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EDITORIAL.

It was an unusual step to select the Chief of the General Staff in India to succeed his Commander-in-Chief, but there were reasons which made the choice of Sir Philip Chetwode to follow Sir William Birdwood a peculiarly wise one. To a wide experience of high command in both war and peace, the new Commander-in-Chief had added the immeasurable advantage of first hand knowledge of India's defence problems, gained during his tenure as Chief of the General Staff. It is especially fortunate that, at a time when so many changes are approaching, he should take office already familiar with the weighty issues with which he will be called upon to deal.

Sir Philip Walhouse Chetwode joined the 19th Hussars in 1889 at the age of twenty, rising to command that Regiment in 1908, and captaining its polo team for several years in succession. He first saw service during the Chin Hills campaign of 1892-93, and next in South Africa where he was twice mentioned in despatches and awarded the D. S. O. The outbreak of the Great War found him commanding the 5th Cavalry Brigade which, under him, took a distinguished part in the early cavalry fighting, and during which Sir Philip was wounded. Promotion followed rapidly, first to the 2nd Cavalry Division which he led in France in 1915-16 and later to the Desert Corps in Palestine. His success in this command led to his receiving the 20th Army Corps in 1917. It was this Corps which took a leading part in the capture of Jerusalem, and in that city Sir Philip was knighted by H. R. H. the Duke of Connaught, thus closely repeating the history of an ancestor who, during the first crusade, was knighted by Richard Coeur-de-Lion at Acre. It was General Chetwode's famous appreciation on which

General Allenby based his plan for the final advance and which thus led to the victorious conclusion of the Palestine campaign. From Palestine Sir Philip returned to England to take up the appointment of Military Secretary at the War Office. In 1920 he became Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in 1922 Adjutant-General to the Forces, and in 1923 G. O. C. in Chief, Aldershot Command, being promoted General in 1926. Thence, with wise pre-vision, he was transferred to India as Chief of the General Staff.

Sir Philip Chetwode has become Commander-in-Chief in India—the greatest military command in the Empire—when the responsibilities of that office are to an exceptional degree vital, not only to India but to the whole Empire. He is faced by a number of problems any one of which by itself would be of major importance but which combined present a task such as never confronted any of his predecessors. In addition to the all-pervading financial stringency with its consequent struggle between economy and safety, he will be called upon to deal with the great problems of Indianization, the strength of British troops in India, the composition of the Indian army, the constitutional position of the Defence Forces and Frontier defence. It is fortunate for India and for the Fighting Services in particular that to meet these exacting demands Sir Philip Chetwode brings an inspiring personality, unequalled experience and great mental vigour added to a physical fitness which is a tribute to his own dictum that "the outside of a horse is good for the inside of a man".

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The terms of the truce recently concluded between the Government of India and the Congress Party were such as Mr. Gandhi could have secured at any time within the last twelve months had he cared to ask. It is thus clearly demonstrated that all the past years unrest with its loss of life and its suffering, and all the damage done to India's credit and economic prosperity were unnecessary. They would have been avoided by a somewhat earlier display of the elementary political commonsense that Mr. Gandhi and his associates have at last shown. However, better late than never, and it is to be hoped that "the change of heart" now evinced will be enduring enough to ensure reasonable co-operation by the Congress Party in putting into practical form the broad recommendations of the Round Table Conference.

It is comparatively easy to enunciate admirable principles in the council chamber but immensely difficult to devise acceptable methods of applying them in practical administration. This, it is to be feared, will be found when it comes to implementing the recommendations of the Defence Sub-Committee of the Conference. This Sub-Committee, under the presidency of Mr. J. H. Thomas, devoted the major portions of its four meetings to the discussion of Indianization. It had before it the proceedings of three previous committees on the subject. Of these the " Rawlinson Committee " drew up a scheme for the complete Indianization of the officer ranks of the Indian Army in forty-two years. Lord Reading's Government, with the concurrence of Lord Rawlinson, recommended that this should be reduced to twenty-eight years. The " Skeen Committee ", more cautiously, advised the Indianization of half the Army by 1952. As a whole the Sub-Committee recognized that, however, just and desirable Indianization may be, its pace must be limited to the maximum compatible with the maintenance of present efficiency. In their anxiety to make this clear the following sentence, possibly a little quaint in style, but unimpeachable in wisdom, occurs in their report. "The Sub-Committee as a whole was very anxious not to create the impression that anyone in any way or to any degree wanted to say anything that could even remotely tend to imperil the safety of the country or to weaken the strength of the Army." While a minority held that complete Indianization should be guaranteed within a specified period, the majority recognized the undesirability, indeed the impracticability, of laying down a definite rate for Indianization. In brief, their resolutions were:—

1. The defence of India must be to an increasing extent the concern of the Indian people and not of the British Government.

2. Immediate steps should be taken substantially to increase the rate of Indianization.

3. A training college for candidates for commissions in all branches of the Indian Defence Forces and in Indian States Forces should be established at the earliest possible moment.

4. A committee of experts should be appointed without delay to work out the details of establishing such a college.

5. Indian cadets should continue to be eligible for Sandhurst, Woolwich and Cranwell.

6. The question of a reduction of the British troops in India should be the subject of early expert investigation.

7. The advisability of establishing a Military Council, including representatives of the Indian States, was accepted.

With the recommendations of the previous committees before them, these resolutions of the Sub-Committee cannot be considered revolutionary or unreasonable.

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The Commander-in-Chief on his own behalf and on that of the Government of India has announced that an increase in the rate of Indianization has been accepted, that an Indian Training College will be established at the earliest moment, and that a committee will be assembled this summer to work out the details for the College. It has been for some time recognized that an advance in Indianization was justifiable and it is no secret that the matter has been under consideration at Army Headquarters for some time. What form the new scheme will take is as yet unpublished, but it must obviously, entail the Indianization of more units, probably at least double the number now ear-marked. It is possible also that the opportunity may be taken to place these units on the same officer establishment as the corresponding British ones. Such a change is eventually inevitable, but great care will be necessary to ensure that it does not adversely affect the prospects of serving sepoys and Viceroy's Commissioned Officers. Possibly a solution of this difficulty may be found in a generous allotment of nominations to the new Indian Sandhurst but age and educational qualifications will be an obstacle.

As to the College itself, the great problem will not be to establish it, but to find really suitable cadets to fill it. There are plenty of Indian youths, especially in the North, who possesses the martial instincts and physique required; there are plenty who possess the educational qualifications needed; but it must be confessed that the number who combine these attributes is comparatively few. If entrance to the College is mainly by an educational test it is to be feared the fighting races, which form eighty per cent. of the Indian ranks of the Army, will be but poorly represented. This would be an

injustice and a source of danger. It would seem that, to begin with at least, the course at the College will have to be considerably longer than at Sandhurst and that cadets will join younger so as to complete their general education before commencing strictly military studies. In any case the task before the Expert Committee is no small one.

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There has naturally been a great deal of discussion on the events which occurred along the Frontier during the past Summer. Amongst the many proposals put forward to achieve increased efficiency and economy—some it must be confessed more creditable to their authors' imaginations than to their knowledge of Frontier conditions—one of the most frequent has been the suggestion to revive the old Punjab Frontier Force. The record of the Punjab Frontier Force as a maintainer of order on the World's most turbulent border has never been surpassed. It rested on two things, mobility and the local knowledge acquired by its officers and men through long service on the Frontier. There can be little doubt that units specially, in fact almost exclusively, trained and equipped for warfare, and permanently located in Frontier stations, would be of greater local value than the ordinary regular units serving their two years tour of duty on the Frontier. It has been suggested that this increased efficiency for a special purpose would make possible a reduction in the strength of the Covering Troops, as two or three Frontier Force battalions would be able to do the work of, say, four of the existing battalions. Economy would then be achieved by disbanding the battalions no longer required.

There is, however, as usual another side to the question. Desirable as such an economy in itself might be, it would be purchased at the cost of a reduction in the efficiency of the Army as a whole. Not only would the Field Army be reduced by the disbandment of certain units, but the invaluable Frontier experience now gained by all units in turn would cease. The Army in India is designed primarily to fight in defence of India on or beyond the North-West Frontier, and, if its efficiency for this purpose is to be maintained, as many units as possible must have experience of service conditions in those areas. There can, too, be no doubt that the reconstitution of a special Frontier Force would tend to divide the Indian Army into two parts—a Frontier garrison tied down to its own locality, and a general service army. The serious disadvantages of such a division are obvious.

It is for those in authority to balance the local advantages against such wider disadvantages. Many of the duties of the old Frontier Force are now performed by the Scouts and Militias, and to most observers it would seem that the real solution of many Frontier defence problems lies, not in creating another small specialized force, but in increasing the tactical mobility and initiative of all units of the Indian Army.

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The Lewis Gun, invented a few years previously by Lieut-Colonel Lewis of the United States Army, was first issued to the British Army early in 1915, when the need for increased defensive fire power for Infantry on the Western Front became pressing. The Lewis Gun has thus had a long innings. Sixteen years ago it was, no doubt, as good as, or possibly better than, any other light automatic available, but it certainly is so no longer. For present day requirements, especially for the East, the Lewis Gun is too conspicuous, too heavy, too fragile, too complicated and above all too unreliable. There are now on the market several light automatics or, as their makers often prefer to call them, light machine guns, which, compared with the Lewis, are vastly superior in handiness, simplicity and reliability. Few would question the desirability of replacing the Lewis Gun by one of these and many would go further and substitute the selected light machine gun for the Vickers also. The performance of the best of the new guns, when equipped with a mounting, approximates very closely to that of the present Vickers with the added advantage of lightness. There is, thus, much to be said for having one type of automatic only in the battalion as it would simplify immensely the problems of training and of the replacement of casualties.

The obstacle to re-armament both at Home and in India is, of course, financial. To re-equip at one time the whole Army in India, arrange for the necessary reserves, and organise factory production would require a sum beyond the capacity of the reduced annual Army Budget. It is, however, an open secret that the maintenance and replacement of the present Lewis and Vickers Guns is a heavy, and likely to be an increasingly heavy, charge. It is worth while considering whether, by spending this money on the provision of new light machine guns instead of on the repair and purchase of old weapons, it might not be possible gradually to re-equip the Army in India. Even

if the complete change over took three or four years, it is long overdue and would be enthusiastically welcomed by regimental officers and men.

It is to be hoped that, under expert examination, the financial obstacles will not be found insurmountable, and that exhaustive tests both at Home and in India will continue with the view to selecting the most suitable of the new light machine guns. It would, of course, be an advantage if the Army in India and the Home Army could re-equip at the same time, but, should India be in a position to make a start first, it would be a pity to delay doing so.

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Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition, 1931.

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1931 :—

"Discuss the organization and control of the military, naval and air forces in India during the future advance towards responsible Government and after, and their relation to the police and other civil forces of the Crown."

The following are the conditions of the competition :—

(1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration, the Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force or Auxiliary Forces, who are members of the U. S. I. of India.

(2) Essays must be type-written and submitted in triplicate.

(3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.

(4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.

(5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1931.

(6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges, chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 150, either in addition to or in substitution for the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published.

(7) The name of the successful candidate will be announced at a Council Meeting to be held in September or October 1931.

(8) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

(9) Essays should not exceed 15 pages of the size and style of the Journal, exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

THE SIEGE OF SARAROGHA

(JULY 1930)

BY "SLORA."

Towards the end of June manifestations of unrest in South Waziristan assumed a more concrete form. The well-known Mahsud hostiles Ramzan, Sadde Khan Kundalai and Gulin, who had been disseminating anti-Government propaganda, proceeded to take more active measures. In the first few days of July *lashkars* were raised in the Baddar and Shaktu, and the intention was expressed of isolating Razmak by cutting the roads at Dwatoi and Dosalli. At midday on July 6th, however, reliable information was received at Sararogha that the *lashkars* were advancing on the Scouts' Post there, and could be expected about midnight. On receipt of this information certain outbuildings which were considered dangerous were demolished, and the defences strengthened generally.

At this time the garrison of the Post consisted of one British officer, 11 Indian officers, 363 Indian other ranks and 82 recruits. This was supplemented by two more British officers. The Assistant Political Agent and the Political Tehsildar were also there. In addition one piquet, Langar Khel Piquet to the West of the Post, contained one havildar, 10 Indian other ranks and two signallers.

To follow the subsequent happenings reference should be made to the sketch map.

At 16-00 hours a Shabi Khel Malik rang up from Piazha to say that the *lashkar* was coming and that if he was not speaking the truth the Scouts were at liberty to cut the throats of his two sons, who were at the time detained in the Quarter Guard for political reasons. Immediately after this the wire was cut north of Sararogha, and at 20-30 hours the telephone line was cut downstream of the Post. Darkness descended with everyone keyed up and ready for what the night might bring forth. Quiet reigned until 04-00 hours of the 7th when about seventy shots were fired in the vicinity of the Post and shortly afterwards Sararogha *Khassadar* Post was seen to be in flames. Dawn of the 7th came and revealed about six hundred *lashkarwals* holding the ridges all round the Post.

Two strong *chighas* were sent out to search the neighbouring nullahs and feel the situation generally. They were not fired on, but the *lashkarwals* shouted to them that if a certain British Officer and a certain Indian Officer, whom they named, were handed over to them the rest would be allowed to go in peace. From this it appeared that the leaders Sadde Khan, Ramzan and Gulin had given out to their followers that the Scouts would be willing to hand over the Post to them—such was the effect of the Congress propaganda. It was thought therefore that the sooner their minds were disabused of this idea the better, and that they should learn at once what was the attitude of the Scouts. To this end, when shortly afterwards a *mullah* was observed haranguing a party of some sixty *lashkarwals* in the open eight hundred yards away, a machinegun was turned on to them and several, including the *mullah*, who spun round like a top when hit, were seen to drop. The remainder took to their heels and cover. By this time, from all reports, two to three thousand *lashkarwals* had collected round the Fort.

During the day Sultan, Shamirai, whose village on the left bank of the Takkizam was threatened by the *lashkar*, went to Gulin, one of the leaders, and entreated him to dissuade the *lashkarwals* from attacking his village. Gulin swore on a Quran, which he had in front of him, that, if the Scouts did not surrender in two days, he would show the world how the Mahsuds could storm and capture a British Post. He concluded, his congress lesson well read, that the people of Waziristan had been disgraced before Datta Khel (where the Tochi Scouts had held out against and inflicted severe casualties on a Wazir *lashkar*) and that here was the opportunity of removing the blot from their fair name.

The problem now arose as to the attitude to be adopted with regard to Mahsuds in general. The fact of the Sararogha *Khassadar* Post having been burnt the previous night gave food for thought. On the other hand definite evidence of loyalty on the part of certain of the *Khassadars* was forthcoming, one particular case being a spirited little encounter in which a Naik shot down a Wazir and slightly wounded Ramzan, and was in turn himself wounded. There was also a number of influential Mahsuds who were pro-Sirkar and evinced every desire to help. These had a certain following, and it was decided to utilize their services. They were consequently distributed in

certain points of vantage. Ten selected men together with a *Khassadar* Subedar and one Prang, an aforetime famous raider, whose name had been a by-word, but was now a stout ally, were directed to occupy the school building, North-West of the Post. Shah Bahram, the Malik of a village immediately opposite Sararogha Post across the Takkizam, elected to hold his village against all comers. In view of the fact that this village to a certain extent overlooked the Post at one thousand yards range, its importance may be estimated. Sapri Piquet, just upstream of Shah Bahram's village, on the left bank of the Takkizam, was strengthened by additional Shamirai *Khassadars*. The caves and huts four hundred yards North of the Post were to be held by Shamirais, the women and children being evacuated.

During the afternoon the Royal Air Force carried out bombing with apparently good effect. At 17-45 hours firing broke out at Sapri Piquet and the garrison were seen running back to the village North of the Post. It was obvious that the *lashkar* was creeping in.

Dusk of this the second night came without further incident. During the night *chigha dhols* were beating in every direction auguring an increase in strength of the *lashkars*. The *lashkarwals* confined themselves to the destruction of khassadar posts between Sararogha and Ahnai. A few shots were exchanged at each of these posts before the post was evacuated and set on fire by the *lashkarwals*. A half-hearted attempt was made to capture Langar Khel Piquet but came to nothing, and an attack was made on Shah Bahram's village but was beaten off.

At 04-00 hours a noise was heard at the pumping station in the garden below and four hundred yards to the East of the Fort. The pumping station consisted of an electric pump installed in a square stone house with an iron door, the whole encircled by a barbed wire fence through which was threaded an electrified wire. The Mahsuds apparently proceeded to smash the lock of the door and flames were seen issuing from the doorway. Fire was opened on the Pumping Station, the effect of which, though it could not be ascertained, undoubtedly surprised them and caused them to decamp. It was subsequently found that cotton waste had been lighted under one of the pumps, but very little damage had resulted,. The fact that they had not laid hands on the pumping machinery may possibly be

attributed to one of them having received a shock from the electrified wire, and in consequence strongly distrusting the glittering copper pipes, etc., of the pumps.

The night was memorable for the number of cipher messages that came in over the wireless. It appeared to be a golden opportunity for anyone in possession of the cipher to have some practice in its use. One particularly long message contained the latest news from Sararogha, while another sent congratulations in cipher.

With the dawn of the 8th came parties of *khassadars*, whose posts had been burnt. They joined the friendly Mahsuds who were in the School. A small party of Mahsuds was seen sitting near the aerodrome about four hundred yards from the Post, but so close together and so openly that they appeared to be friendlies afraid of approaching the Post. To verify this the Assistant Political Agent sent out a *khassadar* Duffadar with four men to tell them that if they were friendlies they were asking to be fired on sitting about as they were. The Duffader sent back word that they were *lashkarwals*. Meanwhile, however, they had disappeared into a small *algad* to the West of the *raghza*. They appeared again at a range of seven hundred yards, when a machine gun was turned on them, and dropped one dead in the open and another in the bushes, which somewhat hastened the retreat of the remainder. Soon after a pretty burst of machine gun fire dispersed a gathering in front of the caves. The gunner had the satisfaction of observing one of his casualties bumping down the steep hillside like a *bhoosa* bale.

The first flight of aeroplanes came over shortly after this and started bombing. This continued throughout the day, and made things very unpleasant for the *lashkarwals* who were forced to remain within their caves. Whenever they came out for a breath of fresh air, they were machine gunned from the Fort.

During the morning a report was received from Langar Khel piquet that they were very fit but would like some snuff and Very lights. These the Assistant Political Agent's orderly contrived to get through to them.

At about midday information was received that Sadde Khan was bringing up his gun. This was supposed to be of the gas pipe variety, but was nevertheless going to strike terror into the hearts of the Scouts. For a cannon reputed to have been made in Kanigurum,

it turned out to be a very good piece of work. It was in fact a three piece Screw Gun with well bored rifling and, strangest of all, metric thread. Provided with a steel trail and A. T. cart wheels it made a load for three camels. The shell, weighing 9 lbs., was of turned mild steel, and provided with a copper driving band.

Exaggerated reports as to the strength of the *lashkar* began to come in. One report stated that there were no less than twenty thousand armed men round Sararogha. Probably there were between four and five thousand men of whom only a half would be armed.

The garrison was warned to be prepared for an attack on the post that night. A sketch map of the Fort was handed in to the Assistant Political Agent, showing the frontages which had been allotted for the attack to the various sections of the Mahsuds and Wazirs in the Congress *lashkar*. The signal for the attack was to be the first round fired from the gun. The attack had been well organized, and fire and movement were an essential feature of the plan. The unarmed were to create the impression of large numbers, and to bring ropes and nets in which to carry off the loot.

During the evening, a Congress standard was planted on the Northern end of the *raghza* about six hundred yards from the Post. The *lashkarwals*, however, remained under cover.

Later, in the evening, an N. C. O. reported that two camels had arrived near Sapri piquet ; and he had seen some men carrying a thing that looked like a bit of telegraph pole to a point in that vicinity, approximately one thousand yards from and overlooking the Fort. Closer observation revealed men digging and it was concluded that they were getting the gun into position. In any case they offered a good target, and a machine gun was turned on, scattering them.

At 22·00 hours Prang was sent out to find the new position of the gun. Sadde Khan saw him and warned him to keep away or there would be trouble. Prang, giving an impudent reply, returned with the required information as to the gun position. Machine gun and rifle fire was then opened on it. This completely upset the plan of the hostiles, who were still awaiting reinforcements, and ruined their hopes of effecting a surprise attack. Shortly after this the gun opened fire and the hostiles in their disappointment began heavy rifle fire against the Fort.

The *laskharwals* had evidently been given the impression by the propagandists that they were suffering all their casualties at the hands of the British Officers who were personally firing the machine guns. An opportunity was therefore sought to make the true state of affairs clear to them. A hostile was allowed to approach the Fort, and when within shouting distance he called out "Oh No. 1 Sentry, kill the Sahibs, throw open the gates and come and join us." On this an Indian Officer, ordered a rifle section to fire on him and shouted "That is your reply" adding some well chosen remarks on the subject of Mahsuds and the Congress in general. After this there was no more shouting.

Three more rounds were fired from the gun at roughly half hour intervals. All these went high over the Fort. During the whole of this time fairly heavy firing was directed against the Fort by the *lashkarwals*, but no attack was made. A burst of machine gun fire from the Fort after the third round from the gun, was followed by groans and shouts from the gun position and the casualties inflicted seemed to damp the spirits of the attackers who gradually withdrew.

The firing of the first round from the gun had a peculiar effect on two people in the Fort. The Sub-Assistant Surgeon left his hospital and went up to the Post Commander with a pistol in his hand, and asked if he might take his place on the "battlements." The other person affected was the Mess *Moharrir*, but in a very different way—his excuse was that he had drunk too much tea during the evening, but he will never live it down!

This night a half hearted attack was made on Langar Khel piquet, but was beaten off with loss. On the morning of the 9th there were still enemy in the vicinity of the Post, and the morning patrol round the Fort was heavily fired on and had to withdraw but got out again as soon as the planes arrived. The aeroplanes again carried out bombing throughout the day, and got a good target in a party of *lashkarwals* and inflicted severe loss.

During the morning Sadde Khan's gun opened fire from a cave sixteen hundred yards distant from the Post. The extreme range of the gun was about one thousand yards and the shells were consequently falling about six hundred yards short. The cave area was subjected to heavy bombing by the planes and machine gunning from the Post, which must have made the position uncomfortable. Only a

few rounds were fired from the gun and it was afterwards ascertained that the breech block had been blown through the stomach of the gunner causing both gun and gunner to be of little further use.

During the evening information was received from the Political authorities that the real attack on Sararogha was to take place that night. The effort on the previous night was merely a demonstration. The *lashkarwals* were determined to capture the Fort, even if they had to climb over their own dead to do it. A second Port Arthur attack was to be expected.

Other reports were to the effect that the *lashkar* was dispersing as there had been a disruption between the leaders. This report proved to be correct, and the night of the 9th passed without incident. With dawn on the 10th *chighas* were sent out to search the neighbouring nullahs, which they reported free of enemy on their return.

