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EDITORIAL.

Politics.

In a book on Imperialism written in 1910 Lord Cromer summed up the attitude of England towards the inevitable devolution of its imperial paramountcy in the following words:

"What answer would the modern Imperialist give to the question of *Quo Vadis?* I do not think that the Frenchman, the Russian, the German, or the Italian, if the question were put to any of them, would be much more seriously embarrassed than the ancient Roman to find an answer. Each would reply that his intention was to civilise his alien subjects, but in no way to relax his hold over them. But what would be the reply of the leading Imperialist in the world—of the Englishman? He would be puzzled to give any definite answer, for he is in truth always striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive—the ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of his supremacy, and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication of his supreme position. Moreover, although after a dim, slipshod but characteristically Anglo-Saxon fashion, he is aware that empire must rest on one of two bases—an extensive military occupation or the principle of nationality—he cannot in all cases quite make up his mind which of the two bases he prefers."

Living as we do in the thick of clashing politics in India it is difficult at times to take a similarly detached view of the present entangled situation. We are going through a peculiarly trying time of transition, when the constitutional problems of over three hundred million souls of diverse creeds, races and ethical standards are being settled by their various representatives. Lord Cromer recognised the two ideals which are in the hearts of all Imperialists, but now that the "principle

of nationality " has been conceded by His Majesty's Government the question of " an extensive military occupation " must be ruled out as impracticable, or at least for the time being impractical, politics. In the meantime the study of contemporary politics gives much food for thought.

The outstanding political event of the last three months has been the Government's successful endeavours to persuade Congress to observe the main purpose of the Delhi Agreement. It has not been an easy task. Before the ink was dry on that controversial document the myrmidons of Congress were busy in all provinces carrying on subversive propaganda, preaching a gospel of hate, organising their shattered forces and making no concealment of their intention to use the intervening period for active preparation for " the next and final war."

With extraordinary patience Government watched these activities, checking them here and there when they ran counter too blatantly to the law of the land, but in most cases holding its hand in the hope that, in spite of the deliberate provocation offered, its immediate and important aim of getting Mr. Gandhi to the Round Table Conference might be realised. This policy of " wait and see " has been partially justified. Mr. Gandhi is now in London face to face for the first time for eleven years with realities, and no matter what the outcome of Congress representation on the Conference may be the British and Indian Governments have demonstrated to the world their desire that the Round Table should be a wholly representative body of all the creeds and factions that make up the sub-continent of India.

The immediate situation, however, has not improved. It may be safely presumed that Government recognised the risks involved in allowing the peasantry of the United Provinces and Bombay to be exploited by unscrupulous half-baked communists, in permitting the most loyal recruiting area in the North West Frontier Province to be seduced, and the rank and file of the police and other services to be discouraged ; these risks were obvious. But we may be sure that they were taken only after the most anxious consideration and weighing of all possibilities. Let us hope that the end will justify the means, and that the Conference will succeed in producing a Federation, Confederation or Commonwealth which will bring peace to a distracted country.

To many this will seem a mere platitudinous aspiration, more pious than probable. The conflicting elements which compose the

Conference are likely to have many bitter arguments and battles before their respective views are merged into a satisfactory compromise. Mr. Shaukat Ali, Dr. Moonje, Sir Mohamed Iqbal, Mr. Ujjal Singh, Mr. Bentham and Mr. Gandhi do not strike one as being congenial bed-fellows. But it will be remembered that similar doubts were expressed before the first Conference, where, except for the Communal problem, British and Indian statesmen succeeded in outlining a new constitution with the unanimous approval of all the various discordant interests.

In the meantime in India we are more concerned with the attitude of Mr. Gandhi's disgruntled followers. They made every effort to prevent him from going to London and when these tactics failed they were left high and dry on a barren shore. It would be too much to expect that men, whose life-work has been agitation, would be content to sit with folded arms during the absence of their leader. We may anticipate, therefore, that they will continue their "Social Uplift" work and their preparations for a further struggle in the not improbable eventuality of Mr. Gandhi withdrawing his co-operation in London.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Gandhi accepts the stern realities of the most complicated problem in the world and comes to a common agreement with his brother delegates his subsequent task will not be enviable. He will have to persuade his heterogeneous followers, including the gunmen of Bengal and the comic opera "red" army on the frontier, that constitution-making is more than shouting "Long Live Revolution" or annoying people who want to buy clothes. It is likely—indeed almost certain when one considers the amount of seditious poison which the youth of India has imbibed during the last two years,—that his appeal will fall on deaf ears. Then, Indian politicians will have to hold the baby of their own begetting.

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Retrenchment.

It is only natural to expect that the present world-wide economic depression should have its effect on the services in India. The various Retrenchment Committees, whose work is wrapped in necessary mystery, are working feverishly to cut down expenditure in all departments of the Government, and, needless to remark, Army expenditure is not escaping the prevailing necessity for drastic pruning. While it is impossible to prophesy what the actual savings will be or in which directions they will be effected, the study of the May Committee's Economy Report at Home

may give an inkling to possible proposals for economy. Briefly, some of these recommendations were as follows :—

Pay and Pensions.	*Saving.*
Introduction of 1925 rates of pay for all personnel of the fighting services (Navy, Army and R.A.F.) ..	£2,199,000
Introduction of revised cost of living deduction for officers of the fighting services	£400,000
Introduction of revised cost of living deduction from pensions of officers of the fighting services ..	£190,000
Reduction by roughly ten per cent. of expenditure on technical research, education, inspection costs, and clothing allowances	£859,000
Discontinuance of subsidies for mechanical transport and the light horse breeding scheme	£50,000

This represents a saving of almost £3,700,000 and does not include the more general recommendations for limiting expenditure in all branches of the services, which brings the cuts to the substantial total of nine million sterling.

The proposed cut in pay leaps immediately to the eye. If pay is reduced at Home it is too much to hope that a similar measure of economy will not be examined in India. The Home cut is based on the general fall in prices in all commodities in Europe, but it can hardly be argued that a corresponding fall has occurred in India. On the contrary, it is clear that the recent increase in import duties, the continuing high level of servant's pay, rents and educational fees, together with the enhanced income tax, have actually raised the Indian cost of living for all British officials.

Further means for reducing the 1931-32 Military Budget of fifty two crores are being energetically explored. In this connection the ultimate fate of the "Military Reserve Fund" which, under the original arrangements for the stabilisation of the Military Budget for a period of four years, had been earmarked to carry out a programme of mechanisation and modernisation of equipment, may now, perhaps, be safely left to the cynic's imagination. The disbandment of two Indian infantry battalions has been reported in the press. It would be unwise to speculate on other methods of economy, but the amalgamation of British and Indian Hospitals, the Anglo-Indianisation of nursing staffs, the overhauling of Ordnance establishments with a

view to their competing in the open market, and the reduction of redundant staff appointments are obvious lines for inquiry. The taking over of all engineer services on the N. W. F. P. by the Public Works Department has been recommended by the recent Haig Commission; this would effect a military economy certainly, but in case of war such a saving at the cost of army efficiency might have incalculable consequences. The whole question of Retrenchment bristles with problems the solution of which is bound to cause heart-burning, but the delicate financial position of India must, as in England, demand sacrifices from all.

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The Disarmament Conference.

The general Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations is to meet at Geneva on 2nd February 1932 under the Presidency of the Rt. Hon'ble Mr. Arthur Henderson, if his new duties permit. India as an independent member of the League is to send a delegation.

It is no exaggeration to say that this conference represents the most important international event since the deliberations which preceded the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. That Treaty, framed whilst its creators were still swayed by the antagonisms and hatreds of the war, has left Europe in an unbalanced and dangerous condition. On the one hand are the victorious allied nations still, with the exception of the British Empire and United States of America, maintaining large conscript armies and numerous Air Forces. On the other hand are the defeated central European peoples with armies rigidly limited and no defensive Air Forces at all. France, with the memory of two invasions in half a century, asserts that her safety depends upon her right to maintain absolute and complete military ascendancy. Germany, still at heart militaristic, with a large and intensely patriotic population, is becoming more and more exasperated at this situation. She accuses the allies of a one-sided application of Article 8 of the covenant, which recognised "that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of Armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." In addition further east there is the menacing figure of Soviet Russia with ever increasing armies permeated by a doctrine undisguisedly hostile to European civilization.

The solutio nof these problems is the task of the Conference, and upon its success or failure may well depend the future of Europe.

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A Frontier Incident.

The report of a gallant frontier episode has just come to light which reflects very creditably on the staunchness and discipline of the Zhob Militia. On the 29th June the Commandant, Zhob Militia, received a message from the small post at Ashewat, (about 50 miles north of Killa Saifulla), that a large *lashkar* was in the vicinity. This intelligence could not be verified until the 3rd July when definite information was received that the post was being beseiged.

During this period of uncertainty the Indian Officer commanding the post (garrisoned by two Indian officers and seventy-six men) had been taking all necessary precautions to strengthen his defences and had sent out reconnaissance parties, who, however, discovered nothing. In addition he had made outside arrangements to communicate with the nearest post if an attack materialised. On the afternoon of July 3rd the attack by several hundred tribesmen occured, and the information reached Fort Sandeman the same night.

The Post Commander, uncertain that the news had got through to the authorities, decided to supplement it by sending two sowars to the nearest post. The gates were thrown open and out galloped the messengers in the teeth of a dust storm and the enemy's fire. They got through safely. Firing was kept up during the night but the use of Verey lights prevented thetribesmen from getting to close quarters, and at dawn the arrival of aeroplanes from Quetta made the *lashkar* melt into invisibility. In the meantime a small party of militia under another Indian officer, which had been sent from Shaighalu post, thirty-five miles away, had been marching through the night and arrived at 11 a.m. A good march, including the crossing of the Torghar Hill (8,000 feet).

This small incident again draws attention to the crying need of a bridge over the Gomal to complete the link between the Zhob and Waziristan. This would necessitate the construction of a post at Gul Kach, which would then facilitate control of this wayward area and prevent the recurrence of such attacks in the future.

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Sport on Leave.

Members who propose spending a portion of their leave in or retiring to the Irish Free State will be interested in the Irish Sporting Estates Agency. This agency has recently been established with the object of providing information on life and sport and inspecting or providing properties in the Irish Free State. The Agency, controlled by retired British officers, is also prepared to put officers of the services and others, who wish to spend their leave or part of the hunting season in the State, in touch with suitable hosts who would be willing to accommodate them as paying guests.

Further particulars are obtainable from The Irish Sporting Estates Agency, Coolmore, Thomastown, Co. Kilkenny.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION, 1932.

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1932 :—

"Disarmament, and its effect on the Foreign Policy of the British Empire."

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and Auxiliary forces.

(2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1932.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1932.

(8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE "COLLECTIVIZATION" OF AGRICULTURE IN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

By "Ledsam."

1. The institution in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of "collective" farms has aroused widespread interest, some misunderstanding and considerable speculation as to its ultimate outcome. A short sketch of the evolution of the agrarian problem in Russia from the days of serfdom, may help to place this latest development in its true perspective.

2. *Serfdom.*

After the death in 1584 of Ivan the Terrible, Russia passed through a period of chaos known as the Time of Troubles. This lasted until 1613, when Michael Romanov, the first of his dynasty, was crowned Tsat in Moscow.

Serfdom was the result of the efforts of the new dynasty to restore order out of social disruption. Its aim was a centralized state, and it was forced to rely upon the great number of "gentry" who in return for land and privileges put their services either civil or military at the disposal of the State. The Time of Troubles had however impoverished these gentry, whose real wealth consisted in the number of peasants available to till their land. Large numbers of these peasants had deserted and fled: some towards the Lower Volga: others into Siberia, leaving the gentry and the land without labour, and the State face to face with famine.

The gentry therefore made urgent demands that fugitive peasants should be restored to them: and that their migration from their particular area should be forbidden. These requests were granted in the form of many decrees extending over a long period, each decree increasing the powers of the gentry and limiting the rights of the peasants.

By 1646, serfdom as we understand it, was complete. From that date the gentry were required to enter in government registers the names of all their peasants. These and their descendants then became

legally attached to the estate. Serfdom became hereditary. In 1649 the Tsar Alexis definitely established serfdom as a state institution. But it must be remembered that the object of all this was to establish order and ensure that the land was tilled to the best advantage. To the government of the day it must have appeared the most logical method.

3. *Peter III and serfdom.*

Serfdom thus continued under a *regime* in which the governing class was entirely aloof from the mass of the people which it appears to have regarded as existing for their special benefit. The powers of the squires grew; and the rights of the peasants dwindled.

Eventually, in 1762, even the fiction that the privileges of the gentry existed in return for services rendered was abolished: for in that year the half-witted Peter III released the Russian gentry from their state obligations. He thus changed them from being servants of the state, and remunerating themselves for their services by the labour of the peasants on their lands, into private landowners owning the freehold of their land and regarding their peasants as their slaves. The peasants, as was natural, bitterly resented this change and, in places, broke into revolt. They had always regarded the land as their own; land which they, under the direction of their squires tilled as part of their general obligation to the State. They were sufficiently shrewd to realize the full implications of this latest decree. Their own obligations to the squires continued, while that of the squires to the State was abolished. In other words they became the property of the squires, and the ensuing period was far the worst in the history of serfdom. But they clung to their time-honoured belief that the land was theirs even though their rights as citizens were practically non-existent. An episode from the reminiscences of the Decembrist Yakushkin illustrates this point of view.

Yakushkin on return from abroad decided to put an end to a state of affairs in which he was practically a slave owner. He went to his estate called together his peasants and put the question to them. The land was his: they were his. He would free them. He would even allow them to rent some of his land on easy terms. What did they think? But the peasants, to his surprise evinced no great joy. They merely asked "And what is to become of the land?" Yakushkin explained: and received the reply—"No: let things remain as they were. We are yours and the land is ours." This was the view of the

mass of the Russian peasantry : a view be it said in contradiction to that of the State and the governing classes, who regarded it as ridiculous.

4. *The Emancipation.*

The Emancipation of the Serfs, carried out by Alexander II in 1861 in the face of much opposition, did not grant them that complete freedom which the words suggest. It is true they were freed from the squires who from now became country gentleman living on their estates, surrounded by peasantry working on their own land, but they continued in a way to live under the conditions of serfdom. The land, not granted to the gentry, was the property of the village commune and was distributed among the peasants according to the number of souls in each household. This distribution was subject to periodical re-adjustment dependent upon the increase or decrease in the sizes of families. Their collective responsibility for the payment of taxes made them dependent upon the village community, which they could not leave without its permission. The peasants were, however, allowed to lease land and in many small ways their lot was improved.

We find therefore at this period, two systems of land tenure. On the one hand the gentry, private landowners with power to dispose of their property. On the other hand the peasants bound to the commune, and still performing the State function laid upon them, that of cultivating the land for the ultimate benefit of the State. Two such conflicting *regimes* could not exist side by side. As the population increased, the peasants, confined within the limits of the land allotted to the commune, began to experience an ever-increasing land shortage and to look at the land owned by the local squire with covetous eyes. To their minds the squire's property was land that had been illegally taken from the peasants (" We are yours and the land is ours ") and there arose an all-pervading desire to own it.

Peasant discontent was marked by serious though abortive risings culminating in the general disorders which followed the unsuccessful conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. The peasants had become definitely hostile and it became evident that reform was essential if revolution and economic distress were to be averted.

5. *Stolypin's reforms.*

The task facing the Russian Government was immense, and in 1907 with great energy, under the leadership of the Prime Minister

Stolypin, it set about its task of converting the peasants into private landed proprietors, and of making them free citizens with full rights. Stolypin freed the peasants from their dependence on the village commune and gave them the right, should they wish to exercise it, of claiming their allotment of land as permanent property and to have it in one compact settlement, instead of being divided into strips all over the village holding.

At first the peasants were slow to realize the benefits conferred upon them by this new legislation, but gradually in increasing volume overcame their prejudices and took advantage of the opportunities offered them. For the first time in Russian agrarian development economic forces were allowed full play. The harder-working and shrewder peasants bought up the land of their lazier or less gifted neighbours, who in most cases drifted into the towns. Thus by the outbreak of the Great War there were the beginnings of a strong nucleus of energetic and enterprising peasant proprietors. The war however put a stop to this development, and the revolution of 1917 gave a set back to the whole movement.

6. *The Revolution of* 1917.

The course of events in Petrograd and in the army during the revolutionary period of 1917 are sufficiently well known. What meanwhile, was happening in the country? Of this we have only slender evidence, though the broad outline of the movement can be traced. The distinction between Stolypin's peasant proprietors and those who had not availed themselves of his reforms, ceased to be: and the peasants *en masse* reverted to type and set about dividing up the land and property of the squires. This, however, was followed by a further development of the movement, and that was a demand by tne poorer peasants for a wholesale equalisation of all land whatsoever. Thus arose a conflict between the peasant proprietors who by thrift and hard work had become people of comparative substance, and those who had little or nothing. For a period the country-side was immersed in its own quarrels: agricultural production declined: and the towns-people began to starve.

7. *The food requisitions.*

In the communist Party however the remedy was simple. The peasants were to hand over to the State all that they did not require for their own purposes. Grain was acquired by force; in many cases

by actual punitive expeditions and this resulted not only in a number of peasant risings throughout Russia, but in the peasants themselves producing no more than their requirements for personal consumption and for seed-grain for the following year.

Meanwhile the towns continued to starve : discontent reigned through the length and breadth of the country and culminated in a mutiny at Kronstadt which nearly broke the Soviet Government.

8. *The New Economic Policy.*

The situation became so critical that Lenin, who alone had sufficient authority, introduced, in March 1921, the New Economic Policy. This was in effect a return to capitalism. The peasants were allowed to dispose of their goods to the best advantage (after having paid a heavy tax in kind) and to hire labour. Conditions started to improve. Grain and food again began to reach the towns and it looked as if Russian agriculture was at last coming into its own. There was, in fact, in the villages a veiled but intensive return to the days of Stolypin : but with this great difference that under Stolypin the innovation had come from the Government : now however it was the peasants themselves who in an elemental stream returned, as it were, to the land and started to work it under conditions of which they had dreamed for centuries.

9. *Beginnings of Collectivization.*

For a while the Government maintained a benevolent neutrality ; but not for long. It soon became apparent that the New Economic Policy was resulting in the establishment of a class of well-to-do farmers : of men who by superior energy and enterprise began to acquire more land, cattle and wealth than their neighbours, who had considerable local influence : and who in fact were potential " capitalists." Here was a problem for the Soviet Government. The country was settling down, but " capitalism " was beginning to return : " Capitalism " of a type which, if allowed to grow, would stifle communism in the most vital part of the political and economic system of the country. What was to be done ?

The reply of the Government was the institution of the collective farm and the introduction of an equalising partition of land among the peasants. By privileges and other advantages the Government set itself to attract the peasants to the kolkhozy but without much success. Many Kulaks themselves entered the collective farms, which develop-

ed into small estates managed by a kulak, and actually known in some cases by the name of the manager. Other collectives simply became refuges for loafers who hoped to live without effort on what the Government provided. In other words in various disguises, and in spite of Government opposition, "Kulakism" continued, the countryside managed to live in comparative prosperity: and the threat to the existence of communist government grew stronger.

The Soviet Government's repressive measures thereupon increased in severity. By means of forced loans, high taxation, and a manipulation of the prices of town and country products, they ruthlessly, systematically and with considerable success set themselves to despoil the peasants. Their grain was bought from them at the lowest prices and town products sold at three and four times their value. The peasants found themselves unable to resist. There remained only one line of action for them and that was to go out of the market. Once more the area sown rapidly diminished: food again became scarce in the markets, and the peasants withdrew into themselves, sowing enough for their own requirements and no more.

The Government retaliated by the seizure of grain. Punitive missions again were sent into the country; and in the face of considerable active opposition, amounting in places almost to civil war, forcibly took the grain from the peasants. But this was no more than an expedient. The harvested crop could be seized: but the peasants could not be compelled to sow more than their own requirements for the following harvest: and in spite of the harshest of treatment, resolutely refused to do so.

10. *General Collectivization.*

What was the Government to do? There appeared to be the alternatives of either reverting to the New Economic Policy, or of instituting State Agriculture on an immense scale. The former indeed meant a return to "capitalism" in the villages: but the latter implied another revolution which would abolish peasant ownership of the land, by far the most important result of the Revolution of 1917, and turn the peasants once more into serfs working on communal land, with their joint obligation to the State. It meant in fact snatching from their grasp the land for which they had dreamed since the original introduction of serfdom and which after some four hundred years they had only just obtained.

The alternatives before the Government were no less than either the enunciation of an undoubtedly important principle, but one which after all had recently been renounced : or the initiation of a system which would probably meet with such widespread opposition as to endanger the whole Bolshevik *regime.*

Small wonder that all outside observers confidently predicted the reintroduction of the New Economic Policy.

The Government however went boldly forward and by possibly the most important decision since they came into power, resolved on the institution of state agriculture: and with the utmost energy and enthusiasm set about hustling the peasants into the new collective farms. Bands of Communists and Young Communists were let loose over the countryside to preach, cajole and threaten : and the peasants, crushed by taxation, bewildered, and thoroughly disheartened, gave way. After selling their property for almost nothing, and killing and consuming their cattle, they streamed towards the collective farms.

But the pace had been too fast, the collective farm organizations were incapable of dealing with this great influx of labour. This, and the fact that peasant discontent began to be reflected in the army caused Stalin to issue his decree " Dizzy with Success " in which the various Communist organizations were ordered to go slow. Compulsory collectivization was stopped in the spring of 1930 ; but the principle remained the same. All peasants were intended eventually to enter the collective farms.

There for the time being we must leave them : these peasants who having just realized the fulfilment of their age-long dream of possessing all the land, now find themselves serfs working under the domination of a system more ruthless and exacting than ever were the old gentry. What are their feelings ? What their intentions ? Will they always continue in this state? Can they after centuries suddenly renounce all their desire to own and till their own land ? The future will provide the answer; and the existence of the present *regime* will be vitally affected thereby.

THE DEFENCE OF PORTS—Part II.

By "Madeira."

VI. The Roles of the Services in Port Defence.

16. *Changes in role suggested by modern conditions.*

For the last four hundred years, that is since artillery came into general use, the primary element in harbour defence has been the heavy gun mounted on shore. This, combined with the fact that the greatest threat to a well defended port has come usually, not against its sea-face, but from the landward side, has almost invariably made the army the predominant service in its local defence. Within the last thirty years, however, new weapons have been forthcoming which have challenged, not only the supremacy of the shore gun as a means of defence, but the advisability of considering the army as the service best suited to provide that defence.

The defensive armour and offensive power of the warship have increased. The submarine may claim to provide a more efficient defence than the gun. Lastly the Air Force with the newest of weapons, whose potentialities are as yet unrealized, possibly even by those who wield them, appears on the scene.

In assessing the relative importance of the Services in port defence, it is first necessary to examine whether the army with its shore batteries cannot be efficiently and economically replaced in its old leading *role* by the other services with their newer weapons.

17. *Shore Defence* versus *Ships.*

Does the gun on shore still retain its superiority over the gun afloat? The increased range, power and accuracy with air observation of the naval weapon are counterbalanced by similar improvements in coastal artillery, while the fundamental disadvantages of the ship as a gun platform remain. Briefly, it is unstable, so that uncontrolled movement of the gun takes place at the moment of firing; restricted, so that its range finding instruments can have only a limited base; conspicuous, so that it is a comparatively easy target; and vulnerable, because, in spite of its armour, there are large areas in which a hit with a heavy shell can do serious damage. A well sited coast defence gun,

on the other hand, fires from an immovable platform, has little restriction as to the location of its range-finding instruments, is almost, if not quite, invisible from the sea and inconspicuous from the air; and presents such a small target that direct hits on it will be practically unknown. In addition its ammunition supply is not so limited. The experience of the last war again demonstrated the weakness of purely naval attack on shore defences. British monitors, with every available device to help them, engaged the German batteries on the Belgian Coast on no less than forty occasions, firing large numbers of heavy shell, but never once succeeding in putting a gun even temporarily out of action. The efforts of the fleet to force the Dardanelles broke down mainly because the mine fields could not be cleared until the shore guns covering them were silenced, and this the ships guns proved unable to accomplish. It may be taken, therefore, that the shore gun retains its efficiency as a defence against attack by surface ships, and it is not, reasonable for this reason that it should be supplanted by other weapons.

The question then arises that while retaining coast defence guns, would it not be better to let the navy man them? Defended ports are part of the scheme for using the naval forces and should perhaps, therefore, logically be in naval hands. In practice, however, the working of coastal artillery resembles much more that of heavy artillery on land, than afloat. The army, also, will have to provide artillery for land defences and against air attack, so that organization is simplified if all artillery on shore belongs to one service.

The submarine, first intended largely as a coast defence weapon, soon took on a wider scope, but it retains and has increased its potentialities for its original role. It can engage the hostile ships at a distance, constitutes a very serious threat to any bombarding ships, and must act as a deterrent to their employment. But means of defence against submarines have progressed to such an extent, that they alone could not hope successfully to repulse serious naval attack, nor could they to any considerable extent replace shore guns.

18. *The Air Force as the Primary Service in Port Defence.*

The advent of a new partner in combined operations has not only given a third dimension to the attack, but it has provided the defence with most potent weapons. So much is this so that it is doubtful whether capital ships would attempt a bombardment without a reasonable assurance of air superiority during the operations. Apart

from the risk of damage or even total loss from air attack, the need to be constantly under way and the restriction of air observation would make accurate shooting most difficult. In fact, the power of the aeroplane against surface ships is held by most airmen to be such as to make it a more effective weapon in coast defence than the gun, which it is urged, it should replace.

(*i*) *Relative Hitting Power.*

As far as hitting the target is concerned there is, round for round, or rather bomb and torpedo for shell, probably not much in it between the aeroplane and the gun. Neither the airman nor the gunner is, one suspects, quite so accurate in practice as he would have his friends believe. The relative seriousness of a hit by a heavy bomb compared with that by a shell is a matter over which technical experts may wrangle ; to the ordinary observer it seems that the element of luck enters too largely into the matter to allow of a decision. It may be taken, however, that, as a rule, a torpedo would have greater effect than the heaviest shell. The gun, however, holds one great advantage, for it can keep up a higher rate of fire, as it does not have to return to a base to reload. This means that, granted equal accuracy, the gun should secure more hits, as it will expend more rounds in a given time.

(*ii*) *Mobility.*

The aeroplane can locate and attack the hostile warship, long before it is within bombarding distance. The gun has to allow it to come within range, and this offers it the opportunity of doing damage which the aeroplane denies.

Then, too, air forces, by reason of their mobility, need not be allotted to a particular port, but can be held in some central locality, from which, if required, they can reach any threatened spot within a radius of a thousand miles in a matter of hours. Thus one squadron of aeroplanes could, it is claimed, do the work of several coast defence batteries. Roughly speaking, only one port in an area can be attacked seriously at a time, and most will never be attacked at all, their immobile defences being so much locked up and useless material and men. This suggestion has obvious advantages, but the objections to it cannot be disregarded. The air forces, although not locked up in a port, would have very definitely, to be locked up in an area. It would have to be clearly understood that they were not available outside that area

in any circumstances, or, inside it, for any other purpose than port defence. Otherwise there would be the greatest risk of their not being available when most needed. In spite of such a guarantee, the very mobility of the aeroplane makes it improbable that, when it came to the pinch, first line air units allotted to port defence would not be diverted to the main theatres of the air struggle.

Even were this temptation resisted, the attackers might, by seizing an opportunity when local atmospheric conditions, *e.g.*, the monsoon, would delay the arrival of the defence air force, get twelve hours or so in which to do their worst to a defenceless port, and that would be enough to destroy every useful establishment in it. Feints to draw the air force to ports it was not intended seriously to attack, or to divide it would have great chance of success, and might leave the enemy an easy prey at a vital point. At present, too, air routes between the ports of the Empire are not sufficiently developed to make the more of a considerable air force from one to the other a matter ot ease or certainty. Even on a highly organised peace time commercial route, the Indian Air Mail has demonstrated that delays are constant and disasters unfortunately too common. In war, it is true, more risks can be taken, but this only means more delays and heavier losses. Many of our Empire air ways cross the territory of foreign powers, who, even if neutral in war, must close these routes to us. Several of the remaining routes which cross only the sea or British territories are within striking distance of main air bases of potential enemies Although actual interception in the air is improbable such routes are precarious.

It would seem, therefore, that, if air forces are to replace naval and military defences, they must be definitely allotted to particular ports, otherwise there can be no certainty of their being available when most needed.

(*iii*) *Attack on an Air Defended Port.*

The effectiveness of aircraft being much limited by darkness, the dangers of night attack would be greatly enhanced, and the risk of such attacks increased. It is often overlooked that the power of the aeroplane to attack ships at a distance may, if aircraft are the sole means of defence, be turned against it. A ship cannot stand close in to engage a shore battery without vastly increasing its own risk. A capital ship which at 30,000 yards might treat with contempt the

efforts of a medium coast defence battery, would invite considerable damage from the same battery at, say, 8,000 yards. In fact, it is most unlikely that it would close to that range. The aeroplane bomb or torpedo on the contrary, is as accurate at fifty miles as at 5,000 yards, though, of course, the greater the range, the less the intensity of the attack. This seems to indicate that the correct tactics in a naval attack on a port, defended only or mainly from the air, would be to stand close in under cover of darkness, open intense fire at dawn with main and secondary armament on the air force ground establishments, and having demolished these, proceed to deal with other objectives at leisure. Air force aerodromes, hangars and workshops are large, conspicuous, and extremely vulnerable targets, which it will often be impossible to site so far inland as to be out of range, and an aerodrome under observed artillery fire of any intensity is for all practicable offensive purposes unusable. Then too, against a port in whose defence aeroplanes had replaced guns instead of risking capital ships because they alone could outrange the shore guns, vessels with less heavy armament would be employed because they could close the range without any corresponding increase in danger to themselves.

