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Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy.

The Journal

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EDITORIAL.

The War Block.

Army Instruction (India), No. 82 of 1934, giving the proposals accepted by the Secretary of State for India in Council for dealing with the War Block has cleared the air. After months of anxiety and inevitable wild speculation among officers commissioned between 4th August, 1914, and 31st December, 1920, the worst is now known. On the whole the terms offered are better than were expected, and it is obvious that Army Headquarters approached this painful duty with a deep sense of the unavoidable hardship it would cause and a desire to soften the blow with as generous compensation as possible.

The main block of 400 officers to be retired compulsorily over a period of six years beginning on 9th September, 1935, deserves our first notice. Officers so selected will be placed on a special unemployed list where they will remain until they attain the age of 50 or complete 28 years' service. They will then be admitted to pension. While unemployed they will draw pay at a special yearly rate of £400. To this will be added, as applicable, £60 marriage allowance, £40 for one child, and £25 each for a second and third child. On admission to pension they will be entitled to the gross pension, up to a maximum of £640, which they would ordinarily have earned if on the active list.

The selection of these officers is being carried out in a very fair and thorough manner. A board of Indian Army Officers, presided over by Major-General A. W. H. Moens, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., has toured

all the principal military stations in India and Burma and collected information at first-hand to supplement the Special Confidential Reports submitted through the usual channels. This ensures that the necessarily diverse idiosyncrasies of individual reporting officers are reduced to a common denominator, and makes it as certain as human ingenuity can devise that the same standard of reporting will prevail. After this exhaustive examination we can hardly imagine that any officer, realising the grim necessity of this axing, will be likely to have any legitimate " grouse " if he is unfortunate enough to be selected to go on unemployed pay.

The other proposals put forward to relieve this congestion are twofold :

(*i*) The tenure of command of all lieutenant-colonels appointed from 1st January, 1935, to the command of regiments of cavalry or battalions of infantry or to equivalent appointments will be limited to three years. This is probably a necessary curtailment of tenure, but we hope it will not become a permanent fixture. A promising officer—one that will become a leader and commander of troops in the real sense—needs four years at least commanding his own unit for him to develop his qualities of leadership and to make his mark. Lieutenant-Colonel Snooks commanding his battalion for three years in Cannanore or St. Thomas' Mount may think he stands less chance of recognition than Lieutenant-Colonel Fooks in the Peshawar Brigade, or at Razmak.

(*ii*) Officers for whom commands or equivalent appointments cannot be found when they complete 26 years' service and attain the rank of lieutenant-colonel will be granted leave up to one year and retired on a minimum pension of £700 a year. This cuts across certain old Indian Army traditions but, from any business point of view, is impeccable. There seems to be some doubt as to the exact meaning of the expression " cannot be found " and some officers imagine that, if they have not obtained command at 26 years' service, they will necessarily be retired. We understand that this is not the intention and that it would not be altogether incorrect to substitute the word " foreseen " for " found." The Selection Board works from twelve to fifteen months in advance and if, at one of its half-yearly meetings, no command or equivalent appointment can be " found " for an officer of 26 years' service, it is presumed that he will be retired : but, if a com-

mand vacancy could be foreseen when the officer would have, say, $26\frac{1}{2}$ or $26\frac{3}{4}$ years' service, he would certainly be considered for this command, if in all respects fit and thoroughly efficient. On the other hand, if there were several candidates for one vacancy, all about the same date, it would presumably be a case of "survival of the fittest."

Japan and the Pacific.

It would be folly at such a time as this to ignore the serious issues raised by the apparent collapse of the Naval discussions in London between Japan, America and Great Britain; this failure to reach an agreement is a significant reminder that Japan is not satisfied with her present situation either from the security or from the economic point of view. Fourteen short years ago the Washington Conference met in an atmosphere of democracy and internationalism; if the 1935 Naval Conference ever takes place the atmosphere will be one of intense nationalism and a suspicion of democratic government as hitherto understood. The stumbling block is Japan, and we might well try and study the Japanese viewpoint.

In Japan there are two political schools, one the liberal and moderate school which negotiated the Washington Treaty, and the other the militarist school which at present seems very powerful. The military party consider that Japan can solve the problem of feeding her people and achieving her destiny as a Great Power by developing the raw materials of the Asiatic mainland, manufacturing them in her own factories and selling the products back to the mainland in a privileged market. After the Industrial Revolution in England the same problem arose and, *mutatis mutandis*, was solved in very much the same manner. The occupation of Korea and Manchuria has definitely committed Japan to a continental policy and, although she is running grave risks *vis-a-vis* a recovering China and a suspicious Russia, she is evidently prepared to accept them.

In this expansionist policy Japan is thwarted by the terms of the Washington Treaties, which established the principle that the problems of the Far East should be dealt with according to certain basic principles and by the signatories to the Nine-Power Treaty *acting in concert.* The Treaties were based on two simple ideas:—

(*a*) They assured equal naval security to the United States, the British Empire and Japan by the adoption of the 5 : 5 : 3 naval ratio, and by an agreement on the part of each of the Naval Powers that they would not further fortify certain islands,

notably Hong Kong belonging to Great Britain, the Philippines (particularly the naval base project at Cavite) the Aleutian Islands and Guam belonging to the U. S. A., and the Kuriles, the Pescadores, Formosa and the mandated Caroline and Marshall islands belonging to Japan. From press reports we gather that already Japan is making secret preparations in some of these islands.

(*b*) The Nine-Power Treaty established the principle of China's integrity and the "open door" as regards trade.

The military party in Japan appear to think they cannot carry out their continental policy without tearing up portions of the Washington Treaties, and at present it is not unlikely that the Treaties will be denounced this year. This would place both England and America in a difficult position, and so far as England is concerned, may force us to spend vast sums on the Navy because we cannot afford to leave our great interests in the Far East at the mercy of anyone. It must be remembered that, once the Treaties are denounced, there is nothing to prevent Japan from fortifying the Kurile Islands, Formosa and the mandated islands, which stand across the seaway between the Philippines and Hawaii. No one, least of all us British, would wish to deny the Japanese a fair field in China on the assumption that their intentions do not cover a plan to destroy our trade interests there and in the Pacific.

The problem for America is not dissimilar, although from the point of view of security and trade her risks are smaller. America, preoccupied with her own internal affairs, is a different country from that of 1922 when her statesmen interested themselves wholeheartedly in the world problems of peace. There is a growing American opinion that it is better to face the facts of Japanese power and cut the losses in the Far East. The fruition of this "Middle West" doctrine, despite its plausible attraction, would be war in which the U. S. A. would inevitably be embroiled; for America's international trade, particularly in the Pacific, has such great ramifications that it would be impossible to sever them without provoking a crisis in her political life.

A solution for this grave problem is difficult to find. If the Japanese peoples could be made to understand that the present policy of the militarist party is akin to the Junker policy in Germany in 1914; if the military party could be made to understand that they cannot go

on antagonising the world all of the time without risk of reprisals; if the statesmen of England and America and Japan would co-operate on the basis of joint policy and common liability; then, perhaps, "the cloud no bigger than a man's hand arising over the Pacific which might come to overshadow the whole sky" (General Smuts in a speech on 12th November 1934), might be dispelled.

Between Japan and England there are traditional ties of friendship, and, even in her continental adventures, a large section of British public opinion was pro-Japanese and unfavourable to the findings of the Lytton Commission; surely with this in the background we can come to an agreement which will be a vital factor for peace in the Far East.

The Indian Report.

We suppose that we ought to comment editorially on the Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform; but we can hardly suppose that any of our readers are interested now in this threadbare subject. Yet, its acceptance by the British Parliament will change—eventually—all our lives and our schemes of living in India. Despite the present political excitement we can safely state that nobody can say when an All-India Federation will be inaugurated, but we can, perhaps, prophesy that within eighteen months Provincial Autonomy will be granted.

The Federation, however, is the main thing. The members of the Committee—like their predecessors of the Simon Commission and the Round Table Conferences—came up against huge bunkers, which even the wildest drive of an extreme Labour or Congress disciple could not escape or evade; the Princes, the Communal Award, legitimate British interests and the impossible demands of the Indian Congress. These were the stumbling blocks which produced the present lengthy Report with all its safeguards.

The majority of Indian politicians have rejected the Report because of these safeguards; a majority, and an unexpectedly large one, of the Houses of Commons and Lords has accepted the Report because of these same safeguards. And yet we cannot help feeling that if the Report is adopted for India with the goodwill of both these British and Indian politicians who have got to work it there is in it all the opportunity and all the hope for an amicable *modus vivendi*. That there will ever be cordial relations between the extreme

politicians of both sides—except in case of war—we doubt. *Swaraj* is the dominant and winning slogan in this country; in the Report even Dominion Status has not been mentioned.

The Committee has accepted the main proposals of the White Paper—All-India Federation with responsibility at the Centre (except in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Ecclesiastic matters) and Provincia Autonomy. The Governor-General and Provincial Governors are given wider powers of veto than at present in cases of vital emergency; but it is unlikely that these will be used unless under deliberate provocation by recalcitrant extremists.

The scheme provides for eleven Governors' provinces, excluding Burma which is to be separated, but adding Sind and Orissa. In all these provinces there will be elected Legislative Assemblies, the major party of which will provide the Ministers. The electorate for these Assemblies will consist of about ten per cent. of the population. We foresee in certain provinces (without mentioning the Centre) a conglomeration of parties which will, in comparison, make the French Chamber of Deputies look a coherent whole.

Although the Report has received in India the whole-hearted disapproval of its vocal politicians we think this adverse criticism can be taken with a grain of salt. They know, as well and probably better than we do, what it means and what power is being transferred. In the provincial sphere—which is, after all, the main concern of the Indian lawyer, merchant, artisan and peasant—Indians will have a full measure of self-government. In all internal matters the Provincial Governments will be free from the control and superintendence of the Central Government. The direct rule of the Indian Civil Servant will cease. Whether this will be a good thing or a bad thing time will show, and we must therefore eschew comment.

At the Centre the principle of responsibility is conceded. The Centre, however, is still a nebulous constellation of converging heavenly bodies and, until they take more shape, we must view them as an astronomical phenomenon, similar, we would suggest, to Halley's Comet which threatened our world for a time but, in the end, missed it.

ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, QUETTA, ON THE 8TH OCTOBER, 1934.

(Published by Special Permission.)

This is probably the last time I shall be able to visit the Staff College here before I finally finish my active military career next year. What I say to you to-day may be my military testament to Quetta.

You men are just starting on the upward military ladder, and some of you are certain to exercise great influence on the future efficiency for war of the Army, during your careers.

An indifferent regimental officer is an encumbrance, but a narrow-minded staff officer is a danger to commanders and troops alike.

I am not happy about the present officer, either in the British Service or in the Indian Army. I do not think that, as a class, they have improved in general education, or military instinct and leadership, since the War. One might well imagine that those, at any rate, who had been through the tremendous experiences of the Great War would have emerged with an increased military instinct.

I may be wrong, but I do not think I am, when I say that, if anything, the contrary is the case.

Let me state my case.

First, as to what I may call the civilian side of the soldier's mind.

We soldiers are looked down upon, by the liberal professions and others, as being of rather inferior intelligence. That, I am perfectly certain, is not the case. There are just as many acute brains in the Army as there are in any other profession, but they are not sufficiently used to keep them up to concert pitch.

Undoubtedly this is partly due to our environment, which we cannot well alter in this country. Small stations in which we meet the same people day after day. One hot weather after another, and the great spaces of India, which prevent us from moving about and coming into contact with alert brains and men distinguished in other walks of life, result in " brain slackness " in all but the most gifted personalities.

Moreover, this " crabbing " by civilians has, to some extent, caused us soldiers to retire rather smugly into our purely military shells, and to ignore the trend of thought and events in the civilian world around us. I am almost inclined to say that this encourages a supercilious narrowness of outlook in every direction, and not the least in a military one.

No matter how much some of us endeavour to encourage independence of thought and the polishing of wits, it is, especially in India, not easy to devise means to keep up the pressure.

In every other trade—politics, business, law, and even to some extent in our sister services, the Navy and the Air Force—men are always, as it were, on active service. In the services they are contending against nature and the elements, and in the civil professions striving for place and success against others ; for, if they do not do so, in the services they may meet disaster, and in other professions they fall behind in the race.

With us, we may read as much as we like, we may theorize as much as we like, and we may discuss as much as we like ; but we are not, day in and day out, and year in and year out, on active service, as are the other professions.

Of necessity, we are always pretending ; our exercises on paper, on the ground, and with troops, are pretence, and it is impossible that it should be otherwise. We cannot have a bullet in every tenth rifle.

Small wonder, then, that only a very few retain their enthusiasm, especially when, in peace time, at any rate in regimental life, the mediocre brain and the lazy man go slowly up the ladder at much the same speed as their more brilliant and persevering brothers.

We cannot well alter the basic facts underlying this state of affairs, but I do suggest that improvement is possible, great improvement ; and the driving force must come from men like yourselves, who have taken the trouble to improve your education and your military knowledge, to acquire the habit of work and study, and, what is perhaps more important, to improve what gifts you have of imparting knowledge to others and for the clear exposition of a case.

I am horrified, as I travel up and down India, at the number of officers I find, senior and junior alike, who have allowed themselves

to sink into a state of complete brain slackness. Their narrow interests are bounded by the morning parade, the game they happen to play, and purely local and unimportant matters.

I have found men all over India who evidently scarcely read the papers, and are quite unaware of the larger aspects of what is going on in India around them, and still less of the stupendous events outside this country that are now in process of forming an entirely new world.

A study of the papers sent in by officers sitting for their promotion examinations and even for the Staff College, makes one glad that the results are not published to the world with critical comments by the examiners. Many officers to-day cannot even express themselves clearly in the simplest language, let alone with any style or distinction.

Men like you can do a tremendous lot, when you pass back into your units, to encourage your brother officers, by suggestion and discussion, to keep their minds active towards events and ideas of world importance in politics, economics, and sociology, instead of only towards polo and tennis tournaments, sport, or the next morning's parade.

So much for one aspect of my case. I pass to the attitude of mind of the average British Officer towards military matters.

You may think it curious, but I am convinced I am right when I say that, taking one thing with another, the British nation, though perhaps the toughest fighters, when they have their backs to the wall, are the most unmilitary-minded people in the world.

For geographical reasons, we have always been navally-minded. It has been forced on us, and it looks as if we are becoming air-minded for the same reasons ; but neither of these Services can by themselves hold our Empire. Army matters hardly interest the public at all, as they do in France or Germany, and the war of trenches convinced the amateur expert, at least to his own satisfaction, that there were no mysteries and no trade secrets in the military art.

War, and particularly successful war, is much more an affair of imagination than many people think, but few officers of the Army allow much play to their imagination. It would almost seem that it is a crime to do so, or to be one inch outside " sealed pattern " and regulations. The longer I remain in the Service, the more wooden

and the more regulation-bound do I find the average British Officer to be. Everyone has heard the British Non-Commissioned Officer, when asked why he did not do something or other, reply that there was "nothink laid down about it." I cannot but think that his officer's attitude of mind is often not very different.

I admit that our system of examinations may have something to do with this. A man's future depends on the result of those examinations, and it is not easy to devise questions that demand the exercise of imagination rather than a meticulous knowledge of the regulations, to answer successfully.

Our manuals of war are purposely general and not particular in their scope; they must be used as foundations, and not assumed to constitute a complete edifice of military thought. They are intended to stimulate thought and imagination. Many British officers appear to think that they are designed to obviate the necessity of thinking at all on their part.

Again, this may be partly the fault of the regulations themselves, for no one can say they are written in a way which stimulates thought or imagination. I wonder what the results would be were I to commission you officers here to re-write those regulations in an arresting and provocative manner, which would cause them to be read with eagerness by the average regimental officer, and promote heated and healthy discussion, and unexpected and unusual tactics on manœuvres? Books on sport or business are eagerly read, but our books on war, in which we may be engaged at any moment, are seldom attractive even to us professionals.

There obviously must be regulations when you are dealing with great masses of men; there obviously must be, and are, principles of war—war has always been with us, and has taught us many things that we cannot disregard without at least risking failure.

You cannot read war history without coming across many instances of failure, and even disaster, owing to the neglect of some or other of the so-called principles of war; but, on the contrary, you cannot read history without coming across many great victories and successes, which, when you analyse them, have apparently been gained by disregarding so-called principles altogether, or, as I like to call it, by taking legitimate risks.

Please do not imagine that I am asking you to leave here, and go on to staff employment and eventual command, with the fixed purpose of ignoring principles and rules. I do, however, suggest to you that there are no games in the world—and war is the greatest of all games –in which to take risks is not one of the secrets of success; but I will qualify that by saying that every risk you take must be legitimate and have good reasons behind it.

If you adopt base-line play in a tennis tournament, and never risk coming to the net for fear of a "passing shot," you may get a reputation for fine stroke play, but you will not often win.

This contention demands proof.

The battle of Tannenburg was converted from a retreat of the Russian Army into a disaster by partial ignoring of orders on the part of General von Francois, and by his taking great risks, with his command and his own career. With 25 Battalions, he strung himself out over a length of 50 kilometres, and in two days, in spite of a further order to advance north-eastward, he established a single thin line of posts between the Russian masses struggling to escape from the forests and whatever hostile troops might be set in motion against him from the direction of Warsaw. The Russians had no idea that anyone could be so audacious as to have nothing behind this thin line, and their rout became a disaster. Even a single battalion of von Francois' Corps captured as many as 17,000 prisoners, and out of a total of 92,000 unwounded and 30,000 wounded prisoners, 61,000 was the share of his Corps. Obviously, anyone who had proposed to do this on peace manœuvres, or in a promotion examination, would have incurred the gravest risks. Pray do not think that I am suggesting to you that you should cultivate the practice of disobedience of orders. If you do so, you take your fate in your hands. But he took *legitimate* risks. He availed himself of the privilege, which even our regulations allow, of the man on the spot knowing more than the commander who issued the original order. He realised the mentality of a beaten army, and knew that it is legitimate, nay imperative, to take risks against a beaten enemy that you would not presume for a moment to take against a still unshaken foe.

Winston Churchill, in his masterly account of the eastern campaign, describes von Francois' action as "that rare alternation of prudence and audacity which is the characteristic of true soldierly genius."

Another example. A year or two ago, I was told by the Director of Training that General Ironside, on manœuvres, was advancing towards his enemy on a three-brigade front, with no reserve !! I asked for particulars, and was told that he was endeavouring to crush a detachment of the enemy before they joined their main body, and that he had the initiative and superiority of numbers, but that time was against him. On this, I asked an obviously horrified audience what use, then, was there in a reserve and that surely speed and an early crushing blow were obvious necessities, and every man out of the front line on such an occasion was a man wasted.

When Lord Allenby attacked Beersheba and Gaza, I myself was in command of four Divisions turning the enemy left flank by attacking Beersheba, with the Cavalry still further round the outer flank. General Bulfin was making a demonstration against the entrenched position on the coast at Gaza, and acting as a pivot for the great wheel. Between us there was a gap of many miles, with only a few scattered Cavalry in observation in it. The pandits were horrified : " Not a man in reserve except local reserves ! Horrible ! Impossible ! "

Why should there be ? We again had the initiative, we outnumbered the enemy, we had mounted troops in large numbers, which he had not, speed was essential and we intended to hit excessively hard with every man we could put into the front line, and when this is done, the defending commander must be a transcendent genius if he grasps what is being done before it is too late. Lord Allenby took a perfectly legitimate risk, and won his battle.

There are geniuses in all walks of life, men outside the ordinary class. Few of us can aspire to that, but I do maintain that we can, and should, cultivate boldness and the legitimate taking of risks ; and, above all, the attitude of mind which leads up to this.

None of you have commanded yet. I have, and I can tell you that, when you are thinking out your plans for battle, whether deliberately or in an emergency, if you are any good at all, a still small voice tells you that in one course lies safety and mediocrity, and in the other risk, but almost certain surprise and more brilliant possibilities.

If that still small voice comes to you as a surprise, unless you are a genius, you will almost certainly adopt the safe course, or at

least you will follow the advice "IN MEDIO TUTISSIMUS IBIS;" but if you have cultivated the habit of looking at every military problem, except purely protective duties, from the point of view of weighing the pros and cons of a bold policy, you will instinctively lean towards a bolder course, and the reasons for and against it will flash into your mind, just as the appreciation of a situation, from long practice, comes into your mind in logical sequence, and you will not be taken by surprise.

Now, before you command, you will be staff officers helping a commander, the servants of the troops. You may have the luck to be under a commander of imagination, and you will recognise it at once. It is altogether a different feeling from being under a commander who is determined to take no risks, and, above all, is determined not to be accused of departing by so much as an inch from the so-called rules of war.

If you are under a man of imagination, he will probably have thought out two or three plans—ordinary, bold, and very bold and he will work out the general idea of them, and pass them to his Chief of Staff and ask him to consult very secretly with his head administrative officer, in order to tell him whether they think they can implement all or any of his three ideas, in food, water, ammunition, disposal of wounded, reinforcements, movement, and so on.

It will not be your business to discourage the bold idea. It will be your business to make sure that no factors whatever are concealed from your commander which might jeopardise his plan; and, "contrariwise," if he is cautious, it is your duty to hold back nothing that might encourage him to adopt a bolder plan.

It is not your business to make the plan. It is not your business to decide on the plan. It is your business to supply all the information —facts, details, etc.—that will help your commander to decide finally.

In the end, it is he who has to decide. If he is built naturally for war, he will like the responsibility. If he is not, the sooner we get rid of him the better. But he is immensely helped in his difficult task by the way in which the facts are put to him by a skilled staff.

However gloomy these facts are, a big commander will and does override them on occasions.

I instance Lord Roberts on his march over the Peiwar Kotal to Kabul. He had two Brigades, but camel transport for only one, and he had to move one Brigade and send his camels back to bring up the other one. He had just done this when the hills around him were seen to be a mass of hostile tribesmen and standards. He knew the psychology of the hill warrior better than most men. Ninety men out of a hundred would have remained where they were until the second Brigade came up. "Bobs" went straight at them, and by his very boldness dispersed them and broke his way through to Kabul. I wonder how many officers would do that in a promotion examination ?

Lord Allenby made every arrangement he could for supplying his troops in his final battle, as far as Nazareth. He then turned to General Campbell, his Q. M. G., and said : "I intend that the Cavalry shall go further, through Damascus, and if necessary to Aleppo. Can you manage that ?" The Q. M. G. replied : "Quite impossible, Sir." Lord Allenby finished the conference by saying : "Then they will go there" —and they did go there. The risk was legitimate. Indeed, it was essential, if the Turkish armies were to be broken up, that the pursuit should be to the last gasp of man and horse.

I wonder if you think I am asking you to take foolish risks. I am not. I am asking you to cultivate the habit of mind that faces risks boldly, but with full knowledge of the consequences—not bald-headed.

You will find I am right in saying that, in the British Army, there are but few men who are prepared to take even a legitimate risk in war. Do not, I beg of you, be content to go with the crowd. Shake yourselves free from the ruck, and the further you get, encourage the more, freedom of thought and imagination by every means in your power.

We, as English soldiers, have been brought up on the necessity of being dressed by the centre, and to regard with suspicion the man who is five yards out of dressing, even in battle. May I remind you of Marshal Saxe's opinion, in his Memoirs on the Art of War, of the average commander of his day (1757) :

"Custom and prejudice, confirmed by ignorance, are the usual foundation of the so-called science of war."

Or Napoleon in 1813 :

" Si l'art de la guerre n'était autre chose que l'art de rien compromettre la gloire deviendrait la proie des esprits médiocres."

Both apply still, especially to the British.

All that I have said really boils down to an appeal to you, instructors and students alike, to encourage, by every means in your power, independence of thought, imagination, initiative, avoidance of the obvious, the ordinary, the commonplace.

We are constantly told that one of the chief aims of a commander in war should be surprise. If he is one of those whose minds have been trained to regard regulations as their god and any departure from them almost irreligious, we can hardly expect him to conceive plans which will be other than commonplace, and easily guessed at and countered by his enemy.

I am rather afraid that quite a number of the average Staff College students aim at being a correct, methodical, " sealed pattern " staff officer, ground out to pattern by the Quetta and Camberley mill. Am I altogether wrong in thinking that, to many Englishmen, to be independent in thought, to have imagination, to go outside the obvious, to be different to others, is to be almost un-English, or even that more frightful crime " not sound ? "

How many great commanders have been orthodox and commonplace ? Did Napoleon never take big risks ? Did not Nelson possess a blind eye ? Must we always attack at dawn with one quarter of our force in reserve ? Must we always be fully concentrated, and never risk some measure of dispersion for a big object ? Must we always have 100 per cent. of our forces, ammunition, and supplies, on the field before we dare attack, even if we have the two great factors of success in war, initiative and time, on our side ?

Do you wish to remain always labelled, as I have so often heard men labelled on the Selection Board, " A reliable staff officer, but no independence of thought; not likely to command ? "

Think it over, and remember that, in war, above all other arts, the commonplace will never succeed.

MARTIAL AND NON-MARTIAL RACES.

The following essay was awarded the second place in the Gold Medal Prize Competition of 1934 :—

Subject—

" It is often said that Indians are by nature divided into what might be called martial and non-martial races. This is a mere myth....." Examine this quotation and state your conclusions.

By Major General E. C. Alexander, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O.

Myth ? A fable, a legend, a fabulous narrative founded on a remote event ; a falsehood.—Chambers : *Twentieth Century Dictionary.*

From the earliest legendary times until the middle of our nineteenth century the history of " India " is a tale of successive sovereignties founded on, and buttressed by, victory on the battlefield. Conquest directly implies the higher fighting value of the conqueror. It is a legitimate assumption that the conqueror has always used every physical and moral means to maintain this superiority. Such methods include obviously the disarming of the mass of the conquered, and the restriction of recruitment, in at least the *elite* of the conqueror's forces, to men of his own following. The more the conquest represented the culmination of a successful racial invasion, the more complete and enduring would be the measures taken and the more definite and final their result—the division of the population into a martial race and a non-martial race.

In that sense, a division into martial and non-martial races has been for many millions of its people for centuries in India, no fable but a practical fact of life. Legend, if any existed, lay in the traditional prowess of the ancestors of the conquered.

" India " has experienced racial invasion and partial repopulation by at least three species of the *genus* man. The polity of one of them, the Indo-Aryan, further reserved the roles, at least, of King and Captain within its own tribes to a hereditary Guild—The Rajput. There were, however, in addition, many invasions, conquests and re-conquests on scales of varying magnitude, by subdivision of these races. It must therefore follow that in many instances the conquered and the conqueror have been of the same racial stock. In these

circumstances particularly it may be legitimately agreed that the separation of the population into martial and non-martial sections was artificial rather than natural. While, however, the ethnological affinities of the conquerors have been as varied as the scope of their conquests, the direction of their advance has been curiously constant. From the days of the fabled Hanuman to the very real Ahmad Shah, the conqueror's advance has been consistently southward. Eddies and backwashes there have been, produced by dynastic struggles or family feud, but in the nine centuries that have elapsed since Mahmud of Ghazni crossed the Suleimans, twice only has the current of conquest set definitely northward,—once with the expansion of Mahratta power in the eighteenth century, and again with the rise to hegemony of British India in the nineteenth.

The first might be claimed as the achievement of clever politicians, rather than warriors ; it was certainly materially assisted by the internecine strife of the southern Muslim sultanates and the striving after universal lordship of the Delhi Moghuls. This movement, though reinforced by all the Hindu chivalry of Central India, met its Marathon at Panipat. It is, however, interesting to note that his genealogical tree on view to-day at Satara, gives Sivaji descent from the royal Rajput house of Udaipur, while legend ascribes it to the Chitpavan Brahmin, an unique oversea, and even Nordic, origin.

The steel frame of British-Indian power indubitably had its origin and source of replacement in a land lying twenty degrees north of Cabul.

Throughout the centuries numbers, learning, wealth, in short, the material means to military power, have lain rather with the conquered Southerner than the conquering Northlander. It would appear, therefore, that there must have existed some very powerful, and constant, factor to account for this consistent supremacy of the latter. I suggest that this factor has been climate ; that the climate of the Indian Peninsula has in the past so devitalized its successive conquerors that they have become within comparatively short periods of time unable to stand up against a new wave of northern energy.

The Muslim historian who wrote, " He who holds Cabul holds the keys of Delhi " was right, and he was right not because there was any mystical strategical importance in Cabul City, but because the ruler of the tracts west of the Indus controlled the connections to the most convenient reservoirs of " new blood."

The conclusions suggested are :—The existence in India for centuries of conquerors and conquered and thereby of martial and non-martial sections of its population is no falsehood but a historical fact. That the former have been consistently found from among those peoples who have been least exposed to the deleterious climate of the Indian Peninsula, is a proposition supported, not only by fabulous narrative founded on remote events, but by the facts of comparatively recent history ; since climate is a natural agency, it would be reasonable to say that this division has in fact been drawn by nature. These are conclusions based primarily on the general history of the two thousand years preceding the advent of the British to India ; it will therefore be of interest to see how far they are consonant with the details of our experience during the century and a half since the general direction of the march of victorious armies was switched from south by east to north by west.

At the beginning of this century officers of the Madras Army still talked of the glorious deeds of "The Coast Army," of which they claimed that their men were the legitimate heirs, and they pointed to the more recent records of the Queen's Own Sappers and Miners, and of such corps as the battalions of Madras Pioneers, as conclusive proof that they were worthy heirs. To a reader of the accounts of our campaigns in Southern and Eastern India, it seems evident that a large proportion of the forces, hostile or friendly, engaged, were of comparatively low fighting value,—the result of the battles usually turning on the result of an engagement between certain small contingents of European, or of Native Troops trained and led by Europeans.

A point of interest to the matter under review is the extent to which the native personnel of these trained contingents was indigenous to the theatres of war. Now, war may be said to have had in India, in the eighteenth century, practically the status of a staple industry. Labour is still in India, very considerably migratory ; it would therefore have been unnatural if the war industry had not produced its own quota of migratory labour : personnel which moved naturally to areas where employment was brisk or wages attractive. The proposition advanced is that there was a considerable body of such labour and that given the necessary condition of good wages, there was ethnologically little difference in the pick of material available at Vellore, or Lahore, Poona or Patna, to a recruiter. Moreover, since for centuries the line

of movement for victorious armies had been southward, it would have been most natural for the flow of this labour movement to have been generally in the same direction; and consequently quite possible for the personnel of a contingent recruited in Southern India to have consisted partially, or even wholly, of individuals belonging ethnographically more properly to areas far to the northward.

In support of the possibly novel, but certainly possible proposition that this actually did occur in the case of corps recruited on the Carnatic Coast, the following facts are cited: In the archives of the 5th Madras Infantry there existed in A.D. 1900, a fairly complete nominal roll of the battalion in about the year 1780. The names therein were characteristic of ethnological affinities north of the Nerbudda, rather than south of the Godavery; certainly there was in it no equivalent of the large number of distinctively Telegu and Tamil names on the roll of 1900 A.D. In the records of the 6th Madras Infantry was a letter of about the same period, from an officer, telling that his battalion had recently taken to enlisting "Cawns." as well as "Moors" and expressing satisfaction therewith. Now, to this day the Muslim fisher-folk of the Ceylon coast are known as Moormen. "Cawn" is an obvious, and somewhat phonetically superior, equivalent for our modern Khan; an inference is that to the eighteenth century Madras recruiter "Moor" was a Muslim with some known local geographical affinity; "Cawn," the more recent and obvious migrant from an unknown northern home. I have known a "Deccani Mussulman" recruit for a Madras Infantry Battalion differing physically little from others of his batch, not merely claim to be a "Pathan" but able to substantiate intelligently that his great-grandfather was a Tarawali from Hazara; also, a "Hindustani Mussulman" sowar of the 26th (*née* Madras) Light Cavalry, physically so true to type as to be recognisable as an Afidi among the sand-hills of Arabia. The latter knew no Pushtu but did know that his family had settled at Fateghur about 1750 A.D., the location of the ancestral village in Sowaki. He said that his family still sometimes got a wife therefrom.

Whatever personnel formed the dough or the leaven in our first drilled contingents, it is certain that as these expanded into armies the demand for men from further north was constant.

In the early years of the nineteenth century we raised many "Subsidiary Forces" and "Special Corps." The majority of these

drew at least a proportion of their personnel from outside the political spheres for which they were specially formed. I know of no instance in which any tangible proportion of this outside element was drawn from areas to the southward of the political sphere. By 1850 the Hyderabad and Gwalior contingents were competing with the regular Bengal Army for the peasantry of Oudh and Rohilkhand, the most northern areas then accessible to our recruiters. The regular Bombay Army drew recruits from far north of the Presidency boundary long before it ceased to be a separate administrative organization.

