

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



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**S-57	China's Quest for Global Dominance : Reality or Myth Edited by Maj Gen PJS Sandhu (Retd)	850	2011
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National Security Papers

*P-27	National Responses to Terrorism Dr Ajai Sahni	150	2010
*P-28	Non Conventional Threat Perceptions in the Indian Context By Maj Gen YK Gera (Retd)	150	2010
*P-30	Restructuring and Integration of the MoD with the Three Service Headquarters By Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (Retd)	100	2013

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Post Bag No 8, Vasant Vihar PO, New Delhi-110057

Telephone Nos. : **Course Section** - 26148682, **Exchange** - 26146755/56

DD (Adm) 26146490 **DD&E** 26154720

Fax : 26149773

e-mail : director@usiofindia.org

dde@usiofindia.org

ci@usiofindia.org

ddadm@usiofindia.org

library@usiofindia.org

cafhr@usiofindia.org

cunpk@usiofindia.org

cs3@usiofindia.org

Website : www.usiofindia.org

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in particular

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● Col RK Tyagi, ** <i>Understanding Cyber Warfare and Its Implications for Indian Armed Forces</i>	Rs 1250	2013
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Errata

Please refer to USI Journal Vol CXLIII, Jul–Sep 2013, No 593

(a) Page No. 430, in bio-data of the author Mr Narender Yadav:–

For : Deputy Director

Read : Assistant Director

(b) Page 413, in bio-data of the author Lieutenant Colonel Arun Kumar Vashishta :–

For : Legal adviser from Sep 1993 to Jan 1994

Read : Legal adviser from Sep 1993 to Jan 1995

Editor

USI CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

1. The USI conducts correspondence courses for DSSC – Army and Navy, TSOC (Army), Entrance Examinations and Promotion Examinations Parts B and D.
2. Membership of the USI is mandatory to join any correspondence course.
3. Schedule of Correspondence Courses 2013-14.

Courses	Commencement of Course	Date of Exam	Cost All Subjects	Cost Per Subject
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(c) DSSC (Navy)	3 rd Week of Dec 2013	Jun 2014	Rs 700/-	Rs 700/-
(d) Part B	1 st Week of Dec 2013	Jun 2014	Rs 2300/-	Rs 700/- for MH Rs 600/- each for Tac and CA Rs 500/- each for Adm & ML
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4. **Contact Programmes.** Three contact programmes for DSSC/TSOC-2014 will be run at USI from 30 Jun to 05 Jul, 14 to 19 Jul and 28 Jul to 02 Aug 2014. Separate test papers will be set for each programme. Fees – Rs 3000/- per contact programme.
5. Correspondence courses for Special to Corps subjects are not conducted.
6. **Mode of Payment.** Local/multicity cheque or bank draft payable at New Delhi in favour of *Director USI of India* or cash.
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Course Section - 26148682, Extn 210
11. Prospectus : Available from Course Section and on Website.

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(b) One Time Fee	7,000	10,000
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(a) Entrance	600	700
(b) Subscription/Renewal Fee	2,400	3,300
Total	<u>3,000</u>	<u>4,000</u>
3. Membership forms available at the USI with Deputy Director (Adm).		

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Subject : JOINT USI-MEA GREAT WAR (1914-18) COMMEMORATION PROJECT

Dear Member,

Please refer to USI Journal Apr-Jun 2013, no 592, page Nos 309-10.

With reference to the Joint USI-MEA Great War Commemoration project, if any reader is a descendant of a soldier who served in the First World War, we would be grateful if they could contribute information about their ancestor for the project.

Details can be sent to Secretary, CAFHR at cafhr@usiofindia.org.

Director's Page

Dear Members,

For a creative and forward looking organisation like the United Service Institution of India, enjoying a rich heritage of 143 years of innovative work, beginning of a New Year is a special time. It compels me to look back and look ahead, simultaneously; both by reflecting on the work on hand and contemplating on threats to National Security on the horizon which require renewed analyses and fresh ideas to tackle them effectively. Of course, military preparedness and diplomatic initiatives which need to be woven into enhancing Comprehensive National Power (CNP) also deserve to be looked into.

Last year, I drew your attention to our 'path-breaking endeavour in the realm of strategic thinking' by introducing Net Assessment, Scenario Building and Strategy Formulation exercises in the scheme of our meaningful activities. It is a matter of great satisfaction that our efforts have been appreciated by all those who are engaged in ensuring that National interests are safeguarded with utmost efficiency to put the ingredients of CNP to best possible use.

The Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation (CS3) conducted workshops on '*The Art of Long Strategic View*' (Net Assessment, Scenario Building and Strategy Formulation) for the National Defence College (NDC), New Delhi; the three War Colleges of the Army, Navy and Air Force; for the Indian Foreign Service probationers and a select group of senior officers from the three Services. Besides the strategic games on strategic neighbourhood, the USI team conducted two strategic game exercises for the NDC; one on the '*Internal Security Scenario*' and the other on '*Security Scenario in Asia-Pacific and IOR*' in the coming decade. Similar strategic games are being conducted at the Army War College and College of Defence Management during the next year. The USI team was invited by S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore to conduct a workshop on Net Assessment / Scenario Building and to play a strategic game on '*Asia - Pacific 2020*'. Presently, USI is in the process of formalising

similar tie-ups with other foreign institutions and think tanks on this novel approach to strategic thought and planning.

The USI Journal, our flagship on Defence Affairs since 1870, continues to engage the attention of the thinking classes across the country; and, internationally too. A look at lead articles and principal contents in the four issues of the Journal in 2013 provides a glimpse of why it is so. Articles on '*Wars – As Seen Through Soldiers' Eyes*', covering accounts from World War II, 1947-48 War in Kashmir, 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Conflicts, and Counter - Insurgency Operations in the Northeast and IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka, have been widely acclaimed and I thank all those who shared their unique personal war experiences for posterity. Similarly, our articles on '*1962 War – A View from Other Side of the Hill*' based on Chinese literature have received wide appreciation from our readers and students of military history.

USI's association with foreign think tanks/institutions and dignitaries continues to grow significantly to broaden our vision on global security scenarios and international strategic thinking vis-à-vis India's strategic interests. In the International Conference on '*Military Records Management*' (13-14 Mar 2013), amongst others, three foreign delegates took part. The seminar on, '*Enhancing India-Central Asia Engagement : Issues and Prospects*' (18-19 Mar 2013) had eight foreign panelists from four Central Asian countries. The USI National Security Seminar 2013 on '*Perspectives of the Indo-Pacific Region – Aspirations, Challenges and Strategy*' (7-8 Nov 2013), which had 21 foreign panelists from eight countries, enthused all like the previous years.

Our distance learning programme through the Course Section continues to deliver good results which is of considerable help to our Young Officers who are heavily committed in their duties. During 2013, 2960 students attended our courses. Out of these 756 took the DSSC/TSOC Correspondence Course. The results once again were commendable. 19 out of the 20 competitive vacancies for the DSSC were secured by the officers who had attended the USI Correspondence Course. Out of 234 nominated seats, 209 were taken by officers who had attended the USI Course. In addition, out of 80 officers nominated for the TSOC, 60 were our students. A number of officers also benefitted from the

three contact programmes run for the DSSC and TSOC. The Chief Instructor and his team of dedicated serving and retired officers are deserving recipients of accolades all around for the yeoman service they have continued to render devotedly year after year. I would appeal to more serving and retired officers to come forward and add to the strength of the pool of our directing staff to provide continuity to this important facet of USI's academic activity.

The Pyara Lal Memorial Library is the heart of all our futuristic output. It has been nurtured devotedly by all those who have been at the helm since 1870. Today, it is a repository of a remarkable collection of reference material in the form of rare books, reconnaissance reports, seminar proceedings, biographies, archives and talks by eminent speakers which are a cynosure of all those engaged in research work related to matters military and looking for something more than what is available anywhere else. The library staff is diligently engaged in upgrading the existing facilities, digitisation of rare books and adding latest books to the shelves – a list is carried in every issue of the Journal. Books presented and bequeathed by members have enriched the library significantly. I reiterate my request to all members to keep this process going; instead of, allowing the books in their possession to either continue to remain unused at home or allowing them to fall in the hands of the *raddiwala*. I am happy to share with our members that the complete catalogue comprising about 65,000 titles has been physically screened by the library staff.

The Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) has taken a notable initiative of highlighting the Indian military's substantial contribution to the First World War. The steps taken in this direction have taken off in a big way. The CAFHR is coordinating India's commemorative activities at a global level under the direction of a USI-MEA Joint Steering Committee. In addition to this, the CAFHR continues to actively support quality research on subjects of Indian military history. Publications in this year include a Seminal History of the Indian State Forces, the Military Biography of late Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, PVSM (Retd), whose *'saga is now a part of India's military lore'*, among others. A project to catalogue all War Memorials to commemorate 'fallen

servicemen of the Indian Armed Forces around the world' is set to be published next year.

The Centre for UN Peacekeeping (CUNPK) continues to receive worldwide acclaim for training Indian contingents as well as officers from Friendly Foreign Countries. Since its inception, it has trained 647 officers from 79 countries. The year 2013 has been a landmark year for CUNPK. A seminar on "Women in Peace Building" was conducted in Feb 2013 and a tri-lateral Table Top Exercise on UN Peacekeeping Operations for India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA forum) was conducted in Nov 2013. The United Nations Military Observers Course conducted by CUNPK in Apr-May 2013 was assessed and has been given training recognition by the UN Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) which is valid till August 2017.

Lastly, I am deeply concerned about the inconvenience caused to the members sometimes due to last minute cancellation/postponement of scheduled events at USI due to reasons beyond our control. May I request you to access and browse through the USI website : www.usiofindia.org regularly to keep yourselves updated on USI activities. We hold our members in great esteem and look forward to your participation in the USI events in large numbers. The USI membership has steadily increased upto 15068 and I welcome all the new members to our fraternity. I would also like to draw the attention of all serving officers that they are permitted to attend USI events, even if they are not members. I am confident that you would stand to benefit from these interactions in the long run. Your attendance and participation would also add to the sum and substance of events during the interactive sessions.

I wish all our esteemed members, on behalf of all of us on the USI staff, a VERY HAPPY NEW YEAR. We look forward to meet you whenever you come to the USI.

With regards

Lieutenant General PK Singh (Retd)
Director

Editorial

As mentioned in the last Issue of the Journal a joint USI-MEA project to highlight India's involvement in the First World War (1914-18) has been launched. I am happy to share with our members that the project has by now gathered steam and its own momentum. This Issue opens with a brief write-up on the 'India and the Great War' by Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd) giving an update on the project and various events planned in the near future.

The USI National Security Lecture 2013 on 'Civil-Military Relations : Opportunities and Challenges' was delivered by Shri NN Vohra, IAS (Retd) Governor Jammu and Kashmir on 06 Dec 2013. The text of the talk is being carried as the lead article in this Issue of the Journal. The lecture was well attended and generated a lot of interest among the audience and the media. This is evident from the fact that excerpts from the talk have already appeared in some of the leading national dailies and some other publications. Mr Vohra in a very precise manner explained the very basis of civil-military interactions at governmental level and various constitutional provisions. It would appear that the 'Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961' and 'Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961' provide the basic constitutional framework which have governed civil-military relations in India during the last five decades. Mr Vohra also highlighted the lack of synergy between the Services and went on to suggest the replacement of the existing single Service Act by an Armed Forces Act which would lay a statutory basis for achieving jointness and delineating the roles, duties and missions of the Armed Forces, as also the procedures and modalities relating to the functioning of the Defence Apparatus. Needless to say, whatever term one may use, there is a systemic problem with our 'Defence Apparatus' and it can be ignored only at the cost of national security.

The next article 'Indian Nuclear Doctrine – A Re-look' by Dr KR Singh examines India's Nuclear Doctrine from various angles and goes on to establish the need for a review, especially the 'no first use' clause and the credibility of 'punitive retaliation'. This has become all the more relevant in view of Pakistan developing tactical

nuclear weapons and the growing Chinese arsenal which will have a profound effect on India's strategic environment.

Today, strategic dialogue between countries has become an important framework for the conduct of international relations; and so it is between India and China since 2005. However, it is pertinent to ask – what have been its achievements? Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh in his article 'China-India Strategic Dialogue : Problems and Prospects' explores its logic, gains and the prospects. While accepting the need for greater investment in the ongoing process he also argues for a realistic target of 'strategic understanding' instead of the so called 'strategic partnership' in various fields in order to avoid frustration.

The next article 'Russia-China Interplay in Central Asia and the SCO' by Dr Zamira Muratalieva from Kyrgyzstan analyses a very complex relationship between these two large and powerful neighbours in a neighbourhood with multidirectional pulls and pressures. For the moment they seem to be manoeuvring for compromise solutions, while hedging for an advantageous position.

Cyber space is an emerging field with very few rules and hardly any regulations at international level. It is also a field which is important from the military point of view and has the potential to be used as hard and soft power. In the next article 'Understanding Cyber Weapons', Colonel Sanjeev Relia analyses the potential of cyber weapons in a non-conflict scenario as also in a conventional war. It is a field that India cannot afford to ignore. Continuing in the same vein, Brigadier Sanjeev Chauhan in the next article examines the role of social media in inciting ethno-religious and civil society unrests in the Indian context. It has far reaching implications for internal security and the State has to develop monitoring mechanisms without being too intrusive.

It is over five years since the Mumbai terror attacks on 26 Nov 2008; yet neither the perpetrators have been brought to book, nor has the Country been able to organise foolproof mechanisms to thwart such an attack in future. In the next article 'Lessons Learnt from the 26-11-2008 Pakistan Based Lashkar-e-Taiba Raid on Mumbai', Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd) looks at various failures and the lessons that ought to have been learnt from this tragic event.

Recently, we heard the news of the death of two Indian peacekeepers and a third one wounded (all three Junior Commissioned Officers) in South Sudan. In the next article "Abyei : Africa's Conundrum", Colonel VT Mathew who has served in the UN Mission in that area explains the basic causes of continuing strife and the dangers that lie ahead. Undoubtedly, the area already seems to be engulfed in a civil war. Incidentally, this is not the first time that Indian peacekeepers have been killed in action. So far 154 Indian peacekeepers have made the supreme sacrifice; notable amongst them was Captain Gurbachan Sibgh Salaria who was killed in Congo in 1961 and was awarded Param Vir Chakra (posthumous).

The liberation of Goa in 1961 is already a distant memory. However, the fact remains that it was nearly 14 years after Independence that we were able to integrate the enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu, till then ruled by the Portuguese, into the Indian Union, and that too after an armed action. There were also many international ramifications which had to be considered. In the next article 'Operation Vijay : The Liberation of 'Estado da India' – Goa, Daman and Diu', Brigadier AS Cheema, VSM (Retd) recapitulates the planning and conduct of the operation in all its details. This was the first military operation conducted by the Indian Defence Forces after the 1947-48 J&K War; the synergy and cooperation displayed by the three Services was commendable. The operation was also concluded rather swiftly by some outstanding tactical manoeuvres. A thought does come to mind – did it create a sense of complacency which was to result in the 1962 debacle, just a year later!

As in previous issues, the last section 'Wars – As Seen Through Soldiers' Eyes' carries three personal accounts from the 1971 War : 'Difficult to Die' by Colonel Brij Bhushan Midha (Retd); 'A True Soldier' by Captain S Bloeria, PhD, IAS (Retd); and '1971 – Challenge in Sind : Munabao to Naya Chor' by Colonel Vijay Bhushan (Retd). These pieces bring to life the trials and tribulations of war at personal level which in some cases also become folklore.

India and the Great War

Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd)[®]

As the centenary of the commencement of the First World War in August 2014 draws closer, countries across the globe are engaged in hectic activities to highlight and commemorate their individual national involvement in the first global conflict in human history.

The First World War involved approximately 48 nations across five continents and left behind a trail of devastation that included over 16 million dead and 20 million wounded. The throes of that gigantic struggle signaled the end of four empires and also heralded the beginning of a new political consciousness in many countries, including India. The sterling role played by Indian soldiers was used by the country's intelligentsia and political classes to try and leverage greater political autonomy from the colonial authorities. The War proved to be a turning point in India's relationship with Imperial Britain and the developments arising from the events of 1914-18 set Indian politics firmly on the road to Independence.

The joint USI-MEA project to highlight India's involvement in the First World War needs to be seen against this backdrop. The project is a national initiative that seeks to credibly highlight not just India's substantial military role and heritage, but also to commemorate the valour and sacrifice of over 1.4 million Indians who served voluntarily in battlefields around the world. It also seeks to ensure that when the world remembers the conflict that changed the course of modern history, the Indian involvement in it is not forgotten. The view expressed in certain quarters that the conflict was a colonial war with no significance for India is therefore an untenable one and based on a narrow sectarian reading of history. While the project will commemorate the sacrifice of Indian soldiers and examine the numerous ways in which the War impacted India in their entirety at the national level, it will also highlight the futility of conflict in the international arena.

[®] **Squadron Leader RTS Chhina (Retd)** is the Secretary and Editor of the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research (CAFHR) at USI.

The project therefore has two operative levels: the popular and the academic. At the popular level it seeks to generate awareness and interaction among people, both nationally and internationally, based on the numerous fascinating episodes concerning the gallantry and sacrifice of Indian soldiers in battlefields around the world. This is being done through the medium of the internet, through the publication of booklets and illustrated coffee table books

At the academic level, the project seeks to examine the impact of the war on India at various levels. This will involve academic conferences, seminars and the publication of a series of volumes including 'theatre histories' of the Indian Army's operations in the First World War. A tie-up has been made with a reputed publisher overseas as well as in India to bring out these volumes as a series titled "India and the Great War".

Preparations are currently under way for the flagship international conference at the USI from 05-07 March 2014. This conference explores Indian participation in the First World War through a variety of perspectives ranging from the representation of Indian involvement in propaganda films, music, poetry to the larger political consequences of the War for India and its struggle for independence. A conference in partnership with the "In Flanders Fields" museum, at Ypres in Belgium, is also scheduled to be held in October 2014. Other planned events include:

- (a) A JNU - USI seminar on "India and the Great War" to be held at the JNU in 2014.
- (b) Exhibition on Indian Army Corps on the Western Front to be held at the chateau that housed the Headquarters of the Indian Corps in 1915; the Chateau La Peylouse, in Saint-Venant, France (2014/2015).
- (c) Planned talk by Ms Jody East (Creative Programme Curator, Brighton Museum, UK) on the experiences of Indian soldiers at Brighton during the Great War at the USI in February 2014.
- (d) Exhibition by the Royal Pavilion, Brighton to be organised in India and the UK (2014/15)
- (e) Exhibition at National Archives of India (NAI), New Delhi,

in collaboration with the NAI and the British Library. Travelling exhibitions in India at civil and military venues also being planned.

The USI is providing research support to national and international scholars and is also liaising with the Australia - India council for scholarly exchange, joint research, and diaspora outreach. Call for research proposals on themes relating to India's role in WW1 have also been circulated among scholars and students in India, the UK, Australia, France, Ireland, the USA.

In addition to the 'India and the Great War' documentary to be produced by the Ministry of External Affairs, a documentary on 'War as Memory' is planned to be produced subsequently, with corporate sponsorship. The USI is planning a series of talks on 'India and the Great War' on All India Radio's overseas service and is also assisting the BBC in its production of programmes relating to Indian involvement in the First World War. A project to preserve Indian bardic heritage pertaining to the Great War period is also being planned.

As a symbolic tribute to the sacrifices of Indian soldiers, the USI aims to enable the issue of a postage stamp to mark the centenary commemoration of Indian involvement in the Great War, in addition to the issue of Army Postal Service special covers and cancellations with the assistance of the Service headquarters.

Utilising the commemoration activities as a platform to further people to people ties, the USI is working, together with the UK High Commission in the construction of memorials for Indian Victoria Cross recipients in suitable locations across the country. In this regard, the role of families/villages that contributed significantly to the Great War will also be highlighted. We are also tracing the descendants of distinguished soldiers who served during the Great War for attending suitable commemorative ceremonies to be hosted by various embassies and organisations. The project is also engaging with the High Commissions/Embassies of France, Belgium, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey and Israel to identify areas of mutual collaboration in commemorative activities and remembrance activities.

Marking its online presence, the Joint USI - MEA Great War commemoration project is all set to launch its project website

shortly. This website will highlight to new audiences the oft-forgotten role of India in the Great War and will serve as a digital platform of resources and information pertaining to Indian participation in the First World War. A Facebook page and Twitter account have also been started for greater outreach among a global audience.

In conclusion, the success of the project is dependant to a very large extent on the cooperation of all project partners including the support of the Service Headquarters, Indian Army Regiments, and our members, both retired and serving. The project team is confident that it will receive the whole hearted support of all to make the venture a grand success. Suggestions and feedback including details of ancestors who may have served during the First World War are welcome and may be conveyed to the project team through the Editor.

RESULTS : USI GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITON 2013

GROUP 'A'

Subject: "Bridging the Gap – Balancing Personal Aspirations and Service Requirements in the Armed Forces".

<u>First</u>	IC - 03588 – B Cdr Sunil D Dogra Dte of Administration IHQ MOD (Navy) New Delhi – 110 011	Gold Medal and Cash Award of Rs.15,000/- and entry accepted for publication.
<u>Second</u>	IC – 54312 K Col Amit Singh Dabas 44 RR 934 544 C/o 56 APO	Cash Award of Rs.10,000/-.

GROUP 'B'

Subject: "Officer-Men Relationship : A Critical Appraisal".

<u>First</u>	IC – 29892 – T Flt Lt Rohan Chacko Jacob 102 Sqn Air Force Station HQ Air Force Chabua – 786 102	Gold Medal and Cash Award of Rs.15,000/- and entry accepted for publication.
<u>Second</u>	IC - 63866 K Maj Sushil Rana 7 Sikh 912 207 C/o 56 APO	Cash Award of Rs.10,000/-.

Civil - Military Relations: Opportunities and Challenges*

Shri NN Vohra, IAS (Retd)[®]

I am very happy to have been asked to deliver the USI National Security Lecture 2013 and to speak on "Civil - Military Relations: Opportunities and Challenges".

Before I proceed to reflect on the theme of today's lecture, I think it would be useful to have reasonable clarity about what exactly do we have in mind when we use the term "civil - military relations". I say this because earlier this year, at a seminar held in a Defence think tank at Delhi, a statement was made that "unsatisfactory civil - military relations are having an adverse impact on the functioning of the military in India". While all those who may be involved in studying military matters would understand that this statement refers to the functioning of the Defence apparatus I feel that a free use of the term "civil and military relations" should be best avoided as it has the potential of causing altogether unfounded doubts and suspicions in the minds of millions of people in India.

Our Armed Forces, comprising the Army, Navy and Air Force, have a strength of about 14 lakh personnel and we have over 27 lakh ex-Servicemen. If the families of our serving and retired officers and men are also taken into account we have more than two crore people who enjoy the trust and affection of all the people of our Country. I would, therefore, stress the importance of ensuring against there being any doubt whatsoever that over a billion people of our Country have a very warm relationship with all our men in uniform. To ensure against any unfounded misgivings being created about this important relationship I feel that our strategic analysts and commentators may, instead of using the term "civil - military

*Text of the talk delivered at USI on 06 Dec 2013 by Shri NN Vohra, Governor, Jammu & Kashmir with General Shankar Roychowdhury, PVSM (Retd), former Chief of the Army Staff in Chair.

[®]Shri NN Vohra, IAS (Retd) served as the Defence Secretary from 1990-93 and as the Union Home Secretary from 1993-94. Post retirement, he has served as Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister of India from 1997-98. He served as Governor Jammu and Kashmir from 2008-13 and was re-appointed as Governor for a fresh term in Apr 2013. He was honoured with the award of Padma Vibhushan by the President of India in 2007.

relations", comment directly on the functioning of the Defence management apparatus and say whatever they wish to say.

I shall now speak briefly about yet another facet of civil - military interface which relates to the duty which the Army has been discharging, ever since 1947, of providing aid to the civil authority and supporting the affected States in combating insurgency and terrorism. Experience in the past over six decades has shown that whenever any State Government faces difficulty in dealing with an existing or emerging serious law and order situation it approaches the Union Home Ministry for seeking the deployment of Central Police Forces (CPFs) to assist the State Police in restoring normalcy in the disturbed area. Experience has also shown that, in many cases, when it is found that even the Police and the CPFs together would not be able to handle a given disorder, the Army has been invariably called upon to provide the required support.

A consequence of the situation which I have just described is that the Army has continued to be deployed in several parts of the Country in considerable strength, and for prolonged periods, to carry out counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism operations. On many occasions, the operations carried out by the Army, in conjunction with the State Police and the CPFs, have led to complaints and allegations from the local population about the violation of their rights. In this context, it would be recalled that for the past several years there has been a continuing debate on whether or not the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) should continue to apply to the disturbed areas where the Army has been carrying out sustained operations for combating insurgency and terrorism.

While every uniformed force, in whichever area it is called upon to operate, is duty bound to ensure that the people's civil rights are protected, it is equally necessary for the Centre and the affected States to collectively evolve an acceptable approach which ensures that the personnel of the military formations which are involved in carrying out counter-insurgency or anti-terrorism operations are provided the requisite legal protection.

As law and order situations shall continue to arise in the future, in one or the other part of the Country, it would be useful in the longer term perspective, if well planned and time bound

steps are implemented for enlarging the strength and the logistical resources of the State Police organisations and upgrading their professional capabilities for meeting future challenges. The development of the Police into a more effective force should, hopefully, lead to a progressive reduction in the recurring need for seeking the Army's support. I would also add that the requisite training and professional upgradation of the Police, as also of the CPFs, can be most usefully assisted by the Army, which has well equipped and competent training centres all over the Country. I would also add that Internal Security management would become far more effective, if the Army were to develop operational interoperability with the Police and identified CPFs.

I now come to the specifics of civil - military relations on which the USI has asked me to speak this morning. The theme on which I am required to comment actually relates to the civil - military balance and, therefore, essentially concerns the functioning of the Defence apparatus and the varied issues which may arise from the professional interface between the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the military leadership of the three Armed Forces. The various elements which comprise this theme fall within the arena of Higher Defence Management (HDM). I shall try to speak on some of the more important aspects of this theme.

In the past two decades and more a growing number of former senior officers of the Armed Forces have been writing on issues relating to HDM. These commentators broadly fall into two main groups: one, which largely focuses on the 'failings of the MoD' and the other which also speaks about the 'deficiencies in the internal functioning of the Armed Forces'. I shall rapidly go over the more significant dissatisfactions voiced by both these groups.

A criticism which has been recurrently raised alleges that impediments arise in the functioning of the MoD because the civilian officers posted in the Ministry exercise authority which far exceeds their mandate. I shall examine the basis of this misperception and try to explain the true position in simple terms.

First and foremost, in any discussion on Defence Management it is extremely important to bear in mind that in our democratic parliamentary framework the power lies with the elected representatives of the people, from among whom Cabinet Ministers are appointed. The Ministers have the responsibility of managing

the affairs of the departments under their charge and decide all important matters except those which are required to be submitted to the Cabinet, Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), Prime Minister, President or other specified authorities. The civil servants working in the various departments of the Government of India (GoI) are the tools or the instruments for assisting the Ministers in finalising policies and then ensuring that the same are effectively executed.

The Constitution of India lays down the framework within which the Union, i.e. the GoI, and the States are required to carry out their respective responsibilities. List 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India enumerates the subjects which are to be dealt with by the GoI. In this List, the GoI has been, inter alia, assigned responsibility for ensuring the "Defence of India and every part thereof". The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces rests in the President. The responsibility for national defence vests with the Cabinet. This responsibility is discharged through the MoD, which provides the policy framework and wherewithal to the Armed Forces to discharge their responsibilities in the context of the defence of the Country. The Raksha Mantri is the head of the MoD. The principal task of the MoD is to obtain policy directions of the Government on all defence and security related matters and see that these are implemented by the Services Headquarters, Inter-Service Organisations, Production Establishments and Research and Development Organisations.

As provided by the Constitution, the various subjects in List 1 are distributed among the different departments in accordance with the GoI (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961. Under these Rules the various matters relating to the Defence of India have been allocated to the MoD which comprises the Department of Defence (DoD), Department of Defence Production (DDP), Department of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare. Further, under the GoI (Transaction of Business) Rules 1961, it is laid down that "all business allotted to a department specified under the GoI (Allocation of Business) Rules 1961, shall be disposed off by, or under the general or special directions of, the Minister-in-Charge" of the Department (Rule 3), subject to the provision of these Rules i.e. the Raksha Mantri.

The Transaction of Business Rules further provide that "In each department, the Secretary (which term includes the Special Secretary or Additional Secretary or Joint Secretary in independent charge) shall be the administrative head thereof, and shall be responsible for the proper transaction of business and the careful observance of these rules in that department" (Rule 11).

Thus, as per the constitutional framework, the overall responsibility for the functioning of the MoD rests entirely on the Raksha Mantri and the responsibility for ensuring that the business of the DoD is transacted strictly in conformity with the Gol (Transaction of Business) Rules 1961 is vested in the Defence Secretary.

