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PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- Army and Civil Authority in Internal Security Operations : Difficulties and Problems —*Sanga R Jangid*
IPS (Prob)
- Power in Power Politics —*Dr Jai Narain*
- The Triple Alliance Threat to India's Security —*Aparna Tripathi*
- Implications of Changing Recruitment—*Dr (Mrs) MK Singh*
Ideology for Indian Army
- An Information Service for the Army —*Brig SS Chandel*
SC, VSM
- Leadership in Captivity—A Case Study of Kwai Prison Camp —*Brig KM Bhimaya*

JANUARY—MARCH 1986

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National Security Essay*

Army and Civil Authority in Internal Security Operations Difficulties and Problems

SANGA R JANGID IPS (PROB.)

"Identify difficulties and problem areas that arise when the army and civil administration work together in areas affected by both insurgency and terrorist activities. Also suggest correctives and indicate guidelines so that purposive, responsive, harmonious and functionally efficient working relationship between the two may result"

INTRODUCTION

THE army is the ultimate weapon available to the State to enforce the nation's will. When diplomats fail to preserve the peace, the soldier has to go to war to re-establish peace. And when the civil administration fails to preserve order, the soldier is called upon to restore order. As the nation's final safeguard, the army must not fail in either circumstance.

The primary task of the soldier is to defend his people against external aggression. In his secondary role, he is required to aid the civil power when called upon to do so. The calling out of troops is the last resort of the Government to maintain order. This implies that troops should be called out only when there is no other alternative and when the normal civil agencies of the Government have not been able to cope with the situation. This is an unpleasant assignment for the soldier. However, in a society where violence—insurgency, terrorist activities or any other form of it—erupts so frequently, a soldier has to be increasingly prepared to face this unpalatable task.

INSURGENCY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES: MEANING:

There is a great deal of difference between insurgency and terrorism. In the case of insurgency the insurgents seek and are prepared

* Awarded the COAS Gold Medal as well as his name was inscribed on the rolling trophy awarded annually for the best essay.

for a direct military confrontation between themselves and the government's force; in the case of terrorism, the terrorists seek to avoid anything of that sort, knowing fully well that their numbers are too weak to survive frontal confrontation. Their strategy is to hit the innocents to cow-down the strong into submission.

The insurgents and terrorists have one major thing in common, that is, the means employed to achieve their ends. They resort to violence.

In aiding the civil authorities, the army has to mount counter insurgency and anti-terrorist operation. In both the areas they face the same kind of difficulties and problems.

INSURGENCY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

Post-independence India has seen 3 main trends of insurgency attempts, differing in geographical location, political inspiration, and some organisational characteristics, but having certain aims as well as strategies in common, and drawing moral (and at times physical) support from India's adversaries.

The first, Kashmiri infiltration and subversion—as substantiated by UN findings—occurred in J&K in 1947 and 1965, and retains a likelihood of reappearing at an opportune time.

The second, tribal insurgency has been a phenomenon in the States of Nagaland and Manipur, and Mizo Hills district of Assam since 1956 and 1966 respectively although waning of late.

The third, Maoist extremist activities, started at Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967 and continued, in varying degrees, in West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra, Kerala, Orissa, Assam, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab.

The recent and very explosive trend is terrorism in Punjab. The problem of terrorism in Punjab had assumed such dimensions that the army had to enter the Golden Temple to flush out the terrorists who were hiding there. These terrorists were controlled sometimes by Sikh terrorist organisations based in foreign countries. Also, as mentioned in the White paper, they had the tacit support of foreign sources who wanted to create instability in India.

Fortunately, Punjab unlike Nagaland or Mizoram, has a clearly defined and easily patrolled international border with Pakistan and there are no mountainous jungles which could provide secret bases for locals which could be difficult for the security forces to detect. To that extent it is impossible for Sikh insurgents to conduct a prolonged

revolutionary war if the intelligence agencies and security forces know their business.

Although Sikh, Naga, Mizo and Naxalite terrorists may argue that they are revolutionaries seeking to overthrow a corrupt government, liberal democracies clearly view terrorism or insurgency as a criminal rather than a political offence. The resort to violence by non-elected groups for achieving political ends in a democracy is an illegitimate and unjustifiable use of force.

The armed forces have always lent helping hand to the civil authorities in fighting the insurgents and terrorists. Both have worked hand and glove many a times to abet the problem whenever it arose. But the increasing interest of some foreign powers in these movements to destabilise Indian democracy and government draw our attention to become more cautious.

SHOULD ARMY BE USED IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER?

The use of army in aid of the civil power is increasing year after year. During the period 1951 to 1970, the army had to be called out on no fewer than 476 occasions for this purpose, whereas during 1981 to 1984, it was called out on 369 occasions, most of which was for restoring order during disturbances.

We need to examine the reasons why the army has to be so frequently called out to restore order. The police has been considerably militarised since independence. The strength of our para-military forces has been increased from a few thousand in 1947 to nearly a million. Yet the police and the para-military forces are finding it difficult to cope with law and order problem on their own.

The two main reasons why army assistance is called for so frequently are increasing violence in our society and the increasing politicisation of the police, which has resulted in demoralisation and corruption in their ranks. In such circumstances, our police has become ineffective in dealing with crisis situations and the government has to fall back repeatedly upon the army to restore order.

The frequent use of the army has certain inherent dangers.

First, the army is being asked to do a job for which it is not trained. The army is trained to deal with the nation's enemies, not its own citizenry.

Secondly, troops employed on these duties lose on training time and this can adversely affect their operational preparedness.

Thirdly, frequent use of the army in this role erodes its deterrent effect and, in the process, the army may be forced to use greater force than it would have otherwise done.

Fourthly, through prolonged and frequent deployment on such duties the strong bond of discipline in the army may weaken. The mutiny of some Sikh troops in June 1984 was a painful reminder of what can happen if troops are used for sensitive tasks, without adequate measures taken to educate those likely to be affected.

Fifthly, troops are called in only when the civil administration has failed in carrying out its task. Frequent failures like this will erode the moral authority of the government and the soldier may begin to lose confidence or even respect for the civil authorities. Such a development will destroy the apolitical complexion of our army.

In spite of all this, one thing has to be borne in mind. When police and para-military forces fail to crush the activities of insurgents or terrorists and when the integrity and security of the nation is in great danger, army must come to the aid of civil authorities. Such grave circumstances demand the use of army. For these reasons, Section 129 to 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure discusses various provisions for the use of army in aid of civil administration.

IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER

The assistance of the army is often sought by the civil government for the following purposes:

- (a) maintenance of law and order;
- (b) maintenance of essential services;
- (c) assistance during natural calamities;
- (d) other types of assistance including assistance in development projects.

Of these, the assistance provided in the maintenance of law and order is the most important and difficult one. Such assistance is generally referred to as "Internal Security Duties". The other types of assistance mentioned above are generally of an administrative nature.

'The Internal Security Duties' can be divided into two parts:—

- (a) Dispersal of unlawful assemblies which has been widely discussed in the Criminal Procedure Code.
- (b) Others, which include counter insurgency and counter-terrorist operations.

Herein after, by IS operations, we will mean counter insurgency and counter terrorist operations, and it is the only type of 'Aid' which is related to our essay.

If civil authorities have reason to think that a breach of peace is likely to occur which will be beyond the power of the police to control, they can requisition military assistance which would be complied with, firstly as a preventive measure and secondly in order that they may have sufficient force available to deal with the situation. In civil disturbances, the presence of troops has a steadying effect and their timely appearance frequently results in the arrest of a dangerous movement before it has had time to develop.

During this precautionary period the action of troops at the request of civil authorities will generally take the form of 'demonstration marches' (or flag marches as commonly known) through disturbed areas, or they may be asked to stand-by, at a definite period of notice ready for action when called for. The demonstration marches serve to give confidence to the peace loving citizens and act as a deterrent to those inclined otherwise.

In certain circumstances even after the disturbances have broken out the mere arrival of troops upon the scene may result in an improvement in the local situation, thus making it easy for civil authorities to establish control without actually having to employ the troops.

Other active measures required of the troops may include patrolling of certain areas, protection of vital installations, offices, etc, or use of military pickets in cordons or in "quartering a locality".

Military authorities are required to prepare Internal Security Schemes to meet likely emergencies. When making these schemes, specially for the suppression of disturbances, it is desirable that differences between police and military methods of operations should be understood, since they are in certain respects vary from one another. Police methods include dispersion of forces and contact with the public and their personnel are trained to work in isolation. Such methods though suited to normal police duties are not suited to the troops who are trained to operate in concentrations and to avoid dispersion. In the conditions under which troops are employed, the isolation of small parties and individuals is ineffective and dangerous, and must be avoided.

Even when the troops have been requisitioned for the suppression of disturbances, the control of the measures remains in the hands of the civil authority. The usual terms "handing over control" or "taking over the area" only mean the assigning of the task of restoring the disturbed state of law and order to a state of near normalcy. These terms by no means imply an abrogation or temporary suspension of the civil authority.

It has to be clearly appreciated that the troops are being assigned specific tasks for restoring peace or prevention of any disturbance. However, in the performance of these tasks assigned by the civil authority, the control of the troops and the manner in which the task has to be accomplished will clearly be the responsibility of the officer-in-charge of the troops. When a magistrate has requested the officer commanding the troops to overcome insurgents or terrorists it is for such officer on the spot to decide the strength and equipment of the force needed for the purpose and he is entirely responsible for the nature and extent of force to be used.

It would be for the magistrate to decide when the purpose can be deemed to have been obtained and his decision must be accepted. The military Commander must, however, be satisfied that the safety of his force is not endangered by premature cessation of action.

It must be restated here that troops should be called out only when it becomes absolutely necessary to do so and as a last resort when all other means available have been exhausted. That, however, does not mean that calling out the army should be delayed till the situation has reached the point of no return.

PRINCIPLES

Army action in IS operations has to be guided by the four principles of necessity, minimum force, impartiality and good faith. There must be necessity for every action that the army takes. The principle of minimum force requires that only the barest amount of force in relation to the requirements of the situation be used. However, unlike in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies it is not necessary to follow this principle in anti-insurgency and anti-terrorist operation. The principle of impartiality is self evident. Lastly, the principle of good faith gets automatically satisfied if the three other principles are complied with.

The distinctive feature of the military aided counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in India was the existence of firm policy-directives under which the tasks set before the armed forces were guided by the following rules :

- (1) Operations were strictly in aid of civil power and not on a war-time basis.
- (2) Minimum force was to be used at all times as deterrence.
- (3) Peaceful villagers were to be given all possible protection and reprisals to be ruled out.

**DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEM AREAS:
WHEN THE ARMY AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES WORK
TOGETHER IN IS OPERATIONS**

An essential condition for the success of such IS operations is that in all stages of such operations, military and civil officers including police officers must cooperate with one another as closely as possible. Different areas of duties and functions of different officers—civil and military—are clearly spelt out and defined by laws. But still some difficulties and problems regarding coordination between the both and some other may arise.

The poor quality of intelligence is a major handicap to the army when it is called out, usually at moment's notice. Intelligence is the most important single factor in the successful planning and conduct of such operations. When the army comes at a short notice, it has no time enough to develop its own intelligence. Therefore, the army has to rely upon the intelligence supplied by the civil authorities. But past experience shows that many times such intelligence proved to be quite inadequate and incorrect. This may fail whole plan of operation. In the Operation Blue Star, such big number of soldiers and officers died and injured mainly because of the army's reliance on very incorrect information supplied by civil authorities about the weapons inside the Golden Temple.

Second major problem that arises, is the problem of personal egoism of superiority about the relative status. The relative status of senior civil servants are generally well defined in the tables of precedence issued periodically by the Government of India since independence and on the basis of their emoluments. In the case of relatively junior civil servants like D.M, SDM and other Magistrates the position is a little vague and sometimes leads to avoidable misunderstandings. Those who in this context argue in terms of supremacy of the civil authority in a democracy or in terms of a D.M being the head of the district, only betray their ignorance. *Supremacy of the civil authority in a democracy stands for the supremacy of the political executives and it does not by any stretch imply any inflated status for a civil servant.*

However, in regard to the police there are certain aspects which deserve special mention.

First, since calling out of the army is generally in the wake of the police not being able to cope with the situation, there is sometimes a tendency on the part of army officers to adopt an air of

superiority. This is totally uncalled for. The responsibilities of the police are very onerous and its tasks very difficult. A situation going beyond its control should not be viewed as an instance of its failure. It should be regarded as a case of violence of greater dimension, requiring more drastic measures.

Secondly, when troops operate in aid of the civil power, policemen in that area do not come under command of the army. Their cooperation should be enlisted tactfully but no attempt should be made to order them around. Lastly, police officers wear very similar badges of rank as army officers but they are police badges of rank and cannot be used as the basis for equation with the army. Pre-47, a Superintendent of Police with less than 15 years of service in IPS was equated with a Captain and those with more than 15 years service with a major. The Govt. of India has so far not changed this equation even though SPs with only 5 years service have begun to wear badges of rank which happens to be of a similar pattern as that of a lieutenant colonel. The relative status of senior police and army ranks has been fixed by the Govt. of India—the I. G. Police stands equated with Major General. However, the relative status of police ranks below IG has not been fixed, except for what was in vogue pre-47. This uncertainty creates inter-personal problem of false sense of superiority, which very much presents in the way for harmonious coordination between the civil and army authorities.

The third problem arises because of lack of training. To derive maximum benefit from the employment of troops in aid of the civil power, it is necessary that different government agencies involved in the task are given training at periodic intervals. So far as army is concerned, this subject is included in the training syllabi of different training institutions like Indian Military Academy, College of Combat and the Staff College. Besides this, training is also required to be carried out in this subject in field formations and units. On the civil side, an odd lecture on this subject is sometimes given to IAS and IPS Cadets when they join their service, but thereafter no organised training is provided. Therefore, this lack of knowledge and training creates big problem in I S operations.

Fourthly, some administrative problems like transport, accommodation and recreation arise. Accommodation is always a difficult problem and will be influenced by the policy towards the civil population. Schools, cinemas and other public places may have

to be requisitioned: this would keep the guards down to a reasonable level. The provision of adequate recreation facilities is also difficult

Fifthly, one more inter-personal problem may arise. The civil authorities think that since the issue has been handed over to the army, they do not take much interest. This lack of interest is a big handicap for the IS operations. Sometimes even civil authorities who called the army to aid them, are not present when the army reaches the disturbed place. The law permits the magistrate to hand over the situation to the army and when the magistrate himself is not present when the army reaches there or on other occasion when he is needed, then a very difficult situation arises.

Sixthly, if joint control rooms and a common command is not organised for army and civil authorities, it creates difficulty in coordination.

Seventhly, the objectives of the training given to army and civil authorities are different from each other. Army is a very disciplined force trained to fight external enemies. Whereas the civil authorities are trained to deal with internal disturbances 'democratically'. Thus, when two different authorities, with difference of their taught objectives and training may find difficulties in coordination when they have to work together.

Lastly, civil authorities, under influence of politics, may sometimes try to interfere in the right course of operation and may desire to change the way in accordance with the vested interest of some local politicians. But the army, being so disciplined force, won't do so. This may sometimes cause bitterness between the two

Thus, we find several difficulties and problem areas that arises when the army and civil administration, two different authorities, trained in different ways and objectives, work together in areas affected by both insurgency and terrorist activities.

SUGGESTIONS, CORRECTIVES AND GUIDELINES

In all stages of aid to the civil administration, military and civil officers including police officers must co-operate with one another as closely as possible. There should be constant and free consultation between them. The military commander should bear in mind that civil officers from their knowledge of local conditions, will often be in a position to give valuable information and suggestions. The civil officers on their part should be prepared to give military officers the

benefit of their knowledge, but must refrain from interfering with matters which are patently the province of the military commander.

The strength, composition and equipment of the force and method of carrying out the operation are matters for the decision of military authority. The civil authority may and should be reason of its fuller knowledge of the circumstances of the disturbance which is likely to occur, or has occurred any of local conditions, given the military authority the benefit of its opinion, so as to enable the latter to make decisions regarding the size and composition of the force to be employed.

First, to ensure this co-operation it is necessary that all internal security schemes are issued over the signature of both the civil and military authorities concerned. In addition the local military authority should give every assistance to the civil authorities in preparing any schemes they are required to prepare, in connection with the military aid to civil authorities.

Secondly, periodical informal conferences between corresponding civil and military authorities are of importance. Such conferences, even if not necessitated by the situation at the time, result in mutual confidence and understanding which is a very important factor when disturbances occur. These conferences should be more frequent when disturbances are probable.

Thirdly, Liaison during disturbances is essential. Liaison and co-operation is best effected by placing headquarters of the civil and military authorities concerned in the same place. When this is not possible, the military authority should send a military liaison officer to the headquarters of the civil authority. Similarly the civil authority should send a civil liaison officer to the military headquarters. These liaison officers should be equipped with adequate means of communications and should remain attached to the authorities concerned until the situation returns to normal.

Fourthly, when civil and military officers are not fully conversant with the organisation and relative status of each officer, the severe inter-personal problems arise, as stated earlier. Therefore, relative status of civil (including police) and their military counter-parts should be clearly spelt out by law.

Fifthly, the civil administration and the army working to a common plan should be coordinated into one team. This requires the appointment of a Director of Operations (DO) functioning from a joint headquarters with joint committees at all levels.

The DO should be in overall command of all armed elements engaged in fighting insurgency and terrorism—the armed forces, the para-military forces, the civil police and any volunteer force. He should also coordinate the operations of the security forces with psychological warfare operations and *developmental activities of the Government*. Since his functions will have a greater bias for operations by armed elements, he must inevitably be a senior military officer.

The appointment of a military officer as DO does not in any way supersede the civil government. The latter will continue to remain supreme except that all its activities directed to combat insurgency and terrorism will be closely coordinated with military operations. The DO should function under the head of the local government and have direct access to him.

There are precedents for such appointments—General Erskine in Kenya and Generals Briggs and Bourne in Malaya. In extreme cases when insurgency is widespread and has taken a serious turn a military officer may be appointed as head of the local Government like Field Marshal Harding in Cyprus and General Templar in Malaya.

Sixthly, one important requirement is to coordinate the activities of different intelligence agencies functioning in the theatre of operation. This will require the appointment of a Chief of Intelligence who may be an experienced police officer from the intelligence organisation. He should function directly under the Director of Operations.

Seventhly, joint committees comprising representatives of the civil administration, army, police intelligence and any volunteer organisation should be set up at all levels and they should meet frequently to coordinate their activities. In the interest of cooperation and smooth working, it would be advisable to have military boundaries of formations and units to conform to corresponding civil and political boundaries. The military commander will then have only one civil administration to deal with and vice-versa.

Eighthly, the army must rely on the civil police for local information, and to be guided for movement in the city. The police on the other hand should ensure that full advantage is taken of the deterrent effect of the presence of troops on miscreants. This requires that army units or sub-units should be used primarily as

strike elements and army resources should not, as far as possible, be dissipated in guard and other static duties.

Ninethly, the requisition should be made well in advance, so that delays do not come up when the force is to be deployed.

Tenthly, the importance of task orientation has been stressed at various points. For example, the district police should be utilised for guard duty and related tasks and the armed forces used as striking units.

Eleventhly, civil administration should provide magistrate/magistrates to the army as the situation requires so that army can carry on the operation in time. In Poonch, when army was called five years ago to quell a riot, the army felt a major handicap in that magistrates were not available in time.

Twelvethly, the army should not stay for too long. As soon as the purpose is over, the army should be withdrawn otherwise it may create distaste in civil administration and public.

Finally, both army and civil officers need to be given joint training in this subject. In 1965 a week's cadre was organised in Calcutta for a large number of Deputy Commissioners and Superintendents of Police of West Bengal alongwith Lieutenant Colonels and Majors. Such a cadre has obvious advantage and should become a regular annual feature in States.

But one thing should always be kept in mind that neither the imposition of martial law nor the employment of the army in aid of the civil power, can meet the requirements of the situation. What is required is a combined and integrated politico-military offensive, closely coordinated at all levels, in an all out bid to crush insurgency and terrorist activities. The military operations are an important contributory factor, but are by no means the only factor. In the final analysis, victory in a counter-insurgency campaign can be attained, only by winning the hearts and minds of the people.

NEED TO REDUCE THE USE OF ARMY IN 'IS' OPERATIONS TOO OFTEN

Looking at the dangers discussed earlier, the need arises to reduce the use of army in aid of civil administration in I S operations. This can be done through several measures.

Firstly, the civil police should be modernised, well equipped and depoliticised.

Secondly, Centre should help the States with funds and advice to improve police capability.

Thirdly, para-military forces should be strengthened.

Fourthly, the NCC should be used at times when the pressure of duties on the police and para-military forces is high.

Finally, citizen readiness to help the Law and order authority should be encouraged in the form of 'mohalla' committees.

The Indian Army is the only apolitical army of the Third World and has been an island of discipline in a growing sea of indiscipline. It has repeatedly proved itself a great asset of the nation. Today, all our institutions are being systematically eroded and mutilated by the forces of evils, like political manipulations, rampant corruption and debasement of values. Our army is one of the very few institutions which has relatively been much less affected. Let us not through its frequent and prolonged use in maintenance of law and order, damage its high professional standard and its deep apolitical roots.