Our "Sepoy" Armies helped to carry the flag from the Indian Ocean to the Himalayas and the Helmand, during a century of military achievement of which any soldiery might be proud. In the latter half of that century they enjoyed all the advantages accruing to the agents of the predominant military power in India, but a comparison of the campaigns of that period in the Punjab and Nepaul with those in the Carnatic and Deccan, in the first half, indicates very clearly that the further north those armies went, the harder was the fighting, the smaller the margin for any errors in organisation or leading. The hastily raised Punjabi corps appear to have dealt effectively enough in 1857-58 with the rebel regiments of the Bengal Regular Army and their sympathizers in the countryside.

The record of the Queen's Own Sappers and Miners needs no advertisement. An old officer thereof told me some years back that service in it was hereditary to the point of "*qosam*," verging on the status of a sub-caste for matrimonial purposes!

I knew, early in the century, at any rate one Madras Infantry Regiment whose peace field exercise ability was at least equal to, while its interior economy, parade ground and athletic efficiency was considerably in advance of that of the bulk of its northern contemporaries. I know of a Madras Infantry Battalion in the Great War which, under the inspiration of a commandant who firmly believed it was his duty and fate to die in Armageddon, successfully crossed bayonets with the Turk. The Mahratta earned high renown amid the dust and heat, the cold and the mud of the fighting before Kut, but to-day the Mahratta peoples have difficulty in finding sufficient recruits of an adequate physical standard to fill the requirements of the five battalions of the 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

The great discovery, or re-discovery, of the War, 1914—18, was the "Garhwali," a folk from our furthest northern hills, who confirmed in Irak and on the North West Frontier, a reputation won in France. The war also showed that fifty years of pax Britannica had not, as some feared, emasculated the Dogra and that for all his quiet manner he was still a first-class fighting gentleman. The blue ribbon for the highest ratio of casualties to men of military age is the guerdon of the Khattak, in his hills on the edge of our north-western administrative border. Since it may be, and indeed has been, argued that the great preponderance of northern-bred men in our Army in 1914 renders any data drawn from "The War," entirely inconclusive in regard to the matter under consideration, it may be serviceable to draw some from an entirely different source. Our own history, if no other, should teach us that the qualities required for the civilian adventurer are very similar to those required of the soldier; that the nation which produces many of the former will at need produce the latter. Lately, much has been written of the pressure of the population on the land in Eastern and Southern India and the consequent need of increasing the opportunities of employment for these peoples. In such circumstances it would appear that a virile population would at least fill all existing local opportunities for employment and avidly seize on all new ones. It would be fair to assume that failure thus to maintain themselves in their own land against "foreigners" was indicative of an inferiority in stamina or energy. It is a matter of common knowledge that the Pathan pseudo pedlar stalks the Deccan and Carnatic, drawing a handsome profit on his transactions. In 1931 two-thirds of the labour on the Western India Turf Club race courses was Garhwali; durwans, car-park superintendents and so forth in Bombay and Madras are 90 *per cent.* North Indian; Bombay Dock labour is recruited largely from both sides of the "Durand Line." The civilian manager of a Dairy Farm in the far south told me in 1932 that he could not run on less than 40 per cent. of "North Indian men" since they alone gave an economic return for good wages given; his northern men were in fact Punjabi Jats. Men from the Salt Range have for many years "fired" the ships of the P. and O. and City Lines. A few years ago "India" started a navy. Here, indeed, one would imagine was an opportunity for the descendants of the famed Angria and Janjira corsairs, or indeed for any of the teeming population of two thousand miles of coast line, seeking honourable,

lucrative and, incidentally, martial employment; to-day, even the "Sick Bay" personnel of the Indian Navy is recruited from the Attock District.

The over-worked pleas of "a lower standard of living" will not avail; the material wants of the northerner are, if anything, greater than those of his indigenous southern competitor. The significance of his success could only be diminished by showing that there was an equivalent rank and file infiltration in the opposite direction. The fact is that while the King's armies have for ninety years paved the way to the armed exploitation of the Indian Peninsula, the forays still continue in a different guise.

The experiences of the last two centuries generally confirm the deduction drawn from the general history of the previous twenty, that where Northerner and Southerner compete on no more than equal terms, the Northerner wins. Since the Northerner and Southerner have been and are themselves of varied race, tribe and creed, the simplest explanation of the former's success is the superior vitality conferred on him by the land of his "infant birth" and nurture.

The final conclusions propounded are then:

The past in other lands besides India has shown that those who know their business can make technically competent soldiers out of any material, with a modicum of physical efficiency. That it is possible to maintain a martial spirit under adverse conditions, possible, even, to create it—given time and other favourble circumstances. History shows equally conclusively, however, that the greater the physical vitality of the raw material and the stronger its initial consciousness of a fighting tradition, the easier the work of making and the smaller the risk of failure under the stress of war. If, therefore, the framers of the Report meant merely that there were no simple anthropological formulae by which we could determine the material in India from which alone soldiers could be made, they were right. If, on the other hand, they intended to lay down as a principle that all the male population within the bounds of the Indian Empire is equally good raw material for potential soldiery they were wrong. They were wrong because Nature working through climate confers a higher physical vitality on a proportion of that population, and that superimposed on this the action of man, and particularly the Hindu caste system, has resulted in large elements of that population having been divorced for many generations from any fighting tradition.

" CHINA TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW."

By " Hsueh Sheng."

The tragedy of China is being enacted in an arena so remote from the centres of white civilization, that, despite its importance to the whole world, it appears to excite less interest than a budget speech in England, the kidnapping of a film star's baby in America or the controversy on the subject of " body-line " bowling in Australia. Yet momentous events are taking place ; events calculated to shatter in an instant this apathetic indifference if only their full import were more generally realized.

China, impoverished to the verge of bankruptcy, her shrinking frame wasted by internal disease and the ill-usage of foreign persecutors lies stretched once more upon the rack, her tortured limbs almost wrenched asunder. Her friends—the signatories of the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty—who have guaranteed her against dismemberment, are content to watch the struggle. They do not applaud, it is true, but neither do they rush to release the harassed sufferer and apply palliatives to her aching flesh. In place of restoratives they offer platitudes ; for medicines and ointments they substitute sermons. But, slowly and inexorably, the rack continues to do its work, until stretched and broken beyond all human endurance the frail body can stand no more. Will those friends who have written and preached so much of their love of fairplay and their horror of war, stand by and watch this crime consummated ? Or will they, before it is too late, realize that the sufferer is powerless to effect her own release, and that if her life is to be preserved, sympathy must be translated into action ?

China is potentially one of the richest countries in the world. Her vast resources, as yet scarcely tapped, include not only every commodity necessary to feed and clothe her four hundred million souls, but are also believed to embrace all the products necessary to the existence of a civilized manufacturing state. Yet this promising country, whose people are unrivalled in their capacity for patient toil and skilful handicraft, stands dangerously close to bankruptcy whilst the spectre of famine lurks constantly in one or other of her stricken provinces. Banditry is rife in many quarters. Piracy infests the China seas. Communism flourishes in the Kiangsi area in flagrant opposition to the National Government in Nanking, whilst

in the North, Manchuria and Jehol have already been swallowed up by Japan, and further inroads appear to be threatened.

The situation is deplorable, chaotic. It has become so involved that few people find it worth the trouble to attempt to unravel the tangled strands of fact and fiction, truth and propaganda. When once the realities are grasped, however, the problems which emerge, and the dangers which threaten the West due to China's weakness will be found to provide a study of intriguing interest. Their consideration will serve to set the stage for a survey of some of the more obvious possibilities of the future. An effort will be made to draw a picture of conditions as they exist in China to-day, to outline the dangers which appear to threaten, and to suggest a solution which it is believed would avert them.

A consideration of China's government or lack of government is a necessary first step in getting down to realities.

Since the revolution which overthrew the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty in 1911, numerous military leaders have sprung up and struggled with each other to seize the supreme power ; but this has proved so elusive that no personality has yet arisen strong enough to grasp and wield it. It was not until 1928, after a series of mushroom governments had sprung up and withered again, that the armies of Chiang Kai Shek thrust Northwards and, seizing Peking, forced the dissolution of the Northern Government established there, and inaugurated the National Government. The seat of government was transplanted to Nanking, which was proclaimed as the new capital of the now " unified " China.

Chiang represented the Southern section of the Kuomintang—" the People's Party, " created by the revolutionary leader Sun Yat Sen, whose disciple Chiang had been—and he triumphed over the North because he had succeeded in collecting around him a more efficient army than his rivals. Immediately upon his success he proudly announced the unification of China, and secured the recognition of the Powers for the new National Government.

China thus became unified, in name if not in fact, and since that date the National Government has continued to enjoy the blessing of the Powers and has been assumed to speak with the voice of all China.

Numerous attempts have been made to upset this government, and the years which have passed since its inauguration have been marked by a series of revolts. Independent revolutionary govern-

ments have been set up in the North, in Canton, and most recently in Fukien, but each in turn has been crushed by Chiang's army, and no single " war-lord " or coalition has yet succeeded in ousting him.

The generalissimo, meanwhile, has concentrated on the improvement and modernization of his army, leaving the administration of government to the politician elements of the Kuomintang party. Aided by a German mission of some sixty officers, he has succeeded in producing a force of two infantry and one cavalry divisions, well equipped and armed, and trained on foreign lines. This he has further supplemented with a steadily increasing air force, the machines and advisers for which have latterly been supplied mainly by the United States. Owing to the inexperience of its leaders and officers and the fact that its German advisers do not hold executive commands, it is doubtful whether this small force could make much showing against troops of a modern Western army, but it is certainly vastly superior to any other force in China. It is virtually Chiang's bodyguard, and the *corps élite* of his much larger army composed of many indifferent Chinese divisions scattered over the limited area which his government really controls.

In this army of General Chiang Kai Shek lies the secret of the National Government's continuity in power. But for it the Kuomintang could hardly have seized and could never have held the reins of government for so long, or retained its capital *in situ* at Nanking. It follows that Chiang, whatever his title for the time being may be, as the man with the gun, is the real head of the party, and little short of dictator in the affairs of its government. If he should resign he would no doubt take his bodyguard of picked troops with him. The Kuomintang would be little inclined to see these under the banner of a political opponent, hence, despite bitter disagreements, he stays and he continues to call the tune.

Within the Party there are, beyond doubt, many earnest and patriotic reformers, and several who can add to these attributes ability and farsightedness ; but owing to internal dissensions, corruption, place-hunting, inexperience and other defects of the new administration it has so far failed to improve materially the lot of the people, to deal effectively with the bandit situation, or to achieve the disbandment of the hordes of soldiery all over the country, owning allegiance to regional generals and preying upon the countryside. It has failed to stamp out the Communist menace in Kiangsi and Fukien, despite

repeated attempts and protracted operations, and though it has triumphed over local revolts, it has never succeeded in imposing any real authority or in collecting revenues from any area outside the limited zone—Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Hupei, Honan and Anhui provinces —actually garrisoned by units of Chiang Kai Shek's army. Other regions are controlled by various generals, each of whom holds his territory as the *nominal* representative of the National Government and each of whom has his own personal army—also *nominally* the troops of the National Government with which he garrisons and holds his territory, and which he supports by taxation of the people. These regional commanders are the men who, from time to time, have led their armies against those of Chiang. The National Government has no real authority in the areas they control, and in fact has nothing more than a somewhat dubious suzerainty. It is thus clear that the government at Nanking has no genuine title to speak for all China, but in that it is the one serious attempt to form a united government which has shown any promise of success since the revolution, the Powers have given it their support and encouragement.

Having originated in Canton, the Kuomintang party is by no means popular in the North, where the feeling has never been very enthusiastically republican. The North has little liking for Canton and its works. Its stolid inhabitants are far more conservative than the somewhat mercurial Southerners, and resent among other things the removal of the capital from Peking. Hence the National Government is anything but popular in North China. In Canton itself the National Government rules only in name. The Cantonese can never forget that Sun Yat Sen and the Kuomintang party sprung from Canton: *ergo* Canton should be the capital and not Nanking. Moreover, at the head of affairs there should assuredly be a Cantonese, and not this upstart Chiang Kai Shek, who is a native of Chekiang. Resentment against the National Government has actually been so acute in Canton that from the summer of 1931 until recently, the Cantonese section of the Kuomintang was in open revolt against Nanking and went to the length of declaring an independent government with its capital at Canton. Under the stress of the situation created by the Japanese aggression, the two warring factions of the Kuomintang have composed their differences for the time being. The union of Canton and Nanking, however, lacks depth and offers slight hope of permanence.

It will be appreciated from the foregoing that the Republic of China is hardly a term which should be taken too seriously, in that there is no one authority which can be said to be in complete control of the whole country. The National Government is the most plausible attempt at a central administration up-to-date, but, though Nanking has nominal authority throughout China proper, it has been seen that she cannot enforce her orders beyond the territory occupied by Chiang's army. Unless, therefore, she can so purge and reorganize her government as to ameliorate the condition of the people and compel the disbandment of the rival armies, she can hardly hope to retain her position indefinitely. Manchuria is lost already. Large portions of Kiangsi and Fukien and parts of Hunan and neighbouring provinces have been merged into the "Soviet Republic of China." There would appear to be every indication that this gradual process of disintegration is likely to continue, unless the National Government can rapidly stabilize its position, or other Powers interested in the welfare of China should deem it advisable to intervene, and lend a helping hand towards the placing of her government on a sound basis.

It should not be inferred that the writer has any desire to criticize adversely either the patriotic fervour or the benevolent intentions of the members of the National Government. On the contrary he is full of admiration for the progress they have been able to make against great odds, and he readily acknowledges the stupendous nature of their task. He is in sympathy with their aims, and desires with them to see China really unified and on the high road to improved conditions for her toiling masses. But he must concern himself with fact, unobscured by sentiment, and he is forced to admit, with any impartial observer, that up-to-date the real progress made towards genuine unification is scarcely encouraging. A hopeful sign for the future, however, may be seen in the fact that quite recently some prominent members of the Kuomintang party have freely admitted their errors and failures, and have shown that they clearly recognize the importance of creating better living conditions for the people and of extending the means of communication and transport.

Having arrived at an estimate of the position at present occupied by China's National Government, the second reality which it is proposed to examine is the existence or otherwise of a Red menace in China. The Japanese Press affects to take this matter very seriously and suggests that the present Government of China will never be strong

enough to make an end of the peril, and that there is danger of the whole country becoming sovietized. This is one of the excuses advanced for their aggression in Manchuria and Jehol, where it is urged that they dare not risk their vital interests being submerged by Bolshevism.

As far as the Kuomintang is concerned, this party may be assumed to be definitely anti-Red. It will be recalled that, in 1924, Sun Yat Sen called in the help of Soviet Russia and obtained the services of Borodin and his mission to assist him in the overthrow of the Northern war-lords. When the Russian intention to obtain control of the organs of government was realized, however, there was immediately a complete revulsion of feeling against Borodin. The members of his mission were driven out piecemeal and many of them were butchered. The Kuomintang thereupon washed its hands of Bolshevism, and has subsequently shown no inclination to revoke this decision or to encourage Red ideas.

The seed once sown, however, has not been completely eradicated and there are still large portions of Kiangsi, Hunan, Fukien and Ssuch'uan provinces, where a form of Chinese communism flourishes, and these areas have not shown any very noticeable tendency to decrease in size despite Chiang Kai Shek's frequent efforts at suppression. In other mountainous regions, notably in Southern Honan and in Hupei there are also small organized bodies of communistic bandits, who have enforced a form of communism upon the areas in which they operate. The sovietized areas are occupied by hordes of communist-bandit troops, organized on a military system and armed with rifles. Most of their weapons and ammunition have been obtained from the Chinese armies, frequently by the simple expedient of offering a definite price for their surrender. Funds are alleged to be supplied by the Third International, and there are believed to be a few Russian agents and advisers, though the bulk of the work is undoubtedly carried out by Chinese. The normal procedure by which sovietization is accomplished consists first in the forcible occupation of an area by the Red army, immediately after which propagandist agents proceed to distribute leaflets, plaster the area with appropriate slogans, address mass meetings of "workers," and generally agitate to enlist the sympathies of the poorer elements of the population. This propaganda is ably assisted by the confiscation of the property of the wealthier classes and its redistribution amongst the peasantry; by reducing the price of food and rates of taxes; by looting banks, public offices and the

property of any unfortunate foreigners who may have been indiscreet enough to remain in the area. A few wealthy citizens and a Christian or so are in all probability executed as a punishment for their past misdeeds of possession and a proof of the turning of the tables. These executions too serve as a salutary warning to all that the Communists are not the type of people to stand any nonsense. The levelling process having been completed, the sovietization of the area is proceeded with by the organization of trade unions and local soviets and the institution of collective farming. According to many reports the troops of the Red armies are not allowed to batten upon the populations, and are said to be regularly rationed and paid, so that, quite possibly, the conditions of life for the poorest class may be slightly better than they were prior to the arrival of the Communists in the area.

Chiang Kai Shek has found it impossible to eradicate Communism so far for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the Communists operate in difficult country and employ guerilla tactics against the Government troops sent to suppress them. Secondly, his lack of funds is so acute that he has been unable to pay regularly the large numbers of soldiers he maintains under arms. As a result these troops have frequently proved unreliable when employed in the Communist areas, the bribes offered by the Reds have proved too tempting, and there have been wholesale desertions to the ranks of the Communists. For this reason too he has hesitated to commit his best troops and risk their loss, fearing defeat at the hands of his political opponents should his fighting forces become greatly depleted. Thirdly, he has been so constantly diverted by the necessity to suppress revolts in other parts of China which threatened the existence of his government, by the floods, and by the Japanese action in Manchuria and Shanghai, that he has been unable to give the Reds his undivided attention for any length of time, and they have consequently profited by his periods of inactivity to enlarge their sphere of influence. His ability to clear up the situation now, without external assistance, is very much open to question, but the problem would be simplified if the recent *rapprochement* between Nanking and Canton were sufficiently sincere to permit of the Canton armies combining with the Nationalist troops against the Reds.

It is true that a very large force of Government troops is at present engaged in the anti-Red campaign and that a serious attempt

at blockading the Reds is being pushed forward with apparent determination. Success, however, will not be achieved by military operations alone, even if the issue of these could be foretold with certainty. It will wait upon the improvement of communications in the affected areas, the provision of roads and yet more roads; and if it is to be permanent, it will demand improved conditions for the people and vastly better relations between the Government troops and the peasantry than have existed in the past. Funds, which are lamentably short, will be the paramount necessity, not merely for road building, but equally to ensure that the troops are regularly rationed and paid, and thus deprived of all excuse for oppressing the inhabitants. There are indications that Chiang Kai Shek has realised the importance of the factors necessary for permanent success, and that he is making serious efforts not only to improve communications, but to promote a better understanding between the military and civil elements of the population. His task is no light one, however, and though it cannot be described as impossible it must be admitted that progress up to date has been too slow to encourage optimism.

There is thus a definite "Red Peril" in China to-day.

At present, however, there appears small likelihood of the movement gathering sufficient momentum to drive out the National Government. And even in the unlikely event of its being able to do so, it appears more than probable that the resulting government would rapidly be purged of all Russian influence. History has a way of repeating itself, and should the leaders of the Chinese Communist movement be successful in seizing the supreme power, they might be expected to be true to type and to throw over all Soviet influences immediately they had achieved the object for which foreign aid and money were utilized. The story of Borodin might well be repeated, and it is somewhat suprising that the Russians do not appear to have realized this. The innate conservatism of the population, and particularly of the Northerners is another factor which argues very strongly against the sovietization of the whole of China. The whole social instinct of the masses is directly in opposition to the principles of Communism. The centre of Chinese life is the family and the main desire in life of each Chinese family is to enrich itself at the expense of other families, and in due course to pass on the benefits to posterity. The division of property may appeal to the very poor in China as anywhere else, but the communal ownership of the property

after it has been divided is not calculated to appeal to a nation of individualists.

The third step towards an appreciation of the realities of the situation in China to-day is naturally an examination of conditions in "Manchukuo" as the Japanese have named the new state they have created from the territories of Manchuria and Jehol. The latest move has been the enthronement of P'u Yi as Emperor of the state. P'u Yi only 22 years ago, as a mere child, was the last of the Manchu Emperors to sit on the throne of China. He remains to-day the rightful occupant of the Dragon Throne.

The Japanese have declared that they have no intention of re-establishing the Ch'ing dynasty in China or of extending the domains of Manchukuo south of the Great Wall: but they can hardly expect the rest of the world to remain sufficiently credulous to take such an announcement seriously, it is certainly not taken seriously in China, where the supporters of the revolution regard this latest manœuvre of Japan with considerable concern.

The facts that the provinces from the Yellow River northwards to the Great Wall have little liking for the rule of the Southerners composing the bulk of the Kuomintang party, that the removal of the capital from Peking is bitterly resented, and that the Northerners have never been very enthusiastically republican have already been mentioned. There are also distinct elements of the population and a large section of the merchant class who were in favour of the resumption of the monarchy in 1915, when Yuan Shih Kai, then President of the Republic, was urged to found a new dynasty and proclaim himself Emperor. The date of his coronation was actually fixed for February 9th, 1916. A rebellion which broke out in the South, however, forced the abandonment of this scheme, and Chang Hsün's attempt in the following year to restore the Manchus fared no better. It failed, not because of lack of monarchist sentiment in the North, but because of non-co-operation amongst the Chinese Leaders. Chang Hsün's army was defeated by Tuan Ch'i Jui, the commander of the Tientsin garrison, who is believed to have opposed him more from personal jealousy than from being out of sympathy with his object of resuscitating the Ch'ing dynasty in the person of Hsüan T'ung (now known as P'u Yi).

These two attempts ended in failure not because the Manchu dynasty lacked friends or because there was any genuine love for the

chaotic maladministration which had followed its overthrow, but rather because of the lack of cohesion amongst the various leaders and the feelings of jealousy and mistrust which existed between them. The failures have discouraged further attempts until the Japanese coup of 1931, but it may safely be assumed that there are fully as many to-day who would welcome the return of the monarchy as there were, in 1916 and 1917; particularly now that the heir to the throne is no longer a child, but an enlightened and thoughtful student of world affairs. The many descendants of the old Manchu court and army in North China still retain a feeling of loyalty for the Imperial house and scorn the misgovernment which has succeeded it. The bulk of the people may be assumed to take little interest in the form of government and to be mainly concerned with the struggle for existence. They would look favourably upon any administration which offered to improve their lot. They are tired of the never-ending civil wars, the depredations and exactions of the rabble soldiery, the unchecked lawlessness of bandits and the general grinding poverty of their lot—they sigh for the good old times before "democracy" came to China. Many of those who have enough education to think things out for themselves must realize that there was more democracy under the Manchu Emperors than ever there has been since their fall.

Such being the case, it would appear that, Japan's assurances notwithstanding, there may be many contingencies more remote than the return of Hsüan T'ung to his ancestral home in Peking, and the resumption of his rule over at least a portion of his former territory in China proper. Such a return could conceivably be "permitted" by Japan "in recognition of the urgent desire of the people," and though it would presumably be strenuously resisted by the Kuomintang, it might well find favour with the leaders and people in North China, particularly if, in the meantime, Manchukuo had made such progress as to compare very favourably with the state of affairs south of the Wall. A factor against the possibility here considered is the deep hatred of the Chinese for the Japanese, which would render unpopular any form of government in China which was capable of being construed as the puppet of Japan. The Chinese, however, are notoriously willing to wait long for revenge. They might, therefore, see in the return of the monarchy an opportunity to make use of the assistance of Japan for their own purposes for the time being, whilst

a sure hope of turning in due course to rend and swallow up the aggressor might well lurk at the back of their minds. Their own history, moreover, has taught them that China, through the ages, has never failed ultimately to devour her conquerors by a steady and persistent process of peaceful penetration. Why should she not repeat once more this historic achievement? Some such dream of ultimately getting even with the Japanese might conceivably prove a sufficiently powerful motive to induce Chinese leaders in the Northern provinces to support the restoration of the monarchy.

Thus, then, might the realities of the situation as it stands to-day be briefly summarized. The Nanking Government does not really rule China, but only the portion occupied by her own army; she has so far failed to reduce banditry or to compel the disbandment of the hordes of regional troops all over the country. The incapacity which she has shown up to the present tends to suggest that it will be a very long time before either she herself, or some other government which may succeed her, will be able to perfect an administration capable of governing efficiently the whole of China and removing the ills from which her people are suffering. The area affected by Communism is found to be too well consolidated to admit of very much hope of its being reconquered by the National Government without external assistance. At the same time it appears probable that the further spread of the Red virus may be arrrested, and it is extremely unlikely that the whole of China would " go Red." In the North, Manchuria and Jehol have become foreign territory, and there appears no present hope of effecting their return. Japanese aggression has stopped for the time being, but few in China are deceived by the pacific assertions of Japan. It is believed that she will neglect no excuse for a further advance, and it is thought in many quarters that she will probably stage the second act of her Far Eastern drama with less abruptness than the first, carefully disposing the settings so that the absorption of Northern China into the new state will be made to appear as the natural result of the craving of the inhabitants for a stable government and relief from the burdens of crushing taxation and extreme poverty.

The actualities of the situation and the trend of events having been briefly considered, an attempt may be hazarded to survey some of the possibilities of the future. There are, however, many factors to contend with, so many uncertainties and so few certainties, that it

will be impossible to reach a definite conclusion as to the impending developments in the Far East during the next decade or so; nevertheless it is possible to imagine several situations which might arise and to derive from their consideration an interesting study.

One of the possibilities of which a great deal has been heard in the Press is that of a war between Japan and the Soviet, in the course of which both these economic competitors for the world's markets will exhaust their strength fighting each other, whilst the great Powers applaud and supply armaments and stores to both belligerents. Such a war is no doubt visualized as giving the Western nations a breathing space, in that the approaching economic threat of cheap mass production by Japan, or Russia, or both, would be postponed until these two nations had recovered from their war exhaustion. It might even lead to the overthrow of Bolshevism and the re-establishment of the capitalistic regime. It is frequently referred to almost as a certainty. Japan's high-handed action in the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute, and Russia's defensive preparations towards the Manchukuo frontier are regarded as pointers. Friction undoubtedly exists, but is the situation really so strained as to admit of no other solution but war? If it really should come about, which of the two combatants would prove the stronger? And what of China in the meanwhile?

The Russians are no doubt much annoyed. They would probably like few things better than a successful war. But their strength is still untried and they have fresh memories of their last disastrous encounter with militant Japan. It is suggested, therefore, that they will put up with a great deal more before they will resort to the extreme measure of war; that they will, in fact, only go to war if absolutely forced to do so, and that they will try to avoid taking the field alone against so formidable an opponent. The doubling of the Siberian Railway and the cantoning of a force of all arms in the vicinity of the Manchukuo frontier can scarcely be construed as a certain indication of hostile intent on the part of Russia; rather would these measures appear as natural precautions of defence rendered imperative by the dangerous aggressiveness recently shown by Japan. What, save the gratitude of China and the great capitalistic Powers, could Russia hope to gain by fighting Japan, even if she were sure of the result? And in the light of her own bitter experience she can scarcely feel supremely confident of turning the tables on her former victor.

And what could Japan expect to gain by forcing a war upon Russia ? A slice of Siberian territory ? But why fight for territory when she can take it, unopposed, from China ? The death of Soviet hopes in China ? But, surely it would be illogical to fight Russia in such a cause ; there would be more sense in attacking the Chinese Reds in the Kiangsi-Fukien area. The gratitude of the Western nations ? It can hardly be imagined that Japan, usually so wide awake to her own interests, has failed to appreciate how the wastage of a war between herself and Russia would suit the book of her economic competitors. It is indeed difficult to imagine that Japan could hope for any gains of sufficient importance to justify the expense and the risk of embarking on a war with Russia ; particularly, too, at a time when she has incurred the enmity of China, the anger of America, the disapproval and mistrust of the League of Nations, and indeed of the whole world. The more one tries to put oneself in Japan's place, the more does one become convinced that for her to fight Russia would be little short of suicidal.

If, however, this now not-quite-so-certain war should come about, dare one hazard a guess as to the ultimate victor ? So little is known of Russia that it is difficult to estimate how much of her supposed strength in the air and on land is real, and how much imaginary ; but it is at least obvious that her troops would be forced to depend upon a long unwieldy line of communication, consisting only of one long double line of railway, and ill-furnished with lateral communications. The Japanese, on the contrary, would benefit by the network of railways with which Manchukuo has been provided, and would thus possess the double advantage of interior lines and a short compact rear area. Russia, of course, has far greater resources of man power ; but this advantage could scarcely be expected to prove irresitible if matched against the superior organisation of a numerically inferior foe, whose state of preparedness was such that he could strike decisive blows before the cumbersome machinery of Russia had been properly set in motion. It is impossible to be positive of the outcome, nor is it at all certain that the war could end without other interested Powers becoming involved, but, as far as it is possible to judge, Japan would appear to have the better prospect of success.

And what of China ? Her leaders realize her weakness. If she were wise she would remain neutral and avoid providing Japan with any excuse for further aggression. The temptation to join in, how-

ever, particularly if Japan should fail to make rapid progress in Siberia, might prove irresistible, urged as it would doubtless be by the misguided enthusiasm of the youth of China, clamourous for revenge. But whether China joined in or stayed out, the result, if Japan were victorious, would probably be much the same in the long run. To wit, either by peaceful or forceful means the Japanese strangle hold would probably be tightened, and another large slice of China would add its quota to the might of Nippon and bear testimony to the new Monroe Doctrine of the Far East.

Should Russia and Japan decline to be goaded into the folly of fighting each other, should Russia continue to content herself with defensive preparations, and Japan succeed in keeping her militaristic party under restraint, what then might be expected to happen in Manchukuo and China ?

Under Japanese tutelage the Manchurian State would probably be considerably developed, banditry would in all probability be stamped out, conditions for the poorer classes rendered more tolerable, taxation reduced, hygiene and sanitation improved, and the standard of living slightly raised from its present very low level. It is not suggested that the Japanese will necessarily develop Manchuria any more rapidly than would have been the case if the Chinese administration had remained, but it is possible that the development may be more rapid than in China proper. Japan may be expected to make great efforts to this end. Any improvement in conditions North of the Great Wall will rapidly become known in the territory to its South. Unless, therefore, the National Government can so reorganize itself as to produce South of the Wall a state of affairs which compares not too unfavourably with that to its North, it would seem that any sentiment which already exists favourable to the restoration of the Emperor would receive stimulus, and that, cunningly aided by Japan, this feeling might become more and more eloquent, until the transfer of the seat of Government from Ch'angch'ur to Peking, and the extension of the territory of Manchukuo right down to the Yellow River, if not to the Yangtse, would be made to appear as the natural consequences of the desire of the people of China.

This surely seems to be the way in which events are shaping themselves, and appears, too, to be the manner in which Japan desires they should proceed. The only situations which suggest themselves as likely to alter this trend of events are either the establishment of

a stable and effective administration in China, or armed intervention by other powers. The latter appears so highly improbable in the present state of world affairs as to exclude it from discussion in this article. But the advent of an effective government in China appears under certain conditions, to be well within the bounds of possibility. This may seem to contradict the suggestion made earlier that the National Government has shown few indications of its capacity to deal with the stupendous task in front of it. It is still thought that, acting alone and without outside guidance, financial aid and administrative assistance, there is little hope that the Kuomintang party could succeed in transforming itself with sufficient speed to stave off the Japanese menace. But if such help could be administered with the full approval of Chinese Leaders, and could be so given as to avoid all suggestion of foreign intervention or aggression, it is believed that rapid strides could be made.

The thought of China at one with Japan, with the resources of both countries organized to compete with the West must be a very disturbing one to the economists and the governments of the European Powers and America. Such a domination of China by Japan is a state of affairs which it may be safely assumed they would wish to avert, and which, indeed, they might be expected to go to some lengths to avoid. Short of armed intervention against Japan, how else can they hope to thwart the Japanese plans to continue and complete the conquest of China, except by giving to the National Government in China such practical help and support as will enable it to become a real government, capable of ruling efficiently a reorganized and unified country? If such a government could be brought into being, there could never be any danger of the success of a movement for the restoration of the monarchy at the price of bondage to the Japanese, and it would be increasingly difficult for Japan to secure control over territory South of the Wall without recourse to aggressive action. Any such resumption of warlike measures would, it is thought, no longer be tolerated by the Powers, and might conceivably be successfully resisted by a reorganized China.

