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
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EDITORIAL

The highlight of events at the USI during the quarter January-March 2001 was the visit by His Excellency Mr Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, on 15 March 2001, organised under the auspices of the USI Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping. This is the second major event of this Centre, following the hosting of the Sixth International Seminar in the series *Peacekeeping and Peace Support into the 21st Century* in September 2000. Excerpts of the Welcome Address and the text of the Secretary General's talk together constitute the lead article in this issue of the Journal.

The European Union (EU) is making steady progress through a spirit of co-operation, integration and increased interdependence amongst the European countries. In the emerging world order, the EU is likely to play a major role. His Excellency Mr Rudolph Scharping, Minister of Defence of Germany, during his visit to New Delhi delivered a talk at the USI on "European Security Policy and Global Stability" on 22 February 2001. Excerpts of the talk have been published as an article in this issue of the Journal. Mr Scharping stated that NATO will continue to remain central to European security, and that the EU is putting in place the military capability to act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. By the year 2003, the EU will have a collective European capability to rapidly deploy and sustain 60,000 troops for tasks such as humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis management, including peace making. The emphasis would be on preventive measures to counter crises as well as co-operation with allies for international peace and security. The common task envisaged is the pursuit of peace, stability, security and economic prosperity both at the regional and global levels.

Central to the future security of Europe would be the status of Russia. Maj Gen Vinod Saighal, VSM (Retd) gave a talk at the USI on the "Resurgence of Russia in the 21st Century". Excerpts of the talk are published as an article in this issue of Journal. The

author has pointed out that Russia cannot simply be written off. With Vladimir Putin as the President and his determination to impose a "dictatorship of laws" on the country, Russia seems set to emerge from the chaos that it had collapsed into during the 1990s. Maj Gen Saighal discusses the problems confronting Russia, and the future of Russia's relations with the major countries of Asia, Europe and the United States.

This issue of the Journal also contains two articles on Pakistan. Lt Gen R Sharma, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) has pointed out how the military in Pakistan had tasted power and hence is reluctant to let go the benefits accruing therefrom. He argues that given General Musharraf's unclear agenda, India should be prudent and not be enthusiastic for talks. Prof Satish Kumar, who argues that India should talk to General Musharraf and thus strengthen his hands against the *jehadi* forces that threaten to Talibanise Pakistan, has presented a contrasting view.

The Role of United Nations in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security

The UN Secretary General, His Excellency Mr Kofi Annan, visited the USI on 15 March 2001 and delivered a talk. He was welcomed by the Director USI. Excerpts of the Welcome Address and the Talk are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Welcome Address

LT GEN SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (RETD)

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome to the United Service Institution of India. It is our great privilege and honour to have with us Mr Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations. For me personally, it is an added pleasure as I have had the privilege of working with him, albeit briefly, during my tenure as the Force Commander and Head of Mission of the United Nations Forces in the former Yugoslavia in 1992-93. As you would notice, Mr Secretary General, there are some others too in the audience who have worked with you before. All of us have been following with great admiration the work you are doing under the most difficult of circumstances. On behalf of the membership I would like to express our gratitude to you for having accepted our request to share with us at the United Service Institution of India, your thoughts on the future of the United Nations in the years ahead.

A few words about the USI may not be out of place here. This institution was set up in 1870 at Shimla in the Himalayan foothills for the furtherance of interest and knowledge in the art, science and literature of national security in general, and of the Defence Services in particular. The membership is largely drawn from the Armed Forces officers, both serving and retired. But we also have on our rolls a number of distinguished members from the Indian civil services like the Indian Administrative Service, the Foreign Service

and the Police Service, among others, as also from the academic community and media. It is a measure of the stature and spread of our membership that of the 19 members of the National Security Advisory Board, nine are members of the USI. We have one of the best libraries in the country with books on an astonishing variety of subjects. We conduct various events on a regular basis, including talks by visiting dignitaries like you. Correspondence courses are conducted for the younger officers of the Armed Forces preparing for their promotion examinations and for examinations for entry into the Defence Services Staff College and the Technical Staff College. We bring out a quarterly journal, the oldest surviving defence journal in Asia, which has been in uninterrupted publication since 1871. We also have a Centre for Research where project studies are undertaken on a regular basis.

Last year, at the request of the Indian Ministries of External Affairs and Defence, and the Service Headquarters, the Governing Council agreed to the setting up of a Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping under the aegis of the USI. The inaugural events of the Centre were an address on 18 August 2000 by Mr Theo— Ben Gurirab, the Foreign Minister of Namibia and the then President of the United Nations General Assembly, and an international peacekeeping seminar in mid-September 2000. You have just visited the outdoor facilities for the training of our contingents. Here at these premises, we are working on preparations to conduct training capsules for commanders and staff officers of troop contingents, military observers, and so on, as also for the conduct of national and international seminars and discussions on peacekeeping, peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, peace-building, and so on.

Needless to say, besides imparting training to our own personnel, we expect attendance of personnel from friendly foreign countries. We are working towards starting the first of such capsules in another couple of months. We are informed that the Government of India would arrange funding for the attendance of personnel from less developed countries at these events. In addition, we shall make this Centre the repository of the great wealth of expertise and experience the Indian Armed Forces have in this most visible

activity of the United Nations. As you are no doubt aware, India has contributed over 50,000 personnel to 26 peacekeeping operations since the inception of the United Nations. We have contributed to every peacekeeping operation in Africa. We have a brigade group on stand-by for response to United Nations requests. In due course, we intend to promote research and documentation on the subject of UN peace operations at the Centre.

Mr Secretary General, your visit to India and to this Institution comes at a defining moment in the history of the United Nations. There is much speculation that the august body you have the distinction of heading is being marginalised in the conduct of affairs that were at the centre of the UN Charter, namely the maintenance of international peace and security. This is as much because the Western world considers it unnecessary to involve the UN in this field, as because many developing countries feel that their views are unheard, and that they are not represented or are under-represented in the bodies entrusted with responsibilities. Allow me to illustrate the point with two recent examples. At the Munich Conference on security policy in February 2001, in two days of deliberations, the only reference to the United Nations was in two sentences by the German Chancellor in his keynote address. At a non-official conference held at Singapore at the end of February 2001, it was evident that many participants had serious reservations about a role for the UN in the resolution of some of the conflicts that plague parts of Africa and Asia. It would appear that in the first instance, it was a measure of the utter irrelevance of the UN in so far as the Western world was concerned. The second instance was a clear message that many in the developing world perceive that the UN is being used by the developed world to pursue its own agenda, and resent the trends towards unilateral interventions in violation of national sovereignty.

While I do not for a moment presume to speak for the Indian establishment, I think I would be articulating the views of many in our strategic community when I make the point that we in India are watching these developments with much interest. As a founder member of the UN, India has a major stake not only in its status

as a powerful international organisation, but also in its role as a forum for the expression of the sentiments of all sections of the global society. India has a proud record in its support of the UN in all its activities in which she has actively participated. Most significant and visible has been India's active participation in UN peacekeeping.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is against this backdrop that we shall hear the Secretary General speaking to us this afternoon. We look forward to hearing how he perceives the role of the UN in the years to come, and what the rest of us need to do to strengthen his hands.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Secretary General.

TALK BY MR KOFI ANNAN

General Nambiar, my good friend, Distinguished Peacekeepers, Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very pleased to visit the United Service Institution and to witness at first-hand your remarkable work on behalf of the United Nation's peacekeeping efforts around the world. As a first-rank training centre, you are providing tomorrow's peacekeepers with the tools, the experience and the knowledge necessary to succeed in carrying out their missions. In your Director, General Nambiar, you have a man who is known and admired throughout the United Nations for his skills and leadership, and it gives me great pleasure and comfort to know that he is setting the standard for future graduates of this institute.

In all these conflicts Indian soldiers have distinguished themselves through discipline, training and professionalism. It is my hope that you can help set a new standard for UN peacekeeping. You have much to teach the peacekeepers of other countries, who may share your enthusiasm and determination but lack your experience and training. I was happy to hear you say, General Nambiar, that you will make space available for soldiers from other countries.

As you are aware, the demands facing peacekeeping troops on the ground today are extremely complex and challenging, requiring innovative leadership and courageous action. Peacekeepers are sometimes deployed into dangerous areas, in areas where there is no peace to keep and are required to help us create security and stability. The situation on the ground can change any minute and military personnel have to be ready to handle many kinds of situations. At times, military personnel may become involved in peacemaking. At others, they are involved in disarmament, demobilisation and in providing security for the reintegration of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

At the United Nations, we are currently in the process of implementing the recommendations of the Brahimi Report; a report which I commissioned and which attempts to address some of the most urgent needs of our peacekeeping department, and to present a vision of peacekeeping that aims to meet the challenges of the new century. The report pointed out that pre-deployment training is one of the most important factors in ensuring that military personnel are ready to tackle the obstacles they face on the ground. India is well ahead of most others in this field, and we will continue to look to you for insights and advice.

If I may comment on some of the remarks you made, General Nambiar, about the attitude of some member states and whether the UN is relevant today or not, I think we all realise that we went through a period when major countries shied away from UN peacekeeping operations, which started with Somalia. When after the Somalia experience the United States pulled out and other Western countries followed suit, thereafter it was extremely difficult to convince them to become engaged in peacekeeping operations in Africa. In fact, I have had the opportunity to say that Rwanda was a victim of Somalia. Because of Somalia, governments did not want to send troops to Rwanda and we saw what happened. It has taken almost ten years for the UN to return to Africa, first deploying in Sierra Leone and now to Ethiopia and Eritrea and Congo.

In Sierra Leone, in addition to the UN troops, we have British forces but not under the UN command. They are operating

separately. They have been a friendly force and extremely helpful to the UN forces. You may recall that we did run into difficulties in Sierra Leone and about five hundred peacekeepers were taken hostage. I appealed to the world to send in a Rapid Reaction Force, but no one would respond. The British decided to send in a separate force, which arrived at the right psychological moment, had an impact on the ground and worked with us side by side in stabilising the UN force for us to continue our work. The Indian contingent in that operation did a brilliant job and I think you all recall Operation Khukri, where they freed the peacekeepers who had been taken hostage. I pay tribute to the men who took part in that operation and redeemed the honour of UN peacekeeping.

I believe that with the new report that has been produced, the UN membership is today discussing seriously what needs to be done to strengthen peacekeeping operations. It is not enough for the members of the Security Council to pass resolutions; they should participate themselves. Because we saw a development where the Council members who passed the resolution, the Permanent Five and the big ones, would not participate and most of the troops were coming from developing countries. In Eritrea, I am pleased to say that there are several Western countries who are on the ground with us. The Force Commander is Dutch. We have the Dutch, the Canadians and the Danes; and it is the first time those forces have returned to Africa since Somalia. There is a serious discussion as to how we can strengthen peacekeeping operations by engaging the troop-contributing countries more.

I see Ambassador Gharekhan here. He was in New York when they first started this idea of bringing the Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping and the troop contributors together to discuss mandates, where possible, before resolutions are passed or changes made in the mandate. People wondered if that kind of discussion would be useful. But I will give you one example. In Yugoslavia, in Bosnia, the Council was discussing a resolution that the force in Bosnia, which was already stretched, should go and secure the corridor, the Brcko Corridor. It would have required around two thousand men, further extending the force on the ground. The troop contributing countries resisted and said that they

will accept the request for troops only if assured of support and additional men. Since there were no additional men to support them, the proposal was dropped. That resolution was not passed but this sort of exchange, and give and take, is going to be necessary and we are going to see more of that.

The other suggestion which has been made is that before the Security Council approves a mandate or a resolution to dispatch troops, they must first make sure that the troops are available. Because in the past we have tended to adopt resolutions, ask a force to go in, but send in a force that is neither equipped nor adequate for the task, setting the men up for failure and raising the hopes, sometimes, of people in the region that the UN would protect them or will take certain actions that we have no means of taking. So we have faced these issues, we are facing these issues very, very squarely now and I hope as we move ahead and discuss the implementation of the Brahimi Report we will be able to resolve some of these outstanding issues.

Another area where I believe we need to do better is the question of information, intelligence gathering, not in terms of spying but to have the information to be able to do serious analysis in order to anticipate how the crisis is likely to develop and be prepared to take appropriate action. Understanding the nature of the crisis and how it is likely to develop also helps in determining the kind of force and the force strength needed to go in with and therefore get on the ground prepared and hopefully be able to carry out the mandate.

Those who believe that the UN is no longer relevant will have to change their mind in today's world. Today we live in a global village. We live in a rapidly globalising world and we are dealing with issues that no one country, however powerful, can tackle alone. From health to globalisation, we can only resolve problems if we work together. And as the world globalises, the UN's influence and role become even more necessary.

Most people do not realise how the UN affects their daily lives. When you look at the norms in the area of international law, for example aviation or air travel, without the work of the ICAO

(International Civil Aviation Organisation), which regulates air-traffic controllers, and insists that they all speak one language, English, I don't think that the air controllers and the pilots would be able to understand each other. Similarly in shipping, the work we do in telecommunications where we control the frequencies, etc. We have a whole set of practices, norms and international law that regulate how we relate to each other and do business in this world. Each community is held together by shared and common values. The international community has shared values, and it is what the UN offers from its Charter to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a whole range of issues. And if each community has a language to be able to communicate, the language of the world today is international law, and here again the UN does lots of work.

When I maintain that in this globalising world the UN is needed more than ever, I am quite serious, because it affects us daily even though most people may not know it. Even some of the most powerful nations admit that the UN has a convening power that no other organisation has, and that it has a credibility with the peoples of the world that other institutions do not have and that they need to help strengthen it. I hope that they will continue to do so. For the smaller and the medium size countries, the UN is extremely important and they almost understand instinctively that the problems they are facing cannot be faced alone and they need to team up with others to tackle them. It reminds me of what Haile Selassie, the late Emperor of Ethiopia said when his country was attacked by Italy. He went to the League of Nations and said "Help us. It is us today and it may be you tomorrow." And that turned out to be very prophetic.

* * *

Question : (partially inaudible, on the reform of the Security Council and India's chances for permanent membership in the Security Council).

Secretary General : If it were up to me, then you probably would not have a problem. We have 189 member states who have to

debate this issue and settle it. They have been debating this for seven years and I hope that, in the not too distant future, we will see some progress. But obviously, when one talks of the expansion of the Council and begins to think of countries that are likely to join, India's name comes up quite frequently.

Question : Are there any plans for sending UN observers or troops to Afghanistan?

Secretary General : At this stage, there is no discussion about sending UN observers to Afghanistan. Before we even begin thinking of sending observers to Afghanistan, we must first determine what they are going to do there, what will be the mandate, what are they going to achieve, and then begin to see if any governments will give us troops for that operation. But I must say that, at this stage, there is no hint in the Security Council or amongst the membership that troops will be sent to Afghanistan.

Question : Do you think that the military staff of the UN which advises the Security Council is adequate?

Secretary General : General Nambiar is right, and he can answer that from his own experience. I can tell him that the situation has not changed much since his time. But let me say that it is part of the reform. The reform proposals require that we strengthen considerably the military capacity at the UN Headquarters, for us to be able to do effective planning and back-stop the troops which are operating in the field much more effectively. When I compare the resources of the men at the UN who are running, planning and supporting these operations with national level efforts, it is lamentable. At one point, when we had about 80,000 troops deployed, we had only about 350 people, both civilian and military, at headquarters back-stopping these operations. There is now a realisation that while we don't want to become another NATO or create a NATO-type headquarters, we need much more resources. In the first discussion the General Assembly gave us about 100 additional posts, but they are going to debate the issue further in May 2001. I hope to get the resources that we need and am determined to fight for that.

Question : How many recommendations from the Brahimi Report were you actually able to get support for?

Secretary General : Our decision-making process in the UN on these things is rather cumbersome. In the first round of discussions, we probably got about a third of it implemented. There are aspects of it that I can implement myself without authority from the governments, which I am putting into effect immediately. But there are certain recommendations that require governmental approval and budgetary resources for us to be able to carry through. On that I would say we have got about a third and there are other aspects that we need to go back to discuss in May 2001. One area where we seem to have run into some controversy is this whole area of information. If you need to set up a unit, you have to gather information for planning purposes to be able to anticipate. And we are going to have to do quite a bit of convincing on that aspect.

Question : What is your position on the establishment of the UN stand-by peacekeeping force; should the UN have it?

Secretary General : I think the idea of a standard corps for the UN has been around for quite a while. It is really when the crisis has exploded and we need troops that we have to go around governments, pleading and begging to get the troops. Member States have not been willing to consider the idea of a standing UN force for several reasons. First is the question of budget. How do you pay for it? Second, where do you locate it? Which legal regime covers it, and a whole range of issues.

There is also resistance from the big powers. They do not want to give the UN or the Secretary General that capacity. But the resistance does not only come from them. Some of the smaller countries do not want the UN to have a standing army, which can be used against them on the basis that they are either abusing their people, say humanitarian reasons, or they are not doing what they ought to do. So you have, let me say, general uneasiness about giving the UN a standing army.

What we have tried to do is to engage governments and work out an arrangement where each government that is likely to

participate in peacekeeping operations will join what we call the stand-by forces arrangement, whereby each government will indicate what capacity or capability to bring to the common effort if it were to decide to participate in peacekeeping operations. It may be an offer of a battalion, a logistics unit, a hospital, so that at the time of need we can get into the system and extract who is going to offer what. But that depends on whether or not the government agrees to participate.

Scandinavian countries, the Dutch and the Canadians have formed what they call SHERBRIG, where they have trained and positioned a brigade that can participate in UN peacekeeping operations should they decide to do so, and which they can deploy very quickly and get into the field within a month to six weeks. SHERBRIG is the unit that I was referring to in the Ethiopia-Eritrea context. India will be joining that force and probably will replace them as they rotate out. But they came together, trained together and have a brigade-size unit and they are now participating in Ethiopia. It helps, but it is not in the hands of the Secretary General of the UN; it is still up to the governments. The only thing is, we can move faster to cut down on deployment time.

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European Security Policy and Global Stability

H E RUDOLPH SCHARPING

In the world of globalisation, it is no longer sufficient to look at foreign and defence policy only from a national or regional perspective. Thinking today about the national security of Germany equals thinking about European security. And thinking about European security requires thinking about security beyond Europe. Security today is global in scope.

In today's world of growing interdependence and cross-border risks, we have to co-operate with allies and partners to counter new challenges and to use new opportunities. This is the reason why our two countries are determined to broaden their relationship and to further deepen the strategic dialogue initiated in 1996. In the new world that has evolved since the end of the great East-West divide, we need a broad dialogue as well as consultation and co-operation not only within but also between regions in order to promote both regional security and global stability.

We Germans recently had the opportunity to celebrate the tenth anniversary of German unification. Overcoming the division of Germany was the last step in a process of historical upheaval, which gave the people of Central and Eastern Europe the chance to join a democratic Europe. In 1989, an era of division and confrontation ended, and a new era of co-operation and integration began throughout Europe. The democratic revolutions in Poland, Hungary and the other East European countries paved the way to extend stability to other parts of Europe by the opening up of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and the European Union (EU) for the new democracies. They enabled us to broaden and deepen European integration. This meant, in other words, a big step forward towards a Europe whole and free. In Europe, we see

Excerpted from the talk delivered at the USI on 22 February 2001.

His Excellency Rudolph Scharping is the German Minister of Defence.

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that reconciliation has replaced hatred and hostility; former enemies have become partners and allies.

Today, most European countries enjoy unprecedented freedom, prosperity and security after decades of tensions and confrontation. But the security environment is, nevertheless, far more complex than it was just ten years ago. Crises and conflicts can still put European security at risk in a variety of ways.

A plethora of new challenges and risks stemming from ethnic and religious conflicts, economic and social problems, humanitarian disasters, international terrorism, organised crime or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means pay no heed to national borders. They can have major repercussions on democracy and prosperity within the Euro-Atlantic community. They are also threatening peace and stability in other regions of the world.

Globalisation and interdependence are bringing enormous benefits to all of us, including our security structures, but they are also increasing our vulnerabilities. This has several important implications for the shaping of our security.

(a) It would be inappropriate to retain a purely military approach to peace and freedom, security and stability. Our approach to security is comprehensive. It comprises political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural and, of course, military aspects.

(b) The comprehensive approach to security and the development of the strategic environment clearly require the emphasis to be put on preventive measures. In the global age, we must be prepared to counter crises and their causes wherever they arise.

(c) Another important aspect of a modern approach to security is our understanding that today no state can guarantee security, peace and stability for itself on its own. Co-operation with allies and partners has become a guiding principle of international security policy.

In the global age, preventing crises and conflicts together, building confidence and developing co-operative structures in the various regions are key for stability and security.

We are witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world in which key regions are gaining influence and interdependence between regions is rapidly growing in terms of politics, economics and security. Common challenges require common answers. This is the essence of the term common security. Against this backdrop, NATO, for example, has over the last decade developed such far-reaching activities as the Partnership for Peace Programme, the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine co-operation programmes, the Mediterranean Dialogue, etc.

In the Balkans, we have forged an unprecedented coalition of allies and partners to restore peace and stability and to help a region known for its chronic instability enter Europe's democratic mainstream. Today 42,000 troops from 39 nations work together in Kosovo to secure a stable environment for the build-up of democracy and a market economy. This is an excellent example of the new spirit of co-operation in Europe.

Managing the crises in South-East Europe required the engagement and the co-operation of various international organisations and fora. It became clear that comprehensive and preventive security has to a considerable extent become the responsibility of international coalitions and organisations. NATO, the United Nations, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the European Union or the G-8 (Group of Eight) all had a share in ending the military conflict, in devising and implementing political solutions. One of the lessons learnt from the Balkans crises is that regional and global multilateral security organisations have to be further strengthened. Because we need their complementary strengths for maintaining peace in this complex world.

NATO and the European Union are in the midst of a comprehensive adaptation to the far-reaching political changes in Europe and the global security environment. The North Atlantic Alliance remains central to European security. After the end of the Cold War, NATO did not fall apart, but adapted to new requirements.

While collective defence remains a core function of NATO, the Alliance is making its structure and its military capabilities more effective to match new security tasks which NATO has adopted – conflict prevention and crisis management, partnership and co-operation. At the 1999 NATO summit, it agreed on a new Strategic Concept and on a far-reaching Defence Capabilities Initiative which is now being successfully implemented. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have joined this reformed alliance. More European states will follow, as decided by NATO at the 1999 Washington summit. America's commitment to our security is still essential for making Europe a safer place.

In line with European integration and our experiences in the Balkans, enormous strides have been made over the last two years in developing a common European Security and Defence Policy. This idea is not new and has been on Europe's agenda since 1945. During the Cold War, the transatlantic relationship was dominated by the issue of collective defence in NATO's framework. In the new strategic environment, our transatlantic partners rightly no longer see it as their role to intervene in every regional crisis on the European Continent. There will be occasions when we will be able to agree between us that Europe should take the lead.

Today, the European Union is one of the most advanced examples of regional integration in the world, particularly in the economic field. But our goal has always been more than that. The European Union's origins and vocation have always been political. The crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have sounded an alarm bell for Europe's leaders and European public opinion. In spite of the impressive political and military role the Europeans played in resolving the Kosovo crisis, considerable shortcomings in European national and collective military capabilities were revealed. Against this background, it is remarkable what the Europeans have achieved. At their summits in Cologne, Helsinki and Nice in 1999 and 2000, the European Union laid the foundations for dealing more effectively with today's security challenges, in particular by improving conflict prevention and crisis management capacities.

As a result, for the first time in history, we have a realistic chance of implementing the two-pillar concept President Kennedy

spoke of in 1962 for Euro-Atlantic security. Europeans have set a historical course: European crisis management will be placed in the hands of the European Union. We are creating the capability to decide and act where NATO as a whole is not engaged. This means changes in two areas. We are creating a political framework for the EU's new role. And we are adapting our military and civilian capabilities to the requirements of effective crisis management. By the year 2003, we will have a collective European capability to rapidly deploy and sustain 60,000 troops for the full range of the so-called Petersberg tasks defined in the Treaty of the European Union : "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

In the military field, our goal is not to create a European army. Our aim is to improve existing national or multinational formations, the great majority of which are already committed to NATO and will remain so. The German contribution will be part of a force pool which the EU can draw from. We are prepared to contribute approximately 20 per cent. This contribution makes Germany Europe's largest contributor. Member states have also committed themselves to providing up to 5000 police officers for international missions by 2003. The EU is thus taking account of the complex crisis management requirements we are experiencing in the Balkans missions.

In the end, Europe's civilian and military crisis management capabilities will increase the range of instruments available to the international community for responding to crises in and outside Europe. And it will increase Europe's ability to act in accordance with its responsibilities, its resources and with international expectations. On this basis, we are developing a real strategic partnership with the United States which will offer the US the chance for a genuine global partnership.

NATO itself is becoming more balanced and even stronger. The European Security and Defence Policy is being developed in close co-operation with NATO. The EU will use NATO assets, and EU resources will also be available to NATO. Consequently, both Euro-Atlantic security institutions will be strengthened and will benefit

from synergy and integration. The adjustment of the European security organisations to the new situation in Europe and the world has been a major feature in recent years. This adjustment implies the development of broad partnership relations with other states which are not members of these organisations.

In particular, the relationship with Russia is important for both European and global security issues. Russia is not only the greatest military power on the European continent in terms of both conventional and nuclear power, but also a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a vetoing right. We are supporting the democratic process and the internal transformation in Russia by integrating the country into the European structures. And we want to cope with the security challenges and foreign policy tasks that confront us in the Euro-Atlantic area together with Russia. This is a consequence of both common security interests in many fields and of the important role Russia plays in the resolution of security problems in our area due to its size, potential and geography.

While the European-US partnership remains the guarantor of European security, active Russian participation in NATO and EU is possible and desirable. Europe and Russia do not necessarily have identical interests or identical solutions, but they are confronted with common challenges. To name a few:

- (a) The containment of the crisis potential in various regions, for example in the Balkans, in the Caspian area, in Central Asia or in the Middle East.
- (b) The increase of nuclear safety and security in both the civil and military sectors.
- (c) Progress in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means.

As a result of European integration, Europe's contribution to international peace and security is becoming larger. The development of military and civil crisis management and conflict

prevention capabilities, as agreed in Nice in December 2000, will enable Europeans in particular to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organisations such as the UN or the OSCE.

A more effective NATO and European Union will greatly benefit international stability and peace. But it is equally important to strengthen the United Nations Organisation itself. Strengthening its capacity to act is key to making the world more stable, more peaceful and more civilised. The UN needs effective mechanisms and greater capabilities for peacekeeping. Germany is supporting all efforts to make the United Nations more effective, for example by providing high-quality forces for the UN Standby Arrangements System. Both Germany and India agree on the need to make the UN Security Council more representative. Both countries are willing to assume more responsibility in this context.

We know that in today's interdependent world, the strategic environment has become more demanding. Regional tensions and conflicts can hardly remain confined to one region alone. Security is becoming more and more indivisible. Regional co-operation and regional stabilisation are therefore key to global security. Lasting peace and security can only be achieved when we succeed in defusing regional crises and conflicts – not only in Europe and on the periphery of NATO and Europe, but also beyond.

For this reason, Germany and its allies and partners in NATO and the European Union are engaged in shaping both a regional and a global environment of stability which makes the use of military force and destabilising spill-over effects less likely. An important way to do this is to broaden our relations and our political and security dialogue with key countries in a region. Having overcome decades of confrontation, Europeans might have something to contribute to the furthering of mutual understanding and political solutions in other parts of the world.


The EU has always been a promoter of security and stability in Asia. The EU is the third largest trading partner of the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) and provides extensive economic assistance to the region's less developed countries through governmental and non-governmental organisations.

Although the EU is not directly involved in security arrangements in Asia, it has demonstrated that it can play a helpful role in improving the security environment. The EU contributes, for example, about \$ 15 million annually to the Korean Energy Development Organisation in support of international efforts to discourage North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. The EU has also joined ASEAN and the United States in region-wide discussions to promote mutual understanding, transparency and trust. Several European countries, including Germany, contributed military personnel to the UN-led peacekeeping operation in East Timor.

India and Germany have realised that on the basis of their excellent bilateral relations they are well prepared to intensify the dialogue between themselves and between their regions. Germany and India share the same values of freedom, democracy and justice and support a peaceful, co-operative international system. Being India's most important trading partner in Europe, Germany is well aware of India's enormous economic potential as well as of its political weight and strategic importance. During the revolutionary changes in Europe a decade ago, it again became clear that Germany and India have a tradition of good and trusting relations. India supported and sympathised with the process of German unification. Today, united Germany is more than willing to build on the deep mutual understanding that has always characterised the Indo-German relationship, even at times of occasional dissent.

Asia, like Europe, is undergoing a process of dramatic change. The region is characterised by promising prospects, but also by enduring conflicts. Russia is still defining its role in the region. China is emerging as a major factor in Asia. On the Korean Peninsula, historical developments are taking place. India, the major power in Southern Asia, is also redefining its role. In this process, it has to take into account not only its regional security interests, but also the consequences of its national policies for an effective international system aiming at maintaining peace and stability world-wide.

The "Agenda for the Indo-German Partnership in the 21st Century", which was agreed upon between our two governments in May 2000, yields the right conclusion:



Our common task is to work together more closely to meet the new global challenges, pursuing the common goal of peace, stability, security and economic prosperity in our respective regions and beyond.

The German-Indian partnership we are striving for reflects the growing sense in Europe of the need to accept the European countries' share in international efforts to maintain peace. Germany is part of a new Europe as India is part of a new Asia. With the unification of Germany, a stronger will on the part of Europe to accept its responsibilities for global peace and India's readiness to participate more actively in international affairs, a new phase has begun in our partnership. This partnership must include all dimensions : political, economic, technological, cultural and, of course, security and arms control. Building on the consultations on the issues of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation which began as early as 1993, we should aim at intensifying this essential security policy dialogue.

