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EDITORIAL.

Persia.

Since the Great War there has been a remarkable growth of national consciousness in many countries where such feelings were not formerly prominent. This change is particularly marked where power has been gained by a dictator, for an absolute ruler is always tempted to adopt a truculent attitude towards foreigners in the hope that it will unite his own people in support of what must be to many an unpopular form of government. Conspicuous amongst such countries has been Persia, and Great Britain's peculiar position in the Persian Gulf has offered ample opportunity for indulgence in the spectacular, applause-gaining and up to the present not very dangerous sport of twisting the lion's tail.

In the Persian Gulf for the past 150 years Great Britain has performed the role of policeman—a role which incidently no one else was either able or willing to undertake and which has benefitted every nation trading into the Gulf, Persia above all others. Gradually and without protest from anyone, Great Britain acquired certain privileges to enable her to carry out her duties. The privileges are in themselves of no vast importance and they are of long standing, but to newly awakened Persian nationalism they constitute a slight to Persian sovereignty.

Within the last few years Britain has voluntarily abandoned certain of these privileges. Armed Consular escorts have been withdrawn; the Indo-European telegraph system and certain wireless

stations have been handed over without compensation. In addition the Imperial Airways route, in deference to Persian wishes, has been transferred to the Arabian side of the Gulf, and the railway to Duzdap, run as part of the North-Western Railway system of India, has been shut down, thus removing a constant cause of petty friction. After these and other concessions to Persian feeling had been made there still remained the questions of the small British naval shore establishments in the Persian Islands of Basidu and Henjam, the location of the Persian Gulf Residency at Bushire, and the Persian debt to Britain. Of these the retention by the navy of the recreational and other facilities at Henjam is the most important, but Great Britain has no territorial ambitions in Persia and a settlement of these outstanding questions, satisfactory to both parties, should not be difficult. Unfortunately Persia has brought forward at various times fantastic counter-claims to certain islands owned by Arab Sheiks under British protection and to Bahrein. Britain does not own these islands, whose rulers and people most strongly refute the Persian assertion, and it would be grossly unjust to abandon those whom we have solemnly promised to protect. After years of negotiation the position has been reached, as it so often is in treating with an Oriental Power, when Britian can offer no further concessions and the Persian Government fears that a withdrawal of their extravagant claims will lead to a loss of face in their own country. This position, difficult enough in itself, was immeasurably aggravated by the sudden announcement that the Persian Government had cancelled its agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

In these hard times Persia's desire to increase the already substantial benefits she obtains from the Company is easily understandable, but an agreement whether individual or national cannot be cancelled because one party would now like more advantageous terms than formerly satisfied them. The sums due to Persia—16 per cent. of the Company's nett profits—have been paid with unfailing regularity. The concession, which has another 28 years to run, gives no authority for cancellation before its term expires, but allows of arbitration on any disputed point. All this Persia ignored and it is useless to argue that the affair is a mere dispute between a Government and a private company operating in that Government's territory. The facts that the Company is a purely British one, that the British Government is its majority shareholder, that in addition many millions of privately

invested British money are at stake, left Great Britain no alternative but to protect her own and her subjects' rights. It was obviously time, for everybody's sake, that a little stiffness should be imparted to our, it must be confessed, rather spineless attitude towards Persia. This has now been done in the British note of protest which, while offering arbitration, made it quite clear that, should any interference with the Company's normal operations be attempted, all necessary steps would be taken to protect its interests and property, and the lives of its British and Indian employees. This could only mean that in the last resort Britain would be prepared to land troops to safeguard the Company's personnel and installations and it is well that Persia should realize that even the mild British lion will eventually show a tooth if its tail is twisted beyond a certain limit. The actual cancellation was probably the impulsive act of the Shah himself and the wholesome dread in which he is held by all his Ministers is enough to prevent any of them pointing out the legal, moral and practical objections to his act. Even so the prompt and plain nature of the British announcement came probably as a shock to a Persian Government that had been living recently in a somewhat unreal atmosphere where lions never hint that they have teeth.

However there is no call for sabre-rattling—nor indeed has there been any. Sooner or later the Persian bluff had to be called on some point, and the illegal and unjustifiable cancellation of this concession is as good a one on which to do it as could be found. Persia has announced that she will take no action until the result of the reference to the League of Nations is declared and in this at least she is wise. Unless she is so supremely ill-advised as to indulge in provocative action, some face saving device should be discovered which will enable her to retrace a hasty step that must be already regretted. With a sigh more than one ardent young officer of the Army in India puts away the map of Persia and turns to prepare his Individual Training Programme for the hot weather.

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Indian Defence Costs.

The Round Table Conference and the Disarmament Conference have led to a revival in certain quarters of the attacks on Indian Defence expenditure. The politicians who tilt at the Army Budget too often take the short sighted view that all Defence Expenditure is " non-productive " and cannot be classed as " nation building." A realization of fundamental facts would show them that the Fighting Services of India produce the most essential

of all commodities—Security, and that there is no institution in India that has achieved so much practical nation building as the Indian Army.

Apart from this, criticisms are based mainly on two allegations, first, that the total cost is too high, and, second, that really serious efforts have not been made to reduce it. Comparisons are drawn between the expenditure of other nations and of India. Now it is an open secret that many nations do deliberately camouflagetheir defence expenditure by showing portions of it in their Budgets as incurred under other heads. For instance, one nation recently spent £200,000 on horses for its army but showed the cost under ' agriculture '; another maintains large second line formations under the heading of ' Education '; barracks and even fortifications are paid from the Public Works Budget; there is no end to the subterfuge employed to conceal the real total expended on Defence. Few nations would think of charging to their military estimates such items as children's education, transportation by Government railways, custom duties on military material, war pensions, or Frontier road construction and maintenance. Yet all these and a good many more are included in the Indian Military Budget. It is this difference in budgetary honesty between the countries of the Empire and certain foreign nations that, as the League of Nations has found, makes comparison between published budget figures apt to be misleading. Even so a contrast between these figures is not nearly so unfavourable to India as many people would have us believe.

The figures on which the truest estimate of relative Defence Expenditure can be based are :—

i. The cost per head of population.

ii. The proportion of the total national revenue which is expended on Defence.

The latest available figures are illuminating :—

	Cost per head in Rupees.	Percentage of Defence Expenditure to Total Revenue.
United Kingdom	27·5	12·6
France	36·4	22·5
Italy	17·1	26·7
United States	18·5	25·1
Japan	10·0	21·0
India	1·3	22·4

It will be seen that, even allowing for a low taxable capacity, the cost per head in India is remarkably small and it is growing smaller. At the same time the proportion of revenue devoted to Defence is, compared with other countries, few of which are faced with such immediate internal and external military problems as India, by no means out of the ordinary.

The second charge, that no serious efforts have been made to reduce the cost of Defence, is clearly refuted by an examination of the Defence Budgets of the last ten years. In 1922-23, when conditions after the Great War and the Third Afghan War were returning to normal, the nett Defence expenditure was Rs. 65·27 crores ; in 1931-32 it was Rs. 50·73 crores ; and in the present year, 1932-33, it is estimated at 46·74 crores. This means that in ten years a reduction of over 28 per cent. has been effected. No other nation in the world has reduced its Defence expenditure in this period to such an extent, and it would be well to remember the fact.

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False Economy.

That this vast reduction in expenditure has been achieved without loss of efficiency has been possible only because of the unselfish co-operation of all officers of the Fighting Services. Without their aid either the economies would not have been effected or they would have bred discontent and deterioration. Try as it might, Army Headquarters could not possibly prevent the effects of such widespread reductions from falling on individuals. The drastic cuts in the Army Budget meant the disappearance of units to which officers had devoted their lives, the compulsory retirement of many in mid-career, impared prospects of command for those who remained, fewer officers to do more work, a scaling down of allowances. Yet all these and a great deal more officers accepted loyally. Indeed it is admitted that the wholehearted efforts of the Fighting Services to effect economies and the success that has attended those efforts have been unequalled. Even the temporary cut in pay, which has inflicted more hardship on officers than is often realized, was accepted in an equally admirable spirit.

Now, as the time draws near when Government must make up its mind whether this cut in pay is to be continued for another year or not, the air is full of whispers. The cut is to be restored ; it is not to be restored for another year ; it is to be made permanent ; five per

cent. only is to be restored; it is to be restored but a Machiavelian Finance Department is to mulct the unfortunate officer an equal amount by increased income-tax. So the rumours fly. Actually, of course, no final decision has yet been reached—everything depends on the financial position a few months hence and no one can guarantee accurately to predict what that will be. There are however certain factors which are already plain. First, in favour of restoration are the facts that India's financial situation is very much better than it was a year ago, revenue is coming in freely, many staple industries show signs of improvement, India has weathered the universal depression better than most countries, the political situation has immeasurably improved, and there is every prospect of a balanced budget even with the restored pay. Against restoration there are the financial difficulties of some of the Provinces, who have little hope of balancing their budgets, and of certain Government Services, notably the Railways. It is argued that it would be impolitic and perhaps unjust to restore the pay of officers of the Central Government and not of those in the Provinces, or of certain Services and not of others. All or none is the cry.

This argument requires careful examination. No one, least of all any officer of the Fighting Services, wishes to benefit at the expense of his confrére of another Service, but there is no question of doing this. Even if the pay of one Service is restored and that of another remains reduced the unlucky Service is no worse off than before. Indeed it is in a better position to claim restoration than it would be if the other Services had not received their pay back. Again Government's object must be economy, and, as the Army has shown, it is best achieved when all officers of a Service co-operate willingly to this end; what better guarantee that such co-operation will be forthcoming than to offer a restoration of pay conditional on a general reduction of expenditure.

At present there seems no insuperable obstacle in the way of a restoration of all pay in the next financial year, but, should it for any reason be decided that it is impossible to give back their pay to certain Services, it is to be hoped that Government will not be so short sighted as to extend this decision to all Services. The Fighting Services, as an example, might fairly claim other treatment. Surely they deserve some material reward for the immense economies they have already and are still effecting. India is entering upon a period of

great and far reaching changes in every sphere of her life. Whether these changes will be allowed to develop along the lines of rapid and peaceful progress depends in the last resort of the efficiency and reliability of the Army, and these in turn depend absolutely on the officers now serving. Would it be wise to continue a cut in pay which, if maintained, as a year's experience has shown, will by involving officers in financial difficulties, undermine their contentment and most adversely affect their efficiency ? It would be the falsest of economies.

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Passing into the Staff College.

An analysis of the results of the 1932 Staff College Entrance Examination proves of undoubted interest and may be of some value, though deductions based on figures such as these are by no means infallible.

618 officers sat for the examination and of these 198 or 32 per cent. qualified. The chief arms of the British and Indian Armies acquitted themselves as follows :—

	Number taking the Examination.	Percentage who qualified.
Royal Signals	24	62·5
Royal Engineers	59	47·4
Royal Artillery	102	38·2
Indian Infantry	125	34·4
British Cavalry	17	23·5
British Infantry	211	23·2
Indian Cavalry	18	16·7
Royal Tank Corps	16	12·5
Indian Army Service Corps ..	8	12·5
Royal Army Service Corps ..	4	Nil.

The first thing that strikes one is that at the head of the list with the highest percentage of qualifications come the three arms trained at Woolwich. Is it safe to deduce from this that the education there given is as superior to that at Sandhurst as the figures would seem to imply ? Possibly not, for it must be remembered that these officers completed their initial military education several years ago, and since then there have been very wide changes in the Sandhurst curriculum. Perhaps ten years hence the distinction between the two institutions in this examination will not be so marked. Again the difference may

not be due so much to variation in the instruction received as Cadets as it is to what happens to the young officer in the first few years of his service. Indeed it seems that here the true cause of the difference is to be found. All Royal Engineer subalterns and many of the Royal Signals follow their cadet training by a University Course which not only raises their technical standard but improves immeasurably their general education and capacity for study. Reformers may seize upon these figures as further evidence that a year's University education would be better training for all our future officers than eighteen months as cadets. In addition the Royal Signals have unequalled opportunities in their ordinary training to become acquainted with the working of other arms and with control and staff work in mixed formations. Similarly but to a lesser degree the Gunner also has a better chance than most other arms of obtaining a broader view during training—he has to be taken more fully into the confidence of superior commanders. Finally all three, Signallers, Sappers and Gunners have in their every day work to keep themselves abreast of rapidly advancing technical knowledge, and this in itself is a great mental stimulant. The position of these three arms at the top of the list and the order in which they appear are thus very much what one would have predicted, though the Royal Corps of Signals surely deserves congratulation on the striking use it has made of its advantages.

It is gratifying to find that, first of the non-Woolwich arms, and treading very closely on the heels of the Gunners, come the Infantry of the Indian Army. What special advantages they have had to enable them to achieve this creditable distinction it is hard to say. The fewness of British officers in Indian Battalions, the extent to which they have personally to supervise administration, the languages they have to learn, the wider responsibilities they have to accept compared with British Service officers of similar seniority, all reduce their opportunities for study. One suspects that the cause of their success is to be found in the simple fact that once again a determination to overcome obstacles has overcome them. There is a considerable drop between Indian Infantry and British Cavalry and Infantry and still more to Indian Cavalry. It would be interesting to speculate why British Infantry have a lower percentage of qualifications than Indian, and as to why in the Indian Army the Infantry should lead the Cavalry and the position be reversed in the British Army—interesting but possibly rash.

It is a little surprising at first sight to find that a British Service officer in India has a somewhat higher expectation of passing the examination than one serving elsewhere. The figures for the percentage of qualifications to entries are :—

	In India.	Elsewhere.
British Cavalry	20·0	25·0
Royal Artillery	45·0	36·6
Royal Engineers	57·1	44·4
Royal Signals	80·0	57·9
British Infantry	43·1	43·9
Royal Tank Corps	0·0	16·6
Average for British Service ..	37·7	30·3

One would have thought that from the point of view of preparing for the examination, service at Home was definitely preferable to that in India. At Home the proportion of officers to men is much higher, there is all the advantage of climate, crammers abound, good libraries are common, and the path of the candidate is smoothed in many ways impossible out here. Still in spite of all this officers of both British and Indian Services in this country seem very successfully to have caught up or out-paced those at Home. Perhaps in India the greater realism of training, the opportunities for active service, and above all the increased responsibility that officers must accept, more than compensate for inferior external aids. For these results so satisfactory to India the major credit is due to the officers themselves, but they would be the last to grudge some of it to those senior officers and higher staffs who, recognising the handicaps to Staff College study in this country, have done so much to remove them.

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NOTICE.

As the Institution has enjoyed a particularly successful year financially the Council has decided to assist officers suffering from the cut in pay by temporarily suspending the Entrance Fee. Officers may now become full members on payment of the annual subscription of Rs. 10 only.

Members are earnestly asked to bring these advantageous terms to the notice of non-members.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1933.

The Council has chosen the following alternative subjects for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1933 :—

(*i*) " **With the tendency of modern Military Organization towards Mechanisation, the increasing complexity of modern weapons and the dependence of troops on their maintenance services, it is asserted by many that Regular troops are losing the degree of mobility necessary for the successful performance of their role on the North-West Frontier.**

Discuss how this difficulty can be overcome so that freedom of action and tactical mobility are assured in the Army in India,

or

(*ii*) " **Discuss the tactical employment of Light Tanks**

(*a*) **with Cavalry**

(*b*) **with Infantry**

in both the plains of India and in the mountainous country of the North-West Frontier: particular reference should be made to the problems of Maintenance and Supply."

(NOTE.—For the purpose of this essay the following may be assumed :—

Organization—Light Tank Company of 3 sections each of 7 tanks ; 1 Company Commander's tank and 3 reserve tanks. Total 25 tanks.

Crew of Vehicle—2.

Armament—One ·303" Vickers gun (Special tank pattern).

Ammunition—3,000 rounds ·303".

Armour—Capable of resisting ordinary ·303" ammunition, ·303" A. P. and shrapnel.

Speed average—Across country. 4—12 m. p. h. Road and track 20—25 m. p. h. Reduced to 15 in convoy.

Crossing power—Trench 5 feet. Water 2 feet 6 inches.

Climbing power—Slope—1 in $2\frac{1}{2}$. Perpendicular obstacle—2 feet.

Circuit of Action—Road approximately 100 miles.

Petrol fill—20 gallons.

The following are the conditions of the Competition :—

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and Auxiliary Forces.

(2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1933.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has offered a Special Prize of Rs. 150 for the best essay submitted on subject (*ii*). This prize is in addition to any awarded by the Council.

(8) The names of the successful candidates will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1933.

(9) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(10) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AT GENEVA, 1932.

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(Chief of the Indian Technical Delegation to the Conference).

The Draft Convention.

The following article is an attempt to summarize, very briefly, certain of the more important facts that emerged from the lengthy and somewhat tedious discussions on disarmament at Geneva during the past year, and to give some sort of explanation, possibly an unsatisfactory one to many enthusiasts who were hoping for the birth of a millenium, as to why the results were not more substantial. Many of those who were present, on the other hand, when taking into consideration the immense differences in the outlook and interests, the fears and aspirations, the local conditions and defence requirements of the sixty odd nations who were represented, will have come away from Geneva amazed that any results were achieved at all. The production of a formula or a definition that would satisfy the interpretation of all was a problem of great difficulty, and was apparent even in the case of nations ostensibly using the same language. As some cynic remarked, the Conference deserved the gratitude of the World, as, at any rate, it had got through several months without starting a new war.

In order to get some idea of the sequence of events and to understand the basis from which the discussions started, it is necessary to remember that a great deal of spade work had been undertaken by the Preparatory Commission, which had been sitting for five years before the Conference assembled and had produced a Draft Disarmament Convention.

The Draft Convention contained some sixty Articles. It aimed at limiting and, if possible, reducing the World's armaments, by fixing the numbers of effectives in the land, sea, and air forces of the various Powers; by limiting the tonnage, and in some cases the numbers by types of war vessels; the numbers and total horse-power of aircraft capable of use in war; and the total annual expenditure on land, sea, and air forces. It also provided for the limitation of the period of service in conscript armies, control of annual expenditure on land war material, and for free interchange of information between High Contracting Parties.

In accordance with the terms of this Convention, all Powers invited to the Conference (and invitations were issued to every Power, great or small, and irrespective of whether they were members of the League of Nations or not) were asked to produce, some months before the assembly of the Conference, tables showing in considerable detail their naval, military and air resources, and details of the funds expended on their armed forces for a particular year, 1929-30.

This, at first sight would appear to be a fairly simple task, as all civilized nations must, presumably, keep accurate records of the numbers of effectives, for instance, serving in their armed forces. But at once points of doubt arose. What were 'effectives,' and what were to be included in the 'armed forces?' Were territorials or militia forces which only did a part-time training to be counted and, if so, on what basis? How were reserves to be counted—some did no training at all, while others did an annual training of considerable military value? Again, taking the case of India as an example—How were our frontier levies and scouts to be counted?—Were corps like Burma Military Police or Assam Rifles forces 'organized on a military basis'? Were Frontier Constabulary and armed police to be included?

All these questions had a reaction also in the financial sphere as budgetary tables could not be produced till answers were forthcoming. Army budgetary figures were not sufficient to produce before the Conference as, again taking the case of India as an example, many of the Corps which were, or might be considered to be, 'organized on a military basis', are paid for out of Home or Foreign Department budgets or Provincial revenues. Another problem faced those who were preparing the data for the Indian Delegation, and that concerned the inclusion of Indian States Forces, both in the tables of effectives and in the budgetary statements.

Many nations have quasi-military organizations which are mainly used for police or customs purposes, and some of these are definitely organized on a military basis, and might well have military value in war. Though in most cases nations might not have the slightest intention of using these formations as they stand for aggressive purposes against their neighbours, the difficulty was to convince those neighbours of their innocence, and to discover where to draw the line. This problem has not yet been solved (December 1932) and is still being debated by the Effectives Committee at Geneva.

In due course practically all the Powers represented produced the tables asked for in accordance with the Draft Convention—though some were very late and obviously inaccurate—and these were printed and circulated with a mass of explanatory notes to the members of all delegations.

Thus when the delegations assembled at Geneva at the end of January 1932, a great deal of preparatory work had been done, not only by the members of the Preparatory Commission who had laboured for five years to produce their Draft Convention, but also by the various governments concerned in presenting the tables of effectives, details of navies and air forces, and the budgetary tables asked for under the terms of the Draft Convention. A mass of documentary information existed on which to start work.

As will be seen later, the speeches of the various delegates frequently drifted far away from the Draft Convention, and, though from time to time valiant efforts were made to bring every suggestion back into the framework already drawn up, this was no easy matter.

The Three Phases of the Conference.

The Disarmament Conference actually opened on the 2nd of February, and its proceedings up to the dispersal for the long recess at the end of July may roughly be divided into three phases.

During the first, the Phase of Oratory, the leading delegates of all Powers paid tribute to the objects for which the Conference was assembled, and made proposals, which they considered would secure those objects, on behalf of their respective Governments.

The second phase may be termed the Technical Phase, during which the experts attached to the various delegations strove, with indifferent success, to define those weapons which were, "Most offensive, most menacing to national defence, and most dangerous to civilians."

The third phase was the period of Private Conversations during which an intense effort was made to provide some sort of formula, which would show the World the measure of the progress made.

Before describing these three phases in rather greater detail, a few words about the procedure and organization at Geneva may be of interest.

At the plenary sessions of the Disarmament Conference most Powers were represented by from three to five delegates, and until

all nations had had their initial say the greater part of the work was done in plenary session.

A General Commission was then formed at which each Power was represented by one delegate, and this in turn resolved itself into several subordinate commissions, the most important of which were the three Technical Commissions dealing with Land, Naval and Air warfare—or "*Terre*," "*Mer*" and "*Air*," as they were described by Monsieur Tardieu.

There were also committees dealing with budgetary questions, with effectives, with chemical and bacteriological warfare, and with moral disarmament.

Mr. Arthur Henderson was Chairman of the Conference and of the General Commission, and he was always assisted by Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, and by the League Secretariat. The chairman of the other commissions and committees were mostly League habitués many of whom had taken part in the work of the Preparatory Commission.

The Conference and each commission and committee formed its own 'bureau,' from among whose members a few vice-presidents and 'rapporteurs' were chosen. These rapporteurs were mostly, like the chairmen, old habitués and were really very hard worked and very important people. A rapporteur was, in fact, a sort of super-secretary, and not only did he have to draw up the final report of his committee, but he was constantly busy trying to evolve resolutions which would bring into harmony the very conflicting views of the various nations.

Two languages, French and English, were officially employed, and, with very few exceptions who spoke in German, all speakers used one or the other of these languages. All speeches made in French were immediately translated into English and *vice versa*. The translators were provided by the League Secretariat and some of them were wonderfully expert and fluent. Practically all the clerical work was performed by the League Secretariat.

The First Phase—Oratory.

To the average onlooker the opening phase, the first few weeks of the Conference, was undoubtedly the most interesting—the speakers were in many cases men with world-wide reputations, men whose names were household words throughout Europe. They came as

plenipotentiaries from the various Powers ready to announce to the World how far the Governments who sent them were prepared to go in the cause of disarmament, and the World was agog to know what each of them proposed. Intense propaganda had been carried out by League enthusiasts, and many less well-informed organizations were demanding results far in advance of those that were hoped for by members of the League—results outside the realm of possible achievement.

The proceedings opened with a somewhat uninspiring address by the President of the Conference, Mr. Arthur Henderson, and this was followed by two or three dull days devoted to routine matters. The opening week was not allowed to close without one dramatic incident. Just before the proceedings for the day terminated, M. Tardieu, who was at that time the French Minister of Defence and Leader of their delegation, marched solemnly up to the rostrum and presented the French proposals to the President. These proposals curiously enough have never to this day been formally discussed at the Conference, though the French representatives have on several occasions insisted that they must be treated as one indivisible whole, and they now (December 1932) seem to have been supplanted by a new set of proposals.

It would be impossible in an article of the length of this, to attempt to deal with even a portion of the speeches made, but it is possible and may be of interest, to describe the attitudes of the more important Powers, as they appeared from the speeches of their representatives.

United Kingdom.

To Sir John Simon, British Foreign Minister, was assigned the honour of first place on the roll of speakers. If anybody was expecting profound suggestions and far-reaching proposals from the United Kingdom Delegation they were doomed to disappointment. The reason for this is perhaps obvious—for years past Great Britain and indeed all members of the British Commonwealth had, under the stern pressure of financial necessity, been reducing their armaments—but this reduction had been unilateral and it was evident to all that it could no longer continue on that basis. Moreover, the British Empire, in common with its co-signatories of the Washington and London Treaties, had shown the World that the mutual limitation of armaments—in that case naval—could be agreed to between Powers, and that a limit could

be put to the strength of fortifications in a defined area. In other words competition in armaments between Powers could in certain conditions be kept within bounds. Briefly, the British policy appeared to be that the United Kingdom had already gone a very long way in the cause of disarmament, and had done so during a period when other European nations had been piling up their armaments, that she could go no further alone, but that she was prepared to do so in co-operation with others. The concrete points in the British proposals were the abolition of gas and chemical warfare, the abolition of submarines, the limitation of effectives (as abolition of conscription was such a very thorny subject), and in addition the prohibition of such armaments as would weaken attack. The United Kingdom was also prepared to co-operate in reducing the size of warships and the maximum calibre of naval guns, and would agree to a limitation in the size of land guns.

France.

The attitude of France was really the deciding factor at Geneva. France, as the strongest land and air power in Europe, held all the high cards, and unless she could be induced to reduce her armaments it was idle to expect that substantial results could be achieved.

In order to understand France's attitude, it is essential to consider her point of view. Her policy is dictated entirely by fear—and fear makes her demand security. For fifty years prior to the Great War she had been bullied and threatened by Germany—she was twice invaded, and the horrors of the second invasion were still vivid in the memory of many of her citizens. After the War her one idea was to ensure her security during, at any rate, the next generation or so. With this object in view she has done everything in her power to prevent the military regeneration of Germany—even to keep her in subjection. German man-power, combined perhaps with national efficiency and organizing ability, is the bogey, and though France with her immense superiority in armaments has nothing to fear at present, even if short of men, she feels that, with every reduction in her armaments, up goes the corresponding value of German man-power—even if it is untrained. It was this craving for security that underlay the French proposals, the basis of which was an international force at the disposal of the League, and the control by the League of all those weapons which are essential for attack, such as heavy and long range artillery, tanks and big bombing aircraft. How they visualised such a force would be accommodated, commanded, trained

or provided with munitions was never explained, for, as mentioned above, the French proposals have up till now not been discussed.

The most striking members of the French delegation were Mm. Tardieu and Paul Boncour. The former was Minister of Defence at the commencement of the Conference but after the Cabinet crisis early in the year he returned as Prime Minister, and still led the delegation till his Government fell and was replaced by that of M. Herriot. M. Paul Boncour is a wonderful orator and in appearance and fluency not unlike Mr. Lloyd George. He is an old League celebrity and has been connected with the disarmament problem for years. He was at this time also President of the Council of the League.

Germany.

The German delegation, who were originally led by Dr. Bruning and subsequently by Herr Nadolni, adopted one single line—they would consider no measure of disarmament that did not reduce the weapons and effectives of other Powers to a level corresponding to that imposed on them by the Treaty of Versailles. In this policy they were systematically supported by the other defeated Powers—Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. There is no doubt that this stubborn attitude delayed progress immensely and, if anything, it alienated sympathy. To the observer it appeared that if they had announced the policy of equality as their ultimate goal, and if they had been prepared to reach that goal by stages, many of the discussions would have resulted more nearly in unanimity. As it was there was always an extremist block who were as far apart from the moderate majority in one direction as France was in the other. Time alone will show whether this German policy will pay in the end. General opinion at Geneva seemed to be that questions involving the revision of treaties concerned only those Powers who were signatories, and that the subject was outside the purview of the Disarmament Conference.

This attitude of Germany, however, is just as intelligible as that of France. She naturally feels her present position, and objects to being kept in perpetual subjection. The smaller defeated Powers perhaps feel their position even more keenly, as they are surrounded by other small Powers, all very heavily armed, some of whom had no existence as nations prior to the post-war re-arrangement of the map of Europe. The political situation in Germany and in particular the growth in political power of the Nazis, was unlikely to encourage a sympathetic attitude in France.

Italy.

The line taken by Italy was interesting. She took upon herself the rôle of 'Father and Mother' of the defeated Powers. She supported them in every detail and, like them, advocated universal disarmament down to the level prescribed for the vanquished Powers in the Peace Treaties. This seemed to be a curious attitude for her to adopt and it is interesting to speculate on the possible causes. In 1914 Italy was bound by the Triple Alliance to Germany and Austria, only in the event of attack on either of those Powers, and she apparently was in no doubt that the Central Powers were the aggressors. Consequently she held aloof for a time, but before long threw in her lot with the Entente. The Peace Treaties practically obliterated her greatest hereditary enemy, Austria, and now she has turned her attention to the north-west and looks on France as the only possible power who can threaten her peaceful development. Moreover, like other nations before her, Italy is probably interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and it does not suit her to see Germany, who from her geographical position cannot cause Italy any alarm, in a position of permanent inferiority. Be that as it may, Italy throughout the Disarmament Conference has shown a marked tendency to support the claims of the ex-enemy Powers, and an equally marked disinclination to agree with any proposal put forward by France's representatives.

Italy also had the advantage of having in her leading spokesman, a very remarkable personality, Signor Grandi, then Foreign Minister, is a man of striking and to many people, attractive personality. His keen eyes and close-cut beard gave him a rather Mephistophelian appearance; he was very young for his position, rumour said in the thirties; he always spoke in French which was very clear and intelligible to non-French-speaking listeners; his speeches were short and to the point; in fact with the general public he was probably one of the most popular personalities at the Conference. He had one great advantage over many of the represenatives of the other Powers in that apparently he had only one man, instead of a cabinet, to refer to, and that one knew his own mind.

The Italian proposals were quite brief—the abolition of capital, ships and submarines (it is noticeable that they linked the two together) of aircraft carriers, heavy artillery, tanks, bombing aircraft, and of chemical and bacteriological warfare, and the revision of the laws of war for the protection of civilians.

Russia.

The first representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was Litvinoff. He always spoke English—he was married to an Irish wife—he was very fluent and never at a loss for a word, but not very easy to understand. The policy advocated by him was one of total disarmament, absolute and complete. No one seriously believed that the U. S. S. R. delegation was sincere in its proposal. However, Litvinoff insisted on having it put to the vote, but he received no support whatever. In discussing Russia's proposal for total disarmament, Signor Madariaga, the leading Spanish delegate, told the General Commission a little fable, the authorship of which he imputed to a British politician. The animals, he said, came to the conclusion that the world would be a happier place if they all gave up certain of their offensive attributes. So the lion agreed to sacrifice his teeth, the tiger his claws, the eagle his beak and so on, and then they approached the bear and told him about their proposals. The bear listened attentively and said," This is a splendid idea ! You give up all those unpleasant attributes of yours and then I will come and embrace you all."

Without abandoning their policy of total disarmament, the Russian delegation stated that they were prepared to approach their goal by stages, and that they would therefore support every partial measure which they considered led in the direction of their objective. In general, they espoused the cause of the ex-enemy Powers. In addition they put before the Conference very comprehensive proposals for the reduction of existing armaments. These proposals received no support worth speaking of, because they were based simply on arithmetical calculation, and in no way adhered to the principles of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.*

The Smaller European States.

The policy of the smaller European States may be described as one of moderate reduction of armaments. They would have liked the abolition or restriction of all those types of armament which they themselves were unable to afford. Most of them were in favour of some form of conscription, even, for example, Switzerland, who though she trains her conscripts for a minimum period, considers it is the duty of every citizen to serve. France's eastern 'allies' though

* Article 8 states that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point *consistent with national safety* and visualises the *geographical situation and circumstances* of each State being taken into account.

prepared to support France up to a certain point, seemed to be distinctly sensitive to the attitude of their Eastern neighbour, and were not antagonistic to proposals which might limit her offensive power.

United States of America.

Although not a member of the League of Nations, and not to any great extent directly concerned in the reduction of armaments, the U.S.A. was undoubtedly anxious for some results from the Conference. She was not sympathetic towards those Powers who maintained they were unable to pay their debts and yet were able to spend large sums of money in piling up their armaments, and, like several others, her delegation was inclined to grow impatient at the lack of definite results from all the discussion. Her attitude was one of approval towards proposals for reduction of those types of armaments which she did not require herself, but she was opposed, except on her own terms, to suggestions directed against armaments in which she was interested.

Japan.

Japan was throughout the discussions perhaps the most silent of the Great Powers, though her delegation was quite the most numerous. It is only fair to say that a large number of her representatives were concerned primarily with the discussion on the Sino-Japanese conflict rather than with disarmament. Japan, like some of her European colleagues, suffers from the proximity of two large neighbours in whose vast man-power she sees a constant potential danger. Although she has waged successful wars against both in recent years, she has no intention of allowing herself to drop to a position of inferiority if she can possibly avoid it. In general, therefore, her delegation sat silent, watched the attitude adopted by other Powers, and supported those who conceded least.

China.

The policy of the Chinese representatives was one of complete support of the defeated Powers. They wanted reduction of armaments to the lowest possible limits, an attitude that was, in fact, adopted by most of the States having the greatest resources in man-power. The minds of the members of the Chinese delegation were concentrated mainly on what was happening in China and Manchuria, and though they were comparatively silent at the various disarmament meetings, they lost no opportunity of propaganding their case and their point

of view in the Sino-Japanese dispute. The Chief Chinese delegate was Dr. Yen, an extremely able man, who spoke invariably in English, and as good English as any one else at the Conference.

The latter weeks of the first phase of the Conference were occupied by the Bureau in framing a survey of the various proposals put forward, in co-ordinating these with the terms of the Draft Convention, and in dividing up the work between the various commissions. This task was very ably carried out by M. Benes, the rapporteur, and it was one of great magnitude and no little difficulty, as delegations were constantly getting new ideas and frequently felt they would like to associate themselves with proposals made by some other delegation. The first tasks of the Technical Commissions were based on four resolutions which were passed by the General Commission towards the end of April.

These resolutions reaffirmed the desirability of the reduction and limitation of armaments in accordance with the varying geographical and other requirements of the States concerned; they adopted the principle of qualitative disarmament, and expressed the opinion that "the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character was most specifically offensive, or most efficacious against national defence, or most threatening to civilians."

The Second Phase—Technical Commissions.

These Commissions started work in April and met morning and afternoon whenever accommodation could be found for them—there was usually room for three Commissions, at least, to work simultaneously.

The Land Commission.

The Land Commission was presided over by M. Buero who was one of the delegation from Uruguay. He had evidently been in Geneva some years and knew all about the procedure. The only land armaments to which objection has been raised, on the grounds that they were particularly offensive and menacing to national defence or particularly threatening to civilians, were heavy guns, tanks and armoured cars. An attempt was made by the German delegation to include frontier fortifications within this category, but although it was discussed nobody really paid serious attention to it, as the claim was obviously only directed against the modern French frontier fortifications. The discussion on guns went on for some days and views varied immensely.

