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JANUARY—MARCH 1977

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
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“Much of the deep poverty of the masses is due to the ruinous departure from Swadeshi in economic and industrial life.”

— MAHATMA GANDHI

**be Indian,
buy Indian**

davp 76/832

PAKISTAN'S DEFENCE PREPARATIONS

COLONEL R. RAMA RAO (RETD.)

IT is over five years since Mr. Bhutto was invited by his countrymen to assume power; save the nation from further disintegration and steer the ship of state on a safe course away from the turmoils of internal strife and, hopefully, towards an era of peace, economic prosperity and political progress. At least that was how Mr. Bhutto appeared to have viewed the mandate that his countrymen through the military caucus headed by Gen. Gul Hasan entrusted him with in the wake of the country's military disaster and Bangladesh's emergence as an independent nation in the fall of 1971.

While Mr. Bhutto enjoyed the support of a powerful section of the armed forces reflecting the attitudes of traditionalists and of the middle classes in the Punjab, the people of 'minority' provinces, i.e. the Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind were in general, apprehensive of his policies for several reasons. Pathans, Baluchis and Sindhis had little say in the way in which the affairs of the country were conducted, thanks to the "One Unit" Scheme under which the whole of West Pakistan was treated as a single province by Pakistan's military rulers in order that they could, with the support of Punjabi troops and administrative and entrepreneurial classes, pit the West wing against the East and so perpetuate their hold on the entire country. It was only when the 'One Unit' concept was given the go by and provinces of the West Wing regained their original identities shortly before General Yahya Khan ordered national elections in the winter of 1970-71 that opposition parties could come into their own. These parties were in favour of provincial autonomy for the then East Wing, since such a development would have enabled them to attain their own goals of local autonomy for minority provinces. By the same token they were against the East Wing seceding as that would reduce their own bargaining strength vis-as vis the Punjab in residuary Pakistan. The events of the past few years have unhappily proved the correctness of the reasoning of leaders of minority provinces.

Their misgivings regarding Mr. Bhutto after his accession to power were based on his past performance, his contribution to the Banglaesh crisis and subsequent debacle and his ambition to become Pakistan's ruler even if, in the process, the country would be dismembered. According to opposition parties in Pakistan as well as of leaders of the Awami

League of erstwhile East Pakistan, had Mr. Bhutto abided by the norms applicable to political parties and leaders in a democracy, he should have recognised Sheikh Mujib ur-Rehman's and the Awami League's right to form a government for Pakistan as a whole, securing such concessions as he could for his People's Party by democratic political processes. Instead, he chose to support—even perhaps encourage—Gen. Yahya Khan in imposing a reign of terror in Bangla Desh and unleashing the dogs of war. Even Gen Niazi, former Pakistani military commander in East Pakistan has noted that had it not been for Mr. Bhutto, Pakistan may have been saved from civil war, dismemberment and the inevitable total military defeat that ensued.

These, no doubt, are essentially domestic matters affecting the people of Pakistan but they have an impact on neighbouring countries if only because of the possibility of Pakistan's political parties or leaders seeking to divert public attention from vital domestic issues by resurrecting traditional external bogies.

Other factors, important in their own right which still operate in varying measure, are that a section of Pakistan's elite has traditionally been operating on the principle that the *raison d'être* for the existence of Pakistan is its religious ideology, and arising from that its self appointed role as champion of Indian citizens professing Islam, emphasising Pakistan's separation and exploitation of popular prejudices. Unhappily, Mr. Bhutto himself has often whipped up popular emotions and utilised the situations to confront this country. Another area of concern is Mr. Bhutto's approach to geo-political problems. He has often explained to his countrymen that given Pakistan's geographical position; the commitment of its people to religious ideology and the comparatively poor resource base when measured against this country's, the only way in which Pakistan can exercise leverage against India is to enlist the strength of external powers, especially the Great Powers by inducing them to think that their interests in the sub-continent are identical with those of Pakistan itself. In the case of countries of West Asia religious and cultural ties were played up and no opportunities missed to malign this country. In fairness to Mr. Bhutto it must be recognised that he is personally no religious fanatic; nor indeed does he abide by the injunctions that most conservatives in the sub-continent would expect of a practising Muslim. Yet the sensitivity of a section of his people to religious issues is too attractive a political weapon in dealing with this country to be left unexploited by Mr. Bhutto. Also in fairness to Mr. Bhutto, the policy of Pakistan aligning with Great Powers in order to gain strength vis-a-vis this country was followed by Pakistan's leaders well before Mr. Bhutto was entrusted with governmental office. Thus as disclosed by Field Marshal Ayub Khan¹

1. "Friends, not Masters", Field Marshal Md. Ayub Khan.

he had planned to get American military aid by entering into a military alliance with USA in order to be able to talk to this country from a position of strength, even before he became C-in-C of Pakistan's armed forces. Regarding relations with China, Mr. Mahomed Ali of Bogra had convinced Mr. Chou En-lai at Bandung in 1956, that Pakistan's membership of SEATO (and Baghdad Pact as it then was, was not to be misunderstood by China; that Pakistan considered only India as its enemy and its membership of military pacts was motivated solely by considerations of obtaining modern military equipment at no cost in order to deal with India militarily and to isolate India to the extent possible from Great Powers as well as from countries in the region. As revealed by Chinese leaders, Mr. Chou En-lai recognised Pakistan's real motives in aligning their country with USA and framed his own policies towards India on the basis of Pakistan's near permanent hostility towards India.

Mr. Bhutto has refined these policies taking due note of developments in the international arena during the past twenty years and has been implementing them with characteristic finesse.

The considerations that generally inspired Pakistan's leadership during the past three decades are now well known to students of international affairs but have been briefly recapitulated here in order to serve as background for an analysis of Mr. Bhutto's most recent policy pronouncements and for drawing inferences that flow from them.

MR. BHUTTO'S FOREIGN POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS

The more important of Mr. Bhutto's recent foreign policy statements are his dissertation on bilateralism², Pakistan Governments White Paper on Kashmir³ and Pakistan People's Party Election Manifesto⁴. These contain the considered views of Mr. Bhutto, the chief articulator and implementor of Pakistan's foreign policy in the Ayub era and its architect ever since his assumption of power in the fall of 1971. There is an essential thread of consistency in all three documents, in so far as Mr. Bhutto's antipathy towards India is concerned, although each was brought out in furtherance of specific objectives on different occasions.

BILATERALISM

This document besides being an exposition of foreign policy that

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2. Published under the title "Bilateralism—New Dimensions" in Morning News of October 31, 1976 and other Pakistani Newspapers.
 3. White Paper on Kashmir, published in extenso in "Pakistan Times" dated January 16, 1977.
 4. PPP Election Manifesto, published in "Pakistan Times" dated January 25, 1977,

Mr. Bhutto's Pakistan is likely to pursue, has been designed to obtain important domestic policy goals as well. This becomes clear from the many annexures appended to the document. Some of these annexures are memoranda from Mr. Bhutto, himself a minister at the time, to Field Marshal Ayub Khan, then President of Pakistan or to other ministers and hence are official papers which under normal circumstances Pakistani officials would rightly treat as highly classified and not release to the public for at least 25 years. Their public disclosure now could only be for the purpose of bringing home to the people of Pakistan, the maladroitness in dealing with issues of foreign policy in Mr. Bhutto's view, of President Ayub Khan and his own farsightedness in pointing out certain aspects of the matter, at that time, for safeguarding Pakistan's interests in its disputes with India.

Officially, the document on Bilateralism places on record Pakistan's movement away from alignments but not military pacts since Pakistan's security alliance with USA has not only not been revoked but is being invoked often enough in demanding supply of arms. After explaining that the development of two principal power centres in the world i.e. the United States of America on one side and Soviet Russia on the other, smaller countries had little choice other than the classic "either or"; that in order to save themselves from one, some of them had perforce to seek alliance with the other Super Power and that the choice in most cases was really between becoming a satellite of one or a slave of the other. The founding of United Nations, the emergence of China, and the liquidation of Western colonialism made it possible for a number of countries to stay non-aligned; but non-alignment would be a practicable policy for the weak, Mr. Bhutto observes, only if there is implied commitment on the part of both Super Powers to let small countries to stay non-aligned and to respect their independence. It concedes that "the bulk of the nations of Asia and Africa, specially the newly independent states, made an instinctive and honourable response", to the changing world situation by choosing the path called non alignment" as it enabled them "to assert their nationalism, preserve their identity, maintain a flexibility of action in their relationship with all powers, great or small, escape an identification with the total strategic interests of one super power at the expense of the others interests and thus collectively restore some equilibrium to an otherwise unbalanced world". Mr. Bhutto while noting that "on the whole, non-alignment has been a balancing force", that it has gained recognition for the majority of Asian African States, that it has been the only morally valid and practically effective policy available to them", also wants his readers to believe that "there has been a canker in the rose". The canker being, of course, this country, because of its "assumed or professed leadership of the group". The original terms of the non-aligned

movement was the maintenance of equidistance between the Great Powers and avoidance of the use of non-alignment to pressurise neighbours, Mr. Bhutto notes and remarks that "when a country enters into close relations with one great power and still professes to be non-aligned in order to be better able to establish its political domination over a neighbouring country, then what we witness is alignment masquerading as non-alignment". The unnamed villain again is India.

These observations of Mr. Bhutto are "balanced" in the sense Mr. Vyshinsky described despatches appearing in "The Times" of London as being 'balanced' because according to the Russian diplomat they contained fifty per cent truth and fifty per cent untruths.

One has only to consider Mr. Bhutto's views on geostrategy, his successful efforts to take Pakistan close to China since that country and Pakistan in his view, can have not only no conflict of aims but positively common interests in containing India; and Mr. Mahomed Ali Bogra's secret assurances regarding Pakistan's membership of pacts to recognise its opportunism not to say duplicity and lack of faith in non alignment. Yet one of the prime objectives in releasing the document at the time was to canvass support from Arab and other Afro-Asian countries for Pakistan being accepted as a genuinely non-aligned nation. Mr. Bhutto in effect sought to assure third world countries that it is now genuinely non-aligned in these words: "Prior to the adoption of bilaterilism, Pakistan's foreign policy was at worst capricious and at best one of pragmatism planted on a half forgotten ideology". With the adoption of this principle, Pakistan has steered itself through treacherous shoals and currents that menace the passage of strategically placed states in the complex contemporary age. Bilateralism has provided a safe chart for this kind of navigation.

Even if some non aligned states hesitate to accept these words at their face value, the exposition, would hopefully, succeed in convincing China of Pakistan's—in particular, or Mr. Bhutto's bonafides, and of cautioning United States which had until recently not been very forthcoming in the matter of arms supplies, that Pakistan has other options.

To convince China of the firm friendship of Mr. Bhutto's Pakistan, documents testifying to Pakistan's blind support to USA in keeping China out of UN in the fifties, of its virtual endorsement of USA's "one China-one Taiwan" stand and President Ayubs offer to Prime Minister Nehru in 1959 have been quoted. Mr. Bhutto's comment is that by offering India joint defence against dangers from the North, Ayub Khan recognised India's right to take steps to defend Kashmir, thus demolishing Pakistan's elaborately built up case that Kashmir is disputed territory and further that India is under threats from the North whereas Mr.

Bhutto's theory has been that India was the aggressor in the border conflict with China. Regarding the first Mr. Bhutto did in fact succeed in getting President Ayub Khan to retract from his stated position and remark that Ladakh was "a disputed area".

Since the early Sixties, Mr. Bhutto as the country's Minister for Fuel, endeavoured to allay Soviet Union's suspicions of Pakistan by proposing economic ties and gradually enlarging areas of cooperation between the two in order to gain some leverage over USA. He has noted that :

"The relationship between the Great Powers and the smaller countries are ipso facto unequal in which the Great Powers can wrench out a multitude of advantages without responding in sufficient, let alone equal, measure"... "In the ultimate analysis it is not the virtue of the cause that becomes the determining factor but the cold global interests of Great Powers which determine their policy". Even so Mr. Bhutto goes on to point out that—"it is possible, with adroit handling of their affairs for the smaller nations to maintain their independence and have a flexibility of action in their relationship with Great Powers as well as smaller nations".

This observation, regarding the flexibility of action, could be taken as a cautionary signal as much to China as to USA. Simultaneously he has noted that—

"It would be the quintessence of folly for a small state to pursue a policy of provocation towards any global power on the strength of support from another Great Power for any other pressing reason".

This is a clear enough hint that Pakistan's policy of total alignment with USA and China—would be counter productive in the context of current developments and hence Pakistan for its part is eager to mend its fences with Russia. Soviet Russia would certainly welcome this approach.

One other factor also emerges from this long dissertation on bilateralism; and that is Mr. Bhutto's effort to get extremists in Pakistan to accept the need for bilateral discussions with India in order to solve bilateral issues. This may be no small gain for India considering that hitherto Pakistani leaders tended to resort to international mediation and intervention in solving purely bilateral issues between the two countries.

WHITE PAPER ON KASHMIR

This again is an important policy document setting forth Mr.

Bhutto's attitude to the Kashmir Problem. The purpose of this document, predictably is to secure Mr. Bhutto's position in the context of the developing domestic situation within Pakistan and at the same time to gain some bargaining strength vis-a-vis this country.

While nothing that "the 'issue of Jammu and Kasnmir is the outstanding international dispute in South Asia' it makes the point that—in turning back on war and—in agreeing to give bilateral negotiations a chance in a changed historical situation free from wasteful confrontation, the Government of Pakistan looks forward to the opportunities of a peaceful settlement".

This policy if earnestly pursued by the rulers of Pakistan would go a long way towards ensuring peace in the sub-continent, and enable the people of both countries to devote their energies for the economic betterment of their underprivileged.

The thesis developed in the White Paper is that "short sighted policies were adopted, wrong evaluations made, ill-considered actions taken and grievous blunders committed which prevented a solution of the problem and took a heavy toll of the nation's energies and resources", although "No previous Government of Pakistan has deliberately sought to surrender the principle of self determination of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's commitment to this principle has remained unchanged".

It argues that Pakistan's Governor General Mr. Ghulam Mahomed used to "flatter Nehru" that Pakistan did not back their own Prime Minister Mohomed Ali of Bogra and that Pakistan's military alliance with USA while enabling Pakistan to develop its military muscle "enabled Nehru to back out from his agreement to hold a plebiscite".

Further, it stresses that President Ayub continually harped on his theme of danger from the North—a point made out in Mr. Bhutto's thesis on bilateralism also—thus arousing the suspicions of both Russia and China towards Pakistan and chides the Field Marshal for not taking advantage of India's difficulties in 1962, and intervene militarily in Jammu and Kashmir. To quote from the White Paper :

"Pakistan had a valid reason, indeed the obligation, to intervene in order to ensure that its own interests in Jammu and Kashmir were not jeopardised by the armed conflict between China and the occupying power, India, since Pakistan had no ground either in international law or in the national interest, to endorse even tactily India's opposition to China's claim, such intervention would not have ranged it against China" and more pointedly adds later :—

"It must be recalled in this context that there did not at that time

exist the disparity in military strength between Pakistan and India which was to handicap Pakistan in later years".

The White Paper while discussing the 1965 war and its aftermath blames President Ayub Khan for agreeing at Tashkent "to leave the Kashmir dispute in suspense" and gives Mr. Bhutto credit for his intervention "that with a provision for the renunciation of the use of force without a corresponding article regarding a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the document would be devoid of balance and of justice".

He chastises Ayub Khan for not even 'mentioning' the Kashmir Issue in his message to Premier Kosygin on the occasion of the Fourth Anniversary of the Tashkent Declaration.

The Simla Pact has not been discussed in the White Paper since "the war of 1971 is outside the purview of the White Paper because it is not germane to the Kashmir Issue".

But it makes the point that "in sharp contrast to the Tashkent Declaration, (the Simla Agreement) stipulates that neither country shall unilaterally alter the situation, connoting the commitment of the parties to a final settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute", and quotes Mr. Bhutto's speech in Peking on May 29, 1976 :—

"It must be clearly understood by all concerned that normalisation does not mean that Pakistan should abandon its traditional support for the rights of the Kashmiris. Though Pakistan is willing to advance from the stage of normalisation to peaceful coexistence, such a relationship is predicated upon a settlement of the Kashmir question".

Thus Mr. Bhutto through the medium of the White Paper not only informs his opponents at home that he will proceed from legalistic normalisation to peaceful coexistence only on the settlement of the Kashmir question (on Pakistan's terms) but equally Great Powers and regional powers who may wish to pressurise India, that Pakistan would continue its traditional policy vis-a-vis this country.

Ominously the White Paper affirms that "neither the passage of time nor the intervention of periods of relative quiescence will alter the nature of the issue. It is an issue which concerns the life and destiny of a people who have been historically and culturally an integral part of the nation that achieved sovereignty through the establishment of Pakistan".

Thus Mr. Bhutto seems very much determined to keep the issue alive to suit his domestic as well as external policy requirements, a point which it would be unwise for this country to lose sight of.

PAKISTAN PEOPLE PARTY'S (PPP) ELECTION MANIFESTO⁵

This again is an important policy document and bears very much the imprint of Mr. Bhutto's authorship. Understandably Mr. Bhutto refers to the wreck that was bequeathed to him in December 1971 and the progress registered by the country in five years under his stewardship. Specifically, it stresses that while the military Junta had left over 90,000 prisoners of war as well as a sizeable chunk of Pakistani territory under Indian hands, Mr. Bhutto was able to secure the return of prisoners and vacation of territory without conceding anything in return. To quote the document, On July 2, 1972, at Simla Mr. Bhutto, "retrieved at the negotiating table what Pakistan's self appointed leaders had lost on the battlefield: the evacuation and return of 5000 square miles of territory occupied by the Indians and the return of over 90,000 civilian and service personnel. That was not all. National honour was vindicated by the agreement to drop trials for alleged war crimes. National interests were upheld by India's formal recognition that Pakistan's position on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains unchanged".

Mr. Bhutto's achievements in the realm of foreign affairs in getting Islamic countries and China to reaffirm friendships and effecting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union have been duly highlighted. Withdrawal from SEATO and the Commonwealth are explained as moves in furtherance of an independent foreign policy and towards bilateralism avoiding entanglements of Big Power policies. This again is discreet notice to USA that that Power should not take Pakistan's support to its policies for granted and to USSR that Pakistan would not be anti-Soviet at USA's (and China's) bidding.

The document devotes adequate attention to economic issues reversing the postures adopted by Mahabub-ul-Haq⁶ the principal architect of Pakistan's economic planning under President Ayub and promises moves towards an economy under which the benefits of planning and development would travel down to the poorer sections of society, emphasising at the same time the importance of fair distribution of essential commodities.

These major domestic issues apart, the manifesto is of importance because of the renewed importance given to the Kashmir issue and the ruling party's pledge to step up all round military capability of Pakistan's defence forces and of the country's defence production complex.

5. Ibid.

6. See "Economic Problems of Pakistan under Mr. Bhutto" by W. Eric Gustafson in *Asian Survey* of April 1976.

In concrete terms, what has already been achieved and what is now proposed to be achieved has been explained as under :

1. The creation of Citizen Forces, capable of being used in emergencies. These Forces, the National guards, comprise the Mujahid Force, the Janbaz Force, the National Cadet Corps and Women Guards. Citizen Forces would relieve regular Army units of their secondary roles such as defence of the country's lines of communication in times of war.
2. "In the past, tanks and aircraft were being sent to the countries of origin for overhaul and major repairs which involved delay and considerable expenditure in foreign exchange; facilities for the purpose are being provided in the country. Essential spares required for maintenance will also be manufactured locally.
3. "New lines for the manufacture of various types of ammunition, bombs and projectiles have gone into production. With the completion of additional projects including those for the manufacture of anti-tank and medium and heavy artillery ammunition the country will be in position to meet its essential requirements through domestic production".
4. "The pre-1972 shortages and imbalances in the arms and equipment of the three Services are being remedied. At the same time, we are acquiring more modern weapons, such as a new anti-tank weapon system, surface to air missiles, naval reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, and various components of a modern air defence system".
5. "Despite the financial constraints, it is a matter of considerable satisfaction for the party to record that as a result of wide ranging measures instituted by its Government during the last five years it has been able to give the Armed Forces and the nation a credible defence capability".

HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION⁷

This document, notes the changes brought about in Pakistan's higher defence machinery in order to rectify the drawbacks of the system obtaining during military rule. First it rightly establishes the supremacy of civil authority over the forces and prevents as far as possible the rise

7. "White Paper on Higher Defence Organisation
Ref: Morning News (Karachi) dated 13-5-1976.

of Bonapartism in the forces. Second, it seeks to depoliticalise Pakistan's armed forces and enable them to concentrate on their professional duties.

Third it ensures that defence planning is carried out in an integrated manner and budget allocations reflect the objectives set by political leadership for the armed forces so that individual services are appropriately armed to be able to carry out their specific tasks as members of a single team⁸.

Thus a common theme in three of the most important policy documents released by Pakistan's rulers in recent months is that the Pakistan is keeping the Kashmir issue alive; relations with this country can proceed beyond 'proforma' normalisation only when the issue is resolved (to Pakistan's satisfaction) and that Pakistan's policy continues to hinge on the maintenance of a very high level of military strength. New weapons and equipment have been obtained and the strength of tank defence and air defence systems significantly enhanced. This automatically confers an edge on that country's ground and airstrike forces which also have been very considerably strengthened by the acquisition of fresh supplies of tanks and aircraft. In addition the acquisition of a formidable armada of 110 A-7 corsair attack aircraft from USA, or an equivalent attack force from West Europe is on the cards, and an integrated defence command has been evolved to ensure optimum use of military forces.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

At least two important Chinese delegations have visited Pakistan during the past one year, one headed by the Deputy Commander of the Sinkiang military region, and more recently another headed by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and including the Deputy Chiefs of Naval and Air Staff. The first was possibly in connection with improving the cooperation in training of troops and especially of these deployed in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir where sizeable bodies of Chinese "road builders" are still positioned. The second almost certainly was concerned with negotiating details regarding the supply of Chinese equipment for Pakistan's three armed services and possibly also regarding the training facilities and equipment that Pakistan's forces may be able to provide to other South Asian countries since it would seem that military delegations from three South Asian countries were also present in Pakistan at the time of the Chinese delegations visit. These would underline the fact that Pakistan's forces in terms of personnel, equipment, organisation and

8. For further discussion see USI Journal. July-Sept.76, pp 219.

training are being geared for action and the country's defence production has been strengthened in order to provide endurance to the forces and sustain them in operations over periods considerably longer than was the case earlier.

More importantly, Pakistan's traditional attitude that it is not interested in entering into a 'No War' Pact with this country "unless either the Kashmir issue is resolved or a self executing and mandatory machinery is established for its resolution"⁹ has been restated emphatically.

THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION

Mr. Bhutto's policy pronouncements cited above could, by reading freely between the lines, be interpreted as elaborate exercises to convince public opinion at home that Pakistan's predicament is entirely due to the many acts of omission and commission of previous regimes, and especially of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan and that within the short space of five years he has succeeded in putting the country back on its feet and of retrieving by diplomatic endeavours all that the military junta had lost on the battlefield. Specifically, his enunciation of the principle of bilateralism and treatise on Kashmir could be taken to indicate his moves to settle the dispute, directly by the two countries, rather than through the intervention of outside powers. The point made by him that the people of Jammu and Kashmir alone should determine as to what they want could imply that while the people of Pakistan could lend support to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the onus of securing a change in the political set up of the area would be on the latter.

However, the frequent reaffirmation of Pakistan's opposition to discuss a no war pact and insistence on "self executing and mandatory machinery" for dealing with the dispute leaves the impression that Mr. Bhutto has no intention of moving towards a solution to the problem except on his terms.

INDIA'S POLICY

This country's policy, traditionally, has been to conciliate Pakistan to the utmost extent. During the past two years when the country was concerned with several important domestic issues there were, remarkably, no arguments regarding external issues, and as government have

9. Mr. Bhutto's response to Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee's offer of a 'No War' Pact.

See Times of India dated 9th April 1977.

correctly noted, there is a continuity about the country's foreign policy based on non-alignment; non-interference in other countries' internal affairs; friendship with all nations, big and small; cooperation with all and especially with developing countries and support for national liberation efforts and in favour of movements to end racial discrimination. It is in pursuance of this policy that our External Affairs Minister offered to sign a 'No War' Pact with Pakistan, to allay Pakistan's misgivings, if any, and to reaffirm our sincerity. The response this time, regrettably, has been no more encouraging than on previous occasions. Mr. Bhutto's reiteration of Pakistan's traditional stand on Kashmir and his reservations about proceeding from formal resumption of diplomatic relations to peaceful co-existence with this country cannot but cause profound disappointment to all those desirous of maintaining peace in the subcontinent. Even the revocation of external emergency by this country has failed to elicit a favourable response.

Disappointing though this is it is clear that there is the need to reexamine current trends calmly and continue our efforts to inspire greater confidence in the minds of people of all other countries in the sub-continent in our earnestness to maintain peace and march in step with them in order to realise our common goal of rapid economic and technological development and closer mutual ties. The recent conference of ministers of non-aligned nations has enabled leaders of these countries to appreciate this country's attitudes.

While this is one aspect of the matter, the other, namely, the need on the part of this country to ensure that there is no let up in defence preparedness is equally important, if only because of the considerable accretions to Pakistan's ground as well as air strike forces—already achieved and projected.

The attached¹⁰ statement at Appendix I showing the strength of Pakistan's forces as in 1976 and 1971 gives some idea of the above. However, a few general observations on this would be in order. Western publications generally understate Pakistan's military strength, defence budget and military hardware purchased or otherwise acquired by Pakistan probably because they are based on information that Pakistan chooses to release.

In particular it may be borne in mind that apart from increasing army strength by 100,000 (that is by a strike force of at least five divisions) Pakistan has a reserve force of 500,000 which would be capable of freeing,

10. Extracted from 'Military Balance 1976-77' and 'Military Balance 1971-72', published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, see Appendix I for details.

as Mr. Bhutto has envisaged, the regular army of all its internal security and communications duties in the event of an emergency. Specifically even the declared tank strength is now 1050 which could provide the equivalent of a strike force of about four tank divisions, not taking into account possible reinforcements from sources friendly to Pakistan.

A strike force of 110 A-7 attack aircraft (or an equivalent armada from West European sources) is likely to be acquired in the near future. This, taken with the fact that sophisticated air defence electronic network directed towards this country has already been established, would enable an impartial observer to draw his own conclusions. Further, as in the case of ground forces, Pakistan's air forces could expect to get reinforcements of aircraft (and crew composed of Pakistani servicemen on loan elsewhere) from friendly sources.

The widespread unrest following allegations of rigging at the last General Elections far from subsiding appears to be growing in intensity. Strong Governmental action such as opening fire by para military forces on demonstrators and arrests of leaders and workers of opposition parties is predictably giving rise to fresh demonstrations, and sometimes acts of violence as well, on the part of crowds supporting one or other political party. In the process, there has been a steady erosion of the credibility of the Government. Two Ambassadors, Air Marshal Rahim Khan and General Gul Hasan, the persons who forced General Yahya Khan to step down and hand over to Mr. Bhutto have come out openly against the latter, warning the country that self seekers are leading Pakistan towards a second civil war. In the face of this internal crisis, the country's leadership may once again be tempted to raise the external bogey.

Also there is the possibility of a military take over, according to foreign observers. Should this happen, military rulers too would be intent on further building up of their defence forces with predictable consequences.

This is the general environment in which this country would have to examine its defence organisation and equipment plans.

Fortunately, however, the danger of direct threats from the north seems to be somewhat less now than for some years. Even so, there are many imponderables and while continuing to work for the maintenance of peace and improvement of relations with all our neighbours it would be unwise to neglect our defences.

POST SCRIPT

Since writing the above there have been some notable developments within Pakistan,

Mr. Bhutto's tough measures in dealing with opposition leaders have boomeranged. Public demonstrations of sympathy for imprisoned opposition leaders have been spontaneous in most cities of Pakistan, leading to violent clashes between PPP and opposition workers on the one hand and between the police and members of the general public on the other.

Opposition demands for Mr. Bhutto's resignation and the holding of fresh elections became more insistent and the latter's efforts to buy time by imposing martial law in key cities of the country and offering to hold a referendum instead, on the continuance of Mr. Bhutto as Prime Minister likewise failed.

The climate of political uncertainty, mounting strikes, and lockouts in industrial establishments and widespread disturbances in major cities have had their effect on national production and movement of goods. According to Mr. Ghulam Mustapha Jatui, Sind's Chief Minister, Sind alone has suffered a loss of production of Rs. 1000 million due to the April-May 1977 internal unrest. Loss sustained by the country as a whole is estimated at Rs. 10,000¹¹. Inflation is raging at 20 per cent a year and a sizeable balance of payment deficit is feared, with an inevitably large increase in money supply and deficit financing. Seeing this gloomy picture, it would seem that Pakistan's friends have prevailed upon Mr. Bhutto to work for a rapprochement with opposition parties. Mr. Bhutto has since agreed to hold fresh elections at the Centre and Provinces.

This is a very hopeful turn; but for the people of Pakistan to be satisfied, the promised elections must not only be free and fair but be seen by the people to be free and fair. Opposition leaders and workers who are still under detention must be released so that they may, if they choose to, stand for elections and organise their election campaigns in a peaceful manner.

While the prospect of ordering fresh elections is welcome, there have been other developments which are far from reassuring. Thus Mr. Bhutto has expressed his determination to proceed with his nuclear plans and his finance minister Mr. Pirzada¹² has made a provision of \$40 million in the 1977-78 federal budget for the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. French foreign minister M. Louis De Guisingand has also

11. See "Pakistan Economist," May 28-June 3, '77 Issue. "Strangled economy: A factual view" by Khalique Zuberi.

12 Times of India, 13 June 1977

13 ibid

confirmed¹³ that France would go ahead with its contract to supply the plant to Pakistan. President Carter has decided against the supply of 110 A-7 corsair bombers to Pakistan, but it would be rash to assume that it closes Pakistan's options. It can obtain an equivalent number of Mirage aircraft from France or other comparable aircraft from another West European country.

Mr. Bhutto has made an extra 14% provision for defence in the current year's budget with defence accounting for 45 percent of the central budget,¹⁴ only a part of which would be accounted for by increased expenditure following the imposition of martial law, which has since been withdrawn in obedience to a court verdict. The rest must surely be towards the acquisition of weapons or raising more troops.

This continued defence build-up would not serve to allay public misgivings about Mr. Bhutto's intentions, either in his own country or in peace loving countries of the region.

Appendix I

(Refer to note 10 at page 13)

PAKISTAN'S MILITARY FORCES

	1976-77	1971-72	1970-71
Population	72,790,000	126,300,000 ¹	128,400,000 ¹
Military Service	2 years/selective	—	—
Total Armed Forces	428,000	392,000	324,500
Estimated GNP	\$10.1 bn (\$=Rs. 9.5)	\$16 bn (\$=Rs. 4.7)	\$15.55 bn (\$=Rs. 4.8)
<i>Defence Budget</i>	Rs. 7980 m	Rs. 3400 m	Rs. 3000 bn
Army	400,000	365,000	300,000
Armd. Dv.	2	2+1 Indep Bde	2
Inf. Dv.	14	12 (+2 under raising)	11 (+1 under raising)
Air Def. Bde.	1	—	—
Army Aviation Sq.	5	—	—
Tanks	med. 1000 ²	575	400

¹⁴ *ibid*,

	1976-77	1971-72	1970-71
	It. 50	300	200
APC	400	300	?
Guns	Fd. & Med. 1000 ²	1100	1100
	Mor 270	?	?
Plus A TK missiles			
<i>Reserves</i>	5000	—	—
<i>Navy</i>			
Submarines			
Daphne	3 (+3 on order)	4	1 (+3 on order)
Midgets	6	?	?
Cruiser	1	1	—
Destroyers	4	2	2
Frigates	4	3+2	3+2
Patrol Boats	17	4	4
Plus Coastal minesweepers and other craft unspecified number			

Air Force

Combat Aircraft	217 ³	285	270
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Including one lt. bomber sqn.,
three sqn. Mirages and 80 Mig 19

Source : 'Military Balance' published by IISS for 1976-77, 1971-72 and 1970-71.

- Notes :
1. Population figures, GNP etc. refer to undivided Pakistan.
 2. The figures shown under Tanks and Guns are probably under statements.
 3. The figures shown under aircraft are also probably under-statements.
 4. Defence Budget for 1977/78 is expected to be 14 percent aigher than that for 1976/77.

SOUTH ASIA—OIL, STABILITY AND POWER BALANCE

MAHARAJ K. CHOPRA

THE great value of oil for economic, political and strategic purposes has been known for nearly a century, ever since technology suitable for its use was evolved and its exploitation in sizable quantities became possible. It was spotlighted as early as the First World War, when oil was one of the main catalysts of the struggle and the eventual capture of its principal sources constituted a major allied triumph. How critically valuable it is and what extensive, multifarious and explosive influence it exercises has perhaps been brought home rather recently, especially after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, when its supplies were throttled and prices made to rocket. This created the "oil crisis", which has since not been resolved and threatens to bedevil the world for quite sometime to come.

While engulfing the entire world, the crisis has however affected different parts of it differently, depending upon variations in such factors as demand and supply of oil, internal conditions and external relations, and geopolitical situations. In this light South Asia may be said to stand apart, a fact clearly borne out if it is compared to other major regions like Europe; for here oil crisis has set forth quite characteristic action-reaction processes with far-reaching implications. For the present discussion South Asia would be taken to embrace the region between West Asia and Southeast Asia, divided from China by the great Korakoram-Himalaya mountain range and overlooking a major sector of the northern Indian Ocean. Thus it consists of seven states—Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka, with a population of about 800 million and area of two million square miles.

OIL POWER

Some idea of oil power is necessary for the framework of our discussion. Its phenomenal influence arises from this : it is widely used in several vital sectors of the economy of mankind; it is indispensable; and it is scarce. From household goods such as lipsticks, soaps, dyes and fabrics, it is used in agriculture, industry and transportation, in hundreds of thousands of tiny gadgets as well as giant machines, in

peace as well as in war, without which present day civilisation cannot be sustained. The demand for it has expanded rapidly, partly because of the boom in industrialised economies and partly because of the switch to oil as the predominant energy resource. The expansion is said to have reached its peak in 1973, after which some restraints upon it have been clamped. Even then a recent paper submitted to the United Nations envisages the rate of expansion over a decade as something like this :

World Demand of Oil

1975	3000	million tons
1980	3800	
1985	4500	

Another set of figures has emerged to depict the relative contribution of oil to the total energy pool. There are several sources of energy on which the world's eyes are pinned. Leaving aside tides and winds, heat of the earth, solar power, ionised gas, hydrogen and oxygen, all of which are on the anvil of research but not of much practical significance at present, the bet now is on the following.

Percentage Contribution of Energy Resources

	1975	1985
Coal	28	23
Hydroelectricity	6	5
Nuclear Energy	2	7
Gas	18	20
Oil	46	45

It appears during the next decade the use of oil is likely to expand 50% and it would retain its prominent position in the hierarchy of energy forms, constituting almost as much as the rest of the sources combined. Further, it is most unevenly distributed and found only in a few tiny little dots on the surface of the globe. And, finally, the stocks are limited : the proven reserves of the world are around 100,000 million tons, which at the prevailing rate of consumption are not likely to last very much beyond the end of the present century.

While oil power has been in action for long, two major factors are behind its latest manifestation. One is the shift in sovereignty of oil. During the early postwar period a handful of cartels—the “seven majors”—controlled the world oil industry. A radical change occurred in the 1960s when oil-producing states started acquiring control, a process all but completed by the time the Arab-Israeli war erupted. Not only did the principal producers become sovereign over their oil, they

also formed two closely knit oil cartels, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The main motivation was economic and nationalistic, but wide-ranging political potential was also absolutely clear. And it was not long before the military ramifications showed up.

IMPLICATIONS

These are economic, political and strategic, with overlapping nuances.

In economic terms, the crisis materialised in embargo upon supplies against selected states, manipulation of petroleum production, and hike in prices. While the former was lifted early, the latter two are still with us, and of these the quadrupled price levels have played havoc. Early, in one single year the oil producers amassed revenues amounting to \$140,000 million, which they had little capacity to absorb. Since then the surplus has upset the entire monetary system, caused fluctuations in foreign exchange and sent the balance of payments mechanism to pieces; and almost overnight has put enormous economic power in the hands of a few states. On the side of the consumers there has been widespread inflation, slowdown in industry, rise in unemployment and large deficits in budgets. Most acute has been the suffering of the Third World : its indebtedness is estimated at \$200 billion. The price hike in December 1976 has further throttled the chances of recovery and raised fears that this sort of phenomenon might become a permanent threat.

In political terms oil power has been articulated through the Arabs, with the objective of creating favourable attitudes over their conflict with Israel. Initially the United States was the main target, but later other states were also roped in. The attempt was largely successful : many states bent over backwards to support the Arabs. At the same time the oil-producing states gained in stature, even those who are otherwise lilliputian in size. Their influence in political circles such as the United Nations and in the sphere of bilateral relations has had a boom, thanks to the newly gained capability to finance and assist. A new balance sheet of political relations must now be drawn by accommodating a small but highly articulate if not militant oil-backed community.

In military terms oil power has been eloquently expressed in arms traffic. Abundant oil wealth has goaded a number of states, especially in the Middle East, to go all out for a massive arms build-up. The result of this is not confined to the swelling of military establishments,

and has spilled into several fields. Some states have so heavily invested in arms that they have begun to moan about financial stringency, hence the pretext for further hike in oil prices. The reinforcement of the armed forces has upgraded the position and power of the military hierarchy, which in turn is attended with the risk of instability and coups. Since arms influx is almost invariably accompanied by fear and tension, there is the possibility of the revival of some in-built rivalries and apprehensions. Inasmuch as inflow of new weapons in large quantities gives rise to an outflow of the antiquated ones, arms proliferation is to be expected.

From the oil-rich, weapon receiving countries, one may look at the weapon-exporting industrial states. Stung by high prices of oil, adverse balances of payment, and idled economic activities these states have been forced to shun some of the political and moral constraints over dumping arms in the more sensitive areas. And, finally, oil power has led to the redefining of national interests, upgraded the geopolitical importance of oil-bearing regions, and influenced global strategy involving big powers.

HOW MUCH OIL

The starting point of oil influence in South Asia would be, how much oil does it have? This must take into account the current indigenous production as well as future prospects. The annual production estimates are : India, 10 million tons; Burma, one million tons; Pakistan 400,000 tons. The remaining four countries of region—Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka—produce negligible quantities.

Exploration is being carried out widely and has been boosted by the oil crisis. In this respect India's efforts have been both intensive and extensive. Prospective areas include the plains and the foothills overlooked by the 1500-mile Himalaya mountain, the basins of the 3000-mile long east and west coasts, the deep continental shelf in the Indian Ocean, and the sedimentary rocks in the Andaman Islands—in fact a very large part of the country. Pakistan is looking for oil in Baluchistan and its offshore zone in the Arabian Sea. Both Bangladesh and Burma have launched efforts in their continental shelves in the Bay of Bengal. Palk Bay and the Gulf of Mannar in Sri Lanka's sea waters are under investigation.

However, so far as actual new finds are concerned, only India has struck it rich offshore with an annual output of two million tons. As for the reserves, some stark realities of the oil world must be kept in view. Having reserves does not mean having oil. Reserves must be explored, proven and established; oil-yielding locations must be

pinpointed; the drilling mechanism must be installed; and the requisite infrastructure of transportation must be organised. All this needs thorough grasp of geological functions, help of sophisticated instruments based upon magnetic, gravity and electronic principles, and technical and financial resources. This is a mouthful, something that even a super power, Russia, cannot muster easily: one is reminded that even though the oil reserves of West Siberia are described as "fabulous", Moscow is looking for skill and finances from Washington and Tokyo. And some idea of the scale of investment may be formed from the estimate of Britain's investment of \$4,000 million in the North Sea oil.