South Asia does *not* have an institutional security framework like Europe does. Nonetheless, there are common objectives with global implications, which enhance the security of all of us. India and Germany agree that the objective is to further reduce nuclear weapons. They also agree that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery must be prevented. As a non-nuclear state, Germany is convinced that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the envisaged treaty to end the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (cut-off treaty) are key for an effective non-proliferation regime, for regional and for global stability. We therefore appeal strongly to all states to support and to adhere to these agreements.

India and Germany do not have a common border – but we do have a common interest in a stable international environment. I am confident that the Indo-German strategic dialogue as part of a far-reaching Indo-German partnership will increase mutual understanding on non-proliferation and security issues. This will contribute to regional security and global stability.

Resurgence of Russia in the 21st Century

MAJ GEN VINOD SAIGHAL, VSM (RETD)

"the dreams we shared did not come true...what seemed simple to us turned out to be tormentingly difficult."

(Boris Yeltsin's lament while departing)

"He who does not regret the passing of socialism has no heart, but he who wants to bring it back has no head."

(Vladimir Putin summing up his philosophy)

If historical experience is anything to go by then the speed and manner of disintegration of the Soviet Union has no parallels. It was unique in more ways than one. Great empires of yore broke up on the death of a great leader, on account of external invasions, internal strife or the pushing back of the empire from without. None of these factors could strictly be applied to the dismantling of the Soviet Empire. The outside world – as well as the republics comprising the Soviet Union – were both taken by surprise at the bewildering speed of events that led to the break-up. Remarkably, many of the non-Russian republics were initially reluctant to face the prospects of life outside the Soviet fold.

On hindsight there appears to have been inevitability about the outcome though not its pace. The former can be attributed to the abating vigour of a once ascendant ideology in the face of the relentless onslaught of capitalism. The Soviet Union did not collapse due to external aggression or unmanageable internal strife. On the face of it, it was relatively as stable as any large, heterogeneous entity can hope to be in this day and age. Economic collapse and loss of faith in the system – again more perhaps at the centre rather than the periphery – helped the disembodiment.

Excepted from the talk delivered at the USI of India on 10 January 2001.

Maj Gen Vinod Saighal, VSM retired from the Directorate General of Military Training, Army Headquarters.

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The counter-revolution could be deemed to have commenced from the time that Mikhail Gorbachev, Secretary-General of the Communist Party, ushered in the new age of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (reconstruction). Somewhere along the way he lost control of the process, which led ultimately to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation as part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991. Gorbachev was not spared either. He fell by the wayside, as elements more powerful than him moved in to exploit the situation.

The post-collapse phase of the Soviet Union also seems to be coming to an end. According to Yevgeny Kozhokin:

"Today, we are witnessing a gradual ideological recreation of Russia. The Soviet past and the Russian past and present are less frequently confronted, but are accepted and evaluated as parts of the whole."¹

This paper relates to the resurgence of Russia. Naturally, there would be doubt in some quarters as to whether Russia could again attain super power status. While this aspect will be examined at some length it might not be out of place, at the very outset, to spell out some of the major attributes of a super power in the new century. Briefly, these could be tabulated as: ability for (rapid) force projection anywhere in the world; credible second strike capability against all; financial might; technical might; and last, but not the least, the intellectual vigour of its academic institutions. By these criteria hardly any country besides the USA could be said to be in the super power category – not only as things stand, but in the foreseeable future as well.

There could be several ways of looking at the subject under review. The method chosen in this presentation examines the issue from the following perspectives:

- Conditions in Russia.

¹ Yevgeny Kozhokin, *The Times of India*, 4 October 2000.

- The Demographic Dynamic.
- Russia 'in' Asia.
- Russia 'in' Europe.
- Russia and the USA.

CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA

The Russian Federation sprawls 17 million square kilometres in Europe and Asia. Notwithstanding its geographical spread, the once powerful country today merits a place only at number 71 out of the 174 countries on the UN's Human Development Index, which lists countries according to literacy, life expectancy, schooling, population growth and per capita GDP (Gross Domestic Product). The average life expectancy of Russian men is 59, fourteen years less than their counterparts in the West – a reflection of poor living conditions and widespread alcoholism. By current trends the Russian population will decline from 146 million to 124 million by 2015. Russia's massive external debt stands at 170 billion US dollars. It requires \$1 billion a month of principal alone to be repaid. Russia needs hard cash from swift arms sales, even throwing caution to the winds in some cases.

It would be tempting, hence, to assume that the end of the Twentieth Century marks the lowest point in the falling trajectory of Russia's gradual rise to super power status since Russian expansion began under Peter the Great nearly three centuries ago. But the realisation comes soon thereafter that Russia has stared at the abyss before. Conditions for Russia could hardly have been grimmer than at the time when Lenin took power. The country not only recovered, but went on to challenge the combined might of the Western powers for the best part of the century. It would indeed be a foolhardy person who would feel emboldened to write *finis* to the Russian tale.

There are already tentative signs of revival. GDP rose by 8.4 per cent in 1999, although in part due to high oil prices. The State *Duma* endorsed the old Soviet anthem proposed by Yeltsin's

successor on 8 December 2000. Mr. Putin balanced the anthem choice with the tricolour flag and the double-headed eagle, which date from Tsarist times and were reintroduced by Yeltsin. Both symbols were also approved by the Parliament. Putin justified the proposal by saying that he hoped the state symbols belonging to different periods of Russian history would cement the nation. Russian liberals protested against the Soviet anthem as a tune of the totalitarian regime that had been personally approved by the Communist dictator, Josef Stalin. Many read a symbolic meaning into the revival of the Soviet anthem on 8 December 2000, ten years to the day after Mr. Yeltsin dismantled the Soviet Empire.

Russian resurgence, however, cannot really take place without the satisfactory resolution of the major problems confronting Russia. These include: population decline; ecological restoration; tackling Islamic terrorism; revitalisation of the economy; better harmonisation with the republics of the erstwhile USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); strengthening of ties with Europe; and dealing with the demographic swamping that could manifest itself from the South.

It is to be seen whether the demoralisation that set in among Russian troops after the pullback from Afghanistan and which continues with the imbroglio in Chechnya can be overcome before the country plunges into an existential gloom. A recent leaked study, "Forecast of the financial and economic support for the organisational development of the Russian armed forces for the period through 2010," pointed out that the promised 3.5 per cent of GDP for defence would only enable Russia to support its 1.2 million-strong armed forces if economic growth reached and sustained the level of 8 to 10 per cent per annum. With a growth rate of only 0.5 to 1.5 per cent, the country would have to halve its military strength or risk collapse. Russia has already sunk to the status of a second rank power in respect of aircraft production. Even between 1991 and 1996, output fell by 50 per cent in respect of civilian aircraft and by 88 to 90 per cent for military aircraft. With military demand low, the output of scientific establishments reached a critical level and led to "the disintegration of scientific and industrial collectives whose development took decades."

Experimental and design bureaux are working at 50 per cent of their 1990 level, with money shortages hindering the development of new aircraft and weapons. They no longer attract young specialists who see no future in them but only low pay (half the national average and one-tenth that available in commercial enterprises). The teams that for so long in the Soviet period successfully compensated for technological backwardness through clever design have now been scattered to the winds. Their re-creation would be difficult and could well prove to be impossible. Consequently, when those weapons and equipment that are already in the procurement pipeline come out at the other end (finance permitting), prospects for the development of the next generation of weapons are not overly bright.²

One of the factors that could play a major role in any reversal would be the leadership provided by Yeltsin's successor. The Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept issued on 11 July 2000 reaffirms its determination to pursue a balanced foreign policy and seeks closer co-operation with major Asian countries like China and India. Presently, Russia is in a state of adjustment. The real policy thrusts indicating the final course adopted by Russia will emerge by about 2005 *after* Putin has been at the head for at least that length of time. Mid-term corrections would, of course, continue.

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin

Russia bespeaks vastness, on a scale unknown elsewhere in the world. In keeping with this bigness its leaders too assume a dimension commensurate with the country's size. The word 'great' comes naturally to mind; not necessarily in the manner of the honorific bestowed to some of the past rulers by posterity like Peter the Great or Catherine the Great. In the Twentieth Century Lenin and Stalin not only dominated their country absolutely, but projected Russian communism onto the global canvas. Even Yeltsin was not insignificant as a leader – though possibly in the negative sense – going by his contribution to the rapid downslide of a once proud people. He did not comprehend the survival imperative entailed in the near total dependence on social security of a populace that

² NVO, No. 2/1999; an interview with the new Air Force Commander-in-Chief Col Gen A M Kornukov by Interfax, 10 June 1998.

had been living under a communist dispensation for the best part of a century. It is not easy to switch overnight from one system to another without horrendous social costs, leading even to the ebbing of the will to live and the will to work. It has lessons for China and India, both of whom seem bent on succumbing to external pressures to take the fast track to globalisation. The last decade has been economically devastating for Russia. According to some estimates, there are 50 million Russians below the poverty line, while 20 million are fully or partially unemployed. Ten million refugees are homeless.

The Yeltsin era accentuated Russia's intrinsic weaknesses: vodka, environmental decline, demographic enfeeblement and ethnic dissension. The rapid post-Soviet decline, the excesses of the past, and the Yeltsin years saw the diminishment of the country's global standing to such an extent that the world took serious note of Russia solely on account of the nuclear equation as a means to power projection. It led, in turn, to the drying up of future leading-edge research, due to financial stringency and the initial flight of scientific talent.

The Russian people expect President Putin to curb the free for all nature of post-Soviet politics, discipline the new capitalist brigands who have accumulated unacceptable levels of power and wealth, and impose what he calls a dictatorship of laws on Russia. There is a growing feeling among the people that the darkest period could be behind them. A recent report by the consulting firm, McKinsey, mentions that Russia has the real and human capital for a growth rate of 8 per cent. Barely two years ago, the Russian economy was in ruins. It had defaulted on its foreign loans, and inflation had risen from 5.5 per cent in the first half of the year (1998) to 84 per cent in December. Moscow's control over its 89 regions was slipping. But since then Russia has experienced a turnaround. Many in Russia feel that the years 1992 to 1999 are beginning to fade like a bad dream. Most wage arrears have reportedly been paid off. Real incomes are rising and possibly pensions as well. There appears to have been an improvement in the investment outlook, with some companies reporting plans to expand investment in the coming year.

Having quoted from the McKinsey study, it would be worthwhile to look at global oil trends because of Russia's over-dependence on oil revenues. Without the rise in oil prices the rosy tint of the report may have had a different colouring. Some experts feel that the soaring oil prices are bound to decline considerably by Spring 2001. A comparison that comes to mind was the "unprecedented prosperity and social stability" in the 1970s, attributed by some to the Middle East crisis and the formation of OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1973. It is worth reproducing here an article by Valentina Feodorova, which appeared recently:

"Russia tends to be radical. This is its main disease. We chose the most radical – communist – of all possible variants of socialism. We also chose the most radical, neo-liberal, variant of capitalism, which is a kind of Western fundamentalism. The political pendulum of Russia moved from communist radicalism to a neo-liberal one. We could expect it to move back, for this is what pendulums do. But a part of the older and the bulk of the middle-aged generations that experienced both variants are not ready for extremes today. They preferred Putin to Zyuganov at the 2000 elections. The people want to live in the new way, but in conditions of order. The pendulum has stopped a little left of the centre, but not in the far left corner. That Putin has kept back the movement of the pendulum is the main and new factor of Russian politics".³

President Putin is very much a product of the Marxist ideology that flourished so long in Russia. Hence it might not be out of place to quote George Lucas on Lenin:

"The Leninist theory and tactic of compromise is, therefore, only the objective, logical corollary of the Marxist dialectical – *historical recognition that, although men make their own history, they cannot do so in circumstances chosen by themselves* but in circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past".⁴ (Emphasis added)

The Russian leader has been moving fast to tighten his grip on power. He has pushed through legislation to remove powerful

³. "Where Ho, Mr. Putin," *The Statesman*, 25 September 2000.

⁴. George Lucas, *Lenin, A Study on the Unity of his Thoughts*.

regional governors from the upper house of Parliament and turn it into a subservient instrument of his policy. He is also attempting to rein in Russia's freewheeling regions by taking away from them control over courts and law-enforcement agencies. The same zealotry is manifest in his control of television, which is by far the most influential source of information in a country that spans eleven time zones. The Putin dispensation has spelled out its security and foreign policy doctrines. Moscow recognises that many of its security challenges are internal, acknowledging in the process that its economic difficulties have led to terrorism, organised crime and narcotics. Mr Putin believes that the entire Central Asian Region could be destabilised if the Taliban reach the Tajikistan border. On the economic front realisation may have come that for global competitiveness Russia needs to revive its capital goods base. In this regard Europe and especially Germany could play a big role. Good governance could help in ensuring return of capital stashed abroad.

The world and, more importantly, the Russian people themselves would be anxious to take a peek behind the KGB-like mask, for there is a mystery and mystique attached to the persona of the Russian President. Is it greater than the substance? The judo black belt does add to the carefully nurtured – strong and silent – macho image. It assists to reinforce the arm-twisting being resorted to, to bring a semblance of order into the free for all that had developed in the Yeltsin years. However, the Russian leader, lest he again provide legitimacy to the earlier methods of governance in the Soviet Union, should keep in mind a saying attributed to Talleyrand: "It is possible to do many things with a bayonet, but one cannot sit on one."

THE DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMIC

As distinct from India, which suffers from a so-called population explosion, Russia is beset by what might be described as a demographic implosion – that is there are fewer of them every year. Over the past decade the population of Russia has shrunk by nearly five million people, or half a million annually. In addition, the balance between young and old is shifting disastrously. By the year 2003 there will be only two working age Russians for each pensioner and within 20 years the ratio will become one-to-one – the point of

economic non-viability would have been reached. The growing mass of pensioners will gobble up any economic growth.

The demographic crisis has come about because post-Soviet Russia, in many ways, is afflicted with many problems of the advanced countries combined with growing problems that beset developing countries. For over two decades birth rates have been plunging as well-educated, urbanised young Russians put off having children well into their 30s. The current birth rate is about 1.3 children per woman, well below the 2.3 children per woman that would be required to sustain the population – a phenomenon not unlike that in Western Europe and North America. The difference with the West lies in the fact that over the past decade death rates among productive adults in their 30s and 40s have risen dramatically. This is due to a post-Soviet mix of bad news, including mass impoverishment, deteriorating environmental conditions, skyrocketing rates of alcoholism, the return of formerly-eradicated diseases like cholera and tuberculosis, more industrial accidents and two bloody civil wars against the separatist republic of Chechnya. A recent UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) study shows that under mass privatisation, nearly one-third of Russia's population has slipped under the poverty line.

President Putin has warned that if the Far Eastern region is not economically developed and integrated with the rest of the country, then it is likely that the Chinese, Japanese and Korean languages may overtake Russian there. Maritime province governor, Yevgeny Nazdarenko has made a call for moving about 15 million people from the central regions to be settled in Amur, Khabarovsk and Primorsky (Maritime) areas in order to create some balance with the population in the adjoining Chinese regions.

The extract reproduced from a famous book written at the beginning of the Twentieth Century does not leave room for doubt:

"In those (coming) days all the people of the earth will rush forth from their dwelling places. Great will be the strife, strife the like of which has never been seen in this world. The yellow hordes of Asians will set forth from their age-old abodes

and will encrimson the fields of Europe in oceans of blood. There will be, oh yes, there will – Tsushima! There will be – a new Kalka!

Kulikovo Field, I await you!

And on that day the final sun will rise in radiance over my native land. Oh Sun, if you do not rise, then, oh Sun, the shores of Europe will sink beneath the heavy Mongol heel, and the foam will curl over those shores. Earthborn creatures once more will sink to the depths of the oceans, into chaos, primordial and long-forgotten.

Arise, oh Sun!"⁵

It is estimated that vast numbers of Chinese settlers could already have pushed across the far-eastern border with Russia and the erstwhile Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan. The exodus commenced after the break-up of the Soviet Union on account of the sparseness of the population and to meet the requirement of cheap labour. What the population profile would be in that part of Russia in thirty, fifty or seventy years from now could be anybody's guess. The demographic threat from the South, linked to Islamic terrorism, could ultimately become a bigger disaster for Russia than any threat faced by the country in the last century. The urge for quick economic gains is making the Russian planners abandon prudence by supplying the most modern technology to those who would be likely to develop into the most potent threat for Russia in the coming decades.

RUSSIA 'IN' ASIA

To begin with it would be interesting to list the countries that were the greatest beneficiaries of the fall of the Soviet Union: the USA, Eastern Europe, West European countries, China, Pakistan, in that order. Central Asian Republics? The question mark denotes a Yes-No condition. It is important to keep this aspect at the back of the mind. It is not only relevant to Russia's strategic posture in the short and medium terms, but also for the *inter se* accommoda-

⁵ Andrei Bely, *Petersburg*, p. 65.

tions that might or might not take place as Russia again starts groping for a more balanced relationship with former adversaries as well as the potential adversaries of tomorrow.

Russia straddles both continents, Asia and Europe. Till Peter the Great turned his attention westwards and forced the Westernisation of his country, Russia could be said to have been more deeply involved with Asia than Europe for more reasons than one. It was this attraction for the Orient that prompted Dostoevski to say in the latter half of the Nineteenth Century:

"Give us Asia and we shall create no difficulties for Europe... It would be useful for Russia to forget Petersburg for some time and to turn her soul toward the East".⁶

With this background it is intended to examine Russia's relationship with some of the countries in Asia that could be deemed to be important for Russia geo-politically in the foreseeable future.

Russia and China

In the past the former Soviet Union had a 7500 km border with China. In comparison India's frontier with China after the latter's occupation of Tibet measures 4700 km. Together they constituted 80 per cent of China's external borders. Today Russia's borders have come down to 4300 km. The Russian/Soviet border with China was determined by the Treaty of Aigun 1858; the Treaty of Peking 1860; the Treaty of St. Petersburg 1881; and subsequent border protocols. However, the Chinese regarded only the much earlier 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk as equal, which placed Russia's border in the Far East as far North as the Sea of Okhotsk.

There has been talk of a Russia-China-India axis. It does not appear to be feasible unless three conditions obtain from the point of view of Russia. The first condition would be for Russia to become as economically strong as China. Secondly, the demographic threat from China should have virtually disappeared from the horizon – a near impossibility going by the present demographic trends obtaining

⁶. Cited by R K Dasgupta in *The Statesman*.

in the region. The third aspect relates to the maintenance of technical and quantitative superiority in the very advanced weapons systems category. The situation could change fast for the worse should Russia continue to throw caution to the winds by transferring advanced technologies to China for short-term gains. China has been ably tapping the cash-and-carry opportunities in the Russian market, picking up a number of sensitive technologies. (Even the United States was quick to buy advanced Russian space and rocket technologies cheaply in the early nineties). Ironically, because of these transfers and sales China might end up replacing Russia as the second power sometime in the future. At the moment there is talk of multi-polarity. In actual fact multi-polarity is a staging point towards just two poles, which could re-emerge after China has narrowed the military technology gap with the USA through Russian help. Then the relationship will subtly change. That will be the stage when Russia starts crying over spilt milk.

China aspires to super power status at par with the USA at some point in future. This is unlikely to happen unless China is able to marginalise Russia and Japan and to a lesser extent India. All these countries have geographic contiguity with China. All three nations have the potential to challenge China in various fields. Their respective spheres of economic and geopolitical influence in and around the region impinge upon each other. Recent efforts by the Russian leader to establish a more direct relationship with North Korea and the Koreas in general could conceivably make China uncomfortable. Japan and the two Koreas would look at the development differently, perhaps more benignly. Additionally, China will emerge as a world power only after it has been able to incorporate Taiwan. Lee Kuan Yew the elder statesman of Singapore put it succinctly in an interview reported in *Asiaweek* on 22 September 2000: "If China does not disintegrate reunification is inevitable. If China disintegrates all bets are off".

Russia and Iran

Russia is quietly building a strategic relationship with Iran. It has entered into an agreement to supply about four billion US dollars worth of material in the next few years to the Iranian Armed Forces. These include: military aircraft, tanks, air defence systems and

diesel submarines. In early February 2000 Russia turned down an offer of \$100 million in aid from the US Department of Energy if it promised to end the reprocessing of nuclear fuel and cancel the Bushehr project.⁷ The Bushehr project would give a much-needed boost to Russian industry, estimated as it is at US\$ 800 million.

At one point the US seemed to be persisting with its efforts to prevent Russia, China and Iran from coming closer in any combination. The Russia-China-Iran axis cannot really emerge as a durable axis for more reasons than one. It was developing primarily on account of the feeling in Iran and Russia that they were being pushed around by the Americans. Should the moderates in Iran led by President Khatami succeed in their thrust towards liberalisation and should the US, in turn, moderate its stance, the outcome could turn out differently. Initially the US strategic goal of total control over Central Asian gas and oil aimed at excluding Russia and Iran. At that point the Afghan-Pakistan corridor was being looked at favourably.

Major changes have taken place since then. China's geo-strategic planning now aims – in the long-term – at being the dominant power in Central Asia. The early occupation of Tibet – and now an enfeebled Russia – will permit China to do so through physical dominance of the region, directly or by proxy. That proxy certainly cannot be Iran. It is the Pakistan-Afghanistan axis that China seeks to exploit to the hilt in the coming years to checkmate the other major powers having interests in the region. The strategy seems to be working.

Iran's efforts to stem the Taliban tide were impelled by geo-strategic and ideological imperatives. Russia too must be feeling uncomfortable at China backing Pakistan with such vigour, and by extension the Taliban, with nuclear and longer range missile technologies. While ostensibly these transfers were meant to keep India engaged, strategic thinkers in Russia, Turkey and Israel have reportedly started feeling uncomfortable at the thought that they too could become vulnerable to the same weapons systems under a more militant Islamic dispensation.

⁷ *Middle East International* no. 629, 10 March 2000.

Russia and the Central Asian Republics

On taking over as President of the Russian Federation, Mr Putin began to play a more active role in the sphere of foreign policy. In May 2000, he held meetings with most of the CIS leaders. Russia desisted from setting forth any global or ideological agenda in the manner of a superpower. The new concept was one of multipolar system of international relations, which objectively reflected the reality at the dawn of the new century. 'Russia has embarked on a sweeping reshaping of its relations with the former Soviet states, abandoning attempts to resuscitate the Commonwealth of Independent States and preferring instead to build alliances with its closest allies on the basis of shared interests. The new strategy could aggravate splits in the CIS. On the other hand, it could start economic integration among at least some of the CIS members.

Meeting in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, in October 2000, the Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus, set up a new economic trade zone, the Eurasian Economic Community. The five countries agreed to gradually pull down economic barriers and encourage free movement of goods, capital and workforce. Russia showed willingness to put up with certain economic losses resulting from the opening of the domestic market to its partners. Moscow also forfeited the right to dominate the grouping, although it will control 40 per cent of the votes in the new union.

Soon after they formed the Eurasian Economic Community the five former Soviet states, joined by Armenia, met in Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan, to resuscitate the 1992 Collective Security Treaty. The six nations resolved to set up a rapid deployment military force to repulse both external aggression and internal insurgency. What is more important, Moscow agreed to supply weapons to its allies at highly concessional rates. These new attempts at economic and military integration are based on the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia. The Taliban's recent military gains in Afghanistan and incursions into post-Soviet Central Asia convinced Moscow that the states in the region had to be made strong enough to stand up to the threat of religious extremism and terrorism.

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 Ukraine had been drifting away from Russia and opposed any CIS accords that could hamper this process. In 1999 Ukraine set up a NATO-oriented security arrangement with Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, which refused to prolong the Collective Security Treaty with Russia, as well as Moldova. The new alliance, GUUAM, which drew its abbreviation from the first letter of its member-states' names, was formally established in Washington in May 1999 where its leaders attended celebrations of the 50th anniversary of NATO. From the start it favoured closer economic, political and military co-operation with the West.

The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community and rekindling of the Collective Security Treaty highlighted the split in the CIS into pro-Russia and pro-NATO camps. The President of Uzbekistan, Mr Islam Karimov, refused to attend the Moscow-led summits in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and played host instead to the Ukrainian President. At about the same time Russia's *Lukoil* pulled out of a consortium of Western-led companies, which was planning to build oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan to Turkey. The Russian natural gas monopoly, *Gazprom*, drew up plans to build a pipeline to Europe bypassing Ukraine. This would cost Ukraine many millions of dollars in lost gas transit revenues. Oil politics continue to dominate the region. European and US investments in Central Asia have grown substantially in the past decade. However, due to its geographical location and linguistic affinities, Russia is better placed to assist existing regimes in matters of defence and internal order.

An important indicator of changing attitudes towards Russia in the region is the position of President Karimov of Uzbekistan. In 1999 Karimov distanced himself from the CIS by becoming a member of the NATO-sponsored GUUAM Pact, which united former Soviet Southern republics in a loose alliance. He also refused to sign the CIS defence pact. Following major terrorist activity in his territory, however, and an attempt on his life, Karimov has sought greater co-operation with Russia in dealing with fundamentalist organisations. While stressing the need to build up Uzbek military forces, he agreed to send Uzbek officers for training at the military

academy of the Russian Federation, and ensured refurbishing of Uzbek hardware from Russia.

Russia cannot really shed its Soviet legacy. It cannot opt out unilaterally. If it does, the vacuum created in the CAR (Central Asian Republics) would, in all probability, be filled by forces inimical to Russia. Putin's quandary is that he cannot afford to leave them alone. Some of the CAR apparently feel obliged to seek accommodation with the Taliban. Not because they welcome the Taliban, but owing to its successes in Afghanistan. Hence, unless Russia acts resolutely to reassure them of its capability to safeguard the CAR's territorial integrity, they will be obliged to look elsewhere.

Russia and Afghanistan

The US was able to get out of Vietnam after the defeat at the hands of the Vietcong, practically abandoning all military and non-military assets *in situ*. Whatever the mess, it turned out to be a 'clean break'. No such luxury was available to Russia on account of geographical contiguity and a host of other factors. Russia is now in the forefront of the global efforts to contain the Taliban and the potential for terrorism emanating from that country. For the time being the US backs Russia in its efforts. The US, being far away, cannot experience the immediacy of the threat. At the moment its short-term interest appears to be limited to the extradition of Bin Laden, not realising that thousands and possibly tens of thousands of die-hard jihadis coming out of the *madrasas* in Pakistan and Afghanistan are potential Bin Laden clones.

Russia really does not have much of a choice in the matter. Either it is successful in containing the militant Islamic threat or it watches as more and more regions in Central Asia and Russia itself go the Chechnya way. The dilemma is very real. It has been amply demonstrated in Vietnam and Afghanistan that advanced military technology in itself cannot adequately deal with small, well-motivated guerrilla bands. More so, in mountainous and jungle terrain, should capture of territory be the real objective. Radical groups bent upon mayhem require well-trained troops to flush them out in close quarter combat. Casualties in men can be high. This is where Russia has

to take a firm decision since it cannot afford to expend manpower. The strategy of the opponents is to make the battle manpower-heavy, which hurts Russia with its declining population much more than it does the adversary. Russia cannot sustain more and more manpower losses. Consequently, it would be left with no option but to strike at source by delineating a line, which, if breached by the jihadis in Afghanistan or their backers, would automatically invite massive high-tech precision retaliation. The retaliation would be limited to training camps and such assets that allow the other side to pursue its northward thrust into the CAR or territory held by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.

Russia and Japan

The defence relationship between Japan and Russia is likely to grow, driven by a wariness of China. This could be greatly strengthened by increased economic co-operation. Fossil fuels and the resources locked up in the coldness of Siberia have long beckoned Japan's hungry industry. Japanese businessmen continue to show reluctance on account of the complicated political relations between the two countries. Japan is anxious to see tangible progress towards the return of the four islands known to the world as the Kuriles, but more precisely the islands of Shikotan, the Habomai cluster, Kunashiri and Etorofu. In 1855, towards the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan and Russia signed a treaty of friendship, drawing a border between the northernmost of the four islands, Etorofu, and Russia's Urup Island. During the period leading to the Japanese surrender in September 1945, the Soviets grabbed all four islands. In 1956, during the establishment of diplomatic relations, Japan and Russia signed the Moscow Declaration, which calls for Russia to return Habomai and Shikotan when the peace treaty is signed. The fate of the other two islands was not mentioned.

After many ups and downs Japan coaxed Russia in 1993 to again formally acknowledge the existence of a territorial dispute. Later during the Hashimoto visit to Russia, the idea of 'land for money' was mooted. Japan would invest in infrastructure in the Russian Far East and could buy natural gas at cheaper prices, and improve Russia's ports, harbours and other facilities on the disputed islands. In return, Mr Yeltsin agreed to sign a document saying both

leaders would do their best to conclude a peace treaty by 2000. There were further talks during Mr Yeltsin's visit to Japan in 1998. In spite of all the parleys there really has not been any satisfactory forward movement in this issue from the Japanese viewpoint.

In the coming years the two countries will have to shed their past antipathy and take a fresh look at the emerging geopolitical scene in Asia and the world. Both are global players and might have to make fresh assessments about their global role. Although the possibility may appear remote at the moment, China, through tacit support to the Pakistan-Taliban axis as well as its direct investments in Kazakhstan, especially in the oil sector, is getting poised to dominate the Central Asian region at some future date. Neither Japan nor Russia would view this development with equanimity. For both countries China appears to be the bigger worry in the future rather than any misgivings about each other.

Russia and India

The Russian relationship with India would be seen by many as a near perfect relationship on account of the absence of dissonance on almost any count, be it trade, geopolitical interests or any other sphere that is included in relations between countries. Not being geographically contiguous, cross-border irritants also get excluded. To add to this, at the present time both countries are threatened by militant Islamic groups sallying forth from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. There appears to be a national consensus in both countries on closer co-operation. To quote Professor Sergei Lunyov, a leading specialist at the Institute of Oriental Studies: "We must never forget that Russia and India are natural geopolitical allies. There is a lot of momentum in the relationship."

The Russian proposal for a North-South Transport Corridor on establishing a railroad-cum-ferry link between Russia and India through several other countries has been well received. The Indian Transport Minister has recently signed an agreement in St. Petersburg pledging Indian co-operation in implementing the project, estimated to cost nearly \$2 billion. It will cut delivery time from India to Russia by 10 to 15 days and save about 30 per cent in shipping

costs. Originating in Helsinki and proceeding via St. Petersburg, Moscow, Astrakhan, the Caspian Sea, Iran and the UAE to India, the Corridor will also open up markets for Indian goods in Eastern Europe.