The opinion of most delegations was that guns and howitzers of calibre of over 6 inches could be classified as particularly menacing to national defence, because, in view of the strength of modern defence with machine guns, a Power would scarcely be able to undertake an offensive with anything less. For reasons entirely connected with the Versailles Treaty, Germany and other ex-enemy Powers tried to bring the level down to 105 mm. (about 4·2 inches) and in this they were supported by the Italians and U. S. S. R. France on the other hand only came down to an 8 inches limit when she felt it was likely that she would be left in a position of isolation, as even her Eastern allies were inclined to consider that all guns over that calibre were particularly offensive.

As regards range, the main discussions revolved round the problem of the size of a modern battlefield, for it was felt that in the neighbourhood of the actual front line, where the majority of personnel and organizations are mainly military, there could be no justification for limiting a weapon because it might hit a civilian with a chance shot. On the other hand behind this zone there existed obviously an area where military organizations would naturally be very few in number and scattered, and where the preponderance of personnel would be civilians. The general opinion was that the range of guns should be limited in such a way that protection should be afforded to civilians living behind the battle zone.

Here again, while the majority of nations considered that a limit of 20 kilometres from the front line was ample, the ex-enemy powers tried to reduce it to 15 kilometres. The French, on the other hand, while preferring a vague wording, wished the zone increased to 50 kilometres on either side of the line, in order to include areas in which reserve formations might be billeted, and from which they could be brought up by motor transport.

The discussions on tanks and armoured cars disclosed wide differences of opinion. There was some unanimity about armoured cars, as, except for the group of States which consistently supported the Germans and their late allies, the majority were of the opinion that armoured cars did not come within the category of armaments which would be described as most efficacious against national defence or most dangerous to civilians.

The views on tanks are not so simple to describe. A large number of delegations expressed the opinion that tanks of every description

should come within the definition laid down by the General Commission. With the exception of France, all the remaining delegations who expressed their opinions considered that heavy tanks, *i.e.*, those weighing over about 25 tons, should come under that definition. France's delegation expressed the view that armoured fighting vehicles of less than 70 tons could not be described as offensive rather than defensive in purpose, and that armoured vehicles should be considered as among the weapons *least* menacing to civilian populations. This plea of France's seems on the face of it to be very far-fetched, but throughout the discussions, when claiming that certain weapons were necessary for defence, it was clear that counter-offence was what was in her mind.

A small number of other States supported the British view that medium tanks, defined as "between about 20 tons and about 10 tons" should not be regarded as objectionable, and a larger number wished to exclude light tanks (those below 10 tons in weight) from the ban.

The Naval Commission.

The Naval Commission at once found itself in difficulties in attempting to definite different types of war vessels as the most offensive, most efficacious against National Defence and most threatening to civilians. It was obvious after the first few discussions that there was no likelihood of unanimity being reached because the outlook of the various Powers and the objects for which their fleets were maintained, were so divergent. The report submitted by the Commission was, therefore, no more than a record of the views expressed by the different nations concerned.

The three types of war vessel around which discussion centred were capital ships, aircraft carriers and submarines. The great Naval Powers, with world-wide responsibilities or great lengths of coast-line to protect, maintained that their battle fleets were the essential backbone of their country's defence, and that they were not threatening to civilians. Another group of Powers declared that they were only offensive when possessed by a State adopting a policy of aggression, while a number of delegations, chiefly those of non-naval States, while admitting that capital ships could contribute efficaciously towards National Defence, insisted that in virtue of their greater tonnage and higher gun-calibre they were most unpleasant in all three respects.

The problem of aircraft carriers led to just as much variety of opinion and confusion of thought. The great naval Powers (except

Japan) considered that if bombing from the air were abolished, aircraft carriers in themselves would have no offensive value at all. The majority of Powers, however, considered that as at the present time bombing aircraft could be carried on these vessels, and as the carriers formed mobile bases for the bombers, they were specifically offensive, efficacious against national defence and threatening to civilians. This view was in fact supported by the Air Commission who, when dealing with the same problem, came to the conclusion that the offensive capacity of aircraft must be considered as being increased by the mobility of the vessels which carry them.

The question of the submarine seemed to cause even more diversity of opinion, and there were definitely two distinct problems connected with it—first, the use of submarines against merchant vessels and therefore against civilians and, second, the purely legitimate use of submarines as ships of war, assuming that they conform to the laws of war as surface vessels do. As to the first there was practically unanimity of opinion that, on the understanding that they adhered to the rules laid down in the Treaty of London, submarines could not be considered as threatening to civilians. The British Empire delegations and the U. S. A. were of the opinion that they were offensive and efficacious against national defence, while all the smaller naval Powers and in this case France and Japan are included, were of the opinion that submarines were indispensable for defence. Italy adhered to her original theory and linked capital ships and submarines together. Her contention was that if capital ships were retained submarines were essential for defence; if, on the other hand, capital ships were abolished, submarines would assume an offensive character.

The Air Commission.

The problem facing the Air Commission was even more confusing, as each State naturally looked upon the offensive character of its own air armaments from exactly the opposite point of view from its neighbour. While the underlying principle that something must be done to protect civil populations from the horrors of air bombardment had been accepted by all in the General Commission, opinions varied greatly in the Technical Commission as to how this principle should be put into practice.

Certain States wished to prohibit bombers, others to prohibit the act of bombing (and naturally the construction of appliances and

training of personnel); a third group to abolish naval and military aviation altogether. Against these proposals were advanced the arguments that it was impossible to differentiate between bombers and other types of aircraft, all were potential bombers ; that no matter how the wings of military aviation were clipped, there would still be the problem of civil aviation to deal with. It was accepted by all that civil aviation was bound to expand and that, unless steps were taken to control them, civil aircraft could rapidly be converted into bombers. So strongly was this opinion held by some of the leading air-powers, that it came to be regarded almost as a *sine qua non* that some effective form of control would be necessary as a corollary to whatever steps might be taken to reduce and limit naval and military aircraft.

Other proposals were discussed, one of which was to limit the area in which bombing would be permissible to a battle-zone in the same way that a limit was proposed in the land commission for long-range guns. In the case of guns, however, the limit would be imposed on gun construction, whereas for aircraft, the limit could only be imposed by rule. Another proposal which received wide support was to limit the size of military and naval aircraft, though this raised heated discussions among the experts as to how that size should be measured. Some delegations maintained that unladen weight was a sufficient basis, while others insisted that other factors such as horse power were essential. If this latter proposal, limitation of the size of military and naval aircraft, that is a qualitative limitation, were accepted, it was considered, on the assumption that a number of small aircraft could do as much damage to civilians as one big one, that a quantitative limitation would be necessary as well.

The unfortunate rapporteur of this Commission had a most difficult task. His report gives a mass of detail for which not he, but the delegations who insisted on having their views recorded, are responsible. It is obvious from reading it that no solution can be expceted from Commissions composed as this was, and it was no doubt due to this fact that the third phase of the Conference was confined to an effort on the part of the leading delegates of the most influential powers to find in private conversations some broad basis of agreement on a few points at least.

Special Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons.

As this subject was common to warfare on land, on sea and in the air, and did not belong specifically to any one of them, a special

Committee was formed to study the problem in connection with the resolutions adopted by the General Commission. Unlike the other Technical Commissions this Committee did come to definite and satisfactory conclusions. This may be due to the fact that these types of warfare had for long been universally condemned, and that no State had really anything to sacrifice—no organization to give up. The report of this Committee dealt not only with the chemical and bacteriological means of warfare but also with incendiary projectiles and it condemned the lot. At the same time, it made it quite clear that neither the normal gasses arising from combustion and detonation of explosives, nor smoke were included in the definition of chemical means of warfare.

The Third Phase—Private Conversations.

This phase, as has been said above, consisted in an effort on the part of the delegates of two or three of the States most interested in the problem of disarmament to get together and draw up a resolution, to which all States represented could subscribe, showing the degree of agreement that had been reached after many weeks of apparently fruitless discussion. The Powers concerned in the first instance were the United Kingdom, the U. S. A. and France and later on other Great Powers were included. The discussions were all carried out in private, and the results are contained in the somewhat nebulous resolution that was adopted almost unanimously at the end of July.

This period, however, was not so uneventful as it might appear, as, on the 22nd June, Geneva was awakened from the lethargy which had descended on it while the private conversations were continuing, by the declaration by Mr. Gibson of the U. S. A. delegation of what are known as the Hoover proposals. This declaration was mainly a political manœuvre made in connection with the forthcoming presidential election. The announcement was made at Geneva at exactly the same moment as Mr. Hoover was making the same statement in America.

The Hoover proposals contained much that had already been in the American programme. In certain points they were perhaps a little more precise, in that, for instance, they definitely advocated the abolution of all tanks, of all bombing planes and the prohibition of all bombardment from the air. There was one quite new point dealing with effectives. Land effectives were to be divided into two parts—a 'police component' and a 'defence component.' The police com-

ponent was to be calculated on a basis of population, the percentage allowed being that permitted to the defeated powers in the various peace treaties. All troops over and above the police component were to be considered as the defence component, *i.e.*, the strength required for defence against foreign attack. After analysis of the forces of all States on this basis, Mr. Hoover proposed there should be a reduction of one-third in the strength of the defence components of all Powers possessing them. The effect of this if agreed to would be a considerable reduction in the strength of the armies of countries such as Russia, Italy and France, and some of the smaller Eastern European nations, but negligible in the case of members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the U. S. A. and, of course, in the case of the ex-enemy Powers. The proposal, while received with caution at first, has now received the blessing in principle of several States.

What, it may well be asked, has been achieved as the result of all these months of discussion, of all this expenditure of time, and at no little financial cost? Very little so far, it must be admitted. Progress has been terribly slow, but it should be remembered that a Conference such as this is very sensitive to political and other influences from all over the world. Delays were caused by a French cabinet crisis, by general elections both in France and Germany, more than once by the Sino-Japanese conflict, by the financial discussions at Lausanne, and finally the Conference adjourned for months because it was felt that it would be useless to continue until after the American presidential election. One fact emerges, and that is that all States have now been compelled to put their cards on the table—some of them perhaps did not know a year ago what their policy was with regard to disarmament. Now most of them have been compelled to state it.

And what hope is there for the future? The world is demanding reduction of armaments for financial, if for no more altruistic motives. The Washington and London naval treaties have shown that, given goodwill, competition in armaments can be controlled. There may well be further reductions in the tonnage of warships which will apply to other Powers than those who are parties to the present treaties. It should be possible to reach agreement for some qualitative reduction in land armaments and the Hoover proposals may form the basis for quantitative reduction of the effectives of those powers who maintain the largest standing armies. The feeling in Europe against air bombardment is intense, and there is no doubt that many States, particularly

those who are surrounded by potential enemies, will leave no stone unturned till some degree of reduction and limitation of air forces is agreed to, and this will necessitate some measure of control of civil aviation. These results may not be much, but they should afford some financial relief, and might well render less likely, or postpone the likelihood of, another European conflagration. Whatever is achieved can only come gradually, and this is clear to many of the keenest disarmament enthusiasts. Only a few months ago when the lack of definite results was making both press and public impatient, Lord Cecil pointed out in an article in a Swiss periodical, that progress must be gradual, and that no one must believe that even complete Disarmament would mean the abolition of War. Human nature would still be the same, and men would still fight with sticks and stones. All that could be expected would be that the probability of War would be rendered more remote.

BRIDGE AND BATTLES.

By Lt.-Col. S. R. Wason, M.C., R.A.

I suppose there is no doubt that there has never been a card game half so popular or so widely played as bridge in its various forms. War is a " game " happily not now by any means as widely played as it once was but certainly more widely studied in its theoretical aspects. Apart from the enormous numbers of officers of different armies, who have to do so willy-nilly, there is an unaccountably large number of civilians who get a kind of spurious interest out of it.

Napoleon said that chess-playing was good training for the art of war, though one of his contemporary biographers, De Bourrienne I think, said he played it very badly which seems to shake the theory. Chess, however, is not a game of chance and, after all there is a lot of luck in both the games we are talking about. Sometimes a false card may divert an opponent from the object really within his grasp ; in a similar way the Turk counterattack on the night of 16th/17th April 1916, which was their very last bolt, effectually prevented any further attempts to relieve Kut. But to return to Napoleon ; he also liked whist though " he preferred *vingt-et-un* because more people could join in the game." It is said he used to cheat at the game which perhaps only shows he knew what company he kept ; anyhow we are not told that the others did not do so too. Talleyrand was a great whist addict, in fact he said of someone who did not play, " What a dreary old age he is preparing for himself !"

There are many apposite analogies to be made between the phases, ruses, decisions and humanities of the bridge player and of the soldier. Each can learn much from the other. We all know the fussy card player and some of us have heard of the fussy commander who, having made plans, issued orders and so on, still would not leave things alone. We had, however, one very senior commander who in similar circumstances used to say " now we must leave it to Thomas Atkins " ; and that ended it. The Generalissimo of another nation may perhaps have carried this too far, but it gave his people the confidence they needed. Anyhow there is no doubt which temperament makes the better card player.

So many comparisons can be drawn that it is hard to know where to begin, and it is probably better not to begin at all. After all "Bridge" means so many different things to different people; from the after-dinner family game as a fine preparation for a good night's sleep to bridge as a life's business, either as a means of making money out of one's friends, or by writing books or newspaper articles, or even as an aspirant to international honours. Then it can be played under many different rules—is not war the same?—from the friendly game as played with elderly relatives, who perhaps have good shooting, where it is positively a disgraceful act to call a card or even draw attention to a revoke, to that brand of game indicated by the player who, on sitting down to the table asked, "Now, boys, is it cricket or all we know?" In the pre-auction game the redouble of a no-trumper was always the affair of the evening. To do so it was supposed to be necessary to have all suits guarded—the doubler as a rule having one good suit and perhaps cards of re-entry. But there were once some Jews playing together; one redoubled on a fine hand but with a singleton king in one suit; whereupon his opponent led out the ace of his long suit, looking over his spectacles and saying, "And, Ikey, if my eyethight doethn't detheive me, you have the king thingle!"

To many the most interesting feature of the battles of the past is the personality of the actors. The "transcendent ability" of Marlborough and the "inevitability of Cæsar's ablative absolutes." So in cards is the personal factor the dominant feature of the game at its best; incidentally its study is the most remunerative. How often have our pockets suffered from the elusive witchcraft of the so-called "psychic" player, who continually gets away with declarations that either rob the adversary of their due spoils, or snatch seemingly impossible victory. There can be few better cases than that of Lord Peterborough in Spain in 1704-1705. Having done the Spanish out of Barcelona he used his guile on Las Torres into withdrawing his force which was in a superiority of over five to one. He then caused the garrison of Nules to surrender to a very inferior force and captured large quantities of stores he badly needed. Next he played the same game on Las Arcos, who, having a superiority of at least three to one, retired and abandoned Valencia. At no time had Peterborough a well-equipped army and he was always in greatly inferior numbers. But psychic play is not really witchcraft. It is the result of knowledge based on study and of sub-conscious calculation. It has relations to time and

space problems and is never (in really good players) purely a matter of chance. We mostly read some military history: how few of us read books on Bridge!

The basis of correct declarations and correct play of the cards is a series of normal systems akin to the tactical and administrative practice and training of an army. Just as there has been a great all-round advance in the training of armies so there has been a great all-round advance in the technique of card playing. There can be no better illustration of this than the fate of the famous Whitfield "six-carder." This is a double dummy problem which bears reproduction. Spades are Trumps.

S. Kn. 9.
H. Kn. 4.
D.—
C. Ace. 4.

S.—
H. Qn. 9.
D. Qn. 6.
C. 10·5.

S.—
H. 10·5·3.
D. Kn. 7.
C. 3.

S.—
H. Ace. Kg. 6.
D. 10·9.
C. 6.

South to play and make all six tricks. The following is, I believe, its history. It was produced over forty years ago as a whist problem, published in a well-read journal in America, and no solutions were received. In the beginning of the bridge boom, say about 1898, it was reprinted and a few correct solutions were forthcoming. It was published again some years later and so many correct answers were received that the envelopes were never opened.

These tactical and administrative layouts are based on a theory of which the principles of war (how many of us have struggled to remember some crammer's aide-memoire) are the foundation. They have their counterpart in bridge to which every one of these sage rules is applicable. How often are they broken! The principle of maintenance of the objective (late-lamented in that its demise destroyed the aide-memoires), how often broken by the greedy who hanker after large scores above the line, or the timid, who play safe—like Sir Harry Burrard and Sir Hew Dalrymple in turn after Vimeiro.

This matter of a theory is an interesting thing; is it not at the back of everything however faintly realised? Some laugh. One young man is supposed to have laughed at Carlyle, who answered that there were others who once thought that practice was enough and that an ounce of practice was worth a ton of theory, and they too laughed; "and there arose a man who wrote a book called "The Social Contract," and the skins of the scoffers went to bind the second edition." For there was a rumour that the revolutionaries, short of leather, tanned the skins of the victims of the guillotine. This was the precursor of the story of the "Kadaverfervertungsanstalt." It is an expensive business both in cards and in war to have to learn entirely by one's mistakes like the hero of "Duffer's Drift." In war few commanders—Frederick the Great was an exception—have made a success of it. But the bridge-player who loses repeatedly is often slow to realise that he is "practising his mistakes." Luckily he is losing his own money and not his country's men.

Every principle of war as has been said before is a principle of bridge. Take the principle of security; what better example than the honesty we all demand of our partners' initial calls? Take the principle of offensive action, well illustrated in the simplest bridge attack—take out trumps and make a suit good before the other side can do so; draw his reserves and then overwhelm him. The combination of offensive action with a degree of security is the rationale of the initial call in bridge as played to-day. A simple plan is probably as important in bridge as on the field of battle; always providing that in the game as in the fight the player has the wit to piece together and turn to account any scraps of information that come his way.

How often have the disagreements of allies, veiled or otherwise, ruined a campaign! The advance on Sebastopol was undertaken because our relations with the French, though not by any means bad, would not have stood the truth being told—that neither army was fit to undertake any operation at all. Not less often has the selfishness and shortsightedness of partners hurled games and rubbers into the abyss. Again the mutual trust of allies—Foch and Haig in 1918—has brought comparatively no greater gains in their way than come to two practised players versed in the indications and inferences of call and play, who seem to be able to read through the backs of each other's cards. Even Marlborough could not win with the Dutch deputies as partners, but with Eugene he rarely lost a game. A feeling of mutual

confidence is the first necessity for successful play; we have all struggled only too often with the erratic caller who blows hot one moment and cold the next.

Bridge in messes is quite a valuable game as long as points are low enough not to matter seriously, and as long as there is no feeling of obligation on anyone to make up games when he may not wish to do so. I do think, however, that everyone wishing to play should be encouraged to cut in as in a club; it is a rule of the game. Guest night bridge is sometimes an extra good game.

Bridge has well-known gambits just like warfare; well-known but oft successful none the less. Ole Luk Oie's third degree is a shaft in the quiver of every experienced player. There was once a habit of calling two no-trumps on a three suit hand as a sort of semi-pre-emptive call. It was always a bad declaration. The only time two no-trumps is now supposed to be called in respectable auction bridge is on a strong hand with all four suits guarded. Now the opponent on your right with a good suit may want it led in no-trumps. I have seen this gambit well played in fairly good class bridge, *i.e.*, first call two no-trumps on a three suit hand and cause the opposition to think this is your habit. Next time call it on a four suit hand and the opponent on your right calls three of his long suit and walks into a nice remunerative double.

Envelopment, counterattack, the valley-penetration, the masked position, the feigned withdrawal (diverse examples are Senlac and Tannenberg) have their standard counterparts in the play of the tenace. Is theory dead? Quite a large number of *soi-disant* bridge-players do not know the meaning of this term—the forced discard, the Bath coup, the Deschapelles coup, the Vienna coup, the Grand coup.

The current practice of employment of all arms in co-operation combined with the normal systems of supply and administration are the groundwork of an army's normal employment. But that never stops the efficient commander from using whatever he has at his hand in an emergency—our dismounted cavalry saved situation after situation in the autumn of 1914—or improvising systems of supply and transport when the need arises. The play of the hand at bridge rests on a network of normal systems of bids, raises, overbids and doubles, and legitimate finesses and legitimate expectations of division of the cards. But that never prevents an experienced player giving a possible but unlikely division or placing of the cards a try when under those

circumstances, and those circumstances only, can the game be won or saved. On the other hand if the game can be won by playing safe, only the beginner risks solid gains for problematical tricks or slams. The effective player—and I suppose it will be agreed that generally speaking the better anyone plays a game the more pleasure he gets out of it—must have all powers at his command, bold yet reasoned declaration, an instinctive knowledge of the possibilities of every hand in play, and a ready command of all the ruses, such as false-carding, misleading discards, unblocking suits, placing the lead in one or other of the opponents hands to induce them to commit a blunder or to force a favourable lead (*vide* the Scots at Dunbar); even the bold lead of a weak suit to induce the opponents to shun it. Behind these he must have a powerful grasp of the potentialities and weaknesses of the position. Even so did Hannibal in his great battles at the Trasimene, the Trebbia, the Ticino and Cannae prevail against usually stronger opponents by making use of his knowledge of the Roman commanders' weaknesses, of ruses, ambushes and well-timed combination of all the forces at his disposal.

Bridge demands in a high degree the faculty of plan-making on rather scanty information. The declarations of auction and even more so of contract are very like the opening moves of a campaign sometimes pursued by two partners with rather divergent views, a situation not unknown among allies or even the commanders of different parts of the same army (Soult and Ney in 1809). Many have crossed the Rubicon in haste, to regret it later.

Bridge again gives several good examples an evening of the necessity for change of plan. Recall Wellington's remark about the French marshals in Spain. " They made their plans like a beautiful new set of harness but what happens if anything breaks ? I make mine of rope ; if anything breaks I tie a knot and go on . " One must be ready too to relapse into a timely defensive when attack has failed and for the still more difficult military operation of grasping the opportunity of changing defence into attack. What coups the Masters of the past have brought off by bold conception—*vide* Tel-el-Kebir and the Peiwar Kotal. In the same way many are the fat scores above the line and at the end of rubber which we have all seen grasped or thrown away by appreciation,—or the lack of it—of the changes and chances of this very varied game.

It presents striking illustrations of the value of the initiative. Two strictly average hands played boldly together on the declaration they have made, will almost always make one trick, often two and sometimes three; here is the campaign of Jena over again. The advantage conferred by interior lines is also very similar to that of the declarer and his dummy. After the late war no one need be at a loss for instances of the help a central position gives.

Bridge has its Pyrrhic victories and its Fabian tactics; one may have to "flag-fly" and so pay too much for success and one may have to sit tight for most of an evening. It has its guerilla tactics. It has its "offensive," or as we should perhaps now say, its active defence. Like Jackson's dashes up and down the valleys of Virginia and Napoleon's movements on the Marne in 1814, the weaker hands can often keep the stronger at bay, and, oftener than in war, can prevail in the end. But there is the final point that, in contract especially, in order to win games high declarations must be risked. Germany made two such in the late war, in August 1914 and in the spring of 1918; she failed narrowly to make her contract in each case and lost the rubber in consequence.

It would be possible to go on drawing similes for pages until all the familiar tags of military history—and with them everyone's patience—were exhausted. So as laid down for "military writing" a conclusion must be stated.

On the whole I think one may say that bridge is a useful game. One learns to know one's friends rather well at this game. It has more pleasures than admitted by the cynic who said it was "a good way of enjoying one's friends society without having to listen to their boring conversation." It can do a little towards quickening the wits—so long as it does not become an obsession. The bridge-player is useful in the mess unless he begins to look on the game as a means of reducing his mess bill. One has even seen the bridge table become quite a useful school of repartee though that is hardly its avowed purpose. But on the whole I'm afraid one could not recommend it as a preparation for the Staff College examination, nor do I see "A Mother of Ten" recommending it as a way to get on in the army. Perhaps it is too fascinating a game.

THE WORLD SITUATION TO-DAY.

By Captain A. G. Fuller, M.P.

The Essence of the Matter.

It has been said that war is the supreme enemy of mankind. This may not be a very popular statement to present to readers of a Service Journal, but we may rest assured that the implications do not single out the soldier as an evil, or even an enemy to progress. Neither is he to be regarded as the sole representative of a barbarism which is as much in evidence to-day as it has been throughout recorded history. For he occupies a position not one whit inferior to his civilian brother, and the top hat and tail coat is as much a cover for barbarism, as was the less comely, but equally effective and infinitely more practical, skin covering of our earliest ancestors.

War is both the finale of reasoned national policy, and the precursor of untold misery and distress to those who partake of it, and to many others besides. The pursuit of such a policy is a certain indication of intellectual anæmia, and the World appears to be suffering from a severe attack of this malady to-day.

Consider the following :

1. There are in the World to-day at least 20,000,000 unemployed, chiefly, be it noted, in the great industrial countries, and especially among those who were more directly concerned in the Great War.

2. The means of exchange, so essential to economic progress, and vital to existence, are chaotic. A gold standard persists here ; sterling prevails there ; barter elsewhere, and all this is reflected in the decline of trade throughout the world. This decline is so severe that 50 per cent. is a conservative estimate. Tariffs, import restrictions, quotas, exchange restrictions, and many other devices to frustrate the free interchange of goods exist in every country of importance to-day.

3. With Ireland we are actively pursuing an economic war, which can but end in irremediable damage to us and ruin to the Free State. The principle of " give and take " is imperfectly understood, and but little practised.

4. India presents the most complex and vital problem which we have probably ever been called upon to solve in the course of Imperial development.

5. Germany, once a great, and still an essential, unit in European economy, is passing through an agony which we cannot fully appre-

ciate, since we have been happily spared from anything like it. Slowly she is groping her way through a sea of disorder to stability, and whether she will be successful no one can foretell. For the moment Herr Hitler, the naturalized Austrian, has received a rebuff, but the political pendulum may swing again in his favour, and he will then be obliged to accept power and shoulder the responsibility which it brings. If this occurs the stability of Europe may be again assailed. The right to re-arm; the repudiation of further reparations payments; the return of colonies, are German demands which cannot fail to have the most violent reactions, especially in France. And in the midst of all this turmoil no one disarms because of fear for the future. Vast sums must be spent on preparation for war because man has not yet learnt how to prepare for peace, and barbarism practised elsewhere must be prepared against by us.

6. The situation in China is overshadowed by events in Manchuria, and Japan is not in the least bit likely to accept dictation from the League of Nations.

In the midst of all this the Russian Colossus plods on, knee-deep in the blood and sweat of the people, in search of the millennium, which she has yet to learn cannot be founded on force; but she, at any rate, is probably the only nation who knows what she wants, and is using all the means in her power to get it.

But the greatest tragedy of all in this welter of confusion, is the seeming helplessness of man to get himself out of his difficulties. The world is rich, richer indeed than it has ever been, yet misery and the poverty are widespread.

Most of our evils to-day are attributed to the Great War, especially by those who like to economise in thought, but this is by no means entirely the case, for the trouble began when we began to be prosperous. Examine the matter a little.

The Part of Trade.

The following figures of British trade speak for themselves, and they speak with a sufficient emphasis to show that it has had a declining tendency for some years :—

		Imports.	*Exports*	
1924	..	£843,483,000	£663,173,000	Produce and Manu-
1931	..	985,323,000	435,132,000	factures.
1924	..	£217,095,000	£513,498,000	Manufactured Goods.
1931	..	288,093,000	326,305,000	

They further mean that comparing 1931 with 1924,

(*i*) Total retained imports rose by 17 per cent.

(*ii*) Imports of manufactures rose by 32 per cent.

(*iii*) Total British exports fell by 34 per cent.

(*iv*) Exports of British manufactures fell by 36 per cent.

A further emphasis on the decline of our trade can be seen from the following :—

1913 .. Our visible exports paid for 82 per cent. of our imports.

1929 .. Our visible exports paid for 71 per cent. of our imports.

1931 .. Our visible exports paid only for 52 per cent. of our imports.

Our position in 1931 was that we purchased £70 millions more of manufactures than in 1924 ; we purchased £12 millions less in raw material ; and we exported £187 millions less in manufactured goods. Since the £ sterling is no longer on the gold standard, the maintenance of its value and purchasing power depends upon trade and general confidence.

The industrial revolution, the result largely of the inventive genius of our people, and their careful and skilful adaptation of their inventions to industry, gave us an enormous start in international trade, and with no potential competitors at the start. As a result, we were able to pave the way for further development. Under a fiscal policy of Free Trade our progress was enormous, so much so that we were able to invest vast sums abroad in productive enterprises which have been instrumental in developing our own Dominions and Colonies, and not least, India. All this was possible with a favourable balance of trade. Came the day, however, when other countries began to realise the source of our wealth and influence, and, under a tariff system, have developed their own industries, without fear of interference from us. This we have allowed to continue, even to the exploitation of our own home market. Not only has our trade languished as a result, but our funds for investment have dwindled so far that last year there were none available for this purpose. From the world point of view this would not have been such a serious matter if other countries, nursing the proceeds of their favourable balances of trade, had invested them in the same world-wide fashion as we have done, but they have not done so, and development has been retarded. This is, without doubt, a vital factor in the present world situation.

National Expenditure.

Our eclipse in the world of trade does not seem, however, to have disturbed us very much, for our national expenditure produces a picture which should appeal to the most apathetic. The average man may feel a sense of pride in the wealth of his country when he contemplates a budget of some £800 millions, but his approbation tends to diminish when he realises that for three months of the year, if he is nowadays unfortunate enough to be a taxpayer, he works for the State, for that is what the State's share has come to be. The following figures show the situation at a glance, and, if considered in conjunction with the trade figures just given, indicate, if they indicate anything at all, that there is something wrong with a mentality which increases its expenditure the while its income is rapidly diminishing. That this has now been realised is true, but the realization has come none too soon.

1930-31 Estimated				
	Revenue. ..	£766,000,000	Expenditure ..	£723,341,000
1931-32	Do. ..	£766,000,000	,, ..	803,366,000

Actual revenue declined by £9,895,000, but actual expenditure over estimated increased by no less than £71 millions. The differences were met by additional taxation. The seriousness of the process was acknowledged by Mr. (now Lord) Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the first National Government when he said :

> " We are far away the most heavily taxed country in the world. It is true the resources of the country are great ; but they cannot continue to be mortgaged for current expenditure."

A further comparison can be made from the following :—

	1906	1931
National Expenditure ..	£123,000,000	£804,000,000
Income-Tax ..	1/- in £	5/- in £ with additional surtax up to 5/6.
Social services ..	£18,000,000	£237,000,000
Unemployment benefit ..	Nil	£132,000,000
Proportion of national income for taxation and local taxation ..	One thirteenth.	One quarter.

In 1914 the total amount raised in rates was just over £71 millions ; in 1930, £155 millions; while in 1927-28 the expenditure of local authorities amounted to over £400 million, and the outstanding loan debts

were no less than £1,121,259,000. Space does not permit of further examples. The cause of the decline in our trade has been suggested. The internal burden of Great Britain has been briefly sketched, and it now remains to deal with two outstanding problems which have added much to our afflictions—the monetary situation and war debts and reparations.

The Monetary Situation.

Previous to the financial crisis in Britain last Autumn the interchange of commerce throughout the world was carried on in the main on the gold standard as the basis of exchange.

There are three types of this standard.

1. *The Full Gold Standard,* which provides not only for the gold backing of the paper currency at par, but also for the settlement of international obligations in that metal, where no obstacles are placed on its purchase at a fixed price. This was probably existent only in pre-war Britain and U. S. A.
2. *The Gold Bullion Standard.*—This was our system until last year. Gold is the measure of value but not the medium of exchange, but it had a free market at a fixed price at the Bank of England.
3. *The Gold Exchange Standard.*—Adopted by countries not strong financially, and who bought gold by the sale of credits. The Free City of Danzig is a well-known example of this kind.

The events which led up to our abandonment of the gold standard are sufficiently well-known. Our action was quickly followed by others, and those who follow sterling to-day balance fairly well those who cling to gold.

By our action then we placed our ability to pay our way, not for the first time, on a confidence basis. Exports must pay for imports. This has led to a depreciation in our exchange, in terms of gold, as can be seen from the daily quotations, but, while it is true that our purchases abroad from gold standard countries cost us some 25 per cent. more, a considerable advantage is afforded to our export trade. But no country can trade for long with an exchange suffering with St. Vitus's dance, and, in order to prevent wide fluctuations, the Government this April formed an Exchange Equalization Account of £150,000,000 by means of which it is hoped to give a certain stability

to sterling by systematic purchases from the fund. So far the scheme has worked well, but many risks are involved, and what the world needs most to-day is a new and stable money economy. Depreciated currencies and exchange restrictions which are to-day worldwide, are the most fruitful source of a diminishing world trade, and a World Economic Conference to deal with these matters is to assemble at the end of the year. This is another of those vital reconstruction conferences which must succeed, for unless it does trade must collapse.

War Debts and Reparations.

The extent of the war debts and reparations are given in the Appendix and are reproduced from the *Economist*. Their magnitude needs no emphasis. On the conclusion of the war Great Britain, in the Balfour note, suggested a complete cancellation of these debts, a proposal which the U. S. A. would not entertain. In view of this refusal we were obliged to lay down the principle on which we would accept payment. This was to the effect that we could not consider our liabilities to the U. S. A. as isolated transactions. This attitude was expressed in the following words :—

> " The policy favoured by His Majesty's Government is, as I have already observed, that of surrendering their share of German reparations and writing off, through one great transaction the whole body of inter-allied indebtedness. But, if this is found impossible of accomplishment, we wish it to be understood that we do not in any way desire to make a profit out of any less satisfactory arrangement. In no circumstances do we propose to ask more from our debtors than is necessary to pay our creditors. And, while we do not ask for more, all will admit that we can hardly be content with less."

Following on the refusal of the U. S. A. to cancellation came their proposal for the funding of the debt. The principal of £850,000,000 at 5 per cent. per annum had by this time reached the total of £957,000,000 and Congress proposal was that this should be repaid in 25 years bearing interest at 4½ per cent. per annum. The Baldwin negotiation affected considerable reduction in these demands, and the settlement made arranged for the repayment in 62 years, the interest for the first ten to be at the rate of 3 per cent., and for the remainder at 3½ per cent. or, in round figures, £33,000,000 for 10 years, and £38,000,000 for 52 years. That we were less fortunate in

our settlement than were France or Italy can be seen from a glance at the Appendix. For whereas our interest rates were fixed at something over 3 per cent. for the whole period, that of France was computed at 1·6 per cent., and of Italy at an even less figure of 0·4 per cent. It is a curious commentary on the position of France that she obtained a " write off " of three-quarters of her debt on the score of penury, and now emerges as the second richest country in the world, with enough gold in her vaults to pay off her debt in one transaction.

The result of the various settlements was that we obtained £17,700,000 per annum from our debtors, and in addition £16,300,000 from Germany by way of reparations. Since our yearly payments to U. S. A. amounted to £32,000,000 per annum this gave us a slight balance, which would be the case until 1962, when receipts and payments were to balance. So far then, we have balanced our debts payments by our debts receipts, but it should be remembered that on account of the delay which occurred before France and Italy funded their debts to us, our payments to U. S. A. had exceeded our receipts by no less a sum than £133,000,000, excluding interest charges, which account for another £64,000,000, allowance for this is made in the series of receipts over payment noted above. But in this case of debts, while man has proposed the growing state of chaos in the world has disposed. Our departure from the gold standard last year, and all that it implies to ourselves and others who have followed our example; the chaotic condition of central Europe, and impending financial disasters in Germany, made the suspension of payments imperative, and led to the Hoover moratorium which ran, in the first instance, until June of 1932 and was later extended to December. One example of the depreciated external value of the £ sterling is here demonstrated. Under the funding agreement with America our yearly gold payments amounted to £33,000,000. To pay the equivalent with sterling at existing exchange rates to-day would require £48,000,000.