(*iv.*) *Extent to which Air Forces could replace Land Defences.*

Such considerations, while they show that aeroplanes cannot, without undue risk, be substituted for land defences, do not mean that they could not replace some guns. Heavy bombers and torpedo planes, could be substituted for heavy coast defence guns, provided that :—

(*a*) The aeroplanes were permanently and instantly available.

(*b*) There were enough of them to compensate for the higher rate of fire of the absent guns.

(*c*) Medium and light guns remained.

Here the question of economy would have to be considered. It is doubtful if the necessary first line air squadrons, with their entirely British personnel, expensive and quickly obsolete equipment, and heavy upkeep charges, could be provided at a cost approaching the equivalent in heavy batteries, which although expensive to instal, cost comparatively little in upkeep, may have a considerable native personnel, and do not need frequent replacement.

19. *Forces likely to be Available.*

This brings us to the real crux of the question which is not, is the submarine or the aeroplane more efficient for coast defence than the gun, but, is it strategically sound to allot offensive naval or air formations at all to the defence of ports ? It is no use hoping that because a flotilla of submarines, or a squadron of heavy bombers, or a battalion of tanks is the best unit for the defence of a particular port that it will necessarily be available for that purpose. The navy possesses barely enough submarines and destroyers to suffice for fleet duties, let alone to supply all requirements for anti-submarine work, protection of trade routes, and patrolling. It follows that, although possibly the most effective vessels for port defence, neither submarines nor destroyers will be available. No mobile naval forces of any strength should be allotted to the local defence of ports, and no clamour from our own people or feints by the enemy should make us violate this principle

Similarly it is strategically unsound to allot first line, mobile air force units of high offensive capacity to port defence, when every available squadron will be required either to co-operate with the main naval or military forces, or to take part in the concentrated and sustained effort of the air force to gain and maintain supremacy in the decisive air theatre. The air force in this respect is on the same footing as the navy, and it would be as unwise to allot air squadrons to port defence as it would be to divert destroyer flotillas from the fleet. The port must hold out without their help. When the Fleet or the main Air Striking Force arrives to its relief, it will be accompanied by these flotillas or squadrons, which will then prove of infinitely more value than they would have been if devoted to local defence.

The naval and air forces allotted to port defence should be the minimum required to co-operate with the shore defences. The military forces should also be limited, and only where a port of first class strategic value is liable to large scale land attack should they include first line mobile formations.

20. *Units Available for Port Defence.*

(*a*). *Naval.*

Excluding submarines and destroyers as unlikely to be available, the naval defence will have to be content with trawlers, coastal motor boats and motor launches. The coastal motor boat is well suited to surprise attacks on heavy ships, but bombardment

will usually be during daylight and they will be escorted by destroyers and aircraft. The coastal motor boat will thus have little chance of reaching them. In addition its value for reconnaissance duties is very restricted by its poor sea keeping qualities and lowness in the water, which gives it a very limited horizon. It is not likely, therefore, that a large number of coastal motor boats will be made available for port defence. Practically the only type of vessel that can be reckoned on is the armed trawler or some equivalent auxiliary craft. Even these will not usually be retained in peace, as at most large ports there are a number of these that could be earmarked and taken up by the naval authorities on the threat of war becoming imminent. Arrangements must, however, be made to have available in the port at all times, guns for these vessels, as well as the necessary sweeping gear, mines, nets, and detector appliances.

(*b*) *Air Force.*

Some air force is very desirable, if not essential, for co-operation with the navy in seaward reconnaissance and with heavy or medium coast defence guns. In naval bases or other ports of primary importance it may be considered advisable to locate a few regular squadrons for these purposes, but their presence should be exceptional.

It is here that volunteer auxiliary squadrons, formed from the local flying clubs which exist in increasing numbers at large ports, could be most usefully employed. Their training, equipment, and difficulties of transport would not allow of their taking part in the main air offensive or fit them for co-operation with the fleet or field army, but for local reconnaissance or spotting duties they might be invaluable, if given a certain amount of training in peace.

(*c*) *Army.*

Heavy coast defence guns will be required only when attack by capital ships is anticipated, and even then the configuration of the coast may enable medium guns to hold attacking ships out of range of the port itself. Futuer increases in range and hitting power of medium guns may also enable them to replace heavy, especially in ports where the distance from his repair bases may make the enemy hesitate even more than usual to risk damage to his capital ships. A varying number of light guns and searchlights will always be required, not only to deal with the smaller surface craft but to cover mine fields. All

these guns should, as far as possible, be manned by either European volunteers or native gunners under regular supervision, so as to liberate first line troops for the field armies and for purposes of economy in maintenance.

In addition anti-aircraft artillery may have to be provided in varying quantities at the major defended ports. Some regular troops also for internal security, signal units, engineers and other technical units are almost bound to be required at every overseas port. If serious attack on the landward side is probable lower category troops to man the close defences, and a fully equipped mobile force will also be needed.

21. *The Role of each Service.*

The number of ports to be defended is so large, and their circumstances so varied that it is impossible to lay down a universal rule that in their defence any particular Service is invariably paramount, or to decide on any fixed proportion in which the Services should be represented. But it may be safely affirmed that in order to secure the most economical, effective and certain defence, and, at the same time, to leave the maximum mobile forces free to operate in the decisive land, sea or air theatres, the Army should, at the vast majority of ports, provide the chief elements of the defence.

Normally the division of responsibility between the services will be :—

(*a*) *The Army.*

(*i*) Protection against attack by land.
(*ii*) Internal Security.
(*iii*) Defence against air attack by anti-air-craft artillery and small arms.
(*iv*) Defence against bombardment by heavy and medium coast defence guns.
(*v*) Defence against enterprises by light naval forces by medium and light guns.
(*vi*) Protection with light guns of minefields and other obstacles laid by navy.
(*vii*) Land reconnaissance and intelligence.
(*viii*) Communications.

(*b*) *The Navy.*

(*i*) Seaward reconnaissance and naval intelligence.
(*ii*) Defence against submarines and light surface craft by patrols, minefields and obstacles.
(*iii*) Examination service and control of shipping, navigational lights, marks, etc.
(*iv*) Control of ships' wireless and port-war signal station.

(*c*) *Air Force.*

(*i*) Reconnaissance, seaward and overland.
(*ii*) Spotting for heavy and medium coast defence guns.
(*iii*) Anti-submarine patrol.
(*iv*) Defence against minor air attack.
(*v*) Control of civil aviation.

Thus the Army, with the essential but limited co-operation of the other Services should hold the ports of the Empire as its contribution to sea power.

VII. Control and Co-ordination of the Defence of a Port.

22. *Command.*

In theory the best way to secure control and co-ordination in any complicated enterprise is to place the whole undertaking under the command of one carefully selected and well qualified man. In practice, however, this absolute unity of command is not usually attempted in major combined operations. Reliance is placed on the senior officer of each Service co-operating with the others so intimately that, while none is subordinate and each retains his independence of tactical command, they will be as one in the strategical direction of the operation. Apart from the obvious difficulties in placing a senior officer of one Service under an officer of probably no higher rank in another, there is the objection that it is impossible to say which particular Service will play the chief rôle. At one phase it will be the Navy, at another the Air Force, and at yet another the Army. While this applies to large scale operations it is worth while considering, before abandoning the undoubted advantages of unity of command, whether it does so equally to port defence.

Normally there will be no large naval forces present, and any Air Force units will be allotted for co-operation with the other Services.

Nor, is it likely that there will be any naval or Air Force officers of high rank with these small detachments. Usually the Army will provide the bulk of the defence forces, both in numbers and offensive armament. It is logical, therefore, that the command should be vested in the senior military officer. An additional reason is that he is the officer most likely to be permanently present, and, as it is essential that the defence scheme should be able to come into force instantly in a precautionary period, he will be in the best position to take up the command.

There will, however, be ports, especially those not liable to land attacks, at which the naval or air force permanently allotted to the defence preponderate over the military. In these, of course, the senior naval or air force officer would take control. The principle to be observed is that there should be one commander, decided on in peace, and that he should come from the Service providing the main portion of the defence.

A clear distinction must be made between the forces definitely allotted to local defence and those, not so allotted, but based on or using the port. If this is not done there will be confusion and friction between their respective commanders. This applies also to naval, military or air establishments for the maintenance of mobile forces, not forming part of the defences, for instance a port with a small defending force might contain a large naval dockyard. The naval officer in charge of the dockyard, except in such matters as air raid precautions, guards for vulnerable points, etc., should then be under the naval commander-in-chief or Admiralty direct, and would exercise no executive control over the port defence.

23. *Staffs.*

The defended port commander should, except where large forces are present, be able to retain in his own hands direct command of his own Service. The senior officers of the other Services could act either as subordinate commanders under him or as his chief staff officers. If the former, they must be represented by liaison officers at his headquarters, and keep in the closest personal touch with him. It is preferable, however, to adopt the second alternative, that is to make them his actual staff officers. This ensures more intimate touch, a quicker access to information, and that their advice will always be immediately available. In addition, all orders to their own services

will issue through them, and a frequent cause of misunderstanding be thus avoided. Should their acting as staff officers make it difficult for them to exercise direct command of their own services, it would be better for them to appoint their seconds-in-command to do so, freeing themselves for intimate co-operation with the port commander. At the same time the senior officer of each Service should be allowed to correspond direct on disciplinary and administrative matters with the heads of his own Service, it being clearly understood that for all operational purposes he would be completely under the port commander.

24. *Sub-division of Defences.*

The defended port area may extend for a considerable distance inland, and on the seaward side will include the approaches to the port and all water from which it may be bombarded. The limits of this area and the responsibilities of each Service within it should be clearly laid down. When either the area or the forces employed become very large, it may be advisable to divide the defence into zones or sectors, each with a commander responsible for its defence and administration. No geographical boundaries can be laid down for the responsibility of each service, as the essence of co-operation is that their defensive measures should overlap. But there must be a clear definition of the action each should take to meet attack, and complete mutual knowledge of one another's plans.

25. *Communications.*

No scheme of control and co-ordination can work without an efficient communication system. In spite of increased uniformity in signal procedure it is no easy matter to link up units of every service, and further complications will arise as the civil telephones and telegraphs will have to be included. A small joint signal committee, consisting of the chief signal officer of each service with a representative of the civil telegraphs, would be most useful to co-ordinate all signal matters. Efficient defence will depend so much on communications that no pains must be spared to protect the main telegraph lines, exchanges and visual stations from bombardment or air attack.

Besides the provision of ample inter-communication facilities, direct liaison between units of the different Services must be encouraged. This is especially necessary where they have to act in direct support

of one another, as for example, the naval examination service and the light batteries covering the examination anchorage, and the approaches.

26. *Liaison with Civil Authorities.*

An attack on a port will bring the civil population into such close contact with the realities of war, that they must be regarded as the fourth partner in the defence. In fact its threefold aspect becomes fourfold.

In addition to existing volunteer units, further reserves of able bodied civilians to man defences or provide labour can usually be raised. The police and special constables can relieve troops of much internal security work. Civil hospitals, doctors, and voluntary aid detachments can be a most valuable reinforcement to the medical services. Civil transport resources will have to be exploited fully by a system of requisitioning.

The control of a large civilian population, liable to bombardment or air attack, is a difficult and complex business. Anti-air raid precautions, shelters, protection against gas, counter-espionage, sanitary measures, and possibly rationing, will all have to be provided for by the port commander. Probably the best way to ensure the necessary control is to appoint suitable, prominent, and loyal citizens as district commissioners, each responsible for an area. Obviously special legislation will be required and it must be drawn up in peace ready to become operative at once by ordinance. As soon as the precautionary period begins the chief civil official should be attached to the Port Commander's staff as political adviser. When serious attack is likely it will probably be advisable to proclaim martial law, the civil authorities then become definitely subordinate to the commander. At all stages a senior representative of the civil authority, usually a police officer, should be permanently at Port Headquarters.

27. *Measures in Peace.*

The organization of the defence is too complicated a business to be done in a hurry; yet it will be required to come into force in a hurry, even before war breaks out. There is only one way to get over this difficulty. Every port must have ready in peace, completely worked out, its defence scheme for war. The officers who are to carry it out should have studied it on the spot and got into personal

touch. Unless these precautions are taken control and co-ordination will present insuperable difficulties.

VIII. Conclusions.

28. It has been seen that there is no kind of attack on a port, except possibly overland invasion, against which any one of the Services by itself cannot put up some form of defence, provided it is allowed to select suitable weapons from its armoury. At times, as in the case of heavy guns and aeroplanes, the relative values of the alternatives are so nearly equal, that a choice can only be made after due consideration of the particular local circumstances, and the demands likely to be made on the Services elsewhere. There is a natural tendency for the sailor, the soldier and the airman each to have such confidence in his own Service that he believes it capable of successfully carrying through an operation without the aid of the others. In this matter of port defence especially, the controversy has at times been in danger of dropping to the level of party politics, in which one side may never admit any truth in the arguments of the other. This is an attitude that should be foreign to the consideration of service problems, and the temptation to press the claim of one's own Service merely because it is one's own must be resisted.

Briefly, the essentials on which a sound system of port defence must rest are :—

(*i*) An accurate estimate of the kind and strength of attack likely at each port.

(*ii*) The allotment, from the available forces of each service, of those units which can most efficiently and economically meet this attack.

(*iii*) The exploitation of all local resources to aid in the defence.

(*iv*) Unity of command at each port, and complete co-operation between the Services engaged, based on a plan prepared in peace and ready for immediate enforcement.

(*v*) Most important of all, the allotment of no forces to local defence which are required for the main naval, military or air striking force, on which all security ultimately depends.

None of these will be the work of one Service only, all must play their part. War itself is a combined operation, and there lurk tremendous dangers in forgetting this, and reverting to "Gallipoli tactics." No service can make war, or even part of a war, by itself; in some operations one Service may take a predominant part but it will always require the help of the others. Port defence is no exception to this, and its problems will never be solved by the complete substitution of one Service for another, but by the co-operation of all to the common end.

THE ARMIES OF MALAYSIA AND INDO-CHINA.

By Major T. A. Lowe, D.S.O., M.C.,

The Highland Light Infantry.

According to an attractive little guide book issued by Messrs. Thomas Cook & Sons, the countries which constitute Malaysia are those which fit in most agreeably with the lines of communication available for tourists. It is pointed out how easy it is for the traveller to proceed from Singapore to Penang by sea, visiting Port Swettenham and Kuala Lumpur on the way ; how the Royal Siamese Railways will take him through southern Siam to Bangkok ; how it is possible from Bangkok to travel overland by rail and automobile to Saigon in Indo-China, and pause for a while to see the wonderful buried city of Angkor ; how a ship may be obtained at Saigon for the journey to Java, the garden island of the Far East. The term Malaysia is a useful one to describe such a tour, so for the purpose of this article it has been adopted. Geographically and historically it might be more accurate to describe the area as the Malay Archipelago.

During three years spent as a General Staff Officer in the Malaya Command, the writer had the good fortune to be invited to visit three foreign armies in neighbouring territories. In September 1926 the Army of the Netherlands East Indies was holding manœuvres in West Java, and the Commander-in-Chief extended an invitation for a British Officer to attend. In November 1927, the King of Siam, who had ascended the Throne but a year or two previously, celebrated his birthday with more than ordinary state as it was the first since the Court had come out of mourning ; the writer was appointed a temporary military *attaché* for the purpose of attending and visiting the Siamese Army. In November 1928, the French Colonial Army Headquarters invited a British Officer from the Malaya Command, to be present at their manœuvres in Tonking. Again the mantle fell on the writer for the very simple reason that there was no one else available to go. Assuredly it was a very lucky chain of events and circumstances. One arrived in Java as the guest of the Dutch Government, and in Siam and Indo-China as the guest of their armies. Every officer, civil and military, vied with his neighbour in showing hospitality and

welcome. There was no feeling of suspicion, no distrust, no whisperings about that fatal word "Intelligence." Questions asked frankly—so long as they were not stupid questions—were as frankly answered, while requests to see all that there was to see of a military nature met with enthusiastic compliance.

Most nations realize nowadays that Military Intelligence is merely a part of a General Staff Officer's duties. The subject has evolved out of its old "hush-hush" chrysalis and it is no part of the business of accredited visitors to foreign armies to adopt disguises or detective story methods. "Look up 'Intelligence' in the new volumes of the Encyclopædia Britannica," remarks a character in one of Aldous Huxley's novels, "you'll find it classified under the following three heads: Intelligence, Human; Intelligence, Animal; Intelligence, Military." A good joke this and there may have been times when it described the truth, but not now!

1. *The Army of the Netherlands East Indies.*

The island of Java is only 38 hours by steamer from Singapore, and it is the most important of the Dutch possessions in the East. Java is about 660 miles long and varies in breadth between 33 and 120 miles. The main physical feature is the range of mountains, which rise in places to a height of 12,000 feet; in this range there are over a hundred volcanoes, fourteen of which are said to be continually active—the "safety valves" of the Malaya Archipelago.

Java is a very beautiful island, and unlike the Malay Peninsula where labour for all cultivation has to be imported, is rich in various forms of agriculture. Rice, sugar, tea, coffee, rubber and many other products, are grown by a huge indigenous population of over forty million natives. These people are mostly Javanese, though traces of many other races can be found. They love Java intensely, as the Maltese do Malta, and refuse to leave it for long even for a neighbouring island like Sumatra which could be developed in the same rich manner as Java but for the scantiness of its native population.

The voyage from Singapore to Batavia is of unusual interest. Dutch ships run twice weekly through an archipelago of innumerable little islands all of which are part of the Netherlands East Indies. Some of these are inhabited by Malays, who scratch a precarious existence out of growing cocoanuts. Others are uninhabited and barren. Most

of these islands, however, possess deep water anchorages, and it was hereabouts that the "Emden" was able to lurk on several occasions quite unobserved, and replenish her supplies of fresh water. I got into conversation with a fellow passenger, who was an employee in a famous Amsterdam firm of wireless apparatus manufacturers, and he explained how difficult such waters were to protect or defend, affording as they do unlimited opportunity for ships to play hide-and-seek. He hoped that wireless telegraphy would be the principal means of defeating such difficulties in the future.

Dutch colonists take a great interest in their Colonial Army, principally because they are all bound to do a period of service in it as young men when they first go out to their colonies. Previous military service in Holland, of course, renders an individual exempt, but many young men who wish to make good in the East, come out to Java straight from school and do their compulsory service then. Doubtless for this reason many of my fellow-passengers, knowing my mission which had been announced in the local press, came along and introduced themselves as old soldiers of the Dutch Army They expressed great pleasure that a British officer was, at last, going to see their Army in being, a matter which they seemed to consider had been neglected for too long. In conversation I soon discovered that Java is much more a home to the Dutch than Malaya is to the British, or Indo-China to the Frenchman. Many Dutch colonists go to Java, build up their businesses and stay there, settling down in the country for life perfectly peacefully. They do not necessarily return to Holland at all; in fact many have no desire to do so. For this reason their interest in their own defence is noticeable. Colonial revenues provide the annual votes for armaments, and there is always much discussion in the newspapers when such matters are the business of the Parliament.

At Priok the port for Batavia, the ship was met by a *liaison* officer who had been sent by the Commander-in-Chief to meet me and to act as guide and interpreter. His *rôle* in the latter, however, was seldom required for most of the Dutch officers met with could speak English perfectly. When I commented on this fact an officer said, "Holland in Europe is a small country surrounded by vast ones. It is therefore necessary for us to learn French, German and English at our schools otherwise we would be unable to talk to our neighbours." No doubt this early training helps greatly in the acquisition of native dialects also.

The first two days were spent in Batavia, performing official calls and attending official luncheons and dinner parties. There is a garrison of about the strength of a brigade stationed in the neighbourhood of Batavia, but as this force was mobilizing for the manœuvres no visits to military establishments there were paid. However, no time was wasted as it was necessary to meet all the leading Government officials and as many of the British community as possible. The manœuvres were to take place in the mountains, near a small town called Garut, and on the way I was to visit Bandoeng where the Army Headquarters are situated. The British Consul-General conducted me to this city, situated at an altitude of over 2,300 feet in the midst of a beautiful plain, and there handed me over to the Dutch Commander-in-Chief and his staff. The following day was spent in studying maps and reading translations of operation orders and narratives, and then we set out for the manœuvres by car.

Garut is an attractive town situated in the centre of a group of volcanoes. It is approached from Bandoeng by a hilly road running between fields on either side which are mainly devoted to rice cultivation. This industry is much encouraged by the Government who have installed a wonderful system of irrigation. Each little field is banked up and has its own water supply, and the fields in some cases are so small that the landscape looks like a sort of crazy pavement. Actually the country over which the manœuvres took place was similar. The rice harvest had been garnered, so little damage was caused to the fields except when the tiny irrigation embankments got broken down. The only variation in the rice-field landscape is numerous clumps of bamboo trees which indicate the presence of native villages. These clumps protect the flimsy native dwellings from storm and heat. Spare bamboo poles are cut and used for innumerable purposes and I was soon to discover their military value. Bamboo in Java might easily be called the "Engineer's friend."

There was about the strength of a division employed in the manœuvres which comprised all arms and about a squadron of aeroplanes. The troops, with the exception of a few white conscripts who formed a company of their own, were entirely natives, called to the colours from such places as Bali, Ambon and other islands of the Celebes. Javanese, too, figured greatly in the picture but mainly in the cavalry and as drivers for the artillery. The organization of

the infantry was of interest. Each battalion had three companies, and one of these wore special facings to their uniforms and were called storm troops. These picked companies seemed to consist of Amboinese, who have amazing powers of endurance. They can march thirty miles a day fully equipped and then sleep out in the open in the rainy season without suffering any apparent discomfort. They got lots of work to do during the manœuvres, but every time I saw them they seemed to be thoroughly enjoying themselves and as keen as mustard.

The non-commissioned ranks are Dutch regulars who are seconded from the Army in Holland for a period. These men act as instructors to the native recruits and as section and platoon leaders when the Army is at exercise. In the field they live with their men and appear perfectly happy to eat the same food and share the same bamboo bivouacks. The native privates call these N. C. O.'s "Uncle," which may be described as a term of affection tempered with respect. This system seems to be a success, but that it is so is due to the fact that these native soldiers from the islands have very clean habits physically. They are keen on sanitation and bathing, delight in laughter and good humour and conduct themselves in a seemly manner before Europeans.

The officers are not seconded. They join the Colonial Army on similar terms to those which a British officer joins our Indian Army. The majority come out as subalterns after a year or two of service with the Army in Holland, and when they arrive they must commence immediately to learn the various native languages and dialects of the troops they will be serving with. Javanese and Malay, for instance, are two completely different languages, while Amboinese is a dialect of both.

The pay of an officer on joining is good, and he is provided with rations and quarters. There are no messes as the towns in the Netherlands East Indies are designed on the Continental plan and the open-air restaurant and cafe system is much in vogue. Matrimony amongst officers is encouraged rather than otherwise. It is considered no disgrace for a subaltern to join up like Mr. Bateman's picture, "complete with wife." Certainly the young wives who come out from Holland seem to know what they are in for, and make no fuss about being sent to wild and woolly out-stations in Sumatra and the islands. They are bound to spend a portion of their service in such places.

Tactically the manœuvres were similar to what one might see at divisional training at Aldershot. The novelty was entirely in the execution, and there were many points of interest for that reason. Owing to the nature of the country soldiers were seldom to be seen moving in extended order across an open rice patch. They were not allowed to do so, even though at that time the fields were caked hard with mud, because for the greater portion of the year these fields are flooded and would be quite impassable. Sections therefore advanced towards rifle fire in little worms and snakes, these formations rushing along the tiny embankments with surprising speed. When halted they seemed to take very effective cover, thus it was difficult to see an attack approaching a position. At least I fear I must qualify this statement. There was one factor which spoiled the whole thing, (which the Commander-in-Chief said afterwards it was impossible to eliminate), *i.e.*, a huge crowd of eager spectators. The Javanese consider that when manœuvres are held in their particular area it is a great honour to the municipality of that area. The entire local population stopswork, (the smallest excuse justifies that at any time), dresses up in its best clothes and then follows the troops diligently. This crowd cannot be driven away. Many of its members are old soldiers who seize upon the opportunity of "swanking" and trying to explain to their friends what is going on. Also they like to assure themselves that the youngsters of to-day are keeping the old traditions going. From position to position the crowds follow, caring nought for the fact that they are giving away the whole show by doing so or that the defence is busy ranging on them all the time. Apart from this the troops advanced well. They knew how to provide covering fire with machine guns and automatic rifles and they never exposed themselves unnecessarily.

The artillery was entirely field. It was good at moving and taking up positions. Batteries seemed always to be in telephonic communication with their groups. But they, too, were at a disadvantage owing to the nature of the country because it was a reasonable certainty, when trying to "spot" positions, that they were in one of the clumps of bamboo trees. When firing started it was only a question of elimination to discover in which particular clump a battery was hiding. Perhaps for this reason they were able to clear out to alternative positions at lightning speed, if necessary.

One cavalry regiment only was employed in the exercises. The troopers were nearly all Javanese. The horses Australian. As their duties were entirely reconnaissance, and they were split up into troops for that purpose, it was difficult to see much of their work. Later on, however, I visited a cavalry depot at Bandoeng and found that the curriculum of barrack training was strenuous and efficient for both man and horse. An exhibition of jumping by Javanese troopers left no doubt in my mind that these natives could ride. There was every evidence that they are well trained in horsemastership as well.

There was the inevitable night advance culminating in a night attack—no manœuvres anywhere in the world would be complete without such an exercise! In this case the defence were in a position where a river had to be crossed, designed, of course, as an opportunity for the sappers to show what they could do about crossing it. The enemy had searchlights and the attacking force had to be provided with bridges. No pontoons were used but bridges were improvised in a very clever manner out of strips of bamboo and rope. The bamboo was cut into pieces of about four feet in length, and then these strips were tied together at both ends like a cork mattress. When rolled up for transport purposes the bamboo seemed to assume enormous dimensions, but they seemed quite light to carry, while the method of getting them across the river was the last word in simplicity. One man swam the stream taking with him a loose rope which he made fast to a tree on the far side. Then by means of a small pulley and block the bamboo bridge unrolled itself and floated across. Almost before the further end had touched the opposite bank the troops were running across one at a time. Most of them got over without a serious wetting although the bridge actually sunk to about three feet in the middle with the weight of one man. In this attack the defending troops were routed, not because they were unaware that the river would be crossed by means of bridges but because there were so many bridges hurled across that they could not concentrate their fire on all of them. The native "sappers" seemed to be able to manufacture these bridges with amazing rapidity. In the same way they can erect a hut or a bivouac with this material which is always to be found somwhere conveniently in Java.

The Quarter-master's branch had few difficulties, as our army knows them, on these manœuvres. Each battalion had its own travelling cooker and the cooks confined their efforts to curry. Rice

was always boiling and the native troops seemed to want nothing else except tea. Apparently the water was dangerous in Java and there was a standing order that no one must drink it, so tea was always available for the water-bottles. Soup is very popular and was issued when the troops were in billets, and sometimes small fish and sauces would be added to the rice. Haversack rations consisted of bread and biscuits.

The strength of the Dutch army in the Netherlands East Indies is about two divisions, but, owing to the scattered nature of the colonies which it is required to defend, considerable numbers of troops have to be used on small detachment duty in Sumatra, Borneo and the smaller islands. Native infantry is used for these detachments and communications are now maintained by portable wireless sets with which every detachment is provided. At intervals of every twenty-four hours each unit is called up by wireless and the news of the day is given. Sometimes, even, concert music from Europe is relaid.

This wireless communication has been found to be invaluable from a medical point of view. The Dutch have no specifically military hospitals. Their medical services are run by the Government for the benefit of the entire community, European and native. Army officers subscribe a small percentage of their pay for medical attention, and then have a definite claim for the best specialist advice if required. I visited one Government hospital in Bandoeng and was much impressed by the system adopted. There were specialists in tropical diseases, in medicine, in surgery and every other branch, but these were not necessarily Dutch medical men. Some were German and some were French. "We try to apply the best scientific thought of all nations," the Director of the hospital informed me, "all our X-ray sisters, for instance, are Viennese ladies who had much experience of this work during the war." The scheme seems to work well for once a week all the specialists meet together and discuss the progress of their cases in conference. This avoids the possibility of "sealed compartments."

After the manœuvres I was enabled to see something of the permanent establishments of the Eastern Division. The journey from Bandoeng to Sourabaya took fourteen hours by train and was far from comfortable as it was a Sunday and there were many passengers. Neither was it possible to see much of the country. But these things

only increased the pleasure of the return journey to Bandoeng, which was made by air. It was a delightful experience to fly with the air mail from Sourabaya to Batavia in the early morning, and to see nearly the whole of Java spread out beneath like a map. And then to fly low over the volcanoes and see the active craters boiling with lava and sulphur. The total time taken to accomplish this journey, which included halts for mails, was about four hours.

The Eastern Division is similarly constituted to the Western one except that it possesses a brigade of pack artillery with mule transport. I spent a day in the field with this unit and we did some really rough marching in mountainous country. The mules seemed to be able to take the guns anywhere and the gunners were skilful at getting their guns into position with the speed and enthusiasm of a competition at Olympia.

The Navy took charge of me after this and I was allowed to see their workshops, submarine depots, dockyards and what ships were in port, before departing once more for Bandoeng to take my leave of the Commander-in-Chief who had been so hospitable and who had arranged such a delightful programme.

2. *The Siamese Army.*

The Kingdom of Siam is bounded on the north by the Shan States; on the east by the French states of Laos and Cambodia; on the west by Lower Burma; and, in the south, by British Malaya and the Gulf of Siam. Its area is about 200,000 square miles.

The King of Siam is the only absolute monarch left in the world. He rules with the assistance of members of the royal family, but in all matters of legislation his word is supreme. The religion of the country is Buddhism.

The present King came to the throne in 1926. As a boy he was at Harrow and then he went on to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. His education was completed in France before he returned to Siam. His reign so far has been a happy and prosperous one for the country; he is a wise, gracious and popular sovereign and has already earned for himself the loyalty and devotion of his people.

