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
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ISSN 0041-770X

The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :
KASHMIR HOUSE, RAJAJI MARG, NEW DELHI-110 011
Telephone No. 3015828

Vol CXXII

October-December 1992

No. 510

USI Journal is published Quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 120.00 Foreign £18.00 or \$ 33.00 by Air
Mail £14.00 or \$ 26.00 by Sea Mail. Subscription should be sent to the
Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution. Articles,
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EDITORIAL

Beijing Voyage

In September this year a USI delegation visited China at the invitation of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies (BIISS). The delegation led by the former President of the USI Council, Vice Admiral SP Govil, included Air Marshal J Zaheer, Lt General ZC Bakshi, Vice Admiral KK Nayyar and the Director USI, Maj Gen SC Sinha. A brief report on this visit by the leader of the team and three papers presented at the BIISS by the members of the delegation form the contents of this issue. We hope to include in our next issue, some papers containing the views of the members of the BIISS on the new international order emerging after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

There is no doubt that such reciprocal visits between India and China and close interaction between senior armed forces' officers of the two countries would lead to creative confidence building, and deeper understanding of each other's views on matters of dispute. To be sure, such visits are voyages of discovery, reconciliation and rapprochement and enable us to reduce the vast encyclopedia of ignorance and prejudice. Such voyages which began with those of Hiuen-Tsang and Fa-Hien in the mists of time, and subsequent contacts and synthesis between the two cultures in the Indo-Chinese States of South-East Asia, clearly prove the profound wisdom of the Eastern philosophy and Politics which led to the long history of peaceful co-existence between the two oldest world civilizations.

The Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962, however, caused a serious break in a long period of peace between the two great neighbours. Despite a lapse of more than 30 years, the vexed boundary issue has not been settled. This calls for collective wisdom to solve it so that recent past does not become the enemy of the future. A solution of the border issue would enable India and China, together, to contribute, in a synergistic relationship, to the building of a new international order, which would help remove the indignation and humiliation of poverty for the teeming millions. For the peoples of India and China, it is a golden moment in the history of the great world. The continuing conundrum on the border issue would now be an archaic anachronism.

In the lead article, General VN Sharma, former Army Chief, reviews India's security environment with penetrating insight and deep understanding of the core issues which impact on the internal and external security paradigms. The article, which is stimulating and thought provoking, provides a useful backdrop to the end of the year introspection of security issues which need to be high-lighted in the preparation of the new defence Budget for 1993-94.

And from the staff of the USI, a very Happy New Year, to all our readers.

The World Power Structure in Transition from a Quasi Unipolar to a Quasi Multipolar State and the Options of a Middle Power in this Milieu*

(Part - I)

GENERAL K SUNDARJI, PVSM (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

Crystal-gazing is at best a hazardous exercise. Crystal-gazing in times of relative stability in the established world order, with projections up to about two decades may be dangerous, but there would be some insurance companies that are bold enough to underwrite the risks. However, doing so when the world is in the throes of rapid change and the world order to come casts but a faint shadow, is almost reckless, but has to be undertaken if any strategic analyses have to be carried out. Such analyses are always needed if we are to evolve effective national policies, but in times of transition to new world orders, in the era of "Powershift", to quote Toffler, these are vital and cannot be escaped. We are in such an era now.

The Indian track record of strategic analyses has been pretty poor. George Tanham, a veteran of the Rand Corporation writes, "Indians have not been great strategic thinkers or developers of strategy, although they have been profound thinkers in many other fields (their) view of life as...unpredictable, did not lead Indians to see the need for strategy, and even if they had, they would have been unlikely to proceed because, if...the future is unknown and unknowable, why plan?"². This may not be the only reason; there was the Nehruvian disdain for matters military: "India is going to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs, not I hope in the military sense, but in many other senses which are more important and effective in the end."³ The result was a lack of strategic culture, and no growth of institutions for holistic strategic planning. The Planning Commission which Nehru set up was for socio-economic planning and excluded defence. Field Marshal Manekshaw writes, "Strategy involves the management of all resources of the country, not only for the security of the State but also for its advancement, and for the

* First part of the text of the USI National Security Lecture - 1992 delivered by General K Sundarji, PVSM, former Chief of the Army Staff, on September 24, 1992 at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Auditorium, New Delhi.

fulfilment of hopes and aspirations of its people. To this end it is essential to formulate policy with a long term concept in mind. This regretfully was not done in the Nehru era...The Shastri era was too short....With Indira Gandhi... much was achieved... but infighting...and the distrust...prevented the evolution (sic) of any long term strategy.⁷⁴

Before we can begin even to conjecture about Indo-US relations in the coming two decades, we have to first try to guesstimate what the world's power structure is likely to be during that period. After that we will have to deduce what the USA's aims would be during these decades and what kinds of policies she is likely to adopt in general in pursuing those aims and in particular those having special impact on India. We will also have to second guess what the USA might perceive to be India's aims and interests during the period. We will have to analyse in similar fashion likely aims and policies of China and Pakistan for the period 1992-2015. In any event, we must have a formulation of India's aims. This might be the toughest part of the exercise, as the Indian government has never yet articulated with any clarity what its aims and objectives are for any perspective period. There have of course been idealistic pronouncements of very long term aims; these are in the realm of political platitudes and are not what a strategic planner can use for analyses. Only after such a thorough and complete analysis will the matrix of threat to India's aims be discerned. How these threats would manifest themselves in the assumed world milieu of the coming decades, would suggest to us strategic options for neutralising the threats to the extent possible. Finally, and only then, can we conjecture about the likely Indo-US relations during that period.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

During the next two decades, what would the new world order portend? By 2015 is it practical to expect that :

The world would be moving towards world government and that the United Nations would have been considerably strengthened towards that end?

(A digression: Is world government really desirable, considering that centralised government of any political or economic hue only means more bureaucracy and a less sensitive administration? It is sad enough that we have highly centralised and inefficient bureaucracies in large states like China and India. But do we want the same kind of dispensation for the provinces of the world from say a central government in New York? At least today we have the notional option as human beings, of voting with our feet and migrating from oppression. It would be sad if the entire planet was under one mono-

lithic and insensitive dispensation of whatever political or economic order, especially, when there is little probability that such a world government could prevent violence between states. What would have been hostilities between sovereign states in the old world, would become 'civil wars' within a 'unified' world)

Nationalism would have withered adequately for nation-states to freely become part of regional federations?

Nationalism would have at least weakened insofar as nations would be willing to give up some of their sovereignty, to be part of regional groupings?

Nationalism would still be so strong that nations would be loath to give up any sovereignty?

Economic colonialism and technological colonialism would have been ended voluntarily by the nations of the North? Or would the North have to be coerced by the South to achieve a New International Economic Order?

Now, I will attempt some guesstimates.

Just because the cold war is over, it does not mean that geopolitics will *not count or that realpolitik* has been legislated out of existence. It is true that for a little while after the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, the USA would be the only global power left, albeit with somewhat inadequate economic means. However it is against human nature, in its present state of evolution, to permit such a situation to continue without challenge. There would be clash of economic and technological interests between the USA and her erstwhile allies in the West and including Japan, China and other emerging powers or groupings would also figure in the overall equation. There could be clashes in the approach to ecological issues. The power imbalance inherent in an unipolar situation might be redressed and a multipolar equation could emerge. Nevertheless, the USA is likely to remain the leading power even in the multipolar phase. Even in that historically fleeting moment of predominance in a unipolar world, life is not going to be easy for the USA. During the cold war the decisions regarding friends and adversaries were made very simply; those states that were friendly to the USSR, or even those who were not anti the USSR were adversaries. Others were friends; no matter what type of government they had or what type of ideology they followed; whether they were breakaway communist states, fascists, tinpot dictators or whatever. Now she will have no such external arbiter of the choice.

Will the USA follow a pragmatic policy of enlightened self interest in

the post Soviet phase, or attempt to perpetuate its preeminence by taking on all challenges be they from erstwhile friend or foe? The latter approach could lead to fierce economic and technological competition between developed free market societies. On the other hand, the developed countries could make common cause with the USA to stall or delay the rewriting of the present economic rule book that favours all of them. These being all free market economies, they may also clothe this 'battle' with the South in ideological garb. All that one can say at present, is that unipolarity may not endure through this entire period till 2015; but that some form of multipolar world will take shape, with the USA enjoying some degree of preeminence.

The UN is certainly likely to be strengthened by 2015, but not insofar as it can so credibly, fairly and effectively police the world that nation states would disarm totally. To this extent, nationalism would still be alive. Nationalism is also likely to get a boost from the recrudescence of ethnicity in Yugoslavia and in the republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The trend perhaps would be that the more economically advanced states, which have also had a fairly long innings of nation-statehood would be more ready to give up some of their sovereignty for the larger economic and political good of their region or interest group. This trend will be visible in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, the trend will not be so marked; as these states have regained their independence only recently from Soviet imperialism and will be chary of shedding some of their newly acquired sovereignty to some larger entity, especially to one that cannot magically improve their dire economic condition quickly. The colonial states that were freed in the Forties and the Fifties, may be a little more inclined towards some sort of loose confederal situation where they shed the minimum of sovereignty, for palpable economic and political gains. This tendency may be a bit more marked among those countries whose economies have thrived in the past couple of decades, such as in South East and East Asia. It may be somewhat more restrained in regions such as South Asia and South America.

Too many federal coalitions are unlikely. Western Europe, where the conditions were most propitious for such a step, is nevertheless displaying all the psychological and sentimental barriers that are natural and have to be overcome. Loose confederations are more likely, with individual states being under the pressure of similarity of self interests, further egged on by their inability to cope with big power bullying if they act as loners. Some indications of this trend are visible in Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific Region, especially the emergence of groupings aimed at safeguarding their collective economic interests.

It is most unlikely that the North will willingly or voluntarily end economic

and technological colonialism. All the indications thus far show that, the end of the cold war has if anything hardened the attitude of the developed countries towards the Third World. Now the donor countries are increasingly feeling free to openly lay down conditions for aid or even trade; they no longer consider arm-twisting a shameful exercise. However, this may not be a persistent phenomenon. Perhaps it is only a sudden release of resentment pent up over the long period when the cold war protected aid receivers from having to demonstrate their gratitude by voting with their donors at the UN. The South most probably will have to secure a change in the economic rule book by means other than through a 'feast of reason and flow of soul'. All the same, as long as it is clearly realised by the 'haves' that the 'have nots' cannot be quarantined in a sanitised ghetto in perpetuity and that the foul emanations from the neglected ghetto will invade their affluent and aseptic segment of the planet, there is no cause for the poor nations of the world to despair. These foul emanations could be anything from uncontrollable efflux of populations from the ghetto, to an uncontrolled fouling of the environment by the ghetto endangering the ecology of the whole planet. If the ghetto is frustrated by Northern stubbornness, it could be forced to export terrorism, ranging from the classical to the novel, including nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism.

In the sphere of arms and armaments too, we must get at least tentative answers to questions such as. By 2015, is it practical to expect that:

The world would have achieved universal nuclear disarmament?

Universal disarmament of conventional weapons (other than those of national police forces) would be achieved?

Chemical and biological weapons would be banned?

The deployment of weapons in Space would be successfully proscribed?

Here again, we may go on with educated assumptions.

The answers to all these questions are going to depend very largely on the attitude of the USA and the leadership she provides to the world during the coming decades.⁵ Her real test of leadership, and opportunity for historical greatness is during the forthcoming period. Idealism, vision, courage and statesmanship of a very high order will be required. It will be necessary to overcome the conditioned reflexes of the somewhat disoriented 'cold warriors' who would out of habit, cater for the most improbable situations. This would obviously be at the cost of statesmanship.

Let us assume that the almost defunct Commonwealth of Independent States by some magic becomes more functional, retains all the nuclear weapons

of the erstwhile Soviet Union, and improbably turns anti American. Even then, the kind of threat it can pose to the USA is comparatively limited. Initially it might have a fairly strong nuclear deterrent. It may even have a notional first strike capability. However both these capabilities are going to erode rapidly, due to the straitened economic circumstances that will not permit the necessary expenditures for their maintenance. In the realm of conventional forces, it cannot be a global power. It may be a strong regional power at best. That strength might also dilute if there is competitive division of conventional forces among the republics. None of this can pose a threat to Western Europe like what the Soviet Union could. With any other dispensation, the threat to the USA will be smaller still.

As already discussed, there could be economic and technological rivalry and competition between the USA on the one hand and Germany or Japan or even a unified Europe on the other. Nevertheless the probability of this leading to a military confrontation is low. Even if a confrontation occurs, it cannot be sudden. Much development, testing, production and deployment of weapons will first be required by these new adversaries; this will be time consuming and will be visible to national technical and other means of surveillance. It will afford more than adequate time for the USA to react. The same argument applies to any possible regional power strengthening itself to an extent that might challenge US interests militarily.

Thus, there is no case for the USA retaining a massive nuclear stockpile. The future of the world could depend upon how the USA handles this opportunity for statesmanship. For analysis, we will use three assumed US choices; the first, providing the best option for disarmament and arms control in the world; the second the next best option and the third the worst.

The first scenario: The USA and the other declared nuclear weapon powers agree to deep cuts in their arsenals, reducing them say by ninety percent, to ten percent of their previous levels; man the residual forces by their own nationals, but deploy them centrally under the control of the UN security council. All countries of the world including the present nuclear weapon powers, sign a new treaty eschewing nuclear weapons, testing or producing weapons grade fissile material, and accepting intrusive and surprise verification by a world body. Suitable escape clauses could be incorporated to permit any nuclear weapon power to withdraw its forces from UN control after giving due notice, if it perceives a dire threat to its security. This kind of situation would be close to the ideal and constitute a giant step forward towards confidence building in the world. It would accelerate the abolition of chemical and biological weapons; help proscribe the deployment of weapons in Space; and greatly help in the field of conventional arms control. It would not however place the big powers totally at the mercy of

small and perhaps irresponsible powers; nor would it subject totally the powerful minority to the tyranny of the majority of weak nations. Without such an assurance, no agreement would be acceptable to the big powers, and we ought to be considering only the possible and not the utopian. A completely non discriminatory regime may be ideal, but is utopian, and would be unachievable for quite a few decades.

The second scenario: is the same as the first, except that the nuclear weapon powers having reduced their arsenals to a tenth or so, do not place their nuclear forces under UN command but retain them under their own national command. However as in the first scenario, they would agree to sign a new treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons and testing and production of fissile material; they would also accept full scope verification. This has a better chance of acceptance domestically in the USA than the first, and perhaps would meet most of the objections of countries like India.

The third scenario: is that the USA only offers apparently big cuts in the nuclear arsenal, such as the fifty percent suggested by a study group recently in the US, while retaining very large stockpiles in absolute terms; insists on retaining a first strike option to take care of a possible nuclear or chemical threat to its deployed forces in any theatre from a regional power with a chemical or small nuclear capability; and does not accept the ban on production or testing or verification for itself and for the other accepted members of the nuclear club.

If the USA chooses the first scenario, it will mean that the world will get as close to universal nuclear disarmament as practicable in the next two decades. It will eliminate the danger to civilisation as we know it from mass use of nuclear weapons. The prospects for complete disarmament beyond 2015 would be very bright, as much more trust and confidence are likely to have been generated by that time. In the meantime, it will erode considerably the legitimacy of nuclear weapons as the prestigious coinage of power. This in turn would almost eliminate the incentive for non nuclear weapon powers to attempt clandestine weapon development. This is a much surer method of ensuring abstinence.

Furthermore, in a regime seen as fair, there would be almost total universal support for tough measures against any nation stepping out of line. This would be a powerful disincentive for those inclined to cheat. In a regime that is patently unfair, however intrusive and harsh the enforcement, the possibility of failure would always remain high. This latter thought often escapes the attention of many impatient patriots in the Pentagon!

If the second scenario comes to pass, the prestige and legitimacy of the nuclear weapon as coinage of international power would not have eroded to

the same degree as in the first case. However, for democratic, moderate, status quo powers like India, even in this situation the incentive to go nuclear would be almost totally absent. In the case of fundamentalist, dictatorial and megalomaniac regimes, however, clandestine attempts to produce nuclear weapons might still continue.

In the case of the third scenario, the regime would continue to be thoroughly discriminatory and cynical. The legitimacy of the nuclear weapon as an instrument of international power would be reemphasised. Even for the sake of nebulous future threats if the USA feels compelled now, to hold on to a large nuclear arsenal, the message to regional powers with more live and immediate threats, some of them nuclear would be loud and clear. *There is no alternative to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles if you are to live in security and with honour.* Those who cannot for whatever reasons go the nuclear and ballistic missile route will have every incentive to clandestinely go the chemical and biological route; and it will be open season for international terrorism with nuclear overtones. Sadly, if the third scenario is the one the world is saddled with, we can take it that humankind has thrown away one more and possibly the last chance to tame the nuclear menace before probable planetary disaster.⁶

What would be the status of the usability of economic measures and transfer of technology as weapons during this period? With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is quite apparent already, that the developed nations are going to be more overt and stringent in their imposing of conditions for economic and technical assistance to developing countries. The degree to which this is indulged in or the abrasiveness with which it is pursued, would depend upon how well the developed world hangs together. If they adopt a uniform posture, the conditions imposed could be quite severe. If there is increasing economic and technological competition among themselves, there may be easing of the severity as they attempt to obtain commercial advantage over one another. The chances are that the early part of this period will see more of the former. As some of the ideological guilt wears off, the later part of this period might see lack of cohesion and cut throat competition from the developed countries.

Irrespective of which of these scenarios come about, it is fairly clear that the ball game is going to be very different in the next two decades from what it was during 1945-92. The major factors that will cause this are two. The disappearance of the Soviet Union as a counter weight to the USA, imparting a boost to American bullying capacity and a USA, with this heady realisation ganging up with the OECD powers in maintaining first world advantages in the world economic dispensation. This would force other nations to form cooperative groups for political, economic and security reasons, as

they cannot hope to cope with this juggernaut by playing a lone hand. Third world countries are sure to be wary of letting the big league play them off one against the other. This must be clear to even inveterate adversaries like Pakistan and India. The speed with which such groupings form would vary with conditions. It would very likely be faster in South East Asia than in South Asia. India and Pakistan would continue to be suspicious of each other. Their cooperation in regional affairs would not occur because they have suddenly decided to kiss and make up, but because of the compulsion of their individual hard headed self interests. So this process will be slow, wobbly and frustrating. It will only gain momentum with the gradual building up of mutual confidence.

To what extent would unconventional force, such as proxy war by sponsored insurgency, subversion and terrorism be usable by nation states against adversary states as instruments of policy in the period 1992-2015? I would first state emphatically that this kind of activity other than terrorism by imported teams in alien countries can neither succeed nor will be attempted unless there is fertile ground for it in the target country. In the case of alien terrorist teams, there has to be sufficient cause and adequate despair to motivate the "aggrieved" to act against great odds in a hostile country, especially ones without local sympathisers. In all cases therefore, the first order of business ought to be to eliminate the causes. Having said which, however, there has to be deterrence at the global level. This will call for severe punitive action by the world community against delinquent states. The prognosis for such actions by the world community is good, if the recent unanimous security council resolution against Libya in the Lockerbie case is a straw in the wind. There is good hope that as the decades roll by the use of insurgency and terrorism as instruments of policy will decrease.

(To be concluded)

NOTES :

¹Alvin Toffler *Powershift* published by Bantam Books NY Nov 1990. Toffler argues that a "powershift" does not merely transfer power, it transforms it.

²George Tanham, *Indian Strategic Culture*, Washington Quarterly - Winter 1992 p. 134.

³Jawaharlal Nehru, "India's Foreign Policy", in Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961 p. 47. (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India New Delhi).

⁴Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw in the Foreword to "Evolution of National Strategy of India" by Colonel Ravi Nanda (Lancers Books New Delhi).

⁵For a view point from the Third World, see K. Sundarji "Thirty Years of US - USSR Relations and Arms Control Negotiations : A View From the South" in *UNIDIR Newsletter No.4 December 1991* pp. 5-7 (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva).

⁶For an articulation of India's position and First World Responsibilities, see General K. Sundarji "Leashing the Nuclear Menace" in *Foreign Service Journal June 1992 Vol. 69, No 6* pp. 35-7 (American Foreign Service Association Washington DC).

India's Security Environment

GEN V N SHARMA, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Over the past few years the security environment of India has continued to deteriorate and poses serious challenges. There are external and internal factors adversely affecting security which the country has not been able to control. Basic aspects of India's threat perception and security environment were detailed by me earlier in September 1991 (See USI Journal Jul-Sept 1991, Vol CXXI No. 505; "A Glimpse of the Threat Perception and Security Environment of India"). The present paper updates certain aspects of the threat perception over the past year to evaluate our defence needs.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the advent of a single super power with uni-polar pressures on world economy, attempted control over world resources and control over the UN Security Council decision-making, has caused a lack of balance in the world strategic environment. The strategic perceptions and needs of the USA now hold sway. This situation is disadvantageous to developing nations such as India who were earlier non-aligned or dependent on Soviet political support and technological cum military equipment aid on soft terms. India has been forced to re-think policy and attempt pragmatic solutions on economic, social and security concerns; solutions which must be acceptable to USA and various world bodies such as IMF and the World Bank.

The demise of soviet power has also created latent danger for India by reduction of Chinese military and economic problems on the Sino-Russian border. This has released a substantial number of Chinese army divisions and support formations besides giving a filip to transborder trade and supplies to Russia of consumer goods. China now has an advantageous relationship with smaller neighbours such as Mongolia, North Korea and the newly independent muslim states of central Asia. At this juncture India has a comparatively weaker central government dependent on outside votes for survival; there is the necessity for consensus with certain other political parties to enable decision and follow through action for any policy. India is riven with internal dissension over caste, creed and the reservation question, fired by political skulduggery and defiance of law. This heady mix of problems is confounded by a

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population explosion which makes India a progressively ungovernable entity. India has lost out on any competition with China that existed during the early years after independence. Our poor image, with constant professions of our weakness and pleas for aid, has reduced our self-esteem. Our lack of leadership and a host of domestic problems have caused our vacation of the international stage for leadership of third world opinion and action. All nations of South and South-East Asia must now face the growing mini-super power of China and bow to the whims of the powerful US led western alliance on aspects of trade, the economy, human rights and enforced control over the military equipment market.

THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT

Over the past year the threat of conventional war across India's northern and western borders had began to ease. This has been the result of more friendly political and diplomatic exchanges with China but coupled with our continued strength of defences in high altitude regions of the Indo-Tibetan border. China is presently preoccupied with its economic development coupled with modernisation of nuclear and military forces; they already possess territory upto their claim lines in Ladakh and can await a more advantageous time for resolving of the disputed MacMahon line in Arunachal Pradesh. China has no hesitation in supplying weapons requirement and missiles to Pakistan and developing close ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar who are likely to provide the Chinese navy some base facilities in the Bay of Bengal and permit Chinese military influence in North Burma. Chinese continued nuclear device testing indicates deeply considered future military aims. These actions portend future problems and the military balance weighs heavily against India with our 'soft-option' philosophy.

In the case of Pakistan, their military capability has been adversely affected by the squeeze on US aid due to non-certification under the Pressler amendment. Their availability state of weapons, equipment and fighter aircraft has deteriorated, perhaps more than India's after the shutting off of our flow of Soviet spares. For the present, Pakistan is unlikely to be capable of military follow through action to take advantage of their fomenting insurgency in Kashmir and Punjab across our western borders. They have also failed to gain any military success against our defences in the glacial Siachen region. Terrorist and insurgent violence in Kashmir and Punjab are now progressively coming under control of our security forces as time elapses and we learn to follow the lessons of political probity and proper coordination of military and police forces; as also the creation of public confidence in the state. Pakistan faces growing internal upheaval and problems in controlling the Afghan imbroglio and their present loss of US support has made them

lean more towards China and Saudi monetary largesse. This is the scene today; but Pakistan's fear and hate for India is endemic. Their determination to enlarge confrontation by all means short of open conflict including the flaunting of nuclear capability, continues.

And now we have the destruction of the babri masjid. The effect of this one action by hindu chauvinists may rally the muslim world in support of Pakistan. Pakistani leaders would take full advantage of this situation in binding their polity to a concerted anti-India campaign, with support from Indian muslims a hoped for development. If India is successful in heading off communal conflict and the fear psychosis, further fragmentation could be avoided. But our security environment is in jeopardy in the coming years; even raising the chances of military action against a divided India. We cannot lower our guard. We must remember that a simple change in US policy can reshuffle the kaleidoscope. We must develop the political will as also diplomatic, economic and military capability to neutralise the threat from Pakistan.

THE NUCLEAR WEAPON QUESTION

The rapid Chinese economic uplift over the past few years and their continued enhancement of nuclear and conventional military power indicates their determined progress despite views of USA or other powers. Their defence budget is enhanced by military exports while their aiding Pakistan with nuclear testing facilities and missile export shows a nexus detrimental to India. With the declared Pakistani bomb, nuclear weapon asymmetry has developed across our land borders in the plains, forcing India to face a dilemma for future policy goals. Our changing governments over the last three years, lack of strategic perception and our political infancy places us in poor position to face this challenge, while we endlessly debate whether we should or should not 'go nuclear'. We are afraid of the economic sanctions which may be brought to bear against us if we make any positive move towards nuclearisation. We want to retain our economic aid from abroad and yet shudder at our lack of military defence. The claim that India already has the bomb, made by international strategists and Pakistani propaganda, is not backed by any clear information of such a development. We certainly have the technology; so perhaps does Japan and Germany. But weapon development requires much more. It must include effective nuclear war-head design, safety control mechanisms, clear political-cum-military command and control channels electronically ensured through safety triggers, adequate security and mobility of weapons systems and proper organisation with trained manpower. Besides, for effective strike, we need satellite surveillance over target areas and target acquisition techniques. We do not appear to have any of these.

The short range Prithvi and medium range Agni will provide a missile delivery system once fully developed and if there is no major set-back in spares and equipment due to the missile technology control regime. These would be usable for nuclear warheads only after much testing of appropriate nuclear warhead devices; we do not do any such test firing.

Any nation which does not have nuclear weapons is at the mercy of these who do. It is a well accepted concept that use of nuclear weapons in future would be particularly feasible against states which do not possess such weapons and cannot retaliate. Nuclear weapons are as 'political' in nature as conventional military forces - both are used, and will continue to be used in future, whenever national leadership wishes to ensure achievement of political aims by "other means" once diplomacy and political coercion fail. So we as a nation have made ourselves vulnerable to the diktat of the great nations of earth; we will be constrained to take decisions acceptable to such powers.

Today our government has little power to take hard decisions and concerted action to rectify our adverse security situation; this is basically due to lack of internal cohesion in the nation, caused by corrupt and communal politics. Thus our only alternative at present appears to be to talk of our high principles for international peace. Our example of having the technology but not electing to develop nuclear weapons systems has not impressed anyone. Examples are followed only when persons or nations give the correct lead despite their power to do as they wish. Hence we must continue to keep "our options open" to face the dangerous nuclear weapon threat to our very existence as a nation. We can only pray for good luck and await our kismet. Strategically, we have no alternative to development of a minimum but effective nuclear deterrent capability as soon as we can. This would also assist in reduction of military manpower and curtailing the defence budget.

OIL POLITICS

India imports nearly 50 per cent of its growing needs of oil, the cheapest energy resource available. Our future development depends largely on continued availability of oil from the Gulf which is most appropriate for our refineries and the cheapest. Any possibility of closure or reduction of oil supplies from muslim states of the gulf is a serious threat to our well being. USA's series of actions in the Gulf, culminating in the war in 1990, has allowed achievement of USA's strategic aim of physical control over the most important oil resource of the world. We can only ensure adequate flow of oil for our needs by diplomatic and political initiative, since we do not possess

the clout for any military action whatsoever in this regard. We have managed this problem adequately so far by complicated tight-rope walking in our foreign policy with muslim states. With the break up of the soviets, good relations with the USA and muslim countries of the gulf have become even more important; especially Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait.

The destruction of the babri masjid and full advantage taken by Pakistan in its international propaganda against us has been a serious set-back. We await the developments of events and world opinion while our government has made the correct moves to limit the damage to our reputation and interests. Our security environment has perceptibly deteriorated with our muslim neighbours and our concept of secularism is under attack, adversely affecting our cohesion as a nation.

THE INTERNAL PROBLEM

Terrorism, insurgency, Mandal, the economy and the janam bhoomi-babri masjid problems have bedevilled Indian progress. We are at war with ourselves. We have no time to govern ourselves or properly plan for distant goals or execute available plans with any determined action. We are saddled with political self-interest and lack of character amongst many politicians, backed by an inefficient bureaucratic system which has no accountability for failure but insists on wielding authority and increasing its role. We cannot reduce or control abject corruption at all levels of the administration. We have no true leadership nor do we permit leadership to be nurtured. India has managed to survive this milieu so far but we need a major effort at house-cleaning and better organisation if we wish to be a successful nation state and do something for our poor. The economic crisis has been brought on by stifling government rules, involved procedures and 'red tape', coupled with massive government expenditure with little control. No minister or bureaucrat can resist long expensive jaunts abroad despite instructions for all to tighten their belts. No government or opposition can resist public bandhs and public opposition to whatever policy; causing massive expenditure in funding such demonstrations and meeting the costs of security forces for control; besides the heavy costs of enforced holidays with no work done. Political and bureaucratic interference in public sector establishments is reason enough for their malfunctioning-their latent profits being usurped by their political masters for personal comfort and getting jobs for their henchmen and vote banks. This has put our internal security and economic environment under grave stress. We must control all such activity before seeking the simple expedient of paying less for defence and thus provide more funds for misuse by a corrupt system. We have raised the hopes and expectations of our millions of poor by orientating the economy towards western consumer-

ism and it is clear we can never achieve such standards and can only cause further resentment and conflict. Surely our industrious and savings - conscious people have been betrayed by our leaders. The present milieu demands greater effort at security and control; this is not possible by less funds allotted.

Despite the need for minimum use of the army in internal security operations there is only an upswing in demand. Unless the army backs up the police and para-military forces, internal conflict and destruction cannot be contained by the administration. Additional police and para-military forces are continually being raised but the criminal-political nexus does not easily allow effective police functioning. Large numbers of state armed police battalions are not disciplined and cannot act in any emergency situation 'as they are politically motivated and corrupt. At present, the defence forces are amongst the very few organisations left in our country which can function reasonably effectively and ensure some standard of disciplined conduct.

The Army has the organisation, command and control system and flexibility for all types of operations, including counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist action. It has efficiently handled counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations in our north eastern states-Assam, Sri Lanka and J & K. But success requires determined political will with full support of the bureaucracy, police and intelligence agencies. The army should preferably have specific formations earmarked for such duties suitably trained and located and not be expected to utilise troops on peace-time turn round from the difficult northern border and non-family stations. The primary army role of border defence requires constant training in peace stations with the chance of living with families. To use the army for internal security duties at the slightest pretext 'because the police cannot do the job efficiently' or the "army is there" or the states could save meagre funds, is not acceptable. It is also unacceptable that social and communal problems are caused at the behest of political objectives in the knowledge that the army would be able to control the violent fall out.

The need is for political probity with an accountable civil administration and police. Further increase in police strength or militarisation of police functioning would be counter-productive and still not absolve the army from internal security duties, besides raising national security costs. The police must be properly trained and equipped to carry out their tasks efficiently. They must not be used to further the political aims of any political party or government but only to maintain law and order, for which they must be made accountable. Once the breakdown of law and order has developed to civil armed conflict, insurgency or terrorism, beyond the capacity of police or para-military forces, the army will perforce be required to take charge. Such

a decision should be taken by the central government and not state authorities. Full support must be given to any intervention by all governmental agencies if success is desired.

