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The Editor regrets the following typographical errors.

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Contents (Reverse)		
Line 5	<i>Lt Gen P E Mann</i> <i>PVSM (Retd)</i>	<i>Lt Gen P E Menon</i> <i>PVSM (Retd)</i>
516		
Last Line	<i>Lt Gen P E Mann</i> <i>PVSM (Retd)</i>	<i>Lt Gen P E Menon</i> <i>PVSM (Retd)</i>

ISSN 0041-770X

The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :
KASHMIR HOUSE, RAJAJI MARG, NEW DELHI-110011
Telephone No. 3015828

Vol CXX

October-December 1990

No. 502

USI Journal is published Quarterly in April, July, October and January.
Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 80.00 Foreign £10.50 or \$ 20.00 by Sea
Mail. Subscription should be sent to the Director. It is supplied free to the
members of the Institution. Articles, Correspondence and Books for Review
should be sent to the Editor. Advertisement enquiries concerning space
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**UNITED
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science and literature
of National Security
in general and of the
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EDITORIAL

Changing Maritime Security Environment

Admiral J G Nadkarni, former Chief of the Naval Staff and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, in his inaugural address in a USI Seminar on "Foreign and Defence Policies for India in the 1990s", held early this year, had suggested that instead of building our defence capability on the expected threat, we should take a long-term view over a period of 15-20 years, on the basis of "Strategic Environment Assessment". In this context, he proposed enhancement of our military power in the Indian Ocean to ensure security of our maritime interests.

In the same Seminar, Mr Eric Gonsalves, a former Secretary in the External Affairs Ministry, said that the strategic location and the size of the country made it India's obligation to shoulder larger responsibilities in the region, particularly since the superpowers had been marginalised.

Now, with the recent crisis in West Asia caused by Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and the build-up of US and allied naval forces in the Persian Gulf, the security of Indian maritime interests as well as those of other states in the region has suffered a set back. The stoppage of free flow of Gulf oil to the developing countries of the region had a critical impact on the economies of these countries.

The question that arises is : Can India safeguard its own sea-borne trade and control the seas around it to ensure free transit to merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean? Further, can India shoulder the responsibility in the region arising out of its size and strategic location? If the answer to these questions is in the negative, which it must be, then the proposal of the former Naval Chief for strengthening our military capability in the Ocean needs urgent consideration.

In this process of thinking about maritime force build up, the roles of the Navy, Air Force and Army must be clearly defined based on cost-effective performance. In addition, the Naval Force Structure would, perhaps, need a closer examination to ensure maximum maritime security at reasonable costs. This is desirable in the context of our critical economic situation.

The National Security Council, established early this year, could be tasked to undertake a comprehensive review of our maritime security in the changing strategic environment world-wide, and particularly, in the sub-regional context, which includes the Gulf and West Asia.

And finally, to all our readers, a very happy new year.

Maritime Security of India

PROF KR SINGH*

India has been subjected to geopolitical pressures both from the land and from the sea. During the ancient and the medieval times, India was invaded from the land, mainly from the north-west. During that period, India's maritime frontiers were secure despite competing powers in the region. Moreover, India's cultural and commercial relations with its maritime neighbours flourished during that period. It was after the sixteenth century that India was seriously threatened from the seas. One reason was that the once strong coastal states of India like the Cholas had declined in their power and the emerging major power, the Mughal Empire, was either unable or most likely unwilling to develop a maritime strategy. It cannot be said that India lacked at that time either heavy ships, guns or the art of seamanship. The politico-military will to combine them to evolve a strong maritime policy was lacking, mostly due to the land-ward orientation of these rulers.

India had to pay a heavy price for the lack of maritime strategy of the Mughal Empire. It not only lost its economic and cultural links with the neighbours but the induction of competing European Powers in the region introduced the new phase of maritime colonialism in the Indian Ocean region. Conquest of India by European maritime Powers had its long-term impact upon the rest of the littoral of the Indian Ocean as well, as was demonstrated by the rapid colonization of these areas by them during the subsequent period.

The twentieth century witnessed a nationalist upsurge in the region. The independence movement in India was also a part of the general process of decolonization. Today, almost all the territory in the Indian Ocean region has been decolonized except a few islands in the Indian Ocean. However, while there is political decolonization, the region is still not free either from the economic clutches of the North nor from the direct and indirect fallout of Great Power rivalry at the global and the regional level. While traditional colonial Powers like Britain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands have faded away, new Powers have replaced them. They have their own military, political and economic stakes in the region. They have developed new sets of linkages with regional powers

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which have heightened regional tensions and generated new sets of threat perceptions.

Unlike the past, when India was threatened either from the land or from the sea, in the post-colonial period, not only is India's land frontier threatened both from the North and the West, but its sea frontier is also not safe. In the past, the threat was either from the land or from the sea. Today, it is a combination of both. Pakistan poses a threat not only from the land but also from the sea. Also, Indian strategic analysts are assessing Chinese threat not only from Tibet but also from the Indian Ocean. Another factor that needs to be noted in this context is that, unlike the past, India today is threatened by a combination of regional and extra-regional powers. These new variables pose an obvious challenge to India's national security that needs a careful and realistic assessment.

Today, Indian threat perception has to take into account challenges from land and from the sea posed by regional powers like Pakistan and China as well as pressures generated by the Great Powers operating in the Indian Ocean. In the light of the above threat assessment, India will need to prepare appropriate or optimum counter-measures not only for any likely land-air but also sea-air confrontation. India, for obvious reasons, gave primacy to meeting the land -air challenges *vis-a-vis* Pakistan and China. It was only subsequently that it could direct more attention towards meeting the maritime challenges.

It would be wrong to suggest that India had no Navy since its independence though its military responses were largely land-oriented *vis-a-vis* Pakistan and China. However, India's threat perception since the mid-sixties took into account not only the Indo-Pakistani naval equation but also the likelihood of China and USA helping Pakistan. Occasionally, it had also to assess the possibility of other regional powers like Indonesia in the sixties and Iran in the seventies as the likely allies of Pakistan.

These multiple challenges to India's maritime security were difficult to assess accurately and gave rise to controversy about the optimum maritime threat to India and India's responses over the years. This has become more vocal now when India's naval capability has appreciated due to long-overdue modernization programme and whose 'legitimacy' is being questioned not only by foreign scholars but also by some experts in India itself¹.

It has to be understood that Great Powers tend to look at regional powers in the larger framework of their global strategy. In that context, one has to look at the statement of Mr. Jim Kolbe, the US Republican

Congressmen, who, in his statement in Manila, said that China and India were potential threats to trading lanes in Asia.² The U.S.A. is searching for excuses to prolong its naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Now that the new detente has reduced the level of Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean or in South China Sea, the USA will have to search for fresh 'threats' to rationalize its pressure in the area.

Australians have also been 'concerned' about the possible threat from India's naval modernization.³ One can understand the Australians echoing US threat perception because of their ANZUS connections. What should be disturbing from India's point of view is the perception of responsible statesmen of the ASEAN who have also chosen to be the relay station of anti India propaganda from some quarters. It is doubtful if they had checked their 'facts' with their Indian counterparts before launching an anti-India tirade. The First Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Goh Chok Tong, who is also the Defence Minister, in his speech on 25 February 1990, said that India not only wanted to be a regional power but also wanted to project its power upto Fiji so as to 'protect' people of Indian origin.⁴

In view of these perceptions not only of India's naval capability but also of its alleged intentions, it is important to objectively analyse the evolution of India's naval capability over the years in the light of developments in the immediate neighbourhood in South Asia *per se* as also in China, South-East Asia, South-West Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Indian Navy did not grow as a major fighting arm under the British even during the Second World War. That reflected in the slow growth of the Navy after India's independence. Thus, by 1951-52, major fighting vessels of the Indian Navy were one light cruiser, three destroyers, five frigates and a few minesweepers.⁵ All of them were either WW II or even of pre-WW II period. Thus, India was faced not only with the question of acquiring adequate number of warships but also with the problem of modernization. It was a slow process. By 1965-66, the fighting arm of the Indian Navy comprised of one small escort aircraft carrier, basically a sea-control ship, of 16,000 tons, two light cruisers, three destroyers, thirteen frigates and a few mine-sweepers. At that time India was faced with tremendous odds.

During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, India had to confront Pakistani Navy directly and the Iranian and the Indonesian Navies indirectly. Pakistani Navy was active during the War. Reportedly, the Shah of Iran had also despatched two warships to help Pakistan during the conflict. Indonesia too sent some warships to Pakistan after the War.

President Sukarno not only promised full support to Pakistan but also took the opportunity to stake claims to some Indian islands in the Nicobar group in the Bay of Bengal. Indonesia, thanks to large-scale arms transfer from the USSR, was the strongest regional naval power at that time. Also, it had close ties with China whose large submarine fleet and naval-air arm posed a potential threat to India's maritime security after the 1962 War. Indian naval capability at that time was totally inadequate even to defend the vast and divided coastline of the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. These perceived challenges from regional powers, the need to overcome the bloc obsolescence of weapon system, growing British disengagement from the mainland of Asia as reflected in the formation of the British Indian Ocean Territory, and the growing Super Power Presence in the Indian Ocean shaped the Indian naval strategy after 1965.

India was passing through an interesting phase between 1962-65. The Sino-Indian conflict had brought India closer to the West. India had even sought air support from USA and UK as seen from the combined air exercise 'Operation Siksha' and the presence of American aircraft carrier in the Bay of Bengal. In 1964, Nehru had even rebuffed some MPs who had suggested that India should lodge a protest against the despatch of the US task force to the Indian Ocean. But this honeymoon was short-lived. While the US interest in India declined, its interest in Pakistan survived as seen from the transfer of one submarine and four ASW aircraft in 1964.

By 1964, the British had also begun to lose interest in the Indian Ocean. It had a profound impact upon India's naval procurement policy. Till then UK was the main supplier for the Indian Navy. But the break came after 1964-65. It was symbolized by the British refusal to transfer the *Oberon*-class submarines to India. Transfer of US submarine to Pakistan, of Soviet submarines to Indonesia and the strong submarine arm with China left India with no option but to acquire the submarines and other vessels from the only source available at that time. That marked the beginning of naval arms transfer between India and the Soviet Union. The result was reflected in the 1971 War.

In 1971, unlike 1965, Indonesia, under the new leadership, had kept itself out of the conflict. Even Iran, despite its close contacts with Pakistan and a better naval capability than in 1965, did not participate directly in the conflict. Pakistan was left alone to confront India. There is no doubt that India had an edge over Pakistan and the Indian Navy played a useful role in blockading and in naval attacks not only in the Bay of Bengal but also in the Arabian Sea. The three *Daphne*-class French submarines were the only effective modern weapons with Pakistan and one of them

sunk the *Khukri*, a small anti-submarine frigate, in the Arabian Sea.

While the Indian Navy scored a clear victory over the Pakistani Navy in 1971, it was about to face a serious challenge when the US task force, led by the *USS Enterprise*, was sent to the Bay of Bengal where the small aircraft carrier, *INS Vikrant*, was also operating. Before the task force could approach the Bangladeshi waters, Dhaka had fallen. Hence the *Enterprise* sailed off to the Arabian Sea to claim subsequently that the US naval presence was responsible for the cease-fire on the Western front. It was a surprising claim because India had already declared a unilateral cease-fire in that sector while the US task force was still in the Bay of Bengal.

Though these tall claims were factually incorrect, the despatch of the *Enterprise* against the Indian Navy meant that India could not rule out the possibility of naval confrontation with a Great Power in future.⁶ It should be understood that Indian experience also coincided with the debate in the UN General Assembly on the question of declaring Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, which the US opposed. These developments projected a threat totally different from the scenario of 1965.

India, after about four centuries, had to think of the possibility of a direct maritime confrontation with a major extra-regional naval power on the high seas. It was a major challenge for which it was not prepared militarily. However, it had to evolve a weapons-mix that would not only ensure it a capability *vis-a-vis* regional powers like Pakistan and Iran but also provide an adequate deterrence and a sea-denial capability against a major naval power on the high seas in the Indian Ocean. That meant acquiring modern submarines, sea and air-launched anti-ship missiles along with a reasonable land-based MR/ASW capability. India's arms acquisition programme during the subsequent period points to that mix.

In the eighties, India's naval planners had to take stock of a new situation arising out of the events of 1978-79. They were the emergence of the new Cold War and the consequent break in the US-USSR talks on naval arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, the Carter Doctrine and finally the Iraq-Iran War. These developments not only provided the rationale for the RDF/CENTCOM strategy but also enabled the Western Powers, especially the USA, to develop close politico-military rapport with the non-Persian littoral of the North-Western corner of the Indian Ocean extending from Pakistan to Kenya. In that context, port and other facilities not only of Pakistan but also of Sri Lanka became relevant for the US strategy in the Indian Ocean. That perception coloured Indian views on the developments in Sri Lanka especially relating to the upgrading of the

VOA station and the oil tank farm deal in Trincomalee. Indirectly, it also affected Indo-Sri Lankan relations on the Tamil question.

The renewed US strategic interest in Pakistan, not only in the context of Afghanistan but also in the context of the Gulf, was reflected in the pattern of US arms transfer to Pakistan after 1978. It will be useful to note in this context that since 1978 while the US arms transfer to Pakistan only helped to qualitatively improve Pakistan's land-air capability, US help became the basis of Pakistan's naval resurgence, especially in terms of heavy surface vessels. Pakistan was given six *Gearing*-class destroyers, armed with *ASROC* anti-submarine rockets and *Harpoon* anti-ship missiles. Subsequently Pakistan was given eight *Brooke Garcia*-class frigates with ASW helicopters. There are reports that Pakistan will be receiving three long-range MR/ASW *Orion* aircraft which can also be armed with the *Harpoon* ASM. There are reports that these anti-ship missiles can also be fired from the 21" torpedo tubes of the *Agosta*-class submarines with Pakistan.

The last decade saw a modernization and expansion of Indian naval capability. According to the *Military Balance* and *Jane's Fighting Ships*, India possesses two small aircraft carriers (only one of them being in active operation) one nuclear-powered patrol submarine on loan (for three years) from the USSR, sixteen diesel-powered submarines, five destroyers, nineteen frigates, eight corvettes, twelve missile boats, seventeen small and medium amphibious ships and a large number of minesweepers. Its naval-air arm comprises of ten *Sea Harrier* attack aircraft. Its MR/ASW fleet comprises of five *Tu-142 M*, three *Il-38* and four *Alize* fixed wing aircraft as well as twenty-six *Sea King* and twenty three *Ka 25/27* helicopters.

While these numbers look impressive on paper they are inadequate to cover the responsibility of India's three distinct maritime sectors ; the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, especially when one takes into account the compartmentalized character of the Indian coastline and the island chains in these sectors. These islands are far away from the mainland and cannot be easily protected from the coast.

India, during the last two decades, has also given a new thrust towards self-sufficiency to the Indian naval capability. Not only can India manufacture the light force like patrol craft but has graduated into building corvettes (800 - 1200 tons) and frigates (1200-3000 tons). It is planning to build destroyers (4000 - 5000 tons) and probably submarines and light aircraft carriers in future. India has already assembled German submarines. Thus, over the years, due to the conscious policy of encouraging indigenous production, despite its cost, India has succeeded not only in reducing its dependence upon its traditional sources like

Britain and USSR but also paved the way for eventual self-sufficiency. India is one of the few developing countries to succeed in achieving that level of technological capacity, that will have its deep impact upon the evolution of Indian maritime strategy in the years to come.

Given the present momentum and modernization efforts, there is no doubt that the Indian Navy will witness some improvements both in quality and quantity in the years to come. It is also possible that some relatively old and obsolete vessels like the F-Class submarines and old frigates might be deleted or placed in storage. Hence, the modernization programme will not mean a great addition to the naval strength. It is anticipated that by 2000 AD Indian Navy would wish to operate two aircraft carriers or small sea-control ships, upto three nuclear-powered attack submarines (though that seems to be difficult with the new changes in the Soviet Policy), 14-18 conventional submarines, 6 destroyers, 16 frigates and 16 corvettes. It is possible that small missile boats might be phased out or kept in reserve because of their serious operational limitations during the *Monsoon* conditions. The amphibious force and mine-sweepers might see only a marginal increase. The naval-air arm will necessarily see a growth with more *Sea Harriers* inducted to provide full strength of aircraft to both the aircraft carriers simultaneously. It is also possible that MR/ASW capability, both long-range and intermediate range, will be improved and some fixed-wing aircraft with limited AWACS capability might be added. India has made sufficient progress in off-shore oil and gas production as seen from Table 1. Moreover, the coast has vital strategic targets like oil refineries and nuclear installations. The AWACS, even with limited capability, will provide adequate surveillance and warning against attacks launched across the sea, either by surface vessel or by aircraft, against these strategic targets.

Table 1
India, Oil and Natural Gas⁷

Domestic Crude Oil Production (mn tons)	1970-71	1980-81	1985-86	1987-88
Total	6.8	10.5	30.15	30.4
On Shore	6.8	5.5	9.35	10.2
Off Shore	-	5.0	20.8	20.2
Import of Crude	10.7	16.2	15.1	18.0
of products	0.8	7.3	1.9	0.5
Natural Gas production (domestic)	-	-	8.13	11.47

Often, the study of maritime policy is confined to that of naval strategy without taking into account the developmental aspect of that policy in its wider framework. That might be one reason why Indian scholars, by and large, have yet to conceive of a comprehensive maritime strategy commensurate with its national requirements. It is ignored that India is a maritime nation. While its trade with immediate 'land' neighbours is negligible and almost static, its overseas trade has been expanding at a fast pace as seen from the *table 2*. Growing foreign trade, which is mostly sea-borne, needs a comparable growth in port facilities and indigenous shipping facilities. In 1987-88, nine major ports of India alone handled about 133.8 mn tons of Cargo. Indian Overseas shipping has also shown a rapid growth and today accounts for about 800 vessels of 6.16 mn tons. Of that the share of the Shipping Corporation of India in 1985 was 146 vessels of 5.356 mn tons. More ships are being acquired.

Table 2

India's Trade (Rs. billion)*

	1970-71	1975-76	1980-81	1985-86	1987-88
Imports	16.34	52.64	125.5	196.58	223.99
Exports	15.35	40.36	67.1	108.94	157.41
Total	31.69	93.00	192.6	305.52	381.40

The newly acquired rights under the UNCLOS III (United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea III), have given to the coastal states new rights to exploit living and non-living resources in their exclusive economic zone and the continental-shelf. That means that more maritime resources like fishing and off-shore oil/gas, can be exploited for developmental purposes. Moreover, these resources have also to be protected. The Coast Guard, raised in 1978, is a new para-military force designed to protect maritime interests in peace time. In times of war it will play a useful supportive role for the Navy. Today according to *Jane's Fighting ships, 1989-90*, the Indian Coast Guard operates approximately 7 (+1) large off-shore patrol vessels, 14(+2) large and 8(+12) small in-shore patrol craft, besides 5 MR fixed wing aircraft and 6 *Chetak* helicopters. The Coast Guard has also a plan for its expansion and modernisation, keeping in view the newly acquired responsibilities.

India's growing maritime capability, which is but a reflection of its growing maritime awareness, has caused a few eye-brow. to be raised. There is no doubt that India is probably the only littoral state in the Indian Ocean which not only commands a geo-strategic position in the area but also has the capability as well as the intention of developing as

a major maritime power in the years to come.

If India had developed as an appendage of the 'recognized' maritime powers, Indian efforts would have been tailored so as to dovetail with their policies in the region. But it is not so. Hence, it is not the naval build-up *per se* but the autonomy of Indian maritime policy, in keeping with its policy of non-alignment, as well as the growing naval capability to buttress that autonomy of having policy options different from those of the Great Powers, that has caused concern, especially among the Western Powers.

These powers fear, and probably with some justification, that the events of December 1971, when the task-force led by the *USS Enterprise* was sent to intimidate India, can no longer be repeated with impunity. The submarine arm, especially the nuclear-powered patrol submarine, has made the 'Enterprise policy' non-viable *vis-a-vis* India. Great Powers naturally do not seem to appreciate the fact that, for the first time since the Portuguese arrived in the Indian Ocean, a regional power is seeking to develop a capability to deny them the blue waters in the event of a confrontation.

That should not bother India. It is a logical continuation of the long-drawn process of decolonisation. Right to feel militarily secure is as important a part of that process as the political or economic freedom. What should worry India is the opposition to India's maritime strategy among the littoral states, especially in South-East Asia and Australia.

Australia is a part of the Western Bloc and closely linked politically and militarily to the USA through the ANZUS Pact. Thus, it is understandable that Australia should feel concerned about the growing autonomy of operation of India and the reach of its weapon systems in the Indian Ocean. However, while Australia can very well criticize the Indian naval 'expansion', it should be noted that it has developed, in cooperation with the USA, and UK a formidable combination of naval and air-power that is capable of denying the sea to hostile powers upto a distance of at least five hundred miles, if not more, from its coast. Australian defence perimeter in the Indian Ocean also includes some ASEAN states as well because of close political and military linkages between them.

Australia's naval-air capability comprises of a combination of sub-surface, and surface vessels and aircraft, most of them armed with long-range *Harpoon* antiship missiles. According to the data provided by the *Jane's Fighting Ships* and the *Military Balance*, Australia operates six submarines capable of launching *Harpoon* from the torpedo tubes. Though

its major surface fleet consists of only three destroyers and nine frigates, its main sea-denial capability is based upon long-range MR and strike aircraft armed with the air-launch version of *Harpoon* missile. Australia has 15 *F-111* bombers and 57 *F-18* fighter-bombers, each capable of carrying four *Harpoons*. It has 20 *Orion* MR/ASW aircraft which can also be fitted with that missile. Moreover, Australia has access to the data on the Indian Ocean that is generated by the US satellites. One wonders what the Australians or their supporters in South-East Asia would have said if the sea-denial capabilities of India and Australia would have been reversed.

As mentioned earlier, India should be seriously concerned with the perceptions of its neighbours in South-East Asia, especially those which are the littoral states of the Bay of Bengal. It is necessary to explain to them the rationale of India's maritime strategy and also to convince them that India's naval development is not directed against them both in capability and intention.

India has very friendly relations with these states. There are no points of friction. Even the controversial question of delimitation of maritime boundaries has been peacefully settled thereby removing the earlier irritants of claims and counter-claims over some islands in the Bay of Bengal. Thus, India has no hostile intentions against them. Rather, a friendly and strong India would mean a secure flank for the ASEAN and *vice-versa*. If history offers any lesson, it is that a weak India enabled European colonialism to infiltrate into South-East Asia via the Indian Ocean. That lesson is valid even today.

Not only has India no hostile intention⁹ it does not even have the capability to harm these states militarily. Many critics of India have voiced concern about India's force projection capability and have given the examples of Sri Lanka and the Maldives operations to prove their point. This is not the occasion to debate the legality or otherwise of Indian action except to point out that Indian forces were sent to both these countries, on the express request of the legally constituted governments of those states to help them solve grave domestic crises. Indian forces were retained by the Maldivian Government for some more time. Though the IPKF got entangled in the Tamil-Sinhala conflict, it must be noted that the IPKF had never fought against the forces of Sri Lankan Government. On the other hand, both the Governments had sought to resolve the broader issues through political process. It should also be noted that neither of the two operations were real amphibious military operations against determined opposition.

India does not possess a really credible capability to intervene across

the high seas against properly defended targets. India's naval force projection capability in support of amphibious operations, beyond the reach of its land-based fighter-bombers, comprises of two small aircraft carriers for direct air support (of which only one is operational with reduced strength of *Sea Harrier* attack aircraft), five modern destroyers and about nine modern frigates capable of long-range operations, plus ten medium tank landing craft and seven small landing craft utility. It has a small Marine force of one battalion. If India can pose an interventionist threat to the ASEAN states with these limited forces, they must indeed be very small powers, which they are not. Thus, India has neither the intention, nor the capability to project its power in South-East Asia despite the adverse propaganda to that effect from some quarters.

In fact, it is not India but China that poses that type of threat. It is the dominant naval power of the region. According to the estimates in the *Jane's Fighting Ships* and the *Military Balance*, China possesses more than three nuclear-powered submarines (more are being built), 86 diesel powered submarines, 18 destroyers and 35 frigates. It has 9 troop ships, 16 tank landing ships, 52 tank landing craft, 20 hover-craft and more than 420 landing craft utility. Its naval-air arm consists of 165 light and medium bombers and 100 fighter bombers. Besides, it has a large Marine force. Thus, China has a massive force projection capability for amphibious operations, especially in the adjoining area in South China Sea.

Beside the military potential, China has also pursued an aggressive diplomacy in South-East Asia. Not only does it claim large parts of that area but has also offered support to several local-pro-Peking communist parties, including the Pol Pot faction of Cambodia, which has such a bad record of human right violation. China also claims large areas in south China Sea and has not hesitated to occupy by force islands that were claimed by some South-East Asian States. China has not only the capability but also the motive to pursue a 'dominant power' role in the region. Thus, one wonders whether the Indian naval programme, modest not only in comparison to that of China but also in relation to its needs, is a real threat to the ASEAN or only a red herring to hide the real intentions of other interested parties.

Today, we are on a new threshold of international politics due to rapid and far-reaching changes at the global level. They command an appropriate regional response. The old concept of Peace Zone in the Indian Ocean, which basically reflected the concern during 1960's and 1970's of the non-aligned states towards the growing Super Power rivalry in the region, is also gradually losing its earlier relevance. The new detente between the USA and USSR and also between China and the USSR, as well as the gradual replacement of SLBMs of IRBM range with

those of ICBM range have reduced the importance of the Indian Ocean in the global strategy of the super powers.

It the context of the regional strategy of these powers, events like Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, end of the Iraq-Iran War and signs of the final solution of the Cambodian conflict have had profound impact upon the power equations in the region. Moreover, most of the littoral states that had once opted for the concept of the peace zone have now shown a marked preference for the USA. Many of them have even provided bases and base facilities to the USA to further its RDF/CENTCOM strategy. Moreover, the USA has virtually rejected the peace zone concept as reflected in the UN Resolutions on that subject. Thus, politically, the concept is virtually dead.

There is, therefore, the need to search for an alternate policy. That policy needs to be based upon the concept of regional cooperation for development. Earlier, efforts were more 'anti' or 'non' denoting a negative approach. That needs to be replaced by a more positive and constructive approach based upon enhanced cooperation among the Indian Ocean States in the context of the developmental strategy. India, even with her limited experience and resources, can contribute substantially in that direction.