One of the King's first acts on ascending the throne of Siam was to set about the re-organization of his army. Although the Siamese had joined the Allies in the War, their principal military

contribution had been aeroplanes. After the War the Army was still in a somewhat medieval state as regards equipment and organization. There were too many senior officers, too many personal and court appointments, too many "camp followers" and "hangers-on." A scheme similar to the Geddes's "axe" was put into force, and though it caused a good deal of criticism and discontent as all such schemes must, there emerged in place of a scattered force of isolated units, an army of two well equipped and mobile divisions. One of these divisions is based on Chiengmai in Northern Siam, and the other—which includes the Guards and Household troops—is quartered at Bangkok. It was the latter that I visited on the occasion of the King's birthday celebrations in 1927.

The Siamese Army is a conscript one. Many of the soldiers come from Northern Siam and have a close physical resemblance to the Burmese. These "mountainy" men take to military training very readily, but the same can hardly be said about those who come from the eastern or Cambodian country. This country to the east consists of a vast alluvial plain some 50,000 square miles in extent and this forms one of the richest rice-growing lands in the world. The entire population works in the rice fields and the monotony of the work produces a sort of bovine stupidity. They supply their quota to the Army, but they do not as a rule find themselves posted to the best regiments.

My programme was arranged and personally supervised by a Siamese staff officer who had been a pupil in the Gymnasium at Aldershot when I had been adjutant there, for a period after the war. It was very pleasant to meet again in his own country, and I was informed that there were nine young officers serving in the Bangkok Division who had been either to Woolwich or Sandhurst since the war. Eventually I met them all and found that they were doing very well indeed, commanding either companies or batteries. I was bombarded with questions about "home," and when an Army List was produced, (which by a fluke I had brought with me), they pored over it to see what had become of their pals in the British Army. It was all very pleasant and entirely broke down any "foreign" atmosphere which a visit of this sort may easily beget. It so happened that Armistice Night happened during my stay in Bangkok, so I organised a small dinner party for these boys at a local hotel. The party was

a great success, so much so that the news was conveyed to me afterwards that had I included in the invitation certain senior Siamese officers who had also been to Woolwich and Sandhurst, we might have had a merrier time still. I wished heartily that I had done so.

There is a Royal Military College in Bangkok, and this we visited. It is run rather on the lines of West Point than of Sandhurst, as the boys who attend do not necessarily become professional officers. Most of them do get commissions when there are vacancies, but as the Army is small quite a number get jobs in civil life.

We walked round the College seeing classes in map reading, geography, mathematics, languages and literature in progress, until my guide—almost in a fever of impatience—conducted me to the gymnasium to see the system of physical training which he himself had introduced after his course at Aldershot. This was good, decidedly so! Small squads of boys under well trained instructors, were fairly flying to their work. "Scissors" over the vaulting horse, athletics, balancing, boxing, "Crow and Cranes," bayonet fencing, and physical training—all going on at once in the liveliest possible manner. I wandered from one squad to another delightedly, and wished from the bottom of my heart that my Master, (Colonel R. B. Campbell) could have seen some of the fruits of his labours. Physical training suits the Siamese temperaments; they love it.

Then the whistles went and the whole College assembled for a grand parade under the Commandant. The boys drilled for an hour in close and open order to the music of a band and finished up with a smart March Past.

Our next day was spent with the Guards, inspecting barracks, watching drill, seeing the Palace guards change. Guards are guards the world over and the Siamese Guards are no exception. Their men are magnificent: fine physically, keen and intelligent. The barrack rooms were the last word in "spit and polish," the saluting was smart, and, if an officer called a N. C. O. the latter sprang to it as if he had been bitten by a badger. Yet there did not seem to be any "Prussianism" about the Siamese Guards. The men seemed happy and healthy, they were well fed and looked proud of themselves.

The conscript system produces greater difficulties in the cavalry and the artillery than it does in the infantry. Out of eighteen months to

two years service, a lot of time is taken up if the recruit has to be taught to ride as well as his other duties. On the way to watch a cavalry regiment parading I was warned by my guide that a number of the troopers were recruits and might not therefore know their drill. But that the ponies were not conscripts and knew their drill very well because they stayed in the army for a lifetime. If only the recruits would leave the ponies alone the parade would be a success, if not, anything might happen. This was amply proved in the course of the morning's work.

The Siamese pony is a small beast of similar stature to the Shetland variety. These little chaps are used as troop horses but the officers ride Australian horses which makes a parade look queer and uneven. The ponies are as tough and wiry as ponies could be, and very intelligent. They knew exactly what their colonel was going to roar at them, so the evolution was performed perfectly. It was a case of "when father says turn we all turn," and highly amusing to watch. Sometimes the recruits stayed on, sometimes they did not. After the parade was over I rode one of the ponies round the parade ground, which caused shouts of delighted merriment from the troopers. Although I am only five feet eight inches in height, I could touch the ground from the saddle with both legs. Then the pony galloped with a nasty, short, jerky motion which jarred every bone in one's body. I sympathised with the recruits.

The same type of pony is used by the artillery for pulling their field guns. Six are harnessed to a gun, and so long as the country is flat they can manage very well, but if the country becomes hilly and difficult they cannot stand the strain. Siam is not a suitable country for artillery to work. In the rice deltas, owing to the mud and water, guns could not operate, while in the mountainous districts jungle and forest is so dense that movement with guns is impossible. It is not a country of roads. Most of the transport is done by water, *i.e.*, by rivers and canals. However, I watched a battery drilling and afterwards inspected their barracks and institutes. The officer who was in command of the battery had been to school in England and then had gone on to Woolwich. He told me that when he came back from England he could not speak Siamese, and was therefore very homesick.

The Siamese Air Force is under the control of their War Office, and it is said by experts to be one of the finest in Asia. Their main aerodrome is near Bangkok, and there they assemble all their engines and manufacture the woodwork. An air display was arranged for my benefit by pilots and their pupils, and some amazing "stunts" were performed—enough to prove that Siamese airmen are thoroughly at home in the air. They have "air sense," and realize that this arm is very important in the defence of a difficult country like Siam. Most of their original pilots were trained in France during the war, but they have a great respect for British aviation and British material for aeroplanes. Eventually it will come to pass that people will travel a great deal by aeroplane in Siam. The climate is ideal for flying.

3. *The Army of Indo-China.*

French Indo-China comprises the colony of Cochin-China, the protectorates of Tonking, Annam, Cambodia and Laos. The area of territory is about 288,000 square miles, or nearly half that of France. Indo-China is a country of great mountain ranges, great rivers and a wonderful seaboard. It is an intensely rich country and becomes richer every year. It is also a country of ancient civilizations.

There are two great native races in Indo-China—the Annamites and the Cambodians. Of these the French army is largely composed. The Annamites originally came from Southern China and settled about the delta of the Red River in Tonking, and along the shores of the China Sea in the territory which is now called Annam. They are very Chinese in appearance. The Cambodians are southerners and live in the vast delta of the Mekong River where they grow rice and catch fish. They are not at all Chinese in appearance but are rather similar physically to the Siamese.

Like the Dutch and the Siamese armies, the French army is conscript. But this means no very great strain on a population of over twelve million Annamities and two million Cambodians. There is a ballot and each man has a chance of being exempted—if he wants to be; quite a number do not—when he is called up. The Annamites provide the greater number of troops, not only because of their numbers but because they have been proved to be the best fighting material. Cambodians are recruited, but largely for political reasons. They are kept in special regiments and seldom taken away from their own country. The two races do not seem to "mix."

The French system of organizing their native army is entirely different to the Dutch. French officers are attached to native regiments for periods of two or three years only, and at the end of that time they move on to another unit. Before coming to Indo-China they may have been serving with Zuaves or Turcos in North Africa or some other French zone. They definitely spend their lives on colonial service and seldom return to the French Army in France where pay and conditions are quite different, but they keep moving about from one colony to another. The system works well except in one particular. Native languages cannot as a rule be acquired in periods of two years, especially a language like the Annamite which is nearly as difficult as Chinese. In order to overcome this difficulty attempts are made to teach the Annamites the French language, but this is only partially successful with short-service conscripts. It is found necessary therefore, to employ a sort of Adjutant-Interpreter to act as *liaison* between the officers and the ranks. This man is usually an educated Annamite, and he often finds himself in a position of great power which can be, and often is, abused. Attempts are now being made to extend the service of French officers in Indo-China because of this language. difficulty, so that they will have more opportunity to study the language.

The manoeuvres were held in Tonking, but before they commenced an invitation to visit Army Headquarters at Hanoi was gratefully accepted. Hanoi is a very beautiful city situated on the Red River and about two hours motor run from the port of Haiphong. The Governor-General of Indo-China has a residence there, and so has the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Many civil service officials and army staff officers reside in the city.

There is an air of aristocratic good taste about Hanoi which is very surprising in the East. The Christian cathedral, the wide boulevards, the restful cafés, the luxurious shops and the solid opera house, all go to prove what sensible and progressive town-planning may do. A magnificent university completes the delusion that one is in France and not in the East at all.

I was the guest of the Commander-in-Chief, an officer with a magnificent record in the French Colonial Army. He had had much experience with African troops and had been to Indo-China previously as a young man. His enthusiasm for the latter country knew no

bounds: he said its development since his previous appointment there had been astounding.

We talked of the ancient wars in Tonking, wars fought on the Chinese frontier, and I heard of the French struggle against the northern hordes who wished to drive them out of the country. Very severe fighting it was too, until the French finally asserted their supremacy and the country settled down to the observance of law and order. Even now, however, the frontier has to be very carefully guarded and this employs a number of native troops. We talked politics; of Communism, and the problem of the educated native; of the spread of Chinese nationalism; of the white man's influence in the East. And when we had talked thus for some time I realized as never before that the military problems of the French in Indo-China, of the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies and of the British in Malaya, are identical. We are European, and for that reason alone we are bound to be thrown more and more together.

I visited a regiment of Colonial Artillery. From the top of a high water tower young officers were practising "spotting" artillery fire on an ingenious map drawn to scale on the ground. An instructor was throwing bombs of white wool on the map and listening to his pupils picking up the map reference aloft, by means of a telephone. Elsewhere French gunners were busy with their 75's while mechanics worked blithely at Renault tanks and motor transport. Then I went on to a regiment of Colonial Infantry. Here a Signals officer belonging to Regimental Headquarters staged a demonstration of the "nerves" of a regiment at work in a battle. Actual war conditions were produced in the lecture room by means of strange devices and the signallers working in little group units, were worried and teased the whole time they were at work taking in and sending out their messages. Dummy aeroplanes came over and they had to dive for their gas masks, shell fire would arrive and cut their lines, Regimental Headquarters would get very worried and anxious about the "situation." I watched this demonstration for sometime and was very impressed with it. A brilliant attempt to get at the root of failure in war.

Then a visit to an Annamite regiment in barracks. More inspections of barracks, more demonstrations, this time of drill and guard-mounting. Then on to the Survey Section to witness the making of

maps. Then to the Headquarters of the Air Force, and so on: my delightful host planning each visit himself and throwing open his Command for my benefit, until we set off together for the manœuvres.

At the place where we left our car and were met by horses, there was drawn up the massed bands of the Foreign Legion, chiefly Austrian musicians as I discovered later. They played The Marseillais while we stood at the salute, and then, somewhat to my astonishment, they played three verses of "God Save the King." Our King was nigh unto death at the time, and it was the French manner of conveying sympathy—a very moving and delicate compliment!

For three days we watched the exercises, accompanied the marches, attended the officers' conferences and inspected the troops. It is not the purpose of this article to go into professional details about such things, but it is permissible to say that the visitor came away with the impression that the French maintain a very fine Army in their Colony. The weather unfortunately was very bad. The time was November, and perpetual rain and sleet seemed to be the order of the day. Yet the troops showed remarkable qualities of endurance. The Foreign Legion, of which there was a regiment taking part, were particularly impressive. The men were of good physique, well fed, well clothed, happy and contented. I spoke of "Beau Geste," and there was hearty laughter, as Mr. P. C. Wren's literary efforts seem to afford the Foreign Legion as much amusement and excitement as they do the British public. But some of the Legion resent the fact that their Corps has been chosen as the medium for this particular form of limelight, which they say bears little relation to the actual facts. "Why should he write about us instead of your own Brigade of Guards?", I was asked good-humouredly. "But they are not surrounded with your romantic associations," I replied, and again the laugh was general.

After the manœuvres there was a great review, all the troops who had taken part in the former being present. They marched past the Governor-General, with massed bands playing, and it was an effective display. The Annamites with their little Chinese helmets, the Foreign Legion with their bearded veterans, the French gunners with their nippy 75's. As a background the aeroplanes which had been engaged in contact work, were drawn up on the parade ground in flights. Soon after this I took my leave of the Commander-in-Chief and

proceeded southwards to Saigon, where another programme of visits had been arranged, *en route* for Singapore.

Saigon is called the "Paris of the East" and possibly for that reason French soldiers like being stationed there. It is the Headquarters of a Division, the one which is for the protection of southern Indo-China. There is an officers' club in one of the boulevards and once a week officers and their wives and guests dine in the open to the music of a military band. This is a homely and delightful social gathering at which senior and junior officers seem to mix freely.

Again I was taken round the various military establishments and given the opportunity of seeing all that I wanted to see. An officer who had been a famous French International Rugby player acted as my guide. We had many mutual friends in Britain.

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The object of this chronicle is to prove that the countries of Malaysia and Indo-China are very fair and fascinating lands. That they teem with interest from a military point of view. That they are controlled, defended and governed by European peoples (with the exception of Siam, of course), whose ideas on these matters though different to the British in many ways, are nevertheless helping the native races in their ambition for progress. These armies of the Archipelago are not designed for war but for security and peace—insurance against the richness of the lands.

FRONTIER CANTONMENT LIFE IN THE DAYS OF LAKE AND WELLESLEY.

By Colonel E. B. Maunsell.

Although memoirs of life in the big Presidential cities of Madras, Bombay and Calcutta are fairly plentiful, descriptions of the small up-country military cantonments in the days of Lake and Wellesley are almost non-existent. Fortunately, we have the journal of Lieutenant John Pester, a subaltern of the 2nd Bengal Native Infantry, stationed, in 1803, at Shikoabad, a small, one battalion cantonment on the then Mahratta Frontier, which was only fourteen miles distant. The place lies thirty-five miles east of Agra, which was then the headquarters of the administration of the great French adventurer, Perron, an individual who had come out to India as a boatswain in the fleet of the great Suffren, the *bougre determine* of our friend William Hickey's blue jacket acquaintance. Perron, in theory, was the servant of Scindhia, the forebear of the Maharaja of Gwalior, then the most powerful chief in India. In practice, however, he was a great and independent prince, commanding an army of 40,000 men, officered by adventurers, most of whom were British, or British half castes, including men like James Skinner and Hyder Jung Hearsey, both of whom achieved fame under Lord Lake within the next two years.

Shikoabad was in what were known as the Ceded Districts, of Allahabad, Corah and Rohilkand, which the Nawab Wazir of Oudh had been "prevailed upon" to hand over to the British in 1801, as the maladministration of that prince was such that there was every prospect of Perron taking them over if we did not. Lord Henry Wellesley, with his Headquarters at Bareilly, had been the Chief Commissioner of these districts, but had just gone Home.

According to modern ideas, Shikoabad would be reckoned an extremely good cold weather station, though abominable in the hot. Its nearest modern counterpart would be Muttra, minus railways or roads. The country in 1803 differed enormously from the present day as the now-existent wonderful irrigation system had not come into being. There were many patches of jungle and uncultivated ground while the fine trees now to be seen bordering the roads and

canals had not yet been planted. Roads, indeed, were quite non-existent, and in many parts of the country even carts do not seem to have been used at all, transport being usually by pack bullock. In cantonments there were dusty tracks, dignified by the name of roads, and these sometimes extended four or five miles out, but no more. The country was still in a very unsettled state and Pester had taken part, in the cold weather of 1802-03, in what was known as the Mud War, against refractory rajas who had refused to pay their taxes. The operations had taken the form of sundry sieges of fortified towns, and on one occasion, before Sarsni, the battalion had been badly punished owing to the assault failing through the ladders being too short. It was when before this place that Lake first came under fire in India. His horse, startled by a cannon shot, had reared up and rolled on him, while Pester's animal, close behind, had been cut in two by another. The incident took place in full view of the army, who were astonished to see the Commander-in-Chief get up and carry on his conversation just as though nothing had happened.

From that day forward, Lake's fame among the native soldiery of India grew, and never diminished.

The whole country was studded with small forts, for it had been in a chronic state of upheaval since the memory of man, and the peasantry tilled their fields with their arms close at hand, and no man's life was safe—except, for such was their prestige, the white sahibs and, extraordinary to relate, their memsahibs.

This prestige, it should be noted, applied also to the European and half caste adventurers in the service of the native chiefs across the Border.

Despite the state of unrest, Shikoabad had, as hubs of society, no fewer than five regimental ladies—a very much married battalion was the 1st /2nd B. N. I. While in the cold weather life was probably pleasant enough, these poor women must have had a terrible time in the hot weather and rains. Pester tells us that, from the commencement of the hot winds, that is about mid-April, until the beginning of July, they did not quit their bungalow compounds, and then only because the first rains had broken. There were, indeed, far more ladies in these up-country stations than is generally imagined, though a visit to the graveyards of the older cantonments will reveal the appalling mortality among them, and among their children. We

hear of seven at Bareilly, including a very attractive *chere amie*, whose protector was a thoroughly good fellow, with the result that the whole of the younger officers would rendezvous at his bungalow rather than at the mansions of the "regular" ladies. Bareilly, however, was a headquarters, and a relatively big station. At Anupshahr, right on the frontier, there was one, and the poor woman must have had a dull time.

At Mainpuri, a very small civil station, there were no less than three. The Collector here was then engaged in building himself a young palace, which cost him close on a lakh of rupees, that is, the best part of £10,000 as money went then, but the edifice was nearly destroyed by Holkar in his famous foray in 1804. At Futtygarh, on the other hand, there were quite a number of white women, for this was the advanced depôt of the "Europe shops," and a number of the shop keeping fraternity were here. The place being a garrison, as well as a civil headquarters, snobbery attained its maximum pitch, and the good ladies—"precedence" among Anglo-Indian women was a regular disease and has not yet died out—were often not on speaking terms.

When Holkar's foray took place in 1804, the whole of these women were herded together in the small fort, and it is satisfactory to learn that the common danger welded them together in a few days time, though their quarrels and bickerings rose afresh after the danger had passed. It is extremely doubtful whether most of these were pure white. At Futtygarh, indeed, it is certain that the majority were half castes. The white ladies, for the most part, were very second class, of the category now known as "Suburbia," and miserably poor, so poor, indeed, that once in India they could never raise the cash to get out of the country again unless they got married. Hence our forefathers alluded to the term "markets" and, sometimes, to the more vulgar term, "the Scotch cattle" when individuals in search of white wives went down to Calcutta or Madras on the arrival of a convoy from Home. Pester, the son of a Somersetshire squire, and an officer of a better-to-do type than most to be found in India, is most contemptuous in his references to Anglo-Indian women as a general whole, though he had several very great friends. "Poor, proud and prejudiced, attempting the airs and graces of gentlewomen, though it is probable that, before arrival in our markets, they had not had a change of dickeys twice in a month."

Poor class or not, they had stout hearts, and the natives respected them. In the case of pretty women, indeed, the credulous peasantry had the most extraordinary notions. An old native officer recounts hearing an old woman of his village describe how she had seen a sahib driving in a buggy with a lovely fairy by his side. In order to prevent her flying away—for she had wings, (probably a tippet)—the sahib kept his hand on her shoulder all the way.

Amusements, in the hot weather and rains, appear to have been confined to an early morning ride, starting at those unearthly hours our forefathers loved so as to avoid the heat of the sun—for the sunproof helmet had not yet been invented—gambling and dinner parties. The fact was, night was more or less turned into day. Billiard tables, on the other hand, were in existence, though not made of slate, in nearly all cantonments, and continual reference is made to the game. Most ladies had "pianos" and musical evenings were usual and very popular.

The outstanding excitement, in that small cantonment of Shikoabad in the hot weather of 1803, was the arrival, in early July of all times, for the temperature must have stood at 110 or so, the rains not having broken properly, of a globe-trotting party *en route* to visit Agra and Fatehpore Sikri. It consisted of three ladies, the Honourable Mrs. Carlton, wife of the colonel of the 29th Dragoons, stationed at Cawnpore, the great cantonment of the day, Mrs. Cunningham with her husband, the Collector of Mainpuri, and a Miss Dunbar. Such an arrival at such a season would create excitement even now, so what it caused in 1803 can be better imagined than described. The news that Colonel Carlton "treated his wife very ill" and was "a perfect brute" created a tremendous stir in the susceptible hearts of the subalternhood of the 2nd Native Infantry, who at once set themselves to console the poor lady. We learn that "she looked very fine" and that a drenching downpour of rain had the effect of merely heightening her appearance. The party, after staying in Shikoabad a couple of days, passed on to Agra, the Mahratta commandant at the Frontier fort of Ferozeabad welcoming them with a salute of guns.

The Agra of 1803 was governed by a famous old Dutch adventurer, John Hessing, a brave and kindly man who entertained such visitors as came from the Company's territory in right royal fashion, for he had accumulated enormous wealth and lived like a prince.

Charles Metcalfe, the future Lord Metcalfe, then a young and precocious Civil Servant, while passing through the Mahratta dominions to the Deccan, had been given a breakfast by Hessing of such gargantuan proportions that he placed it on official record. It consisted of excellent fish, ham, cheese and cream. The ham and cheese had come from Holland, a matter, in those days, of nine months travel. Unfortunately, in July 1803, this fine old adventurer was dying, the succession to the command being "inherited," as was the custom, not infrequently, in the native service, by his half caste son—a very unworthy inheritor too. The visitors, in consequence, were not received on the same scale of magnificence. It is, indeed, not likely that they had much reception at all, for no mention is made of it, although Agra had numerous adventurers and their families quartered there, including a certain Colonel Sutherland who had been cashiered from the 73rd Highlanders. He was an officer who, in the next six months, was to do his country good service in facilitating the surrender of Agra Fort to General Lake. Although, in high places, there were rumblings of war, nothing was known of its being imminent in Shikoabad, though, "like a thief in the night, the troops were warned to prepare for it within the next three weeks and within six weeks the battalion marched out to the bloodiest war native soldiery were to take part in until 1914, and, of the eighteen officers who left the small cantonment, only three were left after the horrible Fourth Assault on Bhurtpore eighteen months later, while 360 out of 600 men had fallen in three months.

The Agra trip lasted about ten days, all the sights, including Fatehpore Sikri, being visited. While passing through Shikoabad, on the return journey, about half the subalterns of the 2nd Native Infantry found urgent calls to visit Mainpuri, and, of course, to accompany the dashing Mrs. Carlton and the charming Miss Dunbar. This maiden, though "of very fine figure," was to our friend Pester, who hailed from the good town of Yeovil, in "Zummerzet"—cursed with speaking broad Scotch. As to whether this dire affliction distressed one third of the other officers of the battalion—for the Company's officers were very largely drawn from the North of the Tweed—may be doubted. We must remember that the custom of army officers being educated at the great public schools is a comparative novelty. The majority, being the sons of the country gentry and corresponding classes, merely went to the local grammar schools, though curious to

relate, there was an Etonian in the battalion. Such being the case, we may assume that most spoke the dialect of their country, and, what is more, were proud of it too. Pester, whose people were squires of some considerable position in Somerset, had intense pride in the West Country and gives details of a famous dinner in which "three honest gentlemen of Yeovil" all feasted together—and got extremely drunk into the bargain, breaking the candle glasses "as is the custom in wine parties in India."

On arrival at Mainpuri, the dashing Mrs. Carlton, instead of returning to the arms of her lord and master, the colonel at Cawnpore, decided to stay on with the Cunninghams for a period. She would then take a boat at Futtygarh and go straight down to Calcutta, nearly three months journey, and proceed Home by the first convoy. Our friend Mr. William Hickey, at that period a leading light in Calcutta society, living with Chief Justice Russell, must have met her there. Miss Dunbar, on the other hand, would appear to have found her society rather too stimulating—at least so we deduce, for she refused to stay, and proceeded to Futtygarh the following day. It is worthy of note that this young unmarried lady proceeded without any white male escort through a country still by no means in a settled state, and through which British officers invariably proceeded armed. It is true that Cunningham, being the Collector, provided her with an armed guard of local levies. None the less, the incident gives some idea of the prestige of white ladies. Sport in the Ceded Districts was abundant, and there was no close season for small game. The chief excitements however, were tiger shooting, and hog hunting. Round Mainpuri there were good jungles, not more than five miles distant—at the present day, irrigation has covered the country with rich crops. While the officers disported themselves in the daytime, the ladies entertained them in the evenings. At these entertainments an enormous quantity of Carbonnelle hock and champagne was consumed—we must remember that a Collector drew an enormous salary and had as many perquisites—and the ladies appear to have been responsible for very many sore heads and leathery tongues in the morning. The ideas of humour of these good dames might not appeal to present day notions, though, from what Hickey and other contemporary writers tell us, very many of our great grandmothers, including ladies of position like Hickey's own

sisters, they were not altogether unique. For instance, one evening, after a particularly successful "tyger" shoot, when they were holding high festival, one of the gentlemen—a fine fellow who died in the breach at Bhurtpore—whose potations certainly justified his action, retired to bed. The ladies, or rather Mrs. Carlton, for Mrs. Cunningham appears to have been less "high spirited," noticing his absence, requested that he be brought in to make his apologies for not being present in the drawing room. The unfortunate man was carried in on his bed, "completely sewn up," and the ladies "had a fine game with him." To do Indian society, lax as it was, justice, Pester tells us that, had the affair been known, it would have been deemed "highly indecorous."

On another occasion, while at tiffin on a roasting hot July day, some twenty cooly women ran into the dining room and, seizing on one unfortunate officer, carried him out and shut him up in a godown, or outhouse—a very enjoyable pleasantry. Taken on the whole, we are by no means surprised at Colonel Carlton, "treating his wife very ill."

The question will now be asked, how did these ladies travel, and that too at such a season. Dak bungalows and roads were, we must remember, non-existent. On the other hand, Mrs. Cunningham was the wife of the Collector, while Mrs. Carlton was a woman of position and means. They had the resources of high civil dignitaries at their beck and call—ponies, elephants and a double set of camp equipment. As soon as one camp was reached, the duplicated set of servants set out for the next, with the result that the travellers always found tents ready for them, double walled, with glass windows, *khus khus* tatties and *punkhas*. Even then they must have approached purgatory in the heat of the day. When within a few miles of the sundry petty cantonments, the officers would provide their ramshackle dogcarts, buggies and curricles—Mrs. Carlton liked being driven tandem—the very chic among subalternhood. A feature which would appear extraordinary to modern ideas was the custom of ladies being escorted by individuals other than their husbands, whose duties obviously held them, for journeys which might last for some weeks. That such affairs occasionally resulted in disaster may be admitted, but it is as well to appreciate their rarity. While at Mainpuri the officers heard the first talk of war, and as only Pester had been "put through it,"

there was much joy at the news—there always is among those who have only lightly tasted its pleasures. The Civil Authorities had received orders to prepare bridges fit to carry artillery over sundry rivers en route to the Mahratta frontier; and the forts were being victualled up as granaries.

Almost immediately after came news that General Gerard Lake, the Commander-in-Chief in India, was to march from Cawnpore at the end of July with the European troops—a sure sign of heavy work, much as the arrival of the Guards Division and other famous formations in France was, for the "*gora log*" were only employed on very big occasions. The officers returned to Shikoabad, and we will now go into the details of "mobilisation" as practised by our great grandfathers in India.

Shikoabad was, it must be remembered, only very few miles from the frontier. Cantonments in 1803 differed from those of the present day in that officers built their bungalows—very pokey little erections—very much where their fancy took them, usually, it would seem, in some clump of trees with a well handy, with the result that they were very much scattered. We know, for instance, that Hammond, of the battalion, a fine officer killed at the Fourth Assault on Bhurtpore lived two miles out. At Mainpuri, Wemyss, a Civil Servant, kept his native mistress three miles out, while the Agent to the Governor-General at Bareilly lived five miles out. The first question that arose was the disposal of the ladies, or at all events those who did not intend to follow their husbands into the field, as sometimes occurred. A Mrs. Griffin was the first white woman to dine in the fort of Gwalior, when the temperature stood at 118, while, in 1843, great ladies actually came within range of the cannon shot at Maharajpore.

All, except a certain Mrs. Wilson, decided to go down to Cawnpore, taking boat from Futtygarh as was usual. Mrs. Wilson, learning that the 1st/2nd were to be relieved by five companies of the 11th Native Infantry, resolved to risk it, and stay on, an extraordinary procedure. Within a fortnight of the 1st/2nd marching out to join Lake's army at Secundra Rao, Shikoabad was attacked by overwhelming numbers of enemy horse, commanded by a fine French officer named Fleury. The first attack was repulsed, but a second, made a day or so later, succeeded, half the officers of the 11th being killed or wounded and one third of the men. The detachment had to capitulate on the understanding that it would take no further part in the war.

Mrs. Wilson was carried off the first day—the attack had taken place before dawn and was probably a surprise—together with her children. The whole of the bungalows and contents were burnt and looted, and the troops carried off as much as they could, including Mrs. Wilson's spare clothing. Fleury, hearing of this, made his men disgorge the lady's gear and sent her off to Agra Fort, where the poor woman was most kindly looked after by the families of the adventurers, all of whom were stated to be French or Dutch. The considerate manner in which she was treated is evidenced by the fact that, two days after the first attack, simultaneously with the official report reaching Lake, then before the fortress of Aligarh, Wilson heard from his wife, the letter being despatched by special messenger.

Particular interest attaches to this body of enemy horse, in that from it is sprung the present First Bengal Lancers, the well known Skinner's Hindustani Horse.

