North Sea. It took us some three hours' steaming to get up to the trawler fleet. There were about half-a-dozen trawlers steaming around with their trawl nets down.

These trawlers haul in their nets about once every two hours and usually give a blast on their sirens to let the tunny fishermen know that they are about to haul in. We steered up to one of the trawlers and I got out of my coble into the light dinghy with my boatman. I was all harnessed up and my hook baited with a herring. I sat on a board into which was fitted a brass swivelled socket which took the butt of my rod. About one foot above the reel the weight of the rod was taken on to my harness by two straps attached to a hook. Like this the fisherman can brace his feet against the prow of the boat and use his whole weight to hold up the rod against the pull of the fish. The steam winch of a trawler rapidly hauls in the trawl and just as the base of the net clears the water a momentary excitement always ensues, for this is the time that the tunnies are likely to show themselves ; the theory being that they follow the track of the trawl-net below the surface of the water, and when it breaks the surface they follow it up to seize the scraps and small fish that are forced through the mesh of the net. No tunnies appeared on this occasion, nor did any appear the whole of that day. I was not sorry therefore, when it was time to put about for home. My coble reached harbour after dark and it was really good to get outside a double whisky and inside a bath.

The next day I sallied forth out into the deep at crack of dawn. We steamed about all day, but never saw a sign of even a trawler, let alone a tunny.

The 16th was a repetition of the 15th. The weather was marvellously fine and, although somewhat boring, it was pleasant, and I took the opportunity of testing my tackle and practising with my heavy fishing gear. However, two days of cruising about the

North Sea in an open motor-boat with little to do, and no one to do it with is no fun and I did not relish a repetition of this on the next day ; moreover, my boatmen were not optimistic and candidly told me that the prospects for the next day were not very bright. It was only H. J. Hardy who persuaded me to stay on for a fourth day as the weather was so gloriously fine. In consequence I started out at dawn on the following day ; there was a haze and the water was dead calm. At the end of two hours' steaming East-North-East, we were still not in sight of any trawlers, and the third hour was almost through and our hopes rapidly fading away when we at last sighted two trawlers steaming aimlessly about in the distance. We made towards one of them and stood by until it was about to haul up.

I now got into my dinghy with my boatman and very carefully baited my hook with a large mackerel. I also had a 16 ft. bamboo-pole arrangement with which to hold my bait clear of the boat. There was one other tunny boat nearby and we were both only some 30 ft. from the side of the trawler. The trawl ropes were rattling over the winches when I cast my bait out. In doing this my bamboo-gadget broke and I had hardly cleared the debris when someone indicated a tunny a few yards away. That fish was apparently making for the bait of the other fellow ; he, however, struck too quickly, missed, and nearly overbalanced into the water. My own bait was still sinking and about 12 ft. down and under my boat when I felt my trace straighten out. The fish must have taken me after his turn away from the other bait and his 'boil' was still visible on the surface. My line then tightened and for a moment I thought that I was foul of the trawl-net as the line was not run out at once. I took a chance and leant back and gave two strikes with all that I could put into them. The next moment my reel was humming and my powerful rod dipping and vibrating. My boatman got the dinghy into line with the course of the fish and strained hard with the oars to get it moving as fast as possible. My line was in the meantime rapidly running out and I thought that nothing could stop it from all going. I tightened up the clutch of my reel as much as I dared. The line was like a banjo string as I had all my weight against the pull of the fish.

We were soon clear of the trawler, one great relief. The chances of the line being fouled by the trawl-net, trawler or one of the other tunny boats are considerable and the first minute always an anxious

time, but my fish was well hooked and we were soon out in the open sea.

I now could hold the fish. He was towing the boat steadily, but an occasional spurt used to run out more and more line which made me very anxious. I don't suppose that I had more than 300 yards of line out at any one time, but to me the line on the wide spool had dwindled down to next to nothing.

We went on like this for some fifteen minutes and then I started trying to regain some line. Here I experienced difficulty with my reel. The clutch rings had become heated in the first run and were now slipping and would not take the combined strain of the pull of the fish and my efforts to reel in. At one juncture I got an overrun, and for ten seconds my line was fast. A sudden increase of the speed of the fish during that critical period would have broken me for a certainty. I got the line running free once more and the struggle went on.

After some ten minutes of these tactics the fish "scunded," and I experienced some violent kicking from my rod which renewed my anxiety. I was at this stage almost beat and my boatman removed my hat and wiped my head with a rag soaked in sea-water to help keep me going. The fish went on jerking and pulling and next I felt a series of very sharp tugs. I think that it was then that the fish was having its last struggle for life and freedom.

Another five minutes elapsed and then my boatman gave the opinion that the fish was dead. The position of the fish was at this time immediately under the boat on the sea-floor, and after holding him up for a few moments to see whether he had any more fight in him, I started pumping him up to the surface. This is always a difficult job as the tunny is a solid, heavy fish, and that and the rocking of the boat demands a considerable amount of care in raising him. He eventually appeared on the surface, however, and I told my boatman to stand by ready with the gaff. Here there was a hitch. The whole time up to now I had been reproved for any interference in the duties of the handling of the boat. "All right, Sir, keep yourself to yourself, I'll look after the boat, you look after the rod," were the words from my boatman that were meant to keep me in order. Now however there was a setback to his assurance, for when I had demanded the gaff, no gaff could he produce. He had left it behind in the coble. The coble was signalled up and the gaff passed across and then a swinging

blow from it missed the fish's flank and hit my trace. A second attempt only served to knock the head of the gaff off its shaft and fail to enter the fish !! Thank goodness he was practically dead when he reached the surface otherwise we were almost certain to have lost him. Eventually he was hauled and made fast to the dinghy.

With the aid of another tunny-boat we got our catch into our coble. It was a great relief to see it at last lying in the boat. I continued fishing for a short while after this capture but, as my crew were anxious to get back to port, I soon wound in my line and we set a course for the harbour.

We arrived at Scarborough with the Union Jack flying at our mast-head--the usual method of indicating a successful trip--and found the quay very full of interested visitors. The tunny was hauled up on to the quay and photographed by a press photographer and then taken to the weighing yard for official weighing. It scaled 464lbs. It was in beautiful condition and measured 7 feet 10 inches long and 6 feet in girth.

The Scarborough Corporation issues a badge to successful tunny anglers and broadcasts any catch to the public. A club known as "The British Tunny Club," with its headquarters in Scarborough and a branch H. Q. in London has been formed. This club is an offshoot of the British Sea Anglers Society and is concerned with looking after the interests of tunny and other big game fishermen.

A SHORT REVIEW OF MECHANISATION

By LIEUT.-COL. A. G. BAIRD-SMITH, D.S.O. (RETD.).

After almost complete scrapping of the immense mechanical equipment accumulated during four years of war, the creation of new "mechanised" fighting units in any considerable numbers could not fail to be a very costly, laborious and slow process. Research and experiment, in view of foreign progress in the same direction, had at least to keep pace with construction; which, unless its products were to be constantly out-dated, had to avoid too much standardisation of types. If, as seemed at first probable, the only way to get sufficient money for the mechanised Arm was to starve the older Arms, then this was a risk that only enthusiasts were prepared to accept. To them, indeed, the old-fashioned Army was hardly worth even its present reduced cost.

Constructive experiments were, of course, the business of experts. It was not till tactical and manœuvre experiments could be begun with the small number of A.F.V.'s at first available, that questions as to their future fighting rôle, or their action in combination with the other Arms, could be examined or debated. The theories already formed from war experience were, however, so conflicting, that soon an acute controversy on the whole subject of mechanisation arose; which has by no means ceased at the present day. On the one side the extreme mechanisation advocates maintain that this process must embrace all Arms, and completely transform them; on the other, the more cautious and conservative regard the A. F. V.'s as at best an auxiliary Arm of yet unproved capability and of doubtful future. Total mechanisation, they maintain, is financially impossible, and, in any case, unsuited to an Army that must be prepared to fight in almost any quarter of the globe.

The mechanical school hold that, if given their way, they could build up fighting formations, "independent" of the other Arms (with possible exception of the Air) capable of conducting a war by themselves, with a rapidity and decisiveness hitherto unknown; a war in which horsed Cavalry would be useless, and ordinary Infantry superfluous. To the majority, however, it seemed that a very long road must be traversed before both conditions and equipment could combine to bring about such a desirable result. *

Co-operation between A. F. V.'s and the other Arms had not achieved in the last war conspicuous success ; chiefly because no general agreement on their respective rôles had ever been reached. To-day it is this co-operation, and not separation, that is occupying the minds of those responsible for the Army's training. A constant financial stringency, and the political pursuit of unilateral disarmament, has limited the scale both of their experiments and their objectives ; for the immediate future any plans for wholesale mechanisation and motorisation of both mounted and dismounted Arms must be regarded as extravagant.

In technical development, since the original design of A. F. V.'s had been exclusively British, it might be assumed that foreign constructors would closely follow each British innovation ; and since they might not be financially so restricted, their output of A. F. V.'s could presumably be greater. Thus the British mechanised Arms would each have its foreign opposite number ; any strategical theory of their employment could not postulate one "independent" mechanised force operating, so to speak, "in vacuo," and scouring an enemy's territory without encountering its like. The tendency of the British mechanical school at first was to conceive its A. F. V.'s as having a monopoly of power, speed and range ; which, naturally, would enable them to achieve the most far-reaching success. As one writer put it—"A blow at the enemy's H. Q.'s, signal centres, transport lines and supply columns would be likely to paralyze all the combatant troops that are dependent on these vital organs." ⁽¹⁾ This was the theory of "Strategic Paralysis," largely based on the mobility, "the mental and moral effect" ⁽²⁾ of A. F. V.'s and on certain war experiences, the result of a one-sided mechanical superiority unlikely ever to recur.

In order to try out small "independent" mechanised formations, Medium Armoured Brigades (each of about 130 A. F. V.'s) were formed. The question of ground space for mobility training was, however, found to be very difficult ; any massed movements of such formations were apt to be very destructive to private property. Even for the older Arms British training grounds were already too cramped. A suggestion was seriously made that the mechanised Arms be bodily transferred to Canada—where 10,000 square miles of open country could be rented or bought. But a boundless American prairie would

⁽¹⁾ ⁽²⁾ Captain Liddell Hart, in "The Daily Telegraph," 25-26 Sept. 1930.

hardly suffice to train units for all the conditions of war in Europe. In France more space for rapid, long-range exercises of mechanised units was available than in England; considerable experience has been gained in the acceleration of all Arms by "motorisation," and in the study of new problems produced by it.