One may now draw a profile of the oil wealth of South Asia, comparing it also with the three other major regions of the continent viz. West Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. The current yearly production is under 12 million tons. As against this, West Asia produces over 1,000 million tons, mainly around the Gulf; Southeast Asia produces 140 million tons—Indonesia 100 million, Australia 32 million, Malaysia 8 million; and East Asia produces 300 million—China 70 million, Soviet Asia 230 million. Besides, exploration in South Asia has begun only recently with very modest investment, while much more has been accomplished in Asia's other regions with success, as for instance in the Kalimantan province of Indonesia, China's Bohai Gulf in the Yellow Sea, and West Siberia in East Asia.

ADVERSITIES OF OIL SHORTAGE

Thus, from the viewpoint of production and prospects South Asia falls far behind other regions of the continent and, indeed, considering its area and population, constitutes one of the poorest parts of the globe. Therefore it is acutely susceptible to all forms of oil influence, direct as well as indirect, and by itself as well as in conjunction with other forces.

It will be remembered that South Asia is one of the most densely inhabited parts of the world and its population is growing fast. All states of the region fall in the category of "developing" countries, with per capita income of \$100 or less, which must have sufficient energy resources to back their industrial and agricultural effort. They have a very special requirement of oil too; in the absence of electricity and coal, kerosene oil is widely used for domestic purposes. Further, paucity of national resources makes them heavily dependent upon international assistance, particularly from the industrial states; but these states are themselves in dire difficulties and find their capacity to assist gravely impaired.

In general the economy of the region is gloomy, though there are

some bright patches. Shri Lanka suffers from high unemployment, food shortages, and adverse balance of payments. Bangladesh has made little progress to diversify its resources, being heavily dependent upon agriculture. Last fall Burma's economy was described as a quagmire. Pakistan's condition is better, but it is almost entirely due to foreign aid. India has buoyantly emerged out of its inflation of over 25% but the jump in its oil import bill from \$400 million to \$1,500 million causes a wide dent in its resources.

Of the seven states, only Burma produces enough oil to meet its demand; this may appear satisfying, and yet once it was among world's leading oil exporters, so that the current output is not a happy commentary on its performance. India consumes around 24 million tons, that is, $2\frac{1}{2}$ times what it produces. Pakistan consumes 4 million tons, which is ten times its production. The rest only consume and produce very little. The consumption works out at .04 tons or less per capita per year—as against two tons in Britain or Japan—and is already so low that further reduction would be seriously damaging. Saving in oil is possible, as India has demonstrated, but there is nothing to stop oil needs from mounting up.

Thus the adversities of oil add to the economic malaise of the region, augment unrest and dissidence, and promote militancy among a large sector of the population, all of which contribute to tension, conflict and instability.

Politically, a striking development is that the entire subcontinent of South Asia is under authoritarian rule or emergency legislation. Bangladesh has had half a dozen military coups since its birth, and in the latest of the series the martial law administrator has taken over most of the powers of the civilian president. In Burma the military rule is now one decade and a half old, which again is marred by conspiracies and widespread insurgency, as incidents in the fall of last year show. Sri Lanka has had its experience with "Che Guevarists" who all but took over the government. Under emergency rule now, after a long spell of military dictatorship, Pakistan faces strong dissidence in Baluchistan and most of its opposition parties are in jail. India has just about brought the long-standing insurgency in its north-east under control, but declaration of emergency testified to the prevalence of disruptive forces, as the then Government saw it.

All the governments claim that vigorous political discipline is necessary to maintain law and order, which again is imperative for social and economic advance. This implies that political authority must justify its operative character and prove its credibility by actual

achievements in the spheres of development and welfare. In South Asia politics is critically dependent upon economics and malaise in one slips easily into the other. In so far as oil impinges upon development, it also influences the credibility and stability of the powers who run the state.

In one respect South Asia is in a comfortable position. For the first time after a generation the Indian subcontinent is breathing the air of detente. Pakistan and India have resumed diplomatic relations and their dispute over Kashmir is swept beneath the carpet. The pinpricks between India and Bangladesh are under control. And, in general, the inter-regional relations are good.

OIL AND MARITIME INTERESTS

However, in this placid situation oil has introduced a new portent. Five out of the seven states are maritime, which have all embarked on offshore oil exploration, with India having already struck it rich. This raises the question of territorial jurisdiction in the sea. The international law on the subject is out-dated, while the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea is still wrestling with its formulation afresh: rights over the waters have in fact become a most controversial issue among its members. So far only India and Sri Lanka have mutually agreed upon a maritime boundary, (hoping it would be in accordance with the sea law). No such arrangements have come about among the other states, and the question of rights over territorial waters, economic zone and continental shelf is still open. This is the area which normally contains oil and is under exploration. Disagreement over the issue has already raised its head between India and Bangladesh. More serious threat to peace cannot be ruled out, remembering how Britain and Iceland have been fighting the "cold war" and Greece and Turkey have nearly come to blows over their claims in the Aegean Sea. In South Asia border disputes have already caused half a dozen armed conflagrations.

MORE FOR DEFENCE

The inauguration of detente in the subcontinent and the prevalence of the climate of peace should normally contribute to a low defence profile. Actually this has not happened; almost every head of the government speaks of the threats to security. Defence budgets have gone up—in the case of Pakistan by as much as 25% last year, and the increase cannot be accounted for only by the inflated costs of weaponry and maintenance. The present stress is not so much on numbers as on quality—for example, both Pakistan and India are seeking light bombers in replacement of the existing older types.

On this profile oil is etching its marks. For one thing, oil money of West Asia has begun to find its way in the subcontinent; Pakistan is its beneficiary, thanks to its geographical contiguity and Islamic appeal among the West Asian Muslim states. Both India and Pakistan have been largely land-oriented states, but the new concepts of maritime rights and sea wealth, oil in particular, have given a spurt to their interests beyond the coasts. Defence of the sea waters is thus a significant addition to the dimensions of security and in consequence to the efforts for renovating the armed forces. Stress is being laid on the navy and the naval air arm; South Asia is having more patrol boats, more small as well as large submarines, and more modern reconnaissance and attack aircraft. There is little doubt defence of offshore oil is going to be an important security consideration in future.

High cost of oil and the fear of the exhaustion of this fossil fuel have injected some urgency into the development of nuclear power. On this plea Pakistan has been trying hard to set up nuclear power stations as early as possible, including a fuel reprocessing plant. Inasmuch as there are no foolproof safeguards against diversion of nuclear knowhow from peaceful to military use, one detects behind Pakistan's plea a desire to "go nuclear" as a counterweight to India, which has already carried out a nuclear explosion. At present the influence of oil on nuclearisation is marginal, but urgency to develop power of the atom, with its attendant risks in a sensitive environment, will grow if oil prospects turn out to be bleak.

PETRODOLLARS AND ECONOMIC POWER

One may now lift sights and examine the impact of oil on South Asia in its wider environment. Here the first question would be, where does the region get its 20 million odd tons of oil to fill the gap between its production and demand? The case of India, the largest importer, is typical. Out of the 14 million tons imported during 1976, 4½ million tons came from Iran, 3¼ million tons from Saudi Arabia, 3 million tons from Iraq, one million tons from United Arab Emirates, and the rest from elsewhere. (During 1977 the Soviet Union is to supply over one million tons). Thus, nearly 85 per cent of India's oil comes from West Asia. The Arab states are the leading suppliers accounting for more than one half, followed by Iran. Pakistan gets its oil almost wholly from West Asia, as do the rest directly or indirectly. Thus, clearly, on the oil horizon of the subcontinent West Asia has loomed up as the brightest patch.

Now, West Asia has always been a very important region for the subcontinent, having figured in its political, economic and strategic relations for nearly two thousand years. The two world wars added to

its importance. Geographic contiguity, anti-Indian slant, and alliances have made Pakistan verge towards it, while sympathies with the nationalist movements and old contacts have attracted India. But prior to the oil crisis the region was rather out of the subcontinent's focus, thanks to its relative backwardness, low economic possibilities, and prevailing instabilities.

This has changed kaleidoscopically; for instance the notion that West Asians are "poor relations" is flung clean out of the window. There has been a spate of collaborative and trade agreements. Ministers, officials, businessmen and specialists have exchanged visits, heading an outflow of a great variety of personnel. There seems to have taken place a mutual rediscovery between the two regions, unparalleled in recent times. Undoubtedly a restructured edifice of relationship has emerged. This edifice has two fronts, economic and strategic, which are distinctive and yet overlapping.

One front depicts the economic power of the oil money. To take India, its contacts with Iran have grown manifold. Iran has invested \$ 630 million in an Indian iron ore project on the basis of supply of the ore for 20 years. A joint Irano-Hind Shipping Line is already in operation. From a bare \$7 million, India's exports to Iran have jumped to \$150 million, and its imports from Iran are among its highest. India has also developed close collaboration with Iraq and a number of other states.

Even more impressively has the West Asian money impinged upon Pakistan, in the form of interest-free loans, donations, and aid for projects. Here again Iran has been very generous, investing heavily in the development of Baluchistan, a backward neighbouring area, and in agricultural projects which are the backbone of Pakistan's economy. Fertiliser plants, shipyards and several sectors of heavy industry have attracted the Arab money. Much of Pakistan's buoyant economy is due to the finances made available by Iran and the Arab states.

Thus, the petrodollars of West Asia have helped reinforce the economic endeavours of the subcontinent and contributed especially to the stability of Pakistan which was in sad plight after its war with India and break-up of its eastern wing.

OIL MONEY AND STRATEGY

The strategic front of the edifice appears less striking but is quite significant and bears the handiwork of Iran as well as the Arab states. In the prevailing West Asian environment, Iran has undoubtedly emerged as an outstanding force. Backed by its oil wealth, sizeable

population and area, and growing industrial strength, it is building up military power fast and of high quality. Of this power the strategic counterpart is the reinforcement of flanks by neutralising the eroding factors, there has been rapport with the Arabs and settlement of disputes with Iraq. And there have been bridges built between Iran and South Asia. Iran has lent support to Pakistan in controlling insurgency in Baluchistan and discouraging spread of the recalcitrant Pakhtoon movement. It has also helped cool down the heat generated between Pakistan and Afghanistan over their frontier dispute. Most significantly, it has lent powerful support in bringing India and Pakistan together, who have now established near normal diplomatic relations. A climate of detente has been created in the subcontinent in which the good offices of Iran, with its economic leverage, have played a significant role.

Arab motivations have been colored by the traditional Islamic orientation of the Arab states towards the large Muslim population of South Asia, over 200 million. They are also colored by the valuable support available in the region over their dispute with Israel. Most states of South Asia have sided with the Arabs over vacation of the conquered territory under Israeli occupation, formation of a Palestinian State, and anti-Zionism. Recent trends generated by oil influence reinforce this slant of these states and narrow their options.

THE MILITARISED WEST ASIA

The magic of petrodollars, prospect of stability, and air of detente are all highly valuable, but these are also accompanied by the thrust of *realpolitick*, articulated now and again in authoritative media. Former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi often spoke of external dangers and had been referring especially to the arms build-up on and beyond the country's western flank.

The militarisation of the Gulf zone is certainly a most striking aftermath of the oil crisis, the character of which may be gauged from the types of hardware used. It is comprised of the weapons of defence such as surveillance apparatus and anti-aircraft missiles; tanks and strike aircraft for battle use; and fighter bombers and combat ships for long-range roles. Some \$60 billion worth of these are estimated to be under contract, of which worth over \$10 billion have arrived. The recipients include the larger states like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, as well as the smaller ones like Kuwait. The weapons are among the most modern available. The infrastructure is no less striking, if one looks at the new bases coming up on the Persian Gulf, some of the most powerful in the Indian Ocean. It is quite clear that the arms build-up

had a threefold aim; it is defensive in scope, with an eye on security of oil installations beside national frontiers; it has inter-regional combat potential; and it has capabilities of long-range operations.

Being contiguous to West Asia, South Asia is affected deeply. Reactions from its various units would differ : for instance Burma is not likely to be perturbed much; on the other hand Pakistan may take it easy, because of its close economic and military ties. But suppose a strategist gives it a hard look from the vantage point of New Delhi. He would conclude that the arms influx is extraordinarily massive, going much beyond the strict defence needs of the states concerned and having perhaps extra-national objectives. Thus it is liable to create suspicions and rivalries, temptation to secure decision by the use of force, and a climate in which an armed clash could erupt by the blow of a whistle; and it might be the cutting edge of hegemonic ambitions on the part of the more resourceful states. As so often happens, it has a potential to proliferate, and its travel close to the Indian borders cannot be ruled out.

In a wider setting, our strategist would find that, after the Arab Israeli zone already littered with arms, the dump around the Persian Gulf militarises the whole of West Asia from end to end to an unprecedented degree. He must take into account the mutual reaction of these zones, other external factors which are bound to operate in the weak of arms flow, and the interests of big powers which cannot be whisked away.

In terms of oil, two important conclusions would be drawn. First, the area which supplies the subcontinent with bulk of it would have to be carefully watched from the viewpoint of stability; any escalation of tension here is bound to influence adversely the production as well as transportation of the vital commodity. The sole dependence upon West Asia for oil would thus appear critical and the vulnerability of this jugular is bound to cause apprehensions. And the strategist would ponder how safe it is to have all one's eggs in one basket. Secondly, it is also clear that oil wealth has given rise to a new power balance right across the subcontinent's flank. This flank is within striking distance of air power based on the Gulf and its sea communications in the upper Arabian Sea are close to West Asia's coast.

Obviously, West Asia is not all good oil and good petrodollars, it is also guns and bombs. Confronted with this situation, some states of South Asia at least are bound to consider a restructuring of their security postures so as to conform to the enlarged security dimensions. Will this also mean a competitive arms race only events would show.

IN THE GLOBAL OIL WORLD

There is a still wider aspect of oil influence on South Asia, if one bears in mind how prominently it figures in global strategy. For over a century before the Second World War it was a bastion of the British empire, radiating imperial might far and wide. In the postwar period, under the impact of even more powerful and far-reaching forces, it serves as a vital link between the worlds of the West and the East via Southeast Asia, as a sensitive part of the southern flanks of Russia and China, and as an observation platform for continental Eurasia; and its characteristic peninsular shape makes it stand out in the regime of the Indian Ocean.

On this broad strategic landscape oil casts its shadows. It is noticed that South Asia is situated between two important oil-bearing areas. To its west is West Asia, already producing huge quantities of it and having become a focus of great power interests. To the east is Southeast Asia where the production is relatively modest and yet considerable and where there are proven prospects of much more oil; here powerful interests are already converging. To this must be added the role of the Indian Ocean. More than 90 percent of the oil produced flows through it, a fact which renders the ocean's sea communications peculiarly vulnerable and their security a matter of paramount importance. It is certain that any serious challenge to oil transportation in the Indian Ocean would become a *casus belli* for world conflagration.

South Asia is right within this global whirl and is subject to its buffets. Often, in conjunction with its neighbours and other littoral states, it calls for an international declaration for "neutralisation" or "denuclearisation" of the Indian Ocean region and making it a "zone of peace". Unfortunately, the imperatives of oil alone, not to mention other factors, make all such proposals sound no more than a rhetoric.

South Asia is a dynamic part of the world, developing and changing fast under the stress of several forces. Oil has joined these forces with its characteristic power and momentum, and pushed the region as it were to a crossroad, with a scenario which has dark as well as bright patches.

Its own output of oil is meagre. Prospects of increasing it are fair; this would take time and investment on a much larger scale than at present. Efforts are afoot to develop alternative forms of energy but this again is a matter of big resources and long haul. High oil prices, eating away scarce incomes, force all countries of the region, more or less, to lean upon outside assistance. With special oil funds created under the auspices of the United Nations and the OPEC, the scope for

such assistance has improved. But assistance from the industrialised states, themselves gripped by oil crisis, has shrunk. What falls to the share of the needy states has little relation to what oil has come to cost.

The upshot is that this vital, indispensable energy resource is scarce, has put enormous strain on the economies of the region, and added to the burdens of planners and politicians who are already concerned with a rather delicate fabric of national life. While oil is not wholly responsible for the authoritarian trends in South Asia, it has become a significant contributory factor.

A climate of detente pervades South Asia, and one might suppose that because oil is scarce and its supplies could be drastically cut in war, there would be less propensity to push old animosities to the brink of an armed conflict. But there is a fly in the ointment. Foreign oil money and enhanced maritime interests in offshore wealth, including oil, apart from divergent orientations and inbuilt mistrust, influence security considerations and promote tendencies to upgrade the armed forces.

South Asia must make up for its deficiency of oil from somewhere, and presently West Asia is about its only source. This has brought the two regions markedly close together, a significant development which has two aspects. West Asia supplies oil as well as petrodollars, thus contributing to the strength and stability of almost every South Asian state. On the other hand, in respect of a commodity vital for development and defence, most of South Asia has become critically dependent upon West Asia, with its notorious vagaries, tensions, clashes of interests and wars. The great arms build-up around the Gulf causes further apprehensions; and the fact that it has catapulted a new power balance, casts long shadows upon the neighbouring regions. This and the enhanced global interests in oil and concern for the security of its transportation through the Indian Ocean, add to the dimensions of security of the South Asian states. What path South Asians traverse eventually has thus become an open question.

PAKISTAN AIR POWER NEW DIRECTIONS

RAVI RIKHYE

AT the time of the 1971 War, the Pakistan Air Force's Order of Battle was :

No.	5	Fighter	Squadron	(Mirage 3)
No.	7	Bomber	Squadron	(B-57)
No.	8	Bomber	Squadron	(B-57)
No.	9	Fighter	Squadron	(F-104A)
No.	11	Fighter	Squadron	(MiG-19)
No.	14	Fighter	Squadron	(F-86)
No.	15	Fighter	Squadron	(F-86)
No.	16	Fighter	Squadron	(F-86)
No.	17	Fighter	Squadron	(Sabre Mk. 6)
No.	18	Fighter	Squadron	(Sabre Mk. 6)
No.	19	Fighter	Squadron	(Sabre Mk. 6)
No.	26	Fighter	Squadron	(F-86/Sabre Mk. 6 OCU)

In addition, No. 6 and 12 Squadrons operated transports, including 8 C-130Bs, and No. 2 and 3 Squadrons handled training. There was a reconnaissance flight with 4 RT-33A, 2 RB-57s and 3 Mirage 3RP.

The Army had three or four army aviation squadrons with O-1Es and Alouette 3s; there were a dozen-plus Mi-8s. The Air Force had 10+ HH-43 helicopters for rescue, plus some Alouette 3s. The Navy had two UH-19s for this job. Total number of rotorcraft was perhaps 40 in all services, and there were perhaps some 40+ O-1Es.

Only one squadron had modern equipment (No. 5 on Mirage) whereas India had 14 such squadrons (8 MiG-21 and 6 Su-7). Counting the OCU, there were 11 squadrons on less modern aircraft; India had 20 (Canberra, Marut, Gnat, and Hunter; Mysteres equal to two squadrons were also flying). India had 21 surface-to-air missile squadrons, Pakistan had none. India had a maritime reconnaissance squadron, albeit with obsolete and limited aircraft; Pakistan had none. India had a dedicated reconnaissance squadron plus other aircraft undertook this role from fighter squadrons. India had far more transports and helicopters.

Considering the limited numbers of PAF aircraft, the small number of modern fighters, the general lack of spares for older aircraft, the suspicion attached to Bengali officers and airmen, and the lack of SAMs and air control aircraft, none seriously expected the Pakistan Air Force to put up much of a fight, and indeed, aside from defending its air bases, it restricted the number of attack and ground-attack sorties except at Chaamb. To further add to the PAF's frustrations, its ordnance was old and would frequently fail to explode even when targets were hit.

