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EDITORIAL.

Quetta.

No words of ours can add anything to the outpouring of sympathy to the stricken city, once called Quetta. In two short minutes at 3 A.M., on 31st May, the City, Civil Lines, and Headquarters of the R. A. F. shuddered, collapsed and buried their inmates in an inescapable and, save for comparatively few instances, an inaccessible tomb. To all the bereaved and sufferers, particularly to the relatives of the R. A. F. dead—so tragically cut down in the prime of life—we offer our deepest sympathy.

Only those who survived the disaster can imagine its horror and its implacable force. It is presumptuous, therefore, for us writing in Simla, to dare to paint or enlarge upon this calamity. But we can and must write about it. All of us know or had friends in Quetta ; we knew the bazaar and had dealings with its shopkeepers ; we hunted and knew the surrounding country and the villages intimately ; we shot *chikor* which brought us further afield and added to our knowledge of the countryside and its simple, pastoral inhabitants ; we even had manœuvres there ; and many of our members were at the Staff College. Quetta was almost India's Aldershot, a station with which the military forces had especial ties.

This is apparent in the Viceroy's Earthquake Relief Fund. It is significant to notice how all units, departments and formations have subscribed generously to this fund. It would seem that the Army in India, officer, man, sowar and sepoy, owed Quetta something in

affection or sentiment and wished to pay it with sympathy. Perhaps this spontaneous charity by the Army was a tribute to the forces in Quetta, who, for the greater part, escaped, and were mobilised immediately to succour the inhabitants. Adequate praise has been given to the Army and all its ancillary services by greater pens than ours. We all know how the Army, with Quetta trembling all around them, leapt to it. Most of the civilian administration, including the Quetta police had been killed. Chaos, that indescribable word, was triumphant.

Fortunately, the A. G. G., Sir Norman Cater, and the officiating G. O. C.-in-Chief, General Karslake, survived. Martial Law—could some less sinister adjective be devised by the authorities when it means, in such cases as this, that *guardian, protective, benevolent* (although summary) Law is implied ?—was promulgated, as there were no other government authorities left to preserve and safeguard the remnants of Quetta.

Under General Karslake the 16,000 troops in Quetta performed their humanitarian tasks. They saved all the living in the catacombs of the city ; they dug out and succoured the wounded and dying ; they evacuated, fed, clothed and comforted the refugees. Camps, hospitals, information bureaux were improvised and all the military stores of Quetta were utilised for this purpose without question and, one hopes, without audit objection.

Thousands of wretched people were buried without hope of excavation in the jerry-built and mud-built city. Their corpses started the process of decomposition and the city became dangerously unhealthy. It was "sealed"—an expressive word meaning only that no person would be allowed to enter it until the serious risk of infection to the outside world could be limited, and that all the property therein buried was under the safe and patent seal of the military cordon surrounding it. This action needs no justification ; it was imperative.

We have paid a wholly inadequate tribute to the military and civil authorities who worked unceasingly to bring relief to the sufferers and to this must be added our tribute to the generous and whole-hearted response made by India at large to the Viceroy's Earthquake Fund.

But we feel compelled to deplore the attitude of certain people who have seen in this terrible disaster an opportunity to make political

capital. Everything has its time and place and the attempts to belittle Government's achievements in a national calamity must be as abhorrent to Indian public opinion as it is to those who have been working so splendidly for the last six weeks in Quetta.

It is far more pleasant to record that on the 5th July H. E. the Viceroy, with H. E. the Commander-in-Chief in attendance, reviewed the Quetta Garrison. His Excellency conveyed to Major-General Karslake and the troops under his command his thanks and the thanks of the Government of India for their great work in the interests of humanity. It was a fine tribute and one which India knows was richly deserved.

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European Affairs.

In the recent re-shuffle of the Cabinet Mr. Anthony Eden had a new post created for his talents. He is now the minister dealing with the affairs of the League of Nations, and as such travels about the Continent keeping touch both with the daily changes in Europe's capitals and with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London. It is an interesting and significant appointment betraying the anxiety of the British Government regarding her foreign affairs.

Europe has for the last few months been seething with uneasy excitement. Herr Hitler started it when he declared Germany's right and intention to re-arm.

The British Government realized that the only answer to this threat was to confront Germany with an established system of "Collective Security," hence the Stresa resolutions and the indictment of Germany by the Council of the League.

The principle of "Collective Security" was embodied in the original Covenant of the League of Nations, and it was applied to a limited extent in the Locarno Treaties. Since then its practice has fallen rather into disuse, mainly owing to the fact that in the last few years attention has been focussed on the Disarmament Convention.

It has, however, now been revived, and in order to give it the backing essential for its successful realization the British Government have been forced to overhaul and increase the Defence Estimates, and to undertake an immense expansion of the Air Force. Many serious observers considered the latter programme to be unduly precipitate and uneconomic, involving as it does the recruitment of 2,500 officers and 20,000 men, to say nothing of the necessary buildings and

aerodromes. It had the appearance of panic and of pandering to the hysterical outpourings of the daily press. But its effect on the Continent was undoubtedly steadying. France saw in it additional security. Germany was certainly impressed, as instanced by the recent speeches of Herr Hitler and other German leaders.

Many of our readers have probably only vague ideas as to what "Collective Security" actually means and it is interesting to quote the words of Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Eden, the chief protagonists. Mr. Baldwin defined it as follows: "The idea of it (collective security) in its modern sense is that Europe shall not tolerate war, and that if any one country, whatever that country is and wherever it is situated, starts making war—in other words is an aggressor—every other country shall join in forcing that country to stop."

Mr. Eden amplified this statement later at the Queen's Hall. "Collective Security," he said," assumed that its success depended upon each of its members playing an effective part in it. In an armed world like that of to-day, with an incomplete collective system, it was clearly impossible for this country to be unilaterally alone disarmed. A measure of armament was clearly necessary, a measure related to the armaments of others, and large enough to enable us to fulfil our responsibilities as members of a collective system. But armaments of themselves were not the best security. Clearly if all the nations were in a collective system, the lower the level of armaments universally adopted by everybody the safer we should be. But we were not, unhappily, in such a world yet."

The idea of world disarmament having failed so disastrously last year, European statesmen are now toying with the idea of an Air Pact so that a suicidal race in this arm may not occur. At present parity between Germany, France and England is mooted. Little is said about naval and military forces, now that Germany has agreed to build up to 35 per cent. only of the British Fleet. France has looked askance at this proposal, possibly because she was not consulted. In the meanwhile Italy is rattling her sabre on the frontiers of Abyssinia, there are signs of unrest in Austria and the Danubian territories, and in the Far East Japan strides unopposed through the northern reaches of China.

We do not envy Mr. Eden his colossal task and only wish his instrument, the League, were made of sterner and more durable stuff.

N.-W.F.P.

The reason why the North-West Frontier of India has always been a fascinating problem is probably because it is a riddle. It would be safe to say that not one of those protagonists of this or that view who has tried to solve it and put his solution on paper would be able to support all his arguments when confronted with the reasoning of the other side.

The Frontier and its problems remain ever fluid. Dogmatism or diehardism count for little when dealing with peoples whose civilisation is yielding perceptibly to the influences which surround it. Because, for instance, Sandeman or Roos-Keppel solved their immediate problem satisfactorily it would be wrong to imagine that their methods must always be correct for us to use to-day. Conversely, it would be idiotic if we did not examine their administrative dealings and not try to benefit from them when applicable.

In this Number we publish a critical appreciation of the Prize Essay, 1934. The author is an officer with distinguished frontier service and his criticism, constructive and fair, will help to show how many sides there are to this problem. He maintains that the object of our frontier policy is the security of British India, and not necessarily —(as so many sentimental critics have it)—the extension of the advantages of British administration to the tribesmen. Complete control of the tribes in law, order and administration, is the logical solution, but that would probably put India into the bankruptcy courts, and does not therefore come within the range of practical politics.

We commend this article to our readers' serious attention, and have only one criticism to offer. It appears to us that the writer, in advocating the maintenance of a tribal belt "buffer" between ourselves and Afghanistan, has overlooked one very important consideration. We have accepted responsibility for the political control of the tribes which implies that we will prevent them from attacking or interfering offensively in Afghanistan. This responsibility was unpleasantly brought to mind by the events of March 1933, when certain tribes from Waziristan made a dangerous incursion across the Durand Line. If Waziristan had been merely a "buffer" state, instead of being the controlled area it now is, the consequences might have been serious.

While dealing with this complex subject it is interesting to notice how Captain Liddell Hart proposes to settle it. In his recent book,

"When Britain goes to War," he devotes a chapter entitled "Air and Empire" to our particular problem. After careful perusal of this interesting, well-written and misleading chapter we must conclude that Captain Hart has never seen the country or the inhabitants west of the River Indus. It surprises us to the point of shocking us that this brilliant military writer should lend himself so ingenuously to the already exploded doctrine of Air Control of the frontier.

We imagine that even the most enthusiastic of our R. A. F. friends (including the writer of a letter in our Correspondence pages) will resent this ill-informed advocacy.

Captain Hart, anxious to prove his thesis, is, we are afraid, inclined to exaggerate or embroider history: so in fairness to the troops which were engaged we should like to refute just one of his statements:

"On May 11 a lashkar of Tochi Wazirs, 4,000 strong, besieged the militia post at Datta Khel. Aircraft came to the aid of the garrison at once, and also dispersed a fresh lashkar that was arriving on the scene, but air action against their villages was not unloosed until the afternoon of the 14th. That same evening the besieging lashkar heard the news and went home; submission was made next morning. . . . .

It is difficult to determine what weight the ground forces exercised. The Razmak Column certainly marched out a *few miles* from its base and shelled some villages in the neighbourhood that were within range. But the tribes of this wide mountain region emphatically dwelt on the influence of the air action in making their submission."—("When Britain Goes to War," pp. 134-5.)

The less picturesque facts are that the tribes, unsettled by successful political agitation in India, thought that the Government forces would offer no resistance. Their first reverse was the splendid resistance offered by the Scouts who garrisoned the Post. They were then bombed from the air and withdrew from the close vicinity of the Fort to the broken ground beyond. Each night they renewed their attacks. Eventually Razmak Column was released to relieve the Post, and their approach combined with the hammering they had received caused the lashkar to disperse. Razmak Column marched 56 miles.

This whole chapter is redolent with similar clever half-truths, and although the last thing we desire is to raise again all the old arguments and dreary controversies, we must regret that a responsible

military commentator and historian such as this author can be of no help whatsoever to us in solving the riddle of the N.-W. F. P. Every sane soldier and every sane airman who have worked together there during the last ten years realise that our work is complementary, and that our successes were always measured by the degree of our close co-operation.

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The Unaxed.

Now that the anxiety regarding the fate of the War Block officers has been removed, those officers commissioned between 1914 and 1920 who are not to be retired are beginning to breathe again. Gasping a little with relief they have come to the surface and, not unnaturally, are taking stock of their brave new world. Now, what next is going to happen to me ? is the general questioning. They all realise that a certain amount of re-shuffling among units is inevitable, but when this necessary adjustment is made they wonder what their chances will be of getting command of their regiments and battalions. Regarding the re-shuffle. We have reasons to believe that it will be much less than generally anticipated. All efforts are being made to keep the parties clean and to limit extra-regimental transfers to a minimum ; inter-regimental transfers may be expected both this year and in 1937-38, but the more we have of that the better it will be to foster the real regimental spirit, which, incidentally, we think is still inclined to be sticky.

A contributor has gone into this command question with great thoroughness and courage in an article published in this number. Arguing from statistics he has produced a series of most depressing tables, but we would comfort both him and those of our readers who become unduly affected by the prospect, that you can argue anything from statistics and that such arguments are generally inaccurate.

We all know that the War Block Committee sub-divided the war generation of officers into three main grades ; above the average, average and below the average. This was an arbitrary and necessary basis for selection and does not imply that the latter category means anything except the military-minded adoration of rigid documentation for serious purposes. We may assume, however, that the first two categories have greater chance of getting command than those left in the basement ; which is only fair. At the same time, owing to the frailty of human nature, it is not unlikely that some of those now judged " below average " may discomfit their critics by displacing

the present blue-eyed boys before the bar of future Selection Boards. Peace standards are often upset by the more rigorous examination of battle.

But we cannot accept our contributor's gloomy forecast that only six out of every ten Indian Army infantry and cavalry officers will get command. Seven would be nearer the mark, and we have evidence from authoritative sources to justify this conclusion. And this we consider is a good thing. Promotion to command in the Indian Army has been considered for far too long a time as automatic. In the British Service rejections of Majors for command have averaged just over 30 per cent. in recent years, and this tightening of selection has been all to the good of the service. A similar levelling in the Indian Army, and all that it would contribute to keenness and a desire for efficiency among its Majors, will have nothing but an excellent effect. In this respect strict accountancy regarding the three-year tenure of command in statistics might be deprecated. There is bound to be some wastage—(early promotion, voluntary retirements and less natural causes)—and, even if everything else fails, the unlucky three out of every ten should be able to look forward to a year's leave at 26 years' service, with a pension of £700 at the latter end.

Our contributor has emphasised another important point. It is not generally realised how few officers were commissioned after 1921;—a remaining total of 73 only for the years 1921 and 1922, and a serious shortage for several years afterwards. This means that officers commissioned in the years 1918, 1919 and 1920 will have to remedy this shortage and some of them may not expect command until 1945-48; *i.e.*, after 27 years' service.

That is a long time to wait, but we may again comfort ourselves with the reflection that long-termed statistics cannot be judged too seriously, and that if all comes to the worst another war may intervene. *Dulce et decorum est pro pueris* mori.* In the meantime, we are glad to hear that there are so many applicants from the British Service for the hundred vacancies of these dog-years.

* Latin for "backward boy."

LYAUTEY, MOROCCO, AND THE N. W. F. P.

By "Spingiral."

(*A Critical Appreciation of the Gold Medal Prize Essay for* 1934.

Last year's Gold Medal Essay begins with a lucid and interesting account of the career, as a Colonial Administrator, of Marshal Lyautey, and of the principles applied by that great Frenchman to the solution of the French Moroccan problem.

The Essay proceeds to summarize the existing situation on the North-West Frontier of India, the methods, or lack of method, by which the British Indian Government has hitherto sought to deal with the grave problems arising out of that situation, and the nature of the administrative and military organization employed to this end. The conspicuous degree of success achieved by the genius of Lyautey in dealing with the Moroccan problem is then contrasted with what is widely believed to be the lack of success of the Indian Government in dealing with theirs. It is suggested that the chronic malady of the Indian Frontier might yield to the treatment so advantageously prescribed for the Moroccan patient; the principal medicine being unity of control.

The unbiassed reader will readily agree with the judges that the Essay is a valuable constructive contribution to the study of our old and thorny North-West Frontier problem. Let it be said at once, too, that the author of the present study unreservedly accepts the essayist's main conclusion, namely, the desirability of unity of control on the Frontier. But when one comes to examine the practical application of that conclusion there are grounds for caution.

The lessons drawn by the Essayist from his study relate to both policy and organisation. It will, perhaps, be convenient first to discuss policy. The criterion of any proposed line of action must, of course, be whether or no it promotes attainment of the fundamental objects of policy. If it does so, it is sound; if it does not, it is unsound, however immediately comforting or specious its effect may be. This is a truism, but also happens to be a truth, and one which is not seldom overlooked.

A further truism, which again it is dangerously easy to lose sight of, is that the first object of British policy on the North-West Frontier

is, not the extension to the tribes of the advantages of British administration, but the security of British India. Yet another is that the main desideratum to this end is the existence of an independent, strong, united, and neighbourly Afghanistan. Independent, for the plain fact is that if Afghanistan became over-dependent on either of her great neighbours there would cease to be a "buffer" between them. So far as any reasonable course taken by the British Empire can avert this contingency, one obvious effect of which would be to raise the Indian military budget from the terrestrial to the astronomical, it should clearly be adopted.

It is towards this Afghan horizon—often stormy or lowering—that the ship of our Frontier policy must always be steered. Important though it is, the question of policy in the tribal area is of course only part of the greater problem of the land defence of India. It cannot be treated *in vacuo*: it cannot be separated from the question of policy towards Afghanistan. Truism again; and not quite overlooked by the Essayist, who has indeed twice quoted to this effect from a recent lecture by Sir Evelyn Howell. But one cannot help doubting whether in his preoccupation with his thesis he has really given sufficient weight to this vital consideration. It is true that the situation which originally confronted Lyautey in Algeria was in many ways similar to that existing to-day on the North-West Frontier of India. The position at that time of the tribes on the Algerian and Moroccan border may perhaps be likened to that of a nut in a cracker. One arm of the cracker was French Administered Territory. The other was a loose Islamic autocracy like that of, say, Muscat or Bahrein. The nut was (like our Pathan tribes), a large and hard one; one arm of the cracker was out of action; and not unnaturally the nut displayed no disposition to be cracked. Lyautey solved the problem in a way which after the event seems obvious; he took both arms of the cracker in his own hand.

But if this is a fair picture of what happened on the Eastern Moroccan Border, is it safe, or even reasonable, to assume that the British Government is in a position to imitate the process on the North-West Frontier? The main difficulty, *i.e.*, of moving the other arm of the cracker, though not ignored by the Essayist, has been disposed of by him by the simple assumption that Afghan co-operation can be counted on. Kabul, he considers, must realize that it is to its advantage as well as that of Delhi and Whitehall to set a curb on our Frontier

King-makers. But is it—and this is basic—safe or reasonable to assume that an Afghan Government, or the people of Afghanistan, or either will take this view? Both have to be reckoned with. May they not rather view with instinctive disquiet the drying up, however salutary and necessary, of that deep, ancient pool of tribal fighting strength, whose waters can so powerfully be stirred by the Angel of Islam (be it remembered that in tribal eyes the Amir of Kabul is the King of Islam) at times of its necessity; or of its opportunity? These are questions the answer to which cannot be lightly given.

In dealing with this aspect of his subject the Essayist seems to concentrate his own and his readers' attention on the problem of the Moroccan-Algerian Border as against the Riff Border of Morocco. In so far as the parallel drawn by him between the former and our problem on the North-West Frontier of India might be taken to imply any kind of analogy between the circumstances of the French-controlled Sultanate of Morocco and modern Afghanistan, the Essay flies directly in the face of the facts. Afghanistan is *de jure* and *de facto* a completely sovereign and Independent State. Even before the Peace of Rawalpindi in 1919, when Afghanistan's right to control her own foreign relations was first formally recognised by the British Government, that staunch friend of the British, the Amir Habibullah, had in fact exercised it, and without effective protest, when he received a German Mission at Kabul during the Great War. Afghanistan has for the last fourteen years maintained Legations at all the principal capitals of Europe. She has moreover for some months been a member of the League of Nations; and the chief point in her credentials as scrutinised by the League at the time of her admission was this very point of independence. These facts are well known; but a restatement of them will be justified if it helps to remove any shadow of a conception which would in this matter be not only erroneous but mischievous.

Without Afghan co-operation can we proceed, this side of the Durand Line, to the disarming (within a measurable period) of the tribes and their reduction to close administrative control? The Essayist has not explicitly stated this problem; but since it is obviously the most likely situation which we should be called upon to face, one must assume that he has envisaged it, and that he would apply his solution whatever the situation and effects on the other side of the

Frontier. Here it seems to the author of the present study that the parallel with Lyautey and French Morocco will no longer serve its purpose. True, we obtain a simple and comprehensible picture of our problem if we say: "For India read Algeria; for Afghanistan read Morocco; for the Pathan tribes read the tribes of the Algerian-Moroccan Border." Simple, but misleading. Some pitfalls of the North-West Frontier-Moroccan analogy have already been pointed out. Leaving aside the vital fact that beyond Afghanistan is Russia, while beyond French Morocco (apart from the Riff), is the desert and the sea, we can surely find a truer parallel between present-day Morocco and the days of the British Commission in the Punjab between the First and Second Sikh Wars. Then the watchword was administer, control, organize—yes, but only up to the foot of the Frontier hills, for beyond that lay what we could not control, even in those more specious days. So with all Lyautey's ceaseless penetration, organization, control, there was one vital exception. This was the tribal belt, itself in French Morocco, but virtually independent, and deliberately left so by Lyautey, to the North of French Morocco and serving as a buffer between it and the Riff, a country then as little amenable to French as Afghanistan to British or Abyssinia to Fascist Italian control. Interference or commitment in this tribal belt was carefully eschewed by Lyautey's "organization on the march." It was not till 1927, and then with reluctance and only under the pressure of Abdel Krim's penetration of the French "buffer" tribes of the Djebala, that Lyautey at last permitted French troops to cross the Vergha River, in order to stiffen tribal resistance to the Riffian advance. A move, by the way, closely resembling the British move into the Mohmand hills in the summer of 1933.

Even Lyautey then does not seem to be such good warranty for a full-blooded "forward" policy in the special conditions of our North-West Frontier as has been commonly supposed. It would, however, be a mistake to make the reverse deduction; the foregoing remarks are only intended to counsel caution in drawing conclusions or espousing sweeping new policies on the North-West Frontier.

Whether we wish it or not, penetration and ultimate absorption of the tribal belt seems inevitable. The tidal pull on the tribes, for centuries exercised by central Asia, has of recent years been exercised increasingly by India. It is really not so much a question of an outward movement of Indian control as of an India-ward movement of the

tribes themselves. Easy communications, trade, the excitement of Indian politics (now closely followed by the tribesmen), sympathy with the Muslim minority in India and response to its desire to draw strength from the tribes—all these things tend to bring and to keep Pathanistan in the orbit of Delhi rather than of Kabul. Some observers think the solution will be a Frontier Federation including the Transborder tribes. A Frontier Legislative Council seemed very far off not so long ago and is already a very lusty infant ; and possibly a Federation of Pathanistan is not so distant a vision as it seems. But for the present there seems little need to force the pace.

Penetration will no doubt continue as in the past. It is sometimes the result of invitation, as in the case of the Turis of the Kurram, the Utmanzai Wazirs, the Shia Orakzais, or more recently the Lower Mohmands and the Tirah Afridis. Sometimes, of course, it is the result of gross misconduct tantamount to the declaration of war, as in the case of the Mahsuds. For this punitive kind of penetration military control from top to bottom is essential. It was in fact established and maintained in Waziristan so long (over four years) as the situation was so unsettled as to threaten a resumption of military operations on a wide scale ; and it was in similar conditions that military control was established—and subsequently discontinued—from area to area in Morocco. Where the Essayist seems in this connection to go beyond the warranty of his Moroccan parallel is in suggesting that all trans-border areas adjoining the N. W. F. P. should *eo facto* be supposed to be in an unsettled condition necessitating military control. It requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to apply this description to most of the Agency territories, for example, the Kurram Valley.

There is perhaps some justice in the Essayist's criticism of the slowness of absorption and consolidation in Waziristan, one of the two tribal areas which he examples. But in view of the facts already mentioned the blame cannot surely be so lightly laid at the door of absence of unity of control (in the hand of the military commander) as seems to be implied. The civilizing of Waziristan has, though steady, undoubtedly been slow ; but it has been no slower in the ten years of civil than in the four or five of military control. As regards the recent Mohmand operations, the observations in the essay seem to afford an example of the danger of seeking to apply a single "yard-stick" to a collection of problems which are almost bewilderingly

varied in their essential features. The Essayist's account may be summarized thus: "Nothing has been done to guarantee the security of our allies the Lower Mohmands against aggression by providing communications which were essential to make our guarantee effective. Then came 'unified control.' Troops went up the Gandab Valley, they built a road; then unified, or military, control was discontinued; the troops therefore withdrew 'leaving the Gandab unabsorbed and unpenetrated, and the situation remained as it was, except for the road' (a big exception, surely?) 'which remains as a memorial of the brief interlude of unified control.'"

This account seems to be based on more than one misapprehension, and a fuller statement of the facts may be of interest.

The plans to deal with the threat on the Mohmand border were drawn up as early as the late Spring of 1932, the initiative being, as was natural and proper, taken by the Governor as Agent to the Governor-General for the tribal areas. As always, he acted in full consultation, and in this case also in full agreement with the military command. The plan subsequently received the approval of the Government of India, advised by their Foreign Office, no doubt again in consultation with the highest military opinion as voiced by the General Staff and Air Staff at Army Headquarters. The important point is that from the onset it was agreed by all concerned that far from its being desirable to "absorb" the Gandab ("penetration," the other desideratum of the Essayist, as will be seen was not only thorough but permanent), it is rather desirable to avoid than to seek commitments in this particular part of the Frontier. The Gandab is on the whole, barren and ill-peopled. Its intrinsic value to government is nil. Moreover, it lies between British India and a wild, fanatical and virtually uncontrolled pocket of Afghan tribal territory.

