

U.S.I. JOURNAL

INDIA'S OLDEST JOURNAL ON DEFENCE AFFAIRS

(Established : 1870)



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
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PVSM, AVSM, ADC
- India's North East - An Overview - *Lt Gen V K Nayar,*
PVSM, SM (Retd)
- India's Defence Expenditure - *Vice Adm Subimal Mookerjee*
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- Human Rights and the Armed Forces *- Captain D J S Chahal*
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
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
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
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
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43/46 GARDEN REACH ROAD, CALCUTTA-700 024

ISSN 0041-770X

The
Journal
of the
United Service Institution
of
India

Published by Authority of the Council



(Established : 1870)

Postal Address :

KASHMIR HOUSE, RAJAJI MARG, NEW DELHI-110 011

Telephone No. 3015828

Vol CXXV

October-December 1995

No. 522

USI Journal is published Quarterly in April, July, October and January.

Subscription per annum : In India Rs. 180.00. Subscription should be sent to the Director. It is supplied free to the members of the Institution. Articles,

Correspondence and Books for Review should be sent to the Editor.

Advertisement enquiries concerning space should be sent to the Director.

For overseas subscriptions, trade enquiries and advertisements write to : Spantech & Lancer, Spantech House, Lagham Road, South Godstone, Surrey RH9 8HB, UK.

Overseas annual subscription (By Air Mail) - £ 30 or \$ 60

Tel : + 44 1342 893239 Fax : + 44 1342 892584

**UNITED
SERVICE
INSTITUTION
OF INDIA**

for

*the furtherance of
interest and know-
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of National Security
in general and of the
Defence Services
in particular*

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NOTE

The views expressed in the Journal are in no sense official and the opinions of contributors and the Editor in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

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EDITORIAL

The Domestic Scene

The President's Report for 1995 by Vice Admiral SK Chand, published in this issue, presents in detail the activities of the United Service Institution of India during the year. The construction of the USI New Building Complex, a major project costing more than Rupees Five Crores, is making good progress and it is hoped that the move of the Institution to its permanent home will be completed by April 1996.

The USI Research Centre started functioning with the first meeting of the Board of Management on November 17, 1995. The process for the selection of topics for research and grant of fellowships is now in progress and hopefully, research activity will commence soon, and will produce additional sets of USI publications from the Research Centre by the end of the year. The establishment of the USI Research Centre in 1995 is an important landmark in the history of the Institution and confirms its position as a leading 'think tank' on strategic affairs in this part of the world.

To commemorate the 125th anniversary of the USI and the 25th anniversary of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in 1995, a joint International Seminar on "Non-Military Threats to Security in South Asia" was held on 7-8 December. The proceedings of the Seminar are being published soon but selected papers will be published in later issues of the Journal for wider dissemination.

The lead article in this issue on "India's North East" by Lt Gen VK Nayar, former Governor of Manipur and a former Army Commander Western Command, is a perceptive and clear-sighted analysis, in a holistic framework, of our domestic scene in the North-East. It needs careful reading and reflection to arrive at the heart of the problem and then to design, with the rigor of objectivity, basic concepts for creative policy in the region. National strategy needs to formulate credible response to credible threats; and Machiavellian materialism needs to be curbed to avoid dismal failure in the North-East.

And finally, to all our readers, a very happy New Year from the Staff of the Institution.

President's Report for the Year 1995

VICE ADMIRAL S K CHAND PVSM, AVSM, ADC
VICE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF AND PRESIDENT USI COUNCIL

Gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to our Council Meeting for 1995. I thank you for the trouble that you have taken to be here this morning and I am sure we will have some useful discussions on this morning's agenda.

As in previous years the Council Meeting has been scheduled to coincide with the National Security Lecture being delivered by Shri Jaswant Singh, Member of Parliament, on "OUR NATIONAL SECURITY - END OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND THE OPENING DECADE OF THE 21ST" at the auditorium of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library at Teen Murti House, starting at 5.00 PM this evening and tomorrow. I hope all of you will be able to attend the talk on both the evenings.

USI NEW BUILDING PROJECT

The progress of the New Building is, I am told, going according to schedule and the project is due to be completed by early next year. The Building Sub-Committee has appointed M/s Payal Visions Pvt Ltd to do the interior designing and provide the necessary furniture and furnishings. This work it is hoped will be completed along with the completion of the Building Project. The Chairman of the Building Sub-Committee and the Managing Director of the AWHO will brief you in greater detail on these aspects.

FINANCES

The audited Balance Sheet for the year 1994-95 alongwith the Auditor's Report, the revised budget for 1995-96 and the Budget Forecast for 1996-97 have been sent to you and I hope you have had the time to examine them. I am happy to say that there are no serious irregularities or objections raised by the Auditors in their report. However, any member wanting any further clarification may please obtain it from the Auditors after his briefing on the State of Accounts.

Text of the report presented to the Council of the United Service Institution of India during its annual meeting on November 23, 1995.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXV, No. 522, October-December, 1995.

The Finances of the USI continue to be in a healthy state as the figures of the past three years will indicate :-

	INCOME (including interest in Rupees)	EXPENDITURE	SURPLUS
(a) 1992-93	22,49,392.05	10,61,597.47	11,87,794.58
(b) 1993-94	23,10,525.22	10,52,367.27	12,58,157.95
(c) 1994-95	30,13,582.65	11,61,219.86	18,52,362.79

The following amounts of interest actually accrued on account of USI investments have not been included in the income, stated earlier, as these were transferred to various funds as reflected in the Balance Sheet :

(a) 1992-93	Rs. 10,48,194.16
(b) 1993-94	Rs. 11,72,634.05
(c) 1994-95	Rs. 13,16,588.00

In the last Council Meeting it was decided that a special review of the Five Years Perspective would be carried out about six months prior to the move to the new location. Although this review has been done for the years 1996-97 and 1997-98, and is reflected in notes to Budget Estimates 1996-97 which were forwarded to you a few days back, the review for the year 1998-99 has not been done as it was felt that a realistic estimate could only be made after experience had been gained on the income and expenditure at the new site atleast for one year.

USI BUILDING FUND

The Balance in the USI Building Fund stood at Rs 2.78 Crores as on March 31, 1995. Since then to date Rs. 1.50 Crores has been paid to AWHO. This brings the total amount so far paid to AWHO to Rs. 4.60 Crores. You will be happy to know that the total sum of Rs. 1.30 crores promised by the Hon'ble Prime Minister from the National Defence Fund has been received and paid to the AWHO.

MEMBERSHIP

Upto November 15, 1995 the total number of Life Members stood at 3,560 as against 3350 last year. The total number of Annual Members was

1590 as against 1107 last year. The number of subscriber members stood at 795 as against 762 last year.

We have so far enrolled 29 Associate Members.

THE USI JOURNAL

The quality of our book reviews has continued to bring in a large number of books from Indian and Foreign publishers. Till 15 Nov 95 we have received 272 books from Foreign publishers thus saving the USI Rs. 2,51,981.00 in foreign exchange. This year, I am glad to say that due to the efforts of the VCAS, DGMT and others, we have had a fairly good response from Public Sector Units placing advertisements in our Journal. However, efforts have to be continuously made to procure adequate number of advertisements. I request the members to please help in this matter.

CORRESPONDENCE COURSES

A total of 1797 officers took our Correspondence Courses during the 1994-95 against 1818 who took these Courses last year. The results of the Army DSSC Entrance Examination which has just been announced are quite good and out of 20 competitive vacancies 14 were obtained by officers who took our Correspondence Courses. The over all pass percentage of the students who have taken Correspondence Courses was 31.67 per cent compared to over all pass percentage of 22.72 per cent.

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY COMPETITION

I am afraid this year we had only 9 entries for the Gold Medal Essay Competition 'OPEN TO ALL OFFICERS' and 8 entries from those for 'MAJOR AND EQUIVALENT RANK'. This was considerably less than the entries we had last year. I would request the Directors Training of the three Services Headquarters to please give wider publicity to our Essay Competition in the coming years.

MACGREGOR MEDAL

I am afraid in spite of all our efforts no head-way has been made in getting any recommendation from the JPC from the three Services for the MacGregor Medal.

SEMINARS AND LECTURES

A large number of lectures were delivered by eminent persons during the year. I would like to particularly draw your attention to the following talks :

- (a) Dr William J Perry, Secretary of Defence, USA
- (b) Ambassador Yoav Biran, Dy Director General Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel
- (c) Sir Christopher France, UK Permanent Under Secretary of State for Defence
- (d) Prof Robert A Scalpino, University of California
- (e) Lt Gen M Sanderson, Chief of Staff of Australian Army
- (f) His Excellency Andrei Kokoshin, Russian First Dy Minister for Defence
- (g) Mr Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary, Political Affairs, Department of State, USA
- (h) Lt Gen VK Nayar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
- (j) Vice Admiral KK Nayyar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The annual Seminar on Defence R&D, that was to be held last year, is being organised by Maj Gen Vinod Saigal in Pune and was scheduled to be held on 21st and 22nd November. The Seminar for this year is being held jointly with the JNU on "NON-MILITARY THREATS TO SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA" on December 7-8, 1995 at the Nehru Memorial Library and Museum at Teen Murti House.

RESEARCH CENTRE

I am happy to report that the first meeting of the Board of Management of the USI Centre for Research was held on November 17, 1995. I will request Admiral Govil to give you the details of the progress made in this matter.

CONCLUSION

During the past year, apart from the fact that no recommendations were received for the annual award for the MacGregor Medal, the USI has made steady progress in all other spheres. Next year after the USI moves into its new location the Institution should be able to make a quantum jump in all its activities. But with this move there will be a very considerable increase in the expenditure for running these activities. I do hope that the three Services Headquarters will continue to extend their help and support to the USI to tide over any financial crunch it may face.

I would like to bring to your notice that at the end of this month I would be saying my farewell to arms. I wish the USI all success in the coming years.

India's North East - An Overview

LT GEN V K NAYAR, PVSM, SM (RETD)

GENERAL

The situation in the North East in the last decade has become more complex and the problems have multiplied. In the limited time available, I will like to focus on what I feel are the major problem areas of the current situation. Before doing so, I feel that it is important to refer to some of the generic and historic causes of the ferment in the North East.

The very first one is the factor of isolation. North East has stood at the crossroads of history as much as the North West of India, with one basic difference that the interaction of the immigrating population with the indigenous remained confined to its natural boundaries due to its geographical vastness and abundant natural resources; unlike in the North West, where invaders and immigrants intermixed with the local population and got assimilated. Even the great Vashnavite surge, Bhakti cult of Sankaradev during the 16th-18th century AD remained confined to the Brahmaputra Valley, which later the Manipuri Kings integrated into the plains of the Imphal Valley. Annexation by the British in the 19th century did not mean administrating the area; it was essentially to protect their interests in the plains. Inner Line Regulations 1873, Govt of India Act 1919 and Excluded Area Act 1935, resulted in perpetuation of physical, social, political and economic isolation. Since independence our efforts to break it have been halfhearted and disjointed.

The second factor is the diversity within the region; there are over 200 ethnic groups and over 400 languages and dialects are spoken in the area; in addition, there is vast cultural and religious diversity. The area is inhabited by a high percentage of scheduled tribes: 93% in Mizoram, 84% in Nagaland, 80% in Meghalaya, 70% in Arunachal Pradesh, 28% in Tripura, 27% in Manipur and 10% in Assam. We need to appreciate that the North East is not a homogeneous region with common political, social or economic system and perspectives. Therefore, search of a North East identity will be fallacious and while searching for a solution and a holistic perspective, we must be conscious

Text of a talk given by Lt. General V.K. Nayar to the Members of the United Service Institution of India on 1 August 1995.

Lt. General V K Nayar is a former Governor of Manipur. He was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Western Army Command, Indian Army during 1987-1989.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXV, No. 522, October-December, 1995.

of the fundamental differences at the ground level in the constituent areas of the region.

In the socio-political field both the good and the bad effects of modernisation have manifested; unfortunately the process has not been harmonised and past values and systems are in conflict with the modern forces. The two major fallouts are that the traditional rural elite has been replaced by the modern or urban elite. Similarly the traditional self governing system has been replaced by a centralised and formal system.

It will also be pertinent to mention that one of the major inbuilt constraints of most of the tribal areas, particularly of the hill tribes is the close and federal nature of the society. Where generally people have been traditionally suspicious of anything from outside and period of assimilation is a long-term process, trust and credibility have high value in their minds. The major outside constraint is the ignorance, lack of detailed knowledge of each constituent state and its heterogeneous inhabitants and their requirements. These not only impose constraints on influencing the solution but is an easy means of exploitation by the parochial elements.

PRESENT SITUATION AND PROBLEMS

ALIENATION

The major area of concern by and large for the entire North East is the increasing alienation of the people of the region from the national mainstream. Primarily, it is due to our failure to recognise the peculiar historical, social and cultural factors of each area in the North East with the common effect of isolation. The various facets of this isolation vary from area to area; of this the factor of physical isolation impinges on the minds of people the most. The road communications and railway network are totally inadequate. Movement into and within the region is restricted and puts people to economic and social harassment by the neighbouring states.

In the tribal areas apart from the political and economic causes, the very federal nature of the society, where each ethnic group has led an independent existence, the suspicion of outsiders persists. The tribal society is a classless society; while it is getting modernised, the federal structure still remains. There is a widespread demand for political independence / autonomy but they find it difficult to accept the emerging economic class structure. Literacy, awareness and modern political system have been accompanied by corrupt administration both civil and political and mounting economic bankruptcy and unemployment, which has proved fertile ground for exploitation both by the corrupt political set up and the insurgents.

Neglect and lack of real economic development have provided incentives for exploitation, which has been accentuated by the influx of foreigners giving rise to ethnic parochialism. Under these conditions the question of identity has come to the forefront. The identity crisis is fermented by the fear of cultural submergence and economic and social insecurity,

Alienation of land is one of the root causes of the alienation. Studies have revealed that in the plain areas of the North East particularly in Assam, alienation of land is primarily due to perpetuation of the colonial land policy inherited from the British, continuation of land based developmental process and unchecked immigration. In the hills and the tribal areas, it is as a result of the perversion of the traditional jurisdiction of the community on land and land based resources due to greed and manipulation of the local political elite and political economy of the neighbouring countries.

To break the alienation of the people of North East, first and foremost is the requirement of honesty of intention and sincerity of purpose backed by a pragmatic policy framework based on correct inputs recognising the genius of the divergent societies that inhabit the area. The key element is to break the physical isolation.

INSTITUTIONAL DEGRADATION

The area has very democratic and well established social and cultural institutions; these institutions regulated all activities at the village and community level. Their authority and effectiveness has been eroded under the pretext of modernisation and the modern democratic set up. We have neither absorbed them into the system, nor replaced them with new ones. The motive is clear: if these are effective then they will question the politicians and the administration, who want a free hand in exercising power and utilisation of meagre resources for their selfish purposes. Without rejuvenation of the institutional structure at the grassroot level, neither can peoples genuine participation in the democratic system and the development process can be ensured nor alienation of the people be reduced. The enactment of the 73rd and 74th amendment to the Constitution on Panchayati Raj and Municipalities is a step in the right direction but it can only succeed if there is mandatory financial devolution and there is no overlap in the functions between these institutions and the State Government Departments to prevent political interference.

STUDENT POWER AND STUDENT POLITICS

Student power and student politics always had a role in these areas. These were broad based, democratic and secular. The high point of student's movement was the formation of AGP Government in 1985 by the student

leaders of the Assam. Since then the student movement in Assam and other States has fragmented on ethnic and communal lines. This has happened because of the failure of the democratic parties to comprehend the dynamics of these developments. The fragmentation and its aftermath has generated its own social tensions; this is being exploited by the local politicians, particularly in the smaller hill States.

DETERIORATING POLITICAL ETHOS

Since the 1980s there has been entirely the politics of expediency and both political parties and individual loyalties have been frequently purchased; this has led to instability and bad governance. Government resources have been essentially used to gain, retain and consolidate power. Insurgent factions have been used in the power game by most leaders and parties; this has provided them unlimited opportunity to gain financial and other resources at the cost of the people. This has worked to the double advantage of the insurgents; one, their resource base has widened, and secondly, due to denial of economic benefits of development, people feel alienated and are vulnerable to insurgent influence and propaganda.

No discussion of the current political ethos will be complete, without touching on electoral politics and blatant corruption. Political will and perceptions are only confined to winning elections and perpetuating power. It has lost its sanctity and meaning as the most sacred and fundamental democratic function. In a closed society divided into small ethnic groups, particularly in smaller States, electoral politics and corruption has effected each individual and spared no one. With limited economic base, political leadership, administrative officers and insurgents are digging into the common limited kitty. Financial mismanagement is of the highest order, there is no ethos of systematic utilisation of funds meant for specific purposes and there is no monitoring. Denial of opportunity to entrepreneurs in some of the hilly States has resulted in benami contractors operating on behalf of local people (mostly people in power or their relatives), who pay large sums to local front man and insurgent nominees out of the meagre development funds. In a nutshell political permissiveness and corruption is eating into the society and feeding insurgency.

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALISM AND SUB NATIONALISM

Nationalism in all its connotations and of various varieties is the most exploited sentiment in the North East, particularly in the smaller hill States. Broadly speaking two versions of nationalism, which are doing the maximum damage to the national cause and the interests of the people of the area merit special attention. First one is, wherein the local political leaders pose as true

nationalists while in Delhi and profess that national interest will suffer without them. They justify it based on the propagated threat to them by the insurgents, the very same people are doing the maximum damage to the national and local interest. The motive is entirely to perpetuate power, with a free hand in utilising resources (totally provided by Central Government) for selfish purposes. The second is the one locally propagated, which is different varieties of local sentiments or sub nationalism. This is exploited by the politician in power and out of power and the insurgents to gain local support. In the recent years the Central Government has shown undue tolerance to these elements for short term political gains, which has resulted in greater turmoil in the area. Real nationalism is not detrimental or exclusive of local interest and identity. There are a large number of political and public leaders, particularly in the younger generation, who have faith and are convinced that their future lies with the Indian nation, but power brokers have continued to keep them away from positions of prominence and power. A review of the last few elections in the North Eastern States and the political instability in the last decade and a half are a testimony to it. The current deteriorating situation in the North Eastern States is an outcome of it and is entirely related to the selfish motives and actions of such political leaders.

STATUS OF INSURGENCY

In all cases of insurgency in the North East, the initial phase of violence had been arrested before it blew up and full scale armed expression of insurgency was controlled by the Army. However, it is continuing as a more sophisticated brand of terrorism and subversion, an ideal combination in the current disturbed environment of the North East. Insurgency has thrived while retaining its low key posture, which is the peculiarity of the North East. Although we have had limited periods of high intensity violence and situation remaining under control for prolonged periods, insurgency, which germinated in Nagaland, spread to Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura and Assam. The insurgents have learnt their lesson well by experience, that the classical guerrilla tactics are not cost effective in our environment; control of population and subversion accompanied by planned acts of violence and terrorism are rewarding at minimum cost. This also gives the Government, Administration and Security Forces a sense of complacency, but they must realise that taming violence is not the same as liquidating insurrection.

Since the inception of insurgencies in the North East, their complexion is changing from those of local unrests to that of collusion amongst them, with the common aim of fighting the established Government and in this both overt and covert help from the local elite and organs of the local Government is available.

Howsoever ineffective our system of democratisation and economic development in these areas may have been, it certainly has demolished the myth of free sovereign tribal states due to their political and economic non-viability. The halo of great and noble cause of freedom has become more or less defunct. It has been replaced over a period by new slogans like 'Pan Mongoloid', 'Seven Sisters Movement', socialist or communist ideology, foreigners issue, greater autonomy and ethnic integration in the shape of greater Nagaland and greater Mizoram and tribal reserved areas, these may not be as glamorous but are equally lethal. A study of these will reveal a secessionist and anti Indian sentiment; of these, foreigners issue has received the widest recognition as it helps in raising the question of identity. The cause to unite against foreigners or India is a negative one. Within this framework local issues which provide anti Government slogans will continue to be exploited. Another issue that needs to be clearly understood in this regard is that when we talk of anti India feelings and sentiments, it is really anti Government both local and central and is essentially related to policy issues, which are inflicted on them by default. The level of motivation of these may not be high to cause a long drawn out violent explosion but it will provide enough fire and smoke for insurgencies to continue at a low key, which is aided and abetted by local politicians and bad governance.

The support base of the insurgents has undergone both a qualitative and quantitative change. On the one hand, people want peace and tranquility and look forward to the benefits of development, on the other hand, they want to exploit all issues to gain maximum benefits. The youth in the changed environment is losing the will to face hardship of an insurgents life in the jungles. Without a support base, not only their survival but the very meaning of their existence may be lost. Therefore, their covert presence must not only be effective but sophisticated. The emphasis has shifted to exploitation of ethnic bonds to influence events in the area, whether these be political, economic, social or cultural. Insurgents have influenced elections in Manipur and Nagaland and established links not only with the politicians but also with the Administration and elite in other spheres. Financial and other resource base has shifted from the rural areas to the urban areas, the main source being Government money, which is passed by dubious means.

Insurgent movements require not only highly dedicated, committed and robust leaders capable of sharing and standing the greatest physical and mental privations but people of impeccable moral character. Of all the current insurgent leaders, Muviah only has the potential to rally the Naga insurgents but due to tribal affiliations, he being a Thangkhol Naga from Manipur, his ability to gain full dominance over the Nagas of Nagaland and other insurgent groups of the North East is constrained.

At the tactical level, the growing potential of NSCN (I), the most potent of the North East insurgent groups is of special interest; NSCN(I) in collaboration with its sympathisers have been exploiting the sentiment of Naga identity and interest, particularly in Manipur and Naga inhabited areas in Assam to expand its area of influence. A combination of misconstrued Naga sentiment, threat and Kuki baiting has been effectively employed, to dominate Naga inhabited areas. In this some Naga leaders of Manipur have played a dubious role. The partisan attitude of the present Government of Nagaland in favour of Khaplang factions is having its own reaction and is acting as a boost for NSCN (I). NSCN(I) has reliable contacts for arms procurement in Thailand and other South East Asian countries; it also has well established links for transportation of arms and material to camps in Bangladesh. NSCN(I) participation in UNPO in July 1993 in Vienna and subsequent representation in Indigneous Peoples Forum has given them openings to international forums and avenues of support. They have reportedly established offices and representatives in Nepal, Hong Kong and some European capitals in addition to Bangladesh and Pakistan to project themselves.

CHANGES IN THE GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The changes in the neighbouring geopolitical environment of the North East are of relevance. Emergence of Bangladesh, change in the attitude of the Chinese towards the insurgent groups of the North East due to thaw in Indo-China relations and negotiations by the Myanmar authorities with most insurgent groups has certainly acted as a dampener to the insurgents and forced them to rethink their strategy. The centre of insurgent activities has shifted westwards from the Eastern border with Myanmar to inside Nagaland and Manipur and is spreading westwards within Assam. Similarly their bases have shifted to CHT and Sylhet in Bangladesh. This has resulted in the manifestation of a more cohesive and potent threat of regional dimensions. Both the validity and relevance of Indo Burmese Revolutionary Front (IBRF) is questionable due to changed situation and new imperatives. United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFSS) when consolidated will be a greater threat.

ATTITUDE OF BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN

Inspite of the progress in talks between India and Bangladesh on the Chakma issue, the attitude of Bangladesh towards North East insurgents in respect of providing safe sanctuaries, help and facilities for training and resource mobilisation is one of total benevolence. Establishment of Camps by NSCN(I) in CHT and Syhlet by Meitei Extremists (ME), ready help for transportation of weapons and men through their area to NSCN(I), ME and ULFA and association of DG Field Intelligence of Bangladesh and ISI of Pakistan

with the insurgents is a definite sign of belligerent attitude towards India. The freedom with which ISI is operating from Bangladesh for anti India activities add further dimensions to the insurgency problem. Apart from active diplomatic measures, we also need to think and consider punitive measures against Bangladesh in the long term.

MYANMAR'S ATTITUDE

Myanmar's attitude is entirely conditioned by their requirements at the ground level, their limited capability against their own insurgent groups and recent negotiations with most of them. Shelter to pro-democracy refugees at Leikun, so close to the border in Manipur has been a sore point with the Myanmar Government, they suspect our connivance in their activities against them. Tactically, in Myanmar's perception, KIA and NSCN(K) in the North and Keren, CNA and Muslims in the South are a bigger threat. Our failure to appreciate their concern has changed their stance to pro NSCN(I) in certain border areas at the local level.

The traditional transborder trade and movement is another area which is causing antagonism. We should resolve it generously by identifying commodities and crossing points and permit it with least restrictions as it will be to our advantage. With the signing of the MOU and opening of trade at Moreh and Champai, it should result in better management of the border and should also help us in controlling narcotic smuggling and contraband trade, resulting in denial of at least some of the dubious resources to the insurgents.

At the ground level, we should fully activate our informal and formal level contacts with the Burmese Army as in the past for better cooperation in joint transborder activities against insurgents.

The presence of large immigrant Bangladeshi population over the entire North East, a fertile ground for ISI's anti Indian designs with full connivance of Bangladesh Field Intelligence exists. ISI has established outposts in the border areas of Bangladesh and is spreading its tentacles in Assam and bordering areas of Manipur, Nagaland and Meghalaya. Mizoram though peaceful but due to Hmar trouble and its location is vulnerable as in Tripura. The threat has acquired regional dimensions, which needs to be countered both at the strategic and tactical levels.

Because of the varied perceptions of the divergent insurgent groups and the people of the North East, there can be no common cause for the insurgent groups in the same area or insurgent groups of different areas. In the absence of a common cause and ideology, the nature and dimensions of the collusion

amongst the insurgent groups will be confined to common interests and requirements. In my opinion, the areas of collusion in the near future will be confined to sharing of material and training resources, mutual support for infiltration and providing safe areas and sanctuaries to insurgents of neighbouring areas, when under pressure from Security Forces. Cooperation at tactical level for joint operations will be limited to insurgents of a particular area within the area. To counter it, the main thrust at a strategic level should be well coordinated intelligence operations covering not only areas within our national boundaries but beyond into Bangladesh and Myanmar. Along with it there is a crying necessity of counter intelligence operations planned on long term basis over the entire North East and adjoining areas of relevance.

In the overall context special areas of attention for the region as a whole are North Cachar Hills as they form a vital corridor for infiltration, Southern and Eastern Meghalaya, North Tripura, North Mizoram and Western borders of Manipur and Nagaland. Complete coordination of operations in the border areas of these States is essential. In this context, there is an urgent need to resolve the inter State boundary dispute between Assam and Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland.

From the above analysis it should be clear that the potential of the "Low Key Insurgency" in the NE is that of a slow poison which requires thorough and prolonged treatment.

CORE AREAS FOR ATTENTION

The grave problems that the region is facing cannot be resolved by wishful thinking and quick fix solutions. These have been fermenting for decades and with the passage of time developed graver dimensions and complexities. One gets the impression that these are permitted to linger on for short term political gains, which is also responsible for negative responses from the local people. The feeling amongst the local politicians and their henchmen at the Centre is that if unrest and insurgency dies down then the North East and they will be forgotten. For me, who has been close to the people and seen the manipulations of these elements, this is nothing but exploitation of the situation both at the local and national level. There can be no short cuts for resolving the problems; we have to have a long term perspective based on correct inputs and formulate a policy for dealing with the complex problems of the area.

LACK OF POLICY FRAMEWORK

Absence of a declared policy has resulted in disjointed responses both by

the politicians and bureaucrats and inconsistent and motivated projections. It has led to expediency and tardy execution. In the economic and developmental field it has resulted in disorientation, circumventing the system and malpractices with corruption as the ugly fallout. Unless there is fusion of a well defined and credible policy based on correct inputs, political will and an efficient and responsible machinery to implement it, success will be difficult. This coupled with the fact that political power is the master both in principle and practice, lays the responsibility squarely on the political leadership.

A Government must function to a mandate and be accountable for the same. Our failures in the NE like elsewhere are due to this reason. In the absence of a policy on the North East or for that matter on Manipur, on imposition of the President's Rule in Manipur on December 31, 1993, I laid down a policy framework based on my assessment of the situation and issued a directive to the administration and Security Forces, covering all aspects of the problem, laying down goals to be achieved in each field. We were able to achieve a substantial lot, if not all our tasks and 1994 has been acclaimed as an year of progress and development in Manipur. Without a policy framework there can neither be accountability nor correct orientation of the organs of the State apparatus.

EFFICIENT AND RESPONSIVE MECHINERY

The State machinery and the administrative set up to be efficient has to be manned by people of high calibre, integrity and dedication; it is just the opposite in these areas. Similarly, to get positive responses and generate peoples participation, credibility, trust and a high degree of involvement are essential which are conspicuous by their total absence. It is a subject in itself; suffice it to say that basic ingredients are political will and a change in ethos. Shuffling of people and changes in personalities is the least requirement, an exercise the Government undertakes often for public consumption.

There is a perceptible change in the functioning of the States and their administration since the 1970s, wherein the emphasis has shifted from administration with involvement by the old IFAS Cadre to that of bureaucratic white collar impersonal management by the IAS Cadre. Neither people's requirements are identified, nor are these met by people's participation. Central services cadres are not only weak but the system has broken down. Cadres are over subscribed by local officers, who are inducted and empanelled based on ethnic and parochial considerations. Such a situation is convenient for the local politicians, who treat the administration as an extension of their personal, political and ethnic designs. Few upright and professional officers are eliminated as it has happened in Nagaland in recent months.

Administration at the district level in the smaller hill States is virtually non functional due to structural defects, wrong manning and influence of local politicians, ethnic elite and insurgents. This will require reorganisation, reorientation and revamping.

To improve the machinery, apart from above measures special emphasis will be required to train the administrative cadres in financial management and monitoring, human resource development, planning, education and employment generation. In the field of economic development planning, grass root level knowledge of local requirements, attitudes and how to generate peoples participation are essential. Another area of special attention is of youth development, unless we take it in hand, our problems of unemployment and unrest will escalate.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Our process of economic development and strategy for the same has failed to achieve the desired results in the North East. The process has failed because of wrong orientation and bad implementation. While with each plan fund allocations have increased but there is no cumulative effect in any field. There is unchecked increase in non plan expenditure due to mismanagement and transfer of large employments and infrastructure under plan projects to non plan for political considerations, instead of redeploying resources and manpower for subsequent plan projects.

An analysis of the increasing unemployment in the North Eastern States, particularly the smaller hill states, would reveal that along with stunted and lopsided economic growth, no employment opportunities were created. The only employment is in the organised sector mainly in Government departments. Neither employment opportunities were created in the unorganised sector, nor people prepared for self employment. This is due to lack of a policy and wrong orientation of the education system. The education system needs a scientific and technological orientation and facilities for vocational training needs to be established.

Our development strategy should recognize unique features of the area and not be a replica of what is followed in other areas. Geographical isolation and constraints of hill area economies with local complexion of each area needs to be recognized, the region's continued dependence on rest of the country needs to be catered for. Due to terrain the cost of infrastructure development may be high but it can be offset by simultaneous development of vast hydel power resource, forest and other natural resources. Potential for clean industries based on power is high, while the technology may be primitive

but manpower is literate and profficient, therefore, upgradation of the technological base will not only be easy and cost effective but will be productive. The seven States of the region need to develop a system of mutual support for each other's requirements and act as sub systems for regional requirements. We should also be concious of the fact that the process of economic liberalisation and induction of free market economy will adversely effect North East as flow of private investment depends on level and quality of administration, social and economic infrastructure. In addition, in some of the areas private investment is reluctant to venture due to disturbed security environment. Therefore, certain safeguards and considerations for these special category States will have to continue. Within the above parameters a strategy to meet the challenges of economic development of the region needs to be worked out.

Our approach to economic development should be on two planes. First, at the macro level, on development of the core sectors of communication, power, human resource and education and at micro level emphasis should be on small scale industries, processing industries in agro and horticulture sector and fisheries; and improvement in civic facilities like water, sanitation community development and health, duly supported by an efficient public distribution system. Due to physical constraints of the area, PDS unless managed well has proved the main cause of corruption and deprivation. Weaving is the mainstay in the cottage industries sector, where every household is equipped with a loom but yarn availability is limited. Spinning mills, run properly, have great potential. Employment generation should form a part and parcel of economic development strategy and it should be an area of major thrust.

Trading is an important part of economic activity. This is in the hands of Marwaris and Baniyas particularly in the hill states, who are acting in collusion with the politicians. With trade with Myanmar opening up, it has vast potential economically as well as for employment. This will entail export of finished goods preferably of local origin, embargo on export of raw material and greater participation of locals in trading. A beginning was made in Manipur in 1994 to train educated Manipuri youth in trading, management and creation of communication and secretarial infrastructure for the same. I am convinced that unless benefits of value addition come to the people of the area, it will create yet another area for exploitation.