The Indian Air Force proved itself to be highly professional, generally aggressive, and ready to innovate. This despite its massive and unweildy size, consisting as it did of almost a hundred thousand men scattered all over India, with dozens of differing types of aircraft ranging from junk to sophisticated fighters, and with a long roster of differing duties. The Pakistan Air Force proved little, except that it could be aggressive when defending its bases; Pakistan Army flak regiments stood their ground impressively.

It is essential to understand that the new PAF emerging in the period 1972-83 is a very different force from that the IAF faced in 1971, and that the air arms of the Pakistan Army and Navy have also undergone quantitative and qualitative changes.

To begin with the PAF, right after the 1971 War it had to disband No. 8 Squadron because of the shortage of B-57s, and No. 14 Squadron was lost in Bangladesh. The only modern equipment on order was a batch of 30 Mirage 5PA/DPs. No. 9 Squadron transitioned from the F-104A to the Mirage, and No. 14 Squadron was re-raised by 1974 on the MiG-19. Limitations on resources precluded rapid acquisition of Mirages, by now the standard first-line fighter in PAF service.

A first priority was an air defence ground environment, but the \$120-million price tag probably delayed the start of construction to 1975, for 1981 completion. There is little information on the Pakistan ADGE, but given the large amount of money, and given the relatively small size of post-1971 Pakistan, we may assume that the ADGE system will be comparable to the modern ones under installation in Israel and Taiwan. The price tag indicates some six primary stations and we may guess they are based around Karachi, Hyderabad, Multan, Lahore.

Unless the ADGE was paid for by a third party, and there is no evidence that this is the case, it must have absorbed a significant part of the PAF's modernisation budget after 1971. The 30 Mirages were

rumoured to have been paid for by Saudi Arabia: embargoed in 1971 because of the Pakistan Civil War, they were finally delivered by 1974.

As money became available, Pakistan ordered several small batches of Mirages. It was aided by a 1973 French credit for \$155-million in military equipment. There is some reason to believe that credits were extended by France also in 1975. The three last batches of Mirages included 10 Mirage 3RPs for 1977 delivery (under French 1973 credit); 8 Mirage 5 PAs for 1977 delivery to bring to strength Mirage squadrons (possibly under French 1973 credit); and 10 Mirage 5PAs ordered in early 1977 (possibly under 1975 French credit) to make good attrition and to provide additional reserves for Mirage squadrons.

With the delivery of the above mentioned 10 Mirage 5PAs, some 102 Mirages of all types (38 Mirage 3EP, 13 Mirage 3RP, 5 Mirage 3DP; 44 Mirage 5PA) will have been delivered to the PAF, for four fighter and a reconnaissance squadron.

We should recognise the ambiguities inherent in the Mirage question. First, consistent rumours have it that Libya and the Lebanon both transferred Mirages to Pakistan, the latter under Saudi payment. Additionally, Saudi is taking delivery of 38 Mirage 3Es. It is believed these are for Egypt, but it is also possible that some will be diverted to Pakistan.

Keeping in mind these ambiguities, and keeping in mind that wartime and attrition losses of the Mirage have been low, it being possible that not more than 8 aircraft have been lost to all causes since 1968 (one aircraft pre-1971, two aircraft in 1971 War; the rest later), it is possible that the 4-squadron force of Mirages has a Unit Establishment of 16 plus 4 to 8 reserves, with the trainers separate and the reconnaissance planes in a separate squadron. Even in the palmy days of massive US aid, the PAF never managed more than 16 UE+4 reserves for its Sabre squadrons.

Very few military planners fail to count the UAE Mirage squadron as a de facto fifth Mirage squadron available for the PAF. And there are ample Mirage reserves available from the UAE, Libya, and in the future even from Egypt. As long as it has the pilots, the PAF can afford to lose Mirages in combat without any reckoning. As for Mirage pilots, it is likely they average a pilot : plane ratio of 2 : 1 because so many are detached for duty in the UAE and Libya.

It is therefore entirely possible that something like 150+Mirages and an equivalent number of pilots are available to the PAF, aircraft

coming from its own and Arab stocks. Pakistan has pegged its post-1971 aircraft procurement plans on US aircraft. This is for two reasons. One, US aircraft tend to be cheaper than their European counterparts. Two, Pakistan has apparently been continuously pressing the US for resumption of arms sales on favourable terms.

The lifting of the US arms embargo on the Indian subcontinent in February 1975 was a major victory for Pakistan's efforts to obtain arms from the US. To start with, the US agreed on a case-by-case cash basis to examine requests for limited amounts of defensive weapons. Pakistan instead submitted a list for \$2-billion worth of arms, that included 900 tanks and 300 fighter aircraft. Obviously the Pakistani request assumed liberal credit terms, because that amount of cash may be simply presumed not to be available.

There is evidence to suggest that Pakistan made a request for 50 F-4 Phantoms, and even offered to pay in cash. The US refused this supply because the Phantom is an attack plane. Pakistan also examined the A-4, A-7 and A-10, and the F-5E. Much to India's surprise in the summer of 1976 the US Department of Defence announced its approval of sale to Pakistan of 110 A-7 Corsair IIs, to be paid for by Saudi Arabia. The aircraft would be delivered between 1978 and 1983. Because the US Navy has decided to procure more A-6 Intruders with the TRAM bombing system and to cut down on procurement of the A-7 Corsair, and because the US Air Force has decided to concentrate on purchase of the A-10 instead of the Corsair for the anti-tank role, the Pakistani Corsair deal was seen as important for keeping the production line for the Vought fighter. So much so that the Defence Department in the outgoing Republican administration asked Congress for six A-7s in the Financial Year 1978 budget simply to keep the Vought production line open for Pakistan.

The Corsair Sale was vetoed by President Jimmy Carter and the decision is unlikely to be reversed. Since, however, Pakistan has the cash, it promptly invited BAC/United Kingdom to promote the Jaguar, 100 of which will be procured for 4 fighter squadrons.

It is interesting that when the US Department of Defence approved Corsairs for Pakistan, it justified its action on the grounds that India had vastly superior ground forces and Pakistan required air power to stop India. This suggests that Pakistan had in mind a ground-attack role for these aircraft. Since Pakistan actually has parity on the ground, the planned acquisition of Corsairs suggested two things. One, Corsair has a deep-strike range, and Pakistan opted for the plane assuming that it could pass off Corsair as a ground-attack plane and therefore of no

offensive long-range threat to India. This dissimulation was presumably required for approval through the US Congress, which is reluctant to foster another arms race between India and Pakistan. Two, Corsair now probably Jaguar will become part of Pakistan's strike forces, and for the first time in the Indian sub-continent, we may see a combination of the strike fighter with the tank used for breakthrough on heavily defended fronts.

The question arises; has Pakistan made a mistake in first opting for Corsair then for Jaguar ? After all, the deep-strike/interdiction role is in great disrepute after the Vietnam War. Back home, it is very difficult to show that the mission justifies its cost. Pakistan could purchase almost twice as many A-10s as A-7s, and a A-10 request would probably have been conceded. The A-10 is a formidable tank killer and ground-support aircraft, carrying 18,000-lbs over short-ranges and with great accuracy.* It has an excellent loiter capability, permitting ground-support fire to be delivered within minutes of FACs requesting it. In short, the A-10 could open up new dimensions in ground war in the sub-continent, and 200 aircraft would prove a deadly addition to Pakistan's strike power. Of course, the A-10 has zero deep-strike potential.

If Pakistan is to attack with conventional bombs for deep-strike, then passing up twice as many A-10s for the A-7 Jagaur may have been a mistake. But Pakistan could employ "smart" bombs, which have effectively put deep-strike/interdiction back in business. Also, because our MiG-21 is shortranged, the Jaguar could force us to tie up the greater part of our interceptor strength simply to protect against its threat.

The Jaguar will replace four Sabre squadrons. It is likely that Nos 5, 8, 9, and 15 Squadrons now fly the Mirage, and that Nos 16, 17, 18 and 19 Squadrons will take the new fighter. This will permit the modernisation of two-thirds of the PAF. There seems to be little doubt that the MiG-19 will be phased out in favour of the F-5, but there are some baffling questions facing India in this regard.

Chief among them is: has Iran transferred 40 F-5As to Pakistan or not? A number of sources report IRAN has, and Indian sources suggest that the aircraft may remain based in Iran for the time being, this being the reason they have not been identified in Pakistan. Also, there is no doubt that Pakistani pilots are completely familiar with this aircraft,

*In a recent US simulated exercise two A-10s operating from a forward base flew 34 attack sorties at a 100 mile radius in 11 hours.

flying it regularly in Saudi Arabia and Iran. These countries and Jordan have several hundred F-5Es between them. Till Pakistan gets its own F-5Es, there is a good chance that Sabre and MiG-19 pilots have been trained to fly Arab and Iranian F-5Es, and that in wartime a number of these aircraft would fly-in to Pakistani bases. In other words, Pakistan may already de facto have modernised part of its MiG-19 force in this manner.

The F-5E is, at any rate, an inexpensive aircraft, and there is no reason why Pakistan could not obtain enough for 4 squadrons by 1983 on its own, possibly with some financial aid from Saudi Arabia. And there is no shortage of reserve aircraft available with friends.

Thus, the next war could see a lineup including 150+ Mirages, 100+ Strike fighters, and 150+ F5Es or 100 modernised MiG-19s. The Mirages and the strike fighters will be able to carry "smart" bombs: the Mirage 3/5 can carry one Martel and the Jaguar can carry four Martel. The updating of MiG-19s with new/attack systems, Sidewinders and ejection seats suggests the PAF is not overly subjective about the possibility of replacing the MiG-19s: this modernisation gives it more time to find a replacement. The F-5E can carry the Maverick anti-tank guided bomb.

Pakistan is not likely to get hundreds of these bombs, but even 50-100 Martel and 200-300 Maverick could give it a very major advantage in a first strike. And, of course, the Mirage and Jaguar will carry advanced air-to-air missiles, exceeding in range and capability anything we have.

With some 400 first-line fighters available, from all sources, Pakistan could lose 200 and still maintain its basic strength of 200 (12 squadrons \times 16 aircraft UE). The real limitation is on pilots: even more Mirages and F-5Es are available from friendly states.

Pakistan has apparently established a requirement for the US Hawk SAM. Hawk is not a cheap system, and though its acquisition costs may not be considerably more than those of comparable Soviet SAMs like SAM-6, Pakistan will be limited by cash considerations in the number of batteries it can purchase. Yet Hawk is rated some 6 or more times effective than Soviet SAMs after it was extensively tested in the 1973 Mideast War; generally a single firing battery (6 to 9 launchers depending on country and practice) is adequate to provide close defence for a major target. Possibly the requirement is for 6 batteries of 6 launchers, to protect the ADGE centres and major air bases,

For the rest, we may expect Pakistan to continue replacing obsolete transports with the C-130E/H, and to increase the total number to about 16. 40+ New jet trainers probably US T-2s, are on its way to replace the T-33s and T-37s. It also may be noted that the number of helicopter in Pakistan Air Force service has increased to 37: 10 HH-43, 14 Alouette, 1 Puma, 12 Bell 47s.

Air support to the Pakistan Navy has significantly increased since 1971. Three Atlantic reconnaissance/ASW aircraft now operate with the PAF's No. 29 Squadron. These were paid for under the 1973 French credit. One suspects that at least two more aircraft may eventually be procured, to permit one for attrition reserve and to allow two aircraft to be continuously airborne in an emergency. The Pakistan Navy is taking delivery of six Seakings, four outfitted with the Exocet anti-ship missile for surface strike, and the other two for the ASW mode. Four Alouette 3s may also be operational with the Pakistan Navy. We may assume that more Seakings will be procured, if only because two seems inadequate for coastal ASW.

Pakistan Army aviation is undergoing a significant change. It is likely that the number of Corps and Army support squadrons has increased to 6. First, the number of helicopters was stepped up to 40 (20 Alouette 3, 20 Bell 47) then 10 CH-47C Chinooks appeared on loan from Iran and authorised by the United States. The Chinook can carry 10-tons or 60-troops under optimum conditions.

Next, the Pakistan Army established a requirement for 100 Hughes 500M anti-tank helicopters, operating with 4 TOW ATGMs or 14 2.75" HEAT rockets, and 7.62 mm machineguns or the Hughes 30 mm anti-AFV gun. The helicopter will carry the "Black Hole" infra-red suppression gear, this reduces exhaust temperatures to the point a man can keep his hand on the outside of the exhaust while the engine is running. Mission range is given as 300-miles, which translates to about a 3 hour endurance. 34 helicopters are required for delivery, 66 for assembly, at a factory at Campbellpur. The Indian Attack Light Helicopter, we may note, will enter service in 1983, though of course there will be by then some 40 helicopters flying with ATGMs.

The Pakistan contracted to purchase 35 Puma medium helicopters from France, possibly part of the 1975 deal with France. The Puma has a capability similar to the Mi-8, though it is, of course, a much more modern helicopter and less performance-limited in less-than-optimum conditions. Somewhat confusing is the planned introduction

of the Super Frelon heavy helicopter into PAF service. Four are to be procured possibly a first increment. One assumes the Chinook would have been better from the viewpoint of commonality, but perhaps since credits available from France, finance was the deciding factor. Probably the Super Frelons are to be used for air-base support. Their introduction may indicate the possibility of dispersed PAF operations in wartime from temporary bases.

Clearly Pakistan intends to establish a considerable airmobile warfare capability. Considering the static and locked fronts from Tithwal to Kasur, such a move makes sense. We may, however, express surprise that resource-limited Pakistan should be prepared to make such an investment in helicopters. Does this mean Pakistan is not as resource-limited as we assume in India, or does it mean that a fundamental change is in offing in Pakistani strategy? Within hours these helicopters, working in conjunction with supporting Mi-8/Chinook/Puma, could shift their location within a 300-mile radius. The possibilities are many, especially with the kind of strong air support Pakistan will now be able to deploy.

For the rest, Pakistan has on order 9 Crotale SAM batteries. It may be assumed they will operate with the armoured formations, perhaps on a scale of two batteries for a division and one for an armoured brigade. Crotale is much more mobile than Tigercat, which is good for fixed installation defence, and is probably a more capable missile. Nine batteries are not enough to make a quantitative difference to Pakistan's air defence of field formations, unless all nine are used to cover the two armoured divisions. Nonetheless, they will represent another increase in capability on the margin. If deployed with the armoured divisions only, then at least these formations will gain a formidable air defence capability.

It can be seen that all three Pakistani services have greatly increased their capability for strike, interception, air defence, reconnaissance, ASW, and helicopter operations. It is time we started serious countermeasures to neutralise this increased capability.

THE SAPPER—SOLDIER OR ENGINEER

BRIGADIER N B GRANT

WHEN a seven-year old grandson of a Sapper officer was asked as to what he intended doing when he grew up, without batting an eyelid he replied, that he was going to be a soldier. When asked whether he would join his grandfather's arm of service, again without batting an eyelid the lad said, that he wanted to join the infantry. When asked why, the boy looked straight into the old man's eyes and replied, because he wanted to become a general. Even a seven-year old realised, that his grand-dad's Corps was fast reaching the end of the line.

There was a time, when the cream of gentlemen cadets at the IMA invariably opted for the Engineers, then the elite arm of the Service. It was the Corps which laid a premium on ingenuity and technical brilliance. It was also the Corps which gave maximum opportunities for its officers to rise to the highest command and staff appointments in the army. It was a Corps of all corps. If the Infantry was the 'queen' of the battle, the Sapper was the 'kingpin' around which the battle revolved. Such then was his fame, such then was his glory. The Sapper was on top of it all, and in the midst of everything. This is why he took the 'Wings' as his regimental march, and the 'Sarwatra' as his Corps motto.

Suddenly at the height of its glory, Op 'Amar' cast its first shadow on the Corps, and the slide started. However any serious damage to its prestige was prevented by the Aksaichin incident with the establishment of the Border Roads Organisation. Added to this, the aftermath of the Chinese invasion, also brought in its wake tremendous amount of construction activities. All this gave the Corps an opportunity to once again assert itself, and take its rightful place in the centre of all activities. Gradually its prestige rose again, and was at its zenith, when Pakistan invaded Kashmir for the second time.

The 22 days war was the crucial turning point. As ill-luck would have it, it was during this period, that some of the newly created 'Sapper Tactical Commanders' were tested in battle under conditions which could not guarantee success. This however gave a golden opportunity to the 'Teeth Arm Trio' to proclaim, that only members

of their clan could be trusted with the successful command of a formation in war. We now know, that the so called shortcomings of the Sapper Formation Commanders were not due to any individual failings, but were due to circumstances beyond their control. Nevertheless, the fact remains, that in the eyes of the army, the Sapper was made to appear as having failed in outside command appointments and unfortunately the war was too short for those within the Corps to achieve anything spectacular even in the purely engineering field.

The Corps has never really recovered from this position, although it did manage a flicker during the Bangladesh operation. Possibly as a result of this, its prestige even on the Works side has suffered, what with the staff and the users having taken over control even of the purely technical functions of the Works Services. As matters stand, the Corps is today at the reviving end from all sides, whether it be with troops or with the Works Services. However there is nothing to be alarmed at this, as the REs went through a similar phase in UK immediately after the war. The aim of this paper is to analyse the cause and suggest a course of action for its recovery.

EFFECT OF THE CORPS CAREER PATTERN

Of all the reasons, that have contributed to the present unsatisfactory position, the main one appears to be a lack of clear understanding regarding the career pattern of the Engineer officer. Various informal definitions have been given at various levels and at various times regarding the ultimate goal of career planning in the Corps. Some are of the view, that the Sapper officer's highest ambition should be to one day be the Chief Engineer of a Command, and that his entire training should be geared for this purpose alone. Others place their sights higher, and maintain, that there is no reason why the Sapper officer should not command a brigade or even a division, and hence qualify for the highest command and staff appointments in the army. There are still others who take a philosophical view of the whole affair and state, that "in my time we never bothered about becoming Generals, tut tut; our highest ambition was to command our regiment and in turn our regimental centre; it is the pleasure of serving that should matter and not the rank which goes with it--brave words, except that they normally are the views of those officers who have since attained General rank.

Let us face it, that every officer worth his salt, that joins the forces either as a Sapper, or for that matter in any other arm of the Service, has an inner ambition to one day reach the top, and in this respect he hopes, that all things being equal, we will not be

debarred from achieving his ambition by being in the 'wrong' Corps. Let us also face the bitter fact, that as things stand today, the Sapper does appear to be in the 'wrong' Corps, and whether it be due to his own folly or otherwise, senior command and staff appointments are generally denied to him in practice, if not officially on paper.

So far the Corps has had no clear cut policy, based on which the Sapper officers' career pattern could be processed through well defined channels. It believed in keeping it vague, and enjoyed having a finger in every pie. By trying to keep one leg in each field, the Sappers wanted themselves to be considered an arm and a service at the same time. They hoped, that by this method they would enjoy the benefits of both without making any overall sacrifices. They have now realised that this was not to be. They also realised, that a few 'crumbs' in the way of a brigade or GS staff appointments are thrown at them occasionally, so to say, to keep them happy, but they are seldom invited to the main banquet of higher command.

Somehow the feeling however still seem to persist that, it is important and essential, that the best officers of the Corps should seek careers outside it, for on them depends the Corps' military reputation and stature. In support of this, examples are quoted from what happens in the other armies, like those in UK or USA.

To begin with, let us appreciate the fact, that whether it be in the USA, Britain or even in India, their respective Corps of Engineers has become famous, not for producing 5 star generals and Field Marshals, but for their River Valley Projects, the Lido Road, the Desert Railway, the Roorkee Canals, the bridging of the Rhine and Irrawadi, the roads constructed by the Border Roads Organisation, and a host of engineering works conducted in war and peace. These works were executed and engineered by the men who remained in the Corps, and not by the Gordons, Roberts, Kitchners, Washingtons, MacArthurs and Taylors, who although did belong to their respective Corps of Engineers at one time, cannot by any stretch of imagination claim credit for the reputation and the glory of their respective Corps. Even with us, it is really the officers who stayed on in the Corps and worked for it, who are largely responsible for its one time greatness. In this respect, those one time Sappers, who left the Corps to seek their fortunes in the other arms, and who although perhaps may have proved good infantry tacticians, and also may have been good engineers in their individual rights, cannot really claim credit for the prestige, reputation and the good name that the Corps once enjoyed. If anything it is ironical, that although the Corps at one time had three Engineer Lieutenant Generals and three Major

Generals serving outside the Corps (a feat which will not get itself repeated in a decade), yet the Corps has not been able to really recover its former military stance.