NOTES

1. For views of some of the Indian critics of naval expansion : see Dilip Mukherjee, "Exaggerating Navy's clout : self-serving US charge", *Times of India* (New Delhi), 25 April 1987, Brig. N.B. Grant, "Does India need more aircraft carriers", *Indian Express* (New Delhi), 12 December 1986, and "Navy's blue water obsessions", *USI Journal*, July-September 1989, pp. 269-74, and Amar Zutshi, "Defence at Sea : the case against aircraft carriers", *The Statesman* (New Delhi), 14 January 1986.
2. *Times of India* (New Delhi), 22 January 1990. For Western perspectives see also Gregory Copley, "Inevitable India, inevitable power", *Defence and Foreign Affairs*, December 1988, pp. 9, 28 and T.R. Ford, "Indian Ocean demands more attention", *Pacific Defence Reporter*, November 1988, reproduced in *Strategic Digest* (New Delhi), 20 (2), February 1990, pp. 1942-46.
3. For Australian critic of Indian Navy see Brian Cloughley, "And whose 'zone of peace' is it going to be anyway?", *Far Eastern Economic Survey* (Hongkong), 7 April 1988, pp. 25 6.
4. *Times of India* (New Delhi), 27 February 1990.
5. For details of weapon systems see the volumes of *Janes, Fighting Ships* (London), *Military Balance* (IISS, London), and data generated by the SIPRI (Stockholm).
6. K. Subrahmanyam, *Bangladesh and India's Security*, Palit and Dutt, Dehradun, 1972, p.270
7. *Economic Survey of India, 1988-89*, (New Delhi), S.72, p. 33.
8. *Ibid.* 1986-87, S. 61-63 and 1988-89, S. 72-72.
9. Even those Indian experts on the subject who are considered as 'hawks' have rejected the policy of force projection to occupy another territory. K. Subrahmanyam, "Naval security doctrine for India", *Strategic Analysis* (New Delhi) 12 (II) February 1990, pp. 1144-45.

The Kashmir Imbroglio

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INTRODUCTION

Kashmir is neither a problem nor a challenge, it is only a backlash of a system which has not kept pace with time, resulting in the present chaos. The weaknesses of the system have been further compounded by a few ambitious leaders who by manipulation and machination created schisms in the public mind so that they could rule the masses effortlessly by intrigues, divide, false promises, power brokers, religion and money-power rather than by logic, commonsense, equality, sincerity and dedication to the people to whom the nation belongs.

It is this old hackneyed system left by the colonial rulers that still continues to differentiate between an Indian and an Indian, whether a Kashmiri or a Bengali or a Tamilian. In short, they are all Indians first, hence all must be treated alike and governed alike. "If a person living in Srinagar can purchase land in Bangalore, why should not someone living outside the state of Jammu and Kashmir be able to buy it in Srinagar? And if one cannot buy it because of Article 370 of the Constitution, it should be scrapped", says K Rajalakshmi from Durban, US (India Today April 15, 1990). The alienation of the Kashmiri people if at all there is any, is it from the Government or the rest of the people in India or are they annoyed with misrule? This aspect requires a deep analysis, so as to draw the right conclusions. Therefore, one has to study the facts of the case first and then the background and finally the recent situation in the correct perspective before drawing any deductions which will axiomatically bring forward the right conclusions for which a remedy then can be found.

FACTS

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL ASPECTS

The J & K State was like any other state in British India, then ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh, father of Mr Karan Singh, India's previous Ambassador to the USA.

On the eve of Independence in 1947 all such states became free from the bondage of British India, but were requested to join any of the two

sovereign nations created by British diplomacy into India and Pakistan. The guidelines being :-

- (a) contiguity to either of the two new nations;
- (b) the decision of the Ruler keeping the wishes of the people in view.

All other rulers decided one way or the other, but Kashmir vacillated and dreamt of remaining independent.

This did not fit into the British strategic plans, as such they fired the gun from Pakistani shoulders. Hordes of Pakistanis supported by the Pakistani regular army attacked Kashmir.

The people of Kashmir and the Maharaja asked for Indian help. The help was provided, but only after the instrument of accession was signed. By then the Pakistanis were only a few miles short of Srinagar.

Jammu and Kashmir (in short J & K) became an integral part of India on signing the instrument of accession. The accession of the state to India is constitutionally total and complete. This is manifest in Article 1 and the first schedule which lists the territories of India and their extent. There is nothing here to differentiate J & K from Uttar Pradesh or Madhya Pradesh. Kashmir's accession to India was unconditional and in the form and manner prescribed for accession of Indian princely states when British imperial power withdrew from the sub continent. The legality of its accession is unquestionable and that is what made Pakistan attack on Kashmir an act of aggression against India and formed the basis for India's complaint to the UNO. At no time did the UN question the status of Kashmir as an integral part of India or India's right to defend it.

CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECT

The princely states including Kashmir enjoyed the same right in principle to negotiate the limits of extension of the Indian Constitution to their states over and beyond the three subjects spelt out in the instrument of accession.

In all other cases, these princely states, after accession participated in the Constituent Assembly and subsequently adopted the Indian Constitution. This procedure was not applied to J & K because of the peculiar prevailing circumstances at that point of time. However J & K confirmed its accession irrevocably through the Constitution of the State, framed and passed by the representatives of its own people as far back as 1956. The initiative for this historic event came from the Kashmiris themselves. This negates the need for even raising the question of a plebiscite.

PARAMETERS FOR PLEBISCITE

The UN decision specifically recognised that the precondition for restoration of peace was for Pakistan to first withdraw its troops and tribesmen from Kashmir. But Pakistan refused to do so and regrettably the UN proved unable to secure its withdrawal which was the original purpose of India's appeal. Krishna Menon as far back as 1957 had informed the UN Security Council that due to the change in circumstances India's agreement to a plebiscite was no longer valid. And the UN representative Gunnar Jarring referred to the plebiscite agreement as "an ad hoc agreement" to meet the then prevailing circumstances and that it had already passed the point of diminishing returns.

THE CLAIM TO PAKISTAN OCCUPIED KASHMIR AND SIMLA AGREEMENT

India's legal right to the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir continues to exist. According to international law "dereliction of territory as a mode of losing it, corresponds to occupation of territory as a mode of acquiring it". India cannot abandon its legal claim to PAK occupied Kashmir. Without prejudice to its legal rights India signed the Simla Agreement on July 3, 1972. The Simla Agreement places on record and highlights the existence of a dispute arising solely from the illegal occupation of J & K territory by Pakistan. The Agreement states that at a mutually convenient time India and Pakistan will meet "to discuss the question of a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir". India showed its desire to resolve this through bilateral and peaceful means, rather than through a unilateral forceful physical action, considering the three fruitless bitter wars. Further the description of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the clauses attached with it more or less make it appear like the defacto international boundary till the dispute is finally settled.

BACKGROUND

DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS

At the time of acceding to the Indian Union every one regarded it as another instance of the process of integration of the princely states. However as the situation stabilised and the world saw the beauty of Kashmir Vale and its potential in the international arena, the Sheikh who by now became all powerful due to Nehru's idealism and the Indian Union's mishandling of the situation, that divergent perceptions started creeping in Srinagar and Delhi over Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union. However it must be clearly understood that the instrument of accession is not a treaty or an agreement,

but an instrument by which the signatory states extinguish themselves and merge their identities with that of rest of India. However some vested interests never allowed the merger of identities, which suited the Sheikh's ego and in the long run assist him in perpetuating the dynastic rule to spite the ex Maharaja and his son, who was the "Sadre Rysat". This also fitted in the American and British diplomatic and strategic policy and plans.

THE KASHMIRI BIAS

Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and the Delhi Agreement between Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah in July 1952 eventually formalised the State's constitutional relations with the Centre. This again was possible only due to Nehru's soft corner for the Kashmiris rather than seeing India's national interest as a whole. It was Nehru's idealism, his human nature and his high moral values, that always took the better of him even while making important decisions in state matters. The bureaucrats working under Nehru held him in so high an esteem that they did not at times question his decisions or gave him correct information and advice in their humility and humbleness or may be psychophancy.

APPEASEMENT THROUGH AID

Without development and without aid the Kashmiri leadership was finding it difficult to hold on to its power and source of money. India was willing to provide aid, but constitutionally it was a dilemma. They wanted to have the cake and eat it too. The answer was found by the Kashmir Government itself in diluting the autonomy by making provision for the input of funds from the Centre for the execution of various economic projects.

These included –

- (a) Hydro electric power stations at Lower Jhelum, Upper Sind, Lower Sind and Bulbasti.
- (b) Thermal power station at Salal.
- (c) Road connecting Kishtwar through the Sinthan Pass at a height of 2743 metres above sea level.
- (d) Construction of railway line from Pathankot to Jammu and its subsequent extension to Udhampur.
- (e) HMT factory.
- (f) Telephone industries.
- (g) Improving the airport to international standards.

While on the other hand there has been no adequate reimbursement to the Central Exchequer by way of income tax and excise duty. The constitutional approach in allotting grants to the state has all along been exceptional, purely for the simple reason that the bureaucrats and the politicians had an obsession that appeasement and money will buy the Kashmiris. They did not realise that Kashmiris are just as much materialistic and self serving as any other group in India. They want to have the best of both the worlds whether they get it through "azadi" or by black mailing both India and Pakistan about their accession and the demand of a plebiscite.

THE EMOTIONAL RUPTURE

Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal from power and indefinite detention in August 1953 was one of the causes of the first emotional rupture between Kashmiri and Indian nationalism, or may be Kashmiri regionalism and Indian nationalism to be more appropriate.

In order to clear the definitional haze, between nationalism and regionalism one must understand the difference between nationality and community. Any political movement that seeks a reform of state structure i.e. more autonomy and power for itself then it should be considered as "regionalism" since it is an expression of the will of a "community", rather than a "nationality". In the initial stages it is difficult to distinguish qualitatively whether the movement is for greater autonomy due to maladministration or it is one of those numerous, ethnic, linguistic, tribal movements from that of political independence. However, such movements when not taken note of in time and remedial measures delayed due to lack of decision making processes or vested interest may well become movements for political independence/secession, making use of terrorism and insurgency. For this the onus entirely lie with the Government in power.

THE SERMON AND ITS PRACTICE

Empirical evidence has shown that whenever there is a secular opposition party in a state it provides an outlet to popular discontent without recourse to insurgency and physical upheaval. In the absence of such a party discontent is forced to seek a secessionist/insurgent outlet. The poor system of administration further compounds the issue. However the Kashmir policy of India worked on a theory that all secular and pro India forces should unite under one party to fight communal and anti India forces.

Before 1986 accord, the Congress was the principal channel of discontent against the state government while the National Conference channelised

discontent against the Centre. When the two parties formed a coalition Government, both the types of discontent were directed to communal and secessionist outlets due to maladministration. The lack of a democratic tradition, civil liberties and free elections, further forced the popular discontent to such outlets outside the Indian system.

The strategic mistake was made when the Congress (I) Government sought to institutionalise Congress support in Jammu in the early eighties along communal lines pushing the National Conference to the wall to be the same in the Valley. The National Conference therefore compounded the problem through political deceptions and mismanagement. The consequences of such political blindness are now clear. The present Government is left with no other choice but to hold Kashmir within the Union at all cost.

The unitary constitution that the Constituent Assembly of the State adopted in 1956 had "built-in" provisions for dealing with inter-regional tensions but these were never utilised. Therefore until Jammu, Kashmir and other constituents of J & K State draw closer, settle their differences and agree to operate as equal partners, there will never be a stable basis upon which relations with the Centre can be satisfactorily settled. In short the thumb rule is autonomy of the state within India and autonomy of the regions within the state.

It was this principle that was supposed to have been followed, when accord was reached between Abdullah and the Prime Minister of India in 1975. But Abdullah did not honour his part of the agreement regarding regional autonomy. In this he was encouraged by the Congress and the Jan Sangh. The State thus continued to be governed by a unitary constitution which continued to generate regional tensions and by implication centre-state tensions. Therefore one should stop having double standards in making national policies. One should preach only what one can practice.

GEO POLITICAL SITUATION

With the USSR less and less a super power strategic adversary in South and West Asia, Pakistan's strategic importance for the global US perspectives diminishes, albeit the temporary importance of Pakistan to Kuwaiti crisis cannot be completely ignored, and one indication of such revaluation was surely the recent public stance by Washington on Kashmir. Similarly Sino US entente is likely to develop a newer rationale which has more to do with preventing a future Sino-Japanese tie up than with containment of a USSR beset with enormous internal problems. The importance of the US-China-Pakistan axis fades correspondingly. In the specifically South Asian context the Sino Indian

enmity is unlikely to be as enduring in the future as it has been in the past. This may alter India's deployment of troops in Kashmir itself, thus creating a deterrent for Pakistan. Besides none of the super powers including China would want Muslim fundamentalism to grow on their borders. The present Iraqi - Kuwait crises in the Middle East may further relegate the importance of Pakistan to the Kashmiris.

VIEWS OF INDIAN MUSLIMS ON KASHMIR

Approach to the Kashmir question should be as an Indian and not as a Muslim, says Arif Mohd Khan. Violence and threats have been used to terrorise Kashmiris into submission. As the militant gained control and the Government writ receded due to maladministration, anti India elements got a free run of the Valley with the result that communalism is being injected to make the situation more tense, more explosive, to make it more intractable to an amicable solution.

Kashmir has a strong sufi tradition. This tradition does not teach exclusiveness in religion. Sufi Shrines are open to every one. A good number of these terrorists cannot speak Kashmiri language. But the common man in the Valley due to fear and lack of Government support dare not challenge the intruders and the militants and submit to their views and actions.

Syed Shahabudin feels it is an ethnic upsurge that you see the world over. That every self conscious, self defined group of people want to establish their identity, want to have some measure of autonomy. Autonomy exists, but the people do not perceive or feel it due to bad administration and mismanagement by the Government in power. Therefore what the Kashmiris want is "azadi" from this misrule. For all this they have to throw up a fresh leader, who can discuss with the Central Government.

He further states that "we as a nation cannot accept self-determination and shall not concede independence to the Valley, but why can't Kashmir enjoy a degree of autonomy which its people can never hope to have in a Muslim Pakistan?" In a Muslim Pakistan they will be absorbed. Their identity and ethnicity will not be respected. It must be noted that a very clear contradiction exists between what the people of the Valley want and what Pakistan wants. Pakistan wants territorial annexation of Kashmir with or without plebiscite. The people of Kashmir want "azadi" which means azadi from corruption, maladministration and centralised system of rule. People want to be real participants in the running of Government. They want peace to pursue their own way of living.

Given the international configuration of forces, independence in Kashmir is an impossible concept, then perhaps through a political dialogue one can set the limits of an agreement. But that calls for statesmanship on both sides. In fact equal autonomy to all states in India including J & K would not isolate any one state. It would on the other hand bring J & K in the mainstream, and possibly end terrorism in Punjab also. A federal structure may possibly bring in more cohesion than the present unitary structure. In fact the founders conceptualised the Constitution as a federal structure but its implementation made it to be more unitary.

Kashmir's tragedy is that when it opted against inclusion with Pakistan it did so to protect its cultural identity. But this was mistakenly seen as an endorsement of assimilation in India, as some Kashmiris stated in anger recently. The submission is that it was correctly seen as an endorsement of yet another culture. Unfortunately the few well to do Kashmiri families took the best and still remained aloof from the mainstream. Majority of the Kashmiri people did not get much in return. In short it was the Kashmiris themselves who let down their own brethren.

The crisis in Kashmir is not the result of impoverishment, unemployment and such things. True they have contributed to the crisis, especially the rampant corruption, encouraged by the large central grants.

A Government facing on the one hand an opposition such as Congress (I) which is using the refrain of a weak government unable to confront separatists and Pakistan and on the other hand dependent for survival on BJP and the Left which always parade their patriotism does not help matters. But generation of war hysteria and shelving of the real issues will create a momentum whose outcome will be worse. This must be understood by all political parties, so that India is not lost due to vested and personal interests.

Politically the Government of India concentrates on populist priorities such as reservation of the SC and the ST with an eye on bringing votes to perpetuate its rule instead of tackling the monstrous problems of poverty, equitable education, modern health care, unemployment, rampant corruption and making speedy and inexpensive justice available to the people. With these blatant shortcomings, anyone will find it impossible to convince an already disgruntled lot of people of Kashmir in the face of insurgent propaganda.

It is worth noting that in many rural areas of Kashmir, people writhe in abject poverty and wretchedness, while the politicians and bureaucracy were busy improving their own lot and not the lot of these downtrodden. This is

true in a large measure in other states as well where, of course, the authority of the state is visible. But in Kashmir the political parties concerned opted out of active politics resulting in non-governance. The neglect of the people thus caused was responsible for alienation among them, which was quite apparent, but neither New Delhi nor Srinagar cared for it.

The almost collapsed administrative structure maintained a pretence of being in command of everything with its indifferent, ill-motivated and ill-equipped police force. Kashmir is a sensitive state over which, everyone knows, Pakistan has a design and it, therefore, demands a strong and efficient administration, but instead as its political history goes from the days of Sheikh Abdullah, it has been a battleground for intrigues and expedient alliances and now it has been reduced to a virtual vacuum so far as its governance is concerned.

Pakistan studied the prevailing situation in Kashmir with interest and took advantage of it. It managed to instigate the youth through the fundamentalist political parties in the Valley, set up training camps for them in POK, equipped them with arms and ammunition for subversive activities in the valley. Thus Kashmir was set on fire. It is the writ of the Kashmiri militants that runs in the Valley. The feeble Government of Kashmir was caught unaware.

The fear psychosis has snowballed. This will take time, as the writ of the Government extends and security to the individuals returns. The Government will have to be clean, innovative, understanding and yet firm. In the bargain people will have to accept innocent casualties as a price for earlier mismanagement and for the return of peace.

The insurgency in Kashmir today has had a setback as of now. How they reorientate their policies and strategy, has still to be seen. However they have an option of playing politics within the constitutional framework. The Government should have their eyes and ears open when such a signal is received. The signal will possibly come from a new young leadership, may be a militant. Even among the militants there are moderates. The Kashmiris must learn from Nagas in this respect. Throw up new leadership and not count on leadership from outside. Similarly Pakistan must also learn that by fomenting or engineering trouble in Kashmir and Punjab, they may weaken India for a while, but through the same process may disintegrate itself if they are unable to meet the aspirations of the Sindhis, Baluchis and the Pathans.

Aasiyeh Andrabi's exhortation to Kashmiri women for "azadi" is basically a fascist Muslim fundamentalism approach. This needs to be countered, since their psyche and their influence can be very dangerous for the future and the present young generation. Fluent in English and Urdu, the

diminutive 27 years old woman, who heads the Dukhtar-e-millat (daughters of the Faith) in Srinagar is extremely knowledgeable on world affairs and there is no moderation in her demand for a separate and independent Kashmir. According to her the JKLF is not serious about Islam and talks of a secular state. This attitude of theirs is considered soft by her. This women leader, must be cultivated intellectually and her energy properly channelised. Alternatively another young lady should be sponsored with similar talent to voice the right ideas and bring out disadvantages of terrorism, fundamentalism giving example of the status of Pakistani women. All kind of media should be utilised, but in a sophisticated manner - a properly motivated women force can be very lethal and at the same time very useful, if correctly used particularly in an insurgency.

VIEW FROM PAKISTAN

Mushahid Hussain feels that the popular uprising in Kashmir presents a situation with unpredictable consequences for the state. It raises the first serious possibility of changing the political status quo in South Asia since the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971.

According to Mushahid Hussain, India annexed the territory together with Jammu - a fact badly mutilated and published in school history books. Pakistan refused to acknowledge the unilateral move and per force had to invade Kashmir. Pakistan has never considered the status of Kashmir to have been settled, notwithstanding the de facto situation.

The uprising in Kashmir is seen in Pakistan from four different perspectives. First, Pakistanis are pleased that unlike 1965, when Pakistan tried and failed to foment an uprising in Kashmir, the current uprising is purely indigenous. (The balloon would have burst by now, if their perception was correct.) Second, Pakistan feels that its case for a plebiscite in Kashmir is legally and morally strong. Third, no government in Pakistan can expect to survive politically if it accepts the de facto situation as being final. The idea of accepting the de facto situation originally came from FM Ayub Khan to Nehru). Neither Government can politically afford to take a "soft-line" on Kashmir at a time when the area is in such turmoil. Finally, the ferment in Kashmir needs to be viewed in the context of the general unrest as is evident in the strategic "Islamic Crescent of Conflict", which begins at Israel and goes through India, from the Palestinian Intifada to the struggle in Lebanon and Afghanistan, the stirrings in Azerbaijan and the uprising in Kashmir - a perception, which the world in general is unlikely to accept. Pakistan is therefore closely coordinating political-military strategy. So that there are no surprises in store for Pakistan on the military front.

There is confidence in Pakistan that in the last few years, the Indian Army has suffered reverses and is to-day stretched thinly all across India. It was badly bruised in Sri Lanka and it has some six divisions tied down on the borders with China and Bangladesh. Therefore Pakistan could take a calculated risk and seize the initiative of attacking India when the law and order problem in J & K and Punjab is really bad. This seems to be a school of thought of some in the Government. The other school of thought believes that Pakistani intelligentsia and the people in general do not have much faith in their own leadership, particularly when they look at the lessons learnt from the Iraq-Iran War. A large number of the Pakistani Army officers also are not in favour of Indo-Pak conflict since the defeat this time may completely demolish the power centre, which the Army has so far been able to achieve.

IMPORTANT OBSERVATIONS

From the above facts and views certain important points come to light as given below :

- (a) J & K is an integral part of India constitutionally and legally and UN has never questioned the status of Kashmir or India's right to defend it. Besides, the accession was unconditional and with the will of the people and there is nothing to differentiate it from any other state in India.
- (b) Pakistan is an acknowledged aggressor and the UN decision specifically recognises the precondition of withdrawal of Pakistani troops and tribesmen from the soil of Kashmir first before a plebiscite could be held. But UN failed to secure the withdrawal, as such this part of the agreement has already passed the point of diminishing return as per the UN representative Gunnar Jarring.
- (c) Assertion of a community for cessation/greater autonomy for the state in desperation in the form of terrorism/insurgency is a result of mismanagement and misrule. In the wake of internal turmoil, poor polity, divide and rule strategy and vested interests bring forth maladministration, resulting in indiscipline and throwing up non-existent issues thereby further harming the innocent people.
- (d) Due to maladministration, some of the Kashmiri families had the best of both the worlds, whereas majority of the Kashmiris suffered at the hands of their own brethren. This suffering alienated the people against the Central Government. Article 370 was an hindrance to a very great extent even when the Central Government or the people of India wanted to help the people of J & K. By not setting things right at that

stage but allowing them to drift and pamper the Kashmiri leadership more and more, the people suffered due to mishandling by the Central Government and mismanagement by the State Government.

(e) The faith of the people in their own Government started diluting on being denied their democratic rights by a succession of corrupt puppet regimes. The maladministration acted as a catalyst in making the community demand for greater autonomy so that people could participate in the governance of their own state. Since their aim could not be achieved it gave rise to religious fundamentalism which is being exploited by Pakistan to get even with India for the creation of Bangladesh.

(f) Unitary constitution is not a suitable and an efficient system for the heterogeneous people of India, therefore autonomy to states and proportionately more autonomy to various regions within the state may help in stopping the slide towards secessionism.

(g) The other alternative is to have a larger number of smaller states with more autonomy instead of having regions, to ensure efficient administration, minimise corruption, increase cohesion between states and between states and centre. The small states should be on administrative basis and not linguistic or community based.

(h) Geographically, the importance of US-China-Pakistan axis is likely to fade.

(j) In a Muslim Pakistan, Kashmiris will lose their identity and get absorbed. In fact they will become second rate citizens like the Muhajirs, the Sindhis and Baluchis in Pakistan.

(k) The crisis in Kashmir is not the result of impoverishment, unemployment, although they have contributed to the crises to some extent, but the support to militancy is only due to fear and not in the erosion of faith in democracy. Community discontent, draws sustenance from and shelter in a community that is alienated from the system on account of its failure to provide non terrorist channels of protest.

OPTIONS OPEN TO PAKISTAN

The forthcoming election campaign will witness acute competition among the political parties to whip up anti-Indian hysteria by making use of religious fundamentalism, and getting Kashmir from the non Muslims (Kafirs). This in turn will encourage the terrorists and secessionists to step up their nefarious

activities. The enhanced role of the armed forces lends itself to two options for Pakistan :

- (a) Keep the armed forces out of this task, since they will be busy in restoring internal law and order situation and also looking outwards to the Gulf situation.
- (b) To permit the ISI to continue with the task with a greater determined effort, but only to a point where war is avoidable.

OPTION FOR INDIA

It has only but one choice and that is to ensure that Kashmir is not lost at any cost. For this internally we must not allow any communal dissensions. Political process/dialogue must continue alongwith sternest measures taken against terrorists and secessionist element. Bring in a clean and efficient government.

LATEST SITUATION

The raids in the Valley, isolating villages, punitive action against certain areas, increased vigilance on the border have badly bruised the militants. With better intelligence, there is hardly any militant organisation in the Valley which has not lost some of its top operators, including some who had been given a halo. Because of pressure the militants have become little more active by using rockets and bombs against government buildings/offices and the killings of innocent people belonging to minority community. Another change is the improved quality of information reaching the authorities as well as the growing differences among the militant groups.

The Hizb-i-Majahideen, the Jamaat-I-Islam's groups who are for merger with Pakistan are the most formidable ones in terms both of arms and numbers. However, their following in Kashmir masses remains very poor. Whereas JKLF which has the largest popular base, are secular and want "azadi" do not have enough arms and ammunition. Finally the writ of the administration is becoming more and more effective, and the top militants have realised that Kashmir problem will have to be solved by the Kashmiris and the habit of looking to others to rescue them will neither work nor is it a good habit.

REMEDIAL MEASURES

In Kashmir militancy is not born out of poverty or economic deprivation, but out of sheer despair, because the man really affected is not allowed to be heard or allowed to participate in the Government of his own state.

The unethical politicians in collaboration with an unscrupulous bureaucracy have thrown to winds all decency and democracy, by not sticking to their election pledges, but due to mismanagement have permitted outside forces to tinker with the cultural heritage of the State and ethical values of the people. Further, where the ethos of a community has not been treated with deference and reason has been allowed to be clouded by arrogance and logic by falsity that has alienated the masses from the Government run by their own brethren. It is this despair that has resulted in terrorism/insurgency. The elder brother - the Central Government sat like the Roman Emperor Nero who fiddled while Rome burnt, without looking into the problems of the people.

Unfortunately independence was accompanied by partition, one party rule and later a faulty language policy which bred the virus that has strained national unity. Nani A. Palkhivala says, "divisionness is the AIDS of India, a disease of growing proportions without a cure in sight. Communal hatred, linguistic fanaticism and regional loyalty are playing havoc with the unity and integrity of the country. They constitute the surest prescription for national disintegration" which cannot be permitted.

He further states that no constitution however beautifully it may have been conceived can keep the nation together unless "an abiding sense of national identity is bred in the bones of the people".

Therefore the answer to Kashmir lies in setting our own house in order by the following acts :-

- (a) By having fresh elections and a clear cut mandate provided to a party to rule the country without internal bickerings.
- (b) No state should be given any special status and all should be treated alike.
- (c) If necessary those states which have to be demarcated on administrative grounds should be done without prejudice to earlier markings on linguistic, ethnic and religious grounds.
- (d) More autonomy be given to all the states irrespective of the party that rules the state.
- (e) No more subsidies to any state government except to specific projects if economically justified.
- (f) Ethnically different regions within a state must also be given adequate autonomy by the state for example Jammu and Ladakh in J & K State.