Russia might be mentioned here. Her original debt to us amounted to £423,000,000 which, with accrued interest to date totals £1,013,279,000, sufficient it will be observed, to liquidate our entire debt liability with some to spare. But John Bull gains little satisfaction from a contemplation of this fact. Will international debts ever be paid? This is a question which needs to be answered this year. On the existing agreements the answer must be an emphatic

"No," and this without any desire on our part to default. The plain reason is that U. S. A. has made it impossible for us to pay. The facts are simple. The gold stocks of the world amount to no more than £2,300,000,000 at par. The U. S. A. demands payment in gold. and already both she and France between them have collected three-quarters of this available supply; there is therefore not enough left or being mined to suffice. Even if there were, our own trade position, with a threatening adverse balance, and the suicidal tariff policy of the U. S. A. precludes any such possibility. Here is the simple position. We owe U. S. A. a debt, which she will only accept in gold. She has most of the available world gold already. Our trade balance with U. S. A. is adverse, which might mean virtually a settlement in gold. U. S. A. will not permit us to improve our trade position with her because she has imposed tariffs expressly for the purpose of keeping our goods out. Therefore, the U. S. A. can't be paid in gold and won't be paid in goods! It is hoped the answer will be provided by the World Economic Conference. In the meantime uncertainty, which is bad for everybody, exists. There is no other remedy except cancellation by negotiation, and one other course which need not be considered here.

So much for debts. Reparations have worked themselves out, more or less. In the Treaty of Versailles—the peace treaty—the German Government accepted liability for reparations in consequence of war damage. In 1920 these payments were fixed at £13,450,000,000 payable in 35 years, which sum was to be apportioned among the Allies in the following ratios:—

France 52 per cent., British Empire 22 per cent., Italy 10 per cent., Belgium 8 per cent., remainder 8 per cent. Some apprehension as to the justice of this settlement soon arose, and in 1921 the first reparations Commission appears on the scene, and reduces the bill to 132,000,000,000 gold marks, the equivalent of £6,600,000,000 at par. Note this to be three times greater than the existing stock of gold in the world to-day, and yet payment was to be in gold. All sorts of disputes arose as a result of this settlement, and it soon became evident that Germany could not pay anything like the sum demanded. Accordingly, in 1924 the Dawes Commission came into being and produced the Dawes Plan, the basis of which was Germany's capacity to pay. This settled a payment from Germany at the rate of £125,000,000 a year for an indefinite period. In order to assist Ger-

many a loan of £40,000,000 was also floated, by means of which she promptly set about her own reconstruction. This plan augured well of success, and Germany began to show signs of a return to normal commercial activity. In 1923 however she had defaulted on deliveries of coal to France, who occupied the Ruhr with troops, the maintenance of which became a charge on Germany. In 1928 Germany raised the question of the evacuation of the Rhineland, and with it reparations and war debts, and a general desire sprang up for a final settlement. This resulted in the Young Commission, which propounded the Young Plan. Its details should be carefully noted. Reparations were now to be at the rate of £102 millions a year for 37 years, and then at the rate of £80 to £85 millions for 22 years to cover Allied war debts.

These payments were to be divided into two portions. One was an unconditional payment of £33 millions to be paid in any circumstances ; the other a conditional payment which could be postponed. Funds for these were to be obtained from the German railways to the extent of £33 millions, and the remainder were to be a charge on the German budget. Further generous assistance was given with the floating of an international loan of £60 millions. The division of payments was settled on the following basis :—

Unconditional payments.

France	..	£25,000,000
British Empire	..	2,250,000
Italy	..	2,100,000

Balance to Japan, Yugo-Slavia and Portugal.

Conditional payments.

France	..	£32,000,000
Great Britain	..	20,550,000, of which £2,665,000 to Dominions.
Italy	..	12,000,000

What Germany has actually paid under these various settlements it is apparently difficult to determine, but a conservative estimate is £500,000,000. The belief that she could pay, or would pay, under the Young Plan was soon exploded.

It was this fact and the rapidly increasing chaotic condition of the world which led the U. S. A., to declare the Hoover Moratorium. Since then a further effort has been made to bring about a final settlement, and on the invitation of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy,

Japan and ourselves the Lausanne Conference was convened. The declaration made by the signatories to the agreement eventually reached is an expressive realization of the state of the world, and the end to which the efforts of statesmen should be directed. It was as follows :—

> " The Powers signatory of the present Agreement have assembled at Lausanne to deal with one of the problems resulting from the war, with the firm intention of helping to create a new order, permitting the establishment and development of confidence between the nations in a mutual spirit of reconciliation, collaboration and justice.
>
> They do not claim that the task accomplished at Lausanne, which will completely put an end to reparations, can alone assure that peace which all the nations desire. But they hope that an achievement of such significance and so arduously attained will be understood and appreciated by all the pacific elements in Europe and the world, and that it will be followed by fresh achievements.
>
> These further successes will be more readily won if the nations will rally to this new effort in the cause of real peace, which can only be complete if it is applied both in the economic and political sphere and rejects all possibility of resort to arms or to violence. The signatory powers will make every effort to resolve the problems which exist at the present moment or may arise subsequently in the spirit which has inspired the present agreement."

But conference or no conference, German reparations are done with. It is even doubtful if Germany will pay the 3 milliards of gold marks which she has agreed to pay under this new settlement. The ratification depends on the settlement of the war debts as between the Allied powers, Great Britain and the U. S. A., but Herr Von Papen, the German Chancellor, is reported to have indicated that it is a matter of indifference to Germany whether the agreement is ratified or not. War reparations are dead, that is the conclusion of the whole matter, and they have killed themselves. Debts will follow the same road, and Germany may reap the greatest advantage.

Consider the following :—

> " There may be some who are inclined to say, " Why then do not sensible men of all nations agree at once that the pay-

ment of these debts is impossible, and wipe the whole thing out ?" The matter, I fear, is not capable of being so easily disposed of. It must not be forgotten that many economic changes in the internal conditions of nations as well as between them, have taken place since the war. Germany for example, for all practical purposes, may be said to have got rid of her internal National Debt altogether by a form of inflation which brought untold hardships upon her people, and resulte l in making her rentier classes almost paupers. France, by a revaluation of her currency, moved, to a smaller extent, in the same direction. Of Austria, Hungary, Italy and other countries a similar story could be told. Take, however, as perhaps of most importance in connection with future international trade relationships, the position of Germany. With no National debt to speak of, were Germany to be freed at one stroke from all indebtedness to the Allies, she would be in an overpoweringly strong position to compete for trade with the rest of the world, and she would have gained that position quite unfairly. Her competition under these conditions, would force other industrial nations either to follow her example by revaluing or repudiating their National Debt, or, alternatively to reduce drastically their standard of living in order to enable them to compete with her for the trade of the world.

The situation in which Germany would find herself, without the necessity of paying war debts or of making reparations payments, would be analogous to that of a factory which had wiped out all its standing charges in the way of outlay for the construction of buildings, plant and the like and was therefore able to show a profit on the sales at prices much below those which its competitors required to realize for their output. Such an advantage for Germany, in spite of her losing the war, would be an unthinkable one for the Allies to contemplate, and, if allowed to materialize, would immediately re-act seriously upon their well-being and prosperity. It would, in all probability lead to a further war.*

What a contemplation ! Things are not going to be so easy after all, but the British character will rise to it."

* G. H. Q. of £. s. d. by Sir J. Wardlaw Milne, M.P.

APPENDIX.

U. S. A. War Debt Settlement.

Debtor.	Total Debts as funded. $ '000.	Total Annuities payable. $ '000.	Percentage of present value to total debt. %
Belgium ..	417,797	727,831	53·9
Czecho-Slovakia ..	115,000	312,811	80·0
Estonia ..	13,831	33,331	82·4
Finland ..	9,009	21,695	82·3
France ..	4,025,387	6,847,674	49·6
Gt. Britain ..	4,604,128	11,104,965	82·3
Greece ..	18,128	19,455	34·8
Hungary ..	1,940	4,693	82·3
Italy ..	2,042,199	2,407,678	25·9
Yugo-Slavia ..	62,857	95,178	31·9
Latvia ..	5,780	13,959	82·3
Lithuania ..	6,032	14,532	82·3
Poland ..	178,565	435,688	82·2
Rumania ..	44,594	122,506	78·9
Total ..	11,525,247	42,162,996	..

Payments due to and from Gt. Britain under the War Debt Settlements and the Young Plan.

Year ending December 1931.	War debt receipts £'s (millions).	*Reparations receipts R. m (millions).	†Payments to U. S. A. $(millions).
1935 ..	18·25	444·8	181·66
1945 ..	18·9	439·1	182·0
1955 ..	18·9	444·2	181·35
1965 ..	20·4	400·6	180·63
1975 ..	20·65	344·6	185·93
1985 ..	20·65	414·1‡	..

* Years ending March 31, 1936, 1946, etc. (British Empire).

† Year ending June 30.

‡ This figure corresponds to the excess under debt receipts of Great Britain over war debt payments in 1935-36.

N.B.—These figures take no account of the repayment of the instalment suspended during the "Hoover" year, 1931-32.

BRITISH WAR DEBT SETTLEMENTS.

Debtor.	Total debt as funded £ '000.	Total annuities payable £ '000.	Percentage of present value to total debts. %
France ..	599,628	799,500	42·6
Italy ..	560,000	248,000	15·5
Yugoslavia ..	25,591	32,800	37·9
Greece ..	21,441	23,550	35·4
Rumania ..	18,448	31,250	45·5
Portugal ..	20,134	23,975	39·0
Total ..	1,245,242	1,159,075	..

War debts and reparations receipts and payments of Allied and Associated Powers up to June 30, 1931.

(All conversions made at former pars of exchange.)

Receipts.	*U. S. A.* £ '000	*Gt. Br.* £ '000	*France.* £ '000	*Italy.* £ '000	*Belgium.* £ '000	*Yugoslavia* £ '000	*Rumania.* £ '000	*Portugal.* £ '000	*Greece.* £ '000	*Japan.* £ '000.
*German reparations (including Belgian debt, Hague annuities, etc). ..	16,700	121,000	273,000	58,700	126,200	34,200	5,600	4,000	2,100	4,000
†War Debts ..	434,400	71,300	500	100	..	..	..	..	..	..
‡Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian reparations, and Czechoslovak liberation debt ..	..	200	200	1,400	100	2,300	200	10	1,000	10
	451,100	192,500	274,300	60,200	126,300	36,500	5,800	4,010	3,100	4,010
Payments.										
§War debts ..	..	326,200	109,400	31,300	7,200	1,500	1,800	1,500	1,700	..
Hague annuities ..	..	..	1,600	900	300	..	..	..	..	..
	..	326,200	111,000	32,200	7,500	1,500	1,800	1,500	1,700	..
Surplus or deficit ..	+451,100	—133,700	+163,300	+28,000	+118,800	+35,000	+4,000	+2,510	+1,400	+4,010

* Receipts in respects of armies of occupation ceded properties and cables have been excluded. Service of the German international (Young) loan has been included. Surplus proceeds of liquidated property are included in the case of Great Britain; in the case of other credit of countries they are understood to have been small.

† Including payments made before funding.

‡ Excluding receipts in respect of armies of occupation, ceded properties and cables, and surplus proceeds of liquidation.

THE BALLAD OF THE BELGAUM BOARDERERS.

(After Kipling's Ballad of the 'Clampherdown.')

By "Pierian Spring."

It was the Belgaum Boarderers
Would force our Frontier law
On Zakka Khel and Yusufzai,
Wherefore they studied 'x' and 'y'
To fit them for Hill War.

One hour's parade they did a day
(To exercise their mules),
And then, although the sepoys cursed,
The rank and file perforce dispersed
To learn in various schools.

Through manuals in half foreign tongue
And wholly foreign script
They droned, ignoring punctuation,
So when they came to do translation
No wonder that they tripped.

They struggled with the map's "iskel,"
With "Kur-din-hit" * and bearing,
With norths, magnetic, grid and true
(Myself, I only mastered two
And that with sweat and swearing :)

With those weird sums we did at school,
Set by some idiot chap :—
'How long a certain pipe must flow
'To fill a tank, when down below
'There runs an open tap.'

They learnt that Canada grows wheat ;
The value of Gibraltar :
That no man could command in War
Till, map-wise, he'd found Singapore,
Aden, Port Said and Malta.

Small time being left, by Tewts they learnt
Of war on modelled sand :
And, clustered round the school sand-table,
On this foundation most unstable
Was trained this fighting band.

*"*Kur-din-hit*"—Co-ordinate, a phonetic spelling actually seen in a 1st Class Certificate Examination in 1930.

The frowning hills in pigmy scale
They picquetted in theory,
Those hills which, lying in their reach,
Full-scale and grim, alone could teach
To fight the tribesmen wary.

Meantime their British Officers,
In stuffy office pent,
Wrote reams to show the C. M. A.
How Havildar Fulana's pay
Was drawn, disbursed and spent.

Or from within or from without
They did or suffered audits
On forage, pay, on clothes and gear,
And earned, if ledgers were quite clear,
Higher Commanders' plaudits.

Three days a week they boarded arms,
On two they boarded men:
A fore-end split, a bay'net bent,
A shin abrased—to boards they went,
Who plied a busy pen.

And ev'ry littlest thing they wrote
The C. O. countersigned,
Contingent bills, reports galore,
Returns, pro-formas by the score
Till he was nearly blind.

One day each month he sat and signed
Each School Certificate:
Weary and yet buoyed up with pride
"I'm glad"—involuntarily he sighed—
"These aren't in triplicate."

Once yearly thirty-three per cent.
Of trained men he 'turned over':
Lest men should really know their arm
Too well and thereby come to harm
By living soft in clover.

Thus men, who after three hard years
  Could read the helio's flickers,
Were taken from this technique skilled
  (While raw sepoys their places filled)
To work L. Gs. or Vickers.

So ev'ry year platoons were changed,
  Sections disintegrated,
Personal knowledge got a blow,
No officer his men could know,
  So quickly separated.

Meantime the ignorant Pathan,
  Who could not sign his name,
Noted and marked with knowing smile,
Wherein lurked centuries of guile,
  This unit as fair game.

Young bloods, whose trigger fingers itched,
  Flouted our Government :
Misdeeds increased in open form,
Until the Boarderers of Belgaum
  To war with them were sent.

Then up the peaks they'd never trod
  They sent a panting picquet,
Which suffered on those jagged hills
Ambushes and a thousand ills,
  Which seemed to them not cricket.

The Vanguard, Tewt-trained for the plains,
  Its picquets far outran ;
While, as per book, it sought to seize
Good tactical localities
  'Twas scuppered to a man.

" Colonel, the Vanguard is wiped out
  " The enemy can shoot.
" As yet no foeman has been seen,
" O Sahib, explain what this can mean ! "
    He answered " Hold a Tewt. "

While they discussed, from that close peak
  Whereon the picquet fell,
The foe well-hidden, looking down,
Shot fast and true into the brown
  And made that nullah Hell.

" Colonel, their bullets fall apace,
  " While ours fly all abroad :
" Our Lewis guns are firing ill,
" New gunners do not know the drill. "
    And he answered " Hold a board."

The Main Guard leaping o'er the slain,
  By whom their path was dammed,
Attacked beneath M. Gs.' support,
But as the gunners were half-taught
  The stutt'ring Vickers jammed.

" Colonel, our covering fire has ceased
  " So our attack is vain :
" Our mainguard's lost nigh every man."
  He said " I'll make a fire-plan
  " As we did on the Aisne. "

E'en as they planned, a Ghazi rush
  Hacked through the column's head,
Beneath the shearing tribal knives
The wounded lost their flickering lives,
  And the nullah's floor ran red.

Platoon Commanders scanned I. T.,
  While some read F. S. Regs.
In Persian-filled vernacular,
But others, less particular
  Made good use of their legs.

Until in flight towards the rear
  They met their old S.—M.
A pre-war, pre-school veteran,
A simple, unspoilt fighting man,
  Of stoic calm and phlegm.

In mighty voice " *Aie* ! *Pundit-jis* !
" O book-ridden *Babus* !
" List *now* to me and ye shall learn :
" Halt there, you ! Rally ! About turn !
" And now your bay' nets use ! "

At these fierce words with him ahead
They turned in fiery charge
And drave the hacking Yusufzais,
Taken in flank and by surprise,
Beyond the nullah's marge.

Red mist before their eyes drove out
All thought of small red books :
As, when recruits, they'd once been taught,
They thrust and jabbed and even fought
With swinging butt-end hooks.

The tribesmen would not face this wrath
Nor the cold steel's ugly rip :
And ere they could resume the fight
The S—M used the short respite
To 'scape from their close grip.

" Ye are," he cried, " as slow-brained byles
" That plough beneath the collar !
" Think ye, recruited at ripe age,
" A man through any printed page
" Can e'er become a scholar ? "

" The Sahibs may be can read and write
" At the tender age of six :
" But ye, who come from farm and byre,
" Cannot, whate'er the Sahibs desire,
" Learn more than Babu tricks ! "

" Hear ye ! I take my pension now,
" Too old to learn anew :
" But recollect this day, ye mutts,
" For the trade of fighting ye need *Guts*,
" And nothing else will do ! "

L'Envoi.
I have written the tale of an unit
For the high Olympians' mirth,
In jesting guise ; may be they're wise
And know what the jest is worth.

(R. K. adapted).

THE BATTLES OF THE MASURIAN LAKES.

By Lieutenant-General N. Golovine, C. B., Late Russian General Staff.

PART II.

In the October number of the Journal, General Golovine gave an account of the concentration and advance of the Russian Second Army under General Samsonov, and graphically described its unpreparedness for so hurried an offensive. By the 23rd August 1914 the Second Army had crossed the German Frontier and reached the line Ortelsburg-Neidenburg-Lensk but the troops were exhausted and behind them was the complete disorganization of the administrative services. The unfortunate General Samsonov telegraphed to Army Group Headquarters in response to their demands for a swifter advance, "It is essential to organize the lines of communication, which has not yet been done. The country is devastated. The horses have long been without oats. There is no bread. Transport from Ostrolenko is impossible."

The Approach of the Russian Second Army and German Eighth Army to the Battlefield.

The Second Army continues its Advance.

On the 23rd. August General Samsonov issued the following orders :—

The VIth. Corps to remain in the Ortelsburg area, the XIIIth. to move forward into the Jedwabno—Omulefoten area, the XVth. to advance on Lykusen and Seelesen, the 1st. to remain at Soldau, and the 2nd Infantry Division (of the XXIIIrd. Corps) to move to Klein Koslau.[1]

On the 23rd. August the prognostications of General Samsonov were justified. The XVth. Corps encountered determined German resistance in the fortified position of Orlau—Frankenau, which had been occupied by the 37th. German Division. Westward of Frankenau to Thurau, along both shores of Lake Kownatken, was the 70th. Landwehr Brigade; from Thurau to Gilgenburg was the 41st. Infantry Division, and Westward of Gilgenburg was Unger's Division. Thus

[1] See Diagram No. 2.

there were 14 battalions, with 12 batteries, against the XVth. Corps on the front Orlau—Frankenau—Janushkau. By a powerful artillery fire the Germans prevented the 14 batteries of the XVth. Corps from taking up a position, and its infantry from approaching. The Commander of the XVth. Corps then decided to get as close as possible to the enemy position during the 23rd. August, with the object of attacking at dawn on the 24th.

" When dusk was approaching," writes General Martos (Commander of the Russian XVth. Corps) " a message was brought me from the corps wireless station; a pretty badly composed report stated that General Mingin's detachment[1] had become panic-stricken and had fled towards the Russian frontier. Upon inquiry it turned out that no one of our stations had transmitted this despatch. It had evidently been fabricated by the Germans. The Liaison Officer with General Mingin then reported to me that all was well with the 2nd. Division, which had bivouacked for the night at the point specified in army orders. I concluded from this that the Germans were either awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, or wished to retreat with impunity, and so desired to delay my attack with a scare about a panic in General Mingin's column.

" I therefore issued orders to the corps to attack the enemy at dawn on the 24th. August without awaiting artillery preparation for the attack.

" I then asked General Klyuev to deal a blow against the German left flank with part of his troops, and specified the time and direction. I also despatched a copy of this request to the Army Commander, asking him to afford me support in this operation."

On the evening of the 23rd. August it was learnt that one of the regiments of the 8th. Infantry Division was retiring. The Corps Commander himself rode forward and re-established order in the regiment, but in view of this disorganisation General Martos considered it essential to secure the position of the corps by forming a reserve. To create this he had to withdraw Colonel Novitsky's Brigade, which, according to the original idea of the Corps Commander, had been intended to deal to a blow against the right flank of the German position. The desire of the Corps Commander for his cavalry to turn the left flank

[1] General Mingin was the G. O. C. 2nd. Infantry Division. (Author's note).

of the German position was likewise unfulfilled. " The Orenburg Regiment," writes General Martos, " was roaming for much of the night in rear of the battle position of the corps, but nevertheless made no sally against the enemy's flank. The remaining troops, in fulfilment of corps orders, in the dark got up into close contact with the fortified position of the enemy, and at dawn made a simultaneous and violent attack against it."

" The Germans apparently were not expecting an attack, and after stubborn resistance at strong points, began to retreat from them in disorder, abandoning their wounded. The whole of the battlefield was covered with corpses and dead horses, articles of equipment, rifles and abandoned vehicles, amongst which were several damaged motors. Two guns and several machine-guns were captured by the 2nd. Brigade of the 6th. Division. In addition, several officers and about a hundred men were captured. The German officers, in accordance with warnings received from above, expected to be straightway shot, and were overjoyed to learn that their lives were not in danger.

" The retirement of the Germans was so rapid that the troops of the corps, being at the point of exhaustion, could not pursue them far. Unfortunately the infantry regiments of the corps had suffered heavy losses : three regimental commanders had been killed, the best battalion commanders had become casualties, killed or wounded, as also many officers and 3,000 lower ranks."

Unquestionably the threat of having their left flank turned by the XIIIth. Corps was a factor contributing to the hasty evacuation of their positions by the Germans. General Klyuev, the Commander of this corps, during the night preceding the 24th. August had sent one infantry division (the 1st.) to the front Lindenwalde—Orlau to co-operate with his nieghbour in the turning movement. The enemy after close observation of this area from the air, swiftly retreated north-westwards. There was only one engagement, the 2nd. Infantry Regiment being in action at Persing (to the South of Kurken).

The same day that the guns of the whole corps were speaking at Orlau and Frankenau, a lively exchange of telegrams was proceeding between the Second Army Headquarters and Army Group Headquarters. By this date, *i.e.*, the 23rd. August, Second Army Head-

quarters had received the following information concerning the enemy : he was retreating upon the whole front, but was resisting with most determination to the West of the Forest of Napivod, between Willenberg and Neidenburg ; documents found in the examination of the killed and wounded had established the presence of the XXth. Corps, reinforced by Landwehr units. The collation of all the data collected by the troops concerning the grouping of the enemy's forces enabled the staff of the army to present the Army Commander with a picture sufficiently close to actuality. These data revealed the fact that up to about the 20th. August there had been roughly two infantry divisions in the Ortelsburg and Jedwabno area. (Actually there had been the 37th Infantry Division at Ortelsburg and the 41st. Infantry Division to the South of Jedwabno—*i.e.*, both the divisions of the XXth. Corps). A German report dated the 21st. August, intercepted by our cavalry, provided the certain identification, that upon this date the 37th. Infantry Division had been at Kurken, and the 41st. Infantry Division at Jedwabno. Consequently it appeared certain that the Germans were withdrawing upon their right flank, but there was no reason to infer from this that they were retreating to Osterode, as this enemy withdrawal might also have been executed with the object of concentrating on the line of the lakes, between Hohenstein and Lautenburg. This would provide for the defence of the Deutsch Eylau line of operations, and was in fact the actual course adopted.

The extract quoted above from the memorandum of the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, in which it is asserted that General Samsonov and his staff fully realised that the axis of the Second Army offensive ought to have been the line of operations upon Deutsch Eylau, when compared with a telegram sent by the Second Army Commander on the afternoon of the 23rd. to Army Group Headquarters, must cause some astonishment on the part of the student. In this telegram General Samsonov asked for the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Army Group to change the *Directive* as regards the demand made for an attack on the front Rastenburg—Seeburg, altering the objective of the further offensive of the Second Army and making it the front Allenstein—Osterode.[1] Moreover, as proof of the necessity for this alteration, the following considerations were brought forward in this telegram : (*a*) the Second Army would be better

[1] See Diagram No. 1.

fulfilling the basic object of the offensive by operating across the line of retreat of the enemy withdrawing before the First Army ; (*b*) the railway line Mlava—Soldau would provide a better base for the Second Army : (*c*) the subsequent offensive into the heart of Germany would be easier from the line Allenstein—Osterode than from the line Rastenburg—Seeburg.

It is evident from this telegram that General Samsonov, renouncing his original idea, was suggesting a compromise between it and the demands of General Jilinsky. But in fact an offensive against the front Allenstein—Osterode, although less disastrous than advancing due North, as it would still be possible in some degree for the army to wheel Westward in case of an enemy offensive from the front Gilgenburg—Lautenburg, nevertheless did not preclude the danger of a blow in flank. This danger could only be averted by an immediate offensive by the whole of General Samsonov's army against this front, *i.e.*, due West, and not North-Westward, as proposed by General Samsono in his telegram. It is difficult to suppose that General Samsonov lacked the courage to express definitely to the Commander-in-Chief his own point of view regarding the operations, and so one must seek a solution in the inefficiency of the Second Army Staff. With the disorganisation which was supreme among this staff, we should not be surprised to learn that Army Headquarters had as yet taken no measure to obtain the information necessary to enable the Army Commander to reach a decision. In actual fact no instructions for the intelligence service had been issued to corps and to cavalry divisions. Similarly we should in no wise be surprised to learn that the reports of the XVth. and Ist. Corps, which were of great importance from the point of view of strategy, had become submerged under the torrent of unimportant reports and telegrams to which the Army Commander had to give his attention. The object of the work of the General Staff, if properly regulated, is not to influence the " volition " of the executive commander, but to afford co-operation, by carefully preparing the data necessary for its development, to enable this volition to take concrete form. This preparation should be based upon the real facts of the situation, sifted out from all the material reaching the staff. Further, the staff has no right to be contented even with this very extensive material : it ought to " hunt " information, sending its officers forward to get into direct touch with unit commanders to the end that those factors of the situation which it is in human nature for

subordinates to dislike to commit to paper, or to delay in so doing, may be quickly elucidated by personal contact.

Commencing the operations of the army, with strategical conceptions so sound as those expounded in General Postovsky's memorandum, but with conceptions radically incompatible with the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group regarding the operations, it would seem that the staff of the Second Army should have displayed special energy in the search for information respecting the enemy. As an elementary measure to this end, it seems obvious that officers of the army staff should have been detailed to Headquarters of the Ist. and XVth. Corps during the first days of the march into Eastern Prussia, to enable the "eyes" of the Army Commander to distinguish at once the first signs of the danger into which he was running—moreover, according to General Postovsky's statement, a danger which was anticipated. This was not done.

The reports of the staff, apparently, were framed in the form of abstract statements and presentiments, but gave no assistance, by means of clear and concrete appreciations, towards arriving at the proper decision. Under such conditions the resolution and "volition" of an executive commander becomes considerably weakened and influenced in the direction of compromise.

Nevertheless General Samsonov's telegram caused considerable dissatisfaction on the part of General Jilinsky. The Commander of the Second Army was censored for failing to fulfil the Army Group *Directive*, and subsequently telegram No. 3004, the contents of which were as follows, was despatched to him: "The German troops, after heavy fighting culminating in the victory of General Rennenkampf, are hastily retreating, blowing up the bridges behind them. The enemy has apparently left only insignificant forces facing you. Therefore, leaving one corps at Soldau, and securing the safety of your left flank by echeloning it back as necessary, you are to execute a most energetic offensive against the front Sensburg—Allenstein, which I order to be captured not later than the 25th. August. The object of your manœuvre is to attack and intercept the enemy retiring before General Rennenkampf's army, in order to cut off the retreat of the Germans to the Vistula."

What strikes one above all on reading this telegram, is that even the simple operation of drawing circles on the map would have shown that the suggestion with regard to intercepting the enemy retreating

before the First Army by sending the Second Army due North was completely fantastic. No less fantastic was the whole plan of straying across Eastern Prussia, with its numerous railway lines, which permitted the Germans in the course of a few days to create in whatever area they wished a concentration of troops of sufficient strength to cut off General Samsonov's army. The fact that General Jilinsky and his staff built these castles in the air not only with regard to their own troops, but also with regard to the enemy, also calls for remark. " The enemy has apparently left only insignificant forces facing you . . ." writes General Jilinsky, though incidentally he and his staff had absolutely no data upon which to found such an assertion. The actual case was the very reverse. Firstly, from the very beginning forces equal to four infantry divisions were opposite the Second Army: secondly, on the 23rd. August the 3rd. Reserve Division had already reached the XXth. Corps, General Muhlmann's Brigade was arriving, and the leading echelons of the 1st. German Army Corps had commenced to move up. One would suppose that, the higher the commander, the greater the necessity for him to avoid the expression of baseless conclusions: otherwise he can only mislead his subordinates.

But it also appears to be one of the intrinsic peculiarities of " strategic romanticism," that it closes the ears of commanders to the demands of the situation. Their obstinacy in acting without regard to circumstances they erroneously hold to be a display of will-power, while considering the reports of subordinates in direct contact with the realities of the situation to be branded by irresolution. So it was in the case under our consideration. Army Group Headquarters did not believe the information concerning the enemy which had been collected by the Staff of the Second Army; they considered it exaggerated. It was this sort of attitude which necessitated the continual repetition by General Samsonov of reports regarding the exhaustion of the troops and the disorganisation of the lines of communication. This also was considered as a display of " weakness " on his part and consequently, when forwarding to General Danilov, the Quartermaster-General at G. H. Q., in telegram No. 3005, confirmation of the order issued by General Jilinsky to General Samsonov, to continue the offensive Northward, the Chief of Staff of the Army Group commenced his report with the words: " The Comamander-in-Chief has pointed out to General Samsonov the irresolute nature of his actions . . . . ."

At 7-30 P.M. on the 23rd. the staff of the Second Army issued *Directive* No. 4. This telegram exactly fulfilled the requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, but the interesting point is that it included the following: "The enemy, defeated by our First Army, is hastily retreating from the line of the River Angerapp, covered, apparently, on the flank of our army by units of the XXth. Corps in the Allenstein area." These lines were written at a time when numerous enemy guns had been thundering at Orlau and Frankenau since 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and when a whole Russian corps was unable to overcome the resistance opposed to it 35 versts to the South of Allenstein. To this must be added the fact that it was known in the Ist. Corps on the afternoon of the 23rd. that an airman had seen two encampments of a division each at Gilgenburg. Such behaviour on the part of the staff of the Second Army can only be explained by the supposition that, being in a state of chaos, they did not dare to believe their own information, and preferred to see the situation through the eyes of their stern superiors.

On the 24th. August, having learnt of the withdrawal of the Germans from the Orlau—Frankenau position, General Samsonov again telegraphed to the Staff of the Army Group, requesting a change of the lines of operations for the army. But again an offensive Westward was not in question, but only the compromise by which the army was to be directed against the front Allenstein—Osterode. This time General Jilinsky agreed, and General Oranovsky, his Chief of Staff, telegraphed:

"If it is certain that the enemy is retiring upon Osterode, and in view of the fact that it will not be practicable to cut the enemy's line of retreat on Konigsberg, the Commander-in-Chief agrees that the Second Army objective be changed to Osterode—Allenstein, but on condition that the exit between the lakes and Allenstein be covered by one corps, with cavalry, which could most advantageously be moved to Sensburg, and which should execute extensive reconnaissance: similarly air reconnaissance should be carried out in this direction."

The reason for this consent can be found in the Summary of Intelligence concerning the enemy issued by the staff of the Army Group on the 24th. August, in which it was stated: "Contact has been lost with the enemy on the First Army front. According to the statements of local inhabitants he is retreating on Konigsberg, and in part

on Rastenburg . . . . " Evidently General Jilinsky and his staff had begun to divine that it was impossible for the Second Army to cut the line of retreat of the Eighth German Army on Konigsberg. The basic idea of the plan of operations remained the same: the compromise suggested by General Samsonov was in accord. The information to the effect that part of the enemy forces were retreating on Rastenburg was the cause of a further compromise on the part of the staff of the Army Group, namely, the detachment of a whole corps (the VIth.) to cover the former line of operations of the army.

The staff of the Army Group could see from a study of the map, that the area in which the operations of the Second Army must be developed was split up into two parts by the expanse of forest and lake lying between Ortelsburg—Allenstein and Neidenburg:

(*a*) the Eastern part, with road-junctions at Bischofsburg, Wartenburg and Passenheim;

(*b*) the Western, with a very elaborate network of roads right to Osterode, Deutsch Eylau and Strasburg. The region of forest and lake which formed the central part of the area was traversed by but a single road, leading from Passenheim to Jedwabno—Neidenburg.[1]

With the intention of securing the right flank of the offensive of the Second Army against the front Allenstein—Osterode, no decision was possible, save that of strengthening the right flank itself at Allenstein. At Passenheim, where the chain of lakes greatly facilitated the task of covering the rear, an infantry brigade might have been left, to support the cavalry sent forward to Bischofsburg. Under the existing conditions it was nonsense, strategically, to send a whole corps to cover the exit between Allenstein and the principal Masurian Lakes. The matter stood thus: if enemy forces were expected to attack in this direction in strength not exceeding a corps, it would appear criminal to expend two divisions out of the Second Army, already weak, upon this secondary and passive task; but if larger enemy forces were to attack in this direction, then the corps torn from the main body of the Second Army would run a serious risk of separate defeat. This desire of General Jilinsky to insure against every kind of failure was weakening the forces of the very commander of whom he demanded

[1] See Diagram No. 2.

superhuman " resolution." The staff of the Army Group was now amputating another two infantry divisions (the VIth. Corps) from the main body of the Second Army, as a " cover " for the area between Allenstein and the principal lakes. What then was left to General Samsonov wherewith to execute the " resolute " offensive into the heart of Eastern Prussia, now directed against the front Allenstein—Osterode ? *Five infantry divisions and* 36 *batteries.* As we know, the forces at the disposal of General Scholtz, without taking into account the reinforcements arriving for him, from the very beginning amounted to 3½ infantry divisions and 37 batteries!

It should here be remarked that the transfer of the units of the 3rd. Guards' Infantry Division (one of the Divisions of the XXIIIrd. Corps) from Grodno to Mlava had commenced on the 23rd. or 24th. August; at the same time sanction had been accorded to General Samsonov to attach to the XXIIIrd. Corps in addition the 1st. Rifle Brigade from Warsaw.[1] But in view of the speed with which the Second Army was required to operate, this was a belated increase, as the reinforcements could not possibly catch up with the main body of the army.