RUSSIA AND EUROPE

The Russian soul, if it could be examined closely, would in all probability be composed of a European half and an Asian half. Over the centuries there have been various pulls and pressures from both halves. After the advent of Peter the Great the European half predominated for a long time. In the new century the pulls and pressures could become even more exaggerated. According to George Lucas, "Emergent capitalism appeared as an important factor in the formation of European nations. After profound revolutionary struggles, it transformed the chaos of small medieval feudal governments into great nations in the most capitalistically developed part of Europe".⁸ Individual countries of Europe – those who had the means, that is – expanded across the world in the 18th, 19th and 20th Centuries. The second half of the Twentieth Century saw the retraction of the European powers in stages. Therefore, the retraction of Russia from Asia nearly forty years after the European colonial powers felt it prudent to pull out – some were forced out – follows a pattern, except that Russia happens to geographically embrace both continents. The stakes for Russia in Asia remain enormous as an existential imperative.

In the late fifties, American researcher Harold R Isaacs wrote, "The European age has ended. The centre of gravity in world affairs has shifted, Europe has to be seen as a peninsula at one end of the great Eurasian continent." While the importance of Asia could continue to grow, it would be wrong to presume that Asian growth *ipso facto* denotes a downsizing of European importance. It would have been the case had the Cold War continued. The demise of the Soviet Union confers upon Europe a whole range of exciting options, provided the Old Continent breaks away from the deeply ingrained habit of looking at the world from an American perspective.

⁸ George Lucas, *Lenin*.

It is time for Europe to get out of the shadow of America. It was America's pushing of its own agenda for world dominance that has prevented Europe from having a European worldview for the 21st Century. A historical turning point has now been reached. Several new vistas have opened up on Europe's geopolitical horizon at the end of the Cold War. Most military experts concede that Europe does not face any real military threat in the foreseeable future. While this does not mean that Europe should lower its military guard, it does mean that Europe should feel free to have an independent strategic vision based on what is good for Europe and the European neighbourhood, which is basically Asia and Africa. NATO, after all, came into being because of the Soviet menace. Russia by itself cannot possibly regain the same geographic, demographic or military mass.

Russia has to be co-opted into the European strategic vision. Going a step further, its leaders should envision a Europe stretching from Calais to Vladivostok. Europe would then stretch not from the Atlantic to the Urals, but in a grand sweep from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Examined dispassionately, freed from the Cold War mindset, the proposal envisages a pivotal role for the extended European Union as one of the most significant pillars of the global equipoise of the new millennium. Any number of difficulties can be conjured up by skeptics and naysayers. European statesman should seize the initiative to usher in a new era. The Russian leadership can hardly be averse to the idea once it sinks in. The Russian people would be enthusiastic about it; as possibly would be the average European citizen.

At some stage the Russian nuclear arsenal could be integrated into a common European defence as a measure of global stability. Thereafter, the process of nuclear disarmament would gather momentum. The P5 negotiating entities could, through a process of give and take, become just three major negotiating entities, namely, the USA, the European Union and China. In anticipation of the possible turn of events in the direction indicated, Russia and Europe should join hands to prevent another Cold War from descending on the world. Europe occupies a unique position in the East-West dialogue. It should encourage Russia to resist acceding to American

blandishments for diluting the 1972 ABM Treaty, a cornerstone of the global equipoise that nearly came into being before the US started once again flexing its military muscle. Should Europe decide to resolutely oppose the American NMD (National Missile Defence) and TMD (Theatre Missile Defence) deployments, the US would hardly be in a position to initiate a new arms race. Europe must remember that should a free for all take place on account of the nuclear and missile proliferation that would surely follow a NMD deployment decision, the battle-ground for any conflagration would be the Eurasian landmass. America is smug and secure beyond the oceans. Europe's vulnerability was during the Cold War – and will remain in any future war – an order of magnitude higher than that of the USA. The Americans are aware of that. So, for that matter, are the Europeans. And yet the 'conditioned' inertia!

To quote from the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which was approved by President Putin on 28 June 2000:

"The Russian Federation views the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuations".

RUSSIA AND THE USA

"If President Bill Clinton had all his wits about him he would challenge the toughest hardliners on the Republican right to posit a plausible scenario for modern day Russia wanting to go to war with the West. Can anyone really make a case that if the USA dropped its guard – and its nuclear allies Britain and France did too – that Russia would move into western Europe and bomb America's industrial heartlands? It is simply intellectually outrageous, which is why no one spells it out". So wrote Jonathan Power.⁹

Russia was down – and almost out – at the end of the Cold War. The US obviously wanted at that stage to deliver a *coup de grace* to the rump Russia. Had it sat back to consider its future

⁹. *The Statesman*, 2 June 2000.

course of action with wisdom and maturity, it would have realised that the course that it adopted for dealing with Russia was not the one to take. Once again the American military-industrial complex forced the issue. Many in Europe voiced their misgivings. As had been its wont in the past the US brushed aside all objections, which in any case were put forward only tentatively, such being the status of the once proud Europeans now herded into collective submission.

The quote that follows is from the Russell Einstein Manifesto, the credo of Pugwash that was issued in July 1955 and was signed by 11 distinguished scientists, most of them Nobel Prize winners. They drew attention to mankind's predicament in language that was, in a way, prophetic:

"We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species man, whose continued existence is in doubt... *Remember your humanity and forget the rest.*"

The US Government failed to respond to this sane piece of advice and went on instead to usher in a global arms race that brought the planet to the brink of disaster more than once in one of the most tense periods of world history. It ended with the end of the Cold War, or so it seemed at that time. Now, after fifty years, the American government seems bent upon starting another arms spiral, far more menacing than the earlier one, by its insistence on going ahead unilaterally with the deployment of National and Theatre Missile Defences.

Zbigniew, Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to President Carter, in a recent article, remarked:

"The US has never followed a genuinely universal and non-discriminatory policy of halting proliferation. In fact, US policy all along has been that of selective and preferential proliferation..."

Conclusion

In the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly, a typical year, the US voted against all of the 25 resolutions to enhance

international security and for disarmament. Western democracies in general and the US establishment in particular have not yet grasped the real import of the altered global reality; that the USA and Russia need no longer look at each other as adversaries but as partners in bringing about an end to all types of threats hanging over the viability of the Planet. What is being witnessed is the latent effect of the Cold War era continuing to manifest itself in the military-industrial complex of the former adversaries. As things stand now, and projecting the same template well into the future, it is difficult to see as to how Russia can again match the might of the United States if one goes by the criterion of a super power described earlier. The only grouping that could surpass – not challenge – the United States by the same criteria would be a European Union stretching from the Atlantic to Vladivostok. Such an entity, if it does come about, could be the harbinger of the equipoise of the third millennium.

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Sino-Indian Detente : The Manipal Joint Meeting

MAJ GEN E D'SOUZA, PVSM (RETD)

Introduction

There are conflicting reports in the media of India's relations with China, a sort of 'blow hot blow cold' affair. Recent reports mention that a joint Sino-Indian team met to delineate the softer areas of our contested border. There can be little doubt that there is a genuine requirement for these two Asian giants to come together and arrive at a viable solution to the many contentious security-related issues facing them.

Nine Chinese academics from mainland China, comprising high-profile representatives from various disciplines including defence, visited Manipal and interacted with representatives from India including academics, one US-based NRI (Non-Resident Indian) scientist, a former Ambassador to Beijing, a Deputy Secretary from the MEA (Ministry of External Affairs), economists, businessmen, media persons and Defence Services personnel, both serving and retired. None of the Indian representatives were Indian Government nominees. This meeting was held over a period of three days in the first week of November 2000. Discussions were conducted under three main heads: Geopolitics; Security; and the New and Old Economies. Selected speakers from both sides were invited to make presentations and each session was co-chaired by representatives from India and China. The presentations and discussions were free and frank.

Geopolitical Issues

The geopolitical and security aspects, anticipatedly, merged. A number of key and pressing issues were raised by the Indian

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panellists, many of which were hotly refuted or disputed by their Chinese counterparts. The more important ones are discussed heretofore. Chinese plans to use the waters of the Tsangpo River, which flows through the Tibetan Plateau, were raised by this writer. One of these ambitious plans, mentioned in the prestigious US Journal *Scientific American*, is to divert the waters of this snow-fed river into the dry and waterless Gobi Desert by constructing a tunnel through the Himalayas. Admittedly this is a Herculean task but China has the know-how and, in addition to nuclear energy, cheap and productive labour. Should the projected step ever be taken, it will result in the virtual drying up of the Brahmaputra River, the lifeblood of Eastern India not only for agriculture but also for inland water transport and fisheries. It will also have serious implications on the rich environment of that area, home to a number of important endangered species. The other alternative which came to the notice of this writer was equally ominous: releasing the flood waters of the Tsangpo into the Brahmaputra, already prone to flooding, and causing untold damage and hardship to the large number of people living in the Valley and the exotic species of wildlife found in this area. It would also hamper movement.

Maj Gen Fan, the Chinese interlocutor on the geopolitical and security aspects, a member of the Chinese National Defence University, hotly denied any such proposals and wished to know the source of such information. He then made it a point of stating that it was a (US Central Intelligence Agency) CIA-inspired report. The vehemence of the denial is a pointer to the sensitivity of the Chinese on this issue. We need to carefully and unobtrusively monitor any such plans, possibly through satellite imagery, and raise such issues at bilateral meetings.

Nuclear Aspect

Yet another issue raised was China's nuclear capability and the export of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. The Chinese response was that no such transfers were taking place and it was a CIA ploy to cause discord in South Asia. It will be recalled that the American Government decided to impose sanctions on Pakistan and Iran for accepting the transfer of such technologies

from China. Intriguing is the fact that no action was taken to haul China on the coals because, whatever else, the American business lobby is powerful enough to ensure that there are no road blocks to the vast Chinese consumer market. A statement was recently made in Delhi by a Chinese Government dignitary that India need entertain no fears that this Chinese aid would ever be used against it. Let us be on the *qui vive* because in the 1960s the Americans gave India a similar assurance that the arms aid to Pakistan would never be used against it; yet this is precisely what happened in 1965. Arguably China's track record in such matters cannot be taken at face value.

The next issue raised was of India's nuclear capability. When countered by the question as to why China decided to go nuclear, members of the Chinese delegation made it abundantly clear that they did so for the security of the Chinese people. They were then asked to specify from which nation China expected to be a nuclear target. Russia, although a nuclear power, had achieved good neighbourly relations with China. Pakistan is a friend of China. France and Britain could not be even remotely considered as nuclear threats. Israel? India? This speaker made it abundantly clear that India was forced to go nuclear as it has on its immediate borders two nuclear-armed nations. Could then the Prime Minister of India ever risk the security of one billion Indians to the possibility of a nuclear attack?

India's track record since 1947 made it abundantly clear that it had no ambitions to acquire the real estate of a neighbouring country. It was essential for China to understand this fact of life. The writer then proceeded to elaborate on the nuclear encirclement of India. He stated that the 'bhagwa' Indian nuclear elephant was surrounded by the 'white' elephant of the five nuclear powers, including Israel. This was not a major cause for worry. Then there was the 'green' elephant of Pakistan and the 'red' elephant of China, the last two ominously poised on its borders. In passing, he mentioned the USA/UK nuclear presence in the Indian Ocean, especially in Diego Garcia. He referred to the Chinese nuclear presence in Tibet. Could India afford to ignore these storm signals? Instead of the 'bhagwa' nuclear elephant, could India ignore the

threats posed by the 'green' and 'red' nuclear elephants poised along its borders by defending itself with a pack of cocker spaniels?

It must be understood that this writer, based on his Hiroshima experience, has always stood for a total ban on all nuclear weapons but was not prepared to accept the sanctimonious attitude of the nuclear 'haves'. Expectedly, there were no comments from the Chinese side and all references to the nuclear issue were glossed over on the specious grounds that India had no cause to fear.

Sino-Indian Borders

A very significant observation was made by Maj Gen Fan that Taiwan was a closed chapter so far as the rest of the world was concerned and that China would brook no interference from any power, obviously hinting at the US, in its quest for the reunification of that province with the Chinese mainland. It was made abundantly clear that China would use all means available to ensure the reunification of Taiwan. Surely it was a veiled warning to India regarding the areas China considers its own in Arunachal Pradesh and other areas along the border.

The attention of the Chinese delegation was drawn to the road-building activities along our borders, including a Class 9 road to Bumla as well as border incursions reported by the Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, and presumably by our own troops, which gain scant attention in the media. It is only when our troops stand firm that such intrusions are evacuated and it gives one the impression that the Chinese are testing us out. The Chief Minister of Arunachal has been repeatedly drawing the attention of the Government to these incursions and road-building activities. Only recently, there was a reliable press report that China was improving its posture in the Aksai Chin area by constructing roads right up to what it considers the line of control. This would then be used as a bargaining point when that part of the disputed area is discussed. The Chinese delegation was significantly silent on any references to their illegal occupation of Aksai Chin. They discounted our fears of road-building activities along the border and pointed out that we too were building roads.

What about Sikkim? China has never hidden its agenda that this Himalayan State is in disputed occupation by India. The Chinese agenda has been carefully charted out and they are absolutely clear as to what they perceive as areas falling under Chinese suzerainty. This was evident when Tibet cropped up in the discussions. The Chinese delegates insisted that India had no business to permit the Dalai Lama to set up a parallel government in India. Or, for that matter, to permit Tibetan refugees from seeking asylum in India. The Chinese delegation was reminded that the Dalai Lama was the spiritual head of Buddhism. It is obvious that the Tibetan presence in India, especially that of the Dalai Lama and the younger Karmapa Lama who recently sought sanctuary in India, is a sensitive issue with the Chinese.

Relations with Myanmar

An issue, discussed under the 'Security' head, was the covert and overt assistance given by China to insurgents from the North East through Myanmarese connivance as also the use of the Coco Island belonging to Myanmar. A former Naval Chief confirms through photographic evidence Chinese presence on that island, stating that it is a definite security threat to India. It appears that attempts are being made to set up a monitoring base in these strategic waters, and use it as a base for illegal movement of arms and narcotics into the Indian mainland. The Chinese vehemently denied this point. The recent visit of a senior member of the ruling Myanmar military junta to India where he was accorded red carpet treatment was explained away as India's attempts to put Indo-Myanmar relations back on track. Unfortunately, we have been late *latifs* because the Chinese presence has already been established. Let us not forget that Myanmar has physical borders with China and is connected to Kunming by the old Ledo road. It is of utmost importance to develop good relations with this immediate neighbour for the simple reason that it is a buffer between India/Bangladesh and China. Some plain speaking on our part is called for to stop this route for activities contrary to our security and trade interests.

Other Pertinent Points

In the mid-nineties, before the late General B C Joshi died in

harness, he was one of the first Army Chiefs to visit China. On his return, in the course of a dinner conversation, he stated that his gut feeling was that the Chinese dragon would slumber peacefully until, by the year 2005, it had built up its economy and modernised its armed forces. Then, after being militarily and economically strong, it would demand all territories it considered its own along the so-called disputed border especially the McMahon Line. Now relate this perception to the predictions made by Humphrey Hawksley in his recently published book, semi-fact semi-fiction, appropriately titled *Dragon Fire*. Completed after two years of painstaking research, he has painted a similar scenario to General Joshi's perception, except that the year is 2007. Hawksley opines that by 2007, India will be driven against the wall by the on-going low-intensity conflict and the Government forced to take remedial action. A conventional attack is launched in the West. China is monitoring the situation carefully, ready to rush to Pakistan's aid. The Pakistan Government decides to use a nuclear weapon against India's advancing forces on Pakistani soil. Now before India can launch a nuclear response, China launches a conventional attack along the Ledo Road and at the same time drops a 15-kiloton nuclear missile each on Mumbai and Delhi. Yet another Army Chief, the late General K Sundarji, states in his book *The Blind Men of Hindoostan* that Pakistan would not hesitate to use a nuclear weapon against advancing Indian forces on Pakistani soil. Predictably, this scenario was aggressively refuted by the Chinese delegation. Would it be right on the part of our planners to write off such a scenario as a figment of the fertile imagination of a BBC journalist? Then how does one explain the rationale behind the perceptions of two cerebral Army Chiefs?

Two of our state-of-the-art naval ships recently visited Shanghai where, one learns, the Chinese were impressed with our ability to produce such technologically efficient ships. The Chinese Navy (read Government) accepted India's invitation to send its naval ships to participate in the International Fleet Review, which was held in Mumbai harbour in February 2001. This response was read as a healthy sign to further foster relations at the Armed Forces' level. But these expectations were belied when China withdrew its offer to participate. In the course of the discussion of China wanting

a naval presence in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, the Chinese delegation made it abundantly clear that it had no such intentions and even lacked an aircraft carrier. Reports speak otherwise. China's interests in the Spratley Group of Islands in the South China Sea, reputed to be a source of oil, is well known, as also the Chinese desire to establish its naval presence in South East Asia. Had the Chinese accepted the Indian invitation, perhaps this would have resulted in further exchanges at the military level. Unless such interactions occur, there would be a continuance of mutual suspicions. In this context, the Chinese delegation repeatedly referred to the 1962 conflict as an aberration that should be forgotten in the larger interests of good neighbourly relations. But the delegation was silent about the move forward to the Sikkim Watershed in the 1965 War to reduce pressure on the beleaguered Pakistanis in the West, the thorny problem of Aksai Chin and the export of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan.

Confidence-Building Measures

It was agreed by both sides that there should be greater exchanges between the media of the two countries, the opening up of direct air links, a greater exchange of students, improvement of overland communications, with one Indian entrepreneur even suggesting the establishment of a rail link, cultural, academic and sports exchanges, tourism and so on. These measures, it was felt, could lead to lessening of tension on security matters.

It was agreed by both parties that the common man in either country knows precious little about his counterpart. It was felt that the exchange of youth would be a good starting point. A commendable initiative was the signing of a MOU between Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE) and the Chinese Delegation to send Chinese students to Manipal to study English, Management and Infotech. The scope of such exchanges should be widened to other educational institutions in India. Equally, it was felt that India could benefit by absorbing the Chinese work ethic, which has proved so productive.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, both parties agreed that given the desired confidence in each other, notwithstanding the different forms of government, it would be of interest not only to these two giants but to Asia as well to prevent yet another colonisation by the industrialised countries, to find common ground to improve relations at all levels and to remove the mutual suspicions that exist. In doing so let us never forget that it takes two to shake hands. Now that the world is a global village, the old ideas of spheres of interest no longer exist. India must move ahead slowly in seeking a rapprochement without ever letting its guard down.

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Military Intervention in Pakistan

LT GEN R SHARMA, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Military intervention in governance of the state has become a perennial chapter in the history of Pakistan. In the 53 years since inauguration, the country has experienced military rule for over two decades. Even when Pakistan was under civil control, the Pakistan Army remained a major stake-holder in the state's governance. The military establishment has emerged as the 'third estate' of the nation, wielding undisputed extra-constitutional powers. It has emerged stronger in the 'Troika' – the other two being the President and the Prime Minister (PM). It has for long assumed the role of an adjudicator and arbitrator in political squabbles and has remained at the helm of National Security matters with a major say in steering the country's foreign policy. Whenever its special status was threatened by a civil government asserting its constitutional authority, the Pakistan Army derailed the democratic process through a military take-over.

On 12 October 1999 the Pakistan Army usurped power once again. The Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, toppled the elected government of Nawaz Sharif in a counter-coup provoked by the Prime Minister's decree dismissing the Army Chief. This is the fifth time that the Pakistan Army has seized power in a military coup, with its own distinctive pattern. Unlike Latin America or the African continent where military coups came about in a civil war scenario resulting in major destruction of human lives and property, military take-overs in Pakistan have been less violent and executed with minimum force. Military coups in Pakistan generally came about when the people 'willed' the Army as their saviour, to succour them from despotic, corrupt and unpopular regimes. At times the civil government itself abdicated in favour of the military establishment, unable to handle severe sectarian ethnic violence, pushing Pakistan to political and economic abyss.

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The phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan has a new dimension, following the country's acquisition of a nuclear status. As to whether General Musharraf steers nuclearised Pakistan is yet unpredictable. Yet the past will always mirror the future. And to presage the internal and external dimensions of Musharraf's Pakistan, the following aspects would be relevant as precursors.

- (a) What makes Pakistan vulnerable to military intervention?
- (b) The beginnings and the end of military regimes in Pakistan and their socio-political effects.
- (c) Pakistan under Musharraf.

What makes Pakistan vulnerable to Military Intervention

In Islamic precepts the army has always held a special status in the traditions of the Caliphate. Monarchies and Sheikhdoms exist in the majority of Muslim states, where authoritarianism is exercised with the strong arm of the army. Democracy did find roots in parts of the Muslim World. Turkey set the new model for democracy and secularism under Mustafa Kemal, in the quest for modernisation. Others like Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan followed suit. Even in these countries the military establishment retained its traditional special status.

Pakistan was willed a Parliamentary Islamic Republic by its founder, Mohamad Ali Jinnah. But as the first Governor General, Jinnah functioned more in the capacity of an Executive President and gave the country a secular hue. This anomaly in constitutional governance left Pakistan a legacy of struggle for power between the President and the Parliament. Pakistan has had to contend with two Constitutional Assemblies, one Constitutional Committee, and three different Constitutions. Pakistan did not inherit the political institutions of British rule, where the military was firmly put under civil control. And, time and again, when President's rule was imposed in Pakistan unconstitutionally, it could only be done with the backing of the Army. Once the Army tasted power under successive Presidents starting with Iskandar Mirza, it never gave up its special status and power. After President Zia's rule ended in 1988 the Pakistan Army was content with its extra-constitutional 'behind the scenes' power, with less accountability and greater

autonomy. However, things took a different turn when Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime Minister (PM) with a massive mandate in 1997. Encouraged by his great popularity and success, Nawaz Sharif asserted his constitutional authority by abrogating the 8th Amendment and securing his position from Presidential intervention. Heady with power, he attempted a dictatorial hold on Pakistan by neutralising the judiciary and the bureaucracy. When he tried to cut the Army to size, resentment in the military establishment surfaced with General Jehangir Karamat resigning on the issue of non-involvement of the Army in national security matters. Nawaz Sharif finally over-reached himself when he dismissed General Musharraf and appointed Lt Gen Ziauddin, Director General ISI, as the next Army Chief.

The military coup of 12 October 1999 was not premeditated. Nor was the Army entirely unprepared for the contingency. Had Nawaz Sharif allowed the Army to bask in its autonomy and allowed it representation in the National Security Council, events may not have taken this turn. The Kargil episode changed the civil-military equation to a point of no return. Military intervention in the wake of the Kargil failure was inevitable. A scapegoat became an imperative, and the Army closed ranks to ensure that it would not end up on the sacrificial altar.

The Beginning of Military Intervention in Pakistan

The political struggle for power between the Governor General and the PM had its socio-political impact in Pakistan. It manifested itself in the form of sectarian and ethnic violence in the streets of West and East Pakistan and in resentment against Punjabi hegemony at the Centre.

In 1957 Maj Gen Iskandar Mirza, a retired officer and veteran politician from East Pakistan, had been appointed Governor General after the sudden death of Ghulam Mohamad Suhrawardi. Since the PM was also from the eastern wing of Pakistan, people of West Pakistan could not reconcile themselves to a Bengali-dominated government at the helm, which triggered off large-scale disturbances in Punjab and other Western provinces. Iskandar Mirza, in an effort to assert his position, carried out a constitutional coup by appointing himself as President, declaring martial law and calling in the Army to quell the violence. He went too far when he dissolved the Western

Provinces and created a unified unit of West Pakistan. This was the clarion call for the Army to move in, which, along with the bureaucracy, was Punjabi-dominated. Yet General Ayub Khan's military take-over from Iskandar Mirza in 1958 was at the President's request, who needed a bail out and not a military coup by use of force.

The Ayub years marked the beginning of the military era in Pakistan. Ayub proclaimed himself President and gave a new Presidential Constitution in 1962, offering the country a guided democracy. Ayub aimed at modernising Pakistan and was against Islamisation, which he felt would negate modernisation. He took some hasty steps which he regretted later: deleting the word 'Islam' from Pakistan's constitutional nomenclature; passing the Muslim Family Ordinance for inheritance; banning the right wing party *Jamat-i-Islami* then under the renowned Muslim scholar Maududi. These were serious errors, for he misjudged the people's mood, and soon had to resile from his concept of modern Islam.

Despite opposition from the orthodox Islamists, the Ayub era lasted for ten years, during which he industrialised Pakistan, effected some land reforms and maintained a GDP growth of 5 per cent. Ayub ruled Pakistan through the bureaucracy and kept the Army out of politics and governance. This was a deliberate move to prepare the Army for Operation Gibraltar, aimed at wresting Jammu and Kashmir from India. But this was a serious miscalculation, and the Indo-Pak War 1965 cost Ayub the crown and glory he had acquired. But being a shrewd administrator and politician, he passed the 'baton' of military rule to General Yahya Khan in 1969, in the hope of retaining military control of the country through a change of guard.

General Yahya Khan, under pressure, held the first ever free and fair elections in Pakistan in 1970 and recreated the provinces in West Pakistan. The elections boomeranged when the Bengali Awami Party won a thumping victory and staked its claim to govern Pakistan. The rest is history: the Pakistani military crackdown in Bengal, the Indo-Pak War of 1971, the break-away of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh.

This marked the end of the first military era in Pakistan, with the emergence of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the first elected leader.

Bhutto gave a new Constitution to Pakistan in 1973, calling it a 'Socialist Islamic Republic'. He set Pakistan on the road to socialism, nationalisation of banks and industry, and Islamisation which he considered imperative to counter the ethnic pulls and fissures in the country after the breakaway of East Pakistan.

Bhutto had a great opportunity to firmly establish democracy in the country and to put an end to military intervention in government for all times to come. But, heady with absolute power, he made serious miscalculations. Firstly, his crackdown in Baluchistan brought the Army back into politics and prominence. Then he squelched democracy himself, by massive rigging of the elections in 1977. This created a wave of political violence by opposition parties, arousing the people to demand his ouster and an end to nepotism and corruption.

Army's Consolidation of Power

In 1977 the political turmoil generated by Bhutto's imperious and corrupt rule, followed by rigged elections, provided General Zia ul-Haq, the Army Chief, the opportunity to seize power in a military coup. Zia suspended the 1973 Constitution, proclaimed himself President and legitimised his actions in the name of Islamic tenets. Over the years he changed the character of Pakistani political institutions, executive and judiciary by promulgating the 8th Amendment to the Constitution, conferring absolute powers on the President to abrogate the parliament and dismiss the Prime Minister under an emergency. His revival of the National Assembly through non-party elections and the appointment of Mohamad Khan Junejo as Prime Minister was a mere facade for democracy.

Then came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which brought Zia in closer alliance with the USA and Saudi Arabia, who provided Pakistan arms and funds to fight the Soviets. Pakistan became the front-line state to conduct the proxy war against the Russians, which Zia did by reviving the concept of *jihad*. Zia's call for *jihad* succeeded but the ten years of war by the *mujahideen* trained, armed and indoctrinated on Pakistani soil, left a lasting impact on the country's polity. Zia revived Islamic orthodoxy endorsing the 'Hudood' code of the *Sharia*, which unified the people and strengthened his hold on the state. But his actions provided

boost to the right wing Islamic fundamentalist parties – the *Jamat-i-Islami* and the *Jammat-e-Ulema*, which enjoyed a special status. The seeds of Islamic militancy were sown by Zia, which gave root to the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, coinciding with the Russian pull-out from Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army and the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), both of which played important roles in the Afghan War, were indoctrinated with *jihad*, enunciating terrorism, subversion and sabotage as basic principles for conducting proxy wars. Zia laid the foundations for the Islamisation of the Pakistani military establishment and its new affiliations with Islamic fundamentalists. He carved the Army's permanent role in the ruling 'Troika'.

Pakistan under Musharraf

When General Musharraf seized power by toppling the elected government of Nawaz Sharif, it was the best of times for military rule and the worst of times for democracy in Pakistan. The last decade of successive elected governments of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and the Presidential rows had depraved democracy, creating instability and political and economic chaos. The state of deterioration in the country's governance had reached such an extent that the people of Pakistan 'willed' and the world 'anticipated' a military take-over. Encouraged by the mood of the country and the unstinted loyalty of the Army, Musharraf soon legitimised his new status. On 15 October 1999 he declared a state of emergency, suspended the Constitution, the National and Provincial Assemblies and declared himself as the 'Chief Executive'. He has retained President Rafiq Tarar as the constitutional head, and invoked a "Provisional Constitutional Order", as Zia did, to prevent the judiciary from declaring Army rule as illegal. He has promised to hold elections in 2002, after cleaning the political and economic mess, and has made a start with 'devolution of power' through non-party elections at the Panchayat level. But he has given no indications as to how he intends meeting the deadline set by the Supreme Court for restoration of democracy. He has till now not allowed political institutions to function; an indication that he might contemplate another form of 'guided' democracy with non-party, indirect elections. Presently he has formed a cabinet of ministers by nominating some well-known personalities, mostly professional

bureaucrats and corporate heads. Army officers have been inducted into virtually every department, though he terms them 'monitors' of the administration. The 'National Accountability Bureau', established under Lt Gen Mohamed Ahmad, is tasked to root out corruption and to recover vast bank loans from big defaulters. But the fact that the Army is not being subjected to such scrutiny belies the credibility of the organisation.

Musharraf lacks Ayub's charisma, Zia's political guile, and the ruthlessness to steer Pakistan through its political and economic morass. Musharraf's rule is de facto a military junta rule, where the affairs of the state are being handled collectively with his corps commanders. Yet, when in an interview to Turkish TV, Musharraf said that he was a great admirer of Mustafa Kemal, his statement was interpreted by the international media as an enunciation of his philosophy of ruling Pakistan, with reforms, liberalisation and democracy. Possibly, these isolated remarks were to project himself to the West as a liberal and a modernist. But within Pakistan he created a major controversy. He was given a serious rejoinder by Amir Qazi Hussein of the *Jamat-i-Islami* that the people of Pakistan would never accept the Turkish model of rule.