From my own experience of working in the MoD for many years I can state, without an iota of doubt, that officers working in the MoD discharge their duties with great care and all important matters relating to the four departments of the MoD are decided by the Raksha Mantri, except those cases which are required to be submitted to the other designated authorities.

In the context of what I have just explained, the MoD is clearly responsible to the Gol for dealing with all matters relating to the Defence of India and the Armed Forces of the Union and, further, as provided under the Defence Services Regulations, the Chiefs of the Services are responsible to the President, through the MoD, for the command, discipline, recruitment, training, organisation, administration and preparation of war of their respective Services.

The civilian face of the MoD is represented by the Raksha Mantri, his junior Ministerial colleagues, Defence Secretary and the other three Administrative Secretaries in the Ministry; and, say, another about 15-20 officers of Joint Secretary level and above in all the four Departments of the Ministry. During my days in the MoD a dozen Joint Secretary level officers in the four Departments of the Ministry were dealing with all the matters which were received from the Army, Navy and Air Headquarters, commonly referred to as the Service Headquarters (SHQ), and from several inter-Service organisations.

The arrangements which obtained in my time have undergone very significant changes after the amendment of the Gol

(Transaction of Business Rules) and the establishment of the Integrated Army, Navy, Air and Defence Staff Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence. The Integrated Headquarters (IHQ) are involved with policy formulation in regard to the Defence of India and the Armed Forces of the Union and are responsible for providing the executive directions required in the implementation of policies laid down by the MoD.

Another frequently voiced dissatisfaction is that the civilians who are posted in the MoD do not have adequate past experience of working in this arena and also do not have long enough tenures to gain specialisation for effectively dealing with military matters. This perception is largely true. Perhaps, only a few among those who get posted in the MoD, particularly officers at the Joint Secretary and equivalent level, may have done previous stints in the Defence or Home Ministries. As regards tenures: while the Central Secretariat Services officers may serve for long periods, the deputationist officers appointed to Director and Joint Secretary level posts enjoy average tenures of five years. I strongly believe that it is necessary to remedy this situation and had made a definitive recommendation in this regard over a decade ago, about which I shall speak a little later.

Some commentators have alleged that the role of the political leaders has been hijacked by IAS officers and what obtains in the MoD today is "bureaucratic control and not civilian political control of the military". It has been further argued that the civil services have succeeded in having their own way essentially because the political leadership has little or no past experience or expertise in handling defence matters, have little or no interest, and lack the will to support reforms in the Defence Management apparatus. This line of thinking is carried forward to conclude that as the MoD does not have the confidence and capability to adjudicate on the competing claims and demands made by the individual Services, each Service largely follows its own course and enlarges its role as per the whims and fancies of successive Chiefs.

I have already explained at some length the constitutional framework within which the MoD and its officers are required to function. However, to eradicate any misperceptions it would be most useful if the curricula of the various military training institutions also contains a suitably designed course for enabling the officer

cadres to gain adequate awareness of the working of the Constitution of India and, side by side, to enhance their political awareness. Doing this would also provide a useful opportunity for appointing well qualified civilian teachers in the various military training academies with whom the trainee officers could have informal discussions on varied other matters in which they may be interested.

As regards the assertion that the individual Services largely follow their own volitions on account of the MoD's failure to enforce effective control, there cannot be any debate about the crucial need for the Integrated Defence Staff to work overtime for securing a level of jointness which will enable critical inter-se prioritisation of the varied demands projected by the individual Services and, based thereon, to evolve a closely integrated Defence Plan which has a 10-15 year perspective.

I now come to the views expressed by several former senior officers who are unhappy with the 'internal health, morale and discipline of the Services'. Some of them are of the view that issues about civilian control have arisen essentially because successive Raksha Mantris have chosen not to exercise the requisite influence and control and have been particularly amiss in never questioning the Chiefs about the logic and assumptions relating to the execution of military plans, as this vital responsibility has been left entirely to the Service Headquarters. Operation Blue Star, Exercise Brass Tacks, Exercise Checker Board, IPKF Operations in Sri Lanka and several other events are cited as examples of serious avoidable failures which happened because of the lack of clarity about the goals to be achieved; and, besides, on account of major gaps in the operational plans. It is asked why such failures have never been subjected to any questioning or audit, as should have been done in a well-run system.

In the context of some of the cited failures, it is regrettable that the records relating to past operations, even of the wars fought by our Armed Forces, have continued to remain clothed in secrecy. This has had the adverse consequence of successive generations of military officers being denied the opportunity of learning from past mistakes. This important issue was taken note of by the Group of Ministers (GoM) on National Security (2001) and a Committee to Review the Publication of Military Histories

was set up by the Raksha Mantri in 2002. This Committee, which I was called upon to chair, gave a clear recommendation that the histories of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 Wars should be published without any further delay. This was in 2003. I gather that the History of the 1965 War has since been published.

Some commentators have gone to the extent of taking the position that difficulties arise in the functioning of the MoD because Raksha Mantris do not have past exposure to military matters. This is not a well-founded notion. The United States of America and various European countries faced two prolonged world wars and two to three generations of their youth were compelled to undergo conscriptions. Consequently, for many years in the post-World War periods, a number of Ministers in these countries were persons who had earlier served in the Armed Forces and had been directly exposed to military functioning. Today, however, even in these countries there may now be no elected persons who would have earlier exposure to serving in the military. In India, we have never had any conscription. Recruitments to all our Armed Forces are done on voluntary basis. It would, therefore, not be logical to suggest that our Raksha Mantris should necessarily have been exposed to military matters.

It is disturbing to hear angry statements that the MoD has not been devoting timely attention to dealing with its tasks. During my days in the Ministry I worked with eight Raksha Mantris, of whom five became the Prime Ministers of the Country; and can say, without any hesitation whatsoever, that even the Prime Ministers who held charge of MoD remained most seriously concerned about national security management issues while being overburdened with a horde of crisis situations on varied fronts. However, a factor which invariably came in the way of arriving at adequately prompt and satisfactory solutions, such as may have been possible in those troubled times, was our failure to present to the Raksha Mantri clear cut options based on the advice received from the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). In this context it is relevant to recall the virtually established practice that the Chiefs would raise no significant matter in the Raksha Mantri's Monday Morning Meetings but seek to discuss substantive issues only in 'one-on-one meetings' with him; and, if possible, also with Prime Minister. I also recall that whenever the Chiefs met the Raksha Mantri together and presented him with even a broadly agreed approach,

there was no delay in the required decisions being promptly arrived at and speedily promulgated. While, after the establishment of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), the decision making processes would, hopefully, have improved very significantly, I would re-iterate the importance of ensuring that the MoD functions on the basis of dynamic coordination between the civilian and military elements. I would also stress that integrated approaches shall materialise if decision making is based on processes which are rooted in jointness.

My memory goes back to the late 1980s when the MoD's functioning was, among other factors, most adversely affected by a severe financial crisis in the Country. Reckoning the understandable worries and tensions within the MoD, Prime Minister VP Singh, who was also our Raksha Mantri at that time, set-up a Committee on Defence Expenditure (CDE), which was charged to review the existing Defence set-up and recommend practical solutions to rationalise military expenditures. I was the Defence Secretary at that time. Arun Singh, who was Chairman of this Committee, consulted me informally about the recommendations evolved by his group. I gave him my personal opinion that while the proposal to create the proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) set-up, for advising Raksha Mantri on all military matters, would necessarily have to be processed for consideration at the political level; there appeared no difficulty whatsoever in implementing all the other recommendations for enforcing economy, closing redundant Ordnance factories, rationalising the Finance Wing functioning and enlarging the existing administrative and financial delegations. The COSC, after examining the CDE Report, communicated that none of the Committee's recommendations would be accepted if the Government did not accept the recommended restructuring of the COSC. To secure better resource management, the MoD went ahead and ordered financial delegations upto the Army Command and equivalent levels, placed an Internal Financial Adviser (IFA) in each Service Headquarters and directed several other useful changes.

The defence reforms process did not move much further till May 1998 when the successful underground nuclear tests at Pokhran catapulted India into the exclusive league of Nuclear power states. Needless to say, this sudden development cast very high responsibility on the Gol, particularly on the MoD. This led to the

establishment of various arrangements and structures for handling strategic issues and decisions. Thus, the National Security Council (NSC) was set up in November 1998 and a National Security Adviser (NSA) was appointed at about the same time. Then, in summer 1999, came the Kargil War, which took the Country entirely by surprise and generated grave misgivings about the failure of the defence apparatus and serious concerns about the Army's preparedness. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) was set-up to undertake a thorough review of the events leading upto the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil district and to recommend measures for safeguarding National Security against such armed intrusions. The KRC Report (1999) was speedily examined by a GoM which was chaired by Home Minister LK Advani. For undertaking National Security reforms the GoM set-up four Task Forces, one of which was on HDM. Among the foremost recommendations made by this Task Force was the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who, supported by the Vice CDS, would head the IDS to improve the planning process, promote "jointness" among the Armed Forces and provide single point military advice to the Government.

While the GoM endorsed almost all the major recommendations of the Task Force on HDM the proposal regarding the creation of a CDS got involved in the lack of collective support by the three Services and failed to secure approval for want of political consensus.

I shall now briefly speak about certain issues which continue to affect the efficient functioning of the Defence apparatus :-

(a) There must be no further delay in finalising the National Security Doctrine, on the basis of which integrated threat assessments could be made.

(b) While some improvements have been achieved in the past years, the MoD must enforce strict measures to ensure that the Ordnance Factories, Defence PSUs, DRDO establishments and other concerned agencies function efficiently to deliver supplies and services as per the envisaged time and cost schedules; prolonged delays cause serious difficulties for the Armed Forces and large economic losses as the lack of certainty about supplies from indigenous sources compels expensive imports whenever any emergency arises.

(c) While there have been notable advances in the rationalisation of the procurement policies and procedures; there is still need to ensure against prolonged acquisition proceedings, as such delays altogether nullify the "make or buy" approaches.

(d) The individual Services enjoy the autonomy of taking decisions to make their own selections of weapons, equipments and systems; the Integrated Services Headquarters must take effective steps to establish a tri-Service approach in regard to such decisions as doing so will engender very significant financial savings.

(e) The Defence Planning Process has still to get established; the Xth and XIth Defence Plans were implemented without receiving formal approvals and while the Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) has since been finalised, it is still viewed as a totalling up of the wish lists of the individual Services; the HQ IDS must devote urgent attention towards finalising a fully Integrated Defence Plan with at least a 10-15 year perspective.

(f) The Services enjoy the authority of virtually settling their own manpower policies; the pro-rata percentage representation of Arms and Services in the Army needs to be modified forthwith as it is virtually a "quota system" which breeds group loyalties and cuts at the very roots of jointness within the Service.

Over the years, continuing efforts have been made by the MoD to promote jointness through integration of the planning, training and other systems so that, progressively, a tri-Service approach could get fully established. Thus, in the 1980s two very important steps were taken: the establishment of the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) and the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DG, DPS). It would be profitable, even at this stage, if the COSC were to set-up an expert group to review the functioning so far of these two institutions and identify the reasons why both these crucial organisations could not achieve their objectives which were, interalia, envisaged to promote the establishment of jointness and a tri-Service approach.

While functioning of the Defence apparatus has been getting

steadily refined I feel that the continuing lack of consensus among the three Services is thwarting the achievement of the vital objective of "jointness". A number of joint service institutions have come into existence in the post Kargil War period. Among the new institutions, frequent references are made to the HQ IDS, Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). While it may be far too early to rejoice over these recently established inter-agency institutions it is disconcerting to learn that the individual Services are not doing all that is required to see that these new organisations get fully established without facing delays and difficulties. A former Army Chief is quoted to say that the HQ IDS is "a redundancy in military bureaucracy"; the founder Director of DIA is quoted to bring out that "the Defence Intelligence Agency cannot deliver as the Intelligence Agencies of the three Services feel threatened by it"; and about the HQ IDS it is stated that "the Services will never allow this body to function as they feel threatened that it will start examining the basis of their budgetary proposals, acquisition plans and force structures".

The time has come for the individual Services to close their ranks and get collectively concerned about the major threats and formidable challenges which we face in our close neighbourhood and beyond. The global security environment is continuing to become growingly complex and huge uncertainties loom large on various fronts.

Our military has to be also concerned about the arising consequences of the economic meltdown and the strong likelihood of the allocations for Defence facing a significant decline in the coming time. In this scenario, to prepare for successfully meeting future challenges, it is of the highest importance that the individual Services shed all reservations and establish meaningful jointness. The pursuit of a truly tri-Service approach will not only reduce functional overlaps but also contribute towards reducing wasteful duplications and redundancies. I learn that the HQ IDS have already promulgated a Joint Doctrine on the Indian Armed Forces which is presently undergoing revision because of the differing views of the Service Headquarters on several important issues. In this context, I would reiterate the crucial importance of ensuring the urgent finalisation of the Joint Doctrine which covers all aspects of Integrated Operations. Any delay in this regard would come in

the way of the Armed Forces preparing themselves fully for delivering an effective response when any emergency arises in the future.

In view of the serious economic problems being faced the world over, many countries are exploring various approaches for containing and restricting the large expenditures being incurred on maintaining their Armed Forces. In this context, our MoD must realise the need to keep a very close watch on the rising cost of maintaining the military apparatus and ensuring that the high cost of the longer term acquisitions can be met from within the future availability of resources. Side by side, urgent attention needs to be paid to reducing dependency on continuing imports of weapons and systems. This would require a very vigorous revving-up of the ongoing indigenisation programmes and DRDO and Defence Production units joining hands with the private sector to yield speedier results. In the years past, only the Navy initiated systematic steps to foster indigenisation of their major platforms and systems and deserve all praise for the wonderful outcomes which they have already been able to achieve.

It also needs being noted that India is not the only Country which is engaged in dealing with problems which relate to the functioning of the Defence Management apparatus. Many democracies have been facing such problems and, benefitting from their own past experiences, several important countries have established strong parliamentary oversight bodies to monitor all the important issues relating to the functioning of their Armed Forces. Some countries have even inducted external experts to monitor their ongoing defence reform processes.

India cannot and must not be left behind in doing all that needs to be done for strengthening and enhancing our National Security interests. I have long been of the view that we need to develop our own model of Defence Management which vigorously promotes and sustains military professionalism while being fully in tune with our constitutional framework and in harmony with our glorious traditions of soldiering. The model to be evolved should also not be excessively encumbered with varied hierarchical fixations which are rooted in our colonial past.

Considering the threats and challenges which loom on our horizon it is extremely important that our HDM structures are

founded in the need to maintain a sensitive balance between the civil and military components and, side by side, ensuring that the entire military apparatus functions strictly within the parameters of "jointness".

On the basis of my own past experience I would say that it would be an ideal situation if the Service Chiefs were to collaborate closely and for the COSC to itself take the various required decisions to pave the way for the future and establish jointness, brick upon brick. In the past over two decades many useful opportunities were lost because of the lack of convergence in the views of the Service Headquarters.

If jointness and a tri-Service approach cannot be achieved soon enough; then, perhaps, the only option left may be to proceed towards replacing the existing single Service Acts by an Armed Forces Act which would lay a statutory basis for achieving jointness and delineating the roles, duties and missions of the Armed Forces, as also the procedures and modalities relating to the functioning of the Defence apparatus. In this context, it may not be out of place to recall that the USA achieved its objectives by promulgating the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, after nearly four decades of experimentation under the aegis of its National Security Act. And more recently, because of the serious budgetary problems faced by the country, the UK has been devoting high level attention to introducing reforms in its Defence Management apparatus. In this context, the Levene Report has sought to clarify the respective roles and responsibilities of ministers, civilian officers and the military at the policy, strategic and operational levels.

In so far as the tenures of civilians working in MoD are concerned, I have been urging, for many years now, the establishment of a dedicated Security Administration Cadre by drawing in the best available talent from the Civil Services, Defence Services, DRDO, Science & Technology, Information and Communication Technology, Broadcasting and Media, et al. I had proposed that officers of this dedicated cadre should enjoy open ended tenures and those found fit should be enabled to develop specialisation in dealing with security related matters and be deployed in the Home Ministry, Intelligence Bureau (IB), National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), MoD, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and other security management related areas for

their entire careers. This recommendation is contained in the Report of the Task Force on Internal Security (2000), which I had chaired. It was accepted by the GoM (reference para 4.105, page 56, GoM Report). After hearing me the GoM had gone further and added that as "the assignments in these ministries/agencies are perceived as exacting and unattractive, the members of such a pool should, therefore, be appropriately compensated by provision of non-monetary incentives". It is time to resurrect and speedily implement this decision of the GoM.

Another factor which was noted by the GoM related to the marked difference in the perception of roles between the civil and military officers. I was asked to chair a Task Force to work out the curricula for organising a continuing Joint Civil and Military Training Programme on National Security which would be undergone by Brigadier and Major General and equivalent rank officers from the three Defence Services, IAS, IPS, IFS, CPFs and, as the training settled down, participants would also be drawn from the Media, Industry and other arenas. On the basis of my recommendations the first two-week Joint Civil and Military Training Programme on National Security commenced at the IAS Training Academy at Mussoorie, in February 2003. This programme has been successfully continuing for over a decade now and the 20th Course commenced at Mussoorie in November 2013. It would be beneficial if the MoD were to review this programme and suitably recast its contents to meet the existing and emerging scenarios.

Recurring media reports in the last two years about controversial interviews relating to personnel issues; the Raksha Mantri's decision being challenged in the Apex Court, and several other unseemly scandals have marred the Army's glorious image and dragged the Services into the cesspool of partisan and parochial politics. This has caused divisiveness and serious damage to the very fabric of our military. It is indeed most unfortunate that any questioning of the deviations from the well established norms is viewed as questioning the very loyalty of the entire Indian Army. Such incidents, which have a grave adverse affect on the morale of the Armed Forces, must not be allowed to recur under any circumstances. Time has perhaps come to review the entire existing basis of promotions and appointments to the higher echelons in the three Services.

The patriotism and professionalism of the men and women of our Armed Forces is second to none among the militaries the world over. Our fearless military personnel, who maintain an eternal vigil on our land, sea and air frontiers, have successfully thwarted successive aggressions and safeguarded the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our motherland in the past over six decades, laying down their lives for the Country.

I have a very long association of working with the military. For the past over five years I have been serving in Jammu & Kashmir where I have had the opportunity of observing from very close quarters the extremely difficult circumstances in which the men and women of our Army operate round the year, in severe weather conditions and harsh terrains. I take this opportunity of paying my humble tribute to our valiant soldiers and reiterate that there should be no doubt ever, of any kind, about the devotion and loyalty of our military. Let nothing be ever said or done which generates any kind of debate or controversy which mars the glorious image or affects the morale of the 14 lakh officers and men of our Armed Forces.

Our National Security concerns demand that all interests and all institutions of national power are brought to work most closely together to further the Country's interest and build a militarily and economically strong India which enjoys the trust and respect of all our neighbours.

In conclusion, I would say to all my friends in uniform and to all my civilian colleagues: "The country must come first, always and ever", and never forget: "Who lives if India dies".

Indian Nuclear Doctrine – A Re-look

Dr KR Singh®

Introduction

Henry Kissinger, the noted expert on nuclear strategy, had commented that only a doctrine which defined the purpose of these weapons and the kind of war to which they were to be employed permitted a rational choice.¹ Doctrine enables decision makers to initiate a considered response. Lack of doctrine leads to improvisation which is not desirable, especially in a possible nuclear stand-off or confrontation. A doctrine is formulated in the context of a given set of variables at a given time. Hence, it needs to be periodically reviewed and, if necessary, updated in the light of new challenges as also possible changes in regional and international environment.

Reasons for Review

There are several reasons why such a revision has become necessary in the case of India. Regional and global environment has changed rapidly in the context of India. India's Nuclear Doctrine (IND) was first formulated in 1998-99 and released for debate in 2003. It was essentially Pakistan-focussed. Today, India's region, in the context of nuclear deterrence, stretches from the Gulf to the Asia-Pacific.

As noted, when IND was first formulated, India's nuclear deterrence was geared to counter the nuclear threat posed by Pakistan alone. Since then, due to India's success in developing medium range and long-range SSMs like Agni III and Agni V, and proposal to develop still more sophisticated Agni VI ICBM, as also the possible deployment of high performance aircraft like Su-30, with inflight refuelling facility, China too has entered as a factor in determining IND. Unlike Pakistan, China is a much stronger military power both in terms of conventional as also nuclear war fighting capability.

®Dr KR Singh was teaching at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi till 1997. He also served as Director, National Security Programme, JNU; Editor in Chief of *International Studies Quarterly* and Visiting Professor, Chair for Maritime Studies. University of Calicut.

International environment has also altered greatly in favour of India since 1998-99. During the Clinton era, the USA was almost hostile to nuclear weaponisation as also to the development of Agni II missile by India. Now, it has virtually given up its hostility. With the USA gradually disengaging itself from Afghanistan and refocussing on the Asia-Pacific, India is being seen by some as a potential interest partner in the US policy of containing China.

While terrorism was always considered as a threat, fear of nuclear proliferation *via* Pakistan is causing concern. The growing apprehension that at least some of the fissile material might fall into the hands of elements that belong to or sympathise with radical Islamic groups, has lent credence to the potential threat posed by these non-state actors, be they state-sponsored or not, of threatening others with nuclear blackmail if not its actual use. IND, thus, needs to factor in not only role of state actors but also of such non-state actors.

Another reason for a re-look at IND is the need to correct misinterpretations that have got associated with terms like *no-first use* (NFU), *second strike*, *minimum credible deterrence* (MCD) etc.

India's Nuclear Doctrine – Backdrop

Though India had exploded its nuclear device in 1974, it took a long time to weaponise it. It is not revealed as to when India acquired that capability. On 11 May 1998 the day of Pokhran II, Brijesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to Indian Prime Minister, said that these tests had established that India had a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme.² Pakistan, to assert that it too had that capability, followed suit by publicly demonstrating its nuclear weapon capability soon after Pokhran II.

India's decision to go nuclear provoked severe adverse international responses, especially from the USA. One possible reason for India to formulate and publicise its nuclear doctrine was to mitigate the intensity of that hostility. In that context, Brijesh Mishra, while addressing a select group of journalists, had said that the structure of India's nuclear forces and the operational doctrine guiding them would be rooted in the broad principles of minimum deterrence and nuclear NFU.³ K Subrahmanyam, who was credited to have a role in formulating India's nuclear doctrine,

also underlined these two points in his article in India International Centre Quarterly.⁴

IND was drafted in June 1998 by a 27-member National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) under the Chairmanship of K Subrahmanyam. The Board comprised of non-official experts and had only an advisory role. Thus, formally speaking, the doctrine had no official stamp upon it except that it was released by Brijesh Mishra who was the then National Security Adviser as also Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister AB Vajpayee. The doctrine, among other things, outlined the broad principles for the development, deployment and employment of India's nuclear force and was intended to serve as a basis for the policy and strategy concerning force structure, deployment and employment of nuclear forces.⁵

Shri Jaswant Singh, the then Foreign Minister, in an exclusive interview to S Raja Mohan, made it very explicit that the IND prepared by the NSAB was not an official nuclear doctrine. It was released to the public for a wider debate and, thus, was not a policy document of the Government of India. When asked about the essence and thinking on India's doctrine, Jaswant Singh said that key elements of India's nuclear policy were spelt out by the Prime Minister in the Parliament in December 1998. He recapitulated them briefly as follows. India shall maintain a minimum nuclear deterrence and shall undertake necessary measures to ensure its credibility. India had declared a policy of NFU. Moreover, India would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. Also, India shall not enter into an arms race. India's commitment to global nuclear disarmament would remain undiluted.

Jaswant Singh also listed three other points that were not part of Prime Minister's speech in the Parliament but were related to India's nuclear policy. The first was that India had declared a moratorium on undertaking any further underground nuclear tests. He, however, insisted that R&D activities that included computer simulation and sub-critical tests would be conducted as and when necessary. The second point that was made by Jaswant Singh in his interview with C Raja Mohan was that India would continue further development of extended-range Agni missile. He added that additional flight testing would be undertaken in a manner that was non-provocative, transparent and consistent with established

international norms and practices. Lastly, he said that India would seek to negotiate confidence building measures, both in the conventional and nuclear fields, with the aim of reducing lack of trust in the region.⁶

Confusion over Terms

Some terms like NFU, minimum credible deterrence (MCD) and second strike, that had got associated with IND, have evoked serious comments. They were probably used at that time to ward off international criticism of India's gesture of publicly defying efforts by some great powers, mostly from the West, to impose a non-proliferation regime upon states that had not signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India had publicly defied them by conducting Pokhran II. Though Pakistan too followed suit, it was India that was targeted most virulently. Use of terms like NFU, MCD was probably designed to justify India's nuclear weaponisation while simultaneously projecting a non-aggressive posture. But, these very terms drew maximum criticism. It is time that IND is gradually disassociated with these terms in the light of changing regional and global environment.

Few took India's offer of NFU seriously even in 1998. Pakistan rejected it outright. The entire nuclear deterrence of Pakistan was designed to deny India its advantage *vis-à-vis* conventional weapons. Hence, Pakistan had publicly proclaimed that it would exercise its nuclear option to deter India's conventional warfare capability. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sartaz Aziz reiterated that position on 19 August 1999 when he warned that a growing conventional imbalance would intensify Islamabad's dependence upon its nuclear capability to deter India.⁷

There are examples of other nuclear weapon powers that had earlier declared NFU as a policy, altering their stand and threatening to use nuclear weapon in the context of asymmetry in conventional forces. Russia, in 1993, reneged on the earlier Soviet pledge of NFU and reserved the right to use nuclear weapon in response to a large-scale conventional attack by NATO forces. That policy was reiterated in 2000 in Russia's military doctrine.⁸

China had announced NFU after its nuclear weapon test in 1964. It was reiterated in 1995 even when it was becoming clear that India was embarking on the path of acquiring nuclear deterrence. But, in 2005, Major-General Zhu Chenghu, in a press interview, said that China would use nuclear weapons if it was

attacked with highly sophisticated conventional weapons.⁹ It is possible that the Chinese were warning the USA against repeating Iraq *vis-à-vis* China. China reiterated that policy in 2011.

Kyodo, a Japanese news agency, revealed that Chinese policy called 'Lowering the Threshold of Nuclear Threat' stated that PLA's Strategic Missile Forces would readjust the nuclear threat policy if a nuclear missile possessing country carried out a series of air strikes against key strategic targets in China with absolutely superior conventional weapons.¹⁰ That statement could even be India-specific; since by 2011, India had started deploying Su-30 aircraft in the context of China, besides proposing to develop longer range missiles like Agni V. Thus, even China, that is a nuclear weapon power and has a strong conventional weapon capability, has put conditions on its NFU policy.

India, in its nuclear doctrine, has also made some exceptions to its NFU policy. IND has made nuclear deterrence a part of India's overall weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat. IND clearly states that India would reserve the right to use nuclear option in the event of a major attack against India or Indian armed forces anywhere by biological and chemical weapons. Is it possible to extend the scope of the exception to enable India to use its nuclear option in case of gross asymmetry in conventional forces as was done by Russia and China?

IND, when it was first released, was Pakistan-focused. India's position on NFU was more in the context of Pakistan since India had an edge over Pakistan in the context of conventional warfare. It could well afford the concept of NFU. By contrast, Pakistan had created its nuclear capability to counter India's edge in conventional warfare. India's NFU concept, thus, put the onus of resorting to nuclear threat on Pakistan. No wonder Pakistan refused to accept that concept. But, is the concept of NFU equally valid in the case of China? Not only China has advantage over India in the case of nuclear but also conventional warfare. It has also said that it would, if need be, resort to use of nuclear weapon if its strategic targets were subjected to superior air strikes.

India also needs to keep its nuclear option open in case it is subjected to a massive conventional strike that is likely to adversely affect its strategic interests and territorial integrity. If Russia and China can modify their concept of NFU in this context, India cannot be blamed for taking such a step.

IND says that nuclear weapons will *only* be used in *retaliation against nuclear attack*. Phrases *only* and *retaliation* against nuclear strike need to be revised in the light of altered environment so as to free India from its self-imposed limitation in the use or *threat to use* nuclear deterrence in pursuance of its national interests. The revised version can include, “Indian nuclear weapons will be employed in the event of use or threat to use nuclear weapon against India on its forces anywhere. India’s response will be massive and designed to inflict maximum damage on the adversary.”

The second point that needs to be refuted strongly is the linkage by some commentators of India’s nuclear strike with second strike. Nowhere does IND use the term second strike. It, however, does mention that India’s nuclear retaliation to a *first* strike will be massive. Thus, the term used is massive retaliation and not second strike. The confusion arises partly because of the policy of NFU as also because of calling the adversary’s nuclear attack as first strike. The confusion can be easily removed by substituting the term first strike with nuclear strike.