Keeping the above parameters in view, a special package for economic development in Manipur, spread over the next seven years at a cost of Rs. 1600 crores, with employment generation potential of 251 lakh man-days was submitted to the Government of India in July 1994. This contained a special allocation of Rs 51 crores for schemes for self employment.

APPROACH TO INSURGENCY

Tackling of insurgency requires a holistic approach, with all sinews of the Government playing their part. It involves removing the people's grievances in the political and socio-economic fields. The examination of insurgency situation at the military level only will lead to wrong conclusions. Having covered some of the other aspects, I would now touch upon some of the major military aspects of tackling insurgency.

I regret to say that inspite of our years of experience in the North East and having been associated with the changing complexion of the problems at each stage in the past so many decades, we seem to make a fresh start with each explosive situation in the same area or similar situation in different areas of the North East, rather than building up on the past. I attribute it primarily to the lack of a high sense of involvement and certain amount of disorientation. More time and energy is spent on questing the situation and legitimisation of actions than in handling the situation. These attitudes have permeated down and blunted our capability. I have discussed these at length and corrective action has been taken in the last year or so. Now I will like to touch upon some of the key result areas and what should be our orientation to these.

SECURITY AND EFFECTIVENESS

Security and effectiveness are key result areas for the administration and security forces. Security embraces all aspects of public life and it should be understood and implemented in all its connotations of physical, economic, social, ethnic and religious security. Similarly effectiveness not only means physical effectiveness, in addition it encompasses positive contribution by the Government and all its instruments to the economic, religious, cultural and social well being of the people. The guiding principal in securing the environment is that you cannot be secure unless you are effective. In any disturbed environment physical security and effectiveness are the foundations on which action in other fields are built up, it cannot be otherwise.

Securing the environment is the whole canvas in which anti insurgent operations are only a part. By carrying out anti insurgent operations, you are only fulfilling a part of the overall task of securing the environment. Foundations of securing the environment and all military operations are laid by controlling the area.

CONTROL OF THE AREA

Control of the area of responsibility of one's command is the key to

success in counter insurgency environment. Without control neither can you gather intelligence, nor can anti insurgent operations by Security Forces and counter measures by Administration be successful. The word control should not be understood in its restricted or defensive sense; it really means total domination of the area, where by security forces and administration provide protection to the population, are aware of all happenings and can predict and forestall or influence events in every field of activity. The essence of control can be summed up as, "Nothing can happen in the area without our knowledge and without we being aware of it in time to counter and influence it". This largely contributes to the physical isolation of the insurgents and creating a secure environment.

There are other areas of interest like intelligence, civic actions, public relations, human rights, psychological operations, which due to paucity of time, it is not possible to cover.

CONCLUSION

In the North East a crisis of credibility is fast emerging and the people's alienation is turning into a sentiment of negative responses to the Government and its instruments. The primary reason for this state of affairs is political expediency over riding all other considerations resulting in instability and bad Governance, the major manifestation of which are denial of resources to the people, exploitation of ethnic and local sentiment by the local leaders for parochial and selfish purposes and impetus to insurgency.

The North East requires an integrated and holistic approach in keeping with its regional requirements and peculiar problems of each of its constituent State to meet their requirements in the socio-economic, cultural and security fields.

The status of contemporary insurgency, its spreading manifestations both area and collusion wise, needs to be understood and countered effectively by securing the environment on long term basis. Political will has to be displayed by our leadership to safeguard the interest of the people of the area and national interest, an essential part of which is not only to deactivate but completely incise the anti national and anti people element in the body politic of the North Eastern States and its elite echelons. Without it neither the national interest can be safeguarded nor peoples alienation removed.

India's Defence Expenditure - A Holistic Approach

VICE ADMIRAL SUBIMAL MOOKERJEE, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

The first duty of a sovereign is defence

— Adam Smith

Continuing decline in our defence expenditure during the past six years has generated considerable concern in our service headquarters, as well as amongst strategic analysts and legislators. At a press conference on the eve of Navy Day, 1994, our naval chief took the unusual step of going public and warned the Government that, unless additional resources were made available on an urgent basis, naval preparedness will, by the end of the century, fall well below the level required to defend our security against sea-borne threats. Similar alarm bells have been rung by the other two service chiefs over the ongoing neglect of needs of modernisation, training, and attracting suitable manpower. In a seminar earlier this year, defence analysts and economists, including L.C. Jain, warned against the price the nation may have to pay for continuing decline, in real terms, in defence expenditure. In a hard-hitting article in a national daily in January 1995, Shri Jaswant Singh, Deputy Leader of the opposition in Lok Sabha, went to the extent of stating that "if there was just one single wrong that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao had committed in these four years of Prime Ministership, it is the slackening in defence preparedness". Further, in its report submitted to the Parliament, the Standing Committee on Defence, 1995, expressed serious concern at the progressive fall in defence expenditure during the last six years, and urged the Ministry of Defence to take up the matter at the "highest level" in the Ministry of Finance.

Judging by the defence grants for the fiscal year 1995-1996 which continues on the path of declining expenditure, it is clear that the Government remains unconvinced that a change in policy is warranted. The powerful lobby, mainly external, seems to have succeeded in depressing our defence expenditure. Familiar arguments are that our defence expenditure in recent decades has been high. The post-Cold War "peace dividend" has permitted significant decline in defence expenditure globally. Ascendancy of geo-economics has

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
Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXV, No. 522, October-December, 1995.

devalued the importance of geo-strategy and geo-politics. Further, it is argued that defence expenditure has an adverse impact on the economy, and stifles economic growth which is at the top of our agenda for national security. Essential needs of military security could be met if service headquarters prioritised these requirements, became cost-effective in determining these requirements and maintained a proper inter-sectoral balance in their expenditure. The above arguments should not be dismissed out of hand. This article addresses these issues and suggests a holistic approach to our defence expenditure.

Both empirical and statistical criteria have been used in assessing adequacy or otherwise of defence expenditure. A cardinal test of defence preparedness is that it deters aggression, and in case of failure of deterrence, wins wars. Within two decades of our independence, we have had to fight four wars. Obviously, our defence preparedness failed the first test of deterrence. Our weak defence posture not only attracted Chinese aggression but also from a country vastly smaller in size, material and human resources. In spite of its humiliating defeat in 1971, the same country, with covert external support, has been waging proxy wars in North-West and North-East India.

Statistically, the international practice is to measure defence expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This approach has its obvious flaws. Globally, size of GDP vary widely, hence any comparison based on a percentage basis would be misleading. In 1994, Japan spent \$ 42 billion on defence amounting to only 1.08 per cent of the GDP. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, another medium military power with security alliance, spent a reduced amount of \$ 34 billion which, however, amounted to as much as 5.2 per cent of the GDP. Likewise, geo-strategic and security environments vary qualitatively requiring widely varying defence preparedness and hence expenditure. Nonetheless, the "GDP" related formula is not without its usefulness.

Viewed thus, our defence expenditure, at current prices, averaged 2 per cent in the fifties, 3.5 per cent in 71-72, less than 3 per cent in 80-81, 4.1 per cent in 87-88 and 2.4 per cent in 95-96. July 15, 1995 issue of the *Economist* tabulates region-wise military spending in 1983 and 1993. This is reproduced below to bring out the fact, that except for Latin America - an area of tranquillity - India's defence spending is considerably lower than elsewhere in the world:



Source : United Nations

Apart from the low level of defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the annual growth rate, at 70-71 prices, was as low as 0.02 per cent, went up to 12.1 per cent during the period 80-81 to 86-87 but since then it dropped to 2.4 per cent and since 1989-90, the growth rate has been zero or negative. At the Spring Meeting in May 1991, when Indian economy was near bankrupt, World Bank and IMF, whilst emphasizing that "defence expenditure was a legitimate public expenditure as national defence was the primary responsibility of any Government", recommended capping of this expenditure at 20 per cent of Government expenditure. As percentage of our central budget, defence expenditure which was 29 per cent in the seventies, dropped to 17 per cent in 1989-90 and stands at 14.8 per cent in 1995-96. By Bretton Wood twins criteria of 20 per cent, our defence budget could be increased to Rs 33,340 crores as compared to the allocation of Rs 25,000 crores!

Going further along the path of statistics, it should be noted that since defence expenditure in India is being borne entirely by the Central Government, for a correct appreciation of its impact on the Indian economy as a whole, we should take into account the total expenditure being incurred by the Centre, the

States and Union Territories, Viewed thus, our defence expenditure, as percentage of total expenditure, was 10.9 per cent in 87-88 and now stands at around 7 per cent.

The ascendancy of geo-economics in post Cold War era should not be overstated. Admittedly, the prospect of global wars in short and middle terms, has virtually disappeared. But, regional tensions - fuelled by ethnic conflicts, export of militant fundamentalism and assertive nationalism - has increased the potential for destabilisation. In a sensitive environment of this nature, coercive diplomacy by Big Powers add to the spectre of destabilisation. Thus, geo-strategy, geo-politics and appropriate military power remain relevant. Defence cuts in West European and North American countries should be viewed in the proper perspective. Dissolution of the USSR and Warsaw Pact have conclusively removed threats to western security. Nonetheless, after decades of high military spending on new technology, these countries retain a significant qualitative edge over newly emerging powers such as China, India, Iran and Indonesia. They retain the capability to pressurise Third World countries and intervene militarily if required. Hence, "defence cuts" - in reality a reduction in massive military spending - due to so-called "peace dividend" should not automatically be accepted globally. Each nation has its special security concerns. This is reflected most visibly in defence policies of countries in East Asia. Rising trend in defence expenditure continues, and in 1994, the region accounted for as much as 15 per cent of global defence spending - the highest regional proportion after NATO.

Continuing increase in defence expenditure in East Asian region has not had any adverse impact on the economic growth of these countries. In fact, economic growth has not only been impressive but spectacular. In spite of military spending being around 5 per cent of GDP, the annual rate of economic growth of China, Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have been of the order of 8 per cent; income per capita has increased annually. Both, South Korea and France are perhaps two best examples of high defence spending along with rapid economic growth. France, whose defence spending in post World War II years has been similar to that of the United Kingdom, achieved what has been hailed as an "economic miracle" during the same period compared to British economy. Similarly, South Korea spent heavily on defence in the seventies and eighties and yet achieved spectacular economic growth during the same period. All this was achieved by maintaining the level of investment, high productivity and quality. In a mid-survey of Indian economy in September 1990, the World Bank did not consider that "defence expenditure, per se, was a constraint on India's development". The braking mechanism in our economy, identified by the World Bank, was our "poor productivity, poor quality, subsidies and pricing policy". Resources freed by cuts in our defence expenditure have

not been put into education, health or social welfare but diverted to loan bazaars, increased subsidies, procurement prices and cost leakage. In mid-1995, a World Bank study has placed India only below China in the merit list for corruption in Asia. Many econometric studies to establish causal relationship between military spending and macro-economic indicators have been carried out. But none has established proven relationship with growth rate, inflation or unemployment.

But, higher military spending does not in itself ensure national security nor does it eliminate the need for spending it wisely. Manpower has proliferated in all three services pushing expenditure on pay, allowances and personnel related costs to the forefront of other sectoral expenditure. A consensus on teeth to tail ratio cannot be deferred any further. Similarly, considering the high cost of uniformed manpower, civilianisation of billets which do not require military skill, should be progressively implemented. Further, we should seriously consider privatisation, if preferred, on a contract basis, of grossly overmanned logistic units. Similarly in acquiring hardware, the quest for across-the-board capabilities should yield to cost-effective forces, appropriate to threat.

Since independence, our Government has taken an accountant's approach to military security. Defence policy and expenditure have been ad hoc resulting in knee-jerk reactions to threats in the terminal stage. To boost confidence, brave claims about our defence capabilities have been routinely stated in Parliament. There is no White Paper on Defence which would identify our vital national interests, geo-strategic and geo-political threat environment, an optimum defence strategy and commitment of resources in support. However, in his reply to the debate on Defence Grants in May 1995, our Prime Minister, with characteristic brevity, defined our defence goal as "effective contribution to regional stability and preventing destabilisation of our neighbours". It is essential that we are clear in our mind what "region" and "neighbours" are of interest to our national security, but which are under threat - actual and potential - the profile of threats and the defence strategy we need to deter these threats and as importantly, make our friendship and cooperation attractive.

India's geography is of great strategic significance. Our central location gives easy access to the nodal points in the Indian Ocean which link the world's two largest and busiest oceans, the Pacific and the Atlantic. It also needs to be recognised that the seas have a unique strategic quality in that they make coastal states - near and not so near - our neighbours. The high seas, thus, provide a wide avenue for the strong to threaten the weak as well as opportunity to coastal states, with appropriate power, to make their friendship attractive to "neighbours" threatened with destabilisation.

Our geography, location and surrounding seas invest India with a role and responsibility not only in the Indian Ocean but also in Asia-Pacific. In his book (1993) *Asia Pacific: Its Role in New World Disorder*, Dibbs Higginson, an Australian strategic analyst has defined Asia-Pacific as a region from India down to New Zealand, including China, Japan and Russia. Mr. Higginson has correctly asserted that strategically and economically, India will turn more to the east and become a power in the Asia-Pacific region. China which prefers to take a long-term view of history and strategy, seems to be of a similar view. China's entry into Bay of Bengal through Myanmar (Burma) whose coastal port facilities are being upgraded by China has implications for security both in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region.

In the New World Disorder, following the end of the Cold War, the USA, with big presence in the India Ocean, has become the sole military superpower. Islamic fundamentalism poses a very grave threat to countries with Muslim minority. The dragon economies, including China, in Asia-Pacific, are systematically building up power that can be applied at sea. China's increasingly assertive nationalism is likely to deepen in post-Deng era. With the contracted acquisition of additional Atlantique New Generation long range multi-purpose aircraft along with modern Agosta 90 B submarines and subsequent licensed series production, would make Pakistan a naval power to reckon with in the Indian Ocean.

In the context of our defence goals, articulated by our Prime Minister, of great concern is the World's sole military superpower's growing unilateralism and policy of interventionism in regional disputes. Two high-power documents viz "Forward... from the Sea" jointly prepared by U.S. Secretary of Navy, Chiefs of the Navy and Marine Corps, and "Bottom-up Review" by the Pentagon elaborate the policy of projection of power at short notice over great distances to exercise deterrence, coercion and finally intervention in two major regional conflicts simultaneously. Of equal concern is USA's declared policy of "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran and interest in an independent Kashmir in a possible scenario of a policy of containment of China. On both counts, Pakistan assumes a special status in USA's strategic calculations. In addition, China's supply of cruise missiles to Pakistan increase our security concerns.

Whilst we must continue our policy of improving and deepening our relations with both the USA and China as also with other countries in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region, it would be a dangerous policy not to build up our defence capabilities. Without in any manner down grading the seriousness of threats on our land borders, our military strategy, to be credible needs to be more balanced and wide-based than it has been in the past. We must take serious note of proliferation of missiles - cruise and ballistic - and

modern submarines in the areas of our interest. Due emphasis should be given to build up our offensive-defensive capabilities in both missiles and submarines. Priorities need to be re-ordered and required funding made available for the navy and for research and development of offensive and defensive missiles. So far as our navy is concerned it needs to be re-engineered around submarines and shore-based long range multi-purpose aircraft in support. Most cost-effective ways to stymie coercive or interventionist actions are missiles and submarines.

In conclusion, the end of the Cold War has led to a New World Disorder, the major scene of which is Asia, to which the centre of gravity of geo-economics and geo-politics has shifted from Europe. Europe faces no threat except of loss of power and influence. India's geography, location, demography and natural resources, have carved for her major role in both Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific regions. India has also much to worry about the security and stability in the regions threatened by the policy, behaviour and defence build-up in the regions both by littoral and extra-regional powers. To meet the defence goal pronounced by our Prime Minister in the Parliament in May 1995, we should not merely increase our defence preparedness but more importantly, re-engineer our defence policy. It should be more balanced and wide-based than in the past. Major emphasis needs to be laid on submarine-centred naval capability and missiles - cruise and ballistic - for defence and offence. Investment in these two sectors should be stepped up.

This will require additional outlay on defence, which by any criteria, has been low to very low since independence. Peace-dividend theory is a ploy by Western countries to retain their superiority in military power over the newly emerging industrial and economic powers in Asia. Defence cuts by the Western powers are cosmetic as they will still continue to enjoy their significant qualitative superiority in military power over Asian countries. Econometric studies prove that there is no adversarial relationship between defence and development. On the contrary, history is replete with instances when increased defence expenditure has co-existed with impressive economic growth. But money must be spent wisely by reducing significantly manpower and related costs. At macro-level, we should invest in re-structuring our forcemix by abandoning our archaic strategy in favour of one that will increase the pain threshold which Big Powers are not likely to ignore in view of their sensitivity towards casualties. Missile and submarine power will ensure that. As Norman Friedman put it in an article in the *Wall Street Journal* in August 1994, "to stymie a Superpower, get a sub".

Human Rights and the Armed Forces in Low Intensity Conflict Operations (LICO)

CAPTAIN D J S CHAHAL

INTRODUCTION

Human Rights may be defined as certain basic, inalienable and fundamental rights and freedoms that every citizen enjoys irrespective of the country he belongs to.

In India on September 28, 1993, the President of India promulgated Human Rights Ordinance 1993 which deals directly with Human Rights Violations in our country. India is also a signatory to international convention adopted by UN General Assembly on December 16, 1966.

The object of National Human Rights Commission at the National level and State Human Rights Commission at State levels is to protect life, liberty and dignity of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution of India. The aim of such commissions is to establish statutory organs throughout the country for detection of Human Rights Violations, protection and their enforcement.

Broadly the concept of 'Human Rights' would include the following :-

- (a) Equality and justice for all.
- (b) The right to a fair and just trial, no one to be held without a charge or a trial.
- (c) After arrest, the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours. The agency holding the arrested persons not to torture or ill treat them during detention.
- (d) Protection against inhuman behaviour and sexual offences.
- (e) Freedom from unlawful and arbitrary coercion.
- (f) Respect for the protection of human dignity of an individual irrespective of caste, creed and religion.

Edited text of the Essay which won the Second Prize in Group B of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1994.

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AIM

The aim of this paper is to discuss the concepts, organizational frame work and measures that could be taken by the armed forces to avoid violation of human rights in low intensity conflict operations (LICO).

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS (LICO)

These operations in their various forms are an ongoing reality in our contemporary internal security environment. The activities like subversion, militancy, terrorism and revolt are a result of some of the conflicting situations particularly those engineered and abetted by the adversaries. These have led to increased involvement of the security forces to bring situation under control.

The main dynamics of LIC are change, discontent, violence and instability. The unchecked population explosion, mass unemployment, increasing industrialization, urbanization and modernization of traditional societies have generated social, economic and political disparities leading to erosion of values, ethics, heightened aspirations and corruption. The degree of violence varies according to the intensity of perceived injustice and discrimination. If neglected or mishandled in the early stage it erupts into an insurgency like state leading to eventual deployment of Armed Forces.

DEFINITION OF LIC

The term 'LIC' has been used to connote a variety of derivatives based on different perceptions and experiences. One view holds that LIC by itself indicates a type of conflict where the quantum of applied violence is restricted. This may be due to political restrictions imposed to prevent unwarranted casualties on the general population or other physical restrictions preventing deployment of heavier weapons including the use of air power. Another view is that it is everything short of an 'all out war'. Some feel that LIC is merely an environment where a host of activities, violent as well as those potentially violent (narcotics trade, smuggling etc) take place.

An all encompassing definition of the term may be that - "It is a politico military confrontation between the established authority (state) and organization of people with or without external assistance, beyond the scope of legitimate routine peaceful agitation. It is waged by a number of means employing political, religious, economic, social, cultural, psychological, informational and military instruments. Being on the low end of the conflict spectrum, it imposes an undefined restraint on the execution of military operations."

The LIC Operations put a lot of constraints on the general environment of a place which is characterised by the following :-

- (a) *Public.* There is a sense of insecurity among the general public. People tend to silently obey the militants or migrate to safer places. They are reluctant to cooperate with forces engaged in combating the situation.
- (b) *Militants.* There is an overpowering cult of the gun and defiance of authority. They acquire sophisticated and lethal weapons by establishing nexus with powers inimical to the state. They have neither the motivation nor anything to gain by peaceful negotiations, unless government outrightly succumbs to their demands.
- (c) *Bureaucracy, Politicians and Judiciary.* These come under tremendous pressure because of constant threat of retribution.
- (d) *Police/Para Military Forces.* Militants endeavour to induce fear in them through intimidation, lynching and other forms of retribution. This, if coupled with inadequate equipment and training, has adverse effects on morale and efficiency of these forces. As a result their credibility gets eroded and they fail to induce any confidence amongst the people.
- (e) *Media.* The official media and some of the national dailies are viewed as the mouth piece of the government and its credibility with the masses is usually low. Reporters have scant knowledge of the LICO and tend to sensationalize events.
- (f) *Civil Administration.* The general conditions prevailing amount to the civil administration being ineffective and the authority of the Government gets eroded and writ of the militants run supreme.
- (g) *Law of the Land.* The law of one state is not applicable in the other states. This facilitates militants to shift their bases and operate from areas where they can escape the law. Once certain special laws are enacted, these are portrayed as draconian in a democratic society, thereby providing sufficient cause for propaganda and also drawing attention of the Human Rights Organizations. Militants also thrive on various lacunae in the legal system.
- (h) *Neighbouring States.* Inimical neighbours exploit the unstable situation to the full extent and resort to waging a proxy war.
- (j) *The Nexus.* Militants tends to establish a nexus with identical anti government movements. Even some religious fundamentalists extend their direct support.
- (k) *State and Central Agencies.* There is a plethora of state and central agencies operating in such an environment. They usually lack unity of purpose and operate at cross purposes.

Impact of Environmental Realities on LICO. All these environmental realities discussed have an impact on the operations carried out by the Army.

- (a) The Army invariably gets into the act when things have gone out of hand for Police/Para Military Forces to handle, thereby making the task much more difficult.
- (b) LICO invariably tend to become long drawn and the Army gets involved over protracted periods to effectively neutralize the militancy potential. The resources required are also invariably out of proportion.
- (c) The Army has to virtually operate in an intelligence vacuum. Militants manage to infiltrate various civil and police organizations compromising the security. Barriers of language pose additional problems.
- (d) There is often an absence of a clear cut political directive, making it difficult for the Army to understand its charter & evolve its aims, objectives and plans in a long term perspective.
- (e) There is inadequate cooperation from the local public, bureaucracy and the politicians.
- (f) Media gets exploited by the militants to discredit the Army, thereby imposing great caution on operations by the Army.
- (g) There is a lack of integration between various agencies, thus making problems of coordination acute.
- (h) Where the militants enjoy public support, willing or forced, it is difficult to sift and isolate the militants from the public.
- (j) Law of the land often provides great immunity to the militants and imposes numerous constraints on conduct of military operations.
- (k) Where the inimical neighbour provides active support to the militants, a great deal of effort is diverted to check infiltration of such support.

Concepts of Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. The concept of operations will vary with the nature of LIC, its perpetrators, the intensity and the area of operations. The militants and the security forces being part of the same fabric of society, the concept of operation cannot be based on 'victory' or 'defeat'. However, keeping in mind the operating constraints of the Army, the concept of operations can be generalized as follows :

- (a) *Intelligence.* There should be an effective intelligence infrastructure to obtain a complete intelligence picture about the likely area of operation.

This information should be continuously updated. The past experiences show that intelligence has been the weakest spot of the security forces. The elusive, conspiratory and underground character of militants coupled with their guerrilla like modus operandi make the acquisition of intelligence difficult. Lack of coordination between various intelligence agencies, problems of operating in-cognito, threat of ruthless reprisals by militants and financial penury militate against the effectiveness of the intelligence system.

The intelligence objectives include the political and armed infrastructure of the militants, their ideology, domestic and foreign support and the civil population.

INFORMATION REQUIRED

(a) *Background information :-*

- (i) History, customs, traditions, political leaning and attitudes of local population.
- (ii) Militant organizations, their ideological bias, leadership and the hierarchy, forms of manifestations of protest, public support for the cause, nexus with other militant organizations and foreign support.
- (iii) The Government stand, state of civil administration and socio economic status of the area.
- (iv) Terrain and its effect.

(b) *Constant Information*

- (i) Recruitment methodology, the area and social strata from where the recruitment is made.
- (ii) Financial support system including foreign support, method of raising funds and the expenditure.
- (iii) Sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and explosives, method of collecting, carriage and distribution.
- (iv) Political, ideological and professional supporters like doctors, lawyers, publishers etc.
- (v) International connections.

- (vi) Training doctrines, camps, modus operandi including infiltration/exfiltration from neighbouring country and strengths/vulnerabilities.
 - (vii) Logistical infrastructure including bases, caches, ware houses, medical cover and welfare.
 - (viii) Intelligence infrastructure, including infiltrators, in Government organizations and security forces.
 - (ix) Hard core militants/leaders, use of pseudonyms aliases, disguises and details of their movement, etc.
 - (x) Network of sympathisers, harbourers, informers and supporters.
 - (xi) Inter group rivalries and clashes.
 - (xii) Organization for hostile propaganda.
 - (xiii) Their communication system.
- (c) *Sources for Collecting Information.* Various sources of information would include the following :
- (i) Static formations, headquarters and organizations like Zonal/Branch Recruiting Offices, NCC Units/Headquarters and Movement Control Organization, who come in contact with a wide cross-section of local population.
 - (ii) Intelligence units/sub units/detachments including Intelligence Security Groups, Liaison Units, Intelligence and Field Security Units/Sub Units.
 - (iii) Intelligence agencies of Police, State and Central Government including IB, SB, SIB, CID etc.
 - (iv) Units/formations deployed and in contact with the population.
 - (v) Interrogation of surrendered/apprehended militants by well trained interrogators.
 - (vi) Cultivation of informers through monetary remuneration, inducement of fear, blackmail etc.
 - (vii) Contacts through fraternisation by activities like participation in adventure sports, religious functions and festivals, opening dispensaries, canteen counters and fair price shops, showing films, interaction with schools and assistance in development projects.

- (viii) Infiltration into militant organisation.
- (ix) Radio intercepts.
- (x) Ex-servicemen, immigrants/floating population, journalists and investigative reporters.

(d) *Preparation and Training.* The units and formations must be specifically tasked and given adequate notice for detailed preparation and to carry out basic essential reorientation training. They must be psychologically, physically and materially well prepared before they are inducted to undertake LICO and temptation to launch troops in a hurry must be curbed. The units must be progressively warned for the impending tasks. They should in turn attend to the following aspects :-

- (i) Mobilisation schemes for such contingencies should be prepared and rehearsed, in addition to the conventional role.
- (ii) Obtain background information from concerned Headquarters/agencies and disseminate the same in detail to all ranks.
- (iii) Collection, preparation and issue of updated maps and air photos.
- (iv) Carry out reconnaissance and area familiarisation, if feasible.
- (v) Carry out reorientation capsule including psychological preparation of troops for the impending task.
- (vi) Streamline and update procedures for operating in conjunction with Police and Officials of Civil administration.
- (vii) Collection/preparation of special arms and equipment, where required.

Preparation. Army is normally deployed as a last resort to control LIC. Thus the deployment is usually at a very short notice. Therefore, Army should all the time be prepared for such contingencies. The preparations can be divided into two phases ie. Ongoing Preparations and Preparations on Warning.

- (a) *Ongoing Preparations.* There is a need to keep abreast with the goings on in various states where LIC situations are gathering momentum and carry out forward planning for possible employment. Military assessment of the situation must be disseminated to the units through conduct of seminars and issue of written literature.
- (b) *On Warning.* Once a warning order for an impending LIC task has been issued, the following preparations would be pertinent :

- (i) Intensify collection of intelligence of militants and disseminate through briefing, intelligence reports and issue of maps.
- (ii) Reconnaissance of areas of operations.
- (iii) Liaisons with civil administration, Police and Para Military Forces deployed in the area.
- (iv) Preparation for mobilisation including issues of special equipment, where required.
- (v) Psychological Preparation of own troops for the impending task.
- (vi) Preparation for establishment of joint operation and liaison cells.

Training. Army is well trained for conventional war and as such possesses the various military skills to successfully operate in LIC environment. However, these operations being on the lower end of the spectrum of violence and being essentially directed against own misguided country men, require certain amount of reorientation of training. Keeping this in mind the training of the troops can be divided into :

- (a) *Continual Training.* Since the commitments in the LIC situations are going to remain a reality for the foreseeable future, the training for it must remain an ongoing process. A capsule on this training must form part of each individual training cycle. Periodic seminars and discussions on the subject should be organised at formation and unit level.
- (b) *Pre-Induction Training.* Once the unit has been warned to mobilise for LIC, a well chalked out capsule should be conducted to hone up the skills and to relate the training to specifics of task at hand.
- (c) *Training on Induction.* Once the units are inducted into the sector of operations, situation specific and role related training should be organised. The new inductees to the units should be grouped with the veterans to acquire practical skills.

Conduct of Tactical Operations. The methodology of conduct of operations will take into consideration the topography, strengths/weaknesses and modus operandi of the militants and the degree of domination by the Police/Para Military Forces over the militants. The approach in combating the militants must be innovative and unconventional and must ensure that innocent population is not unduly inconvenienced. Building up of confidence and establishment of morale ascendancy over the opponents should be the cornerstone of tactical operations. These operations should be conducted with a view to :

- (a) Dominate the area by deployment on an area grid system. This would deny the militants room for manoeuvre and to operate at liberty and would restore the confidence of the population.
- (b) Intercept and isolate the militants sealing the international border, where applicable.
- (c) Provide protection to VAs/VPs/VIPs/convoys and lines of communication.
- (d) Seek and destroy militants, particularly the leaders and their wherewithal by search and destroy/cordon and search operations. Since the militants keep moving frequently, these are often tiring and protracted operations.
- (e) Hot pursuit of the militants after strike.

Employment of Other Arms/Services. The other arms should be employed, by suitable organisational reorientation, in infantry role in order to supplement the Infantry effort. This role sharing would help to reduce the overall burden of such commitments on infantry units. The other arms to be employed would include :

- (a) *Mechanised Forces.* The very presence of armour and infantry Combat Vehicles act as a force multiplier and induce a certain degree of fear amongst the militants.
- (b) *Artillery.* The employment of artillery in LIC is best avoided because of its characteristically excessive power of destruction and limitations to fire on pin point targets. This results in collateral damage, which may alienate the populace and prove counter productive. However, in exceptional case, artillery may be employed in direct firing role and to harass/chase the militants.
- (c) *Engineers.* These have a very important role to play in LICO because of expertise in use of explosives and improvised explosive means rather imaginatively employed by the militants. Some of the main tasks for the Engineers are the construction of helipads, sanitising a given area of explosives/booby traps, construction/neutralisation of obstacles and opening of axis.
- (d) *Signals.* They provide and sustain the communication network. They can also effectively intercept the radio communications of the militants.
- (e) *Special Forces.* Special Forces/Para Commando teams may be, at times, deployed to surgically carry out a specific mission of importance

and requiring specialisation. At times divers may be required to retrieve weapons, ammunition, etc, submerged under water by the militants.

(f) *Air.* Helicopters have a variety of useful roles to play, in lending enhanced fire power, speed, mobility and flexibility to the ground forces.

Psychological Operations. Concurrent to military operations, another effective instrument to combat LIC is the psychological operations. The aim of these operations is to affect favourable changes in the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of the target audience. The activities may include propaganda, selective application/threat of use of force, economic development, civic actions and various other humanitarian activities. The psychological operations must address the problems at the following three planes :-

- (a) Lowering the morale of the militants and their sympathisers by sustained psychological operations by exposing their weaknesses, partisan motives, fallacies, misdeeds and nefarious activities as also by inducing surrenders and desertions.
- (b) Strengthening and sustaining the morale of the public by restoring their confidence in civil administration and security forces.
- (c) Fortification of the minds of troops so that their vulnerabilities and sensitivities are not exploited by the undesirable elements and their confidence in themselves as well as the organization is not diluted.

Civil Actions. Concurrent to the conduct of military operations it is equally important to win over the hearts and minds of the people by civic actions. Military operations do not offer any permanent solution to LICs. These can only create conditions that are conducive to implementation of political and socio-economic development processes.

The civic action programmes must aim at establishing a close rapport with the public, foster friendship and mutual confidence, express genuine desire for the betterment of the society and project the image of security forces in the correct perspective. These actions can be planned within the following parameters :

- (a) The civil actions undertaken by the Army must be in conformity with the overall effort of the other Government agencies. The actions must be feasible and fully justifiable.
- (b) The actions undertaken must be need based to induce satisfaction levels in the public and should be commensurate with the general social/ economic status and levels of prosperity of the people.