Conservative Muslims identify "Kemalism" with westernisation which they regard as immoral, materialistic and anti-Islam. Ataturk is also accused by clerics for terminating the concept of the Caliphate in 1932. They regard the Caliphate as indispensable for the unity of the Muslim World under a lead nation. Its traditions go back to the 7th Century starting with the Umayyad Caliphate and its capital at Damascus, and later the Abbassi Caliphate based in Baghdad. Ottoman Turks ruled the Caliphate from the 15th Century till it was terminated by Ataturk in the name of modernisation. In present times, Iran assumed the leadership of the *Umma* under Ayatulla Khomeini. But Iran being a Shia state, the Muslim Sunni majority looked up to Saudi Arabia for leadership of the *Umma* since it wielded great leverage in the world with its oil-wealth.

Pakistani Muslim fundamentalists have grandiose designs and dreams of establishing the new Caliphate of the *Umma* in South Asia, stretching from Kashmir, Islamabad, Kabul, Kyrgyzstan to Chechnya. Islamic resurgence in this part of the world has been kindled by the victory of *jihad* over a superpower and by

possession of the 'Islamic' nuclear bomb by Pakistan. Whether Musharraf himself aspires for the Pan-Islamic vision is not clear. But undoubtedly parts of the Pakistani military hierarchy subscribe to the pan-Islamic concept with Pakistan as the vortex.

Pakistan is at the crossroads of history, and whether Musharraf would steer the country towards 'modernisation' or 'Talibanisation' is still not evident. It is a difficult path, strewn with hurdles set by Islamic fundamentalists within the military hierarchy and the *Ulema*.

Conclusion

In Pakistan, military dictators come and go at regular intervals, with the blessings of forces termed the three 'A's — Allah, Army and America. Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq established military regimes when Pakistan was enjoying the best of relations with the US. Ayub and Yahya also managed opportune and timely exits, and melted into the elite without vilification and prosecution, indeed with US patronage. Zia met his fatal destiny, perhaps at the hands of Allah.

General Musharraf's military intervention comes at a time when US-Pakistan relations are at an all-time low. The present military regime needs US backing desperately, not so much for military reasons but to bail out Pakistan from an economic collapse. Pakistan has been salvaged for the time being by IMF (International Monetary Fund) loans at the behest of the US. But if Musharraf does not break the Pak-Afghan militant nexus, Pakistan would fall into disfavour with the US.

Pakistan lost its strategic value in the post-Cold War review of US foreign policy. Its geo-strategic status devalued further with the Talibanisation of Afghanistan, ironically with the help and abetment of the Pakistani military establishment. Though Pakistan enjoys friendly relations with Afghanistan, it has lost its leverage and hold on the Taliban regime. This has upset US plans to access the oil-rich Central Asian Republics through Pakistan. US oil companies now consider the alternate routes through Russia, Turkey and even Iran more reliable.

In this situation Musharraf has to recreate Pakistan's geo-strategic value to regain American confidence and interest in this

region. In the past US Republican administrations have had the closest of ties with Pakistan as it served them well in its roles in establishing the Sino-US rapprochement and in the Afghan War against the Soviets. US relations with Iran are now thawing and Pakistan could open the US a 'window' to Iran, Musharraf could regain his lost status with the American administration. But with the rise of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan and their nexus with the military establishment, Musharraf's survival may be tied up more with the *Ulema* rather than the US. In the eventuality of Pakistan falling into disfavour with the US, Musharraf will have to turn to China – an old and reliable military ally – and act as the conduit for export of Chinese military hardware, missile and nuclear technology to Iran. A new realignment of forces between China-Pakistan-Iran would be a dangerous development in the region, yet not entirely improbable.

Musharraf's military take-over struck a jarring note in an apparent thawing relations between India and Pakistan during Nawaz Sharif's regime. The Indian Government has reconciled to the new reality, and taken a pragmatic approach by initiating steps towards bringing about peace in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). In reality, if even there is a chance for peace in Jammu and Kashmir, it can only be brought about by a dialogue with the military establishment of Pakistan. But the catch here is that the Pakistan Army's status and power can only survive if the Kashmir problem is kept on the boil. Though Musharraf is making repeated overtures for dialogue with the Indian Prime Minister, it is not clear if he is in absolute command at Pakistan's helm. The real power behind the throne may not yet have been revealed. Thus, Indian caution in starting any dialogue with Musharraf is understandable. If he does not rein-in the militants and cross-border terrorism, it either confirms that he is not in total charge of affairs, or that his peace overtures are not sincere and that he himself harbours the pan-Islamic visions of a Pakistan dominated Caliphate in the region. Thus any dialogue with Musharraf at this stage would be premature; lest we end up talking to the wrong man, at the wrong time and through the wrong people. The move to encourage the *Hurriyat* to indulge in talks with militant groups in Pakistan would only muddy the dirty waters. Once the *Hurriyat* is conferred an unofficial ambassadorial status to represent the people

of Jammu and Kashmir, they will never get off the high horse. Hurriyat's credibility and leverage to tone down the militant's belligerency in Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be established.

India has taken a major step in declaring a unilateral non-initiation of operations against the militants. It has indeed gained India some credits in the international media. But it is meaningless if the militants do not respond to our move. A "bunkered" down Security Force, in a reactive tactical mode, will only result in apathy and lowering of the morale of our troops, besides exposing the minority groups in Jammu and Kashmir as easy prey to the militants. It gives the militants time and freedom to increase their contacts with the local population, to consolidate their urban bases, stockpile their caches and to spread their intelligence network.

The Indian initiative should have been confined to the LoC, as Pakistan did. Time will tell if we have gained any peace dividend by this move in the hinterland. If in the coming summer, militancy erupts in a big way in the state with the terrorists having used the gifted 'lull' for regrouping, consolidation and reinforcements through indigenous recruitment, then the heightened insurgency would come about.

The US will remain an important factor in the New World Order. A lot will depend on how the Bush administration perceives its role in South Asia; whether they seek co-operation in the region on the basis of "military" or "market" alliances. We had made the necessary impact on the Clinton administration regarding our positive role in globalisation. It is more important that we continue the good work in affirming our economic status to engage the new US administration, to shift its focus in this region to economic issues unlike in the past. The military establishment in Pakistan can wait, as no meaningful peace dividends are likely to accrue in the present environment. Those who talk of reconciliation with Pakistan through people-to-people contacts are off the mark, and are disregarding the ISI factor and the Pakistani military establishment's guiles, as in the past. Musharraf is indulging in double speak when he talks of peace, and abets *Lashkar-e-Toiba* attacks on Indian Security Forces and on innocent civilians. Professor Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the political head of *Lashkar-e-Toiba* maintains a fiery tirade from his headquarters in Muridke, near Islamabad, while the *Lashkar*

continue their vicious and brutal attacks on innocent civilians. Yet, Musharraf has refrained from condemnation, regret or any attempt to curtail the Lashkar's operations.

Musharraf has completed one year of military rule, which has been enigmatic, to say the least. The military take-over of 1999 was welcomed by the people, who had set high hopes on the Pakistan Army in alleviating their misery, inflicted by a decade of civil misrule leading to political and economic chaos. But the miracle has not come about, and the public is dismayed, disappointed and somewhat frustrated at the Army's inability to effect a turn around. The Pakistan economy still 'teeters' with a 32 billion dollars deficit, devalued rupee, and an all-time high rate of inflation. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has made little headway in recovering vast amounts from major loan defaulters. There is also resentment against the NAB for having omitted the military hierarchy from scrutiny. The political system in the country has not started functioning, as most senior political leaders are in the NAB's dragnet. Thus Musharraf's slogan of 'People's Power' through devolution plans at lower levels are farcical, when he has not allowed leadership to come up at the grass-roots level. The law and order situation in the country has not improved. Ethnic and sectarian violence continues, with the growing 'Kalashnikov' culture especially in Quetta and Peshawar, where *madrassas* of the fundamentalists have proliferated. Musharraf has been extremely circumspect in dealing with right wing fundamentalists, especially the *Jamat-i-Islami*. His earlier promises of curbing internal militancy, modifying blasphemy laws, protection of minorities and women's rights, have all fallen by the way side.

Musharraf is aware of his waning popularity at home, and wants to cover up his failures in domestic policies through gains in foreign affairs; this explains his Kashmir-obsessive approach. Musharraf is likely to raise the ante in Kashmir with escalation in the proxy war, while his rhetoric on peace overtures continues. The emerging military rule in Pakistan is all too familiar in our experience with earlier military regimes. Musharraf is another 'General in the Labyrinth' who finds it difficult to come out through the normal exit.

Making Peace with India : Pakistan's Internal Imperatives

PROF SATISH KUMAR

India and Pakistan have been involved in a low-intensity conflict in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) since 1989. This conflict was raised to the level of a full-fledged war, even though of short duration, in Kargil from May to July 1999. Since then, the low-intensity conflict has continued. On 19 November 2000, India announced the cessation of combat operations against the militants in J&K. This initiative has since been extended thrice, the first two times for a month each, and the third time, on 22 February 2001, for a period of three months, valid upto 26 May 2001.

Grave reservations have been expressed by responsible sections of society in both India and Pakistan about the utility of this Indian move. In India, it has been criticised for not resulting in stoppage of acts of terrorism and violence by Pakistan-based militant organisations, even though it did lead to de-escalation on the Line of Control (LoC). The targets of *jihadi* terrorism, like the Red Fort in Delhi, were so carefully chosen that they were bound to arouse anger and revulsion in the Indian mind.

In Pakistan, the *jihadi* elements have been opposed to the Indian decision not to initiate counter-insurgency operations, because it is quite contrary to their approach to Indo-Pakistan relations. Other elements have been critical of the move on the ground that it has not been accompanied by either a tripartite dialogue or a dialogue simultaneously with the Pakistani Government and the militants. Yet another ground for criticism has been the Indian reluctance to allow all members of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) Executive Committee to visit Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan, however, did respond positively by

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first announcing that it would observe "maximum restraint" on the LoC, and then withdrawing some troops from the LoC. Since January-end 2001, there has been no further response from Pakistan except to say that India should agree for talks without putting any further conditions. There is also a feeling among certain sections in both countries that the two governments are playing a game to please the United States, while in actual fact there is no improvement in ground realities to warrant any hope of long-term gains.

The Pakistani Mind

The social and political structures of Pakistan, to the extent they affect decision-making on security issues, have undergone such critical changes in the last twenty years that it is not possible to anticipate Pakistani behaviour on the basis of traditional parameters. I will first try to capture the most recent trends in Pakistani thinking on Indo-Pakistan issues on the basis of my interactions with eminent persons from diverse backgrounds, while participating in the 20th Round of the India-Pakistan Neemrana Dialogue. I will then examine the possible impact on Indo-Pakistan relations of two dominant internal variables in Pakistan: the Army and the Islamic Militants, or Jihadis.

The Kashmir issue occupies the foremost place in the Pakistani mind. The suggestion that other issues could be taken up simultaneously for discussion had no takers, and was therefore not worth mentioning. The nuclear issue was put out of the realm of controversy on the basis that both sides recognised that their nuclear capability could not be reversed and that both needed to resort to more nuclear CBMs (Confidence-Building Measures) through negotiations. The different attitudes of the two countries on the No-First-Use principle were well recognised and understood.

There is a widespread feeling in Pakistan that India should not place any more pre-conditions for holding talks. It was repeatedly asserted that Pakistan has responded positively to India's initiative in Jammu and Kashmir – offered "maximum restraint" and pulled out some troops from the LoC – and that it was now for India to take the next step. Any step that India takes in the direction of holding talks will send the right signals, strengthen the forces of

peace, and make it easier for the authorities to deal with anti-peace elements.

The argument that Pakistan must first control the terrorists got subsumed under an expression of Pakistani helplessness or inability to exercise full control over them. The opinion on the role of jihadis was divided. There is certainly a strong section of well-placed Pakistanis who believe that, Pakistan being a religion-based state, the jihadis cannot be denied their role. But there is an equally strong section of well-educated and responsible Pakistanis who believe that jihadis are playing havoc with not only Pakistan's external image and foreign relations but also internal stability. They point out that Pakistan is certainly trying to rein them in but it will take time.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Abdus Sattar, in a pre-lunch session with the Indian delegation, made a few interesting observations. While dwelling on the Kashmir question and reiterating that India should take the next step in opening a dialogue with Pakistan, he slipped in a comment which did not go unnoticed. He said that Pakistan had not referred to the UN resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir for quite some time. When questioned within Pakistan on the reasons for this, he said his reply was that Pakistan right now would like to address the primary concerns of the Kashmiri people at present. He further stated that, "The Kashmiris represented by APHC tell us that questions like accession and independence are not uppermost in their minds at present. It is the 'oppression' which concerns them most." The fact that the Pakistani Foreign Office statement of 22 February 2001 denouncing India's extension of ceasefire by three months also said that India should enter into a dialogue with Pakistan "in accordance with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions" simply means that there is an internal struggle within the Pakistani establishment on whether to go forward with India or remain stuck in the past.

The Foreign Minister also said that he did not agree with those (in Pakistan) who say that even if the Kashmir question is resolved, the conflict with India will continue. The Minister offered this clarification on his own, although the context was provided by the objections raised by many Indians as to why Pakistanis in

authoritative positions, like the Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf and the then Information Minister, Mr. Javed Jabbar, made such intimidating statements.

The Army's Quest for a Permanent Role

The Pakistan Army, represented by the Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf, did not reject India's Kashmir initiative but responded to it positively, even if in a limited measure. And yet, it has not been able to put sufficient pressure on the Islamic militants to prevent them from waging terrorist attacks in India and thereby paving the way for India to start a dialogue with Pakistan. How does one interpret the Army's intentions?

At the outset, it must be admitted that when the Army says that it does not have full control over the activities of *jihadi* terrorists, there is an element of truth in it. This question can be examined in somewhat greater detail later. It is important at this stage to understand the rationale of the Army's behaviour in the perspective of Pakistan's history.

It has to be stated without reservation that the Pakistan Army has tasted power, with its concomitant economic benefits, since 1958. It allowed the government to be formed on the basis of general elections held in Pakistan after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq on the condition that it would share power from the back seat. This phenomenon of the so-called 'Troika' continued until Nawaz Sharif, on the strength of his newly gained two-thirds majority, repealed the 8th Amendment on 1 April 1997. Consequently, the Army which was exercising the power of dismissal of elected governments through the President was deprived of this privilege. Pakistan's nuclear tests of May 1998 further led the Army to believe that in a state of nuclear deterrence the role of conventional war, and therefore of the Army, would be reduced.

The rethinking process that began in the higher ranks of the Army as to how to enhance and re-establish their control on the power structure of the country led General Jehangir Karamat, the then Army Chief, to make the famous speech in October 1998 suggesting the establishment of a National Security Council. This mechanism was intended to provide a permanent role for the Army in all vital decision-making.

The dismissal of Jehangir Karamat by Nawaz Sharif and the appointment of Pervez Musharraf as the Army Chief did not make a difference to the thinking of the Army. The Kargil operation was planned primarily as a way of demonstrating the primacy of the Army in the country's power structure. With its limited understanding of international politics, the Army did not like Nawaz Sharif's act of "betrayal" when he ordered the withdrawal of troops on the basis of his talks with President Clinton on 4-5 July 1999.

The power struggle within Pakistan was played out to the advantage of the Army with the coup on 12 October 1999. The Army since then has learnt its lessons. It chose not to sentence Nawaz Sharif to death but to make a deal with him. The exile of Nawaz Sharif to Saudi Arabia in December 2000 was a pact of co-existence between the Army and the political class. The facility extended to Nawaz Sharif might soon be extended to Asif Zardari too. The judiciary is already a participant in this political game, in which the Army is being accepted as a necessary evil.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan has already permitted the government to make such changes in the political system that do not affect the basic structure of the constitution, meaning the parliamentary and federal features and the judiciary's independence. It has been known in Pakistan for some time, and the Chief Executive specifically said so on 22 February 2001, that a National Security Council would be established soon. It is also widely speculated in Pakistan that before the elections are held and the provincial and national assemblies restored, the Chief Executive, under his "limited" legislative powers, will bring into effect the Eighth Amendment again giving to the President the power to dismiss elected governments.

It does not require any exceptional wisdom to infer from these developments that the Army would like to get firmly established in power on a durable basis before it allows an eruption of peace with India. Peace with India directly affects the fortunes of the Army. While it understands the logic of peace, in terms of the country's economy, external image, and internal stability, peace cannot supersede the interests of the Army as a class. Therefore, any meaningful dialogue with India on the Kashmir question will take place under the strict supervision of the Army, and only after it is firmly saddled in power on a durable basis.

The Jihadis as a new Interest Group

The jihadis have emerged as a new interest group in Pakistani politics. This is not the place to go into their origins and evolution, which is well understood by now. There is no doubt that Islamic ideologues and extremists have infiltrated the Army, the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), and the mainstream political parties to a considerable extent. Their exact numbers and influence are not yet easy to assess. But their ultimate goals are not difficult to discern. For the *jihadi* terrorists of Pakistan, Kashmir is only one of the targets. Although Chechnya, Dagestan, etc. are some other targets, most others are still undefined. Perhaps they themselves do not know. What they do seem to know for certain is that their ultimate aim is to capture power in the world, and that they must begin with Pakistan.

Any student of Pakistani history will acknowledge that capture of power in Pakistan has rarely taken place through constitutional means. Nor is it likely to be so in the foreseeable future. It is futile to argue that the Islamist parties in Pakistan have always had a poor showing in the elections. In the last twenty years, the Islamist parties, groups, and organisations have acquired enough potential to enable them not only to mobilise the masses but also to utilise their well-armed and trained cadres to achieve desired results within the country and abroad.

It was not without reason that Pakistan's Interior Minister, Lt Gen Moinuddin Haider (Retd), buckled under the combined onslaught of militant outfits. Having earlier announced his government's resolve to put an end to fund-raising in the name of *jihad* and the public display of weapons, he was forced to say in a meeting with the top brass of Pakistan's leading religious and militant outfits in Islamabad on 23 February 2001 that the government considered Kashmir an 'unfinished agenda' and would not backtrack on the issue. He further added, "We respect *jihadi* outfits and we never called for giving up *jihad* in Kashmir. We do say that what is going on in Kashmir is indigenous *jihad* and not terrorism." There are many other instances of the military regime having bowed to the pressure of Islamists in the last sixteen months.

It has to be noted that apart from random and unsuccessful efforts of the military regime to rein in the jihadis, there has been no organised protest against them by the civil society. There is no doubt that the military regime is conscious of the need to control the jihadis, partly under international pressure and the fear of being branded as the breeding ground of terrorism and denied economic aid, and partly because of threats to internal stability caused by sectarian riots. But whether the government will succeed in controlling them and whether everybody in the government wants them to be controlled is doubtful.

Conclusion

The best option for India, therefore, would be to weaken the basis of *jihadi* interference in Jammu and Kashmir by resolving the problem first within India through peaceful means. To this end, the central government needs to initiate two parallel processes :—

- (a) Developing a consensus among mainstream political parties with regard to available and acceptable solutions.
- (b) Initiating talks with a representative group of Kashmiris (of J&K), elected and non-elected, to explore the limits within which, and the lines along which, their grievances can be met.

As regards Pakistan, it is important to keep in mind that the Army is a reality which cannot be wished away. There is no point in hoping that Pakistan would produce a political system of the kind that prevails in India. There were times when it made sense for India to make common cause with democratic forces in Pakistan against the authoritarianism of the Army. Now, it is time to make common cause with the Army against the fundamentalism and terrorism of the *jihadi* organisations. Jihadis are a long-term and pernicious threat not only to India and Pakistan but to the whole region around South Asia. It is important for India to give a helping hand to the Pakistan Army by starting a dialogue with Pervez Musharraf, even if exploratory and on the margins of the forthcoming SAARC summit.

India-Pakistan Reconciliation (Part-II)

LT GEN M L CHIBBER, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

During most of the seminars, the main focus, comments and questions were on the Siachen Glacier and the Kashmir Problem, which was referred to as the core issue.

Siachen Glacier

Since the hidden *truth* about Siachen Glacier has been revealed in General Jahan Dad's Book *Pakistan Leadership Challenge* (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999), it was easy for me to *plead guilty for having preempted its occupation by Pakistan*. The problem started in 1978 when Indians learnt from mountaineering circles that after opening the Karakoram for mountaineering, some foreign expeditions were being sent to the Siachen Glacier which was an undemarcated area. The High Altitude Warfare School was asked to send a reconnaissance patrol to ascertain the truth. It brought back evidence of Japanese expeditions having visited the area. So, yearly summer patrolling of the Glacier started to ensure that expeditions did not come to this area.

The problem was precipitated on 21 August 1983 when the Northern sub-sector commander of Pakistan sent a protest note in writing to his counterpart at Kargil. The note had two main components:

- (a) The Line of Control mutually agreed and demarcated after the 1971 War forms a part of the Simla agreement and terminates at NJ 9842. This line was unilaterally extended to North East to Karakoram Pass; and
- (b) It was claimed that all territory West of this unilaterally extended line (the Siachen Glacier) belonged to Pakistan.

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This protest note was sent to Delhi. It was also learnt that an attempt had been made to occupy the Bila Fondla Pass in August/September 1983. So the Northern Command was ordered to prevent the occupation of Siachen Glacier. The following extracts were read to the participants from General Jahan Dad's book who, as the 10 Corps Commander, had planned the operation from the Pakistan side :

"SSG Company started its mission in early August and reached Bila Fondla last week of August... the company was ordered to withdraw in the first week of September as it had started snowing and did not have the equipment for survival in winter.


A meeting was held in December 1983, in the GHQ Operation Room under Chairmanship of President General Zia ul Haq... General Pir Dad Khan (Commander of the Northern Area) was given the task of pre-empting occupation of passes, reaching there not before May 1984... I handed over command of 10 Corps to Lieut General Zahi Ali Akbar Khan on 31 March after completing my tenure of four years. I gave him detailed briefing about this operational plan".

On the Indian side we had fixed our D-day for 13 April and pre-empted the Pakistani occupation. The Pakistan Army reacted vigorously and with great skill within about a week. This is the whole *truth*.

A question was raised in some seminars whether Indian occupation of Siachen was not a violation of the spirit of the Simla agreement. The following is the clause in the Simla agreement dealing with Kashmir.

"In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from cease-fire on 17 December 1971 shall be respected from both sides *without prejudice to the recognised position of either side*. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both the sides undertake to refrain from threat or use of force in violation of this line".

Jammu & Kashmir

JAMMU & KASHMIR

"Around 3.6 million Kashmiris of the valley are holding 1,130 million Indians and Pakistanis as hostage"

An aware Pakistani Citizen

If there was any violation of the Simla agreement, it was the unilateral extension of the Line of Control beyond the mutually agreed terminal point and then the plan to occupy the claimed area. Incidentally, the words in italics in the above clause were added at the last minute after Mr Bhutto gave a verbal assurance that he would convert the line into a border between the two countries by integrating the Pakistan held area into Pakistan; he pleaded that he needed these words to tighten his hold on the Army. I also explained that the solution to settle the Siachen problem was quite simple. Having been directly involved as the Deputy Director of Military Operations in finalising the Line of Control, I knew how far more complex problems were resolved by General Bhagat of India and General Hamid of Pakistan who were responsible for deciding and demarcating the Line of Control. Unfortunately, the Siachen problem got complicated when Benazir Bhutto started beating General Ziaul Haq with the Siachen stick. It froze after Indira Gandhi was assassinated.

Kashmir Problem

There is virtually a psychosis in Pakistan about what the common man calls 'Kashmir Ka Masla' (the Kashmir problem). The vast majority, barring the ruling elite, would like this problem to be somehow taken out of their hair. The ruling elite in Pakistan, barring a few realists, do not want to bother about the truth related to this problem. The starting point for them can be summed up thus: 'now that the Muslims of Kashmir are alienated from India, they must be allowed to join Pakistan, whatever the modalities'. The extreme view in this tenor was expressed by a well-known barrister at Islamabad thus, "*Time has come for India to gracefully withdraw from Kashmir or face fragmentation of the country*". A more sophisticated version of this was that "almost completely Muslim Kashmir valley and Muslim majority districts of Doda and Kargil should be given to Pakistan and India can keep the rest". There was also one emotional outburst by an Urdu-speaking Pakistani retired diplomat who lambasted India for its perfidy, supported by a string of facts and figures. Having worked for the cause of reconciliation for 15 years, we are used to such outbursts from Indian as well as Pakistani emotional hawks. These, in fact, make

our effort to put across our long association with Jammu and Kashmir, understanding their hearts and mind and to focus the Indian and Pakistani attention on a few basic worthwhile truths about this problem. *Truth, at times, hurts but is also a great healer.*

Truth about Accession of Jammu and Kashmir

To understand the current situation, it is important to focus on a few truths about how this problem started. If we remove all the verbal acrobatics, the heart of the problem lay in the interpretation of the Independence Act and *insistence by Pakistan that the right to decide the future of the 625 princely states of India was the sole prerogative of the ruler of each State.*

In order to force the accession of Jammu and Kashmir, a two-phase plan was evolved in September 1947 by Colonel Akbar, DSO under the patronage of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali. Phase One was the issue of 4,000 rifles to ex-servicemen in the Poonch area for an uprising, and Phase Two was the tribal invasion (codename Gulmarg) to annex the state. The Qaid-e-Azam was not informed about this plan till it was very late. Colonel Akbar, under the name of General Tariq, later commanded the crucial Uri sector.

To understand the *truth* about how the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir was literally forced by the invasion to accede to India, the book that every Indian and Pakistani opinion- and policy-maker must read is *Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case* by Zaheer Hassan (Oxford University Press, 1998). The invasion almost succeeds in capturing Srinagar. It was significant for the cause of the *truth* that a young girl stood up in a seminar at Islamabad and asked a question, "My father was commanding the leading Pathan Lashkar. He was only three miles from the Srinagar airfield when the Indian aeroplanes started to land there on the morning of 27 October 1947. Don't you think that the Kashmir problem became a victim of the global environment" (meaning the Cold War). She was right. Relevant to this truth was the assertion of my platoon commander at the IMA, Colonel SGS Mehdi. We met in 1996 in the office of Mr Niazi the editor of *Jang*, London. With passion and some anger, he asserted that "the concept of the tribal raid was not the criminal

folly. It was the way it was implemented that was the criminal folly". Reading Zaheer's book based on the primary documents of the trial of Maj Gen Akbar Khan (General Tariq of the tribal raid) and others will enable people to appreciate his conclusion. The failure to annex Kashmir between 22 and 28 October 1947 "*provided as all military defeats do, the setting and plausibility of the stab-in-back theories, myths and conspiracy*". Another, very graphic, description and view about the failed invasion titled "The war of lost opportunities (Part 1)" by Washington DC based Major Agha Humayan Amin is published in the April 2000 issue of the *Defence Journal* of Pakistan. It helps people to understand how the Kashmir problem started. The next major landmark in the Kashmir problem is the 1965 War.

Operation Gibraltar and Grand Slam

Very few people in Pakistan are aware of the details of these two operations in 1965 which escalated into all-out war. The popular view is that the 1965 War started on 06 September 1965 with Indian aggression. Mr Bhutto, with his Kashmir study group, had planned these two operations. General Musa, the Army Chief, objected to these plans on two counts. One, that the intelligence agencies had not yet prepared a reliable network of people in Kashmir who would ensure a popular uprising in Kashmir. Two, that these operations were likely to escalate into an all-out war for which Pakistan was not prepared. Similarly, Colonel SGS Mehdi, commanding the SSG force in Jammu and Kashmir, warned the people concerned in writing that Operation Gibraltar would end in a fiasco. Despite these objections and warning, Operation Gibraltar (Gibraltar is the European version of the Arabic name in memory of General Tariq who captured Southern Spain) was launched in early August 1965. Musa was proved right on both counts. The War ended with the Tashkent Agreement restoring status-quo-ante in Jammu and Kashmir. If people are made aware of the truth about this war, then they would be able to view the policy of permanent confrontation with India (see earlier discussion of this point) with a degree of detachment instead of emotional hurt by depicting the 1965 War as India's aggression.

India's Neglect

The present situation in Jammu and Kashmir is also due to India's neglect. At no stage the problem of Jammu and Kashmir was given quality-time and quality-attention that it deserves. We put across three examples of this during some of the seminars where an opportunity to discuss this aspect arose:

(a) After commanding a Brigade in the Valley in 1968 to 1970, I went to the National Defence College. I was aware of what Pakistan Intelligence services were doing to develop a dependable network of committed associates which was absent in 1965 for Operation Gibraltar (An excited scholar in Islamabad interjected that these steps had actually started in 1963!). Having been in-charge of counter-insurgency studies at the Staff College, I formulated 'Preventing Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir' as the subject for my year-long individual dissertation which is compulsory for every student. The dissertation was marked secret by the Commandant and sent to the people concerned. But it is doubtful if anyone even read it.

(b) This is an example of political skullduggery with which New Delhi handled Jammu and Kashmir, thus creating conditions for full exploitation by the Pakistan intelligence agencies. One afternoon in 1984 my friend, Governor BK Nehru, visited the Army House at Udhampur and shared with me the political developments brewing then. "General I want your honest reaction. People at Delhi want me to be party to their arrangement for toppling Farooq Abdullah (who had won a big majority in 1983 elections). I do not want to do this and wish to tell them to move me out if they insist on doing so. Am I right?" Of course, he was right. He was moved out to Gujarat and the rest is history. It is this type of politics which promoted an utterly corrupt system of governance. Its best example is a bureaucrat who was personal secretary to a minister in 1955. In his spartan living room, there were merely two pencil sketches of Tagore and Karl Marx. When he retired in 1983 he was reliably reported to be the richest man in the Kashmir Valley.