A result of the exercises carried out in the United States in 1932, was a report by the Chief of Staff in favour of breaking up the experimental Mechanised Force. The report stressed the "inherent weaknesses and limitations" of the various machines; which precluded "their employment in many types of terrain." Further it pointed out the impossibility of maintaining a sufficiently large number of up-to-date vehicles in immediate readiness for an outbreak of war; this impossibility, though not so specified, being no doubt financial. It also considered that the commencement of large scale manufacture after war had begun would be too late. Accordingly the principal tasks that had been allotted to the Mechanised Force were to be assumed, examined and developed as far as practicable by the Cavalry.

The problems of the United States' General Staff are certainly not identical with those of the British or French; probably it could reckon on a much longer period, subsequent to the declaration of war, in which to supplement its shortage of machines. As to the "inherent weaknesses" of A. F. V.'s, these are familiar to all who have handled them; but there is no need to assume that all these defects are to be permanently reproduced in every new type constructed.

The low rate of speed of the first tanks made them easy gun-targets; but no rifle bullet then in use could penetrate their armour. The theory, however, that "speed is armour" tended by degrees to make armour-plating a secondary consideration; the A. F. V. began to evolve from a land "battle-ship" into a "protected cruiser." But speed also spelt expense. Moreover, the only reply to armour-piercing projectiles must be either more speed or more armour-till finality is reached in one direction. The ultimate triumph of the armour-piercing projectile over both these expedients must always be considered possible.

British designers' latest achievement is a 16-ton tank, the fastest long-range A. F. V. yet made; but until money is allotted for its mass production, it remains, like the anti-tank gun, scheduled as "experimental." Costing about £10,000 apiece, A. F. V.'s of this

type, though triumphs of engineering skill, are extremely complex mechanisms, requiring as repairs and "spares" a multitude of reserve parts. Considerations of the cost of their maintenance, in large numbers ready for war, weigh even more heavily in Great Britain than in the United States; but if this cost is to be regarded as prohibitive, the part to be played by them in the earlier stages of a great war can only be a small one.

The general "motorisation" of the other Arms, which is necessary if all rates of movement are to be governed by that of A. F. V.'s, must produce a crop of fresh problems. The enormously increased, indispensable mechanical impedimenta that must follow and keep pace with "motorised" armies, suggest the dire possibility of the armies being, so to speak, strangled by their own tails. A plan to avoid this palpable danger is the drastic reduction in the personnel of the fighting forces. Thus one authority ⁽¹⁾ maintained that a mechanised army of 30,000 men would be, for example, a much more powerful instrument than was the B. E. F. of 1914. Assuming, without warrant, that its continental opposites were equally reduced in size, still the amount of mechanical spares, and of skilled mechanics, required to keep even this small army off its feet, and in rapid and continuous motion, would still be formidable; and any prolonged separation of the mass of vehicles from its repair shops might render it completely immobile.

Proper provision for the sudden expansion of production, on the outbreak of war, of every variety of mechanical vehicle, is possible only in a country organised beforehand for "industrial conscription" as real and far-reaching as its military conscription. Such provision cannot be made in a country whose government and people are averse to conscription of any kind whatever.

So much for the material problems; those of a tactical or strategical nature are not much nearer solution. For example; it is impossible to decide whether the sudden irruption of a fleet of A. F. V.'s into an opponent's rear lines would result in his "Strategic Paralysis"; it is scarcely possible, in the light of the limited experience of peace-time exercises, to be sure that such an operation will be attempted in the next war. The natural tendency of anyone wishing to prove a theory by experiment is to provide favourable conditions; and these have sometimes produced one-sided tactical schemes, in

⁽¹⁾ "Lectures on F. S. R. 111." Major-General J. F. C. Fuller.

which one active party encountered "passive resistance" embodied in the other. In war, of course, it may be possible to mark down, and stalk a passive enemy; yet for reasons of ordinary prudence it is usual to act as though he were on the alert. A mechanised surprise labours under a variety of handicaps; of which, to-day, noise is one, visibility from the air another, and a third a certain lack of flexibility, and liability to awkward mechanical breakdown.

In the exercises of 1934, a small 'independent' mechanised force was employed, in the Salisbury Plain area, against an objective representing the H. Q.'s and services of the line of communications of an army, which was halted and deployed on a wide defensive position. The conditions, of course, were far from ideal for surprise; they included all the usual hindrances and restrictions of a peace manœuvre-area. The A. F. V.'s were not all of the newest pattern; but in no circumstances of British war are they ever likely to be so. The assumed passive opponent, moreover, proved unexpectedly active, employing both cavalry and guns with conspicuous success. The attempted raid was judged to have failed; partly for want of proper ground reconnaissance, partly for want of covering troops to its line of march, and partly to lack of concealment, and insufficient average speed. This speed was, naturally, governed by those of the slowest vehicles in the column, and the necessity of having them closed up; it would have been even slower had the duties of reconnaissance and covering been properly performed.

Inter-Divisional exercises in the Aldershot Command, in 1935, afforded several interesting situations; for example, a massed frontal attack by A. F. V.'s on a defensive position, strongly held but only lightly entrenched. The attack was to make a breach which the Infantry could afterwards exploit. On the defenders' side, a number of anti-tank guns were hidden on a forward slope below the main position, and were thus judged to have escaped the effects of a smoke barrage laid down on it. Their fire, and that of the defenders' artillery, combined to put the A. F. V.'s largely out of action. This attack, of course, was a reversion to the original tank tactics, by way of experiment; but no decided body of opinion can be said to favour such reversion.

In the subsequent Army Manœuvres, held in Wiltshire and Hampshire, the A. F. V.'s had to operate in enclosed and wooded country very unsuitable to the development of their special qualities.

A completely "motorised" Infantry Brigade, and a partly mechanised Cavalry Regiment were employed to test rapidity of movement, and the effect of an entire absence of horses. The opposing Armies, which were of about equal strength, started some thirty miles apart and met in an encounter battle somewhere in the centre of the manoeuvre area; only the limits of this area constituted some kind of security to their flanks, which otherwise were more or less "in the air." Both the rival Commanders, tempted by these artificial conditions planned enveloping attacks; which, conducted by the available mechanical means, spread themselves out to great lengths in a very short time. If it is considered likely that small, modern armies such as these might encounter each other, as it were, in empty space, then the question of "defensive flanks" assumes a new aspect. The employment of motorised Cavalry and Artillery in wide flanking movements of an "independent" nature, must necessitate, on the part of the opponent, the provision of an equally mobile flank guard; but where in space the two opposing, independent bodies would finally meet, the commanders of the armies could never know. In these exercises it was found that the attempt to provide a more or less stationary flank defence led to the stringing out of divisional fronts to so much as fifteen miles.

At present it appears that the chief problem to be studied is an increased combination of "motorised" troops with A. F. V.'s. Motorised Cavalry, probably horseless, will act with light armoured cars, and light tanks; while Infantry, if only mechanically brought to the battle zone, will be accompanied and supported by the I. tanks, the pattern of which is still the subject of experiment.

As regards all A. F. V.'s, the tendency has lately been to favour the lighter and speedier types, and to consider armour as secondary. Apart from its cost, the British Medium tank is by many considered unsuitable, as being too slow and too conspicuous in action. In fact, many advanced thinkers are already contemplating a future when armour will once more, and finally, disappear from the battlefield; in which the machine-gun bullet and the gas-shell will reign supreme.

THE CHOICE OF A SCHOOL

BY MAJOR G. E. HAMILL, I.A. (RETIRED).

A Major Problem.

This is one of the major problems which the parent has to face. It cannot be shelved. A solution has to be found. Stated briefly, the problem is to find a good school charging fees which the parent can afford. I wish to shew that it is possible to do this.

The fact that Public Schools turn out many young men who are inadequately equipped to enter a world in which high standards of efficiency are demanded, is due in many ways to the apathy of the parent. The parent pays fees but seldom takes any action to obtain satisfactory results. If he demands results, he is considered fussy. Once a child has been placed in a particular school, it is often impracticable to make a change even if the parent considers a change desirable.

As a precaution, and to ensure that money spent on education is well-spent, a school should in the beginning be chosen with care and deliberation.

My Authority.

With what authority do I write ?

My investigations into this subject began two years ago, originally on my own behalf and subsequently on behalf of a friend stationed abroad. In my own case I visited schools in Sussex and Kent : in the other, the East Coast. Since that time I have had occasion to visit schools in most of the other counties. My object on each occasion was to find schools suitable for the children of Service Parents with limited means.

As a result of these investigations, I am able to say that it is possible for every parent to educate his child at a good school at a fee he can afford to pay. See Appendix A.

The maximum inclusive fee which I can at present afford is £90 a year. This is what I pay at an excellent Boys' Preparatory School in Broadstairs. My standards are, I think, high and I believe I have made a wise choice.

The procedure I shall outline will enable every parent to solve his own particular problem without difficulty.

Service Parents are Nomadic.

If the parent is permanently resident in England, it is a relatively simple matter to arrange his child's education. The Service Parent, however, may to-day be stationed at Catterick or Shorncliffe, and to-morrow at Rawalpindi or Gibraltar. Similar conditions obtain in all the Services.

However frequently the parent may move, it is not desirable that a child's education should be continually interrupted. Hence when a child reaches school age, the wisest plan usually is to select a Boarding School.

I am not going to discuss the relative merits of Boarding and Day Schools. Most Service Parents are obliged at some time or other, to leave their child at home when they go abroad. They have no alternative therefore, but to send the child to a Boarding School. There is no satisfactory compromise.

If both parents are abroad, arrangements have to be made for the care of the child during holidays. Where reliable relations or friends are willing to accept this responsibility, no difficulty is experienced. But if such an arrangement cannot be made, another problem arises. Is the child to be left at school or boarded out with a family?

I shall deal with these two problems as briefly and in as practical a manner as possible.

The Practical Difficulty.

The parent may say, "I know the exactly type of school I want, where I want it and how much I can afford to pay. But what I do not know is how to find the school. What I want is a Starting Point." This is the chief practical difficulty. My object is not to choose schools, but to suggest how the difficulty mentioned may be overcome.

There are various methods of getting into touch with schools. Lists of schools can be obtained through Scholastic Agencies, from School Books and from Newspapers and Periodicals. I do not propose to discuss the usefulness or otherwise of these methods. I believe, however, I am right when I say that the majority of Service Parents are averse from employing any of the methods mentioned. Something of a more personal nature is desired.

The ideal medium would, I think, be someone whom the parent could consult in the same way as he would consult his lawyer, doctor

or broker. This implies that transactions are conducted on a personal basis and that the client has confidence in the person consulted.