CONCLUSION

As far as possible, State Governments should tackle law and order problems like insurgency, terrorist activities etc. With the considerably increased strength of armed police units both at the Centre and in the States, the army should be rarely called out in aid of the civil administration. However, so far as army is concerned, it should at all times be prepared to promptly respond to any call made for aid to the civil power. The use of the army in this role is the last resort of the Government to maintain order. The army cannot, therefore, afford to fail in carrying out this task when called upon to do so.

The civil officers and the army officers, employed for these duties, must show tact and develop understanding with each other. There is of course no functional subordination of one to the other; the two must work in close co-operation and harmony, to achieve the common goal of restoring normalcy in the quickest time, with the least amount of casualty or inconvenience to our people.

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Power in Power Politics

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Recently the idea of power has assumed an importance of its own both in the realm of political theory and practice. The reason for this can be traced in the fact that the meaning of politics has changed from one of being a 'study of state and government' to that of being a 'study of power'. As Michael Curtis says: "Politics is organized dispute about power and its use, involving choice among competing values, ideas, persons, interests and demands. The study of politics is concerned with the description and analysis of the manner in which power is obtained, exercised, controlled, the purpose for which it is used, the manner in which decisions are made, the factors which influence the making of these decisions, and the context in which those decisions take place."¹

The kind of power we are concerned in the present context is all and every influence, abstract and concrete which can change men's minds and nature of their ideas. As a rule, those who seek and use power in its very varied manifestations wish to cause change in the behaviour of other men because this is the way to make them act in accordance with the wishes of power operator. 'Thus a power relation', writes Jack Nagel, "actual or potential is an actual or potential causal relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself."² Actor here refers to an individual, group, organisation or other collectivity. The outcome is a variable indicating the state of behaviour, beliefs, attitudes or policies of a second actor.

This is another way of stating the simple and obvious fact that every action undertaken by an actor is the visible and outward sign of an idea in his mind. Sovereign states, political parties, pressure groups and politicians use such power as they can command in order to achieve a variety of purposes which they consider desirable. It

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1. Michael Curtis, *Comparative Government and Politics*, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, p. 1.
2. Jack H. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 28-29.

is rare indeed that the purpose for which an actor uses its power commands full legitimacy.

Sovereign states, political parties, pressure groups and politicians became dedicated to rival or conflicting purposes and the question arises: which shall prevail?

The answer emerges from the power politics struggle, whether the issue between blocs of sovereign states, between single states, or between political parties down to village panchayats where the issue may be where to plant a tree on village road.

Some scholars accept the statement that in state relationships, it is the amount of physical violence available to one state for use against its opponent—even if only in the last resort—which has always been of prime significance. They say that what was true in tribal days; it was true in 1939-45; it is true in 1980's and what always has been, is and always will be.

This viewpoint finds brilliant manifestation in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.³ A clear inference from his explanation of power is that the search for power is the root cause of competition among actors. Interests collide in the race to acquire more and more riches, honours and commands and for this sake the actors take to the means of killing, subduing, supplanting and repelling their opponents. After Hobbes, this theory has its reiteration in the works of Hegel who absolutised the sovereign authority to the extent of discarding the ethics of international morality. Power and the urge towards it were very much extolled in the 19th century by a good number of writers. In this direction we may in particular refer to great German thinkers like Nietzsche, Trietschke, Bernhardt. Among the leading advocates of this theory in the present age, we may refer to Hans J. Morgenthau who in his 'Politics Among Nations' writes: "Internatinnal politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever is the ultimate aim of international politics, power is always the immediate aim."⁴ This statement is correct if the analysis is confined to the nature of power in the international usage from the dawn of history until the beginning of the nuclear age.

This essay will show that because physical violence has always been what matters most in international power politics it does not

3. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Penguin, 1977).

4. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1972), p. 27.

follow that there is some immutable law of nature which says that the principal ingredient of power in power politics must always be this one factor of physical violence. If it can be shown that some ingredients of power in the past have changed either up or down in the scale of importance then we have made progress towards conceding that if some have changed, may not all, including the factor of violence have changed their relative significance?

Let us consider some changes in the composition of power politics which have occurred in Indian history.

In 326 B.C. Alexander the Great and Porus clashed to gain power. Undoubted the decisive factor in Porus-Alexander struggle was military strength or the ability to inflict, physical violence on each others' army. When we turn some more pages of history, the decisive factor in the battle of Tarain in 1192 A.D. between Prithvi Raj Chauhan and Mohamad Ghori was again the military strength. But one change in the ingredient of power can be noticed here and that was the religion. In this struggle for power religious motive also played a dominant role.

When we come to the freedom struggle in India, especially the later part, we can notice another ingredient of power. The power which Mahatama Gandhi exercised in the second quarter of the present century was non-violent power. Because of his complete identification with the masses, selflessness and purity of the purpose, Gandhi acquired so much power during this period that he became the uncrowned king of the nation.

We now turn to a page of our history and come to a period in which money became increasingly important in the domestic power politics struggle. What has, however, dragged the economic institution of property into the realm of power politics is its character as power that enables a man to have a share in the decision-making process or, what David Easton calls, the authoritative allocation of values.⁵ The discovery of the idea of treating money as the source of political power should be attributed to Karl Marx who maintained that in modern conditions property has become a means of control over the life and labour of other people, strictly speaking of the propertied classes over the propertyless, is thus understood by Marx:

"The capitalist is not a capitalist because he directs (the work), but he becomes an industrial commander because he is a capitalist.

5. David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry Into the State of Political Science* (Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1971), p. 129.

Industrial command becomes an attribute of capital as under feudalism, the power of command was in war as in law an attribute of the ownership of land."⁶

Money, large amount of it, could and did buy votes and seats in Parliament and Council of Ministers. There is no single post in government hierarchy which cannot be bought by money. It has also importance for indirect use such as paying the cost of propaganda, a political party which is poor is—other things being equal—at a disadvantage in fighting a party which is rich.

But a party without money can wrest power from one which is richer and the possession of money is only one of many requirements in the struggle for power. There is the question of the programme, of the image the party can project to the electors; of character and personality of the leader in a society accustomed to hero worship, and attaching importance to film stars, cricket and hockey players and other public figures. The existence of the television has added enormously to the importance of the leaders' appearance and personality. There is the question of obtaining press support etc.

If Porus or Alexander could have a discussion with the Indian Prime Minister now on the subject of how the latter had got to the power, and how he kept himself and his colleagues in power, the bewildered Porus or Alexander would doubt whether they were talking about the same thing. He would be wrong. The subject would be exactly the same in 1986 as it was in 326 B.C.—viz. how to achieve power, keep it and use it. What has changed during these more than 2000 years, are the ways and means of obtaining power; how to maintain and use it. One thing is certain, no man or group of men today have much chance of seizing power in India because of their ability to use violence and win a civil war. That would seem very strange to Alexander and almost beyond belief.

Now look beyond the shore of this sub-continent and consider what has happened to the ingredients of power in the international power politics struggle.

The central and decisive factor in international politics, at any rate upto 1945, has been a state's capacity to exert physical violence upon its opponent. But this core of power has been surrounded by subsidiary sources such as a 'sun' is encircled by its 'planets'. But

6. Karl Marx, *Capital*. Vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 297.

some planets of power have faded into insignificance, others have grown and are still growing.

Could one or more than one of them, eclipse the 'sun' itself, this great feature of physical violence which has dominated the power system for so long? Could physical violence decline into becoming a 'planet' of some other aspect of power? To determine this let us first of all consider other planets.

For example, there have been periods in history when the element of religion was harnessed to the chariot of power politics and a strong steed was he: the Arab invasions of North Africa, Spain and France; the Muslim invasion of India; the European crusades into the Middle East; the Spanish Armada; the European wars of religion etc. These all were struggles for power in which the religious motive was of great importance. In these cases it was used as a major stimulus, support and justification for the use of physical violence.

A sign of the weakening of the religious factor in the content of power which could be exerted by a state was perceived in 1914. The Germans hoped that by enlisting Turkey as their ally they would secure not only the aid of a tough and vigorous army but also the general support from a religious point of view of the Muslim world, because the Sultan of Turkey was the Caliph or spiritual leader of all Muslims. It was his prerogative to declare that a war was a 'holy war' against the infidels, and this he did. Had the Caliph's injunction been followed all the Muslims in India would have risen in revolt and the Indian army would have been a menace instead of an asset to British power. The Caliph's call went unheeded, yet throughout World War I the British cabinet had to give careful thought to the feelings of Indian Muslims when dealing with Turkey and the future of holy places. The most recent example was the election of a Roman Catholic to the Presidency of United States. Mr. Kennedy's faith no doubt, had some electoral advantages and disadvantages. They seem to have cancelled each other out. Fifty years ago his faith would have been a fatal handicap.

Now, although one of the changes which has taken place in the content of power politics has been a depreciation in the power value of organized religion. This does not mean that ideologies have become less important in the use of power politics for the conquest of men's minds and hence the control over their actions. But when physical violence is allied to a religious purpose in a power politics

struggle, the violence is very often exceptionally great. The wars of religion in Europe, Islamization of Iran, Pakistan and other Muslim countries are the recent examples of this havoc.

Another example of a change which has altered the relative importance of one of the components of power in power politics between national states is provided by the unimportance today of royal marriages. In the past marital relations between dynasties were of great significance. Chander Gupta Mauriya's marriage to Helen, the daughter of Seleucus of Greek, tied both India and Greek in the bonds of friendship and mutual trust ending a long series of battles. But now-a-days the marriage of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi with Italian Sonia have hardly any impact on Indo-Italian relations.

Religion and dynastic marriages have decreased in importance, whilst propaganda (some use of which has been made from very early times) and economic pressures have become more important than they were in the past.

It has been said that the 20th century is the century of common man but this 'person' began to become important in the political life of world at the end of 18th century when "common men" in France launched a revolution which had world-wide consequences. Thereafter, to an increasing extent the ruling elite had to take account of the opinion of the masses and time and money had to be diverted to the control of their opinions.

The growth of the power of public opinion has depended upon the spread of literacy and the developments of means of communication such as the press, radio, films and television. The spectacular upsurge of ways and means of spreading ideas and circulating opinions has, on one hand enabled a public opinion to be created and on the other enabled the leaders to control or influence it.

The need to pay attention to the state of man, public opinion is common to both democratic and totalitarian leaders. To dictators such as Mussolini and Hitler the control of this public opinion was essential to the maintenance of their power and in such states the minister for propaganda or of information, is a key man with great resources at his disposal. Through his apparatus the dictator strove strenuously to identify himself and his clique with aims and aspirations acceptable to the mass of the nation. Even in democracies the extension of the franchise vested ultimate sovereignty in the mass electorate. It is, however, true that people are only allowed to wear their crowns in public at election time and elaborate though subtle

controls and buffers existed to shield the leaders from too direct and frequent impact from a public opinion usually not well informed and liable to change direction with disconcerting and unpredictable suddenness. From time to time in India public opinion, like a nuclear reactor which starts 'running away' in its processing, gets 'out of control.'

As in domestic power politics struggle the importance of money is also increasing in international sphere. Rich nations can exert this pressure on the poor nations even without resorting to violence. The 'power of dollar', is now recognised by all including the communist countries. In 1966 India devalued its rupee due to economic pressures from abroad. Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egypt, economic blockade against South Africa and Libya etc. are the recent examples of money power. There are other dozens of examples like these where America or other economically advanced countries forced others to dance to their tune. More recently by withdrawing economic assistance to UNESCO, America and its allies have reduced this famous branch of UNO to sheer helplessness. All these instances show the increasing power of money in international power politics struggle.

Thus we can accept the fact that ancillary aspects of power have changed as a result of the changes which have taken place in the structure of human society. Though all these planets have not been able to eclipse the sun (physical violence) yet there is an origin of a new force in the orbit of power politics struggle, which has dethroned violence from its position of supremacy. And this devaluation is done by nuclear violence.

The first atom bomb which was dropped at Hiroshima in 1945 in which there were more than 20,000 immediate casualties and those who remained alive for some time after that were jealous of the fate of the dead ones. The point to be noted here is that the capacity of that bomb was 20,000 tons of T.N.T. but now the capacity of the nuclear bombs have been increased to manifold. The destruction which these bombs can cause can just be imagined only. According to one report, upto 31 December 1982 the total number of nuclear explosions carried out was 1375.⁷ The object of the present essay is not to show the horrors of nuclear warfare but to measure its effect on international power politics struggle as an ingredient of power. And this planet has definitely dethroned the sun to become a planet and acquired its place in the power politics struggle.

7. The report of the Secretary General of the study on a comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban requested by the General Assembly at its Thirty-fourth session. Disarmament, A Periodic Review by United Nations, Vol. III, No. 2. July 1980, p. 25,

The Triple Alliance Threat to India's Security

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ONE hears a great deal about the worsening security environment in and around India and the threat it is posing both externally and internally. The magnitude and extent of these external and internal threats were highlighted on the morning of October 31, 1984 when a prime minister of India was most cruelly and treacherously gunned down by her own bodyguards in her own official residence.

On hind view, it looks to-day, like the climax scene in the third act of a Shakespearean tragedy from where denouncement begins and a process of resolution of the hitherto insurmountable seeming problems is set into motion. Just a year ago, on that self-same fateful day, Rajiv Gandhi was hurriedly sworn in as India's youngest prime minister. This was watched with mixed feelings of hope and misgiving, which were not altogether dispelled even after his return two months later, with the largest mandate ever given to someone in the world's largest democracy. While Rajiv's youth led some people to regard him as a symbol of hope and change, there was no dearth of doomsters predicting an early, and ominous end to this hamhanded amateur politician's life and career. After a year, it is clear now that Rajiv has not only survived just threats to his life but some of the gravest crises in the country's recent history. Indian democracy has emerged more bright after this fire-baptism and has once again demonstrated its high staying power, stability and inner strength in the face of all odds, to the whole world.

Undoubtedly, one perceives a radical change, not only in the style and tone of Indian foreign policy but also in her goal priorities, under Rajiv Gandhi's one year of stewardship. India is to enter the 21st Century in a big way and in order to achieve this we desperately need technological change-nay-a revolution. Within this time bound goal and futuristic scenario, all policies and plans, domestic as well as foreign, are to be worked out. A nation's security is directly dependent

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on the national interests involved in it. One has to always bear in mind that a country's security can be protected, territorial integrity safeguarded and its freedom maintained, only if the entire nation is determined to preserve its independence. To this end, it must mobilise and utilise its full capacity and manpower potential. Apropos, in this light, the establishment of a Ministry of Human Resources Development can be viewed as a timely and sound national strategy on the right lines.

India is a sub-continent stretching from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean with the second largest population and seventh largest territory in the world. Its huge land mass which sprawls 3214 kms. from North to South between extreme latitudes, and 2933 kms. from East to West between extreme longitudes, has a land frontier of 15,200 kms., of which 6000 kms. borders China and Pakistan. It has a long coastline of 7516 kms. to patrol and a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone to protect. It is the only state in the region whose boundaries touch by land or sea, the territories of all the other six states in the region. It has also close physical proximity to Afghanistan, three Asian Republics of USSR, China as well as Indonesia through adjoining territorial waters. South Asia comprises of seven states. India constitutes about 75% of South Asia in terms of demography, territory and natural resources.¹

Politically, India is the only republican, secular, parliamentary democracy in the region. Pakistan and Bangladesh are fundamentalist Islamic states under coup d'état regimes; Sri Lanka ruled by a Buddhist and Sinhali racist presidential government under a state of emergency; Bhutan is another theocratic monarchy; Nepal a Hindu patriarchal monarchy and Maldives a military dictatorship. The three major nuclear weapon powers out of six surround the region—Soviet Union and China mainly on land though they have a naval presence in the Indian Ocean too. The USA, with naval bases in the Indian ocean and its CENCOM with RDF, has been able to effectively extend its tentacles to countries of South Asia also. With India already a nuclear club member and Pakistan on the verge of joining it "our strategic environment is getting increasingly nuclearised."² The problem of India's defence and national security is indeed formidable.

1. Rashiuddin Khan, 'Indo-Pakistan Strategic Equations' in *Pakistan and Asian Peace* ed. by V. D. Chopra Patriot Publishers New Delhi, 1985.
2. K. Subrahmanyam, "International Peace and Security and its Impact on India's Security and Development," *Strategic Analysis*, VIII: 3 (June 1984) pp. 244-60.

It is a common place of political science that defence policy should flow from a country's strategic circumstances. Two equations of power relations, severally or jointly, seem to dominate the security environment in South Asia in the main viz. Indo-Pak relations and strategic perceptions and interests of the two super powers in the region. "Pakistan's close collaboration with the US and its military alliances, and India's multifaceted co-operation and understanding with the Soviet Union remain two major and mutually reinforcing determinants in power equations."³ China is the third major global power directly involved in the intra-regional affairs in South Asia. Though Chinese Communists had already made up their minds to capitalize on Indo-Pak differences ever since Kashmir conflict, they played a cautious hand till mid-fifties and avoided open involvement in bi-lateral dissensions. But as ideological dispute grew wider between USSR and Peking and India and USSR came closer, the Chinese decided to disrupt the harmony in the sub-continent by 1962 attack on India's borders and by lending support to the peripheral nations of South Asia in their bi-lateral disputes with India. Only after Indo-Pak war of 1971 leading to dismemberment of Pakistan and wider recognition of India as a regional power, Beijing restrained itself in bilateral disputes and has been making apparent efforts to normalize relations with this core country of the region, though not very convincingly.

Pakistan's Janus faced policy with regard to Beijing and Washington from the very beginning was a clever tactical manoeuvre on their part. Pakistan's cordial relations with China did not mean any break with the West as has been proved now. In fact, we already know how Pakistan became a link between Beijing and Washington when Kissinger shuttled to China from Pakistan on a clandestine visit. In fact, interests of both Beijing and Washington coincides because both want to use the Islamabad card to pressurize India. One should not overlook that both the Chinese aggression of 1962 and the Pak aggression of 1965 on India had a common objective—to forcibly capture India's territories. This coincided with Washington's interest too who were interested in 'cutting India to size.' Thus, the common expansionist motive has been making Beijing and Washington back the military rulers of Pakistan in the Past and even now. The two trans-Karakoram highways built by the Chinese have brought China logistically to the Indian Ocean shore. The first all weather road linking Gilgit in Occupied Kashmir with Skardu in Chinese Sinkiang

3. Zalmay Khalizad, "The Super powers and the Northern Tier". International Security, Winter 1979/80. pp. 6-30.

and the recent Knjjerab bye-pass, both reduce a journey of two weeks to nine hours according to an IDSA study. According to an Indian note to China, the construction of this road demonstrates "China's collusion with Pakistan to undermine the sovereignty of India and provides proof of China's policy of aggravating relations between India and Pakistan". Beijing, apart from relying on Pakistan to build pressure on India, is using it as a link to forge relationship with the conservative Muslim world in a bid to make a thrust in the Arab world. The Sino-American collaboration has already assumed enormous proportions. The Washington Post recently published through intelligence sources that China was helping Pakistan in the development of nuclear bomb in return for gaseous centrifuge technology which Chinese as yet do not possess. The U.S. even threatened to cancel its nuclear cooperation with China on this issue. China is already supplying 14 tonnes of heavy water to Pakistan to make up the shortfall faced by her due to Canada refusing to supply the same in the absence of full scope safeguards. But, the most disturbing aspect of the Sino-American alliance in Asia is China's approving the development of American missiles in Europe. Chinese leader Deng Xiaopeng has said that the deployment of American missiles in Europe was 'inevitable'. It is important for India in the context that Washington is now planning to station Pershing-II nuclear missiles in Pakistan and Beijing is not opposing the move while "the American policy makers are taking one step after another to place these missiles in Pakistan's territory."⁴ Is it any wonder then that the U.S.A. is clandestinely and actively encouraging Pakistan to go nuclear?

Only after a strategical assessment of all the political, economic and military factors and their trends, a defence planner decides whether there is a threat now or in the foreseeable future and what is the time-span of defence planning available for meeting it. "It is generally accepted that 'there are two basic elements to a threat; first, capability and second, intention. Until and unless a potential enemy has the necessary capability, he cannot be a threat; his capability is open to assessment and there are limitations on how quickly he can change it. The second element intention, can change much more quickly and the degree to which it can change will be more a matter of judgment than assessment.'"⁵

4. V. D. Chopra, "Asian Peace and Neo-Imperialist Axis." Pakistan and Asian People. ed. V.D. Chopra, Patriot Publishers New Delhi, 1985, pp. 79.

5. Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot, *The Determinants of Defence Policy for a Medium Military Power in New Directions in Strategic Thinking*, edited by Robert O'Neill and D. M. Horner, Pubd. by George Allen & Unwin: London: 1981 p. 275.

The induction of sophisticated air-crafts and weapon systems in the sub-continent by Pakistan through Chinese and massive U.S. backing and aid, has completely neutralised whatever little strategic edge India might have enjoyed vis-a vis Pakistan. What is still more alarming is the continued U.S. supply of more and more sophisticated radars, AWACS and lethal armaments like Harpoon missiles to Pakistan which can only be used by her against India, as Afghanistan does not have even an inch of coastline. This has led to an arms race in the region and India's defence budget for 1985-86 has already shot up to an incredible Rs. 7,685 crores, a clear hike of Rs 886 crores over last years, and is likely to rise further in the coming months because India naturally has to prepare against all eventualities. The actual acquisition or near acquisition of an atomic bomb by Pakistan, through Sino-U.S. collaboration (Symington waiver is one indication) leaves no doubt in mind about Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis intentions—to 'teach a lesson' to India, to 'cut her to size', 'to grab her' territory by force 'and to create a few more Bangladeshs. In the case of U.S.A. for her supposed pro-Russian tilt; in the case of Beijing for her holding the Dalai Lama card and border dispute—and in the case of Islamabad's sweet revenge for the humiliation and defeat in three wars and dismemberment of East Pakistan. In this axis of three nuclear powers—two full and one to be-threatening India's security, who shall be the tail and who shall be the teeth is obvious.