That the interested Powers should combine and take a practical part in the reincarnation of the Chinese Empire as a republic has been constantly urged by that able student of Far Eastern affairs, Mr. J. O. P. Bland, who, in his book, " China, The Pity of It " (Heinemann), has developed the idea in some detail and outlined a

scheme, which if it could be inaugurated with the approval of the Chinese Leaders should have every prospect of success. This is how he puts it, and the pages of his whole book burn with the ardour of his conviction :—

"Therefore, if there be anything of vitality in the ideals which the Anglo-Saxon race professes, anything dynamic in the political faith of the League of Nations, the world's collective conscience must face the realities and urgency of the problem and set itself to solve it by regarding the Chinese people as a "ward of civilization." In other words, there must be an end to the fetish of non-interference and the friendly powers must devise and impose measures, during a period of tutelage, first for the restoration of law and order, and thereafter of the nation's commerce and credit. What China needs, above all else, is ten years of uninterrupted peace and security, and this she cannot possibly have, except with material assistance from without. The civilized Powers owe it to the unfortunate Chinese people to abandon the formula of non-interference and to recognize the truth that the doctrine of self-determination is inapplicable in the case of a people which is manifestly incapable of self-government."

Mr. Bland urges benevolent intervention by the Powers, preferably with the consent of Nanking, but, if necessary, without it. His views are so sound and so forcibly expressed that it is difficult not to agree with him; yet it would appear very doubtful whether there could be any hope of agreement between the Powers as to combined operations with a view to intervention in China, short of a critical situation arising which left them no other course for the protection of their own nationals and interests. Without such crisis, however, benevolent intervention for the benefit of the Chinese people might yet be achieved through the joint action of the United States and Great Britain, even if other powers could not be prevailed upon to participate. It might even be possible to inaugurate the scheme with the full approval of the Chinese Leaders, if they could be successfully convinced of the disinterestedness and non-aggressiveness of the Powers. Guarantees of the unimpaired sovereignty of China and of protection against aggression during the period of tutelage would naturally be required.

The announcement in the Spring of 1934 by the Japanese Foreign Office, which was given considerable prominence in the Press under

some such heading as " Japan's ' Hands Off China ' Warning, " would seem to indicate that Japan herself is not unaware of the danger of foreign intervention in China, and that she would do her utmost to resist it. Her uncompromising attitude towards the question of naval quotas and her lavish expenditure on her army and air force are further indications of her determination to place herself, as speedily as possible, in the position to carry out her expansion policy on the mainland of Asia in the teeth of foreign opposition. That she would resist outside interference in Chinese politics as strenuously as she dared is certain. Her resistance might, indeed, be expected to be active if intervention were attempted by any single Power, but, in the present state of her national armament, it is scarcely believable that even she would be capable of the folly of attempting to fight single-handed against a coalition of Great Powers.

The Chinese National Government, after its recent bitter experience at the hands of Japan, must have fully realized its impotence, and the complete hopelessness of attempting to oppose the advance of the Japanese army without outside aid. The failure of its attempts to suppress Communism in Kiangsi and Fukien must have convinced the leaders of the extreme difficulty of bringing this area under control, whilst the series of rebellions and attempts to establish opposition governments must have brought home to them the fact that the " Republic of China " is still an empty boast and the " National Government " a meaningless title. Those leaders of the Kuomintang party who have the interests of their country at heart must surely realize their failure, their complete inability to stand alone any longer against Japan, and that they are now faced with two alternatives : to come to an agreement with Japan and to accept her aid, with all the bondage to a hated foe which this would connote. or to seek other assistance to put their house in order and enable their country to preserve its independence.

If, as they surely must, the governments of the Powers interested in China's future fully realize the extent of the Japanese menace, the importance in their own interests of backing up the National Government in China and of affording every possible assistance to enable it to resist the overtures or the attacks of Japan must be apparent. The thought of a Japan, paramount in China, with the vast resources of this rich territory—more a continent than a country—organized to compete for world markets, conjures up visions

of an economic crisis in the West which would completely upset present standards of living and possibly spell the reversal of our whole social system. It is a thought which cannot be tolerated in Europe and America. Clearly, something must be done to stay the ominous trend of events in the Far East and stave off a crisis which threatens the very existence of our civilization. How is it to be achieved ?


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SATURDAY TO FRIDAY—AN AIR JOURNEY—(*contd.*).

PART II.

By "Mouse."

In the first part of this epic or comic flight to the East,* I described the journey as far as Alexandria. The beautiful "Scipio" had just shaken the waters of Alexandria from off her shining floats and we were heading to Cairo in the mysterious south. I was fed up. Having looked forward to smoking a cigarette for close upon eight hours, and then baulked of my vicious desire by the exigencies of the petrol service and a delaying head wind, I was childishly upset.

"I think the Air Service is the greatest invention since horses in the world, don't you?" emitted the Great Man in a gentle roar.

"No," I said, feebly but firmly, "I don't."

"No?" he enquired in a horrified squeak which awakened all my lady friends who were prostrate.

"No." (From me, lying exhausted with hushed eyelids and every simulation of approaching demise).

The Great Man rose in his seat, put two thumbs in his waistcoat armpits, cleared his throat in a manner which put the back-firing of the engines to shame, and declared: "By gad, sir!" [This is the first time I ever heard this Edwardian expression employed seriously. All the electorate (*i.e.*, ship's company) sat up]. "When I was in the Air Force in the Great War," he said, "and commanded No. Squadron, I learned them that England's only hope lay in the Air." ("Hear, hear" from a nice looking passenger whom I had not met). "That squadron was one of the most famous of all; I had in my command two V.Cs., seven D.S.Os., and I can't remember all the other decorations. One of the finest air squadrons in the War, Sir!" he finished, looking at the Peach impressively.

"No.— . Sir?" inquired the nice unknown young man, excitedly. "I was with you in Amiens in '18, then. We hadn't any V. C. then, Sir, but we did have old Rolly Poley who got that D.S.O. north of Arras. Do you remember, Sir? That was a good show. Old Rolly often tells me things about you, Sir. You must be General Tooty-kins?"

* Published in the Oct. No., 1934, of the Journal of the U.S.I.

There was a horrified and embarrassed silence. The Great Man hummed and gargled and said that he did not mean number such a squadron but that he meant number so a squadron, and that so far as he was aware he had never had the pleasure of the nice young man's acquaintance. Snob, we all snorted to ourselves, and snored to Cairo.

(Moral: Never believe any casual War reminiscences. They are all built on the unsubstantial structure of emotional memories; and now have produced as their Cenotaph a Prime Minister's Bar Memories.)

Egypt lay all around us like blue-black ink, the engines droned on and on, and we moved far more steadily than any train. But I was hungry, thirsty and smokeless. At 10-10 p.m. (Sphinx time) we approached Cairo. The city lay below us like some vast jeweller's shop—with all her diamonds and brilliants and iridescent trinkets laid out in patterned rows. The "Scipio" had all her lights burning and I must have imagined seeing our shadow—perfectly luminous brushing the lights below as we swooped down, effortlessly, in a spiral curve to land gently on the bosom of the Nile between two bridges. I forgot all my trivial, personal and possibly childish troubles in the joy of an achievement. We, in fact, had arrived in the glamorous land of Pharaohs, Sphinxes, Mummies and Pyramids.

Instead of any fun, however, I had to clamber unsteadily up a gangway into another customs house and suffer the embarrassment of further rubber-stamping by Egyptian officials.

Eventually we were all unbottled at the Hotel Continental (excellent so far as I had time to see it). I asked the Peach to share my humble table and we sat down on the terrace overlooking the street to eat our dinner at 10-45 p.m. Victorias, taxis, and all those Egyptian chaps with nightshirts and post cards wandered below us, their noises echoing uneasily through the sleeping town. We were hungry and thirsty. The Peach ordered the whole menu and I demanded the whole cellar. The food was first-class, my whisky and soda was better than any champagne, and we were both looking forward to a bath and some sleep.

Along came a waiter with a neatly printed card issued to passengers by the Imperial Airways with all the cold-blooded efficiency which stamps modern so-called staff work. "Your luggage," it said, "will

be collected at 1 a.m." The Peach grabbed my drink and drank it. "You will be called at 1-15 a.m." continued the death sentence. I have never felt so much the lack of a Mummy, but the waiter said they were all shut up in the museums. The Peach reacted marvellously (my whisky possibly), and whispered urgently a tip about our onward journey. "But you must be quick!" she said.

So I rushed to my room, shaved, bathed and changed, sped to the bar for some iced beer, and greeted all my fellow passengers at 1-15 a.m., on the steps of the bus as if I was a Viceregal A. D. C. doing it for love. I sat in front. We were transported through uninhabited, brilliantly lit streets to the Aerodrome at Heliopolis, where we were herded into yet another Customs office. The Great Man, when he found that the other important Government officials were absent and asleep, did his indignant stuff. I—this was naughty—took advantage of the uproar, slipped through a bath-room door, ran across the Aerodrome to the dimly-shaped Hannibal and effected a burglarious entrance. An outraged steward confronted me. He was shocked. I pleaded with him in the darkness. I told him that I was escorting an invalid lady, that I believed two seats were available in the fore-cabin, that my father had been Prime Minister of England, that my aunt was Mae West, that I was engaged to Sir Eric Geddes' niece, that I was a Squadron Leader in the R. A. F., and that the lady must have peace and quietness. He didn't believe, I believe, one word, but was good enough to allow me to put a cigarette case on one seat and my hat on another. (Incidentally, he refused to accept my furtively offered tip and made me feel rather ashamed. However, all is fair in love and air.) I got back to the Customs Shed in time. A Customs official and I examined my pyjamas and shaving brush with mutual horror. I grabbed the Peach by the arm and raced her to the Hannibal. We rushed aboard, tore selfishly into the fore-cabin, and she—you will hardly believe it—plopped down on my Black Homburg hat (not yet paid for), and said: "Well, you're not such a funny fool as you look!" Later I forgave her the wanton ruin of a good hat when I discovered the extra comfort she had won for us by knowing the ropes.

Owing to the extra amount of fuel required on the long hops between Cairo and Karachi it appears that the live freight in the fore-parts of the aeroplanes has to be decreased. This entails that less passengers can be carried, and that the bulk of their weight must

be in the aft-cabin. Only two passengers, therefore, are allowed in the fore-cabin, and, naturally, this cloister is reserved for distinguished passengers. I could hardly go to sleep with laughing. In fact, just after the Great Man rumbled for'ard and glared at me with my feet upspread on the table before me, my head on cushions, and facially an appearance of innocent repose, I cried myself to sleep. (The Peach asked him to put out the light. He didn't.)

* * * * * * *

Five minutes later (it seemed) the steward was shaking me. "Have we crashed?" I asked tentatively. "No, Sir", he replied, "Landed. Gaza. Breakfast."

Tuesday.—I crawled out feeling and looking like one of those what-nots one meets under an upturned slate. A hearty Imperial Airways official, looking like Lord Beatty, greeted me and the dawn with an ill-judged smile of welcome. "Breakfast is ready," he said, and taking the Peach (almost as comatose as the author), by the arm escorted her with a sickening flourish to the restaurant. I stumbled through sand in the rear, and wondered dazedly why we had fought three hard battles in the war for this incredible sand-dune.

In the restaurant the proprieties were being (thank heaven) observed. The ladies were each eating an enormous breakfast at one table; and the gentlemen were eyeing each other sourly at another. I joined the men and sensed immediately an atmosphere of loathing. I was too sleepy to care and ordered an egg, a bacon, an Eno and an aspirin. The Great Man swallowed a pint of coffee, put his thumbs in his armpits, beamed at two colleagues, and with very elaborate emphasis said: "Ha! Here is our gay Lothario!" A sycophantic titter greeted the gibe. "And how is His Excellency this morning?" he inquired. They all roared with laughter, and looked at me as if I was an illegitimate baby or the author thereof. I couldn't think of anything to say and said nothing. The Great Man continued in this strain for a bit when suddenly the Air pilot cut in with a remark: "Well, anyway, His Excellency bagged the best seat—why didn't you?" The Great Man, for the first and only time since London, said nought, and "His Excellency" ordered another good egg.

The great "Hannibal" lifted us from this childish scene at 7 a. m., and it was interesting to see from the air the imprints in the sand of the war trenches, machine gun emplacements and so on which, quite likely, are now obliterated from the view of the pedestrian. We

ew on eastwards and uneasy atmospherics became more apparent. The Dead Sea I noticed was, quite rightly, dead. Before long I wished to be dead also. A sand storm was billowing below. Through one twitching eye I saw the starboard wing of the aeroplane describe a badly-drawn circle; through the other eye I saw a nauseatingly blue sky merge without reason into a ground *motif*. In between I felt Hannibal rolling up and down the Alps on his elephants.

The Peach was sleeping like a little child. I belled the steward. He produced a card-board box. "Kiss me, Hardy," I said, lying back. "Don't mention it, Sir," the kind fellow answered, "Have another." I did. Twice. What a morning.

Down below I could dimly see a telegraph wire wasting its time over miles and miles of desert. Incidentally the same line demarcates a significant line of air petrol stations on the direct journey from West to East, but I was barely interested. We landed at a Petrol Station, called H. 4, for supplies, a desolate station with a very nice manager and assistants in charge. They could offer Hannibal 48 gallons, a meagre gin and bitters, as their main store had been emptied by aeroplanes from Saigon and Java that same morning. It sounds rather fantastic that this obscure spot in an almost uninhabited eastern desert should have been sucked dry within a few hours by the machines of three western countries. I was worrying out in my own small mind the peculiar significance of this incident when the Great Man grabbed my arm savagely. "I told you, didn't I?" he said, "that what we need is guts. Why the hell should a British aeroplane find all its petrol pinched by these something awful other fellows?" I didn't know the answer again. Maddening.

We spent an hour and a half imbibing this small cocktail (48 gallons) and then flew on to the next Petrol Dump, H. 5. The Peach slept. I had two more card-board boxes and hoped secretly that we would crash and be killed instantly. At H. 5.—I must pay a fleeting tribute to all those kind people who succour air passengers when they land so fortuitously at their god-forsaken homes—we got our fill of petrol and I went for a long wholesome walk.

The sand storm continued and the Hannibal and I fought our sickening way through it as far as Rutbah Wells, that oasis in the desert. I joined the Great Man and his boy friends at their table. "His Excellency has been sick," he said. Stung at last I managed to

say : " If you don't shut up His Excellency will be sick again," and I think I looked it. An enormous lunch, soup, tinned salmon, curry, cold mutton, tinned pears, cheese, a bottle of beer and everything else offered. What one needs, travelling by air, I think, is guts. I paid three shillings at Rutbah Wells for a bottle of iced beer ; it was worth ten.

In the glare of sand and sun we took off at 2-50 p.m. (Iraq time) I slept. When I awoke the air was thin and cold and the Hannibal was cruising on a most even keel. I looked down and saw nothing but a swirling, amorphous mass of golden sand-storm very busy four thousand feet underneath. We were flying at 10,000 feet in a purified and calm atmosphere.

At 5-30 p.m., the pilot switched off his engines and we volplaned, or rather revolplaned, down to the murk of sand, spun through it and landed with deadly accuracy on the Baghdad Aerodrome. A beautiful bit of navigation.

Formalities were quickly expedited and the passengers were transported smartly to the Maude Hotel. It looks like a " Hindu Hostel for Travellers " from the front, but has a magnificent terrace at the back on the bank of the Tigris. On this terrace the Great Man and I shared dinner. It was a good dinner but the conversation was more enjoyable. He was in a humble spirit, and said that perhaps as I had been in India recently and he had not been there since before the War it might be possible that I could tell him something of its modern spirit ; what will you drink, my good fellow ? " Champagne," I replied, " please." He didn't bat an eyelid and ordered a bottle, and after the first glass I began to like him.

He was an honest Die-hard and was so genuinely saturated with 1890 ideas about India that he had no room left in his head to accommodate the events of subsequent history. I explained to him that I, too, basically, was a Die-hard and that it was a dangerous experiment to transfer benevolent British rule to mobocracy, but that we, the British, had to stick to our promises, that the War had caused fundamental changes in our political outlook, that the rising tide of democratic impulse was a significant growth in our constitutional political genius, that it is no use kicking against the prigs—thank you, I wouldn't mind another glass.

And the great turgid Tigris swept past us greyly and without emotion. The Great Man then told me things about England's most

famous politicians which I can't write here. "Mark my words!" he ordered me. "The White Paper will never get through Parliament."

Wednesday.—I got to bed at 10-30 and was called at 2-15 a.m. I stumbled on board and slept until Basra, although I have a faint memory of gloomy, oily marshes lying below. At Basra we had a poor breakfast—perhaps I wasn't in a breakfast mood ?—and left at 6 a.m. for Koweit. It leaves no mark on my memory except we did not know if one pronounced it "Quite", or "Quaite."

Thence to Bahrein where the aerodrome is an expanse of nothing in a similar situation, and where I met an Indian Muslim Customs official who waxed lyrical about a brother officer of mine and procured me a mother-of-pearl shell for eight annas.

We got to Sharjah in the evening, having flown for several hours down the Persian Gulf over the sea, a quaint admission of Persian territorial rights, but—as I looked at our landing wheels and the deep blue sea below—hardly a tribute to so-called Oriental hospitality. Sharjah is a "Beau Geste" fortress, standing solidly on a palm-dotted peninsula. Barbed wire surrounds it, towers for enfilade fire are at its corners, and the battlements were, until recently, loop-holed with loop-holes whose loops looped *outwards*. Otherwise, if it had a garrison, it could withstand a minor siege. It possesses a pet gazelle, the most friendly little deer I have ever met.

The homeward-bound Imperial Airways machine arrived shortly after us and dinner was a swopping house of experiences. I shared a bedroom with a Mr. —who was making a reconnaissance for the London-Melbourne flight. He was most interesting and made no bones about his belief that his machine would win. He showed me his maps—four long strips with a red compass bearing streaked across each; London—Baghdad; Baghdad—Allahabad; Allahabad—Singapore (1,500 miles over water); Singapore—Port Darwin; Port Darwin—Melbourne. He said that the official estimate of the time was 72 hours but that his machine would walk it in 54. I was so air-minded by this time that I believed every word. The poor chap failed to get off the ground at Mildenhall and I lost two pounds.

Thursday.—In an extraordinary pearl-coloured mist we left Sharjah next morning for Gwadar at 5-15 a.m. This is, I understand, the longest hop made by Imperial Airways on any of their routes. Flying at 2,500 feet nothing was to be seen except a pale golden and

enlarged sun trying to penetrate the soft fog. Later we got glimpses of the jagged coast with its fantastic rock formations. At 10-2 a.m.—450 miles distance—we arrived at Gwadar, the first Indian outpost. What a thrill! (impersonally).

Gwadar consists of a petrol godown and a Ladies and Gentlemen, a mean city untouched by Lutyens. After some welcome tea we embarked again, the Peach remarking that there was nothing like tea after all (thank Heavens), and we set sail for Karachi. We had an excellent lunch *en route*—the air meals are really good and served most efficiently—and we wandered through the afternoon along the edge of desolation, called Baluchistan, until almost without warning we were precipitated upon Karachi at 3 p.m.

Drigh Road, Karachi, will eventually be one of the greatest air junctions in the Empire. As such, it will require better facilities for passengers. We were driven by car from the aerodrome to a dâk bungalow a mile or so away and looked after with the greatest courtesy. We were driven back and had to stand kicking our heels about until the mail was sorted and our kit transferred to the India liner—a monoplane of the Atlanta Class. Obviously, a Waiting Room with all conveniences in the Aerodrome itself is required; by this time one is getting tired of being polite to fellow passengers and herded with them everywhere. Even the Peach could hardly bear to look at me, and I had to pass her the sugar and ask for more milk in my tea.

I wandered into the Postal Sorting Shed and watched the end of this epic Air Mail journey—mail posted last Saturday in London arriving in India on Thursday. What a triumph of modern inventions! What a meeting of West and East!

There seated on the ground with his legs tucked under him in the manner of the agile East sat a little Babu. Before him lay a litter of air-mail stamped letters, heaped in heaps and scattered in piles. He had a bit of string fastened to his big toe and with the help of his teeth and hands was bundling those letters into bundles destined for all the great cities of the Orient. An urchin kept adding fuel to the pile murmuring "Shimla-wala." That Imperial Airways use such gigantic transports as Heracles, Scipio and Hannibal to transport Imperial mails to India where they are sorted by a small Babu's big toe struck me as a Big Thought with which to comfort the Great Man. But he had gone, and I would like to meet him again.

The journey from Karachi to Jodhpur that evening was uneventful. Most of our fellow-passengers had departed and the Peach and I felt flat; returning to India always has a deflating effect. The hotel at Jodhpur is easily the best I have met in India, but the heat in June is not conducive to happy slumber.

Friday.—I was glad to be called at 4 a.m. and to leave the aerodrome for the cooler heights at 5 a.m. At 7-30 a.m. I delivered the Peach to her perspiring husband at the Safdar Jung Aerodrome, New Delhi,—pleasure over, duty done, battle won—and retired to Maiden's Hotel. My bearer woke me the same evening at 6-30 p.m. and I still felt short of sleep.

One does not like to criticise or praise such efficient hosts as the air and ground staff of Imperial Airways. They are amazingly thorough and efficient. Dubious as I am of all this air business, I never suffered a technical qualm during the whole flight and always found the ground officials so full of staff work efficiency that they made me shudder. I met four pilots personally and I could not help being struck by their modest air, their quiet sense of their own unimportance, and their shattering efficiency. They all talked very little; I was disappointed at that, as I always thought air chaps talked too much.

Saturday's Washing.—Some of the people who read this article may say that it is all very well to travel by air for people who can afford it; but what of us poor devils who can barely afford a tourist passage by steamer?

The answer, of course, is that the tourist passenger cannot afford the present air rates. I couldn't either if Windsor Lad hadn't won. But I have found a comparison of rates between a first-class sea passage plus P. & O. Special across France, and an Imperial Airways in the "*Journal of the Aero Club of India.*"

The figures strike me as being moderate for the sea journey, but do not include the extra expense incurred by the air passenger's kit sent by sea. They are as follows:—

By Sea.

	Single.			*Return.*		
	£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*
1st Class "A" and Special ..	105	18	6	192	2	0
1st Class "B" and Special ..	99	18	6	182	2	0
1st Class "C" and Special ..	93	8	6	172	2	0

(The above includes rail journey from Delhi, tips and expenses both on the steamer and train across France.)

BY AIR.

From Delhi to Victoria Station, London.

	Single.			*Return.*		
	£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*
Government officials and Army officers	95	8	0	171	14	0
For unofficials	106	0	0	190	16	0

Recent developments in the Air Service, which include the facilities to fly to Marseilles and the doubling of the weekly service, give hope that the passage rates will be decreased and thereby make the air journey more popular. But, in conclusion, I would add that the journey needs to be made more comfortable. To sit in a chair for hours on end and on one's own end gave me the holy thought that it was not a divinity of the Air Service who "shaped our ends." If the passenger has to be in an aeroplane for fourteen or sixteen hours of the day and denied more than four hours in a bed she and he ought to be given long seats in which complete relaxation would be possible. However, the Peach and the French air cushion saved my life.

INFANTRY—THICK OR THIN.

By "Hoplite."

The problems of the proper organisation and functions of infantry are matters of frequent discussion and speculation by military minds to-day.

One writer in a recent article in this journal,* entitled "The Fallacy of the Line," hopes to improve the chances of success of infantry in the attack by reintroducing the old column formation. This author bases his arguments on the result of two battles of the Great War: the second battle of Ypres and the battle of Loos to prove that, as regards formations in the attack, the German column method was more successful and more economical in casualties than the British linear method.

True, it has been said that Nature's great book is written in mathematical language, but it is doubtful whether battles can be won by applied geometrics.

Besides the factor of formation, there are other important factors in both these battles which may have contributed very largely to the results of each.

The figures for casualties in the second battle of Ypres when the Germans attacked were:—

Killed, wounded and missing—

	British.	German.
Officers ..	2,150	860
Other ranks ..	57,125	34,673

The British and French were on the defensive and the French casualties are not included. The Germans although employed in an unsuccessful attack were giving approximately three casualties to one received. The outstanding facts are that the Germans had a great preponderance of artillery, especially the heavy types, and they employed gas which was in the nature of a surprise weapon. The British counter-attacks, when launched, were unsupported by adequate artillery fire and hence were costly. It appeared to be an operation in which rifles on the British side were pitted against artillery and gas; and for the latter the wind at the time was especially favourable.

* July, 1933.

As regards the battle of Loos in which the British attacked and the Germans were on the defensive, the figures for casualties were as follows :—

Killed, wounded and missing—

		British.	German.
Officers	..	2,013	441
Other ranks	..	48,367	19,935

In the initial attack the British employed about 50,000 men on a front of eight miles: this, on the face of it, can hardly be considered a linear movement, nor, it is maintained, can formations be entirely responsible for the disproportionate number of casualties on both sides as compared with those for the battle of Ypres. To consider one item alone, which strikes the eye,—the heavy proportion of losses among officers. Officers are not affected by linear or column formations. The same fact is noticeable in the figures for Ypres.

No ; the story seems to be similar to that of the second battle of Ypres. There was a shortage of artillery, especially heavy guns, and of ammunition, on the British side. The Germans were favoured by having good artillery observation, whereas the British had not. The Germans used on the whole more wire to protect their positions than the British did, and evacuated the forward zones during the bombardment which we learnt afterwards to do. The British did make use of gas on this occasion, but the wind was unfavourable for its employment. It would appear that both engagements were an example of the triumph of matter, and the bigger the weight of it used the better. It cannot seriously be disputed that the main obstacles to an attack, with the exception of barbed wire, are machine guns and automatics whether an attack be in linear or column formation. It has been an accepted principle and is easily demonstrated that extended lines are less vulnerable to machine-gun fire than columns. It was firstly, the breech-loading rifle ; secondly, the machine gun that compelled the infantry to adopt the line formation. Latterly, machine-gun fire has tended to become more and more oblique, so that it is a moot question whether lines should not be perpendicular, *i.e.*, in single file, rather than parallel to the front : in other words in relation to the front they would be in the nature of column formations. But with infiltration methods, there will be no real front in minor tactics. Hence no standard formation can be prescribed.

These conditions are relatively the same whether the defence be organised on a static, semi-static, or encounter basis. For an attack to be successful, apart from attaining the element of surprise, the most essential factor is the accurate and sustained fire of artillery. Armoured fighting vehicles will in a measure be able to perform certain of the functions of artillery, but they in turn require their allotment of artillery, thereby making less available for the infantry. It should and will be possible to employ less infantry as the number of armoured fighting vehicles increases, but this does not mean the extinction of infantry ; and it is as well to try and to clarify our ideas on this controversy.

The infantry will always have scope as being the most readily concealed and ubiquitous fire unit in the land forces. The armour-plated sages will dispute this, and quote in support of their argument the fact that on sea the old wooden fighting ship has been driven off by the ironclad. But on reflection it must be evident that this does not end the naval part of the simile. Coastal motor boats and torpedo boats still exist alongside the battleship and cruiser, and are as vulnerable to them as infantry are to armoured fighting vehicles. This result has evolved on an element like the sea which practically offers equal facility of movement to both classes of ships ; unlike conditions on land where the armoured fighting vehicles are faced with various obstacles. Besides, the land battle does not necessarily close down at night as the naval battle is forced to do. It is to be expected in future that night operations will be resorted to more often. By this means it is hoped to place the fire power of the defence at a disadvantage and give the attack a better chance. Infantry are and will be the paramount arm for this sort of work. It must, however, be borne in mind that, even with well-trained troops, night operations will tend to be hazardous affairs. They cannot normally be undertaken by very large forces, nor is it likely that the defence will allow the attack to turn the scales against it without devising a means of restoring the balance.

The defence can reduce the odds against them by an adequate system of patrolling, by the employment of flares in the area, and by reconnaissance with armoured fighting vehicles. (A night attack has to avoid the closer parts of the country, the defence has no need to hide its presence ; no weapon is going to range with any degree of accuracy at night on a moving armoured fighting vehicle even if it carried a small

searchlight, and the armoured fighting vehicle will be moving over ground which can be previously reconnoitred.) There seems no reason why armoured fighting vehicles should not be an answer to night attacks.

Furthermore, the defence machine-guns fitted with spotlights throwing a beam up to three or four hundred yards should be able to make fairly accurate shooting. These lights are not going to afford much of a range mark and they would be defiladed from the front. The advantages the attack hopes to gain from darkness are not going to be so predominant, and the situation from the attacking infantry point of view will be much the same as by day, with the added difficulty of co-operation and inter-communication. There does not appear to be a solution to the infantry problem on these lines. The subject still centres round the problem of increasing and making fire power more effective,—fire power primarily in the form of guns and armoured fighting vehicles. It is with this end in view that the activities of infantry must be developed. The use of smoke is not touched on in this article. For one reason, it is in an experimental stage. Secondly, it is considered that owing to the variability of meteorological conditions, smoke will be too uncertain a quantity to form the basis of a fire plan.

There appear to be four chief ways of increasing fire power :—

(*i*) By the rapid and accurate indication of targets.

(*ii*) By the provision of ample ammunition and the means of getting it forward in small armoured track vehicles.

(*iii*) By an increase in the number of guns and mortars.

(*iv*) By developing the mobility of artillery in the form of armoured protection and track vehicles. (This is gradually being done.)

It is not proposed to dwell much on the last three means, they are more or less self-evident, and do not so intimately concern the infantry problems under discussion.

The provision of ample ammunition is a corollary of the present mechanical and industrial age. Its distribution in action should be the work of special units working in zones with their own cross-country vehicles.

The increase of tractor-drawn and propelled guns should reduce the general cost of maintenance of the artillery and enable an increase

in the number of guns to be made. Further, it would seem advisable for the machine gun company or the support company to go the whole hog and have a mortar for every machine-gun : the former for use in the attack and the latter in defence. For rapid consolidation, the new Vickers-Berthier machine-gun should fulfil all requirements.

It is the first means which it is proposed to examine in some detail. The rapid and accurate indication of targets is a task in which the infantry can give more assistance than they do at present. The methods of doing this must be more widely taught and practised. *Vide* Infantry Training, Vol. II, Sec. 5. (7), "subordinate infantry commanders must therefore do everything in their power to keep the artillery and machine-gun commanders supporting them continuously informed of the position of their forward troops, and to indicate to them where and when fire is required."

Sufficient attention is still not paid to this vital factor of information, and to exploiting ways of distributing it, with the means available at present. Information and inter-communication are essential in all forms of warfare, and no great progress seems to have been made in this respect since the war. The wider use of wireless telegraphy will be a means of speeding up communication, but enlarging the scope of information to be sought, and the collecting of it, still require much attention. The subject of infantry doing more F. O. O. work is dismissed lightly with the reply that this savours too much of static warfare. By what Black Magic on the day is the present inadequate artillery fire going to be directed on to the essential areas, when it is not only areas on the front of attack, but especially on the flanks of it, which will have to be neutralised. Guns or armoured fighting vehicles are the tools with which to do it, helped no doubt by the new mortars, but the mortars will be dependent on receiving good information the same as the other arms.

The first stages of any attack will usually be a fight for information. The infantry will have considerable scope for manœuvre, but the attack must be backed by sufficient numbers in order to make the defence disclose its fire plan. It is not reasonable to assume or hope that the attacker's first fire plan is normally going to dislocate the enemy's. In the light of the information gained in the first stages, the attack's fire plan will have to be readjusted. The quicker and more accurately this can be done, the more effective will be the results.

The infantry must be imbued with the stalking instinct, be able to recognise good view-points, and the ways of "getting there." The infantry cannot rely on F. O. O.'s or intelligence sections, nor on a widespread use of wireless. The former may be knocked out, the latter jammed by counter-wireless devices. The only method of communication for the infantry seems to be visual signalling. On a modern battlefield semaphore is archaic, but there seems no reason why the Morse code should not be used. Once learnt, it is not so quickly forgotten as semaphore. A man using Morse only employs one flag and can lie on his back behind cover while sending it. Every non-commissioned officer in a company should know it. For indicating targets and the fall of shot the horizontal clock code method is the simplest and most practical. Even an approximate indication of certain targets will be a help. The question of observing the shot is a harder one, especially, taking into consideration the shells, smoke and dust, which will confuse observation. Indication of targets can be practised on field exercises. Certain objects or localities in the defence will be given numbers starting from right to left, which are easily recognisable by both infantry and artillery. A target can be quickly pointed out with reference to anyone of them. The observer only requires a piece of paper with a description of reference and their numbers written on it, a pencil, and an ordinary pocket compass for setting the North point. It is a system which can be checked without necessarily the attendance of gunners, by raising flags or dust at distances and directions from reference points known to the instructor. (See Appx.)