It now became necessary to clear the local situation and a strong *gasht* under two British Officers piquetted their way down to Ahnai Post, five miles South of Sararogha Post, and returned without incident. A reconnaisance *gasht* from Jandola moved up past Kotkai to within four miles of Ahnai to find a considerable number of the *lashkarwals* in parties of fifty or sixty strong on the hills around, but in effect blocking the road to Ahnai. The Post there had been fired on on the night of the 7th/8th but no serious attempt had been made to capture it. The only evidence of the Congress *lashkar's* visit was a certain number of bent telegraph poles, and a lot of useless telegraph wire lying on the road. On the 11th a strong *gasht* in lorries, came right through from Jandola to Sararogha and got back without a shot being fired at it.

During the course of the next three days, patrols were sent out North and South of Sararogha, but no opposition was met with. The Congress *lashkar* had dispersed.

Now remained to the Political authorities the task of rewarding the " good boys " and punishing the bad. From the accurate information received it was known which sections and sub-sections were involved. The failure of the siege had a great political effect on the Mahsuds, who realised that the Congress theory of the Scouts joining with them had been a lie, and they were up against a garrison staunch and loyal to the Sirkar whose salt they ate. The final of the

Congress effort in Waziristan ended a little later in July when the Razmak Column and detachments of the Tochi and South Waziristan Scouts proceeded to Ladha, the home of Sadde Khan and Ramzan. Here, after a few minor engagements resulting in casualties on both sides, all except the irreconcilables came in and made their peace with Government.

SORAROGHA AREA



Scale 1 Inch = 1 Mile.

Furlongs 8 6 4 2 0 1 Mile

The Gun's 4th position is on the Jandola Mess Lawn

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MACHINE GUNS IN THE BRITISH ARMY DURING THE GREAT WAR.

By

Captain D. N. Wimberley, M. C.,

The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders.

Military thought has sometimes been criticized in the past by Service writers as resembling the swinging of a pendulum: if the history of our Machine Gun organization and tactical training in the last fifteen to twenty years is studied, there will certainly be found support for such a simile. It is proposed here to trace what have been the generally accepted methods of handling Machine Guns in the British Army during this period and, where possible, to account for the changes in organization and tactics which have arisen from time to time. In our survey, examples will be taken from the Western Front of the Great War, partly because this was the main theatre, but mainly because it was the theatre where the writer happened to have served.

From the earliest days of the Machine Gun the question which exercised tactical thinkers in the various European Armies was to decide whether this weapon was to be regarded as an Artillery weapon, as a purely Infantry weapon, or as a support weapon having special characteristics and thereby best served by specialist personnel of its own. As a purely Artillery weapon, the Machine Gun went out of favour as long ago as before the Russo-Japanese War, but as late as 1911 we find Sir Douglas Haig ordering in a collective training treatise that "The practice of employing an Artillery officer as Brigade Machine Gun Officer is unsound; he may only be employed to assist." The controversy as to whether the Machine Gun should or should not remain as a weapon to be handled inside an Infantry Battalion continued, as we shall see, for many years.

The opening of the Great War found the B. E. F. Infantry organized with two Machine Guns per Battalion. The gun was used as a purely infantry weapon and the tactical teaching had for some time resembled in some respects that of the present day, as may be seen from the following extracts from pre-war training manuals.

Machine Guns will cover the advance of the firing line by engaging the enemy from positions in close support of it..... positions on a flank of the attacking Battalions or on commanding ground will be selected.

It will be advisable to keep Machine Guns with the battalions which are first extended, while those of reserve battalions are placed under the command of the Brigade Machine Gun Officer.

Overhead direct fire was a recognized method of shooting. Indirect fire was more talked of than used, though as early as 1909 Captain R. V. K. Applin in his book "Machine Gun Tactics" described in detail how this could be carried out.

By the end of 1914 the Machine Gun had proved itself as the weapon in defence, thereby merely confirming a reputation already earned in the eyes of observers as far back as the Russo-Japanese War. In the attack, its virtues were not so apparent. With but two guns in a battalion, the bold handling rather advocated could hardly be afforded. Indeed, this policy of bold handling became near to a form of suicide when it entailed carrying heavy guns and tripods across a no man's land between trenches, completely lacking any form of covered approach, close behind the leading infantry attacking wave. Infantry battalion Machine Gun detachments at this time became frequently known as the "Suicide Club," a dubious honour which they later passed on to the infantry bombers! The lack of knowledge of Machine Gunnery possessed by most infantry officers in 1915 was very marked; the Machine Gun Officer was a complete specialist and in most cases he was given a free hand as to how he used his guns. As is usually the case with new weapons, there were various schools of thought as to the best use for the guns and battalions relieving each other in the trenches seldom seemed to occupy the same defensive positions, thus each detachment laboriously prepared fresh emplacements.

Throughout 1915, Machine Guns, now increased to four, were usually used, in defence, singly in the front or support lines to fire in enfilade. In attack they endeavoured to keep down enemy fire by sweeping his front line parapet from the flanks of our own attacking infantry, and made their way forward as consolidating guns once our infantry had established themselves in the enemy's forward trenches. Overhead fire was not very commonly used, this being largely due to the lack of training of the personnel then serving in most

detachments. It must be remembered in this respect that very few infantry reservists at that time were trained Machine Gunners, and owing to the heavy casualties of 1914-1915, Reserve Battalions at home had the greatest difficulty in keeping their active battalions supplied with even partially trained personnel. For instance, when the writer found himself appointed Machine Gun Officer of a Regular Battalion a week after joining for the first time in France, the bulk of his section consisted of men of a new draft who had also just arrived overseas after but a few weeks Machine Gun training in the Reserve Battalion.

It was the impossibility of maintaining trained reinforcements which was the main reason for the forming of the new Machine Gun Corps which was raised at Grantham in the Winter of 1915-1916. In France the forming of the Corps was a very gradual business. Infantry Machine Gun detachments at this period generally numbered over fifty men for the four guns. This number was necessary to provide relief gun teams, as the policy in many Infantry Brigades was now to keep the bulk of all units Machine Guns permanently in the trenches so long as the Brigade in question held a part of the line. Thus Machine Gunners were becoming accustomed to finding themselves supporting battalions other than their own. The next stage was for the resting Machine Gun teams of the various battalions to live together in billets, and from this, Machine Gun companies, composed of the four battalion sections, were gradually formed, though in some divisions each unit section retained its own uniform right up to the Somme in July, 1916.

The Winter 1915-1916 saw also the arrival of the Lewis Gun in France, and this, combined with the new Machine Gun organization, was responsible for great changes in the tactical handling of the latter weapon. Emphasis was now laid on the sustained fire power possible with the Machine Gun, and by the time of the Somme it became the exception to find these weapons sited amongst the foremost infantry. Great attention was now paid to long fields of fire, but guns were still normally sited singly. With a more highly trained personnel, overhead and indirect fire became more generally used in the new 16 gun Companies. This showed itself in the practise of night harassing fire in defence, and in longer range overhead fire in attack. In the Somme battles Machine Guns no longer accompanied leading attacking waves. Instead, seizing their opportunity to pass through the hostile bar-

rage, they moved forward as consolidating guns to predetermined positions. Similarly, in defence, the old haphazard system whereby each Battalion Commander, or even Machine Gun Officer, moved the position of guns at each relief into a trench system, gave way to a more centralized system whereby the Brigade Commander decided the permanent emplacement for all the Machine Guns in the sector. These positions, as soon as time permitted, were supplied with covered over loopholed emplacements built of steel rails and concrete.

At Grantham, a veritable hive of Machine Gunnery had sprung up. By the late Summer of 1916, the new Divisions in France had all been supplied with Brigade Machine Gun Companies and still the demand was for more Machine Guns. It was decided that every Division should be given a new fourth Divisional Machine Gun Company, thus bringing the total number of guns in the Division up to 64.

Unfortunately there were no infantry undergoing training near the Machine Gun Training Centre, and as a result the new Machine Gun Companies never had an opportunity of working with infantry until they arrived in France. Six months were allowed a Company Commander to turn his 200 odd raw Derby recruits and newly commissioned officers, all of whom incidentally reported to him practically on the same day, into a unit fit for active service. As can be imagined, under these conditions, the tactical training of all ranks was exceedingly sketchy. But if the tactical training was lacking, the standard of fire direction attained in the new Companies was probably higher than it had been since 1914. The Machine Gun Corps seemed to attract mathematicians, advice was eagerly sought from the Royal Artillery, and at all the Grantham courses interesting new methods of indirect fire were being dunned into willing ears, while the Grantham tradesmen did good trade in innumerable gadgets advertised as aids to Machine Gun indirect fire.

That the Machine Gun was not an infantry weapon was now the lesson brought out in every course at the Training Centre in 1917. "Machine Guns form the connecting link between the infantry on the one hand and the trench mortars and field guns on the other," said an official G. H. Q. publication of the time, and it continued later "The Machine Gun is recognised, as indeed it must be, as an intermediate

weapon with tactics of its own, which are neither those of the infantry nor artillery. They are employed apart from the infantry." No longer an infantry weapon, the Machine Gun was now generally regarded as a support weapon with special characteristics of its own.

By the Summer of 1917 many changes were noticeable. With the arrival of more guns, it had become customary to site guns in pairs in defence, the whole Divisional Machine Gun plan of the sector being co-ordinated, and frequently nearly every pair of guns being actually sited by a Divisional Headquarter Officer termed the Divisional Machine Gun Officer. Guns, though still generally sited for direct enfilade fire covering the so-called 'Battle Zone' of trenches, had a invariable secondary task of overhead fire, direct or indirect, in answer to a S. O. S. call when put up by the foremost infantry. Long night harassing fire programmes were now the normal routine. In the attacks on July 31st near Ypres and on the 20th November at Cambrai, while a proportion of Machine Guns were still used as consolidating guns, the bulk of them were now used as supporting weapons to give Machine Gun Barrage Fire.

Equipped with "T" bases to ensure steadiness of platform, and with officers informed by the Artillery of the meteorological variation of the day, they employed indirect fire over the heads of the advancing infantry, working to a rigid timed programme. As the advance continued, fresh Machine Gun batteries usually eight guns together, came into action in predetermined positions, and by means of previously worked out calculations off an accurate 1/20,000 map, they continued the same type of fire to a considerable depth. Similarly, when the infantry were ordered to consolidate a position, these Machine Gun batteries were at once laid on S. O. S. lines and on the signal that a counterattack was developing they fired belt after belt of blind indirect fire. Had statistics been obtainable at say this Third Battle of Ypres, it would probably have been found that it took several belts of this type of shooting to inflict a single casualty! It must be remembered, however, that at this period of the war the Artillery on both sides were carrying out exactly the same type of semi-blind barrage shooting, and there were undoubtedly occasions when a Machine Gun barrage of this nature and the advancing enemy did meet in the same area when very heavy casualties were inflicted. Incidentally this fighting at Passchendale

was the cause of some curious departures from accepted methods for carrying out indirect fire. By our text books at the time it was laid down that Machine Guns were to be sited for this type of shooting at regular intervals of about ten yards apart. Cover from shells, however, in that battle was the first essential, and any remnant of a captured concrete pill box still standing was eagerly sought for by infantry and machine gunners alike. Near the river Steenbeek, in the writer's Company, for the battle of the 20th September, 1917, four Machine Gun teams crouched under the shelter of one such battered concrete remnant. This, in its complete state, was probably not more than fifteen feet square. One gun was tucked into position against each side wall, a third was dug into the mud against the front, while the fourth, built up, fired over the top of what was left of the roof.

The collapse of Russia in the winter of 1917-1918 meant almost the certainty of a big German offensive in the Spring. Attention in our Army in this winter was therefore focussed more on defence than attack. From the French was now copied the "Champagne" Machine Gun emplacement and by March, 1918, in many Divisions, this had become the standard type. Machine Guns were no longer sited in the trenches themselves, but tunnels were driven forward from the big platoon deep dug outs existing in trenches of the battle zone; these broke surface some 40 to 50 feet in front of the infantry fire trench in the form of two square holes. Here, covered by camouflage netting, two open Machine Guns emplacements for a sub-section (then two guns) were built. This type of emplacement was slow to build but had great advantages. The guns being well away from the fire trench were, provided they remained concealed, less likely to get a direct hit from a shell. The emplacements being connected with the platoon dug out, the gun teams and infantry lived together. This undoubtedly assisted co-operation, while, when in action, the gunners had the comforting thought that the infantry were close at hand. Unfortunately, however, the enthusiasm of certain Machine Gun technical experts had led them into developing a rival theory for the siting of Machine Guns in defence. So interested in indirect fire had some of these enthusiasts become, that to those that disagreed with them, it appeared as if they preferred to kill the enemy by elaborately calculated indirect fire rather than by using the simpler method of open sights. They forgot that it was for the latter simpler and quicker method that

the gun was designed. Followers of this school sited their guns in defence in batteries of four or even eight guns for indirect fire, sometimes even regardless of whether good fields of direct fire were obtainable from the position chosen. Linked by an elaborate telephone system to the Divisional Machine Gun Officer's battle post, and surrounded by diagrams showing alternative barrages in different colours depicting a "No Man's Land" covered with interlocking zones of fire, they awaited the German attack. In justice, however, to the above somewhat scathing indictment, it must be stated that there was another good reason for the grouping of guns in such large numbers. The reason was undoubtedly partly for the sake of morale. This factor of morale is important, as it is one apt to be lost sight of in peace time when all soldiers are expected, when ordered, to fight to the end. In 1918, the type of officer or man was not that of "The First Hundred Thousand," nor had they the discipline of the Regular Army. It had been found on certain occasions that very small parties of Machine Gunners in isolated positions away from the infantry could not always be relied upon to continue firing just when they were most required. The grouping of guns gave the comfort of added numbers, and ensured the presence of at least two officers.

While the changes in tactical handling, just described, were taking place, there was also a great change in organization. At different dates during the first half of 1918 the four Machine Gun Companies in each Division were re-organized into a Machine Gun Battalion. There were many good reasons for the change at the time :—

(*a*) Machine Gun Companies were quite independent units, the Divisional Machine Gun Officer being more or less a staff officer. Thus in a small way the Commanding Officer had as much responsibility as the Commander of an infantry battalion. There were, however, in France at this time nearly two hundred Machine Gun Companies and the supply of efficient young company commanders capable of taking the responsibility of an independent command had begun to give out. Many companies, reflecting the inexperience of their commanders, had become slack and inefficient.

(*b*) At about this time infantry battalions in the Division had been reduced from sixteen to twelve battalions and in every

Division there was thus at least one good Commanding Officer unemployed.

(*c*) Machine Gun Companies were wasteful in Headquarter and administrative personnel, and the man power question was beginning to become acute.

(*d*) The new organization made the Machine Gun fire power available more flexible. Companies were no longer tied to Infantry Brigades.

(*e*) True or false, rumour at the time had it that certain of the Machine Gun hierarchy were not adverse to a new organization which greatly increased the number of Lieut.-Colonels in the Corps. However, if the above were some of the advantages there were great disadvantages to the new organization. The battalions were unwieldy and cumbersome to a degree. Consisting, as they did, of 64 guns, and no less than some 50 British Officers, they had to operate over a whole Divisional frontage. Difficult enough in defence, this was an almost impossible task in the attack. For trench warfare it managed to function, but it divorced still more the Machine Gunner and the infantryman by breaking the Brigade link. The best that can be said of the Machine Gun Battalions was that they were probably a necessary evil of the time. Concurrently with the decision for Machine Gun Battalions, and following on logically with the teaching that the Machine Gun was an intermediate specialist arm with tactics of its own, came the appointing of Machine Gun advisers to the higher staffs. Thus Corps and Army Machine Gun Officers took their place in these formations.

On the 21st March the great German attack began. The weakness of the battery system of indirect fire became at once apparent. The elaborate system of telephone wires, when laid, were mainly cut, the enemy penetrated with apparent ease at various points in the dawn mist and turned inwards to pinch out the intervening ground. The batteries of Machine Guns which had been conscientiously firing on to a portion of No Man's Land on which, as often as not, the Germans had not advanced, found themselves presented as a massed target

taken from a flank on which they had almost no direct field of fire. Meanwhile, the personnel of those Machine Guns more wisely sited for a long wide direct field of fire, were obtaining the targets of their dreams. With the advent of more open warfare, the question of the supply of food and ammunition under the new organization became even more difficult. Except under the loosest possible form of decentralization, no easy matter with the establishments now laid down, it was difficult to carry on at all. It was now, as far as possible, the Divisional Artillery organization rather than Artillery fire tactics that all tried to follow. As usual, the pendulum swung rapidly. From April, 1918, onwards stress was again laid on the necessity of a good direct field of fire before everything else, less emphasis was laid on close liaison with the Artillery and more on keeping the closest touch with the Infantry.

With the end of the Great War came the end of the Machine Gun Corps, though at least one battalion lingered on to do good service in Ireland as late as 1921. Gone was the elaborate organization, and once more the Machine Gun found itself a part of the infantry battalion, though now consisting of eight guns and being increased from a section to a platoon. During the next five years, co-operation with the infantry once more became of the closest. With every year's training the tactical handling, always the weakest part in the War, rapidly improved; fire direction, meanwhile, almost as rapidly deteriorated. In the opinion of many, the old standard of indirect fire, from want of use, had become, in many units, largely a lost art. Overhead direct fire as often practised on schemes could never, in actual fact, have been carried out. The pendulum had now swung back with a vengeance.

To-day we have back with us the Machine Gun Company, but this time as a very important part of the battalion. The Machine Gun is again firmly established not as an infantry weapon but as the infantry weapon. The most experienced and best brains in the Army are busy thinking out how best it can be used in the attack. Stress has been laid on the fact that the Machine Gun is no longer a specialist weapon. All commanders, we are instructed, must fully understand its powers and limitations. It was partly in order to drive this very fact home to Commanding Officers that last year Machine Gun concentrations were not held in certain districts in India. The tactical handling of the Machine Gun requires but tactical common sense, knowledge

of the weapon's characteristics, and some practical experience. A thorough understanding of the fire direction of the weapon, however, requires considerable study and, better still, attendance at a course. The Brigadier, the Commanding Officer and his senior officers are all perfectly capable of ensuring that the Machine Gun is properly handled in the field, but, without actual previous experience, are they equally capable of supervision to ensure a high standard of Machine Gun fire direction in their units ? How many, having laudably made it their business to see detachments actually on the Field Firing Range, are able to criticize helpfully the type of shooting being carried out ? If we are to get the most out of the weapon, not only must the Machine Gun be tactically manoeuvred to the best possible position and range to give suitable covering fire, but when got there the fire direction must be of a standard which ensures that the gun employs the type of fire best suited to the ground and for the particular target engaged, and then hits this target without delay.

In this lies the main argument for the retention of the Brigade Machine Gun Officer.

JOHN JORROCKS, AIRMAN.

HE USE OF AN AEROPLANE FOR HUNTING.

BY

LIEUT.-COLONEL A. V. T. WAKELY, M. C., M.F.H.

It is hoped that readers will not imagine from the heading of this article that the writer is in the habit of following hounds in an aeroplane. It would indeed be difficult to think of a more unsuitable method of pursuing the fox or the jackal, and one would probably see more of a hunt from a cross-country tractor than from an aeroplane. This does not mean to say that an aeroplane is of no value to a Master of Hounds, and the object of these short notes is to describe how the aeroplane can be used with great advantage to provide good sport for followers of hounds.

It is for reconnaissance work previous to hunting days that the aeroplane can be usefully employed. In India we hunt under different conditions from those that obtain at home. Our hunting days are shorter, because, in a hot sun, scent does not lie. We have to meet at daybreak and have only two or three hours available before scent disappears entirely. Also many of us are busy men and cannot afford the time to stay out with hounds all day. The M. F. H. in India is, therefore, faced with the problem of how to show sport in the shortest possible time, and he must make sure of finding jackal almost as soon as he moves off from the meet.

Jackal in India are not exactly ubiquitous, they have their definite abodes which must be known to the M. F. H. The area of country which may have to be traversed in search of jackal is enormous, and no master can afford to hack with his field miles to covert as is done at home. He must meet close to his coverts, and those coverts must hold jackal. The present writer remembers explaining this to some lady members of his field sometime ago, and saying that he used an aeroplane for finding jackal. The reply was, "Gracious, I did not think you could see a jackal from an aeroplane." Quite, one cannot see that elusive animal, but one can see where he lives, and, having spotted the covert from an aeroplane, it is a simple matter to visit it

with hounds. It may be argued that all this can be done more efficiently and more pleasantly by ground reconnaissance on horseback. It can certainly be done more pleasantly by that means, but not more efficiently. In many hunting countries in India the chief coverts in which jackal are found consist of sugar-cane crops. The cultivators sow very large areas of this crop as it is a valuable one. It grows about eight or ten feet high and is quite easily seen from the air. The cutting of the crop begins in October and lasts until January.

The result is that the Masters' coverts are continually changing, both in location and in size. At the beginning of the season many coverts are so big that it would be quite hopeless to bring hounds to them. No pack could ever get a jackal to leave them. In January the same covert may be so small that it will not hold jackal. Between these two extremes there is infinite variation. An M. F. H. must keep abreast of the situation in order that he may know at any time where to go to find jackal with a reasonable prospect of getting a hunt in open country. He must also know at any time where not to go, and where his hounds would be likely to spend hours in heavy cover without the possibility of a run.

No master has sufficient horses available to do on the ground the continuous reconnaissance which this entails and it is here that an aeroplane is so extremely valuable.

One can fly over the whole of an average hunting country in a couple of hours in an aeroplane, and one can mark up on the map the location of the various coverts. The most likely ones, and those only, can then be visited on horseback on subsequent mornings. The procedure which the writer adopts and which works excellently is :—

(1) to fly over the whole country twice or three times at the beginning of the season and to mark on the map the approximate position and the size of every patch of sugar-cane ;

After a little experience this is much easier to do than it seems.

(2) to fly over the country once a fortnight during the season to note how the cutting of the cane is proceeding, to fix suitable meets for the next fixture card and to settle the draw for each meet ;

(3) to make occasional flights as may be convenient for the purpose of settling doubtful points.

It is clearly impossible to find out from the air whether jackal are inhabiting any particular coverts, or to find out where their earths are. This can be done subsequently on horseback, the advantage of previous air reconnaissance being that the exact location of the coverts to be visited is known and time and horseflesh are not wasted in, possibly, fruitless searches over wide areas for the coverts. Air reconnaissance also saves one the trouble of visiting very large coverts which it would obviously useless to draw with hounds.

The procedure outlined above would seem entraordinary to a Master of Hounds in England. His coverts, however, are fixed and do not alter. It is when the whole basis of the Master's draw is continually in a state of flux that regular air reconnaissance is of such value and saves so much time.

It is now proposed to give instances of the direct advantages of air reconnaissance for hunting purposes. In the Delhi country at the beginning of the current season it was clearly evident from air reconnaissance that there were four areas into which it would be hopeless to take hounds. These particular areas at the end of the previous season had been our happy hunting grounds and many good hunts had been enjoyed in them. The writer received many enquiries as to why we never went to these places this season. They were left severely alone till January, and when the cane was cut they again gave excellent sport.