THE DEFENCE BUDGET

India's external and internal security environment continues to deteriorate. The cry for reduction in the defence budget is only the easier and softest option to follow while trying to face upto our self-made economic crisis. There are hardly any government ministries, departments and PSUs who have shown efficiency in handling their budgeted funds. We cannot expect defence budgets to bear the brunt of financial constraints caused by inappropriate government policy and endemic corruption.

When we compare our defence budget with other nations we can see that India has one of the lowest defence expenditures amongst larger nations when seen as a per capita and GDP/GNP percentage. Yet we have some of the longest hostile borders of any nation, besides the need for not only border defence but also internal security by the defence services (see end-table). It is not feasible to reduce defence expenditure any further without serious adverse affect on our military power and unacceptable loss of security. In fact, it is necessary to raise defence expenditure from the present low of 2.75 per cent of GDP (estimated for 1992-93) to about 3.5 per cent. This is especially so because of the reduction of rupee value by some 30 per cent causing serious difficulty in payment of outstanding dues and purchase of spares and updating ageing equipment, to keep the defence services in reasonable fighting capability.

Modernisation of the defence services is a constant requirement but has not been adequately carried out over the past few years due to extreme shortage of funds. The army, especially, has had to find funds from their allotted budget for all internal security operations as also special foreign operations such as the intervention in Sri Lanka and Maldives. When the Services are used in internal security it is necessary for concerned states and the home ministry to fund operations, since such operations are necessitated due to failure of state and central police as also criminal politics. This is not done. In fact it is of financial advantage for states to call out the Army on the slightest pretext and avoid use of their own political and police capability. Military budgets do not cater for war or foreign operational assignments and these too must be especially funded by the nation in view of national political aims. But in India these are debited to defence estimates further confounding any hopes of balancing military budgets. The main budget casualty is the allotment for modernisation and training; this would seriously weaken mili-

tary capability over a few years.

To correctly align and even reduce overall military expenditure, there is need to evolve clear government security policy for the future and to spell out national military objectives. What do we want from our armed forces? It is vital to ensure adequate defence of our land and maritime borders, which also demands an offensive deterrent capability; the armed forces must have the organisations and equipment for this task. What exact role should the defence forces play in regard to internal security and aid to the civil authority? Whose responsibility should it be to confront insurgency and terrorism, which may well be the style of future conflict management by hostile powers? Do we wish to develop military capability to recapture our lost territories along the northern borders or to gain control over Pakistan - occupied Kashmir or should we leave this to politics and diplomacy? Can these reduce the temperature of our relations with Pakistan and get agreements for mutual reduction of military force levels by confidence building measures; and what if politics and diplomacy fail to attain national objectives and we have to face hostile action against our borders and internally? So what should be our minimum military force levels and equipment and with what objectives? There are many views and projections on such matters but government policy directions are conspicuous by their absence in matters military. Politicians have little time or conviction to look into the future and give decisions. The bureaucracy resists change in their system of functioning.

There is clearly need for official and private think-tanks and a top-level security body which can garner informed opinion from all walks of life and officially produce papers and suggestions for the ministries and the Prime Minister. These could suggest re-organisation of our bureaucratic system for efficiency as also give views on our future goals. There is need to reorganise the ministry of defence to achieve a proper integration with the three defence services and permit coordinated military views to reach beyond the 'secretaries committee' of bureaucrats. And above all, there is need for effective political leadership which can rise above 'self' and the party in the national interest.

For the armed forces, it is necessary to ensure that budgeted amounts go as far as possible. Older military units and formations need constant review for reduction in manpower to permit improvement in fire power and equipment. Formations in border regions need to lean more heavily on civil logistics infrastructure which must be adequately developed to accept military needs. Manpower shortfalls must draw more on citizen soldiers and part-time soldiers drawn from other government organisations and by utilising territorial army concepts in selected areas. Lateral induction is necessary for trans-

fer of military officers and men to other government departments and police to spread military management expertise, work ethics and discipline and yet protect the careers of highly trained military personnel, at heavy government cost, rather than retrench experienced hands. Civil and police officials should also do military service for a few years before joining their organisations and departments to relieve the manpower needs of the services especially the army, and also get an excellent exposure to a disciplined work ethos.

All these schemes would help in manpower reduction so that more funds are released for modernisation of the services. Such schemes have been suggested to government again and again over the past many years; to little avail. One can only stress the crying need for informed and determined political leadership and revamping the methods of bureaucratic functioning. Only when that day comes would India begin to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, and be able to effectively manage its security environment.

End Table : Comparison of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower - 1991

Country	Defence Expenditure			Numbers in Armed Force (Thousands)	Para Military (Thousands)
	\$ Million	\$ Per Capita	Percentage of GDP/GNP (Local Currency)		
1. NATO-Europe	82,914	206	—	2801.4	588.4
2. UK	22,420	395	4.2	293.5	0
3. France	18,044	317	2.8	453.1	91.8
4. USA	227,055	902	5.1	1913.8	68.0
5. Soviet Union	91631	318	11.1	3988	530
6. China	12025	10	3.2	3030	12000
7. Japan	16464	132	1	246	—
8. Pakistan	3014	25	7	580	270
9. India	7990	9	2.9*	1265	1280.5
10. Malaysia	1670	92	3.7	127	22.7
11. Indonesia	1739	9	1.3	283	480
12. North Korea	5328	224	26.7	1132	200
13. South Korea	6359	142	3.8	633	3.5

Note : Figures are shown at 1985 prices of dollars.

Authority : The Military Balance 1992-93, IISS London.

*Projection of percentage of GDP for 1992 is 2.75

A Report on USI Delegation's Visit to China

VICE ADMIRAL S P GOVIL, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

The visit of a USI delegation to China in September this year was a landmark event, for this I believe is the first of its kind in the long history of this institution. General Chai Chengwen, Vice Chairman of the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies had visited India on IDSA'S invitation when he also visited the USI and gave a talk to our members in Nov 90.

A sequel to this visit was an invitation extended to me as the President of the USI Council to visit the BIISS along with four other delegates. Accordingly, in Sep 92 I led this delegation consisting of Gen Zorawar Bakshi, Admiral Kewal Nayyar, Air Marshal Jafar Zaheer and Maj Gen Samir Sinha to China for a duration of 12 days.

You will be glad to know that our delegation was very well and warmly received and it held useful and interesting discussions with the BIISS and with the faculty of the Chinese National Defence University covering wide ranging aspects for new world order and Sino-Indian relations. Other than Beijing the delegation was taken around to visit Shanghai, Xian, Guang Zhou (old canton) and Shenzhen. In China we travelled by air, road and train. Throughout our visit we were accompanied by two officials from the BIISS, the Dy Secretary General and an interpreter. I was personally visiting China for the third time. I first visited in 1979 as part of the RCDS team from London - China was a very different country then. I next led a delegation in 1990 when I was the commandant of NDC - no doubt it was a country making headway but rather subdued just a year after the Tianamen Square events. But this visit was an eye opener - China had a new confidence in itself - it had overcome Tianamen and it was really a country on the move. They certainly had reason to be proud of their economic achievements.

DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL CHAI CHENGWEN

General Chai Chengwen, the Vice Chairman of BIISS, our host, called on the delegation at the hotel on the day of our arrival and hosted a dinner. The General who is 78 years old and as I said earlier had led a BIISS

* Text of a talk given by Vice Admiral S P Govil, a former Vice Chief of Naval Staff and President of the USI Council, to the members of the USI.

delegation to India two years ago, was very warm in his references to India and remarked that we should forget the aberration of 1962 and revert to the days of 'Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai'. He remarked that both our countries had a formidable task of economic reconstruction ahead and that no diversion of scarce resources should be made to non-productive endeavours. He further stated that towards this end, the Chinese had not only drastically reduced the size of the PLA but substantially reduced the defence budget. He warmly lauded the recent improvement in Sino-Indian relations and was of the view that the visit of the President of India and that of the Indian Defence Minister were landmark developments. He hoped that these bilateral contacts would continue at all levels.

DISCUSSION AT BIIS

The highlight and *raison d'être* of our visit were discussions in the BIIS on 03 September. General Chengwen and his entire staff of nine were present for the discussions. After exchange of pleasantries the General invited the Indian side, as guests to open the discussions and give their assessment of the current international scene. The first paper titled "New World order - An Agenda for China and India by Admiral Kewal Nayyar set the tone for our opening discussions.

The other two presentations titled Sino-Indian relations in 1990's and 'New Global Security Dimension' which flowed from the above were made by Lt Gen ZC Bakshi and Air Marshal Jafar Zaheer respectively.

VISIT TO NDU

The delegation visited the National Defence University on the outskirts of Beijing on 04 Sep and was very warmly welcomed by its Commandant, Gen Zhang Zhen with appropriate ceremonials. We were shown around the excellent facilities of the University. Development of leadership and professional expertise are clearly the major training goals as testified by the multi-disciplinary and multi level programmes run at the NDU for about 500 officers. Civilians also attend the courses. A large number of overseas officers also attend courses specially tailored for them. NDU courses are mandatory for future promotions. They made a video presentation on the NDU in which the Indian NDC's first visit in 1990 led by me as the Commandant featured prominently. During the walk around they made it a point to show us the friendship exhibition hall where photographs of the same NDC visit were prominently displayed. Chinese are very good at this kind of gestures.

General Zhang Zhen is 78 years old and is a veteran of the "Long

March". He has a proven record as an experienced soldier and military thinker. He served as an army commander in the Korean war and went on to establish the NDU in 1985 where he has been the commandant since. Accordingly to recent reports, at the 14th party congress, he has been made the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, a very powerful top body in China and shows his standing in the party, a job earlier held by the President of China. At an extended lunch lasting over 3 hours he emphasised on the need for substantial improvement in Sino-Indian relations.

GENERAL XU XIN

General Xu Xin who is the senior Deputy Chief of General Staff of PLA and Chairman of BISS hosted a dinner for the delegation on 04 Sep at the famous Beijing Roast Duck restaurant. It was generally mentioned by some people that in the re-organisation in the wake of the 14th party congress, the General would be elevated to the post of the Defence Minister. However from the newspaper reports, no such thing has happened and in fact he seems to have lost his job.

After exchange of pleasantries the General stated that the Chinese Govt, the PLA and their leaders at all levels attached great importance to the improvement of relations between our two countries. The General mentioned that India and China had a long history of friendship. Development of good relations between the two countries was not only beneficial for Asia but also for the whole world. China and India had established diplomatic relations in 1949. The five principles of peaceful co-existence were enunciated both by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and premier Zhou En Lai. These principles continued to be valid and are acknowledged world wide.

When asked to give his world view, he came out that China wanted peace and Asia was more stable than Europe. The General spoke of the international situation and said that it was not stable. The most troubled region is the gulf though the war is over, problems confronting the Middle-East have not yet been solved. There was talk of a new world order. In an obvious reference to USA he stated that some countries in the world considered themselves more powerful and wanted to play a leading role. They believed in hegemonism and power politics. The gap between the North and the South, and the rich and the poor nations, was widening.

The Chinese Govt believed that the new world order should be based on the five principles of peaceful co-existence. Though there may be differing perceptions between nations, there should be no interference in each other's internal affairs. If there were any disputes between countries, these should be

solved by mutual consultation and not by the use of force. He emphasised that spratly Islands belonged to them and that the problem would be solved with the concerned parties peacefully by negotiations.

The newspapers of 04 Sep had carried the news of the American sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan. The General was emphatic that this was an ill-considered move by the Americans and would affect their bilateral relations. He said that it was absolutely incorrect to tie the American action to purchase of Soviet military aircraft by China from Russia, as China was a sovereign country - and had every right to acquire whatever it liked from wherever it wanted.

He then went on to emphasise China's policy towards its neighbours which included India, Pakistan, Mynamar and the newly independent Republics of Central Asia. He stated that our bilateral relations with one country will not hamper development of relations with any third country. For example improvement of Sino Indian relations does not hamper Sino Pak relations.

He stated that he had many contacts with Pakistani Generals and had visited Pakistan many times. Whenever he had met them he had told them clearly that disputes between India and Pakistan including the Kashmir dispute should be resolved peacefully. He had repeatedly told them that China does not favour use of force to resolve any disputes. He said please be assured as a friend that China will not do anything which is ungrateful.

Following were some of the other points made by the Chinese side at various forums :-

(a) The Sino-Indian border problem is a legacy of history but can be solved by goodwill and pragmatism on both sides through fair and friendly consultation.

(b) The Chinese defence budget is very small and barely adequate for an army of over 3 million and just about covers the cost of maintenance. It was US \$ 5 billion till recently and had been increased to 6 billion US dollars in 1991-92. According to them this was less than the Indian defence budget. On close examination it was found that they had not included the PLA's defence equipment sale earnings and other income derived from activities like construction and agriculture in the defence budget. When plinted out this was contceded to.

(c) The Chinese Military capability in Tibet was nowhere near what the Indian side was making out it to be. Maintaining a soldier in Tibet

cost the Chinese ten times than anywhere else in China. It was neither necessary nor cost effective for them to keep a large army in Tibet. Indian fears on this count were therefore unfounded.

(d) The Chinese would respond to any Indian initiatives on increasing bilateral trade.

(e) They considered that Asia was currently more stable than Europe. This was ceaselessly repeated in every discussion.

(f) Russia poses no military threat to them as they have insurmountable and growing internal problems and will take considerable time to solve them.

(g) They were extremely cautious in referring to the expected course of American-Chinese relations. However, they kept referring to Americans resorting to "power-politics".

(h) China will never use nuclear weapons against non nuclear states and it will never use such weapons first. China's military strategy is defensive in nature and it will not indulge in aggression against any other country.

USI Journal : Subscription Rates : 1992

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New World Order An Agenda for China & India*

VICE ADMIRAL K K NAYYAR, PVSM, (RETD)

The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the end of cold war has come with a suddenness that has left most of the erstwhile principal players in the international arena completely benumbed. Their camp followers naturally share the predicament of the principals. The non-aligned fare no better, for there is now no ideological divide from which they can pretend to opt out. The situation today is therefore highly uncertain and fluid. In these circumstances any talk of a new world order, represents a desire rather than the emergence of a new concrete reality. The fact is that in the Persian poet Omar Khayam's words, some have "conspired with fate to shatter the old scheme of things". Building it "nearer heart's desire" would be another ball game.

In human history, global reach of power, associated power projection, and domination are of comparatively recent origin. Eighteenth, nineteenth and the first half of the 20th century saw European domination of the world. Colonization, socio-economic exploitation of the weaker nations and mind boggling accretion of capital in Europe were the hall mark of this so called world order.

The two world wars saw the end of the Eurocentric world. The end of the second war saw the emergence of two powerful states, the USA and the USSR. There were no other states in their power league and it was therefore inevitable that they would attract the appellation of super powers to themselves.

The end of the Second World War, therefore, saw the emergence of a new world order. The eco-political arrangements worked out at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks resulted in the creation of the UN and its associated economic institutions. This was supposed to be a just and democratic world order. Subsequent experience was to show that power really vested in the two super powers and they imposed their will on international affairs with impunity often "high jacking" the international organisation to serve their purposes. This world order polarised the nations as never before because of the dimensions of the ideological conflict between the two states.

* Text of a paper presented by Vice Admiral K K Nayyar, former Vice Chief of Naval Staff, at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies.

In this regime regional issues were rarely handled on merits. Overriding consideration always was the affect the regional problems would have in the global super power equations. Two consequences flowed out of this. In some cases local issues got blown out of all proportions and conflict and adversary relationships resulted which would not have happened but for the fiercely continuing super power rivalry which got termed the cold war. However, it must be acknowledged that certain regional conflicts which under normal circumstances would have resulted in a shooting match got contained because of the fear of an escalation of the conflict into a much bigger problem because of super power involvement and alignments.

The collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union has seen the end of world order of the last five decades. It is imperative that China and India appreciate the significance of the existing global situation and review their future strategies to arrive at a formula that would enhance their individual and collective capacities to move into the same league as the more developed nations, and into their rightful place to influence world events.

The realities of the world in the last decade of the 20th century are essentially as follows:

(a) The principle driving force in the development and regulation of global interaction in the last five decades, that is, the ideological divide between the democratic West and the Soviet and Chinese led communist theologies, has given way to tribal aspirations manifested in terms of ethnic polarisation of the erstwhile Soviet Union, the splitting of Yugoslavia and the declared aspirations of the different people of Czechoslovakia. The trend is spreading further to the larger multi ethnic states of the world.

(b) The emergence of Japan and a unified Europe, that are fast overhauling the mighty American economy, has brought about radical changes in the centre of gravity of economic power. The potential of economic power to influence policy formulation has assumed equal if not more relevance than military force as an instrument in global interaction. Major realignments are in the offing which will have a serious bearing on the future of world community.

(c) Despite the economic development in the Third World there is a growing disparity between the haves and the have nots. This is a problem peculiar to both, inter State developments and intra State domestic growth. The resultant is an ever increasing conflict situation between States as also in their domestic being. This growing disparity is not confined to the natural function of survival of the fittest but has been accentuated by the phenomenal burgeoning of technology and restrictive regimes incorporated to curtail its availability to all.

THE FUTURE

The existing nature of the international regulatory bodies such as the United Nations and its subsidiaries and the economic developmental monetary institutions controlling international fiscal and trade agreements is unsatisfactory. Even though China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, recent events have shown that the rich nations control these institutions at will, and enforce policies that while meeting their national aspirations, do not necessarily take into account the perceptions and interests of the lesser endowed nations. The present system is based on too narrow a governing base to equitably regulate global affairs. It would be in the interest of both, China and India, if this power is meaningfully diffused by enlarging the composition of the extant Security Council from five permanent and ten rotational members. Representation should take into account the human base of member countries, as the aim of regulating international activity is, after all, to improve the lot of mankind through collective endeavours. India and China together have two fifths of the world's population, and this should, therefore, give them a larger say in the management of world affairs. Similarly, the Security Council should include the major economic entities such as Japan and Germany as their potential in global affairs is exceptional.

The trend towards the division of existing national States along ethnic lines is a serious cause of concern as it is demonstrably a critical cause for conflict. This area needs the immediate attention of the responsible segments of the world. China and India should jointly formulate policy options that would prevent the division of accepted political entities along ethnic lines. If this trend is not arrested we are likely to see the tribalisation of Africa which would negate the possibility of any collective uplift of the people, and the subdivision of all large States on all continents. This will leave behind an unmanageable conglomeration of conflicting sub entities without the wherewithal for meaningful development.

Supply side economics as advocated by President Reagan may or may not have produced the desired results in the American economy. But the prevailing 'grab side economics' in the form of pre-empting natural resources by the rich countries is leading the world towards dangerous imbalances and conflict situations. While individual nations strive to create a modern and balanced economic structure, it would be irrational if the same balance were not to be maintained globally also. However, universal economic balance is not something that can be achieved overnight. It has been estimated by John Reid, the Chairman of City Bank, that to achieve comparative western standards of living (universally comparable) an investment to the order of 50

trillion dollars would be required. Since China and India combine two fifths of the world's population, on a pro rata basis an investment of 20 trillion is indicated for their development to the lower spectrum of western standards. However, if we take into account the existing disparity, it would be prudent to peg this figure at 30 trillion dollars.

This order of investment is well beyond the reach of both these countries in their present status. With an adversarial stance between the two, the possibilities will become unattainable. The only way it may become achievable is if China and India were to formulate mutually supporting strategies for the future. This would entail: engendering a closer relationship even than the once sought after Hindi Chinni Bhai Bhai days; an exponential expansion of mutual trade during the next two to three decades; a concentrated thrust towards a joint technical development programme to exploit the human and natural resources of the Asian landmass in preference to a secondary role of dependency on the West for redundant technology; and, to jointly implement policies to promote stability in the region to avoid frittering away scarce resources and leadership energies on non-developmental activities.

Economic and ethnic issues alone will not be the decisive input in the cauldron from which a new world order will emerge. Cultural diversity has been hitherto an important heritage of mankind. A cultural onslaught of unmanageable proportion is underway to produce a unicultural world based on Euro-American culture. This invasion has been possible because of the new informatics technologies. The dangers inherent in this situation require very careful analysis. Small nations and nascent cultures were not expected to withstand the enormous Western pressure. However, we have seen how even the Japanese are reeling under the Western attack. India and China with their ancient distinct cultures and civilizations are ideally equipped to ensure that the world does not reduce itself to a Western clone status. Much greater cooperation in the cultural field among us is also therefore a paramount requirement.

There are some other important areas which will play a significant part in the evolution of the new world order. First one is the manner in which the billion strong Islamic world sorts out the challenges being posed to their polity, by the more stringent fundamentalist factors. Should these tendencies intensify, the stability of the whole world order is likely to be threatened considerably. The power alignments in this situation are not difficult to conceive and will greatly affect countries like India and China which have large Muslim populations.

Finally in my view, the most important factor in management of international affairs is the direction US, China relations take. Is there going to be

increasing economic cooperation or ideological cleavage? If latter is the case, how will the trilateral relations of US, China and Japan be managed? A new world order would emerge depending upon the interplay of the above mentioned varied and conflicting interests of many players. It would definitely be more complex order than the one which we have been accustomed to in the past fifty years. It is also unlikely to be a stable order as there would be constant realignment of forces to cover various group interests.

In the dynamic situation portrayed above, there would undoubtedly be many areas in which China and India would have mutually competitive interests. However, the objective reality is that on balance there would perhaps be far more areas in which the two countries can work together. It is imperative therefore that the level of dialogue between the two countries is considerably expanded so that we can understand each other better. For instance, there is a requirement to understand the rationale of increasing Chinese defence outlays when significant arms cuts are being resorted to by other countries.

CONCLUSION

The old world order is finished. More often than not transition periods are one of uncertainty and confusion. We live in one of these periods. The situation is exceedingly fluid because there is now greater power diffusion and more acute clash of economic interests than what existed in the cold war era. In spite of many differences which India and China have, there is now an excellent opportunity for the two countries to work together and strive for a just and stable world order.

Stability and economic development are not issues that can be achieved in isolation. A collective thrust by all regional powers is a pre-requisite. Therefore, any strategy being shaped by China and India will require to take into account weaknesses, strengths and national interests of other regional and global entities. In our case, policies must include Japan, Korea, Vietnam and the ASEAN countries. Conditions and confidence must be created to absorb the surplus fiscal resources of the regional countries so that continuous growth is accelerated and intra regional development takes place on an equitable and peaceful basis.

Sino - Indian Relations in the 1990s*

LT GEN Z C BAKSHI, PVSM, MVC, VrC, VSM (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

In this short paper, I have made an attempt to examine 'Sino-Indian Relations in the 1990s'. We in India have always attached the greatest importance to the relations between our two countries. Jawaharlal Nehru, who was a great student of history, had this to say about these relations :

"I have always thought that it is important, even essential, that these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly and, as far as possible, co-operative relations. It would be a tragedy, not only for India, and possibly for China, but for Asia and the whole world, if they develop some kind of permanent hostility....."

These words of Jawaharlal Nehru, who passionately believed that these two largest countries of Asia must maintain friendly and co-operative relations in the interest of peace and stability in Asia, are as relevant today as they were during his life time. In fact, the prevailing political and strategic environment, both at the regional and global level, is such that any further delay in the normalisation of relations can prove highly unproductive for both the countries.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

India and China have had friendly contacts for over two thousand years. Separated as they are by seemingly insurmountable mountain barriers and vast deserts, extending over hundreds of miles, the inquisitiveness and desire of the people to meet their neighbours drove them to undertake long and hazardous journeys to interact and trade with them.

The Indian Ocean was navigated at a fairly early stage and diplomatic relations were established between the Chinese empire and some of the kings in South India. Social, cultural and religious relations existed between the two countries for centuries which have helped to create a sense of basic unity in Asian countries.

Throughout the period of our struggle for independence, our national

* Text of a paper presented by Lt. Gen Z C Bakshi, a former Director Military Operations and a former Corps Commander, at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies.

leaders and scholars maintained close and friendly relations with their counterparts in China. Jawaharlal Nehru was a great admirer of Chinese culture and had many friends in China. He passionately believed that the two largest countries of Asia must work unitedly against the existing unjust world order in which the Western countries were exploiting the people of Asia and Africa. Free India's world view and foreign policies are a true image of Nehru's ideas.

INDIA'S WORLD VIEW

India's world view has been greatly influenced by its struggle for independence against the colonial rulers which has generated in anti-colonial and, therefore, an anti-hegemonic foreign policy. India has never accepted the argument that any country, no matter how powerful, can abrogate to itself the right to decide vital issues of world order exclusively on the basis of its military or economic strength. This world view has provided the main spring for the Indian diplomacy to decide every international issue on its merits.

THIRD WORLD AND NON-ALIGNMENT

By coincidence India emerged as an independent country when the World was gradually moving towards two power blocks under the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union. India decided to charter an independent course, and decide every issue on its merits as also its effect on India's national interest. What India needed most was to establish relations with other countries of both the East and the West in terms of trade, aid and investment without which the country could not make any progress in the economic and industrial field. This concept of following an independent policy came to be known as the policy of non-alignment. Other newly independent countries joined this movement which was called 'The Non-alignment Movement'. India has played a pivotal role in the NAM from its very inception.

Non-alignment was officially adopted as a policy at a meeting of like-minded countries in 1961 at Belgrade. Although China could not join NAM for technical reasons, it gave full support to the organisation from outside. With a membership of nearly a hundred countries and outside support of many powerful countries like China NAM soon acquired a strong moral force in the World.

Third World countries are now passing through a very difficult period when they are completely overshadowed by the Western Block. Most of these countries are dependent on Western countries for economic assistance, tech

nology, industrial machinery and certain other vital necessities for their growth and development. This gives the Western countries great leverage to influence many of their foreign and economic policy decisions. India and China must help the Third World countries to stand united and meet such challenges of a Unipolar World.

UNIPOLAR WORLD

The re-unification of Germany, disintegration of the Soviet Union and the recent Gulf war have brought about an end of the Old World order. The demise of the Cold War has ended the bipolar international system which had provided stability to the world so far. The United States is now the only super power in the world. Quite obviously this is a transitory phase and before long some of the new economic giants would lay claim to be super powers. Nonetheless, there is not much likelihood of any other country challenging Washington's pre-eminence in the present world order in the 1990s.

China is likely to lose some of its room for manoeuvre that it enjoyed previously with the United States. Both China and India, to a varying degree, are likely to be subjected to greater pressures in the political and economic fields. They must stand united to face any challenges that they are confronted with.

UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION

The UNO was constituted at a time when most countries in Asia and Africa were being ruled by the Western countries. This is clearly reflected in the composition of the Security council. Out of five permanent members, China is the only representative from Asia while Africa and Latin America remain unrepresented. This absurd situation needs to be rectified. India and China must co-operate fully and take up the case for rectification of this imbalance in the Security Council. Otherwise, this powerful organisation will remain under the exclusive control of the Western nations to the detriment of all other countries.

Some of the recent decisions of the United Nations Organisation and other World bodies have been so blatantly partial that they have created a sense of fear and insecurity in the Third World. Countries which are in dire need of funds for the reconstruction of their economies, are under intense pressure from some of the world bodies like the International Monetary Fund, IBRD and GATT. Funds are provided only if these poor countries accept the severe conditionalities laid down on their national economies for

the grant of such loans. This is yet another area where India and China must co-operate, and with the help of other Third World countries, fight for justice. The Third World should take up the issue of the re-organisation of the Security Council to give adequate representation to all regions of the world.

EXCHANGE VISITS

Mrs. Indira Gandhi once told a high level delegation, led by Zhu Duman, Vice President of Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries that India and China should build a "home for friendship" through increased cultural and other exchanges which will provide opportunities to our people for emotional integration and will help us in solving many of our problems. It is heartening to note that considerable progress has been made in the area of exchange of personnel. People from diverse fields e.g. historians, scientists, artists, linguists, sociologists and military officers have been on such missions, building a "home for friendship". The President of India, Prime Ministers of both the countries, politicians and a host of other individuals have been on such missions to meet their counterparts and exchange their ideas with them. This, surely, will lead to a better understanding of the problems and the aspirations of the people of our countries. Such exchanges should be arranged more frequently during the 1990s to extend friendship to many more 'homes'.

TRADE

The present volume of trade between India and China is insignificant in terms of the total trade of the two countries. Last year, total trade amounted to 264 million dollars which is ridiculously small. Both the countries must take measures to correct this situation. It is quite possible that there is an information gap, caused by the cessation of trade for a long period of 30 years, which is responsible for this low level of trade. Luckily, the Joint Group on Trade and Economic Relations and Science and Technology has recognised the need for a very large increase in the trade. New areas of co-operation have also been identified.

In the new protocol for 1992, off-take of iron ore and chrome ore from India has been increased to 1.4 million tonnes and 1.2 million tonnes, respectively. China also promised to recommence import of Indian tobacco. It is hoped that the bilateral trade would touch one billion dollar mark by 1995.

The recent resumption of border trade across the Himalayas at two points is a positive step, which will ameliorate the difficulties of people living

on both sides of the border. The volume of this trade may not be large but its benefits to the border people will be quite substantial.

BOUNDARY ISSUE

India has consistently taken the stand that resolution of the boundary question was an essential pre-requisite to the proper restoration of confidence and a complete normalisation of relations between India and China. In October 1985, Rajiv Gandhi and Zhao Ziyang reiterated that the border dispute "was not an insurmountable problem" and needed to be addressed on a priority basis in order to effect a speedy settlement. This important issue has now become a part of the discussions of the Joint Working Group (JWG) set up after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China.

It is a matter for some satisfaction that the JWG has given shape to the modalities of contacts between the military personnel in the border areas. Regular meetings are held of local commanders and measures for ensuring peace in the border area have been jointly worked out.

In my opinion, an area of separation between the two sides should be worked out. Troops should be moved back from such border areas which are not considered militarily important. These areas can be handed over to the border guards and para military forces who should be under command of the local military commanders.

As far as the delineation of the border is concerned, the actual line of control in the Central and Eastern Sectors runs, more or less, along the highest crest of the mountains. If the universally recognised watershed principle is followed, it should not be difficult to find an acceptable solution of the border in these two sectors.

In the Western Sector, the problem has been somewhat complicated because of the strategic importance of the Aksai Chin highway linking this area with Western Tibet. There is, however, a growing awareness in India now that the final delineation of the boundary in this Sector should be so drawn that it meets these Chinese concerns.

Rajiv Gandhi and Zhao Ziyang had rightly assessed that the border dispute "was not an insurmountable problem". What is really needed is the political will to find a mutually agreed solution. China has displayed this political will in resolving boundary disputes with some of its smaller neighbours. There is no reason to believe that "similar approach cannot succeed in the 1990s in the case of the Sino-Indian border dispute.

CONCLUSION

India and China, except for a short period of 30 years, have maintained friendly relations for nearly two thousand years. In the closing decade of the Twentieth Century, they must stand together to deal with the complexities of a unipolar world in which even the U.N.O. is overshadowed by the only Super Power. Beyond the horizon lies a new World which will witness the emergence of a powerful Asia. The unity of these two most populous and largest countries of Asia can contribute substantially to the peace and prosperity of that new Asia.

USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION - 1991

On the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee, the USI Council during its meeting on 18 December, 1991, selected the following officers for the award of prizes in the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition - 1991 :

Group 'A' - "FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDIA DURING THE 1990s"

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Captain Akshaya Handa	First Prize	Rs. 2,000/-
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New Global Security Dimensions*

AIR MARSHAL J ZAHEER, PVSM (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

The Bi-Polar Power Structure - which the world lived with for about 45 years, came to an end quite suddenly about two years ago. The United States emerged as the sole Super-power without the countervailing balance of the Soviet Union. It is this reality, i.e. the absence of countervailing balance which suggests the need to recognize the present pre-eminence of the USA as constituting an important "New Global Security Dimension".

Other new dimensions flow from the breakup of the Soviet Empire. There is the enhanced potential for conflict due to acute nationalities and ethnic problems among and within the many heterogeneous constituents of the CIS and the dangers inherent in the visibly weakened command and control structure of the huge military apparatus which still exists and includes weapons of mass destruction.