The very way in which the orders of the Commander-in-Chief were framed—" . . . . but on condition that the exit between the Lakes and Allenstein be covered by one corps, with cavalry, which could most advantageously be moved to Sensburg . . . . " could but confuse the staff of the Second Army, already uncertain enough in their strategic conceptions, and indeed this staff left the VIth. Corps in an advanced position at Bischofsburg, at a distance of 50 versts from the flank of the army. Consequently the Second Army, with a strength of nine infantry divisions, was spread out by evening upon the lines Bischofsburg (the VIth. Corps)—Allenstein (the XIIIth. Corps)—Osterode (the XVth. Corps and half the XXIIIrd. Corps)—Soldau (the Ist. Corps); *i.e.*, on a front of 120 versts.

The instructions from Army Headquarters altering *Directive* No. 4 were only received by corps on the morning of the 25th. August. The XIIIth. Corps, not knowing of this, had sent back the Ist. Infantry Division during the early part of the 24th. August to the

[1] The move of this brigade from Novogeorgievsk to Mlava had commenced on the 25th. August.

place where it had previously bivouacked, in the Omulefofen area. General Klyuev supposed that for the 25th. August, in accordance with *Directive* No. 4, a march in the direction of Wartenburg lay before him, but, as it turned out, he had now to march on Allenstein. Thus, owing to the lack of organisation on the part of the staff of the army, the already exhausted infantry had to execute unnecessary marches backwards and forwards. On the evening of the 25th. August the Units of the Second Army were disposed as follows :—

The VIth. Corps in the Bischofsburg area, with the 4th. Cavalry Division at Sensburg.

The XIIIth. Corps in the Kurken area.

The XVth. Corps delayed in the area Orlau—Frankenau.

The XXIIIrd. Corps :—

The 2nd. Infantry Division at Lippau.

The Units of the 3rd. Guards' Infantry Division and the 1st. Rifle Brigade—*en route.*

The Ist. Army Corps : in the position Usdau—Meischlitz—Koschlau—Grallau, with one brigade of the 6th. Cavalry Division on its right flank in the area Usdau—Gardienen and one brigade of this division at Lensk.

The 15th. Cavalry Division in the Zielun area.

On the 25th. August the staff of the Second Army received definite information of an enemy concentration in the area Gr. Gardienen—Strasburg, opposite the left flank of the army ; on the other hand they received from the Commander of the 4th. Cavalry Division information that considerable German forces had passed through Rastenburg on the 24th. August.[1]

One would suppose that the Commander of the Second Army could no longer have had any doubts as to the immediate necessity for wheeling the front of his army westward, to meet the enemy attack threatening its left flank. There are many indications that on this day, the 25th., General Samsonov was seriously perturbed. From the Commanders of the XIIIth. and XVth. Corps General Samsonov could only obtain confirmation of his misgivings. The unauthorised

[1] "Strategic outline of the war of 1914—1918," Part I, by Tsikhovich. Moscow, 1922 (p. 87).

halt of the XVth. Corps at Orlau—Frankenau, although justified by the necessity for organising the supply service of the corps, yet at the same time was doubtless due to the desire of the Commander of the XVth. Corps to facilitate the inevitable Westward wheel of the Second Army. A similar attitude was also adopted by the other (the XIIIth.) Corps Commander. When, at dawn on the 26th. General Klyuev received the Second Army Operations Orders, ordering the continuation of the corps march to Allenstein, he decided to defer the march of the corps until noon, and sent an officer of the General Staff to report to the Army Headquarters. " Being well acquainted with the East Prussian theatre, and with the war games of the senior commanders of the German Great General Staff, and discounting the retreat of the Germans North-Westward, General Klyuev was all the time of opinion that the main blow of the Germans should be expected from the West, say against Neidenburg; the more so as the whole position which had arisen strongly reminded General Klyuev of the situation at the last war game of the German General Staff.

" The Corps Commander set forth all these misgivings in a letter to the Army Commander, in which he insisted on the impossibility of advancing with such haste, as the rear could not keep up, and shells would be exhausted in one good battle; on the difficulty of organising Signals and intelligence, and on the urgent necessity for protecting the left flank, remembering the last war game of the German General Staff."[1]

General Samsonov had no such assistance from his own staff. In reply to his misgivings he was given reports proving that the course of action mooted—to attack the enemy assembling in the Gilgenburg—Lautenburg area, the main blow to be dealt by the left flank of the Second Army—" would mean the retirement of the majority of the corps of the army, which would by no means accord with the main idea of the operations to force the Germans, by a swift advance into their territory, to transfer Eastward units from their forces on the Western front." Further force was given to these considerations by the assertion that a decision on the part of the Army Commander to wheel Westward would mean " the entire re-grouping of the army, involving the intersection of lines of communication." That such

1 " Brief outline of the operations of General Samsonov's Army of the Narev in Eastern Prussia in August 1914," by Fuchs, an officer of the General Staff of the XIIIth. Corps. " Voenny Sbornik " No. 4 (p. 131).

considerations lacked any foundation in fact may be seen from the circumstance that, even on the 25th. August, the Second Army could have swiftly executed the necessary re-grouping, with its front facing West, without any confusion on the lines of communication, and without " the retirement of the majority of the corps of the Army." To do so, it would have been necessary for the XVth. Corps to march as far as the line Skottau—Wiersbau on the 26th. August; the XIIIth. Corps should have been given, in the Kurken area, the day's halt so essential to them, preliminary to moving them on the 27th. into the Waplitz—Michalken area; the 2nd. Infantry Division should have been left halted for the 26th. and in view of the fact that the belated units of the XXIIIrd. Corps (*i.e.*, the 3rd. Guards' Infantry Division and the 1st. Rifle Brigade) had got up to Mlava by rail, a favourable opportunity presented itself for the assembly of the whole of the XXIIIrd. Corps on the left of the 1st., with which object the 2nd. Infantry Division during the following days should have executed a march to Soldau from the area in which they were halted. With the whole army thus wheeled facing West, the presence of the VIth. Corps at Bischofsburg, which was already unnecessary and dangerous, would have become positively absurd. This corps might have been brought from Bischofsburg to Passenheim, which move, in view of the reports received from the 4th. Cavalry Division concerning the march of large German forces through Rastenburg on the 24th. August, ought to have been carried out by night.

The difficulties advanced with regard to the adoption of such a course of action by General Samsonov thus had no existence in the realities of the situation, and a staff so badly informed as to see obstacles where none existed could not have been of any assistance to the Commander of the Second Army.

In defence of General Samsonov's staff it must be said that its work was greatly complicated by the chaos supreme upon the lines of communication. This is well seen from the report rendered by General Postovsky, the Chief of Staff of the Army, by direct wire on the 25th. August, *i.e.*, on the very day upon which his every thought should have been directed towards helping the Army Commander to find a solution of the difficult problem regarding the operations of the army. This report ran as follows:—

" Though fully recognising the necessity for advancing unceasingly and energetically upon Allenstein—Osterode, and beyond, following

up the enemy, the Army Commander has been forced to make a halt. The army has made a continuous advance of 8 days from its starting position, and, in consequence of the delay in arrival of certain field bakeries and corps transport—the latter, moreover, being lower than normal in carrying capacity, as single-horsed carts were received instead of two-horsed—and in view also of the army transport having arrived with a deficiency of 40 per cent. in vehicles, the army has had to be fed entirely with bread brought up from the rear from augmented or private bakeries. With these bakeries a considerable distance away from troops ever advancing away from them, with wretched sandy roads, and with the insufficiency of local fodder, there has been inevitable delay in transport, preventing the punctual supply of the troops with bread, for which reason the troops have consumed some two-thirds of their iron rations, although bread for them was on the way.

"Apart from this, there was no transport to the Tsyekhanov issue depot, which, according to the instructions of the Commissary of the Armies of the Group, was to be drawn upon for the formation and refilling of supply dumps. It has turned out to be hopeless to depend upon local resources for the maintenance of supplies, as, on the one hand, the stocks in the country are insignificant, and, on the other, some of the regimental commissaries turn out to be quite untrained.

"While recognising a halt to be absolutely essential for the army, the Army Commander will of course order units to advance at any cost, should the Commander-in-Chief, in view of the general situation, nevertheless consider such an advance necessary.

"The Army Commander begs to convey to the Commander-in-Chief this report regarding the necessity for a halt, which he personally communicates by telephone, and would add that all his corps commanders urgently request this to be granted, in particular Martos (XVth. Corps) and Klyuev (XIIIth. Corps)."

Between the 17th. and the 25th. August the Corps of the Second Army had marched the following distances :—

VIth. Corps	..about 200 versts	(22 versts per day).
XIIIth. Corps	..about 130 versts	(16-18 versts per day).
XVth. Corps	..about 120 versts	(with a battle on the 23rd. and 24th. August).
XXIIIrd. Corps	..about 190 versts	(21 versts per day).

The corps had been marching through a terrain which was difficult to traverse, in intense heat, driving before them the enemy units which had been covering the frontier. Prior to the 17th. August the corps had covered great distances without a halt, in order to reach their starting positions.

The reply of the staff of the Army Group to General Postovsky's report was as follows: " With regard to a halt, the Commander-in-Chief states that the Second Army offensive has progressed considerably more slowly than he expected. The enemy had already left Insterburg on the 23rd. August, and is therefore at least two marches away from that town. In view of this, the Commander-in-Chief finds it impossible to sanction a halt until the line Allenstein—Osterode has been reached, as only then will it become possible to threaten the enemy's line of retreat to the Lower Vistula."

Army Headquarters was also making efforts to obtain the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief to a Westward wheel of the army. A member of the staff relates the following incident, which to some extent throws light on the psychological conditions under which General Samsonov had to carry out his difficult work. General Filimonov, the Quartermaster-General of the Staff of the Army, had been despatched to the staff of the Army Group, to render a personal report to the Commander-in-Chief regarding the danger threatening General Samsonov's left flank and rear. General Jilinsky entirely disagreed with the considerations laid before him, and demanded an immediate continuation of the offensive into the heart of East Prussia. Moreover, he concluded his remarks, which were couched in the sharpest of tones, by saying: " To see an enemy where he does not exist is cowardice, but I will not permit General Samsonov to play the coward, and demand of him the continuation of the offensive." Those who know the gallant bearing of the late General Samsonov will understand how this must have affected him in his further actions.

As the result, an operation order was issued by the staff of the Second Army on the 26th. August. It contained the following intelligence concerning the enemy. " No change before the front of the XVth. and XIIIth. Corps. At Allenstein there is more than a division of the enemy." On the 26th. August the XIIIth., XVth. and XXIIIrd. Corps were ordered to advance to the following lines: the XIIIth. to the line Kellaren –Darethen, the XVth., to the line Schönfelde—Guse-

nofen, the XXIIIrd. to the main road Hohenstein—Reichenau. The Ist. was ordered to remain in the area it was occupying, between Gilgenburg and Soldau; to safeguard the lines of communication of the army from attack from the direction of Deutsch Eylau. The VIth. Corps, with the 4th. Cavalry Division, was to remain at Bischofsburg, safeguarding the right flank of the army from attack from the direction of Rastenburg. The 6th. and 15th. Cavalry Divisions were to carry out *Directive* No. 4. The Staff of the Army was to be transferred to Neidenburg.[1]

The operations order of the 26th. August is a direct proof that the Army command had renounced the ideas by which they had been guided, according to General Postovsky's statement, at the commencement of operations. This order despatched the XIIIth. and XVth. Corps to take Allenstein. It inclined the line of operations of the army further East, even in comparison to the line on Allenstein—Osterode, sanctioned by General Jilinsky after such hard bargaining. Such a decision appears the more strange, in view of the fact that the staff of the Army had been able to ascertain definitely, from reports received by it, the existence of a concentration of large German forces on the front Gilgenburg—Lautenburg. On the 25th. August a report had already been received from the Commander of the Ist. Army Corps concerning an enemy offensive from the direction of Lautenburg and the Damerau Lakes.[2] Though in possession of all the data necessary to elucidate the situation, the staff of the Second Army were unable to do so, and communicated entirely groundless intelligence to the troops; alleging the presence of "more than a division at Allenstein" and dismissing other areas with a formula—"No change before the front of the XIIIth. and XVth. Corps."

Finally, by a similar use of formulae the Staff of the Army thought to get rid of the danger threatening the left flank of the army. A careful perusal of the orders herein given to the Ist. Army Corps is sufficient to convince one of this. This corps, remaining in the area between Gilgenburg and Soldau, was to safeguard the lines of communication of the army from attack from the direction of Deutsch Eylau. On

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1 The contents of this order are given in Vatsetis' Book "Operations in Eastern Prussia in July, August and the beginning of September, 1914." (Moscow, 1923, p. 72).

2 "Strategic outline of the war of 1914—1918," Part I. By Tsikhovich, Moscow, 1922 (p. 88).

the 25th. August the Ist. Corps, with a strength of two infantry divisions and 14 batteries, having already extended its right flank to Usdau, and covering a front of 20 versts, had to deploy covering another 25 versts Northward, following up the 2nd. Infantry Division, which had moved away from it.

On the morning of the 26th. August, impressed by the report dated the 25th. from the Ist. Army Corps Commander, concerning an enemy offensive from the direction of Lautenburg and the Damerau Lakes, General Samsonov decided to postpone the move of the XIIIth. and XVth. Corps, but later, influenced by a conference of the members of the staff, gave up this intention. His staff insisted on the continuation of the march of these two corps, at the same time reinforcing the Ist. Army Corps with the 3rd. Guards' Infantry Division, the 1st. Rifle Brigade and a heavy artillery division, and placing the 6th. and 15th. Cavalry Divisions under the orders of the Commander of the Ist. Corps.

This concluded the work of the higher staffs in getting the Second Army on to the battlefield. One must regretfully state the fact that everything possible had been done to ensure the defeat of our troops in their impending collision with the Eighth German Army. This conflict began on the very next day ; the army being engaged in battle on the front Hohenstein—Soldau, and the VIth. Corps fighting an engagement at Bischofsburg.

We must now make a digression, and describe what had been happening on the enemy's side during these days, in order to reveal in its entirety the terrible strategic situation which had been created for the Second Army.

The battle of Gumbinnen had undermined the morale of General Prittwitz, commanding the Eighth Army. He and his Chief of Staff were relieved, and Hindenburg and Ludendorff appointed in their place. The latter was summoned to the German G. H. Q., where he was interviewed, after 6 p.m. on the 22nd. August, by General von Moltke, Chief of Staff to the Emperor. General Ludendorff does not make the nature of these negotiations public in his memoirs, but it is a very reasonable supposition that General Moltke's fundamental requirement was that Ludendorff should continue the active defence of Eastern Prussia at any cost.

Thus Ludendorff, when with Moltke's Staff, was not forced to undertake any heroic enterprise. He occupied himself only in issuing

the instructions necessitated by the task imposed upon the Eighth Army by the German Supreme Command (General Mühlmann's 5th. Landwehr Brigade and a brigade of heavy howitzers were ordered to join the XXth. Corps from the fortress of Thorn).

In his memoirs General Ludendorff asserts that orders were also included in these instructions for the Ist. Army Corps to be detrained in the proximity of the right flank of the XXth. Corps. This assertion, like many others in Ludendorff's memoirs, traverses the facts, as can readily be ascertained by comparing with the memoirs of General François, the Commander of the Ist. German Corps ("Marneschlacht und Tannenberg").

In his memoirs Hindenburg does not attempt to conceal the fact that the fundamental idea of the operations against the Russian Army of the Narev had already been settled before he assumed command of the Eighth Army. The following is his own description of his first meeting with his Chief of Staff, which took place at 3 a.m. on the 23rd. August in the special train which was to take the new Commander of the Eighth Army to East Prussia, and which was already occupied by General Ludendorff, who had come from the German G. H. Q.

"In a few moments I had reached an agreement with my Staff as to the view to be taken of the situation which had arisen. In Coblentz General Ludendorff had already issued the first instructions, which could not be delayed if the struggle was to be continued to the East of the Vistula. Above all, it was necessary not to remove the point of detrainment of the Ist. Corps far back to the East, but to fix it in the Deutsch Eylau area, nearer to the enemy and behind the right flank of the XXth. Corps. No further decisions could be taken prior to arrival at Army Headquarters, at Marienburg. Our conversation hardly lasted half an hour. We went to bed and I used the whole of the time remaining at my disposal to rest."

On the afternoon of the 23rd. Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived at Eighth Army Headquarters at Marienburg. At this time the Russian XVth. Corps had already come into collision with the left flank of the XXth. Corps, which was disposed in the fortified position Orlau—Frankenau.

The units sent to reinforce the XXth. Corps had commenced to arrive:—

The 3rd. Reserve Division was detraining at Allenstein,

The Ist. Army Corps had commenced its detrainment in the Deutsch Eylau area.

General Mühlmann's Brigade was at Strasburg, under orders to proceed to Lautenburg.

Lastly, the detrainment of General von der Goltz's 1st. Landwehr Division was to commence in three days' time in the Osterode—Allenstein area.

Knowing what was the fighting strength of General Samsonov's attacking army, we can definitely state that the situation of the Germans could not be called critical. It is true that the left flank of the XXth. Corps at Orlau—Frankenau was threatened by concentrated Russian forces, but the commander of this corps, holding on to the position with a part of his forces, was intent only on gaining time, to enable the remainder of his command to complete its march from the Jedwabno—Ortelsburg area to the Gilgenburg area. This manœuvre, already decided on, as we know, on the 21st. August, and confirmed by General Prittwitz, had of course also been approved by General Hindenburg, and thanks to it the Southern group of the Eighth Army was assembling for a blow against the left flank and rear of the Russian Army of the Narev.

Upon the arrival of all the units above enumerated the Germans would be able to deploy $8\frac{1}{2}$ infantry divisions, with 90 batteries, facing the Hohenstein—Soldau front. In the whole of General Samsonov's army there were only 9 infantry divisions, with 67 batteries, dispersed between Ortelsburg and Soldau.

In the preceding chapter we remarked on the fact that as early as the 21st. August, General Moltke had pointed out to General Prittwitz the necessity for bringing up the XVIIth. and Ist. Reserve Corps to reinforce the XXth., with which object he suggested taking these corps by the shortest routes in the general direction of Allenstein. We also remarked at the same time, that General Prittwitz considered this move extremely risky, supposing a third Russian Army to be advancing along the centre line of operations from Graevo. By the 23rd. August one of the Russian army *Directives* had fallen into the hands of the German staff (apparently General Jilinsky's *Directive* No. 1 dated the 13th. August). This *Directive* had been found in the wallet of a dead Russian officer. It provided quite definite confirmation of the fact that only two Russian armies were operating against Eastern Prussia, and that General Rennenkampf's army had been

ordered to operate to the North of the line of the principal Masurian Lakes, while General Samsonov's army had been directed against the front " Lötzen—Ortelsburg. All General Prittwitz's fears being thus proved baseless, Eighth Army Headquarters sent orders to the XVIIth. and Ist. Reserve Corps, changing the direction of their march : the first was wheeled towards Bischofstein, the second, towards Seeburg. In the execution of these movements, these corps changed their bases to bridgeheads on the River Alle, the first to that of the railway junction of Heilsberg ; the second to that at Guttstadt.

The distance gained during the " break away " from Rennenkampf's army, amounting to two marches of the army, also ensured the safety of these Corps from attack from the West in the course of their march South-Westward, the more so as their bases could gradually be transferred to bridgeheads on the River Alle, in the Guttstadt area and South thereof.

Not being yet sure of the " distance gained," the Staff of the Eighth Army quite rightly took measures to guard against any attack on the part of the First Russian Army. Two brigades of the 1st. Cavalry Division were ordered to cover the march of the XVIIth. and Ist. Reserve Corps from Rennenkampf's army. Numerous Landsturm commands and detachments were available to co-operate with this cavalry screen, which was also reinforced by four regiments of the divisional cavalry of the XVIIth. and Ist. Reserve Corps. In addition, to allow of timely support for the covering screen by strong infantry units, the 6th. Landwehr Infantry Brigade, taken from the troops defending the neck of land lying between the principal Masurian Lakes in the Lötzen-Nikolaiken area, was despatched to Rastenburg. With the same object the Commander of the XVIIth. Corps ordered one of his infantry divisions to be echeloned to the South of Schippenbeil.

It pleased fate still further to lighten the task of the Eighth Army Command. On the morning of the 24th. August, while Hindenburg and Ludendorff were on their way from Army Headquarters (Marienburg) to XXth. Corps Headquarters, some intercepted Russian wireless messages were handed to them. These were the radio telegrams which we have already mentioned, from which it was possible to ascertain with exactitude the strengths and grouping of General Samsonov's VIth., XIIIth. and XVth. Corps. By comparing these telegrams with the *Directive* earlier captured, it was possible

to determine that the intercepted telegrams were no enemy ruse, but genuine operations instructions.

The revelations provided by these documents presented to General Hindenburg and his staff a complete picture of the offensive by the Russian Army of the Narev. The right flank corps (the VIth.) of this army was marching from Ortelsburg to Bischofsburg, thus laying itself open to a blow from the German corps converging from the North. All anxiety on the part of the Command of the Eighth German Army regarding the further march South-Westward of these corps must now have disappeared.

The intelligence as to the Russian operations, which had been obtained thanks to the disorganization of our higher staffs, not only facilitated the task of Hindenburg and his staff as regards the course to be adopted in the Bischofsburg area : it also enabled them, with a knowledge of " enemy intentions " unprecedented in the whole of military history, to prepare a blow against the left flank and lines of communications of the main body of the Army of the Narev, despatching 8½ infantry divisions for this purpose.

With what forces could General Samsonov's army oppose this blow ? Seven infantry divisions and considerably weaker artillery.

Nevertheless, on the evening of the same day, *i.e.*, the 24th. August, a telegram signed by Hindenburg was sent by the staff of the Eighth Army to German G. H. Q., the contents being as follows :—

" It has been decided to hold the XXth. Corps position, as retirement therefrom would be equivalent to defeat. The junction with the Ist. Corps has been delayed. The XVIIth. and Ist. Reserve Corps are being brought up on the left flank. Morale is high, although the possibility of an adverse result cannot be dismissed."

This lack of confidence on the part of the Command of the Eighth German Army was due to two reasons :—

1. The left flank of the XXth. Corps had been pinched out and annihilated at Frankenau—Orlau. The valiant exploits of the Russian troops seemed to confirm the pessimism of General Prittwitz.

2. On the 23rd. August strong Russian cavalry units had occupied the village of Gorzno (12 versts South-West of Lautenburg). This intelligence again caused the Staff of the Eighth Army to be apprehensive of an offensive by the left flank of General Samsonov's

army in the area West of the Mlava. An offensive by large Russian forces against Lautenburg would have endangered the Ist. German Corps, coming up on the left flank of the XXth.

The captured Russian *Directive* did not enumerate the forces included in the establishment of the army, and the intercepted radio telegrams were instructions issued to individual corps. The Staff of the Eighth Army had every right to suppose that there were other corps on the strength of the Russian Army of the Narev, the more so, as the air reconnaissance of preceding days had confirmed the existence of a strong concentration in the Warsaw and Novogeorgievsk areas. Hindenburg and his General Staff, like Prittwitz on the day of the battle of Gumbinnen, could not manage to credit the gross blunders of Russian strategy, which were being depicted before them in sober reality.

During the 24th. and 25th. August the situation became still more clear to the Staff of the Eighth Army. An offensive of the VIth. Corps against Bischofsburg was quite definitely indicated. The 4th. Russian Cavalry Division was identified to the East of this corps at Sensburg. The XIIIth. Russian Corps had reached the neck of land between Lakes Lansker and Grosse Plautziger. Further left, it was established that forces were advancing echeloned on the right flank of the XVth. and XXIIIrd. Corps. Finally, it was ascertained for certain that only Russian cavalry were operating in the direction of Lautenburg and West thereof, and that only one Russian Corps, the Ist., was attacking from Soldau.

" The temptation was very strong," writes General Ludendorff in his Memoirs, " to make a detour South of Soldau, in order to turn the flank of the Ist. Russian Army Corps also. The shock of such a blow to the Narev Army, combined with the advance of the XVIIth. and Ist. Reserve Corps, might have led to the complete destruction of the enemy. But our strength was not sufficient for this. Therefore I proposed to General Hindenburg that the Ist. Corps should attack from Eylau and Montowo, together with the left flank of the reinforced XXth. Corps from Gilgenburg, both towards Usdau, with the object of driving the Russian Ist. Corps South from Soldau; thereafter our Ist. Corps was to be sent to Neidenburg, to surround, together with the XVIIth. and Ist. Reserve Corps, at least the main body of the Army of the Narev. *One must learn to limit one's objectives in order to attain success.*"

Upon studying the map, one can at once perceive that the main blow of the Southern group of the Eighth Army would lead to the seizure of all the Russian Second Army lines of communication which passed West of the region of forest and lake between Neidenburg and Willenberg.

The dispositions of the German troops assembling between Lake Mühlen and Lautenburg were as follows on the evening of the 25th. August :—

> The reinforced XXth. Corps (General Scholtz) had deployed its two first-line divisions facing South-East between Lakes Mühlen and Grosse Damerau ; General Unger's Division was at Gilgenburg. The 3rd. Reserve Division was assembled echeloned to the rear of the left flank of the XXth. Corps, behind the River Drewenz. The Ist. Army Corps was assembled to the South-West of Lake Grosse Damerau, behind the line of lakes stretching from Gilgenburg to Lautenburg.

Lautenburg was occupied by General Mühlmann's Brigade.

For the speedier execution of the plan conceived it appeared essential to expedite the concentration of the Ist. Corps. With this object orders were issued to advance the points of detrainment of its divisions ; on the 23rd. and 24th. August the detrainment of troops of the 1st. Division had been taking place at Deutsch Eylau, and of the 2nd. at Bischofswerder ; now, with Mühlmann's brigade advanced to Lautenburg, and, under cover of units of the Ist. Corps which had already arrived and had marched ahead, these points of detrainment could be changed to Zajonskowo for the 1st. Division, and to Neumark for the 2nd. " Day and night, train after train, at intervals of half an hour, the Ist. Corps rolled on towards its detraining stations Southward of Deutsch Eylau," writes an officer of the General Staff of the Eighth Army ;[1] " instead of the one to two hours laid down in peace time for offloading, echelons were allowed 25 minutes or less. The railway employees worked to the last ounce of their strength. Neglecting all railway regulations, without paying any attention to signals, the trains were driven one behind another on every free sector, in order to reach the platform ordered without losing a moment of the time given for offloading. This

[1] "Mit Hindenburg bei Tannenberg," N. von Stephani, p. 25.

demanded continued and intense exertion on the part of all the railway employees, despite their complete exhaustion. Such a decision was extremely daring. The failure of one single brake might have resulted not merely in loss of life, but in the stoppage of traffic upon a whole section of the railway. But he who takes no risks will win no battles. Everything possible had to be done to expedite the arrival of the Ist. Corps on the battlefield. On the evening of the 26th. August General Hindenburg thanked the officer in charge of railway transport, in the following words: "If we attain great results to-day, it will in large measure be thanks to you."

Despite all these expedients, on the morning of the 26th. the Commander of the Ist. Corps only had 20 batteries out of 30 at his disposal.

In view of the fact that the 26th. August had been fixed for the commencement of the Eighth Army offensive, General François asked General Hindenburg to postpone this commencement by one day. General Ludendorff, who was present during this conversation, insisted that it was impossible to defer the day of attack. General François writes as follows in his Memoirs: "'If the order is given,' I replied, 'of course the troops will attack; only they will be obliged to fight with the bayonet.' Hindenburg remained silent."

At 8-30 p.m. on the 25th. August General Hindenburg issued Army Orders for the 26th. For this day a combined offensive by the Ist. Army Corps and the right flank of the XXth. against the right flank of the Russian Ist. Army Corps, in position at Usdau and to the North thereof, was ordered, with the object of opening the way for the further advance on Neidenburg. The offensive of the Ist. German Corps was directed upon Usdau, and that of the right flank of the XXth. Corps upon Jankowitz. Prior to carrying out this main idea, the Ist. German Army Corps, had to debouch from the line of the lakes lying between Gilgenburg and Lautenburg. This was the first task, and this Corps was ordered to execute it by obtaining possession of the high ground at Seeben by 4 a.m., while the right flank of the XXth. Corps was to co-operate in this debouchment by attacking in the direction of Grieben, against units of the Ist. Russian Corps which had been pushed out ahead, and had entrenched in the Bergling—Grieben area.

During the 25th. August orders had been sent to General Belov, commanding the Ist. Reserve Corps, for his corps, in co-operation with

the XVIIth. Army Corps and the 6th. Landwehr Brigade, to attack the Russian Corps isolated at Bischofsburg, and to try to drive it back to Ortelsburg.

Thus the detachment of the Russian VIth. Corps to Bischofsburg not only exposed it to attack by enemy forces several times larger, but further served as the strategical bait which tempted the Germans to send their Ist. Reserve and XVIIth. Army Corps round in rear of our right flank.

Recalling the information given above as to the remaining Russian corps, it will be seen that on the 26th. the XIIIth. Corps was advancing into the empty air; the extreme right flank of the XVth. Corps at Mühlen must collide with General Unger's left flank division, and in addition, the corps in its further advance in the direction ordered would expose its flank to a blow from the 3rd. German Reserve Division, assembled at Reichenau in full readiness for an offensive. The Commander of the XVth. Corps would have to be very skilful to avoid falling into a trap. The one division of the XXIIIrd. Corps (the 2nd.) was marching in an oblique direction towards the front of the main body of the German XXth. Corps, thus exposing its left flank and rear to it. The Ist. Russian Corps, fettered to the Soldau area, remained with its right flank in the air at Usdau. The farther North the 2nd. Division marched, the wider were we opening by our own action the right half of the gates which had closed the way to Neidenburg to the Germans.

On comparing the strategy of the two sides it is not difficult to foresee the result, which might be likened to that which must ensue were two opponents at draughts to move their men, one playing the ordinary game, and the other the "losing game." [1]

(*To be continued*).

1 "Poddavki"—a Russian form of draughts, the object being to lose all one's men. (Translator's note).

DIAGRAM No. 2.

LATER STAGES OF THE ADVANCES OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN AND EIGHTH GERMAN ARMIES.



GAS IN NEW DELHI.*

By 'Mouse.'

Prologue.

After the Disarmament Conference of 1932-33-34 a new impetus was given to the jealousy and suspicion which the nations of the world harboured one against the other. During the following two decades the results of this *malaise* were apparent in the growing armaments of the Greater Powers and the increasing number of secret pacts and treaties of non-aggression entered upon by various countries in Europe and in the East. This period marked also a time of intense activity among inventors and scientists, who applied their minds with singular assiduity to better and quicker methods of human destruction.

In 1941 an obscure chemist working in an ill-equipped laboratory in the village of Uzbegachan, forty-two miles north of Womsk, produced an almost odourless gas which he called Theresene. (He was a sentimental old man and his only child's name was Theresa). When he had proved by test and demonstration to the proper authorities the peculiar efficiency of this new armament the chemist, his wife and the little Theresa were detained in the cells of the yellow-washed police-station behind the Kremlin. Two nights later the little family disappeared. Before he died Boms, the chemist, told a fellow guest that his gas was unique in that one inhalation caused the victim to lose his memory and become partially demented. The brain, he averred, would continue to function plausibly, but the region of the subconscious mind, where the inhibition and inverted complexes were lying dormant, would gain dominion over the rational mind and cause the subject to act in a manner contrary to his normal character. For example, a Kommissar of the Ogpu had been experimented upon with the result that for a whole day the man imagined that he was the offspring of an Indian Congressman and an American lady gospeller. He tried to convert his fellow Komissars to non-violent evangelism.

The Declaration of War.

As history tells us, in 1952 the Lesser Soviets of Transoxania declared war on the Non-Federated States of India, and all India from the Cauvery to the Kabul rose in arms. Owing to various mea-

* For fuller details of this historical event the attention of the reader is directed to "*The Report of the Inquiry Commission on Indian Affairs 1952*," of which the distinguished author and chairman was Viscount Rammyswammy, second Earl of Mettupalaiyam. Published by H.M's. Stationery Office. Price two annas.

sures of disarmament and retrenchment—imposed by politico-sentimental rather than practical reasons—the N. F. States found themselves unprepared for the struggle, and in the initial stages of the war suffered grievous losses. The five great passes fell in the first week, and Quetta and Peshawar were occupied by the advanced guards of the invading armies. Then followed a period which soldiers euphemistically call "peaceful penetration." Within a month Baluchistan and the Punjab were being actively seduced from their loyalty; Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Lahore had risen in rebellion against the central government in New Delhi and were in the enemy's hands, the invaders had captured Mach, Sibi and Jacobabad and were advancing remorselessly towards the Sukkur Barrage and the rich port and aerial junction of Karachi. Lahore was being prepared as the hostile Advanced Base.

In New Delhi confusion reigned. On the declaration of war the Hindu Cabinet had resigned and in the resultant election the Muhammadan Opposition had won their first victory under communal electorates. The Muslim fighting programme, their motto, "No Surrender," and their plagiarised slogan, "What we have we hold," swept the country, and it is estimated that over twenty-three *per cent.* of the enfranchised electorate recorded their votes. The Muslims won by a small majority. This was due to the fact that in many cases Muslims were returned by Hindu strongholds, the most sensational case occurring in Vellore where the President of the Hindu Mahasaba was defeated by a depressed Oxford undergraduate. But this accession to political power of the minority party divided issues even more savagely than before, and the unhappy history of Muslim politics in India, which had been one long series of schisms and internal jealousies, served only to make chaos more chaotic. The House of Orators became a guerilla arena wherein party strife and partisan rivalries obscured the threat confronting the filaceous nation. All this is ancient history, and elderly members of the now defunct European Association tell of their acute disappointment at the turn of events. The Association had backed the Muslims in the hope that their fighting policy would unite the country. Instead, the House of Orators was the scene of wrangles, long-winded futile resolutions and communal jealousies which disgusted and alarmed all the saner elements of the constitution. Things were no better than in the old days of transition and devolution.

THE ULTIMATUM.

On the 23rd. February, 1952, a squadron of Transoxanian aeroplanes appeared over New Delhi and dropped a sheaf of printed documents on the popular War Memorial bus terminus. At that moment in the House of Orators the Finance Member was defending his Budget which, *inter alia*, demanded a War Vote of ten crores to which the Hindu Opposition had taken violent objection. Such, however, was the temper of the house that a heavy government defeat seemed imminent. Before a division was taken the Prime Minister, the Right Hon'ble Sir Fatty Can, entered and interrupted the acrimonious debate. In a low voice, rigorously controlled so as to avoid any appearance of excitement or alarm, he read:

" The following ultimatum has been sent to my government by enemy air-craft. Unless the North West Frontier Province, Kashmir State, the Punjab and Sind are ceded unconditionally to the United Soviets of Transoxania by noon on Thursday, 25th day of February, 1952, the cities of Lucknow, Benares and New Delhi will be subjected to relentless and ruthless chemical action." A shudder of horror rippled through the assembly. " Notice of surrender," the Prime Minister continued his reading in an even, passionless voice, " should be broadcasted from your radio stations at Bombay and Calcutta, and steps will then be taken for a Round Table Conference of your peace party and our plenipotentiaries at Bagh (in the Afridi country) to discuss details of complete transfer of the ceded territories. This is the first and final warning." The Prime Minister sat down, and the Leader of the Opposition moved a motion of adjournment for the proper discussion of the brutal ultimatum.