Perpetuation of certain regimes such as those in Islamabad and Dhaka dictates continuance of an atmosphere of mistrust, disputes and tensions. Though both Pakistan and India realise that much of the military expansion by both countries is avoidable, such a welcome development seems improbable, because of the two back-state wire-pullers—China and U.S.A who have put big stakes on this Pakistan Card. Hence, while there can be little doubt now about Pak-threat having capability factor as a potential aggressor, there is none at all regarding the second one, intention, Pakistan's nefarious record of past aggressions, big and small since 1947 to Siachin skirmishes and active support to Sikh extremists of recent, leave no ground for any illusions on this score. Pakistan has set up more than a hundred base camps for training bandits and saboteurs from among the so called 'Afghan refugees' who are being trained by American, Chinese and Pak instructors. Even Pakistan's regular units are taking part in these raids. They only change their equipment and uniforms for disguising themselves as Afghans. Indians can understand this aspect because some Paks disguised as sikhs are operating in India' too. One of the most fanatic counter-

revolutionary group operating from Pakistan soil is the Hezhi Islam party headed by a 40 years old terrorist Gulbuddin Hekmatyare (an Afghan Bhindranwale) who is being actively supported by the CIA and Pakistan's ministry of Foreign Affairs. They try to brainwash the Afghan refugees ideologically and intimidate the border population through terrorism. 'The modus operandi, the style, the technique all are identical to what one is witnessing in some parts of India. It is part of an organised international Terrorism which is planned and organised elsewhere'.⁶ It is no coincidence that destabilisation of Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir in India and Afghanistan are being organised from Pakistan territory. It is the Muslim fundamentalism which is the main driving force and which is directed against Kafirs-Hindu Kafirs in India and Communist Kafirs in Afghanistan.⁷

Though a global war may be ruled out, a regional conventional war with Pakistan is on the cards, if past experience is any guide, especially with newly acquired nuclear potential acting as a morale booster. India can only hope, with crossed fingers, that a Nero-maniac Zia will not exercise that option in his 'Jihad' against 'Kafir' India to add another Hiroshima to an already guilt-ridden American conscience because after all they are the pioneers in this field who used it twice against an already tottering Japan when they were riding the tide of victory and contemplated using it in Korea, Vietnam and in Indo-Pak war of 1971 when, they were losing, if that Peace Nobel laureate Kissinger's memories are to be believed.

Some secret U.S. and British documents of 1951 which have been declassified and released reveal startling facts about Americans gradual tilt from impartial stance to a pro-Pakistan one. In this document we find that even in the early fifties Americans were evaluating Israel's role in the Arab world and Pakistan's role in the sub-continent along with a comparative study of the Arab-Israel conflict on one hand, and India-Pak on Kashmir question on the other. In the beginning America wanted India to join the grand alliance against 'Soviet Penetration' but while Nehru refused to oblige, Pakistan agreed to join this alliance for a price-merger of Kashmir with it. This explains subsequent and continuing hostility of America towards India and her deep interest and involvement in subverting India. It also explains

6. V. D. Chopra, *Asian Peace and Neo-Imperialist Axis in Pakistan and Asian Peace*, Patriot Publishers, New Delhi, June, 85.

7. *Ibid.* p. 98.

Pak efforts to destabilise India all these years. At a meeting of U.S. Joint Chiefs-of-staff on May 2, 1951 Pakistani position is made clear. "Pakistan wants to play a role in West Asia—they would do anything if the Kashmir problem could be settled. Liaquat is strongly on our side. He has burned his bridges behind him. Pakistanis are good fighters and can raise almost any number of men. Again, there is an equipment problem to be solved. With Pakistan, West Asia could be defended (and) without Pakistan (Asstt. Secretary of State George McGhee). I don't see any way to defend West Asia, of course, it is hard for us to give Pakistan a guarantee against India since India is a friendly country."⁸ So we see that both Israel and Pakistan were created simultaneously, one to subvert Arab States and the other to communalise the sub-continent's politics in line with two nation theory. K. Subrahmanyam is right when he equates Pakistan with Israel. Both are child of partition based on two nation theory—both consider themselves martial and chosen ones—and now Pakistan's Base bomb policy of ambivalence also seems a copy of Israel with a difference—in Pakistan's case USA has thrown its NPT law also in the garbage can through Symington waiver in 1981. The 'Israel of South Asia' is growing nuclear teeth and readying itself for launching 'lightening wars' against the common enemy of Trimuverate Sino-US-Pak Axis—India. Beijing's expansionist ambitions in Asia and Washington's to lord it over this continent have reached the point of realisation and Pakistan has become the springboard for achieving that—a major cog in Sino-American neo-imperialist axis.⁹

One must keep in mind that the dominant power throughout the post-war period which acted as a 'threat' to world balance of power was not U.S.S.R., until recently a regional power, but USA, which until recently was the leading military power in the world as a whole and is still the leading economic power.¹⁰ U.S.A. is feeling great difficulty in adjusting to its loss of international primacy and its new mood of belligerence can only be explained by this fact. The essence of an alliance, however, is not common goals, and still less common values, but (as the British chief-of-Defence Staff, Sir Neil Cameron, said in his celebrated speech in Peking) the existence of a common enemy.¹¹ U.S.—Sino-Pak alliance is a classic example with India on the cross-wires.

8. V. D. Chopra, *Asian Peace and Neo-Imperialist Axis* p. 83.

9. *Ibid.*, 79-80.

10. Headley Bell, *OF MEANS & ENDS in New Directions in strategic Thinking*, p. 275.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

India's defence policy is naturally linked with its foreign policy, both diplomacy and military strategy are mutually interactive. In his speech to the National Defence College, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in setting out his strategic foreign policy, postulated that he wanted to see defence and foreign policy moulded into a single theoretical framework with four over-riding objectives :—

1. Stability at home
2. Modernisation of the economy
3. Friendliness in the neighbourhood and
4. A congenial global environment.

The Prime-Minister also identified 'three bases' for India's security, *First*, the domestic base—'strength, unity and cohesiveness; politics of conciliation, not of confrontation; (which has already paid dividends in Andhra, Karnataka and W. Bengal); removal of deep rooted social evils; modernisation aimed at growth and development of the economy, and an attack on mass poverty.

The *second* base of India's national security is "friendly co-operative relations" with its neighbours; no Indian hegemony; settlement of differences through dialogues so that they do not lead to conflict.

The *third* base of national security is the "world environment"—and end of the cold war, nuclear arms control, and disarmament; preventing the arms race from going into 'space': keeping the super power rivalries off traditional peaceful regions such as the Indian Ocean.

The purpose of diplomacy should be to stabilise national security to help economic progress and developments. Rajiv Gandhi has made good progress on all the three bases. On the domestic base, he has forged a new creative relationship, if not partnership, in the matter of Center-State relationship, by giving up confrontation and adopting a new tactical line of conciliation and accommodation which has drawn encomiums from such hard-liners as Jyoti Basu, Hegde and N.T. Rama Rao and led to Punjab Accord with Mizo one on the anvil. In building regional base, he has already won the hearts of Sri Lanka's Julius Jaiwardane and Bangladesh's Lt. Gen. H.M. Ershad under his new neighbourhood diplomacy. King of Bhutan during his recent visit found him sympathetic and helpful in expanding his kingdom's sovereignty. Only Nepal and Pakistan suffering from China syndrome remain unaffected. King Birendra during his royal visit to New Delhi in September 1985 found India not prepared to modify her Nepal Policy in the light of Nepal's Zone of Peace proposal for that country over which India has her own reasons and reservations for not accepting and hence Indo-Nepal relations remain extensive and cold as

before. Pakistan remains overtly friendly and covertly hostile as usual, partly due to its historic origin and mainly due to present regimes of Sino-U.S. involvements and commitments, both not exactly friendly to India at the moment. So, an immediate and imminent threat to India exists from an adventurist, fundamentalist, politically unstable, dictatorial, militarist regime in Pakistan whose avowed motto is thousand years war with India, fulfilment of which it is prepared to sell even its soul to the devil.

Pakistan, a caesarian child of partition based on a fictitious two nation theory, is plagued with cancer of secession right from birth, amputation of East Pakistan was on the cards from the very outset, has not been able to develop during its thirty eight years of existence—any political structure or a sense of national identity or any nation of territorial sanctity—a willing puppet in the hands of foreign powers who played the mid-wife to it and Israel, its political twin, at the time of their birth and both being artificially kept alive on massive arms transfusion and gun-powder smoke. It does not look upon the occupied Kashmir territory as an integral part of motherland but as spoils of war to be shared with friends like U.S.A. and to be bartered away to Chinese toughs in exchange for armaments and collaboration against India. India's attitude even on Kashmir issue has always been pacificatory and conciliatory as between two brothers of the same father, to the extent that after 1965 war, even areas won over from Pakistan in Kashmir were returned to it—meaning thereby that each should content himself with the area already possessed by one irrespective of legalities involved. But, the lesson as well as the generosity was lost on Pakistan and in its blind antagonism to India; it is not averse to inviting a mid-Asian power like China to intervene directly in South Asian affairs. Even its recent mis-adventure in Siachin, a bid to dominate Karakoram pass, will serve Chinese interests more than Pakistan's. To spite India Zia is ready to cut-off his nose, forgetting the parable of the Camel and the Sheikh, who was gradually pushed out of his warm and comfortable tent into the desert cold after acceding to Camel's humble request that it may be permitted to put its head only through the tent door. Pakistan is playing the classic role of Jai Chand to Prithviraj India, which has been played many times in India's long history under different names and scenarios in different eras. The British restored the security imbalance in the sub-continent before evacuating the premises in 1947, by not leaving just an open khyber pass for invading hordes to trickle down as of hoar through the western ramparts but a whole vast plain for invader armies to march abreast all along our western borders.

India has no intentions to subjugate or eliminate Pakistan as it has no wish to repeat another Tibetan mishap of wiping out a friendly buffer which was amply demonstrated too in 1971 in the creation of Bangladesh and return of prisoners of war to Pakistan. The recent 'peace offensive' of Pakistan for what it calls the 'normalisation of relations with India' sounds plausible only on the face of it. 'The scale and the speed at which it is building up its military strength, including nuclear capability, raises doubts about the real intentions of the military rulers of Pakistan.'¹² In an interview to the Times of London in May, 1984, President Zia emphatically rejected India's offer to jointly sign the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation for it contained two stipulations to which they could not agree *viz.* India and Pakistan should not permit foreign military bases on their territories and that they should settle all issues between them bi-laterally. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reiterated this stand again on the eve of his U.S. visit in June, 1985. Zia's silence on this, in fact, holds no mystery for the newspapers and media of other countries who have already reported more than once the existence of a secret agreement between Washington and Islamabad in this regard.¹³ In fact, the White House, Pentagon and CIA have already decided to base CENCOM headquarters on Pak territory and making it a jumping off ground for the Rapid Deployment Force. They are also actively engaged in training anti-India subversive elements through CIA, U.S.A. has assigned Pakistan to be the policeman of the region. Peace stance of Pakistan is clearly a camouflage. India's foreign policy cannot altogether prevent these security threats, it can at best reduce their severity only through a deft mix of diplomacy and deterrent strategy which is exactly what Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is doing at present.

India must decide now on its broad military strategy to face the triple alliance threat posed by Reagan-Zhao-Zia trimuverate. May be in the case of U.S. we have to perforce adopt a defensive strategy and in the case of China a mix of deterrent and defensive strategy, but in the case of Pakistan only a deterrent-repeat deterrent strategy will work. The potential enemy must be convinced of our will to retaliate offensively and of our capacity to inflict unacceptable damage. 'It is worth remembering that it is better to deter war, rather than to plan or winning it after it has started.'¹⁴

12. Pramod K. Misra, South Asia in International Politics, UDH Publishers, Delhi, India (1984) p. 61.

13. V. D. Chopra, Pakistan and Asian Peace, Patriot Publishers., New Delhi, June, 1985 p. 102.

14. Admiral Sir Anthony, Synnot, The Determinants of Defence Policy for a Medium Military Power.

Implications of Changing Recruitment Ideology for Indian Army

Dr (MRS) M K SINGH

INTRODUCTION

THE army institution is one of the oldest institutions of the society. The military has always existed, in all the societies, in some form or another. The need for the upkeep of the defence force can be seen in the axiom of 'survival of the fittest' or 'the need for self protection'. Hence, all the nations, big or small, have to maintain a defence force whether they wish to do so or not. It is interesting to know that the human race, as a whole, is spending six percent of the global GNP, on the maintenance of the armed forces and the acquisition of armaments every year. In India "we spend 30 percent of our revenues on defence, which is quite a dent in our resources."¹ The inevitable aspect of the organization can be gauged from the statements made by scholars like Levy Jr, who says, "In the present world situation, no society of any considerable scale is going to be characterized by an absence of armed forces organizations, regardless of the form of government or leadership or ideology expressed by the general membership."² Hence, it can be concluded that the army organizations are universal in nature.

In India, though the army organization had existed from times immemorial, yet it had to pass through the various stages of growth and development. A well knitted Indian Army was evolved with the British stepping in on the scene. Thus, the credit definitely goes to the Britain for giving us a well organized army, fully integrated, well structured, highly disciplined, duly trained and fully bureaucratic in nature. It would not be an exaggeration to say at this stage that "one of the most impressive accomplishments of the British, was the military integration of the land."³ Though, the struggle to develop an

1. E. Habibullah, Major General, "The Sinews of Indian Defence", Page 9.
2. Levy Jr and Marion, J. "Modernization and Structure of Societies", Vol I and II, Page 518.
3. S.P. Cohen, "The Indian Army, Its Contribution to the Development of the Nation". Page 1.

efficient and a loyal military force, on the part of the British, was the most difficult and arduous one; it continued till the last days of their regime.

Some sort of recruitment ideology always has been a necessity, which could serve the basis of recruitment for the army organizations. This ideology, of course, has been undergoing changes from time to time, but its impact on the structural-functional level of the organization had always been felt. Its impact could easily be understood if a systematic historical study of the organization was to be done. It is suffice to say at this stage that changes in recruitment ideology not only bring changes at the compositional level, but also has far reaching implications touching the functional level and even the efficiency of the organization.

After independence the army organization in India has been undergoing a definite change. Some of these changes had been introduced intentionally, but other changes had cropped up automatically. The sum total of these changes have, however, transformed the structure of the institution not only positively but these have some derogatory effects as well. In the present paper an attempt is being made to understand the sociological implications of changing recruitment ideology—how the changed pattern has affected the structure of the army organization, how and what kind of effects it has on the functional level of the organization, how far has the efficiency of the soldier been affected, and so on. The present analysis might help us to understand the whirl pool in which the organization is caught and the repercussions that it shall have in the long run.

I

REQUIREMENT IDEOLOGY—A PERSPECTIVE

An ideology has been defined "as a system of ideas and judgements which are explicit and generally organized, and which serve to describe, explain, interpret and justify the situation of the group or collectivity, and which largely on the basis of values suggest a precise orientation to the historical action of this group or collectivity."⁴ Recruitment ideology, thus, may be defined as a complex system (patterns of ideas and judgements), regulating and controlling the entry of the individuals into a professional group. It tries to match the skills of the aspirants to the job requirements and standardises the criteria for selection. The system, as a whole, then operates with a

4. Rocher Guy, "General Introduction to Sociology".

built in control valve in it, so that the superfluous or unfit elements can get screened out and only 'the fit' or the right ones enter the profession. Recruitment ideology, thus, with the requisite selections, prevents round pegs going into the square holes and vice versa.

All professions by and large, at whatever stage of development these may be, have some sort of ideology worked out regulating the entry of its personnel into the professions. The army as a profession cannot be an exception to it. In fact "No large scale organization, as vast as the military establishments, can operate without a standardised personnel selection system, though sometimes it drains off the superior talent from essential but unglamorous assignments."⁵ Thus it may be said that some kind of recruitment ideology has always existed at every stage of the development of the Indian Army.

A recruitment ideology in the Services is not only an essential requisite for purely right selection of the personnel, but it has also wider implications attached to it. The military force, for instance, is a vital force for the country and it serves as an effective pressure group in the organs of the government. It is thus of utmost importance for the nation, to see and understand, from which parts of the country and from which pockets of the society, its personnel are being drawn. The composition of the army itself, speaks volumes about the socio-economic and political policy of the country. Changes in recruitment ideology, resulting in corresponding changes in the composition of the armed forces, shall have far reaching and serious implications, which normally are not visible on the surface. Hence, prevailing recruitment pattern, at a particular time in the history, is of immense importance for the organization as well as for the nation. In short, we can say that recruitment ideology for the army is important for the whole issue of the national identity; it reflects the nature of the army a country keeps; it reflects the social policy of the country and finally it mirrors the general ideology of the country.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Historically speaking, no specific recruitment ideology was used for the selection of the soldiers for the early armies. The only criteria of selection was the bravery. For instance, in the case of Rajputs, Sikhs and Maratha armies, recruits were selected from all the classes of the population, with bravery as the sole criteria of selection or preference. At that time, soldiering was a 'calling', a duty, and was not

5. Morris Janowitz, "The Professional Soldier".

considered a profession. It has been very rightly pointed out by Das that "The entire menfolk within the new fold were fit by courage to bear arms, to handle the sword, bow and pike and ride a war horse. Soldiering was a calling, soldiering was a duty to be performed by all during difficult times."⁶

Mughal emperors, too, who had organized and disciplined their armies to some extent, did not develop or adopt any scientific recruitment pattern. Bravery, the sole criteria of selection, continued to be the only basis of recruitment. "No military doctrine was developed by either Babar or any of his successors, and the Mughals, too, miserably failed to appreciate the advantages of military organization. The cavalry and the artillery, two main sources of strength, were allowed to deteriorate."⁷

Similarly, as far as early period of British regime is concerned, no uniform pattern of recruitment ideology was used. In fact till 1810 the Sepoy regiments were raised haphazardly just before the war by an individual British Officer, who even gave his own name to the regiment. "Relatively weak and powerless, and desperate for manpower, they took into their armies any Indian who was willing to serve. At times their ranks included a large number of tribals and untouchables."⁸ But with the passing of time, a uniform pattern of recruitment was evolved by the British. In this process of recruitment, ideology had to pass through various stages; changes within it had to be made in order to have a functional army.

The British had kept on changing the recruitment policy in order to have a force loyal to them. They had created the martial race theory which was modified from time to time to best suit their ends. All this had resulted in the lopsided development of the army; certain communities were represented overwhelmingly while others were meticulously excluded. Thus, though British army was built on scientific lines, still it had a narrow base and was developed with the only motive of perpetuating and expanding the British empire. All the same, the process of professionalism, started during the early period of British regime was completed and a well defined criteria for selecting the manpower for the armed forces came to be adopted.

6. S.T. Das, "Indian Military, Its History and Development", Page 24.

7. Inder Malhotra, "From Sepoys to Jawans". *The Illustrated Weekly of India*, 19 January 1975, Page 30.

8. S.P. Cohen, "The Untouchable Soldier—Caste, Politics and the Indian Army". *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, May 1969, Page 458.

RECRUITMENT PATTERN AFTER INDEPENDENCE

The past thirty five years of our independence have brought vast changes in the country. The educational, economic and political systems have undergone a complete change. The Indian Army, as an institution, could not have remained static in this over-riding process of transformation. There have been radical changes in the war technology; adoption of modern technology has led to a high level of specialization in the army cadres, so much so that its members are likely to think themselves as members of a specific skilled group rather than only a social class or a professional class. The man behind the gun—the warrior—has totally been transformed. In order to cope up with the professional recruitments, recruitment ideology also had to undergo a change after independence.

There are other reasons, and equally important too, for bringing about changes in the recruitment pattern in the armed forces. Those are concerned with our national policy. That is to say, changes in the recruitment ideology had to be brought in keeping in mind the democratic egalitarian policy enshrined in the Indian Constitution. Thus, a new pattern had to be evolved to suit the social and political environments of the nation. It has been rightly pointed out, "Few Indian politicians have articulated the deep non-military stakes behind the issue of recruitment, but many sense the importance of the question. The nature of recruitment is important to the whole issue of national identity and nation building, especially in democracy. Democratic states have (though) always had difficulty in relating egalitarian and democratic values to the values of the military whose main purpose is to kill and destroy."⁹ All the same, the well planned changes in the recruitment policy were introduced and as visualized, changes in recruitment pattern brought in changes in the army institution and new and totally transformed organization emerged. After independence, these steps helped to evolve a truly national and integrated force. The new objectives to be achieved were as follows:—

- (a) The army had to be made fully representative of the nation, overcoming the prejudices of caste and region.
- (b) The 'Martial races' had to be given up as it accentuated compartmentalization and strengthened the codification of the types akin to caste.

9. S.P. Cohen, Op. Cit., Page 181.

(c) A sense of dedication to the country's national integrity, values and heritage had to be inculcated among the armed forces.

(d) Merit and efficiency and not traditionalism were to be considered the basis of recruitment.