It is a bold statement to make that air reconnaissance can be of assistance to a Master actually in casting hounds during a hunt, yet it is true. In one instance this season the writer had a trace of jackal in front of hounds. They divided at a certain point and it was a question which one would be pursued. One ran apparently into very open country and the other into apparently close country. The latter was chosen and a fine hunt resulted. The reason was that just beyond the open country which was on high ground was a huge sugar-cane covert several hundreds of acres in extent into which the jackal was going and into which hounds would have at once run and stayed for several hours. This large covert though never visited on the ground had been seen from an aeroplane. It later on in its turn produced a good hunt when it had assumed manageable dimensions. On another occasion the meet was on a certain road and it had been decided some ten days previously to draw north of

the road, but the day before the meet there was some doubt whether this would do. On account of horse influenza no horse was available for reconnaissance, and it was thought that enough could be seen from the road in a car. A suitable sugar-cane patch was noted, but on the way home we met a zamindar. He expressed surprise when he was told where we were going to draw, saying that we would never find. It was then too late to do anything but take a quick flip in an aeroplane. The patch of cane was then seen to be only five yards wide. A strip half a mile long was visible from the road, but it had no depth and would not have held any jackal. The pilot was then asked to fly over the area south of the road, and an excellent patch of cane was seen. It was well sheltered by trees and a more suitable place for jackal could not be imagined. Hounds drew it next morning and ran eight miles, killing their jackal handsomely. On another day the meet had been fixed some days previously on the assumption that normal cutting of the sugar-cane would proceed and that the area would be open. Hearing that there had been three weddings in the village and that no cane had been cut for a week the writer went up in the air to see. The place was still a mass of sugar-cane and quite hopeless. The meet was therefore changed and hounds brought off a great hunt.

These are typical instances of the value of air reconnaissance for hunting purposes. It should be noted also that this sort of close reconnaissance from an aeroplane is extremely valuable military training. It gives one the eye of a hawk for anything and everything on the ground. It teaches one to read a map rapidly and accurately since the reconnaissance is worthless without quick and good map-reading. One learns the country by this means in a way that is impossible otherwise on account of the enormous areas to be covered. The whole country lies like an open book before one, and it is a fascinating occupation to work out from an aeroplane where hounds have run in previous hunts and the reason why. The changing conditions of coverts may be peculiar to India, but any M. F. H. taking over a new country at home could not have a better means than the aeroplane for learning it and the likely runs of his foxes.

What would our old friend John Jorrocks have thought of this ultra-modern aid to killing foxes. He would surely have welcomed it if it assisted him to kill foxes, but it is doubtful whether he would

have forsaken his trusty friend Arterxerses for it. He would certainly have had some caustic remarks to make if he had been compelled to don a parachute, and indeed a special make of that uncomfortable article would have had to be provided to take an M. F. H. of his proportions. As the worthy Master would have said "A fall's an hawful thing."

THE IRISH REGIMENTS IN THE SERVICE OF FRANCE.

The Irish Brigade.

1689-1791.

On the 10th of August 1791 the historic Irish Brigade of the French Army, which had served it for just 101 years, taking part during that period in 89 major battles, sieges, and naval engagements in Europe, the French Colonial possessions, and in India, ceased to exist as such, and became the 107th Regiment of the French Line, though retaining the name "Dillon's L'Irlandais."

This measure of the National Assembly, then the governing body of France, has been cited as an example of the ingratitude of the nascent Republic to a body of soldiers who had served the nation long, well, and faithfully. The accusation is without any real foundation, for in hard fact, the decision was forced upon the Assembly by the action of the officers of the Brigade. It was well known that their sympathies lay with the fallen monarchy, which, from the point of view of mercenaries, as these men really were, was an illogical attitude. Their duty lay with the nation that paid them, and not with the monarchy which had discredited itself, and been set aside by that nation.

This question of the nationality of the officers and men of the Irish Brigade had occasionally been an awkward one for the British, when some of these men became their prisoners of war. For instance, when Lally's regiment (a battalion of Dillon's) surrendered to the English at Pondicheri in January 1761, it was ascertained that quite a number of the officers were native born Irishmen, who had never renounced their nationality, and as such were liable to be shot as traitors to the English Government. However the question was eventually settled by treating the native born and the French-born Irish alike, and in order to save complications after the war all were repatriated to France.

But, long before 1791, with the exception of officers, native born Irishmen had become exceedingly scarce in the Irish brigade, nor was there a great proportion of the descendants of the original soldiers,

who had crossed over in 1689. About one-half of the officers were Irish born, the remainder, though Irish by name, being practically Frenchmen of a descent of three generations. Lecky, writing of the Irish Brigade, remarks in this connection: "The severe laws passed by the Irish Parliament against those who enlisted under the French flag, coupled with the relaxation of the Catholic penal laws, which permitted Catholic soldiers to join the ranks of the British Army for the first time since 1688, had long checked the tide of such emigration to France, and the Irish element amongst the soldiers was reduced to very small proportions, and those mostly French-born. But the officers were still Irish, or of Irish origin, and to a large extent belonged, or had belonged, to distinguished Irish families." This statement is corroborated from the memoirs of Count O'Connell, the last Colonel of the Irish Brigade, who, in a letter dated August 1770, remarked that the recruiting prospects of the Brigade were at last excellent, it having been assigned a special district in French Flanders from which to draw its recruits. Another source is indicated in a letter of June 1779, in which the Colonel mentions having received a large draft of English recruits from the prisons whom he characterises as "the most wicked Dogs that ever trod the decks of a Privateer."

The ultimate fate of the Irish Brigade, as well as that of the other foreign regiments in the service of France, which comprised Swedes, Italians, Germans, Catalonians, and Swiss, was long and acrimoniously debated in the Assembly; some of the members being for a total abolition, whilst others were contented with a drastic change of constitution. The latter counsel prevailed, so that, in July 1791, the Irish Brigade was ordered to discard the distinctive red uniform it had worn since its formation, and the banner which distinguished it from the other regiments of the French Army.

This banner consisted of a Crowned Staff, to which was attached a flag divided into four quarters of red and green silk, quartered diagonally, in each of which was embroidered a golden crown. Over these squares was a Red Cross outlined in white, extending the length and breadth of the flag, in the centre of which was embroidered an Irish Harp and Crown in gold, beneath which was the motto "*In Hoc Signo Vincis.*" Beneath this, again, was the name of the regiment, such as Dillon, Clare, Berwick, or Walsh. For the old uniform and this banner, were to be substituted the ordinary dress of the French

line and a tricoloured flag bearing the words "Discipline and Valour," in French—a motto ever since borne by the foreign regiments of France, with the exception of the short-lived Irish Legion, hereafter to be chronicled.

Some of the officers declined to accept these stipulations, and deserted to the *Emigres*. Others remained on in the service, and it was thought that they would accept the change without further demur, until, on the 7th of August, 1791, Colonel MacCarthy, a French-born Irishman commanding the Regiment of Berwick, marched it from Givet on the frontier to join the Germans at Coblentz. This definitely settled the fate, not only of the Irish Brigade, but of the other foreign regiments in the service of France. On the 10th of August, 1791, the very day of the assault on the Tuileries and the annihilation of the Swiss Guards by the mob, the fiat went forth for the abolition of all foreign regiments, and the Irish Brigade became a four—battalion regiment of the French line.

Apparently, the services of Berwick's Regiment were not appreciated by the Germans, for it ceased to exist in 1792. What became of the officers for the next few years is not apparent, though in 1794 a number of them, including MacCarthy himself, were gazetted to the new Irish Brigade of Catholics, raised in Ireland for the Colonial service of the English. Colonel MacCarthy became Governor of Senegal in 1812, and in 1824 was ambushed in an expedition against the Ashantis, who killed him and a number of others, ate their bodies and retained their skulls as fetishes, until they were recovered by a subsequent expedition.

This Irish Brigade of the English, though sanctioned in 1794, did not really materialise until 1796, and even then, the six battalions originally ordered were reduced to three owing to lack of recruits. It being impossible to retain such units in Ireland on account of the disturbed state of the country and the suspicions of the English concerning battalions of Irish Catholics, they were despatched to the Colonial garrisons of the West Indies, Canada, and Nova Scotia. The climatic toll was so heavy that by 1806 the battalions ceased to exist, and the officers were placed on the half-pay of the English establishment.

Of the original Irish Brigade of France, one battalion of Dillon's surrendered to the English at San Domingo in September 1793, and a

year later were received into the British service, only to be disbanded in October 1798 without seeing any service under its new employers. Another Dillon's was raised in 1795, also officered from the old Irish Brigade and this saw service in Egypt, at the battle of Alexandria in 1801. It was broken up in 1812. Still another Dillon's came into existence in 1805, which was numbered the 101st of the British Line, and later named the Duke of York's Irish Regiment. This saw no service, and was disbanded in 1817.

We have thought it necessary to give these details, the result of considerable research, in order to clear up the confusion regarding these numerous regiments of Dillon and to confute the assertion that some of the Regiments of the Irish Brigade of the French actually fought for England. In parting with them we should state that the original regiments of the Irish Brigade of France, were in order of seniority, Dillon's, Clare's, Berwick's, and Walsh's. The regiment of Clare ceased to exist in 1775, when it was absorbed into Berwick's. Other names borne by these Regiments, or battalions of them, were, Bulkeley's, Rothe's, Conway's, Lally's, and others. But all were battalions of the original Regiments, or those Regiments themselves, which in accordance with the custom of the time, bore the name of the then Colonel commanding.

The Irish Legion of Napoleon.

1803-1815.

For the next twelve years, France, for almost the first time in her history, was without any foreign regiments in her service, until, their usefulness being realised, four more were raised. These, in order of seniority, were La Tour D'Auvergne, Isenberg, D'Irlandais, and Prussia. The Legion D'Irlandais was raised at the suggestion of Marechal Clarke, a French-born Irishman, who was Minister of War to Napoleon. At this period the preparations for the invasion of England from Boulogne were in an advanced stage, and it occurred to Marechal Clarke that an expedition to Ireland, at the same time, would still further embarrass the English by raising the native Irish against them.

At the moment there was a considerable number of Irish refugees from the rebellion of 1798 and other political upheavals in France, and it was thought to utilise these to form a regiment of Irishmen, which would become the rallying point of the Irish rebels when this

force of combined Irishmen and Frenchmen should land in Ireland. The command was given to Arthur O'Connor, an ex-Irish M. P. who had been implicated in the rebellion of 1798, but had been acquitted when tried at Maidstone in the following year. After the acquittal, he crossed over to France and entered the French Army, ultimately becoming a General. He managed to escape being entangled in the "Hundred Days," thereby retaining his rank, and dying a General in the year 1852. With him was associated a person named John Nadget, whose career forms a curious parallel with that of Roger Casement one hundred and thirteen years later. John Nadget had also been employed in the British Foreign Office, and, being detected in treasonable correspondence with the rebel Irish, had been compelled to seek refuge in France, where he secured employment in a similar capacity under Marechal Clarke. Being Irish born, he was deputed to endeavour to raise recruits for the new Legion from the French prisons, in which there were immured a considerable number of Irish Catholics, prisoners of war from the British Army and Fleet. He had even less success than Casement in this mission, for, whilst Casement managed to secure three or four men, Nadget could not manage to enlist a single one! This was all the more peculiar as a considerable number of these prisoners of war were ex-rebels, who had been forced into the British service after Vinegar Hill, as the alternative to death or long imprisonment.

However, sufficient recruits, whether all Irishmen or not, were forthcoming to enable the Legion to be strong enough to present itself before Napoleon in December 1804 to receive, with the rest of the French Army, the new Eagles from his hand. Though there were three other foreign regiments, the Legion D'Irlandais was the only one honoured with an Eagle, the rest having to be content with the tricolour of the French Army, a fact which shows the importance Napoleon attached to this unit.

As these Eagles have often been mentioned, but seldom described, we consider ourselves justified in describing that presented to the Legion D'Irlandais, which differed only from those of the French Regiments in the attached banner being of Irish Green, instead of the French tricolour. The standard of Napoleon differed from all others of any army at the time, in being a combined one—the Eagle being the insignia of the Emperor, and the banner that of the Nation. It consisted of a staff surmounted by an Eagle of copper

gilt, representing the bird with partly opened wings, glancing to the left, and grasping a thunderbolt in its claws. The dimensions were 8 inches in height from claws to crest, and 9½ inches from wing tip to wing tip, the weight being exactly 3½ pounds. The bird was supported on a brass tablet, 5″ long by 3″ wide, on which was inscribed the name of the Regiment, which in this case was

3me. Legion Etrangere

L'Irlandais.

The banner attached to the staff was of dark green silk, on one side of which was embroidered in gold, "Napoleon, Empereur Francais, au Legion Irlandais," and on the other the legend, " L'Independence d'Irlande " also in gold lettering, surmounted by an uncrowned Irish Harp. Later, this banner bore the battle honours of the Legion, and it is interesting to note that the custom of inscribing battle honours on regimental colours, owes its inception to Napoleon the Great. Unlike the English and other nations, who entrusted their colours solely to officers, Napoleon considered his Eagles the peculiar care of the rank and file, and they were borne in battle by the Regimental Sergeant-Major, (or the equivalent rank) who was escorted by six trusty veterans, each of whom had distinguished himself, in not less than two engagements.

The ceremony of presenting the Eagles to the Irish Legion is thus described in a work entitled " The War Drama of the Eagles." " Each Eagle deputation consisted of two officers and ten non-commissioned officers and soldiers....Amongst these deputations was one, the strange appearance of which attracted a special curiosity; all gazed in wonder at a band of strapping foreigners of all ages, who marched along by themselves, dressed as light Infantrymen in bright green uniforms, with green tufted shakos. They belonged to one of the Emperor's latest creations, and had come to the Champ de Mars to receive the only Eagle that Napoleon ever granted to a foreign regiment in his services.....Two expatriated men of good family, refugees from the penalty of treason under English law for their part in the rising of 1798, headed the deputation, their names being Captain Corbett and Captain Tennant. In the ranks of their regiment there marched other Irish refugees who had shed English blood at Wexford and Enniscorthy, and other fugitives from justice who had joined in with Hoche and Humbert in the abortive raids of a

few years later. There were also 'wild geese' who had made their flight over seas after the other fiasco of 1803, together with a sprinkling of French-born Irishmen who had worn the red coat of the old Irish Brigade in the service of France and were grandsons of the men of Fontenoy.

"Napoleon had enrolled this legion just a twelve month before, with a view to a descent upon Ireland simultaneously with the invasion from Boulogne. At the special request of those who had come forward to enlist, he had uniformed the legion in Irish green instead of the historic red coat worn by the Irish Brigade, which had been formed from the remnants of the army of James the Second which had surrendered to Schomberg and been deported from Ireland after the Battle of the Boyne."

But the Eagle, presented with such ceremony, was not destined to very great honour, though those who followed it comported themselves with bravery and dignity. After the abandonment of the project to invade England, the Irish legion remained in garrison at Morlaix until 1806, in which year it was sent into Holland against the invading Russians, and after that marched into Walcheren to meet the English. But here there was no fighting, for the swamps and fevers of Walcheren and Beveland so decimated the British army that it was forced to retire to England.

In 1807 the command of the Legion was assumed by Count Mahoney under whom it served with the Army of Murat in Spain, until 1811, in several actions. By 1810 the supply of Irish recruits seems to have died out, for in that year it was solely designated as the "3rd Foreign Regiment *ci-devant* L'Irlandais." From Spain it returned to France and took part in the expedition to Moscow, whence it emerged with considerable strength, to judge by the fact that it was engaged at Liepsic.

In this disastrous battle the Irish Legion suffered greatly, being almost cut to pieces and only saving its Eagle by breaking it from the staff and concealing it in the knapsack of one of the men who escaped from the battle.

To judge by the following list of officers of the "*3rd Foreign Regiment called D'Irlandais*," who signed a memorial to the Minister

of the Interior concerning the disposal of the charitable foundations of the old Irish Brigade in 1814, most of them were Irish, either native or French-born.

Here follows the list:—

Le Chevalier Mahoney, Colonel.
,, ,, Ware, Major.
,, ,, Coyn, Lt.-Col.
,, ,, Allen, Lt.-Col.

Captains and Lieutenants.

,, ,, Maguire.
,, ,, Byrne.
,, ,, Donegan.
,, ,, O'Quin.
,, ,, Dowling.
,, ,, Delany.
,, ,, MacEgan.
,, ,, Lawless.
,, ,, O'Brien.
,, ,, Brown.
,, ,, Smith.
,, ,, Plunkett.
,, ,, Esmond.
,, ,, De Wall.
,, ,, Glasser.
,, ,, St. Leger.

After the surrender of Napoleon at Fontainebleau, and his deportation to Elba, there came a demand for the surrender of the Eagles of the different regiments, which was evaded by the Irish Legion who concealed theirs until the return of Napoleon from Elba, when they are said to have followed him to Waterloo. Of their services in that battle, if they did take part in it, there is nothing on record, but they disappeared from the French Army list immediately after Waterloo, when all Napoleon's formations, or such of them as still survived, were disbanded. What became of their Eagle we know not; probably it was appropriated by one of the officers of the Regiment.

SIMPLIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATION AS A WAY TO BETTER TRAINING.

By

Capt. S. W. Bower, 7th Rajput Regiment.

Compared with pre-war days, the instruction which must be given to Regimental Officers and men has increased both in quantity and complexity. Unfortunately there has been a similar, or greater, increase in the amount of clerical work necessary for the correct administration of the unit. Finding time in which to carry out training, especially that of leaders, is a very difficult problem. This article will attempt to shew that, by the simplification of the method in which unit administration is carried out, time can be saved for this purpose. Wherein this article the practical application of the suggested principles is given an Indian Infantry battalion is considered. It is believed, however, that the scheme could be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to all combatant units. For obvious reasons the suggestions have been limited to what can be done within the money now spent on the upkeep of the unit.

The modern business world goes in for specialization of labour, centralization of all functions of a similar nature and tries to avoid wasted effort. We cannot do better than follow this example. As far as the subject of this article is concerned this means the creation of a special section where all the clerical labour necessary for unit administration will be carried out. Further the methods laid down by our regulations, while ensuring efficiency, must not cause effort to be wasted.

The practical application of this scheme to an Indian Infantry battalion will now be considered.

Within the battalion the trainers of the officers are the Commanding Officer and his Second in Command. The Company Commander is the principal trainer of the men. It is, therefore, these officers who must be relieved of excessive office work. To do this an Administration Section would be formed in Headquarters Wing where all clerical work involved in the administration of the pay, clothing and feeding

of the battalion would be carried out. On mobilization this section would proceed complete to the Training Battalion where it would function as Records. Continuity in peace and war would thus be assured and dislocation reduced to a minimum.

The Section would be commanded by the Quartermaster. This may be open to the objection that it turns a combatant officer into a glorified clerk, but the objection is more apparent than real, for now-a-days the Quartermaster, except occasionally during collective training, is mainly employed on administrative tasks. An officer has to be sent to the Training Battalion on mobilization and the obvious one is the officer mostly concerned with administration. The appointment of Quartermaster with the battalion after mobilization could easily be filled by an officer who had received all the training necessary during the collective training season. This scheme would open the way to the appointment of permanent Quartermasters to Active battalions on similar lines to those now serving with Training Battalions, in fact, it almost demands it.

The remainder of the Section would consist of four soldier clerks. The present Quartermaster's staff would remain under the orders of the Quartermaster but would not accompany the Section to the Training Battalion on mobilization. The clerks would be extra to the present establishment and would take the place of the present Unit Accountant and the pay staff with companies. The substitution of a soldier clerk for the present Unit Accountant would remove the anomaly that the Commanding Officer is responsible for the accounts of the unit but, the most important one, pay, is prepared by a civilian who is not under his command.

The division of responsibility and labour within the Section would be as follows. The Quartermaster would be responsible to the Commanding Officer for the whole of the work of the Section. His present staff, under his orders, would be charged with the receipt, care of, issue and disposal of all clothing and equipment, also the maintenance of the necessary accounts. They would also receive and issue rations and administer the Extra Messing Allowance Fund. The four clerks would maintain the pay and clothing allowance accounts. (One clerk per rifle company and one for Headquarter Wing and M. G. Company). They would also deal with the officers pay account and pensions, etc. Cash accounts would be maintained on a unit basis.

Cent-alization will automatically produce certain advantages. The reduction in the number of people concerned with any transaction permits of simplification of the form in which the accounts are kept and reduces work. The maintenance of unit cash accounts will cut out all inter-company transactions and reduce the work of the Accounts Officer. The accounts being kept by specialists who have no other duties, errors should be few.

The method of maintaining the Pay accounts will now be dealt w th in more detail. The Army has a two-fold duty as regards pay, first to see that the soldier receives all that is due to him at the time at which it is due, second to see that no Government money is expended other than in accordance with the regulations. To permit of this being done we must have an individual account which can be easily made up and checked. If it is not easy to make up mistakes will occur. As the accuracy of the demand for the total pay of the unit rests primarily on the accuracy of the individual accounts, these must permit of easy check. Finally, we require a system which permits of an easy check being made of the total demand for pay against the individual accounts.

The present system of a Pay List and Pay and Mess Book does not fulfil any of the above conditions. Effort is wasted in that every man's number, rank and name, and certain figures, are written twice. At least three people are concerned in the making up of the accounts from start to finish. Rapid check over a period of more than one month of any individual's account is impossible.

It is suggested that the pay accounts should be kept on an individual basis in a ledger large enough to cover the requirements of a company for one year. Each man would have one double page to himself where his accounts for the whole year would appear. The heading would contain the information on which his rate of pay is based, *e.g.*, rank, appointment, etc. There would be a space for the entry of Battalion Part II orders changing his rate of pay or the amount of pay due, such as grants of Good Conduct pay or forfeiture of pay. The remainder would be ruled on the lines of a combined Pay List and Pay and Mess Book, his account for any one month being written horizontally across the book. The amount due to the soldier, after all Government claims had been met would be transferred to an abstract. This abstract would shew the ledger and page number

(for future reference by auditors), the amount due and the amount under or over paid compared with last month (check for clerk). This abstract would be used to support a consolidated demand for the pay of the unit. The regimental cuts would now be entered in the man's account and the amount due for cash payment calculated. The pay would be disbursed under the supervision of an officer. The soldier would sign his account as is now done. The Company Commander would hear the " pay report " and would have the right to examine his men's accounts when necessary for the investigation of complaint.

Comparing this system with the old we see :—a considerable reduction in the amount of work to be done each month ; only one person concerned with the making up of the account ; up to one year's account for any individual can be checked at once without reference to any other book; a glance from the individual account to the abstract checks the unit's total demand.

On mobilization, as already stated, the clerks would be transferred to the Training Battalion, taking their ledgers with them. Here they would continue to maintain the pay account in the same books in the same manner. Family allotments would be entered in a special column and cash payments adjusted as acquittance rolls came to hand. These rolls would have been prepared in the field by the clerical staff with the battalion, assisted by the Company Havildar Majors or Quartermaster Havildars as necessary.