Nuclear deterrence can be broadly classified under two heads; pre-emptive and punitive. Pakistan has, time and again, reiterated its policy of pre-emptive deterrence. Since IND has reiterated NFU, Indian nuclear strategy is restricted to punitive deterrence. IND states that Indian response to a nuclear strike will be massive. Thus, the term strike (by adversary) becomes the core for determining India’s nuclear deterrence. How does one define nuclear strike? Unlike conventional war or even in the case of manned nuclear bombers, that can be recalled, nuclear missiles, once launched, cannot be recalled. Thus, does strike commence once the missile is launched or after it has hit the target? Since the missile cannot be recalled, the term strike should logically be associated with the launch of the missile.

Even if one takes that as the benchmark for determining nuclear strike and subsequent steps for launching massive retaliation (punitive deterrence), still the time span for effective response is limited, in the case of South Asia, to a narrow margin of 3-7 minutes only. Does India have the capability to detect the launch, communicate it to appropriate decision-making authorities

for taking final decision to retaliate within a span of 3-7 minutes? Thus, whether one likes it or not India's real and effective capability for conveying a convincing punitive response will still depend largely upon the credibility of its second strike capability.

Another phrase that needs to be reviewed is MCD. It is vague and hence subject to conflicting interpretations. This phrase can be faulted on several counts. MCD had indirectly got associated with NFU and massive destruction of the adversary. That meant that India's command and control structure as also its nuclear strike capability will not only survive the so-called first strike of the adversary but will also retain its capability to launch a retaliatory strike that is capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on the adversary. Hence, it meant that India must possess nuclear capability that is large enough to deter adversary from launching any nuclear strike. That makes the term 'minimum' superfluous if not contradictory to the ethos of IND.

No one will deny the fact that deterrence to be effective has to be credible. But that adjective itself defies exactitude because it is subject to different assessments by those who want to deter and those who need to be deterred. Adjective minimum only adds to the confusion.

Hypothetically, can 120 SSMs of different types deter Pakistan that seems to be bent upon an arms race to overtake India in the field of tactical SSM, strategic SSMs and nuclear capable cruise missiles, and which never ceases to flout its nuclear capability and intention to deter India from using even its conventional warfare capability? Can India pose a credible deterrence to China with a nuclear force level of 20 Agni II/III, 10 Agni V and 5 Agni VI missiles? Can India claim that mix as its MCD *vis-à-vis* China since it cannot enter into an arms race with China under the present conditions as it can do in the case of Pakistan.

Hence, does India need to incorporate MCD concept *vis-à-vis* China and balanced nuclear force concept *vis-à-vis* Pakistan in its revised nuclear doctrine? The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on January 4, 2003, had reviewed the IND.¹¹ In that review it had totally ignored the term MCD. Now, in 2013, we need to once again review IND and re-examine the relevance of terms like MCD and credible punitive deterrence (CPD) in the context of China and Pakistan respectively.

Another criticism of the term minimum is that it is not quantifiable but is related to adversary's capability to fight a nuclear war. For example, what could have been considered minimum and credible in 1999 or even in 2003 may not be so in 2013. Thus, India will have to constantly anticipate capability of adversaries and relate its so-called MCD to their nuclear strategy. Hence, India's nuclear strategy will only keep on responding to moves of the adversaries instead of charting its own course and let adversaries respond to it. The term MCD is also difficult to define. Who decides whether it is credible, India or its adversaries?

IND was formulated in 1999 or at best in 2003 when India's nuclear strategy was largely Pakistan-focussed. Now, China has also emerged as a variable in determining India's nuclear strategy. Can India have a single norm to determine MCD or will it evolve separate norms for the two potential nuclear adversaries. It must be underlined that India's threat perception, especially on nuclear confrontation, differs *vis-à-vis* the two countries. IND needs to provide for that so that it does not send wrong signals to either of them.

If IND was aimed at reassuring adversaries and thereby preventing an arms race, it has failed in its objective as far as Pakistan is concerned. One witnesses a sustained growth, both in terms of quality and quantity, of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia. As per details provided in the *Military Balance*, in 2005 India had about 45 SSMs of the Prithvi series and about 24 SSMs of the Agni series; a total of 69 SSMS. Pakistan was reported to have about the same numbers. By 2010, the number had increased to about 60 SSMs of the Prithvi series, about 100 of Agni-I and 25 of Agni II series; a total of 185 SSMs. Pakistan had about 105 Hatf I/II, 50 Hatf III, 25 Ghaury missiles and 10 Shaheen SSMs, a total of 190 SSMs.¹² Since then both the countries have been not only updating their delivery system by adding new missile systems but also improving upon their quality.

There are reports that India has tested *Prahar*, a 180-km range missile, designed to replace the Prithvi series of that range. It has quick response time and is mounted on vehicle that can carry four such missiles.¹³ If these specifications are true then *Prahar* can also serve as a tactical SSM, a counter to Nasr of Pakistan. India is also qualitatively improving its Agni II and III SSMs. It has not only launched Agni V, an ICBM, but is reported

to be developing Agni VI, a longer range ICBM with capability to launch multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). It is also reported to be working on *Nirbhay*, a 1,000 km range cruise missile. In the meanwhile, Pakistan has inducted Nasr as a tactical level nuclear-armed SSM as also *Babur* and Raad cruise missiles. The arms race goes on.

IND – Points for Review

It is necessary that IND if and when revised needs to address two different types of challenges; from Pakistan and China. There is a basic difference between the approaches of India and Pakistan towards nuclear deterrence. CCS's review of IND in 2003 had emphasised the retaliatory or punitive aspect of India's nuclear strategy *vis-à-vis* Pakistan. By contrast, Pakistan's strategy is based upon threat of pre-emptive nuclear strike as deterrence not only *vis-à-vis* nuclear strategy but also conventional threat. Indian decision-makers have so far refused at least publicly, to base India's nuclear strategy upon pre-emptive (i.e. first strike) deterrence but have emphasised upon credible retaliatory or punitive deterrence as the basis of its strategy.

Such a policy *ipso facto* requires that India must not only demonstrate a credible or convincing retaliatory or punitive capability for the proposed massive retaliation after absorbing the adversary's nuclear strike but also a decision-making authority as well as command and control mechanism, that can be effectively activated within a short time span of 3-7 minutes, as a part of its credible punitive deterrence (CPD) strategy. Indian decision makers will also need, in that context, to make a fine distinction between nuclear launch based upon pre-emption, on warning or on actual launch. Is India's retaliatory capability suitably geared and does IND reflect the same?

When IND was formulated it was largely Pakistan-focussed. India had neither the resources nor the intention to openly pursue a policy of nuclear confrontation *vis-à-vis* China. But, by 2012, by developing *Agni V* (and working on *Agni VI*) as also the decision to arm its SSBN with long-range SLBMs, India is sending signals that it is preparing for a possible nuclear deterrence *vis-à-vis* China also. Hence, India needs a nuclear doctrine that is also China focused.

Of course, India's relations with China are of a different nature than that with Pakistan. But, it needs to be underlined that China is, since a long time, pursuing a policy of confronting India directly on what can be called a low key but is doing its best since long to assist Pakistan to act as a proxy against India. This is true not only about its significant support to Pakistan in the field of conventional but also nuclear warfare. How does India define its nuclear doctrine to deal with two different sets of threats; from Pakistan and from China? Is its present doctrine sufficient to address these twin challenges or does it need to be reviewed and, if need be, revised in the light of new developments?

Doctrines are not sacrosanct and need to be adjusted in the light of new challenges and opportunities. That is true of India as well. It is possible that Indian decision makers have made suitable modifications. If so, as the CCS had done a decade ago in 2003, they have not been shared with the public so far. One wonders why?

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China-India Strategic Dialogue: Problems and Prospects

Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh^{*}

Introduction

If strategic dialogue is a painful process in international relations that yields little in terms of tangible outcomes, China and India are noteworthy examples. As the two countries resumed their strategic dialogue after a hiatus of three years recently (in New Delhi on 20th August), there was little expectation of an immediate outcome. The fifth round may have resurrected the fossilised dialogue process and may give a new lease of life to Sino-Indian relations that have been suffering from strategic impasse for quite some time, but the new investment needs comprehensive support if it is to facilitate the resolution of core conflicts in the bilateral relations.

A Euphoric Beginning

The contextual environment was harmonious and conducive when China and India inaugurated their first-ever strategic dialogue in January 2005 at New Delhi. The two countries had signed a landmark declaration in June 2003 during the then Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee's visit to China on 'Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation'. In addition, they also concluded a border trade protocol between India's Sikkim province and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) of China. The protocol signalled China's recognition of Sikkim as part of India. Most importantly, the two countries appointed Special Representatives (SRs) to explore the framework of a boundary settlement.¹ Subsequently, the new Indian leadership under Dr Manmohan Singh was quite willing to carry forward the good work of previous government.

The logic of a dedicated China-India strategic dialogue was necessitated for several reasons. *First*, despite a marked improvement in the overall bilateral relations, India's security dilemma vis-à-vis China remained complicated. The border talks were in stalemate; China's military modernisation was quite visible near Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India; and above all, the

^{*}Dr Bhartendu Kumar Singh is from the Indian Defence Accounts Service and is presently posted as Joint Controller of Defence Accounts (Air Force), Subroto Park, New Delhi. He is a PhD in Chinese Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University.

Sino-Pak military and nuclear cooperation had confirmed India's 'two-front' threat perceptions. India needed, therefore, a dedicated dialogue platform to discuss such issues with China from a realistic perspective. *Second*, as rising great powers, China and India had also enough stakes in the fashioning of regional and global order. While there was huge potential for cooperation, no diplomatic platform existed to discuss the cooperative ventures in seclusion. *Third*, this was also the period when India was seeking specialised dialogue platforms to discuss special issues with China. The strategic dialogue was just one of them; subsequently, there were institutionalised dialogues on financial matters and defence issues.

Gains from the Earlier Rounds of Strategic Dialogue

It would be naïve to say that strategic dialogue alone led to progress in the bilateral relations since there were other dialogue platforms and engagement tools between the two countries. Since 2005, a series of positive developments took place in the bilateral relationship that could be attributed to these dialogue platforms. *First*, India was able to convey its concerns on Sino-Pak military cooperation and, today, it is relatively less hyped about the axis than a decade back. China has also got similar assurances about the non-political nature of the Tibetan movement in India. The larger success for Indian foreign policy establishment also lay in reduced tone and tenor of China on issues concerning India. India's missile programme, for example, today does not generate reactive Chinese response. *Second*, the two sides made some concrete move on the border issue. In April 2005, an agreement was signed on 'political parameters and guiding principles on the boundary question. The agreement generated some optimism about a resolution of the border issue since the two countries had moved beyond historical issues to political principles (like not disturbing settled populations). *Third*, the two sides also pledged a move from strategic rivalry to one of 'strategic partnership'. In 2005, for example, the two sides issued a joint statement establishing a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity. It reflected the consensus that bilateral relations transcended bilateral issues and acquired global and strategic perspective. When Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh visited China in January 2008, a joint statement was issued on 'a shared vision for the 21st century of India and China', outlining common positions on numerous international issues.

Explaining the Pause in Strategic Dialogue

While the first strategic dialogue was held in January 2005, the second took place a year later in January 2006. The third round was almost two years later in December 2007. The fourth round was held after an interregnum of three years in November 2010 and so was the fifth round. Thus, it would be fair to conclude that the dialogue process that was supposed to be an annual exercise slowly got derailed! The lull in the frequency and periodicity of strategic dialogue was due to several reasons. *First*, there was a general decay in overall bilateral relations. As Professor C Raja Mohan explains, 'India's continued efforts to build a partnership couldn't prevail over the logic of conflict'.² Sino-Indian relations (have) reverted to the mode of conflict and rivalry amid renewed border tensions, differences over Tibet, nuclear politics and a range of other issues that divided them in the 20th century'.³ *Second*, China's military modernisation and its transformation from a continental power to a maritime power (it launched an aircraft carrier during this period) also contributed to its reduced interest in the dialogue process. China was more interested in consolidating the 'strategic encirclement' and enhancing the security dilemma of India. *Third*, the clamour for 'Chindia', the new strategic version of the romanticised version of 'Hindi-Chini bhai bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers)' of fifties had cooled down due to ground realities. Concurrently, the hype and hoopla in the Sino-Indian relations in early 21st century due to buoyancy in political and economic relations had also come down considerably. *Fourth*, during this period, there was a comprehensive decline in the dialogue processes between the two countries across the spectrum. The annual defence dialogue had equally suffered and the strategic economic dialogue was faltering in the wake of widening trade deficits. The pause in the strategic dialogue was, therefore, part of the larger communication breakdown between China and India.

Inferences from the 5th Round of Strategic Dialogue

The fifth round of strategic dialogue was convened when the bilateral atmospherics had been vitiated few months back by PLA intrusion across LAC into India's Ladakh area. Notwithstanding a new leadership in Beijing and the visit of the new Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to New Delhi soon after, there was an induced trust deficit in the bilateral relationship. The strategic dialogue, like in past, provided an opportunity to discuss mutual concerns in an

informal, free and frank manner. Apart from the hot topics of bilateral concerns like utilisation of trans-border river waters, trade deficit and ways of maintaining peace and tranquility across the LAC in the India–China border areas, the two sides also discussed issues related to BRICS, security architecture in Asia-Pacific region and the outlook for Afghanistan in 2014. The latter two are issues where the two countries are holding opposite perspectives. China, for example, is opposed to US' self-declared role as 'pivot' whereas India does not find it detrimental to security in Asia-Pacific. Similarly, on Afghanistan, where both countries initiated a separate dedicated dialogue process recently, there remained perceptual differences about the arrangement of post-US Afghanistan.⁴ China prefers a bigger role for Pakistan much to the chagrin of India. The reconstruction of strategic dialogue was an indication that India wanted to narrow down the differences with China on such issues.

Strategic Dialogue: Prospects

The strategic dialogue process may have resumed, but there are ample reasons to conclude that it will not have a smooth ride in future. *First*, the conflictual trend in Sino–Indian relations will continue for foreseeable future, including the core issue of border dispute that is not likely to be resolved for considerable time. The basket of differences is expanding and proliferating to other issues. In fact, whispers of Sino-Indian conflict have even been heard on international platforms (like the Asian Development Bank where China tried to block a loan for India, albeit unsuccessfully). *Second*, China is increasingly being perceived as 'number one threat' in India's strategic circles. China's military modernisation and logistical development near LAC with India add weight to perceptions that China is looking for a military solution of the border dispute than explore diplomatic solutions. *Third*, both countries are undergoing power transition. As rising great powers, they are bound to have enough conflict issues on plate, more so since they are neighbours. It is debatable if strategic dialogue could be of much use in mitigating this 'conflict of great powers' despite the charm offensive in some strategic corners that there is enough geo-political space for the two countries to co-exist. *Fourth*, the power gap between China and India is widening and this might make the strategic dialogue platform meaningless where China would dictate terms of dialogue and still play political chicanery outside the platform. The best evidence of this proposition is Chinese perception of India as

a 'sub-regional power'. *Fifth*, both China and India have fundamental differences in their respective worldview despite some political noises of similarity on bilateral and multilateral platforms. As a recent study concludes, 'Sino-Indian differences are considerable on issues relating to global order, non-proliferation system, Asian security, regional stability in Southern Asia, security in the maritime commons, space and cyberspace even though those differences may not always be apparent in public discussions'.⁵ It is debatable if India can use the strategic dialogue process to forge a consensus view with China on major themes of Asian security.

Strategic Dialogue: Choosing a Realistic Milestone

Eight years ago, the strategic dialogue had started with much fanfare and a huge expectational basket. China and India had hoped to use this platform to forge a strategic partnership in international affairs. That would have been a really good development since both carry reasonable clout in the emerging international world order and together they can design constructive Asian security architecture. However, given the inherent contradictions in Sino-Indian relations, 'strategic partnership' between them would always remain a distant milestone. Moreover, 'strategic partnerships call for greater engagement between the parties than mere ad hoc bilateral relationships'.⁶ Such higher level of engagement is simply not possible between China and India, despite the existence of romanticised joint declarations, agreements and proliferation of numerous dialogue platforms. India cannot expect to develop a relation with China equivalent to Sino-Russian or Sino-Pak relations.

In order to make the dialogue meaningful, therefore, a realist, minimalist and achievable target of 'strategic understanding' is desirable instead of the so-called 'strategic partnership' for various reasons. *First*, it would be less ambitious, would cater for exclusive agendas in international relations and Asian security, would accept the differences China and India have with each other and above all, perpetuate the 'cold peace' between the two countries through institutionalized 'conflict management'. *Second*, it would also allow the two countries to continue with respective strategic partnerships (like Sino-Pak or Indo-US relationships) without being bitterly critical of each other and at the same time allow space for issue-based cooperation without compromising the bilateral rivalry. *Third*, it would enable bilateral relations to remain manageable without any conflict escalation, the foremost prerequisite for Indian foreign policy.

Conclusion

As a recent document on India's foreign policy puts it, 'China will, for the foreseeable future, remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge for India. It is the 'one' major power which impinges directly on India's geopolitical space'.⁷ The future of Sino – Indian relations is, therefore, fraught with uncertainties. India is also a weaker power and has 'resource constraints' in bridging the power gap with China, not to mention its lack of capacity to 'shape the rules' in the emerging global order.⁸ India does not choose balancing or bandwagoning as standard foreign policy options and, therefore, the Chinese 'challenge has to be met without confrontation or appeasement'.⁹ **Therefore, from an Indian perspective, more investment in strategic dialogue is the only option despite the pangs of expectational frustration in the past.** India should seek regular dialogues apart from enhancing its economic and military profile to thwart Chinese power games and military adventures. Perhaps, that is the best way to engage China and bring down the flux in bilateral relationships.

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Russia - China Interplay in Central Asia and the SCO

Dr Zamira Muratalieva®

Central Asia is a region of growing geopolitical importance. Being a buffer zone, or in the terminology of the Anglo-Saxon school of geopolitics – Rimland – the border area of (Land and Sea) Central Asia is a territory, control over which will provide a springboard for any external actor to secure its position in Eurasia; primarily, the United States (US), China and Russia which are leaders in the scheme of regional balance of powers. However, the relationships within this geopolitical triangle are complex and multifaceted, especially in relation to Central Asia, due to the fact that the region directly borders with China and Russia; and any aggressive actions by any of the external actors will lead to the revitalisation of the others. Therefore, the US sanctions against Uzbekistan after Andijon events were not so stringent as, for example, in the case of Iran. In addition, the region is rich in hydrocarbons, and this fact along with region's central geographic location determine foreign players' specific geo-strategic moves centred around integration initiatives and projects for transcontinental highway construction.

Against this background, there is an inherent potential for conflict in the relationships between Russia and China, the proximate neighbours of the region, but it is latent for two reasons¹:—

- (a) Different tactics of Central Asian countries' involvement in the area of their interests that include different spheres of their major influence in the region;
- (b) Existence of a common enemy in the face of the US.

European experts have metaphorically called Russia a “reluctant soldier”, and China – a “silent merchant”.² In the context of opposition to the US, in these metaphors there can be traced similarity to the US and the European Union (EU) division of zones

[®]Dr Zamira Muratalieva is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Kyrgyz-Russia Slavic University and Scientific Secretary at the Institute for Strategic Analysis and Prognosis, Kyrgyzstan. She participated as a panelist in a seminar on 'Enhancing India-Central Asia Engagement : Prospects and Issues' held at USI on 18-19 March 2013.

of influence. Being on the opposite sides, the US and Russia are the supporters of 'hard power'; the EU and China are the apologists of 'soft power' instruments.

Since the collapse of the USSR, China had begun to increase its bilateral economic cooperation with the countries of the region and by 2006 it had become the third largest trading partner of the Central Asian countries after Russia and the EU.³ At the same time, the economic potential of the region had not yet been appreciated by either the US or Russia in that period. The latter pursued a pro-western foreign policy and virtually ceased all economic relations with the countries of the region.⁴ The proposed US projects of economic liberalisation of Central Asian countries led only to a protracted crisis against the background of restructuring or total destruction of most of the industrial enterprises of the Soviet period which led to their overwhelming dependence on foreign aid due to lack of an equivalent trading capacity with the Russians. Also, in the early 1990s, intra-regional relations between the republics had deteriorated sharply. This led to the need for finding an external trading partner – a supplier of ready-made products.

The establishment of trade relations by China with the countries of the region has economic, security and geo-political implications. In the sphere of economy, the PRC gets a market for its products in Central Asia region. It also enables China to diversify the sources of its energy imports vital for its dynamically developing economy; which according to experts, would amount to 65 per cent by 2025.⁵ In the field of security, the priority is to prevent external support for the separatist movement in Xinjiang. China's geopolitical ambitions are aimed at countering the US and ensuring for itself a reliable foothold on its western borders.

The US, acting according to its "Anaconda loop" geopolitical strategy, can destabilise the political situation in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa by influencing the oil supplies which make up for 56 per cent and 27 per cent respectively of China's hydrocarbon imports to restrict the resource base of China's economy. In addition, Washington has announced the new initiative of Trans-Pacific Partnership, involving the creation of a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific region. Consequently, supply of oil to China from the region (Indonesia) would be under threat. As

a result, it appears that Beijing would give boost to the dynamics of developing economic relations with the Central Asian countries.

This situation may lead to an increased cooperation between Russia and China, as well as escalation of their rivalry in the region. Externally, in the light of Russian-American relations cooling off in 2012-2013, Beijing and Moscow have demonstrated the capacity of upgrading their cooperation. The first visit of China's President Xi Jinping to Moscow and the recent joint Russian-Chinese military exercises that have taken place in the Far East have caused a visible negative reaction from the US.⁶

However, it is likely that the US would deliberately create conditions for the growth of China's influence in Central Asia, as it would directly affect Russian interests. In the event of collision of interest between the two giants, the winner may be the arbiter and script writer of this rivalry i.e. the US. Thus, in the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), there are some clear contradictions between Beijing and Moscow. The latter insists on strengthening the military capacity of the SCO [through initiatives to establish a centre for combating security threats to the SCO member states under the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS)] and tries to restrain the intensification of economic cooperation (China's initiatives to create a free trade zone and special bank account of the SCO) where China would be the main investor and trading partner of the Central Asian countries. These initiatives would strengthen its credibility both at the organisation level and in the framework of bilateral relations, to which Beijing pays a special attention.

Significant financial resources allow China to build trade and investment links with the region on a bilateral basis without stringent guarantees and commitments. This fact distinguishes it from both the US and Russia. In addition, China, a major trading partner of the EU, is actively involved in the projects of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), aimed at creating overland trade routes between Southeast Asia and Europe bypassing Russia which would allow Beijing to settle complex matters connected with Central Asia, such as, ensuring economic growth and stability of the western provinces Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), formation of a commodity market for its products in the region extending from Central Asia to the EU, and access to natural resources of the Central Asian region.

In its turn, Russia, firstly seeks to strengthen its military presence in Central Asia through the mechanism of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) (military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and rearmament of both republics). On one hand, these measures allow Russia to constrain the US in the region and on the other, they also seek to create a counterweight to China's economic influence. Initiated by Moscow, Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC, Customs Union, Common Free Market Zone) is currently in the early stages of its development, whereas the bilateral relations between the PRC and the countries of Central Asia have a twenty-year history that is reflected in the economic indicators. Thus, the volume of commodity turnover between the members of the Customs Union – Kazakhstan and Russia increased by only 6.8 per cent, and between Kazakhstan and China by 25 per cent in 2012.⁷

At the same time Russian Federation, in response to the American project "New Silk Road" and European - Chinese CAREC, provides the foundation for the Eurasian overland transit schemes. In particular, after the Bishkek summit of the SCO states heads of governments in December 2012, where Kyrgyzstan lobbied for the idea of the SCO member states' financing of "China – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan" railway, the initiative of "Russia – Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan" railway's construction was announced at the informal summit of heads of the CSTO member states. The type of organisations within which these initiatives were announced reflects the tactics of involving the Central Asian countries in the respective zones of interest of Russia and China – the "reluctant soldier" and the "silent merchant".

On one hand, Beijing and Russia maintain a common position on a number of major geopolitical issues which do not allow the West to ignore them; whereas, the task of ensuring the military security of the region is administered by Russia. This fact creates conditions for China's increasing economic presence in Central Asia and for avoiding accusations of a planned expansion against the background of cooperation with Russia. At the same time, China gets the opportunity to focus on the Asia - Pacific region where differences with Japan—the main US ally in the region are growing.

In their turn the Central Asian countries, firstly, get guarantees of support for their security in case they do not cooperate with the

US; and secondly, massive financial and economic assistance. In this regard, only Uzbekistan occupies a special position, because its participation in the Organisation is determined by the economic prospects of cooperation with China. This fact is evident from its refusal to participate in military exercises of the SCO in 2012, and absence of its experts at the discussion for the upcoming "Element – 2013" exercises in Kyrgyzstan in September 2013.

Thus, at present, the relations between China and Russia are twofold in the geopolitical space of Central Asia. On one hand, both states aim at cooperation, although both use different spheres to spread their influence in the region due to the presence of the third player – the US – which clearly shows its hegemonic aspirations. On the other hand, China's growing economic influence in Central Asia affects the regional interests of Russia. Its dominance in the military field, against the background of socio-economic crisis being faced by the countries of the region, cannot be the only basis for a long-term presence of Russia in the region. However, it is difficult for Russia to compete with China in the economic sphere. The strategy of the PRC, of binding the region based on bilateral cooperation looks more attractive rather than the economic integration projects connected with commitments and guarantees of the participating countries proposed by Russia, because Moscow does not have the financial clout of China. It is also necessary to take into account the "lost decade" of the 1990s, when Russia virtually broke off all the trade and economic ties with Central Asian countries as also its lack of experience in using soft power instruments – the need for which was indicated only in 2013, in the 'Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.'

Meanwhile, it appears that this game of 'interests' in Russia - China relations, could go on for a long period; as, long term cooperation and compromise between them would lead to the achievement of mutually beneficial goals. However, this development is contrary to the US interests in the region. Given the complexity of the geostrategic position of Central Asia (proximity to China and Russia) which is often compared to the Balkan Peninsula (a "powder keg" of Europe) the USA cannot use direct force measures, as it did in the case of Yugoslavia. Instruments of soft power (democratisation of political systems and economic liberalisation) proved their overall effectiveness only in Kyrgyzstan. In this situation, the best scenario (from the point of view of Central Asian Republics) is a clash between two potential rivals.

The US deliberately backs China to strengthen its position in Central Asia which is the area of traditional interest of the Russian Federation by destabilising the situation in the Middle East and North Africa (which provide over 80 per cent of China's imports of hydrocarbons) and also supporting it through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank projects under the CAREC. The latter helps to promote economic development of the US transatlantic ally – the EU – and on the other hand turns China towards Central Asia, to become a stumbling block in the way of energy imports from Russia to China against the background of the initiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership programme.

Thus, the prospects for development of Chinese - Russian relations in the Central Asia region, in the spirit of cooperation, depend on the space for manoeuvre that still exists between them. This outlook enables them to find compromise solutions to safeguard their own interests in a way that intersection of such interests does not affect their overall geo-strategic goals.

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Understanding Cyber Weapons

Colonel Sanjeev Relia®

Introduction

A weapon is any device used in order to inflict damage or harm to living beings, structures, or systems. Weapons are used to increase the efficacy and efficiency of activities such as hunting, crime, law enforcement, self-defense, and warfare.¹ In a broader context, weapons may be designed to include anything used to gain a strategic, material or psychological advantage over an adversary. Simple as well as complex products can be used both for peaceful purposes and as arms or weapons depending on the intentions of the user. So is the case with Information Technology tools. While the internet was never designed to wage a war, cyber space today is on the threshold of being the fifth domain of warfare.

A lot is being spoken about attacks in the cyber space and cyber weapons. Nations like the USA, Russia and China have gone ahead and raised cyber units and even cyber commands. Although, we in India lag behind a little in this facet of warfare, however measures have been initiated to bridge the gap. The defence minister of India, Shri AK Antony in May 2013 announced that India too will soon form a cyber command to handle the online threats being faced by the country. He further said that we have already got a mechanism for cyber security but we are augmenting it further and the forces are finalising a proposal for a cyber command.² Does this mean that we have entered into an era where our defence forces will be fighting in the cyber domain? Does it also imply that we will need to create new kind of weapon systems to ensure territorial integrity of our nation and that we will have to create new units of computer geeks in uniform who will control cyber weapons and employ them when the need arises?

What are Cyber Weapons?

When a weapon is spoken or written about, a distinct perfect shape of the weapon system emerges in the mind. Whatever be

®Colonel Sanjeev Relia was commissioned into the Corps of Signals on 20 Dec 1986. Presently, he is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies and Simulation, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.

the weapon system, the IHS Jane's Defence Weekly would clearly spell out the destructive powers of each of the system with a few glossy pictures leaving little doubt in the mind what the weapon platform or system can do. But as the concept of cyber weapon is abstract, these weapons find no such mentions in any of such glossy journals. Besides, what can be made out of a printout of a software programme claiming to be a deadly cyber worm capable of destroying the command and control system of an Air Defence Network? A trained military mind finds it difficult to comprehend how an innocent looking laptop or desktop could cause havoc in the battlefield and perhaps may cripple the critical infrastructure of a nation. Therefore, there is a need for the men in uniform to critically analyse the concept and capabilities of Cyber Weapons.