This debate was held on the same afternoon in the presence of a crowded house and galleries. Fierce argument, burning patriotism and brilliant oratory were prominent features. All parties appeared to be joined in their noble determination to defy the enemy's threat, a prominent Punjabi landowner offering to place himself at the head of five thousand horse, and a Bengali solicitor assuring the Home Member that if he would only raise the ban on *Detenus* he would guarantee two battalions of terrorists to fight for the honour of their country. The moment appearing propitious the Finance Member again suggested the necessity of increasing taxation to meet the costs of the war. This sudden descent from the sublime to the material sobered the

members, and the debate fizzled out in a welter of childish bickering and personal recriminations.

Next day the Opposition refused to vote supplies hoping thereby to force the government to resign, and, in that astonishing way which Eastern people have of ignoring the unpleasant, seemed to forget altogether the hideous threat overhanging the country. Nothing was done. Leaders talked. Army Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Indian Air Force set their plans in operation. Steps were taken to defend the threatened cities from aerial gas attacks. All the world watched. England, alert and ready, prepared to answer the frantic appeals of her stricken erstwhile dependency for succour.

The Indian Forces, 1952.

One of the healthiest and most heart-breaking features of British military thought used to be its owlish complacency. This was not the prerogative of the Admiralty, the War Office or the Air Ministry but had been imposed upon them by the traditions of generations to such an extent that it was no wonder that some of our greatest military minds used to think themselves infallible and indispensable.* The man in the street, vocalised by the great daily press, paid his frequent tribute to the sentries in Whitehall, the be-bunted battleship off Margate, and the expensive exploits of an adventurous air force; these typified for him the greatness—nay, the incomparableness of British arms, and he was allowed to shut his eyes to the potentialities of other nations. This pretty spirit of self-conceit had been passed on to the other members of the Commonwealth of Nations and in India particularly had risen like a heady wine to the minds of her Legislators.

It is true that the twelve battalions of British infantry, the three regiments of British cavalry and the one battalion of tanks could not be called popular in political circles, but the flow of democracy with its attendant labour troubles in industrial areas had alarmed the Congress cotton and jute magnates so gravely that these influential gentlemen had been able to bully successive governments into accepting this minimum white force for internal security. On the Indian Army, therefore, all the admiration and woes of frustrated politicians were poured. Arguing on the facile basis that India's only legitimate enemies were the tribes on her frontiers whose armament and personnel

* *cf.* The Lives of Marlborough, Wellington, etc.

were still very much below Western standards, the Indian Legislatures were content to see the gradual degeneration of their army to a state comparable with the forces maintained by the old feudal aristocracies of the eighteenth century. Gradually the British Officer cadre was being eliminated and those remaining had lost faith and hope and were almost in need of charity. King's Commissioned Indian officers, educated in the traditions of the old order fought loyally to prevent disintegration, but even their best efforts were of little avail in the fight against corruption, communal interests and nepotism in high places. The Air Force had been completely Indianised except for the seven Air-Vice-Marshals who controlled the seven frontiers. Although the machines and equipment, judged by American or Japanese standards, were out of date and in indifferent order it must be conceded that the personnel were magnificent. For the most part all pilots were Sikhs and the observers were Pathans, generally Kambar Khel Afridis or Mahsuds. *Esprit de corps* was on a high level. Crashes were frequent and were directly attributable to poor ground organisation, but the *elan* and recklessness of the flying officers were a byword throughout Asia. The Navy consisted of one 1908 cruiser, two 1913 destroyers (one without engines), six river gunboats and a training ship. Owing to economical and political reasons gunnery practice had not been carried out for six years.

Such were the fighting forces at the disposal of the Government of India to meet the invasion of six well equipped divisions and twenty air squadrons.

The Viceroy's Council and Army Headquarters.

It is needless, perhaps, to remind the reader that India ignored the enemy ultimatum with the exception that the authorities in Delhi took all protective measure against asphyxiation. These included the concentration of the Air Force in the Delhi Province to drive off enemy air-craft and the issue of the few gas-masks available to the more senior members of government. In spite of these precautions it is common knowledge that the enemy succeeded in gassing the nerve centre of the country. The gas used was Theresene and the methods employed to paralyse the brains of the Viceroy's Council, A. H. Q., and the New Delhi Defence Force are worthy of being brought back to memory. (It might be observed fitly here that some of the following information has never before been published; most of

the chief actors have passed away and the writer hopes that the passage of the years has healed the wounds of the old controversies which rent India so sorely until 1961, the year that Ginger Sanderson died.)

On the morning of the 25th. February, 1952, His Excellency called a Council meeting to discuss the intransigeance of the Lower House on the question of supplies. Much to the amusement of their colleagues three Hon'ble Members appeared in gas-masks. On His Excellency's assurance that the Viceroy's House would receive ample warning of an impending attack the masks were laid aside and the Council settled down to business. Outside in the world-famous Moghul Garden the flowers and shrubs were a blaze of colour and the fountains were bubbling and plashing in their exquisite setting. War and the threat of war seemed distant. One mile outside the Viceregal Estate and eight feet under the ground two men were attaching portable gas cylinders to the water main which supplied the merry fountains. Nobody noticed half an hour later the change in cadence of the fountains, the hissing noise made by the nozzles or the more frequent rise and fall of the jets of water; nobody noticed the faint, sweet smell which crept in through the open windows of the Council Chamber except the Viceroy, who apologised for the strong scent of his orange trees.

The Army Member, General Sir Belvedere Sanderson, known to his intimates as "Ginger," concluded a grave statement in which he urged the announcement of a "State of Emergency," the dissolution of the House of Orators and the formation of a War Ministry. The Finance Member, rising to protest, was in the middle of a philosophical dissertation on the uses and abuses of democracy when to the horror of all the Home Member leaned across the table, placed a sheet of notepaper in front of His Excellency and asked him to play noughts and crosses! The Army Member in his indignation snorted audibly and violently, which was the cause of his immediate undoing for his lungs also became impregnated with Theresene. The others quickly succumbed to the poisonous atmosphere. Within a few minutes the Cabinet of India, in the face of the greatest crisis which had confronted them since 1919, were blissfully engaged in parlour games. It is not without significance to note, especially in the light of later events, that at the same time a similar metamorphosis had overtaken the Viceroy's staff. It gave the Military Secretary a severe shock to find

that instead of clamouring to attend the opening of a War Hospital, all the *aides de camp* were working industriously for the Staff College.

In Army Headquarters the enemy had succeeded also. Theresene had been introduced into that labyrinth of corridors and offices by the simple expedient of poisoning the thermostate air current supply. (This modern invention had been installed in 1939 when it was finally decided that the rest of India could not tolerate the idea of anybody else being comfortable during the discomfort of the hot weather. Simla had been abandoned to the monkeys. The Hill Exodus was no more. Instead, an air cooling apparatus had been set up in all government offices in New Delhi with a corresponding increase in mortality from pneumonia and kindred diseases.) On this fateful morning a Principal Staff Officers' Conference was being held attended by the Air Marshal, the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes and the Naval Commander of the Indian Oceans. As the Chief of the General Staff was expounding his theories on the conduct of the present war a thin odour, sweetish but indefinable, stung the nostrils of the assembled officers. The first to appreciate its significance was the Quartermaster-General, a man who owed his exalted position to his uncanny " nose " for bad smells. He sprang to his feet and cried, " Gas ! " Everybody sniffed anxiously but sat down again when reassured by the C. G. S. that the Intelligence Branch were in close touch with the situation and had reported that no enemy aircraft had left Peshawar or Lahore that morning. The proceedings continued and were made memorable by the offer of His Highness the Chancellor to place all the State Forces, including private aeroplanes, at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. The invisible gas slowly saturated the air. Then Air Marshal Sir Gilbert Sullivan electrified the meeting by bursting suddenly into the chorus of the latest musical comedy song : " I wanna thyroid baby, but that thyroid must have pep." He sat there, did the Air Marshal, with his head back and eyes shut and roared the childish ditty with the most super-charged abandon. The Master-General of the Ordnance was the next to let his subconscious mind gain control, and he, relapsing to the amusements of his subaltern days, commenced to play imaginary jazz drums with pen-holders ; then fell the Adjutant-General who whistled the fascinating tune with remarkable variations and amendments assisted by His Highness who couldn't whistle. Eventually the P. S. Os.' Conference became a sing-song and terminated in a dance to which the lady typists only of A. H. Q. were invited.

Such was the potency of Theresene that nobody in A. H. Q. considered that anything extraordinary was happening, and many were the amusing (although deplorable) *contretemps* which occurred. I like the story best of the very junior G. S. O. 3 who marched into his Director's office, poured both inks over his superior's head, clapped the waste-paper basket on top and then demanded a brevet. Fortunately for all concerned the subconscious minds of junior staff officers rarely see the light of day.

The Battle Front.

Major-General Sir Arbuthnot Gillander, M.C., M.B.E., *p. s. c.*, was in command of the Force guarding the northern frontier of the Delhi Province. His G. S. O. 1 was Colonel (Temp. Brigadier) Albert Lozenge, and his *aide de camp* was Lieutenant (local Captain) the Hon'ble Percy Smaile, Ulster Guards. The Force consisted of one Cavalry Brigade, one Artillery Brigade, two Infantry Brigades, one Mechanised experimental battalion and the usual ancillary services. The G. O. C.'s orders as issued by A. H. Q. were more of a general than explicit nature. He had to preserve intact the Delhi Province, prevent the ingress of the enemy at any point between the Jumna River, inclusive at Qalakpur, and Kutabgarh, and finally if a suitable opportunity offered he was to " crush the enemy utterly in the field." These orders were subsequently amplified in the usual way by more detailed instructions regarding the submission of daily returns and reports concerning :—

(*a*) Petrol consumption and m. p. h.

(*b*) The incidence of bites, frost and snake.

(*c*) Damage to (1) crops, (2) buildings and (3) enemy.

(*d*) The number of nonconformists requiring Holy Communion.

For the few days before battle was joined these reports served as a safety valve for the staff officers, one of whom was overheard remarking how little war was different from peace. Poor fellow, he was killed the very first day by a ricocheting mule—and the mule succumbed later to multiple pedal injuries.

Before discussing the actual operations the character and temperament of General Gillander and his staff merit our attention. In 1915 he was commissioned direct from the Harrow O. T. C. and spent the remainder of the Great War, like so many of his contemporaries,

in trenches, hospitals, canteens, staff billets, cabarets and debt. He emerged an acting Lieutenant-Colonel with a Military Cross, two mentions and a pathetic belief that the final victory was mostly due to him and the other junior infantry officers. The following years deflated him and about 1925 he suddenly realised that his knowledge of the art of war was nil. Taking a pull at himself he bought a new copy of Field Service Regulations, an Imperial Geography and a course in Writing English in Ten Easy Lessons. Within two years he was at the Staff College in Quetta. Then he performed brilliantly. Of a heavy wit, a slow but sure mind and handsome appearance he rapidly endeared himself to all, teachers and pupils alike. Thereafter he alternated staff appointments with yearly spells with his regiment and gradually during the years of peace added steadily to his rank and decorations. As a soldier one would not be harsh to call him slow in the uptake. He was one of those one-ideaed men who get hold of a *cliche* like " Depth " or " Have you watered your horses ?" and for several years are content to apply depth or water as a solution of all tactical or administrative difficulties. Then, perhaps, a new D. M. T. or treatise appears from the War Office laying stress on surprise or agility or mechanised First Line Transport and after serious cogitation Sir Arbuthnot regretfully abandons his Depth and adopts a smarter piece of back-chat. I have met a lot of men like that in my time. Unfortunately at the start of this war the General was preoccupied with Trench warfare, a new type of fighting recently discovered by some bright spark at Aldershot, and appealing with almost sentimental force to the rugged heart of the Great War veteran. That its application was specialised and extraordinary made no difference in the mind of the man who had spent those sodden years in Flanders. " By Gum," he said, his eyes sparkling as he read the Trench Warfare Pamphlet, 1950, " those perishers at the War Office have wakened up at last. This is the indubitable stuff to give the troops." And this was the spirit with which the old warrior went forth to meet the vivacious and ubiquitous mechanised advanced forces of Transoxania.

His G. S. O. 1, Albert Lozenge, was of a different calibre. The descendant of a long red line of soldiers dating from the Mutiny, with pre-natal influences of a marked militaristic character—he was born under fire, so to speak, at Pachmarhi, India—and brought up under the strictest discipline at Cheltenham, Wellington, Sandhurst, the

N. W. F. P., Camberley and Simla, he was everything that a staff officer ought to be including strictly temperate. He lived, ate, slept, drank and dreamt soldiers, F. S. R. were his Bible and T. & M. Regulations his Prayer Book. His wife did her housekeeping by numbers, and his sons and daughters spent their playtime doing T. E. W. Ts. He was one of those brilliant cavalrymen who are soldiers first and horse-copers afterwards.

Of Captain Smaile little need be mentioned. He was a mere *aide de camp* and as such a pipsqueak. For his own peace of mind it was fortunate that he thought a lot of himself, for nobody else did. Having been at Eton he acted on his Harrovian master as a permanent irritant with an irritant's inevitable stimulating effect. He was beautiful and lazy and owed a vast amount of money.

The G. O. C. looked at his map, called for his dividers, an India rubber, his A. D. C. and his Intelligence Officer. "Where's the enemy?" he barked out ferociously, and Smaile peered piously into the waste-paper basket. In rapid sentences the available intelligence was unfolded: north of Lahore the dispositions and movements of enemy troops were obscure; the enemy held temporary superiority in the air; south of Lahore it was reliably reported there were six battalions of infantry in motor transport, at least three regiments of cavalry and some artillery, mechanised. Air photographs with the Ilford long distance apparatus had disclosed scattered bodies moving athwart the Grand Trunk Road on a front of twenty miles, all moving south. Whether this dispersion was a concerted approach march on the Delhi Province or whether it was imposed on the enemy (who were living on the country) by administrative necessities was not clear. Time, the great feeler, would show.

"Time the great dealer be damned," roared Sir Arbuthnot at the conclusion of the report. "Call Albert."

Brigadier Lozenge appeared with a portfolio containing his Appreciation. It consisted of thirty pages of type-written matter concluding with four alternative plans and eleven appendices. Inserting his monocle in his off-eye he proceeded to read out his Labour of Love. Gillander fidgeted impatiently, told him to cut out the rough stuff, interjected a few indigestible criticisms and showed merely a flaccid interest in the scholarly production. Smaile slept. When the four plans—all based on the main principle of concentration in an

area giving power of manœuvre until such time as the enemy would show his hand more completely were propounded, Lozenge asked his Chief's opinion.

"Bosh," replied the General simply. "You haven't said a word about trenches. You ought to read your books, y'know."

"Trenches!" gasped Albert, and Smaile woke up thinking that wenches had been adumbrated.

"Yes. Trenches. Didn't you read that thing from the War Office last month? Good stuff, that. Said that "Commanders must not overlook the fact that occasions frequently arise in war when it may be necessary to dig artificial cover for men both for protective and morale purposes." Well, then—gimme that map. The enemy have five lines of approach into my sector. The river; the net work of roads leading south from Janti Kalan; the Grand Trunk Road the railway and the Delhi Tall Distributary. Now then, if we build a system of trenches from Qalakpur—south of Janti Kalan—Narela and swinging back to Kutabgarh we will be impregnable. Like we were at Loos, old boy, in '15. What d'you think of that, Albert?"

Albert in his well-bred efforts to groan silently nearly burst his peritoneum.—"B- but, Sir, you really can't be speaking seriously. Trenches for fourteen miles! We haven't the men to man them, nor the shovels to dig them, nor the engineers to site them, nor the time to do it. Sir, I assure you that your scheme—excellent as it is in many ways, Sir,—is impossible."

"Impossible!" roared Gillander. "Nothing is impossible in war. These are my orders and you, Brigadier Lozenge, will see that they are carried out. I am now going to lie down."

Lozenge turned despairingly to Smaile who was training his moustache to the position of attention. "What do you think of that, Percy?"

"Jolly good egg, Sir," replied the loyal aide-de-camp. "My old man is red-hot, isn't he?"

* * * * * *

For two days the Delhi defenders dug trenches. None of the subordinate commanders, the regimental officers or men had their hearts in the work; the staff was almost mutinous and only the G. O. C. seemed care-free and happy. The news had percolated back to

A. H. Q. in New Delhi where after a hurried consultation among three senior officers, one of them decided to go forward and ascertain the truth of the devastating work. He left on the morning of the 27th. February, but fate—in the form of Theresene Gas—intervened before his arrival.

Just before dawn that morning when the first gentle flood-lighting of the sun was throwing its opalescent colours on the eastern canvas of the sky ; when the trees were casting their great purple shadows and the earth seemed to move uneasily in its sleep ; just before the actual sunrise three enemy air craft swooped silently down from the subaqueous vault of heaven and dropped a few candles on G. H. Q., a few more on the night-shifts of troops digging trenches—and sped away northward like flighting duck. It was a matter of moments—but what momentous moments in the destiny of a great country !

Captain Smaile, who had been arguing with his bearer regarding the accuracy of his watch, sniffed in about two pints of Theresene, leaped from his bed, dashed to his mirror, and, on catching a view of his leonine moustache, grabbed his nail scissors and cut it close. As he shaved he read a chapter of F. S. R. and found it thrilling. Dressing hurriedly but immaculately he rushed to his General's dug-out and reported for duty.

" Anything I can do for you, Sir ? " he inquired politely.

Sir Arbuthnot turned an amazed eye on his solicitous A. D. C. " Gaw, Percy," he said. " You're not sick, are you ? "

" No, Sir," said Percy indignantly. " I feel that I haven't been what I ought to have been in the past and I wish to make amends. If you don't want me at the moment, Sir, I thought I would go to the front line and dig a trench or two."

" Trenches my foot ! " was the surprising answer. (Percy did not know, of course, that his General had sucked in two cubic feet of Theresene). " There will be no more trenches. Tell Albert-boy to toddle in as I've got a new stunt up my sleeve."

By the fortune of war Brigadier Lozenge's dug-out had collapsed during the night, thus rendering him immune from the gas-attack, and by the time the A. D. C. arrived he was emerging blasphemously from a cloud of dust. " The General's compliments, Sir, and he would like to see you at once," reported Smaile, saluting in the long-forgotten Sandhurst manner.

"What's wrong with you, Percy? Been bitten by a *p. s. c.*?"

The G. S. O. 1 reported and was closetted with his G. O. C. for two hours. The second plan of his Appreciation was the one adopted with certain vital modifications. Briefly, the General's new plan was to concentrate his force in the enclosed country on his left flank, leaving decoy troops in the more completed entrenchments near the river on the right and sending out his mobile forces to draw the enemy towards the right with orders to avoid entanglement.

"But you can't risk leaving the main approach to Delhi open, Sir?" expostulated his more book-bound subordinate.

"I've thought of that," chuckled the General. "Send in to New Delhi and get those four thousand coolies who are building the new Horse Show Stadium on the old Tis Hazari Maidan, and get them to block the main road there—and there—and there. That will give me all the time I want."

"But the risk, Sir?"

"The risk be blowed, Albert. No battle has ever been won without taking risks. You fellows who have had all your soldiering on the Frontier get so security-ridden that you forget the supreme weapons of Generalship—Surprise and Mobility. Watch me, Albert." (The reader will forgive General Gillander's lapses into vulgar slang. The effect of Theresene.)

Every soldier dreams. Probably the most universal dream is that of being a General waging a successful battle. The dreamer imagines two evenly matched forces, his own a perfected instrument leaping to every call and ready for all emergencies; the enemy being lured into a disadvantageous position by Machiavellian guile. Then comes the dawn. The guns roar and plant their shells with uncanny accuracy, the infantry move forward like a wave, consolidate and are passed over by the following wave like the fluent surge of an incoming tide. The enemy breaks cover and the cavalry are brought on to the line with the superb judgment of a M. F. H. Throwing a joyous tongue the whole pack, horses, guns and foot, pour along pursuing, relentless, dauntless, their sterns like the wrath of God, and their hearts like incandescent flame.

There is no harm in dreaming such romantic mixed metaphors, and if the actuality of war boils down to being invalided from the Lines

of Communication with a septic gumboil one can only hope for a squarer deal next time.

The Battle of New Delhi made General Gillander's dreams come true. The enemy, after leaning with heavy suspicion against his right flank and finding it bogus, moved uneasily down the main road in the hope that the main body, as had been reported from the air, were digging across the road in front. Gillander swooped on their right flank, and as they conformed hastily to this danger caught them on their exposed flank with his cavalry. Desperate fighting ensued, but the issue was never in doubt and only stragglers ever reached Lahore.

This spectacular victory came at an auspicious time and rallied the country to unity. Reinforcements from England and Australia were arriving and very soon an expeditionary force under the command of Major-General Albert Lozenge was moving north through the Punjab driving back a demoralised enemy and restoring the courage of the people. Sir Arbuthnot had to go home to have his lungs looked at, and was made a Freeman of the City of London and a F. R. C. S. of Edinburgh University. Smaile lives in the city now, and works in the West End. Neither of them realises how much he owes to Theresene.

MAP OF NORTHERN FRONTIER.
DELHI PROVINCE.



THE IRON DUKE VERSUS CORPORAL JOHN.

A COMPARISON AND A CONTRAST

BY

MAJOR A. L. PEMBERTON, M.C., ROYAL ARTILLERY.

"*I have done, according to the very best of my judgment, all that can be done. I care not either for the enemy in front, or for anything which they may say at home.*" (*Wellington to a Spanish general, when facing Marmont, Sep.* 1811.)

In three previous articles,[1] I have attempted to illustrate three definite stages in the evolution of military genius. The first stage was represented by Cromwell, a simple, primitive fighting man, who, till 1647, remained quite unconscious of his military talent. Favoured by circumstances, he rose with astonishing rapidity to the height of military and political power, but away from the battlefield his balance was uncertain, and he became the victim of religious fanaticism. In spite of all he had done to further England's greatness, his death brought about an immediate reaction; his political creations died with him, and his New Model Army and its major-generals left a heritage of hate for the redcoat that it has taken centuries to eradicate.

Stonewall Jackson, who formed the subject of the second study, differed from Cromwell only in that he became aware of his military genius at an early stage and immediately set to work to make the most of it.

Cultivating a technique of auto-suggestion that Coué could not have bettered, he rapidly overcame the deficiencies of his early education and became an acknowledged master of his profession. But, partly perhaps because success came so quickly to him, and partly because his religious scruples drove him into an early retirement at Lexington, he never attempted to extend his mastery over the arts of diplomacy and statesmanship. He remained to his death an aloof, impatient enthusiast; a great fighter, who was at his best amid the heat of battle, but without the poise and adroitness of the man of affairs.

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[1] U. S. I. Journal, India, July, '29, Jan., '30, and July '31.

In Marlborough, the next on our list, we saw a man who had the conscious ambition of a Jackson and the unconscious perfection of a Cromwell. Nor did that perfection stop short at military ability; he was a born statesman as well as a soldier, being absolutely natural and well-balanced in everything. He loved fighting but was not aggressive; he was deeply religious but did not make a parade of his religious feelings; he was a polished courtier but his manner was never affected; in fact, no matter where he was, or what he was doing, self-control seemed to come naturally to him.

It was but natural, therefore, that he should be little given to introspection. He realized that he possessed great talents for war, and was willing enough to exploit these talents for the sake of himself, his country, and, above all, his beloved Sarah; but throughout his career we can find singularly little trace of any conscious striving after perfection. His "nature was essentially simple. His thought was clear and effective, but was not of the type called profound. Indeed, he had none of the love of thinking for its own sake by which most men would hold that their best selves were revealed. He seems himself to have regarded his genius as something apart from his character." [1] He probably felt that this genius was a divine gift, which, according to his simple faith, ought not to be made the subject of a scientific analysis.

Now, to complete our series, it would be interesting to study a man who, like Jackson, had to struggle for success, yet who ultimately attained to Marlborough's all-round greatness. And for this purpose we cannot choose a better subject than the great Duke of Wellington.

In his youth, Arthur Wellesley showed little promise of greatness or even of ordinary vitality and determination. A letter from his mother, Lady Mornington, still exists, in which, speaking of her sons, she says: "They are all, I think, endowed with excellent abilities except Arthur, and he would probably not be wanting, if only there was more of energy in his nature; but he is so wanting in this respect, that I really do not know what to do with him." [2]

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[1] "John and Sarah, Duke and Duchess of Marlborough," by Stuart J. Reid, D. C. L., p. xxii.

[2] "Personal Reminiscences of the First Duke of Wellington," by G. R. Gleig, p. 4.

His elder brother, Richard, had at first no better opinion of him. "Little Gore! I'll tell ye a thing," he is reported to have said to a friend, "there goes my brother Arthur, the biggest ass in Europe."[1]

He did, no doubt, give the impression of stupidity. He had a slow, unintelligent way of speaking, and the appearance of a dull boy. At Eton he was idle at work and at games, and he had got no higher than the Remove when his mother, for reasons of economy, took him away and placed him in a "pension" in Brussels. There he showed signs of having inherited his father's musical genius and acquired considerable skill upon the violin but exhibited no other signs of promise. So his mother, in despair, destined him for the "fool's profession" and packed him off to the French academy at Angers. Again, however, he did not shine; his health was bad, and he could take little part in the riding, fencing and other exercises which constituted the life of the place. In fact, little can be said of him at Angers except that he was "rather of a weak constitution, not very attentive to his studies, lay about a good deal on a sofa, and was constantly occupied with a little terrier called 'Vic.'"[1]

His early career in the Army was scarcely more inspiring. During the first six years of his service—years spent by John Churchill on active service at Tangiers, at the naval battle of Solebay, and in Flanders and France under Turenne—he was content to serve as A. D. C. to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in which post he appears to have earned a certain reputation for frivolity. "Lady Aldborough recorded that the Dublin girls would not go on a party if 'that mischievous boy' was to be one of the members, and Lord Leitrim noticed that it amused the young Wellesley to twitch out the lace neck-cloths of his friends"; while "years afterwards Lady Aldborough reminded him that she had found him such dull company driving back from some picnic that she had to turn him out of her carriage, and make him walk back to Dublin with the band."[1]

Not very promising material, this, for the future victor of Waterloo and saviour of the liberties of Europe! One must not, of course, attach too much weight to these retrospective judgments of a great man's youth. No one can foretell what is going to happen to a young man in later life, and few indeed are the people who keep an objective record of the sayings and doings of their children, or of youths of their

1 "Wellington," by Oliver Brett, pp. 3, 4, 7.

acquaintance. And afterwards, when a man has become great, there are three important factors that intervene to distort the truth and hamper the work of the investigator; firstly, the hero worship of his friends and followers; secondly, the envy of his political and other opponents, and of all those who resent his too evident superiority; and thirdly, an occasional tendency on the part of the great man himself to accentuate his earlier weaknesses in order thereby to enhance the value of his achievements.

After making all allowances, however, there still remains enough evidence to show that the young Arthur Wellesley bore little apparent resemblance to the great Duke of Wellington; and our task must now be to discover, if we can, how and when the change in his character occurred.

According to Guedalla, Lady Mornington found Arthur much improved on his return from Angers. Writing of her efforts on his behalf to two friends at Llangollen in 1787, she says: "He really is a very charming young man; never did I see such a change for the better in anybody."[1] But, bearing in mind her efforts on his behalf, we may question whether this expression of opinion by Lady Mornington was not influenced by her desire to see her son Arthur suitably placed in the Army.

It is true that from the first his work in the Army seemed to interest him. As he said in later years: "I was not so young as not to know that since I had undertaken a profession I had better try to understand it."[1] And, as evidence of his sound practical sense, one of his earliest acts was to have a Highland private weighed in full marching order.

Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that his real conversion began with his infatuation for Kitty Pakenham, and the disapproval with which it was viewed by her father, Lord Longford, on the score of Arthur's poverty and lack of prospects. This was just enough to arouse his pertinacity, which was afterwards to be such an outstand ng feature of his character. He borrowed from Richard the purchase money for a majority in the 33rd. Regiment; he next foreswore cards; and finally, in the summer of 1793, he burnt his fiddle.[1]

The expedition to Holland in 1795 gave him his first experience of active service and must have greatly hastened the process of his

[1] "The Duke", by Philip Guedalla, pp. 27, 28, 36.

conversion. Indeed, in later life, when asked how he learned his profession, he replied: "I learned more by seeing our own faults, and the defects of our system in the campaign of Holland, than anywhere else. I was left there to myself with my regiment, the 33rd. on the Waal, thirty miles from headquarters, which latter were a scene of jollification, and I do not think that I was once visited by the Commander-in-Chief."[1]

Yet, though his ambition was now clearly aroused, he still required to be convinced that the Army was his true, or at least his most promising, calling. The apathy displayed by the authorities during the Dutch campaign was not calculated to inspire confidence in the military machine, and Wellington, unlike Cromwell, could never regard himself as a divinely appointed reformer; the guiding motive of his life was a more practical egoism that disdained theatricalism and self-deception.

In fact, he carried his lack of sentimentality to extremes. Before Waterloo, when someone had protested against his order to the Rocket Troop to store its cherished weapons and use ordinary guns instead, and had urged that the change would break their Captain's heart, the implacable reply was, "Damn his heart, sir, let my order be obeyed."[2] And later, when, as a very old man, he stood one evening hesitating on the kerb-stone opposite Apsley House, and another old gentleman, after making a great show of assisting him by controlling the traffic, effusively expressed his pleasure at being able to help "the greatest man that ever lived," the Duke looked him coldly in the face, said "Don't be a damned fool!", and walked into Apsley House.[3]

Such a man was not likely to indulge in any false sentiment over whatever profession he might choose to adopt; and for a period, while the blunders of the Dutch campaign were still fresh in his memory, he had thoughts of devoting himself to politics, where his brother Richard seemed more likely to be of use to him. Perhaps the break would actually have been made, had it not been that a kind Fate was about to invest Richard with the Governor-Generalship of the Indian Provinces, whither Arthur's Regiment was on the point of setting sail.

Having once made up his mind, however, he acted with characteristic thoroughness. By this time he had acquired the habit of studying

1 "Personal Reminiscences of the Duke of Wellington," by Francis, First Earl of Ellesmere, p. 161.
2 "The Duke," by Philip Guedalla, p. 269.
3 "The Sword of State," by Susan Buchan, p. 228.

by himself for some hours every day, and before he sailed for India in 1796, he spent £50 on the purchase of books, in anticipation of his long exile. Most of these books were historical and dealt with India ; but the military art was represented by volumes of Saxe, Frederick, Dundas, Dumouriez, and Lloyd ; politics by Bolingbroke ; law by Blackstone ; and economics by the " Wealth of Nations " ; while places were also allotted to Swift, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Crébillon. " It was," as Guedalla has observed, " a statesman's library in miniature—but all designed for use, and none to awe visitors."[1]

Apart from its stabilizing influence upon his character, this habit of study was soon to bring material rewards. Lord Mornington, as Governor-General showed a very different estimation of his younger brother's ability than that which he had confided to " little Gore." " Aye ! " he could now say to Mr. Wyatt, the architect, " Arthur is a much cleverer fellow than I am, you may depend upon it."[2] And he gave evidence of his new found confidence in Arthur by making him his unofficial adviser on both military and political questions.

In this Fate was kind to Wellington as it had once before been kind to Marlborough. What Arabella Churchill had done for her brother Jack, Richard Wellesley was now to do for his brother Arthur, and, once started, Arthur Wellesley knew as well as anyone else how to fight his way to the top of the ladder of fame. After eight years of high responsibility, hard work, and incessant campaigning in India his judgment and knowledge had so matured that in later years he could read through his Indian despatches and say : " I understood as much of military matters then as I have ever done since."[3]

It is of little use, then, to trace the evolution of his greatness through all those eventful years from 1796 to 1815 ; his golden moment had come on the Waal in 1795, and it will suffice if we now take a brief glance at his personality as revealed by the historian.

In spite of his constitutional weaknesses which later reappeared in the form of an exaggerated susceptibility to colds—he was possessed, like Marlborough, Jackson and Cromwell, of the most astounding physical endurance and energy. When in pursuit of some freebooters after Argaum, in Feb. 1804, he marched 60 miles between the early

[1] "The Duke," by Philip Guedalla, p. 63.
[2] "Wellington," by Oliver Brett, p. 13.
[3] "Conversations with the Duke of Wellington (1831-51)," by Philip Henry, 5th Earl Stanhope, p. 130.

morning of one day and noon on the next, and then attacked with his infantry ; during the battles of the Pyrenees, in July 1813, he fairly wore out his staff as he galloped, on his English hunter, from one post to the next, in his efforts to check the powerful thrust of Soult ; and at Waterloo he offers a pretty parallel to the serene, ubiquitous Marlborough of Blenheim. He was there when the Nassauers were pressed out of Hougomont, and put in the Guards to retake the position with a brief " There, my lads, in with you—let me see no more of you." When the Life Guards charged, a deep voice was at hand to say, " Now, gentlemen, for the honour of the Household Troops." At one moment he was reforming a line of shaken infantry, within twenty yards of an oncoming French column, and as the tide of cavalry ebbed down the trampled slope, he asked the Rifles in his quiet manner to " drive those fellows away." In the dusk, as the Guard made its last charge, and the waiting line held back its fire in the Peninsular fashion, he was heard calling, " Now, Maitland ! Now's your time," and finally, he galloped off with a single officer to order the advance.[1]

In temperament, he lacked the cheerful optimism of a Marlborough and the fanatical zeal of a Cromwell or a Jackson ; but he had his share of initiative and daring. No brighter example of the offensive spirit could be found than his opening manœuvres in the battle of Assaye, or his subsequent attack at Argaum, against vastly superior numbers and after a long march on a very hot day. And nothing could beat his initiative at the passage of the Douro (May 1809) and the Bidassoa (Oct. 1813).

His coolness is, of course, proverbial. When setting out for Portugal in April 1809, his ship was caught in a violent storm, and the captain, in despair, contemplated running her ashore on the Isle of Wight. Sir Arthur, about to turn in to bed, was informed by an excited A. D. C. that the end was at hand. " In that case," he replied, with studious unconcern, " I shall not take off my boots."[2]

At Talavera, sitting on the hill on the British left, watching the progress of a fierce French attack upon his centre, he was approached by another excited A. D. C. sent by Albuquerque to say that the Spaniards on his right, under Cuesta, were deserting him. Without

[1] " The Duke," by Philip Guedalla, p. 275.
[2] " The Duke," by Philip Guedalla, p. 179.

so much as moving his head, he answered drily, " Very well, you may return to your brigade."[1]

During the battle of Sorauren, while he was sleeping in an inn after an excellent dinner, some officers, alarmed at the general situation, came rushing in and insisted on waking him. " Well, sir," he said, after listening to their spokesman for some minutes, " you are certainly in a very bad position, and you must get out of it in the best way you can." He then turned over and was instantly asleep again.[2]

Yet, for all his calm rationalism, he never allowed reason to interfere with instinct and intuition; he knew well enough when the time for thinking was over and the time for action had come. At Salamanca, while he was in the midst of a hasty meal, a movement of the French line attracted his attention, and he asked his A. D. C., who was watching them through a glass, what they were doing. " Extending rapidly to the left," came the reply; whereupon he sprang to his feet, seized the telescope, and then, muttering that Marmont's good genius had deserted him, mounted his horse and issued the order to attack.