(e) British Indian Army had been kept away from technical arms, though a beginning had been made to some extent to organize it on the scientific lines. After independence, this aspect had to be reinforced to a greater extent.

(f) The army's objective had to be enlarged from a mere 'defence force' to a 'national reconstructive force'.

(g) Before independence the army was inadequate considering the size and population of the country, and even that was further reduced as a result of the partition of the country. This inadequacy had to be made up by reorganization, regrouping, consolidation and expansion.

The Indian democracy thus aimed at building up a new defence force—modern in every sense, representative of its population, enthusiastic about its national obligation, fully aware of military realities of the regions and its problems and truly integrated in every sense. For this rational principles of recruitment were adopted by introducing changes in the recruitment ideology. Krishna Menon during his tenure as Defence Minister made efforts to widen the base of recruitment of the officers' corps, made military more aware of social obligations and expanded the range of the defence items manufactured in India, thereby laying the ground work for self-sufficiency. Thus, it may be said that the rational principles adopted after independence have gone a long way in the reconstruction of this organization. In general, it has mitigated the previous social prejudices, controls and hierarchial standing and has made it a modern and nationally integrated group, though a lot still needs to be done to keep under control the dissipative forces being generated day after day by stresses and strains of internal political and social changes.

II

CAUSE-EFFECT RELATIONSHIP

The impact of post-independence changes on the recruitment ideology have not been all beneficial to the professional standards of the army. Further, sudden expansion of the army in 1962, after the Chinese aggression and the creation of the emergency commissions

have played a definite role in bringing down the professional standard. This happened in two ways:

- (a) The new entrants, during the expansion, were accommodated by somewhat lowering the standards and relaxing the criteria.
- (b) The selection of the officers from the lower ranks was encouraged.

Initially this relaxation was adopted as a temporary exigency, but eventually it became part and parcel of the system. As a result, the composition of the army changed and affected the future tenets of recruitment. The irony of the situation was that the emergency lot, who were indirectly responsible for bringing down the selection standards, were the ones who opted out of the army at the first available opportunity. It is on record that most of the released emergency officers opted out for civil sector than continuing in the army service, when they were given the option after having completed their minimum tenure. Offers of permanent commission were rejected by a majority of them.¹⁰

The Indian Constitution takes special care of the under-privileged and weaker sections of the society. Efforts are being made to bring them at par with the privileged groups. The caste and class barriers are being broken. As a result of this the doors of the services too have been opened to all castes and classes. This policy has had a tremendous impact on the recruitment pattern and changes have been made to absorb the disprivileged. The youth of the lower strata are now coming forward and joining the services. Army is increasingly becoming an avenue to improve their status and rise higher in the socio-economic ladder. This fact further gets substantiated when we consider the example given below:

"Very recently a study was conducted by a researcher to find out the aptitude of the young boys, studying in Higher Secondary Schools, towards the selection of military as a professional career. The conclusions drawn by the scholar are: The Higher Secondary School students perceive in the military career, more negative attributes than the positive ones. Institution-wise, central schools' children are more motivated towards military career than that of other institutions, specially the convent schools. In terms of parental background, the students coming from middle-class homes are more inclined to select army as career than those coming from higher social strata"¹¹

10. Brig S.K. Sinha, *Carrer Prospects for Officers in Armed Forces*, U.S.I. Journal, July-Sep. 1968, Page 263.

11. R.P. Gautam, "Cause of Higher Secondary Students giving Preference for Military Career". *USI Journal* Oct.—Nov., 1979, Page 389.

India is among the new nations, and like most of the new nations' armies, her army has eventually to be monopolized by middle and lower middle class group of the society. This fact has been brought out by Morris Janowitz, who writes, "New nations' armies which were organized or extensively modified by the struggle for the national liberation are almost completely middle-class or lower middle-class without aristocratic elements."¹² This process continuously seems to be at work in India. "To-day there is no such thing as a martial tradition. Sons who automatically join the old man's regiments, are now plumping for 'civvy streets'. The incentive is gone. The so called good families no longer consider the armed forces as a last resort for a not very intelligent offspring; even he goes to a firm. Of over 140 General Officers and their equivalents in the Air Force and Navy with sons, not more than ten percent have their boys in uniform."¹³ A study was conducted by the author, for which information was collected from the serving officers of the army. As far as parental background of the officers is concerned, the following data was obtained:

Profession of the Parents of the Officers

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Profession</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1.	Army Service	9	4.45*
2.	Government Service	25	12.39*
3.	Private Service	21	10.37*
4.	Business	23	11.38
5.	Practitioners (Lawyers and Doctors etc.)	28	13.86
6.	Agriculturists	40	18.80*
7.	Retired	56	27.75*
Total		202	100.00

Note: *Categories considered as middle-class.

From the Table given above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- (a) The officers joining the army as a tradition in the family are very few, if at all such families exist. Only 4.45 percent officers belong to the families, where fathers were in the army.

12. Morris Janowitz, "The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis", Page 53.
 13. Bikram Vohra, "Fair Deal for Our Fighting Man", The Illustrated Weekly of India, 23 June. 1947, Page 16.

(b) Nearly one fifth of the officers belong to the agriculturist class.

(c) Combining the percentage of parents from the army service, agriculturist and retired, it is seen that 75 percent belong to this group. By and large this is considered as a middle-class group. This means that three fourth of our serving officers to day belong to the middle-class group of the society.

On the basis of the above data, it can be concluded that the composition of the Indian Army mostly consists of middle-class, and the aristocratic families, by and large, do not patronize this profession.

The socio-economic and political conditions in the country have in their own way attributed to lowering the professional standards of the army organization. Considering the economic aspect—theoretically speaking the number of professions in the growing economy like that of India, have increased considerably. There are varied career opportunities that are available to-day. For example, selecting a career in the industry, hotel management, advertising, banking or starting as an entrepreneur for small scale industry are some of the newer and more ~~lucrative openings~~ that are available to-day. In these new professions chances of economic advancement are very bright. As against this, military as a career is not only a stereo-type profession but offers also very limited chances of advancement coupled with meagre monetary gains for the hardships undergone. There are limited vacancies at the top, and eventually the road to progress gradually seems blocked. One has to retire at a much younger age and is forced to make a second career at a stage where the personal social and financial commitments are at their peak. Economic rewards in the services have also lagged behind as compared to civil services. Thus while selecting a career, the present day generation tends to fall for career other than in the services. Considering the political environment, one tends to feel that there is an obvious display of pathetic attitude towards the terms and conditions of service of the armed forces' personnel. Status-wise military profession has lagged behind the civil services in every way and has become a subordinate profession. One of the officers, during the interview for the study remarked, "Consider it from any angle—prestige-wise, salary-wise, and future prospects in services—you will find that the army profession has become a second rate profession. Then why should any professionally ambitious person opt for the armed forces." All these factors, have had dampening effect on the spirit of the serving officers, have lowered their morale and this is bound to affect the quality of the future entrants. Consider the total social framework to-day, it seems the soldier of to-day does not

occupy a very attractive place and his role too remains dormant. For instance, the whole nation today is concentrating on eradication of poverty, achieving economic development and trying to bring about equality in every aspect affecting daily life. The complete socio-political policies are revolving around this axiom. In this whole gambit the need and role of military professionals is minimal; in the activities concerning the reconstruction of nation, their contribution remains closer to nil. They definitely remain the least important members of the society and no longer remains part and parcel of the elite group. This in turn, affects the social standing of the soldier and the prestige of the profession.

Thus, it is obvious that to-day's social, economic and political conditions in the country are not very conducive to attract the youth towards the military professions. The current shortages in the officers cadre are a clear proof of this situation. These shortages are being attempted to be made up by attracting the persons from lower strata of the society, by bringing changes in the standards of recruitment.

REPERCUSSIONS

Some of the obvious repercussions, as a result of changes in the recruitment ideology, have been enumerated below:

(a) The importance of leadership in the army hardly needs any elaboration. It is also needless to say that the quality of performance by man shall depend upon the quality of leadership provided to them. That is why it is necessary that every officer must perform tasks that demand organizational and manipulative skills and tasks that demand heroic or personnel leadership. To perform heroic tasks or prove a leader of men, an officer must be 'the right type' as the British call him, must possess moral character, leadership ability and personal courage. With the current changes in the recruitment ideology and thereby lowering the standards of selection, there is a danger that leadership quality in the services may get adversely affected. We may have more and more service personnel who are not 'the right type' and hence the professional efficiency would stand impaired.

(b) The present trends, as observed in the economy, are making it difficult to get enough number of qualified people willing to join the services. Most of the available hands in the market are opting for the civil sector. It has been observed that many technical hands, particularly engineers, were not even interested in the military as a career, but being unable to find jobs in the

civil sector turned to military career. For them military career is a good service, though arduous one, but definitely not a faith.¹⁴ This trend can have an adverse effect as far as quality of technical expertise is concerned because :--

- (i) in the absence of non-availability of suitable technical hands, the new entrants may not be professionally sound, if taken in by lowering the standard; and
- (ii) the replacements may have to be made by promoting from among those who are from lower ranks and have worked as foremen or mechanics etc. These replacements certainly would be inferior to the appropriately qualified hands. All these hurdles definitely may lead to lowering the technical standards in the services. With modernization and increasing sophistication of war technology, the second grade technical experts will definitely affect the professional efficiency of the soldiers, with far reaching consequences.
- (c) There is a danger that the composition of the army may get dominated by the rejects from the other professions—those who would fail to find an avenue outside and are the left overs or the 'inferior type' in the strict sense. Hence, the army profession would be left to be manned by mediocres only, or by those who would be attempting to rise higher in the socio-economic ladder. Thus, a new and derogatory image of the military profession may emerge, whereby it shall be considered a profession which is ready to sell cheaply. The handful of dedicated, idealist or elite, who would be willing to join the services for the love of it, and to serve the nation, would also shy away.

An allied phenomenon observed, as an off-shoot of the above situation, is the heavy drain on the trained manpower that is being caused as a result of increasing number of officers seeking premature retirement. A vast majority of them wish to quit the service, after completing minimum pensionable service, and seek an opportunity in the civil sector and start a second career at the earliest possible. At that matured age, when they have already attained some status, financial standing and experience, they do not find the armed forces financially lucrative, satisfying and challenging enough to induce them to continue further. Thus on one hand the nation loses skilled manpower, having been trained at a very high cost, and on the other,

14. S.P. Cohen, Op. Cit., Page 184.

it is forced to induct newer hands which are inferior to their predecessors as earlier highlighted. These officers, quitting at a premature stage, also tend to serve as a reference group for the younger generation not to opt for the services.

From the foregoing, in conclusion, it can be said that the changes brought upon in the recruitment ideology for the Indian Army soon after independence, with the intention of broadening the base for bringing about equality and national integration, have had their obvious derogatory effect on the professional standards of the armed forces. The situation got further accentuated as a result of the need for sudden expansion consequent to wars with China and Pakistan, and the changing socio-economic level of the country, which has made civil sector more lucrative. There is an obvious necessity to initiate deliberate steps to improve the terms and conditions of the defence services to ensure induction of the 'right type' and their continued retention. Hence the impact of changes in recruitment ideology can aptly be summarized in the following words:

"There may not be shortage of volunteers for the defence services because of the staggering unemployment in our country. (But) In terms of quality, however, there is no doubt that the defence services are lagging behind in drawing the more promising boys from our schools and universities . . ." and "if we fail to ensure that our armed forces get the pick of nation's youth, we may have to pay serious penalties for this lapse."¹⁵

This phenomenon is equally applicable to and is being experienced by all newer nations, who are traversing a similar path of industrialization and economic development. Thus there is an obvious necessity to take effective steps to rectify the situation.

15. Brig. S.K. Sinha, Op. Cit., July-Sept., 1963, Pages 268 and 269.

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An Information Service for the Army

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INTRODUCTION

IT is a common place phenomenon for one segment of our large army to be unaware of the happenings elsewhere however relevant. We function in our compartments which although not watertight are not sufficiently porous to effect positive interaction. Obvious ill effects are a lack of perspective, a disregard for others, a tendency to empire building and a confusion as to the direction pattern and speed of growth. And obvious conclusion is dissipation of effort resulting in avoidable expenditure and ineffective deployment of our scarce resources. Need for meaningful and continuous communication between various faculties is an accepted practice in the industrial and many other scientific disciplines. Exchange of information is considered vital even between antagonistic superpowers in such spheres as space research, medicines and oceanography.

Army has not taken to these modern methods of information dissemination. Firstly, because of built in inertia and resistance to anything new. Secondly, a distorted understanding of security of information has become another major hurdle in a smooth exchange of information. Thirdly and perhaps most importantly because of lack of any organ for such exchange of information which is both comprehensive and easily available. Nothing like the document being a regular issue to all officers.

The aim of this paper is to examine areas of exchange of information in the Army and suggest a mode for making such an exchange feasible.

AREAS OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

GENERAL

There are three levels of functioning at which exchange of information is called e.g.

(a) *Departmental Level.* Exchange of information within a department e.g. Armour, Infantry, EME, Ordnance and so on

which are of same centre but located in different geographical environs under different formations.

(b) *Formation/Theatre Level.* Formation located in different geographical and possibly facing different type of situation, likely opponent and having different tasks.

(c) *Problems of Common Concern.* Problems pertaining to primarily human and administrative concern, which are normally dealt with under A and Q heads. Both these levels of information have a certain amount of relevance for each other although more for the similar genre. At any rate both the levels must keep taking cognizance of each other so as to retain the right perspective.

FORMATION LEVEL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Formation level exchange of information may relate to the following aspects, to name but a few important ones :—

(a) *Threat Perception.* Specially pertaining to freshly noted capabilities whether technological, topographical, tactical, logistical or related to personalities.

(b) *Strategic Options.* Strategic options are not really a secret in that, any intelligent brain can work out the various options available. It's the adoption of a course which must remain a conundrum for the opponent as also the ultimate test of a commander's acumen.

(c) *Tactical Doctrines.* Being practised, suggested or reflected.

(d) *Drills and Procedures.* Problems faced, solved or needing solutions.

(e) *Logistical Innovations.* Procurement, preservation, transportation and storage.

(f) *Weapons and Equipment.* Efficacy, maintenance, improvisations, suggestions.

(g) *Maintenance of Equipment.* Problems and solutions.

DEPARTMENTAL LEVEL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

This would be applicable to more specialised aspects of various Arms and Services where technical intricacies cater into picture. Some examples of relevant aspects of various Arms and Services may be as follows:—

(a) *Armour.* Use of Chobham armour, technological and financial implications; Eastern versus Western Tanks; Aired Regiments of

PT 76 and T 54; Employment of armour in riverine, jungle and mountainous terrain etc.

(b) *Infantry*. Flak Jackets for infantrymen; How to tackle a minefield; Battle loads for an infantryman in assault; Quantum of anti-tank weapons for an infantry battalion etc.

(c) *Artillery*. Designing of a gun; improvement of met prediction; Increased mobility for arty.

(d) *Engineers*. Current equipment in Service; Construction of mule tracks and roads in mountains; minelaying and breaching in mountains.

(e) *Signals*.

(f) *Medicals*.

(g) *Supplies and Transport*.

(h) *Ordnance*. Local purchase of ordnance stores; streamlining of procedure between DGOF and DGS & D to reduce load time.

PROBLEM OF COMMON CONCERN

In addition to the professional and technical aspects discussed above, certain aspects of common and human concern must also be debated both to arrive at a consensus and also to obtain varied views on how best to achieve an objective. These aspects may pertain to basically A and Q aspects of administration i.e. postings, promotions, awards and punishments, quartering, CILQ and so on. However, since this is a sensitive era, we should open it up for discussion after due deliberation.

MODE OF EXCHANGE

It may be recalled here that South East Asia Command had brought out a daily called SEAC of whose Frank Owen, a professional Fleet street journalist was the Editor. About its impact Slim had this to say :

SEAC under his direction, and Admiral Mountbatten wisely gave him complete editorial freedom, was the best Wartime Service Journal I have seen. It, and Owen himself made no mean contribution to our morale."

Similar paper and magazines were brought out by all advanced Western Countries. Some of the magazines and periodicals which

discuss these matters and could be consulted here are :—

<i>Periodical</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Publisher MT Branch</i>
(a) Army Training News	Quarterly	British Army (UK)
(b) Military Review	Monthly	USA
(c) RUSI	Quarterly	UK
(d) Soviet Military Review	Monthly	USSR

Periodicity. It is suggested that we should bring out such a periodical: to begin with it should have quarterly frequency. Thereafter depending on the experience gained, response observed and the usefulness of the publication the frequency can be increased to monthly. It may be noted that live and practically useful discussion can be carried on only in a periodical which keeps appearing at a quick enough frequency. Anything beyond three months will make the issues entirely academic and of little practical utility.

Editorial Control. The periodical should be edited by a professional journalist of repute. Frank Owan's name as the editor SEAC has already been mentioned. It will be worth mentioning here that the great Urdu Poet Faiz Ahmad 'Faiz' also was the editor of our Sainik Samachar (Then Fauzi Akbhar) from 1940 to 1942

We already publish our MILITARY DIGEST (Approximately 25000 copies). This could be redesigned and refurbished to contain all that has been suggested above. We should aim at supplying one copy each to every officer to have a full impact. Therefore, if we need to divert funds from various other publications that we bring out from the Army. Alternatively an all arms magazine like COMBAT along with its allied publication WHAT'S NEW can be financially reinforced to take on the task.

SECURITY ASPECT

The most important single decision to be made in this regard is pertaining to the security aspect. Presently our security restrictions are overly cautious and restrictive. Practically nothing instructive or stimulating is allowed to be published. Many a time the material compiled/extracted from open sources is also classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL. Innocuous references to one's own moods in a lonely place are censored to bring wrath of the authorities on the hapless author. It is felt that such a view is counterproductive and does damage both to intellectual development as well as to the morale of the Army. It is well worth examining at the highest level whether this policy should not be drastically revised in the interest of healthy development of the Army in general and its officer corps in particular.

For without such a review the suggested News letter/magazine will be still born.

It may be pointed out here that one can peruse scores of foreign magazines and publications which permit discussion of debatable issues and do not insist on our style of security of information. Some such magazines/periodicals are RUSI, Army Quarterly, Brassey's Defence Annual, Soviet Defence Review and Military Review (US). Magazines like TIME and NEWS WEEK bring out and discuss issues which may well be classified TOP SECRET according to our conventions and practice. Discussing this aspect of security of information versus the motivation derived by keeping everyone informed at a certain risk of loss of security. Slim had observed, "I had long ago decided that any risk of leakage from such a source was more than outweighed by the increased keenness and intelligence developed by this feeling of being in the know" (Defeat into Victory, Page 141).

CONCLUSION

Burden of the above has been that the policies conceived in the minds of a few and borne in the hearts of none are unlikely to take root and endure. On the other hand, the decisions and the programmes arrived at by consensus have enduring validity and vitality. Looking for the reasons of Japan's near miraculous economic growth, author Christopher Byron cites CONSENSUS as one of the most important characteristics, 'nearly everyone has atleast some voice in running society'. No matter what the group, from the smallest developing enterprise to the largest multinational, nothing gets done until the people involved agree. The Japanese call this NEMAVASHI (root binding). Just as a gardener carefully wraps all the roots of a tree together before he attempts to transplant it, Japanese leaders bring all members of society together before an important decision is made. It is often tedious and sometimes interminable process. But in the end the group as a whole benefits because all members are aligned behind the same goal. To paraphrase the thoughts of one of our own officers, "there is an imperative need, as a matter of training policy, to institutionalise interaction and mobility of ideas between the field units and training establishments". The answers to our problems are here. Those of us who are responsible for training the Army ought to reach out ; find these answers and recycle them into our instruction schedule to produce an adequately responsive structure for the Army.

Leadership in Captivity

A Case Study of Kwai Prison Camp

BRIGADIER K M BHIMAYA

.....a rising of the human spirit over doubt, despair, fear, hardship, strain and fatigue and great danger to life itself, man's most precious possession.'

—Sir John Smyth, VC

A debate on leadership does generate a great deal of emotion. It spawns wide-ranging issues while providing varying focus to many a specie, of the leadership fauna. It addresses live problems of combat and conceptual leadership and offers valuable suggestions and solutions towards achievement of shared goals and objectives. This article does not seek to introduce any exotic variety to the already rich repertoire of leadership traits; it attempts to cover the less dramatic and more melancholy ground : leadership while in captivity. It argues that this genre is subsumed by the framework of the time-honoured leadership principles; but having been liberated in traumatic environments, the leadership potential acquires distinctive properties that can seldom be anticipated much less replicated in peace time. Captivity invests the leader with a kind of helplessness and poignancy that does not normally visit defeat and adversity. It places such severe and exacting demands on the leader that he has to combine in himself the varied qualities of a philosopher, rationalist, social scientist and even a psycho-analyst, the ultimate aim being to ensure the survival of maximum number of prisoners with dignity, social cohesion, disciplined poise and aplomb. It is this uncertain complexity that provides the cutting edge to the challenge.

Captivity conjures up the most shattering vision of gloom, dejection and despondency; yet it cannot be wished away. It is as old as the hills and as inevitable as the daybreak. In the absence of a scientific study of behavioural pattern of our prisoners in captivity no firm conclusions have been recorded. But available records suggest that they could have been given more purposeful sense of direction with regard to their conduct and the general techniques of survival. This

aspect needs to find more emphatic expression in our training curriculum.