The definition of a kinetic weapon fails to capture the essence of what are generally regarded as cyber weapons. This is because most of the malicious computer codes, may it be Virus, a Trojan or a Worm that would fall within the parameters of a cyber weapon are designed to have an indirect kinetic outcome which may, or may not, result in inflicting damage or harm to living beings, structures, or systems. To define a cyber weapon in the specific context of conflicts, it is necessary to first differentiate a cyber weapon from a malware, typically used for criminal purposes or an information tool used to perform espionage in the cyber space. To reach a definition of cyber weapon, it is therefore necessary to focus on three essential elements. As Thomas Rid explains it, a computer code as a cyber weapon has to first "weaponise" the target system in order to turn itself into a weapon.³

(a) The Context. It must be the typical context of a cyber warfare act. This concept may be defined as a conflict among actors, both national and non-national, characterised by the use of technological information systems, with the purpose of achieving, keeping or defending a condition of strategic, operational and/or tactical advantage.

(b) The Purpose. Causing, even indirectly, physical damage to equipment or people, or rather sabotaging or damaging in a direct way the information systems of a sensitive target of the attacked subject.

(c) The Mean/Tool. An attack performed through the use of technological information systems, including the Internet.

Based on the above, Stefano Mele defines a cyber-weapon as: "A part of equipment, a device or any set of computer instructions used in a conflict among actors, both national and non-national, with the purpose of causing, even indirectly, a physical damage to equipment or people, or rather of sabotaging or damaging in a direct way the information systems of a sensitive target of the attacked subject."⁴

Thomas Rid defines a Cyber Weapon as a subset of weapons more generally as computer code that is used, or designed to be used, with the aim of threatening or causing physical, functional, or mental harm to structures, systems, or living things.⁵ The spectrum of cyber weapon system therefore becomes very large and hence there is a need to spell out the important facets of such weapons such as their lethality, its effect and their employment.

Aspect of Lethality

One aspect which clearly emerges from both the above definitions is that cyber weapons are built with lethal intent although the lethality of such weapons is not quantifiable. For instance, for a nuclear strike with 20 KT weapon, the extent of damage that will be caused on any particular type of target can easily be tabulated. For a cyber weapon, such predictions can never be accurately made. How lethal is a cyber weapon, depends on its ability to cause the following to a network :-

- (a) Disruption of the network services.
- (b) Denial of services of the network to its users.
- (c) Degradation of the performance of the network, thereby degrading the efficiency/ performance of the overall system.
- (d) Destruction of critical components of the network thus rendering the entire system useless.

The easiest way to check the above capabilities of a cyber weapon would be by carrying out a live test fire, like an underground nuclear test for a nuclear weapon. However, no such tests of a cyber weapons are possible on actual networks as not only the damage caused may result in loss of property or revenue but also may be seen as an act of aggression. Stuxnet, a cyber worm attack in 2009 from an unknown origin (probably collaboration of the US and Israel) on a highly protected nuclear site at Natanz, in

Iran is perhaps the only example which clearly indicated the extent of damage that a cyber weapon can cause. Although a large number of scholars till date still debate on Stuxnet as a cyber weapon, it did attack the nuclear centrifuges that operated with a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system using Siemens software and is believed to have caused a setback of at least one year if not more to the Iranian Nuclear Development Program.⁶

To establish the lethality and destructive power of cyber weapons and the network security aspects against such attacks, the US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is developing the National Cyber Range (NCR) to provide realistic, quantifiable assessments of the Nation's cyber research and development technologies.⁷ The NCR will provide fully automated range management and test management suites to test and validate leap-ahead cyber research technologies and systems. It will test technologies such as host security systems, and local and wide area network (LAN and WAN) security tools and suites by integrating, replicating or simulating the technologies. Seven large-scale cyber experiments for multiple US Department of Defence (DoD) organisations were executed on the range during a one-year beta operation phase that ended in Nov 2012.⁸

Effect of Cyber Weapons

Cyber weapons and cyber attacks offer a means for potential adversaries to overcome overwhelming advantage of a nation in conventional military power. The other most important aspect of a cyber weapon is that they need not necessarily target a military objective. In fact more often than not, the objective of a cyber attack will be a non-military target. Critical national infrastructure such as the power grid systems, telecom networks, the air traffic control system, economy sector to include banking and other financial institutions and railways could be such possible targets as all these sectors heavily rely on automation and networking. The payload of a cyber weapon could vary from a programme that copies information off a computer and sends it to an external source; or an altering and manipulating programme to either take control of the system or to alter the way in which it works. It could also be a code which could convert a computer into a botnet[#] and employ the machine in a Distributed Denial of Service^{##} (DDoS) at

a later stage or even cause destruction of a physical process which the computers of the SCADA system controls like it happened with Stuxnet. Various effects of a cyber weapon attacking a network have been summarised by Dr Roland Heickerö in an Effect matrix as shown at **Figure 1**.⁹

	Physical arena (land, air, maritime, space)	Information Arena	Cognitive domain (cognition, perception, emotion)
Physical Effects	Interruption, destroy electronics and sensors, affect transmission and access links, derive robots, system failure	Interrupted communication, denial of services; DOS	Fragmented communication, decreased amount of information, reduced analysis capability
Syntax Effects	Hacking, cracking virus, Mistrust against system Trojans, spam, interception, exploit, bugging Illegal misuse of information system	Attack logic of system, delay and distortion of information	Mistrust against system
Semantic Effects	Mass medial manoeuvres, planted information, mutilation of sensor data	Deception and manipulation of information (disinformation)	Changed situation awareness, mistrust against and questioned of information, inability for decision making

Figure 1 : Effect Matrix of Cyber Weapons

A botnet (also known as a zombie army) is a number of Internet computers that, although their owners are unaware of it, have been set up to forward transmissions (including spam or viruses) to other computers on the Internet.

A DDoS attack is one in which a multitude of compromised systems attack a single target like a server, thereby causing denial of service for users of the targeted system.

A single cyber weapon may not be able to impact the physical arena, information arena and the cognitive domain and hence a multi-pronged cyber attack may be necessary if all the three spheres are to be addressed simultaneously. Key for success in cyber space is to understand prerequisites for conducting operations in the information arena and cognitive domain of the enemy. Cyber weapons do not create the same spectacular visual that a nuclear or even conventional missile does, which makes them weapons of stealth. Also before being hit, a network is unlikely to get any advance warning of an incoming cyber attack. Not knowing what the next attack is going to be or when it will happen has a profound effect on the victim and makes cyber weapons unique amongst all possible coercive systems. Another characteristic of cyber weapons is that for the first time in history, this technology gives small states with minimal defence budgets the capability to inflict serious harm on a vastly stronger foe at extreme ranges.

Employment of Cyber Weapons in a Conventional War

The US Air Force has designated six cyber tools as weapons to help normalise military cyber operations and keep up with rapidly changing threats in the newest theatre of war.¹⁰ This clearly indicates that time has now come that the armed forces around the world gear up to employ as well as defend against cyber weapons. The 2008 cyber-attacks on Georgia is the first case in history of warfare when cyber space domain attacks were synchronised by Russia with major combat actions in the other war fighting domains. Although denied till date by the Russian Government, the Russian naval and land operations against Georgia were preceded by large scale DoS attacks on Georgian Military and Government networks. The attacks continued as the Russian tanks and troops were crossing the border and bombers were flying sorties.¹¹ The impact : Georgian citizens could not access websites for information and instructions while the nation was being invaded.

When employed in conjunction with conventional operations, cyber weapons increase the cost of conflict for adversaries as he has to now protect the National Critical Infrastructure against cyber weapons besides the conventional and nuclear threat of the enemy. Imagine, if India was involved in a conflict situation and the adversary through pre-emptive cyber attacks crippled the movement of trains and air traffic and the civil telecom network at the mobilisation stage itself. The problems that would arise for movement of troops and logistic supplies would be phenomenal. Similarly, if the major oil refineries were to be shut down because of failure of its SCADA system, it could create a critical situation for the defence forces embroiled in a conventional war. Hence, like the lines of communication have to be protected during the war, in a similar manner in the cyber age, the Critical National Infrastructure will have to be protected against enemy cyber attacks both before the outbreak of hostilities as well as during the hostilities, thereby increasing the cost of war fighting. However, cyber weapons are unlikely to influence beyond a point the national security policy when core national interests are at stake.¹²

Like the civil infrastructure, cyber weapons can target the military networks too. Although our defence networks enjoy the advantage of being segregated from internet, however this does not make them immune to cyber weapons. Most of our defence

equipment is imported and most hardware today is produced in and around China. Also, there exists no agency in the country to sanitise the network equipment when it is being imported against malware pre-embedded in them. Therefore, a cyber attack could yet be initiated during critical periods of the battle employing Embedded Devices and Trapdoors.¹³ Any network in the battlefield is perhaps therefore as vulnerable to a cyber attack as a civil target is. However, developing and deploying potentially destructive cyber weapons against hardened military targets will require significant resources, hard-to-get and highly specific target intelligence, time to prepare, launch and execute an attack. Hence, the deterrence value of such weapon systems against military targets is negligible.

India too could employ such weapon systems during the preparatory as well as the contact stages of a battle to weaken the enemy's war waging potential by targeting their critical national infrastructure. After all, cyber weapons are a cheap way to build a global strike capability against networked states and armies and our potential adversaries are well on their way to create such networks, if already not existing. Therefore, the time has now come to take charge of the cyber space and develop offensive cyber capability as part of the overall national security policy. After all, like in a battlefield, even in the cyber space, offence is the best form of defence.

Conclusion

We once lived in a world in which wars were fought by brave soldiers who faced each other in furious combat in a way that today we would find it hard to believe. In the last decade, the concept of war and war fighting has changed considerably. The massive introduction of the technology component in all spheres of warfare has ensured that cyber weapons and cyber attacks too become activities undertaken by governments to degrade the enemy's war waging capabilities.

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Social Media: A Tool to Incite Ethno-Religious and Civil Society Unrests in India

Brigadier Sanjeev Chauhan®

Introduction

Media is the propeller as well as direction provider of our society for playing a significant role in fulfilling people's right to information and being a watchdog by making the government and social institutions accountable for their actions. However critics claim that at times media has not played the constructive role that it should have played and has inadvertently played into the hands of a few vested interests. Media, as guardian of social polity, needs to connect the general public to evolving realities around the world; rather than, engaging in baseless sensationalism for the sake of its commercial advancement with disregard to social sensitivities. The degree of media influence differs from country to country depending upon literacy/media access ability of the population, media maturity and government policies.

Mass media in India has been a principal agent for societal development, democracy and good governance. A study of mass media trends contributes to an understanding of social, economic, technological and other factors that influence communities and their relationship with regular citizens and government agencies. Mass media has had a profound impact on democratic process in modern societies, thanks to an ever present phenomenon called investigative journalism. Today omnipresent mass media is considered to be the backbone of our vibrant democracy and consistently influences its many hued changes.

The galloping growth of mass media over the past few years has revolutionised content creation, its dissemination and consumption with emergence of new forms like web enabled social media. In an interdependent, interconnected and globalised world,

®Brigadier Sanjeev Chauhan was commissioned into the First Gorkha Rifles in Dec 1987. He commanded his unit 5/1 Gorkha Rifles in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIL) during 2009-10. Presently, he is commanding a Mountain Brigade in the Northeast.

the challenge of managing this internet driven mass media is to monitor with unwavering objectivity its extensive coverage of global, national, local events and to channelise its immense powers in a constructive manner. Web based mass media continues to gallop ahead in its people popularity and impacts almost all sections of society in different cultural, ethnic and economic settings.

Understanding Social Media: Mass Media's Latest Avatar

Social media today represents a shift in how we access and use news-information. It used to be that we would wait for the paper boy to throw our newspaper on the doorstep and we would read the paper, front to back, in the morning hours. Now we get information, 24x7 and on the fly, from anywhere through online sources, on our phones, and through the social platforms. Social media allows us to interact and engage, with like-minded people, to find people and connect to varied information sources viz. text, audio and video. It flattens out the world and gives us access to people we never would have been able to meet otherwise. Thus, **social media** is all about leveraging online tools that promote sharing information and conversations, which ultimately lead to relationship building and connecting with target audiences. As opposed to traditional media, social media offers the opportunity to users and providers to interact with each other in real-time allowing news feeds to change and adapt on the fly.

Social media platforms will not replace face-to-face meetings or usher in death of telephonic conversation. Social media tools allow users to create and converse in *interactive dialogues over the web*. Social media is all about influencing people one-on-one; and achieving P2P (person-to-person) communication that influences awareness, acceptance and behaviour. Powerful tactics and tools of social communication, across community networks today play an important role in nation building, maintenance of good governance and protection strategy of the state.

The mainstream media is left with no choice but to cooperate with masses in a converged fashion with social media being used to highlight emerging issues like hobnobbing with opinion leaders and exposing discredited parts of governance and politics. What is clear is that mainstream media risks being irrelevant in public sphere if it ignores the epoch shift in public popularity of social media. This has lead to fostering greater transparency and internal

democratisation of different media channels. This media democratisation can be viewed as impacting our communities in multiple positive and negative ways across India's diverse religious and ethnic groups. The revolutionary features of social media that makes it unique in today's media mosaic are:—

(a) Reach. Media which was traditionally the preserve of rich and powerful is now accessible to all: it is free, pervasive and democratic. This reach and spread is simply unstoppable across cultures, geographies and nations. All people from rural to urban areas, across different age groups, and different emotional/religious/ethnic leanings are now enmeshed within this global media whirlpool.

(b) Non-perishable, Collaborative and Community Generated in Real Time. The days of visiting and merely reading website contents written as a visitor are all but gone. Now, everyone is a user as well as content creator which can be in different forms – text, images, audio, video or even symbolic likes and dislikes for a content post on a social media site. It is thus the consuming community that dictates shape and scope of content and content once posted stays on forever, making it non-perishable.

(c) Interactive Conversation Fuels Intercultural Dialogue. Anything anyone posts via social media has the potential to start a conversation and anyone can jump in and out whenever he so feels. As in real life, you may contribute as little or as much as you like, thereby shaping ongoing conversation that can expand in both reach and impact to global proportions in a flash. Social media brings people together with different backgrounds and encourages interaction; ignoring distance. This leads to more friendly and interactive intercultural dialogues.

(d) Information Sharing. Social media has the ability to share an article or an item of public-popularity simultaneously. This ensures its easier and faster dissemination by providing a common medium to communicate, interact and collaborate.

Ethnic, Religious and Civil Society Unrests in India and Role of Media

India has been characterised by more ethnic and religious groups

than most other countries of the world. The 1920s were a transformative moment in our nation's politics because it was then that mass politics emerged in India under Mahatma Gandhi's leadership. He talked of two intertwined battles of independence (*swaraj*): one against an external adversary, the colonial power; and another against an internal enemy; India's social evils, arguing that the former could not be meaningful without the latter. He first concentrated on three social objectives: Hindu-Muslim unity, abolition of untouchability and *swadeshi*. To these were later added other projects of social transformation: women's welfare, tribal welfare, labour welfare, prohibition, and so on.

Post-Independence India's secular society has come under significant strain, particularly in the latter stages of 20th and the turn of 21st century. The media, post-Independence, was fragmented into regional and localised media channels, as national level media houses did not exist. The issues raised by regional media were a carry forward of unfulfilled aspirations of the Quit India movement. Regional power blocks across India got polarised on linguistic grounds giving rise to India's multiple state federal system. Thus mega states like Madras and Bombay got spilt into multiple states. The role of the media in ethnic or religious conflicts was localised and impact was not viral. On the other hand, pockets of emancipated intelligentsia grouped under the civil society took up cudgels against the government and social elements by leveraging the growing information reach and people impact of the traditional media to raise issues and suggest remedial measures.

In the last four to five years there has been an exponential growth in India in the use of social media. The power of social media and its impact on individuals and society in India has provided an equal opportunity to all Indians to voice thoughts, opinions, and share information. Social media today induces audiences to become digital activists; changing user behaviour from passive to active, non-participatory to avid participation enabling users with a voice that was otherwise unknown or untapped. Although presently the reach of social media is mostly urban, it is predicted that by 2016, nearly 20 per cent of rural areas will have access to Internet. The ethnic conflict in Assam (2012), Muzzafarnagar communal riots (2013) and the recent civil rights movement against corruption and for women rights have shown how virtual communities on social

media have played a vital role in spreading their issues and mobilising mass support pretty effectively.

In July 2012, violence between indigenous Bodo tribes and Minority Community migrant settlers started in Kokrajhar and spread to several districts in Assam, resulting in the death of at least 97 people and displacement of over 4,50,000. It was the biggest internal displacement in the history of Independent India. This conflict threatened to engulf the entire Northeast region as Muslim radicals across India vowed to stand by their Muslim brethren in seeking revenge. In Uttar Pradesh the protests converted into communal tension and violence while in Mumbai road protests turned into brutal violence. Subsequently, doctored images, on social media, portraying gun-toting monks from the northeast killing Minority Community migrant settlers and hate SMS were circulated. This triggered sudden panic and thousands of northeast Indians fled from Bangalore, Delhi, and Mumbai to their homeland. It is believed that Pakistan based groups were involved with south India based Popular Front of India in spreading communal SMS and hate posting. The government banned over 300 websites and bulk SMS were banned for 15 days. In Muzaffarnagar communal riots, which started with a minor incident between two communities, snowballed into a major riot by circulating inflammatory video with morphed images through facebook to incite anger amongst people of rival communities.

The India against Corruption Movement (IAC) that erupted in India was unprecedented in its success in galvanising India's middle classes to protest against corruption. Social media has provided individuals and citizens' rights groups unmatched power to reach their target audience in real time. The brutal gang rape of Nirbhaya girl and attack on her companion led to citizen groups spreading the information through social media to formulate appropriate corrective actions i.e. public marches to demand better laws, proactive policing and more sensitive governance.

Reality Check

'Social media is today being used in ways that it wasn't originally designed for'¹. Everyday thousands and millions of ideas, concepts, themes and rumours spread across the globe, making it difficult to question their authenticity. Moreover, as the Indian masses are highly emotional, if something sensational is spread by media they

react instantly and strongly. The common man's psychological fear forces them to believe in anything without understanding the authenticity of the content – this fear converts into panic if it is related to religion. National subversive groups and opposing movements – religious/political take advantage of this crowd sourcing means for “Management of collective attitudes by manipulation of significant symbols” simplifying the spread of mischievous deeds.²

The Information Technology Act 2008 covers all issues related to Cyberspace including the social media. Section 66(A) states, “Any person who sends information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character... is punishable with imprisonment for a term extended to three years”.³ The legality of this section has been criticised for its interpretation in number of cases and needs a review. Section 69 states, “empower the government to block any website, if found violating the sovereignty or integrity of the country”. However, in the case of social media, as it works on World Wide Web this present section will have limited jurisdiction under its direct control.

The Government has taken large number of measures to counter misinformation spread by social media; however the pace of things on the social media is so fast that it makes these steps appear reactive. The Government has released a social media strategy framework for Government Departments. A team of experts has been set-up to monitor social media on critical issues. In order to facilitate banning of social media in specific geographies directives have been issued to Internet service providers and mobile phone companies to build ‘embedded technologies’.⁴

The Way Ahead

The emerging landscape of social media necessitates it to have a UN mandated body duly ratified by member nations which would standardise policy formulation, monitoring, arbitration and articulate emergency response in respect of the internet and social media.

The monitoring mechanism in the USA and Russia are ‘Social Media in Strategic Communication (SMISC)’⁵ and ‘Dispute/Monitor-3/Strom-12’⁶ respectively to cover different facets of social media. Our Government also needs to set-up a centralised content monitoring system with tools and programmes to filter out anti

national threats and 'track ideas and concepts to analyse patterns and cultural narratives'.

The strategy to respond to a crisis would have to be an on-going process. Firstly, an understanding of the dynamics of social media interactions and why issues go viral in India needs to be analysed. Secondly, identify virtual communities who are anti-national or anti-social and keep them under watch. Thirdly, have a dedicated organisation with adequate infrastructure, mandate and legal sanctions to continuously monitor and carry-out emergency responses. Fourthly, in order to overcome redundancy, use both local and national traditional and mass media to provide authentic information to the target audience.

Censorship of social media is a major issue as it is believed that social media is just a medium and cannot be blamed for unsavoury use made by certain anti-national elements. And in a democracy, people at large oppose any kind of regulation or censorship to suppress their freedom of expression. Moreover, the issue of jurisprudence over an entity operating from foreign land, prevents complete regulation. Therefore there is need to understand each problem separately and ensure that the state response to provocations is 'incident specific' or 'situation to situation' strategy to handle the spread of misinformation.

Regular training at grass root levels for police officials and of community opinion leaders needs to be conducted. The aim of this training would be to make them adequately aware of all important issues of social media and internet which can provoke and spread tension. Training community leaders would help foster inter-ethnic dialogue and to bridge divides between emerging adversaries, especially amongst the youth. The training of youth is not just a "feel good tactic" but is aimed at getting ahead of the cycle of conflict.⁷

Conclusion

Unity in diversity is the main character of India and with increased information access we need to effectively exploit social media as a proactive violence prevention tool. Secondly, we need to empower our people by spreading perspectives on social causes and changes leading to digital activism and faster information sharing in times of grave crisis. Finally, we need to be fully prepared to

deal with any content generated by anti-national or anti-social elements.

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Lessons Learnt from the 26-11-2008 Pakistan Lashkar-e-Taiba Raid on Mumbai

Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd)[®]

Introduction

In March 1993, there were a series of thirteen well-coordinated explosions directed against chosen economic targets by a group of Muslims trained and organised by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan with the assistance of Dawood Ibrahim a Mumbai Muslim who was a kingpin in a smuggling and *Hawala* (illegal foreign exchange) racket in which 250 innocent civilians were killed. Incidentally Dawood Ibrahim was a leading smuggler who, reportedly had the Central Government Customs and the Mumbai city Police on his pay rolls. Opium and heroin were smuggled in boats from Pakistan and both the Customs and the Police were on the payroll of Dawood Ibrahim. After the Babri Masjid was demolished, Dawood Ibrahim was given the task of smuggling in weapons and explosives supplied by the ISI of Pakistan into Mumbai and this he did adopting the usual pay offs to the Customs and the Police by saying it was the regular consignment of drugs!

This was the first response to the dastardly demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 1992, an utterly stupid and idiotic action of the Hindutva forces, which could easily have been prevented by the Central Government but for their total lack of courage to remain strictly neutral on a religious issue.

The Root Causes of the Failure of Intelligence and Policing in India

Describing the demolition of the Babri Masjid as an utterly stupid and idiotic action is absolutely justified. In the 8th century AD when Islamic armies from the West crossed, what was the then Afghanistan and entered India, they encountered the idolatrous

[®]Shri EN Rammohan, IPS (Retd) is a 1965 Batch Assam Cadre IPS Officer. He retired as Director General of Border Security Force in November 2000. Post retirement, he was Adviser to the Governor of Manipur. He was an elected member of USI Council from 2010-2013.

Hindu religion with idols of Gods and Goddesses carved in stone in temples, with more sculptures of Gods and Goddesses on its walls. Fresh with the tenets of a new religion – Islam, that had freed them from worshipping 256 idols in the *Kaaba*; the inspired Islamic armies destroyed the temples of the Hindus and their stone idols of Gods and Goddesses. I do not think History has counted and recorded the number of temples that were destroyed by the invading Muslim armies. Dozens of Mosques must have come up on the sites of the destroyed Hindu temples. What then was the necessity of destroying the Babri Masjid, which was probably built on a Hindu Temple that was perhaps destroyed by the victorious Muslim Army? The mass destruction of temples by the invading Muslim armies happened in the 8th century AD. What happened at that time was because the numerous Hindu kingdoms were divided and the different Hindu kingdoms could not fight the Muslim invasion. “Might is Right” was the dictum of the kings of that period and the Hindu kingdoms were defeated in war and the consequence was the destruction of their temples. The early Muslim kings gave way to the dynasty of the Slave Kings also Muslim but more moderate in their approach to the majority Hindu people. Then came the Mughal dynasty and you had kings like Akbar who synthesised a religion absorbing the best tenets from Islam, Hinduism and Christianity. Hindus and Muslims were treated as equals by Akbar.

After all this, the British came and then India got its Independence. People of all religions could freely practise their respective religions in India. What then was the necessity of demolishing a *Masjid* that was supposed to have been built over a temple that was destroyed hundreds of years ago when rulers ruled as per their might?

It is the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1991 that has triggered off a wave of Muslim hatred for the Hindu Indian people that finally led to the creation of Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups like the Indian Muslim Mujahideen. Being a majority Hindu country, when we have sizeable sections of people of other religions: Islam, Buddhism, Christianity it is the duty of all the people of the majority religion to be tolerant and not rake up issues of temples having been destroyed hundreds of years ago when the international rule between nations was “might is right”. Might is not right in the comity of nations today.

Now that we are in the midst of this situation, how are we handling it? I am afraid in a very poor manner. Whoever are the rulers of this country that has a large Muslim population, some Christians and some Buddhists and of course a majority of Hindu people, must rule this mixed religious groups strictly impartially. Are we doing this? Regrettably not. Whoever constitutes the ruling party should be strictly impartial and treat all religions equally. Instead you have a Hindu majority party who will treat the minority groups with special privileges, hoping that they will vote enmasse for the ruling party. This naturally enrages other parties who are not favoured.

The worst is what happens to the Police. Here we have a disease that has slowly crept into the body politic, called 'committed bureaucracy'. This is a foul disease that has crippled our Government very badly. The bureaucrats and Judiciary who administer this country are afflicted badly with this disease. It is this disease which is at the root of all our troubles. It should be a fundamental principle of the Police and Judiciary to be above religion and be strictly neutral and impartial. Instead of this we find political parties being absolutely partial favouring one religious group against another. When this is added to the obsequious issue of committed bureaucracy we have a system that has destroyed society.

Details of the Lashkar-e-Taiba Attack on Mumbai

Let us go back to the situation in Mumbai. When the situation was normal, the Police and the Customs departments of Mumbai were in league with Dawood Ibrahim, a known smuggler and *Hawala* dealer, allowing him to smuggle in large quantities of drugs like opium and heroin. As for the *Hawala* racket, this is known to every Indian who works in the oil rich Arab countries. The majority of Indians working there send their money earned in *Dhirams* or other currencies by the *Hawala* route where they get a higher exchange than the Bank route. This open crime was continuing with the Government of India (GoI) doing nothing to curb it. The Government lost millions of Rupees by allowing this illegal money trade to go on.

The leader of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) had a cousin who was an official football referee. After he retired from active football refereeing, he went to Mumbai and became a *Hawala* dealer. Paresh Barua sent all the lakhs of Rupees extorted

from the business community from Assam to his cousin who exchanged them for Dollars from the illegal *Hawala* channel and sent Dollars to Paresh Barua. He purchased arms from the Kachin Independent Army and armed the ULFA cadres to fight the Government of Assam.

What action did the GoI take to control Dawood Ibrahim? They took no action because a number of Government departments were getting pay offs from him – the Customs, the Income Tax and of course the Police. The Politicians controlling these departments must have been at the head of recipients. Obviously, the Intelligence agencies knew of this enormous financial racket. Here we come to the fundamental issue that is the root cause of this problem – committed bureaucracy.

The heads of various crucial departments are told verbally to layoff these billion Dollar rackets. If Dawood Ibrahim was picked up and prosecuted at the first instance for his drug smuggling, he would have been in no position to smuggle in weapons and explosives in the name of drugs and there would have been no serial explosions. Much more serious than this was the committed bureaucracy of the Babri Masjid demolition. This was clearly an illegal action and could have set-off communal riots as it did. Why did the Police not take action to prevent it? Why did the Director General of Police of UP not deploy force around the Babri Masjid and disperse the riotous mob? Because he was verbally told to layoff? This is committed bureaucracy. And this is why we are paying such a heavy price today.

When the Babri Masjid was demolished, Dawood Ibrahim and all his Muslim workers were upset. They decided to teach the Hindus of Mumbai a lesson and brought in a consignment of explosives and weapons from Pakistan and got them past the Customs by saying it was the usual drugs that were being brought in. The weapons were distributed and explosives utilised in preparing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that were timed and simultaneously set-off in suburban trains, stations and bus stands causing a number of casualties.

When it was known to the Police that contraband like drugs were being brought from Pakistan regularly for sale in Mumbai and other urban centres, did the Intelligence Bureau and R&AW officers think of taking steps to seal this obvious smuggling route from

Karachi, Pakistan to Mumbai? During my tenure in the Border Security Force (BSF), I had sailed through all the channels of what is known as the Creek area at the northwestern boundary with Pakistan, because I was worried about infiltration across that stretch of the International Boundary (IB).