Turning now to the officers, and how they "mobilised." In the days of which we write, organised lines of communication were unknown. The army carried most of its requirements with it, and the regular daily convoy system now in vogue had not come into being. Convoys—enormous ones, with 7,000 pack bullocks and sometimes even as many as 100,000 with 700 carts, would move at irregular intervals. Officers drew no rations, and had to feed and tent themselves, their servants and horses. With certain stores, usually wines, it was necessary to lay in a stock that would last for three months or so, for such things were quite unobtainable in the country. Messes in native regiments were not officially in existence, though one or two corps, notably the famous Lal Paltan of Clive, had one, and officers grouped themselves in small private messes, each providing his own table gear and each having usually to maintain his own cook. The preparations for a campaign thus differed for each officer in accordance with his own views and experiences. The wise ones, like Pester, believed in doing themselves well and even running into debt in order to secure good tentage and gear. Others, including an officer in the 15th Native Infantry, whose reminiscences are of much value and interest, fitted themselves out "on the cheap."

This officer rued his misplaced economy, for he found his tent, a cheap one, "either too cold on a cold day, or too hot on a warm one," and his other gear in like manner. Pester, on the other hand,

had fitted himself out with an enormous tent, so enormous indeed that he found it too cumbersome to move and Wemyss, a Civil Servant on the Headquarters Staff of the magnificent Lord Lake, tried to borrow it for himself. Pester, in consequence, had to content himself with a mere shack—a type of tent a major-general of the present day would be glad to occupy in mobile war. He packed ten dozen bottles of Madeira, four dozen of port, and beer in proportion, to accompany him. In addition he arranged for a pipe of Madeira to be in readiness at Futtygarh, a place at the time deemed safe from incursions of hostile horse, but which was burnt down, for the most part, by Holkar in the famous foray the following year—the Madeira, however, having been absorbed before that calamity occurrd. He also had a tent for his horse, a very valuable Arab, bought in the auction of kit of the Deputy Quartermaster-General killed at Laswari. When this tent was stolen, the animal sometimes came into the his own tent, not a usual procedure as may be imagined.

It is not reasonable to suppose that his numerous servants went tentless. In lieu of our present day camp bed, he used his palanquin, which was, indeed, an almost essential article of equipment of all officers. He also took twenty-four suits of linen.

In addition, there would be a small menagerie, fowls of the robust and athletic Indian variety, probably a sheep, several dogs of weird and wonderful breeds, and usually a milch goat, "to supply milk for tea, a beverage of the most refreshing nature, particularly after a long march."

In the England of the day, China tea was regarded as an effeminate beverage among men, hence the apologetic tone of Captain Thorn, an officer of the 29th Dragoons, in reference to it. In India it was extremely expensive, costing, at Calcutta, nine shillings a pound. Indian tea was, of course, unknown. Pester's equipage was, it must be owned, grander than that of most officers, but may be taken as the equivalent of the war-wise ones of some degree of seniority. Officers of the Bombay and Madras armies, drawing less "batta" —in the Ceded Provinces all officers drew double batta—and life being generally more expensive, had far less elaborate equipages. The superior luxury of the Bengal troops led to great soreness and jealousy when the armies of the different Presidencies worked alongside each other—and there was no love lost between the rank and file, for they had

about as much in common with each other as a Prussian and a Portuguese.

Pester does not give us the details of the transport required to carry all this, but we gather that he had at least one bullock cart and four camels, the camels being his own property. In other words, transport that would suffice six officers at the present day. On August 15th, 1803, the 1st/2nd marched out of Shikoabad for the last time, the 11th having taken over.

"The drums were beating the Grenadiers March, and all ranks in the highest spirits possible," while the regimental ladies, with aching hearts, watched their husbands passing, all officers saluting them as they filed by. The officers of the 11th rode out with their comrades a little way, cursing their luck that they, too, were not to form part of the Field Army of the great Gerard Lake. A little more than a fortnight later, however, half of them were *hors de combat*, and the cantonment burnt while the 1st/2nd although it played a part in the battles of Delhi, Agra and Laswari within the next three months, was a lucky corps, losing but few, though, as we have said, it made up for it in the long run, at Deeg and Bhurtpore, where it lost considerably over half its strength.

DRILL—A PLEA FOR A REVIVAL OF THE DRILL SPIRIT.

By An Indian Infantry Company Commander.

Pre-War Drill Compared.

Before the War, according to the considered opinions of many senior British officers and senior Indian officers, the drill of Indian infantry battalions was uniformly good. Now-a-days the drill of an Indian infantry battalion is not only poor in quality, but is executed without that keenness and interest which accompanies the performance of work by men who know they are doing their job well. On those occasions when the battalion is called upon to demonstrate its efficiency by its drill, one at the most hopes the line will hold between flags A and B, or that the concerted noise of rifles moving to the 'present' hides the defects of style and method.

When comparative failure has crowned the efforts of a week of concentrated parades, one seeks consolation in such half truths as :—"The increase in weapons has decreased the time available for drill"; "the Battalion is a field battalion not an 'Eye Wash battalion'; "Drill has no place in a modern battalion."

But in spite of such excuses outwardly expressed, one always—and naturally too—feels that the battalion ought to drill more cleanly and more precisely than it does, and that there must be something radically wrong with the present system of teaching drill.

Pre-War Drill Organization Compared.

Before the Training Battalion system was instituted the Adjutant, together with his Drill Staff, was responsible for the teaching of drill to recruits, and to the battalion. All future drill instructors were noted from the day they enlisted, through the stages of drill sepoy, drill naik to the rank of drill havildar and jemadar-adjutant. The drill havildar was the best of many naiks, who were in varying degrees drill experts. The Jemadar-adjutant was a super-expert; he might, in this branch of training, be compared to the regimental sergeant-major of a British infantry battalion. The resulting staff was, therefore, from the point of view both of experience and natural aptitude

an expert one; and as the holding of an appointment on the drill staff was a sure road to promotion, competition to secure a vacancy was very keen.

Under the present system recruit drill is entirely separate from the active battalion. The cadre of instructors in a training battalion changes every two years. Instructors sent to the training battalion are nowadays expected to be capable of teaching musketry, bayonet training, elementary field training and, of course, drill.

The present training battalion instructor learned his field work from British officers and his musketry, etc., at Pachmarhi, or from experts trained there. His knowledge of drill he has acquired either during his three or four months' training as a recruit in a war depôt or from instructors who have received that amount of training. Because of his good musketry and bayonet training such an instructor can demonstrate perfectly a complicated movement comprising a series of long and short points and jabs, and his class of recruits vie with each other to emulate him in movement and spirit.

At drill, however, his lack of training prevents him from demonstrating with accuracy, precision or confidence the simplest movement, and the class, having no model, fall into similar faults in slovenly execution, and the more times they do the movement the more marked the fault becomes. Drill taught in such a manner must be not only time wasted, but is contrary to the spirit of drill which demands accuracy and precision.

British versus *Indian Recruits.*

The teaching of drill to the Indian Army follows slavishly the principles laid down in a publication issued by the War Office for the instruction of British soldiers. The principles and methods outlined therein are based on the knowledge that every British recruit appreciates military march time and can move naturally in time to march music. Some form of drill is included in every Elementary School curriculum and the teaching of physical training is also a subject which fills many hours in a school boy's life. Thus every such potential recruit has learned to control his body, to breathe correctly, and to perform simple military movements.

Compare with such a recruit, the potential recruit of the Indian Army; the '*Jawan*' fresh from his village. His natural walk bears

no resemblance to the march step which the Army authorities have decided to be the most economical in expenditure of strength. In walking the average Indian recruit makes little or no use of his ankle muscles, and the movements—if any—of his arms bear no relation to the movements of his legs. The rhythm he has to learn is entirely different from his native music, which suggests sinuous or spasmodic movements. His natural movements, in the main, are either opposite in nature to those he has to learn *e.g.*, the, *salaam* which with slow a motion places the palm of the partially closed hand on the forehead, combined with a forward inclination of the body, as against a military salute which necessitates the chest being raised as the back of the hand, fully opened, is swung smartly to the head, or demand the reconditioning of muscles which have by disuse become partially atrophied. An example of this loss of control is the 'eyes right' movement which no Indian can do without either bulging the eyes, inclining the head forward or backward or turning the shoulders.

It is therefore patent that by following blindly the methods laid down in Infantry Training, Volume I, it is impossible to teach correctly, controlled drill to the future sepoys, non-commissioned officers, Indian officers and British officers of the Indian Army; one must begin at a much more elementary stage, and proceed much more slowly.

System of Instruction.

To instruct an Indian recruit one has three tasks to perform :—

(*i*) The elimination of his natural faults.

(*ii*) The training of those muscles which in the case of a British recruit have been trained previous to his enlistment, but which are undeveloped in an Indian recruit.

(*iii*) The inculcation of the drill spirit.

No instructor can hope for success unless he possesses :—

(*i*) A sound knowledge of the muscular processes involved in each movement.

(*ii*) Natural physical ability to demonstrate movements.

(*iii*) Patience to teach.

The first lesson in musketry is the movement of the index finger of the right hand—a small matter but typical of the deep study which has been given to the evolution of the system of instruction.

Similarly in teaching the salute, the primary essential is that the recruit should be able to open fully his hand and at the same time keep the fingers and thumb straight and together.

To turn correctly and smartly there must be

(*i*) Ability to balance on the heel and toe raised.

(*ii*) Knowledge of the relative position of the body to the feet during the turning movement.

No movement in drill can be smartly performed and cleanly completed unless the body is correctly placed during the process of the movement, and immediately preceding the movement by which the drill motion is completed. Halting, about-turning and forming fours are only a few of the movements which habitually are followed by the reprimand "*Hilo mat.*" If recruits have absorbed the thirty pace, and are made to march along a straight line the word 'dressing' would disappear.

Has Drill any Value?

A whole Army manual has been devoted to the teaching of drill and many hours of both the recruits period of training and of the trained soldier are allotted to the performance of drill.

The following extracts from Infantry Training, Volume I, show the value the Higher Command place upon drill.

Chapter II, section 12, para. i:

..... "drill is the foundation of discipline and *esprit-de-corps.*"

Chapter I, section 3, para i:

"Discipline by means of which the *morale* of a force can alone be maintained, is the bed-rock of all training."

Chapter II, section 12, para. ii:

"Slovenly drill is harmful."

In spite of the introduction of new weapons and the advance of mechanization the words "A smart and well drilled battalion" are still considered synoymous with those "An efficient battalion."

The experience of the War showed that a well drilled and smart battalion was always capable of dealing effectively with the many and varied new problems which arose during the changing methods of fighting.

The *morale* of a war-weary battalion was not revived by periods of rest and idleness, but by a concentrated programme of intensive drill whereby its pride, self-esteem and *esprit de corps* were invariably restored. It is therefore clear that drill has a very definite value in the training of an Army.

In other branches of training, *e.g.*, signalling, musketry and physical training, it is not left to the battalion to create a standard of efficiency ; Army schools have been instituted and the existing system ensures the best men being selected as students. The more the standard of teaching drill is raised the more efficient our battalions will become. It is not a question of increasing the number of hours allotted, but merely one of improved methods of instruction.

Drill Spirit.

The British soldier differs from the Indian sepoy in his possession of a tradition of drill, and of those qualities which evolve from absorbing the spirit of drill. Both races possess martial qualities but drill is foreign to Indian life, and the spirit of co-operation and self-discipline are with him undeveloped. To maintain, at a reasonable standard of efficiency in an Indian regiment, a brass band, or drums and pipes, it is necessary for the men to receive periodic instruction from players who not only have the necessary skill but also in whom the spirit of music is present. The drill of a modern Indian battalion must in like manner be revived and the spirit which was possessed by the pre-war Regimental Drill Staff must again be inculcated within the battalion.

A cadre of drill experts must be carefully selected and trained who will be similar in every respect to the musketry specialists, and who will hold similar views regarding the importance of their branch of training. These men will raise the standard of drill in their own battalions and also, during their tour with the Training battalions, be a cadre of experts similar to the Physical Training Staff, replacing the mediocre non-commissioned officer who, being useless elsewhere, is generally considered capable of teaching drill.

Solutions.

To re-create the drill spirit and raise the standard of teaching, assistance from Higher Command is essential. The founding of a new Army school where drill alone shall be taught is, on financial grounds

alone, an impossibility but, fortunately, the necessity does not arise as institutions already existing can be with very slight additional expense adapted to the purpose.

An extension of the curriculum of the King George Schools to include a technical study of drill and the training of drill instructors will, amongst such good material, produce not only keen, skilful instructors but man in whom the true spirit will have been inculcated.

At the Kitchener College, Nowgong, are collected the promising non-commissioned officers and Indian officers of the Indian Army, and the formation there of a Special Wing, to which young non-commissioned officers, selected with the same care in choosing students for other army courses, could be sent, would speedily supply the cadre of experts which has disappeared with the disbandment of the Regimental Drill Cadre, and also would give the future Indian officers and British officers of the Indian Army an excellent opportunity of learning at first hand the principles and application of the most important branch of army training.

MY MANX CAMEL CORPS.

By Lieut.-Col. C. G. Lloyd, C.I.E., M.C.

The title, unfortunately, is a trifle misleading. It suggests the camel expert—the veteran who has commanded so many camel corps that he has to give them names or numbers in order to distinguish one from the other. That is not my case at all. I have commanded but one camel corps—the one specified above—and that only for a brief period. Any reader therefore who looks for pearls of wisdom concerning the manners, habits, ailments, or internal structure of these peculiar beasts will, I fear, be disappointed in this narrative.

But I must not be over-modest. If my knowledge about camels in general is small, I can claim that in respect of *Manx* camels, I am the greatest living expert. For I am, I fully believe, the only man alive who has held command of a completely tail-less camel corps.

The place was Western Persia, the period the last year or so of the Great War. As a result of the Russian break-up, a huge slice of the Central Asian plateau lay open to a Germano-Turkish thrust eastwards. Hence the genesis of our little "Hush-Hush Army", designed for operations towards the Caucasus and Caspian Sea. The force of course was small, but the distances were great, and there was no railway. It was my special job to find road transport for the expedition, and my orders were to collect, organise, and put into work everything that was capable of carrying a load – human, bestial, and mechanical.

I had only recently started on this and was up to my eyes in work, when I received from Army Headquarters at Baghdad a cipher telegram which ran approximately as follows :—

Proceed ZAITUN forthwith and carry out surprise inspection Ex-Russian Camel Corps stationed that neighbourhood. This unit now in British employ, Commanding officer being Lieut. E. Shogitoff. Latter suspected wholesale frauds in connection abnormal casualties alleged to be due to *Shuturzigorski* a camel epidemic unknown to these Headquarters. Investigate circumstances fully and report by wire present strength, men and animals, also unit's carrying capacity and

fitness for service. If found necessary suspend Lieut. Shogitoff and assume control as Commandant. Further instructions on receipt your report."

The receipt of this wire upset me considerably. Apart from the interruption to my own urgent work, I had no technical knowledge of camels and, to be quite frank, no overwhelming desire for closer acquaintance. But an order is an order; so, having handed over my office to a deputy, I set out in a staff car accompanied by an armed sepoy.

The eighty-mile drive to Zaitun proved uneventful, and on nearing the outskirts of the squalid little town, I ascertained to my relief that the "RUSSKI" camel corps was still bivouacked in the neighbourhood. My informant, an emaciated but markedly intelligent boy, offered to show me the way, and I took him up on the running-board. En route I gathered from him that at that hour the camels would probably be out grazing; but that the Lieutenant Sahib, a Kafkazi (or inhabitant of the Caucasus) lived at the Serai half a mile further on.

Following the boy's directions we turned in at a ruined gateway and found ourselves in the usual large untidy compound. A few camels stood about, and the first impression I got on glancing at them was that none of them had any tails. I was about to approach them to investigate this surprising phenomenon when my attention was diverted by what appeared to be a gypsy caravan of six or eight roomy four-horse wagons locally known as fourgons. They were drawn up in a sort of *laager* in a shady and secluded corner of the courtyard.

"This" said my guide, indicating the wagon-laager, "is where the Lieutenant Sahib lives."

I rubbed my eyes, for I felt that the long drive in the glaring sun-light must have impaired their keenness. This surely could not be the headquarters of a military unit. Rather did it remind me of a village circus taking its Sunday morning's rest. In the background was a ragged line of mules and horses drowsing contentedly. Scraggy fowls scratched about in the dirt, and tethered to one wagon-wheel were two tame gazelles which made friendly advances. On a long line of washing which stretched right across the laager hung a collection of garments that for colour, design and variety surpassed anything that I had ever seen. I was standing there considerably bemused when a young woman suddenly appeared from behind the tilt of the

nearest wagon. She was a fine strapping wench of clean-cut and handsome features. Over her abundant hair she wore a striped kerchief; on her feet she wore soft leather riding boots; and over all, was a kimono-like wrapper which atoned for its grubbiness by its striking and colourful design. Altogether, a decidedly startling apparition to eyes accustomed for so long to the drabness of Mesopotamia. I gazed at her stupidly and I fear rudely.

She, for her part, was not the least taken aback and greeted me frankly and pleasantly. She spoke fluent Persian, eked out with a few French phrases. English she had none. I judged her to be Caucasian or possibly Jewish. "This" interpolated my Persian guide, "is Madame Shogitoff." Once again the lady bowed and smiled, and, in considerable embarrasment, I bowed and saluted in my turn. So this was Madame Shogitoff! The wife of the pestilent fellow whose alleged iniquities I had been specially deputed to unmask. Surely the business was embroiled enough already without this added complication. However there was nothing for it; one could not allow oneself to be influenced by a pretty face and a picturesque kerchief. So I assumed my most military air and informed her stiffly that I had come to see her husband Lieutenant Shogitoff—on business.

For a moment or two she eyed me intently as though seeking to divine my thoughts; and it seemed to me that a look of apprehension came into her eyes. But it was gone almost instantly, if indeed it was ever there; and with a gay smile and a flash of white teeth she lifted up her voice and loudly hailed someone by the name of Emmanuel.

A man's answering hail came from the interior of a wagon on the far side of the laager. Lieutenant Shogitoff, it seemed, was taking a *siesta* and strongly resented its interruption. A vociferous duet followed, and finally a man's head appeared in the curtained entrance of the wagon, and peered out at us. I caught a glimpse of a long sallow face, blue-jowled, a shifty pair of eyes set close together, and long drooping moustaches. Then the face withdrew into the darkness of the interior, and I distinctly heard a sound such as might be made by a scent-spray. (I was subsequently in a position to test my conjecture and adjudged it to have been correct.)

A couple of minutes later my host made his entry. He had obviously taken some trouble over his turn-out, though it had not

included a shave. The effect was most striking, suggesting as it did something between an Armenian brigand and a shooting-gallery proprietor. However, his manner to me was very cordial, not to say effusive. He spoke fluent English with a strong trans-atlantic accent picked up, it seemed, at the American college in Odessa where he had been educated.

My turning up like this, I was given to understand, was the one thing needed to complete a perfect day. He, Emmanuel Shogitoff, had ever cherished the most intense admiration for the British race. It was a race unique, sublime! Justice and Fair Play! Where could you find them but in Britain? To meet one of that race in the flesh, and particularly one like himself—of the officer class, why, it was a red-letter day indeed. "Wine," he cried. "Wine and cigars for our illustrious guest!"

We sat down at a rickety table laid with small saucers containing sweetmeats and pickled gherkins. Two bottles of Caucasian brandy were opened by my host himself with all the due ceremony. A long dun coloured cigar and a sticky glass were pressed into my hand, and I was bidden to eat, drink and be merry. I did my best, though I was feeling far from merry. I abominate spirits in the forenoon; I hate dirty drinking-vessels; nor am I at all partial to Smyrna cheroots and dust-laden halwa. But worst of all was the constant harassing recollection of the very distasteful duty with which I had been charged. I was continually wracking my brain how I could introduce the motive of my visit with as little disturbance as need be. In the end, taking advantage of Madame's temporary absence from the table, I blurted it all out bluntly and clumsily.

The effect on my host was electrical. His face went green, and his prominent eyes goggled at me in undisguised terror. I must confess I felt sorry for the poor devil, guilty though he might be. It was some time before he recovered sufficient equanimity to answer me coherently. He assured me with a ghastly smile that there must be some stupid mistake; that he could satisfy me in every single particular. His camel corps was up to strength and in excellent fettle. "Ready to march to Tiflis to morrow morning," he added with a feeble attempt at jocularity. I replied that I was delighted to hear it. My car was at his disposal and the sooner we started for his lines the better. To this he agreed, adding that he would be ready in two minutes. He went

off in the direction of the kitchen and I sat unhappily at the table fingering nervously a stick of grey nougat. From time to time, I caught the sound of whispering and I wondered to myself what exactly Shogitoff was telling her. And then suddenly she came out; and I saw to my great relief that she looked quite calm and composed.

She said something about my orderly and the car-driver. They also must have some refreshment. I did my utmost to dissuade her, but she smilingly ignored my expostulations, filled up two glasses with the Caucasian brandy, and went over to the car. I followed, beset with horrid tremors connected with poison. The two Indians did not know what to make of it. A memsahib—or a sort of memsahib—was urging them to drink, whereas the Major Sahib in rapid Hindustani was issuing *sakht hukms* to the contrary.

While we stood there, all at cross-purposes, there was a sudden sharp clatter of hoofs, and a mounted man crossed the courtyard at full gallop, dashed through the gateway, jinked to the left, and vanished from sight. I caught a glimpse of a long sallow face with drooping moustaches leaning low on the pony's neck. And that was the last I ever saw of Lieutenant Emmanuel Shogitoff.

It had all happend so swiftly that I was taken completely unawares. By the time I had recovered my wits, the fugitive must have been half a mile away. In any case, it was ridiculous to attempt a pursuit in the car, for there was not the slightest hope that our man would be so complaisant as to follow the motor road. At the time I cursed myself heartily for my stupidity and lack of foresight; but, really, looking back on it I cannot find myself to be seriously blameworthy. I turned angrily on Madame Shogitoff who quite obviously was privy to the plot.

"It seems Madame," I said sternly "that Lieutenant Shogitoff has deserted his post. Are you aware of the penalty for desertion in war-time?" My hostess did not bat an eye-lid. "Desertion?" she repeated with every show of amazement. "My husband hasn't deserted. He has just had bad news about his mother in Vladikafkaz. I fear very much she is sinking rapidly."

It was said so seriously that I found it difficult to preserve my gravity. And after all what if he had run away? My business was primarily with the camel corps, not Lieutenant Shogitoff. The camel

corps had not run away. As though to confirm my reflections, a long string of government camels at that very moment filed into the serai. I eyed them critically and found to my relief that their condition was by no means bad; and then I looked at them again. *They had not a tail among them.* My eyesight after all had not been at fault. "Curiouser and curiouser," I said to myself, with the immortal Alice.

I turned to my hostess. "Forgive me madame," I began, not without irony, "you are so good at explaining things that I venture to ask you why your husband's camels have no tails." "Haven't they?" she said carelessly. "It must be due to that terrible epidemic —the *Shuturzigorski* I think they call it." I re-examined the camels. "No madame," I rejoined, "you are wrong this time. This is no tail sloughing caused by disease. Clearly each tail has been neatly amputated—in short, a surgical operation." "It may be so," she replied gravely. "I have often heard my husband say that a camel's tail is a useless appendage; an encumbrance, a dead weight. So why not cut them off? We humans do very well without tails. Then why not camels?"

While I was still struggling to find an appropriate rejoinder, my hostess, humming a gay snatch of song, retired once more to her kitchen. It was my Persian boy who elucidated the mystery. With the Russians (a suspicious race) the practice was this; If a camel died on the march you had to produce the tail before their remount department would issue a fresh camel in replacement. This practice was continued when these transport detachments were taken over by the British. It was our friend Emmanuel who conceived the profitable idea of extending this procedure to the living as well as the dead. Whenever, therefore, he found himself short of cash, his first step would be to report a serious epidemic of *Shuturzigorski*, knowing well that the British had probably never even heard of this rare disease. Then he cut off a few score tails, sent them to the base and drew an equivalent number of remounts. He sold these and pocketted the proceeds. It was a regular gold-mine.

There is little more to add. Within a week or two, I was relieved of my command, and I subsequently learnt from my successor (dead now poor fellow) that his Manx camels showed no signs of having

suffered by their mutilation. On the contrary, they normally used to carry a load of six maunds instead of the usual five. So possibly there is something after all in Madame Shogitoff's contention that a camel is better without its tail. Anyhow it is an interesting theory, and I present it to the experts for what it may be worth.

THE £ *s. d.* OF A FOX HUNTING HOLIDAY.

By P. C. Pratt.

This article, designed principally to aid the soldier on leave from India whose aspirations towards a season's hunting are possibly tempered by the uneasy recognition of a somewhat anæmic bank balance, should, perhaps, open with a quotation from the late Mr. Surtees; but the startling originality of such a course deters me and I prefer to begin with an aphorism by that equally celebrated and still more prolific writer "Anon" who once made the profound observation: "where there's a will there's a way." And that may be said to express the attitude of him who, while feeling the urge to spend his leave in the healthiest and most satisfactory way, finds himself compelled to look his affairs very fully in the face and say: "thus far shalt thou go, and no farther!"

I admit that it is difficult to generalise. One man's English home is in the midst of a fine hunting country, while another dwells in London, or in the heart of a manufacturing district. Much of what follows, therefore, cannot be expected to apply universally, but if I prove—as I hope to—that a season's hunting is within the scope of a man of quite modest purse, I can safely leave to him who knows what he wants to "see that he gets it!"

The first question to be considered is, for the man who can choose, the particular Hunt to which he shall attach himself, and on this point there is a great deal to be said. First of all, he may not wish to tie himself down to a single district. Anyone without friends and associations attaching to a particular country may prefer to gain experience with different packs over vastly differing terrain, hiring his mounts as he goes. That, however, is an expensive way of working for anything like regular hunting and not to be recommended, its only advantage being that of variety.

The better way both for pleasure and comfort is to choose our country and horse, and to make the best of them. The joys of hunting are vastly increased as one begins to share them with hunting field friends—than whom there are none-better. Also, a strange

horse takes much of the pleasure from the game until one has tried him out and found what he can do ; in other words until he has ceased to be strange. Now to most people one particular district in England is more attractive than another, either because they know it or because they don't, and it is quite impossible in the scope of this article to describe the hunting countries peculiar to each, nor is it necessary, as we are not now concerned with the more expensive packs over the best country of big grass fields and tall fences where two good horses are almost a minimum. Such as the Croome, Pytchley, Mr. Fernie's and The Warwickshire are rather beyond our ambitions at present and may well be left for some happy day in the future.

I will content myself with giving a few particulars of certain Hunts representative of those which I deem to be more suitable from the point of view of sport coupled with financial considerations. The subscriptions and other terms mentioned are the special rates charged serving officers on leave, roughly half those in force for ordinary members. Indeed, the New Forest Hunt is the only one I am definitely aware which makes no such concessions. The Fernie, on the other hand, charge one-third their usual rate, but even so, the fee is £25 for a two-day week, and the horse must be a thoroughbred of an all-round type.

First the Tedworth Hunt which is, of course, by reason of its situation, peculiarly military in character. The country is mostly downland with a good deal of timber that wants jumping. Subscriptions of officers quartered on Salisbury Plain are paid regimentally and work out at a very low figure for each individual. It may be taken, therefore, that an officer not so situated would find his two days a week covered by a £5 subscription. And let me say here that I am writing chiefly for the one-horse man, who will not be out more than twice a week, on which point I shall have more to say later. There is with the Tedworth, as with almost every Hunt, a daily cap of half-a-crown for the wire or poultry fund, to which each person out is expected to contribute.

The South Staffordshire Hunt also has something of a military nature owing to its situation near the Barracks of the Staffordshire Regiment at Lichfield. No cap is sought from officers on leave for an occasional day, and no definite subscription has been laid down. Such matters, in this as in most cases, would be settled between the

individual and the Hunt Secretary. The country is a close one and the fences are mostly hedge and ditch calling for a horse that is a bold jumper, but need not be of the fastest. The Albrighton, lying in parts of Shropshire, Staffordshire and Worcestershire, is a very varied country, many of the fences consisting of hedges on banks, with a ditch on the take off or landing side and calling for a clever and active horse which it should be within the power of our "Hypothetical Huntsman" to obtain. The usual concessions are made in the matter of subscription. The Albrighton Woodland, hunting part of the Albrighton country within a few miles of Birmingham would, I believe, be an excellent choice. Convenient livery is obtainable at Harborne and elsewhere and expenses generally are moderate. The country is varied and not too difficult, while, owing to its wooded nature, runs are not so fast but that a quite moderate horse can easily hold its own.

The country of the Atherstone, another Midland Hunt, lies between Coventry and Leicester. This would be a somewhat ambitious move for our "H. H" to make, as parts are rather stiffly fenced with cut-and-laid, and there are many big ditches, so that a strong, fairly fast horse is required. The terms for officers on leave, are however, said to be very moderate, and it may be worth an enquiry.

So also the South Berkshire, hunting a good country whose banks and ditches call for a good stamp of horse, is perhaps, something of a tall order for us, but at least those who like the district can do no harm by thinking it over. The Old Berkeley, on the other hand, covering parts of Hertfordshire, Buckingham and Middlesex, would seem well suited to his needs. Not only are the usual terms always halved for officers on leave, but special arrangements would willingly be made if necessary. As it was put to me: "Officers are always very welcome, and the O. B. H. would never prevent them hunting for financial reasons." The country, also, is not too difficult, and admits of a quite ordinary horse being used with good effect. A convenient centre would be Berkhamsted where there is at least one excellent Riding School that takes horses on livery at very reasonable rates. It is, moreover, within easy reach of Town.

Further north, the Rufford Hounds hunting parts of Derby and Nottingham are worthy of consideration. There is no definite scale of subscription, but I am assured that serving soldiers are always given special consideration, even to the point of waiving all claims.