In this forbidding region only sixteen miles separate the Afghan frontier at its nearest point from the Administrative border of the Peshawar District. While, therefore, there is little to gain by absorption of the Gandab there is plainly much to be gained by its retention as a buffer. And here the considerations pointed out in connection with the position of Afghanistan between the British and Russian Empires apply, on a lesser scale of course, but with no less truth. A buffer ceases to be a buffer when it is absorbed. Thorough-going occupation of the Lower Mohmand country could only result in making the wild and ill-controlled stretch of Afghan tribal

boundary mentioned above in effect the boundary also of the British district of Peshawar. Each petty border incident would then have international and tribal reverberations out of all proportions to its intrinsic importance. And the more grievous the preoccupations of Government at other points, the more pressingly and frequently these incidents would clamour for its attention. Nor could they then be ignored as they now conveniently can when circumstances require it. Here, then, indeed, would arise in its acutest form the problem envisaged by Maurois in the words quoted by the Essayist, when two civilisations, in time separated by centuries, seek to live side by side in space. At present, the friction of contact in this delicate and dangerous zone is greatly lessened by the interposition of the Lower Mohmands, as a medium in close touch and sympathy with the primitive conditions and ideas on the one side and the civilisation on the other side of them. It is seemingly to the cogency of very similar factors that one must ascribe the recently reported establishment of neutral zone in the wild tribal territory between Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia.

As has been said, responsible opinion was and is that the Lower Mohmands had better continue to play this rôle of buffer for as long as possible. The plan, therefore, having as its object the security of the British Indian Border, deliberately avoided any further objective which might commit us to occupation than the construction of the road. The function of the road was partly to deter, by the threat of its extension into Upper Mohmand territory, these gentry from further aggression against the Lower Mohmands and the British Border screened by them, and partly to enable aggression to be met half-way in future. So the road was built, and well built, and as anticipated, its building produced the necessary guarantees (hitherto scrupulously observed) against either interference with its use, or future aggression. When it had been completed (not without a good deal of fighting) and all hostile bodies had dispersed, troops were peacefully withdrawn in accordance with the original plan, declared in detail to the Mohmands at large before troops crossed the border at all. Much dissatisfaction was felt by the rank and file, fine troops spoiling for a fight, at the strictly and rigidly limited nature of their task; but the fact remains that the plan was carefully and maturely considered and carried out in its completeness and exactly. The road is freely used, largely with the aid of petrol, by all kinds of Mohmands and Bajauris, by British and Indian officials, armoured cars and by Frontier Constabulary.

During these operations, political powers, as in Waziristan in 1919-1923, were vested in the military authorities concerned, the Governor (as Agent to the Governor-General) and the local political officer (the Deputy Commissioner of Peshawar) officially acting as advisors only to the Army and Divisional Commanders respectively. After withdrawal of the troops, normal control by the political authorities was, as usual, restored.

It will be seen that the facts in no way support the suggestions (*a*) that there was no permanent penetration; if a road from top to bottom of the valley regularly maintained and used as described is not "penetration," it is difficult to imagine what penetration is; (*b*) that "absorption" was desirable; (*c*) that an attempt at penetration and absorption was for the first time conceived after operations had begun, as the result of unified (military) control; (*d*) that it was then discontinued as the result of the discontinuance of that control and a reversion to the normal (by implication nerveless or purposeless) control of the Agent to the Governor-General.

The facts have been detailed at this length partly in the hope of removing what appears to be a misconception, possibly shared by others and in any case disseminated by the Essay; partly in an attempt to show the danger of advocating identical methods for parts of the Frontier so widely dissimilar in their circumstances as, say, Baluchistan and the Mohmand border; and partly because the operations afford an example of the working of the present system of military and civil control, based on the experience of a century.

The Essay does not state the ultimate object of policy on the Frontier, namely, the security of British India. As a means to that end, however, the bulk of modern thought will scarcely be inclined to cavil at the suggested definition of policy; "the establishment of effective control over all tribes which live on our side of the Afghan Frontier." Such criticisms as have been made in this study are concerned only with what seems to be an over-facile discounting of real difficulties in the application of this policy and (as instanced by the examples given) a tendency to over-simplify the problem by assuming uniformity of conditions all along the Frontier. A degree of administrative interference or control which might be both desirable and feasible in Baluchistan or in, say, the Adamkhel Afridi salient east of the Kohat Pass may for the reasons given be so undesirable in, say, the Mohmand country as to make its avoidance itself an object of policy.

Turning to organisation, the Essayist considers that for the effective prosecution of the policy of intensive penetration and absorption which he advocates, unity of control is necessary. And he makes it clear that this control in all of the hitherto unsubjugated (by which apparently he means unannexed, for it has never been part of British India, legally, geographically, or practically) tribal area adjoining the North-West Frontier Province-proper should be in the same hands as the command of the troops in that area. Further, that the Frontier Military Command should include a definite proportion of the Air arm as well as all the existing Civil Trans-Border forces (*i.e.*, Militia and Khassadars) and one Cis-Border force, the Frontier Constabulary. "The G. O. C.-in-Chief of the Frontier Command should be an Agent to the Governor-General in the Trans-Border tracts from Chitral to the Gomal River, and the Commanders of Peshawar, Kohat and Waziristan Districts should be his local representatives. At each headquarters one or more officials, specialists in tribal affairs, should be appointed in charge of civil administrative questions affecting the tribes."

Who these officials are to be, and what the nature of the civil administrative questions of which they are to be in charge, will be discussed later ? First, however, it seems desirable to make one general observation on the proposals generally, as outlined above. The plan advocated in order to give effect to the policy as defined in the essay is apparently to include at least considerable disarmament as well as cessation of tribal allowance. If these objects are to be pursued with any energy it is probable, if not certain, that the transfer of political control from the hands of the Political Agent, Resident and Governor, to those of the District and Army Commanders, even under the existing system would be not only speedy but automatic. For it is difficult for anyone with first-hand experience of the Frontier tribes to envisage the general taking of steps, however pacific at the start, to speed up these highly desirable ends without involving military operations probably on a Frontier-wide scale. And, as has been explained in connection with the recent Mohmand campaigns, the undertaking of major military operations, even now, automatically involves the passing of political control to military hands. This control connotes command of all civil forces. Responsibility for advising the Government of India on questions of policy, it is true, remains with the Foreign Department. This appears to be the

practice in similar circumstances (the French Colonial Department corresponding to the Indian Foreign Department) of the French administration, and presumably the Essayist does not propose to alter it. The Governor, as Agent to the Governor-General, and his local political staff, are of course always in a position to influence with their expert advice the relations of Government with the tribes in the zone of operations. But so long as operations are in progress, or likely to restart, the contact of Government with the tribes is solely made through the General Officer Commanding in the operations.

Of these facts, the Essayist is doubtless aware. He is, however, suggesting not the retention of but a change in the present system, and, therefore, presumably means that even in a peaceful state of affairs, Trans-Border control should be in military hands as it is now in times of war. The reasons are not explicitly stated, but they appear to be, first, that unity of control is essential; secondly, that direct command over regular troops can only be exercised by a serving soldier; and, thirdly, the example of Lyautey, who was a soldier. The outstanding—indeed startling—feature of this proposal is that while it would certainly establish unity of control over troops and tribes across the Border in peace time as well as in war, it arbitrarily shatters the present—and immensely more important—unity of political control of the Frontier, Cis- and Trans-Border, in the hands of the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province. This aspect has not been touched on in the Essay, but it has hitherto been regarded as axiomatic, since the earliest days of British rule, that Pathanistan, Cis- and Trans-Border, Hills and Plains, must be in one and the same hand. For, apart from the fact that every important Trans-Border tribe (except the Mahsuds, and they have close and constant trading connections with British India) has its holdings on both sides of the administrative Border, it is notorious that not only raids and counter-raids but all important happenings and movements on either side of the Border have immediate repercussions on the other. Thus a Congress "hartal" in Peshawar City at once sets beards wagging at Bazar and Maidan in the Afridi Tirah and the Haji's holy caravan-serai in the Mohmand hills; while a raid on a post, or a pot-shot at a "brass-hat" in the Khyber, causes flutterings in the Red-Shirt dovecotes in Charsadda, Peshawar City and Mardan. The friction which would be bound to arise from the handling of such developments by two independent wardens of the marches would surely drive

the most long-suffering Viceroy ere long to insist on a speedy reapplication of the Essayist's first principle, Unity of Control.

Let us suppose, however, that this divorce of the Cis- and Trans-Border is really feasible ; and proceed to examine how the reform would in practice work out in a typical military district, say Peshawar, and at the new Frontier Command. The District Commander at Peshawar would still be charged, as at present, with the command and administration of the troops in his area ; but in addition he is to be saddled with the following nice little list of civil charges, *i.e.*, for all the responsibilities and activities of Government in these areas :

Malakand Agency (Yusafzai and Bajaur tribes, as well as conduct of the relations of Government with the rulers of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb).

Peshawar Border Agency (Mohmand and cognate tribes, Hassankhel and other Adamkhel Afridis, Yusafzai of Buner).

Kohat Border Agency (Kohat Pass Afridis, Orakzai and cognate tribes and certain minor clans). [So as not to reduce the argument to absurdity, it might be suggested that the Kohat area might be administered separately from Peshawar.—ED.]

The "civil specialists in tribal affairs" would presumably be the present Deputy Commissioners of Peshawar and Kohat and the Political Agents of the Khyber and the Malakand. Some of these are purely civilian officers of the Indian Civil Service, serving under the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India ; and some are military officers permanently seconded from the Indian Army to the same Department, relieved of all purely military duties, and having several years of political experience behind them, in addition to a year's special training in such subjects as Land Revenue, Law, and Excise.

Now unless the District Commander is to function merely as a Post-Office, or shall we say a sort of military censor interposed between the Governments of India and the North-West Frontier and the experienced officers by whom the whole real work of administration would continue to be done, is it really conceivable that he should personally and closely supervise this work, see important Jirgahs, grant constant interviews to civil officials and tribal notables, hear and dispose of petitions, go through the records (often vernacular) of law suits and the thousand and one miscellaneous cases which now

come to the Resident in Waziristan and the Governor for decision; and simultaneously administer, in detail, as it should be administered, his own military command ? One can imagine all these duties being done by a military officer if he were divorced from all purely military duties and responsibilities; had considerable knowledge of law and the intricacies of civil adminittration, including irrigation and land revenue (yes, these fearful wild-fowl are to be found even across the Border, *e.g.*, in the Tochi, Kurram, and Malakand); and above all an intimate knowledge of tribal divisions, dialects, and personalities. The District Commander with these qualifications would clearly be no usual District Commander. He would certainly not be readily interchangeable with Cis-Indus commands. In what essential would such a soldier differ from military Politicals such as Herbert Edwards, Nicholson, Sandeman, Roos-Keppel, Griffith,—or, one may not impertinently add, Lyautey himself ? And in what essential, except the retention of military rank ("the relics of ould dacency," as the Irish song has it) do these officers differ from your O'Dwyer, Bolton, Maffey, or Pears ?

Now to visit the new Frontier Command headquarters. If, as has been assumed, the administration of the tribal areas is to be real, the Frontier Commander must more and more be compelled to go behind the backs of his British Commanders for information on the purely military side of his charge. Indeed it seems inevitable that in time the divorce would (as it perforce was at an early stage of development on the Frontier) be formally recognized by the appointment of District Commanders (Troops) as distinct from District Commanders (Political). On the political side he would have to take important decisions without direct access (unless again he chose to short-circuit his own responsible local officers, the District Commanders) to the trained Political Officers, the Political Agents. Nor would he have a responsible adviser of his own; for the Governor, who at present advises the Command during military operations, would not be available even then under the new regime. He is to be completely divorced from responsibility for Trans-Border affairs at all times, and advice without responsibility is a dangerous thing, and a thing moreover which the Governor might well hesitate to tender.

The fact seems to be that peace-time civil administration, that is the conduct of the business of state in all its activities except the military, is the work of an expert, and is a wholetime job, just as the

command of an Army is an expert whole-time job. The absorption of this foreign body by the Army is no more likely to be wholesome to either party than the absorption of Jonah by the whale. While therefore admitting the desirability of unity of control, is it not wise to recognize freely that this is not to be attained by any attempt at absorption? Let it also be recognized that no system will be workable which arbitrarily divides the Cis- from the Trans-Border on the North-West Frontier. The line which divides them is not one of race, language, custom, or religion. It is mainly one of hill and plain, of poverty and sterility on the one side, and fertility and comparative well-being on the other; and on this fact is really based the main case for the Forward Policy, as voiced by that forceful Pathan, Sir Abdul Qaiyum. There should and can be only one Governor, not two. He may have started life as a soldier or as a civilian, but he has a full-time job, and that is to govern the Frontier Province. It would be ideally best if all fighting forces in his area were under his general control as those of Morocco were under Lyautey, and those of the Sudan and the Aden Protectorate are now under the Governor (often a civilian) who is also Commander-in-Chief. As under the French Colonial System in similar circumstances, he would then take his orders in purely military matters from Army Headquarters, and in matters of general policy, and of purely civil concern from the Foreign Department. Both Departments of State would as at present be in close and constant consultation on all important and Frontier questions; but responsibility for policy would naturally be as stated. It should not be forgotten that a large and important body of Frontier forces—the Frontier Militias, the Frontier Constabulary, the Armed Police Reserve and the Khassadars—still is under the control of the Head of the Frontier Government, and so were once the famous "Piffer" regiments (including Artillery) of the Regular Army. The chief obstacle to restoration of that old control seems to be a fatal obstacle also to realization of the Essayist's vision—namely, the post-war doctrine of interchangeability and what may perhaps be termed "continentality" of the Indian Army. All officers and units, says the experience of the Great War, must be ready to take their place at any time in modern large-scale warfare, and there is no longer room for local specialisation; though the Frontier tradition is dying hard in many fine old regiments, such as the Guides. Unless this policy can be reversed—and of this there seems no prospect—neither the handing

over of the Army to the Governor, nor the handing over of the Civil Government to the Army seems possible. Nor indeed is either process vital to prosecution of the policy stated by the Essayist.

In conclusion be it repeated that this study has no quarrel with the main conclusions of the Essay, and in particular with its insistence on the value to us in India of Lyautey's example as a single vivid and forceful personality, inspiring and unifying all the activities of Government in a situation in many ways resembling that on our own Frontier. It is only when one examines closely the application of those conclusions that it is difficult not to feel that the Essay has gone astray in one or two matters of substance. This appears to be due mainly to a misapprehension of the true parallel, which seems to be not between French Morocco as a whole and the Indian Trans-Border tribal belt, but between the latter and the tribal belt on the Riff Border of French Morocco, or on the Abyssinian Border of Italian Somaliland. As regards the theory of military control of Trans-Border areas, provided this is to apply to really unsettled areas, that is, areas actually in or just emerging from a state of war with Government, this is already provided for under the existing system. As regards military control in settled Trans-Border tracts such as the Kurram or Tochi, or indeed any tribal Agency in normal times, no real reasons have been given for it and it is doubtful if such reasons exist, whilst the objections, as stated in this review, are certainly formidable.

The Frontier cannot be run according to schedule. To-day there is a craze for "Plans," Five-Year or otherwise. They are an admirable means of escaping responsibility for the moment; but their further uses are problematical. And nowhere is rigidity of conception or execution more dangerous than on the North-West Frontier. Steadiness of purpose, yes; but, as observed in a recent penetrating study in the "Spectator,"* government is not a science, but an art. "England does not demand detailed plans from them (her Ministers) in advance, recognizing that they will have to move by scent and sight as well as by any map. She puts what she considers to be the best men to grips with her problems, and leaves the rest to their good workmanship."

The difficulties on the North-West Frontier, like those on the Northern border of French Morocco, are mainly due to permanent

* "The Art of Governing; Plan or Map," by Sir Stephen Tallents, "Spectator," March 29th, 1935.

and widely varying geographical and political factors, which are not really affected by this form of plan or organisation or that on the British or French side. Government and its agents, whoever they be, while keeping the main object, namely, the security of British India, steadily in view, must always recognise and conform to these intractable and dominant factors.

PROMOTION IN THE WAR BLOCK

By Captain G. Creffield, M.B.E.

The War Block Committee has now completed its difficult task and for many officers the shadow of the axe has now been removed. The threat of premature retirement having disappeared, officers are discussing their chances of getting command. Many appear to think that, in spite of the axe, they will be badly blocked for appointment to command. The figures worked out in Table "A" may therefore assist officers in estimating their chances; they also illustrate several important points which will be mentioned later.

I have seen none of the statistics prepared by the War Block Committee; all the information in the tables was taken from the January 1935 Army List. A meticulous examination of the gradation list has not been made, consequently minor inaccuracies in the figures may be discovered. Furthermore, any estimate made now of what the position of any individual will be in four years' time is bound to be inaccurate. It is hoped, however, that the system employed may assist individuals in working out their own position when they are nearing 26 years' service. It also enables one to see, with reasonable accuracy, where the blocks will occur.

In compiling Table "A" the following was taken into account:—

(*a*) Infantry regimental officers, including those in staff appointments, only were considered. Officers on the supernumerary and General Duty List were excluded.

(*b*) There are 118 infantry battalion commands; other Lieut.-Colonels' appointments were not considered.

(*c*) When assessing the number of officers due to retire, after completing 26 years' service, only Majors and Captains in the gradation list (January 1935 Army List) were taken into account.

(*d*) The qualifying service for retirement was calculated on "Service for promotion;" *i.e.*, permitting every officer to attain the rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

(*e*) That the 26 years' rule would be rigidly applied.

(*f*) No allowance was made for wastage among officers on account of War Block retirements and other causes.

The reasons for the last consideration were twofold. In the first case it gives the worst possible case for every officer. That is to

say, that if an officer on the figures given in the table calculates he will not be blocked for command then on the question of seniority alone he will get command. Secondly, it is impossible to assess accurately the casualties that will occur. At the bottom of the table I have given an estimate of the wastage that will occur, based on the following :—

(*a*) War Block retirements.

(*b*) Casualties on account of sickness.

(*c*) Officers prematurely vacating command to take up staff appointments.

(*d*) Officers unable to get command on account of age.

(*e*) Transfers of infantry officers to R.I.A.S.C. and I.A.O.C., etc., to make good war block wastage in those departments.

(*f*) Officers considered unfit for command for reasons other than those mentioned above.

War Block Retirements.—400 officers are going and I consider 300 is a generous estimate of the number of regimental officers that will go. There are approximately 1,100 regimental officers in the war block years who complete 26 years service by the end of 1946, *i.e.*, 27 per cent.

Casualties on Account of Sickness.—Difficult to estimate ; 3 per cent. is considered a low estimate.

Transfers to Staff Appointments.—Numbers will tend to diminish as staff appointments are held for 4 years, whereas command is for three years only. Average estimated at 2 per cent.

Over Age for Command, say, 3 per cent.

Transfers to Departments.—Most of these appointments will be filled by transfers from the British Service, 1 per cent.

Unfits (*i.e., Bowler Hats*), say, 4 per cent.

The above represents a total wastage of 40 per cent. This percentage has therefore been deducted from the number reaching 26 years service by years. It should be noted that the wastage effect in the years 1938-39, and 40 is cumulative as there are no surplus officers in these years, and that the 1941 year will benefit and possibly the first three months of 1942.

Points brought out by the table.

1. Considering seniority alone all officers who complete 26 years service before the end of May 1941 will get command.

2. If the wastage percentage is considered a fair estimate the worst block will occur during the years 1942 and 1943, *i.e.*, officers whose service for promotion commenced in the years 1916-1917.

3. Any abnormal casualties occurring among officers, eligible for command, who complete 26 years' service before the end of 1941, will increase the chances of the 1942 officers up to the end of March only. The numbers completing 26 years' service during the remainder of the year and in 1943 are so big that the effect will not benefit them.

4. If anything is done to relax the 26-year retiring rule in favour of the 1942-1943 years only it will make it similarly bad for the 1944-1945 years; which years are fairly bad as they stand. If this is contemplated it appears that the end of March 1942 will be the best time to increase the retiring age to 27 years for all officers.

This will have the effect of extending the block to 1947; in which year 59 commands fall vacant.

5. The effect of the War Block retirements, and other causes of wastage, on officers' chances of getting command is interesting. Up to the end of 1940 every officer can get command before he completes 26 years service. It does not therefore give a true picture if these years are included when working out the average. The last estimate, *i.e.*, 6 out of every 10 get command, is therefore nearer the mark. I understand the War Block Committee figure was 7 out of every 10.

Conclusion.

I have no doubt that the War Block Committee have earmarked a big percentage of the 1942-43 for premature retirement, but it will be impossible to clear the block in these years by this means. The problem has received close study by experts during the last year and the suggestions mentioned below have, most probably, been fully considered.

1. The selection of officers for command should be made from among all officers who complete 26 years service in any one year. In fact, owing to the small number of commands falling vacant in 1942 and the large number occurring in 1941, officers completing 26 years' service during these two years should be considered as being of the same seniority for the purpose of selection for command.

2. Preference should be given to the 1942, 43 and 44 years when subsequent applications for voluntary retirement are received.

3. After March 1942 the 26 year service limit might be extended to 27 years, or more.

4. First grade staff appointments should be limited to a three years' tenure.

Table showing months during which Infantry commands fall vacant.

Month.	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946
1 ..	..	1	..	4	1	..	4	1	..	4	1	..
2 ..	2	2	9	11	2	9	11	2	9	11	2	9
3 ..	..	1	4	2	1	4	2	1	4	2	1	4
4 ..	2	6	1	3	6	1	3	6	1	3	6	1
5 ..	2	2	2	7	2	2	7	2	2	7	2	2
6 ..	..	3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2	1	3	2
7 ..	1	2	2	4	2	2	4	2	2	4	2	2
8 ..	6	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2
9 ..	1	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2	7	..	2
10 ..	1	3	5	2	3	5	2	3	5	2	3	5
11 ..	1	..	5	3	..	5	3	..	5	3	..	5
12 ..	1	..	5	8	..	5	8	..	5	8	..	5
Total	17	20	39	59	20	39	59	20	39	59	20	39

Compiled from January 1935 Army List.

Majors and Captains of Infantry Regiments who will complete 26 years service. Not allowing for War Block retirements and normal wastage.

	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	
1 ..	..	3	24	27	28	1	52	
2 ..	..	1	16	..	11	..	..	
3 ..	..	5	9	5	..	1	..	
4 ..	..	6	48	..	25	49	..	
5 ..	..	41	24	14	..	5	..	
6 ..	..	35	32	28	..	1	..	
7 ..	..	9	22	14	..	10	47	
8 ..	..	36	11	..	43	..	..	
9 ..	..	14	9	23	1	1	1	
10 ..	..	28	7	22	16	10	..	
11 ..	..	33	17	8	2	..	..	
12 ..	144	14	..	15	38	6	31	
Total ..	144	225	219	156	164	84	131	= 1,123

Compiled from January 1935 Army List.

FOREST WARS.

By Captain R. C. Howman, 20th Burma Rifles.

In recent years marked attention has been paid at Home to training for operations against second class and irregular enemies. Such training has proved a wholesome antidote to any tendency towards thinking along the narrow lines fostered by certain sections of the popular press. We have been reminded (if indeed reminder were necessary) that the British Army must be trained and equipped for purposes other than the despatch of a small Expeditionary Force "encased in steel" to the Continent of Europe.

When a survey is made of potential theatres of operations outside Europe, it is noticeable that many of these lie within the forest lands of the world[1]. It is the purpose of this article to examine our past experiences when called upon to fight in such terrain, and so deduce the extent to which forest fighting merits attention as a branch of military study.

THE INCIDENCE OF FOREST WARS.

On the 8th of July, 1755, an American Indian scout reported to his French Commander that "a scarlet river coursed through the trees." A few hours later British regular troops, thus picturesquely described, had their first taste of forest fighting. They were to have a surfeit of it before operations in America ended, twenty-six years later, with the loss of our colonies.

The Nineteenth Century opened with a small but costly campaign in the jungles of Ceylon, followed a few years later by the Java expedition, where a force 12,000 strong, mainly composed of British troops from India, saw considerable forest fighting. In the same year, 1811, fighting recommenced in the backwoods of America, where it lasted until 1814. This was immediately followed by the Nepal War of 1814-16, and a further unhappy expedition to Ceylon.