- (g) Government servants who refuse allegiance to the Constitution should be sent to special reformatories.
- (h) Government offices, banks, transport, hotels, post offices must be opened forcibly if necessary by handing it over to the security forces.
- (j) An elite force of Kashmiri volunteers about a thousand strong recruited from the Defence services, para military forces, civil government, and civilians, trained in anti terrorist activity and suitably equipped to be placed and used directly under the Governor or his representative.

CONCLUSION

Regionalism, whether in Kashmir, or Punjab or in Tamil Nadu will have to be contained in a more elastic, federal set up and refinishing the Sarkaria Commission may be a point of departure.

The partition, linguistic separatism, mismanagement, casteism, divide and rule policy have over the years caused so much strain on the national unity fibre that it has started splitting. The decline of the Congress monolith and the subsequent natural growth of the regional genius has further aggravated this strain. To add to the confusion people due to their own fault complicated the issue by bringing in dynastic rule. There is therefore a requirement to remodel the architecture for the nation and the region. The arch of genuine federalism for the country is therefore the only answer to all its ills along with disciplining of the masses along with a mature and a clean administration.

TO OUR ORDINARY MEMBERS

The Annual subscription for the Membership of the U.S.I. falls due in April each year. And therefore, this is to remind all our members to send their membership subscription for the year 1991-92 so as to reach us by 15th Mar 91. This would ensure the despatch of the first issue of U.S.I. Journal (April 1991).

Impact of Military Technology on Conventional Warfare

MAJ GEN VK MADHOK, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

Military technology is fast changing the character of conventional warfare : it is automating the future battlefield. A target, the Superpowers have set for themselves within the next 10-15 years if not earlier. Also, sound decisions can no longer be taken without consideration of technical factors : Can the tanks be used without night vision devices at night; how many aircraft can be kept airworthy with the spares at one's disposal and for how long; is adequate technical man power available? Consideration of such like factors can dictate as to how long the operations will last or can be undertaken. The challenges of future are accordingly leading to a technically oriented service culture – a change, which will surely clash between a tradition oriented military and technology – atleast for sometime, till there is no option to technology.

As regards the Third World countries, military technology will continue to assist in giving shape to their desires, to compensate for lack of man-power and to overcome those obstacles which are troubling the soldier, such as the need to minimise casualties while crossing live minefields. Therefore in addition to the soldier and military leaders, it is even more important for the technological leadership to understand their country's tactical doctrine and the philosophy behind the technological vision of the Superpowers. Because the technologist does not lay the tactical doctrine, he only evolves and designs technology to implement that doctrine. And in keeping with that, he has to spell out in clear terms his country's technological vision covering a period of atleast 10-15 years. If that does not happen then the imported technology will dictate his country's tactical doctrine.

It was on 16 Oct 69 that Gen Westmoreland, then US Chief of Staff had stated, that in future, enemy forces will be located, tracked and targeted almost instantly through the use of data links, computer assisted intelligence evaluation and automated fire control. He felt that the battlefield will be under 24 hour real time surveillance of all types, on which anything which can be located and identified can be destroyed instantly by lethal firepower. This dream is becoming a reality and US is expected to reach this stage by 2010, if not earlier.

Future warfare will therefore not only be a combat between offence and defence but between a sophisticated application of stealth and transparency. The principle, as given above being that, if a target can be seen and identified, then it should be possible to destroy it. Accordingly, new surveillance systems from air, land and sea as well as satellites, the use of stealth materials in the entire range of new combat aircraft which are now being designed for the late nineties and the early 21st century, the 'smart' bombs and autonomous missiles which once launched will be in a position to navigate, recognise and then destroy targets on their own.

Military technology is also providing alternatives by compensating for manpower. For instance, while selecting the type of air defence system one should have for one's country, alternative choices may well be 1500 anti-aircraft guns with 15,000 men costing 300 crores, or 1,000 surface to air missiles with 3,000 men costing 1,000 crores or 50 air defence fighters with 500 men at a cost of 500 crores or a mix. But technology is expensive and therefore the need for care and wisdom while expending taxpayers money and even for the taxpayer to know and understand what it is all about?

THIRD WORLD

After a long time, though a bit late, Third World countries have understood that today, technology is the byword for nations seeking power status. It replaces the old concept of annexing vast territories – an aspect on which Superpowers have been more than clear for nearly two decades. That is why their race to maintain technological superiority continues. While the Third World countries are struggling to create 'technological wombs' in which their indigenous projects can be conceived and developed, although countries like Argentina, China, Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, North Korea, South Africa, Taiwan and Israel are producing aircraft but the gap between them and the Superpowers is wide and would, unfortunately, continue to grow while the latter find ways and means to dump their current technologies on the Third World and themselves go in for newer ones.

At the apex lies military technology. Countries minus a technological base have no option but to buy superior technological gadgets from abroad at huge cost-alongwith spares, then establish maintenance and overhaul facilities and later go in for modernisation schemes with foreign collaboration. Countries with a technological base are, therefore, in a position to exercise political influence, dictate policies, even interfere with elections and affect regional and global power balance. One single US aircraft carrier packs a punch equivalent to that of the arsenal of many countries entire arsenal. They

would continue to exercise this influence till the underdeveloped countries remain dependent on them and do not establish a secure indigenous technological base to escape 'technological tyranny'.

Fortunately, India has made a good start with developing a technological base in the last 40 years. Projects for missiles (Agni, Trishul, Akash, Prithvi and Nag) are doing well. Futuristic laser systems are being designed for integrated ranging, designating and seeking systems for installation in the third generation missiles. Projects for ALH (advanced light helicopter), MBT (main battle tank) Arjun, communications (Plan AREN), space (image processing and satellite communications), Radar (radio detection and ranging) are at advance stages. Projects now on the drawing boards and which are likely to be launched include the construction of an aircraft carrier by 1997 (with approximately 40 aircraft on deck) which will replace INS Vikrant, the capability to produce a hyper-sonic plane with a speed of Mach 10, the breakthrough in armour technology (for perfecting an impenetrable armour), construction of a multi role light transport aircraft, night vision devices and even an air defence system. All this bears testimony to an increasing technological thrust. If the momentum of technology can be speeded up and does not get bogged in red tape and bureaucratic delays - as has happened in a couple of projects, India can and should boldly set itself the objective of assuming the technological leadership of the SAARC by the late nineties. There is no reason why the country should not do so.

But this goal needs to be understood by the entire country. As the "technological key" is in a position to unlock economic prosperity, create jobs for millions and place the country in a position where it will be in a position to exercise political influence. In fact, this should be the slogan and India must prepare for this technological revolution, the outline of which can be seen on the horizon.

TECHNOLOGICAL VISION

To make this happen, our masses need to understand the fundamental importance of technology in future to our standard of living, well being and of military technology to our national security. Also a clear understanding amongst the research and defence scientist, the soldier and the civil entrepreneur - the three main players in the game, is essential. But before that, the Government needs to make a clear statement of the 'Technological Vision' it has, for this decade and the early 21st century. The areas on which military technology will focus itself would not only need to be defined but articulated. Such a policy statement is long overdue and has not been made so far. Instead,

year in and year out, the annual Defence Ministry report only brings out what our technical establishments are doing and have achieved, the progress on various projects but nothing about the future!

TECHNICAL MANPOWER

Technological advances are the work of research and defence scientists. It is estimated that world wide, of the 2,300,000 scientists and engineers now working on research projects, over 500,000 (nearly 20%) are working on developing new weapon systems, improving present ones or developing connected support systems. Even US is anticipating tremendous technical manpower shortages in the nineties. Therefore the technological leadership of the country has an important task of building a technical manpower which is a long term process. There is a requirement to give incentives to young students to take up military research.

In the last 20 years or so, the characteristics of combat aircraft, missiles, tanks and warships have changed beyond recognition. These changes have been possible due to increased efficiency in guidance systems with the use of micro electronics, new materials, efficient fuels, development of better armour, greater engine efficiency, improved electronics, greater adaptability of firing platforms, smaller size and lower weight of weapons and so on. There is no visible reason as to why such changes would not continue to take place at an even faster rate in future.

Climate, Conflict and Peace

The Effects of Global Warming on International Relations

VICE ADMIRAL MK ROY, PVSM, AVSM (RETD), NEHRU FELLOW

The Toronto Conference held on 27th June 1988 in response to the call for action by the U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development issued the following statement on the changing atmospheric implications for global security :

"Humanity is conducting unintended uncontrolled globally pervasive experiments whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war. The atmosphere is being charged at an unprecedented rate by pollutants resulting from human activities..... Which indicates potentially severe economic and social dislocation for present and future generations which will worsen international tension and increase the risks of conflicts between and within nations. It is imperative to act now."

The radiative balance of planet earth is between the two broad streams of downward solar radiation and upward terrestrial radiation which in turn are dependent on their absorption in the atmosphere. Thus, the atmosphere provides a mantle for our planet trapping a large part of the terrestrial radiation (absorption of solar radiation by the atmosphere being negligible). This is known as the green house effect which is responsible for global warming.

The major culprit contributing to the green house effect is carbon-dioxide (49% contribution to green house effect) as the other constituents of the atmosphere viz nitrogen and oxygen do not absorb terrestrial radiation. Ozone and water vapour absorb radiation only in certain wave length. Therefore, largely due to inefficient fuel burning in the growing numbers of motor vehicles, there is increasing carbon-dioxide emission into the atmosphere. Hence industrial cities such as Los Angeles, Detroit, Tokyo and Calcutta are smog bound with poor visibility (Calcutta due to 'open chulas' on the pavements). A concerted effort is therefore needed to revolutionise transport technology by switching to lower carbon-dioxide emitting fuels and even changing over to other fuels such as alcohol from sugar and a hydrogen driven transport as also lighter and more fuel efficient vehicles.

There is also an emerging trend in developed countries for garbage disposal without consuming energy. This trend also applies to cooking less red meat in order to keep energy intensities within prudent limits. For example, North America consumes 190 thousand megajoules of energy, Europe 124 mega-joules; China 194 mega-joules but the average for India, Brazil and Pakistan is 7 mega-joules. Therefore, even if the developing countries double their consumption, it will only be an additional 12 per cent. But if the developed countries double their energy intake, the world out-put will go up by 26 per cent. Hence during the North-South dialogue, the developing countries should resist the compulsory introduction of new technologies unless there is an equitable transfer of know how (if not know why) as also financial assistance for effecting the change over.

Methane gas, which contributes 18 per cent to green house effect, is another strong absorber of terrestrial radiation and originates from water logged rice fields, termites, cowdung and nitrogenous fertilisers which are largely used in India, Brazil and China. However, it is interesting to note that when more Carbon-dioxide and Methane are absorbed by the Ocean, the ELNINO phenomena occurs causing a rise in the level of the seas which however augurs for good monsoons.

Another gas is Nitrous oxide with 6 per cent contribution to green house effect, which is emitted from the exhaust gases of high flying aircraft. The last and perhaps the major man made polluter is Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) with 14 per cent contribution to green house effect which consists of chlorine, fluorine and carbon that are widely used in refrigeration, air conditioners and some cosmetics. CFCs remain for long periods in the stratosphere and under the influence of ultraviolet radiation release their chlorine atoms which destroy the ozone contents of the stratosphere. This progressive destruction of ozone which is a strong absorber could lead to an increase in the intensity of this radiation reaching the earth which causes global warming as also adverse repercussions on human health. Therefore, the Montreal Protocol of 1987 recommended the freezing of CFCs and its substitution by ozone friendly technologies which conveniently had been introduced by Duponts of USA. Hence poor countries voted that the polluter must financially assist third world countries to change over to the new technology. The Indian Prime Minister, projected a 'Planet Protection Fund in the Bulgarian summit of Non Aligned countries. But the United States was of the view that a country must raise its own resources. Japan abstained from voting.

The consequence of this global warming will perhaps be a rise in temperature from 1.5°C to 4.5°C over the next five decades at the present

pollution rate. However, other scientists feel that there will be hardly any rise in the earth's temperature because of cloud cover and its properties of scattering, reflection and radiation which are dependent on the proportion of water vapour, liquid vapour and ice crystals present in the clouds. The Bush Administration is still not convinced of the alarming view on global warming taken by most countries some of whom are even reconsidering nuclear power options particularly as the NPT comes up for extension in 1995, and which should be made applicable to all countries. These issues concerning the strategies for renewable energy especially advanced biomass conversion technology which subject will dominate the conference on Global Warming in Brazil in 1992.

The rise in temperature will in turn increase the volume of water by melting ice sheets in Western Antarctica subsidence or rise in the level of coastal areas and a rise in the level of the seabed due to tectonic movements. These will result in a rise in sea level which will have serious repercussions on low lying countries such as Holland, Indonesia, Maldives, Laccadives, Andaman & Nicobar and Bangladesh. For example if there is a rise in the sea level of 2.2 meters, eighteen per cent of the habitable land in Bangladesh will be unusable. The submersion of the ancient port of Dwaraka has been linked to such effects. The Dutch have already commenced strengthening their dykes, dunes and other coastal defence and have offered expertise to both Indonesia and the Maldives whose President had raised this issue in the U.N. General Assembly in 1987.

Further, erosion of habitable land will not only affect the more densely populated countries but also the density of population and the demographic composition of nations.

This may cause internal and external violence as in Brazil. There is for example a Hispanic influx into the United States, albeit due to population and economic pressures as also migration from the South to the North Mediterranean coasts. Hence countries are seized with the need to tighten immigration law.

The other effects of increasing population pressures are the rapid deforestation and desertification which have caused floods, droughts and global warming. Eleven million hectares of tropical forests which absorb carbon-dioxide are cut down annually. This has changed the precipitation pattern and accelerated the green house effect. In Europe, the 'Green movement' for the preservation of the environment is very active and has led to internal tensions. Even in India, the Narmada and Tehri Dam projects have caused social, economic, and political upheavals.

Hence in the North-South dialogue, India must resist the North redesigning an international system for their own advantage. Further the youth must be encouraged to view the entire planet as one family for as Jawaharlal Nehru stated 'the only alternative to coexistence is co-destruction'.

It will be apt to conclude by quoting Dr Manmohan Singh, Secretary General of the South Commission headed by Julius Nyerere : "The world shares a single environmental system. Three-fourths of humanity lives in the South which is vitally concerned about supporting the poor of this planet. The North is responsible for the bulk of the damage to the environment because of its wasteful life styles. However, poverty is also a great degrader of the environment and hence different development strategies have different environmental implications. Society has therefore to be mobilised in supporting life styles that do not put excessive pressure on scarce national resources. The South must play its rightful role in the process of fashioning a more equitable and stable system to fulfil the aspirations of all people.

It will be observed that billions are being spent on Defence just in case threats to national security develop in the future. But nonetheless there is hesitancy to spend a few thousands on environmental security because of differing views on the time frame of the Green house effect with resultant rise in sea levels. Society, therefore, needs to be mobilised to support a new international environmental security system so that the citizens of today do not race to destroy the environment of tomorrow.

A Land-Lubber's View of Our Navy's Air Arm

BRIGADIER AS APTE (RETD)

THE CARRIER ERA

World's first aircraft carrier came into existence when, in 1913, the British navy modified a warship and gave it an improvised flight deck. This was followed, in 1917, by similar conversion of a battle cruiser. By 1930, the carriers had come to stay when UK, USA and Japan possessed seven carriers each and France one. Carrier-borne aircraft enhanced the firing range of the task force and enabled it to exercise control over upto 150 kilometers of the ocean around the vessel. In both the world wars, they were used to gather information about the enemy's fleet strength and disposition as well as for strike missions. In World War II especially, aircraft carriers proved themselves invaluable as a part of the naval caravan engaged in supply or troop-carrying missions in support of the operations thousands of kilometers away from home shores. This was the case with Britain, with her empire spread all over the globe, and her wartime ally, USA. Their slow, short range, propeller-driven, shore based aircraft of those days were unable to provide immediate protective cover when required during the long voyage. Under the circumstances, floating, mobile aerodromes which could carry strike aircraft to provide on-the-spot protection from hostile warships, submarines and aircraft, proved to be a great boon. Besides, on account of its enormous size, the carrier presented an awesome spectacle creating an aura of great power and gave it tremendous power projection potential which was useful in peacetime too. However, within a few years of the termination of the Second World War, the thinking on the operational utility of carriers began undergoing a change in view of the emergence of better and cheaper alternatives in the shape of faster, long range, land based aircraft, high technology submarines and long range, precision missiles, all of which had none of the limitations of the aircraft carriers.

LIMITATIONS OF CARRIERS

Before long, it was realised that the carrier's extended operational control of the sea, its high cost and its very size which helped in the projection of the nation's maritime might, also proved to be its bane, making it a highly tempting target. Easier to locate, it was more vulnerable to the enemy missiles, submarines and aircraft. A single well-directed bomb, missile or torpedo has enough potential to destroy or disable it making it unusable

as a floating airstrip. Once damaged or disabled, the carrier has no power of recuperation. In contrast, it is not easy to put out of commission for any appreciable length of time an airstrip on terra-firma. Another serious limitation of a floating airbase is that it can never contain enough airpower to ward off the entire hostile air force in the enemy waters.

For all these reasons, a carrier cannot sail alone; it must have an escort of 3-5 fast-moving warships and carry defensive aircraft aboard. Referring to Vikrant's vulnerability in our 1971 war with Pakistan, Vice Admiral N Krishnan, in his book 'No way but surrender', admits that Vikrant presented the most worthwhile target for Pakistan's Daphne class submarines possessing deadly striking power and as many as six escorts would not guarantee any complete immunity to the carrier.

A shore based aerodrome is easier to build and maintain and simpler to operate from than a shaky, floating platform, which has restricted space for storage, take-off and landing of the aircraft and which is useless in rough seas, computerised gyroscopic stabilisers notwithstanding. Further, the aircraft cannot take off or land on a carrier unless she steams into the wind throughout the period of operation of the aircraft, for, the submarine threat is greatest when the carrier is on a straight course. Lack of wind also prevents the launching of aircraft as happened on 11 December 1971 when the seahawks could not be flown from Vikrant for this very reason.

The need for periodical refuelling of ships, particularly those whose ranges are limited, presents yet another problem during operations. This was the case with Vikrant's escorts. According to Vice Admiral Krishnan, even Vikrant herself 'would have to be withdrawn (to Madras) from the operational area (in the Bay) after about 15 days'.

All these factors make the carrier very expensive. Being a miniature floating township, it costs a fortune even when not engaged in operations. After the Second World War, Britain was unable to maintain large number of carriers due to the economic devastation the war had caused and their high cost. Also, her empire had begun to shrink. Consequently, she sold all but three of her carriers to other countries including India. Vice Admiral S Mookerjee, in his article 'Indian naval development - need for review' published in the Apr-Jun 89 issue of the USI journal, estimates that today an indigenously built medium-sized carrier (30000 tons) along with its five escorts but without its aircraft is unlikely to cost less than Rs 3500 crores and that the 30-year life cycle of one carrier task group, excluding its aircraft, would be around Rs 45000 crores !

As regards the power projection capability, this is true only of large carriers embarking 80-90 aircraft each. Carriers like Vikrant embarking only a few aircraft can, at best, perform the role of anti-submarine warfare (ASW). In fact, INS Virat was formerly performing the ASW role as HMS Hermes with the British navy and was constructed not under the nomenclature of aircraft carrier but that of 'through-deck' cruiser. Both Vikrant and Virat are light carriers compared to, say, the US carrier Nimitz which is 1092 feet long, has a displacement of 81600 tons, speed of 30 knots, a complement of 6300 personnel and over 90 aircraft. As against this, Vikrant is 700 feet long, has a displacement of 16000 tons, speed of 24.5 knots, a complement of 1345 personnel and only 22 aircraft. Our carriers have no power projection capability, especially against a country possessing even a normal air power capability.

EMERGENCE OF HIGHLY IMPROVED LAND BASED AIRCRAFT

With the advent of jet propulsion and revolutionary advancement in weaponry, military aviation took long strides within a short period during the fifties and the sixties. Now the land based aircraft could fly faster and farther and performed better over land and sea at a lower cost. This new situation not only made aircraft carriers unnecessary but also untenable. Astride Mediterranean, Italy felt no need for carriers. Would it not, therefore, be wiser for us to build along our shores airstrips spaced suitably instead of maintaining unaffordable carriers? A dozen military/commercial airfields already exist on each of our two coasts; more may not even be necessary.

Throughout the Falklands War, 1982, Argentina's aircraft carrier did not dare to stir out of the safety of her harbour due to constant threat from British submarines. So Argentina had no choice except to use her land based aircraft to harass the British carrier task group forcing it to keep itself at a safe distance from the mainland out of the reach of the Argentina aircraft. This also had the effect that the British carrier based aircraft were unable to take on the mainland targets. During our war with Pakistan in 1965, Vikrant was in dry docks for a re-fit. So her air squadrons operated from the land based airfields at Jamnagar and Bombay - a task clearly within the competence of the IAF. In the 1971 war, Pakistani gunboats without any air cover were constantly strafed not just by Vikrant-based aircraft but by shore-based aircraft too. In Sri Lanka operations, our carriers had no role to play. So the naval aircraft operating from land based airfields at Madurai and Ramnad knocked out some arms supply boats of the LTTE - again a task clearly within the purview of our Air Force.

The USA needed carriers in the Viet Nam war in 1965-68 and the UK needed them in the Falklands war in 1982 just for one reason - distance! The land based planes on the western shores of the USA could not have flown bothways over the enormous expanse of the Pacific all the way to carry out thousands of strikes in Vietnam except at a much higher cost. Similarly, the British land based planes too could not have flown bothways over a total of 26000 kilometers of the Atlantic. In the words of Admiral GER Kinnear of the US navy, spoken while commenting on the Falklands war, on 12 May 1982, 'It is necessary to have carriers as floating air bases when naval forces have to fight in distant areas'. Shall we be ever doing that? Land based aircraft seem to be good enough for us.

HIGH TECHNOLOGY SUBMARINES CHANGE THE SCENARIO FURTHER

Revolutionary advancement in the air was accompanied by matching one under the ocean. Now submarines are more silent and more difficult to detect. They run faster, deeper, have greater under-water endurance, are more manoeuvrable and possess the ability to fire long range, precision guided, high speed torpedoes as well as tactical and strategical missiles against targets in the sea or deep inland. All this makes them a formidable foe of the aircraft carriers. The fact that even with the protective cover of the escort ships, the carrier is not fully secure against a submarine attack was dramatically brought home as early as 1944 when on 29 November of that year, a 2000 ton lone US submarine, Archer-Fish, patrolling in enemy waters, 400 kilometers east of Japan, detected the 68000 ton Japanese carrier, Shinano, escorted by three battle-proven destroyers, and sunk it within minutes of the encounter. Designed to be unsinkable, Shinano was till then the largest carrier afloat. Maritime history is replete with such instances.

THE CARRIER'S DAYS ARE NUMBERED - AT LEAST IN THE INDIAN CONTEXT

The carrier era is, therefore, over. In the USA, the balance began tilting in favour of the deadlier, yet cheaper, combination of submarines and land based aircraft, when in 1960, the US Secretary of State, McNamara, decided that the number of US carriers should be allowed to decline without replacement. That policy has not only not undergone any review but was actually reiterated in 1983, when Admiral Rickover of the US navy declared that in a major war, a modern carrier should not be expected to last for more than a couple of days!

YET, WE WENT IN FOR THEM !

Notwithstanding the unmistakable bias against carriers in favour of

submarines and land based aircraft, our navy went ahead and purchased two second-hand carriers-Vikrant in 1961 and Virat in 1987 - and is considering constructing our own in future. In this regard, a report published in the Indian Express dated 31 August 1987 (soon after we purchased Virat) about an article by US defence expert A.J. Tellis, in the Journal of the Strategic Studies, is relevant. Some excerpts : Indian navy 'lacked a doctrine' in acquiring two aircraft carriers and planning for more as there was nothing the carrier could do which could not be done cheaper or better from land bases in a country so strategically situated as India... The current carriers are neither cost-effective nor operationally useful... In the event of a showdown the carriers' contribution to both combat missions and power projection missions would be 'pathetic' in view of the demonstrated limitations of the carrier".

But the Indian Navy seems to be determined to retain and expand this component - an action quite inconsistent with our declared national policy of not carrying war over the oceans to distant lands. There is not even the slightest possibility of our sending long-haul supply or troop-carrying convoys in support of operations thousands of kilometers from our shores. Our future naval activity is going to be restricted to no wider than a 1000 kilometers belt along our coastline, which is well within the capability of our land based aircraft and submarines. Not just this land-lubber, but even a responsible senior naval officer -Vice Admiral Mookerjee- also thinks likewise when he says (in his article mentioned earlier) that our unambiguous national policy, on which our maritime strategy is based, is to pursue the policy of 'panch-sheel' and non-alignment.

Why did we act the way we did? One sure possibility is that in the early days of freedom, our nouveau Nelsons could have wanted an aircraft carrier as a status symbol. It was but natural that on assumption of power and consequent glamour that invariably goes with it, we yearned to copy our erstwhile masters in everything. But, does that excuse, though acceptable in the context of a newly emerging free nation trying to equate itself with the rest of the free world, hold good any longer? Should n't we have matured over four decades of freedom and pushed out emotionalism in favour of rational thinking? Or is the reason more earthly - conservation of the species, preservation of the empire and its further expansion?

OK ! WE GOT THE CARRIERS, BUT IN WHAT ROLE DID WE USE THEM?

In the 1965 war with Pakistan, Vikrant was not used at all as she was in dry docks. In the 1971 war we used her simply because she was there ! Crippled, of course. In the words of Vice Admiral Krishnan (in his book mentioned earlier) : "With her reduced speed - because of a defective boiler

- she would never survive any operations in the Arabian sea, with Pakistan's most modern submarines, 'Daphnes' on the prowl...". It is obvious, therefore, that Vikrant had no genuine 'carrier' role to play. But then, there was little point in mothballing when the opportunity presented itself, albeit in a minor role, in the narrow waters of the Bay of Bengal so long as her safety was fully assured. The non-carrier role allotted to her was, however, praiseworthy, for, playing it, she was instrumental in the sinking of the Pakistani submarine Gazi by INS Rajput. Pakistan had known that the disabled Vikrant would not be in the Arabian sea but in the Bay of Bengal and our navy knew that Pakistan would most certainly send Gazi to the Bay with the sole aim of sinking it. So our navy's radio deception plan allowed to be monitored by the enemy led it to believe that Vikrant was in Vishakhapatnam waters although she was in fact at Madras. When Gazi went for it, INS Rajput detected it, torpedoed it and sunk it. It was only after the submarine threat was removed that Vikrant could get out of Madras and go into offensive against East Pakistan using her aircraft.