(c) The ventures undertaken should conform to the availability of resources.

(d) Civic actions which are executed on the basis of natural impulse produce the best results.

Although the availability of resources is limited, nevertheless, Army can undertake various activities. These may include :

(a) Provision of immediate relief to victims/displaced people by way of food distribution and medical aid.

(b) Assistance in selective reconstruction activities to restore normal life. These may include restoration of civic amenities, water, electricity, medical aid etc.

(c) Assistance in small scale development programmes like repair/construction of playing fields, schools, libraries, bridges, roads, shelters for bus stops, water tanks, etc.

(d) Holding medical rallies including eye operation camps.

(e) Distribution of essential commodities through fair price outlets and extension of canteen facilities.

(f) Educational programmes particularly for the adults.

(g) Assistance in repair and recovery of vehicles in emergency situations.

Public Relations. It should be ensured that the media projects the role played by the Security Forces in LICO in the correct perspective. As the media persons are in a hurry to get the news, it is imperative that the Army's authentic version of events is promptly given to them rather than their depending on half truths and concocted versions given by the militants. A good and effective PR machinery should aim at achieving three fold objectives :-

(a) *Safe guarding the Image of Security Forces.* This entails forestalling the militant propaganda by feeding factual information to counter militants claims, issue of rebuttals and by diversionary counter propaganda.

(b) *Projecting the Image of Security Forces.* This is done by building up public opinion in favour of security forces by highlighting inescapability of military operations, demonstrating successful performance like capture of militants, their weapons and ammunition and by exhibiting the civic actions being taken by them.

- (c) *Exposing the militants.* By showing proof of their nefarious activities, through confessions, surrenders and narrations.

The common guidelines which should be borne in mind for dealing with the media can be as follows :-

- (a) Be fair, accurate, firm, alert and credible while giving an account of a particular event, leaving no room for speculation.
- (b) Resort to pro-active reporting and where necessary be prompt in issuing rebuttals with proof if possible.
- (c) In the transparency of media, all ranks must be upright in their behaviour with the press as well as the public.
- (d) Best suited spokesmen must invariably be used in giving official statements.
- (e) Be impartial to all the media persons.

Measures. Army is generally called out in LICO, when the situation has deteriorated beyond the control of the police and other Para Military Forces. As a result the situation may require some violent means by the Army. But the Armed forces are duty bound to ensure that human rights are not violated and excesses are not committed during the maintenance of law and order. The principle of 'minimum force', laid down for such situations should always be kept in mind. To avoid Human Rights Violations in such situations the Army must ensure :

- (a) Minimum force must be used in such operation to avoid civilian casualties.
- (b) Fire should be opened with the aim of incapacitating rather than killing. Ring leaders should be identified and targetted, retaliatory action should not be taken. The aim should be to arrest or capture the ring leaders and culprits rather than killing them.
- (c) Only those people should be arrested who have committed cognizable offence or who are about to commit cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable ground exists that they have committed or are about to commit cognizable offence.
- (d) Village and society elders should be incorporated as eye witnesses.
- (e) Immediate medical aid should be given to the injured during the encounter. If any person dies in the encounter his dead body should be handed over to the Police alongwith the details leading to such death.

- (f) In chance encounters, response from the troops should be guarded and directed at identified hostiles or miscreants.
- (g) When arrests are made screening should be done at the earliest and innocent civilians allowed to go away. Adequate warning must be given before using force.
- (h) Even in the event of casualties to own troops retaliation or repression must be avoided at all costs. Troops must be educated suitably and senior officers must rush to the spot in case an adverse situation is likely to develop.
- (j) The troops must be educated against acts of indiscipline against civilians and women and suitable preventive measures taken. In case incidents take place, the guilty must be punished expeditiously and in an exemplary manner.
- (k) Actions to guard against fabricated allegations must be taken by :
 - (i) Ensuring the presence of police representatives.
 - (ii) Employment of women police while searching villages or houses.
 - (iii) Ensuring the presence of village/society elders during such operations.
 - (iv) False allegations or wrong reporting by the media must be guarded against.

These are some of the measures which should be taken by the Army to prevent any Human Rights Violations during the operations. There are certain aspects which should be taken care of after the operation to avoid false allegation later on. Some of these are :-

- (a) After arrest prepare a list of the persons so arrested.
- (b) Handover the arrested persons to the nearest Police station with least possible delay.
- (c) While handing over, a report should accompany with detailed circumstances occasioning the arrest.
- (d) Every delay in handing over the suspects to the Police must be justified. Least possible delay may be 2-3 hrs extendable to 24 hrs or so depending upon a particular case.
- (e) After raid, make out a list of all arms, ammunition or any other incriminating material/document taken into possession.

- (f) All such arms and ammunition should be handed over to the Police station alongwith a seizure memo.
- (g) Obtain receipt of persons and arms/ammunition etc so handed over to the police.

Conclusion. The Low Intensity Conflicts in the future are a reality where the involvement of the security forces will be a predominant phenomenon. Therefore, it is imperative that the security forces acquit themselves effectively and set the stage for the political and socio-economic development process to be launched in order to find lasting solutions to the conflict situation.

LIC operations are distinctly different from the conventional operations. These are directed against our own misguided countrymen or anti - national elements. Although the basic military operations remain the same, suitable reorientation of the troops is essential before they are committed to such operations.

The security forces must guard against the temptation to act outside the law while dealing with terrorists, militants, guerrillas etc, even though the process of law may appear cumbersome. The security forces are required to show utmost regard for the human rights. These must not be lost sight of even in the interest of operational expediency. Minimum use of force, good will and public interest have to be upper most guiding principles for the troops.

The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) of USA

B. RAMAN

The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), which is part of the US Defence Department and functions under the over-all control of the Defence Secretary, came into being in 1961 when Mr. Robert McNamara was the Defence Secretary under President John Kennedy for co-ordinating the working of the Intelligence Directorates of the three Services and of the unified commands and special commands at the field level such as the Pacific Command, the Atlantic Command, the European Command, the Southern Command, the Central Command, the Space Command, the Strategic Air Command and the Transportation Command.

At the time of its inception, the DIA was also made responsible for ensuring, in co-ordination with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other national intelligence agencies, that the military intelligence requirements of the Armed Forces and other wings of the Department of Defence (DOD) were constantly reviewed and updated and adequately met by the national intelligence organisations as well as those of the DOD.

There are over a dozen intelligence organisations in the US Intelligence Community, which are generally divided into two categories — the national intelligence organisations and the departmental intelligence organisations. Apart from the CIA, the other national intelligence organisations are the National Security Agency (NSA), which is responsible for communication intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which organises satellite reconnaissance programmes. The NSA and the NRO are within the DOD for cover, budgetary and staffing purposes, but are not part of the DOD. Director, CIA, in his capacity as the Director, Central Intelligence, supervises and co-ordinates their functioning. They are called national intelligence organisations because they meet the intelligence requirements of all departments of the Government.

Departmental intelligence organisations cater to the intelligence requirements of only their Department. The DIA, like the Intelligence

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Directorates of the three services, is thus a departmental intelligence organisation. Amongst other Departments which similarly have their own intelligence organisations are the Justice Department (the Federal Bureau of Investigation), the State Department (the Bureau of Intelligence and Research) and the Departments of Energy, Commerce and Agriculture and the Treasury. Even the Congress has its own intelligence analysis organisation called the Federal Research Division (FRD) attached to the Library of Congress.

Of the departmental intelligence organisations, only those of the DOD, the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the unit of the Treasury responsible for preventing counterfeiting of US currency are allowed to collect intelligence through open as well as clandestine means, through human agents as well as technical means. Those of other departments like the State Department are allowed to collect only open and diplomatic intelligence. They cannot run clandestine intelligence collection operations.

The functions performed by the departmental intelligence organisations could be broadly divided into the following categories :

- (a) Collection/collation of intelligence of specific interest to their departments through appropriate means as allowed by the Government.
- (b) Analysis and assessment of situations on the basis of intelligence collected/collated by them as also supplied by the CIA and other national intelligence organisations.
- (c) Advising the heads of their departments as to what extent their needs are being met by the national intelligence organisations and taking action to have the deficiencies removed.

Compared to the CIA, the DIA is a much smaller set-up as would be evident from the fact that during fiscal 1992 for which figures are available, the DIA had a total budget of US \$ 582 million only as against US \$ 3.2 billion for the CIA. Published reports in the USA had estimated the total staff strength of the CIA at between 16,000 and 19,000 as against between 7,000 and 8,000 in the DIA. Amongst other major differences between the two are :

- (a) Selection by the President to the post of Director, CIA, is subject to Senate confirmation, but this is not so in the case of Director, DIA.
- (b) The President can nominate anyone, even someone in the private sector, as Director, CIA, but the post of Director, DIA, is tenable only by a serving officer of one of the three services.
- (c) The DIA's charter is confined to intelligence collection and related

security and counter-intelligence functions pertaining to the DOD and it cannot be used by the President for covert actions or para-military operations in foreign countries for which he can use only the CIA under certain conditions.

The decision to constitute the DIA could be traced to misgivings reportedly entertained by President Eisenhower that the reports and estimates originating from the intelligence directorates of the three services regarding Soviet military strength, and particularly in the field of missiles, were not very objective and tended to be "self-serving" in order to justify the case of each service for increased budgetary allocations. His administration, therefore, set up a Joint Study Group headed by Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick which reported that in the absence of a central, co-ordinating agency for the DOD as a whole, the overall direction and co-ordination of the intelligence efforts of the three services was becoming "a very difficult, if not impossible task", with considerable overlapping of functions, duplication of efforts and wastage of funds by three different agencies chasing the same piece of intelligence.

As in the CIA, in the DIA too, the collection and analysis functions are separated, with the collection efforts being co-ordinated by the Directorate of Operations, Plans and Training and the analysis being handled by the Directorate for Foreign Intelligence. The Operations Directorate has separate Divisions dealing with Collection Management, Plans and Policy, Operations and Service Attaches and Training. The Directorate for Foreign Intelligence has separate Divisions to handle Intelligence Estimates, Research, Imagery Exploitation and Scientific and Technical Intelligence. In addition to these operations and analysis Directorates, there is another Directorate responsible for organisational Security and Counter-Intelligence and a Scientific Advisory Committee, both of which work directly under Director, DIA.

With the increasingly key role played by the C⁴I system (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) in the implementation of the National Security Strategy of the USA, there has been a corresponding increase in the functions of the DIA and other intelligence wings of the DOD such as the Intelligence Directorates of the three Services and the unified Commands and Special Commands, the Central Imagery Office, the Defence Investigative Service, the Defence Information Systems Agency, the Information Systems Security, the Defence Mapping Agency, the Information Warfare Wing, the Foreign Counter Intelligence and Security Programme etc.

Of the Intelligence Directorates of the unified Commands, those of the Pacific Command and the Central Command should be of special interest to us because the jurisdiction of the intelligence Directorate of the Pacific Command

covers India, while that of the Central Command covers Pakistan. As in the case of their headquarters in Washington, in the Command Directorates too, the responsibilities for collection and analysis are separated.

The Central Imagery Office meets the imagery requirements of policy-makers in Washington as well as of fighting formations in the field. The Defence Investigative Service is responsible for investigations into the background and life style of all those handling classified information in the DOD, issue of security clearances to contractors, industrialists etc having dealings with the DOD and the implementation of the National Industrial Security Programme which seeks to standardise security measures in all industries, research laboratories etc dealing with defence and other sensitive equipment and technologies.

The Defence Information Systems Agency is responsible for planning, developing and providing information services while the information Systems Security is entrusted with the protection of the information network of the DOD. The functions of the Defence Mapping Agency should be obvious. The Information Warfare Wing supplements the efforts of the Information Systems Security in protecting the information systems of the DOD and, at the same time, develops techniques for penetrating the information networks of the adversaries during peace time for collecting intelligence and for sabotaging and paralysing them during times of war. The Foreign Counter Intelligence and Security Programme maintains internal organisational security and prevents penetration by foreign intelligence agencies. Its staff are attached to all field formations and accompany US troops based or sent on temporary duties abroad.

In his annual report for 1994 submitted to the Congress in February 1995, Mr. William Perry, Defence Secretary, described the over-all aim of the C'I System as "to establish and maintain information superiority in support of the National Security Strategy of the USA. "Amongst the new initiatives taken in the DIA in this regard, he mentioned the following :

- (a) The re-structuring of the collection of military intelligence through human agents by setting up by October 1, 1996 a Defence HUMINT Service which would consolidate the HUMINT elements of the DIA and the Intelligence Directorates of the three Services.
- (b) The setting-up of a Joint Military Intelligence Programme (JMIP) to be supervised by a Defence Intelligence Executive Board chaired by the Deputy Defence Secretary with the Director, CIA, the Directors of the DIA and the Intelligence Directorates of the three Services, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries in charge of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force as members. Its objective is "to

promote the integration of defence intelligence activities by establishing a single programme manager. "It would have four sub-groups dealing with General Intelligence and Applications, Cryptography, Imagery and Mapping, Charting and Geodesy.

(c) A New National Intelligence Needs Process to ensure that the collection efforts of the national and DOD intelligence organisations are effectively oriented towards meeting in the most cost-effective manner the priority requirements of military intelligence consumers.

(d) An Intelligence Review to test the capabilities of the national and DOD intelligence organisations to provide effective intelligence support to the armed forces in case they were involved in two theatres of war simultaneously and identify gaps.

While the DIA and the other intelligence wings of the DOD are barred from launching covert actions and clandestine para-military operations abroad, their staff deputed to the Operations Directorate of the CIA are often used for covert actions of a military nature. Mr Perry's report mentions a threefold rise in the number of DOD personnel deputed to the Counter-Proliferation Centre of the CIA and the creation of a post of Deputy Director, Military Support, in the CIA Centre, apparently for assisting it in covert counter-proliferation operations undertaken abroad, if diplomatic efforts fail.

Effective maintenance of national security in any country and particularly in a country like India, which has been the victim of a proxy war waged by Pakistan for more than a decade now, would depend upon a carefully-formulated and well-articulated National Security Strategy and a constant review of the intelligence support available to our Armed Forces as well as the police and para-military forces in order to identify gaps and take action to remove them. Such a review of the capabilities and performance of civilian and military intelligence agencies is a continuing process in countries like the USA, the UK, France etc. It is more an exception than the rule in India. We have had such reviews or enquiries, that too in a compartmentalised manner, only when we were overtaken by a crisis as after the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Indo-Pak War of 1965 when the Army reportedly complained of poor intelligence in the Lahore sector which led to the bifurcation of the IB and the creation of the R&AW in September, 1968, the Mizo revolt of 1966 and the tragic assassinations of Smt. Indira Gandhi in 1984 and Shri Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. A more systematic review, from time to time, by a high-powered body of the capabilities, performance and deficiencies of our intelligence agencies and of any need for restructuring in the light of changing threat perceptions, the phenomenal progress in science and technology, the use of information technology as a new weapon of penetration and destruction etc is called for.

Nuclear Weapons : A Threat to Human Security or a Sacred Trust? - Part I

MATIN ZUBERI

The atom bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless world....We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force--to prevent its misuse, and to turn it into channels of service to mankind--

Truman's address to the American people, August 9, 1945 Quoted in Joseph I. Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1970) p.124

Global political and security issues are effectively settled by a directorate of the United States, Britain and France, World economic issues by a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan, all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other..... The West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western predominance, protect Western economic interests and promote Western political and economic values.

Samuel P. Huntington, "A Clash of Civilisations?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 39-40.

While the Charter of the United Nations was being drafted at the San Francisco Conference, scientists in the Los Alamos laboratory were engaged in a frantic effort to fabricate the bomb for the first test. Some of them were worried about the impending military use of the bomb and its postwar consequences. At a meeting convened by these agitated scientists, the director of the laboratory Robert Oppenheimer presented an ingenious imaginary scenario. The United Nations was being organised and it was necessary for the destructive potential of the bomb to be demonstrated so that world statesmen would ban its use for ever. But if the bomb did not become a reality, its existence would be kept secret to be used in the next war.¹ James Conant, President of Harvard University and one of the scientific overlords of the Manhattan Project, also believed that without a combat use of the bomb "there was no chance of convincing the American public and the world that it should be controlled by international agreement".² Nobel laureate Arthur Compton believed that without its military use, "the world will have no adequate warning as to what was to be expected if war should break out again".³ Thus the bomb was already being hailed as an enforcer of peace. The technology of death

Text of a paper presented by Professor M. Zuberi of Jawaharlal Nehru University at a Seminar on "UN in the 21st Century", held at Rajiv Gandhi Foundation, New Delhi on August 22, 1995.

would preside in a benevolent manner over human destiny. Atomic bombing would shock Japan into surrender and a sufficiently spectacular demonstration of its destructive power would have a salutary effect on the anticipated confrontation with the Soviet Union. The bomb was an instrument for peace as well as an instrument of diplomacy in the postwar world.

Another group of scientists in the Manhattan Project arrived at diametrically opposed conclusions. The famous Franck Report of June 1945 started with the basic assumption that the manner in which the new weapon was used would determine the future course of events. It suggested a demonstration of the power of the bomb "before the eyes of the representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or a barren island". It might then be used after an ultimatum to Japan if the sanction of the United Nations and of American public opinion could be obtained. Pointing out the urgency of international control of atomic energy, the report warned that if it was not established, "the race for nuclear armaments will be on in earnest not later than the morning after our first demonstration of the existence of nuclear weapons". It also asserted that the United States could not hope to avoid a nuclear arms race either by keeping secret the basic scientific facts or by cornering the raw materials required for such a race. The authors of the report did not know that the basic decisions regarding the bomb's use had already been taken.⁴

The Postwar consequences of atomic energy were the subject of concern among some scientists as early as 1944. Niels Bohr, exemplar of the good citizen in the republic of science, tried to preempt a nuclear arms race even before the first weapon had been fabricated. His apocalyptic imagination made him uneasy about the terrifying potential of the new weapon. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt he warned that any advantage which the United States may initially have would be outweighed by "a perpetual menace to human security". He tried to persuade Roosevelt and Winston Churchill to abandon their faith in nuclear secrecy and to inform the Soviet ally of the existence of the Project without giving any technical details. This could facilitate postwar nuclear planning and ensure that atomic energy was "used for the benefit of all humanity". He urged them to make arrangements which offered "safety against secret preparations".⁵ Bohr believed that the international contacts of scientists could moderate international rivalries in the nuclear arena. But to Roosevelt and Churchill, Bohr's campaign was a most unwelcome trespass into their political territory. In an unwarranted slur on Bohr's integrity, Roosevelt and Churchill said in a secret document dated September 8, 1944 : "Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information, particularly to the Russians".⁶ Bohr's failure to bring about an understanding among major powers

while they were still allies revealed the basic issue concerning the bomb: How did political leaders think about it? Was it a threat to human society forcing competing states to come together in the face of common danger? Or was it a "winning weapon" and thus a valuable instrument of state policy?

Terrified by the consequences of their own success, a large number of the Manhattan Project scientists embarked on a crusade after the end of the war in favour of international control of atomic energy. Scientific leaders like Robert Oppenheimer devoted apprehensive attention to the nuclear danger and warned that the American nuclear monopoly was "like a cake of ice standing in the sun and melting every hour".⁷ Never again would scientists speak with such clarity and sense of urgency and never again would their pronouncements receive such wide and respectful attention. In order to warn the American public they hit upon the ingenious idea of sending lumps of fused sand from the first test site to 42 mayors as a hint of what could happen to their cities in case of a nuclear war.⁸ They succeeded in putting international control of atomic energy on the global agenda.

Resolution I adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in January 1946 established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and charged it with the mandate of making specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons of mass destruction. "As the only country which had the monopoly of knowledge and expertise in the nuclear field, it fell to the United States to propose a scheme for international control of atomic energy. The Baruch Plan of June 14, 1946 proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Development Authority to control all dangerous activities and to promote peaceful uses of atomic energy. This control was to be exercised in stages, the first being a global survey of uranium and thorium resources and the last being the elimination of the American nuclear stockpile. The greatest asset of the Soviet Union at that time was the secrecy which surrounded its human and material resources relevant to nuclear matters. Condemnation including nuclear attack was to be imposed for any violation of the provisions. These sanctions were to be imposed without the use of the veto in the security Council. Thus these two provisions were sufficient to ensure Soviet rejection of the plan. Moreover, the United States conducted the first series of nuclear tests after the war in July 1946 to which all members of the Commission were invited. The incongruity between the nuclear tests and the Baruch Plan was not lost on the Russians. Baruch had elicited the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who stressed the central role of nuclear weapons in American policy. The mythology of the American secret of the bomb sent congressmen and senators into paroxysms of anxiety regarding any scheme of international control. The Russians rejected that plan because they were engaged in producing their own bomb. But even

if they had found the plan more attractive than they did, it would have been difficult for the American government to carry out its provisions. Thus international control of atomic energy could not be established because of the conflicting security concerns of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was an unfortunate failure because such a control was technically more manageable as only one country had nuclear installations on its territory.⁹

The nuclear arms race had started and over a period of time the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China became nuclear-weapon powers. A new breed of experts with backgrounds in mathematics, physics and economics emerged to provide a theoretical framework for nuclear armouries. Holding the banner of value-free research, they took a cool appraising look at the mechanism of the holocaust and tried to make it endurable and survivable. Bereft of detachment and perceptions of human tragedy, their elaborate chains of reasoning provided a scientific warrant to nuclear fantasies. They domesticated the fantastic through an elaborate use of abstractions and euphemisms. They discussed "menus of weapons". Human death became "collateral damage" in their parlance. The grim jocularity of Herman Kahn set the tone of debate. Describing the five-year plan for his think tank, the Hudson Institute, he wrote with typical immodesty: "The first year we would put down on paper everything a good secretary of defence would want to know; the next year a good secretary of state; the next year a good president; the fourth year a good secretary-general of the United Nations; and the fifth year a good God. And then we'd quit".¹⁰ The project, of course, took much longer leaving the secretary-general and God without the benefit of his advice.

The Baruch Plan served as a model for American nuclear diplomacy for about 15 years. It helped to start the Cold War because a sequence of events on the diplomatic chessboard led from "joined hands to drawn swords". Nuclear diplomatic negotiations were a "souffle that never rose". The United Nations became the battleground of the Cold War where the great powers presented schemes for general and complete disarmament for propaganda purposes. In June 1954 an Anglo-French plan for the abolition of nuclear weapons and drastic reductions in conventional forces was presented at the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament. It was supported by the United States as well. On May 10, 1955 the Soviet Union unexpectedly proposed a scheme which substantially accepted the Anglo-French plan. The British disarmament expert, Philip Noel Baker, called it the "moment of hope". The American delegate, however, announced the withdrawal of all American disarmament proposals submitted at the United Nations. He declared: "It is our view that if armaments, armed forces and military expenditures are brought down to too low a level, then...instead of the prospects of peace being improved, real danger of war is increased".¹¹ This bold assertion of the dangers of

disarmament was an important landmark in the nuclear age. The American civilian nuclear strategists who were exponents of the strategy of nuclear deterrence, evolved a concept of 'arms control' to supplement that strategy. Disarmament was now considered either a utopian dream or a dangerous proposition to be entertained. More modest efforts to regulate the arms race, to make it predictable and to reduce its costs became the objectives of international dialogue. Nuclear disarmament has not been the objective of the major powers since then; they have only been engaged in arms control negotiations.

The objective of arms control is stability in an armed world. It has become a vehicle for the rational management of arms races and reducing the risks of nuclear war. The essence of arms control is to make the world safe for nuclear deterrence. Those weapons and delivery systems which stabilise the deterrent relationship are welcome, while destabilising systems and strategies have to be eliminated. It is claimed that there is safety in large stockpiles. Arms control negotiations themselves accelerated the arms race through incessant comparisons of relative numbers, yields, circular errors probable, and so forth. Many weapons systems were started as bargaining counters for the arms control negotiations; having gathered large scientific, industrial and military constituencies in their support they were incorporated in the arms buildup.¹²

The arms race proceeded at an accelerated pace with the Soviet Union catching up with the United States after a gap of a few years. By 1948 the United States had 50 nuclear weapons in its stockpile. But none of these were assembled. They weighed 10,000 pounds each and it took 39 men over two days to assemble them. The arms race then moved from fission to fusion bombs. By January 1953 a construction programme had started in the United States which added 8 plutonium-producing reactors and 10 gaseous diffusion plants for enriched uranium to the 5 reactors and 2 plants then in operation. There was an enormous growth of destructive capabilities. The stockpile grew from about 1000 in 1953 to 18,000 by the end of the decade. Annual production rate exceeded 7000 warheads per year in 1959-60. About 19,500 new warheads were produced in a short period of three years, at the rate of 75 per day. The U.S. nuclear stockpile in 1960 contained 20,491.17 megatons. (One megaton is equivalent to 70 simultaneous explosions of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima). Bomb-making had become an orderly industrial enterprise. With the arrival of accurate missiles for distant delivery the arms race moved from huge bombs towards warheads of high precision. The era of nuclear plenty in yield, variety and delivery had arrived.¹³ The Soviet stockpile reached a peak of 45,000 warheads around 1986. In both countries gigantic nuclear weapon complexes were created; they became self-perpetuating, conducting their business in secrecy.

The strategy of deterrence is based upon "the assumption that paranoia and prudence can coexist". Mutual Assured Destruction became a fact of the nuclear age before it was elevated to the level of security policy. As one of the influential members of the strategic community put it, the jargon of strategic analysis blinded people to the fact that the method of preventing nuclear war rested "on a form of warfare universally condemned since the Dark Ages".¹⁴ Nuclear anxiety gave way to confidence in managing nuclear crises through self-congratulatory analyses of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Achievements of science and technology reinforced national piety and showed the basic soundness of things. Nuclear disarmament had become inconceivable; arms control and nuclear deterrence were now expected to maintain global peace and stability.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban has been on the global agenda ever since Jawaharlal Nehru's appeal for a cessation of nuclear testing made in 1954.¹⁵ It was proposed as a disarmament measure; simulation techniques had not yet developed and a total ban on testing would have considerably impeded development of thermonuclear armouries. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 may be viewed as the first global agreement to protect the environment; its contribution has been that of a nonproliferation measure. France and China did not subscribe to the treaty and continued to conduct atmospheric tests while the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain embarked on an accelerated pace of underground testing. The United Nations General Assembly has passed more than 70 resolutions on the subject of nuclear testing. An agreement was almost reached during the late 1970s but was sabotaged by directors of nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States. Many technical objections, ranging from the difficulty of detection of nuclear cheating to the imperative necessity of testing in order to ensure the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile, were raised by these laboratories. The American and British governments insisted that so long as their security depended on nuclear deterrence, they would have to conduct nuclear tests.¹⁶

There followed a spate of arms control agreements prohibiting activities in which no state was really interested, like not to plant nuclear weapons on the seabed and not to militarise the moon and other celestial bodies. Bilateral arms control negotiations between the two nuclear superpowers resulted in the SALT I and SALT II agreements including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. Britain, France and China, not participating in these negotiations, continued to build their strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Arms control did not hinder the military programmes of the United States and the Soviet Union either; ten arms control agreements were concluded during the 1970s while the United States added 6,056 and the Soviet Union 3,903 new strategic weapons to their stockpiles.¹⁷

The planetary increase in destructive capabilities threatening human existence and entailing incalculable drain on human and material resources led to two Special Sessions on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly as well as the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and Development. India sponsored the General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) of November 24, 1961 which declared the use of nuclear weapons "a crime against mankind and civilisation" and a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations. India, along with other countries, has repeatedly tried to get the United Nations committed to the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-violent World Order presented at the UN Special Session on Disarmament on June 9, 1988 proposed a detailed scheme for a phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2010. It was one of the most comprehensive schemes for the elimination of the nuclear threat; its special feature was a time-bound series of steps to be taken by the two nuclear superpowers, the three secondary nuclear weapon powers and the so-called threshold countries.¹⁸ But continued reliance on nuclear deterrence and the Cold War were driving nuclear-weapon states to acquire more diversified nuclear arsenals.

II

The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union radically transformed this dismal picture. Making asymmetrical concessions on behalf of his country, he paved the way for the INF Treaty of 1987 which for the first time provided for the elimination of a category of nuclear weapons. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union virtually eliminated the Soviet threat. It was generally assumed during the Cold War that the two nuclear superpowers were invulnerable to external or internal pressures with the exception of each others' nuclear forces and that it was not only irrational but positively mischievous for any country to doubt it. History, however, is a record of failure of events to conform to projections even if made by think tanks. The disintegration of a nuclear superpower raised some unprecedented problems. Approximately 3,000 strategic nuclear weapons were deployed in Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, while 6,500 tactical nuclear weapons were spread across four military organisations in the republics of the former Soviet Union.¹⁹ At the insistence of the United States, the Russian Federation was recognised as the sole legal heir to the entire Soviet stockpile. And by May 1992 it was reported that all tactical nuclear weapons had been transferred to locations in Russia. The removal of strategic weapons, however, is a technically complex, time-consuming and hazardous operation. It is also very expensive.

The possibility of seepage of nuclear material, weapons, scientists and

even tactical nuclear weapons was a novel aspect of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The former Soviet custodial system was designed to guard the stockpile against isolated attempts to capture the weapons or materials against a background of party discipline and KGB control. It was not devised to cope with socio-economic distress and political disorder. The prospect of seepage of nuclear material is compounded by the removal of nuclear material contained in the core pits of the warheads covered by the START-1 agreement. Custody of warheads is much easier than keeping control of nuclear material being transported to various locations. It is estimated that about 900,000 persons in the former Soviet Union were working in the nuclear weapon complex; out of these about 3,500 had detailed knowledge of weapons design. Former US Secretary of State James Baker plunged deep into the Urals to visit Chlyabinsk-70, one of the ten closed cities of the weapon complex. As he arrived at the site, every window in the buildings was packed with scientists and technicians, creating a remarkable tableau of smiling faces and waving hands. Chief Scientist Yevgeny Avrorin told Baker in the presence of 50 top scientists that it was "not profitable for Russia or for the entire world" if the Russian scientists were without work. They were almost desperate in their desire to obtain civilian contracts from the West. This was a truly remarkable encounter and resulted in the establishment of an International Science and Technology Centre to provide rewarding jobs for the weapons scientists. It is, however, reported that not many contracts have materialised so far.²⁰

The nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, if controlled by the two republics, would have made them the third and fourth largest nuclear weapon powers in the world. They resented American pressure and tried to use their nuclear inheritance as a bargaining counter. The Ukrainian parliament had a large number of influential members who were keen to retain the weapons in their own country. General Tolubko, a senior officer of the former Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and a member of the Ukrainian parliament, said to a correspondent: "Idiots are people who give up their nuclear weapons." Diplomatic pressure coupled with financial inducements finally forced Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. By the end of 1994 a total of \$1.27b was made available by the U.S. Congress as financial support for the three republics as well as the Russian Federation in promotion of the safe dismantlement, transport and storage of weapons and nuclear materials. Ukraine's accession to NPT was based on three conditions; security guarantees and legal title to the nuclear materials thereby obtaining a share in the projected sale of 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia to the United States. It was also categorically stated that economic or military pressure from a nuclear state (a veiled reference to Russia) would be considered an exceptional circumstance allowing Ukraine to reexamine its position on the NPT. In a secret operation

code-named Project Sapphire the United States airlifted HEU enough for about 25 nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan in November 1994.²¹

The unilateral initiatives of George Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Boris Yeltsin have resulted in the removal of a large number of tactical nuclear weapons from forward locations in Europe and from the air and naval components of nuclear triads. Britain and France have also announced removal of some of these weapons. De-targeting of each other's territories, even though a symbolic measure, and lower alert status of strategic nuclear forces are measures which would have been difficult to imagine even a few years ago. Tactical nuclear weapons are weapons of first use and the withdrawal of some of them is a most welcome measure. But there is no formal bilateral or international agreement relating to this category of weapons; they can once again be deployed without any hindrance. Moreover, China is not engaged in this process at all. The two major international agreements (START I and START II) deal with the strategic nuclear weapons of only the United States and Russia. There are no treaties constraining the strategic nuclear weapons of Britain, France and China.