After a brief interval came the First Burmese War of 1824. The expeditionary force of 11,000 men sent to Rangoon was followed up a few months later by several thousand reinforcements of all arms.

[1] The term "Forest" is taken to include any large tract of country covered chiefly with trees and undergrowth.

The following year an army, 12,000 strong, attempted to co-operate overland from India, but, becoming enmeshed in the intervening jungles, was decimated with disease and forced to turn back.

Simultaneously with the Burmese War fierce fighting went on in Ashanti, culminating in a pitched battle which cost us 1,800 casualties. Then came the Kaffir War of 1834, followed a few years later by operations in New Zealand. The scene next shifted to Burma again, where 20,000 troops were employed in 1852. This began a second cycle of Burmese, New Zealand and Ashanti Wars.

The Nineteenth Century closed with yet another Ashanti Campaign, that of 1895-96, and the Benin Expedition of 1897. Interposed amongst the operations mentioned were innumerable minor expeditions against forest peoples in Malaya, North Burma, Assam, Africa, South India, America and elsewhere.

The frequent minor forest wars of the period 1900-14 need not be enumerated. It suffices to mention the operations of 1912 in India against the Abors, and to remark that in Africa alone, upwards of thirty medals or bars were granted for purely bush campaigns.

The campaigns of the years 1914-18 differed from those of the Nineteenth Century in that they were mainly fought against European, or European-led troops. Once again, as in our Eighteenth Century struggle against France, they formed a part of the mosaic of a world war. In West Africa and the Kameruns, the British force numbered some 17,000 men, while in German East Africa 300,000 troops were engaged. These numbers exclude considerable Allied contingents in both theatres of operations.

In post-war years forest fighting may be said to have resumed its normal "peace time" proportions. There have been the usual minor expeditions, intermixed with more important operations. Of these, two particularly call for mention, the Moplah Rebellion of 1921-22 and the Burma Rebellion of 1930-31.

The foregoing brief summary shows that, taking the period 1755-1931 as a whole, campaigns involving forest fighting have predominated in our non-European Wars. Nevertheless, military writers have given them comparatively little attention, and in many cases recourse for details has to be made to contemporary diaries and memoirs. One reason probably is that most forest wars took place in diverse and little known corners of the world: unlike, for example,

our mountain campaigns, which were fought in, or around, the single famous battle ground of the North West Frontier. Again, active operations were normally overshadowed by the endless problems of administration inseparable from the terrain, and in bygone days administration was apt to be considered a somewhat dull mystery, uninviting to probe, and almost indecent to write about. But in truth the story of our forest wars is far from dull, and shows them to possess certain characteristics which call for consideration and analysis.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREST WARS.

The first characteristic of forest wars is that the time taken to end them has usually been out of all proportion to the strength and quality of the opposition. As examples, Wolseley's successful invasion of Ashanti was the climax of eleven years of desultory fighting, while the operations against the Maoris in the Second New Zealand War lasted, almost unbroken, for a full decade. The pacification of Lower Burma after the Second Burmese War took ten years, while that of Upper Burma after the Third War took five.

In the present century, the striking force in the Kameruns, 8,000 strong, took 19 months to round up the German garrison, largely composed of armed police, and considerably under half its strength. In East Africa, Von Lettow with a mixed force of 8,000 German settlers and askari diverted the attention of over thirty times this number of Imperial troops before the Armistice finally ended his activities.[1]

Equally characteristic has been the excessive cost of forest wars in men, money and material. In the second Ceylon campaign the British force was decimated by disease, losing 2,000 effectives within a single period of three weeks. In the First Burmese War, 9,700 men were sick or dead within the first few months, while the Army which attempted to co-operate from India was practically wiped out, the average mortality in a British regiment being six out of every seven men.

In these days medical science was in its infancy, but statistics given in the *Military Effort of the British Empire* show that our dead

[1] In mandays, East Africa absorbed 21 per cent. of our total war effort on all fronts exclusive of France. This figure is based on *The Military Effort of the British Empire*, p. 742 *et seq.*

in East Africa numbered 20,000, while over a period of 30 months, 267,645 sick were admitted to hospital. In addition, losses from invaliding were very high, 12,000 white personnel being evacuated overseas in 1916 alone.

The financial cost of forest wars has inevitably been heavy, owing to the length of operations, the heavy wastage in personnel and animals, and the customary necessity for diverting ships and other transport agencies to the task of importing supplies into areas lacking in natural resources. In East Africa eight seaports had to be opened up, and everything—men, ammunition, petrol, and even food for some 150,000 carriers, brought from overseas. In money, East Africa cost the British Government £500,000,000, but in many cases the purely military expense of operations has been of secondary consideration. It is almost impossible to estimate the repercussions resulting from the breakdown of civil administration over large areas of a productive country. For example, the recent Burma Rebellion, which lasted fifteen months, is quoted as one of the main reasons for "the finances of Burma having for the time being gone out fo control"! [1]

A further characteristic of forest wars has been the tactical setbacks, and even disasters, which have too frequently marked their course. The following extracts from *Wolfe and Montcalm* give a vivid account of an early example—the debacle which befell General Braddock's force in 1755.

While the British, covered by the orthodox protective detachments, were advancing through dense forest, "the French and Indian suddenly opened a deadly fire on our helpless soldiery, who could see nothing, and wasted volley after volley on the impassive trees. The invisible death was everywhere, in front, flank and rear. The troops huddled together in a bewildered mass, shrinking from the bullets which cut them down in scores. Both men and officers were new to this blind and frightful warfare. So matters grew worse and worse, the artillery doing great damage to the trees and little to the enemy, the soldiers loading and firing mechanically, into the air at times, and often into their own comrades." In this action our losses were nearly a thousand, while those of the enemy were under fifty. History repeated itself some years later when one of Cornwallis's detachments,

[1] Report of the Burma Retrenchment Committee, May 1934.

1,100 strong, was surrounded and destroyed by American backwoodsmen.

As regards the Nineteenth Century, Fortescue tells of the campaign in Canada being marred by heavy and avoidable casualties caused "by the tactical blunders of the British Commander." Of the New Zealand war of the 'sixties he says "our assaults were always costly—we suffered more than one ignominious repulse—and so badly co-ordinated that, if a position were taken, the enemy had invariably gone."

These examples might be paralleled by many others in the Second Burmese War, but it suffices to add that both the major forest campaigns of the Great War began with disasters, in the Kameruns by the defeat of our three frontier columns, and in East Africa by the tragedy of Tanga. In the case of Tanga, the fact that the troops on landing had to advance through thick bush was probably only a contributory cause of their defeat, though Von Lettow makes the significant claim that it was his knowledge of the "clumsiness" of British troops in close country which finally induced him to stand and give battle.

In enumerating these general characteristics of forest wars it is not, of course, implied that every campaign has been lengthy, costly, and tactically undistinguished. In the following paragraphs our occasional successes will be measured against our failures, with the object of discovering why the debit balance has been so heavy.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

Organization and administration have played a great, perhaps the greatest, part in deciding the outcome. When initial arrangements have been faulty and ill-considered, subsequent operations have invariably been costly and ineffective. On the other hand, care and forethought have as inevitably received their due reward. Defects in administration have, however, sometimes arisen from causes beyond the control of military commanders. Administration in East Africa, for instance, has been drastically criticized, but while the failure of certain major operations was unquestionably due to fundamental errors in the composition of the force, the real fault lay with those responsible for the inception of the campaign in 1914.

The objective of the Expeditionary Force, as given to the G. O. C. by the Government of India, was to capture and occupy German East Africa. This amounted to an order to capture a base, and then conquer an undeveloped forest country, seven times the size of England, in face of certain opposition from German units trained to bush warfare. The military force allotted to this task was two improvised infantry brigades with an inadequate proportion of ancillary services.

A disaster was invited, and duly came about at Tanga. Following on the failure of the opposed landing, the British were forced to remain on the defensive until early 1916, by which time a Headquarters Staff had been improvised in London and sent to East Africa. The administrative staff was then faced with the task of re-organizing a heterogeneous patchwork of units in the field, and maintaining them in a country devoid of supplies. It is little wonder that their efforts did not meet with much success.

An instructive comparison with East Africa is provided by Wolseley's Ashanti Campaign. The circumstances under which it was undertaken were briefly these. In 1873 an Ashanti army, 12,000 strong, invaded the Gold Coast, proclaiming, not without reason, that "the British will not dare to attack us in the bush, and are incapable of harming us if they do." [1] The Government of the Colony, as usual unprepared, lost control of the situation, and "it was imperative that a signal victory over the enemy be gained if we were to remain any longer on the Coast." [2] The climate of the Gold Coast was then probably the deadliest in the world, while the country was undeveloped and covered with dense bush.

The task of pulling the chestnuts out of the fire was entrusted to Wolseley. His first care was to collect a staff with practical experience of the shifts and improvisations necessary for campaigning in uncivilized countries. It is noteworthy that he gave particular attention to the officers selected to organize his medical, supply, and transport services. Under Wolseley's personal direction, all officers accompanying him overseas then made a detailed study of the history and topography of the theatre of operations.

[1] A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, Claridge, Vol. II, p. 53.
[2] Claridge, p. 45.

On landing, the task of evolving order out of chaos was immediately begun. Communications were improved, transport re-organized, hospital erected, live-stock imported—in fact every detail of organization, even the smallest, received attention.

Particular care was given to economizing expenditure and transport by the utilization of material available in the country, and future contingencies were provided for, even to the collection of fuel at possible camping sites, and the marking down and preservation of natural building material in their vicinity.

When, at the end of twelve weeks, all was ready, Wolseley gave orders for the offensive to begin. Three weeks later his force had marched 180 miles, defeated the Ashantis in two pitched battles, and ended the war with a total loss of 70 men.

While it is unquestionable that this result was only made possible by the excellence of Wolseley's administrative plan, it is important to realize that he has one great asset on his side, namely that of *time*. Time in which to make adequate preparations was denied to the G. O. C. of the East African Expeditionary Force, and it has been denied to many other British commanders in similar circumstances. Wolseley would probably have been equally unfortunate, but for the fortuitous circumstances that, while the Cabinet discussed the Ashanti situation in August, climate conditions made it impossible for them to send British troops there before December. To quote Fortescue, "English ministers have a genius for thrusting their armies into positions from which they can neither advance nor retire . . . and they will very likely do it again."[1]

Lest this prophecy be fulfilled, and inadequately prepared forces be again thrust headlong into forest wars, it would appear wise for a study to be made of the history of such enterprises in time of peace, in order that facts and figures to prove their futility may be ready in time of war.

The administrative defects of forest wars cannot, however, always be attributed to the impetuosity of politicians. There was, for example, adequate time in which to prepare for the First Burmese War. Yet operations in 1824 were held up, while the troops rotted in Rangoon, for the good reason "that the army came unprovided with the necessary equipment for advancing either by land or water."[2]

[1] R.A.S.C. History, Vol. II, p. xxxi.
[2] *Narrative of the Burmese Wars*, pub. 1827.

That this was so may seem incredible to us to-day, but it should have appeared equally incredible to a commander making his preparations for a Third Burmese War sixty years later. Yet we read that, in 1885, save for an inefficient coolie corps "the Expeditionary Force was entirely without land transport; this was a great clog on all operations undertaken. Without transport not only could moveable columns not be despatched, but posts, if established, could not be supplied with provisions."[1]

These extraordinary oversights arose through a complete misconception of the topographical conditions, and of the probable action of the enemy. The troops probably accepted the situation philosophically as one beyond their comprehension. On the other hand, they took a keen interest in such transport as ultimately came their way, for the good reason that on its quality depended their fighting efficiency and personal comfort. The criticisms directed by the fighting soldier at his transport have been curiously similar over a period of nearly a century, and have been particularly free after operations in which regular units have fought side by side with local forces equipped for the work in hand. Criticisms of a constructive nature have been mainly concerned with the weight and nature of transport loads, and the type of equipment provided to carry them.

As regards the weight of loads, army equipment is made up in multiples of 80 lbs. for carriage on mules. Examples are the 160-lb. tent and the 80-lb. box of small arms ammunition. When coolie transport becomes necessary, such loads have either to be abandoned or, if and when possible, broken up and repacked. A similar difficulty arises when use has to be made of local animals, such as the Chinese mule, which carries only 120 lbs. The solution adopted by local units is the simple one of having their loads made up in 20 or 40 lb. multiples. Ammunition, for instance, is packed in 40-lb. boxes, while tentage is made up in 20 or 40-lb. sections.

It has also been pointed out that the army mule is too expensive a luxury for use on column, except for the carriage of Lewis guns and a few other specialized loads. The difficulty is that the Army mule eats a weight of forage equivalent to his own maximum load in under 15 days. His "useful load" thus rapidly decreases to

[1] "Frontier and Overseas Expeditions," p. 167.

vanishing point, while the carriage of forage adds enormously to the length and vulnerability of a column. The only satisfactory solution is the substitution of local hired transport, which can more or less live on the country. As has already been pointed out, the standard army load must in such circumstances be reduced. It is, of course, possible partially to overcome the " vanishing load " problem by ingenuity in forward dumping. Moreover, army mules can be made to tighten up their surcingles and accustom themselves to coarser fare. In this connection it will be remembered that careful experiment and training produced remarkable results in Palestine.

Another point which has been questioned is the suitability for column work of the standard type of pack equipment. If mules become badly bogged, the only remedy is to lighten them by manhandling their loads across the obstruction. As, with army equipment, every load has to be untied, retied, and re-balanced, this process may hold up an advance for hours. Again, camping sites are always circumscribed, and may often have to be cleared out of the jungle. Mules standing about while being unloaded foul the ground, and interfere with the work in hand. When breaking camp, loading up in a limited space is far from easy, particularly in self-contained columns where the proportion of animals is very high in comparison with the number of men available for loading parties. Any delay in pitching or striking camp is a very serious matter, as a column's marching day is shortened by the tactical necessity for halting in ample time to get settled in before nightfall.

The Chinaman has gone far to overcome these difficulties by constructing his pack saddle in two parts. The load, attached to an upper framework, can be lifted off and replaced *in situ* in a few seconds. The advantages of this arrangement for obstacle crossing are obvious, while on entering camp mules need only be halted for the few moments necessary to deposit their loads. Since only the few essentials for the night need be untied, considerable time and labour is again saved in the morning.

Of equipment in general, it may be said that the tendency has always been to carry far too much, to the grave detriment of mobility. Articles, such as coils of wire, nails and tools are, or should be, unnecessary in countries where almost anything can be constructed with bamboos and a cutting knife. Troops must, of course, first be trained

in the use of local materials, but this should be a part of the normal training of all units stationed in forest countries. Yet, while the list of desirable weight-cutting expedients is a long one, regular troops have, on the other hand, frequently suffered great discomfort from the lack of various small necessities of jungle life. Amongst these may be mentioned waterproof kit and ration bags, and individual cutting knives. These last are an absolute essential in the jungle, yet British troops have been sent on service without them during the last decade.

As the foregoing paragraphs indicate, much might be done to improve the equipment of regular troops for forest wars. The type of mule equipment described might indeed with advantage be adopted for general service purposes. Its practicability was recently proved at Aldershot where an Army pattern, based on the Chinese model, was successfully tried out. General stores suitable for column purposes are readily available, being already under production for Military Police and other local units. While it is not suggested that large quantities of such stores should be held in peace time, permanent provision should at least be made for regular units stationed in forest countries.

The organisation of forces for forest campaigns is too extensive a subject for detailed consideration here. Historically, organisation has been haphazard, and the student will find such curious anomalies as sailors storming stockades many miles from salt water. In the early days in East Africa, apart from a stiffening of a few first line regiments, the bulk of the force was composed of units insufficiently trained for employment elsewhere. The ideal was perhaps approached in the final stages of the Moplah Rebellion, when units were specially selected for their aptitude in forest fighting.

The bulk of the fighting, as may be expected, has fallen on the infantryman, while in modern times the Lewis gun has proved the most useful of his auxiliary weapons. While machine-guns were successfully used by the Germans in East Africa to ambush unskilled troops, later experience in the Moplah and Burma Rebellions shows that they are of little use for offensive purposes. Opportunities for effective fire are rare, and a proportion of their considerable transport could probably be more usefully employed in carrying mortars. When a jungle enemy stands to fight, he usually chooses stockades or

buildings. Opinions differ as to the utility of the rifle grenade. While it is effective against stockades, it must be used with discretion where there is any risk of the bomb striking intervening branches.

Artillery has on occasions proved useful for breaching stockades, and has a high moral effect. On the other hand, on the rare occasions when a jungle enemy stands to fight, it is doubtful policy to frighten him away. Moreover, artillery targets are few and far between, while the large number of transport animals required to move and maintain the guns, imposes a severe strain on lines of communication.

It is somewhat curious to find that cavalry were described as "the most effective arm" during the 1885-6 operations in Burma. Sir George White, in asking for three more regiments, remarked that "in a land where only ponies are bred the cavalry horses seemed monsters to the people and the long reach and short shrift of the lance paralyse them with fear." In general, opportunities for cavalry action in forest countries are rare, but since horsemen are dreaded by the people, they should be employed whenever the ground permits.

Mounted infantry have been extensively used in forest wars. In their case the primary object of the horse has been to increase the mobility of the rifleman in his pursuit of an elusive enemy. In the Third Burmese War and recent Rebellion, Mounted Infantry units were improvised from infantrymen mounted on country ponies. Those interested will find an instructive account of the capabilities of M. I. in close country in Deneys Reitz's "Trekking On."

While the whole subject of organization is controversial, there are two guiding principles. The first is that a force must be capable of pinning down and destroying the enemy in ground of his own choosing, which will often be in thick jungle. The second is that a force must give the highest possible fighting return for its cost in maintenance. The answer in both cases will generally be the infantrymen, or to be exact the forest-trained infantryman, as will later be made clear.

The duty of keeping the troops fit is probably the greatest administrative task of all, for disease has been the main reason for the length and costliness of forest wars. Efficient arrangements can bring about remarkable results, as in the Burma Rebellion when, contrary to all expectations, sickness amongst the troops in the field

actually fell below the usual cantonment rate. But it does not belittle a fine achievement to point out that our medical resources were not at the time seriously taxed in other directions, as they were in East Africa and may be again.

A note of warning is struck by the present forest fighting in South America. There the Paraguayans, trained by the French, are said to have learnt the military lessons of medical science very thoroughly. The best doctors in the country are established in well-equipped casualty clearing stations and field hospitals, a few kilometres behind the front line. Yet, though the Paraguayan soldier is physically strong and inured to hardships, the medical personnel have had more work than they can possibly cope with. By January 1934, Paraguay had already lost 20,000 men, chiefly from typhus and dysentery.

It is an obvious deduction that in forest wars the medical education of the troops, and the arrangements made to safeguard their health, must continue to be one of the first cares of a commander.

This brief administrative survey may be fittingly closed with a remarkable quotation—remarkable in that it was written at A. H. Q. in India with reference to an administrator who apparently usurped most of the functions of a commander and his staff. It reads as follows:—

"Forewarned by the first war . . . the absorbing interest which Lord Dalhousie took in the welfare of the troops, and all matters connected with this war (the Second Burmese War), was its most noticeable feature . . He with vigilant forethought, exerted himself to the utmost to bring it to a rapid and successful conclusion. Reading his original minutes one cannot fail to be struck with the masterly way in which he foresaw and arranged for all contingencies. From first to last he personally arranged for everything; now we see him dictating in short crisp sentences, the number of reinforcements to be despatched—now hurrying off to Rangoon to decide matters on the spot. . . True, there was little decentralization of command, but with such a man . . . . one is prone to think how unnecessary this may sometimes be."

We are not here concerned with who made these arrangements, but with the fact that they *were* made. The Viceroy's "vigilant forethought" unquestionably saved thousands of lives, while the war, both administratively and operationally, was highly successful during his tenure of office.

To sum up the administrative lessons of forest wars. The success of operations is wholly dependent on a sound administrative plan. This plan must, whenever possible, be complete before active operations begin. More than ordinary attention must be given to details of organization and equipment, for small bodies of troops may often be required to operate independently over considerable periods of time at a distance from centres of supply. The personal responsibility of a commander is very great. In order that he may be able adequately to supervise the work of his staff, it is essential that he should be fully conversant with the characteristics of forest wars, and particularly with these, if any, fought within the proposed theatre of operations.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

Operationally speaking, forest wars may be divided into two classes, namely, wars of conquest, such as those fought in Ceylon, Nepaul and East Africa, and wars of pacification, such as the Moplah and Burma Rebellions. Some campaigns, notably the Second and Third Burmese Wars, fall under both headings. The first phase has been one of invasion, and the second the pacification of the occupied territory. In all forest wars, British commanders, in order to gain a decision, have been forced to maintain the offensive in terrain markedly favourable to the defence. Conversely, their opponents have been able to adopt guerilla tactics with, in most cases, the advantage of local knowledge, and the assistance of such powerful natural allies as climate and topography. In wars of pacification an additional and particularly troublesome feature has been the fluidity of the opposition. As Private Mulvaney remarked, "such double-ended divils I never knew. 'Tis only a *dah* an' a Snider that makes a dacoit. Widout thim he's a paceful cultivator, an' 'felony for to shoot."[1]

Nevertheless, even when full weight is given to these difficulties, it seems that the progress made in overcoming them has been unduly slow. The mistakes made in one war have too often been repeated in the next, which argues either a misappreciation or neglect of the lessons of history. To take an example from our most recent campaign, the Burma Rebellion, we find that the opening phase, from December 1930 to June 1931, was chiefly remarkable for the lack of a definite plan. This appears to have been due to friction between the civil and

[1] "Frontier and Overseas Expeditions," p. 88.

military authorities, mainly arising from the demands which were made for the dispersal of the small available military force—demands which were naturally resisted in order that striking reserves might be maintained. Turning to the pacification of Burma, fifty years earlier, we find the Chief Commissioner writing as follows:—"It was found necessary from the first to restrain firmly the tendency of the local officials to fritter away the strength of the force in small posts. The moment anything occurred they wanted to clap down a post on the disturbed spot; and if this had been allowed to go on unchecked there would not have been a man left to form a movable column or even send out a patrol of sufficient strength."

It seems a fair comment that, with this warning before them, the civil and military authorities should have been agreed upon a *modus operandi* when rebellion broke out in 1930.

There is another curious example of history repeating itself in the Third Burmese War, when operations failed to get under way for several months owing to the mistaken policy of sending out flying columns. These marched rapidly through a part of the country and then returned to their headquarters. The result was that "if the people were friendly and helped the troops, they were certain to suffer when the column retired. If they were hostile a hasty visit had little effect on them. They looked upon the retirement as a retreat and became more bitter than ever."[1]

This identical mistake had been made by the French, many years earlier, in their initial attempts to pacify the rebellious province of La Vendée.[2] Flying columns entered the country, burnt towns and villages, and immediately returned to their bases. The Vendéans retaliated by ambushing and harassing the columns, or if defeated, simply hid their muskets and turned into peaceful cultivators. The only lasting impression made on the population was one of bitter resentment.

The methods by which La Vendée was eventually pacified by General Hoche are of great interest. His policy was a complete reversal of that of his predecessors, and was identical in principle with the plan arrived at, after considerable delay, in both pacifications of Burma.

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[1] "The Pacification of Burma," p. 57.

[2] A maritime province of France, largely covered with woods and marshes.

Hoche formed a circle of strong posts connected by patrols, whose duty it was to prevent any enemy from breaking through the cordon. The cordon then gradually closed, preceded by mobile columns which attacked and broke up the following of truculent chiefs. The posts as they advanced occupied each town or village in turn, and disarmed the inhabitants. The principal citizens, together with cattle and corn, were held as hostages for good behaviour. When submission was complete, the men were released and the bulk of the cattle and corn restored to their owners. Part, however, was retained as a Government tax, and stored in magazines in rear to lighten the difficulties of supply. Stringent orders were issued to the troops, enjoining fair treatment of the inhabitants, and the immediate fulfilment of pledges given. By such means Hoche left behind him a country at peace with, and even favourable to, his Government.

Hoche's methods of subjugating a forest country have never been materially improved upon, and, except in the case of savages who might require sterner measures, their principles seem equally applicable to the future. Some form of organized drive must always be necessary, and the main scope for improvement appears to lie in quickening up this operation, and reducing the large number of troops which in the past have been required.