Clothing Allowance accounts would be kept in a similar manner. The Clothing Allowance ledger would be ruled with columns to shew credit and debit balances, amount received from Government each month and cash payments. Further columns, headed with the names of the various articles which are issued on payment would be ruled for cash entries. In these columns the cost of articles issued during the month would be entered. The ledger would thus combine the Clothing Allowance columns of the Pay List and the Clothing Allowance account with the information now shewn in the form " Issues on payment." It would also contain the history sheet of public clothing. Each month the total amount due to the battalion on account of clothing allowance would be demanded in a similar manner to the pay.

Additional machinery is necessary for the issue of articles. Each company would have a "Demand, Issue and Receipt Book." This would have columns for the number, rank and name of the man and the articles required by him. Entries would be made as and when necessary and signed by the Company Commander as authority for their issue. The Company Quartermaster Havildar, accompanied by the man, would take this book to the Quartermaster's Stores and draw the articles, the man signing the book as a receipt The book would be passed to the Administration Section where the cost of the articles would be entered in the individual's clothing allowance account.

The Company Commander would have powers of inspection over his men's accounts. He would remain responsible for the correctness of his men's kits.

As the same clerk has to prepare both the Pay and the Clothing Allowance accounts it would be preferable for the Clothing Allowance month to start on the 16th and for a separate cheque to be issued. On mobilization the accounts would be closed.

The rations would be dealt with in a somewhat similar method to that used in war. They would be drawn by companies each evening on an estimated return given the evening before. Any differences between estimates and actuals would be adjusted in the following day's rations. Companies would report daily the changes in ration strength to the Quartermaster so that the unit ration return could be kept up to date. This system has been successfully used in certain units and it reduces to a minimum audit objections as to differences between strength and rations issued.

The Extra Messing Allowance fund would be run by the Quartermaster. Articles would be issued with the rations or by means of chits on the bunnia The amount of money due to the unit would be calculated on the ration return

There are certain miscellaneous allowances drawn which can be divided into two classes, those paid to the individual and those claimed and administered on a unit basis. The former would be claimed and adjusted through the individual's pay account. The latter would be drawn on a special form. This form would be drawn up to cover all normal contingencies, the information being supplied by the Adjutant and Companies where it is not already in the Administration

Section's possession. When once signed by the Commanding Officer, it would require no supporting certificates or contingency bills as his signature would be taken to mean that all claims were correct and in accordance with the regulations.

The proposals outlined above may be said to be drastic but they set out to try to remedy a very serious evil and no cutting out of a few returns or forms will give any real relief. They may also be said to be dangerous as they do away with all the certificates, contingent bills and safeguards of the old system. All it amounts to is that the Commanding Officer's responsibility for the correctness of his accounts is made a real one. To help him in his task of shouldering this responsibility a system has been suggested which has for its keynote simplicity. This simplicity makes it easy to understand, easy to run and easy to check. If errors occur, the individual responsible is at once evident and he is subject to military discipline. If the Commanding Officer fails he too is under this discipline. The civilian audit staff should provide an adequate safeguard if they do their work properly.

Some people may think that the Company Commander will, in losing much of the administration connected with his company, also lose some of the moral supports of leadership. This appears improbable as he still remains the guardian of his men, hears and investigates their complaints, watches over their food and clothing and generally attends to their well being. He is merely relieved of the supervision of much clerical labour.

The battalion loses a number of fighting men in the company pay establishment and gets clerks in their place, but it is maintained that the gain in general efficiency, through the trainers having more time to devote to their primary task, will more than compensate for the loss in numbers.

Finally, the writer would disclaim all pretensions to being a financial expert. Most probably this disclaimer is unnecessary, the article is sufficient evidence. He merely numbers himself among the many who daily spend valuable hours among figures when they might be better employed being trained or in training their men

AIRCRAFT AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN INDIA.

By

"Constabeel."

The preservation of peace inside India, with its various races and its two great antagonistic religions, is unfortunately, at any time, a permanent problem of great magnitude. When, to the racial and religious stresses that the Indian body politic is normally subjected to, there is added, as has recently happened, a deliberate, widespread and violent attack on the very structure of government, this problem becomes acute. In no part of the Empire, one might well say in no part of the World, is the term internal security liable to embrace operations so diverse in scope as it does in India. Whether it is the dispersal of an unruly city mob, the rounding up of a gang of well armed dacoits in a jungle, or a fair sized war such as the quelling of the Moplah rising, it is all "internal security"—and all in the day's work for the civil and military forces of Government.

The task of those responsible for maintaining law and order in the sub-continent is, thus, so immense, incessant and exhausting that no legitimate means of supplementing their present resources should be overlooked. This consideration at once leads to the question whether aircraft might not be used to a greater extent than they are either to supplement or to replace other methods of maintaining order.

Principles governing the Employment of Armed Forces for Internal Security.

Before considering whether any particular arm or weapon is suited to this particular task, it is well to be clear about the objects to be attained and the principles that should guide all armed forces employed on internal security duties. These differ very widely from those of the same forces in war, and may be stated generally as:—

(*i*) The object of armed forces in internal security is, not to inflict loss on the disturbers of the peace, but to restore normal conditions in the shortest time and with the least exercise of force.

(*ii* The forces of law and order should take and maintain the offensive against disaffection and disorder and should not allow themselves to be thrown on the defensive.

(*iii*) Prevention is better than cure, and the aim should be to check the trouble at an early stage by the arrest of leaders, break up of the hostile organisation, and prompt quelling of initial disturbances before the unrest has had time to spread.

(*iv*) Such force as has to be used should be employed only against the disorderly elements; the property and persons of law abiding citizens should, as far as possible, be immune.

(*v*) The action taken should not be such as to leave behind it an aftermath of bitterness or resentment amongst the population at large.

Any consideration of the use of aircraft for internal security duties must pay strict regard to these principles. By them the various uses of aircraft as a normal procedure should be accepted as efficient and desirable or forbidden as ineffective and objectionable.

Possible Uses of Aircraft for Internal Security.

The uses of aircraft in war, where they are an essential component of any force, may conveniently be grouped under certain headings :—

(*i*) Reconnaissance.
(*ii*) Communication.
(*iii*) Moral effect.
(*iv*) Offensive action.
(*v*) Transportation.

All these functions are possible to aircraft employed on internal security duties; the only question is whether, in view of the principles already laid down, it is advisable so to use them.

Reconnaissance.

The use of aeroplanes for purely reconnaissance duties obviously does not offend against any of the accepted principles. There can be no objection to it as a normal procedure, and it only remains to consider its value.

The collection of information from the air in times of civil disturbance is a much more difficult matter in many ways than it is in

war. An aeroplane may fly over a thickly populated district and little may be seen to indicate whether the area is seriously disturbed or not. There will be no formed bodies of troops, supply trains, dumps, camps, defensive positions or rail movements such as betray a hostile army to the air. Even firing from the ground will indicate nothing more than the presence of a few malcontents. Large crowds may be observed but their temper and whether they are actually bent on forcibly resisting authority cannot be accurately estimated from the air. Disturbances usually occur in the more densely populated areas, where cultivation, trees, buildings and towns add to the airman's difficulties. In fact it may be said that negative information obtained from the air in such circumstances is not likely to be of much value, while positive information will need very careful and expert interpretation before its real significance can be gauged.

On the other hand, from the air it will usually be possible to recognise serious rioting actually in progress, to locate large crowds, moving or collected, and to discover to some extent the state of communications, *i.e.*, whether roads are blocked, bridges destroyed or telegraph poles down. The lack of fire from the ground and of hostile aircraft will make the airman's task much easier, but darkness will of course practically put a stop to all air reconnissance.

Thus it would appear that for internal security purposes air reconnaissance would be a valuable addition to the other sources of intelligence, but could not replace them to any great extent. The nearer an outbreak of disorder approximated to a state of war over a large area the greater would be the need for aeroplanes for this purpose. In many districts the machines and pilots of the civil Flying Clubs would provide the air reconnaissance necessary.

Communication.

Realizing the importance of communications to the government forces, rioters will nearly always at an early stage attempt to destroy telegraph lines, roads and railways. It is easy to cut wires, fell trees across roads, and tear up rails, so that all normal communications into and out of a district may cease with the most disconcerting suddenness. The authorities are then thrown back almost entirely on wireless. In India at present many large areas are without wireless stations, some of those that exist are partially dependent on commercial electric power which may be cut off, and in any case atmospherics

have an unpleasant way of interfering at critical moments. Whenever wireless is not available the aeroplane will provide a means of rapid communication. Where landing grounds are secure messages can be carried both ways, and where they are not messages can at least be dropped. An additional and valuable use of the aeroplane will be to convey rapidly important civil, police or military officers to the scene of trouble.

The employment of aircraft for communication purposes, however, while it may, in some circumstances, be of great value, is not likely to warrant the permanent retention of government aeroplanes for this duty; the civil Flying Clubs will again have to suffice.

Moral Effect.

The moral effect of a new weapon is always tremendous. Submarines, aeroplanes, gas and tanks, as long as they were something mysterious and uncanny, had an effect out of all proportion to the actual material damage they could inflict. But, as time goes on familiarity breeds certainty not contempt, but a knowledge of their limitations and of how to counteract them. This is particularly noticeable about the aeroplane in India. There was a time when an aeroplane flying overhead was enough to scatter a crowd—now they hardly glance up at it. The main reason for this is, of course, that they do not believe the aeroplane will be allowed to bomb or machine gun them.

Conversely, to the loyal elements who may be inclined to resist the spread of disaffection, or to the potential victims of mob violence, an aeroplane is at the best very remote comfort, and even that must vanish when darkness falls and the isolated loyalist or the minority community has most to fear.

One powerful moral weapon does, however, remain unimpaired to the aeroplanes—propaganda. The Official labours under the disadvantage that malicious rumours against government or against a community always have a start over his counter-propaganda. These lies are usually produced by the town-dwelling agitator or fanatic and spread to the villages; the aeroplane now provides a mean by which the antidote may reach the more remote country-side almost as soon as the poison.

Offensive Action.

There can be no doubt that the unrestricted offensive use of air craft against violent mobs or centres of disaffection would be astoundingly effective in the sense that the crowd would scatter at the first burst of machine-gun fire and the most obstinate town would be cowed by a few hours bombing. In addition a single instance of such offensive action would at once restore the lost moral effect of the aeroplane. There are, however, certain considerations which must always prevent this employment of aircraft as long as any other form of force can possibly be made available. These considerations are both ethical and practical.

In the first place even the actual rioters must be regarded, not as enemies to be destroyed, but as British subjects who are temporarily misled by agitators or carried away by their own religious feelings. When dispersing an obviously violent mob the airman cannot pick out the leaders, as can police or troops acting on the ground. He can kill or maim but he cannot arrest. Nor can he keep in that constant and immediate touch with the local civil authorities which is so essential throughout the whole time military action of any kind is being taken. The aeroplane used offensively in civil disturbances must of necessity tend to be indiscriminate in its action. There will always be the grave risk that, as the rain, its bullets and bombs will fall alike on the just and the unjust. Some of the damage done will be inflicted on the property and persons of those taking no part in the outbreak, even possibly on those doing their best to suppress it. From the air it is most difficult to distinguish a Hindu mob from a Mohammadan one, or aggressors from defenders. It is by no means easy even to decide whether a mob is actually engaged in some violent act. A crowd surging round a burning building is not necessarily engaged in incendiarism, it may be composed of co-religionists come to the rescue of a member of their community whose house has been fired by the opposing faction. Many police officers will have seen such crowds more than once during serious communal riots. The tragic and far-reaching effects of bombing or machine-gunning our own friends or other inoffensive citizens could not be exaggerated.

Then too, a violently hostile crowd will frequently be in close proximity to the forces of law and order. The first ranks of the mob will often be in actual bodily contact with the police, struggling to hold

them back. The airman will find it difficult to recognize the small body of uniformed men involved with the mob, and will naturally machine-gun the head of the crowd. A policeman may be forgiven if he is inclined to consider this an additional and somewhat serious drawback to offensive action from the air.

But the main and underlying objection to the offensive employment of aircraft in civil disturbances goes much wider than these local effects. The use of aircraft to bomb or machine-gun even the most violent crowds would at once raise an outcry against Government that would rally more moderate elements against it than any other step. A government which relied on this method of controlling its own subjects, however unruly, would be condemned, not only by Indian opinion, but by that of the whole civilized world. However immediately effective air action might be in quelling the disturbance it would leave behind it such discredit for Government and such an aftermath of bitterness and hatred that, when civil officials and police came to resume control, they would find the difficulty of their task magnified a hundredfold.

While in the last resort, when no other method is possible, Government has undoubtedly the right to use aircraft offensively to prevent the commission of violent crime or to quell dangerous rioting, such employment of aircraft as a normal method of suppressing disorder cannot be contemplated : it offends against too many of the principles that should govern the action of armed forces engaged in maintaining internal security.

Transportation.

There remains to be considered the employment of the aeroplane as a vehicle pure and simple, and it is here that it is of the greatest promis for internal security purposes. The effectiveness of the police and military has been immensely increased by the advent of mechanical transport ; it is only logical to let this include air as well as road mechanical transport. The greatest of all the principles that should govern action to maintain tranquility is that disorder should be nipped in the bud, that is, never allowed to reach the stage of actual violence. When violence threatens adequate force to deal with it, and to make quite clear to everybody that it will be dealt with, should be immediately available. The mere presence of a party of armed

police or soldiers will often restore a doubtful situation; arriving at the start of a disturbance a small detachment may restore order at a cost of few or no casualties, when ten times the force will be unable to quell it a few hours later without serious bloodshed. It is in this that the peculiar value of aircraft in preserving or restoring the peace will lie. A modern passenger aeroplane, or what is known in the Royal Air Force as a Heavy Transport Aircraft, can carry twenty-five armed men a hundred miles in an hour. The speed with which an air-borne reinforcement could arrive would multiply its value several times, and where such reinforcement is assured should permit of police reserves being maintained at a central headquarters instead of being, as now often happens, scattered in small detachments. Similarly, troops allotted to internal security duties could be kept concentrated and the disadvantages to training and administration of small isolated detachments largely avoided. In addition, if it can be guaranteed that at any time within a few hours, troops will arrive from elsewhere to assist the police, it may no longer be necessary to retain the present military garrisons in certain stations, and thus a reduction in the troops allotted to internal security duties may be effected.

The evacuation of women and children by air from threatened localities would be comparatively simple and would relieve the authorities at an early stage of a very hampering and anxious responsibility. Isolated posts or places of refuge could also be supplied by air if other methods failed, but this would only be called for when what practically amounted to a state of war had been reached.

Before, however, we allow ourselves to be carried away by the pleasant vision of reinforcements dropping like manna from a blue sky wherever and whenever required, it must be realized that there are in India a great many obstacles to the successful and general employment of air transport. Most of these arise from the fact that civil aviation in this country has not yet been developed to any great extent. To begin with there are, considering the size of India, very few landing grounds which can be safely used by large aeroplanes. The landing grounds, too, are naturally almost all near large cities where considerable police or military forces are already immediately available. With the exception of these, most potential centres of disturbance are without landing grounds at all and could not, therefore, in

emergency be reinforced by air from the main police or military centres. It might in some cases be possible to land light aeroplanes on unprepared or only roughly prepared grounds, but the risk of attempting this with heavy transport machines would be prohibitive. It follows, then, that at every place which it is intended to reinforce if necessary by air there must be existing and ready a first class landing ground. To provide these in even a fraction of the localities where they might be required would cost a great deal of money.

Even where a properly prepared landing ground existed there might be very serious difficulty in using it during disturbances. It may be expected that the first act of the leaders of a disturbance who know that police or military reinforcements may arrive by air, would be to put the landing ground out of action. In fact, in anything in the nature of a premeditated and organized disturbance, an attempt to do this might be expected simultaneously with the first outbreak of disorder. Carts or cattle left scattered over the landing ground, shallow trenches dug or wires stretched across it, are all easily and quickly arranged and would effectively prevent its use. If, therefore, reinforcement or evacuation by air is to be relied on, the landing grounds must be secured from hostile interference. In many cases this will be difficult even in large centres with the troops or police now available, and it may be out of the question in stations where there are only very limited police forces, and as often happens the landing grounds are some distance away. The acceptance of this added responsibility to secure landing grounds may thus in some places entail an increase—not very large possibly, but still an increase—in the local police or military garrisons.

To make sure of the landing grounds is obviously the first essential, but there is another equally important. Before any reductions or redistribution in either police or troops could be made, it would have to be absolutely certain that the transport aircraft would be permanently available at the shortest notice. Eventually, no doubt, the police of each province will have their own air transport, just as they now have their motor lorries. This would be the most economical and logical way of providing the machines whose functions would be those of civil passenger carriers rather than of a fighting service. At present, however, the state of aviation in India would necessitate the Royal Air Force taking over the rôle of transportation

agents to the Army and Police. In these circumstances it would have to be clearly laid down that the aircraft were allotted solely for internal security in a certain province or district and could not be diverted to any other use. Otherwise there would be the danger that when suddenly required, they would be absent, engaged on the Frontier or elsewhere. There would inevitably be delays in withdrawing them from the operations on which they were engaged, even if they began their return flight at once, many precious hours would be lost, and any scheme which relied on immediate reinforcement by air would then be in danger of breakdown. Aircraft allotted to internal security would have to be permanently available just as troops now are.

The Immediate Future.

The conclusions that are reached by a consideration of this subject are that it is not as a fighting service, but as a means of transport that aircraft can chiefly assist or replace either police or military in internal security duties. While aeroplanes would undoubtedly be of value for reconnaissance, communication and propaganda there would be little to justify their special provision for these purposes. Impressed civil aircraft, supplemented by any available Royal Air Force machines, would have to be relied on for these tasks. The provision of heavy transport aeroplanes for police, and still more troop carrying does, however, offer promise of economy and increased efficiency in the immediate future. Whether these promises could be fulfilled depends on the extent to which the many obstacles to efficient air transportation in this country can be overcome, and whether reductions in police or troops sufficient to counterbalance the very high cost of even one squadron could be made with safety. A very careful examination of all the factors involved would be required before these questions could be answered. It must be remembered that any scheme will have to provide for the security, not only of the towns, but of the country districts remote from any possible landing grounds, where mobile forces will be required. It will not be enough to legislate for isolated disturbances in two or three big cities, widespread and simultaneous riots and risings in many places and over wide areas must be envisaged.

Investigation may show that aerial transport will make possible economies in internal security forces, but internal security is not a matter in which risks can be taken either now or in the near future. Before any alterations or substitutions are decided upon we should make very sure that our already none too great margin of safety is not further reduced. A financial saving purchased at the price of internal security would be the reverse of economy.

THE BATTLE OF KOREGAON.

(1st January 1818).

By

Lieutenant Colonel H. E. Kenyon, D.S.O., R.A.

" One of the proudest triumphs of the British army in the East," was the description given by the British Government to an heroic action fought by a small detachment of the Army in India and, as the details are probably only known to a few these days, it may be of interest to give an account of this battle.

The scene of the fight was at the village of Koregaon on the banks of the Bhima river, 16 miles from Poona, on the road to Ahmednagar. After the Battle of Kirkee, General Smith was ordered to follow up and capture the Peshwa and his army. He accordingly ordered Colonel Burr, Commanding the troops at Poona, to report any indications of the Peshwa's army outside Poona. He realised that any delay of the enemy forces outside Poona would facilitate his efforts to overtake the Peshwa and inflict a final defeat on his army. He therefore ordered Colonel Burr to put up as strong a show as possible to delay the Peshwa. Colonel Burr, however, receiving reports of the Peshwa's army approaching Poona in force, departed from his orders and sent to Seroor, 41 miles away, for reinforcements.

Accordingly a force consisting of the 1st Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, 500 strong, accompanied by 200 Irregular Horse, 26 Artillerymen and two guns, the whole under the command of Captain Staunton of the 1st Regiment, Bombay Native Infantry, was ordered to march from Seroor to Poona. This force left their Camp, 25 miles from Seroor at 8-30 p.m., on the night of December 31st 1817. At about 10 a.m., on 1st January 1818, they reached the river Bhima at Koregaon and found the whole of the Peshwa's army encamped on the open country across the dry river bed. The Peshwa's force consisted of 20,000 Mahratta Cavalry, 8,000 Infantry and a large number of mounted and dismounted Arabs. The Peshwa had received information of the move of the detachment from Seroor to Poona and had decided to intercept it and wipe it out before continuing his march.

By a clever manoeuvre Captain Staunton obtained possession of the village of Koregaon. He decided to fight and delay the Peshwa

in the hopes that General Smith's force would come up in time to engage the Peshwa's. Staunton occupied the walls of the village and two temples, posting one gun to cover the main road and the other to cover the river bed.

The Peshwa, not knowing the exact strength of Staunton's force, did not put in his Cavalry at once, but ordered up his 8,000 Infantry who arrived on the scene about 11 a.m., He realised that any prolonged delay might allow General Smith's army to come up with him and he therefore attacked with the utmost vigour. By noon he had captured the outskirts of the village and his troops were established in the two temples. The gun covering the river was captured and half of the company of Artillery had been killed. By 3-30 p. m., four of the British officers were either killed or wounded, and by early evening it appeared that the detachment must be overwhelmed and annihilated. Captain Staunton, however, called on his men—British, Hindus and Mahommedans—to stand firm. Cut off from their water supply, they contested every yard of the village and put up amazing resistance in every lane. They recaptured one of the temples and brought back to safety the three wounded officers who were in it. They re-took also the lost gun, killing the Arabs who were in possession of it.

The details of the recapture of this gun are worthy of record. Lieutenant Pattison, the Adjutant, heard of the capture of the gun whilst he was lying mortally wounded. A huge man, 6 feet 7 inches in height, he rose up and calling on his men to follow him, seized a musket from one of the enemy, with which he laid out the Arabs one by one until the gun was recaptured when he fell dead. By nightfall only three officers remained fit for duty and the casualties amongst the other ranks were 275 ; twenty of the 26 gunners being incapacitated. Maddened by thirst the Detachment fought on till 9 p.m., when the fighting ceased, and Captain Staunton then crawled forward himself to find water for his men. From 11 a. m., to 9 p. m. 500 Infantry, 200 Irregular Horse and 26 Artillerymen with two guns had withstood the attack from two flanks of a force consisting of 20,000 Mahratta Cavalry, 8,000 Infantry and a number of mounted and dismounted Arabs.

During the night Captain Staunton re-organised his defences, calling on his men to be prepared to continue the fight on the next day, posted sentries for the night, helped Assistant Surgeon Wyllie of

the detachment of Madras Artillery to tend the wounded and so waited for the dawn and the renewed assaults of the enemy. Dawn broke and it was then seen that the river bed and surrounding country were empty. The Peshwa and his army had fled and the gallant little force was left alone in its glory.

All that day Captain Staunton rested his force, collected the wounded and buried the dead in a grave that still stands in the village of Koregaon, and prepared to move back to Seroor. At dusk they set off and marched into Seroor the following morning bringing their wounded and the guns with them.