Inadequately conditioned troops and their leaders serve as prime targets for subtle indoctrination that seeks to induce disaffection, dissension and social disorder. It brings about ideological conflict and in some cases produces hard core traitors. A psychologically disoriented prisoner cannot be rehabilitated with ease and hence is an enervating drain on trained manpower.

It is accepted that there are numerous crises situations in peace and war which also constitute grave challenges. But in the case of leaders in captivity, events invariably control them. Uncertainty and insecurity that stalk alike the leader and the target group have a dismal continuum. Prospects of reward and recognition are non-existent. The leader does not have any worthwhile mandate over the prisoners except such elusive authority as may be vested with him by the captors with an ulterior motive. And even this dubious authority may be met with redoubled defiance by the prisoners. The strength and power of human will may be unequal to the ghastly circumstances of prison life. The leadership that is thrown up in such circumstances will then have to mediate discreetly and tactfully between the opposite possibilities: defiance and cooperation, posturing and policy; and group cohesion and individual liberty. The Kwai prison camp established by the Japanese during the Second World War provides a classic example of leadership while in captivity.

Let us digress for a moment to sift the lesser known facts from the highly publicised and romantic fiction. Pierre Boulle, the author, had never visited Thailand. He intended his Colonel Nicholson (in real life it was Colonel Philip Toosey) to be a subject of parody—the kind whose attitude would undergo total reversal in a strange milieu of ideological alliances.

While Boulle's main thesis sought to prove that the military mind can evolve and develop objectives that are at total variance with the original purposes of the institution, David Lean, the movie producer, was out for entertainment and hence retained such apocryphal issues as were vital for the box office. Even though the former prisoners protested against the contrived distortions of the movie, some of the embodied fantasies engineered by the dexterous cameras were painstakingly retained. So much for the fictional portion.

The facts, however, were stranger than the fiction. There never was a total rebellion against the Japanese in the Kwai prison camps. Survival depended upon accepting the hard realities of the prison life.

The prisoners worked in the blistering tropical sun from 6 a.m. until as late as 9 p.m. The cause of the inhuman sufferings that were inflicted upon the prisoners was not so much the Japanese brutality as the social tensions between the camp staff. When one day the prisoners in one of the camp refused to work, machine guns were trained on them. When orders given for these guns to be loaded, the commanding officer yielded and the work continued. Even the realities of the bridge that provided the majestic backdrop to the story were changed. It is a less known fact that there were two bridges—a low wooden bridge and the high steel bridge. If the latter was hit, the former could be used. In fact, B-29 bombers did score direct hits and destroyed two spans of the steel bridge (quite different from the movie's depiction of allied commandos bringing about its dramatic destruction). There were distortions even in the exposition of the attitudes and ethos of the prisoners as well as the motivation of Colonel Toosey.

Contrary to what was portrayed in the movie by Alec Guinness, Colonel Philip Toosey was not a career officer, but a merchant and banker before World War II. Toosey, with remarkable instinct, diagnosed the causes for camp friction: it was a non-military problem. It had other dimensions: labour organisation, engineering and the complicated psychological interaction between the prisoners and their captors. Toosey identified the obvious solution: the troops had to work cheerfully and the officers should ensure that they got food and fair treatment. When this work ethic was enforced there was much less waste of time and weeks passed without any prisoners being beaten; happy feelings pervaded the camp. But this was not an easy job to accomplish particularly in view of the psyche of the prisoners who were a motley crowd comprised of heterogeneous elements. And there was the incompetent prison camp staff to boot.

In early 1942, Japan was quite unexpectedly confronted with the task of having to look after more than 200,000 allied prisoners of war. The camp staff comprised people unfit for combat duty and more often unfit for anything. They were pitted against a highly efficient lot of engineers who were charged with the responsibility of building a rail road. The engineers had scant regard for the camp staff and indeed despised them as much as they did the prisoners. The latter's responses initially were weird; but as they started understanding the realities of prison life, their reactions became more rational.

Amongst the prisoners, the humiliation of captivity combined with the breakdown of cohesion generated a feeling of anti-institutio-

nalism first and revolt later. Their pent-up emotions exploded and rebelled against anything that interfered with individual liberty. When epidemics broke out and theft increased the prisoners became painfully aware of the need for some social organisation.

The leader who integrated all aspects of social organisation under such trying conditions was none other than the indomitable Colonel Toosey. Some prisoners found him too regimental for their taste, but went along with him cheerfully as he delivered the goods. Toosey's approach reflected pure gumption and gusto. He understood the limitations of individual will under appalling circumstances. Without making the Japanese lose face he conveyed the message that there could be workable equation between honourable soldiers who were doing their duty as they deemed right. In retrospect, Toosey's judgement was sound. There was much less waste of time and lesser incidence of beating. This singular achievement raised several thorny issues relating to his collaboration with the enemy. Did Toosey collaborate with the enemy?

It seems axiomatic that the majority of the soldiers would not have supported Toosey if he had shared the Japanese objectives. What then was his approach to the problem? At first he painstakingly but objectively collected all the relevant facts and by imaginative cognition understood their human meaning. Here is a moving excerpt from his correspondence. "I felt I had a mission not only to save as many lives as possible, but also to maintain human dignity in those ghastly circumstances." Toosey avoided publicity like plague. He made no efforts to justify his actions while in captivity. Unlike Nicholson of the book, Toosey not only recognized the nuances of human meaning but played a double game. The excerpt that follows is an eloquent testimony to this theory. Toosey wrote "...personal publicity always makes me feel exceedingly uncomfortable. Perhaps this also is an aftermath of being a prisoner when I did a number of things which if found out would have disastrous results for me and may be I have an inbred wish to keep everything to myself."

Toosey played an important part in the V organisation (a secret underground group of people who smuggled money, medicine and food). The organisation operated albeit undramatically for over two years and saved thousands of lives. Toosey eventually became a legendary figure who could handle the Nips. Though his strategy was adopted with astounding success by other allied commanders in various camps, Toosey remained the Triton among the minnows till the end of the war in 1945.

A prisoner of war camp offers the individual a very limited range of practical choices. Leadership can rise from the din and chaos of the turbulent environs. Toosey's responses to his captors and guidance to his fellow prisoners derived from his fertile imagination free of unbridled fantasy. Nor had egocentricity any place in his scheme. He collaborated more with 'actual circumstances' than the enemy. Toosey had thoroughly appreciated the complexities and contradictions of the real world. He knew that romantic beliefs can seldom be satisfied. He had also grasped "one of the most humbling lessons of the humanities that one must not expect certain progress or a permanent resolution of conflicting opinions; the best that one can do is to look at the whole picture, try to see what it means, and act according to that and to nothing else."

Toosey did not indulge in romantic pipe dreams. His actions did not stem from his beliefs but by realistic appraisal of the circumstances around him; by his imagination which used his past experience to prepare for the future; and by his tenacity to optimise the chances of decent survival.

The dismal environment of a prisoner of war camp bristles with complexities. As in the case of panic in battle, the conditions can seldom be faithfully represented during peace-time. However, foreknowledge without undue defeatism may pave the way for appropriate mental conditioning. Like a grand strategist the leader should not only inspire confidence before and during the battle but also think of ways and means of maintaining the original purpose and cohesion after the war.

Philip Boulle by seeking to caricature the fictional 'Colonel Nicholson' unwittingly illuminated a serious problem and a plausible pitfall: In captivity there is a dire possibility of the military mind to get disoriented and drift away from the natural moorings that give it a sense of direction and sustains original purpose. The leader's unenviable task then is to navigate such minds through dangerous shoals and bring it back to its original direction. The ultimate end is to ensure the decent survival of maximum number of prisoners with dignity and cohesion must never be lost sight of; or else it will create insurmountable problems of rehabilitation and impede the restoration of their clan and camaraderie.

While conventions and beliefs are sometimes pillars of strength, in the psychologically depressing milieu of captivity, accurate knowledge

and understanding of the circumstances are of the essence. A human and commonsense approach will reap richer harvest than the monotonous application of a granite form of molten logic. The following invocative aphorism of timeless worth would perhaps encapsulate the philosophy which Col Toosey followed with singular success:

“Grant me the SERENITY to accept the
things I cannot change;
COURAGE to change the things I can;
and WISDOM to know the difference.”

Integrated Logistic Support A Suggested Inter Services Organisation

MAJOR (DR) SWAPAN BHATTACHARYYA

INTRODUCTION

Integrated Logistics In Indian Context: One of the most productive fields for the economic application of centralised management is in the provision of common supplies and related services to the Armed Forces and other allied forces. There are many different levels of installations and units and many different phases of the Logistics Management for the Services. While for a certain Service, certain equipment/weapons, necessities are peculiar, there are some common items like vehicles, a number of clothing items, tentage, spare parts of vehicles, generating sets, electronic spares, mouldes, general hardware, assemblys etc, where scope lies for inter-service integration. The forum of Policy Management, sources of original supply and aim of Logistic Support Management are the same. And, this gamut of activity is so vital to combat particularly in the face of concept of Rapid Deployment Force, that there cannot be a sharp break among the various parts of the logistic system causing delay and contribution cost, threatening success of an operation, either to repeal (external threat) or in aid to civil power. In national context any OPs is going to be combined effort of the three services, or at least of two services including para military and ancillary forces. If integration cannot be done at tri-services level, integration at one force level only is not expected to yield result. With that scenario in view, integration in logistic system is proposed from the inter-services level. We must, strive for an Integrated Management system which is task oriented, reliable, flexible, compatible and maintainable. The sole aim of the proposed organisation should be to make available to the fighting forces systems, equipment, assys, components, clothing and necessities at a point of the time when they need it.

To suggest a suitable alternative structure to the existing Logistic Support System.

DEFINITION

There are 'Wholesale Logistics' element and the 'Army-in-the-Field' element. These are useful however, in delineating generally between two broad areas of logistics operations. The Army Dictionary defines 'Army Wholesale Logistics' as the Army Logistics System less 'Army-in-the-Field Logistics; includes complete logistic support of the Army Wholesale Logistics complex itself and of special Army activities retained under direct control of Headquarters Department of the Army. The same source identifies 'Army-in-the-Field' logistics as that portion of the Army Logistics system which pertain to functions internal to theatres of operations. including units and organisations deployed in overseas theatres.

PERCEPTION BEHIND DEFINITION

Perception behind the definition is—

(a) Effective support to combat forces/formation through balanced and timely distribution of system equipment, ammunition, assys, components, clothing and necessities etc.

(b) To achieve the object at (a) above, requirement exists for—

(i) Timely responding to the material requirement call of combat forces through;

(aa) Timely development and supply of new equipment.

(bb) Quick supply of existing 'systems' equipment, spares, accessories, assemblies etc and through replacements and/or repairs.

(cc) Timely disposal of obsolete equipment.

(c) For achieving (b) above, requirement exists for congruation of individual organisational goals of R & D, DGI, DGOF, DGS&D, Public Sector undertaking, AOC Logistics Branch of Navy and Air-force etc to the objective at (a) above.

(d) Logistics have been divided into two parts 'Wholesale Logistics' and 'Army-in-the-field' Logistics.

The Concept : Integrated Logistic Support: To follow the concept it is advisable to go through the Logistic Support Process. The stages followed are :—

(a) Design development through—

(i) Understanding QR/QA (Qualitative Requirement/Quality Available). based on reliability, maintainability.

(ii) Compromise.

- (iii) Material resources availability.
- (iv) Availability of tech-know-how, buy (Import) or develop.
- (b) Procurement Policy, considering—
 - (i) Present order (of old material).
 - (ii) Production capacity availability/ or to be augmented.
 - (iii) Raw material availability.
 - (iv) Selection of production source—Buy or make, import or indigenous.
- (c) Financial planning, consisting—
 - (i) Planned expenditure.
 - (ii) Non-planned expenditure.
 - (iii) Mixed expenditure.
 - (iv) A cost benefit analysis (CBA).
- (d) Contract administration—
 - (i) Timely completion of existing contracts (old equipment).
 - (ii) Signing of new protocols/contracts (for new equipment or modification).
 - (iii) Monitoring progress.
 - (iv) Earmarking of production capacity for defence requirement.
 - (v) Establishment of Buyer/Seller ethics and relation.
 - (vi) Quality standards and assurance.
- (e) Project administration encompassing project planning development and procurement for new equipment.
- (f) Quality assurance administration—
 - (i) Validation of quality standard.
 - (ii) Interface with contract administration in buyer/seller ethics and relations.
 - (iii) Codification and standardisation.
 - (iv) Inspection.
- (g) Distribution Management
 - (i) Wholesale distribution of items common to all Services.
 - (ii) Retail distribution of items special to Services viz Army, Navy and Air Force.
 - (iii) Retail distribution items from one source to the users in respective services.
 - (iv) Theatre retail for particular theatre of OPs.

- (v) Stocking of 'Systems based Equipments'
- (vi) Co-ord movements.
- (h) Disposal Management
 - (i) In situ.
 - (ii) Central Disposal.
- (j) Communication Management
 - (i) Establishment of common catalogue and vocab procedure.
 - (ii) Establishment of Communication network between interfaces mentioned above and between indenter and supplier.
 - (iii) Monitoring of information.
 - (iv) Human Resource Development.

Through a rather overview of this entire problem, it may be postulated that considerable economy and efficiency could begin if all the common supply management activities were consolidated into a single agency. One person to head the agency with enough statutory power and status to decide on interministerial issues. The person to be aided/assisted by a set of persons of heirarchical and bureaucratic eminence in respective fields of logistic management. It can be confidently submitted that in the long run it will improve supply support to the operating forces while materially reducing the cost to the tax payer. The integrated Logistic system Board is proposed to have the following aim:—

- (a) To provide a basic, uniform and integrated inventory control concept to be employed by all Defence Services users including Para Military and ancillary forces.
- (b) To ensure effective and timely supply to the Armed Forces and allied departments in the event of mobilisation, war or other national emergency, as well as in peace time.
- (c) To furnish this support at lowest feasible cost of money, time and material.

Object: The operations of ILS Board is oriented primarily toward logistic support of the armed forces and encompass a variety of responsibilities. Important objects of the ILS Board include:

- (a) Management of assigned items of material.
- (b) Procurement of common supplies and common services.
- (c) Operation of a distribution system for assigned supplies in India and for friendly foreign Governments.

(d) Provision of contract administration services in support of the Armed Forces and other MOD/MOH components, viz the Coast Guard, DGOF, BSF, CISF, OISF etc and other designated state agencies and friendly foreign governments.

(e) Logistics systems analysis and design, procedural development and the maintenance of assigned supply and service systems.

(f) Scientific and technical documentation, including acquiring, storing, announcing, retrieving and distributing formally recorded information.

(g) Administration and supervision of a number of constant and ever changing programmes as directed by the Ministry of Defence (of primary interest to inventory managers).

(h) Human resources development for Integrated Logistic Support.

ORGANISATION AND FUNCTION

Integrated Logistic System Board as HQ. The ILS HQ and its field activities is to be jointly staffed by Army, Navy, Air Force, Mil and Civ pers. HQ organisation consists of the Chairman, Jt Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen to coordinate the integrated function. Members are charged with the responsibility of different stages of Logistic Support System. It will have a central staff under a member secretary to provide common administrative, professional, technical, and managerial support and an operation element to exercise staff supervision over the execution of Logistic Operation. The Jt Chairmen will have also their own staff to assist them in the exercise of direction and control over the sub system as a whole and is responsible to assist the Chairman (as a part of his staff) for policy development, broad planning and staff supervision of the total Logistic Support System of Armed and allied forces. The deputy chairmen will head a part of sub system so as to reduce the span of control and to co-ordinate mutually inclusive activities in a sub system. Proposed Organisation is shown in Chart I.

Function of Members. The members are to be charged with the respective responsibility of R & D, projects, production, Procurement through the Deputy Chairmen, Jt Chairmen and the Board. They will have their trained personnel working with stocking units with Direct Logistic Supply and Support Organisation. These personnel would be appraised by the local heads on their performance. The responsibility and authority thus have been matched for the purpose of goal congruation.

Communication Network: The whole network of communication and storage is proposed to be inter linked on method shown in Chart II.

Logistic Depot—Detailed Function: Detailed function of Defence Logistic Depots in their respective field of activity will comprise complete responsibility for the performance of all inventory management function for the full range of items assigned to it, providing for necessary catalogue, computing whole sale stock required to support the anticipated needs of the consumer, initiating appropriate procurement or repair, action. Positioning stocks in accordance with the expected needs (dispersed stock) determining retention limit, initiating disposal action.

Defence Logistic Depot: In his functions, the Defence Logistic Depot Commandant will be assisted by expert personnel from R & D, Inspection, Finance etc. These personnel will get their technical guidance from the board members but will be appraised by the Depot Commandant for their primary functions. A separate appraisal system has to be developed on the basis of task assigned and achieved. The Army Logistic System, like that of the other departments of the Armed Forces (viz Navy, Air Force, Para Military Force) is to be governed by Deputy Chairman on the policies established by the ILS Board. The Deputy Chairman of the Army (MGO) like other departmental Deputy Chairmen is responsible for all MOD and ILS Board directive and instruction which deal with the Forces Logistic System, procurement, production, cataloguing, standardisation, warehousing, distribution, maintenance, disposal and related functions. The organisation of Defence Logistic Depots is given in Chart III.

In the proposed organisation of Defence Logistic Depots, the stores common to all the services are proposed to be held. The theatre Commanders through Direct Ordnance Support Depots will indent for those items straight from Defence Logistic Depots, through a national EDP network. The EDP network will order, issue, delivery and procure; depending on stock position. Advantages expected are:

- (a) Variety reduction—resulting in saving of procurement lead time.
- (b) Accountability.
- (c) Economy of cost, time.

Army Logistic Depots: The Army Logistic Depots will hold those items of stores peculiar to Army. Like the Defence Logistic

Depots they will also be in direct communication with theatre depots (Direct Ordnance Support Depots), and system depots as well as with the board on the logistic services viz procurement, inspection, R & D etc. These depots will also have integrated inspection, finance elements, with it.

Direct Ordnance Support Depots: The Theatre depots (Direct Ordnance Support Depots) proposed will hold stock on commodity and system basis, as per the requirement of the theatre Commander. The policy of reserves however is required to be spelt out at the board level under guidance of MOD.

The Deputy Chairman of the Army (MGO) will be aided in supply and logistic by the DGOS and DGEME, thus not disturbing the present set-up.

The Army Logistic Orgn: In the proposed organisation, the AOC does not liquidate, some of its responsibilities of stocking and supply of stores common to all the three services to the Defence Logistic Depot Organisation, but retain with it the material management responsibility of those stores and equipment peculiar to the Army as well as other Forces. Thus some of the Defence Depots become defence Logistic Depots. The AOC integrates with it technical services viz DGI, DGOF etc. with the contribution of staff from national level. A suggested organisation chart is given in Chart IV.

Functions: Army Logistic Org. Functions encompasses development testing, cataloguing direction, quantitative requirement determination, procurement, production, planning direction, inventory control, maintenance direction and disposal of surpluses of Army supplies and equipment. The present function of the AOC with the field commanders or in staff is not proposed to be altered. The DGOS in his HQ gets a test and evaluation organisation for introduction of new eqpt as for rationalisation, standardisation and inspection. The organisation will be staffed under suitable AOC Project Officer with compliments from R & D, DGI, DGOF and will have direct access to the DGOS. The supply and distribution management upto theatre level is proposed to be accomplished through Army Commodity Depots, Army System Depots, Direct Ordnance Support Depots. The logistic supply support responsibilities for the Army is proposed to be divided as under:

- (a) The tank and combat vehs group.
- (b) The electronics and communication and power generator group.
- (c) The missile group.
- (d) The weapons, armaments and ammunition group.
- (e) The systems group (dividing it into compatible system in association with other groups mentioned earlier).
- (f) The clothing and necessities group.
- (g) The evaluation, testing and project group.
- (h) The theatre logistic supply support group.

The proposed Depot location and reorganisation are proposed to be as under:

- (a) The COD, CVD, CAFVD to become principal distribution commodity depots.
- (b) Alongwith CODs/CVDs/CAFVDs—situated in close proximity with inspection organisation and users, specialised system depots to come up. Thus the present commodity group is not disturbed.
- (c) Direct ordnance support depots or composite depots to function for a theatre of operation alongwith command Depot or FODs at a location approved by GOC-in-C and on the basis of a study (Proposed).

CONCLUSION

This is in form of an over-view (but, not a surrogate) based on published paper, experience, suiting futuristic view. This has emerged largely from the concepts of integrated logistic support as it is generally understood and is followed in developed countries.

Since we are keen to change from commodity basis to system basis with the aim of rendering better customer satisfaction, without much resistance to change, the deliberation have started from where we are in the existing system. It requires a detailed study on the parameter suggested to validate on:

- (a) Types of consumer demand.
- (b) Kinds of consumer demand.
- (c) Kinds of production schedule.
- (d) Timing of replenishments.

The proposed study should have the following operational objectives:

- (a) Centralise inventory control by commodity.
- (b) Consumer requisition submitted to one control location for each commodity, where the requisition will be validated against system-wise asset availability.
- (c) Supply information provided to consumer from one point of each group or system.
- (d) Maximum specialisation in the use of EDP.
- (e) Minimum storage location (with capacity of expansion) strategically located in India to provide economical and effective support to consumers.