(c) By the time I was to retire in 1985, I was aware of the preparations that were being made by the Pakistan intelligence agencies for sparking an insurgency. All the expertise and tricks for covert operations acquired by the ISI from the CIA and the PLA, like deniability, promotion of alienation, disinformation and propaganda while conducting the American Jihad in Afghanistan, was being cranked in. New Delhi was no doubt being informed by the plethora of Indian intelligence agencies, but I felt it to be my duty to try to persuade them to act wisely. A detailed top secret letter was carefully crafted, illustrated with a map, and included concrete suggestions to arrest and reverse the situation. It was sent to the Prime Minister before I retired. All that happened was two meetings with the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister and then it was business as usual! The insurgency broke out in 1989, soon after the military exercise *Zarb-e-Mommin* organised by General Aslam Beg.

We were repeatedly asked in Pakistan for specific suggestions to solve the Kashmir problem. We avoided doing so. It is our conviction that in any walk of life only those options are workable that are evolved by people who are responsible to implement them. However, in one interaction, we did explain the following two extreme stands that are not likely to work.

(a) The Indian stand on Jammu and Kashmir was reaffirmed in a unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament during the early nineties when Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister. It postulated that the only unfinished business was to persuade Pakistan to vacate 'occupied' Kashmir. This was based on the internationally accepted legal position that the whole state is a part of India. The Kargil conflict has generated widespread support for this stand among the Indian people. Given India's commitment to the Simla agreement (see the text of the clause quoted above), *it is unlikely that Pakistan can be persuaded to pull out of Jammu and Kashmir.*

(b) On the other hand is the Pakistani perception of the current reality in Jammu and Kashmir. When we visit Kashmir and meet the people privately, be it in Baramulla, Sopur,

Kupwara, Srinagar, Anantnag, Kishatwar and Doda, they pour out their hearts as people do to their parents or grand parents. They have suffered immensely and pain is writ large on their faces. If they could have their way they would put both Indian and Pakistani benefactors on the direct flight to hell. This does not mean that there are no highly committed segments for Pakistan and for India. About 30 lakh Muslims out of around 1,300 lakh Muslims in India have been alienated from the state by a combination of factors discussed earlier. *No Government in Delhi can even contemplate that Kashmiris can secede from the multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual and multi-cultural country that is India.*

One outcome of Operation Badr at Kargil has been that the Indian state has woken up to the reality that the Kashmir problem needs time and quality attention. This development is reflected in the government persuading an eminent person in India to come back into the Government. Arun Singh is not a politician but the scion of a royal family and an eminent enterprise leader. He was a personal friend of Rajiv Gandhi who had persuaded him earlier to be the virtual Defence Minister in his government.

Conclusion

We met no hostility from any person in Pakistan. However, obsession with the Kashmir problem was palpable. This obsession will erode if the basic *truths* about India-Pakistan hostility and the Jammu and Kashmir problem are put across to people with patience and perseverance.

The best we could do in Pakistan for the solution of the Kashmir problem was to share with the people there the results of our research relevant to the *irreversible march of mankind towards the unity of man, global economy and eventually earth citizenship.*

The closest parallel to the Kashmir dispute in the rest of the world is Alsace. A small enclave, it has been for centuries contested by France and Germany and has frequently changed hands. A region of predominantly German culture, it once again became a

part of France after World War II. It has taken Western Europe almost 40 years to overcome the hurts and hates promoted by their rulers in what scholars now brand as the *foolish civil wars*. They have converted battlefields into bridges built with bricks of economics. Today they have moved forward and, significantly, the homes of the European Parliament as well as that of the European Human Rights Commission are in Strassburg, the capital of Alsace.

It is our conviction that Kashmir can be similarly converted into a bridge rather than a battle ground in far lesser time than it took Europe to adjust to the emerging reality.

We suggested to the people to let the tempers in India and Pakistan cool down to create a climate conducive to dialogue (not debate). That the two countries should stop speaking to each other through the media. However, in the meantime, India as the bigger country should consider initiating at an appropriate time the following unilateral steps to recreate an environment of trust for moving forward. These are based on our feel of the people's mood in India and Pakistan who would welcome opportunities for interaction in every human activity.

Children as Ambassadors. School children from Pakistan coming and staying for a week with Indian families and institutions, who are willing to offer them local hospitality and show them around to meet their counterparts in India. The Indian Association of the Experiment in International Living under the chairmanship of Justice Bhagwati is already in this programme. This could be enlarged with the help of the India-Pakistan Friendship Society, Rotary Clubs, etc, and the Government. This suggestion of Mrs Chibber, first, put across at Islamabad and Lahore in 1992, received the most enthusiastic response. There was loud clapping from the audiences when she emphasised that "mothers' hearts are full of love and children are pure as diamonds". Numerous individuals like presidents of Rotary clubs, journalists, eminent television anchors like Shahin and Army officers would flock to her to express their appreciation of this step. In India, General Virendera Singh who runs a string of Modern Schools in Delhi has offered his Institution to start the process as a role model for others.

The Media. The English media in Pakistan is remarkably free and outspoken. All hurdles against giving free and unhindered access to Pakistani papers and magazines should be removed. When we mentioned this need to the Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan, he said there was no restriction from the Indian side. Mr Javed Jabbar felt that there were some postal problems. Syed Jawaid Iqbal, the Chief Editor of the magazine *South Asia* explained that a distributor in India was willing to buy 40 thousand copies but the hurdles were too many. He is now sending a limited number to India via a Dubai distributor.

Pakistan Television is a bit different. Based on the sad experience that some of us had in 1992, we were reluctant to participate in any television programme. However, on urging by Javed Jabbar, we recorded a 55-minutes discussion with Lt Gen Lodi in the PTV studio at Karachi on 09 May 2000. However, this has not yet been shown. Perhaps the permanent establishment in Pakistan does not want people to listen to certain *truths*. Indian television channels have a lesson. They must adhere to *truth* because in the long run *truth* prevails.

Invitation to Pre-Independence Military Officers. Our Services should be encouraged to invite officers of this category to reunion and other occasions. There would be resistance to this from some segments of the Pakistan military. For example, an officer confided that on an occasion when invitation was received, a senior warned them that he would break the legs of anyone going to India. Despite this some of them did come to India.

Interaction Between Armies. The reality of Pakistan is that the Army has, directly or indirectly, ruled that country since 1958. This is likely to continue even after the revival of democracy in some form. It can be constructive to encourage interaction between the Armed Forces of the two countries at appropriate levels in a variety of activities. Fear that the Indian Military may be infected with military coup mentality is misplaced. Military coup is impossible in India. If anything, it is the Pakistan Army that will benefit by seeing the role of a professional military in a functional democracy.

Organised Tours. Organised tours to India by tourist agencies should be completely liberalised. Also facilitate grass root contact. Villagers who migrated to Pakistan from Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat should be permitted to visit their old villages.

Trade. There is a large trade between the two countries via Dubai etc. Initiative should be taken to bypass wooden bureaucracies in the two countries by letting entrepreneurs of proven integrity in India and Pakistan evolve a plan to increase trade that will benefit both countries. The two names that evoked much respect were Mr Babbar Ali in Pakistan, formerly a Minister for Industry and Trade in the interim government, and Rahul Bajaj a well-known and respected industrialist in India. The initiative in this field must pass into the hands of people who generate wealth instead of control by the parasites who consume it.

India and Pakistan are on a fateful crossroad. Seizing this as an opportunity for reconciliation can put both countries on a speedy course for development and economic growth. They must stop poisoning themselves with the past and raise their vision to the great future that awaits this region. This momentous opportunity in history must not be missed.

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Siachen After Kargil (PART-II)

LT GEN M THOMAS, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

Efforts to Resolve the Issue Through Bilateral Talks

The first round of talks were held at Rawalpindi, in Pakistan, between Indian and Pakistani Foreign and Defence Secretaries on 10-12 January 1986, almost 21 months after the outbreak of hostilities. The Pakistan Foreign Secretary claimed that India's induction of forces on to the Glacier was in clear violation of the Simla Agreement, which states *inter alia* that "In Jammu and Kashmir the LoC resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides shall further undertake to refrain from threat or the use of force in violation of this line." The Indian Foreign Secretary's counter argument was that Pakistan had attempted to unilaterally extend the LoC in a manner clearly advantageous to it. Nothing concrete emerged from the talks.

The second round of talks were held at New Delhi in June 1986 again without progress. Later that year, General Sundarji's brainchild "Operation Brasstacks", a massive Indian military exercise conducted close to the India-Pakistan border, to formulate Mechanised Warfare and Land-Air Warfare concepts, took both nations to the verge of war. Pakistan's massive counter-exercise "Zarb-e-Momin" to formulate offensive defence concepts, held a few months later, further deepened the existing suspicions.

The third round of talks was held at Rawalpindi in 1988. This was a period of struggle for power between the incumbent Zia-ul-Haq and the opposition leader Benazir Bhutto, who had been allowed to return from exile. The latter used the Siachen take-over by India

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as an issue to castigate Zia for having effectively lost territory which Pakistan claimed as its own. Any concessions on the Siachen dispute would have meant "loss of face" for the Zia regime, and hence no progress resulted. President Zia's untimely death in August 1988 in a C-130 Hercules aircraft crash hampered the fourth round of talks held in September 1988.

From 15 to 17 June 1989, a fifth round of talks took place at Rawalpindi. The talks were unsuccessful and high lighted the differing Indian and Pakistani views on the Siachen Glacier dispute. It was here that India outlined six proposals for resolving the dispute, which remain in effect to this day. These were:

- (a) A cessation of "cartographic aggression" by Pakistan. This referred to Pakistan's unilateral efforts to extend the LoC at its agreed terminus at point N J 9842 to the Karakoram Pass of the border with China.
- (b) Establishment of a demilitarised zone in the Siachen Glacier.
- (c) The exchange between India and Pakistan of authenticated maps showing present military dispositions on the ground.
- (d) Delimitation by India and Pakistan of a Line from point N J 9842 northwards to the border with China based on "ground realities" (AGPL).
- (e) Formulation of ground rules to govern future military operations in the area.
- (f) Redeployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions.

Pakistan's response was uncompromising :-

- (a) Deployment of Indian and Pakistani forces to mutually agreed positions, held at the time the ceasefire came into effect in 1971... and only then...

(b) Delimitation of an extension of the LoC beyond point N J 9842.

Following the inconclusive fifth round of talks, relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated rapidly as a result of the escalation of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. In 1991, at the height of this period of separatist insurgency, India and Pakistan came to the brink of war, this time with the added drama (mostly dreamt up by US Intelligence Agencies) of a possible nuclear exchange. Thus the Siachen Glacier dispute, which given the right ambience could have been resolved, became submerged in the deep and muddled waters of Kashmir's future.

A sixth round of talks were held at New Delhi from 4 to 6 November 1992. The two central issues that came up for discussion were the "mutual acceptance of an agreed LoC in the undemarcated glacier area", and "disengagement and redeployment" of forces on both sides. India wants an LoC demarcated prior to the redeployment of forces, while Pakistan wants redeployment first and demarcation subsequently.

The Indian stand regarding the LoC is that it should extend along a line, based on the time-honoured principle of alignment of international boundaries along the watershed. This line, India maintains, runs along the Saltoro ridge-line connecting point N J 9842 with the Sia La, Sherpa Kangri and on to K2, thus merging with the international boundary agreed in the 1963 Sino-Pak Border Agreement. This suits India as it also represents the present AGPL. Such an LoC is not accepted by Pakistan and unless accepted, India maintains, there will be no withdrawal of its troops from the glacier.

The seventh round of talks was held between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan (J N Dixit and Shahryar Khan) at Islamabad from 1 to 3 January 1994. Nothing meaningful was achieved at these talks, with both sides reiterating that there were differences on key issues over both the Kashmir issue and Siachen dispute and would continue the dialogue to find acceptable solutions. At the close of these talks the Indian Foreign Secretary indicated

that India would send Pakistan details of its position (non-papers in diplomatic parlance) on six 'specific and specialised irritants'¹⁵ including the Siachen Glacier dispute, which stood in the path of a negotiated peace and friendship between the two nations. Dixit also stated that the Indian position on Siachen would be based on the sixth round of talks. The Indian stance did not augur well for resolution of the dispute at the eighth round of talks, scheduled for April 1994. India and Pakistan ended their bilateral dialogue in 1994. Due to tensions aroused between the two nations over the Kashmir crisis, the next round of Foreign Secretary level talks was held after a gap of three years, during the month of March, June and September 1997. Despite the euphoria of the celebrations of 50 years of Independence by both countries from the colonial yoke and both countries' leaders making professions of peaceful future relations, these talks too were adjourned with no significant progress made.

From the above, one concludes that any solution that may possibly be attained on the Siachen Glacier dispute will at best be at the level of small compromises, such as a ceasefire when talks on Kashmir's future are taking place between India, Kashmir (State Government) and Militant Groups such as the Hizbul-Mujahideen or the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC). A permanent settlement of the Siachen dispute hinges on an overall settlement of the Kashmir issue and cannot in the foreseeable future be dealt with in isolation.

Is there light at the end of the Tunnel?

India and Pakistan continue with efforts to resolve the Siachen Glacier dispute and the Kashmir issue bilaterally. India insists on adhering to the 1972 Simla Agreement in its dealings with Pakistan, especially over Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan, on the other hand, airs these matters in international fora such as the UN and OIC suggesting third party mediation. Whether India should continue with its bilateral approach which has not produced the desired results or attempt to negotiate a solution with third party involvement, under

¹⁵ The six 'irritants' are the Siachen Glacier Dispute; NPT Issue; Disarmament of conventional weapons; Sir Creek Maritime Boundary issue; Stabilisation of LoC; and Impediments to steps for greater economic co-operation.

the auspices of the UN for example, is a matter that should be examined by the Indian political leadership with an open mind. That multilateral mediation will set a precedent for other Indian peripheral states to attempt breaking away from the union through armed militancy¹⁶ and then demanding multilateral mediation does not appear a plausible reason to prevent the inclusion of a 'facilitator' to help solve the Siachen Glacier dispute and the Kashmir issue.

The war on the Glacier has continued for 15 years. That it has not escalated from small scale infantry-artillery duels on the highest battlefield in the world to a general war between India and Pakistan is an indication of the restraint shown, despite high costs and major casualty levels sustained by both antagonists.

Both India and Pakistan are now, after the May 1998 nuclear tests, unambiguously in possession of nuclear weapons. As late as 14 August 2000, Pakistan's President, in his Independence Day message to the people, spoke of South Asia being a nuclear flashpoint, re-emphasising the US view. This was followed the next day by India's Prime Minister, who, in his Independence Day message to the Indian people, warned Pakistan against indulging in any misadventures in Jammu and Kashmir, reiterating that Kashmir would always remain an integral part of India. The mood of the new century, he observed, was decidedly against tinkering with a country's map by either triggering religious passions or brute violence. Holding Pakistan responsible for the ruptured peace process and resurgence of hostilities, the Prime Minister remarked, "The world knows who has sabotaged the peace process". Significantly the Prime Minister kept alive the prospects of negotiations while blaming Pakistan for the disruption in peace efforts and warning it against the consequences of its proxy war. Under such an ambience bilateral discussions seem doomed.

The Pakistani intrusion of May-August 1999 across the LoC in the Kargil Sector has further complicated the Siachen dispute and the whole of the Kashmir issue. Indian restraint in not crossing the

¹⁶ Nagaland and Mizoram are examples of uprisings where internal talks with Militant Groups and their leaders achieved the Central Government's aim of bringing these states into the Indian mainstream through greater devolution of power and economic independence.

LoC in the Kargil Sector to interdict the intruders' supply routes and prevent reinforcements and the use of the IAF only against well-entrenched positions held by the intruders and their supply bases on the Indian side of the LoC, prevented the conflagration from escalating to all-out war between India and Pakistan, which could have, in the ultimate analysis, should Pakistan have been facing a major military defeat, triggered the use of what she considers to be her ultimate trump card, a nuclear response to India's conventional superiority.

A further factor that impinges on a negotiated settlement of the Siachen dispute and the Kashmir issue has been highlighted in a report in *The Washington Times* which speaks of some 1.75 million young men undergoing training in *madrassas* in Pakistan for waging a *Jihad* (holy war) in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of the world. The scale of death and destruction in Jammu and Kashmir, if these fanatical *Mujahideen* are infiltrated into the state, will be horrendous. The goal appears to be to spread terror in Jammu and Kashmir and across the world, the ultimate target being the USA. Pakistan under Musharaff is slowly being identified as the centre of a complex web of terror, religious extremism and the narcotics trade. Ironically, Pakistan seems completely unconcerned about the fallout of its deadly preoccupations, which can only lead to eventual destruction.

In the third week of July 2000, a glimmer of light flickered at the end of the tunnel, with regard to negotiations. The Hizbul Mujahideen leader in Jammu and Kashmir, Adbul Majid Dar, had unilaterally declared a ceasefire on 24 July 2000 so that negotiations with the Centre could be facilitated. The Centre accepted the ceasefire sceptically, as any let-up in military operations would only be of advantage to the militant cadres operating in the state. But it honoured the ceasefire. The ceasefire was however called off later by the Hizb's Pakistan-based supreme leader, Syed Salahuddin, who maintained that Pakistan should also be included in such talks. To overcome this snag, particularly as New Delhi refused to hold talks which included Pakistan on what India considered was an internal matter, the Hizb leadership (after taking the Hurriyat Conference into confidence) decided that the talks would be held

at two levels. One of their teams would conduct talks with India and the other with Pakistan. Abdul Majid Dar, having cleared the decks for a resumption of the talks, stated that he was confident that the ceasefire would again come into force. He further maintained that the issue could not be resolved without involving Pakistan in the talks. "Whatever solution comes out of the trilateral talks...will be acceptable to my organisation, irrespective of whether the solution is in favour of India or Pakistan," Dar stated. He further stated that even if the on-going bloodshed continued for ten more years, the parties to the issue would have to come to the negotiating table to resolve the problem. "So it is better to start meaningful and sincere negotiations early, so as to save the people from more blood-bath," he added. Stating that the Hurriyat Conference had the "most important" role to play in this regard, Dar disclosed that a committee was being set up to coordinate between the Hizb and the Hurriyat.¹⁷

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, Director of the USI of India, in an appeal to the COAS Designate (General S Padmanabhan) addressed a series of problems confronting the Army that required the new Chief's immediate attention.¹⁸ "The proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir," he stated, "has crossed the limits of tolerance. Pakistan must be made to pay a price for it. Any overt violation of the LoC or border must be used as an opportunity to hit at the militant bases and training camps inside Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir with whatever weaponry is considered necessary including the Air Force. This may result in escalation to a full-fledged war and we should be prepared for it. If the Pakistan military leadership wants war, let them have it. It would be preferable to fight that war than bleed slowly, as in the present proxy war". Bold words indeed, but is India's Army prepared to fight a short duration, intense, high technology war with Pakistan, over Kashmir? Particularly when the whole of the western world feels that such a war over Kashmir would escalate to a nuclear war, with all its ramifications. Nambiar outlines many steps to be taken in view of this latter scenario, such as a sound command and control system, alternate command structures, protection arrangements, reconsideration of the 'no first

¹⁷. As reported in the *Times of India* (New Delhi), 23 August 2000.

¹⁸. Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, "Make the Army Fighting Fit, Paddy," *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), 20 August 2000.

use' option to 'a first use' option, etc. While the Defence Services prepare for such war scenarios, the politicians and bureaucrats should continue to negotiate with the Hizbul Mujahideen, the Hurriyat Conference and even other major militant groups such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), to forge a solution. Track II and Track III diplomacy should be encouraged and given due weightage in such negotiations. The Militant Groups appear to prefer politicians rather than bureaucrats at the negotiating table. Are Indian politicians capable of hammering out a solution acceptable to all sides (India, Kashmiris and Pakistan). Is the inclusion of a 'facilitator' advantageous towards moving to a solution? These are all questions that need to be addressed.

Now that the Kargil intrusions have opened up a whole new sector of confrontation in an adjacent part of the LoC, would it be possible to find a solution to it in isolation. Kargil and the Siachen are now inextricably tied in a Gordian knot where one's tactical and strategic worth is complementary to the other.

There is every likelihood that during the military regime of General Musharraf further official talks may not take place, at least in the immediate future. What little hopes there were for resumption of talks is mitigated by such statements as the one made recently by the chief of the Pakistan-based Hizbul Mujahideen, Syed Salahuddin, to the effect that no Muslim country except Pakistan has been providing support to Kashmiri separatists: "No one (Muslim country) even sent 11 cartridges, 11 grenades, or 11 ounces of explosive material over the last 11 years." General Musharraf has stated on many an occasion that Pakistan will continue to support its Kashmiri brethren in their quest for *azadi*.

The glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel seems destined to flicker and die, unless men of stature rise to the occasion, move from a rigid to a flexible stand on major irritants that stand in the way of reconciliation, negotiate and hammer out an interim phased plan, on which a just and honourable solution can be based. For too long has the Siachen Glacier dispute and the Kashmir issue bled our economy and our young men have died in the flower of their youth, both in and out of uniform, in senseless militant and anti-

militant operations. In the new year let us all, politicians, bureaucrats, the Military, Kashmiris and the rest of the people of India, resolve to make it possible to find a just and lasting solution to the vexed Kashmir problem. Our negotiating team's motto should be : "The difficult we can do straight away, the impossible takes us a little time."¹⁹

Author's Note

The author has quoted extensively from an article that appeared in *Contemporary South Asia*, Vol. 8, No. 2, (1999), pp.187-209, titled "The Siachen Glacier Dispute : imbroglio on the roof of the world" by Raspal S Khosla; and the articles that appeared in the *HIMAL : The South Asia Magazine*, December 1998, 11/12, titled "Frozen Frontline" by Semina Ahmed and Varun Sahni and "High Stakes" by Harish Kapadia.

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¹⁹ CRE to FM 'Bill' Slip, on the banks of the Irrawady, when the latter told him that he had to ferry the whole of the XIV Army across the river, as the promised air support was not forthcoming from SEAC.

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Aggressive and Optimum Employment of Helicopters

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Introduction

At one time it was believed that the tank with its awesome firepower, virtual invulnerability to all but the heaviest of weapons, and all-terrain capability had revolutionised warfare on the ground. Indeed it had. It did put a new 'spin' on warfighting, making it a fearsome weapons system.

However, all this has changed in the last 80 years or so since the introduction of the aircraft. Since then, yet another dimension has been added to the inventory of the world's arsenals in the form of the helicopter. The helicopter was used only as a means of rescue and casualty evacuation during the Korean War, but really came into its own during the war in Vietnam. It has since then taken pride of place as an all-purpose, all-terrain and virtually all-weather fighting machine. Its use has been exploited to the limits of its flight envelope, and perhaps to the limits of modern technology. It has been used throughout the entire spectrum of its capability and one wonders whether there are any new areas that have as yet been unexplored.

Helicopters in the Indian Air Force

Helicopters have been in service with the Indian Air Force (IAF) for over half a century, and have been used in a variety of roles and missions. Till recently the greater portion of this utilisation has been for peacetime tasks. These have included casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), search and rescue (SAR) of lost and stranded mountaineers and disaster relief of victims caught up in the aftermath of natural or man-made calamities. There have been stirring reports of daredevil rescue missions carried out from the

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turbulent oceans, blazing infernos, and from the anoxic benumbing heights of the Himalayas. This role has been pretty much the same in the Army and Navy as well. This is not to suggest that the offensive capability has been neglected. The Army and the Navy have continued to perform their specific role-oriented missions, and the Air Force its roles in support of the Army such as anti-tank missions and special heliborne operations (SHBO). Yet, in war there have been no such sagas of courage and daring or of what is referred to as "derring-do". There have been no missions out of the ordinary requiring daring offensive action, initiative or surprise. One of the principal tenets of war, that of surprise, has been neglected. Perhaps for the first time the IAF carried out offensive operations in 1965 when Flt Lt Johnny Dweltz dropped bombs from a Mi-4 over infiltrating enemy troops in Kashmir. Then in 1971 even the nascent Bangladesh modified its Chetaks with machine guns to attack Pakistani troops in erstwhile East Pakistan. We, however, seemed content with the rather prosaic role of transporting our troops across the riverine plains to hasten the surrender of Dhaka to the Indian Army. Though we have had attack helicopters for a long time, and have had the capability of firing weapons from nearly all "choppers" in our inventory, their offensive ability has not been fully exploited. Nor has the unique flexibility and versatility that characterises the machine been meaningfully addressed. It is hoped that after our experience during the war in Kargil, the loss of a Mi-17 notwithstanding, the IAF will have learned some lessons. There will always be losses and casualties in the profession of arms but they must not deter us, or determine our tactical employment capability.

In the Indian context, as I expect in other countries too, there have been, and will continue to be, "turf wars" between the three Services to demand proprietary rights over the limited helicopter assets that are available. 'Cash -strapped' as we are in India, we are perforce resource constrained. Yet, knowing this there is often conflict as to which Service should be responsible for a particular aspect of helicopter 'warfighting' capability. To overcome this problem there should be a common approach that is in the best interests of the Nation. To this end, there should be interactive training that is jointly conducted, and a commonality of equipment making allowances for specialist requirements. Much like the Air

Force's TACDE (Tactical Combat and Development Establishment) a 'combat employment of helicopters' training institution must be established where innovative tactics and initiative are encouraged and practiced. The stifling of initiative was the undoing of the Soviet Union's helicopter operations in Afghanistan.

HELICOPTER COMBAT ROLES

Though there really should be no necessity to recapitulate the classic war-time missions carried out by helicopters, it would be worth the while to do so in order that those soldiers, sailors or airmen not *au fait* with them are brought onto the same 'wave-length'. As flown by our Armed Forces, the roles include Special Heli-borne Operations (SHBO), CASEVAC, SAR, Attack (anti-tank) Air OP, Reconnaissance, Communications and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). These are more or less conventional tasks. However, what this paper is aiming to highlight are those that need to be fine-tuned, honed and specialised with a joint Service flavour.

Offensive Operations by Night

Darkness is as much a friend as it can be an enemy. It all depends on who is using the cover of night to further one's operational ends. Though this is recognised as a matter of fact, not enough however has been done to exploit the element of darkness. Our crews must therefore be trained to fly at night with the same degree of confidence with which they operate by day. If such a capability can be achieved it will prove to be a most important 'force-multiplier'.

Ultra Special Heli-borne Operations

Most Service personnel would be aware of what conventional SHBO entails. What is being proposed here is an "ultra" mission that involves transporting a 'stick' of Commandos on a dark night to a target that is 100 kms or more behind enemy lines. They would attack stretches of railway lines in remote areas, or small but important marshalling yards that are far from habitation. Or they would disrupt power lines and communication systems, and if

possible subterranean oil pipelines if their exact location is known. The troops would be taken to a point close enough the target area, and yet not so close as to compromise their presence. The helicopter would then, if necessary, switch off its engine(s) to await the return of the men. If, however, the target is a complex one that requires some time in the preparation of demolitions then the Commandos could be air-landed at the required location to be retrieved the following night. This of course would have its attendant risks. Since 'surprise' is a "force-multiplier" and often the key to success, inserting these special troops in the most unlikely of places such as mountaintops, or in the near vicinity of enemy airfields, will pay rich dividends. The latter is a target set that could be successfully attacked, even if only for serious nuisance value with the possibility of unexpected success. A section of Commandos could fire off a number of mortar shells into an airfield or a communications hub-centre damaging whatever might be in the way, and get away even as the shells are falling. The effect on enemy morale would be considerable. Then, Early Warning radar sites that are usually fairly close to the border or forward edge of the battle area could also be attacked or destroyed either by air-to-surface weapons or by Commandos.

Close Support

By virtue of its unique capability, a helicopter, if suitably armed, can be effectively used against enemy ground positions, more especially by night when such attacks are least expected. This has special reference to such missions as anti-DCB (ditch-cum-bund) operations when the enemy has launched an offensive and is close to breaching our defences. Traditionally, fixed-wing aircraft are the first choice to thwart the enemy offensive because of their greater weapon carrying capacity. However, such operations do have serious limitations because the speed of the aircraft and their very sophistication militates against their use for such missions. The most important drawback is the difficulty experienced by the pilot in acquiring the target even though flares may illuminate it. There are some inherent problems in flying a high-performance aircraft on moonless nights. Attack manoeuvres under 'dark night' conditions involve rapid changes in height and direction. The pilot must adjust

his vision from near total darkness to the bright glare of high intensity flares, and then to darkness again. This can be disconcerting and can lead to disorientation, and perhaps even loss of control over the aircraft. Then, given the importance of success to his offensive, the enemy will do all he can to thwart or reduce the effect of air activity that he knows will be the one element that can deter him. The tactical area would be bristling with air defence weapons, and even small arms fire would be directed at the attacking aircraft. Since our fighter aircraft would be over-flying enemy territory while carrying out attacks they would be extremely vulnerable. Helicopters on the other hand could operate from within our territory and thus be immune to enemy weapons. Besides, the enemy would not even be aware that helicopters are being used since their presence and subsequent tactics would not be discernible on enemy radars. Where helicopters are concerned there are no violent manoeuvres involved, and it is easy for a pilot to 'pop up', from behind cover, release his 'fire and forget' weapons without the enemy being any the wiser, and then 'sit down'. Apart from this versatility, one great advantage of using the helicopter is that neither bad weather nor poor visibility inhibits its operations to the same extent as they affect high performance fighter aircraft.

Anti-terrorist Operations

Major General Gerald Templar was perhaps the first proponent of the use of helicopters against terrorists. He used the machine to telling effect in the war against the anti-national elements (ANEs) in erstwhile Malaya. What he succeeded in doing is part of history, but it is apparently not something that we in the Indian Armed Forces have learned from. Our Army has had long, and at times painful, experience in dealing with insurgency and ANEs. Yet, there have been no instances when the ground forces commander has used the helicopter in dealing with the threats. This weapons system could be used as a most effective time saving 'force multiplier' in getting troops to where they should be in the least possible time. They could insert a 'blocking force' to prevent the escape of insurgents if our intelligence forces have their information correct, yet this has never been done. In another type of mission the helicopter could be used to provide convoy escort in hilly or mountainous terrain. Incidentally, this role

has been employed when escorting convoys of VVIPs, notably during prime ministerial visits to Nagaland. It is a well established fact that infiltrators from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir use known infiltration routes to enter into Kashmir. Our various news media seem to know exactly where their hideouts are and are able to film their ingress into India. Regular patrolling of such areas would reduce the casualties our Army and para-military forces suffer in their war against terrorism. The helicopter must be used. Is it that we are fearful of losses? But, if it is agreed that there is an on-going war surely we must employ every means at our disposal to put an end to it.