START I allows both parties considerable freedom to choose which strategic nuclear forces to retain and which to eliminate. They have naturally chosen the oldest systems for removing the nuclear cores from them. The agreement was deliberately crafted to allow continued modernisation of strategic forces with the exception of the Russian SS-18 ICBMs. It has rightly been pointed out that neither side could efficiently use more than 2,000 nuclear warheads for military purposes and that they are in effect only removing excess destructive capacity. The warheads to be retained are more accurate and therefore more lethal than those in the previous decades; and they are available for prompt use in any part of the globe. Moreover, the Gulf War showed that many old nuclear jobs can now be performed by smart conventional weapons. The main effect of START I and START II has been to move a large portion of American and Russian strategic nuclear forces from field deployment to the status of stored reserve. This is certainly not irreversible nuclear disarmament. START II has provoked a heated debate in Russia because it would lead to the elimination of all land-based SS-18 ICBMs, each equipped with 10 nuclear warheads - the most threatening component of the Russian strategic deterrent. But the United States is allowed to keep the core of its submarine forces and its Trident II missiles equipped with multiple warheads. "The Americans are simply wiping their feet over the sovereignty of Russia with this agreement", commented Iona Andronov, an influential member of the Russian parliament immediately after the agreement was signed.²² The ratification of START II by the Russian parliament is doubtful; but even if it is implemented the United States and Russia will have strategic nuclear forces in four figures at the

beginning of the 21st century. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has assured American senators that even after the full implementation of START II by the year 2003, the American arsenal "will have a capacity to destroy civilisation as we know it several times over."²³

It is generally believed that the U.S. nuclear stockpile will have 3,500 warheads by the year 2003 in conformity with the START II agreement. The figures in the Nuclear Posture Review, released by the Department of Defence on September 22, 1994, however, reveal that the stockpile will actually have 8,500 warheads.²⁴ This may make ratification of START by the Russian parliament even more problematic. The nuclear competition between the United States and Russia now has no cause but itself. On the eve of his Moscow trip in March 1994, Secretary of Defence William Perry said that the United States must "hedge" against the possibility of Russia "emerging from her turbulence as an authoritarian, militaristic, imperialistic nation hostile to the West"²⁵. There is a real danger that efforts to expand NATO right upto the border of Ukraine may turn these fears into a self-fulfilling prophesy. The United States and Russia are maintaining obscenely large nuclear forces because they both fear that a new enmity might emerge between them; but they are afraid of such an enmity precisely because they maintain such forces. The old no-first-use pledge given by the former Soviet Union has been withdrawn. The new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation promulgated by Boris Yeltsin in November 1993 says that the main function of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear as well conventional attack thereby making the Russian posture similar to that of the United States.²⁶ Western nuclear strategy during the Cold War was predicated on the assumed conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries, necessitating first use of nuclear weapons in case of conventional attack led by the Soviet Union. With the demonstrated conventional superiority of the United States since the Gulf War and the deterioration in the military effectiveness of Russian conventional forces, nuclear weapons have acquired greater salience in Russian strategic planning.

Former British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind denied in the House of Commons early this year that there was a commitment under NPT for the abolition of nuclear weapons and added that doing so would be "a remarkably foolish initiative" which would weaken British defences. He explicitly rejected the notion of a no-first-use pledge as a retrograde step.²⁷ France has no designated enemy but now subscribes to "deterrence by the strong of the insane", meaning the so-called 'rogue states'. Former Prime Minister Balladur said in May 1994 that a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) "must not in any way envisage the elimination of nuclear weapons or seek to undermine the status of nuclear powers". A no-first-use pledge would have damaging effect on the solidarity of NATO countries. A Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and

Doctrine has now been established.²⁸ China's strategic nuclear inventory has expanded at the rate of 70 percent per decade. By 1985, the total megatonnage of British and French nuclear forces was about 40 and 150 respectively, while that of Chinese forces was about 350. In June 1982 Chinese military forces conducted a military exercise simulating use of tactical nuclear weapons.²⁹ The Chinese modernisation programme of its nuclear-missile and conventional forces has been accelerated. There is speculation about China's strategic nuclear doctrine. Some defence analysts maintain that it is aimed at developing a second-strike capability against Russia, India and U.S. military forces in the Asia-Pacific region. Welcoming reciprocal reductions in American and Russian nuclear stockpiles, Chinese spokesmen have declared that China would join the arms control process only when these two countries reduced their arsenals to the Chinese level.

(To be concluded)

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International Security in a NFWW

SHALHEVETH FREIER

"Out of timber so crooked
as that of which man is made,
nothing entirely straight can be built".

Immanuel Kant (1784)

INTRODUCTION

As far as my imagination goes, international security in a Nuclear Weapons Free World (NFWW) should not be much different from the maintenance of internal security in a Western democracy, of which I recognize the following ingredients: an overwhelming consensus on the rule of law, on permissible conduct, and on the obligations of citizens' on the existence of an enforcement agency (the police), able to deal with trespasses; and on an educated electorate able to give vent to its desires and dissatisfactions in periodic elections. Moreover - and I believe this to be important - these countries have a sense of pride which reposes largely on their intrinsic performance and achievement. Having said this, I do not wish to infer that the Western democracies are virtuous in their international comportment. Not at all, looking only on their lucrative arms trade, with little concern where and when these arms will be employed. But I claim, the ingredients of a Western democracy, are still the best we have in trying to contemplate a livable world, made up of countries.

It is immediately apparent that the ingredients of democracy are completely lacking in the community of nations, as compared with a community of citizens - a democratic nation. It seems therefore, however unpalatable the thought is to a citizen of a democratic country, that the community of nations need pass through some intermediate stages, in which some nations will lead, and some will have to be led, before all will share those norms which make peaceful cohabitation possible, i.e. in which international security is assured. Of course we have much of this inequality even now. The General Assembly of the UN - with one country, one vote - is a complete fiction, and hundreds of resolutions against war have not prevented a single one. Also, I can conceive of an Israeli proposing the Charter and the Charter being voted down, because the sponsor is unpopular.

Text of a paper which was to be presented to the United Service Institution of India by Dr. Shalheveth Freier of the Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel. Regretfully, he passed away just before his planned visit to India.

Much more power resides in the permanent members of the Security Council, certainly not so democratic an arrangement, and more power still, in understandings between the heads of government of the major nations, with or without international appointments.

It pays to face these facts soberly and acknowledge them. This is necessary if we wish the transitory period, in which some nations lead and some are led, to result in community of nations which share the norms, on which the maintenance of international security need rest.

There is some comfort in the fact that there are no more than about 200 sovereign states in the world. This is a number which permits looking at each individually.

On the other hand, one has to acknowledge the disturbing fact, that many of these states lack the coherence, internal stability and the popular basis, which make for a reliable partnership and a coherent policy in the quest for a secure world.

In the following an attempt will be made to address some of these problems, in the hope of advancing the discussion of international security in a NWFV by a little.

ASSUMPTIONS

The thoughts presented in this paper build on these assumptions.

1. Nuclear weapons are bad, for five reasons.
 - They are so destructive, that irreparable damage can be done, once they have been employed and second thoughts cannot redress the damage wrought.
Conventional weapons are not as indiscriminately destructive, and second thoughts might limit the extent of the damage they cause.
 - They effect lasting and pernicious injury to people and the environment.
 - They tend to proliferate also to countries which might feel less inhibited in contemplating their use, than the recognised and veteran nuclear-weapon states.
 - Once the threshold has been passed, and a nuclear weapon has been employed in an actual conflict, there is no credible barrier to their escalation in number and destructive power.

- Possible loss of control over such weapons by a government whose authority is contested - or which is not otherwise in complete charge of military hardware, installations and personnel on its soil - can have devastating consequences.

- This contingency has assumed a measure of likelihood with the break-up of the USSR, the internal instabilities in some of the republics and the uneasy relations between some of them.

2. Other papers deal with the most knotty problem of arriving at a nuclear weapon free world. A NFWF can only be attained in passing through some intermediate stages, some of which need necessarily be concurrent.

Prior to the elimination of nuclear weapons, their number need be reduced and a residual nuclear arsenal need be set up under multinational - not international - control. Such residual arsenal cannot be eliminated and need be in place until two conditions are fulfilled: A credible verification regime is instituted which ensures that nuclear weapons and their carriers are not developed or produced anywhere and a mobile military force is established for speedy intervention in order to halt the outbreak of hostilities between states, anywhere at an early stage. A third condition, of course is the commitment on the part of the major powers - those which control the residual arsenal - not to use military force in the settlement of any claim pertaining to their individual interest.

Verification includes procedures, by which infringements are dealt with.

3. A verification regime and a mobile military force address only a very limited, though indispensable, aspect of the transition to a NFWF, and its eventual establishment. Policing actions are credible only if an overwhelming consensus exists all round that wars are a non-befitting and non-profitable way of settling conflicts. The creation of such consensus and such climate need be addressed, in parallel, with commensurate vigour.

NFWF - PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS

Let me divide the problems into two categories, those which pertain to the coercive aspects of a NFWF - verification and a mobile intervention force - and those which can create the appropriate international setting and climate.

Recent experience has borne out that international verification, as practices by the I.A.E.A., can at most serve as a useful back-up to regional verification, as embodied in Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. It is, after all, one's

neighbours which can constitute a military threat, Regional negotiation of a NWFZ and mutual, rather than international, inspection of each other's installations are much more reassuring than an international team of inspectors, whose sense of mission is necessarily limited in motivation and subject to extraneous considerations, such as being welcome to the inspected party.

I should, therefore, suggest that the practice of negotiating NWFZs regionally be encouraged, and that the I.A.E.A. serve not as a substitute for them but rather as an instrument of technical expertise and overall assurance that the NWFZs are established, and function, in conformity with their purpose. NPT is useful only when you do not intend to cheat.

A mobile intervention force poses two problems : Who controls it and what size should it have.

In the matter of control it is evident, as is the case with the Security Council, that some countries will make the decisions, and some will not. The countries which should make the decisions need be such as are relatively immune from yielding to venal or particular interests, have a sense of global responsibility, and have publicly renounced recourse to war in the pursuit of their national interests.

Such sense of global responsibility can only reside in countries which are militarily and economically powerful and can afford not to think of their own interests anytime they are called upon to make unpalatable decisions. Their judgement need be tempered by the association of other countries in their councils, which have equally renounced recourse to war in the settlement of such problems as they might have with their neighbours. The controlling body, moreover, need address itself to the identification and settlement of conflicts before they erupt into war.

In fact, the controlling body should publicly and periodically survey the state of the world. Such survey could acutely increase our awareness of conflicts which do or may lead to wars, destruction and destitution. The UN has been highly selective in this matter. Irrespective of Iraq, it would seem that arraigning Israel - at least in the past - has been its major contribution to the identification and "settlement" of conflicts in the Middle East.

The size of the mobile intervention force is something to be thought about, because its employment must not be influenced by fear of the tasks it has to confront in halting military conflicts. This in turn implies that in NWFZ there cannot be unfettered arms races, but that arms reductions need be negotiated between potential adversaries, especially such as have a powerful and

numerous military establishment at their disposal. There is a clear correlation between the size and credibility of the mobile intervention force and the forces at the disposal of potential adversaries in a military conflict. Moreover speed is of the essence, Kuwait was annexed and largely destroyed, before the Iraqi army was rolled back.

This survey of the coercive measures which would have to be a part of a NFWF, is of necessity partial and does not do justice to the problems which stem from the fact, that the world is anything but uniform in its values and circumstances. Let me therefore now turn to the appropriate international setting and climate, which need be generated in parallel with the introduction of the coercive measures.

Indeed, coercive measures by themselves have only a limited life-span, unless they are supported by norms of behaviour which are willingly accepted, such as is true of the rule of law and its enforcement within national states.

Creating the climate and the setting on which international security can be built, need take account of the following problems:

- There are nations, already powerful militarily and economically, and as such dispose of a vast human and resource potential. And there are nations bereft of any power to influence their destinies.
- States differ widely in their sense of identity and pride. Some take pride in their military prowess and sense of power; some in their economic, social and scientific achievements; some are riveted on their internal struggles - with no sense of being part of the international community; some just wish to be left alone with their conationals, with whom they share a common history; and some have religious affinities which determine their transcendent sense of belonging.

This division is not neat, Some states combine mixture of these attributes.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult to inculcate the overwhelming interest all states should have in eliminating the scourge of war. This will take time, but two approaches commend themselves as deserving of purposeful pursuit.

The organizational approach should

- emphasize in thought, speech and act the growing interdependence of states, and eventually its all-inclusive character. Especially, economic planning and industrial development supported by inter-

national funds should pay heed to creating such interdependence between states which are potential adversaries. This should be done, as I said, also in thought and speech, because it is also necessary that the sense of interdependence be brought into relief, at a high profile.

- Also, regional groupings should be promoted, in order to offset the artificial and incidental nature of many small states. Such regional groups may guarantee economic and social viability to such small states without infringing on their sense of identity.

In speaking of an interdependent world, such regional groups are in fact inevitable.

- The common hazards we face are a compelling argument in favour of common action - certainly regionally common action. Their recognition, and the need for joint action upon them, largely transcend the particular sensibilities of individual states, and can help in adjusting the sense of priorities of states which otherwise desire to go it alone.

Dealing visibly and prominently with these hazards is intrinsically and politically strongly to be recommended.

The educational approach is conceptually the most challenging. It requires sustained effort and wisdom.

- We should try to create a sense of national identity which does not derive from an accrual of dominion, but from distinction in those areas which constitute the contribution of a state to the common international weal.

This goal does not contradict the reality which has become manifest in recent times, that common history is a bond which reasserts itself within nations which have been forcibly amalgamated in bigger unions. There seems much to be said in favour of recognizing these communal identities and not promote unfeasible and unnatural uniformity. The regional groupings, as I have said before, can take care of the practical - rather than emotional - interests, common to the states of a region.

- In the realm of education proper, we must acknowledge that vast populations are not privy to the problems we discuss, also on their behalves. But they are suffering and will suffer more from the conditions created by the industrial and scientific nations. It is not conceivable that in the long run, there will be populations deprived of access to the occupations and preoccupations of the more affluent and successful nations of the world.

This is easily said, but daunting as a challenge. It demands education in all spheres and on all levels, in order to increase popular participation in national decisions and to enhance the potential of individual people to choose and lead lives satisfactory to them. It tacitly assumes that the ideas the Western democracies have about themselves reflect in fact desirable values and criteria. This is not at all certain, but I can see no other way of trying to attend to the problems of a world which need be increasingly integrated, viable and free from violent conflict.

This recipe is not one for linear progress. It will be full of inconsistencies - some of an unconscionable enormity, viz. the aberration of communism trying to create wealth, rather than distributing wealth which only capitalism could produce, according to the much maligned Marx, and the terrible and protracted consequences of this aberration. Progress may even require cherished values in the Western countries to be modified in favour of a manageable world. But I see no loadstar in education, other than the one proposed.

Problems and proposals relating to international security in NFWF, as touched upon in this essay, are surely not exhaustive, but they are pertinent.

As a last suggestion, I believe, these problems can move centre-stage only if they become a permanent feature of summit meetings of heads of governments. The UN and its agencies are no substitute. The UN can prepare valuable studies and help to implement decisions arrived at by heads of governments. Experience shows that international dispositions of consequence still flow from meetings of heads of governments.

New Technology Naval Force Structure

REAR ADMIRAL, R.K. WHIG, AVSM, VSM

A balanced fleet has been a firm aim of our service right from the time of Independence. The complexion and composition of the fleet today, comprehensively reflects our aspirations. Changing technology, economic and political compulsions and our perception of own capabilities will determine the force levels we shall be able to achieve and maintain in times to come. Our vision of a balanced fleet will evolve from our perception of our potential and the threat that we may face in the future.

INSTABILITY

Tranquility in the world may be disturbed by the pressures of over population, mounting consumption of fossil fuels, dwindling rain forest cover and the hole in the ozone layer. History tells us that religious fundamentalism is yet another well-known cause of instability. The threatened region of the world is in our very vicinity-the South. Amongst them poor countries of the South are the most threatened. It is they who need to protect their interests most in an unpredictable region of the world. Whereas the population of the Northern countries especially the West has stabilised, in the South it is rising. Africa is being depopulated by AIDS. The distribution of wealth is uneven. There is a migration from the over populated to the underpopulated regions. Capabilities of nations around us and their intentions, political and economic naturally have a bearing on our vital interests.

As has been repeatedly demonstrated, in a pluralist world, there will be local invasions and wars as opposed to global wars. In such a world, there will be many interdependencies between nations. Our commerce with other countries hinges on maritime shipping. The posture we adopt, will largely be determined by size and composition of our force, arguments about the degrees of intensity of conflict, humanitarian role or making intense war, notwithstanding. Humankind has time and again turned violent and we continue to live in a fragile world.

SEA POWER

Principle of seapower is, platforms at sea, concepts in the boot; studies in hand, models in laboratories and perfect designs on the drawing board have no value in a conflict. The size of a force, is derived from strategic philosophies, concepts of warfare, dreams of future potential and fears expressed in

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different studies, papers, articles, speeches and posture statements. Realities of the annual Budget, cost of ships, submarines and aircraft, their average lives determine the force one can hope to raise. Simply stated, the quantity of items one has, is equal to the quantity purchased in a given time period multiplied by the number of time periods it is kept.

Total Quantity = Number purchased in a year \times Average age in years.
Force level over a given span can be determined in the same manner;

Ship Force Level = Average Annual Acquisition \times Life of unit

Force Level = (Annual Acquisition/Average Cost) \times Service Life

To match the vision of a balanced fleet with the reality of resources, it would be appropriate to examine each factor in the above mathematical interpretation. Allocation annually made in the national budget for the acquisition of ships or new construction will come from the Navy's share in the Defence funding authorised by Parliament annually. If other factors like service life and unit cost were to remain constant a growing G.N.P. would assure us larger force levels. There is, however, the question of our share in the allocation for defence. The national resource has to be divided into the competing interests of the other services. An increase in the navy's share will facilitate larger allocation for acquisition.

Thus average procurement allocation depends upon two factors, namely, the allocation to the Navy and the proportion earmarked for new construction and acquisition, after allowing for expenditure on operations, stores, maintenance and manpower. It would be obvious that if we spend less on upkeep and support then we can hope to spare more for new construction. It is well known that the manpower bill is mounting. This is an area where savings can make a substantial difference. Procurement allocation can be expected to be increased, if expenditure on running costs, be it manpower, stores and maintenance is proportionately reduced. Similarly, if the share of the cake allocated to the Navy is increased in relation to the Army and the Air Force, then too the allocation for procurement can be expected to be increased. To this end there is perceptible change and the Navy's share has been increasing gradually year by year.

As the G.N.P. increases and larger allocations are made for Defence, and the Navy in particular, followed by a larger allocation for new construction and acquisition, the force levels will grow, other factors like service life and unit cost remaining the same.

SERVICE LIFE

In the force level equation service life is another important determinant. Life of a unit is the period in which it will continue to perform its intended role. Life depends upon the materials used, technology incorporated and support and upkeep furnished life long. Service life may be extended by retrofitting new systems and upgrading others at an appropriate stage of its life. A less demanding role may be assigned where discarding of out of date technology is not of value.

UNIT COST

At this stage we can consider the remaining term - unit cost in the denominator of the force level equation. A lowering of costs is obviously the choice. Cost is generally dictated by the staff requirements of a platform. The performance expected out of a platform determines the overall size, the propulsion plant and the weapon fit. There is little that can be done to the size of a platform as laws of physics be it for seaworthiness, buoyancy or length of upper deck for seamanship, weapon and sensor fit, machinery arrangements and aviation, cannot invariably be infringed for the sake of safety. Yet to be effective, the built in performance must at least be marginally better than that of the adversary. For assured success the platform must have an edge over the opposing unit.

A larger platform, with more powerful engines and more comprehensive weapon fit is bound to be more effective and more expensive. Yet force levels can only be brought up if higher performance is achieved at lower cost. This may sound a bit far fetched, though possible, if one looks at the revolution in the personal computer market. Look at it another way, if the costs keep on rising, the platforms become more expensive, then either some platforms will become extinct or their population in the fleet will dwindle. For a balanced fleet, the answer is to build better and cheaper ships.

DESIGN

Technological advances must be utilised to obtain higher performance at a lower cost. For instance, reduce platform resistance to obtain higher speed, use coatings with riblets (such coatings have been developed to achieve higher speed in torpedoes), do away with appendages by replacing shafts for transmission of power with pump jets, or propelling pods, use nozzles behind jets for steering rather than a rudder with a blade, else use rudders for roll stabilisation also. Jets with nozzles have a reliable record of manoeuvring space ships. Submersibles use many a thruster for positioning themselves efficiently. Optimise

the monohull for minimum motion and employ other types like hydrofoils and multiple-wave-piercing or surface-effect hulls, which use hydrodynamic lift to avoid skin and wave making resistance.

SPEED

Use designs which can operate effectively in two distinct speed regimes; one for being on the beat, loiter at slow speed on patrol, on the look out for an adversary or routine cruising, and the other for transiting fast to an assigned area of patrol, prepositioning, chasing a submarine, or for a quick get away after hitting an enemy. For this consider foil borne, surface effect, air cushion or wing-in-the air platforms, optimised for the dual speed role and endowed with an edge over that of the likely enemy.

COMPOSITES

Use lighter materials - composites based on carbon or Aramid fibres or even high alloys to save weight as is being done in the aerospace industry. Save weight in coverings, cables and piping. Fibre optics, longer lasting coatings and non-metallic piping offer great deal of scope. If permanent ballast is required, it should take the form of thicker plating.

PROPULSION

To propel them, use high power to weight propulsion plants. Gas turbines and high speed Diesel engines hold the maximum promise. The propulsion prime-mover should drive a generator and send power down a flexible cable to the electrical motor coupled to a propeller. We could have propellers mounted on pods rather like aircraft pulling the platform rather than pushing it. We would get away from the tyranny of shafts, plunger blocks, thrust blocks, gear boxes, controllable pitch propellers. We need not have generators solely to support the domestic and operational load, the same source could meet this need. We may then be able to achieve below-deck arrangements which are more compatible with weapon, sensor and aviation demands of the upper deck space.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The requirements of expanded C⁴I dictate, radars and EW antennae to be mounted high up, unrestricted by reflective surfaces and multi-path imaging, caused by proximity to sea water surface. For best results, the number of sensors or aerals should be minimised by features of common aerial-working, be it for communications or early warning and surveillance. Fewer aerals, and

larger separation both spatial and in frequency minimise mutual interference and enhance effectiveness. Separation between the target classifier and the armament should be reduced for close range weapons, to minimise the parallax error. Systems which have the gunmounting and its director on a common base have an inherent advantage.

For command and control, surveillance, offense and defence functions the systems fitted should avoid duplication.

WEAPONS

Weapons which can be stowed below deck and do not require bulky launchers, to be trained and elevated, will add to effectiveness. Again, the principle of common launcher as in the case of aerial, say a torpedo tube being used for launching a missile or verticle launch module for surface to air missile or an anti-submarine projectile. This would add considerable flexibility and enhance the ordnance carrying capacity of the platform. This will facilitate cellularity in weapon system and make role change easier. Disguising or using deception decoys would make the platform less observable and confuse the enemy sensors and the guided ordnance aimed at our platform. This can delay detection, and make the adversary risk engagement at closer range.

ORDNANCE

Smart projectiles which can discriminate and decide the best site to inflict the maximum damage would sharpen the cutting edge. They should be included in the arsenals on-board.

HUMAN SUPPORT

Arrangements which are less infrastructure intensive, say for the preparation of food and its consumption especially on small platform, for administering the crew through offices, say by pre-cooked meals and paperless offices using electronic mail can generate considerable savings in the workforce on-board and spare prime space to be better utilised.

SIGNATURE

To survive, the platforms must be less observable. To protect themselves from acoustic seeking weapons and to effectively use their own passive sensors, they must be quiet. Noise reduction in discrete bands may offer rich dividends.

For instance, at different speed, different sources may dominate different frequency bands;

Speed	Source	Frequency	Character
Low	Machinery	Low	Discrete Frequency
Medium	Propeller	High	Broad Band
High	Flow	High	Broad Band

If the platform were required to rely upon a passive sonar, then measures against high frequency are not necessary. Similar approach can be adopted for other emissions.

BUILD FOR FUTURE

Having enunciated measures which will help us get more value for Navy's money, we must decide what then shall we build to achieve a force level, a self-respecting country of our size and standing should have? Ships and submarines which can stay longer on patrol and deliver more ordnance when challenged at sea. Platforms which can be built in numbers to match our interests and at a less cost in our shipyards or those of friendly countries abroad.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

It is acknowledged that the seapower that dominates the air at sea will prevail. This has been proved over and over again since the Second World War. Planes with formidable and accurate ordnance from aircraft carriers will not allow any unprotected platform to survive long at sea. In a war, the unmatched capabilities of aircraft carriers will quickly neutralise the unprotected surface force and will steer the campaign towards tackling the threat posed by submarines and shore-based air power. The possibility of projecting power from the sea with high performance aircraft can effectively tie large proportions of enemy fighting machine as was vividly brought out in the Gulf conflict.

The aircraft carrier must be the centre piece of a naval force structure. The size, weapon magazines and aviation fuel capacity should match the aircraft under development or those that we may be able to acquire. This virtually makes the carrier compatible with all other carrier-borne aircraft, available globally. The answer lies in a certain minimum size ship, with sufficient length and volume below deck for aircraft, weapons, fuel and the crew.

Considering the fact that such ships are built to last and the trend is towards smaller though faster aircraft, the future carrier must approach the size

of present day Viraat. Going by the experience of others, we must build platforms which are identical for deriving the best advantage from economy of scale. The design of the platform should be such that it can be adapted for logistics, amphibious and troopship role. This will make such ships less distinguishable at sea, unlike the variety of landing ships for tanks, fleet oil tankers in our existing force mix. Such a design can be made more producible and logistically less demanding.

SUBMARINES

Cost of stealth is coming down progressively. Submarines will remain difficult to detect. Over 40 Navies operate them to-day. Their presence will be felt more. Submarines, therefore, must remain an important element. Features like air-independent systems, closed cycle diesel, sterling cycle, powder metallurgy and fuel cells for propulsion will give an edge to the future boats. They can stay on patrol, dived much longer. With off-board sensors, submarines armed with long-range missiles can be provided target information. Such submarines can expand their battle space dramatically.

Common launchers for self-propelled weapons like torpedoes and missiles, common periscopes which do not penetrate the pressure hull, trainable pods for propulsion and steering, can create space for more long-range missiles, to mount a saturation attack. They need not close the torpedo range and can attack from a distance. Low drag Diesel-electric boat hull form has reached an appreciable degree of refinement for such applications.

Submarines are the only element of a force which cannot be readily reduced through rapid attrition the other elements may be subjected to in the opening phase of an action at sea. Submarines, therefore, must continue to remain an important element of the force mix.

SURFACE ACTION ELEMENTS

Even though, there may be a shift towards the submarine and land-based aircraft with extended endurance, the inherent strengths of surface warfare platforms would assure them a substantial presence in a future force at sea. Ships with significantly reduced signature and ability to stay on station longer compared to current practice need to be added.

To stay longer on station and approach designated area with despatch, the unit must be able to maintain speed in higher sea states. They must possess good seakeeping qualities. Longer ships have reduced ship motions. Yet refined hull design and active roll-damping devices can considerably enhance seakeeping quality, making even relatively small platforms helicopter-capable.

With reduced signature and superior seakeeping, the functions of command and control, surveillance, strike and defence are effectively shared well by more mobile, far smaller and less expensive destroyers, frigates and corvettes-stretching from the fully capable, multi-warfare to the warfare specific unit.

These units can carry large weights, make long range detection and do high speed to localise an attack. When equipped with vertical launch systems which combine strike, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine capability they pack a formidable punch. They have proven staying power and visible presence. It is possible to mass firepower in such less expensive units, pre-positioned to shoot down the "archers" (aircraft, helicopters, submarines and surface ships) rather than the "arrows" (missiles).

SMALL CRAFT AND AUXILIARIES

Future investment in industry and associated infrastructure is increasingly being made in the narrow coastal strip all along our coastline. If not patrolled, shallow continental shelf and island territories can be turned into sanctuaries for clandestine activities. Smaller fast craft are suitable for defence against such threats. They must, therefore, remain a useful part of a future force.

Submarine rescue ships, mine-sweepers, survey ships, salvage ships and other auxiliaries have a role in support of the battle force units. They must also receive due attention of those responsible for the force mix and be given budgetary support in new construction or acquisition planning.

REALITIES

Having explored the force mix and engineering challenges for different types of platforms, let us now look at the realities of shipbuilding capacities, unit costs, service lives and annual funding. This may give us an idea of what is feasible in the next ten years.

Ship type	Average Annual Prod.	Unit Cost Crores (Rs)	Annual Cost Crores (Rs)	Force in 10 years
Aircraft Carriers	0.10	2000	200	1.0
Submarines	0.15	500	75	1.5
Destroyers	0.25	800	200	2.5
Frigates	0.30	450	150	3.0
Corvettes/Missile Boats	1.50	150	225	15.0

Logistics/Amphibious Depot ship	0.15	500	75	1.5
Survey ships/Mine sweepers/Rescue/ Salvage ships	0.6	200	120	6.0
TOTAL	3.05	-	1030	30.5

The above is based on past performance of our shipbuilders, their demonstrated capacity and estimated cost of construction with the exception of the aircraft carrier. It makes the requirements of funding pegged at Rs. 1030 crores annually, amply obvious. Even though the force mix and alternate shipbuilding capacities can be debated upon, the requirements of funding have to be respected. Administered prices of P.O.L, Railway freight, construction material, food stuff, dearness allowance, etc, will continue to rise, nibbling away at the proportions allocated for acquisition and new construction. The existing programmes have had to be slowed down on account of depreciation of the Rupee vis-a-vis foreign currencies. The requirements of funding pegged at Rs 1030 crores annually is necessary for a reasonable force level.

We have to keep in mind that it has taken anything from eight to fourteen years to bring in a new class of platforms of our own concept. Stable product lines take long to establish. We, therefore, should not be tempted to stop production on account of the resource crunch or waiting for new technologies to materialise. We may upgrade them from one unit to the next one, as was very successfully demonstrated in Leander frigate programme. We must continue building and seriously take note of limitations of aircraft carrier and submarine building capacity. We cannot let our guard down at sea.

Having reviewed the challenges ahead in creating the new technology force mix, those responsible, need to give the foremost attention to the following:

- Driving down costs
- Driving down unit costs
- Making do
- Making them last
- Making realistic budgetary allocations
- Maintaining the shipbuilding base
- Building ships and submarines

Strong naval forces are not a luxury, but a necessity for maintaining our relationships with the others. Between vision and reality, lie years of dedicated engineering.

Prisoner of War in Changi : A Memoir

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL E L SAWYER, MBE

I went to Malaya in August 1939 with 22 Indian Mountain Regiment in which I commanded 4th Hazara Mountain Battery. After a year based in Singapore, when the role of 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, which we were supporting, was the defence against a Japanese landing off Mersing on the East coast, the regimental HQ and two batteries moved via Ipoh in North Malaya to Jitra on the border with Thailand. Here, early in 1941, it came under command of 11th Indian Infantry Division which was starting to arrive from India. The role of the division was the defence of the main road and rail entrances to Malaya from the North. The camp was in a rubber plantation and consisted of attap-roofed huts. The gloom and perpetual dripping of moisture from the trees was most depressing, but the open paddy fields of the area were refreshing for training after the closeness of the Johore jungle. My 4th Mountain Battery joined the regiment in September 1941, having recently exchanged the four 6-inch Howitzers with which it was armed, for four 3.5-inch Howitzers (screw-guns) which had just been sent down from Hongkong. Two of the batteries now with 11th Indian Division were each given two 2.2 Breda A-Tk guns captured in N.Africa, and the third two 18-pounder guns which had been saluting guns elsewhere in Malaya, all in addition to their screw guns, to be used in the anti-tank role. Extra men were allowed for manning the guns but none for control and administration, so that the extra guns proved of little use in battle as it was found impossible to control efficiently two sets of equipment with different characteristics and roles.

The role of 11th Indian Division (6th, 15th and 28th Indian Infantry Brigades) became two-fold. First an advance into Thailand to pre-empt a Japanese invasion of Malaya from landings in Thailand (Operation Matador), second the defence of the frontier on what was known as the Jitra line, 20 miles south of the border. A lot of work had been put into this position: an anti-tank ditch had been constructed, weapon pits and gun pits dug, and a few pill boxes built. When the Japanese landed in South Thailand in December 1941 Command reaction was slow. Operation Matador was called off at the last minute. The troops had been kept waiting near their trains for many hours

Lt Col EL Sawyer, MBE served with 22 Mountain Regiment, Royal Indian Artillery, in the Malayan Campaign December 1941 - February 1942, and became a Prisoner of War. His evocative account provides many fresh insights into the difficulties of the Indian units in the campaign, and in the subsequent formation of the Indian National Army. For the first time, it is revealed that British officers encouraged Indian prisoners-of-war to join the INA in order to safeguard their lives from their Japanese captors.

and were sent back into the Jitra positions at night in heavy rain, by which time the Japanese had landed in Thailand and were well on their way to the frontier.