Unconnected with the end of the so-called cold war are the global imperatives of the rapidly degrading environment, the rapidly depleting earth resources and the exploding population. In today's world no discussion on global security would be complete without consideration of these extremely threatening dimensions.

A PRE-EMINENT USA : NEED FOR ENLIGHTENED LEADERSHIP

Whether we call it a uni-polar world or not the USA looms large on the geo-political horizon. But for reasons which we shall try to identify the world seems more unsettled than ever before and the outlook gloomy. In contrast the 'cold war' era is beginning to look more and more as a period that served well the peoples of this earth. Underpinned by the nuclear stand-off and mutually assured destruction it kept the peace between two ideologically polarised and totally antagonistic systems. That one pillar of the structure was strongly Marxist was an important stabilising feature - curbing on the one hand the imperial ambitions of the West and on the other providing hope and sustenance for the many weak and struggling nations striving to emerge from beneath the colonial or feudal yoke following World War II. It was not that conflicts were eradicated but they could be contained and direct

* Text of a paper presented by Air Marshal J Zaheer, a former Vice Chief of the Air Staff, at the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies.

confrontation between the super powers carefully avoided. And then there were the Gorbachev years and his relentless pursuit of the Peace Process. He broke through the frozen mind sets of the West as indeed through the mind sets within his own country and the world was witness to great advances in arms control - INF, SNF, CWE, START. In biological and chemical weaponry, German reunification, withdrawal from Afghanistan, territorial and border disputes. The record is long and distinguished. Nothing like the wave of optimism and hope of those years appears conceivable now. So how should we assess the prospects of stability and a just peace in this period of a pre-eminent USA?

Given their interventionist history in the pursuit of their perceived national interest, their enthusiastic display of power at the first opportunity after the Soviet decline, combined with their demonstrated capacity to marshal the co-operation and support of other powers and of the United Nations itself suggests that for the present the US is indeed in a position to define and prescribe a New World Order to its chosen design and its vision of "Manifest Destiny". The US is not given to undue introspection or self-doubt in the exercise of power. And although the strategic imperative of a Communist counter point may have declined, the world has already witnessed and should be prepared for US activism more readily resorted to than before, of course with sharing of the financial burden with others and under the cover of the United Nations. Ready resort to coercive diplomacy in the pursuit of lesser indeed trivial interests would be another feature. We in India have had a taste of this in connection with our attempts to supply rice to Cuba, a nuclear reactor to Iran and procurement of cryogenic engine technology from Russia.

Some analysts subscribe to the view that the frequency of regional conflicts in the underdeveloped world would decrease with the decline of superpower rivalry. This could be so to the extent that the proxy involvement of super power(s) tended to trigger as well as prolong the conflict. In the emerging new global order the world will witness increasing external power interventions in the regional and indeed internal affairs of developing nations. The primary concerns of the powerful would be to ensure favourable access to the strategic natural resources and markets of the developing nations on the one hand and on the other to safeguard their own security against weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the 'irresponsible' poor. The focus of confrontation will shift, has already shifted, from East-West to the North-South dimension.

There are those who say that with anti-communism no longer the main plank of US foreign policy more noble interests such as the promotion of

democracy and international law would temper if not replace the exercise of realpolitik and restrain American unilateralism. Such a development would be widely welcomed. But it does seem a pity that in the search for noble causes strong political voices in the US or in the West have yet to be heard on the imperative need of US leadership in the implementation of programmes for the salvation of "Planet Earth"; programmes designed to reverse environmental degradation, natural resource depletion, population growth and above all consumerism. The agenda calls for a revolutionary turn-around of the developed world's societal values in living standards and lifestyles; calls for deceleration in industrial production as against growth. As the chief protagonist and practitioner of capitalism and the biggest consumer of energy and materials in the world the USA must take the lead in making the sacrifices and the major restructuring involved. Without the US itself setting the example, enforcing the agenda on others would not be remotely possible. It is obvious that US leadership is critical for success. It is equally obvious that in the event of US non-acceptance amounting to an affirmation of business as usual would mean that the Planet Earth would remain under serious threat. The absence of adequate recognition of this fact by the developed world who alone control the wealth to implement the agenda would establish this threat as the foremost security dimension of these times.

AN EMPIRE BREAKS UP

There has always been unrest in the many nationalities of the erstwhile Soviet Union. As long as Moscow Centre was strong the unrest remained manageable. By 1989 nationalist aspirations with strong ethnic and religious overtones had escalated and had reached acute proportions in the Caucasus, the Baltic Republics, the Soviet Western Republics, Central Asia and Russia itself. The Soviet collapse followed and in the present dispensation the Baltic three are independent and the remaining twelve republics are held together in what appears to be a loose transitional arrangement - the Commonwealth of Independent States with Russia in a status somewhat more equal than the others.

Some or several of the inter and intra disputes have the potential for developing into full-fledged conflicts. The Russian Republic is facing the problem of defending Russian minorities suffering varying degrees of threat in several states notably Moldova, Georgia and the Baltics. In the case of the latter a serious issue could develop on the question of land access to the major naval base at Kaliningrad on the Baltic.

In the Caucasus the centuries old animosities between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians erupted into civil war in 1989 with intense Muslim and

Christian hatreds fuelling the conflict. Large quantities of weapons including armoured vehicles and helicopters commandeered or stolen from Army depots and bases have been used. Sporadic warfare continues requiring the standing presence of a large contingent of the Red Army. Even in Byelorussia and the Ukraine nationalist sentiments have been growing. With the latter there are serious differences over the Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. Both States are part of the industrial heartland and of considerable strategic importance to Moscow.

This brief summary of the unsettled conditions in the CIS brings out the dangers of Balkanisation with its attendant instabilities. It is clear that at the core of the unrest in these Republics is the economic breakdown in the region. Should the economic rejuvenation of the CIS fail to take place in the short term it could bring in its wake not only heightened conflict but along with it the likelihood of refugee mass migrations thereby upgrading an essentially regional security threat to one of global dimension.

ARMS PROLIFERATION

Once the largest military apparatus of its time the collapse of the Soviet Union has had a severely debilitating effect on the command and control structure and the morale of the rank and file. The concurrent presence of both these factors has the potential for promoting unauthorised, covert transfer of arms of all descriptions including weapons of mass destruction or their critical components. Serving personnel in military establishments including R & D and Production Units are facing severe financial and material hardships and would be tempted to succumb to illegal arms diversions for monetary gain. At the official level individual Republics of the CIS are pursuing major arms transfers at attractive prices to any one who has the capacity to pay in hard currency. The East European States facing financial stringency are doing the same. Although such trade in conventional weaponry may not add up to a substantial security concern - it would indeed become a matter of the most substantial concern if such transfers include weapons of mass destruction or their technology or their critical components including fissile materials. Already ex-Soviet experts in R & D or production of nuclear or other weapons have become attractive commodities and a significant number are believed to have moved to other countries so far mostly of the developed world. In time such technology along with its experts would reach third world countries aspiring for nuclear status. Would it then be a safer world? No doubt the answer to this would be a resounding NO from the existing Nuclear Powers and others of the developed West. From the aspiring Third World States the answer would be an equally resounding "YES". Their argument we need MAD as much as anyone else for security as well as political status. The world ends

up with a 'stand-off' between the powerful NPT states against the weak anti-NPT states. Between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' and an existing security dimension emerges in accentuated form.

SUMMARY

The recognition of a pre-eminent USA in the absence of a countervailing balance as constituting a global security dimension has been suggested with the focus of confrontation shifting from East-West to North-South.

The dangers of Balkanisation and proliferation of the technology and weapons of mass destruction due to the instabilities inherent in the break-up of an Empire have been recognised.

The over-riding importance of the looming dangers to "Planet Earth" due to human society and its values has been suggested as a Security concern of truly global dimensions.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

The Council of the United Service Institution of India during its last meeting on 18 December 1991, keeping in view the increase in cost of paper and printing charges of the USI Journal as well as increase in cost of general provision of administrative facilities to the members, decided that w.e.f. 1 January 1992, the revised membership and subscription rates will be as follows :-

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Central Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: The Strategic Dimension

PROF. K R SINGH

Old order has changed though a new order has yet to emerge. 1991-92 was an important turning point in the history of modern civilization. It was probably as important as the years 1945-46 which transformed the global alignment of forces from the Allied-Axis Powers of the Second World War to the two blocs of the Cold War. By 1991-92, not only had the Cold War ended, thereby creating a temporary geopolitical vacuum, but the disintegration of the USSR, one of the two Super Powers, paved the way for a fresh restructuring of the World order. Probably the forces that had led to the collapse of the Soviet will to confront were also responsible for the disintegration not only of the Warsaw Pact but even of the USSR as a single unified state. The Second World War had initiated a process of disintegration of the imperial system dominated by the states of Western Europe. The end of the Cold War had similar impact upon the ex-Czarist Empire (the USSR). Both these inter-related events, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, had a profound impact upon Central Asia and its immediate environment.

During the years of the Cold War, Central Asia, as a geo-strategic area, was crucial for projecting Soviet military power, both nuclear and conventional. Kazakhstan was of crucial importance for testing nuclear weapons and missiles. Also, strategic ICBMs like SS-18/19 were clustered there. Moreover, strategic bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were stationed there. Besides, 15-16 divisions of conventional troops with accompanying air power, armour and air-lift capability were earmarked for the Central Asian region of the USSR. While the strategic-nuclear forces were directed mostly against the nuclear adversaries of the Cold War, conventional forces could pose a major threat to the littoral of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in the South which includes major oilfields of the world. Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was sustained from this area. The disintegration of USSR has removed this conventional military threat to this sensitive area.

During the Cold War era, Central Asia, as a part of the Warsaw Pact, and also because of its proximity to the Gulf oil, had become the target of Western diplomacy. This was especially true during the last two decades of

Working paper presented by Prof K R Singh of JNU at the seminar on Central Asia organized by the India International Centre, New Delhi, on 12 November 1992.

the Cold War rivalry, and more so after the Afghan Crisis. The West even used Islam as a tool in this Cold War rivalry between capitalism and communism. The aim was to undermine the Soviet hold over Central Asia. Thus, Cold War added fuel to the fire of Islamic fundamentalism. This will have long-term impact upon the region.

Now, with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of USSR, Central Asia has been relegated to an insignificant part in the overall framework of global geopolitics. The region has, however, attained relevance as a new variable in regional geopolitics. If the present unipolar global order continues, Central Asia will be, at best, an additional buffer between Russia, as one of the regional great powers in the north, and the Gulf in the South. Its future global relevance will be determined only after the emergence of the new pattern of alliances of the post-Cold War era. Situation is too fluid today to spell that out with any certainty.

While the post-Cold War environment has diminished the global relevance of Central Asia, the breakdown of USSR has brought about a major transformation in the geopolitical restructuring of the region. From being a relatively insignificant area on the periphery of USSR and of the Warsaw Pact system, it has now emerged as the hub of a new geopolitical pattern in the region. Recent developments have brought the region to a position more akin to the beginning of the nineteenth century than the one at the end of the twentieth century. Despite the passage of time, the area today represents more the politics of the Khanates of the eighteenth century, than modern state system, when some of them were under Russian influence while others were under Persian influence. Most of them professed Islam to varying degrees. The region was also subject to several competing forces like Russia, China, Iran and Britain.

Almost a similar situation prevails today except that Britain has been replaced by USA and more new regional actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have also joined in the 'great game'. Some of these new actors very often act as proxies for great powers. Moreover, since all the regional actors are Muslim, Islam will become an important variable in Central Asia's domestic and foreign policies. Other factors will be the Iranian and the Turanian influences based upon historical pulls. These factors are likely to link Central Asia closer to South-West Asia. One can even argue that through Islam and medieval history, South-West Asia is intruding into Central Asia today. This will have important consequences for both the regions.

DOMESTIC VARIABLES INFLUENCING FOREIGN POLICY

The rapid disintegration of USSR, and consequently the emergence of

independent states in Central Asia, poses the crucial question of defining their national identity which is likely to influence their domestic and foreign policies. It needs to be underlined that though factors like ethnic and religious divide between the Central Asian people and those of the rest of USSR came as useful explanations, they were not primarily responsible for the breakup of Central Asia within USSR. Nor did a long-drawn 'nationalist' struggle lead to their 'liberation'. Moreover, these Central Asian republics, that were primarily administrative units of the USSR, did not necessarily represent coherent ethnic and self-sufficient regional entities. A long-drawn nationalist movement might have ironed out their inherent differences. But that did not happen. Hence, one finds these newly formed states being subjected to contradictory forces revolving around religion, ethnicity and challenges of regional development. These will not only influence their domestic policies but also their foreign policies.

There is no doubt that religion (Islam) was frowned upon by the Communist regime. But it could not be totally ignored. Even during the last few decades of the Communist rule in Central Asia, there were multi-tiered religious activities. One can be termed as the establishment Islam, sponsored and directed by the state. The other was based upon local Islamic traditions, especially the Sufi brotherhood and their associated activities, which, because they were frowned upon by the state, had even gone underground and thereby, acquired a new meaning of 'protest'. Lastly were the waves of modern Islamic fundamentalism emanating from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, that not only sought to galvanize the local population under the banner of Islam against the Moscow regime and Communist ideology but also provided the basis for the present Saudi-Iranian rivalry in Central Asia. All these major trends; official, traditional and revolutionary, are competing for the attention of different strata of society in the region. Of these, Islamic fundamentalist waves reaching Central Asia from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and often clashing with each other, will have crucial impact in determining the foreign policies of these states.

In Central Asia, Tajikistan is most affected by the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism. There are three main reasons for the same. Traditionally, Tajiks were deeply influenced by Islam and Persian culture. In the eighties they came under the impact of Islamic revolution in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Equally important was the competition between Iranians and Saudis to push their versions of Islam. Till the disintegration of USSR, Saudi efforts were a part of the global Cold War rivalry in which Saudis had lined up with USA. In the post-Cold War period it is a part of the wider Saudi-Iranian competition over the minds of the Muslims. This intra-Islamic cold war will continue to influence Central Asia for some time to come.

Tajikistan has already emerged as the centre-piece in the regional Islamic power politics. It is a relatively small state, which is economically poor, an ethnic melting pot and a hot-bed of Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Events in Afghanistan also affect Tajikistan directly. Islam in Tajikistan and Afghanistan will also influence Uzbekistan, especially the Fergana Valley which also witnessed series of riots recently. Thus, the southern core of Central Asia is going to remain destabilized for some time to come. Unlike Tajikistan and Uzbekistan religion does not appear to have a marked impact in other Central Asian republics like Kazakhstan and Kirgizistan. The intensity of the 'Islamic' impact in the south and the relatively more 'secular' trends in the north might even hinder the emergence of regional cooperation.

Beside religion, ethnicity will have great impact not only upon the domestic but also foreign policy of the Central Asian states. Russian (or Slavic) minority in Central Asia is of great significance because it represents two facets of Central Asian personality; the era of Russian domination in the past, and the bond cementing Central Asian states within the CIS of today. The Slavic population is not uniform in all these states. It is fairly large in Kazakhstan (38.0%) and Kirgizistan (21.5%). Though the percentage is much less in Turkmenistan (12.6%) they are still vital factors in the infra-structure of a modern state system. However, there is already some cause for fear, especially in the southern part of Central Asia, which might lead to an exodus of these people in future, especially if religious fundamentalism becomes the dominant force there. Recent ethnic riots had already caused some anxiety. Any forced migration will have adverse effect upon the solidarity of the CIS. It will be difficult to envisage a 'commonwealth' divided by marked ethnic hostility.

As noted earlier, maps of these central Asian republics, while purporting to represent separate ethnic identities, do not effectively divide these groups into independent states. These ethnic groups spillover into other states thereby posing problems of socio-political assimilation in each state. Tajiks are found in Uzbekistan, Kirgizistan and even in Kazakhstan. Uzbeks are found in substantial number in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgizistan and Kazakhstan. Intra-ethnic trouble led to riots in June-July 1990 in the Osh region of Kirgizistan between Uzbeks and Kirgizs. Reportedly 320 persons were killed. Many were even mutilated. As economic and socio-political tensions mount, ethnic divide will provide a ready-made excuse for riots and thus pose serious problems of regional peace and security.

These ethnic problems are likely to take a different shape when one analyses relations between Central Asia and its immediate neighbourhood. Kazakh and Kirgiz people spillover into neighbouring Chinese territory.

Afghanistan has a large Central Asian ethnic population consisting of about 3.5 mn Tajik (almost 40% of the total Tajik population), 1.8 mn Uzbek and 0.8 mn Turkmen. Turkmen are also found in Iran in large numbers. Thus, the southern frontier of Central Asia and the northern frontiers of Iran and Afghanistan are a melting pot of ethnic groups. It is too early to predict the future course of events. However, if the state structures in the region, and more so in Afghanistan, do not stabilize in the near future, it is possible that state boundaries might tend to realign themselves more in conformity with the ethnic boundaries.

REGIONAL VARIABLES INFLUENCING FOREIGN POLICY

Geopolitical location as well as socio-political factors will mould the foreign policies of these newly independent states in Central Asia; both on the bilateral basis as well as on the regional level. Newly formed Central Asian states are already members of several regional and international organisations beside the UN. Being Muslim states, they are represented in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). They are also members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Some of them are members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Thus, within a short period these newly independent states are already developing a regional and an international personality.

The linkage of these Central Asian states with CIS is of crucial importance. CIS was an effort to salvage part of the heritage as well as the economic and security linkages that had evolved over years. CIS, while providing certain advantages, also imposes obligations upon its members. Above all, they are supposed to be bound by treaty obligations of the erstwhile USSR. CIS also provides the mechanism for single unified control over the nuclear weapon capability of the erstwhile USSR. It also offers a blanket security cover of conventional armed forces, governed by the Minsk agreement of 30 December 1991. It provides for a single armed forces command, while leaving the option open to individual CIS members to control their own armed forces. CIS members also signed a treaty of collective security on 15 May 1992. Moreover, the borders of the former USSR are guarded by the Committee for the protection of State Borders, with joint command of border troops.

No one can predict what definitive shape CIS will take with the passage of time. It could go the way the British Commonwealth or it could develop into a viable regional organization like the ASEAN or the European Community. Whichever way it goes it will have a decisive impact upon the domestic and foreign policies of Central Asian republics.

These republics are also being drawn towards the Islamic world, especially towards the states on their southern periphery. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, which are founder-members of the ECO, a revamped version of the defunct Regional Cooperation for Development, took the lead in extending the membership of the ECO to these newly formed Central Asian republics. Iran took the initiative by inviting them to a meeting in Tehran in March 1992. Heads of the States and of the Government of the members of ECO and of the Central Asian Republics met again on 9-10 May 1992 at Ashkabad to continue this dialogue. Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have already joined the ECO. Others have also shown keen interest. ECO is also linked, via Azerbaijan and Turkey, to the newly evolving Black Sea economic cooperation arrangement. Thus, Central Asia will become yet another link in the chain of regional cooperation agreements of the South, extending from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

There are also talks of evolving an intra-regional grouping consisting of all these ex-Soviet Central Asian states. The aim is to create an Islamic State of Turkestan, with Tashkent as its focus. Reportedly some Islamic groups even in Kazakhstan, like the Alash, share this goal. As noted earlier, religious fundamentalism and ethnicity might prove to be obstacles in the evolution of such an Islamic state of Turkestan. However, if these constraints can be overcome, and economic and developmental considerations given the primacy that they deserve, Central Asia can evolve as a viable regional unit that can play a pivotal role in regional politics. In fact, if one looks at the available basic infra-structures of development like lines of communication, power grid, irrigation resources etc. one finds that the Southern part of Central Asia is already knit in an interdependent system. This system is linked with Russia via Kazakhstan and with the South via Iran and Afghanistan. If such arrangements of economic cooperation can be institutionalised, they would not only help to remove the present constraints on the economic development of the region as a whole but also lead to greater regional harmony.

Formation of new sovereign independent states following the disintegration of USSR was welcomed by almost all states. USA, which saw in the disintegration of USSR, its arch rival, the finale of the Cold War drama, had targeted Central Asia as the soft underbelly of its Cold War rival. It moved ahead not only to consolidate its political gains but also to ensure that the vacuum thus created was not filled by forces hostile to US global interests. Among other things, USA was interested that the nuclear weapons stockpiled by USSR in Central Asia did not fall into the hands of forces that were considered hostile by USA. Also, USA was interested that the impact of 'revolutionary' Islamic ideology be contained. USA not only granted quick diplomatic recognition to these states but Secretary of State, James Baker,

also visited the area in February 1992 itself and met not only the ruling elite but also the 'opposition'. However, USA has kept a low posture and is not seen to be directly and deeply involved in Central Asia. Reportedly, its interests are being protected and promoted *via* Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Turkey had been seeking to influence the Turkic groups in Central Asia even during the Cold War. Pan-Turanism was further underlined by Turkey after the disintegration of USSR when Turkey began to cultivate these newly formed states. In March 1992, a high-powered Turkish delegation toured Central Asia and promised help in several fields. Among other things, Turkey promised to help in the conversion from Cyrillic script to Roman script. That would be of great significance and would reorient these states from the Russian heritage to Turkish heritage and indirectly to "Western" sphere of influence. Uzbekistan signed an educational cooperation agreement with Turkey on 29 February 1992. It was announced on 19 March 1992 that Uzbekistan would relay Turkish T.V. shows. Thus, pan-Turanism has even become an instrument to woo these states away from Iran.

Iran too has taken great interest in Central Asia. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited the area in December 1991 itself *via* Moscow. After the independence of these Central Asian states, Iran signed agreements granting transport, transit and communication facilities *via* Iran. Iran is actively promoting a regional integration of Central Asian States with the states on its southern periphery under ECO. Iran is coming closer to Turkmenistan which is its next-door neighbour. They have signed several bilateral agreements dealing with economic and cultural matters. Iran has, however, emphasized that its attempts to seek greater cooperation with Central Asian states would not be at the cost of CIS, or more specifically Russia. In this respect Iran's policy will differ from that of Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia's interest in Central Asia stems largely out of its partisan approach during the Cold War era. Saudi Arabia's interest in Central Asia *via* Afghanistan was well known as a part of the Cold War rivalry. After the disintegration of USSR, Saudi Arabia will seek to develop fresh linkages with this region. Unlike Turkey or Pakistan or even Iran, Saudi Arabia has petro-dollars to spare and has demonstrated its willingness to spend them rather lavishly to win over people to its side. Already, some Central Asian states are showing interest in Saudi Arabia. President Suparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan visited Saudi Arabia in March 1992 and was received by King Fahd. President of Uzbekistan, followed suit in April 1992. Besides holding talks with King Fahd, he also visited the Holy Places in Mecca and Madina. Thus, already, within a short span of time Central Asia and its southern periphery are seeking ways and means of greater interaction.

ISSUES OF SECURITY : NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL

Disintegration of USSR has created a security vacuum in this region. The question of regional security in Central Asia needs to be approached from two angles. As far as Central Asian states are concerned, they lack resources for creating and maintaining large and powerful armed forces. Moreover, now that the Cold War has ended, the threat perception will be determined more by factors like intra-regional divide rather than by threats from outside the region. Thus, in future, Central Asia will be confronted with security problems like domestic instability, with added possibility of transborder intervention, both direct and indirect. Afghan border will remain sensitive. Today, CIS framework offers some guarantee against both these types of threats. However, the maximum limit of Russian willingness to be involved in these intra-regional and trans-regional interventions will be worth examining. Russians may prefer not to get deeply involved in intra-regional ethnic and religious disputes.

The future of nuclear weapons that were kept in Central Asia gave rise to several speculations, especially after doctored reports began circulating about the possibility of their falling into 'wrong' hands, especially Iran. In Central Asia, these weapons were stationed mostly in Kazakhstan. Control over these weapons in future was in the context of breakup of USSR. Under the agreement on strategic forces, signed at Minsk on 30 December 1991, CIS members undertook to respect obligations of the former USSR, and pledged to pursue a coordinated policy in the area of disarmament and international security. The final decision about the use of these nuclear weapons rested with President of the Russian Federation - in consultation with the leaders of other republics where nuclear weapons were stationed (Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan), and with the leaders of other members of the CIS. The four nuclear - weapon republics of CIS also signed a protocol on Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) on 23 May 1992 thereby preparing the ground for the ratification of the START which was signed in July 1991 between USA and USSR.

Earlier, there was some dispute among the successor states over the question of ownership of nuclear weapons stationed in their respective territories. Russia insisted that she should be treated as the sole successor state of USSR as far as these weapons were concerned, and all those nuclear weapons be handed over to her. While Ukraine and Byelarus objected strongly to that suggestion, Kazakhstan was more amenable to 'persuasion'. In fact, Kazakhstan has very limited strength to withstand the pressure not only from Russia but also from the entire 'West' on this sensitive question. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, during his Washington visit, agreed to eliminate all

nuclear weapons in the republic either by handing them over to Russia or by their destruction, and to formalize Kazakhstan's status as a non-nuclear weapon power by signing the NPT in due course. It was reported that Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, the Chief of the CIS armed forces, during his London visit in January 1992, had said that all tactical nuclear weapons located in all former Soviet republics, except Ukraine and Byelarus would be withdrawn to Russia by July 1992. USA was worried about these weapons, and feared that some of them might fall into the hands of 'Islamic fundamentalists'. Secretary of State James Baker visited Kazakhstan and Kirgizistan to seek assurance on that question. According to the *Washington Post* of 7 February 1992, US officials reportedly said that those former Soviet republics that held nuclear weapons had agreed that all strategic nuclear weapons outside Russia would be destroyed within seven years.

The fear, often highly exaggerated by interested parties, about these nuclear warheads falling into the hands of so-called undesirable elements, needs to be evaluated rationally. It is difficult to envisage a situation under which these strategic warheads, that were always kept under strict supervision of dedicated and specially trained units, and were fitted with multiple fail-safe devices, including coded soft-ware programmes, could be hijacked so casually from strategic bases. It also needs to be noted that while the Soviet political and economic system had disintegrated, military discipline had prevented the Soviet armed forces from falling into similar pitfalls. It is also to be noted that despite all the wild rumours, there is no authentic report of these nuclear warheads missing from the stockpile. However, until and unless all the known nuclear warheads are *formally* accounted for by the recognized authorities not only in the CIS but also elsewhere, the cause of this fear and speculations connected with them will be difficult to be suppressed.

BREAKUP OF USSR AND IMPACT ON PAKISTAN

The breakup of USSR had great impact upon the strategic thinking in Pakistan. The decade-long Afghan crisis and the subsequent emergence of several Muslim states in neighbouring Central Asia gave added weight to the concept of 'strategic depth' of Pakistan. In its effort to psychologically disengage itself from its 'Indian' past, as well as to seek additional support for its confrontation with India, Pakistan has, since independence, sought to project itself primarily as an Islamic state with its roots in the Islamic world. It did gain some advantages from that policy. However, for a long time these were based upon emotional, or at best religious, ties and had limited practical relevance. Pakistan's active involvement in Afghanistan on behalf of some of the *mujahedeen* groups opened new vistas of future geo-strategic advantages. Some Pakistanis thought that an erst-while troublesome frontier could be

converted into assets. The concept of strategic depth was accordingly advocated. That concept got an added boost after the disintegration of USSR and the creation of several Muslim states in Central Asia even beyond Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan's dream of strategic depth acquired a more rosy hue. For some in India, what was only Pakistan's dream, assumed the shape of a reality. Hence, it is important to evaluate the potentials of this concept of defence in depth.

Like other neighbouring states, Pakistan also got excited once new states were created in Central Asia. But, unlike Iran and Turkey, Pakistan's response, though vocal, was officially on a low key. Pakistan's delegation, led by the Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Sardar Assef Ali, visited the area in the first half of January 1992 and met with the leaders of the new republics. Pakistan, as a member of the ECO has actively supported the stand of Iran and Turkey of extending the ECO to cover Central Asian states as well. Pakistan has also advanced some credit to them to encourage trade. Schemes were drawn for greater economic and technical cooperation with this area, including the ambitious proposal to obtain surplus-hydro-electric power from Tajikistan *via* Afghanistan.

Pakistan's dream of intensive cooperation with Central Asia depends above all upon a stable and united Afghanistan capable of and interested in acting as a bridge between Pakistan and Central Asia. At the moment, Afghanistan is a divided country tottering on the verge of political anarchy. While the attention of international media and even of UN is focused on Yugoslavia, Georgia etc. in Europe, Somalia in Africa and Iraq and Cambodia in Asia, situation in Afghanistan is being downplayed even by the OIC. At the moment, Pakistan is finding itself unable to wash its hands off the Hikmatyar group and is, therefore, 'halted' even before it has reached Kabul. If the situation degenerates further, and if Afghanistan disintegrates as a single unified state, not only will Pakistan's dream of defence in depth suffer a major set-back but the demand for greater Paktoonistan, submerged today for political reasons but most likely to reemerge as a result of a truncated Afghanistan, will even eat into whatever strategic depth Pakistan possesses today. Thus, one will have to await developments in Afghanistan before commenting effectively upon this concept of strategic depth.

Pakistan will also face tough competition from its ECO partners like Turkey and Iran, especially in the context of strong Saudi-Pak linkages. Pakistan's 'Islamic' linkage with Central Asia might even erode Sino-Pak relations in the context of likely impact of Central Asian Islam upon Chinese part of Central Asia. The Karakoram highway might become a conduit for Islamic fundamentalism into Chinese Central Asia, especially if Saudis get interested in ex-

panding the Wahabi influence there. Above all, an economically and militarily weak and politically divided Central Asia which is being pulled towards several foci like Russia, Turkey, Iran, USA, EC, Japan etc. can hardly be termed as a strategic depth of any neighbouring state.

INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

In the light of all these uncertainties, India will have to chalkout its policy towards these Central Asian republics with great care and caution. Till recently, Central Asia was seen as a part of USSR, and one tended to approach it via Moscow. Now, one is forced to start afresh. There is no doubt that India must seek avenues of fruitful dialogue with these states lest we miss by default. But, it must be underlined that while India should evolve a policy for the region as a whole, bilateral relations would ultimately become the foundation on which an effective regional policy can be based.

Central Asian republics have been attracted towards India. India's bilateral relations with Central Asian republics began with a three-day official visit of President of Kazakhstan in the middle of March 1992. Series of agreements were signed on establishment of diplomatic relations, as well as on development of trade, on scientific technical cooperation, joint mineral exploitation, training in agriculture, banking, management and foreign service. In mid-April, President Suparmurad Nayazov of Turkmenistan came to India on a three-day visit. Diplomatic relations were established and agreements were signed on cooperation in economic, cultural and scientific fields. India also reciprocated. Though an unofficial delegation had toured Central Asia soon after the disintegration of USSR, formal official visit was inaugurated when Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. R.L. Bhatia, visited three republics of Central Asia in mid-October 1992. Agreements were signed establishing Joint Commissions on trade, economy, and science and technology. Thus, though slightly delayed, Indian diplomacy has taken some concrete steps to formalize India's relations with these states.

While other neighbouring states have approached Central Asia *via* the route of ethnicity and/or religion, India will have to approach it via 'secular' path of political and economic interaction based upon the general principles of South-South Cooperation. To begin with, it will have to be based upon an unequal pattern, and India will have to offer more than what it can expect to get, at least in the immediate future. This policy alone can lay the foundation for a more equitable partnership in future.

Though India is rich in human resources, as well as in medium-level technology, it is short of economic resources especially foreign exchange.

Moreover, India has the inbuilt disadvantage of not having direct boundary with any Central Asian state. Hence, India will benefit if it approaches these states *via* their immediate neighbours especially Russia and Iran (and Afghanistan once it settles down), as well as others who have the intention of establishing close political and economic relations with them, like Turkey and some Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. India has already established bilateral relations with most of these states. These relations can be expanded to cover central Asia as well. India cannot be a member of the CIS or ECO. Hence, ways will have to be found of either bypassing them or even trespassing through them.