ORGANISATION CHART INTERATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT BOARD (DEFENCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT BOARD)





CHART I



Member AOC




Chart III

**ORGANISATION CHART : ARMY LOGISTIC SUPPORT
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN
ARMY (MGO)**

—Coord




Chart IV

Lessons From Future History: Memoirs of an Armoured Brigade Commander from an Automated Battle Field-1998

MAJ GEN V K MADHOK

“Technology is outstripping tactics and future Warfare will be much more automated”

“Technological developments greatly favour defence rather than attack”

“Technology is in a much better position to enhance our means for aggressive defence, provided the doctrine can paint a clear picture to it”

“Somewhere in Rajasthan, 14 Jan 1998.

MY brigade has been given the task of preventing enemy ingress from across the international border towards Barmer and to destroy any enemy who manages to do so: thanks to the technological developments in surveillance, weaponry with precision guidance techniques—both terminal as well as mid-flight and communication systems in the last decade. As a defender I have no qualms in saying that we are much better placed than the attacker. In fact I am convinced that my formation is truly in a position to deal with any ingress most aggressively instead of the situation a decade ago, when we were only told that ‘defence will be aggressive’.

For the first stage of battle which is to locate and identify the enemy, a Barrier Zone (BZ) of approximately 8 kilometers width has been cleared from East to West. In this zone, ground sensors with their aerials just visible above the ground have been planted. Sensors will pick up signals due to seismic and acoustic disturbances and automatically transmit these through relay-stations to the central computers at Jodhpur. It would be possible to drop sensors by aircraft or deliver these with artillery in the BZ by next year. The present sensors need to be replaced every four months. In due course it would be possible to increase their life to a year or so. Sensors are to be

planted in a pattern. This is being done by the 'strip method of laying sensors' evolved by the University of Military Engineers (erstwhile CME). Sensor records are kept in the mini computer at the brigade headquarters and a print-out is available at short notice. Additional surveillance devices for my sector include two scout RPVs¹ which carry TV cameras focussed by a remote operator on ground and a side looking radar; India's first AWAC² with a range of approximately 300 Kms carrying a load of computers and radars for the entire defensive zone. Augmenting this effort are the Recce satellites and Electronic interception stations-all linked with the computer. The BZ has been purposely left free of personnel and vehicles so that the anti-tank/personnel mines can be fired in clusters by artillery at very short notice on vulnerable approaches and of course to let the sensors do their job. Quite a change from the days when I was a young intelligence officer in the late seventies with Brig Zaki, VrC and the so called 'BZ' as it is known today was littered with motorised surveillance detachments, forward observers to identify aircraft, alert and warn airfields, artillery and infantry OPs, Protective patrols, BSF posts and what not.

Further down, own side of the border, 'Weapon Platforms' (WPs) have been deployed. Once the computers have analysed all data concerning targets, given preference and decision regarding weapon selection for firing, WPs will take on all those targets in the BZ which survive artillery and rocket bombardment. WPs are a mix; a squadron each of Air cushion vehicles, tank destroyers and mechanised Infantry in APCs, all modified against NBC³ operations. All AFVs⁴ are fitted with highly accurate missiles with seeker systems and homing devices. Once a target has been located, it is a sure kill. All personnel have duplicate and in some cases triplicate trades which caters for instant replacement. This measure alone has resulted in drastic reduction of personnel in units. In fact, the position now is that we need more personnel in the rear to handle, maintain and repair a variety of equipment and not to remain idle in their field fortifications in front waiting for the enemy to appear. WP Commanders who are in the rank of Lt Col can seek or press for attack helicopter support or an armoured helicopter squadron at short

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1. RPV—Remotely Piloted Vehicles, which are un-manned aircraft guided by radio or pre-programmed computers.
 2. AWAC—Airborne warning and control system aircraft which performs the same function as its name.
 3. NBC—Nuclear, biological and chemical.
 4. AFVs—Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

notice. Their tasks are quite clear; to destroy all enemy in the BZ. The line of WPs is also the limit of penetration.

Further back I have the FOFs (Follow on Forces) which are really the reserves and highly mobile. These consist of a regiment each of tanks and APC's and an armoured helicopter squadron. Plan NERA, successor to AREN, with satellites has revolutionised communications. I need not go into the intricate yet simple system designed to meet various command, control, communication and intelligence requirements.

I will not go into my Electronic order of battle or artillery as....."

INTRODUCTION

Technology has been a factor in the equation of warfare throughout history. It has provided the tools of combat, altered or introduced new ideas and strategies and together with politics, created new forms of war. This aspect and the fact, that provision of military deterrence is a continuous conscious effort, impels one to project future forms of war, which is nevertheless an uncertain pre-occupation. There is no difficulty in articulating the above piece of memoirs in detail with a number of options. That however is not the intention. Purpose is to visualise an automated battle-field, how it could look and read, say in another 12-13 years or so in our environment, in the plains or desert and of course to draw useful lessons from it. The scenario is a non-nuclear one as it is felt, that it is and would be possible to evolve effective non-nuclear, non-provocative defence deterrence with appropriate technology. Majority of the weapon systems and other devices like RPVs, Air cushion vehicles, Missile fitted helicopters, Remote controlled vehicles, guidance systems and so on are already on the shelf. These are being continuously updated and developed for future warfare. With the state of art now obtaining in the world, it is proposed that the above memoir might as well read authentic in the year 2000! Considering that visualisation of any future event cannot be 100 per cent accurate, even if half of the above reads feasible then it is worth considering measures which might provide a quantum operational jump to reach the stage visualised. One thing however is definite, clear and certain that the task of manning the automated systems for war in future will consume a large portion of the personnel of future military profession. Further, it is to be noted that countries around which political competition is unlikely to diminish, technology plays an important part! What has to be decided is the use to which this technology should be put to. It is fair

to put it to all such uses by which one can protect oneself and defend one's country. Therefore the military tactical doctrine has to think well ahead and to tell technology what to pursue atleast 10-15 years in advance.

IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

Of necessity, there is little option but to take note of the numerous developments in USA and USSR—the two super powers who spend the maximum amount on development of weapon technology. Of these, USA alone spends approximately 25 Billion Dollars every year on research excluding the money spent on space research. It is roughly spending three times more on military science than its expenditure during the peak years of second world war. Together, both are spending approximately 85% of the total money spent in the world on research and development. France, UK, China and West Germany account for another 10 per cent while rest of the world which includes India spend the remaining 5 per cent.

It appears that the fields of technology in which great advances will take place from a military angle are laser, radar, heavy particle beams, chemical explosive techniques and missile guidance. Effects of these developments will obviously be felt on the sophistication of mass destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical and biological), conventional weapons and of course strategy and tactics, both nuclear as well as conventional.

Technology is a new phenomena for majority of us in which the military was really not interested till the late seventies. But a steep climb seems to have taken place recently—primarily because of what is available in the world market and of course to keep up with the Joneses. A good start was made with the introduction of the scientific orientation course for the Staff College candidates in 1962. This is but a drop in the ocean and there is a long way to go. It is stated that to-day, 20% of the world's best scientists are working on the development of weapons. Though a weapon system forms only one link from surveillance, identification to firing, nevertheless an important one. It is opined that the combat aircraft of future would be too sophisticated to be flown by human beings and as such may be replaced by RPVs.

The impact of technology is likely to be felt on a wide spectrum. It would however enable re-structuring of present organisations so as to provide more battle-field reserves. With all weather possibility for reconnaissance and surveillance, normal deception as we understand

today may be out of place and alternative methods and means would have to be thought of. The automated equipment which will have to be handled could lead to the emergence of the 'Technological Leader' in the armed forces and impose much heavier technical demands on the individual. Real time surveillance of the battlefield would be possible round the clock and there may be little difference between fighting by day or by night. Electronic supremacy may take precedence over air supremacy. Electronic order of battle would be as, if not more, important than the routine one so as to fight the electronic battle successfully. Use of air cushion vehicles (hover craft) VTOL/STOL, ability of the assaulting infantry man to fly across a minefield with a flying belt, use of Astrolite (a liquid explosive which offers possibilities in mine warfare) may become part of the WET⁵. Further, days of well aimed rounds by the infantryman may be over and replaced with the doctrine of massive suppressive fire for shock effect from the assault rifle with a burst limiter. The traditional bullet may be replaced with a flechette—a barbed projectile approximately one inch long with the diameter of a pencil lead. The artillery round being packed with thousands of flechettes—along-with of course increase in range. The possibilities are limitless for continuous growth of military technology.

So far as we are concerned, from a wide spectrum, some of the areas which are of interest and concern are the Tank and its survivability along-with its crews, surveillance to locate and identify the enemy, weapons and weapon platforms. Electronic warfare and Satellite communications amongst others.

TANK SURVIVABILITY

The pendulum seems to have swung in favour of a fire power dominated battle field. The variety of anti-tank arsenal which would be available in future, such as the anti-tank helicopter, cluster bombs with multiple hill bomblets, influence mines and the latest CLAMP (cannon launched armour manoeuvring projectile) a laser guided artillery shell developed by the Israelies—now under test clearly indicate that, the developments in technology towards the killing of a tank are outpacing those contributing to its survivability. As a sequel, a medley of developments in protective measures have taken place: Reactive or Add on armour such as 'Balzer' with armour plates mounted on the exterior of a tank so as to explode outwards on impact from a shot; Active armour, with a shaped charge so as to cut

5. War Equipment Tables.

into an incoming Kinetic energy shell or Mobile armour with layered levels of compound armour with free floating plates in between — and a host of measures, all designed to ensure the tanks' survivability as well as its crew's all over the world.

Tank was the technical answer to the practical requirement of a mobile, protected, direct fire weapon system. It was brought to the battle-field to restore mobility. Sophisticated anti-tank guns and missiles in the offing threaten its survivability which can no longer be ensured by merely adding tons of armour. Massive heavy tanks accordingly become tank destroyers as increased weight affects mobility.

Also, from the stage of heavy artillery pounding at the farthest zone to the infantry-man with his anti-tank rifle grenade is a carefully orchestrated defence system which the armour has to penetrate. Further, anti-tank policy being followed now in most countries is not to wait till the tank has arrived at the wire and then open up. But to begin attacking it at as long a range as is technically feasible. Aim being to defeat 70-80% of tanks with a long range weapon before they reach the infantryman's parameters. Research in 'Remote delivered munitions' to hit formations when they are in concentration areas—say 20 miles or so behind the FDLs and of course Precision guided weapons could therefore cause havoc. Add to all this an adversary's capability for atomic or chemical warfare. The tank and tank formations face a formidable challenge indeed so as to be prepared to contend against such threats.

So far as the development of the tank and its design are concerned, there appears to be a pause all over the world—whether it be in Sweden, Britain, USA, Germany or for that matter Israel. The cost factor is one major constraint and accordingly, even less radical changes such as the reduction of weight by trying to have all crew positions in the hull, replacement of the conventional three men-turret with a two men—one or to have an automatic ammunition loader with an ammunition magazine in the turret etc are being progressed slowly. An increasing number of countries have switched over to the use of 120 mm smooth barrelled gun except the British who continue to retain their preference for rifled guns. The armour crews of future face a difficult and critical risk of continuing their missions with likely degradation under the NBC conditions. As such a great deal of thought is being given to crew survivability. Introduction of ammunition water jackets for instance in the chieftain and challenger, possibility of placing fuel in lightly armed self sealing multiple fuel cells,

provision of bullet proof goggles, vest and fire proof gloves and overalls—as in Israel are all measures to enhance crew survivability. In future, so far as the Infantry-man is concerned, technology may further so simplify anti-tank weapons so that a greater number are available in the units.

The helicopter, however, offers ample scope and credible reasons for augmenting such mobility. A proportion of armoured units and even complete armoured regiments could be lifted in the air, after changing their equipment. The innumerable options to augment a tank formation's anti-tank bite and capability by means of helicopters needs to be exploited. A larger role can be visualised for helicopters equipped with medium and long range missiles. Such helicopters even at shorter ranges could play a significant role because of their capability to overcome the confining aspects of terrain, thereby enhancing a defenders effectiveness and of course mobility of armoured formations. The statement of a French Aviation officer 'that a troop of missile armed attack helicopters could effectively disable a tank battalion while four such troops could stop a medium regiment is therefore, worth taking note of'.

SURVEILLANCE

On an automated battle-field, location and identification of enemy and his equipment can be done by means of sensors, RPVs, reconnaissance satellites, aircraft and electronic measures. This would obviously lead to reduction of manpower which is utilised for such purposes today. Sensors are capable of transmitting information by radio. These could have long life and remain active for many months. The radio-relay equipment could be carried in aircraft or RPVs. So far as the RPVs are concerned, besides reconnaissance these could be used for many other purposes such as ground attack missions as these carry no pilots and can fly high at speed. These will not be detected easily. Israelis demonstrated the utility of RPVs during the Lebanon war in 1982 when they used Scout and Mastig—20 RPVs built by their industries. The operators had no problem in observing the vehicles on the streets of Lebanon. Progress in the surveillance field is taking one to a 'Transparency revolution'. Therefore while deception has become difficult, other innovations have made surprise possible such as the increased range of missiles which makes it easier to deliver deep strikes. Time required to move fully mechanised, combat ready formations in forward areas from barracks to deployment areas would now be in hours instead of days and weeks; further, equipment configuration makes it difficult to assess whether it is for defensive or offensive preparations.

WEAPONS—WEAPON PLATFORMS

The weaponry for future is likely to be guided weapons; missiles or bombs fitted with homing devices so that once launched, these can seek out targets and destroy them. Recent conflicts in the Middle-East have confirmed and shown that, modern warfare is relying more and more on missile warfare in which hover-craft, aircraft or helicopters are used as 'weapon platforms' for firing missiles and in which missiles are in turn used to destroy these platforms. Micro-electronics would enable the use of missiles in fog, rain and haze against electronic counter measures, including chaff to jamming devices and decoys. In adverse weather, sensors will provide guidance system.

COMMUNICATION SATELLITES

It may be feasible to have an early warning satellite system with ground based radars. USA to-day has a defence communication system which provides their forces world-wide voice, data and teleprinter services. Measures would be possible to make the radio-links more secure from sensing, interception, electronic eaves-dropping and other forms of interference. Due to the demands which automated systems will make on communication systems, there is no escape from undertaking heavy research programmes now. Highly sophisticated communication systems under development in USA, such as MILSTAR or the SKY NET (British vehicle series) need attention and study.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

An adversary will always aim at those measures which would disable the equipment deployed on the automated battle-field. In turn the opposite number would take measures to nullify such designs. The Electronic battle, therefore, between the defensive and offensive systems would continue. To ensure, that one's radar, aircraft, command, control and communication systems are not detected; continue to function satisfactorily and are prevented from jamming has led to a whole new range of Electronic warfare. The Electronic order of battle would therefore be as—if not more important than the normal orbat. Besides, it has led to an entirely new military activity—Elint (Electronic intelligence) which uses various information gathering techniques. Together with this a whole new range of equipment for electronic counter and counter/counter measures has erupted. It is desirable to prevent detection of costly equipment and big targets so as to avoid targetting by precision guided weapons. A defender seems to be better placed to locate and destroy such targets. Traditional

problems of discovering the enemy's dispositions, strength and movement would be overcome by sensors and a host of other equipment.

LESSONS

What lessons emerge or can be learnt from the above memoirs and scenario? The most important one to my mind appears to be to give as accurate a scenario as possible, of an automated battlefield, as it would be 10—15 years hence to the private entrepreneur so that he has sufficient time and a clear idea as to what is expected of him. This will enable him to focus his attention on those items which he could produce. Besides, chain reaction of ideas may enable him to produce even better equipment. To encourage him, the Government could subsidise his efforts towards research. This is a proposal with inherent strength. In the long run this will also prove economical.

Amongst the others and more important ones:—

(a) It is and will be possible to reduce manpower in a large number of areas by judicious application of technology. The field of surveillance is one such example. Also, with better and effective weaponry, the size of the units could be reduced. It is not difficult to identify such areas. To that effect organisations will in turn need re-structuring.

(b) Much more man-power which is technologically competent would be required to handle automated areas and of course in maintenance and towards repair of equipment. Education of the soldier with this aspect in view and higher entrance standards at the time of recruitment would need attention.

(c) The battle-field leader would have to be much more technologically competent. In fact, a leader's technological competence and experience will have a distinct technical bias to enable him to handle his formations in an automated battle-field, just as to-day in the mountains a leader has to be much more fitter physically than in the plains.

(d) The distinct stages of war and operations would need to be clearly recognised and defined such as is being done in the USA: Location and identification of enemy forces, decision as to how to deal with them, selection of appropriate weapons and firing, assessment of damage and to find if it needs repetition.

(e) Once the above is clear, it would then be necessary as well as possible for the doctrine to tell technology what to pursue. If that does not happen, the technology could outstrip and dictate tactics.

(f) The above memoirs have told us nothing about the adversary and his capabilities. It is certain that he would be more or less at the same level if not a step ahead. If that be so, then sophisticated electronic measures to see that his equipment does not function effectively and ours does is a field in which great strides would be necessary. In fact, before the tactical battle begins, it would have already been decided to a large extent from the decision gained in the electronic battle.

CONCLUSION

As we look ahead it is quite clear, that the Information Society of the 21st Century would be as different from, as our Society was from the Agriculture Society of the 18th Century. We also need not fear that technology, as it moves forward at a rapid pace, will leave everything behind as obsolete. This may not happen. For instance, the aircraft may still continue to remain one of the important methods of delivering missiles although the types of missiles might change. Time is not very far off when it is opined that, the man would be in a position to create man made tidal waves, simulate earthquakes, divert hurricanes and use their energy towards mass destruction of countries. One of course hopes that this does not happen.

Westminster Abbey and India

LIEUT GENERAL S.L. MENEZES, PVSM

THIS article is prompted by a visit to Westminster Abbey several years ago, and recent browsing in the old libraries and graveyards of Calcutta. I endeavour to record in their chronological order a small selection of the many epitaphs/inscriptions in the Abbey which have association with India.

Vice-Admiral Watson, then C-in-C of the Naval Forces in India, died at Calcutta on 16 August, 1757, aged 43. The East India Company "as a grateful testimony of the signal advantage they obtained by his valour and prudence, erected this monument" in Westminster Abbey. In a central arch of the monument is a life-sized figure of the Admiral, clad in a Roman toga. Various allegorical figures fill two other arches, and overall is inscribed "Chandernagore, March, 3rd, 1757". He figures prominently in Macaulay's "Essay on Clive". The inscription on his tombstone is still discernible in St. John's Churchyard, Calcutta.

The memorial in the Abbey to Clive is a medallion-bust inscribed, very simply : "1725—Clive—1774", to which is added; "Erected in 1919 by Public Subscription". (He is buried in the church at Moreton Say, near Market Drayton).

General Stringer Lawrence ("Father of the Indian Army") is commemorated by a bust and by a medallion bearing the dates of his birth and death (1697 and 1775). To the right of the bust "Fame" holds a shield inscribed : "Discipline established, fortresses protected, settlements extended, French and Indian armies defeated, peace concluded in the Carnatic." To the left is a figure representing the "Genius" of the Company. At the foot is a view of Trichinopoly.

Stringer Lawrence had led an adventurous life. He had fought at Culloden. Coming to India, in 1748, as a major he had been captured by the French, but on being released the next year had obtained command of Fort St. David, Cuddalore. In 1757, with the local rank of brigadier-general, he commanded Fort St. George, Madras, and also during its siege by the French in 1758-59. He

became major-general in 1759, and left India in the latter year. Clive's first battles in India were fought under him; and when Clive, in England, was subsequently presented with a sword of honour by the East India Company, he refused to accept it unless a similar distinction was conferred on Lawrence, his veteran commander. Later, when he found that Lawrence was to spend his remaining years unnoticed and in poverty, he insisted on settling £500 a year on him from his own purse.

The large pyramidal monument to Sir Eyre Coote is adorned with a palm-tree, a figure of Victory, an elephant and a medallion, the whole presented by the East India Company to commemorate: "his military talents when, as C-in-C of our forces in India, in 1760 and 1761, he expelled the French from the Coromandel Coast and, in 1781 1782, again took the field in the Carnatic, in opposition to the united strength of the French and Hyder Ally, and in several engagements defeated them until, in 1783, death interrupted his career of glory, in the 58th year of his age." His remains were brought from Madras and interred at Rockbourne, near Salisbury, where there is an obelisk to his memory.

A memorial in the Abbey was erected in 1806 as "a grateful testimony to the valour and eminent services" of Captain Edward Cook, commander of H.M.S. Sybille, who "after a long and well-contested engagement, captured La Forte, a French frigate of very superior force, in the Bay of Bengal, an event not more splendid in its achievement than important in its result so British trade in India. He died in consequence of the severe wounds he received in this memorable action, on 23rd May, 1799, aged 27." In 1799 one of the most brilliant frigate actions on record was fought in Balasore Roads off the Orissa coast by the British frigate La Sybille against the French frigate La Forte which was reputed to be the most heavily armed vessel afloat of her time. The French frigate had been playing havoc at the Sandheads (mouth of the Hooghly) with the English shipping. After a fierce exchange in which La Forte lost an admiral (de Sercey), her captain and all her lieutenants, and sustained casualties of 140 out of a crew of 300, the French vessel struck her colours. La Sybille carried her prize off into the Hooghly with only 15 casualties, amongst whom was her commander Captain Edward Cook, RN, who is buried in South Park Cemetery, Calcutta. He was the son of the famous navigator of that name, according to the London Times of 3rd August, 1799.