If this is to be done, three things will be essential: firstly, to ensure that rapid information is received of hostile movements; secondly, to provide continuous means of inter-communication between detachments; and, thirdly, to bestow a high degree of mobility on striking columns.

A great deal must depend on the liaison maintained between the civil and military authorities in time of peace, particularly as regards the judicious improvement of communications, and the maintenance of an efficient intelligence system. This latter necessitates the pooling of resources, and a high degree of friendly co-operation. In order to facilitate troop movements in time of emergency, a pool of light cross-country vehicles, such as those recently tried out in the Sudan, should be available in the country. In view of the probable armament of the opposition, the provision of detachable armoured plates would enable this M. T. to be used for patrolling, and even offensive action. In this connection it is interesting to note that a few old armoured cars were tried out in East Africa. Although they proved too heavy

for rough work, they showed that they could deal most effectively with road ambushes in thick bush.

As regards the problem of inter-communication, the only practicable solution lies in the provision of wireless sets on an adequate scale. There is a widespread belief that wireless is of little use in thickly wooded countries, but this is not borne out by experience. In the Hereros rising of over 30 years ago the Germans maintained communication between columns operating in dense bush up to distances of 150 kilometres. Incidentally they showed considerable technical ingenuity by raising their aerials, or "antennæ" as they were then called, above the level of the trees by means of small balloons. In the Burma Rebellion entirely reliable communication was established by day, up to 150 miles in areas where hill ranges did not intervene.

The effectiveness of air-craft for reconnaissance purposes has hitherto been limited by the paucity of landing grounds and the difficulty of observation at flying speeds in close country. It is suggested that these difficulties could largely be overcome by the new C. 30 type of autogiro. This machine could operate from small clearings and hover over suspected areas. An autogiro's wireless, operating at heights superior to ground interference, would be a valuable addition to communications in the field. Moreover, it could, if opportunity arose, be used to call up fighting air-craft for offensive action.

As these suggestions indicate, modern equipment might do much to overcome the tactical difficulties imposed by the terrain. Furthermore, cross-country vehicles, wireless and autogiros can be put to a variety of peace-time uses in undeveloped countries. In any case, from the financial point of view their cost would only amount to a small additional insurance premium against the enormous expenses of quelling internal trouble. The Burma Rebellion increased normal expenditure under one civil head alone by over £160,000.

Before dismissing the subject of wars of pacification, further reference must be made to the relations between the civil and military authorities, for the majority of such wars have been fought, in part or in whole, in aid of the civil power. Mention has already been made of the grave consequences which may arise from lack of liaison. History indicates that by far the most satisfactory results are obtained when Government delineates a definite area of Army responsibility within which the military commander exercises supreme control.

Wolseley's Ashanti Campaign was an outstanding instance, for the Cabinet gave him absolute authority not only beyond, but within the civil frontiers of the Gold Coast. Such a counsel of perfection has been rare—unfortunately so, for it was the keynote of Wolseley's success.

Apart from such questions of high policy, liaison with the Civi closely concerns individual officers during the subjugation of forest countries. Operations centre round the townships and villages, in which are located the great bulk of the population. Column and post commanders have thus frequent dealings with headmen and other minor officials. Furthermore, area commanders are in constant touch with local administrators who, as is natural in view of their responsibilities, have a marked tendency towards interference in the tactical dispositions of troops. Errors in the disposal of a force cannot readily be rectified in undeveloped areas, where cross-country movement may be impossible. In order that injudicious demands may be successfully resisted, it is thus most necessary that officers should have a thorough grasp of the civil organization and political situation within their districts. While space precludes further discussion of this subject, its importance can hardly be over-emphasized. It will be found that Sir Charles Crosthwaite has dealt very fully with certain aspects of the problem in his book on the pacification of Burma.

As military operations, wars of invasion have been more straightforward than wars of pacification, but their strategy has followed much more divergent lines. In his invasion of Ashanti, for example, Wolseley correctly based his plan of campaign on the belief that the enemy would mass to resist a direct threat to their capital. In East Africa the problem was entirely different though, after Tanga, an attempt was made to solve it on similar lines. As might have been anticipated, Von Lettow was far too astute a commander to allow himself to be pinned to the defence of fixed positions. and his guerilla tactics called for nothing less than the systematic subjugation of the whole country. A little clear-thinking as to what this entailed might have prevented a campaign which was, from the point of view of world strategy, the least justifiable and most damaging " side-show " of the Great War. To the German higher command, East Africa was a heaven-sent diversion.

The strategy of wars of invasion, differing as it has in accordance with the characteristics and objectives of the enemy, is too vast a subject for detailed consideration here. An attempt has, however, been made to embody their main lessons in a general summary of the strategical principles of forest wars.

Firstly, the enemy are difficult to locate, and prone to purely harassing tactics. A commander must therefore decide, at the outset of the campaign, on the localities or material which are vital to hostile interests, so that the enemy must either collect and fight in their defence, or open themselves to being systematically starved into submission.

Secondly, in operations which entail the subjugation of a large tract of country, a commander must guard against the common tendency to under-estimate the number of troops, he will require.

Thirdly, offensive action must be the keynote of all operations. Withdrawals, over-caution and delay are interpreted as signs of weakness. Opportunities to strike a decisive blow are fleeting and any hesitation spells failure.

Fourthly, assumptions as to the absence of the enemy are fatal, and reconnaissance must always be pushed out to the furthest limit that prudence permits.

Fifthly, the moral effect of surprise cannot be exaggerated, but the facilities which the terrain offers to the free movement of enemy scouts and spies makes it most difficult of attainment. In order to create a situation for which the enemy is unprepared, a commander must possess a highly organized intelligence service, and observe secrecy to an extent which would ordinarily be considered excessive. The superior advantages usually held by the enemy in obtaining information can often be turned against them by the skilful dissemination of false intelligence.

Lastly, the degree of mobility and powers of concentration of a force depend on the suitability of its organization. No scheme of operations can succeed which is not based on a sound administrative plan.

TACTICS.

When all is said and done, however, forest wars have been described as " subaltern's wars," and the description is not inapt. A

commander must disperse his force from sheer lack of space, if for no other reason, and the successful execution of his plans consequently depends on the initiative of junior leaders and of the troops themselves.

On the necessity for training in forest tactics all authorities are unanimous. While Callwell soberly remarks that "experience of wood fighting . . . goes to show that even with the best of regular troops the men are liable to get out of hand," another writer has it that untrained units are "at first almost helpless in the jungles of Africa, India or Burma. Even intelligent and well read officers find the problems of bush fighting novel and bewildering."[1] Colonel Deneys Reitz simply says that "in bush fighting ordinary rules do not apply."

Fighting in dense forest is rather like fighting at night, and has the same psychological effect on the untrained man. There is the same uncanny stillness, the same absence of landmarks, and the same feeling of being watched at close quarters by invisible eyes. Even at mid-day it is dim under the trees, and at other times gloomy and almost dark.

Again, when things happen in the forest, they generally happen suddenly. A column marching along a jungle path may have its transport suddenly fired on by hidden enemy who have evaded the flankers. For a trained column the correct action is simple. Two previously detailed parties, marching in front and rear of the transport, force their way into the jungle with the object of surrounding the enemy and cutting off his retreat. The transport, meanwhile, clears the path, as far as may be possible, on the opposite side from the enemy; the baggage guard faces the enemy, and combines its protective rôle with that of a "stop." Firing is, of course, prohibited unless there happens to be a clear prospect.[2] The point to be emphasized is that this action must be instantaneous, for no jungle enemy worth his salt fires from ambush without first planning a quick getaway. If he brings off his *coup* unmolested, the news soon gets round, and the column is in for trouble. It can hardly be expected that an untrained column will have a plan ready to meet such an emergency, or even if

[1] "Jungle and River Warfare." Casserley.
[2] This means of dealing with an ambush was first suggested by Lord Roberts.

it has, that those on the spot will be capable of putting it into instant execution.

Yet, in expressing the opinion that training in forest tactics is essential, it must not be overlooked that such training must be carried out under conditions calculated to give officers and men the right "atmosphere." To do so at Home is admittedly not easy, for in most training areas troops are prohibited from entering woods. Nevertheless, wooded areas do exist on Crown Lands—those behind Sandhurst are an example—and if training in forest tactics were considered desirable it seems possible that the necessary arrangements might be made in most Commands. In overseas stations training areas may either be non-existent or there may be too many of them. The difficulty in countries such as Malaya or Burma is to find any clear space in which troops can deploy.

The conclusion appears to be that facilities for training are available, or could be made available, for a considerable proportion of units during the course of their Home or Foreign tours. In the case of units stationed in countries where forest fighting may occur, there can seldom, if ever, be any difficulty.

The question then arises as to whether the study and practice of forest tactics can materially contribute towards the general training of the Army for war. In this respect, history shows that the woodland and forest fighting of the American wars considerably influenced the evolution of modern tactics. Encounters with scattered sharpshooters taught the British the use of natural cover and the value of loose and flexible formations, while the need for individual marksmanship revolutionized musketry and led to the introduction of the rifle. From these beginnings Light Infantry tactics gradually emerged, culminating in the publication, in 1798, of "Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen and Light Infantry and Instructions for their Conduct in the Field."[1] This was the genesis of the famous Light Division of the Peninsular, and of Sir John Moore's system of training, which high authority recently suggested as a valuable subject for modern study.

While for this reason the American Wars are probably of unique general interest, the fundamental value to be derived from the study and practice of all forest tactics is much the same. In peace time

[1] Written by the Officer Commanding, the 5th Bn. (Rifles), 60th Royal Americans.

training in open country an umpire, even if trebly blessed with activity, imagination, and a sufficiency of screens, cannot prevent many consultations which would be impossible in war. Trees make a more natural and more effective barrier. By cutting off communications they throw individuals on to their own resources, and so foster the initiative and self-reliance so necessary in the modern soldier. This can best be illustrated by the following suggestions for simple training exercises.

Exercise 1.—Riflemen advancing through a belt of woodland are confronted by a succession of surprise targets.

Remarks.—This teaches men to keep their wits about them and quickens up snap-shooting under realistic conditions.

Exercise 2.—Lewis Gun sections advancing along a forest path are suddenly fired on.

Remarks.—Again a quickening up exercise which teaches section commanders to grasp a fleeting opportunity.

Exercise 3.—Patrols are sent out to report on definite localities in, or beyond, a tract of forest.

Remarks.—This is a practical test of map and compass reading. It also throws a considerable degree of personal responsibility and strain on to the patrol commander if the intervening country is, as it should be, occupied by "enemy."

Exercise 4.—Company or platoon columns march through wooded country in which ambushes have been staged.

Remarks.—As explained earlier in the article, this teaches both officers and men to think ahead and act immediately in an emergency with the minimum of orders. A well staged exercise resolves itself into a battle of wits with the "enemy," which keeps interest at a high pitch.

Exercise 5.—A company or platoon attack on a forest village, or similar objective.

Remarks.—This is a particularly valuable exercise for commanders. In particular, it tests the soundness of initial orders, and illustrates the difficulty of control and communication once troops have been committed to battle.

An important point about these exercises is that they hold the interest of the troops, especially if the "enemy" put up a realistic

performance. This in practice they nearly always do, owing to the soldier's love of playing a part. Before leaving this subject of training it is worth mentioning an objection sometimes made to practising forest tactics. It is that officers find it impossible personally to supervise more than a fraction of the work of their commands. This of course is just the reason which makes such exercises valuable for general training for war, and an essential preparation for forest fighting itself.

CONCLUSIONS.

Forest wars have been numerous in the past, and it is conceivable that they may be equally numerous in the future. Since the Empire has ceased to expand, wars of conquest are less probable, but differences on our frontiers are still likely to arise. Again in many of the forest lands of Asia and Africa this is an age of political advancement. Relief from the growing pains of progress is apt to be sought in political strife, in which British troops may be called upon, as often in the past, to arbitrate between the contestants. In the event of another Great War arising the lesson of East Africa must not be forgotten. Large areas of our Empire are covered with forests—they have been added to since the late war—and they are by no means the least important parts. Nor are they isolated from the influence of other Great Powers who might well seek to make diversions as profitable as was that in East Africa. The possibilities of propaganda increase the potential danger. This form of attack was not overlooked by our late enemies. At least one rebellion of a forest people in 1914 can be attributed to their agencies.

The forest wars of the future, unlike those of the past, will be fought in the limelight. There is now no part of the world so inaccessible that the gap cannot be bridged by wireless. The days of easy-going finance are over. Public opinion will insist on operations being finished quickly and economically. This can only be made possible by considerable specialized study, and some training, in time of peace. The benefits derived from such study and training would not be confined to forest wars alone.

WADHGAON

By D. Kincaid.

The Wadhgaon campaign ended in the most peculiar and disgraceful reverse that ever attended British arms in India. Apart from this unenviable singularity it is worth a moment's study as an almost perfect object-lesson in how not to conduct a campaign.

A few historical facts are necessary as a background to that disastrous expedition. From the earliest days of the English establishments in Surat and Bombay the Company's neighbours in Western India had been the Marathas. The national Maratha monarchy was, after the death of King Shahu, eclipsed by the power of the Brahman mayors of the palace, called the Peshwas, who confined the king in Satara fort and themselves assumed the headship of the Maratha confederacy. The Bombay Government had for long been irked by the proximity of the Maratha power which effectively barred their expansion inland; and they envied the easy successes of Bengal and Madras. When, therefore, a claimant to the position of Peshwa, by name Raghunath, begged for English help in return for large territorial concessions, the Bombay Government eagerly agreed. Unfortunately this Raghunath was a peculiarly unsuitable candidate. He had caused the last Peshwa to be murdered and his offer of Maratha territory in return for foreign aid did not increase his popularity among his countrymen. On the other hand the virtual head of the Maratha Government, the Regent Nana Phadnavis, was both popular and extremely able. The Bombay Government, however, seem to have considered none of the difficulties of their policy; and though the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, angrily forbade the proposed "wild and precipitate expedition" they ignored his order and on November 22, 1878, sent six companies of sepoys and some light artillery to force the passage of the Bhor Ghat.

Then, as now, the road to Poona, the Maratha capital, ran east from Bombay to Khandala and then turned southwards through a wide valley enclosed by rolling hills. The Maratha government appear to have been taken by surprise and made no serious attempt to contest the passage of the Ghats, and the advance party of the Bombay army reached Khandala at the head of the Ghats without any trouble. On the way they passed through a tiny village called

Venegaon: and the priest, Madhav Bhat, must have come out of his champak-shaded temple to stare at them. He was a young man and it was probably his first sight of Europeans. But his son, Dhondu, was to know them better, for he would one day be the Nana Saheb of the Mutiny.

Encamped at Khandala the English officers must have revelled in the cool air of mist-wreathed uplands after the damp heat of the sub-ghat country. The rains were but recently over and the hills green and many wild flowers in bloom. They were but two days' march from the Maratha capital and the most difficult part of the campaign was already over. Moreover their commander was a young captain who was famous in Western India for his bravery and leadership. He was James Stewart, the only foreigner who has ever been awarded the Maratha title of Pakde or "hero." To him and his officers the expedition must have seemed a pleasant military promenade, and they wrote to Bombay in the highest spirits reporting that they had easily beaten off the attempts of the Marathas to dislodge them from their fortified camp.

On December 13 the main army arrived at Khandala and Colonel Egerton took over command from Stewart. The British force was now composed of 3,300 sepoys and 591 European soldiers. They were accompanied by 4,000 Maratha troops whom their ally, the claimant to the Peshwai, had rallied to his standard. Had this army at once marched on Poona there is no doubt whatever but that the enemy's capital would have been occupied without a battle. Indeed, the Maratha regent had already given orders for the evacuation of Poona. Of course it is easy enough now to see that the occupation of Poona would have been of little value and that its capture would no more have ended the war than Napoleon's capture of Moscow ended his war with Alexander. But this was a problem inherent in the policy of intervention adopted by the Bombay Government. Egerton's orders were to occupy Poona, where it was believed a number of the pretender Raghunath's supporters would declare for him. Now Poona was only two days' march from Khandala and should have been occupied almost at once. Egerton, however, while boasting in his reports of anticipating an early victory, only advanced eight miles in eleven days. There were no enemy forces opposing him except a few snipers and bands of irregular cavalry who were easily swept aside. On January 4th the Bombay

army arrived at Karla (well known to-day for its Buddhist caves) and there engaged with an inferior Maratha force which was driven back. During the engagement, however, the one British officer of intelligence and energy with the expedition was killed. Stewart had climbed a tree to reconnoitre the enemy's position when he was recognised by the Marathas who greeted him with a cordial "Shabash." The next moment they trained their guns on the tree and blew him and tree away.

At that moment the Regent Nana was holding a council of war in the Saturday Palace at Poona. The boy-Peshwa lay sleeping on a sofa in a corner of the room, undisturbed by the anxious consultations of the ministers. Outside, carts filled with refugees from the country rattled past over the cobbled streets. Servants hurried down the long corridors of the palace piling up straw and dry wood along the walls; for it had been resolved to fire all the buildings when the capital was evacuated. During their discussions the ministers mentioned the name of Stewart as a resolute and brave commander. On hearing his name the boy-prince awoke and said "That Englishman is dead" for he had just then seen Stewart's death in a dream the very moment it occurred. The Regent was so much heartened by this curious instance of telepathy that he countermanded the preparations for evacuation of the capital and resolved to offer battle.

The English army was still advancing at the glorious speed of three-quarters of a mile a day, and on the 9th it reached Talegaon. There they found the village in flames and a Maratha army of about 9,000 men drawn up for battle. The numbers on both sides were about equal, but Egerton declined an engagement. Apparently, he was alarmed by a report that the Marathas were expecting reinforcements and that a considerable force was concentrating at Poona. This was true; but one would have thought that his obvious course was to attack before the reinforcements reached the forces opposing him. Instead of this he remained for two days motionless behind Talegaon. Then he became frightened that his supplies would fail, though, as was afterwards realised, he had sufficient supplies for all ordinary purposes. On the other hand, he had made no attempt to secure his communications and a Maratha army, marching over the hills to his right, dropped to the sea coast plain and lay across the Bombay road in his rear. On the 11th, though no reinforcements

had yet reached the Maratha forces facing him at Talegaon, he suddenly decided to retire and threw all his artillery and 2,000 muskets into Talegaon Lake. Such a retreat through a valley, in hostile country, was a hazardous enterprise, but could have been successfully carried out had Egerton moved with ordinary speed. But his retreat was as leisurely as his advance. In two days he only covered five miles. The hills were now alive with irregular cavalry who emerged out of the shadows of the great basalt rocks, swept over the yellow spear-grass and dashed on to the rear of the straggling army.

On the 13th Egerton stopped at Wadhgaon and offered to surrender. A member of the Bombay civil service by name Holmes, was sent as plenipotentiary and he agreed to the most extraordinary treaty. The Bombay Government was to hand over to the Marathas all their recent acquisitions and pay an indemnity of Rs. 40,000. In addition the Marathas were modern enough to anticipate the Versailles peacemakers and to insist on a detailed confession of war-guilt. It is some satisfaction to record that all the officers who were parties to this treaty were dismissed on their return to Bombay.

Egerton and his surrender are both forgotten to-day. Yet, but for the fact that Warren Hastings was then Governor-General, Egerton might have enjoyed a melancholy celebrity equal to that of Burgoyne whose surrender in not very dissimilar circumstances at Saratoga in the previous year had doomed British rule in the thirteen colonies.

THE WRONG SPIRIT IN ARMY SPORT

By "Nike."

The purpose of this article is to plead for a recovery of our sense of proportion in regard to Army Sport. We seem to be in some danger of losing it, especially over competitions. Is it not time we asked ourselves whether games are still being played in the traditional spirit and to the benefit of both the Army and the Individual?

Sport plays such a large part in the life of most units that this question is of some importance and should be seriously considered. A number of us have heard ugly words like "cup-hunting" and "professionalism" applied to competitive tournaments. Up to a few years ago, such expressions would have been met with an angry denial. The accusations would have been false and unjust. To-day we must regretfully acknowledge that they contain an element of truth. There is creeping into Army Sport a spirit at variance with its traditions; those excellent traditions of true sportsmanship, team work and friendly rivalry.

Ever since the War the worship of sport has been an outstanding feature in most civilised countries. The Press has devoted enormous space and energy to the description of games, players, and the crowds that watch them. The grotesque stories of international contests leave many of us wondering what relation these much-advertised fixtures bear to true sport. We have been given graphic accounts of the private lives of "star" performers, even to details of what they eat and what they wear, what they think about and how they spend their spare time. If we chose to read it all, we should know far more about these people than we are ever likely to know about such national figures as the Prime Minister or the Commander-in-Chief. The head of a large business firm in Calcutta recently told the writer that after the War many big firms started recruiting athletes to the exclusion of other material. To be a 'Varsity Blue meant almost certain engagement. Business was sacrificed to sport. Now very few of these men are left. The firms found that expert athletes did not necessarily make good business men and that the sports arena could not replace the workshop or the office as a place of apprenticeship.

Is it reasonable to expect that the Army should have escaped this virus of Sport Worship ? Far from having escaped, here are four instances to show how the virus is being absorbed in India :—

(1) There are Units which give special or accelerated promotion to their expert athletes. Many of these men being good sportsmen make good leaders. But some of them are merely mechanical athletes and acknowledged as useless N. C. Os. Their promotion is given them to keep them contented and to retain their services for competitive sport purposes.

(2) There are Indian Units which specially enlist outstanding athletes from Universities and Schools, demand from them little or no military service, and feed and train them like gladiators for the annual orgy of competitive tournaments.

(3) There are Units which if military training coincides with athletic training will excuse the former so that intensive training for competitions shall not be interrupted.

(4) There is a large Military District in India which calls its Sports Championship Cup " The Best Unit Cup." This is presented annually to the Unit gaining the most points in various sports competitions. The winning Unit can walk about for one year calling itself the Best Unit in that District. From the point of view of military efficiency, it may or may not be the best Unit. No test of military efficiency is included in the rules of the Cup.

No sensible person will deny the importance of sport. In the Service we believe in and acknowledge the benefit of games on the moral and physical training of the soldier. From the day he enlists he is rightly encouraged to play those games which bring out the military attributes of courage, physical fitness, self-control, unselfishness, and team spirit. We all know about Waterloo having been won on the playing fields of Eton, and we firmly believe in the real truth which underlies that seemingly exaggerated statement. But it has not been on the prowess of the individual player but on the spirit of the playing fields that we have always prided ourselves as a nation. To play games hard and keenly was what mattered. To excel at games was a heaven-born gift. And nowhere was the true spirit more in evidence than in Army Sport. Is there not now some danger of its decline ? Have we not begun to lionize and encourage the star performer at the expense of the ordinary man who plays his games for recreation and

pleasure ? Is not most of our energy and money expended on the " stars " (hateful word) who may bring us back cups and help to raise our Unit's " sporting " reputation ?

There may be some who see no harm in this. Let us then observe the effect of it on competitive tournaments and within Units.

Annually at big District Meetings are collected hundreds of highly trained athletes under (in most cases) splendidly organised conditions. Many of these men have been struck off duties for weeks and sometimes months before the competitions start in order to train for the high standard required. It is no good saying this is against the rules. It happens because some Units refuse to play the game, and the rest, or most of the rest, can only compete against them by thus juggling with the rules. Then when the teams meet in the various games and athletic events, is there that friendly rivalry which always used to exist ? Unfortunately not always. Quite often now-a-days there is suspicion, distrust, and active hostility towards opponents. The Competition Hound is abroad ! The Cups are at stake ! Gone is the spirit of the playing fields and in its place has crept a new thing which we have always associated with the worst features of professionalism. Sometimes games are rough and end in violent abuse. See some of the competitors examining and criticising the cups and medals, and hear some of the winners and runners-up grumbling if each individual does not get a prize. Such behaviour is still rare, though unfortunately less rare in civilian tournaments for which military teams often enter. But the very fact that it exists and is growing unchecked points to something wrong.

The financial aspect of these meetings is becoming a matter of concern, and is bound up in the whole question of competitive sport. Few Districts in India are able to repay all the travelling expenses of outstation teams. Indian Units are not wealthy, but every year there comes a large bill on account of these competitions. Items such as extra feeding, clothing, gear, and part or whole of the travelling expenses to Brigade and District Meetings have all got to be met. Everyone is out-of-pocket, including the competitors who, if they are Indians, now consider it necessary to dress themselves up in special mufti befitting gladiators about to perform before the crowd. Many British Units also complain of their heavy sports expenses. With all this expenditure perhaps it is not to be wondered that Units are

anxious to get their money's worth, and strain every nerve to bring back the coveted trophies.