Short- and Long-Range Interdiction

With the considerable improvements and advances in armament technology, even helicopters which were once considered restricted by weapons loads that could be carried now pack a lethal and devastating 'punch'. Even a single helicopter could attack lines of communication or lay mines along either known convoy or infiltration routes and defiles. Estuaries or specific water bodies could also be targeted for such attention. Here too, neither weather nor poor visibility would necessarily be a constraining factor.

Short-Range Oblique Tactical Reconnaissance

The tactical reconnaissance task has been the responsibility of the fast, low flying jet fighter. Strategic reconnaissance is flown at high altitude by specialised photo reconnaissance aircraft, usually when the international situation is 'hotting up' and war could be imminent. Nowadays, however, there is a permanent 'spy in the sky' in space. During peacetime too reconnaissance would continue to be required, but, since over-flying enemy airspace would be construed an act of war, such missions have to be flown from within one's territory. The advent of the UAV or RPV (Unmanned Air Vehicles or Remotely Piloted Vehicles) with real time photo capability has changed the rules somewhat, and if one does get shot down there is not much either side can do about it. Stated somewhat simplistically, oblique tactical reconnaissance involves 'snooping' from within our territory to find out what defences a potential enemy has erected or installed. The intelligence that can be received is a function of height and means: the

higher the platform, the further can the camera see across the border. As a rule, the distant tasks would be carried out from heights above 20,000 feet, with optical devices that can look fairly deep into the area of one's military interest. But the areas of interest that are close to and just across our border could be carried out by suitably equipped helicopters, or by slow propeller-driven aircraft. During wartime oblique photography would provide a commander information about the disposition of enemy troops and whether or not an offensive is being planned. It is obvious that such preparations would be carried out some distance from the forward edge of the battle area, and more likely than not under the cover of darkness. Then, since the troops would only be moved forward at night, suitably equipped helicopters using infrared cameras and other "state-of-the-art" optical devices can monitor their movements. This is not a 'glamorous' mission but would be one of great tactical importance to the ground forces commander, more especially if he is fighting a defensive battle or has a 'holding role'.

Electronic Warfare

A helicopter would be an ideal platform from which to 'jam', disrupt or interfere with an enemy's radar or voice communications and his 'Signals Order of Battle'. Of course it is very likely that the Army would have its own ground-based devices in the tactical area. The helicopter provides the advantage of height and the ability to hover for an extended duration, while enemy radars and communication facilities are transmitting. This would be critical at any time during a defensive or offensive operation. The erstwhile Soviet Union laid great emphasis on this aspect and this is something that we could emulate.

Logistic Support Beyond the Tactical Battle Area

The smooth flow of logistics supplies to a fast moving field formation on the offensive will always be the key to success. A Combat Command or Group would require large quantities of Fuel, Oil and Lubricants (FOL), ammunition, water and food to sustain the offensive. Any attempt to re-supply by road would be fraught with danger unless a more than favourable air situation (FAS) prevails. Obviously therefore, the quickest means of getting the vital necessi-

ties to the troops is by air, either to be air-dropped by fixed-wing aircraft or air-landed by helicopter. Here too an FAS is essential if the mission is to be accomplished successfully by day. By night the threat from enemy air is somewhat reduced, but not by too much. The disadvantage of a fixed-wing air transport mission, even if air superiority prevails, is that the supplies once dropped by parachute would be spread over a large area and each load would have to be collected separately, thereby increasing the time factor considerably.

The best alternative is to use the helicopter by taking the supplies to exactly where it is required. However, this is not as easy as it may appear. First of all, even though the helicopter is capable of carrying out what is virtually a vertical take-off and landing, this is not actually the case. Thus, depending on the terrain and the size of the machine, a helipad of suitable dimensions is essential. The higher the operating or landing area, or the higher the ambient temperature, the larger should be the size of the helipad. Then, a helicopter does not really make a vertical descent to land, but follows a 'glide path or slope' which means that there should not be any obstacles in its path as it approaches to land. When operating over dry ground, or over a desert, the downwash of the rotor blades causes sand and grass to be blown upwards, enveloping the helicopter in a dust cloud and causing the pilot to lose sight of the ground below him. Similarly, when operations are carried out in snowscape conditions the possibility of snow being recirculated and once again obscuring vision can be a major hazard. These are extremely dangerous situations and could cause disaster. In fact, the attempt to rescue American Embassy personnel held hostage by Iran some years ago was aborted when re-circulating desert sand blinded the crew of two helicopters involved, causing them to collide. Thus, apart from first class training and experience, there are some essential prerequisites to be provided by the ground forces which are being re-supplied. If a helicopter is to land and off-load supplies the following must be ensured:

- The approach to the helipad must be free of obstacles in order that a safe descent can be executed.
- The surface must be 'hardened' or stabilised to ensure that there is no chance of a dust cloud enveloping the helicopter as it comes to a hover.

- The area around the helipad must be made secure to ensure that there is no chance of any interference by enemy troops. The possibility of enemy air action cannot be ruled out and so suitable air defence weapons will have to be available.
- Off-loading should be completed in the shortest possible time so that the machine does not have to switch off its engine(s). If there are casualties they must be positioned close enough to expedite their evacuation.

If the large and lumbering Mi-26 is used, and there is no reason why it should not, then the ground handling requirements would be much more elaborate to ensure rapid off-loading and thus reduce the time the aircraft spends in that hostile environment. The load will have to be 'palletised' and placed on rollers to facilitate the process, and suitable 'flat-top' trucks with rollers would have to be available to accept the loads. The Mi-26 is an extremely valuable helicopter and its safety and security cannot be compromised by short cuts. It will do the job of four or five Mi-17s and is thus an invaluable 'force multiplier'. Since such a mission will be of great tactical importance for the furtherance of the larger aim, an airborne escort of air defence fighters, and even missile-equipped 'gun ships,' would need to be provided. This sort of mission would need practice and therefore adequate training. After all it is not easy for high performance jet fighters to orbit either single Mi-26, or a train of seven or eight Mi-8/17 helicopters to provide the required degree of protection. On the other hand the very presence of an airborne escort or Combat Air Patrol would "give the game away". This is a decision for the Army and Air Force commanders to take jointly.

There is yet another method of re-supply that has been perfected by the USAF (United States Air Force). The process is known as LAPES, or Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System. This has been successfully tried out on fixed wing aircraft that fly low over the designated 'drop zone' and which at the appropriate moment releases the load to be dropped. A parachute deploys and drags the load out. I am unsure as to whether something like this has been tried out on helicopters because the shift of the centre of gravity could be critical at the low height and low speed at which a helicopter would operate. However, it may be worth the effort to carry out trials and

decide as to whether this is a practical method of delivering supplies where time is of the essence. It may not, however, be practical to use a parachute for fear of its being 'snagged' in the tail rotor. Thus, as suggested earlier, the loads will have to be palletised, and on rollers to ensure swift and safe dispatch. The advantages of this method are obvious.

Another method that has been tried out is known as "under-slung" operations. This involves the carriage of bulky and voluminous loads that are suspended below the helicopter whose transit speed and manoeuvrability are severely restricted. The over-riding advantage of this method is that there is no need for a helipad, and hence there is no problem of re-circulating dust clouds or snow. A 'quick release' facility ensures immediate release of the load permitting the helicopter to speed away thereafter.

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

This, regrettably, is an area that has received scant attention in military aviation in our country. There have been numerous instances where nerve-tingling rescue missions in peacetime have been carried out under the most demanding climatic and topographical conditions. For some unknown reason, however, this ethos has not permeated into the Indian Armed Forces for Search and Rescue under combat conditions. Yet, in the West, and particularly in the RAF (Royal Air Force) and the USAF, this mission is given the highest priority. Is it because we in India do not rate the value of human life as highly as they do? Is it because our culture tells us that *karma* ordains everything? The morale factor seems to have been forgotten. One should be able to imagine what it means to an aircrew, or to a few elite troops beleaguered behind enemy lines, to know that every effort will be made to effect a rescue before the enemy gets to them. A separate paper has been written on this very vital aspect of military aviation under combat conditions. It is hoped that it will generate the thinking and necessary planning that this very special mission deserves.

Deception and Surprise

For any wartime mission to succeed, surprise and deception are of utmost importance. Stealth and stratagem can change the

entire course of an operation, the outcome of a battle and perhaps, if taken to an extreme, to the outcome of the war. The Russians have named it *maskirovka* which means masking one's intentions or, to keep the enemy guessing as to what one's intentions are. Surprise, as has been stated earlier, is one of the Principles of War as enunciated by military strategists and philosophers. The enemy will spare no effort to penetrate signals communications to glean information or intelligence about our intentions. That same amount of effort, if not more, will have to be invested by us to prevent any breach of security. Any required degree of subterfuge will have to be indulged in to keep the enemy guessing.

When night missions are planned, helicopters may not be able to resort to tactical routing because of their limited range and endurance. As such, they may have to over-fly the forward line of enemy troops thus giving away their presence. If such missions are to succeed then an artillery barrage could be fired along the border or in different tactical areas a couple of days before the intended insertion or cross border operation. This would create doubts in the minds of the enemy as to whether or not an offensive is being planned in that area. The sounds made by over-flying helicopters would thus be deadened and enemy troops would be forced to 'keep their heads down'. Or, suitably equipped helicopters fitted with loudspeakers, flying along the border or even over enemy territory, could amplify sounds over different areas thus 'foxing' the enemy as to what is afoot.

Training

For any mission to be successful the personnel involved in, and with it, must be thoroughly trained, confident in their ability and should be dedicated professionals. Training should be conducted in as realistic an environment as possible without compromising future missions or flight safety. Yet, in the event that there are accidents, they must be accepted as 'normal operating risks'. Training must continue and every effort must be made to determine what went wrong and why. The very best of people must be at the helm of a Joint Services training establishment where such combat training is imparted to select air and maintenance crews. The successful culmination of the mission must be inculcated within each individual.

Our aircrew may be required to operate in a wide variety of environments, from sea level to the high Himalayas. The conditions could vary from the hot and humid (40 C and 90 per cent humidity) in Assam, to 45 C and zero humidity of Rajasthan, to sub-zero 'dry as a bone' heights that could go up to 20,000 feet in the Himalayas. We are indeed fortunate to have the training grounds where there will be minimum of disturbance to the local population and where security can be safeguarded. This facility must be taken advantage of. Special courses would need to be conducted depending on the terrain in which operations will be mounted. Crews must learn to fly together and to believe in one another because their lives will depend on each other. Maintenance crews will have to learn that the success of a mission could hinge on their professional expertise in ensuring that the machine is 100 per cent serviceable. There can be no margin for error.

When operating in the mountains, aircrew will have to learn that while transiting through valleys in poor weather it is easy to 'press on regardless' only to find that one is being forced higher towards low cloud, instead of doing the more prudent '180'. There are many pitfalls in operating at high altitude; one of the major hazards that aircrew face is when flying in or over snowbound areas. A phenomenon known as 'white out' occurs when the ground and the horizon merge because of problems in depth perception in snow-bound conditions leading to disorientation. Captains will have to take hard decisions under pressure keeping in mind the many considerations, other than the operational task, that are involved. There are the lives of men at stake, not just the aircrew but also the commandos who have placed implicit faith in the men who are flying them. It is for this reason that the establishment of a joint training facility is mooted where aircrews of the three Services fly with each other and learn to respect the various environments in which the others operate. Just as flying in the mountains has its attendant hazards, so too do operations in the plains where there could be high-tension cables strung across the countryside. This is particularly compounded during night operations even though night vision goggles (NVGs) are being used, and when pylons and cables merge into the background to catch the unsuspecting or the complacent pilot. The Indian Armed Forces helicopter fleets must pay more attention to NVG operations, for which the right

equipment must be made available and crew must practice through regular 'continuation training'.

Some years ago helicopter crews of the Indian Air Force were put through a training camp at the Tactical and Combat Development Establishment to familiarise them with a hostile air environment. They were taught rudimentary tactics in thwarting an attack by enemy fighter aircraft. I am not sure how much this has helped, even in training, but this is an aspect that every combat helicopter pilot must be aware of. In the process, they will learn how to handle their machine to the limits of its capability without exceeding flight envelopes.

A Wish List

It is quite obvious that one helicopter type cannot be tailored to meet the wide spectrum of missions that have been suggested in the preceding paragraphs. Yet, it is not unrealistic to suggest that there should be some commonality in equipment that is being procured for similar roles and purposes. Also, with some modifications there is no reason why the basic airframe cannot be put to multi-purpose use. It is obvious too that the power plant requirements for operations at high altitude as compared with the requirement for sea level operations are vastly different. This is something that can be attended to by our R & D laboratories. Enumerated below are some of the characteristics I would like to see in our future helicopters:

- Armour-plating around the cockpit and other vital components.
- IR (Infrared) suppression to reduce hot gas emissions from the engine, and noise reduction.
- Noise reduction of the rotor blades through use of more efficient aerofoils.
- Roof-mounted thermal and visual imaging through a periscope sight facility.
- Weapons :
 - (a) Fire-and-forget missiles to reduce exposure to enemy fire.
 - (b) Air-to-air missiles.
 - (c) Nose-mounted cannon.
 - (d) Chaff for IR jamming.

- Low silhouette to reduce visual acquisition.
- Modular servicing facility and easy accessibility to various parts of the helicopter to ensure rapid turn-around, servicing, maintenance and repair.
- Rapid re-arming and refuelling.

Conclusion

The training of the men who fly and service the helicopters that will form an elite attack force must be honed to perfection. The crucible for such an assessment will be war. There is, however, the facility of competition that is always available. Units within the individual Service could be pitted against each other, and there could be Inter-Command competitions. The acme of professional excellence could be determined in an Inter-Services competition where the entire spectrum of operations from maintenance, to firing live weapons, or finding an 'ejected pilot' can be tested. Pilots will need to be motivated to accomplish the mission no matter what the odds. However, they must be mature enough to identify a "no-win" situation and take the appropriate decision at the appropriate time. In the end, that old adage, "No guts, no glory" will always apply, or as the British SAS believes "Who Dares Wins".

Human Factors Engineering in the Army

BRIG R S GREWAL

It is said that the military world has become a victim of its own sophistication in weaponry. Bewildered by the technology of the atomic age, it has forgotten that brain, nerve, heart and imagination are all beyond the capacity of the computer. Human being in an organisation always was and remains an important resource, which should be preserved and put to optimum use. A forward thinking concept demands emphasis on an organisation wherein individuals acquire capabilities required to perform various functions associated with their perceived roles and develop and exploit their inner potentials for their own and organisational advancement. This helps in evolution or improvement of an organisational culture in which leader-led relationships, team work and collaboration among sub-units and units prosper.

Some of the major dimensions involving human resource development are: analysing the role of an individual culminating in identification of his critical attributes, matching the role and the individual implying recruitment and placement, developing the individual in the role which involves his training and career development, and finally, developing equitability which involves management of salary, amenities, incentives and rewards. Sadly, except for the management of salary and to a certain extent amenities and rewards, the other aspects applicable to personnel below officer rank (PBOR) have not received due attention in the Army. Not only has the Army not been able to correctly define the attributes needed in a soldier, but it has gone astray in developing his career. It is, therefore, necessary to critically analyse the conceptual framework of human resource development as applicable to PBOR in the Army in its totality. The need is to identify the crucial

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factors and evolve an approach to engineer these in order to meet the goals of the organisation.

Attributes of PBOR

Changes during the past three decades that impinge on performance have been the increasing automation, the advent of artificial intelligence and information technology. This has resulted in induction of advanced technology on the battlefield. Prior to that, the emphasis had been on the use of mechanical power to amplify human efforts. These technological developments have progressively shifted the emphasis to better skills, which can be divided into three functional areas as follows:-

(a) Technical Skill. It implies the ability to use knowledge, methods, technique and equipment necessary for performance of specific tasks and it is acquired from experience, education and training. In fact, it is the summation of knowledge and capability to perform, implying that an individual must possess the basic skills (reading, writing, general sciences and their usage) and functional skills which help him perform his duties efficiently.

(b) Human Skill. It is the ability and judgement involving working with and through people, including an understanding of motivational aspects and an application of effective leadership.

(c) Conceptual Skill. It is the ability to understand the complexities of the overall organisation and where one's operation fits into the organisation. This knowledge enables an individual to act according to the objectives of the total organisation rather than only on the basis of the goals and needs of his own immediate group.

The appropriate mix of these skills varies as an individual advances in his career. This could be elucidated by a diagram (See Figure 1).


ORGANISATIONAL LEVELS

SENIOR OFFICERS
(TOP LEVEL)

MIDDLE
LEVEL OFFICERS
(MIDDLE LEVEL)

YOUNG OFFICERS,
JCOs AND
SENIOR NCOs
(JUNIOR LEVEL)

JUNIOR NCOs AND
SOLDIERS
(ACTIVITY LEVELS)



SKILLS

Fig. 1 : Human Skills and Organisational Levels

It could be seen that the significance of technical skills is more at junior levels, whereas that of conceptual skills is greater at higher levels. However, the importance of human skills remains in focus at all levels, and rightly so, because each individual deals with other human beings at his own level in his domain. The human skills as applicable to the Army relate to the capability of an individual to interact with others in different situations and his reactions to stress, danger and uncertainty. Recent research has proved that human skill is directly proportional to an individual's emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is defined as a set of skills, attitudes, abilities and competencies that determine an individual's behaviour, reactions, state of mind and communication style. Social scientists have proved that an individual's success at work is 80 per cent

dependent on his Emotional Quotient (EQ) and only 20 per cent is accounted for by his Intelligence Quotient (IQ). There are numerous examples where individuals with very high IQ have failed to deliver because of their low EQ.

Our selection processes in the Army have laid stress on EQ levels as far as officer cadre is concerned. But this aspect has been totally ignored while formulating the selection process of OR. The present day stressful battlefield milieu, including that of counter-insurgency operations, fast changing socio-economic environment and rising aspirations of individuals demand that a datum level of EQ is established for induction of OR into the Army. The profile of a present day soldier is very complex. Some of the attributes which he must possess are physical and mental toughness, dedication, personal bravery, high standards of intelligence, good education and general knowledge and most important of all, control over his own emotions. He has to be strong enough to stand up to adverse situations, endure mental stress and have the capability to interact with others in different situations. In short, he should be able to fit into a team. Considering the rigours and stresses that he is likely to be subjected to, he should have a high degree of EQ level to enable him to cope with different contingencies. His social behaviour is as important as his professional prowess. Thus, the attributes that are needed in a soldier are basic skills (acquired through education, knowledge and experience), physical prowess and high levels of IQ and EQ. His psychological stability is as important as his military proficiency. In effect, these attributes could be summed up as Soldier Like Qualities (SLQ).

Quality of Intake

The system presently in vogue to assess the suitability of a candidate for induction as an OR in the Army is based on testing his physical attributes, academic prowess and to an extent his IQ. His EQ level is not assessed at all. However, the need is also to test his intelligence, motivational levels, devotion to duty, ability to persevere under stress and his emotional stability.

A major drawback of the tests in vogue in our recruiting

organisation is that these basically assess the academic prowess of a candidate, which has already been tested by a University or State Level Board of Education. Moreover, the tests are generally biased against rural candidates. These ignore the environment prevalent in rural India where the level of general awareness of students is low. The written tests are held to assess a candidate's prowess in mathematics, general knowledge and to a limited extent judge his IQ level. The portion dealing with General Knowledge ignores the fact that in rural areas schools pay scant attention to it. The main concern of such schools is to ensure that their students secure pass-marks in the Board-level examination. Moreover, a vast majority of the 'field worker' students have to assist their parents earn their livelihood. This leaves them with little time to learn something about the 'outside' world. A candidate from rural background, therefore, finds it difficult to get through the written examination and the problem is compounded for candidates who do not have Hindi as their mother tongue because the question paper is set either in English or Hindi. Thus, in our endeavour to get candidates with a higher level of education, we reject the 'field workers' in favour of the 'book worms'. The need today is to have a battery of tests to assess a healthy mix of general awareness, IQ and EQ levels and the physical prowess of a candidate. It should be possible to conduct these tests in the field and procedures should be evolved to ensure that these are not compromised at the levels of Recruiting Offices or Regimental Centres.

In order to attract the best material it is desirable that imaginative media publicity should be undertaken. The image of the Recruiting Organisation needs to be given a boost by improving its infrastructure. The erstwhile Boys' Companies used to contribute very good OR into the Army. Though these had to be closed down due to financial constraints, the need for quality manpower still remains. Some of the measures that could be adopted to get candidates with the right credentials, and at a younger age, into the Army are :-

- (a) Enhancement of motivational factors to make Army service more attractive.

(b) A vigorous campaign to be launched in rural areas to attract candidates. *Navodaya Vidyalayas* and NCC (Junior Wing) units could be targeted for this purpose.

(c) Formal and structured training capsules could be run in our Regimental Centres for enrolment under Unit HQ Quota. Sons or wards of serving personnel and ex-servicemen could be employed on 'learn and earn' basis as employees for various regimental ventures. This would help them pay for their board and lodging and the Regimental Centres could coach them for recruitment.

Some categories of personnel could be enrolled in technical arms and services, as direct entry JCOs and NCOs. With suitable guidance they should be able to help the officers in performance of their duties. However, appropriate training capsules would have to be designed in order to ensure that they occupy their assigned roles in units with confidence.

Career Development

The Existing System. It is ironical that the first promotion that an OR in the Army can aspire for is based on selection. At that stage almost 60 per cent of the OR are weeded out from further development in their careers. One could well imagine the efficacy of an organisation, especially in the absence of an 'assured career progression' even in pay scales, where more than half the work force lacks avenues for further advancement. With the upgradation of the appointment of a section commander to the rank of Havildar, a Naik is now a working hand in the unit. Thus, promotion to the rank of Naik should be time-bound after seven years of service. It may be argued by some that this may lead to proliferation in the number of Naiks in a unit causing problems in their employment. However, the Naiks could be employed as seconds in command of sections and also to man high technology weapons and equipment in the units. Promotion, thereafter, to the rank of Havildar and beyond should be based on comparative merit. Moreover, there should be time scale promotion after 21 years of service to the rank of Havildar for those missing the selection grade.

Lateral Induction. Lateral induction into the Police and Paramilitary Forces could be the other option. The proposal for lateral induction has also been mooted by the Kargil Review Committee. Its report states "... Instead of the present practice of having 17 years of colour service, it would be advisable to reduce the colour service to a period of seven to ten years and thereafter, release these officers and men for service in the country's para-military formations. After an appropriate period of service here, older cadres might be further streamed into the regular police forces or absorbed in a National Service Corps (or a National Conservation Corps), as provided for under Article 51 A(d) of the constitution... The para-military and police forces have their own ethos and traditions and might well be chary of such lateral induction as has been proposed. The objection might be overcome were para-military forces to undertake recruitment on the basis of certain common national military standards and then send those selected for training and absorption in the Army for a period of colour service before reverting to their para-military formations." This proposal, if implemented, would help remove stagnation at the level of PBOR in the Army.

Policy for Promotions. There is a need to recognise merit. The criteria presently laid down for promotion to the rank of Havildar and upto the rank of Subedar breed mediocrity. There is no incentive to excel. To overcome this malady promotions could be regulated by a system of comparative merit. Similarly, accelerated promotions or ante date seniority could be given for excellence in professional field. Our aim should be to prevent our NCOs and JCOs from getting into 'play safe' mode by earning Average or High Average reports. The promotion policy should aim to identify junior leaders with personal qualities like leadership, decisiveness, social-intelligence, devotion to duty, perseverance under stress, character, and emotional stability.

Intellectual Aspirations. Our JCOs and OR should be encouraged to acquire higher qualifications whilst in service to meet their intellectual aspirations. We could explore the possibility of a concept of study leave for selected JCOs and NCOs. Apart from courses imparting higher educational qualifications, there could be other technical courses which could help a JCO or an NCO perform

his duties better. These should not be merely oriented towards post-retirement rehabilitation.

Developing Competence

Inadequate quality of material at intake level, introduction of sophisticated weapon systems and equipment and shortage of officers have accentuated the need for greater emphasis on developing the competence levels of PBOR in the Army. Some of the contributory factors have been the absence of quality education, lack of communication skills and the prevalent ethos in the Army which inhibit entrusting adequate responsibility to JCOs and NCOs. Absence of worthwhile responsible jobs and the consequent lack of status has resulted in the formation of a generally demotivated JCO cadre which is shy of accepting accountability. A knowledgeable junior leader entrusted with a responsible assignment and enthused with motivation could prove to be a great asset. There is a need to take deliberate steps to develop the competence level of junior leaders in the Army.

The JCOs and OR in the Army lack the basic knowledge which could give them the confidence to operate and maintain sophisticated equipment. They are generally shy of working with their own hands to carry out even minor adjustments to the equipment they are expected to handle. Thus, the education and other training curricula should be so designed as to enable the PBOR to cross the desired levels of technological threshold. A programme launched in the early 1990s to overcome this problem has failed to provide dividends because it was biased more towards theoretical aspects.

The cost of the high-technology equipment introduced in the Army is prohibitive, which acts as a deterrent to its frequent use for training. Though simulators have been introduced, these have not produced the desired results due to lack of an integrated approach. Invariably the equipment is issued to training establishments without sanctioning the requisite infrastructure like MES works. Moreover, suitable instructions are not issued to ensure its integration with the laid down syllabi. Its utilisation is left totally to the imagination of the users. A typical example is the introduction

of the Small Arms Training Simulator without any guidelines to integrate it with the weapons training of recruits. The whole process was left to the imagination and initiative of officers at different Training Centres. Consequently, there have been delays in deriving full benefit from it. Similarly, the Driving Training Simulators were issued to Training Centres without sanctioning the associated works to install and make these functional, resulting in idling of resources. There is a need to streamline the bureaucratic procedures prevalent in the Army.

The Army has been slow to absorb the advantages of the silicon revolution. It should endeavour to ensure that it does not miss the IT Revolution. There is a need to run structured training capsules at the earliest in various training establishments. These could even be outsourced to certain private organisations.

Hygiene Factors

A vigorous drive needs to be launched to enforce the much talked about hygiene factors in the Army. In-house measures to provide job satisfaction by assigning greater responsibility, recognising achievements, providing a better working environment, curbing employment on non-military duties and introduction of labour saving devices would go a long way in enhancing the self-esteem of PBOR. Further, the concept of looking after a man from womb to tomb needs to be given a practical shape. Lateral induction of manpower into defence-related services like the MES, Ordnance Factories, DRDO, DGQA, apart from other Government jobs and industry, could help in successful rehabilitation of the disciplined work force being discharged by the Army every year. A performance-audit of placement cells set up at the Army Headquarters and in various Regimental Centres should be undertaken.

Conclusion

The human resource development system in the Army needs to be designed to suit its organisational culture. It should be based on various contextual factors as applicable to the organisation, its culture and tradition, size, technology, levels of existing skills and

the support that is likely to be available to adopt the system. Selecting the right type of material and moulding it to ensure that it fits into its desired role would help build a covetable culture with healthy norms. Assiduously identified goals for the PBOR, planning their training thoroughly and a high quality of work life can win their commitment.

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UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

CENTRE FOR ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL RESEARCH (USICAFHR)

RESEARCH PROJECTS – 2001-02

A Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research has been established at the United Service Institution of India by the Council of the Institution in consultation with the three Service Headquarters, to study the history of the Indian Armed Forces with objectivity, covering different facets - strategic, tactical, logistic, organisational socio-economic aspects and their implementation. To begin with, two fellowship chairs namely Chhatrapati Shivaji and Maharana Pratap have been established.

Scholars, both serving as well as retired, desirous of taking up research projects in the field of history of the Indian Armed Forces may submit project proposals in quadruplicate either through Service Headquarters or directly to the USI. Copies of the Rules and Regulations and Application Format may be obtained from the USI.

Each fellowship for research project shall carry a contingency grant of Rs 12,000/- to be paid in four equal quarterly instalments. In addition an honorarium of Rs 10,000/- to serving and Rs 72,000/- to retired officers shall be paid as per the terms and conditions laid down in the Constitution for CAFHR.

Women in Uniform : Gender Dialectics in the Indian Armed Forces (Part-I)

DR ANITA NAHAL ARYA

**Till yesterday the forces, a man's domain
Today women have joined that restricted chain
Feminism has in India indeed matured
On egalitarianism the forces will now be nurtured
Women in uniform all skeptics must accept
Gender bias they should not reflect.**

Anita Nahal Arya

In Sahitya Akademi award winner and well-known novelist Chaman Nahal's novel, *The Salt of Life*, the heroine Kusum says,

"woman is shakti...

**An intense vital flame of molten lava
Demanding her rights."**

Jawaharlal Nehru implored in a speech in Allahabad on 31 March 1928 :

"the women of India will not attain their full rights by the generosity of the men of India. They will have to fight for them and force their will on the menfolk before they can succeed."

Yes woman is *shakti*, and power is what the Services are about – military *shakti*. It is hoped that in the gender dialectics in the Armed Forces, lady officers do not have to fight to attain their acceptance and their *shakti* is utilised for the benefit of the Services and the security of the nation. My focus is on the enormous ongoing social change in India where women are increasingly contributing to the wealth of the nation, and which change has now spread to the Armed

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Forces as well.¹ Almost all countries invest on human resource development. India, however, does not rank very high in that sector. Given this context, the decision to induct women into the Services, besides the medical branch, is definitely an attempt in that direction. An attempt that many gentlemen officers feel is a "waste of time, money and energy". However, an experiment of this type serves two purposes. One, it will realise the Indian Constitution's promise of equality of opportunity for all regardless of caste, gender or religious differences. Two, it is hoped that it would improve the abysmally dismal social position of women in the Indian subcontinent.²

With the induction of women, the Services are now coming in line with the mainstream, where social change in favour of the female gender began with the freedom movement. Yet, at the same time, it cannot be ignored that since the Armed Forces are extremely high-profiled, a dramatic change like this would indeed filter down to the common masses of India. People would turn around and question that if women can fly aeroplanes, service our delicate communication networks, command regiments, serve on ships for months, then why should they not be treated with respect and dignity? Perhaps people's mindsets would be affected! Through the combination of the processes of education, socialisation and acculturalisation, it is hoped that existing social evils like dowry, child marriage, widow ostracisation and *sati* would be obliterated from the Indian cultural set-up.