But was there any opposition worth the name? The IAF had already neutralised the Pakistani airforce in the east. It was known to us that East Pakistan had only four sea-worthy gun boats armed with short range weapons unsuitable for anti-warship role. Against this opposition (!) was poised our task force consisting of Vikrant, her eight escorts and their landing craft squadrons. It is noteworthy that these four little gunboats were continuously strafed by our shore based aircraft. Vikrant's aircraft strafed Cox's Bazar, Chittagong, Chalna, Barisal and Rajapur but none of these places were outside the capability of the IAF. Did we really need a carrier for this purpose? Vikrant was not in the open ocean hundreds of miles away from her targets and beyond the range of our land based aircraft but in the restricted waters of the Bay !

So, WHAT SHOULD WE DO NEXT?

The conclusion should be obvious to all : the air force, the land-lubbers, the civilians, and, above all, the Indian Navy. After all, the Navy's own Admiral Mookerjee too observes : "The need has decisively tilted the balance in favour of modern submarines which have become capital ships *replacing aircraft carriers* ...our navy should be built around submarines in close alliance with shore based maritime aircraft". It is time we took a re-look at our carrier mania; the IAF can do all that the carriers can do and more, and cheaper too. I am tempted to quote the Admiral once again, for, he makes an interesting remark, surely tongue-in-cheek, "...There is no doubt about usefulness of carriers for ceremonial (purposes)". Brigadier NB Grant was more

forthright when he wrote in the Indian Express dated 5 April 1984 that the only safe role for our carrier is to lead the fleet every five years for the Presidential review.

Need I say any more ? But I have two comments. According to Vice Admiral Krishnan, the replacement of Vikrant's sick boiler would take at least a couple of years. If this can be taken as a yardstick, the construction of a new carrier would take nothing less than a couple of decades, during which time, there would be further advancement in the aircraft and submarine technology, rendering the newly created carrier absolutely a white elephant. My other comment is about the term '*maritime* shore based' aircraft constantly used by Vice Admiral Mookerjee. Why maritime ? Preservation instinct? Having acquired two carriers from Britain and a squadron of superconstellations from the IAF, the navy has designs to build more carriers. It is not going to allow mere pragmatism to come in the way of perpetuation of its *air arm* which it has built up painstakingly over the past three decades. If the carriers become redundant in our context, our naval air arm will have no justification to exist. But our Navy will never tolerate its demolition even if the IAF's shore based aircraft can take over its functions *in toto*. Nevertheless, let us hope that rational thinking will prevail and flying confined to the IAF which has the infrastructure for training, maintenance and all the allied matters and more stress is placed on improving inter-service relations at all levels which will surely result in an overall advantage to the nation. This, after all, is stressed all along from the NDA to the NDC!

What Makes The Air Force Tick?*

AIR VICE MARSHAL SS MALHOTRA, AVSM, VM (RETD)

Air Force is commonly perceived as composed of aircraft and airfields only. Those somewhat familiar with flying may visualise fliers, technicians and ground equipment etc., also as its constituents. But a majority of others usually conceive Air Force as millions and millions of Rupees spent in costly equipment, construction of airfields and heavy recurring expenditure on operations apart from the risk to life and public property in flying/ground accidents. While the common perceptions of laymen cannot be considered baseless altogether, certainly most of the misconceptions are due to ignorance.

Air Force is not just a 'sister' service forming an element of national security. Despite its small size, it is the most potent decisive and indispensable instrument not only in shaping the course of war and its outcome, but because of its quality and size it can be a deterrent as well. In any war, Air Force performs a pivotal role; fastest to react, it is usually the first to check enemy's advance and has the farthest reach into enemy territory.

What makes the Air Force formidable and what gives it the strength - merely its size? If not then what is it that makes it so? Can the country afford a large Air Force. If not, then where do we compromise? If we do decide to have an effective Air Force, what constituents should we go in for? Such questions, commensurate with the curiosity of laymen can be un-ending. However, some of the salient aspects are covered in the succeeding paras to meet their curiosity.

These requirements are dictated by the country's declared aims, national interests/policies and defence needs based on its area, resources available, adversary (ies). Air Force has multiple roles to perform in order to meet multiple demands based on various requirements. During war time the emphasis is naturally more target oriented in the form of Offensive Air Operations, Air Defence and Supportive Roles - mainly these are military oriented. During peace time, the Force is predominantly occupied with 'preparatory' activities for its war time role and supportive operations - both civil and military - including the special and mercy missions which generally get publicised. Paradoxically, the peace time operations (despite their versatility and enormity) have to be carried out on war footing.

* This article was sent to us on the 58th anniversary of the IAF.

Peace time, time bound planned activities, are generally termed as 'Tasks' or 'commitments' and cover the fields of Training, Production, and Maintenance and assigned Supportive Role. Broadly, they include the following :-

- From basic flying training to advanced, applied, in-squadron armament/weapons and specialised Aircraft and Armament Testing Training; technical, non-technical, logistics, accounting, physical, education and other allied subjects form the ingredients on the non-flying side. Training in the field of staff and command functions at various levels/tiers is equally important and given due emphasis.
- Include not only technical services and routine maintenance of aircraft and specialist servicing equipment but it also has to stick to overhaul and production schedules, licensed manufacture/production of aircraft/components, research and development for indigenisation of latest inductions involving high degree of technology absorption, technology transfer, inventory control of new currently in use as well as obsolete equipment, storage and distribution of armament stores, quality control and certification of machines and materials, a large fleet of Mechanical Transport comprising common user and specialist vehicles. Above all, the procurement and provisioning of stores particularly the Fuel, Oil and Lubricants (FOL) demands, accomplishment within very tight time schedule.
- Maintenance of supply/life lines for various military/para military and civil agencies and outfits in remote, inhospitable and inaccessible areas is perennial task of the Air Force which requires dedicated, time bound air effort. The other significant areas requiring Air Force support are the short notice airlift commitments of the Army, Navy, Para military forces and civil authorities to meet the disaster/climatic situations and endowment exploration and exploitation. This very briefly being the charter of the service, let us see how this youngest of the three services accomplishes its roles and tasks. The achievements of Air Force may not appear to be very extraordinary but if we familiarise ourselves with the constraints, problems, limitations and handicaps, then the same achievements will not only get viewed in the correct perspective but will appear simply magnificent.
- Air Force is probably the worst hit by resource crunch because of its large financial outlays - whether it is the construction, maintenance of airfields and acquisition of equipment, stores or machines; replacement costs, non-availability particularly due to high rate of obsolescence because of rapid technological advance

and consequently a very heavy investment on infrastructure. No doubt, we have to share the poverty but we have to have enough to incur viable and purposeful expenditure. This is perhaps the planner's and policy makers' dilemma, nightmare or challenge - whatever one may call it.

- Problems that Air Force has to encounter are peculiar to it. Non-existence of well established aeronautical industrial base results in compulsive overdependence on other industrially advanced countries. This straightaway puts us at a handicap of not being able to get what we want and when we want, even if the country is prepared to circumvent the resource crunch. Industrially advanced big powers' actions are dictated by their own economic, regional/geo-strategic, geo-political, hegemonistic interests and international treaties obligations to maintain or upset the regional balances. Irrespective of the size of such countries' arsenals, the latest in any field can NEVER be made available.
- Long gestation periods for the development and subsequent availability of trained manpower, machines, materials and infrastructure put very severe limitations on the expansion and growth of the service. Just to illustrate, it takes roughly 5 to 7 years to train a single aircrew to 'fully operational' status at a cost of just about Rupees seven crores. Similarly, to train a technician it takes about 5 years to bring him up to a level of reasonable proficiency and competence. To produce an aircraft - from drawing board to delivery stage - it can take anything from 10 to 17 years, for a frontline service span of about 7 years and at a phenomenal developmental and production cost.
- To start off with, the IAF started as an appendage to Royal Air Force. Whilst it was still in early teens, the IAF got divided along with the rest of the country and was deprived of its founding bases located in Pakistan. While still recovering from the deprivation, it had to go into action in 1948 in J & K. Based on the lessons learnt in J & K, it undertook the re-equipping programme and right in the middle of its developmental phase, 1962 and 1965 operations seriously interfered in successful promotion and completion of projects in hand - due to diversion of resources. Subsequently, of course, the service re-equipping programme and its consolidation went through at the desired pace and it went through the 1971 operations with a 'bang'.

To bridge the technology gap without the existence of an industrial base introduces its own problems in knowledge/expertise update of personnel. Desirability of keeping the force young results in frequent and greater turnover. The changing socio-economic conditions and more lucrative pastures elsewhere lead to an exodus of trained manpower, which aggravates the inherent manpower problems created by adhoc expansion, recruitment and retirement ages, terms of engagement, career profiles and prospects. Service having an all India liability - which perforce leads to transfer turbulence with telling effects on families - does encourage the exodus and adds to the handicaps.

At this stage the pertinent question arises as to what has brought the Indian Air Force to its present state, size and shape - being one of the largest, most modern, formidable and versatile in the world, notwithstanding the problems mentioned above. To put it simplistically, it is simply the indomitable spirit of the men behind the machines - nay all personnel - who have had the privilege to serve it. When we consider our success in satisfactory growth, timely expansion and consolidation, we undoubtedly have to pay tributes to the vision and far-sightedness of our founders, pioneers and top level leadership. When we think of our achievements - collective as well as individual - we have to reverentially bow to the bravery, determination and singlemindedness of purpose of those who lit the blaze for us and of course to those who also followed the trail in best traditions of the service. We the posterity of yester years owe our present proud existence to those who improvised and indigenised using their genius despite the short lived/biased ridicule and became paradigms/epitomes of professionalism, to those who set the (world) records in flying like landing a packet at the highest airfield (CHUSHUL), landing a helicopter at the highest helipad, landing an IL-14 at LHASA, landing the HS-748 fitted with Rolls Royce 531 (un-uprated) engines at FUKCHE (around 14,000) in the thick of summer, carrying as many as 114 passengers in a Dakota aircraft, bringing back a badly shot up Sukhoi and landing it safely; to those who exploited the aircraft's design limits by developing our own doctrines, tactics and modifications much to the surprise and amusement of principal manufacturers; to those functionaries who could use simple devices like a 'homer' AD-200 as effectively as a modern day sophisticated Radar assisted approach; to those who explored the barriers of human engineering and established facilities for its development; to those who took the country on the 'SPACE' list; to those who devotedly answered the call of duty from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari and beyond; to those who managed our selections, recruitments and records and maintained standards so ably and resolutely; to those who bore the brunt of initial hardships in every sphere but did not let their spirits dampen; and above all to those who sacrificed their present so that the posterity could hold its head high.

Professional Defence Institutes— Can We Afford Them?

BRIG NB GRANT, AVSM (RETD)

A news item concerning the recruitment for the merchant navy reads as follows :

"The annual turn-out of officers for the executive branch of the merchant navy will be increased from 250 to 650 with immediate effect. The increase will be achieved without any addition to the existing establishments, or any substantial addition to the annual expenditure. The increase will mainly be brought about by reduction in the existing training period on T S 'RAJENDRA', and by raising the educational qualifications at entry. Similar policy will also be adopted for the recruitment of officers of marine engineering and other technical branches of the merchant navy."

The merchant navy have since realised that, the time spent in their basic training establishment amounted to three years of academic education, and only one year of naval training multiplied three times. They therefore, debated that the same results could be achieved not only speedily, but what is more important, much more economically, by directly recruiting university graduates and then giving them a year' basic naval training.

If the economics of the direct entry system of recruitment has been appreciated and accepted by the merchant navy, our armed forces still seem to be dragging their feet on this issue. If anything, our Defence organisation appears to be continually augmenting its training establishments, by having in its fold professional institutions providing basic education, of which there is no dearth in our civil educational system, resulting in unnecessary duplication at the expense of the Defence budget. The aim of this paper is to examine whether, the different avenues of recruitment and training of the Service officer, for various professional disciplines of which civilian equivalents already exist, justify their duplication in the Defence establishments.

ENTRY THROUGH THE N D A

Let us start off by examining the necessity of having a basic training institution like the National Defence Academy (NDA) for our officer intake.

This prestigious establishment was built for achieving two main objectives, namely —

- (a) to mould the future officer in the traditional pattern of military leadership while he is still in the formative years, and,
- (b) to instill in him from the beginning a feeling of a coordinated defence service, which would form the basis of inter-service co-operation in his later years.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Regarding the first objective, it has been made to believe, that it is necessary to catch a boy while he is still in his teens, so that —

- (a) he will make a better officer by being drilled into the Service method of behaviour and thinking from the very start, and,
- (b) if he can be enlisted into the Service at an early age, he will not develop a taste and knowledge of other more lucrative careers open to him.

The fallacy of the above reasoning is obvious, but we still seem to continue deceiving ourselves. Regarding the first one, there is no proof today to suggest that, the NDA cadet has made a better officer than the direct university entry from the Indian Military Academy (IMA). If anything, results have shown that, the latter's three years at the university at the crucial adolescent stage of his life, matures him into a more creative and thinking man.

The second argument, of catching a boy young before he has had the time and opportunity of thinking of entering some other career, is self defeating from its very concept. Firstly, at the tender age of sixteen, a boy does not really know his mind, and is not aware of what is in store for him; as such, if inducted in a career without being exposed to other alternatives, he gets a feeling of having been trapped into a profession not to his liking, but in which he has now to make the best of a bad bargain. The concept may be excusable provided we are sure that by catching them young, the Services are getting the cream of the country's youth. However, recent statistics taken over a period of ten years show quite the contrary, and indicate a sharp decline in the quality and standard of boys opting for the NDA. In this respect the greater tragedy is that very few sons of even Service officers, specially those in the senior ranks, want to go through the NDA.

INTER SERVICE CO-OPERATION

The second objective for creating the NDA was to infuse an inter-service co-operation amongst officers from the very beginning of their career. Ever since Independence, our armed forces have never stopped boasting of their inter-service establishments like the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) and the National Defence College (NDC). We proudly display the fact that unlike what is prevalent even in the more modern armies of UK, USA and the USSR, the officer in our army begins his career in an inter-service institution, namely the NDA, and carries this throughout his training career at the DSSC and the NDC. The irony, however, is that in spite of the above, for all intents and purposes, we still fight as separate and independent services, unlike the armed forces in the countries mentioned above, who have long since introduced effective unification of their services through the office of the Chief of Defence staff, a concept which is still absent in our organisation.

DIRECT ENTRY SYSTEM

Thus whichever way one looks at it, it is apparent that the NDA has not fulfilled either of the two objectives for which it was created. The basic question to ask is, whether under the circumstances, is the NDA really necessary for our officer intake, and why the IMA, the Air Force Academy (AFA) and the Naval Academy (NAVAC) cannot cater for the entire officer requirements of the army, airforce and navy respectively, through the direct entry system as is done in other countries. After all even at the NDA, although three years are taken purely for academic studies leading upto a university degree, the basic military part of the curriculum is really confined to only one year's training multiplied three times. Thus, if the Merchant Navy can cut down its basic training period from three to one year by raising the educational qualifications on entry, the Services can also do the same quite easily. The need for this is even greater now with the vast number of graduates that are being turned out by the universities each year, the bulk of whom remain unemployed for want of suitable openings. The usual argument advanced by the Services against this is that only the left-overs of those graduates will want to join the armed forces. The counter argument to this is, that the quality of cadets at the NDA is no better (and if anything, it is slightly lower down the scale) as today hardly anybody who has gained an admission to a good university gives that up for the NDA — thus the latter gets the left overs in any case.

MILITARY TECHNICAL COLLEGES

ENGINEERING AND MEDICAL

Let us now examine some other basic military training institutions whose existence is also questionable in their present form. Two such typical establishments are the College of Military Engineering (CME) and the Armed Forces Medical College (AFMC). No other armies that we know of, even those of the affluent countries, have found a need for such expensive institutions to form a part of their military establishments. For example, in UK and USA, officers of the Engineers and Medical Corps do their basic education in engineering and medicine in respective civil universities in their fields. They do this either by joining the army after graduation, or attend universities through the army on being commissioned. The Service schools (note not colleges) established for these disciplines, cater only for the purely military aspects of engineering and medicine, subjects which are outside the orbit of universities. In our country, however, the CME and the AFMC not only cater for the specialised military needs, but also duplicate the functions of any civil university in respect to the basic academic education, leading respectively to an engineering and medical degree.

Again the same arguments as stated previously, have been advanced for maintaining the status quo of the CME and the AFMC as has been done for the NDA, namely, that good engineers and doctors are not coming forward to join the armed forces. If, therefore, there does not appear to be sufficient justification for continuation of the NDA, there is still less justification for duplicating another civil university at the CME or the AFMC specially so when today there is no dearth of engineering and medical graduates in the civil market, who are as good, if not better, than the products of the CME or AFMC, as has been amply proved by the performance of the former in World War II, and in our three wars since independence. The same argument can also be extended to the basic technical institutions of the other two Services. For example, the basic marine engineering and electrical course at the INS 'SHIVAJI' appears to be a duplication of identical basic disciplines of any civil marine engineering college. This is not to advocate the abolition of such Service institutions altogether, but to suggest that they should confine themselves only to imparting knowledge in the purely military aspects of their respective disciplines, to officers who are already technical graduates from the respective civil universities.

MANAGEMENT SCIENCES

In keeping with the latest craze in the country, for every one to be termed as a professional manager, the military has also been bitten by the

management bug. There are today thirty-seven civil universities offering management sciences, four Indian Institutes of Management, an Administrative Staff College, a National Institute of Training and Development, and numerous Government recognised management institutions in the country. The Army, not to be outdone, has also established its own special Institute of Defence Management (IDM), where the modern management deities reside, to recoup the soldier's lost faith in his own inherent managerial ability, and to perhaps get some high and mighty favours in the form of acquiring some predominantly jargon-oriented terms representing managerial skill. The irony of it, however, is that whereas the military were the pioneers of the very management techniques now being taught in business schools and since adopted in commercial firms, the Service Officer is now wanting to introduce this in his own institution, and relearn his own inherent trade of management. Even the USA, which is the fountain-head of the modern management movement, has not felt the need to establish such an institution in its military hierarchy.

A DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

As if the above was not enough, there is now a proposal of even establishing an independent Defence University. The following three reasons have been advanced in support of this —

- (a) In the mind of the prospective civil employer, the Serviceman remains a bluff, fit only for watch and ward duties.
- (b) Value of Service education remains a closed book to the rest of the society.
- (c) It will lead to a better integration of three Services.

Let us examine how far the establishment of a Defence University will fill in any of the above gaps.

CIVILIAN IMPRESSION OF THE MILITARY OFFICER

If the civilian society today has got a low impression of the Service man, the fault is that of —

- (a) the Defence PR Department having done very little if at all, to project the image of the soldier, and,
- (b) after independence, the military hierarchy having failed to maintain the dignity and Izzat of the fighting man. If the army chooses to

denigrate its own creed, it must accept the consequences of lowering its status and prestige in the eyes of the civil public.

No Defence University can restore the lost image and prestige of the Serviceman — this has got to come from within the Services themselves.

VALUE OF SERVICE EDUCATION

Here again it is the fault of the Defence PR Department having totally failed to bring home to the civilian public, the value of Service education in the commercial and industrial life. In this respect the Defence Rehabilitation Organisation has done no better. Unless the task of resettlement is taken up as a normal function of military command, and merged as routine within the existing welfare responsibilities and duties of the three Services, little can be achieved to improve the present situation. In any case a Defence University is no solution to this problem.

Another factor responsible for this lack of knowledge, is our antiquated security system. Instead of encouraging the civilian society to visit military institutions, and mix freely with army personnel, our outmoded security system does just the opposite. The fact that, military matters are never discussed threadbare in our Lok Sabha, as is the case in other democratic parliaments and senates, makes this communication gap even more large. Our censored military journals and the press, do not help matters either. We already have a chair in almost all our universities on Defence Studies. It is not clear how a Defence University is going to fill in this void in the lack of knowledge of the value of military education to the civilian society.

BETTER INTEGRATION OF THE SERVICES

Of all the beliefs for the Defence University, this business of Service integration is its biggest myth. This has amply been clarified under the para Inter Service Cooperation mentioned above. If countries like US, UK and even USSR did not feel the necessity to have a Defence University but opted to bring about the effective unification of their Services through the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, it is doubtful if a Defence University can bring this about in our country.

CONCLUSION

The impact made by the current advancement of service and technology on all branches of the armed forces dictates that, the basic academic education of the future Service officer, whether he be a generalist or a

specialist, has to be that of a university graduate level. However, whereas other countries, even the more affluent ones, achieve this by imparting to their military officers basic academic education in civil universities, and only sending them to Service schools for specialised military training, we in our poor country choose to duplicate even the civil university education in our basic service establishments. We have been made to believe, that the added expenditure is justified on the grounds of quality, namely, that the direct entry university graduates are only the left overs, and the good ones do not join the Services. Possibly this is correct in perspective to what the Services have to offer compared with other more lucrative careers, and is not peculiar to India alone, but the pattern is prevalent in all other countries as well. However, instead of improving the existing service conditions of the military to attract first rate graduates from civil universities, we seem to be recruiting mediocre material from secondary schools, and putting them through Service colleges, in the hope of turning them into good professionals later on. If for any reason the Army feels the necessity of only recruiting school boys, it can still impart to them the necessary professional training by sending them to civil universities after they are commissioned, as is the practice in UK and USA.

To conclude, the basic question to be asked for justifying the establishment of the various professional colleges in the army, is an economical one, in that, when more affluent countries like UK and USA cannot afford the cost of even institutions like the CME, AFMC and the IDM, can we a poor country like India, even think of affording the luxury of a Defence University? In any case, there is no added advantage to be gained by it, except perhaps to enable a BA (Def. Univ.) to be put against the soldiers name. However, experience shows that, the chances of him obtaining a civil appointment on this ground alone (as that seems to be the prime objective of this exercise) will still remain as remote as at present. A Defence University cannot regain the image, worth and prestige of the Serviceman, which has been lowered after Independence — only the character of our military leadership can restore this to its former glory.

To sum up, our existing military technical institutions may be the finest of their kind in the country, of which the Services are justly proud. The question is, when equivalent type of education already exists in our civil universities, and when even the more affluent countries do not feel the need of duplicating this in their military establishments, can a poor country like India afford this luxury.

Pakistani Prisoners of War in India— The Great Escape Bid

MAJ GEN AFSIR KARIM, AVSM (RETD)

When the 50 (Indep) Parachute Brigade returned to AGRA after 1971 operations some of its units had to stay out in the open as their unit lines had been requisitioned for a POW Camp for some of the Pakistan Army personnel who had surrendered in Bangla Desh. However, of some thousands of prisoners who were brought to Agra about two thousand or so could not be accommodated in this Camp and were therefore lodged in Agra Jail in Civil Lines. It was from this high security jail that a most daring and ingenious escape bid was made by sixty odd Pakistani other ranks belonging to the Special Service Group (SSG) and the Baluch Regiment. The news of this audacious attempt caused a major sensation at that time. Inevitably a court of inquiry was ordered by the Station Commander, to inquire into the circumstances of the attempted escape and pin point responsibility for the lapses.

Statements given to the Court by the prisoners unfolded a most fascinating tale of grit and determination of a few persons and also of human frailties of some others. Having heard the stories of Second World War prison Camps and daring escapes from these, we were curious to know how the plan for escape was made and activated by a few other ranks of the Pakistani Army, in our environment.

Agra Central Jail is a typical example of high security Jails of British era with very high walls and various compartments and compounds inside. The chances of any mass break out from this kind of complex are very slim indeed. Deep tunnelling by highly skilled groups perhaps was the only way escape could be affected; if the tunnelling operation could go on unnoticed. Problems of disposal of earth would be insurmountable in such environment as it would be well nigh impossible to hide or camouflage the enormous amount of earth which would be thrown up in a tunnelling operation. Moreover, digging of a stable tunnel would require suitable implements, props and absolute secrecy. On the face of it, such a task seemed beyond accomplishment under the circumstances. Yet all these difficulties were successfully overcome by a group of prisoners and a tunnel was dug right under the noses of the security personnel without any one being the wiser. Despite the astounding effort and ingenuity of the plan, the attempt failed; this is another strange and interesting facet of this story.

The POWs which were examined by the Court were cooperative and gave their statements freely except if any question which could implicate our Jawans was asked; here we always came up against a stonewall. One of them explained later, the reason for this 'Sir your rules and military laws are the same as ours, so something we say may implicate an Indian Jawan for no reason'.

Asked as to why were they so concerned about Indian Jawan, the answer (invariably) was "after all we are all soldiers, and the Indian Jawan had given us all the regard due to a prisoner of war, he never harassed us or insulted us".

The rest of the story which remained consistent throughout was told freely with justifiable pride in their effort and a little sadness for having failed. The main ingredients of the story reconstructed from various statements and inspection of various sites is narrated below.

The ball was set rolling quite by chance when one POW NCO peeped through a gap in the rafters of a dilapidated wooden barrack which stood in the centre of their Courtyard. This long barrack which was sealed and barricaded by barbed wires, was due for demolition since long. Later this NCO mentioned to a senior NCO that this barrack was empty and could be used for secret meeting, only if they could get into it without being noticed. It was obvious that if they tried to make an entry through the rafters or a door they will be spotted straight away, even if they were seen hanging around this barrack, suspicion of the authorities may be aroused. Finally a plan was drawn, to dig into the barrack from a corner which could be used as a spot for prayers and was not under the direct observation of any sentry. A suitable spot was selected and prayer mats for a platoon were set here with due permission taken from the authorities. After watching the movements of the sentries and pattern of surprise checks, the initial digging started with the only implement available to them – a steel eating plate discarded by some one in older days. The trick was to dig under the mats during morning or evening prayers when the light was not too good and dig only a little at a time so that the earth could be disposed or spread under the mats. Time was no consideration at this stage.

They made slow but steady progress and managed to add a blade of a pick axe to their store of digging implements. This blade was obtained after some planning, from the handle of a pick while washing implements in a shallow reservoir, after working on a vegetable patch. One fine evening they entered this barrack, unnoticed through a one man tunnel or hole which had its opening under the prayer mats. Once inside this barrack, they realised it was an ideal place to hide the earth and they could dig a tunnel towards the

outer wall. The direction for the tunnel was to be maintained with the help of a TV mast on a house outside which was visible from their compound.

The task seemed quite hopeless to begin with, but soon a few more digging implements were smuggled in, some more were improvised and the digging started inside the barrack right in earnest. It was safer to work during the day when outside noises drowned the noise of digging inside and a discreet watch could be kept on the sentries. Over a period of about two months, earth kept on piling inside the barrack without any one getting the wind of it. The digging of the tunnel required great patience, skill, and hard work but with each foot of tunnel the enthusiasm and hopes, kept on mounting; one day lo and behold one of them could peep out and see the busy street outside the Jail Compound.

All was set now and it was decided to attempt the escape before or during morning prayers in dim light conditions and when the street outside will be deserted. The pre dawn activity would also preclude easy detection during or after the escape. All else was ready. Some old clothes and Indian currency had already been stored inside the barracks, which would enable about sixty men to escape dressed in assorted civilian clothes. Finally after a conference it was decided to effect the escape after 'ID-UL MILAD' the Prophets birthday which was now a couple of days away. This decision was based on two reasons both sentimental; firstly, they wanted to escape after 'Khatm-ul-QURAN' the end of ceremonial reading of the Holy Book related to Prophets birthday. Secondly, they did not want to spoil the festivities of 'ID-UL-MILAD' for other prisoners, as their escape would surely cause great commotion and authorities would impose severe restrictions on others.