These functions of information collecting should be a primary duty of the infantry. A second important function is the partial demoralisation of the enemy by their own fire, either as a preparatory measure to a main attack, or in exploitation. This is only a return to the original Light Infantry tactics of a century or so ago. It means the working forward of small parties of infantry to demoralise and destroy by fire part of the defence fire plan. A bold use of automatics will be a feature of this fighting.

Such infantry must be as physically fit as possible; good marksmen, of indomitable will, and must be trained to realise instinctively the use of ground. Some assistance from ground will be necessary for these tactics. They cannot be introduced in an attack over terrain like the plains of Mesopotamia. Normally, practice for these tactics can be found in situations such as are visualised in advanced guard

actions, or the initial fight for information ; in exploitation after the crust of a defence system has been broken; and, lastly, against a second class enemy, or when surprise has been affected and the defence has not been organised. They imply the manœuvring of the infantry under fire power probably provided only from battalion resources. For this work the infantry will require to be in small packets. In conjunction with these duties, infantry will be required for night work, to hold ground seized by the armoured fighting vehicles, in mass attacks supported by preponderating fire power, and as local protection to observers and to the other arms. For most of these duties column formations will be the most suitable.

Finally, to employ an allegory, the infantry both in attack and defence are like the mortar which binds the bricks of a wall ; they are instrumental in binding the military fabric together. What is required to be done is to increase the size of the bricks and decrease the layers of mortar ; in fact keep the infantry thin and employ more material, so that it shall be the destruction of material in the land battle just as in the naval battle which shall decide the issue.

APPENDIX.

By the use of Roman figure such messages can be made very brief, as these figures obviate the use of the numerical sign. Thus with sender as reference point, a hostile V. G. could be described : —

Vic. I (VI) DCC EN M. G.

[From my position 700 yds. six oc'l enemy M. G.] The half hour direction can be denoted by adding an O, e.g., VIO. 630.

These messages can be translated into map references if necessary at Coy. or Bn. H. Qs.

THE ROYAL EMPIRE SOCIETY.

A Study of its Early Years.

By Major H. G. Tranchell, I.A.

There has recently appeared a book called "The Royal Empire Society—formerly The Royal Colonial Institute—Formative years," which deserves the careful attention of all those interested in the growth of the Imperial Idea. The author is Miss Aveline Folsom, Ph.D., and it is published by George Allen and Unwin Ltd., at sh. 10/6. Miss Folsom, who graduated at Colombia University and is now a Professor of History in the United States, spent much time in research both at the British Museum. and at the Headquarters of the Royal Empire Society itself, where she was able not only to study one of the best existing libraries on Colonial matters, and to see the very archives of the Society, but also to meet personally people intimately connected with the Society from its earliest days. The result is a very interesting book indeed. The authoress has not only given an excellent résumé of the Colonial situation as it was in the decade 1860-70, but she has also traced out the growth of the influence of the Society and has written an entertaining account of the papers read, and of the general activities undertaken, between 1868, the year the Society was founded, and 1882, the year in which it received a Royal Charter, and thus became fully established in the life of the nation.

In these days the British Empire is brought to one's notice in so many ways, that is difficult to realize that only seventy years ago the greatest ignorance about the Empire prevailed in England, and that educated opinion in that country confidently expected the dissolution of the Empire within the next few years. It is so much the fashion, these days, to take everything for granted, that it is overlooked that what is now generally accepted as being in the nature of things, was not always so.

On the contrary, seventy years ago the British Empire was far from being accepted as a part of the natural order of things. Even the expression, "The British Empire," was scarcely ever used, the customary phrase being "England and her Colonies." The decade 1860-70 was, indeed, one of the most critical periods in the history of the Empire since the loss of the American Colonies eighty years

earlier. The unpopularity of the Colonies in England at that time was remarkable, and they were regarded as expensive and dangerous burdens. Their gradual dropping off from the Mother Country was looked on not only as inevitable, but even as desirable.

Various factors had contributed to bring about this state of affairs, but broadly speaking, they may be grouped under two heads. First and foremost, there was the change in British economic theory, consequent upon the growing industrialisation of the country; and, secondly, there was the action of the Colonies themselves, often quite justifiable in itself, but usually completely misunderstood in England. Furthermore, this spirit of estrangement between England and her Colonies grew the more easily because of the profound ignorance about, and utter lack of interest in, the Colonies that then existed in England.

Up till 1822 England had completely controlled the commerce of her Colonies by means of tariffs and Navigation Acts, which had been in operation since the middle of XVII century. But the gradual growth of the Free Trade doctrines preached by Adam Smith and others early in the XVIII century, and the desire of the manufacturers to find markets for their goods, led to a series of fiscal changes in England, which entirely altered the economic life of the Colonies.

The first important changes took place in 1822, when noteworthy reductions of the import duties into England were made, and this was followed in 1825 by a further departure from established custom, when it became possible for ships of foreign countries to carry to the British Colonies the produce of the country of registration, and to load colonial produce destined for any country outside the British Empire. The carrying trade between the various parts of the British Empire was still confined to British shipping.

The end of the Napoleonic wars ushered in the decline of agricultural England. The manufacturing classes increasingly demanded cheap raw materials for their factories, cheap food for their labour, and enlarged foreign markets. The potato famine in Ireland in 1845 gave added strength to those who opposed the agriculturists. The result was the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, when the import duties on grain, sugar, and on many other commodities were abolished.

While the abolition of these duties spelt increased prosperity for the English manufacturers, it spread consternation and havoc in Canada, and in the West Indies, threatening each with ruin. Thanks

to the Corn Laws the Canadian grain trade with England had been particularly flourishing Not only was actual Canadian produce exported, but large quantities of grain from the adjoining American States were shipped to England through Canada. The repeal of the Corn Laws ruined this Canadian carrying trade, which was diverted to New York, and seriously injured Canada's actual export trade.

In the West Indies the disaster was worse. The sugar planters had not fully recovered from the effects of the emancipation of the slaves, but so long as they had received protection in the English market, they were able to keep their heads above water. The coming of Free Trade exposed them to the competition both of those foreign plantations where slavery was still in force, and of the Beet-sugar Industry.

In 1846 an Enabling Act had given the legislatures of British North America and of Mauritius a considerable degree of fiscal autonomy and English statesmen had confidently expected that those Colonies would follow their lead and adopt Free Trade. It was a great shock to them when those Colonies proceeded to protect their own interests by erecting tariff barriers, even against the Mother Country.

The decade 1860-70 opened with a feeling of great irritation in England over a Canadian Tariff Act, which was purely protective in purpose. So great was the feeling, that the Sheffield manufacturers had even gone as far as to demand that Parliament should disallow the Act. Canada's example was followed during the next ten years by Australia and other Colonies. This infuriated the disciples of Free Trade and brought upon the Colonies considerable, and one must admit unmerited, odium.

Two allied schools of thought thundered against the Colonies, the Manchester School and the Separatist School. The former, led by such brilliant men as John Bright and Richard Cobden, looked on the Colonies as useless burdens, useless because they were not free markets for British goods, burdens because the major cost of their defence fell upon the Mother Country. The Separatist School, led by Mr. Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, held that the greatness of England lay "not in her Empire but in herself," that her "strength and wealth" could be materially increased by "resigning useless dependencies." Professor Goldwin Smith outlined his theories in a series of letters to the "Daily News."

"Not apparent power, but most apparent weakness, is the true name for territories scattered over the globe, known to yield neither revenue nor military force to the possessors, and for the moral feebleness which besets all dependencies, unprovided with any effective means of self-defence."

In addition to all this there was the tremendous influence of Mr. Gladstone, who held the Greek theory of Colonial polity. For him the ideal to be aimed at was that of "perfect freedom and perfect self-government. That the Colonies should be united to the Mother Country by sentiment alone, and that there should be no coercion to secure Colonies, nor coercion to retain them." Mr. Gladstone was, further, of the opinion that those Colonies, which had achieved a considerable measure of constitutional freedom, should be responsible for their own internal defence. He had, in consequence, gradually withdrawn all the garrisons of regular British troops from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This action had caused considerable annoyance to the Colonies concerned, and in the case of New Zealand, had been carried out in spite of the vigorous protests of the local government, which was then engaged in armed conflict with the Maoris over disputes connected with the acquisition of land by the English settlers. Also, in pursuance of Mr. Gladstone's policy of not adding to existing Colonial commitments, the Ionian Islands had been ceded to Greece in 1864, and the Government had declined to make certain extensions of British territory recommended by the Governor of Cape Colony.

Such public opinion in England, as was at all interested in Colonial matters, looked on the federation of the North American Colonies into the Dominion of Canada in 1867, and on the growing tendency of the Australian Colonies to reach out towards some form of federation, with the greatest suspicion. In each case it was considered that federation was merely a prelude to independence. At that time it was generally accepted that Canada would gravitate to the United States, and that the Australian Federation would soon proclaim its own independence, and many influential men considered that the height of wise statesmanship would be so to arrange things that when the parting came, it should be with the best of good feelings on both sides. So strong was this feeling, we read, that somewhere about the year 1867 a Bill was actually drafted to permit the Colonies to secede as and when they pleased.

Thus, towards the end of the decade, we see on the one hand the vast mass of the people in England completely apathetic towards the Empire and on the other, educated opinion almost entirely swayed by the active disintegrationists and the pessimists of the Manchester and Separatist Schools. It was into this deep gloom that there stepped, in June 1868, a few gallant souls, who believed in the strength of Imperial Unity, and who felt that the time had come when a concerted effort should be made to dispel the clouds of ignorance and prejudice, and to awaken people to the true value of the Empire. As a first fruit of their efforts was born the Colonial Society, which later became the Colonial Institute, and in 1882 the Royal Colonial Institute, a designation it held until 1928, when it became the Royal Empire Society.

Who, then, were the stalwarts who dared challenge the all-pervading pessimism and brave the very Manchester School itself? They were only a handful, of whom the acknowledged leaders were Mr. A. R. Roche and Lord Bury. Mr. Roche had been a resident in Canada for some years and had taken a keen interest in the development of the North-West Territories, and had successfully worked for their inclusion in the Dominion of Canada. Lord Bury had had considerable administrative experience and had been Civil Secretary to Lord Elgin, and to Sir Edmund Head, in Canada. He had been a deep student of Colonial affairs and had, in 1865, published a work entitled "Exodus of the Western Nations," wherein he looked upon the ultimate separation of England and British America as inevitable. His conversion from pessimism was very remarkable, and so complete that he became the first President of the Society.

In June 1868 this small group of enthusiasts met in London and decided that the time had come to form a Colonial Society, which would uphold the value of the Empire and be a focal point, in England, of the interests of the Colonies. When it came to sending out invitations to the preliminary deliberations, it was soon discovered, Miss Folsom tells us, that no means existed of ascertaining what Colonials were in London. The preliminary meeting was held on 26th June 1868, and was attended by a number of people in important positions. Lord Bury was the Chairman, and, in concluding the discussion, presented certain resolutions, the tenor of which was, (*a*) that it was expedient to form a Colonial Society, which should bear to all matters of Colonial interest a position analagous to that occupied by the Royal

Society with regard to Science; (*b*) that as soon as funds permitted, there should be opened a lecture hall, a library and reading room, and a museum of science, industry and commerce; (*c*) that there should be opportunities for reading papers and holding discussions on Colonial subjects generally, and for carrying out investigations in connection with the Colonies; (*d*) that the Society should be entirely non-political. These resolutions were adopted and a Provisional Committee was formed to draw up the necessary rules of the Society and to form a Council. In August the rules were adopted and Viscount Bury was elected President of the Society, Mr. Roche being elected Honorary Secretary.

In the Spring of 1869 the Society was launched by an Inaugural Dinner, which as attended by a brilliant Company, including The Prime Minister (Mr. Gladstone), the United States Minister (The Honourable Reverdy Johnson) and the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Earl Granville). As the Society was non-political, members of all parties were able to meet amicably at that dinner. Many felicitous speeches were made welcoming the foundation of such a Society. There was only one jarring note, the United States Minister permitted himself in his speech to refer openly to "certain British Dominions finding themselves in the process of time under the flag of the United States."

After reading Miss Folsom's two chapters "The Founding and Inauguration" and "Organization and Personnel", one cannot but feel that the genius of Mr. Roche launched the Society at the very moment when England was, subconsciously, ready for a reaction against Separatist Doctrines. That this was the case is shown conclusively by the success of the Society, by the remarkably rapid spread of its influence and by the achievements standing to its credit, all with in the short space of fifteen years.

In 1872 Mr. Roche was succeeded as Honorary Secretary by Dr. C. W. Eddy, a man of wide culture and of indomitable energy, and one who had travelled much. He had studied at Oxford and at King's College, London, and had been awarded a Ratcliffe Travelling Fellowship by Oxford University, which he had made use of for visits to Australia, Tasmania, Canada and certain parts of Europe. Unfortunately he died suddenly in 1874. His successor was a remarkable man, a Mr. Frederick Young, who did sterling work until 1886, when he handed over his duties to a paid secretary. But that was not the

end of Mr. Young's services to the Society, he continued to take the greatest interest in its work until he died at the ripe age of 99. He was honoured with the K.C.M.G. in 1888. When he handed over his duties as Honorary Secretary in 1886 many papers printed eulogies of him. Miss Folsom quotes the Sheffield "Daily Telegraph" as saying "No single man has done so much as Mr. Young to promote the present good feeling between the Mother Country and the Colonies, and to strengthen the ties which unite the various sections of the Queen's dominions in one great Empire."

In 1871 the Duke of Manchester succeeded Lord Bury as President of the Society, a position he held for seven years. He worked indefatigably for the Society, or Institute as it had become. In 1869 the Queen had granted permission for the Society to call itself the Royal Colonial Society, but as the initials R. C. S. tended to confuse it with the Royal College of Surgeons, which was the older established body of the two, the name was changed in 1870 to the Royal Colonial Institute.

As well as having such exceptionally able men as President and Honorary Secretary, the Institute was fortunate in obtaining on its Council the services of some of the most distinguished men of the time. This resulted in a rapid growth in influence, so that, within a few years, the Institute had, by carefully eschewing all matters of party politics, achieved a position of high importance in the State. It became a recognised thing for deputations from the Institute to wait upon the Secretary of State for the Colonies in order to put forward some special point of view. The general activities of the Institute attracted increasing attention in the Press. In 1878 the Prince of Wales became President of the Institute, while the creation of the new post of Chairman of the Council made it possible for the Duke of Manchester to continue as Presiding Officer.

The economic survey of the Constituent parts of the Empire is now so complete, that it is hard to realize that in 1868, when the Colonial Society was founded, scarcely anything was known in England about the Colonies. Consequently one of the first occupations of the newly-formed Society was the collection and dissemination of information about the Colonies. This was done partly by the reading of papers and partly by the foundation of a library, wherein were collected Blue Books issued by Colonial Governments and other publications and books of interest. The Colonial Institute was particularly fortunate

in having as its first Librarian Major Boosé, a man of untiring energy and of unerring "flair" for any books, pamphlets or articles of interest bearing upon Colonial subjects. Thanks to the splendid foundation that Major Boosé laid, the Royal Empire Society has now one of the finest libraries on Colonial matters in the world.

But papers of a purely informatory nature would soon have become tedious, and so the Institute also devoted itself to the putting forward of Colonial opinion by the reading of papers, great care always being taken to avoid anything that might be constructed as of the nature of party politics. Miss Folsom deals with these papers in three separate chapters headed "Colonial Information," "Current Topics" and "Imperial Relations." These chapters, specially the two latter ones, are particularly interesting in the way they take us back to problems that were considered important sixty years ago. In those early days Canada loomed large in the "Current Topics" section. Canada had only recently been created a Dominion and had to face many problems, a glance at which may not be without interest for students of present day problems in India. Outstanding were the questions of the purchase of the Western Territory of Canada from the Hudson Bay Company in 1869, of the Red River revolt in 1870 and of the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. The question of the fiscal relationship between Canada and the United States was also the subject of considerable discussion at that time. On the other side of the globe the problems of the Fiji Islands of the Polynesian Labour question, and of the occupation of New Guinea received much attention. The Australian Colonies were particularly anxious that no foreign power should be allowed to occupy the Island of New Guinea, and for years pressed the Home Government to annex the whole island. Actually, no action was taken for some years, until spurred on by the German menace, the British Government occupied the south eastern portion of the island. Considerable attention was also paid to the question of emigration to the Colonies.

The Institute had not long been established before the question of Imperial Relations came before it and it was the object of much discussion throughout all the years under review. As the Institute was always strictly non-party in all these matters, there sprang from its loins other movements of a definitely political tinge of which the most important was the Imperial Federation League. The nature of the relations between the Mother Country and the Dominions and

Colonies is a matter of extraordinary complexity; and is in a constantly fluidic condition. As the Empire has grown up from being a mere collection of "Colonies dependent on a Mother Country" into being a "group of sister nations" held to the Mother Country by a common loyalty to the throne, and by sentiments of affection, it is only natural that the relations between Great Britain and them have also changed. But what is the best form that this relationship should assume during any given period? That problem was much discussed during the early years of the Institute.

The Separatist tendencies of the Manchester School had few supporters in the Colonies. consequently the papers read mostly tended to the theory that an Imperial Federation was the ideal to strive for. The Institute itself stood strongly for Imperial Unity, and its motto was "United Empire," which later (in 1910) became the name of the monthly publication. Naturally it was not possible for the Institute to solve so delicate a problem as that of Imperial Relations, but the fact that the papers and discussions were kept above party politics and gave expression to the views of the most important people of the time, was not without weight in England and caused the Institute to retain the friendship of the Press and to gain an increasing amount of space for the reporting of its papers and for the discussion of Imperial affairs.

Lord French used to say that the study of the history of the past is one of the most important helps to the facing of the problems of the present. These are times when the Empire is beset with the two major problems of the New Constitution for India, and of the best means of Imperial organization, and Miss Folsom's book is of value because it suggests useful lines of research and draws attention to a Society, which besides presenting the advantages of a club, has been for over sixty years attracting to itself a brilliant company of Fellows, and devoting an immense amount of time and study to those very problems upon the successful solution of which depends the future of the Empire.

THE TACTICS OF TIGER SHOOTING.

By Colonel E. J. Ross, o.b.e., m.c.

In the July 1934 issue of this Journal was published, probably owing to the absence of the permanent Editor on leave, an article of mine which dealt on general lines with shooting in India. I have now been asked to deal more especially with the subject of tiger shooting, and to try to give some idea of the tactics employed.

This is not a very easy thing to do in a short article, for tactics vary with the characteristics of the individual man and the individual tiger, as well as with the local topography.

The first thing you have to do, if you are to be successful in tiger shooting, is to be able to put yourself in the place of a tiger and to think like a tiger ; until you can achieve that you are not likely to meet with much success. While one can lay down general rules and general lines for this sort of shooting, one must remember that tigers vary quite a lot in their habits, and, because one tiger acts in a particular way one day, it does not follow that another tiger will do the same thing on another day. This much is, however, certain : a particular tiger nearly always has his own particular habits ; he will generally kill in the same way and behave in the same way, and once you have discovered his individual habits you have generally gone a long way forward in the direction of getting him.

There is not room here to give a long dissertation on the habits of tiger, but I will try and outline a few general and salient points which may help people when the time comes.

Firstly, about the tiger himself : of all animals in the jungle the tiger has got the best sight and the best hearing, but he is definitely deficient in the powers of scent. This question of scent is rather a controversial one, and a good many people disagree with this. My own experience, however, is that although he may possess a fairly good nose, he has a very indifferent one compared with the normal animals—deer and so on—which one comes across in the jungle. It is safe, I think, to say that whereas deer, goats, and sheep think through their noses, a tiger thinks, like human beings, through his eyes and his ears which are, however, much more efficient.

A tiger is by nature, and when well-fed, rather lazy and fond of comfort. He particularly dislikes a strong sun and a glare. Although, therefore, he will travel, and even rest, in fairly open ground in the early morning and evening, he will invariably pass the heat of the day in really thick shade. Normally speaking, except when hunting, a tiger is not very cunning or alert. Once he has been disturbed, however, his whole nature changes. He becomes one of the most cunning animals in the jungle.

One of the first principles, then, in tiger shooting is never to run the risk of disturbing a tiger until you are pretty certain that you are going to get him. If you get a kill in a doubtful place, therefore, either for beating or for sitting up, leave it alone and do not chance your arm. Tie up again for him and let him kill again. It is much better to let your tiger kill two or three baits and then get him, than to take a doubtful chance with your first kill and put your tiger off altogether. If you once disturb him off the kill he will run cunning. He may go on killing your baits and making himself a perfect nuisance to you, but he will dodge you every time. It is never worth while economising over baits. I can never understand the mentality of a person who will spend hundreds of rupees on his journey and his *bandobust*, but who will skimp the number of baits and the number of kills on which his sport really depends.

While in general, as I say, a disturbed tiger is a lost tiger, I do not mean to say that there are not exceptions. Occasionally one meets a complete fool. Somebody once said that 90 *per cent.* of human beings are fools; in the case of tiger you can reverse this, I think, and say that 90 *per cent.* are clever and 10 *per cent.* are fools. It is good business, therefore, to treat every tiger as a clever one until you have proved the contrary.

Tigers when hungry are restless and wander over large areas. They are comparatively rare in any jungle, and the first thing you have to do, therefore, is to localise them. Until you have done this, you may wander through the jungle for weeks and months and never come across one, at least so that you can get a shot. There are, however, some lucky people who seem to meet them whenever they go out. But do not imagine that you are going to be one of the lucky ones! To localise your tiger you must get him to kill; if once you succeed in this he will stay in the same area, at least for three or four days.

There are two normal methods of shooting tiger—one is by beating, and the other by sitting up over a kill. Each has its own technique, and if you are going to be successful with either you must start from the beginning with the particular method in view. Do not start merely tying up in the hopes of getting a kill somewhere, and of then making up your mind whether you are going to beat or to sit up. To be successful at either method, you must start from the very beginning with that method in view. The success of each depends on a different state of conditions.

A tiger in the heat of the day must always lie up in shady cover, and nearly always in or very near water. He will stay by his kill throughout the day if conditions are suitable, but, if he cannot drag his kill into suitable lying-up ground, he will leave it for at least two or three hours in the middle of the day and lie up by the nearest water.

The art of sitting up depends on getting into position without disturbing the tiger, while he is away from his kill. The art of beating depends on finding the tiger at home, on or near his kill, and beating him away from it. In sitting up, locating the tiger does not matter very much so long as you make sure that he is some distance away when you are putting up your *machan*, and that you have a general idea of the direction from which he will come. If you are going to beat, however, you must locate your tiger accurately. It follows, therefore, that, in tying up to sit up, you tie up in some place where the tiger cannot drag his kill into cover suitable for lying up, and, in tying up for a beat, you place your bait so that the tiger will drag it into lying-up cover and will stay near it through the heat of the day.

I propose now to deal separately with the question of sitting up and beating. Sitting up is really the poor man's method, and it is also the method which has to be employed in jungles where beaters are unobtainable. There is a great deal of rubbish written to the effect that sitting up is a form of poaching requiring no skill. As a matter of fact, to be successful, it requires just as much woodcraft and as much knowledge as beating. It is not, as some people suppose, merely a question of getting a kill in any old place and sitting up over it in any old tree. The reason, I think, why many people regard it with disfavour is that they do not understand it and, therefore, they sit up time and again and nothing happens. Beating is, of course, mor certain, and, given a reasonable amount of knowledge of the ground, success is easier. On the other hand, to the naturalist and to the

person who really enjoys seeing the undisturbed life of the jungle, sitting up is the more attractive, as, apart from the chance of your tiger, you will see all the inmates of the jungle at their ease and undisturbed. When the tiger himself comes, you see him behaving in his natural way in his natural state, and not worried and hustled by a crowd of beaters.

It is a mistake to suppose that tigers, in general, only come out on their kills at night. My own experience is that, provided the right conditions have been selected and adequate precautions taken, tiger will normally come out to feed quite early in the afternoon. The normal habit of the tiger when he has killed is to stay on his kill until he is driven off it by the heat or the glare. He will generally stay fairly near it till the heat drives him off to look for deep shade and water. He will lie up there for three or four hours in the heat of the day and will generally begin coming down to his kill again as soon as the sun gets off the patch of jungle in which it is located. What you have to do in sitting up is to take advantage of this habit. Get all your business in the neighbourhood of the kill completed while the tiger is away and while he cannot hear the noise which you must inevitably make in rigging up and getting into a *machan*.

Whatever you do, never allow yourself, or anybody else, to follow up a drag or go anywhere near the kill in the morning. Even if the tiger is not actually on the kill, he will be somewhere quite near it, and he will certainly hear you. Although he will hear you, you will not hear him. He will slink away very quietly and as likely as not you will not even know he was there. Time and again, however, you will hear a cheetal or a khakur barking a couple of hundred yards away in the jungle. You will think it is barking at you ; as a matter of fact what is worrying it is not you, but the sight or the smell of the tiger which you have disturbed. Although he may come back to his kill after he has been disturbed like this, he will do so terribly cautiously and generally after dark. When disturbed in this way a tiger develops a most annoying habit of coming down within a hundred yards or so of his kill quite early in the evening but of remaining quiet, listening and watching, for an hour or so before he actually comes out. I have once or twice been able to see this myself, and it is amazing to see how, for an hour on end, he will remain alert and listening for the slightest sound. It is almost impossible for the keenest man in the world to remain absolutely motionless for an hour

on end, and the slightest sound while the tiger is near will mean that your chance has gone.

If it is possible, therefore, go round your baits yourself in the early morning and make sure that, if there is a kill, there is no disturbance whatever in the neighbourhood. If you cannot go round them yourself, send a reliable man with the coolie who looks after your baits. Give him the strictest possible orders that, if there is a kill, he is to come straight home without making a sound. It is exactly on this point that the average *shikari* fails. He likes to show his great knowledge by coming back with specious tales of the size of the tiger and of where it has left the kill. If your *shikari* can tell you where the kill is, you can tell him that he has almost certainly spoilt any chance of getting your tiger. The moment you have a kill, therefore, come straight home and make all your preparations to go out, put up your *machan*, and get into position during the heat of the day while the tiger is away.

It is as well to allow an extra hour or two for delays and for the difficulty in following up the drag. You should, however, make certain in the hot weather of being in position all ready in your *machan* by three o'clock at latest. When you come out, the first thing to do is to locate the kill. Bring out your *machan* and necessary gear and the men to tie it up, but leave them for the time being at the place where your bait was killed. Then go on yourself very quietly with only one man and follow up the drag. This is not quite as easy as it sounds; a big tiger will often carry a small buffalo so that the track is very difficult to follow, especially when the ground is dry or rocky. He may drag as far as three-quarters of a mile, or even more, but, in any case, you must expect it to take an hour to find your kill and to select the tree for your *machan*. Having made this reconnaissance and decided exactly on the position of your *machan*, send back for your men, and in the meantime sit very quietly in some spot where you can get a view round about the kill. There is always just the chance that a tiger may be lying somewhere near and he may, when he hears your man go back, come out to have a look at the kill.

Some authorities recommend, when tying up with the intention of sitting up, using a rope which the tiger cannot break, so that he cannot drag the kill away. I am strongly opposed to this. It may work all right with a very inexperienced tiger; once, however, a tiger

knows the game, anything like this will make him suspicious and less likely to return by daylight. My experience is that it is much better to let your tiger drag into some quiet place, and take the chance of being able to find a suitable tree for your *machan* than to risk rousing the suspicions of a beast which is already quite cunning enough.

If you are sitting up over a live bait, by all means use a strong rope. Remember, however, that it must be a very strong one. It takes something like a four inch hawser to prevent a heavy tiger dragging his kill!

There are several points to be thought of in selecting a place for your *machan*. You have to consider two things. The first is the question of being able to sit up without making a noise. You must select a tree which will not shake or sway every time you make the slightest move: therefore, select a good, solid tree at some distance from the kill, rather than a fragile tree which may be nearer from the point of view of shooting, but which will shake every time you move and especially at the critical moment when you put your rifle up to fire. A tiger approaching a kill, depends more on his ears than his eyes—even the rustle of one or two dried leaves is quite enough to put him on the alert. Remember that his attention is concentrated towards the kill: try, therefore, to arrange your *machan* so that it is out of the line of his direct approach to the kill. The mistake which every *shikari* makes is to put the *machan* too much on top of the kill so that the tiger either walks straight under or straight towards it. Try and tuck it away to one side so that the tiger will pass you well to one side when he is coming to the kill. It is much better to have a steady shot at a tiger fifty or sixty yards away in broad daylight, than to have a doubtful one at fifteen yards rise in the dark or straight under your tree.

A tiger, when he is hunting at night, nearly always moves either by a road, a path or a dry *nullah* bed where he can move quietly and not make a noise. The best place to tie up is generally either at a point where a track meets a road, or where a road crosses another, for this sort of place will give you a double chance. A very favourable place is where a road crosses a long *nullah* leading down from the hills. You often find that these *nullahs* have water in them right up at the top, but that the lower end is dry for perhaps a mile or so. The bottom end of one of these is the best possible place to tie up. The tiger which kills there will drag up into the *nullah* but must leave the

kill to go to water at the top of the *nullah* and to lie up for the day. You can, therefore, slip in and get your *machan* up, knowing that the tiger is almost certainly lying up right away at the top of your *nullah*. You will also, which is a great advantage, have at least a general idea of the direction from which he will return. Remember, however, that this is a general direction only. A tiger will not necessarily, in fact will hardly ever, come right down the bed of the *nullah* to a kill; he will nearly always approach it from some slightly higher ground from one side or the other. A little experience will soon give you a pretty shrewd idea of the route by which he is most likely to come, and it must be your business to try to locate your *machan* so that it will be off the direct route and so that, from it, you will be able to cover his advance for the last thirty or forty yards up to the kill.

I have tried, in the attached diagrams, to give some idea of what I mean. Diagram I is of a kill which has been dragged up into a *nullah* of this nature. " B " shows the place where your *shikari* will generally want to put up your *machan*, that is to say, right on top of the kill and so that the tiger will walk straight up to it as he comes to the hill; this is the worst possible place. I have tried to show the sort of place you should select, and have marked it " A." You will see that this is tucked away right off the line of the kill, so that there is very little chance of his seeing you; but at the same time so that it gives you a fair broadside shot as he approached the kill. In this connection, it is well to remember that, if possible, you should never wait for a tiger to come to the kill before taking your shot; try to take him, if you can, well before he gets to the kill, for once he gets there you never know quite what will happen. He may suddenly suspect something at the last moment and shy off, or he may, as I have actually seen happen, suddenly pick up the kill and go off with it before you get your rifle off. There is only one rule, and that is to take the first certain shot that offers.

I have added two more diagrams (II and III) which are, I think, self-explanatory and follow similar principles. Each of these are of actual kills, and in each case the tiger was shot. In each case " B " is what appeared at first sight the most obvious place to put the *machan* and " A " is the place where it was finally located. You will see that in each case the *machan* was so located that it was hardly possible for the tiger to come underneath it, and that in each case the tiger was shot well before it reached the kill.

A trick I have played two or three times on a tiger which refuses to co-operate by coming to his kill before dark, is to sit up, not over or near the kill, but right away from it on his road down. Most tigers, even though they will come out to the kill by daylight, will generally come down to the neighbourhood of it quite early in the afternoon. In certain types of country a tiger may go a mile or so away to lie up. Although he will vary his route in the immediate neighbourhood of the kill, he will often use the same route for the initial part of his move.

If you see signs of this it is worth while letting him kill two or three times in the same place, then sit up early in the afternoon at some selected point on his route. A tiger on the move like this is much less alert than he is near the kill, and it is a very pretty way of getting a cunning tiger. It requires, however, very good local knowledge, and very skilful reconnaissance.

Now about the actual *machan* and the paraphernalia you want. The ordinary small-sized *machan*, although it is light and handy, is a perfect abomination for sitting up quietly. It is quite impossible for an ordinary human being to sit up in one of these for two or three hours without moving. It is essential, if you are going to keep from moving, that you should be completely comfortable. Anything—a lump or a wooden bar which you can just feel when you first sit up—will cause you absolute agony when you have been sitting on it for an hour or so. In my experience the only way really to sit up well, is to have a *machan* arranged so that you can lie full length and make yourself completely comfortable. In fact one in which you can lie up, rather than sit up. You are, moreover, less conspicuous when lying down. The ordinary village *charpoy*, if long enough, does very well indeed. You want to have on it either a camp mattress or a well-padded *rezai*, and I strongly advise two good fat cushions. Equipped like this, you can lie full length on your face with a couple of pillows under your chest, your rifle tucked in under your right arm, and you can keep quite still for hours on end. There is no reason at all why you should not read a book, and you can smoke quite safely provided you do not make a noise lighting your pipe.