There could not be a more positive experiment than this, for it has not only professional advantages for many women but also sociological benefits for them and the nation as a whole. Of course, like any thing that is new, it has had teething problems. However, a mature democracy like India and its people know that given time any experiment can be moulded to the advantage of everyone.

¹ This paper is based on interviews conducted by the author with lady and gentlemen officers from the three Services who are at present posted in Delhi.

² Though the Indian Constitution guarantees equality of opportunity and employment, Articles 16(3) and 33 exempt the Armed Forces from the provisions of the Fundamental Rights with regards to the employment of women. The Army and Air Force Act of 1950 and the Navy Act of 1957 exclude women from enrollment. See Air Cmde S M Hundiwalla, "Women in the Armed Forces: Problems and Prospects," *NDC Journal*, Vol. 14, November 1992, pp. 50-73.

Speaking of the race struggle of the African-Americans in the United States in the early 20th Century, WEB Dubois had said that, "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line."³ To me it appears that the problem of the 21st Century is that of the gender-line. And while Dubois entreated Americans to help Blacks emerge from behind the "veil",⁴ women are entreating men today to accept that they have already emerged from behind the veil. 2001 has been declared as the Year of the Women. The Indian Government has declared it as the Year of the Empowerment of Women. Perhaps this ought to be the indicator of where women ought to be in the Services – totally empowered. It is upto the men now to appreciate, honour and work with women as co-citizens of mature democracies.

The study of history is one of assigning places. If one were to look at history as a jigsaw puzzle, each piece has a particular place. Neither can the sidepieces be placed in the centre nor the reverse. But the puzzle would not hold or be complete even if one piece were missing. Gender history has for long been ignored, for it were the winners and the main players in wars, governments and economies that mattered and not the side players or the behind the scene players who looked after social issues of concern to the family, community and society at large.⁵

According to a distinguished American women's historian, Kathryn Kish Sklar and Professor of Labour History, Thomas Dublin, "One of the biggest challenges facing historians... is the task of identifying the causes and consequences of long term changes in women's lives."⁶ The induction of women in the Indian Armed Forces would definitely pose one such challenge, for the changes would not be overnight but long drawn-out. It was in 1992 that the Indian Air Force inducted its first batch of women pilots. The Army

³ WEB Dubois, *The Souls of the Black Folk* (New York : Dover Publications, 1994, originally published in 1903 by AC McClurg and Co., Chicago), p. v.

⁴ *ibid.*

⁵ In the US, Gender History became an academic discipline in the liberalism of the 1960's. In India, however, it is not taught as a subject in colleges and universities, though there is a prolific body of books on women, their work and roles in society.

⁶ KK Sklar and Thomas Dublin, *Women and Power in American History : A Reader*, Vol.1 (New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 1991), p. 1.

followed in 1993 by inducting them in services besides the medical. The Navy was the last. In a field that is still considered a man's domain, it is indeed refreshing to find women. But are they in the front ranks? Which branches have women been inducted into? Are they there in the back-up and peripheral services? What have been the professional advantages? How do men and women officers relate to each other and what is the contribution of that gender discourse to the Armed Forces? With more and more women opting for a career in uniform, what in the final analysis would be the outcome of gender dialectics in the Indian Armed Forces? These are some of the questions and areas this paper will attempt to tackle.

The paper will be divided into four main parts:

- (a) Motives or causes for induction.
- (b) Role of women in the Services.
- (c) Impact of induction.
- (d) Future participation.


Motives or causes for induction

As the first point of gender discourse, I was told by most of the officers that the induction of women into the Indian Armed Forces was not done either from the 'need for survival' motive (as is in a country like Israel) or the 'socio-cultural-acceptance' motive (as is in Western countries). If anything these two would be restraining factors in a nation like ours. We have no dearth of men who are more than willing to become soldiers. And our nation is not in a constant war for sheer survival where each and every citizen's services would become essential for the security of the country. Further, our socio-cultural structure is not liberal enough at present to accommodate the close interaction of the sexes at the most sensitive of professional spaces – the battlefield, where male bonding is the essence of the fighting spirit.⁷

⁷ Apart from this, there are many myths attached to having a woman on or near the battlefield. For example, the *Times Of India* of 10 January 2001 stated in a lead story on the first page entitled, "The Cost of a Soldier's Survival", about the Saichen Glacier : "strangely the presence of women is considered ominous here, since a woman's visit always brings bad luck, according to popular legend. Last August, a few soldiers were wounded soon after a lady doctor visited the Siachen Base Camp. Earlier on April 13, one soldier was killed and 13 wounded in Pakistani shelling when a lady had similarly visited this place." If these kinds of myths prevail, gender bias can never be removed. Mind-sets can be changed only if legends that encourage disparities are demythified.

However, the hard truth is that in our history, Indian women have often been on the battlefield. Rani Durgawati of Gondwana and Chand Bibi of Ahmednagar (during Akbar's period), Rani Laxmi Bai of Jhansi during the Mutiny in 1857, are a few examples of women fighters from our history. Our freedom movement is replete with examples of courageous women leaving the 'Chaar Diwari' of their households to secure freedom from the British – Sarojni Naidu, Kamala Devi Chattopadhyaya, Aruna Asaf Ali, Sucheta Kriplani, revolutionaries like Durga Bhabhi, Bina Das, Shanti Ghosh and Suniti Chaudhary, are just a few of the prominent names. Subhash Chander Bose had even organised an all women's regiment – the Rani Laxmi Bai Regiment to fight the British. Thus, historically the 'other gender' has played a very significant part alongside men in our freedom struggle. Nationalism became a metaphor for liberal, and at times radical, feminism in our past. In fact, it can be said that had it not been for the 'picketing', 'courting arrests', 'boycotting', 'non-cooperation', and 'civil-disobedience' of Indian women, we may not have won our independence when we did.

But when we look at the induction causation construct, the following would be the likely picture, contrary to the 'battlefield' having already been feminised in our history:




There seems to be a direct correlation between cause and effect, which is indeed essential for the satisfactory fulfillment of all goals. This being the case, women are at present recruited into the Services for a minimum of five years with an extension of another five. By that time most would have achieved the rank of a Maj or Lt Cdr or Sqn Ldr, in the three Services. The gentlemen officers whom I spoke

to said that whether men or women, most officers should be weeded out within 10 to 12 years. It was between 1962 and 1973, I am told, that there was the highest intake of officers. As a result there are too many senior officers now. It would have been prudent, it is said, if there had been a horizontal shifting at appropriate levels into the BSF, (Border Security Force), CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) or into the Cabinet Secretariat. Thus, by commissioning women for a maximum of ten years both the purposes are achieved. The Constitution is notionally upheld and the Services are helped.

Role of women in the Services

Once inducted, where are the lady officers being placed? Looking at our next construct, the placement construct, the following emerges:



The consensus amongst most male officers is that women professionally do the "best in the Feeder Cadre." However, the term, "do the best" is a gendered statement, one that attempts to qualify what women are best at, from the standards of gentlemen officers. Most women who join the Services are well qualified with professional degrees that can be put to good use in the communications, education, judicial and administrative sections. But that does not imply that women cannot be in the front ranks – the fighting arms. Unfortunately, the use of the words, 'front or primary rank' and 'support, secondary or feeder cadre' are also masculine and patriarchal in nature.

The question that arises is, who is to decide where women will be placed? For me, the question is not who but what should decide? For, should not the principle of equality of opportunity' be the decisive factor and not its interpretation by men? Gandhiji had said in 1941 that the 'uplift of women' was one of the basic requirements of future India and he lamented that, "woman has been suppressed under custom and law for which she has no hand."⁸ The laws applied to them, Gandhiji adds, are conceived and formulated by men. It is hoped that women have a hand now in deciding where they want to be. The front or the fighting ranks ought to be opened up to them and they can join if they so wish. Acceptance by men – officers and ranks – will come once it has been established in principle. At present, this not being the case, women are found in the following cadre :

Army : Signals, ASC (Army Service Corps), AMC (Army Medical Corps), AOC (Army Ordnance Corps), JAG (Judge Advocate General), AEC (Army Education Corps), Intelligence Corps.

Air Force : Flying, Technical (Aeronautical Engineering), Administration and Logistics, Accounts, Education and Meteorology.

Navy : Law, Logistics, ATC (Air Traffic Control) and Education.

It is only in the Air Force that we have women flying planes even into danger zones. The Navy tried to have women on ships, but the experiment has not proved very successful and is under review. The Air Force is considering the recruitment of airwomen also. At present the women are not employed as soldiers in the fighting arms. Our conservative attitude towards free interaction between the sexes cannot have men and women in the same bunkers in a war situation. It can be argued that if women can be in the police and in the CRPF as constables, sub-inspectors and inspectors, all requiring work alongside of men, then why not in the Armed Forces? In fact, it has been asserted that unless and until women are included in the fighting arms, their induction would remain incomplete, ad hoc and unsatisfactory.

However, at present, notion combines with a gendered pragmatism to bring women into the Armed Forces as the support or

⁸ D.G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma, Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi*, Vol. 6 (New Delhi : Publications Division, 1953), p. 24.

feeder cadre and that is where they will most probably remain in the coming decades, is the general feeling. British sociologist Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) argued that interdependency and co-existence are essential to maintaining equilibrium and termed it as Functionalism. He concluded that, "...there is a systematic whole and there are differentiated parts and integration can only occur through mutual dependence."⁹ This is the scenario that exists between lady and gentlemen officers in the Armed Forces. It is a gender discourse, which allows for mutual reliance providing in turn an equilibrium to the systematic whole – that is the Services. Gentlemen officers and male soldiers are the front ranks, the primary level, and lady officers provide the support or auxiliary services. There is nothing wrong with this and it is serving the purpose for now, but the situation cannot remain like this for long.

Overall looking at the induction and placement constructs in a narrative historical approach, it can be concluded that the Armed Forces, which have always been considered the last of the male bastions, had to be opened to women sooner or later. The emphasis of the Indian government and of the nation on the growth of the girl child has allowed for the emergence of the new Indian woman over the last decade or so. Women have been opting for a variety of careers and the Services would have attracted their attention sooner or later; women do try to prove that what men can do so can they. On the other hand, the Information Technology revolution has presented for men an entire gamut of alternative careers where material benefits and climbing the corporate ladder as fast as possible have become the main incentives. The Armed Forces have consequently gone down in the priority list as men's traditional career choice. Thus, the gap in the recruitment of motivated men to fill the officer cadre is being filled instead with the rise in the women's desire to prove themselves. The narrative therefore is one of interactionist switch of gender versus professional necessities and options.

(To Be Concluded)

⁹ For more details read, Jonathan H. Turner, *The Structure of Sociological Theory* (Jaipur : Rawat Publications, 1995).

A Maritime Security Policy for India*

COL PK GAUTAM (RETD) **

All life form originated from the sea. More than 97 per cent of the water on the planet is in the oceans. It is estimated that the oceans contain 80 per cent of the global resource potential. India has a coastline of 7515 kilometres out of which nearly 20 per cent comprise islands and rock territories. The total area up to the 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is 2.02 million square kilometres. 97 per cent of India's international trade by volume or 75 per cent by value is dependent on sea communications. The Indian Ocean is actually the crankshaft of India's economic growth and sustainable development.

The author has presented the Indian maritime security from the economic, political and the military dimensions that are given separate treatment in the first three chapters. The next two chapters are on the trends in maritime and Naval cooperation. Quoting from official statistics and reports the author analyses the economic linkage of the ocean for movement of sea borne traffic and its resources with the need to plan in terms of the security not only with sea power but by cooperation and confidence building with the neighbours, major sea faring powers and the rim countries. The book gives the background with the present status and future trends concerning maritime matters. What are the interests of foreign navies in the Indian Ocean and what is the deployment at the strategic base of Diego Garcia? What are the unresolved disputes with Pakistan at the Sir Creek or the status of New More Island which is claimed both by India and Bangladesh?

The author has indicated the role of the Navy in a limited war and also in a nuclear situation. His insights are illuminating when

***India's Maritime Security.** By Rahul Roy-Chaudhury (New Delhi : Knowledge World in Association with Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2000), pp 208, Rs 550, ISBN 81-86019-29-4.

** **Colonel PK Gautam** is an independent analyst on subjects pertaining to security and strategy.

he explains the concepts of sea denial or control in the context of current doctrines from the Naval Headquarters. He presents in a subtle manner the case for a blue water navy. There is a need for comprehending inter service joint integration. This can only be possible if the maritime resources at stake and measures to secure them are known. The book is considered a classic contemporary text book, to be prescribed even in the universities. The conclusion is a blueprint of the Maritime Security Policy 2001(MSP) for India which should supercede the antiquated scientific and technical Ocean Policy Statement of 1982.

Many scholars have lamented the neglect of the sea due to land centric fixation of the dominant elite. Probably that may not be true as the author's research indicates endemic complexities. Thirteen ministries, departments and organisations are involved in ocean related research and manpower development.

Our budding diplomats, academia and attachés will find the book as a ready companion for quick and handy reference on our 'national' interests in their overseas assignments, where ready and instant answers must be known on our maritime doctrine and policies. Individuals, and defence and public libraries will find the book very useful. A reference manual such as this will also need regular updates, and fresh editions at regular intervals.

The Second Nuclear Age*

I.R. Kumar**

It was in May 1998 that India conducted a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran and declared herself a Nuclear Weapon State. As India opted for overt nuclearisation to acquire new dimensions, her relations with neighbours and major powers were bound to acquire new dimensions.

Now that nuclear weapons are here to stay in South Asia, the trends of regional and international responses to these tests and diplomatic manoeuvring and changing perceptions will shape the patterns of conflict and co-operation in this part of the world. Given the political realities, total nuclear disarmament seems almost impossible.

The Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Calcutta organised a national-level seminar on Pokhran II tests and its implications, in the year 1999. This volume, under review, contains select papers that are not confined only to the debate over the strategic aspects of Pokhran II but also discusses the socio-political variables, political and economic implications of the bomb, reactions to the nuclear tests, evolving foreign relations and consequent developments including the Kargil experience.

In a backgrounder that deals with the origin and evolution of the nuclear bomb, Professor Matin Zuberi recounts briefly the events and personalities that shaped the process and the patterns of development of atomic arsenal in the nuclear weapon states. He also highlights the salient features of the draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine.

As a useful means to prevent nuclear war in the absence of total nuclear disarmament, the concept of no-first-use of nuclear

Nuclear India into the New Millennium. Edited by Anindyo J Majumdar (New Delhi : Lancer Books, 2000), pp. 344, Rs. 480.00, ISBN 81-7095-079.

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weapons is gaining ground, despite serious reservations in some quarters. Rabindra Sen takes note of the recalcitrant approach of the five nuclear weapon states to this issue but provides a rationale behind the idea and argues that no-first-use could precede the ultimate non-use.

With two nuclear-armed rivals, the future of peace and security in South Asia looks uncertain at best. The contents of this book only highlight the issues as they stand today; they can hardly foresee any solution in the near future. Anindyo Majumdar has really done a commendable job by administering the contents of various papers in such a fashion that the reader hardly notices the disagreements amongst the authors. The cover of the book is attractive enough to get you tempted to procure a copy hardly realising that it is the same old wine in a new bottle, unfailingly talked about in almost every forum on nuclearisation of India. However, the papers printed here are worth having for reference by those who are concerned with this subject. The facts are tight knit, undoubtedly well researched and well presented. A useful addition, and this is an interesting topic to continue debating on.

ARTICLES FOR THE USI JOURNAL

1. Members are welcome to forward articles pertaining to national security and defence matters for publication in the USI Journal. Articles should preferably be around 2,500 words. These should be forwarded in duplicate in double space on A-4 size paper, along with a floppy disk (1.44 MB diskette), IBM Compatible, on MS Word for Windows 97. The articles should be sent to the Editor, United Service Institution of India, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057. Alternately, articles may be sent through e-mail on dirusi@nde.vsnl.net.in. The Editor reserves the right to make alterations.
2. The full name and address of the author along with a brief Curriculum Vitae should be given. Serving officers should enclose no-objection certificate signed by their immediate superior for publication of their articles.
3. The author will receive a copy of the issue of the Journal in which his article appears along with three offprints. A suitable honorarium will also be paid after the article is published.

The Less Known Nationalist Movement in Pre-Independence Burma*

COLONEL JM SINGH**

Cornell University, New York, is one of the few universities that have regularly run fully-funded research programmes to document authentic history of various regions of the world; the Southeast Asian Programme (SEAP) enabled Khin Yi to put together this monograph on (hereafter referred to with her old name i..e Burma) Myanmar's pre-independence period, which happens to be the least recognised but very important period in its history. It was in 1930 that the Dobama Movement was launched by a small group of highly nationalist Burmese, as a non-racial and non-religious movement for Burmese independence. Khin Yi restricted her study to the period 1930-1938 to keep it within manageable limits while at the same time coinciding with the most important period of the Movement's evolution.

Although the Dobama Movement signifies the most important aspect of the advent of nationalistic politics in Burma, it has inexplicably escaped attention of most studies on Burma prior to its independence in 1948. Even after this, most works of English writers on Burma failed to recognise the full impact and role of this Movement on nationalistic politics of Burma. This Movement is also referred to as the 'Thakin Movement' (which in Burmese means lord or master). What prompted the young patriots to adopt the word 'Thakin' was not the love for the word itself but their aversion to an Englishman or, worse still, an Indian using it in place of Mister as an appellation. The use of 'Thakin' as an appellation was seen as a means of developing their consciousness of being their own masters, the superiority of the Burmese as a race and in the hope of kindling the flame for eventually attaining freedom from the colonial yoke. On the other hand, '*Dobama Asiyone*' as the movement was

***The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930-1938).** Monograph by Khin Yi (SEAP, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp.140, \$ 9.00, ISBN 0-87727-118-6.

**Colonel JM Singh is a freelance researcher after a long stint with the Army Training Command, Shimla.

named in Burmese, tried to inculcate nationalistic sentiments through its literal meaning, i.e. 'the association of we the Burmese' or 'the association of our Burma'.

Khin Yi has graphically and faithfully documented the history of Dobama from its inception without any digressions or sidelights whatsoever. The story of the initial eight years of the movement in Burma that Khin Yi has recounted is, in broad outline, a familiar one in colonial Southeast Asia around that period of history, with parallels in the 'Parai Nasional Indonesia' (PNI) founded in 1928, the 'Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League' founded in the late 1920s and the 'Kesatuan Melayu Muda' (Young Malay Union) founded in 1938. In all these movements a small number of youth, well educated (at home or abroad) in comparison with the majority of the population, well versed with their own and another European language, living in a major cosmopolitan commercial city and familiar with political, economic and social movements in other parts of the world, felt a strong sense of dissatisfaction with the behaviour of the indigenous political leaders who had been co-operating with the colonial rulers. They sought a new departure in politics and morality, condemning the past as both defeatist and corrupt. Initially much of their inspiration came from the intellectual excitement that accompanies the reading of radical critiques of western civilisations and then attempting to apply these to their own situations. In the case of *Dobama Asiyone*, the catalyst for its inception was the first Indo-Burmese riots in Rangoon from 26 to 29 May 1930 in which 2000 Telegu (Indian) dock workers, who had gone on strike against Scindia Steam Navigation Co Ltd for wage increase (from Rs 1.50 to 2.00 per day), clashed against replacement Burmese workers on resumption of work on 30 May 1930 (on securing Rs. 1.75 per day after the wage increase agreement). Although these riots had economic reasons, the young Thakins made it a political issue and used the opportunity to launch the nationalistic movement. As one of the most far-reaching effects of the Movement, Khin Yi has graphically outlined the first serious challenge that this Burmanisation movement posed to the dominance of alien languages in Burma at a time when English and Hindi had prominent place in the Burmese social and governmental systems. The Thakins were afforded one more opportunity to popularise the Movement when six months later

another riot broke out in Rangoon between Burmese labourers and some local Chinese.

The study is in three parts : initial phase of inception and formalisation; the consolidation and gathering of momentum by the Movement; and when it reached its zenith followed by the split that disrupted the Movement in 1983, due primarily to personality clashes. The efforts for the resolution or the split were soon sidelined by the subsequent rush of events as also the position of Burmese nationalists on the question of collaborating with Japanese facism. This is beyond the historical narrative of Khin Yi but it too was eventually overtaken by later events during the subsequent anti-fascist resistance and post-war independence struggle against the British. The undercurrents and effects of the Movement, however, continued to be felt in Burmese politics for long, as exemplified by the fact that during the later years it was commonly recognised that many of the individuals in top positions in the ruling Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) and its major armed and unarmed opponents had been active Thakins in pre-war nationalist politics. General Aung San (whose daughter, Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, is currently leading the democratic movement in Myanmar) himself was a Thakin and had been a secretary general of the Dobama Movement. Since 1980, surviving members of the *Dobama Asiyone* have been given state awards and political pensions for their dedication to the nationalist cause.

Khin Yi's work does not pretend to be anything other than a straightforward history of the Dobama Movement from 1930 to 1938 and, therefore, she has not attempted to provide it with a wider historical perspective. It would, thus, prove an insipid experience for any lay reader to peruse this work in isolation, whereas it could prove to be an invaluable supplement for a larger study. However, there is a saving grace in the exhaustive foreword given by Prof Robert H Taylor of Department of Economics and Political Studies of School of Oriental and African Studies, London, which fills in the necessary gaps by outlining the events prior to and subsequent to the launching of the Dobama Movement. Here is a book that would prove a good addition to the available literature on the modern history of our neighbours.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

Fundamentalism Reborn ? Afghanistan and the Taliban. Edited by William Maley (London : Hurst & Co, 1999), pp. 253, Rs. 795.00, ISBN 1-85065-360-7.

Afghanistan is a conundrum which has ensnared the world's greatest powers over the past two centuries. Great Britain in the Nineteenth and Soviet Union in the Twentieth Century were humbled at the gates of Kabul and Kandahar. The fractured feudal polity of the Afghans saw the dawn of a new era of fundamentalism in 1996 under the Taliban. Who and what are the Taliban? Maley, an Australian military analyst and his fellow essayists, a mix of academicians and journalists have attempted to unravel the mystic surrounding the Taliban, against the backdrop of the social and political fabric of Afghanistan and the "new great game" being played by United States, Russia, Iran and Pakistan and multi nation players as United Nations and non governmental aid agencies.

The fall of the Soviet backed Najibullah regime in April 1992 was expected to bring in an era of hope and prosperity in Afghanistan under President Rabbani. However the fragmented nature of Afghan polity was exploited by Pakistan to attain its strategic objective of gaining depth and Taliban was the phoenix sponsored to achieve this aim. The Taliban is said to have grown out of the motley congregation of religious fundamentalists which bred in madrasas around Kandahar and Baluchistan, catalysed into political action by the Pushtun lobby of the all-pervasive Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Around this Islamic core coagulated ex jihadi warriors and erstwhile Communist military commanders providing it military muscle. The rapid rise of Taliban can thus be attributable to its appeal to these deviant forces who joined the popular band wagon. Taliban's backers in Pakistan apart from the ISI included other powerful lobbies as the Jamaat-e-Islami, transport mafia based in Quetta and Chaman, and drug lords. The decline in US interest, post Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, also contributed to its unfettered growth. At the other end, Russia and the Central Asian states, threatened by rise of Islamic

fundamentalism in their backyard, would prefer a fractured Afghanistan rather than one united under the Taliban. Saudi Arabia and Iran also have powerful stakes in Afghanistan, and in turn Central Asia, and have thus continued to undermine Pakistani influence in the region. In all this conflict of interests, the social tragedy of Afghanistan is perhaps the greatest with human rights and gender inequity on top of the agenda.

The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan is an assertion of the Islamic fundamentalist forces spanning the crescent from the Middle East to Kashmir. However Talibanism, claim the authors, is a purely local phenomenon restricted to Afghanistan as its extreme irredentism renders it unacceptable to other Islamic regimes.

Fundamentally, the Afghan people have to be removed from an arena of conflict in which far too many external forces have a stake and propelled into modernity without tearing apart their traditional roots. It is a gargantuan challenge for the world community at large but the gauntlet has to be picked up for a peaceful Afghanistan would mean peace in South as well as Central Asia. A federal structure for government within the existing territorial boundaries of the nation rendering the country as well as the people free is the prognosticated road map of Afghanistan's future. This book is a very useful primer in understanding complexities of the Afghan imbroglio under the Taliban and leaves a deep impression with its multi-faceted approach.

Colonel R K Bhonsle

The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation. *Edited by David Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1998), pp 392, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-691-01690-9.*

Human history is a tale of divides. The colonial divide of the Nineteenth Century and early Twentieth Century was replaced by the ideological divide of the Cold War, while a much larger threat of ethnic divide forebodes human progress in the coming millennium. A decrease in the coagulating power of nation states, a weakened United Nations, and lack of public commitment for intervention in

areas of peripheral national interest by larger powers such as the US, has seen proliferation of ethnic conflicts in 37 major and many other minor flashpoints in the world since 1989.

To explore the multi-faceted hues of ethnic divisiveness, a research study was undertaken by the University of California Institute on Conflict and Co-operation, funded by Pew Charitable Trust. The aim of the research group was to identify how, why and when do ethnic conflicts spread across national borders and how can these transnational conflicts be managed? Set in three parts, Part I is a lucid summarisation of the phenomenon of international diffusion of ethnicity. Ethnic conflicts are said to spread due to fear of unknown and uncertainty in minority communities. Fear can be of assimilation into dominant culture and hegemonic states, physical safety and survival, a state's inability to arbitrate between groups, information failures and lack of credible commitment to uphold mutually beneficial agreements. Strategic agreements with groups also impel ethnic divide subtly exploited by political entrepreneurs, seeking power based on ethnic appeals and emotional power of ethnic attachments, while internationalisation of ethnic conflict is said to occur due to factors such as diffusion and escalation.

In part II, the phenomenon underlying spread of ethnic conflict is analysed in detail. Factors contributing to international diffusion are stated to be demonstration, regulation and expectation effects. Part III examines the limits of spread of ethnic conflict such as its particularistic appeal to limited sects. The essayists have extensively drawn upon various seminal studies on ethnicity and examples drawn from a wide canvas of break up of post Cold War Eastern Europe, a survey of spread of ethnic conflict in Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries and the North Caucasian imbroglio of the present days. The live situations have been dissected in detail using quantitative analysis and graphs to support each hypothesis.

In the final part, measures to manage transnational ethnic conflict are suggested. The essential ones being containing fear by providing physical and cultural security to minorities, power sharing,

elections, regional autonomy and federalism and, as a last resort, coercive intervention by third parties. The international phenomenon of preventive diplomacy undertaken by credible players is seen to act as a powerful proactive aid to prevent conflict.

While the study is Europe-centric, a rough check on applicability of factors of spread and measures to limit ethnic conflicts in India today reveals the veracity of the conclusions of the authors to the indigenous environment. Thus making this expansive volume a must read for our political, administrative, police and military hierarchy. In the Indian scenario however it appears that though measures necessitated to reduce ethnic divisiveness are probably well known, these are more often exploited to exacerbate rather than suppress division by political conspirators with nefarious agenda of self rather than community interests.

Colonel R K Bhonsle

Defence Themes To Ponder About – The Good : The Bad : The Ugly. By J R Saigal. Edited by Ranbir Singh (Noida : Book Mates Publishers, 1999), pp 84, Rs.100.00

A former editor of the now defunct *Defence Seminar*, this book has forty of his editorials, and includes quotations, quips and wisecracks.

The author seems to be having a chip on his shoulders regarding the performance of senior field commanders, or he has an axe to grind. The only exceptions appear to be Sagat Singh and Harbaksh Singh. He is quite categorical in demolishing many Generals, starting with the ones supposedly responsible for the Indian debacle against the Chinese in 1962. According to Saigal, the one reason the Henderson Brooks report is not seeing the light of day is that it exonerates the military commanders and indicts the politicians and the bureaucrats of the day. This is debatable, but what is not is the way he has gone hammer and tong at the jugulars of Generals.

Mostly red herrings, '... Good : The Bad : The Ugly.' is good enough for a train journey; not worth the price it has been tagged at.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

Sea Our Saviour. By Rear Admiral K Sridharan (Retd) (New Delhi : New Age International Publishers, 1999), pp 180, Price not indicated, ISBN 81-224-1245-9.

This book is a welcome addition to the scarce collection of maritime books authored by Indian writers. Ambitiously it covers a diverse range of themes arranged in patchwork quilt form. Due to its horizontal approach the book cannot afford to be in-depth in character.

Since most Indians are generally unaware of the multi-hued facets of the sea, the author after painstaking research has tried to create awareness of oceans. The author traces the maritime heritage from prehistoric times, bringing out important lessons at each milestone. Then abruptly shifting tack, he traces the beginnings and progress of Indian ship-building industry, repair industry and ports while giving suggestions on how to improve their lot. The track record of Indian ship borne trade and companies holds the author's attention thereafter. He suggests measures to overcome handicaps ailing this industry.

The book includes a brief but good overview on the Laws of the Seas. A chapter on all types of ocean wealth has the author offering simplistic tips to encourage their optimum exploitation. The book analyses the role of the Indian Navy in various conflict situations since independence along with lessons learnt for the lay reader.

Overall, the book makes interesting reading for the uninitiated, especially those who have or are keen to choose the sea as a career. In a sense the strength of the book is in its breadth which may be perceived by some as its weakness.

Commander P K Ghosh

Information Technology-India's Tomorrow. By N Vittal and Dr S Mahalingam (New Delhi : Manas Publications, 2001), pp 416, Rs 795.00, ISBN 81-7049-119-3.