This delay, perhaps, proved the undoing of their otherwise meticulous plans; the very next day someone gave information of their plans and the tunnel to the camp authorities. Their plans for reaching Pakistan after the escape were rather vague but had a fighting chance. They had planned to divide themselves into small groups of three or four and hitch-hike in trucks going towards Punjab border. Since most of them were trained commandos they expected to survive all the way without much problem. According to them they had no outside connections but if hard pressed they would have sought refuge in a masolium or a mosque, pretending to be pilgrims heading for Ajmer Sherif.

Their answer to our question as to who according to them leaked out their plan indicated that they all suspected the 'MULLAH' – one of the soldiers deputed to head platoon or company prayers according to the cus-

toms of Pakistani Army. Such a soldier sports a beard and gets some privileges - generally such people are not trusted by hard boiled soldiers in any Army.

The Court of inquiry revealed that the commandos of the SSG group were highly trained and motivated soldiers and were experts in the techniques of escape and evasion. Their NCO class was far more intelligent and better educated than the normal sepoy or NCO of the Infantry of the Line. Another factor which came to light was that, those personnel who were not highly motivated and had been away from their near and dear ones for a long period in erstwhile East Pakistan, were extremely susceptible to small pressures. A sense of isolation, anxiety and uncertainty had made them highly vulnerable and they could, therefore, be bribed by small things like a promise of a letter or news from home - even a packet of cigarettes was enough for some nicotine addicts.

The inquiry on the other hand, revealed serious lapses on the part of the Camp authorities; one of the reasons for this seemed to be that most officers selected for this task were superseded officers on the last leg of their service. A case of selling prisoners rations in the camp made head lines at a later date. In such circumstances a tunnelling operation of this magnitude could perhaps go undetected.

Well, it may not be out of place to end this narrative on an anecdote of human interest. During this court of inquiry a POW major sent us urgent messages stating he had something important to say. This is what he told us when he was given an opportunity "I want to be transferred to the other Camp in the Cantonment. Here they blindfold me every time they take me outside - though it is quite unnecessary because I know this town rather well, you see I belonged to Agra before partition. Moreover I was brought to the same place as a POW in 1965. I therefore, request an immediate transfer to the other Camp which I believe is in proper unit lines."

The MacGregor Memorial Medal 1889-1989

MAJOR ROBERT HAMOND (RETD), THE ROYAL NORFOLK REGIMENT

*Down to Gehenna or up to the Throne
He travels the fastest who travels alone.*

Rudyard Kipling *The Winners*.

(Quoted by Captain G.E. Leachman, The Royal Sussex Regiment, (award for 1911), during his journeys in Northeast Arabia).

*Deserts have the same effect on me as unknown
mountain ranges. I always want to look beyond.*

(Colonel C. M. MacGregor, as he rode into the Kara Kum desert towards Merv).

Personal Diary 1879 – 1880

HISTORY OF THE MEDAL

The medal was founded by the United Service Institution of India in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor KCB CSI CIE, who had founded the USI of India in 1870.

PURPOSE OF THE MEDAL

It was intended that the medal should be awarded annually for the best military reconnaissance, journey of exploration or survey in remote areas of India, or in countries bordering or under the jurisdiction of India, which produced new information of value for the defence of India. In some areas it was, in fact, the medal of 'The Great Game'.

Personal risk to life during these journeys was not a necessary qualification for the award but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who had incurred the greater risk would be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

Most journeys, especially in the remote areas of the Himalayas and Tibet, in the deserts of Persia and Afghanistan, and in the jungle regions of Burma, Assam and the Tibet/China/Siam borders, carried an in-built physical risk. Some areas had additional hazards in the form of hostile inhabitants, brigands and decoits, as well as dangers from wild animals and lethal diseases. A few medals were awarded in times of war for reconnaissances in, or escapes from, enemy-occupied territory and for these medallists there were additional dangers.

In some years no medal was awarded; in others more than one were given. A medal would sometimes be awarded several years after the journey had been made. Such awards were at the discretion of HE C in C, India, who might, in a year in which no journey had justified an award, bring forward a journey made in previous years which had not led to an award in the year in which the journey was made.

In the 100 years from 1889 – 1989, 77 Gold and Silver medal awards were made to 65 Officers, (one Officer gaining two awards), and to 11 Indian Other Ranks who had done especially valuable work. Of these 77 medals, 7 were Gold and the remainder were Silver. (In these figures I have assumed that the 7 Officers awarded Gold medals were not also awarded Silver medals, although both could be awarded. See 'Eligibility for Award', following). In addition to the above awards, 37 Indian Other Ranks were awarded the reduced size Silver medal, with ribbon and gratuity, between 1889 and 1947 but no awards of this medal have been made since 1943.

ELIGIBILITY FOR THE AWARD

INITIALLY,

Officers

- (a) British officers of British Regiments serving in India.
- (b) British and Indian officers of Indian Army Regiments.
- (c) Political officers (many of whom had transferred from their Regiments to the Political Service).

LATER,

Eligibility was extended to officers of all Services and, during the Second World War, to British Commonwealth of Nations Officers while serving with the India Establishment or with South East Asia Command.

Officers were awarded the standard size Silver medal or, in cases where especially valuable work had been done, the Gold medal instead of, or in addition to, the Silver medal.

OTHER RANKS

All Other Ranks of British and Indian Army Regiments were eligible for the award of the reduced size Silver medal which was worn suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal. Indian soldiers in uniform were entitled to wear the medal on ceremonial occasions. These awards were accompanied by a gratuity, usually of Rs 100 or sometimes more.*

The term "Indian Army" included Indian State Forces, Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under Local Governments.

Despite this widening of eligibility, all awards of Gold and standard size Silver medals were, in fact, made to Army officers, British and Indian, to Political Officers and to a few Indian Other Ranks whose work was deemed to be especially valuable and who, for the most part, worked for the Survey of India. Indian Army and Political Officers, often because of the geographical location of their stations, had greater opportunities for carrying out reconnaissances or explorations in remote areas than were available to officers of the British Army, Royal Indian Navy or Royal Indian Air Force. In fact, only nineteen officers of the British Army were awarded this medal; two were Cavalry officers (who later became Political Officers), four came from Royal Artillery Regiments (one of whom transferred to the Indian Army and later became a Political Officer), eight were from Royal Engineers and five from British Infantry Regiments (one of whom later became a Political Officer).

The opportunities for British Other Ranks were even more restricted; they had little chance of making such journeys as they lacked funds, knowledge of Countries and their languages, and were much more confined than were officers to the immediate environs of their regimental stations. Consequently all awards of the reduced size Silver medal with ribbon were made to Other Ranks of the Indian Army.**

* The medal ribbon is nowadays worn in uniform and the gold or standard size silver medal, adapted to hang from the ribbon round the neck, is worn on ceremonial occasions.

** Awards of this later medal have not been researched due to lack of information available but their names and Regiments are listed at the end of the Appendix ("Register of Awards") although without any information about their journeys/work except where this has come to light during research into awards to officers. This Appendix, on which research continues, is not published as part of this article but will be included with this article in a pamphlet to be published in due course by the USI of India.

Since 1947 eligibility has been confined to the present Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force (including Territorial Forces, Reserve Forces, Assam Rifles and Militias) and awards have been made to only eleven officers over the years 1947 - 1989. In recent years the necessity and opportunities for journeys of reconnaissance or exploration having declined, the Council has decided that the conditions for the award of the medal should, henceforth, be as follows :-

- (a) The first priority of the award will continue to be for the best military reconnaissance or journey of exploration in any year.
- (b) In the absence of any individual eligible on the above count, then the following activities may also be considered for an award of the MacGregor medal :-
 - (i) Mountain/Desert expedition,
 - (ii) Rafting down rivers,
 - (iii) World cruise like Trishna. (15 month round the world cruise, sponsored by Adventure Foundation of Corps of Engineers, 1985-1987. Officers of Madras, Bengal and Bombay Engineering Groups took part.)
 - (iv) Polar Expedition,
 - (v) Running/Trekking across the Himalayas,
 - (vi) Flights including adventure by light aircraft/microlight aircraft.

DESCRIPTION OF THE MEDAL

1. Standard size Silver medal, without buckles, bob, ring or ribbon, contained in a medal case about 4 ins by 4 ins. Medal $2\frac{3}{4}$ ins diameter, weight 168 grams, silver. Normally awarded to officers but also to Indian Other Ranks who had done especially valuable work.
2. Reduced size Gold medal, as above, $1\frac{1}{4}$ ins diameter. Awarded to officers for especially valuable work.
3. Reduced size Silver medal, with buckles, bob, ring and ribbon with which to suspend the medal round the neck, and a gratuity, usually of Rs 100 but sometimes more. Awarded to Other Ranks.

All medals carried the same design, as below :-

Obverse side. Effigy of Major General Sir Charles MacGregor is in the centre, the legend 'Major General Sir Charles MacGregor KCB CSI CIE' is situated on the upper periphery and the inscription 'In Memoriam 1887' on the lower periphery.

Reverse side. Depicts figures of Army personnel belonging to various races who served during British rule in India.

OBSERVE SIDE

REVERSE SIDE




Around the outer rim of each medal is inscribed the year of award, rank, initials, name and Regiment of the medallist, followed by 'for valuable reconnaissances' or 'for valuable work', the word 'especially' being added in the case of Gold medal awards to officers and standard size Silver medal awards to Indian Other Ranks in place of the reduced size Silver medal with ribbon normally awarded to them.

RIBBON FOR REDUCED SIZE SILVER MEDAL

Colours of the ribbon, from left to right, are :-

Red, Green, Red Green, Black, White, Black, Green, Red, Green, Red.
These colours are based on the MacGregor tartan.



Photograph by Alex Law ABIPP

THE MEDALLISTS – WHO WERE THEY?

They came from several sources; Survey of India personnel who mapped remote areas, Military Attaches, Consuls and Political Officers who explored routes across deserts and through mountains and jungles in the countries to which they had been accredited, sending in reports on the feasibility of mounting military operations in those areas; Indian Army officers, both British and Indian, with a distaste for the humdrum Regimental routine and trivial social life in their stations in India, sought appointments in the wilder frontier areas; others, including a handful of officers from British Regiments, with a similar inclination, spent their leaves, often combined with shooting, in journeying into little-known regions thereby adding to the Government's knowledge of those parts.

A study of the books and reports written by medallists, combined with information supplied by their families or friends, gives us a picture of the characteristics of these men. Some were "loners" who preferred solitude to the company of their fellow men but nearly all of them travelled alone, possessing a self-sufficiency which enabled them to live alone among alien peoples. Many were energetic and restless by nature, driven by a sense of adventure and a strong desire to find out what lay behind the mountains, in the heart of the deserts or in the unexplored jungles. They accepted the hardships, loneliness and, at times, dangers which they knew would attend their journeys, aware that, by travelling alone, they could be more flexible in their decisions and would get more "under the skin" of the countries in which they travelled.

There were disadvantages in journeying alone; serious illness and vulnerability to attack by hostile natives being the main ones but, although a few were ultimately killed or died on later journeys, most felt that the advantages of travelling alone outweighed the risks involved.

A few medallists, in both World Wars, were involved in military operations into, or escaping from, enemy-occupied territory, especially in the Near East, 1915-1920, and in Burma, 1942-1945. For them there were additional military risks on top of the normal physical hazards which attended journeys in wild country. But, wherever they travelled and whatever they did, the ability to live alone for long periods was paramount and virtually all medallists possessed this gift.

Many Indian Officers and Indian Other Rank medallists worked for the Survey of India; some Other Ranks accompanied British Officer medallists on their reconnaissances or served as guides or escorts to expeditions such as those undertaken by Sir Aurel Steen in 1912-1916 in Central Asia and in the 1930's in the Hindu Kush. But there were a few Officers and Other Ranks, who followed the lonely path of Lt. Col. T. G. Montgomerie's "Pandits"; the latter carried out extensive reconnaissances in disguise between 1864 and 1884, mainly in the North-west frontier areas, Tibet, Assam and the North-east borders of Burma with China and Tibet. These men played the "Great Game" in the manner of Mahbub Ali and Hurree Chand Mukerjee in Kipling's "Kim". They were brave and resolute men who, although less conspicuous than British officers in disguise, put their lives at risk in areas where every man carried a weapon and life was cheap. They often endured great hardships and danger but they gathered much Intelligence information of value for the defence of India.

The tradition has been carried on by medallists for a century. The dangers attending exploration in the earlier years had receded to some extent between the two World Wars but have increased sharply during the last forty years on India's northern borders from Ladakh to the North-east frontier.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Pending completion of research into awards, which will eventually be published as 'Register of Awards' and attached to this Paper, readers may be interested in the following examples of journeys made by medallists. They have been selected to show the vast range of terrain in which awards were won. These journeys were the ones for which medallists were awarded the medal; many of them also explored in other areas and on other occasions.

AWARD SOME EXAMPLES OF WORK DONE BY MEDALLISTS

- 1880 *Capt. F.E. YOUNGHUSBAND*, 1 KDG
Recces/Route surveys. Leh – Kashgar. Return via Karakorum
Gilgit – Kashmir.
- 1893 *Capt. H. BOWER*, 17 BC (Gold Medal)
Recces/Route surveys. Ladakh – W.Tibet (Changtang) – China.
- 1910 *Maj. P.M. SYKES* CMG, 2DG (Political Dept), (Gold Medal).
Recces in Persia.
- 1910 *Khan Bahadur SIHER JANG*, Coke's Rifles & Survey of India.
Recces/Surveys Baluchistan/Afghan border 1909, Afghan Mission
1910.
- 1912 *Capt. B.E.A. PRITCHARD*, 83 Wallajahbad LI, (Gold Medal).
Recces Burma (NE Frontier). Killed by local tribes about 1914).
- 1914 *Capt. F.M. BAILEY*, 32 Sikh Pnrs & Political Dept.
Recces & Surveys together with *Capt. H.T.M. MORSHEAD* RE
and separately, Tsangpo valley, Dihang & Dibang valleys, 1911-
12.
- 1921 *Maj. A.L. HOLT* OBE RE
Recces/Surveys North Arabian Desert.
- 1927 *Maj. M.C. LAKE*, 4/4th Bombay Grenadiers.
Recces Aden Protectorate and Yemen.

- 1938 *Maj A.S. LANCASTER*, 2/10 Gurkha Rifles, M A Kabul.
Recces in Afghanistan.
- 1946 *Col. A.S. LANCASTER*. CIE OBE
Recces in Afghanistan (The only officer to have been awarded two medals)
- 1942 *Subdr TEGHBAHADUR LIMBU*, NSS Bn Burma FF.
Escape from Lashio area back to India through Japanese-occupied territory. commissioned and awarded MC also.
- 1943 *Hav DHIRTA SINGH* 4/11th Sikhs. (Reduced size silver medal with ribbon). Escaped from POW camp at Tobruk August 1942 with three others and travelled nearly 400 miles on foot back to our lines. His observations of enemy movements and positions through which he had to pass proved of great value. Awarded IDSM also.
- 1957 *Capt. V BADHWAR*, 5th Gurkha Rifles
Carried out valuable military recces in E. Ladakh.
- 1971 *Maj. C.S. NUGYAL*, Sikh (Gold Medal)
Carried out strategic military recces of exceptional value in Eastern Himalayas.

The Annexation of the Punjab

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SL MENEZES, PVSM, SC (RETD)

It has been said that political and financial considerations made it impossible for Lord Hardinge to annex the whole of the Punjab after the First Sikh War. But the Bhairowal Treaty of 1846, which he forced on the Lahore Darbar was worse than annexation of the land of the five rivers to the British territories. That treaty was intended to provoke hostilities, and then the appointment of Sir Frederick Currie as Resident, who had no love for Dalip Singh or the Khalsa Raj, was made with the secret object of exasperating the Sikhs, of goading them to war and of finally annexing their country. Many Englishmen were clamorous for devouring the remnant of the Kingdom of Ranjit Singh. This is evident from the letters addressed to the Governor-General of India (Lord Dalhousie), by "Economist," an officer of practical experience in the Punjab.* Just after the surrender of Dewan Mulraj in 1849 at Multan, this officer addressed the first of his letters to Dalhousie, in which he advised him to annex the Punjab. He wrote :

"The arguments in favour of annexation of the Punjab are rather negative than positive - rather that no one can devise any other possible plan than that the acquisition itself is desirable."

In the above sentence is struck the keynote of all his arguments for the annexation. He did not stop to consider whether such a measure was just or not, but he proceeded and said :

"The question now to be decided is no matter of petty policy - no mere affair of Duleep Singh or Sir Frederick Currie, nor even a purely Sikh question ... But it is now for you, my Lord, to fix the permanent limits of our Indian Empire... A lasting line of demarcation must be drawn; permanent land marks must be set up; and then, having disposed of our external defences, we may turn to internal management, and do what we have never yet done - make the country pay."

It was on these grounds that this officer told Dalhousie to "Hold it (Punjab) for good, or give it up for ever."

To keep the people of the Punjab in subjection, he advised Dalhousie to grind them to poverty, place the iron heel on their necks and rule them

* These letters were reprinted and published by the "Sun" printing press of Lahore in 1897. "Economist" was Sir George Campbell, who rose to be the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

without any show of justice or mercy. He wrote : "Do not buy the consent of such people to a 'treaty of annexation.' Take a more straightforward and wiser course. In regard to those who have really some claim to be considered the nobility of the country, Sikh Chiefs, and Jagheer-possessing sodies, gooroos; etc., - I would only say, keep them down as much as possible. A well satisfied and unimpoverished nobility may be all very well to European notions, but, if we are to rule in Asia, we are much better without them.... Such people should be reduced to a reasonable subsistence, so that they may neither be driven entirely desperate, nor retain more than is good for them and for us."

This was no doubt a counsel of perfection, on which it is needless to say that the Government of India in those days always acted not only in the Punjab, but in other parts of India also.

The same writer pointed out the advantages of annexation as follows :

1. It is easier (and especially so in India where the principle of passive obedience to the power that be is so universal) to hold in check disarmed than an armed people.

2. A considerable force must always be maintained on the frontier of India. If this force occupies the Punjab the revenues of that country are available as an offset to meet a portion of the expense....

3. By taking the Punjab we arrive at the natural boundaries of India, and obtain a final settlement of the question.

4. We shall be enabled to establish a sure defence against the hordes of Central Asia and the Russians, or any one else who may have an eye to the East....

5. Independent of the expense and anxiety of always keeping an army in the field east of the Sutlej, we have, as a question of humanity, to choose between a state of continual war and a secure peace.

6. If we do not keep the Punjab - what then? We must abandon the country and retire - our prestige will be ruined and our name will lose its spell. We shall have commenced a backward career. Is any one prepared to advocate this? I believe that it is impossible. ...

"... The Punjab must henceforth be held by British troops, and by British troops alone. The occupation must be complete as to manner - no concurrent,

but an exclusive possession - complete as to place - of no portion of the country, but of the whole - complete as to time - for no term of years, but for a permanency."

He did not advise Dalhousie to repeat the experiment of Hardinge, the experiment of a double government in the Punjab. He wrote :

"There is nothing on which so much depends as the feeling of self-responsibility. If the natives are left to themselves, they feel that every thing rests with themselves, and they are not altogether depraved. Take away this feeling - support them with a military force - interfere vexatiously in their civil system - and they become but the corrupt instruments of a corrupt system. They lose all power of doing good, but apply their remaining strength to do unmitigated evil for their own sordid and selfish ends. I utterly deny the possibility of a respectable native Government supported by our troops and over-ridden by our Politicals.

The natives cannot consider themselves the rulers of the country...

"The people of the country would not feel themselves thoroughly our subjects. They would be exposed to the evils of either system, they would be serving two masters. Unquiet and uncertainty must prevail, and all progress be much retarded."

But the strongest argument that he advanced for annexation of the Punjab was that might is right. He wrote :

"People begin to discover that, in a country where from time immemorial might is right, we having the greatest might have also the best right... it has become our duty as well as our right to hold."

Another argument which this officer urged in favour of annexation was that the continuance of the Sikh Raj would go against the interests of the Muhammadan population of the Punjab, because they assisted the English against the Sikhs and so the latter would make short work of them. He wrote :

"After having stirred them (the frontier Musalman tribes) up to rebel against the Sikhs unassisted by our troops, how we are to persuade them to receive as the price of their exertions a yet heavier yoke, I don't know. Abbott's Hazarehs and Edwardes' Pathans can hardly consider themselves to be fighting merely on our account. They look on it as an opportunity of regaining their inheritance."

Of course, Dalhousie was for annexation.

But Henry Lawrence, who had returned and resumed charge of the Lahore Residency from Sir Frederick Currie in the beginning of January, 1849, was opposed to annexation. Wrote Campbell :

"I understand, however, that Sir Henry Lawrence is opposed to it, Now, I would not for a moment be supposed to impugn the purity of that gentleman's motives, but I beg of you to remember that not only was he a principal artificer in the settlement which has just broken down, but under present arrangements he is king of the Punjab. As then, human nature is but human nature, you must regard Sir Henry not so much as an unbiased adviser as a potentate pleading his own cause. ...

"To another opinion of Sir Henry's I would not be so tolerant. It is said that he has come back to declare that the 'Sikhs had been exceedingly ill used' and that if he had stayed there would have been nothing of the kind. Now this is, really, too much. ...

"altogether, I think that if Sir H. Lawrence says that the Sikhs were ill used after his departure, the charge is ungrateful and unfair."

Campbell considered the Treaty existing between the English and the Sikhs as so much waste paper, for, he wrote :

"I am glad to find that the treaty seems to have died a natural death. No argument is hinged on that pretext, and the tenderest conscience may, therefore, throw over that consideration without fear of offence. In fact, 'the Sikhs' neither made the treaty nor broke it. The few individuals who went through the farce of consent were nominees of the British power. Dileep Singh was a mere piece of paper money, and is now as valueless as a note when the bank has broken."

The government in England were reluctant to annex the Punjab because it was inhabited by martial people who might give trouble to their English rulers. Against this argument Campbell wrote :

"After all, fear is the prevailing argument against annexation. The Times talks of the martial tribes commencing with the Sutlej. But you are not 'afraid'. ...

"But annex, if things are managed by people who understand them, the country will assume exactly the same phase as the Cis-Sutlej territory—"

"The broad fact remains, that in our own important possessions serious rebellion has throughout our history in India been unknown. Will you, then - can you, in the face of this all-powerful fact—give way to imaginary fear? ...Annexation will bring safe and lasting peace."

Such were the arguments of Campbell for annexing the Punjab. And when Dalhousie did annex, he wrote his last letter in which he heartily congratulated him.

On the 29th March, 1849, Dalhousie issued a proclamation tolling the death-knell of the Sikh Raj.

In his farewell minute, dated the 28th of February, 1856 Dalhousie, with that unscrupulous disregard for truth which characterised his diplomacy, wrote:

"The murder of the British officers at Mooltan, and the open rebellion of the Dewan Moolraj, were not made pretext for quarrel with the Government of Lahore. ... The Sikhs themselves were called upon to punish Moolraj as a rebel against their own sovereign, and to exact reparation for the British Government whose protection they had previously invoked.

"But when it was seen that the spirit of the whole Sikh people was inflamed by the bitterest animosity against us - when Chief after Chief deserted our cause, until nearly their whole Army, led by Sirdars who had signed the treaties, and by members of the Council of Regency itself, was openly arrayed against us - when above all, it was seen that the Sikhs, in the eagerness for our destruction, had been combined in unnatural alliance with Dost Mahomed Khan and his Mohamedan tribes - it became manifest that there was no alternative left. The question for us was no longer one of policy or of expediency, but one of national safety.

"Accordingly, the Government put forth its power. After a prolonged campaign, and a struggle severe and anxious, the Sikhs were utterly defeated and subdued, the Afghans were driven with ignominy through the mountains, and the Punjab became a British province."

Regarding this annexation, Major Evans Bell observed :

"Lord Dalhousie's procedure in settling the future relations of the Punjab with British India after the campaign of 1849, just amounts to this : a guardian, having undertaken, for a valuable consideration, a troublesome and dangerous trust, declares, on the first occurrence of those troubles and dangers, of which

he had full knowledge and fore-warning, that as a compensation for his exertions and a protection for the future, he shall appropriate his Ward's estate and personal property to his own purposes. And this, although the guardian holds ample security in his own hands for the repayment of any outlay, and the satisfaction of any damages he might have incurred, in executing the 'conditions of the trust.'*

The same author has exposed the untruthful character of the statements contained in Dalhousie's proclamation. Extracts from his writings are given below. He wrote :

"During the period prescribed by the Treaty for the Maharaja's minority, no crisis, no second struggle, could absolve the British Government from the obligations of guardianship and management, so long as it professed to fulfil those duties, and was able to do so without interruption :

" ... supposing the rebellion had not been in the slightest degree provoked or extended by any error, excess, omission, or delay of the British Government, — Lord Dalhousie's Case would not be in the least improved. Supposing that the surmise by which he attempted to justify the annexation, were demonstrably true, and that the Sikhs were really animated, from the first day of the occupation, with so deep and bitter a hostility, that they only watched their opportunity for revolt, and would never have been pacified without a second lesson, then I say that they were entitled to that second lesson, without any extra charge. The State of Lahore had paid heavily in money, and in territory, for the first lesson; and we had undertaken, in consideration of an annual subsidy, secured on the public revenues administered by ourselves, to perform the office of teacher for a term of years. If unexpected difficulties had presented themselves in the performance of this office, we should even then, have had no right to complain. But it was not so. We understood quite well the nature of the evils to encounter and cure, and they were clearly aggravated by our own malpractice."

"The continued existence of this Regency, throughout the rebellion, proves that British responsibility and guardianship were never shaken off or shifted for a day. If indeed the British Resident had been driven from his position at Lahore; if he had lost the custody of the Maharajah's person; if he had been forced to abdicate for a time the functions of government, and the Ward and thrown off his tutelage, the guardian might have been justified in re-entering the country as a conqueror, and declaring all previous engagements to be at an end. But no such interruption ever took place. The Resident's

* Major Evans Bell, *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy*, (1868) p.142.

authority as Chief ruler of the Punjab was never suspended. During the rebellion, which in Lord Dalhousie's opinion warranted him in dethroning his Ward, the capital city was never disturbed, and the Government of the Punjab, exactly as we had chosen to organise it - including the Council of Regency, - was unaltered to the last. ...

"Lord Dalhousie totally fails to make out any violation of the Treaty against the Lahore State, - the only specific instance he adduces, the non-payment of the subsidy, being, as we have seen a mere matter of account, by which the case is not modified to the prejudice of the State of Lahore. He contrives to fasten a plausible stigma of perfidy and violation of treaties upon the State of Lahore, only by ringing the changes through several paragraphs, upon the terms, 'the Sikh nation', 'the Sikhs,' 'the sikh people,' and 'the Government,' or 'State of Lahore,' until a thorough confusion is established. For these are not convertible terms.