Everything you have with you in the *machan* must be arranged so that you can get at it with the minimum amount of movement and, of course, everything must be of some neutral colour. The ordinary

topee with its hard outline is most conspicuous in a *machan* ; I strongly advice you to camouflage it by sewing on wide black stripes on to the khaki so as to break the outline.

Remember that, from the lying position, you cannot shoot to the right, and only with difficulty straight to your front. You must arrange the *machan*, therefore, so that the kill is well to your left. It is better, in fact, to have the kill on what the sailors call your " port beam " rather than broadside on or on your " port bow." This is a point which is often missed. I have many times seen people put themselves into a *machan* so that they cannot shoot at the tiger at all when he appears.

If you are going to sit up, as you should, from three o'clock till dark, in the hot weather, you will want lots of water and something to eat. See that the cover of your water-bottle is thoroughly soaked before you get into your *machan* so that it will keep cool, and hang it so that you can drink with the least possible movement. Your food must be something that you can eat without making a noise ; do not have it in a tin or wrapped in paper. Sandwiches wrapped up in a khaki handkerchief will do very well, but to my mind the most convenient form of food is the cold sausage.

Whatever you do, never take a man in the *machan* with you ; even if he does not cough at a critical moment, which he probably will, he is certain to cramp your style, and doubling the number of people in a *machan* means double the amount of movement and double the amount of noise. If you really want to get your tiger, leave your girl friend at home. If you select a firm tree, however, there is no reason why you should not be able to eat and drink when you want without giving the show away. As a rule, too, in a jungle where there is lots of game, you will have warning when your tiger is getting near. You will hear cheetal, khakur, sambhur or monkeys making a noise when the tiger begins to move, and as soon as you hear that, you must be absolutely still and absolutely on the alert. Generally, too, a tiger does not come very quietly to the kill ; if he is quite undisturbed you will very often hear his footsteps on dry leaves, and once you have heard a tiger coming down like this, you can never mistake his footsteps for anything else.

I personally do not like the idea, which many people suggest, of having men sitting up two or three hundred yards away ; if there is

a main road ro open ground, say, five or six hundred yards away, I generally have some men there so that I can call them up by whistle if I want them. One has to be very careful about this, however, especially if one fires at a tiger and is not quite certain whether he is dead or not. If your men are reasonably well trained you can generally get them up to you without any risk. If, however, they are simple, untrained coolies who really do not understand what you say and what you are at, it is much better for you to get out of your *machan* and go to them, rather than get them to come up to you. Always, therefore, have a rope in your *machan* so that you can lower your rifle if you want to get down, and also have a really powerful whistle with which you can make yourself heard. Whatever you do, warn your men that they are on no account to come near you after you have fired a shot until you have definitely called them up.

Do not forget that a dead tiger is very often not so dead as he looks. Even, therefore, if you think he is quite dead make certain that your men approach you from the other side of the *machan* while you keep the tiger covered in case he comes to life again.

It is nearly always getting towards evening and the light is generally beginning to go about the time you fire your shot. If you knock him down, therefore, and he shows any sign at all of movement, do not hesitate to give him another shot or two, it may save you a lot of trouble later on in case he moves. A few extra bullet holes in the skin make practically no difference, provided you stitch them up while the skin is still wet. So do not be deterred from making certain he is dead by the risk of spoiling his skin. The only shot that is likely to do much damage to the skin is a shot in the face or one which breaks up his skull.

Before I go on to the question of beating, there are one or two situations in which beating and sitting up overlap. It is often worth while, if there are two of you shooting together, and where the ground is suitable, for one gun to go very quietly on to a point where he can cover the possible line of retreat of a tiger, while the other follows the drag and makes the necessary arrangements for putting up the *machan*. The sort of place where this can be done is where a tiger has dragged into one of the flats at the side of a *nullah* bed. A very common formation in the lower hills is a sandy *nullah* which winds about through thickly covered flats with hills on either side. If the tiger drags into one of these flats, one gun may go quietly on to the point

where the nullah curves back under the hills again. If the tiger is disturbed by the other gun off his kill, he will very often move away along the bottom of the hill. If the forward man goes very quietly on up the nullah and gets into a tree where that flat ends, he will often stand a chance of getting a shot. This should, however, only be attempted where the ground permits of his getting quietly into position without any disturbance of the jungle. It is, however, a very pleasant trick if it can be brought off. (See Diagram IV.)

Another trick which is well worth carrying out, when sitting up in the evening has been unsuccessful, is to stalk the kill very carefully in the early morning. A tiger which is hungry and has been kept off his kill in the evening will very often come back late at night and may feed till fairly late the following morning. By that time you will know the ground, and may be able to overlook the kill from a convenient ridge. A fellow I was out with two years ago was driven off his *machan* in the evening by a violent storm of wind and rain. The following morning, as the jungle was wet and he could move quietly, I sent him out to stalk the kill. Actually he got two tigers, or rather curiously enough, two tigresses which had evidently been quarrelling as to who was to have the kill!

Now to turn to the question of beating. The first point, as I have already said, is to locate your tiger as closely as possible without running the risk of disturbing him. In general, a short beat is much better than a long beat. The tiger has less chance of breaking out on the side or of stopping before he gets to the guns and of having to be put up again. Six hundred yards is about as long as a normal beat should be, but, of course, at times it may have to be longer still. Some of the most successful beats I have seen, however, have been quite short, and if the cover is really good it may be possible to run a beat of 100 yards or so. The difficulty, of course, with a short beat, is getting the guns and stops into position without disturbing the tiger.

The first principle in beating is, of course, to drive the tiger in the direction he naturally wants to go. When tying up for a beat one tries to get one's tiger to lie up in a fairly isolated bit of jungle of a size which is manageable with the available strength. When disturbed in a cover like this, he will naturally move towards the main forest or towards the hills, provided there is suitable heavy jungle there. It

follows, then, that your beat will be laid out towards the main heavy forest or hills. I do not, however, mean to say by this that you must try and force the tiger up a steep hill, but what I do mean to say is that you must try and move him along the natural lead to the main hills.

I have never noticed any difference between beating up wind or beating down wind ; I do not believe that a tiger coming out on a beat takes much notice of human scent. Naturally, if there is a wind blowing down from the guns into the beat, noise will carry better so that one has to be more careful about getting into position quietly.

The ideal is for him to come straight to the gun without being forced or turned by stops. This, however, is sometimes not possible ; it may be necessary to force him to some extent off his natural line if it is not possible to cover this with the guns, but those sort of beats are rarely satisfactory, and in my experience generally result in an unsatisfactory galloping shot. What one wants to aim at is to move the tiger rather than to drive him, so that he will come forward quietly and unsuspiciously to the guns.

Once you have decided on the general line on which you are to beat your tiger, the next thing is to consider the detailed location of the guns. A tiger, when he kills, nearly always drags into the thickest cover available, and generally in the direction he will finally go. Generally, therefore, one should beat away from the kill, and it is certainly undesirable to try and drive a tiger straight back over the place where he has killed.

A tiger in a beat moves on a different line to what he does when hunting at night. At night, for instance, he will generally move by the bed of a nullah ; during a beat, although he will follow the general line of a nullah, he will nearly always keep along thick cover on one bank or the other. He will not go round the bend in a nullah, but will generally cut across it, and the same applies to small hills and the like. If a low ridge runs through the beat he will very often follow it so as to get a view on either side. A common form of beat is up towards the fork of a nullah. In this case he will very often cross the nullah near the fork and follow the ridge between the two branches. If a bank running parallel to the beat is included in the beat, he will often follow the top of a bank, and if not, will keep along through heavy cover at the base of it.

Diagram V is of a beat carried out successfully in a situation of this nature. The kill took place where a nullah coming down from the main hills crossed a little used forest track; between the track and the hills is very dense cover with some moist ground in the middle of it; above this is a thickly wooded bank, with a flat and fairly open sal forest between it and the main hills. I have twice beaten this successfully, and each time the tiger, after lying up in heavy cover below the bank, has climbed the bank and come along through thick bushes on top of it—each time coming to gun "A." In the reverse of this beat, however, (which I have also carried out successfully from the opposite direction), although the ground is very similar and the same bank continues right through it, the tiger has on both occasions come along the bottom of the bank to gun "B." On each occasion, however, he has followed close to the bank and has never come out more than twenty yards from it.

When beating up into a large nullah, or towards the mouth of it, the best place for the guns is commanding the spurs up to the top of the bank on either side of the nullah. Here again, your tiger, as a rule, will follow the general direction of the nullah, but he will hardly ever, when disturbed, enter the mouth of a narrow nullah (Diagram VI).

When your beat consists of a flat on one side of a winding nullah, a tiger may do one of two things: he may either cross the nullah, where the flat narrows, into the corresponding flat on the other side, or he may, as he very often does, cut across the ridge and go straight on into the next flat on the same bank of the nullah. Again, he will hardly ever follow the bed of a nullah.

These notes, and the diagrams I attach, may assist to some extent. Remember, however, that they illustrate only very general rules and it is a matter requiring great experience and skill to be able to tell at a glance in a new jungle the exact line that a tiger is most likely to take. Some people have this faculty to an extraordinary degree, and, by some form of second sight, are able to pick out in a strange jungle the natural line by which the tiger will move.

Remember that to carry out a successful beat you have got to bring the tiger at a walk, if possible, through the frontage of seventy or eighty yards covered by the guns. You may have several hundred square miles of jungle behind you into any part of which the tiger may

want to go. If, therefore, you are to be successful, you must have the means for keeping the tiger to the correct route ; this you can only do by the use of skilfully located stops, and stops are, in nearly every beat, more important than the actual beaters themselves. In many beats, for instance, you will find that you need two or three times as many stops as beaters, and on the successful laying out of the stops all your success will depend. The principles of beating are exactly the same whether you use men or elephants in the actual beat line. I am not talking of those sort of shoots where fifty or sixty elephants can be obtained, but of the normal affair where one, two or three elephants can be begged, borrowed or stolen. In this case you use the elephants instead of beaters, and such men as are available you use as stops.

One often hears a lot of argument as to whether stops are to be silent or are to make a noise. There is no hard and fast rule for this. If a tiger is coming straight to the guns, the less noise that is made the better, for the less noise there is the more likely will he be to come on slowly and steadily. Therefore, where a flank is sufficiently open for stops to see the tiger on the move it is better for them to remain silent and only make a noise if he is showing signs of taking the wrong line. On the other hand, where the jungle is very thick, it is generally better for the stops on that flank to start tapping as soon as the beat starts. This will generally turn the tiger right away from that flank, but if he once gets quite close to the stops and then is turned by a sudden noise, he is likely to become unmanageable and may break back or gallop right through the line of stops.

In Diagrams V and VI, you will see that I have marked the stops to the right of the guns, who are in comparatively open ground, as silent stops, and the stops who are covering heavy jungle, as noisy stops. When I say "noisy," I do not mean that they must make much noise ; all that is required is a very gentle tapping of a branch, for this is quite sufficient to turn any tiger or to warn him off the flank. In any case stops near the guns must be silent. One thing they must not do is to make a noise when the tiger is coming straight forward. There is a great art in knowing the exact moment to turn the tiger. If this is done too soon it will turn him right back into the beat line, and that is the mistake which most stops make.

The ideal to aim at in any beat is to get the tiger quietly on the move in the right direction and well ahead of the beaters. Once he

has been put on the move like this, he will move steadily on and not require hustling from behind. It is a good thing, therefore, to start a beat, especially if the cover is thick and the beat a fairly long one, with a lot of noise and, perhaps, a shot or two. After that the more silently the beat comes forward the better. This wakes the tiger up and prevents him sitting tight until the beaters get quite close to him. If he is put up suddenly by the beaters when they are right on top of him, he will lose his head and start galloping about, and may break out anywhere.

People are apt to regard a beat as a show carried out by a howling mob of some scores of beaters. This is very far from being the case. The most successful and the pleasantest beats from every point of view are those carried out by a very few men. There is one particular one which I have carried out several times successfully with only about half-a-dozen men; of these three were used as stops and the rest did not even extend through the jungle, but simply walked up the nullah bed talking. I have included a diagram of this as Diagram No. VIII.

The small beats carried out with one or two elephants can be run on exactly similar lines. The whole thing is to get the tiger on the move quietly in the right direction, and not to let him realise that it is a beat at all.

It never does to put your guns on ground which is too open; a tiger, when he has been disturbed, will always shy off open ground, and if you force him across it he will generally come at a gallop. It is much easier to kill a tiger when he is moving quietly through fairly thick cover than to kill him galloping in the open. Therefore select a place for your guns, not so that the ground is absolutely clear in all directions, but so that they will get a steady shot in reasonably thick cover.

When you are shooting in a beat remember that, although you are up a tree, your beaters are on the ground. The greatest crime you can commit is to send a wounded tiger back into the beat. In general, therefore, you should never fire at a tiger until he is through, or practically through, the line of guns. If you take a shot in front it must be an absolutely certain shot, and you must be completely certain that you are going to kill him dead. Once a tiger is broadside on to you, coming through the line of guns, even if you wound him, he

will normally gallop straight on, on his original line. It is a good thing to have a reliable man available in a tree seventy or eighty yards behind you. It is the business of this man to see exactly what happens to a tiger after you have fired at him. Even if you hit a tiger clean through the heart, he will nearly always gallop on for forty or fifty yards, and if the jungle behind you is tolerably thick, an observer up a tree will save you an immense amount of trouble and possibly some danger after the beat is over.

There are often more than one tiger in a beat, so when one tiger has come through and been fired at, there is no need to stop the beat unless he is in front of the guns. You should, therefore, give very careful instructions to your beaters to continue coming forward irrespective of whether a shot has been fired or not, but the most careful arrangements must be made for an alarm signal in case a wounded animal is between the guns and the beaters. Where the jungle is very thick and the tiger is not likely to come far ahead of the beaters, it is probably best to reverse these instructions and to arrange with the beaters that they are to stop and climb trees when a shot is fired, and are not to advance until you signal them to do so by whistle. I have noticed that in very wet weather and when the jungle is thick, that a tiger will often hang back and come along quite close ahead of the beaters. In this case it is particularly necessary to let him through the guns before you fire at him.

The last tiger I shot was one killed in September while the monsoon was still on, at the special request of the local civil officers, as it had been doing a lot of damage close to a main road. We were three guns, and the beaters were actually up to the line of guns on my left and not more than thirty yards away from me. The jungle was terribly wet and heavy and the tigress, as she was in this case, suddenly appeared slinking along not more than twenty yards ahead of the beaters. She looked utterly disgusted and bored with the wet and discomfort, and was obviously very reluctant to move at all. The jungle was very thick, but I managed to get her with rather a lucky shot as she jumped the track on which my *machan* was located.

One of the great difficulties in arranging a beat is to get your *machans* up and to make your reconnaissance without running the risk of disturbing your tiger. If time permits, it is much better to make your arrangements in advance, *i.e.*, do a complete reconnaissance of the cover you intend to beat, select the position for your stops and

actually put up your *machans* before you get a kill. Then, having done all that, tie up so that the tiger will drag into the beat.

It is a good thing, if you are going to be fifteen days, or so, in a jungle, to spend the first three or four days laying out and preparing two or three beats a day, and when each is ready to start tying up baits for it.

There are two other ways of shooting tiger available to the ordinary officer on leave. The first of these, and one of the most effective, is *ghooming* on a single elephant, but this can only be applied where the jungle is suitable. The method adopted is this : Instead of sending men to look at the baits in the morning, the sportsman himself goes out and visits them. If there is a kill, he works his elephant very quietly up the drag, and if the tiger is not found on the kill, he works very quietly through all the likely spots in the neighbourhood. This is a very deadly method in the early autumn when the jungle is undisturbed and the mornings are cool, and can be applied successfully all through the cold weather. It is only likely to be successfu', however, in grass or in forest such as sal where there is a grass undergrowth, for in other types of jungle the elephant makes so much no se that it disturbs the tiger. If you are practising this method, therefore, the moment you find that the drag is leading you into bamboo jungle, or where there are a lot of dry branches about, it is much better to chuck it up and go home. If you persist in unsuitable ground, it only means that you will spoil your chance of getting your tiger in some other way.

In this form of shooting, it is absolutely necessary that you should have a complete understanding with your *mahawat.* He must, in the first place, really understand that complete quietness is essential to success. He must on no account talk to his elephant, for the sound of a human voice will put the tiger clean away. He must direct his elephant entirely by pressure, and he must on no account beat it over the head with his *ankus* if it does the wrong thing. The ideal is to give the impression of a wild elephant wandering about in the jungle. Further, you will be perched up on a pad a bit higher than he is, and you must have an arrangement by which he will stop the elephant at a touch from you and will turn it automtically in the right direction.

A *mahawat,* unless he is very well trained, forgets that it is impossible to shoot to the right, and difficult to shoot even straight

ahead off a pad elephant. The moment a tiger is sighted, therefore, he must automatically turn the elephant so that the tiger is slightly to your left and keep it absolutely steady for the three or four seconds required for your shot.

If it can be carried out successfully, this is a very pretty method of getting a tiger, and has the advantage of not requiring large numbers of men and complicated apparatus.

The last method is that of stalking your tiger and shooting him on foot. This is the method adopted by the hero in the story books, but it is not one which is likely to be successful often in practice. A tiger is much too quick of hearing to allow a clumsy animal like a man with a rifle to get up to him unless conditions are very suitable. Where you know the ground well, however, and where your baits are suitably located, it is often worth while going round yourself on foot and stalking them with great care on the off-chance of a tiger being on a kill. As a rule, however, he will drag into thick stuff before daylight and the most you are likely to see of your tiger is a flick of his tail as he disappears into cover.

Where there are isolated pools in a sandy nullah, it is, however, sometimes possible to stalk a tiger when he is lying up in water in the middle of the day. If you want to try this, you must previously make a very careful reconnaissance so that you cannot only approach your pool from the most favourable direction, but so that you know the exact spot where the tiger is most likely to lie. You want to tie up a hundred yards or so from your pool, and, if there is a kill, to come out in the heat of the day and stalk the water carefully. It is unsound under these conditions to fire at a tiger when he is lying down. If you do, you are much more likely to wound him than to kill him. If, therefore, you get up to a sleeping tiger, get yourself absolutely ready then waken him up with a slight noise—say the snapping of a twig. If he is wakened up like this, he will generally stand long enough to give you an easy shot, but if you disturb him too violently he will bound straight off without your being able to get a reasonable shot at him at all.

A great deal of rubbish has been written about the danger of shooting tiger on foot, and of it being the only sporting method, and so on. It is, of course, a very fine sport if it can be brought off, but

DIAGRAM I.

SITTING UP.



DIAGRAM II.
SITTING UP.



BAIT KILLED AT.....
DRAG.....
POSITION OF KILL.....
PROBABLE LINE OF TIGERS RETURN.
WRONG PLACE FOR MACHAN..... B.
RIGHT PLACE FOR MACHAN..... A.
TIGER SHOT AT.....
RANGE 50 Yds.

DIAGRAM III.
SITTING UP.



KILL DRAGGED IN TO SMALL GRASSY PLATEAU.

BAIT KILLED..... ✳

DRAG..... ←

KILL..... X

PROBABLE LINE OF TIGERS.

RETURN..... ←

WRONG PLACE FOR MACHAN.... ⊙ B.

RIGHT PLACE FOR MACHAN..... ⊙ A.

TIGER SHOT..... ☼

RANGE 50 Yds.

DIAGRAM IV.

FOLLOWING UP A DRAG IN SUITABLE GROUND WITH 2 GUNS.



BAIT KILLED AT.................... ×
DRAG.................................
KILL................................. ×
PROBABLE LINE OF TIGER. IF DISTURBED.
No. 1. GUN FOLLOWS UP DRAG.........
Nº 2. GUN GOES ROUND BY NULLAH.
FOLLOWING BLACK LINE, & GETS INTO
A TREE AT......................... A"

(N.B.) THIS SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED UNLESS Nº 2. GUN CAN GET INTO POSITION WITHOUT ANY DISTURBANCE OF JUNGLE.

DIAGRAM V.



KILL.----------

DRAG.----------

ROUTE OF TIGER IN BEAT.----------

SHOT BY "A" GUN.---------- ⊕

STOPS.---------- ⊙

STOP ON RIGHT OF GUNS.----------SILENT.

" ON LEFT OF GUNS,----------NOISY.

AS FORMER ARE IN OPEN & LATTER IN THICK COVER BELOW THEM.

BEAT LINE.---------- XXXX

TIGER WAS NOT SEEN BY STOPS.

DIAGRAM VI.

(BEATING TO THE MOUTH OF A NULLAH.)



TWO TIGER IN THIS BEAT.
EACH CAME TO LOW RIDGE LEADING UP SIDE OF EXIT OF NULLAH FROM HIGH GROUND.
NEITHER SEEN BY STOPS.

BEATERS ---------- XXXX
GUNS ---------- ⊕
STOPS ---------- ⊙
KILL ---------- X
DRAG ---------- —→—
LINE TAKEN BY TIGER ---------- →

STOPS ON LEFT OF GUNS ARE IN THICK COVER.
& START TAPPING AS SOON AS BEAT STARTS.
STOPS ON RIGHT OF GUNS ARE MORE IN THE OPEN & REMAIN SILENT.

DIAGRAM VII.



BEAT. ALONG LOW RIDGES & LOW GROUND BETWEEN GRASS TAPPAR & SAL FOREST RIDGES NOT MORE THAN 50ft HIGH & SLOPES GENTLE.

BEATEN TWICE.

1st TIME SINGLE TIGER FOLLOWED BLACK LINE.

2nd TIME 3 TIGER FOLLOWED RED LINE.

A OCCUPIED BY STOP INSTEAD OF GUN.

DIAGRAM VIII.



BEAT CARRIED OUT WITH 7 MEN.
KILL AT JUNCTION OF TWO NULLAHS.
C. C. HOLDING COVER INTO WHICH TIGER DRAGGED.
S.S.S.S. STOPS.
A. GUN.
X X X B. 3 MEN WALKING UP NULLAH TALKING & BREAKING AN OCCASIONAL BRANCH.
NULLAH HAS OCCASIONAL POOLS OF WATER IN IT.
SLOPES OF HILLS FAIRLY OPEN SAL FORESTS.
FLATS BY NULLAH GREEN JUNGLE FAIRLY THICK WITH GOOD SHADE.

the chief objection is that except where the country is unusually suitable, it is about a thousand to one against your ever getting a shot.

So far as my experience goes, there is practically no more danger in shooting a tiger on foot than in any other method. A tiger will hardly ever charge immediately on being fired at, even when wounded. He will, nearly always, whether wounded or not, blunder straight on along the line he is facing when the shot is fired.

Obviously you do not want to take uncertain shots either on foot or anywhere else, and, of course, no one but a fool will fire at a tiger which is likely to blunder straight into him or which is straight uphill and likely to fall on top of him whether killed or wounded.

The danger in a tiger shoot, of course, starts some time after the first shot, when you are following up the wounded beast. Whether your original shot has been fired on foot, off a *machan* or off an elephant, a wounded tiger is equally dangerous. I have specifically said " off an elephant " because, in my experience, except for the one fact that you can see better, it is more dangerous following up a wounded tiger on a half-trained elephant than on one's flat feet, and the majority of elephants which we soldiers can borrow are definitely half-trained or worse.

I trust these notes will be of use to people embarking on this fascinating sport for the first time, and may even possibly interest those who have considerable experience of it.

The main points which I would emphasise again are : Firstly, begin from the very beginning with a clear idea of the method you intend to use in each particular case—that is to say, from the very start, tie up and make your arrangements definitely either for sitting up or for beating. Secondly, never take an unnecessary risk of disturbing a tiger until you are pretty certain that you are going to get him.

A FEW THOUGHTS ON LIGHT INFANTRY AND MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRAINING.

By Captain F. D. S. Fripp, 2nd Punjab Regiment.

It has been a recognized fact since the Great War, that in normal open country infantry are powerless to advance against machine-guns without the close co-operation of tanks and artillery. In fact the tanks supported by artillery were becoming the chief arm, while the infantry were assuming the more humble *rôle* of mopping up and holding. It is unlikely however that in India the infantry will be displaced from being the chief arm, owing to the limited artillery fire power available, the paucity of A. F. V.'s and the terrain over which possible operations may take place.

In order therefore for infantry to advance against machine-guns without adequate fire and A. F. V. support, the present and rather inflexible linear tactics must be changed to some other form to avoid overwhelming casualties.

Whatever form of tactics or formations are evolved, it is still manifestly impossible for infantry to advance against machine-guns across bare open ground, but infantry can and must be able to deal with machine guns where the country affords opportunities for covered approaches, such as hilly and mountainous country, scrub, jungle, woods, villages and crops.

To counteract the impression that infantry are powerless against machine-guns, and to create an antidote against this infernal machine, the Commander-in-Chief's directive on "Infiltration" and Light Infantry tactics has been issued. Infiltration is not a new horror inflicted on the infantry. It is but an old and well tried form of tactics which has been used by all successful armies in the past and is as old as the hills. The enemy's defensive position is penetrated, not by direct bludgeon work, but by indirect approach and by employing every means of cover available and exploiting any opening made. This in fact is "stalking" tactics, and for troops to be successful at this, they must possess first class weapon skill, mobility and flexibility. This is, however, impossible without self-reliance and initiative on the part of all junior leaders, and to enable them to carry out their *rôle*, units and sub-units must be given more latitude, which implies larger frontages.

We have only just begun to realise out here in India that our post-war training has not altogether been on the right lines. Training has been modelled on F. S. R., Vol. II, and Infantry Training, Vol. II which are unfortunately heavily impregnated with Great War doctrine. We have now to readjust our thoughts and eradicate the Great War complexes caused by trenches, barbed wire and machine guns.

The potential enemy armies with which the Indian Army may have to deal will undoubtedly possess machine-guns, and the tribesmen have in their possession modern rifles and ammunition. We must therefore train our infantry to deal with the machine-gun and to infiltrate through the enemy's defences. To this end the sepoy must become a master of flexible penetration and an elusive but determined stalker.

It is generally recognized that the average sepoy, whatever his caste or creed, is really only capable of mastering one thing at a time and is inclined to lose his initiative when commanded by British officers through leaving all the thinking to the latter. The tendency in the past has been to instruct the sepoy in various kinds of warfare by classification into various watertight compartments. The general result is that he has become a jack of all trades and a master of none. This has been specially noticeable when an Indian battalion has been transferred from the frontier to a down country station. On arrival it has been immediately immersed in all the technicalities of training for civilized warfare and in a very short time has forgotten what it had learnt on the frontier.

In peace time, the normal duties of the Indian Army are small frontier wars and internal security; the latter including the rounding up of Moplahs, Burmese rebels and Terrorists and such like. There is one common factor applicable to either the frontier tribesman, rebel or terrorist and that is elusiveness. Unhampered with impedimenta, their mobility is assured and consequently they are very rarely pinned to a position. What finer trainers could be found to teach the Indian Army the old but new tactics of flexibility?

It is maintained that if the qualifications of weapon skill, flexibility and mobility are applied to mountain warfare, the training therein acquired will be equally applicable to any other operation against an Asiatic enemy or rebel. Accordingly, to allow the sepoy to become a master of a trade, he should, I think, be trained in mountain warfare to the Ninth degree as modified or altered to suit the new tactics.

Mountain warfare does not necessarily imply skirmishing on a khud side ; there are many flat places on the Frontier including villages, crops, scrub, copses and nullahs. In the writer's limited experience, the most dangerous ground is that which is flat, covered in scrub and interlaced with nullahs ; ideal country for elusiveness and infiltration. Similar ground can be found in the vicinity of most garrison stations and there should be no difficulty in alloting suitable training areas.

Mountain warfare, however, has first to be purged of its Great War complex. The general tendency is to restrict all movement to a narrow corridor flanked by piquets and to employ the use of too much barbed wire. It is admitted that a secure line of communication is vital and that the protection of permanent camps and piquets demands wire, but the sum total is that the initiative is left largely in the hands of the enemy and that our troops feel naked and exposed when they leave the security of their barbed wire enclosures and the comparative safety of the corridor.

The opportunities offered for a stand up fight by the tribesmen are comparatively rare, and therefore unless the troops can engage the enemy at their own method of warfare, the latter are enabled to choose their own time and place to inflict losses. To change the *rôle* of the tethered goat, the troops must be trained to be as equally elusive and to stalk the tribesman instead of being stalked.

A camp having been established in tribal territory, we must be able to roam the country side whenever and wherever we choose and to put the fear of God into those tribesmen who object.

In regard to this, a quotation from Callwell's TIRAH, 1897, describing the small unit of Gurkha Scouts, is interesting :—

" All were especially selected for their activity and fleetness of foot, and they had been trained on the steepest hillsides. They were all good marksmen and had been taught self-reliance. At night they often went out barefooted and in disguise carrying arms. Although called Scouts, they were in reality much more than Scouts and could surpass the tribesmen at their own tactics."

What finer training could be obtained anywhere else ? and when war comes either on the frontiers of India or outside against an Asiatic army, the Indian Army thus trained should be more than a match for the enemy. Given the ground and essential cover, it will be

comparatively easy to stalk and obliterate the machine-gun and to penetrate the enemy's defence.

To enable these light infantry tactics to succeed, clothing and footgear must be suitable. At present the infantryman is weighed down with a various assortment of articles that he may require. Give him the bare essentials to carry and train him to lie hard and to fight and stalk even harder.

The worse features of the man's clothing at present are the shorts and footgear. Taking the latter article first; one cannot expect a man to move nimbly, swiftly and silently in a heavy pair of hobnailed boots. Look at a Punjabi youth playing "Kaudi Kaudi"; see him leap into the air like a young goat; watch the spring and tension of his muscles. Then put him into a pair of ammunition boots and see how comparatively immobile he becomes. To allow his legs and feet full scope he must be given suitable footgear. The most suitable of course for hill warfare and arid regions are *chaplis*. and for serious stalking and patrolling, grass *chaplis* are better still, as those who have used them on shikar well know.

These are cheap and, being a local product in the north of India, there should not be any difficulty in supply. The argument against *chaplis* is that they are not a general utility footgear.

Regarding shorts; these are useful garments and comfortable but provide no protection against cold or mosquitos. The ever-present transport problem will not allow of the carriage of a second pair of neither garments and therefore some kind of general utility garment is indicated. For Indian troops some form of baggy pyjama or very loose knickerbocker giving full freedom to the knees and legs and yet providing necessary protection against mosquitos and cold appears desirable. For winter these could be made of a light woollen material or serge. The present pattern of trouser or knickerbocker is too tight and the drill material too heavy and thick.

The *puttee* also comes in for criticism. These constrict the calf muscles, are hot and uncomfortable and when wet are beastly. A short ankle *puttee* to guard against thorns and a thick woollen stocking or hose top into which the *pyjamas* can be tucked would provide a practicable and comfortable ensemble. Not perhaps smart, but serviceable.

Bearing in mind the type and efficiency of the probable enemy of the Indian Army and the limited fire power available for support, the infantry must not and cannot wait for elaborate fire plans of machine-guns and artillery, but must fight their way forward on their own by infiltration and light infantry tactics. This definitely requires a new form of training. The best training that can be carried out in peace time and employed with little difference in mountain warfare is by "Fighting Patrols." The conduct of a fighting patrol demands self-confidence and initiative on the part of the commander and weapon skill, stalking ability and initiative of a high order by all ranks.

The general picture one has in mind is that from a camp or camps established in tribal territory, fighting patrols varying from a platoon to a company or more, depending on the task in hand, are sent out at frequent intervals to roam the hillsides and broken ground under dispersed control, elusive, lightly equipped, suitably clothed and with no transport tail, stalking the tribesman and domineering the countryside.

It is suggested that a man so trained in peace and on the frontier could easily adapt himself to any other kind of warfare and that, given the ground, he could stalk and deal with enemy machine-guns with comparative ease. There is no reason why our infantry should not be able to emulate the Gurkha Scouts of 1897 and become first class troops at infiltration. It is considered, however, that to unlearn the barbed wire tactics of the Great War and the linear formations which have become a second nature to the average sepoy and his immediate commanders, time must be given. At least two complete training seasons might be devoted to nothing more ambitious than company training.

Based on a simple doctrine of training of the shikar instinct and applied to fighting patrols in mountain warfare, a high standard of light infantry tactics should easily be reached.