Dr. Johnson had said that "in lapidary inscriptions a man is not on oath." It would be difficult for such a "devil's advocate" as

"Junius" to find anything of a derogatory nature to insert in the epitaph of Warren Hastings, "Sacred to the memory of Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, a member of HM's Privy Council, descended from the elder branch of the ancient and noble family of Huntingdon. Selected for his eminent talents and integrity, he was appointed, in 1773, the first Governor-General of India, to which high office he was thrice reappointed. Presiding over the Indian Government during thirteen years of a most eventful period, he restored the affairs of the East India Company from the deepest distress to the highest prosperity and rescued their possessions from a combination of the most powerful enemies ever leagued against them." After referring to the "wisdom and energy" with which "he successfully sustained a long, varied, and multiplied war with France, Mysore, and the Mahratta States, whose power he humbled," the inscription goes on to say: "having concluded an honourable Peace, he ruled the Kingdom of Bengal, seat of his Government, with a mild and equitable sway, preserved it from invasion, and secured to its inhabitants the enjoyment of its customs, laws, and religion, and the blessings of peace (so that) he was rewarded by their affection and gratitude; nor was he more distinguished by the highest qualities of a statesman and patriot than by the exercise of every Christian virtue." Very different from the accusations pressed against him, but which were so ably rebutted, during his impeachment and trial of more than seven years! The epitaph concludes: "He lived for many years in dignified retirement, beloved and respected by all who knew him, at his seat at Daylesford, in the Country of Worcester, where he died in the 86th year of his age on August 22nd, 1818. This monument was erected by his beloved wife and distressed widow, M.A. Hastings."

On a gravestone is the name of Gilbert Elliot, Earl of Minto (1751-1814), Governor-General of India, 1806 to 1813, and beneath the same stone lies his brother Hugh (1752-1830), Governor of Madras in 1814.

One "Indian" memorial in the Abbey, which surprisingly makes no direct mention of India is that to James Rennell (1742-1830), who has been described as the "Father of Indian Geography." He eventually became Surveyor-General of Bengal, a Fellow of the Royal Society, and conducted an extensive correspondence with men of learning. He married into the Thackeray family. The inscription on his bust mentions merely his "useful life". A protege of Clive, however, he had gone from strength to strength in the Indian Survey and, as Colonel E.W.C. Sanders says in his "Military Engineer in India," "had reaped all the honours of science."

In the North Transept is the statue to Major-General Sir John Malcolm, the administrator and diplomatist, who was born in 1769, and who died in London in 1833. His epitaph says : "Employed confidentially in those important wars and negotiations which established British supremacy in India, by the indefatigable and well-directed exertion of those extraordinary mental and physical powers with which Providence had endowed him he became alike distinguished as a statesman, a warrior, and a man of letters. Disinterested, liberal, and hospitable, warm in his affections and frank in his manners, the admirer and patron of merit, no less zealous during the whole of his arduous and eventful career for the welfare of the natives of the East than for the service of his own country, his memory is cherished by grateful millions and his fame lives in the history of nations. This statue has been erected by the friends whom he acquired by his splendid talents, eminent public services, and private virtues."

Another Lawrence in Westminster Abbey is John Mair Lawrence (1811-79), Governor-General. Lawrence's bust surmounts the inscription : "John Laird Mair, First Lord Lawrence of the Punjab, who from the Civil Service of the East India Company rose to be Governor-General. His public life began among the races of Upper India, whose hearts he won and whose lives he inspired. In the Mutiny he maintained peace in the Punjab and enabled our armies to reconquer Delhi. His Viceroyalty promoted the welfare of the Indian people and confirmed the loyalty of the Chiefs and Princes. His devotion to public duty was ennobled by the simplicity and purity of his private life. He feared man so little because he feared God so much. This Monument records the love and pride with which his memory is cherished by his widow and children. On a white gravestone is engraved. "Here rests from his labours John Laird Mair, First Baron Lawrence of the Punjab. 'Be ready, his works do follow him."

In several cases the announcement is made on a monument that it was "Erected by the Secretary of State in Council." This occurs in regard, for instance, to the bust in the West Aisle of the North Transept of Major-General Sir Herbert Benjamin Edwardes (1819-68), whose epitaph states : "In early life, as a subaltern in the East India Company's Army, by his fertility of resource and promptitude in action, he struck the first victorious blow at the insurrection in the Punjab, in 1848; and in later years by his courage, sagacity, and mastery over men, ever animated by Christian principles, won an enduring place in the affection of the people, to whose welfare he long devoted himself. In 1857, at a time of unexampled danger, he greatly

contributed to the security of the Frontier and the salvation of the British Empire in India."

Colin Campbell (Lord Clyde) and Outram are buried, not far apart, in the centre of the Nave. A red marble stone covers the first, and on it is recorded how he, "by his own deserts, through 50 years of arduous service, from the earliest battles of the Peninsular War, to the pacification of India in 1858, rose to the rank of Field-Marshal and the Peerage. He died lamented by the Queen, the Army, and the People, August 14th 1863, in the 71st year of his age."

Outram's epitaph is equally laconic: "To the memory of Lieut. Colonel Sir James Outram, a soldier of the East India Company, who during a service of forty years in war and council, by deeds of bravery and devotion, by an unselfish life, by benevolence never weary of well-doing, sustained the honour of the British Nation, won the love of his comrades, and promoted the happiness of the People of India." On the right of a bust with supporting figures are the dates of his birth and death (1803 and 1863) and the intimation that his burial was at the public cost. There is no memorial to Havelock in the Abbey. A tribute was apparently paid to him in a sermon there when news of his death at Lucknow reached England.

Field-Marshal Sir George Pollock of the Bengal Army lies beneath a white gravestone in the centre of the Nave. He, the son of a saddler in Charing Cross, will be remembered, with Major-General Sir William Nott, for the effort by which they restored the British name in Afghanistan by "retreating" to India via Kabul, having first relieved Jellalabad (15th April, 1842). Pollock Avenue at Dum Dum (Calcutta) is named after him. The inscription on the Bengal Artillery Monument at Dum Dum, *inter alia*, includes, "the return of the Victorious Army under the Command of Major General Sir George Pollock, G.C.B., of the Bengal Artillery."

Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-88), whose tablet is in the Abbey was a Member of the Council of India, Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, and an eminent jurist, "one of the earliest" (says the Dictionary of National Biography) "to apply the historical method to the study of political institutions." His Latin epitaph declares that he "studied the wisdom of the ancients, gave new laws to the Indians, and uncovered for his countrymen the springs of ancient laws."

In the Poets' Corner, South Transept, is a bust engraved with the one word "Macaulay". His gravestone has the words: "born at Rothby Temple, Leicestershire, October 25th, 1800, died at Holy

Lodge, Campden Hill, December 28th, 1859. His Body is buried in peace, but his Name liveth for evermore." Nearby rests Rudyard Kipling.

The monument to Lord Canning (1812-62) is a life-sized statue on a broad pedestal. Its epitaph states : "In that high office of Governor-General and first Viceroy of India" (ie last Governor-General to the East India Company and first Viceroy to Queen Victoria) "he displayed during the perilous crisis of the Sepoy Mutiny such fortitude, judgment, and wise clemency as proved him worthy of his illustrious father and justly entitled him to the lasting gratitude of his Country." He rests with that father under a simple blue gravestone.

Lord Curzon, who died in 1925 and is buried in the family vault at Kedleston, is commemorated by a white marble tablet. Says its Latin inscription : "In memory of a man indefatigable, eloquent, devoted to the liberal arts, who as long as he lived, at home or in India, dedicated himself with the utmost faith and diligence to that country and its inhabitants, having loved justice and hated inequity."

Lord Willingdon, who died in 1941, rests, with Marie his wife, beneath a gravestone in the centre of the Nave; and Sir Herbert Baker, co-architect of New Delhi, his friend, who died five years later, lies near him.

Book Reviews

THE LIFE AND MURDER OF HENRY MORSHEAD A TRUE STORY OF THE
RAJ

BY IAN MORSHEAD

The Oleander Press Ltd., 17 Stansgate Avenue, Cambridge, CB2 2QZ.
£10.50.

THE LIFE AND MURDER OF
HENRY MORSHEAD by Ian
Morshead, published by The
Oleander Press Ltd., 17 Stansgate
Avenue, Cambridge CB2 2QZ,
England, Price U.K. £10.50
USA \$ 27.00.



IAN Morshead, son of Lt Col HT Morshead, DSO, FRGS, RE, was nine years old when one afternoon in May 1931, he was told by a schoolmaster "Run and find your brother and then both of you report to the Headmaster's Study."

On reporting to the Head, the boys were asked if they had seen the day's paper. No, they hadn't. Without beating about the bush, the Headmaster told them that their father had been shot dead while out riding in the jungle near Maymyo (Burma).

Henry Treise Morshead, born 23 November 1882, was commissioned on the 21st December 1901 as a second lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. After a stint of about five years as a Garrison Engineer, he joined the Survey of India in 1906.

No adventure was too daring or risky for Henry Morshead. The tougher the task and the rougher the terrain, the more ready he was to have a crack at it. No wonder when in 1913 Captain FM Bailey, Indian and Political Service, was looking for a colleague to explore the Tsangpo Gorges, he chose Henry. The two were well matched: "Both could work long hours in almost impossible conditions... Comfort meant nothing to either of them." While out at work

Morshead climbed every hill in sight to take his observations. In the evening, Bailey was puzzled to see him running round a field and shouted, "What's the matter?". "Nothing" retorted Morshead, "just taking a little exercise." For this Tsangpo exploration, both Bailey and Morshead were awarded the MacGregor Medal by the United Service Institution of India. (The Medal is awarded only if an exploration or reconnaissance of frontier areas produces new material which is valuable for the defence of the country.)

Henry was 'expedition mad' and, besides distinguishing himself in World War I where he got a DSO, and was mentioned in despatches, went on expeditions as far apart as Spitzbergen and the Himalayas. He was a member of the 1921 and 1922 Everest Expeditions. In 1922 "he received permission to join the expedition so late that there was no time to get proper kit from home." He attempted the Everest climb "in stuff he'd bought in a Darjeeling bazaar, until frostbite forced him down."

Despite separations caused by normal survey field duties and exploration work, he had an idyllic life with his wife, Evelyn, and their children. There is ample evidence of his love for his wife from the letters quoted in the book. Even on the day of his death, 17 May 1931, he had written a letter to her at 6 am, ending, "I'm wanting you so badly, darling. Hurry up and book your passage to Rangoon!" She had gone to England to leave the two eldest boys in school there.

How could such an indestructable man die? As a boy the author frequently said, "You'll never die, Daddy, will you?". He had always been puzzled by the circumstances of his father's death. So, in December 1979 he came to India to collect all available information about his father. Officers of the Survey of India, serving and retired, and others gave him all the material they could. But "Maymyo is my Mecca", said Ian, and went to Burma in January 1980 to try to find out what really happened to his father on the morning of 17 May 1931 when out for a ride. Was his father shot by accident or was there someone who hated him enough to murder him or have him murdered? "I discovered the truth to my own satisfaction, and I felt as if I'd been pole-axed", Ian stated later. However, any one interested will have to read the book to learn the startling details of the murder of Henry Morshead.

The production is excellent with no printing errors; there are some mistakes in matters of detail such as "Gubbon" instead of "Cubbon"

and "Jan Path" translated as "Road of Life" instead of "Road of the People". The book has an absorbing Introduction by Mark Tully, BBC, New Delhi.

This true story from the days of the Raj is one of adventure like Livingstone's in Africa and Fawcett's in Brazil. It shows the high calibre of the officer who used to be attracted to the Survey of India, the pioneer of all development in the country. The author has an easy style and the subject matter is extremely interesting. The descriptions of places and areas where Henry Morshed lived and worked are so vivid that any one reading the book will want to visit them.

—JAFD

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PERSIAN GULF : PAST MISTAKES, PRESENT NEEDS

By Alvin J Cottrell and Michael L Moodie

National Strategy Information Centre, Inc., 150 East 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10155. 1984; Pages 45, \$ 3.95.

THIS is a very full discussion of the subject from the US point of view. The importance of the Gulf region is of course related to the supply of oil to the USA, Western Europe and Japan. The paper states that the loss of this oil would affect a decline in the GDP of the above named states of 13%, 22% and 25% respectively. It emphasises the importance of Saudi Arabia both as a source of oil and also its strategic location in the region. The strategic value of Pakistan is also mentioned in connection with the sea routes to and from the Gulf. In the view of the authors the necessity to locate a sea borne force to prevent any penetration into the region is also mentioned. They refer to the sensitivity of the Saudis to the actual placement of US personnel in their country. As is well known now this problem has been overcome by using troops from the US surrogate, Pakistan. Their reliability in the event of any internal upheaval in the kingdoms which lie in the area is open to question. On the other hand they have at least discouraged the advance of Iran from across the Gulf.

The paper, as it is called, advocates the early establishment of the 600 ship navy to give the Indian Ocean the priority that it thinks it needs in US global defence

An interesting supplement to reading on the subject of the volatile Middle East.

—S S

AFGAN RESISTANCE : DANGER FROM DISUNITY

By Anthony Hyman

Institute for the Study of Conflict, 12/12A Golden Square, London
WIR 3 AF, Pages 24 (Conflict Studies No. 161).

THIS study gives a comprehensive background to the Afghan problem and the situation prevalent at the moment there. Disunity is favoured by the tremendous spirit of independence of the different tribes and the venality of those accustomed from long usage during British times to receive money to keep the peace. The real problem is of course economic. The people living to the SE of the Hindu Kush have made their money out of the hinterland to the East. They are of different stock to the people living on the other side of the mountain range that splits the country into two nay three regions. Historically the foreign occupation of Afghanistan South of the Hindu Kush has always been fraught with danger. It is after this occupation has been consolidated that invasions into South Asia have been effected. Thus the occupation of this part of the country by the USSR should not be looked on with equanimity. In the long run Pakistan and India have to mend their fences to enable a coordinated front to be developed against any threat from this direction.

—S S

SOUTH AFRICA : EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION?

By William Gutteridge

Institute for the Study of Conflict, 12/12A Golden Square, London
WIR 3 AF, Pages 38 (Conflict Studies No. 171).

THIS study evaluates the recent steps taken by the Government to open its doors to races other than the whites. It is a start in the right direction though it still excludes any representation of the majority—the Blacks. South African politics is bedevilled by two opposing factors. There is the inbuilt resistance of the dominant white population against any change which might endanger their control of their country. As opposed to this there is the naturally increasing pressure for the non-white majority to share in this. One tends to need slow changes while the other wants change quickly.

While the South Africans have repaired their relations with the neighbouring Black states they have yet to come to terms with their own Blacks. This they will no doubt be forced to do in the coming years if they wish to survive. Time is of the essence and this they have to use to convince their whites of this necessity while holding back the eagerness of the majority.

—S S

TRIUMPHANT FOX; ERWIN ROMMEL AND THE RISE OF THE AFRICA KORPS

By Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr

Stein and Day, Scarborough House, Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510, 1985, Pages 224, \$ 3.50. (Paperback ed).

ON the face of it this appears to be a crib for officers studying to pass the Staff College Examination. It is very handy in the paperback edition and possesses reasonably clear maps on which to follow the course of The Desert battles.

The book however restricts itself to the formative years of General Rommel's short but brilliant career. In the case of the Western Desert the book ends at the point where the Germans lost the Battle of Sidi Rezegh in November-December 1941. This is a pity. The author is however at pains to bring out that it was in the eleven months of 1941 that Rommel forged that great team, the Africa Corps. And even successive defeats later on following the great victories in the first months of 1942 never eroded this spirit.

The author also very clearly brings out the difference between the British and German way of fighting mobile battles. In fact the former never really functioned at their best in the free for all that Rommel directed. The British character is for steady setpiece battles where all is controlled and orderly. This Montgomery restored to the battle field. This needs preparation. The free for all type of mobile operations requires improvisation on the spot and leaders well forward so that they can direct their forces. It also needs well thought and practised battle drills that eliminate paper work. This enables them to operate in a very flexible way. The last aspect is that mobile war does not mean the tank. It is the use of different arms depending on the role in a coordinated manner. This the British learnt only at the end of the war. Till then each arm swanned about, particularly in the Desert, on its own.

The book also shows that Rommel was human like other generals. He made his mistakes too and lost his cool. He tended to gather round him loyal and competent officers. Loyalty does not imply subservience. A subordinate has the right to air his views even when they might not be in accord with the superior. But loyalty is the acceptance of the latter's last word and to execute orders given, faithfully. Disloyalty is the act of going behind the superiors back and reporting to someone further back in the chain of command. Even Rommel had such subordinates but he soon got rid of them. The account clearly shows how he had to establish himself over those

unknown to him, some of whom resented his methods. This will always be a problem in any new command. The fact of the matter is that he won most of them over and formed an efficient team.

The book is a useful adjunct to the study of leadership and the battles of the Western Desert. — SS

RUSI AND BRASSEY'S DEFENCE YEARBOOK 1985

EDITED BY THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES, LONDON

Brassey's Defence Publishers, 74 Worship St., London EC 2A 2EN, 1985. Pages 381 £29.50

THE RUSI, in its 153rd Year, published this 95th Year book, containing first class articles on different aspects of Defence, written by eminent experts in their respective fields all over the world. Beginning with "Setting The Scene : A New Age of Diplomacy"?, written by David Bolton, RAF (Retd), a member of the Editorial Board, the book carries the following other essays :

Perspectives of the World Scene : British Defence Issues in the Year Ahead, by Sir Frank Cooper, GCB, CMG;

Prospects for the Alliance, by George Walden, CMG, MP;

Perspectives of the World Scene : Prospects for American Power and Influence, By Hon Edward J Streater;

Perspectives of the World Scene : Perceptions of Soviet Power and Influence, by Helmut Sonnenfeldt;

How Neutral is the Irish Republic?, by Sir John Biggs-Davison;

The South Eastern Flank : Political Dilemmas and Strategic Considerations, by Professor James Brown;

The Cape Route and the Persian Gulf : A Warsaw Pact Perspective, by Dr Christopher Coker;

Defence and Security in Europe : A German View, by Rear Admiral Dr Kurt Fischer;

UK Defence Policy : Seeking Better Value for Money, by Dr Keith Hartley;

Strategic Vulnerability, by Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Pope;

Prospects for the Middle East, by Philip Windsor;

Space : The Military Applications Today and Tomorrow, by Group Captain Timothy Garden;

Emerging Technology : Economic and Military Implications for the Alliance, by Dr Farooq Hussain;

Weapon Development 1984 : Sea, by Captain G R Villar, DSC, RN;

Trends in Maritime Warfare : The Influence and Power of the Super Navies : America and Russia, by Captain G R Villar, DSC, RN;

Weapon Development 1984 : Land, by Chris Bellamy;

Trends in Land Warfare : The Operational Art of the European Theatre, by Chris Bellamy;

Weapon Development 1984 : Air, by M J Jackson;

Trends in Air Warfare : Airborne Early Warning: by M J Jackson;

Defence Literature of the Year, by Richard Tubb, ALA:

Chronology of Main Events of Defence Interest, May 1983-April 1984, by Robert van Tol.

Besides, it contains 13 informative Tables about latest military aircraft, missiles and tanks, and also an Index to Advertisers.

Although the book has attempted to give a world-wide defence perspective and also to deal with some regional problems, it has not tried to identify the hot spots of threats to world peace in different regions. However, the publication will be of great interest to defence analysts and defence planners all over the world. —BC

THE HISTORY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IN WORLD WAR II : THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

BY GRACE PERSON HAYES

U. S Naval Institute Annapolis, Maryland, 1982. Pages 964. \$31.95

THIS is the first of the two volumes on the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States in World War II. It tells the story of strategic discussions and decisions of JCS during the period of emergency action in the Pacific, the first offensive moves against Japan, and the planning for the first steps in the long offensive war towards victory. The publication describes the thinking, planning and decisions of the JCS about the war with Japan, as evolved through the JCS Committee structure. Although the major operations against Japan took place in the Pacific, the U.S. faced the Japanese in the area of China, India and Burma also. While in the Pacific the JCS planned

operations under the overall control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in case of the China-India-Burma area, they shared responsibility with the British and the Chinese. Besides, many matters were handled directly by the heads of the governments of USA, Britain and China.

This was originally written by Lt. G P Hayes as early as 1953, but not for publication. However, it is not a history of the Second World War against Japan, but only the story of the JCS's involvement in it. The author has researched into thousands of official documents and consulted many veterans of that war to produce this excellent work.

Since JCS decisions were always unanimous, it is difficult to determine the part played by the four members of the U S JCS in directing the war. However, the author has listed Admiral King was the most influential of all of the four, which was inevitable as the war against Japan was largely amphibious. General George Marshall's role was second only to Admiral King's. The other two members—General Arnold and Admiral Leahy—seldom expressed their views during discussions in JCS meetings. General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander, South—West Pacific Area, came closest to Admiral King's view that Japan should be kept under constant pressure.