"The Sikh people,' ... is not a phrase synonymous with 'the people of the Punjab,' the great majority of whom took no share in the revolt, and felt no sympathy with it; while at least 20,000 subjects of the Lahore State, enrolled in its service, fought on the side of the Government, and assisted in suppressing the rebellion.

"It is strange that Lord Dalhousie should have so completely overlooked the real difference between 1846 and 1849. The question of age was immaterial at both periods. There was no plea of annexation in 1846 when the warning was given and acknowledged, because the Maharajah was the reigning Prince of an independent state. In 1849 the actual ruler of the state was the British Resident, under the Governor-General's instructions. ...

"From the 16th of December, 1846, the date of the treaty of Bhyrowal, down to the 29th of March, 1849, when the Proclamation annexing the Punjab was issued, the Government of Lahore was in strict subordination to the British Government; and its subordination was never interrupted, suspended, or relaxed for a single day. If, indeed, the Government of Lahore could justly have been made responsible for any of the untoward events in 1848 and 1849, Sir Frederick Currie, the Resident, must have been the first person indicted, for he was the absolute head of that Government."*

There is very little doubt that Lord Dalhousie was assisted by Sir Frederick Currie in drawing up the Proclamation of the 29th March, 1849, sealing the doom of the Sikh Raj.

* Major Evans Bell, *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy*, (1868) Chapter VI.

Karl Von Clausewitz "On Rommel"

BRIG VIJAY OBEROI

(As Revealed to him in a Dream) !

From my lofty perch here I have been following with mounting interest the escapades, nay the momentous happenings in the life and times of this remarkable young man, Erwin J. Rommel, who appears to have captured the imagination of the military mind. I see in this great military leader the vindication of those pearls of wisdom I had so thoughtfully left behind on Earth, and which continue to be studied so avidly by both the real and the pseudo military leaders of the 20th Century. But let me not digress from today's thoughts which are only "On Rommel", that illustrious son of the Fatherland, who comes fairly close to my estimation of a complete military leader.

A brief look at his career first.

This charismatic German general of World War II fame came from a solid middle class background, and not from the upper class, as had been the Prussian tradition. He distinguished himself in World War I, winning both the Iron Cross and the Pour Le Merite. Between the Wars, he rose steadily, holding a number of staff, training and command appointments, including that of Commandant Wiener Neustadt Academy, Austria. During this period he also published an important work – 'Die Infanterie greift an' (Infantry in Attack), which even I have found to be conceptually stimulating; In 1940, as commander of the 7th Panzer Division, he led the invasion of France and became a national hero. In 1941, as a Lieutenant General, he took over command of the Afrika Corps and soon became a figure of world renown. In 1942, he had two promotions, first to Colonel General commanding panzerarmee Afrika and then to Field Marshal. After dominating the desert battles in 1941 and 1942 he was defeated in the Second Battle of El Alamein, but conducted a masterly withdrawal. In February 1943, he defeated the U.S. Forces at the Battle of Kasserine Pass but lost the Battle of Medenine the next month and left Africa for good.

In 1943, Rommel was appointed to inspect German coastal defences along the Atlantic Wall, and in early 1944, he was given command of Army Group B. He was severely wounded on 17 July 1944 in an R.A.F. attack. On 14 October 1944, he was forced to commit suicide because of his alleged

complicity in the abortive plot to assassinate Hitler. Thus ended the life of this great military leader at the young age of 53.

But enough of these historical ruminations. Let me now come to the essentials, viz, Rommel as a military leader.

If you have studied my theories diligently, you will recall that I always described leadership, not in isolation, but in an environment of danger, uncertainty and turmoil, which work together as a psychological fog to disrupt and disorient the commander and his perceptions. Very few commanders can break through this psychological fog to ensure that their soldiers would fight at the right time and in the right place, and win. This feat requires the skills of a military genius.² I find that Rommel managed to penetrate this psychological fog very well, particularly in the campaign he conducted in Africa. This was because he possessed, as I had stated in my writings, 'a very highly developed mental aptitude for the profession of arms'.³

A military genius possesses two very distinct features. The first is the embodiment of a strong mind which I call 'character', and the second is distinct personality traits. Only strong and intense individuals possess the strength of will to sustain the troops in their effort to defeat the enemy. Self control is hence a supreme military virtue. Proper military 'character' develops when the officer balances his intense emotions, with self control acting as a counter-weight.³ A review of how Rommel operated in the desert indicates that he had this military 'character'. As General Alfred Gause has stated 'the command methods employed by Rommel evolved from his almost one-sidedly developed military frame of mind and a certain measure of audacity, combined with ability and flexibility in the exploitation of favourable situations and an extraordinarily instinctive sense for terrain and the enemy situation'.⁴ Consider also what Rommel himself has stated in his paper on Modern Military Leadership – 'the tactical leader of the future, who will decide the battle will need not only mental gifts of a high order, but also great strength of character.

It will in future, be impossible to make more than a rough forecast of the course of a battle. The issue will be decided by flexibility of mind, eager acceptance of responsibility, a fitting mixture of caution and audacity, and the greater control over the fighting troops.⁵ A truly accurate prediction.

Let us now see some other traits of leadership, which I have so succinctly explained in my treatise "On War", and see how many of these Rommel possessed. The major ones are :-

(a) Of the various types of individuals, only the 'intense' type possesses the character to become a good military commander. The 'intense' type is best able to summon the titanic strength it takes to clear away the enormous burdens that obstruct activity in war.⁶

(b) To balance the commander's intense passions and provide him the knowledge to deal with uncertainty, danger and suffering, he must be well educated and should possess an imaginative and reflective intellect.⁷

(c) Ultimately, commanders must use their intellect and temperament to turn their knowledge into genuine action. The excellent commander is the individual who is 'permanently armed' with the proper knowledge to deal with war's quickening tempo. These leadership qualities are "Coup d'oeil" and "determination".⁸

(d) Commanders need both physical and moral courage. Moral courage includes a willingness to face powerful psychological pressures, make a decision and accept the responsibility of actions.⁹

(e) In great battles, boldness is always necessary. Boldness is a noble quality that allows a commander to rise above the engagement's menacing danger to provide the proper leadership.¹⁰

(f) Potential leaders must first of all be born with the proper temperament, and then they must acquire military skills through rigorous study of practical and theoretical knowledge.¹¹

(g) Excellent military leadership includes the sort of mind that is inquiring rather than the creative mind, the comprehensive rather than the specialised approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children and the safety and honour of our country.¹²

The following statements of General Alfred Gause regarding Rommel confirm that Rommel did possess the qualities of a great military commander, which I have enumerated above :-

"(a) Rommel had a robust constitution, disdain for personal safety and an almost ascetic frugality.

(b) While conducting operations, Rommel at no time lost sight of the overall situation, in spite of being away from his established command post.

- (c) He conducted operations with extreme dash and free from any stereotyped rules. To retain the initiative was one of his cardinal laws.
- (d) In spite of his boldness Rommel was not rash.
- (e) What earned him the respect, devotion and loyalty of his troops was his personal courage and his absolute reliability in the conduct of operations.”¹³

Another biographer, Major General F.W von Mellenthin has stated the following :-

- “(a) Once Rommel was convinced of the efficiency and loyalty of those in his immediate entourage, he never had a harsh word for them.
- (b) Rommel's vitality was something to marvel at.
- (c) Rommel always 'lead from the front'.
- (d) In planning an operation he was thoughtful and thorough; in taking a decision in the field he was swift and audacious - shrewdly assessing the chances of some daring stroke in the ebb and flow of battle. What I admired most were his courage and resourcefulness, and his invincible determination under the most adverse circumstances.”¹⁴

Lieutenant General Fritz Bayerlin has also well documented the intellectual depths of Rommel.¹⁵

Desmond Young has stated that Rommel had a gift of direct, clear and forceful expression, well in keeping with his character as a commander in war.¹⁶

The conclusion that Rommel was indeed a military genius and a great captain of war, is obvious, you will say; but I, Karl von Clausewitz, the great military theoretician, still hesitate in reaching a firm decision. What is troubling me are some of the other traits of Rommel which also have been commented upon. Consider the following :-

- (a) General Alfred Gause has stated :-

“(i) Rommel's methods were inconvenient for some subordinate commanders because he used to interfere in the control of individual units if he thought it necessary.

(ii) Fundamentally, Rommel was hard, uncompromising and impersonal".¹⁷

(b) Major General F.W. von Mellenthin has stated the following :-

"(i) Rommel was not an easy man to serve; he spared those around him as little as he spared himself. An iron constitution and nerves of steel were needed to work with Rommel.

(ii) Rommel was sometimes embarrassingly outspoken with senior commanders.

(iii) Rommel had some strange ideas on the principles of staff work. A particularly irksome characteristic was his interference in details.

(iv) Decisions affecting the army as a whole were sometimes influenced unduly by purely local successes or failures."¹⁸

(c) Some other views :-

(i) He was difficult to work with. He was by nature impatient and insisted on his orders being obeyed without question.

(ii) Sometimes he was insensitive in his criticism of subordinates.

(iii) In battle, wishing to oversee everything, he concerned himself with details, which are not the proper province of a commander.

(d) And last but not the least, he committed suicide, didn't he? Is this the hallmark of a great captain?

These are some of the imponderables with which I must wrestle before I make a firm conclusion about Rommel. After all, my conclusions will have a profound effect on the contemporary military mind, especially that at the U.S. Army War College, where "students tread lightly and speak in hushed tones when they pass the hollowed niche where my bust is in prominent display".¹⁹ So let me ponder a while.

Perhaps this will be the subject of my Book Nine. These notes will form part of it, rough as they are. That reminds me, I must get back to my book 'On War'; I still have to revise and update it from the 'rather formless mass'²⁰ that it is at present.

Adieu for now, but don't forget to periodically pay obeisance at the alcove dedicated to me, the great Karl von Clausewitz, by the fawning Class of 1982 of the U.S. Army War College.

NOTES

1. This article was written while the author was attending the U.S. Army War College Course, where the writings of Clausewitz are held in great esteem, and are frequently quoted in the context of current issues.
2. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
3. *Ibid.*, p100.
4. Alfred Gause, "Command Techniques Employed by Field Marshal Rommel in Africa," *ARMOR MAGAZINE*.
5. "Modern Military Leadership", in Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, editor, *The Rommel Papers*.
6. Clausewitz, *On War*. p 107.
7. *Ibid*, p15.
8. *Ibid*. p102.
9. *Ibid*. p103.
10. *Ibid*. p190.
11. *Ibid*.
12. *Ibid*. p112.
13. Cause, *Command Techniques*.
14. F. W. von Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles : A Study of the Employment of Army in the Second World War*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.
15. Fritz Bayerlein, "Invasion 1944", in Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart, editor, *The Rommel Papers*.
16. Desmond Young, *Rommel : The Desert Fox*, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1950.
17. Gause, *Command Techniques*.
18. Mellenthin, *Panzer Battles*.
19. Colonel Lloyd J. Mathews, "On Clausewitz," *Army Magazine*, 1988.
20. *Ibid*.

Letters to the Editor

**Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.*

I

WHAT AILS OUR MILITARY MEDICAL SERVICES

Sir,

I would like to present our views with reference to the article titled "What Ails our Military Medical services" Published by Brig NB Grant (Retd) in Apr-Jun 90 Issue of the Journal and I would request you to publish it.

The author has been very critical about the Armed Forces Medical Services without appreciating the tremendous workload that the AFMS has been bearing as a result of ever increasing clientele, which include parents and other dependents of service personnel, ex-servicemen and their families, without any commensurate increase in the staff and resources. The morbidity pattern has changed as a result of inclusion of elderly people requiring more intensive care. The specialist services have been stretched to the extreme and despite various constraints, the AFMS continue to provide efficient patient-care to its clientele.

The author has highlighted various shortcomings of AFMS by comparing the present set-up with IMS of yesteryears on one hand and the modern high-tech hospitals having 5-star medical facilities in the corporate sector on the other hand. Such comparison is unrealistic and not based on equivalent factors.

The article has mentioned about the "excellence" of the IMS officers without explaining the scenario of the Medical care prevailing in the country in those days, which consisted of only rudimentary provincial medical services and a few and ill-equipped hospitals with handful of doctors. Military Medical services were the only well organised medical care system and provided care to limited clientele consisting of British and Indian soldiers and their wives and minor children. The IMS officers were all trained in UK and some of the brilliant specialist officers used to be deputed to the Provincial Medical services and also as Heads of various departments in the few Medical Colleges that existed at that time. Therefore, the doctors in the IMS cadre were regarded as the best ones, in comparison to the Indian

trained doctors in the district hospitals who were mostly licentiates and very few Graduates.

The entry of the profit orientated corporate sector hospitals with their publicity campaign as high-tech institutions for tertiary care alongwith 5-star physical facilities, has contributed to the enhanced expectations of service personnel. These hospitals have plenty of resources and money power to purchase latest technology. But AFMS have to follow the procedure laid down by the Govt and it takes time to acquire any new technology and sophisticated equipments, specially due to resource crunch and limited budgetary allotment to AFMS. Therefore, the comparison of AFMS with private sector hospitals is falacious. However, it may be mentioned that most of the private hospitals of repute have retired AFMS personnel as administrators or specialists on their staff which bears testimony to the competence of the personnel of AFMS.

The provision of medical care for the ex-servicemen is an area of concern for all. It is reiterated that AFMS is equally concerned, if not more, for provision of total medical care to ex-service personnel. The present authorisation of medical care to the ex-servicemen came with a rider of "within locally available and existing resources".

This problem has to be examined in the context of additional workload it has created, as 15 lakh ex-servicemen and their families constitute 60 lakh clientele and about 50,000 ex-servicemen are added every year, which adds another 2 lakh clientele. The morbidity pattern of the ex-servicemen requires intensive care facilities and round the clock attendance by various specialists. This requires added input in terms of staff, equipment, physical facilities, drugs and accommodation. We are projecting the requirements for consideration of the higher authorities at various levels.

The case of Wg Cdr Rakesh Sharma has been mis-quoted. The officer suffered injury to ankle, as far as we know and was sent directly to Sancheti Nursing Home by the public sector undertaking in which he was on deputation. His ailment could have been treated in any of the Military Hospital, leave aside MH Kirkee. Surely, if any individual including service personnel or ex-servicemen prefers Nursing Home care and does not want to be treated in service hospital for reasons of his own, the service hospital cannot be blamed for this.

The author appears to be misinformed about the medical vocabulary of the drugs used in AFMS, which is regularly updated and is most comprehensive. The APC has been deleted about 17 years back and the medicines are purchased in their generic names from reputed pharmaceutical

industries, for optimisation of resources, as proprietary drugs which come in fancy colours and packages are costly and do not add to the efficacy. However the Association of Pharmacologists of India have now voiced that drug manufacturers market their products by generic names as a practice already in vogue in AFMS ever since.

The medical care has become specialist orientated in last three decades with addition of more and more super-specialities. AFMS has also established various types of super-specialist centres in all the Command Hospitals and Army Hospital Delhi Cantt and also in some Zonal Hospitals. These are being updated and modernised with sophisticated equipments and technology and staff with well trained officers and technologists. All these hospitals are recognized by the regional Universities and MCI for Post Graduate training in various subjects. The new Army Hospital at Delhi is under construction and this has been conceived to match any high tech hospital in the country and abroad.

-- *Maj General A Daityari, VSM,*
Senior Consultant (Surgery)
Armed Forces Medical Services

II

MARCHING-THE NDA STYLE

Sir,

It is observed that, the marching at NDA and regimental centre's parades, though perfect in all other respects, is becoming more and more comical to watch. The main cause for this is, the insistence on the men to march on their heels, thereby breaking their natural step, instead of stepping out freely with a natural gait. The effect of this is that,

- (a) the hand becomes stiff, jerky, and is raised even above the shoulder level,
- (b) the stomach sticks out in order to balance the rest of the body,
- (c) the natural swagger is totally lacking, and,
- (d) the whole show appears to be like robots marching mechanically without any rhythm, giving it a clownish effect.

I understand that, even the Medicals are against this, as it causes tension in the natural movement of the body.

I had the opportunity of witnessing passing out parades at Sandhurst, UK, and also at West Point, USA, and believe me that, although in all other respects, our NDA and regimental centre parades are equally good or even better, but to the spectator, our marching is hilarious. we do not march like this at Republic Day parades, where every one steps out with a free and natural movement of the arms and feet; why then is this unnatural style, which appears to be a hotch-potch of the goose-step and a normal march, being adopted at the NDA and our regimental centres?

It is also observed that, at all such parades, it is mentioned in the programme, and the commentator also keeps on announcing that, officers in uniform will stand and salute when the President's or Regimental colours are marched past. Surely, we have not come down to that stage of casualness of asking officers in uniform to salute - is this not expected of them automatically, or have we not trained them to do so? What impression will this have on our foreign guests present at such parades? How is it that abroad, no such instructions are laid down or announcements made?

-- Brig NB Grant, AVSM (Retd)

III

THE CURVED SWORD

Sir,

It is not commonly known that, the sword drill in the army, specially the part where the sword is brought to the lips in salute, is a relic of the Crusade Wars against the Muslims. The act of touching it with the lips, was really meant in kissing the Cross, which the handle of the sword so formed. This practice still continues, but with one difference.

Right upto the '80s, the sword was always straight, as it was always meant to be. However, when Gen Arun Vaidya took over as the COAS, in keeping with the tradition of the Peshwas of his home town Pune, he introduced the curved sword of Shivaji. This curvature does not lend itself to a proper balance, as an effort has to be made to keep it in an upright position. Besides, a curved sword is always more difficult to draw out and put back in its scabard. However, the worst thing that happens is, that when pressing the sword to the lips, a conscientious effort has to be made to ensure that, it does not fall towards the nose and cut it.

I see absolutely no advantage of a curved sword. I wonder, if the sword could again be restored to its former glory of being straight. Perhaps even psychologically, this would be a good thing for our upright army.

-- Brig NB Grant, AVSM (Retd)

IV

INDIA'S ENERGY SCENE

Sir,

The review of the book, 'India's Energy Scene :Options for the Future', by Col R Rama Rao of the Birla Economic Research Foundation, which appeared in the USI Journal Jan-Mar '90 does little justice to the book.

Para 1 of the review avers that aspects of energy conservation and research and development have been adequately covered. Para 3 goes on to discredit this statement claiming that research and development have not been adequately covered. The author has, in fact, devoted an entire chapter (out of the six chapters of the book) on research and development.

The review makes no mention of the author's well reasoned suggestions with regard to energy conservation, substitution and development of alternative sources, notably in the field of renewable energy resources.

The reviewer's suggestion for "some serious efforts" in the research on 'super conductivity' could convey a wrong message to the lay reader. 'Super conductivity' is as yet being researched upon. Though the phenomenon was noticed by the Dutch Scientist Onnes as long ago as 1911 (i.e that electrical resistance to mercury disappeared at 4.2 degs K,- Minus 268.8 degs Celsius), it was only in the eighties that the research efforts registered some progress . American scientists discovered in 1987 that some elements, notably lead, yttrium and bismuth act as super conductors even at temperatures as high as 98 degs K (i.e Minus 175° Celsius). Experiments have been confined to transmission of very small quantities of energy over extremely short distances under laboratory conditions. Thus India's energy transmission problems are unlikely to be solved through the introduction of 'Super conductors' in the foreseeable future.

Col Rama Rao's book is a well researched, lucid exposition of the energy problems faced by the country and our options in finding solutions. It will be of immense interest to experts, researchers and lay men.

-- Lt Gen PE Menon, PVSM (Retd)

V

JUSTICE IN THE ARMY THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Sir,

Justice in the Army is both fair and prompt. Cases do not drag on as they do in the civil courts. Verdicts by military courts, set up under the

Army Act, are usually accepted; the number of appeals against conviction is infinitesimal.

The term, "Administrative Action" in legal parlance means that an officer is sent out of the Service for committing an offence under the Army Act, through a Presidential (Government) order. Recourse to such action is permitted in the Army Act, when trial by court martial is neither expedient nor practical. In a situation like this, the Chief of the Army Staff, has the legal prerogative to recommend to the Government whether an officer's service should be terminated, and if so, whether the officer should be:

- (a) dismissed from the services, or
- (b) removed from the Service, or
- (c) called upon to retire, or
- (d) called upon to resign.

Admittedly, bringing officers particularly the senior ones, to book as per the stipulated procedure, is time consuming and laborious which also ties up members of the court martial for prolonged periods. However, this aspect of military law needs to be looked at afresh.

The important point of military law that I wish to discuss, is the other incongruous aspect of the "Administrative Action"-the "Put in your papers syndrome" which, ipso facto, means that senior officers are quietly advised to leave the Service when involved in disciplinary cases, without going through the usual legalism. It will be readily conceded that this is a travesty of natural justice and a flagrant subversion of law of the land. In fact it is a misuse of a legal provision that allows an easy escape but unethical route to an offender. This lacunae needs to be rectified.

It is a moot point whether letting off senior officers for wrong doing in such an arbitrary manner is the right way to save the image of leadership in the Army; I personally doubt it because it is well nigh impossible to keep misdemeanors of senior officers under the wraps for any length of time. And are such soft options also available to the rank and file? If not, then it would be tantamount to a discriminatory administration of justice. This obviously cannot be permitted.

When, why and how this dubious practice crept into the otherwise excellent justice-dispensation system of the Army is rather obscure. Be that as it may, this legacy of the old British days when the Army Brass did not want defaulting British officers to be exposed to ridicule and loss of face to their native troops, may have served its designated purpose, but in the

present day media exposed environment, it is as outdated as it is unacceptable. The guilty person, howsoever, senior, must face the music the whole hog.

Of late, a spate of senior officers being sent out of the Service on "Administrative" ground, has had its echo among certain sections of troops. A common refrain of their remarks, heard in this context, is somewhat like; "lower ranks are jailed for petty offences while senior officers are let off the hook even for daylight robberies" or words to that effect. Sporadic expressions of dissatisfaction with some actions of their superior officers, may be insignificant now; these may turn dangerous if allowed to fester.

Conviction of the Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Other Ranks (OR) is promulgated in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Defence Services Regulations, and it is also given wide publicity in the Army Orders. The convicted JCOs/OR are also debarred from re-employment in Government and Public Sector Undertakings. Such promulgation, publicity and bar on re-employment are meant to be a deterrent to serving personnel and advice to the employing officials in the Government and Public Sector Undertaking.

It is for consideration whether the same procedure should not be followed for similarly placed officers, whether convicted or sent out of the Service on Administrative ground. Additionally, there is a desirable need for an enforceable social boycott of such officers, for example, they should not be invited to formal functions like Independence/Republic/Army Days, Passing Out Parades, Ceremonial Parades, N C C Rallies, etc. I believe, such ostracism is necessary to distinguish honourably retired and serving officers from those who have besmirched the fair name of our great and fine Army.

The Administrative Action practice/malpractice puts premium on crime. It is inconceivable that a senior officer, found *prima facie*, guilty of an offence under the Army Act, goes scot free with full retirement benefits and without any recorded blemish or stigma on his character. It simply is a comic and absurd situation which regrettably is suggestive of a nexus between the Judge and the accused. This obnoxious distortion must no more be countenanced, if we are to keep the flag of the fourth largest and the finest Army in the world flying high.

-- Brig Rai Singh, MVC, VSM (Retd)

Review Article 1

Evolution of International Politics*

COL R RAMA RAO, AVSM (RETD)

The Fate of Nations' is a study of the systems of government that had evolved in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe as a result of the interplay of several forces. These had their origins in the legacies that people in different regions of Europe had inherited before nation states as such came into existence. Emperors, Kings, their regents or powerful chancellors had exercised their sway over their respective domains. "In the 18th Century balance of power systems, each great power opposed the designs of all others in pursuing its own, but none challenged the others' legitimacy. Kings and Emperors might lose their territory in the ongoing competition for power, but none would lose his throne. the French Revolution introduced precisely this threat". The Revolution had shown how "fragile and perishable" regimes could be (p.11).

As Mandelbaum has noted (p.11) "War was dangerous of course, if it ended in defeat. But it was dangerous even if it were won". Great as well as lesser powers now realise that war is at least as costly for the victor as it is for the vanquished.

The British were vitally interested in preserving balance of power in Continental Europe for the simple reason that a divided Europe, where no single power could dominate the others would enable Britain, at least cost, to maintain her supremacy on the high seas and control her colonies unhindered.

A few other European Powers had followed Britain's example and had annexed parts of what is now called the Third World. France had acquired colonies; so had Holland, Belgium and Portugal. Spain, among the earliest to establish colonies in the America's had to retreat from the New world when the United States made it known that it would not tolerate any European Power holding colonies in her part of the world.

Thucydides had remarked that -

"Of the gods we know and of men we believe that it is a necessary law of their nature that they rule wherever they can".

* The Fate of Nations : Michael Mandelbaum, Council of Foreign Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 416, £ 9.95 (\$ 13.95)

The European Powers did precisely this in their colonies during the period between the sixteenth, and twentieth centuries. As the influence of European Powers waned after the Second World War, that of America grew.

"American expansion after the Second World War followed a pattern common to other countries similarly situated in the international system". (p. 133).

CHINA

Mandelbaum notes that China's diplomatic manoeuvring after 1949 aimed at making use of the power of one of the world's nuclear giants to "inject a dose of caution into the policies of the other". Some of the other lessons that can be drawn from the history of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations since 1949, are that weak states cannot bank on help from third countries when fighting stronger adversaries. "A strong state is assured of victory if it is willing to pay a high enough price. That is the source of the weak state's leverage..... . It's goal in fighting must be to make the cost of victory higher than the gains of victory can justify" (p. 235). This is a point that Third World countries would do well to note.

ISRAEL, 1948-1979

Israel, since its inception, had felt beleaguered. Israel's dilemma has been that "All the tangible concessions, above all territory, had to be made by Israel; once made, they were irrevocable. The Arab quid pro quo was something intangible, such as diplomatic recognition, or legal status of peace, which could always be modified or even withdrawn" (Kissinger, in "Years of Upheaval"). David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first Prime Minister had felt that his people who were subjected to pressures from all sides could survive only if they acted on the principle :-

"We must go to the borders, or the borders will come to us"

India has learnt the validity of this principle, at great cost. The Israelis have been wiser.

The Palestinian problem remains. One can only hope that justice will be done to the Palestinians and peace will prevail in the region.

JAPAN

Japan's economic miracle has stunned western economists and policy

makers. Western countries though dependent on outside sources for raw material supplies, could sell their products to neighbouring countries. Japan's dependence on external sources for its raw material requirements is far greater. Further, there are no markets close by to which it could export its products. Hence, intrinsically, Japan's economy has been more vulnerable than those of other countries. It is more dependent than others on free trade and on maintaining an 'open international economy'. Hardwork and discipline pay: as Japan has proved. Likewise, a comparatively low military profile. This is the lesson that the Third World can learn from Japan's example.

Mandelbaum's 'Fate of Nations' is an exposition of the many factors that have governed and still continue to govern international relations. It provides valuable material for study by students of political science and international relations.