It is common sense, that no good Sapper will want to leave the Corps, if the latter can provide him ample career opportunities within it. The fact, that today a lot of the Corps' good officers want to seek their career prospects outside, is because the Corps has not been able to provide them with higher appointments within the Corps. This exodus and braindrain must of necessity therefore result in the following anomaly:—

- (a) If all the good officers aspiring for higher ranks, leave the Corps to better their prospects outside, we will be left with only mediocre ones in the Corps itself. This is self-evident and does not require further elucidation.
- (b) By constantly looking over his shoulder for securing an appointment outside the Corps, the good Engineer officer will begin to pay less importance to his technical profession, and will be more interested in infantry tactics. This must ultimately result in the lowering of the overall technical tone of the Corps.
- (c) If only Sapper officers graded 'outstanding' can aspire for the command of an infantry brigade, it automatically entails, that the Sappers are accepting the fact, that the post of an Infantry Brigade Commander is superior to that of a Zonal or Corps Chief Engineer.

To sum up, by the good officers being forced to leave the Corps in order to improve their career prospects, the effect on the Corps will be to—

- (a) staff it with mediocre officers left in it,
- (b) lower its general engineering efficiency and technical tone,
- (c) equate the outstanding Engineer officers with the Infantry man of average calibre.

THE MILITARY ASPECT OF ENGINEERING

How often has it been said, that the Sapper is a soldier first and only then an engineer. There appears to be a grave misconception in this statement. There can be no doubt in any one's mind, that the Sapper is foremost a soldier. In this respect he is as much a soldier as members of the other arms and services. What however is not realised, that the Sapper must always be an engineer soldier and not

an infantry one. Here then is the dichotomy. When it is said, that the Sapper is a soldier, we mean that he is a military engineer. However, how many of us have confused this basic definition, and expect the Sapper to behave like an infantry man? In this connection, it must be clearly understood, that within the military orbit, the Sapper must remain an engineer first and only then an infantry tactician.

No commander expects his Signals officer to be a first rate tactician, but he does expect him to put his line and wireless communications through. Similarly, no commander expects his EME officer to draw up a tactical plan, but he certainly expects, that the repair and recovery operations will function efficiently within the commander's tactical plan. So it goes on for all other arms and services. Even so, as far as the Sapper is concerned he need not be a super tactician, but he must be able to make roads and bridges to further the commander's tactical plan. In this respect Sapper will only be able to advise his commander tactically as to which road to take or which bridge to blow, if he is technically competent to construct those roads and bridges. If today the Sapper is accused of not being sound tactically, it is because perhaps he is basically not sound technically, and as such cannot advise his commander on the engineering aspect of the tactical plan. To sum up, the Sapper must remain a soldier, but in his soldering he must first be an engineer and only then an infantry tactician. The fallacy today appears in reversing this role, with the result, that the commander no longer seeks engineer advice, which his Sapper Commander appears technically incompetent to give.

Psychologically this situation has been further aggravated by the upgrading of the GSOIs and AQMGs appointments in the Division. Whereas in the former days the Commander Engineers was a 'big man' in his formation, today he has to play second fiddle to the Col GS and Col 'Q'. Although in theory the OC Engineer Regiment (no longer Commander Engineers) has a direct access to his Divisional Commander, in practice, for obvious reason, this does not happen. What a comedown from the days when the Commander Engineers was the right hand man of the GOC, and the OC Fd Coy of his affiliated Brigade Commander.

CONCLUSION

The Sapper must once again dominate the scene with technical competence, only then will he be able to also have a say in evolving the tactical plan. This technical competence in turn can only be achieved if the Corps is prepared to accept that—


- (a) its good engineer officers do not leave the Corps, and seek

their fortunes outside. This in turn can only be achieved if it can guarantee them higher ranks within the Corps itself. Those officers however, who for some reason feel, that they are not technically competent to have a future in the Corps, should be permitted and even encouraged to leave for outside command appointments, the earlier the better. However it is for consideration, whether such officers be permitted to return back to the Corps, and specially so if they appear to have failed outside. In this category we should not include for obvious reasons, those officers who do a tenure in Border Roads, Research and Development or certain General Staff appointments and then return to the Corps.

- (b) it must stop 'playing soldiers', and take the correct view of what is meant by the saying that "the Sapper is a soldier first and only then an engineer". There can be no doubt, that the Sapper must always remain a soldier, that is why he is in uniform, however his military duties dictate, that he must first be an engineer and only then an infantry tactician. Primarily the commander wants the Sapper's technical skill and not his tactical advice. Only if the Sapper is in a position to render the former, will he be consulted on the latter.

If the Sappers want once again to march with the "Wings", and bask in their motto of "Sarwatra", they must concentrate on the engineering aspect of their profession and thus infuse in the Corps its former technical brilliance. Only then will they be able to re-fix their position in the tactical orbit of military glory.

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PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS

LIEUT COLONEL J.K. DUTT

INTRODUCTION

GUIDED missiles have been in use for many decades now. They have been employed in operations by a number of countries, some with good and some with mediocre results. The essential problem in any weapon system of this nature is connected with guidance—in the main, terminal guidance. There is no doubt that a missile is more expensive than a normal artillery or tank gun round. Therefore, it becomes all the more necessary to ensure that a target engaged by a missile should be hit with the minimum number of missiles fired: ideally by the first one. Military scientists have been carrying out fairly exhaustive trials on techniques of terminal guidance. They have now been able to derive certain methods of imparting reasonably accurate guidance and consequently, a new term has been introduced in the missile vocabulary, namely, Precision Guided Munitions or PGM as an acronym.

The military definition of a PGM would be “a guided missile whose chances of obtaining a first round hit at maximum range are more than half.” Tactically speaking, this means targets like fighting vehicles, aircraft and static installations can be hit much more quickly and effectively with PGM than with the type of weapons currently in use. It follows, therefore, that the introduction of PGM on the battlefield will have certain radical effects on tactics and logistics, not to mention strategic planning also. The aim of this article is to study the effects of PGM warfare on tactics and logistics, with particular reference to the ground forces.

PRECISION GUIDANCE TECHNIQUES

Basically, the PGM system involves an operator studying a target scene either as real life or represented pictorially, selecting a target, placing a cursor setting on it, and completing a missile firing circuit to actuate an automatic seeker. Some precision guidance techniques have emanated as a result of experimentation and have been accepted as more reliable than the earlier ones. In the anti-tank field, the launch point command technique seems to have established its dependability with regard to the missiles fired from surface launchers as also from the attack helicopter. In essence, the technique incorporates steering

commands being fed to the missile after launch, generally by means of an infra-red tracker, gradually reducing the angle between the launch pad-missile and launch pad-target, till the missile fires a course approximately along the line of sight to the target. The operator need keep only the target in the reticle of his sighting system. Operative examples of this technique are the American TOW, Franco-German HOT and MILAN, French SS-12 and Russian SWATTER AT-2. Reach out ranges vary from 2000 to 6000 metres.

A technique currently predominant with the anti-tank missiles launched from ground attack aircraft is the homing device. In this method, a stabilised television camera fitted in the nose of the missile continuously feeds automatic tracking and guidance signals into the missile's circuits. Also incorporated is a lock-on mechanism which ensures that the missile keeps seeking the target after launch. The aircraft can leave any time after launching the missile. A typical example of this category is the American MAVERICK fired from the *Phantom* aircraft. A modified version using laser guidance is also in the offing, known as ROCKEYE.

In anti-aircraft engagements, the infra red seeker system has gained predominance. Examples are the Russian SA-7 and American STINGER.

In engaging targets like installations or other non-movers, the choice of laser as the prime guidance agency is undoubtedly proven. This was used with tremendous effect in Viet Nam by the Americans. In fact, with their PAVEWAY family of bombs, the US Air Force used to achieve anything up to 80 per cent reliability in guidance. A later version of this bomb is the BULLDOG.

In the futuristic field, two techniques are currently under proving trials. The first is the optical area correlator, in which a device uses its electronic circuits to compare a map like picture of the terrain-cum-target with a reference photo taken by a reconnaissance aircraft from a very high altitude. Tests have shown that this method of map matching terminal guidance is extremely difficult to jam. The second technique involves transposition of the map coordinates of a target into temporary electronic coordinates and guiding the PGM to the latter along the entire flight path. But by far the most sensational achievement has been the employment of the RPV (remotely piloted vehicle) as a PGM link. This has been effectively incorporated in the MIMS—multiple independently manoeuvring submunitions—Weapon system, wherein a bunch of missiles are released from a cluster bomb and find their way to individual targets. Also, a RPV which itself is a PGM, is designated as a

Kamikaze RPV.

The resultant effect of all this on war is rather succinct—a target can be hit with the first or second PGM. There is no scope of having to range on to it in the normal manner, as far as the receiving end is concerned. Obviously, this new facet of warfare is going to make tacticians and logisticians sit up and think, particularly in view of the two acceptable premises advocated by the boffins. These are, first, accuracy is no longer dependable on range or ballistics and secondly, PGM can be mass produced at reasonably economical rates.

EFFECT ON TACTICS

The first implication of PGM warfare on tactics is that it will not be prudent to concentrate forces in the conventional manner during operations. Concentrations will have to be dispensed in small groups over a large area.

It follows, next, that command and control will have to be decentralised. Junior leaders will have to resort to independent decisions, sometimes crucial ones, and this entails emplacing far greater responsibilities on them. Obviously, a very high degree of junior leadership will have to be achieved and maintained. Alternate headquarters will have to be designated unit level upwards.

Mobile warfare will be the order of the day. Any effort to hold ground will be inviting disaster. The defender, in particular, will have to sacrifice ground and await an opportunity for a suitable strike-time.

Radio communications will not only have to be infallible but should be multiple. Electronic warfare with regard to communications and counter measures will gain overriding importance. A special over-watch has to be maintained round the clock to detect guidance signals of incoming PGM.

With regard to ground equipment, the trend will be to produce a large number of inexpensive land vehicles with good cross country capability rather than a proportionate number of expensive armoured fighting vehicles. Since the emphasis will be on speed coupled with the ability to cover distance and elusiveness, the attack helicopter will take precedence over the tank. A modified version of the American TRICAP Division with greater emphasis on attack helicopter and airmobile infantry teams could be the answer. A very interesting theory has been put forward by some protagonists in connection with battlefield mobility for the infantry. They have advocated the reintroduction of the horse as a mode of carriage as, they contend, it would not be cost-effective to use

a PGM to kill a horse vis-a-vis an infantry combat vehicle !

Camouflage and concealment will require unprecedented efforts. Presently, PGM warfare is dependent on the operator's ability to see and identify the target. Well camouflaged units will have an in-built evasive advantage. At the same time, employment of decoys will become a prime subject in the sphere of deception and surprise.

Night operations will be the norm for major offensives. PGM are not very effective at night due to non-visibility of targets. Therefore, this characteristic can be usefully exploited for conventional attacks and special missions. Similarly, such operations will pay good dividend during inclement weather like rain, fog, smoke, haze and dust.

The anti-aircraft capability of the ground forces will become considerably more effective as a result of availability of PGM for this task. Consequently, a much lesser proportion of air effort may be allocated for counter air operations. Air effort may be increased instead for strategic tasks.

A significant factor in combat intelligence will be the acquisition of information relating to PGM launch sites, particularly after the artillery has been fully integrated in PGM warfare. Conversely, the attacking forces themselves will have to constantly jockey for such sites.

Due to its long range and high hit probability, a much lesser scaling of PGM will be adequate as compared to the present authorisation of missiles and allied weaponry.

EFFECT ON LOGISTICS

As with tactics, the main recourse that logistics will require in order to escape punishment by PGM, will be dispersion of stocks. At all levels of control, stocks will have to be dispersed over a wide area in mobile composite groups. It may not be wise to have these groups on a commodity basis, for obvious reasons.

Base depots and industrial complexes producing war materials will have to be securely guarded with ECM and anti-aircraft weapons. These areas will be the most lucrative targets for PGM.

As far as the administrative delivery system goes, innumerable small groups of vehicles with less payload will have to be resorted to rather than vehicles with larger payloads. This will, in turn give rise to acute traffic control problems as also repair and recovery.

It may be even worthwhile to increase the fast expendable ad-

ministrative holdings at unit level and correspondingly decrease the holdings in the higher echelons. Of course, the command and control problems in the unit will have to be weighed against the advantage of prolonged availability of these holding and possibly a *via media* obtained.

Lines of communications for the land forces will have to have duplicate medium. This means irrespective of the number of administrative axes that may be available on terra firma, an alternative air supply route must be planned for.

GUIDANCE TECHNICALITIES

It would be interesting to get a brief insight into the technical aspects of precision guidance. Since infrared is in maximum vogue, it provides the best study. The optically visible spectrum encompasses the wavelength span of 0.4 to 0.7 micron. A micron is one-millionth of a metre : it is also known as a micrometer. The infra-red wave length spectrum covers from 0.7 micron to over 100 microns. There are two windows in the infra-red spectrum which are most suited for detection of targets by ray reflection, namely 3 to 5 and 8 to 14 micron windows. Essentially, infra-red detector mechanisms use the environmental attitude of the difference in temperature between a target and its surrounding background to pick up a directional ray reflection. This reflection can be arrested in its strongest form in the two window regions mentioned, where there is minimum atmospheric absorption of the reflected ray.

A major factor influencing the quantum of reflected strength is the presence of water vapour. If the water vapour content of the atmosphere is 5 grammes per cubic metre, the reflection strength on a clear day would be in the region of 85 per cent; with 10 grammes it would be 70 per cent, and with 15 grammes the strength would be 55 per cent. With regard to haze and smoke, if the diameter of their particles in the atmosphere is less than approximately one-tenth the infra-red wavelength, no major absorption may be feared. However, fog and cloud, which are basically conglomeration of water particles, severely attenuate ray reflection because their particle sizes are of about the same wavelength as portions of the infra-red spectrum.

Besides infra-red, two other media of the electronic spectrum being used for guidance are Millimetre Wave, spanning 35 to 140 Gigahertz—one Gigahertz is 10 raised to the power of nine cycles per second—and Microwave, spanning 3 to 10 Gigahertz. Both these media have good cloud and fog penetration capabilities. The main theme in

both aims at improving the signal-to-noise ratio derived from a target. Microwave, in particular, capitalises on two attendant aids—a great contrast between the target and its background, and the presence of space around the target. Both these aids are available in the engagement of aircraft and ships.

CONCLUSION

The advent of PGM has brought about some extraordinary changes in our concepts of tactics and logistics. PGM have a high hit probability due to extremely effective terminal guidance. However, since the accuracy is dependent on visibility of the target, it will still be possible to carry out major manoeuvres under cover of darkness.

Controlled dispersion, mobile warfare and ECM will be the main dictums on the PGM battlefield. Protection of logistic establishments will require greater insurance than of now.

It is time that we started giving some serious thoughts to PGM warfare. It is quite conceivable that in the foreseeable future, our adversaries might obtain a generation of PGM. It would be rather unpleasant for us to discover its reality as target-end recipients of these munitions! Therefore, it would be prudent on our part to evolve our own doctrines beforehand and disseminate them to all concerned. Also, a project to develop our own indigenous PGM could be qualified by the General Staff and given to the Indian Space Research Organisation, who could, in collaboration with the Electronics Commission, of India, produce an embryonic PGM. Subsequent development could then be undertaken in greater perspective and a complete PGM weapon system be introduced in our armoury. This would pay us very handsome dividends in times to come.

45TH RATTRAY'S SIKHS DURING THE PATHAN REVOLT, 1897

LIEUT COLONEL GULCHARAN SINGH (RETD.)

IN July 1897, a mullah known as "the Mullah of Swat", or commonly known as "the Mad Mullah", had raised a banner of Jihad (a holy war) against the infidels (i.e. the British). He had started his crusade from upper Swat, and his fame spread to the Khaibar and even to Kabul. With him he carried a thirteen-year-old boy, whom he declared to be the only surviving claimant to the throne of Delhi. On 26th July, at Aladand, a village near Chakdara, the Mullah claimed that he could, with the aid of miracles that he could work, oust the British from Chakdara, and then from the Malakand Pass; this would be followed by their ouster from the whole of the North West Frontier Province.

The "forward policy" adopted by the British rulers during 1890 had not been to the liking of the tribesmen; and the latter had even killed a Political Officer in upper Tochi in Waziristan.

Also, the British had annoyed the Muslim world by their actions in Turkey. During the recent war between Greece and Turkey, the British had "abused" the latter which infuriated Sultan Abdul Hamid II, whose agents were also alleged to be operating on the Frontier. The Amir of Afghanistan, being unhappy with the Durand Line, delimiting the Afghan boundary, also gave helping hand to the Mullah's Jihad. In 1897, the Amir addressing the Frontier mullahs exhorted them to do away with the infidel rule.

BRITISH NOT PREPARED

The British were not prepared for this, although, reports of the Mullah's progress were received daily. No one believed that the trouble would spread beyond Swat, and thus they thought it could be easily dealt with. According to Winston Churchill, who was present there, "everybody doubted if there would be a rising, nor did anyone imagine that even should one occur, it would lead to more than a skirmish. The natives were friendly and respectful. The Valley smiled in fertile prosperity." So affairs went on in the normal way.

When the British occupied Chitral, it was considered essential to hold Chakdara and the Malakand Pass, in order to keep open the line and thus facilitate replenishment of the Chitral garrison. These places to start with were temporarily occupied in order to facilitate the relief of Chitral. But, unless it was decided to vacate Chitral, these two posts had to be kept occupied ; if either was lost, Chitral would be cut off again.

45th Rattray's Sikhs (now 3rd Battalion The Sikh Regiment), then commanded by Lt-Col. H.A. Sawyer, who were at Mian Mir received orders for a move to Malakand where the unit arrived on 12th April 1896, and was accommodated in tents. Fort Chakdara built on a rock on the banks of the Swat river, is located 11 miles from Malakand and was then occupied by a force composed of 200 bayonets of 45 Rattray's, a detachment of cavalry, three guns and about 150 followers, under the command of Major H.N. McRae of 45th Rattray. To Major McRae it appeared to be "such a pretty place. A lovely river along the Valley, passing just below our walls ; corn fields all round and distant hills everywhere."¹ The Garrison had but one problem, water. The regiment was not allowed more than 200 *mussacks* (leather water containers, a day. Half of the quantity was supplied by a water-point one quarter of a mile away ; and the other half was fetched on mules from a place 14 miles away, twice a day.

Malakand position has been described by the official historian as follows :—

"The Malakand position was somewhat extended. The fort was built on a spur running down from Guides Hill on the south-west to the Kotal ; north of this, in an irregular hollow known as the "crater," were the camps of the 24th Punjabis, 45th Sikhs, and Sappers and Miners, with the Engineer park and Commissariat office and stores. The various enclosures were surrounded by abatis and wire entanglements, and piquets were posted on the high ground to the north. About three-quarters of a mile to the north-west was a second camp, called North Camp, which was situated on a piece of flat open ground and protected by a breastwork and obstacles. The two camps were connected by a well-made road. From the Kotal (a large blockhouse which defended the actual pass) the newly-made Chitral Road (known as the graded road) ran through the Crater Camp and, passing between the Castle Rock spur and Gibraltar Hill, led down to the Swat Valley. Further east the old Buddhist Road, of which only a rough track remained, ran in a more or less parallel direction through a succession of narrow gorges."²

1. Regiment History of the 45th Rattray's Sikhs, Colonel H.St.G.M. McRae' Vol. I, P. 330.

TRIBESMEN'S ADVANCE

On 26th July, the officers played polo at Malakand as usual. Lt. Rattray also came from Chakdara to join the game. Major H.A. Deane, the Political Agent, did not play polo that afternoon and stayed back at his office at Chakdara. It was then that he received messages that thousands of tribesmen had gathered, and an attack was expected soon. He reported the matter to the garrison commander, Brigadier-General Meiklejohn, who immediately sent for the Guides from Mardan, and alerted all the troops under his command. Soon this was followed by another message from Chakdara that the tribesmen were advancing towards Aladund, Lt.-Col. McRae was ordered to leave at midnight and hold the Amandara Pass before it fell into the rebels hands. He had under him, 45th Rattary's, two guns of 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, two companies of 31st Punjab, and the squadron 11th Lancers. The remainder of the Brigade was to follow under the garrison Commander.