There is no doubt that India can do a lot, on bilateral basis, to help these newly independent states in the field of education, scientific training, management consultancy etc. India has already provided some expertise like training for diplomats, but above all, India must break the language barrier. India is in an advantageous position in that field. Some years ago, India had arranged for the teaching of English to young Vietnamese who were brought to India for that purpose. That was a more difficult task because of the lack of knowledge of Vietnamese with those who taught English to them. But, India has a reservoir of persons who are teachers of Russian and who are also capable of teaching English through the Russian medium. If India can extend facility even to ten students from each republic to come to India annually to study English, or if they know English, to improve upon it, it will be a step in the right direction. These same persons then can be offered training in the area of their choice and aptitude. India can also offer military training at various levels to officers of these newly formed republics that are faced with the task of creating independent armed forces of their own. India can also cooperate in the cultural field, beginning with the exchange of T.V. programmes. Above all, it must be noted that both India and these Central Asian states have limited capability for bilateral or even multilateral interaction. Thus, promoting good-will on both sides by friendly gestures can be a good starting point for the Indian diplomacy in Central Asia. Other things will flow from that.

China and West Asia : The Arms Diplomacy

DR P R KUMARASAMY

'Insatiable' has often been used to describe the West Asian⁽¹⁾ arms imports. Not long ago it was either a colony of the metropolitan powers or a vital trade route to their colonies further East. When it became free with numerous independent states, the colonial interests did not vanish but took a different shape; initially the need to contain the then USSR and subsequently the desire to control production, distribution and pricing of oil. The regional upheavals and developments in West Asia since the end of the World War-II should, thus, be attributed to the competition as well as accommodation between the regional and non-regional powers. The uninterrupted flow of arms to West Asia is just a symptom of this phenomenon, especially when the latter and their institutions define the regional threat perceptions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the major arms suppliers to the region, as in others, are also the major powers.

In this race for arms exports, both at the global as well as regional levels, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was a late entrant. Well over a decade after its first significant deal with West Asia, China's share in the regional arms imports remains marginal. In order to fully understand the extent of its exports and their implications one has to examine some basic problems that confronted China in the initial period. First, its political as well as diplomatic isolation until the seventies was a serious impediment to China's international behaviour. In spite of its size China needed the political support of West Asia rather than otherwise. Its admission into the United Nations did not introduce a metamorphosis. China's economic and military power was marginal and it was in the midst of series of violent domestic turmoils.

Secondly, much of the Chinese arms and systems were outdated Soviet weapons supplied during the hey days of Sino-Soviet friendship. Since Moscow was the principal non-Western supplier, Beijing's chances of penetrating West Asia was minimal. In other words, China had nothing which the region could not receive from elsewhere. Thirdly, Chinese arms transfer policy was heavily dictated by its ideological content. Reeling under the charismatic leadership of Chairman Mao and the turmoil of Cultural Revolution, China approached international relations through a confrontationist mould. These, in turn, generated

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a great degree of pessimism in the Arab world. At times China had blatantly interfered in the inter-Arab conflicts and disputes. As a result even though it did not have an hegemonic past like others, its attempts to secure legitimacy took a very long time. The Bandung Conference of 1955 formally opened the door for Chinese penetration of West Asia. Yet it took more than two decades for example to obtain recognition from Saudi Arabia.

THE WINDS OF CHANGE

Mid-seventies onwards various national, regional and international developments ushered in a new era for China, thus paving the way for an active participation in the arms trade. While some of them bore fruits soon, others needed a longer gestation period.

The announcement in 1975 by Prime Minister Chou En-lai on the Chinese drive towards four modernizations - agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defence - altered its fundamental attitude towards arms trade. China needed additional resources and outside technology and military modernization was not the top priority. The army had to fend for itself. Earning precious foreign exchanges through arms exports became not only a viable but also essential option. Thus the People's Republic of China formally discarded its earlier practice of 'gifting away' arms to national liberation movements and allies and earnestly entered the arms bazaar.⁽²⁾

Secondly the setbacks suffered by the Soviet Union and its arms in West Asia since early seventies proved advantageous to China. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 saw a high degree of attrition in the Soviet-supplied armies of Egypt and Syria. Their replenishment proved difficult in the wake of serious political developments. The two-decade old military relations between Cairo and Moscow came to an abrupt end in March 1976, when, in order to bolster his position in Washington, President Anwar Sadat abrogated the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship and Co-operation Treaty. Similarly Moscow was caught unawares by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and notwithstanding its friendship treaty with the latter, the Soviet Union declined to replace the losses and spares. In both these cases--Egypt and Iraq - the armies were dependent upon the Soviet weapons but, for different reasons, spares and re-supplies were not forthcoming.

This ironically fitted well with the Chinese policy and their new perception of arms trade. As in the case of these countries, Soviet weapons had played a very important role in Chinese armed forces, until the former cut-off military assistance in 1959⁽³⁾. Both, to maintain the Soviet based military hardware and to fight the international isolation, Beijing resorted to a novel

idea: reverse engineering. A very large chunk of its arms production were either out-right reproduction from the original Soviet supplies or adapted from them. This ingenious Chinese expertise proved valuable to countries starved off Soviet supplies and support. As Table-1 indicates, much of the Chinese arms trade with West Asia was Soviet in origin or design. To put it differently, what was needed from USSR and what was available in China, were one and the same. It was not accidental that days after abandoning the Soviets, Sadat announced the Chinese supply of engines and spare parts for his MiG fighters. Given the size of the Chinese army, larger orders could be met with limited dislocations.

Table 1 China's reverse engineering and Soviet/Russian arms

<i>Chinese designation</i>	<i>Weapon description</i>	<i>Soviet version</i>
F-4	strike aircraft	MiG-17
F-5	fighter	MiG-17
F-6	interceptor	MiG-19
F-7	fighter	MiG-21
FT-6	trainer version of F-6	MiG-19 UTI
T-59	main battle tank	T-54
Type-69	—	improved T-59
Type-59 130 mm	towed gun	M-46 130 mm
H-6	bomber	TU-16
Type-77	armoured personnel carrier	BTR-50
Oghab 230 mm	rocket	Type 83 273 mm
Hai ying-2	ship-to-ship missile	Styx
HQ-2J	surface-to-air missile	SAM-2
HN-5	—	SAM-7

Source : Eden Y. Woon, "Chinese arms sales and U.S.-China military relation", *Asian Survey*, vol. 29, no. 6, June 1989, pp. 604-5; Yitzhak Shichor, "Unfolded arms: Beijing's recent military sales offensive", *The Pacific Review*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1988, p. 323; *The Military Balance, 1989-90* (Tel Aviv); and "Military cooperation relations between China, Middle East, in light of New World Order", *Al-Hayazh* (London), 16 January 1992, in *Joint Publications Research Service - Near East-South Asia Report*, (JPRS-NEA), 6 March 1992, pp. 3-5;

Note : This list includes only those items which were reportedly supplied to the region and is not a complete list of inventories.

Thirdly, arms transfers have assumed the status of a barometer in examining a nation's proximity with great powers. If one recipient was an ally of one of the big two, he would receive the latest fighters or tanks. While the Chinese do not have the state-of-the-art technology, they realised the potential leverage of arms sales in the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Its ability to cultivate nations through economic aid and assistance was limited. Ideological route on the other hand was viewed with suspicion. In this endeavour, the U.S., pre-occupied with the containment of the Soviet empire, turned a blind eye to Chinese penetration.

And lastly, in the eighties, military isolation of belligerent nations in the Gulf proved immensely beneficial to China. Both Iran and Iraq were abandoned by their erstwhile patrons. The United States of America was too weary of the pronouncedly anti-American Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet Union was unenthusiastic in strengthening Baghdad's quest for domination of the Persian Gulf. Since both the parties were militarily dependent upon their respective benefactors, this meant near starvation amidst hostility. For Iraq, China was the only major source of supply of spares for its Soviet-based arms; and for Iran, it was the only major source of supply. It was, therefore, no wonder that during the 1980s these two countries emerged as the prime recipients of Chinese arms. According to *Congressional Research Service Report*, prepared by Richard F. Grimmett, during 1989-90, China signed arms transfer agreements worth \$ 10.98 billions; out of this as much as \$ 7.3 billions or over two-thirds was with Iran and Iraq. On the question of deliveries, the figures stood at \$ 11.4 billions, \$ 7.5 billions and 66 per cent respectively.⁽⁴⁾ Considering the fact that West Asia accounted for about 80 per cent of the Chinese arms exports during the same period, the economic benefits to China owing to international 'embargo' on Iran and Iraq were enormous.

THE RATIONALE

While arms exports were steadily growing for well over a decade, it was not until late 1988 that China declared the principles that govern its arms sales.⁽⁵⁾ Known for its fascination for numbers--'five' principles of peaceful co-existence or 'four' modernizations-- it outlined a three-point formula: strengthening the legitimate self-defence of the recipients, maintaining regional peace and stability, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This continues to be the official line.⁽⁶⁾ Yet, when one examines China's arms trade since the first major deal in mid-1970s, the motives are much more realistic. Arms transfers were no longer a charity affair.

There are serious economic, political and even strategic contents in this policy. The quantum of arms trade amply testifies the financial inducements

for selling arms. Nations that oppose even a fractional increase in their share of overseas developmental assistance, have no qualms in granting magnanimous military aids and grants. For instance, during 1986-90 the Third World alone imported more than hundred billion dollars worth of arms. Out of this as much as \$90 billion came from the big five, viz., the USSR, US, France, Britain and China⁽⁸⁾. It was no accident that these countries are also the nuclear haves as well as exercise the veto power. Compared to others China's share is undoubtedly smaller or just over seven per cent during 1986-90. Since its exports to the industrialised world has been next to nothing, the share slips further down to about 4.7 per cent in total global trade in arms.⁽⁹⁾ The Chinese officials often capitalise on this aspect, especially when dealing with the question of arms control in West Asia. For instance, speaking to reporters in Amman in July 1991, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, accompanying Premier Li Peng, reminded his audience that the U.S. had been the largest arms exporter and added: "The United States often openly criticizes other countries; however, it seldom conducts introspection."⁽¹⁰⁾

Much of the Western Criticism of 'irresponsible' Chinese behaviour, however, is a case of pot calling the kettle black! China unquestionably was a late entrant. Yet its exports had gradually increased over the years. As *Table-2* exhibits, from around less than two per cent of the total trade in the early 1970s, it peaked to over 9 per cent during 1987-88. Since the warring Gulf states were Beijing's main customers, a slump in its exports following the Iran-Iraq ceasefire was inevitable. Within a short time it emerged as the *fifth* largest arms supplier in the world. Considering the fact that it had no former colonies or protectorates like other major powers, it was no mean feat. Among the arms suppliers to the Third World China ranks *fourth*. Its share in the Iraqi arms imports was much more significant as China emerged as the *third* largest supplier. (*Table-3*). And in the case of Iran, more than fifty per cent of its major arms imports during 1986-90 came from China. (*Table-4*). The prolongation of the Iran-Iraq war could partly be attributed to the enthusiastic response from Beijing.

Secondly for the military industries in China, modernization drive paradoxically meant a depletion of financial support from the government and a greater degree of financial and functional autonomy.⁽¹¹⁾ As a result, arms exports became not only an attractive but also inevitable source of foreign exchange.⁽¹²⁾ The acceleration in the exports collaborates this development. In economic terms its sales of *Dongfeng-3* (known more popularly as CSS-2) intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Saudi Arabia was the largest single arms deal. Estimates however vary. The *SIPRI* puts the entire Chinese arms sales to Saudi Arabia during 1986-90 at just over \$ 1.4 billion⁽¹³⁾. Revising his earlier estimates, Israel's leading Sinologist, Yitzhak

Shichor, argues that the deal earned China around \$ 2.4 to 3.6 billion.⁽¹⁴⁾ In others words, it ranges from as low as \$ 450 million to \$ 3.6 billion. Nonetheless, there is unanimity on the economic benefits accruing to China.

Table 2 China's arms exports

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total arms sales</i>	<i>China</i>	<i>China's share as percentage of the total sales</i>
<i>(in 1985 US \$ million)</i>			
1967	7,509	214	2.85
1968	7,721	162	2.10
1969	7,238	86	1.19
1970	9,223	101	1.09
1971	12,702	346	2.72
1972	16,903	409	2.42
1973	17,327	197	1.14
1974	13,346	290	2.17
1975	14,062	251	1.78
1976	15,544	200	1.29
1977	22,863	110	0.48
1978	22,702	362	1.59
1979	22,269	339	1.52
1980	21,188	568	2.68
1981	23,964	277	1.16
1982	24,271	682	2.81
1983	24,483	1,060	4.33
1984	23,727	1,419	5.98
1985	21,551	1,217	5.65
1986	24,114	1,463	6.06
1987	27,228	2,553	9.38
1988	20,025	1,810	9.04
1989	18,256	817	4.47
1990	11,841	926	7.82

Source : *Sipri Yearbooks 1987 and 1991*.

Table 3 Import of major weapon systems by Iraq, 1980-90

Country	Aggregate sales	per centage
<i>(in million of US \$, 1985)</i>		
U.S.S.R.	15,002	55
France	5,076	19
China	2,261	8
Egypt	1,108	4
Brazil	1,067	4
Czechoslovakia	593	2
Others	2,262	8
Total	27,369	100

Source : Sipri Yearbook 1991, p. 202.

Table 4 Major Chinese arms transfers to the region, 1986-90

Country	Total arms imports	Imports from China	China's share in the total	Recipient's share in China's exports
<i>(in million of 1985 US \$)</i>				
Algeria	930	54	5.8	0.7
Egypt	4,717	89	1.9	1.2
Iran	2,913	1,488	51.1	19.3
Iraq	10,314	988	9.6	12.8
Saudi Arabia	10,838	1,440	13.3	18.7
Sudan	189	47	24.9	0.6
Total	--	4,106	--	53.4

Source : Adapted from Sipri Yearbook, 1991, pp. 208-11.

Thirdly, the sales also cornered political dividends for China. Its continued importance to Pakistan should be seen in this context. While its share had consistently showed a downward trend, as *Table-5* highlights, Islamabad remains one of the top three recipients. In addition to China's conflict with India, Pakistan serves its interests by acting as an important conduit to the Arab and Islamic world. In the case of Egypt and Iraq, arms helped China

to enter traditional Soviet markets. The missile deal with Saudi Arabia was a direct outcome of the threats posed to the shipping in the Gulf by the Iranian *Silkworms* supplied by the Chinese. One deal thus led to another more lucrative deal with a country that still regarded the tiny Taipei republic as the real China.⁽¹⁵⁾ Both the Silkworm and CSS-2 deals caused consternation in the West and Washington's concerns were exhibited through high level visits aimed at 'restraining' the Chinese drive. By posing a serious threat to Western interests in the region, China gained increased attention and clout in regional affairs.

Fourthly, by supplying arms to countries pronouncedly hostile to Israel, China had attained leverage over the Jewish State. Arms exports has been one of the important and most successful, foreign policy instrument even for Israel.⁽¹⁶⁾ These were often used to seek new friendship, renew old ones or strengthen the existing ties. Yet, over the years increasing reports have come regarding growing military ties between these two countries.⁽¹⁷⁾

Table 5 Percentage share of important recipients of Chinese Weapons

1971-75			1976-80		
Rank	Country	Share	Rank	Country	Share
I.	Pakistan	45	I.	Pakistan	32
II.	North Korea	16	II.	Egypt	26
III.	Tanzania	15	III.	Kampuchea	10
IV.	North Vietnam	12	IV.	North Korea	9
V.	Bangladesh	8	V.	Bangladesh	8
Total		95			85
1981-85			1986-90		
Rank	Country	Share	Rank	Country	Share
I.	Egypt	31	I.	Iran	19.3
II.	Iran	28	II.	Saudi Arabia	18.7
III.	Pakistan	18	III.	Pakistan	15.6
IV.	Iraq	6	IV.	Iraq	12.8
V.	Bangladesh	5	V.	Thailand	11.3
Total		88			77.7

Sources : Michael Brzoska & Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-1985*, (Oxford, 1987), p. 84 and *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 208-11.

The fact that China was an important supplier in the region apparently did not bother Israel too much. Speaking to reporters in Beijing following normalization Israel's Foreign Minister David Levy gave China the benefit of doubt: "I believe it would be unfair to say that this (arms race in West Asia) pertains to China alone; the same can be said about the superpowers and about countries friendly to Israel which have made similar deals...(18)

Normalization he hoped would stem the flow.⁽¹⁹⁾

And lastly, arms supplies provide China an access to more advanced Soviet systems than it had in its inventory. In exchange for its supply of spare parts and adopted systems, China apparently received among others, MiG-23S fighters, MiG-23 engines, MiG-21MF, Sukhoi Su-20 bombers, SA-3 and SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, T-62 tanks and Sagger anti-tank missiles⁽²⁰⁾. In the light of Chinese expertise in reverse engineering, this means modernization at a cheaper price. The region, especially, the prolonged Iran-Iraq war provided China an important opportunity to battle test and possibly improve its weapons and such a benefit could not be measured in terms of political and monetary terms only. West Asia, known for its clamour for latest technology, has been an important market for China. *Table-6*. This implies that in spite of their technological drawbacks, Chinese arms have greater utility and their uncomplicated functioning should not be treated lightly.

IMPLICATIONS

Arms sales have become a necessity for China in securing foreign exchange and technology. Growing market orientation of its military industries and the creation of overseas marketing outlets indicate the underpinnings of the exports. The political leverage it generates, both in the region and in the West, would prevent China from abandoning the golden path, especially, when the alternative means foregoing all economic, political, strategic and technological benefits.

China's reactions to the demands for regional arms control in the Middle East underscore the basic thrust of its arguments. On the eve of the five nation arms control conference in Paris in July 1991, the official spokesman repeated the Chinese position: "Arms control in the Middle East is clearly linked with the political settlement of the Middle East issue and the realization of the arms control will constitute part of that political settlement."⁽²¹⁾ Speaking in Paris, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs argued that any arms control in the region should follow "the principles of *fairness, reasonableness, comprehensiveness and balance*."⁽²²⁾ It should include all types of weapons and all countries should be treated on par, an euphemism for treating Arabs and Israel alike.

Table 6 : Share of West Asia and North Africa in China's arms exports

	1983-86 (in million of current US \$)	1987-90
Arms transfer agreements	3,925	7,055
Arms deliveries	4,965	6,395
<i>Share of the region in China's exports</i>		
Agreements	89.61%	66.36%
Deliveries	89.78%	83.53%
<i>Share of China in the Region's market</i>		
Agreements	4.37%	8.21%
Deliveries	5.18%	9.36%

Source : Adapted from Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1983-1990*, Congressional Research Service Report, 91-578 F, (Washington D.C., 2 August 1991), pp. 48, 49, 61, 62 and 63.

China repeatedly contended that its arms sales "will not upset the regional balance." But during the Iran-Iraq war, Chinese arms were in action on either side of the *Shatt al-Arab* and the protraction of the war was partly due to Beijing's drive to seek a 'balance' between the warring parties. Likewise capitalizing on the Saudi concerns over Iranian threats in the Strait of Hormuz, China signed a substantial military deal with Riyadh. The deal also highlights its insensitivity towards transferring non-conventional weapons to a conflict ridden region.

The Sino-Israeli normalization is unlikely to dampen the arms sales. On the contrary, now that it had firmly secured a foothold in the West Asia peace process, it gains leverage over Israel. The much speculated M-9 deal with Syria⁽²³⁾ for example, could well result in China extracting more technological concessions from the Jewish State. Normalization and its recognition of Taiwan as an integral part of the People's Republic of China, did not inhibit Israel from negotiating a multi-million dollar *Kfir* deal with Taipei. Thus Beijing will have no restraint in continuing its business with the region.

China's arms trade with West Asia, has been a two-way affair with Israel supplying the much needed but not easily available Western technology to China and the latter sending inventories to Israel's adversaries. Its dexterity in upgrading and renovating Soviet weapons captured from the Arabs made Israel an ideal supplier for China's demands. As various reports revealed,

a number of Chinese systems had an uncanny resemblance of their Israeli counterparts.⁽²⁴⁾ The CSS-2 deal, according to a Chinese missile scientist, had indirect technological inputs from Israel.⁽²⁵⁾ In March 1992 a serious allegation broke out in Washington accusing Israel of illegally transferring Patriot technology to China. But since it is the only, though inadequate, anti-missile technology available today, such a move sounds illogical. More so when Beijing had often exhibited its craving for reverse engineering and sale of non-conventional weapons to Israel's adversaries. Even though an official investigation team from Washington technically cleared Israel of any wrong doing, one is not sure whether that was the last word on the controversy.

Though West Asia is emerging as the principal basket for Chinese arms, it had not abandoned Pakistan and the latter continues to be a major client. Such a relation is mutually beneficial. Islamabad is a useful political and technological conduit for China. Its exports to the region finding their way to Pakistan during an emergency situation is remote but a possibility. Its sales like CSS-2 pose a direct security threat to India.

Above all the likely Chinese behaviour in West Asia should be seen in the context of the demise of the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War world, for the near future, implies American domination, with a Russia desperately seeking economic assistance and accommodation with the West. China, thus, becomes the only country which has both ability and political aspiration to fulfil the vacuum created by the Soviet abdication. Its unusually long isolation and current economic problems at home would prevent any immediate move in that direction. Yet situation is rather favourable for a Chinese domination in a not so distant future. One such inducement could occur in West Asia. Should the on-going peace process fail to result in Israeli concessions corresponding to the Arab flexibility, the latter might look forward to China as their new patron. Despite its diminishing strategic utility, the United States, for a variety of historical and emotional reasons, is unlikely to abandon Israel. Under that circumstance China could well emerge as a countervailing force; its cultivation of Israel without burning the bridges with the Arab and Islamic world, continued arms sales to the region and its positions on the Kuwait and Libyan crises, could pave the way for such a position.

Table 7 China's major arms transfers to West Asia and North Africa

<i>Weapons designation</i>	<i>Weapons description</i>	<i>Year of delivery</i>	<i>Nos.</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1. <i>Algeria</i>			
Hainan class	PC	1990	4
2. <i>Egypt</i>			
F-6	Fighter	1979	40
F-6	" "	1982-84	50
F-7	" "	1980-85	110
Hai ying-2L	ShShM Launcher	1984	10
Hai ying-2	ShShM/SShM	1984	96
Hainan class	PC	1983-84	8
Hegu class	PAC	1984	6
Jianghu class	Frigate	1984-85	2
Romeo class	Submarine	1982-85	6
3. <i>Iran</i>			
F-6	Fighter	1982-84	80
F-6	" "	1985-86	9
F-7	" "	1986-87	24
T-59	MBT	1982-86	500
T-59	" "	1987-88	240
Type 50/1 130 mm	TG	1982-86	400
Type 60/122 mm	" "	1985-86	100
Type-63/107 mm	MRS	1983-87	700
CSA-1 SAMs	Mobile SAM system	1985-87	6
C-801 L	ShShM Launcher	1987	8
C-801	ShShM	1987	100
Hai ying-2L	ShShM Launcher	1987-88	8
Hai ying-2 (Silkworm)	ShShM/SShM	1987-88	124
Hong Jian-73	ATM	1982-88	6,500
Hong Jing-5	Portable Sams	1986-88	540
PL-2A	Air-to-Air Missile	1986-88	540
PL-7	" "	1986-88	360
Type-63 107 mm	MRL	1983-90	800
Type-501	APC	1986-88	300
4. <i>Iraq</i>			
T-59	MBT	1982-88	720
T-69	MBT	1983-88	600

<i>Weapons designation (1)</i>	<i>Weapons description (2)</i>	<i>Year of delivery (3)</i>	<i>Nos. (4)</i>
Type-531	APC	1982-88	650
Type 59/1 130 mm	TG	1982-88	720
Tu-16	Bomber	1988	4
C-601	AShM	1988	128
Hai ying-2	ShShM/SShM	1987	72
5. <i>Oman</i>			
Type 59/1 130 mm	TG	1983	12
6. <i>Saudi Arabia</i>			
CSS-2	IRBM	1987-88	50
7. <i>Tunisia</i>			
Shanghai class	PC	1977	2
8. <i>Yemen, North</i>			
F-7	Fighter	1989	6

Source : Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-85*, (Oxford, 1987) and *SIPRI Yearbooks*.

Note : Some of these deals are confirmed. At times SIPRI alters the figures without any explanations. For example, during 1983-88 Iran was supposed to have received 900 MRLs; but two years later Yearbook 1991 puts the figure at 800 for 1983-90.

Items which were not delivered but included by SIPRI are excluded here.

APC : Armoured Personnel Carrier.

ATM : Anti-tank missile.

FAC : Fast attack craft.

MBT : Main battle tank.

MRL : Multiple rocket launcher.

MRS : Multiple rocket system.

PC : Patrol craft.

ShShM : Ship-to-Ship missile.

SShM : Surface-to-ship missile.

NOTES

1. The term 'West Asia' is used in a larger context to include North Africa as well.
2. Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85*, (Oxford, 1987), p. 88; Vitzhak Shichor, "The Middle East", in Gerald Segal and William

- T.Tow, ed., *Chinese Defence Policy*, (London, 1984), p. 264; and Eden Y. Woon, "Chinese arms sales and U.S.-China military relations", *Asian Survey*, vol. 29, No. 6 June 1989, p. 603.
3. By the end of 1960 all Soviet military personnel were withdrawn from China. *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, p. 201.
 4. Richard F. Grimmett, *Conventional arms transfers to the Third World, 1983-1990*, Congressional Research Service Report, 91-578 F, (Washington, D.C., 2 August 1991), pp. 45, 48, 53, 61, 66 and 67.
 5. Woon, op. cit. n. 2, p. 607.
 6. "Background: China's position on Middle East arms control", *Xinhua* (Beijing), 9 July 1991 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China* (hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), 10 July 1991, p.19.
 7. *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, p. 198.
 8. The figures were: USSR \$ 43,169 million; USA 21,761; France 10,490; China 7,569; and United Kingdom 6,210. *Ibid*.
 9. China's total trade including those with the industrialised world stood at \$ 7,684 million out of the total sales of \$ 165, 232 million. *Ibid*.
 10. "China abides by three principles in sale of weapons", *Hsin Wan Pao* (Hong Kong), 8 July 1991, in *FBIS-CHI*, 9 July 1991. p.17.
 11. Brzoska and Ohlson, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 86-8; Yitzhak Shichor "Unfolded arms: Beijing's recent military sales offensive", *The Pacific Review*, (Oxford) vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 324-7.
 12. Or as one Chinese scientist recently remarked: "There (is) no real chance of limiting such sales because they were one of the most important sources of income for the Chinese treasury." *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 19 December 1991 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia* (hereafter *FBIS-NES*), 20 December 1991, pp. 25-6.
 13. *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, p. 210
 14. Writing in *Pacific Review*, Shichor argued that the value of the deal 'has been estimated at \$ 450-500 million at least', op. cit. n.11, p. 321; In his monograph *East Wind over Arabia: Origins and implications of the Sino-Saudi missile deal*, (Berkeley, California, 1989) he valued the deal at \$ 1-1.5 billion. p. 27; and in 1991 he argued: "Since the price-tag of each DF-3 is believed to be some \$ 100 million, including ground support systems, training and maintenance, the estimated value of the deal could reach \$ 2.4-3.6 billion." Shichor "A multiple hit: China's missiles sale to Saudi Arabia", *SCPS Papers No. 5* (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, 1991), pp. 2-3.
 15. Saudi recognition came only in July 1990 or nearly four years after the CSS-2 deal.
 16. Israeli arms sales have been covered widely and they include Aaron S. Klieman, *Israeli arms sales: Perspectives and prospects*, (Tel Aviv, 1984) and *Israel's global reach : Arms sales as diplomacy*, (Washington, 1985); Bishara Bahbah, *Israel and Latin America: The military connection*, (London, 1986); and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, *The Israeli connections: Whom Israel arms and why*, (New York, 1988).

17. Shichor, op. cit. no. 2, p. 272; Gerald Segal, "China and Israeli Pragmatic politics", *SAIS Review*, (Washington) vol. 8, No. 2, Summer-Fall 1987, p. 207; *Middle East International* (London) 11 January 1985; and the Sacramento (CA)-based *Israeli Foreign Affairs*.
18. *Kol Israel* (Jerusalem), 24 January 1992 in *FBIS-CHI*, 24 January 1992, p. 6.
19. Agencies despatch in *FBIS-CHI* 24 January 1992, p. 8.
20. Shichor, op. cit. no. 2, p. 271.
21. *Xinhua*, 9 July 1991 in *FBIS-CHI* 10 July 1991, p. 19.
22. *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), 10 July 1991 in *FBIS-CHI*, 11 July 1991, pp. 4-5. Emphasis added.
23. J. Mohan Malik, "Missile proliferation: China's role", *Current Affairs Bulletin*; vol. 67, no. 3 August 1990, p. 7; and *Al-hayah* (London) 16 January 1992, in *Joint Publications Research Service-Near East-South Asia Report (JPRS-NEA)* 6 March 1992, p. 5.
24. These include 105 mm gun atop a new Chinese T-59 model and PL-8H new naval air defence system model.
25. *Haaretz* 19 December 1991, in *FBIS-NES* 20 December 1991, pp. 25-6.

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Thoughts for the Future

GROUP CAPTAIN LORD LEONARD CHESHIRE VC OM DSO and Two Bars, DFC

What I would like to do is talk about the future to try and give something of my hopes, my dream, if I may put it that way of the future. When I have talked about this idea to people close to me they have always said that they thought I should put something down in writing and leave it behind me, but somehow I feel more at home on film and I would rather do it on film.

Well I have given other talks of this kind on different subjects, which you may have seen, and the difficulty I have always had is how to be natural when looking at a camera lens for about 15 minutes. So between us we have worked out this system and here in front of the camera you can see a mirror, actually its a half mirror, and reflected on the mirror absolutely in front of the lens is a face, a face of somebody I know, and in this case in fact my daughter, and this makes me feel that there is a personal contact, I feel as if those to whom I am talking, whom I can't see, are actually in the room with me. I go further than that and say that as I talk, as I sit here and talk, through my mind goes an image of all the people, or anyway many of them, with whom over these past 30 years I have worked, who have helped, who have been building up the Foundation. And even more into the future, in some undefinable way I feel as though you who come after are here with me in this room and I would like to feel that it was the same in reverse, at least to some extent.

One of the problems of every organisation like ours that is growing is remoteness, that is to say you begin to get out of touch with the individuals who are doing the work, as you get bigger you get removed from them, you become an administrator and its something that I have been conscious of for a long time. The difficulty of getting round and meeting people and knowing them face to face. What a difference it makes when you are able to be with those who are actually doing the work in the field. So there is this overriding importance always at all levels in every possible way of keeping in personal touch. As the Foundation grows bigger and bigger, as I suppose it will, that need to retain a personal element will always predominate in importance and one must look for ways of bringing it about, because we are thinking of a diversity of different units each small each carrying on its own affairs in its

* Group Captain Lord Leonard Cheshire, the most highly decorated hero of the Second World War and former founder President of the Cheshire Foundation died on July 31, 1992, at Cavendish, Suffolk, United Kingdom.

own way and yet integrated so that it does make in a sense a unity. As I look back from the starting point some 35 years ago I remember particularly two great impacts which really started me off that the war made upon me. First how much individuals, ordinary people, men and women, old people and young can achieve when they are together, when they know what their objective is and when they know that sink or swim that objective has got to be attained. Secondly the enormous price that was paid for peace and therefore the urgency of trying to see that peace remains - true peace - peace with freedom and justice, that we are never again thrown into a world war. These were the thoughts that dominated my mind at the end of the war. But I couldn't find an answer to them, I was just an individual, I didn't want to stay in the air force because after all we had fought a war that was going to end all wars so we were told, and so there didn't seem much point in staying in the air force. But quite what to do, what was relevant to my hopes and my dream, I couldn't see, so I was lost. I had seen it in others I know the symptom that you feel in your heart that there is something you have got to do, you can't identify it, you are looking for it, you wander about, other people think you are irresponsible, they tell you to pull yourself together but you know there is something and then one day suddenly a door opens and you know its a door and you walk through it and from that moment on you are sure you know.