Now let us see the effect of all this within the Unit. Take Commanding Officers. There are a few who will no longer allow their Units to take part in these competitions either because they disapprove of the present atmosphere or on the grounds of expense. Most C. Os., however, feel it is up to them to support these meetings. A small number of them are so impressed with the importance of sport that they consider the efficiency of their Unit in the eyes of those above them, and their own professional future, lies almost as much in the sports arena as on the barrack square or in the field. This type of C. O. is always on the look out for new athletic blood, and cases are not unknown where excellent Unattached List material has been refused a vacancy because the applicant's games were not up to a sufficiently high standard. Such Commanding Officers are rare, but they must bear a large share of responsibility for the growth of the wrong spirit in Army Sport.

Amongst British Officers the effect is noticeable. There are now so many branches of competitive sport; the training for tournaments is so intense, and the standard so high, that many officers spend all their spare time and more in coaching Unit teams instead of playing ordinary games with their own more ordinary men as they used to do. The younger generation which has been brought up in this new atmosphere is apt to treat games as parades, and not infrequently they overwork and overtrain their teams. These same officers continue to play their own games of polo, cricket, tennis, golf, etc., in the traditional spirit, but as soon as they are charged with the training of Unit teams they seem to lose their sense of proportion.

As for the men. Here are remarks recently made by two Indian Officers of different units. Subadar-Major "A":—"Games used to be played for pleasure and we all thoroughly enjoyed them. Now they have become hard work and there is very little enjoyment." Subadar "B" (not very well educated!):—"It is time the conditions of service were changed. Instead of asking the recruit to serve so long with the Colours and so long with the Reserve, he should now be asked 'Will you promise to try and run a hundred yards in ten seconds?'"

So much for the disease. There may be readers of this article who consider that the facts quoted above are isolated incidents. The

writer naturally does not intend for a moment to accuse all those who are keen on sport or "cup-hunting" and "professionalism." He knows there are dozens of first rate Units who treat sport at its proper value, and who can produce splendid teams which play the game and win competitions without any extra special training, or special recruitment, or any other special trick. But he submits that there is an increasing number of Units which do not abide either by the spirit of Army Sport or by the A. S. C. B. rules. It is against them and the spirit they are inculcating that this article is directed. To clear himself of the charge of ignorant criticism, may the writer say that he has served on Brigade, District, Command, and A. S. C. B. Sports Committees, and for some years was in charge of large District Tournaments and Meetings. He speaks, therefore, from a fairly wide experience. And he knows, from talking to others, that there are many who are equally anxious to cut out this canker from Army Sport.

Why are so many Indian Units, qualified by reason of their composition or designation to compete in "private" tournaments such as the Punjab Native Army Hockey, Frontier Force, Gurkha Brigade Cup, etc., so much keener on them than on the average Army Meeting? Because up-to-date those tournaments have tried to preserve the true sporting atmosphere and friendly rivalry, which is growing rarer in Official Army Competitions.

What is the remedy? First and foremost let us recapture our sense of proportion. Let us continue to acknowledge the importance of games, but cease to make a fetish of them. Encourage and train the good player, but do not make a hero of him. Games are intended for recreation and should not be treated otherwise. To treat them as work and to extol those who happen to excel at them, as if they were the champions of military efficiency, is to ask for professionalism in Army Sport.

It is not suggested that competitive sport be discontinued. Friendly rivalry is an excellent thing and raises the standard of games. But if the proper spirit is to be preserved, it is essential that those responsible should deal ruthlessly with any Unit or team which fails to abide by the existing rules. A Unit found enlisting and paying "hired gladiators," striking men off duty for prolonged periods to train, or behaving in an unsporting manner, should be disqualified without warning and their names published in Army Orders.

And within Units let there be a little less intensity and a good deal more enjoyment in their games. Let them recapture the "Spirit of the Playing Fields" and take their chance in competitions, treating such as sporting and not business contests. While aiming at a high standard let us leave record breaking to professional and Olympic "Stars," whose object in life it is.

If we can bring the transgressors to a change of heart and methods, we shall restore the traditional spirit of Army Sport. There is yet time, but only if the disease is treated before it spreads.

THE FOREIGN LEGION

By Captain J. A. Codrington, Coldstream Guards.

Early in 1930 I did an attachment to the French Army in North Africa. As I had already come in contact with the Foreign Legion in Syria, General Naulin, who then commanded the 19th Corps in Algeria, was kind enough in addition to allow me the privilege of staying with them at their depot at Sidi Bel Abbès for a few days.

First let me say that nothing could have been kinder and more friendly than the officers of the Foreign Legion, from their famous Colonel (now General) Rollet downwards, in showing me everything I wanted to see, and explaining everything I asked about. Even when I told them candidly of my wanderings in the evenings "*incognito*" in plain clothes round the public houses, etc., in the back streets, where I talked and drank with Legionnaires of various nationalities (including English), they accepted the fact calmly and generously, and did not attempt to discourage me from getting to know the men at first hand.

It stands to reason that a short tour at any depot is not sufficient to know a regiment properly; and to judge it one should see it not only on parade but in hard conditions on service. One ought not to judge the Legion only by its depot at Sidi Bel Abbès, and I should much like one day to meet the Legion again in the "bled." Nevertheless, I heard and saw enough to be able to correct some, at any rate, of the false, and one might almost say, libellous, impressions that are so prevalent in England; but I readily admit that to know the Legion properly and to speak with authority one must have been a Legionary, or, anyhow, have been with it under service conditions.

Ever since its formation, in 1831, the Foreign Legion has added more and more glorious feats of arms to its list of battle honours. It is safe to say that no corps of any army has known such a continuous list of desperate fighting, often under dreadful climatic conditions; and never has the Legion been known to fail in its task. *La Légion sait mourir.* Besides the numerous engagements during the conquest of Algeria, the Legion took part in the expedition to Mexico in 1863, where the battle of Camerone is its most famous

engagement. The conquest of Tongking owes much to it, and the siege of Tuyen Quan, in 1885, was a magnificent episode in its history. The history of the Legion is seen in detail in the *Salle d'Honneur* at Bel Abbès, which is really a museum where the relics of its numerous campaigns are piously kept.

At first the Legion consisted of companies of different nationalities, but it was found that it worked much better when the nationalities were broken up as far as possible. Its strength has varied ; in 1930 it amounted to about 20,000 men, most of whom have received their initial training at Sidi Bel Abbès.

After reading most of the books on the Foreign Legion, one gets the idea—I did, anyhow—that every legionary was a desperate cut-throat and black-guard, and probably " wanted " for murder, fraud, or robbery in his own country, and that Sidi Bel Abbès and its barracks was an absolute hell upon earth—a sort of glorified blockhouse miles from civilization, with nothing of any sort that could contribute even to the rudiments of comfort. Neither of these impressions is correct. Certainly there *are* black-guards, and certainly Bel Abbès is not Paris. I should think, however, that the average legionary enlists either purely for adventure, or because some love affair has gone wrong, or because an irate father has kicked him out of the house. Petty pilfering, or fraud committed in a moment of weakness or mental strain, may easily send a man in fear or remorse to the nearest French recruiting depot. For every two or three " bad hats " there are probably ten to twenty perfectly honest and reliable soldiers. Among the 20,000 men in the ranks of the Legion there are experts of nearly every profession. There are plumbers and priests, jewellers and joiners, musicians and miners, dentists and dramatists, bankers and burglars, and all are welded together by discipline and a strange comradeship of arms, and a feeling that the world up to now has dealt unkindly with almost all of them in some way or another.

Built by the Legion, Sidi Bel Abbès has been its home ever since it began. It is a square, dull, military garrison town, surrounded with ramparts. Though not a brilliant centre of social activity and amusement, it has many cafés, bars, and less respectable establishments ; a few hotels and restaurants ; trees, and a shady public garden ; a square and a church ; shops, cinemas and a dance hall. True, it is pretty hot in summer, but there is a compulsory siesta through the

middle of the day. The barracks consist of three blocks which enclose a parade ground with trees in it. Here it is that recruits first come to, and pass through their preliminary—and pretty energetic—training. Here legionaries come between different postings (*e.g.*, from Morocco to Syria or Tongking), and here, at the end of their period of service —that is to say five years—they come and are given a suit of plain clothes and are dismissed. Some re-enlist straight away for another five years; some re-enlist for less, in order to go to Tongking, while naturally some are only too thankful to go. Many even of the latter come back after a little time in civilian life.

In the barracks is a cinema, and the men have a library containing books and papers in every language, including English, and a writing room. The canteen (*Foyer du Légionnaire*) is a long room with little tables and a bar, where cakes, coffee, tea and non-alcoholic beer are sold. This room certainly seemed a bit small, but in fine weather there are little tables outside, like a French café. All these arrangements, while not so luxurious as in our own modern barracks, are far better than those in most other French barracks. There are shower baths and a long trough where the men have to wash their own clothes. Here again, the accommodation is becoming decidedly inadequate, for the barracks were built a long time ago when the Legion was much smaller, and washing, either of clothes or persons, was of less account. "Washing day" is a crowded affair, and I should think is an admirable opportunity for some of the cunning ones to increase their wardrobe.

The sergeants' mess is well run, and clean and airy; it is more spacious than some of our own. It consists of a library and a reading room, a series of mess-rooms (warrant officers and sergeants' mess in separate rooms), and a café with tables and a bar. In the N.C.Os' messes the nationalities are purposely mixed up, and French has to be spoken there, and on all official occasions. The N.C.Os. are often fierce, but this fierceness is common to the N.C.Os. of most depots. The sergeants' bunks are far bigger and more comfortable than those in the average British barracks. No sergeants sleep in the barrack rooms, which are each in charge of a corporal. The barrack rooms are kept very clean and tidy, even before afternoon parades. The beds, however, are very much closer together than in the case with us, and the rifles are kept in a rack at the end of the room. A legionary's meals, which he eats in his barrack room, are very different from those of a British soldier, but are much the same as those of most continental

armies, *i.e.*, a cup of coffee on getting up, *La soupe* at 10-30 (soup, meat, vegetables and wine), supper at 5-30 (meat and vegetables). In barracks it is generally very good.

Life at Bel Abbès is not one of ease and idleness. In the French Army there are no half holidays. Reveillé was at 6-30 a.m. when I was there (winter hours), and the legionaries are on the go most of the day. Their scheme of instruction for recruits is more or less run on the same lines as most British depots. Marches and physical training are carried out progressively—the weight of the equipment and the length of the marches increasing gradually up to about twenty-five miles; this is interspersed with weapon training and the range. I watched a squad of recruits being instructed in machine gun training by a Hungarian sergeant in bad French. His instruction was repeated in bad German by a Czechoslovak corporal. How a Greek, Spanish or English recruit understood I have no idea; *Ils se débrouillent* was the only explanation the officers gave me!

The proportion of nationalities is interesting. Far the greatest percentage is German, then Belgian or Swiss (many of these actually French), then Russian, French, and Central European, and a sprinkling of British and American. The question of the British in the Legion is one that still excites the English Press to a frenzy. General Rollet estimated the number of Britishers to be about 100 at the most. (This, it must be remembered, is in a force of some 20,000.) Naturally, they are, as a rule, far more lonely and therefore unhappy, than the men of other nations, for, on arrival, they probably will not find a single soul who speaks their language. I met several at Bel Abbès; they seem, on the whole more or less contented, or anyhow resigned, with the usual grouses without which no British soldier can be said to exist, wherever he is, but they feel a sort of isolation. There is no doubt that the British are very often failures in the Legion, and are—generally quite rightly—mistrusted by the authorities. I have often been asked, both by Englishmen and Frenchmen, why so few good men of British blood enlist, and I think it is due to four main causes:—

1. The average Englishman of all classes instinctively considers himself a superior and god-like being, on a plane above all creatures who are what he calls "ruddy foreigners." Therefore he does not like to mix with them, and still less to be ordered about by them.

2. Almost all continental nations have universal service. Barrack-room life and its ordinary annoyances, grievances and hardship is no new thing to foreigners, who all do their military service as part of growing up. The average English civilian, however, has no idea of life in barracks, nor of the rigours of military discipline of any sort.

3. The continental system of meals is so different that an Englishman would consider himself half-starved on what any continental soldier would consider quite normal diet.

4. If an Englishman has a taste for soldiering, he can voluntarily join his own, much higher paid, army; therefore, it may be supposed, the English Legionary has joined for rather special reasons.

The Legion, however, must not be judged by the tiny sprinkling of British subjects who naturally find themselves "fish out of water." One can only fairly judge the Legion by the many thousands of Germans, Russians, Swiss and Central Europeans, who make themselves happy in it, and either rise up and become N.C.Os. and perhaps officers, or who re-engage.

The strange stories that percolate to the sensational so-called popular Press, and to the House of Commons, are not worth bothering about, as they mostly come from the mouths of disgruntled deserters; moreover, when all is said and done, the French Foreign Legion is part of the French Army, and is really nothing to do with England at all. The Englishmen in it voluntarily and automatically become French citizens for the time being, and do not always warrant the fuss made by certain interfering busybodies.

The Legionaries are certainly a tough crowd. They need to be. They have to know how to look after themselves; *se débrouiller* means to fend for yourself, to "old soldier" others, to "scrounge," to "wangle" and to improvise. The Legion is no place for the feeble and helpless. *Se débrouiller* might be taken as the motto of the Legion. After the fortnightly pay day (a legionary is paid the same as a French soldier, and it is not very much) a large majority of them get drunk, and the bars and other haunts in the town become lively, and often exciting. Discipline is very strict and punishments are severe. This strictness is necessary in order to form such a mixed collection into an efficient force. Simple drunkenness is not a crime, even if a man falls in an unconscious heap at the barrack gate; the

prisons would not be big enough if it were. As is usual throughout the French Army, N.C.Os. can award punishments for small crimes, and these can be augmented by higher authority; corporal punishment is, however, strictly forbidden.

The legionaries in Bel Abbès are on the whole smart in their turn-out, and there is a full length looking-glass at the barrack gate for them to check their appearances before going out into the town. They are punctilious about saluting, and the officers are very careful to return all salutes. Nevertheless, the French do not understand leather like we do, and waistbelts do not have to be polished.

The officers come to the Legion from St. Cyr as to any other unit. It is a unit much sought after by those who have a flair for adventure and active service, and it is often the picked few at the top of the passing-out list who go there. At the same time, it is perfectly possible for foreigners who enlist in it to become N.C.Os., pass into St. Maixent, and finally to get a commission while retaining their own nationality up to the rank of Captain. As a general rule, when once an officer has served with the Legion, he never wants to serve with another corps. To lead Legionaries, an officer must have a very strong personality, and must be able to put up with hard conditions of service in many outlandish parts of the world.

In 1931 I was privileged to be invited personally to the celebrations in connection with the Centenary of the founding of the Legion at Sidi Bel Abbès. The celebrations centred round the unveiling, by the Governor of Algeria, of the Memorial to fallen Legionaries throughout the world, upon April 30th, the anniversary of the battle of Camerone in Mexico, the Legion's most famous fight.

Marshal Franchet d'Esperet made an inspiring speech, the keynote of which was that the iron discipline of the Legion had made it, throughout its history, an irresistible fighting force. It is this discipline which makes the Legion a *Corps d'élite* in every sense of the term, which has never failed in battle.

Detachments with bands, from the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Regiments (Morocco) joined with the 1st Regiment (Algeria) in the march past, and in other parts of the festivities, including a physical display of different items, by the *Equipes Sportives*. The teams—mainly composed of Germans and Scandinavians—were of magnificent physique and looked very fit; they could well compare with the bigger men in the Brigade of Guards.

What was, in a way, the most interesting thing about the celebrations was the number of ex-Legionaries present. They amounted to over 1,000, among whom were some thirty different delegations of *anciens Légionnaires* from Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, Germany and Austria, and of course, from Algeria itself, where many ex-Legionaries settle and make their homes. This reunion of "Old Comrades" speaks for itself, and requires no comment. It is a significant answer to much of the nonsense that is written about the Legion.

After his tour at the depot, a man has to do at least two years in the "bled," where he garrisons some desert post, and is ready for raids by tribesmen. After this he generally has a choice of going to Syria or Tongking, or of staying in Morocco; he may, however, manage to get some struck-off job. There are many "specialist" (which often means "cushy") jobs, among them a place in the Legion band, which is justly renowned. It contains many really first-class musicians, the majority of whom are German, Austrian and Hungarian.

On the occasion of the Centenary the band gave two admirable orchestral concerts, in which the discipline of the Legion was ever present in the precise execution of the items. There was also a *revue* of scenes from the Legion's history, and various other entertainments, which included songs and choruses by a German and by a Russian choir. The Germans continued their part of the show in a "pub" in the town, where I came upon them later in the night, drinking beer and singing songs in harmony, as they do in the Fatherland. They were certainly not "brutalised slaves and convicts, trodden down by savage and tyrannical methods," as some sensational propagandists persist in describing them.

Boring monotony is a far more accurate description of the life of most Legionaries (making roads, and garrisoning far-off posts) rather than perpetual adventures and hairbreadth escapes, such as one reads in most English tales. Anyone who thinks of joining, hoping to find himself for five years the hero of a "Threepenny Thriller," would be sadly disillusioned. It is this monotony which produces *le cafard* (an exasperated state of being "fed up," often bordering on madness).

The best (French) books on the Legion are those by Manue; in English, the only one I have read which gives a fairly accurate

picture of the life is the American book, "The Legion of the Damned," by Doty, which despite its somewhat flamboyant and uncomplimentary title, is a good book; it is, however, a description of active service in Syria, whereas the ordinary everyday life of many thousands of Legionaries would in reality be far too uneventful to weave into a saleable novel. It is the imaginative stories that Legionaries will tell you for the price of a drink that sell, and are "good copy." These stories are almost all at least partially untrue or highly coloured, and often entirely the product of alcohol and a vivid imagination.

One of the secrets of the Legion's success as a corps is the fact that officially no questions are asked of a man who joins, about himself or why he joined. He can tell lies about his age, name and nationality, and, no matter how obvious is the lie, it is hardly ever questioned by any of the authorities, on principle. A certain proportion of the Legionaries find the conditions too hard to be endurable; they cannot *se débrouiller*. They get *le cafard* and try to desert. This usually means the beginning of their real troubles, for if they are caught, fat doses of prison follow. Often attempting deserters are prompted by sheer bravado, as they hope to achieve a reputation among their comrades as dare-devils. One cannot help feeling that they have only themselves to blame if they are caught. After all, no one asked them to enlist. Anyone who is fool enough to engage on such a venture without having some sort of idea of the conditions, and then breaks his contract, can surely be allowed to submit to the consequences without much sympathy.

Why do they enlist? God alone knows (and I mean this literally, for almost everyone carries his reason secretly). One must, of course, never ask them; it would be the very last word in tactlessness. Sometimes, however, they themselves lift the veil. One of them told me quite simply that his wife, after having gone on the streets in Brussels, was now in a brothel in Antwerp; this, he considered, had permanently disarranged his home life, so he had found another in the Legion. He had just finished five years and had signed on. Love affairs that have gone wrong are responsible for producing most of the recruits, but sometimes it is the political situation in their own country that forces these men to start a new life under the French flag.

To a very large number the Legion is the only form of home they have known, and they are happy to have regular meals and to live

and forget in this strange, intense, and rough world of camaraderie, hardship and adventure.

It is the wonderful *esprit de corps* of the Legion which makes this possible. The Legionaries always stand up for one another in a scrap or brawl, no matter what nation they belong to, and it is not worth while other troops or civilians trying to interfere with the Legion when they are out on the spree. Indeed, nationality practically ceases to be ; they live—and die—not for France, but for the Legion.

INDIA—THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HORIZON.

By Captain C. B. Birdwood.

In attempting to survey the Indian political situation, it is impossible for an amateur to present the picture with photographic accuracy. For the serious student, the Government reports are available. But for others, on whom the distracting wealth of available material in the daily press may have a depressing effect, an amateur review will have its advantages.

This paper attempts little more than a very brief précis of the existing and proposed constitutions and the present political reactions in India to the latter.

To follow intelligently the issues of to-day, retrospection is necessary; and at the risk of covering some very elementary ground, we may return to the famous 1917 declaration and from that point note the subsequent constitutional landmarks.

On 20th August 1917, Mr. Montagu declared the policy of his Government to be "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible Government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." This policy was reaffirmed in the Preamble to the subsequent Government of India Act of 1919. It is to be noted that "responsible Government," a term open to a wide interpretation, was declared the goal. Dominion status had hitherto not been mentioned, though, in the Instrument of Instructions issued to the Governor-General in 1921, responsible Government in British India is the declared policy "to the end that British India may attain its place among the Dominions."

The Government of India Act 1919, gave India a constitution of which the following are the main features :—

The Centre.

1. An Executive, consisting of the Governor-General and his Executive Council of seven members, three of them being Indians.

2. A Legislature, consisting of—
   (*a*) A Council of State of 60 members, of whom 34 are elected, the balance being nominated.
   (*b*) A Legislative Assembly of 134 members, of whom 105 are elected, the balance being nominated.

The Provinces.

1. Governors, assisted by their Executive Councils of not more than 4 members and 2 ministers each.
2. Provincial Legislative Councils based on elected majorities in the Councils of at least 70 per cent.
3. Dyarchy. A dual system by which the Governor acting with the members of his Executive Council are responsible for "reserved" subjects, while "transferred" subjects are administered by the Governor acting through his ministers, the latter being elected members in the provincial Councils and thus responsible direct to the electorate for the administration of their subjects.*

The Franchise and Electorates.

In each Province, the electorates are designed to give separate representation to the various communities and interests. Thus in Bengal there are no less than seven classes of the electorate. The vexed question of separate as opposed to joint electorates based on a common electoral roll, is more conveniently treated later under consideration of the communal problem. Generally speaking, the franchise is based on a property qualification as tested by a minimum payment of either municipal or income-tax or land revenue.

For the Central Legislature the system is that of direct election. The electorate for the Council of State is on a basis of very restricted franchise designed to give that body a special character representative of men who have a definite stake in the country, such as the big land owners. For this reason, it is more conservative in its politics than its more aggressive sister, the Assembly.

The franchise for the latter is on the same basis as for the provincial Councils. But a higher electoral qualification is required. There are just over a million on the electoral roll for the Legislative Assembly as opposed to some nine millions on the provincial rolls.

* "Transferred" and "Reserved" subjects, see App. II.

Powers of the Legislature.

Under the present constitution, the Legislature's powers are of a very general nature. It can make laws for all subjects of His Majesty within India and for all Indian subjects beyond India. There are, however, certain limitations on the introduction of measures affecting the public revenues, religious matters, the discipline of the Forces and the relations of Government with the States.

The Legislature may not vote on certain classes of expenditure such as—

(1) Interest on loans.
(2) The pay of the Civil Service.
(3) Ecclesiastical, political and defence expenditure.

Defence expenditure includes nearly the whole of the Army Budget with the exception of the charges for the Civil Secretariat of the Army Department. The latter charge was reduced to one rupee by a recent vote of the Assembly and was duly reinstated in the budget by the Governor-General. No vote may be taken on the Army Budget, but it may be discussed, a privilege which is exploited always to its full interpretation.

Whatever sins of commission or omission the Legislature may perpetrate, there is always the corrective power of the Governor-General, who may either pass essential legislation in the case of failure of either Chamber to do so, or who may certify a Bill which the Legislature refuses, if the measure is essential for the "safety, tranquillity or interests of British India."

Legal implications of the present constitutions.

To appreciate the contemplated changes, an understanding of the present constitutional relationship between the Secretary of State, the Indian Executive and the Legislature is essential. In theory the present Government of India is a subordinate Government, wholly responsible to the Secretary of State and the British Parliament. In practice, the direction and control of civil and military Government in India is vested in the Governor-General with his Executive Council. Such direction and control extends to the "reserved" field in Provincial Governments. The part played by the Indian Legislature, therefore, amounts only to a considerable influence on the policy and acts of the Central Executive; and although the Legislature may initiate legislation, only in the field of "transferred" subjects in the Provinces is true responsible Government enjoyed.