This area consists of four wide channels that flow from Pakistan into India and then move out into the Arabian Sea. The first channel from the North is called Sir Creek and as per old agreements its southern boundary is the IB. Further south are two channels Vianwari creek and Pabewari creek, both roughly parallel to Sir Creek. Both these channels open into the Arabian Sea south of the mouth of Sir Creek. The three creeks are linked by several narrow navigable channels that are navigable only at high tide. Hence any attempt at intrusion from the Sir Creek into Vianwari creek and from there to Pabewari creek can easily be checked and the enemy prevented from ingress from Sir Creek itself. The dangerous and far more likely ingress is along the coast of the Arabian Sea from the mouth of Sir Creek or directly from Karachi by sailing, hugging the coast. This must have been studied by the Coast Guard and the Navy. It is this route that was taken by the ten desperados who sailed from Karachi carrying weapons. After reaching some distance they steered close to a local boat and boarding it killed its crew and then sailed down the coast and reached Mumbai, before abandoning the boat and sailing to the jetty in Mumbai in a dinghy that they had brought from Karachi.

Failure of the Coast Guard

Well before this incident several States on the sea board had set-up coastal Police Stations (PS). Each of these PS had a stretch of coast as its jurisdiction and only a limited area of the shore. The task of these Coastal PS was to basically monitor the movement of all the fishing and other craft berthed in their jurisdiction. It was the duty of the Coast Guard to set up a liaison with each coastal PS along its jurisdiction of several kilometres of the coast. A couple of years before I had taken a lecture of Intelligence officers of the BSF and the Coast Guard. The first question I asked of the Coast Guard officers was whether they had liaison with the coastal PS of their jurisdiction along the coast. The answer was in the negative. And this was well after the 26/11/ 2008 raid by the commando terrorist group of ten L-e-T terrorists from Pakistan. I was amazed

and disappointed and told the Coast Guard officers that they should go back and immediately set-up liaison with their respective Coastal PS.

If this liaison had been established, the Coast Guard officers who interacted with the Coastal Police would have found out the involvement of the Coastal Police in the smuggling of drugs and how explosives had been brought by the Islamic fundamentalists to set-off the explosions in Mumbai after the Babri Masjid demolition. The Intelligence agencies, both Central and State could not find out that the explosives used by the Muslim fundamentalist terrorists to take revenge for the Babri Masjid demolition were brought in through the smuggling network that already existed.

From the results of the investigation of the case of the ten L-e-T commando terrorists it has been found that a L-e-T terrorist was arrested in February 2008, who carried information with him that the Taj Mahal hotel had been selected as a target for attack. This information was passed on to the Hotel authorities and security was bolstered for some time, but when nothing happened after some time, the alert was downgraded.

This warning by the Intelligence Agency based on their intelligence was correct, but the guard was dropped after some time when no attack happened. This threat is confirmed by the interrogation report of the United States/Pakistan terrorist, David Coleman Headley, arrested by the United States Security Agency. In his interrogation he is reported to have said that selected persons had come to Mumbai to reconnoitre the targets and had even stayed at the Taj Mahal hotel. Immediately after the incident had occurred I was in touch with a friend of mine who was then the Chief Security officer of a Western hotel in Mumbai. He said that he had some sources in Mumbai who told him during the attack on the Taj Mahal hotel that some of the terrorist commandos who were inside the Taj Hotel had visited Mumbai earlier and had stayed at the Taj Mahal hotel and even cached weapons and grenades in some hidden places in the hotel! This naturally could not be verified, but it was found that no security check of the visitors was being done at that time.

This is only a stray piece of information. But could it be that our Intelligence Agencies, both external and internal knowing that in Mumbai there is a Jewish Institution close to the Sea Board did

not warn them of a Sea Board attack by a Muslim fundamentalist group in the background of Israel being a target of international Muslim fundamentalist groups? Also it is criminal negligence that terrorists were able to bring in weapons and explosives /grenades into the Taj Mahal hotel. Was no metal detector being used on all baggage in this hotel?

Regrettably today the situation on the West coast has not changed one bit. There has been no liaison between the Coast Guard units covering a stretch of the coast and the Coastal PS on that stretch. Is there sharing of intelligence between the Coast Guard on the coastal stretch and the Police on that stretch? Obviously smuggling of drugs continues to be carried out along the sea route between Karachi and Mumbai and landings must be taking place along the coast. Smuggling of drugs from Karachi is regularly taking place all along the Western coast right down to Kerala. I remember a case that I had supervised of the Central Bureau of Investigation in 1989 where the Customs had been bribed by a smuggling syndicate and there was a landing of heroin on the Mangalore coast. This was many years ago. I had recently discussed this with a Customs officer, who said that this smuggling route is still very much alive!

Steps to Prevent Future Use of Sailing Down Along the Coast for a Commando Raid

In the background of the above paras, I would suggest the following steps be taken to prevent such commando raids. This applies to the stretch of the Arabian Sea from the coast of Kutch touching the Pakistan border at the mouth of the Sir Creek straight down to Mumbai and further below. It will also apply to vessels that sail from Karachi out to sea and then curve in to hit the West coast of India below Mumbai all the way to Kanyakumari. This will also apply to the East coast, to cover the coast of the Sunderbans from the Bangladesh border to Kolkata and then follow the coast further all the way to Chennai and beyond.

It will be necessary to place two geostationary satellites in space, one to cover the West coast from the Pakistan border all the way to Kanyakumari and another to cover the coast from the Bangladesh-Indian border in the Sunderbans to Kolkata port and beyond to Vishakapatnam and Kanyakumari. These two satellites should be able to track all vessels moving from Karachi south and

from the Sunderbans-Bangladesh border moving to Kolkata port and beyond.

The second part is to establish a liaison between the Coast Guard and the Coastal Police of all the sea board states both on the West and the East coast. The Coast Guard could monitor all movements of vessels plying parallel to the coast by monitoring the satellite transmissions. The Coastal Police will have to account for all the boats, large or small, that leave the coast for fishing or transport. It should be made compulsory for all boats, large or small, that are beached in the jurisdiction of a Coastal PS to register with that station and inform the station of their movement. The Coastal PS should collect intelligence of all smuggling syndicates and other criminal elements that use the sea for their movements. If such a net was in place, Dawood Ibrahim would never have been able to smuggle in weapons stating that the cargo was the usual heroin or opium and there was a pay-off for this.

Conspirators of the Attack on 26/11/2008

The conspiracy to carry-out the attack on Mumbai was hatched in December 2007. The persons involved in the conspiracy were – Hafiz Muhammad Sayeed, the chief of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, Abu Hamza, Abu al Kama @Amjid, Abu Kaahfa, Mujamil @ Yusuf, Zarar Shah, Abu Fahdullah, Abu Abdul Rehman, Abu Anas and twenty two others with similar assumed names. Included are – Major General Sahib and one Hakim Sahib. These last two were probably an Army and an Intelligence officer. It is clear from the names Abu Fahdullah, Abu Anas that they are from the Lashkar-e-Taiba. In this Tanzeem once a Pakistani joins he assumes a name from the Kuniats of the Quran. It is clear from the above data that the Pakistan ISI and Army were involved in directing this commando terrorist raid.

Indian Reaction to the Raid on 26 November 2008

It was clear from the reaction to the raid that the Mumbai Police had not anticipated any such raid and had, therefore, not prepared an emergency plan to react to it, if and when it occurred. Prior to this, there was the Madrid bombing of a train and the simultaneous suicide bombing in the underground by Pakistani Muslims who had immigrated to Britain, but whose children influenced by TV and indoctrination had gone to Pakistan and were trained in

Madrassas of some fundamentalist *Tanzeem*. We had several such cases to set us thinking – “Could some such act be done here?”

Mumbai Police were the first responders but they had no commandos who could take on diehard terrorists, well entrenched in a huge complex of buildings. The only other commando element available nearby were the naval commandos (MARCOS) who are trained for different kind of operations. In any case their numbers were too small to handle the entire situation. In the event, the available MARCOS about 25 of them entered the building around midnight and continued to operate to the extent possible till the NSG arrived on the morning of 27 Nov (some thirty hours later) and took overall control of the operations. However, MARCOS though small in numbers were able to contain the terrorists and rescued a number of hostages. Overall, the response of the Indian State to the crisis was quite slow and inadequate.

Conclusion

At the root of the majority of our problems is this cancer of committed bureaucracy. Our Intelligence Bureau, the Central Bureau of Investigation and all the State Police organisations are humble lackeys of the political parties. Until our Government is ridden of this cancer of committed bureaucracy, our financial and security situation is not going to improve and we will keep staggering from one crisis to another in an erratic manner leading to, heaven alone knows, where?

Abyei: Africa's Conundrum

Colonel VT Mathew®

Introduction

The Sudans have had a long record of conflict. Of the two principal ethnic inhabitants of the region, the Southern Dinka/ Nuer Christians have a history of neglect and colonial subjugation by the Arab Muslims in the North. This led to a prolonged armed freedom struggle culminating in UN intervention and a referendum for separating the South from the North. As a result of the referendum, South Sudan came into being on 9th July 2011. The border between the two states is as yet un-demarcated. Pockets and areas of conflict and disagreement exist all along the border, most important of them being the Abyei dispute. The Abyei issue is emotive and has the potential to shape the relations between the two countries. It may be termed as Africa's Conundrum.

History of the Conflict


Abyei is located along the provisional border between Sudan and South Sudan, straddling the UN monitored Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) between the two states. There are two communities in Abyei, the Misseriya who owe allegiance to Sudan, and the Ngok Dinka who owe allegiance to South Sudan. The traditional Abyei area is composed of a group of nine ancient Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms.¹ In 1905, the British decided to merge Abyei with the Southern Kordofan state, which is part of Arab Sudan. Abyei people therefore did not take part in the referendum held in the Southern states for the creation of South Sudan. In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the two parties in Jan 2005, it was decided to hold a separate referendum for Abyei along with the referendum to create South Sudan. Residents of Abyei would vote either to stay as a special administrative area in Sudan or to join South Sudan.² However

®Colonel VT Mathew was commissioned into 11 MADRAS in December 1988 and later commanded the unit. He was the Chief Operations Officer of United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) from May 2012 to May 2013. He is currently a Directing Staff at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington.

due to disputes on voter eligibility, the referendum is yet to take place.

The boundaries of the Abyei Administrative Area (AAA) have undergone a series of changes, successively whittling down its size, finally reaching its current contours in July 2009 enclosing an area of 10,546 sq km, known as the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) boundary.³ This boundary has been accepted by both parties.

Abyei has oil resources and produces about 1 per cent of the total oil production in Sudan.⁴ However the dispute over Abyei is not centred around oil. The PCA boundary leaves just one oil field inside AAA at Diffra. The villages to the north of the AAA, bordering Sudan, are inhabited by the Misseriya and that to the south bordering South Sudan are inhabited by the Ngok Dinka. Abyei town is a Dinka area, with a few Misseriya traders in its Market.⁵ While a formal census has not been held, it is evident that the majority resident population in Abyei is Ngok Dinka. In addition to the resident Misseriya, there are the nomadic Misseriya who reside in Sudan who need to migrate south to Abyei during the dry season, in the months of Oct to Apr, in search of pasture and water. The scale of this migration is large and amounts to movement of almost 100,000 migrants with about 1.5 million plus cattle.⁶ At the core of the dispute is the localised conflict between these two pastoral communities who traditionally compete for resources in the area.



Map showing the location of Abyei and the current contours of AAA

As and when this migration reaches the Ngok Dinka areas in the South of Abyei, there is potential for conflict as these mutually distrustful and inimical communities compete for resources. Even small incidents have the potential to flare up into large scale communal violence.

This migration process is not restricted to Abyei area alone and is an activity that regularly happens all along the North-South border during the dry season. Earlier, when the Sudans were not bifurcated, the migration could proceed along various migratory corridors from North to South. The issue has now been complicated by an international boundary replacing state borders.

In the event of Abyei opting to join South Sudan in a referendum, the annual migration of Misseriya nomads is likely to be affected, leading to an existential crisis for them. Sudan has insisted that the Misseriya be eligible to vote in the referendum process, a view contested by South Sudan. The CPA calls for a referendum including all residents of Abyei. Sudan claims that the Misseriya migrants are resident in Abyei for six months and hence be part of the referendum, a view not accepted by many. Due to these conflicting views, the proposed referendum has been delayed inordinately.

Abyei has been attacked and destroyed by Sudan/Sudanese backed militia twice, in May 2008 and May 2011⁷. After the attack on Abyei in May 2011, about 120,000 Ngok Dinka were internally displaced, to areas to the South of AAA and to the border states of South Sudan, where many of them continue to this day.⁸ After the destruction of Abyei in May 2011, the United Nations adopted resolution 1990 (2011) and deployed United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) comprising of 4200 Ethiopian troops, with a mandate to provide security to the local population.

Current Situation

The deployment of UNISFA troops in Abyei in the aftermath of the May 2011 attack, helped stabilise the region and resulted in the gradual return of Ngok Dinka IDPs to the region. However, humanitarian assistance to rebuild the destroyed town and its essential services including schools have not kept pace with the return of IDPs.⁹ The Misseriya migration has been impeded after the return of Ngok Dinka IDPs to Abyei. The mutual distrust between

the communities has worsened and has resulted in the Ngok Dinka refusing Misseriya migrant's entry to prime pasture land and water resources in the areas in South Abyei dominated by them. The Misseriya migrants are heavily armed with small arms including AK 47s and RPGs and in the normal course would have continued their migration till the Kiir river South of Abyei.¹⁰ The Ngok Dinka are however embittered by the destruction of their town and emboldened by the presence of UNISFA troops, to deny this movement.

Both the Misseriya and the Ngok Dinka have been preventing entry of each other's leaders into areas inhabited by them. During the migration season of 2012, a group of Misseriya leaders visiting UNISFA HQ and Abyei town were stoned by angry Dinka youth forcing these leaders to seek refuge in UNISFA camp. A group of armed Misseriya migrants waylaid the Paramount Chief of Ngok Dinka during an escorted visit to the Northern Abyei in May 2013 and assassinated him.¹¹ The mosque and the Misseriya dominated market in Abyei town were destroyed by the Dinka in retaliation.

While at the national level, reconciliatory statements have been made by both presidents Kiir and Bashir, they themselves are leaders struggling to maintain their turf. At the local level, positions have been hardened and with each passing day, reconciliation and a permanent solution to the Abyei issue appear distant.¹² This has led to understandable frustration among the people of Abyei, who remain stateless without governmental or administrative institutions including police. The UN force is purely a security force without governance or policing mandate. The AAA administrative institutions which were supposed to be established by consensus have not yet been agreed upon due to seemingly irreconcilable differences, leaving an administrative vacuum.

Against this backdrop, the Ngok Dinka of Abyei carried out an unofficial referendum in Nov 2013, which has been condemned by both Sudan and South Sudan.¹³ It is however likely that South Sudan tacitly supported the exercise, while publicly distancing itself from it. Around 60,000 Ngok Dinka participated and overwhelmingly voted to join South Sudan.¹⁴ The aim apparently was to pressurise both governments through the international community for an early settlement of the issue. The Misseriya have threatened to hold their own referendum in retaliation.

Way Forward

As time passes, positions will further harden and it will be near impossible to orchestrate a universally accepted and peaceful referendum. The Ngok Dinka are likely to prevent Misseriya migration into their areas during the forthcoming migration season, which is likely to further escalate tensions between the communities and thus make a final solution even more difficult. Both communities are in the process of settling their people in AAA in order to influence the outcome of the referendum. As of now, it is difficult to foresee a situation where Abyei will vote to join Sudan. In case the vote is to join South Sudan, it is again improbable that the Misseriya living in the Northern regions of Abyei will accept such a merger. It is possible that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) will then deploy in the Northern regions of Abyei for their protection, leading to a face-off between the two countries leading to a 'Line of Control' like scenario.

There have been proposals that a future solution should include migration rights for the Misseriya.¹⁵ History has shown that tenability of such agreements is suspect. Fearing a negative vote, Sudan will continue to insist on Misseriya being included in the referendum, knowing that it will not be accepted, thereby interminably delaying the process. Status quo will help Sudan. Since UNISFA has managed to provide security to the population of Abyei, except for isolated incidents, their presence gives breathing space to both countries and makes the necessity of a final solution less expedient.

A permanent solution will have to be found by the two countries, supported by the UN and the African Union. The South has rejected informal proposals to divide Abyei based on ethnicity, or in other words formalising the existing status quo.¹⁶ However, as time passes, this may be the only possible solution. At the forefront is the unfortunate plight of the stateless people of Abyei and the existential crisis for Misseriya denied their migration rights. The potential of the issue to destabilise the entire region, should spur the international community and both governments to find an early solution, even if it means letting go of hardened positions.

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Operation Vijay: The Liberation of '*Estado da India*'- Goa, Daman and Diu

Brigadier AS Cheema, VSM (Retd)®

Introduction

Vijay' extolling 'Victory' is a befitting name for any military operation as it injects both hope and valour; no wonder that there have been three Operations 'Vijay' in India's recent military history. The first was the recapture of Jhangar by Brigadier Usman in 1948; the second, liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu in 1961, and lastly, Kargil operations in 1999. What distinguishes the Vijay of 1961 is the fact that this was India's first Tri-Service 'Integrated' operation where the Indian Navy was tested in battle. Many invaluable lessons from this truly unique operation entail a revisit due to the growing salience of integrated operations.

The liberation of Goa was unique in other ways also. Having been colonised by the Portuguese in 1510 and governed by Lisbon as '*Estado da India*'; Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli remained under colonial occupation for 451 years. The rhetoric of the 'Liberation' of these colonies by India reverberated shrilly in the portals of the UN; since India, despite being a third world country had taken unilateral action against a 'European' nation. Apart from severing diplomatic ties, a visibly perturbed Lisbon even offered prize money of US \$ 10,000 on the head of the Indian commander who had spearheaded the liberation, and even offered citizenship to Goans who did not wish to be ruled by the 'natives.'

Political Background

Despite India's independence, Portugal adopted the stance that her territories were not colonies but part of 'Metropolitan Portugal' and hence beyond 'negotiation.' This charade continued till India was constrained to withdraw her diplomatic mission in June 1953. Since this failed to make a difference, she instituted visa restrictions 'from' and 'to' Goan colonies through Indian soil, paralysing trade.

®Brigadier AS Cheema, VSM (Retd) was commissioned into 69 Armoured Regiment on 03 Sep 1977. He was Brig IC Administration, HQ Northern Command from 01 Dec 2009 to 30 Nov 2011. He was a Senior Research Fellow at USI from Mar 2012-Nov 2013.

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Concurrently, armed (civil) resurrections in Dadra and Nagar Haveli were successful¹ and the situation in Goa had also become serious.² At this stage, the Portuguese Prime Minister asked Britain to mediate, but since she was unable to break the impasse, the matter was taken to the UN. On the other hand, Pandit Nehru clearly stated: '*Continuance of Goa under Portuguese rule was an impossibility.*' It needs to be highlighted that the decision was taken at a time when war clouds were building up for India in the north and the liberation perhaps also was intended as a signal to Peking – if this was the case, this could be called the only failure of the operation.

Mandate to the Governor General of Estado da India

Despite the Defence Minister advising Prime Minister Salazar that the resistance in Goa would be suicidal, he gave instructions to the contrary. Governor General Vassalo e Silva was tasked to fight till the last man and hold out for eight days, by which time, he hoped international support could be mustered against India's unilateralism.³ The armed forces at the disposal of the Governor General are tabulated below :—⁴

	Force Levels	Remarks
Army	3,995 combat soldiers Two Artillery Units Contingent of Female Paratroopers	Reduced from 12,000 in 1960
Air	Two Transport aircraft	A squadron of F-86 Sabres was erroneously reported at Dabolim
Navy	Naval Sloop ' <i>Afanzo de Albuquerque</i> ' Three Light Patrol Boats	Frigates <i>Bartholomeu Dias</i> , <i>Gonsalves Zarco</i> and <i>Joao de Lisboa</i> withdrawn
Miscellaneous	1,040 Police officers 400 Border Guards	Five Merchant Ships

The Indian Military Build-Up

Lieutenant General JN Chaudhuri entrusted the task to Major General KP Candeth commanding 17 Infantry Division, and placed 50 Parachute Brigade under him. Air operations were delegated to Air Vice Marshal Erlic Pinto and the Navy was entrusted to create a suitable Task Force. Details of forces mustered for the operation are tabulated below:-

Army	Navy	Air Force
GOA	INS Vikrant (Carrier)	Poona Air Base
17 Infantry Division	INS Delhi (Cruiser)	Air Operations Centre
63 Infantry Brigade	INS Mysore (Cruiser)	16 Squadron (Canberra)
2 BIHAR	INS Rajput (Destroyer)	35 Squadron (Canberra)
3 SIKH	Frigates	Hunter Force (ex 17 & 37 Squadrons)
4 SIKH LI	INS Trishul (Anti-Sub)	Santa Cruz
48 Infantry Brigade	INS Kirpan (Anti-Sub)	1 Squadron (Mystere)
5 GUARDS	INS Khukri (Anti-Sub)	Jamnagar
1 SIKH LI	INS Kuthar (Anti-Sub)	Armament Training Wing (Ourangan/Toofanis)
13 KUMAON	INS Betwa (Anti-Aircraft)	Forward Air Base (for Goa)
50 Para Brigade	INS Beas (Anti-Aircraft)	Sambre
1 PARA	Mine Sweeper	Tactical Air Centre with 17 Infantry Division
2 PARA	INS Karwar	Communication Duties
2 SIKH LI	INS Kakinada	(Mix of Harvards, Otters and Mi-4 Utility Helicopters)
7 CAV less a Squadron	INS Cannonore	
8 CAV⁶	INS Bimilipatnam	
DIU		
20 RAJPUT	INS Dharini (Support Ship)	
DAMAN		
1 MARATHA LI		

Drawing of Indian Battle Plans

The Land Offensive

Major General Candeth planned to launch simultaneous operations against all three colonies. 'D' day was set for 18 December, 1961.⁷ The broad plan is given below :—

Goa. Launch a multi-pronged offensive with 50 Parachute Brigade advancing from the north, while 48 and 63 Brigades were to advance from the east. The objectives were Panjim and Mormugao. Simultaneously, a feint depicting the fictitious 20 Infantry Brigade was to simulate an advance from the south.⁸

Diu. Capture of Diu by 20 RAJPUT and a company of 4 MADRAS.

Daman. Capture of Daman by 1 MARTHA LI.

The Naval Plan

The tasks assigned to the Navy were fourfold as under :—

- Establish effective control of the seaward approaches to Murmagao Bay and Aguada, Daman and Diu.
- Capture of Anjadiv Island.
- Neutralise enemy coastal batteries.

- (d) Sink or immobilise units of the Portuguese Navy in and around Goa.

In order to accomplish the above, the Navy organised four Task Forces :-

- (a) **Surface Action Group.** INS Mysore, Trishul, Betwa, Beas and Cauvery.
- (b) **Carrier Task Group.** Apart from INS Vikrant, this included INS Delhi, Kuthar, Kirpan, Khukri and Rajput.
- (c) **Mine Sweeping Group.** INS Karwar, Kakinada, Cannanore and Bimilipatan.
- (d) **Support Group.** INS Dharini.

The Air Plan

Based on the overall plan, the Air Plan was kept flexible. The specific tasks assigned to the Air Force were :-

- (a) Dabolim airfield to be made unusable, though the terminals and facilities were not to be damaged.
- (b) The Wireless Station at Bambolim was to be knocked out.
- (c) Close support to the land forces.
- (d) Deny the enemy the use of Diu and Daman airfields.

The Portuguese Plan for Defence

Lacking adequate forces for area defence, the Portuguese employed a strategy of Sectoral Defence. Four Battle Groups, each comprising a Motorised Reconnaissance Squadron and two Infantry Companies with detachments of Artillery and Engineers were assigned to designated sectors. These Battle Groups (*agrupamentos*) were tasked to engage, disrupt and delay the Indian columns and fall back in a coordinated manner. This was a difficult task as the Portuguese not only had problems of communications; but, also had major deficiencies in terms of mines and ammunition and against the opposition arrayed against them – it was an unviable military mission.

Progress of Operations

Initial Actions

Tensions escalated after the Indian Steam ship '*Sabarmati*' was fired upon from Anjadiv Island, resulting in injury to the Chief Engineer and the death of several Indian fishermen. In order to restore confidence, India commenced patrolling off Goa's coast by INS *Betwa* and *Beas* while INS *Vikrant* was deployed to prevent foreign intervention. In the meanwhile, in order to lure enemy fighter aircraft, the IAF commenced reconnaissance flights, but this did not yield results.

The Capture of Diu

Diu was a tiny 40 sq kms island off the Gujarat coast, and at the time of Operation Vijay, there were no bridges across the creek. The island was held by approximately 500 Portuguese soldiers, supported by artillery and the Patrol Boat *Vega* which had a formidable 20 mm Oerlikon Gun. While the main defences were based in the Diu Fort, the Portuguese had covered the crossings with artillery, mortars and machine guns. On the other hand, India had the advantage of Air Support and Naval Gunfire.

The Indians decided to cross the creek exploiting darkness and launched silent attacks. Braving chest high water and muddy swamps and using improvised rafts, 20 RAJPUT and the company of 4 MADRAS attempted initial crossings but proved unsuccessful in the face of well-directed artillery and mortar fire. Air Support and Naval Gunfire, where India had an advantage could not be exploited at night resulting in a temporary stalemate, till they were brought into action.

Wing Commander Mickey Blake of the Armaments Training Wing launched air attacks at 0700 hrs and this made the enemy positions untenable, forcing him to withdraw to the fort. In the meanwhile, Air Traffic Tower at the airfield and an ammunition dump were destroyed. The patrol boat *Vega* which had been forced to take shelter, trained its Oerlikon guns on the Indian aircraft and in response was sunk by the IAF, killing her Captain. Gunfire from formidable 6 inch guns of INS *Delhi* proved effective and this took out the bravado from the Portuguese holding the fort. By the evening, it was all over and 403 prisoners were taken, including the Governor General.

Operations at Daman

Located on the borders of Gujarat and Maharastra, Daman had an area of 72 sq km. The area was marshy and interspersed with rivers and rivulets and the town of Daman was split by the Daman Ganga River dividing the township as Nani Daman or *Damao Pequeno* and Moti Daman or *Damao Grande*. The colony had 360 soldiers and 200 policemen at the fort. In addition, the airfield was an important objective. Organised as two companies, supported by a battery of artillery, the area was defended by minefields and well sited defensive emplacements.


1 MARATHA launched operations at 0400 hrs, under the cover of darkness and planned to overrun the airfield with stealth. However, surprise was lost when the Indians stormed the Air Control Tower and both sides suffered casualties. Since surprise had been lost, the Indians opened up with their artillery and this helped in isolating the command post at Damao Grande. At 0700 hrs, the Air Force struck using Mystere fighters against enemy mortar positions and guns deployed in the fort. By the evening, the Indians had secured most of the colony, except the airfield and Damao Pequeno, where it appeared that the Portuguese planned a last ditch defence. In order to break their will to resist, the IAF launched six successive attacks, but the enemy still refused to surrender. The Indians were forced to assault the airfield and by 1100 hrs it was overrun and with this action all resistance had been overcome. The Portuguese eventually turned out to be 600 soldiers, including 24 officers. The Patrol boat 'Antares,' which had remained a mute spectator escaped in the melee.

The Liberation of Goa⁹

Progress of Operations (Refer to Map). Preliminary operations commenced on 17 December with capture of the border town Maulinguem, after a brief skirmish. Wanting to avoid escalation, the Portuguese High Command denied engagement and clearance for counter action – restricting options for their ground troops. The main offensive, synchronised with the operations of Daman and Diu, started at 0400 hrs the next day.

50 Para Brigade: The Northern Thrust. Brigadier Sagat Singh advanced along three columns as annotated on the Map. By 1000 hrs, initial contact had been made north of Ponda and Mapuca and

resulted in the destruction of an armoured car by an AMX tank of 8 CAV, operating under 7 CAV.¹⁰ Apart from this action, there was no other major engagement as the Portuguese kept withdrawing and after crossing the river, blew up the bridge at Banastarim. Around the same time, the enemy opposite 2 PARA escaped across the Mandovi river in the face of the advancing Indians. By 2000 hrs, a cease fire offer was received by the Squadron Commander of 7 CAV. Under the circumstances, the Indians consolidated their gains. Next day, the Indians made a triumphant entry into Panjim; though, Fort Aguda still had to be physically captured.



Map : Operation 'Vijay : The Liberation of Goa, December, 1961

48 and 63 Infantry Brigades: The Eastern (Yellow and Green) Thrusts. The progress of 63 Brigade which moved in along the Yellow and Green routes was similar; and they too did not encounter organised resistance. But, the advance was slow, as the enemy following a 'scorched earth' policy, destroyed all the crossings. It was only by midday on the next morning that 4 SIKH, the reserve battalion, entered Margao and after a fierce encounter captured Verna; and by the evening, even Margao and Dabolim were secured. At this stage, the formation was joined by 4 RAJPUT,

from the south. Though planned, 48 Brigade remained in reserve and was not required to take over at any stage.