The Division thus started off very much on the wrong foot. The troops had the maps for Matador instead of for the frontier and were generally ill-briefed. My battery was switched at the last minute from its role with 3/16 Punjab Regiment at Kroh to the East, to supporting 1/14 Punjab with whom it had not trained. This battalion was the divisional advance force in covering positions on the road from Jitra to the frontier. Going into action at night is bad enough, but going with comparative strangers, for a key role, and with the wrong maps is hellish.

On 10 December the forward company of 1/14 Punjab came into contact with the Japanese and held up well. I was with the battalion commander, Lieut-Colonel Fitzpatrick, at battalion HQ, my battery deployed in support astride the road, with a detachment on the railway to the West. On 11 December Japanese tanks, moving fast, caught the main body of the battalion on the move five miles North of Jitra and overwhelmed it. With others I got away to the West of the road and rejoined the regiment. Fitzpatrick, who was wounded, took refuge in the swamps to the East through which he struggled for three days, emerging at Kuala Nerang 14 miles East of Jitra on the 14th. He found that the Japanese had swept 30 miles southwards into Malaya; there was no possibility of rejoining the Division and he surrendered with his party of survivors the following day. To facilitate their policy of 'winning over' Indian soldiers the Japanese removed him from his men and Captain Mohan Singh, his HQ Company commander, was left in charge. The first Japanese Mohan Singh met was the psychological warfare expert with Yamashita's 25th Army, Major Fujiwara, who, with a handful of Indian revolutionaries recruited in Bangkok, immediately set to work on him.

Indian troops surrendering to the Japanese after the Battle of Jitra were understandably demoralised. The fact that defeat was the fault of the British was more than usually manifest; failures of equipment - of which the bizarre mixture of weapons held by 22nd Mountain Regiment was an example - the replacement of experienced soldiers by raw recruits, the absence of air cover, failures of administration and command, tactical and strategic incompetence, were clear to all and had undermined whatever confidence the Indians had in their British commanders. Moreover, the brunt of the calamity had been borne by Indian troops. Of the twenty infantry battalions defending North Malaya only three were British. There is no doubt that at the time we British Officers felt very strongly that we had let down our loyal Indians, and some committed suicide in, I should imagine, abject shame. But to Mohan Singh and his comrades in arms it was obvious that the battle of Malaya would be lost. The

British had gone. The Japanese would probably occupy Burma, even India. What was to be done? Fujiwara offered a bargain. Mohan Singh would be put in charge of all Indian prisoners of war; he would gather up stragglers and organise food and shelter; Indian soldiers, officers and men, would not be harmed. In return he would form an *Indian National Army* from the prisoners, to fight alongside the Japanese when India was reached - not before. The Japanese had no idea of reaching India at the time; Fujiwara had mentioned it; Mohan Singh thought it possible. On January 1, 1942, after many days' thought and consultation with the VCOs and senior NCOs among the prisoners - only three Indian officers had been captured so far - Mohan Singh agreed. At least he would be able to save Indian prisoners from Japanese brutality of which there was ample evidence, and thereafter, just possibly, the population of India as well.

I knew Mohan Singh, whom we had entertained in the regimental mess on a number of occasions before the war started. We found him an affable Sikh and a talented professional soldier. The 1/14 Punjab had been one of the first battalions to be Indianised, i.e. the British officer strength was reduced to five or six. In 1938 only four officers, including the CO and 2IC had been British, and the latter two would hardly ever invite any of the Indian officers, particularly their wives, into their houses. When I knew them there was some resentment between the Indian officers and Fitzpatrick (the 1938 2IC and the only regular British officer left) because of this; but otherwise loyalty was of a high order.

Six months later, after the American victories in the Coral Sea and Midway battles, we prisoners all knew that the Japanese could not possibly win the war. Mohan Singh, doubtless realising it too, and also that he had backed the wrong horse, decided to dissolve the Indian National Army, ostensibly because of Japanese insincerity, on December 29, 1942.

When Singapore fell in February 1942 the Japanese had segregated Indian and European prisoners into separate camps for political reasons. The Indian units were thus deprived of such British officers as had survived the campaign. Indian POW were assembled in Farrer Park on February 17th, and as the British were to be prohibited from contact with them, responsibility for them was formally transferred to the Japanese, and by the Japanese to Mohan Singh. A considerable orator, he made a rousing nationalist speech, blaming the British for the Indian predicament and announcing his intention of forming an Indian National Army. Although he was received with cheers it was a period of indecision on all sides; no one knew quite what to do and there appeared to be no compulsion to join Mohan Singh's army although all prisoners would be under his 'Supreme HQ'.

In March, Rash Behari Bose, an old revolutionary who had fled from India to a safe refuge in Japan in 1915 after the failure of revolutionary risings he had plotted, called a meeting in Tokyo which Mohan Singh and other senior Indian officer prisoners attended. A policy of sorts emerged. From then on certain Indian officers and VCOs used violence to compel Indian prisoners (non-volunteers) to join the Indian National Army (INA). Methods of compulsion included starvation, no medical treatment for the sick, the withholding of Red Cross Supplies, beatings up etc., culminating on two occasions when INA personnel opened fire on Indian prisoners. Many succumbed to this treatment (in which the Japanese played no part); on the other hand many went through untold trials and maintained their loyalty.

We officers in Changi prison meanwhile managed to establish and keep established a link with our jawans, through which we encouraged and helped them in many ways. When we realised the difficulties they were going through regarding the INA, for instance, we strongly advised them all to join and get to the front in Burma as soon as possible in order to escape, but on no account to fight. This was passed on. I believe it got around and that many jawans obeyed it. What we did not appreciate was the difficulty, once at the front, of actually reaching the other side. Those who tried ran the risk of being shot by the Japanese, or else by a hostile XIVth Army if they failed to establish their good faith. There were in fact many occasions when INA trying to surrender were treated with severity.

Another instance occurred in 1944. We were constantly in touch with the Indian POW hospitals and were alarmed at the death rate which, owing to lack of drugs and equipment, - we had nothing to send ourselves - had reached 125 in October. A message was sent to Lt Col B.P. Chaudhuri, IMS, in charge of the Neesoon Hospital, telling him to borrow as much money as he could from the civilian population and that we would under-write any loans made. By July 1945 he had raised the remarkable sum of \$406,319 on this slight security, and had spent it on medical supplies; the death rate had fallen.

It is my feeling that loyalty in the old Indian Army was more personal than anything else. To quote one example: in Changi POW Camp, our guards were provided by Mohan Singh's HQ and one day a fracas broke out at one of the gates between the guards and some British officers. I wandered over to see what was happening. Imagine my surprise - one of the guards was my driver, Sirdar Singh. He rushed at me with a large grin on his face and hugged me like the prodigal son must have done when he returned to his father. There was no more trouble with the guards. Again - the sort of experience that came to many - on release three and a half years later, I nicked a jeep to look for our senior Indian officer, a Punjabi Brahmin, Captain Parshotam Das. I soon

found him with a party of Punjabi Muslims of our regiment. He hugged me tight and cried with joy saying: 'Here at last is a sahib whom I can trust and who will solve all our difficulties'. This was ample reward for what we had been through. I had great difficulty in not crying too.

Those who refused to join the INA in 1942 were in a predicament. They were under INA administration and the Japanese would not recognise them as Prisoners of War. They petitioned the Japanese on a number of occasions to be taken over and treated as pukka POW, stating that they never had and never would join the INA. But the Japanese would not agree. Numbers of POW were sent overseas on working parties - to the East Indies and South-West Pacific. Others were formed into MT companies to carry out transport work for the Japanese in and around Singapore. Because the MT companies got about the place they proved of inestimable value in maintaining contact between British and Indian prisoners - which was strictly forbidden by the Japanese. Later, after the end of Mohan Singh's INA, the Japanese recognised the existence of Indian POW as distinct from the INA and an Indian POW HQ was set up to administer the Indian camps. Major (later Lt Gen) Bahadur Singh (Balu) of the 4/19 Hyderabad Regiment was the liaison officer at this HQ. Due to his indefatigable work in organising hospitals and rations, the lot of the POW was considerably eased. In fact this period might be regarded as one of peace and quiet for the Indian PW whose treatment and conditions became similar to those of the British. On account of the nature of his work Major Bahadur Singh was accused by some of the Indian POW of being 'Nip-happy', and in October 1943 Havildar Sawarn Singh reported him to the Japanese for spreading anti-Japanese propaganda amongst the troops. He lost his job but his work continued.


Through Bahadur Singh and a number of brave and devoted jawans in the MT Companies and elsewhere, who acted with supreme contempt for their captors, we were able to assemble written records of the INA, especially of the leaders and of those who had committed atrocities against their fellow-countrymen. These were collected and preserved in a steel cylinder with a screw top and a solid base, - made by me in the camp workshop, from an old fire hydrant stand pipe - which when not in use was sunk in one of our vegetable gardens. On release we captured the INA 2nd Echelon which confirmed our records. To my knowledge ten Indian POW were decorated for their bravery in this connection; the following names come to mind: Hav Major Nur Khan, 4/22 Mtn Regt, Jem Karam Dad, 9th Ind Div Signals, Hav Mohd Khan, 2/16 Punjab Regt, Jem Gandharab Singh, 3/16 Punjab Regt. A number of Indian officers were likewise rewarded, including Major Bahadur Singh, and Captains (later Major Generals) Hari Badhwar (of 3 Cavalry later 4 Hodsons Horse) and Dargalkar (of 3 Cavalry) who had been utterly stalwart under appalling treatment by the Japanese.

After the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose from Germany in mid 1943, the INA, which had been kept going at much reduced strength on a care and maintenance basis since its 'dissolution', was reorganised and revived. The appearance of Bose and his formation of the 'Provisional Indian Government' in October 1943 gave great impetus to the Indian Independence Movement; but Bose had a very cool reception from the Indian POW when he tried to recruit and he obtained only a handful of volunteers. Thereafter the lot of the POW deteriorated,

Towards the end of 1943 the INA began to move to Burma; Bose moved his HQ to Rangoon in January 1944. The INA were now little seen in Singapore. Propaganda, recruitment etc. continued through the Rear HQ of the INA which remained there. This hardly affected the POW as it was chiefly directed towards the Indian civilian community.

After the Japanese surrender and before we returned to India, a committee of ex-prisoners of war, including myself, two other British officers and about fifteen Indian officers, sat in Singapore under the chairmanship of a Brigadier sent from India for the purpose, to recommend what should be done with the INA. The unanimous decision was that those on our Black List (about 350 names) should not be allowed back into the Indian Army and should be summarily punished, the rest allowed back and pensioned off. Some members of the committee, - I was not one of them - explained the findings to the Viceroy, Lord Wavell. It is to be noted that the handling of the great bulk of the INA was eventually more severe than our recommendations. The actual trials were ended by a political decision in April 1946, but the overwhelming majority of the INA were not allowed back into the Indian Army, nearly all were discharged and more than half lost all entitlement to pension or back-pay for the time spent in enemy hands. Very few officers, - those with records of brave resistance to and sabotage of the INA - were allowed back at all.

More than once it has been said to me in the intervening years that the morale of British and Australian prisoners of war in the Far East was amazingly high considering what they had suffered. Men who had come from the Burma-Siam railway camps were full of questions about the war - which they had missed! What was PLUTO, what was D Day, what could they do to help, was there any work that they could be given now? The same was true of the prisoners in Changi, and I recall that I myself on arrival in England refused to take the leave so liberally offered and demanded to be given something immediately to do. This was due, I think, to a certain sort of freedom which we had enjoyed - even those so cruelly treated on the railway. When we were bottled up at night, it is hard to describe how irritating harmless occupations such as your neighbour's snoring, scratching etc became. But we could from



time to time get away from our fellow men. For instance I spent half my time with other POWs going out of the camp to cut wood for our own use- when we had Korean guards we used to carry their rifles for them - or in helping NOT to build Changi airfield (a non-activity resisted by some). Also there was a job to do as an Indian Army POW, and once we realised that we were treated no worse than the ordinary Jap soldier it was easier to accept our conditions. Even on the railway there were interludes, I am told, when Japanese soldiers and British POW sunbathed and swam from the same sandbank. I was never myself beaten up though there were some near misses; all Japanese were not brutes, but I can quite understand the bitterness of the many tortured or injured.

I eventually got back to India on about 15th October 1945 on a troopship full of other prisoners of war from Singapore. I remember standing on deck with some of our own jawans while we were waiting to disembark at Madras, when the news broke that the INA were being garlanded in Calcutta and treated as heroes. A cry went up around me: 'But, sahib, we are the heroes, not those surely. I felt very sad for them.

Service to the Services

CANTEEN STORES DEPARTMENT

"ADELPHI"
119, MAHARSHI KARVE ROAD,
BOMBAY-400 020

**IN PURSUIT OF ENHANCED CONSUMER
SATISFACTION TO OUR VALIANT
ARMED FORCES**

Air Mobility Operations: An Indian Experience

AIR VICE MARSHAL S S MALHOTRA AVSM, VM, (RETD)

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Large Scale Military Air Transport Operations (MATO) are contemporary by products of the World War II. The policy of western allies about the future status of Berlin and the aims and consequences of NATO prompted the Russians to resort to the "Berlin Blockade", by stopping rail, road & water borne communications and reducing the power supply. This led to the mass airlift to sustain the population of West Berlin. The success and magnitude of this airlift set the pace for the future Military Air Transportation Operations for maintenance of troops & civil population in far flung and inaccessible areas.

Ever since the advent of communications, the transport services have played a crucial role in the history of mankind during peace and war. After the advent of Air Transportation the courier flights became crucial to provide massive airlifts, and in coping with the logistics requirements all over the world during war and peace. Whether it was to halt the advance or ensure a victory through a rapid build up, or a tactical withdrawal and emergency evacuation, or to establish and sustain peace or promote science and technological missions, courier flights were indispensable and the most economic and fastest means of achieving the aim.

All the Air Forces (Military Aviation) had devised their own methodology to cope up with their requirements -- domestic or overseas, depending on their area of operation & span of activities. The Royal Air Force had to meet its commitments throughout its Empire and Commonwealth countries. The USA & USSR Air Forces had to meet their global commitments within their Treaty and Pac: obligations or under the UN charter. The RAF operated scheduled courier flights from the UK to The Far East and Canada even before the WW II and post WW II period witnessed the emergence of heavier and longer range aircraft (thus reducing the number of transit halts). However, their flights were tailored to their requirements of linking and maintaining regular bases or to meet ferries and staging requirements and that is how one did come across RAF transport aircraft routinely flying London-Aden-Singapore (Via Carnicobar) - Hongkong-Sydney routes.

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Indian Air Force continued with the W.W. II routes and during the post W.W. II period and after Independence, they started their own Internal and External Courier Routes. Internal routes were divided into North and South, East and West & Garland routes; duration of each courier ranging from three to six days, using Dakota aircraft. One aircraft used to fly across the country from Jorhat to Jamnagar via Nagpur, Kanpur or Delhi. One Dakota used to fly clockwise from Barrackpore back to Barrackpore, i.e. Nagpur-Hyderabad-Tambaram-Sulur-Poona-Jamnagar-Agra-Jammu-Kanpur-Barrackpore. The other Dakota used to touch the same stations following an anti-clockwise pattern. East -- West courier, Jorhat-Barrackpore-Kanpur-Jodhpur-Jamnagar-Delhi-Kanpur-B'Pore-Jorhat used to be of three days duration. The North and South courier used to fly Srinagar-Jammu-Delhi/Agra-Nagpur-Begumpet-Bangalore/Sulur-Tambaram & back, once again a three day schedule. Deviation in route and timeframe was permissible at the discretion of the Captain depending on the weather, serviceability, night flying facilities, load/passenger availability. Changes in the itinerary were usually authorised by Base/Headquarters. Carnicobar courier got added on in 1956 and was a weekly flight to meet the fresh and dry ration requirements of the Staging Post. The Dakotas operated ex Barrackpore via Rangoon, whereas Packets, HS-748, AN-12, AN-32 and IL-76 could operate non-stop from the mainland.

Region wise courier was introduced on setting up of geographical and rolewise commands except Assam Courier ex Delhi which took birth during and after Chinese aggression in October 1962. Initially we used Dakotas, Viscounts & Packets till Super Connies got inducted after proclamation of the 1962 Emergency. Till 1963, the Super Connies were operated by Air India personnel; later Air Force personnel took over after getting trained. Major servicing continued to be done by Air India at Bombay. The route for Super Connie was Delhi -Bagdogra-Jorhat-Bagdogra-Delhi. Hasimara-Tezpur and Chabua were alternates to Bagdogra & Jorhat and operated from those bases when Bagdogra & Jorhat were closed for operations due to runway extension and re-surfacing. This is the only other courier (after Car-Nic) which has been and still is in operation since its inception in October 1962, though the type of aircraft had been changing. After the Super Connies were handed over to the Indian Navy, AN-12 took over and since its phasing out the task is entrusted to IL-76. Within the region, we had the Link (Lima) couriers connecting remote stations, ALGs and Helipads to Assam Courier destinations. The aircraft used were Dakotas, Otters, Carribous, Helicopters--Allouettes, MI-4 and later MI-8. All seven North Eastern States were linked.

In the Western Air Command area No 12 Sqn Dakotas/Packets used to undertake courier flights between ALGs, DZs, Detachments to main bases. ALGs and DZs were linked by 'L' courier to Srinagar, Jammu, and Pathankot

by Helicopters, Dakotas, IL-14s from where the Packets used to take over for Delhi-Agra-Jodhpur-Jamnagar route. After the formation of Maintenance Command and moving out of Conversion and Training Squadron from Agra to Begumpet/Yallahanka, these commands started their own courier linking their Bases and Depots to meet their requirements. The aircraft used were Dakotas, HS-748 and Helicopters. On formation of Central Air Command (CAC) and South Western Air Command (SWAC), their respective couriers started operating to their Stations/Bases using the aircraft under their own control. Inter-Command re-allocation of air effort could always be resorted to by Air HQ to meet specific and special airlift requirements. Such courier's periodicity was generally weekly or fortnightly. In addition to all these, a monthly courier was also in vogue - for S&C Publications and distribution of salaries, cash, mail, etc. This was directly under the control of Air HQ.

In the late seventies, when Transport Training Wing (TTW) Yallahanka switched over to HS-748 training, No 10 Wing had to be entrusted with the task of converting pilots to Dakotas-after HS-748 conversion, to man Dakota Squadrons - a retrograde step as far as pilots were concerned. Two Squadrons were operating Dakotas for supply dropping in NE Region. Their monthly flying used to be around 400 hrs per Squadron, out of which nearly 60 percent was training flying. In 1981, we started a Mike (Maintenance and Movement) courier, linking all stations in Eastern Air Command, twice a day, viz. Chabua-Jorhat-Tezpur-Guwahati-Kumbigram-Hasimara-Bagdogra-Barrackpore-Kalaikunda (Night Hailt) and back. One Dakota would leave KKD and one Chabua, crossing each other at Hasimara. EAC was able to cut out all short notice special Training Cross Countries in connection with urgent movement of spares, engines, personnel etc; all within a total air effort of 370 hours per month. In addition, the U/T pilots got adequately trained on route flying, procedures and problems and 'away from Base' landings. 'Mike' courier lasted till the DAKS were phased out in 1986.

The external or 'Foreign Couriers after Independence were generally tailored to meet the requirements of new inductions of aircraft and weapon systems. Till then they were operated to meet the war effort and post WWII Allies and Empire's commitments. When I joined the service in 1953, there were only two monthly couriers ie U.K courier and Indonesian courier. Till the induction of Packets these couriers were undertaken alternately by No. 11 and 12 Squadrons - the only two Transport Squadrons. After the induction of Toofanis the UK courier frequency increased and it was taken over by Packets of No. 12 Sqn; No.11 solely looking after Indonesian courier, till 1958. After the induction of Hunters, Mysteres, Gnats, Canberras, the UK courier commitments increased manifold--once a week routine and during peak period, even twice a week. The duration of round trip was generally 10-15 days. The

highlight of UK Courier in Packet Aircraft was a record performance of 'Four Day Round Trip' By Laloo Grewal. The only tragedy was the Dakota crash on 06 Oct 1951 at Gultar in Turkey, killing five crew - both pilots i.e. Air Cmde Narendra, Fg Offr Phillipose and three others viz Fg Offr Ghosh, Sgts Gill and D'souza. Flt Lt Choudhry and Plt Offr 'Lambu' Dutt were injured while the aircraft HJ 940 was completely destroyed.

The route & halts used to depend on aircraft to aircraft and protocol and diplomatic relations. The Packets made way for Super Connies and Super Connies yielded to AN-12/IL76. It was generally preferred to transit through RAF Bases where reciprocal facilities were available apart from aircraft handling and technical services. Other port facilities like Customs/Currency/Health/Immigration/Messing etc. posed no problems. The destinations one often heard those days were Jamnagar-Sharjah-Baghdad-Istanbul-Beirut-Malta-athens (or Sharjah-Cairo-Malta-Athens) - Naples-Nice-Lebourget (Later Istres) -Northolt; subsequently reducing to only two halts enroute i.e. Cairo & Paris in Super Connie. Indonesian courier continued to be undertaken by Dakotas except a couple of them which were done by Packets while carrying VIPs to reduce the number of transit halts, the route being Barrackpore-Rangoon-Bangkok-Kualalumpur-Djakarta & back.

After the induction of IL-14s, AN -12s MiGs and other weapon systems of USSR Origin, 'Fortnightly or Monthly Russian courier' was started with AN-12s. Before that a few trips were done by IL-14s via Kabul, Tashkent and Frunze. After 1965 conflict with Pakistan, the routing had to be changed via Dubai-Tehran-Tibilisi and Tashkent to Moscow, ex Jamnagar. On induction of Iskara, Poland courier by AN-12 aircraft had to be introduced monthly or quarterly, depending on spares, ferries and repairs requirements. A few external flights at regular intervals had to be undertaken to the USSR in connection with the major servicing of aircraft like TU-124 & AN-12 (till we established our own infrastructure for AN-12/MI-8s/MiG variants). A few more were undertaken to the UK and France in connection with the ferry flights of additional Canberras and Hunters and their staging. Likewise the Congo couriers were operated to Leopoldville on as and when required basis where our Canberras were operating as part of the UN Forces. Likewise, before that during 1953-55, courier flights were operated to Indo-China by Dakotas (after the initial airlift of Indian troops by Dakotas as part of the ICSC to Saigon/Hanoi) to support the Indian contingent. Much later, ofcourse, we operated the external courier to Sri Lanka in support of the IPKF using Helicopters and fixed wing aircraft including IL-76. No couriers were operated during the induction and ferry flight of Otters & Carribous except the initial staging effort, which was provided by the Packets of No. 12 Sqn.

The external flights of other aircraft into our country were equally

thrilling. We got as much training and opportunity to develop initiative in problem solving by handling foreign aircraft in India as we got while flying our own machines to foreign lands. RAF aircraft flying from Aden to Hongkong staging through Carnic or any of their VIPs making use of a routine courier flight and diverting it through Delhi, put to test our technical and handling capabilities and port facilities. More thrilling used to be the handling of Pakistan Air Force's courier from Karachi-Lahore-Delhi to Dacca and Chittagong, operating a high cockpit, fixed under-carriage Bristol (168-170) Freighter aircraft. Once it was made to land while flying without diplomatic clearance and on top of that their Head of State-Field Marshal Ayub Khan was on board; the only time I stammered on telephone as a Flying Officer manning the Base Operations Room. But soon thereafter, the aircraft was allowed to depart and I regained control over myself after handing over duties to Oi/c Flying - W/C C G I Phillip.

The couriers were not only a treat or thrill, shopping or money making missions. They generated their own tensions, turbulence and torture--mental, physical and financial; the language, the air-traffic controls, the diplomats' attitude concerning crew accommodation and allowances, lack of admin and technical facilities, the passengers without valid documents, loading and over-loading problems, non-availability of latest route charts and information, flying of American and English machines into Russian territory and vice-versa (even Anglo French specifications in terms of tools, adapters, ground power supply systems, did not match) definitely generated avoidable nervousness. An odd enterprising crew member or a passenger, jeopardised the smooth progress of the mission - purchase of an odd small arm (weapon), ammunition, contraband, large quantity of whisky or cloth(es), undeclared foreign currency at times proved to be a night-mare for service, captain, customs or the country, leading to prolonged investigations and disciplinary action - apart from the financial loss due to confiscation or non-clearance of loans and audit objections.

It is a pity that no body has worked out the quantum of load and personnel airlifted and flying effort carried out by the courier flight--individually and collectively. It would have definitely been a record setting and noteworthy performance in the annals of Aviation, more so when co-related with the flight safety aspects. Only one Dakota crash due to bad weather, coupled with engine failure, in Turkey, only three casualties would surpass all records pertaining to even mass airlifts--civil and military. With the introduction of computers, the task of compiling this information, if past records are maintained and available, should not be a difficult proposition. We should work for our rightful place in the history of the world aviation. Even the post 1962 airlifts to J&K and Northeast by IAF & US Air Force during 1962-63 would appear monumental in terms of tonnages lifted, flying hours and accident free flights.

Post WW II Berlin Airlift by allied Air Forces lasted just about 322 days from June 25, 1948 to May 12, 1949 (both days inclusive). Air lift started with a meagre effort of six tons, to meet an estimated requirement of 2,500 tons per day to keep Berlin's population of 2.5 million supplied with crucial amount of fuel & food. Berlin had only one month's stock of food & fuel. On September 17, 1948, the RAF airlifted a record 7,000 tonnes in 895 flights in a 24 hour period and the USAF flew 651 flights to airlift 5,500 tons despite poor visibility due to fog, heavy rain and high winds, to celebrate 'Air Forces day'. This was the proof of their will to keep Berlin supplied with crucial items of subsistence despite the land blockade. On February 18, 1949, the 'millionth ton' was airlifted in 239 days (making an average of 4184 tones per day) - RAF transport aircraft landing successfully, with 7.5 tons of potatoes at Gatow airfield, with Visibility barely 500 yards in fog. The Air Traffic Controllers contribution in air-bridging Berlin was equally significant in consistently ensuring one take off & one landing in less than 30 seconds (a flight a minute as it came to be known popularly).

Airlift of 13000 tons of supplies on April 16, 1949 - 294th day of blockade/airlift, really brought the 'End to the Blockade' in sight and divided the Russian hierarchy about its continuation. Blockade was ultimately lifted on May 12, 1949, after 322 days, airlift aggregating 13,47,280 tons, averaging 4184 tons per day, maximum being 13,000/- tons in a single day, on April 16, 1949. The end of the blockade brought a sense of victory to Berliners.

The tables at the Appendix, worked out as a rough estimate, should be an eye opener for all airlift operators and aviators and a motivater for Air HQ to search out the records and work out more accurate information.

REMARKS :

- (a) Figures do not include the airlift effort in respect of joint para exercises, routine air maintenance in Western and Eastern Sectors, emergency relief & rescue operations (natural calamities/otherwise), airlift of para military forces, tourism oriented fares and festivals, special tasks in connection with induction and staging of aircraft, helicopters, cultural troupes, special tasks in connection with state-hood inauguration, Republic day celebrations etc. AN-32 & IL-76 effort could offset this shortfall.
- (b) The percentage between passengers and cargo in respect of Car-Nic courier has been assumed to be 2/3 / 1/3 and 70 / 30 in respect of Assam courier.
- (c) The weight per passenger has been taken as 100 kg.
- (d) An over load factor of 10 per cent has been added over and above the payload for meeting exigencies of the military and service task,

A - CARNICOBAR COURIER-01 AUG 1956- 31 JUL 1995 (39 YEARS)

PERIOD	A/C TYPE	FREQUENCY	NO OF TRIPS (BOTHWAYS) PER YEAR	PAYLOAD PER TRIP (TONNES)	TONNAGE PER YEAR/ TOTAL PERIOD	TOTAL CARGO/ PASSENGERS +10%	TOTAL TONNAGE FOR THE PERIOD
AUG 56-JUL 60 (4 YRS)	DAKOTAS, EX B' PORE VIA RANGOON	WEEKLY	52x2=104	1.5	156/624	458/2280	686
AUG 60-JUL 73 (13 YRS)	PACKETS, C-119/G EX B'PORE/KKD,DCT	WEEKLY	52x2=104	2.5	260/3380	2488/2300	3718
AUG 73-JUL 95 (22 YRS)	HS-748 EX, GORAKHPUR KKD, BHUBANESWAR, TAMBARAM	WEEKLY	52x2=104	2.5	260/7800	6006/25740	8580
AUG 85-JUL 95 (10 YRS)	AN-32 EX, B'PORE/KKD	MONTHLY	12x2=24	3.5	84/840	616/3080	924
AUG 86-JUL 95 (9 YRS)	IL-76 EX, AGRA/DEL	QUARTERLY	4x2=8	21	168/1512	1108/5550	1663
TOTAL Average Load per year : 341 Tonnes			104x39=4056			8861/44220	13283

B - ASSAM COURIER - OCT 62 TO SEP 95 (33 YEARS)

OCT 62-SEP 72 (10YRS)	SUPER CONNIE	WEEKLY	104	9	936/9360	3080/72100	10290
OCT 72-SEP 87 (15 YRS)	ONE AN-12 OR TWO AN-32	WEEKLY	104	10	1040/15600	5145/120150	17160
OCT 87-SEP 95 (8 YRS)	IL-76	WEEKLY	104	35	3640/29120	9609/22423	32032
TOTAL			104x33=3432			17834/416470	59482
Average Load per year : 1802 Tonnes							
AGGREGATE TOTAL A+B							
		CARGO	- 8861 + 17834 = 26695	TONNES			
		PAX	44220 + 416470 = 460690	OR 46069 TONNES			

TOTAL TONNAGE = 26695+46069 = 72764 TONNES

compassionate grounds exodus and influx before or after festivals and supernumerary crew for training, servicing and maintenance.

(e) Air effort in respect of inter Island courier commitments after revision in courier schedule (Port-Blair/Carnic-Port Blair) has not been worked out and should rightly form a part of such calculations.

(f) Rough estimates of flying effort are as under : -

(A) - FLYING HOURS - CARNICOBAR COURIER

DAK BARRACKPORE- BARRACKPORE	$52 \times 4 = 208 \times 16 = 3328$ Hrs (Via Rangoon)
C-119/G	$52 \times 13 = 676 \times 12 = 8112$ Hrs. (Via Rangoon)
HS-748 BASE TO BASE	$52 \times 22 = 1144 \times 10 = 11440$ Hrs.
AN-32 AGRA - AGRA OR JORHAT - JORHAT	$12 \times 10 = 120 \times 12 = 1440$ Hrs.
IL-76 AGRA-AGRA OR NAGPUR-NAGPUR	$4 \times 9 = 36 \times 10 = 360$ Hrs.
Total Hours	24680

(B) - FLYING HOURS - ASSAM COURIER

Super Connie (Pune to Pune) Ten years	$52 \times 10 = 520 \times 16 = 8320$ hrs.
AN-12 CHANDIGARH - CHANDIGARH 15 Years.	$52 \times 15 = 780 \times 12 = 9360$ hrs.
IL-76 (Base to Base) 8 Years	$52 \times 8 = 416 \times 8 = 3328$ hrs.
Total Hours	21008

Grand Total (A+B) $24680 + 21008 = 45688$ hrs.

Letters to the Editor

Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the services.

I

Dear Sir,

INFANTRY DAY

If there is one event which warrants inclusion in the Guinness Book of the bizarre, is the Indian Army's celebration of the 'Infantry Day' on 27 Oct, to mark the occasion when a company of the Sikhs and Kumaon Regiment landed in Srinagar to fight the Pakistani raiders. Even a memorial lecture has been instituted for the purpose, which Field Marshal Manekshaw inaugurated in Delhi last week.

It is not realised that, unlike the other arms and Services, like the Engineers, Artillery and Signals etc, who have a distinct connotation of a 'corps', the Infantry does not have a common linkage of this nature. For that matter, it does not even have a common tie, a distinctive scarf or even a common flag, like is the case with the other arms and services. The Infantry's allegiance has always been to the particular regiment, eg the Gorkhas or Dogras or the Sikhs, but never to the Infantry per se. The same applies to the Infantry's father figure designation of Colonel of a particular regiment, and not Colonel of the Infantry, which is in sharp contrast to the designation of Colonel Commandant of the Corps of Engineers, Artillery or Signals as a whole, and not of any particular regiment of such arms.