From the political confusion of the post-war years, with all its contradictions, among Indians, of vested interests and true patriotic endeavour, and with obstinate conservative opposition to reform among Englishmen alongside a more liberal desire to help, a surprisingly common measure of agreement has emerged on the part played by Dyarchy in the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution. The reports of the Simon Commission and the Joint Select Committee, and Indian political opinion have all condemned it; so that, whatever the future may hold, we may take it as certain that Dyarchy, in the provincial sphere, is dead. Where major questions are concerned it has been found impossible in practice to separate the conduct of government into two halves. Provincial Councils have tended to forget their direct responsibility for the "transferred" field at the expense of remembering too well their lack of responsibility in the "reserved" field. Divided responsibility in any sphere of administration is a dead alley. And yet Dyarchy has served its purpose. For we may presume that such future extension of responsibility as is to be given to the Indian Legislature, is based on the very real service that Indian Ministers have rendered to the administration of their Provinces in the past twelve years and to the experience they have thereby gained.

The Government of India Act 1919 prescribed that within ten years a Commission should visit India to inquire into the working of the new system of Government and to report whether it should be either extended or restricted. Accordingly the Simon Commission visited India in 1928 and 1929. In India, there was much opposition because no Indian had been appointed to it. Its subsequent report was, therefore, received with vituperative hostility from political India, before its contents could possibly have been read, let alone digested. There followed the three Round Table Conferences, the publication of the White Paper and the appointment of the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament. For the present purposes, it is sufficient to treat the Report of the Joint Select Committee and the India Bill now before Parliament as one.

The New Constitution.

A very limited study of the proposed constitution leaves the reader with the general impression that, at least, its authors have done their work thoroughly. There is an iconoclastic touch in the proposals, which cut across the present system in a manner which

the most liberal-minded of English statesmen would not have contemplated a generation ago. Any précis of proposals which are covered by a Report of 280 pages and a Bill of 451 clauses, is bound to be unsatisfactory; and one can but ask the reader's indulgence for the inadequacy of the following summary:—

1. *A Federation** of Indian States and the Provinces of British India. Before the Federal Structure can be embodied, two conditions are to be fulfilled:

   (*a*) The States must nominate members sufficient to occupy half the number of seats in the Council of State.

   (*b*) The total population of the number of States federating, must represent half the total population of all the States.

2. *The Executive.*

Executive authority is vested in—

   (*a*) The Governor-General who will be responsible to the Secretary of State for the administration of defence, external affairs and ecclesiastical matters. For this task, the Governor-General is to be assisted by three Counsellors.

   (*b*) A Council of Ministers not exceeding ten, appointed by the Governor-General from elected Indian members of the Legislature who are likely to command the Legislature's confidence.

3. *The Legislature.*

   (*a*) A Council of State of 260 members, of whom 150 will be representatives of British India, 100 will be appointed by the States and ten will be nominated by the Governor-General.

4. *In the Provinces.*†

   (*a*) An Executive consisting of the Governor himself in whom is vested the whole executive power and authority of the Province, aided and advised by a Council of Ministers. The latter to be elected members of the Provincial Legislature.

* For Federal and Provincial subjects, see App. II.

† The scheme provides for 11 Governor's provinces adding Sind and Orissa and separating Burma.

(*b*) In the case of Bengal, Bombay, Madras, the United Provinces and Bihar, a bicameral Legislature consisting of the Governor, a Legislative Council and an Assembly. In the case of other Provinces, a unicameral Legislature consisting of the Governor and a Legislative Assembly.

5. *Provincial autonomy*,* and the end of Dyarchy, with an Executive responsible to the electorate for advising the Governor over practically the whole of the provincial sphere, including "Law and Order." In order to ensure that the discipline and impartiality of the Police Force may not be undermined by political influence, special "Police Rules" are to be formulated.

6. *Special responsibilities of the Governor-General.*

These are the much criticized safeguards and consist of—

(*a*) The prevention of any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India.

(*b*) Safeguarding the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government.

(*c*) Safeguarding the legitimate interests of minorities.

(*d*) Securing the rights of the Public services and safeguarding their legitimate interests.

(*e*) The necessary executive action to secure the prevention of discrimination against British subjects.

(*f*) The prevention of action which would subject goods from the United Kingdom or Burma to discriminatory or penal treatment.

(*g*) The protection of the rights of any Indian State.

(*h*) Securing that the discharge of his functions when acting in his discretion or exercising his individual judgment in the matter of his special responsibilities, is not prejudiced by any action taken with respect to any other matter.

* The J. P. C. Report defines Provincial autonomy as the Scheme whereby each of the Governor's Provinces will possess an Executive and a Legislature having exclusive authority within the province in a precisely defined sphere and in that sphere broadly free from control by the Central Government.

7. *The Federal Court.**

The establishment of a Federal Court for the general interpretation of the Constitution and for the determination of disputes between—

(*a*) The Federation and either a Province or a State.

(*b*) Two Provinces or two States, or a Province and a State.

8. *The Reserve Bank.*

The establishment of a Reserve Bank to control the credit mechanism of the country. The Bank to be free from political influence and to be in successful operation before the Constitutional changes at the centre take place.

9. *The Franchise and Electorate.*

(*a*) A greatly enlarged electorate of 29 millions; the vote extended to women and to 10 per cent. of the depressed classes. The present property qualifications remain to which are added educational qualifications.

(*b*) The substitution of the indirect system of election to the Central Legislature in place of the direct system.

General Impressions.

To the layman, intelligent comment on the changes is fraught with difficulty. There are so many angles from which the picture may be viewed. Proposals have followed each other with bewildering disparity. Thus in the matter of the franchise system, the Simon Committee recommended indirect election, the White Paper was for direct election and the Joint Parliamentary Committee and the Bill revert to the indirect method. The increased electorate alone must mean a change, for better or worse, the effect of which cannot be gauged by a mere mental note of the figures involved. It is difficult to realise that one in every ten we see in the bazars and fields of India will have the vote. In England die-hard opinion has criticized the transfer of Law and Order in the Provinces. But it is difficult, after reading the well-balanced argument of the Joint Select Committee, not to agree with their verdict that responsible Self-Government without the transfer of the power to implement their own laws and control the Police, would be a poor form of responsibility to offer the Provinces.

* The Federal Court is not for the interpretation of Acts passed by the Federal Legislature.

The heart of the whole structure, the Federal conception, has grown in a manner that illustrates only too forcibly the difficulties which lie ahead. The Simon Committee did but touch on Federation as the goal of a distant future. In 1930, previous to the first Round Table Conference, under the suave spell of Pandit Malaviya and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, the Princes were persuaded that in Federation lay the safe guarantee of their rights and privileges for many years to come. By direct association with Government at the centre, they could doubly secure their treaties and independence. At the time, Civil disobedience was at its height and there were symptoms of a genuine abdication of British power. In the obscurity that lay ahead, it would be wise to come to terms with Congress and political India.

The Indian Liberals were converted with difficulty in time for the opening session of the Conference. Finally British statesmen accepted the Federal idea. At the second Round Table Conference the National Government sought to postpone Federation, which they visualized as following Provincial autonomy at a later date. In face of the united opposition of the British Indian delegation including Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Malaviya, the Cabinet yielded and Provincial autonomy and the Federation were to be ushered in as one scheme in one Bill.

Compare this with the situation to-day. In Bombay the Princes have declared that "The scheme of Federation as adumbrated in the Government of India Bill and the Instruments of Accession are unacceptable to us without vital modifications."* Paradoxically in England, the National Government have now captured the first enthusiasm for Federation which formerly was the monopoly of the Princes and Politicians of India, while Pandit Malaviya seems to have forgotten Federation and remembers only the alleged injustice of the Communal Award. The story would be humorous, if it did not token an inconsistency and irresponsibility which does not promise well for the future.

Passing from the Federation, to matters of more detail, it seems generally to have escaped attention that Dyarchy has died in the Provinces only to be reborn at the centre ; and all the invective which previously has been lavished on its operation in one sphere, may now legitimately be transferred to another. The Counsellors in

* (These pseudo-legal difficulties have now been overcome.—Ed.)

their administration of the three "Reserved" subjects are divorced from the ministry and although the Governor-General will undoubtedly summon Counsellors on occasions to the deliberations of his Ministers, the fact remains that the machine as a whole functions in two halves.

Political India, however, is more concerned to condemn the entire scheme than to waste its time on technical details; and the administrative defects of a dyarchical system pass without criticism, while we may be certain that unremitting condemnation of the safeguards will continue to the end; and here we should conveniently turn to the Indian side of the picture and attempt an analysis of the reactions of the various parties to the new proposals.*

Indian Political opinion.

The attitude of the Liberal party to the new Constitution is confused. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru is of the opinion that, on the whole, the proposals represent an advance on the present position and he is for making the most of a bad business. Mr. Sastri admits that as a matter of academic comparison, this may be true. But he contends that the Constitution is so mutilated by the safeguards and reservations as to discount the value of any gain. Mr. Sastri's opposition has resulted in a measure of co-operation between Liberals and the Congress. The Liberal Federation has passed a resolution to the effect that it "does not want any legislation based upon the Report of the Joint Select Committee."

The Independent Party, through its spokesman Mr. Jinnah, objects to second Chambers in the Provinces and to the provisions relating to Police Rules and the Secret and Intelligence Departments, "which render real control and responsibility of Executive and Legislature ineffective." Mr. Jinnah, however, very definitely accepts the Communal Award. The party's attitude is that of critical acceptance of the proposed Provincial Constitution. It does not accept Federation with the States and advocates a British Indian Federation of the Provinces only. Mr. Jinnah has been consistent throughout in discarding an All-India Federation. But it is by no means confirmed that his views are shared by all of his party.

As is to be expected, Congress declare their complete rejection of the whole business though, within the Assembly, they have remained

* An attempt to catalogue the political parties is made in Appendix I.

neutral on the question of the Communal Award. Their constructive proposals have been limited to a demand for the formation of "a Constituent Assembly" consisting of delegates elected on the basis of universal franchise* which body is to work out a new Constitution for India. This proposal, however, has not been pressed lately. In the Council of State Rai Bahadur Lala Ram Saran Das, the leader of the Progressive party, has insisted that he prefers the existing Constitution, that the Memorandum of the British-Indian delegation to the Round Table Conference has been ignored and the time and efforts of the delegates wasted. Thus, if the India Bill had to await the declared good-will of political India, it is evident that the new Constitution would never see the light of day. But it has to be remembered that the Communal problem pervades every aspect of Indian life, including the political arena; and that, for this reason, opposition to or support of Government from any particular quarter is but a symptom of the reaction of those concerned to the Communal Award.

The Communal Problem.

The story of communal representation may be conveniently traced from the agreement known as the "Lucknow Pact." The principle of separate communal electorates had already been recognised in the Morley-Minto reforms. In October 1916, it received fresh impetus when Congress and the All-India Muslim League, both holding their Annual Conference of that year in Lucknow, came to an agreement regarding the proportion of Mohammadan seats in the Imperial Legislative Council of that time. The agreement subsequently formed the basis of Mohammadan representation embodied in the Montagu-Chelmsford Constitution of to-day.

At the Round Table Conference of 1932, in the absence of any agreement between the Indian representatives on the question of separate electorates and the distribution of seats, the Prime Minister took it upon himself to provide his own solution, having previously obtained a promise of consent from the parties concerned. It is round this settlement known as "the Communal Award" that the various party leaders have concentrated their vituperation.

The arrangements under the award by which the Depressed Classes received special representation, stirred the conscience of Mr. Gandhi

* B. Rajendra Prasad in the *Manchester Guardian.*

who held that an artificial barrier within the Hindu community had thereby been erected. His subsequent "fast into death" to obtain agreement between the two elements was derided by hard-headed Westerners as a touch of theatrical madness. Nevertheless, it had the desired effect and Mr. Gandhi's "Poona Pact" was embodied within the Communal Award.

At the moment, the attitude to the Communal Award is confused. Outside the Assembly, Pandit Malaviya has vehemently declared that there can be no Swaraj based on separate electorates, that the award gives excessive representation to Muslims and that it is a device of British statesmen to create obstacles to Indian unity. Anti-Communal Award days have been organised by the Hindu Sabha in Calcutta and Lahore. In the Punjab, the Sikh community further complicate the issue and Master Tara Singh has seen in the Award, the dawn of a Muslim "Raj" in that Province. The Sikhs, he declares, would "sacrifice their lives" to have the Award rejected.

Within the Assembly, efforts were made by Mr. Jinnah representing Muslim opinion, to come to terms with the Congress Parliamentary party, and in debate Mr. Jinnah's support of the Award was not opposed by Congress, whose attitude of neutrality incensed the Malaviya die-hards in the country. Private efforts in Delhi to negotiate an alternative to the Award were, however, completely unsuccessful; and Mr. Jinnah's talks with Babu Rajendra Prasad, the Congress President, broke down, after they had aroused the suspicions of Mr. Jinnah's own followers, who saw in the negotiations a trap to deprive Muslims of the position they hold under the Award. From the beginning, there was considerable doubt as to the objects both sides were striving to attain. Thus, while Congress leaders were concerned to substitute joint for separate electorates, the Muslim attitude throughout has assumed separate electorates and the Award itself as the basis of discussion. The only way to pave the way to joint-electorates is for Congress first to win the Muslim minority by unqualified acceptance of the Communal Award. The Congress attitude of neutrality to the Commual Award within the Assembly, which, at its face value, is a healthy omen, was later revealed as the result of the unexpected decision of the Government official *bloc* to support the Award. Congress, realizing they were unable to defeat the combined vote of Government and the Independents, refrained from voting.

In all this talk, there is only too evident, a complete lack of the appreciation of realities. Negotiations are based always on a spirit of manœuvre and counter-manœuvre rather than on any passionate realization of the criminal folly of endless schism and internecine communal strife. That Mr. Jinnah at least realises this, is evident from his advice to his Muslim colleagues, recently in Delhi, when he declared " the problem of all problems, the question of all questions is this : so long as Hindus and Mohammadans are not united, let me tell you that there is no hope for India and we shall both remain the slaves of foreign domination."

But whatever limitations the Communal problem may place on constitutional advance, it is only wise to appreciate the Bill's omissions from the Indian point of view. We have touched on the Communal Award and on some features that are objectionable to the Independents and on the inevitable hostility of Congress.

In very general terms, Indians have also criticized—

(*a*) The omission of any mention of " Dominion status " in the Bill.

(*b*) The safeguards.

Dominion Status.

The cry for Dominion Status first came from Congress in 1928, previous to the visit of the Simon Commission. It took the form of an ultimatum to Government, demanding complete Dominion Status by January 1st, 1930. In October, 1929, two months before the ultimatum was due to expire, Lord Irwin made his famous declaration, and announced the intention to hold a Round Table Conference.

A week before their ultimatum expired, Congress informed the Viceroy that the object of the Conference must be not to discuss whether Dominion Status should be granted, but the method of putting it into effect. The Government were thus in the position formerly adopted by moderate Indian opinion, while Congress now adopted complete Independence as the goal.

Meanwhile, the Report of the Statutory Commission was published and made no mention of Dominion Status. Nevertheless, a pledge had been given, so that when the Preamble to the new Government of India Bill again made no reference to Dominion Status, Indian politicians were quick to challenge the omission. In the House of Commons the excuse was given that once the actual words were put

into a Preamble, there would follow a legal wrangle as to their exact interpretation, that it was difficult to frame suitable language in regard to the nature of Dominion Status it was intended to confer, and that it would be valid only so long as a Government was in power which was prepared to support continuity of policy.

At the time of Lord Irwin's announcement, the recognised definition of Dominion Status was that of the Imperial Conference of 1926 under the chairmanship of Lord Balfour. This defines the Constitution in the following terms : " Great Britain and the Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations." In 1930, the Statute of Westminster did little else but add weight to this pronouncement and give a more concrete form to an Empire Constitution that was already defined. Whether or not those in authority had this definition in mind when the 1929 declaration was made, the issue has since been put beyond doubt by Sir Samuel Hoare and Sir Thomas Inskip, the latter having stated that it is the status adumbrated in the 1926 Conference which is intended for India's goal and that the day of its fulfilment will be " one of the proudest in the annals of England."

If this be the case, it is difficult to understand why suitable language could not have been framed in the Preamble as to the nature of the status for India.* If it is to be full Dominion Status, as accepted by the partners in the British Empire, it would seem impossible to qualify such status as to its nature. So far as India is concerned, when the time comes to doubt this partnership, the present Bill will be a back number and a new generation will be holding the baby.

The Safeguards.

These have been assailed by all shades of Indian political opinion. The phrases " individual judgment " and " in his discretion," which govern the Governor-General's application of his powers, have particularly rankled ; and indeed, India's case is based purely on considerations of pride. Without doubting the need of securing such things as the rights of the Public services, it does not seem to have been considered that Indians in the position of executive authority, will

* The new Instrument of Instructions to the Governor-General concludes as follows : " Finally it is our will and pleasure that our Governor-General should so exercise the trust which we have reposed in him that the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within our Empire may be furthered to the end that India may take its due place among our Dominions."

depend on the stability of the Constitution for the safety of their own salaries and that, for this reason alone, it is unlikely that they would initiate any spectacular or revolutionary changes. It is, therefore, possibly unfortunate that the I's have been dotted and the T's crossed quite so forcibly in the framing of the safeguards.

In their criticism of the commercial safeguards, however, Indian opinion has run amok. These are designed not to discriminate against India but to prevent India discriminating against England.

Some Conclusions and the Future.

After a string of platitudes, a politician once concluded an eagerly awaited pronouncement with the words "The future is pregnant with possibility!" and this we may justifiably apply to the situation to-day.

Much depends on the attitude of the Princes on the one hand, and Congress on the other. In the past, the latter's only constructive contribution has been the Lucknow Pact. They won the recent elections because they ingeniously avoided formulating a policy. They have purposely not committed themselves to support Mr. Gandhi's Harijan movement for fear of losing the orthodox Hindu vote; while their neutrality over the Communal Award has served to keep them in the good books of a section of Muslim opinion. There could be no more striking tribute to the barrenness of Congress policy since the war than Mr. X's proscribed book "The Indian Struggle, 1920—1934." In it we read a tale of wasted energy and futile inconsistency of attempts to wreck the Constitution first from within, then from without. Under the leadership of Mr. C. R. Das there was, for a time, hope of building a virile and constructive opposition. But Das died and, to quote the author, "The combination of political boss and world leader in Mr. Gandhi fixed upon Congress an aspect of futility in the political field." The new Bill will be passed before Christmas and so far as Provincial Autonomy is concerned, the new Constitution may well be functioning by the end of 1936. In several of the Provinces Congress will undoubtedly be in control, represented in the Provincial ministries, and responsible over the whole Provincial field including Law and Order. It may then be that with new opportunity and real responsibility there will develop a healthy regard for the details and difficulties of day to day administration. This, at least, has been the experience of England in a similar situation.

The Princes have, from the beginning, claimed the right to review the Bill as a whole before committing themselves to Federal

accession. Having seen the Bill, they have, in no uncertain terms, registered their disapproval. If sufficient numbers accede, the Central Constitution will be embodied. Congress may then capture such power at the centre as is offered and they may then initiate an attempt to secede from the Empire. Under full Dominion Status South Africa has framed an Act of Sovereign Independence under the Crown which has not been challenged by Britain; and the Union Prime Minister has asserted that the Union may now secede at its pleasure. The position in India is, however, safeguarded by Clause 110 of the new Bill which prevents the Legislature from altering the Constitution.

If, as appears more probable, the Princes refuse to accede, the Federal Scheme falls to the ground and only such clauses of the Bill as relate to the Provincial Constitution will stand.

Lord Wolmer has mooted "an Advisory Council of Greater India." Others have suggested a Federation of the Provinces exclusive of the States. But it has been rightly pointed out that such a structure would be analogous to Ireland which now enjoys all the evils of divided control.

In the event of the Princes wrecking the Central Scheme, one of two things may happen.

The Indian Intelligentsia, recognizing their opportunity, may desert the Central Legislature and grasp power in the Provinces, a course which all with the interests of India at heart would welcome; alternatively, if political India was suddenly to become alive to the fact that there was to be no change at the centre, however much they may now assert their preference for the existing Constitution, we might well expect a revulsion of feeling and a recrudescence of Civil Disobedience and terrorism on a scale not hitherto contemplated.

That some one has faith in the future is evident from the rush to buy shares in the Reserve Bank.

Taking the broad view, it is impossible to believe that the march of democracy elsewhere in the world will not have its repercussions sooner or later in India. For a time, pleading the protection of out-of-date treaties, the States may stay the hands of meddling democracy from encroaching on their preserves. But eventually, perhaps in another generation, whether by revolution or evolution, a new—may we dare hope, better—era may dawn for India.

APPENDIX I.

The Indian Political and Religious Organizations.

1. *The Independent Party.*—Leader, Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

Holds the balance of power in the Assembly as between Government and Congress.

2. *The National Liberal Federation.*

Leaders .. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.
Mr. V. S. Sastri.
Sir Chimanlal Setalvad.
Sir Phiroze Sethna.
Mr. C. Y. Chintamani.
Mr. N. M. Joshi.

Represents the more sober shades of political opinion though it has frequently joined hands with Congress in the past, in opposition to Government.

3. *The Indian National Congress.*

President .. Babu Rajendra Prasad.
Secretary: Vallabhbhai Patel.

(*a*) The Congress Parliamentary Party.
Leader: Mr. Bhulabhai Desai.

(*b*) The Congress Nationalist Party.

Leaders: .. (In the Assembly) Mr. M. S. Aney.
(Outside the Assembly) Pt. M. Malaviya.
Bitterly opposes Communal Award.

(*c*) The Congress Socialist Party.

Leaders .. Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose.
Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru.

An extremist organization which stands for a communist dictatorship and economic social planning after the Russian model. Regards the normal activities of Congress as out-of-date.

4. *The All-India Muslim League.*

President.—Mr. M. A. Jinnah.

A religious-political organization founded in 1906 to represent Muslim interests throughout India.

5. *The All-India Muslim Conference.*

An organization which broke away from the Muslim League over the question of co-operation with the Simon Commission. Efforts to unify the League and the Conference, notably under the Aga Khan, have failed.

6. *The Hindu Mahasabha.*

President.—Bhai Parmanand.

The Official Organization of orthodox Hindu opinion. Has refused to take part in the Congress-Jinnah negotiations.

APPENDIX II.

1. *Under the present Constitution.*

(In the Provinces.)

"*Transferred*" *subjects.*	"*Reserved*" *subjects.*
Local Self-Government.	Administration of Justice.
Public Health.	Police.
Education.	Land Revenue.
Public Works.	Provincial Revenue.
Agriculture.	Irrigation.
Excise.	Industries.
Co-operative Societies.	Control of Public services within the Province.

2. *Under the new Constitution.*

"*Federal*" *subjects.*	"*Provincial*" *subjects.*
The Defence Forces.	Local Self-Government.
Ecclesiastical affairs.	Public Health.
External affairs.	Education.
Shipping.	Public Works.
Railways.	Agriculture.
Broadcasting.	Land Revenue.
Posts and Telegraphs.	Administration of Justice.
Currency.	Police.
Air Navigation.	Provincial surcharges on income-tax.
Income-tax.	

There is also a "concurrent" list of subjects which cover inevitable risks of overlapping between the Federal and Provincial Lists.

In such cases, where doubt arises, the Governor-General acting in his discretion is to define the field of responsibility.

NOTE.—Only the more important subjects are enumerated.

THE BATTLE OF SEDGEMOOR: ANOTHER VERSION

By "Hazara."

In an article published in the January number of the Journal, describing the rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth in 1685, an account was given of the battle of Sedgemoor. The author followed the conventional story of the battle, a story which has the support of many historians ranging from Lord Wolseley in his Life of Marlborough to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle in his book "Micah Clarke." Briefly, this version of the story of the battle is that the night march of the rebel army against the Royal position failed owing to the unexpected presence of a serious obstacle, the Bussex rhine, which prevented the attackers from coming to grips with the Royal troops. Unable to cross this obstacle, the rebels were forced to remain within musket shot of their opponents till daylight allowed the Royal army to destroy them.

It is true that this story depicts in an admirable manner the forces of nature fighting for the King against his traitorous enemies, and it is perhaps the most likely tale to be told by the rebels to excuse their defeat; but for many years it has not satisfied a local antiquary, Mr. Maurice Page of Bridgwater, whose interesting booklet on the battle provides another explanation of the disaster. The present writer, also, has examined the ground in some detail, both as it is to-day, and, with the aid of old maps and the extremely accurate sketches made by Mr. Dummer of the Artillery who was present at the battle, as it was in the seventeenth century. As the battle provides an excellent example of an intricate night operation the following account may be of interest.