Again, during the battles of the Pyrenees, while riding along his very extended front, he caught sight of a French force under Clausel that seemed likely to intercept the movement of one of his own columns. Realizing the danger, he sprang from his saddle and pencilled a note on the parapet of the bridge, warning the threatened column to take another route. As he was writing, peasants crowded round him with the news that the French were entering the other end of the village. He continued to write, keeping an eye on the street, until his order was finished, and only galloped off as the leading French troops made their appearance.

Nor was it fear of responsibility that lay behind his oft-criticized caution. Even in the darkest moments of his Peninsular campaign, he never lost confidence in himself. " They may overwhelm me," he said one evening to Crocker, shortly before his departure for Portugal, " but I don't think they will outmanœuvre me. I suspect all the continental armies were more than half beaten before the battle was begun. I, at least, will not be frightened beforehand."[3]

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[1] " Life of Duke of Wellington," by W. H. Maxwell, Vol. II, p. ?
[2] " Wellington," by Oliver Brett, p. 124.
[3] " The Duke," by Philip Guedalla, p. 153.

And in Jan. 1810, when he was being attacked in Parliament at home, when his troops were reduced by sickness and indiscipline, when Napoleon was everywhere triumphant, and when the Spanish armies were at their last gasp, he wrote to Villiers from Viseu: "I will neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on those of ministers the responsibility of the failure by calling for means which I know they cannot give nor will I give to the ministers, who are not strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army."

We see here that calm steadfastness and tenacity of purpose of which mention has already been made. It was displayed in full measure at the battle of Assaye, during which two horses were killed under him and eight out of ten of his staff sustained wounds to themselves or their horses, yet in which he somehow contrived always to be at hand when most wanted, perfectly calm, cool, and collected. It shone through his administrative thoroughness when he organized and equipped the bullock train that contributed so largely to the success of the operation against Seringapatam; and when, during the winter of 1812-1813, he carried out a searching reform of the whole of the army then under his command, thus paving the way for the successes of 1813 and 1814. Again it was in evidence when, after the Commission of Adjustment appointed in 1815 had failed to settle the question of war damages, he, at the request of all concerned, undertook the job single handed, and in three months, by unremitting industry, firmness and tact, finished the settlement in a manner with which even the French ministers declared themselves satisfied.

He knew when to give way, however, and in his subsequent career as a statesman he displayed a sane opportunism that was sometimes misunderstood by his less evenly balanced political allies. Though a staunch Tory himself, he was not afraid to force Catholic Emancipation through Parliament in 1829, after he had been convinced by the Lord Lieutenant that nothing could avert civil war save a concession to the Catholic claims. And in 1832 he was again prepared to sacrifice his Tory principles and abstain from voting against the Reform Bill, after receiving the King's assurance that, if driven to it, he would create sufficient new peers to make the passage of the bill a certainty.

In military affairs he showed the same good sense and adaptability; by which he was led to a general distrust and dislike of plans.

His belief in plans was never strong. He once said pityingly of the Marshals that " they planned their campaigns just as you might make a splendid set of harness. It looks very well, and answers very well, until it gets broken ; and then you are done for. Now, I made my campaigns of ropes. If anything went wrong, I tied a knot ; and went on."[1]

This same evenness and opportuneness of character has been diagnosed—perfectly correctly, I think—by Larpent as the cause of his apparent neglect of old friends. " I think," Larpent said, " Lord Wellington has an active, busy mind, always looking to the future, and is so used to lose a useful man, that as soon as gone he seldom thinks more of him. He would be always, no doubt, ready to serve anyone who had been about him.... but he seems not to think much about you when once out of the way. He has too much of everything and everybody always in his way to think much of the absent."[2]

It was probably also responsible for his complete lack of vindictiveness. " When war is concluded all animosity should be forgotten " was one of his maxims ; and in Jan. 1815, when mob hysteria was demanding the execution of Napoleon, he insisted that, " if the sovereigns wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which should not be me " ; [2] while the Pont de Jéna was only saved from the barbaric wrath of Blucher by the appearance of a British sentry, who was posted night and day on the bridge, with orders from the British Commander-in-Chief never for a moment to leave it.[3]

Finally, I suggest that it was at the back of his extraordinary ascendancy over the Portuguese and Spanish authorities. Lord Roberts has ascribed this ascendancy to his earlier experience in command of Indian troops. " They disliked him," he says, " but they feared him."[4] And one may suspect that what they feared was the almost uncanny calmness of demeanour that somehow served only to magnify the hidden wrath within.

For Wellington was of a markedly irascible nature, and though he normally kept his temper well under control, it would flare out on occasion with devastating intensity. We are told that Abisbal, a Spanish general who had incurred his displeasure during the advance

[1] " The Duke," by Philip Guedalla, pp. 272, 253.
[2] " The Words of Wellington," by Edith Walford, pp. 196, 108.
[3] " The Sword of State," by Susan Buchan, p, 13.
[4] " The Rise of Wellington," by F. M. Earl Roberts, V.C., p. 120.

into France in 1814, and who subsequently visited him in Madrid, was so upset by what the Duke had to say to him that he emerged from the interview pale, nearly fainting, and clinging to the banisters for support.[1] And the sarcasm that was the more usual vehicle of displeasure seems to have been hardly less overwhelming. We can feel for the unfortunate staff officer who came to see his Chief while the latter was sitting to Goya, the painter, in Madrid, and was dismissed with these words: "I shall be glad to know who is to command the army, you or I? I establish one route; you establish another. As long as you live, sir, never do that again; never do anything without my orders."[2]

Wellington was, in fact, inclined to be haughty and arrogant in his dealings with his subordinates, and his low opinion of the British soldier—of everything except his fighting qualities—is too well known to need repetition. Undoubtedly, the type of man then serving in the Army was not of a very high intellectual or moral standard, but in this he was no worse than those who had followed Marlborough, and who, under the inspiration of his leadership, became reformed characters and left the Army sober and self-respecting men.

Here, then, we see the essential difference in character between these two great soldiers. Corporal John, the idol of his troops; and the Iron Duke, haughty and aloof "the little black-guard that stops the French" to a corporal in a rare outburst of enthusiasm,[3] but "the Peer" to his generals, even behind his back, and "our great Lord" to ardent subalterns.[4] The explanation seems to be that in the one mental poise came naturally and without effort, whereas in the other it was the result of fierce inward repressions. The flashing eye, the biting sarcasm, and mordant wit of the Duke of Wellington, all betray the inner tension of one whose mind is not naturally well balanced and who has to fight hard to win and maintain his self-control; a state that is still further illustrated by the severity of his discipline in his dealings both with himself and others. It has been said that once, when two men were caught plundering and brought before him, he remarked curtly, "In ten minutes report to me that these two men have been executed."[5] And we may well ask ourselves

1 "Personal Reminiscences of the Duke of Wellington," by Francis, First Earl of Ellesmere, p. 111.
2 "Wellington," by Oliver Brett, pp. 65, 101.
3 "Wellington," by Oliver Brett, pp. 65,101.
4 "The Duke," by Philip Guedalla, p. 207.
5 "Wellington," by Oliver Brett, p. 78.

whether this outward asperity and intolerance of weakness in others was not the mere reflection of his own harshness with himself. Indeed, one is almost forced to agree with Sir John Fortescue that Wellington "had actually an emotional nature, which he kept, owing to early training, under so stern control as to forbid it any vent except upon very rare occasions."[1]

This would explain the many self-imposed standards of behaviour that earned for him the reputation for devotion to duty. What other people did, or thought, or felt, made no impression on the Duke of Wellington. "I have done," he would say, "according to the very best of my judgment, all that can be done. I care not either for the enemy in front, or for anything which they may say at home."

His standards were certainly very high, and so sensitive was he to the idea of failure that he never quite recovered from the effects of his unfortunate night attack at Sultanpettah Tope. It was the one recorded occasion on which he showed signs of being flustered, and it obviously left a very deep impression on his mind; which may possibly have accounted for his subsequent disinclination to use night operations.

The truth is, he was an abnormally sensitive man; he hated admitting himself in the wrong, and he hated being helped, but loved helping others and liked to know that this help was being appreciated. Writing to a friend in India after his appointment to the Chief Secretaryship for Ireland, he says: "I am employed in this country much in the same way that I was in India—that is to say, in everything." And from Villa Franca, in May 1811, he writes to the Earl of Liverpool, "I am obliged to be everywhere, and if absent from any operation something goes wrong."

In later life it was the same. "There is no animal in nature so worked as the Duke of Wellington" is a constantly recurring phrase in his letters to Lady Salisbury; and he would never have admitted, even to himself, that he could have avoided all his troubles by the simple expedient of withdrawing from public life. He could never have contemplated, as Marlborough did, retiring from the Army and living quietly among his horses and his dogs; he had to be helping somebody, and since—unlike Cromwell and Jackson—he had no religious mania, his help had to take a practical, worldly form.

[1] "Wellington," by Hon. John Fortescue, p. 220.

Now let us summarize the steps that seem to have occurred in the evolution of this most interesting character. We started with a delicate, shy, and sensitive child, who grew into an apparently indolent and slightly frivolous youth ; then there came an unsuccessful proposal of marriage, followed by a rapid transformation of our hero into an ambitious, industrious, and self-reliant soldier, whose health, though bad at first, flourished surprisingly amid the rigours of campaigning in Southern India ; and later, there emerged the national leader of iron will, haughty temper, cynical shrewdness, and sane opportunism ; who mellowed ultimately into the disinterested and trusted servant of the State, still irascible, still haughty, but with the selfishness gone out of his ambition, and with a very human weakness for catching colds.

There is something inspiring about a career such as this, for it seems to hold out hope to everyone. As we read of the apparently effortless perfection of a Marlborough, we are filled with admiration, but we hardly feel inspired to try and emulate his achievements. It was easy for him, because he was a born soldier and statesman ; but it would have been impossible for one who lacked his inherent ability. With Wellington, it is different ; he had a bad start in life ; he was bad at work and bad at games ; he was not even keen on soldiering when he joined the Army ; yet somehow he made good, and managed to span the enormous gap that had separated Arthur Wellesley from Jack Churchill.

It was hard work that did it ; the habit of studying by himself for some hours every day ; the same habit of mental concentration that did so much for Stonewall Jackson. But whence this habit ? Was not the price a cold and cheerless childhood and married life ?

Here again there is a marked contrast with Marlborough. In my paper on the latter, I have attempted to show how happy were his relations with women throughout his life ; and I deduced that his sweetness of temper, serenity, and sociability were the result of a state of emotional contentment.

Now with Wellington it was quite different. His mother appears to have been a cold, austere woman, who could not even remember the date of his birth ; and what little we know of his childhood is enough to show that it cannot have been happy. In his marriage, too, he was no more fortunate ; Kitty Pakenham was a sweet creature

but undecided, timid, sentimental, and not very truthful. "Mated unfortunately to a man who was irritable, punctual and business-like, she was continually found wanting. She lacked all the qualities which her husband really admired in a human being." [1]

Thus Arthur Wellesley was never able to get away from himself and establish an emotional contact with the outside world. The seclusiveness engendered in him by his early frailty and unhappiness was confirmed by the failure of his marital relations. And as he could not be happy, he had to be great, for his sensitiveness was such that he could not bear to be pitied, even by himself. His greatness was, in fact, a compensation for his emotional failures, and, like all such compensations, it was overdone. The mental concentration, practised at first as a few hours isolated study every day, became at last the tyrant of his life; like some mental Sandow, his very existence depended on the exercises that he had once cultivated as an aid to health; he could not retire gracefully from the arena of public life, but fought on, an object of mingled awe and pity, till death at last released him from the struggle.

[1] "The Sword of State," by Susan Buchan, p. 32.

IMPRESSIONS OF COLLECTIVE TRAINING, ALDERSHOT, 1932.

By Major A. B. Gibson, M.C., 13th Frontier Force Rifles.

The following notes make no pretence to being a survey of the work done in the Aldershot Command last summer. They are merely the random jottings of a spectator from India, who was attached to the 2nd. Division. They are written mainly from the standpoint of the 6th. Infantry Brigade.

To the Commanders and Staffs of the 2nd. Division and of the 6th. Infantry Brigade, as well as to all officers with whom he came in contact, the writer tenders his warmest thanks. Nothing could have exceeded the kindness shown to him by everyone in Aldershot.

Effectives.

Shortage of men appears to be the greatest weakness of training at Aldershot, as at all home stations. To the Indian spectator, accustomed to full peace establishments, units were often scarcely recognisable. Battalions looked like companies; batteries often produced only the men and armament of a section. The number of officers on the other hand seemed enormous. In one exercise a battalion at war establishment was improvised. To effect this, practically the whole resources of an infantry brigade in men, and more than its resources in animals and vehicles were called on.

To the young officer, and not so very young either in 1932, who has never seen a real battalion, much less a brigade or division, this shortage must to some extent produce false lessons. To the staff officer it makes for a simplification of his problems by reducing the factors of time and space. This simplification affects more especially the complicated staff duties inevitable in dealing with mechanized, or worse still semi-mechanized, forces. Watching the concentration and extrication of such forces one could not help thinking how vastly more difficult these already complicated operations would be if the forces concerned were not virtually skeletons.

Infantry Organization.

The equipment of the infantry of the Aldershot Command is normal, except that of the 6th. Infantry Brigade. This brigade is partially mechanized, but not to the extent carried out in the 7th.

Brigade. The battalion organization follows closely that laid down in the latest official publication on the subject of mechanization and appears to be an almost unqualified success. In particular the new mortar receives a volume of praise on all hands. Considerable practical experience has been gained in the handling of anti-tank guns. It has emerged from this practice that employment of these guns on a battalion basis is often uneconomical, and that higher co-ordination is necessary to obtain the best lay-out. To achieve this the 6th. Brigade have appointed a Brigade Anti-Tank Officer, whose duties are in part analagous to those of the Brigade Machine Gun Officer—co-ordination of guns which are under battalion control. On occasions however all anti-tank guns were brigaded and their layout and control then became the task of the " B.A.T.O. " An instance of this form of employment was when anti-tank platoons formed piquets or part of piquets for flank protection of the moving brigade. Incidentally, a controversy was in progress on the subject of the necessity of B. M. G. O. Meantime brigades retain them, but in the collective training season they have little or no work to do with the machine guns of their brigades ; they have, however, full time jobs as assistants to their brigade majors.

6th. Brigade Headquarters have a Morris 6-wheeler staff car, and work frequently with a lorry office. Both of these are of immense assistance to the Commander in enabling him to retain control of his brigade when it is widely deployed. Throughout the brigade Austin Sevens abound, and are constantly used for reconnaissance and liaison.

The 6th. Brigade forms the nucleus of the mechanized " school of thought " at Aldershot. With it are associated continually the mechanized gunners—the 10th. Field Brigade,—a mechanized Field Company, and a mechanized Signal Section. Affiliation between units goes strong, everyone knows everyone else, and there is a tremendous " *esprit de groupe* " throughout. This mutual understanding is an absolute necessity in a formation of such a heterogenius nature, where staff duties are unusually difficult. Orders, often quite unavoidably, become long and complicated, and the simple march table for the concentration of an unmechanized brigade becomes a most formidable document. Not only is special training required for the production of these orders, but a considerable degree of intelligent initiative is called for in their recipients if they are to be successfully carried out.

Mechanization and Mentality.

There seemed to the spectator no doubt at all of the effect of mechanization on the officers and men of the infantry concerned. Quite apart from the useful trade which the man in the ranks learns as part of his normal soldiering, service in a mechanized unit is definitely much more " fun " than that in a non-mechanized one. Driving a Carden-Loyd through the dripping woods of Surrey is certainly hard work, but it is infinitely more amusing than plodding through them heavy footed and enveloped in a sweating ground sheet. The whole mechanized show goes with a snap, and one got the impression that this increase of pace was definitely reflected in the mentality of the men concerned. Battalions coming into mechanized brigades take to the work extraordinarily quickly. The anti-climax of leaving them to return to the old ways must be hard to bear.

Communications.

Rapid communications between the parts of a mechanized force are an essential for successful action. The 6th. Brigade was particularly well served in this respect. Wide and complicated movements requiring the most careful co-ordination were carried out time after time smoothly and successfully thanks to the rapidity and efficiency of the intercommunication. Virtually two agencies alone were responsible for this state of affairs.

(*a*) *Service of Liaison.*—The principle of liaison appeared to have been thoroughly instilled into everyone. No one ever waited in ignorance of the situation, or of the position of the troops on his flanks, front, or rear. Liaison agents were everywhere. Officers working between units and Headquarters and units dashed about in Austin Sevens or on motor cycles. They were by no means always the most junior and inexperienced officers, as seems so often to be the case in India. Admittedly of course, there are far more officers to play with in England, but even in cases where young officers were employed on liaison work, the manner in which they made their reports was evidence of considerable training in this most important duty.

(*b*) *Wireless.*—The 6th. Brigade was liberally equipped with the new No. 1 Sets which are combined R/T and W/T.

These were mounted in Austin Sevens and accompanied battalions sent off on detached missions. They appeared to be very satisfactory and through them almost uninterrupted communication was maintained.

Scope of the Training in 1932.

In 1932 Collective Training at Aldershot was limited for reasons of economy to exercises carried out from barracks. These exercises usually lasted for several days but were conducted over ground very familiar to the troops. As a result personal reconnaissances were largely unnecessary, and at times even the map was hardly consulted. In spite of these drawbacks the training was neither stereotyped nor dull, the schemes being in some cases most unusually ingenious and live.

Tanks took no part in exercises with other arms; in 1932 they were playing by themselves.

Direction and Umpiring.

Having set the schemes the Directing Staff interfered very little in the course of the operations, which were allowed to develop to their logical conclusions. Good plans were not penalised, and were allowed to achieve the success they deserved. Action by the Directing Staff was often confined to suspending operations when one side had definitely succeeded in attaining its object. This unhampering direction gave opportunities for real training in leadership, and kept the exercises live and interesting.

Umpiring was most efficient. The umpires themselves knew their business, and there were plenty of them everywhere. The system was simple and practical; there was no elaborate " neutral signal service " nor system of reports to hamper umpires and to take them away from their proper place in the operations—between the opposing forces, and in touch with their opposite numbers. In most cases umpires used their private cars as transport.

Controlled by good direction and umpiring, the operations were most realistic. Prisoners were always taken, and were treated when captured in a thoroughly business like fashion. In India we rarely take prisoners, and when we do we hand them back at dark for fear they go hungry. The taking of prisoners apart from other considerations is most stimulating to the troops, and we would probably gain

much if we always took prisoners, and kept them to the end of the operations. If they went hungry it would teach them not to be captured again.

The Will to Win.

The outstanding impression produced on the spectators of the Aldershot training was the spirit in which the whole business was undertaken. Some things were noticeably better done than in India, especially co-operation with the R. A. F., anti-aircraft training, and traffic control. Other things were not so good—notably the training of the troops themselves.

The spirit of everyone was however quite remarkable. The success of the whole training was really made by the will to win with which everyone seemed imbued. Plans were made not to conform to academic ritual and formulæ, but with the object of defeating the enemy. Inter-brigade rivalry was intense. The results of each battle were canvassed with the greatest keenness. Interest culminated in the last exercise, a fight between the 2nd. and 6th. Brigades. This is an annual fixture, and is regarded very much in the light of a major sporting event. In the course of this battle the Commander of the 2nd. Brigade was captured. The officer who effected this coup was quite incoherent with excitement, and the news was received with wild enthusiasm by everyone in the 6th. Brigade.

In India we have certain handicaps to live and amusing training. In monotonous country devoid of interest or even of features, it is difficult to stage stimulating exercises. Much has lately been written in our official training memoranda about this will to win, which often in the past has been sadly lacking in our training. Matters have certainly been improved of late, but further development is certainly possible. Our schemes for two-sided exercises with troops must be framed and controlled to give full scope to this factor. Too often in the past over-control has made success impossible to achieve. In every exercise large or small the defeat of the enemy, or at least the attainment of the object should be a possibility. The will to win will then develop naturally in commanders and in their troops. It should be the basis of all training. Without it the best exercise must be boring ; with it even a dull scheme is enlivened.

THE TRAVELS OF RISALDAR SHAHZAD MIR KHAN.

PART III.

My Journey to Africa with Captain Wellby Sahib Bahadur in 1898-99.

In 1898, when I was in Jhelum, I received a letter from Captain Wellby Sahib through the Q. M. G.'s office in Simla, asking whether I would like to go to Africa with him. At first I was not keen on the idea of spending my whole life travelling and so being passed over for promotion in the Regiment; but the Colonel Sahib eventually persuaded me to go.

I met Captain Wellby Sahib in Bombay and we sailed on the 30th August arriving at Aden on the 7th. September. After a few days there we sailed for Zula, a port in Somaliland near the northern boundaries of Abyssinia where we met Harrington Sahib who was on his way to the capital.

Zula, Bulghar, Berbera and Aden are all prototypes of Hell, for there is not a blade of grass or a green leaf to be seen in any of them. Water is so scarce that one can only get it on payment.

The Somalis are divided into twelve tribes and own large flocks and herds. They are shameless beggars and will ask for *bakhshish* for merely telling you where the road goes to. They are terribly conceited and think that they are the most beautiful, the bravest and cleverest people in the world. From my experience of them, I am of opinion that they are first class hunters, that is, in tracking and marking down game. They have wonderful eye-sight, are congenial companions and can endure thirst second to none. For the rest they are repulsively ugly. Their food consists of milk and the meat of the camel only.

The only Somali tribe of any importance is the Isa. In this tribe, a young man is not allowed to marry till he has killed one or two men—for before he has accomplished this, they say he is no man and he has to eat his food with the women. They kill their men treacherously and usually in the following manner. The young man meets some unfortunate on the road or may be is walking alongside someone. He will eventually suggest that they should rest for a while in the shade. When his victim is asleep he will stab him with his spear.

At the wedding, the groom will hang an iron plaque round his bride's neck, and the size of the plaque will depend on the number of men he has murdered and it is looked on as a sort of medal for bravery! When he dies they will erect as many grave stones over his grave as the number of men he has killed. The Somalis in general marry only one wife and when she has had three or four children, her husband gets rid of her, sends her back to her people, and marries a new one. They say this improves the breed !

The Somalis as a nation are of no account, for they have never fought a war, and are essentially cowardly and therefore peace-loving. However they have a Mulla, Muhammad Abdulla by name, whom I saw in Berbera when he was on his way to the Pilgrimage to Mecca. He indeed had had sufficient spirit to raise an insurrection in the land, for after he had induced half the people to accept him as their leader, he attacked and plundered the other half and even gave the British Government a good deal of trouble.

Captain Wellby Sahib Bahadur and I left Berbera on the 13th. September and reached Hargisa, a distance of some eighty-eight miles, on the 19th. We stayed there till the 30th. and then marched the remaining seventy-seven miles to the frontier of Abyssinia within a mile of which we were met by an Abyssinian General called Abdulla Lihaha, who refused to let us go any further till he had permission from his Commander-in-Chief, Ras Makinnan. We were delayed for a week till the necessary permission came.

The Abyssinians and their King.

We arrived at the capital, Addis Ababa or Antoto, on the 25th. October and on the 26th. the Sahib told me that on the following day I was to take four sowars of the Aden Troop as escort, and that we would pay our respects to King Menelik. This we did, but when the king saw the sowars with drawn swords he appeared uneasy. Harrington Sahib noticed this and told me to withdraw the escort.

The various districts in Abyssinia are governed by military Governors appointed by the King. Such Governors are styled *Ras*, *e.g.*, Ras Makinnan who administers the country from Jagjaga (?) to the Eastern frontier. Such military Governors appoint Generals and Colonels to assist them in the administration. Once a year they offer a present to the king which consists of money, elephant tusks, young girls or anything else worth having. The king rewards them with

some small gift. That is the king's chief source of revenue and with this money he buys rifles from France and Russia which he distributes among the various Ras. In former days the tribes were only armed with bows, arrows and spears but now, thanks to these rifles, they have been able to take over the vast territory which comprises the Abyssinia of to-day.

The Abyssinians appear to be a very brave and warlike people. But in my three visits to their country, I have had a good opportunity of studying them and have come to the conclusion that they are chicken-hearted and are even afraid to leave their own country.

Some of their customs are really disgusting. For instance, they slaughter an ox, a sheep or a goat in the following manner. One of them fells the animal by a single blow on the head with a large hammer and then plunges a dagger into its intestines and so causes a stream of blood to gush out. If the onlookers happen to have a vessel with them, they will let the blood flow into it and drink it, otherwise they will merely suck up the blood off the ground. They will then cut off large portions of the flesh and seize one end of a piece of the meat with their teeth and the other end with their hands and tear and eat it just like wolves. I often asked them why they did this and they would reply that there was no nourishment in cooked meat and that raw meat made them strong.

They will boast of their bravery and prowess by saying that they have killed a lion, an elephant, or some other wild animal. The method they employ to kill these animals is as follows. Not less than fifty will go after a lion and not less than sixty after an elephant or rhinoceros. The animal belongs to the man who first lets off his rifle at it whether he hits it or not. They have no idea whatsoever of how to use a rifle and turn their faces over to the right when they pull the triggers, so it is impossible to tell when the bullet will go. Nevertheless, when fifty or sixty rifles are let off, it is probable that one bullet will hit the mark. If the animal is killed, that very night a great crowd will collect in the house of the man who fired the first shot, and they will sing and make merry and drink themselves drunk.

We stayed in Addis Ababa till the 29th. and on the following day the king prepared to go to war with a neighbouring state. An army of 60,000 went out to battle and we also went in the King's train. On the second day, a messenger arrived from the Queen-Empress who

implored the king to make peace and return. This His Majesty decided to do. To mark the termination of the operations, a salute of eleven guns was fired.

Notes on the Abyssinian Army.

The troops have no barracks or lines and all live in the bazaars. The men always go about armed with rifles and swords. These swords, which are curved like bows, they wear on their right sides. No musketry whatsoever is carried out in the army. When a soldier takes an oath, he does not swear by the name of God or of any Saint, but by name of the Commander-in-Chief, Ras Makinnan, which is considered absolutely binding.

Menelik's forces had been trained by a German officer and when I saw them marching out to attack Tigri (the State mentioned above), I noticed that, just like an European Army, they had scouts out in front of the advanced guard and patrols on both flanks. When halted at night, they took all necessary precautions for protection, not by outposts but by the same guards as they used by day. Tents were carried for the whole force.

There were about a thousand women with the force, some of whom were the General's wives. These carried umbrellas of various colours. The remainder consisted of nine hundred concubines who were a great encumbrance on the road. A Lance-Naik was allowed one woman to look after him and a Jemadar, two or three. The supply of women in Abyssinia is an easy matter for they are all prostitutes.

Instead of an Arsenal, they have a reserve of arms and munitions at the capital which they captured some years ago from an Italian force which had invaded their country. The Italian General was utterly incompetent and had made no arrangements for the protection of his supply column. The men suffered agonies of thirst and eventually the whole force was surrounded by Ras Makinnan's troops and some 6,000 European troops with their artillery, arms and horses were captured.

The Foreign Consulates.

The French were the first nation to have a consulate in Addis Ababa and that was because they hoped to take the country over. They were soon followed by the Italians and the Russians. Last of all the British appointed a consul and I had the honour of hoisting his flag ;

that is to say I was the first man to hoist the Union Jack in front of the British Agency in Addis Ababa and Captain Wellby Sahib took a photograph of me doing so.

We continue the Journey.

On the 31st. October, Captain Wellby Sahib received permission to continue his journey, and having made all necessary arrangements and collected fifty-five followers under an Abyssinian headman we marched to Mount Zukala.

The hinterland of Abyssinia is very fertile during the rainy season —indeed it must be one of the most fertile countries in the world. Owing to the fact that it rains for five months on end, pools of water are usually to be found even on the tops of the hills. The natives cultivate maize, wheat and barley, but know nothing of other crops, although their country is admirably suited for rice and tobacco. They sow millet in large quantities out of which they make a sort of bread.

Our way now lay through really wild country. On such a journey one has to take the greatest precautions. One must always have a rifle, a knife, the means of lighting a fire and a water bottle with one, and remember that in this part of the world if you have a double barrel gun and some cartridges you will never go hungry. If you are travelling alone, keep off the paths as far as possible, for lions and savages often frequent the paths.

Nearly all our transport animals died on the road and Captain Wellby despaired of our being able to continue the journey. I thereupon took fifteen coolies with me and went off to the southern shores of Lake Rudolf, which is 300 miles long from North to South.

On the way we came to a forest in which we found some shepherds with their flocks, and later we came to know that they had some donkeys too. They were in front of us and when we approached them I shot a stag. As soon as they heard the shot, they prepared to fight. There were many of them, and to frighten them I fired several more shots in the air. As soon as they heard the shots, they left their sheep, goats and donkeys and fled. Sixty big fat donkeys thus fell into our hands which were more than sufficient for our needs. We also rounded up four hundred sheep. The shepherds tried to attack us that night but could not get near our camp. By way of payment for the donkeys, sheep and goats, the Sahib left on the ground some bales of cloth and bundles of beads.

In this land there is an extraordinary animal called the "Shutar-murgh" (Ostrich), the feathers of which the English consider very valuable. It is an enormous bird though it cannot fly. Then there is the Giraffe which looks like a deformed camel. It can eat the leaves off the top of even very large trees. Besides this, there are large stags called *Kudu*, lions, wild donkeys and many rare kinds of deer. It is a sportsman's paradise.

Another feature of the country is that whereas the water of any great lake is brackish, that of Lake Rudolf is sweet. In this lake, hippopotami are to be found, from the teeth of which good false teeth are made for human beings. There are great big crocodiles and shoals of fish. On this journey I shot an elephant, and a rhinoceros which took six Martini-Henry bullets to bring down, whereas a single bullet in the head from a Lee-Metford will stop either animal.

When we left Lake Rudolf, we were entirely dependent on rain for our water supply. For many days on end we had not had a drop of rain and Captain Wellby Sahib sent me out with nine coolies to reconnoitre for water. We marched all night long and at dawn saw a woman of the savages and asked her by signs where we could get water. She led us to a stream where we saw some camels which we were badly in need of for transport. The Sahib had told me that if ever I commandeered any transport animals, I was to bring the owners up as well, and that he would give them cloth and coral beads. As soon as they saw us the men ran away, but three women remained and these I took along together with seven camels and I sent two men to bring the Sahib.

The savages did not seem to mind very much about the camels but they were extremely annoyed at their women being taken, and that night crowds of them surrounded us and I had to sit up all night with my seven men. We fired our rifles till dawn when the Sahib arrived and gave the owners of the camels cloth and coral beads, and let the women go. When the savages saw their women returning with the camels and these gifts they were delighted, and one of them actually drove his camel with us.

After a time our supplies of food came to an end, and for many days we had seen nothing to shoot, so the Sahib again sent me out with two coolies to reconnoitre and to try to shoot something for food. We soon met a couple of savages to whom we explained by signs that

we wanted food. They took us to their village and offered us some millet. They then came back carrying the millet to our camp. I noticed that they seemed surprised that we were so few and that most of our followers were ill. They examined our rifles with curiosity and apparently did not realise that they were weapons. They returned home and that very night some three hundred of them surrounded our camp. Led by two of their chiefs, a party of them came forward and the Sahib and I pointed our rifles point blank at the stomachs of the two chiefs and told them that unless they sent their people away we would kill them. They signalled to their followers to retire. Next morning these two men came to pay their respects to the Sahib, but as soon as we started off, their warriors followed stealthily on our flanks with the obvious intention of murdering us at the first opportunity. I suggested to the Sahib that we should halt and make a zariba of thorn bushes round our camp. This we did and after a while we saw some sixty of them coming up from the rear preparing to attack. The Sahib knelt down and fired two shots at them and I had one shot at them standing. These three rounds were quite enough for they retired. Some of them must have been hit and the others probably realised for the first time what a rifle could do !

Some days after this we came to a river which was a branch of the Nile. This river was infested with crocodiles so we could not swim across. We had several of our donkeys taken by these animals. We met with the same difficulty at every branch of the Nile we had to cross. We overcame this difficulty by means of a canvas boat which we had brought with us. This now proved invaluable. It would hold four men and a lot of kit.

We made two long ropes out of the bundles of cloth we had brought for the savages and fastened iron rings to the necks of the transport animals which we managed to pull across with the ropes, whilst the men in the boat shoved the crocodiles off.

The people in this part of the world live on fish for they know nothing about cultivation. Neither men nor women wear any clothes. They do not appear to be shy about it, but it makes a foreigner blush !

After marching through dense forests, deserts and swamps for about a year, one day as we were following the bank of the river Nomer (?) we were astonished to see in front of us a camp of considerable size, and that the people of the camp had trained two field guns

on us! We studied them through our field glasses and found that they were a detachment of the Egyptian Army. When we reached the camp we came to know that there were two companies under a Bimbashi called Mackenzie Sahib. They were encamped at the junction of the Nile and Nomer Rivers.

We crossed the Nile and reached Fashoda on the 8th. July 1899. In Fashoda there were two officers, one an Englishman, and the other a Turk. Each of these was trying to enlist the sympathy of the local tribes against the other, for after the campaign against the Dervishes it had been decided that both nations, *i.e.*, the British and the Turkish-Egyptians should have an equal share in the administration of the country and when we were there each of them was trying to get the greater share.

We stayed in Fashoda for a month and then sailed up the Nile in a ship called the " Sultani." In Omdurman, there were about 15,000 Sudanese and Egyptian troops. I saw them on parade. All words of command, etc., were in Turkish.

The Egyptians are fat, lazy and insolent. Their women too are very fat and go about enshrouded in black veils, though they are not very careful about keeping in purdah. The men-folk wear European dress, and although the climate is excellent they do not look healthy as, like the French, they are too fat.

The River Nile.

The whole country is irrigated by the Nile and is very fertile. This river flows so slowly that it takes one some time to realise that it flows northwards. For this reason it is navigable for all kinds of shipping. It is wrong to call the river " The Nile " which means the " blue " for it ought to be called like the " Hoang Ho " of China " The Golden River." The banks on both sides are so fertile that the land might be called " Nature's Throne." Every year the floods irrigate it and make it one of the world's granaries. Portions of a railway have been constructed along the banks of the river from Khartoum northwards, but they have not been linked up as yet. The banks of the river itself are covered with date gardens.

Cairo.

There are no buildings of any great age in Cairo, but there is a shrine in which the head of Imam Husain is said to be kept. The

city is well built—all the houses are of brick. I stayed in the "Egypt Barracks." One day Lord Kitchener Sahib came there and I was introduced to him. He was very nice to me and complimentary on the work I had done. We stayed in Cairo for eight days and then went by train to Suez, a twenty-four hours journey. On the following day, Captain Wellby Sahib sailed for England, and it took me eight days to settle up with the servants, etc., and I then returned to Aden.

(To be continued).

MAINTENANCE OF A CAVALRY BRIGADE WITH MECHANISED TRANSPORT.

By Captain G. S. R. Webb, M.C., 15th. Lancers.

The decision to mechanise the transport of Cavalry Brigades on the Indian Establishment has roused a certain amount of controversy. There are many who consider that the A. T. Cart, slow and cumbersome as it is, is more reliable in roadless Asia. The difficulties of the Mechanical Transport at the crossing of the Bimber Nullah during the Northern Command manœuvres of 1928 are quoted as an outstanding example. Advocates of the new system argue that the 30-cwt. six-wheeler lorry can go almost anywhere that the A. T. Cart can go, its mobility more than compensating for any small delays that may occur in getting it over bad places. They further insist that delays due to rain would normally be limited to a few days anywhere in Northern India or beyond the Frontier and would affect both sides, while the Indian Army would be ill-equipped with A. T. Carts to meet an opposing force which had the advantage of M. T.