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Review Article 2

Fighting Low Intensity Wars*

LT GEN SK PILLAI, PVSM, AVSM

This book is a study about how conventional armies adapt to the unexpected, unorthodox requirements of low intensity conflict. It first examines the evolution of warfare and the forms that it takes in response to the changing political and technological environment. A brief historical overview concludes that changes in one area be it in weaponry, mobility or C 31, affect all other areas connected with warfare. Hence the need for an Army to adapt to new technological developments not only by organisational changes but also in the manner of command, the utilisation of new resources and the use of fresh means to wage war eg developing intelligence and surveillance of the enemy to a degree that one's country can optimise its resources by regrouping and redeployment to meet the threat rather than being prepared for all contingencies at a higher force level. Good intelligence could also lead to persuading the enemy, indirectly and by deception, to abandon certain forms of weapon development and doctrine thus reducing a technological or policy advantage that the enemy may have. There is also the need to adapt to a changed outlook wherein low intensity warfare is considered not as an adjunct to conventional warfare but as an equivalent to it. Finally an Army must understand the implications of the three new dimensions of contemporary and future warfare viz scale of force, internal situation and the political factor, if it has to adapt itself for low intensity operations.

According to the author, the US Army displayed organisational resistance, conceptual misunderstanding and doctrinal confusion in tackling the conduct of low intensity warfare. The application of one of the principles of conventional war viz the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, was erroneously applied to low intensity operations. There are also confusion in considering Ranger type special operations as synonymous with low intensity operations. This led to the erroneous assumption that units trained in raids and long range patrols could undertake all kinds of low intensity conflict missions. The author concludes that in a democratic system in which the armed forces are under civilian control, there can be no effective conceptual, organisational and doctrinal adaptation to low intensity conflict till the civilian leaders understand the character of low intensity conflict particularly that of revolution and counter revolution.

* *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict - A Comparative Analysis* edited by David Charters & Maurice Tugwell., Published by Brassey's Defence Publishers, Ltd., 24 Gray's Inn Road, London, WC1X 8HR, Pages, 272, Price \$ 25.

In the case of the Israelis, their historical background and experience have enabled them to meet the conventional and low intensity threats well. Special units have been assigned low intensity operational roles. The author makes a pertinent remark that for a society to engage in long term low intensity conflict it is necessary that the conflict be accepted by the bulk of the population as just and necessary.

In the case of the French, an important observation made is that as the armed forces get modernised, the cost of intervention outside the country in a low intensity war gets higher and higher. Power projection therefore implies a commitment to enhance defence expenditure.

In the final chapter, the author makes the following points :- Adaptability in the face of a wide range of military and politico-military threats is of vital importance to an Army. The terrorists or adversary in a low intensity war may be using sophisticated weapons and technologies. Their small size is no guarantor of insignificant performance.

Of the five armies studied, the British, French and Israeli Armies have adapted more effectively to low intensity warfare by taking the following measures :-

Modifying conventional sub unit tactics to suit the political and military conditions of the situation. Commanders being given the freedom to develop low intensity operational doctrines and technologies. Considerable emphasis was placed on junior leadership, acquisition of intelligence, surprise and mobility. They were aware of the political context in which military operations were being conducted. In this process, there is however a risk of the politicisation of the Army. This is countered automatically if the democratic norms and political institutions of the country are viable.

Finally, the authors state that three lessons emerge out of the study:-

The importance of allotting the right emphasis to low intensity conflict in the doctrine and training of the Army.

The need to have a small specialist cadre as the nucleus for dealing with low intensity conflicts.

The dangers of imagining either (a) or (b) above can act as a substitute for the other eg the peace keeping role of the US Marines in Lebanon, blinded their leadership to other threats.

By now, the reader of this review would be experiencing a sense of deja vu. Haven't we gone through all this in our experience of Sri Lanka

and internally, in various States? Our experience in conventional and low intensity operations is considerable, possibly amongst the richest in the world. We have had many success as also some failures. We have shown an ability to face facts and recognise new challenges as well as sometimes to obfuscate them. We have developed new models of counter insurgency suited to our environment. The question that looms is that despite this experience are we able to adapt adequately to the challenges of low intensity warfare? Have we fully grasped its implications including the danger of dulling moral sensitivity and discipline in a protracted low intensity conflict? And what of future developments? This book will stimulate such questioning. Its relevance to our situation should be studied and discussed. The answers, as the books suggests, lie with field commanders at the executive levels as well as in the understanding and awareness of the political leadership of the implications of low intensity warfare.

Review Article 3

Economies of Defence*

AIR MARSHAL KD CHADHA, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

Military strength is expensive and has become particularly so in the case of the United States with an increase in the defence budget from 150 billion dollars in the seventies to 400 billion at the end of the Reagan era. Gansler's treatise on "Affording Defence" suggests that insurance premium for security can be brought within acceptable proportions through pragmatic and rational courses. The general perception in the United States is that military spending has ascended to astronomical limits because of mismanagement, waste and fraud. The belief gets reinforced because of absurd prices like 960 dollars for a wrench, 426 for a hammer and 640 dollars for a toilet seat paid by the Pentagon. Gansler however, suggests that these preposterous figures are more the product of costing anomalies and that the real difficulties are systemic.

The first problem according to the author, is the budget itself where an advance period of 27 months is needed for a current year's defence appropriations. In the process, according to him, "the time, effort and the money demanded and wasted is extra-ordinary". Because of lobbying and political pulls and pressures, many programmes not demanded by the Defence department get arbitrarily included. The result as one Senator put it is that "the Congress instead of becoming an answer to waste becomes the problem". And a cynical comment is "since the country ain't broke why fix it".

The other major cause of spiralling defence budgets in the USA is cost and time overruns in practically all major projects. This in the main stems from unrealistically optimistic forecasts of cost estimates and delivery schedules promised by contractors. The refrain, like in India is, "lets get the programme started and worry about the future when it comes". The infirmities of prevarication quickly manifest themselves because the undervalued estimates just cannot provide the desired performance and the programmes get behind schedule even before they start. The penalty exacted by the process is severe in the extreme, both in terms of money and field deployments.

Over stated specifications and frequent changes in requirements are other reasons for escalations and slippages. The author quotes that there were 394, 922 changes in the F-111 contract and 35,000 in the case of a

* *Affording Defence* : by Jacques S. Gansler, Published by the M 17 Press, 55 Hayward Street Cambridge, Mass 02142, 1989 pages 417, Price \$ 24.95

submarine in the first seven years of the programme. The net result is that despite a mind boggling defence budget, where today the United States spends 28 million dollars per hour 24 hours of the day, the Services are progressively receiving less and less equipment. To highlight the point, Gansler mentions that reduced to 1983 value, 2 billion dollars would have purchased 7000 tanks thirty years ago and in 1989, this amount suffices only for 700. Likewise, 11 billion dollars would have fetched 6300 combat aircraft in 1951 and today they buy only 322. Only through improved resource planning and improved response of the industrial base, as well as a firm declaration that over-runs will not receive their extra dollars can, in Gansler's conviction, growing budgets be contained. For successful achievement of high technology programmes he suggests

- (a) Cost realism.
- (b) Fall back on alternatives.
- (c) Proper communication with future users.
- (d) Maximum use of proven technology and emphasis on technological advances which have relevance to improvement in quality as well as costs.

In the case of United States, Gansler feels there could also be handsome payoffs through better utilisation of existing facilities and greater effectiveness of manpower which currently accounts for 50% of the defence budget. National service he suggests could help in reducing costs because of lesser rates of pay. A larger national participation could also reduce the deep seated distrust of armed forces harboured by politicians in the US. Surprisingly, Gansler opines that it is this suspicion which prompts the US Congress to deal with Services separately so that they can be kept divided.

Pension bills are another area in the US which is bloating defence budgets. From 4 billion dollars in 1972 it had soared to 24 billion dollars in 1989. Encouragement of military officers to stay on beyond the 20 year retirement point would, according to the author, greatly assist in reducing expenditure in this realm.

The author also complains that despite integrated structures there is not enough stress in the United States on an integrated fighting philosophy. The emphasis, he says, remains on independent Service capabilities. Though there are integrated military force plans and budgets, assigning of personnel and weapon acquisitions remain the prerogative of the respective Chiefs of Staff. This is not only a cause for acrimony between them and the

Regional C-in-Cs, but also considerable waste. Votaries of Unified Commands in India do need to take note of this position.

Gansler believes that if his suggestions were to be accepted, savings of upto 50 billion dollars a year could accrue. "Affording Defence" is a very extensively researched, and even if somewhat repetitive, a very readable book. In the context of potential threats it is not quite abreast because it talks of Super power rivalry and potential nuclear conflicts through Europe when Gorbachevism has put paid to the Cold War. On Third World actions, predictions, particularly in the context of present West Asia crisis, are on target. The book indeed contains wealth of material which could be of immense interest to students of national security.

Revival of Islam*

MAJ GEN SC SINHA, PVSM (RETD)

Revival and reform have, as correctly analysed by the author, been a recurring phenomena in Islamic history. Islamic revival is mainly a movement to return to the fundamental scriptures of the faith: the Quran and the practices of Prophet Muhammed as recorded in the Hadiths, which together form the Sharia, the divine law. Irrespective of their sectarian persuasion muslim fundamentalist reformers have been unanimous that what the Quran offers is final, unique and most authentic and that in Islam there is no room whatsoever for synthesising the Quranic message with any non-Islamic doctrine or practice.

An early experience that India had of Islamic fundamentalism was under the last of the great Mughals, Emperor Muhyi-al-Din Aurangzeb (1658-1707), ironically a great grandson of the most liberal of the Mughal Emperors, Akbar the Great. Inspired by the ideology of Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi, Aurangzeb set out not only to purify the Muslim community by strictly implementing the tenets of the Sharia but he also re-introduced the Jizya, the poll tax on his Hindu subjects. The pursuit of such fanatical practices lost him much of the good-will that Akbar's liberal policies had created amongst the Hindus and resulted in the eventual downfall of the Mughal dynasty.

During the period of European colonisation, Islamic fundamentalist movements were restricted to Muslim countries, which did not then have the means to export such movements to other countries and so hardly any notice was taken of the process outside the Islamic ambit. A good example of this can be found as late as 1926, when Abdul Aziz ib Abdul Rehman al Saud, proclaimed himself the King of Hijaz and brought with him the strict fundamentalist practices of the Wahabi Sect. Interest in this change over was limited only to the Muslim population in other countries only because their holy cities of Mecca and Medina came under the new Islamic dispensation.

All this has, however, undergone a drastic change with the dramatic rise in the price of oil, which is found in large quantities in many Muslim countries. The scenario changed further with the withdrawal of European

* ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM by Dilip Hiro, Series Editor Justin Wintle Published by Paladin Grafton Books, 8 Grafton Street, London W1X 3 LA, 1988, Pages 304, Price £ 4.95

colonial powers. With the gaining of political independence and with the huge wealth amassed from oil revenues, these Muslim countries have the means to extend their influence beyond their borders. Therefore, what happens in these countries is of concern to most countries and of vital interest to those of the Third World especially those having large Muslim minority populations like India. This explains the tremendous amount of interest and concern evinced by them in Ayatollah Khomeini's successful Islamic fundamentalist revolution in Iran.

It is patent that what happens in the Islamic heartland of the Middle East is of great concern to us in India. It is for this reason that the clear, concise and a most interesting non-partisan narrative of Islamic fundamentalist movements in various Muslim countries given in Dilip Hiro's book is a valuable and timely contribution to understanding this important problem. It is imperative for all of us in India to know and understand the dimensions of these Islamic fundamentalist movements to appreciate the challenges they are likely to pose to our secular state and culture.

BOOK REVIEWS

War Aggression and Self Defence

By Yoram Dinstein

Published by Grotius Publications Ltd., P.O. Box 115, Cambridge CB 39 BP, UK, 1988, Pages 292, Price £ 52.00

Man is an aggressive animal. This, perhaps, explains the fact that, from the dawn of recorded history, mankind has suffered from the blight of war. Whilst in earlier times it caused immense devastation and suffering, it was confined to segments of the human race: today, with the advent of weapons of mass destruction, it threatens the very existence of mankind on this planet.

Civilisation means the subordination of baser instincts, tolerance for others' way of life and acceptance of the rule of law in societies. Contemporary international law, evolved over the years, proscribes aggressive war, though little heed is paid by nation-States to such legal injunction. They continue to wage war, disguising its brutal reality under euphemisms such as self-defence, reprisal, teaching of lessons and so on. As the author puts it: "One may say, in a combination of cynicism and realism, that so far the legal abolition of war has stamped out not wars but declarations of war."

This is a work of great scholarship, intended mainly, in my judgement, for students of international law, though it does hold interest for those responsible for public administration, and high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces. It is divided into three parts. The first part deals with questions like: What is war? When does it commence and terminate? Is there a twilight zone between war and peace? What is the difference between peace treaties, armistice agreements and cease-fires? What are the laws of neutrality? The second part goes on to discuss the contemporary prohibition of the use of force in international relations. There is an analysis of the meaning of aggression, as defined by a consensus Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974. The controversial implications of the illegality and criminality of wars of aggression are probed, together with the effects which they have had in transforming modern international law in this regard. There is an interesting reference to individual responsibility for crimes against peace, as reflected in the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials of 1946, and a suggestion made that a permanent international criminal court be established for the conduct of such trials, in preference to trials by domestic courts. The third part of this book deals with the complex topics of self-defence and collective security. The crucial question is when, and under what conditions, can self-defence legitimately take place? the functions discharged

by the United Nations Security Council in the evaluation of self-defence are investigated. As Professor Dinstein puts it: "Collective security, as an institutionalised use of force by the international community, is still an elusive concept in reality. The original mechanism devised by the [United Nations] Charter has not stood the test of time, yet some imperfect substitutes (principally, peace-keeping forces) have evolved."

The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the international scene is a historic landmark in the defusing of international tensions, between East and West of the Cold War. A climate has been generated where the term "war" has an unpalatable connotation. Whilst lip-service to the cause of peace may be hypocritical, the author quotes La Rochefoucauld to say that "the recognition of virtue is an indispensable first step without which no vice is likely to be eliminated."

Professor Dinstein concludes his masterly study with these words: "For aggressive war (as well as unlawful uses of force short of war) to disappear, the international community must establish effective measures of collective security. The 'harnessing' of force to international procedures of law and order is the real challenge of our day."

This is the only answer to the terrible scourge of war.

-- Lt General ML Thapan, PVSM (Retd)

Strategic Studies in the Konrad Adenauer Era (1949-1966), Research Report 1984 No 11

By Julian Lider

Published by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Lilla Nygatan 23-S-11128, Stockholm Sweden, 1984, Pages 114, Price not mentioned.

The book covers one of the research reports outlining West German military thought during the Konrad Adenauer era '1949-1966' published by Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

At the outset, the authors could be commended for their in-depth conceptual analysis of warfare and theory of military art. Various ramifications of strategy and its applications in the contemporary global balance of power, based on military alliances, as also the current bi-polar nuclear parity, have been covered in great detail.

Though the research work covers various aspects of strategy including the nuclear strategy in fair amount of depth, yet it does not cover the aspect of defensive/offensive strategic debate with particular

reference to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). The hangover of Clausewitzian thought in the overall analysis is also noticeable for its excessive emphasis.

On the whole, a very readable conceptual treatise.

-- Maj Gen MM Walia

The Mechanized Battlefield: A Tactical Analysis

Edited by Lt Col J.A English and Majors J Addicott and P J Kramers.
Published by Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1340 Old Chain Bridge Road, McLean, Virginia, 22101, U.S.A, 1985, Pages 188, Price \$ 30.00

This book is the outcome of a Symposium organised by the Canadian Combat Training Centre, Gagetown in 1983. In addition to the presentations made by the eminent experts at the Symposium, two presentations made independently by Brigadier Richard Simpkin to military audience at Ottawa have also been included as separate chapters.

Of late, the importance of long range defence planning and the need to look at the future have gained due recognition. As a result, visualisation of the future battlefield scenarios has received considerable attention. Lot many academicians and professionals have started analysing the impact of the future battlefield on the organisation, equipment and other related aspects of the armed forces. However, this attention has been generally biased towards macro level issues. Not much of the effort has been directed towards the 'knitty-gritties'. Issues like, how the units and subunits should be organised and equipped and how well they can fight in the future have not been given sufficient consideration. The Combat Training Centre, Gagetown Canada needs to be complimented for attempting to fill this gap by organising this Symposium. The book under review is a record of the proceedings and has enabled those who could not attend the Symposium to benefit. The editors have ensured that important issues highlighted during the question and answer sessions of the proceedings are included as part of their notes under each chapter. References to published literature are well documented.

Altogether an interesting book which will be of great value for the officers of fighting and supporting arms.

-- Col K Srinivasan

Super Power Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight

Edited by Albert Carnesale & Richard N Haass

Published by Ballinger Publishing Company, 54 Church St, Harvard Square, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, 1987, Pages 394, Price \$ 14.95.

The book offers a composite and analytical study of the Arms Control experience of the Super Powers since 1950's. Seven Case Studies and subsequent critiques by the authors and the editors cover the entire gambit of Treaties Negotiations and Conventions pertaining to diverse issues inherent in the arms' and armament technology race of the Nuclear and the Missile age-governmental perceptions, national rivalries, public sensitivities, technological capability to evade detection, and not the least, nuclear proliferation outside the nuclear family.

While dealing with various treaties and agreements, the authors have compiled the areas of success and failure of each as well as the lessons that can be drawn. Has this on-going exercise on disarmament or Arms Limitation and non-proliferation by the Super Powers been mere power play? What does the pattern portend for the future? How will the new nuclear nations fit into the scheme of things?

This book lays a good foundation for the discussion and thus extends beyond the category of historical record or reference material.

-- Maj Gen SK Talwar (Retd)

The Technology, Strategy and Politics of SDI

Edited by Stephen J Cimbala

Published by Westview Press Inc 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301, USA., 1987, Pages 252, Price not given.

On 23rd March 1983 President Ronald Reagan pre-empted his own defence establishment by calling for development of defences which would render nuclear weapons obsolete. Experts in the US Administration have still not been able to satisfactorily explain how their President came to make such a statement. Nevertheless, an organisation known as the Strategic defence initiative Organisation came into being in the US Administration to give concrete shape to the President's concept and the term SDI was born.

Proponents of 'defence', from the dawn of history to the present day, have had the common aim of rendering 'offence' and offensive weapons ineffective, which they have consistently failed to achieve. Can Reagan's vision of rendering nuclear weapons, which are essentially weapons of offence,

obsolete turn out to be different? A debate amongst defence experts, analysts and academics has been going on in the USA, and elsewhere, on the pros and cons of SDI.

This book is a collection of essays or papers embracing the technological, strategic and political aspects of SDI by several American analysts and academics. The book is divided into five parts under appropriate heads, in addition to an introduction by Stephen J Cimbala. The book makes interesting reading and brings out some facts about SDI which are not often appreciated. For example there is a common belief that SDI is an American idea. In Chapters 7 and 9, James Wendt and Richard Thomas, respectively, bring out that the Soviets have been ahead of them in the game. Thomas, while discussing SDI with some European academics in 1984 frequently encountered the response: "If you Americans persist in developing the SDI, you will force the Soviets to do the same thing". His reply was "Have you not read Sokolovskii and the writings of the other Soviet military leaders that describe Soviet strategic defence and military space programmes?". These writings date back to the 1960s and 1970s which puts them some two decades ahead of Reagan's pronouncement.

As can be expected in a collection like this, the style and readability of the book varies from author to author. While some of them are quite readable others are indeed heavy to read.

-- Brig RD Law (Retd)

Defending America's Security

By Frederick H. Hartmann and Robert L Wendzel

Published by Pergamon Brassey's International Defense Publishers Inc 8,000 West Park Drive, Fourth Floor McLean, Virginia 22102, USA, 1988, Pages 363, Price not given.

Two eminent experts on National security and professors of political science, Hartmann and Wendzel, have brought out a comprehensive book on the contribution of defence to security of the USA. National security in turn has been considered in the context of international relations. Spread in three parts, the book covers a wide spectrum. The first part is conceptual in nature. It explains how the international environment affects American security and how the threats are perceived by the government and the people. It then defines American attitudes and perceptions. The authors emphasise the need for multipronged thrust to counter the perceived threats. They highlight the significance of military strength that may be necessary as the last resort. In their view, "ultimately one's sure ally is oneself. Military force is the final arbiter in the international system and if a nation is to defend its security it must have enough military power to protect its vital interests."

This highly readable book is recommended both for students of military studies and those dealing with national security in government. It is an extremely useful addition to the library.

-- Air Marshal ML Sethi, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The CIA : A Forgotten History, US Global Interventions Since World War 2

By William Blum

Published by Zed Books Ltd, 59 Caledonian Road, London, N 1 9 B 4, UK., 1986, Pages 428, Price £ 9.95. (P/b) & £ 32.95 (H/b).

The book chronicles the amazing story of CIA interventions, since the end of World War II, in some 55 countries from China to Nicaragua, often leading to the overthrow of governments, perversion of elections, assassination of leaders, suppression of revolutions, manipulation of trade union leaders and even the "manufacturing of news". Claiming that the US Foreign policy pursued 'anti communism' for its own sake, at one level, Blum avers that at another level, the policy was inextricably bound up with "a far older seducer of men and nations, the lust for power; the acquisition, maintenance, use and enjoyment of influence and prestige." 'Communist' was merely the name ascribed to those people who stood in the way of the realization of such ambition.

The cases presented in the book illustrate how the US policy makers treated particular targets of intervention - be they individuals, political parties, movements or governments. It was irrelevant whether they called themselves communists or not, whether they were scholars of dialectical materialism or persons who had never heard of Karl Marx, whether the government had come into being through violent revolution or peaceful democratic elections. They were all targets, all communists.

Blum, an investigative author, shows how the mainstream media have failed to probe, highlight or even report some of these aggressive actions, thus helping the US administration in concealing its intentions and camouflaging its operations abroad. Concurrently, the American people have been subjected to a relentless anti communist indoctrination, from the 'red scare' of the 1920s, through Macarthyism of the 1950s to Reagan's crusade against the evil empire of the 1980s.

It is obvious that considerable research has gone into the compilation of the book and it makes very interesting reading, often devastatingly so.

-- Lt Gen PE Mann, PVSM (Retd)

Politics and Government in African States 1960-1985

Ed. by Peter Duignan & Robert H Jackson

Published by Croom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell Row, Beckenham, Kent, BR3 1AT (UK), 1986, Pages, 442, Price not mentioned.

This book deals with the politics and government of sub-Saharan African countries after they obtained independence. It has been commissioned by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. The authors of the case studies are distinguished scholars. The editors are Peter Duignan, Director of African/Middle East Program at the Hoover Institution California and Robert H. Jackson, professor of political science at the University of British Columbia. The former has written a comprehensive introduction and the latter an analytical conclusion. The chapters have been grouped broadly on a country and regional basis, i.e. West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, The Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Lusophone Africa. Within this grouping an attempt has been made to bracket those with common historical, cultural and political experience such as ex-British colonies, ex French, ex Belgian and Lusophone Africa being Portuguese speaking.

The basic theme throughout is that the mood of confidence at the time of independence in the 1950-60s has swung the other way and beginning in the 1970s the picture darkened and the whole region began to slide into a condition of "profound crisis" from which (in 1985) it has yet to emerge. Although the ex colonial masters in varying degrees did leave behind administrative infrastructures and cultural heritages these in themselves were not able to tone down the fierce and selfish upsurge of independence and revolutionary movements which threw up leaders who could not rise above their own interests obtained by corrupt and often brutal means. They failed to knit together with a sense of justice the multi racial tribes and factions to form strong independent and proud countries.

The political, economic and cultural background of each country is discussed in great detail. Sadly no strong and fair African bureaucracy has emerged and no strong ethnically integrated army.

The book is recommended for students of African affairs, for political researchers especially those interested in solving problems of ethnic groups all over the world and for government and business officials who have dealings with African countries.

-- Maj Gen RL Chopra, PVSM (Retd)

Evasions, The American Way of Military Service

By Philip Gold

Published by Paragon House Publishers, Fulfilment Department, J A F Box 1890, New York 10116, USA, 1985, Pages 182, Price \$ 17.95.

Armed conflict between states has been the 'raison d'être' of armed forces the world over. The existence of such forces impose upon the state the inevitable demand to modernise to keep pace with advancing technology, belligerent nations, and with increasing commitments. The question of increasing commitments, particularly on a world-wide scale is one which Professor Philip Gold has tackled in his book.

The present administration of the USA, in its second term under President Reagan has re-established the image of America as the guardian of liberty the world over. However, this perceived role has led to dilemmas of re-armament in a world keen to disarm, the use of force in a comity of nations professing peaceful negotiations and the ever increasing pressure to intervene, in support of freedom, ever more frequently. The primary purpose of the author has been to make an honest assessment of the military capability of the USA and then derive the obligation of its citizens in executing a clearly stated American purpose in today's world.

The arguments in this book are of particular interest to the Indian reader in that the Indian Armed Forces do not suffer from a lack of recruits presently - but we may well come to a stage of economic uplift that would make the military once again the least attractive job prospect. Further there is an increasing regional commitment which may also expand exponentially. What then, would be the Indian purpose in this planet?

-- R Subramanyam

Hostage Negotiation: A Matter of Life and Death*Published by Diane Publishing Co., Defence Information Access Network, 71 Indel Ave, Box 497, Rancocas, N J 08073 (USA), 1987, Pages 44, Price \$ 14.95*

The large scale air movements, urban developments and geo political affairs have resulted in terrorism as one weapon for achieving a limited goal and pressing a view point. Thus often situations are created when important persons or otherwise are taken in a hostage for bargaining an issue.

It is study of human behaviour and human behaviour is an inexact science and one which is constantly evolving 'As many minds as many ways'- and like that a hostage action is also a non repeated action. No two situations can be the same.

Security office of the US Department of State has compiled a general review of principles of hostage negotiation in general terms. The principles are based on common sense and are a useful study material; it should form a subject of discussion in combat units/police outfits likely to be assigned for anti hostage action.

These can be modified keeping the characteristics of people involved in a region. It is well presented coup d' oeil.

-- Col Harbhajan Singh

Fortress - USSR: The Soviet Strategic Defense Initiative and the US Strategic Defense Response

By William R Van Cleave

Published by Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, 1986, pages 60, Price not mentioned.

The book (first printed in 1986) is designed to correct, according to the author "focus of Western Media on the - Reagan Programme". Its refrain is that Soviet Union possesses the initiative and even the capabilities of strategic defence and United States has only to react resolutely for saving lives. It is, therefore, largely a justification, on moral and practical considerations of the steps taken by USA in development and deployment of Atomic Missiles including those in outer space.