Notwithstanding the above, as far as I can remember, even the companies of the Sikhs and Kumaons which were involved in the Srinagar battle, did not march there on their own, but were airlifted to the border area by the 12 Sqn IAF. Why not then call 27 Oct as Air Force Day? It is as illogical as saying that, as the first Indian officer to get a VC in World War II and a PVC in the 1947 J&K operations were both officers of the Corps of Engineers, one of such days should be called the Engineers Day.

If it was at all necessary to have an Infantry Day, it should have been selected for an event with a distinctive Infantry flavour. For example, it could have been the day when the Directorate of Infantry was first established in India, or the day when the first Indian appointed to that position, or even the

day of the inauguration of the Infantry School at Mhow. To the best of my knowledge no army in the world celebrates an 'Infantry Day' but then, our army is different, and our Infantry even more so.

When I had referred this case to the Army HQ for a classification, I got a cryptic answer from the Dte of C & W, AG's Branch, quote "celebration of Infantry Day has the approval of Army HQ" unquote. The letter gave no logical reason or the rationale for this decision, nor did it refute even a line or a word of what I had stated. I therefore request some subscribers to your journal to enlighten me on this issue, and without mincing any words, to tell me where I have gone wrong in my thinking.

Yours faithfully

16-A, Shankerseth Road
Pune - 411 042

Brig N B Grant, AVSM (Retd)

II

Dear Editor,

WORKING TOGETHER FOR PEACE

Apropos your well thought out Editorial in the April-June 95 issue of the Journal, I should like to submit three points to ponder. First, we know that Pakistan not only possesses nuclear capability but by dint of its pragmatic handling of international relations, has elicited the support of the US on one side and the Islamic World on the other both politically and materially. Pakistan has been thirsting for revenge since 1971 but it knows that success will not come its way via a conventional war with India. It will therefore strike us with a nuclear weapon sooner or later; this is indubitable. Ergo, we must go nuclear ourselves if we wish to avoid a repeat of the 1962 debacle, this time at Pakistan's hands and with far worse consequences. The balance of terror can best be assured on our subcontinent by both sides being nuclear. Second, once we go nuclear we can conveniently do away with three Army Commands viz. Central, Western and Southern Commands. Appropriate reductions can also be effected in our Navy, Air Force and the para military forces. Hence the financial burden of going nuclear will be squared off by reducing conventional forces. Third, the Army must totally absolve itself - by dire threat if necessary - from its counter insurgency role, an albatross that our politicians have saddled it with so that they can have a readymade scapegoat. This role must be assigned to the para military forces. Insurgency movements are deliberately encouraged by politicians so that they can extract maximum "power and pelf" for themselves. It is *deja vu* that no solution will ever be found to insurgency.

Sir Christopher France has glossed over one fact of life in his presentation - England will never have to go to war alone. This is a far cry in our case. The fault is wholly ours because we have never had a cogent foreign policy since independence. Inanities like Panchsheel and Non alignment are strictly for the birds, as events have proved. We refused to accept the truism thanks to our ostrich syndrome that Foreign Policy and Defence essentially complement each other for a developing country.

9-A Beltola Road
Calcutta 700 026

Yours truly

Lt Col J K Dutt (Retd)

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles on National Security issues and Defence and Security forces, for publication in the USI Journal, may be sent to the Editor in duplicate, typed in double spacing. Subjects should be covered in depth with adequate research and reference made to sources from where information has been obtained. The length of articles should be between 3,000 to 4,000 words.

Articles may not be returned unless accompanied by self-addressed and stamped envelope.

Review Article 1

The Threat From Islamic Fundamentalism

AIR MARSHAL H K OBERAI, PVSM, AVSM, VM (RETD)

The cold war is over. Communism is virtually extinct. The United States of America has emerged as the only super power. No one can challenge its military supremacy. Its sway is absolute. There are no worthy opponents in sight. The think tanks had gone into limbo and the military industrial combine was losing its *raison d'être*. Something had to be done to ensure their resuscitation. Suddenly a host of strategic threats to the security of USA were seen. "Islamic Fundamentalism" heads the list. John L. Esposito the author of "The Islamic Threat" contests such an assumption. He delves deep into history to buttress his conclusions. He brings out that "The history of Muslim-Jewish-Christian relations has been more of competition and combat than dialogue and mutual understanding, driven by competing theological claims and political interests. The confrontations and conflicts have spanned the ages and reinforced images of a historic and global militant Islam... The realities of colonialism and imperialism, although are conveniently overlooked by many in the West, are part of its living legacy firmly planted in the memory, however exaggerated at times, of many in the Middle East". Herein lies the genesis of the problem.

Western nations had subjugated Muslim and other countries of Asia and Africa for centuries. They continue to exploit their mineral and oil resources even to-day. The West helped in the creation of Israel and continues to provide it political and military support. Israel was able to inflict humiliating defeats on Arabs. Loss of territories has shattered the Muslim / Arab psyche. Their pride in their culture and history has received a body-blow. There is soul searching in the Islamic world. How did they go wrong? Western models of Govt. have become suspect. An Arab / Muslim identity less dependent on the West and rooted more vigorously in Arab / Muslim heritage and values which had given Islam its halcyon days appears to provide a release from disillusionment. A collective urge of this nature, which impels the Muslims to go back to the fundamentals of their religion need not be seen as a threat. A broad look at the international Islamic scene helps us to see the issue in its true dimensions.

Out of the total world population of one billion Muslims, over 650

The Islamic Threat : Myth or Reality? By John L. Esposito, New York, Oxford Univ, 1992, p. 243, \$ 22.00, ISBN 0-19-507184-0.

Air Marshal H K Oberai is a former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of an Air Force operational Command and a former Principal Staff Officer at Air Headquarters, India.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXV, No. 522, October-December, 1995.

million reside in Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Barring the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, there is no other significant radical or fundamentalist Muslim party or group in these countries. The Jamaat received considerable succour from late president Zia-ul-Haq and was exploited by him for sectarian purposes. After his passing away, it has lost popular support, receiving only 5% of the total vote in the last elections held in Pakistan. Thus, barring a miniscule minority in Pakistan, 65% of world's Muslims pose no conceivable threat to the security of USA or the prevailing world order.

Approximately 350 million Muslims reside in various other countries. There are relatively larger Muslim populations in Iran, Egypt and Algeria. Iran's political moves and other actions during Ayatullah Khomeini's time may be regarded as an aberration. The West had plundered its oil wealth and had unabashedly interfered in its internal affairs. It had conspired in the deposition of Iran's legally elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, after he had nationalised the oil industry. The Shah who had been exiled by Mossadegh, returned to Tehran in a US plane accompanied by the head of CIA. The Shah remained a puppet in the hands of the West. He was insensitive to the aspirations of his people. His economic programmes and extensive military purchases benefited only the rich. His crude efforts to westernise the Iranian society were seen as threats to the cultural and religious moorings of the populace. The position is well explained in the words of a popular socialist Iranian. He said "We effect western training, we effect western thinking and we follow western procedures to solve Iranian problems". No wonder then, Khomeini who had given a call for a new political order based on Sharia and promised to solve Iranian problems by Islamic teachings, returned home triumphant from exile in France.

Iran of Ayatullah Khomeini has given way to Iran of Ali Rafsanjani. Khomeini denounced the West and called the USA "The Great Satan", while Rafsanjani is a pragmatist who is endeavouring to build bridges to the West. National interests now predominate the export of Islamic revolution. Support to terrorist groups like Hizbullah has been muted. Economic reconstruction has been given priority for which cooperation with the West rather than confrontation is deemed necessary. Besides, after experience in the war with Iraq, Iran is unlikely to get embroiled in any military misadventure.

Egypt is regarded as the leader of the Arab world. It is the most progressive Islamic state, but its electoral system does not permit any challenge. "Muslim Brotherhood" which is considered the main opposition is yet to find political legitimacy. The platform of the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups is clear. They want Islamic alternatives to Egypt's socio-economic problems. There is nothing fundamentalist about such a proposition. A people must be allowed to

choose a system that suits their genius. The West despite its oft repeated commitments to democracy has preferred to remain silent on the persecution of "Muslim Brotherhood".

The position in Tunisia and Algeria is no different. In Algeria, "Islamic Salvation Front" which had won power in a free and fair election and proposes to pursue an Islamic path to social and economic development has not been allowed to form a government. In fact, like the Brotherhood in Egypt, its members have been hounded and forced to go underground. They need to be regarded as freedom fighters rather than fundamentalists.

The case of PLO deserves special mention. Here are a people who were forcibly driven out of their land to make room for the birth of another country. Their sufferings and frustrations are unparalleled. They were left with no other alternative but to take up arms. Their legitimate demand for a homeland should have been conceded decades earlier. It would have avoided so much bloodshed. They are no fundamentalists. They are eschewing violence even though only limited autonomy has been conceded to them so far. Grant of sovereign rights will truly integrate them with the international community.

The author brings out that, Islam is not as monolithic as is made out to be. Islam of Turkey is not quite the Islam of Saudi Arabia. Even in Afghanistan where various groups and tribes united under the Islamic banner and compelled the Soviet forces to withdraw, religion is unable to provide the necessary impetus for political consensus and national unity. The concept of Umma or pan Islam is there, but the prevailing diversities within the Islamic world rule out the sudden emergence of a transnational Islamic community.

Words of James Piscataries, another keen watcher of the Islamic scene are relevant; "The problem with assuming a unified response is that it conceals the reality of entrenched national differences and national interests amongst Muslims".

John Esposito quite rightly highlights that, there is no such thing as an Islamic threat. There are of course fringe elements in Islam like they are in other religions. The ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and the massacre in Hebron are recent examples. If the so called Islamic fundamentalist groups are in the news more often, then the West must share atleast part of the responsibility. It has failed to explicitly condemn the repression in Egypt and Algeria. It is silent about the misdeeds of autocratic regimes in Morocco and Saudi Arabia. In fact it is seen as a collaborator and its commitment to democracy and human rights is considered suspect. It is perceived to care more about its economic and security interests rather than welfare on civil liberties of people in the developing world.

The writer gives us a brilliant exposition of the relationship that is developing between Islamic ideology and political power. He believes, "For many Muslims, Islamic revivalism is a social rather than political movement whose goal is more Islamically minded and oriented society, but not necessarily the creation of an Islamic state. For others, establishment of an Islamic order requires the creation of an Islamic state". And should such a state emerge through the free will of its people, their decision must be respected.

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Review Article 2

The Second World War : A Fresh Look

COMMANDER S VARMA, SC, IN (RETD)

Probably the most catastrophic event that has ever occurred in the four thousand five hundred million years old history of our planet was the Second World War. Consequently thousands of books have been written about it. Fifty years after the end of the Second World War comes this magnum opus which is unique in its treatment of history of that period. Prof. Weinberg, an eminent historian, has used all the documents which had been de-classified in various countries along with the existing literature to come out with this book.

He has briefly outlined the reasons for the occurrence of the Second World War and the part played Hitler and other *dramatis personae*. One of the most important contributions made by Prof. Weinberg is the ability of the reader to visualize the global geopolitical situation at any given point of time. He has very clearly shown the options before the belligerents after each phase of the conflict. For instance, what were the options for Germany before the war and how did they interact with the Russian perception of signing a peace treaty with Germany. The advantages and disadvantages that each of these two nations would have got from the treaty. Similarly options before the United States, France, Great Britain and Japan are clearly spelt out in the light of the treaty. While discussing Germany's attitude towards the neutral countries he writes that a plan for the invasion of Switzerland was considered by Hitler. In fact, Colonel General von Leeb was sent on a secret reconnaissance mission to that country.

Once the war was in full swing in the west, it became abundantly clear that the French were in no condition to check the Germans. Though materially superior it was the military leadership that was found wanting. "In World War I it has been said, with at least some degree of justice, that the British soldiers fought like lions but were led by donkeys. In the first stage of World War II, this description best characterized the French" the author has written. He also has exploded the popular concept that Hitler deliberately allowed the British to escape from Dunkirk so that they would sue for peace. He writes quoting official documents, "Hitler was confident that few of the British would escape

A World at Arms : A Global History of World War II. By Gerhard L. Weinberg, Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1994, p. 1178, £ 24.95, ISBN 0-521-44317-2.

Commander S. Varma in a well - known radio and Television Commentator on defence issues and a frequent writer on military matters.

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- the later suggestion that he hoped that the British might be encouraged to make peace by being allowed to get away is a fabrication”.

There were three reasons for Hitler to attack the Soviet Union, geopolitical, ideological and finally military. He has elucidated all the three and clearly shown how these affected the final outcome. Hitler was entirely correct in issuing the “hold at all cost” order in December 1941, it prevented an utter rout. He states that the reasons for the Germans being able to hold out, “One element was the ability of experienced German higher officers. A second was the desperate cohesion of small units... holding together for survival. The third was the narrow margin of Soviet superiority.” But it was the setback at Stalingrad which had great repercussions of the German home front and its allies. It brought into focus for the first time that, after three and a half years of war, all was not going well, neither in Russia nor in North Africa. It also resulted in a major effort in mobilization the home front.

The entry of Japan into the war and with it the United States had a tremendous effect on the conduct of the war. The great industrial capacity of the latter country was now available to the allies, not to mention the huge reserves of manpower. The special relationship between the US and Britain produced, despite its ups and downs, the desired results. The author has clearly shown the differences in strategic thinking between the allies and its effect on the results. Americans were not happy with the British policy in the Mediterranean, thinking it to be imperialist. Americans wanted to attack the European mainland in 1943, which the British perceived, quite correctly, to be premature. The last thing that the allies wanted was a set back, which would have been the result if the landings had taken place in 1943. The Americans only reluctantly agreed to the Sicilian and Italian campaigns to attack the “soft underbelly” of Europe as Churchill put it.

Pacific campaign, primarily an American area, has been done the justice that it deserved. The reasons why that area was given second preference to the war against Hitler have been explained in great detail. Intelligence gathering both human and electronic played a major part in the second world war, though it was the breaking of German Enigma code and the Japanese naval codes that really affected the war in a big way. The author feels that the information obtained from code breaking was better utilised in the Pacific than in the west, the Battle of Midway being a classic case. In the west while the British and US generals got the information from Ultra, its use was it times pathetic. How else does one explain the inability of Montgomery to chase Rommel after the Battle of El Alamein when the full German battle order was in his hands. The same again happened in Normandy and other battles in Europe. Yet, the counter intelligence and deception services worked very well, particularly at the time of Normandy landings. In discussing Intelligence, the author has quite

rightly criticized the British Government for not declassifying a lot of documents even after 50 years, thereby hampering the efforts of military historians to write an accurate history of that period.

While writing about the Battle of the Atlantic, the author has shown how close the German U-Boats came to winning the war, despite the fact that the British could read the German naval signals. The terror bombing of Britain and the strategic area bombing of German cities did not really bring the belligerents to their knees. In fact the War production in Germany reached its zenith in mid 1944 when the bombing of its cities was the heaviest of the war.

Another singular service that the author has done is to highlight forgotten campaigns in Burma and the importance of the British capture of Madagascar where the Germans wanted to deport all the Jews. Very few books on the war as a whole have given such a detailed background for the operations as he has done. The capture of Burma and exploitation of its oil were the primary reasons for the Japanese attack. He has written in some detail regarding the exploits of the forgotten army fighting in the hell of Burma. The trials and tribulations of troops and the political leadership have been highlighted. India was never a serious target for the Japanese, it only made sense if the Germans also managed to advance so far, a practical impossibility. He writes, "In fact, by the time the Japanese army was willing to order its troops into India in 1944, the situation had changed far too much for such an operation to make much difference, regardless of the result." The effect of the conflict on policies of the Congress party and Subhas Chandra Bose on India's involvement on the allied side and how this affected its march towards freedom have been clearly explained.

The actions of smaller nations who had parts to play in the tragic events of the war have all been covered. One may go as far as to say that the author has not forgotten anyone who had anything to do with Second World War. The persecutions of the Jews and the killing of over six million of them makes depressing reading. The atrocities committed in the POW camps and other concentration camps, particularly those housing the Russian and other eastern states, have been put in perspective. A truly gigantic task.

The final act of dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki when the Japanese had approached the Soviets to act as a mediator in their efforts to bring about an end to war with the US and allies makes fascinating reading. The US President, Harry Truman, waited till the Potsdam conference where he got the news of the successful test of the atomic bomb. He informed Stalin and then a declaration was issued asking Japan to surrender unconditionally. The bomb was only dropped when Japan officially refused though the Allies were aware through Japanese signal intercepts that there was

a large lobby, including the Emperor, which was for accepting the Potsdam call. It killed a lot of Japanese, but whether it saved the lives of US soldiers who may have died in the planned invasion of Japan is a question that may never be answered in view of the fact that the landing may not have been required after all. The reason for the dropping of the bomb was its perceived effect on the postwar world, particularly on the Soviet Union. The cold war had truly started then.

Two other points about this marvellous book need to be highlighted. There is a bibliographical essay of 25 pages in which the author recommends books for additional reading. When a book needs to be criticized, he has been forthright in his comments. Writing about the Francis H. Hinsley's *British Intelligence in the Second World War*, 5 Volumes in 6 parts, he states "Early volumes of this British official history were not provided with footnotes to the records - a fraud on libraries and scholars if ever there was one because they must now purchase reprint volumes which include the notes!" There are also approximately 200 pages of exhaustive notes on sources, including new archival material, which would be a boon to any scholar.

This book is the history of the world during the period of the Second World War. Prof. Weinberg suggests that the war was no walkover for the victors, it was a very close run contest. No doubt it was "The Greatest War"

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Published quarterly in April, July, October and January

Review Article 3

Consequences of Brasstacks

MAJOR GENERAL DIPANKAR BANERJEE, AVSM

Why do wars take place? How do they originate? What causes conflict? These are fundamental questions raised throughout history. Answers are seldom satisfactory and they differ in every case.

Wars usually occur due to misperception, miscalculation or inadvertence. This is especially true of antagonistic nations that have nurtured mutual suspicions for long. When leaders perceive or misperceive apparent weaknesses in potential adversaries, it seems to open a window of opportunity that is fit for exploitation.

Wars originate in the minds of men, in the orientation of its peoples and in the ethos cultivated by its leaders. In a general environment of hostility, such as between India and Pakistan, actual conflict may result over petty reasons. Fear, anxiety, suspicion, over confidence or arrogance may set off a war. Also, where two sides are well armed, it may break-out due to sheer unintended force of events, almost accidental in their occurrence. The root cause is one of misperception of an opponent's capability or even a sudden awareness of one's own vulnerability that has to be corrected through a pre-emptive attack, or an enlargement of the theatre of operation.

The history of wars and near-wars in the Indian sub-continent since Independence amply bear this out. Usually one side (more often Pakistan), felt that the situation was ripe for sudden exploitation. There have also been close calls that did not lead to war. One of these was the 1986-87 crisis over Exercise Brasstacks. If we are to avoid the possibility of unexpected conflict in the future, the book *Brasstacks and Beyond* should be an essential reading. For military soldiers, to understand the politics related to war. To civilian strategists to fathom the complexities of military manoeuvre whose ultimate logic may lead to a conflict that nobody wants.

Five distinguished scholars have meticulously studied all aspects related to the situation in 1986-87 in the sub-continent. All have detailed knowledge of South Asian affairs. Stephen Cohen is an acknowledged authority on South

Brasstacks and Beyond : Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia. By Kanti P. Bajpai and others, New Delhi, Manohar, 1995, p. 205, Rs. 300/-, ISBN 81-7304-130-X

Major General D. Banerjee is Deputy Director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Vol CXXV, No. 522, October-December, 1995.

Asia, particularly of security policies and the armed forces of India and Pakistan. Sumit Ganguly is a leading authority on South Asian conflicts on which he has written extensively. Chari was a senior Defence bureaucrat and strategic analyst with deep knowledge of and participation in Indian security processes. Cheema is a highly respected Pakistani academic with knowledge of Pakistan's defence policy. Kanti Bajpai is a young scholar of enormous promise and considerable work on regional confidence building. Their collective knowledge has been supplemented by extensive interviews and examination of primary sources. The result is impressive.

Warfare is not merely the effective use of weapons. It is the collective employment of men and arms and their manoeuvre in battle. To perfect these and overcome the "fog of war", collective exercises at formation level form an integral part of military training. It is also a realistic way in which military commanders can be tested in peace time. Brasstacks was one such exercise. By far the largest that the sub-continent had seen or perhaps likely ever to see. General Sundarji had sound reasons to initiate it. Besides, his reputation as a strategist made it mandatory that he prove it, if not in war, atleast in an exercise realistically resembling conflict. But it had lessons far wider than merely military.

In the first four chapters the authors examine Brasstacks from different perspectives. The fifth chapter draws lessons both political and strategic. Learning lessons from wars is a time worn practice. But bringing people together from both sides of a conflict to analyse all aspects of the problem, has recently acquired importance. Robert McNamara sponsored the study of the Cuban confrontation of 1962. He brought together all major participants of the three involved states who shared their views frankly and provided original documents to support their arguments. Many startling revelations offered positive lessons for the future. A similar effort is unlikely to be possible between India and Pakistan for a long time. Failing which this Book is as close as we are likely to get to assess the situation from both perspectives. There are some minor failings and limitations. Authoritative statements from crucial actors are lacking. No document of value has yet been made available by either side. Even then the overall contribution of this Book is substantial.

The first question that arises is, was there really a crisis? Was war a possibility? There is a general consensus that the threat of war never really existed, but a crisis was actually at hand. The nature of the last phase of Brasstacks Exercise with troops, the lack of information to Pakistan, and non-use of the hot line at crucial periods led to a sense of unease if not tension in Islamabad. From a Pakistani perspective the situation was indeed grave. The trouble in Sind had begun. The War in Afghanistan was not going well. The

Stingers had been introduced, but their effect was not yet proved. At the same time Zia was quite sure that with the Americans so deeply committed in the subcontinent an Indian attack could not take place. But he continued to up the ante.

Three issues come out starkly in the Book. First, was the nature of decision making and the organisation structures in each country. The Prime Ministers were the Defence Ministers in both states. Surprisingly it worked differently in each case. In Pakistan it is obligatory for the Prime Minister/President to be also the minister for defence. In addition Zia ul Haq was the Chief of Army Staff, though General Arif really officiated in this role very effectively. This enabled Zia to hold frequent meetings and he kept himself fully in picture and in firm control over the situation at critical moments. In India, Arun Singh was the Minister of State for Defence with close proximity to Rajiv Gandhi. He handled all routine matters very ably, but lacked the authority to coordinate the larger picture. The somewhat personalised and fragmented manner that major decisions were taken and other key individuals and ministries kept in the dark, brought out the infirmities of this system. In India, the Prime Minister's holding the defence portfolio is a clear liability. VP Singh's later support for a National Security Council may have had something to do with his observation of the ineffective decision making process in this crisis. That this lacunae has not yet been rectified is another story.

Second, was there a failure of intelligence and consequent misperceptions? Generally, both sides are well aware of developments in each other's country and are adequately prepared. But when there is a sudden gap, there is major cause for worry. One was the nature of the Brasstacks Exercise; its direction, force levels, bridging equipment and ammunitions carried. All were of major concern to Pakistan and on none of which it was entirely clear. To India, the anxiety was over the location of Pakistan's Army Reserve South. First, it was "missing" for a while near Lodhran bridge in the second week of January. Then, when it was located opposite Bhatinda and Ferozepur, it appeared poised for an offensive in the Punjab sector. Ofcourse it exposed Pakistan's Sind province to attack, but it could also be interpreted to mean that Islamabad was ready for a gamble. A pretty close run thing indeed.

The third factor was that this entire crisis was played out under a quasi nuclear environment. Neither side was quite weaponised, but doubts prevailed. India had been predicting a nuclear Pakistan for long. Pakistan ofcourse was deeply conscious of India's nuclear explosion in 1974. The nuclear question is what brought the Americans into the picture. What role the US "mediators" actually played in this crisis will remain a mystery. But even as a go-between, if nothing else, it was handy. Its global surveillance capability allows it to develop transparency to contending sides, should it so desire.

Finally, there was one major consequence and one important lesson from Brasstacks. There is no doubt that this experience expedited Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and compelled it to weaponise early. Whether it would have ever desisted from this course is ofcourse a moot question. But there was no holding it back after this. The urgency of the situation left Islamabad with no other option. The lesson is the supreme need for developing means to avoid unnecessary conflict in the sub-continent. There was absolutely no reason for a conflict at this time. Kashmir was a non-issue. Both countries were preoccupied with other things. Pakistan with Afghanistan and legitimising a dictatorship. India with its own domestic problems and initial attempts at economic restructuring. There was no tension in the air, which actually made the Brasstacks situation seem surrealist to most citizens in both countries.

The Book makes a substantial contribution to conflict studies in the sub-continent. Regrettably, South Asia remains a conflict prone region in the world. Perhaps this is merely tension and somehow we can bungle through without a major conflict in the future, as the last 25 years have shown. Whatever be the case, it is important to study more carefully the nature of conflict in South Asia. What causes them. How they occur. And more important how these may be prevented in the future. Not quite a new area but one that is wide open for a meaningful analysis. Let us hope there are more to come.

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Short Reviews of Recent Books

Low Intensity Conflict. New Delhi, National Defence College., 1994, p. 179, Rs 55/- (NDC Papers 2/94)

Four of the best military brains of the Indian Army and one of the British, propound on a topical and vexed issue in this second set of NDC Papers. Low intensity operations, the scourge of a number of armies the world over, are discussed at the macro as well as micro level as only experts can. Undoubtedly thoroughly researched, brilliantly argued and painfully well presented these papers provide a invaluable resume of the strategic problems, prevalent perspectives and policy options for India. The thrust is towards obtaining of real time intelligence. Arjun Ray holds forth on the role of the media in combating insurgents and terrorists. He has very nicely put it when he says that there is no absolute right to know, or to suppress, or to ask questions but that there is an absolute right not to answer provided you answer why! The other paper that stands out is authored by Brig Osborne of the British Army. He has tackled the subject with the hindsight garnered from the problem in Northern Ireland.

No one in a position of significance in the maintenance of law and order can afford to miss studying these papers.

-- Lt Col A.K Sharma

Terrorism in an Unstable World. By Richard Clutterbuck, London, Routledge, 1994, p. 235, £ 30 ISBN 0-415-10340-1

The book is a comprehensive account of international terrorism in the post - Cold War world. Richard Clutterbuck has expressed western concern for growing nexus among drug mafias, dealers of arms, international crime and terrorism. The author envisages an important and extended role for NATO under the aegis of the United Nations. The book looks at how new developments in the field of technology can help fight terrorism and other related problems such as ethnic cleansing, drug trafficking, and fundamentalist violence etc. It also suggests that international military efforts be strengthened to fight this alarming menace.

The book is divided into six parts. Part I has two chapters which deal in depth with conflicts in the post - Communist World and response to these conflicts. The first three chapters of Part-II primarily deal with modern technological developments particularly in the field of personal weapons, missiles, bombs, and other explosives. Chapter six and seven pertain to analysis of various scientific techniques to detect explosives and weapons and use of computers and microelectronics in collecting and collating intelligence. Chapter eight discusses about security measures including the VIP security. In part III which has three chapters, the author examines the origins, mode of supply and in fact the entire gamut of drug trafficking and its international ramifications.

Part IV dealing with rural guerrilla warfare contains three chapters examining their activities in Latin America, Asia and Africa. It also portrays development of rural guerrilla warfare. Part V and its four chapters discuss various urban terrorist organizations, their mode of operations and development of methods of countering terrorism including aviation and airport security. In the concluding Part, the author has advocated that NATO be used to counter global terrorism. It also deals with the concept of rule of law and civil rights.

A well written book of great contemporary value. It gives a westerner's view of problem of global terrorism. The book will be useful to academicians, military experts, journalists, diplomats and students of international affairs.

-- Mohan Kudaisya
Sr Research Scholar, JNU

Century of War : Politics, Conflict and Society Since 1914. By Gabriel Kolko, *New York, New Press, 1994, p. 546, \$ 29.95, ISBN 1-56584-191-3.*

The Century of War is a critical re-examination of the gross distortion of socio-cultural concepts and the diverse political cross-currents or the complex power gaming which resulted from the wars of the twentieth century. As professor Kolko contends—"the (modern) wars have vastly telescoped social time and dynamics in the twentieth century as they transmute human and social realities ——wiped out vast sections of privileged classes economically or even seen them destroyed".

Professor Kolko offers a fresh interpretation of the social and political forces emanating from the two World Wars, the Korean and the Vietnam traumas - and some others, wherein the political strategists and military generals grossly defaulted in their long term calculations.

In the context of the re-active responses of the populace, particularly the mass peasant classes in or out of uniform, Chapter 7- (Soldier and the crisis of World War I) and Chapter 10 - (Resistance Movements in Captured territories) are pointedly relevant. The author has also offered a fresh synthesis and future directions of world communism in Europe, China and socialist nationalism of South-east Asia.

The book is a highly contributive probe into the course of contemporary history in the context of the dimensions and potency of modern warfare.

-- Maj Gen S K Talwar

The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries. By Forrest D. Colburn, *Princeton, Princeton University, 1994, p. 125, \$ 19.95, ISBN 0-691-03676-4*

In the aftermath of World War II, a large number of poor countries experienced revolutions, among them Vietnam, China, Cuba, Algeria, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, Iran and Nicaragua. These countries geographically and culturally were quite diverse and revolutionaries came to power by different

routes, but once in power, they had similar ideas on reshaping of their countries and societies.

The author tries to explain the reasons, for this commonality. He observes that in an era marked by the demise of European Colonialism, paradoxically, it was Europeans like Marx, Engels and Lenin, who supplied the vision of what could replace colonialism. The political fantasy and imagination, which inspired revolution, led to sadly flawed ideas, about how to eliminate poverty and inequality. Gradually the vogue for revolution in poor countries deaccelerated by the East European events of 1989-1991 and in the process, many countries were profoundly wrecked.

Forrest D Colburn is the author of other works as well, including "Managing the Commanding Heights -Nicaragua's state Enterprises."

-- Major General Ram Nath, SM. (Retd)

The Strategic Quadrangle : Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia. Ed By Michael Mandelbaum, *New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1995, p. 221, \$ 16.95, ISBN 0-87609-168-0*

Five statigicians of the world have explored the new shape of power among the major powers in the region ie; Russia, China, Japan, and the United States of America. The authors have examined the network of alliances, historical rivalries and conflicting world wide views, that define the relations among these four powers and analyse among them how the interaction will affect East Asia and the international system as a whole.

Robert Legvold has surveyed the fast changes that have taken place in Russia and the rest of the countries of earstwhile Soviet Union. He has analysed that the economic changes that have taken place in Russia and the CIS are a good sign, but it will take years before the countries get integrated into East Asia economically. David Lampton has examined the Chinese leadership's policy of military detente and economic cooperation with the other three powers in order to remain economically viable. Michael Mochizuki has discussed Japanese domestic politics and foreign policy that has been influenced by Soviet-American rivalry. Michael Mandelbaum has discussed the bilateral relationships between the US and the other three countries especially on security, economics, and human rights. Finally Richard Solomon has tried to answer a million dollar question as to who will shape and wield the power in East Asia?

The book is useful for the students of political science, and research scholars who are working on the strategies of various countries.

-- Lt Col. P K Vasudeva (Retd)

Enforcing Restraint : Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts. By Lori Fisler Damrosch (Ed)., *New York, Council on Foreign Relations , 1993, p. 403, \$17.95, ISBN 0-87609-155-9*

When do "Internal Conflicts" and "Extreme Violation of Human Rights" become threats to International Peace, warranting a "collective International Response"?

This book offers six detailed studies of UN interventions to enforce good behaviour from "wrong doers"; be it by armed force or economic sanctions, along with separate general comment and analysis. It is a timely survey, pointing to the future. There is a change from "cold war rivalries", which led "superpowers to pour in weapons and support into internal conflicts", some of which are now "humanitarian disasters". Major powers "no longer view conflicts through the lens of superpower competition". The UN opinion is "in a shift between consent based peace keeping and non-consensual peace enforcement". The general secretary records: "It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which Human Rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity", and "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed: its theory was never matched by reality".

Soldiers handling the nuts and bolts of armed intervention and peacekeeping will find these writers distinctly more legal than practical; but that is inevitable in any effort to establish the rule of law in the jungle which is our world of today. The papers are impartial, possibly optimistic to finally reflect that "International efforts, though far from perfect, have been justified". This is in the face of their comments - "In the guise of neutrality the UN will neither guarantee the delivery of humanitarian aid, nor allow the Bosnians to take their own effective measures": "In the middle-eastern world of oil and geo-politics, the interests of the Kurds have been at the bottom of everyone's list": "In Haiti the US action has been practical if not legal": "In Liberia armed intervention allowed the parties to build up for a yet bigger war — but there is hope (for peaceful negotiation)". We have analysis to stress that Intervention must be "honest", "principled", "differentially targeting wrong doers", along with record that in practice "perpetrators of violence have improved their position of armed advantage", and "economic sanctions have (themselves) created humanitarian crises (among the innocent)."