But, the situation took a sudden turn. At about 2230 hours, a levy Jemadar brought the news that "The Fakir had passed Khar and was advancing towards Malakand, and that neither levies nor people would act against him, and that the hills to the east of the camp were covered with Pathans."³ At this time all the officers were in the Mess. The D.A.A.G. of the force asked Lt.-Col. McRae to sound the Alarm, which he immediately did, and himself with Major Taylor and a handful of Sikhs rushed to a deep gorge about a quarter of a mile from the Malakand, Kotal Camp. (This gorge was the only entrance into the Camp from the Khar side.) In his own words, McRae, on arrival there, found "a mass of the enemy, some thousand strong, creeping silently and stealthily up the mountainsides towards the Kotal Camp."⁴

This small party held the defile for nearly half an hour, till the Regiment started arriving there in small parties. The Sikhs fired on the tribesmen who started shrieking and cursing. They (Pathans) climbed the hillside and started hurling stones on the detachment. The Colonel and all the Sikhs were hit ; Major Taylor was mortally wounded, and he died two days later. Later, the Pathans in overwhelming numbers attacked the ridge held by the Regiment ; but finding " a cool and steady resistance" the Pathans retired at 2 A.M. Brigadier-General Meiklejohn appreciated the action of the small detachment of 45th which saved the Kotal Camp and also the lives of hundreds of men. He said : "There is no doubt that the gallant resistance made by this small body in the gorge, against vastly superior numbers, saved the camp from being

3. Official Despatch quoted in North-West Frontier, P. 236.

4. Quoted in History of 45th Rattray's Sikhs, P. 337.

rushed on that side, and I cannot speak too highly of the behaviour of Lt-Col. McRae and Major Taylor on this occasion." In the morning Rattray's Sikhs occupied a line of picquets covering the right of the Kotal Camp. These picquets were held till 2nd August, when advance was ordered for the relief of Chakdara. Meanwhile, to the right of the Sikhs, the Pathans marched to clear a 24th Punjab Picquet and enter the camp; this was followed by fighting on the graded road, fighting in the bazaar, on the football ground, in the commissariat lines, in the field engineers park. On this Brigadier Meiklejohn sent for reinforcements, and by 3.30 A.M., the area was cleared of Pathans.

ATTACK REPULSED

On the 27th, the North Camp was evacuated, and stores, etc. were brought to the Kotal Camp. The 24th Punjabis, who were holding the hills to the north of the Kotal Camp, were attacked by Pathans that evening at about 8.30 P.M. The attack was repulsed, and the Punjabis drove the enemy away pursuing them for about two miles.

On the Chakdara side, the fort was attacked by about a thousand Pathans on the night of 26/27th July: the attack was repulsed. The Pathans again attacked the fort once during day and twice during the night of 27/28th July. Their communication with Malakand which had been broken, were reestablished on 29th for a short time. They informed that though the fort was held, they were running short of food and ammunition.

The Pathans had that day received more reinforcements and they attacked Malakand again at 9.33 P.M. on two flanks. At 2 A.M. on 30th a tremendous attack was launched on the Chakdara fort, this time led by the "Mad Mullah" himself. The Mullah was wounded, he left the field and the attack petered out. The enemy suffered heavy casualties. On the night of 30/31 July 45th Rattray's were again attacked by the Pathans who were repulsed with bayonet. On the morning of 31st, 38th Dogras and 35th Sikhs marched into the Malakand Camp.

During the Malakand fighting 45th Rattray's captured standards from the enemy, which were treasured in the Officers' Mess. One fine black standard was taken away by General Blood.

Brigadier-General W.H. Meiklejohn, while commending the courage and endurance against the heavy odds the troops had to fight against, without sleep for five days and five nights, wanted to "specially bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the name of Lt-Col. H.N. McRae, who commanded the Regiment on the 26th—

29th. His prompt action in seizing the gorge at the top of the Buddhist Road on the night of the 26th, and the gallant way in which he held it, undoubtedly saved the camp from being rushed on that side." Also, was commended the work of Lt. R.M. Barff, and Major W.W. Taylor.⁵ The latter's loss, added the Brigadier General, was "a heavy one to his Regiment and to the Service....."

On 30th July was then formed the Malakand Field Force, Its command was given to General Sir Bindon Blood, who took over charge on 1st August. He immediately took stock of the situation and ordered a column for the relief of Chakdara, It was to move on 2nd August and was composed of two squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers, two squadrons Guides Cavalry, 8 Bengal Mountain Battery, 50 Sappers, 400 rifles of 24th Punjab Infantry, 300 rifles 45th Sikhs, 100 rifles of 35th Sikhs, 200 rifles Guides Infantry, and two sections N.F. Ambulance.

Before the column could resume advance, the enemy position on Goldney's Hill, just beyond the Castle Rock picquets, was cleared by a small force under Colonel Goldney, and the Pathans were seen running to and fro "like ants in a disturbed ant-hill."

The relieving column under Meiklejohn, collected at "Gretna Green" commenced its advance shortly after 4.30 A.M. As soon as the column reached the open ground and was deployed, it was engaged by the enemy. The Guides and 45th Sikhs were at once ordered to attack; they carried the position with bayonets. This was followed by an attack on Bedford Hill by 45th Sikhs and 24th Punjab Infantry. Now, disheartened the Pathans fled across the Khar plain. The fleeing Pathans were intercepted and pursued by the cavalry "spearing and cutting them down in all directions." Then the cavalry reformed and advanced towards and seized the Amandara Pass. Meanwhile the Infantry continued its advance, and on arrival at Batkhela, 45 Rattray's drove out a number of the enemy.

CHAKDARA SAVED

The cavalry was sent ahead; they reported the Swat Bridge as uninjured, and crossing over it advanced towards the fort at Chakdara which was being attacked by the Pathans. It was followed by the rapidly advancing Infantry supported by guns; on the latter's approaching Chakdara the enemy started retiring. 'Chakdara was saved.

After the occupation of the fort, 45th Sikhs were despatched to destroy the Chakdara village, and the 24th P.I. occupied posts on the surrounding hills.

5. A memorial tablet was later erected at the place on the Buddhist Road where Major Taylor fell.

Chakdara fort has been described in the Regimental History of 45th Rattray's as under :

“THE DEFENCE OF CHAKDARA—Chakdara Post was constructed in 1895 for the protection of the suspension bridge across the Swat River. This fort, which was built of stone, was situated on a small rocky knoll on the right bank of the river and about 150 yards from the end of a spur which descends from the high hills on the west. On the north-west faces were double-storied barracks with rows of loop-holes and arrangements for flanking fire. The north-east side of the knoll was steeply scarped and protected by a wall and barbed-wire fence, while on the south was a small hornwork enclosed by a stout wall and surrounded by wire entanglement. About 500 yards away, on the spur to the west, was a small one-storied blockhouse used as a signalling tower, from which communication was obtained with the Malakand. On the left bank of the river the entrance to the bridge was guarded by a loopholed iron gate with a blockhouse on each side. On the north-east was the civil hospital.”⁶

This fort, in the middle of July, was held by a garrison commanded by Lt. H.B. Rattary and was composed of two companies of 45 Sikhs and 25 Sabres of 11th Bengal Lancers, In addition, there were a Political Officer and a Medical Officer with them. The first warning of the impending Pathans attack on the garrison was received on 23rd July 1897 when the garrison commander took steps to safeguard the bridge.

On 26th July when Lt. Rattary was about to leave the polo ground at Khar, he was warned about the gathering in large numbers of Pathans and their advance towards Chakdara. On arrival at Chakdara, almost simultaneously, Havildar Gurdit Singh, 45th Sikhs, who was out on survey reported about the Pathan rising, Lt. Rattray reported the matter to force HQ by telegram; this being the first report to alert the troops at Malakand.

At 2215 hours, as previously arranged, a light appeared on the proposed hill giving the garrison warning of the Pathan attack, and no sooner the troops took up position than they were fired upon by the Pathans. The enemy attack on the western side of the fort was repulsed; then the enemy attacked the north-east corner, and again they were driven back. Their third attack this time on the eastern side also met with the same fate. The day dawned and the enemy retired to the hills on the North and North-West from where they kept on sniping the whole day.

On 27th July Captain H. Wright 11th Bengal Lancers with 40 Sabres

6. PP. 348-349.

was ordered to join the Chakdara garrison. He succeeded in the mission but en route had frequent engagements with the enemy. On arrival he took over command of the Chakdara Garrison.

At 11.30 A.M. the Pathans again attacked the East and North-East sides of the fort, but lost heavily. The enemy attack at 2300 hours was also repulsed.

A PRETTY SPECTACLE

The day of 28th July was quiet. But at about 5.30 P.M., the Pathans were seen advancing to attack the fort; "the enemy's advance made a very pretty spectacle, the gaily coloured flags representing contingents from nearly every tribe on the frontier." This time the brunt of the attack fell on the east side, held by cavalry and twenty men of the 45th Sikhs. The fighting continued the whole night, and the Pathans retired just before dawn. It was a bold night attack, but the defenders proved their worth and stood it.

On 29th, the Pathans, now in large numbers than before, again attacked in the evening. This time the target was the Signal tower. The enemy continued attacks on this tower from 4 P.M. to 8 P.M., after which "they appeared to have had enough of it", and withdrew to the Chakdara village and the hills to the north.

Throughout the siege, there had been no communications with Malakand. But on this Thursday the Chakdara Garrison due to "the bravery and devotion of the signallers" was able to communicate with Malakand, though for a short while, and report that the garrison was holding on to the fort, though the men were "nearly worn out with fatigue and want of sleep".

On 30th and till the evening of 31st July the enemy, except for sniping, kept quiet. At about 4.30 P.M. 31st, the enemy attacked the north-east side of the fort. The Maxims and nine Pounders took heavy toll of the enemy, who again was compelled to withdraw to the Chakdara village.

On 1st August the fort garrison faced a more difficult position. This time the enemy was more numerous than before; they had more rifles; they had occupied the civil hospital building; they had cut off communications with the Signal tower; hence no water could be sent to them; their marksmen on the ridge made any movement on the north and west sides of the fort difficult. The situation remained tense the whole day and night, but the enemy did not press home the attack. The next day, 2nd August, at daybreak the enemy came in even larger numbers, estimated to be 10,000 to 15,000. They seemed to be determined

to take the fort at any cost. Both sides kept on firing; Havildar Kishan Singh commanding the gun detachment was killed and his two companions were wounded. Just at the "critical point" the relieving Cavalry appeared at Amandara. When the Cavalry reached the bridge-head the enemy in the hospital started running away. Lt. Rattray who was standing by the west gate saw the enemy running; on this, Lt. Rattray "collected the few sepoy that were round me and ran across and drew the remainder out of the hospital. We pursued down the river, killing most, and on the way were joined by Captain Baker and Lieut. Wheatley and more men. We then returned and found the Cavalry checked by a hot fire from the sangars on the hill, so we attacked them in flank and drove out at the point of the bayonet, and the Cavalry pursued them on as they retired. Our loss here was two Sepoys killed and one officer wounded."

Lt. Rattray who "had been the life and soul of the defence," was himself wounded in the neck, and was personally congratulated by the G.O.C. of the relieving column. According to the Official Report it "speaks volumes for the excellence of the defences and the forethought shown by the officers in preparing cover. One last word for the little band of Sikhs in the signal tower. They got their well-earned drink about 10 A.M., and one can well imagine that no nectar ever tasted more refreshing, sweeter or cooler to them than plain Swat River water, "(8)

The 45th Sikh detachment in the Chakdara fort was now relieved by 22nd Punjabis.

The operations and steadfastness of the troops was appreciated by the higher authorities. A few extracts are given below:—

From the Adjutant General, to the Secretary, Government of India:—

"The advance from the Malakand to the relief of Chakdara was carried out with skill and judgment. The troops, in spite of the exertions and hardships they had undergone during the past week, advanced with great energy and drove the enemy, disheartened and panic-stricken, in all directions into the plain, where they were pursued by the Cavalry and still further dispersed."

Sir George White wished "to record his admiration of the manner in which the small garrison successfully held their own for six nights and days against overwhelming numbers. He would also refer to the patient courage and endurance of the followers both at the Malakand

7. Regimental History 45th Sikhs PP. 356-357.

8. Ibid., P. 357.

and Chakdara during the operations from the 26th July to the 2nd August, Among other brave acts performed during the defence (Sir George White wished) to draw special attention to the gallantry and devotion of the signallers, who, isolated as they were in the signal tower under very trying circumstances, without water to drink and at times under a heavy fire, continued to perform their duties in most soldier-like manner. That the morale of the small garrison of Chakdara was in no degree shaken by the severe strain to which they had been subjected is evident from the brilliant sortie which was made by the party under the command of Lieut. Rattray on the arrival of the relieving force."

Major General Sir Bindon Blood, the Force Commander wrote :

"I would beg to recommend all the British and Native Officers who took part in the defence I have described for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as under,....." General Blood's List included the following names from 45th Rattray's (The awards they received are given against each):—

Lt.-Col.	H.N. McRae	CB
Lt.	H.B. Rattray	DSO
Lt.	L.L. Wheatley	DSO
Subedar	Jwala Singh	OBI (2nd class)
Jemadar	Ala Singh	OBI (2nd class)

I. O. M. (3rd class)

Sub-Maj,	Mangal Singh	L/Nk.	Natha Singh
Jemadar	Uttam Singh	L/Nk.	Wir Singh
Hav.	Jawala Singh	Sepoy	Nand Singh
Hav.	Teja Singh	Sepoy	Jiwa Singh
Nk.	Chanda Singh	Sepoy	Prem Singh
Nk.	Sant Singh	Sepoy	Bhola Singh
		Sepoy	Kahan Singh

OPERATIONS IN UPPER SWAT

The Malakand Field Force was now reorganised under General Blood, 45th Rattray's Sikhs formed part of the 1st Brigade under Meiklejohn.

On 12th August orders were received for the Malakand Field Force to advance towards Mingora, in Upper Swat; the advance commenced on the morning of 16th with twelve days supplies for men and two days gram for animals, and the force reached Thana, a few miles up the Valley, the same day.

After reaching Thana, the G.O.C. planned to attack the next morning the "Gate of Swat", held by the Pathans. So, on 17th August tents and baggage in excess of light scale were despatched to Khar. The remainder of the baggage and stores were dumped in the Camp with spare animals, till the road was cleared. The dump was protected by guards of two companies of 45th Rattray's, two squadrons 11th Bengal Lancers and 400 rifles of 35th Sikh.

LANDAKAI FORT TAKEN

The cavalry advanced towards Jalala, and with the help of two companies of Royal West Kent contained the enemy established on the Buddhist ruins, and were cleared when the remainder of the Royal West arrived, here. The R.W.K. were followed by 24th and 31st P.I., followed by the field battery. Now, 45th Rattray's also arrived on the scene, and was kept in the reserve. The Infantry supported by artillery was able to capture the Landakai fort. Cavalry pursued the running enemy.

After the battle of Landakai, 10th Field Battery escorted by two squadrons of 11th B. L. and a detachment of 35th Sikh, was sent to Khar.

On 18th August the force marched through Barikot to Galigai. The next day the force advanced to Mingaora, its objective for the time. By now the tribesmen had given up all idea of opposition and arms numbering about 800 of all kinds were given up by them at Galigali and Mingaora.

On 20th the force halted for rest. On the night of 19/20th, it had rained heavily, and the troops had no tents, but water-proof sheets. There was only desultory firing on the Camp. Lt-Col. McRae's work was "to go on with some of our Sikhs and burn five villages," and thus they "lit up the country for miles". The force also halted on the 21st, except for the Cavalry who reconnoitred upto Chah Bhag, Gali Bhag and towards Kotka Pass. On 24th, the force returned to Barikot from where a reconnaissance of the Karikar Pass was carried out.

On 25th General Blood advanced into Upper Swat and went up the Karakar Pass. He writes: "I went to the top of the Karakar Pass and had an excellent view of the Buner country, which had not been invaded since the Pathans took possession of it nine hundred years ago." General Blood, in fact, requested higher authorities for permission to advance into Buner and teach the Pathans a lesson. But, this permission was not accorded; on the other hand, he was ordered to come back, as things were becoming hot somewhere else.

On 26th the force returned to Thana, and to Khar and Malakand on 27th. The 45th Sikhs halted at Khar.

PANJKORA VALLEY

At this time the authorities became anxious about the situation in Panjkora Valley, and orders were received (on 6th September) to commence operations against the Mohmands. On 10/11th September a portion of the 1st Brigade (three squadrons Guides Cavalry, a detachment of Sappers and Miners, 31st Punjab Infantry and 45th Sikhs) was moved from Khar to Sadi, on the left bank of the Panjkora river, to guard the Bridge there. Its place at Khar was occupied by 2nd Brigade. The 3rd Brigade moved to Shamshak, at the southern end of the Watelai Valley. The Force Headquarters moved to Watelai, west of the Panjkora Bridge.

On 14th September, 2nd Brigade seized the Rambat Pass, and, leaving a detachment there, returned to Markhani, north of the Pass. The 3rd Brigade was at Nawagai. The Camp of both these brigades was attacked on the night of 19th and 20th, but the enemy attack in each case was repulsed.

TIRAH OPERATIONS

On 29th September Rattray's Sikhs (part of 1st Brigade) received orders to join the Peshawar Column, Tirah Field Force, they left Panjkora on 30th September for Malakand where it halted for two days and then moved to Peshawar reaching there on 7th October. The Regiment was still commanded by Lt-Col. H.A. Sawyer, a man "tall, handsome, of great ability with a high Staff College reputation, but feared and hated, not loved by the Regiment....."⁹

On 17th August, news were received by the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, that an Afridi lashkar 10,000 strong, led by 1,500 Mullas had left Tirah on 16th and were moving towards the Khaibar Posts from Landikotal downwards where they were expected to reach on 18th. The Khaibar defences were swept away by the Pathans. They attacked Landikotal on 25th August, often described as "the blackest day in the history of the Frontier," and completed the sack of the post. The revolt then spread to the south towards Fort Lockhart and the Samana Range. Even villages in the Kurram Valley were attacked. Damage to life and property was considerable. Even here, the British were not ready for action on a major scale. The communications in the Frontier were inadequate, about which Sir William Barton wrote thus: "Peshawar was the only border station linked by rail with India. There was no road through the Kohat Pass connecting Kohat and Peshawar. The

9. Reminiscences of Major H.B. Luard, I.M.S. reproduced in Regimental History, P. 373.

Indus was crossed by ferry in the summer months on the way to Kohat and Dehra Ismail Khan, in winter there were bridges of boats. It was over a hundred miles from the rail-head to Bannu. As a result in an extensive border campaign transport difficulties were enormous."¹⁰ To tide over this unsatisfactory state of transportation, bullocks, mules, ponies, cammels, etc. were collected from the Punjab and pushed across the Indus. Since the owners of these animals were not used to the Frontier weather, they were "alternately frozen and roasted; hundreds of them died from pneumonia. Thousands of their beasts died too."¹¹

So, to punish the Afridi and Arakzai tribes on the Peshawar and Kohat frontier, a special force, known as Tirah Expeditionary Force was organised as under :—

- (a) Main Column of two Divisions, each of two Infantry Brigades plus Divisional troops. This was commanded by General Sir W.S.A. Lockhart. (15th Sikhs and 36th Sikhs were part of this column.)
- (b) Line of Communication Troops under Lt-Gen. Sir A.P. Palmer.
- (c) The Peshawer Column, under Brig-Gen A.G. Hammond; a mixed Column of arms and services. 45th Sikhs formed part of it.
- (d) The Kurram Movable Column, under Colonel W. Hill.