The chief reasons for suspecting the accuracy of what has been called above the conventional version, are as follows:—

1. The Duke of Monmouth, whatever his failings, was a good soldier. The tactics of the skirmish at Philip's Norton, to say nothing of his soldiering in earlier years on the Continent, when he and Churchill served together under Turenne, reveal him as no incompetent commander on the battlefield. It is surely unlikely that he would have led his army on a night march with the intention of delivering a night attack without discovering that a serious obstacle lay between his forming up place and the enemy's position.

2. The rebel army contained many men from this part of Somerset. The Bussex rhine can hardly have been unknown to them. It was indeed one of the mouths of the river Cary before the Somerset Drainage Board constructed the orderly system of rhines which now drain the moor. The guide, also, who volunteered to show the way over the moor lived within a mile or two of it and must have been well acquainted with its presence and nature. During the careful discussion of the route which must have taken place between Monmouth and the guide, it seems incredible that such a feature can have been ignored.
3. Further, when Monmouth had decided that a night operation might well be feasible, he called a council of war and asked his subordinates whether in their opinion such an attack was likely to succeed. Taking into account the lax discipline which was reported to exist in the Royal army, they replied that the attack was feasible provided that the enemy was not entrenched. The guide was therefore sent back to Chedzoy to discover if any entrenchments had been constructed. He made a careful reconnaissance and reported that there were none.
4. Finally, it would appear from many accounts that the Bussex rhine was no obstacle to infantry at all. For the Royal foot had no difficulty in crossing it when and where they liked, and did so as soon as the order to attack was received. That it was an obstacle to cavalry is more likely, but there were on either flank of the Royal position two crossings or plungeons, as they were called, by which the Royal cavalry crossed to envelop the rebels.

On the other hand, as Wolseley points out in his Life of Marlborough, an obstacle which would seriously impede an army might not seem to be one to a civilian who was accustomed to cross it at certain well-known places without giving the matter much thought. Even so it hardly seems possible that after the second reconnaissance, made particularly to ascertain whether the Royal army was entrenched, no mention was made of the Bussex rhine.

The most likely conclusion is that the Bussex rhine was no serious obstacle to infantry, but that it was so to cavalry ; and that Monmouth

was aware of its existence and took it into account in making his plan.

Assuming then, that this was the case, we may reconstruct the events of the 5th July as follows. The rebel force had arrived in Bridgwater on 3rd July. On the 5th the Royal army, marching from Somerton, arrived at Weston Zoyland. Monmouth was at first inclined to move once more towards Bristol and the North, but the arrival of a local inhabitant who offered to show a way over the moor by which the Royal army could be attacked caused him to change his mind. This guide was a servant who had been sent to Monmouth by his master. The latter, who lived near Weston Zoyland, had examined the Royal camp in some detail and was able to give an accurate account of the disposition of the force. The infantry were in bivouac to the North of the village; the cavalry were in the village itself; and the artillery, much exhausted by the infamous roads and by far the last of the force to arrive, were parked on the left flank of the infantry. The militia, being untrustworthy, were left in rear in the village of Middlezoy some two miles from Weston.

So much was reported by the volunteer guide. What were not completely known were the arrangements Feversham would make for the protection of his force during the night. These will be explained later. The guide did, however, also report that a satisfactory watch was not being kept and that most of the Royal troops had been drinking heavily. It was this fact, coupled with the wide dispersion of the Royal bivouacs, which had suggested to Monmouth that a night attack had a good prospect of success.

The guide proposed that the rebel army should move by night along the route marked on the sketch map. It was to leave Bridgwater by the Bristol road, turn off down Bradney Lane, and, after negotiating about a mile and a half of droves (a drove being an indifferent unmetalled track over the moor, frequently half flooded) it was to strike straight across the moor to Weston. Two serious obstacles would be encountered in the first part of the march, the Black Ditch and the Langmoor rhine, but the guide was confident that he could find the crossings over both of them. That over the Langmoor rhine was marked by a large boulder, the Langmoor stone, but it was unpleasantly close to Chedzoy village in which the Royal cavalry had been reconnoitring since the arrival of the army.

Once the force was safely over the Langmoor rhine there remained only the Bussex rhine between them and their enemy. If we assume that Monmouth and the guide were both fully aware of the existence of this partial obstacle, we can reasonably suggest the following plan for the final assault. The cavalry could cross the rhine only by the plungeons. Therefore it was essential that as soon as the Langmoor rhine was crossed the cavalry should push on as rapidly as possible to seize one or both of these crossings before they could be held by the enemy. The Upper plungeon was the one less likely to be guarded, and it was by this that the cavalry were to cross. Once over the rhine they were to attack the flanks and rear of the Royal foot while the infantry attacked them in front. That it was Monmouth's intention that his cavalry should move round the flank of the Royal position and spread confusion in the bivouacs and billets in rear is shown by his exultant remark, "We shall have no more to do than to lock-up the stable-doors and seize the troopers in their beds."

Such, it is suggested, was Monmouth's plan. It depended for its success on the Royal force being unaware of the approach of the rebels, who were, after all, undertaking an extremely daring and unexpected operation, and on the possibility of the plungeons not being held satisfactorily. It remains to show how the plan failed and why.

It has been remarked above that exact information as to the protective detachments of the Royal army was not forthcoming. They were in fact as follows. Three cavalry patrols were sent out. One was to establish a standing patrol on Knowle hill overlooking the Bristol road, for Feversham suspected that Monmouth might try to evade him and slip away towards the North. The second was to find a standing patrol in Chedzoy village, and the third was to guard the road Weston—Bridgwater which was blocked. There was also an "outguard of foot" posted near the road some little distance from Weston. An inlying piquet of 100 men of Dumbarton's regiment was also detailed. The plungeons over the Bussex rhine were unguarded.

Let us now see what actually happened during the night of 5-6th July. The rebel army set out a little before midnight, and it is worth noticing what good march discipline must have been kept by the very imperfectly trained troops. For some quite inexplicable reason the cavalry patrol on Knowle hill entirely failed to discover the

approach of Monmouth's army, in spite of the fact that the heavy baggage wagons which could not cross the moor were parked under their noses. Some time after the army had passed, the patrol actually moved down the road towards Bridgwater and discovered on nearing the town that the whole rebel army was gone. They then galloped back to Weston by the Southern road and arrived somewhat late for the battle.

One of his patrols, and one which might reasonably have been expected to do so, had failed to give Feversham warning of the approach of the rebels. Was the other to be more successful?

The night march, especially for such untrained troops as Monmouth's, must have been a considerable feat. They passed down Bradney Lane, making a detour to avoid a loyal farmer's house, and reached the end of the drove in good time. They then wheeled to the right and struck off over the open moor. The Black Ditch was crossed, and the guide headed for the Langmoor stone. In his anxiety to avoid the Royal cavalry in Chedzoy and confused no doubt by the mist which had risen, the guide missed the crossing. After some delay he returned from a rapid reconnaissance and led the force to the right spot. Realising the Royal dispositions we can see that this was the real danger point. The rebel force was crossing a considerable watercourse within a few hundred yards of a Royal patrol. It is easy to imagine the tension of those moments. Grey's cavalry splashed their way over the rhine, but still no sound was heard from the enemy. The infantry began to cross. Suddenly a single pistol shot rang out over the moor.

Some have suggested that this shot was the work of a traitor, Captain Hucker of Grey's horse. Hucker, when tried later by Jeffreys, pleaded this treachery in mitigation of his crime. Surely a more likely explanation is that the shot was fired by a sentry of the patrol in Chedzoy. There is no doubt that the patrol did discover the presence of the rebels at this moment, for its commander sent an orderly back to Weston to warn the sleeping force. The trooper rode up to the Northern bank of the Bussex rhine and shouted to all the sentries in turn till the whole force was roused.

Even now there was still a chance that the rebels might succeed. If Grey's cavalry could seize the plungeon over the rhine it would be possible for them to cross and carry out their task against the

Royal flank and rear. Everything depended on the leadership of the half-trained rebel cavalry. Unfortunately they bore too much to their right and struck the rhine midway between the two plungeons. A wheel to their left upstream and a rapid search for the crossing, which was in reality so near, and they would have been across. But at this point disaster overtook them. Straight to their front they could see a twinkling mass of lights which they took to be the lights of Weston Zoyland village. Thinking they were too far to their left they turned to the right along the bank of the rhine. In fact the lights were the slow matches of Dumbarton's regiment, the only Royal troops still armed with the matchlock, and almost immediately their sentries shouted their challenge across the rhine :—

" Whom are you for ?"

" The King," came the rebels' answer.

" Which King ?"

" King Monmouth and God with us " (the rebel countersign).

" Take this with you then," was the reply and a volley raked the wavering squadrons which broke and stampeded to the rear spreading confusion throughout the whole force.

The rest of the story is well-known. Surprise had been lost and the infantry, many armed only with scythes and home-made pikes, could only wait there on the moor till they were surrounded and destroyed. The plan had failed, though like many another it had failed by a small margin. The plan was undoubtedly complicated and would have tried the capacity of even the best regular troops ; but it was not quite so bad as most historians have made out and it was not founded on complete ignorance of the existence of an obstacle. Though complicated it was not impossible, and, given a more competent leader than Grey, the cavalry might well have crossed the rhine as they were intended to.

Whether the rebels would have won the battle if their cavalry had succeeded in crossing the Rhine and interposing themselves between the Royal foot and their cavalry in rear it is impossible to say. Many, remembering the presence of Colonel Churchill in the Royal army, will not admit the possibility. It is fair to conclude, however, that the famous night attack was a better planned operation than is usually admitted, and it is certain that it was the only chance which Monmouth was likely to find of defeating the Royal army.



SCALE 2 INCHES TO 1 MILE.

MILE 1 3/4 1/2 1/4 0 1 2 MILES.

EDUCATION FOR ALL.

By *a. p. s. c.* C. O.

There has never been a time when the importance of good staff work and good relations between Staff and units has been more essential. Our army is dwindling in size; in India it is continually being called upon to perform most unpleasant duties, often at most unpleasant times of the year; the cadre of officers of the Indian Army is under strength and is likely to be considerably more so in the near future and yet the same standard of efficiency is necessary. At the same time the Staff cannot be reduced beyond a certain limit and there seems little doubt that this limit has been nearly, if not actually, reached. Some will say that it has been exceeded, hence any reduction of officers is bound to take place at the expense of units, active and regular units.

With the cadre of Staff and units at a minimum, it is essential for the efficiency of the latter that the most adequate methods are in force to maintain the highest standard of the former. The writer has heard a good deal of anti-staff talk lately, some merely due to prejudice or ignorance, but a fair amount founded on fact. It is essential that this latter is made impossible. How? I know that the subject is being continually discussed and that the consensus of opinion is that the present system is the best for the time being, but—is it? Are the most suitable officers passed into and out of the Staff Colleges? Let us consider the facts.

Every officer must qualify at a written examination in order to reach the Staff College. Written examinations are absolutely fair and valuable as far as they go. They ensure candidates working for them, a very sound necessity; they insist on a decisive answer to each question; they insist on that most important essential in a staff officer or good higher commander, the ability to put his thoughts and orders down clearly on paper for another to read.

But they cannot take into account the essential qualities of character and personality, both of increasing importance as higher appointments are taken up. I admit that these qualities are supposed to be considered when C. Os. are selecting officers for the Staff College list, but C. Os. are human, perhaps too much so, and there is no doubt that some do not give as much attention to these points

as they should. It is difficult to discourage a keen officer and the writer has known cases where a refusal to allow an officer to try for the Staff College has been looked upon as an adverse report. All very reprehensible, but facts remain. And the result is a case of "house full" as regards the examination. It means so much competition that a form of slavery exists, lasting sometimes for years. And the slave market is overstocked. Clever students at examinations get in and most of them manage to get out, but what of the rest?

It is a tragic picture. Strong men, proved as leaders in the field or at the "bar," lose their qualities of leadership and become disappointed, cynical middle-pieces; erstwhile good soldiers come on to parade with a vacant and hunted look, having been working at grand strategy or imperial air routes since 4-0 a. m., and are entirely useless at the job for which they are paid and for which their C. O. holds them responsible, with the result that other officers have to do their work; homes are wrecked; engagements are broken off; for who wants to maintain marital relations with a semi-human compendium of Imperial geography, the Great War and the Penal Code?; human beings become broken robots. Some of these shattered relics may gradually regain their perspective, some even may eventually pass into the Staff College, but they will have lost much of their buoyancy and self-confidence and is it worth it for them, and does the Army gain? Many wise ones say "no" and live cheerful, useful lives in consequence, but the Army loses their full services. I agree that working in order to better oneself and to "try, try and try again," brings out the quality of perseverance from the point of view of the individual, but does it help the State?

What is the solution? Some form of efficiency test is essential over and above pure selection, even if all students were selected; and how better than by an impartial written examination which at least insists on a certain standard of education and makes candidates work? Entry by nomination immediately raises the question of favouritism. It was possible and right just after the war, but wars to prove merit are rare.

There are two suggested alternatives. The first may be considered half, way, but has its points. They are discussed below.

First alternative. No officer to be considered for staff employment, namely, for employment which results at once in his dealing

with and often ordering the movements of several units until he has shewn himself of a very high order as a regimental officer who is keen on his unit and his men and understands their needs. Such officers, I am not going into details of ages, etc., will be recommended for appointment to junior staff billets. Any officer who has successfully acted as Adjutant in his unit and undergone a few periods of manœuvre training will be fit in a short time to be a Staff Captain or G. S. O.3, as actually is sometimes the case now.

Such officers as have successfully held these appointments will be permitted to take a qualifying examination a limited number of times and successful candidates will be nominated by a selection board on their nameless reports. Those who are unsuccessful, either through failure to pass the examination or through not having been selected (of which there will be a negligible quantity) will be allowed to carry the letters "s. q." after their names as an additional qualification for future employment.

This proposal will at least ensure that no officer is allowed to take the examination until he has shewn himself practically suitable as a leader and a staff officer.

It may be contended that this proposal will raise the age of staff college candidates. I hope it does. The present age-limit is too young if the Staff College syllabus is meant to include training for higher command. What guarantee is there that an officer who was lucky enough to undergo the two years training at 29 or 33 will be fit as regards character or up-to-date in his knowledge at 43 or 50? For the staff college course, though excellent in itself, is largely academic and little of it is of practical use in time of peace. In itself it does not build character, other than the self-confidence produced by knowledge, and it is character which is most required by senior officers. Hence a staff college training at 34 to 38 is considered of more value than from 27 to 34, always remembering that, under the proposed scheme, students will have shewn themselves fit for junior staff appointments by having successfully held them.

The second proposal, I fear, will be turned down with contumely, by the M. A. G. if by no one else.

I want every officer in the Army to undergo a course of command and staff duties between the age of 26 and 30. The length of the

course could be four months (still counting as temporary duty for purposes of allowances) and the syllabus would include problems including command of a small mixed force, staff duties for this force and the practical application of our fire support weapons of all "arms." Candidates to attend the Staff College proper would be selected from the most successful officers at the junior college.

There are many objections to this proposal as is realised. Expense, an extra course; officers away from their units still more; why cannot C. Os. teach their officers up to a sufficient standard and so on. But,—the correct training of the officer is of a value which cannot allow expense to interfere if the money is considered to be necessary.

It is held that such a course will be of the greatest value to every officer and to his unit. It will broaden the outlook of an officer who is not likely to serve outside his unit in the ordinary course of events. It will make him a more efficient regimental officer. It will give all officers an insight into the problems of Brigade command. It will help the Army by increasing the knowledge and experience of all Regular officers, who may at any moment when a big war breaks out take up appointments of all descriptions and especially the training and staffing of new units and formations which are raised on mobilization. It will standardize staff work as a whole.

To meet the cost of this establishment to some extent it is suggested that other schools might be abolished or reduced. If officers attending the proposed school receive practical instruction in the fire support weapons, I consider that a reduction of the Small Arms Schools can be effected. The rifle wing in India could be amalgamated with the M. G. wing in Ahmednagar, to the advantage of both and with a great saving in overhead costs. And is a school of cookery necessary? Good cooking is vital. An army still moves on its centre-piece, but could not some wife in each British unit teach this very domestic subject? It is, surely, unnecessary to maintain a special school. Research work could be carried out at Porton or Belgaum or even at the "Corner House." Other establishments might be considered with a view to their reduction in the same way; anything to raise funds for the vitally necessary instruction of the officer.

One main objection I forestall. The question of favouritism in selecting students for admission to the Staff College. But this is not

accepted. The choice of the Directing Staff of the new school should preclude criticism in this direction and, with the right personnel, their selection, in the experienced opinion of the Commandant, aided by his staff, should ensure that only those officers who would be of the greatest value to the Army in staff employ and later in higher command would be chosen.

THE FIRST BATTLE OF JABAL HAMRIN, MARCH 25TH, 1917, MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN.

By "Scorpio."

Preface.

There is a natural tendency amongst soldiers to avoid an analysis of battles where things have gone wrong, for fear of hurting an individual's or even a unit's feelings. This seems a pity as mistakes are more easily recognized and difficulties better gauged after a defeat than after a victory. The terrain over which the battle of Jabal Hamrin was fought is not unlike much that we can find up and down India and beyond its frontiers. The enemy had much the same armament and characteristics of the second class power we find ourselves fighting against so often in our schemes and t. e. w. t's. When winning, he was also helped by tribesmen, and harassed by them in defeat; and so were we. There is much in this battle therefore of an instructive and interesting nature to soldiers serving in India to-day. Mistakes have been emphasized so that those without experience of war of this nature, to whom peace training, however imaginative the instruction, can never quite convey the true picture of battle, may be able to understand that mistakes which may seem trivial and pass unnoticed or unpunished in peace training rarely escape their just reward in war.

Events leading up to the action at Jabal Hamrin, on March 25th, 1917 (See Sketch "A").

On the capture of Baghdad, the situation confronting General Maude was :—

(*a*) on his right flank, slowly retiring from Persia at their leisure and followed up by some weak Russian forces also very much at their leisure, two strong Turkish divisions. These divisions were two of the best in the Turkish Army and were well commanded ; moral was high, and their record in Gallipoli had been particularly good. Their retirement from Persia was strategical and not forced on them by tactical considerations ;

(*b*) on his front, constituting a possible threat to Baghdad, were the remnants of the Turkish Army defeated at Kut,

Aziziyeh, Diyala and Baghdad a fairly large remnant owing to the supineness of our cavalry after the Tigris had been crossed at the Shumran bend at Kut. Their moral and fighting power were still fairly high, considering the defeats they had suffered ;

(*c*) on his left flank, at Felujah and Ramadi on the Euphrates, about 30 and 45 miles respectively from Baghdad, were the Turkish garrisons of the Euphrates line, withdrawn northwards from Nasariyeh without serious loss as the advance of the British from Kut northwards progressed. The fighting value of this Turkish detachment was not high.

In addition, the action of the local Arab tribes, who were all well armed and supplied with ample ammunition, was very doubtful. While on the left flank, a powerful tribe was definitely hostile, the attitude of the rest was typically Arab, *i.e.*, they were out to get what they could from both sides.

To deal with the above situation, General Maude had, in addition to a cavalry division, the following divisions, all of which had been heavily engaged at Kut, and some of which had had heavy casualties during the subsequent advance on and capture of Baghdad :—

I Corps.—3 (Lahore) Div. and 7 (Meerut) Div.

III Corps.—13 Div. (British) and 16 Div. (Indian).

The long line of hastily organized communications, the lack of drafts, the bad effect of the long march over the thick sand and dust from Kut did not make the situation any easier. Supplies were scarce, units were at very low strength, and in many cases in need of a rest. The weak Russian forces in Persia were looking over their shoulders at the revolution in Russia, and were not to be relied on in any way.

General Maude's plan was :—

I Corps to take on the enemy on all three fronts :—

(*a*) 3 Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. to advance *via* Baqubah and defeat the two Turkish Divs. retiring from Persia.

(*b*) 7 Div. to advance along the Tigris on Samarrah Ry. Sta. (the end of the Baghdad-Samarrah Ry.) and drive back the remnants of the main Turkish Army.

(*c*) 7 Inf. Bde. of 3. Div. to advance to the Euphrates, seize Felujah, and guard the left flank.

II Corps was kept in reserve, but 13 Div. of this Corps was subsequently moved northwards out of Baghdad along the West bank of the Diyala river towards Dali Abbas, with the object of cutting off the retreat of the two Turkish Divs. retiring from Persia, after they had been defeated East of the Diyala by the 3 Div., or had escaped from it.

The advance of 3 *Div. less* 7 *Inf. Bde. along the Diyala, from Baghdad.*

(See Sketches " A " and " B.")

3 Div. less 7 Inf. Bde. with 13 Lancers attached, called Keary's Coln., marched on the 19th March *via* Baqubah, 33 miles from Baghdad, and Abu Jisra, 15 miles further on, with the 8 Inf. Bde. leading. Opposition was not encountered till Abu Jisra, when the 8 Inf. Bde. advanced guard had no difficulty in driving back some weak enemy detachments. Information was here received from prisoners and agents that the two Turkish divisions had arrived at Kizil Robat, on the Persian side of the Jabal Hamrin, and were holding a strong position in the foothills and on the main ridge of the Jabal Hamrin itself, with advanced detachments holding the crossings of the Balad Ruz Canal. This canal flowed out from the Diyala river some 2,500 yards in advance of the advanced posts of the Turkish main position.

8 Inf. Bde. pushed forward rather leisurely, evicted with little loss a small Turkish detachment of infantry and cavalry from Shahraban, and by the late morning of the 23rd March had reached the South bank of the Balad Ruz Canal, and were in touch for about half a mile on either side of the road (*sic*) with the Turkish outposts, on the North bank. 8 Inf. Bde's attempts to advance were met with a heavy fire and by the afternoon, they appeared content to dig in and watch the enemy. The enemy outposts showed no disposition to retire on their main position in the hills, and their fire took heavy toll of the 8 Inf. Bde. forward battalions during that afternoon and during the whole of the next two days.

9 Inf. Bde. advanced to just North of Shahraban after a dusty and tiring march, and by 4 p.m. went into bivouac in vineyards and fields.

During the day, 13 Lancers guarded the right flank from Arab interference from the direction of Balad Ruz and reconnoitred this flank up to the foot-hills.

A digression is necessary here to explain two points.

(*a*) The orders originally received from G. H. Q. by the Coln. Comdr. were to defeat the enemy where met, and prevent him crossing the Diyala river and retiring into the hills towards Kirkuk and Mosul, but rather to drive him back into the arms of the advancing (?) victorious (?) Russians. G. H. Q. appreciated that he would take up a position in the Jabal Hamrin facing South with a strong rearguard in the hills near Qasr-i-Shirin, while he was throwing a bridge across the Diyala near Kizil Robat to allow his transport to cross.

The first mistake was committed here owing to the lack of knowledge of the real situation *vis-à-vis* the Russians, and a consequent over-estimation of the pressure they were exerting on the Turks. The Turks needed no strong rearguard.

(*b*) On receipt of the Coln. Comdr.'s information on the 23rd, that the Turks were holding a strong position in the Jabal Hamrin, G. H. Q., misled by their over-estimation of the Russian pressure, and their under-estimation of the numbers and moral of the Turkish force, and with a total disregard of the very tired and under-strength condition of the units of Keary's Coln., ordered the Coln. Comdr. by wire to attack the enemy's left flank and roll him along the hills into theDiyala.

The G. O. C. and his Div. Staff had full knowledge of the following facts :—

(*a*) The under-strength and tiredness of all units.

(*b*) The strength of the position in the Jabal Hamrin.

(*c*) The fact that the position was strongly manned. This was reported by the Bde. Major, 8 Inf. Bde., who went up in an aeroplane sent up on the 23rd and saw the strength of the enemy position, and appreciated correctly their superior numbers of artillery and infantry.

(*d*) The fact that any movement on the plain below was in full view of the enemy on the hills.

(*e*) The fact that operations in the tangled mass of the Jabal Hamrin of which no map existed would be extremely difficult to co-ordinate.

(*f*) The fact that at least one serious obstacle to movement northwards existed in the unbridged, unfordable, and 20 feet wide Balad Ruz Canal.

(*g*) That the opposition of the enemy outposts in front of the 8 Inf. Bde. pointed to no lack of moral, but rather to a determination on the part of the enemy to resist very strongly any attempts to dislodge him until he was ready to go.

(*h*) That the 13 Div. was proceeding up the West bank of the Diyala towards Dali Abbas.