In the matter under discussion it would, I think, be an advantage if the consultant himself were a Service Parent. He would know the type of school required and would appreciate the difficulty of providing school fees with limited means.

The Sound Foundation.

It is not enough to say, "I want a Good school." This holds good both for a girl and a boy. Let us suppose a Preparatory School is required for a boy. What do we mean by "Good ?" These are my views :—

The Preparatory School stage is the most important in a Boy's education. His career at his Public School and in after life will depend largely on the quality of the training given by his Preparatory School. I know parents who have spent from £1,200 to £1,800 on their boy's education, but when the boy left his Public School he had not taken his School Certificate. A Tutor had to be provided to coach the boy for an examination which his parents anticipated he would have taken at school.

Why should this be ? Parents cannot afford to spend money so unprofitably. When a boy leaves his Public School he ought, in addition to possessing charming manners and an aptitude for games, to have passed his School Certificate or Matriculation, and have some idea as to what he wants to do.

The responsibility of the Preparatory School is to lay that sound foundation without which this ideal cannot become a reality. The best foundation in my opinion is, to teach the elementary subjects really well ; to teach the boy to work hard as well as to play hard, and to do this under the healthiest and happiest conditions. Until the parent insists on these minimum requirements, it is unlikely that there will be any change of thought as far as the schools are concerned.

Fees.

The difficulty with limited means is to provide fees.

Fees for Boarders vary from £60 to £200 a year exclusive in many cases, of extras. As a general rule, the higher the fee the better the school. This, however, is not an infallible guide. I know a school charging an inclusive fee of £75 a year which, in my opinion,

is a far better school than some charging £120. The school in question is suitable for the children of Service Parents. It is self-contained and has always its full complement of from thirty to forty boys paying full fees. The Headmaster owns the property. No unnecessary expenses are incurred. The school is intended primarily to give a sound education for the lowest possible fee.

We can rule out schools charging over £150 as being beyond the means of the average parent. The school most likely to suit Service Parents charges from £100 to £150, and unless one is certain that a school charging a lower fee is a sound concern, it is better to avoid it.

Many schools are ready to reduce fees in order to get pupils. Some are willing to make a limited number of concessions each year in order to assist parents who cannot afford full fees. I differentiate with reason.

If a school has to meet high overhead charges, it cannot afford to take, say, half its pupils at greatly reduced fees. To do so something has to be sacrificed. Is it the food? Is the teaching staff underpaid? These questions naturally arise. The point I wish to make is that if a concession is to be of value it must be a sound business proposition, both from the point of view of the school and the parent.

There are, as I have indicated, many good schools in a position to make genuine concessions where these are justified. These take the form of Bursaries and the number granted each year is necessarily limited. The child concerned receives exactly the same treatment as those paying full fees, and the parent can with safety accept such a concession.

Parent Decides Maximum Fee.

Our object is not to "beat down" the school. It is not a question of discovering the lowest fee the school will accept. One is not bartering in an Indian bazaar. The question to be decided is what is the maximum fee the parent can afford. Only the parent himself can decide this, but until it has been decided it is better not to attempt to negotiate with schools.

Private Schools.

Only certain classes of the community are in a position to take advantage of the educational facilities provided by the State, free of cost—at the ratepayer's expense. This fact has resulted in the

growth of the Private School, or the school depending on private enterprise for its existence.

There are thousands of these schools in England. In Eastbourne alone, there are twenty-two Girls' and eighteen Boys' Preparatory Schools.

As far as I have been able to discover, anyone who chooses to do so can open a school, irrespective of his or her qualifications to assume such a responsibility. It is obvious, I think, that many of these establishments would be rendering a service to posterity were they to close their doors.

Some Private Schools submit themselves to inspection by the Board of Education. This is a voluntary act. Certain requirements have, however, to be fulfilled before a school becomes eligible for inspection. Some schools are eligible but will not submit to inspection—not because they fear inspection, but because they fear red tape and desire to preserve their individuality. There is much to be said for this point of view, provided of course that the school is run on efficient lines.

The inspection referred to is, I understand, very thorough. A school which satisfies the Board's Inspectors, becomes Recognised by the Board of Education. When choosing a school therefore, the parent should find out if it is Recognised, when it was last inspected and the result thereof. Although I, personally, am of the opinion that all Private Schools should be inspected, I would point out that a school may be efficient and yet not be a Recognised School.

Locality Preferred.

This usually decides itself. A parent having relations or friends in Sussex will likely look for a school in that or in an adjacent county. For a delicate child, or one not too robust, the south or south-west will probably be chosen. When this has been settled, the field of choice becomes narrowed down and the number of schools to be considered is limited accordingly.

Considerations in Choosing a Boy's Preparatory School.

The boy—a child of eight—is about to leave his parents for good, or for at least thirty-six weeks of the year. He is about to exchange for home life the rough and tumble of school life. It is therefore essential that the school selected be one which aims at preserving something of the home atmosphere which the child has hitherto

enjoyed. The transition from home conditions to school life proper should be gradual.

The Preparatory School should not, in my opinion, be regarded either by the parent or by the school as a miniature Public School, but rather as a nursery in which the boy as an individual is prepared for his Public School. In a large Preparatory School with, say, one hundred boys, it is seldom possible to ensure this. During this important stage of his education, it is highly undesirable that a boy should become merely one of a crowd. His individuality must now be developed and preserved. If the Headmaster finds it necessary, because of large numbers, to delegate his responsibilities to Assistant Masters, and if keen competition as between Houses is an important item in the life of the School, the boy becomes a mere pawn in the game. I am definitely against competition in a Preparatory School.

The school selected therefore, should be small, with forty or fifty boys. The Staff should be sufficient to admit of small classes of ten or twelve boys. The atmosphere should be homely and happy.

Preliminary Step.

Let us assume that the ideal medium has been found, and that the parent wishes to choose a Boys' Preparatory School for his boy at an inclusive fee of £90 a year. The parent will receive a short list of schools considered suitable. Schools will write and send prospectuses.

It is not possible to choose a school from a prospectus, but just as one studies the map before going out to the ground, so one should study a prospectus. It has to be remembered that it is the school which compiles the prospectus, and that whereas one is told that, "Guinness is GOOD for you," Guinness may really be very bad for you.

The turn-out of a prospectus can be very informative. Some are cheaply got up and badly printed. Some are altogether too attractive to be genuine. I have seen a prospectus containing a photograph shewing extensive playing fields, whereas actually, the school had no playing fields worth mention. The photograph was so taken that a large piece of Common was included! The prospectus of a good school is usually simple, well-printed on good paper.

The Headmaster's qualifications should be noted. If the letters M. R. S. T. appear after his name they shew that he is a Member of the Royal Society of Teachers. This implies proficiency in Practical

teaching. A degree is desirable but not, in my opinion, absolutely essential. An Honours Degree in Mathematics may be of little use when it comes to teaching small boys simple addition. A Degree may be no indication of proficiency as a Teacher.

It is desirable that the Headmaster himself should be a parent. If he is, he is likely to understand boys, and this is half the battle in teaching boys.

The records of Scholarships recently obtained, will indicate the quality of the work done in special cases. The number of boys passing into the well-known Public Schools and into The Royal Naval College, will indicate the general standard of work.

A large Day connexion is not always an asset to a school.

It is desirable that a school should be self-contained. It should have its own playing fields, carpenters shop, swimming bath, etc.

References are usually quoted in a prospectus. Referees are usually reticent but two or three should be taken up and specific questions asked.

Other useful information will be noted.

The Visit.

The next step will be to pay a number of visits.

The personality of the Headmaster is reflected in his school.

While the boy is at school the Headmaster and his wife will have to act *in loco parentis* towards him. The question the parent should ask himself is, do they inspire confidence, can I trust them ?

Now is the time to ask questions and to become satisfied on all major points. I need not go into details. Food and Health, for example, are of vital importance.

Opportunity should be taken to meet some of the boys and to talk to them.

Normal boys are dirty and untidy, therefore a school should not be too clean. Due regard must of course be paid to hygiene, sanitation and to the undesirability of overcrowding in dormitories.

The value of corporal punishment is, in my opinion, grossly over-rated. I cannot conceive of any situation which justifies a grown man beating a small boy. It is farcical for him to lament, "This hurts me as much as it does you." I cannot believe this. Psychologically it is wrong. The Schoolmaster will ask, "But how are we going to maintain Discipline ?" The answer is, " You don't have to maintain 'Discipline ' in a well-run Preparatory School." To talk of

Discipline in a Preparatory School is absurd. Boys are naturally mischievous, destructive, noisy and untidy. If they are not, there is something seriously wrong with them. Corporal punishment has never eradicated these faults—if they can be called faults. It is unnecessary to legislate for the maintenance of Discipline in a well-run school. If boys are kept usefully employed and if they are happy they do not break rules, for no rules are necessary. If it becomes necessary to punish a boy, the deprivation of some privilege is much more effective than a beating.

The parent should get some assurance on this question before making his choice.

The Choice.

Having followed the procedure suggested, the parent cannot fail to form sound impressions of the schools he visits and to decide on the suitably or otherwise of any particular school.

When a school has definitely been decided upon, the parent ought, if possible, to pay a second visit and take his boy with him. If a careful choice has been made, there is little likelihood of the boy not being attracted by the school. Such a visit serves a useful purpose in that it enables the boy to become acquainted with the Headmaster and to meet some of the boys. When he enters the school he will not be entirely a stranger.

Once a decision has been made, it is desirable that the school should be given as free a hand as possible. If both parents are abroad they will not, of course, be able to interfere and it is unlikely that the boy will complain should anything be amiss. Boys are like that, and this is all to the good. Confidence is necessary.

It will serve a useful purpose if the parent will get the Headmaster to be absolutely candid in his reports. When a boy is backward in a particular subject, it is not enough that the Headmaster should say he is weak. The parent probably knows that already. What he does want to know, however, is, what exactly is the school doing about it? It may be the boy's fault, but more often than not it is the fault of the master taking the subject.

Preparatory Schools are notoriously weak where the teaching of important elementary subjects is concerned. One finds a boy devoting a lot of time to French or Latin when he can neither read nor write his own language fluently. These neglected subjects—Reading, Writing and Arithmetic,—are the foundation on which his

future education has to be built up. Neglect to lay this foundation in the early stages will result in an anti-climax such as I described in the beginning.

I am convinced that the parent should, without interfering or fussing unnecessarily, keep a very close watch on his child's progress at school. Since he pays fees, he should insist on sound teaching and the best possible practical results.

Girls.