On 18th October, the main Column under General Lockhart moved up the Kurram Valley from Kohat and entered Tirah, "the sacred fastness of the Afridis which no white man had ever seen." Before this, there took place the same day the battle for the Dargai heights, covering the road to Tirah. The heights were captured, But Staff-work failed the troops, supplies failed and the troops had to come down 5,000 feet to Shinawal. The heights had to be recaptured on 20th. Thence the Column advanced northwards and cleared the Sampagha and Arhanga passes, the latter cleared on 2nd November. From here one could see the Valley of the Tirah Maidan. The Valley was about a hundred square miles in area, flanked by pine clad slopes; it contains terraced fields, with groves and copses here and there; houses built for all-round-defence dotted the Valley and were joined by goat tracks. Thence the Gasoley's Brigade of the 1st Division climbed down the Valley and advancing along dry nullahs reached Bagh, the tribal centre place.

Sir William Lockhart and the rest of the Column arrived in a few

10. Quoted in North-West Frontier, Arthur Swinson, P. 244.

11. North-West Frontier, Arthur Swinson, P. 244.

days. Seeing no one coming for negotiations, General Lockhart decided to destroy the Valley. On getting orders the troops burnt the villages, cut down the copses, and by mid-day so many smoke columns were seen that "for large areas the sun was blotted out". This had the desired effect, and the Orakgais sued for peace. But the Zakka Khels continued to offer resistance. It was not till the 14th December that the 2nd Division fought its way out of Tirah down the Bara Valley. The 1st Division who were, on 7th December, at Bagh, left in two Columns, with a day's gap in between and proceeded towards the Mastura Valley and, seeing some fighting, reached Manani (13th December) forming the Junction with Bara Valley.

In the meanwhile, the Peshawar Column had arrived at Sawaikot, at the entrance of the Bara Valley, twenty miles south-west of Peshawar.

As compared to 2nd Division, the 1st Division, and the Peshawar Column had seen little fighting; so 2nd Division was left to guard the Bara Valley, and the other two Columns were ordered to advance towards the Bazar and the Khaibar Pass. They were given the following objectives :—

THE PESHAWAR COLUMN

- (a) The reopening of the road through the Khaibar Pass.
- (b) Destruction of the Zakka Khel defences in the Khaibar.
- (c) Reoccupation and repair of Khaibar forts.
- (d) Restoration of Landikotal water supply.

1ST DIVISION

- (e) A punitive visit to the Zakka Khel and Malikdin Settlements in the Baazar Valley.

To achieve the above objectives, both forces concentrated at Jamrod. On 18th December, the Peshawar Column reconnoitred Fort Maude, five miles west of Jamrod; it was found deserted, and was occupied. On 23rd December, Ali Masjid was occupied without any opposition. It also covered the flank of the 1st Division which, meanwhile had entered the Bazaar Valley.

The next morning, leaving a wing of Oxfords, 45th Sikhs and two guns at Ali Masjid, the remainder of the Peshawar Column marched to Landi Kotal, which was found in a deserted state. The punitive measures were continued by the 1st Division and the Peshawar Column, until 3rd April 1898 when the tribes submitted unconditionally. The operations being over, the 45th Sikhs moved from Ali Masjid to Jamrod on 29th March; here the Regiment was demobilized on 6th April and ordered to proceed by train to Multan.

RAJMAHAL—A LOST CITY

P.C. ROY CHAUDHURY

Rajmahal in the District of Santal Parganas in Bihar at a distance of 92 miles from Dumka the district headquarters is now a neglected township and not even the headquarters of a subdivision. Yet Rajmahal was once the capital of Bengal and Emperors Akbar, Shah-Jahan and others had visited Rajmahal. Occupying a very strategic position on the river Ganga Rajmahal was the gateway of Bengal and was rightly chosen as the capital for Bengal under the Mughals after the decadence of the historic city of Gaur particularly after Gaur was overrun by Sher Shah in 1538.

Sher Shah had selected the area then known as Ag-Mahal as the seat of Government because of the strategic position on the river and the mountain passes. But it was left for Man Singh, Akbar's Viceroy in Bengal to carry out this measure. From 1202 to 1576 Gaur now in West Bengal was the capital of the province except for about sixty years when the capital was shifted to Pandua and for a short while to Tanda. Gaur and Tanda were in a bad shape as the river Ganga had receded and had become very unhealthy. An epidemic in 1575 carried away a large part of the population. Man Singh decided to shift the capital to Rajmahal where he built a palace for himself and erected a strong rampart buttressed by bastions encircling Rajmahal. Man Singh as the Governor of Emperor Akbar wanted to command the river and the mountain passes leading to fertile Bihar. The name was changed from Agmahal to Rajmahal and again to Akbarnagar. The place was certainly more healthy than Gaur or Dacca. From 1575 to 1612 Rajmahal had a glorious spell. Islam Khan shifted the capital to Dacca in 1612 for political and military exigencies and particularly to hold back the raids of the Arakanese pirates and the Portuguese buccaneers.

But Rajmahal continued to be a storm centre. The bitter fights between Prince Shah Jahan and Ibrahim Khan, the brother of Empress Nur Jahan brought Rajmahal again prominence and Ibrahim Khan was slain on 20th April, 1624. This was followed by the fall of the fort at Rajmahal. Bengal passed under the control of Shah Jahan who, however, departed for the Deccan in 1625 leaving Bengal to Jahan gir.

Prince Muhammad Shujah came as the Viceroy to Rajmahal and it is here in 1657 Shujah crowned himself and the fights for succession

among the sons of Shah Jahan broke out. Mir Jumla the Commander of Aurangzeb and Muhammad Sultan the eldest son occupied Rajmahal and Shujah fled. Rajmahal lost much of its importance when the capital was definitely shifted to Dacca but continued to be the town for minting coins and for supplying ice from the Rajmahal Hills and delicious mangoes for the royal table.

While slowly spreading trade and commerce the English fully utilised Rajmahal. Dr. Gabriel Boughton was based at Rajmahal as the family physician of Prince Shuja and helped the East India Coy. to get *farmans* for trade without much restriction to the discomfiture of the Dutch. Even after Shujah's eclipse the English traders continued and had set up an agency at Rajmahal in charge of Robert Hedges who became subsequently the Company's President of Council. Rajmahal figured in the war of succession after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 and the quarrels of Murshid Kuli Khan, Alivardi etc. and the Coy. It was at Rajmahal that Siraj-ud-daula was captured in 1757 by Mir Daud, the brother of Mir Jafar. Three years later, in 1763 Udhua Nallah, six miles to the south was the scene of Major Adam's victory over Mir Kasim Ali. Rajmahal was the centre from where the early British administrators tried to pacify the aboriginal but wily Paharias the main ethnic group in the area.

This historic city still boasts of a number of splendid remains of the Muhammadan rule. The most important is the *Sangadalan* or marble hall built by Raja Man Singh consisting of three rooms, of which the centre one has an arched roof supported by six finely polished stone pillars. Though protected under the Archaeology Dept. steady vandalism has largely spoilt the remains. A mosque near the *Sangadalan* was built in two months by Raja Man Singh to do his *namaz* when Emperor Akbar came to see the bigger Juma Masjid built by Man Singh. The Juma Masjid, a fine specimen of the Mughal style is on an elevation. The legend is that this was being built by Man Singh as his palace with a temple nearby and the story was carried to Emperor Akbar. Man Singh's rival Fateh Khan poisoned the ears of Akbar that Man Singh was spreading profanity by the temple and wanted to consolidate himself by the palace. Man Singh quickly converted the building into a fine mosque. Nearby there are the ruins of a fine building known as *Baradwari* flanked by the remains of a gate-way. There is a lake nearby known as Anna Sarobor.

A wonderful specimen of an old Muhammadan bridge, 236 feet in length with six pointed arches of 10 feet span, built on five piers and four round bastions could be seen to the north-west of the Juma Masjid. The bridge is still serving its purpose and shows engineering skill. It is said the bridge was built along with the Juma Masjid while there is also the story that it was built earlier.

The *Pir Pahar* with a tomb of some Muslim *Pir* is on a small rock about half a mile away from the bridge. There is another hillock to the west known as *Kanaithan* sacred to the Hindus and the legend is that Lord Krishna had once danced here. There is an annual big mela at *Kanaithan*.

The relics are hardly visited now and Rajmahal a small township now by the river Ganga sleeps with her treasure and the nostalgia of the days that are no more. The place is well connected by road from Dumka which runs through attractive scenery and also by a branch railway line from Tinpahar station on the Chord line. Tourism could have been developed easily.

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DEAR ELECTOR : THE TRUTH ABOUT MPs*

(A Review Article)

P.K. MISHRA

MEMBERS of Parliament in any democratic country represent the general will of the people. As ambassadors of their constituency, they are the guardians of people's liberty. Their social status is rated very high in the minds of the people. Everyone looks towards them with great enthusiasm.

Normally one comes across a number of writings on the procedural aspects of the elections for Parliament and the participation of members on the floor of the House. Moreover people talk about the part played by the important leaders of various political parties, both within the fourwalls of Parliament and outside. But on the other hand there is hardly any attention paid to the real process of policking, the personal whims and caprices of the persons who intend to contest election. One hardly knows in depth about the vociferous promises and subsequent frustrations of the MPs, particularly the back benchers. The very purpose of choosing politics as a career is also a big question mark. People come to Parliament with great expectations, but finally end up with unending frustrations. At times it is assumed that success in political life depends on one's oratory skill. But is it true, when one scrutinizes the political process of any country? Nesta Wyn Ellis' being herself a seasoned politician from the Liberal Party in Great Britain find answers to numerous such questions with interesting illustrations from her own country. Supremacy of Parliament is deeprooted in the political culture of United Kingdom. But one has to understand its various implications. The conflict between Parliament and the Cabinet although not apparently visible, can be objectively investigated by throwing light on the personalities of politicians of different ratings. The author's attempt in this regard is equally commendable.

She makes her objective very clear in her introduction when she writes, "If electors gripe about the 'usefulness' of Parliament they could have a point. The fact that their elected member is only a cog

*Dear Elector : The Truth About MPs, by Nesta Wyn, Ellis Coronet Books, London, 1974, pp 236, price 50P.

in the Government or opposition machine has not escaped them and when the Government of the day rats—as ever—on its hustings vows, it is largely Parliament which gets the blame.” She also feels that “against the complex background of international events, economic crisis, social upheaval, industrial trends and rapid technological advance the member of Parliament is a slender figure”. She analyses how MPs have to fit into their family life between erratic and time consuming political duties and thereby refutes the general fallacies about their extrovert life. She very emphatically and perhaps rightly writes, “If the nature of Parliament is to be understood, then the politics that lies between the lines of the Parliamentary dialogue must be examined” (p. 13). She is rather modest in her “attempt to bring parliament and its members down to an ordinary human level”. Her particular focus is on the backbencher politicians.

In the Part I under the heading “why chose politics?”, she makes a searching analysis of the pros and cons of taking politics as a career. Her particular emphasis is on the general apathy of the vast majority of people about joining political life. She, being herself young, is very much appreciative of the increasing number of young MPs. According to her “There are certainly rich rewards in politics for the man who deliberately seeks them, but the ambition of most politicians to start with are mainly an ambition for their ideas” (p. 20). In her analysis “of the person and personality factors” she makes an interesting comment that some people decide to join politics, as an escape from the boredom of family life. Some others make a choice so as to get new opportunities and influential connections in public life. She also delineates the different motivations and perceptions of people in the Liberal, Labour and Conservative Parties. The professional representation in Parliament forms a different study by itself. According to her the most representative group are the lawyers, teachers, lecturers and journalists. Moreover in her estimate the present Parliament is “overwhelmingly middle class, self-employed and professional in its representation” (p. 25).

Under the Captain “Who chooses MPs, she throws light on the High Command of various parties while they make nominations for their respective parties. She finds the selection process of Labour Party as “most fascinating because of its federal origin”. According to its constitution, the candidate (Labour Party) is expected to platform the views of the party in preference to his own. On the other hand if a Conservative Party candidate decides to speak out against his party, his leader on their policies, he is unlikely to be disciplined. This certainly provides an interesting contrast. According to her malpractices, while making nominations, can’t be ruled out here and there. How-

ever her projection of an ideal candidate for any party cannot but amuse the readers. The prospective choice should be "a man in his middle thirties; married with a nice wife and a couple of children" (p. 44). Interestingly the bachelors are not the favoured lot. About the various causes for less representation of female members, she makes an equally searching analysis. Candidate's personal life does play a significant role in projecting his image in the National Politics. About the formal education of MPs, she appreciates the initiative taken by the Labour Party.

Under the Caption "A call to Arms", she evaluates the interaction of various forces, while electioneering goes on. According to her, although public meetings are waning in popularity in favour of television politics, oratory is still the real stuff of politics" (p. 69). Once the members get elected, it takes quite sometimes to project their own image in the Parliament and the national life. Some are destined to remain as backbenchers, while others get opportunities to rise within the House and finally assume responsible positions in the government. Here also the author rightly points out that along with the personality factor, various other circumstances also play their role. Another sweeping observation of the author needs to be noted. While assessing the progress of an MP stage by stage, she writes, "By the time the end of his first Parliament comes the MP will have changed considerably. No longer the fresh-faced idealist of the hustings, he will have become in five years flat, a polished politician. By ten years, he will be a fullfledged political fowl. After twenty years an MP is frankly too far gone to be much use to the electors unless he has managed to continue as a faithful constituency man" (p. 82). Such a metamorphosis in different stages of his career, makes an impact on the political process itself.

In the next part the author elucidates on the relationship and conflict between the Parliament on the one hand and the government on the other. Her diagnosis revolves around the common viewpoint that nowadays the "Parliament does not work". She points out the various factors which are responsible to make Parliament impotent. While talking of "Power at the Grass Roots", she points out that "The basic job of every MP is to see that his constituents get a square deal and the most direct way of doing this is to solve their problems individually" (p. 93). At present any ordinary MP can atleast ventilate the grievances of his constituency on the floor of the House, whenever the occasions come. Members can also make their presence felt through intra-party groups and the select committees. Even the opposition members can hope to contribute at the committee stage of the bill. About the futility of private member's bill, she compares it to a "fox getting away from the hounds on a bad day for foxes", Because of lack of infor-

mation the MPs are likely to be "preys to sophisticated lobbyists". The major factor responsible for Parliament's inactivity, according to her, is not because the government is all-powerful, but because all the exchanges which take place between the member and the Executive do so within the straitjacket of party" (p.115). The party which controls the MP out and out can practically force the members to toe its line, through its whipping power and the recourse to threats and cajolery.

About the role of newspapers, Radio and Television on the MPs, the writer feels that the media are the lens through which the public views its politicians (p 138). About the loophole of reporting the debates of Parliament, she rightly feels that ordinary members are always bypassed. As a result, "much of the events of Parliament, and the behaviour of the representatives during the legislative process is lost to all but the keenest political student" (p 147). It has also disastrous effects in the constituency which is represented by the member.

About the remuneration for the MPs, she would like a substantial increase as it would not encourage the members to be tempted by vested interests. If the members become susceptible to corruption, then Parliaments, image as the guardian of people's rights and privilege will suffer.

About the personal life of a private member she begins with an unpleasant note. According to her "politics does not much afford much opportunity for spare-time pursuits" (p. 201). She emphasizes on the need of a happy home for any successful parliamentarian. She cites the example of a classic wife as "strong woman behind a successful man". About the poor representation of lady members she has a very sharp reply to make. She writes, "the scarcity of mothers in Parliament is a comment on the lack of ease with which maternity and politics coexist" (p. 210).

About the use of secret service against the MPs. She is very critical. However, she feels, if tapping and other forms of privacy invasion are practised on politicians, more than other people, the members "have only themselves to blame for not exposing this grey area". Moreover the MPs needs to be protected by the state against any anti-social elements. According to her "Security and protection, go hand in hand with extensive intelligence" (p. 228). No doubt the government can be restrained in its spying network.

Her concluding observations more or less end with a note of optimism. She has some useful suggestions to make for the survival of parliamentary democracy in Great Britain. She would like reforms "at every stage in the process of selecting and electing MPs, and then within the House itself (234). The private life of members must be eased by

simple reforms as a regularisation of parliamentary hours, the provision of fulltime paid assistants, proper office facilities, and suitable honorarium. All these conditions will "facilitate the flow of help and information between the member and his constituents" and improve his general level of knowledge about the technicality of legislation. According to her the executive encroachment on parliamentary Supremacy has got to be contained in a systematic way. The Parliament, must be made free from the dangers of an inadequately informed House.

In general it provides an interesting reading to layman because of the lucid style and clarity of judgement. To a more serious student of politics, it broadens the horizons in the study of the working of Parliamentary Democracy in any part of the world. Such type of political analysis about any particular country is always a welcome addition to any research library. Without a vast and colourful political experience, one cannot venture to write such a masterpiece. It is only a wishful thinking that more and more politicians of the presentday world should have the intellectual depth and keenness to observe the political phenomena of their respective countries. In the developing countries where the general public lacks political consciousness and naturally becomes apathetic to the political process, the legislators should play the role of educators. The successful working of the democratic system depends on them to a great extent. They can certainly play a positive role for the mass involvement in the political, social and econmic modernisation of their nations.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

by R.N. GARDNER

(Published by Frederick A Praeger, New York, 1968), pp 498, price 79s

MAN has long been striving to solve the problems of his society, and during the last three decades he has given a worldwide scope to his endeavours in this regard. Since World War II this effort has been made through a proliferating chain of international institutions like IMF, IBRD, GATT, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, etc. These organisations have been engaged in sorting out problems of world economic and social developments, especially of the less developed countries. Virtually all the developed countries are today contributing towards the development of the under-developed countries. These international institutions do not confine their interests to the development problems, but have political and other motivations too.

The book is a collection of essays analysing the political forces in various developed countries, which inhibit or promote the acceptance by the world community of the responsibility for the economic and social development of all constituent parts of the world. It discusses the various evolutionary changes which occurred in the post-war period in the perception of the institutional requirements for dealing with world economic and social development. It also shows how the activities of all the international institutions are coordinated with each other and with those of an even greater number of specialized national bodies. It is for the readers to judge whether claims of developed countries like the U.S.A. that they have launched a number of inter-governmental agencies to help the under-developed countries, are justified, or whether they are just the defenders of the status quo.

The book is a very well-written exposition of the concept of global partnership to abolish poverty. It does not pretend that this partnership of the developed countries has been a wholly successful experiment and states clearly that "everyone knows what international agencies have failed to do." The book starts off with the assumption that what these international agencies have succeeded in doing is still largely unknown, and therefore sets out to tell about them.

Though the book was published way back in 1968, its value is nonetheless undiminished, for the essays in the book chart the growth of the various economic and other institutions from the beginning and bring out their potentialities in the on-going struggle for economic development in the present-day world.

KHLS

TO THE BACK AND BEYOND

by FITZROY MACLEAN

(Published by Jonathan Cape, London, 1974) pp 144 price £ 4.00

THIS is a delightfully told and illustrated travelogue of Central Asia and Mongolia. Fitzroy Maclean has been visiting the area since his youth as a Diplomat, Journalist and a Traveller in quest of knowing the country and the people. As a young diplomat he had visited Samarkhand and Bokhara then forbidden cities of Turkestan. Twenty years later he revisited them and since then he has travelled widely through Central Asia, from Caspian to the Chinese border.

The book is well organised and before the reader has realised he has been taken through the history, geography, the life-style of the people in an unbeatable simple and fascinating language. The author modestly asserts that his is not a serious work of scholarship nor even a serious travel book. Right, that is why the book is so entertaining. His descriptions of the pioneers in those regions are humorous but very revealing. His descriptions of the Mongols, Kazaks and Kirghiz, Bokhara, Khiva, Tajiks and Turkmens are vivid and his picture of the Mad Baron Ungern makes him relive with us.