Whatever the arguments, the fact remains that the decision has been taken and it is desirable to examine the problems that will arise with the new form of transport. The increased mobility and range of action now given to the Cavalry Brigade are to some extent offset by the separation of man and horse from essential equipment, by increased distances between the Brigade and its transport, and by the fact that men on their feet such as followers, will be useless under the new organisation.

A few notes on the present system of maintenance in India compared with the Home system, will help us to get a mental picture of what is going on behind the Cavalry Brigade itself.

At Home.

1st. Line Transport belongs entirely to the unit.

2nd. Line Transport organised as sections of the Cavalry Divisional Baggage, Supply and Ammunition Companies R. A. S. C.

3rd. Line Transport consists of Cavalry Maintenance M. T. Companies which work between Railhead and S. R. P. or A. R. P.

In India.

1st. Line Transport consists (in Cavalry Brigades only) of unit transport, some of which is held in peace and some allotted from the I.A.S.C., on mobilisation. A portion of the weight previously carried on the horse is now carried in " A " and " B " Echelons, 2nd. Line Transport.

2nd. Line Transport. " A " Echelon.—This comprises 22 30-cwt. lorries attached to units and carrying reserves of water, ammunition and other essentials required close at hand.

" B " Echelon is arranged in Baggage, Supply and Ammunition Sections together with certain technical I.A.S.C. lorries.

The whole of the 2nd. Line Transport is organised as a Cavalry Brigade M. T. Company.

3rd. Line Transport consists of standard M. T. Sections up to the number required and working under the orders of the superior commander (*i.e.*, rearward of S. R. P. and A. R. P.).

It will be found that all transport in the Brigade is now Pack or M. T. except that of the Battery R.H.A.

The Cavalry Brigade, I. A. S. C., is organised as follows :—

C. I. A. S. C.—A Major I. A. S. C. who is responsible for all supply and transport arrangements within the Brigade.

M. T. Company, I. A. S. C., consisting of Headquarters and four Sections of 30-cwt. lorries. Headquarters includes workshops, petrol tank lorry and other technical vehicles.

The four Sections provide lifts as under :—

22 " A " Echelon vehicles.
31 Baggage Section vehicles.
12 Ammunition Section vehicles.
24 Supply Section vehicles.
10 per cent. spare lorries for use in case of breakdown or to replace casualties.

The balance of the Sections (which each consist of 25 working vehicles) will probably be retained as an Army reserve and will not be available for use within the Brigade.

The Ammunition Section.

The Cavalry Brigade Ammunition Column is abolished but the Battery R. H. A. retains a horsed Ammunition Section. 168 rounds per gun are now carried by the Battery and 84 rounds per gun in the Ammunition Section.

Cavalry Regiments carry their normal echelon of ammunition reserve on pack horses; regimental reserves for Vickers guns and rifles being carried in "A" Echelon M. T.

The Ammunition Section of "B" Echelon 2nd. Line M. T. carries 140 rounds per 13-pdr., 17,000 rounds per Vickers gun and 150 rounds per rifle. This Section will usually work well ahead of the rest of the M. T. Company and under the direct orders of Brigade Headquarters. When an engagement is imminent a portion of the Section will usually be ordered to form a Forward Ammunition Point (F. A. P.) in order to give units a definite fixed point from which they can draw supplies of the various natures. The location of the F. A. P. will be notified in the orders for the operation. It will be the duty of the O. C. Ammunition Section to maintain a forward impetus of supply to the Battery Ammunition Section, "A" Echelon Ammunition reserves, or direct to units, by keeping in close touch with them and sending up lorries as required. It will be an advantage to load all S. A. A. lorries on a standard basis, *i.e.*, a proportion of charger packed, bundle packed and fireworks in each so that a mere demand for S. A. A. will ensure the correct type being sent up. All the S. A. A. lorries will form a pool, any one being available to go to any unit. A Regiment on detached duty might, however, take its Ammunition lorries with it. The function of the Section does not, however, end here. The remainder of the lorries will be required to fetch refills from the A. R.P. and to replace empty lorries at the F. A. P. At present there is only one motor cycle with this Section but it is proposed to increase the number; failing this it may be necessary for units to send back for S. A. A. lorries owing to the lack of means of communication.

During operations it will be usual to refill unit packs direct from this Section instead of *via* the "A" Echelon lorries so as to save double handling. The latter Echelon will supply deficiencies in bandoliers, etc., when in bivouac.

The Supply Section.

The system of supply is normal. The Supply Section, working under order of the C. I. A. S. C. will collect from S. R. P. where bulk is broken by the Supply Issue Section and deliver thence to units *via* Meeting Points. The question of its control will be discussed later. Bakery Sections do not now form a part of the Brigade but will be located at or near railhead, sending up their bread by the Supply

Column. Butchery Sections are under the C. I. A. S. C. of the Brigade and may be located near the S. R. P. where bulk is broken. Stores are sent up in Supply lorries. If they are too bulky, special transport will have to be detailed.

The Baggage Section.

This contains all unit loads not required immediately, and units may have to be prepared to do without them for one or more nights. The Section will collect baggage from unit bivouacs in the morning and rendezvous at a point selected by the Staff until it can be moved up. The lorries will normally return to the parent unit (M. T. Company) at night for maintenance.

M. T. Company Headquarters.

This includes one breakdown lorry, a petrol tank lorry and, normally, the workshop and store lorries of each section which will form a Company workshop and be able to deal with all 2nd. line repairs—those which can be completed within six days. It will also be able to despatch a breakdown or local repair detachment to any point where its assistance is required. The Mobile Repair Unit allotted in War Establishments 1929, does not now form part of the Cavalry Brigade.

3rd. line repairs, *i.e.*, those taking more than six days, will be evacuated in the normal manner, replacements being demanded. It will be seen from the above that the Company workshop should not normally be moved daily with the Brigade owing to the difficulty in moving vehicles under repair and the loss of working time. A portion of the workshop could however go forward and open up an advanced workshop, the remainder closing up as soon as they had finished the repairs on hand.

The petrol tank lorry is for the supply of the M. T. Company and not for the M. T. of the whole Brigade. The latter is supplied by the Supply Columns, the fuel being in tins decanted from bulk as far forward as possible. All lorries can carry petrol in their tanks for two days supply on a normal raidus of 25 miles, *i.e.*, 50 miles per day. Refilling can therefore be suspended for one day in emergency, but the second day's supply in the tank should be regarded as an iron ration and the tank maintained full whenever possible.

Each Section has approximately 50 per cent. of spare drivers.

Engineers.

The Field Troop, Sappers and Miners, has 10 lorries, all 1st. line transport, as its M. T. Echelon. The other half troop is organised as a horsed unit with pack transport. These loads are interchangeable with those in the M. T. The Troop will, therefore, usually move in two Echelons.

Water Supply.—Every unit has one or more water trailers, except the I.A.S.C., who utilise mule pakhals carried in each Section. This will considerably reduce the work to be done each evening by the Sappers and R.A.M.C. as one central water point can be made from which all trailers can draw drinking water.

Medical.

The Cavalry Brigade Field Ambulance is entirely mechanised and all its transport is 1st. line. It therefore moves as a compact unit. It can open an A. D. S. or M. D. S., act as a field hospital, or divide into two echelons, half remaining to collect and dispose of casualties while the remainder goes forward with the advancing Brigade. It may be well to mention here that any 30-cwt. lorry can be rapidly converted into an ambulance, the necessary fittings being carried on each lorry in war to sling four stretchers; the latter, of course, are not provided.

Other Units.

Other units with M. T. include the Signal Troop with one wireless lorry which will usually move with Brigade Headquarters M. T.

The Mobile Veterinary Section has three lorries (no horsed transport) which will move as a unit in the M. T. Column.

The Provost and Traffic Troop is organised as a Headquarters, with one British Section mounted on motor cycles and cycles and two Indian Sections mounted on horses. One light van forms its 1st. line transport to convey dismounted personnel from point to point.

Although none is yet provided, it is considered that an office lorry should be provided for Brigade Headquarters. The complications of a modern major engagement are such that duplication of orders is nearly always necessary and there is seldom time to dismount the necessary equipment.

Thus we get a picture of numerous echelons of M. T. from a dozen or so touring cars of officers who have business at or near Brigade Headquarters to the echelons of supply well in rear, which are not immediately necessary. It becomes desirable to sort out all this mass of M. T. and to lay down the principles which govern the movement of each part. For this purpose it will be best to superimpose the transport on a march road, not in contact with the enemy, and to take bird's-eye view of it. It might look something like this :—

Advanced Guard	.. Say, one Regiment.
Main Body	.. Brigade Headquarters and Signals. Two Regiments. Battery R.H.A. and Ammunition Section R.H.A. Field Troop, S. & M. (horsed half-troop). Provost and Traffic Troop (less M. T.).
Brigade H. Q. M.T.	.. Brigade Commander's car. Signals wireless lorry. R./T. Tender R. A. F. (if attached). Motor cars of O. C. Field Troop, O. C. Signals. S. M. O., C. I. A. S. C. and others.
In a M. T. Column	.. M. T. of Field Troop. Cavalry Brigade Field Ambulance. Brigade " A " Echelon, 2nd. line M. T. Ammunition Section, M. T. Company. Mobile Veterinary Section.
Provost and Traffic Troop	M. T. employed on duty along the route.
At a place of concealment or moving up towards end of march	.. M. T. Company. Headquarters Baggage Section.
At S. R. P. or a place of concealment or moving up ..	.. Supply Section.

During an advance it will be almost essential to Brigade the " A " Echelon lorries to facilitate control. The latter, however, must not be too rigid. Units have now to depend on this echelon for a great part of their equipment and necessaries so that access to unit lorries

must be readily obtainable and units even allowed to withdraw one or more lorries to take up essential stores without the necessity of applying to Brigade Headquarters which may be two miles away. The O. C. who will probably be the O.C. Section which finds the lorries, must be trained to appreciate the needs of units and to co-operate in ensuring their supply. This echelon, like the Ammuntion Section, must be used boldly, so that its contents are always at hand and yet it must remain concealed from both ground and air observation. This will entail frequent moves and the O. C. must have fresh locations ahead, reconnoitred with a plan for air defence.

This brings us to the question of command and protection of the M. T. Columns at the halt and on the move, from ground and air. It will be for the Brigade Commander to decide whether it will not be advisable to detail an officer of experience from one of the Regiments to command this mixed M. T. Column. It is vitally necessary that the column should be well-controlled and ready to move as soon as an opportunity offers. It must be handled from a tactical as well as from a technical point of view.

Protection on the Move.

Disregarding the Brigade Headquarters M. T. which will be close enough to the Brigade itself to render extra protective measures unnecessary, there will be two separate columns to be considered. The mixed column and, further back, the M. T. Company Headquarters with the Baggage and Supply Sections.

With the exception of the Field Troop lorries the personnel of these two columns are quite unarmed and their vehicles will be an easy prey for any party of raiders or dacoits. It is considered essential that the lorries of the Ammuniton Section should each carry two armed guards. These could be found from certain dismounted personnel from the Regiments. In addition the Field Ambulance must often, after an engagement, leave some of its vehicles to collect the wounded and some sort of protection will be necessary for these.

To provide an armed guard for every lorry in the Brigade is out of the question as it would entail dismounting 179 men. Some protection would be gained by arming the drivers, but a man cannot drive and fight at the same time and mobility forms the principle weapon of defence. But there are 50 per cent. spare drivers and these could do a certain amount. The Brigade Commander would, however,

never be free from a fear that at any critical moment, his transport containing the resources of his fighting machine, might be held up by a handful of enemy cavalry thus causing him to halt and turn to its relief, or else that it would not for the same reason, arrive in time to enable him to carry an engagement through to success. No Commander can deal properly with an enemy in front if his attention is distracted to the protection of a lengthy L. of C.

Armoured cars would solve the problem but it is unlikely that these will be available in sufficient quantities for the purpose.

The most probable solution would appear to be to arm all drivers with rifles and to issue two Lewis guns per Headquarter or Section of M. T., better still two of the new automatics now being tried out in India. If these could be mounted in Austin Sevens their usefulness would be vastly increased as they could work in pairs for mutual protection and rapidly move up a lorry congested road to any threatened point. Additional trained I.A.S.C. personnel would be required to work these guns.

Air defence of the columns would also be facilitated by the issue of these guns as each lorry could be fitted with a clamp of a simple nature on which the gun could be mounted for A. A. sighting.

Let us take the I.A.S.C. column and see how its defence could be arranged on these lines.

The Supply Section will have refilled early in the morning at S. R. P. while the Baggage Section will have collected its loads. Both these Sections will have received orders from the M. T. Company Commander to join Company Headquarters at a suitable concealed point. Here the column will halt until the Brigade has reached, or nearly reached, the area where it is likely to spend the night, when orders for it to make a complete bound forward would be sent. No Commander would be willing to have this collection of lorries making continual tactical bounds behind the Brigade, thus giving away the direction of its march and increasing the risk of losses from air attack.

While awaiting these orders the column would be halted under air cover with all available protective measures taken, such as dispersal in small blocks, scouts posted and riflemen told off for controlled S. A. fire against aircraft. Of these measures careful concealment will be the most effective. If seriously threatened it may become necessary to bolt. For this reason alone, a high standard of

training for both drivers and gunners will be necessary to ensure a quick get-away.

While on the move mobility must form the principal means of defence both from ground and air and every precaution must be taken to ensure uninterrupted running. It is here that the automatics mounted in Austin cars would prove invaluable. While the lorry column is getting away they could halt and deal with any threatened attack or they could move out over reasonable country and deal with a threat before it develops.

In case of a serious attack by armoured cars it would be best to move the lorries across country, for armoured cars are usually confined to roads and tracks. Here the Austins would be employed in reconnoitring a suitable route to rejoin the main road further on.

Protection at the halt or when in contact with the enemy.

There are two principles to be considered, the application of which will depend on the situation, enemy air strength, etc. Concentration, to facilitate all round protection from raids and marauding bands. Dispersal along the L. of C. to render the transport a less easy target for air attack.

In general, where the enemy has an appreciable air force and the country is not unfriendly, dispersal will be advisable. Where, however, we have marked superiority in the air and the inhabitants are hostile, concentration within an area that can be watched by standing and other patrols, will often be necessary. This concentration must, of course, be out of range of, at least, the enemy's field guns. It will probably be necessary to locate one squadron by night as an inlying piquet close to the concentration of M. T. This squadron would find the necessary patrols.

A situation may arise where the forward progress of the M. T. is subject to delay, *e.g.*, where a bridge over a river is destroyed and the only crossing is by a ford impassable to motor vehicles or by country boat. Bridging material is not carried by the Field Troop and would have to be sent up. A Commander would be at a distinct disadvantage if his cavalry were held up owing to transport difficulties. In such a case it would be necessary to use the 20 pack saddles which each Regiment carries in its " A " Echelon lorries, dismounting an equivalent number of men who would be left as a guard for the M. T. As soon as the Brigade had effected a crossing and established a bridge-

head, a dump would be formed on the far side of the river and essential supplies would be sent up by all available pack resources. If the delay were considerable it might be necessary to replace the grooming and picketting gear, great coats and blankets, etc., on the horse until such time as the M. T. rejoined the Brigade.

Thus all the Regiments, the Battery, half the Field Troop, and the Signal Troop can move over ground impassable to M. T. and operate at a limited distance from their supply echelons.

A word as regards the distribution of loads in " A " and " B " Echelons. It will be observed that the grooming brush and other essential items are at present in " B " Echelon. Also officers' kits and cooking pots. It is understood that new loading tables are under issue which will remove these disadvantages and so adjust the loads that all essential articles are in " A " Echelon and the ' luxuries ' which can, if necessary, be dispensed with for one or more nights, are in " B " Echelon. Some of the loads appear to render the lorry top-heavy, but it has been found that by practice the bulky loads can be so arranged that the weight is forward and low down. Blankets should be tightly rolled and tied in bundles of ten, while great coats are best rolled up in the coat covers that most regiments provided privately when the coat was carried on the saddle. Piquetting gear, etc., should be tied up in troop sacks labelled with the troop and squadron number. Many such detailed arrangements will commend themselves if practice parades are carried out.

The problem of followers is the next that obtrudes itself. No longer can we march with that imposing array of footsloggers armed with hurricane lamps and bath tins. An Indian Cavalry Regiment alone has eighty followers and it is manifestly impossible to provide M. T. for their conveyance ; yet it is desirable to retain these followers for employment in standing camps when the Brigade is not on the move. It is understood that the difficulty has been overcome by arranging two scales of followers. The first will be those to be carried on all occasions and this scale will be the absolute minimum. Lorries will be made available for their conveyance. The second scale will be for standing camps and will be somewhat less than that given in War Establishments at present. The balance between the two scales will be left at the advanced base when the Brigade moves out on operations and will be brought up when the Brigade is once more in standing camp.

Prisoners of War.

The evacuation of these will be a considerable problem when the Brigade is operating at a distance from the main forces. Troops can ill be spared to go with them if the numbers are considerable and even if empty supply lorries are available several guards per lorry will be necessary to prevent escape.

In friendly country the problem would be less acute for they should be left in civil police stations with a small guard until collected by rearward forces.

Veterinary cases for evacuation would have to be left with villagers until the Veterinary Services in rear could collect them.

In conclusion it is suggested that the main problem is to ensure that the advantages gained by removing a great portion of the weight from the horse are not lost by the articles being inaccessible when the time arrives for their use. To this end the " A " Echelon transport must be used boldly, communication must be good, and the method of maintaining it understood by everyone. Those in charge of unit lorries must be well trained and selected for their initiative. Officers of the I.A.S.C. detailed for duty with Cavalry Brigades must make a study of the peculiar requirements of cavalry and their tactics to enable them to make decisions to meet the rapidly changing situations when time may not permit of orders being passed to the various rearward echelons. Only by expert knowledge and whole-hearted co-operation will the greatest advantages be derived from the transport which is no longer a ' tail ' which merely wants guarding but an essential and integral portion of the fighting Brigade.

While every endeavour has been made to consult official manuals and instructions to ensure that procedure suggested is based on the policy laid down, there are many points on which no such policy as yet exists. The suggestions therefore must be taken for what they are worth and not as an accepted policy.

The latter can only be laid down after Cavalry Brigades have tried out their transport under service conditions and arrived at conclusions on the various problems that have been dealt with here and many others that will undoubtedly arise.

THE NEW IMPERIALISM IN EASTERN ASIA.

By Major B. R. Mullaly,
10th Gurkha Rifles.

Events in the Far East have developed with the ruthless logic which was expected of the principal actors in the Manchurian drama, and there can be no question of the resumption of control by the central government of China over the territory once known as The Three Eastern Provinces.

Japan has formally recognised the independent government of Manchukuo, and it is certain that public opinion in Japan stands so solidly behind the government in its insistence upon the vital necessity, both strategically and economically, of an independent Manchuria, that secession from the League of Nations will be regarded as not too high a price to pay for the stragetic gains and the impetus to Japanese industry which are expected to accrue.

It is clear, from much that has been written in the last few months, that the underlying motives of the Japanese action in Manchuria are still, in many quarters, imperfectly understood.

The issue has been clouded by much talk of the oppression of a weaker power by a stronger, and of an Imperialistic Militarism having seized the World economic crisis as a favourable opportunity for the furtherance of its sinister ends, so that the plain facts of strategic and economic necessity which drove Japan to take decisive action in Manchuria have been, to a great extent, overlooked.

As already pointed out in a recent article in this Journal, *these two paramount and over-riding considerations of national policy were inexorable, and it had long been obvious to all serious students of Far Eastern affairs that action such as that taken by Japan in Manchuria was inevitable and could not have been long delayed.

Ancient myths die hard, and few writers on Far Eastern affairs are able, even now, to resist the temptation of parading the hoary bogey which attributes to Japan Machiavellian designs against the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand as a solution of the problem of over-population. That over-population is one of Japan's

* "Manchuria," The Background of the Present Far Eastern Crisis, U.S.I. Journal, July 1932.

greatest problems is perfectly true, but it is not incapable of solution without resort to the desperate expedient of territorial expansion. The Japanese are, above all else, realists, as has been demonstrated on countless occasions in their dealings with China in the last few years, and it is inconceivable that they would invite certain disaster by coming into collision with the British Empire and the United States of America in the Pacific when other means of absorbing their surplus population can be devised. If the idea of territorial expansion was ever seriously entertained as a practical solution of the problem of providing for a rapidly increasing population, there is abundant evidence that it has long since been abandoned, and that a policy of industrial expansion has taken its place. Now, industries require raw materials, and Japan is lacking in many of the essentials required by her rapidly expanding industries. In the search for a source of supplies of these raw materials lies the key to one half of the Japanese policy in Manchuria.

The key to the other half lies in the menace of Soviet Russia. Strategically, it is obvious that Russian paramountcy in Manchuria would be a menace to the very existence of Japan, and this menace has already once been met by the Russo-Japanese war, while there will be few to deny that a conflict between Japan and Russia is not beyond the bounds of possibility, some would say probability, in the future.

The Japanese people believe most fervently in the righteousness of their cause, and regard their country as the only bulwark against Bolshevism in the Far East. They find it difficult to understand the sensitiveness of the nations represented at Geneva, and of the United States, over this Manchurian business in view of all that the Powers have suffered at the hands of China for years. They feel that, by forestalling Russia in Manchuria, Japan is serving the true interests of civilization in the universal fight against the threat of Communism.

They argue that this is a matter which concerns the whole world and not the Far East alone, for Bolshevik supremacy in Manchuria would spell complete chaos in China and throughout the adjacent countries, with consequent immense loss to commerce and security. They point to the mischief already caused in China by Communist activities and to the fact that vast areas of that distressful country are, even now, under the complete control of Soviets organised on the

approved Moscow pattern. They maintain that a peaceful, well-governed Manchuria, will not only provide a check on the flow of much of the poison which is being poured into China, mainly through Harbin and the Chinese Eastern Railway, but will prevent, to some extent, its dissemination throughout the Pacific and beyond.

Such being the point of view of the Japanese people, a very brief survey of the history of Russian policy in the Far East, and of the trend of its present developments, may be of interest.

II.

The Imperialism of Czarist Russia was dictated by the inexorable search for ice-free ports as an outlet to the sea. It was only towards the East that such an outlet was possible, and it is often forgotten that it is towards the East that the Soviet, fundamentally as imperialist as any previous government of Russia, is looking to-day.

The period of Russian aggression in the Far East began about the middle of the last century, when events in Europe, which shortly afterwards culminated in the Crimean War, made it necessary for Russia to strengthen her position in Eastern Asia. The weapon was to hand in the person of Nicholas Muravieff, better known as Muravieff Amursky, the Governor of Eastern Siberia, by whose able diplomacy the Treaty of Aigun was signed in 1858 with China, and Russia secured the whole of the Northern bank of the Amur river from the Argun Fork to the sea. The South bank as far as the Ussuri remained Chinese and it was agreed that the territory between this river and the sea should, pending further negotiation, remain in common between the two nations. For this Russia had not long to wait. As a reward for her services as "honest broker" in the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Tientsin between China and Great Britain and France, a Convention, signed with the Chinese government at Peking in 1860, gave her the whole of the South bank. This is now the Primorsk Province.

Having secured her position in Eastern Siberia and Primorsk, Russia turned her attention southwards and showed her hand when Japan, in 1895, after decisively defeating the antiquated army of China, forced the signature of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which the independence of Korea was to be recognised and Japan, in addition to an indemnity of two hundred million taels, was to receive Formosa,

the Pescadores and the Liaotung Peninsula. Here Russia stepped in and did some bullying on her own account, persuading Germany and France to join her in "advising" Japan that the occupation of Port Arthur would "destroy the political balance in the Far East." Thus Japan was cheated of the fruits of her victory.

The war had demonstrated China's military impotence to the world and there now ensued a fierce scramble among the Powers to secure "spheres of influence" and "concessions." Russia led the way in this unseemly scramble. Her first step was the establishment of the Russo-Chinese Bank, the object of which, although it was ostensibly an ordinary joint-stock concern for the exclusive purpose of developing commercial relations with the Far East, was the exploitation of the situation in Russia's interests.

Then followed the negotiations for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway which had long been a cherished dream of the builders of the great Trans-Siberian Railway, who realized how greatly the work of construction would be facilitated and how substantial an economy would be effected in mileage, if, instead of following the long and circuitous route along the Amur river, the line could be carried straight across the intervening salient formed by Manchuria. The Russian government was equally alive to the political and economic advantages latent in the idea. After prolonged and delicate negotiations, Russia finally induced the Chinese government, in the person of Li Hung Chang, to agree to the construction of a line across Manchuria from Chita to Vladivostok, and the famous Chinese Eastern Railway was born. The agreement reached took the form of a Treaty of Alliance between Russia and China, under the terms of which the latter agreed to the construction of the railway and the two nations undertook to support each other against any armed aggression by Japan. The next move in the game was the acquisition by Russia in 1898, with cynical insolence, of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula which she had prevented Japan from securing as the legitimate spoils of war only two years before.

It now became clear that Russia's aggressive policy constituted a deadly menace to the very existence of Japan. A suggestion by the latter that an agreement should be arrived at whereby Japan would undertake to abstain from interference with Russian plans in Manchuria if Russia would similarly allow Japan a free hand in Korea, came to naught, and Russia's feverish activity in the work of railway

construction, the fortification of Port Arthur, the great reinforcement of the Russian troops in the Far East, and all kinds of military and naval preparations, made it clear that she was prepared to support her ambitions by force of arms.

There followed the Boxer Rising of 1900 which afforded Russia the opportunity of occupying Manchuria, treating it as conquered territory and of intensifying her provocative policy in Korea. Finally, the situation became so serious that Japan was compelled to accept the challenge, and the Russo-Japanese war followed. The defeat of Russia compelled her to abandon her aggressive designs in South Manchuria and from now on, Japan became the paramount power in Manchuria and Korea.

As the result of her great victory, Japan secured the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the railway from Dalny to Changchun. This has been developed into the great South Manchuria Railway which has done so much to open up and develop Manchuria. Japanese enterprise and capital have been poured without stint into the country and, in the years that have passed since the Russo-Japanese war, she has steadily consolidated her position.

During the period of the Great War and the Russian Revolution she held undisputed supremacy in these regions until, in 1924, Russia was once more in a position to reassert herself and the triangular struggle between Japan, Russia and China began again. The end of this struggle is not yet in sight, but Japan has won the first round by her determined action in Manchuria.

With the consolidation of the Bolshevik regime in Russia a new technique made its appearance in Russian policy in the East. This consisted in seizing every opportunity which presented itself for disseminating communist doctrines amongst the various comparatively backward and credulous peoples inhabiting the countries bordering on Russia, with the object of establishing Soviet states which would, in their turn, serve as centres for the further introduction of communist doctrines into the countries adjoining. This policy has met with considerable success, notably on the borders of Turkestan and Afghanistan. At the same time Russia has ceaselessly fomented class hatred and discontent among the working masses of the world, with a view to the consummation of " The World Revolution."

As far as China is concerned, Russia relied mainly on the latter policy and, under the astute guidance of Borodin, met with considerable success. At first an attempt was made to secure control of the government of China in Communist interests and Russian advisers wielded considerable power in the counsels of the Nationalists. In 1927, however, a reaction set in and, since then, Russia has reverted to the policy of underground intrigue which she is employing all over the world. The conditions in China are peculiarly favourable to communist propaganda, a large measure of success has been achieved, and the work is still being assiduously carried on. The mass of peasants and workers, at the best of times living on the edge of starvation, bled white by the exactions of the warlords, and the hordes of unpaid and ill-disciplined soldiery who are, in most cases, indistinguishable from bandits, coupled with the absence of any stable central government, form a fertile soil for Communist doctrines. Great areas have passed under the control of local organisations which are Soviets, pure and simple.

At the same time the Communist poison is working in the masses throughout the country, and the whole picture presented by China is one which justifiably fills Japan with foreboding and confirms her in her belief that Russia is the great enemy of civilization with whom a reckoning is bound to come.

In Manchuria, Russia has been checkmated by Japan. The competition of the South Manchuria Railway, with its port of Dairen, conducted with characteristic Japanese efficiency, and the network of new railway construction over Manchuria, had already greatly reduced the value, both strategic and commercial, of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The establishment of the new Manchurian state, under Japanese tutelage, has now completed its ruin, and has, by cutting off Russia from direct access to the Pacific, almost isolated Vladivostok and greatly increased the vulnerability of the whole of Eastern Siberia.

Until she is in a position to take positive action to meet this development, it is certain that Russia will continue her present policy of doing all she can, in collusion with China, to embarrass the progress of Japan's measures to acquire complete control over Manchuria.

Long before the present extension of Japanese influence, however, Russia had realised that Japan's position in Manchuria would effectively block her further activities southwards through that country.

She had accordingly turned her attention westwards to Mongolia and Turkestan, where for years she has been working to extend and consolidate her position.

III.

In the heart of the continent of Asia, covering an area of some 1,370,000 square miles, lies the vast tableland which we call Mongolia. The cradle of the fierce nomads who, from time to time, swept over not only the Far East but also the Near East and a great part of Europe, Mongolia produced Genghiz Khan, under whom and his successors the Mongols were the rulers of a vast empire. The Yuan dynasty of China, which ruled from 1260 to 1368, was founded by Kublai Khan, the grandson of the great Genghiz. After many years of strife with their successors, the Ming Dynasty, the Mongols accepted the sovereignty of China and the country became, in 1689, a part of the dominions of the Middle Kingdom.

Nothing now remains to mark the former greatness of the Mongols except a few ruins, the legends of the glory that has departed, and a scattered, semi-nomadic population of some two million backward people. This decline of the Mongols was brought about, to a large extent, by the introduction of Lamaism, which, with its vast monastic system, saps the energy and intelligence of any nation upon which it fastens. Mongolia, nevertheless, remains a country of very great importance in the politics of Eastern Asia, on account of its geographical position, its economic possibilities and its untapped natural resources.

The Mongol tribes fall naturally into two main categories—those of Inner Mongolia and those of Outer Mongolia. The tribal organisation remains much the same as it has been for centuries in the territory immediately abutting on China proper, but has suffered severe modifications, amounting to virtual abolition, in Outer Mongolia where Soviet influence now reigns supreme.

In Inner Mongolia the Chinese devised an alien institution known as the League, which was designed to weaken the ancient tribal organisation and facilitate the passage of real power into the hands of the Chinese officials. This has had the desired effect of weakening the Mongol princes by playing upon their mutual rivalries and jealousies to the advantage of their Chinese rulers. At the same time the loose

and, on the whole, benevolent control which China ad for centuries exercised over Mongolia, eminently suited both parties but made the way easy for Russian intrigue which did not neglect the opportunity here presented for further consolidating the position of Russia on her Eastern borders. The effect of this intrigue became at once apparent on the downfall of the Manchu dynasty in the revolution of 1911.

Instigated and supported by Russia, the Mongols declared that the allegiance which they had given to the Manchus was not owing to the new regime. The independence of Mongolia was proclaimed in 1912 and was recognised by Russia. The Chinese authorities were compelled to retire from Outer Mongolia and that territory fell more and more under the influence of the Russians.

The Russian revolution gave China a short-lived opportunity of once more resuming her nominal sovereignty over the whole of Mongolia, and the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was revoked, but the loose and inefficient grasp of the Chinese government was unable to retain control or to stay the march of events. In the next few years Mongolia became one of the principal centres of White Russian intrigue in the abortive attempts to bring down the Soviet government, and the country suffered from the attentions first of Ataman Semenov, and then of Baron Ungern von Sternberg who established a reign of terror equal to the best efforts of the Bolsheviks. Ungern was eventually driven out by Soviet forces in 1921 and from that time onwards Soviet influence has gone from strength to strength in Outer Mongolia.

On the total elimination of the White Russians a "Peoples Provisional Revolutionary Government of Mongolia" was established which soon developed into an orthodox Soviet, inspired by, and represented at Moscow. The whole question of Russian influence in Outer Mongolia has been used as a bargaining pawn in the repeated efforts which Russia has made in the last few years to secure the resumption of diplomatic relations with China. A short lived conference met in 1925 for the discussion of Mongolian affairs, but was adjourned *sine die* without anything having been settled, and China has made no further attempt to rehabilitate herself in her former territory.

The methods pursued by the Soviet in Outer Mongolia are typical of those which have been employed with such success in Russian dealings with other backward peoples on the borders of the Soviet Union and have met with uniform lack of any serious setback.

To begin with, the tribal organisation of the Mongols, already essentially communistic in principle, lent itself to easy adaptation to the main teachings of Bolshevism and the transition from the ancient tribal council to the Soviet was accomplished without very great upheaval or difficulty.

The material advantages which the Soviet system has conferred upon Outer Mongolia have, curiously enough, been a contributory factor in hastening the process of sovietization and the once impoverished Mongol tribesmen now enjoy a degree of material prosperity which is in marked contrast with the state of affairs that existed under the suzerainty of China. This has been brought about by the efficiency with which the Russians have organised the economics and commerce of the country.

Banking has become a State monopoly, controlled by the only bank in Outer Mongolia, the Mongol Bank, which is entirely managed by Russians. Under its aegis the finances of the State have considerably improved and it is perhaps significant that in the officially published figures no mention is made of indebtedness to Russia. All trading activities have been concentrated in the hands of a Government trading monopoly known as the "Moncencop", which, as its name indicates, is a central co-operative organisation. This supervises all Mongol trading ventures, while another organisation, known as the "Stormong", has centralised all Russian trading interests. Transportation has become the monopoly of the "Mongolian State Transport Company"; road-making and the use of mechanical transport are increasing the facilities for the flow of trade outwards. As was to be expected, this flow is now towards Russia, and not, as heretofore, towards China.

The rigid monopolies which have been established in banking, trade of all descriptions, and transportation, have succeeded in killing outside competition and the once prosperous trade which passed between Urga and Kalgan has virtually ceased to exist. The rich export trade in furs, hides, sheep and camel wool, which used to flow down through Kalgan and thence along the Peking-Suiyuan Railway to the sea at Tientsin is practically extinct. The whole of the export trade now goes North to the Trans-Siberian Railway and Russia, with considerable gain not only for the Russians but also for their Mongol protégés.

Having thus placed the material resources of the State upon a comparatively sound footing the Russians have turned their attention to the education of the Mongols in the Bolshevik creed. Great attention is paid to this and selected Mongol youths are sent to Russia for higher instruction in the tenets of Bolshevism and for training in the approved methods of furthering the advent of the world revolution, while the usual intensive propaganda and anti-capitalist and anti-religious teaching are carried out unceasingly throughout the country. All outside influences are rigorously guarded against and it is exceedingly difficult for a foreigner to enter the country; mere sightseeing is severely discouraged. Chinese are regarded as foreigners equally with the rest and it is probably easier to get into the country from the Russian than from the Chinese side.

Russian influence reigns supreme in all the activities of the people and thus has Russia succeeded in adding Outer Mongolia to the wall of sovietized states which she has built up on her Asian borders.

IV.

Further westwards again lies the great territory of Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan.