Similarly, the Downham Hunt, covering part of West Norfolk, leaves the matter of subscription payable by officers on leave for them to decide what they can afford to give. The country is largely light plough, and not too difficult.

The Wheatland in Shropshire is another good country with plenty of grass and all kinds of fences. A clever short-legged horse suitable for the work required will not be beyond our reach. Additional Hunts that deserve consideration include the Brecon, hunting the Beacon and river Wye districts, which is a good sporting country, inexpensive and not demanding too much in the way of horse-flesh; the Cumberland and Cumberland Farmers; the Bedale in the North Riding of Yorkshire, with its hedge and ditch fences; and the Hambledon in parts of Hampshire and Sussex, varied as to land—mainly pasture, downland, and woods—and also as to fences, which include some banks. All are Hunts that would suit the short-legged, medium bred horse we have in mind.

There are too, the Exmoor, the Dulverton, and the West Somerset, mostly moorland, calling for a moderately fast, low set horse; while, should we be lucky enough to pick up a better class animal, preferably of Irish extraction, the Dorset Hunt, with its flying fences, would suit us admirably. In addition, there are many private packs owned and maintained by the Master, to whom, as a rule, no subscription is payable, the majority of whom are delighted to welcome soldiers on leave, if by any means a *liaison* can be brought about. Such Hunts as the Cheshire Forest, a fine little pack with which I have had excellent sport; Mr. David Davies', in the Montgomeryshire Hills; Colonel Spence-Colbys, a wooded country situated in Gloucester and Hereford; or the Tedworth Woodland, lying between the Tedworth and Vine countries will, if an invitation be obtained, give good sport under the pleasantest conditions.

To sum up, then, our Hunt Subscription for a two-day week will not exceed £15 for the season, and may, if we cannot give more, be as low as £5. At least, it can be taken for granted that sooner than see a good man unable to hunt, a Master would in nine cases out of ten waive the question of subscription altogether and with an air of receiving, rather than of conferring a favour, for such is the democracy of the hunting field.

Now as to the very important question of a mount. I take it one horse has got to see us through—and one good one is better than a

pair of duds. Are we going to buy or hire? If we hire, we have no control over its treatment in stables, we are tied to the apron-string of the liveryman, and it is going to cost us probably three guineas for every day's hunting. On the other hand, should a long spell of frost appear, or even foot and mouth disease break out, or should the horse fall sick or break its leg out hunting, the responsibility and loss are not ours; and of course, we have not the trouble and expense of his keep. I like to think, however, that there will be many to whom the horse is not merely a "vehicle," a means of progression, and who would not be equally satisfied—and perhaps feel happier—in a tank. The man who "hunts to ride" is deeply—and to a certain extent rightly—scorned by your true hunting man; but I freely confess that he to whom hound work means little but "horse work" everything has more of my sympathy than the over keen follower who would prefer to break a horse's wind rather than miss the kill. At all events, if he intends to hire, no more need be said, as his £3 per day clears him. Let us suppose, on the other hand, that we want a horse of our own, and instead of paying about £90 for the season's hiring, we prefer to spend £50 or £60 on our own account. This can be done privately, or at a sale, or the sum can even be halved by some cavalry friend buying for us a charger, cast on the score of age, but otherwise sound, which will have years of good work before it. But (except in the last case, when one must "take it or leave it"—though its history can generally be learnt) however one buys, a trial in the hunting field should be insisted upon. Many a good-looking horse, a cool jumper in cold blood, will be unmanageable to hounds, and one of the things to be avoided at all costs, is making oneself a nuisance at the covert side by kicking or undue restlessness, and equally when hounds are running, by the horse bolting, or barging at a crowded spot. Moreover, many a good-looking and apparently high-spirited horse will turn out a craven in the face of a stiff open ditch or a wide stream; and few things are more annoying than to see the field streaming away into the distance while one's horse trembles before a perfectly reasonable jump, or while one crawls in a bedraggled state from a stream wherein one has been deposited by a sudden and unexpected stop. Look out, then, for a horse that is handy, well-mannered, intelligent and stout-hearted. A short-legged animal, about 15 hands 2 inches is the best for general work, if up to one's weight, and if there is a touch of breeding, so much the better. But don't demand a great turn of speed, which is always

costly. In close country, pace is not so important as the qualities I have mentioned, and may, indeed, be a positive disadvantage where there is much wire and where sudden changes of direction are frequent. In this class of country, where earths are plentiful and checks constant, the steady and resolute little horse will generally serve to keep you up with the leaders and more often than not bring you in at the kill. It must be remembered that a five-mile point, covering perhaps twice that distance in actual running, is unlikely to occur without sufficient check to enable such a horse to keep in touch. Of course any horse we contemplate buying must be able to pass a stiff examination by our own Vet.

And now, having bought our horse, what are we going to do with him? Are we going to put him out to livery at some Riding School or Stables? Can we afford an efficient groom at from 45/- to 50/-per week? Or do we wish to keep the "personal touch," to make a friend of our horse and in so doing undertake a burden that will bring from us many a groan and sigh at having to leave fireside or bed at the dictates of stable duties, but which will repay us a thousand times for our pains and discomforts by the knowledge we shall gain of horses in general and the intimacy of one in particular. Many men are good horsemen, but singularly few ever become horsemasters in the true sense of the word. So in the hope that a goodly number will be persuaded to take the stony path of personal attention, and to eschew the soft and easy way of the livery stable, I will give a rough estimate of the cost of a suitable establishment. First of all, one has got to live somewhere oneself and to take a cottage or small house with a stable, or out-buildings that can easily be converted, is certainly no more expensive than living in a hotel. That is the object to have before one, the achievement of which should not be too difficult in view of the present state of the property market!

If you are a married man, you will probably need a gardener. Engage one who can relieve you with your horse. The social events incidental to a season's hunting make a certain elasticity in your personal duties essential. If you do not need a gardener, a useful lad with some experience to work under supervision may be hired for about 20/- per week. Remember, you are not now in India, with its obligation to maintain a large staff of more or less useless servants to look ornamental, (while the sweeper does the work) together with their indigent families. There is a no indignity here in a man tending his

own horse, in fact, very much the reverse; and the man whose horse knows and loves him, is he who has tended the animal in the stable, as well as ridden him outside.

As to equipment, a good second-hand saddle and bridle may be picked up for about £6 or £7; but knee-caps (essential with roads as they are to-day), night-rug, grooming kit and other stable furniture, will bring the total to at least £10. Don't be over-elaborate; a night rug is no warmer for having your initials in the corner, and over-elaboration in buying equipment merely adds to the bill without adding to efficiency. A pair of hand clippers, if the horse has a hogged mane, will pay for themselves, but clipping out—which will certainly be needed at least once in the season—can be done at the nearest livery stable. You have to remember that you are setting up for a short season, only, and that at the end of your allotted span of leave will probably be selling everything. Shoeing is an important item, and in choosing your establishment, the distance from the nearest forge is a point that may well be taken into account. Shoes need renewing about once a fortnight and will have to be "removed" and re-fitted after seven or eight days. The cost is 9/- for new shoes and 4/- to 4/6 for "removes," so that this item is a considerable one.

As to your own outfit, unless you already possess hunting kit—the regulation black coat, top hat and black boots, I advise you to do what many officers hunting for short seasons do constantly, that is, hunt in "ratcatcher." It is perfectly *comme il faut*, and cuts your cost by anything from £10 to £20. All that you require is a smartly cut and well fitting sports coat—a brown or reddish colour looks best—with a hunting "bowler" hat. Your own riding breeches will do perfectly—these can even be used with "hunting black"—and you may use your Army riding boots. If you wish to get black ones, I strongly advise you to pocket your pride and go to some good dealer in mis-fits where you can probably pick a well-fitting pair by a good maker for less than half the price charged by the same man for a pair made to order. The price in the last case, with trees, will certainly not be less than ten guineas.

A plain white stock looks better than a collar and tie and—once its intricacies have been solved—will prove warm and comfortable. A vest, in which alone you may "express your individuality," string gloves, and a plain stout crop with lash, complete your outfit. The small

question of a hat-cord, whether to wear one or not, is a vexed one, but with a well-fitting bowler, it should not be necessary.

Now, as to selling off at the end of your leave when circumstances compel your parting with your mount that has now become an old friend. There is a strange phenomenon connected with amateur horse deals in that one nearly always has to sell at a lower price than one pays. It is strange, but true. Nevertheless, a £60 horse that has been well cared for, certainly should fetch a good price, and I believe £40 will be a safe figure to take for purposes of calculation. Saddle and bridle, if good and comfortable, I advise you to keep as they are always useful and will help to reduce the cost on the next occasion if, as is probable, you have made arrangements to repeat the visit in three or four years' time.

The average first cost then, of a four-months season, may be summarised as follows :—

	£
Hunt Subscription	10
Horse	60
Equipment	10
Boy's Wages	16
Horse Food and Bedding	25
Shoeing	5
Wire Fund Cap	4
Additional personal Kit	5
	135
Less re-sale of Horse (say)	40
	95

The cost for the next season, or of the first one to those who already have the kit and saddlery, should be about £10 less. On the other hand, it is well to realize that, as "the best laid schemes of mice and men gang aft aglee," so sickness or injury may lay the horse up for the season, reduce his value to nothing, and cause us the expense of veterinary treatment—and of another horse, if we wish to continue to hunt. However, knowing the worst that can happen, the average so far exceeds the best obtainable from any other holiday that few would hesitate to take the risk.

A word in passing, on the cost of feeding which, you will notice, I have put at £25. To keep a hunter in hard condition he must have

at least 16 lbs. of oats a day. In four months, he will eat nearly a ton of hay, besides chaff, bran, linseed, etc., all of which must make a very big item in your expenditure ; an item, moreover, that does not, and must not, allow of cutting.

And now, to summarise the relative costs of keeping a horse ourselves or at livery, or hiring for four months. These will be approximately as follows :—

(*a*) *Hiring*—if done for two days per week during the whole period, say 5 guineas per week. (Allowing four days with no hunting, due to frost) Total .. £75

(*b*) *Livery*—for the whole period, say £2-10-0 per week plus net cost of horse £20 and shoeing £5. Total .. £65

(*c*) *Personal Attention*—

	£
Horse food and bedding..	25
Boy's wages	16
Stable equipment, etc.	4
Shoeing	5
Net cost of horse	20
Total ..	70

And the points to remember in connection with each are :—

(*a*) *Hiring.*—No responsibility for horse's keep or welfare, but use of horse for two days per week only. Money saved in case of frost, etc.

(*b*) *Livery.*—No responsibility for horse's keep, but all in connection with his health. The horse is at your disposal at any time for hacking or exercise.

(*c*) *Personal Attention.*—Full responsibility, but complete control and an absorbing occupation.

Having dealt with economy of cash, may I be permitted a word on economy of horse-flesh ? For from that results not only the success of our season's hunting, but also a satisfactory sale at the end. And here I must say that the advisability or otherwise of taking entire charge of our horse chiefly depends on our knowledge and experience. It would obviously be foolish for one inexperienced in horse management to undertake sole charge of a hunter, with or without the aid of a "useful lad." The things that can go wrong are so many and varied

and withal so vital, that failure to recognise a symptom immediately it appears may result in the permanent injury or death of the horse. In the absence, therefore, of personal knowledge, a really competent groom is essential, otherwise, we shall do far better to keep our horse at livery with some well-managed riding school—pure and simple livery stables being almost non-existent in these mechanical days—at a charge of from £2-10-0 to £3 per week.

As to the treatment of the horse himself, one of the chief points to be remembered is that he is as subject to fatigue as we are, and it is when he is tired that accidents are most liable to happen. It is a painful sight to see an obviously weary mount put at a stiff jump at the end of a heavy day merely to gratify the rider's vanity as a "first flighter." If a bad fall results, the blame will be entirely the rider's. It is the greatest mistake in the world for a one-horse man to try to compete with a more fortunate fellow riding his second and fresher mount. Again, it is not a sign of sportsmanship to stay out until hounds are counted if one's horse is spent, nor will the decent members of the field feel anything but contempt for a man who insists on doing so. If the horse is to last the season he must not be worked to death, and every possible chance must be taken to rest him. For instance, after a twelve-mile hack out to a meet, there is no sense in sitting "on top" for half an hour before hounds move off. Similarly, when hounds are working in a wood, it is often possible to dismount for a few minutes and even to ease the girths occasionally. One continually sees a large field held up under conditions that make a quick get-away impossible and scarcely a soul takes the opportunity of resting his horse. The only possible excuse is a horse that cannot be mounted when other horses are on the move, and that, for an army officer, should be an exceptionally difficult one, such as we are not likely to have bought.

The ride home must always be regarded as part of the day and borne in mind when deciding whether the time has come to leave hounds. It should always be taken very quietly and if the horse is exceptionally weary, an occasional bit of foot-slogging on the part of the rider will be an act of mercy and good sense, and incidentally, warm one's own frozen feet! Always be on the look-out for a lost or twisted shoe, as grave damage can occur from this cause in a very short time. At all times it is well to remember that galloping on tarmac, besides being dangerous if persisted in, is stark ruin to a horse's feet.

On arriving home, a "chilled" drink is the first duty to our horse followed by a bucket of gruel or a bran mash. If the horse is very wet, either with sweat or rain, he should be dried and loosely rugged before being left. We may then snatch a wash and a meal ourselves after which the horse must be thoroughly cleaned and given a feed. From the time we get home to the final moment of shutting the stable door on a tired but comfortable horse munching contentedly at his hay-net, will not be much less than two hours; and if we are wise, we shall then proceed to clean our saddlery, which will not be improved by leaving till the morning.

If this careful process be followed regularly, the best results will be obtained. It will not be wise to expect or insist on a regular two days a week. If the horse is in good condition, he can probably do it more often than not. For safety's sake, however, reckon on having three days a fortnight which, with occasional hold-ups on account of frost, will probably be near the number without much additional sacrifice. After each hunt, the horse will certainly need one day's complete rest, but for the remainder of the time he will be available for much pleasant hacking round the country, and at the end of the season will be in a condition to recover a considerable proportion, if not the whole of our original outlay. And, of course, there is always the chance of a "bargain," that dream of every horse owner, the hundred and fifty guinea hunter we "picked up for a song."

But good or bad, win or lose, we shall have "lived our life," and come what may, shall go back to harness with a fund of yarns and memories that shall last us until it is time to return for a fresh batch.

CLOSE SUPPORT OF INFANTRY.

AN INFANTRY OFFICER'S POINT OF VIEW.

By

Captain D. McK. KENNELY, 5th Mahratta Light Infantry.

"Close support artillery is placed under commanders of forward units to assist their advance and to deal quickly with unexpected resistance." F. S. R. Vol. II, Chap. VII, Sec. 66.

This rôle appears to be a simple one but in actual practice close support guns seldom have the opportunity to perform their task quickly, with the result that their assistance is not as effective as it might be.

There are two methods of employing close support artillery :—

(*a*) The battalion commander keeps the guns "in his pocket." In this case the battery or section commander moves with the battalion commander: the guns making suitable bounds in rear of Battalion Headquarters.

(*b*) The battalion commander details a section to move in close support of a leading company. If he is lucky enough to have another section he keeps that "in his pocket."

The first method has several points in its favour : the guns are not unduly exposed : the questions of crest clearance, ammunition supply and control are less difficult than in the second. Above all the battery or section commander from his central position with the battalion commander is in touch with the situation and is able to cover the front of the whole battalion.

The second method is tactically unsound for artillery. The guns often have to cross open ground within close range of enemy machine gun and artillery fire and sometimes become involved in the infantry fight. In all probability ammunition is exhausted owing to the difficulty of supply in a forward area and the section commander loses touch with the situation on either flank. If the artillery has been allotted for anti-tank purposes then the latter method is advisable as it is difficult for guns to knock them out except by direct fire, but it

cannot be regarded as the normal method of employing close support artillery owing to its many tactical disadvantages.

The first method has one great drawback: communication is slow and some links in the chain of communication are weak. Should a company commander wish to send a call for support to Battalion Headquarters he can send the message by visual (Morse flag or shutter) but even with the assistance of the battalion code the message is rather long. In all probability, owing to dust and smoke, company headquarters are not in direct communication with the battalion advanced signal centre or with Battalion Headquarters and some time elapses before the company signallers can even get in touch with either station. Then if the message is taken by a connecting link, such as the battalion advanced signal centre, much time is wasted in receiving and sending on the message to Battalion Headquarters. It must also be remembered that these battalion stations may be busy sending and receiving other messages. There is not much doubt that company commander commonly find it quicker to send the message using their second means of communication—by runner.

Both methods are slow and unreliable. The runner may be knocked out, the company commander cannot dispense with both runners; visual communication will probably break down as, generally, connecting links are not arranged between company headquarters and battalion advanced signal centre and from the latter to Battalion Headquarters. In peace time we manage to scrape along somehow or other, as visibility is usually good. The bulk of artillery is in Brigade and Divisional control and covers the movement of infantry by a series of concentrations according to a time table, or with a barrage. Naturally, much time is spent in training on these principles, while close support being regarded as of less importance has little attention paid to it. The fact that battles seldom start with a deliberate attack is forgotten. The enemy has to be encountered first and if he can be kept on the run by quick and effective close support so much the better. In addition, at some stage of every battle decentralisation of guns becomes necessary. Without it continuous support would be impossible. If infantry cannot communicate its needs quickly to close support artillery, how will it be able to do so to decentralised batteries?

Aeroplanes supply valuable information to artillery, but when troops are in close contact it cannot be accepted as reliable until confirm-

ed by ground reports. In war when two opposing armies have joined in battle only the foremost troops can tell the position of the enemy with any accuracy; aeroplanes cannot distinguish friend from foe. Quick ground reports appear to be the only solution: a short message in code passed if necessary through connecting links by a recognised system through the army. This code message should be the first means of getting the guns on to the target, being confirmed later by a written order in case of a breakdown.

Below are given two suggested methods of sending a call for support from the company commander to Battalion Headquarters. A call for the support of machine guns may be sent by the same system. Red and yellow semaphore flags (one foot square) are used for sending the message and part of the semaphore alphabet is adopted. Each company commander of forward companies has with his headquarters two runners and two signallers who are all trained in this system. A further pair, either reserve signallers or selected soldiers, work as a connecting link between company headquarters and battalion advanced signal centre.

Suggested Codes.

Directly a company commander has decided that he requires artillery or machine gun support and has selected the target, he orders one or his runers to send through the support call:—

Diagram 1.



(*a*) For artillery support the semaphore flags are waved two or three times in line with the shoulders to above the head. (See diagram 1).

Diagram 2.

(*b*) For machine gun covering fire the flags are waved below the shoulders. (See diagram 2.

The target is described by either of the following methods :—

(*a*) By map reference using the semaphore system. For instance the co-ordinates are 713452 : the signal for this is GACDEB.

(*b*) From a previously selected reference point. For this the oriented clock code and semaphore system are used. For example, the target is at eleven o'clock and eight hundred yards from the reference point. The message in sempahore is R. P.K. H. (Note the first twelve letters of the alphabet A to L including J represent the numbers one to twelve).

Employing either of the above methods the message can travel from link to link in under twenty seconds or roughly six hundred yards in half a minute with good visibility, and three hundred yards with poor visibility. The same code may be used with the helio, lamp, shutter or Morse flag. The message will not be so distinctive and will take longer to send in Morse, but with good visibility connecting links will not be necessary. For instance, the same message by helio would be OBS RP KH. All calls for support should be repeated after an interval of a couple of minutes to ensure accuracy.

It will be noticed that no mention is made of the altitude of the target to give the gunners their angle of sight. The reasons for the omission are :—

(*a*) In war the Forward Observing Officer, battalion or battery commanders are seldom in direct visual communication with the company commander concerned. It is therefore useless to send "Up fifty" "Down hundred," etc.

(*b*) Artillery officers will probably obtain this information more accurately from the map than from forward troops.

The allotting of reference points needs consideration. It is suggested that in mobile warfare the F. O. O. moving with battalion advanced signal centre should be responsible for this. Immediately troops become engaged he selects a reference point and enters it on flimsies. Copies of the flimsy are sent to each leading company commander and one copy to Battalion Headquarters. The reference point should be approximately one thousand yards in front of the leading troops and near the battalion dividing line. In a deliberate attack the battalion and battery commanders in conjunction would select the reference point.

The message by semaphore is confirmed in the following manner :—

Before the start of any operation company commanders prepare flimsies by entering on them all necessary details, *i.e.*, grid numbers, the selected reference point and date, etc. After sending through the first call for support the company commander enters on the flimsy :— (*a*) a line marked in red with hachures denoting the position of our foremost troops ; (*b*) a cross marked T for the target stating its nature; (*c*) a line from T to R. P. with the clock and distance marked on the line. (See diagram 3).

Diagram 3.



The flimsy is given to a company runner who takes it to the connecting pair of signallers. The latter are in close touch with a mounted orderly provided by the battery. The message is handed to the mounted orderly who rides with it to the F. O. O. or Battalion Headquarters according to his orders.

For the observation of fire two letters only are sent through by the company commander or F. O. O. A letter for the clock and one for the range. For instance a shell falling at eight o'clock and

four hundred yards from the target would be reported H. D." (Note that the clock is always given before the range). A direct hit is signalled "O. K." and "stop firing" by waving a flag in a complete circle.

That is the broad outline of the suggested method of calling for support. Many small details regarding the working of the system are omitted for the sake of brevity, but these should present no difficulty. For example, the attachment of a couple of men of the intelligence section to leading platoons would be of great assistance to platoon and company commanders. A company commander would then only have to check and sign the flimsy prepared by one of these men and forwarded by a platoon commander before despatching it to the mounted orderly.

The visual method of communication may be adapted for signalling between piquets and guns or machine guns in mountain warfare. Communication should be direct, for the only practicable method of selecting a reference point is for the signaller himself to be the reference point. Other methods are likely to cause confusion. Map references too are difficult to give in mountainous country, so there appears to be no alternative to the direct method. The chief difficulty will be to attract the attention of battery observation points and machine gun sections by the "support call," but it is suggested that the large artillery piquet screen be employed to do this with, if necessary. The message itself would be simple, consisting of two letters only: the first for the clock and the second for the range (using the oriented clock code system). Should trained signallers be available then the two letters preceded by O.B.S. may be sent through in Morse.

Some objections may be lodged against these methods of communication. For instance, it entails the use of a new code, but it should be remembered that all ranks are instructed in sempaphore and that the knowledge of only fifteen letters of the alphabet is necessary—R. P. for "reference point"—O for "O K" and the numeral O and A to L including J for the clock and distance up to twelve hundred yards. These letters are sufficient to send any map reference. Our present system requires specialists whereas the suggested method can be learnt in a day by a man of ordinary intelligence. It may be contended that there is not always sufficient cover for sempahore signalling, but a

company commander may overcome this by dropping one of his trained signallers with the connecting link. The message would then be sent by shutter for the first stage, being sent on in semaphore by the connecting link.

A possible objection by artillery officers may be that they cannot spare mounted orderlies to work behind company commanders. There is little doubt that the weakest link in the chain of communication is in forward areas and if artillery is to help in *liaison* that is where its assistance is required. It is stated in Artillery Training, Vol. III, Section 8 (5). "The responsibility for establishing *liaison* between two parties must be shared by both."

Every year many infantry officers are attached to artillery, and *vice versa*, to facilitate co-operation between the arms. Practically every company commander is capable of directing the fire of a battery on to any given target. It is suggested that little benefit will be obtained from these attachments until a company commander, under war conditions, can communicate his needs more rapidly to the guns.

SOME THOUGHTS ON BURMA.

By

Captain A. G. Fuller, Indian Army.

In political matters the talk which precedes action is generally considerable and often justified, either by the vastness of the problem or the seriousness of its import. Discussion clears the air. The settlement of the Indian problem has proved no exception to this, and in the meantime the people of Burma are left to wonder. The separation of Burma from India has been recommended by the Simon Commission in a report which has been eulogised as the greatest contribution to political science for many years.

The British Government is reported to have expressed its approval, and in the meantime the Burmans live on in patient expectation of the consummation of their hopes, while the Indian politician looks around for further arguments against them.

While the political side of Burma's future may thus be left, speculation may be made as to likely changes in the forces now responsible for her external defence and internal security. In this matter there are certain avenues of approach which all must tread. The Simon report dismisses the external defence of Burma in two lines. It says "The land frontier of Burma on the East is so difficult that it seems scarcely possible for any large body of men to cross it." The same can of course be said with equal truth of the North, North-Eastern and North-Western frontiers. No one will cavil at this statement, but it is as well to mention that there is quite a well-organized power on the Eastern frontier, with the largest air force in Asia, while in Burma there are no air forces at all. So long, however, as Burma remains inside the Empire the prospects of hostilities with Siam need not be seriously considered. History does however supply us with instances of conflict before the British connection, which are worth remembering.

Responsibility for external defence is bound to rest for sometime to come on Imperial forces, and presumably assistance will always, in the first instance, be available from India, as it now is, any views to the contrary notwithstanding.

The question which remains is that of internal security. This is at present provided by the Civil police, Military police and, in the last resort, regular troops. The military police has a dual rôle. In the first place it is essentially a civil body, and as such forms a reserve to the civil police force. In the second it has a military organisation, is officered by regular officers of the Indian Army, and guards the frontiers. The diversity of these duties, the distances which prevail in a very undeveloped country, and the strategic points which facilitate the approach and attract the invader, indicate and determine its distribution. The nature of its likely employment therefore calls for a good deal of dispersion.

Let it be accepted that, all things considered, this force of forty officers and ten thousand men is the most economical way of meeting the two contingencies. Its personnel is recruited from Gurkhas, Indians (mainly Punjabi Mussalmans) with some Karens, Kachins and Chins who are indigenous to the country. It is also important to note here that Burmans have not, as yet, any appreciable representation in the force, but this is not due entirely to their supposed unsuitability for military service.

The information given in the Simon Report as to the composition of the military forces in Burma is inaccurate. This would be a bold statement to make were it not for the fact that it can be readily verified. The report says :—

"Apart from this semi-military force (*i.e.*, the Burma Military Police), mainly recruited from the martial races of India, and from the non-Burman inhabitants of the Hill tracts, there are normally stationed in Burma only two Infantry battalions and two companies of Sappers and Miners.....

That, but for the existence of a powerful army in India, Burma, would require more troops for its own security there can be little doubt. The troops stationed in Burma are moreover British and Indian troops."

The garrison of the Province is as follows :—

1. *At Maymyo. District Headquarters.*

1 Indian Mountain Battery.
1 British Infantry Battalion.
1 Indian Infantry Battalion.
1 Indian Infantry Training Battalion.
Supply Depot, etc.

2. *At Mingaladon. Headquarters, Rangoon Brigade Area.*

1 British Infantry Battalion.
1 Indian Infantry Battalion.
Supply Depot.
Ordnance personnel.

3. *At Mandalay.*

1 Field Company Sappers & Miners.
1 Indian Infantry Battalion.
1 Indian Pioneer Battalion.
Supply Depot.

2 and 3 comprise the Rangoon Brigade Area. The troops at Mingaladon supply detachments at Rangoon (two companies) and at Port Blair in the Andamans, one company.

The question which remains to be considered is whether this force is sufficient for the internal security of the province.

In area the country is larger than France and has a population of thirteen millions. Of this number ninetyone per cent. are indigenous, while ten out of every thirteen are Burmans proper, with the high literacy percentage of fifty one per cent. for males and eleven per cent. for females, a much higher performance than India. Class antagonism is notably absent and Burma is remarkably uniform in race, language and religion. "To those whose experience has lain in other parts of India it is the homogeneity of Burma which is the most striking characteristic. The Burman, being a Buddhist, recognises none of the social divisions of caste and custom erected by Brahminism." (Simon Report, Vol. I page 79): These are outstanding facts which must receive the fullest consideration in any discussion on the internal security of Burma. To study the question in the right perspective it will be advisable to retrace our steps a few years to get a comparative view of events.

Ten years ago Burma was a peaceful country. Political agitation was practically unknown. There was no field for extremists, and the few disturbances, or "rebellions", which did occur were due to the interference of pseudo-priests in politics, an interference not countenanced by the Buddhist religion; and the misguided efforts of a few disgruntled Burmans to claim Theebaw's throne. Such movements are not unknown in other countries where the monarch has been deposed.

Later, in 1925, there was a serious no-tax campaign in Tharrawaddy, the scene of the recent "rebellion", which was put down with some difficulty, and necessitated the intervention of the military police. The tax complained of on this occasion, the Thathameda or capitation tax, is not a British invention, and was one of the more peaceful means employed by Burmese kings to raise money. It has always been unpopular, and there is no reason to believe that it will not be heard of again. Up to this point agitation in any serious form, with this one exception has been negligible, and so continued until last year, when the bubble burst. Immediately prior to the first outbreak of rioting in Rangoon there was no indication of trouble whatever. It was the direct result of a labour dispute, pure and simple, accentuated no doubt by racial feeling between the Burman and Indian labourer. But it is equally certain that towards the end of the upheaval there were signs that the Indian agitator was present, and had it not have been for the presence of the troops, which brought about the collapse of the rioting, the strife would have assumed a political and more widespread nature. It is necessary to understand all this, and to appreciate the one fact which emerges, that udtil Burma is entrusted with the management of her own affairs the slightest disturbance, no matter what the cause, will afford an opportunity for poisonous propaganda directed, in the main, against the British. Burmans are as incredulous as Indians, and a widespread agitation would place on the existing forces of law and order an impossible task, and one which they would be quite inadequate to undertake. When Upper Burma was annexed in 1885 the fact was hailed with jubilation, but it took three years to pacify the country at an enormous cost in life and treasure. The "subaltern's war" may occur again, for the communications in the country are little better than they were then, and the great jungles are still capable of hiding the most ubiquitous of raiders, and of furnishing an arena for the perpetration of heinous crimes, as recent events have shewn.

With a separated Burma we may be fairly certain that she will be capable of controlling the activities of those whose outiook does not coincide with her own, and that she will have the good sense to tread the path of peace and progress. It seems a reasonable belief that after separation other methods of agitation may be expected, and this must not be lost sight of in any review of internal security needs.