I have referred mainly to the education of the boy. There are essential differences between a boy's and a girl's education. The object is different in many respects, but the necessity for a sound education remains, and hence the same care must be taken in choosing a girls' school as in choosing one for a boy.

Entire Charge.

I have not the space at my disposal to enable me to deal fully with this question. Here are a few points for consideration.

If arrangements cannot be made with friends or relations, there are three alternatives. The school can be asked to take charge ; the child can be sent to a family or to a holiday home.

I am not keen on the last named. The second is ideal but difficult to find. The first is the simplest and again one is reminded of the necessity for care in choosing.

The cost is usually from two to three guineas a week.

Financial Provision for Education.

It is wiser to insure to provide £30 a year for education than to make no provision at all.

SUMMARY.*The Choice of a School.*

Decide on the type of school required.

Decide on the locality.

Decide on the maximum inclusive fee to be offered.

Decide on the medium to be employed.

Pay a preliminary visit to some of the schools and subsequently a second visit accompanied by the child concerned.

Entire Charge.

Decide at the time of choosing the school whether entire charge is to be taken by the school and go into the matter fully.

If a family is required adopt a similar procedure to that employed when choosing a school.

Settle all details, if necessary with legal assistance.

Financial Provision.

Decide how much can be afforded for the purpose.

Consult a reliable Insurance Broker.

Insure, whether it be for a large or small amount.

In Conclusion.

My wife has always accompanied me on my visits to schools. I mention this because, whereas the father usually chooses his boy's Public School, the mother plays the principal part in choosing the Preparatory School. Mothers usually know instinctively whether a school is suitable or not. They can sense a good school or an unsuitable one without making any conscious effort to do so. In forming opinions I have relied to a great extent on the views expressed by my wife.

In the event of any parent wishing to submit a specific problem, I would require the following information :—

Type of school required.

Locality.

Age and sex of child.

Maximum inclusive fees.

Religious denomination.

Boarder or day.

If entire charge is to be taken.

Any other relevant information.

[*Editor's Note.*—The address of the author may be obtained from the Secretary, United Service Institution of India.]

APPENDIX A

SCHOOLS GRANTING CONCESSIONS TO SERVICE PARENTS

<i>County.</i>		<i>Normal. Fees.</i>	<i>Concessional Rate, p. a.</i>
<i>Kent—</i>			
Country, Girls'	..	120	75
Folkestone, Girls'	..	150	100
Folkestone, Boys' Prep.	..	150	90
Broadstairs, Boys' Prep.	..	150	90
<i>Sussex—</i>			
Eastbourne, Boys' Prep.	..	105	80
Eastbourne, Boys' Prep.	..	126	100
Country, Boys' Prep.	..	150	100
Coast, Girls'	..	126	90
Coast, Girls'	..	140	100
<i>Hants—</i>			
Country, Boys' Prep.	..	156	80
Country, Boys' Prep.	..	126	80
Country, Boys' Prep.	..	141	90
Coast, Girls'	..	150	105

These are some of the schools my wife and I have visited. We consider them suitable for the children of service parents. Similar concessions are obtainable at other schools known to us in Devon, Dorset, Surrey, on the East Coast, in the West Country, and a few in the Midlands and the North.

APPENDIX B

TYPES OF SCHOOLS AND NOTES

Boys' Preparatory	.. For boys under 15 preparing for Public Schools and the Royal Naval College.
Pre-Preparatory	.. For boys and girls preparing for Preparatory Schools.
Home	.. For small boys and girls.
Nursery	.. For infants.
Girls' Preparatory	.. For girls preparing for Girls' Public or Private Schools. Most Girls' Schools nowadays have a Junior Department which serves the purpose of a Preparatory School.
Girls' Public	.. Administered by a Board of Governors.
Domestic Science	.. For senior girls. Most Girls' Schools have a Domestic Science Department but there are also a number of schools which specialise in the subject.
Tutor	.. For backward or delicate boys and girls or for those requiring special coaching.
M. R. S. T.	.. Member of the Royal Society of Teachers. Membership implies proficiency in Practical Teaching.
Incorporated Association	Headmasters of Boys' Preparatory Schools of Preparatory Schools. are eligible for membership. One of the aims is to advance the interests of Preparatory School education and to ensure efficient liaison with Public Schools.

INDIAN ARTILLERY

BY MAJOR M. E. S. LAWS, M.C., R.A.

It is curiously appropriate that the year 1935 which witnesses the formation of the first unit of the Indian Artillery should also mark the centenary of the senior Indian Mountain Battery of the Royal Artillery. The 5th Bombay Mountain Battery, R.A., which completes a hundred years of unbroken service this autumn, is one of the only two surviving links between the old Native Artillery of the East India Company and the new Indian Artillery.

The early history of the Native Artillery units of the Indian Army is obscure, but it is clear that the policy of enlisting Golandaz (or Indian Gunners) was at first only adopted with great reluctance. A letter from the Court of Directors of the East India Company dated 17th June 1748 laid down that no "Indian black, or person of mixed breed or Roman Catholic of what nation soever, should be admitted into a laboratory or military magazine," and later this order was extended so as to prohibit the employment of native artillerymen. Accordingly Indians were only enlisted as gun lascars, and their duties were confined to moving the guns in action by means of drag ropes, and to the carrying of ammunition. But the increasing commitments of the Army in India combined with the acute shortage of British gunners, compelled the local authorities to ignore this order and in August 1777 the first company of Indian gunners was raised for service with the Oudh Brigade. This unit, under Lieutenant Robert Bruce, marched with General Goddard's column from Bengal *via* Bundelkund to Bombay in 1778 and behaved so steadily that two further companies of Golandaz were raised in Bengal, and these were later expanded to form three battalions of eight companies each and the gun lascar companies were disbanded.

But this reorganisation was most unpopular in the Army, since it meant the withdrawal of battalion guns from infantry regiments and their grouping into batteries manned by Golandaz. Immediately a storm of protest arose and the old order forbidding the employment of Indian gunners was again invoked. The Court of Directors (Minutes of Council dated 23rd November 1779) decided that the Indian artillery companies were to be disbanded, but apparently

took no adequate steps to augment the supply of European gunners to take their place. This was the more extraordinary as the British were at that time on the eve of hostilities with the Mahrattas and were also fighting Hyder Ali of Mysore. So the Golandaz were disbanded and their guns once more distributed among the infantry battalions, where they were far less efficiently served by untrained sepoys.

Since no increase had been made in the number of British artillerymen, gun lascars were again recruited "to perform all the duties of ordnance with the exception of pointing and loading guns and mortars." Meanwhile, the disbanded Golandaz, refusing to re-enlist as lascars and thus accept a lower status, mostly took service with the Mahrattas and fought against the Company's troops with great gallantry. For some years this system continued, but in 1798 another expedient was tested. To each European artillery company was added an Indian officer and 46 Golandaz, the intention being that the two races should be mixed indiscriminately in the gun detachments. But the Golandaz—who were officially termed "The Component Part"—objected strongly to working beside men of different race, language, customs and religion. The British gunners were also discontented since they mistrusted the reliability of the Indians at drill and a lack of care in those days of muzzle loading guns firing powder charges meant a serious accident, with the probability of death or mutilation for most of the detachment. In 1802 after many protests the Component Parts were withdrawn from European units and were merged into a separate Golandaz establishment which was officially sanctioned in 1806. Many of the men enlisted had already manned the Mahratta guns against the British during Lake's campaign and had thus proved their staunchness as soldiers and their ability as gunners.

From this time onwards the Native Artillery grew steadily in strength. The original Bengal establishment of five companies in 1806 was increased to seven in 1809, to 10 in 1812 and to 15 in 1818. Meanwhile Madras had also been experimenting with Golandaz and though units formed in 1784 and 1799 had been disbanded soon after being raised, the Native Artillery was definitely established in 1819. Bombay raised five Golandaz companies in 1826, and by 1846 there were 12 companies of Indian gunners on that establishment. The companies were in all cases entirely separate units and they soon

earned an excellent reputation for steadiness and skill. Thus the Bombay Golandaz took part in the campaigns in Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan, Sind, Capture of Aden and the Mutiny, while the Madras Native Artillerymen fought in Burma, China and Malaya. The Bengal Golandaz were engaged during the Mahratta War (1817), in Burma, Afghanistan, Gwalior (1843) and the Sikh Wars, and in several cases these companies were awarded special distinctions as a reward for good service. Thus the 2nd Company of the 6th Battalion, Bengal Artillery, received the unique honour of having a mural crown engraved on its guns to commemorate its gallantry during the defence of Jelalabad in 1841-2. (G. G. O. of 9th January 1843). The 3rd Bombay Golandaz Company was authorised to bear the word "Hyderabad" on its appointments (G. G. O. of 11th April 1843) as a reward for its services during the Sind campaign, while the 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion, Bombay Artillery was permitted to have "Beni-Boo-Ali" inscribed on its appointments (G. O. of 11th February 1831) for its gallantry during the Arabian expedition of 1820.

When the Mutiny broke out there were 6 Troops of Native Horse Artillery and 36 companies of Native Foot Artillery in India, besides the semi-independent Indian units of the Punjab Frontier Force and the contingents maintained by various States. Though nearly all the Bengal Cavalry and Infantry regiments were infected by the spirit of mutiny, only ten Golandaz regular units failed in their loyalty and in no case was any violence offered to their officers. Indeed several Troops and Companies of Native Artillery fought against the rebels and proved themselves entirely trustworthy, while in at least one case (1st Company, 7th Battalion, Bengal Artillery) the Indian gunners carried out death sentences on convicted mutineers—a high test of loyalty. But when the Company's Artillery was absorbed into the Royal Artillery in 1862, it was decided that no Indian gunners were to be retained on the regular establishment except in the Frontier Force, and the Golandaz Companies were gradually reduced.

There were however two exceptions to this rule. The old 8th and 10th Companies of Bombay Golandaz were retained as the 1st and 2nd Companies of the Native Artillery and were equipped as Mountain Batteries. They are to-day the 5th (Bombay) and 6th (Jacob's) Mountain Batteries R. A. and can trace their unbroken descent from the original Golandaz units raised in 1835 and 1843.

respectively. From after the Mutiny until January 1935 there were no Indian Artillery units other than the Mountain Batteries and these did not belong to the Royal Artillery until 1927 (Army Order 88/1927.)

The old distrust of the Indian Artilleryman which was first officially set forth in 1748 and which was revived in 1862 has at last been definitely abandoned. The services of the Indian Mountain Batteries during the Great War—which were rewarded by the grant of the title Royal to the 1st (but not the senior) battery—have disposed of all doubts as to their loyalty and efficiency, and the formation of the Indian Artillery is perhaps the happiest sign that the old prejudice is forgotten.