That the detachment should never have been summoned to Poona in no way detracts from the triumph of its bravery, skill and determination to win through, but the Officer Commnding at Poona was relieved of his post and shortly afterwards the General himself retired. Elphinstone, the resident of Poona, visited the spot two days later and placed flowers on the grave. Staunton was appointed A. D. C. to the Governor-General, presented with an inscribed sword and a purse of five hundred guineas. On attaining the rank of Major in 1823 he was invested with the order of Companion of the Bath. He did not live long to enjoy his honours, but died at sea, off the Cape of Good Hope, in June 1825.

The British Government ordered an obelisk to be erected on the site of the battle. It is 65 feet high, standing on a stone platform of about 32 square feet, and surrounded by an enclosure. The names of the killed and wounded are inscribed on a panel at the base of the monument and a brief account of the event it perpetuates is given on panels on two other sides. On the front is inscribed in English the fact that it has been erected by the British Government to commemorate the force which " withstood throughout the day a series of the most sanguinary assaults of the Peshwa's best troops under his personal command, under the most appalling circumstances, who persevered in their desperate resistance and, seconded by the unconquerable spirit of the Detachment, at length achieved the signal discomfiture of the enemy and accomplished one of the proudest triumphs of the British army in the East." During recent years this gallant action had been almost forgotten and the monument had been sadly neglected. The present G. O. C.-in-C., Southern Command, Lieutenant-General Sir. William Heneker, has however, had the obelisk cleaned up and its enclosure generally put in order.

THE JAPANESE ARMY.

By

Major B. R. Mullaly, 10th Gurkha Rifles.

We are so accustomed to take for granted the position which Japan occupies as one of the Great Powers of the World, that we are, perhaps, apt to forget the extraordinary rapidity with which she rose to her present eminence once she decided to give up her policy of isolation. This is a point which should, I think, be borne in mind when discussing any aspect of modern Japan. It is as true of the army as of any other sphere of activity and one should remember that just over sixty years ago the Japanese were, speaking from a military point of view, literally in the bow-and-arrow stage of development.

The Japanese have always been a warlike race and it is recorded in the earliest written annals of the nation that the sovereign was, as he is to-day, the supreme commander, and that the duty of serving in the ranks devolved upon all subjects alike. In the earliest days the army probably consisted of a loose tribal organisation, the units of which were commanded by their respective chieftains, and it was not until the feudal system began to develop in Japan that the soldier came to assume the important position which he has ever since occupied in that country. With the rise of the clan system, the feudal lords found it necessary to surround themselves with bands of retainers just as the Barons did in England in the middle ages. The result was the glorification of the profession of arms and the institution of a class of hereditary warriors who despised the ordinary working man or farmer, and occupied a position of pre-eminence in the social scale. These hereditary warriors were called *samurai* and, if we are to understand the spirit of the Japanese Army, it is essential to learn something of the wonderful ethical code known as *bushido* or "The way of the *bushi* or Warrior Knights" which was evolved by them. The traditions of the *samurai* are jealously guarded and fostered by the officers of the Japanese army of to-day, many of whom are, of course, their lineal descendants.

The *samurai* lived for nothing but the service of his overlord and his profession. He regarded with contempt anything which might

conduce to softness and made a cult of frugality, loyalty and personal courage. Self-control was regarded as the highest ideal and the *samurai* was trained to endure physical pain without a murmur. He schooled himself to regard death either at the hands of an enemy, or by his own hand, as a normal eventuality, and it was from this training that he amazing custom of suicide known as *hara-kiri* arose. "Death rather than dishonour" was the maxim of the *samurai* and any *samurai* who failed in his duty was expected, as a matter of course, to commit "*hara-kiri.*" The literal translation of the words is "belly cutting" so that you may imagine the amazing state of self-control to which the *samurai* had attained to enable him to perform this operation without flinching. Although officially frowned upon, *hara-kiri* is still occasionally practised, and the most notable example of it in modern times was the suicide of General Nogi, the veteran hero of the Russo-Japanese War who committed *hara-kiri* on the day of the funeral of the late Emperor Meiji, in which act he was followed by his wife. However misguided we may consider the act, there was something very fine in the spirit of the old warrior who believed it to be his duty to follow his master in death. This spirit still lives in the Japanese army of today.

I must now turn to a consideration of the organisation of the modern Japanese army, touching briefly upon the stages by which it has arrived at its present state of development.

With the coming of the American squadron under Commodore Perry in 1853, the Japanese realised that, if their nation was to survive, foreign methods must be followed and at the Restoration of 1868 the organisation of the Army on European lines was commenced. Universal conscription was instituted and after the natural opposition of the conservative *samurai* class had been overcome steady development took place. French instructors were at first engaged, but later Germans took their places and the modern Japanese army is still very largely modelled on German lines.

The first major war which the new Japanese army was called upon to fight was that against China in 1894. For this the Japanese put into the field an army of approximately 120,000 men. The infantry were armed with a single-loading rifle, and the only two divisions armed with magazine rifles and smokeless powder never came into action. The war resulted in a rapid and complete victory for Japan and as a

result of the experience gained the army was considerably reorganised and improved.

In 1900 Japanese troops took part in the relief of the Legations at Peking and the suppression of the Boxer Rising, and considerably surprised the troops of the other Powers by their high state of efficiency.

The great test came in 1904, when Japan was forced in self-preservation to resist Russia's encroachment on Manchuria and Korea, the domination of which by Russia would have been the death-blow of the Japanese Empire. The manner in which the Japanese army stood the ordeal and emerged triumphant is recorded in history, and from that moment, thanks to her Army and Navy, Japan was acknowledged as one of the Great Powers of the World. The great victory was directly due to the reckless gallantry of the Japanese soldier and the self-effacing patriotism of the Japanese nation as a whole.

After the Russo-Japanese War the army was organised on a peace footing of 19 divisions with certain Army Troops. This establishment was further increased by two divisions as a permanent garrison in Korea, making a total of 21 divisions. Up to the outbreak of the Great War Japan remained at peace consolidating her position in the Far East. The Japanese army took no active part in the Great War except for the Tsingtao Expedition when a Japanese force, assisted by a small British contingent, captured the leased territory of Kiaochao in the province of Shantung. In 1918, Japan, in co-operation with the Allies, intervened in Siberia and Japanese troops remained there until 1924. After the Great War a policy of retrenchment was decided upon and a scheme for the re-organisation of the army was taken in hand in 1922 by which various adjustments were made. The actual peace establishment of the army was reduced and various minor administrative reforms were put into effect but the main organisation remained practically untouched.

In 1924, popular agitation, and the necessity for economy forced upon the nation by the great earthquake disaster of 1923, were responsible for a further scheme of army re-organisation. The main points of this were the reduction of the peace establishment by 4 divisions, making a total of 17 instead of 21 divisions, and the modernisation of the army, on the principle of quality before quantity.

Every Japanese male is liable to service in the Navy or Army. This liability commences with the seventeenth year of age and lasts

until the end of the fortieth year. Men are not called up until they have attained twenty years of age, but may enlist voluntarily before they are twenty. The general procedure is that the civil authorities give the military authorities information as to the number of men available, the military authorities then state the numbers they require, and the civil authorities call the men up. Conscripts are medically examined and classified as fit or unfit for colour service. Those classified as " fit " are then selected by ballot. In practice only about one man in seven is made to serve with the Colours. the remainder passing direct to the Conscript Reserves. The terms of service for a man taken for the Active Army are as follows :—

Colour Service	.. 2 years.
1st Reserve	.. $5\frac{1}{3}$,,
2nd Reserve	.. 10 ,,
1st Levy National Army ..	.. $2\frac{2}{3}$,,
Total	.. 20 ,,

Although men drafted into the Active Army are liable to two years continuous service with the Colours, in effect the actual period of active training with the Colours in the Infantry has been reduced to one and a half years, the remaining six months being treated as furlough.

This brings us to an important feature of the reorganisation scheme of 1925. In order to qualify for this reduction in Colour service, the conscript must first have undergone a preliminary course of military training. To allow for this, two schemes have been put into force, one applying to youths who have left school and the other to those who have elected to continue their studies beyond the age limit for compulsory education. Those who have left school may obtain the reduction in colour service if called upon to serve, provided that they have satisfactorily undergone a course of 100 hours training per year for the years from sixteen to twenty. For those who are still at school every Middle School and upwards has an officer on the active list of the Army attached to it for elementary military training.

The important bearing which this system has upon Japan's preparedness for war is obvious. Although the size of the standing army has been reduced from 21 divisions to 17 and the period of service with the colours has been greatly curtailed, the number of partly trained reserves is considerably increased. Instead of only about the one man in seven being trained and the remainder totally untrained,

there will, in future, be very few men who have not learned at least the rudiments of the military art.

The improvement of the physique of the nation is an obvious advantage to be derived from this scheme of military training, but another very important factor is its value as a means of combating the advanced radical views which are officially characterised in Japan as "dangerous thoughts." One of the most important parts of the training of the Japanese soldier is what is known as "spiritual training" which is designed to instil into all ranks the ideals of patriotism and loyalty to the Throne, and this training also occupies a prominent position in the course of military instruction given in the schools.

The majority of officers of the combatant arms of the Japanese army are graduates from the military preparatory schools in Tokyo. The system of training of the candidate for commissioned rank is interesting and very searching and is, I think, unique. A boy must be under fifteen when he goes to the military preparatory school. The course lasts for three years and consists of both general and military education. At the end of this period the candidate undergoes a competitive examination for entrance to the Military Academy and, if successful, does a course of both general and military subjects lasting two years in the Junior Division of the Academy. On completion of this two years the future officer does a six months attachment as a cadet to the unit to which he will eventually be posted. During this attachment he performs duties in the ranks from private to sergeant and in addition attends lectures for officers. He then returns for a period of one year and ten months to the Military Academy, this time in the Senior Division, where he receives a purely military training designed to make him fit to take his place in his future unit as a 2nd-Lieutenant. The final stage is a further period of attachment to the unit, this time for two months as an officer on probation. At the conclusion of this attachment a conference of all officers of the Regiment is called to decide on the fitness of the probationary officer for a commission in the army. If he is approved the aspirant becomes a 2nd-Lieutenant and remains in the regiment.

It will be agreed, I think, that this system is thorough and, if conscientiously carried out, must ensure that an officer is very carefully tested before he is given a commission.

Many, but by no means all, Japanese officers are members of the *samurai* class, but birth is no bar whatever to commissioned rank, and any boy may become an officer provided he passes the necessary examinations and practical tests. Speaking generally, the Japanese officer is well educated, very conscientious, extremely hardworking and keen on his profession. In fact, he has no interests outside it, and is therefore apt to be somewhat narrow-minded. He is very rarely possessed of private means and as his pay is very small, ranging from £85 a year for a 2nd-Lieutenant to £360 a year for a Lieutenant-Colonel, he lives very simply and economically ; anything approaching luxury is never allowed.

All officers, except the orderly officer, live out of barracks and have to find their own quarters. There is nothing in the nature of an officers' mess as we understand it, but each unit has a building which serves as an officers' meeting place where all the officers assemble for the mid-day meal. This is of the simplest description and the building itself is very plainly furnished with bare necessities in the way of chairs and tables.

Hours of work are long and the officers see very little of their men off parade as there are no organized games as in our army, although a start is being made in this direction. The principal recreation of the officers is fencing, carried out with double-handed bamboo single-sticks in imitation of the double-handed war sword. Great keenness is displayed over this, and great moral value is attached to the sport. The sword, it will be remembered, was the principal weapon of the *samurai* and it has assumed almost a religious importance in Japan. No finer examples of craftsmanship have been produced than the Japanese sword at its best, and many legends have sprung up around famous blades. In Field Service order every Japanese officer carries a large war sword and most of these are treasured heirlooms handed down from *samurai* ancestors.

As already stated, the peace establishment of the Japanese army was reduced in 1925 from 21 to 17 divisions. The peace organisation is now as follows :—

(*i*) 17 Divisions, including the Imperial Guards Divisions ; the remaining 16 being numbered from 1 to 20, omitting 13, 15, 17 and 18.

(*ii*) Army Troops consisting of :—

4 Cavalry Brigades.
4 Medium Artillery Brigades having a total of 44 4-gun batteries.
2 mountain Artillery Regiments, each of 3 battalions of 2 4-gun batteries.
1 Horse Artillery Battalion of 2 batteries.
55 Fortress Artillery Batteries.
2 Regiments of Railway Troops.
2 Telegraph Regiments.
1 Balloon Corps.
1 Anti-Aircraft Regiment.

In addition there are the Military Aviation Corps and the Tank Corps. The former is still in process of reorganisation, and, when the present scheme is completed, it is expected that the Military Aviation Corps will be composed of 8 wings, with a total of 26 squadrons and 267 first line machines. The Military and Naval Aviation Corps are quite distinct. The former is an integral part of the Army, and is regarded as a separate arm of equal status with the Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery. The Tank Corps at present consists of two tank units, one of which is organised as a battalion of two companies armed with about twenty tanks of various designs purchased in England and France. The other is a training unit on a smaller scale.

In addition to the troops in Japan proper there are the overseas garrisons of the outlying portions of the Empire and China. The garrison of Formosa consists of 2 Infantry Regiments, 2 Mountain Artillery batteries, 2 Fortress Artillery Battalions and one wing of the Military Aviation Corps, the whole under the command of a General. The garrison of Korea is composed of the 19th and 20th Divisions, to the headquarters of the latter of which I was fortunate enough to be attached for four months, one heavy Artillery Battalion, and one wing of the Aviation Corps, with ancillary troops. The Commander-in-Chief in Korea is a full General with Headquarters at Ryuzan, a suburb of Seoul. For purposes of administration Korea is divided into two areas—the Eastern and the Western—with the 19th Division in the Eastern area with Headquarters at Ranam in the North-East corner of Korea and the 20th Division in the Western area with Headquarters at Ryuzan.

The garrison of the Kwantung leased territory and the South Manchurian Railway zone consists of one Fortress Artillery Battalion at Port Arthur, one division from Japan, and railway guards; the whole under the command of a General with Headquarters at Port Arthur. The division, which is relieved every two years, is split up into detachments along the South Manchurian Railway. The railway guards consist of four independent battalions stationed at important points along the railway between Mukden and Changchun, the Northern terminus of the South Manchurian Railway. The garrison in North China is under the command of a Lieut.-General with Headquarters at Tientsin and consists of five Infantry Companies, one of which forms the Peking Legation Guard, and various details.

To turn for a moment to the organisation of the Japanese division. The establishment which I am giving you now is the peace organisation, that for war is, of course, secret.

The Division, commanded by a Lieutenant-General, consists of :—

Divisional Headquarters.
2 Infantry Brigades.
1 Field Artillery Regiment.
1 Cavalry Regiment.
1 Engineer Battalion.
1 Divisional Train Battalion.

The Infantry Brigade, commanded by a Major-General, consists of two Infantry Regiments.

The Infantry Regiment, commanded by a Colonel, consists of three Battalions which are commanded by Majors, and a Machine Gun company. Each Battalion is divided into three companies commanded by Captains which expand to four companies in war. In peace there is one Machine Gun company to each Regiment. The company consists of four guns and there is in addition an "Artillery" unit which is armed with 37 m. m. close support Infantry guns and mortars. The Infantry company is organised in three Platoons and the Platoon in six Sections, of which Nos. 5 and 6 are Light Automatic Sections. The peace strength of a company is about four Officers and 140 Other Ranks. There is also in each Regiment a Signal Platoon.

The Infantry soldier is armed with rifle and bayonet. The rifle is of a pattern brought out in 1905 with a calibre of ·256 inches. The magazine holds five rounds in a clip, the total length (with bayonet) is 5 feet 5½ inches, and the weight (with bayonet) is 9½ pounds. The bayonet is 1 foot 3 inches long and weighs 15¼ ounces.

The soldier in field service marching order carries the following equipment :—

A leather waist belt which carries the bayonet frog and three leather ammunition pouches carrying a total of 120 rounds.

A knapsack, made of hide with the hair outside, in which are carried two days iron rations, underclothing, housewife and a bottle of oil for the feet.

A haversack carrying unconsumed rations, cleaning materials for the rifle, and a spare striker, bolt head and extractor.

A waterbottle.

A small shovel.

A portion of a bivouac tent.

A pair of boots strapped to the top of the knapsack.

A greatcoat strapped round the knapsack.

A mess-tin, and,

In winter, a blanket.

The total weight is about 70 lbs. in winter and 56 lbs. in summer.

The Light Automatic is a gas-operated, air-cooled gun of the same calibre as the rifle. The ammunition is fed from a box on the left side of the gun which holds 30 rounds in six clips. The gun has two legs and is fired from the shoulder. The weight is 22 lbs. The heavy Machine Gun, of the same calibre, is of the Hotchkiss type—air-cooled, on a tripod mounting and with a strip feed.

The Field Artillery Regiment consists of three battalions of 2, 4-gun batteries, so that there are 24 guns to the Division. The field gun is a Japanese made gun after a Krupp model, and has a calibre of 75 mm., with a maximum range of 9,300 yards and fires shrapnel and H. E.

The Divisional Cavalry Regiment consists of Headquarters and two squadrons. The Divisional Engineer Battalion consists of Headquarters and three companies, two Field and one Siege. The Divisional Train Battalion consists of Headquarters and two companies, each of

four Sections, with about 75 vehicles. The wagon at present in use is an open cart drawn by one horse.

The system of command and administration of the Japanese army is somewhat complicated and is different from ours. The Emperor, advised by the Supreme Military Council and a Board of Marshals, exercises direct control over the Army. There is no direct control by Parliament, and the Minister for War, although a Cabinet Minister, has no seat in the Diet and is appointed by the Emperor. He is always an Army Officer. The Chief of the General Staff, again, is directly responsible to the Emperor alone for plans and policy. Training is not under the Chief of the General Staff but is the responsibility of the Inspector-General of Training who is co-equal with the Minister for War and the Chief of the General Staff, and directly responsible to the Emperor alone. The army is thus controlled by three independent chiefs—the Minister for War as regards Administration, the Chief of the General Staff for Mobilization Operations and Intelligene and the Inspector-General of Military Training for Training. Divisional Commanders also have the right, under certain conditions, of direct access to the Throne. The Board of Marshals is a purely advisory body consisting of Marshals of the Army and Admirals of the Fleet, and the Supreme Military Council is a larger body comprising high officers of both services and certain civilian cabinet ministers.

Now, a word as regards training. Each arm has a school of its own, the objects of which are to train commanders of companies and equivalent units, to ensure uniformity of training throughout the army and to try out new methods and weapons. The largest is the Infantry school where courses are carried out for Field Officers, Captains and Subalterns. The Field Officers course is very similar to our senior officers' course, and its main object is to keep senior officers in closer touch with the latest methods. The Captains' course is mainly tactical, while the Subalterns' course is devoted to the training of junior officers in Signalling and Machine Guns.

The Staff College is situated in Tokyo and provides a three years' course, divided into three terms, each of one year. Entrance to the Staff College is confined to 2nd-Lieutenants and Lieutenants of all branches of the service. Admission is by an examination in two parts—a written qualifying examination, followed by an oral competitive examination. The object of the written examination is to test the

candidate's literary attainments, and that of the oral examination is to test his military knowledge and personality. The course at the Staff College is almost entirely tactical and the time devoted to this subject is out of all proportion to that spent on other subjects. The object is rather to produce a body of General Staff officers who will think in the same way under any given conditions than to develop originality of ideas. A graduate of the Staff College wears a distinguishing badge in the form of a star on the right side of the coat.

When considering its tactical training it must be borne in mind that the Japanese army, except for the Tsingtao expedition, took no part in the Great War. The result is that it has no body of officers who can speak from personal experience of what modern war is like, and its training manuals are mainly based upon those of other nations. The effect of modern fire power is not appreciated and there is a great tendency to rely too much upon the almost unaided efforts of the Infantry, without paying sufficient attention to training in the co-operation of all arms, and to adopt too rigid formations. Although the training manuals are fairly up to date, the Japanese officer is still rather liable to hark back to the Russo-Japanese war for his tactical ideas.

Little progress has been made in mechanisation and the principal reason for this, apart from the ever—present need for economy, is probably that the Japanese Army does not expect to fight anywhere but upon the mainland of Asia, where it is not likely to meet a highly technical opponent or suitable conditions for the use of mechanised forces on a large scale.

The value of the offensive spirit is constantly stressed throughout all training, and the Japanese infantryman may be relied upon to exhibit the greatest gallantry, elan and determination to close with the enemy. To put it briefly, the Japanese army may be described as a very formidable weapon composed of superb material, the full development of which awaits modernisation in training and equipment.

Apart from its obvious value as a fighting machine the Japanese army fulfils a very important function as a stabilizing factor in the Far East.

The Japanese army has been described as "A Bulwark against Bolshevism" and this description is as true now as it was ever. It is

" the repository of those virtues which have made the nation great," and it is in the Japanese army that the ancient virtues of patriotism and loyalty to the Throne are cherished and fostered, and through it are disseminated throughout the nation. It is thus a very potent factor in the fight against the pernicious doctrines of communism.

The relations between the British and Japanese armies have always been of the most cordial description. We both have a long history behind us, and both have similar traditions of loyalty to the Throne ; the Japanese officer, like his British comrade, holds his commission direct from his sovereign alone.

During his visit to England in 1921, when Crown Prince, the present Emperor of Japan on several occasions appeared in his uniform as a General in the British army, and when the Prince of Wales visited Japan in 1922 he was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm, especially when he attended the review given in his honour in the uniform of a General in the Japanese army. In 1929 a mission, headed by the Duke of Gloucester, proceeded to Japan to invest the Emperor with the insignia of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, and in 1930 the connection of the Royal House of Japan with the British army was still further cemented by the promotion of the Emperor of Japan to the rank of Field Marshal in the British army.

Close liaison is maintained by the fact that the British Military Attaché in Tokyo is always an interpreter in Japanese and by the interchange of officers. There is also a Japanese Military Attaché at the Headquarters of the Army in India. A number of British officers are sent to Japan for a three years' course of study during which they spend various periods of attachment to the Japanese army, and Japanese officers are similarly attached to units of the British army at home. The experience thus gained is invaluable and I know that none of us who has had the privilege of serving with it leave Japan without a profound respect for the Imperial Japanese Army.

GAPS IN INDIAN ARMY HISTORY

By

"Hyderabad."

I.

The considerable quantity of research which has been carried out regarding the history of the military forces of Company and Crown in India has not hitherto been systematised in any way. Each individual worker has followed his own course as best he could, traversing such country as seemed interesting to him which lay on the road to his goal, and often skirting, rather than trying to penetrate, ground which seemed arid or difficult. True, the bolder or more plodding travellers have negociated some hills and deserts, but this was usually by means of forced marches; and when surmounting such obstacles they have rarely delayed to investigate the nature of the surrounding country or of the soil beneath its surface.