The Surrender at Vasco da Gama. The Portuguese had planned their last ditch stand at Vasco. Notwithstanding the order, 'to fight to the last man and raze Goa to the ground' the Governor General appreciated the futility of the orders from Lisbon. At 2030 hrs on 19 December, he offered to surrender and with this the 48 hrs operation came to a triumphant end. The cumulative casualties on the Indian side were 34 dead and 51 wounded; while there were 31 killed and 57 wounded on the Portuguese side, apart from surrender of 4669 prisoners. On repatriation, most of the officers were tried and the Governor General was cashiered.

The Naval Operations. Apart from actions of the Navy in Daman and Diu, the operations off the Goa coast were launched, to secure access to the Mormugao Harbour and to capture Anjadiv Island. The Portuguese sloop *Afanzo de Albuquerque* was anchored off the harbour. At 1200 hrs on 18 December, three Indian Frigates led by INS *Betwa* took on *Afanzo* after the harbour had been bombed by the IAF. The warning shots asking the *Afanzo* to surrender were answered by fire from her 120 mm Guns. Despite being outnumbered and placed in a disadvantageous position, the engagement continued for fifty minutes, wherein the *Afanzo* took several hits and was ultimately abandoned. On the Indian side, damage on two ships was reported. Concurrently, Anjadiv Island was also stormed. The Naval landing party under Lieutenant Arun Auditto was duped by displaying a White flag and was fired upon, causing seven deaths and wounding nineteen. After fierce shelling, the island was captured by 1400 hrs on the next day.

Air Operations over Goa. IAF *Canberras* were used to raid Dabolim Airport on 18 December to destroy the runway. However, two civil aircraft remained unscathed and were used by the Portuguese to evacuate some officials at first light, after limited repair work on the runway. Other raids were carried out to destroy the wireless station at Bambolim and on the Mormugao Harbour. Though *Vampires* were at hand to support the ground forces and a Tactical Air Centre (TAC) had been established with HQ 17 Infantry Division, however, no requests for air support were received from the formations. The synergy and cooperation displayed by the three Services in Operation 'Vijay' was of a high order, despite the hastily established command and control set-up.

The Way Forward

Integrated operations mandate sound hierarchical structure with well defined and clear lines of command and control organisation and operational procedures. In view of India's growing multi-dimensional operational requirements, developing the capability of undertaking truly 'integrated' and not merely 'joint' operations is the need of the hour and that is the direction the Indian Armed Forces need to pursue with earnestness.

Endnotes

1. Dadra was liberated by the United Front Activists on 21 July, 1954 and eleven days later Nagar Haveli was also liberated by local Freedom Fighters.
2. On 15 Aug, 1955, a peaceful liberation of Goa, Daman and Diu by 3000 Satyagrahis was repelled by the Portuguese Security Forces using force. The cumulative casualties in these actions were 22 shot dead while 225 were injured, out of which 38 were serious. This led to an uproar in India and the people demanded that the Government takes military/police action as it had done to liberate Hyderabad in 1948.
3. Wikipedia, Indian Annexation of Goa
4. Collated from Hiranandani GM, Vice Admiral (Retd), Transition to Triumph, Indian Navy 1965-1975, Jagan Pillarisett, The Liberation of Goa:1961 and Liberation of Goa: Role of the Indian Navy by Lieutenant Commander VS Kore.
5. The appreciation of General JN Chaudhuri, GOC-in-C, Southern Command published in the Historical Division, MOD publication: Op Vijay: the Liberation of Goa and other Portuguese Colonies in India (1961), Delhi, 1974.
6. 8 CAV was equipped with the newly acquired AMX-13 Light Tanks armed with a versatile 75 mm High Velocity Gun and it was with this that the only known 'kill' of a Portuguese Armoured Car was recorded.
7. The 'D' day had been postponed from 16 December due to intense diplomatic activities in the UN.
8. The plan was for a company of 4 RAJPUT to simulate movement of a Infantry Brigade (the fictitious 20 Infantry Brigade) along the Karwar-Goa axis to deceive the enemy.
9. Basic map and information adapted from Historical Section, MOD, GOI Publication, Op Vijay: The Liberation of Goa and Other Portuguese Colonies in India (1961), Delhi, 1974.
10. Sandhu Gurcham Singh, Major General (Retired), *The Indian Armour*, p-313, Vision Books, New Delhi, 1987.

Wars – As Seen Through Soldiers' Eyes (Based on their personal experiences)

Difficult To Die

Colonel Brij Bhushan Midha (Retd)*

Editor's Note

Colonel Brij Bhushan Midha commanded a rifle platoon of B Company, 4 GUARDS in Bangladesh War. His account of the war as he saw it as a subaltern, fresh from the Officers Training School, covers the period from 01 Dec 71 to 10 Jun 1972 when 4 GUARDS was deinducted from Chittagong Hills where it was deployed after the fall of Dacca to flush out Mizo insurgents. The narrative of then young officer is told in the backdrop of operations of 311 Mountain Brigade that was tasked to capture Akhaura, an important road, rail and water communications centre close to the International Border opposite Agartala. The task of 4 GUARDS was to infiltrate through enemy lines and occupy a position behind the main defences astride Brahmanbaria – Akhaura railway line. Akhaura was cleared by 05 Dec and thereafter the Battalion fought at Asuganj and Narsingdi on its way to Dacca.

Prologue

The idea of death can be very scary for most of us. The normal perception about army, war and death is that they are synonymous. However it is far from the truth. The statistical data of Second World War has revealed that 17,000 bullets were needed for causing one fatal injury. You have to assume and believe that NO bullet has been manufactured in an enemy ordnance factory which has your name written on it. This is exactly what was told to us by our 'CO Saheb' Lieutenant Colonel Himmeth Singh in his durbar, one day before we were to be launched into East Pakistan.


The Narrative

Please refer to **Sketch P**. We left our location Litchi Bagan at Agartala (property owned by erstwhile Maharaja of Tripura) and

* Colonel Brij Bhushan Midha (Retd) was commissioned into 4 GUARDS (1 RAJPUT) on 06 Sep 1970. He participated in the 1971 War as a Platoon Commander cum Company Second-in-Command in the Eastern Theatre. He retired from the Army as Colonel General Staff (Intelligence) of HQ 16 Corps on 31 Jan 2001.

Akhaura

Sketch P



NOT TO SCALE

Source : 4 GUARDS Regimental History Records

crossed the Battalion Start Point (SP) at 1730 hours on 1 Dec 1971. We were to be launched across the International Border (IB) at 2000 hours from the launch pad, which was located approximately eight kms south of the airfield. The Battalion column reached the launch pad half an hour early and took a lying position and waited for the clock to strike 2000 hours. The Pakistanis sensed some abnormal activity, but were not sure of our axis of approach. As part of the deception plan, a number of one-ton vehicles, with their exhaust pipes removed, were to make a lot of noise north of the airport. Despite the fact that there was a lot of speculative firing (small arms and artillery by Pakistanis), we were not much scared and remained practically in "exercise mode". While waiting for orders to commence our march, I dozed off. I got up when the Company Havildar Major pushed me. As a result of my folly, the contact with the leading company had been broken and confusion prevailed for 10 minutes; we were able to link up after I got a mouthful on radio set from Himmeth (the CO) and a few tracer bullets were fired to indicate the direction. This costly mistake on my part could have resulted in us being daylighted before reaching our intended location.

We were given 20 Mukti Bahini personnel to carry ammunition. We had cultivated a very knowledgeable local civilian guide, who we were confident would guide us to a small village called Shyamnagar, located behind Akhaura Railway Station – 150 to 200 m apart with the benefit of perennial river called Titas, which was fordable at places and lay between the village and the railway station. We had no inkling that Shyamnagar was to become our '*Kurukshetra*' for next one week.

We marched silently throughout the night all along the deeply watered paddy fields and back waters of River Titas, often in waist deep slush. During the march the terrain became our number one enemy. Mentally we were still in the "commando type exercise mode" and more concerned about not losing any controlled store like compass, binocular, carbine magazine (which I did loose in the slush).

Our company got detached from the main column after crossing the slush area at a village called Barisal. We were now to march northeast (towards India) for about 3-4 km – the time was approximately 0500 hours. We were running behind time and extremely tired. We reached an open patch and were already

daylighted. Major Kharbanda (the company commander) in his wisdom decided to dig in at this open location and we soon began digging our foxholes. His reasoning was that any further advance may mean presenting the enemy a very lucrative target. When Himmeth was told about this decision, he hit the roof; nothing short of Shyamnagar was acceptable to him. We were ordered to close our foxholes and resume our advance towards Shyamnagar which was still one km away. At this moment the 'Hand of God' came to our rescue. A thick cloud of fog descended on our route. The fog remained in our direct support till we were able to capture Shyamnagar, there being no enemy presence in the village. We dug in our foxholes. The locals had built formidable dugouts and were found nicely tucked in. We were ready to fight but there was no resistance offered by the villagers; at first they thought that we too were from the Pakistan Army, but when they learnt about our identity, they were more than willing to extend all help.

As the sun rose, the enemy who had built very strong defences around the platform of Akhaura railway station could hardly believe that Indian troops were deployed behind them and that too at a distance of barely 150 m. Perhaps their first impression was that it was a detachment of Mukti Bahini or at worst it could be an isolated commando force. Meanwhile, our troops started shooting at those unsuspecting Pakistani soldiers who, with water bottles in their hands, were defecating in the fields of Shyamnagar.

By 1000 hours, the enemy command structure realised what had hit them. They started firing at us with all types of weapons. They were particularly aiming at the freshly dug earth of our foxholes. We did suffer a few casualties; one of the first such casualties was our artillery officer Captain Sundram, a very intelligent officer.

During the pause in firing I decided to come out of my foxhole to visit my three sections. Not known to me, the enemy's two inch mortar gunner was perhaps keeping a track of my movements. Hiding behind the embankment of railway line, he aimed and fired at me. The round burst approximately two metres away from me and I could see its impact. There was not sufficient time to take cover and I got splinters in my left thigh and left hand. I could observe the Pakistani gunner reloading; I therefore crawled to the culvert in the stairs of a brick house and threw my body in the

culvert. However, both my feet remained exposed. After a gap of a few minutes another two inch mortar bomb landed near the culvert. Since my body was inside the culvert I escaped any major injury but a splinter went into my left heel. After a lull in firing, all the three wounds on my body were dressed with First Aid kit in my haversack.

By 1100 hours, although I had escaped many bullets, I became a 'walking wounded soldier' due to injuries caused by splinters from two separate mortar rounds. Indeed, I realised it is difficult to die. However, we were only in the first four hours of the war; what followed for next four days and nights has perhaps few parallels. The enemy by now had decided that enough was enough and decided to teach us a lesson; intense fire was brought upon us which included small arms, medium machine guns, mortar, artillery, tank and air. We were so close to the enemy that even an error of 100 m in ranging or a slight error in plotting observer target (OT) bearing could bring own artillery fire on us. The most fearsome were the enemy tanks firing at us. Despite sighting their tanks we were reluctant to fire our rocket launcher at them because of expected retaliation. Intensity of fire could be judged from the fact that none amongst the injured (total 16) were keen to be evacuated, although we had a detachment of stretcher bearers with us. All of us were convinced that the evacuation party would be wiped out in no time. The best option was to remain tucked in the foxhole. While the injured could reason it out and give themselves a chance to survive, some of those who had died on the first or the second day had to be buried in the very foxholes in which they had lost their lives because their bodies began to decompose. Captain Sundram's dead body was one of them.

There were many incidents during this period which brought me close to death and some are still fresh in my memory. I am describing a few of these:-

(a) During infiltration when we were negotiating waist deep slush, I lost the magazine of my carbine. Even after reaching Shyamnagar the feeling of being in war had not sunk in. My company commander, Major Kharbanda, for fear of court of inquiry pertaining to loss of a Controlled Store (to which was attached a bit of loss of face) wanted the loss to be made up. He asked me to take a section strength, attack an isolated

enemy position to bring back at least one magazine of a carbine. The section led by me had gone only about 50 m and we were still under voice control when the company commander called me back because the enemy fire was so intense that he soon realised that for an item of Controlled Store he was about to lose a section including his second in command.

(b) In order to confirm our identity, the Pakistanis rounded up a group of four civilians and pushed them towards our side, perhaps under threat of shooting them if they did not do so. The civilians were under our observation from the word go: our first instinct was to shoot them but we were held back by Major Kharbanda (an ex-Police Officer) who reasoned that since they (the civilians) were unarmed they may be more useful to us as informants. As soon as they came near our defended locality, they were apprehended, blindfolded and taken to a shelter for interrogation. Needless to say, these hapless Bengalis were more than willing to cooperate and work for us.

(c) On the fourth day, the Pakistanis realised that they needed to sort us out. At about 1500 hours, they brought on us very heavy fire including tank fire and were observed forming up behind the embankment of the railway line as if for an attack. Our Senior JCO, Subedar Rawat (who had been severely wounded, and was being attended to by his sahayak) told his sahayak to leave him alone, go out and kill the Pakistanis; and if they were still likely to capture our position, then he should come back and shoot him dead. He did not wish to be captured alive. I also got highly motivated and gave similar instructions to my sahayak, Laksman. As soon as he left me, he got a splinter in his eye and lost an eye forever.

Perhaps due to our effective fire and pressure from other directions, the intended enemy attack was dissipated in the 'forming up place' itself. There was perceptible reduction in the intensity of enemy fire and it appeared that they were likely to abandon Akhaura and move towards Brahmanbaria along the railway line.


During these four days and nights, our company was in contact with no one. There was no possibility of receiving any

ammunition or food. We had to conserve our ammunition; out of 20 Mukti Bahini who were with us to carry ammunition, only six could make it to Shyamnagar, others disappeared. We survived on limited quantity of '*shakarparas*', 25 per cent of which had got wet while wading through the water of Titas River. The first to reach our location was the CO's party at around 0700 hours on 05 Dec. This party while approaching our location came under very heavy enemy fire and Himmeth's radio operator Lance Naik Nahar Singh's hand was badly injured. We were told that Himmeth escaped very narrowly. It was evident to me that the encounter was nerve shattering for Himmeth. As soon as I welcomed him, he asked for a cigarette, although he had left smoking a long time ago. While Major Kharbanda was busy briefing the CO (who expressed his regrets for not having been able to visit earlier), I did a smart act: I called one of the civilian prisoners and asked him to go to Akhaura and get a few chicken. This Bengali wasted no time in doing the needful. The chicken was hurriedly cooked on a make shift *chullah* (oven) and served to the CO's party. This incident remained in the memory of Himmeth who often talked about it and linked it with the 'high morale' of his troops. He also acknowledged my initiative and graciously mentioned it in my annual confidential report: "Will make a very good Regimental Officer". The war may not always bring you death but it can, sometimes, get you laurels.

Please refer to **Sketch Q**. On 05 Dec 1971, Akhaura Sector was totally liberated. Brigadier Mishra, our Commander, reached our location around 1600 hours. The CO and the Brigade Commander laid out the map on ground and started discussing about further action. Both agreed that such an opportunity came seldom in life and they must press on regardless. Consequently, I was asked to take charge of all the dead and the wounded; to take the wounded to the nearest Advance Dressing Station (ADS) and the dead to Litchi Bagan. While the Company moved towards Brahmanbaria at Last Light, we had to spend another night at Shyamnagar and could move only on 06 Dec, early morning. The Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) who attended on me in the ADS was Captain Vinay Kumar (later, he served as a RMO in our Paltan at Bangalore). By now my wounds had healed but the shrapnel were still in my body at three places. The doctor dressed the wounds and evacuated me to Field Hospital at Telliamera on Road Dharamnagar-Agartala, approximately 50 km away.

AGARTALA TO DACCA

Sketch Q



NOT TO SCALE

Difficult To Die

On 07 Dec, I was taken to the operation table. The Surgeon saw the X-Ray and examined my wounds. The shrapnel could be clearly seen in the X-Ray and the metal could be felt by touching, but the wounds had almost healed. For extracting the metal, the wounds had to be reopened. Instead of going ahead with surgical procedure, the Surgeon asked me if I would like to carry these shrapnel as war trophies in my body forever. I thought he was joking, but no, the Surgeon was serious and was only offering me a choice. He was able to convince me that the metal would find a suitable place in the body and would cause me no pain or disability. "Then, why reopen the wounds and remain in bandages for next 15 days?" I reasoned in my mind. I accepted his offer and promptly got down from the operation table. The Surgeon next offered me two alternatives for my further disposal because I was still a walking wounded soldier; either he would evacuate me to the Base Hospital at Guwahati or send me on Sick Leave to my home for recuperation. I quickly analysed the situation and came up with a third alternative, why could not I go back to my Paltan. The Surgeon was a learned man and must have read his military history well to know that an injured soldier returning to the front is a big morale booster. He promptly accepted my request. I was at Litchi Bagan the next day (08 Dec), which was our Battalion's rear location.

The rear JCO apprised me of our Battalion's advance to Brahmanbaria and beyond. The aerial distance between Agartala and Brahmanbaria is about 25 km but there was no road beyond Akhaura. If I wanted to join the Battalion, I had to go by the Brigade convoy, which took another detour of 90 km via Comilla. At Brahmanbaria I met Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter Master General (DAA & QMG) of our Brigade, who was busy organising F (fighting) echelon convoy, which was to be based on country boats. I learnt from him that my Paltan could be at Narsingdi or beyond towards Dacca. He directed me to take charge of the boats and leave at First Light next day. Although the distance between Brahmanbaria and Narsingdi as the crow flies is approximately 30 km but there was no road which was intact. Therefore, this innovative method of transportation was resorted to in order to send supplies to troops in contact. These country boats were propelled by human effort. With a long rope tied to the boat and pulled by 2-3 men moving along the banks and another

person in the boat ensuring that it did not hit the shallow water or a stone or jetty, with the help of a big pole. The journey period was to be approximately 48 hours. There was always a danger of enemy action enroute. We had to take all the precautions as we normally do for surface convoys. It was a very adventurous voyage with interludes like song and dance. Like all others, the boat-pullers were also very fond of drinking and they knew that some quantity of rum was loaded as part of ration supplies. It needed all my tact to keep them at a proper distance and in good humour and yet ensure that the convoy kept moving.

We reached the port of Narsingdi at 1000 hours on 12 Dec after sailing non-stop for 48 hours. At Narsingdi, I met a few NCOs of our Paltan, who had come to collect supplies. I was told by them that at Narsingdi they had encountered heavy resistance. After clearing-up the area around Narsingdi our Paltan had moved on towards Dacca in all types of civil transport and was located 12 km short of Satlakhya River at village Barpa. I rejoined them at this location. On my rejoining, with bandages on my heel and hand, Himmeth decided to keep me in the Headquarters as his Intelligence Officer (IO).

Here we waited for the bigger picture to crystallise. After 48 hours lull, General Niazi decided to surrender. On 15 Dec afternoon, we were told to cross Satlakhya River at a ferry site. This ferry could carry about 80 men, but the ferry personnel had all run away. So, who was to pilot it? Second Lieutenant KS Yadav volunteered smilingly, but the ferry would not respond to his commands and broke down mid-stream; any amount of effort could not re-boot it. It was allowed to go down the stream and touched the far bank approx 100 metres downstream.

After crossing the river, we took shelter in a jute mill which was just across. Next day i.e. 16 Dec 1971, while the Surrender Ceremony was in progress, we were ordered to move to Dacca Cantonment and occupy Adamjee College Complex. We selected a bungalow opposite the College as our Officers' Mess. This was to remain our temporary residence for a few days. Although each day spent in Dacca was an experience worth recording, I shall describe only a few episodes.

In view of our impending deployment for internal security duties in Dacca City, I along with Second Lieutenant Waryam had

gone for reconnaissance on 17 Dec. While walking in a narrow street, we were the object of curiosity and silent admiration. An individual approached us and requested us to come inside his house. He said that his old mother was very keen to meet the Indian Army officers. We were a bit apprehensive but agreed to oblige him. When we walked in and he introduced us to his mother (approximately 70 years old), the woman was overjoyed and she hugged us like our own mother would have. She said that she would like to worship us because we were their liberators. They insisted on serving a cup of tea and snacks and bade us farewell very apologetically with a gift of a new packet of 7'O'Clock blades.

While walking through the by-lanes of Dacca City, we learnt that in the compound of Central Bank of East Pakistan, a lot of fire and smoke was observed on 16 Dec. We decided to investigate and what we saw was unbelievable – a 20'x20'x10' high heap of burnt Pakistani currency notes of various denominations. We lifted the ashes of burnt currency in our hands which was still warm. The bonfire was lit a day earlier while the Surrender Ceremony was in progress.

Our unit was selected for the Farewell Parade after which the Indian Army was to withdraw totally from Bangladesh. We were all happy about returning to India, but someone's idea to search and destroy Mizo insurgents in Chittagong Hills, ruined our dreams. We were now placed under command of another brigade and from Liberation Army we turned into an Expeditionary Force with all the consequent benefits of a foreign posting. From Dacca we moved by road to Chittagong and then heli-lifted to interior areas of hills bordering India. We landed by rappelling, cutting the jungle, making helipads and establishing company pickets. We were in thick jungle, with no signs of civilisation for miles around. We came across a few Chakma people who were still in the Stone Age. They were naked and totally forest dependent for all their needs. They had no idea about Mizo Insurgents or their camps. Our regular patrolling and limited intelligence network could not obtain a single lead about Mizos. It was a wild goose chase. Eventually we handed our posts to Bangladesh Rifles after jungle bashing for nearly two months.

At last we were heading home and I had the honour of leading the last convoy of Indian Army from Bangladesh on 10 June 72.

A True Soldier

Captain Sudhir S Bloeria, PhD, IAS (Retd)[®]

Background

The origin of this narrative took shape in my mind some time ago while I was going through a 'Compendium of Gallantry Awards' that this grateful Nation has bestowed on its brave and heroic sons from 1947 onwards. While thumbing through the pages containing 'Citations of Awards for 1971 Operations', my eyes got riveted to a familiar face. Yes, it was the photograph of Lieutenant Colonel NN Rawat, VrC, Commanding Officer 166 Field Regiment supporting our Brigade (67 Infantry Brigade) in 1971 War in the Fazilka Sector. I was then posted as Ground Liaison Officer (GLO) with the Brigade Headquarters (HQ) along with an Air Force fighter pilot to direct air strikes. The action which resulted in Rawat getting his Vir Chakra took place on 14 December – almost immediately after my team was called back to the Brigade HQ from the scene of bitter fighting as the proposed air strike on the enemy did not materialise. It was late afternoon when our troops, due to intense pressure from the enemy counter attack, started falling back and that too in a disorganised manner. He, along with the Brigade Commander was standing on an embankment nearby witnessing the depressing situation developing. Someone reported to the Brigade Commander that the withdrawing troops had left behind an anti-tank RCL gun. The Commander flew into a rage and wondered aloud if anyone could do something about it. Rawat said, "at least an effort could be made to get it back." Then he collected about 10 men from the withdrawing battalion and a platoon of 3/11 Gorkha Rifles and personally led the charge on the enemy, heading his small party. This attack, coming from the flank was so fierce and sudden that the enemy which had a short while ago overrun the position, was thrown into confusion and fled from that area. The RCL gun was retrieved and brought back.

[®]**Captain Sudhir S Bloeria, PhD, IAS (Retd)** was commissioned as a Short Service Officer into 2 JAK RIF in 1966 and served in the Army till 1972. He took part in the 1971 War in the Fazilka Sector. After leaving the Army he joined IAS and was seconded to the J&K Cadre. He is also an alumnus of the National Defence College in Delhi. His last appointment was Chief Secretary J&K Government from Nov 2002 till his superannuation in Sep 2005. In Jul 2008, during Governor's Rule, Dr Bloeria was appointed Adviser to the Governor. Presently, he is the Vice Chancellor of The Central University of Jammu, since 08 Aug 2011.

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A few months after the 1971 War, I left the Army and then lost all contact with Colonel Rawat. Someone mentioned a few years later that he had become a Brigadier and was posted at a Corps Headquarters. I chuckled silently. He hated a chair-borne job and despised all those who occupied such posts. Now, I wished I could meet him in his office to see how he was doing. Pressures of my new Service and the distance involved prevented our getting in touch.

After going through his Citation, I tried to check on his whereabouts. Surely he must be leading a quiet retired life somewhere, I had visualised. But it was not so. Rawat had died, I was told by a common friend, a few years ago. The news of his death filled me with grief. He was no relation of mine, I could not even call him a friend as we had never served in the same unit. Still I mourned his death in a quiet and silent manner befitting a war hero – the status he had come to acquire in my esteem, right from the early days of the war, following an incident which involved my closest brush with death.

The real baptism of a soldier, it is said, takes place under fire in the battlefield and Rawat presided over that ceremony, in my case. That winter afternoon, in the soggy cotton fields being sprayed with bullets and with shell splinters flying around I jettisoned lingering traces of fear from my being. By personal example, he also taught me about the ultimate bond that exists between soldiers transcending the rank structure, class composition and regimental spirit et al. The incident needs narration to as large number of persons as possible because it symbolises the strength of the officer-man relationship in the Indian Army and also provides a clue to the enigmatic phenomenon which makes a soldier lay down his life. For Rawat, though, the whole thing was nothing out of ordinary and he never mentioned the incident again. I am certain he would not even have spoken of it to anyone else. He was made that way.

Little over a year before the 1971 War started, I was posted as GLO 67 Independent Infantry Brigade HQ, of which his regiment was a part. His regiment was located at quite a distance from our HQ and therefore my interaction with him was not frequent – limited only to official gatherings and formal Officers Mess functions. He never discussed his personal life, nor ever asked me about mine, except on two occasions.

Once while emphasising that soldiers should be straight forward and truthful, he narrated how in 1962 War with China one officer of the Division HQ had reported to his seniors that he had seen Rawat being shot by the Chinese, just to prove falsely that the informant was also in the thick of action. The news was duly conveyed to his family causing avoidable distress all round (may be his dislike of staff officers was rooted in that incident). On another occasion, just before the war started, he confided in me that during their first meeting he had told his wife that being married to a soldier she should be prepared to hear about his death anytime. By and by, he rose in my esteem and I started admiring his personal and professional qualities. Towards the close of the year when mobilisation had taken place and outbreak of war seemed imminent, his unit had won confidence and appreciation of the Brigade Commander as well as the battalion commanders.

In Fazilka Sector, the war started with shelling by the Pakistanis around 1800 hrs on 3 December 1971. Rawat came to our Operations Room, established in Fazilka town, after midnight. I had just finished my round of duty but had stayed back to help the Brigade Major and my reliever in recording the messages that were pouring in and plotting them on the Situation Map. We were trying to sort out early confusion of the battle and it appeared that things were developing unfavourably for us. He gave us his assessment of the situation based on the information of his battery commanders and his personal visit to the critical area. As usual his mannerism and voice did not betray any cause for concern or despondency, though the rest of us were extremely worried about what was happening.

Pakistanis had successfully executed a well thought out plan and managed to breach our main defence line based on a ditch-cum-bund (DCB) system. Within first few hours the enemy had captured some portion of the DCB on both sides of an important bridge. This bridge could carry the load of tanks. Thus the Pakistanis had established a bridgehead which could be enlarged for launching major offensive by armour and infantry. We also knew that a major enemy armour concentration was located not far away from our defences. The situation was critical not only for us but for the entire sector. Our orders were very clear – to throw back the enemy from the bridgehead he had established, at all costs.

All through the night vigorous efforts were made by our forces, including unorthodox use of some weapons and equipment, to dislodge the enemy from the Bridge Area. The enemy, also realising the importance of their foothold, held on resolutely to the gain. By the morning of 4 December, having failed to push the enemy back, the next best alternative was adopted. Both ends of the breach in the defence line were connected by a new set of hurriedly dug defences in an area of few hundred metres diameter, thus attempting to foil any attempt by the enemy to enlarge his bridgehead. These new defences were located in the cotton fields, behind the DCB, with full grown crop providing an excellent camouflage to the troops. The plan was to consolidate this defensive position during day time and attempt clearing the ingress during the night of 4/5 December. The task was given to 4 JAT and the attack was launched during the night. Two companies pushed through the defences and, accompanied by artillery support, launched a fierce attack on the Bridge Area. The valiant Jats fought hard, even hand to hand, and almost captured their objective, but at a crucial moment lost their brave Company Commander who was leading them from the front. They suffered a number of casualties and fell back. The CO of the Jats sought permission to try another attack the next night.

On the afternoon of 5 December, I had just returned after directing a ground attack by our planes on the enemy forces in a different area and was having lunch with my colleague from the Air Force. It was a successful strike and both of us were happily discussing the achievement. As we were nearing the end of our meal, Colonel Rawat emerged through the door. He reciprocated our greetings, sat down on one of the chairs, declined our invitation to lunch, but agreed to join us for the sweet dish. The discussion naturally revolved around the current military situation in our area and spectacular advances of our forces in East Pakistan. We informed him of our air strike and expressed concern over the previous night's failure in the Bridge Area. He said something was being planned for the coming night and he had been asked to personally brief the CO of the Jats about the plan and attendant details. Then suddenly he asked me, "What are you doing after lunch?" "Nothing much", I replied. "There are no air strikes planned and no urgent request is expected. In any case after sometime the light would also start fading. I am practically free for the day".