PRIVILEGE LEAVE TO AUSTRALIA

By LT.-COL. R. H. MYLNE, M.C., 4TH P. W. O. GURKHA

RIFLES

Two months' privilege leave to Australia—and why not? The object of this article is to try and place before the officer community of the Army in India the numerous advantages which, in the opinion of the writer, as the result of a recent round trip by P. and O. to Australia and back during August and September, this particular form of leave affords to all who are minded to seize the chance while it offers. It is written in the hope that it may cause a few who would not otherwise have considered the question, to give it a passing thought and, in the case of those who may have already envisaged it for future years, to try and convince them that they would be unlikely to have any ultimate cause for regrets over their choice.

How then to attack the question?

First of all is it not a fact that for those who have already spent a good many years in this country the choice of where to spend one's two months of the hot weather in India is a problem not always susceptible of very easy solution? There are some who, having enjoyed the delights of Kashmir once, for one reason or another feel disinclined to repeat the expedition. Again, even the keenest shikari may feel that in the year in question his health is deserving of more consideration than to spend his two months in the jungle. Sightseeing anywhere in the plains is obviously impossible except during the cold weather. The normal round of hill-station life is, to say the least of it, a spineless sort of existence for two months for such as could hope to fare better. The dash to England and back, unless of course it be a measure of necessity, in spite of the many advantages it may bring is, in the opinion of many, too unrestful and expensive an experience to be worth while.

If, then, for any or all of the above reasons leave in India does not seem to meet the case and the choice of where to spend those two months already lies outside her shores, surely a visit to the Antipodes, for all but those who are afflicted with a rooted dislike to the sea, should have much to offer as an alternative. Just how much must naturally depend on individual tastes as to what a well-

spent leave should, embrace, and to generalise would be unwise, but an excellent argument on the credit-side is that one is, so to speak, half-way there from the start and that a similar chance may never occur again once one has left India for good, if only on the score of expense alone.

It can hardly be out of place, then, for the writer to give a rough outline of his own experiences during the two months, whilst adding from the outset that they provided him with the happiest and most interesting short leave which he has ever been privileged to enjoy during 29 odd years in the East. In other words he speaks from the point of view of an enthusiast on the subject, but will try and temper his feelings by setting forth dispassionately under certain headings such points as should be of general interest. These are :—

- (a) The voyage there and back.
- (b) The country and the people who live in it.
- (c) Kit and finance.

(a) *The Voyage*.—As already mentioned, for such as dislike to “go down to the sea in ships” a “sea” leave of this nature is already ruled out. On the other hand, even to those who have long since wearied of the sameness of endless voyages to England and back it is recommended that they do not allow themselves to be put off straight away by the prospect of the bulk of their time being spent on board, say, a P. & O. Liner of the nature of the *Strathaird* or *Strathnaver*, both of which have in their turn of late years been doing the Australian run during the hot weather. The contrast in conditions of the rapid voyage to England and back and that of the long Australian cruise is just as marked as can be. During the former the natural tendency, and a very noticeable one, is for the ordinary passenger from the moment he embarks at Bombay, to be thinking mainly of the moment when he can scuttle off again at Marseilles. The voyage throughout is merely a means to an end and the quicker the means are accomplished the sooner will the end be achieved. Whereas, by contrast, on a two-months cruise he will at once come to look on the ship as his temporary home thus investing it with much the same regard as he might feel towards any well-found hotel in which he has elected to take up his abode for a similar period, and it will be surprising if his whole nautical outlook does not at once change in proportion.

There may also be a tendency to exaggerate in anticipation the length and resultant dullness of the periods that are to be spent purely at sea between ports. Actually the only long period is the nine days between leaving Colombo and touching at the first Australian port, namely, Fremantle. Thereafter the other ports follow in quick succession, each with its attendant variation of interest. Neither on the outward nor the homeward voyage at the time of the year in question is the ship anything approaching full, with the result that ample space and privacy, if desired, is to hand of the traveller; hence ship travel begins to reveal itself in a new light and at once assumes its brightest mantle of real comfort. No extremes of either heat or cold are likely to be experienced, and at the other end one finds oneself in a climate, probably unrivalled anywhere in the world, in the pleasant transition period from late winter to early spring, when the days on which the sun fails to shine are comparatively few and the atmosphere generally is as pleasant an antidote to the recent fatigues of the hot weather in India as the soul of man could desire.

An outline of the ship's itinerary throughout the complete voyage is given below :—

Outward journey.

Z	day	dep.	Bombay.
Z plus 3	day	arr.}	Colombo.
		dep.}	
Z plus 12	,,	arr.}	Fremantle.
		dep.}	
Z plus 16	,,	arr.}	Adelaide.
		dep.}	
Z plus 18	,,	arr.	Melbourne.
Z plus 19	,,	dep.	Melbourne.
Z plus 21	,,	arr.	Sydney.
Z plus 22	,,	dep.	Sydney.
Z plus 24	,,	arr.	Brisbane.
Z plus 26	,,	dep.	Brisbane for cruise to Fiji Islands.
Z plus 35	,,	arr.	Sydney.

Homeward journey.

Z plus 37	day	dep.	Sydney.
Z plus 39	,,	arr.	Melbourne.
Z plus 40	,,	dep.	Melbourne.
Z plus 42	,,	arr.}	Adelaide.
		dep.}	
Z plus 46	,,	arr.}	Fremantle.
		dep.}	
Z plus 55	,,	arr.}	Colombo.
		dep.}	
Z plus 58	,,	arr.	Bombay.

A glance at the above will show that at Colombo, Fremantle and Adelaide the ship halted in port for the day only, but on every occasion this comprised a generous "inside of a day," both going and returning, thus providing an ample spell on shore for sight-seeing or, may be, a round of golf. At Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane two full days are at one's disposal, and in such glorious cities the possibilities are great, always assuming that the voyage is one for whom new places and new people hold their genuine appeal. Furthermore, even those to whom the very word sight-seeing is apt to conjure up visions of super-organised parties being rushed round in charabancs by garrulous guides may set all such fears at rest. Hired cars for organised tours certainly are at once to hand in every port and may be booked from the ship's bureau, at very reasonable cost withal and excellently arranged in every way. In fact, as far as the writer's experience goes, they have everything to recommend them. The drivers are efficient at their trade and themselves constitute the guides, explaining just as much or as little as their passengers desire, but the ultra-loquacious specimen was never encountered and they seemed to take a genuine pleasure in showing off whatever their town had to offer, with a pride in it that was nothing but justifiable. But for those who prefer to wander on their own, picking out their own itinerary in their own way, the information contained in the little brochures issued free on board the day before arrival, provides much of the information requisite to avoiding waste of valuable time. At night during the periods in port one's floating hotel with its every comfort renders it a pure waste of money to sleep in hotels on shore.

There remain the periods between Z plus 26 and Z plus 35 days, which on this occasion the *Strathaird* spent on the cruise from Brisbane to the Fiji Island, returning direct to Sydney, from which port she commenced the homeward journey. Of this the writer had no personal experience, having preferred to spend the ten days on shore, divided between Brisbane and Sydney, in preference to spending an additional ten days at sea with the prospect of less than two full days at Suva in the middle. Some of us Army folk disembarked at one or other of the remaining ports whilst others did the whole round voyage. Suffice it to say that on all these short cruises the ship becomes extremely crowded with Australian trippers, for whom in fact the cruise is primarily laid on. Many of these may never before

have left their own state, with the result that, faced with the prospect of spending their ten days' holiday at sea, they are determined to do the thing thoroughly. The ship inevitably responds in turn by providing a highly organised programme of sports and entertainments of every kind with few empty moments, and, if a recommendation be called for at all, it is that this part of the voyage may well be avoided and the time spent far more profitably on shore in trying to see a little more of Australia itself, which one has come so far to see, and all the pleasures that it offers.

To sum up : for those who completed the Fiji cruise as an all—in part of the round trip, the number of days spent on Australian or Fijian soil totalled sixteen in all. For a passenger who disembarked at Brisbane and re-embarked at Sydney this was increased by ten days, making a total of twenty-six days in all, of which the ten days in the middle were continuous. Both going and returning also, a whole inside of a day could be spent on shore at Colombo, which for those who were minded could comfortably include the very pretty drive to Kandy and back.

(b) *The Country and the People.*—To attempt to give any detailed description of the country itself must be considered beyond the scope of this article, as it would savour of treading lightly on ground already well-trodden down by many and better feet. But to most visitors the charm of Australia's five great ports, namely, Fremantle (the port of Perth), Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, the capitals, respectively, of Western Australia, South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, must surely lie in their great contrasts, whilst to the round voyager too there is the advantage that the two *chez-d'œuvres*, Melbourne and Sydney, come late in the programme ; and those who gasp mildly at the beauties of Perth, as well they may do, may find their breath coming shorter still after Melbourne and Sydney. Even then the greater homeliness of Brisbane, with its contrasting semi-tropical vegetation and climate, will not be without its charms. There is a saying that a stranger arriving to take up permanent residence in Melbourne is asked “Where do you come from ?” In Sydney the question is “How much have you got ?” And in Brisbane “How d'ye do ?” Perhaps there is something in it. But in every single port there is much to see both within the town itself and outside it. The only difficulty lies in seeing all that one would wish to in the time, though gaps left on the outward journey may still be filled in as far as possible during the return trip.

and if a word of advice may be given to the prospective visitor who has not the time to journey far inland, it is to concentrate on the towns themselves and their immediate environs rather than on the outlying country which borders them—that is, as far as the scenic beauties of the latter are concerned. Many beautiful sights there undoubtedly are, but there is a tendency in Australia to exaggerate scenery to the eyes of anyone who has travelled at all extensively elsewhere. To do so in the case of what the towns themselves afford, both at Melbourne and Sydney, would be difficult. In other words, each in its own way is unique—the country in their close vicinity is not. Few places could be harder to describe in adequate terms than Sydney. The visitor will assuredly be prepared for a beautiful harbour, spanned by what is generally termed the finest bridge in the world, but he is likely to find that both of them are far beyond his expectations; and he can be possessed of no soul at all if, on first introduction, he fails to experience a thrill from the time when the pilot is picked up outside The Heads until the ship finally ties up at the Quay. More especially when, as it passes under the famous bridge, the optical illusion remains to the last possible minute that a considerable portion of the mast must be carried away in the process.