The inevitable result of this lack of research organization in the past is that large and serious *lacunae* exist in our knowledge of Indian army history. The purpose of the present paper is to take note of the more important omissions. To put forward suggestions as to how they may be filled in and to frame a tentative scheme for methodical research in future, are matters which may be discussed hereafter.

II. *Some serious Omissions.*

The task of particularising those gaps which are most serious is an invidious one; and any list must of necessity be but a reflection of its compiler's individual ideas. The short list which follows here is submitted as representative rather than comprehensive; and the writer has included only those subjects which, in his opinion, are of basic importance and whose neglect appears to handicap Indian army historical research in general. These include:—

(*a*) There is no history of the Bombay Army.

(*b*) There is no dictionary of regiments, existing and disbanded, regular and auxiliary. Such a work of reference is necessary.

(*c*) There is no book on the uniform of the Indian forces or of any substantial part thereof.

(*d*) There is no book on cantonments old and new; and very little published material on particular cantonments.

(*e*) There are (it is believed) no published lists of inscriptions on Christian tombs in the Central Provinces: Rajputana: Central India States: Burma: parts of the Bombay Presidency such as for instance Poona and Belgaum; and various of the lists which have been officially published in respect of other areas are manifestly incomplete even for the period up to 1857, or are blatantly incorrect in many respects (as for instance the Bihar and Orissa Government's printed list).

(*f*) There is no history of the Indian Mutiny which fulfils military requirements proper. (Nor, though the fact is incidental to the ends discussed in the present paper, is there any history of that period which (*i*) is not free from numerous mistakes on points of detail, or (*ii*) deals adequately with the political theory of the Revolt).

(*g*) There is no public military museum in India, nor any public depository of consequence in which serious attempt has been made to bring out the military significance of any exhibits.

(*h*) The military bibliography of India is a neglected subject: no single published book provides an adequate conspectus of it.

(*i*) No military periodical published in India habitually prints critical articles on Indian military history, except one quarterly journal issued to members only.

(*j*) No adequate account of the European and Eurasian military adventurers (other than those in the Sikh service) exists.

III. *History of the Bombay Army.*

So much by way of indictment of the present state of affairs. I will now endeavour to discuss successively the *desiderata* which I have listed in (*a*) to (*j*) above. First of these is a history of the Bombay Army.

There were three Presidential armies in India, with a number of ancillary contingents of which only the Hyderabad Contingent and the Punjab Frontier Force have stood the test of time. Of the Bengal Army there are three general histories, by Williams, Broome and Cardew respectively, from which—especially the latter—it is an easy matter to acquire a perspective of the affairs of the Old Bengal Army. Lieut. (now Major) Cardew's book is in a form which renders it also very valuable for reference purposes. Wilson's history of the Madras Army is a standard work, and fills all ordinary requirements. Burton's history of the Hyderabad Contingent is also a model compilation, from original sources. Though the Punjab Frontier Force possesses no published history of the force as a whole, many useful records of individual units have been put forth in the last fifty years.

Of the Bombay Army, however, there is no account of any sort; and the handicap to the research worker who is dealing with the history of a particular regiment or a particular campaign, for example, is very great. Ample materials exist on which such a book could be based, and its publication should be commercially feasible. The Old Bombay Army took part in many campaigns which present points of special interest; and the possibilities of the subject can be gauged by a casual inspection of that model regimental history, Major Mainwaring's *Crown and Company,* the story of the Bombay European Regiment.

Now that Bombay has a historical society of its own, it is time for the task to be undertaken.

IV. *Dictionary of Regiments.*

The Indian forces, throughout their long history, have ever been in a state of flux. Every few years one or more new regiments have been raised, or one or more old regiments disbanded. During the last thirty years alone the name of almost every Indian infantry battalion has been changed at least twice. It is difficult enough even for those who have a considerable acquaintance with the subject to keep track of all these changes; and it is easy to confuse regiments with similar titles. Further, a large proportion of writers in the past have, in describing *e.g.*, a campaign, designated an Indian battalion merely by its number and the words "Native Infantry": thus, "2nd Native Infantry": regardless of that fact that at the period concerned there may have been half-a-dozen battalions to whom such a designation

would apply, such as the 2nd Bengal N. I., 2nd Madras N. I., 2nd Bombay N. I., and the second regiments of the Hyderabad Contingent, Punjab F. F., Gwalior Contingent, and others.

As an example of what is required, the appendices to Cardew's *Services of the Bengal Native Army*, may be cited. The projected dictionary should contain such facts as:—

(*a*) Title when raised.
(*b*) Date raised, by whom, and where
(*c*) Successive changes of designation, with dates thereof
(*d*) Battle-honours (and perhaps details of all war services)
(*e*) If disbanded, date of disbandment.

Many other data suggest themselves as worthy of inclusion: the amount that it would be practicable to include would be a matter for compromise.

It is submitted that such a work would be invaluable for reference purposes not only to those interested in historical matters, but also in government offices and for other purposes.

V. *Indian Army Uniform.*

Uniform is sometimes supposed to be a purely sartorial matter, and on that account the study of the subject is occasionally decried. Nothing is further from the truth. A knowledge of the changes in military uniform is an invaluable handmaid to history, and will sometimes lead to the most surprising and valuable results in the authentication and identification of portraits, and kindred problems. Space does not permit of particulars of instances of this which are within the writer's personal knowledge.

Nothing whatever appears to have been written about the interesting uniforms of the Indian forces. Ample materials exists for a study, long or short. The subject could be dealt with at large or by sections. A book to be of value would need to be well illustrated: coloured plates would be eminently desirable but considerations of finance would limit these severely.

It is hard to explain the neglect which this attractive subject has suffered hitherto.

VI. *Cantonments.*

The writer knows of only one historical sketch of a cantonment *qua* cantonment; and that was privately printed in an edition of only

twenty copies, being thus inaccessible. It is now put forward as an axiom that there is sufficient of historical interest in every cantonment, whether occupied or abandoned, to justify the compilation of notes on its origin, growth, the regiments and persons who have occupied it, prominent buildings, and so on. Such a work would be of general interest, and might command some sale as a local guide-book. It would be of assistance not only to historical students but also to the authorities of the Military Engineer Services and to the Cantonments department.

From personal research into the subject of more than one abandoned cantonment, and discussion with other persons interested, the writer is convinced that cantonment histories are as practicable and as desirable as regimental histories. This proposal should meet with less financial objections than some of the *desiderata* now set forth.

II. *Monumental Inscriptions.*

Those who have never given close attention to the various published lists of epitaphs on Christian tombs in India can have little idea of their tremendous value as sources for the biographer, genealogist, regimental historian, and others. The publi cation of such lists has been accepted as a government responsibility by most of the provincial administrations; and though the results vary in quality there are useful lists for the Punjab, Madras, and the United Provinces, as well as publications of lesser scope or accuracy for a few other provinces. But there exist many cemeteries, largely military in character, which have never been properly explored by an expert. As an instance, the burying-grounds at Saugor, C. P., are given : they are probably known to many officers, but no list of the epitaphs has ever been published.

Though government sponsorship is necessary for full lists, there is no reason why individual officers should not transcribe the inscriptions in particular cemeteries. Provided they conform to certain very simple rules, the resulting lists would very probably be gladly published by various historical societies in India or England.

VIII. *The Indian Mutiny.*

Far too much has been written about the Indian Mutiny : much that is inaccurate : much that is contentious : and much that is ill-informed. The writer has no intent.on of swelling the vast mass of waste paper : he would merely d aw attention to what he has already

written in the list of *desiderata* above, namely, that there is no military history proper of the campaign and very little of military value in most of the monographs on particular phases of it. The outstanding exception of course, is Major Burton's account of Rose's doings in Central India, published some years ago by the General Staff India.

IX. *Military Bibliography: Military Museum.*

To discuss either of these matters in detail would take a book in itself. In London we have the Royal United Service Museum, and the catalogue of the War Office Library. Achievements of the magnitude of these cannot be expected in India; but one has a right to expect something, however small, by way of groundwork. The absence of a reasonably complete guide to the military literature of India, and of a representative collection of military relics and other exhibits, is a serious obstacle to the student of the military history of the Indian forces.

X. *Lack of Literature.*

The Journal of the U.S.I. of India is ready, even in these hurried days, to open its columns to studies in military history; and the Journal of the (English) Society for Army Historical Research also devotes considerable space to such matters. The lack of a medium for the full discussion of military historical problems is however no small handicap to research, especially when it is remembered that personal contact between students is rarely possible owing to the great distances which separate them in India.

XI. *The "Adventurers."*

The works of Compton and Keene on the soldiers of fortune, interesting as they are, no longer provide a sufficient account of the many free-lances who fought and died in the East between 1750 and 1850. It is within the writer's personal knowledge that many remarkable characters are not mentioned at all in either of these works, and that many of the biographical sketches are incomplete or incorrect in the light of modern research. Here is room for a "best-seller": only an author is needed.

THE PASSING OF THE FRENCH IN BENGAL.

By

Captain F. T. Birdwood, 4/11th Sikh Regiment.

At the beginning of the year 1757, the British were faced with a delicate problem in Bengal. Calcutta had been retaken by the combined naval and military force from Madras under Admiral Watson and Clive; and Hugli town had been stormed in face of the Nawab Suraja Dowla's troops. We seemed secure enough for the moment; but the future was pregnant with unpleasant possibilities. We were already at war with the French, as represented by the garrison and stronghold of Chandernagore. War, too, was also now declared against the Nawab—by the Governer and Council at Calcutta in the name of the East India Company, and by Admiral Watson "in that of the King, his Master."

Chandernagore, on the West bank of the Hugli, lay some miles upstream between Murshidabad, the Nawab's capital, and Calcutta. This made the possible consequences of an offensive alliance against us between the French and the Nawab all the more dangerous. An offer of neutrality was therefore made to "the Gentlemen of Chandernagore," on condition that they should join us against the Nawab. This they declined, but stated their willingness to act as mediators. A similar offer was received from the Dutch, but was turned down as "most certainly the French ought to be preferred to the Dutch, who are only a Republic, and I am persuaded will not have the same weight, neither can it be so honourable to ourselves."* Two French agents accordingly arrived on January 21st, but could do nothing to assist, as our terms had already been forwarded to the Nawab.

The Nawab, meanwhile, had not been idle. It was no part of his plan that the French should be allowed to play an intermediary rôle. He wanted them definitely on his side. And so, on January 30th, simultaneously with the commencement of his own advance on Calcutta, he threw out tempting overtures to them to join and help him "to punish this faithless people and chase them from this

* See "Life of Lord Clive", by Sir G. Forrest, Vol. I, page 351.

country." But the French declined. The Nawab was at the head of 40,000 men, and the situation was clearly critical. We renewed our offer of neutrality with the French, accordingly, but omitting the condition of alliance against the Nawab. The French were, however, sitting on the fence, and made no answer.

On February 3rd, the Nawab's forward troops approached Calcutta. They made their way into the outskirts in search of plunder, but were driven out. The same evening the Nawab wrote to Clive, excusing himself for having brought his force so close—lack of suitable camping grounds elsewhere was the reason offered—and requesting him to send two deputies next day, the 4th, to discuss terms. In point of fact, the Nawab's desire was to repeat the tactics which secured the fall of Fort William the previous year, when his troops swarmed in and captured the fort while peace parleys were actually in progress. The deputies, however, saw through the meditated treachery. They escaped from the Nawab's camp under cover of darkness that evening, got back to Calcutta, and made their report. Clive, now as ever the man of action, at once turned out the whole available force—2,000 men, including 600 sailors, against the Nawab's 40,000—marched out before dawn and attacked the enemy's camp at first light on February 5th. Thick mist prevented the plan from being carried through, but the results were decisive. The enemy fled, with a loss of 1,300 men, as opposed to only 200 casualties among the British; and though the Nawab still temporised, he could eventually find no way out, and ratified our terms of peace on February 9th. It was his failure to implement these terms that was, in part, the cause of his own ruin at Plassey. As Clive wrote a week or two before the battle of Plassey—"Four months are elapsed since the treaty, and many times that you have fixed on for the full execution of the treaty passed by, yet very little advance is made towards fulfilling it. Of the great sum paid into your Treasury taken at Calcutta you do not consent to pay me above a fifth part, and yet expect I should send you a full discharge."

In the meantime, there seemed little obstacle to a period of peace on the Hugli. The French were a source of some anxiety, however. Their failure to reply to our neutrality proposal aroused some suspicion as to their intentions. The opinion began to be expressed that it might be as well to attack and capture Chandernagore, and

be done with it. The matter was put to the Nawab, with a view to gaining his approval, since the French were his tenants; but the Nawab's only answer was to inform us that Bussy with a large force and some men-o'-war, was expected, and to request us to prevent them from entering Bengal. At the same time, unknown to us, he entered upon active intrigues with the French in order to discount the possibility of our capturing Chandernagore, and so further adding to our power and influence in his territories. Suraja Dowla's object of avoiding strife within his bounds, and keeping his highly profitable guests in subjection to him, was legitimate enough. It was his vacillation, his treacherous ways and his intrigues, combined with similar characteristics among his underlings, that made it so impossible for him to put his wishes into effect. As it was, in our ignorance of his intrigue with the French and in the absence of any clearer guidance than the letter mentioned, we construed his words into permission to attack Chandernagore, and preparations were at once put in hand.

About this time, however, unfortunately for Suraja Dowla, the agent through whom his intrigue with the French was being conducted, sold himself to the British. This was effected by the mediation of Omichand, the banker, who had again wormed his treacherous way into our counsels. At the same time, Omichand himself so worked upon the Nawab that the proposed active assistance to the French was diverted. The Nawab now merely contented himself with sending Clive a peremptory veto on the suggested operation, while mentioning that in the event of Clive's failing to obey him, he would throw the whole weight of his forces on to the side of the French. The operation was hurriedly postponed, and so once again, an active alliance between the Nawab and the French was staved off.

On February 22nd, a request for neutrality was received from the French, and negotiations were commenced. A serious obstacle soon appeared, and the success of the conversations began to look doubtful. Though Admiral Watson was empowered to conclude terms with the French, it seemed that they on their side, could arrange nothing definite without ratification by the authorities in Pondicherry. So that in the long interval that would elapse before the French ratification could be obtained, our own hands would be tied, while the French themselves would not actually be under any material obligation

to keep the peace at all. This would especially be the case if a new French commander arrived who disapproved the terms arranged and declined to subscribe to them in the interim. This, in the prevailing circumstances of suspicion and intrigue, was a risk the authorities on the spot felt disinclined to run. If neutrality could not be arranged in a more satisfactory manner—and particularly in the light of what we now knew of the Nawab's desire to come to terms with the French—there seemed to be no alternative but to attack Chandernagore forthwith, before a combination with the Nawab could be effected. However, if we could by diplomatic means, stave off the combination a little longer than would otherwise be the case, so much the better; since Clive, for one, quite realized that the fall of Chandernagore could only have the effect of precipitating war with the Nawab.

The moment was an auspicious one, from this point of view. Ahmed Shah, the Abdalli, had raided down into India, and Suraja Dowla appealed for our assistance to protect his dominions from attack. We at once made permission to attack Chandernagore the condition to our agreement, on the ground that we could not possibly march up-river with the Nawab, and leave behind us a possibly hostile French garrison, unbound by any treaty terms, to threaten our communications with, and interests in, Calcutta. We postponed the neutrality negotiations, meanwhile; and on March 8th, without waiting for a reply from the Nawab, marched upstream towards Chandernagore.

On March 9th, in reply to a query from the French, Clive wrote that he had no present intention of attacking Chandernagore, and that he would give them warning if he changed his mind. The fact was that he wanted the Nawab's sanction, and had no intention of attacking without it. On March 10th, the force reached the outskirts of Chandernagore, and halted till the 12th in the French gardens. That day, as he heard that the French were erecting batteries commanding the approaches to the Fort from that direction, he moved round and encamped two miles West of Chandernagore. On the 13th, a letter arrived from the Nawab. Its last paragraph read as follows:—"You have understanding and generosity; if your enemy with an upright heart claims your protection you will give him his life, but then you must be well satisfied of his intentions; if not, whatever you think right, that do." This ambiguous sanction is supposed

to have been derived from the Nawab's very present fear of the Afghans, but also more than a little from an exchange of presents with his secretary.

The French were now summoned to surrender, but returned no reply.

The Settlement of Chandernagore clustered round the Fort d'Orleans—the greater part to the South, with fine houses and beautiful gardens bordering the banks of the river. The Fort was a stronghold of no mean character—built in the form of a square, with sides 120 yards long, and bastions mounting ten 32 pdr. guns each, at the corners. A quantity of 24 pdrs. were further mounted along the walls. The Fort lay back some 30 yards from the river, with which communication was ensured by an outwork mounting eight more 32 pdrs. There was a ditch round three sides of the Fort, which was further protected on its Western face by a large tank.

A good deal of work had been done on the Fort since our recapture of Calcutta in January. Measures were also being taken, by new construction and, by sinking ships in the fairway, to reduce the possibility of attack by the Navy—a contingency which the French feared, as it proved, with reason. The streets of the Settlement had also been blocked as far as was possible by ditches and barricades, and by the erection of batteries of artillery.

The total available garrison amounted to a little under 800 of all colours and grades—including a good proportion of civilians. There were in addition 2,000 of the Nawab's troops, which had been lent to the French ; but these deserted at the first shot. Whether this was treason or panic is not definitely known.

The British force amounted to between twice and three times the French. They had, furthermore, the material backing of three men-o'-war, over and above their land forces.

Operations started promptly on the evening of the 13th, when the town batteries were harassed, and a deserted battery position to the N.W. occupied. Early on the 14th, the attack on the guns withdrawn by the French from the deserted N.W. battery, was pressed ; and after stubborn fighting, which lasted all through the heat of the day, the position of the French guns was rendered untenable. As the capture by us of this battery would have entailed the isolation and loss of seven other batteries in the Settlement, all were withdrawn

about 9 p.m., and all guns which could not be got away, were spiked up. At the same time, the outlying works to the South, including a battery which commanded the river, were pulled in.

Next day, the 15th, Clive occupied these deserted positions on the South, advancing his troops up to within 100 yards of the Fort. The bombardment began that evening with "five small mortars and a cohorn." During the 16th and 17th, the bombardment continued, thickened up with musketry fire from the house-tops. That evening, it is stated, arrows were shot into the Fort, bearing a promise of pardon to returning deserters, and of rewards to officers who would themselves desert to us. Whether or no, certain it is that the commander of the French artillery, who was at odds with the Governor, did desert to us. This man, a Monsieur de Terraneau, had lost an arm fighting for the French on the Madras Coast. There is some resemblance, thus, between him and the General Arnold who, the story runs, lost a leg fighting for the Americans, and then, falling out with Washington during the War of Independance, came over to us.

The bombardment continued up till March 22nd—not by any means uninterrupted by the French, who played havoc with our battery construction near the river.

Meanwhile, the men-o'-war had approached. They first sent out parties to cut the cables of three fire-ships which the French had prepared, and which now drifted down on to a sand bank. After that, they took soundings round the obstructions in the channel, in spite of heavy firing from the Fort, and found them to be passable.

On the early morning of the 23rd, the ships sailed up, while Clive stood ready to assault. After a desperate artillery duel between the ships and the Fort, which cost the "Kent" and the "Tyger" 131 casualties between them, but inflicted 200 on the French—in the space of 3 hours only—the Fort capitulated. The Governor and Europeans were, at the time, released on parole; but proof coming to hand a little later, that the parole was being infringed, they were rounded up and detained in Calcutta until after the battle of Plassey.

The Nawab, meanwhile, had received peaceful assurances as regards Ahmed Shah. He promptly regretted the dubious sanction given by him for the attack on Chandernagore, and sent a large force down to attack us. Clive, who heard of this the day before

the Fort fell, wrote placidly thanking the Nawab for sending his troops down to help him, but assuring him that they were unnecessary.

Chandernagore was taken—and to that extent the situation was cleared up. As so often happens, however, much needs more. The French factory at Cossimbazar, which might now be expected to become the centre of French intrigue—the forces under Bussy, not so very far distant now—and the secret fury of the Nawab—had all to be reckoned with. The Nawab was only waiting for Clive to sail back with his men to Madras, orders for which had already been received, to fall upon Calcutta again. Meantime, he occupied himself assuring Bussy of his goodwill. To gain more time, and to secure himself as far as possible from attack by us, he fell in with our demands to the extent of ordering the French out of their factory at Cossimbazar-but he took them into his service, and sent them to Patna, while strictly forbidding us to pursue. At the same time, he tried to dam up the Hugli, to prevent our warships sailing up it. As Scrafton tersely puts it—"Oh, the fool."

As an earnest of his firm resolve to oppose any further move by us against the French, the Nawab now sent Mir Jafar, his commander-in-chief, with 15,000 men, downstream to Plassey, where Rai Dulab was posted with the troops which had been intended for the relief of Chandernagore. An entrenched camp had been constructed on the bank of the river; and not far distant, lay the Nawab's shooting box, and the mango plantation which later become known as Plassey Grove.

At this juncture, an interesting development appeared. Suraja Dowla had become increasingly at odds with his Mahommedan subordinates, as well as with his Hindu financiers. A strong subversive movement had set in, and the British were invited to join it. This, in the circumstances, they decided to do. Matters were not, however, composed without difficulty. Omichand was—almost necessarily—admitted to the conspiracy, and, as the price of his silence, put in a claim for 5 per cent of the Nawab's entire treasure, and 25per cent of his wealth. The alternative, in case we should not agree, was quite simple; disclosure of the plot to the Nawab, the consequent massacre of all our people up-country, and war. So we should necessarily have accepted the terms, except that, as Clive well knew, neither Mir Jafar, our nominee for the Suba-ship, nor the big Hindu banker, Jagat Seth, who detested

Omichand, would for one moment listen to such a demand. So that, once again, disclosure and its consequences would follow. In the circumstances, Clive adopted a subterfuge. He had two copies of the proposed treaty made out. One embodied Omichand's demands—boiled down to a flat sum of £200,000, together with a percentage on the total receipts, which was expected to bring him £100,000 more. This was a false treaty. The other copy omitted this clause, and was the one upon which action was to be taken. The ruse was successful. Both parties to the conspiracy were satisfied (it was not thought likely that they would exchange confidences with one another on so delicate a matter), and the certainty of failure and bloodshed was averted.

Clive naturally came in for a good deal of abuse later in this matter of the treaties, but he never failed to uphold his conviction that the deception was justified. If we consider the odds—on the one hand blackmail (it was nothing else)—on the other, whether we agreed to the blackmail or not, disclosure, failure, and loss of the lives and property of probably every British subject North of Calcutta; I think it may be allowed that the end this time did justify the means. In any case, whatever the decision as to the morals of Clive's act, Omichand deserves very little sympathy. Secure, as he thought, in his promise of £300,000, he then went to the Nawab and extorted £80,000 more—half of which was admittedly an old debt—by revealing to him just as much about the plot as he thought could be known.