"Then why don't you come with me. I would have some company and you can also see the ground situation yourself. It will help you in directing air strikes in that area whenever required". I readily agreed. The temptation to be in the hottest sector of the Brigade got the better of me.

Soon we were headed towards the Jats battalion, few kilometres from our location. Rawat was on the wheel, without any personal weapon, as usual. I was next to him carrying my Sten Gun. In the rear sat his wireless operator and driver. Two things appeared odd to me, there was no other vehicle carrying troops for his protection. Such protection is necessary while visiting forward areas and more so in that sector as there were rumours of some enemy guerrillas having been air dropped behind our front line. Also, it appeared strange that instead of sending Operational Orders through a messenger, these were being carried by the CO of the Artillery regiment. However, I did not probe him for answers. We drove mostly in silence and encountering few shells bursting around our jeep, but none near enough to cause damage. The sound of small arms fire became almost continuous and clear as we approached the front line.

About five hundred metres behind the DCB was a big drain (Sabuna), which had at that time very little water in it, almost mud filled bottom. There was a bridge over the drain, which was considerably higher than the road surface on both ends. To reach our destination, we had to cross this bridge on the drain, then turn right and drive over a dusty track for about six hundred metres. Because of the height of the bridge, any vehicle over it could be seen and accurately fired upon by the enemy. Similarly, driving on the kacha track would kick-up a cloud of dust behind the vehicle thus betraying its position, making it almost a sure target to get shot by the enemy force. Therefore, we left our vehicle little short of the drain bridge, crossed over it in a crouched position and got on to the track on the right, whereafter, thanks to cotton fields, we could walk without being seen clearly from the Pakistani occupied area of the bund. We were now in the active part of the front. The sounds were mixed, small arms fire of both sides, whine of some bullets passing close by and intermittent whistle of shells going overhead. Suddenly a loud whistle sound, almost shrieking, came from very near. Instinctively I hit the dust barely seeing Rawat and his operator doing the same. Almost simultaneously there was a

deafening blast very near. The earth under us shook and we were sprayed with mud. An enemy shell had just landed about 20 metres away from us in the drain. We were lucky. But for the drain, all of us would have been blown up by the projectile. I got up, shaken by a close shave, shook as much dust and mud off as possible and resumed journey with the other two, reaching the trench of the Jats CO, without another close encounter.

We found the CO sitting in his trench and munching a chocolate. He shared it with both of us and explained to Rawat what had happened during the attack previous night. Both of them discussed in detail the proposed attack during the coming night. While the two colonels were engrossed in their discussions, I had a good look around. This trench was almost at the bottom of the semi-circle defensive position that had been thrown around the enemy bridgehead, connecting two points on the bund with our forces. Behind us was the drain and right in front I could see, not the bridge but its location indicated by a depression in the skyline of the bund which was clearly visible from our position. The trenches of our troops were concealed reasonably by cotton plants, but still movement was made by use of communication trenches or crawling behind the slightly raised edges of the fields. The firing from both sides was moderate, becoming intense only when a target was sighted by either side, which meant a careless or over confident soldier throwing caution to the winds and exposing himself to the enemy observation.

Sometime later we started the return journey, half crouching or walking on the edge of the track without disturbing the cotton plants. Half way through we heard a faint moan coming from the right which froze us. Carefully entering the field, we saw a soldier in supine position moaning with pain irregularly. On closer examination he turned out to be a Havildar of the Jats. Both his knees were bandaged and he appeared to be in agony and too weak to even talk. We sat down around him, Rawat making efforts to hear what he was trying to say in a whisper. The Havildar was part of the attacking force previous night and they had fought through the first few trenches and bunkers of the enemy. Suddenly he was hit by a burst of machine gun in both his knees and fell down. Two of his companions had quickly dragged him to the nearby field and put the field-dressing on his knees slowing down the bleeding. He had asked the jawans to join back the attack,

leave him there and he would try to crawl back to safety. That was the last he saw of his comrades. After being left alone he tried to slowly crawl back to the rear but soon fainted due to loss of blood and pain. Through the rest of the night and the day time he had been trying to reach back to his unit by crawling whenever he regained consciousness. By now he was almost dead, as loss of blood, excruciating pain, lack of food and water for almost sixteen hours, had all taken their toll.

Rawat spoke gently to him and assured that we will see him out of trouble. He was given some water to drink, after which he appeared to be in a slightly better shape. One of us held him from the shoulder and the other from the thighs, lifted him from the ground to bring him out of the field on to the track. Legs below his shattered knees kept dangling making this movement even more painful. His body became stiff and gurgling spasms indicated the agony it caused him. With difficulty we brought him on to the edge of the track, put him on the ground and gave him some more water to drink. We still had three to four hundred metres more to go before the vehicle could be used and it was not possible to carry the seriously wounded soldier, who was just about alive. Some other method had to be adopted to take him to safety.

After some thought, Rawat spoke to me, "My wireless operator is the sturdiest amongst us. You take his set and the two of us will try carrying him on the back". I adjusted the set on my shoulders and Rawat gently turned the Havildar on his belly and helped him piggy ride on the back of his operator, a well-built Sikh soldier. While the operator moved gingerly, Rawat supported carefully the bottom of the wounded man, who still appeared in great pain. Hardly had the party gone twenty paces ahead, when his body started serious convulsions due to unbearable pain, his face distorted and with unusual strength he pushed forward the operator and fell back. We watched him apprehensively lying almost still on the ground. His eyes had rolled up, froth appeared on one corner of his mouth and he was gasping for breath. I thought he was just about to die. Slowly the breathing became more regular and with effort he said, almost inaudibly, "Saab, you very kindly tried your best but I can't be carried, the pain is unbearable. Please do me a favour and shoot me". I froze, avoiding even contemplation of what he had said. And yet there was no way to help him. Could we just go back and inform the Jats about their NCO. They would

be happy to take care of him. But then he needed expert medical help at the earliest which would not be available in the unit. For that he had to be evacuated. But how to carry him? It was a dilemma. I looked at Rawat, he was deep in thought and looking intently at the wounded man. Then he quietly said, "There is no alternative but to put him in the jeep" and turning towards the operator asked him to get the vehicle.

To me this appeared almost suicidal. The jeep would be seen crossing bridge over the drain and continuously give its location by the cloud of dust which it would kick up while approaching us on the track. The resultant fire brought down on us by the enemy would almost certainly kill all of us including the man he was trying to save. Doubtfully I looked at Rawat, he probably read my thoughts and said something which I will never forget. He said, *"I expect this soldier to die for me and hence I should be prepared to risk my life to save him. We will either take him to the hospital or all of us will die here"*.

I heard him silently and understood the essence of what he had conveyed. A strange sense of calmness was enveloping my entire being driving out even the last traces of fear and instinct of survival so basic in all living beings. We waited for the jeep which appeared on the scene after a few minutes, turning from the metalled road on to the track. The driver drove very fast and took a sharp about turn near us, kicking up a lot of dust on the entire trail in an effort to conceal the actual location of the vehicle. By now the enemy fire had picked up indicating their awareness of our presence in that area. The whining of bullets very close suggested their firing was not wide off the mark. Quickly we put the injured man in the jeep and drove off fast on the bumpy track, on to the road and over the bridge. The intensity of enemy fire was continuously increasing. I thought I heard sounds of bullets hitting metal parts and ripping through the tarpaulin. When the jeep was beyond danger zone, I looked around, and found all four of us without an injury. The Havildar had again lost consciousness.

We drove straight to the Field Hospital near the Brigade HQ, where the casualty was quickly taken to the Operation Theatre which had been informed of the patient's condition on wireless enroute. Rawat spoke to the officer in charge briefly and then dropped me near my bunker before driving off to his own location.

I controlled my curiosity to count the number of bullets that had hit the jeep. It really did not seem to matter. Rawat never spoke of the incident again. Knowing him I am certain nobody around him ever came to know of it.

I checked up after the war. The Havildar survived after undergoing amputation of one leg at the knee. The last I heard of him, he was recuperating in a Command Hospital.

Narender Rawat is no more. He was my ideal as a soldier and provided me a good measure of inspiration and guidance. The incident of 14 December 1971, for which he got a Vir Chakra, and the one I have narrated were both not out of the ordinary for him. What mattered was a soldier rising to the occasion. On a different plane, he undertook extremely hazardous tasks which were beyond the call of his duty. For one he got decorated with a gallantry award. The other gave him the satisfaction of saving the life of a comrade-in-arms. What he did on the cotton fields of Fazilka on the 5th of December 1971, would not find a place in a citation. Such deeds, in fact, cannot be measured by any yardstick, even that of gallantry. These belong to the realm of traditions. Rawat added yet another chapter to the glorious traditions of the Indian Army.

“No campaign can be understood, and no valid conclusions drawn from it, unless its logistic problems are studied as thoroughly as the course of operations”

M Howard,
The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy, Vol. 57,
No. 5, Summer 1979, p. 976 (Taken from the
book *Gallipoli*, Edited by Ashley Ekins, p. 445)

1971 – Challenge in Sind : Munabao to Naya Chor

Colonel Vijay Bhushan (Retd)*

Background

After my marriage in July 1971, I reported to 68 Field Regiment – supporting unit of the School of Artillery, Deolali from the Air Observation Post Flight located in the same station. The Regiment was to form part of 330 Infantry Brigade of 11 Infantry Division. My Commanding Officer (CO), Lieutenant Colonel Tirlok Singh soon after told me to leave my wife somewhere and to board the military special train. I left my wife in Mumbai and boarded the train which moved on 'red-hot' priority to Barmer. We detrained at Ramsar, where we did intensive affiliation/artillery training. My battery (194 Field) was in direct support to 2 GRENADIERS, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) YN Sharma. The narrative that follows describes a young Captain's personal experience, as an Observation Post (OP) Officer, during the advance from Munabao (last Indian railway station) to Naya Chor. Read on.....

During the Night 3/4 December 1971, we crossed the International Border (IB) and captured the reinforced Pakistan's border out post – Ghazi Camp. Same night, Khokhrapar (Pakistan's first railway station across the IB), was also captured. However, by then the last Pakistani train had departed in a hurry.

At Khokhrapar railway station we found one 10-15000 litre water tank filled with water. I debated whether to use that water or not, as it could have been poisoned. It could, however, be used for other purposes, if not for drinking. However, I decided 'not to use the water for any purpose' and ordered my OP party not to go anywhere near the water tank. It was very difficult to implement the order, as water (most precious commodity in the desert) was

*Colonel Vijay Bhushan (Retd) was commissioned into the Regiment of Artillery (9 Parachute Field Regiment) on 14 Feb 1965. He retired as Instructor Class 'A', Tactical Wing, School of Artillery, Deolali on 30 Sep 1994. Presently, he is a Faculty Member with All India Management Association as also a Directing Staff with the Centre for Distance Education, USI which runs correspondence courses for officers to prepare them for Promotion and DSSC/TSOC entrance examinations.

an inescapable necessity for everyone throughout the operations. At Khokhrapar, I noticed a very old woman moving around fearlessly at the railway station. Straightway, I thought of killing her, suspecting she may be a spy or a 'stay behind' artillery OP. We kept a close watch on her and restricted her movement. Hesitatingly, I had spared her. These were the first moments on the battlefield!

Unfortunately, our Forward Air Controller (FAC), Squadron Leader AN Mulla was captured with signal instructions. We changed the radio frequency and passed messages using Tamil/Telugu language. Our unit's class composition, based on South Indian personnel, proved to be very useful as we could safely pass our artillery orders on the new radio frequency.

The desert terrain was devoid of any road or well developed tracks and it was very difficult to move (25 Pounder) guns. I was ordered to move with the guns and assist in their cross country movement. During this struggle, we got the idea of moving them on the metre gauge railway track. The idea was very successful, inspite of the risk of air attacks during the day. One morning (at about 0900 hours) our Gun Position at Akli and its Wagon Line (Wagon Line is where vehicles are kept for security) were attacked by two Sabre jets resulting in serious casualties. It was very sad to find two jawans killed, Adjutant's 3 Ton lorry destroyed and one gun damaged. It affected our whole unit seriously. We had to recover quickly as by now we had realised that such incidents do happen in war.

Next day, I was totally surprised to receive a bunch of 15 letters from my wife. It was exciting, enjoyable and a great morale booster. I read them again and again and that encouraged me to give off my best in the war.

One day, I got a call from my battery commander, Major GS Attariwala informing me that I should accompany him and 2 GRENADIERS CO Lieutenant Colonel Yogi Sharma for a special reconnaissance mission. At the last moment I was left out due to lack of space in the jeep. Later, after two hours, the CO's radio operator called to say that their jeep had run over a land mine, seriously injuring everyone. Quickly, all of them were brought back. Yogi Sharma was very seriously injured – his foot was bleeding profusely and application of many First Field Dressings could not stop it. Attariwala was also injured and the Intelligence Officer,

Lieutenant Atma Ram, had lost one eye. Luckily, by the God's grace, one helicopter landed beyond the authorised time of 'last light' and took all the casualties to the Military Hospital at Barmer/Jodhpur. A sense of dismay had swept through the whole unit. However, as the sun was setting, I saw a few lights moving towards the Pakistani defences – likely a convoy of vehicles. I quickly engaged the area with an airburst shoot and the lights were gone. I thought our artillery fire was very effective and that lifted our spirits.

Next afternoon I, along with another OP officer Captain P Krishna Kumar, took some shoots but with difficulty because of inaccurate survey. The Artillery Survey was out by a few thousand yards due to lack of latest maps. On the Night 10/11 December, the screen position, Naya Chor was contacted. 'A' Company 2 GRENADIERS attacked a Pakistani locality and we captured a Naik of 22 BALUCH. At the Company HQ, I talked to him informally. He told me, "Aap afsar lagte hain. Hamare afsar itne nazdik nahin aate." He added that he was handling a Light Machine Gun. All others (young soldiers) had run away when he was captured.

Suddenly, I felt that some object had passed by my right ear with speed followed by a loud sound, rendering me motionless. I did not know what had happened. Later, I learnt, it was a round from a Pakistani RCL gun. I get nightmares even today, whenever I recall that incident.

During the operations, Parbat Ali (a very dominating feature), was captured by us. We had fired 3003 artillery rounds. After a few years, our unit was awarded the Battle Honour for capturing 'Parbat Ali'. I was lucky to be a part of the attacking force for its capture. Naya Chor defences were strongly held. In the meantime, on 17 December 1971, the Cease Fire was announced.

Being newly married, I got casual leave and left my location for Jodhpur by a goods train, travelling in the engine. During the journey from Jodhpur to Delhi, I was overwhelmed by the enthusiasm and 'recognition' shown by the young girls and boys. They implored me to narrate accounts from war – which I did with aplomb. I cannot express in words, how elated I felt by their expression of 'gratitude' to the Army for winning the War with Pakistan as also the 'recognition' accorded to us by our citizens. These experiences of the 1971 War will remain with me forever.

Letters to the Editor

I

India and the Great War

Dear Editor,

This has reference to the article 'India and the Great War' published in the USI Journal of Apr-Jun 2013. On pages 312-313 there is a mention of Maharaja of Tikari Estate.

The name of Maharaja of Tikari as mentioned therein is 'SHYAM SARAN SINGH of TIKARI'. I am from Tikari and am aware of all the Maharajas of Tikari. I have written a book too titled "Tikari Estate, A Saga of Origin, Growth and Decadence." No Maharaja named Shyam Saran Singh was ever born in Tikari estate. However, Maharaja GOPAL SARAN SINGH was born in the Tikari family who served in the British Army in the Corps of Signals as a Captain during the First World War and was a Special Dispatch Officer to Field Marshal Haig. He was a very keen *Shikari*. It certainly could be him.

Yours sincerely,

Lieutenant Colonel Vidya Sharma (Retd)

II

1962 – War in the Western Sector (Ladakh)

Dear Editor,

Compliments to Major General PJS Sandhu for revealing the facts in his article '1962– War in the Western Sector (Ladakh)' (A View from the Other Side of the Hill) in Jul-Sep 2013 issue of the USI Journal. A must read article for all senior serving Infantry officers, especially those deployed in Ladakh; and formations must conduct presentations to bring out the lessons learnt and facts not known so far. Having served in Chushul in mid 1970s as a young Lieutenant, I only knew about the Battle of Rezangla and Gurung Hill. There was no one who fell back to narrate the events as most battalions fought to the last man and last round; and the rest, mostly wounded were taken prisoners of war. Battle of Rezangla has possibly been in the limelight because the company belonged to 114 Brigade Commander's Regiment (KUMAON) and that was the only post which had a company plus strength deployed in Ladakh. All the battalions fought extremely well with no disorderly withdrawals of any kind to tell the stories. The narrative highlights

the well fought battles by 1/8 GR while inflicting maximum casualties to the Chinese.

Another amazing fact is that the Chinese attack instructions or Operational orders appear not to be in line with the Mongol ruthlessness and brutal campaigns of Chenghis Khan. The instructions surprisingly are quite clear and humane in nature, which is different from the existing popular perceptions.

A major reason of the limited Chinese offensive in Ladakh was possibly because of Nehru's 'Forward Policy' deployment. They initially dealt with posts which had been deployed in their claimed area. Their limited offensive was aimed upto their claim line.

Yours sincerely,

Colonel RC Patial, SM (Retd)

III

Dear Editor,

With reference to the following three articles published in the Jul-Sep 2013 Issue of the Journal, I have a few suggestions for expansion of their scope and effect on the serving and retired Armed Forces personnel :-

- (a) 'Revitalising the Image of the Indian Armed Forces' by Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)
- (b) 'Service Jurisprudence in the Defence Forces : A Conceptual Approach – An Overview' by Lieutenant Colonel Arun Kumar Vashistha
- (c) 'Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) Needs Re-structuring' by Brigadier Amarjit Singh Randwal (Retd)

The above articles are no doubt informative but in my opinion more needs to be done as suggested in the succeeding paragraphs.

For (a) and (b) – Image and Jurisprudence

The Army legal system requires more perceptible justice, transparency and elimination of possibility of bias (personal and class) especially, where the cases are between officers and personnel below officer rank (PBOR). For this the following are recommended :-

- (a) The system of Summary Courts Martial (SCM) be abolished; at least, for offences committed or tried in peace area. Presently, the principles of natural justice stand compromised. Legal aid by counsel of choice, with the right of audience, is another aspect before any tribunal.

(b) Separate trials should not be held where joint trials are warranted; especially, where the allegations, date, place and witnesses are common or similar.

(c) Harsh punishments like reduction in rank and dismissal from service should not be promulgated without prior approval of higher authority.

(d) The Court Martial orders should be published like civil cases for general information.

(e) Research on orders of Courts Martial should be conducted for growth of military law.

For (b) only – Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT)

(a) Geographical jurisdiction of the AFT should be like other tribunals, i.e. on High Court basis.

(b) Parallel jurisdiction of High Court and AFT be allowed. The High Court should decide whether the case of serious illegalities and irregularities are retained or sent to the AFT.

(c) Appeal forum should not be split on the basis of quantum of punishment. The provisions of Section 3(0)(iv) (iv) of Chapter 1 of the AFT Act, 2007 should be harmonised to retain only one forum.

(d) Retired military officers should not be on the AFT benches as the principle of appearance of justice stands compromised. Instead, eminent advocates should be selected as members of the AFT like other tribunals.

(e) Appeals to High Courts should be unrestricted i.e. leave of AFT be not necessary.

For (c) – ECHS Services

(a) Mobile units for periodical visits to distant places be added.

(b) As far as possible, Ex-service personnel be employed because of their familiarity and for building greater confidence in the scheme.

(c) Attending to emergencies should be made more effective and patient friendly.

(d) Refund of money spent by patients should be made quicker.

(e) Authorised consultation fee and testing charges etc. for empanelled agencies should be realistic, i.e. closer to the prevailing charges on the civil side.

Yours sincerely,

Wing Commander ZH Khan (Retd)
M.Com., MIBM, LL.M

The Ladder of His Life – A Biography of Air Chief Marshal Idris Latif, PVSM*

Brigadier DS Sarao (Retd)®

I would call this book a gift of love by Mrs Bilkees Latif to her husband, Air Chief Marshall Idris Latif, the much respected Chief who headed the Indian Air Force from September 1978 to August 1981. Mrs Latif has captured the essence of the Air Chief Marshal's life from childhood to his step by step rise to the uppermost echelons of the Indian Air Force and thereafter, as he steps out in civvies to serve his Country as the Governor (Maharashtra), the Lieutenant Governor (Goa) and finally as the Ambassador to France. It did help that Mrs Latif herself is well versed in writing. She has not only authored a number of books earlier, but has also lectured at a number of international forums. As an Air Force officer's wife and later when the Air Chief Marshal was the Governor and the Ambassador, Mrs Latif has always been at the forefront of welfare and social upliftment causes.

The book is spread over thirty concise chapters with quite a few photographs of each phase of her husband's life. Of special interest to the aficionados of aviation history are the many photographs of various planes; *Tigermoths*, *Wapitis*, *Spitfires*, *Hurricanes* to the jet era of the *SU 7's* and the *MiG* variants. The Air Chief Marshal had flown 25 different types of aircraft.

Fast forward to 1940, the war is raging in Europe and Idris, an impressionable 17 year old applies for a career in the Air Force. He goes for the preliminary interview by the British Resident for joining the Indian Air Force Volunteer Reserve (which later became the RIAF). Selected, Idris is sent to the Madras Flying Club before proceeding to Walton, Lahore and then to the Elementary Flying Training School Begumpet for further flying. Here young Idris is awarded the trophy for the 'best' simulated forced landing. Idris finishes his training at Ambala (*Audax* and *Hart*) and is

***The Ladder of His Life – A Biography of Air Chief Marshal Idris Latif, PVSM.** By Bilkees I Latif (KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, New Delhi in Association with Centre for Air Power Studies, 2013), pp 384, Rs 880/-, ISBN 978-93-81904-85-5.

®**Brigadier DS Sarao (Retd)** passed out from OTA Madras with a Gold Medal and was commissioned into 216 Medium Regiment in 1977. He retired as Brigadier Artillery 33 Corps in 2012.

commissioned on 26 January 1942. His first posting is to Karachi, Drigh Road. It was here that the future Chief of the Indian Air Force gets a 'severe reprimand' and a fine of Rs 35/- for losing his service revolver (stolen with his bag from under his seat while travelling by train on leave).

Chapters five and six take us through his experiences in England for operational training on *Spitfires* and *Hurricanes* and his return to India and onwards to the Burma front as a fighter pilot with No 3 Squadron. Here was his experience during war time which made his lifelong associations with distinguished and well known pilots of the likes of Minoo Engineer, Asghar Khan, Shivdev Singh and Subroto Mukherjee, to name a few. From chapter seven onwards is recounted the journey of Idris Latif from his command of No 4 Squadron as a 26 year old Squadron Leader, to his various command and staff assignments including tenures at the Joint Services Wing, Dehradun and then as the Deputy Director Weapons followed by an assignment to Indonesia (which was inducting the *De Havilland Vampire*). His stint as the Air Attaché in Washington and an insight to the behind the scene machinations during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 as India bid unsuccessfully for the F 104 aircraft, and then almost got the C 130 and the *Northrop F 5*, makes interesting reading.

What strikes the reader is how the Air Chief Marshal was involved in various far reaching policy and equipment related decisions as he slowly rose in the hierarchy. The book elaborates as to how Idris Latif, not yet the Chief, pushed through the project for the *Ajeet* and later was involved in the induction of the *Jaguar*, the *MiG 25* and the *MiG 23*, the *MI 24* attack helicopters and the *AN 32* all of which fructified when he was the Chief. No wonder the IAF truly became a multi-dimensional force under his captaincy.

Chapter 25 onwards begins the journey of the Air Chief Marshal; now retired, as the Governor of Maharashtra, the Lieutenant Governor of Goa and finally his appointment as the Ambassador to France from April 1985 to April 1988 where he and Mrs Latif struck a personal chord with the French establishment and were instrumental in organising the ever so popular and successful 'Festival of India'. Indeed, a full life.

Credit must be given to Mrs Bilkees Latif for having painted a panorama of the life of Air Chief Marshal Idris Latif so beautifully – and why not, she has been by his side all along as they climbed the ladder together.

The Third Dimension : Air Power in Combating the Maoist Insurgency*

Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)®

The debate on the use of air power in counter-insurgency operations in India drew the media attention when the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal PV Naik, PVSM, VSM sought government clearance for helicopters involved in support of para military forces in Maoist-infested areas to retaliate when attacked by the Maoists. While the Government did not clear the proposal, the demand for air support to the para military forces is increasing day by day. It is in this context that Group Captain AK Aggarwal's book is timely.

The author has discussed use of air power in insurgencies in Algeria and Malaya before taking on the Indian situation. It must be remembered that these insurgencies were being tackled in foreign countries. India also used offensive air power with armed helicopters against the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Would France, Britain or for that matter the United States use air power against their own citizens within their own countries? It is extremely doubtful. One just wishes that the author had discussed use of air power in domestic counter-insurgency operations.

The author has dealt with the lessons learnt in these insurgencies in depth and in most lucid manner. The main limitations of air power is that it cannot distinguish between friend or foe and thus has to be used with greater caution than any other element of force as there are both human rights and public relations issues that can have disastrous effects on the overall counter-insurgency campaign. Any counter-insurgency campaign is a war to win the support of a population and demands engagement with the people – an engagement that air power simply cannot provide. Air policing had demonstrable merit in the imperial period for suppressing

* **The Third Dimension : Air Power in Combating the Maoist Insurgency.** By AK Agarwal, (New Delhi : Vij Books, 2013), pp..181, Price Rs 795.00 ISBN 9789382652168.

® **Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)** was commissioned in the Indian Air Force in December 1959 and retired from the service as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command in 1997. Presently, he is the Chairman of CAFHR, USI Board of Management.

recalcitrant natives, but against modern, fanatical non-state actors who operate within the civilian population in an era of unrestrained media reporting, heightened legal scrutiny and different economic circumstances the imperial experience is of dubious value. The author has brought out these points very well and needs to be commended.

Coming to India, air power was extensively used by the British in the North West Frontier Province – initially it was Royal Air Force followed by the Indian Air Force. It was to the credit of air power that it was able to contain the insurgency and not let it go out of hand – the basic causes of insurgency have to be tackled by political and social actions and not by use of air force. Another important political decision taken by Indian National Congress in 1945 was that (offensive) air power would not be used against Indian citizens – a policy which the Indian Government follows till date barring two major exceptions, one against Nagas in early 1960s and in Mizoram in 1966. A major shortcoming of the book is that it does not cover this major facet of Indian Air Force's history. The author has covered Naga and Mizo insurgencies but he could have-given a lot more details regarding: What forced the Indian Government to take this drastic step? He could have also given more details of air operations in these two cases and lessons learnt from them could have been brought out. These are some of the areas which are not very well-known to even those in uniform.

The chapter '*The Maoist Insurgency*' is detailed and covers almost all the relevant aspects. The history of the movement is detailed as is the description of its organisational structure and tactics. It sheds light on the methodology that one needs to adopt to counter the same.

The chapter on the '*Use of Air Power against the Insurgency*' is the meat of the book and has been covered in detail. The author has painstakingly gone through all relevant aspects on the use of air power and its implications and thus needs to be congratulated. He has covered the terrain and weather aspects that influence the use of air power for various regions affected with Maoist insurgency.

The author has covered all possible legal aspects including rules of engagement. The problem that needs to be addressed is – since armed action is inevitable in most cases and use of air

power is an exception, one wants to know how to counter the human right activists and the media relations policy that the Air Force needs to follow in such cases. One possible method can be moulding of public opinion against the Maoists and educating the population beforehand about the inevitability of the use of air force in certain situations. Such an approach would be useful in two ways; firstly, the adverse reaction to the use of air power would be less and secondly, it may serve as a deterrent as far as Maoists are concerned. On the other hand, this may lead the Maoists to acquire anti-aircraft weaponry and thus up the ante. This aspect needs to be debated.

The author has rightly brought out that any counter-insurgency operation has to be based on a strong political will, aggressive anti-guerrilla tactics and economic and social development of affected areas to regain the confidence of the people. It has to be an all-inclusive approach which unfortunately has been lacking in most of our counter-insurgency operations.

All in all, a well-researched treatise on the use of air power against the Maoist insurgency operations in India.

Shivaji*

Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)®

In popular perception the upheaval of 1857 is considered to be India's first war of Independence. The perception is further heightened by the prominence gained by some great personalities who found a place in popular folklore; a prime example being Rani of Jhansi. This book serves to illustrate the fact that Shivaji was the first Indian King who sounded a clarion call for Swarajya. Surely, it was Shivaji who earned this honour as practically out of nothing he carved out a kingdom from the entrails of three hostile kingdoms. He was a practitioner of a form of warfare now known as asymmetric warfare. Many of the principles of war enunciated and practised by him are valid to this day.