For me that door was Arthur Dykes the old man Arthur Dykes. I don't want to go into his story because you will probably know it, at least part of his story. Except to say that he was an old man or elderly man of 75 dying of cancer and nowhere to go and I took him into my own house, a large empty house in which I was living and wanting to sell and for want of anything else, there was nobody to look after him, I looked after him. Now I know that may sound a great thing to do but under the circumstances it wasn't because I was lost I didn't know what to do and I was thankful to have something concrete that I could get my hands into, something positive I could do, the usefulness of which I could see even though it had no relevance that I could see to the objective after which I was searching. It was Spring and the grass was growing up, there was an acre of grass and we had the most derelict old mower there was nobody else to mow it and I had to mow it. I knew that if I didn't get a move on it would overtake me and the mower would no longer cut it, so everything was activity, there was no time to think. Then suddenly out of the blue, not very long before he died, Arthur said one evening a very surprising thing, he said: "Len, I don't think I have come here only for myself, I think you will find there are others like me, and if there are take them. Don't you sell this house". Well I thanked Arthur, I mean it had nothing to do with me, I was'nt going to pay much attention to that because I was looking for something different. But suddenly there was somebody else and

so without knowing how or why there I was on the course that has been my course ever since. But I have to say that despite that there were many moments when I had doubts, great doubts, I used to say to myself: "Are you sure that this is the right road?" I used to think "Have I gone mad? Should I really be doing this in a welfare state?" And I remember so vividly looking at the gardener in the garden, he himself was about 70 and I thought that at least he knows what he's doing and he is doing something constructive, so I used to have these doubts. Well looking at that early beginning of the Foundation I can see that there are certain definite elements fundamental to it which I think are fundamental to the whole way we operate now and in the future.

The first thing is that I hadn't chosen it, I hadn't looked for Arthur, I hadn't wanted Arthur, I hadn't thought that Arthur had any particular relevance to my future but he was there and so in my mind I knew that if I took him I could expect providence, the providence of God to help me. If I had sat down and thought well I think I will do so and so and gone off and done it, then that would have been my decision, and in that case I would have been responsible for finding the money and everything else, but this way, in a sense again that I find difficult to describe, I felt secure.

Secondly delegation. The Home grew, filled up, it got to a size that I couldn't possibly manage and so I took a step that I think many people in this country take when they can't see the next thing to do, I formed a committee. So we had a committee and from that moment on I realised that either the committee ran it or I ran it and so without going into the details I decided to delegate to the committee and leave them to it. I then realised that if I delegated I must really leave them to it, I couldn't stand over them and breathe down their necks and you will find that if it is something you have built up yourself its a very, very difficult thing to do to delegate, because you think this is my baby, I understand it, he doesn't, he won't look after it properly. But you discover as I discovered, that although he looks after it differently in fact he will do it better and that was a lesson that I had to swallow. But of course as time went on it was clear that had I not delegated and had I not been willing to let them get on with it we would never have grown, we couldn't possibly have grown to the size that we are 30 years later. Now one thing I find a little extraordinary is that people will talk about delegation and say how wonderful it is that there is the strength of the Foundation that we are left to run our own Home in our own way and therefore we will do it, but they in their turn are not seeking to delegate. They say that it is right for him to delegate but its different for us. To me it isn't different for them or for you. Delegation is absolutely essential provided one understands what delegation means. Delegation isn't abrogation, you give somebody a job to do but hold him to account for it and if he doesn't do it properly tell him or remove him.

Then thirdly money. From the very beginning money seemed to be the chief topic that people would talk about. When we had that first committee meeting that was all they could talk about, money. They kept saying that you must understand you can't run a nursing home properly without money, so they said what we will do is close the Home down, organise a big appeal and then when we've got the money start on a proper footing. But of course that was completely impossible because how do you dispose of 32 disabled people while you close the Home down? Soon they realised that money or no money the Home was running. And so I have seen it in other cases. What I want to say is that there is a paradox to this question of money, obviously money is essential, one has got to have money or you can't run a Home let alone build it up and expand it, but money isn't really the key, not the basic key. The basic key is people. If you have the right people the rest will follow and what is more you will find that in life there come moments when you are faced with a challenge or a need, something in front of you that nobody else can do anything about, it's obviously in your path and you have got to meet it, you have got to take the challenge money or no money you have got to do it, and so there are times when I think it is quite good to be short of money because when you are short of money you give of your best. Man gives of his best when he has got the least resources with which to work because he has got to make them into something worthwhile. When you have got all the money you want you are free to make your own choice, you can make your own decisions you become less economical and I think that you lose something of your drive, of your spirit, and if you look at history even at the Church you will find that once an institution becomes rich it loses a great deal of its spirit. So I hope, as long as I am not misunderstood, that we as a Foundation will never become rich that we will always use the money we have got to do more work with it not put it away in the bank and live off the income.

Then fourthly we were basically a layman's organisation. By that I mean we were taking people who had been through medical treatment and as far as doctors could see were not going to get better. So their problem really was a human problem, a social problem, it was a question of helping rebuild a life broken by disability and I think that this is absolutely essential to us. Every organisation has its own character, its own personality and fundamental to us is this fact that we are a layman's organisation that we, so to speak, take over where the doctors have finished. That's not to say we don't need doctors, that we don't need highly professional nurses and therapists, we do. But basically it is ordinary people who may be business people, professional people, managing it in their spare time.

Those I think are the four basic elements that give us our role, define

our role. Now in talking about our role for the future one thing I want to say quite clearly is that insofar as I am able and I have the right to do it, I bequeath to the future complete freedom, absolute freedom to go the way that you in the future can see you ought to go. In no way whatsoever would I want to tie down the future to a particular way of operating so long as those basic principles always remain at the foundation of what is done. We work, talking about our role, within the terms of reference of people who are disabled either in mind or in body and who are not likely to get better as the result of medical treatment. They may well get better due to being in the Home to the rehabilitation in a general sense that the Home gives them, the increased confidence and so on. Obviously we have got to work to rehabilitate to give a person more independence, but I think that whatever way you may chose to go in the future it should remain outside the strict medical world, that is the world for the state rather than for the layman.

So leaving the role of the Foundation I would like to look at the Foundation as a family. Now I think that hitherto we have normally talked about us as a family meaning the residents in the Home. We talk about the Home being, if not a family, as much like a family as it can be. Obviously it isn't completely because nothing can be the same as a true family, but I look upon it in a much broader sense, I am looking at all the Homes in all the different countries, all those who are connected with each Home and I like to feel that all of us together in a certain but real sense are a family. Now that means first of all in terms of outlook. Looking at everything globally. I know that your own Home has got to be your principal concern, you have got to give your whole heart and soul to your own Home, that's the first responsibility. But always in the context of the whole, that's true in fact, in life, that we should not only see our own little job but we should see it as part of the whole human family. We should not be parochial and it's a sad thing but in the world of charity you see great parochialism, it's dreadful. People in one charity think that this is the entire world and they will say to somebody else "What are you doing on my patch, leave this alone, I'm working here, you work somewhere else". Whereas in fact we should all be working together helping each other, strengthening each other and so on.

Then secondly communication. There obviously has got to be very good communication at all levels within the Foundation. Not only personal contacts, exchange visits, conferences, I know that people sometimes think that conferences are rather a waste of money but they bring people together, they enable you to share experiences, share problems, and again to see that one is part of something bigger.

Then also, I think, mutual respect and support is crucial. That we

should know that we are not only doing our own work but we are involved in the others, because if you have one Home that is badly run obviously that is going to reflect upon everybody so each of us, whatever level we are, ought to be doing something to keep the other up to the mark. The problem is how do you do it? When I look at the past I realise that too often we have done it by way of confrontation and people get so wedded to their own ideas. We think my idea is the right one everybody else should follow it, but in fact there are so many different ways of doing a thing and we should recognise that, and when we have to confront somebody with the fact that he is doing it wrong, if he is, we should do it in the spirit of kindness and understanding. I think this is the lesson that the past has for the future.

That I think brings me to a very crucial thing - motives. Here again we have a paradox. I remember very well quite sometime ago meeting an elderly lady, a very devout lady, and I don't know how but we got on to the subject of saints. She said a very surprising thing to me, she said: "In my opinion a saint is somebody who is very hard on himself and very kind and very tolerant of others". I think that is a very profound statement. If we have somebody who comes forward to help or even perhaps start a Home, and we can see that his motives are not right, we shouldn't refuse his help. The question is, is he willing to help? Is he going to do it well and efficiently? If his motives are slightly wrong as long as they are not going to affect the Home then we should accept him. But as for ourselves individually I think we should be self critical, and what I think is most important of all is to be quite sure that there is no self seeking in ourselves. That we are not doing it for ourselves, some good for ourselves, either because we want a public honour or perhaps because we want to climb the social ladder but that we are doing it for the good of the Home, that is to say for the good of the disabled residents in the Home. Again, I think it is a sad thing that the world of charity for all the good people that it has, and for all the great virtues that it has got a number of people who are clearly there because they want an honour or hope they are going to get an honour of because they see it as a way of climbing the social ladder.

Now I think that brings me to the summing up if I can of my great hope for the future. I hope that the Foundation always will be forward looking, outward looking. That it will always be reaching out to see what else it can do in its own district and in its various ways. The one thing I hope will never happen is that a Home when it has reached its full potential and obviously cannot expand any more will say: "That's it, now all we've got to do is maintain the status quo". That it will use its resources, its public standing and everything that its got to go out and provide some other service, either in the district where its situated or help one of the other Homes in the country or perhaps look to the developing countries and see what it can do there. What

I am really leading up to saying is that just as at the very beginning the old man Arthur said that he didn't think that he had come to Le Court only for himself, I think the day will come when the Foundation will be told by somebody, or in some way, that it hasn't come to the point that it has, just for itself. When you look at the different people from so many different nations with so many different outlooks and so on all brought together with one objective in mind, united, I feel that the day will come when it as a Foundation can go out and do something for the unity and peace of the world. It may only be something modest but if that day does come if there suddenly is a challenge, an appeal that is obviously for you as a Foundation even though it takes you off in to uncharted and unfamiliar ground, I hope that you will respond and take it. That always you will go on growing out and out and out.

And in conclusion, as best I can, I would like to say thank you and express my gratitude to all those who from the very beginning in one way or another have helped us - so many of them - and I would like to use this occasion to say that the memory of what they have done will always remain on in my mind. In particular I would also like to thank my wife because I know that somebody in my position who starts something and is the founder and in a sense everybody has to bow to you if there is something you really want, is slightly in danger of taking himself a bit too seriously. I mean down in your subconscious whatever your conscious may say and deny, you have a slight feeling that you are a little bit different you are a little bit better. Marriage as I think in most people's cases, has helped me keep a sense of proportion. Added to that I have had the example, the daily example, of somebody whose life is totally dedicated to her own particular cause and I have been helped to understand how many different ways there are of achieving the same objective. Last of all I think I must say thank you to my daughter, to Gigi, she has sat here and listened to me and through her I thank all those in the future who in their own particular way are going to help either this Foundation or some other Foundation or in whatever way they choose, to work for the good of society.

Military and the Media

LT GEN S C SARDESHPANDE, UYSM, AVSM (RETD)

Armed forces are the watchdog of nation's military security. Media is the watchdog of the nation itself, in all its activities. It is the only bridge between the people and the military, particularly because military is required to remain a little away from the people in keeping with the demands and nature of its peculiar tasks. This need is observable in most democracies in varying degrees, but is not so prominent in Western countries because of large-scale participation of their peoples as servicemen in the two World Wars, and the eventual civil-military relations and awareness of the military that have come about in those countries. In India these started on a weak footing as a colonial residue and were markedly weakened/distorted by the political leadership in its mistrust, misreading and misunderstanding of the military, its role and force-application. Two things have emerged from the country's obsession with keeping the military away and servile to civil authority; one, widespread ignorance about the military among the people, disinterest among the intelligentsia and misplaced concern among the elite; two, pre-occupation of the military with keeping itself "apolitical, and perpetuating its self-image of "glorious tradition" to the exclusion of concern for the disastrous happenings in the country and the direction it is taking towards security abyss. In this dangerous turmoil it is media alone which can help people and prompt the government to arrest the drift on one hand, and on the other, elbow the military to realise its true role and contributive dimension in the nation's security concern.

National defence, military force, soldiering, armed forces, military organisation, strategy, tactics and weaponry are a specialised subject, demanding deliberate, deep and integrated study alongside humanities, science and technology. Military is an organismic being, not a robot of mechanical obedience. It is narcissistic and egotistical, sensitive and secretive. It can remain dutiful and responsive only up to a point in the endurance scale of moral stress, mental tension and psychological strain; beyond that it either disintegrates or runs wild. One of the most complex and intriguing investigations is why soldier fights, including against his own countrymen! Unless the media has this basic specialised knowledge it cannot be accurate, objective and useful; and the military keeps it at arm's length, often in disappointment and derision.

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Military has its own psyche, ethos, idiom, image-consciousness, sense of binding and functional norms. A science of considerable depth it is practised as an art with marked finesse. Its study base is heavily dependent on history, politics and technology, and is influenced by social, economic and diplomatic environs. Without a requisite study of these it becomes difficult to grasp its construct and dynamics. Its strength of organisation, cohesion, motivation, weaponry and hierarchical leadership make it a powerful instrument which requires effective controls over its destructive potential. To a measure this is done, in house, by the military itself through what has been termed military ethics. Fotion and Elfstrom identify civilian control (organisational), political control (directional), social control (Amnesty International, Human Rights Organisations), cultural control (military ethical code and education) and media control as the main forms of controlling the military. What is of particular importance in exercising control over the military is that military force manifests through large number of ordinary, less educated, "unenlightened" soldiers as against other professions like medicine and law where the manifestation is through a few highly educated and enlightened individuals. This essential difference is pertinent.

Media wields tremendous power of information by way of with-holding, delaying or denying "access" to information, and choice of priorities, emphasis and texture of military view, incident or statement. In influencing public opinion it has become so powerful that today's media blitz is said to win or lose wars. So goes an argument, which cites Op Pawan and Vietnam as examples. Military at worst withholds "information", stonewalls investigation and renders itself to be ignored by the media or to bad, indifferent biased coverage. Soldiers react "intuitively" while media acts "critically". These characteristics are to be properly understood as they generally lead to a sort of adversarial relationship between the military and the media. Media criticises the military constructively, unfairly or out of ignorance. Military replies, if it does, intuitively, objectively or out of its narcissistic obsession with self-image. Mutual relations may improve or deteriorate. Military may encourage and provide scope to the media, whereby the later may become a healthy bridge or pro-military; or it may debar media from coverage, which forces media to "snoop around" the military or, worse still, ignore it.

In healthy democracies all indicators point towards the need to consider media as a "loyal opposition", since it is a critical observer, but only where media has developed credible sureties against failure. Media failure is caused by its carelessness towards military; relegation of military in priorities as less newsworthy than, say, crime, cinema, politics and sex; lack of expertise; fear of being critical of the holy cow and thereby earning government wrath including opprobrium of being branded unpatriotic; inability or

disinclination to gather correct and factual information about the military; and the influence, leanings and compulsions of media cartels. Military's failure to lay itself increasingly open to media critique and public scrutiny stems from its narcissistic apprehension of damage to self-image; lack of faith in and understanding of the media as an equally patriotic instrument of ensuring and promoting national health and public awareness; and genuine doubts about the maturity, expertise and credibility of the media, its scribes in particular.

It is a tricky circle. The military is shy, apprehensive of and reluctant to let the media in, secretive and bound by the injunction "Thou shalt not communicate to the press" that it is. The media does not know" whom to approach", as A G Noorani says, to get information from the reluctant military, thanks to the ignoramuses it appoints as PROs who possess inadequate military knowledge and indifferent imagination. Yet the "snooping" media seems to be slipping into the military precincts and scratching out information, thanks mainly to various interested and dissatisfied elements within the military. If information, even if somewhat distorted, lopsided and scratchy, does go out via the very holes and chinks which are so obsessively guarded through Official Secrets Act by the schizoid military hierarchy, then why perpetuate the mental make-believe and resist coming out of the constricting carapace to facilitate liberal mutual interaction with the media and the people? But then what about that gospel Official Secrets Act? An exercise to review it was undertaken in late 1980s, but it seems to have made neither positive progress nor difference.

In turn the media too gives up efforts to keep at finding out what is happening inside the military; what its states of mental, material, doctrinal, organisational and cumulative combat readiness are; and how these states measure in their cogitative, intellectual and attitudinal content, when the country is spending such hefty slice of its budget on the holy cow. Instead the media reaction to military stonewalling is to pick holes, be censorious, blow up the casual and the trivial or whatever bits and pieces it manages to get out, and thereby present a half-baked picture of the military. On one hand the press is riled at the military's taciturnity, inaccessibility, non-communicativeness; on the other hand it jumps at the military leader who once in a blue moon says something different, uncongenial or bitter, as he perceives it. He is immediately branded as "over-eloquent", accused of "over-stepping his brief", and "advised" to keep his trap shut, little realising that senior officers put in more than three decades of reticent dedicated service before feeling necessary to speak or being called upon to do so.

It is incumbent on the media, free that it is, to take upon itself to study and develop expertise in military subject and soldiering as a speciality; to

appreciate the characteristics of the military; to approach it with understanding, objectivity (even in its "critical" function) and patience to overcome its shut-off. Not many newspapers and periodicals have military correspondents or even reporters who are knowledgeable enough. The few who indulge in military reporting concentrate overly on things like nuclear option, size of armed forces, discontent among officers, service promotions and military excesses in various internal employment, but have little to say about the military's social, political, psychological, intellectual, moral, economic and secular interaction and many connected fallouts. These are indeed far more important in the longer run in shaping and strengthening the country's military institution and personality, and ensuring better and more efficient service to the people by the military profession.

Indian military lacks the tradition of undertaking domestic reform from within, since it has remained a holy cow to the outsiders and suits the military that way. It is an intellectual light-weight steeped in unwillingness to cleanse and rejuvenate itself periodically, afraid of breaking into enquiry and new experimentation, reluctant to cultivate a vision of military service and military profession in a free democratic republic of our brand and aspiration. Therefore it is the media which has to fill the gap, act the gadfly, goad the military, the intelligentsia and the elite, and awaken the people to the need for requisite military interest and necessary concern for military security. It has to be prepared to negotiate the dilemma as it courses its way towards truth in war and national security endeavours, and bringing that truth to the people, among undercurrents and crosscurrents of loyalty and patriotism, objectivity and quick scoop, authenticity and propaganda, secrecy and public information. All these operate within the triangle of people, government and the military. Mediaperson has a lien on all as he/she is the direct representative of the people on the battlefield and in national security issues, as so succinctly brought out by Trevor Royle in his "War Report".

How Dreadful was the Scud?

AIR MARSHAL H K OBERAI, PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

After Saddam Hussain moved into Kuwait, a lot was said and written about Iraqi missile capability particularly the Scud-B and Al-Hussein surface to surface missiles (SSM). Did they prove to be as dreadful as they were made out to be? Notwithstanding the propaganda unleashed by western media to dramatise the issue and some tall claims, made, perhaps unwittingly by President Saddam Hussein himself, a dispassionate examination of the capabilities of these missiles will reveal a different story.

Scud-B has a gross weight of 6,370 kgs and a range of 300 kms. It can carry a warhead of 1000 kg and its circular error probable (CEP), a measure of its accuracy is estimated as 900 to 1,000 mtrs. Al-Hussein, a derivative of Scud-B, has twice its range but less than half its warhead and a CEP close to 2 km.

It may come as a surprise to many that, with this accuracy or more appropriately inaccuracy, to obtain one direct hit with an assurance level of 60% on a runway of usual dimensions of 3000 M × 50 M, at least 50 Scuds or hundreds of Al-Husseins would need to be launched and even then, unless the hit is close to the centre, the runway would remain at least partially operative. Ideally, a minimum of two direct hits, whereby no segment of more than 1200 mtrs remains available, would be necessary. This exercise would have to be repeated every 6 to 8 hours; the usual time for such repairs and would need hundreds of scuds every day.

On the other hand, if CEP is improved to 100 mtrs, only four missiles would be needed for a direct hit. Similarly, the number required for longer immobilisation would reduce dramatically. But it is noteworthy, that the US and its allies considered weapons even with this accuracy wasteful and instead chose cruise missiles and precision guided munitions, all credited with a CEP of no more than a few meters.

Scud-B's inability to hit defined military targets with any degree of assurance or accuracy precluded its use as a direct military threat. Iraq used them as countervalue weapons to achieve political objectives and targetted population centres in Israel and Saudi Arabia. But even here, real success eluded the Iraqis.

Details of Iraqi Scud launches, as given by Gen Mc-Peak, Chief of Staff, USAF, in his briefing on the air campaign part of the combined operations are reproduced at Appendix. It is clear that barring the missile that fell on US barracks (more by chance than design) in Dhahran on 25 Feb 91, all others were targetted against Israeli and Saudi cities. The success of Allied air action against the Scuds is confirmed by the fact, that launches which averaged 5 per day for the first 10 days of the war, were suppressed to an average of one per day for the last 33 days. Out of a total of 86 missiles launched, 40 were apparently intercepted by Patriots.

The aim of targetting Israel was to draw it into the war, as it had threatened to retaliate if attacked. To mount sorties against Iraq, Israeli aircraft would have had to overfly Jordan, thus bringing Jordan into the war on Iraqi side and giving the war an Arab versus Israeli dimension. Popular reaction within the Arab countries would have compelled some of them to withdraw from the US-led coalition. USA however thwarted Iraqi designs by quickly providing Israel with Patriots and located some in Saudi Arabia as well. Israeli pride was hurt but they refused to be provoked and in any event, there is nothing that Israelis could do that the allies could not do for them. Saddam's attempts to fracture the coalition with his 'Scud Card' failed completely.

Targetting of Saudi cities was predominantly for psychological reasons. Saddam wanted to show, that despite American protection, he could hit them at will. But by the end of the war, even the simple Saudis who really had not experienced war before, tended to dismiss Saddam's Scud threat as no more than political blackmail. They did not appear to be overly unnerved and this is no different from the experience of the last world war or Vietnam, where bombing of innocent civilians instead of wearing down their will to resist fortified it further.

The only consolation that Iraq could claim from the Scud adventure or misadventure was an indirect one. As admitted by the allies after the war, the worse intelligence failure was the gross underestimation of the number of mobile Scud launchers. They were not aware, that besides those supplied by USSR, Iraq had converted a large number of heavy trucks for this purpose. The 36 fixed sites were easily targetted, but mobile launchers proved particularly difficult to detect, and were never fully suppressed. About 15 functional mobile launchers have been located by ballistic missile analysts of the UN commission now supervising the destruction of Iraqi weaponry.

Iraqi Scud teams could fire a missile and hide in a culvert or other shelter, all within 5 minutes. Then letting the launcher cool to reduce its infrared signature, they would drive away to some remote location, resuming

firing the next night. The ensuing 'Scud Chase' involved a total of 2,493 sorties, thrice the number originally estimated for this task. Iraq thus gained a minor reprieve, but in the overall context, it proved to be of little or no consequence.

In sum, the deployment of Scud-B by Iraq failed to achieve any of its military or political objectives. On the contrary, it showed Iraq as a perpetrator of international terrorism. It is as well that Iraq did not have the capacity to manufacture triggers for detonating chemical warheads, 30 of which were found by a UN inspection team after the war. The use of chemical weapons would have attracted the most severe reprisals from Israel and the allies and the hapless Iraqis would have been exposed to even greater perils.

There is perhaps a lesson for us here. Our integrated missile development programme comprising Agni (IRBM), Prithvi (Theatre Ballistic Missile), Akash (High Altitude SAM), Trishul (Short Range Low Level Quick Reaction SAM) and Nag (Anti Tank Missile) is in full swing. The 8-year programme is proceeding on schedule and is likely to be completed by 1995; a rare achievement considering the complexities of design and development. Our Scientists have achieved major break-throughs in building indigenous design capability and development of advanced technologies like composite materials, despite restrictive international regulations such as Missile Technology Control Regime. A grateful nation appreciates their work which has been given a high recognition even abroad.

All this augurs well, for the future but a word of caution is deemed expedient. Take the case of Prithvi, SSM, which has undergone nine test firings, of which seven are reported to have been successful. It is scheduled to go into production this year. Its performance bears some comparison with Scud-B.

There is no doubt that our scientists must have provided it with much better accuracy, but unless its CEP is close to 100 mtrs, its operational utility will remain restricted. It is highlighted, that as yet we do not have fail-safe means for generating target co-ordinates which when set on the missile guidance system give it the desired trajectory. The co-ordinates are best obtained through satellites or photographic reconnaissance. We lack the desired satellite capability and reconnaissance during peace has obvious difficulties. But a high degree of basic system accuracy would compensate at least partially for the aforesaid difficulties.

Development of various types of warheads needs equally urgent atten-

tion; particularly the tactical munitions dispenser which releases a variety of sub-munitions that are set to explode at random and can paralyse all movement on ground including aircraft. They can be equally effective against massed armour and troop concentrations. Their spread compensates for minor degradation in accuracy. A list of similar capabilities as appropriate to each missile including terminal guidance would have to be developed and provided at an early date.

Our experience in missile production technology is limited. Quality control must ensure that performance demonstrated in the lab remains available in production models.

It can be argued that our scientists must be aware of all these needs and perhaps are already engaged in related research and development, but since the programme is crucial to our future security, even at the expense of being repetitive, it is emphasised that missiles systems that may be handed over to the defence services, must be contemporary in all aspects and should have an inbuilt potential to absorb upgrades so that their performance continues to match 'OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS' for at least a decade.

Saddam's needs were different. Ours are purely 'MILITARY'.

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Published quarterly in April, July, October and January

*Appendix***Iraqi Scud Launches during the Gulf War**

<i>Day</i>	<i>Against</i>		<i>Result</i>
	<i>Israel</i>	<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	
Jan 18	7	0	Landed in Tel Aviv and Haifa, 7 injured.
Jan 19	4	0	Landed in/near Tel Aviv.
Jan 20	0	2	Destroyed by Patriot missiles.
Jan 21	0	7	6 destroyed by Patriots, one fell in water.
Jan 22	1	7	1 landed on apartment house in Israel, 3 dead 96 injured; 7 intercepted over Saudi Arabia.
Jan 23	1	4	all intercepted.
Jan 25	8	2	Most of those launched at Israel intercepted at low altitude, with 1 dead, 65 injured, widespread damage; all Scuds aimed at Saudi Arabia intercepted.
Jan 26	4	1	All destroyed by Patriots.
Jan 28	1	1	Scud aimed at Israel fell in Palestinian Village in West Bank. No damage reported in Saudi Arabia.
Jan 31	1	0	Scud aimed at Israel fell in West Bank.
Feb 02	1	0	Destroyed by Patriot.
Feb 03	1	1	Scud against Saudi Arabia intercepted, Scud against Israel fell in remote area.
Feb 08	0	1	Destroyed by Patriot missile.
Feb 09	1	0	17 injured in Tel Aviv.
Feb 11	1	1	Scud against Israel destroyed by Patriot no damage reported in Saudi Arabia.
Feb 12	1	0	Destroyed by Patriot.
Feb 14	0	4	Two fell in northern Saudi Arabia, some casualties.
Feb 16	4	1	No damage in Saudi Arabia; light in Israel.
Feb 19	1	0	No details given.
Feb 21	0	3	Aimed at King Khalid Military City, no details.
Feb 22	0	4	No injuries or damage reported.
Feb 23	1	2	No injuries reported in Israel.
Feb 24	0	3	No injuries or damage reported.
Feb 25	2	1	One landed on U.S. Barracks in Dhahran, 28 U.S. dead and 100 U.S. injured. No injuries or damage reported in Israel.
Feb 26	0	1	No damage reported.
Total	40	46	

Defence Services : Passive Spectators or Effective Players?

BRIG Y S DESAI, AVSM (RETD)

THE BIG QUESTION

The Defence Services are under oath to defend the Nation from external and internal threats. They have, so far, fulfilled this task admirably, enabling the country to progress to even the present stage of development. The Defence Services (hereafter, in this article, referred to as Services) have a vital stake in the unity and well-being of the Nation.

The Services have always been loyal to the Government in power i.e. the Civil Authority - unthinkingly so! This has become a tradition. Even when the Government, led by so eminent a leader as Pandit Nehru, made the Army lose face, in 1962, in having to fight the Chinese without proper equipment and preparation, the services remained mutely loyal to it.

Today there is enemy inspired as well as loose talk on whether India - already truncated by the sliced off portions of Pakistan and Bangla Desh - will remain as one country! Such thoughts receive further inspiration from the words and deeds of selfish politicians, who focus only on their constituency and appeal to sectarian, divisive passions to get elected. They do not see the damage such action will cause to the integrity of the Nation, or may be they just dont care! Further gloom is caused by the poor governance of the country - the injustices, corruption, inflation etc. The governments at the Centre and States, generally, appear to be drifting rudderless, without any clear cut destination. If things continue in this fashion there is real danger that India will break up.

Should the Services, passively watch this happening or, should they do something to prevent it? Is not their loyalty first to the Nation - the Motherland - and not to the Government in power? That is the Big Question! The answer is obvious.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

What should be the degree of the Services' intervention in the govern-

* Brig Y S Desai was Instructor at Staff College Wellington, 1963-65, Military and Air Attache in West Germany and Switzerland 1966-68, and later Brigadier Signals Staff at Army Headquarters, New Delhi.

ment of the country? It is important that the Services do not get deeply involved in actual governing. Governance includes various facets - politics, economics etc, is extremely complicated, and even "experts" who have studied the subject, lifelong, have not found the success formula. If the Services get involved in this, they will only make a mess of it. It will also result in diminishing the fighting efficiency of the Services. Power corrupts! Exercising the power of governing will corrupt the Services. This has happened in all countries where the Military has taken over the reins of government, and the quality of governing has not improved either! It also seems advisable and in the national interest, the Services and the Civil Authority work in reasonable amity, to attain agreed aims.

COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY

No system of government is perfect. However of all the systems tried out in the world, Democracy seems to be the best in ensuring human rights and making the government answerable to the people. We in India have a democratic system. This is in consonance with our culture and ethos. What is needed is to make the system function in a more efficient manner.

Services interference should, therefore, be towards guiding and monitoring the actions of the civil government, ensuring that all actions are in the best interests of the Nation. This will be achieved to a large extent by merely preventing political interference in the working of all branches of government - the administration, the police, the judiciary, the financial institutions etc - and allowing them to function as designed. Persons at all levels must be accountable, and speedy disciplinary action taken against those not carrying out their duties properly. This will raise the morale of the other services and consequently the public.

It is axiomatic that a person is efficient at his job if he is properly trained for it. Persons employed in trade, industry administration, the military and in all other walks of life are so trained. It is however astounding that the politicians, who are elected to rule at the Centre and the States are not trained for carrying out the heavy responsibilities! Their knowledge is based on their own personal experience, which is mainly confined to human nature and intrigues. Many of the politicians in India are ill-read and ill-informed, having been elected only on basis of caste and community, and have a narrow, parochial, non-National outlook. It is imperative for good government that these politicians are properly trained. The Civil Authority must arrange this. Suitable courses should be arranged in the various management and other civil training institutions in India. The Services should run courses to educate the politicians on military matters - at strategic and tactical levels. The USI and IDSA could conduct orientation courses for MPs. The need to make

India the pre-eminent deterrent power in South Asia, to ensure peace and unhampered development of the country, must be brought home to them. India must use this power against naughty neighbours, to make the deterrence credible. Emperor Ashok and even Lord Ram, were able to usher in a 'golden age' of peace and progress for their people, only after great military victories. Such education of politicians in military matters, will, not only help making them better patriots, but also ensure sympathetic and informed assessment of the defence needs in terms of manpower, weapon systems etc.