As will be seen from the figures given, the size of the present garrison is small when compared with the area of the country and the size of the population. This is due to lack of money, and a wider margin of security would no doubt afford greater peace of mind to those responsible for tranquility, which is so necessary for expansion and orderly development. Let us take it for granted that the present garrison will have to suffice, since Burma will require all her new resources to further the great plans for development which must, even now, be taking shape in the minds of her administrators. But let us hope that if it is found possible to increase the military budget, that the increase will be spent on the provision of more British troops. This opinion is put forward because of the military aspirations of the Burmans themselves. At present there are no Burmans in the army, a significant fact when it is remembered that ninety per cent. of the population is Burman.

Neither can it be argued that the military qualities of the Burman are similar to those of the Bengali, who, as we know, has no military traits whatever. If it were so the answer would be easy. It is necessary to again refer to the Simon report for the official reason. In Vol. I, page 80 it is stated " The strict economy enforced of late in the Indian Military budget has left the Indian Government unwilling to continue the experiments which have from time to time been made with the recruiting of Burmans. Burmans are less amenable than the martial races of India to military discipline, and Burman units are consequently at present more expensive and less efficient than Indian units.....But Burman public opinion earnestly desires these experiments to continue and were Burma responsible for her own military budget, would certainly aim at their continuance."

That Burma does aim at the continuance of these experiments there can be not the slightest doubt, although it must be said that those most loud in their demand for a " Burmese army," and who extol the Burman as the most desirable and suitable material for military requirements, need not be regarded as possessing expert knowledge on the question, for they are, in the main, politicians unacquainted with the needs of the army. Those who know the Burman as a soldier will, I believe, have no difficulty in subscribing to the views of the Commission. But such a statement does little justice to the man and ignores the difficulties and prejudices which those responsible for raising the first Burmese units had to overcome. That they

apparently did not overcome them was no fault of their own. If the old units are to be resuscitated these experiences should serve as a guiding star, not only to the individuals on whom the special burden will fall, but to the authorities who will direct and lay down the policy for the process. There are sufficient officers in Burma, with a knowledge of the Burman, to know what is required. Hybrid organizations, where civil officers direct in one sphere and military officers in another are a failure.

The civil officer will have his special part to play. He can assist recruitment in the districts enormously by his advice and propaganda, and especially in the verification of character and ruthless pursuit of the deserter. These were two great blots on the old system, which doomed it to failure.

There will be no dearth of applicants for admission, but there must be the most critical discrimination in their selection. It is notorious that a vast number of recruits for the army in the war years were unsuitable in every way. This, in the judgment of many, was the reason for the death from inanition which the units suffered.

The army was made the dumping ground for the undesirables of the villages. The headmen were glad of the opportunity to rid themselves of many a pest, and no better means had offered itself for many years. Criminals were there by the score, who made the enforcement of discipline a heartbreaking job, and, in addition, contaminated those decent Burmans who, for patriotic reasons had enter the service. Moreover, the Burman was well served when he wished to rid himself of an irksome service, for it was only on rare occasions that deserters were apprehended, and their number ran into hundreds. None but the best will do for any new units, and if success is to follow they must be secured. It will be a slower process, but will provide a sound and sure foundation on which smart and efficient Burmese units can be built. The critic of this will naturally point his finger to a further remark of the Commission which reads, "It has been found difficult to recruit Burmans even for the Military police." If this is so, how can the army hope to succeed? The answer is that police service is not attractive compared with the army, and that the pay and conditions of service are far less beneficial. This should not be taken to imply that the present army pay satisfies the Burman, for it never did. The standard of living in Burma is higher than in India.

In Vol. I, page 79 of the Simon Report can be read "Extremes whether of wealth or of poverty are far less marked than in any other province, and the average standard of living is decidedly higher in Burma than in India." This is another point to be remembered.

The argument as to desirability of including Burmans in a future "Burma Defence Force" has been considered in some detail, because it indicates difficulties which need to be faced during the transition period, when Indian units will have left Burma, and only units raised from indigenous races will remain with the two British battalions. Clearly a weakness will result, which will not disappear until the new units raised to replace them are as efficient as those they replace. This will take some years. This strengthens the argument for an increase in British troops, and even when Burma has her own efficient defence force, there will be a need for something besides units of indigenous troops to maintain order and sustain public confidence. Those gaps which will occur in the garrison when the Indian units leave, for they presumably will leave Burma if she is to be taught to shoulder her responsibilities, should be sufficient to satisfy the demands of the most vocal Burmese advocate. Political expediency and a growing sense of Nationalism, which has received a great filip with the growing importance of separation from India, will demand liberal treatment for Burmans in the army, especially as Burma must "foot the bill."

The likelihood of a separate military force for Burma has caused some speculation in the minds of British officers of the Indian Army, now serving with units raised in Burma, as to their own future.

Will officers be seconded from the Indian Army? Will there be a separate officer cadre for Burma, or will officers be seconded for five years as is done in some regiments in Africa. This latter idea seems to be popular in some quarters. But it appears to be a fatal proposition, not only for existing units, but for any new ones to be raised. Units raised in Burma have especial difficulties, which are now appreciated, and chief among them is the language. There are many tongues and many differences among the men, and no *lingua franca* as yet, although Burmese is likely to emerge as such. Under the new conditions which will prevail it will be more necessary than ever that officers should know their men intimately.

This entails not only a close study of their psychology, but a knowledge of at least two dialects, and these dialects are not easy.

This cannot be done in five years. Even if it could, as soon as an officer is settled and is becoming useful his tour of duty would be over. Prolonged, personal touch must be maintained at all costs, and this can be obtained without any dislocation by letting things remain as they are. Officers can still remain on the general list of the Indian army for service in Burma, where they can equally well qualify for command of Indian units as they do now. The balance is easily maintained by posting younger officers from India. If this is not done, under existing time scales for promotion there will be no prospects of advancement for anyone, and we shall be back again to the "bearded subalterns" of John Company's army, with all the attendant evils!

MORE MUSINGS ABOUT ADMINISTRATION *Versus* TRAINING.

By

Major C. W. Sanders, 1st Punjab Regiment.

There is an increasing tendency for those interested in their military profession to grumble at the ever-increasing amount of office work and the resultant lack of time for training. How are we to study and keep our men and ourselves abreast of the times if we have to spend most of our hours and mental energy in administration? This is the prevalent complaint and there have been from time to time various proposals submitted for improvement.

The object of this short paper is to review briefly the state of affairs to see if they are as bad as they are painted. It may be confessed at once that the conclusions are, shall we say, retrograde and the writer is prepared for the weight of public opinion to descend on his head; but this will probably be considered either thick enough to withstand the blow or empty enough for no great damage to result.

Let us first consider the case of administration. Admittedly in staff offices the flood of paper may well cause thinking people to consider the investment of their money in soft wood syndicates. But this article is written from the point of view of a regimental officer in an Indian Infantry Active Battalion.

The contention is that the company commander cannot get out and train his men owing to his time being taken up with administration, and Captain Bower, in a recent article in this journal, submitted a proposal for centralizing all the administration of a unit under a junior officer, the Quartermaster, so as to free company commanders. While most emphatically agreeing that office work should be reduced to the necessary minimum and that the crime of making paper is one for which the only punishment should be death, the writer wishes to remind officers that a successful commander must have considerable administrative ability. It must be remembered that the higher the command the more general administrative responsibility there is, often including, in the case of a commander of an army in war, the problems of the civil administration of the theatre of operations, and that at a time when all his energies should be directed towards planning the defeat

of the enemy. Is it therefore wise or good training for war or for high command to relieve company commanders from all administrative duties? Admittedly Captain Bower agrees that they should still check their mens' receipt of pay, etc. but will they, or can they, do this satisfactorily if they are not responsible for their company books and accounts? The answer is a definite negative. Furthermore, at what stage in his regimental career will an officer start learning administration? To follow the proposal to a logical conclusion, an officer may suddenly find himself in command of a battalion, where he is responsible for everything, with no experience of administrative details or accounts. If the Quartermaster be a permanent officer, an excellent suggestion with safeguards, it means that still less will other officers in the unit have opportunity for learning this part of their profession.

To deal with the complaint that administration is so heavy these days that insufficient time is available for training.

Let us be honest with ourselves. How many company commanders in an efficiently administered unit, with a practical commanding officer, have to stay in office more than an average maximum of two hours a day, with considerably less when on field training? There is a limit to the amount of hours of useful instruction which can be allotted for the training of the sepoy, especially in individual training. What then would company commanders do during the remainder of the working day if they did not have to attend to the administration of their companies? There is a limit to the amount of tactical exercises without troops and private study which can be effectively undertaken in any given period. Furthermore it is again stressed that, unless an officer is prepared to spend time and thought on the welfare of his men, he is only doing half his duty. It is submitted that, now that we have more or less cleared up the arrears of office work due to the war and to post-war reorganization, the paper in a unit is very little, if any, more than it was prior to 1914. If, in addition, it is realized that there are now no recruits, except the odd band boy or bugler, that the annual weapon training courses have been reduced to a most practical minimum and that increased responsibilities have been given to Indian officers, including the command and administration of companies, there seems little justification for the complaint that there is less time for training now than before. Admittedly there are more weapons to

be taught, that the soldier now goes to school and that there is an all-round increase in the standard which is expected of him, yet all these are training and not office problems ; they are full of interest and to fit all these subjects into the training year requires much thought and careful organization. Do we organize our time for training economically ? It has been stated above that the sepoy can only stand a limited number of useful hours a day of individual instruction, so that, it is submitted, his programme can be completed without difficulty, although the generous leave and furlough terms do not leave all the time required to hammer out some of the details of field work to the full extent one would wish.

On the other hand, are we training the sepoy on the right lines as regards field work and so as to make the best use of the time available ? Here again the answer is considered to be " no." In a recent article by a keen student of human nature the writer wished to simplify command in the Indian Army in the field by the use of such inspiring orders as " chalo bai, " or as the British N. C. O. would translate it " ere, get a move on you perishers." The result anyhow is the same, a clear well-expressed order about the intention of which there can be no doubt and one that appeals to the mentality of the recipient. He is right. So muddled is the poor sepoy becoming with all the instructions now received, especially in field work, that, whereas in the old days, if you told him to go and take an objective, he would unhesitatingly do so. Now when he hears the first round of enemy blank fire, he usually lies down and wonders, all of him from platoon commander downwards, what the devil he must do to please the sahib, thereby doing the one thing calculated to destroy his peace of mind for the rest of time. This seems to be somewhat of a digression, but, before wanting more time, let us check our methods and go up and look at the wood for a bit instead of dodging about amongst the trees.

Are we obeying our manuals and concentrating chiefly on making the soldier a good man at arms, filled with the offensive spirit, disciplined, fit and cheerful, able to march and undergo hardship and to show practical initiative ? If not, what are the remedies and how can we make better use of the twenty four hours, daily granted for work and other things ? The answer, it is submitted, is that the teaching of the soldier as regards field work can be simplified by concentrating on boldness, a vigorous offensive when required and good use of

ground. We know that the man will fight well when the time comes and he has forgotten to think what is required of him, so let us encourage simplicity.

On the other hand the training of the leader who plans and initiates the operation requires all the time and energy available, though each exercise or discussion wants careful limitation as to time and the lessons to be brought out. But it is held that a great deal of extra time can be made available if we really devolve more responsibility on the N. C. O. instructor for the teaching of individual work. It should be recognized that during individual instruction of the men officers could go away two or three days a week to prepare programmes, carry out tactical exercises without troops and discuss problems on the sand model or in the Mess or Indian Officers' club instead of feeling they should stand about on parade, probably in little bunches discussing their next shoot. It is easier and more efficacious to come on parade, say, three days a week fresh and with an observant eye for faults, either on the part of the instructor or the man than to keep up to the mark when on parade all the time every day. In the first case, like the spectator, you see more of the game, in the second, unless exceptional, you are apt to become stale and unobservant. Naturally each case must be treated on its merits and there are times when the continuous presence of the officer is necessary, but the object of this brief paper is to try and encourage a broader vision and to submit for discussion that there are many possibilities for the reorganization of our working hours. The writer is only too well aware that the ideas given above are not new and that some have been adopted in certain units, but he does consider that there is room for improvement as a whole.

To sum up. The paper situation in a unit is not so alarming as is often made out. There is certainly room for much improvement, especially in connection with the methods of the audit branch and by giving commanding officers more powers, but these questions are not within the scope of this paper. But the amount of administration devolving on company commanders should not, to any great extent, limit training if the time for this all-important branch of his work be more practically arranged and more trust be placed on subordinates. Further, administrative responsibility is essential for all commanders if they wish to insure the comfort, health and contentment of their

men and are to train themselves for higher command. If thought, method and commonsense be brought to bear on current problems and in the preparation of programmes, there should be time to teach the man and to encourage the leader to develop his powers of command, while, at the same time, enabling every one to play games, shoot and take the leave which is so essential to the well-being of all ranks.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

Military Widows' Fund, Indian Army.

Sir,

In an editorial note in the July issue of the journal you invite discussion regarding a Military Widows Fund, Indian Army. This is a subject in which I am interested, particularly now that there is such a fund, *viz.*, "Indian Army and Royal Indian Marine Officers Provident Fund" *vide* "Extract from the Gazette of India" Army Department No. 163 dated 21st March 1931. Having read carefully through the rules of this fund it struck me that there were certain points on which more information was required. A letter was therefore sent officially to the Controller Military Accounts, Presidency and Assam District asking certain questions, and a short time ago his answer was received. As there may be several other readers who like me are interested in this fund I append below certain of these questions and answers.

Q. 1.—Reference, Para (4). Is it permissible, for an officer who wishes to become a subscriber, to pay in a lump sum on joining ? If so, what is the limit of the amount.

A. 1. Para. 4 does not apparently make any provision for the lump sum payment.

Q. 2. Reference, Para. (4) (*iii*) (*iv*). An officer fixes the amount which he wishes to subscribe monthly. Must the original sum fixed be contributed the whole time he is in that rank or may he vary the amount periodically to suit his wishes, *e.g.*, a captain subscribes for one year at Rs. 60/-, later goes on furlough and wishes to reduce to to Rs. 40/- and after four months furlough he wishes to reduce to Rs. 20/- Is this allowed ?

A. 2. It is held that these Rules on the General Provident Fund will apply *Mutatis Mutandis* to the Indian Army Fund as well.

Q. 3. Reference, Para. 6 (*i*) What is the current rate of interest ?

A. 3. The rate of interest on subscriptions for the current financial year is five per cent.

Q. 4. Reference, Para. 6 (vi) Is it possible to give a rate of interest below which it can be guaranteed the current rate of interest will not fall ? Unless something on these lines can be given it would seem to me that though the scheme can be called attractive in many ways, it will not induce a large number of voluntary subscribers to join.

A. 4. The question seems premature. The fund has hardly been in operation for three months and it will serve no useful purpose by attempting to answer it now.

Q. 5.—Reference, Para. 9 (vii). One of the most attractive features of the scheme from the point of view of a married man is that a lump sum will be available for his family. Such a lump sum though is often required by the said family without delay. Can it be guaranteed that the family will be paid the sum standing at the deceased's account in the shortest possible time after the notification of death ? For example, say within fifteen or twenty days at the most.

A. 5. The points may involve legal and technical difficulties and each case will have to be decided on its merits.

There are certain factors which influence any prospective "investor" of money which should be always considered and as regards investing in this provident fund it seems to me that some of the more important questions are as follows :—

(*a*) If death occurs then will the widow receive her dues quickly say, within two or three weeks ? As seen above this is not guaranteed.

(*b*) As an investment, is the investor getting an adequate rate of interest on his money ? At the moment yes, but if the rate fell to one or two per cent then I should say no.

(*c*) Is rebate of income tax allowed on these subscriptions ?

The rules do not say, and this did not occur to me when the letter was sent to the Controller of Military Accounts raising the other queries.

Then there is the question of the lump sum subscription. Would it not be of advantage to the Fund itself, as well as to the individual if the latter was allowed to contribute a lump sum to the fund on joining. This would I think appeal to officers of say fifteen years service or over. I cannot see any disadvantage to this plan.

If agreed to I suggest that conditions attached to this subscription should be as follows:—

(*a*) One payment only would be allowed.

(*b*) It should be paid on becoming a subscriber.

(*c*) The amount which could be subscribed would be limited according to the number of years of service of the subscriber, *e. g.*, Rs. 100/- or Rs. 50/- for each year of service.

(*d*) Any amount up to the total amount authorised under para. (*c*) would be accepted.

As the scheme stands at present I personally am no longer interested as I consider I can get more certain if not better terms privately; but should the doubtful points mentioned above be definitely cleared up then I should have no hesitation in becoming a monthly subscriber.

Yours faithfully,
E. R. S. DODS, CAPTAIN,
2/4th Bombay Grenadiers (*K. E. O.*)

SPORTS.

Sir,

As I feel that many of your readers must be interested in the preservation of sport, I wonder if you would allow me to draw their attention to the British Field Sports Society and its work.

Founded at the end of 1930 under the presidency of the Duke of Beaufort it already has a membership of close on 4,000 and its influence in the sporting world is making itself felt. This is not to be wondered at as it is supported officially by such bodies as the Masters of Foxhounds Association, Master of Otter Hounds Association, Association of Masters of Harriers and Beagles, the National Coursing Club, the Field Trial Council and many others.

Its principal object is to counteract the growing volume of anti-sport propaganda in the press and elsewhere, organised by societies who have as their objective the abolition of all Field Sports. That this propaganda was having a disastrous effect on uninformed public opinion in the large industrial areas there is no manner of doubt, but this is now being more than countered by the British Field Sports Society.

It is impossible in the short space of a letter to give more than a brief outline of our work. In addition to that mentioned above, we hope to help sport in many ways—such as veterinary research, game rearing and the preservation of fish, whilst it is proposed to form as soon as possible an Information Bureau for the use of members, through which it will be possible to obtain particulars of sporting quarters, stabling, fishing, etc., procurable throughout the country, which should be particularly useful to overseas members.

The subscription has been placed as low as one shilling so that it will be possible for sportsmen to join, whatever the depth of their pockets, but larger sums are very welcome as there is a lot of work to be done and the opponents of sport have enormous funds at their disposal. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that that influential body, the R. S. P. C. A. has a Bill before Parliament intended to put an end to Stag hunting, and should this pass there is little doubt that it will be the thin end of a wedge designed to destroy sport in the United Kingdom.

In conclusion may I be allowed to say that all subscriptions will be very gratefully received at this address, however small, and that I shall be very glad to give any further information on the Society and its work which correspondents may desire.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
J. W. FITZWILLIAM,
(*Secretary, British Field Sports Society,*
St. Stephen's House, Westminster,
S. W. I.).

THE BATTLE OF CORYGAUM.

Sir,

1. Is the spelling of 'Koregaon,' as used in the article which appears in No. 263 of the Journal of the U.S.I. India,* necessary, or even desirable?

2. "Corygaum, 1st January, 1818" as a battle-honour was borne by the Madras Artillery of the Hon. East India Company's service; and is to-day borne by The Poona Horse (17th Queen Victoria's Own Cavalry); and by the 4th Bombay Grenadiers, in virtue of its 2nd battalion being the present day representative of the 2nd

*Vol. LXI. April, 1931. No. 263, pp. 221-3.

Battalion, 1st Regiment of Bombay Native Infantry, in 1818. It was in consequence of 'Corygaum' that the title 'Grenadier' was conferred upon this battalion.

3. As this 'affair' has hitherto been known and officially recognized as The Battle of 'Corygaum,' it seems a pity to introduce a new spelling of the place-name, which can only add to the difficulty of remembrance, and cause confusion.

4. Lieutenant Pattison, who is mentioned in the article, should be Pattinson-Thomas George. He was dangerously wounded, and died on 4th January, 1818.

5. The artillery of the force consisted of two 6—pounder guns, manned by a detachment of the Madras Artillery, under the command of Lieutenant William Chisholm who was killed.

6. A pamphlet of 32 pages, published in 1839, will be found in Vol. viii of *Madras Artillery Records*—"Correspondence"—entitled "Sketch of the Column at Corygaum, with a plan of the village, some letters, private and public, the General Orders, and the Dispatch from the Honorable Court of Directors, relating to the action on the 1st January, 1818." It was printed at Madras, by J. B. Pharoah.

7. Major P. J. Begbie's *History of the Madras Artillery*, published in 1853—vol. ii, pp. 42-5-describes the 'affair' in detail.

8. The India medal (Sky-blue ribbon), with clasp 'Corygaum,' was granted for this service—General Order (India) of 14th April, 1851.

9. The article by Colonel Kenyon states that "during recent years * * * * * the monument has been sadly neglected." But why?

10. The following extract from a General Order by The Honorable The Governor of Bombay, in Council, dated at Bombay Castle, 13th December, 1824, shows that land was assigned to pay a care-taker "for ever."

"The Hon. the Governor in Council is a pleased * * * * * to appoint Cundojee Mullojee, now a Havildar in the 1st Company of Invalids, but late of the 2nd Battn., 1st Regiment Native Intantry, and wounded at the Action of Corygaum, to the charge of this Pillar,

and to declare the trust to be hereditary in his Family for ever ; but, in case of the failure of any male Issue to the person enjoying the grant, it will rest with the Government to appoint a Successor. * * * *

"A Piece of Land adjacent to the Pillar, or an annual sum of Money, will be further assigned by Government for the future maintenance of the Persons in charge of this trust.

"By Order of the Honorable the Governor in Council."

(SIGNED) "W. NEWNHAM, CHIEF SECRETARY."

11. Has the "piece of land," or the "annual sum of money," mentioned in the Order, also "been sadly neglected" ?

12. From the *East India Calendar*, 3 vols., published in 1826, the following paragraph from vol. iii, page 461, gives further details about the founding of the monument—

"Extract of the account of the Ceremony of the laying of the first stone of the monument erected by order of the Bombay Government, to commemorate the victory of Corygaum.

BOMBAY, APRIL 7TH, 1821.

"The foundation stone of the monument, destined to perpetuate the defence of Corygaum, was laid by Colonel Huskison, on behalf of Major-General Smith, on Monday the 26th ult. This interesting ceremony took place at half past five in the evening, in presence of the chief civil and military authorities of the Deccan. The party assembled in an adjoining suite of tents, and marched in procession to the spot, where they were received under a general salute, by a detachment of artillery, two companies of grenadiers, from the 1st or Corygaum regiment, and the band of H. M's. 47th regiment.

"A brass plate with the following inscription :—

'This foundation stone was laid, Anno Domini 1821, the Most Noble the Marquess of Hastings, Governor-General of India, and the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay,' was then deposited in the foundation stone, with a few British coins, and a scroll of parchment, containing the names of the persons present at the ceremony. The Colonel then

ascertained with true masonic precision, the correctness of the level, when three vollies of musquetry, and a royal salute from the artillery, announced the termination of the ceremony."

2. Do the brass plate, the British coins, and the scroll of parchment still exist ?

Yours faithfully,
J. H. LESLIE, LIEUT.-COLONEL,
Editor of Journal, Society for Army Historical Research.

THE BATTLE OF CORYGAUM.

SIR,

With reference to the contribution, " The Battle of Koregaon " by Lieut.-Colonel H. E. Kenyon, R.A., in the April 1931 number of your Journal to which my attention has been drawn by past officers of the Regiment, I, as Honorary Colonel, send you the following which may be of interest to your readers.

At the end of his article Lieut.-Colonel Kenyon says, " of recent years this gallant action had been almost forgotten and the monument had been sadly neglected." The battalion concerned in the battle of Corygaum is now called the 2/4th K. E. O. Bombay Grenadiers. The title ' Grenadiers ' was given for its share in the battle. The irregular cavalry engaged became " The Poona Horse." The age-old custom of commemorating the battle on the 1st January—"Corygaum Day "—with a special and unique parade on which the colours are garlanded and trooped is still kept up.

On the 1st January 1928 the most striking addition to the old ceremonial was made. The sword of honour which was presented to Captain Staunton in commemoration of the battle by the East India Company was, and will always be, trooped with the colours. This sword was given to the battalion by Miss M. Cahill, a descendant of Captain Staunton, in 1926.

After the parade the rest of the day and night, as circumstances permit, are given up to entertainments such as sports, nautch, dance or dinner, etc.

The neglected state of the monument at Corygaum was brought to the notice of the military authorities and the Government of

Bombay a few years ago by Lieut-Colonel C. P. F. Warton, the then commandant. The reply received was to the effect that the work would be done, but that funds were not available.

Besides the 'Corygaum Sword' the battalion has Captain Staunton's medals including the Corygaum medal which was specially re-cast for us at Calcutta, as the original medal was not issued till sometime after Captain Staunton's death.

We have also a 'Coatee' worn at the battle and kept as an heirloom by the hereditary keeper of the monument who with his son handed it over to us for safe keeping at an annual memorial celebration. I trust these extra details may be of interest to those who study the past history of the Indian Army and show that 'this gallant action' has not been forgotten at any rate by the battalion concerned.

Yours truly,

S. M. EDWARDES.

MILITARY NOTES.

FRANCE.

Military Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for the Study of Treaties.

A decree was issued by the President of the Republic on 9th May, creating a military section for the study of treaties to be attached to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The section will comprise—

A general officer.

A colonel or lieutenant-colonel.

A subaltern officer.

Two permanent civil employees.

This personnel will be under the War Department for administrative purposes.

"Agents Militaires."

A bill was introduced in June, 1931, suspending recruiting for the *Agents Militaires*, an organization of civilians employed in mobilization centres and for routine duties in the army, for the purpose of freeing conscripts for training purposes. The bill was introduced for reasons of economy since many of the *Agents Militaires* are drawing army pensions in addition to their civilian pay. It is proposed that their duties shall be performed by permanent staff non-commissioned officers and men who will continue in the service until the age of 60 or 65.

Mobilization.

A bill was introduced in June, 1931, for the purpose of enabling the national defences to be manned speedily upon the outbreak of war. It is proposed to legalize the individual calling up of certain reservists on government initiative, to supplement the *Disponibles* classes (which correspond to our *Section A* of the Reserve) who are considered inadequate for this purpose.

Steps are also proposed to ensure that sufficient trained specialists are available for this preliminary mobilization.

INDO-CHINA.

French army manœuvres.

Manœuvres took place in Tonkin in January last. Practically the whole of the Northern Division took part.

Considerable political importance was attached to these manœuvres, to which many foreign missions were invited.

The following troops took part:—

Red—

Divisional Headquarters.
Divisional Artillery Headquarters.
9 battalions infantry.
3 groups artillery.
2 sections armoured cars (10 cars).
1 company engineers.
1 platoon cavalry.
2 flights air force.

Blue—

Brigade Headquarters.
5 battalions infantry.
1 group artillery.
Detachment engineers.
1 platoon cavalry.
1 flight air force.

ITALY.

EXPENDITURE ON TRAINING.

The Committee responsible for the compilation of the Annual Budget Report draw attention to the increased allotment of 22 million lire for training and put forward the following recommendations for the consideration of the Minister of War:—

(*a*) There should be more exercises without troops for the commanders and staffs of higher formations and the training of generals and senior officers should be increased.

(*b*) The scale on which large concentrations of artillery fire are practised should be increased so that commanders and staffs of higher formations and of artillery commands may be accustomed to the organization and application of fire power.

(*c*) A larger number of reserve officers should be called to the colours during the summer training period.

(*d*) Winter courses for reserve officers, of whom 7,000 attended in 1929 and 11,000 in 1930, should be made compulsory and steps should be taken to overcome difficulties raised by firms who employ reserve officers.

(*e*) Guards and "employments" of all kinds should be reduced as much as possible in order not to take men away from training.

As regards recalling personnel to the colours the Committee evidently desire to concentrate on reserve officers and specialists. The Minister of War however appears to have decided to recall only 2,500 to 3,000 reserve officers as in previous years and to utilize the additional funds in calling up for the first time a batch of 20,000 other rank reservists belonging to the Perugia and Chieti Divisions for a period of 20 days.

MOROCCO.

French Zone.

Railway Construction.

The section of the new railway from Oudja through Berguent to Bou-Arfa has been officially opened. This line is the first step towards the future Trans-Saharan Railway. It is intended to continue the railway through Bou Denib southwards round the Atlas Mountains linking up with the existing line at Marrakech.

Work is also proceeding actively on the section of the line from Oudja to Taza, which, when completed, will give communication by Railway from Tunis to Marrakech.

Spanish Zone.

Reorganization.

By a decree of 3rd June, 1931, the Provisional Government has ordered the separation of the functions of High Commissioner and

Commander-in-Chief of the military forces in Morocco; the High Commissioner will be a civilian. The decree divides the Protectorate into two military areas (*circunscripciones*) instead of four; the eastern includes Melilla and the Riff; the western, Ceuta-Tetuan and Larache.

Consequent changes in artillery commands and ancillary units are decreed, but it appears that these will only entail a small reduction in the strength of the Spanish Army in Morocco.

Appointments.

On the above reorganization, Senor Don Luciano Lopez Ferrer, for the last eight years Spanish Consul-General in Gibraltar, has been appointed High Commissioner, and General Don Miguel Cabanellas, the recently appointed Captain-General of Andalusia, has been transferred to Morocco as Commmander-in-Chief. General Don Jose Sanjurjo who has been temporarily filling the dual appointment of High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief has returned to Spain and resumed the active command of the Civil Guard.

Brigadier-General Don Leopoldo Garcia Boloix, the commander of the Riff military area, and Brigadier-General Don Gregorio Benito Terraza, the commander of the Ceuta-Tetuan military area, have been respectively appointed to command the new eastern and western military areas.

PORTUGAL.

Manifestations in honour of the Dictator and the Armed Forces.

The Minister of Marine and the expeditionary forces sent to Madeira to quell the recent insurrection there, returned to Lisbon on the 12th May, on board the "Carvalho Araujo" and the "Vasco de Gama" and were given an official and enthusiastic welcome.