The book is much more than a travelogue. He found that the power of Lamas in Mongolia has been broken. Modern education and modern health services have progressed. Sciences and technology have made vast progress. Wrestling, the traditional Mongol robe, *Del*, and the brimming silver bowls of the indigenous *airag* have held their place steadfast.

Maclean has enjoyed telling us his experiences and we have thoroughly enjoyed his book. While reading his dissertations of food and drinks in different areas we almost sampled their taste and kick. The plates taken by the author are superb and have tremendously enhanced the value of the book. The author does not bore even when he talks of the great problems between China and Russia.

PCRC

WAR AND PEACE IN THE SUDAN 1955—1972

by CECIL EPRITE

(Published by David and Charles, Newton Abbot, 1974), pp. 1971, price £4.50

THIS is a valuable addition to the World Realities series published by David and Charles, Newton Abbot, London, by a specialist. Sudan was bitterly split by constant warfare between the Arab north and black Africans in the south for seventeen years. This has recently ended in the Sudan one of Africa's two largest countries.

The chapters are well organised and replete, rather too replete, with facts and comments. The author has made an extremely good study of the bitter fights, the causes and the herculean efforts by the different factions to solve their own problems. It is a dispassionate study of the two main factions, the violence and suffering of the people had to undergo, the rise of the powerful *Anya-Nya*, the part Russia played in Sudan and a careful analysis of the present opposing elements.

The author had personal experiences of the fights and the peace efforts. He had interviewed the leaders of the opposing factions and enjoyed a certain amount of trust in both the camps. At some stages he was a sort of bridge but the author is too modest to speak at details. He fully makes out that Sudan has been a bridge between the Arab world and Africa after the cessation of the fights between the largely Arab North and the African South. The author has analysed Egypt's role both in King Farouk's time and after. King Farouk thought the Sudan belonged to him. President Nimer had cut the Egyptian influence to a proper size and there was a lot of fuss over it. President Nimer played cool to all the accusations and slowly but deliberately worked out his scheme.

The author has brought his dissertation up to the end of 1972. The candid views of the author deserve commendation—he has studied the problems for years, taken some part as an active observer, studied books and papers with care, interviewed personalities and has kept his balance even on sensitive issues. We are sure the book will find a wide readership among scholars and administrators and interested students. The Publishers have our congratulations for publishing a solid book in their World Realities series.

PCRC

BRITISH AND AMERICAN TANKS—IN WORLD WAR II

by PETER CHAMBERLAIN AND CHRIS ELLIS

(Published by Arms and Armour Press London, 1969), pp 222, price 105s

HAVING brought the tank on the battlefield before anyone else, the British, thereafter, neglected the development of equipment for their armoured forces after 1918 until the beginning of World War II. This can, to a large extent, be attributed to the non-acceptance of the concepts advocated by thinkers like Liddel Hart, Fuller and others by the die hard and conservative British Army. British Cavalrymen looked upon the tank as a greasy and noisy intruder into their gentlemanly life. At best they could think of the tank as an unwelcome substitute for the horse for performing the traditional roles of the cavalry. The British infantry refused to believe that any serious fighting could take place at a speed faster than their own marching pace and continued to look upon the tank as nothing more than a supporting weapon for the infantry. Even the rough handling which the allies received at the hands of the German Panzers early in the war failed to wake the British up. Practically, throughout the war the British Army continued to believe in the concept of two types of tanks—the lightly armoured and faster cruiser tanks for the traditional Cavalry roles and the heavier and lumbering heavier 'I' tanks for support of infantry. It was only towards the end of the War that the British hit upon the design of a good main battle tank, the Centurion. It is no wonder that, while they produced a multitude of their own designs during the war, the mainstay of the British Armoured forces through World War II remained the American Sherman.

A point in favour of the British was their excellence at improvisation by which they were able to improve upon the capability of some existing tanks e.g. Sherman 'Firefly' with the 17 pounder gun. They also utilised some of their otherwise redundant chassis to build specialised armoured vehicles or "funnies" as they were popularly known. Almost all such vehicles used by the Allies during the War were based on British developments.

The Americans who did not enter the War until 1942, used the period until then to draw upon the lessons of the British as well as the German Armies. Unlike their more conservative Allies they were not shy of changing any out-dated concepts or picking up good ideas from wherever they could. Although a variety of tanks were designed by the Americans, they settled on two main types—the Stuart for reconnaissance and the Sherman as what might, in current parlance, be termed their main battle tank. The production of both these models was so well established that the US industry was able to meet the requirements of their Allies as well as their own. The Sherman was qualitatively in-


ferior to its German counterparts, but its availability in very large numbers compensated for the lack of quality.

Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis have given accurate factual details, in chronological order, of the many tanks which were developed in Great Britain and USA during World War II and in the years immediately preceding it. The authors have undoubtedly done a great deal of laborious research and compiled an excellent reference book. Besides tanks, the book has a part devoted to self-propelled guns on half-tracks and carriers. There are also some informative Appendices, notably the one on tank guns, engines and fittings.

India, though an important user, understandably, does not feature in the book as no tanks were designed or built in India at the time. However, readers will find two photographs of interest—No. 21 on page 24 showing a MK VI B Indian Pattern evidently in use for training at Ahmednagar and No. 207 on page 92 which shows the Command tank of Lt. Col. Jack Barlow, Commandant 7th Light Cavalry, which he had christened "Curse of Scotland" during the Burma campaign where the Regiment fought with distinction.

RDL

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To
The Editor
Kashmir House
King George's Avenue
New Delhi-110011

I

CORPS OF MILITARY POLICE—OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL

Sir,

Major GS Thakur's article (USI Journal, Jul-Sep 76) in defence of the Military Police does make interesting reading. 'Changing Times' had said earlier (USI Journal, Jan-Mar 74) that the CMP is much maligned, and having said it had gone on to malign it further by including so many half truths and incorrect statements. However, there is no need for Major Thakur, or whoever it is who desires to pick up cudgels for the Military Policeman, to be apologetic, or be on the defensive while setting the record straight. The Corps is a proud and impressive segment of the Indian Army, and can only be as good or as bad as the rest of the Army, of which the author of 'Changing Times' is also a part. Did not Oscar Wilde say: "If a man is persistently disliked inquire after him, for he may be a great man." The Corps stands nothing to lose with some criticism, even if such criticism tends to be subjective.

But then, is everything honestly alright with the Corps? What is so onerous about policing duties which presently seem to consist of manning TCPS, piling VIPs, standing in Car Parks and reporting defaulters? Cannot a fine body of men be put to better and meaningful use, and assigned truly worthwhile duties? Yes, they can, and should be, for any organisation is as important as the functions it is called upon to perform. Have a fine reputation and you are respected. To my

mind the CMP should be completely re-structured, and while this is done it will be pertinent to consider the following :—

- (a) Introducing an entirely new policy in the matter of posting officers to the Corps, rightly and urgently realising the need of posting up and coming energetic Majors and Captains who are good regimental officers for maximum tenures not exceeding three years, and consider these as career appointments (The Corps will never succeed in improving its image by having within it a large number of time scale Lt Cols, senior re-employed and poorly motivated officers. There may be odd exceptions, but this only helps to prove the point).
- (b) Re-organise the Corps into something like battalion type units and deploy them in a manner they are commanded, controlled, effectively trained and led by their own commanders. When operational conditions warrant it provost units/sub units should be able to take on the combat functions of infantry. The men of the Corps can match their strides man to man with any Infantryman.
- (c) Train Military Policemen to take on such duties as providing immediate protection to VIPs, which would mean training to be alert, quick in reflexes and actions and proficient in the use of close quarter weapons. (It was the courage and fighting efficiency of the MPs of the American Army that warded off the determined attack on the American Embassy in Saigon by the Viet Cong in the Tet offensive of 1968. They were a tough lot, and so can our MPs be).
- (d) Change the concept that has taken hold now that the Corps is so much a bunch of traffic constables. Broad base its role and functions by adding an investigative branch and also examine the feasibility of integrating some elements of the JAG Department, War dog units and Intelligence personnel.
- (e) Revert to the original practice of obtaining fully trained recruits from Infantry Regimental Centres. The CMP Centre can screen them on arrival and then concentrate exclusively on training to convert those chosen from Infantry soldiers to Military Policemen.
- (f) Re-examine the necessity of having Deputy Provost Marshals and Assistant Provost Marshals at Command and Corps Headquarters. (In the conditions obtaining in the CMP today they seldom have any scope for functioning in a positive manner as provost units are integral to their own formations

and provost officers in units are constantly striving, as all others in the formation, to be on the right side of their formation Commanders/staff. Human character being what it is he has little or no time for provost staff officers, who any way have to lean heavily on the staff at their own Headquarters to get any thing done. If the Corps is restructured as recommended above then again the Provost Staff Officers become redundant.

Taking the normal career prospects of our officers into consideration it will be seen that the CMP just cannot have a permanent cadre of officers. Besides, there seems to be no need for it. The Corps will indeed stand to benefit if officers of the category mentioned in (a) above are posted to it and thereafter not permitted to serve longer than the stipulated three year tenures. Furthermore, the existing practice of making it obligatory for officers posted to the CMP to wear separate items of dress which was thoughtlessly introduced some years back should be immediately discontinued. No good regimental officer worth his name will ever like to part with his regimental dress, accessories and accoutrements and thus sever connections, even if it be temporary, from his 'regimental' family. If there are any who do not mind this then they are invariably the ones who have been 'regimental liabilities' and hence obviously unsuitable to officer the men of the CMP. A long unfulfilled desire of the CMP is in essence to have a dedicated lot of fine officers whose character and leadership qualities can enhance the reputation of the Corps and thus help break the "barrier of misconception about the CMP".

Headquarters
Northern Command
C/O 56 APO
28 Mar 77

Lt Col Balchandran Kunneth

II

QUO VADIS INDEPENDENT ARMOURED BRIGADE

Sir,

I have read with interest the article "Quo Vadis, Independent Armoured Brigade" by Lt Col JK Dutt in your Jul-Sep 75 issue and with greater interest the rejoinder to this article in the form of a letter written by Lt Col SC Sardeshpande published in the Jul-Sep 76 issue of your esteemed magazine. I have some comments to offer on Lt Col Sardeshpande's letter.

It appears to me that he has not only missed the theme of the article in question but has also thrown in a number of proverbial "herrings" in his letter. Let me deal with the herrings first.

It Col Sardeshpande has stated that our knowledge and planning of warfare is very high but we flounder in the execution part of it. Perhaps he subscribes to that odious lobby of our army who, after the failure of an operation, invariably propound the vicarious hackneyed euphemism "a brilliant plan, poorly executed". The troops are scapegoated while the "brilliant" planners collect decorations. The fact of the matter is, that truly speaking, it is precisely the other way round. What we read from books and pamphlets are never ever applied to our planning. This is particularly so in the case of employment of armour due to an intrinsic phobia in our planners, as it is connected with taking risks. More on this later.

Lt Col Sardeshpande suggests experimenting with a sort of composite hotch potch armoured-infantry sub-division. The bete noir of our army has always been this ad hoc attitude to organisations. Somehow, our planners feel it infra dig to launch formations into battle as complete entities with their authorised establishment. They have a habit of making a "kitchree" out of the available troops and then commit them into battle, with obvious dire consequences. In this a feature of our "brilliant" planning?

Lt Col Sardeshpande talks about the German infantry marching 30 to 40 miles each day behind their Panzers during the second world war. I do not really know what state this infantry would have been in to be able to fight, after a few days. However, the problem, particularly with some of our planners is that they find it next to impossible to get out of the archaic "foot mobility configuration". It is extremely difficult for them to comprehend mechanised mobility. To the majority of them, exemplified by Lt Col Sardeshpande, infantry mobility means foot mobility. The only advice that I can render on the subject is "Think mobile, think mechanised. Stop thinking with your feet".

Lt Col Sardeshpande has not been able to understand the implication of taking risks, as mentioned in the article. Boldness or taking risks is not referred to at the unit level, in the context meant. The risk taking discussed is at the higher level of planning, command and control. The higher commander must have the moral courage of taking risks by denuding a part of his formations of armour if need be and concentrating as much armour as possible for a *schwerpunkt*, instead of playing safe and distributing tanks of the armoured brigades like Diwali sweets to all and sundry. Obviously, diffident and doubtful commanders feel that it is futile to expect boldness and dash in the course of mechanised warfare and yet want some trade secrets for being bold. But, to quote one of the Wehrmacht's ablest commanders, Gen Vole Mannteuffel, "to win decisive victories, the higher commander must exude bold-

ness in planning and execution bordering on audacity and this spirit must flow down to all subordinate commanders.....". (Ardennes 1944). If higher commanders, as propositioned by Lt Col Sardeshpande, demonstrate a play safe attitude, then no decisive victories can ever be won. His reference to tremendous stakes is all the more reason for our higher commanders to be utterly aggressive and audacious in their planning and execution by employing maximum armour for offensive action as opposed to defensive.

Lt Col Sardeshpande mentions a number of famous non-armoured corps British and German generals of the second world war who did not consider it necessary to have armour advisers. Quite rightly too, as they had left no stone unturned to study the complete gamut of the intricacies of armour and mechanised warfare. A perusal of the book "A Full Life" by Lt Gen Brian Horrocks (one of the names mentioned by Lt Col Sardeshpande), for example, shows the tremendous effort the general put in, to understand armour. Is it the same in our case? I hardly think so. There is no doubt that armour is a specialised arm but most of us do not realise this. Unless one has a high rate of "TQ" (Technical Quotient, quoting Gen Israel Tal) and a full comprehension of mechanised warfare, he will not be able to understand armour, much less employ it. Just like artillery and engineer advisers, there is an inescapable requirement to have an armour adviser at corps level and above, to prevent misuse of this arm. I fully agree with Lt Col Sardeshpande when he says that more non-armoured corps officers should attend courses at the Armoured Corps School. I would go a step further and suggest that infantry officers being appointed to command armoured formations should initially attend a ten-month course at the Armoured Corps School, thoroughly learning tank automotive, armament, communications and tactics. Only successful officers on such courses should be given command of armoured formations.

The central theme in the article, which Lt Col Sardeshpande has obviously missed, is that the armoured brigade must be launched in operations in toto and not under the Diwali Sweets scheme! As an analogy, if an infantry brigade is deprived of two of its battalions and then given a brigade level mission, one could hardly call it cricket! It therefore rests with the higher commander to be man enough to use the armoured brigade as a fullfledged formation and accept risks elsewhere in the bargain. The malaise of playing safe under cover of a mushroom of ostensible constraints is not quite edifying at that level of command. I, for one, am hopeful that we shall have audacious and non-play-safe type of higher commanders in the wars to come.

The College of Combat

Maj HS Dhaliwal, VrC

Mhow (MP)

24 Mar 77

III

Dear Sir,

I read Lt Col JK Dutt's article, "Quo Vadis, Independent Armoured Brigade" in your Journal of July—September 1975 with great interest.

We have had two major wars with Pakistan in which armour was used extensively—first in 1965 and second in 1971. But it is a tragedy that we could not produce a Rommel or a Patton, or a Sharon.

The author has analysed at great length the drawbacks in the employment of armour. In short they are :—

- (a) Faulty command and control at Corps HQ.
- (b) Employment of armour in penny packets.
- (c) Using armour with extreme caution.

As an Infantry Officer, I have observed one more drawback—"The lack of mobility and dash on part of the Armoured Corps Officers !"

If there is a mine field the armour cannot advance until a lane is made. (Why don't you use your trawls ?). If there is Anti-tank ditch the armour cannot advance until the Engineers come up. (Why don't you use your bridge layer tanks ?). If one RCL Gun opens up, the advance halts until infantry clears it. (Why don't you use your tank gun ?). So, may I ask, when will you advance ?

The tank was originally invented to clear a way for the infantry n the teeth of machine gun fire. Now it is the infantry which is asked to clear a way for the tanks, and it seems to me that it will be very hard one now, that fire power is so greatly increased.

2nd Battalion
The 11th Gorkha Rifles
C/o 99 APO
25 November 1976

Major S K Singh

4 Agrahayan 1898

SECRETARY'S NOTES

SUBSCRIPTIONS

Subscriptions are payable in advance, i.e., at the beginning of the financial year of the Institution which is from January to December. Members and subscribers are therefore advised to make these annual payments without waiting for reminders.

Whereas the subscription was revised from Rs 10/- to Rs 15/- wef 1 January, 1975, I continue to receive credit of Rs 10/- from a large number of members through their Banks, even though I have reminded them individually on more than one occasion. The number of such subscribers is over 500. You can thus see the total annual loss to the Institution which it can ill-afford. Even though I am trying once again to remind each individual member, I shall be grateful if the Banks are advised, under intimation to me, to send Rs 15/- as subscription in future and also to clear the arrears.

Further, in a number of cases the Banks send the credit without indicating the name of the officer and I do not know in whose name the money is to be credited. This sometimes results in stoppage of the Journal. It shall help me a lot in serving you better if the Banks are also advised to indicate your name and membership number, if possible, when crediting the amount.

BOOKS

Books borrowed by the members are not returned within the stipulated period of one month. This practice is on the increase thus depriving other members from reading the books. Also, there are a large number of members who have kept the library books for a prolonged period. May I remind you to return the books to the Library immediately.

CHANGES OF ADDRESS

There are still many instances of members going on transfer failing to inform us of their whereabouts. It is important that members and subscribers notify any changes of address to the Secretary's Office.

NEW MEMBERS

From 1st January 1977 to 31st March, 1977 the following members joined the Institution :—

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AGGARWAL, Fg Offr H.K.	BASWAN, Captain R.S.
AHLAWAT, Captain S.S.	BATH, Captain S.S.
AHLUWALIA, Captain J.J.S.	BATRA, Captain H.S.
AHLUWALIA, Major M.P.S.	BATRA, Captain P.R.
AHUJA, Captain P.S.	BATTU, Major M.S.
AJIT KAMAL, Captain	BEDEKAR, Major V.K.S.
AJIT SINGH, Flt Lt	BEDI, Major H.S.
ALEXENDER, Flt Lt V.P.	BEDI, Major J.D.S.
AMAR NATH, Major	BEDI, Captain S.P.
AMAR NATH, Flt Lt S.V.	BHAGAT, Major P.P.
ANAND, Captain B.L.	BHALLA, Captain S.C.
ANAND, Major S.D.	BHARDWAJ, Captain B.L.
ANAND, Lt Col V.K.	BHARDWAJ, Captain D.
ANIMESH CHANDRA, Major	BHASIN, Flt Lt D.K.
APPAIAH, Captain A.K.	BHASKARAN, Flt Lt K.V.
ARORA, Fg Offr C.L.	BHATI, Major C.S.
ARTI, Flt Lt A.S.	BHATIA, Shri H.S.
BABU, Fg Offr A.T.	BHATIA, Captain I.J.S.
BABU, Flt Lt K.H.	BHATIA, Major P.P.
BADHWAR, Captain LALIT	BHATTACHARJI, Captain D.K.
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BAKHSHI, Major M.R.	BOSE, Flt Lt A.
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BALDEV, SINGH, Captain	CAPLASH, 2/Lieut A.K.
BALJEET, SINGH, Flt Lt	CHADHA, Flt Lt K.C.
BALWANT SINGH, Captain	CHANDRA SEKARAN, Captain K.
BALWINDER, SINGH, Captain	CHARANJIT SINGH, Captain
BANERJEE, Captain B.K.	CHATTOPADHAYAY, Captain G.P.
BANERJEE, Flt Lt G.	CHATTERJI, Captain AMAR
BANSAL, Captain RAKESH	CHATURVEDI, Flt Lt K.S.
BARDWAN, Major D.S.	CHATURVEDI, Flt Lt S.C.

CHAUDHARY, Captain C.K.	GREWAL, Captain B.S.
CHAUHAN, Captain R.S.	GREWAL, Captain H.S.
CHAWLA, Flt Lt N.C.	GREWAL, Major K.S.
CHHIBER, Maj Gen M.L. AVSM	GREWAL, Captain K.S.
CHIMA, Captain I.J.S.	GREWAL, Captain K.S.
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