This study is a significant contribution towards progressing the cause of Human Rights. In our post-cold war world, the USA is the dominant superpower, a nation where "God created all men equal", (except Red Indians, Blacks, and lesser humans of assorted colours), and who fought "the Evil dictator of Iraq in defence of democracy and human rights". Nevertheless, in history no nation other than the USA has so strongly and effectively promoted and progressed Individual Freedom and Human Rights: may be the writers of this book are correctly pointing to a change in the future world. Meanwhile military men should note and take heed of their warning: "the luxury of a peace keeping operation requiring only military expertise is a relic of the past".

-- Tindi

House of Cards : Why Arms Control Must Fail. By Colin S. Gray, *Ithaca Cornell University*, 1992, p. 242, ISBN 0-8014-2703-7

During the Cold War era, Korea's security agenda was defined largely by superpower rivalry. The goal of US strategy, as reflected in the Truman Doctrine was to stem the tide of Communist expansionism, and contain Soviet Power within the USSR's existing borders. Korea was cast as a crucial buffer and fulcrum in the balance of

power among the major powers surrounding the peninsula, and North Korea's invasion in 1950 of its Southern neighbour was seen as a key test of containment policy.

With the end of the cold war, re-unification of Germany and breakup of Soviet Union, it is time to reconsider the Korean peninsula's strategic role in global and regional politics. In this book, leading scholars and experts provide new perspectives on Korea's changing role in the new world order. What are the implications of the dramatic end of the cold war for East Asia and Korean peninsula? Will peace and prosperity return to the region, followed by the re-unification of divided Korea. The two factions have been having a series of negotiations towards achieving that goal. Or will history repeat itself in the form of violent conflict and rivalry. The contributors consider these questions in the context of major power's policies towards Korean peninsula, inter-Korean relations and revived prospects of Korean re-unification.

We must understand that the Korean people - though long divided by contending ideologies - view themselves as a single culture. They share a common thirst for re-unification. Thus if there is to be an enduring peace on the peninsula, it must be grounded on Korean values.

-- Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Imperialism and its Contradictions. By VG Kiernan, Ed and Introduced By Harvey J. Kaye, *London, Routledge, 1995, p. 218, \$ 11.99, ISBN 0-415-90797-7*

One of the top British Marxist historians, Kiernan has written extensively on colonialism and imperialism. This book is a collection of some of his writings on the subject reflecting wide-ranging issues of modern capitalism and imperialism and a historical examination of Europe's imperial experience.

Though Kiernan has been deeply influenced by Marxist historical - political traditions and participated in left political activities himself, his ideas and essays, unlike those of some of his compatriots have never really been dogmatic. The appeal in his writings emanates from his original thinking and freshness that go beyond and broaden the Marxist framework. The present selection - competently edited by Harvey Kaye, himself an author of critical assessments of Marxist writings - is no exception.

The book would prove to be utterly useful for students of international relations and world history.

-- Dr Anandyo J. Majumdar

Conventional Arms Control : Perspectives on Verification. By Sergey Koulik and Richard Kokoski, *Oxford Univ, 1994, p. 323, £ 20.00, ISBN 0-19-829149-3*

In the most daunting process of maintaining world peace, in an era of mass destruction weapons, limiting and controlling of Arms is an essential pre-requisite; 'Verification' is not only the BASIC input to the peace process but also the basis on which the citadel of peace can rest. To achieve this aim, the SIPRI analysis has tackled

the complex problem of verification and its mechanism in plain language - logically and without ambiguity. The issues raised and resolved cover not only the recent developments but also examine the past in depth and record them, chronologically information of the posterity. The perspectives take into account international political arena (the treaties and alliances) and its current realignments of boundaries, socio-ethno-techno-Eco-compulsions/interests impinging on national interests and sovereignty. Probabilities of information sharing and threat evaluation give these perspectives greater acceptance/practical application - thus bringing humanity closer to attainment of its aim-prevention of mass destruction.

The authors have displayed remarkable ability to sift the relevant information from heaps and heaps of papers on the Subject and record it in a manner which will make sense to any average reader - leave alone those involved in the game. When the present players are gone, the threads will be easily picked up by succeeding generations to continue weaving the web of Arms Control. For the students of diplomacy and military history, this book will be easier to refer for retrieval of data, than a word dictionary. In my humble opinion, simply a must for all libraries and personal collection for its inherent value and topical contents.

-- Air Vice Marshal SS Malhotra
AVSM, VM (Retd)

Cooperating for Peace : The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. By Gareth Evans, Australia, Allen & Unwin, 1993, p. 224, \$ 17.95, ISBN 1-86373-623-9

U.N. Secretary General, Boutros-Ghali published a Report 'An Agenda for Peace' in June 1992 which started international debate on future role of the United Nations, as end of the cold war had raised high hopes throughout the world that international confrontation and conflicts would give way to a new era of security cooperation, peace and progress of mankind in which the United Nations would play a vital role. 'Cooperating For Peace' is the Australian response to the Secretary General's Report. Conceived and authored by Gareth Evans with able assistance of bureaucrats, diplomats and UN experts, it is a comprehensive document in which United Nations' operations have been analysed objectively. Problems and constraints experienced in UN operations due to pulls and pressures of conflicting national interests have been highlighted and emphasis has rightly been placed on securing peace by preventive operations rather than resolving the conflicts after hostilities begin. Gareth Evans has drawn heavily on his rich experience as Foreign Minister of Australia, initiator of the successful UN peace keeping plan for Cambodia and active contribution in developing Chemical Weapons Convention. The proposals for reforming the United Nations are apt and well conceived, particularly the proposed reorganisation of the UN Secretariat. As an Indian, one would have liked to see a firm recommendation regarding the countries which should be included in the proposed enlarged Security Council. Students of International Relations and the United Nations would find the book interesting and useful.

-- Air Marshal M L Sethi,
PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Prospects and Strategies for Nuclear Power : Global Boon or Dangerous Diversion? By Peter Beck, *London, Earthscan, 1994, p. 118, £ 12.95, ISBN 1-85383-217-0*

The author, Peter Beck, a Chemical Engineer in this study highlights the option for nuclear power as a future major global energy resource. The book is divided into nine chapters and opens up to explain the fundamental of nuclear facts, such as what are nuclear reactors, their types, the nuclear fuel cycle and relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In a rather simplified manner the next chapter describes the relevant technology regarding nuclear fuel recycling. The most interesting part of the book is a concise history of the nuclear energy from the nuclear bomb to the present time.

The insight into the future demand of electricity and choices of fuel with their merits and demerits have been discussed in the book in an objective manner. The book ends with thought provoking actions for the future of mankind. The author has skillfully avoided to address the criticism raised on nuclear power. A useful addition to the existing literature on the subject.

-- Major (Dr) Sunil Chandra

The General Will : Rousseau, Marx, Communism. By Andrew Levine, *Cambridge, Cambridge Univ, 1993, p. 222, \$ 49.95, ISBN 0-521-44322-9*

The book is a study of Marxism and Communism as seen through the philosophy of Rousseau's "the general will". For Rousseau sovereignty implied supreme authority over a given territory or population, which he termed as state and this sovereignty was the exercise of "the general will". The change to acquire land, desire for more, need for leisure, disproportionate acquisition, a sovereign to keep control over his subjects, when the rich were able to convince the poor that in their interest all confrontation should end and problems solved by political means, were the conditions for the formation of a state. Levine then goes on to explain the concept of "solidarity" which is a kind of unconditional altruism, and Rousseau's view of democracy which as seen by him, was a kind of "slavery", a form of governance in which the other rules. Hence, he recommended that politics should be structured like a career, with appropriate penalties and incentives.

The author rounds up his views by explaining the reason for the decline of communism - notorious inefficiencies in production and distribution, inability to produce at international standards, to innovate or to marshal entrepreneurial forces at the economic level. It was a conflict of a highly educated, technocratic class and a cultured population with the old command system of management by a political superstructure. However, Levine still feels that Marxism identified the disease affecting the existing world, provided the diagnosis and as scientific socialism, identified the cure. An interesting evaluation of Marxism and Communism in the contemporary world scenario.

-- Col Valmiki Katju (Retd)

New Nuclear Nations: Consequences for U.S. Policy. Ed By Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, *New York, Council of Foreign Relations, 1993, p. 272, \$ 17.95, ISBN 0-87609-153-2*

An extremely well researched book, based on discussions at biweekly seminars between a group of ten knowledgeable persons including one in the Ministry of Defence. What options are open to the U.S. in dealing with the proliferation on Nuclear weapons.

The book identifies ten countries as potential nuclear powers. Israel, India with 100+ warheads, Pakistan with 10+, the remainder —Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea & Syria with possibly 1-3 bombs, by the year 2000. Most of the emerging nations would opt for Plutonium, which may be diverted; but have to also obtain uranium ore to construct the reactor. It does not elaborate on the South Africa's potential, or that of Argentine, and Brazil, who have renounced their nuclear option. The three Nuclear powers Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, are named as potential sources of leakage of materials, including to Sikh extremists!

The Pakistan - India nuclear confrontation is highlighted. It is stated that there are disputes regarding the completeness of the list of sites — not to be bombed - in the 1991 agreement. A statement of ex COAS Gen Sunderji, on lack of doctrine on deployment of nuclear weapons is of interest.

-- Maj General Partap Narain (Retd)
MA (Cantab)

Legacy in the Sand : The United States Army, Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. By Kimberly K. Porter and Herbert P. LePore, *Rock Island, Historical Office, United States Army Armament, 1990, p. 232, \$ 15.00*

As rightly said, "wars are won by all and not alone by the combat units", in fact the outcome of military operations is the result of integrated efforts put in by the combat and logistic echelons. The contribution of logistic formations becomes all the more significant, when it involves the strategic movement of over 5 lakh troops, over 8000 miles and then launch operations in a totally unknown and inhospitable terrain as witnessed during the operations 'Desert Shield and Desert Storm'.

Compiled by Kimberly K Porter and Herbet P LePore, the book provides useful account of the role played by AMCCOM in preparing and equipping such a large force for decisive operations during the Gulf War. The account suggests that administrative issues how trivial they may appear such as; mobilisation, prioritisation of requirements, storage and testing of equipment, need to be carefully handled and addressed during the preparatory stage as they also contribute towards the success of operations.

In such like terrain and extreme climate, looking after health and hygiene leading to high state of battle worthiness of troops is an important factor. Authors also highlight the importance of compilation and timely dissemination of lessons learnt to avoid any reoccurrence.

By far, much has been written on the operational aspects, this perhaps is the only book which discusses the logistic issues during op Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

-- Col. Ramesh Davesar

Thunder Monsters over Europe : A History of the 405th Fighter Group in World War II and the Christchurch Squadrons. By Reginald G. Nolte, *Kansas, Sunflower University, 1986, p. 160, ISBN 0-89745-075-2*

This is a diary cum scrapbook of the part played by the USAAF 405th Fighter Group (FG) during the later stages of the second world war.

It was initially formed in the USA in early 1943 as a dive bomber group, but this was changed after the bad experiences of the Luftwaffe dive bombers during the Battle of Britain and the USAAF and US Navy difficulties in this form of attack in the Pacific. It was, consequently, decided to scrap the dive bomber and the group was refitted with the famous P-47 Thunderbolt, and renamed the 405th FG. The Thunderbolt was the heaviest and the biggest fighter of the war.

The group was based at Christchurch on the south coast of England prior to the Normandy landings. During the initial part of the landings the FG was used as an escort force but it transferred to Normandy on 11 June 1944 and, thereafter, as a part of XIX TAC, supported the US 1st Army consolidating its hold and then Patton's 3rd Army during its breakout and its gallop across France. It took part in the Battle of the Bulge and also for a time it supported the US 9th Army before reverting back to its original role. The highest decorated Luftwaffe pilot, Col Rudel surrendered to this Group at the end of the war. One thing that is clearly brought out in the book is that the Luftwaffe were far from dead during this period as some historians would have us believe.

This book would be of interest to those who are researching the history of the Second World War and the part played in it by the USAAF.

-- Cdr S. Varma, SC IN (Retd)

Democracy and American Foreign Policy : Reflections on the Legacy of Alexis De Tocqueville. By Robert Strauvs-Hupe., *New Brunswick, Transaction, 1995 p. 183, ISBN 1-56000-175-5*

Robert Strauvs-Hupe's book is an in-depth study on Alexis de Tocqueville's view of America's democratic ideals and its foreign policy. As a basis, he presents Tocqueville's model of the dynamics of democracy - the interaction with nationalism, egalitarianism, liberalism, individualism and autocracy. Tocqueville also warns of American hedonism, "endeavouring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives". Turning to Russia he predicted its balkanization and remarked that empires are most dangerous when they begin to crumble.

American liberal democracy is aimed at "levelling up" and not "levelling

down". American leaders understood the interplay between domestic and foreign interests to determine their foreign policy. But they had to bring along with them the legislature, judiciary, powerful interest groups, and public opinion for taking decisions based on realism. The author highlights the fact that American diplomacy is selective and prefers solving conflicts by economic power.

In the latter part of the book, Strauzs-Hupe examines the reason for collapse of the USSR, policy towards India, China and the Soviet independent States, USA's relations with the European Union and the future of NATO. He casts doubt whether the American people can bear the burden of spreading democracy everywhere. According to him, although the average American looks more favourably to his immediate needs, he is also well informed about foreign affairs - a view which is debatable.

A very informative and absorbing book on the power-play of the only super power.

-- Col Valmiki Katju (Retd).

Limited War : The Challenge of US Military Strategy. By Swaran Singh, *New Delhi, Lancers Books, 1995, p. 259, Rs. 450/-, ISBN 81-7095-048-1.*

A thought provoking book by a talented young author who is currently working with the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis.

Dr Swaran Singh has researched his subject thoroughly, and although the main thread of his thesis is the increasing relevance of limited war, he has explored and analysed the entire gamut of every conceivable type of war in chronological sequence before bringing us to his conclusions. He convincingly brings out the futility of a Nuclear War, on account of its potential for mutual self-destruction, and the inevitability of Limited War as an instrument of state policy.

The author covers the evolution of a wide spectrum of concepts, strategies, and categories of conflicts but his focus has basically been the American experience. Indian readers will however find the book eminently useful if they use the American encounter as a window to view the Indian predicament in the type of war being waged against this country from across her borders.

Stimulating reading for serious minded professionals in the fields of defence strategy, and National Security. A must for libraries, and for students of military science.

— Maj Gen Ian Cardozo, AVSM, SM (Retd)

Soviet Strategic Arms Policy Before Salt. By Christoph Bluth, *Cambridge, Cambridge Univ, 1992, p. 317, \$ 40.00, ISBN 0-521-40372-3*

This book examines in detail the Soviet build up of strategic forces after Stalin's death to the signing of SALT-1 Agreement. It focuses mostly on Khrushchev era (1953-

SHORT REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS

1964) but also spills over to Brezhnev early period. The effect of inter relationship between policies - foreign, military and domestic —, the concept and development of strategic nuclear forces is well analysed and presented based on authentic empirical data hitherto unavailable because of restrictions by Soviets due to their zealous sense of security.

The author argues convincingly that Khrushchev did not intentionally pursue a strategic arms race policy vis-a-vis USA trying to give parity to USSR let alone superiority in ICBMs and SLBMs because of conflicting requirements of foreign and domestic policy objectives. Despite Khrushchev's bombastic claims and bluffs, USSR had to accept a substantial margin of superiority by USA in ICBMs and SLBMs. Khrushchev tried unsuccessfully to divert resources from strategic arms policy to Soviet economy and society as a whole but was vehemently opposed by military and industrial institutions.

The role of politics, domestic compulsions, heavy industries and strategic threat perceptions perhaps explains the obvious inconsistencies between the USSR foreign and military policies. An interesting book to understand the making of policy decisions concerning strategic arms race by the USSR.

-- Maj General J.N. Goel (Retd.)

The Making of a Soviet Scientist : My Adventures in Nuclear Fusion and Space from Stalin to Star Wars. By Roald Z. Sagdeev, Ed By Susan Eisenhower, *New York, Wiley, 1994, p. 339, \$ 24.95, ISBN 0-471-02031-1*

Robert McNamara feels the book provides insights into how the scientific community in the former Soviet Union was a 'hostage to politics'. The early work on the first draft was started in late 1988 while Sagdeev was still working in Moscow, but the major part was done when he moved to Maryland, USA - he calls it a 'heart drain', not a 'brain drain'.

In the beginning of the Cold War, Sagdeev did pioneering work in the field of plasma physics, the behaviour of electrically charged gases in controlled nuclear fusion, a field directly related to nuclear weapons. He rose to become the Director of Space Research Institute, a crucial position from where he observed the inner functioning of the secretive military industrial complex of the FSU. On the other hand, Sagdeev introduced glasnost in the Space Research Institute much before Gorbachev did it. This led Carl Sagan to comment how much he wished there were more people like him at the right hand of every national leader.

-- Dr. Kishore Kumar

The War that never was : The Fall of the Soviet Empire 1985-1991. By David Pryce-Jones, *London, Weidenfeld, 1995, p. 456, £ 22.00, ISBN 0-297-81320-X*

Sovietologists have often wondered why Gorbachev could not preempt the coup of August 1991 and crush his opponents in true Stalinist style. David Pryce-Jones has

met and interviewed major political personalities throughout the former Soviet empire to find a satisfactory answer to this question.

Till the end the Soviet Union remained a mighty super power with nuclear and conventional weapons capable of challenging the combined military might of the U.S., the Western bloc and China. Yet the machinery of the state was unable to protect the ideological construct of Communism or prevent changes of truly gigantic magnitude - the kind of change normally brought about by war.

When he took over as the Seventh General Secretary of the CPSU, Gorbachev had, like his predecessors, unparalleled powers to crush any opposition. Why did he then given up power so easily? Is it because he did not lust for power or because he lacked the ruthlessness to outmanoeuvre his adversaries? David Pryce-Jones narrative has a fine journalistic flavour and provides the ordinary reader with an overview of the events that led to the collapse of the Communist empire in the Soviet Union and in the East European Countries and in the process ended the Cold War. In spite of its seemingly unfocussed and rambling style, the book makes interesting reading but the question whether Gorbachev could have contained the forces set in motion by him, remains partially answered.

Though a product of the 'nomenklatura', Gorbachev lacked the ruthlessness of his predecessors. His eagerness to play the role of a partner of democratic West in the building of a new world order proved to be an important reason for his downfall. But it would be unfair to blame him entirely for the collapse of the system which was already in a state of decay after four decades of Cold War. The expensive and fruitless Soviet adventures in the Third World, the heavy burden of the East European satellites and the combined challenge of the rich industrialised West had drained the meagre resources of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev rightly felt that restructuring of the economy was the need of the hour. What he did not realise was that openness and political pluralism was incompatible with Communist rule.

In the ultimate analysis, Gorbachev failed because he antagonised vested interests without being able to recruit new supporters as he could not offer a viable alternative to Communism and the concept of a centralised state. He once told Henry Kissinger, "Knowing what was wrong was easy, knowing what was right was the hardest part". Gorbachev did not realize that 'perestroika' and 'glasnost' contradicted the very basis of the party rule to which he remained committed till the end.

-- K K Mitra

Former Principal Director, DGS, Cabinet Secretariat

State, Religion and Society in Central Asia: A Post-Soviet Critique. Ed By Vitaly Naumkin, *Reading Ithaca Press, 1993, p. 289, £ 35.00, ISBN 0-86372-162-1*

The book was prepared by a group of Russian scholars in 1990 when Gorbachev's 'Perestroika' was entering its final stages and the leaders of the erstwhile Soviet Union were making desperate attempts to keep the centrifugal tendencies at bay. Although by then Moldova was talking of sovereignty, Ukraine was seeking independence and it was clear that the Baltic Republics would secede, no one knew or believed that just a year later, every former Soviet Republic would be independent.

In all, there are thirteen essays in this book. Free from their ideological prejudices in the wake of the 'Perestroika', Russian scholars (all experts in oriental studies) compared the Soviet Central Asian Republics with their neighbours in India, Japan and the Middle-East. Vitaly Naumkin, the Editor, is the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies.

Quite a few of the essays have become somewhat outdated, yet, there are some which are of special interest today. The book represents the first attempt at a new approach to the entire region of Soviet Central Asia through comparison with oriental societies outside the former USSR. The book has to be seen as a prelude to more in-depth topical studies which, one hopes, will be reflected in future works of Russian scholars.

Prof. Prazauska's essay titled "Ethnicity, Political Culture and National Integration in India and the USSR" will be of interest to Indian readers. Having examined the problem of political mobilisation of ethnic groups in India and the former USSR, the author has reached the conclusion that in India, the political system has provided a balance between ethnic heterogeneity and basic unity of the country. The democratic system has significantly enhanced ethnic integration by providing a mechanism for articulation of demands by ethnic groups and response to such demands. By contrast, the totalitarian regime in the USSR failed to eliminate the historical incompatibility of the Slav, Baltic, Trans-caucasian and Central Asian peoples. The official theory of the creation of a "new historical community" of Soviet people could not forge socio-political unity among various groups. As a result, when the Political System collapsed, various ethnic regions asserted their independence.

-- K K Mitra

Former Principal Director, DGS, Cabinet Secretariat

Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990. Ed By Peter Shearman, *colorado, Westview, 1995*, p. 324, \$ 55.00(HC), \$ 19.95 (Pb), ISBN 0-8133-2633-8

The dismemberment of the former Soviet Union changed the whole range of permutation and combinations on the global scale. The socialist command economy became an 'untouchable' internationally, and put the successor state Russia in a precarious position, i.e the dilemma of a former super power still in possession of nuclear weapons that accorded her the status, while seeking to come out of its economic mess with the help of its former rivals. It has significant bearing on Russia's global identity and its relations with various regions and nations in the changed context.

The various articles in the book were meant for a planned conference at Melbourne which could not take place due to lack of funds and other difficulties. Nevertheless, they are presented in this book so as to provide a comprehensive analysis of Russia's relations with most of the important countries and regions of the world. The author himself has introduced the book with a detailed piece on the dynamics of policy making in the FSU during the socialist regime. The other chapters take off from there in order to analyse what Russia has made of its 'independence' in terms of its global identity and foreign policy.

-- Dr. Kishore Kumar

Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective. Ed By Brantly Womack. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ, 1991, p. 334, ISBN 0-521-42282-5

This book is a compilation of eight essays by eminent Chinese specialists. Topics cover a wide spectrum of contemporary Chinese politics including historical development, legacy and dilemma of Deng Xiaoping's leadership. The book concludes with an analysis of Tiananmen massacre. This book will be useful for Sinologists.

-- Col. Daljit Singh (Retd)

Marxism, China & Development : Reflections on Theory and Reality. By A. James Gregor, New Brunswick, Transaction, 1995, p. 283, \$ 3495, ISBN 1-56000-195-X

The stated objective of A. James Gregor's scholarly work is to understand why Marxism-Leninism collapsed as a political and economic system and what the impact of Marxist thought was in China under Mao and in Post-Mao years. The author focuses attention on the so called neglected alternative to Marxism - Leninism as a strategy for development. The ideas of Sun Yat Sen and the 'Taiwan experience', in his view, provide more of a model for the modernisation of Post-Mao China.

Although the Post-Mao leadership of China is attempting to rationalize a political and economic system that has lost its bearings, very little of Marxism survives in Deng's China today. James Gregor's contention is that it was not only Marx and Engels, or Lenin and Stalin or the thought of Li Dazhao and Chen Du-Xiu that shaped Chinese responses but China was and remains influenced by the thought of several others - Sun Yat Sen being principal among them.

Sun Yat Sen argued that only a nation guided by nationalism could undertake the vast programme of collective defence, economic modernization and rapid industrialization. It was this ideology of 'New Nationalism' that Sun's followers carried to Taiwan after their military defeat on the mainland and industrialized Taiwan through one of the most successful programmes of wealth generation in this century.

It is not known to many that Mao's programme was substantially similar to that of Sun Yat Sen's. Mao felt that neither the Soviet model nor Communism could be imposed on economically backward China. But subsequently, Maoism had become the variant of Stalinism and Sun's ideas were rejected as 'reactionary' and 'irrelevant'. Gregor argues that since Deng's China seems to have accepted Sun's ideas on capital investment and technology transfers from the 'imperialist' powers, Beijing's resistance now centres around the democratic political philosophy of Sun. As China's economy becomes increasingly marketized, the dictatorship will not endure for long.

But will China discard the Leninist state apparatus and will the Communist Party give up its rule in favour of an increasingly pluralistic political system of the Taiwanese kind which is marked by a strong centralised political structure so common in several South-East and East Asian countries? There is very little evidence to justify the hope that there will be changes in China's political system with the exit of the old guard. Available data, in fact, points to the opposite direction.

China under Deng has no doubt repudiated Mao's economic theories, but neither the Socialist State nor the basic ideology of Marxism-Leninism have been given up. The 14th CCP Congress (1992) gave a clear signal that the tight control of the Communist party will be geared up to face the likely social and political consequences of the strategy for economic reform which destroyed Communist rule in East Europe and the former Soviet Union. The emphasis on 'Socialist market economy' in China today means in practice, continued dictatorship of the party. If the road to prosperity is not 'Socialist', then the party's legitimacy to rule will vanish.

The CCP's distrust of political pluralism is rooted in its Leninist heritage and has been reinforced not only by the experience of The Hundred Flowers Movement, The Cultural Revolution, the democracy movement of the 70s and the Tienanmen incident of 1989 in all of which the party came under attack, but also by the collapse of the Communist rule in Europe and the Soviet Union. The Sept. 1994 plenum of the 14th CCP Congress revived the old slogan of Democratic centralism - which is a call for strong single line of command. Political pluralism and democratization - even of the Taiwanese or the Singaporean kind - will not figure in the agenda of Deng's successors.

Whether one agrees with Gregor's thesis or not, his book should be read by all serious students of Marxist thought and its impact on modern China.

-- K K Mitra

Former Principal Director,
DGS Cabinet Secretariat

The Ugly Japanese : Nippon's Economic Empire in Asia. By Friedemann Bartu, Singapore, Longman, 1992, p. 287, \$ 29.90, ISBN 9971-89-868-3

This book traces the unique character of the Japanese and their complex relationship with their Asian neighbours. Japanese are a highly self-contained lot staying within their group and shunning social contacts outside it. They mostly go for organised package tours, wear identical hats and follow a group flag. Japanese women prefer to shop at expensive departmental stores—pricier the label the better. Japanese success story is based on the ethic of '*gambatte*' (do your best; try harder, persist). It is small wonder that diligence has transformed an ugly Japanese into a handsome member of the world community.

-- Lt Col Daljit Singh (Retd)

The Military - Industrial Complex : The Cases of Sweden and Japan. By Masako Ikegami - Anderson, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1992, p. 143, £ 35.00, ISBN 1-85521-309-5.

This interesting book written by a Japanese scholar, at Upsalla University in Sweden, discusses the relevance of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC), in today's context, and sheds a lot of light on the Swedish and Japanese military industries.

In Sweden the M.I.C, consists of both, public and private sectors. The country has always, supported arms industry & given it importance, as a part of the total defence — ie military, civil, economic and psychological defence. Swedish security

policy, supports Defence Industry, for self reliance of military equipment. Major private industries are interested in development of military technology with an eye to the future export market. A fairly large export market is envisaged as necessary for maintaining a viable industry, which provides jobs. — keeps the important trade unions happy.

In Japan on the other hand, labour has little influence, it is run by the private sector, called "monopoly sector". This has an historic background. Zaibatsu family owned businesses. During the period 1925-45, the dominance of the national arsenals was reversed. The private sector produced 65 % of the total requirements of the Army. The production of the tanks vehicles, electronics, and opticals was totally in the private sector.

For the future the author envisages a dual technology regime, where the civil and the military technologies shall converge. The Japanese have promoted advanced technologies such as aerospace, advanced materials superconductivity and artificial intelligence. Of the Pentagon's list of 20 technologies at least 15 are dual-use. What is happening in the world is not closing down of arms industries, but their restructuring towards higher technology.

Industrial base has to be maintained as a key factor in national security.

-- Maj General Partap Narain, (Retd)
M.A Cantab

The Cambridge History of Japan - Vol I - Ancient Japan. Ed By Delmer M. Brown, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ, 1993, p. 602, £ 70.00, ISBN 0-521-22352-0.

Prof Delmer M. Brown in the Preface of this Volume writes to say that human beings have lived on the Japanese archipelago for about 100,000 years. Volume I of *The Cambridge History of Japan* covers the first 99,000 years. The book is remarkable in the historical setting which explores this period in four stages: (1) The Yayoi period; (2) The Yamato period; (3) The Century of Reform; and (4) the Nara period.

In this historic task, it is revealed that political changes had resulted in the fashioning of a highly subjective fusion of Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian norms. It is only in the 19th century that the Japanese became familiar with Western forms of historical expression who felt the need to fit their national history into patterns of a larger world history. Thus the Japanese history faced the task of reconciling a parochial past with a more catholic present. It is a complete record of Japanese history through Western eyes. Surely, Japanese history belongs to the world, not only as a right and a necessity, but also as a subject of pulsating reality with compelling interest. The approach is holistic, reflecting great waves of change in historicity.

The three characteristics, namely, *Linealism* (arising from an early and lasting belief in the importance of sacred-ruler descent), *Vitalism* (stemming from a constant preoccupation with the origins and enrichment of physical life), and *Optimism* (flowing from convictions that the immediate future will be better than the present or the past).

while affecting and being affected by one another, have been in constant tension with polar opposites. And today the beliefs, ideas and assumptions on the Japanese side of the polarity give a vivid account of finality in the evolution of historical consciousness in all its profundity which has made Japan truly great with ancient moorings.

All said and done, it is a stimulating book which is deeply immersed in interpretative history.

-- Prof T N Rastogi

Hiroshima : Chronicles of a Survivor. By Katharine Johnson with John F. Rasche, Boston, *Branden Books*, 1994, p. 204, \$ 22.95, ISBN 0-8283-2001-2.

The story of Hiroshima after the atom bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945, has been told many times. But the eminently readable chronicles of a survivor, by Katherine Johnson and John F. Rashche presents a picture of what the Japanese city was like before the blast killed nearly 100,000 people and caused incredible destruction. Johnson, a teacher at a girls school in the city for 18 years, writes with sensitivity and flair. The stark black and white photographs complement her delightful prose. The manuscript, with the family since the author's death in 1959, was "released" on the 50th anniversary of the dropping of the first atomic bomb.

All along, even during limpid description of humdrum everyday life — of Oji San, sitting on a bench outside the kitchen door, a fig tree shading him from the sun or of Sandra, a young girl, playing the piano, the reader is aware that the book is inexorably heading towards catastrophe. Japan enters the war on December 7, 1941 and four years later, Johnson writes of the ultimate horror — a flash, brighter than a thousand suns. The atomic age dawns and the mushroom clouds have brought death.

-- Srinjoy Chowdhury

Kuwait and Iraq : Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes. By Richard Schofield, 2nd Rev ed., London, *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 1994, p. 207, £ 15.00, ISBN 0 905031 76 8.

By invading Kuwait on 2nd August 1990, Saddam Hussain delivered devastating blow to the entire world by disturbing the established order in the Middle East and due to the oil blockade, economic order of the world.

The history of the border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait dates back to 1913 when the unratified Anglo-Ottoman Convention of July 1913 recognised that Kuwait was an autonomous state carved out of Iraq and its borders loosely defined. Iraqi claims to Kuwait have essentially been on two counts : first, based on historical account Kuwait be administered as an integral part of Iraqi territory and second, that the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq be modified to allow greater access to Iraq to the waters of Persian Gulf. Even the high level ministerial meetings all these years failed to provide a solution to this problem.

The book seeks to explain the emergence and development of the territorial dispute as also the story of the emergence of the modern state of Iraq and Kuwait. In the second edition, the author has incorporated the post-crisis developments including the work and conclusions of UN Demarcation Commission established to delineate the international borders between Iraq and Kuwait.