(*i*) That the Balad Ruz Arabs were distinctly hostile to the British, and, consequently, the Turkish Commander would get early and accurate information of our movements.

(*j*) That the reconnaissance of 13 Lancers on the 23rd March up to the foothills on the enemy's left flank and the absence of any movement towards his right flank, was a sure indication to the Turkish Commander that an attack, if any was to be made, was likely to come on his left flank.

However, after a mild protest to G. H. Q. which was followed by peremptory orders to attack, the Coln. Comdr. appears to have accepted the risk, in spite of the above facts, most of which were not known by G. H. Q. sitting in Baghdad. The action described below, which is called the 1st Battle of Jabal Hamrin, was the result.

So much for what can be called the strategical aspect of the story.

Mistakes committed during this phase were :—

(*i*) *By G. H. Q.* :—

(*a*) Faulty intelligence.

(*b*) Lack of appreciation of all the factors in the situation.

(*c*) Undue interference with the man on the spot.

(*d*) Lack of provision of sufficient aircraft. (Probably there were very few in the country at the time, but even if no Cl/R sorties were available, the Coln. Comdr. should have had accurate information daily of the movements and strength of the Turkish force.)

(*ii*) *By Keary's Coln.* :—

(*a*) Lack of real decision by the Coln. Comdr. He should not have allowed himself to be dictated to by G. H. Q. with regard to the tactical direction of his force.

(*b*) Lack of drive. The advance of 8 Inf. Bde. was too leisurely.

(*c*) Misuse of the cavalry. Information about the enemy was the first essential; this was not forthcoming. Cav. did, indeed, guard the right flank by day but there was not enough danger from this flank to warrant the neglect of a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's position.

Action of 9 Inf. Bde. on the 23rd/24th March. (*See Sketch "B."*)

On receipt of the peremptory orders from G. H. Q. to attack the enemy, the Coln. Comdr. ordered 9 Inf. Bde. to march into a position on the enemy's left flank on the night 23rd/24th, and attack his main position on the hills from East to West on the early morning of the 24th. A how. bty. was attached to the Bde. for this purpose, and the remainder of the Div. Arty. were to give support from their present positions South of the Balad Ruz Canal. A det. of S. & M. was detailed to bridge the canal on the 23rd as soon as it became dusk at the crossing place decided upon, which was about 2 miles south of the road, and to ramp the second canal which had been reported, on the morning of the 23rd, dry and easily ramped. A large reconnaissance party composed of some of the Div. Staff and the 9 Inf. Bde. staff had reconnoitred this crossing in broad daylight on the 23rd in full view of the Turks on the hills, but had not reconnoitred the second canal, owing to the Balad Ruz Canal being unfordable. This party was shelled during its reconnaissance.

9 Inf. Bde. had about 4½ to 5 miles to march at night, the last 2½ to 3 miles being over unreconnoitred country; the first 2 miles involved the crossing of two defiles, the bridge and ramp over the two canals. First light was at about 5-30 A.M., so that there was not much time to spare. On arrival at the first bridge at 12 midnight, H. Q., 9 Inf. Bde. were informed that the second canal had been flooded in the late afternoon, that it was unfordable, and would have to be bridged but that there was no more bridging material with the Det. S. & M., and more had been sent for from the neighbourhood of Shahraban.

It was clear that no crossing would be possible that night, and after a two hours' wait, the Bde. was ordered to bivouac in an area between the two canals, and shelter as far as possible in watercourses, behind walls and any cover that could be found.

Dawn broke on the 24th therefore with a whole Bde. massed practically in the open, 2 miles away from its positions the day before,

on the right flank, with one new bridge constructed over the canal behind it, and another being constructed over the canal in front of it—all in full view of the Turks!

The mistakes made during this phase of the operation were :—

(*a*) Faulty reconnaissance by the Div. Staff. It should have been appreciated that the second canal was liable to be flooded, as the head works were in the enemy's possession and the R. Diyala was in flood.

(*b*) Lack of provision of spare bridging material.

(*c*) The massing of the Bde. in a constricted area in full view of the Turks, thus giving away all the advantages of the night advance, and thereby ensuring that little real rest for the troops would be possible.

Sound tactics would have been :—

(*a*) to have withdrawn the Bde. to cover round Shahraban during the night, as soon as it was discovered that the 2nd Canal had been flooded and could not be bridged in time, and

(*b*) to have camouflaged the bridge already made, and ceased all work on the 2nd bridge during the daytime.

Action of 9 Inf. Bde. during the night 24th/25th March, and on 25th March—the battle of Jabal Hamrin. (*See Sketch "B."*)

During the 24th March, it was decided to persevere with the original plan to move at night and attack the enemy's left flank, in spite of the fact that surprise had been forfeited. To make doubly sure that the enemy would be certain of our subsequent movements, the S. & M. were ordered to start work on the bridge over the 2nd Canal during the daytime. This they proceeded to do, and were duly hampered by some extremely accurate shelling, which took toll of the working parties, as well as of some of the units of the Bde., clustered as they were in close proximity to the bridge. The bridge was eventually finished shortly after dusk, when the enemy shelling ceased.

At 9 P. M., 9 Inf. Bde. marched across the 2nd bridge in the following order :—

Dorsets.
H. Q., 9 Inf. Bde.
105 Mahratta L. I.
1/1 G. R.
93 Burma Inf.
M. G. Coy. (16 M. G's.).
One 4·5" (How.) Bty., Fd. Arty

All units marched with full 1st line transport. At midnight the Bde. halted and bivouacked 300—400 yds. from the foothills, complete except for the battery which failed to arrive.

It might be as well here to digress and tell the story of the artillery. The first gun which attempted to cross the 2nd bridge, fell into the water and broke the bridge. All efforts to extricate it failed till the 25th, with the result that the battery took up a position *South* of the 2nd Canal to support 9 Inf. Bde. during the 25th. No artillery support moved further North during the whole action; artillery support, therefore, except at long range, was practically non-existent, and the broken nature of the country made observation and recognition of friend and foe almost impossible, so that the few shells which were fired in support of 9 Inf. Bde. during the 25th did no damage at all. In fact, our shells fell much closer to our positions than to those of the Turks. Counter-battery work was completely lacking.

9 Inf. Bde. bivouacked in diamond formation, as shown on Sketch B, each unit putting out its own sentry groups. There was a great deal of "trusting to luck" in the arrangements made for the defence of this bivouac whose position should have been given away to the Turks by the braying of the many mules in the column, who thus gave vent throughout the remainder of the night to their very natural disgust at the whole proceedings.

Luck was with the bde. however, owing to the fact that the nearest Turkish piquets, which morning discovered to have been only about 500—600 yards N. E. of the bivouac area were asleep. Not a shot was fired during the night.

The Brigade marched at first light, about 5-30 A.M., on the morning of the 25th, after a night when little sleep was possible for anyone.

Orders were :—

(*a*) The advance to continue in diamond formation, 105th on the right, Dorsets advanced centre, 1/1 G. R. on left, 93rd in rear and reserve; H. Q. and the m. g. coy. to move with the 93rd.

(*b*) 1/1 G.R. were to reach a suitable position about half way to the crest of the hills, face West, and form a pivot on which the Dorsets and 105th would wheel successively.

(*c*) When all three battalions were in line facing West, the attack on the flank of the enemy main position was to take place under further orders from Bde. H. Q.

No information about the enemy was given, as none was known. The reader may be reminded here that no maps were available ; a sketch map hastily compiled from the very inadequate air reconnaissance on the 23rd, and naturally very inaccurate and therefore definitely dangerous, had been issued to each officer.

The first phase of the attack was never completed. Instead of advancing well clear of the flank, the Bde. happened to advance on to the left flank of the Turkish position. 1/1 G. R. reached their position, a series of knolls, with scarcely a casualty. Dorsets and 105th, after a series of desperate efforts to wheel inwards, were driven back with very severe casualties, by some well timed counter-attacks, which threatened to involve the right flank and rear of the 1/1 G. R. The Dorsets and 105th finally withdrew under heavy pressure, across the plain, the 93rd were ordered up on the right of the 1/1 G. R., two platoons of the Bde. m. g. coy. were sent forward as forward guns, and the Div. reserve of two coys. each of 1 Manchester and 124 Baluch were ordered up to the foothills to cover the retirement. Two strong counter-attacks on the left flank and centre of the 1/1 G. R. and 93rd were driven back between 12 noon and 2 P.M., and at 4 P.M. orders were received for each of the remaining units to retire as best they could to the areas South of the 2nd Canal, where they had spent the day on the 24th. The Turks followed up this retirement with arty. and m. g. fire but did not themselves debouch into the plain, or attempt seriously to attack the Manchesters or Baluchis, who retired between 5 and 6 P.M., practically unmolested.

Casualties particularly in officers were very heavy. The 9 Inf. Bde. was very weak to start with, but in spite of this was ordered to attack, without artillery support, two strong Turkish divisions in a wonderful natural position who had eighteen to twenty guns to support them, and who had not only had time to improve the natural strength of the position, but had also been able to watch, as from an aeroplane, every move of the attacking force for two to three days before the attack took place.

13 Lancers spent the day on the plain well away to the right flank and took no part in the action. Their presence there may have kept off the Arabs during the day, though it is doubtful if the Arabs

would have interfered during the day. Their withdrawal at night allowed the Arabs to swarm on to the battlefield in great numbers, in order to loot, mutilate the dead, and kill the wounded.

The mistakes committed during this phase were :—

(*a*) The night advance was wrongly directed. It was not directed far enough to the East.

(*b*) The transport should have been whittled down to the absolute minimum. There was a great quantity of unwanted transport which got in the way, and suffered unnecessary casualties.

(*c*) The lack of proper arrangements for the defence of the bivouac. It is all very well to trust to luck, but the brigade could easily have been mown down at first light by a few machine-guns brought down into position at close range during the night.

(*d*) The haphazard "barging into the blue" orders for the advance. The Bde. Comdr. lost control from the very start. Even in easy country, his orders would have resulted in unco-ordinated action. In this country, the result was a series of completely unconnected actions, and, as soon as resistance was found to be greater than anticipated, disaster.

(*e*) The carelessness of the artillery in driving over the edge of the 2nd bridge which broke it and blocked it.

(*f*) The misuse of the cavalry. A squadron on the right flank would have been sufficient. The remainder of the regiment would have been invaluable even in these hills for protection of the immediate flanks of the brigade and for reconnaissance, or even as a mobile reserve.

There are also some good points about this phase of the action which bring out some valuable lessons :—

(*a*) The value of a flank guard in a strong position. The 1/1 G. R. on the left flank though enfiladed and at times shot at in rear were in a naturally strong position and successfully resisted all the desperate attempts by the Turks to drive in the flank. If this had happened, nothing would have saved the brigade from complete disaster, and the division reserve moving up would have been badly handled as well.

(*b*) The excellence of the supply of S. A. A. and bombs. In an infantry man's battle of this nature, the expenditure of ammunition is great. In spite of this, and the long carry across the exposed plain Bde. H. Q. kept 1/1 G. R. and 93 Inf. supplied amply with S. A. A. and bombs from their brigade reserve, which was replenished from the division reserve in time.

(*c*) The great value, in fact necessity, of covering a withdrawal with fresh troops not previously involved in the withdrawal. The moral effect of the fresh troops advancing across the plain to cover the withdrawal was very great. The fact that they were there in position when the sorely harassed and disorganized units retired from the hills not only checked the Turks from advancing to close range but also enabled the retiring units to reform and so saved the retirement from developing into a *sauve-qui-peut*.

Wisdom after the event.

On receipt of orders from G. H. Q. to move northwards, the Coln. Comdr. should have insisted on adequate air reconnaissance, and on a free hand in carrying out the operations. G. H. Q. intelligence should have come to the correct conclusion that Russian help was negligible and the Turkish force was of good moral and fighting value.

On receipt of the information from the Coln. Comdr. that the Turks were holding the Jabal Hamrin in force, the best chance of decisive success lay in blocking his line of retirement with adequate forces, not in attacking him on the flank farthest from his line of retirement. A large force of cavalry—(there was a Cav. Div. in the country, only too anxious to make up for previous mishandling)—was available, and this backed up closely by the 13 Div. should have ridden hard *via* Dali Abbas to block the Kizil Robat-Kirkuk road.

Having decided, however, to attack the enemy's left flank in the hills, the Coln. Comdr. should have made quite certain that any attack or movement achieved surprise, however difficult it was. He should have realized that, with the Turks perched up on the hills watching all his movements, deception was an essential step to gaining surprise, and that haste did not mean speed. He should have realized that long marches on dusty and bad roads are not a good prelude to night advances and to successful attacks.


JABAL HAMRIN
Shatt al Adhaim.
QASR-I-SHIRIN
TURK WITHDRAWAL MARCH 1917.
KIRMANSHAH
RUSSIAN ADVANCE APRIL 1917.
SAMARRAH.
Tigris
DALI ABBAS.
KIZIL ROBAT
PERSIA
SHAHRABAN
ABU JISRA.
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THE JABAL HAMRI
MARCH 1917
SCALE OF MILES.
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BAGHDAD
Sakiawie Canal.
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Euphrates
From Kut.

IRRIGATION CHANNELS.

From AHRABAN.



FLAT COUNTRY MOSTLY
SOME PATCHES OF CULTIVATION
BUT MAINLY FIELDS LYING FAL
WITH A NUMBER OF IRRIGATIO
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On the 23rd and 24th, therefore, the cavalry should have made reconnaissances of *both* flanks. His own reconnaissance of the flank decided upon should have been made inconspicuously under cover of the cavalry reconnaissance. Movements of infantry towards the Diyala would have helped to confuse the Turkish Commander. Air reconnaissance of the position should have been more thorough and should have fixed the exact positions of the flanks of the Turkish main position. A realization of the fact that the River Diyala was in flood and the head-works of the canal were in enemy possession should have led him to make sure that the 2nd Canal was crossable by arranging for it to be bridged, dry or not, and not merely ramped. He should have given the 9 Inf. Bde. a rest under cover in Shahraban on the 23rd/24th, and all day on the 24th, and postponed the night advance to the night of the 24th/25th and the attack to the 25th. He should have allotted the majority of his cavalry to the 9 Inf. Bde.

With such preparations made by the Div. Staff, the Brigadier, 9 Inf. Bde., would have had an easier task :—

(*a*) There would have been no difficulty in crossing the two canals ; hence the attack would have come as more of a surprise.

(*b*) The direction of the night advance would have been correct ; the brigade would have started the attack on the morning of the 25th well out of view or range of the Turks and the brigade comdr. would have been able to make his plan for the attack more deliberately and carefully.

(*c*) The cavalry could have guarded his flanks during his westward attacking movement, and he would have been able to keep a strong reserve in his hand.

(*d*) Some artillery support would have been available instead of none.

Combined with the strong thrust on to the Turkish line of retirement by the Cav. Div. and 13 Div., the attack by 9 Inf. Bde. followed by a forward movement by 8 Inf. Bde. as soon as the effect of the flank attack was being felt by the enemy, may well have had decisive results.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

DEAR SIR,

I should be glad if you will allow me to correct some statements in The Gold Medal Prize Essay, 1934, printed in the October 1934 issue of your Journal.

The statement at the head of page 499 is not correct. Various Army and District Commanders can in Watch and Ward order air reconnaissance from the nearest R. A. F. formation.

The statement at the head of sub-para. (*iii*), page 498, conveys an impression contrary to the fact and this impression is not wholly corrected by the first line on page 499.

There is an air annual allocation by Army Headquarters of flights and sorties to work with various Army formations and units, and such flights and sorties are under the Army Commander as allocated.

Thirdly, para. 5 of the same sub-para. (lines 7—9 on page 499) is incorrect, since sanction of the Government of India for bombing is only required in certain cases, for example, when bombing of villages is in question.

I enclose my card.

Yours truly,
"K. L. G."

[It is regretted that owing to an oversight this important letter has not been published earlier, and we commend its careful perusal to all our members in conjunction with the Prize Essay of 1934, published in the October 1934 number. It will be of especial interest in this number in which we publish an article dealing with the same essay and its political reactions.—ED.]

A FEW THOUGHTS ON LIGHT INFANTRY, ETC.

DEAR SIR,

I was much interested in Captain Fripp's article on the above subject which was published in your issue of January last and in the comments thereon in the April number. It did not strike me that Captain Fripp had any intention of criticising the Indian soldier's ability, as was suggested by one writer, and there is much truth in some of the points he brings out in his article.

It appears to me that the chief mistakes made in our training since the War have been :—

(1) Excessive stress being laid on the inability of Infantry to advance against M. Gs. in open country without support from Artillery and A. F. Vs.

(2) Far too much training of the " set piece " type.

With regard to (1), the tendency in India has been to damn the Indian Government for not providing the necessary support, rather than to concentrate on the means of overcoming the difficulty by training in manœuvre at night and stalking tactics where cover exists. During the Great War there were, as a general rule, no flanks and very often no cover to speak of, but let us hope that in future wars, at any rate those on a smaller scale, there will at least be opportunities of effecting surprise by turning movements during the hours of darkness and we should train our men accordingly.

With regard to (2), such training has definitely been the result of the trench warfare complex and to my mind, as far as the individual soldier is concerned, time spent on " set pieces " is so much time wasted. Small schemes introducing an element of surprise are not only much more interesting, but also far better training for both officer and man, requiring as they do quick decisions, quick action and the maximum flexibility of the troops employed.

The P. B. I., however, suffer from two great handicaps, *viz.*,—

(1) Inadequate opportunities for Platoon and Company training.

(2) The incumbrance of the Lewis Gun in mountain warfare.

The first of these handicaps is a question of money, or rather the lack of it. To send companies out into company camps (and no really useful training can be done from barracks where there are too many other abstractions) costs money and the question almost invariably arises as to how the limited money available for training is to be spent, on the training of lower or higher formations ? And though the Company Commander holds the baby, *i.e.*, the training of the soldier who wins the battles, the higher formations generally get the lion's share. Nature would not be human if it were not so. Higher Commanders also require training and it is they who allot the money. I remember arguing for an hour or more one day with a Staff Officer from a high command who tried to prove to me that Brigade training was more important than Company training. After

some judicious questioning I discovered that he had only done one season's training in his life.

Now about the Lewis Gun in mountain warfare. I submit, and I have always done so, that so long as the Platoon is tied to its L. G. mule, or the mule is tied to its Platoon, you will never get the Platoon away from what Captain Fripp describes as the roll of the tethered goat. If troops are going to take on the Pathan at his own game, small formations working independently must be unencumbered and be able to work across difficult country where roads or even tracks, don't exist. This they will never be able to with a blighted mule trapezing behind them. But in the Army our Platoons always stick to their L. G. cum mule. In any case the L. G. is a poor weapon in mountainous country as its flat trajectory will never dislodge determined men from behind cover. Why not, therefore, let troops drop it when occasion demands and rely more on the rifle grenade, a far more valuable weapon in such circumstances, training in which is sadly neglected. With regard to clothing, suggestions for drastic changes are invariably turned down on account of cost, but I am heartily in agreement with Captain Fripp's views about puttees and boots. Puttees are an invention of the devil, a nightmare inflicted upon the soldier from the day of his enlistment until the day of his discharge, or death from varicose veins. On the Frontier they are rapidly discarding these man-stoppers and taking to hose-tops and ankle putties instead, a much more suitable garb. Boots are a definite encumbrance on rocky hill sides and I can see no reason why all troops (at any rate Indian troops) should not be provided with a pair of stout chaplies in lieu of one of their pairs of boots. Shorts are not really suitable for active service, but the majority are loth to give them up on account of their comfort, particularly in the hot weather. In my own regiment in the days before standard patterns, when we made up our own clothing, our men wore loose plus fours with "continuations" of the same material, which fitted the calf and were buttoned down the side. In summer these were worn without puttees or hose-tops and, with chaplies on the feet, were smart-looking, serviceable and comparatively cool.

Yours, etc.,
"SHIGGADAR."

REVIEWS.

The Motorist's Vade Mecum from Lahore to London.

By Lieut.-Colonel C. A. Boyle, D.S.O.

Into this little handbook of some eighty pages the author has compressed every conceivable piece of information necessary to enable one to undertake, by car, and in reasonable comfort, the journey from India to London.

After leaving Quetta, the author's route took him through such places of interest as Meshed, Teheran, Baghdad, Damascus and Alexandretta to Moudanya on the Sea of Marmora; thence by sea to Istanbul (Constantinople) and onward *via* Adrianople, Sofia and Belgrade to Calais. The intervening places and the distances between each, in terms of mileage and daily stages, are shown. There are notes on the condition of the roads; accommodation-hotel and other, and the charges therefor.

The journey described took nearly three months, but, for the benefit of those with less time available, the author offers a number of alternative routes in both Asia and Europe.

The principal places of interest throughout the journey and the sights worth visiting are mentioned, and in many cases the author has added a brief historical account of them.

The chapters on finance and exchange, clothing and equipment, food and water, and general information are instructive and helpful.

This book should prove of value to those who contemplate spending a portion of their leave visiting places of historical, religious and artistic interest, and can afford the time necessary to do so.

J. S. B.

Between the Oxus and the Indus.

By Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg, C.M.G., D.S.O.

(*Martin Hopkinson, Ltd.*) 15 *s.*

"It is the duty of all young officers and staff officers to take every opportunity of travelling in the countries of our future allies and enemies; to study the topography of those countries, to get acquainted

with the inhabitants, and to learn their language. Then and then only will they be able to appreciate the information they will get in time of war, and so to frame plans of operations which will be suited to the local situation." So says *The Handbook for Young Officers and Staff Officers of the Turkish Army.*

In these luxurious days, however, there are few who are willing to exchange the warmth of their fireside for the snow-swept slopes of the Karakoram, or the congenial society at the Club bar for that of a Central Asian potentate, whose conversation is, perforce, translated by one whose knowledge of English is limited. Moreover the coveted reputation of being " a keen soldier who takes an interest in his profession " can be won, perhaps, by the study of little books whilst seated in an armchair at home.

In these days, therefore, we rely more than ever on our professional travellers and explorers to supply us the material and local colour for our Military Reports. Officers will welcome this book by the well-known traveller and explorer Colonel R. C. F. Schomberg, and in view of our new commitments in the Gilgit area it should be studied by all who take an interest in the problem of the defence of our Indian frontiers.

It deals with the Gilgit Agency, the States of Yasin, Hunza, and Nagir, and the land where Russia, Afghanistan and India meet. The book is full of information which should interest soldier and civilian alike. It is written in a very readable style, and sparkles with anecdotes and stories of adventures. The production of the book leaves nothing to be desired, and it contains many illustrations and an excellent map.

C. A. B.

Security.

By Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(*Methuen & Co., Ltd.*) 5 shillings.

The issue of this book will have particular interest at the present time, not only for Military readers, but for all those who study the international situation and the efforts that are being made to obtain a peaceful solution of its many problems. The author stresses the importance of maintaining peace and criticises the various methods that have been implemented in recent years. Whilst recognising

the value of the Locarno treaty and supporting the principles of the League of Nations, he is doubtful of the value of the latter as an instrument for preventing war or of any schemes for disarmament that have been produced up to date. He advocates the adoption of a clear policy as a solution of our defence problems, but his first chapter is apt to leave the reader in some doubt as to what this policy should be.

The menace to the peace of Europe that has arisen through the rebirth of Germany is very clearly dealt with, and General Rowan-Robinson points out that the conditions of strategy have changed. He draws attention to the increased difficulty of protecting our vital yet vulnerable communications and urges a readjustment of the values of sea and air power to safeguard these. He is of opinion that a strong air force is a necessity and that the increase of air power will sound "The knell of large armies on the Continent," limit the possibility of our employment of an expeditionary force, and make opposed landings even more hazardous than they have been in the past.

In view of the necessity for a common strategy, a common policy for armament, and the fact that true co-operation between the three services has not yet been attained, the author urges strongly that a Ministry of Defence be created. He advocates a complete reorganization of the army on a mechanized basis and a reorientation of Naval policy, possibly involving the removal of our Mediterranean fleet and the organization of the Cape route.

As modern war is a struggle which involves all the resources of a nation, he urges that the Nation should be so organized in peace that the necessity for improvisation on the outbreak of war will disappear. Since all political parties have really only one common object, the well-being of the nation, he pleads the necessity for a united national front to obtain economic efficiency and the preservation of peace.

Whilst all the author's arguments may not be agreed with and some of his solutions appear optimistic, this book shows very clearly the problems that confront the Empire and provides excellent material for thought on the subject of combination of effort as a means to security.

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