The book is laid out in 23 chapters with 11 maps. This well researched work unfolds to fire the reader's imagination and curiosity. Shivaji's childhood was that of a fugitive with his mother a prisoner of the Mughals, but he lived among free and wild tribesmen who honed him for his future role. Early in life under wise tutelage Shivaji developed fine leadership qualities, concern for the poor and downtrodden, and a keen sense of justice and fair play.

The capture of Torna Fort is well described and is reminiscent of what Pakistan did at Kargil in 1999. Shivaji's exploits now grew bolder and soon like Robin Hood he attacked caravans and distributed the proceeds among the poor. With the defeat of Afzal Khan, Shivaji's reputation had reached its apogee. The Battle of Ghod Pass is graphically described and is a parallel with King Leonidas and his 300 Spartans.

The attack on Shaista Khan sent ripples across the country. Shivaji's legend grew and he was now believed to have magical powers. The common Maratha thought him to be an incarnation of a deity. So high was Shivaji's reputation that when he was granted

***Shivaji : A Great Leader, Statesman & Champion of 'Swaraj'**. By Colonel KD Sharma, (Satara: Kargil Offset Printing Press, 2013), pp.. 398, Rs 550/-, ISBN: NA.

®**Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)** was commissioned in the Regiment of Artillery in 1961 and retired as Sub Area Commander, Jharkhand, Orissa and Bihar in 1994. He has been Chief Instructor at the USI since 11 Sep 2000.

an audience before Aurangzeb the latter took precautions against his 'magical powers'. The story has a love angle too. Aurangzeb's eldest daughter fell in love with Shivaji, was not allowed to marry him and remained a spinster all her life. History seems to have ignored the effect of her influence in Shivaji's escape from Aurangzeb!

Given the circumstances of his birth, it is not exceptional that he became a great guerrilla leader, but what really was remarkable was Shivaji's analysis of the requirement for a navy for the domination of the seas. Shivaji wanted a navy to defend his coastal possessions, fight pirates, take on Portuguese Navy and raid the Mughal ships. He did this with his customary zeal and efficiency. The fleet was supplemented by a chain of naval fortresses and naval bases. The author has done well to describe these fortresses, explain Shivaji's naval tactics and compare the maritime powers of that time in the region. Shivaji was the first Indian king to use navy in support of land operations. He was as daring on the sea as he was on land and made the mighty English eat humble pie at Khanderi.

The quality of print is good and the book is well illustrated. However, there is scope for improvement in the content. Chapters 3 to 6 which cover the background could have been incorporated into one chapter. In some cases past and present tenses are mixed up (pp 100). Often wrong words have been used "irate young man", (pp 107,108), dictums (pp 117), bursting tears (pp 164) etc. Location of maps in the book needs more care. On pp 145, it is stated, "A map showing the interview venue and deployment of rival forces is attached". This map was better placed opposite this page rather than opposite pp 23.

This well researched book will play a role in arousing martial pride in our past and will be an inspiration to our youth. The fact that the author has explained the contradictions in some events in Shivaji's life, as recorded by other authors adds value to this work. Though many books have been written on Shivaji none of these has brought Shivaji alive in the manner this book has.

Short Reviews of Recent Books

21st Century Mahan: Sound Military Conclusions for the Modern Era. Edited by Benjamin F Armstrong (*United States of America: Naval Institute Press, 2013*) pp..179 Price \$ US 21.95 ISBN 9781612512433

The book is a compilation of five of Alfred Thayer Mahan's essays, written for periodicals, specifically for readers who find Mahan's classical writing style difficult to read. The editor of the book, Benjamin F Armstrong, intentionally draws no conclusions from Mahan's work and yet applies them to current events in a 21st century context.

The book illustrates why Mahan's work remains relevant to the 21st century and how it can help develop our strategic thinking. Armstrong argues that readers often misunderstand Mahan as they read only what others have said about him, and not what Mahan himself wrote. The author's analysis is derived directly from Mahan's own writings. From the challenges of bureaucratic organisation and the pitfalls of staff duty to the development of global strategy and fleet composition, to illustrations of effective combat leadership, Armstrong demonstrates that Mahan's ideas continue to provide today's readers with a solid foundation to address the challenges of a rapidly globalising world. The book is critical of those who make light of Mahan's ideas on the acquisition of territories to enable a fleet to project power globally. The author, by his lucid writing style, has been successful in persuading his readers to re-examine Mahan and his ability to synthesise the master's ideas on the importance of Asia, which continues to be a hotbed of conflicts and tensions.

In the chapter on Globalisation and the Fleet, Mahan writes about China, Japan, Russia, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. He evaluates the importance of the Mediterranean Sea to the world's commerce, which brings to fore the discussion by Robert D Kaplan in "Monsoon" of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. The author very aptly brings out that as commerce becomes the predominant interest of the world today, so, as a consequence, overseas political acquisitions, and maritime commercial routes are now the primary objects of foreign policy among nations.

The principal value of the book lies in its systematic collation of a historical perspective, operational development, emergent doctrines,

trends and challenges brought out in a century old Mahanian thought, which makes it as relevant today as it was when the master propounded the same.

This well edited and well-presented book provides the reader with a very comprehensive expose on how Mahan saw the value of an educated and aware naval force – able, ready and equipped to operate forward.

Captain Sandeep Dewan, IN

Brave Hearts of India. *By Maj Gen Shubhi Sood (NOIDA: SDS Publishers, 2013) pp..215, Rs : 465.00, ISBN : 9788190282857*

The author being a soldier and a scholar has written this book from the depths of his heart in a manner which no run-of-the-mill author could have done. The book covers 28 actions/individuals in a gripping manner.

Giving appropriate examples to make his point seems to be the author's forte. He points out that the President of the USA made his first formal call after election to the "Veteran Hospitals". The Prime Minister of the UK on seeing Indian Victoria Cross winners (VCs), alighted from his car, saluted them and escorted them to their place. Among the VCs, Umrao Singh posed a problem regarding the meager pension that he was getting. When he returned to Delhi, an officer from the British High Commission handed to him a very favourable response to his problem at the airport itself. In a sad contrast, the Supreme Commander in India refused to meet the veterans to hear their grievances.

Each of the 28 accounts is deeply moving and dramatically recorded saga of astounding sacrifice, loyalty, alchemy of tradition and above all the essence of the Indian Army.

The first account is of Subedar Nagarkoti who won four Indian Orders of Merit (IOM, the nearest equivalent of Victoria Cross which the Indians could not be awarded at that time). Which soldier's martial spirit has not swelled with pride at the name 'Saragarhi'? All 21 Sikh soldiers defending the post held out till the end. It was probably the purest example of 'last man, last round'. Each one was awarded the IOM. The British Parliament gave them a standing ovation. Queen Victoria was herself moved. Thereafter other great acts are chronicled. Major Som Nath Sharma in whose name a

famous colony in Delhi is named. Major Shaitan Singh whose frozen body was found many months later exactly in the same posture in which he had died. Captain (IN) Mulla who was last seen sitting on his chair and smoking a cigarette as the Khukri slowly sank. Flying Officer Sekhon who lived upto his Squadron's motto, "Swift and Fearless", till his last breath. Second Lieutenant Kheterpal, whose father visited Pakistan after the war and was treated with deference. There, the man who had killed his son came up to him and saluted him. And finally Lieutenant Triveni Singh, mortally wounded, reporting to his General Officer Commanding, "mission accomplished".

About whom is this book? It is about ordinary Indians who took the human spirit to another level. And, who is the target readership? Again the ordinary Indian, more especially those gone astray and the young and aspiring. This book is well written and easy to read. Those in authority must give it the widest reach. The author should follow it up with a sequel to cover other gems, such as Lieutenant General PS Bhagat, Victoria Cross, Lieutenant KS Judge, Victoria Cross and others of their ilk.

Brigadier MS Chowdhury, VSM (Retd)

Understanding Cyber Warfare and Its Implications for Indian Armed Forces. By RK Tyagi (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2013), pp..300, Price Rs. 1250.00, ISBN 9789382652090

The subject chosen by the author Colonel RK Tyagi is very topical and raises a lot of expectations from the book. The layout of the book shows a high content of generic discussion which is factual and is available abundantly in literature on the subject. However, it may be useful for the uninitiated. The author has taken pains to illustrate his point of view with topical and current examples; and by the time one finishes reading part one, there is adequate interest generated to know how it affects the Indian Armed Forces.

The author has used simple and well flowing language that is easily understood with suitably interjected references. He has tried and partly succeeded in transposing well known principles of war into cyber space. Maybe a little more deliberation on the cyber relevance would have brought in convincing value. But the thread seems to have been lost when additional principles have been introduced. If they are to form part of learning they should have

been adequately supported by references from literature and other researchers.

The author goes on to discuss generic effects on society and thereafter on Indian population. Good statistics have been given in related fields but adequate insertion of cyber space has been left out. Readers expecting something original in the context of Indian Defence implications will be in for a little disappointment as this aspect has been covered either generically or very sparsely. All aspects where cyber warfare and timelines could have been covered have been left a little vague. Same is the case with the chapter on recommendations.

Lieutenant General SP Kochar, AVSM and Bar, SM, VSM (Retd)

India's Energy Security. By Vivek Dhall, (New Delhi : Vij Books, 2013), pp..108, Price Rs 595.00 ISBN 9789382652151

Result of the research done by a serving officer at USI in 2012, the book covers all facets of Energy relating to India. Spread over 11 chapters in 106 pages, he traces the evolution of Energy Security Concepts since mid 20th Century and their co-relation to national well-being. He points out that India's energy basket is a mix of coal, gas, oil, LPG, electricity (including hydro generation), biomass and a bit of nuclear. While urban India is reasonably well-off, 47 per cent of rural India still does not enjoy benefits offered by energy, thus it lags behind. This gap is likely to grow further by year 2030.

Highlighting importance of Energy as an 'essential ingredient for social development and economic growth for eradication of poverty', it is brought out that India's present record is low, and she imports 70 per cent of her oil requirements (mostly from West Asia) – a big financial drain. Steps initiated by the Government to reduce this gap are adequately covered.

Plans to import gas and oil from West and Central Asia and problems being faced in developing pipeline projects through Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh have been highlighted. Maritime issues, especially safety and security involved in transportation and distribution of oil and gas through international waters and the choke points have been covered, and measures suggested to overcome them.

Renewable energy in India and energy's interface with climate change have been covered, and comparisons drawn with European and Asian countries. He points out that while Japan has taken a lead in measures related to climate change, India still lags behind. As regards renewable energy, the author emphasises that much needs to be done in this field, as it can make a significant change in lives of the rural masses of the Country. The monogram ends with Policy Recommendations in which viable suggestions have been made for policy makers.

The author could have suggested "How the Armed Forces of India could contribute in ensuring Energy Security?" Though a lot of facts are included, use of graphs would have made their interpretation simpler. The text could also have been better edited.

The book tackles an issue of contemporary national importance and is a useful addition to the existing literature on a subject of great national importance.

Lieutenant General YM Bammi, PhD (Retd)

Military Agency, Politics and the State in Pakistan. By Ejaz Hussain, (*Sanskriti: New Delhi, 2013*) pp..452, Rs. 1150.00 ISBN 9788187374770

This well researched volume, by a noted Pakistani scholar, attempts to fill the gap of a proper theory-guided research of civil-military relations (CMR) of Pakistan as well as the phenomenon of military intervention in politics in Pakistan. In this study the Author's attempt is to solve through analytic narratives, dependent and independent variables, the core question – why the military continues to intervene in Pakistan's politics? The Author has taken due cognisance of the seminal works of Huntington, Janowitz, Feaver, Finer, Nordlinger, Pearlmuter, Desch and Cohen in CMR, thereby designing the model and flow matrix for detailed examination of all five cases of coup d' etat in Pakistan. The emphasis in this study is less on sociological, historical and economic perspectives but centres primarily on the political aspects that resulted in military takeovers.

This comprehensive work is spread over seven chapters. In the first chapter are dealt the theoretical aspects including the core question as also dependent and independent variables that are germane to the core question. Subsequent three chapters

analyse the theory and practice of CMR, general politics, the state in Pakistan and the empirical shortcomings therein, the nitty-gritty of 1958 and 1969 coups and the CMR during the period. Thereafter, in following two chapters are explained the changes during Bhutto's regime with the help of a causal model and Nawaz Sharif's failure to control the military. He concludes that it is the military that caused the July 1977 coup because the military maintained its stranglehold especially on defence and foreign affairs. Thereafter the fourth and the fifth coups are discussed for which the military again is directly held responsible.

The coups d'etat were legitimised on account of weak political institutions, incompetent politicians and the bogey of external threat from India! The Author concludes that Pakistan's military is able to maintain its overall suzerainty of the state because it is able to maximise its own economic interests and drive the foreign/defence policy as a dominant factor. The study clearly demonstrates that in Pakistan the military intervenes both overtly (coups) and covertly for its own interests which are primarily political in nature. A well researched study which will doubtless be of interest to Pakistan analysts, thinkers and students of political science.

Major General Ashok Joshi, VSM (Retd)

The Islamist Challenge in West Asia, Doctrinal and Political Competitions After the Arab Spring. *By Talmiz Ahmad (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, in Association with Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, 2013.) pp 150, Price Rs 695 ISBN 978-81-8274-737-1.*

Implanting of Israel in Palestine in 1948 gave fresh impetus to Arab nationalism: army-led regimes took over in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Yemen in the 1950s. Soon after, North African Arab states gained freedom from colonial rule. Thereafter, the Arab states in the Gulf shook off colonial tutelage. The new regimes ruled in the name of nationalism but failed to meet adequately either, the aspirations for better life or, the challenge posed by external forces. The overthrow of the Iranian monarchy and subsequent rule by dominant Shia clergy, added another challenge posed to the Arab rulers – that by Islamist forces. Corrupt governance by the rulers saw outbreak of Islamist-led mass protest in Tunisia and then in Egypt in 2011. The protest catapulted them to state power (in Egypt, for a brief period only).

While the mainline Islamists were willing to seek non-violent change, groups like al Qaeda mounted armed challenge to the existing regimes and their alleged foreign sponsors. As in other cases of historic change, there is alternate advance and retreat. Undoubtedly, the setback to peaceful change such as in Egypt creates space for armed insurrection as is currently seen in Syria and in North Africa.

Ambassador Talmiz Ahmad has spent decades in the Arab world – he was twice India's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Currently, he advises on energy issues from his base in Dubai. In his latest work – *The Islamist Challenge in West Asia* – he elaborates on the prevailing 'doctrinal and political competition' in the region, where India has vital political and economic interests. He deals with 'competition-and-confrontation' in the struggle for power within Arab countries and between the Arabs and the Iranians in the region. Importantly, he elaborates on the emphasis on doctrinal purity which motivates the Islamists.

The book is essential reading for policy planners and others interested in the region, known for its diverse political and cultural traditions competing for pre-eminence.

Shri SK Bhutani, IFS (Retd)

Territorial Army: Future Challenges. By Lt Col Harish Katoch
(New Delhi: Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 2013), pp..138, Price 595.00
ISBN 9789382652120

The author has researched the historical evolution of the Territorial Army (TA) in India since its inception during the British era to its growth post-Independence; and thereafter, examined its relevance in the present day security environment. The author has highlighted the need for expansion of the TA in India for the urban areas, border regions, as well as for the specialised roles. He, however, laments that the concept of the TA has not really taken-off in India due to the indifference of the Army and apathy of the Government.

Harish has examined the employment of the TA in some of the leading militaries and given a broad overview and analysis of their size and likely roles, which obviously differ in each country due to their peculiar needs. The author opines that the TA in India

as a percentage of the regular forces is comparatively rather low and suggests its enhancement for, both, the active duties and as national reserve. The suggestion to selectively raise TA units, to replace a unit or sub-unit of the combat elements, in the defensive formations has to be examined in the larger perspective of its competence, operational preparedness, the peace and field rotational policy, its frequency of deployment in the field and the equipment profile.

Whereas TA, as a concept is good for ensuring economy and as an instrument of social cohesion, its growth has to be balanced. Some of the TA units have performed exceedingly well both in the operations and during peace time, however, it cannot be enlarged unduly and assigned new roles without acceptance of necessity, notwithstanding the better options that would be generated by expansion, for making the service a more attractive career. The author, has been able to document various issues and the challenges being faced by the TA, and has recommended a few steps in this regard. These recommendations should generate considerable interest and debate amongst the planners, both within the Armed Forces and in the Government.

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

March of a Foot Soldier. By DK Havanoor (Bangalore : DK Havanoor, 2013), pp..175, Rs 500.00, ISBN 9789351043

An interesting narrative of the journey of an infantry officer from his induction into the Army to the day he retired.

The language is easy to follow and his story reminds us of our own journey through life in our own regiments. Vignettes of life at the Officers Training Academy, initiation into his regiment, incidents on courses of instruction, experiences at border posts and forward areas, interaction between officers and soldiers of his regiment, the institution of the Officers Mess and regimental customs and traditions, all make an interesting and absorbing mirror image of our own lives in uniform.

Colonel Havanoor's book reminds us that all of us have stories to tell and that we need to follow his example.

Major General Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)

Conspiracy of Silence: Japanese Prisoners of War in India 1942-1946 [Selected Source Materials]. By TR Sareen (*New Delhi: Life Span Publishers & Distributors, 2010*) pp. 382, Rs 1100.00, ISBN: 9788183690287.

As most students of military history in India are aware, the Imperial Japanese Army was a force to contend with during the Second World War. Their unyielding, rigid discipline stemmed from the *Bushido* code of the warrior. They were not only fanatical in battle, but also brutal towards those who were unfortunate enough to fall into their hands as prisoners of war (PsW). However, the *Bushido* code not only meant that the Japanese often preferred death over surrender, it also meant that the few Japanese soldiers who did fall alive into allied hands considered it a fate worse than death. Many would subsequently attempt suicide, or refuse to give their real names and personal details to their captors. Subsequently repatriated to Japan after the end of the war, they were shunned and ignored by their countrymen. The saga of Japanese PsW remains one of the shameful untold stories of modern Japanese military history. Two major PsW camps in pre-Independence India were located at Bikaner (Rajasthan) and Baleli (Baluchistan).

This book is a compilation of numerous primary source records collected by the author from various archives around the world while researching his book 'Japanese Prisoners of War in India, 1942-46: Bushido and Barbed Wire', published by Global Oriental, 2006. To that extent, it is in many ways a companion volume to the earlier book. However, as a stand-alone publication, the book contains much of interest to the historian and lay reader alike. Of particular interest to students of military propaganda are the sections on psychological warfare and morale. While the book is essentially a compilation of documents from various archives, the author has done a great service by publishing these records as a consolidated volume for reference by interested scholars of the Second World War.

Squadron Leader Rana TS Chhina (Retd)

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter – Ending Dec 2013

(The books reviewed in Jul-Sep 2013 Issue have been added to the library during this quarter but not shown in this list)

Afghanistan

Pakhtunistan : A Factor Between Pakistan and Afghanistan by Sudhir Kumar Singh. Delhi, Shipra Publications, 2013. 204p., Rs.595, ISBN 9788175416185

Storm Warning : Riding the Crosswinds in the Pakistan-Afghan Borderlands by Robin Brooke-Smith. London, Radcliffe Press, 2013. 298p., Rs.1995, ISBN 9781780764085

War From the Ground Up : Twenty - First - Century Combat as Politics by Emile Simpson. London, Hurst Chance Company, 2013. 285p., £20, ISBN 9781849042550

Armed Forces

The Army in British India : From Colonial Warfare to Total War 1857-1947 by Kaushik Roy. London, Bloomsbury, 2013. 238p., Rs.6664, ISBN 9781441177308

Cavalry: Its History and Tactics by Louis Edward Nolan. Yardley, Westholme, 2007. 224p., \$30, ISBN 9781594160318

By Force of Arms : Armed Ethnic Groups in Burma by Paul Keenan. New Delhi, Vij Books, 2013. 260p., Rs.1195, ISBN 9789382652212

Implementation of RTI Act 2005 in Armed Forces and Its Implications by AK Vyas. New Delhi, Vij Books, 2013. 102p., Rs.450, ISBN 9789382652144

Military and Media by Rajesh Kumar. Delhi, Prashant Publishing House, 2013. 328p., Rs.1200, ISBN 9789380565392

The Soldier: A History of Courage, Sacrifice and Brotherhood by Dareen Moore. London, Icon Books, 2010. 500p., Rs.499, ISBN 9781848311534

The Ultimate Marine Recruit Training Guidebook by Nick "Gunny Pop" Popaditch. California, Savas Beatie, 2012. 181p., £14.99, ISBN 9781932714739

Arms Control

The Evolution of Arms Control : From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age by Richard Dean Burns. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. 252p., Rs.1943, ISBN 9781442223790

Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats. Edited by James J Wirtz and Peter R Lavoy. California, Stanford University, 2012. 315p., Rs.1887, ISBN 9780804774017

Weapons of War : Environmental Impact by UC Jha. New Delhi, KW Publisher, 2013. 450p., Rs.150, ISBN 9789381904749

Autobiography/Memoirs

Courage and Conviction: An Autobiography by VK Singh. New Delhi, Aleph Book Company, 2013. 363p., Rs.595, ISBN 9789382277576

Genghis Khan : Life, Death and Resurrection by John Man. London, Bantam Books, 2011. 464p., £9, ISBN 9780553814989

The Leader of His Life: Biography of Air Chief Marshal Idris Hasan Latif by Bilkees I Latif. New Delhi, KW Publisher, 2009. 384p., Rs.880, ISBN 9789381904855

March of a Foot Soldier by DK Havanoor. Bangalore, DK Havanoor, 2013. 175p., Rs.500, ISBN 9786498139256

My Share of the Task : A Memoir by Stanley McChrystal. New York, Portfolio/Penguin, 2013. 452p., \$29.95, ISBN 978591844754

China

China Goes Global : The Partial Power by David Shambaugh. New York, Oxford University Press, 2013. 409p., Rs.1195, ISBN 9780199860142

The Dragon Extends Its Reach : Chinese Military Power Goes Global by Larry M Wortzel. Washington DC, Potomac Books, 2013. 240p., \$ 29, ISBN 9781612344058

Inside China : New Leadership, Social Change and Economic Challenges. Edited by D Suba Chandran, Teshu Singh and Namrata Hasija. New Delhi, Samskriti, 2013. 162p., Rs.550, ISBN 9788187374794

Inside Out India and China : Local Politics Go Global by William Antholis. Washington, Booking Institution, 2013. 235p., Rs.1648, ISBN 9780815725107

The Morality of China in Africa: The Middle Kingdom and the Dark Continent. Edited by Stephen Chan. London, Zed Books, 2013. 154p., £14.99, ISBN 9781780325668

Return of the Dragon : Rising China and Regional Security by Denny Roy. New York, Columbia University Press, 2013. 279p, Rs.2305, ISBN 9780231159005

Self Deception : India's China Policies, Origins, Premises, Lessons by Arun Shourie. India, Harper Collins, 2013. 398p., Rs.599, ISBN 9789351160939

Spying for the People: Mao's Secret Agents, 1949-1967 by Michael Schoenhals. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 266p., Rs.1975, ISBN 9781107603448

What's in a Chinese Character by Tan Huay Peng. China, New World Press, Page NA, Rs.1200, ISBN 9787800055157

Cyber Warfare

Cyber War Will Not Take Place by Thomas Rid. London, Hurst and Company, 2013. 218p., Rs.1604, ISBN 9781849042802

Surviving Cyber War by Richard Stiennon. United States, Government Institutes(Scarecrow Press) 2010. 170p., £24.95, ISBN 9781605906881

Defence and Diplomacy

India's Military Conflicts and Diplomacy : An Inside View for Decision Making by VP Malik. India, Harper Collins, 2013. 300p., Rs.699, ISBN 978351160830

Pentagon's Notes on Military History : For DSSC/TSOC Examination 2014 by Harjeet Singh. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2013. 215p., Rs.395, ISBN 9788182747159

Pentagon's Notes on Military History : For Part D Examination 2014 by Harjeet Singh. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2013. 175p., Rs. 395, ISBN 9788182747210

Energy Security

Energy and Security in South Asia : Cooperation or Conflict by Charles K Ebinger. New Delhi, Foundation Books, 2013. 224p., Rs. 795, ISBN 9789382993018

The Oil Road : Journey From the Caspian Sea to the City of London by James Marriott and Mika Minio-Paluello. London, Verso, 2013. 374p., \$19, ISBN 9781781681282

History

Chandernagore: From Bondage to Freedom 1900-1955 by Sailendra Nath Sen. New Delhi, Primus Books, 2012. 376p., Rs.1150, ISBN 9789380607238

A History of the Modern World : An Outline by Ranjan Chakrabarti. New Delhi, Primus Books, 2012. 416p., Rs.295, ISBN 9789380607504

The Mughal Throne: The Saga of India's Great Emperors by Abraham Eraly. London, Phoenix Paperback, 2004, 555p., \$16.99, ISBN 9780753817582

Mutiny at the Margins : New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857 Vol 1 to 4. Vol. 1 Anticipations and Experiences in the Locality, Vol. 2 Britain and the Indian Uprising , Vol. 3 Global Perspectives,

Vol. 4 Military Aspects of the Indian Uprising . (Series) Edited by Crispin Bates. New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2013, Rs.850, ISBN 9788132110514

A Political Legacy of the British Empire : Power and the Parliamentary System in Post Colonial India and Srilanka by Harshan Kumarasingham. London, IB Tauris, 2013. 297p., Rs.1995, ISBN 9781780762289

Sindias and the Raj: Princely Gwalior c. 1800-1850 by Amar Farooqui. New Delhi, Primus Books, 2011. 156p., Rs.650, ISBN 9789380607085

Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany : Politics, Intelligence and Propaganda 1941-43 by Romain Hayes. London, Hurst and Company, 2011. 249p., Rs.2050, ISBN 9781849041140

A Text Book of Medieval Indian History by Sailendra Nath Sen. New Delhi, Primus Books, 2013. 278p., Rs.275, ISBN 9789380607344

The Twilight of the East India Company : The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics 1790-1860 by Anthony Webster. New York, Boydell Press, 2009. 205p., Rs.2049, ISBN 9781843838227

Historiography

Revisionist Histories by Marnie Hughes-Warrington. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2013. 141p., £19, ISBN 9780415560795

Indian Ocean Region

Deep Currents and Rising Tides : The Indian Ocean and International Security. Edited by John Garofano and Andrea J Dew. New Delhi, Foundation Books, 2013. 331p., Rs.850, ISBN 9789382993148

Indian and American Perspective on Technological Developments in the Maritime Domain and their Strategic Implications in the Indian Ocean Region. Edited by Pradeep, Kaushiva and Kamlesh K Agnihotri. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2013. 158p., Rs.640, ISBN 9789381904770

International Relations

Global Peace and Security : International Treaties and Conventions on Seas by Kripal D Joshi. Delhi , Forward Books, 2013. 254p., Rs.750, ISBN 9789381763360

India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia. Edited by Takenori Horimoto and Lalima Varma. New Delhi , Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2013. 299p., Rs.795, ISBN 9789350980019

Indo-US Strategic Relations : Prospects and Challenges in 21st Century by Mohammad Samir Hussain. New Delhi, Neha Publishers and Distributors, 2014. 374p., Rs.1550, ISBN 9789380318295

Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahara. Edited by Frederick Wehrey and Anouar Boukhars, 2013. New Delhi, KW Publisher, 2013. 213p., Rs.720, ISBN 9789381904831

The Rise of the BRICS in Africa : The Geopolitics of South-South Relations by *Padraig Carmody*. London, Zed Books, 2013. 176p., £16, ISBN 9781780326047

Sino-US Relations and the Role of Emotion in State Action: Understanding Post-Cold War Crisis Interactions by *Taryn Shepperd*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 216p., £57.50, ISBN 9781137020086

Understanding International Diplomacy : Theory, Practise and Ethics by *Corneliu Bjola and Markus Kornprobst*. London, Routledge (Taylor and Francis Group), 2013. 240p., Rs.2664, ISBN 9780415688215

The World Under Pressure : How China and India are Influencing the Global Economy and Environment by *Carl J Dahlman*. New Delhi, Foundation Books, 2013. 301p., Rs.795, ISBN 9789382264644

Islam

The Muslim Brotherhood : Evolution of an Islamist Movement by *Carrie Rosefsky Wickham*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2013. 360p., \$29, ISBN 9780691149400

In the WhirlWind of Jihad by *Martha Brill Olcott*. New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2013. 414p., Rs.820. ISBN 9789381904848

Israel

Fortress Israel : The Inside Story of the Military Elite Who Run the Country - and Why They can't Make Peace by *Patrick Tyler*. London, Portobello Books, 2013. 562p., Rs.550, ISBN 9781846272752

Maoist Insurgency

Insurgencies in North East India : Moving Towards Resolution by *Gautam Das*. New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2013. 163p., Rs.595, ISBN 9788182747227

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These should be limited and the whole paragraph should not be lifted.

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
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