So far we have spoken of the ports only without mentioning what, as most Australians will tell you, the "real Australia" consists of, namely, the life on the "stations" inland, which those who base themselves on the ship throughout the whole voyage will not have the opportunity of glimpsing. Those who break the journey at Brisbane, however, or at one of the other ports, will have this chance, to a greater or lesser extent according to their separate tastes. A possible compromise which affords a fleeting impression in economical form is to travel by train from Brisbane to Sydney, not by the direct coastal route which occupies approximately 24 hours, but to spend some 5 hours longer in the train and travel inland *via* the Toowomba Ranges. "Trains and sleeping accommodation are both good and moderate, as are the meals at the recognised halts, and the country traversed will at least afford a glimpse from the train of some typical country such as the stations administer—mile upon mile of land under cultivation, animals at grass in their paddocks, here and there a lonely bungalow or straggling township, but otherwise hardly a living soul in sight. With this comes realisation of the extreme paucity of population for so vast a country—seven millions in all, of

whom nearly half are comprised by the combined populations of Melbourne and Sydney alone, and the grand total of whom is more than swallowed up by that of Greater London. Is it to be wondered at that the problem is ever present of how much longer the policy of a "White Australia" can continue to be maintained? That it has lasted as long as it has is surely a lasting testament to the country, always bearing in mind that Australia, as countries go, is yet in its teething stage and that Melbourne, the city of wide and tree decked thoroughfares, with its open spaces and glorious green parks, all planned by master hands, has only quite recently celebrated its centenary.

It is not proposed to make more than passing reference to the possibilities which Australia holds out to the War Block or normally-pensioned officer. There was more than one officer on board on the return voyage who had been spending his furlough there with a possible eye to the future. But the subject has been duly dealt with in the various pamphlets issued for the benefit of all such by Army Headquarters, and it will be sufficient to say that of the several States of the Commonwealth, New South Wales and Queensland, especially the latter, are generally considered to offer the greatest opportunities. Sir Leslie Wilson, some time Governor of Bombay and now Governor of Queensland, and who must therefore be more than ordinarily qualified to understand the outlook of the retired officer from the the East, has himself written up the amenities of Queensland after touring in it extensively. Furthermore, in conversation with him in his study at Government House in Brisbane, he spoke of it in equally, if not more, enthusiastic terms than he has already expressed in print.

And what of the people themselves, or such of the seven million as the privilege-leave-wallah is likely to encounter throughout his journey, and what sort of impressions of them is he likely to carry away? Whatever these may be it will be surprising if a memory of the most genuine and open-handed hospitality on every side does not hold pride of place. It may be that the visitor will start with a few introductions already, but should this not be the case let him have no fears of any real necessity for them. Acquaintances made on board ship are likely to mature into friendships on shore, and no feeling of loneliness or of being in a strange land can hold good in a country where, as Australians will always assure you, "we are all

British," and who, even if they have never been there, will commonly refer to England as "home." Remember also that the Englishman on shore in Australia, even when he is on leave from India, is not immediately recognisable as such and is likely to be taken for an Australian at the start or until he proclaims the facts to be otherwise. It is true that for anyone who has travelled much the motto "In Rome do as the Romans do" is one which it does him no harm to bear in mind, but the necessity for it must be largely discountenanced in a country where he at once finds himself a "Roman amongst Romans."

It will be strange if he is not struck with the fine physique of the population, especially amongst the male fraternity, which is noticeable at once even in the capital cities, where the weedy and under-nourished specimen is infinitely less in evidence than in any of our big cities at home. Unemployment there is, though happily on a far smaller scale than in England, and the prevailing atmosphere, as it is likely to strike the outsider, is that of a healthy and prosperous community where labour is well paid ; where sport in its every variety is exceptionally easy to obtain and at an extremely low cost ; and where amongst all classes a genial and entirely natural camaraderie takes the place of the somewhat icy frigidity that even nowadays is apt to enshroud the severer class distinctions of life in the Homeland.

Tipping of all and sundry, on the part of the inhabitants themselves at any rate, is far less the recognised order of things than in England or on the Continent—at times its absence is even somewhat noticeable. From the English visitor, once he is known to be such, it is fair to say that a tip is usually hoped for but nonetheless gratefully accepted.

A notice which appeared in this Journal not long ago exhorted officers when visiting Australia to be sure to call on the various Messes. The writer, who made a point of doing so in all the ports, would like to endorse this excellent advice. You certainly should have no regrets for doing so—but let your head be a strong one!

Strange as it may seem, there is even now one topic of conversation which may well be left alone, whether it be on board ship or on shore, in the company of Australians, namely, International Cricket—that is, unless you are sufficiently adroit in steering the conversation deftly through the channels bounded by the Bodyline-controversy. Discussion on this vexed and sorely tried subject is

seldom easy to conduct in the amicable and impartial spirit that one would wish in the circumstances—and that in the third year since the series of Test games which gave it its most inopportune birth—truly a sad indictment of two great sporting communities.

Why raise the subject ? But even that advice may be easier to give than to follow when, if you are a keen cricketer, you are likely to pay a visit to the beautiful grounds in Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney, quack with groundsmen and pavilion keepers, pore over old photos and autographs—and—relate your experiences to your hosts at supper the same evening. If so, beware of the fat that may already be frizzling in the fire.

Be that as it may, should your views on the whole miserable controversy have been entirely pro-English at the time of leaving Bombay, it is unlikely, should you be unwise enough to enter into discussions on them during your time in Australia, that you will not end by at least modifying them.

A custom that may strike you as an extremely pretty one is what may be termed the “ streamer habit ”—in other words the practice of throwing streamers from the shore to the ship and *vice versa* during the half hour preceding the vessel’s departure from the quay. It is believed to have emanated from America and now-a-days is an universal custom in Australia, the streamer of coloured paper forming the last link between the departing passenger and his (or her) friends on shore, who will have come down in their dozens to see him off, and who will freeze to their end of the streamers until the ship is sometimes fifty yards from the dockside and the paper finally parts in the middle. At one port where the number of departing passengers was extra large and the ship’s side was a mass of streamers from stem to stern, a rough calculation put the value of coloured paper floating in the air at £50—and a streamer costs sixpence.

It is probable that in at least one of the ports you may be bombarded by press reporters for interviews and by press photographers for your snapshot on deck. Whether you give in or not is your own concern, but, should you do so, the experience will not be without its amusing side. It may be that you will even be asked on shore to spare five minutes of your valuable time to giving a five-minute chat in the “ In Town Tonight ” broadcast on the local radio. The writer, who was weak enough, after an early refusal, to submit himself eventually to “ Sydney 2 S. M.,” found the experience most

entertaining, if only as giving him a glance from behind the scenes at the inner workings of a Wireless Studio.

(c) *Kit and Finance*.—Of the above two headings the first calls for but little comment. A point not to be forgotten, however, is that, as already mentioned, a trip during the Indian hot weather embraces at the other end either the Australian winter or the beginning of spring, a fact which constitutes one of the greatest advantages of the trip. Hence, when crossing the Bight especially, the weather is apt not only to be rough but sometimes extremely cold. Consequently in the various ports, where incidentally the climate will vary very considerably, and for a good portion of the voyage both ways, ordinary English clothes are required. On the other hand the portion from Colombo until a day or so after crossing the Line will probably produce the same warm stickiness as prevails anywhere southwards in India at the time when you leave, thus necessitating plenty of tropical stuff in addition. In other words, with the great variations of climate and the length of the voyage both ways, there is not really very much of one's mufti outfit that calls to be left behind.

It will be found that in Australia, both in hotels and private houses, dressing for dinner, in the accepted sense of the word, is far less in vogue than in England, still less so again than in India. The reason is not far to seek—the servant problem simply does not admit of it, and even Mary Jane of the Hotel, by the time 8 P.M. is striking, if you are still seated at your dinner table will be making vigorous onslaughts on the plates under your nose as threatening the punctuality of her subsequent appointment for the "pictures." Hence a dark suit, or better, a thick and a thin dark suit, for you may be glad of either, is an essential item.

Let anyone who is a golfer, whether good, bad or indifferent, make sure of taking his clubs. Golf courses are many in all the ports and absolutely first-class in some, with the added advantage that both green fees and caddies' wages are, generally speaking, far lower than is customary in England. Moreover the general rule is for the Clubs to extend a cordial welcome to the overseas visitor.

And lastly Finance, which must necessarily divide itself into the expenses of the voyage itself and those on shore at the other end. As to the voyage, seeing that every detail of the cost of passages is readily available in highly advertised form from Shipping Firms

and Agents, and that they are liable to yearly fluctuations, it would be superfluous to do more than quote actual costs on this occasion. These came to £56, first class, for the whole round cruise, including the Fiji portion. In other words one's keep for all purposes of food and accommodation on board for every day of the two months worked out at less than a pound per day. Cutting out the Fiji cruise and spending the corresponding period on shore made an almost negligible difference, as far as passage money was concerned. Leaving the shores of India also had its attendant compensations in the matter of Income Tax. And one thing more—for those who are over forty-five years of age and are fortunate enough to have a Government passage up their sleeve, bear in mind that, in accordance with the regulations, it can be utilised for the trip and you will have the satisfaction of knowing that your keep for the two months has been met at the expense of King George.

As far as the remaining expenses are concerned, both at sea and on shore, these must of necessity vary so much according to the tastes and spending propensities of the individual, including his capacity at the bar, that any detailed estimate is hardly feasible. It may not be out of place to mention, however, what these totalled up to in the case of the writer of this article. They include all tips and other boardship expenses attendant on a long voyage, ten days in hotels at Brisbane and Sydney, the roundabout railway journey between the two ports, plenty of ordinary sightseeing and a good modicum of golf, but exclude the rail journeys to and from Bombay, not forgetting at the same time that at present one English pound produces twenty-five Australian shillings on the exchange. Long may it remain so. In his case £50 amply covered the lot, and of this sum he regrets nothing.

His hope is that the reading of this article may be the indirect means of encouraging others to go and do likewise.

HIS MAJESTY'S PRIMULAS

As told to Captain M. C. Nolan, Assistant Recruiting Officer, Burma, by Riflemen Agrawng Hpung and Labwi Tsi, 20th Burma Rifles.

Note, the Kachin word "Kha," means river.

"O Chief, we two be Nungs, mountaineers from the headwaters of the N'mai Kha which joins the Mali Kha to form the Irrawaddy just North of the town of Myitkyina, the Northern terminus of the railway in Burma.

Why did we join the Army, O Chief? Well, we Nungs are wanderers by nature, we are a poor people living in a barren mountainous country and we have always had a longing for adventure and to see the wonders of the Great World far to the South, of which vague rumours filtered through to us occasionally.

However, being cut off by the powerful marauding Kachins, we had been unable to satisfy our craving for wandering until the British occupied the Hkamti Long plain in 1914 and gradually started to open up the hinterland and make it safe for travellers.