Special honours were accorded to the Minister of Marine on the successful termination of the mission on which he had been sent. He was greeted on arrival by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and by a large gathering of officials and civilians.

The Expeditionary Force was warmly cheered on disembarking. The streets through which the troops marched were lined by naval and military units of all arms. The Expeditionary Force assemble in

the *Praca do Comercio*, which was beflagged for the occasion. From there they proceeded to the *Avenida da Liberdade*, where they marched past the President of the Republic, the members of the Government and other authorities.

On 17th May a series of ceremonies took place in honour of the President of the Republic, the expeditionary troops and the armed forces of the nation in general.

The principal ceremony consisted of a military parade in which, under the command of Brigadier-General Daniel de Sousa, units of all corps of the army and navy, numbering some 6,000, marched past General Carmona, who took the salute from a balcony of the palace of *Belem*.

During a speech made at a function arranged by the *Union Nacional*, the Prime Minister made the following statements:—

(1) The Military Dictatorship will only hand over its powers to a Government which, on the conclusion of the Dictatorship's transitory action will be freely established according to the future constitution, with the supremacy of the civil authority and the assurance of the regular functioning of the powers of the State.

(2) It will severely repress with arms any revolutionary attempts of whatsoever nature.

(3) It will be obliged to punish with all severity, for the good of the nation, anyone who, abusing the tolerance shown up to date, may provoke disturbances.

(4) The moment for the establishment of constitutional normality will depend upon the national and international situation of the Portuguese nation.

The Prime Minister and the Minister for War have carried out a long series of visits to the barracks of the various units of the Lisbon garrison.

During these visits the two ministers confirmed the Government's recent political statements and were promised the loyal support of the different units.

SPAIN.

Spanish Republic.

New national flag.

The new flag adopted by the Provisional Government for the Spanish National Colours is formed of three horizontal bands of equal width of red, yellow and dark purple, with the coat of arms in the centre.

The old Colours, of red and yellow, which have been in use for a century and a half, are being deposited in the various museums.

All units of the army, the *Guardia Civil* and the *Carabineros* will use the same flag. The possession of special Colours, which was formerly the privilege of certain corps, will no longer be permitted. All military forts and camps will use the same flag.

The promise of allegiance to the flag will in future be as follows :—

C.O. : " Promise to be faithful to the Nation, loyal to the Government and to obey, respect and not forsake your Commanders."

Recruit : " Yes, I promise."

C. O. : " The law will uphold you and the Nation reward you if you do so ; if you do not you will be punished."

At this ceremony the old custom of forming a cross with the C. O.'s sword and the Colours is to be discontinued.

REVIEWS.

U-BOAT STORIES. By Neureuther and Bergen.

(*Messrs Constable & Co., Ltd., London*, 1931). 10*s. net.*

The U-Boat campaign, the most ruthless and dangerous threat which the Germans employed against England, and which was responsible for more innocent deaths than even the invasion of Belgium, is an interesting study of the lengths to which a nation will go to preserve its existence. In essence it was a logical reply to the British blockade which was slowly starving Germany. Owing to the clever propaganda produced during the war the people of the British Isles looked with horror and a burning indignation at the inevitable cruelties which the wholesale sinking of British and neutral merchantmen involved. That U-Boat commanders were guilty of the greatest brutality and a cynical disregard for the exiguous decencies of war cannot be denied; neither can it be denied that this very savagery brought its own retribution in the shape of the United States of America. Germany disregarded the opinion of the world and was beaten in the end, both under the sea and on the land.

But if we accept the old adage that "all is fair in love and war" these U-Boat stories, written by submarine commanders and even engine-room artificers, will show us ourselves from the other fellow's point of view and the new angle of vision will do us no harm. The attitude of the Germans who volunteered for the hazardous duty in submarines is summarised in the preface written by the German seascape artist, Claus Bergen, who contributes the best story in the book: "Humanly speaking, the strongest impression that stayed with me was the spirit of fine and loyal comradeship, the iron bond that united officers and crew in the narrow space of the vessel, cut off, as they were, from home, far out upon an enemy-infested sea, completely self-dependent, beset by a hundred lurking perils and with death always before their eyes, offering their lives in chivalrous combat for the honour of their Fatherland. That could equally well have been written by Kipling for his "Land and Sea Tales."

Running through the whole book is this theme of loyal, perilus service of men who believed that every liner, cruiser or fishing smack sent to the sea bottom was another nail in England's coffin, and their jubilation at every success is only natural in the circumstances. That they were brave men with the dice often heavily loaded against them is proved in many of these ingenious narratives. Towards the end it is apparent that the anti-submarine measures evolved by the British Admiralty were having increasing effect and, as we know, they succeeded finally in reducing this, one of the deadliest attacks which the British Empire has ever had to face, to comparative harmlessness. The book has some excellent coloured plates, but in these days of financial stringency is too highly priced to be sought for by the general reader.

W. E. M.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS ARMAMENTS YEAR-BOOK 1930-1931.

(The League of Nations, Geneva, 1931).

The Year-Book has been in existence since 1924 and the current edition is therefore the seventh which has been published. During this period the book has been considerably extended in scope. It was originally published in order to implement the last paragraph of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League. This paragraph states that "Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes."

The present edition contains monographs on the Armed Forces and the budgetary expenditure on Armaments of sixty-two different nations, both members and non-members of the League. There are no important omissions. The information with regard to China has been expanded and there is a new monograph on Egypt.

Each monograph opens with a general heading giving figures with regard to the area, population, extent of railways and the length of the frontiers and seaboards of the country under reference. This is followed by a detailed description of the system of command, organization and administration of the various defence Services.

Details are given of the systems of recruitment and training and, in some cases, of civilian mobilization in the event of war. In the case of the Air Force the numbers of the various types of aeroplanes in commission are given, and in the naval sections there are full details of the war vessels extant and under construction.

In each case the monograph concludes with an analysis of the budgetary expenditure on armaments of the nation concerned.

In the latter part of the volume are included a series of tables relating to the principal products and raw materials of importance to national defence. Firstly, a series of tables are provided to show the sources of origin of the various products which vary from coal and iron ore to oats and sheep. Then follow statistics of the principal exports and imports of products and materials important to defence by the various nations.

The book concludes with two annexures. In the first will be found the texts of the principal treaties and international agreements dealing with the limitation of armaments and the demilitarisation of zones. The second annexure contains a recapitulation table showing the chief characteristics of the armies of the different nations, a table showing male populations and graphs to illustrate the rise and fall of the naval strengths of the various countries from 1913 to 1929.

All through the volume it has been the aim of the editors to present the information as far as possible on the same lines in the case of each country.

It will be seen therefore that the Year-book presents a very complete picture of the military strength, both actual and potential, of the nations. The Disarmament Conference opens at Geneva in February 1932. Before the Conference the League Secretariat is to publish a special edition of the Armaments Year-book. This edition will be based upon the information which all the nations have been asked to send to Geneva by the 15th September this year, and will doubtless be more authoritative and complete than its predecessors. The present volume however, is well worthy of study by any one who wishes to realise the magnitude of the problem with which the Conference is faced. In addition, candidates for the Staff College and promotion examinations will find here complete and concise information with regard to the Armed Forces of the Empire.

J. B. B.

MESOPOTAMIA 1917-1920—A CLASH OF LOYALTIES.

By Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

(*The Oxford University Press, London*, 1931). 25*s*.

In publishing his second volume on Mesopotamia Sir Arnold Wilson has once more proved that he can be just even towards those whose ideas and feelings he does not share. This gives his opinions the more weight. The book is indeed both criticism and defence, and coming from the pen of so able and authoritative a writer is sufficient indication of the problems facing those in authority not only in war, but in the more difficult period immediately following the cessation of hostilities.

We see here the conflicting demands of strategy and politics: the one favouring concentration of troops, the other sometimes demanding dispersion: and we learn that a broad outlook and the will to co-operate on either side go a long way towards reconciling opposing views.

It is refreshing to read the author's appreciation of the sympathetic attitude of Sir William Marshall and Sir George MacMunn to the problems confronting the civil administration, though one is tempted to ask why such co-operation should be regarded as the exception instead of the rule. Is the clash of loyalties between political and military authorities inevitable? There is apparent a tendency to think that it is: a tendency as unprofitable as it is dangerous. That is one of the reasons why this volume should be read by members of the United Service Institution. Our loyalties are to one head only and they should not clash.

The story of the gradual spread of revolutionary ideas into Iraq from Syria, financed, as the author asserts, by the government of Damascus from subsidies paid it by the British Treasury, discloses the gulf that existed between the various departments of State responsible for the Levant and the Mediterranean. Inter-communication and co-ordination were weak. The Middle East was not regarded as a whole, and there was a lack of a common policy between the British authorities in Syria and Mesopotamia. So much so that not only is British money from Syria stated to have found its way into the pockets of Mesopotamian revolutionaries, but rifles supplied to

Lawrence's Arabs seem also to have had a ready market on the Euphrates.

The period was one of peculiar difficulty for Sir Arnold Wilson, subordinate as he was to the military command in Iraq and yet in correspondence with the Foreign and India offices, and the Government of India. Prevented by considerations of high policy at Home from giving to the population of Iraq the eagerly awaited announcement as to the type of government under which they were to live, he yet managed to effect many administrative improvements and to lay the foundations of local Government in town and country. The burden of responsibility and pressure of work were great, and the author pays a just tribute to the Services, and in too many cases the sacrifices, of the political and other military officers under him.

Apart from the historical and political aspects of this book, its main interest to the military reader lies in the description of the vast and intricate organization necessary for the development of the local resources and communications of the country; the employment of local labour; the relief of famine; and the protection of refugees; in addition to the general administration of the occupied territory. All these form part of the responsibilities of a commander in war and require, for their successful accomplishment, wide study, and sympathetic handling.

R. A. S.

SADDLE ROOM SAYINGS.

By William Fawcett.

(*Messrs. Constable & Co., Ltd.*, 1931. *Obtainable from the Oxford University Press, Bombay*). 8*s.* 6*d.*

The title of this book is perhaps a little misleading, as it really describes only the last chapter.

The first chapter is an interesting study of the evolution of the English thoroughbred, but the bulk of the book deals with the breeding and training of hunters.

Mr. Fawcett, who is a well-known authority on the subject, has written of the hunter from foalhood to maturity, and his remarks, which all have a light crisp touch, concerning stables and stablecraft, breeding and buying, making and breaking, are founded upon a deep practical knowledge.

The author is not content to take facts as they are ; he balances one against the other, and enquires into cause and effect. As he himself says, " There is always so much to be learned " of horses ; one can never know all, and there will be few to whose store of horse knowledge this book will not contribute.

At the same time it is very readable, being well stocked with horsey anecdotes, strange stories of the wiles of horse copers, etc.

M. S. B.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

SALE OF PERIODICALS.

The Institution offers the following periodicals to members on sale for twelve months—1st January to 31st December 1932. The papers will be sold to the member submitting the highest bid by the 31st January 1932. Each issue of the periodicals will be sent to the purchaser as soon as the next issue is received at the Institution. In the case of purchasers in Simla, delivery will be free, otherwise postage will be charged.

Title.	*Published.*	*Cost per copy New.*
		s. d.
The Empire Review	(Monthly)	.. 2 0
The Nineteenth Century and After	,,	.. 3 0
The Geographical Journal	,,	.. 2 0
The United Empire	,,	.. 1 0
Blackwood's Magazine	,,	.. 2 6
The Journal of the R. A. M. C.	,,	.. 2 0
The Navy	,,	.. 0 6
The British Trade Journal and Export World.	,,	.. 1 0
The Cavalry Journal	(Quarterly)	.. 5 0
The Asiatic Review	,,	.. 5 0
The Royal Engineers' Journal	,,	.. 5 0
The British Empire Review	,,	.. 0 6
The Fighting Forces	,,	.. 5 0
The Journal of the Royal Artillery	,,	.. 5 0
Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research.	,,	.. 6 0
		Cents.
The Canadian Defence Quarterly	,,	.. 50

Illustrated Publications, &c.

		s. d.
The Times Weekly Illustrated	(Weekly)	.. 0 4
The Aeroplane	,,	.. 0 6
Punch	,,	.. 0 6
The London Daily Times (6 copies weekly).		.. 0 2

		Re.	a.
The Field—The Country Newspaper	(Weekly)	1	0
The Sketch	,,	1	0
The Illustrated Sporting and Dramatic News.	,,	1	0
India Monthly Magazine	(Monthly)	1	0
Britannia and Eve	,,	1	0

American Publications.

		Cents.
The National Geographic Magazine	(Monthly)	50
The Coast Artillery Journal	,,	50
The Infantry Journal	,,	50
The Journal of the Franklin Institute	,,	60
The Cavalry Journal	,,	75
Foreign Affairs	(Quarterly)	1·25
The Army and Navy Journal	(Weekly)	20

Foreign Publications.

Revue Militaire Suisse. Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires. Rivista Di Artiglieria E Genio. L'Afrique Francaise. Rivista Militaire Italiana.	(All monthly).

United Service Institution of India.

JANUARY 1931.

CONTENTS.

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st September to 30th November 1930:—

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

G. Cunningham, Esq., C.I.E., O.B.E., I.C.S.
H. Denning, Esq., C.I.E., I.C.S.
J. C. B. Drake, Esq., C.I.E., O.B.E., I.C.S.
The Hon'ble Mr. J. A. Woodhead, I.C.S.
T. G. Creighton, Esq.
Brigadier C. P. Heywood, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Brigadier C. G. Ling, D.S.O., M.C.
Colonel B. C. Penton, D.S.O.
Lt.-Colonel D. F. Anderson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Lt.-Colonel A. E. Crawford, M.C.
Lt.-Colonel H. C. Harrison, D.S.O.
Major L. Browning, O.B.E., M.C.
Major J. O'Sullivan.
Major C. A. West, M.C.
Captain M. G. Beck.
Captain H. E. Carey.
Captain J. W. T. Colsey.
Captain A. E. Cumming, M.C.
Captain W. J. Damerell.
Captain W. P. H. Gorringe.
Captain D. S. Khanvilkar, M.C.
Captain K. A. T. McLennan, M.C.
Captain G. Nadin.
Lieut. J. M. Ditmas.
Lieut. L. L. Loewe.
Lieut. H. A. Maconochie.
Lieut. E. G. B. Proctor.
Flight-Lieutenant E. L. Ardley, R.A.F.
Squadron Leader W. F. Dickson, D.S.O., A.F.C., R.A.F.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.

Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum post free. Advertisement rates may be had on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution. Articles may vary in length from three thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made at from Rs. 30 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution. Payment is made on publication.

Articles submitted for publication must be typed in *duplicate*, on one side of the paper only. Drawings, plans, maps, etc., for reproduction should be in *jet* black. No washes or ribands of colour should on any account be used. If it is absolutely necessary to use colours (and these are only permissible in line work or names) the following will reproduce photographically, *i.e.*, dark red, dark orange, dark green. No other colour should on any account be used.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

Anonymous contributions under a *nom-de-plume* will not be accepted or acknowledged; all contributions must be sent to the Secretary under the name of the writer and the paper will, if accepted, be published under that name unless a wish is expressed for it to be published under a *nom-de-plume*. The Executive Committee will decide whether the wish can be complied with.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right of omitting any matter which they consider objectionable, and do not undertake to authorise the publication of such papers as are accepted in the order in which they may have been received.

Manuscripts of original papers sent for publication in the Journal will not be returned to the contributor unless he expresses a wish to have them back and pays the postage.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

Contributors will be supplied with three copies of heir paper *gratis*, if published.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A. M. until sunset.

The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of military interest that are published. Papers, magazines, " orks of reference " or books marked " Not to be Taken Away," or noted as " Confidential " may not be removed from the Reading Room.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules :—

(1). The Library is only open to members and honorary members of the United Service Institution of India. Members are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2). No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3). The United Service Institution of India is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A. M. until sunset. Books may be taken out at any time provided Rule 2 is complied with.

(4). A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(5). Papers, magazines, " works of eference " or books marked " Not to be Taken Away," or noted as " Confidential " may not be removed.

(6). No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member in Simla may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the library as useful as possible to members ; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(7). Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(8). If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee.

(9). Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(10). The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(11). A list of all books presented and purchased, and also a list of books useful to members studying for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations, will be found under Secretary's Notes in the quarterly issue of the U. S. I. Journal.

(12). Members are invited to contribute presents of books, maps and photographs of naval and military interest. These may be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. I. of India, Simla. They will be duly acknowledged.

(13). The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

	Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
1.	Reconstruction of India (Presented by Messrs. Faber, and Faber Ltd., London).	1930	E. J. Thompson.
2.	The Paris, Gun 1918 (Presented by Messrs. G. P. Harrap & Co., Ltd., London).	1930	Henry M. Miller.
3.	The Pacific Basin (Presented by The Oxford University Press, Bombay).	1930	Gordon L. Wood.
4.	Imperial Military Geography, 6th edition. Presented by Messrs. Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd., London).	1930	Captain D.H. Cole.
5.	The Complete Guide to Military Map Reading, 9th edition. (Presented by Messrs. Gale and Polden Ltd., London).	1930	.. ..
6.	History of the 1st Bn. 5th Mahratta Light Infantry, (Jangi Paltan). (Presented by the Officers of the Regiment).	1930	.. ..

BOOKS PRESENTED.

	Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
7.	Leave from Indian Forests (Presented by Messrs. Edward Arnold & Co., London).	1930	Sir S. E. Wilmot.
8.	Dawn in India (Presented by Mr. John Murray, London).	1930	Sir Francis Younghusband.
9.	Indian Cavalry Standards (Presented by Messrs. Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd., London).	1930	Capt. H. Bullock.

BOOKS PURCHASED.

1.	The Caliphate—Its Rise, Decline and Fall.	1924	Sir William Muir.
2.	Personal Reminiscences in India and Europe of Augusta Becher 1830-1888.	1930	H. G. Rawlinson.
3.	Verdun, 1916	1930	Marshal Petain.
4.	India—the Truth	1930	J. E. Woolacott.
5.	Bengal Lancer	1930	Francis Yeats-Brown.
6.	Behind the Scenes in Many Wars	1930	Sir George MacMunn.
7.	Great Short Stories of the War, England, France, Germany and America.	1930	.. ..
8.	Memoirs of an Infantry Officer	1930	Siegfried Sassoon.

BOOKS ON ORDER.

1.	British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914 Vol. VI.	Gooch and H. Temperley.
2.	My Early Life	The Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill.
3.	Liaison	Brig. Genl. E. L. Spears.
4.	My Life—The Rise and Fall of a Dictator.	Leon Trotsky.
5.	The Congreves-Father and Son	Lt.-Col. L. H. Thornton and Pamela Fraser.
6.	The Prodigious Marshal	E. B. D'Auvergne.
7.	Turenne, Marshal of France	Max Weygand.
8.	Mars, or the Truth about the War	Alain.
9.	A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and Other Weapons.	H. L. Gilchrist.

VI.—Army Examinations.

(*a*) *Promotion.*—The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set from March 1931, for lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head (*b*) (*iii*) and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head (*d*) (*iii*):—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of examination.	Campaign set for the first time.	Campaign set for the second time.	Campaign set for the last time.
1	March 1931 ..	Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702–09.	..	Battle of Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos, 1915.
2	October 1931 ..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.	Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702–09.	..
3	March 1932 ..	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.	Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702—09.
4	October 1932 ..	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.

(*b*) *Staff College.*—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination:—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917, to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

*The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

VII.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated below there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

(The list of books presented and purchased as shown in the Journal should also be consulted).

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

* Applicable to 1932 and subsequent examinations.

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—Official History of the War.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to IV.

B.—Other Books.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff).

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

B.—Other Books.

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914—18 (Bowman Manifold).

The Palestine Campaign (Colonel A. P. Wavell).

Army Quarterly—January 1922 (Lieut.-Colonel Wavell and C. T. Atkinson's articles).

Cavalry Journal—October 1921 (Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's article)—July 1923 (Lieut.-Colonel Beston's article).

R. U. S. I. Journal—May 1922 (Colonel-Commandant Weir's article).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

Naval and Military Despatches	A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q. standpoint.
Reports of the Dardanelles Commission.	Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I (C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—Other Books.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) .. The best unofficial account and criticism of the strategic conduct of the campaign.

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—Official Account.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV, (F. J. Moberly).

B.—Other Books.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917. (Staff College).

The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).

A Chapter of Misfortunes.

My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).

Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).

Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).

With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).

Waterloo (Ropes).

Campaign of 1815, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W. O'Connor Morris).

Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).

Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).

Wellington Campaigns. Peninsula-Waterloo, 1808—15, also Moore's.

Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).

7.—*Marlborough's Campaigns.*

History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).

Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).

The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).

Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).

A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).

The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).

8.—*The American Civil War.*

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).

History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).

The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).

History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buel).

Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

9.—*The East Prussian Campaign.*

Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).

Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War*, 1904, *up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).

Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military), 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.

Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).

A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

11.—*Napoleon's Italian Campaign*, 1796-97.

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).

Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12.—*Organization of the Army since* 1868.

A.—Organization of the Army since 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of British Army, by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson.

B.—Forces of the Empire.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, 1928.

The Statesman's Year Book, 1930.

Army List.

C.—Foreign Armies.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—The British Empire.

Encyclopædia Britannica—(contains much concentrated information).

The Statesman's Year Book.

Whitaker's Almanack.

The Colonial Office List.

The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).

The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).

The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (Sir C. P. Lucas, 1917).

The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).

The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).

The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).

The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).

England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).

B.—Books on Special Portions of the Empire or World.

The Rise and Expansion of British Dominions in India (Sir A. O. Lyall, 1894).

General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).

India in 1928-29 (J. Coatman).

India in 1929-30 (Bajpai).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).

The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).

International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse). (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).

What's Wrong with China ? (Gilbert).

Why China Sees Red (Putman-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).

Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakeley).

TACTICS.

15.—*Tactical Problems.*

Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).

Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady, 1926).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, 1927).

VIII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1930 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

It is obviously impossible for the Secretary to undertake the correction of individual solutions, but all the recent schemes include a suggested solution in the form in which it is considered that the paper should have been answered, with reasons for the solution given.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified and numbered as follows.

They can all be obtained by V. P. P., *plus* postage, on application to the Secretary. When ordering members are requested to give the number and subject of the schemes required.

PROMOTION SERIES.

(*A*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (*Reprinted May*, 1928).

To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2.

(*B*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). Complete with maps and solutions :—

Lieutenant to Captain.—

(*i*) Mountain Warfare .. .. Rs. 2-8

(*ii*) Defence .. .. .. „ 2-8
Attack orders.

Captain to Major.—

(*i*) Outposts .. .. .. Rs. 2-8
Defensive position.
Withdrawal.

(*ii*) Tactical exercise without troops .. „ 2-8
Reconnaissance.
Attack orders.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES.

(*C*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). With one map for the three schemes and solutions :—

(*i*) Approach March .. .. Rs. 2-8
Reconnaissance before night attack.
Orders for night attack.

(*ii*) Outposts .. .. Rs. 2-8
Defence.
Action of a force retiring.

(*iii*) Move by M. T. .. .. „ 2-8
Occupation of a defensive position.
Counter-attack.

(*D*) *Army Headquarters Staff College Course Tactical Schemes*—

1928.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

(*i*) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders and Appreciation.
(*ii*) Withdrawal—Operation Orders.
(*iii*) Rear-Guard, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

1929.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

(*i*) Withdrawal—Appreciation.
(*ii*) Advanced-Guard—Operation Orders with march table. (Map as for (*i*).)
(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

1930.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

(*i*) Defence.
(*ii*) Attack.
(*iii*) Advanced-Guard. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*E*) *Mountain Warfare.*—

(*i*) A scheme, with map and solution (Reprinted May 1928) .. ..Rs. 2-8
(*ii*) A scheme, with map and solution (1930) .. „ 2-8

(*F*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (*Reprinted May*, 1928).
To illustrate the supply system of a Division ..Rs. 2

(*G*) *Other Schemes and Specimen Examination Papers.*—

(*i*) Supply Problem (without maps and solutions) 1930 .. ..Re. 1 each
(*ii*) Movements (1930) .. .. .. „
(*iii*) The History and Organization of the Empire.

IX.—Precis of Lectures.

A number of precis of lectures delivered to the Army Headquarters Staff College Course is available for members on payment. These precis are sufficiently full to be of great value to those who have not attended the lectures. The majority of these precis are those of the 1930 Staff College Course; the date of the precis is given in each case.

(*i*) Hints on working for Examinations (1930)	.. As. 8 each
(*ii*) Notes on Military Writing	.. ,,
(*iii*) The employment of Artillery (1930)	.. ,,
(*iv*) Anti-Aircraft Defence (1930)	.. ,,
(*v*) Aircraft in Co-operation with the Army (1930)	,,
(*vi*) The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)	,,
(*vii*) Tanks (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*viii*) Armoured Cars (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*ix*) Military Engineering (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*x*) Signals in the Division ..	.. ,,
(*xi*) Mountain Warfare, II (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*xii*) The Organization of the British Army (1930)	.. ,,
(*xiii*) Medical Services (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*xiv*) Mobilization (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*xv*) Reinforcements (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*xvi*) Military Law, I (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*xvia*) Military Law, II (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*xvib*) Military Law, III (1930) ..	.. ,,
(*xvii*) The Dardanelles Campaign (1930)	.. Re. 1-8 each
(*xviii*) The Palestine Campaign, I (1930)	.. ,,
(*xviiia*) The Palestine Campaign, II (1930)	.. ,,
(*xix*) Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796 (1930)	.. As. 12 each
(*xx*) The American Civil War (1930)	.. ,,
(*xxi*) Transportation-War (1930) ..	.. As. 8 each
(*xxii*) Supply of a Division in War ..	.. ,,
(*xxiii*) Training (1930)	.. ,,
(*xxiv*) The "Q" Administrative Services in Peace (1930)	,,
(*xxv*) Inter-communication within a Division 1929	,,
(*xxvi*) The Indian Territorial Force (1929)	.. ,,
(*xxvii*) Organization and Administration, Peace (1929)	,,
(*xxviii*) Organization and Administration, War (1929)	,,
Course of five lectures given at the London School of Economics, 1925, on "Transportation in War."	.. As. 12 each

X.—Historical Research.

The U.S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with manuscript or type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per manuscript or type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

XI.—Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition, 1931.

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1931 :—

"Discuss the organization and control of the military, naval and air forces in India during the future advance towards responsible Government and after, and their relation to the police and other civil forces of the Crown."

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force or Auxiliary Forces, who are members of the U. S. I. of India.

(2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1931.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three

judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1931.

(8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA.

Prize Essay Gold Medallists.

(*With Rank of Officers at the date of the Essay*).

1872 ..Roberts, Lieut.-Col. F. S., v.c., c.b. r.a.
1873 ..Colquhoun, Capt. J. S., r.a.
1874 ..Colquhoun, Capt. J. S., r.a.
1879 ..St. John, Maj. O.B.C., r.e.
1880 ..Barrow, Lieut. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1882 ..Mason, Lieut. A. H., r.e.
1883 ..Collen, Maj. E. H. H., s.c.
1884 ..Barrow, Capt. E. G., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1887 ..Yate, Lieut. A. C., 27th Baluch Infantry.
1888 ..Maude, Capt. F. N., r.e.
Young, Maj. G. F., 24th Punjab Infantry (specially awarded a silver medal).
1889 ..Duff, Capt. B., 9th Bengal Infantry.
1890 ..Maguire, Capt. C. M., 2nd Cavy. Hyderabad Contingent.
1891 ..Cardew, Lieut. F. G., 10th Bengal Lancers.
1893 ..Bullock, Maj. G. M., Devonshire Regiment.
1894 ..Carter, Capt. F. C., Northumberland Fusiliers.
1895 ..Neville, Lieut.-Col. J. P. C., 14th Bengal Lancers.

PRIZE ESSAY GOLD MEDALLISTS—*concld.*

1896 ..BINGLEY, Capt. A. H., 7th Bengal Infantry.
1897 ..NAPIER, Capt. G. S. F., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
1898 ..MULLALY, Maj. H., R.E.
CLAY, Capt. C. H., 43rd Gurkha Rifles (specially awarded a silver medal).
1899 ..NEVILLE, Col. J. P. C., S.C.
1900 ..THUILLIER, Capt. H. F., R.E.
LUBBOCK, Capt. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1901 ..RANKEN, Lieut.-Col. G. P. P., 46th Punjab Infantry.
1902 ..TURNER, Capt. H. H. F., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
1903 ..HAMILTON, Maj. W. G., D.S.O., Norfolk Regiment.
BOND, Capt. R. F. G., R.E. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1904 ..MACMUNN, Maj. G. F., D.S.O., R.F.A.
1905 ..COCKERILL, Maj. G. K., Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
1907 ..WOOD, Maj. E. G. M., 99th Deccan Infantry.
1908 ..JEUDWINE, MAJ. H. S., R.A.
1909 ..MOLYNEUX, Maj. E. M. J., D.S.O., 12th Cavalry.
ELSMIE, Maj. A. M. S., 56th Rifles, F. F. (specially awarded a silver medal).
1911 ..Mr. D. PETRIE, M.A., Punjab Police.
1912 ..CARTER, Maj. B. C., The King's Regiment.
1913 ..THOMSON, Maj. A. G., 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F. F.).
1914 ..BAINBRIDGE, Lieut.-Col. W. F., D.S.O., 51st Sikhs (F. F.).
NORMAN, Maj. C. L., M.V.O., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides (specially awarded a silver medal).
1916 ..CRUM, Maj. W. E., V.D., Calcutta Light Horse.
1917 ..BLAKER, Maj. W. F., R.F.A.
1918 ..GOMPERTZ, Capt. A. V., M.C., R.E.
1919 ..GOMPERTZ, Capt. M. L. A.. 108th Infantry.
1920 ..KEEN, Lt.-Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A. 2/15th Sikhs.
1922 ..MARTIN, Maj. H. G., D S.O., O.B.E., R.F.A.
1923 ..KEEN, Col. F. S., D.S.O., I.A.
1926 ..DENNYS, Maj. L. E., M.C., 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1927 ..HOGG, Maj. D. Mc. A., M.C., R.E.
1928 ..FRANKS, Maj. K. F., D.S.O., 5th Royal Mahrattas.
1929 ..DENNYS, Maj. L. E.. M.C.. 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment.
1930 ..DURNFORD, Maj. C. M. P., 4/6th Rajputana Rifles.

THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal, with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

Note.

(*i*) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal; but in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has run the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the reward.

(*ii*) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value, or has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to deserve it.

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* *N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists.

(*With rank of officers and soldiers at the date of the Award.*)

1889..Bell, Col. M. S., v.c.r.e. (specially awarded a gold medal).

1890..Younghusband, Capt. F. E., King's Dragoon Guards.

1891..Sawyer, Maj. H. A., 45th Sikhs.
Ramzan Khan, Havildar, 3rd Sikhs.

1892..Vaughan, Capt. H. B., 7th Bengal Infantry.
Jaggat Singh, Havildar, 19th Punjab Infantry.

1893..Bower, Capt. H., 17th Bengal Cavalry (especially awarded a gold medal).
Fazaldad Khan, Dafadar, 17th Bengal Cavalry.

1894..O'Sullivan, Maj. G. H. W., r.e.
Mull Singh, Sowar, 6th Bengal Cavalry.

1895..Davies, Capt. H. R., Oxfordshire Light Infantry.
Ganga Dyal Singh, Havildar, 2nd Rajputs.

1896..Cockerill, Lieut. G. K., 28th Punjab Infantry.
Ghulam Nabi, Sepoy, Q. O. Corps of Guides.

1897..Swayne, Capt. E. J. F., 10th Rajput Infantry.
Shahzad Mir, Dafadar, 11th Bengal Lancers.

1898..Walker, Capt. H. B., Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Adam Khan, Havildar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.

1899..Douglas, Capt. J. A., 2nd Bengal Lancers.
Mihr Din, Naik, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

1900..Wingate, Capt. A. W. S., 14th Bengal Lancers.
Gurdit Singh, Havildar, 45th Sikhs.

1901..Burton, Maj. E. B., 17th Bengal Lancers.
Sundar Singh, Colour Havildar, 31st Burmah Infantry.

1902..Ray, Capt. M. R. E., 7th Rajput Infantry.
Tilbir Bhandari, Havildar, 9th Gurkha Rifles.

1903..Manifold, Lieut.-Col. C. C., i.m.s.
Ghulam Hussain, Lance-Dafadar, Q.O. Corps of Guides.

1904..Fraser, Capt. L. D., r.g.a.
Moghal Baz, Dafadar, Q. O. Corps of Guides.

1905..Rennick, Maj. F., 40th Pathans (specially awarded a gold medal).
Madho Ram, Havildar, 8th Gurkha Rifles.

1906..Shahzada Ahmad Mir, Risaldar, 36th Jacob's Horse.
Ghafur Shah, Lance-Naik, Q. O. Corps of Guides Infantry.

1907..Nangle, Capt. M. C., 92nd Punjabis.
Sheikh Usman, Havildar, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*contd*).

1908..Gibbon, Capt. C. M., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Malang, Havildar, 56th Punjab Rifles.

1909..Muhammad Raza, Havildar, 106th Pioneers.

1910..Sykes, Maj. M., c.m.g., late 2nd Dragoon Guards (specially awarded a gold medal).
Turner, Capt. F. G., r.e.
Khan Bahadur Sher Jung, Survey of India.

1911..Leachman, Capt. G. E., The Royal Sussex Regiment.
Gurmukh Singh, Jemadar, 93rd Burmah Infantry.

1912..Pritchard, Capt. P. P. A., 83rd Wallahjabad Light Infantry (specially awarded a gold medal).
Wilson, Lieut. A. T., c.m.g., 32nd Sikh Pioneers.
Mohibulla, Lance-Dafadar, Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.

1913..Abbay, Capt. B. N., 27th Light Cavalry.
Sirdar Khan, Sowar, 39th (K. G. O.) Central India Horse.
Waratong, Havildar, Burmah Military Police (specially awarded a silver medal).

1914..Bailey, Capt. F. M., i.a. (Political Department).
Morshead, Capt. H. T., r.e.
Haidar Ali, Naik, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1915..Waterfield, Capt. F. C., 45th Rattray's Sikhs.
Ali Juma, Havildar, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1916..Abdur Rahman, Naik, 21st Punjabis.
Zarghun Shah, Havildar, 58th Rifles (F. F.) (specially awarded a silver medal).

1917..Mian Afraz Gul, Sepoy, Khyber Rifles.

1918..Noel, Capt. E. W. C. (Political Department).

1919..Keeling, Lieut.-Col. E. H., m.c., r.e.
Alla Sa, Jemadar, N. E., Frontier Corps.

1920..Blacker, Capt. L. V. S.. Q. V. O. Corps of Guides.
Awal Nur, C. Q. M. Havildar, 2nd Bn., Q. V. O. Corps of Guides. (Special gratuity of Rs. 200.)

1921..Holt, Maj. A. L., Royal Engineers.
Sher Ali, Sepoy No. 4952, 106th Hazara Pioneers.

1922..Abdul Samad Shah, Capt., o.b.e., 31st D.C.O. Lancers.
Nur Muhammad, Lance-Naik, 1st Guides Infantry, F. F.

MacGregor Memorial Medallists—(*concld.*).

1923..Bruce, Capt. J. G., 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
Sohbat, Head Constable, N.-W. F. Police.
Hari Singh Thapa, Survey Department (specially awarded a silver medal).

1924..Havildar Rahmat Shah, N.-W. F. Corps.
Naik Ghulab Hussain, N.-W. F. Corps.

1925..Spear, Capt. C. R., 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.
Jabbar Khan, Naik, 5/13th Frontier Force Rifles.

1926..Harvey-Kelly, Maj. C. H. G. H., D.S.O., 4/10th Baluch Regiment.

1927..Lake, Maj. M. C., 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.

1928..Bowerman, Capt. J. F., 4/10th D.C.O. Baluch Regiment.
Muhammad Khan, Havildar, Zhob Levy Corps.

1929..Abdul Hanan, Naik, N.-W. F. Corps. (With gratuity of Rs. 100.)
Ghulam Ali, Dafadar, Guides Cavalry (specially awarded a silver medal).

1930..Green, Capt. J. H., 3/20th Burma Rifles.

United Service Institution of India.

APRIL 1931.

CONTENTS.

I.—New Members.

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st December 1930 to 28th February 1931:—

LIFE MEMBER.

Lieut. W. D. Horniman.

ORDINARY MEMBERS.

C. W. Gwynne Esq., C.I.E., C.B.E., I.C.S.	..	Lieut. S. W. Boast.
Lieut.-General Sir Alexander E. Wardrop, K.C.B., C.M.G.	.. ..	,, C. H. Bowker.
Lieut.-Colonel N. M. Wilson, D.S.O., O.B.E.	..	,, J. N. Chaudhury.
Major B. C. Dening, M.C.	.. ..	,, E. H. W. Cobb.
,, G. M. FitzGerald, M.C.	.. ..	,, J. C. S. Compton.
,, A. C. Gordon-Smythe	.. ..	,, E. L. Fanshawe.
,, R. MacG. M. Lockhart, M.C.	..	,, F. T. Copeland.
,, A. D. Magnay	.. ..	,, M. G. Crofton.
,, C. W. Sanders	.. ..	,, E. A. B. Dryer.
,, M. M. Stevenson	.. ..	,, E. L. Fanshawe.
Captain L. Bootle-Wilbraham, M.C.	..	,, R. M. Ferguson.
,, K. Le H. Guiton	.. ..	,, A. Goring.
,, F. H. Hartnoll	.. ..	,, W. Gracie.
,, C. M. Hutchings	.. ..	,, P. M. Hill.
,, H. S. Larkin	.. ..	,, W. F. Lamb.
,, M. McLellan	.. ..	,, C. F. Loewen.
,, W. E. Maxwell	.. ..	,, L. G. Man.
,, F. W. H. Pratt, M.C.	.. ..	,, T. A. Massie.
,, N. S. Rawat	.. ..	,, G. Parkee.
,, J. C. Saunders-Jacobs	.. ..	,, G. E. Sankey.
,, R. L. Simpson	.. ..	,, R. B. Scott.
,, C. A. Stansfeld	.. ..	,, S. Southey.
,, W. E. H. Talbot	.. ..	,, J. M. K. Spurling.
,, M. S. Teversham, M.C.	..	,, F. H. Stevens.
,, P. A. Tucker	.. ..	,, H. H. Sykes.
,, B. W. G. Walker, M.C.	..	,, D. M. B. Vauqulin.
,, B. G. Dalrymple-Hay	.. ..	,, W. L. D. Veitch.
Lieut. G. R. W. Beal	.. ..	,, M. H. Walters.
,, G. P. D. Blacker	.. ..	,, J. D. Welch.
		,, P. H. C. White.

II.—The Journal.

The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued postage free to members in any part of the world.

Non-members may obtain the Journal at Rs. 2 annas 8 per number, or Rs. 10 per annum post free. Advertisement rates may be had on application to the Secretary.

III.—Contributions to the Journal.

Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution. Articles may vary in length from three thousand to ten thousand words. Payment is made at from Rs. 30 to Rs. 100 in accordance with the value and length of the contribution. Payment is made on publication.

Articles submitted for publication must be typed in *duplicate*, on one side of the paper only. Drawings, plans, maps, etc., for reproduction should be in *jet* black. No washes or ribands of colour should on any account be used. If it is absolutely necessary to use colours (and these are only permissible in line work or names) the following will reproduce photographically, *i.e.*, dark red, dark orange, dark green. No other colour should on any account be used.

With reference to Regulations for the Army in India, paragraph 204 and King's Regulations, paragraph 522, action to obtain the sanction of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the publication of any article in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India will be taken by the Executive Committee of the Institution.

Anonymous contributions under a *nom-de-plume* will not be accepted or acknowledged; all contributions must be sent to the Secretary under the name of the writer and the paper will, if accepted, be published under that name unless a wish is expressed for it to be published under a *nom-de-plume*. The Executive Committee will decide whether the wish can be complied with.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right of omitting any matter which they consider objectionable, and do not undertake to authorise the publication of such papers as are accepted in the order in which they may have been received.

Manuscripts of original papers sent for publication in the Journal will not be returned to the contributor unless he expresses a wish to have them back and pays the postage.

Articles are only accepted on these conditions.

Contributors will be supplied with three copies of their paper *gratis*, if published.

IV.—Reading Room and Library.

The United Service Institution of India is situated in the Mall, Simla, and is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A. M. until sunset.

The Reading Room of the Institution is provided with most of the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of military interest that are published. Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential" may not be removed from the Reading Room.

There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free, in accordance with the following rules:—

(1). The Library is only open to members and honorary members of the United Service Institution of India. Members are requested to look upon books as not transferable to their friends.

(2). No book shall be taken from the Library without making the necessary entry in the register. Members residing permanently or temporarily in Simla are requested to enter their addresses.

(3). The United Service Institution of India is open all the year round—including Sundays—from 9 A. M. until sunset. Books may be taken out at any time provided Rule 2 is complied with.

(4). A member shall not be allowed, at one time, more than three books or sets of books.

(5). Papers, magazines, "works of reference" or books marked "Not to be Taken Away," or noted as "Confidential" may not be removed.

(6). No particular limit is set as to the number of days for which a member in Simla may keep a book, the Council being desirous of making the library as useful as possible to members; but if after the expiration of a fortnight from date of issue it is required by any other member it will be re-called.

(7). Applications for books from members at out-stations are dealt with as early as possible, and books are despatched per Registered Parcel Post. They must be returned carefully packed per Registered Parcel Post within one month of date of issue.

(8). If a book is not returned at the end of one month, it must be paid for without the option of return, if so required by the Executive Committee.

(9). Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost books which are out of print the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee, and the amount, when received, spent in the purchase of a new book.

(10). The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules, and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(11). A list of all books presented and purchased, and also a list of books useful to members studying for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations, will be found under Secretary's Notes in the quarterly issue of the U. S. I. Journal.

(12). Members are invited to contribute presents of books, maps and photographs of naval and military interest. These may be addressed to the Secretary, U. S. I. of India, Simla. They will be duly acknowledged.

(13). The catalogue of the Library is completed to 31st March 1924. Price Rs. 3-8-0 or postage paid Rs. 3-14-0. An addendum completed up to 30th September 1927 is available. Price annas 8 *plus* postage annas 4.

V.—New Books.

BOOKS PRESENTED.

Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
An Indian Diary, 1917-18 .. (Presented by Messrs. William Heinemann, Ltd., London).	1930	..Edwin S. Montague.
The Practical Dog-Book .. (Presented by the Author).	1930	..Edward C. Ash.
All the World's Aircraft .. (Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., London).	1930	..C. G. Grey.
Loyalties-Mesopotamia, 1914-18 .. (Presented by the Oxford University Press, Bombay).	1930	..Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson.
Five Tactical Schemes with Solutions (Messrs. William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., London).	1931	..S. W. Kirby and J. R. Kennedy.
The Biography of Thakore Sahib Shri.. Sir Daulat Singh of Limbdi. (Presented by Mr. John Murray).	1931	..Elizabeth Sharpe.
The Map Reading Instructor .. (Presented by Messrs. Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd., London).	1931	..Capt. C. A. Wilson.

Books Purchased.

Title.	*Published.*	*Author.*
New War, New Weapons ..	1930	..J. M. Kenworthy.
Turning Points in History ..	1930	..Earl of Birkenhead.
Steinhauer—The Kaiser's Master Spy.	1930	..S. T. Felstead.
British Documents on the Origins of the War, Vol. VI, 1907-1912.	1930	..Gooch and Temperley.
My Early Life ..	1930	..Hon. Winston S. Churchill.
Imperial Air Routes ..	1930	..Major A. E. W. Salt.
Whitaker's Almanack ..	1931	.. ..
The Prodigious Marshal (Saxe.) ..	1928	..E. B. D'Auvergne.
Liaison, 1914 ..	1930	..Brig.-Genl. E. L. Spears.
Turrenne-Marshal of France ..	1930	..Genl. Max Weygand.
Mars or the Truth about the War ..	1930	Alain.
The Congreves-Father and Son ..	1930	..Lt.-Col. L. H. Thornton.
My Life ..	1930	..Leon Trotsky.
Military Organization and Administration, 10th Edition.	1930	..W. G. Lindsell.
Indian Round Table Conference, 12th November 1930 to 19th January 1931 and Sub-Committees' Reports and Proceedings.	1931	.. ..

Books on Order.

A Comparative Study of World War Casualties from Gas and other Weapons.	Col. L. H. Gilchrist.
Military Operations Egypt and Palestine, from June 1917 to the end of the War.	..Capt. Cyril Falls.
History of the Peninsular War, Vol. VII.	..Charles Oman.

VI.—Army Examinations.

(*a*) *Promotion.*—The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set from October 1931, or lieutenants for promotion to captain in sub-head (*b*) (*iii*) and for captains for promotion to major in sub-head (*d*) (*iii*):—

1	2	3	4	5
Serial No.	Date of examination.	Campaign set for the first time.	Campaign set for the second time.	Campaign set for the last time.
1	October 1931 ..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.	Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702–09.	..
2	March 1932 ..	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.	Marlborough's Campaigns, 1702—09.
3	October 1932 ..	Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1861-62).	..	Egypt and Palestine, from the outbreak of the war with Germany to June 1917.

(*b*) *Staff College.*—(See Staff College (Camberley) Regulations, 1930, obtainable from the Central Publication Branch, Calcutta).

The following campaigns have been set for the Staff College Entrance Examination:—

Strategy of—

Napoleon's Campaign of 1796 in Italy.

Waterloo Campaign.

Peninsula Campaign up to and including the Battle of Salamanca.

The strategy and broad tactical lessons of—

The American Civil War.

Russo-Japanese War up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.

The Great War in France, Belgium, Mesopotamia, the Dardanelles and Palestine, including a knowledge of the influence on the strategy in these areas of the events in other theatres of the War.

The East Prussian Campaign, 1914.

The strategy and tactics of—

The Palestine Campaign from 9th November 1917, to the end of the War.

The action of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium up to and including the Battle of the Aisne.

*The 3rd Afghan War, 1919.

VII.—Books recommended for Staff College and Promotion Examination Students.

The following list of books available in the Library may be found useful for reference by officers studying for Promotion Examinations or entrance to the Staff College. In addition to those enumerated below there is a large number of books in the Library dealing with Military History, Tactics, Organization, Administration, Military Geography, Languages, etc. Should any member require a book not shown in this list he should apply to the Librarian, when it will, if procurable, be forwarded to him.

(The list of books presented and purchased as shown in the Journal should also be consulted).

MILITARY HISTORY.

(Before beginning to read Military History, candidates are advised to study carefully Section 9, Training and Manœuvre Regulations, 1923.)

1.—*The Great War, General History.*

Soldiers and Statesmen (Field-Marshal Sir W. Robertson).

The World Crisis (Winston Churchill).

The Real War (Liddell Hart).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

General Headquarters, 1914—16, and its Critical Decisions (Falkenhayn).

* Applicable to 1932 and subsequent examinations.

2.—*The Campaign of the British Army in France and Belgium.*

A.—Official History of the War.

Military Operations, France and Belgium, Vols. I to IV.

B.—Other Books.

Forty Days in 1914 (Maurice, new edition).

Ypres, 1914. (An official account) (German General Staff)

Story of the Fourth Army (Montgomery).

The Last Four Months (Maurice).

3.—*The Palestine Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1919.

The Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in Egypt and Palestine, Vol. I, and Maps (Lieut.-General Sir G. MacMunn).

B.—Other Books.

The Revolt in the Desert (T. E. Lawrence).

Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914—18 (Bowman Manifold).

The Palestine Campaign (Colonel A. P. Wavell).

Army Quarterly—January 1922 (Lieut.-Colonel Wavell and C. T. Atkinson's articles).

Cavalry Journal—October 1921 (Lieut.-Colonel Rex Osborne's article)—July 1923 (Lieut.-Colonel Beston's article).

R. U. S. I. Journal—May 1922 (Colonel-Commandant Weir's article).

U. S. I. Journal—October 1923 (Captain Channer's article).

4.—*The Dardanelles Campaign.*

A.—Official Accounts.

Naval and Military Despatches	A clear account of the operations in detail from the G. H. Q. standpoint.
Reports of the Dardanelles Commission.	Fixes responsibility for the inception and conduct of the campaign. An interesting study in the relationship between Politicians and Naval and Military Experts.

Despatches from the Dardanelles (Ian Hamilton).

Official History of the Great War, Gallipoli, May 1915, Vol. I (C. F. Aspinall Oglander).

B.—Other Books.

The Dardanelles (Callwell) .. The best unofficial account and criticism of the strategic conduct of the campaign.

5.—*The Mesopotamia Campaign.*

A.—Official Account.

Official History of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vols. I to IV. (F. J. Moberly).

B.—Other Books.

Critical Study of the Campaign in Mesopotamia up to April 1917. (Staff College).

The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914—18 (Evans).

A Chapter of Misfortunes.

My Campaign in Mesopotamia (Townshend).

6.—*Waterloo Campaign.*

Wellington and Waterloo (Arthur Griffiths).

Waterloo, the Downfall of the first Napoleon (George Hooper).

Campaign of 1815 (W. H. James).

With Napoleon at Waterloo (E. B. Low).

Waterloo (Ropes).

Campaign of 1815, Ligny: Quatre-Bras: Waterloo (W. O'Connor Morris).

Waterloo Campaign (S. C. Pratt).

Wellington and Waterloo (G. W. Redway).

Wellington Campaigns. Peninsula-Waterloo, 1808—15, also Moore's.

Campaign of Corunna (C. W. Robinson).

7.—*Marlborough's Campaigns.*

History of the British Army, Vol. I (Hon. J. W. Fortescue).

Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Archibald Alison).

The Wars of Marlborough, 1702—09 (Frank Taylor).

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, Vols. I and II (Viscount Wolseley).

Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army (C. T. Atkinson).

A Short Life of Marlborough (H. J. & E. A. Edwards).

The Battle of Blenheim (Hilaire Belloc).

8.—*The American Civil War.*

Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (G. F. R. Henderson).

History of the Civil War in the United States, 1861—65 (W. B. Wood and J. E. Edmonds).

History of the Campaign of Gen. T. J. (Stonewall) Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia (William Allen).

The American Civil War, 1861—64 (John Formby).

History of the American Civil War (J. W. Draper).

Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville (J. E. Gough).

Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (Johnson and Buel).

Robert E. Lee, The Soldier (Maurice).

Sherman (Liddell Hart).

9.—*The East Prussian Campaign.*

Tannenberg—First 30 days in East Prussia (Edmund Ironside).

Out of my Life (Von Hindenburg).

My War Memories (Ludendorff).

10.—*The Russo-Japanese War*, 1904, *up to and including the Battle of Liao-Yang.*

Lectures on the Strategy of the Russo-Japanese War (Bird).

Questions on the Russo-Japanese War (Brunker).

Official Account: The Russo-Japanese War (Naval and Military), 3 Vols., published by Committee of Imperial Defence.

Outline of the Russo-Japanese War (Ross).

A Study of the Russo-Japanese War (Chasseur).

Outline History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904, up to the Battle of Liao-Yang, with Questions and Answers (P. W.).

An Account of the Battle of Liao-Yang (with questions and 10 maps for examination purposes) (Bird).

11.—*Napoleon's Italian Campaign*, 1796-97.

Napoleon's Campaign in Italy (Burton).

Encyclopædia Britannica.

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION.

12.—*Organization of the Army since* 1868.

A.—Organization of the Army since 1868.

History of British Army, by Fortescue, Vols. I to XIII.

Outline of the Development of British Army, by Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson.

B.—Forces of the Empire.

The Annual Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services (H. M. Stationery Office).

Notes on the Land Forces of the British Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, 1928.

The Statesman's Year Book, 1930.

Army List.

C.—Foreign Armies.

League of Nations Handbook, Armaments.

War Office Official Handbooks of Foreign Armies.

13.—*Development and Constitution of the British Empire.*

A.—The British Empire.

Encyclopædia Britannica—(contains much concentrated information).

The Statesman's Year Book.

Whitaker's Almanack.

The Colonial Office List.

The Government of the British Empire (Jenks, 1923).

The Foundation and Growth of the British Empire (J. A. Williamson, 1918).

The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise (Sir C. P. Lucas, 1917).

The Government of England (L. A. Lowell, 1912).

The Expansion of the British Empire (W. H. Woodward, 1927 edition).

The Origin and Growth of the English Colonies and of Their System of Government (H. E. Egerton, 1903).

The English Constitution (Bagehot, 1909).

England in the Seven Years' War (Sir J. Corbett, 1907).

B.—Books on Special Portions of the Empire or World.

The Rise and Expansion of British Dominions in India (Sir A. O. Lyall, 1894).

General Survey of the History of India (Sir Verney Lovett).

India in 1928-29 (J. Coatman).

India in 1929-30 (Bajpai).

Modern Egypt (Cromer, 1908).

Egypt and the Army (Elgood, 1924).

The History of Canada (W. L. Grant).

Report on British North America (Sir C. P. Lucas).

The Union of South Africa (R. H. Brand, 1909).

History of the Australasian Colonies (Jenks, 1912).

The Lost Possessions of England (W. F. Lord, 1896).

International Relations of the Chinese Empire (H. B. Mosse). (Kelly and Walsh, Shanghai).

What's Wrong with China? (Gilbert).

Why China Sees Red (Putman-Weale).

MILITARY GEOGRAPHY.

14.—*Military Geography.*

Naval and Military Geography of the British Empire (Dr. Vaughan Cornish, 1916).

Imperial Military Geography (Capt. D. H. Cole).

Imperial Communications (Wakeley).

Imperial Economy (Major R. J. Wilkinson.)

TACTICS.

15.—*Tactical Problems.*

Common mistakes in the solution of tactical problems and how to avoid them (Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Beauman, 1926).

Historical illustrations to Field Service Regulations, Vol. II (Major E. G. Eady, 1926).

Elementary Tactics or the Art of War, British School (Major R. P. Pakenham-Walsh, 1927).

VIII.—Schemes.

Efforts are being made to compete with demands for tactical schemes from officers working for the Staff College and Promotion Examinations by introducing as many new schemes as possible. In addition to reprints of several schemes, the Institution is now in possession of the complete set of schemes with solutions set at the 1930 Army Headquarters Staff College Course.

It is obviously impossible for the Secretary to undertake the correction of individual solutions, but all the recent schemes include a suggested solution in the form in which it is considered that the paper should have been answered, with reasons for the solution given.

In order to simplify their issue, the schemes have been classified and numbered as follows.

They can all be obtained by V. P. P., *plus* postage, on application to the Secretary. When ordering members are requested to give the number and subject of the schemes required.

PROMOTION SERIES.

(*A*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (*Reprinted May*, 1928).

To illustrate the supply system of a Division .. Rs. 2.

(*B*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). Complete with maps and solutions :—

Lieutenant to Captain.—

(*i*) Mountain Warfare .. .. .. Rs. 2-8

(*ii*) Defence .. .. .. ,, 2-8
Attack orders.

Captain to Major.—

(*i*) Outposts .. .. .. Rs. 2-8
Defensive position.
Withdrawal.

(*ii*) Tactical exercise without troops .. ,, 2-8
Reconnaissance.
Attack orders.

STAFF COLLEGE SERIES.

(*C*) *Tactical Schemes* (*Reprinted May*, 1928). With one map for the three schemes and solutions :—

(*i*) Approach March .. .. Rs. 2-8
Reconnaissance before night attack.
Orders for night attack.

(*ii*) Outposts .. .. Rs. 2-8
Defence.
Action of a force retiring.

(*iii*) Move by M. T. .. .. „ 2-8
Occupation of a defensive position.
Counter-attack.

(*D*) *Army Headquarters Staff College Course Tactical Schemes*—

1928.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

(*i*) Advanced-Guard, Operation Orders and Appreciation.
(*ii*) Withdrawal—Operation Orders.
(*iii*) Rear-Guard, Appreciation and Operation Orders. (Map as for (*i*).)

1929.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

(*i*) Withdrawal—Appreciation.
(*ii*) Advanced-Guard—Operation Orders with march table. (Map as for (*i*).)
(*iii*) Attack, Appreciation and Operation Orders.

1930.—Three tactical schemes, complete with maps and solutions ..Rs. 3 each. (Re. 1 without maps.)

(*i*) Defence.
(*ii*) Attack.
(*iii*) Advanced-Guard. (Map as for (*i*).)

(*E*) *Mountain Warfare.*—

(*i*) A scheme, with map and solution (Reprinted May 1928) .. ..Rs. 2-8
(*ii*) A scheme, with two maps and solution (1930).. „ 3-8

(*F*) *Administrative Exercise, with diagram.* (*Reprinted May*, 1928).

To illustrate the supply system of a Division ..Rs. 2

(*G*) *Other Schemes and Specimen Examination Papers.*—

(*i*) Supply Problem (without maps and solutions) 1930 .. ..Re. 1 each
(*ii*) Movements (1930) .. .. .. „
(*iii*) The History and Organization of the Empire „ (without suggested answers.)

IX.—Precis of Lectures.

A number of precis of lectures delivered to the Army Headquarters Staff College Course is available for members on payment. These precis are sufficiently full to be of great value to those who have not attended the lectures. The majority of these precis are those of the 1930 Staff College Course; the date of the precis is given in each case.

(*i*) Hints on working for Examinations (1930)	.. As. 8 each
(*ii*) Notes on Military Writing	.. ,,
(*iii*) The employment of Artillery (1930)	.. ,,
(*iv*) Anti-Aircraft Defence (1930)	.. ,
(*v*) The Employment of Divisional Cavalry (1930)	,,
(*vi*) Tanks (1930)	,,
(*vii*) Armoured Cars (1930)	,,
(*viii*) Military Engineering (1930)	,,
(*ix*) Signals in the Division	,,
(*x*) Mountain Warfare, II (1930)	,,
(*xi*) The Organization of the British Army (1930) ..	,,
(*xii*) Medical Services (1930)	,,
(*xiii*) Mobilization (1930)	,,
(*xiv*) Reinforcements (1930)	,,
(*xv*) Military Law, I (1930)	,,
(*xva*) Military Law, II (1930)	,,
(*xvb*) Military Law, III (1930)	,,
(*xvi*) The Dardanelles Campaign (1930)	.. Re. 1-8 each
(*xvii*) The Palestine Campaign, I (1930)	.. ,,
(*xviia*) The Palestine Campaign, II (1930)	.. ,,
(*xviii*) Napoleon's Campaign in Italy, 1796 (1930)	.. As. 12 each
(*xix*) The American Civil War (1930)	.. ,,
(*xx*) Transportation-War (1930)	.. As. 8 each
(*xxi*) Supply of a Division in War ..	,,
(*xxii*) Training (1930)	,,
(*xxiii*) The "Q" Administrative Services in Peace (1930)	,,
(*xxiv*) Inter-communication within a Division (1929)	,,
(*xxv*) The Indian Territorial Force (1929) ..	,,
Course of five lectures given at the London School of Economics, 1925, on "Transportation in War."	.. As. 12 each

X.—Historical Research.

The U.S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with manuscript or type-written copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per manuscript or type-written page.

The staff of the Institution is always available to assist units, authors of regimental histories and members by searching the many old military records in the Library on their behalf.

XI.—The Macgregor Memorial Medal.

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June :—

(*a*) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(*b*) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal, with Rs. 100 gratuity.

For especially valuable work a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal, without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. Only officers and soldiers belonging to the Army in India (including those in civil employ) are eligible for the award of the medal.*

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.†

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* *N.B.*—The terms "officer" and "soldier" include those serving in the British and Indian armies and their reserves, also those serving in Auxiliary Forces, such as the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces and Corps under Local Governments, Frontier Militia, Levies and Military Police, also all ranks serving in the Indian States Forces.

† Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U. S. I., Simla.