How can the Services impose their will on the system, to achieve the above mentioned aims? The three Service Chiefs need to work this out. It should be possible to find the answer, considering the present poor state of the establishment - weak leaders looking for support. It may be possible to use the powers of the President, which appear to be rather ambiguous, for leading the Nation in the right direction.

ENSURING DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS

Notwithstanding the training of politicians to understand defence requirements and thus obtaining their sanction to meet essential defence demands, the Services cannot take any chances on this. They must ensure that vital defence requirements are met.

The first requirement for planning defence is Intelligence. Intelligence about the neighbours and their allies, their weapon systems, terrain etc. In the past the Services have passively accepted whatever intelligence was fed to them by civilian intelligence agencies, and found to their great cost that the intelligence was inadequate and even wrong! Henceforth the Services must insist that they got the intelligence they need, and must be involved in planning the acquisition of it. Military personnel must be associated with civilian intelligence agencies concerned. Design of satellites must incorporate military intelligence requirements. The Survey of India must have 'master copies' of updated maps of neighbouring countries, from which it should be possible to reproduce the large numbers required for military operations.

Based on the intelligence and anticipating the modernisation plans of likely enemies, the Services must update their own weapon systems to have an edge over the enemy. Operation plans must also be kept updated - plans for small scale and full scale operations. The Government must be made to agree to the measures necessary for this. Required weapons systems should be developed indigenously, if possible, or else purchased abroad and modified for the south Asia environment. Weapon systems, developed indigenously, need to be tried out under actual battle conditions - such conditions are bound to exist in some part of the world.

There must not be any interference, by politicians (or bureaucrats), in the functioning of the Services. This is vital for the Nation, as only under these conditions can the services remain efficient and always alert. The Service Chiefs will be primarily responsible to see to it that there is no politicisation in the Services. To ensure no Chief is enticed by politicians, it should be a strict rule that no Chief may take up a Government post, on retirement, till the next General Election, or two years after retirement. The process of selection of Chiefs will have to be devised to prevent political factors coming into play. The Chiefs must maintain the dignity of the Services by not accepting, after retirement, any post lower than their status.

With less governmental control on the Services, the latter will have a greater self-regulating responsibility. They must constantly question themselves - are we fighting fit? are we getting soft? are we having too many courses and not enough regimental service for officers and men? are we developing new weapons systems and tactics for the future? and very important, are we cost effective?.

CONCLUSION

It is mainly the All India Services which have a broad National outlook. Of these, the Defence Services are the most patriotic, because they are least subject to corrupting political influences. It must be kept that way. The Services must take a greater role in keeping the Nation united and its security inviolate. They cannot afford to be passive watchers whilst divisive elements are working to destroy the country. The Services must bring pressure for politicians to be trained, to obtain a broad national outlook and improve their power of administration. They must be educated on military matters to ensure appreciation of military requirements and the military budget. Strategic and tactical defence planning will have to be done by the Services themselves, as it is clear, from past experience, that civilians are incapable of this. The Services must have a overriding say in procurement of all inputs, such as intelligence, for such planning. Today the governmental system has got very corrupted and weak characterised men are acquiring positions of power. Things are not likely to get better. There is gloom and despondency in the Nation. It is time the Defence Services make a positive contribution towards Nation building. A big responsibility devolves on the Chiefs to remain united and plan measures towards attaining the common aim.

World War II : Para Operations in Greece

COL AMAR SINGH

INTRODUCTION

In 1942 during the Second World War, the Allied Middle East Command was planning the break-out of the El Alamein line. It was most important to hinder the enemy in every way possible, in his efforts to bring supplies by sea from Southern Europe to his bases along the North-African coast. One of the routes, which was very difficult for the Allied Air Force and Navy to prevent Germans from using because of enemy air cover based upon the Greek islands, was from Piraeus, the port of Athens via Crete. From Crete a considerable number of enemy ships were able to slip across to Tobruk and Benghazi each night. Piraeus was served by a single-line standard-gauge railway in Greece, which hugged the coast south of Salonica, then meandered southwards across the plains of Thessaly and eventually wound its intricate way through the steep mountains of Roumeli and Attica down to Athens and the coast. In Roumeli there were three large railway viaducts situated on the north-eastern edge of the mountain group of Giona, the demolition of any one of which would cut the railway line for many weeks, possibly months. These were, in order from north to south Gorgopotamos, Asopos and Papadia viaducts. The task was to blow up any one of them.

THE PLAN

The accomplishment of the task would involve para dropping a party of 10-12 British parachutists with sabotage experts and necessary explosives, by night behind enemy lines. This party would then carry out the mission with the help of local Greek guerrillas of the Greek Resistance Forces.

EXECUTION

At the end of Sep/Oct 1942 nine officers and three wireless operators were flown in Liberator aircraft from Cairo and para dropped in the mountains of Southern Greece after a five hours journey. One of the officers on the mission was Lieutenant Inder S. Gill, Royal Engineers, then serving with the British Army. I S Gill was none other than Lt Gen I S Gill (Parachute

* Col Amar Singh is Military, Naval, and Air Attache' at the Embassy of India, Belgrade and also accredited to Greece.

Regiment) who joined the Indian Army after the war and retired as our GOC-in-C, Western Command some years back, at the end of a very distinguished career.

Lt Inder Gill who was among a group of four dropped together landed on the outskirts of an Italian garrison town and were greeted with considerable mortar and small arms' fire. They all had miraculous escape. Hiding in bushes from searching Italians, they had been forced to scatter to avoid capture. Ultimately the four managed to marry up with the remaining party.

On the night of 25/26 Nov 1942 the party alongwith approximately 150 Greek guerrillas attacked the Gorgopotamos railway bridge which was guarded by an Italian garrison of 80 men. In the fighting 20 to 30 enemy soldiers were killed and the bridge successfully demolished. Lt Inder Gill was part of the demolition party. He was awarded the Military Cross for gallantry the following summer for sabotage operations in Thessaly in connection with the Allied landings in Sicily.

FOOTNOTE

Fiftieth anniversary of the para-drop was held in Greece on November 28, 1992 in which Lt Gen I S Gill, PVSM, MC, a former Army Commander and presently a member of the USI Council, was invited to participate.

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Sir,

INFANTRY DAY

If there is one event which warrants inclusion in the Guinness Book of the Bizarre, is the Indian Army's celebration of the 'Infantry Day' on 27 Oct. Unlike the other arms and services, who have a distinctive connotation of a Corps or a Regiment eg Corps of Engineers, the Regiment of Artillery or the Signals Regiment, the Infantry does not have a common linkage of this nature. For that matter, the Infantry per se does not even have a common tie, or a distinctive coloured scarf, or even a common flag, like is the case with the other arms and services.

Even in respect of regimental allegiance, the loyalty of the Sapper is to the Corps of Engineers, and not to any particular Field Company. Similarly, in respect of Gunners, their affiliation is to the Regiment of Artillery, and not to any particular Battery. However, in respect of the Infantry, the belonging has always been to the particular regiment, eg the Gorkhas or the Dogras, or the Sikhs, and never to the Infantry per se. The same applies to the Infantry's designation of Colonel of a particular regiment, as distinct from the term Colonel Commandant as applicable to the Corps of Engineers, Artillery or Signals. The very fact that, even an officer of the other arms and services can always get himself transferred to the Infantry, and is given command of an infantry brigade or an infantry division, but that, no purely infanteer can ever command an Engineer Brigade or a Regiment of Signals, proves the fallaciousness of regarding the Infantry per se as having a distinct entity of its own.

Notwithstanding all what has been stated above, if it was at all necessary to have an Infantry Day, it should have been selected on an event with a distinct Infantry flavour. For example, it could have been the day when the Directorate of Infantry was first established in India, or the day when the first Indian was appointed to that position, or even the day of the inauguration of the Infantry School at Mhow. However, to link this with the Sikh and the Kumaon Regiments repulsing the Pakistani invaders on 27 Oct 1947, is as

illogical as saying that, as the first Indian Officer to get a VC in World War II and a PVC during the 1947 operations were both Sappers, one of those days should be called the Engineers Day. In any case, as far as I can remember, even the companies of the Sikhs and Kumaons which were involved in the battle did not march there on their own, but were airlifted to the border area by the 12 Sqn IAF. Why not then call 27 Oct as 12 Sqn IAF Day? Any takers?

To the best of my knowledge, no army in the world celebrates an 'Infantry' day. But then, our army is different, and our Infantry even more so.

16-A Shanker Seth Road
Pune - 411 002

Yours faithfully
Brig N B Grant

II

IOM AND IDSM AWARDS

Dear Sir,

This is with reference to an article entitled "A Further Analysis of IOM and IDSM Awards from Secondary Sources" by Mr CJ Parrett and published in the USI Journal (Jan-Mar 1987).

While there is no doubt that Mr Parrett's analysis provides an excellent source of reference for Indian Army military history enthusiasts and medal collectors, yet there are a few avoidable discrepancies between his analysis and Hypher's work. Mr Parrett in his analysis of the number and location of IOM awards has attempted to verify Hypher's records by cross-referring them with various regimental histories. In doing so he appears to have relied more upon the regimental histories as the primary source for compiling his analysis, and in the process has missed out a number of IOM awards already listed by Hypher in his book.

I have been engaged in some research on Indian Army campaigns and medals and while I was regrettably unable to obtain Hypher's book till fairly recently, I wish to make the following additions to Mr Parrett's analysis of IOM awards based on a study of Primary Sources, viz The Gazette of India, for the period 1890-1911.

(a) *Mr Parrett's analysis*
[Ref App 'A' (4)]

Revised Total

<i>Date of act of Gallantry</i>	<i>3rd Class</i>	<i>2nd Class</i>	<i>1st Class</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>3rd Class</i>	<i>2nd Class</i>	<i>1st Class</i>	<i>Total</i>
1890	2	1	--	3	3	--	--	3
1895	81+9P	1	--	91	82+9P	1	--	92
1899	2	--	--	2	3	--	--	3
1900	9	--	--	9	10	--	--	10
1901	18	2P	--	20	14+2P	--	--	16
1902	5	3	--	8	9	3	--	12
1904	21+2P	3	--	26	20+2P	3	1P	26

P-Posthumous Awards

(b) Location of Acts of Bravery [Ref App 'B' (1); Parrett]

<i>Mr Parrett's Analysis</i>					<i>Revised Total</i>			
<i>Campaign/Year</i>	<i>Class</i>				<i>Class</i>			
<i>Location</i>	<i>3rd</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>1st</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>3rd</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>1st</i>	<i>Total</i>
Chin Hills 1890-1	2	--	--	2	3	--	--	3 (a)
Looshai 1890-1	2	1	--	3	3	?	--	3 (b)
Manipur 1891	86	1	--	87	86+1P	1	--	88 (c)
NWF 1893	5	--	--	5	7	--	--	7
(Chilas 1899 Bir) (Daccits)	2	--	--	2	3	--	--	3
China 1900-1	7	--	--	7	8	--	--	8 (d)
Mahsud- 1901-2	12	2	--	14	12+2P	--	--	14 (e)
Blockade								
Tibet 1904	22	3	--	25	19+2P	3	1P	25 (f)

Notes : (a) 1890 : 1, 1891 : 2

- (b) 2nd Class not traced but may exist.
- (c) P : 399, Sepoy Mohammed Hayat, 12th Madras Infantry, Killed in action, Thobal, 31 Mar 1891.
- (d) 1901 : 8+2P, 1902 : 4
- (e) P1 Subedar Muhammad Gul and No 4339, Havildar Mir Muhammed, 1st Punjab Infantry, killed 25 Nov 1901.
- (f) 1st Class award (P) to Naik Sohbat, QO Corps of Guides, 25 Jul 1904.

A cursory perusal of Hypher's book showed that a number of awards omitted by Mr Parrett had already been included. There are certain other discrepancies that appear to exist but pending further research I have not included these additions.

A note regarding the award of the IOM 2nd Class to No 262, 1st Grade Daffadar Darim, Northern Waziristan Militia, for gallantry on the NWF (Army Dept Notification No 301 of 1915). The award was rightly not listed in the 'Roll of Honour, Indian Army' since it was subsequently withdrawn by ADN No 186 of 1920. The award was however later restored with effect from its date of withdrawal in 1926 (GGO No 511, 01 May 1926).

Regarding the IDSM, both Abbot and Tamplin in their book 'British Gallantry Awards' and Mr Parrett in his analysis take the figures quoted by Lt Col H Bullock, Indian Army, in his article 'The Indian Distinguished Service Medal', published in the USI Journal in 1942 as the base to work upon. While Mr Parrett assumes that Col Bullock consulted secondary sources, viz Indian Army Lists, in compiling his data, Col Bullock states in his article that the figures for the period 1914-20 were taken from the official 'Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-18', (London 1922), p 554; while for the rest he used the Gazette of India. He admits that the figures may not have been absolutely accurate, but may be taken as reasonably so. My work on the IDSM is also as yet incomplete but I submit a few corrections/additions to Mr Parrett's figures.

Mr Parrett notes that there were 49 awards published in Army Department Notification No 527 of 26 Jun 1908, whereas Col Bullock has recorded only 48 awards. In fact there were 56 awards published in ADN No 527 of 1908 and the same has been reflected by Col Bullock. I presume Mr Parrett is referring to ADN No 526 of 28 Jun 1907 which published the 48 original awards of the IDSM and which Mr Parrett has revised to a probable 49 on

a mistaken assumption. The total number of awards for 1907 therefore remains at 48.

Of the 56 awards notified in Jun 1908, the award to Risaldar-Major Sardar Janmeja Singh, 21st PAVO Cavalry, FF, was subsequently cancelled (GGO No 623, 24 Jul 1908) and he was instead admitted to the 2nd Class of the Order of British India (GGO No 622, 24 Jul 1908). The revised total of awards for 1908 therefore stands at 65. (Jan 1908 ; 10+56-1).

Col Bullock in his article lists the 41 recipients of a bar to the IDSM and the same have been included by Mr Parrett in his analysis. The only difference is that while Col Bullock lists 3 awards for the period Jan-Aug 1921, Mr Parrett lists 4, and for Sep-Dec 1921 the numbers are given as 3 and 2 respectively. The sum total of both for 1921 however remaining at 6. I am inclined to agree with Col Bullocks figures and wish to add the following 1st bar recipients to his list :

- (a) No 2681, Dafadar Ghulam Baqir Khan, 10th DCO Lancers, (Hodsons Horse).
- (b) Subedar Dharam Singh, Signal Company.

Simultaneously, the number of medals awarded for Sep-Dec 1921 may be reduced by 1 since Dafadar Ghulam Khan's award was wrongly listed in the ADN No 1972 dated 07 Oct 1921 as being awarded the medal, instead of the bar to which he was entitled. An amendment to this effect was issued by ADN No 1545 dated 11 Dec 1926. His original award was published in ADN No 879 dated 25 Apr 1919. The number of medals awarded for Sep-Dec 1921 therefore is 71 and the number of 1st bar awards is 4, bringing the total awards for that period to 75.

The second addition relates to Subedar Dharam Singh, being the first gallantry award winner of the present Indian Corps of Signals. He won his IDSM as a Lance-Naik in the 31st Divisional Signal Company, Sappers and Miners, during the 'Abor' expedition against the Minyongs of present day Arunachal Pradesh in 1911-12. (ADN No 780 dated 09 Aug 1912).

Lastly, I wish to conclude by saying that in the absence of Hypher's books, Mr Parrett's article has proved of enormous help to me in my research, and the few errors/ additions that I put forth in no way detract from its value as a first rate and invaluable source of reference.

BFTS, Air Force
AF Stn Barmrauli
Allahabad - 211 012

Yours Sincerely,
Sqdn Ldr Rana T S Chhina

III

TERRITORIAL ARMY

It is nice to find an article on Territorial Army in our USI Journal Apr-June 92 issue. What is TA is not even clear to most of the people, in uniform, it is unheard to a Civilian and even to the people who are formulating the policies for the Country. Though it is a pride for this organisation to have TA personnel among parliamentarians and State legislators. But very little effort has been made to attract able people for this unique organisation which is 43 years old. To ascertain Government's effort to inform the public one can find out how many visuals are available for viewing and how many published materials available for reading on this organisation? In the eighties a Committee was formed to evaluate this force, not much improvement has been done for the benefit of TA personnel, specially of Non Departmental TA Units. Due to acute unemployment prevailing in our country people join TA force as part time occupation but do not take it as part time soldiering. They are hired and fired as and when required. There is no scope for TA Regimentation since Units are affiliated to various Regiments and Corps. NCC is having Regimentation of their standard and requirement. They have their own training institute. TA Cadre is not available as they are ill compensated, as a result suitable personnel are not available for this organisation for full time occupation that is to say permanent staff. The personnel from Army who come here on deputation are least interested about prospering the organisation, as it is not a career posting whereas NCC posting is a career one. For example a Commanding Officer of an Inf Bn (TA) who mobilised his TA Unit for operational duty has to move to a NCC Bn for earning ACRs for his promotion. A Unit or even a Territorial Army Group headquarters is ignorant about the exact amount of service required for substantive ranks of a Major alongwith passing promotional examination IA Part 'D' for Ex-service Officer.

It gives a clear picture about interest taken by Staff Officers at various level.

C/2/8 Karunamayee Housing
Estate, Salt Lake, Section II
Calcutta - 700 091

Major S K De (TA)

IV

USI JOURNAL

Sir,

I must convey my profound appreciation for sending me the January-March 1992 issue of the USI Journal. Superb! I became so intrigued with its articles that I looked at the clock to find that it was 2 AM-and this was no exaggeration.

I thoroughly enjoyed and enjoy your journal. The articles on the Gulf War are splendid and 'outstanding'. The article by N B Grant, "No Medals for Moral Courage", I want to pass this one around for it is ever the sine qua non. I liked the book reviews and was pleased that you've dealt with a little known (here anyway) affair, about the Second Maratha War.

May I, as a foreigner, offer one thought, which your editorial board may have long since rejected, but I feel help your less knowledgeable readers such as I; namely to provide a short paragraph of a biographical nature of each article's author. This would give those of us more of a sense of credibility to the article. But far more importantly, in a century or two when some historian is researching names and careers now "household names" are by then less than recognizable. I have spent countless hours trying to find out who so-and-so was who wrote a letter or left a diary, who in his day was locally quite famous. Time's stream carries us all away, and in two generations the memory, unless buttressed by documentation, is lost, sometimes forever. The Latin 'sic transit gloria mundi' - so passes the glory of the world - is sadly right on target. The marvelous efforts you and your contemporaries are making for India's future need not nor should ever be lost to future generations by lack of documentation. I had many pounds of photographs dating back to our Civil War of chaplains without anything written on the back, and no amount of effort could bring their identification. It is so sad. I hope you don't find this suggestion objectionable, but I speak out of my own frustration of wanting to give adequate honor to my forebears in the Chaplainary, and yet being blocked by the silence of the years.

I record with understandable glee at the reviewer's ref to the Padre in 'Men of the Red Beret Airborne Forces' (p 135), which I can use in my 'talks'. This observation rang true to me! I recall two incidents. Chaplain (Major Gen) Frank Sampson, who said one time to me ref his first jump (he later made the Normandy and Holland jumps in World War II, and both combat jumps in Korea) "Only God and my laundryman knew how badly I

felt". And the Chaplain, who was overheard praying as the stick lined up" :
"O Lord, how in your infinite wisdom did You ever allow me to get here?"

I noticed on p 138ff, 'Additions to the USI Library'. Would it be presumptuous of me to send an occasional book for the Collection? 'Military Lessons of the Gulf War' (Edited by Bruce Watson) and the outstanding 'Hitler and Stalin' by Prof. Alan Bullock have been on my recent reading list. I'd be happy to do my little part to enlarge your research department, if this is not considered presumptuous or vain. You mentioned the 'chaplains' of your Army and indicated that you all do not have an organized Corps as we have. Could your library use a set of books - 'The History of the US Army Chaplains' in 5 volumes? I cannot imply or imagine that the line would be long to read them but if in the future your military find it worthwhile to organize a Corps of Chaplains they may be helpful in no other way than how not to do it - as we found it by trial and error. If these would be helpful or in the scope of your library's guideline, I'll fire them off to you.

Yours Sincerely

339 Jefferson Street
Winchester, Virginia
USA 22601

Parker C Thompson
Chaplain (Brigadier General) Retd

Review Article 1

The Chiefs of Staff in the Calculus of Defence Policy*

LT GEN V R RAGHAVAN, UYSM, AVSM**

The formulation of Defence Policy and its implementation in peace and war has been the subject of wide ranging studies. It has had preceptors and practitioners through the ages. Jomini and Clausewitz in the west, Sun Tzu in China, and the Kautilya-Chanakya duo in India are known by their written records. Theirs were philosophical treatises which covered war as part of statecraft. They were addressed to the ruling princes or kings who combined in themselves the authority of a Head of State and the Commander-in-Chief. Conceptually relevant as they are today with a certain timeless quality about them, the changed context of threats to national security and the nature of modern warfare have made their specific prescriptions largely unusable.

It would be difficult to imagine that less than 90 years ago when the First World War commenced, its higher direction was initially undertaken not much differently than the campaigns of the Napoleonic era. The scope, cost and endeavour needed to win today's wars, transcending of defence policy an integral part of statecraft. The means of attaining this central forces has generated a wide ranging debate that assumed the dimensions almost of a controversy during the last thirty years. The debate mainly addressed the issue of the organisations best suited to the purpose. Should one person advise on defence policy to the political leadership, or, would a consensus by committee produce better results alongwith the question of structures needed to facilitate the process have led to a search for organisational models. These have ranged from the unified single service Canadian example to the Chief of Defence Staff in United Kingdom to the party control of such organisation in the socialist states. Since the United States and United Kingdom had borne the major burden of the allied effort in the Second World War, their examples have generated widespread interest and have virtually become role models for other countries.

THE INDIAN DIMENSION

Since 1962 when the Chinese jolted us out of what Mr Nehru termed

* *The Chiefs : The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff* by F M Lord Bramall & Gen Sir William Jackson, London, Brassey, 1992, p. 508.

** Lt Gen V R Raghavan is Director General Military Operation, Army Headquarters, New Delhi, India.

our world of make believe, the debate on defence policy in India has kept pace with the growth of its armed forces. Given the Indian fascination for organisations, notwithstanding our special skill in subverting the best of them, some alternatives have been thrown up leading to a lively and continuing debate on the need for a Chief of Defence Staff, or, otherwise. The debate also obtained a political tenor when a party made the creation of the National Security Council, a part of its election manifesto. Serving and retired Chiefs and senior officers have also not lagged behind in adding to the quantity and quality of the debate. A perceptive former minister of state for defence also argued through this journal for reorganising the management of defence. The creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) has been made out to be the answer, to all that is not right with India's defence policy and practice. Underlying much of these postulations has been the long outstanding and not wholly misplaced frustration of those in uniform, resulting from the lack of understanding of defence related matters and less than tolerant attitudes of those not in uniform. The classic dividing line between the 'brass' and the 'frocks' has been formalised in India with the demand for a CDS providing a totemic symbolism. What an acknowledged British analyst had called a dialectic between two contrasting models appears to be taking place in India. The publication of a definitive study of the UK Chiefs of Staff, therefore, provides a timely and valuable insight into the CDS concept that has been worked for twenty five years.

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) was formed in 1923. Interestingly, the advent of the Air Force did more to bring this about than other factors. The three services could not bring themselves to coordinate their plans. Indeed in 1922, when the Chiefs produced contradictory plans for possible operations against Turkey, Lloyd George was forced to say in effect: "Gentleman, I am tired of these squabbles. We all know the Navy has to protect the straits, the Army has to reinforce and the Air Force to cover both. It is your job to tell us how. Come back when you have an agreed plan!"

Before three years had passed doubts had sprung up amongst Ministers, on whether the service Chiefs were paying enough attention to their collective as against their own service responsibilities. Prime Minister Baldwin found it necessary to issue a memorandum to the COSC stating, 'each of you is to keep always before his mindthe considerations of questions of defence as a whole... all considerations concerning a single service being subordinated to the object of National Defence.....' The Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee also came into being. The missing harmony amongst the Chiefs was attempted to be corrected by

developing their collective voice through the institution of the COS Annual Review. In the 1926 Review, they spelt out for the Govt their assessment of Britain's strategic commitments and highlighted the pathetic inadequacies.

In the 1920s the COSC was mainly preoccupied with warning the Govt of the mismatch between defence commitments and resources. It has been a recurring theme upto the Second World War and later right upto the Falklands war. The COSC responsibility for tendering military advice to the government and the Treasury's duty to ensure financially and industrially sound programmes are the two sides of the defence planning coin. Political judgement, therefore, becomes the arbiter of the policy and that judgement can only be based on a commonly agreed view of the COSC. The political requirement was ably met in the Second World War by Churchill keeping the Defence portfolio to himself and choosing his own COSC.

After the war, the shrinking British Empire, the economic burden of reconstruction, the advent of the nuclear weapons and their delivery systems all had a telling effect on armed forces. It is in these years of the economic constraints that the COSC played the vital role of matching Britain's military needs with its resources and simultaneously building its nuclear capability. Yet the defence policy suffered its most serious post-war set back when Britain intervened in the Suez. The Chiefs were frustrated by the confused political and foreign policy aims against which the operations had to be planned and mounted. The COSC had misjudged the JIC assessment and underestimated the speed of military reaction needed in the new world of mass communications. The COSC was perhaps not privy to the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion at the political level. The US was against the whole enterprise as was the general world opinion. The results are now history and in consequence Eden had to step down and Macmillan became the Prime Minister.

Two major defects of the COSC system had by now been confirmed : its vulnerability to personal clashes, and its lack of strong tri-service direction which became more pronounced in the nuclear era when weapon technology went off exponentially in cost and performance terms. Strong willed Chiefs like Teddar, Montgomery, Cunningham and Alexander had made tri-service cooperation extremely difficult. Suez provided the catalyst from which the CDS philosophy emerged. It was designed to further strengthen the linkages between the Ministry of Defence and the COSC and to bring about closer integration of defence policy in the new era of nuclear missiles. The first CDS was an Air Chief but it was Mountbatten who played the major part in shaping the contours of the CDS concept. His idea was to have a single Chief controlling all the three services including their operations and a single Ministry of Defence. The plan evoked hysterical reactions, and he stopped short by

making the CDS and his secretariat truly capable of taking on the single service views comprehensively to create a viable-defence opinion. That he succeeded well is beyond doubt. In the process, each Chief had to bear his calvary by surrendering a part of his needs for the good of the whole.

The CDS with the COSC backing him made the most vital contribution in harmonising the defence needs to the economic compulsions. In 1974 when Healey as Chancellor proposed cuts over a ten years period in defence spending from 5.5 to 4.0 percent of the GDP, the CDS Field Marshal Carver did not accept a treasury dominated led resource and review and insisted that reduction of commitments and revision of strategy be undertaken first. He felt that the treasury approach would create a 'shopping list of reductions' which would lead, as happens in all negotiations with the treasury to a choice between the best and the worst figures. He established through the COSC a 'critical level of forces' for which the treasury would have to find the means.

The Falklands drama in 1984 was competently overseen by the CDS and COSC even though both had been taken somewhat by surprise.

The armada carrying the forces from England's shore included the two carriers HERMES and INVINCIBLE, two assault ships and twelve destroyers and frigates that had all been ordered to be scrapped by an earlier Defence White Paper of 1982. A year more and the operations might not have been launched! Prime Minister Thatcher drew on the ideas of all Chiefs and the CDS and consulted them before War Cabinet meetings. It has also been said that, in Falklands the CDS system worked more as a function of good judgement than of clearly established structures.

THE CENTRAL DIRECTION OF DEFENCE POLICY

The CDS system has drawn a mixed response even in the UK. The CDS has been vested with powers to be the principal military adviser to the Government in his own right, and not just as Chairman of the COSC. He is charged with using the COSC as a forum to draw single tri-service advice with which to evolve an overall defence view. The fundamental principle of Mountbatten was the centralisation of policy and decentralisation of management, although often it was difficult to decide where one ended and other began. Experience has shown that one requirement stands above all else and that is, the need for balance between the politically desirable and militarily practicable or vice-versa, between the three services and between policy makers and service experts. The availability of continually improving communications and monitoring capability has encouraged matching centralisation. Since technology has telescoped operational space, decision making is feasible at

increasingly higher levels even in ongoing operations. Today the Defence Minister in the UK is advised by a triumvirate comprising the CDS, the Secretary and Chief Scientific Adviser. The Chiefs in their collective capacity have been reduced to a subordinate advisory role. Thus, the service Chiefs were kept more on the fringes of Gulf War operational policy and planning. The CDS alone advised the Govt and debriefed the Chiefs after the meetings of the War Cabinet. He did not draw on their expertise or experience. The Chiefs were confined to deployment of forces and making the logistic arrangements. The questions, therefore, now being asked are : is policy getting divorced from management? are the Chiefs days numbered? and whether centralisation has been taken too far?

The Chiefs are, like other mortals, fallible. They are torn between the dual roles of being a Chief to a service in which they have served a lifetime and having to give a collective opinion. They eye each change from its effect on their service. Their individual and collective responsibilities clash. They tend by their training to err on the side of caution and as Churchill said, "you may take the most gallant soldier, the most intrepid airman, and the most audacious sailor, put them at a table together - and what do you get? The sum of their fears!" They nonetheless represent, unarguably the best service assessment available. A CDS is no better than the collective view of a COSC working in cohesion. The CDS cannot possibly support a view contrary to the collective COSC opinion. The CDS must draw the COSC into a collective effort to formulate and project a tri-service voice.

In defence policy forums, the balance between political power and service expertise is a potentially vulnerable one. The ideal structures for peace are not necessarily the best in war. In peace the time dimension is long but in war it is immediate. In peace centralising helps but in war it can be disastrous. Above all, organisations do not consist of tidy lines on charts but of individuals who make the system work inspite of its flaws. Michael Howard, who wrote authoritatively of UK Defence organisations, felt in 1970 that the insertion of a new body above the COSC was neither practical nor desirable and recommended that enlarging the COSC may be the answer.

PERSONALITIES VS ORGANISATION

The authors of the book rightly emphasise that the COSC is a very British institution, suitable only for the Anglo-Saxon style democracy with its abhorrence of dictatorship in any shape or form. A CDS cannot afford to ride roughshod over the COSC but provide, as the authors say, a central dynamic, clarifying issues, identifying alternate points of view, stage managing and presenting military advice for political decision. Yet this institution always

needed the guiding hand and the pushing elbow of a Churchill in war, a Mountbatten in peace and a Thatcher in the Falklands endeavour. Even Churchill had difficulty deciding on Gen Alan Brooke as his CIGS and confided, "when I thump the table and push my face towards him, what does he do? Thumps the table harder and glares back at meI know these Brookes - stiff necked ulstermen and there is no one worse to deal with than that". Churchill himself was no great conciliator. His personal dissatisfaction brought about the removal of Wavell and Auchinleck from the North Africa command. He also tried his hand at generalship, not unlike the Fuhrer, but got away with it. He effectively worked the COSC by bullying, cajoling and by the sheer power of his intellect. After Suez, Macmillan achieved the same with his suave ways whereas Mountbatten played the supremo and even used his royal connections to get the COSC moving his way. In 1982, after Argentina had occupied the Falklands, only the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach was available for Mrs Thatcher to consult. The CDS, the Army and Air Chiefs were away. Leach convinced the Prime Minister that against all odds the Royal Navy will put the necessary force on the Islands. It was by any standards a fine example of a service Chief's professional judgement and it allowed the Prime Minister to help the Parliament to take the basic decision of recapturing the Islands. The selection of a CDS must, as that of a Chief, involve judgement and proven service credentials. It can lead to potential discord but also to great success in crisis. He must be able to draw the best out of the COSC and be able to lead rather than arbitrate over their deliberations. Incumbents will have to be spotted and groomed to hold not only the appointment but also their own in councils of state and against counsels of fear. The authors state that the potential CDS or a Chief must combine in himself command ability, intellectual talents with political sensitivity and the ability to handle the bureaucrat. Montgomery for example had all that is required of a Chief but the political feel and the ability to work in a team. The balance between a mature professional and an egoist will have to be found if the circumstance is to be avoided that occurred in the case of the CIGS, Sir George Milne in the 1920s. On completing his first tenure and being asked who should succeed him, he is said to have replied, "I have searched far and wide, but I cannot find any one worthy to succeed me!" His tenure was extended twice!