EMPIRE OR . . . .

By Colonel F. Dickins.

Within the last few years there has sprung up a town called Becontree, in Essex. It is the result of the efforts of the L. C. C. to construct an ideal city for the working classes; it is well laid out, neat and clean; the small standardized houses are good, and each is surrounded by its own garden. With its population of 120,000 it should surely be held up as a model of what such a city should be. And yet—and yet—there is something wanting. Somehow, for all its technical perfection and large area, it conveys an impression of smallness, of a dearth of large ideas and purposes, of a want of balance; something indefinable is missing. And the reason is—that it is entirely composed of working-class dwellings. The well-to-do, the middle class, the professional classes, have not been catered for. Consequently, everything is pitched in a minor key, as it were, and there is no invitation for further progress. The houses, the shops, are small and somewhat mean; the streets are dull and monotonous. And they have no escape. It is a town in which spacious ideas and ideals will never flourish.

Recently this township has achieved the honour of having had a general survey made of it, which has been published in book form. And this is the lesson which a reviewer in *The Times Literary Supplement* has garnered from it:—

"Let housing committees and all responsible citizens learn the lesson from Becontree that technical planning is sterile without social imagination."

A similar lesson might well be taken to heart by that gallant, zealous band of thinkers who wish to see some plan, some definite form, designed for the queer, loosely-knit collection of countries and contingents which some call the British Empire, and others the British Commonwealth of Nations. Imperial Conferences, Imperial Defence Committee and Colleges, Ottawa Pacts, and Economic Conferences are called into being, and, after all the talk and the squabbling have died away, the several component parts of the British Empire do not appear to be one whit more closely connected than they were before. Professors, journalists, politicians, Mr. Robert Stokes, Major-General

J. F. C. Fuller, and others, write irreproachable books and articles, lay down attractive principles, and produce carefully thought-out designs for a constitution and for institutions which should weld the scattered bits into one homogeneous whole.

But, however, scientific their approach, however logical their argument, there is just one thing which not one of them seems to bother about, and it is just that "social imagination" which has, by its absence, nullified the technical perfection of Becontree.

Is there not a real danger that no Imperial Plan, however scientific, however technically correct, will really meet the needs of the situation, and will fulfil the purpose for which it is designed,—namely, the assurance of the permanent unity of the Empire—unless it is framed in accordance with "social imagination"? In short, before the brain begins to plan, is it not essential that the purpose of the plan should appeal to the heart? To achieve Empire unity, is it not necessary to win over the Empire's heart before its brain can be expected to function in the required direction?

Fifty years ago, one Sir John Seeley created a small sensation by the publication of his book—"The Expansion of England." He was one of the pioneers to explore the problem—"Is the Empire worth conserving?" and its corollary—"Can it be conserved?" His reply in both cases is a very decided—"Yes." But he makes a curious exception in the case of India, regarding which much troubled continent he remarks: "It may be fairly questioned whether our possession of India does, or ever can, increase our power or our security, while there is no doubt it vastly increases our dangers and responsibilities." That is a subject about which a certain amount of controversy may be noticed to-day; a subject, indeed, which has become so obscured by gas-cloud and ink-deluge that it is becoming a little bit difficult to distinguish what the real point at issue is.

But as regards the rest of the Empire he has no doubts or reservations at all. He denies vigorously that, because the Empire is enormous and widely scattered, any inherent necessity for dissolution is thereby involved, and points out that no real parallel exists between it and previous Empires whose decay is writ in the sad pages of history. It is true that the English had already lost one Empire—but so unnecessarily. Had there been displayed on either side a sufficiency of "social imagination," that first Empire would never

have been lost. The appeal to the heart would have conserved what the appeal to a half-baked brain lost.

For this is all that social imagination really means—the recognition of a common humanity—the realization that men are just men, and not dummy figures to be regimented like pawns on a chess-board: that they are swayed by emotion as well as by reason, by sentiment as well as by selfishness, and that, in the long run, they cannot be persuaded against their will; that the various classes and estates have their own appointed functions to fulfil, their own useful place in the world's affairs; that nations will remain nations, and that races will continue to produce races in spite of all the declarations of quacks and cranks and intriguers to the contrary; and that it is sheer lunacy to shut one's eyes to the fact that mankind is, after all, only just a tiny proportion of that "fortuitous concourse of atoms," which, according to old Lucretius, *is* the world.

It is really humiliating to consider that, according to Mr. Van Loo, the whole population of the world could be packed into a square box with sides only half a mile long!

Presumably everybody is acquainted with Sir John Seeley's sentence: "We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind." What would be still more remarkable would be the loss of half the world, due to a continued state, not much of absence of mind, as of careless and ignorant indifference as to the significance and result of such a loss.

Since Sir John Seeley's day there has been a steady tendency for the business of Empire to become more and more complicated, for conflicting interests to stand out more prominently against the background, until the problem has become so difficult that no statesman seems to know quite where to begin—and still less where to end. Consequently all efforts towards consolidation and understanding have been somewhat isolated and uncorrelated; there is no consistent melody, only a series of staccato notes. A good deal of lip-service is paid to the sanctity of Imperial unity; but the appeal is generally made in narrow terms to interest, to fear, to self-conservation.

Sir John Seeley puts the solution into a very simple form—and leaves it there. "If the colonies are not, in the old phrase, possessions of England, then they must be part of England. . . . . When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire

together, and call it England, we shall see that here, too, is a United States. Here, too, a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion, and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space. We shall see that, though it is bound together by strong moral ties, it has little that can be called a constitution, no system that seems capable of resisting a severe shock."

That *is* the problem—the Dominions and England to be one and indistinguishable, and yet each component part to preserve its individuality and its independence. If the Empire is to be permanent and indissoluble, then it must be homogeneous at least in spirit and in purpose. No matter what constitution may be baked and boiled and katalysed and synthetized in the political laboratory, it will not be a successful experiment unless some strong flux of the most tenacious nature is employed that will ensure the cohesion of all the constituent parts of the finished product.

The trouble is that the Empire is not a homogeneous whole, much less so than it was in Sir John's day. And it is just this very lack of homogeneity which will nullify any purely academic constitution or elaborately designed institutions. To fabricate any sort of constitution or institution before any sort of homogeneity has developed is wasted labour. So long as all the constituent parts are the playgrounds for party politics, and so long as successive governments can repudiate the policy of previous governments, what can the Empire be but a congeries of separate, independent entities ?

Sir John says—" Here, too, is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, languages, religions, and laws." But that is just what the Empire is not, and never can be ! It is, therefore, a vain thing to attempt to frame a constitution as if homogeneity existed. Yet, unless there *is* some form of homogeneity, what good does there appear to be in attempting to frame a constitution ? There must be a " something " that all the constituent parts have in common—some strong flux to bind them together as a cohesive and balanced whole. It is fairly obvious that what is required is something rather less evanescent than merely common interests and mutual fears. When we try to discover common interests, we seem to discover a preponderance of conflicting interests, attempts to satisfy which seem to lead rather to common dissatisfaction. When we try the appeal to common dangers and fears, we are apt to discover that

more attention is paid to the immediate and selfish necessities of the moment.

Yet, when the Great War shattered the complacency of the world, we found that he had no need to make any appeal at all. In their thousands, the people of the Dominions obeyed some irresistible urge and gave all they could without counting the cost. It is easy to sneer and to state with airy superiority that self-interest lay at the bottom of their action. It did not. Self-interest was not in the heart of one single soldier who came over the seas, and their dead have earned some better memorial than a slander which only discredits the fatuous few who are mean enough to utter it.

There is a similar school which sneers at any attempt to idealize the reasons which brought England herself into the War. They do a poor service to the 3,000,000 volunteers who obeyed the same irresistible urge in our own Islands, before conscription was resorted to, in order to balance the conscription, that has always obtained on the continent.

It is not a question of the policy of a government; goodness knows *that* may be swayed by any fitful breeze. It is a question of what is in the heart of a people, and it is to the heart of a people that the ultimate appeal must always be made.

If, then, the appeal to the heart proved the strongest bond in the face of danger, it is surely not illogical to argue that the appeal to the heart will prove the strongest bond at all times, and that we may find that the magic flux we are seeking, the homogeneity which is not to be found in a physical form, or a religious form, or a legal form, or in any tangible form at all, will be found in a higher form which cannot be expressed in any easy words, but which can be felt with intensity—a form at once indescribable and inarticulate, but nevertheless indestructible. But it can no more be expected to take root and flourish without any attempt at cultivation than can a fallow field be expected to produce a rich crop spontaneously.

Here is a good opportunity for the hard-baked industrialist or financier, for the strong, silent, ruthless soldier, for the crafty, cynical, ambitious politician,—all those disagreeable people we meet with frequently in novels, occasionally in biographies, and sometimes in real life—to be faithful to type, and to apply the guillotine, for the argument is really beneath their notice.

It is just possible, though, that the argument is above their notice ; it is away and beyond their power of understanding and imagination. For they can conceive of nothing useful except elaborate, cut and dried plans, framed in exact accord with all the approved principles of strategy, economics and politics.

And yet—just as the technical perfection of Becontree is nullified by its complete lack of social imagination, so may all the technically perfect plans of Empire conservation be ruined by this very same lack of the gift of social imagination. And when one comes to think of it, it is a little bit difficult to recognize what *are* the approved principles of strategy, economics and politics. If one thing is certain in this changing world, it is that all the old principles are hopelessly discredited, and that there is universal disagreement as to what the new principles should be.

To cut the cackle, let us now assume, if we may, that the only homogeneity achievable in the Empire is that which almost amounts to a spiritual homogeneity—spiritual, not in a religious sense, but in the sense that it is something removed from mere empirical laws that are supposed to govern human motives ; ideals held in common and a purpose reached out for in union. If we can find some such brotherhood beneath the sun, then indeed, we will be justified in framing our constitution and our institutions.

If not. . . . . .

Why should it be difficult to build up this common Imperial outlook and intention ? Perhaps a few cold facts will bring the difficulty home. If we take Canada, according to an article in the August number of the FORTNIGHTLY, we find the following complications. " French Canada has one of the highest birth-rates among the white people of the world. . . . . the population of English speaking Canada is stationary." (The proportion of British, French, and " others " is—5—3—2.) Then " there are 1,300,000 Canadians in the U. S. A. " A pretty big proportions out of a population of 10,000,000. Of the European population other than British—" 54·32 per cent. are on the western fields ; 34.7 per cent. of the British only." And of this foreign element, the queerest of the lot prove to make the most stable, contented, and successful farmers—the only farmers who can face the grim and hard reality of life in the far west—namely, that stubborn Russian sect, the DOUKHOBOORS. They, and

the Scandinavians, seem fated to form the population of the western prairies. Finally, here are some disquieting statistics :—"The whole country is being Americanized ; one-half of the stocks and bonds are in American hands ; 75 per cent. of the vast wood-pulp industry is in the hands of Americans ; the total value of American capital invested in Canada amounts to £800,000,000."

These are hard and stubborn facts. What is to be done about it ? As time goes on, as the ties of sentiment and race grow less and less with every generation, what can we throw into the scales to balance narrow self-interest and the expediency of the moment ?

It is hardly necessary to mention the racial antagonism in South Africa. A great fight is being staged to bridge it over—a fight, remember—and one of which the final result cannot be foreseen, because the real designs of the protagonists are by no means apparent.

In Australia—how much of Ireland has flowed into Australia ? So far from seeing any great encouragement for Empire unity in Australia, we actually see signs of Australian dis-unity : the openly expressed desire of West Australia and of the riverine portions of New South Wales to break away from the Dominion.

In New Zealand, there does appear to exist stability and homogeneity, and, curiously enough, that is the one Dominion which was originally colonized on a definite, purposeful plan, due to that queer character, Gibbon Wakefield, who also achieved the unusual distinction of being twice arraigned for, and convicted of, abducting eligible young ladies !

No amount of tinkering with quotas and tariffs seems to help the situation. Whatever we do to improve dairying in England must re-act unfavourably on Australia and New Zealand. In Canada and Australia the determined efforts to establish industrial activities must affect our English industries. The acreage under wheat this year in England is 42 per cent. more than it was last year ; hardly pleasant for Canada. Canada is shipping large quantities of motor-cars to Australia—hardly pleasant hearing for our motor industry. The South African Government has heavily subsidized an Italian shipping line—a shrewd blow to our crippled mercantile fleet.

Not one of the Dominions is in the least bit anxious for any scheme of British emigration on a large scale. "Charity begins at home" is their motto. Moreover, even supposing we were able to

inaugurate a successful scheme of emigration (and so far all attempts have failed), what are the new inhabitants going to do when they get there? Grow more corn when more is already produced than the world can buy? Produce more beef and more wool before the additional potential markets have been ascertained? Help in founding more industries when half the industries of the world are well-nigh bankrupt?

One begins to wonder whether Sir John was quite justified in saying that there is no inherent reason why the Empire should disintegrate. It would appear that, with the appearance of the Statute of Westminster, all the seeds of disintegration have been sown, and that no one can tell when the crop of weeds is going to materialize. Good, easy gentlemen assure us that the more complete the independence of the Dominions, the more remote is the likelihood of their breaking away from the Empire. That, surely, can only be true if there is some bond stronger than their independence.

After all, this fissiparous tendency is rather a natural one, considering that until quite recently, as history goes, nothing whatever has been done to avert such a development. Indeed, the desirability of any such action has hardly been considered. There was Wakefield, who advocated a definite plan of colonisation; there was Lord Durham, who gave us a united Canada; there was that Empire spell-binder, Lord Beaconsfield, who, as Ben Disraeli, remarked that the colonies were millstones round our neck; there was the voice of one crying in the wilderness in the early days of this century, one Joe Chamberlain, the converted Radical, who was rejected by the mugwumps of his own party and was despised by those Empire wreckers, the intelligentsia of that Liberal Party which did more during its nine years of tyranny to destroy the "green and pleasant island," perhaps, than any other Government of modern days. There was the voice of old Sir John Seeley 50 years ago, and there are the voices of two or three striving to make themselves heard to-day.

Among the latter, Mr. Robert Stokes and Major-General J. F. C. Fuller have each produced a book with practical suggestions. The latter, with good commonsense, stresses the senselessness of this bleat for independence by peoples incapable of maintaining their independence against aggression—a bleat that reverberates round and round the old world that is itself completely dependent on the laws of physics and chemistry and Professor Einstein—some, indeed,

say on the laws of God. But the desire for independence is not dependent on common-sense, on stodgy facts of history, geography, economics or anything else. The clamour for independence is generallydue either to a heart-felt national pride, or to an artificial national ambition manufactured by idealists or self-seekers.

But few pause to consider to what lengths independence can be stretched—where it must end. When the Hyde Park tub-thumper or the perfervid patriot shriek about independence, what do they actually mean ? Independence of common sanity—common weal—common folly—common greed—common decency ?

What is meant by this magic word, this hot gospel of independence and self-determination, which, reduced to its ultimate ratio, must lead to the independence of the individual ? We see now, before us, the tragic result of the cult of the individual in the mess in which the U. S. A. finds itself, in the collapse of all preconceived tenets of economics, finance, and industry. To free themselves from this mess into which their independence has carried them, the people of the U. S. A. now have to submit to a very drastic code of public behaviour in which there is no room for individual independence at all.

The cult of the individual does not seem to have produced any happier results than has the cult of mass-production or the cult of socialism. The reaction to this dismal record of universal failure is to be seen in the surrender to a modern form of dictatorship, at first ruthless, subsequent benevolent—so long as you do what you are told. And why ? Because the appeal is a sentimental one rather than a scientific one. Because dictators, with a shrewd knowledge of human nature, appeal to the individual, not as an individual, but as a unit of the national mass. In other words, they apply *their* version of the doctrine of social imagination. Their methods are uniform in that they are designed to give each member of a state a sense of his responsibilities towards the state.

Thus the point to be noted is not so much their method or their ultimate purpose, as their discovery that by appealing to sentiment, and not to intellect, they can force a sense of mutual interdependence on to the people of nation. The people are brought to see that they must pull together or starve together; that there is really no room for divergent motives, for different ideals, for uncorrelated effort—in a state. The nation must work as one—like a nest of ants.

We tried it once in England, nearly 300 years ago, and nothing is more unlikely that we will ever try such dangerous medicine again.

To quote old Sir John again—and for the last time—" When we have accustomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire together, and call it England....." It was difficult to do so in his day, and now the difficulties would seem to be even greater. How many of the inhabitants of England ever give one single thought to the Dominions! What, exactly, is conveyed by the word " Australia " to the *average* Englishman ? Well, it's a patch on the map, somewhat larger than Rutlandshire, perhaps, but hardly more important. And what is England to the *average* Australian ? A little island, vaguely situated in the north of Europe, where the fogs are cold in winter, but warmer in summer. And what does the farmer in Saskatchewan think of the farmer in Cornwall, and what does either of them think of the problem of direct *versus* indirect rule in our " coloured " colonies ? Who can name straight off the third most populous dependency in our Empire ?

It is sheer lunacy to expect that any average man can possibly master, or even take an interest in all the literally incalculable problems that are involved in a great and scattered Empire.

Now, all that the would-be Empire reformers are able to suggest is some form of economic, strategic and political alliance between England and the Dominions—an alliance which surely would be at the mercy of any Government of the day, which might be blown to pieces by the breath of any demagogue, at the mercy of a specious catchword. Alliances and treaties within the Empire merely stress the independence of its constituent parts. If the Empire is to be *one*, there can be no room for alliances and codes. They cannot serve to bring the parts closer together than an alliance with a foreign country. Can any one maintain that our alliances with France and Japan did, in the long run, bring our people into more intimate sympathy with the peoples of those countries ? They did *not* break down national barriers and racial antipathies. They have never stopped economic rivalry and industrial throat-cutting. An alliance is but an expedient only, and serves its purpose for a day, and then is filed away for the dust to collect.

We may work out as many meticulous and high falutin' schemes of Empire reciprocation as we like—but that won't help us to " call

it England." Indeed, the unholy squabblings that seem fated to attend any conference have an effect the exact contrary to that for which the conference was summoned. Was it not a Canadian premier, who, many years ago, airily pronounced that he could not see why Canada should bother about contributing to the upkeep of the British navy, when she could always have the navy of the U. S. A. to fall back upon !

The other side of the picture is displayed in Australia's and New Zealand's very real alarm when, at one time, we seemed to be deliberately proposing to send our navy to join the German fleet at the bottom of Scapa Flow. It certainly looked as if we were prepared to throw them to the wolves !

Both these historical instances show exactly to what a dangerous pitch the old policy of *laissez faire* can be developed. This clamour for independence on the part of the Dominions is not the result of any tyranny or oppression on the part of England. On the contrary, it is the result of the complete indifference—one may almost say, of the contemptuous indifference—of the English people, and of a parochial outlook on the part of the peoples of the Dominions.

If these pitiful attitudes are to be altered, something more than ministerial or bureaucratic alchemy is required. There must be an appeal that goes home to the heart of the people, over the heads of all the little tin gods.

We rather pride ourselves on lack of sentiment in England ; at any rate, whatever we may feel, we would rather die than give expression to our feelings. It is quite true that most of us are quite incapable of expressing ourselves. Still, apart from that, we don't like doing it, and when some fellow *does* get up and let himself go, we are rather apt to regard him with suspicion and disfavour. That's all very right and proper, but perhaps we rather over-do it. It is difficult to imagine any British General appealing to his men as " mes enfants," but, against that, one seems to remember an appeal by Earl Haig—something about having "our backs to the wall" came into it. The appeal succeeded. Under similar circumstances, a similar appeal would always meet with response.

Sentiment ? No such thing in England ? Why, it does not require a very extensive journey through the fields and villages and little towns of England to discover that the stolid inhabitants and

workers have a sentimental attachment for their own particular little niche that is as deeply felt as it is inarticulate. A mile or two on either side of a tortured main road in Sussex you will still find the real England—hemmed in, attacked, bewildered by noise, vulgarity and shallow flippancy, but still persisting.

For, in spite of all the hideous desecration of the lovely country that the Industrial Revolution has left in its ruthless tracks, in spite of unspeakable vulgarisation by means of pink-roofed bungaloid eruptions, of the cancerous attacks of ribbon development, in spite of all the discordant sights and noises, in spite of the cult of what is ugly, unhealthy, obscene, in art, literature, and drama—in spite of all this men *do* still dig in the fields of England, and her kindly earth still *does* produce its fruits.

The moderns have not yet succeeded in killing the spirit that is England—the sense of unity. Indeed, in the far country something very like a feudal spirit still persists—astoundingly so. It is not so much a racial instinct—that developed very late in England. It is not so much patriotism, which hardly existed at all before Tudor days, and which is now condemned by the Intelligentsia as an unspeakable word—as a consciousness of mutual interdependence between the land and the dweller on the land, and between the individual dwellers of the land, rich or poor. An interdependence due, not so much to personal interest, as to a finer feeling of the continuity and stability that *is* a country, that makes a nation. That this spirit still exists in spite of the sneers and jeers and arguments and figures of the self-complacent Intelligentsia, with their well-paid, well-advertised propaganda, is just a proof of its depth, its persistence, its sincerity, its radical truth.

But, if neglected and passed by, it cannot endure for ever.

It is just because no effort has ever been made, in the whole history of our Colonial Empire, to inspire this feeling of unity, this necessity for continuity and stability, as between England and her Colonies, that the problems of Empire unity have reached the pitch of complexity where we find them to-day. Conflicting interests have been allowed to expand ; ties of sentiment and race have been allowed to slacken ; the gospel of self-determination has been preached vociferously as if there were some peculiar sanctity in the word.

And all the time it might have been so easy to concentrate on working out a scheme of mutual interdependence, on the basis of

equality, of oneness. But the Victorian industrialists and free-traders were far too busily employed in building up their own private fortunes, in exploiting the whole world. It was a paying game—while it lasted.

The whole root matter of the trouble is this word—independence. What the Dominions mean, presumably, is independence of British Parliamentary control. They have got that now, and they are welcome to it. If they are satisfied with what they have substituted, well and good. It is their business. As a matter of fact, they do *not* appear to be particularly satisfied with it.

They cannot have it both ways, though. They cannot be members of an Empire, and at the same time be independent of some central guiding principle or ideal or purpose or pattern, that can shape their policies and destinies as one entity. They cannot have progress here, and reaction there. There *must* be some common starting-point and some common goal. One can hardly visualize the north of England following protection, and the south clinging to Free Trade. But that would be no greater lunacy than to imagine that an Empire can be maintained whose several parts are all pulling in different directions. If they are to remain members of a living Empire, then Canada and Australia must consider the extent of their independence, not only in their relations with England, but in their relations with each other. And both of them must balance, vis-a-vis South Africa, their several and mutual dependence on, against their several and mutual independence of, South Africa.

It seems a little bit odd to imagine that you can have the closest alliance coupled with the greatest independence.

We have, then, several individualistic co-partners in association, who are quite desirous of working together in amity, but who are not *quite* sure what the objects of the association are or ought to be, who are more than a little bit suspicious as to how the profits (if any) are going to be allocated, while not one of them has the slightest intention of recognizing the chairmanship of any other partner.

But, all the time, did they but know it, there has been available for them the strongest form of national cement known—the strange and indefinable magic of the Crown—not necessarily of the sovereign in his person, but all that the Crown stands for, that wonderful cohesive element in our own constitution which has preserved our being as a

nation through so much adversity, so much folly, so much careless disregard of the lessons of the past, of the dangers of the future. Here we have, as developed in England, a central, idealized, and permanent focus, undisturbed by political intrigues, unruffled by the fall of governments—a focus from which guidance can be gathered and directed without any fear of that patronage and dictatorship which seem to infuriate so many otherwise harmless inhabitants of England and her Dominions. The Crown of England stands like a lighthouse against which the winds and the waves do most furiously and impotently rage.

If the various peoples of the British Empire can once get it into their heads that the Crown is but a symbol, not of tyranny, but of permanence and unity, and that its value and its power lies, not so much with its accidental wearer, as in its symbolical character, standing for stability, continuity, fidelity and justice, then perhaps it might be possible to frame the ideal constitution and build up the ideal institutions on and by which alone can a real Empire be founded and maintained.

But first the symbol and its significance must be worn in the hearts of the people.

When the society bore remarked to a witty individual that "Familiarity breeds contempt," instantly there came back the comment—"But you can't breed anything without a little familiarity, can you?" And so, if one is to have an ideal Empire, surely it is necessary to have some idealistic purpose in accordance with which its constitution must be designed, its development planned, and its actions directed. And surely, in idealism, there is no room for envy and petty selfishness and short-sighted greed and false ambition—no—and no room for any detestable snobbishness and assumption of superiority, of which our race is by no means always guiltless, not only towards the inhabitants of other (and so less-favoured) climes, but towards individuals of its own race, less favourably endowed by Providence, by opportunity—and by conceit. The unity must be real, not merely as between all constituent parts of the Empire, but as between the individual inhabitants of each part.

The preceding paragraphs do not pretend even to sketch the outline of a working plan. They are merely intended to offer the germ of an idea, to suggest a possible starting point, and to warn

against the folly of putting the cart before the horse : to remind those who would attempt to concoct plans and institutions and alliances in the political laboratory, no matter of what technical perfection, that they will be wasting their time and ours, unless they leaven their technicality with the spirit of "social imagination." Human actions spring from human hearts, and the motives that sway humanity are not to be fabricated in any scientific, philosophic, bureaucratic or political laboratory whatever.

NOTE.—When half-way through this article, the author was gratified by reading in the Army Quarterly for July a review of Major-General Fuller's book, "Empire Unity and Defence." The reviewer ends up by quoting a remark once made by the Empress Catherine the Great :—"You work on paper, which puts up with anything and presents no obstacles. I, a poor Empress, have to work with human nature for my material, and that is a much more ticklish job."

Further, the following extract from Mr. Gerald Heard's 'These Hurrying Years "—read long after the article was completed—perhaps crystallizes what I have endeavoured to expound. The quotation refers to Chamberlain's dream of Empire :—

> "The Empire must become more than an emotional racial confederation ; it must become a reciprocating engine. It should give England food, and England should give it machines and all manufactures.....It looked as concrete as cement.. ...but it was only a dream—a dream of German mechanical thoroughness quite aliven to actual organic life and the way peoples and constitutions do in fact grow."

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TROUT FISHING IN AUSTRIA.

By "Newt."

A fishing trip in Austria is still perhaps sufficiently uncommon a variation to the course of an ordinary home leave, to make its details of interest to officers serving in India. The author and a friend visited the country during July 1933 when, owing to the drought, fishing prospects in most parts of England were distinctly depressing. Austria, however, had undergone rather a wet summer; and the two streams fished were, if anything too high. Discoloured water interfered with sport on several occasions. Neither member of the Expedition was an expert fisherman and neither had had a very wide experience previously.

The duration of the trip was a month, including the journey both ways. The name of the village adopted as a headquarters was Windischgarsten in Upper Austria. It is reached by way of Dover—Calais—Paris—Basle—Buchs—Innsbruck—Salzburg. A second class return fare cost £17-10-0, but this could be reduced by travelling third class from Innsbruck, to about £15. Third class in Austria is quite clean, although not very comfortable as it consists merely of bare wooden seats. However, from Innsbruck to Windischgarsten is only a day's journey, so a little discomfort is endurable. It is probably better to get one's tickets through the Continental Travel Bureau, Victoria Station, rather than through an agent, as one saves the extra charges.

To enjoy the trip a smattering of German is advisable. In larger towns like Innsbruck and even Salzburg some English is understood, but in the country neither French nor English will get one far. However, a very little German combined with a few inventive gestures will meet most necessities and all the inhabitants are friendly and helpful.

Roughly speaking, there are two main classes of accommodation to be found in the country, the pension and the pub. In the larger towns there are, of course, modern hotels which are clean, comfortable and not over-expensive, but these do not affect the fisherman. The pension is generally run by a family who take paying guests, either foreigners or townsfolk from Vienna on holiday. An inclusive charge is made

for board and lodging. The Pension Sonnhof at Windischgarsten charged £3 a week, drinks being extra ; also baths which cost 6d. a time to pay for heating the water by means of a sort of geyser. Wine, red or white, cost 1/3 for half a litre (about the equivalent of a small bottle in a London Restaurant) and beer 3d. a pint. We economised a good deal on baths.

The accommodation was very clean and comfortable and the food excellent. Herr Schartler, the owner of this pension, is a most courteous and considerate host, who did everything he could to make one comfortable and took a personal interest in one's success with the fishing.

The other form of accommodation is the gasthans or Austrian pub. The accommodation is rough, but feasible. One pays so much for a bed and has one's food in the beer-garden. The whole probably costs rather less than £2 a week. All the above calculations are worked out on an exchange of 30 Austrian shillings to the pound.

There is a great drawback to trout fishing in Austria. All the fish one catches are the property of the Government and it is compulsory to take out a gillie. All fish caught must be kept alive if over the 10½ inch limit. This is done by putting them in a small, portable barrel which the gillie carries. At the end of the day they are taken back to the village and kept in a large tank until such time as the housewives feel inclined to buy some fish for dinner. Of course one is permitted to buy one's own fish if one wants to do so and they even allow one a 10 per cent. rebate for having caught it.

It is distinctly trying at first, to see the day's bag being removed in this way and one is deprived of the pleasure of holding post-mortems on the local trout's diet. We used to contrive to weigh our fish by putting them in a landing net, weighing the whole ; and then subtracting the weight of the net. All fish under 10½ inches had to be returned, but I am not sure whether the limit is the same in all parts of Austria.

We shared one gillie between us and his pay was 5 schillings, *i.e.*, 3/3 a day. In addition we provided him with a sandwich luncheon and his train fare when we took the train to get to the further end of our beat. We always went third class and the return fare was about nine pence each. Gillie's fees vary all over the country and probably on a second trip one would be able to arrange for a cheaper one.

However, the head gillie at Windischgarsten was worth his pay, because he knew the stream like the back of his own hand. He always knew where fish were likely to lie; and, more important still, he knew what beats would be affected by a rise or fall of the stream. This saved us much valuable time which was important when our total stay only amounted to four weeks. In addition the head gillie was a genial and amusing fellow, who could beguile the luncheon hour with stories of his war experiences or of previous visitors and their foibles. He seemed to have friends throughout the locality and occasionally, when we were soaking wet would take us to some farm house where we would be regaled with hot tea and schnapps. Other gillies who occasionally deputised for him knew very little about the locality or fishing, and were in reality merely porters for any fish we caught.

A license for a month's fishing cost eighty schillings, *i.e.*, about £2 10s. In our case this covered stretches of two streams, the Dambach from Windischgarsten to where it joined the Teichl, and the latter river to where it was joined by the Steyr; in all, this amounted to about eight miles of fishable water (both banks). The type of fishing varied considerably throughout. The Dambach actually flowed through Windischgarsten and from the inhabitants' back gardens one could get into fish as stout as anywhere on the other beats. In fact it was from one of these gardens that I hooked and lost what both of us agreed to be the monster of the tour.

This, however, merely filled in the evenings. For the day we went further afield, sometimes on foot and sometimes by train. Below Windischgarsten the Dambach runs for about ¾ mile through hay-fields, a stream about ten to fifteen yards wide, to where it joins the larger Teichl. The latter varies between twenty and thirty yards in width and is edged with willow and hazel thickets. Lower down it flows through a magnificent pine-clad gorge. It is a gravel-bottomed stream, rocky in places with a series of fine pools, in which on a sunny day one can see scores of fish basking.

All the tackle one requires for one's trip should be bought in England and taken with one. No duty is charged, provided rods, etc. can be certified as not new. Tackle is only obtainable in the larger towns in Austria and even then it is merely an inferior English article with 80 per cent. added to the price.

A 9-foot rod with 30 yards of tapered line to match was found quite adequate to meet all requirements. Casts should be tapered to 3 × gut and should be 7—8′ in length.

We fished with the sunken fly exclusively and this is usual throughout Austria, I believe. Our gillie told us an occasional visitor had tried out dry flies, but only one had met with much success. A list of flies is given below :—

(*a*) We took fish regularly with the following :—
March Brown, Wickham's Fancy, Green Well's Glory, Red Palmer, Water Hen, Olive Gnat, Butcher.

(*b*) We had occasional success with : Mallard and Claret, Red Spinner, Water Cricket, Hardy's Favourite, White Moth, March Brown Red.

(*c*) The following were recommended to us, but we did not catch much on any of them :—
Mole fly, Whirling Blue, Stone fly, Red Tag, Alder Invicta, Alexandra.

The above should be tied on size 3 or 4 hooks, in teams of two or three on a cast. There is a May fly season in Austria, but we were too late for it.