Of late, it has been in focus with the high profile visits of Bill Clinton and Bill Gates, worldwide demand for Indian IT professionals,

and introduction of the IT Act-2000. Therefore, the topicality and relevance of the book is in no doubt. The joint authors, which include the now famous Central Vigilance Commissioner Mr Vittal and Dr Mahalingam, have analysed and researched various aspects of IT, with a healthy detached thoroughness, as it relates to India both for internal applications as also for its huge economic potential for India on its road to IT superpower status. They have rightly deduced the present lack of adequate bandwidth for IT superhighways to function optimally in India as our most serious shortcoming. This requires our policy makers to adopt a holistic and expeditious approach, without being overcautious, for the next few years to ensure that we reap the benefits of IT as projected rather than be left watching as other emerging IT powers walk away with the cake.

The authors have good advise for the defence planners too for a speedy and relevant IT policy for the Army. Taking cue from the fact that the birthplace of internet itself was the testbed of the US Army, the authors feel that best results would emerge if we are proactive in synergising the skills-base of the defence and other national institutions be it the academia or the corporate sector. They have additional advise about the methodology that Army needs to adopt for harnessing IT in order to attract more young people to make up its officer-shortages and adoption of the Chinese PLA – like commercial ventures to make up its budget shortage. Overall, the book comes through as a complete and authentic compendium laying a feasible road map for the Indian IT juggernaut to roll on. The book could do with slightly better editing to eliminate all spelling and syntax errors.

Colonel Jagmohan Singh

Dragon Strike : The Millennium War. By Humphrey Hawksley and Simon Holberton (London : Pan Books, 1997), pp. 438, £ 5.99, ISBN 0-330-35036-6.

Though *Dragon Strike*, categorised as non-fiction, on the back of the cover, was authored by Humphrey Hawksley and Simon Holberton in the year 1997 it did not draw much attention in India

till *Dragon Fire* by Humphrey Hawksley was released in 2000 and became a subject of controversy in the media. It was only then that *Dragon Strike* was considered the first release in the Dragon series.

The authors in the Preface to the book amply clarify the omnipresent risk in writing a book about the future as one could be proved wrong. However, since the publication of this book in April 1997, events in East Asia have served to support their apprehensions about China's rise as a world power. Indeed some events described in this book have now taken place.

The authors are of the view that the real potential of China has only become apparent during Clinton's presidency. Yet, the United States of America failed to draw up a comprehensive policy on how to deal with it. Ten years after demise of the Soviet Union another power bloc is emerging. It is wealthy and expansionist. It has yawning cultural differences with the West. It is embittered about its past. China is a non-democratic one-party state, whose government has to prove itself to survive. This book had been written as a warning of what might happen if Western, and especially American, policy towards China was allowed to drift.

If the much talked about *Dragon Fire*, is an explosive thriller and ultimate confrontation of the Twenty First Century then *Dragon Strike* is an authoritatively constructed thriller in which the United States, Asia, and Europe become dramatically and unavoidably enmeshed in war. All said and done, *Dragon Strike* has the page-turning quality of best-selling fiction, yet the events described therein make up a real-live scenario, which horrifies Western defence planners as per *Far Eastern Economic Review*.

Anyone not reading *Dragon Strike* before reading *Dragon Fire*, is missing out on future shocks.

I R Kumar

The State in Medieval Kashmir. By R L Hangloo (New Delhi : Manohar Publishers, 2000) pp. 150, Rs. 300.00, ISBN 81-7304-251-9.

The book under review delves on the state's medieval history,

ending with its Mughal domination. Before the formation of a unified state, Kashmir comprised of territories with their Naga chieftains under whom the peasants and shepherds thrived. There were some 529 clan settlements scattered over the entire valley. The chief of the Nagas acknowledged the authority of a super chief and paid regular tributes to him. Between 200 and 300 AD, these tribal formations were integrated. Buddhist monks and Brahmins helped destabilise the system of the tribals and unified them to be part of the Mauryan empire. However, Buddhism could not last long in Kashmir because the people in this cold region could not be made to stick to the tenets of non-violence and vegetarianism, a life-style demanded by that religion. The Brahmins of course bent their faith to suit the occasion. While they acted as God's agents they did not put restrictions that went against Kashmiri customs. While the king pampered the Brahmins with material goods, the Brahmins gave divine legitimacy to the king's position. Throughout the medieval period this alliance of rulers and the priestly class helped sustain the feudal system even when it became highly oppressive. This oppressive system continued till the rise of Islam, the birth of a new set of rulers called Sultans and their priestly class, the Sayyids .

Islam came to Kashmir with a 'human face' that gave the people the choice between conversion or slavery, if not death. Shahmir, who laid the foundation of Muslim rule (1339-42 AD) was able to get the support of the Hindu chiefs and went to the extent of marrying his daughters to them. Later, Sultan Sikandar challenged the authority of Brahmins, demolished their temples and confiscated the property of *Agraharas*. There was no evidence of people's anger against the acts of the Sultan because there was hardly any sympathy for the Hindu priestly class.

The Sultans extended their patronage to the Turks and the Persians who brought with them the skills from which native artisans gained artistic excellence. The early period of Muslim rule in Kashmir thus helped the common people of the state. However, the Sultan-Sayyid combination slowly degenerated to the standard of the erstwhile Rajah-Brahmin alliance. The Sayyids, in the name of legitimising the Sultan's power, began exploiting the people leading

the state into the "vortex of complete economic and social collapse from which it was ultimately rescued by the extension of the Mughal rule.

The Mughal emperors integrated Kashmir into India. Kashmir became more prosperous during Akbar's reign. His liberalism and religious tolerance appealed to the Kashmiri psyche. Arts, crafts and trade flourished and the vast Indian subcontinent became ready market for Kashmiri products.

This vividly narrated early history of Kashmir is well authenticated by notes and quotes.

Subedar Major N Kunju (Retd)

The Story of The Pakistan Air Force 1988 – 1998 : A Battle Against Odds. By PAF (Project PAF History under Air Marshal A Rashid Shaikh (Retd)) (Islamabad : Shaheed Foundation, 2000), pp 414, Pak Rs 595.00, ISBN 969-8553-00-2.

The PAF published the history of its first forty years of existence (upto 1987) in the year 1988 under the title *Story of the PAF*. The present book is the second volume covering the period from 1988 to 1998, i.e. a period of ten years. This volume was inspired by the present Chief of the PAF, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi, who considered it prudent not to wait for another forty years to chronicle the progress of the PAF. Considering the sway and predominance that the Army has over the two sister Services in Pakistan, reducing them to largely 'silent' roles, publication of this book is indeed a good effort to lend an independent voice to the otherwise low profile PAF.

The book, which was commissioned by the top leadership of the PAF itself, starts with a rather quaint tribute to the same successive top leadership for its exceptional competence and courage! True to the claim of the authors that the book is a chronicle of major events of the decade related to the PAF, her involvement in the Afghan War has been discussed in detail at the very outset. The role of the PAF remained largely unsung in this covert

unconventional war, in which the PAF was severely restricted by very difficult 'rules of engagement' (ROEs) that prevented the PAF from pursuit across the Durand Line as also prohibited shooting down any intruders if there was the slightest chance of the debris falling across the borders. While avoiding wholesale criticism of the Pak Army's persistent big-brother attitude towards the other two Services, the authors have provided enough hints of the simmering discontent across the PAF for having been forced to play 'second fiddle'. The PAF, like the other tactical air forces of the subcontinent, seems to be struggling to assert itself as the dominant strategic arm of state-power in the present context, as evident from the opening quote of the book, "The application of air power is now a profession of considerable complexity... It demands discrete professionalism which must not be subordinate to primary interests of another service, that would lead to the subordination of air power itself...".

The inventory of PAF aircraft given corresponds to the ones published elsewhere (Brasseys etc). However, what should interest the PAF watchers more is the very detailed account of each and every formation and unit of the PAF, running over no less than 140 pages of text. The book makes much of the veritable coup that enabled the PAF in clinching a bargain deal of 50 Mirages (old 1960 version) from Australia in 1990, inspite of strong Indian protests. The Indian lobby has also been blamed for the 1996-1997 events which led to the falling-through of their Mirage-2000 and SU-27/MIG-29 deals with the French and the Russians. The strong base of the PAF in relation to training and modern repair facilities have been highlighted to emphasise the fine health and positive progress of the PAF.

The other interesting inclusion is the detailed account of the activities of various PAF welfare organisations. Noteworthy amongst these are the PAF Officer's Housing Scheme which ensures provision of houses for all retiring officers and the PAF Women's Association which has made great strides in promoting self-sufficiency amongst the PAF personnel through highly successful and impressive social and commercial ventures. These include projects such as Shaheen Foundation which has floated its own private airline (Shaheen Air International), air cargo and ground

handling companies apart from pay TV, FM radio, insurance and so on.

This coffee-table book has been produced in a good readable format, liberally embellished with visuals and photographs set to provide excellent study material for all those involved in the study of the region's Armed Forces especially of the PAF.

Colonel Jagmohan Singh

China and the Middle East : The Quest for Influence. Edited by PR Kumaraswamy (New Delhi : Sage, 1999), pp.228, Rs 425.00, ISBN 81-7036-847-2(Pb)

It is beyond doubt that China is emerging as a political, economic and military power in the region. Like all countries, it is also aspiring to have lasting and good relations with the Middle East, oil rich, countries. The author has detailed the means which China has adopted to have political and economic leverage by way of trading in consumer goods, arms export, projects and supply of cheap Chinese labour. The other topics of interest covered are China's relations with Turkey, India and Pakistan. The chapter on China and Proliferation – Implications for India by Ashok Kapur is of particular interest to the Indian readers. It explores certain dilemmas being faced by India as to whether it should rely on peaceful diplomacy and a belief that outside powers would protect a territorially non-expansionist India or should it rely on military diplomacy to protect its interests; should India prepare to fight a war at a time and place of the adversary's choosing, that is plan a military defence or should it acquire the means to raise the costs of foreign intervention so that the adversary would think twice about the costs of war or intervention (coercion short of war)?

Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)

The Russian Far East : Prospects for the New Millennium. By Michael Bradshaw (UK : The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), pp. 40, Price not indicated) ISBN 186203 0731

Michael Bradshaw, a senior lecturer in the School of Geography and Environmental Sciences and an Associate Member

of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, in his short paper examines the economic and political situation in the Russian Far East (RFE).

The author has summarised the number of economic problems faced by RFE due to increasing costs and declining profits, so much so that the enterprises are unable to pay the bills and wages. The Soviet system created a distorted and dependent peripheral economy in the Far East.

The study also examines the political relations and identifies the key trading partners like China, USA, Japan and Korea who have their own interests, and constraints. The report ends on an optimistic note predicting good prospects for the RFE for the millennium with open economy and an improved environment for foreign investors.

A good reference report with facts and figures of interest to research scholars.

Commodore R P Khanna (Retd)

The Armenia - Azerbaijan Conflict : Causes and Implications.
By Michael P Croissant (Westport : Praeger Publishers, 1998), pp.172, \$ 59.95, ISBN 0-275 - 96241-5.

The international boundaries of nations are a legacy of geography-cum-history and invariably divide ethnic, religious and linguistic communities on either side of the border. The memories of fraternal ties and bitter conflicts with some of their compatriots lie dormant under a strong central rule but can explode into bloody ethnic strife under a weak administration.

With the collapse of the Soviet rule, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the strategic Transcaucasus region took to ethnic cleansing, leaving over half a million refugees in its wake and threatening peace and security in the neighbouring states of Iran, Turkey and Russia. Russia undertook to act as the mediator to resolve the conflict peacefully without success. As the cleansing went on, with

interludes and the spill over of refugees into the neighbouring states, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and later the USA joined the peace negotiations as a three-way Co-Chairman with Russia and France. In the early Nineties, the vast oil and gas reserve in Azerbaijan added a new factor to the conflict. A consortium of global oil companies signed contracts with Azerbaijan to exploit its oil fields to their advantage, with a minor share for Russia.

The author has probed deep into the causes of the conflict and the progress of peace making in the increasing interplay of the 'big game' role of world powers whereby a local conflict became regional and finally ended as an opportunistic game at the international level.

An interesting book with good sketches.

Major General L S Lehl (Retd)

Decade of Transition—Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American-Israeli Alliance. By Abraham Ben-Zvi (New York : Colombia University Press, 1998), pp. 219, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-231-11263-7.

In the context of the current stand off in West Asia, it is hard to imagine that the US foreign policy was any thing but favourable to Israel. However, this, indeed, was the case in the 1950s under the Eisenhower administration. It was only with John F Kennedy, who pandered to the New York Jewish community during his election campaign and later went on to tilt towards the manifesto of this moneyed lobby after his victory at the hustings, that the US-Israel alliance started to take hold, and has held ever since. This book is about the decade between the inauguration of the Eisenhower administration in 1953 and the landmark decision of Kennedy administration to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel in August 1962. Broadly, it covers two periods, one when Israel was construed as a strategic liability; and two, the ensuing one which saw the shifting of emphasis towards Israel.

For all the difference in form and business approach and cognition between the foreign policy experts of the two eras, the axial end results that emanate are: the policy Kennedy adopted was

modeled on some of the stipulations of Eisenhower's second term. The sale of Hawks was based on groundwork laid by Ike's men; who relinquishing their earlier views; became amenable to perceiving Israel as a strategic asset. Hence it can be safely said that this special relationship paradigm was determined by considerations of regional security rather than ideological predilections. The stimulus of the missiles was in overall harmony of the US government's operational code in the Arab-Israeli area. This methodology was practiced in relation to Egypt as well, quite successfully. In both cases major incentives were dangled as carrots in the hope of setting in motion a process of regional compromises, and as a mechanism of augmenting American predominance and leverage on the protagonists. Overall, this was dictated by the cool and hardheaded computations of the American national interests.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

The Palestinian Exodus 1948-1998. Edited by Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran (UK : Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 264, £ 35.00, ISBN - 0-86372 244 - X.

The University of London had arranged a conference on 17 May 1997, for focusing on the relationship between the demographic displacement of the Palestinians, and the emanation of the State of Israel on the cartographic landscape of the world. It brought together a few eminent historians, scholars and legal luminaries on a common platform. This book features the papers presented by the discussants as also a couple of add-ons. Essentially, it roundly condemns the role of Great Britain and the United States; the UN also comes under fire; but it is Israel mainly that draws the maximum flak for the "ethnic cleansing" and the odd fifty years of the ongoing exodus of the Palestinians from their traditional homeland.

The first part of the book details the history, geography and the compendium of the Palestinian diaspora; the second examines the possible solutions for sorting out this mired mess. Interesting to note that whereas the contributors to the first portion of the conference included a Briton and a Palestinian Jew, the solution providers were predominantly Palestinians, though John Quigley;

an American law expert; has also pitched in. The overall perspective, therefore, is more or less balanced. However one cannot really blame Ghada Karmi for getting progressively bitter while recounting the frustration at the international inertia in the face of strong Jewish lobby in the US.

Socio-economic, legal, political placement of the refugees and their dispersion in neighbouring Arab states and the vexing problem of adoption of new citizenship is presented in the opening chapter. The opposing Zionist and Palestinian viewpoints are discussed in the next, where the total indifference of the Israelis to the Palestinian plight is highlighted. The effectiveness per se of the Oslo Accord is watered down, even though its usefulness to a degree acknowledged. Evictions, expulsions and "transfers" enforced after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, are narrated along with their overall impact on this mass departure. A hardheaded strategy, for local and international human rights organisations, political radicals, the Palestinian Authority and mediators, to counter this Israeli high-handedness is discussed in a legal perspective in another very illuminating essay.

Ways out of the existing morass are spelt out in the political and legalistic lore. Exacting compliance of the right of return, resettlement as an alternative to reparation to areas appropriated by Israel, and compensation is sought under the aegis of the United Nations, international courts and the various human rights organisations. The notion of the preposterousness of "return" is turned down out of hand. The basic ambient factors for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem suggested are : the refugees and their progeny have a right to return in principle; a formal apperception of Israel's fundamental responsibility of fabricating the refugee problem; remuneration/damages for those who cannot or will not go back; a right to live in the newly created Palestinian State as its subject; a special jurisdiction for those in Jordan and Lebanon. Though nowhere near the much celebrated *Exodus* of Leon Uris, this book is definitely worth a browse on a Sunday! Researchers will find it useful as a minority/contra view.

Lieutenant Colonel A K Sharma (Retd)

Suharto and his Generals : Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983. By David Jenkins. *Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. Third Print* (New York : Cornell University Press, 1997), pp.279, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-87763-030-5

This is an attempt to provide a historical-descriptive record of the "challenge" posed to President Suharto within the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) during the period 1975-83. A debate developed over ABRI's relations with other socio-political groups in general, and the political parties in particular. The centre of debate was the "contradiction" between ABRI's claim and the reality of its support for Golkar, the political group which held a majority of seats in the DPR (Parliament).

The author has focussed on the appointment of military officers to nonmilitary functions. There were, in the mid-70s, more than 20,000 military men serving in a *kekaryaan* (nonmilitary) capacity. ABRI's involvement in *kekaryaan* activities was excessive and needed to be scaled down. The armed forces were short of manpower. Even so, cutback in the *kekaryaan* was slow with the system remaining firmly in the hands of the military leaders. However, most of the officers at the middle and lower levels, were "apolitical" and did not take sides. The majority could be expected to follow whatever dictates came down from the hierarchy.

The author has incorporated two papers pertaining to the Army's role in society. The first paper, produced by members of the teaching staff at Seskoad, appeared in mid-1977, shortly after the general elections. Reacting to the "excesses" of Golkar's 1977 election campaign, the paper urged ABRI to refrain in future from siding with one of the contestants. The second paper – issued by the Chief of the Army Staff, General Widodo, in October 1978 – came to similar conclusions. From 1978 until 1980, General Jusuf conducted a widely publicised campaign aimed at reunifying ABRI and the people and stressed that ABRI was not the property of any one group in society but was above all groups – an assurance that gave hope to many that the Armed Forces would not throw their weight behind Golkar in future elections. By 1981, the ruling group

reasserted itself. Widodo, whose performance as the Chief of the Army Staff had come under criticism had retired and was replaced by his deputy, General Poniman.

A "Hankam Paper" - *Fighters and Soldiers : The Concept and Implementation of ABRI's Dual Function*- was issued in 1981. The paper sought to provide an ideological justification for the status quo and look at ABRI's likely future role in the Indonesian society.

The book is of value for researchers of Indonesian regime under Suharto.

Colonel P K Vasudeva (Retd)

From Plassey to Pakistan : The Family History of Iskandar Mirza, The First President of Pakistan. By Humayun Mirza (New York : University Press of America, Inc., 1999), pp 418, \$ 44.50, ISBN 0-7618-1509-0

The author is the son of Major General Iskandar Mirza, the first president of Pakistan. He traces his family's lineage to Mir Jafar, the Commander-in Chief of Nawab Siraj-ud-doula, who is better known in Indian history for his betrayal of the Nawab, which in turn led to the success of Robert Clive in the historic Battle of Plassey. Not surprisingly the first hundred odd pages are expended in justifying the actions of Mir Jafar and numerous wards. This portion of the book throws light on the goings on in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa during the formative years of the British Empire detailing the intrigues and guile the British adopted in exploiting the weakness of the Nawabs.

Chapter Six onwards narrates on the birth and growth of Syed Iskander Ali Mirza, the first Indian to graduate from Sandhurst (on 15 July 1920) and later the first President of Pakistan. The times and turbulence of the era of freedom movement have been nicely interwoven in the narrative dealing with the concurrent professional progress of Iskander Mirza, who resigned his commission in August 1926 and joined the Indian Political Service (drawn half from the

Indian Civil Service and half from the Indian Army). In 1946, Iskandar Mirza was appointed Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence. Mr Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, desired Iskandar Mirza to safeguard the interests of Muslims before the partition and thereafter. There are some startling revelations. In that (a) Iskandar Mirza had saved (the then) Brigadier Ayub Khan from being court-martialed in 1947 for dereliction of duty, and how Ayub upstaged his benefactor; (b) Sardar Patel had offered to Pakistan that if Pakistan could lay off Hyderabad, it could have Kashmir. Why the offer was not taken is not clarified. The narrative ends with Zia refusing to spare the life of Bhutto, a friend of the author, and declining to send him into exile.

On the whole, a very informative and interesting treatise on creation and growth of Pakistan, its relations with India and other countries. The book should be of great use to those doing research on the subcontinent and its history. The appendices, and 'notes' on different chapters, add to the value of this book.

Brigadier Parmodh Sarin (Retd)

Witness to Surrender. By Siddiq Salik (New Delhi : Lancer Publishers, Distributors 2000), pp 245, Rs. 595.00, ISBN 81-7062-108.9.

Siddiq Salik went to Bangla Desh (then East Pakistan) as a Public Relations Officer of the Pakistan Army in June 1970 on a tour of duty from Pakistan (then West Pakistan), which ended on 16 December 1971 with the fall of Dacca. Throughout this fateful year, the author was in Dacca as a uniquely privileged observer and participant in the political and human drama which culminated in the Indo-Pakistan War and creation of Bangla Desh. Subsequently, during his two years as prisoner of war in India; he was able to ponder and analyse the complex circumstances which underlay the high drama. Prior to his death in the fateful Bahawalpur crash of 1988, the author was able to give a comprehensive overview of the political turbulence of the period along with his first detailed professional account of the War itself, which got published in Karachi in 1977.

An informative book, of interest to all.

Brigadier RPS Malhan

One Day Too Long : Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam. By Timothy N Castle (New York : Colombia University Press, 1999), pp 371, Price not indicated, ISBN 0-231-10317-4

To increase the effectiveness of aerial bombing missions around Hanoi and along Ho Chi Minh trail in North Vietnam, the USA upgraded its TACAN LIMA site - 85 - a bomber navigational aid, into a Combat Sky Spot for directing the mission onto their specified targets. In October 1967, this top secret base on the towering and seemingly unassailable summit of Phon Pha Thi about 12 kms from North Vietnam in northern Laos—called project Heavy Green—started functioning. Staffed by 16 unarmed technicians and depending for their protection on Hmong and Thai militia dispersed in the valley down below, it was annihilated by a classic infiltration raid by the special sapper unit Dac Long of PAVN on 11 March 1968.

As a research scholar and Department of Defence investigator for Laos, Castle has, in this book, revealed the entire course of project Heavy Green from its inception, tasking and Viet Cong operations for elimination of site 85 wherein only four of the sixteen staffers could be evacuated. He has meticulously examined the anomalies and flaws in the venture, functional and command set-up and the day-to-day events of enemy invasion. He has involved some relatives of the staff as well as some Viet Cong officers in his explanatory mission.

The book is both a tale of heroism and sacrifice by the American soldier volunteers, and a disclosure of conflicting planning by Defence and CIA bosses.

Major General S K Talwar (Retd)

Hullabaloo in the Guava Orchard. By Kiran Desai (London : Faber and Faber, 1998), pp. 209, £ 6.99, ISBN 0-571-19571-7

The book was the winner of the 1988 Betty Trask Prize. It revolves around Sampath Chawla whose mother does not fit into the neighbourhood and who is himself a day-dreamer to the disappointment of his family. Yet, his grand mother had great faith in him and predicted that he would come up in life in the near future. One day Sampath climbed a guava tree, and remained there as

a hermit. The village folk thought he was a pious "Baba" and developed faith in him.

Through this story the author pokes fun at the innocent town dweller's insatiable appetite for a Guru but does not condemn their faith. The author has in a clever and hilarious exercise, brought out the incompetence of the local authorities as also corruption in a small town. This book is like any other fiction which Kiran Desai has crafted in a beautiful and unusual way around a family of no consequence.

An enjoyable book for light reading that would appeal to all sections of the society.

Commodore R P Khanna, AVSM (Retd)

How to Face Interview Successfully. by Air Vice Marshal S P Dhawan (Retd) (New Delhi : Summit Printers, 2000), pp. 38, Rs 50.00.

Ever since liberalisation spread its wings, the employment market in our country has undergone a sea-change. While there are ample opportunities for qualified people in technical and non-technical streams; the disciplined cadre of retired defence personnel is yet to get recognition of its skills and strengths and seek an entry in industries and in multinationals.

Their sound academic back-up and hands-on experience on high-tech equipment and machinery, coupled with ingrained qualities of discipline, devotion to duty and non-agitational approach, have not helped them get suitable slots in civil jobs. Regrettably, the breakthrough is nowhere in sight!

Where are the gaps? Could it be that the technique of preparing a focused CV is not known to them, or that they generally meet their Waterloo in the Interviews?

Useful hints on initial preparation, covering aspects of power of expression, general awareness, self assessment and importance of physical fitness and interest in sports and hobbies - have been highlighted in simple and lucid style. The subject of "facing the interview" is written in an analytical manner. Elaborating importance of punctuality, dress, mannerism, initiative, and the etiquette; the author has delved deep in techniques of self-marketing.

This ready-reckoner infact has been compiled by the author, based on his vast experience in the Selection Boards where he has conducted a large number of interviews. It is extremely useful in gearing-up confidence levels of the candidates to face the ordeal of "Interview". The author has also illustrated two model Interviews. It is like experiencing the excitement of the event in person.

The candidates - infact all job-seekers – are likely to be much better prepared by referring to this book. Air Vice Marshal Dhawan needs to be complemented for his efforts in "pouring" his life-time experience as a trainer and an interviewer in writing this book. Quality of print is excellent and layout extremely pleasant. The text is immaculate and error-free and the book is modestly priced.

Recommended as a prized possession for all those who are on the lookout for a job. Defence libraries will do well to have a few copies on their shelves.

Group Captain D C Bakshi, VSM



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Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending December 2000

(The books reviewed in October-December 2000 issue have been added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

ARMED FORCES

1. Kondapalli, Srikanth **China's Naval Power**, New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2001, Rs 650.00
ISBN-81-86019-37-5
2. Raza, Maroof **Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan**. New Delhi, Har Anand Publication, 2001, Rs. 250.00, ISBN-81-241-0762-9
3. Bajpai, Kanti **Kargil and After: Challenges For Indian Policy**. New Delhi, Har-Anand Publication, 2001, Rs 595.00, ISBN-81-241-0646-0
4. Alam, Aftab **Pakistan's Fourth Military Coup**. Delhi, Raj Publication, 2001, Rs 325.00, ISBN- 81 86208-16-X
5. Kadyan, R S **The Rajputana Rifles**. New Delhi; Lancer Publisher, 2000, Rs 995.00, ISBN 81-7062-122-4
6. Chatterji, S K **Vintage Guns of India**. Delhi; Macmillan India LTD, 2001, Rs 1500, ISBN-0333 936736.
7. Jagjit, Singh **With Honor and Glory: Wars Fought by India 1947-1999**. New Delhi, Lancer Publishers & Distributors, 2001, Rs 595.00
ISBN 81 7062 1097

STRATEGY, ARMS RACE AND DETERRENCE

8. Denardo, James **The Amateur Strategist: Intuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race**. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995, £15.95, ISBN-0-521-4844-4

9. Sachdev, AK **Space Age Gladiators: Surface to Surface Missiles and Air Strategy: An Indian Viewpoint.** New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2000, Rs. 600.00, ISBN81-86019-36-7

- INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY**

10. Bhattacharjea, Mira Sinha **China, the World and India.** New Delhi, Samskriti, 2001, Rs.595.00, ISBN-81-87374-06-3.

11. Jones, Clive and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe **International Security in a Global Age: Securing the Twenty-first Century.** London, Frank-Cass,2000, £17.50 ISBN-07146-8111-3.

12. Reychler, Luc and Thania Paffenholz **Peace Building: A Field Guide.** London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, \$ 24.95 ISBN-1-55587-937-3

13. Rothermund, Dietmar **The Role of the State in South Asia and Other Essays.** New Delhi, Monohar Publishers & Distributors, 2000, Rs. 375.00, ISBN-81-7304-361-2

14. Banerjee, Dipankar **Security Studies in South Asia: Change and Challenges.** New Delhi, Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2000, Rs 375.00 ISBN-81-7304-363-9

15. Brentjes, Burchard and Helga Brentjes **Taliban – A Shadow Over Afghanistan.** Varanasi, Rishi Publication, 2000, Rs 800.00, ISBN 81-85193-24-X.

- INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY**

16. Kurian, Nimmi **Emerging China and India's Policy Options.** New Delhi, Lancer Publisher & Distributors,2001, Rs 495.00, ISBN-81-70621100.

17. Sharma, Prem Lata **India Foreign Policy: Prospects & Retrospect.** Jaipur, Mangal Deep Publication, Rs. 655.00, ISBN-81-7594-064-6.

18. Dharamdasani, MD **India and Nepal: Big Power–Small Power Relations in South Asia.** New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 2001, Rs 275.00 ISBN-7003-242-3

19. Nanda, Ravi **Kashmir and Indo-Pak Relations.** New Delhi, Lancer Books, 2001, Rs 395.00 ISBN-81-7095-082-1

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

20. Suri, RK **Information Technology Laws: Laws Relating To Cyber & E-Commerce.** New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2000, Rs 995.00 ISBN-81-86830-03-0

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

21. Wadhwa, KK **Constitutional Autonomy: A Case Study of J& K.** New Delhi, Bhavana Books & Prints, 2001, Rs 395.00, ISBN 81- 86505-53-9

REFERENCE BOOKS

22. **India 2001: A Reference Annual.** Edited by Research, Reference and Training Division, New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 2001, Rs 240.00


23. Giri Babu, DY **The Parliament of India Directory: Members of Lok Sabha/Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Committees.** Delhi, Adset Communications, 2001, Rs 200.00

24. Mukhopadhyaya, Jiban K & Aiyar Sarita **Statistical Outline of India 2000-2001.** Mumbai, Tata Services Limited, 2000, Rs 195.00

TERRORISM

25. Gill, KPS & Ajai Sahni **FAULTLINES - Writings on Conflict & Resolution, Vol. 7.** New Delhi, Bulwark Books, 2000, Rs 250.00, ISBN-81-87553-06-5

26. Gill, KPS **Terror and Containment Perspectives of India's Internal Security.** New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2001, Rs 540.00 ISBN-81-212-0712-6



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
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