While discussing US Anti Ballistic Missile Policy the author traces the history of ABM, starting almost 25 years back with the R&D efforts in this direction. Till almost late 1960, these were not considered cost effective. Another doctrine, however, during 60s was of 'Mutual Assured Destruction'- MAD. This, in essence, meant that consequent to an attack on USA, a deliberate, massive extermination of civilian population (in addition to strategic targets) of USSR will be carried out. This concept was subsequently not considered adequately deterrent. As such in 1969, Nixon administration decided on ABM deployment programme - SAFE GUARD. Thereafter the strategy underwent considerable change. The chapter ends up by defining the US strategy as 'based upon an attempt to deny enemy objectives while controlling escalation and limiting damage'. Damage limiting efforts per-se are no longer seen as destabilising.

Chapter 2 on Soviet Ballistic Missile Responses are highly informative to Indian Reader since access to such an information is very limited. Soviet ABM capabilities and programmes are discussed in three categories (a) existing capability (b) programme to upgrade, modernize and expand existing ABM programme (c) Advanced ABM Research & Development programme.

According to US Intelligence, Soviet Plans and doctrine, for strategic defence, is based on layered barriers and "effectiveness is achieved through multiple types of defence capabilities compensating for shortcoming in individual systems. This defence system includes Anti Satellite Weapons (ASATS), ABM, 12000 SAM launchers, 4000 Air Defence interceptors, full net work of ABM and air defence radars (about 10,000) and thousands of shelters for leaders and command/control functions. According to US Air Force FY 1985 report, the USSR has "the world's only operational space weapon system - a CO ORBITAL anti satellite (ASAT) system, which poses a threat to many important US low altitude civil and national security satellites.

Research & Development Programme: Soviet Union R&D programme included military application of laser particle beams, kinetic energy devices, and radio frequency devices. Soviet Union has also conducted intensive R&D on 3 types of gas lasers - the gas dynamic, the electric discharge and chemical.

Passive Ballistic Missile Defence: Objective of Soviet civil defence is to ensure the survival and wartime continuity, in descending order of importance - Soviet leadership, command and control, war supporting industrial production, essential work force and as much of the population as possible. It has built special accommodation for more than 175,000 communist party and government personnel. There were also, in 1982, 20,000 blast resistant shelter able to accommodate 15 million people and this figure was likely to be doubled by 1988.

Chapter-3, gives the Soviet violation of ABM treaty on all three major provisions of ABM treaty. Chapter 4 and 5 elaborate implications of the Soviet strategic advantages and discusses if the US strategic Defence Response is adequate. The entire concept is based on a concept that defence against a nuclear attack is feasible and that "technological leaps have been shifting the offence/ defence cost ratio to favour defence". Dr. Fletcher, former head of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and later Chairman of Defensive Technology Study Team of Scientists and Engineers had suggested a four layer defence with each layer having 80% effectiveness against attacking objects.

The book primarily projects USA view on a highly controversial subject but it is worth a study by Indian readers. It discusses relevant concepts, traces evolution of strategy by two super powers and provides an insight into the capability of USSR. An excellent background to readers who are keenly watching the current progress for limitation of nuclear war.

-- Col RN Khanna (Retd)

Containing the Soviet Union: A critique of US Policy

Edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis

Published by Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 8000 West Park Drive, Fourth Floor, McLean Virginia 22102, 1987, Pages 251, Price \$ 23.00 (H)

An extremely interesting book, which gives an insight into the development of the thought of 'CONTAINING RUSSIA' -formulated by career diplomat George F. KENNAN as a member of the National war College in Dec 1946.

The concept of American interest not in territory, but keeping the 'Key Centres of military, industrial capability from falling into wrong hands', containment of weapons race are particularly interesting.

NSC paper - 68 - 14.4.1950 by the Dept of State further amplified the position.

"A defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere" from which followed that the US interest was not only in Industrial - Military capacity - but CREDIBILITY which led to the impossible position in Viet Nam the tripling of defence expenditure.

The alliance with JAPAN was important due to its "great Industrial Power".

Written before the present detente - the progressive decline of US position after Viet Nam; Shah's fall discredited the Nixon doctrine. The invasion of Afghanistan was a shock to CARTER's view of the Soviet Union and led to reversing of the US military decline.

-- Maj Gen Partap Narain (Retd)

NATO'S Maritime Strategy Issues and Developments

By E.F. Gueritz, Norman Friedman, Clarence A. Robinson and William R. Van Cleave

Published on Behalf of the Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc Cambridge, Massachusetts and Washington DC

By Peragamon - Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 8000 West Park Drive, Fourth Floor, Mclean, Va 22102 - 3101, USA, 1987, Pages 85, Price Not Mentioned (Special Report)

A variety of technological, political and operational developments have resulted in a wide range of new challenges to NATO. Owing to the nature of these challenges, sea borne forces are playing an increasingly significant role in alliance operational planning. Therefore, it is necessary that alliance members both individually and collectively re-examine the role of Sea Power in NATO defence planning.

The book under review contains four essays on different aspects of maritime strategy and examines the various issues involved.

The essay by E.F. Gueritz examines as to how economic capabilities of a member country particularly the United Kingdom has reduced its defence commitments based on maritime forces. This resulted in the Falkland war. The Royal Navy failed to maintain a credible deterrent posture. The fact that it involves whole spectrum of political - economic and politico strategic options open to government for the protection of their interest world wide was being overlooked when efforts were being made to economise for the future development of new technology based weapon systems "TRIDENT". It is very well argued with examples by the author how "Flexibility of Response" erodes and government does not clearly understand what risk is being taken. The military advice should indicate what "Unforeseen" is being overlooked by the Government. Argentine would have won if they had delayed the action by one year.

Norman Friedman discusses in depth the new development which is taking place around the world when warships are being positioned for the protection of national interests of the USA. Basically, the rules of engagement are standing orders which govern a commander's ability to open fire. They will vary with the perceived political situation in peace time and for the period of crisis. The proper rules of engagement is to minimise the likelihood of pre-warfare disaster while avoiding embarrassing aggressive peace time behaviour. These are dependent combination of current state of military technology and current military and naval dispositions. The important aspects of these rules should be limited warfare, identification before firing, avoid hitting neutrals,

balance embarrassing error with the prospect of military embarrassment.

Clarence Robinson Jr. brings into focus the problems which have been generated with the development of Sea Launched Tomahawk Cruise Missile since 1972. This versatile missile can be adopted for use under water launches with nuclear warhead and with conventional warhead for antiship role. The paper examines in great depth the response in the deployment of such a missile in a submarine and other ships and the reaction of the USSR strategic planners.

The paper by William R. Van Cleave examines the concept of Horizontal Escalation (HE) and its application to the NATO Strategy. This distinctive military strategy or option H.E. has potential application to deterrence and defence of Western Europe. The H.E. has two aspects; one is selective response, the other to extend the armed conflict application of containment both as supplement to deterrence of Soviet aggression and as a possible response to it.

Recommended reading for serious students involved in the study of Naval Warfare and those responsible for planning operations. A useful book for all naval libraries afloat and ashore

-- Captain CM Vyas, NM
Indian Navy (Retd)

Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s

By Christopher Tugendhat and William Wallace

Published on Behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, by Routledge, 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC 4 P 4 EE, 1988, Pages 125, Price £ 6.95

Mrs Thatcher in her introduction to the party manifesto said "Founded on a strong economy and robust defence, we have not only rebuilt our economy and established our world reputation, we have also regained our self respect". How true is this statement as Britain after years of economic weakness which resulted in enforced retrenchment and at one time considering to reduce to 3 working days in a week has completely established her position.

The success of the Falkland Campaign in contrast to the failure of Suez played a critical role in the establishment of British self confidence.

The book examines in depth the historical background of the British Empire, the present position, the economic and security considerations, the intangible elements of foreign policy and lastly the constraints and options.

The authors have correctly brought out that the Britain's international standing and influence will not only depend upon its economic success and military strength but also upon its representation, that is the image which the foreign governments and the public have of Britain, of the quality of its Government, the stability of its society, the richness of its culture and the projection of British social and political values.

The authors in their concluding chapter analyse the options for British policy in terms of social economy, multilateral relations and lastly the priorities in the expenditure.

An interesting and absorbing book which brings out all aspects of the British policy in 1990s. Should find a place in all the libraries.

-- Captain RP Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and their Aircraft
By Norman Friedman
*Published by Conway Maritime Press Ltd, 24 Bride Lane, Fleet Street,
London EC 448 DR (UK), 1988, Pages 384, Price £ 35.00*

The well researched and documented book on the evaluation of the ships and their aircraft is a fitting tribute to the Naval Constructors and aircraft designers who toiled all through to make British Carrier Aviation a legendary success.

The Saga of the Fleet air Arm's growth through the years and the glory brought thus, to the British fleet unveils fold by fold to reveal the dramatic turn of events interspersed with history. With the author's established skills in tackling Design and Development stories as illustrated in his books on surface ships and sub surface units he has no problem in taking to the Air in this book on the British Carrier Aviation. The Book dwells in great details on the compulsions of design and development that brought the best out of the carriers and the 'Carried'.

The emphasis on the conflicting design requirements of Carrier on one hand and the heavier-than-air machine on the other is fully justified. Thus one comes across the downward sloping deck of the early 20's as opposed to the upward sloping deck christened the 'Skijump' of the 80's both designed to meet the end objective of launching an aircraft safely. The intervening period shows up some remarkable shapes and sizes of a/c and ships as presented in a variety of rare photographs. These photographs and useful sketches match upto the well researched text which

is fluent. It is a credit to the author that even a casual reader is rewarded with the rich experience of sharing the heritage, the growth and decline of British Carrier Aviation.

The author clearly addresses himself to the political compulsions, historical facts, technology applications, impact of war and reality on ground combined with requirements at sea which came together to mould the British carrier aviation through the years. The analytical approach in the study of design aspects during the war period gives the reader an insight into the rare ability of the author to perceive things of the past in a profound manner.

The Book also has two very useful appendices giving details of British carriers and performance figures of the aircraft.

It may be intentional but one does miss personal references to the architects of British Carrier Aviation. A few names here and there from a cross section of constructors, designers and flyers perhaps would have added a human touch. Unmistakably, this book replete with authenticated facts is a must for naval designers, aviators and reference libraries.

— Commander RS Vasan

Lost Years: My 1,632 Days in Vietnamese Reeducation Camps

By Tran Tri VU.

Published by Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, 1988, Pages 381, Price \$ 15.00
(Indo China Research Monograph No. 3)

Vietnam, the largest and the most heavily populated part of Indo-China, at one time controlled by the French, had a troubled history. After the World War II, the decision of the allies led to the division of independent Vietnam at the 16th parallel. While Chinese controlled the north, the British controlled the south.

Aftermath of the division, however, contributed to the civil war of 1946, which soon became an international conflict due to the involvement of major powers. It was United States bombing of Hanoi, which led to the cease-fire in 1973. But in 1975, the communists aided by the North Vietnam, violated the cease-fire and launched a massive offensive and seized nearly 2/3rds of the South Vietnam territory.

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the communists set up 'Reeducation Camps, for the non communists or the southern Vietnamese, who were enslaved by the process because of 'suspect' past affiliations to the government.

The experience at the camp and the account of the suffering of one Southern Vietnamese among thousands confined, is the main theme of this book 'Lost Years, My 1,632 Days in Vietnamese Reeducation Camps' On Indo - China monograph series, published by the Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

Tran Tri Vu's memoir, translated by Nguyen Phu (names of the author and the translator are pseudonyms) does not, relate only to the physical torture at the Camp. Tran, being a skilled observer, gives us a descriptive account of the events at the camp. He highlights the relationship between the detainees among themselves and with the 'bodee' (politicised soldier of communist Vietnam). The Camp which was to be for seven days, prolonged for 4½ years in the case of the author before he was released. The political education session to impart communist ideology, also involved other activities like carpentry, kitchen work and forestry. Here Tran highlights the labour accidents, malnourishment of the prisoners and widespread scabies disease among the prisoners and the cruelty of the Doctor.

Another important observation Tran makes is that, 'gathering of information' was seen as an important task by the prisoners. Here, he gives an instance of listening to BBC news. Finally, before he concludes his memoir, Tran mentions Mr. P.T.L. (abbreviation not known), whose humanitarian intervention released Tran from the camp.

This volume, though very descriptive, is an excellent piece and an important contribution to the 20th century. It is not only useful for historians and research scholars, but also recommended for laymen, who can grasp the true value of freedom after reading this book.

— G Satyawati
J N U

Mutiny in Force

By Bill Glenton

Published by Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 47 Bedford Square, London WC1B 3 DP, 1986, Pages 239, Price £ 12.95

This book is a graphic account of the mutiny that resulted from the inadequate planning, official indifference and incompetence that failed to take into account the basic requirements and morale of its fighting forces.

The author served in the flagship of the discredited Force X as a young seaman. They were dispatched from Britain to assist the Americans in their SW Pacific campaign during World War II. He became one of the mutineers.

Apart from being very absorbing and interesting story the book is a grim reminder that the agony and suffering of the men in uniform can be alleviated to a large measure with adequate preparations and planning at higher levels. This book should be of greater interest to the Naval Officers.

— Maj Gen GK Sen, AVSM (Retd)

Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures and Processes

By Kenneth Liberthal & Michel Oksenberg

Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540, 1988, Pages 445, Price \$ 39.95.

A good researched work useful as an aid in comprehending the strategic perceptions of the Chinese, their strong and weak points, notwithstanding the enigma of culture and the apparent dilemma of their present leaders. It may be fair to quote George Ball from his work 'Diplomacy for a Crowded World' "Repulsive though the Chinese system may be to any one devoted to the values of the west", he said "the Chinese nation today seems capable of living" So despite a mixed-up bureaucracy, party-oriented policies that tend to be based on individual whims than long term strategic perspectives, as the deductions seems to be made out, China continues to be guided by more inward looking aged leadership of Deng & Li Peng. Does one see clearness of the silhouettes of a new modernistic world order now? A question, quite a few China watchers must be attempting to answer.

— Brig Chandra B Khanduri

Iran: The Revolution Within

By Dilip Hiro

Published by the Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 12/129 Golden Square, London, W1R 3 AF (UK), 1988, Pages 24, Price £ 5.50 (Conflict Studies 208)

The 'Iranian revolution' surprised observers, particularly those with the modern western outlook. An economically sound nation with a strong military is no breeding ground for revolution, but it came and overthrew the Shah and his power base. The new regime of mixed and opposing elements had no reason to survive, but it did. By Western assessment Iran should have collapsed under Iraqi attack, but it got more united, withstood the challenge and went on the offensive. It violated all norms of accepted international conduct in the capturing of American hostages, and not only got away with this but received clandestine arms and intelligence from the USA. How and

why all this happened is well researched, analysed and presented in this booklet.

Further developments in Iran during consolidation and the future succession to Khomeini completes the Study, published in February 1988. We are watching the succession in progress and some changes.

There are observations of much interest to students of international affairs and human nature. One is that the IRANIAN revolution is not a consequence of Islamic revival and fundamentalism, but is due to the specific conditions which developed during the Shah's regime. It is implied that such revolution is not automatic in Muslim countries, all of whom face the fundamental religions upsurge; something more is required, which has its roots in the conflict between the rich and the poor, the normal human society differences which arouse emotions and reactions.

The booklet has been well researched and skillfully written by a journalist; it is very readable, brief, and thought provoking. It is strongly recommended for all those interested in current affairs and Iran in particular.

-- Tindi

The Generals' Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980
By Mehmet Ali Birand, Translated by MA Dikerdem
Published by Brassy's Defence Publishers, 24 Gray's Inn Road, London, WC1Y 8 HR, UK, 1987, Pages 220, Price £ 19.95

Turkey is one of those rare spots on the globe where boundaries overlap between East and West, giving it a split personality, hence referred to as the soft underbelly of Europe.

There have been three coups in Turkey in as many decades and each has resulted in significant transformation in the country's social life.

The author is a doyen of the Turkish foreign affairs and describes in great detail the planning and execution specially from 9 Sep 80 when 'Operation Flag' was percolated down to unit level. Even the senior generals who had retired in the meantime and had details of the plan remained loyal to the Army.

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic under the aegis of the legendary Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, the Generals who came to power on 12 Sep 80 have stamped their imprint on every aspect of Turkish

society, as gentlemen who handed back power to the civil government soonest.

The people of Turkey heaved a sigh of relief, after years of terror let loose in the streets when an average of 20 Turks lost their lives daily in political violence, the economy was in shambles and because of no foreign exchange, there were no oil imports and every thing was at a virtual stand-still.

What is remarkable about the military coup is the installation of a Prime Minister eight days later and a general election in May 83.

For India and the Western World, Turkey should be considered a bastion against Islamic fundamentalism which started under the Ayatollah is spreading Eastwards through Pakistan. A detailed study by our political leaders and economic planners of the conditions which led to the coup would help avert such a situation for our country.

— Brig YP Dev (Retd)

Lions and Tigers : the Crisis in Sri Lanka

By Dennis Austin and Anirudha Gupta

*Published by the Centre for Security & Conflict Studies 12/12A Golden Square, London, W1R 3 AF 1988, Pages 25, Price £ 5.50.
(Conflict Studies 211)*

Sinhalese and Tamils came to the Island 2000 years ago. The Sinhalese were converted to Buddhism in 3rd century BC. The Sinhalese comprise 70 percent and those who speak Tamil 20 Percent. Tamils are heavily concentrated in Jaffna (92 percent) and form a large minority in the Eastern province comprising Batticaloa and Trincomalee (42 percent). In the Northern and Eastern province together the Tamil population is 68 percent.

State - sponsored colonisation of Sinhalese has eroded the Tamil base. On the other hand the Sinhalese feel that they can't be alien in their own land as most of the land development schemes are in the Eastern province.

The Indian position was set out by Kurshid Alam Khan, Minister of State for External Affairs in April 1985.

In April 1987 Sri Lankan Army was asked to make a full-scale assault on the Jaffna peninsula. A blockade by land and sea cut off 800,000 Tamils of the peninsula and 200,000 in Jaffna Town. On 25 Jul 87 an agreement

between Sri Lanka and India was signed and two days later the peace keeping force arrived. At the end of 1987 control over Jaffna was established.

The book provides a useful insight into the Sri Lankan imbroglio and highlights the various factors contributing to it.

-- Maj General BD Kale (Retd)

Monarchy in Nepal - Tribhuvan Era: Imprisonment to Glory

By Kusum Shrestha

Published by Popular Prakashan Ltd, 35C Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya Marg, Popular Press Bldg, Bombay 400034, 1984, Pages 282, Price not given.

The book is based on the author's dissertation for a doctorate from the Agra University. The text contains large passages from newspapers and official publications relating to the administration. Delving in the early history, reference is made to the Licchavi dynasty in Seventeenth Century who had adopted the system of dual and triple Kingship - the throne was shared by the brothers in the line of succession.

Internecine feuds, court intrigues and a rapid succession of weak rulers paved the way for the legendary Jang Bahadur Rana to establish the Rana dynasty which provided all powerful hereditary Prime Ministers for over 90 years. The members of Royal family were introduced to a life of licentiousness and debauchery, thereby impairing their mental and physical faculties. The King was assigned a passive role and confined to the four walls of the palace during the entire period of 'Ranarchy'. All top positions in military and civil departments were assigned to the members of Rana family. Under them immutable tribal culture flourished and the country was shut off from the rest of the world.

Anti - Rana Movements and final restoration of monarchy have been discussed in fair detail. The most exciting event being the escape of King Tribhuvan from his palace for taking asylum in the Indian Embassy. The period preceding this was full of bloody struggle by Parja Parishad, Nepali Congress and Dr KI Singh's militant groups who had to face serious reprisals and punishments in their efforts to end autocratic Rana Rule. On restoration of Monarchy in early 1951 King Tribhuvan ended his personal rule and gave ample opportunities to the political parties to form representative Government.

Finally, the King abdicated in favour of Prince Mahendra in Feb 55, who in view of the serious law and order situation dismissed the ministry and

assumed personal control. Thus ended Nepal's courtship with democracy. Uncertain political situation continues to keep the Himalayan Kingdom on a short fuse to this day. Obviously, a people imbued in tribal traditions and in grip of poverty, ignorance and corruption cannot sustain a democratic government.

The book is devoid of any maps, photographs and illustrations; however, chapterwise notes and Bibliography are welcome additions. All in all, the author has failed to maintain the enthusiasm which is aroused by the title of the book.

— K Narendra Singh
Brig 1A (Retd)

History of the Remount and Veterinary Corps 1794 - 1987

By Lt Col J S Bhalla

Published by Additional Directorate General Remount and Veterinary, West Block 3, R K Puram, New Delhi - 110066. 1988, Pages 316, Price not given.

This history of the RVC is a beautifully produced book that the Corps can take pride in. For the author it has, obviously been a labour of love. Judging by the bibliography, all conceivable material has been unearthed, scanned and judiciously used. The end product is a very presentable and undoubtedly useful record of the evolution and activities of the Remount and Veterinary Corps.

Though essentially a technical record with emphasis on the veterinarian remount and on generational aspects, the style of and the leavening of anecdotal material makes it readable even to a lay man. Some would demonstrate why Curzon after his early, abortive journey into Mysore, managed to escape by Tiger. The reason adduced by the experts of the day was that he could do so because he rode a gelding. Apparently, he was rather partial to geldings, for it is on record that on another occasion he speared a tiger, mounted on a gelding.

To revert to the main theme, the period of the Second World War has been very well covered. One misses the same degree of completeness in the treatment of the subsequent wars and operations. Probably the reason is that these have not been well documented, but then one wonders if such a handicap could not have been overcome by interviewing those that were directly involved in such activities. Most of these gentlemen must still be around, a few years hence it may be too late. One other minor discrepancy may be mentioned -- the deconnotations shown under the photographs of the very distinguished gentlemen who have been Colonels of the Corps, is not upto-date. A small matter, but considering that this is a book of history which will

be used as a source book by posterity, it may be judicious to correct this aspect in future editions of the book.

The author and all others responsible for the preparations and production of this book are to be complimented.

— Col RR Chatterji

Supplement to Indian Mountaineer Commemorating the Mussoorie Meet - 88

Published by Indian Mountaineering Foundation, Headquarters Complex, Benito Juarez Rd , New Delhi - 110021, 1988, Pages 87, Price not mentioned

This glossy pamphlet commemorates the Fifth Himalayan Mountaineering and Tourism Meet held in Mussoorie. This gathering of mountaineers of international repute, discussed 'Adventure and Tourism', Environment including Wild Life', 'Adventure Tourism in all its Facets' and 'Developments of Rockwall Facilities', all in the context of the Himalayas. Tastefully laid out, the text, subdivided into chapters dealing with promotion of tourism in UP, Sikkim, J&K, West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh and Assam, is interspersed with eye-catching photoplates of resorts, landscape and adventure sport. The cover inset; "Shivling" from a painting by RN Pasricha, is particularly appealing to the heart and soul. The ITDC, Indian Airlines, Vayudoot, ONGC, IMA, Nehru Institute of Mountaineering and Survey of the India, have also contributed their pieces about adventure activity in their areas of influence. The First Ascent of Rimo - I' in the Siachen area is an absorbing reading for the armchair adventurer.

The general trend is to sell tourism throughout India, which amounts for 15% of the foreign exchange earning; to this end, this brochure provides adequate details of hotel facilities, airline details, travel agencies and trekking routes etc. It should be worth bearing in mind, however, that tourism is essentially customer satisfaction oriented. The affluent will hardly return if they are made to shell out their dollars and also subjected to agony vis - a - vis service and infrastructure. Most come for a change, hence the ITDC needs to undertake construction of cottage type tenements, using local construction materials like bamboo, wood or slate. This would provide the ethnic flavour apart from being cost effective. The tourists also have to be handled with efficiency by our national and domestic airways, which at present is so woefully missing. Adventure sport like heli-skiing, can be afforded only by the very rich, so should not be promoted, especially when its impact on ecological disturbance is considered. In the West it has been banned.

A good house journal.

— Lt Col AK Sharma

The Second Maratha Campaign, 1804-1805 : Diary of James Young-Officer, Bengal Horse Artillery and Twice Sheriff of Calcutta

By D. D. Khanna

Published by Allied Publishers Limited, 13/4, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi-110 002, 1990, Pages 204, Price Rs 175/-

This diary of James young has been introduced and edited by Prof D.D. Khanna and published in a book form in July 1990 by Allied Publishers Ltd.

Prof. Khanna's perseverance to discover the identity, family, social and intellectual background of the author, is indeed, commendable. Prof. Khanna's research is certainly painstaking and he has accomplished this herculean task with dedication of a scholar.

The forty-six pages of introduction along with the notes, is loaded with quotations and quite exhaustive. Prof. Khanna has gone into great detail to explain the historical and political condition of India under the Maratha pentarchy of the Sindhias of Gwalior, the Holkars of Indore, the Bhonsles of Nagpur, and the Gaekwads of Baroda. The foreign policy of the East India Company under Lord Wellesley has also been expounded at great length. All this elaborate framing of the canvas was, perhaps, felt necessary by Prof. Khanna to prepare a necessary background for a proper understanding and appreciation of the diary by James Young.

The Diary is a journal of occurrences commencing on August 24th 1804 and is signed off on September 12th 1806, Fort William. The day to day details during this period are recorded in lucid style giving a strong sense of authenticity. The author's personality as a young liberal Englishman, with moral, social and democratic values, is also revealed through this journal. What strikes the reader most is the candid criticism and objective observations of the author. He has carefully obliterated the names of his superior to avoid any trouble to himself and it is quite understandable. As the writer himself points out in conclusion to his journal that his account is not a 'Regular Digested History' but an exact picture of his mind and of his heart for the pleasure of his 'dear parents'. To make reading more entertaining, he has illustrated his journal with pen-sketches and maps, many of which were, unfortunately, lost in the hazards of his marching from place to place. One puts down the book with a little sense of regret that James Young did not maintain a diary during his two tenures as the Sheriff of Calcutta. He had come in close contact with many illustrious Indians of the time, who were appreciated by him and in return, held in high esteem by them.

In all fairness, one can comment that, the book is not only a magnificent, historical document of military manoeuvres and strategy, but a

young Englishman's sincere observations of things happening around him, a man who grew to love this country which he calls 'country of my adoption.'

-- Mrs Sheila Sen

Fighter Combat : Tactics and Maneuvering

By Robert L. Shaw

Published by Naval Institute Press, 2062 Generals Highway, Maryland, USA, 1987, Pages 428, Price not given.

Air Power became the dominant force in warfare during the Second World War "The Battle of Britain" successfully fought to prevent the Germans from gaining air superiority for their planned invasion of Britain, was described by Sir Winston Churchill as "Their Finest hour". Commenting on the feats of valour and sacrifice of the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few".

Since then, aerial combat has always been the most-sought after method for gaining air superiority and takes a high toll of the cream of fighter pilots. However, the 'dog-fights' of today have become highly complicated with the introduction of long-range air-to-air missiles, search and sighting radars, and beyond visual range interceptions guided by AWACS.

Robert L. Shaw, with over 4,000 hrs of flying experience, mostly on fighter aircraft has produced an excellent book on air combat tactics with useful diagrams to help the reader understand the mechanics of aerial fighting. The book covers in depth almost all situations that could arise during air combat, and how they could be tackled. It would be of great interest to and a profitable study for all fighter pilots and combat leaders.

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
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
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