So we were very interested when, some twelve years ago, a white military chief accompanied by some Kachin soldiers visited our village saying that he had heard we were a brave race and asking us to join the Army.

We thought the Kachins with him were the most phenomenal liars as they talked of houses made of iron which travelled at great speed along an iron road carrying hundreds of people, of machines one hundred times greater than the largest eagle that flew through the air with a great roaring, of horseless carriages driven by the white chiefs, of guns firing three or four hundred pellets a minute and other wonders.

However the maidens looked with favour on the soldiers as they had plenty of money and gave them beads, mirrors and other presents, so that our young men were very jealous, also the soldiers mocked our young men saying that they were afraid to leave their mothers, so that they nearly came to blows.

Anyhow, after long and weighty deliberations with our elders, some of the more venturesome of our young men agreed to join the Army and marched away with the white chief and his soldiers.

We heard no more of them for some years and we thought that they were surely dead, for, as you know, O Chief, in those days none of us knew how to read and write, when suddenly they re-appeared in the village saying they had been granted seven and a half moons leave on full pay and bringing in their turn money and gifts for their parents and the maidens so that we two, who had grown up in their absence, were very jealous.

Many things they told us, O Chief, and being our kinsmen we believed them, though insisting that they were liars from jealousy, so that when a white military chief came again for more recruits we slipped away and joined him.

Many tribulations we suffered on our way to Maymyo, O Chief ; half-way between Hkamti Long and Myitkyina, we came on a party of Government armed men (Burma Military Policemen) and they had with them great animals as large as houses with enormous long noses and two great teeth as long as one's leg, which made a great noise so that we were very frightened and ran away into the jungle, whereat the soldiers laughed hugely and told us they were tame animals used for carrying food, so that we were very much ashamed.

At Myitkyina too, after we had rested and fed, we were put into long houses in which we were sitting quite comfortably, when suddenly there was a great whistling and the houses started off down the road gradually gaining speed ; we thought we were surely bewitched and hurriedly climbed out through the openings on to the ground, seeing which our white chief made a signal and the houses gradually stopped moving ; our white chief was angry with us but laughing at the same time and, after he had explained to us that these were the iron houses running on an iron road of which we had heard and that there was nothing to fear, we settled down in peace.

At Maymyo the white medicine men examined us, thumped us and pulled us, made us hop and leap, examined our eyes and teeth and finally stuck little needles into us which made us very sick for a day or two.

Then we were taken along to the Training Battalion, washed, which nearly killed us, it being too cold in our country for washing, and given great quantities of strange clothes such as we had never seen before, so that some of us put them on back to front and some put those intended for their legs over their heads, so that the soldiers with us were helpless with laughter.

However, eventually, we were clothed and then we were told numerous things we must do and innumerable things we must not do, so that our brains reeled for we are a free people accustomed to doing as we please.

The next morning we were taken out and made to do this thing called P. T., which made us ache all over, so that we groaned much during the nights and bethought us of running away but knew not how to do so.

However that is all long past now, O Chief, and we in our turn have become clean upright soldiers and laughed at the trials of many hundreds of recruits.

We two have always been good soldiers and have no entries in our conduct sheets so that we were very much upset and worried when our Platoon Commander told us during the fourth moon of 1934 that we were wanted in the Orderly Room and cudgelled our brains to think in what manner we had erred.

However our Commanding Officer was very kind and told us that we had been recommended to him as two good steady men from the Nung country and that he had selected us accordingly to go and search for certain kinds of flowers, which the Great White King had heard grew near our country and desired for his garden in England.

Well, O Chief, we were very surprised but proud, honoured and excited when we were told this, as we had not thought that the Great White King, who lives so many moons march to the west, had ever heard of our race or country and promised to do our level best to find the flowers.

Next day, we were taken along to the office of the white chiefs, who control the cutting down of trees, and shown and given photographs and samples of the flowers required, being told to get some red and white ones and some seeds.

After receiving full instructions, we left for Myitkyina at the middle of the fourth moon, where we bought Chinese clothes as a disguise, also blankets to keep out the cold, and hired a Lisu coolie at a rupee a day to carry our food, which we had to buy for, as you know, O Chief, there is no surplus rice for sale North of Myitkyina.

Then came the question as to which route to take from Myitkyina to the Akhyang valley.

We considered going *via* the country on the East bank of the N'mai Kha through Laukhaung and Hpimaw but we knew that North of Hpimaw the country is uninhabited, the mountains are all covered with dense vegetation and that there are roaring torrents with precipitous banks, which make travelling almost impossible ; some of our young men have tried to come down South from the Akhyang *via* this route but have always had to turn back owing to lack of food and the terrible nature of the country, so we abandoned this idea. (Only three white men have travelled this route up to date, Captain Pottinger, driven back by the Maru tribe, in 1897, Kingdon-Ward the botanist in 1914 and Captain Bowerman of the Burma Military Police in 1926, with the utmost difficulty in each case).

Then we considered walking to the confluence and striking North-North East directly across the Triangle to the Akhyang, but this route is still unsafe for strangers and we should undoubtedly have been killed or taken as slaves if we had attempted it, despite the British Government's release of all the slaves in 1924-26 and the despatch of columns into the Triangle every cold weather since.

So we finally decided to strike North up the Myitkyina-Fort Hertz road as far as the Burma Military Police Post at Sumprabum and then East across the Northern part of the Triangle, which has become more or less safe of recent years.

Then when all was ready, we set off up the road to Fort Hertz, which follows more or less the line of the Mali Kha, the road being good most of the way though practically deserted as the monsoon was almost upon us when all the hill people, who keep tea and food stalls on the roadside during the open season, take refuge in the mountains, the road becoming almost impassable through rain and mud.

As far as Sumprabum this part of the journey was comparatively easy, but when we entered the Triangle we soon had to climb the high rocky mountains in the centre and at the same time we had to be careful to avoid any Kachin villages or parties of men travelling as they might fain have robbed or killed us, we being but three and armed only with dahs.

However we came through safely and soon we approached the high rocky mountains, rising to twelve thousand feet, which form the Mali-N'mai Kha Divide, here the going was terrible, we having to climb on our hands and knees a great part of the time, up and

down, up and down seemingly never ending mountains and ridges, being lucky if we progressed forward five or ten miles a day.

Finally at long last we reached the N'mai Kha and then we had to search for miles until we found a cane rope bridge by which to cross.

Here at the confluence of the Akyang, the N'mai Kha is a narrow foaming torrent and crossing these cane rope bridges is highly dangerous, it being necessary to make a loop of one's pagri forming a sling in which one lies on one's back, propelling on self forward by pushing on the rope with one's feet and at the same time pulling with one's hands.

Twenty-five long days marching and climbing it took us, O Chief, before we reached the Akyang Valley and our relatives and friends so, being tired, we rested some days with them and spent our time in sleeping and feasting.

(Reginald Farrar, the botanist, was buried here by the Nungs.)

All the inhabitants of the valley were very interested in the nature of our quest and astonished that the Great White King, who lives so far away, should not only know of us and our country but even of the varieties of flowers that flourish therein and wished us God speed in the fulfilment of our task.

We left all our Government clothing and kit at the house of a relative and donned the Chinese clothes bought in Myitkyina, so that if we encountered any Chinese military police there would be nothing to show that we were Government men as, if the fact were known to them, they would surely put us in gaol as spies and intruders and we might even be tortured to death.

After resting sufficiently, we struck North-East up the Akyang Valley to the very source of the Akyang River, the journey taking six days due to the difficult nature of the country as numerous torrents flow into the Akyang, which are unfordable and can only be crossed by those cane rope bridges, added to which the low mountains are covered with thick vegetation full of leeches and various stinging pests, all of which combined to slow our progress.

At the source of the Akyang, we were confronted with the wall of snow-capped mountains, twelve to sixteen thousand feet high which form the Salween Divide, the feet of these mountains are covered in thick jungle thinning out into tree forest as far as the snow line, the pass being over ten thousand feet high.

Here we were out of the country of the Nungs, our own race, and entering that of the Black Lisus, an evil, treacherous tribe, who use crossbows and arrows tipped with aconite, much feared by all their neighbours, and it behoved us to travel with caution to avoid them.

Three days it took to cross the pass and it was between these mountains and the Salween river that we eventually found the flowers.

At the waning of the sixth moon, we arrived in this country and from then until the waxing of the eighth moon Rifleman Labwi Tsi was attacked by the evil spirits and went more or less insane through suffering, making our travel very difficult; on account of the depth of the snow during the sixth and seventh moons, which made it impossible to see the flowers properly and Labwi Tsi's illness, we abandoned the search until the snows should melt and returned to the last Nung village we had passed.

Here we consulted the village witch-doctor and after a long time and great difficulty he drove evil spirits out of Labwi Tsi after sacrificing nine pigs and a goat, leaving him too weak to move for some weeks.

By this time we were short of money owing to the expenses on sacrifices and so on to the witch-doctor for Labwi Tsi's illness, and also food as little grows there but millet and maize and there is nothing to drink but water, so Agrawng Hpung decided to go to Fort Hertz, wire for more money and buy rice and other provisions from the Shans of the Hkampti Long plain.

This is a journey which we mountaineers all hate especially, as then, in the rains, the way from the Akyang valley to the Shing Rup Kyet pass up the N'mai Hka being very arduous, owing to the necessity of continual crossings of torrents by the cane rope bridges and the unhealthiness of the thick vegetation in the low-lying country by the river, it becoming even more unhealthy and malarious after one has turned West through the now deserted Burma Military Police Post of Kawnglu and approached the Hkampti Long plain.

However it had to be done, so Rifleman Agrawng Hpung set off with the Lisu coolie, leaving Labwi Tsi in the kind hands of the Nung villagers and, after much difficulty and several bouts of fever, he reached Fort Hertz, sent off his wire to the Commanding Officer and, after receiving the telegraphic money order, bought rice and

other provisions, the journey there and back taking several weeks owing to the rough going and frequent attacks of fever.

After Agrawng Hpung's return and early in the eighth moon, Labwi Tsi was strong again so, the snows having melted and there being now a good chance of seeing the flowers, we set forth again over the pass for the country between the divide and the Salween river.

We were lucky in soon finding the flowers we wanted but they were not very good specimens, being small, so we remained, from the beginning of the eighth to the beginning of the eleventh moon, until the flowers were in full bloom and seeded.