OTHER MODELS

What has been the US experience with a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, a massive Department of Defence and what President Eisenhower termed the Military Industrial lobby? The US higher defence organisation has been called an 'Organised Anarchy' and its functioning is said to bear no relationship to the organisational structures'. The ability of the office of the

Secretary of Defence to exploit the centralisation has been assessed as limited, with accusations of micro-management. In fact, the judgement for the future portrays confusion, institutional drift, shifts with political tides and a reactive rather than an innovative posture. 'This was not the way the US helped win the second world war but is assuredly the way it would help the country lose the peace.'² Even though the socialist states had centralised all political and military power, it is the US organisation which has had excessive military influence in and outside the Department of Defence.

THE INDIAN CONTEXT

The strategic scenario of the 1990s and the decade after poses a special challenge to India's defence planners. The sub-continental adversarial realities, the relentless pressure of economic squeeze, the unending internal security needs created by ethnic sub-nationalism, the fluid state of international and regional alignments can be a nightmare even to affluent nations. India's defence needs with its disputed borders, its long sea-board, its island territories (not unlike Falklands) the daily demands on its armed forces and its threshold status in nuclear and missile capabilities demand comprehensive and holistic analyses and options beyond the skills of any single individual. The single Ministry of Defence in India is a circumstance of special advantage. Britain had to put up with separate service ministers and secretaries and it took all of Mountbatten and Macmillan's skills to get a single ministry even to start in 1964. On the other hand Indian manning policies, political preferences and the traditions of India's civil service will continue to preclude the selection and grooming of senior bureaucrats to be the Defence Secretary. The ministerial incumbents to the job, have without exception had to start from the very basics in this complex field. Those of us who have had the luck to work with highly capable exceptions to this trend, can only confirm the magnitude of the problem of first educating and then convincing a minister and civil servant new to defence matters. In the existing arrangements the defence commitments - costs resources equation thus gets based on a limited and single point view. Since political judgment is the vital link that joins the nations' security needs to financial resources, the government can ill afford to deny itself the vital ingredient of an integrated defence view.

THE INDIAN REQUIREMENT

There is no general prescription that exists for a Central Organisation for Defence. It can only evolve out of a nations' history, legal foundations, political context and the conduct of individuals involved. Each state is, therefore, unique and it is to be seen 'sui generis'.³ In this context, the Indian arrangements of the COSC with a rotatory Chairman from within requires

a close look. This arrangement detracts greatly from the potential of the COSC to render the level and quality of advice it is capable of. Instead of the battle for a CDS in an environment of doubts and fears of an Indian Cromwell, a Chairman of the COSC appointed in addition to the Chiefs, will be a meaningful step by the government in obtaining for itself the quality of advice it ought to get. The Chairman can then be of help through the COSC in obtaining the vital balance between the strategic needs, resources and capabilities. He will bring about the much needed cohesion in tri-service planning for growth and readiness for war. To make a definite start with even a limited but clear charter would be the best way to evolve the mechanisms of an integrated defence view from the COSC. The future course can thereafter be more purposefully charted, to suit the Indian politico-military genius. Kautilya and Chanakya would endorse the action just as posterity will applaud it.

THE CHIEFS

Brassey's have produced a truly comprehensive and incisive story. The authors, one of whom was a CDS, have made it even better in its rendition. It shall be essential reading not only for analysis of defence organisations but also for those who aspire to tackle issues of national security at the highest levels.

NOTES

1. "Organisational Anarchies : Military Bureaucracy in the 1980s" - *Journal of Applied Behavioural Science* 18, No. 2 (1982) : 140.
2. Archie Barrett, *Reappraising Defence Organisation*, (Washington DC : National Defence University Press, 1983.)
3. Ed Martin Edmonds, *Central Organisation of Defence* (Westview, 1985).

Review Article 2

Impact of Economic Factors on National Security

COL RAMA RAO, AVSM (RETD)

National Security has many dimensions. Basically it connotes the safety and well being of the people of the country, i.e. the nation, the maintenance of its territorial integrity, of peace along its borders and above all of its ability to deter neighbours and others from attempting to violate its borders, or subjecting it to pressure in order to extract economic, political or territorial concessions.

In order to protect its security, a nation, therefore, must have the strength to defend itself should attempts be made by its neighbours or other countries to coerce it into conceding a part of its territory or other concessions. Should the potential aggressor, however, consider that it can bring to bear overwhelming force on the designated victim, it may mount an attack and try to seize a part of the territory of the victim state. In such an eventuality, the State that is attacked should be able to muster enough strength to repel the attacker, inflicting heavy losses.

The relative power of States however "depends not only on military forces but on many other factors - size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technical development, financial strength...They have value in themselves and they have the means to power". NJ Spykeman 'America's Strategy in World Politics, 1942, PIB-New York, Starcourt Brace) Spykeman also notes that modern warfare 'can be fought successfully only on the basis of a rich supply of strategic raw materials and an enormous industrial output'.(P.3)

Planning and preparations for the conduct of Operation 'Desert Storm' by United States (in 1991) was commenced immediately after Saddam Hussein's forces attacked and occupied Kuwait. They were methodically completed and US Forces, with some support from its NATO allies were ready to strike by end 1990.

When ready, US Forces struck using all their might, so that Saddam would not face the attackers. US Forces evidently acted on the principle

* *The Political Economy of National Security : A Global Perspective* by Ethan Barnaly Kapstein. Columbia, University of South Carolina, 1992, p. 232, \$ 34.95, ISBN 0-87249-796-8.

outlined by a British admiral towards the end of the 19th Century, namely - 'Hit First; hit hard, keep on hitting'. The result was that by fielding overwhelmingly strong forces (like using a sledge hammer to knock out a fly), US achieved a masterly victory. The attack, spearheaded by US Air Force, was virtually unopposed. US had by this operation brought home to the rest of the world that it was master of the world's air space. US marines and Navy gained control of the Gulf. The land forces had a relatively easy task, namely to ensure that Iraq would not come in the way while Kuwait was being prepared for the return of its legitimate ruler and restoration of his authority.

The Gulf War is the first war waged in what is usually described as a Uni-polar World. The Soviet Union had thanks to the actions of its rulers during the period 1989-1991, disintegrated. Although, Russia under Yeltsin still retains some of its forces and in particular its nuclear arsenal, US has no reason to exercise the same kind of restraint in its dealings with developing countries in Asia as it used to earlier.

However, wars have become extremely expensive, as the Gulf War has proved. Gulf states the European Community, Japan and others made commitments to provide US with a total sum of \$ 15.6 bn to meet the costs incurred in Desert Shield carrying out Operations Desert Storm (Estimate of costs by US Dept of Treasury; P 163).

In the event, the estimated costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm according to Kapstein were considerably higher as shown below :-

Estimate of Costs actually incurred: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

<i>Contributors</i>	<i>Commitments</i>
Saudi Arabia	\$ 16,800 bn
Kuwait	16,000 " "
UAE	3,000 " "
Japan	10,700 " "
Germany	6,600 " "
Korea	.385 " "
Others	.003 " "
Sub Total	\$ 53,488 " "
Direct Allied Costs	16,000 " "
Total Costs	\$ 84,488 " "

Warfare, in a unipolar world, is indeed very expensive certainly from the point of view of allies of the dominant power, not to speak of the country

against whom such wars are waged. Cost of waging a war has soared because the costs of manufacturing, testing and acquiring weapon systems have been steadily rising. This is due at least in part to what Fen Hampson, an American Political scientist has described as under (See 'Unguided Missiles' by Fen Hampson, p. 298 and quoted by Kapstein at p. 126) :

"The way America buys its weapons is a supremely political process and one plagued by inefficiency, waste and political mismanagement".

This in fact is the case in most countries, with the possible exception of UK, France, Germany and Israel; major weapon producers in the world, who have recognised the advantages of arms sales to their allies and to selected Third World Countries.

In Third World Countries which generally import all or most of the weapons and equipment needed for their defence forces, political personalities and military leaders who may determine what to buy, how many/how much of each item to buy and from which supplier/suppliers to negotiate and finalise the deal/deals are invariably given "Commissions"/"Kickbacks" in keeping with the size of the supply Order.

India until recently relied on Russia (the Soviet Union of yester years) for the supply of important items of defence equipment such as combat aircraft, submarines and some other items required for our Navy and battle tanks, guns and possibly a few other weapon systems for our Land Forces. Under the political accord governing India-Russia relations, the equipment was sold on concessional terms. Although India has become self-reliant in the production of most of the items by our Armed Forces there is yet some distance to go.

Our task now is to ensure that we produce all the costly equipment that we now import and also export a good proportion of what we produce, weapon systems included. In that case we can afford to import a few items that may not be economical to produce locally. Given the proved nuclear weapon competence of two of our neighbours who have attacked us in the past, occupied and are still in occupation of parts of our territory we will be foolish not to build at least a moderate sized nuclear weapons stockpile to deter potentially hostile powers from intimidating us. Such pressures already seem to be building up. We need not, and perhaps ought not to discuss our options openly. Instead we would do well to adopt the swan's policy of remaining calm on the surface while paddling hard under the surface. Raising defence production in our case also helps our general industrial progress considerably.

The longer we take to raise our weapon building competence, and the stockpiling of deterrence systems the more vulnerable will our defences be. Likewise the more vulnerable will we be to pressures exerted by dominant powers to accede to NPT, which will tie our hands while leaving those who attacked us in the past, free to further stockpile nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction continue to pose threats to our security and well being.

In this context the book under review by Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, is worth careful study as it deals with all aspects of the political economy of national security. It does not, however, discuss the question of nuclear and other horror weapons.

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Review Article 3

Military Decision Making

BRIG N B GRANT, AVSM (RETD)

A more appropriate title of this fascinating book could have been 'Military Decision Making', as that is what this book is all about. A leader, whether he be in the military or industry, has been attributed with a number of traits like courage, robustness, initiative, drive, integrity etc. In the ultimate analysis however, a leader has to use all such traits for one purpose only, viz, to make the correct decision at the right place and right time.

In industry, where normally there is plenty of time to ponder over, a decision is mostly based on logic, data and statistical analysis. This is a stark contrast with the military, wherein its problems are never linear but have a much higher content of imponderables, uncertainties, fog of war, and the stress of battle; as such, military decisions have in them a very large element of factors like intuition, sixth sense and the gut-feeling. The entire book is devoted in proving this concept through examples ranging from the wars of Ceasar and Alexander, through World Wars I & II, and bringing it up to date in Korea and Vietnam.

To understand in some depth this decision making process, the examples selected in the book have been grouped and correlated, with the various facets of war like strategy and tactics, and its organisational aspect of command and control, both in respect to the higher direction of war at government and the Chiefs of Staff level, and also within the regiment. To so bifurcate any military event is difficult enough but to do so linking it up with the decision making process, must have been a herculean task, but which makes this book so absorbing.

Throughout the book, great emphasis is laid on the character and personality of the decision maker, rather than on his knowledge and intellect. All the given examples bring this out very clearly, indicating how every decision, in identical military situations, were different, depending on the moral force of the commander making it, rather than on the nature of the ground or the resources at his disposal.

Another aspect of this book which is radical in the decision making process, is whether Commanders have displayed very high degree of courage

* *The Analysis and Solution of Military Problems* by Brig J Nazareth (Retd), New Delhi, Lancer International, 1991, p. 160, Rs. 180/-, ISBN 81-7212-003-6.

and strength of character, in deliberately disobeying orders of their superiors, in what they believed to be in the higher interest of the mission, even at the expense of their life and career. I have yet to see any treatise on Chetwood's dictum of putting the interest of the country before one's own interest or even before the interest of one's command, better presented than what has been done here. He ends this Chapter by a quote stating that "no general can vindicate his loss of battle by claiming that he was compelled to do so against his better judgement. What happened in the '62 Chinese invasion, Op Blue Star and Op Pawan, are classic examples of this."

I feel however that, although what is stated in this book may be true in war, (which we have only once in 20 years and lasts only for 20 days), the question is, whether such things as intuition and gut feeling etc should apply with the same force in peace, wherein there are no ponderables, uncertainties, fog of war etc, and what is more important, plenty of time to ponder over. In peace therefore, military decisions have of necessity to be based on logic, data and scientific analysis. Brig Nazareth has not touched on this aspect of decision making.

Notwithstanding the above, this book is a must, not only for the study of military decision making, but will also be useful for industry, wherein, inspite of data, analysis and the computer, the managing director still likes to take the final decision on his intuition and gut feeling, although he seldom admits having done so.

Note to Contributors

We invite original, well-researched articles on National Security, Defence Forces and Military History. The length of the article should be between 4,000 and 6,000 words. They should be typed in double-spacing on one side of the paper and sent in duplicate to "The Editor, USI Journal".

Contributors are also requested to provide a brief bio-data about themselves on the following lines :

"Maj Gen VP Sharma passed out from the IMA, Dehradun, and joined Para Regt in 1956. His early career included service in J&K and Nagaland. He commanded 4 PARA in 1972 and was GOC 3 Inf Div, 1983-84. He became Director of Infantry in 1985. His book *The Nagaland Story* was published in 1989".

Book Reviews

The Decay of International Law : A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in International Affairs By Anthony Carty, *Manchester University*, 1986, p. 138, £ 8.95 ISBN 0 7190 18501.

We have here a penetrating study written by a lawyer for lawyers. Dr Carty legally and historically analyses international law as actually practiced in the past and present, and the relevance of this to present world society. Today's concepts of self-determination, ethnic and religious grouping, territorial integrity and nationalist government have swept aside the rule of kings and established states. The study spreads well beyond what is purely legal in customary law, territory and property, "peoples" and owners: We have quagmires of non-intervention and human rights, with conflict in modern concepts where States have boundaries other than their territorial ones", where "States protect their private citizens in foreign countries, and where "no man has authority to compel another to act for his own good or supposedly common good."

The cases of the British in the Falklands and the Israelis in Lebanon are analysed in detail to illustrate the concepts. These would shake the faith which most combatants have in the moral and legal strength of what they fight for.

Dr Carty has written a stimulating book for those interested in the subject, but it is not the kind of heavy reading appreciated by the average scholar of defence studies who uses the conclusions of such professional analysis.

-- Tindi

Contemporary Strategy II -- The Nuclear Powers By John Baylis & Others, 2nd ed. New York, Holmes, 1987, p. 209, ISBN 0-8419-0929-6.

Initially a book with the title 'Contemporary Strategy; Theories and Policies' was published by the authors in 1975. With increasing importance of the subject the book was expanded and bifurcated into two Vols i.e. 'Contemporary Strategy Vol I : Theories & Concepts' and 'Contemporary Strategy Vol II : The Nuclear Powers'.

The book is considered valuable for the student of Nuclear Defence Policies the world over. It can also serve as a handy composite guide for the strategic analysts and defence policy makers of the developing countries.

-- Lt Col Jagmohan Singh

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security ed. By David B. Dewitt, London, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 283, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-7099-0896-2.

The book is a collection of articles by experts, many of whom were participants in the third review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) held in Geneva in 1985. They examine the whole range of issues connected with nuclear non-proliferation and the Treaty. Different perceptions on non-proliferation, ranging from those of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) who are signatories to the NPT and NNWS who remain outside the Treaty, are represented in the collection.

The present detente following the INF Treaty augers well for the future of nuclear disarmament. There is a growing realisation that any course other than easing of tensions and general disarmament is fraught with such dangers as would threaten the existence of life on our planet.

The articles contained in the book are well researched and informative. Although most of the subscribers are from Western countries who favour the NWS view, there are some contrary views, particularly in articles by the two authors of Indian origin. Altogether a highly readable book.

— Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War By Paul K. Huth, London, Yale University, 1988, p. 227, ISBN 0-300-04167-5.

A thought provoking book, which analyses historical cases of attempted extended deterrence, empirically tests a set of hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which deterrence is likely to succeed or fail.

— Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems. By Norman Friedman, Maryland, Naval Institute, 1989, p. 511, £ 89.95. ISBN 0-87021-793-3.

The Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, USA is to be congratulated for bringing out a guide which contains wealth of information on surveillance and control radars, guns, missiles, sensors, communication and data systems, under water weapons, torpedoes etc. fitted on the ships of the major navies of the world. The photographs depict each weapon or system clearly.

The most useful part of the guide is that all the details are given in a chronological order and a reader requiring information of a particular weapon or system will have no difficulty in finding the same. To keep the readers abreast of new development, publishers intend to bring out biennially the Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the world.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Military Communication : A Test for Technology By John D. Bergen, Washington, Center of Military History, United States Army, 1986, p. 515, \$ 34.00.

This book gives a history of the U.S. Corps of Signals in Vietnam, starting with one intelligence officer and a radio operator who cooperated with the anti-Japanese HO-CHI-MINH organisation during the Japanese occupation starting in 1940. The narrative continues about communication facilities established with the U.S. Military Advisory Group established in 1950; the withdrawal of the French in April, 1956, the famous Tet offensive in 1968 through to 1970s when the U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam.

The book brings out the importance of communications during active operations, the use of South Korean and Vietnamese soldiers and their training for taking over the high-tech communication system - well worth a study by our signals officers.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain

Submarine Warriors By Edwyn Gray, Novato, Presidio, 1988, p. 275. ISBN 0- 89141-325-1.

A submarine has no peace time role as she can neither be used for flag showing nor for carrying dignitaries nor for aid to civil power. Therefore, her commanding officers can aptly be called the Captains of War as described by Winston Churchill at the outset of the war.

The author has given in a very interesting and chronological order the events which led to the role played by the various submarine commanders by way of either sinking merchant or warships or the fight against terrorists.

Mr Edwyn is to be congratulated for his deep research in providing the readers the heroic deeds of the submarine commanders. This book would be of particular interest to the submariners who inspire to become daring and efficient commanding officers of the most deadly weapon of future.

— Captain R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements By Heather A. Wilson. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988. p, 209, £ 30.00 ISBN 0-19-825570-5.

This book covers a very live and continuously changing aspect of insurgent wars which concern national defence and security. We are in an age where dedication to ideology and "cause" is only too often judged by the degree of willingness to kill or even murder innocents not directly involved in the conflict. The emotional cover of

National Liberation movements using force is dispassionately though sympathetically analysed by Dr Wilson, whose background of USAF and NATO defence planning adds realistic and practical assessment to what could have become only an academic study.

The average soldier would find much of this study a detail, not needed by him to make use of the conclusions in his approach to insurgent war. Planners and policy makers should find this very useful in their assessments and possibly in decisions for execution.

-- Tindi

The Hybrid Warship : The Amalgamation of Big Guns and Aircraft By R D Layman & Stephen McLaughlin. London, Conway, 1991, p. 224, £ 25.00. ISBN 085177 85551.

The authors have painstakingly gathered information and details of characteristics of different Hybrid Warships thought of or proposed to be built in different countries. This also resulted in the development of tactical and strategic concepts among the maritime powers based on their national interests. These details are not normally available in any book connected with maritime warfare. The book would, therefore be of interest to almost all the segments of those interested in maritime history, tactics and geographical concepts.

-- Captain C M Vyas NM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Engines of War : Merchants of Death and the New Arms Race By James Adams, New York, Atlantic Monthly, 1990, p. 307, \$ 19.95 (ISBN 0-87113-352-0).

There have, in the recent past, been many works, specially from the west, which highlight arms transfers to a vast variety of countries and disreputable organisations through a new breed of arms brokers who care little about the consequences of their actions. The author who is a Defence Correspondent and an Associate Editor of UK *Sunday Times* evidently has had extensive contacts with the intelligence set ups of many countries. He has very convincingly articulated how such covert transactions did and can take place. One Monzer-al-Kassar is an ubiquitous figure in practically all the dubious deals of the 80s.

Of special interest to the Indian readers would be the account of siphoning of US arms meant for the Mujahedeens in Afghanistan by Pakistan to its own armouries. The explosion near Rawalpindi in April 1988, according to the author, occurred just as US was about to carry out a detailed inventory and stock check of weapons relating to the Mujahedeens.

-- Air Mshl K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

The Parameters of Military Ethics Ed. By LJ Mathews & Dale E. Brown, London, Pergamon - Brassey's, 1989, p. 178.

The Parameters of Military Ethics examines the basic moral issues, the responsibilities and ethical postures of the military profession. The book contains an excellent collection of articles on basic ethical questions faced by the military leadership all over the world.

This book must be studied carefully by all senior officers of our armed forces and should be obligatory reading in various courses of instruction. The factors discussed in the book are relevant to our prevailing moral environment.

— Maj Gen Afsir Karim, AVSM (Retd)

Power and Insecurity : Beijing, Moscow and Washington, 1949 - 1988, By Harvey W. Nelsen, Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1989, p. 178, ISBN 1-55587-162-3.

The book is an excellent commentary on major international developments during the period 1949-1988. The author has painstakingly researched in a lot of original source material, such as CIA Research Reports on China and the Soviet Union, Documents of the National Security Council, Top Secret Hearings by the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, apart from a large number of books and monographs, and articles and book chapters.

— Dr K M L Saxena

International Theory : The Three Traditions. By Martin Wight, Leicester University, 1991 p. 286, £ 39.95 (ISBN 0-7185-1412-2)

At the London School of Economics, in the 1950s, Martin Wight developed a lecture course on the theory of international relations. These lectures have been put into a book form now with minor editing and a few deletions.

To Wight, international theory, as Hedley Bull in an introductory essay puts it, is 'a study in political philosophy or political speculation pursued by way of an examination of the main traditions of thought about international relations in the past.' In these lectures, Wight analyses three specific schools of thoughts led by Machiavelli, Grotius and Kant respectively, or the Realist, Rationalist and Revolutionist traditions and he further puts forward means of sub-dividing these groups as theories cannot reflect the true nature of international politics if sought to be viewed within rigid, expedient or intellectually ideal classifications.

Time has changed since Wight delivered these lectures at the LSE. Still, Wight's analysis has not lost its relevance. For any serious student of international relations, this book is a must.

— Anindyo J. Majumdar, JNU

The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700 ed. By J H Burns and Mark Goldie, London, Cambridge University, 1991, pp 798, £ 70 (ISBN 0521-247160).

The book offers a comprehensive and scholarly survey of European political thought in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Concepts, arguments and terms, encountered during the medieval, renaissance and the reformation periods unmistakably appear midstream of any discussion of the modern Thought. Thus the present volume makes a natural sequel to the earlier volume on Medieval thought (Pub 1988). Here is an erudite guide for the student and the specialist presented by a team of distinguished contributors. The book has an expanded bibliography.

— Colonel Balwant Sandhu

Security Commitments and Capabilities : Elements of an American Global Strategy ed. By Uri Ra'anana & Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Connecticut, Archon Book, 1985, p. 204, \$ 3250 ISBN 0-208-02095-0.

This book is a compilation of previously unpublished papers by the foreign policy and defence experts of great repute and international standing. Some of them are from inside the Government, the Armed Forces, think tanks and higher academia.

The analyses of these specialists of the geostrategic, political, economic and social differences between USA and USSR and their assessment of hardships in building and sustaining cooperation with allies as well as non treaty partners and their allocation of burdens in defending shared values and interest has stood the test of the time during the recent US intervention in the Middle East Kuwait-Iraq war. It therefore stands to reason that such compilation of analytical documents from people having convictions and commitments play an important role in the field of intellectual pursuits by not only the enthusiasts of Military Science but for any other person interested in history as a guide for future events.

The editors Uri Ra'anana a professor of international politics and director International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy Tufts University and Robert L Pfaltzgraff Jr professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School and President of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Cambridge Massachusetts and Washington DC have succeeded in presenting these papers in an extremely readable manner.

— Brig Mulk Raj (Retd), PhD, MA, AMIE, psc

Deterring Chemical Warfare : US Policy Options for the 1990s. By Hugh Stringer, Washington, Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986, p. 76, \$ 9.95, ISBN 0-080-343228.

Hugh Stringer is a Lt Col in the US Army. As a Special Assistant for Defence Chemical Matters in the Office of the Secretary Defence, he has worked on the chemical warfare problem from operational, logistics, training and policy perspective.

In his book the author traces the origin of chemical warfare (CW), since it was first encountered in its modern form at Ypres, Belgium in 1915. Since then America continues to wrestle with the dilemma. In its initial chapters the author gives out the characteristics of chemical agents like chlorine, mustard and the more recent nerve agents like Tabun, Sarin, V and VX agents. He goes on to briefly explain their tactical, psychological and special effects, based on which he gives out a series of counter measures against CW to include use of masks, protective clothing, collective protection, decontamination and some training aspects.

A thought provoking and very educative book. A must for all service officers and military analysts.

— Maj Anil Shorey

Restructuring American Foreign Policy By John D. Steinbruner, Washington, Brookings Institution, 1991, p. 260, \$ 29.98. ISBN 0-8157-8143-1.

The book is a collection of eight well researched articles written by eminent senior fellows in the Brookings Foreign Policy and Economic Studies programme and edited by John D. Steinbruner, Director of the 'Programme' at Brookings. Each article is self sustaining and projects a facet concerning American Policy.

The book was published when events like disintegration of U.S.S.R., collapse of communism in East European countries and reunification of Germany were rapidly changing the world order. To that extent some of the events and analysis need review. USA's policy dealings with Third World countries is a glaring omission. The book is recommended for scholars and foreign policy experts and would make a prize collection in any professional library.

— Col B K Khanna; SM

Assignment Pentagon : The Insider Guide to the Potomac Puzzle Palace. By Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, USAF (Retd), Washington, Pergamon- Brassey's International Defence, 1989, p. 267, \$ 15.95. ISBN 0-08-036720-8.

It is a 'How to' Book with a difference. It is not about how to plan a vacation or how to build a house but as the name suggests, it explains the environment of the Pentagon and how an US Service Officer posted there should cope with his assignment to the Pentagon. I found the Book rather interesting because of two reasons. First, it provides a fascinating insight at the nitty gritty level of US Defence policy making process. The other was that having recently had a brief stint at the Indian Army Headquarters, a comparison of the functioning of the two establishments was quite absorbing.

I wish somebody would write a similar book on the Indian Service HQs. If it did pass the security clearance, it might be a very useful book. All in all "Assignment

Pentagon" is good reading for all those interested in insights into the functioning of the "Potomac Puzzle Palace".

-- Maj Gen D Banerjee, AVSM

Forged in Battle : The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers By Joseph T. Glatthaar, New York, Free Press, 1990, p. 370, \$ 28.70.

In this very well researched book, "Forged in Battle", Joseph T Glatthaar, gives a clear and concise picture as to how, despite the under-current of universal prejudice prevailing against the Negroes (in Southern States, they were considered 'subhuman', and in free North, they were treated as childish and inferior to whites in all respects), President Abraham Lincoln, took the bold step of raising these coloured units and how they proved their mettle through valour, in the face of overwhelming discrimination and abuse. However, in the aftermath of war, the contributions made by American blacks in the Union victory, got forgotten with the resurgence of racial conflict, which in a way is a legacy still deeply entrenched in American mind.

The book gives an insight as to how much struggle and suffering black Americans must have had to undergo, to reach the present status of equality.

-- Lt Col Y P Gupta (Retd)

Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam : Ideas and Actions By Donald J. Mrozek, Alabama, Air University, 1988, p. 196.

The Vietnam war continues to rankle the American psyche. This is yet another study on the subject with emphasis on how the use of air power evolved in Vietnam. But what stands out even more vividly, is the inadequacy of political direction, inter service differences and the absence of a unified command and control system for the prosecution of war.

In assessing the impact of air power, the author delves into the mechanics of "efficiency and effectiveness". While bombing of N. Vietnam and interdiction in South may have been efficient, yet in effect they proved to be ineffective. These campaigns made the enemy more determined and innovative and compelled USSR and China to provide additional and more modern weapons to North Vietnam. Escalation proved cheaper for North Vietnam but highly expensive for the United States.

-- Air Mshl H K Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VM (Retd)

United States Foreign Policy in the 1990s By Harold R Moroz. New York, Carlton Press, 1989, p. 112, £ 12.95. ISBN 0-8062-3503-9.

The author, a former US Infantry Officer and Assistant Professor of Military Science at University of Massachusetts, with experience of training of foreign soldiers at US Army Infantry School has attempted to provide a perspective on US foreign

policy and emphasised the need to dovetail professional military formulated thought to the execution of US national goals and objectives.

— Gautam Sen, IDAS

Screaming Eagle : Memoirs of a B-17 Group Commander By Maj Gen Dale O'Smith, North Carolina, Algonquin Books, 1990, p. 241, \$ 18.95, ISBN 0-912697-99-7.

Screaming Eagle is a true story which is a saga of heroism and leadership by its author Maj Gen Dale O'Smith.

On taking over command of 384th Bomb Group (Heavy) of the US Eighth Air Force, Smith commenced the most challenging and terrifying year of his life. He found his group scruffy with low morale and poor combat efficiency. He was ordered to see 351 Bomb Group commanded by Willie Hatcher and considered an excellent unit. During his attachment he found that a group commander had to understand just what the cutting edge of a group was meant to do over enemy country and that he could not lead from a desk chair. He says "My first mission taught me a major lesson, however that would carry me through the next year of bloody warfare: to blanket fear, keep busy"

The review of this book will not be complete without a mention of an acute problem. Dale Smith had to have a divorce from his wife as he says " The life of a service wife is hard at best because the professional soldier must give his first loyalty to his country and the duties expected of him. He swears ultimate allegiance to the colours. Service wives may understand this but few will accept it emotionally, because it is so contrary to common American values where wife and children always come first". Fortunately we in this country have different values.

— Brig S K Kaul (Retd)

The Present State of Communist Internationalism ed. By Lawrence L Whetten, Massachusetts, D.C. Heath, 1983, p. 253, ISBN 0-669-05582-4.

The policy of Communist expansion through proletarian internationalism was well known as a serious threat, but apparently was not understood by most. In this book we have a comprehensive review and analysis tracing Communist internationalism and assessing its status; clear and well presented, the book is based on a workshop, and is dated 1983. Events have since outstripped this study. However, the analysis has shown the fissures and stresses which later led to the breakup of the Soviet Union. What appeared to the world as a monolith, built on exceptional dedication to the cause, was in fact full of diversity, dispute, local interests, and personal deviations. The collapse of Russia as leader of a super power union could not have been a surprise to the scholars writing this book, though it was a shock to most of the world.

A book only for those studying the subject.

— Tindi

Perestroika and Soviet National Security By Michael Mcc Gwire, Washington Brookings Institution, 1991, p. 481, \$ 39.95, ISBN 0-8157-5553-8.

The USSR has, in recent years, witnessed cataclysmic changes. Radical political upheavals in Eastern Europe, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, unilateral, but significant force reductions announced by the Soviets, break-throughs in arms limitation negotiations, serious unrest within the constituent units of the Soviet Union and the like, have triggered myriad studies and commentaries, notably in the western world. But few of these have attempted to analyse the causes for such changes. The book under review examines the context of the developments and tries to explain why and how they came about.

-- Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Soviet Socialism : Social and Political Essays By L G Churchward, London, Routledge, 1987, p. 216, £ 15.95, ISBN 0-7102-1166 -X.

Soviet Socialism has invoked numerous writers to write and comment on it. The book under review has come from the pen of an erstwhile Reader in politics at the University of Melbourne, who has published other books also on the Soviet Government and society.

As this book was completed by 1987, it has not commented on Gorbachev's reforms, or anticipated the break-up of the communist world. However, this well-written book will be welcomed by all those who are interested in Soviet socialism. The book contains a useful bibliography, besides reference notes and an Index.

-- Dr B C Chakravorty

The Soviet Perspective on the Strategic Defense Initiative By Dmitry Mikheyev. Washington, Pergamon Brassey's, 1987, p. 95, £ 7.00, ISBN 0.08-0-35748-2.

Of Soviet origin and a Ph.D. in Physics from the Moscow State University, the author was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1979 after imprisonment in a hard labour camp for 6 years due to political dissent. Now a U.S. citizen, he has written a perceptive and analytical report on the Soviet perspective on SDI.

Even without pushing through SDI, the U.S. policy makers are witnessing today a huge economic crisis and great political upheavals in the former Soviet Union. Only the future can tell what shape the Russian economy and political system will take in the months to come.

-- Dr B C Chakravorty

Soviet Foreign Policy Today : Gorbachev and the New Political Thinking. By Robert F. Miller, Australia, Allen & Unwin, 1991, p. 210, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-04-4422-873.

Although this book was published in 1991, it was before the dramatic changes

that have taken place in the USSR, and therefore much of the interest it might have had, have unfortunately been diminished through no fault of the author. It is supposed to represent the new political thinking of Gorbachev, but how relevant that is going to be remains to be seen in the light of the contest for power between him and Boris Yeltsin. Moreover the secession of the nine or ten republics from the Soviet Union represents a political factor which will greatly influence the new political thinking of the Kremlin.

– Maj Gen K C Khanna

The USSR and Iraq : The Soviet Quest for Influence By Oles M. Smolansky with Bettie M. Smolansky, Durham, Duke Univ, 1991, p. 346, \$ 55.00 (P), \$ 29.95 (P) ISBN 0-8223-1116-X.

The book is a well documented account of Soviet Union's attempts to gain a foothold in Iraq, in furtherance of its super power role. With the larger objective of enhancing its influence in the Persian-Arab gulf over a period of nearly twenty years up to 1988, and how a newly emerging Iraq, after shaking off the "yoke of imperialism" reads the Soviet mind and exploits its political ambitions to its advantage.

Smolansky has chosen to examine the evolution of Soviet-Iraq relationship on the basis of all the important events that occur in the period, rather than getting enmeshed in a chronological diary. The material has been well researched and coherently presented.

Smolansky has almost proved his point that at about every stage of this relationship Iraq gained immensely from Soviet assistance in emerging as an autonomous entity of the region, without conceding anything substantial to the USSR whereby its basic objectives could be fulfilled. I say "almost", because the fact that the U.S.S.R. was the most significant presence in Iraq all these years sent a powerful message to all countries in the region that the Soviet Union would hence forward be one of the important players in any political game including the Middle-East peace process.

The lessons drawn in the concluding section of the book are based on incontestable facts and sound analysis. The book does not lose much of its usefulness to students of political history and policy makers even after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a super power, because a case study of this nature should remain relevant to a vast number of such patron-client relationships in the modern world. To wit India and Nepal.

– Vishwa Pal Singh

Modern Chinese Defence Strategy : Present Developments, Future Directions By Rosita Dellios, Hamshire, Macmillan, 1989, p. 256, £ 45.00, ISBN 0-333-49891-7).

This book is an analysis of the strategic doctrine of the People's War under

modern conditions propounded by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1977 on return of Deng Xioping to Power. Rosita Dellios has brought out that contradiction between the traditional Chinese Strategy of massive manpower and contemporary technology has been resolved and balance has been achieved between competing requirements. She has painstakingly examined, the evolution of the 'Peoples War' concept and shown how it has been modified to absorb modern technology. The structure of the armed forces has been altered and advanced weapons systems have been inducted. In this process, however, emphasis has been laid on indigenisation and intermediate technology. The PRC has realised the futility of blind pursuit of technical equivalence with the advanced nations and opted for pragmatic achievable goals. The author avers that the Chinese have overcome their resource constraints and technical weaknesses by evolving a strategy superior to their adversaries. It is an amalgam of military capability and diplomatic finesse. It is also in line with their view of 'expansive' nature of time-patience is a virtue highly prized by the Chinese.

— Air Marshal M L Sethi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

China's Crisis : Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democracy By Andrew J. Nathan, New York, Columbia Univ, 1990, p. 242, \$ 28.50, ISBN 0-231-07284-8.

Author Andrew Nathan, in his book CHINA'S CRISIS, has reviewed the changing political scenario in China through selected essays written at successive stages since 1981, thus placing the Movement in correct real-time perspective and offering various models and possible scenarios. He has then analysed American perceptions as well as reforms in post "Chiang Kai-Shek" Taiwan, before, projecting the wherefors and whys of the ruthless suppression of the Democracy Movement in 1989. The thrust of his arguments is the dichotomy in the concept of political reform as perceived by intellectuals and the democratic dictatorship acceptable to Deng Xiaoping, whose concept of political reforms of liberalisation could not infringe upon the four cardinal principals.

-- Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6 The Twentieth Century ed. By Peter Duus, Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1988, p. 866, £ 65.00, ISBN 0-521 22357 1 (v. 6)

The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 6 - The Twentieth Century, published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, New York, is a collection of chapters written by specialists, under the guidance of a panel of editors, John W. Hall, Marius B. Jansen, Madoka Kanai and Dennis Twitchett. The volume attempts to provide a general introduction to Japanese history through the first three quarters of the present century with particular emphasis on political, economic social and intellectual trends in that country.

— Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)

Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan : Domestic and International Factors By Tahir Amin, Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies, 1988, p. 285, Rs. 180.00, ISBN PB 969-448-001-9.

The book provides an in-depth analysis of ethnic movements in Pakistan and their impact on the domestic politics of a country still in its formative stage.

— Maj Gen B D Kale (Retd)

Tanzania : An African Experiment By Rodger Yeager, London, 1989, p. 193, £ 19.50. 2nd Edition, Revised and Updated, ISBN 185521-070-3.

Named a choice outstanding book of 1982. Professor Yeager writes of the rich past but concentrates on the period after 1960.

A ten year development plan was introduced in 1946, TANU (TANGANYIKA African National Union) was formed in 1954 and on 9 Dec 60 it became Independent. NYERERE devoted most of his attention to socialism and development ideology is based on ethical rather than material. TANZANIA has had a tripartite system of policy which allows the party, the Government and the President to formulate policy on different basis. With this relationship the President's role is important as he can change the equation.

— Maj Gen B D Kale (Retd)

Burmese Nationalist Movements 1940-1948 By U Maung Maung, Edinburgh, Kiscadale 1989, p. 382, ISBN 0-8248-1342-1.

U Maung Maung, an ex Army brigadier and a former diplomat, has produced an extensively researched work of literature. It covers a comparatively brief period. i.e. 1940-48 but these eight years were by far the most crucial in Burma's struggle for independence. It is chiefly meant for Burmese readership.

— Brig Rai Singh, MVC, VSM (Retd)

ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia By Michael Leifer, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 198, £ 30.00.

The author is a Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics. While completing his thesis he spent a year as visiting professor in political science at the National University of Singapore. The book is well got up and indexed; style is scholastic and laboured. His attempt at delinking ASEAN from SEATO rationale makes the reader feel that it is contrived. Further, it is disappointing to note that no comment has been made about the coup in Fiji Is. in May, 1987, staged by its miniscule army, ousting a duly elected representative government. One may ask, 'Whose interest was best served by that development?'

A study of this thesis could be useful to scholars and political analysts in countries of SAARC.

— Brig Ramesh Chandra

Roads and Rivals : The Politics of Access in the Borderlands of Asia. By Mahnaz Z Ispahani; London, IB Tauris, 1989, p. 286, £ 22.95. ISBN 1-85043-145-0.

This book explores the relationship between geography, technology, and political interests based on the premise that routes create access to and from a region and thereby determine the geo-political environment present therein. On the other hand borders and boundaries create natural and/or artificial constraints which the author calls "anti-routes".

The book also includes a brief description of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute and examines the Indian and Chinese competition in the Himalayan borderlands of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.

-- Dr Rajesh Kadian, MD FACG

The Druze By Robert Brenton Betts, New Haven, Yale University, 1988, p. 161, ISBN 0-300-04100-4.

The author is Director of American Research Centre is Egypt and a student of Islam, Arabic, and the Middle East for more than 20 years. The Druze are a thousand year old ethnic minority, concentrated in the mountains of Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Despite the fact that they are non-Muslim Arabs in an overwhelming muslim world, they have been key participants in the shifting power struggles in the Middle East and exert an influence far beyond their numbers. In education they have outpaced the Muslims and are respected for their high ethical standards, by the Muslims, Christians and Jews. The author has discussed the treatment of the Druze and their influence in each State separately. Though in Israel, they are the smallest of the country's Arab communities. they are the most favoured by the Israeli Government as they are considered the only Arabs who can be trusted. The Druze have also enlisted in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).

The book is well illustrated with maps and photographs; the author has also included a glossary of Arabic and Islamic terms, persons and places for better understanding of the Middle East and the Druze.

-- Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

The West Bank and Gaza : Israels Options for Peace : Report of a JCSS Study, Group, Tel Aviv, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, 1989, p. 235.

The JCSS study group Tel Aviv University has carried out an incisive and in-depth analysis of various options available and the effect of each of these on Israel's relations with the Palestinians, Arabs, US, USSR with special emphasis on geopolitics, demography and economics. The options are:

- (a) Status Quo.
- (b) Unilateral options - annexation or withdrawal.

(c) Negotiated compromise options - autonomy, Palestinian State or a Jordanian
- Palestinian Federation

The deliberations reveal a comprehensive grasp and analysis of all facets effecting the problem and make knowledgeable and excellent reading. The book is recommended for all students of history and geo-strategic studies pertaining to the Middle East.

-- Maj Gen Nirmal Sondhi, AVSM & Bar (Retd)

Amal and the Shia : Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon. By Augustus Richard Norton. Austin, University of Texas, 1987, p. 238, \$ 25.00. ISBN 0-292-73039-X.

The history of Lebanon is a sad story of factional politics and mutual feuding. The present state of Lebanon came into being in 1943 when it was agreed to distribute the political offices between the main communities on the basis of the census of 1932. Over the years, the demographic structure of Lebanon has changed. The Christians have lost their majority while the Shias have become the majority sect in Lebanon in an otherwise predominantly sunni region of Arabia.

The author has written the book based on his first hand experience when he was posted in south Lebanon as a Military observer in the UN Truce Supervision Organisation. The book deals with the question of the political destiny of the Shia community in great depth. It is a useful book to understand the genesis and history of the present strife in Lebanon.

-- Maj Gen L S Lehl, PVSM, VrC (Retd)

In the Name of God : The Khomeini Decade, By Robin Wright, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1989, p. 284, £ 10.95, ISBN, 06 71-67 235-5.

The Revolution in Iran developed in ways totally unexpected by the USA, the super power then having the maximum interest and resources in this country of oil and manpower, with the will to dominate the gulf. It seemed that in 1979 the USA could not understand what was happening, and why and consequently misjudged the significance of events and its own role in manipulating them. So failed most Western thinkers, who did not understand how the Shi'ite Iranians tick. Robin Wright is an exception; she writes the story of Khomeini, and the first ten years of Iran after the Shah, with deep insight, and a wealth of detail not found in most other accounts. This is a very well written book presented in the form of an exciting story, but backed by research and references, analysis and comment, worthy of a journalist who is also an established scholar on Militant Islam.

-- Tindi

Kuwait and Iraq : Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes. By Richard Schofield, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1901, p. 134, £ 7.50, ISBN 0905-031-350.

A well documented book which traces the disputes between Kuwait and Iraq from 18th century onwards. Although the book in question is published by Royal Institute of International Affairs, UK, efforts have been made to give an objective review of the above dispute with elaborate factual information in support of the conclusions reached. It is interesting to discover that this dispute was almost resolved in 1968 but in spite of all the good intentions, the above two states had not taken any initiative to clearly demark the boundary between them and to take a categorical stand regarding the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. A concerted drive and dynamic approach to these two issues would possibly have saved the catastrophe that took place on 02 Aug 90.

— Col R N Khanna (Retd)

The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives ed By Francis Robinson. Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1989, p. 520, £ 35.00, ISBN 0521 33451 9.

An encyclopedia is intended to provide information. This book does much more; it is a veritable store house of knowledge of this part of the world, covering every facet of the life and times of the land and the peoples who inhabit South Asia. Sixty nine scholars from all over the English speaking world, including several from India and Indians teaching abroad, have contributed to this masterly study. Consider its range: geography, climatology, vegetation, soil water resources and fauna are some of the topics covered in the section dealing with land. The chapter on peoples describes the ethnology, demography, urbanisation, internal and external migration, of the inhabitants of this region. And so it goes on, to deal with the history, politics, foreign relations, economies, religions, societies and culture of the states covered by this study, which also include Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives. The role of the armed forces after the evolution of these nation states is touched on; there is a perceptive comment on the increasing use in India of the army - on the average 40 to 50 times a year - by the political authorities to deal with domestic disturbances. The long-term danger visualised to the Indian political system is that of a militarization of politics and a politicisation and demoralisation of the army, arising from its widespread use as a mechanism of political control." This is but one example of the immense readability of this book which is not just a stodgy collection of data, but offers informed, stimulating comment.

A region comprising one-fifth of mankind deserves such comprehensive treatment as the Cambridge Encyclopedia provides. It is richly illustrated with numerous photographs, maps and tables, closely interwoven into the text. It is beautifully printed and got up and a joy to pore over. For the more serious student, each chapter and section has a list of recommended further reading.

Altogether, a first class work of reference.

— Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

The Indian Army of the Empress 1861 - 1902 By Alan Harfield, Kent, Spellmount, 1990, p. 192, £ 25.00, ISBN 0946771-03-0.

The Indian Army of the Empress - 1861-1902 by Major Alan Harfield is a very comprehensive record of the period covering various aspects of the Indian Army, its campaigns and the expeditions to establish control of the frontiers of India and of its various expeditions abroad. It is very well illustrated with some rare pictures of the Indian Army and its campaigns. The author should be congratulated on his well researched work and bringing a compact account of such a large number of campaigns. Some of which though equally important are perhaps not so well known. Each chapter has been given a Bibliographic notes and references which are extremely useful. Though some sketches of the operational areas have been given, a large number of these have been omitted. Each campaign requires a separate sketch which would have helped in better study and understanding of the various operations.

This book covers all the campaigns undertaken by the Indian Army from 1861 to 1902 in a concise form. It brings out how the British, deployed it extensively to control not only the borders of India but also to maintain their hold on the colonies and to meet their commitments abroad.

— Maj Gen Chand N Das (Retd)

The Amritsar Legacy : Golden Temple to Caxton Hall : The Story of a Killing By Roger Perkins, Wiltshire, Picton Publishing, 1989, p. 233, £ 16.95, ISBN 0 948251441

'The Amritsar Legacy' is a legacy of violence, from Jallianwalla Bagh, to Caxton Hall, through to the present day. The killing of O' Dyer, Governor General of Punjab in 1919, by Udham Singh, in Caxton Hall in the mistaken belief that he was Dyer, makes novel reading. The author has treated the incident like a murder mystery with very clinical overtones. Udham Singh, who is much revered in the Punjab as a martyr, has been made out to be a galavanting free-booter, or at worst, a double agent of the Germans, who killed O'Dyer, only for finding himself a place in the history books. Much of the mystique of this prominent Indian Nationalist of his time, has also been removed by delving far too much in detail, and by dwelling far too long to the morbid days, when he awaited execution. I am not too sure, how many will find the narration about technical details of the gallows, the hanging and burial etc, palatable or in good taste.

— Lt Col A K Sharma

Brothers Against the Raj : A Biography of Indian Nationalists, Sarat & Subhas Chandra Bose By Leonard A. Gordon, New York, Columbia Univ, 1990, p. 807, \$ 29.00 (P), ISBN 0-231-07443-3.

Professor Gordon, an acclaimed historian and a long association with India, has followed up his award winning book "Bengal - The Nationalist Movement (1876-1940)" with this joint biography of Sarat Chandra and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in "Brothers against the Raj" after extensive research and exploratory work.

Any biographical work must progressively depict the stage-setting and the changing scenarios under which the star performers carried out their ordained roles, whereby the whys and hows of events and the strength or weaknesses of the characters come into proper focus. Prof Gordon has effectively achieved this labour of love.

— Maj Gen S K Talwar (Retd)

The New Cambridge History of India - Vol IVJ: The Politics of India Since Independence
By Paul R. Brass. Cambridge; Cambridge University, 1990, p. 357, £ 22.50 ISBN 0-521 26613-0.

The book deals with Indian politics, the system and functioning of Indian Government, nationalism and political economy - the central theme being the centralisation of power. The centralised drive has eroded the effectiveness of political organisations, has heightened ethnic, religious caste and other cultural and regional conflicts. These consequences suggest that the Indian State Society and economy are in a state of systematic crisis created by excessive centralizing drives of the national leadership determined to transform the country into a modern industrialised military power.

The author has done full justice in presenting a panoramic account of the Indian Constitution and the system of government and the politics of India since independence. His style is lucid and presentation objective and fair.

— Maj Gen Amarjit Singh (Retd)

India By Stanley Wolpert, Berkeley, University of California, 1991, p. 273, \$ 27.50 ISBN 0-520-07217-0.

The book covers varied aspects of Indian complexities - understood little or only superficially by western nations particularly America. The author-after a very wide and detailed study and having visited "INDIA" many times and having taught Indian History at UCLA in USA, has brought out in very powerful and magnificent style the very aspects that the Americans - and even the Indians settled abroad need to know about this subcontinent. For students of Indian, Asian and South Asian History, he has suggested reading of many books published in India and abroad.

The book covers not only the rich historical background but also touches on aspects such as religion and philosophy; society covering the family life, untouchability, the village and urban life; arts and sciences to include the contribution made by India in this field, and polity and foreign policy, covering the long period of more than 2000 years which witnessed the primary polity of Rajas and the ruled- changing into democratic system (one of the largest democracy) of functioning since 1946-47. It highlights the problems that this sub-continent faces and efforts that are being made to surmount the vast poverty stricken economic problems and territorial disputes.

The book is worth reading and valuable to all those who know India and desire to know still more. The book is a masterly study of India, not only covering its inheritance and her present problems and difficulties but also highlights the futuristic trends which need regular and proper understanding by all those in power-if the same have to be tackled satisfactorily - to call India - Great.

— Lt Gen L S Rawat, PVSM, AVSM (Retired)

September 65 : *Before and After* By Amjad Ali Khan Chaudhry, Dehra Dun, Natraj, 1991, p. 193, Rs. 150/-.

The author commissioned in Indian Artillery in 1942, served in Pakistan Army as Chief Instructor Staff College, DWE, and commander of corps artillery and Infantry brigade group. Although he has covered the operations in J and K and wars of 1965 and 1971, his personal involvement in battle was mainly as Commander of 4 corps Artillery during the offensive of Pakistan in Chhamb-Akhaur Sector and against the advance of Indian 1 Corps in Sialkot Sector in 1965. The tactical employment by commanders at formation and unit level and fighting by all the three arms along with response of our armour, artillery and infantry have been narrated in considerable details. While giving accolade to his own army, he has not hesitated to give due credit to the fighting qualities displayed by opposing forces and his account of operations is reasonably close to our own versions and war histories, for which the author can be complimented.

The author is a great believer in the crucial role of artillery arm in war. Before the start of Operation 'Grand Slam' in Chhamb on 1 September, surprisingly, he was posted out to command an infantry brigade and his HQ assigned the role of movement control. He managed to convince higher command to change their mind, a decision amply and fully justified by subsequent events and the congratulations received from President Ayub Khan who wrote that the 'part played by 4 Corps Artillery was magnificent and results they achieved are miraculous'.

The book is of particular value to our commanders, as this is the first time that the employment of artillery from battery to corps level during war has been brought out in such detail. Our artillery commanders will find it useful to have seminars and model discussions based on salient points brought out, linking them with our own versions of battles in Chhamb and Sialkot sectors.

— Brig R C Butalia
AVSM (Retd)

Agriculture and Food Supply in the Second World War ed By Martin & Alans Milward, Haldenweg, Germany, Scripta Mercatura Verlag, 1985, ISBN 3-922661-16-5, p. 323, D M 59.

The vast armies of W W II and the supporting populations of the Axis powers and the occupied territories of Europe of South East Asia were fed through a complex

system of production supervision and distribution of food. Availability of food calculations were usually linked to strategy and were often belied.

Experts in connected fields in the primary sector met at various conference seminars during 1978-1985 and the result is this scholarly collection of over a dozen papers, in English and many in German. The originals avoid the translators bias and each essay carries a summary in the other language. A most useful, and a specialised book.

— Col Balwant S Sandhu

War, Industry and Society : The Midlands 1939-45 By David Thomas, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 197, £ 30.00, ISBN 0-415-02272 X.

This book about British Industrial War Production in the Midlands during WW-II - a limited survey - would be of interest to the industrial mobilisation planners.

Of particular interest is the work on the development of jet engine prototypes to Frank Whittle's design which was undertaken by two teams of Armstrong Siddley, and Vickers and Rovers & Rolls Royce. There were too many disputes over exchange of information which resulted in the British and the allies not been able to utilise the jet propulsion system for aircraft during WW-II. The Hurricanes and Spitfires were powered with radial engines.

— Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

Blood and Steel By Brig DE Hayde, MVC Dehradun, Trishul, 1989, p. 261, Rs. 48/-.

'Blood and Steel', is an autobiography written by a decorated, Anglo Indian Solider. This is the author's second book after "Battle of Dograi", published in 1984.

The book covers extensively, the origin of Anglo Indian community in India and their outlook. The author also narrates his experiences as a cadet, at the IMA, at the time of partition of the country and as a YO with the JAT Regiment. The book is written in simple style and forthright observations are made, with wit and candour.

— Maj Gen Ram Nath, SM

We Lead : 7th Light Cavalry 1784-1990 ed. By Lt Col C L Proudfoot, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1991, p. 259, Rs. 250/- ISBN, 81 7062-105-4.

In 1784, the 2nd Regiment of Madras Native Cavalry was raised from selected personnel of the Cavalry formally taken out by the East India Company from the Nawab of Arcot. This history is thus a record of two hundred years, the 7th Light

Cavalry having earned the largest aggregate of decorations in the Indian Cavalry. Post-Independence, it has the distinction of having participated in many conflicts : J&K 1947-8; Goa, 1961; NEFA, 1962; Punjab, 1963; and East Pakistan and Punjab 1971. An evocative regimental history.

— Lt Gen S L Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)

British Intelligence in the Second World War Vol. 4 Security and Counter Intelligence By F H Hinsley and CAG Simkins, 1990, p. 408, £ 15.95, ISBN 0116309520.

Vol 5 : Strategic Deception By Michael Howard, London, HMSO, 1990, p. 269. ISBN 0116309547.

These volumes are part of a series of five books on British Intelligence in the Second World War. The first three volumes dealt with the influence of intelligence on strategy and operations. Volumes 4 and 5 are complementary in that they virtually deal with counter-intelligence aspects besides a review of security policies at the outbreak of the war.

These volumes provide interesting reading for serious students of intelligence policies and matters. The last chapter in volume 5 could be of special interest to Indian readers.

— Brig Subhash Kapila

Secrets of the Second World War By Jane Sayer, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1992, p. 227, ISBN 81-7062-136-4.

The book is made up of a number of articles on some unusual and unexplained happenings of the Second World War. It would have greatly helped the readers if the book also had a foreword with some information about the original from which it has been translated and the year of the original's publication. From the names of the authors of the articles and their text, it has apparently been translated from a Russian publication, compiled sometime in the post-Glasnost era.

The most interesting article concerns not war but human psychology and life in concentration camps. It begins with an interesting question: how was it that a small administrative staff of only a few hundred people was able to manage by itself between 20 to 30 thousand inmates in a camp, most of whom were aware that they would ultimately be put to death? The method, explains the author, was to turn them into ideal prisoners by destroying their individual adult personality and replacing it with a child's mentality. Grimly the author suggests that government officials, deprived of their uniforms and their regalia and power were generally the first to experience personality disorientation and break down.

— Maj Gen P K Pahwa

After the INF Treaty : Conventional Forces and Arms Control in European Security:
The Aspen Strategy Group & The European Strategy Group in Cooperation with the
Aspen Institute Berlin. Lanham, University Press of America, 1988, p. 52, \$ 7.00.

The book is the product of a joint study committee composed of individuals representing the Aspen Strategy Group and the European Strategy Group. The U.S. -- Soviet agreement on intermediate - range nuclear forces (INF), signed on December 8, 1987 set the ball rolling for subsequent progress in other fields of disarmament, viz. strategic forces, short range nuclear forces (SNF), nuclear testing, chemical weapons and conventional forces. It was difficult to foresee the tremendous progress in disarmament and the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, when the essays included in the book were written. In spite of this some of the conclusions drawn in the book are still relevant. NATO has still not renounced the role of nuclear weapons for achieving deterrence in Europe. The U.S. commitment to the defence of Europe continues, although substantive reductions are foreseen as a result of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations.

-- Major P K Gupta

Kitchener's Army : The Raising of The New Armies, 1914-1916 By Peter Simkins,
Manchester University, 1988, p. 359, £ 13.95

The author is the Historian at the Imperial War Museum, London and the scholarly approach and depth of research that has gone into this book, which is essentially about a narrow specialised period of British Military History, is ample evidence of the wealth of material he has studied. The decision to get involved on the Continent fully and the consequent massive expansion during 1914-1916 of Britain's land armies by 5 million men with essentially British rather than colonial troops from the Empire was an extremely creditable achievement which undoubtedly contributed to Britain's ability to outlast Germany in the long drawn out slaughter of the First World War.

Conventional wisdom has been giving the credit for fielding these armies to Lloyd George, whereas the author cogently argues with a mass of facts from recently declassified British Government papers and private collection of papers now available, that it was the foresight and drive of Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, Secretary of War from August 1914 till his untimely death in the torpedo sinking of HMS Hampshire on 5 June 1916, that was largely responsible.

The book is really in two parts: the first dealing with the method of recruitment by which over two and a half million men were induced to volunteer, and the second with their experiences while being moulded by an unprepared and numbers-swamped organisation into the New Armies. The book makes enjoyable and interesting reading for a scholar of Military Sociology but is of little value to the lay Indian Army officer as its scope in time is, perforce, too focussed on a period of British military history which has few parallels with the modern Indian situation.

-- Col Arjun Katoch

The Invisible Bomb, The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East By Frank Barnaby, London, Tauris, 1989, p. 223, £ 16.95.

The Gulf War is over but the nuclear arms race is far from over, infact it might generate more endeavor to develop nuclear weapons quickly and avoid a future devastation as Iraq did.

The revelations made by the ex-Israeli nuclear scientist Vanunu and his subsequent arrest and trial by the authorities there, bears the fact that indeed Israel has rather a sophisticated and advance nuclear industry which is beyond her needs. This has compelled the Arabs to develop their own nuclear industry (read bomb).

However, much is to be achieved, one of them being a comprehensive disarmament, conventional as well as nuclear, which is doubtful given the fact that Western economies run on arms industries. The manner the Americans demolished Iraqi capabilities gives rise to more defiant policies on behalf of other states in the region. Until a comprehensive settlement is reached on all issues, disarmament remains a mirage.

This book gives valuable insights into the various countries' nuclear programmes and Frank Barnaby's work deserves a closer look.

— Shahram Sepahi
JNU

The Red Web - MI6 and the KGB Master Coup By Tom Bower, London, Aurum Press, 1989, p. 214, £ 14.95.

The commitment of the Western powers towards restoration of the independent status of the Baltic States is not so well known. Even less is known of the massive espionage effort mounted by both sides during the now buried cold war. This book is a valuable addition to these fields. The book, for the first time, presents a complete espionage operation as seen from both sides of the ideological divide. The espionage operations of the MI 6 and CIA in the Baltic States were thoroughly subverted by the KGB through masterly deception. MI 6 agents sent to the Baltic States and other parts of Russia turned out to be KGB officers, some of whom had been sent to London to be indoctrinated and employed by MI 6. Once the true nature of the MI 6 operation became known, its officers blamed Kim Philby's treachery as the cause of the failure. Tom Bower has revealed that the true cause of the failure was *The Red Web* spun by the KGB and Philby was a negligible part of it.

Tom Bower has based his story on extensive interviews and on declassified information from the Western countries and Russia. *The Red Web* is an interesting narrative which has been made easy to follow as the author has used code names of the various agents.

-- Guru

The Iron Duke : A Military Biography of Wellington By Laurence James, London Weidenfeld & Nicolson; 1992, p. 306, £20.00 (ISBN 0-297-81074x)

The book traces the life and achievements of Arthur Wellesby, third son of the First Earl of Mornington. As the sub-title suggests more emphasis is given to the military career of the hero of the book, well-known as Duke of Wellington.

In March 1787, he joined the 73rd Highland Regiment as an ensign. On the 14th of September 1852, at the age of eighty three Wellington died as a renowned General who did not know how to lose a battle. The years between 1787 and 1852 are packed with important historical events in all of which Wellington had played a striking role of great importance.

Laurence James, introduces his readers to Wellington's Anglo-Irish aristocratic background and how he lived to believe till the end that an aristocrat is always a born leader. This kind of conservative attitude made Wellington often a ruthless disciplinarian and hence the attribution 'The Iron Duke'.

There is no doubt that Wellington was a man of immense self-confidence, a quality essential for a General in times of war as well as in peace. The author has recorded in great detail this iron quality of determination which saw Wellington victorious in his innumerable campaigns in Europe and in India where he helped to establish the British Raj more firmly than before though mostly disliked by the people of the country. However, Waterloo remains Wellington's most famous battle.

Besides this 'iron' quality of Wellington, the author has endeavoured in this biography to show the humane side of the man; specially in his concern for the well being of his soldiers, who in return respected and loved him much. It seems he had commented once, "my soldiers would do for me what perhaps no man can make them do". In his private life Wellington was not a happy man. His marriage to Kitty Pakenham was not a success. The public image of Wellington was of an austere, lonely man wholly dedicated to his country's service either as the Chief of an army or even as not so successful a politician.

This book is enriched by many interesting and famous paintings of the time pertaining to the life of Wellington. The diagrams and sketches also reveal Wellington's astute knowledge of army manoeuvres, strategy, the importance of intelligence service and logistics.

-- Prof. Sheila Sen

Trident : The Only Option? By Colin McInnes, London, Brassey's, 1986, p. 235, £ 24.00. (ISBN 0-80-033599-3)

The decision of the British Government to replace Polaris submarine system with Trident is the main theme of the book in which the author does a thorough examination of all the options and the factors guiding this decision in 1980. There has

been no impact on this decision of the recent review to cut Britain's armed forces. The strategic nuclear weapons programme, though delayed, is expected to be completed in the mid 1990s, the first submarine HMS Vanguard is due to be commissioned in 1994, and the first batch of 14 Trident II missiles from the USA will arrive during 1992-93.

Dr. McInnes, who conducted the research for this book while he was a member of staff in the Department of International Politics, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, has examined in full detail, the various options open to the Government. His research has led to a most comprehensive and fully documented analysis.

A very useful book for decision makers and scholars interested in the decision making process involving high defence strategy and cost.

— NBS

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Army Group Insurance Fund
Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No 14
PO - Vasant Vihar, New Delhi - 110 057

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
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