In June, after a series of plots and counter-plots, and dark intrigue, Suraja Dowla, whose suspicions against Mir Jafar had been definitely aroused, removed him from his post. The treaty had, however, been ratified by him, and his oath was now obtained over and above his signature, by smuggling Watts, our agent, into his women's quarters in a covered litter, and so enabling him to meet Mir Jafar without exciting suspicion. The stage was now set for the final act.

On June 12th every available man was drafted upstream from Calcutta to Chandernagore. The following day, leaving a garrison of only 100 seamen behind him, Clive moved off with a force of a little under 800 Europeans—infantry and gunners—and 2,100 native infantry. His artillery comprised only eight 6 pdrs. and two small howitzers. He had no cavalry at all. Europeans, artillery, ammunition and stores were carried by water. The native infantry followed the Hugli-

Patna high road, along the right bank of the river. The same evening, our representatives at Murshidabad and Cossimbazar made their escape under cover of darkness, and, after an adventurous journey, they joined Clive at Culna, 95 miles distant, on the afternoon of the 14th.

On the 17th, Eyre Coote captured the town and fort of Cutwa. This operation coincided with the break of the monsoon. Clive's most pressing business now, however, was to ensure that Mir Jafar and the 10,000 men he still commanded, should in fact come down to his assistance. Clive had no idea at all of butting his head blindly into the whole of Suraja Dowla's army while Mir Jafar looked on from a safe distance. But in spite of all Clive's endeavours, little information, and no direct assistance at all was ever received from Mir Jafar, though he came just sufficiently close to guaranteeing his active co-operation to induce Clive to commit his small force, and boldly advance on Suraja Dowla's great army. Truth to tell, Mir Jafar was in no very pleasant position; he knew just how close to the crater's edge he had been sitting during the past few weeks. So far as Clive himself was concerned, try though he might to stir Mir Jafar to action, he must have known very well that there were really no two ways to the matter. The alternatives were—either battle with the Nawab at once before the French could actively help him, or withdrawal to Calcutta, and consequent disgrace in the eyes of the whole native world of India.

Accordingly, on the 22nd June, when Mir Jafar wrote that he had at last marched out of Murshidabad, Clive renewed his advance about 5 p.m.—and after a long and tiring march through pouring rain, closed up between midnight and 3 a.m. at Plassey Grove, close, as it happened, to the Nawab's entrenched camp. Clive fixed his head-quarters in the bungalow by the river, while the force bivouacked in the Grove itself.

Of the battle next day, little need be said—the circumstances are too well known. The Nawab disposed of 35,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 53 heavy guns. Clive mustered 3,200 infantry, no cavalry, and 10 small guns. The battle opened with an artillery duel about 8 a.m. This lasted till noon when a violent thunder-storm wetted the enemy's powder, and caused a period of enforced inaction. The hostile fire had done little damage to the British forces,

sheltering in the Grove, and our guns had more than held their own. The Nawab's troops, meanwhile, had formed in a vast crescent round the British, but little offensive action was taken by them, other than by the 50 French. Scrafton writes in his account of the battle—"What with the number of elephants, all covered with scarlet cloth and embroidery; their horse with their drawn swords glittering in the sun; their heavy cannon drawn by vast trains of oxen; and their standards flying, they made a most pompous and formidable appearance."

After the storm had passed, the artillery fire re-opened, but about 3 p.m. the enemy began to withdraw into their entrenched camp. Mir Jafar had at last taken some action in his own, and our favour. Clive had been sufficiently upset before the beginning of the fight, to send him the following note—"Whatever could be done by me I have done, I can do no more. If you will come to Daudipore I will march from Placis to meet you, but if you won't comply even with this, pardon me, I shall make it up with the Nabob." Later, in a letter to the Select Committee, he wrote—"During the warmest part of the action, we observed a large Body of Forces composing the left wing of the Army marching towards the Right of Placis Grove; these proved to be Jaffeir Ally Khan and his Party, but as they made no Signal to testify their being Friends, we fired on them and made them keep their Distance." The odds were too great for Clive to take chances with possible treachery. At the same time, he must have felt a certain degree of satisfaction at the thought that if Mir Jafar wouldn't come under fire on one side in the fight that was to win him his throne, he should taste it on the other.

Mir Jafar did eventually take action, in helping to persuade the Nawab to break off the fight till the next day. He then wrote to suggest that Clive should make a night attack on the camp. There was not the slightest suggestion of co-operation with him, however. A night attack was, as it happens, what Clive had already decided upon—but his hand was forced. Part of his troops advanced without orders to take up some important ground to the front. They were insufficient to hold it. So Clive, faced with the alternatives of reinforcing or evacuating it, decided on the former. As he had expected, the enemy troops at once poured out of the camp—but its exits were now under fire, and their artillery could not be got out.

The situation remained critical for some little time—the enemy closing in some parts to within between 50 and 100 yards of our line, and threatening our rear with their cavalry. Presently signs of wavering showed ; our attack was pressed in ; and by 5 p.m., the camp was in our hands. Suraja Dowla had already escaped to Murshidabad, but the pursuit of his troops was carried through for 6 miles, in spite of the lack of cavalry with our force.

The losses in men had been some 500 in the Nawab's army and 65 in ours. A very small cost—on either side—for the notable consequences involved.

The troops were now moved up to Murdshidabad, which was entered with some small degree of state on June 29th Mir Jafar was formally installed on the Musnad and perhaps the only really disappointed person in the whole city was Omichand. He was so overwhelmed when the matter of the treaty came up that he feigned insanity—and with a skill that deceived many. This unhappy state did not, however, prevent his continuing in his avaricious ways. It is, incidentally, on record that he left in his will, in 1762, Rs. 18,750 to the Foundling Hospital in London—the equivalent, then, of something under £2,000.

The other leading character, who remains to be mentioned, was Suraja Dowla, who, as we have seen, fled from Plassey as soon as his defeat seemed imminent. He escaped from Murshidabad with a great quantity of treasure, but fell into Mir Jafar's hands not many days after. The tables were now turned with a vengeance, and Mir Jafar decided to have him put to death before the British could interfere. Shrinking from the deed himself, he commissioned his son Miran, who had a name for expeditious murders, to do it for him. Miran persuaded an acquaintance to carry out the sentence, and Suraja Dowla was then cut down in cold blood, and his mangled body paraded round the streets on an elephant, on July 3rd, by way of notifying the accession of a new Nawab. A ghastly end, but no more than the pattern of the victim's own life.

Victory was complete. As "the Admirals and Select Committee" wrote a few days later, the victory was indeed of "extraordinary importance not only to the Company but to the British Nation in General." Though the French still swayed to some extent our fortunes in Bengal, whether by intrigue, or by force of arms, their power

was broken, and, in a very few years, we became the paramount power in the Province.

The credit for this was Clive's. He had been given a curiously independent rôle by the authorities at Fort St. George, and he took good care to retain it. Coming up from Madras, at the age of only thirty-two on a purely temporary mission, he had taken an increasing degree of both military and political responsibility on his shoulders. He gambled continuously—but never in the face of reason, and never with less than every single available card in his hand. When he drove Suraja Dowla back from Calcutta, when he marched against Chandernagore, most of all, when he carried through the intrigues and operations which led to the final throw against overwhelming odds at Plassey, he put his absolute all into the fight, and, once committed, forced matters through with unrelenting vigour. He was not, in every case backed up. We see something of his inner feelings in his reply to a letter from the Select Committee at Calcutta, giving him their conditional blessing in the matter of the impending battle at Plassey—a letter which was received after the battle had been fought and won. He wrote back—"I have received your letter of the 23rd instant, the contents of which are so indefinite and contradictory, that I can put no other construction on it, than an intent to clear yourselves at my expense, had the expedition miscarried." He is a fortunate soldier indeed who only has one enemy to fight.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

Babu Tactics, Royal Artillery.

Sir,

Prosperity makes friends, but adversity distinguishes them. Micky the "*Mouse*" and the picquet's scalded cat are indeed strange playmates. Their joint plaintive squeal for a sense of proportion has, however, echoed round the Frontier hills even unto Hazara and its school of confused thought but oh-so-clear teaching. To this confusion may I too add my bit?

Thus squeals "*Mouse*" in Hindostan *:—

(1) "We are all obsessed by our artillery and forget that it is generally inadequate in India" (I understand, however, that much of it can be spared during the next few years).

(2) "Codes, artillery programmes, co-ordinates and inaccurate maps and all the erudite backwash of" various seats of learning.

(3) "They blur initiative."

(4) "Then more reconnaissances, more recognition of places to note (*Kantrol paints, sahib, achcha*), detailed descriptions of the mechanical aid to be expected to disbelieving Indian officers."

Thus echoes his unknown friend Mutt (hardly on speaking terms with his Staff Officer, R. A., Jeff by name) in arguing to his battery at Home on very parallel lines through the pages of the R. A. Journal, April 1930.

(1) "Another disadvantage (of brigade concentrations) is that the practice of them uses up ammunition which would otherwise be devoted to teaching young officers to shoot *by observation* which is becoming a lost art."

(2) "In peace, we drift further and further away from the simple and direct. We get more complicated and academic."

(3) "All this 'tan theta' business has slowed things up. It cramps initiative."

(4) What do the 'Feet' really want. "First-quicker response.

* Babu Tactics by 'Mouse', Journal of the United Service Institution of India, January 1931.

"That the one battery that can *see* can take on the job single-handed by utilizing its quick-firing properties." Brigade concentrations demonstrated by picked batteries, on known ground, in a good light give the other arms confidence which is definitely misleading.

Finally—"the effect of bullets and cold feet on 'tan theta' has yet to be put to the test."

Mutt writes this last paragraph from Woolwich and not from Miri Khel. "*Mouse's*" primitive friend, Afridi Khan has quite recently been teaching the disciples of 'tan theta' that O. P's should be occupied unobtrusively unless the occupants wish to quit them like scalded 'cats.' Surely we all agree so far that "Mouse" keeps on squeaking sound sense and that Mutt, like Felix the Cat, keeps on squeaking in much the same vein.

Quotation being a drug on the *Aj* market, a few more reinforcements are being called up from varied sources, R. A.

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Mark *Surveyor*, states.—"I am often asked by the other arms what are the real uses of artillery survey. To this there is only *one* correct answer. Some people make a living out of it."

Subaltern, R. A. Field Brigade Survey Officer, writes.—"We have got so many forms in our brigade for saving us thought that most of us have stopped thinking altogether."

Someone evidently thinks that initiative is undoubtedly being blurred. Driver Naik Kishan Singh, severely reprimanded for parking two mules on the battery bearing picket, to his friend Bolo Singh:—"Beware o the pock pickets, they are—dangerous. *Bilkul marne ke karib hain.*" Too true. More recognition of places to note from the enemy's point of view.

Brigadier, R. A. (*sadly*), on a brigade's recent exploits at camp: "Their rangefinder plot work was really excellent, the rest of their shooting was too painfully slow for words. We got back to tea at six."

Artistically mosaic, pathetically prosaic. Much paper has blown over bridges since the days when the F. O. O. was ordered to "*Chelo bhai*" on a fleeting opportunity. Now-a-days the unfortunate youth has to put in for a shooting license, which has to be backed by a Board of Survey and the calibration *wala* before indulging in a sequence of ten different fire orders.

Staff Officer, R. A., another Command, (grimly).—"It's too late to argue who invented the plane table and its white paper top, it's you *pandit* blokes what keep the damn thing going."

Mobility and surprise are indeed muted strings. So much so that "*Mouse*" must have been burrowing beneath the undercarriage of the Raike's miniature range. The Raike's progress is becoming just as mute, the strings are being gnawed away. The wide open spaces of Jallozai and Tughlakabad are being covered with brigade concentrations, with a few marginal and virginal errors for dispersion. Trot out your disbelieving Indian officers. The aids are so mechanical that most of the drivers do not now wear spurs.

To those of my readers who have read thus far and must by now be convinced that I have quoted quite enough and have confused the issue in the best Babu tradition, I would ask them to remember that Babu Tactics are only too apt to ignore the fact that "artillery is generally inadequate in India."

Biennial practice is building up a reserve of hitherto inadequate ammunition and concentrating on a sounder knowledge of the tactics of co-operation. The young officer, in consequence, is getting less and less opportunities for observing live shell.

The Regimental Subaltern should, therefore, be extremely grateful to "*Mouse*" (he has already made an idol of Mutt) for having the irreverence to suggest that there may be, if we are not very careful, something wrong with training. This something might well be called Babu Gunnery.

Yours faithfully,

A. M. B. ROSE, CAPTAIN, R.A.

"DO YOU SHOOT ?"

SIR,

Now and then we see in the pages of the Journal an appeal for something obviously officially inspired, say for instance a bit of propaganda urging officers to keep more horses and ride up the hills to see the country rather than sticking to the roads in cars. "It is all so good for their military training." This appeal, if the Editor will publish it, has nothing official about it.

Can anything be done to make our officers go out shooting and what is the reason that so many of them no longer keep scatter guns ? The idea that the motor bicycle and the car prevent people from shooting must be wrong ; motors are very necessary to those who shoot. No, the trouble lies in the scarcity of game. Every year more and more guns are in use in the villages, waste land is being cultivated, and jheels are being drained so that there is less cover for birds. But even these reasons do not completely account for the shortage of game.

To get down to brass tacks the sale of game is largely responsible, and the buyer is as much to blame as the seller. Let us cite a few buyers of game starting at Simla and working outwards. The hotels in Simla buy hill pheasants. These birds are shot on the roost by moonlight and carried into Simla by muleteers coming down the Tibet road. Once upon a time one could get quite decent pheasant shooting round Simla. You can't now. Take any plains Cantonment; partridges and teal are always on sale in the cold weather. These birds have been netted. Near Delhi there used to be excellent partridge shooting—now the birds are netted wholesale and sent in to Raisina Khansamas. Consider the frontier. Chickor, *see-see* and partridges are trapped in season and out and carted round for sale. (If we have no game laws to prevent this, surely the thought of poor wild frightened creatures being hawked round ought to put people off buying them.) Men literally sit up over water for duck and teal and send the birds they shoot for sale into Cantonments by boys on bicycles.

You see a man hanging round your bungalow, who calls himself a "Shikari"—a term that used to mean an optimistic and usually pleasant scoundrel who enticed you far with his promises of showing you sport—now it means a poacher selling game unblushingly and often out of season at that. I can quote instances of people giving "Shikaris" a liberal supply of cartridges in return for game. Not long ago a lady said to me "This man has brought in six *see-see* what ought I to give him ?" The answer she got was probably classed as unnecessarily rude. It was "A damned good hiding."

As long as people are content to depart from the ethics of sport by buying game, (Game buyers would be horrified if one suggested buying golf balls from caddies or tennis balls from tennis chokras), so long shall we see our sport gradually vanishing. Remove the demand and you soon remove the supply or, as regards game, you cause the sup-

pliers to go out of business and give the birds a chance. Let some one in authority take the first step to bring home to people that the buying of game is not cricket, and that it is doing much to kill a very useful and healthy form of training, for those of us who do not get invitations, to join in shoots over Rajas' preserves.

Yours faithfully,

"LUMBIDUM".

MILITARY NOTES.

BELGIUM.

The Military Budget for 1931.

1. Details of the Belgian Army Estimates for 1931 have now been published.

The financial policy adopted last year appears to have been continued and re-armament of the army to be progressing normally. There is a total decrease of £274,000 in comparison with the 1930 Budget.

2. Under the heading of *Ordinary Expenditure* the most notable increases are :—

	£
Pay and allowances	191,000
Hospitals	83,000
Armaments and harness	128,000

while the more important decreases are :—

Rations and forage	271,000
Aviation	35,000

3. The chief decrease is due to the reduction in the strength of the army to 62,000, a reduction of 28 officers and 3,000 men, which is estimated to produce a saving of £271,000 on feeding and forage, though it will be observed that it is somewhat counterbalanced by an increase of £191,000 on pay and allowances.

4. Under the heading of *Extraordinary Expenditure*, there is, this year, no expenditure on armoured cars, but last year's allotment of £173,000 for the purchase of aircraft is repeated. The chief items showing an increase are :—

	£
Artillery material	22,000 (increase of 14 per cent.)
Industrial mobilization	5,000 (increase of 50 per cent.)
Gas-masks ..	70,000 (new item).

and the chief items showing a decrease are :—

	£
Purchase of transport..	89,000 (reduction of 60 per cent.)
Purchase of small arms	44,000 (reduction of 20 per cent.)
Engineer services ..	119,000.

The £119,000 for Engineer services is accounted for by the non-recurrence of the £76,000 voted last year on fortification works, and the re-armament of the Meuse forts and a 50 per cent. reduction on the rest of the vote.

5. According to recent statements in the press a special credit is likely to be voted for the Namur and Antwerp defences. It is understood that these defences will be taken in hand early next year.

Regimental Centenaries.

The following regiments severally celebrated their centenaries with theatricals, concerts, banquets, memorial services and trooping of the colours :—

1st Regiment of Guides.
1st ,, Lancers.
2nd ,, ,,
1st ,, *Chasseurs à Cheval.*
2nd ,, ,, ,,
1st Line Regiment.
5th ,,
6th ,,
8th ,,
9th ,,

1st Lancers.

The Headquarter Staff and the 1st Group of the 1st Regiment of Lancers has now moved to its permanent quarters at Spa.

GERMANY.

Civil Employment of Ex-Soldiers and Policemen.

The German press reports that about 35,000 ex-soldiers and policemen, recently discharged, are now awaiting absorption into civil life. The State funds expended on their assistance within the next year will amount to 40 million marks.

Legislation is to be introduced to ensure that the central government, the provincial governments and municipalities reserve a definite proportion of their vacant posts for ex-servicemen and ex-policemen. It is intended to fix the proportion of posts so reserved at 100 per cent. of the lower and lower middle employment grades, and 50 per cent. of the upper middle grade. In the Post Office 80 per cent. of

the vacant posts are to be reserved for men discharged from the army and police. By these measures it is hoped that all discharged men will be absorbed into government or municipal employment within 4 years.

Discipline.

On the conclusion of the recent trial at Leipzig of two army officers and an ex-officer, the Reichswehr Minister, General Groener, addressed the following circular to all officers :—

" Berlin, 6th October, 1930.

On the 4th October, 1930, the Supreme Court in Leipzig pronounced the following sentence on 2nd Lieuts. Scheringer and Ludin and Lieut. (retired) Wendt :

> The accused are sentenced to 18 months fortress imprisonment and ordered to pay the costs of the trial for joint conspiracy in preparing a treasonable enterprise. The period of 6 months and 3 weeks spent in custody to count towards the sentence. Ludin and Scheringer are to be dismissed the service. Scheringer is acquitted on the other counts of the charge."

In passing this sentence the President of the Court emphasized, among other things, that the condemned officers had been animated by noble motives in committing the regrettable offence, and that they had been inspired by patriotism. In spite of this, however, the Court made no allowance for extenuating circumstances and laid particular emphasis on the fact that it is impossible in the German Army to have subalterns undertaking journeys for propaganda purposes, no matter on behalf of what party.

I have to make the following considered observations on the case :—

1. The Reichswehr must essentially be, and is, in the highest degree, national. When, however, young officers who possess no other qualification besides their youth, reproach their superiors and therefore the Supreme Commander of the Reichswehr, President Hindenburg (who has the deciding voice in all matters of national policy) with a lack of national sentiment, and arrogate to themselves the right to decide what is or is not national, their action can only be described as unparalleled insolence, revealing a regrettable lack of the sense of authority.

2. It is a fact that the chief task of the Reichswehr is the protection of our Fatherland against outside aggression, and it is the self-evident duty of the responsible heads to do everything possible to carry out this task. It is, however, pure presumption on the part of young officers, revealing an astonishing over-estimate of their own powers of discernment, when such men, who are not in a position to appreciate foreign political and financial possibilities, speak of inadequate measures for the protection of the country taken by the High Command, and go so far as to criticise them in public.

3. The Reichswehr stands for the State and is above all parties. It must unconditionally be kept outside party strife and the political influences of the day. Consequently there can be no leaning towards left or right. All military-political measures taken and orders issued are dictated from this point of view only. When, however, young officers believe it to be their duty to combat what they consider to be tendencies towards the left in the command of the Reichswehr, it indicates complete failure on their part to recognize the actual state of things.

The usual channels are open to them in case they desire to approach their highest superiors and put forward their objections to any orders or measures they do not understand. It is the state of mind prevalent since the war which leads every young officer to believe himself entitled to criticise all orders issued by the High Command, and to demand the why and wherefore of each measure taken.

4. The strength of every armed force depends on unconditional and implicit obedience. Soldiers who, before carrying out orders, ask themselves whether these orders are in conformity with their own views, are not worth their salt. Such questioning is the first step to mutiny and the dissolution of the Reichswehr, and, if allowed to continue, would lead to each man turning his hand against his neighbour. It was a blot on the scutcheon of the Reichswehr when young officers voiced such thoughts before the Supreme Court.

5. It is obvious that officers holding such views cannot remain in the Reichswehr. I therefore expect of every officer who possesses a sense of honour and has the courage to tell the

truth, that he will at once send in his papers in case he subscribes to such opinions.

6. This order is to be brought to the notice of every officer and at the same time the order concerning the preliminaries to the trial is to be recalled to mind.

The carrying out of this order will be reported to the Reichswehr Ministry by 1st November, 1930.

(Sd.) GROENER.

SPAIN.

Visit to Spain of French Minister of War.

Monsieur André Maginot paid an official visit to Madrid from 24th to 26th October on his return to France from Morocco, where he had accompanied the President of the French Republic.

On 25th October the French Minister paid a visit to Toledo. He was accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Military Governor of Madrid and many other authorities. He inspected the Cadets at the Military Academy, where a lunch was subsequently served, during which very cordial speeches were made by the French and Spanish Ministers of War.

On 26th he left for Saragossa and paid a lengthy visit to the General Military Academy, where he inspected the Cadets and was entertained to luncheon by General Franco, Director of the Academy, whom he afterwards decorated as a Knight Commander of the Legion of Honour. King Alfonso, he said, has asked him to give his opinion on the Academy. He said he considered it one of the best military educational establishments in Europe. On the conclusion of this visit Monsieur Maginot left for France, *via* Irun, accompanied by Senor Quinones de Leon.

The Spanish authorities extended great cordiality to the French Minister throughout his stay.

During his visit to Madrid Monsieur Maginot received a group of press reporters, to whom he made special reference to the successful results of Franco-Spanish co-operation in Morocco. He further said—

"Your Army interests me in the very highest degree as Spain and France are not only friendly nations but nations which each have need of the other, and everything that increases your strength is looked upon by us with favour.

"Spain and France are peaceful nations . . , and continuing strong and united, not only ensure their own security, but also contribute efficaciously to the maintenance of peace in Europe."

Death of the Generalissimo of the Spanish Army.

Captain-General Don Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marques de Tenerife and Duque de Rubi, died at his home in Madrid on 20th October at the age of 92, after a short illness. General Weyler and H.R.H. don Carlos de Bourbon were the only two officers in the Spanish Army holding the rank of *Capitan-General* (Field-Marshal). The dead officer was a Knight of the Golden Fleece.