-- Maj Gen Prem K Khanna, MVC (Retd)

Unveiled : Love and Death Among the Ayatollahs. By Cherry Mosteshar, *London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1995, p. 352, £ 16.99, ISBN 0-340-61794-2.*

It is an autobiographical account of a Persian lady who had returned from her exile after the overthrow of Reza Shah Pahalawi. The family, very modern and rich by Iranian standards had gone into exile among the days of the monarchy. Cherry Mosteshar, the author, who had grown up in Britain, probably romanticizing about Iran that she had not seen since she was a child, returned to Iran as a foreign correspondent of important British papers hoping to explain Iran to the foreign readers. The book is important since it reveals the cultural shock. Over the period, the author begins to understand and face the challenges of a society which in the name of religious fundamentalism, was trying to impose a total control over the Iranians, and beneath the trappings of a modern twentieth century facade was seeking to impose medieval Islamic norms, especially social norms, with their in built gender bias. The marriage that she had entered into for social security only added to the bondage. Finally she manages to escape to England.

Obviously, the author was unable to cope with the totally different environment. It is amply demonstrated in her portrayal of Iran even under the relatively enlightened period of President Rafsanjani. The book is a very personal account in which one finds glimpses of an Iranian family, that had tried to combine the best of the traditional Iranian culture with Western modernism, trying to cope with the condition of present-day Iran. The socio-economic and political difficulties faced by the author are woven into the auto-biographical presentation. The book is an interesting reading though sometimes it loses focus and becomes rather dull.

-- Prof K R Singh
JNU

Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza : Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad. By Ziad Abu-Amr, *Bloomington, Indiana Univ, 1994, p. 169, £ 7.99, ISBN 0-253-20866-1.*

The author is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Birzeit University and has authored several books on Palestinian politics and society.

It is a study of two major group of Islamic Movement -Muslim Brotherhood including its Hamas faction and Islamic Jihad, analysing their ideologies and relationship with Nationalist Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). When Fatah faction of PLO lost its bases in Jordan and Lebanon the Islamic Groups shot into prominence. Earlier they had worked together during Intifada (Popular Uprising).

Iranian revolution provided a model to Fundamentalist Groups. The sanctuaries of universities and mosques were used for indoctrination of the youth and their cadres received military training even in Pakistan camps set up for Afghan Mujahidins.

Recognition of Israel by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat undermined the very *raison d'être* of Islamic Organisations who believe that destruction of Israel is a Koranic imperative. Palestinian society has strong secular tradition with very influential Christian community, there is vacuum in the front rank of Fundamentalists and Arab regimes who finance them are loathe to Iran inspired revolutionary trends. However, their ability to challenge the PLO cannot be ruled out.

— K Narendra Singh, Brig IA (Retd)

First World War. By Martin Gilbert, *London, Weidenfeld 1994, p. 616, £ 20.00, ISBN 0-297-81312-9*

The Great War of 1914-1918 not only changed the geo-political map of Europe, but also laid the foundations for the multi-dimensional ferment and ideological conflicts across the globe which snow-balled through the twentieth century. Essentially it resulted in the devastation of the European land-scape and reckless loss of life for the participant armies that haunted the world polity for decades to follow.

Martin Gilbert's History of the First World War is yet another narration of the socio-political power gaming through the decade as well as the course of military operations on land and sea. Deeply researched, laboriously put together, it is comprehensive and thematic. More than that, it highlights instances of human responses - both of valour and glory in the battle-field, and of revolting soldiery and tragic often inhuman infliction of death and disease on prisoners of war.

The book thus is a useful contribution to the annals of social political and military history, and would enthuse the keen reader.

— Maj Gen SK Talwar

The Birth of Fascist Ideology : From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution. By Zeev Sternhell and Others, *Princeton, Princeton Univ, 1994, p. 338, £ 19.95, ISBN 0-691-03289-0.*

Fascism was a departure from materialism and Marxism. The protagonists of Fascist ideology firmly believed that a national movement could not be Marxist, liberal, proletarian or bourgeois. With these inferences, the author has traced the origins of Fascism to "revolutionary syndicalism" which had three preconditions - a revolutionary dynamic was dependent on market economy; social myths like cult of energy, heroism, morality, and virtue were necessary to build a nation with vitality; and the absolute need for the destruction of liberal ideas and its intellectual norms and moral values. The Fascist ideology is traced to Georges Sorel who felt the inability of the proletariat to lead, was convinced that all changes must come about through force, and the socialization of production and commerce should proceed together. Taking a holistic

view, Sorel felt that capitalism does not produce class struggle as it exists only in the domain of economics, production and technology. He also proclaimed that an absolute class does not exist and morals can exist only when people lead a hard life with a sense of duty, sacrifice, ascetism, love of glory, altruism, and are convinced of the historical and civilizing value of violence.

Sternhell explains the basic difference of Fascist thought vis-a-vis Marxist and Nazi ideologies - the relationship between the worker and the process of production (not the means of production) in case of the former and the criterion of biological determination in case of the latter.

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd.)

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd.)

The Naked President : A Political Life of Lech Walesa. By Roger Boyes, *London, Seeker & Warburg, 1994, p. 342, £ 20.00, ISBN 0-436-20055-4.*

Lech Walesa's phenomenal rise from a non-entity electrician in a Polish shipyard to power broker with the Communist regime and from a behind-the-scene tactician to a President is a remarkable achievement in a nation's history. He took up the cause of industrial workers to form Solidarity, a movement which led him on to power and leadership. Walesa's strategy was to engineer strikes in factories and industrial plants but never to engage the government authorities on the streets. This was coupled by his ability to "shift ground and correct mistakes".

The author rightly points out that Walesa had religious leanings but along with this he also knew the necessity of Papal support in his scheme of things. From Pope John Paul-II he recognized the dangers of headlong confrontation with the Soviet Union and concluded that "confrontation means arguments, strong arguments". The Pope was instrumental in channelising the Solidarity movement into a Gandhian struggle for independence and Walesa put it in practical terms by making the movement universal so that it remained a peaceful resistance. To appease the Soviets in the east, a reunified Germany in the west and a strong Jewish lobby in the U.S.A., he followed a realistic policy of diplomatic overtures. Walesa's forte, however, was his ability to manipulate Polish leaders and close confidants for his own ends, and when redundant to discard them and make new alliances. As Boyes sums up, "Poland is a captive of geography and the resulting geo-politics. Its room for manoeuvre was and will always be, restricted". Can Walesa succeed another presidential election is a million dollar question. An informative book and interesting reading.

— Col. Valmiki Katju (Retd.)

Nato's Defence of the North. Ed by Eric Grove, *London, Brassey's (UK) 1989, p. 104, £ 7.50, ISBN-0-80-037339-9.*

The editor, along with his fellow commentators, has highlighted the significance of Fenno-Scandinavia, in the defence of the area. Eric Grove examines the strategems of rivalries between the NATO and Warsaw pact powers logging the armament and geographical resources of the NATO's military might and the spearheading of soviet

led Warsaw pact strength through the bastion of Kola fortress. Edward Fundson elaborates on the northern lifelines and commando exercises by the militia under Arctic conditions to acquire confidence both in himself and his equipment, to be followed by the description and importance of Kola to the Soviets by Henry Van Loon and supplemented by Fundson. Rolf Hallerbach has a bash on the continued importance of "Baltiyskoye" as a divider and uniter of the main-land Europe and Scandinavia; and also of the Bornholm Island to the Danes and its take over from Russia soon after World War II, climaxing in "Enough Deterrence to Deter" by the editor, ably summarising the defence of the Nordic region and the workable co-existence of the groups of conflicting ideologies and their muscle power.

The "boxing" of information highlights the important information and comparative data about both the parties, and has gone a long way in enhancing the usefulness of this treatise. The maps have added to the proper comprehensibility of this book. The commentary is recommended to all students of Geo-politics, Defence Services and Foreign policy.

— Air Commodore SK Bhardwaj (Retd)

The Perfect English Spy : Sir Dick White and the Secret War 1935-90. By Tom Bower, London, Heinemann, 1995, p. 426, £ 16.99, ISBN 0-434-00080-9.

It is not everyday that a definitive book comes out on the old subject of traitors in Britain before and during the Second World War and afterwards during the cold war, which is a pleasure to read. John le Carre may have written wonderful fiction on the subject but Tom Bower's biography of Sir Dick White, head of both the MI 5 and MI 6, the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service, is superb.

Sir Dick White started his service with MI 5 in the mid thirties. During the war he first supervised the working of the "Double X", which enabled the British to run a highly efficient disinformation campaign against Germany by turning the radio equipped German spies to work for the allies. During the Normandy landings he was attached to Gen. Eisenhower's staff as the Chief of the counter intelligence and with whom he developed an excellent relationship. After the war he continued with the MI 5. He was responsible for the capture of atomic spies, Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May. When in 1952, the head of MI 5 Sir William Skardon retired, White was made the Head of that service which he extensively reorganized to meet the challenge of the cold war.

In 1956, after the "Buster Crabb" disaster during Khrushchev's visit to Britain White was made the head of SIS, a rare occurrence. His MI 5 experience resulted in his immediately curtailing the activities of the "gung ho" types which the SIS had inherited from the Special Operations Executive of the Second World War. His school master background and the ability to get long with the people was his key to success. When Burgess and Maclean defected to the Soviet Union, it was his onerous task to carry out the investigation in such a manner so that the credibility of SIS was not destroyed. He was also involved in the investigation and interrogation of Kim Philby, probably the most dangerous and notorious spy ever.

Tom Bower has finally told the truth about the investigations of the spy cases in Britain. He is fortunate that Sir Dick White, MI 5 & 6 officers, the CIA officials and the erstwhile Soviet spy masters talked to him. This is a signal service in view of the fact that numerous of books on the subject have been printed based on half truths, hints and innuendoes.

— Cdr S Verma, AVSM (Retd)

New French Thought : Political Philosophy. Ed by Mark Lilla, *Princeton, Princeton Univ*, 1994, p. 239, \$ 14.39, ISBN 0-691-00105-7.

French political experience in the 1960s and the 1970s helped develop a unique national perspective for analysing aspects of contemporary liberal societies. While the Anglo-American approach accepts liberalism easily, the recent French approach is cautious, probing and critical.

The book is a commendable compilation of selected works of the representative writers of recent French thinking on modernity, human rights, liberal political order and new individuals. Thought-provoking and interesting, the book is for serious study and reference.

— Dr. Anindyo J. Majumdar

The Imperial War Museum Book of Victory in Europe. By Julian Thompson, *London, Sidgwick*, 1994, p. 274, £ 25.00, ISBN 0-283-06161-8.

Victory in Europe is a unique book in concept, content, depiction and production. Coming out nearly half a century after the 'greatest event' of this century, there is nothing other than the dates, which has been published earlier. This by itself speaks volumes about the persons involved in its production i.e. the author, the publishers, the printers, the researchers, the curators and the contributors.

The account of this 'most stupendous joint operation in history' is highly illustrative of human nature - daring and devilery, viciousness and virtue, courage and savagery, victors and vanquished, humanism and barbarism, cruelty and compassion, right and might, caring and killing, cause and effect, survival and death, present and future, resistance and torture, dreams and idealism. Without taking sides, it truly records the events as they germinated and concluded. Apart from the past occurrences, it also projects subtle lessons for posterity, which if understood properly would prevent the mankind from committing itself to the folly of War for resolving egoistic/self created problems of sovereignty and national boundaries.

The value of the book lies in its impact on the reader's mind - whether a research scholar, professional military person or simply a layman. Its appeal lies in 'prevention of war' rather than its glorification. It lays a balance emphasis on human angles, scientific and technological advances and socio-economic fall-out. The laudable role of voluntary organisations in maintaining basic human values during war and peace have been recorded as well as the heroic deeds of unknown soldiers and generals.

politicians and diplomats of allies and their foes. The remarkable phenomenon of combined/integrated planning, joint command and integrated co-ordinated action have been given due weightage.

— Air Vice Marshal S.S. Malhotra, AVSM, VM (Retd)

Democracy in the Third World. By Robert Pinkney, *Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. 182, \$ 17.95, ISBN 1-55587-454-1.*

The term Third World is by and large understood as 'developing countries', 'under-developed countries' or 'emergent countries', but it has come into common usage for want of anything better. The expression 'Third World' has come to connote the regions and individual countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America and Middle East. It has been argued in the book that these countries are least likely to be sustained for democracy, since politics is more of a life and death struggle for them.

The author has discussed the meaning of democracy and its definitions and forms. 'People's democracy' as practised until recently in Eastern Europe, is out of favour, and the practicability of 'socialist democracy' has come increasingly into question as the limitations of the capacity of the state have come to be recognised.

Most of the Third World countries had been colonies of western powers, especially European countries before they attempted to develop democratic institutions. The author has taken pains to explain the conditions conducive to Third World. The majority established some form of pluralism after achieving independence, although this involved a long term interval in Latin America, but these eras generally proved to be false, with incipient democracies superseded by authoritarianism. There have been exceptional cases where democracy has survived continuously since independence. In the end the author assesses future prospects for democracy in the Third World.

— Col P.K. Vasudeva (Retd)

India and Nepal : A Changing Relationship. By S.D. Muni, *Delhi, Konark, 1992, p. 237, Rs. 200/-, ISBN 81-220-0181-5.*

For any strains in the Indo-Nepal relations, India is blamed for her over-bearing and big-brotherly behaviour. This well-researched book studies the inequalities between the two neighbours in-built into their respective geographical dimensions, demographic magnitudes, economic resources and, above all, their military potentials. Inequality is a harsh fact of global power stratification. The author covers the three main points of mutual mis-trust-strategical, economical and political. With China moving into Tibet, Nepal has been put in an unenviable position of being sandwiched between too powerful nations. Although Indo-Nepal relations have been nursed by deeply pervading inheritance of historical evolution, geographical contiguity and socio-cultural identities, presence of China just next door, has changed the strategical equation. India and Nepal are the only two countries with majority of Hindu population and Gorkhas are serving in the Indian Army with distinction. But a stage has come when Nepal is apprehensive of India but afraid of China. Indian Military Mission downgraded to just Indian Military

Liaison Group was finally withdrawn in 1969-70. Drift had started. Nepal's King Birendra propounded the Zone of Peace (ZOP) proposals in 1975 and in its seven points, one point was 'to bar any activity on the Indian side hostile to Nepal'. While all other South Asian countries - Pakistan and China enthusiastically - endorsed the ZOP, India kept its reservations. An economic crisis took place when Nepal failed to lower the tariff on Indian exports into Nepal while giving 40% duty concession to Chinese imports. Also Nepal signed a deal to import Chinese arms. On 23 Mar 89, Indo-Nepal trade came to stand-still. Things improved with political changes in India. One important lesson is that India should behave like a big brother who does not carry a stick but candy.

— Lt Col. Daljit Singh (Retd)

Nanda Devi : Restoring Glory. By Deepak Sanan, *New Delhi, New Age International, 1995, p. 86, ISBN 81-224-0752-8.*

This book is a story of perseverance against heavy odds in selection of Nanda Devi as the most suitable peak to celebrate the golden jubilee of College of Military Engineering due in 1993. It is a narrative of adventure, hard work and beating the time clock to get permission from the Ministry of Environment, assemble the team, train and launch the expedition with a negligible time lead. It is a description of crowning glory for the Sappers to fulfil their long cherished dream and desire to climb Nanda Devi "the Blessed Goddess" after two abortive earlier attempts. It is an invocation to mother goddess, the most revered in Garhwal and Kumaon regions to seek her blessings for furthering adventurous spirit amongst young sappers.

Nanda Devi, height 7817 meters, one of the most difficult and elusive peaks in the Himalayas was climbed by Sappers on 13 June 93; it being the thirteenth successful attempt by the summitters since 1934. Its approach and basin offered the most fascinating and challenging study to scientists, environmentalists, botanists and zoologists in herbs, fauna and flora, ornithology and effects of diminishing in herbs, fauna and flora, ornithology and effects of diminishing endangered species, if any, to the environment for which it had highly qualified and competent participants with impressive credentials. This expedition was the first to bring back one ton of used, unused, misused and abused equipment of earlier expeditions thus improving the local environment.

The reader pictures himself following the travails and trepidations, successes and failures, joys and sorrows of the team members. The photographs are of exceedingly good quality and international standard. However, proof-reading could have been more thorough.

— Maj Gen J N Goel (Retd)

The Pomp of Yesterday : The Defence of India and the Suez Canal 1978-1918. By William Jackson, *London, Brassey's, 1995, p. 262, £ 30, ISBN-1-85753-008-X.*

The book gives a vivid and absorbing account of the role played by the 'politicos' and the Armed Forces in the Middle East to neutralise the threat of Russian invasion

of 'The Jewel in the Crown' by land route, secure the Suez Canal and flow of oil from Persian oil fields and fill the gap in Muslim World on disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. All the events from defeat of Napoleon's fleet in 1798 to the Battle of Megiddo in 1918 have been presented in one volume with well illustrated maps.

Installation of deposed ruler, Shah Shuja in Kabul against Afghan resentment proved disastrous therefore Dost Mohamad was reinstated after two Afghan Wars and a treaty was signed with Persia to provide a viable buffer against expansionist Russia.

The stranded French Army was routed from Syria and Egypt shattering their dream of an Eastern Empire. Egypt was made a British protectorate and the control of the Suez Canal assumed. Islamic rebellion in Sudan was put down by Kitchner which also frustrated the French ambitions in Equatorial Africa and upper reaches of the Nile.

The Russian Revolution encouraged Turkey to regain its heart land with the German help. The failure of Gallipoli Landings made it necessary to show success in the Middle East. Therefore, Mesopotamian and Palestine Campaigns were undertaken to capture Bagdad and free the Arab lands from the Turkish yoke.

The Middle East by and large was an Indian Army Show. It was not the Western Front, however; the paucity of resources, piecemeal arrival of troops, harsh realities of terrain and stoic resistance by Turks under German military leaders like Kress resulted in 30 to 50% casualties in bayonet and sabre strength of the units.

Acceptance of the French claim on Lebanon, assurance of Jewish home land in Palestine and Caliph's call for Jihad did strain Anglo-Arab relations but Faisal's forces and Lawrence of Arabia's Bedouines ably supported Allenby's historic campaign culminating in the Battle of Megiddo and subsequent advance to Aleppo for destruction of the remnants of the Turkish Army. RAF played a significant role in this operation.

By 1918 end the British were administering the whole of Ottoman Empire. The subsequent events are recorded in the sequel to this book under the title 'With Nineveh and Tyre'.

— Brig K N Singh, IA (Retd)

Agenda for Peace. Ed By Sundeep Waslekar, *Peace Initiatives, Vol 1, No 1, July-August 1995*) New Delhi, International Centre for Peace Initiatives, 1995, p. 131, Rs. 100/-

A joint effort of the International Centre for Peace Initiatives and the Indian Doctors for Peace and Development the journal focusses on the problems and prospects for peace in South Asia especially the two vital actors of this region - India and Pakistan. Under four broad headings and the Document section the articles are well written and to the point. Section One on Policies ranges from the background of the Indo-Pak rift and the passive attitude of the people to any undertaking of the government in the name of 'National Interest' analysed by Zian Mian, to the demand for a formal strategic and thinking and planning body and the need to realise the interrelationship

between defense development and social welfare systematically researched by Air Cmdr. Singh. Pervaiz Cheema pleads for the need to reduce tension between the two nations and reduce arms competition and seek a comprehensive security set up with a wide range of options. Moonis Ahmar provides a detailed list of the CBMs undertaken and Mani Aiyer gives his four options to negotiate settlement in his delightful piece. In the section on Perspectives on Kashmir Amitabh Mattoo has given a well planned action plan for Kashmir elections and Athale gives information on Project Hope dealing with development of remote areas with the help of the armed forces. The section on Institutions has Javed Jabbar writing on the importance of a non legislative parliament, the economic relations between India and Pakistan by H.S Tondon, the role of non officials and the media as peace initiators when the governments falter on certain issues to keep the talks going dealt well by Saqlain Imam and Cohen faithfully sticks to his South Asian Regional Initiatives and the place of US in the Triad of India, Pak and US relations. These initiatives deserve an equally serious consideration by concerned people and need to be expanded. These articles are interspersed with an interview with Yasin Malik and the opinion of Kashmiris on their plight and the prevailing situation. The Section on Resources provides information on post nuclear attack effects, the institutions projects and actions undertaken on dealing with the urgent need for peace in the region. It is a must for people sincere in their quest for peace in South Asia to read this journal, reflect creatively and act competently. The Journal provides the Kathmandu Statement on options for peace and the inaugural address by the Maldives President as an impressive finale to its well formulated issue on peace.

— Dr Sudha Raman, PhD

Kashmir Fact-Finding Report (Peace Initiatives, Vol 1 No. 2, Sep-Oct 1995) New Delhi, International Centre for Peace Initiatives, 1995, p. 42, Rs. 100/-.

Conflict analysis, it emphasizes human security as a prelude to peace and stability in Kashmir. Dealt in two main sections, Crisis in Human Life and Peace with Dignity, the Report details the ruin and degeneration of the state and the life of the people by analysing the travails of health care, the trauma of the civilians and soldiers alike, the impact on education, tourism, agriculture industry and the civic amenities. It probes into the problems as based on history the meaning underlying the demand for independence, the role of the media to assess the situation, intermilitant rivalries and the Pakistan factor. The Report is at its best in analysing the 'Role of Pakistan' and the 'Path to Peace'. The recommendations are noteworthy.

Sincere, comprehensive and all encompassing, it is an excellent guide in search for solutions. A must for the pedant and the layman.

— Dr Sudha Raman, Ph.D.

A Mountain of Happiness. By Brigadier DK Khullar, New Delhi, Interprint, 1995, p. 118, Rs. 480/-, ISBN 81-85917-76-X.

Darshan Khullar's book recounts the ascent of Saser Kangri, 7679 m, by a team

of star mountaineers of our army and the British army's barring the odd one, team of amateur climbers. On the mountain the Indians performed like stars doing some first rate hard stuff and the British, well, like amateurs, doing some equally satisfying climbing. The mountain was climbed in happy camaraderie despite there being a lone attractive young woman doctor the British team fielded.

A brief narrative of the innards of the expedition, some within the sounds of the fighting for Siachen Heights, leads to a pictorial drama of the climb. The book thus meets two needs of the purist who reads the book through in one sitting and that of the coffee table sampler.

The story is told simply: with economy, humour and insight laced with personal logs. The happiness content - a plum of a summit, no one dead or injured and the climbers returning as friends means kudos for both the leaders. Considering the carping endemic to most international climbing groups one would imagine a mountain summit to be a nickle narrow place. Darshan's account is all the more welcome for its imagery of vast, wide world of mountaineers - not holy but not small. A good mountain book.

— Colonel Balwant Sandhu

'By My Sword and Shield' : Traditional Weapons of the Indian Warrior. By E. Jaiwant Paul, *New Delhi, Roli Books, 1995, p. 119, Rs. 225/-, ISBN 81-7436-014-X.*

It sounds a "strayed affair" and more so when one sees it written by an author who neither assaulted with a sword nor lifted a mace in defence!

The readers will nonetheless be pleasantly surprised to read this little nitty-gritty of a book with interjections of historical anecdotes into the histories of swords, maces, daggers, spears, battleaxes and even armour. There is something on the Vedic weapons and famous Khukri of the bravest of the braves, the Gorkhas of Nepal. In the latter case he lets his imagination run wild and unfounded when he says: the projection in the Khukri represents a female organ. It is, in fact, nothing but a small cut to beautify this deadly weapon.

What makes the book as I said earlier interesting and readable are the anecdotes on some of the battles of Indian history. Bravery and the unfortunate *Quisling* in the Indian character created our history of slavery first to the Muslims and later to the *Firingis*. Chittor, Panipat, the Second Maratha War are good additives, though not well researched. That seems to be the basic flaw of the book. No where one finds the authority mentioned which makes the basis of historic statements. And surely, the author could or would add an Index to facilitate reading. He may note it for the reprint.

Mr Paul must have worked hard on his book which is so very reflective from its contents. It is certainly very readable.

— Brig Chandra B Khanduri, Fellow ICHR

Defence Forces Law and Courts. By Cmde. Ranvir Kumar, AVSM, *New Delhi, Soni Publishers, 1995, p. 321, Rs. 295.*

Defence Forces Law and Courts by Air Commodore Ranvir Kumar, AVSM meets the long overdue need of consolidating in one place variety of legal issues and privileges affecting the armed forces.

Of late the armed forces personnel are taking the govt. to the civil courts but with the help of this book which contains wealth of information, there is no need to do so as the privileges and immunities are available to them in one place.

Air Commodore Kumar has in a simple and concise manner compiled all what the armed forces personnel, in particular retired officers and men, need to know about the rules and regulations. They need not have to walk the various corridors of the courts and chambers.

A well compiled book which should find a place in all defence libraries.

— Commodore R P Khanna, AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

South Asia after the Cold War : International Perspectives. Ed by Kanti P Bajpai and Stephen P Cohen, *Boulder, Westview, 1993, p 263, \$ 55.00 (hc), ISBN 8133-8762-0.*

Whither India in the twenty-first century? Has India a long-term national, strategic perspective? This collection of essays edited by Kanti P. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen on South Asia puts together scholarly facts and views to help chart a course. The essayists are six from India, three from Pakistan, one from Sri Lanka, and four from the United States with six concentrating on South Asia, three on nuclear issues, one each on Afghanistan and the littoral states; the collection is rounded off by a rather dense essay on "Whither Security Studies---", which, ironically, introduces the subject by highlighting the failure of security analysts to foresee the end of the cold war, making one apt to wonder whether it's necessary to read further; But it is.

Even though the national bias of each essayist shines through, there is a consensus that is thought-provoking and convincing; that the South Asian region is Indo-centric; that this region has no special significance for the rest of the world in the post cold war scenario; that the region is poor, so poor that if the correct decisions are not taken now it might be a hundred years before the region catches up with SE Asia; that "security" of the region should be considered in social and economic terms; that major thrusts must be in preserving harmony among diverse ethnic, linguistic, religious and racial groups within the state and in the region; that the region must work together to accelerate the economy to support the welfare and necessary harmony amongst its people; that the Indian-Pakistan power struggle focussed on Kashmir holds the whole region back.

As an Indian, there is a nice glow about the word "Indo-centric". The region

is Indo-centric because of India's size and relative geographical location, but, say the essayists, along with the patriotic glow, comes a responsibility - a grave one: the onus of setting these thrust areas in motion lies on India. In a fresh and bold essay, Lt. Gen. M.L. Chibber spells out those responsibilities and how they can be achieved. Can we muster the national and political maturity, the strength of will to go along this path or, is there another, better way? This collection of essays make for thoughtful reading.

-- Air Marshal S.D.L. Tully, AVSM (Retd)

The Awami League 1949-1971. By Shyamali Ghosh, *Dhaka, Academic Publishers, 1990, p 294, Tk 325.*

The book is an extension of the doctoral thesis of the author, and describes the origins and evolution of the Awami League as a political party in erstwhile East Pakistan. While doing this, the book throws interesting light on political development in Pakistan from its creation to the events leading up to the War of Liberation of Bangladesh. The growth of military dictatorship on the one hand, and the curbs on democracy particularly in East Pakistan, on the other, made the break-up of the two wings of Pakistan inevitable. The refusal of West Pakistani leaders to share power with the Awami League which represented East Pakistan and had gained absolute majority at the Centre during 1970 general elections led to the confrontation and blood shed in 1971. Whether the political framework in Pakistan has now evolved to allow enough freedom to regional aspirations is doubtful as evidenced from the events in Sindh during the last few years.

The book shows sound scholarship and penetrating insight into the growth of political parties and their constructive and destructive role in nation building in the sub-continent. The book is an essential reading for anyone interested in the recent politics of the region and the events leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

-- N B S

Additions to the USI Library for the Quarter - Ending December 1995

*(The books reviewed in July-September 1995 issue have been
added to the Library during this quarter but not shown in this list)*

<i>Ser No.</i>	<i>Author's Name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Year</i>
Autobiography			
1.	Vas, E.A., (Lt Gen)	Fools and Infantry Men : One view of History (1923 - 1993)	1995
China - History			
2.	Seagrave, Sterling	Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese	1995
Education			
3.	Phillips, Estelle, M and Pugh, D.S.	How to get a Ph.D : A Handbook for Students and their Supervisors (Third Reprint)	1995
Gulf War			
4.	Brown, Ben and Shukman, David	All Necessary Means : Inside the Gulf War	1991
Indian Ocean			
5.	Melkote, Rama, S (ed)	Indian Ocean : Issues for Peace	1995
India - Russia Relations			
6.	Naik, JA	Russia's Policy Towards India : From Stalin to Yeltsin	1995
International Economy			
7.	Kenwood, A.G. and Loughheed, A.L.	The Growth of the International Economy 1820 - 1990 : An Introductory Text (3rd ed)	1992
Military History			
8.	US. Dept of Army	Fighting Future Wars	1994

Military Intelligence

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|---|---------------------|------|
| 9. Hoy, Claire and
Ostrovsky, Victor | By Way of Deception | 1990 |
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Military Law

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| 10. Ranvir Kumar,
(Air Cmde) | Defence Forces : Law and the Courts | 1995 |
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Nepal - Foreign Policy

- | | | |
|------------------------------|--|------|
| 11. Bhasin, Avtar Singh (ed) | Nepal's Relations with India and
China : Documents 1947 - 1992, 2 vols. | 1994 |
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Nuclear Bomb

- | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|------|
| 12. Brodie Bernard and
Fawn M. | From Crossbow to H-Bomb
(Rev. and enlarged ed) | 1973 |
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Pakistan Politics

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| 13. Arif, Khalid Mahmud
(General) | Working with Zia : Pakistan's
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| 14. Surya Prakash, A | What Ails Indian Parliament ?
An Exhaustive Diagnosis | 1995 |
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| 15. Thakur, Ramesh | The Government and Politics of India | 1995 |
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| 16. -- | The Oxford Dictionary for Writers
and Editors | 1995 |
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| 17. Sohan Lal | Perspectives on Current Affairs
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| 18. Turner, Peter and
Others | South - East Asia : A Lonely Planet
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Religion

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| 19. Zakaria, Rafiq | The Widening Divide : An Insight
Into Hindu-Muslim Relations | 1995 |
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20. Mehrotra, LL and Others (eds) SAARC 2000 and Beyond 1995

Sea Power

21. Ramanarasaiah, NK (Rear Adm) (Retd) Introduction to Torpedo Technology 1993
22. Mathew, K S (ed) Mariners, Merchants and Oceans : Studies in Maritime History 1995

South Asia

23. Bajpai, Kanti P. and Others Brasstacks and Beyond : Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia 1995
24. Iftekharuzzaman (ed) South Asia's Security : Primacy of Internal Dimension 1995

Sri Lanka

25. Werake, Mahinda and Jayasekera P.V.J (ed) Security Dilemma of a Small State - Part II, Internal Crisis and External Intervention in Sri Lanka 1995

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26. Marwah, Ved Uncivil Wars : Pathology of Terrorism in India 1995

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One of the oldest and finest military libraries in India, today it has over 50,000 books, and journals on its shelves, including books published in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, on an astonishing variety of subjects. While the principal emphasis is on strategy and defence, there are a large number of works on different facets of Indian life, as well as on other countries. It is a store house of rare books and manuscripts for scholars and research workers devoted to political and military study.

Correspondence Courses

The introduction of Correspondence Courses for promotion and Defence Service Staff College examinations some years ago found ready response and today the Institution has 1,500 members who participate in the Training Courses annually. Material is despatched to them regularly wherever they may be.

The students have undoubtedly profited by these courses, as evidenced by the success achieved by them in these Examinations. Popularity apart, the courses contribute substantially to the revenue of the USI.

USI Journal

Oldest Defence Journal in India, it contains proceedings of lectures and discussions, prize essays, original articles, book reviews, etc.

It is published quarterly in April, July, October and January each year (the first issue being Jan-Mar each year). The Journal is supplied free to members. It provides a forum for the most junior officer to express his opinions relating to his profession.

Gold Medal Essay Competitions

The gold medal essay competition is held every year. The subject for essay is announced during the month of March each year. On the occasion of the Centenary, an additional Gold Medal Essay Competition has been instituted for Junior Officers of not more than ten year's service.

Lectures and Discussions

A series of lectures by outstanding experts on service, international affairs and topics of general interest to the Services are organised for the benefit of Local Members in Delhi.

Mac Gregor Medal

This medal is awarded every year to officers for any valuable reconnaissance they may have undertaken.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services and all Central Services Gazetted officers Class I (including Retired), Cadets from NDA, other Services' Academies and Midshipmen shall be entitled to become members on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.
2. Life Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of Rs. 1650/- which sum includes entrance fee.
3. Ordinary Members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee of Rs. 150/- on joining and an annual subscription of Rs. 150/- to be paid in advance.
4. The period of subscription commences on 1 April each year and shall be operative till 31 March of the following year.

For further particulars, please write to Director, USI of India, Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi - 110011.