In the Dambach and Teichl wading is absolutely essential. We did not use waders, but wore shorts and stockings and found this a most comfortable kit, and not too cold for wading. In May and early June, when the snow water is coming down, it might not be possible to do this.

Spinning is practised a good deal by Austrian fishermen and our gillie told us that it was the best way to get big fish. We only used this method when the water was too thick for a fly. Some $\frac{1}{2}''$ fly-spoons are an asset therefore.

An account of the costs to each member of the party is given as an appendix. Our bag to two rods in four weeks was as follows :—

Sizeable fish—211 ; average weight—9·4 ozs. ;
Larger fish—1 lb ; returned 308 undersized fish.

In four weeks, rain prevented us fishing a good deal, and we only had fifteen full days on the river.

From the above it will be seen that one's bag is not likely to be startling either in numbers, or individual size of fish. The charm of the fishing lies in the fact that, on Dambach and Teichl at all events, the fish are doing something all day ; and one is in most delightful surroundings.

As to the time of year to select for one's trip, May and June are, I believe, excellent for fishing, but one is apt to be held up by snow water right into the middle of the latter month.

In July one does not get snow water, although we were hindered by excessive rain. Later on in September one gets grayling fishing in some streams which is reported to be excellent. But of this I speak mere hearsay.

The national dress is shorts; and one can, therefore, be comfortably dressed without being stared at. The people are most friendly and as to Nazis, bombs and outrages, we saw nothing of them. As in India they are probably the privilege of the vocal minority.

APPENDIX.

Expenses for one person. Exchange rate 30 Austrian schillings to the pound.

	£	s.	d.
Return fare 2nd class London-Windischgarsten ..	18	0	0
Board, lodging at pension for four weeks @ £4 a week including drinks, tips and baths ..	16	0	0
Licence for fishing	2	10	0
Cost of ½ share of gillie's pay, etc.	3	10	0
Extra tackle bought for trip	3	0	0
Extras (including food on train journey both ways, a night's stay in Innsbruck, developing of films, books, etc.)	10	0	0
Total ..	53	0	0

SEDGEMOOR.

THE LAST BATTLE FOUGHT ON ENGLISH SOIL.

By Major S. R. Macdonald, 1st K. G. O. Gurkha Rifles.

The battle of Sedgemoor, fought on the sixth of July 1685 dealt the death-blow to the cause of James, Duke of Monmouth. It was fought less than four weeks after the standard of revolt had been set up at the small port of Lyme in Dorsetshire, where Monmouth and a few followers had landed from the Dutch vessel, the *Helderenberg*, in which they had set sail from Amsterdam for the purpose of raising England and of driving James the Second from the throne.

Before describing the battle in more detail, and the other small passages of arms that made up the tale of the Western Insurrection, it is necessary to give a brief account of the events, political and military, that ascended in a climax to the total rout of the insurgents by the royalist forces in that dreary morass which formerly environed Bridgewater.

The Duke of Monmouth, a natural son of Charles the Second by an early mistress, the beautiful Lucy Walters, was born at Rotterdam in 1649. Shortly after the Restoration he had been brought over to England, and on his marriage at the early age of seventeen with the daughter and heiress of the Earl of Buccleuch was publicly acknowledged by his father. His alliance with this noble Scottish house was made the occasion for creating him Duke of Monmouth, Duke of Orkney, and a knight of the Garter.

In addition to these high honours he was given a command in the Life Guards, and was installed as Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. But despite these proofs of his father's esteem and affection, and of his being acknowledged as Charles' natural son, his claims to kindred were regarded by a vast majority of people in England as entirely supposititious. His beautiful but fickle mother was known to have had many lovers even after she came under Charles' protection, and it was generally supposed that Monmouth's true father was Robert, brother of the ill-fated Algernon Sidney. From his mother he appears to have inherited his handsome features, his charm of manner and sweetness of temper, as also a shallowness of mind and a fatal want of resolution.

His marriage was not a happy one, and in his early manhood he gained, according to Pepys, a reputation for debauchery and riotous living. But though a libertine he was strangely popular with the Puritan party, who for the sake of his Protestantism overlooked his scandalous conduct, putting it down to headstrong youth and the evil influences of a licentious court. Soon, however, more honourable employments gave him the chance of reinstating himself in the public esteem and of restoring his somewhat blemished character.

Monmouth had already, in 1665, taken a creditable part in the action off Lowestoft—a sanguinary and hard-fought affair in which the Duke of York, afterwards James the Second, distinguished himself as a naval commander. During the Dutch war he was sent, with the command of six thousand English troops, to the assistance of Louis the Fourteenth of France, and he is said to have, notwithstanding his inexperience and lack of generalship, proved himself a good soldier. Again, when England was at war with France in 1676 Monmouth commanded the English contingent which had been sent to help the Dutch, and at the battle of Saint Denis distinguished himself by his personal courage.

At this time England was imbued in pandemic form with the virus of anti-popery. The depositions of the infamous Doctor Oates and Captain Bedloe concerning the so-called Popish Plot had rent the country from top to bottom, and it was at this conjuncture of affairs that Monmouth became politically important. The Whig party of which the all-powerful Earl of Shaftesbury was the head was clamouring for a bill to be passed in Parliament to exclude the Duke of York from the succession. Efforts had already been made by the Exclusionists to secure the Protestant succession in favour of Monmouth. Charles had been urged to legitimize him by declaring that he was his lawful son born in wedlock, that he had married Lucy Walters. But to all their importunities the King had remained adamant in his refusal to rob his brother of his birthright. Shaftesbury and his party now made it their business, by playing on the fears and suspicions of the populace, already driven to the point of frenzy by the stories of Oates and Bedloe, to accustom the people to look upon the "Protestant duke," as Monmouth was now commonly called, as the natural protector of their church. For this purpose Monmouth, during James' enforced absence from England, was sent on a prolonged tour of the Western counties, which had since the days of Cromwell

remained fanatically loyal to the reformed religion. Throughout his progress in the West he was rapturously welcomed by the people on whom his affable manners and charm of person made such an impression as was to last for long after his death. It was probably on this tour that the thought of future armed rebellion first entered his head. Certain it is that Shaftesbury's scheming brain had already conceived such a plan, and but for the frustration of the Rye House Plot, which had for its object the waylaying and assassination of the king and his brother, his intrigues against the rightful succession might have prospered. This nefarious plot against the king's life and person resulted however in a complete change in the public opinion. The leaders of the Whig party were arrested, several of them were executed, and Monmouth was only able to reconcile himself to the king by betraying his colleagues. The exclusionist party was now completely crushed, and Monmouth, sick at heart perhaps over his own cowardly behaviour, fled to Holland. In that country he lived in comparative obscurity with his mistress, the Lady Wentworth, a woman of high rank and ample fortune, until the king's death.

It was not fated, however, that he should spend the remainder of his life thus peacefully. Many of the Whigs who had been implicated in the Rye House Plot had found an asylum in the Low Countries, and had there employed the period of their exile in forming schemes of rebellion in the island kingdom. These and other outlaws, of whom the most notable were the Duke of Argyll, Lord Grey, Wade, Ferguson, and Fletcher of Saltoun, determined to make a simultaneous descent on England and Scotland for the purpose of raising the respective country sides. Argyll was chosen to lead the northern enterprise, for it was confidently assumed that the highland clans would flock to the standard of the greatest noble of Scotland. For the southern landing Monmouth was chosen, and to this end he was approached by the conspirators. Though desirous of living peaceably in retirement with his wealthy mistress, he at length allowed himself to be persuaded against his better judgment. It is said that, weakwilled and vacillating as his nature was, he would have withstood their urgent solicitations had not Lady Wentworth added her own entreaties to make him quit a retirement which she herself had made so delightful. She urged him to go, for she wished to see him a king. Monmouth at length gave way and acquiesced in all they had planned for a landing in England. Ambitious hopes which he had thought were long

extinguished revived in him, and his irresolute mind now favoured a scheme that before had terrified it. He remembered his triumphal progress through the Western counties, how he had been acclaimed tumultuously by the populace, and how he had always borne the good will of the army. He believed, and encouraging messages from the conspirators' agents in England confirmed his belief, that he had but to show himself in the country when whole regiments would come over to him, the city of London would declare in his behalf, and the counties would eagerly rise in arms and gather round him.

Preparations were now put in hand for the two expeditions. Several Dutch ships were commissioned, and were loaded with arms and stores. The exiles had been promised the necessary funds for equipping the two expeditions, and from London in particular was expected a large sum of money. But these promises of help did not materialize, and for his own small armament Monmouth was constrained to sell his own and Lady Wentworth's jewels.

At last after many delays all was ready. Argyll sailed for Scotland and, following many vicissitudes of fortune, landed on the western coast at Campbelltown. From here the fiery cross was sent forth to summon the clans to a gathering. The resulting muster was not as large as had been expected, but some two thousand clansmen obeyed the summons. The chieftains however who were either well affected to the government or were afraid of risking life and property in the venture held back. Argyll must have seen from the first that his cause was hopeless.

Monmouth set sail for England two weeks later. He seems to have thought it advisable to allow the rebellion in the northern kingdom to break out before he landed in the south. All the available troops in England would be marched against Argyll's gathering, and his own landing would thus have far more chance of success. His voyage was long owing to bad weather and contrary winds, but his ship, the *Helderenberg*, escorted by two smaller vessels, having managed to escape an English squadron cruising off the Dutch coast, made her way into the Channel. At length, on the morning of the eleventh of June, his small armament arrived off Lyme.

The inhabitants of the small town, on the three foreign-built ships being sighted, lined the cliffs with no little uneasiness, which was not dispelled when they perceived boats putting off and making towards the shore. They were seen to be full of armed men,

The boats were beached and about a hundred well-appointed soldiers sprang out. One of the first to land was Monmouth, who was accompanied by Lord Grey, Fletcher, Ferguson and Wade. When the Duke was recognised the townsmen's apprehensive fears gave way to unbounded delight. They pressed down to the beach and acclaimed him with joy. Monmouth and his party moved off to the town, where his ensign was set up in the market-place and a declaration read to the assembled population. In this declaration were set forth the objects of his armed descent on English soil. It had been drawn up by Ferguson, a fanatical theologian and inveterate schemer who having been deeply implicated in the Rye House Plot had had to fly the country with a price on his head. Written in language so strong as to approach scurrility, the Declaration, among other charges, accused James of having ordered the burning of London, and of having poisoned his brother Charles to obtain the crown.

This masterpiece of invective ended by declaring James an usurper, a traitor, and a mortal enemy to the liberties of the people, and adjured all right-thinking men to throw off their allegiance to him. Monmouth, in a further manifesto, stated that he would be able to prove beyond dispute that he had been born in lawful wedlock, and had therefore a just claim to the throne, but that he would for the present waive his pretensions of that nature and leave the settlement of all questions of future government to the findings of parliament. The effect of this declaration on the common people was such as within a few hours after his landing no fewer than fifteen hundred men had enlisted in the Duke's cause. The local gentry held aloof, but the yeomen, the tradesmen, the artisans, flocked to his standard in crowds.

But while recruits were being enrolled at Lyme, the local militia was being mustered at Bridport to oppose the insurgents. News came to Monmouth that the Dorsetshire and the Somersetshire contingents had arrived in that town, and were preparing to march on Lyme. He determined to attack the militia forces forthwith, and Grey with about a hundred mounted men and Wade in command of four hundred foot marched on Bridport. Despite the disparity in numbers, the insurgents, who made up in spirit what they lacked in training, drove back the militia; but the latter having given some ground made a stand, and in the end routed the men of Lyme.

In this small action Grey and his horsemen did not acquit themselves very creditably, for as soon as the militia began to stand up to them they fled from the field as fast as their horses could gallop. Wade, however, was able to steady his men and to draw them off in good order. A few days later Monmouth at the head of his undisciplined but enthusiastic men entered Axminster.

News of his landing and of the growing insurrection had now spread far and wide. While recruits came pouring in from all sides, the Lords Lieutenant of the neighbouring counties were calling out the militia, and couriers were speeding fast to London with the tidings from the west. James greatly perturbed at the intelligence instantly assembled the Privy Council, in which it was decided that extraordinary measures for the safety of the realm should be immediately taken. Commissions were granted for the raising of new regiments, and a brigade of English troops that was serving in Holland was recalled. The Commons granted a large supply for the King's purposes, and without one dissentient voice brought in a bill for attainting Monmouth of high treason. A large reward was offered for him dead or alive. A state of emergency was declared in the capital, and many persons of high standing suspected of being in sympathy with Monmouth were arrested. Those regiments of the regular army that were available were placed under the command of the Earl of Feversham, who was ordered to march to the west with all possible speed. A regiment of household troops, the Blues, under John Churchill, afterwards the great Duke of Marlborough, was also ordered to join this force.

While this activity was taking place in London, affairs in the west had not stood still. The Duke of Albemarle, son of General Monk, who had distinguished himself in Cromwell's army, had mustered the Devonshire militia and marched on Axminster when he heard that the insurgents had taken possession of that town. But Monmouth's men were ready for him. As he approached the town his troops came under a heavy musketry fire from the hedges that lined the road. The militia who although numerically far superior were little better disciplined than the rebels wavered, and Albemarle fearing that his troops might cross over to the enemy should they but see the person of the popular duke, ordered the retreat to be sounded. But the militia's morale was shaken and the retreat became a rout. In their flight the fugitives cast off their arms and

equipment which the insurgents following in pursuit eagerly gathered. Had Monmouth acted with more vigour and closely pressed his disordered enemy there can be no doubt that he would have taken Exeter, the capital of the west. Such a gain would have immensely increased his prestige and might probably have brought to his side many of the dissatisfied nobility and gentry. Instead he marched to Taunton, in those days a city of great commercial importance, where he expected to find reinforcements of men and supplies. Nor was he disappointed. The city had from the Commonwealth days remained republican in spirit, and in no part of England was the hatred of papacy so intense. He was rapturously welcomed by the citizens, supplies for his growing army were generously given, and hundreds offered themselves for enlistment.

It was in Taunton that he was prevailed upon to declare himself king. Some of his officers who had noted with increasing anxiety that so far no man of substance had declared for the Duke importuned him to take this step. They argued that so soon as he should assume the regal title many of the disaffected nobles and other influential people would rally to his side. Although in Ferguson's Declaration Monmouth had explicitly stated that he would waive his pretensions to the crown until parliament should have decided in his favour, he yielded to their specious counsels.

The rebel army now set forth for Bridgewater, where it was as eagerly welcomed as at Taunton. The Duke was escorted to the market-place by the Mayor and Aldermen and there proclaimed as the rightful king. Recruits offered themselves in crowds, but owing to the scarcity of arms hundreds had to be turned away. The whole countryside was searched for scythes and other rude implements, and with these improvised weapons the new levies had to be content. The time in Bridgewater was spent hastily drilling and organising into regiments the willing but raw material. The cavalry about a thousand strong was formed into three regiments over which Grey was placed in chief command. Raw as were the men the horses were even more so. The animals, large and shaggy creatures, had been brought in from the farms and the moors, and the first business of training was to accustom them to the bridle. The infantry, roughly five thousand in number, was formed into six regiments. Only those men who had formerly served in the militia possessed any uniform.

It was now necessary that Monmouth should form some definite plan of operations. Up to this time he had merely wandered about the countryside collecting recruits. In no other part of England had there been any rising nor even a threat of one. No regular regiments had mutinied and come over to him. His assumption of the regal title had effected nothing. To his deep chagrin he found that not one man of note had decided for his cause. The royal army was approaching fast, and in all the southern and western counties the militia had been mustered. In a council of war held at Bridgewater it was determined to strike a blow at Bristol. That thriving port was known to contain a large Whig element, and it was thought that should the Duke once appear before the walls the gates would be thrown open in welcome. Its fortifications had for some time been neglected, and it was garrisoned by only one regiment of militia. The rebel army therefore set out for Bristol. It marched through Glastonbury, Wells, Shepton Mallet, to Pensford, greatly harassed throughout the advance by the royal cavalry under Churchill.

On the Gloucestershire side of Bristol the fortifications were in a much more decayed state than on the city's western side, so it was planned to make an attack from the east. To effect this however the Avon had to be crossed, and the nearest bridge was at Keynsham. The march from Bridgewater had exhausted Monmouth's ill-shod troops, so instead of pushing on with all speed to cross the river, he delayed a while at Pensford.

This halt proved fatal to his designs on Bristol. The royal army was now in the neighbourhood, a regiment of foot-guards was thrown into the city, and the bridge at Keynsham strongly held by the Gloucestershire train bands. It only remained for the rebel army to retire on Bridgewater.

At this juncture Monmouth received news of the total rout of Argyll's forces in Scotland. This blow to his hopes of a general rising in the North must have given him a grim foreboding of the hopelessness of his own undertaking.

The retrograde march of the rebels took them through Philip's Norton, closely pursued by the royal troops. Here a sharp action took place. The advanced guard of the royal army, following precipitately after the retreating rebels, allowed itself to be ambushed with the loss of a hundred men killed. This successful skirmish gave

Monmouth breathing space, and that night he quitted his position and fell back on Frome.

But the rebel army was in evil plight. Ill-equipped, tired and famished after a succession of long marches, constantly molested by the royal cavalry, and commanded by one who seemed to have lost all confidence in them and in himself, it is amazing that these raw troops should have held together so long.

But they were of sterner heart than their leader. Monmouth had now given up all hope, and craven fears for his very life began to assail him. Ignominious thoughts took possession of his mind. He planned to desert his followers and to escape to the continent. He confided his nefarious scheme to his chief officers, and some of them, in equal fear for their lives, basely counselled flight. But Grey, Wade, and others stood out against the cowardly design and implored the Duke to stay.

The rebel army on the following day fell back on Wells. It was from the roof of the cathedral in this city that the lead sheetings were torn off to make bullets. Bridgewater was entered again on the 3rd of July, and by this time Monmouth's army was little better than a rabble. It was decided to fortify the town and to make a stand, for further marching in the present state of the men was deemed impossible. The inhabitants were summoned to assist the rebels in digging trenches and in throwing up embankments. But time was short.

On the 5th of July the royal forces under Feversham came in sight, and encamped on Sedgemoor, some three miles from Bridgewater. His force consisted of about three thousand regular troops of all arms, and fifteen hundred of the Wiltshire militia. Sedgemoor was then, as its name implies, a quaggy tract of moorland intersected by many deep and wide ditches which in the wet weather became full and impassable. Feversham encamped his army in three divisions, the cavalry in the village of Weston Zoyland, the militia in the neighbourhood of Middlezoy village, and the infantry on the open moor.

When Monmouth heard of his enemy's dispositions, which, in fact, he could discover for himself from the lofty tower of the church at Bridgewater, he conceived that his only plan was to make an attack under cover of darkness. It was, therefore, decided to march that night and to surprise the main body of the royal infantry. Monmouth was to lead the foot, and Grey with his cavalry and the ammunition waggons were to follow.

A little before midnight the rebel army set out. As soon as the outskirts of the moor were reached a thick marsh fog was encountered which made the going, already difficult, slow and halting. Scouts had reported that between them and the enemy were two deep ditches, filled with water. The ammunition waggons were therefore halted on the edge of the moor.

The column after great difficulty and delay managed to cross these two ditches, but was soon unexpectedly arrested by a wider and deeper obstacle, a canal known as the Bussex Rhine, of which the guides had made no mention. On the far side and within musket shot lay the royal forces. In the resulting confusion the accidental discharge of a pistol raised the alarm. All hopes of effecting a surprise were now lost. Monmouth ordered his cavalry to beat along the bank of the Rhine to find a passage, and hastily drew up his infantry into some sort of battle formation. But the drums of the royal regiments were now beating to arms, the men were hurriedly falling in the ranks, and in Western Zoyland Churchill's troopers were feverishly mounting. Grey groping his way in the thick mist was suddenly fired upon at close quarters by a regiment lining the far bank. His untrained troopers and even less trained horses were sent flying in all directions. Such was their utter rout as it was impossible ever to hope to rally them, and their leader made off himself as fast as his horse could carry him. Some of the fugitives passed close by where the ammunition waggons had been parked. The wagoners on seeing their disordered appearance took fright, and turning round drove off at full speed towards Bridgewater.

Now indeed was the rebels' plight desperate. Dawn had broken and the sun was dispelling the mists. The royal cavalry was in their rear, Feversham's infantry had crossed the Rhine in large numbers, and the Wiltshire militia was coming up to reinforce the regular troops. The only advantages that the rebels had possessed, surprise and darkness, had both been dissipated.

But still the untrained and ill-disciplined foot stood their ground. Their ammunition had long run out, and yet they stood staunch to the murderous fusillades poured into their ranks by the royal troops. Monmouth who till now had borne himself gallantly perceived his desperate straits. His courage forsook him, and leaving his devoted troops to fend for themselves, he fled from the field of battle. Even then the deserted rebels held their ranks and beat off with their rude

weapons attack after attack. Only when Feversham's artillery after great exertions had been dragged across the marshy ground and had opened fire did these raw levies break. Leaderless, broken, and encompassed by foes, their flight became a slaughter. Those who effected their escape poured through the streets of Bridgewater, hotly pursued by Churchill's troopers. All that day the fugitives were harried, and only the approach of night gave any respite to the survivors. The proceedings on the ensuing day were even more merciless. Prisoners in hundreds, not excepting the wounded, were summarily executed, and on the roads leading out of Bridgewater long lines of gibbets exposed their grim burdens. Monmouth, after some days of wandering disguised as a peasant, was discovered hiding in a turnip field on the borders of Hampshire. He was carried to London under a strong escort and lodged in the Tower. At his urgent request he was given an audience of the King. He pleaded for his life with the utmost unmanliness, crawling to James' feet in a paroxysm of terror. But the King was inflexible in his resolve that Monmouth should die, and he was beheaded on the 15th of July. On the scaffold he is said to have comported himself with both courage and dignity.

And thus ended the last battle to be fought on English soil. But the misery and horror inseparable from internecine warfare in which the wretched vanquished is hunted down by a merciless conqueror were not ended. A more terrible vengeance than that of Colonel Kirke and his Tangier regiments who were now ranging the countryside was to be let loose on the stricken western shires. Judge Jeffreys and his Bloody Assize were yet to come. But it is not the present writer's intention to bring into the compass of the story of Sedgemoor the awful doom that was to visit the scenes of the Western Insurrection. Sufficient be it to say that even the horrors of that assize, which will be infamous as long as the history of England runs, were not enough to crush the spirit of freedom that ran so fiercely in the veins of the rustics of Dorsetshire and Somersetshire. Three years later the embers of the seemingly crushed rebellion for liberty of conscience burst forth into flame when William of Orange landed at Torbay and summoned the people of the west to his standard.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF LIGHT TANKS WITH THE ARMY IN INDIA.

By Major H. G. V. Roberts, M.C., Royal Tank Corps.

In England after a number of years of experiment and controversy a doctrine regarding the tactical employment of Tanks, which is unlikely to be modified to any considerable extent in the near future, has become crystallized. This doctrine, however, the result of investigation in the United Kingdom, is mainly concerned with Tanks organized in a Brigade or in a Mixed Battalion, and of necessity is chiefly directed towards their employment in a war of major magnitude.

Tanks in India do not include all the types which are contained in the Home Establishment. The opponents, which may be encountered, are unlikely to be organized, armed or handled in the same manner as European troops, while the regions in which they may be required to operate possess definite peculiarities of both climate and terrain.

It is therefore natural, particularly as the Tank is a new weapon in India, that the accepted doctrine regarding the employment of this Arm should be exposed to searching examination and criticism on the ground that European methods may be found unsuited to Oriental practice.

The object of this paper is therefore to examine the problem of the employment of Tanks with the Army in India, in the endeavour to elucidate how far methods adopted in the United Kingdom are compatible with the particular circumstances prevailing in Southern Asia and to what extent, if any, modifications of such methods appear to be justifiable or necessary.

Before examining this problem there are certain factors, which vitally affect the methods of utilizing this Arm in Southern Asia, upon which stress should be laid.

One of the most important of these is dust. Its density varies in accordance with the character of the ground, the wind, and the speed of the vehicles, but when Light Tanks are moving at normal speed over typical Asiatic plains, dust is always considerable and often comparable to a smoke screen.

It is at once a safeguard and a danger. On the one hand, it so envelops the Tanks, especially when the wind is favourable, that they offer a very difficult target to hostile gunners. On the other, it greatly increases the difficulties of the Commander and of the crews. It tends to clog the mechanism of machine-guns and turrets, and to cause petrol stoppages. It hinders visual communication and in the absence* of radio telephony, the provision of which is essential to mobility, renders repeated rallying necessary for the issue of orders. Except when the cover of hills is available dust discloses tank movement by day to enemy observers. It imposes additional strain on the crews, although the extent of such strain may be easily exaggerated. But above all it so obscures the vision of the gunner, as to make accurate fire difficult, or sometimes even impossible.

Dust is one of the main problems with which a Light Tank Commander in Asia has to compete, and it may well form a decisive factor in determining the method of employment of his force.

While dust is the greatest hindrance to concealment by day, it is noise which is most likely to give warning of their approach by night.

The sound of Light Tank engines possesses a distinctive tone audible at a considerable distance, which, however, varies sometimes unaccountably, but usually in accordance with the wind and the acoustic properties of the area in which they are operating.

This sound can to some extent be blanketed by the employment of aeroplanes over the area, though the hum of their engines strikes an entirely different note, and by small arms or artillery fire. But even if steps are taken to conceal the sound of tank movement by external means, it is essential that the vehicles themselves should move as quietly as possible, if they are to avoid giving warning of their presence.

Light Tanks produce the minimum of noise when they are proceeding at a steady pace which does not necessitate changing of their gears. Acceleration of the engines which is essential when rough ground is encountered will, however, almost inevitably disclose their presence to any enemy within two miles.

This fact accentuates the desirability of choosing the best possible going, since surprise can usually only be attained by moving tanks, either by virtue of their speed, which can only be developed to its

*[This deficiency, we learn, is now being remedied.—*Ed.*]

maximum extent over suitable country, or by their approach under cover of ground or darkness, when their proximity is likely to be disclosed by the noise of their engines.

The Light Tank is a highly efficient cross country vehicle, and can usually reach its destination even over the rougher types of country, if time is not a matter of consequence. There is, however, sometimes a tendency to under-estimate the extent to which bad going impedes the movement of Light Tanks and, on the other hand, a lack of appreciation of the speed and ease with which they can cover long distances over suitable ground. Movement is slow over country intersected by numerous small *nalas* or by the small banks which form a network in irrigated areas and Tanks operating over such country offer a comparatively easy target. It is impossible to forecast with any degree of accuracy their speed over rough, hilly or mountainous country except on well defined tracks or in the beds of dry water courses.

The selection of an alternative route over good going—when such exists—even if the mileage to be covered is much greater, will usually be justified by increased accuracy of timing, and by comparative certainty of arrival at the required point at the decisive moment.

This truth becomes even more evident in the case of night marches, since Light Tanks without any illumination other than dimmed tail lights can maintain a steady speed over well marked tracks, but can only move across country very slowly and with great caution. Bright moonlight naturally facilitates cross country movement, which at night should otherwise be confined to limited distances, and then only over ground which is known to be free of obstacles, or which has already been reconnoitred.

A well trained Light Tank gunner can bring effective fire to bear on targets at short or medium ranges when moving at a speed of 20 m. p. h. if dust does not obscure his vision, and if the surface of the ground over which his Tank is travelling is even. But, in fact, such favourable conditions seldom exist and the extent to which the accuracy of fire is affected by less advantageous circumstances must largely influence a decision as to the methods of their employment.

To obtain, therefore, the maximum fire effect from Light Tanks advantage should be taken, whenever possible, of the ease with which these little vehicles may be concealed even in apparently bare and open country in order to enable them to shoot from stationary positions.

When this is not possible fire may be developed from moving Light Tanks, but in such cases the object of the movement will usually be, either to reach covered positions from which they can engage the enemy while stationary, or to close to point blank range, when in addition to the consequences of their fire the threat of shock action is likely to have an adverse effect upon their opponents' morale.

The principle of the employment of fire from stationary Light Tanks, whenever possible, is fully recognized and practised in the United Kingdom, where training is primarily directed with a view to encountering an enemy, whose anti-tank armament is likely to be greater and more skilfully handled than would be the case in the East, and where obstacles to accurate fire whilst moving, are usually less than they are in Southern Asia.

Reference has been made in the preceding paragraph to Shock Action, by which term is meant the infliction of material damage on the enemy by means of the vehicles themselves, as opposed to the casualties caused by the fire of their guns. This rôle which in the United Kingdom is normally confined to Medium Tanks, the employment of Light Tanks being limited to protective and reconnaissance duties.

The problem therefore arises as to whether in the absence of Medium Tanks, the use of Light Tanks for Shock Action is justifiable.

The fire power available in a Light Tank unit combined with the ability to reach suitable positions from which to develop it, either at medium or point blank range, is so great that far heavier casualties are likely to be inflicted by this means than by shock action, the moral effect of which is almost invariably far greater than the material.

It follows that they will be called upon to operate by fire more frequently than by shock. But when infantry or cavalry are not available, or are unable to close with the enemy, shock action by Light Tanks may be not only justifiable but necessary in order to achieve a decisive result.

Note.—The question of fire from moving Medium Tanks lies outside the scope of this paper. To prevent misconception it should be noted that Medium Tanks seldom fire from stationary positions.

Opportunities for concealment of these larger vehicles seldom occur. When stationary they present an easy target to hostile gunners. Their comparative stability renders effective fire practicable even when moving over ground so rough as to render shooting from a Light Tank impossible, while, except in Tank *versus* Tank action, their advance against the enemy culminating in shock action will almost invariably be covered by fire from Light and Close Support Tanks and possibly by the weapons of other arms.

When Light Tanks are utilized for shock action, a reserve sub-unit should, if possible, be detailed to deal by fire with the enemy as he disperses.

In deciding whether to employ Light Tanks in fire or shock action, a Commander must carefully consider whether his object will be better attained by the infliction of heavy casualties, or by the deterioration of morale likely to result from the closing of the Tanks with the enemy.

It may, therefore, be concluded that when Light Tanks are operating in Southern Asia, due weight must be given to the following considerations :—

(*a*) The effect of dust which may prove a help or a hindrance to the successful achievement of the object.

(*b*) The necessity, especially at night, for utilizing every available method of minimizing the noise made by these vehicles, in order that surprise may be attained.

(*c*) The most favourable line of approach in order to effect surprise. This will usually be identical with the route which affords the best going irrespective of mileage.

(*d*) The higher efficiency of fire from stationary than from moving Light Tanks, which will often use their mobility and immunity from small arms fire for the sole purpose of reaching positions inaccessible to other machine-guns, in order to carry out their task.

(*e*) The ability of Light Tanks to operate by shock action, should the exigencies of the situation require it, whilst recognizing that the great moral effect which may thus be achieved is likely to be offset by a decrease in the material damage inflicted.

It will be convenient to group the tasks which may be allotted to Light Tanks in India under three headings, which will be termed the Close Contact rôle, the rôle of the Independent Tactical Objective, and the Strategic rôle.

The term Close Contact rôle is used to cover all those operations of Light Tanks in which their function is direct and immediate co-operation with Cavalry or Infantry. It embraces for examples the use of Tanks with Advance or Rear Guards, in the type of attack envisaged in F. S. R., Vol. II of 1929, in the counter-attack or in mountain warfare.

The task of Light Tanks employed in this rôle will normally be to act in support of cavalry or infantry, whereas in the Strategic rôle the function of other troops engaged is primarily to assist the Tanks, which in such operations must be considered as the basic arm.

The term rôle of the Independent Tactical Objective includes all tactical operations in which Light Tanks, although working in conjunction with other arms, have been given a particular objective differing from that allotted to other troops, as for example, attacks against enemy gun positions, Headquarters or Reserves.

The term Strategic rôle is applicable to occasions when Royal Tank Corps units with or without other mechanized troops are ordered to carry out a special task, with an objective remote from the enemy's main fighting forces. Such an operation will generally entail severance from the normal channels of supplies and support, will necessitate the Commander being given a free hand as to the method he may employ, and is essentially part of the strategic rather than the tactical plan.

In European warfare increase in Anti-Tank Armament and in the study of Anti-Tank tactics renders the employment of Tanks in a Close Contact rôle not only unlikely to achieve the maximum effect, but also uneconomical, since the result obtained will seldom be proportionate to the heavy casualties in Tanks and personnel which must be anticipated. Further it must be realised that with a limited number of Tanks, it will seldom be possible to create a breach in the enemy's defensive system sufficiently wide to enable unarmoured troops to pass through it without being exposed to machine-gun fire from the flanks.