All this time we went in fear of our lives of the Black Lisus, the crossbowmen, all thieves and murderers, so we were forced to hide in caves during most of the day and avoid the obvious tracks as there were far too many signs of their murderous activities in the form of corpses, with arrows sticking in them, of unfortunate wayfarers to and from China who had fallen to their deadly aim.

Many times we saw parties of these Black Lisus but by dint of keeping to ridges and spurs, far from the beaten track, and only venturing forth to search for the flowers at early morn and late afternoon we managed to escape them.

To add to our troubles, Hnetzar Khing, our Lisu coolie, also was attacked by evil spirits in the beginning of the ninth moon and was very ill until the ending of that moon, so that we were forced to return to the Nung village, where we had taken Labwi Tsi, and consult the witch-doctor again, who drove out the evil spirits after the sacrifice of five pigs, and, after Hnetzar Khing had rested, we were able to wend our way back to the flower country again.

Many privations and tribulations we suffered, O Chief, whilst in the flower country from the penetrating cold winds of those altitudes and latterly from the torrential rains, accentuated by lack of proper food, drink and housing as, from dread of the Black Lisus, we dared approach none of their villages but had to sleep in caves, like wild animals, on the least accessible ridges swept by rain and icy blasts of wind.

However we were well rewarded for our sufferings and patience for in the tenth moon the white flowers were at their best and early

in the eleventh moon the red ones, so that we were able to gather the best of them and their seeds.

Finally, having gathered what we considered the best according to our ability and instructions, we turned back in the middle of the eleventh moon and made our way back over the divide rejoicing.

Being weak by this time, it took us fifteen days march to return to the houses of our relatives and friends in the Akhyang Valley, where we arrived in a semi-starving, exhausted condition, our clothes and blankets in tatters, at the waning of the eleventh moon.

We stayed with our relatives for some ten days, recouping ourselves with good food, drink and sleep, they being all agog to hear of our adventures for none of them had ever dared to cross the divide for fear of those murdering Black Lisus.

Then being rested and fed and in full bodily health again we started on the arduous journey across the rocky mountains of the Mali—N'mai divide but this time we minded the travail little for, whereas we had gone forth in dread of the unknown difficulties and dangers ahead of us, we were returning in triumph, having conquered them.


We encountered no Kachins in our passage across the Triangle, travelling circumspectly and knowing the way and the position of their villages by this time, for it would have been a cruel stroke of fate, if we had been captured by them and possibly killed, at this juncture, losing the fruit of all our endeavours and disappointing the Great White King and our Officers, whom we have sworn to serve, even at the cost of our lives.

However, the spirits being kind to us, we arrived back safely at the Burma Military Police Post at Sumprabum and from then on our troubles were over, the road South being crowded with travellers and there being plenty of food stalls on the roadside, it being now the open season and how different from the deserted landscape we had seen eight moons before ?

Towards the waning of the twelfth moon we arrived at Myitkyina, and how glad we were to get in to one of those once dreaded iron houses that travel along the iron road and, resting our tired limbs, allow the iron horse to do that for us that we had been doing for ourselves for eight long moons over precipitous mountains, foaming torrents and through dense tropical vegetation.

The following day we were back in Maymyo, having travelled nearly as far in less than two settings of the sun as we had travelled on foot in the previous eight moons, and we handed over our flowers and seeds with a sigh of relief to our Officers who were very pleased with us and congratulated us on our success.

Many trials, both physical and mental, we suffered in our search for the flowers, O Chief, but we are proud and happy that we achieved that which we set out to perform at the behest of the Great White King.



ROUTE FOLLOWED - - - - -

LETTER TO THE EDITOR
INDEBTEDNESS OF OFFICERS

SIR,

In your issue of October 1935, "M. Stone" contributes a valuable article entitled "Debt," wherein he describes the well-nigh insurmountable difficulties confronting a C. O. when dealing with an indebted officer.

This C. O.'s position is truly unenviable, for without any effective sanction in law which would pass legal muster, he is expected to exercise power by dint of a mixture of the "heavy father," coupled with "3rd Degree methods" and thus ensure that his officers never get into debt, further, that they are rescued should they fall from grace.

But "M. Stone" does not even mention the root-cause of almost all trouble of this nature in India, namely, the credit system, which in turn depends wholly on the difference between British and Indian law governing deductions from the pay of officers.

In England, this pay cannot be touched, whereas in India it can.

Bring the two codes into line and our chief curse, the Indian money-lender, would go out of business.

Officers in doubtful financial circumstances would no longer be given credit or allowed, even encouraged, to pile more liabilities on top of existing ones, for there would be no legal redress of any practical value open to the creditor.

2. When reform of the Indian Code in this respect is advocated it is usual to hear stated that, if an amendment is introduced, it would be necessary to grant similar relief to all Government officers, whether civil or military. And that the Legislative Assembly would never consent to such a measure. But is it unreasonable to hope that the Legislative Assembly working with a sense of responsibility under the new Government of India Act, will cease from throwing out legislative measures, no matter how constructive, merely because they are sponsored by Government.

However, if the passing of a measure to protect all Government officials is thought to be impracticable, it is still possible to make out a case for providing protection for military officers.

For apart from the clear Home precedent, the soldier is still entitled to special treatment in this matter by reason of his youth

on joining, his smaller pay and the more gregarious life he is forced to lead in a military community, where the temptations to comparatively minor excesses are strong and where the means of recovery are lacking. There is no elasticity about the budget of the young officer, unless he has private means—a factor which is fast disappearing and on which the State has no right to reckon.

It is entirely in the interests of the State that its lower paid servants shall function at the peak of their capacity, which is impossible unless they are free from the encumbrance of debt, and from the temptations which indebtedness invariably breeds.

Nor is it in the interests of the community that a type of social parasite should be protected by the Courts to enable it to batten on the life-blood of the young soldier.

Unless and until the law in India is amended, it is futile to expect a C. O. to exercise control over the affairs of his officers once they have got into the usurers hands.

As "M. Stone" states, and as every family solicitor will confirm, *no* involved youth ever tells the *whole* truth.

The poison of debt has eaten deep into his system sapping his moral sense; he has become a blind gambler refusing to face the issues; he is desperate, in fact for all practical purposes, he is insane.

And all the time, nudging his elbow, is the money-lender with his circular.

Being so deeply involved, what does it matter if he dips deeper still? It will postpone the evil day for a little, and in the meantime he cultivates the gambler's feverish hope that something will turn up to save him.

And when the inevitable happens, the State loses a servant on whose training a large sum of public money has been wasted.

To attempt a cure, except in the initial stages of the disease, is a waste of time.

The treatment required is prevention, which an amendment of the law, here recommended, would ensure.

The incubus of debt on a considerable scale amongst serving officers is no fantasy. Unless they are protected their avoidable wastage, from this cause alone, will be heavy.

It is an issue which can no longer be buried.

I am Sir, etc.,
"A SEXTON,"

A SUGGESTED METHOD OF HANDLING REMOUNTS.

SIR,

The article in the October number of your journal on "A suggested method of handling remounts" throws some doubt on the nationality of Professor Lichtwark and where he learnt his equitation.

About 1892 Lichtwark who was then living in Taranaki, New Zealand, published a book called "Educating the Horse." In the preface it states that the author was the descendant of a German physician and that he arrived in Melbourne when fifteen years old. Since then he had spent all his life in Australia and New Zealand.

As a boy Lichtwark had been interested in the training of horses for his uncle's circus but he makes no reference to Continental methods. He compares the systems of Rarey (an American who lectured in England in the 'fifties), Sample (also American) and Hickton (an Australian); he also quotes from J. Mayhew's work on horse management as he admits that his own knowledge on this subject is meagre.

The methods as described in the article and in the book only differ in two small details.

(i) Lichtwark does not mention the tail raising lessons but places great importance on handling the horse's head, particularly the nostrils and upper lip.

(ii) Lichtwark only recommends the safety rein used in conjunction with a crupper for a hard mouthed horse that had already been broken in.

His system of "mouthing" was to connect the rings of a straight bar rubber bit to a crupper for periods of about two hours, during which time the horse was allowed to run loose. This also taught the horse to carry his head correctly.

In this part of the world horses were seldom ridden in anything but a snaffle and many owners could not devote much time to training a horse once it had been backed. Lichtwark's method would teach the young horse to bend and develope a good head carriage.

Yours faithfully,

E. J. C. C.

26th October 1935.

REVIEW

The Campaign of the Marne, 1914

BY SEWELL TYNG

(Oxford University Press) 21 sh.

This American author, writing twenty years after the battle, has made a clear and impartial study of the leadership and strategy on both sides. His main conclusion is that the Allied victory was the reward of better generalship than the enemy displayed, and that it was in no sense a fluke or happy chance that turned the tide of German invasion.

Mr. Tyng has not brought to light many new facts. That was hardly possible, but he has treated as one connected campaign the whole fighting from the first shots around Liége to the German recoil to the Aisne. Orders and events in each sector of the long swaying front combined to bring about the strategic situation which was the hope and the plan of the French Generalissimo.


Joffre is generally referred to as the embodiment of a serene composure, a tower of comfort to France in her hour of danger, but like many another chief he has had to see his successes attributed to more popular figures. The author portrays Joffre as a leader whose quality shewed itself not only in calm courage, but in the energy with which he recast his plans and revived his armies by personal touch ; and in the boldness with which he detached troops from his right and even from his retiring centre to rebuild the left wing. With peremptory firmness he bade Lanrezac counter-attack at Guise to help the British, and with tactful firmness he persuaded the British Commander, who looked like marching right out of the battle front, to join in his general offensive. This energetic leadership is sharply contrasted with the weakness of the German High Command and the jealous dissensions between their Army Commanders.

The book is well arranged for its purpose, and is recommended for inclusion in the general reading of any student of 1914 or of the War as a whole. Its forty-three short chapters each deal with a phase at one of the various General Headquarters, or with one stage of the fighting, such as Mons, Guise or the Ourcq. The tactical descriptions of the fighting are not as good as the strategic narrative,

and, although enlivened with some graphic pictures, such as Franchet d'Esperey's charge with colours flying at Guise and the struggle around Mondemont Chateau on Foch's front, give but little idea of the conditions of the battlefield or of the methods of fighting on either side.

In dealing with the share of the British Expeditionary Force Mr. Tyng is somewhat biased. We are told that we retreated too fast and advanced too slowly! But there were other considerations which have received little notice from the author. He omits all reference to the difficult rivers and wooded slopes of the Morin and Aisne Rivers, so skilfully used by Marwitz's cavalry and Jaeger rear guards. He does, however, give full credit to the sturdy fighting of the British soldier at Mons and Le Cateau.

R. M. H.



His Excellency General Sir ROBERT A. CASSELS, G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.,
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