In deference to his last wishes, the Government refrained from giving their senior *Capitan-General* a military funeral, and only his sons and most intimate friends were present at his burial. In order to ensure this privacy, the correct time of the funeral was not disclosed beforehand. In fact it was the late General's wish to be buried before his death was announced, but this was impossible.

An official memorial service, which was attended by the members of the government and all high military and civil officials, was held in the *Church of San Francisco El Grande* on 29th October.

Visit of the Spanish High Commissioner to Gibraltar.

Lieut.-General Count Jordana, Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, arrived at Gibraltar from Ceuta on 31st October in the Spanish cruiser *Extremadura*, on a return visit to H. E. the Governor. General Sir Alexander Godley visited the Spanish Zone at the beginning of this year.

A programme of visits and inspection had been arranged, at which General Muslera, Military Governor of Algeciras, was also present.

The High Commissioner was present at a parade of the 1st Bn. Lincolnshire Regiment, and afterwards inspected the 2nd Bn. North Staffordshire Regiment. He lunched with the officers of these two regiments.

The Garrison barracks, museum and military library were visited.

The High Commissioner concluded his visit at 6 p.m. on 1st November, when he returned to Ceuta in the *Extremadura.*

Concentration of Recruits.

Incorporation of 1st Group of 1930 Contingent.

On 30th September the Active Service Contingent for 1930 was fixed at 90,000 recruits; of these, 58,000 are destined for service in the Peninsula, and 32,000 for Africa.

Balloting took place on 12th October for the posting of the year's recruits, and in accordance with the new Recruiting Regulations, the incorporation took place during October of :—

One-third of the year's recruits allotted for service in the Peninsula	19,334
One-half of those for service in Africa ..	15,816
Total ..	35,150

The figures for the 1st Group, 1929, were :—

Peninsular ..	50,039	(these formed *half* the year's recruits for Spain).
Africa ..	12,135	

TURKEY.

Relations with Greece.

For the first time in the history of the two nations since Greece became a Sovereign State, a Greek Prime Minister has paid an official visit to the Turkish Capital, and as a result, relations between the two countries have been completely regularised after seven years of severe tension.

M. Venizelos arrived at Angora towards the end of October, and on the 30th of that month a Treaty of Arbitration and Friendship was signed. This was followed by a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and finally of a Protocol on the limitation of Naval Armaments. This Protocol cannot be said to have completely settled the question of naval armaments as far as these two countries are concerned, because it merely lays down that each Power will give the other

6 months' notice before commencing any new construction. It is at least satisfactory, however, that there will be time for an exchange of opinions before building is actually begun. Thus a great step forward on the path towards maintenance of peace in the Eastern-Mediterranean has been taken, and both countries will be able to devote a correspondingly greater part of their energies to their internal problems.

NOTES ON MILITARY REVIEWS.

BELGIUM.

"Bulletin Belge des Sciences Militaires."

Published by Imp. Typo. de l'Institut Cartographique Militaire, Brussels.

Price, 1.50 Belga.

November, 1930.

1. *An Infantry Battalion Guard Action. Employment of Reserve Machine Guns.*

A detailed study of the action of the 3rd M. G. Platoon, 4th Company, in the case given in the article printed under the same heading in the August issue.

2. *A Concrete instance of the Employment of Corps Air Squadrons and Anti-Aircraft Units.*

The first instalment of a series.

The Army Corps is approaching the enemy and has attached to it:—

1 balloon squadron (1 balloon).

1 aeroplane group, of 2 squadrons, each of 9 machines, with 2 *messenger* aeroplanes.

1 *groupement* (2 groups) of anti-aircraft guns on trailers.

The employment of these units is studied in detail.

3. *The Reduction of Armaments before the League of Nations.*

An interesting study of the question as it now stands, by Major Diepenryckx, head of the Intelligence Branch of the Belgian General Staff.

FRANCE.

"REVUE MILITAIRE FRANCAISE."

(Published by Berger-Lebrault, Paris. Price, 5·50 francs.)

October, 1930.

1. *The Defence of the Frontier. Lessons from past Masters.* By Colonel Doumenc.

Traces the effects of reliance on permanent fortifications for this purpose from 1815 onwards. This article emphasizes the danger of such works being looked on as an end in themselves, and therefore immobilizing a large part of the field army instead of acting as an aid to manœuvre. The author stresses the view that in modern war success depends on the rapid concentration of force where required and manœuvre, combined with up-to-date armament and means of transportation, far more than on any fortress system.

2. *The 20th Corps at Morhange.* By Commandant Lefranc.

A somewhat disputable apology for Foch's action on this occasion, which has been much criticised. Interesting, as it shows how a French Army, in this instance, was drawn on by the German Command into a most dangerous situation, which would have been accentuated, had not the Crown Prince Rupert turned to the attack prematurely.

3. *The Manœuvre of the Counter-Attack.* By Commandant Delmas.

This, the concluding article of the series, deals principally with the pre-arranged counter-attack, with or without tanks. It sums up the general question of the best means of launching a successful counter-attack, and especially stresses the need for forethought and good liaison with the artillery, simplicity of plan, and the avoidance of complicated movements.

4. *Monthyon.* B Captain R. Michel. (Conclusion).

This chapter is chiefly the narrative of the movements of the French 55th Reserve Division on the Ourcq. It is of interest as regards the movements of the German Higher Command.

REVIEWS.

The Paris Gun. By Henry W. Miller.

(*George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., London*, 1930). 10*s.* 6*d.*

The story of the shelling of Paris in 1918 cannot fail to be of interest to the general reader, soldier or civilian; to those interested in guns and gunnery it will prove absorbing.

The author has clearly taken great pains to obtain a remarkable amount of detailed information both of the guns themselves and of their effect on Paris, and has placed it all in an appropriate setting in relation to events on the Western Front between March and August 1918. The book contains several small but clear sketch maps, which facilitate the following of the narrative, in addition to a number of interesting photographs. Separate chapters are devoted to events in Paris when shells were falling and to corresponding events in the various long range emplacements, and the story at either end of the trajectory has many dramatic moments. The reader is made to enter into the feelings of the inhabitants of Paris when detonations occurred in the city preceded by no air raid warning, and when no hostile aeroplanes had been observed. He will also sympathise with the authorities in Paris who stated in their first communiqué that the city had been bombed by aeroplanes operating from such a height as to render them invisible, and added that these aeroplanes were at once pursued.

The opening chapters emphasize the difference in effect on morale between being subject to air raids of which warning may be expected and which cannot last long as compared with being within range of a gun which gives no warning and can engage its target at any time and for an unknown period.

From the German side, the magnitude of the conception of throwing a 228lb. shell up to a distance of 80 miles is well brought out, together with the thoroughness and minute attention to detail employed. An example is given of the attempt to avoid discovery. In addition to the most careful overhead camouflage, smoke pots capable of producing an artificial fog were spread over a large area, and ordinary heavy batteries were sited in the neighbourhood for the purpose

of defeating the French sound ranging installations. Up to January 1916 the designers of the gun were asked for a range of 60 miles; this afforded some choice of position. After the German withdrawal in March 1917 a range of 80 miles was called for, and even that only allowed for one possible area for the guns. Probably only artillery experts will appreciate what a demand for a 33 per cent. increase to a range of 60 miles must have meant.

A graphic account is given of the tense atmosphere round the gun on 23rd March 1918 when the first shell was fired and as the 176 seconds time of flight were carefully checked off while the shell sped along its trajectory.

It is not generally known how quickly the slaughter of civilians met with a measure of retribution. The story is unfolded of how the combination of an air photograph taken in general reconnaissance on 6th March and a mean line taken through the plot of the first seven points of impact in Paris gave the French a very good indication of the starting point of the shells.

There was no waste of time, and a realistic account is given of the arrival of French 12-inch shells round the "Paris" guns within 30 hours of the opening of fire by the latter, the infliction of casualties in the original gun detachment on 24th March, and finally, as if to bring home to the Germans that all the danger was not to be on one side, the blowing out of the breech of one of the big guns on 25th March. Again, when fire was opened from the second position on 27th May, a description is given of the French reply with 13·5 inch shells from a railway gun on 31st May.

For those with an interest in guns and gunnery there is a wealth of technical detail. The following will be found in various places in the book,—the two calibres employed, muzzle velocity, time of flight, ranges, maximum height of trajectory, chamber pressure, weights of shell, construction of emplacements, assembly of gun and carriage, life of the guns, average rate of fire and method of preventing droop. The great range is explained to a large extent by the fact that three quarters of the trajectory was in a virtual vacuum. The difference in range between a straight line joining gun and target and the map range along the surface of the earth is pointed out, and a very clear explanation is given as to why an allowance had to be made for the rotation of the earth. The zone found by the gun is given, but the

reader must not draw conclusions concerning the accuracy of the gun from this because the charge was varied from round to round as mentioned later.

Among several intriguingly novel features in the gun the following are carefully described. (1) Steel lands on the shell which were inserted into the rifling on loading. These were in addition to the normal copper driving band. (2) Pressure gauges inserted into the chamber from which the probable point of impact of the shell could be determined. These gauges and odd reports in French newspapers were the only available substitutes for observation. (3) Perhaps the most striking of all. Every round was fired at 50° elevation for a reason which the author explains. Any errors due to wear of the gun or atmospheric variations were taken up by adjusting the weight of propellant in one of the three parts of the cartridge.

The pressure gauges referred to above would of course only disclose details of the interior ballistics of the gun, and one would like to know how the equivalent constant wind and effective air temperature were obtained and allowed for. In a 3 minutes time of flight these factors must have affected the flight of the shell considerably even though the greater part of the trajectory was in a virtual vacuum.

There are one or two small errors in the text and a few statements which the critical reader will query. For example the writer refers to a system of telephones for warning the gun detachments when a salvo of French shells fired at the " Paris " guns was passing over the front line. When it is stated that these shells would cover the seven miles between the front line and the German gun in 4 seconds an error of some sort has been made. An allowance for the time taken for the sound of the shells to reach the ground hardly explains it as this could not have been many seconds or the sound would not have been heard.

Where most readers will disagree with the author is in his statement that the British and French staffs did not believe that marks manship with the rifle had much to do with success in war. It saved our Expeditionary Force several times in 1914, and among the many new tasks that the infantryman had to learn during the war marksmanship was not neglected. The author stresses the point that the Americans kept up their training in open warfare ; most of our soldiers in France and Belgium never ceased to consider so-called " rest " behind the line as synonymous with open warfare

training. His list on page 137 of what each man in the forward companies carried on a certain occasion is evidence that trench warfare conditions took as firm a hold on new troops as on veterans, and, although he decries the use of the rifle as a handle for a bayonet, he is justly proud of the example he gives of the bewilderment of the Germans in face of the bayonets of the Americans.

However, these are really side issues in the story, and "The Paris Gun" is a most clear, detailed and arresting account of an unique episode in the history of the Great War.

F. J. R.

Five Tactical Schemes with Solutions. By Major S. W. Kirby, O.B.E., M.C., R.E. p.s.c., and Captain J. R. Kennedy, M.C., R.A., p.s.c.

(*William Clowes and Sons, Ltd.*) 3*s.*

As Major-General Gwynn, the Commandant of the Staff College, Camberley, states in his foreword, this pamphlet, complete with map, for the price of three shillings is a successful attempt to meet a real demand. It contains five schemes of something like the length of a promotion or Staff College entrance examination paper. Each scheme is divided into problems, and the authors' full suggested solutions and notes follow immediately on the problem; this is most agreeable to the student who has been dealing with official reports on examinations. The narrative is continuous throughout all, but a summary at the beginning of the second and subsequent schemes enables a student to "get into the picture" and deal with the schemes separately and in any order. Schemes cover approach march, outposts, attack and withdrawal. The size of the unit dealt with in each problem varies from an infantry company to a division with attached troops. There is one map, across which the authors work in a masterly manner; this enables the student to mark up the various situations in turn without confusion or need of erasion later. Moreover, it is in a pocket which is a great advantage. Like so many first editions, the pamphlet is naturally not free from errors and, dealing with tactics as it does, many of the suggestions of the authors are open to argument, if not criticism.

As the authors dub this pamphlet "Series I" and promise "a further set of schemes illustrating other phases of War." it is questionable

whether it would not have been preferable to deal in separate series with the needs of the promotion examination candidate and of his more talented brother the Staff College candidate respectively. There is much in the present pamphlet which is above the head of the former and the one map is on the one inch scale whereas all written promotion examination papers are set on a map of scale 1/20,000. Another general criticism that is leviable is that the pamplet is definitely "unmechanised"—armoured fighting vehicles enter little into the schemes and there is not a single problem involving movement by bus or a reference to gas. The authors no doubt intend to deal fully with defence in their "further set of schemes" it is suggested that their solution to defence problems might be given on a 1/20,000 map to shew candidates, for promotion examinations in particular, how to mark up a map clearly and intelligibly.

On a few points the authors' suggestions do not appear to be quite consistent with the doctrine of the training manuals. It is unfortunate that this is most noticeable in the first scheme and in fact in the first two problems.

In scheme one the strategical situation is not well enough set out to enable the divisional cavalry and air problems to be discussed adequately, (this is partly due to the very laudable efforts of the authors to keep the General and Special Ideas and the narratives as short as possible). In the approach march outlined in Problem 1, with the enemy many miles away there can be no question of sub-allotting the whole of the divisional cavalry regiment to the two leading infantry brigades. The discussion of an alternative such as this is too academic. It is suggested also that, in such a situation the divisional cavalry regiment (less two troops for local protection of the leading infantry columns) must use their mobility to the fullest possible extent. It is wrong to lay down bounds for the regiment and say that "at the completion of each bound the regiment will pause to allow the distance between it and the main body to be corrected." (Scheme One, Problem 1).

In such an approach march of two corps and a cavalry division on a narrow front, surely it is incorrect to place an A. C. Squadron, R.A.F., under the orders of a divisional commander. (Scheme One, Problem 2).

It is a question whether in a small main guard it is worth while splitting up a battalion, and a M. G. company in particular, to the extent shown in order to get some light artillery and R. E. further forward. When a battalion with attached troops is acting as advanced guard and orders are issued as "D. Battalion Operation Order No. 15" copies should certainly go to all companies—the main troops with which the advanced guard commander has to fight are his three rifle companies and his M. G. comany. (Scheme Two, Problem 2).

It is feared that the wording of the plan for the Vanguard company to attack "in square formation" will horrify many readers. (Scheme Two, Problem 5).

An infantry brigade attack, which is part of a divisional attack but has its own timed barrage up to Z+30, after that timed concentrations up to Z+55, and which involves also at least a 45% change of direction, seems too complicated to succeed. The brigading of the machine guns of forward battalions in an attack to such a depth is open to grave criticism. Surely the guns of the two reserve battalions could be utilised instead for the brigade fire plan in the initial stage. (Scheme Three, Problem 2).

To disperse an infantry brigade at night with two battalions on battle outposts and Brigade Headquarters and the two reserve battalions 2½ miles in rear seems dangerous. (Location of 4 Infantry Brigade in Scheme Four).

Errors in staff duties and abbreviations are noticeably scarce. The only editing required to improve the pamphlet is the elimination of some of the capital letters used, *e. g.*, "an Infantry Company," "one Squadron," "Subordinate Commanders."

On the whole, however, the authors are to be heartily congratulated on producing a carefully constructed series of schemes, with solutions and a map, at a remarkably cheap price.

G. S. B.

Loyalties—Mesopotamia, 1914—1917.
By Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson.

(*Oxford University Press, London*, 1931.) 25*s*.

It was something more than a happy inspiration which led Sir Arnold Wilson to choose the title "Loyalties" for his personal and

historical record of the activities of the Political Services in Mesopotamia. His story begins with the outbreak of the Great War, and this, the first volume, carries it up to the end of 1917. It is indeed a history of loyalties, for Mesopotamia was to a unique degree the scene of a conflict of varied loyalties. There was first the loyalty, tested to the utmost by suffering and death, of the soldier whether British, Indian or Turkish to his country, his officers and his comrades. As a background there were the discordant loyalties of the various inhabitants of the country, Arab, Jew and Christian, Sunni and Shiah, each to his own race, religion and leaders. Above these were the major, but no less conflicting loyalties of Great Britain to her Muslim subjects, to the peoples of the occupied territories, to the rival Arab potentates, and to her great Allies. No wonder that Mesopotamia in the war years presented—and even now presents—a welter of violent cross-currents of feelings and interests. It fell to the lot of Sir Arnold Wilson, first as deputy to Sir Percy Cox and then as his successor, to stand in the midst of these cross currents between the Army and the Arab, understanding both and working for both. Not the least of the loyalties displayed in this book are those of "A.T." himself, to his chiefs both civil and military, to his own hard-worked subordinates, and to those high administrative ideals which inspired all his dealings with the local population.

It is impossible to separate the political narrative from the purely military history of the campaign in Mesopotamia. The method followed is to relate briefly the progress of the fighting and then to describe in more detail how the Political Service took advantage of each advance to consolidate the occupied territory. All soldiers have at some time or other grumbled at the restrictions the "politicals" would impose on them if they had their way. There will always be a tendency for the soldier, with his gaze fixed on the immediate military objective, and the "political," who must keep an eye on the more distant future, to find themselves in conflict. Such a disastrous event will, however, be unlikely when the political officer is able, like Sir Arnold Wilson, to appreciate the soldier's point of view and to realize, as he did, that the first essential on which all else depends is the defeat of the enemy in the field.

"Loyalties" describes how, out of nothing—for practically all vestiges of the old slip-shod and corrupt Turkish administration had

vanished—a small band of British officers gradually evolved an efficient and beneficient civil government behind the army. The difficulties, the dangers, and at times the humours of this task are here set forth. In 1916 the reviewer once asked a young political officer what his duties were. He replied, "Oh, I spend half my time excusing the Arabs to the Army and the other half excusing the Army to the Arabs." A hard and at times a thankless job, but, as the Duke of Wellington said, "It would be useless to commence military operations upon any great scale, unless the civil officers should be prepared to take possession of the country and to re-establish the civil government as the troops shall conquer it."

Throughout the book the author shows a whole-hearted appreciation of the indomitable courage of the troops, British and Indian, in the face of appalling trials. Realizing, and at times sharing their hardships, and understanding the difficulties which confronted their leaders, he is sparing in criticism of the generals whether in victory or defeat. He reserves his strictures mainly for the higher officials, civil and military, who were responsible for the breakdown in the administrative arrangements of the force in 1916, and anyone who was bumped across the Mesopotamian desert with a bullet through him or a broken limb will be inclined to think these strictures, if anything, rather mild. But it is not necessary for a man to froth at the mouth to make his criticisms effective, and those of Sir Arnold Wilson lose nothing by being restrained and obviously well informed. His description of the unspeakable inhumanity and cruelty of the Turks to the helpless prisoners of Kut is to be recommended to all those sentimentalists who fail to realize that the Turk victorious and the Turk defeated are two very different beings.

Sir Arnold's style is clear and readable, even if a little undistinguished. He has the habit, irritating to the unerudite—and after all we are most of us that—of interlarding too plentifully his text with Latin tags. But these are small faults in a work of such unquestionable value and ability, which shows throughout a balanced judgment, a deep insight, a knowledge, and an honesty that few war books have approached.

A. M.

The Practical Dog Book. By Edward C. Ash, M.R.A.C. (*Simpkin Marshall, Ltd., London*) 21*s*.

Mr. Ash in his foreward to the book under review claims to have written a practical book, one that will be useful to dog owners of every class, from the owner of a pet to the owner of a Kennel. The author set himself a heavy task when he undertook the preparation of such a volume, and we think he has achieved his purpose with a considerable degree of success. If a book on such a vast subject is to be practical it must be presented in such a form as to enable ready reference to be made to details that arise in every day life. We think that Mr. Ash's book as far as his notes on the breeds are concerned fulfils this condition. We have in fact seen the pages of the book being turned over and over, and incidentally trampled upon, in the midst of a squealing and struggling mass of fox-terrier puppies in India. Each show point was being read out and each puppy was taken up and examined in detail to see whether he did or did not come up to the required standard. The book was actually being used practically. The incident was illuminating since it disclosed the difference between Mr. Ash's book and other less practical books whose fate is usually to remain uncut upon the book-shelf.

We have great admiration for the author of this valuable book for two reasons. First, Mr. Ash is a dog-lover. Every remark in his book stamps him as a real dog-lover who likes and understands a dog. Secondly, it is difficult to realise the amount of research and hard work that the compilation of this book must have entailed. The wealth of detail is enormous, and we are lost in admiration for the industry of an author who can so successfully not only obtain but also write up such a vast amount of information on what is admittedly a world-wide subject.

The book opens with a chapter on choosing the breed. Then follows a detailed history of the various breeds, and the final chapter gives the show points of all British Breeds. Chapter XI is a very valuable one on the days work in the Kennel, and, though we do not agree with all of Mr. Ash's remarks, yet the chapter contains a great amount of sound advice.

Chapter XII is entitled "Veterinary information and dosage" and is very clearly written. The two other chapters contain in clear

and concise form information on the export of dogs, and on the conditions and licences for dog shows.

In a work of this description it is inevitable that a reviewer will see points for criticism and will not always agree with the author's views. There are extraordinarily few criticisms that we can make on Mr. Ash's work. The author's character as a dog-lover at once disarms criticism since his object is so clearly to be helpful to the dog-owner.

We would however fail in our duty as reviewers if we did not bring to the author's notice what we think are faults or omissions in the publication. We do this in the hope that in future editions, and we trust there will be many of this valuable book, the points we raise may be considered.

We notice a remarkable omission, that of fox hounds in the chapters on breeds. We should have liked a short chapter on that great and useful member of the dog world.

We do not quite agree with the author's method of treating the question of feeding. Feeding, of course, is the most important item in the dog's daily existence, and within the past few days we ourselves have received no less than three applications for advice on the subject. We could not recommend the book under review to searchers for information on feeding since the subject is given an unimportant place in the book. Sufficient stress is not, in our opinion, laid on the fact that meat is the natural food for a dog, and most dogs, working dogs at any rate thrive better on a diet of meat, suitably supplemented by farinaceous foods, than on any biscuit diet.

In the veterinary chapter the remarks on biliary fever are somewhat out of date. The disease is called biliary fever in horses, and in dogs it is tick fever. Trypan Blue injections have been discontinued now for some time as more efficacious drugs have been discovered, notably Novarsenobillan, Sulfarsenol and Tryparsamide.

The author's notes on rabies are incomplete. By this we do not mean that the notes should be a veterinary treatise on this dread disease. For practical purposes it would be well to give fuller notes on the steps that should be taken both in regard to dogs suspected of rabies and in regards to human beings who have been in contact with such dogs.

A small criticism that we have is with reference to the plates. The method of collecting the descriptions of the plates at the beginning of the book entails a lot of cross reference. Unless there are insuperable difficulties it would be preferable to put the description opposite to or on each plate in the book. The price of the book is extremely low for such a mine of information and it is a work that should be in the possession of every one who takes a real interest in dogs or who desires to have up to date information on any of the numerous breeds treated of in the book. The publication is essential to those who breed dogs for business purposes.

A.V.T.W.