But in those theatres of war in which the Army in India is likely to operate, the inferior armament, training and discipline of the enemy are factors which entirely alter the situation. Light Tanks can operate over suitable ground with little risk of loss since the possibility of anti-tank weapons being used against them is remote, the artillery fire of a second class enemy against these fast moving vehicles is likely to be innocuous, and they are impervious to rifle fire.

For these reasons the two principles governing the employment of Tanks in a Close Contact rôle, namely that they should be used in large numbers and retained for the decisive stroke, are not equally applicable, when it is decided to utilize them for tasks of this nature with the Army in India.

Care must, however, be taken that Tank resources are not frittered away, and in this connection it should be noted that casualties in the type of warfare under review are more likely to be caused by their employment over unsuitable ground than by enemy fire.

A decision regarding the number of these A F. Vs. to be employed on any particular task will be reached, not only after consideration of the nature of the task and the character of the ground, but also after allowance for the retention of a reserve under the hand of the local Tank Commander both for protective purposes and to enable him to exploit success.

It must be realized that once Light Tanks are actually firing, the whole energies of the crew will be absorbed in carrying out their task, and it is a difficult matter for their Commander to attract their attention in order to break off the action. It is therefore highly desirable that some portion of his command should be available, both to give warning of enemy movement in other directions and to provide a means whereby immediate advantage may be taken of any fleeting opportunity of inflicting casualties which may occur in his vicinity.

It has already been pointed out that, although in exceptional cases shock action may be justified in the case of Light Tanks co-operating with other arms in a Close Contact rôle, far greater results will usually be obtained by employing them as mobile armoured machine-guns. It is, of course, true that it will often be necessary for them to break through the enemy's forward defences in order to reach the best position from which to develop their fire, but this act of breaking through is to be considered only as an essential preliminary to their fire task and not as shock action in its true sense.

Since the primary duty of Light Tanks thus employed in immediate co-operation with other troops is essentially that of mobile armoured machine guns, the principles to be observed in their employment are fundamentally identical with those applicable to the use of the machine-guns of other arms, though the methods utilized will naturally be modified by the great mobility of the Light Tank and by the high degree of protection which is afforded by its armour.

In consequence, differences in the methods of employment of Light Tanks with Cavalry or Infantry in open or in mountain warfare are differences in detail and not in principle. A competent Commander of a Tank unit or sub-unit should be able to operate successfully in

support of troops of either arm over either type of country. Similarly the Commander of a Force, to which a detachment of Tanks has been allotted, by observation of the principles governing the employment of machine-guns and after consideration of the characteristics of Light Tanks, should be able to allot to them suitable tasks, the fulfilment of which will materially simplify the achievement of his object. Although circumstances may often necessitate the employment of Light Tanks in the Close Contact rôle, decisive results will more frequently be obtained by giving them an Independent Tactical Objective, when the nature of the ground renders such a course possible.

Asiatic forces, though far less dependent on communications than European troops, are peculiarly susceptible to threats against their flanks and rear, while a further characteristic is their ability to melt away when attacked, only to reassemble ready to renew the fight at a later period.

The bold use of Light Tanks against the enemy's flanks or rear may therefore often transform a local tactical success into a decisive victory.

It will, however, seldom be advisable to employ less than a company on tasks of this nature. Opposition will often be encountered before the locality, in which the objective is situated, has been reached, local protection may be required, the area of operations will usually be of considerable extent, and a reserve to meet any unforeseen contingency will be essential. Finally the problem must be considered as to how far the Strategic rôle is practicable for Light Tanks in Asiatic countries.

A Tank Brigade organized as a permanent formation with its four battalions, its various types of tanks, its well-equipped signal organization and its transport is a very different proposition to two or more Light Tank companies operating under a Commander with an extemporized Headquarters, but the difference in organization and training between potential European and Asiatic enemies is even more apparent.

A strategic mission would usually be beyond the scope of a single Light Tank company. Although such a unit might successfully maintain itself in enemy country for three or four days, it is too small, its fighting crews only number forty-six all told—to carry out more prolonged operations of this character.

A mobile force detailed for such a task, even if living on the country or supplied from the air, would require a certain proportion of transport which at present entails the use of wheeled vehicles. These would require protection which would be most economically afforded by Armoured Cars. Wireless communication with the air would be essential. A detachment of Sappers and Miners transported on lorries might prove invaluable. Some medical provision would be necessary and one or more political representatives would probably be required.

A Battalion of Infantry in lorries and possibly a Mechanized Battery might prove valuable adjuncts, but the Light Tanks would be the primary arm in any such operation.

A force of this character, capable of moving at least 80 miles a day on roads, with its striking force of two or more Companies of Light Tanks able to operate freely across country, would prove immensely powerful in the open plains of India, in the deserts of Iraq, and in many areas in Asia. By its employment a campaign, otherwise liable to last for months, might be concluded in a week at the minimum expenditure of men, money and material.

If there is any justification for faith in mechanization for European Warfare, where every device known to science will be utilized by highly skilled opponents to counter its efforts, there can be little doubt that the employment of a Mobile Force of which Light Tanks form the basic framework in those potential Eastern theatres of war, where the country is suited for such operations, merits the most careful study.

The utility of Light Tanks and the development of their tactics with the Army in India depends not only on an accurate appreciation of their capabilities and limitations, but also upon the formulation and acceptance of a definite doctrine as to the methods of their employment.

For the formulation of a doctrine a broad and possibly even a futuristic outlook is essential. When the principles have been stabilized, details can speedily be worked out.

In this paper an attempt has been made to indicate some of the fundamental facts upon which such a doctrine may be based.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,

Among the many excellent things in last October's number of the *Journal of the U. S. I. of India*, I found " Shiggadar's " story about " Fateh Khan, Bunerwal," of perhaps the greatest personal interest to myself, as I took part in the raid into Buner which he describes so well, though slightly inaccurately.

The raid was ordered by Army Headquarters, and was carried out early in February, 1914, by the Nowshera Brigade, under the command of Major-General R. Bannatine-Allason (very widely and affectionately known as "B.A."), and composed of the Durham Light Infantry (under Lieut.-Colonel, now Major-General Sir C. C. Luard), the 24th (now 4/14th) Punjabis, the 46th (now 10/16th) Punjabis and the 82nd (now 5/1st) Punjabis, reinforced by a squadron of Cavalry, some 400 men of the Guides Infantry, a Mountain Battery, and a detachment of Sappers and Miners from Peshawar under Major Sanders (afterwards killed in France while in command of a Brigade). A 2nd Brigade was in support, the Brigade with which the Nowshera Brigade was about to try conclusions at the Peshawar District Manœuvres.

We marched from the manœuvre area to Mardan and, next morning, after the unpleasant night mentioned by " Shiggadar," to Rustam, with our white manœuvre bands round our headgear, exchanged blank ammunition for ball on the way, and surprised the tribesmen completely as the result of our night march to the Malandri Pass. But for this, we might have encountered a good deal of opposition, and more might have been heard of our little " war," which was made the subject of a lecture on Frontier Warfare to the " Backward Boys " at Simla in 1927,—if I remember right.

The raid certainly was an excellent " show " and a complete success, and " Shiggadar " (who is or was evidently an officer of the Guides) is right in praising the marching of those two splendid battalions, the 24th Punjabis, under S. H. Climo (later Lieut.-General Sir S. H. Climo), and the 82nd Punjabis, under Tweddell, in every way just as good a Battalion as the Guides and the 24th Punjabis,—which is saying a great deal. The 24th and 82nd, the battalions that carried out the destruction of those two trans-Border villages, ably assisted by " Sandy " and his Sappers and Miners, did even better than " Shiggadar " says : they both did over 70 miles in 60 hours, as they had to

march from Nowshera to the bivouac near Mardan on the first day: and in spite of that wretched night in camp; a most unpleasant march next day across heavy sodden country to Rustam, and that long night march over rough and unknown country (led by my old friend, now dead, alas, Khwaja Mohammed Khan of Hamzakot), not one man fell out in either battalion, to the best of my recollection.

I remember well that night spent in the fields near Mardan, but it's a bit 'ard to have "most of the staff" accused of having "fled for shelter to the officers' bungalows in Mardan." As regards the expression, "most of the staff," "Shiggadar" should know that a Brigade Staff is not very numerous: actually there was only the Brigade-Major and the Staff Captain with two officers of the 38th Dogras attached. These four officers were certainly all in the bivouac, and our brigade commander would have been the last man to desert his troops.

I hadn't heard of the "slanging match" between "the two irate and red-faced commanding officers." As the Guides were on that day commanded most efficiently by Captain (now Brigadier) Hector Campbell, he was presumably one of the two referred to by "Shiggadar." Had the "naughty soldiers" (Shiggadar's own Guides) really "forgotten to load their rifles before starting" on their flanking movement? And, if they had remembered, would it have been necessary to "fell the enemy dead."

I 'm glad to say our gallant commander B.A. is still going strong: he must be at least 77 now, but I'm certain he hasn't forgotten our little "war," nor how splendidly he was served by his troops.

Yours faithfully,
MONGOLIAN.

COURTS-MARTIAL AND CIVIL COURTS.

SIR,

The statements regarding Justices of the Peace contained in Brigadier Peet's article *Courts-Martial and Civil Courts* cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged.

I should be the last to grudge the Judge Advocate-General his satisfaction at the smooth working of military justice in India,* but

* Perhaps I may be excused a personal reminiscence for I have sat on every species of Court-Martial in India—from "Subalterns" to "General" (and that for murder). But my first District impressed itself most vividly on my memory. For when the time came for the President to be sworn, his "bearer" entered with his sword, and held the belt round his master's waist while the oath was being administered. The ceremony ended he retired, taking the sword with him.

that is no reason why he should present such a prejudiced picture of the Civil Courts at Home. To those who know the facts such a caricature will only cause amusement, but there must be many serving in India who are not familiar with country life in England, and it would be a pity if they derived a false impression from the pages of the Journal.

Brigadier Peet asks, rhetorically, "Who are these J. P.'s?" and then proceeds to reply that they are persons "frequently appointed without regard to their suitability merely as a reward for political services, often as the result of wire-pulling." He would be a bold man who would assert that political influence is entirely unknown in any walk in life. But I can safely say that such a general statement as the above is a travesty of the truth. And in view of Brigadier Peet's high opinion of the legal training of the officers of the army, it is curious that he should make such a reflection upon a class in which retired officers are so largely represented. This Bench, for instance, numbers among its members a Major of Hussars (Chairman), a Major-General of Artillery, a Colonel of the R.A.M.C. and a Lieut.-Colonel of Rifles. And this is not exceptional: the Chairmen of the two adjoining Petty Sessional Divisions are respectively an admiral and a guardsman—all resident in the district and intimately acquainted with the people and local conditions.

Turning from Petty Sessions to Quarter Sessions, Brigadier Peet stigmatises these meetings as "an unwieldy mass of J. P.'s who use the occasions as a good opportunity for showing themselves on the Bench, and meeting their contemporaries at lunch." Anything less like my experience it would be impossible to conceive. Our proceedings are presided over by an eminent K. C. who has held high judicial appointments. All appeals* are considered by a specially selected committee; and if we do adjourn for lunch at the club, I seem to remember something similar—only much more elaborate—at an establishment on the slopes of Jakko.

It would be interesting to know on what personal experience Brigadier Peet bases his attack on a body, the members of which count among them so many members of the service to which he belongs.

I enclose my card, and am, Sir,

Yours obedient servant,

19th November 1934. "J. P."

* The £50 surety for an appeal is no longer required.

SIR,

In answer to the criticism of "J. P." I suggest that he read the "Lawbreakers" by E. Roy Calvert and Theodora Calvert, referred to in the commencement of my article, and "English Justice" by "Solicitor."

No reflection was intended or implied on the character or strivings of any J. P., but a criticism was intended as to the competence of many of them, and a comparison with a Court-Martial.

"J. P." appears to consider that the article was a reflection on members of the services, who are now J. P.'s. Surely the article stresses the fact that members of the services receive legal training throughout their careers, and a logical deduction would be, therefore, that members of the services are suitable for the appointment of J. P.

The recent legislation in England, and that under contemplation, is also an answer to "J. P.'s" criticism.

With regard to his enquiry as to my personal experience, though I have never appeared or gone before the Bench as a prospective victim, I have met many J. P.'s, have had members of my family, who are or were J. P.'s, and have discussed the position with retired Indian Judges, who are or were J. P.'s.

On one occasion, in England, one of the latter came back from a session, when there were something like 15 J. P.'s on the Bench (a number not unusual in this particular place) and described a miscarriage of justice entirely caused by a wrong exposition of the law to the Jury by the Chairman.

"J. P." is lucky in his Bench, but that does not mean that all benches are equally well composed, or books like the "Lawbreakers" and "English Justice" would not be written, nor would there be such a growing opinion in England that reform is necessary.

With regard to J. P.'s note as to the incident at a Court-Martial, I suggest he attend any Court-Martial in England, India or elsewhere, and he will find that they are conducted with a proper sense of dignity and decorum.

19th December 1934. L. M. PEET, BRIGADIER.

SKI-ING IN AUSTRIA—A POSTSCRIPT.

Since the appearance of the above article in the quarterly issue of the *U.S.I. Journal* for July 1934, I have received the following kindly sent in reference to the article by an officer who in the past two years has spent several months ski-ing in Austria. From this it will be seen that Ober Gurgl is yet another paradise providing everything that either the expert or the novice—especially the novice—can desire, but that Vent, lying in a deep valley, is not to be recommended. The *en pension* rates vary from 9 *sch.* per day at the *gasthäuser* to a maximum of 17 *sch.* in the hotels.

Ober Gurgl (6,332) *feet.*

Some 16 miles nearer to Innsbruck from Landeck is Otztal station (slow train for which change from mail at Landeck or start from Innsbruck) from where a comfortable motor bus service takes one south up the beautiful Otz Valley 25 miles to the end of the motor road at Zwieselstein (comfortable hotel). From here the road branches to Ober Gurgl (6,332) and Vent (5,700).

The bus journey occupies two hours, and on to Ober Gurgl by sleigh another two hours.

Ober Gurgl is the highest village with a church in Europe. It is situated in a beautiful open valley surrounded by the glaciers and peaks of the Otztal Alps, the highest in Austria. The valley is higher than the famous Engadine of Switzerland and is considered by many to surpass it in beauty and grandeur.

It is the skier's paradise, with extensive nursery slopes, numerous tours taking the beginner to 'cols" and peaks from which he can look down on the Italian Dolomites and feel that he is on the roof of the world. For the experienced skier the terrain is the finest in Europe. Snow is certain from the middle of November until May.

There are two very good hotels, Hotel Edelweiss and Hotel Gurgl, and three or four *gasthäuser*. The Gurgl ski club has produced some of the finest international ski-runners and there is an excellent ski-school. Complete ski-ing outfit including skis and clothes can be purchase in Ober Gurgl. Ober Gurgl is cheaper than other Austrian resorts owing to its distance from the nearest railway station.

The German and Austrian Alpine Club have provided in the Otztal Alps a number of " glacier hotels." Some of these ski-huts in

addition to the usual dormitories have over thirty single rooms complete with feather beds and all conveniences. They provide excellent meals. The Karlsruhe hut, the Samoar hut, the Hochjoch Hospiz, the Similaun hut, the Brandenburg hut are some of these glacier hotels situated in gorgeous scenery from which innumerable peaks can be ascended by the skier of quite medium experience. A tour from Ober Gurgl to these glacier hotels is something to dream about and one need not park ones skis until the end of June.

Vent is a village in a deep valley surrounded by steep mountains. It is far from ideal as a ski-ing resort and is used chiefly as a halting place on the way to the "glacier hotels" beyond. There is a good hotel and several *gasthäuser*.

S. W. S. H.

MILITARY NOTES.

BELGIUM.

Admission of Reserve Officers to the Ranks of the Active Army.

A Royal Decree has just been published by which fifteen reserve officers under the age of 30 may be admitted as second-lieutenants to the ranks of the active army on condition of qualifying in French and Flemish and of passing an examination corresponding to the passing-out examination from the *Ecole Militaire*. These officers are destined for the infantry and the artillery, and are required to fill the shortage in officers in the junior ranks occasioned by the creation of the Cyclist Frontier Units, the 14th Regiment of the Line and the extra artillery which will be required for the *Chasseurs Ardennais*, and by the provision of a fifth group in the artillery regiments of active divisions ; the latter will then consist in peace of two groups, each of two 4-gun batteries of 75-mm. Q. F. guns, two groups of 75-mm. long-range guns, and one group of 105-mm. howitzers.

At the same time 120 candidates are being admitted next year to the *Ecole Militaire*, instead of the usual 90. It will, however, be at least three years before these extra officers will be available for units.

BURMA.

Burma-Yunnan Frontier Dispute.

There is little to add to the account of the dispute in this area.

Mainly owing to the weather, which is exceptionally bad even for this time of year, both sides have been inactive. It has also been suggested that an aerial survey of the area be made in order to assist any future boundary commission. These steps may persuade the Chinese to withdraw their commission of enquiry and come to some arrangement for confining their nationals to certain specified areas before the rains cease, so that the whole question can be settled in a peaceful atmosphere.

CHINA.

Peking-Mukden Railway.

As foreshadowed the running of through trains on the Peking-Mukden Railway was resumed on 1st July. A bomb exploded on the first train to run from Peking, the coach affected being wrecked,

four Chinese killed and ten wounded. The coach was uncoupled and the journey completed without further incident.

Officers Training Regiment.

In an attempt to introduce a common standard of training throughout the armies of the various provincial governments, Chiang Kai-shek has instituted a Military Officers Training Corps. This establishment was due to open on 1st July at Lushan in Honan province. General Chiang Kai-shek himself is Colonel of the Training Corps, which will be divided into three battalions, each commanded by an Army Commander (General). The students will consist of brigade, regimental and battalion commanders and seconds-in-command, chiefs of staff of divisions and brigades, and staff officers down to the rank of major. They will be organized into three classes, each class receiving one month's training. No details have been announced as to the qualifications or method of selection of the instructors.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA.

Extension of the Special Army Equipment Fund Grant till 1947.

The Government on 21st June succeeded in passing a Defence Bill through the Chamber which authorised the issue of the "Special Army Equipment Fund" grant of 315,000,000 crowns (£2,600,000) a year for a further 10 years, from 1937 to 1947.

This grant was originally authorized in 1926 for a period of 11 years. It is not shown in the Ministry of National Defence Budget, but in that of the Ministry of Finance. Its object is to permit the purchase of military equipment and stores, and expenditure in any one year may be adjusted in other years. This privilege is extended in the new authorization, and, in addition, from 1934 onwards expenditure in anticipation of annual instalments is also permitted.

Thus, in effect, the Ministry of National Defence is now able to borrow up to 13 years' (1935 to 1947) allotment, or a sum of 4,095,000,000 crowns (approximately £27,000,000) in respect of armaments, equipment and buildings, from the Ministry of Finance, at short notice without any further reference to Parliament.

FRANCE.

Passive Defence Measures against Air Attack.

A Bill has been submitted to Parliament relating to passive defence against air attack, seeking in general terms to deal with the juridical

and financial aspects of this problem and to define the chain of responsibility.

The Minister of the Interior assisted by a Committee of Passive Defence is responsible for the direction, co-ordination and supervision of an obligatory national organization for passive defence.

Plans will be made and their execution supervised by the following:

(*a*) Ministers, who will be responsible for the protection of services and installations under their command.

(*b*) Prefects, who will be responsible for their departments, and Mayors for their Communes.

(*c*) Firms and undertakings who, by reason of their possible participation in national defence, of their importance, or of any special conditions affecting their production, will be dealt with by the Ministry of the Interior, who will decide how they should ensure their protection against air attack.

The Minister of the Interior will be responsible for producing measures to reduce the vulnerability of Public Services, Communes, and private undertakings, by the adaptation of municipal projects, etc., to the requirements of passive defence. Through his advice, Public Administrative Orders will be produced providing for the addition of supplementary civil establishments, composed of volunteers to departmental and municipal authorities.

In principle the cost of passive defence will be borne by those for whom it is organized, but in exceptional circumstances where such cost is very high the State will issue a grant. In the event of failure to fulfil their obligations by Departments, Communes, and other beneficiaries, the Minister of the Interior will decide by decree the minimum requirements necessary for the preparation of passive defence. These decisions will be obligatory.

In the case of non-compliance within a specified time, the necessary work may be ordered by the Prefects, and carried out at the expense of those concerned.

Periodical manœuvres are to be carried out and any person attempting to oppose them will be liable to punishment.

The extension of the law to cover the Colonies is provided for at the request of the Minister concerned.

The weakness in the legislation lies in the fact that parties who fail to fulfil their obligations may appeal against the decree enforcing them,

and thereby gain a substantial respite pending a decision on their appeal.

It should be remarked that 11,000,000 frs. was included in the 1934 Budget for the State participation in passive defence.

Wearing of Full-Dress Uniform.

An instruction has recently been issued under which the possession of full dress will be obligatory for all officers from 1st January, 1936. It is already so for officers on promotion to General's rank and for cadets on first commission to the Army.

Credits for National Defence.

After lengthy debates in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the additional credits demanded by the Government have now been passed.

(*a*) The total allotted to the War Department has been increased by 100 million francs to 1,275 millions (£10,200,000 at par), sub-divided as follows :—

880 millions to meet over-expenditure on the fortifications already incurred (180 millions on ordnance services and 700 millions on engineer services).

103 ,, for the completion of the works on the eastern frontier.

292 ,, for construction of new fortifications on the northern frontier.

(*b*) The vote for the Ministry of Marine has also been increased by 40 million francs to 865 millions divided as follows :—

595 millions for construction and filling of storage tanks for oil fuel in France and overseas.

80 ,, for coast defence (30 for works now in progress and 50 for new works).

190 ,, for the naval air force.

(*c*) The vote for the Air Army remains at 980 million francs sub-divided into :—

620 millions for new material (aircraft and engines).

120 ,, for armament and equipment.

90 ,, for reserve ammunition stocks.

80 ,, for war aerodromes.

40 ,, for preparation of industrial mobilization

30 ,, for research and experiment,

Air Manœuvres.

Important anti-aircraft manœuvres are to take place at Lyons and later in Paris.

The two chief objects of these are to—

(*a*) Ascertain the length of time it will take to bring the defensive organization into operation.

(*b*) Try out the co-operation of the civil authorities, both urban and departmental, and the civilian population in general, as regards the length of time which elapses between the sounding of the alarm and the extinction of all lights, and to test the organization of safety and first-aid units.

raining of Army Officers as Observers.

1. A recent decree gives details of the conditions under which officers may be attached to the Air Force as observers in aeroplanes or balloons.

2. Officers may apply at any time to carry out an attachment to the Air Force.

Subject to physical fitness they carry out an initial course lasting four months, at the end of which they are required to pass a test to gain their observer's certificate.

If successful they then do a further attachment of one year, and subsequently an annual attachment of one month, with a squadron.

The preliminary four months course is divided into—

(*a*) Three months at the training school at Avord.

(*b*) Three weeks at the aerial gunnery and bombing school at Cazaux.

(*c*) One week devoted to examinations and tests.

During their year's attachment officers must be employed in active flying with army co-operation squadrons and, if they show particular aptitude, may be allowed to continue for another year.

The possession of an observer's certificate will entitle an officer to reckon nine months increase in service in qualifying for a pension and to other benefits.

All p.s.c. officers of the General Staff after leaving the Staff College are required to carry out a two months attachment to the training school at Avord and obtain their observer's certificate, followed by voluntary attachments lasting two weeks whenever practicable.

3. Officers can also volunteer to qualify as observers in balloons. To qualify for their certificate they are required to carry out the following attachments—

(*a*) An initial course of seven weeks at the *Ecole Militaire d'application de l'armée de l'air.*

(*b*) A specialist's course of one month's duration with a balloon unit.

(*c*) An annual course of one month.

Officers who obtain a certificate will receive similar benefits, but on a lower scale, in the matter of pensions, etc., as for the aeroplane observers.

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ROUMANIA.

Introduction of pre-military training.

A law has recently been passed, to take effect from 1st November, 1934, whereby pre-military training will become compulsory in Roumania for all youths between the ages of 18 and 20 years inclusive.

The law contains 24 Articles, the most important of which are as follows :—

Article 1 defines the scope of the law as "Moral and national training to produce order and discipline. Physical training. Elementary military instruction to permit of rapid progress being made when individuals are subsequently called to the Colours."

Article 2 allows for certain exemptions or postponements due to ill-health or other reasons.

Article 3 lays down the obligatory annual training as 50—60 parades plus 4—7 days camp.

Article 4 lays down that the Minister of National Defence will direct the training, working through the General Staff, and the Inspector-General of territorial commands.

Articles 7 *to* 9 explain the chain of responsibility for training from the Ministry of National Defence, down to actual District or Municipal training centres.

Article 10 lays down that the instructional staff shall be—

(*a* Active officers, or ex-active officers incapacitated through service.

(*b*) Reserve officers.

(*c*) Other ranks from the reserve.

Article 13 lays down that the cost will be met from the Army Budget, augmented by obligatory subscriptions from districts and municipalities.

Article 15 authorizes ground belonging to the Army to be utilized for parades, etc.

Article 16 lays down that youths undergoing pre-military training will wear distinguishing badges. Instructors will, in addition, wear badges of rank.

Articles 17 *and* 19 deal with recording and analysing results.

Article 18 authorizes reduction in the subsequent period of service of from three to six months, and a reduction in the qualification periods for promotion to non-commissioned rank by one-half for those who have completed their pre-military training satisfactorily.

Article 20 lays down the punishments for those not showing zeal, or displaying indiscipline during their pre-military instruction. These include, amongst other punishments, the forfeiture of all leave during subsequent military service.

Article 21 lays down certain advantages which will be granted to Officer and N. C. O. instructors at pre-military training centres.

SPAIN.

Budgets.

The estimated expenditure for 1934 has now been approved by Parliament.

The difference between the estimates as approved and those originally submitted is only slight; it entails a small increase in expenditure under the War Ministry, but the total military vote still represents a decrease on the 1933 figure of nearly £1,100,000.

The full estimates are now as follows :—

NOTE.—For convenience pesetas have been converted throughout into pounds sterling at the current rate (37 pesetas to £1).

	1933.	Proposed 1934.	Voted 1934.
	£	£	£
Estimated Revenue ..	124,268,000	122,476,000	122,471,000
Expenditure ..	124,403,000	122,705,000	123,174,000
Deficit ..	135,000	238,000	703,000

The military budget is as follows :—

	£	£	£
Home ..	11,410,000	9,955,500	10,302,500
Morocco ..	4,150,000	4,031,000	4,167,000
Total ..	15,560,000	13,986,500	14,469,500

Provision has also been made in the budget for the administration of the air force in three branches (military, naval and civil) to pass to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The annual expenditure of this department has increased by about one million pounds, though it is impossible, as the figures are set out, to ascertain whether the whole of this increase is intended for air service expenditure.

Reorganization of the Army.

New establishments both for the Peninsula Army and for Morocco which came into force on 1st July 1934, show that certain reorganizations and reductions in personnel have taken place.

The following are the most important changes :—

(1) The Air Service will henceforth come under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers whose budget will, in future, include Air Service expenditure. Air Service personnel are in consequence no longer included in army establishments, which fact must be borne in mind in considering the reduction in personnel in the new establishments.

(2) The Peninsula Army has been reduced by approximately 550 officers and 7,000 other ranks. Animals are reduced by about 2,000. Of these figures over 500 officers and 4,147 other ranks are accounted for by the separation of the Air Service, the remaining reductions being shared amongst all arms. The new total establishment is 7,285 officers, 106,629 other ranks and 30,000 animals.

(3) The Army in Morocco has been reduced by 108 officers and 4,066 other ranks, and animals by 586. Of these figures 45 officers and 955 other ranks are accounted for by the separation of the Air Service, the remaining reductions being principally in infantry and artillery personnel.

The new establishment is 1,404 officers (of whom 64 are natives), 32,116 other ranks (of whom 8,919 are natives) and 8,934 animals.

(4) *The Foreign Legion* (*Tercio*).—The two " legions " of which the *Tercio* is composed will, in future, be separate administrative units. They will be known as Legion No. 1 with H. Q. at Tauima in the Eastern Circumscription, and Legion No. 2 with H. Q. at Riffien in the Western Circumscription.

Each Legion consists of H.Q and three battalions (*banderas*) each consisting of three rifle companies and one machine-gun and close support weapon company. The latter consists of two sections of machine-guns (eight guns in all) and one close support section of one gun and two mortars.

In order to ensure uniformity in the organization, administration and training of the two legions, an inspectorate is to be formed at Ceuta, which will consist of a colonel, assisted by two officers and 64 other ranks.

The total establishment of the *Tercio* is 157 officers, 4,326 other ranks and 767 animals, but it is believed to be about 1,000 below strength at the present time.

(5) *The Automobile Service of Morocco.*—Pending the formation of a Train Corps, all M. T. units and personnel have been formed into a separate service known as the *Servicio Automobilismo de Marruecos.*

The service will be organized into H.Q. and two groups (Eastern and Western). Each group will consist of H.Q., a general transport company and a workshop company. The total establishment of the service is 27 officers and 736 other ranks.

TURKEY.

Budget Estimates for Defence Expenditure, 1934-35.

The final figures as published differ considerably from the original estimates and now read as follows :—

	1934-35. £T
Army	40,964,881
Air	4,583,774
Marine	3,808,818
Military factories	3,290,643
Cartographical section	603,505
Total ..	53,251,621

or a total of £T12,600,116 increase over the figures for 1933-34.

This still does not take into account the sum of £T8,889,372 which is included in the Public Debt Estimates for 1934-35 in order to cover Treasury Bonds issued on account of military supplies. If this is included the total Defence Budget is £T62,140,993 or 33·75 per cent. of the total national budget (as against 29 per cent. in 1933-34).

Further, this does not take into account the Gendarmerie budget of £T8,679,379, a large proportion of which could legitimately be debited against national defence since the Gendarmerie are a trained military force.

In addition to the above ordinary Budget an extraordinary sum of £T49,000,000 has been authorized to be spent on war material during, it is believed, the next seven years. Legislation has already introduced additional taxation in the current financial year to produce £T9,850,000 of the above sum.

The main heads of expenditure of this Extraordinary Vote are the purchase of warships (mostly submarines), and the construction of naval bases, new barracks and aircraft.

REVIEWS.

A SEARCHLIGHT ON THE NAVY.

By Hector C. Bywater.

(Constable) s.10/-

The whole of this book is an attempt to show the relative position of the British Navy at the present day *vis-à-vis* the navies of other first class naval powers and, although in a study of this type figures must be quoted fairly frequently, the author has presented his facts in an easily readable form in which technicalities have been carefully avoided. The resulting picture is a most depressing one and shows a position little appreciated by the majority of people in England.

The author examines very carefully the effect of modern inventions on the Navy with particular reference to the often highly exaggerated claims of the supporters of the air arm, and he shows quite clearly that the Navy still remains a vital factor in Britain's defence. From this he goes on to discuss whether the Navy is in a position to carry out the tasks which are by force of circumstances its true rôle in war. The chief of these is to guarantee the continued arrival of our essential imports, in particular food, since, on stocks held in the country we can only exist for six weeks.

The predominance and necessity for the battleship is most clearly explained and it is interesting to read his views on the so-called " pocket battleships " which Germany produced within her 10,000-ton limit, and for perhaps the first time the shortcomings of these vessels are brought out. Their effect on France and Italy however has been much in excess of their actual worth for as a counter to the German production these countries have each laid down two battleships with a tonnage of 26,500 in the case of France and 35,000 in that of Italy.

Our policy of trying to achieve mutual disarmament, by example, such as we have followed since the Washington Conference and London Pact is shown to have been a bad mistake in psychology, for whilst we were not building up to our authorized allotment no other power restricted its output and as a result we now find ourselves much behind in our war preparedness.

The only sound system of limitation would now appear to be a graduated scale of " global " tonnage linked with limits to the standard of battleship and cruiser.

The author, however, contends that at the next naval conference the Washington and London Pacts will most probably go by the board and it is most doubtful whether any system of limitation will receive the blessing of all parties.

The future thus looks as if there is to be a reversion to the pre-1914 situation of unrestricted naval building and this will only be limited by the economic conditions of the countries concerned. Whatever happens the policy of the British Navy is clear, namely, to get back to the position where it can carry out the protection of our sea routes and trade against the navy of any other power. Then, and only then, will we be able to carry the same conviction in the councils of Europe and convince them that we are not getting "soft."

H. R. S.