The author has observed that although the MacArthur program and Fleet Admiral C. W. Nimitz (Commander Pacific Ocean Area) program were mutually supporting, the full benefits of the circumstance could have been better realised had the entire Pacific Theatre remained under a single command. "With one command responsible for the whole Pacific Theater, operations in the two areas could have been better coordinated both in planning and in execution, fewer facilities duplicated, and less time spent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in settling conflicting views of strategy and according priority on the limited stocks of planes, landing craft, shipping, and other resources." The author also remarks that the military contribution of China-India-Burma area to Japan's defeat did not balance the effort expended. She says: "As it was, China was considered to be the objective toward which the advance across the Pacific was headed, an area essential for air and naval bases and a possible source of troops as well for the final blow against Japan. As the war progressed, however, China's strategic significance decreased. The political commitment to continue to support China was an un-rewarding drain on military resources as it became apparent that Chinese bases were of doubtful strategic importance and that Chinese forces were incapable of making a large contribution toward Japan's defeat. Complicated by British reluctance

to recapture Burma and open a land route to China instead of retaking Singapore and opening a sea lane to the Pacific from India, the problems of China, Burma, and India certainly did not repay in strategic gain the mental, physical, and financial effort that went into them." She has concluded by saying, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate committees had fought the war to a victorious conclusion. The organization forged in war had not been a perfect one. Joint ways of thinking had not always come easily and often not at all. Eight years after Japan's surrender it is not difficult to point to things that might have been done differently. Despite many rough spots, however, the JCS had achieved cooperation among representatives of the services to an extent never before considered possible." However, the author has not cited any instance how JCS could do things differently, but in a better way.

The book contains a brilliant Bibliographical Essay, written by D. C. Allard of U. S. Naval Historical Centre. The book was compiled by Mrs Hayes in 1953 from classified official records. Since then the records have been declassified and are now available for consultation at the Naval Historical Centre, Washington, and the National Archives, Suitland, Maryland. A contemporary scholar may now consult certain additional records, i.e. the files of the members of the then JCS and records of President Roosevelt, President Truman, Secretary of War H. L. Stimson, Frank Knox, James V. Forrestal, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur, General J. W. Stilwell and General Albert C. Wedemeyer.

The book contains an Index, Notes, and a Foreword by Col. Thos. G. Dobyns, Executive, Historical Section, Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA. However, it lacks maps, which could have illustrated certain important strategic plans. Top-level Military planners would surely be benefited by reading this interesting book.

—BC

MOBILIZATION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENCE

EDITED by HARDY L MERRITT AND LUTHER F CARTER

National Defence University Press, Washington D.C. 1985. Pages 186

MOBILISATION and the National Defence is sponsored by Mobilisation concepts development centre of National Defence University, Washington D.C. It focuses critically on major mobilisation issues. The contributors attempt to integrate strategy, industrial base, and man-power, the three major elements of mobilisation planning. Mobilisation is a complex problem and calls for cooperation among the

major sectors of the society in order to achieve and maintain national preparedness. The book includes articles on mobilisation concepts and theory, manpower mobilisation and industrial mobilisation. It also contains an annotated bibliography listing the more renowned works on mobilisation. An important work was 'Economics of National Security' Managing America's Resources for Defence by George A Lincoln, published in 1954. It stressed on mobilisation of all resources like economic, political, moral, psychological and military strength in support of national security objectives. In the modern times with so many US Forces deployed near potential enemies and with technology shrinking the world. America must be prepared to mobilise more quickly, if she is to avert losing the conflict before the U.S. can become more fully engaged. The United States is fighting on two fronts, economically for survival with its allies and traditional partners and militarily with Russia and the Soviet Block nations.

Mobilisation is the art of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources. It has two broad aspects: Industrial and manpower. Department of Defence (DOD) defines Industrial Mobilisation as the transformation of an industry from its peace time activity to the industrial programme necessary to support the national military objectives. Luther F. Carter and Hardy L. Merritt provide a synoptic view of the contributions covered in this volume. They observe that the problems of mobilising material and manpower have not been empirically or analytically examined in ways which would lead to more comprehensive understanding of the Phenomenon generally. They call for an integrative and coordinative approach for it to be effective.

Ralph Sanders and Joseph Muckerman hold that mobilisation is relevant in meeting any major military situation (short of an outbreak of the blue massive nuclear attack on the US home land) irrespective of the time. They have argued that by strengthening the ability of conventional forces to endure beyond the first battle both deterrence and flexible response benefit. The Reagan Administration recognises that sustainability and mobilisation plays an important role in U.S. military strategy. The authors emphasise the need for an integrated concept of sustained response and advocate for cost effective peace time mobilisation options. It would greatly assist in undertaking more expensive actions later in the mobilisation spectrum.

John Eley pleads that an agency as the Central component of the executive office of the President is likely to function as an agent of the President and as the overall manager of the mobilisation. It requires

a policy coordination mechanism. It is suggested that Emergency Mobilisation Preparedness Board (EMPB) may be given all the attributes that were enjoyed by office of War Mobilisation and Reconversion (OWMR) during World War II. The EMPB may be identified as Presidential agent. It may be structured to balance recommendations and/or decisions on the allocation of national resources. The focal point for planning effort should shift from Federal Emergency Mobilisation Agency (FEMA) to EMPB. This will ensure that the mobilisation coordinating unit envisioned by planners in a pre-emergency period will not be discarded immediately by the President as was the case of previous mobilisation.

Leon Karadbil and Roderick Vawter focus on the Defence Production Act (DPA) which was first enacted on 8 September, 1950. The scope of the DPA was in the context of the Soviet threat and was much broader than the material needs of the Korean war. However, in the years to come, the industrial base was not fully committed to meet the demands of industrial mobilisation. The Reagan Administration in 1981 tried to improve the overall defence programme to include readiness, sustainability and modernisation of conventional forces. It had a positive effect on industrial base. In this context the EMPB was established by the President in December, 1981. In spite of it, the authors observe that the stock pile in the present configuration is not adequate to satisfy the mobilisation requirements of U.S. Further, no programmes are under consideration which will substantially correct the deficiency. The DPA was amended on 17th April, 1984 and was extended upto September, 30, 1986. Still an extra-ordinary support to U.S. industrial base is imperative.

O.M. Collins argues that capital investment in major industries is being misapplied because the long term strategic planning objectives of business and Govt. are divergent. He pleads that the preparedness planning functions of the Department of Defence should be used to reorient the objectives of the major defence industries. The Planning System should be one vehicle for integrating policies and programme acquisition decisions. It is suggested that the proposed industrial planning mechanism though complex, is the only reasonable approach to ensure long term strategic availability of those domestic production and technological resources required to support long term national security objectives.

Robestic Farbie highlights the nations' industrial preparedness with global economic conditions. The economy of the United States is linked with the economy of its allies. He is of the view that U.S.

major sectors of the society in order to achieve and maintain national preparedness. The book includes articles on mobilisation concepts and theory, manpower mobilisation and industrial mobilisation. It also contains an annotated bibliography listing the more renowned works on mobilisation. An important work was 'Economics of National Security' Managing America's Resources for Defence by George A Lincoln, published in 1954. It stressed on mobilisation of all resources like economic, political, moral, psychological and military strength in support of national security objectives. In the modern times with so many US Forces deployed near potential enemies and with technology shrinking the world. America must be prepared to mobilise more quickly, if she is to avert losing the conflict before the U.S. can become more fully engaged. The United States is fighting on two fronts, economically for survival with its allies and traditional partness and militarily with Russia and the Soviet Block nations.

Mobilisation is the art of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organising national resources. It has two broad aspects: Industrial and manpower. Department of Defence (DOD) defines Industrial Mobilisation as the transformation of an industry from its peace time activity to the industrial programme necessary to support the national military objectives. Luther F. Carter and Hardy L. Merritt provide a synoptic view of the contributions covered in this volume. They observe that the problems of mobilising material and manpower have not been empirically or analytically examined in ways which would lead to more comprehensive understanding of the Phenomenon generally. They call for an integrative and coordinative approach for it to be effective.

Ralph Sanders and Joseph Muckerman hold that mobilisation is relevant in meeting any major military situation (short of an out of the blue massive nuclear attack on the US home land) irrespective of the time. They have argued that by strengthening the ability of conventional forces to endure beyond the first battle both deterrence and flexible response benefit. The Reagan Administration recognises that sustainability and mobilisation plays an important role in U.S. military strategy. The authors emphasise the need for an integrated concept of sustained response and advocate for cost effective peace time mobilisation options. It would greatly assist in undertaking more expensive actions later in the mobilisation spectrum.

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a policy coordination mechanism. It is suggested that Emergency Mobilisation Preparedness Board (EMPB) may be given all the attributes that were enjoyed by office of War Mobilisation and Reconversion (OWMR) during World War II. The EMPB may be identified as Presidential agent. It may be structured to balance recommendations and/or decisions on the allocation of national resources. The focal point for planning effort should shift from Federal Emergency Mobilisation Agency (FEMA) to EMPB. This will ensure that the mobilisation coordinating unit envisioned by planners in a pre-emergency period will not be discarded immediately by the President as was the case of previous mobilisation.

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Robestic Farbie highlights the nations' industrial preparedness with global economic conditions. The economy of the United States is linked with the economy of its allies. He is of the view that U.S.

allies are its economic adverseries and it is an obstacle in meeting the defence requirements at home and abroad. He pleads for enforcing consistent fiscal and monetary policies to promote stable prices and for evolving a consensus about national industrial policy while retaining the principles of free trade and open market.

The manpower aspects of mobilisation dealing with Guard and Reserve and Retires are covered by James L Gould; and Robert R Rumph and Richard T Pokryfke. Gould opines that Guard and Reserve are mobilisation assets which support national defence. The total Force Policy introduced in 1973 has resulted in greater reliance on these assets. For increasing their war time readiness, their training and equipment need to be improved. For part time reservists, new ways of working with active component are to be thought of. It is imperative that their expertise is utilised in defence for which tact is needed. Rumph and Pokryfka pleads that retirees need to be mobilised early in the conflict to perform a variety of training and support functions. They are a cost effective pool of ready talent which can be mobilised in the event of national emergency. It is essential to have an inventory of retiree assets and recall procedures need to be standardised. Finally, Barbara A Hensler provides an annotated bibliography of major mobilisation literature.

In sum, this book gives an opportunity for all countries to have a fresh look at their national preparedness in the light of the American experience. It also suggests that developing nations should move towards self sufficiency in regard to equipment. The book can be read with interest by all those interested in defence affairs. It is sure to induce many students to contribute towards the problems raised in the book. The editors and authors of the articles deserve the gratitude of the reader. It provides ample food for thought and is likely to receive a wide audience.

—PCB

THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION : PRESS OFFICERS AND THEIR OFFICERS

BY STEPHEN HESS

The Brookings Institution, Washington, D C 1984. Pages 160, \$ 22.95

FOR democracies, and even in other forms of government, the need to keep the people and the world at large informed about their actions and views is compelling, if for no other reason but political expediency. Different governments achieve this objective differently.

In the United States, with its institutionalised and constitutional commitment to freedom of the press, the message of the government is carried to the people largely through the commercial media which is more independent of the pressures and pulls of the executive than in any other country in the world. To ensure that its actions and views are favourably projected by the media the US Government maintain a large and sophisticated information disseminating systems which in Washington alone, has some 5000 government employees.

Hess's slim book *The Government Press Connection* is about the US Government's Washington based press officers, the Government's main merchandisers of information. The book is focused on Press officers and their office. It is aimed at finding out, as the author. notes : "How do they (press officers) organise their work, and what are their relations within their organisation ? Who are they? What do they do and how all do they do it?"

To find out the answer to these question the author spent a year with press officers in their working habitat in the White House, the Department of Defence, Department of Transportation and the Food and Drug Administration. He went about his work with clinical detachment, curiosity and sympathy that would do credit to an anthropologist investigating an exotic, mysterious long lost tribe. He took notes kept logs, and eves dropped, but did not intrude even when sometimes requested to do so.

The one year that he spent with press officers in their offices, he studied their normal routine (informed themselves, and their colleagues; issued news releases; briefed the press and respond to queries from the press); their officers (shabby with ancient furniture, the most unkempt was in the Pentagon); their relative strength (the Pentagon has the largest number of press officers and is best organised for wholesale dissemination of information); their output (the Pentagon output of handouts was greatest at 551 in 1981; State Department came second with 441); their education (better educated than reporters, but degrees from less prestigious institution); their work ethic (worked hard); their relative bureaucratic status (low); their tribal instinct (not well developed). In addition to the insights into the professional world of American Press officer, there are useful and interesting chapters on how briefings are organised why news leak occur and their types (Egoleak, Good will Leak, Policy Leak, Animus Leak, Trial Balloon Leak, Whistle Blower Leak) and how press officers respond in a crisis. The book is padded with such fascinating insights.

The most controversial and disputable part of Hess's observation is with regard to whether the press officer 'manage, manipulate, or control' news. He concludes that they don't. The reason Hess says is that they are 'simply not skillful enough or large enough' to do so. An observation, which he refutes by noting that there twice as many press officers in Washington, as reporters. He does however note that most press officers believe that lying 'for public good' are justifiable in a democracy. A belief which in practice has its problem. As the Vietnam War was to prove and more recently the Grenada War proved, in which not only reporters were lied to but even the press officers. Hess devotes almost a chapter to Press officers and the Grenada War.

The Grenada War government—media crisis the worst of its kind since the end of the Vietnam War, began on 24 October (a day before the invasion) when Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, on being asked if, the invasion of Grenada was imminent, replied 'preposterous'. What added fuel to media fury, however, was not this 'lie' and the other lesser lies, but the denial to the media access to the island for the first crucial 60 hours of invasion.

Considering the attempts to 'manage news' in the Vietnam War, the Cuban missile crisis, the Day of Pigs invasion, to name only the best known instances, Hess's conclusion that the Government is either incapable or inadequately staffed to do so, is questionable to say the least.

Notwithstanding the debatable conclusions of the book, it remains of great value: not only for media specialist, but all those who are interested in a more comprehensive understanding of the news about the US Government and its actions that is directed at them daily through newspaper, magazines, radio and the television.

—VT

GALLIPOLI 1915 : PEN, PENCILS AND CAMERAS AT WAR

BY PETER H LIDDLE

Brassey's Defence Publishers, 74 Worship Street, London EC 2 A, 2EN, 1985 Pages 157

PPETER H Liddle deserves congratulations for bringing out this book on the Gallipoli Campaign during the World War I on its 70th anniversary. For military history students, the Gallipoli Campaign is significant in many ways. The amphibious operations, planned by the Allies, were based on the new concepts of strategy. Seaplanes,

ships and soldiers were to operate together—a combination which was not envisaged before 1915. Six separate beach landings on a single day i.e. 25 April 1915 and later successful evacuation add to its strategic significance. Another interesting aspect of this campaign was that from the Allied side, a mixed force of several nations operated here. Soldiers from India, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Algeria and Morocco cooperated in this campaign.

Such a campaign, naturally, has always fascinated the students of military history. A few well known works have been published, yet the interest has not diminished. This book has certain novel elements. It brings out contemporary evidence from participants in an interesting style. It gives a clear picture about the perception of participants. The photographic pages from the private diaries and letters on important aspects of campaign reveal how they perceived them. Landings at different beaches have been described by different soldiers very picturesquely. One of the major Anglo-French assaults at Cape Helles on 4 June 1915 has been beautifully described by a British Officer of the 14 Sikhs who led his men into action. The “bald-headed” tactics employed there was nicely explained. The book is full of such letters that throw light on different aspects of the campaign. What further adds to its value is that most of the above mentioned sources are published for the first time. These are nicely and systematically placed to give coherent view of events. A nice summary of the campaign given in the beginning further enhances its value. It is recommended both for students of military history and general reader.

—S D P

MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM

By Anthony Hyman

Institute for the Study of Conflict, 12/12A Golden Square, London W 1 R 3 AF : Pages 271 (Conflict Studies 174)

THIS is another concise study of the problems afflicting society in the present day.

In this case the study is related to the re-birth of Islamic fundamentalism. As the author states there is some form of fundamentalism in different creeds, including communism.

There has always been a strong backlash to modernity in Islam. but as the author points out Islam in its ‘golden age’ was one of the most modern states or collection of states. This is what the fundamentalists tend to forget. In fact one could suppose that the recourse

to the religious factor is caused by those who see loss of their power in society. In Iran the mullahs viewed the confiscation of property belonging to the local mosques as a direct attack on them, which it indeed was. This loss of wealth would reduce their independence and their power. Being closer to the rural population they were able to divert unhappiness at some of the Shah's dictums towards support of themselves. It is easy to subvert an illiterate people by spouting the scriptures quite out of context with what the scripture really implies. And of course the rise of fundamentalism also need the existence of some charismatic figure.

The adherence of some highly educated persons to a fundamentalist creed could be said to relate to the need for recognition, to belong to something. In this sense it is the same desire as wanting to join a club or exclusive party. This need could be as a result of some loss of bearings. Sometimes it could be the consequence of affluence, of boredom. It could be a backlash to regain an identity which it is thought has been lost. In this case religion becomes a camouflage behind which political power is sought.

The author has pointed to the similarity between fascism and fundamentalism. While one is based entirely on religion the other takes its support from religion. The military rulers of South American states generally back and receive the backing of the church. They too exploit the seeming sinfulness of modern society and pretend to guide the people into a 'golden age' of purity. In this sense they are synonymous with fundamentalism.

Fundamentalism cannot be stated to be the sole prerogative of Islam. All societies and people suffer from some form of this. The human psyche is so full of irrational aversions and antagonisms that they can always be exploited by charlatans or power seekers. Modernity should change the human being into a rational entity. This is more important than mere gadgetry.

An interesting paper which is well worth reading.

—SS

NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC PLANNING

By Colin S Gray

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, 19104, 1984 :
Pages 130, \$ 5.95

THIS is one of the many books trying to unravel the strategy to be followed in nuclear war. Recourse to the latter is a plunge into the unknown which the author acknowledges. Except for the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War the weapon has not been employed elsewhere. In the interim period the weapon itself has been made more destructive and the delivery systems are much more sophisticated than they were at the time of Hiroshima. It is now possible with the press of a button or something similar to unleash missiles carrying nuclear warheads directly from

the home country to the heartland of the enemy. While the USA or the thinkers in that country consider that this is a completely new type of war, the USSR think that it is merely a sort of artillery augmenting non-nuclear forces.

The one thing is that nobody in his or her right mind wants to unleash a nuclear war where the casualties would be out of all proportion to the political aim to be achieved. It is this fear that mankind might destroy itself that fuels the disarmament movements in many countries. And it is because of this that arms control talks are so essential at least from the point of view of domestic politics. At the same time it is the only form of communication between the nuclear strategists on both sides, that is the USA and the USSR. In this communication the resolve not to succumb to nuclear blackmail is in a way passed on to the opposing side. Thus it is a form of deterrent on any adventurist policies. By and large it would appear that the USSR takes advantage of these meetings to hold up progress on the other side till they have acquired the same capability, if such advances on the technical front have been made. At the same time it is possible that inadvertent release of nuclear weapons can be avoided due to the contacts between the opposing sides, which obtain at these meetings.

The author describes the evolution of US strategy over the past three decades. Commencing from a clear advantage which would have led to a 'win' situation then to a 'probable win' and then to a condition of 'stalemate' which is the existing position. The problem is to enable the use or threat of use of the nuclear weapon to influence hostile forces to act in accordance with US requirements. The idea now is to develop some protection against attack. Passive measures would need much time to cover the population of the USA and absorb large funds. Hence the turn to offensive measures which entail the destruction of missiles before they can arrive over the USA. This is the 'star wars' idea of the present administration. This policy has the advantage that it would protect the vital interests abroad of the Americans, particularly in Europe, which the purely passive measures would not. In this sense it would gain support from all NATO countries. Technical difficulties have now to be solved and this might take five to ten years. Russian propaganda is now directed at slowing this process on the US side. The balance is so delicate between the superpowers that constant development of weapons and delivery system goes on so that the other side does not obtain some advantage which could upset this balance.

The jargon of nuclear strategists is such that it is sometimes difficult to understand. The book is however well written and is small enough for students of nuclear warfare to read and re-read it so that the main arguments can be comprehended with clarity. Now that the antagonists of India in the neighbourhood are in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons with the obvious intention to influencing affairs in their favour such reading becomes obligatory for those who would shape Indian nuclear policy in the future.

—SS

Secretary's Notes

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

I would like to thank all those members who paid their subscription so promptly at the beginning of the year. To those of you who have not yet paid may I remind you that your subscription was due on the 1st January. Would you please, therefore, put a cheque in the post to me today. There are some members who have also to pay their subscription for 1984 and 1985. They are requested to make the payment for these years to avoid unnecessary reminders. Effective from 1 Jan 1971, the annual subscription has been raised from Rs 15 to Rs 20.

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It has been reported by many of our members that though annual subscription for membership of the Institution is being debited to their account regularly by their Bankers, they are not receiving the USI Journal for quite sometime. The non-receipt of the Journal is because either the members have failed to notify change of address, or their Bankers have not duly sent the credit to the Institution or while sending the credit they have not given full and correct particulars of the member making it difficult to identify him in the ledger account. All these factors create accounting problems and result in names of members getting dropped from the mailing list.

It is requested that all members who have continued to send upto date subscription through their Bankers and are not receiving the USI Journal may kindly intimate to me direct their latest address and membership number so that the USI Journal could be sent to them immediately. They are also requested to write to their Bankers that while sending annual subscription to Institution, their membership number, correct name with units and latest address is invariably given.

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All payments with Institution are to be made by Bank Drafts or Postal order: At station where the above facility is not available, the payment may be made by cheque by paying an extra amount of Rs Ten on account of Bank Commission.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE JOURNAL

The USI Journal is in its 113th year of publication. As you will, no doubt appreciate, the Institution spends a great deal of its funds on producing this publication, we would like to have your comments, criticism and suggestions so that we may improve this publication to meet your requirement.

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter Ending Mar 1986

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OUR ACTIVITIES

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