The Chinese were acquainted with, and nominally ruled this remote region as far as Kashgar as early as the first century A. D., but although Genghiz Khan overran the country in the 13th. Century, their dominion was never effective until about the middle of the 18th. Century.

Chinese rule, such as it was, was of such a nature that rebellions were of frequent occurrence and, in 1862, when the great Mahomedan insurrection spread to Turkestan, the territory was virtually lost to China.

Kashgaria fell to Yakub Beg and the constant disturbances which kept the country in a state of unrest afforded Russia the pretext for occupying Kuldja in 1871. This event roused the Chinese government to action and it was determined to undertake the colossal task of reconquering Sinkiang. The history of this expedition and the account of how the Chinese, by such laborious methods as sowing and reaping crops at each oasis, succeeded in transporting an army across the desert from Kansu, are of absorbing and probably unique interest. But succeed they did, not only conquering the North of the province,

but later, at the death of Yakub Beg, reoccupying Kashgar. In 1881 Russia returned the Kuldja district to China, and since then Sinkiang has, nominally at least, remained a part of the Chinese dominions. The Revolution of 1911 had strangely little effect on this remote territory and while the rest of China has suffered from the ravages of civil war, banditry and communism, Sinkiang has enjoyed almost unbroken peace.

The physical features of Chinese Turkestan are sufficiently well-known to require no detailed description here, suffice it to say that the great potential wealth of this vast region of mountain and desert lies in its untapped mineral resources. Gold is found in many parts and the Altai range is a vast repository of mineral wealth, while petroleum, silver, copper and iron are known to exist in many localities. All these riches only await the development of the country and the improvement of communications. The Altai goldfield already employs several thousand workers. Russia has naturally been fully alive to the great possibilities of Sinkiang and the adjoining territories. There has taken place a great development of communications in the neighbouring Russian territory, the latest and most important manifestation of which is the completion of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway.

The construction of this railway is an event of great importance both strategically and economically. The " Turk-Sib " bridges the gap between Lucovaiya in the South and Semipalatinsk in the North and completes the circuit between Tashkent and the Siberian Railway at Novo Simbirsk. At Lucovaiya connection is made with the European lines through the Caucasus and at Semipalatinsk with the great Siberian system through Novo Simbirsk, and thus a valuable alternative route has been created in addition to the previously existing single route provided by the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The possible bearing of this development upon the security of India will not be discussed here, but Japanese opinion sees in it a threat through China from the point where the railway reaches Sinkiang onward *via* Lanchow and the Lunghai Railway to the coast.

The economic effect of the Turk-Sib cannot but be of the utmost importance in facilitating the exploitation of the natural resources of Central Asia and it is bound to have a serious effect upon the trade of the North-Western Provinces of China, Kansu and Sinkiang, which will find it easier and cheaper to trade with Russia than with China.

The railway will open up vast areas for cultivation and one of the first results will be a great increase in the area under cotton, which is of such importance to the Soviet and which figures so prominently in the Five Year Plan. Mineral deposits of very great richness and, at present, practically untouched, will also be made accessible.

The scheme of development which is to follow the completion of the line is a part of the Russian programme for the creation of a great new territory in Siberia and Central Asia, where the vast natural resources of these regions are to be exploited and made to serve the ends of the new Russian Imperialism. One of the most important projects designed for the attainment of these ends, a project which has received due attention in the press of the Far East but which has, apparently, escaped the notice of the press of the rest of the world, is the proposed construction of the great steel plant in the Altai. Such a plant would supply Russia with the means of providing for future railway construction in this region, and, in war, with a centre for the production of munitions buried in the heart of Central Asia in a situation of unique invulnerability even from air attack.

Whether Russia can repeat in Sinkiang the process which she has brought to so successful a conclusion in Outer Mongolia, and create there another sovietized buffer state, remains to be seen, but there can be no doubt that the completion of the Turk-Sib and the development of the adjacent regions will greatly facilitate the attainment of such a plan. Its importance to British interests on the one side, and to China on the other, needs no emphasis.

Blocked as she is by Japan's commanding position in Manchuria, Russia has transferred her attention to Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan and it is in these regions that she is making preparations for the next stage in that march towards the South which was the keynote of Czarist imperialism as it is the inevitable manifestation of the new imperialism of Soviet Russia.

The socialist Bertrand Russell, in his book " The Problem of China," admits the essential imperialism of the Russia of to-day when he says : " The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's regime....." But he only admits half the truth, for the Russian penetration of

the adjacent Asiatic territories, has, besides its purely imperialistic aspect, the object of providing jumping-off grounds for the better dissemination of the tenets of Bolshevism in the countries beyond.

It is not extraordinary, then, that Japan is determined to keep Bolshevism at arm's length, and, with the object-lessons of Outer Mongolia, the Soviet states of Central Asia, and Russian activities in and around Sinkiang before her is determined to prevent Russia from securing a foothold in Manchuria. China is impotent; it is useless to refuse to face the hard fact that either Japan or Russia must be predominant in Manchuria. Failure to face this fact is fraught with dangers to the peace of the world, the full extent of which it is not yet possible to estimate.

Russia, once established in Manchuria, would be in a position the more easily to carry on an intensive campaign for the further disruption of China. Placing aside for the moment the obvious strategic considerations of such a position, the Soviet would be able to undermine, by propaganda and by support of subversive elements, the Japanese dominion in Korea, whilst exploiting, in Japan itself, the labour troubles which are the inevitable concomitants of intensified industralisation.

By her determined action in Manchuria Japan has delivered a well-timed blow at the new imperialism in Eastern Asia.

BADGES.

Worn by the Indian Soldier from the time of the Mutiny to the end of the Great War.

By Yusuf.

One of the many post-Mutiny reforms was that of reclothing the Indian Soldier. The European-type uniforms gave place to the more practical variety of clothing, which had so well served the recently-raised Irregulars. Brass helmets, Persian hats, shakos, and forage-caps disappeared as did the cross-belts. The various badges and belt-plates, which embellished them, went the way of all unwanted brass in the East—to the melting-pot; so much so, that. to-day, scarcely one can be found!

For many years after the Mutiny, badges, in the Native Army, were articles worn only by Officers. The system of dressing the men regimentally out of clothing allowances led to so much divergence of pattern that the wearing of badges, as a distinguishing-medium between Units, was quite unnecessary. They were not authorized and were seldom worn. Sowar and Sepoy remained badgeless until after the Second Afghan War. This campaign, with its large concentrations of troops, the universal adoption of khaki, and more uniform patterns of dress, made it advisable to employ some simple type of identification for regiments.

Brass numerals, three-quarter inches in size, were issued for wear upon shoulder-straps, and some regiments began to adapt badges, to be displayed by their men, after the manner of those worn in British regiments. These badges were in no way an official issue—in fact were often unauthorized. They were paid for from regimental funds and allowances. The designs were drawn up by the regiment, and the badges either die-struck in England, or else hand-made by the *Mistri*, or by a local metal-worker, who cast them in a mould of sand and sugar, and finished them with a file. Some were very handsome—others crude!

Badges may be classified as:

(*a*) Head-dress.
(*b*) Collar.
(*c*) Cavalry pouch-badge and belt-plate.
(*d*) Shoulder.

(*a*) *Head-dress badges.*

Metal *pagri*-badges have never been popular in the Indian Army (possibly on account of their expense), though some regiments have worn them for half a century and more. Most Corps considered that the *pagri* with a coloured fringe, *kulla*, or *pag*, was sufficiently distinctive.

Pagri-badges were never worn by Cavalry, Artillery, or Transport.

They were worn in 1914 by all ranks of the 1st. Sappers and Miners and by about forty Infantry regiments. They had also been previously worn by the 8th. Madras Infantry (disbanded in 1903), and by the 26th. Punjab Infantry. The buglers of the Madras regiments wore glengarry caps, with badges in them. Badges were also worn by the Gurkha Rifle Regiments, upon their kilmarnock caps, an exception being the 4th. G. R., who wore no badge.

A short description of some of those badges in use when the Great War broke out is of interest, as several of the regiments have since disappeared.

1st. S. & M., 14th. Sikhs & 61st. Pioneers ..	Wore the Prince of Wales's plume, adapted at the time when they were 'P. of W.,' regiments.
1st. Brahmans	.. In brass, two holy fish from the Ganges upon a tablet, bearing '1776,' the date this regiment was raised.
2nd. Rajput L. I.	.. Brass bugle with 2 between strings.
4th. Rajputs	.. White-metal 'Khanjar' (dagger).
6th. Jat L. I.	.. Brass bugle with 6 below.
7th. Rajputs	.. Brass cypher of Duke of Connaught with Roman number and title.
8th. Rajputs	.. Brass circle bearing title, surrounded by laurels, and surmounted by Crown—Numeral in centre.
15th. Sikhs	.. Black steel quoit. (Worn in khaki only).
16th. Rajputs	.. Brass 'Gateway of Lucknow,' surmounted by numeral, and scroll 'Defence of Lucknow.'
17th. Infantry	.. Large crescent in aluminium.
18th. Infantry	.. Crescent and five-pointed star.

28th. Punjabis	.. White-metal crescent and quoit below a crown.
30th. Punjabis	.. White-metal Roman numerals within a laurel wreath, surmounted by a crown.
31st. Punjabis	.. White-metal circle bearing title, surmounted by crown, within circle a star of eight points, numeral in centre.
32nd. Sikh Pioneers	.. White-metal quoit bearing Roman numeral and title, surmounted by a crown and crossed axes. Below quoit the motto. 'Aut viam inveniam aut faciam.'
34th. Sikh Pioneers	.. Upon a brass 'Star of India,' a white-metal crowned garter, bearing the title and containing the number. Below, crossed axes.
45th. Sikhs	.. White-metal quoit with 'Kirpan' (Sikh dagger) above.
48th. Pioneers	.. Brass crossed axes upon a white-metal star of six points.
63rd. Palamcotta Light Infantry	.. Brass French-horn with number in the curl and crown above.
72nd. Punjabis	.. White-metal peacock and title.
74th. Punjabis	.. Brass Chinese dragon.
79th. Carnatic Infantry	.. Brass circle bearing the title and containing the numbers, surrounded by laurels, and surmounted by a crown.
80th. Infantry	.. Brass numeral within a laurel wreath.
81st. Pioneers	.. Brass circle bearing the title and containing the number, surmounted by a crown and surrounded by laurels.
83rd. Wallahjahbad Light Infantry	.. Brass bugle with number between the strings.
86th. Carnatic Infantry	.. Brass circle bearing the title and containing the number, upon a crowned star of eight points.
88th. Carnatic Infantry	.. Solid brass circle, containing the title and number, surmounted by a crown and surrounded by laurels.

90th. Punjabis .. White-metal Burmese 'Kylon' with number and title below.

91st. Punjabis .. White-metal crossed 'Dahs'.

101st. Grenadiers .. Brass grenade with white-metal horse on ball.

102nd. Grenadiers .. Brass grenade with white-metal Prince of Wales's plume on flame and 'Sphinx on ball.

104th. Rifles, 125th. Rifles .. A black crowned bugle with numeral between the strings.

107th. Pioneers, 128th. Pioneers .. Brass garter bearing the number and title. Within the garter crossed axes.

110th. Mahratta Light Infantry .. Brass bugle with strings.

The cap-badge of the 2nd. Gurkhas was a Prince of Wales's plume in black. All other Gurkhas wore a device of crossed 'Kukris' in white-metal. The 1st, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th. crossed the kukris back-upwards while the 3rd, 5th and 7th. crossed them blade-up. All wore the numeral above the kukri except the 6th, who wore no numeral, and the 9th. who kept it between the handles. The later pattern badges of the 1st. and 3rd. had, respectively, the Prince's plume and the cypher of Queen Alexandra, over the numeral. The 1st. G. R. wore this badge also in bronze upon their service hat.

(*b*) *Collar-badges.*

The only regiments whose sepoys wore collar-badges were:—

8th. Madras Infantry wore an elephant (Awarded for Assaye).

1st. Bombay Grenadiers wore a grenade.

61st. Pioneers .. P. of W. feathers over crossed pick and shovel.

81st. Pioneers, 107th. Pioneers, 121st. Pioneers, 128th. Pioneers .. Brass crossed axes of different patterns.

113th. Infantry wore a brass 'Sphinx.'

(*c*) *Cavalry pouch-badges and belt-plates.*

Before the issue of bandoliers, most cavalry wore a pouch to contain their ammunition, either on a waist, or a shoulder belt. Metal badges were sometimes worn upon these pouches. Certain regiments also wore belt-plates upon the waist-belt. These usually bore a number or a badge engraved or super-imposed upon them.

In 1914 the following regiments wore belt-plates:—

1st, 2nd, 9th, 14th, 15th, 18th, and 19th. Lancers.

6th, 12th, 16th, 26th, and Guides Cavalry.

All were of brass except the 19th. and Guides, which were of white-metals.

(*d*) *Shoulder-badges*, (known officially as Numerals or Titles).

The shoulder-badge, though the least ornamental, is the most important badge of the Indian Army. It is the only badge worn on Service, and, indeed, has for many years been the only badge worn in any order of dress by far the greater portion of the Indian Army.

Mention has already been made of the brass numerals, issued by clothing-factories. These were possibly once universally worn, but by the nineties most Corps had unofficially adapted badges of their own design, for wear with khaki, reserving the official numerals for use in full-dress uniform. The practice soon crept in of substituting the regimental badge for the official numerals, even in full-dress; so much so that by 1914 a bare dozen battalions were wearing the latter article.

(*i*) *Period Prior to* 1903.

Bengal and Punjab cavalry wore on the shoulder-chains simple badges, made up in the regimental shops, usually consisting of the number and BL, BC, or PC. The 11th. and 6th. wore a Prince of Wales's feathers. The Madras, Bombay and Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry wore more ornate badges, combining the numeral and title with crossed lances or sabres.

The Artillery wore the battery intitals, *i.e.*, G.M.B. for the Gujerat Mountain Battery, etc.

In the Infantry many regiments, particulary in the Bengal and P. F. F. wore plain numbers, though some Punjabis wore the number and P. I., cast in a straight line. The 34th. Punjab Pioneers wore the plain title 'Pioneers'. Gurkha numbers were blackened.

Most of the Madras Infantry had the number and M. I. or M. L. I., though the 20th. wore a full title, and the 23rd. a bugle with the number, and title below. The seven battalions localized in Burma wore titles 'Burma' and numeral of the Burma numbering. The 6th. Burma Bn. (31st Madras L. I). wore at one time a white-metal title bearing both designations.

The Bombay Infantry usually wore the word 'Bombay' in a curve below the number. The 1st. Bombay Grenadiers and the

Bombay Pioneers wore the full designation in a double curve. The 3rd. Light Infantry wore a badge of similar design to the 23rd. Madras. The three Baluch regiments wore black titles, that of the 27th. having a French-horn with figure I in the curl and the word ' Belooch ' below. The three Bombay Rifle regiments wore the title ' Bombay ' under a bugle in black, without any number.

The 1st Moplah Rifles wore an Arabic ' I ' and curved title ' Moplahs ' in black. The 2nd Moplahs had a Roman ' II ' and title in brass.

(2) *Period* 1903—14.

The reorgainzation of 1903 meant a change in designation of nearly every Indian Army Unit and necessitated an alteration in the pattern of shoulder-badge of every Cavalry Regiment and Mountain Battery and of almost every Infantry Corps.

The total number of Indian Army Units which existed in this period, inclusive of Transport and Medical, was over two hundred and fifty. Each of these Corps had its own distinctive shoulder-badge, and most of them wore these through the period of the Great War, and until the re-shuffle of 1922-23.

Owing to the fact that there was no standard-pattern, or official issue, of badges in the Indian Army, as existed in the British, and, in fact, every other army in the world, there was tremendous diversity of pattern in the designs of these.

All were of brass except those of the 19th. Lancers, Guides Cavalry, 54th. Sikhs, and 57th. and 59th. Rifles, which were of white-metal, and the 39th, 42nd, 55th, 71st, 77th, 104th, 123rd, 125th, 127th, 129th, 130th, and the ten regiments of Gurkha Rifles, which were black.

The Cavalry usually wore the number followed by ' L ' (Lancers) or ' C ' (Cavalry), through the 3rd, 19th, 21st, 31st, 33rd, 34th, 35th, 36th, and Guides wore the full title in various patterns. The 29th. included crossed lances, and the 34th. sabres in the design. The 33rd. wore, over the number, a crown to denote that they were the ' Queen 's Own ', and the 6th, 11th, 18th, 26th, and C.I.H. had, as part of their badge, a Prince of Wales's plume, to show that they had at some period been ' P of W ' regiments.

This wearing of a crown or ' P of W ' plume on the shoulder is peculiar to the Indian Army.

Mountain Batteries wore the number and M. B. in a straight line.

In the Infantry, there was a multitude of designs. The 1st, 2nd, 4th, 8th, 16th, 18th, 45th, also 2nd, 1/3rd, 7th and 8th Gurkhas wore the old pattern separate numerals, while the 11th, 17th, 20th, 23rd, 25th, 26th, 29th, 31st, 33rd, 34th, 39th, 52nd, 55th, 56th, 57th, 59th, 67th, 74th, 80th, 82nd, 91st, 96th, 97th, 99th, 105th, 109th, 110th, 112th, 113th, 114th, 120th, and 10th Gurkhas wore one-piece numbers, varying in size from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches.

The 19th, 21st, 27th and 28th Punjabis favoured Roman numerals, that of the 21st having the word ' Punjabis ' super-imposed.

The 5th, 103rd, 104th, 123rd, 125th and 127th had bugle-horns, and the 102nd had a grenade, with number in white on the ball, and scroll ' K. E. O .' below.

The 10th, 30th, 35th, 47th, 51st, 63rd, 71st, 73rd, 86th, and 1st, 2/3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th Gurkhas wore the initials or title in a straight line.

The 43rd. and 106th. preferred a lozenge form.

The remaining regiments wore the number and a curved title, though the size, are and type of lettering were in scarcely two regiments the same.

The 36th. Sikhs had a peculiarly solid label and the 13th. and 48th. curious wavy affairs. The Guides' title curved in a way opposite to all others. The titles of the 14th. Sikhs and 130th. Baluchis included a white Prince of Wales's plume.

The Transport Units of the Supply and Transport Corps usually had a brass numeral, Arabic or Roman, followed by T. C., M. C. (Mule-corps), B. T. (Bullock Troop), C. C. (Camel-corps), or P. C. T. (Pony Cart Train).

The Army Bearer Corps wore large letters A.B. C. and the number of the Division.

Imperial Service Troops normally wore only the name of the State, though the Cavalry regiments of Bhopal, Hyderabad, Mysore and Patiala included crossed lances in the design.

(3) *War Period* 1914—19.

During the war extra regiments of Horse and Foot, Batteries, and Transport Corps were raised. The new Cavalry Regiments wore the

numeral-over-title type of badge, of the same design as the 21st. Cavalry. The Artillery wore the usual Mountain Battery pattern, or were issued with the letters I. M. A.

As regards the new Infantry Regiments, the 49th. had two patterns, one a plain number, and the other the numeral and title 'Bengalis.' The 50th. wore a black 'Kumaon.' The 3/70th. Burma, 111th. Mahars, 71st. Punjabis, and 141st. Bikaner wore the full title, the two former being black. The 85th. wore 85. B. R., and the 60th. and 11th. G. R. wore similar type in black. The 131st. 140th. Patiala, and the 150th to 156th, each received issues, consisting of small size one-piece numbers.

Second, third and fourth battalions of regiments usually wore the same badge as the parent-battalion, but there were exceptions. Each four battalions of the 9th. Bhopal Infantry wore a different badge, the 2nd. Bn. wearing the title 'The Delhi Regiment.' The 2/2nd, 2/3rd, 2/23rd, 3/34th, 2/42nd, 2/43rd, 2/73rd and 2/91st all wore their own pattern.

(*e*) *Buttons.*

In most Cavalry Regiments the half-ball or ball was popular though several wore buttons impressed with a regimental design.

The old button of the Indian Artillery bore a device of three cannons surrounded by laurel leaves. For many years, however, the R. A. button has been worn by the personnel of the Mountain Batteries.

Native Infantry were at one time issued with brass buttons, on which appeared the number within a 'broken ring' surrounded by laurels. These were discontinued when shoulder-numerals were issued, and a universal 'Crown and Imperial Cipher' button was provided on uniforms supplied from clothing factories.

For use with khaki-drill many regiments purchased buttons bearing a device, similar to that authorized for the officers. A curious exception was that of the 21st. Punjabis. The Officers wore silver half-ball buttons without design, while the sepoys wore brass numbered buttons of the pattern issued by 'John Company!'

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

The Philippines and the Pacific Problem.

Sir,

Regarding the interesting article, *The Philippines and the Pacific Problem* in your July issue, which states that the United States House of Representatives has recently passed a bill by which the Philippine Islands will be granted complete independence within eight years, I presume that the Hawes-Cutting Independence Bill is referred to. The House of Representatives recently approved this bill, but I understand that in American circles in Manila it is considered that the United States Senate will not pass it. This bill would give independence to the Philippines subject to a plebiscite after a period of twenty years. Meanwhile sovereignty would rest with the United States, and the effect of the bill would merely be to make some expensive changes in the system of administration and a redistribution of administrative responsibilities. In exchange for the Filipinization of the government, the personnel of which is already 98 per cent. Filipino, the United States would be represented in the Islands by an American High Commissioner, whose authority would be supreme. He would in effect have the powers of a Viceroy.

It seems to me that this correction of an apparent error in the article may be useful.

Yours faithfully,
E. S. MacL. PRINSEP, Major,
Probyn's Horse.

18*th September* 1932.

Sir,

In reply to Major Prinsep's letter I would point out that in the opening paragraph of my article entitled "*The Philippines and the Pacific Problem,*" it is distinctly stated that no final decision has been reached on the question of Filipino independence. The question has of course been under consideration for some time and a variety of suggetions have been put forward. Though there is no doubt much opposition to any measure involving complete independence in the immediate future, it is equally certain that an influential section of American business opinion supports the early withdrawal of control

for financial reasons. As however the whole question is largely a matter of party politics, he is indeed a bold prophet who would venture to foretell future developments, especially on the eve of a Presidential election. Filipino independence must come sooner or later and it was on the assumption that it might quite possibly come sooner than the majority expect that the article was based.

Yours faithfully,
M. E. S. LAWS, CAPTAIN,
Royal Artillery.

28th October 1932.

QUETTA OR CAMBERLEY ?

SIR,

I am sure that many of us feel that John Hooker's pathetic appeal in your October issue should not go unanswered. I am not certain that his main object, *i.e.*, the pursuit of the really wealthy young woman is a cause in support of which we need draw swords, but his description of his handicap vis-a-vis his opposite number from Camberley is a more serious matter.

As a start, I think our friend can take a little comfort from the statement with which indeed 'The Mother of Four Officers' did qualify her remark on the rating of officers who have passed the Quetta Staff College, *viz.*, that for those who wish to serve on the Staff in India, Quetta is much the best place in which to secure one's education, if only because of the friends made there who will be all over India afterwards.

Further I do suggest to the pursuer of fair favours that the answer to the searching parent is, first, a stiff upper lip, and, second, in answer to, " Which Staff College ? " a reply, " Oh ! *The* Staff College ! Didn't you know they were one ?" A little later in the evening John Hooker really ought to enlighten the assembled guests, for they need it. Without the least disloyalty to his fellow competitors for the soft hand who have enjoyed the home Staff College, he might murmur that, of course, given the choice, he for one would never select the ease and seductions of two years at Home when there was the same study to be had in a land for " he-men " where, thanks be, soldiering was still practical ! He might go on to add that old Jerry Jackson who

just passed in miles above a lot of lads going to Camberley, has definitely asked for Quetta. He might also say that one unique friend of his who did his first year not so long ago at Camberley and his second at Quetta, found the latter far the more searching of the two!

Joking apart, dear Editor, I think the excellent John Hooker is suffering from an hallucination as regards his handicap in the race for the lady. Disparity between the outputs of the two Colleges if it ever existed, is now, I am certain, a thing of the past.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
"*A Student of Form.*"

MILITARY NOTES.

ARABIA.

The Situation in Saudi Arabia.

The new nomenclature, used above, for the territories ruled by Ibn Saud was introduced by royal decree at Riyadh on 18th September. At the same time a council of ministers is to be set up to prepare and submit to Ibn Saud a constitution for the King's rule, succession to the throne and for the organization of the Government. The change would appear to have as its objects (*a*) the unity and solidarity of the two kingdoms of Hedjaz and Nejd under one name, (*b*) the forestalling of any efforts in the future to revert to a separate kingdom of the Hedjaz.

MOROCCO.

French Zone.

Operations.

Minor operations were carried out during the month of July by the Marrakech and Tadla mobile columns, and a steady advance was made without many losses. A few casualties, however, occurred as a result of raids on posts and convoys.

On 7th July an attack on a convoy caused the following casualties: 2 French non-commissioned officers and 5 natives killed, 1 French officer, 1 non-commissioned officer and 3 natives wounded.

On the night of 13th July tribesmen counter-attacked a position which had been occupied that morning without loss by a detachment from Meknes. The tribesmen were driven back but the French lost 1 non-commissioned officer and 1 soldier of the Foreign Legion killed; 1 French officer, 7 legionaries and 1 French soldier wounded.

In the course of an engagement against raiding tribesmen on 25th July, 1 French officer and 1 non-commissioned officer were killed (the latter, *Maréchal des logis* de Sandras, was the nephew of M. Herriot, the Prime Minister); 3 native soldiers were also killed and 2 wounded. The raiders, who had penetrated behind the French lines, were put to flight with considerable loss.

A mobile column operating in the neighbourhood of Nouachott, Mauritania, was ambushed by a band of rebel tribes under the leadership of Ahmed Hammadi. This band is alleged to have crossed the frontier from the Spanish territory of Rio de Oro.

The casualties officially reported are as follows :—

Killed : 1 officer and 5 European non-commissioned officers.

Missing : 11 *Senegalese Tirailleurs* and 28 *Gardes Maures.*

The rebels, pursued by another mobile column and aeroplanes, are reported to have fled over the frontier into Rio de Oro, where the French troops were unable to follow them because of the Franco-Spanish treaty of 27th November, 1912.

Oil.

In the Djebel Bou-Kennfoud region, 20 kilometres south of Djebel Tselfat, towards Moulay-Idriss, oil of good quality has been found at a depth of 470 metres. Its proximity (1½ kilometres) to the Meknes—Petit-Jean route ensures easy access and transport.

Ten tons a day are at present being extracted ; this will be increased later when more powerful plant is installed.

Oudjda-Fez railway.

General Messimy, Senator for the Ain Department, and a former Minister for War and the Colonies, recently undertook an official tour in Morocco in his capacity of *Rapporteur* to the Senate on the proposed loan required to finance the completion of this railway.

In his report, after mentioning the advantages which will accrue to Morocco's agriculture and its mining industry, General Messimy stresses the importance of this railway from the military point of view, and points out that whereas during the Riff campaign of 1925-26 reinforcements from Algeria and Tunisia reached Tadla very slowly, it will soon be possible to run 15 military trains every 24 hours on this line when completed.

PERU.

Peru-Colombia Frontier Incident.

On 1st September a group of civilians from the town of Iquitos on the Amazon in the North-East of Peru captured the town of Leticia on the Amazon in Colombia, and hoisted the Peruvian flag.

The boundary between Colombia and Peru in this district was fixed by a treaty drawn up in 1922 and ratified by the two countries in 1925 and 1927, after being in dispute for many years. Under this treaty Colombia was granted a corridor running due south from the Putumayo River to the Amazon between Brazilian and Peruvian territory. Leticia, the town in dispute, is a port on the Amazon at the southern end of this corridor.

The development of Leticia by the Colombians combined with a certain amount of smuggling by her citizens, has damaged the trade of the port of Iquitos, which is further up the river. As a result the citizens of Iquitos have taken the law into their own hands. Their action has placed the Government of Peru in an awkward predicament. On the one hand they wish to honour their treaty obligations, but on the other hand they are unable to take any action to remove the invaders from Leticia, as such action would cause a revolt in Iquitos, where the public demand for the retention of Leticia and the revision of the treaty is intense.

Colombia has protested vigorously and has voted a sum of £2,000,000 for frontier defence.

SPAIN.

Strength of the Army.

A decree of 8th September, 1932, fixes the total strength of the army in other ranks for the year 1933 at 151,000, of which 111,657 will form the army in Spain, and 39,343 that in Africa.

The figures for last year were :—

Total other ranks,	Spain	..	98,114
,, ,,	Africa	..	45,849
	Grand total	..	143,963

It will thus be seen that while the army in Morocco has been reduced by some 6,500, that in the Peninsula has been increased by 13,500, the result being an increase in the total strength of the army of 7,000 men.

TURKEY.

Language reform in Turkey.

Not content with his earlier cultural achievements—the abolition of the fez, the closing of the Dervish monasteries, the emancipation of

women, the substitution of a modified Roman alphabet for the old Arabic script—the Gazi Mustafa Kemal Pasha now proposes to purify the Turkish language, expunging from it all foreign elements and substituting words of pure Turkish origin.

For some months the comparative freedom which he has been able to enjoy from the conduct of affairs of state has been devoted to a study of the origins of the Turkish language, and his researches have led him to the conclusion that the debt owed by the European languages to Turanian origins has never been properly appreciated—the very word " culture " has, it would appear, a Turkish origin.

The fruits of his labours are shortly to become manifest. A linguistic Congress is to be held at the presidential palace this month, and is to be followed by an organization of special means to spread throughout the country a new Turkish language recreated on the lines which have been indicated by the Gazi's months of research.

The task to be accomplished is a formidable one for the language of the educated Turk contains thousands of words and usages borrowed by the Ottoman Turks from Arabic and Persian, while the modern " journalese " includes innumerable words of French, Italian and English origin, many of them, such as " orevar " (au revoir)," kokteyl" (cocktail), hardly recognizable in their new rendering.

Fortunately for the prospects of the scheme not only is the modern language a very rich one but it has behind it a background of medieval Turkish much of which has only become known to the world from the researches of European scholars during the present century and, though there may be difficulty in finding scientific and philosophical terms of pure Turkish ancestry, there is little doubt that the Gazi's characteristic energy and thoroughness will enable him to succeed in this reform as he has in the many others associated with his name.

U. S. A.

War Department Appropriation Bill for the Fiscal Year 1st July, 1932, to 30th June, 1933.

1. *Summary of Appropriations.*

The annual Appropriation Bill for the Army usually receives Presidential signature in February. This year, after seven months' consideration by Congress and a struggle of quite unusual severity, it was eventually signed on 14th July, two weeks after the commencement of the financial year for which it makes provision.

The following is a summary of the final appropriations as compared with those for the preceding year :—

——	1931-32.	1932-33.	Increase or decrease.
	dollars.	dollars.	dollars.
Military expenditure ..	335,505,965	290,300,024	—45,205,941
Non-military expenditure ..	111,067,270	106,578,489	—4,488,781
Total ..	446,573,235	396,878,513	—49,694,722

2. *Principal increases and decreases.*

The following items represent the principal savings effected in military expenditure :—

	dollars.
(*a*) Subsistence of the army	..10 millions approx.
(*b*) Clothing and equipage	.. 2·5 ,,
(*c*) Army transportation	.. 2·5 ,,
(*d*) Military post construction	..18·5 ,,
(*e*) Barracks and quarters	.. 2 ,,
(*f*) Air corps	.. 6 ,,

The only increased vote of any consequence is that for the Ordnance Department : an extra 400,000 dollars has been allotted to this supply branch. The total sum earmarked for mechanization is 504,000 dollars of which 200,000 dollars is expressly designated for the purchase of Christie tanks.

Last year the curve of expenditure on the U. S. Army, which had tended upwards for the six previous years, dropped to the extent of 5 million dollars, due to lower commodity prices and a small cut in the Air Corps vote. This year's cut of 45 million dollars (about £11 million) can also be accounted for, to a considerable extent, by still lower commodity prices and by expedients, such as the reduction of stocks and the transference of a large sum for barrack construction to a civil vote. When every allowance for such factors has been made, there remains a sum estimated at 8 million dollars (about £2 million) representing a real cut in the Army vote, the effect of which must be felt immediately in the service. The major part of this sum is to come off the allotment to the Air Corps.

Army Reorganization.

1. *General scheme.*

The War Department in Washington has announced an important reorganization of the peace time military establishment of the United States.

Previously the continental United States was divided into three Army Areas, each sub-divided into three Corps Areas, but the Army Areas existed only on paper and no commanders or staffs, were designated for them though legislative authority existed for their appointment should the necessity arise.

The new organization provides for General Headquarters and four Field Armies.

The Chief of Staff of the United States Army is appointed Commanding-General General Headquarters, and his staff will be composed of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff and other personnel as required. In addition to his other duties therefore, he is placed in command of the Field Army Group composed of four Field Armies.

The four Field Armies are composed of divisions of the Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserves organized into corps. Each Field Army contains two or more of the present Corps Areas.

The Senior Corps Area Commander in each Field Army is appointed Commander of the Field Army and his staff consists of his Corps Area Chief of Staff and other personnel as required.

The First Field Army, with headquarters in New York, will deal with the North Atlantic and the North-Eastern frontier.

The Second Field Army, with headquarters in Chicago, will deal with the strategic area of the Great Lakes and the central Northern frontier.

The Third Field Army, with headquarters at San Antonio, will deal with the region of the Gulf of Mexico and the Southern frontier.

The Fourth Field Army will have its headquarters at first in Omaha, the headquarters of the present Senior Corps Commander, but it is intended that its headquarters will be moved later to San Francisco. This Army will deal with the Pacific Coast.

2. *Objects.*

The War Department order gives the following as the objects of the reorganization :—

(*a*) To provide appropriate agencies to complete the development of war plans prepared by the War Department General Staff.

(*b*) To provide commanders for high units, and their staffs, prepared to take the field and execute the plans prepared by them.

(*c*) To provide agencies for the conduct of command post and other suitable peace-time training exercises.

(*d*) To provide, as a preliminary step to any general mobilization, an adequate force, within the minimum of time with the maximum of training, sufficient to protect any general mobilization that may be necessary.

(*e*) To provide a force sufficient to handle all emergencies short of a general mobilization.

REVIEW.

A Short History of the 17th and 22nd Field Companies, 3rd Sappers and Miners, in Mesopotamia 1914—1918.

(Printed for private circulation.)

An interesting and readable account of the work carried out by the Field Companies of the 6th (Poona) Division in Mesopotamia, based on the available war diaries and the personal recollections of surviving officers.

The period covered by the narrative is from the embarkation of the division at Bombay in October 1914, to its surrender at Kut, when both the companies became prisoners of war. Two short narratives of the experiences as prisoners of a Mussalman Indian Officer and a Hindu Sapper are added as appendices. They are interesting to contrast; as they show how much better the Turks treated prisoners of their own religion.

The narrative brings out well the varied and almost entirely improvised work which falls to the lot of a Field Company in war. In the first month the work done included a gallows in Basra City and a strong room for the Army Pay Department, besides numerous bridges, piers and sheds.

The sufferings of the troops in the siege of Kut are vividly described.

The book is well got up and has ten clear sketch maps, but unfortunately suffers from careless proof-reading.

K. G. M.

NOTE.—*A few copies are available for sale to members on application to the Commandant, Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners, Kirkee, Price Re.* 1/- *per copy in India or two shillings elsewhere.*